[pic] | KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN |

Brüssel, den 17.1.2006

SEK(2006) 49

MITTEILUNG AN DIE KOMMISSION VON VIZEPRÄSIDENT KALLAS IM EINVERNEHMEN MIT PRÄSIDENT BARROSO UND FRAU GRYBAUSKAITÉ

Aktionsplan der Kommission zur Schaffung eines integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens:Defizitbewertung und Maßnahmenkatalog für die Kommissionsdienststellen

{KOM(2006) 9 endgültig}

MITTEILUNG AN DIE KOMMISSION VON VIZEPRÄSIDENT KALLAS IM EINVERNEHMEN MIT PRÄSIDENT BARROSO UND FRAU GRYBAUSKAITÉ

Aktionsplan der Kommission zur Schaffung eines integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens: Defizitbewertung und Maßnahmenkatalog für die Kommissionsdienststellen

1. EINLEITUNG UND HINTERGRUND

1.1. Zur uneingeschränkten Zuverlässigkeitserklärung

2004 hat der Europäische Rechnungshof zum elften Mal in Folge eine eingeschränkte Zuverlässigkeitserklärung (DAS) abgegeben. So hat er nur für die Zahlungen im Zusammenhang mit den Verwaltungsausgaben, den Heranführungshilfen und den Teil der Agrarausgaben, die nach dem Integrierten Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsystem (InVeKoS) verwaltet werden, eine positive Zuverlässigkeitserklärung vorgelegt. Die Einschränkungen der Zuverlässigkeitserklärung machen deutlich, mit welchen komplizierten Problemen die Kommission bei der Ausführung des EU-Haushalts konfrontiert ist und wie schwierig es für sie ist, dem Rechnungshof hinreichende Prüfnachweise vorzulegen.

Dass die Kommission bisher keine uneingeschränkte Zuverlässigkeitserklärung erhalten konnte, beeinträchtigt das Image der EU, sodass sie es sich zum Ziel gemacht hat, noch in der Amtszeit dieses Kollegiums eine positive Zuverlässigkeitserklärung zu erhalten.

Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, hat die Kommission im Juni 2005 einen „Fahrplan zur Schaffung eines integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens“ mit einer Reihe von Vorschlägen für einen gemeinschaftsweiten integrierten Kontrollrahmen angenommen[1]. Wie in der Stellungnahme Nr. 2/2004 des Rechnungshofes zu einem wirksamen und effizienten integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmen[2] wird auch in dieser Mitteilung ein integrierter Ansatz empfohlen, der eine wirksamere und effizientere interne Kontrolle der EU-Mittel ermöglichen und eine solide Grundlage für die vom Rechnungshof zu erstellende Zuverlässigkeitserklärung bieten soll.

Der dort vorgeschlagene Maßnahmenkatalog wurde unter Berücksichtigung der Reaktionen des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates sowie der informellen Ratschläge des Rechnungshofes erstellt und zeigt auf, was die Kommission und ihre Dienststellen tun müssen, um ihr Ziel zu erreichen.

1.2. Fortschritte bei der Schaffung eines integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens seit der Annahme der Mitteilung zum Fahrplan

1.2.1. Auf Kommissionsebene

Der am 3. Mai 2005 angenommene Vorschlag zur Änderung der Haushaltsordnung sieht vor, dass der Rechnungsführer die Abschlussrechnungen der Kommission abzeichnen soll. Durch die verstärkte Anwendung von Wesentlichkeitskriterien werden die Zuverlässigkeitserklärungen der Generaldirektoren mehr Aussagekraft erhalten. Mit der Synthese der jährlichen Tätigkeitsberichte 2004[3] wurde die Beurteilung der Verwaltungsvorgänge kommissionsweit verstärkt. Mit der Synthese 2005 wird die Zuverlässigkeitsgewähr, die die Kommission dem Rechnungshof bieten kann, insgesamt weiter verbessert. Die Umsetzung vorhergehender Empfehlungen des Rechnungshofes durch die Kommission wird nunmehr vom Auditbegleitausschuss überwacht. Ferner hat die Kommission in allen ihren Diensten ein einheitliches Risikomanagementkonzept[4] eingeführt.

Wie in der Mitteilung über einen Fahrplan zur Schaffung eines integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens vorgeschlagen haben die Kommissionsdienste eine Bewertung der Defizite der bestehenden Kontrollen vorgenommen und die Ergebnisse in einem Arbeitsdokument[5] festgehalten, in dem für jede Form der Mittelverwaltung die Mängel aufgezeigt werden, die abgebaut werden müssen, wenn ein vollständig integrierter Kontrollrahmen verwirklicht werden soll. Die in dieser Mitteilung behandelten Themen wurden in vier Arbeitsgruppen formuliert.

1.2.2. Auf einzelstaatlicher Ebene

Am 21. und 22. September 2005 trafen Vertreter von operativen, Prüfungs- und Finanzdiensten aller Mitgliedstaaten in einer von der Kommission und dem Ratsvorsitz gemeinsam geführten Arbeitssitzung zusammen, um diese Defizitbeurteilung zu erörtern und zu überlegen, wie die Kommission bei der Konzeption und Umsetzung ihres integrierten Internen Kontrollrahmens unterstützt werden könnte. Bei dieser Sitzung waren ferner Vertreter des Haushaltskontrollausschusses des Europäischen Parlaments und leitende Beamte des Rechnungshofes anwesend.

Nach Diskussionen im Haushaltsausschuss und AStV bestätigte der Rat auf der Tagung „Wirtschaft und Finanzen“ am 8. November 2005, dass er den „Fahrplan“ der Kommission unterstützt. Außerdem forderte er die Mitgliedstaaten zur Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommission in Bereichen wie der Durchführung von Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen und der Annahme gemeinsamer Kontrollgrundsätze mit Blick auf eine Vereinfachung der Verfahren auf. Im Verlauf der Gespräche haben fünf Mitgliedstaaten für die Kontrollen im Bereich der Strukturfonds die Unterzeichnung eines „Vertrauenspakts“ zugesagt.

In seinen Schlussfolgerungen unterstützt der Rat mehrere Vorschläge:

- Er unterstützt den Ansatz, dem zufolge ein wirksamer interner Kontrollrahmen dem Rechnungshof eine ausreichende Grundlage für eine positive Aussage über das Risikomanagement bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen und – bei Mehrjahresprogrammen – über die Bewertung des Fehlerrisikos während der gesamten Laufzeit bieten kann.

- Er befürwortet eine Vereinfachung der Rechtsetzung für den Zeitraum 2007-2013, die gleichzeitig eine hinreichende Zuverlässigkeitsgewähr ermöglicht.

- Er sieht noch Spielraum für die Harmonisierung der Kontrollgrundsätze und -normen der Kommission und der Mitgliedstaaten auf der Grundlage international bewährter Verfahren.

- Er unterstützt das Konzept eines mit einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten auf freiwilliger Basis zu schließenden Vertrauenspaktes.

- Er befürwortet den Ausbau der bestehenden Kontrollstrukturen im Hinblick auf eine Verbesserung des Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnisses und die Vereinfachung der Verfahren.

Keine Zustimmung fand hingegen der Vorschlag, dass auf der höchsten politischen Ebene Erklärungen zur Mittelverwaltung vorgelegt werden sollten. Der Rat bestätigte aber, dass Erklärungen der operativen Stellen für die Kommission und im Endeffekt auch für den Rechnungshof eine wesentliche Grundlage für die Beurteilung der Zuverlässigkeit darstellen und dass diese Erklärungen nutzbringend und effizient sein müssen.

2. DEFIZITBEWERTUNG: ERGEBNISSE UND HANDLUNGSBEDARF

Interne Kontrolle der Kommission

Die Ergebnisse der von den einzelnen Diensten durchgeführten eingehenden Defizitbewertung (Übersicht siehe Anhang 2) bestätigen, dass die Kommission bereits über eine brauchbare Grundlage für einen Internen Kontrollrahmen verfügt. Bei jeder Mittelverwaltungsart wird das Risiko von Unregelmäßigkeiten bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen mit speziellen Kontrollverfahren bewältigt. Die Kontrollen der zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge sind selten erschöpfend. Die Intensität der Kontrollen richtet sich zwar in gewissem Maße nach Kosten und Nutzen, wird aber nach empirischen Methoden festgelegt; an diesem Punkt muss weiter gearbeitet werden. In den Bereichen mit den mutmaßlich höchsten Risiken werden verstärkt Ex-ante- Kontrollen durchgeführt, beispielsweise mit Unterstützung der Delegationen der Kommission. Die im Agrarsektor vermuteten Risiken sind durch das Integrierte Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsystem (InVeKoS) und zusätzliche Ex-post- Kontrollen auf ein Mindestmaß begrenzt worden. Bei allen kleineren Projekten, die mit EU-Mitteln gefördert werden, gehen die Mittelbewirtschafter nach dem Kosten-Nutzen-Prinzip vor und führen gegebenenfalls zum Zeitpunkt der Anträge auf Abschlusszahlung oder nach Abschluss des Projekts Vor-Ort-Kontrollen durch; bei den Zwischenzahlungen wird dabei ein relativ höheres Fehlerrisiko in Kauf genommen.

Interne Kontrolle in den Mitgliedstaaten und sonstigen Einrichtungen

In den Fällen, in denen die Kommission die Bewältigung des Fehlerrisikos bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen anderen Behörden übertragen hat, sind sowohl auf regionaler als auch zentraler Ebene Kontrollsysteme eingerichtet, dank deren die Kommission davon ausgehen kann, dass ein angemessenes Fehlerrisikomanagement seitens dieser Behörden gewährleistet ist. Die Kommission prüft die Funktionsweise dieser Kontrollsysteme und setzt, falls sie zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass die Sicherheit der Gemeinschaftsmittel nicht angemessen gewährleistet wurde, Zahlungen aus bzw. nimmt Finanzkorrekturen vor, um den dem Gemeinschaftshaushalt entstandenen Schaden wieder gutzumachen. In den neuen Legislativvorschlägen für 2007-2013 sind die einschlägigen Bestimmungen verschärft worden; sie werden im Wege von Durchführungsbestimmungen und Leitlinien weiter ausgestaltet werden.

Auf diese Weise können Fehler in einzelnen Zahlungsanträgen vor der Leistung der Zahlung entdeckt, zum Zeitpunkt des Antrags auf Abschlusszahlung bzw. im Anschluss an eine Ex-post- Prüfung korrigiert oder im Wege einer dem Mitgliedstaat oder der betreffenden Einrichtung auferlegten Finanzkorrektur kompensiert werden.

Mögliche Verbesserungen

Die Vorgehensweisen sind in den einzelnen Dienststellen der Kommission und, wenn es sich um in geteilter Verwaltung bewirtschaftete Mittel handelt, in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten häufig unterschiedlich. Wenn die Kommission einen einheitlichen Internen Kontrollrahmen einführen will, muss sie

- erforderlichenfalls auf die einzelnen Politikbereiche abgestimmte gemeinsame Grundsätze für die interne Kontrolle und gemeinsame Standards festlegen, an denen sich die Dienststellen für die vorzulegenden Erklärungen zur Mittelverwaltung und Prüftestate, bei den Ex-ante -Kontrollen, den Strategien für die Ex-post- Kontrollen und den Stichprobenverfahren orientieren können;

- eine gemeinsame Methode festlegen zur Darstellung der Grundlage für die Zuverlässigkeitserklärung der Generaldirektoren und zur Erläuterung, wie mit den Risiken umgegangen wurde und wie die Kontrollverfahren optimiert wurden;

- auf der Ebene der GD-Familien und, für Aspekte von gemeinsamem Interesse auf Ebene der Kommission, den Austausch von Prüfungs- und Kontrollergebnissen zwischen den Dienststellen der Kommission und anderen Beteiligten und ihre Weiterverfolgung weiter ausbauen;

- die Kontrollstrategien nach dem Kosten-Nutzen-Prinzip ausrichten. Nach Durchführung einer Kostenabschätzung und Ermittlung des möglichen Nutzens (einschließlich der abschreckenden Wirkung) wird schrittweise bewertet werden können, welches Risikoniveau noch vertretbar ist.

Um einerseits angemessene Kontrollen zu gewährleisten und andererseits Regeln zu vermeiden, deren Einhaltung hohe Kosten verursachen würde, wird sich die Kommission mit ihrem Aktionsplan an folgenden Grundsätzen orientieren:

- Kohärenz: Ausgehend von den in der Stellungnahme des Rechnungshofs zum Modell der „Einzigen Prüfung“ formulierten Kontrollgrundsätzen und allgemein anerkannten Verfahren und Standards für die interne Kontrolle ist in allen Fällen, die hinsichtlich der Art der Empfänger und der beteiligten Stellen, der Art der Tätigkeit und der Anzahl und Größenordnung der Vorgänge Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen, ein kohärenter Ansatz zu verfolgen.

- Vereinfachung der Rechtsvorschriften und Kontrollstrukturen, soweit machbar, um die Belastung für die Beteiligten gering zu halten, wobei jedoch ein ausreichendes Maß an Überwachung gewährleistet sein muss.

- Flexibilität und Rechenschaftspflicht: Unter Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Besonderheiten der einzelnen Politikbereiche und der zwischengeschalteten Kontrollen, ist ein gewisses Maß an Berichterstattung erforderlich, um nachzuweisen, dass ein angemessenes Fehlerrisikomanagement gewährleistet ist. Die Kommission gewährt eine gewisse Flexibilität, indem sie soweit möglich die Verwaltungsverfahren der jeweiligen Staaten gelten lässt, vertritt aber die Auffassung, dass die jeweiligen Partner im Gegenzug stärker Rechenschaft über die von ihnen verwalteten EU-Mittel ablegen müssen.

- Die Transparenz der Kontrolltätigkeiten, Ergebnisse und Abhilfemaßnahmen ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass ein auf Grundsätzen basierendes System korrekt funktioniert. In einem integrierten Kontrollrahmen sind die aufeinander folgenden Kontrollen nur dann verlässlich und ist somit das Modell der "Einzigen Prüfung" nur dann realisierbar, wenn die Strukturen genau definiert und dokumentiert werden.

3. VORSCHLÄGE FÜR 2006 UND 2007 UMZUSETZENDE MASSNAHMEN

3.1. Gemeinsame Grundsätze für die interne Kontrolle und gemeinsame Standards

3.1.1. Verankerung des Grundsatzes einer wirksamen und effizienten internen Kontrolle in der Haushaltsordnung

Um den Grundsatz der wirksamen und effizienten internen Kontrolle rechtlich zu verankern, schlägt die Kommission vor, im Zuge der Änderung der Haushaltsordnung[6], die sich derzeit im Stadium der interinstitutionellen Konsultation befindet, einen entsprechenden Haushaltsgrundsatz aufzunehmen. So kann gewährleistet werden, dass sich alle Beteiligten an eine Reihe grundlegender Kontrollgrundsätze halten müssen, und dass das effiziente Fehlerrisikomanagement bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen als Endziel der internen Kontrolle festgeschrieben wird. Ein gemeinsames Grundprinzip würde außerdem die Prüfungen des Rechnungshofs zu den Verwaltungsprozessen und –verfahren auf eine klarere Grundlage stellen.

3.1.2. Erklärungen zur Mittelverwaltung, die einen echten Mehrwert bieten

Die Mitgliedstaaten vertreten unterschiedliche Meinungen hinsichtlich der auf nationaler Ebene abzugebenden Erklärungen zur Mittelverwaltung. Nach Auffassung der Kommission erhöhen solche Erklärungen das Verantwortungsbewusstsein der direkt mit der Verwaltung von EU-Mitteln befassten Personen. Daher beabsichtigt die Kommission, bei geteilt, dezentral, gemeinsam und indirekt zentral verwalteten Mitteln, und soweit dies nicht bereits der Fall ist, stärker auf Erklärungen zur Mittelverwaltung oder vergleichbare Erklärungen zurückzugreifen und diese zu einem zentralen Instrument der internen Kontrolle zu machen.

Bei der Defizitbewertung wurde erkennbar, dass einige Dienststellen von einem Erfahrungsaustausch in diesem Bereich profitieren könnten. Ein solcher Erfahrungsaustausch ließe sich außerdem zur Erarbeitung von Leitlinien für die Erstellung aussagekräftigerer Erklärungen nutzen. Diese Leitlinien könnten z.B. Empfehlungen zur Kontrollkette, zur Wesentlichkeit, zu den Fehlerkategorien und der Formulierung von Vorbehalten enthalten. Die Überlegungen werden sich auf die Erfahrungen der Dienststellen stützen, die solche Kontrollmechanismen bereits einsetzen, und in praktische Leitlinien münden, die im September 2006 vorgelegt werden sollen.

3.1.3. Gemeinsame Grundsätze für die Bescheinigung der Zuverlässigkeit durch externe Kontroll- und Prüfstellen

Es wurde festgestellt, dass mithilfe von gemeinsamen Grundsätzen gewährleistet werden muss, dass die von externen Prüfern und bescheinigenden bzw. Prüfstellen durchgeführten Kontrollen angemessen sind und dass die Empfänger die Art und Auswirkungen der Kontrollen der zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge nachvollziehen können. Dies ist eine der wichtigsten Voraussetzungen für die Umsetzung des Modells der „Einzigen Prüfung“.

Für den Bereich der Strukturmaßnahmen ist mit dem „Vertrauenspakt“ ein Muster für eine zweiseitige Vereinbarung im Bereich der Prüfung und Kontrolle geschaffen worden. Die Kommission wird mit allen Mitgliedstaaten, die dies bereits auf politischer Ebene zugesagt haben (Dänemark, Niederlande, Österreich, Portugal und das Vereinigte Königreich), einen entsprechenden Pakt unterzeichnen, weitere Mitgliedstaaten für die Unterzeichnung des Paktes gewinnen und die Anwendung dieser Grundsätze im Bereich der Verwaltungskontrolle propagieren.

Die für den Zeitraum 2007-2013 anzunehmenden Rechtsakte bieten die Gelegenheit, durchzusetzen, dass die grundlegenden Prinzipien hinsichtlich der Art und Umfang der Kontrollen allgemein zur Anwendung gelangen. Das Grundkonzept des Vertrauenspakts hat außerdem in die künftige Strukturfondsverordnung des Rates Eingang gefunden. Die Kommission vertraut darauf, dass der Rat dieses Ziel auch in der Endrunde der Verhandlungen um die für den Zeitraum 2007-2013 zu beschließenden Rechtsakte nicht aus den Augen verliert.

Für die Prüf- und Kontrolltätigkeit der Generaldirektionen verwandter Politikbereiche wird die Kommission Leitlinien erarbeiten, die auf der in den Diensten üblichen Praxis und den international anerkannten Standards aufbauen. Diese Leitlinien sollen den Generaldirektionen und Diensten bei folgenden Aufgaben helfen:

- Festlegung klarer, einfacher und solider Kontrollstrategien, die dem Mehrjahreszuschnitt vieler Programme Rechnung tragen;

- Festlegung von Kriterien, die mit der Ausstellung von Prüfungsbescheinigungen beauftragte Prüfer bei ihren Prüfprogrammen berücksichtigen müssen, mit einem Schwerpunkt auf „vereinbarte Prüfungshandlungen“;

- Zulassung, Fortbildung und Überwachung der externen Rechnungsprüfer;

- Verringerung des Verwaltungsaufwands und optimale Nutzung der bereits bestehenden Kontroll- und Berichterstattungsstrukturen;

- Übernahme eines gemeinsamen Ansatzes für die Feststellung der Auswirkungen der Nichteinhaltung von gültigen Bedingungen (einschließlich allgemeiner EU Vorschriften) und sonstiger Fehler auf den EU-Haushalt;

- Übernahme gemeinsamer Ansätze für im Hinblick auf die Korrektur von Fehlern und die Ermittlung deren globaler Auswirkungen geeignete, risikoorientierte und repräsentative Stichproben.

Ferner wird Mitte 2006 ein Vergabeverfahren für den Abschluss eines Rahmenvertrags eingeleitet, der verschiedene Kontrollmethoden sowie die Durchführung von Kontrolltätigkeiten und die Verfolgung der Leistung der Kontrollen zum Gegenstand hat und von allen Generaldirektionen und Diensten verwendet werden kann.

3.2. Gemeinsame Muster für die Darstellung der Kontrollstrategie auf der Ebene der Dienststellen

3.2.1. Gemeinsame Muster für die internen Kontrollstrukturen

Einer der wichtigsten der bei der Defizitbewertung aufgezeigten Mängel besteht darin, dass die Generaldirektionen und Dienste die Zuverlässigkeit und Solidität ihrer Kontrollstrategien und ihres internen Kontrollsystems nicht hinreichend nachweisen können. Um die notwendige Gesamtübersicht über die einzelnen Stufen der internen Kontrollkette und die Verantwortlichkeiten der jeweiligen Dienststellen zu ermöglichen, muss kommissionsweit ein gemeinsames Konzept zugrunde gelegt werden.

Ziel der Muster ist, für jede Form der Mittelverwaltung die Struktur der Kontrollkette zu verbessern und zu dokumentieren, inwieweit die Kontrollkette eine ausreichende Grundlage für die im Rahmen der jährlichen Tätigkeitsberichte vorzulegenden Zuverlässigkeitserklärungen darstellen. Es müssen daher auf die einzelnen Verwaltungsbedingungen abgestimmte Muster für die interne Kontrolle entwickelt werden. Diese sollen folgenden Prinzipien Rechnung tragen:

- Die Verteilung zwischen Ex-ante- und Ex-post- Kontrollen muss ausgewogen sein.

- Die Wirksamkeit der Ex-ante- und Ex-post- Aktenprüfungen muss erhöht werden (insbesondere indem die Prüfungen zeitlich so geplant werden, dass es noch möglich ist, Abhilfemaßnahmen zu ergreifen).

- Das Risikoprofil der Empfänger (und zwischengeschalteten Stellen) muss bewertet werden.

- Die Kontrollen/Prüfungen müssen dahingehend angepasst werden, dass die für die Bestimmung der Stichprobe herangezogenen Zuverlässigkeits- und Wesentlichkeitskriterien dem Risikoumfeld und dem tolerierten Risiko entsprechen.

- Dem Mehrjahrescharakter der Programme muss Rechnung getragen werden.

- Es müssen faire und angemessene Finanzkorrekturen und Sanktionen auferlegt und zu Unrecht gezahlte Beträge wieder eingezogen werden.

- Den Kontrollen bei den Endempfängern und den mit der Abwicklung beauftragten Stellen muss Vorrang eingeräumt werden.

- Die Aufgaben und Zuständigkeiten der verschiedenen Akteure müssen – insbesondere im Bereich der Strukturfonds – klar geregelt werden.

Diese Muster sollten nach Abschluss einer kommissionsweiten dienstübergreifenden Konsultation im Mai 2006 von der Kommission angenommen werden.

3.2.2. Übersicht über die Strategie für die interne Kontrolle der einzelnen Generaldirektionen oder Dienste

Die vorstehend beschriebenen Muster werden es den Generaldirektionen und Diensten ermöglichen, mit Unterstützung der horizontalen Dienststellen bis September 2006 einen Entwurf für eine Übersicht über ihre Kontrollsysteme und ihre diesbezügliche Strategie auszuarbeiten. Aus dieser Übersicht muss klar hervorgehen, welche Zuverlässigkeitsgewähr auf den jeweiligen Kontrollstufen erreicht wird. Auch auf die Kontrollsysteme der Mitgliedstaaten muss gegebenenfalls verwiesen werden.

Diese Übersichten werden noch vor Jahresende 2006 informell geprüft; dabei werden die Generaldirektionen nach Politikbereichen zusammengefasst. Die Übersichten sollen eine kohärente Berichterstattung über die internen Kontrollsysteme im Rahmen der Tätigkeitsberichte für 2006 ermöglichen und diese auf eine solidere Basis zu stellen. Werden an den Kontrollsystemen wesentliche Änderungen vorgenommen, haben die Dienststellen ihre Beschreibungen jeweils entsprechend zu aktualisieren.

3.3. Austausch von Prüfungs- und Kontrollergebnissen und Folgemaßnahmen

In den Fällen, in denen mehrere Generaldirektionen oder Dienste mit denselben externen Partnern und Empfängern zusammenarbeiten, wird die Kommission einen Koordinierungsmechanismus einsetzen, um auf möglichst effiziente Weise die Zuverlässigkeit deren Kontrollsysteme zu ermitteln.

Mehrere politisch verwandte Generaldirektionen übermitteln sich gegenseitig ihre Prüfberichte, und auch Mitgliedstaaten erstellen jährliche Übersichten über ihre Prüftätigkeit in Form von Plänen oder Tätigkeitsberichten, die auf Antrag eingesehen werden können. Die Kommission schlägt vor, solche Austauschmaßnahmen auszubauen damit die Generaldirektionen verwandter Politikbereiche eine vergleichende Bewertung ihrer Fehlerkategorien, der bei Vor-Ort-Kontrollen anhand repräsentativer Stichproben ermittelten Fehlerquoten und der Abhilfemaßnahmen vornehmen. Die Prüfergebnisse müssen regelmäßig analysiert werden, damit festgestellt werden kann, wo zentrale Probleme sind, die behoben werden müssen. Zur Verbesserung des Datenaustauschs und der Verfolgung der Umsetzung von Empfehlungen können EDV-Instrumente, wie Sysaudit und Issue Track eingesetzt werden. Alle Kommissionsdienststellen werden die erzielten Fortschritte in ihren Tätigkeitsberichten für 2006 zusammenfassen.

Zusätzlich zu diesem Ansatz nach verwandten Politikbereichen soll kommissionsübergreifend ein Austausch von Kontroll- und Prüfungsdaten (insbesondere von Systemprüfungen) zwischen Generaldirektionen und Diensten und hochrangigen zwischengeschalteten Stellen, wie die VN, EIB, NRO oder andere beteiligte Einrichtungen (akkreditierte Stellen bei dezentraler Mittelverwaltung, nationale Stellen im Bereich der Bildungspolitik usw.) stattfinden. Dieser kommissionsweite Ansatz wird in das laufend weiter entwickelte ABAC-Informationssystem integriert und, sobald dieses lauffähig ist, schrittweise umgesetzt.

3.4. Kosten-Nutzen-Prinzip

Wie die Defizitbewertung gezeigt hat, ließe sich die Intensität der Kontrollen mit Hilfe des Kosten-Nutzen-Prinzips effizienter bestimmen. 2006 wird die Kommission (wie vom Rat “Wirtschaft und Finanzen” gefordert) ausgehend von Informationen der Mitgliedstaaten und anderer Beteiligten eine erste Schätzung der Kosten für Kontrollen in den Bereichen der geteilten, dezentralen, gemeinsamen und indirekt zentralen Mittelverwaltung koordinieren. Sie wird ein kohärentes Konzept vorschlagen und darauf hinarbeiten, dass die Ergebnisse Anfang 2007 vorliegen. Für die Kontrollkosten in den Bereichen der direkten zentralen Mittelverwaltung werden die einzelnen Kommissionsdienststellen im September 2006 erste Schätzungen vorlegen. Auf dieser Grundlage kann die derzeitige Verteilung der Kontrollkosten zwischen den Dienststellen neu erörtert und untersucht werden, in welchem Verhältnis diese Kosten zu den Risiken bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen stehen.

Zusätzlich zur vergleichenden Bewertung der Prüf- und Kontrolltätigkeiten wird 2006 im Rahmen einer Pilotstudie der relative Nutzen der Aussetzung von Zahlungen und der Wiedereinziehung sowie die Abschreckungswirkung beurteilt werden; Letztere wird allerdings schwierig zu quantifizieren sein.

Die Kommission ist der Auffassung, dass diese Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse der Kontrollen in Verbindung mit der Entwicklung einer Risikomanagementkultur wertvolle Erkenntnisse für die Festlegung der tolerierbaren Risiken liefern wird.

3.5. Interinstitutionelle Maßnahmen

Die in den Abschnitten 3.1 bis 3.4 erläuterten Maßnahmen betreffen vornehmlich die Kommission; besonderes Augenmerk verdienen aber auch folgende interinstitutionelle Maßnahmen[7]:

- Die Kommission wird im März 2006 eine interinstitutionelle Debatte einleiten, um im Einvernehmen mit der Haushaltsbehörde gemeinsame Standards festzulegen und insbesondere über die Grundprinzipien zu entscheiden, hinsichtlich des Risikoniveaus welches angesichts des Kosten-Nutzen-Prinzips bei den zugrunde liegenden Vorgängen toleriert werden sollte.

- Da zahlreiche Vereinfachungen erst nach Änderung der Haushaltsordnung und ihrer Durchführungsbestimmungen möglich werden, sollten der Rat, das Europäische Parlament und der Europäische Rechnungshof darauf hinwirken, die laufenden interinstitutionellen Beratungen zu beschleunigen.

- Im Bereich der geteilten Mittelverwaltung wird die Kommission anstreben, die Existenz einer wirksamen nationalen koordinierenden Behörde zu gewährleisten, die den Beteiligten einen Überblick über den Stand der internen Kontrolle je Politikbereich in dem Mitgliedstaat vermitteln kann, beispielsweise durch eine Synthese operativer Zuverlässigkeitserklärungen.

- In den Rechtsvorschriften für den Zeitraum 2007-2013 wird die Kommission für alle Politikbereiche, einschließlich der Bereiche Forschung und Strukturfonds, so weit wie möglich den Bedarf nach Vereinfachung des Rechtsrahmens, einschließlich der Bestimmungen über die Förderfähigkeit bestimmter Ausgaben, berücksichtigen und die Rollen aller beteiligten Akteure klarstellen.

- Wie vom Rat „Wirtschaft und Finanzen“ gefordert, wird die Kommission Ende 2006 die bisherige Kontrollpraxis bei den Strukturfonds in den einzelnen Sektoren und Regionen sowie die Aussagekraft der bestehenden Erklärungen auf der Grundlage der jährlichen Berichte prüfen, die die Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten gemäß Artikel 13 der Verordnung Nr. 438/2001 bis zum 30. Juni 2006 vorzulegen haben und auf der Grundlage der von den Kommissionsdienststellen durchgeführten Prüfungen. Ferner wird sie Leitlinien zu den Rollen sämtlicher Beteiligten vorlegen.

- Die Mitgliedstaaten werden gebeten, die für eine Bewertung der Kontrollkosten im Bereich der geteilten Mittelverwaltung relevanten Angaben in einem Format vorzulegen, das einen Vergleich ermöglicht, damit die Kommission, diese Bewertung, wie vom Rat gefordert, vornehmen kann.

4. SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN

Eine positive Zuverlässigkeitserklärung für den Haushaltsvollzug wird von allen Organen gewünscht, doch nur die Kommission und die Mitgliedstaaten zusammen können erreichen, dass der Rechnungshof bei seinen Prüfungen tatsächlich Fortschritte hinsichtlich eines angemessenen Fehlerrisikomanagements feststellt. Der Aktionsplan könnte schließlich als Referenzrahmen für die Prüfungen des Rechnungshofes dienen. Die Kommission steht vor der nicht leichten Aufgabe, die von den jeweiligen Generaldirektionen und Diensten verfolgten Ansätze in Einklang zu bringen und zu gewährleisten, dass der Rechnungshof hinreichende Nachweise vorfindet. Da der Haushaltsvollzug in den Bereichen Verwaltung, Heranführungshilfe und Europäischer Entwicklungsfonds sowie für die nach dem InVeKoS verwalteten Agrarausgaben positiv beurteilt wurde, werden sich die Maßnahmen des Aktionsplans vorerst auf die internen Politikbereiche und die Strukturfonds konzentrieren. Der Kommission wird daher vorgeschlagen,

- die als Anhang 2 beigefügte Zusammenfassung der von den Generaldirektionen und Diensten ermittelten Defizite anzunehmen,

- ihre Dienststellen anzuweisen, die auf ihrer Ebene erforderlichen Maßnahmen in den jährlichen Managementplan aufzunehmen;

- den in Abschnitt 3 beschriebenen und in Anhang 1 näher erläuterten Maßnahmenkatalog anzunehmen;

- Vizepräsident Kallas und Kommissionsmitglied Grybauskaité zu ermächtigen, im Anschluss an die dienststellenübergreifende Konsultation im Einvernehmen mit Präsident Barroso die in Abschnitt 3.2.1 erläuterten Muster für die Darstellung der Verantwortlichkeiten bei der internen Kontrolle anzunehmen.

ANHANG 1

A ction list for Commission services

No | Action | Sub-action | Ref. | Who | When |

Simplification and common control principles |

1 | Simplification review of proposed 2007-2013 legislation | Keep under consideration simplification of the rules for the 2007-2013 period concerning in particular the eligibility of expenditure in the structural funds and in the research programmes | 3.5 | Structural Funds family; RTD | 2006 |

2 | Integrate common internal control principles in the proposal for the revised Financial Regulation | Propose internal control as budgetary principle in the revised Financial Regulation on the basis of the results of the inter-institutional consultation | 3.1.1 3.5 | BUDG | First sem. 2006 |

3a | Establish and harmonise better the presentation of control strategies and evidence providing reasonable assurance | Establish Internal Control Templates which outline the range of control components (management declarations, balance of ex ante and ex post checking, certification, etc.) which would be expected in a given control environment | 3.2.1 | BUDG & DGs | 05/2006 |

3b | Demonstrate how DGs will gain assurance on the internal control structures for shared management and internal policies, taking the developed templates and control strategies at Commission-level into account. | 3.2.2 | Int. policy & shared management DGs * | 9/2006 |

3c | Organise peer review to enhance coherence and consistency of control strategies per family | 3.2.2 | Concerned DGs * | 12/2006 |

3d | Demonstrate how DGs will gain assurance on the internal control structures for external policy, administrative expenditure, pre-accession aid, EDF and own resources, taking the developed templates and control strategies at Commission-level into account | 3.2.2 | Concerned DGs * | 6/2007 |

3e | Organise peer review to enhance coherence and consistency of control strategies per family | 3.2.2 | Concerned DGs * | 12/2007 |

4 | Initiate inter-institutional dialogue on the basic principles to be considered regarding the risks to be tolerated in the underlying transactions | Launch inter-institutional initiative on the basic principles to be considered regarding the risks to be tolerated in the underlying transactions and the definition of common benchmarks for the management of this risk | 3.5 | BUDG | 03/2006 |

Management declarations and audit assurance |

5 | Promote operational level management declarations and synthesis reports per policy area at national level | Promote the use of management declarations at operational level in the negotiations on the 2007-2013 legislation for indirect centralised management (through national agencies, mostly in the area of education and culture) and the establishment of national coordinating bodies able to provide an overview of the assurance available for example by a synthesis of operational declarations per policy area. | 3.1.2 3.5 | AGRI Structural Funds family; EAC | First semester 2006 |

6a | Examine the utility of management declarations outside shared and indirect centralised management | Develop guidelines on making management declarations more effective in research and other internal policies (at beneficiary level) | 3.1.2 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 09/2006 |

6b | Extend guidelines on making management declarations more effective for external policies | 3.1.2 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 06/2007 |

7a | Promote best practices for increasing cost-benefit of audits at project level | Establish criteria for certification audits in research and internal policies, focusing on the use of ‘agreed upon procedures’ | 3.1.3 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 12/2006 |

7b | Examin criteria, where these are not already in place, for certification audits in shared management 2007-2013, considering also the use of ‘agreed upon procedures’ | 3.1.3 | Concerned DGs * | 03/2007 |

7c | Extend criteria for certification audits, focusing on the use of ‘agreed upon procedures’, to other management modes, where appropriate | 3.1.3 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 06/2007 |

8 | Facilitate additional assurance from SAIs | Analysis of potential additional assurance from SAIs on existing practice related to EU-funds. | 3.5 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 12/2006 |

Single audit approach: sharing of results and prioritising cost-benefit |

9a | Construct effective tools for the sharing of audit and control results & promote the single audit approach | Assess potential actions necessary for enhancing the sharing of audit and control results and recording of their follow-up in the area of - Internal policies, including Research - Structural Funds 2007-2013 - other policies | 3.3 | Concerned DGs * | 10/2006 05/2007 12/2007 |

9b | For expenditure under direct management, implement a tool linked to ABAC for a Commission-wide exchange of information on control and audit missions in intermediary bodies such as UN, EIB, NGOs, etc | 3.3 | BUDG | 05/2007 |

9c | Launch tender for a Commission-wide contractual framework DGs for assistance on methodological issues, implementation of control work and tracking control performance | 3.1.3 | BUDG | 09/2006 |

10a | Conduct an initial estimation and analysis in the costs of controls | Assess costs of controls in shared management based on - define a common methodology - launch initiative for data to be provided by Member States - provision of data by Member States - analysis of received information | 3.3 3.5 | BUDG & concerned DGs AGRI, Structural Funds family * | 05/2006 09/2006 02/2007 09/2007 |

10b | Make a first estimation on the costs of control incurred in direct centralised management expenditure | 3.3 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 12/2006 |

11 | Initiate pilot projects on evaluating benefits | Run a pilot-experience for evaluating benefits in the context of control of internal policies | 3.4 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 03/2007 |

Sector-specific gaps |

12 | Address the gaps identified by participating services | Put in place steps to close these gaps via the Annual Management Plans, with follow up reporting on progress in the Annual Activity Reports | 4 | Every DG concerned | 03/2006 |

13 | Analyse the controls under Shared Management (in particular Structural Funds) at regional level and the value of existing statements | - Finalise, as requested by Ecofin, the analysis for Structural Funds on the present controls at sector and regional level and the value of existing statements and declarations, taking the Article 13 annual reports due by June 2006 and the results of Commission audits into account. - Update, in the context of the Annual Activity Reports, how DGs gain assurance from the internal control structures for Structural Funds and Agriculture for the 2007-2013 period. | 3.5 3.2.2 | Structural Funds family * | 12/2006 12/2007 |

14a | Provide greater guidance for structural funds on managing the risk of error | Disseminate good practices for primary level checks to manage the risk of error in underlying transactions and recommend Member States to step up their information activities directed at beneficiaries, including information on controls and risk of cancellation of funds. | 3.2.1 and roadmap | Structural Funds family | 06/2006 |

14b | Provide in the context of the Structural Funds and indirect centralised management 2007-2013 guidelines for beneficiaries and/or intermediate levels on controls and responsibilities in the control chain | 3.1.2 3.5 | Structural Funds family, EAC | 01/2007 |

15 | Promote the ‘Contracts of Confidence’ initiative for Structural Funds | Conclude for Structural Funds ‘Contracts of Confidence’ with 8 Member States, if sufficient volunteers, as a sound basis to prepare for implementation of the new legislation and to improve assurance on expenditure under the existing legislation. | 3.1.3 | Structural Funds family | 09/2006 |

16a | Establish common guidelines per policy family | Establish guidelines, based on existing experience, on accreditation, training and monitoring of external auditors in the domain of research and other internal policies | 3.1.3 | BUDG & concerned DGs | 12/2006 |

16b | Develop common approaches to using risk and representative sampling in - research and other internal policies - external policies | 3.1.3 | Int. policy DGs * | 12/2006 12/2007 |

16c | Coordinate audit standards, error rate reporting, etc. for Structural Funds | 3.1.3 | Structural Funds family | 06/2007 |

* with the help of central services, if required

ANHANG 2

1. OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT MODES

1.1. Management modes and their relationship to control principles

For all management modes, the responsibility for minimising the risk of irregularity in the underlying transactions and effecting primary controls lies with the body responsible for implementing the assistance scheme concerned. When the Commission implements an assistance scheme directly, it can readily gain assurance that this risk is minimised by the responsible services, and can rapidly take the measures it deems necessary to improve this assurance. The controls in place are described below.

For other management modes, the Commission must gain this assurance from the other bodies responsible for implementing each assistance scheme, in particular through reports and through reliance on their control systems. The Commission can test the reliability of these systems, and if necessary recover misspent money from the responsible authority. Where the systems are particularly unreliable, it can reinforce its controls. The more distant the implementing bodies are from the Commission, the more it must rely on a pyramid of audit and control bodies to obtain the assurance it needs.

The following overview presents each management mode and the particular control issues it represents. In doing so, the six control principles identified by the Court of Auditors in its ‘single audit’ opinion No 2/2004 are used[8]: Control objectives, General control conditions, Control structures, Application of controls, Cost and benefits, and Roles and responsibilities. Some of these principles are more or less relevant depending on the management mode. The means to reinforce the integrated internal control framework are then explored.

1.2. Shared management

1.2.1. Definition of management mode

While the European Commission has overall implementation responsibility for the EU budget under the Treaty, the actual operational and financial management of the funds and assistance schemes in areas under shared management is carried out by bodies appointed by the Member States. The Commission exercises supervisory controls, mainly of Member States’ control and management systems, including transaction tests at beneficiary level, and controls the flow of funds to Member States.

Final beneficiaries in areas under shared management may be farmers, private companies, associations or public entities, who conform to the eligibility criteria specified by the legislation. In the agricultural sector, eligibility criteria are defined in the regulatory framework. Eligibility criteria for Structural Funds are fixed in Community regulations and decisions but are also defined at the national level.

1.2.2. Control challenges

Policies under shared management are characterised by the predominantly local or regional nature of actions and operations. This can mean a considerable detachment from the funding source at the European level, for beneficiaries and national / local management and control actors alike. It also means a relatively long control chain with a relatively high number of actors involved and the corresponding difficulty to maintain common/comparable levels of application of rules, including potential “over-auditing” as well as “under-auditing”. The system calls for coordination of audit work and the reliance of auditors on the work of others under the 'single audit' approach.

The long control chain and reporting periods and the multi-annual nature of the system may lead to errors being detected some years after the disbursement of funds. This may limit the chances for successful recovery of amounts overpaid to private-sector beneficiaries. Where the Commission detects system deficiencies it applies flat-rate corrections which are not directly linked to beneficiaries. For the co-financed assistance schemes, moreover, the Commission sometimes encounters difficulties enforcing management and control rules and standards because beneficiaries and Member State bodies do not have sufficient awareness or knowledge of their application.

Depending on the sector concerned, there may be considerable administrative, management and control differences (control intensity, frequency and quality etc) between and even within Member States (various implementing agencies or various degrees of decentralisation), that need to be taken into account by the Commission’s planning, guidance and control activities. Member States in turn are faced by a variety of different funding schemes.

The desire to achieve high implementation rates together with absorption difficulties in Member States can diminish the focus on prevention of errors, definition of control requirements and execution of controls at the primary level. This may also reduce the incentive to cancel or recover funds. In some areas there is a lack of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions on claimants to deter incorrect claims.

1.2.3. Controls in place

Agriculture – Guarantee Section

Primary controls | Secondary controls | Central controls | Supervision |

Paying Agency (or under the supervision of Paying Agencies) | Certifying Body | Usually at Government level | Commission |

Detailed administrative controls on 100% of applications for aid, cross checks to independent databases wherever possible, and on-the-spot controls of a sample of transactions going from 1%-100% depending on the measure, and the risk associated with it (5% for rural development, 5% for arable crops, 10% for animal premia, 100% for sugar storage). Sampling is generally a mixture of risk based and representative sampling. | Independent review of the accounts and of the management system of the Paying Agencies. Representative sampling required, with a tolerable error set at 1%. (Certifying Bodies have to operate in accordance with International Audit Standards, supplemented by a number of Commission guidelines on specific subjects.) | Paying Agencies must be accredited by a Competent authority in the Member State – generally the Minister of Agriculture or the sometimes the Minister of Finance. This involves an examination of the management system. Ex post controls on a sample of large beneficiaries. It complements the controls done at primary and secondary level. Sampling is risk based. | Annual financial clearance of accounts decision – examination of the work of Certifying Bodies. Conformity audits. Analysis of Member State control statistics. Extensive guidance, including on audit and control methods, key and ancillary controls, sampling methods, sanctions Suspension of payments and financial corrections. |

Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund:

Primary Controls | Secondary Controls | Central Controls | Supervision |

Managing Authority | Paying Authority | Member state control and audit bodies | Commission |

At beginning of programming period: Verification (desk review + missions where necessary) of descriptions of management and control systems communicated by the Member States |

During programming period: verification of operations and payment claims from beneficiaries - administrative., - legal, - physical and - financial checks In some cases, audit certificates by external auditors | During programming period: Verification of expenditure declarations presented by managing authorities with reference to the management and control systems and certification of the legality and regularity of the expenditure to the Commission. | During programming period: Member state level (central or regional, possibly Supreme Audit Institutions) controls, verifying the proper functioning of management and control systems, including transaction tests (minimum sample of 5% / 15%). . | During programming period: Monitoring of programme implementation. Audits of systems in place based on risk (with substantive tests). Guidance on control and audit work (dissemination of good practices, audit manual and annual meetings) Analysis of Member States annual reports on the controls done 100% control of expenditure declarations forwarded by the Paying Authorities to the Commission. Suspension of payments and financial corrections. . |

At the closure of the programme: Verification by an independent audit (“winding-up”) body of the management and control systems and, if necessary, of a sample of transactions, in order to obtain reasonable assurance on validity of certified expenditure declarations and the regularity of underlying operations | At the closure of the programme: Control of reliability of validity declarations provided by Member State winding-up bodies and checking of final reports and final payment claims submitted by managing and paying authorities. Closure audits on-the-spot of beneficiaries on basis of risk or representative samples followed by financial corrections and recoveries after the closure of the programme. Cross-check with OLAF databases before closure |

1.2.4. Main issues identified after gap analysis on current legislation

Control objectives: Despite extensive descriptions of the various control systems for the Structural Funds, the definition of specific control objectives at primary and secondary level is less clear than for the central Member State level (e.g. audit manuals addressed to the ex-post control bodies). Progress has been made at Commission level as evidenced in the AAR 2004. Monitoring the effectiveness and timeliness of recoveries / financial corrections needs more attention, notably in the context of Structural Funds.

General control conditions: Information on the controls carried out is not always easily available for all levels of control, and there is a need for guidance on good control practices in some areas. Provision of a legal base for and use of penalties and sanctions at Community level is as such not foreseen in Structural Funds.

Control structures: Disclosure statements and annual assurance declarations by a high-level political authority in the Member State (ex. Finance ministers, as proposed by the European Parliament) are not required. In agriculture, ex-ante accreditation as well as yearly audit certificates (and in future yearly management declarations by the Paying Agencies) are available. Structural Funds base assurance on certification of payment claims, reports of independent audit work and audit certificates at closure. In addition to this, an ex ante assessment of the compliance of the management and control system by a national audit body and an annual audit opinion are proposed for the new period.

For the Structural Funds, the ‘Contracts of Confidence’ initiative offers comparable audit assurance on an annual basis to what is proposed for the new period. It is being pursued on a voluntary basis with some Member States, while efforts are being made to raise assurance generally for all Member States through improved reporting and co-ordination. There is also scope for further harmonisation of audit standards.

Application of controls: For agriculture the use of the IACS[9] is extended to measures not yet covered by the system. For Structural Funds, common databases regarding essential control results of control are not in place but central and supervisory levels have access to records at primary and secondary levels for their audit work.

Guidance to beneficiaries on the rules to be applied could be enhanced in some areas. There is scope for better reporting by Member States on the controls carried out and their results. Controls at first and second level should be analysed and used as a management and monitoring tool. Emphasising beneficiaries’ expectations of being controlled can also reinforce the controls’ dissuasive character.

Cost and benefits: The estimation of control costs is available in areas where this represents eligible expenditure for Community funding. Where this is not the case, it should be possible to assess costs in particular for dedicated control staff and activities. Parliament recommended extending the eligibility of control/audit cost to all areas. The error rate, based on a consistent methodology (to be defined beforehand where possible), should be reported in all control reports. Among the benefits, the preventive effect of controls needs to be taken into account as well as the financial impact in terms of recoveries.

1.3. Decentralised management

1.3.1. Definition of management mode

In decentralised management, certain implementation tasks (namely tender and contracting and/or payments) are delegated to third countries. The key element of all decentralisation is that the National Administration is the contracting authority. Unlike shared management, there are various degrees or modes of decentralisation, depending on the quality and existence of management and control systems of third countries. Legally, international agreements (usually a financing agreement, often supplemented by memorandums of understanding of various kinds) between the Commission and the third country are adopted, and the Commission retains the overall responsibility for financial implementation.

There are three main types of decentralisation, the main differences arising from whether payments are decentralised or not, and whether ex-ante control by the Commission is carried out on procurement or not (some ex-post controls are always carried out).

Decentralised procurement with ex-ante control and Centralised payments: the Commission decides to entrust a number of tasks to the partner country, typically the tendering and contracting process, but the Commission controls all decisions ex-ante. Payments are made directly by the Commission to the contractors. The main reason behind this system is that the Commission does not have the means to build adequate assurance on the management and control systems in the third country (Not used in enlargement).

Decentralised procurement with ex-ante control and decentralised payment: this management mode is used for pre-accession countries in the early stages of their decentralised management and for development aid, when predefined criteria defined in article 164 of the Financial Regulation are met. Practical modalities are detailed in internal instructions.

In the case of pre-accession countries, the National Administration pays the contractor and then claims back from the Commission (who again applies ex-ante control to the claim according to the FR 79-81 often supplemented by additional ex-post controls over both procurement and payment). Since 2003 this any new operation under ‘Decentralised Implementation System’ (DIS) is preceded by a process of preparation and improvement by the National Administration of the structures and procedures which are managing EC funds in a decentralised manner. These are then checked by the Commission services through ‘DIS’ verification system audits and formally accredited by a Commission Decision[10]. The organisational structures of the National Administration for implementing aid are broadly established through Memorandums of Understanding between the Commission and the National Authorities, as well as internal operating agreements within the National Authorities. The structures include “Implementing Agencies” to handle contract and payment matters and a “National Fund”, which handles the flow of funds between the Commission and the Implementing Agencies and is responsible for overall control of the implementing systems. The Commission monitors implementation on an ongoing basis through a joint monitoring structure and where required through follow-up audits.

In the case of development aid, payments are made to the beneficiary third country or its implementing authority on a designated account from which the third country/the implementing authority is authorised to make payments to a final beneficiary.

Decentralised procurement and payment without ex-ante control – neither over decentralised tendering and contracting nor over payments : this management mode mainly applies to the implementing structures in the 10 new Member States who are still implementing Phare programmes and so-called Transition facility programmes after accession and for development aid, when predefined criteria defined in internal instructions are met. It will also apply to future candidate countries when their DIS systems are considered ready to waive the ex-ante control over tendering and contracting.

As with all decentralised models, the Commission still continues to exercise its ex-ante controls over payments of claims from the National Authority and certain selected ex-post controls over contracts and payments.

The enlargement model is practically identical to the previous one except that the ex-ante control over procurement is removed following a Commission Decision. This is done when a National Authority has been managing under the previous model and has reached the point where they have demonstrated their capacity to work effectively and have been subject to a further systems assessment. Implementation agencies are accredited by decision of the Commission following a more demanding EDIS audit of the management and control systems. This model is mandatory under the Act of Accession for new Member States who are still implementing PHARE, although it can be applied to candidate countries as well if they are ready. Furthermore, new Member States are required to apply procurement rules compliant with the Public Procurement Directives for all new procurement from the day of accession.

Likewise, in development aid, controls on procurement occur ex-post.

1.3.2. Control challenges

Inherent risks for external assistance are linked to the geographical spread of actions, the diversity of partners and of their management and control capacity, the variety of the cooperation instruments, the high number of operations and financial transactions, the fact that funds are often implemented outside the authority of the Commission and, in some cases, the fact of shared responsibility between different Commission services. These different elements, and the potential ‘dilution’ of responsibility, generate a high variety of risk profiles.

1.3.3. Controls in place

Decentralised procurement with ex-ante control and Centralised payments

This management mode is principally applied in developing countries with weaker management and control structures. The Commission play a key role in ensuring strong ex-ante checks and close supervision of the implementation of projects.

Audit certificates accompany certain claims, established by auditors selected by the contractor. These are compulsory for certain contracts and grants reaching a given ceiling. Then, there are audits of the project/programme launched by the Commission or by the partner country, as specified in the financing agreement and additional audits deriving from an audit plan based on risks.

In addition, there is a very strong ex-ante control during all steps of the project cycle starting with the tendering (including visits on the spot). This goes beyond the usual concept of supervision, as the Commission also approves a number of decisions: tender notice, award of contract, endorsement of contract, authorisation of advances, of interim payments, acceptance of reports, etc… The Commission also carries out a transactional ex-post control since 2004. Finally, the Commission relies on a Results Oriented Monitoring system, which is sub-contracted to experts and provides through field visits coherent information on the achievements of on-going projects. This is then complemented by evaluations of the assistance schemes, usually at the end of the programme. Thematic evaluations are also carried out by the Commission.

Primary controls | Secondary controls | Central Controls |

Partner Country (Implementing Body) | Partner Country(Verifying Body) | Partner Country (National authorising Officer…) |

-tendering and award of contracts/grants -check of payment requests by contractor/beneficiary | -control of payment requests | -preparation of Financing Agreement -authorisation of payment requests -audits of projects by national audit body foreseen in Financing Agreement |

Commission Checks | Commission Supervision | Commission Supervision |

-verification and signature of Financing Agreement -acceptance of tender notices and award (above 50,000 €) -acceptance and award of call for proposals -endorsement of contracts/grants -operational checks on contracts/grants (visits, reports, etc) -financial checks: verification of eligible costs claimed, payments to contractor/beneficiary -project audits by Commission foreseen in Financing Agreement | -additional control of projects | -monitoring by Headquarters of operations by devolved Delegations -acceptance of audit certificates if required -Results Oriented Monitoring (outsourced) -transactional ex-post control (sampling based on risks) -additional audits by Commission based on risk analysis -evaluations |

Other types of decentralisation

In the context of enlargement the degree of control is largely the same in these cases as in the previous model except as regards payments (where the primary payments to contractors are under the control of the recipient states) and as regards waiver of ex-ante control over procurement by the Commission in the case of ex-post controls. Contracts and payments are, nonetheless, subject to a large number of control checks within the National Administration, together with controls affected periodically by local (internal and external) auditors. The National Authorising Officer (NAO) must present to the Commission its Annual Audit Plan as well as the main findings of the previous year’s audit. The NAO also reports quarterly to OLAF and copy to the Commission on any irregularities and measures taken. When projects and programmes are implemented, the NAO presents a final declaration to the Commission. In addition to its prior accreditation of systems, the Commission also engages in normal ex-ante controls over the payments of claims and also carries out a number of ex-post checks (selected on a risk basis) over the implementation. As a result, correction, reduction or recovery of funds may be made. The National Authorising Officer (NAO) must present to the Commission its Annual Audit Plan as well as the main findings of the previous year’s audit. The NAO also reports quarterly to OLAF and copy to the Commission on any irregularities and measures taken. When projects and programmes are implemented, the NAO presents a final declaration to the Commission.

Implementation is monitored by Joint monitoring structures (effectiveness and quality of implementation, technical and financial progress). External evaluators provide their report to these monitoring structures.

The Commission may perform on the spot checks. Closure audits by the Commission of implemented programmes/projects take place according to a risk based method and lead if necessary to recoveries.

Controls in the context of enlargement:

Primary controls | Secondary controls | Central Controls |

Partner Country (Implementing Body) | Joint Monitoring Structures | Partner Country(National authorising Officer) |

-tendering and award of contracts/grants according to EC rules in case of ex-ante controls (national rules, Public Procurement Directives compliant in case of ex-post control) -check of payment requests by contractor based in the case of works on reports by independent engineers engaged by the agency) -payments to contractor | -review and assessment of the effectiveness and quality of implementation, as well technical and financial progress -external Evaluation -resulting corrective measures (decided by the Commission, implemented by Recipient State -National Fund Verification of the payment requests submitted by the Implementing Agencies | -preparation of Financing Agreement -authorisation of payment requests -audits of projects by national audit body foreseen in Financing Agreement -verification of co-financing -authorisation of payment requests, progress report on implementation, declaration by NAO -final declaration by NAO upon closure of programmes -system audit of implementing agencies by internal audit -annual audit plan and findings of audits to Commission, report to OLAF of irregularities |

Commission Checks | Commission Supervision |

-verification and signature of Financing Agreement - control of every phase of the procurement process in the case of ex-ante controls to provide conforme aux faits assurance for payments of claims - operational checks on contracts/grants (on the spot checks) -financial checks: verification of certification of expenditure by NAO before authorising payments, recoveries/corrections | -Results Oriented Monitoring (outsourced) -transactional ex-post control (carried out by Headquarters, sampling based on risks) -additional control of projects -Verification through the PERSEUS reporting system of the use made of the Community funds transferred to the NF | -follow-up audits up to 18 months after accreditation -closure of accounts procedures by Commission made on the basis of final declarations certified by the NAO, which may give rise to corrections in the Community aid - closure audits sample selected based on risks, outsourced) -suspension of payments, if Commission concludes that a Recipient State has not complied with its obligations or it finds serious failings in the management or control systems which could lead to irregularities -evaluations |

1.3.4. Main issues identified after gap analysis

Control objectives: DGs should consider their system from the perspective of providing a coherent, well documented structure on which reliance can be placed and which can be demonstrated to the ECA. This could include a further formalisation and consolidation of the overall control strategy.

Control structures: The typology defined in the single audit opinion, namely primary, secondary and central controls, does not readily fit with this management mode. This typology will be adapted as part of the action plan of the Commission. Management and control structures for assistance schemes intending to work in the future under shared management (i.e. cross border cooperation, regional development) should be further detailed to ensure a smooth functioning of these assistance schemes and sound financial management, (particular areas of improvement are prior accreditation of implementation bodies, close supervision during implementation by concerned parties, preservation of Community’s financial interests). Management declarations should be introduced, where they do not exist yet and if appropriate considering the level of ex-ante checks and controls by the Commission. Use of penalties and sanctions at Community level could be reinforced.

Application of controls: Reliance on audit certificates can be further improved, by setting a more prescriptive framework, as recently launched by some services. The possibility to develop a common database recording audit results could be explored.

Cost and benefits: Error rates are known in some areas and the cost of controls are measured for outsourced controls/audits. An appropriate system to identify and monitor costs relating to controls and error rates could be established.

Roles and responsibilities: There may be scope in some policy areas for further improvement in establishing more clearly the roles and responsibilities in the various layers of agreements leading to contracts and grants. This may be particularly important for contractors, with whom the Commission has no direct legal relationship.

1.4. Indirect centralised management

1.4.1. Definition of management mode

Where the Commission implements the budget by indirect centralised management, implementation tasks are delegated to national public-sector bodies or bodies governed by private law with a public service mission providing adequate financial guarantees and complying with the conditions provided for in the implementing rules, the so-called National Agencies. In such cases, the Commission defines a priori all procedural rules to be respected by the implementing bodies as Commission rules fully apply; it also sets all selection and awarding criteria together with annual priorities for the award of grants, through its annual programming exercise and permanent guidance for the whole duration of the assistance scheme.

So far, this management mode has been mostly limited to national agencies working as a network in all Member States, some third countries in the field of education, training and youth, and the European Bank for Investment. The implementing bodies/agencies are then selected by National Authorities, with the agreement of the Commission. From 2004, another programme started in the field of environment.

1.4.2. Control challenges

Typical control challenges are: high number of (sometimes very small) final beneficiaries, multiple small-size projects and trans-national dimension of projects – as is also often the case in direct centralised management; high dependence on National Agencies’ control systems and audit certificates; control responsibilities of National Authorities unclear/too limited.

1.4.3. Controls in place

The table set out below gives an overview of the primary, secondary, central and supervisory controls in place in the field of education, training and youth[11]:

Primary controls | Secondary controls | Central controls | Supervisory level |

National Agencies | National Agencies | National Authorities | Commission |

- Evaluation procedures and project selection (eligibility, financial capacity, etc) - Operational monitoring of projects (review of intermediate reports to assess progress made) - Control and processing of technical reports and financial claims (check of supporting documents) - On-site audits (sampling) | - Ad hoc controls on the initiative of the National Agency (not required by the Commission) | - Ex-ante: Approval of the National Agency’s work program by the National Authorities (including a commitment for co-financing) - Ex-post: Controls of the National Agencies by the National Authorities as per Commission Decisions C(2000)402, C(2000)1537, C(2000)3155 | - Monitoring visits to National Agencies by competent operational services from EAC (various tests and sampling) - System audits as per art. 35 ME - Analysis of system audits. Presentations of main conclusions regarding primary control quality to National Agencies - Dialogues between Commission and National Authorities in case of exceptional circumstances (for example replacement of National Agency) - Bilateral meetings between Commission and National Authorities (pilot) |

External Auditors |

- Certification of the financial accounts - Ad hoc audits requested by the National Agency (not requested by the Commission) |

1.4.4. Main issues identified after gap-analysis

Control Framework : The main issues identified in the gap-analysis concern the control responsibility of the National Authorities, which is considered too weak. The aim is to implement a new control architecture via the next generation of programs (2007-2013) that will strengthen the accountability of the National Authorities (notably by requiring ex-ante Disclosure Statements and ex-post Declaration of Assurances) and also ensure that the controls carried out at this level are in line with basic control principles (e.g. establishment of control objectives, clarity and simplicity of laws and regulations, application of coherent and minimum control standards, clear communication to the control chain stakeholders, promoting of internal control, etc.).

Control structures: The Commission regularly carries out audits of the National Agencies’ primary controls systems used for controlling the final beneficiaries. The consolidation and analysis of the results of the National Agencies’ controls and audits could however be improved by enhancing the monitoring and reporting tools. No common databases on the findings of audits carried out by National Agencies exist. Use of penalties and sanctions at Community level could be reinforced. Ex-ante disclosure statements and annual ex-post declarations of assurance should be introduced in order to strengthen the control responsibility of National Authorities.

Cost/benefit : Cost/benefit-aspects and risks are generally taken into account when defining the control focus and intensity. There is however room for improvement in this area. Also, further actions are necessary to define and determine acceptable error rates.

1.5. Direct centralised management

1.5.1. Definition of management mode

For direct centralised management, the Commission has a direct contractual and control relationship to the final beneficiary. The Commission performs all the key control functions from ex-ante to ex-post approval, where necessary engaging experts or contractors to perform control or evaluation tasks on its behalf.

1.5.2. Control challenges

Although the Commission can perform detailed desk checks, when dealing with a large number of widely dispersed beneficiaries, often carrying out small projects with a transnational dimension, technical and financial verification cannot be carried out on the spot on a continuous basis. Thus supervisory controls (both on-the-spot and monitoring) are essential to reinforce and evaluate the effectiveness of primary controls.

1.5.3. Controls in place

The following table gives an overview of primary and supervisory controls put in place by the Commission on centralised, directly managed assistance schemes:

Primary controls | Supervisory controls |

Commission – Operational | Commission (where possible a unit separate from the operational unit) |

Set contractual requirements regarding delivery and execution to protect the Commission’s interests. | Ex-post evaluation of projects (frequently on a sample basis) to assess whether: Ex-ante approval correctly given; Operational controls were sufficient to identify and rectify problems; Project goals were achieved; Operational control weaknesses exist which may have contributed to under performance. |

Set selection and award criteria and request appropriate evidence in order to check (high risk) applicants. |

Selection of beneficiary and agreement defined to ensure reasonable budget and project goals. Assessment of capacity of the applicant. |

Ex-ante ‘desk checks’ of periodic technical and financial reports and tracking of project delivery. Provision of advice and guidance to ensure project goals are met. |

On-the-spot review of project work and progress, assessment of quality and reliability of beneficiary. |

Review of final deliverables against stated objectives. |

Primary controls | Supervisory controls |

Commission – Financial | Commission (where possible a unit separate from the operational unit) |

Approval of initial budget and compliance with financial provisions of the programme. | Ex-post or ‘on-the-spot’ control during or after the project (frequently on a sample basis) to assess whether: Financial claims are supported by underlying documentation; Claims have been made in accordance with applicable rules, including checks on eligibility and necessity of costs (in collaboration with the operational unit); Amounts claimed are not ‘double funded’ from other sources; Co-financing has been correctly provided and no profit is made; Financial systems are adequate to record and allocate relevant project costs. |

Approval of renewed prefinancing and interim payments based as appropriate on review of underlying documents and compliance with budget and contract. |

Controls over the correct and accurate recording of the transactions in the accounting system. |

Approval of final payments based on final delivery of project goals and compliance with budget and contract. Review of supporting documentation as appropriate. |

Independent auditor (appointed by beneficiary) |

Approval that costs claimed are consistent with requirements of the contract based on an examination of underlying documents, payments, and where appropriate a review of the beneficiary’s financial systems. |

1.5.4. Main issues identified after gap analysis

Control framework: DGs should consider their system from the perspective of providing a coherent, well documented structure on which reliance can be placed and which can be demonstrated to the ECA. Error rates and recoveries should be tracked using comparable bases where possible.

General control conditions: Legislation needs to be adapted to ensure full coherence with the reality of how assistance schemes are carried out at beneficiary level. Policies on the application of penalties and sanctions need to be introduced, harmonised and monitored across the Commission.

Control structures: The implementation of audit certification should be monitored to ensure quality control and cost effectiveness compared to other control activities.

Application of controls: Approaches to sampling and the intensity of checks should be made more consistent, taking into account the strategy implemented on ex ante controls (desk reviews or on the spot checks, supporting documents analysed). All DGs should establish awareness policies with the aim of a medium term reduction in the error rate during the lifetime of an assistance scheme.

Costs and benefits: Information on costs of controls and error rates needs to be gathered on the way to establishing a cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment to determine the appropriate level of control.

Roles and responsibilities: Consistent ex post controls can be used to make systems recommendations for beneficiary control systems which will increase the accuracy of future claims.

1.6. Joint Management

1.6.1. Definition of management mode

In joint management, certain implementation tasks are entrusted to international organisations, when actions require the pooling of resources from a number of donors, and where it is not reasonably possible or appropriate to assign the share contributed by each donor to each type of expenditure. These organisations are required to apply standards which offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards in their accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures. The Commission has to ensure that suitable arrangements exist for the control and audit of the action in its entirety. The Financial Regulation defines international organisations as international public-sector organisations set up by intergovernmental agreements, and the Red Cross.

Joint management is mostly carried out in humanitarian aid and development aid and is growing in importance (€ 159 million in humanitarian aid, and € 1.3 billion in development aid for the budget alone, 2004 figures). Other policies can have recourse to this management mode for schemes delegated to international organisations, but usually opt for the centralised direct or indirect mode.

It is proposed in the next Financial Regulation to create the possibility for a wider use of this management mode with international bodies. It is also provided that the individual contribution agreement shall contain detailed provisions for the implementation of the tasks

In addition, the existence of long-term framework agreements laying down the administrative and financial arrangements for their cooperation is one of the cases where joint management can be used in the future, the other two being the pooling of resources and joint project or programme elaborated by the Commission and the international organisation.

1.6.2. Control challenges

In this framework, control is based on mutual confidence. The focus is more on system aspects and on the action in its entirety as the EC contribution is part of a pooling of resources.

1.6.3. Controls in place

The International Organisation (IOs) may manage the EU contribution in accordance with its own regulation and rules provided that these comply with internationally accepted standards as regards accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures. The international organisation carries out its own monitoring/supervision, internal audit, and external audits. The Commission signs specific Contribution Agreements with the IOs concerned, which specify the control modalities foreseen. The Organisation has to state what parts of the action it intends to contract out, which types of contracts are foreseen and what procedures will be followed for such contracting. It will then award the contracts and monitor their implementation, being fully responsible for the co-ordination and execution of all contracted activities. The advance payment can go up to 80 or 95%. Intermediary and final payments are effected upon receipt and approval of financial reporting by Commission services.

Given the characteristics of this kind of action, the Commission has to ensure that suitable arrangements exist for the control and audit of the action in its entirety. In this respect, the General Conditions to the standard EC Contribution Agreement with an International Organisation allow the Commission to perform necessary controls, including on the spot checks. The focus of the verification clause concerns contractual and financial verifications on the individual project level in the field and at headquarters level.

The Commission has signed a number of Framework Agreements with a number of IOs (WB, UN family, etc.) with a view to establishing a lasting strategic partnership with these organisations.

Primary controls | Secondary controls | Central Controls |

International Organisation | International Organisation (Regional Offices in UN or National Red Crosses) | International Organisation |

- checks under their own rules -audit certificates if required in contract | -contracting to partners or organisations operational monitoring by Organisation experts -financial checks: verification of eligible costs claimed, payments -acceptance audit certificates -field audits | -preparation of financing request (possibly based on requests by other organisations) and signature of contribution agreement -preparation of requests to EC for advance, interim payment, and final payment |

Commission Checks | Commission Supervision |

-signature of prior framework partnership agreement - preparation of contribution agreement and commitment of funds -financial checks of payment requests (compliance with financing agreement, receipt of reports from international organisation, and of audit certificates if requested) | -operational and financial monitoring by Commission -verification mission at the International Organisation (periodic financial walkthrough test etc.) by Commission services -audits |

1.6.4. Main issues identified after gap analysis

Control objectives: As in other management modes, the overall control strategy could be better formalised and harmonised, although audit strategies already exist.

Control structures: Services intend to further harmonise and coordinate the verification of compliance with international standards by International Organisations, as foreseen in art 53.7 of the FR. There should be agreement on relevant standards on accounting, procurement, audit and internal control. Compliance audits would then be performed and incorporated into risk assessments. Management declarations should be introduced, where possible.

Cost and benefits: Error rates are known in some areas and the cost of controls are measured for outsourced controls/audits. An appropriate system to identify and monitor costs relating to controls and error rates could be established.

2. ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

After having analysed the replies of services on their gap analysis towards the control principles forwarded by the Court in its opinion 2/2004, a first list of issues to be addressed has been identified. This list has to be seen as a first contribution to the dialogue that will be initiated with Parliament, Council, the Court of Auditors and inside the Commission services. Through this consultation process this list will have to be fine-tuned and completed and should then lead to a concrete action plan to be adopted by the Commission by the end of 2005. In parallel, specific issue papers are presented and working groups will have to be started up in order to elaborate on certain basic concepts. These will be also further developed as this consultation process with the external stakeholders progresses.

Four major themes have been identified for further reflection: considerations on the overall control framework, suggestions for strengthening the organisational framework (inside the Commission as well as with its external partners), the instruments in implementing its control chain accountability and, finally some specific implementation issues.

2.1. Overall control framework

Defining and implementing an Integrated Internal Control Framework requires developing clear models of accountability for cooperation with beneficiaries and, in the case of indirect management[12], with management authorities, certifying bodies and audit bodies, including those in Member States.

The framework must be defined in sufficient detail to permit all participants in the control chain to identify and fully execute their role and to specify under which conditions assurances from the work of other management and control entities can be obtained. In doing so, the Commission services can use several instruments such as certification of expenses, audit certificates, management statements and other monitoring tools, which are defined more precisely in section 2.3.

The specification of a global view of the control system must go beyond the guidelines and legal bases, and include structures for monitoring and reporting which can be relied upon by all levels of the control chain. It has to give a global picture of all ex ante and ex post controls, as well as of the supervision to be put in place. On this basis, the most effective control structure can be defined and implemented.

These elements should include:

- Establishing the overall objectives of the controls at each level;

- Assigning accountability to each participant, including the obligations and elements to be reported on;

- Ensuring each control in the chain is based on a clearly defined and transparent methodology and related strategy;

- Choosing the correct range and level of control procedures and instruments to provide assurance in the most efficient manner;

- Ensure the intensity of checks is proportional to the financial and other risks identified;

- Providing the required level of supervision and oversight to ensure effective implementation at all points in the control chain.

2.2. Organisational issues

2.2.1. Senior management involvement

Commitment of senior management to incorporate the control framework within all aspects of programme management is key to its success. At Commission level, this means that Commissioners and Director Generals should publicise this commitment and communicate this clearly to the external partners and to the beneficiaries. At Member State level or Third Country level, the same top management involvement can be expected of representatives at Member State or Third Country level and of the management authorities.

Understanding the benefits provided by adequate risk management and the necessity of accepting a residual risk level (as a zero tolerance would impose 100% controls) are key in this respect.

Priority should be given to providing stakeholders with the information and incentives necessary to ensure all parts of the control chain are carried out to the same standard and in order to be able to give, in turn, the relevant assurances to the Commission.

2.2.2. Establishing a consistent approach per policy area regarding best practices

Initiatives which currently exist within families of DGs to develop common approaches for particular policy areas should be better structured. Models of accountability which have been found to be effective should be shared and incorporated into the global control strategy for each policy management area in accordance with the existing legal framework in each case. Organisational procedures for co-ordinating each policy management area and for structuring the work between services have to be established.

The error rate found at each control level should be monitored. These rates will vary according to the specificities of each assistance scheme and can change over time for multi-annual programmes or projects. In this context, error rates at policy level are not very meaningful.

2.2.3. Ensuring legal bases comply with the principles of the internal control framework

Legal bases should set out the criteria for the overall control strategy and define the appropriate accountability constraints, where this does not already exist. In this context, the reflection and verification of appropriate management, control and accountability mechanisms, depending upon the different actors involved, has to be reinforced[13]. The proposals the Commission has submitted in the past year in order to clarify and strengthen these mechanisms are a good platform for testing these mechanisms.

The Commission should also reflect on the necessity of adopting a specific legal base defining minimum internal control issues for all legislation, in which also global instruments, such as a management declaration at Member State level could be formalised, if this proposal is retained. Another solution would be to make the key requirements of internal control more visible in the Financial Regulation. Consideration should also be given to reconciling the multi-annual nature of Commission programming and the annuality of the DAS. Specific issue papers will develop these aspects further.

2.3. Instruments

Hereafter, some potential instruments are analysed. The minimum conditions and criteria for making these instruments effective should be defined on the basis of the control needs assessment to be done. A working group will deal with it and should include in their work the criteria to be imposed on the external partner delivering the assurances, the control specifications for the execution of the expected controls as well as the impact that these instruments have on checks and supervision by the Commission.

2.3.1. Monitoring tools and ex ante control tools

The correct implementation of ex ante controls appropriate to the domain of activity remains the primary means of ensuring sound financial management. When well constructed, defined in the legal basis (indicating the minimum level of checks for each category of expenditure), and properly supervised, ex ante checks, such as the first-level management checks in the Structural Funds, can identify and correct irregularities, allowing for immediate correction. Monitoring tools (‘scoreboards’) which provide a high-level view can identify problems not visible at the individual transaction level. A network of ex-ante financial verifiers could enable the sharing of best practice within the Commission.

The implementation of the control framework should be accompanied by regular reports and key indicators across the control chain which will enable progress to be tracked as feedback is received. These monitoring tools will permit the Commission to report adequately on its reasonable assurance or to take corrective action where necessary. The monitoring process will give the opportunity to fine tune the control strategy in order to obtain the necessary assurances throughout the life of an assistance scheme.

2.3.2. Management declarations

Management declarations (often also called ‘representations’) are a key means to focus the attention of managers on their control responsibilities and identify possible weaknesses which may have an impact on the overall level of assurance. Written management declarations should give evidence that management acknowledges its responsibility for the fair presentation of the financial statements, and for the design and implementation of internal controls.

2.3.3. Audit certificates

Audit certificates enable on-the-spot verification of a high percentage of claims to be made, providing significant assurance and the possibility of corrections before payment is made.

To ensure that this assurance is credible, the certifying auditors must fully understand the technical detail and contractual requirements of the grant/ contracts they are certifying. Effective methods to achieve this understanding should be integrated in the control framework. The type of certification to be provided and the related controls should also be adapted to each policy area.

In this context, special attention has also to be given to the criteria for selecting external auditors (including the cost effectiveness of outsourcing), the minimal control specifications to be met and the possible impact of such certificates on the level of Commission supervision. Account should also be taken of the relative costs of audit certificates by comparison with controls by the management bodies themselves.

2.3.4. System audits

In cases of indirect, decentralised or shared management of Community funds by third party entities more focus is progressively put in audit work on ensuring that the internal control system can give reasonable assurance on the regularity and legality of the underlying transactions. Instead of controlling transactions, system audits focus on the sound functioning of the internal control system and should help to base the level of assurance on more permanent mechanisms instead of testing at the level of individual transactions. Nevertheless, these system audits need also to be corroborated by some testing in order to confirm their conclusions.

Where system audits are outsourced, issues similar to those identified for audit certificates have to be addressed: the criteria for selecting external auditors, the objectives of the system audit, and the minimal control specifications to be met.

2.3.5. Ex post controls

Risk based and representative ex post controls provide a unique opportunity to verify the performance of all elements in the control chain and to reinforce the assurance provided. To maximise effectiveness, supervisory controls can make use of the underlying documentation and data from controls at secondary and central levels, where these results are reliable. The strategy should take into account the scope and methodology of ex ante controls, to remain proportional to identified risks. In particular, an appropriate balance between desk and on the spot controls has to be found. Controls should be carried out on the spot with a sufficient frequency to ensure some deterrent effect.

The benefits of these controls can be enhanced by ensuring they are performed according to a common approach within each policy management area regarding sampling methodologies, classification of errors, and overall comparability. If all elements in the control chain are performing controls according to a common representative approach, it may be possible to extrapolate the results across the policy management area.

In this context, the following issues should be developed inside the Commission: the timing of controls (during implementation, at the end of the process), the criteria for selecting external auditors, the criteria for sampling strategy, the classification of financial errors and errors in legality and regularity, and the minimal control specifications to be met in order to have a real impact on the Commission’s supervision.

2.4. Implementation issues

2.4.1. Explain and enforce common controls down the chain

In addition to establishing a consistent and effective standard for checks and supervisory controls, the Commission must ensure that secondary and central controls carried out at Member States/Third Country/International Organisations are comprehensively implemented to agreed and commonly understood minimum standards.In doing so, it is important to ensure the existence of incentives to ensure errors are identified at secondary and central level (e.g., enabling Member State authorities to keep a percentage of amounts recovered or to redistribute funds recovered to other relevant parts of the same assistance scheme)

The way Member States/Third Country/International Organisations fulfil their control obligations and report on them, will have a significant impact in achieving reasonable assurance in the area of indirect management. Guidelines must be developed well in advance and should be clearly identified as the framework the Commission will use for its checks, monitoring and supervision tasks. Support to beneficiaries (often through the intermediate levels) should get sufficient attention. The better the final beneficiary is aware of the constraints and possible sanctions, the more effective preventive controls will be.

2.4.2. Reinforce the dissuasive and proportionate nature of sanctions and recoveries

Sanctions, suspension of payments, and recoveries provide a valuable incentive to ensure claims for payment are submitted accurately and in a timely fashion. As many beneficiaries cooperate with the Commission on a long term basis, recoveries and sanctions can be easily executed, and are liable (along with the threat of suspension) to have a positive effect on future compliance.

To operate effectively, the level of sanctions or financial corrections and the criteria for their imposition must be well understood and supervised and applied fairly and proportionately (including in the case of Member States’ responsibility for applying recoveries or sanctions on claimants). The procedure for imposition of sanctions should be administratively clear and simple. The possible disincentive effects of financial corrections in the Structural Funds, for example when they lead to a net reduction of EU funding to programmes or individual beneficiaries, should be borne in mind.

2.4.3. Error rates, cost-benefit analysis and risk

As error rates become more accurately estimated according to a common methodology, the risk attached to different areas of Commission activity can increasingly be identified. To make error rates a reliable indicator of risk, however, benchmarking of standards of reporting is necessary. This should provide for split treatment of representative sampling (hopefully revealing low error rates) and risk-based sampling (aiming at finding the largest errors) and take account of the fact that due to budgetary ceilings and co-financing errors can be identified which have a small or zero budgetary impact.

Gathering data regarding the costs of controls, together with the corresponding reliable error rates and risk analyses will enable the Commission as well as every other control level to direct control activity to be more cost effective, and to ensure that the levels of controls are proportionate. Therefore, errors should be defined from the beginning in order to be correctly measured and used throughout the life of the assistance scheme.

Error rates and cost-benefit analyses will then provide the basis for DGs to assess their eventual risk tolerance and acceptable level of risk for different policies and programmes. However, it should be recognised that these methods can only provide preliminary information, after which judgement must be exercised in reaching a final decision.

[1] KOM(2005) 252.

[2] ABl. C 107 vom 30.4.2004, S. 1 (Stellungnahme zum Modell der „Einzigen Prüfung“).

[3] KOM(2005) 256.

[4] SEK(2005) 1327.

[5] SEK(2005) 1152.

[6] KOM(2005) 181 vom 3.5.2005.

[7] Nähere Informationen sind dem Dokument KOM(2006) 9 zu entnehmen.

[8] The checklist on which these reviews were based is attached in annex 1 and refers to points 34 to 56 of the Court’s single audit opinion No 2/2004.

[9] The Integrated Administration And Control System (IACS) comprises: a computerised data base, an identification system for agricultural parcels and animals, a system for the identification and registration of payment entitlements, aid applications, an integrated control system, and a single system to record the identity of each farmer who submits an aid application.

[10] Some agencies in Bulgaria and Romania still ‘benefit’ from the derogation in the Implementing Rules 269 regarding this prior systems assessment and Commission decision – but this situation will be superseded during 2006 by the assessments and Accreditation Decisions of the ‘EDIS’ process.

[11] It should be noted that EAC has reinforced the controls foreseen in the Financial Regulation, thus other implementations (e.g. ‘Forest focus’ at DG ENV) do not share all characteristics. It is also proposed to extend this management mode in the next Financial Regulation to international bodies.

[12] Indirect management means all management modes other than centralised direct, and includes thus shared management, decentralised management, joint management and centralised indirect management

[13] OLAF proposes within the framework of the interservices consultations systematically the introduction of the appropriate clauses regarding internal control in the legal base, including ensuring the legality of the on the spot controls carried out by OLAF in the course of its investigations.