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62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Finally, every provision of EU law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied (judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 20, and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 49).

62015CJ0379

Association France Nature Environnement v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie.

49 In addition, it is on the basis of the characteristics of EU law and the specific difficulties presented by its interpretation that it is for that national court to examine the extent to which it is not obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court. Accordingly, every provision of EU law, including the case-law of the Court in the relevant area, must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1982 in Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 17 and 20).

2016-07-28

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Before concluding that such is the case, the national court or tribunal of last instance must be convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 39; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 42; and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 48).

62015CJ0379

Association France Nature Environnement v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie.

48 In paragraph 16 of the judgment of 6 October 1982 in Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335), the Court held, in that regard, that the correct application of EU law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the way in which the question raised is to be resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court ruling at last instance must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied may the national court refrain from submitting that question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it.

2016-07-28

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It should be observed, in the fourth place, that national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must take upon themselves, independently and with all the requisite attention, the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves one of the situations in which they may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 40; and of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62014CJ0072

X v Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

59. It follows therefrom that it is for the national courts alone against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, to take upon themselves independently the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves an ‘acte clair’.

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts or tribunals and the Court of Justice, the national court or tribunal alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court or tribunal before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgments of 26 May 2011, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others, C‑165/09 to C‑167/09, EU:C:2011:348, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraph 57; and of 12 May 2021, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, C‑70/20, EU:C:2021:379, paragraph 25).

62014CJ0072

X v Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

57. It must be borne in mind that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgment in Eon Aset Menidjmunt , C‑118/11, EU:C:2012:97, paragraph 76).

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It should be observed, in the fourth place, that national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must take upon themselves, independently and with all the requisite attention, the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves one of the situations in which they may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 40; and of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62014CJ0072

X v Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

58. Moreover, the case-law as stated in Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335) gives the national court sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and for deciding, as a result, to refrain from referring to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of EU law which has been raised before it (judgment in Intermodal Transports , C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited) and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it (judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16).

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the second place, it should be noted that the authority of an interpretation already provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU may deprive the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance, especially where the question raised is materially identical to a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or, a fortiori, in the same national proceedings, or where established case-law of the Court already resolves the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 1963, Da Costa and Others, 28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6, p. 38; of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 and 14; of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C‑337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraph 29, and of 2 April 2009, Pedro IV Servicios, C‑260/07, EU:C:2009:215, paragraph 36).

62007CJ0260

Pedro IV Servicios SL v Total España SA.

36. While it is indeed true that the block exemption regulations apply in so far as agreements contain restrictions on competition caught by Article 81(1) EC, it is nevertheless often more practical to ascertain first whether those regulations apply to a given agreement, in order to avoid – if those regulations do apply – a complex economic and legal assessment to determine whether the conditions for the application of Article 81(1) EC are met. In any event, it is clear from the line of case‑law established in CILFIT and Others that a referring court, the decisions of which are not subject to appeal in the internal legal order, and which has to apply a provision of Community law to a dispute before it, is not bound to ask the Court for an interpretation of that provision if the point of law at issue has been resolved by established case-law of the Court, whatever the nature of the proceedings which have given rise to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical.

2009-04-02

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It follows that the determination and formulation of the questions to be put to the Court devolve upon the national court or tribunal alone and that the parties to the main proceedings may not change their tenor (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

62012CJ0136

Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei geologi.

29. The determination and formulation of the questions to be put to the Court devolves upon the national court alone and the parties to the main proceedings may not change their tenor (Joined Cases C‑42/10, C‑45/10 and C‑57/10 Vlaamse Dierenartsenvereniging and Janssens [2011] ECR I‑2975, paragraph 43, and Case C‑316/10 Danske Svineproducenter [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32).

2013-07-18

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it is appropriate to recall, in the first place, that it follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts and tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts and tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case (judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 10; of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 26; and of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 43).

62012CJ0136

Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei geologi.

26. It follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts or tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of European Union law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts or tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of justice a question concerning the interpretation of European Union law raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case (Case 283/81 Cilfit and Others [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 10).

2013-07-18

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the system of direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, established by Article 267 TFEU, is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia, C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22). The latter cannot deprive the national courts of their independence in exercising the discretion referred to in paragraph 50 above, in particular by compelling them to make a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 1978, Mattheus, 93/78, EU:C:1978:206, paragraph 5).

62012CJ0136

Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei geologi.

28. The Court has already held that the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States institutes direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (Case C‑210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I‑9641, paragraph 90, and Case C‑104/10 Kelly [2011] ECR I‑6813, paragraph 62).

2013-07-18

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

The principle of equivalence requires that all the rules applicable to actions apply without distinction to actions alleging infringement of EU law and to similar actions alleging infringement of national law (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

50 First, as regards the principle of equivalence, it should be borne in mind that this requires that all the rules applicable to actions apply without distinction to actions alleging infringement of EU law and to similar actions alleging infringement of national law (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 January 2014, Pohl, C‑429/12, EU:C:2014:12, paragraph 26, and of 20 October 2016, Danqua, C‑429/15, EU:C:2016:789, paragraph 30).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

If, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Member State concerned which observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the pleas in law raised before a court or tribunal referred to in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be declared inadmissible, a request for a preliminary ruling cannot be regarded as necessary and relevant for that court or tribunal to be able to give judgment (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 44).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

44 Consequently, if, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Member State concerned, the pleas in law raised before a court referred to in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be declared inadmissible, a request for a preliminary ruling cannot be regarded as necessary and relevant for that court to be able to give judgment.

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

As regards the principle of effectiveness, national procedural rules must not be such as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order. In that regard, account should be taken of the role of those provisions in the procedure, its progress and special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In that context, it is appropriate to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraphs 52 and 53, and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

53 Moreover, according to the Court’s case-law, each case that raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the EU legal order impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (judgment of 21 February 2008, Tele2 Communications, C‑426/05, EU:C:2008:103, paragraph 55).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it is appropriate to recall, in the first place, that it follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts and tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts and tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case (judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 10; of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 26; and of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 43).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

43 It follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as all other national courts as to whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. They are not therefore obliged to refer a question of the interpretation of EU law raised before them if the question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, whatever it may be, cannot have any effect on the outcome of the case (judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 26).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

As regards the principle of effectiveness, national procedural rules must not be such as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order. In that regard, account should be taken of the role of those provisions in the procedure, its progress and special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In that context, it is appropriate to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraphs 52 and 53, and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

52 Secondly, as regards the principle of effectiveness, a national procedural rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings must not be such as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (judgment of 20 October 2016, Danqua, C‑429/15, EU:C:2016:789, paragraph 29).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it must be recalled that a national court or tribunal of last instance may refrain from referring a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on grounds of inadmissibility specific to the procedure before that court or tribunal, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 December 1995, van Schijndel and van Veen, C‑430/93 and C‑431/93, EU:C:1995:441, paragraph 17, and of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 56).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

56 In the light of the above considerations, the answer to Question 3 is that the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a court adjudicating at last instance may decline to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling where an appeal on a point of law is dismissed on grounds of inadmissibility specific to the procedure before that court, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In addition, it should be recalled that where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a national court or tribunal, that court or tribunal is in principle obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice within the meaning of the third indent of Article 267 TFEU where a question concerning the interpretation of EU law is raised before it (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0003

Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat.

42 In this respect, it should be recalled, to begin with, that, where there is no judicial remedy against the decisions of a national court, that court is in principle obliged to make a reference to the Court within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question of the interpretation of the FEU Treaty is raised before it (judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 25).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Before concluding that such is the case, the national court or tribunal of last instance must be convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 39; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 42; and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 48).

62014CJ0160

João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português.

42. A court or tribunal adjudicating at last instance may take the view that, although the lower courts have interpreted a provision of EU law in a particular way, the interpretation that it proposes to give of that provision, which is different from the interpretation espoused by the lower courts, is so obvious that there is no reasonable doubt.

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In addition, the question whether the possibility referred to in paragraph 39 above exists must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 17, and of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

62014CJ0160

João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português.

39. The Court has also made clear that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (judgment in Intermodal Transports , C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 33).

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the third place, it should be recalled that, in addition to the situations set out in paragraph 36 above, it follows from the Court’s settled case-law that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may also refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it where the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 16 and 21, and of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 38).

62014CJ0160

João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português.

38. As regards the extent of that obligation, it follows from settled case-law, beginning with the judgment in Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335), that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law concerned has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the context of that cooperation, the Court of Justice provides national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 7), with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 37, and of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 23).

62014CJ0160

João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português.

37. In that regard, although it is true that the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them, the fact remains that when there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before it (see judgment in Consiglio nazionale dei geologi and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato , C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It should be observed, in the fourth place, that national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must take upon themselves, independently and with all the requisite attention, the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves one of the situations in which they may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 40; and of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62014CJ0160

João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português.

40. It is true that the national court or tribunal has sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and for deciding, as a result, to refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law which has been raised before it (see judgment in Intermodal Transports , C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

2015-09-09

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

According to the Court’s settled case-law, one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 March 2021, A, C‑950/19, EU:C:2021:230, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0950

Proceedings brought by A.

In those circumstances, a purely literal interpretation of Article 22a(1)(a) of Directive 2006/43, based on the text of one or more language versions, to the exclusion of the others, cannot prevail. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union (see, in particular, judgment of 8 October 2020, Combinova, C‑476/19, EU:C:2020:802, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

2021-03-24

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the system of direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, established by Article 267 TFEU, is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia, C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22). The latter cannot deprive the national courts of their independence in exercising the discretion referred to in paragraph 50 above, in particular by compelling them to make a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 1978, Mattheus, 93/78, EU:C:1978:206, paragraph 5).

62019CJ0910

Bankia SA v Unión Mutua Asistencial de Seguros (UMAS).

It should be recalled, in the first place, that the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that EU law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States institutes direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties. Consequently, although the referring court is at liberty to request the parties to the dispute before it to suggest wording suitable for the questions to be referred, the fact remains that it is for that court alone ultimately to decide both the form and content of those questions (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraphs 28 to 30).

2021-06-03

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

According to the Court’s settled case-law, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law cannot be relieved of that obligation unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 33; and of 4 October 2018, Commission v France (Advance payment), C‑416/17, EU:C:2018:811, paragraph 110).

62003CJ0495

Intermodal Transports BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

33. Secondly, in respect of national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, it should be remembered that the third paragraph of Article 234 EC must, following settled case-law, be interpreted as meaning that such courts or tribunals are required, where a question of Community law is raised before them, to comply with their obligation to make a reference, unless they have established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.

2005-09-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It should be observed, in the fourth place, that national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must take upon themselves, independently and with all the requisite attention, the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves one of the situations in which they may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 40; and of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62003CJ0495

Intermodal Transports BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

37. Secondly, and without prejudice to the lessons to be drawn from the judgment in Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, the case-law as stated in Cilfit and Others gives the national court sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and for deciding, as a result, to refrain from referring to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of Community law which has been raised before it (Case C-340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4109, paragraph 35).

2005-09-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Before concluding that such is the case, the national court or tribunal of last instance must be convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 39; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 42; and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 48).

62003CJ0495

Intermodal Transports BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

39. In that respect, the Court has, admittedly, held that, before the national court or tribunal comes to the conclusion that the correct application of a provision of Community law is so obvious that there is no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved and therefore refrains from submitting a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling, it must in particular be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice ( Cilfit and Others, paragraph 16). On the other hand, such a court cannot be required to ensure that, in addition, the matter is equally obvious to bodies of a non-judicial nature such as administrative authorities.

2005-09-15

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It must be borne in mind nonetheless that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts and tribunals retain the broadest power to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so, and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (judgments of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and of 3 March 2020, Tesco-Global Áruházak, C‑323/18, EU:C:2020:140, paragraph 46).

62013CJ0058

Angelo Alberto Torresi and Pierfrancesco Torresi v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Macerata.

32. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts and tribunals remain entirely at liberty to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so (see the judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 to 15), and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (see, to that effect, the judgment in Boxus and Others , C‑128/09 to C‑131/09, C‑134/09 and C‑135/09, EU:C:2011:667, paragraph 32).

2014-07-17

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts or tribunals and the Court of Justice, the national court or tribunal alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court or tribunal before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgments of 26 May 2011, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others, C‑165/09 to C‑167/09, EU:C:2011:348, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraph 57; and of 12 May 2021, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, C‑70/20, EU:C:2021:379, paragraph 25).

62009CJ0165

Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others v College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Groningen (C-165/09) and College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland (C-166/09 and C-167/09).

47. It should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case‑law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the forthcoming judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33; Case C‑119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 43; and Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I‑6845, paragraphs 27 and 32).

2011-05-26

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Moreover, it is for the national court or tribunal alone to decide at what stage in the proceedings it is appropriate to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2008, Coleman, C‑303/06, EU:C:2008:415, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited), with the latter having no jurisdiction, however, to hear a reference for a preliminary ruling when, at the time it is made, the procedure before the referring court or tribunal has already been concluded (judgment of 13 April 2000, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, C‑176/96, EU:C:2000:201, paragraph 19).

62006CJ0303

S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law.

29. It must be borne in mind that Article 234 EC establishes the framework for a relationship of close cooperation between the national courts or tribunals and the Court of Justice based on the assignment to each of different functions. It is clear from the second paragraph of that article that it is for the national court or tribunal to decide at what stage in the proceedings it is appropriate for that court or tribunal to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others [1981] ECR 735, paragraph 5, and Case C‑236/98 JämO [2000] ECR I‑2189, paragraph 30).

2008-07-17

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that context, it should be recalled that the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which is the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties, sets up a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts of the Member States, having the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law, thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 37).

62016CJ0284

Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV.

37 In particular, the judicial system as thus conceived has as its keystone the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law, thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties (Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the EU to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited).

2018-03-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the system of direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, established by Article 267 TFEU, is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia, C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22). The latter cannot deprive the national courts of their independence in exercising the discretion referred to in paragraph 50 above, in particular by compelling them to make a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 1978, Mattheus, 93/78, EU:C:1978:206, paragraph 5).

61978CJ0093

Lothar Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkühlkost eG.

1978-11-22

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Moreover, it is for the national court or tribunal alone to decide at what stage in the proceedings it is appropriate to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2008, Coleman, C‑303/06, EU:C:2008:415, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited), with the latter having no jurisdiction, however, to hear a reference for a preliminary ruling when, at the time it is made, the procedure before the referring court or tribunal has already been concluded (judgment of 13 April 2000, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, C‑176/96, EU:C:2000:201, paragraph 19).

61996CJ0176

Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB).

19 It may be noted to begin with that, as the Court held in Case 338/85 Pardini v Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero [1988] ECR 2041, paragraph 11, and Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, paragraph 12, a national court is empowered to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the Treaty only if a dispute is pending before it in the context of which it is called on to give a decision which could take into account the preliminary ruling. Conversely, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear a reference for a preliminary ruling when at the time it is made the procedure before the court making it has already been concluded.

2000-04-13

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the second place, it should be noted that the authority of an interpretation already provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU may deprive the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance, especially where the question raised is materially identical to a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or, a fortiori, in the same national proceedings, or where established case-law of the Court already resolves the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 1963, Da Costa and Others, 28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6, p. 38; of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 and 14; of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C‑337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraph 29, and of 2 April 2009, Pedro IV Servicios, C‑260/07, EU:C:2009:215, paragraph 36).

61995CJ0337

Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV.

29 According to the established case-law of the Court, although the last paragraph of Article 177 unreservedly requires national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to refer to the Court any question of interpretation raised before them, the authority of an interpretation provided by the Court under Article 177 may deprive that obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance. This is especially so when the question raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case (see, in particular, CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo, cited above, paragraph 13, and Joined Cases 28/62, 29/62 and 30/62 Da Costa en Schaake and Others v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31). Such is also the case, a fortiori, when the question raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the same national proceedings.

1997-11-04

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

According to the Court’s settled case-law, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law cannot be relieved of that obligation unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 33; and of 4 October 2018, Commission v France (Advance payment), C‑416/17, EU:C:2018:811, paragraph 110).

62017CJ0416

European Commission v French Republic.

110 Indeed, that court is not under such an obligation when it finds that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt, and the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraphs 38 and 39; and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 50).

2018-10-04

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It must be borne in mind nonetheless that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts and tribunals retain the broadest power to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so, and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (judgments of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and of 3 March 2020, Tesco-Global Áruházak, C‑323/18, EU:C:2020:140, paragraph 46).

62018CJ0323

Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága.

46 In that regard, it must be recalled that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts remain entirely at liberty to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so, and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (judgment of 6 November 2018, Bauer and Willmeroth, C‑569/16 and C‑570/16, EU:C:2018:871, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

2020-03-03

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it is appropriate to recall, in the first place, that it follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts and tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts and tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case (judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 10; of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 26; and of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 43).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

10 SECONDLY , IT FOLLOWS FROM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE 177 THAT THE COURTS OR TRIBUNALS REFERRED TO IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH HAVE THE SAME DISCRETION AS ANY OTHER NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER A DECISION ON A QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THEM TO GIVE JUDGMENT . ACCORDINGLY , THOSE COURTS OR TRIBUNALS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO REFER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE A QUESTION CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW RAISED BEFORE THEM IF THAT QUESTION IS NOT RELEVANT , THAT IS TO SAY , IF THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION , REGARDLESS OF WHAT IT MAY BE , CAN IN NO WAY AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

The system established by Article 267 TFEU therefore does not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal. Thus, the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the interpretation of EU law does not mean that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to consider that such a question has been raised within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 9).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

9 IN THIS REGARD , IT MUST IN THE FIRST PLACE BE POINTED OUT THAT ARTICLE 177 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF REDRESS AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES TO A CASE PENDING BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL . THEREFORE THE MERE FACT THAT A PARTY CONTENDS THAT THE DISPUTE GIVES RISE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE COURT OR TRIBUNAL CONCERNED IS COMPELLED TO CONSIDER THAT A QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 177 . ON THE OTHER HAND , A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL MAY , IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE , REFER A MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF ITS OWN MOTION .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the context of that cooperation, the Court of Justice provides national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 7), with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 37, and of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 23).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

7 THAT OBLIGATION TO REFER A MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE IS BASED ON COOPERATION , ESTABLISHED WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING THE PROPER APPLICATION AND UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW IN ALL THE MEMBER STATES , BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS , IN THEIR CAPACITY AS COURTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW , AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE . MORE PARTICULARLY , THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 SEEKS TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF DIVERGENCES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON QUESTIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW . THE SCOPE OF THAT OBLIGATION MUST THEREFORE BE ASSESSED , IN VIEW OF THOSE OBJECTIVES , BY REFERENCE TO THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL COURTS , ON THE ONE HAND , AND THOSE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE , ON THE OTHER , WHERE SUCH A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION IS RAISED WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 177 .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Finally, every provision of EU law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied (judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 20, and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 49).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

20 FINALLY , EVERY PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LAW MUST BE PLACED IN ITS CONTEXT AND INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW AS A WHOLE , REGARD BEING HAD TO THE OBJECTIVES THEREOF AND TO ITS STATE OF EVOLUTION AT THE DATE ON WHICH THE PROVISION IN QUESTION IS TO BE APPLIED .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the second place, it should be noted that the authority of an interpretation already provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU may deprive the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance, especially where the question raised is materially identical to a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or, a fortiori, in the same national proceedings, or where established case-law of the Court already resolves the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 1963, Da Costa and Others, 28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6, p. 38; of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 and 14; of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C‑337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraph 29, and of 2 April 2009, Pedro IV Servicios, C‑260/07, EU:C:2009:215, paragraph 36).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

13 IT MUST BE REMEMBERED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 MARCH 1963 IN JOINED CASES 28 TO 30/62 ( DA COSTA V NEDERLANDSE BELASTINGADMINISTRATIE ( 1963 ) ECR 31 ) THE COURT RULED THAT : ' ' ALTHOUGH THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 UNRESERVEDLY REQUIRES COURTS OR TRIBUNALS OF A MEMBER STATE AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW . . . TO REFER TO THE COURT EVERY QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION RAISED BEFORE THEM , THE AUTHORITY OF AN INTERPRETATION UNDER ARTICLE 177 ALREADY GIVEN BY THE COURT MAY DEPRIVE THE OBLIGATION OF ITS PURPOSE AND THUS EMPTY IT OF ITS SUBSTANCE . SUCH IS THE CASE ESPECIALLY WHEN THE QUESTION RAISED IS MATERIALLY IDENTICAL WITH A QUESTION WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A PRELIMINARY RULING IN A SIMILAR CASE . ' '

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

It must also be borne in mind that EU law uses terminology which is peculiar to it and legal concepts that do not necessarily have the same meaning as the corresponding concepts that may exist in the law of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 19).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

19 IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND , EVEN WHERE THE DIFFERENT LANGUAGE VERSIONS ARE ENTIRELY IN ACCORD WITH ONE ANOTHER , THAT COMMUNITY LAW USES TERMINOLOGY WHICH IS PECULIAR TO IT . FURTHERMORE , IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT LEGAL CONCEPTS DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE SAME MEANING IN COMMUNITY LAW AND IN THE LAW OF THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In addition, the question whether the possibility referred to in paragraph 39 above exists must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 17, and of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

17 HOWEVER , THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A POSSIBILITY MUST BE ASSESSED ON THE BASIS OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF COMMUNITY LAW AND THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH ITS INTERPRETATION GIVES RISE .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

According to the Court’s settled case-law, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law cannot be relieved of that obligation unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 33; and of 4 October 2018, Commission v France (Advance payment), C‑416/17, EU:C:2018:811, paragraph 110).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

21 IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THOSE CONSIDERATIONS , THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE CORTE SUPREMA DI CASSAZIONE MUST BE THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW IS REQUIRED , WHERE A QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS RAISED BEFORE IT , TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE , UNLESS IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE QUESTION RAISED IS IRRELEVANT OR THAT THE COMMUNITY PROVISION IN QUESTION HAS ALREADY BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE COURT OR THAT THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT . THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A POSSIBILITY MUST BE ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY LAW , THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH ITS INTERPRETATION GIVES RISE AND THE RISK OF DIVERGENCES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the third place, it should be recalled that, in addition to the situations set out in paragraph 36 above, it follows from the Court’s settled case-law that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may also refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it where the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 16 and 21, and of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 38).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

21 IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THOSE CONSIDERATIONS , THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE CORTE SUPREMA DI CASSAZIONE MUST BE THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW IS REQUIRED , WHERE A QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS RAISED BEFORE IT , TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE , UNLESS IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE QUESTION RAISED IS IRRELEVANT OR THAT THE COMMUNITY PROVISION IN QUESTION HAS ALREADY BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE COURT OR THAT THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT . THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A POSSIBILITY MUST BE ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY LAW , THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH ITS INTERPRETATION GIVES RISE AND THE RISK OF DIVERGENCES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the third place, it should be recalled that, in addition to the situations set out in paragraph 36 above, it follows from the Court’s settled case-law that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may also refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it where the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 16 and 21, and of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 38).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

16 FINALLY , THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW MAY BE SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE QUESTION RAISED IS TO BE RESOLVED . BEFORE IT COMES TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH IS THE CASE , THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE MATTER IS EQUALLY OBVIOUS TO THE COURTS OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE . ONLY IF THOSE CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED , MAY THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL REFRAIN FROM SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND TAKE UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING IT .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Before concluding that such is the case, the national court or tribunal of last instance must be convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16; of 15 September 2005, Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 39; of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 42; and of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 48).

61981CJ0283

Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.

16 FINALLY , THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW MAY BE SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE QUESTION RAISED IS TO BE RESOLVED . BEFORE IT COMES TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH IS THE CASE , THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE MATTER IS EQUALLY OBVIOUS TO THE COURTS OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE . ONLY IF THOSE CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED , MAY THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL REFRAIN FROM SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND TAKE UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING IT .

1982-10-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the present case, it should be stated that, by this request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court has failed to remedy the lacuna established by the Court in paragraph 23 of its judgment of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, (C‑152/17, EU:C:2018:264), in so far as, in breach of Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, it still fails to state with the requisite precision and clarity the reasons why it considers that the interpretation of Article 3 TEU as well as Article 26 and Article 101(1)(e) TFEU is necessary or useful for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings or the relationship between EU law and the national legislation applicable to those proceedings. Neither does the referring court specify the reasons which prompted it to inquire about the interpretation of the other provisions and measures mentioned in the second and third questions referred, including, in particular, the European Social Charter, which the Court, moreover, has no jurisdiction to interpret (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2015, Nisttahuz Poclava, C‑117/14, EU:C:2015:60, paragraph 43), but merely sets out, in essence, the questions of the applicants in the main proceedings in that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 20 above, without giving its own assessment.

62014CJ0117

Grima Janet Nisttahuz Poclava v Jose María Ariza Toledano (Taberna del Marqués).

43. In the grounds for its decision, the referring court also refers to Articles 2.2(b) and 4 of Convention No 158 on the Termination of Employment, adopted at Geneva on 22 June 1982 by the International Labour Organisation, and the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961. It must be held that the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU to rule on the interpretation of provisions of international law which bind Member States outside the framework of EU law (see judgments in Vandeweghe and Others , 130/73, EU:C:1973:131, paragraph 2 and TNT Express Nederland , C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 61; the order in Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor , C‑134/12, EU:C:2012:288, paragraph 14; and the judgment in Qurbani , C‑481/13, EU:C:2014:2101, paragraph 22).

2015-02-05

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts or tribunals and the Court of Justice, the national court or tribunal alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court or tribunal before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgments of 26 May 2011, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others, C‑165/09 to C‑167/09, EU:C:2011:348, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited; of 9 September 2015, X and van Dijk, C‑72/14 and C‑197/14, EU:C:2015:564, paragraph 57; and of 12 May 2021, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, C‑70/20, EU:C:2021:379, paragraph 25).

62020CJ0070

YL v Altenrhein Luftfahrt GmbH.

According to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, of which the Montreal Convention forms an integral part, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (judgment of 9 July 2020, Vueling Airlines, C‑86/19, EU:C:2020:538, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

2021-05-12

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Similarly, the authority of a preliminary ruling does not preclude the national court or tribunal to which it is addressed from taking the view that it is necessary to make a further reference to the Court before giving judgment in the main proceedings (judgment of 6 March 2003, Kaba, C‑466/00, EU:C:2003:127, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). A national court or tribunal of last instance must make such a reference when it encounters difficulties in understanding the scope of the judgment of the Court.

62000CJ0466

Arben Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department.

39. It should be noted at the outset that the authority of a preliminary ruling does not preclude the national court or tribunal to which it is addressed from taking the view that it is necessary to make a further reference to the Court before giving judgment in the main proceedings. Such a procedure may be justified when the national court or tribunal encounters difficulties in understanding or applying the judgment, when it refers a fresh question of law to the Court, or again when it submits new considerations which might lead the Court to give a different answer to a question submitted earlier (order in Case 69/85 Wünsche [1986] ECR 947, paragraph 15).

2003-03-06

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the second place, it should be noted that the authority of an interpretation already provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU may deprive the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance, especially where the question raised is materially identical to a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or, a fortiori, in the same national proceedings, or where established case-law of the Court already resolves the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 1963, Da Costa and Others, 28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6, p. 38; of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 and 14; of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C‑337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraph 29, and of 2 April 2009, Pedro IV Servicios, C‑260/07, EU:C:2009:215, paragraph 36).

61962CJ0028

Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration.

1963-03-27

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the second place, it should be noted that the authority of an interpretation already provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU may deprive the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance, especially where the question raised is materially identical to a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or, a fortiori, in the same national proceedings, or where established case-law of the Court already resolves the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to that case-law, even if the issues in dispute are not strictly identical (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 1963, Da Costa and Others, 28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6, p. 38; of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 and 14; of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C‑337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraph 29, and of 2 April 2009, Pedro IV Servicios, C‑260/07, EU:C:2009:215, paragraph 36).

61962CJ0028

Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration.

1963-03-27

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the context of that cooperation, the Court of Justice provides national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 7), with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 37, and of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 23).

62017CJ0042

Criminal proceedings against M.A.S. and M.B.

23 The procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU thus functions as an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts and tribunals, by means of which the former provides the latter with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 16).

2017-12-05

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

39 It should be noted, however, that it is apparent from the order for reference that the dispute in the main proceedings does not concern such individual actions for damages. It follows that those questions are, at this stage, hypothetical and that the inherent need for the answer to them for the resolution of that dispute has not been established. In those circumstances, since the function entrusted to the Court of Justice is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, those questions are inadmissible (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 November 2020, Sögård Fastigheter, C‑787/18, EU:C:2020:964, paragraphs 76, 80 and 81).

62018CJ0787

Skatteverket v Sögård Fastigheter AB.

80 Dans ces conditions, la question relative à l’interprétation de l’article 19 de la directive TVA est, à ce stade du litige au principal, hypothétique et le besoin inhérent de la réponse à cette question pour la solution du litige n’est pas avéré.

2020-11-26

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

39 It should be noted, however, that it is apparent from the order for reference that the dispute in the main proceedings does not concern such individual actions for damages. It follows that those questions are, at this stage, hypothetical and that the inherent need for the answer to them for the resolution of that dispute has not been established. In those circumstances, since the function entrusted to the Court of Justice is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, those questions are inadmissible (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 November 2020, Sögård Fastigheter, C‑787/18, EU:C:2020:964, paragraphs 76, 80 and 81).

62018CJ0787

Skatteverket v Sögård Fastigheter AB.

76 Toutefois, il appartient à la Cour d’examiner les conditions dans lesquelles elle est saisie par le juge national en vue de vérifier sa propre compétence. En effet, l’esprit de collaboration qui doit présider au fonctionnement du renvoi préjudiciel implique que, de son côté, le juge national ait égard à la fonction confiée à la Cour, qui est de contribuer à l’administration de la justice dans les États membres et non pas de formuler des opinions consultatives sur des questions générales ou hypothétiques (arrêt du 24 avril 2012, Kamberaj, C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, point 41 et jurisprudence citée).

2020-11-26

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

39 It should be noted, however, that it is apparent from the order for reference that the dispute in the main proceedings does not concern such individual actions for damages. It follows that those questions are, at this stage, hypothetical and that the inherent need for the answer to them for the resolution of that dispute has not been established. In those circumstances, since the function entrusted to the Court of Justice is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, those questions are inadmissible (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 November 2020, Sögård Fastigheter, C‑787/18, EU:C:2020:964, paragraphs 76, 80 and 81).

62018CJ0787

Skatteverket v Sögård Fastigheter AB.

81 Partant, la Cour ne saurait répondre à la seconde question en formulant une opinion consultative sur un problème qui est, à ce stade, hypothétique (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 10 novembre 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group, C‑156/15, EU:C:2016:851, point 56 ; du 28 mars 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15,EU:C:2017:236, point 194, ainsi que du 11 décembre 2018, Weiss e.a., C‑493/17, EU:C:2018:1000, point 166). Le fait que cette question pourrait être pertinente si la juridiction nationale jugeait que les dispositions relatives à la transmission d’activités devaient être appliquées dans la situation en cause au principal est sans incidence à cet égard.

2020-11-26

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

23 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in so far as, in accordance with recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation repeals and replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), which itself replaced the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter legal instruments also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012 whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’. That is the case with point 3 of Article 5 of that convention, as amended, and Regulation No 44/2001, on the one hand, and with Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, on the other (judgment of 9 July 2020, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C‑343/19, EU:C:2020:534, paragraph 22).

62019CJ0343

Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen AG.

22 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in so far as, in accordance with recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation repeals and replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), which itself replaced the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention (‘the Brussels Convention’), the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter legal instruments also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012 whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’ (judgment of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). That is the case with point 3 of Article 5 of the Brussels Convention and Regulation No 44/2001, on the one hand, and with point 2 of Article 7 of Regulation No 1215/2012, on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2018, Nothartová, C‑306/17, EU:C:2018:360, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

2020-07-09

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

26 Nevertheless, as the Court has repeatedly found, the concept of ‘place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to that damage, with the result that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those two places (judgment of 9 July 2020, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C‑343/19, EU:C:2020:534, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0343

Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen AG.

23 As has repeatedly been held by the Court in its case-law concerning those provisions, the concept of the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, with the result that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places (judgments of 16 July 2009, Zuid-Chemie, C‑189/08, EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 23, and of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

2020-07-09

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

33 The place in which the damage occurred thus identified is in line with the objective of Regulation No 1215/2012, which is to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the European Union by simultaneously enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he or she may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he or she may be sued, given that the issuer of a certificate who does not comply with their legal obligations in respect of the prospectus must, when they decide to notify the prospectus relating to that certificate in other Member States, anticipate that inadequately informed operators, domiciled in those Member States, might invest in that certificate and suffer damage (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 56, and of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 35).

62013CJ0375

Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc.

56. The place where the loss occurred thus identified meets, in circumstances such as those referred to in paragraph 51 of this judgment, the objective of Regulation No 44/2001 of strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union, by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he may be sued (see, to that effect, judgment in Kronhofer , EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 20), given that the issuer of a certificate who does not comply with his legal obligations in respect of the prospectus must, when he decides to notify the prospectus relating to that certificate in other Member States, anticipate that inadequately informed operators, domiciled in those Member States, might invest in that certificate and suffer loss.

2015-01-28

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

28 The Court has also clarified that that concept does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he or she has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his or her assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State (judgments of 10 June 2004, Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 21, and of 16 June 2016, Universal Music International Holding, C‑12/15, EU:C:2016:449, paragraph 35).

62015CJ0012

Universal Music International Holding BV v Michael Tétreault Schilling and Others.

35 In the wake of that case-law, the Court has also held that that expression does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State (judgment of 10 June 2004 in Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 21).

2016-06-16

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

28 The Court has also clarified that that concept does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he or she has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his or her assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State (judgments of 10 June 2004, Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 21, and of 16 June 2016, Universal Music International Holding, C‑12/15, EU:C:2016:449, paragraph 35).

62002CJ0168

Rudolf Kronhofer v Marianne Maier and Others.

21. In view of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred must be that Article 5(3) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ does not refer to the place where the claimant is domiciled or where ‘his assets are concentrated’ by reason only of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Contracting State.

2004-06-10

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

24 It must also be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction laid down by Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted independently and strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

17 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the rule of special jurisdiction laid down by Article 5(3) of that regulation must be interpreted independently and strictly (judgments of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 43; of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 37, and of 21 April 2016, Austro-Mechana, C‑572/14, EU:C:2016:286, paragraph 29).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

25 The jurisdiction provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1215/2012, namely that of the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, constitutes the general rule. It is only by way of derogation from that general rule that the regulation provides for special and exclusive rules of jurisdiction for cases, which are exhaustively listed, in which the defendant may or must, depending on the case, be sued in the courts of another Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

18 The jurisdiction provided for in Article 2 of that regulation, namely that the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, constitutes the general rule. It is only by way of derogation from that general rule that the regulation provides for special and exclusive rules of jurisdiction for cases, which are exhaustively listed, in which the defendant may or must, depending on the case, be sued in the courts of another Member State (judgment of 13 July 2006, Reisch Montage, C‑103/05, EU:C:2006:471, paragraph 22, and of 12 May 2011, BVG, C‑144/10, EU:C:2011:300, paragraph 30).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

33 The place in which the damage occurred thus identified is in line with the objective of Regulation No 1215/2012, which is to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the European Union by simultaneously enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he or she may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he or she may be sued, given that the issuer of a certificate who does not comply with their legal obligations in respect of the prospectus must, when they decide to notify the prospectus relating to that certificate in other Member States, anticipate that inadequately informed operators, domiciled in those Member States, might invest in that certificate and suffer damage (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 56, and of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 35).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

35 In this connection, given that the issuer of a certificate who does not comply with his legal obligations in respect of the prospectus must, when he decides to notify the prospectus relating to that certificate in other Member States, anticipate that inadequately informed operators, domiciled in those Member States, might invest in that certificate and suffer damage, the objective of Regulation No 44/2001 — which is to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the European Union by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he may be sued — is met by upholding as the place where the damage occurred the place where the bank is established in which the applicant possessed the bank account in which the damage occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 56).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

29 Although the mere fact that the applicant has suffered financial consequences cannot justify the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the applicant’s domicile, such an attribution of jurisdiction is justified if that domicile is in fact the place in which the events giving rise to the damage took place or the damage occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraphs 24 and 25 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

25 On the other hand, such an attribution of jurisdiction is justified if the applicant’s domicile is in fact the place in which the events giving rise to the damage took place or the damage occurred (judgment of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 50).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

27 That concept of the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 may not, however, be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences of an event, which has caused damage actually arising elsewhere, can be felt (judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

23 In this connection, the Court has held that the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ may not be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences of an event, which has already caused damage actually arising elsewhere, can be felt (judgment of 19 September 1995, Marinari, C‑364/93, EU:C:1995:289, paragraph 14; of 10 June 2004, Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 19, and of 16 June 2016, Universal Music International Holding, C‑12/15, EU:C:2016:449, paragraph 34) and that such a concept does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State (judgments of 10 June 2004, Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 21, and of 16 June 2016, Universal Music International Holding, C‑12/15, EU:C:2016:449, paragraph 35).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

32 In that regard, the Court has already noted that it is possible for the courts where the applicant is domiciled to have jurisdiction, on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, to hear and determine an action seeking to put in issue the liability of the issuer of a certificate on the basis of the prospectus relating to it and of breach of other legal information obligations binding on the issuer, particularly when the damage alleged occurred directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts (judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

28 In addition, the Court has held that under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, the courts where the applicant is domiciled have jurisdiction, on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, to hear and determine an action seeking to put in issue the liability of the issuer of a certificate on the basis of the prospectus relating to it and of breach of other legal information obligations binding on the issuer, particularly when the damage alleged occurred directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts (judgment of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 57).

2018-09-12

62019CJ0709

Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v BP plc.

2021-05-12

29 Although the mere fact that the applicant has suffered financial consequences cannot justify the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the applicant’s domicile, such an attribution of jurisdiction is justified if that domicile is in fact the place in which the events giving rise to the damage took place or the damage occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, Löber, C‑304/17, EU:C:2018:701, paragraphs 24 and 25 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0304

Helga Löber v Barclays Bank PLC.

24 Thus, the mere fact that the applicant has suffered financial consequences does not justify the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the applicant’s domicile if both the events causing damage and the damage itself occurred in the territory of another Member State (judgment of 28 January 2015, Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 49).

2018-09-12

62020CJ0130

YJ v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS).

2021-05-12

19 In that regard, it must be noted that the concept of ‘direct discrimination on ground of sex’, referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7, must be understood as covering any situation in which one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation (judgment of 26 June 2018, MB(Change of gender and retirement pension), C‑451/16, EU:C:2018:492, paragraph 34). It follows that, in order for direct discrimination to be ‘on ground of sex’, a person must be treated unfavourably on account of being male or female.

62016CJ0451

MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.

34 As is clear from Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54, there is direct discrimination based on sex if one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation. That concept must be understood in the same way in the context of Directive 79/7.

2018-06-26

62020CJ0130

YJ v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS).

2021-05-12

17 In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, it is for the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation with national courts, to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it and, to that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 3 March 2020, Gómez del Moral Guasch, C‑125/18, EU:C:2020:138, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0125

Marc Gómez del Moral Guasch v Bankia SA.

27 It should be noted as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 7 August 2018, Smith, C‑122/17, EU:C:2018:631, paragraph 34).

2020-03-03

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

63 Second, while the binding character of a framework decision places on national authorities an obligation to interpret national law, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the text and the purpose of the framework decision in order to achieve the result sought by that decision, the principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraphs 72, 73 and 76 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0573

Criminal proceedings against Daniel Adam Popławski.

76 Similarly, the principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (judgment of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). In other words, the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law ceases when the former cannot be applied in a way that leads to a result compatible with that envisaged by the framework decision concerned (judgment of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov, C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraph 66).

2019-06-24

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

63 Second, while the binding character of a framework decision places on national authorities an obligation to interpret national law, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the text and the purpose of the framework decision in order to achieve the result sought by that decision, the principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraphs 72, 73 and 76 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0573

Criminal proceedings against Daniel Adam Popławski.

73 When applying national law, those authorities are therefore required to interpret it, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the text and the purpose of the framework decision in order to achieve the result sought by that decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 June 2005, Pupino, C‑105/03, EU:C:2005:386, paragraph 43; of 5 September 2012, Lopes Da Silva Jorge, C‑42/11, EU:C:2012:517, paragraph 54; of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov, C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraph 59; and of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 31).

2019-06-24

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

64 That being so, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires that the whole body of domestic law be taken into consideration and that the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law be applied, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0573

Criminal proceedings against Daniel Adam Popławski.

77 That being so, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires that the whole body of domestic law be taken into consideration and that the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law be applied, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision concerned is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 September 2012, Lopes Da Silva Jorge, C‑42/11, EU:C:2012:517, paragraph 56; of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 34; and of 12 February 2019, TC, C‑492/18 PPU, EU:C:2019:108, paragraph 68).

2019-06-24

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

63 Second, while the binding character of a framework decision places on national authorities an obligation to interpret national law, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the text and the purpose of the framework decision in order to achieve the result sought by that decision, the principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraphs 72, 73 and 76 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0573

Criminal proceedings against Daniel Adam Popławski.

72 In the third place, it should be recalled that, although the framework decisions cannot have direct effect, their binding character nevertheless places on national authorities an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law as from the date of expiry of the period for the transposition of those framework decisions (judgment of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov, C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraphs 58 and 61).

2019-06-24

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

57 In that regard, it should be noted that the condition that the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country, in so far as it has the effect, if not satisfied, of requiring the surrender of the requested person in order for that person to be prosecuted or to serve the custodial sentence ordered against him or her, contributes to the attainment of the objective of the European arrest warrant mechanism of preventing, within the area of freedom, security and justice, offences going unpunished (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2020, SF(European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 47, and, by analogy, judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 77).

62014CJ0129

Zoran Spasic.

77. The ne bis in idem principle set out in Article 54 CISA is intended not only to prevent, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the impunity of persons definitively convicted and sentenced in the European Union but also to ensure legal certainty through respect for decisions of public bodies which have become final, in the absence of harmonisation or approximation of the criminal laws of the Member States.

2014-05-27

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

99 However, the ne bis in idem principle set out in both Article 4(5) of the Framework Decision and Article 3(2) thereof and in Article 54 of the CISA is intended not only to prevent, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the impunity of persons definitively convicted and sentenced; it also seeks to ensure legal certainty through respect for decisions of public bodies which have become final (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 77).

62014CJ0129

Zoran Spasic.

77. The ne bis in idem principle set out in Article 54 CISA is intended not only to prevent, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the impunity of persons definitively convicted and sentenced in the European Union but also to ensure legal certainty through respect for decisions of public bodies which have become final, in the absence of harmonisation or approximation of the criminal laws of the Member States.

2014-05-27

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

97 In that regard, it should be recalled that, as can be seen from Article 67(3) TFEU, in order to achieve its objective of constituting an area of freedom, security and justice, the European Union endeavours to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws (judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 62).

62014CJ0129

Zoran Spasic.

62. As can be seen from Article 67(3) TFEU, in order to achieve its objective of constituting an area of freedom, security and justice, the European Union endeavours to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.

2014-05-27

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

41 As regards the grounds for optional non-execution listed in Article 4 of the Framework Decision, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, when transposing the Framework Decision, the Member States have a margin of discretion. Therefore, they are free to transpose those grounds into their domestic law or not to do so. They may also choose to limit the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, thereby facilitating the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of that Framework Decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg, C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 58, 59 and 61).

62008CJ0123

Dominic Wolzenburg.

58. It follows that a national legislature which, by virtue of the options afforded it by Article 4 of the Framework Decision, chooses to limit the situations in which its executing judicial authority may refuse to surrender a requested person merely reinforces the system of surrender introduced by that Framework Decision to the advantage of an area of freedom, security and justice.

2009-10-06

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

79 In doing so, it allows Member States to limit the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on that ground, thereby facilitating the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision (judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg, C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62008CJ0123

Dominic Wolzenburg.

58. It follows that a national legislature which, by virtue of the options afforded it by Article 4 of the Framework Decision, chooses to limit the situations in which its executing judicial authority may refuse to surrender a requested person merely reinforces the system of surrender introduced by that Framework Decision to the advantage of an area of freedom, security and justice.

2009-10-06

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

41 As regards the grounds for optional non-execution listed in Article 4 of the Framework Decision, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, when transposing the Framework Decision, the Member States have a margin of discretion. Therefore, they are free to transpose those grounds into their domestic law or not to do so. They may also choose to limit the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, thereby facilitating the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of that Framework Decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg, C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 58, 59 and 61).

62008CJ0123

Dominic Wolzenburg.

61. When implementing Article 4 of Framework Decision 2004/584 and in particular paragraph 6 thereof, referred to in the decision for reference, the Member States have, of necessity, a certain margin of discretion.

2009-10-06

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

41 As regards the grounds for optional non-execution listed in Article 4 of the Framework Decision, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, when transposing the Framework Decision, the Member States have a margin of discretion. Therefore, they are free to transpose those grounds into their domestic law or not to do so. They may also choose to limit the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, thereby facilitating the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of that Framework Decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg, C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 58, 59 and 61).

62008CJ0123

Dominic Wolzenburg.

59. Indeed, by limiting the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, such legislation only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision.

2009-10-06

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

79 In doing so, it allows Member States to limit the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on that ground, thereby facilitating the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision (judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg, C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 58 and 59).

62008CJ0123

Dominic Wolzenburg.

59. Indeed, by limiting the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, such legislation only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision.

2009-10-06

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

52 In that regard, it should be recalled that EU law is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the European Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU (judgment of 24 September 2020, Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof (Speciality rule), C‑195/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:749, paragraph 30). That premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States, in particular in their respective criminal justice systems.

62020CJ0195

Criminal proceedings against XC.

30 Afin de répondre à la question préjudicielle, il convient, à titre liminaire, de rappeler que le droit de l’Union repose sur la prémisse fondamentale selon laquelle chaque État membre partage avec tous les autres États membres, et reconnaît que ceux-ci partagent avec lui, une série de valeurs communes sur lesquelles l’Union est fondée, comme cela est précisé à l’article 2 TUE. Cette prémisse implique et justifie l’existence de la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres dans la reconnaissance de ces valeurs et, donc, dans le respect du droit de l’Union qui les met en œuvre [arrêt du 11 mars 2020, SF (Mandat d’arrêt européen – Garantie de renvoi dans l’État d’exécution), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, point 35 et jurisprudence citée].

2020-09-24

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

58 In that context, it should be recalled that the Framework Decision must be interpreted in such a way as to ensure compliance with the requirements of respect for the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, without, however, calling into question the effectiveness of the system of judicial cooperation between the Member States of which the European arrest warrant, as provided for by the EU legislature, is one of the key elements (judgment of 10 August 2017, Tupikas, C‑270/17 PPU, EU:C:2017:628, paragraph 63).

62017CJ0270

Openbaar Ministerie v Tadas Tupikas.

63 Consequently, Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted in such a way as to ensure compliance with the requirements of respect for the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, without, however, calling into question the effectiveness of the system of judicial cooperation between the Member States of which the European Arrest Warrant, as provided for by the Union legislature, is one of the key elements.

2017-08-10

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

75 In those circumstances, reasons of consistency and legal certainty dictate that the concepts which are worded identically in each of those two provisions, and in Article 54 of the CISA, should be given the same scope (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Özçelik, C‑453/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:860, paragraph 33).

62016CJ0453

Openbaar Ministerie v Halil Ibrahim Özçelik.

33 Given the need to ensure consistency between the interpretations of the various provisions of the Framework Decision, the above interpretation appears, in principle, transposable to Article 8(1)(c) thereof. That provision must, therefore, be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘judicial decision’ covers decisions of the Member State authorities that administer criminal justice, but not the police services.

2016-11-10

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

53 The principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (judgment of 17 December 2020, Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

62020CJ0354

Openbaar Ministerie v L.

In that regard, it should be noted that both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191, and judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 43).

2020-12-17

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

39 It follows that executing judicial authorities may, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by the Framework Decision. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception, which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 17 December 2020, Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

62020CJ0354

Openbaar Ministerie v L.

It follows that executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584 and that execution of the warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 thereof. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

2020-12-17

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

33 In the second place, it is necessary, according to the settled case-law of the Court, to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the case in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 17 December 2020, Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

62020CJ0354

Openbaar Ministerie v L.

In the second place, it is necessary, according to the case-law of the Court, to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the case in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau)), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

2020-12-17

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

56 That interpretation is, moreover, consistent with the objective of Article 4(5) of the Framework Decision which, as is apparent from the wording of that provision and in accordance with Article 67(1) TFEU, is intended to enable the executing judicial authority to ensure legal certainty for the requested person by taking into account the fact that he or she has been finally judged in a third State in respect of the same acts, provided that, where there has been a sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country (see, by analogy, with regard to Article 54 of the CISA, judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 44).

62014CJ0486

Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski.

44 In that regard, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the ne bis in idem principle in Article 54 of the CISA is intended, on the one hand, to ensure, in the area of freedom, security and justice, that a person whose trial has been finally disposed of is not prosecuted in several Contracting States for the same acts on account of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement, the aim being to ensure legal certainty — in the absence of harmonisation or approximation of the criminal laws of the Member States — through respect for decisions of public bodies which have become final (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 September 2006 in Gasparini and Others, C‑467/04, EU:C:2006:610, paragraph 27; 22 December 2008 in Turanský, C‑491/07, EU:C:2008:768, paragraph 41; and 27 May 2014 in Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 77).

2016-06-29

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

54 Such mutual trust also exists between the States party to the CISA, Article 54 of which precludes a person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one contracting State from being ‘prosecuted’ in another contracting State (judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

62014CJ0486

Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski.

50 Finally, as the Court has already stated, Article 54 of the CISA necessarily implies that the Contracting States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Contracting States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied (judgment of 11 December 2008 in Bourquain, C‑297/07, EU:C:2008:708, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

2016-06-29

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

77 It is true that the application of the ne bis in idem principle necessarily presupposes the existence of trust in the criminal justice system of the country in which the judgment was delivered (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2006, Van Esbroeck, C‑436/04, EU:C:2006:165, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). As is clear from paragraph 55 of this judgment, the high level of trust that exists between the Member States cannot be presumed as regards third States and, in particular, their criminal justice systems.

62004CJ0436

Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck.

30. There is a necessary implication in the ne bis in idem principle, enshrined in that article, that the Contracting States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Contracting States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied ( Gözütok and Brügge , paragraph 33).

2006-03-09

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

69 According to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard not only to its wording but also to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 25 June 2020, Ministerio Fiscal (Authority likely to receive an application for international protection), C‑36/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:495, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

62020CJ0036

Ministerio Fiscal v VL.

53 Ainsi qu’il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, il découle des exigences tant de l’application uniforme du droit de l’Union que du principe d’égalité que les termes d’une disposition du droit de l’Union, qui ne comporte aucun renvoi exprès au droit des États membres pour déterminer son sens et sa portée, doivent normalement trouver, dans toute l’Union, une interprétation autonome et uniforme, qui doit être recherchée en tenant compte non seulement des termes de celle-ci, mais également du contexte de la disposition et de l’objectif poursuivi par la réglementation en cause [arrêts du 18 janvier 1984, Ekro, 327/82, EU:C:1984:11, point 11, et du 7 novembre 2019, K.H.K. (Saisie conservatoire des comptes bancaires), C‑555/18, EU:C:2019:937, point 38].

2020-06-25

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

100 Legal certainty for persons who have been finally judged can be effectively guaranteed only if they can be sure that, once they have been convicted and when the penalty imposed on them can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing country, they may travel within the European Union without fear of further prosecution for the same acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2008, Bourquain, C‑297/07, EU:C:2008:708, paragraphs 49 to 50), including where their sentence has been remitted by a non-judicial authority as part of a general leniency measure which is not based on objective criminal policy considerations.

62007CJ0297

Klaus Bourquain.

49. That interpretation is reinforced by the objective of Article 54 of the CISA, which is to ensure that no one is prosecuted for the same acts in several Contracting States on account of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement.

2008-12-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

100 Legal certainty for persons who have been finally judged can be effectively guaranteed only if they can be sure that, once they have been convicted and when the penalty imposed on them can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing country, they may travel within the European Union without fear of further prosecution for the same acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2008, Bourquain, C‑297/07, EU:C:2008:708, paragraphs 49 to 50), including where their sentence has been remitted by a non-judicial authority as part of a general leniency measure which is not based on objective criminal policy considerations.

62007CJ0297

Klaus Bourquain.

50. That right to freedom of movement is effectively guaranteed only if, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the person can be sure that, once he has been convicted and when the penalty imposed on him can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting State, he may travel within the Schengen area without fear of prosecution in another Contracting State on the ground that the penalty could not, on account of the specific features of the national legal procedures of the first Contracting State, have been directly enforced.

2008-12-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

71 The Court also noted that the concept of ‘same acts’ also appeared in Article 54 of the CISA and, in view of the shared objective of that article and Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, which is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect of the same acts, it held that those two concepts had to be interpreted in the same way, as referring only to the nature of the acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together, irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).

62009CJ0261

Gaetano Mantello.

40. In view of the shared objective of Article 54 of the CISA and Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, which is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect of the same acts, it must be accepted that an interpretation of that concept given in the context of the CISA is equally valid for the purposes of the Framework Decision.

2010-11-16

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

71 The Court also noted that the concept of ‘same acts’ also appeared in Article 54 of the CISA and, in view of the shared objective of that article and Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, which is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect of the same acts, it held that those two concepts had to be interpreted in the same way, as referring only to the nature of the acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together, irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).

62009CJ0261

Gaetano Mantello.

39. It should be recalled that that concept of the ‘same acts’ also appears in Article 54 of the CISA. In that context, the concept has been interpreted as referring only to the nature of the acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together, irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected (see Case C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I‑2333, paragraphs 27, 32 and 36, and Case C-150/05 Van Straaten [2006] ECR I‑9327, paragraphs 41, 47 and 48).

2010-11-16

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

70 As regards, in particular, the concept of ‘same acts’ in Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, the Court held that, since that provision made no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to that concept, the latter had to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraph 38).

62009CJ0261

Gaetano Mantello.

38. In that regard, the concept of ‘same acts’ in Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision cannot be left to the discretion of the judicial authorities of each Member State on the basis of their national law. It follows from the need for uniform application of European Union law that, since that provision makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to that concept, the latter must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, by analogy, Case C‑66/08 Koszłowski [2008] ECR I‑6041, paragraphs 41 and 42). It is therefore an autonomous concept of European Union law which, as such, may be the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling by any court before which a relevant action has been brought, under the conditions laid down in Title VII of Protocol No 36 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on transitional provisions.

2010-11-16

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

38 In the field governed by the Framework Decision, the principle of mutual recognition, which, as is apparent, in particular, from recital 6 thereof, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is put into practice in Article 1(2) of that Framework Decision, which lays down the rule that Member States are to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of that Framework Decision (judgment of 11 March 2020, SF (European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0314

SF.

39 In the field governed by Framework Decision 2002/584, the principle of mutual recognition, which, as is apparent, in particular, from recital 6 of that framework decision, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is put into practice in Article 1(2) of that framework decision, which lays down the rule that Member States are to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of that framework decision. Executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584. Similarly, execution of the arrest warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 of that framework decision. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41, of 13 December 2018, Sut, C‑514/17, EU:C:2018:1016, paragraph 28, and of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 48).

2020-03-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

46 First, as the Court has repeatedly held, execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, whereas refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2020, SF(European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 39).

62018CJ0314

SF.

39 In the field governed by Framework Decision 2002/584, the principle of mutual recognition, which, as is apparent, in particular, from recital 6 of that framework decision, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is put into practice in Article 1(2) of that framework decision, which lays down the rule that Member States are to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of that framework decision. Executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584. Similarly, execution of the arrest warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 of that framework decision. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41, of 13 December 2018, Sut, C‑514/17, EU:C:2018:1016, paragraph 28, and of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 48).

2020-03-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

40 The Framework Decision explicitly sets out, in Article 3, grounds for mandatory non-execution of a European arrest warrant and, in Articles 4 and 4a, grounds for optional non-execution of such a warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2020, SF(European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0314

SF.

40 Framework Decision 2002/584 thus explicitly sets out the grounds for mandatory non-execution (Article 3) and optional non-execution (Articles 4 and 4a) of a European arrest warrant, as well as the guarantees to be given by the issuing Member State in particular cases (Article 5). Although the system established by Framework Decision 2002/584 is based on the principle of mutual recognition, that recognition does not mean that there is an absolute obligation to execute the arrest warrant that has been issued (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 October 2010, B., C‑306/09, EU:C:2010:626, paragraph 50, and of 13 December 2018, Sut, C‑514/17, EU:C:2018:1016, paragraphs 29 and 30 and the case-law cited).

2020-03-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

37 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the Framework Decision seeks, by the establishment of a simplified and effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgment of 11 March 2020, SF (European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0314

SF.

38 In that context, Framework Decision 2002/584 seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgments of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 40, and of 13 December 2018, Sut, C‑514/17, EU:C:2018:1016, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

2020-03-11