WEISSBUCH zur Überprüfung der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 4056/86 über die Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln auf den Seeverkehr {SEK(2004) 1254}

(von der Kommission vorgelegt)

1. Einleitung

1.1. Zweck des Weißbuchs

1.1. Mit dem vorliegenden Papier soll das weitere Vorgehen im Bereich Wettbewerb im Seeverkehr unterbreitet werden. Insbesondere soll geprüft werden, ob die derzeit geltenden Vorschriften der Verordnung 4056/86 beibehalten, geändert oder außer Kraft gesetzt werden sollen. Des Weiteren wird erörtert, ob es sinnvoll ist, die derzeitige Gruppenfreistellung von Linienkonferenzen, wie sie die Verordnung 4056/86 vorsieht, durch andere Gemeinschaftsinstrumente (z.B. eine neue Gruppenfreistellung oder eine Reihe von Leitlinien) zu ersetzen, in denen neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Linienschifffahrtsbetreibern auf Routen aus der und in die EU (abgesehen von den bereits existierenden Formen wie Konsortien oder Allianzen) berücksichtigt sind.

1.2. Ratsverordnung 4056/86

1.2. Die Verordnung 4056/86 des Rates über die Anwendung der Artikel 81 und 82 des Vertrages auf den Seeverkehr (nachstehend ,Verordnung 4056/86") [1] erfuellte ursprünglich eine doppelte Funktion. Zum einen enthielt sie verfahrensrechtliche Bestimmungen, die der Kommission die praktischen Hilfsmittel für eine effektive Sachverhaltsfeststellung und Durchsetzung der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln im Seeverkehr an die Hand gaben. Zum anderen sah sie materiellrechtliche Vorschriften für den Bereich des Seeverkehrs vor. Die wichtigste materiellrechtliche Bestimmung ist die Freistellung von bestimmten Gruppen von Vereinbarungen, Beschlüssen und aufeinander abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen zwischen Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen vom Verbot des Artikels 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag. Die erstgenannte Funktion der Verordnung 4056/86 wurde mit dem Inkrafttreten der Verordnung 1/2003 überfluessig, mit der die verfahrensrechtlichen Bestimmungen der Verordnung 4056/86 außer Kraft gesetzt und praktisch für alle Sektoren einschließlich des Seeverkehrs einheitliche wettbewerbsrechtliche Durchführungsbestimmungen eingeführt wurden (von einigen wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen) [2]. Die materiellrechtlichen Bestimmungen der Verordnung 4065/86 sind jedoch unverändert gültig. Nach Abschaffung der verfahrensrechtlichen Sondervorschriften für die Handelsschifffahrt drängt sich daher in einem nächsten Schritt die logische Frage auf, ob in der gegenwärtigen Situation die Beibehaltung spezieller materiellrechtlicher Wettbewerbsregeln für den Handelsverkehr zur See noch ihre Berechtigung hat.

[1] Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 4056/86 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 1986 über die Einzelheiten der Anwendung der Artikel 85 und 86 des Vertrages auf den Seeverkehr, ABl. L 378 vom 31.12.1986, S. 24, zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung 1/2003 vom 16. Dezember 2002 (ABl. L 1 vom 4.1.2003, S. 1).

[2] Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002 (ABl. L 1 vom 4.1.2003, S.1).

1.3. Überprüfung der Verordnung

1.3. Bei der Überprüfung muss eine Gesamtsicht der Dinge gewahrt bleiben. Auf dem Treffen des Europäischen Rates in Lissabon im März 2000 [3] wurde die Kommission aufgefordert, ,die Liberalisierung in Bereichen wie Gas, Strom, Postdienste und Beförderung zu beschleunigen". Weiteren Anlass zu der Überprüfung gab ein im April 2002 veröffentlichter Bericht des OECD-Sekretariats, in dem empfohlen wird, über eine Abschaffung der kartellrechtlichen Freistellung von Preis- und Frachtratenabsprachen nachzudenken [4].

[3] SN 100/1/100.

[4] Bericht des OECD Sekretariats vom April 2002, Competition policy in liner shipping, S. 80-88, abrufbar unter http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/46/2553902.pdf.

1.4. Im Mittelpunkt der Überprüfung steht die derzeitige Freistellung bestimmter wettbewerbsbeschränkender Praktiken von Linienkonferenzen, darunter vor allem die Festsetzung von Preisen und die Regulierung des Angebots. Darüber hinaus sollen noch einige andere Vorschriften der Verordnung 4056/86 unter die Lupe genommen werden, so die Vorschrift über die Nichtanwendbarkeit der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Durchführungsbestimmungen auf bestimmte Handelsschifffahrtsdienste (Kabotage, d.h. der Seetransport innerhalb eines Landes, und Trampdienste, d.h. Dienste außerhalb des Linienverkehrs), die Vorschrift über technische Vereinbarungen und die Vorschrift zum Thema Rechtskollision.

1.5. In den achtzehn Jahren seit Annahme der Verordnung 4056/86 hat sich der Handelsschifffahrtsmarkt gewandelt. So hat vor allem die Bedeutung von Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen, die Liniendienste außerhalb einer Linienkonferenz anbieten (unabhängige Betreiber), auf den meisten Routen in die und aus der EU zugenommen. Zudem gibt es inzwischen zahlreiche weitere funktionierende Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen (z.B. Konsortien und Allianzen), bei denen keine Preisfestsetzung stattfindet. Was jedoch noch mehr zählt, ist die deutliche Zunahme individueller geheimer vertraglicher Vereinbarungen zwischen Reedereien und Verladern (individuelle Dienstleistungsverträge). Hierdurch stellt sich die Frage, ob die generelle Freistellung der Praxis der Preisfestsetzung und Kapazitätsregulierung im Rahmen von Linienkonferenzen gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag immer noch berechtigt ist.

1.6. Mit den Mitgliedstaaten war vereinbart worden [5], dass die Überprüfung in drei Schritten erfolgen soll: 1) Sachstandsermittlung, 2) Erarbeitung eines Kommissionspapiers und 3) Unterbreitung eines Vorschlags für einen Rechtsakt. Ganz zu Anfang - im März 2003 - wurde ein Konsultationspapier veröffentlicht, das über das Internet unter der Anschrift abrufbar ist. Insgesamt gingen hierzu 36 Kommentare von Anbietern von regelmäßigen Transportdiensten zur See (Reedereien), Nutzern (Verladern und Spediteuren), den Mitgliedstaaten, Verbraucherverbänden u.a. ein. An der Auswertung der Antworten wirkten Wirtschaftwissenschaftler der Erasmus Universität Rotterdam mit. Die Antworten auf das Konsultationspapier und der Erasmus-Abschlussbericht sind auf der Website der Kommission veröffentlicht. Im Anschluss an eine öffentliche Anhörung, die im Dezember 2003 stattfand, gab die GD Wettbewerb ein Diskussionspapier heraus, in dem sie das Ergebnis des Anhörungsprozesses erläuterte und eine erste Analyse vornahm. Dieses Papier, das unter der Internet-Anschrift veröffentlicht wurde, diente als Grundlage für die Erörterung der anstehenden Fragen mit den Mitgliedstaaten im Mai 2004.

[5] Beratender Ad-hoc-Ausschuss vom 25. März 2002.

1.4. Diskussionspunkte

1.7. Die Überprüfung der Verordnung 4056/86 wirft im Wesentlichen folgende Fragen auf:

(a) Ist angesichts der aktuellen Marktlage die generelle Freistellung der Praxis der Preisfestsetzung sowie der Angebots- und Marktregulierung im Rahmen von Linienkonferenzen gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag nach wie vor gerechtfertigt?

(b) Wenn nicht, wären dann andere Gemeinschaftsinstrumente nötig (z.B. eine neue Gruppenfreistellung oder verschiedene Leitlinien), in denen neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen auf Routen aus der und in die EU (abgesehen den bereits existierenden Formen wie Konsortien oder Allianzen) berücksichtigt werden?

(c) Ist es immer noch berechtigt, dass Trampdienste und Kabotage vom Anwendungsbereich der Verordnung 1/2003 ausgenommen werden?

(d) Gibt es einen vernünftigen Grund, weshalb die Ausnahmeregelung für rein technische Vereinbarungen in der Verordnung 4056/86 beibehalten werden sollte?

(e) Gibt es einen vernünftigen Grund, weshalb die Kollisionsvorschrift in der Verordnung 4056/86 beibehalten werden sollte?

2. Die gruppenfreistellung für linienkonferenzen

1.8. Die Verordnung 4056/86 ermöglicht unter bestimmten Bedingungen und Voraussetzungen eine so genannte Gruppenfreistellung von Vereinbarungen, Beschlüssen oder aufeinander abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen zwischen allen oder einzelnen Mitgliedern einer oder mehrerer Linienkonferenzen im Sinne von Artikel 1 Absatz 3 Buchstabe b) der Verordnung 4056/86, in deren Rahmen die Verschiffungspreise und -bedingungen festgelegt und zudem eine oder mehrere der nachstehenden Formen der Zusammenarbeit praktiziert werden:

- Abstimmung von Fahrplänen oder Auslauf bzw.- Einlaufzeiten,

- Festsetzung der Fahrtfrequenzen,

- Abstimmung bzw. Aufteilung der Fahrten unter den Mitgliedern der Konferenz,

- Regulierung der von den einzelnen Mitgliedern angebotenen Transportkapazitäten,

- Aufteilung der Lademenge oder der Einnahmen unter den Mitgliedern.

1.9. Aus der Verordnung selbst, der Entscheidungspraxis der Kommission und der ständigen Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs geht hervor, dass die Gruppenfreistellung in der Verordnung 4056/86 ,absoluten Ausnahmecharakter" hat [6], weil sie Preisabsprachen und die Regulierung von Kapazitäten, die normalerweise zu den ,Kernbeschränkungen" gehören [7], auf unbestimmte Zeit freistellt und keine Marktanteilsschwellen enthält. Tatsächlich ist die Verordnung nur aus der damaligen Situation heraus zu verstehen.

[6] Siehe z.B. Rs. T-86/95, Companie Générale Maritime, Slg.2002, II-1011, Rdnrn. 254, 393 und 484.

[7] Kernbeschränkungen sind Beschränkungen des Wettbewerbs, die per se von Artikel 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag erfasst werden und in aller Regel die Voraussetzungen für eine Freistellung gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag nicht erfuellen.

1.10. Die Linienkonferenzen haben versucht, die Gruppenfreistellung weit auszulegen. Ihrer Ansicht nach fielen zum Beispiel die Vereinbarungen über die Nichtnutzung von vorhandenen Kapazitäten [8] und die Festsetzung von Preisen für die Inlandsbeförderung [9] unter die Gruppenfreistellung. Weder die Kommission noch der Gerichtshof schlossen sich jedoch dieser Auffassung an, da die Gruppenfreistellung eine Ausnahmeregelung vom Verbot des Artikel 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag darstellt und daher eng auszulegen ist [10]. Sonstige Zielsetzungen des EG-Vertrags können nur insoweit berücksichtigt werden, als sie unter einer der vier in Artikel 81 Absatz 3 genannten Bedingungen subsumiert werden können [11].

[8] Siehe Entscheidungen der Kommission vom 14. November 2002 in den Sachen TAA, EATA und TACA (ABl. L 26 vom 31.1.2003, S. 53) und Pressemitteilung IP/02/1677 der Kommission vom 14.11.2002.

[9] Siehe Entscheidungen der Kommission vom 14. November 2002 in den Sachen TAA, EATA und TACA (ABl. L 26 vom 31.1.2003, S. 53) und Pressemitteilung IP/02/1677 der Kommission vom 14.11.2002.

[10] Verbundene Rs. T-191/98 und T-212/98 bis T-214/1998, TACA, Slg. 2003, noch nicht veröffentlicht, Rdnr. 568.

[11] Siehe implizit hierzu Rs. T-17/93, Matra, Slg. 1994, II-595, Rdnr. 139, und Rs. 26/76, Metro (I), Slg. 1977, 1875, Rdnr. 43.

2.1. Bewertung

1.11. Die EU-Wettbewerbsregeln wurden ausgehend von der Prämisse konzipiert, dass der Wettbewerb für ein optimales Preis-Leistungsverhältnis aus der Sicht der Verbraucher sorgt. Die Grundregel im Vertrag lautet daher, dass der Wettbewerb nicht verfälscht werden darf und dass jede Ausnahme von der Regel begründet werden muss. Vereinbarungen, die den Wettbewerb im Sinne von Artikel 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag einschränken (wie dies bei Preis- und Kapazitätsregulierungsvereinbarungen der Fall ist), können nur freigestellt werden, wenn sie alle vier Bedingungen des Artikels 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag erfuellen, d.h.

1) die Vereinbarung muss einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Warenerzeugung oder -verteilung oder zur Förderung des technischen oder wirtschaftlichen Fortschritts leisten,

2) die Verbraucher müssen angemessen an dem entstehenden Gewinn beteiligt werden,

3) die Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen müssen für die Verwirklichung dieser Ziele unerlässlich sein und

4) die beteiligten Unternehmen dürfen keine Möglichkeit erhalten, für einen wesentlichen Teil der betreffenden Waren den Wettbewerb auszuschalten.

1.12. Die Anwendung von Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag auf bestimmte Gruppen von Vereinbarungen im Wege der Gruppenfreistellung beruht auf der Annahme, dass die wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Vereinbarungen jede der in Artikel 81 Absatz 3 des Vertrags genannten Bedingungen erfuellen.

1.13. Die Begründung für die Gruppenfreistellung von Linienkonferenzen findet sich in Erwägungsgrund 8 der Präambel der Verordnung 4056/86, wo grundsätzlich davon ausgegangen wird, dass die Konferenzen eine stabilisierende Rolle spielen, indem sie den Verladern zuverlässige Dienste garantieren, die durch weniger restriktive Maßnahmen nicht gewährleistet werden könnten. Dies heißt jedoch nicht, wie das Gericht erster Instanz ausgeführt hat, dass der Rat behauptet habe, dass Stabilität wichtiger sei als Wettbewerb (was er auch gar nicht hätte tun können) [12].

[12] Rs. T-395/94, TAA, Slg. 2002, II-00875, Rdnr. 156.

1.14. Es sei angemerkt, dass die in Erwägungsgrund 8 der Präambel der Verordnung 4056/86 genannte Rechtfertigung für die Freistellung nicht mit Erfahrungen der Kommission mit der Anwendung von Artikel 81 Absatz 3 auf Linienkonferenzen begründet worden ist [13]. Die Kernfrage bei der Überprüfung der Verordnung lautet daher, ob angesichts der aktuellen Marktlage die in der Verordnung 4056/86 genannte Rechtfertigung für die Preisfestsetzung und die Regulierung des Angebots durch Linienkonferenzen (nach wie vor) Gültigkeit besitzt. Sollte dies nicht der Fall sein, bestuende nämlich kein Grund mehr für die Gruppenfreistellung, die dann entweder außer Kraft gesetzt oder abgeändert werden müsste. Deshalb wurden die Beteiligten aufgefordert, objektiv gerechtfertigte Gründe für eine weitere Freistellung vorzubringen.

[13] Vgl. hierzu die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 823/2000 zu Konsortien (ABl. 100 vom 20.4.2000, S. 24), die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1400/2002 zu Kraftfahrzeugen (ABl. 203 vom 1.8.2002, S. 30) und die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2790/1999 zu vertikalen Vereinbarungen (ABl. L 336 vom 29.12.1999, S. 21), in denen die Kommission ausdrücklich auf die gewonnenen Erfahrungen verweist, die sie in die Lage versetzten, bestimmte Gruppen von Vereinbarungen zu bestimmen, von denen normalerweise davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass sie die Voraussetzungen des Artikel 81 Absatz 3 erfuellen.

1.15. Die Anhörung hat gezeigt (wie in der Anlage ausführlicher erläutert wird), dass die vier kumulativen Bedingungen für die Freistellung der Preisfestsetzung und der Angebots- und Marktregulierung durch die Linienkonferenzen offensichtlich nicht mehr erfuellt sind. Es gibt keinen triftigen ökonomischen Grund, der dafür spricht, dass die Annahmen, mit denen die Gruppenfreistellung bei ihrer Verabschiedung im Jahr 1986 begründet wurde, heute die vier Bedingungen des Artikels 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag noch erfuellen.

3. Sonstige formen der zusammenarbeit zwischen handelsschiffahrtsunternehmen

3.1. Einleitung

1.16. Konferenzen sind nicht die einzige Form, in der Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen organisiert sind. Liniendienste können auch von Konsortien und Allianzen erbracht werden. Die Tätigkeiten von Konsortien sind gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag unter bestimmten, in der Verordnung 823/2000 genannten Voraussetzungen freigestellt. Die Reedereien könnten ihr Frachtgeschäft auch zusammenlegen; der Zusammenschluss wäre dann nach den nationalen Kartellvorschriften oder der EG-Fusionskontrollverordnung zu prüfen.

3.2. "Discussion Agreements"

1.17. Eine andere denkbare Form der Zusammenarbeit im Handelsschifffahrtsverkehr auf den Routen aus und nach Europa wären die so genannten ,Discussion Agreements". Diese Vereinbarungen, die vor allem auf den US-amerikanischen Routen und den Routen von und nach Australien praktiziert werden [14], sind mehr oder weniger Rahmenvereinbarungen, mittels derer Reedereien, die Mitglied einer Linienkonferenz sein können oder auch nicht, ihr Wettbewerbsverhalten in Bezug auf Frachtraten und andere Beförderungsbedingungen flexibel untereinander abstimmen können. Umfang und Inhalt der Vereinbarungen können variieren. In der Regel kommt es dabei auch zum Austausch sensibler Geschäftsdaten zwischen Wettbewerbern, weshalb bei diesen Vereinbarungen die ständige Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs zum Datenaustausch zu beachten ist. Wie in den USA gesehen, sind die ,Discussion Agreements" aufgrund ihrer per se flexiblen Handhabung auch für traditionell unabhängige Reedereien von Interesse. Daher können ,Discussion Agreements" für den Wettbewerb noch schädlicher sein als Konferenzen, da sie eine wirksame Konkurrenz der Linienkonferenzen auszuschalten vermögen.

[14] Eine ausführlichere Beschreibung der Situation in diesen Gebieten findet sich in der Anlage zu diesem Papier.

1.18. Andere Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Reedern im Rahmen der EU Wettbewerbsregeln sind denkbar.

3.3. Der Vorschlag der European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA)

1.19. Die ELAA hat der Kommission einen Vorschlag für eine neue Rahmenregelung für Linienfrachtdienste zur See aus der und in die EU vorgelegt [15], der ihrer Ansicht nach die Verordnung 4056/86 ersetzen könnte [16]. Die Kommission nimmt diesen Vorschlag zur Kenntnis, möchte aber betonen, dass er nicht das Ergebnis von Verhandlungen oder einer Vereinbarung mit der Kommission ist. Er gibt lediglich wieder, was nach Ansicht der ELAA ein geeigneter Rahmen für eine Zusammenarbeit von Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen wäre. Die Kernpunkte des Vorschlags sind [17]:

[15] Linienfrachtdienste werden von der ELAA in ihrem Vorschlag definiert als ,regelmäßige, auf einer oder mehreren bestimmten Routen zwischen Häfen gemäß im voraus veröffentlichten Fahrplänen und Abfahrtzeiten durchgeführte Beförderung von Gütern, die jedem Verkehrsnutzer gegen Bezahlung auch bedarfsweise zugänglich ist, einschließlich Nebentätigkeiten" (vgl. Artikel 2 Absatz 2 der Verordnung 823/2000).

[16] ELAA-Vorschlag vom 6 August 2004, abrufbar unter:

[17] Im Anhang findet sich eine ausführlichere Beschreibung des ELAA-Vorschlags.

(1) Austausch von Daten über die Gesamtauslastung und den Marktumfang je nach Route und für den gesamten Verkehr zwischen jeweils zwei Regionen/Zonen zwischen den Reedereien und deren Erörterung (Zusammenstellung der Daten mit einmonatiger Verzögerung),

(2) Erörterung und Einschätzung der Güterentwicklung je nach Route (anhand von mit einmonatiger Verzögerung gesammelter Daten),

(3) Erörterung und Bewertung der Angebots- und Nachfragedaten je nach Route/Transportgut; Veröffentlichung der Nachfrageprognosen je nach Route und Transportgut,

(4) Unterrichtung der Reedereien über ihre Marktanteile je nach Route, Region und Hafen (Zusammenstellung der Daten mit einmonatiger Verzögerung),

(5) Veröffentlichung der Preisindizes je nach Art der Ausrüstung (mit Kühlaggregat, Trockenlagerung) und/oder Route (Zusammenstellung mit vierteljährlicher Verzögerung),

(6) Festlegung der Aufschläge und Nebenkosten anhand von öffentlich zugänglichen transparenten Berechnungsformeln, deren Einzelheiten mit den Verladern erörtert würden.

3.4. Erste Kommentare zu dem ELAA-Vorschlag

1.20. Die Kommission begrüßt die Bereitschaft der Reedereien, über eine künftige Neuorganisation der Linienfrachtgutbeförderung nachzudenken, die von dem bisherigen Konferenzsystem abrückt. Aus der Branche selbst war zu hören, dass es den Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen gar nicht mehr so sehr um die in der Verordnung 4056/86 freigestellten Tätigkeiten geht (d.h. Festsetzung von Preisen und Angebots- und Marktregulierung), sondern eher um die Gespräche ,drumherum". Deshalb versteht es sich von selbst, dass jede neue Rahmenregelung für eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen Handelsschifffahrtsunternehmen sorgfältig auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit den EG-Wettbewerbsregeln hin geprüft werden muss.

1.21. Die Kommission ist sich darüber im Klaren, dass sich die Mitglieder der Konferenz an Praktiken gewöhnt haben, die nach den EG-Wettbewerbsregeln normalerweise untersagt sind. Diese Vorzugsbehandlung erschwert Einigen von ihnen die Anpassung an eine Situation, in der sie wie in jeder anderen Branche auch die üblichen EG-Wettbewerbsregeln einhalten müssen. Aus geschäftlicher Sicht ist daher verständlich, wenn die Reedereien versuchen, das derzeitige System ,sanft" auslaufen zu lassen oder zumindest durch ein anderes System zu ersetzen, das der derzeitigen Regelung nahe kommt und das ihre vermeintliche Sonderstellung am besten widerspiegelt. Dies sollte jedoch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass jede fortgesetzte Sonderbehandlung der Linienhandelsschifffahrtsbranche im Vergleich zu anderen kapitalintensiven Branchen mit hohen Fixkosten und Nachfrageschwankungen (wie z.B. der Luftverkehr) stichhaltig begründet werden muss. Darüber hinaus müssen die Auswirkungen einer Alternativregelung auf die gesamte Branche berücksichtigt werden, d.h. nicht nur die Interessen der Mitglieder der Linienkonferenzen, sondern auch diejenigen ihrer Wettbewerber (d.h. der unabhängigen Reedereien), ihrer Kunden (der Verlader) und der Endabnehmer. Die ELAA hat betont, der Vorschlag sei für die gesamte Branche und deren Kunden von Nutzen. Die Kommission würde daher gern die Meinung aller betroffenen Kreise zu den verschiedenen Punkten des Vorschlags in Erfahrung bringen, vor allem die von Verladern, Vereinigungen wie dem European Shippers Council und Reedereien.

3.5. Schlussfolgerung

1.22. Bei einer Aufhebung der gegenwärtigen Freistellung der Praxis der Preisfestsetzung und Kapazitätenregulierung wären die Linienkonferenzen auf Routen in die und aus der EU im Sinne der Verordnung 4056/86 mit Artikel 81 EG-Vertrag unvereinbar [18]. In diesem Fall stellt sich die Frage, welches andere EU-Rechtsinstrument benötigt wird, das in Bezug auf die Anwendbarkeit von Artikel 81 auf andere Formen der Zusammenarbeit bei der Linienfrachtgutbeförderung zur See eine Orientierungshilfe gibt. Selbstverständlich würden die Notwendigkeit und die Form eines solchen Rechtsinstruments in starkem Maße vom Inhalt der geplanten Rahmenregelung für die Zusammenarbeit abhängen. Vor allem ist es wichtig zu wissen, ob damit Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen im Sinne von Artikel 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag verbunden sind und wenn ja, ob die Voraussetzungen für eine Freistellung gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag gegeben sind.

[18] Zumindest eine Linienkonferenz, die als Gruppe von zwei oder mehr Seeschifffahrtsunternehmen definiert ist, die für die Beförderung von Ladung einheitliche oder gemeinsame Frachtraten vorsehen (vgl. Definition in Artikel 1 Absatz 3 Buchstabe b) der Verordnung 4056/86).

1.23. Die Kommission würde gern wissen, ob Dritte einen neuen Rechtsrahmen zur Regelung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Linienseefrachtunternehmen für notwendig halten und wenn ja, welche Form dieses Rechtsinstrument ihrer Ansicht nach haben sollte.

4. Kabotage und trampdienste

1.24. Gemäß Artikel 32 Buchstaben a) und b) der Verordnung 1/2003 gelten die Durchführungsbestimmungen zu den EG-Wettbewerbsregeln nicht für internationale Trampdienste im Sinne von Artikel 1 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a) der Verordnung 4056/86 und Seeverkehrsdienstleistungen, die ausschließlich zwischen Häfen ein und desselben Mitgliedstaates erbracht werden (Kabotage -Artikel 1 Absatz 2 der Verordnung 4056/86) [19], [20].

[19] Die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 ersetzt seit 1. Mai 2004 die verfahrensrechtlichen Bestimmungen der Verordnung 4056/86. Der Ausschluss von Kabotage- und Trampdiensten vom Anwendungsbereich der Verordnung 4056/86 hat daher im Grunde seit 1. Mai 2004 seine praktische Bedeutung verloren.

[20] Um keine Missverständnisse aufkommen zu lassen - die materiellrechtlichen Vorschriften (Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag) gelten selbstverständlich auch für diese Leistungen. Der Ausschluss beschränkt sich auf die Durchführungsbestimmungen, mit anderen Worten - die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 ist auf Tramp- und Kabotagedienste nicht anwendbar.

1.25. Wie in der Anlage ausführlicher dargelegt ist, wurde kein glaubhaftes Argument vorgebracht, weswegen für diese Dienste andere Durchführungsbestimmungen gelten sollten als für alle anderen Wirtschaftssektoren. Es wurde auch nicht näher erläutert, welche nachweislich nachteiligen Folgen sich hieraus für die Branche ergeben könnten. Die Kommission schlägt daher vor, die allgemeinen Durchführungsbestimmungen der Verordnung 1/2003 auch auf Kabotage- und Trampdienste im Bereich des Seeverkehrs anzuwenden. Um der Trampindustrie zu helfen ihre ,pool agreements" korrekt zu bewerten, zieht die Kommission in Erwägung, die Industrie in angemessener Form zu beraten.

5. Technische Vereinbarungen

1.26. Nach Artikel 2 der Verordnung 4056/86 dürfen Anbieter von Transportleistunngen zur See Vereinbarungen schließen, die ausschließlich technische Verbesserungen oder eine technische Zusammenarbeit bezwecken oder bewirken. Derartige Vereinbarungen fallen nicht unter Artikel 81 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag. In der Vorschrift werden einige Beispiele genannt, z.B. Vereinbarungen über Normen oder Typen für Schiffe und sonstige Ausrüstungsgegenstände und die Abstimmung von Fahrplänen auf Anschlussrouten.

1.27. Diese Ausnahmebestimmung hat, wie auch der Gerichtshof befand, rein deklaratorischen Charakter (siehe hierzu die ausführlicheren Erläuterungen in der Anlage). Deshalb wird vorgeschlagen, sie zu streichen, wie dies der Rat zu Beginn dieses Jahres bereits für den Luftverkehr getan hat.

6. Rechtskollision

1.28. Artikel 9 der Verordnung 4056/86 schreibt vor, wie zu verfahren ist, wenn die Verordnung mit den gesetzlichen Vorschriften eines Drittlandes kollidiert. In diesem Fall ist die Kommission aufgerufen, die zuständigen Behörden in den betreffenden Staaten zu konsultieren und sich gegebenenfalls vom Rat zur Aufnahme von Verhandlungen ermächtigen zu lassen. Diese Bestimmung wurde seinerzeit deshalb in die Verordnung 4056/86 aufgenommen, weil man der Ansicht war, dass aufgrund der Besonderheiten des internationalen Seeverkehrs die Anwendung der Verordnung 4056/86 zu Kollisionen mit den Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften einzelner Drittländer führen und abträgliche Folgen für wichtige handels- und schifffahrtspolitische Interessen der Gemeinschaft haben könnte (siehe Erwägungsgrund 15 der Verordnung).

1.29. Wie den Ausführungen in der Anlage zu entnehmen ist, ist es bisher noch nie zu einer Rechtskollision gekommen und es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass dieser Fall eintritt, selbst wenn die Gruppenfreistellung von Linienkonferenzen vollständig außer Kraft gesetzt wird. Somit gibt es eigentlich keinen Grund, an dieser Vorschrift festzuhalten.

7. Schlussfolgerungen

1.30. Aus obigen Ausführungen ergeben sich folgende Schlussfolgerungen:

(a) Ist angesichts der aktuellen Marktlage die generelle Freistellung der Praxis der Preisfestsetzung sowie der Angebots- und Marktregulierung im Rahmen von Linienkonferenzen gemäß Artikel 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag nach wie vor gerechtfertigt? Nein. Es gibt keinen triftigen ökonomischen Grund, der dafür spricht, dass die Annahmen, mit denen die Gruppenfreistellung bei ihrer Verabschiedung im Jahr 1986 begründet wurde, heute vor dem Hintergrund der vier Bedingungen des Artikels 81 Absatz 3 EG-Vertrag noch zutreffen. Die Kommission zieht daher in Erwägung, die Gruppenfreistellung für die Linienkonferenzen aufzuheben.

(b) Würde die Kommission vorschlagen, die Gruppenfreistellung durch ein anderes Rechtsinstrument für Linienschifffahrtsdienstleistungen, die auf Handelsrouten zu und von der EU anwendbar sind, zu ersetzen? Die Kommission wird die maßgeblichen Vorschläge der Industrie und die Kommentare der Anspruchsberechtigten beurteilen, mit dem Ziel eine Position bezüglich eines alternativen Kooperationsrahmens zwischen Linienschifffahrtsgesellschaften einzunehmen. Dies wird mit Hilfe eines angemessenen Rechtsmittels geschehen. ELAA hat bereits konkrete Vorstellungen bezüglich eines solchen Rahmens vorgelegt. Bevor die Kommission in Bezug auf diese Konzepte eine Position einnehmen wird, möchte sie interessierte Dritte einladen ihre Stellungnahmen einzureichen, sowie alternative Möglichkeiten anzubieten.

(c) Ist es immer noch berechtigt, dass Tramp- und Kabotagedienste vom Anwendungsbereich der Durchführungsbestimmungen der Verordnung 1/2003 ausgenommen werden? Es wurde kein glaubhaftes Argument vorgebracht, weswegen für diese Dienste andere Durchführungsbestimmungen gelten sollten als für alle anderen Wirtschaftssektoren. Es wurde auch nicht näher erläutert, welche nachteiligen Folgen sich hieraus für die Branche nachweislich ergeben könnten. Die Kommission zieht daher in Erwägung, die allgemeinen Durchführungsbestimmungen der Verordnung 1/2003 auch auf Kabotage- und Trampdienste im Bereich des Seeverkehrs anzuwenden. Die Kommission wird die Trampindustrie in angemessener Form hinsichtlich der Anwendung der Wettbewerbsregeln in ihrem Sektor beraten.

(d) Gibt es einen vernünftigen Grund, weshalb die Ausnahmeregelung für rein technische Vereinbarungen beibehalten werden sollte? Die in Artikel 2 der Verordnung 4056/86 enthaltene Ausnahmebestimmung betreffend technische Vereinbarungen hat, wie auch der Gerichtshof befand, rein deklaratorischen Charakter, weshalb die Kommission in Erwägung zieht, sie zu streichen, wie dies der Rat zu Beginn dieses Jahres bereits für den Bereich des Luftverkehrs getan hat.

(e) Gibt es einen vernünftigen Grund, weshalb die Kollisionsvorschrift in der Verordnung 4056/86 beibehalten werden sollte? Es ist es bisher noch nie zu einer Rechtskollision gekommen und es gibt eigentlich keinen Grund, an dieser Vorschrift festzuhalten. Bevor die Kommission in dieser Frage jedoch endgültig Stellung bezieht, möchte sie die Meinung Dritter, vor allem ihrer internationalen Partner, zur Notwendigkeit einer Kollisionsvorschrift einholen.

8. Vorgeschlagene maßnahmen

1.31. Die Kommission schlägt daher folgende Maßnahmen vor:

(7) die Aufhebung der materiellrechtlichen Vorschriften der Verordnung 4056/86 in Erwägung zu ziehen, vor allem der Gruppenfreistellung von Linienkonferenzen und der Vorschrift über technische Vereinbarungen,

(8) Untersuchung der Frage, ob die Verordnung 4056/86 durch ein anderes Rechtsinstrument ersetzt werden sollte, und ggf. Vorlage eines entsprechenden Vorschlags, wobei auch die Konkurrenzposition der EU Linienschifffahrtsindustrie in einem globalen Zusammenhang mit einbezogen werden,

(9) sorgfältige Prüfung des ELAA-Vorschlags unter Berücksichtigung der von dritter Seite eingegangenen Kommentare, sowie von anderen Vorschlägen, die von der Industrie oder anderen interessierten Parteien eingereicht werden könnten,

(10) Änderung der Verordnung 1/2003 dahingehend, dass die Nichtanwendbarkeit auf Kabotage- und Trampdienste gestrichen wird,

(11) sorgfältige Prüfung der Frage, ob es Gründe für die Beibehaltung der Kollisionsvorschrift gibt,

9. Aufforderung zur übermittlung von kommentaren

1.32. Die Kommission fordert die Mitgliedstaaten sowie alle sonstigen Institutionen und betroffenen Kreise auf, ihre Kommentare zu dem Weißbuch innerhalb von zwei Monaten ab seiner Veröffentlichung an folgende Anschrift zu übermitteln:

Per Post:

Generaldirektion Wettbewerb

Europäische Kommission

Referat D2 (Verkehr)

Weißbuch zur Überprüfung der Verordnung zum Seeverkehr

Rue Joseph II 70, 2/237

1049 Brüssel

Per E-Mail:

COMP-D2-REVIEW4056@cec.eu.int

Anlage: Hintergrundpapier

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Annex to the WHITE PAPER on the review of Regulation 4056/86, applying the EC competition rules to maritime transport {COM(2004)675 final}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Liner shipping conferences 3

2. International developments regarding liner conferences 4

2.1.1. Introduction 4

2.1.2. United States 4

2.1.3. Australia 5

2.1.4. The OECD 6

3. The block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 6

3.1. Relevant provisions 6

3.2. Assessment 8

3.2.1. Legal and economic framework 8

3.2.2. Burden of proof 9

3.2.3. Outcome of the consultation on the block exemption 9

3.2.4. The four cumulative criteria of Article 81(3) 10

3.2.4.1. Efficiencies 10

3.2.4.2. Consumer benefits 11

3.2.4.3. Indispensability 11

3.2.4.4. No elimination of competition 12

3.2.5. Conclusion on Article 81(3) EC 13

4. Impact of withdrawal of the block exemption on the market 13

4.1. Introduction 13

4.2. Impact assessment 14

4.2.1. Effect on trade 14

4.2.2. Effect on investment and fleet 16

4.2.3. Effect on innovation 19

4.2.4. Effect on consumer prices 19

4.2.5. Effect on employment 20

4.2.6. Experience from other liberalised markets 20

4.2.7. Position of EU carriers in global context 21

4.3. Conclusion 22

5. Other forms of liner shipping co-operation 22

5.1. Introduction 22

5.2. Discussion agreements 22

5.3. Comments 23

5.4. The ELAA proposal 24

5.4.1. Main elements 24

5.4.2. Details 24

5.5. Preliminary comments on the ELAA Proposal 28

5.5.1. General remarks 28

5.5.2. Differences of the ELAA proposal compared to present conference activities 28

5.5.3. Capacity forecasting 32

5.5.4. Commodity developments 33

5.5.5. Market shares 33

5.5.6. Price index 33

5.5.7. Formulae for surcharges and ancillary surcharges 34

5.6. Conclusion 34

6. Cabotage and tramp services 35

6.1. Relevant provisions 35

6.2. Outcome of the consultation 35

6.3. Assessment 36

6.3.1. General remarks 36

6.3.2. Cabotage 37

6.3.3. Tramp 37

6.3.4. Conclusion 38

7. Technical agreements 38

7.1. Relevant provision 38

7.2. Outcome of the consultation 39

7.3. Assessment 39

7.4. Conclusion 40

8. Conflict of laws 40

8.1. Relevant provision 40

8.2. Outcome of the consultation 40

8.3. Assessment 40

8.4. Conclusion 41

1. Liner shipping conferences

1. Liner shipping conferences exist since 1875. They are associations of ship-owners (carriers, providing liner shipping services to transport users (shippers)) served by a secretariat. The ship-owners set common or uniform freight rates and make a common policy on the discounts or rebates which may be offered to shippers. Furthermore, they may share the cargo between themselves in various ways and coordinate timetables. Conferences themselves do not bring about the joint operation of liner shipping services. [21] Rather the members of the conference do, either on an individual basis or in co-operation with other liner service providers (e.g. in a operational co-operation form such as a consortia). [22]

[21] Compare TACA decision of 16 September 1998, OJ L 95 of 9.4.1999, p. 1) para 93-95.

[22] A consortia is a form of operational co-operation between liner companies, see for consortia para 38.

2. There are currently about 150 liner shipping conferences world-wide, of which 28 operate on trades to and from the EU. [23] The conferences on the three main trades to and from the EU (that is the transatlantic trade, the Europe-Eastern Asia trade and the Europe-Australia/New Zealand trade) [24] are respectively the Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) [25], the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) [26] and the Europe Australia New Zealand Conferences (TEANZC) [27]. Their members include both European and non-European liner shipping carriers, e.g. 4 out of the 7 TACA members, 4 out of the 15 FEFC members and 6 out of the 7 TEANZC members are European carriers.

[23] OECD Secretariat report of April 2002, Competition policy in liner shipping, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/46/2553902.pdf. p. 19. and ELAA submission of 18 June 2003 to DG Competition's consultation paper available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf.

[24] These trades are ranked first (Far East-Europe), second (Transatlantic route, with the US), and sixth (Australia and New Zealand) of all trades to and from the EU.

[25] The 7 members of TACA are: AP Moller/Maersk (DA), Atlantic Container Line AB (US), Hapag-Lloyd Container Line GmbH (DE), Mediterranean Shipping Co S.A. (SWISS), Nippon Yusen Kaisha NYK Line (Japan), Orient Overseas Container Line (China) and P&O Nedlloyd Limited (UK/NL). See www.tacaconf.com

[26] The 15 members of FEFC are: ANL Container Lines Pty Ltd (Australian but fully owned subsidiary to CMA CGM France), CMA CGM SA (FR), APL Co Pte Ltd. (Singapore), Egyptian International Shipping Co., Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie GmbH (DE), Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Korea), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (Japan), Maersk SeaLand (DA), Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd (Japan), Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan), Norasia Container Lines Ltd (Hong Kong), Orient Overseas Container Line (Hong Kong), P & O Nedlloyd Ltd (UK-NL)., Yangming Marine Transport Corporation (Taiwan). See www.fefclondon.com

[27] The 7 members of TEANZC are: Australia National Line - ANL, Consortium Hispania Lines (ES), Contship Containerlines (UK), Hamburg-Suedamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft Eggert & Amsinck (DE), Hapag Lloyd (DE), Lloyd Triestino (IT). P&O Containers (UK-NL). See http://www.anl.com.au.

3. Conferences secretariats organise the meetings of the members of the conference and monitor trade conditions by collecting statistics of trade volumes and prices which are supplied to the secretariat by the members of the conference. The data collected and information exchanged may differ depending on the trade. According to the European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA), an organisation which was specifically established in May 2003 to represent the carriers' position on the review of Regulation 4056/86, the following data are provided by members to the secretariat and the following topics are discussed at the meetings for the three main EU conferences respectively: [28]

[28] ELAA response of 18 June 2003 to the consultation paper, page 68, available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf

Table 1:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

4. It is useful to note that the activities of conferences operating on trades to and from the EU have changed over the years. In the past, some conferences have, apart from fixing the maritime tariff, also been involved in price fixing covering the inland leg of multi-modal transport. Furthermore, some conferences concluded capacity non-utilization agreements, agreed on freight forwarder remuneration, prohibited or restricted individual service contracting by their members and/or agreed on prices and surcharges with independent operators (non-conferences). In a number of Commission decisions and Court judgments these activities were considered to be illegal under EC competition law and the conferences concerned were ordered to abandon these practices. [29]

[29] See in particular Commission decisions of 19 October 1994 (TAA, OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994 p. 1), 21 December 1994 (FEFC, OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994 p. 17), 16 September 1998 (TACA, OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1), 30 April 1999 (EATA, OJ L 193 of 26.07.1999), 16 May 2000 (FETTSCA, OJ L 268 of 20.10.200, p. 1). For the Court judgments see in particular: Case T-86/95, Companie Générale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011, Case T-395/94, TAA [2002] ECR II-00875, Case T-86/95, FEFC, [2002] ECR II01011, joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 TACA [2003] ECR -not yet reported.

5. Notably in its most recent decision as regards liner shipping services, the Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002, the Commission has set a number of principles which should be emulated by all conferences operating on EU liner shipping trades: 1) conferences should refrain from inland price-fixing, 2) no restrictions should be placed on the right of conference members to enter into individual contracts with transport users, 3) collective regulation of capacity by members of a conference is only permissible where it is necessary in order to adapt to a short-term fluctuation of demand, and it must not be combined with a price increase. [30]

[30] Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

2. International developments regarding liner conferences

2.1.1. Introduction

6. Most OECD countries have traditionally granted some form of anti-trust immunity or exemption to liner conferences. Some of the Community's main trading partners, such as the United States and Australia, have conducted reviews of their own liner shipping regimes.

2.1.2. United States [31]

[31] Canada has also recently re-examined the case for antitrust immunity or exemption. The outcome, as laid down in the amended Shipping Conferences Exemption Act, is largely similar to the United States.

7. On 1 May 1999 the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) entered into force, substantially amending the United States 1984 Shipping Act. Two pro-competitive changes in particular were introduced: (1) carriers were no longer required to make public all essential terms of service contracts and (2) conferences could no longer prohibit their members from entering into individual service contracts. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is in charge of monitoring agreements between carriers under the Shipping Act. [32]

[32] See for further details www.fmc.gov.

8. The US reform has brought the US liner shipping competition regime closer to its current EC counterpart (Regulation 4056/86, as interpreted by the Commission and the Court of Justice). US law allows shipping lines to enter into agreements (on price fixing; or capacity regulation) similar to those allowed by the EU liner conference block exemption. However, there are still differences between US and EU law, the main one being that the US allows shipping lines to enter into "discussion agreements", i.e. to agree voluntary guidelines for prices and capacity, outside, the framework of conferences. The EU does not, because of the risk that effective competition between conferences and independent lines would be much reduced or eliminated altogether (see para 91 below).

2.1.3. Australia

9. Part X of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the TPA") provides for a limited exemption for international liner cargo shipping conferences. Essentially, Part X allows lines, under certain conditions and obligations, to enter into co-operative arrangements, including the joint provision of services and agreements on capacity, service levels and prices charged.

10. Part X defines a conference quite broadly, ranging from full conferences to non-binding discussion agreements, as well as technical agreements covering slot swapping and rationalisation of sailings. The agreements must be registered at the Department of Transport and Regional Services. [33]

[33] There are a number of discussion agreements that operate in several Australian trades which are currently registered under Part X, including the Asia-Australia Discussion Agreement (AADA). The exemption granted to this agreement is currently being re-examined by the Australian Competition Authority (ACCC). See position paper of the ACCC of April 2004, available at www.accc.gov/au.

11. In 1999 a review of the TPA Part X performed by the Productivity Commission (an advisory body to the Government) was carried out. As a result, in 2000 amendments where made to the Part X of the TPA. Part X would be retained but the Minister for Transport and Regional Services and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), would be granted increased powers to identify and address concerns about anti-competitive behaviour (including undertaking on its own initiative an investigation with a public benefit test) and to deal with concerns about the operation of agreements which potentially cover a large proportion of a trade.

12. Currently, the Productivity Commission is undertaking, on the request of the Government, another review of the exemption system in Part X to see if it is still beneficial to the Australian community. The Productivity Commission has released in June 2004 an issues paper, inviting third parties to comment and is expected to issue its final report by the end of the year. [34]

[34] See for further details www.pc.gov.au/.

2.1.4. The OECD

13. As part of the OECD's general Regulatory Reform Programme, [35] the OECD Secretariat presented a "Discussion document on regulatory reform in international maritime transport" [36] in May 1999. The document recommended inter alia that agreements to set common rates should no longer receive automatic antitrust immunity or exemption. It was then discussed at a joint workshop of the OECD's Maritime Transport Committee and Competition Law and Policy Committee in May 2000, at the end of which the OECD Secretariat decided to produce a draft report for discussion at a second workshop in 2001.

[35] The Programme is a result of the request by Ministers in 1995 that the OECD should embark on a study of the reform of regulatory regimes in OECD countries. The review of liner shipping has a parallel in a similar OECD review of air cargo transport.

[36] DSTI/DOT/MTC(99)8, 19.5.1999.

14. The draft report, circulated in November 2001, made, inter alia, the following findings of particular interest for EC maritime competition policy:

- The liner shipping industry is not 'unique' in the sense that its cost structure does not differ substantially from that of other transport industries and shipping lines do not suffer from exceptionally low returns on investment when compared to other scheduled transport providers. There is therefore no evidence that the industry needs to be protected from competition by anti-trust immunity for price-fixing and rate discussions;

- There is no evidence that the conference system (with anti-trust immunity or exemption for price-fixing) leads to more stable freight rates or more reliable shipping services than would be the case in a fully competitive market. On the contrary, the OECD finds support for the view that the most competitive markets provide the greatest stability.

15. In the light of its findings, the draft Report came to the conclusion that countries should:

- Re-examine anti-trust exemptions for common pricing and rate discussions, with the goal of removing them, except where specifically and exceptionally justified;

- Have the discretion to retain exemptions for other operational arrangements so long as these did not result in excessive market power.

16. Following discussion at an OECD Workshop in December 2001, the OECD Secretariat published its final report on 16 April 2002. [37] The report essentially endorsed the above findings. In particular, it found that it had not been established that collective price-fixing, whether by conferences or within discussion agreements, was an indispensable pre-requisite for stable freight rates and regular scheduled services. [38]

[37] DSTI/DOT(2002)2, 16.4.2002.

[38] Report, pages 69 and 76.

3. The block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86

1.1. Relevant provisions

17. Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86 provides for a so-called block exemption for agreements, decisions and concerted practices of all or part of the members of one or more liner conferences, as defined in Article 1(3)(b) of Regulation 4056/86, that have as their objective the fixing of rates and conditions of carriage, and that, in addition, cover one or more of the following forms of co-operation:

- the co-ordination of shipping timetables, sailing dates or dates of calls;

- the determination of the frequency of sailings or calls;

- the co-ordination or allocation of sailings or calls among members of the conference;

- the regulation of the carrying capacity offered by each member;

- the allocation of cargo or revenue among members.

18. Article 4 of the Regulation attaches a condition to the exemption: the above agreements must not cause detriment to ports, transport users or carriers by applying rates and conditions of carriage which vary without justification according to the country of origin or destination or port of loading or discharge. In addition, various obligations are attached to the block exemption (Article 5). Lines must consult with transport users; while they may institute loyalty arrangements, such arrangements must contain safeguards for transport users. Transport users must also be free to make their own arrangements concerning inland transport and quayside services. Tariffs and other conditions applied by the conference must be made available to transport users on request, or must otherwise be available for examination.

19. Failure to observe the above and other conditions may cause the Commission to withdraw from the conference the benefit of the block exemption. It may also lead to the imposition of fines.

20. The justification for the block exemption for liner conference agreements is given in the eighth recital of the preamble to Regulation 4056/86, which states:

Whereas provision should be made for block exemption of liner conferences; whereas liner conferences have a stabilising effect, assuring shippers of reliable services; whereas they contribute generally to providing adequate efficient scheduled maritime transport services and give fair consideration to the interests of users; whereas such results cannot be obtained without the co-operation that shipping companies promote within conferences in relation to rates and, where appropriate, availability of capacity or allocation of cargo for shipment, and income; whereas in most cases conferences continue to be subject to effective competition from both non-conference scheduled services and, in certain circumstances, from tramp services and from other modes of transport; whereas the mobility of fleets, which is a characteristic feature of the structure of availability in the shipping field, subjects conferences to constant competition which they are unable as a rule to eliminate as far as a substantial proportion of the shipping services in question is concerned.

21. The legislator has thus assumed in the past that price-fixing and capacity regulation within conferences leads to stability of freight rates, and that stability assures shippers of reliable scheduled maritime transport services.

22. It follows from the Regulation itself, from the decisional practice of the Commission and the case law of the Court that Regulation 4056/86 contains a "wholly exceptional" block exemption [39], because it exempts price fixing and capacity regulation, which are normally regarded as hard-core restrictions [40], for an unlimited duration and does not contain any market share thresholds. Indeed, the Regulation can only be explained in its historical context.

[39] See e.g. Case T-86/95, Companie Générale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011, para 254, 393 and 484.

[40] Hard-core restrictions are generally considered as restrictions of competition by object caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty, which generally do not fulfil the conditions for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

23. Liner conferences have sought to interpret the block exemption in broad terms. In particular, liner conferences considered capacity non-utilization agreements [41] and inland price fixing [42] to be covered by the block exemption. This has however not been accepted by the Commission, nor by the Court. Indeed, the block exemption derogates from Article 81(1) of the Treaty and should therefore be interpreted narrowly [43]. Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account only to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. [44]

[41] See TAA, EATA, Revised TACA decisions of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

[42] See TAA, FEFC, TACA, Rev TACA decisions of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

[43] Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 TACA [2003] ECR -not yet reported, para 568.

[44] See to that effect implicitly para 139 of Case T-17/93, Matra, ECR [1994] II-595 and Case 26/76, Metro (I), [1977] ECR 1875, para 43.

1.2. Assessment

3.2.1. Legal and economic framework

24. The EU competition rules are modelled on the presumption that competition provides the best services to the consumer at the most affordable prices. For that reason, the starting point under the Treaty is that competition should not be distorted and that any exemption from that rule needs to be justified. Agreements which restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty (such as price fixing and capacity regulation agreements) could only be exempted if they fulfil the four cumulative conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty, namely:

1) the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress (efficiency),

2) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits (pass-on),

3) the restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of these objectives (indispensability), and finally

4) the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question (no elimination of competition).

25. The application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements by way of a block exemption regulation is based on the presumption that restrictive agreements that fall within its scope fulfil each of the four conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

26. As said above, the justification of the liner conference block exemption is provided for in recital 8 of the preamble of Regulation 4056/86, which in essence assumes that conferences bring stability, assuring reliable services which could not be achieved by less restrictive means. In this regard the Court of First Instance stated that "the Council did not assert (and indeed could not have asserted) that stability is more important than competition". [45]

[45] Case T-395/94, TAA [2002] ECR II-00875, para 261.

27. It should be noted that the justification in recital 8 of Regulation 4056/86 has not been based on experience of the Commission in applying Art 81(3) to liner conferences [46]. In this regard, the core question examined in the review process is whether, in light of the cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, the justification for price fixing and supply regulation by liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 could (still) be said to be valid in light of the present market circumstances. If not, there would no longer be a legal justification for the block exemption, which consequently would have to be either abolished or revised. To that end parties have been invited to provide factual evidence.

[46] To compare, see for example Regulation 823/2000 on Consortia (OJ L 100 of 20.04.2000 p. 24), Regulation 1400/2002 on motor vehicles and Regulation 2790/1999 on vertical agreements (OJ L 336 of 29.12.1999, p. 21), in which the Commission explicitly referred to the experience acquired in the sector concerned which enabled it to define categories of agreements which could be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 81(3).

3.2.2. Burden of proof

28. In this context supporters of the block exemption (notably ELAA) have emphasised that the burden of proof in the review of Regulation 4056/86 would be at least a shared one and that the Commission should show that a possible revocation or amendment of the liner conference block exemption is justified. [47] Naturally, it follows from Article 253 of the Treaty that, when proposing (changes to existing) legislation the Commission shall motivate its proposals. This implies e.g. that if the Commission proposes to repeal the present block exemption for liner shipping conferences it will have to explain the reasons why price fixing and supply regulation by the conferences would, in the present market circumstances, no longer be exemptable from the prohibition of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

[47] See in particular the ELAA technical paper on burden of proof of 3.12.2003.

3.2.3. Outcome of the consultation on the block exemption

29. In broad terms the reactions that were received to the Commission's Consultation Paper of 2003 could be divided in two groups: those who are in support of maintaining the liner conference block exemption (essentially the carriers) and those who would like to see it repealed (basically the shippers and a leading consumer association).

30. In essence, the supporters of the block exemption argue that the liner shipping industry, because of its specific features (such as high fixed costs, high investment risks, inelastic demand and supply, asymmetries in demand etc) would be inherently unstable and that this would require special treatment under EU competition law. According to this argument, price fixing by liner conferences provide for stability in a large sense, which could not be achieved to a similar extent by alternatives such as consortia and service contracting. Stability would be to the benefit of all actors involved.

31. Opponents contest that there is evidence of stability and even question the relevance of the concept of stability. Rather, reliable shipping services would be what matters to consumers. Furthermore, they contest the alleged benefits of price fixing for consumers and favour a free competitive market for liner shipping services. The respective positions have been summarized in more detail in the Discussion Paper, which has been posted on the Commission's web-site.

32. The argument of the supporters of the block exemption is based on the notion of "destructive competition", and is not new. It has been advanced by carriers in various liner shipping cases that the Commission examined under the EC competition rules. [48] In these cases the Commission has explained why it is not convinced of the applicability of this economic concept to liner shipping. There is no concrete evidence that the liner shipping industry should be treated substantially different than other global capital intensive industries. [49] Any explanation or justification for price fixing and supply regulation by liner shipping conferences should be considered in light of the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. The argument of the carriers that the liner shipping industry is unique and would require special treatment cannot imply that the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty do not apply. Rather, the argument should be considered within the framework of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, notably its first condition

[48] See TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1), para 332-367, EATA decision of 30 April 1999 (OJ L 193 of 26.07.1999) para 107-142.

[49] For a more detailed discussion of the economic theories in this regard reference is made to the above mentioned discussion paper, available on DG Competition's web-site [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/others/maritime/review_4056.pdf].

3.2.4. The four cumulative criteria of Article 81(3)

3.2.4.1. Efficiencies

33. The first condition of Article 81(3) requires that the agreement produces economic benefits, in terms of e.g. cost efficiencies or qualitative efficiencies such as new or improved liner shipping services. Only objective benefits can be taken into account. Cost savings arising from mere exercise of market power, such as price fixing, cannot be taken into account [50]. ELAA appears to argue that conferences improve maritime services by providing stability in terms of rate stability and stability of supply.

[50] Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C 101 of 27.04.2004 p. 97) .

34. Carriers have relied in this context mainly on the alleged price stability that conferences would achieve. The data which have been provided in this regard are however not conclusive. Shippers have even contested the relevance of the concept of price stability as such in the context of Article 81(3).

35. It is questionable whether price stability as such could be regarded as sufficient for the fulfilment of the first condition of Article 81(3). Price stability only becomes relevant if it is read in conjunction with the concept of "reliable services", meaning the maintenance over time of a scheduled service providing shippers with the guarantee of a service suited to their needs. [51] As the Commission has indicated in its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [52], there must be a sufficient and direct causal link between the agreement and the claimed efficiencies. Whatever may have been the force of the justifications that led at the time to the block exemption of price fixing by liner conferences, it is doubtful whether it can be maintained today that the provision of reliable services result directly from the conference price fixing. In this regard, it should be recalled that conference members increasingly offer services on the basis of service contracts. [53] It is not excluded that under the current market circumstances price stability and reliability of services are mainly brought about by such contracts. Moreover, the increase of both internal price competition within conferences and external competition by independent operators have not changed significantly the overall level of reliability of liner shipping services. It would therefore appear that the alleged causal link between the restrictions (i.e. price fixing, supply and market regulation) and the claimed efficiencies (reliable services) is too tenuous to meet the first condition of Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

[51] See TAA decision of 19 October 1994 (OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994, p. 1), para 388. See also FEFC decision of 21 December 1994 (OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994 p. 17), para 129: reliable services are those which are of a reasonable quality, such that the shipper's goods come to no harm, and at the same price irrespective of which day and which line is chosen to carry the cargo. Reliability in the supply of transport services is the maintenance over time of a scheduled service, providing shippers with the guarantee of a service suited to their needs.

[52] Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, para 73-83 (OJ C 101 of 27.04.2004, p. 97).

[53] Service contracts, such as e.g. individual service contracts (ISCs) on the transatlantic trade, are contracts by which a shipper undertakes to provide a minimum quantity of cargo to be transported by an individual carrier over a fixed period of time and the carrier commits to a certain rate or rate schedule as well as a defined service level.

3.2.4.2. Consumer benefits

36. The second condition of Article 81(3) requires that, if liner conferences were to achieve economic benefits, a fair share of these benefits should be passed on to consumers. Consumers must be compensated for the negative effects resulting from the restrictions of competition. In case of hard-core restrictions, such as horizontal price fixing, it is clear that the negative effects are serious and that any positive effect must therefore be very clear-cut.

37. None of the benefits that have been identified by the carriers would appear to at least neutralize the negative effects for consumers of conference price fixing. In this regard weight should also be given to the fact that consumers themselves fail to see any benefits of price fixing by conferences. [54] The OECD Secretariat concluded in its report that conference price-fixing leads to rates being set at the level necessary to cover the average cost of the least efficient member of the conference. Under this system, efficient members of the conference reap benefits stemming from rates that are above their costs, while the cost savings and efficiency gains of these carriers are not passed on to shippers.

[54] See for further details the DG Competition discussion paper para 26 and 95-103.

3.2.4.3. Indispensability

38. Under the third condition of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, even if there were economic benefits to the benefit of consumers, it will have to be established that the restrictions of competition are indispensable, i.e. reasonably necessary and proportionate to produce these economic benefits. The test is basically whether there are less restrictive alternatives than conference price fixing which would assure reliable liner services to the benefit of consumers.

39. In this regard account should be given to the growing importance of independent operators and the increase of service contracting between carriers and shippers, in particular individual service contracts, both showing that reliable liner shipping services can be provided by carriers totally or partially outside the conferences framework.

40. It has not been contested that independent operators, which operate outside conferences on all main trades to and from Europe, are capable of providing reliable liner shipping services outside conferences. The fact that the market share of independents has since the adoption of the block exemption generally increased on the main trades, to the detriment of conferences, indicates that the liner services provided for by independents achieve at least equal efficiency gains. The existence of reliable liner shipping services by independents shows therefore that the restrictions of competition by conferences are not indispensable for the promotion of technical or economic progress of liner shipping services [55].

[55] Compare the TAA decision of 19 October 1994 (OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994 p. 1), para 485 and the FEFC decision of 21 December 1994 (OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994, p. 17) ,para 121, where the Commission, with regard to inland carrier haulage services, concluded that collective price fixing was not essential for the provision of these services since many independent carriers offered equivalent or similar services outside the framework of a conference and without fixing prices in common with any other line for the provision of carrier haulage services.

41. Also service contracts contribute to stable and reliable services. The importance of service contracting, in particular individual service contracts, has increased significantly since changes were made in US Law [56] and the Commission in its 1998 TACA decision removed barriers to conclude such contracts. [57] Service contracts are generally less restrictive than price fixing by liner shipping conferences. The benefits of service contracts in terms of assuring shippers of reliable services are generally accepted. The Commission has explicitly recognized that service contracts provide benefits to shippers, e.g. they allow for special services tailored to particular needs. Furthermore, because the price negotiated is established in advance and does not fluctuate for a predetermined period (usually up to one year), service contracts can contribute to price stability -if that is what an individual shipper wants. Service contracts also help to reduce search costs and can offer "all-in"" prices, thereby removing the uncertainty as to the level of surcharges to be imposed. [58]

[56] The US Ocean Shipping and Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 allowed shippers and carriers on US trades to enter into confidential contracts without prior notice.

[57] On the transatlantic trade the vast majority of liner shipping cargo (up to 90%) is nowadays transported through service contracts (ISCs). Also on the Europe/Australia and New Zealand trade the majority (75-80%) of cargo, according to ELAA, moves under contracts. (ELAA submission of 18 June 2003 available http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf. According to the ELAA service contracts are common on all trades (ELAA submission of 30 June 2004 to the Commission's consultation document on Regulation 823/00.

[58] TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999 p. 1, para 472-476.

42. Even in so far as there would be felt a need for cooperation, operational co-operation agreements between shipping lines such as consortia and alliances show that there are less restrictive forms of cooperation than liner conference price fixing and market regulation. Alliances establish co-operation among a group of carriers over certain major trade routes, which can be described as global. These agreements cover a wide range of forms of operational co-operation, e.g. space chartering, slot charter and schedule/sailing arrangements and they aim at the integration of each participant's services into one whole. These alliances do however not include common pricing.

43. Liner consortia are industrial co-operation agreements between liner shipping companies aimed primarily at supplying jointly organised services by means of various technical, operational or commercial arrangements. [59] Thanks to consortia agreements, ship owners can organise jointly the services they supply (in particular container liner shipping) and thus provide users with a better service while rationalising their maritime transport activities and securing economies of scale and cost reductions. [60]

[59] In many cases, members of a consortium are also members of a conference. However, a consortium can also be composed entirely of otherwise independent lines or it can include both conference and non-conference members. Consortia are under certain conditions covered by the block exemption of Regulation 823/2000, provided that they do not fix prices.

[60] The Consortia block exemption will expire on 25 April 2005 and DG COMP has in May 2004 published a paper on its web-site in order to consult the industry and Member States on possible options for the future regime of consortia. The consultation paper is published against the background of the ongoing review of the Maritime Regulation. What possible consequences the on-going review process of the Maritime Regulation might entail for the Consortia Block Exemption cannot yet be foreseen. Accordingly and awaiting the results of the review of the Maritime Regulation renewal of Regulation 823/2000 (with only minor modifications that are independent from the Review of Regulation 4056/86) would appear the most appropriate option at this stage.

44. The argument has been advanced that the success of consortia is closely linked to the activities which take place within conferences. Such argument is difficult to accept under EU competition law. The consortia block exemption does not allow horizontal price fixing and it covers both consortia operating within a liner conference and consortia operating outside such conferences. In competition policy terms the argument rather reinforces the general concern that the existence of the conference system combined with the growth in operational co-operation through consortia and alliances could possibly raise the potential for sensitive market information to spill over to other non-Conference market actors.

45. These alternatives already available on the market show that shipping lines do not need any longer to engage in price-fixing, supply and market regulation to provide reliable shipping services.

3.2.4.4. No elimination of competition

46. Finally, the fourth condition of Article 81(3) requires that the conference should remain subject to effective competitive constraints.

47. Competitive constraints on conferences can come from independent operators. Agreements between conference and non-conference members do not benefit from the block exemption and the Commission has in the past intervened to avoid that such agreements would undermine competition between independent and conference carriers. In general, independent operators have increased their market share on the main trades to and from Europe. [61] However, the importance of the competitive constraints from independent operators on a particular trade, depends also on their capacity to compete and their incentive to do so.

[61] For example, on the Transatlantic trade the market share of independents has increased from about 39% in 1994 to about 52% in 2001 (Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53), para 45 and table 1).

48. Service contracting between individual shippers and members of the conference is another source of competition. In the past liner conferences have sought to limit effective competitive constraints from individual contracting. The Commission has acted against this in order to ensure that there are no restrictions on conference members as regards their freedom to negotiate and enter into service contracts with shippers. [62] As a result, individual contracting has increased importantly in recent years, for example, on the Transatlantic trade nowadays only 10 % of the cargo carried by the TACA conference members is moved under the conference tariff. [63]

[62] E.g. TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1) .

[63] Also on the Europe/Australia and New Zealand trade the vast majority (75-80%) of cargo, according to the ELAA, moves under service contracts.

49. However, given the increasing number of links between carriers (i.e. consortia, alliances, vessel-sharing arrangements and slot-charters) determining the extent to which a particular conference is subject to effective, internal and external, competition can be a very complex exercise, even if the conference in question does not have a substantial market share. In any event, such an assessment would necessarily have to be made on a trade by trade basis.

3.2.5. Conclusion on Article 81(3) EC

50. The four cumulative conditions to justify an exemption for liner conference price fixing, supply and market regulation would appear to be no longer fulfilled. There is no conclusive economic evidence that the assumptions on which the block exemption was justified at the time of its adoption in 1986 are, in the present market circumstances and on the basis of the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, still justified.

4. Impact of withdrawal of the block exemption on the market

1.3. Introduction

51. Under EC competition law price agreements and agreements on supply and market regulation between competitors are restrictive of competition by object. It follows from the above that, in the present market circumstances, there seems to be no justification under the EC competition rules to exempt these type of agreements by liner conferences from the prohibition of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. The present "wholly exceptional" regime for liner conferences, compared to other (capital intensive) industries, seems no longer justified under EC competition law.

52. The overall objective of removing the present "wholly exceptional" regime for liner conferences would be to make the liner shipping industry on trades to and from the EU more competitive, to the benefit of consumers. Bringing liner shipping conferences under a normal competitive regime is expected to have important pro-competitive effects on liner shipping services in terms of increased economic efficiencies (less efficient lines will be forced to become more efficient due to competitive pressure) and, in a competitive market, these efficiencies are expected to be passed on to shippers (e.g. in terms of more competitive prices and better quality of service) and the ultimate consumers.

53. Based on the above, it would appear that the present block exemption in favour of liner conferences should be repealed.

54. In this regard there are in essence two policy options. The first option would be to repeal the present block exemption and not replace it by any other instrument. This would bring the whole liner shipping industry on equal footing as most other industrial sectors and would imply that conference members, like any other shipping carrier, will have to carry out a self-assessment as to whether their activities would fall within the scope of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and, if so, whether they would fulfil the conditions for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Lines would be assisted in this regard by the decisional practice of the Commission, various guidelines issued by the Commission and the case law of the Court.

55. The second option would be to repeal the present block exemption, but in parallel explore the need and possibilities to replace it with an instrument recognising the compatibility with Article 81 of the Treaty of other forms of cooperation of liner services operating to and from the EU, in addition to forms of co-operation for which there exists already a legal framework (e.g. consortia, mergers). This option will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.

56. Hereinafter the possible impact (positive and negative) on liner shipping services on trades to and from the EU the first option (i.e. simple withdrawal of the present block exemption), are examined. On subjects where the impact assessments is limited to a static analysis of the current situation, there are no indications that the withdrawal of the block exemption will have any effect on the respective issue in future. Once the Commission will have a more concrete picture of possible alternatives for liner conference price fixing, supply and market regulation, in light of the comments from interested third parties on the White paper, it will carry out a more in-depth impact assessment, in line with the Commission's Communication on impact assessment (COM(2002) 276 final)

1.4. Impact assessment

57. As a preliminary remark it should be noted that an assessment of the impact on liner shipping services, in terms of economic, social and environmental consequences, in a situation without the present block exemption would necessarily be largely hypothetical. [64] Indeed, traditionally in all jurisdictions liner conferences have been granted some form of immunity or exemption from the competition rules and none of the competent authorities who looked into it or who are reviewing this (e.g. US, Canada, Australia, Japan) have removed that immunity/exemption so far.

[64] This is also recognized by e.g. ELAA: .. "a critical problem in examining both the effectiveness of the conference system and possible substitutes for it is one of history. The liner conference has been a fact of life in European (and, indeed, worldwide) shipping for centuries, and as such very little empirical evidence of alternatives exists. Economic theory and examples from other industries with similar characteristics must be called upon in order to forecast how liner shipping, its pricing structure and stability might function without conferences.".... (CI March 2004, page 37).

58. Hereinafter, on the basis of facts and developments on the liner shipping market an impact assessment has been carried out, notably in terms of the likely effect on trade, investment and fleet, innovation, consumer prices, employment. Furthermore, experience from other liberalised markets has also be taken into account.

4.2.1. Effect on trade

59. Sea transport [65] is responsible for about 45% of EU25 external trade in value terms and about 75% in volume terms. Container transport by sea accounts for approximately 40% of EU25 external trade by sea in value terms (and between 9% [imports] - 28% [exports] in volume terms). Finally, sea containers make up for 6% of all EU25 imports in volume terms (18% in value terms) and 21% of all EU25 exports (see table 1). Conferences have market shares between 40%-70% [66] on the major trades.

[65] Including deep sea and short sea transport. For data on EU 15 see EU Energy and Transport in Figures - Statistical Pocketbook 2003, European Commission, DG Energy and Transport.

[66] See ELAA Response to the Commission Consultation Paper dated 18 June 2003, p. 48.

Table 2:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

60. The origin of imports of goods by sea of EU15 in 2002 were equally shared between America, Africa, the other European countries and Asia. [67] However, the trend differed slightly when focusing on exports, for which the volumes handled were always inferior to imports. America took the largest share (40%), Asia also had a larger share in the exports of the EU15 than in the import (25%), while the opposite was true for Africa (17%) and other European countries (17%).

[67] The import shares based on volume in tons were: America 26%, Africa 25%, other Europe 23% and Asia 21%.

Table 3:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

61. Conferences are predominant on deep sea routes between Europe and Asia, America and Australia. Hence EU trade with these regions would consequently be most affected by any regulatory change. On the other hand, routes in the Mediterranean, North, Baltic and Black Sea are typical short-sea shipping routes, where conferences are less important. Consequently, the considerable EU trade with North Africa, Near East or other European Countries would be less affected by regulatory change.

62. Petroleum products and solid mineral fuels represent the largest part (42%) of total volume of goods imported by sea by EU15 from extra EU partners in 2002. In terms value of imports the group "machinery, transport equipment, manufactured and miscellaneous articles" had the largest share. For exports from the EU15 to non-EU members, petroleum products were also the most important category in terms of volume (32%), while "machinery, transport equipment, manufactured and miscellaneous articles" had again the largest share in total value of goods. In extra EU trade, the volume of goods exported by EU15 was three times lower than the volume of imports. However, the respective values of the goods exported and imported by EU15 were almost the same, which can be explained by the fact that Member States export goods with higher value than the good they import. [68]

[68] Statistics in focus - theme 6/7 - 4/2004: Intra-and Extra-EU trade by sea.

Table 4:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

63. It should be noted that while some of the goods can practically only be transported by bulk carriers such as petroleum, chemicals or solid mineral fuels, most of the remaining goods can be carried by either bulk, specialised or container carriers, e.g. foodstuff or machinery.

4.2.2. Effect on investment and fleet

64. Investment decisions in vessel capacity depend on the complex supply and demand conditions on four different markets that are the global freight market, the charter market and the market for new and second-hand vessels. Rising freight rates indicate capacity shortage and consequently prices for second-hand and charter vessels increase. When second-hand and charter rates climb, building new vessels become more attractive and carriers start to invest before new-building prices also start to rise. However, when the new capacity arrives on the market with a two-year time-lag, demand for ocean transport might have dropped or carriers might have overestimated demand. Thus freight rates will fall again. If this cyclical nature of the container vessel market remains undisturbed from any co-ordination or collective action, it might generate a continuous flow of companies entering and exiting the market. Inefficient carriers leave the market by selling their vessels and new efficient companies are able to enter the market, which promotes overall efficiency in the long-run.

65. Entry into the liner shipping market is however more difficult since it requires a minimum number of container vessels. The basic mechanisms are nevertheless the same. It is very questionable whether co-ordinated action or planning of conferences as regards capacity and freight rates is able to adjust imbalances on all four markets simultaneously and whether the result of conference action is superior to free competition.

66. Vessel chartering has become a widespread practice in liner shipping. Recent figures show that charter owners now account for 45% of the current fleet and nearly 60% of vessel orders [69]. There are two different charter markets: the long-term and short-term charter market. The latter market covers all time and voyage charter contracts of up to two years. It mainly serves to fill capacity gaps at short notice, comparable to a rental car in case of a breakdown or accident.

[69] In the early Nineties only about 18% of tonnage of the top30 carriers were chartered. By 2000, the proportion had risen to 40% and currently 45%. See Lloyd's List, 29 July 2004, p. 5.

67. The long-term charter market is of greater importance to carriers. Carriers may decide to own or charter a vessel. In the case of long-term charter, carriers enter into a legally binding contract of more than two years, typically between five and ten years, before the vessels is being built. A large number of shipowners that charter out vessels are benefiting from tax incentives and are not active in the liner shipping market. Hence, long-term charter can be seen as a flexible way of vessel financing.

68. However, when a carrier is able to obtain a long-term charter contract over a relatively limited period of five years, it can substantially mitigate its investment risk. Thus, carriers with a well-balanced portfolio of owned vessels and long-term charter contracts of different durations are not bearing a great investment risk while at the same time these carriers are able to react independently (i.e. outside of conference co-ordination) to capacity imbalances at relatively short notice.

69. Carriers attempt to mitigate their investment risk through their participation in conferences. This might however lead to the so-called "moral hazard" phenomenon: a carrier might invest in "too much capacity" which is not in accordance with supply and demand projections on the market. In this case a carrier relies on the conference price-setting system which ensures that freight rates are only partly or with a certain time-lag reflecting supply and demand conditions on the market. While such a strategy could be profitable for a single carriers, it might lead to overcapacity in the market when a larger number of carriers follow this strategy. Under these circumstances conferences would systematically provide poorer market results than free competition.

70. The OECD [70] affirms that liner shipping industry has record of over-investing heavily in new capacity. Recent data of Containerization International [71] appears to confirm this trend. In 2003, the global container fleet grew by 10% and slot capacity by 18%. In November 2003, 500 ships were on order and the world fleet was expected to grow another 8% in 2004 and 8.5% in 2005. Only a few experts however expected transport demand to rise that much.

[70] See OECD report (2002), p. 47-49.

[71] Containerization International, November 2003, p. 57-61.

71. Many conference and non-conference carriers follow the path of ordering new and larger vessels in order to achieve economies of scale which would allow them potentially to cut costs. A number of experts however hint at the trade-off between capacity vessel and transhipment costs, i.e. economies of scale brought by larger vessels can be easily wiped out by increasing transhipment costs. It therefore appears that the industry's conventional wisdom regarding economies of scale is not necessarily as well founded as carriers might hope to believe. [72]

[72] See OECD report (2002), p. 49.

72. In conclusion: it is not evident that capacity co-ordination under the conference system is capable of delivering a better market outcome than an entirely competitive market organisation.

Table 5:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

73. Five out of the top 20 and three out of the top five container service operators are of European origin. These top 20 carriers are operating about two thirds of the world capacity, which is relatively fragmented for a global and capital intensive industry. A more competitive environment in the fragmented liner shipping market may lead to more concentration, i.e. mergers and take-overs.

74. Mergers might generate efficiency gains in terms of economies of scale and scope, learning economies, enhanced technical progress or improving the efficiency of management. On the other hand, mergers may have anti-competitive effects such as the unilateral increase of market power or greater risk of collusion due to a reduction of market players.

75. While more concentration in liner shipping may well lead to considerable efficiency gains, it is questionable whether a single liner shipping operator could exercise more market power than a conference or whether a liberalised but more concentrated liner shipping market would be more prone to collusion than the conference system. In addition, EU merger control aims at preventing mergers that "significantly impede effective competition". Hence, it is not excluded that in the long and medium term transport users and consumers might even gain from increased concentration within a liberalised market.

76. It is difficult to anticipate the outcome of concentration processes since most of the carriers are parts of larger corporate entities. Profitability and financial strength of an individual carrier might make it less vulnerable to a take-over. On the other hand, larger corporate entities might be less guided by profitability of carriers as a single business unit, but by their overall business strategy, e.g. diversification or vertical integration strategies, or the profitability of the entire door-to-door logistics service. Moreover, it should be noted that a number of carriers "still lack the ability to accurately track and assign costs on a specific, rather than average basis" and pricing regimes are based on average costs [73]. Average cost pricing and inaccurate cost assignment may adulterate profitability calculations of inter-modal services and hence the profitability of a carriers within a larger business entity.

[73] OECD report (2002), p. 47.

4.2.3. Effect on innovation

77. Competition is generally associated with static efficiency gains in terms of better price-output combinations. In the long-term competition also contributes to dynamic efficiency gains, i.e. cost savings, research, innovation of new products and services. However, in order to innovate or carry out research firms usually require sufficient financial resources or a considerable market size.

78. Liner shipping is characterised by relatively low concentration rates in general as well as on a trade-by-trade basis [74]. Most of the major carriers are parts of larger corporate business entities and are vertically integrating (e.g. dedicated container terminals, information technology, integrated global logistics services) [75]. Although container transport has seen technical progress over the last decades, for instance increasing vessel sizes, it is more than likely that competition will further accelerate technical progress in liner shipping. Experience from liberalisation of other sectors shows that a liberalised liner shipping sector will see reinforced horizontal concentration, i.e. inefficient firms will leave the market or will be taken over by competitors, as well as vertical integration, both tendencies together lead to more innovation and a quicker dissemination of innovation, e.g. inter-modal solutions. Liner shipping companies will become big enough to carry research and to innovate and there will also be an incentive to use these innovations in vertically integrated inter-modal logistics chains.

[74] Annex to the Consultants' report, p. 95-96.

[75] Consultants' report, p. 3.

4.2.4. Effect on consumer prices

79. According to ECSA "the transport cost element in shelf price of consumer goods has reached a marginal level in percentage: TV set 2%, 1 kg coffee 1.2%, bottle of whisky 0.5%, vacuum cleaner 1.3%, cassette recorder 1% and 250cc motor cycle 1.4%." [76] Such a view suggest that there is no impact on consumer prices at all since the transport cost share is relatively limited. It neglects however long-term effects of "too high" transport costs. Transport costs can significantly influence investment decisions in upstream or downstream markets. In the manufacturing industry for instance transport cost of 1.4% for a motorcycle can be decisive when it comes to deciding whether to build the motor cycle in Europe or Asia. In addition, a large part of liner shipping companies' customers are logistics providers for which ocean transport is a major part of their overall costs.

[76] ESCA answer to Consultation Paper dated 13 June 2003, p. 5.

4.2.5. Effect on employment

80. By far the biggest share of all global seafarers (approximately 700000) are Philipinos (28%), followed by Russians and Ukrainians. There is no indication however that repealing the block exemption will have any effect on the supply and demand conditions for seafarers. There is growing shortage of sailors in the European Union. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the EU lost 40% of its seamen. There is a desperate need for merchant shipping officers. Between now and 2006 the EU will be some 36 000 sailors short. [77]

[77] COM (2001) 0370, White Paper, "European transport policy for 2010 : time to decide ", p 40.

Table 6:

>VERWEIS AUF EIN SCHAUBILD>

4.2.6. Experience from other liberalised markets

81. By increased competitive pressure, deregulation of economic sectors has encouraged firms to be more efficient and helped boost the productivity of entire industries. Increased efficiency leads to lower prices for consumers and business. Prices have fallen significantly and often swiftly where regulatory reforms strengthened competition. Deregulation of the electricity and road and air transport sector in Europe as generally lead to price reductions from 10% to over 30%, while the telecommunication sector has seen price drops of up to 70%. [78]

[78] OECD Report on Regulatory Reform - Syntesis (1997), p. 11-12.

82. Following European airline liberalisation low-cost carriers have become major players in European aviation and had captured 12% of all intra-EU capacity by the end of 2002. Many of the biggest fare reductions were available on intra-European services, especially in Germany and the UK. This followed from some full service airlines restructuring their fares to meet increasing threat from the low-cost sector. [79]

[79] DG TREN - Analysis of the European air transport industry 2002, Final Report December 2003, Contract number: B2-7040B-S07.17962.

83. The implementation of the European telecommunications regulatory package introduced competition to the sector, which is bringing prices for consumers down overall. Incumbents' long distance calls are down 11% in price since 2000 and 45% down since 1998. Overall average monthly expenditure for national calls went down from EUR85.57 to EUR68.54 for business users between 1998 and 2001. Incumbents' international calls are also further down in price, by 21% since 2000 for business users.

84. New entrants' prices are in most cases considerably lower, with one new entrant in Germany offering prices 75% lower than the incumbent's for long-distance, for example, and reductions for local calls of up to 29%. New entrants in Belgium, France, Spain and the United Kingdom charge between 36% and 56% less than the incumbent for long-distance calls. There has also been a trend, that prices are starting to reflect the actual cost of providing the service.

85. The strength of competition in the telecoms sector is evident from the fact that the whole population of twelve Member States can choose between more than five operators for long distance and international calls. For local calls, six Member States report that the whole population has a choice of more than five operators. [80]

[80] COM (2001) 706, 7th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package.

4.2.7. Position of EU carriers in global context

86. Although in liner shipping relevant markets are determined on a trade-by-trade basis, liner shipping has a global context. It has been advanced in this regard that repealing the EU block exemption could affect European carriers more than non-European carriers since the latter could more easily move their services to other trades, where they would still be subject to immunity/exemption from the competition rules. In this regard the following remarks could be made.

87. First, repealing the block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 will affect all carriers that are part of conferences on trades to and from the EU. These carriers are both EU and non-EU carriers (see para 2 above). Less efficient carriers may perhaps have an incentive by changes in regulatory regime to move their operations to other more regulated, non-EU trades. The resulting capacity gap would be filled by more efficient carriers since freight rates would be expected to rise in the short term. In the long term however, due to competitive forces, freight rates would drop even below the initial freight rates since EU trades are served by more cost-efficient, competing carriers. Hence, it is not to be expected that carriers in general, whether EU or non-EU, would decide to leave trades to and from the EU. To the contrary, it might be expected that EU trades will be served more cost-efficient. Secondly, the regulatory context in which liner carriers operate is not static. In fact, various jurisdictions have or are reviewing the respective immunity/exemption and it is not to be excluded that they will end or substantially limit the present privileges granted to liner conferences. [81]

[81] In Australia the Productivity Commission, the Australian Government's principal review and advisory body on microeconomic policy and regulation, is undertaking a review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act (1974) which is the regulatory regime for international liner cargo shipping operations in Australia. In the US the Free Market Antitrust Immunity Reform (FAIR) Act of 2001 has been issued.

1.5. Conclusion

88. Although an assessment of the impact of repealing the present block exemption on liner services on trades to and from the EU remains to some extent hypothetical, it would go too far, as some carriers have suggested, to speak in this regard of a "leap in the dark". Economic theory, facts and developments on the liner services market as well as examples from other industries provide sufficient information to weigh the various pro's and con's of repealing the block exemption. Also the position of consumers should be taken into account. Shippers, for example, have explicitly stressed that they are willing "to take the risk" of a competitive liner shipping world. Overall, the available evidence shows that, although less efficient carriers are likely to be affected most, there are no indications that the liner shipping operators on trades to and from the EU, or European carriers as such, will be worse off without conference price fixing in the long term.

5. Other forms of liner shipping co-operation

1.6. Introduction

89. Conferences are not the only form of liner shipping organisation. Liner services could also be provided by consortia and alliances (see para 43 above). The activities of consortia are group exempted pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty under certain conditions and obligations, as set out in Regulation 823/2000. Carriers could also decide to merge their activities, which will have to be assessed under the applicable (national or EC) merger control rules.

90. In order to examine if there is a need for a Community instrument covering other forms of liner shipping co-operation than those already available on trades to and from the EU, it is useful to have a closer look at forms of cooperation between lines which exist already in other parts of the world, notably the US and Australia, such as so-called discussion agreements, and examine their compatibility with EC competition law.

1.7. Discussion agreements

91. A discussion agreement is a sort of framewo