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CoAStaL NLP Group 27

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

The Court has previously held that the provisions of Directive 93/13 preclude a term that has been found to be unfair from being maintained in part, with the elements which make it unfair removed, where that removal would be tantamount to revising the content of that term by altering its substance (judgment of 26 March 2019, Abanca Corporación Bancaria and Bankia, C‑70/17 and C‑179/17, EU:C:2019:250, paragraph 64).

62017CJ0070

Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA v Alberto García Salamanca Santos and Bankia SA v Alfonso Antonio Lau Mendoza and Verónica Yuliana Rodríguez Ramírez.

64 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred in Cases C‑70/17 and C‑179/17 is that Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted, first, as precluding an accelerated repayment clause of a mortgage loan contract that has been found to be unfair from being maintained in part, with the elements which make it unfair removed, where the removal of those elements would be tantamount to revising the content of that clause by altering its substance, and, second, as not precluding the national court from compensating for the invalidity of such an unfair term by replacing that term with the new wording of the legislative provision on which it was based, which is applicable where the parties to the contract so agree, provided that the mortgage loan contract in question cannot continue in existence if that unfair term is removed, and that the annulment of the contract in its entirety would expose the consumer to particularly unfavourable consequences.

2019-03-26

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

If it were open to the national court to revise the content of unfair terms included in such a contract, such a power would be liable to compromise attainment of the long-term objective of Article 7 of Directive 93/13. Accordingly, that power would contribute to eliminating the dissuasive effect on sellers or suppliers of the straightforward non-application with regard to the consumer of those unfair terms, in so far as those sellers or suppliers would still be tempted to use those terms in the knowledge that, even if they were declared invalid, the contract could nevertheless be modified, to the extent necessary, by the national court in such a way as to safeguard the interest of those sellers or suppliers (judgment of 26 March 2019, Abanca Corporación Bancaria and Bankia, C‑70/17 and C‑179/17, EU:C:2019:250, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0070

Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA v Alberto García Salamanca Santos and Bankia SA v Alfonso Antonio Lau Mendoza and Verónica Yuliana Rodríguez Ramírez.

54 Thus, if it were open to the national court to revise the content of unfair terms included in such a contract, such a power would be liable to compromise attainment of the long-term objective of Article 7 of Directive 93/13. That power would contribute to eliminating the dissuasive effect on sellers or suppliers of the straightforward non-application with regard to the consumer of those unfair terms, in so far as those sellers or suppliers would still be tempted to use those terms in the knowledge that, even if they were declared invalid, the contract could nevertheless be modified, to the extent necessary, by the national court in such a way as to safeguard the interest of those sellers or suppliers (judgments of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 69, and of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 79).

2019-03-26

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

Thus, if the national court finds that an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is void, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as prohibiting the national court from modifying that contract by revising the content of that term (judgment of 26 March 2019, Abanca Corporación Bancaria and Bankia, C‑70/17 and C‑179/17, EU:C:2019:250, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0070

Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA v Alberto García Salamanca Santos and Bankia SA v Alfonso Antonio Lau Mendoza and Verónica Yuliana Rodríguez Ramírez.

53 Next, according to the case-law of the Court, where a national court finds that an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is void, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding a rule of national law which allows the national court to modify that contract by revising the content of that term (judgments of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 73, and of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 77).

2019-03-26

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

Thus, the purpose of that provision, and in particular of its second part, is not to cancel all contracts containing unfair terms but to substitute for the formal balance established by the contract between the rights and obligations of the parties real balance re-establishing equality between them, it being specified that the contract at issue must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms. Provided that the latter condition is satisfied, the contract at issue may, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, be continued as long as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible without the unfair terms, which is to be determined objectively (judgment of 3 October 2019, Dziubak, C‑260/18, EU:C:2019:819, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0260

Kamil Dziubak and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, prowadzący działalność w Polsce w formie oddziału pod nazwą Raiffeisen Bank International AG Oddział w Polsce, anciennement Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA.

According to settled case-law, the purpose of that provision, and in particular of its second part, is not to cancel all contracts containing unfair terms but to substitute for the formal balance established by the contract between the rights and obligations of the parties real balance re-establishing equality between them, it being specified that the contract at issue must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms. Provided that the latter condition is satisfied, the contract at issue may, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, be continued as long as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible without the unfair terms, which is to be determined objectively (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2019, Dunai, C‑118/17, EU:C:2019:207, paragraphs 40 and 51, and of 26 March 2019, Abanca Corporación Bancaria and Bankia, C‑70/17 and C‑179/17, EU:C:2019:250, paragraph 57).

2019-10-03

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

It follows from the above factors that, first, where a national court considers that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of its domestic law, it is impossible to uphold a contract without the unfair terms which it contains, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 does not in principle preclude that contract from being annulled (judgment of 3 October 2019, Dziubak, C‑260/18, EU:C:2019:819, paragraph 43).

62018CJ0260

Kamil Dziubak and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, prowadzący działalność w Polsce w formie oddziału pod nazwą Raiffeisen Bank International AG Oddział w Polsce, anciennement Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA.

It follows from the considerations contained in paragraphs 40 and 41 of this judgment that where a national court considers that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of its domestic law, it is impossible to uphold a contract without the unfair terms which it contains, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 does not in principle preclude that contract from being annulled.

2019-10-03

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

Therefore, since the system of protection against unfair terms does not apply if the consumer objects to it, that consumer must a fortiori be entitled to object to being protected, under that same system, against the unfavourable consequences caused by the contract being invalidated in its entirety where he or she does not wish to rely on that protection (judgment of 3 October 2019, Dziubak, C‑260/18, EU:C:2019:819, paragraph 55).

62018CJ0260

Kamil Dziubak and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, prowadzący działalność w Polsce w formie oddziału pod nazwą Raiffeisen Bank International AG Oddział w Polsce, anciennement Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA.

Similarly, since the system of protection against unfair terms does not apply if the consumer objects to it, that consumer must a fortiori be entitled to object to being protected, under that same system, against the unfavourable consequences caused by the contract being annulled in its entirety where he does not wish to rely on that protection.

2019-10-03

62020CJ0019

I.W. and R.W. v Bank BPH S.A. and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich.

2021-04-29

In that context, the consumer is entitled, after having been informed by the national court, not to assert the unfair and non-binding nature of a term, thus giving free and informed consent to the term in question (judgment of 3 October 2019, Dziubak, C‑260/18, EU:C:2019:819, paragraph 66).

62018CJ0260

Kamil Dziubak and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, prowadzący działalność w Polsce w formie oddziału pod nazwą Raiffeisen Bank International AG Oddział w Polsce, anciennement Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA.

The Court has interpreted that provision as meaning that, where the national court considers a contractual term to be unfair, it is required not to apply it, an obligation from which there is no derogation unless the consumer, after having been informed of it by that court, does not intend to assert its unfair or non-binding status, thus giving his free and informed consent to the term in question, as observed in paragraph 53 of this judgment.

2019-10-03

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

Admittedly, as the European Commission notes in its written observations, it is also apparent from the case-law of the Court that a Member State cannot make the recognition of the validity of a driving licence issued in another Member State subject to a condition set by the legislation of the first Member State for the issue of licences, such as the production of a medical-psychological expert’s report, where that licence has been issued after the withdrawal by the first Member State of an earlier driving licence, after the expiry of any period of prohibition from applying for a new licence (see, to that effect, as regards Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1) – which was replaced by Directive 2006/126 – judgment of 19 February 2009, Schwarz, C‑321/07, EU:C:2009:104, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited, and, as regards Directive 2006/126, judgment of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 84).

62010CJ0419

Wolfgang Hofmann v Freistaat Bayern.

84. In that context, it should also be remembered that the Court of Justice has held, concerning Directive 91/439, that a host Member State making the issue of a driving licence subject to stricter domestic conditions, especially after an earlier licence has been withdrawn, may not refuse to recognise a driving licence subsequently issued by another Member State solely on the ground that the holder of that new licence has obtained it pursuant to national legislation that does not impose the same requirements as that host Member State ( Wiedemann and Funk , paragraph 54). That interpretation is equally valid in relation to Directive 2006/126 which, like Directive 91/439, provides for a minimum degree of harmonisation of the national provisions relating to the conditions under which a driving licence may be issued (see, to that effect, Akyüz , paragraph 53) and the linchpin of which remains, as stated in paragraph 78 of this judgment, the principle of the mutual recognition of driving licences issued by the Member States.

2012-04-26

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

Once the authorities of one Member State have issued a driving licence in accordance with Article 1(1) of Directive 2006/126, the other Member States are not entitled to investigate whether the conditions for issue laid down by that directive have been met. The possession of a driving licence issued by one Member State has to be regarded as constituting proof that its holder satisfied those conditions on the day on which that licence was issued (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

47. Once the authorities of one Member State have issued a driving licence in accordance with Article 1(1) of Directive 2006/126, the other Member States are not entitled to investigate whether the conditions for issue laid down by that directive have been met. The possession of a driving licence issued by one Member State has to be regarded as constituting proof that its holder satisfied those conditions on the day on which that licence was issued (see, to that effect, judgment in Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 46 and 47).

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

It also took the view that, in such a situation, in which fitness to drive is challenged not at the stage at which the driving licence was issued but following an offence committed by the holder of that licence after it had been issued, the penalty for which took effect only in the territory of the Member State in which that offence had been committed, that Member State is competent to lay down the conditions with which the holder of that driving licence must comply in order to recover the right to drive in that Member State’s territory (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraphs 73 and 84).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

73. In that regard, while the Court has repeatedly found, as is apparent from paragraph 46 of the present judgment, that it is for the issuing Member State alone to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by EU law, particularly those relating to fitness to drive, have been satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment in Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 45), it must be borne in mind that, in the case in the main proceedings, the fitness to drive was challenged not at the stage at which the driving licence was issued but following an offence committed by the holder of that licence after it had been issued, the penalty for which took effect only in the territory of the Member State in which that offence had been committed.

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

In that regard, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States. That provision imposes on those Member States a clear and precise obligation which leaves them no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (judgments of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and of 28 October 2020, Kreis Heinsberg, C‑112/19, EU:C:2020:864, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

45. It must be noted that, according to settled case-law, Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States. That provision imposes on those Member States a clear and precise obligation which leaves no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (see, to that effect, judgments in Akyüz , C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 40, and Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 43 and 44).

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

The Court inter alia considered, in that regard, in paragraph 60 of that judgment, that the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 allows a Member State that is not the Member State of residence to take measures, in accordance with its national legislation and as a result of unlawful conduct in its territory by the holder of a driving licence obtained in another Member State, the scope of those measures being limited to that territory and their effect limited to the refusal to recognise the validity of that licence within that territory.

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

60. It should be noted, however, that the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126, which does not provide for the possibility of exchanging a driving licence, merely allows a Member State that is not the Member State of normal residence to take measures in accordance with its national legislation and as a result of unlawful conduct in its territory by the holder of a driving licence previously obtained in another Member State, the scope of those measures being limited to that territory and the effect limited to the refusal to recognise the validity of that licence within that territory.

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

Moreover, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that it is for the issuing Member State to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by EU law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issuing of a driving licence is justified (judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

46. Moreover, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that it is for the issuing Member State to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by EU law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issuing of a driving licence is justified (see, to that effect, judgment in Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 45 and 47).

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

It also took the view that, in such a situation, in which fitness to drive is challenged not at the stage at which the driving licence was issued but following an offence committed by the holder of that licence after it had been issued, the penalty for which took effect only in the territory of the Member State in which that offence had been committed, that Member State is competent to lay down the conditions with which the holder of that driving licence must comply in order to recover the right to drive in that Member State’s territory (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraphs 73 and 84).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

84. Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the third question and to part (b) of the fourth question is that a Member State which refuses to recognise the validity of a driving licence in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is competent to lay down the conditions with which the holder of a driving licence must comply in order to recover the right to drive in that Member State’s territory. It is for the referring court to examine whether, in applying its own rules, the Member State in question is not in fact refusing indefinitely to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State. In that context, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether the conditions laid down by the legislation of the first Member State, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective of Directive 2006/126, which is to improve road safety. Costs

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

The Court however made it clear that it was for the referring court to examine whether, by applying its own rules, the Member State in question did not in fact refuse indefinitely to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State and that, in that context, it was the referring court’s responsibility to ascertain whether the conditions laid down by the legislation of the first Member State, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, did not exceed the limits of what was appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective of Directive 2006/126, which is to improve road safety (judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 84).

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

84. Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the third question and to part (b) of the fourth question is that a Member State which refuses to recognise the validity of a driving licence in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is competent to lay down the conditions with which the holder of a driving licence must comply in order to recover the right to drive in that Member State’s territory. It is for the referring court to examine whether, in applying its own rules, the Member State in question is not in fact refusing indefinitely to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State. In that context, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether the conditions laid down by the legislation of the first Member State, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective of Directive 2006/126, which is to improve road safety. Costs

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

It is however for the referring court to examine whether, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the rules, provided for by the legislation of the first Member State, laying down the conditions with which the holder of a driving licence deprived as a result of unlawful conduct of the right to drive in its territory in which he or she was staying temporarily must comply in order to recover the right to drive in that territory, do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective pursued by Directive 2006/126, consisting in improving road safety (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 78), which would be the case in particular if they precluded that licence holder from being able to provide evidence that his or her fitness to drive, after the expiry of any period of prohibition from applying for a new licence, was checked in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to Directive 2006/126 when his or her licence was renewed in his or her Member State of normal residence and that the purpose of that check corresponds with that of the check ordered by the legislation of the first Member State.

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

78. It is ultimately a matter for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to assess the facts in the main proceedings and interpret national legislation, to examine whether in this instance, in applying its own rules, the Federal Republic of Germany is not in fact refusing indefinitely to recognise Ms Aykul’s driving licence. In that context, it is also for the referring court to ascertain whether the conditions subject to which, under German legislation, a person in Ms Aykul’s situation may recover the right to drive in German territory comply with the principle of proportionality and, in particular, do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective of Directive 2006/126, which is to improve road safety.

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

The Court however held, in paragraph 71 of the judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul (C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257), that Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State in whose territory the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State is staying temporarily is not precluded from refusing to recognise the validity of that driving licence on account of unlawful conduct on the part of its holder in the territory of the first Member State after that driving licence has been issued that results, under the national law of the first Member State, in unfitness to drive motor vehicles.

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

71. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first and second questions and to part (a) of the fourth question is that Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State in whose territory the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State is staying temporarily is not precluded from refusing to recognise the validity of that driving licence on account of unlawful conduct on the part of its holder in the territory of the first Member State after that driving licence has been issued that results, under the national law of the first Member State, in unfitness to drive motor vehicles. The third question and part (b) of the fourth question

2015-04-23

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

Furthermore, since Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 does not make any distinction between the means by which the driving licence is issued, namely following success in the tests laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2006/126, following an exchange pursuant to Article 11(1) of that directive or following a renewal pursuant to Article 7(3) of that directive, the principle of mutual recognition applies equally as regards the driving licence issued from such a renewal, subject to the exceptions laid down by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 2020, Kreis Heinsberg, C‑112/19, EU:C:2020:864, paragraph 26).

62019CJ0112

Marvin M. v Kreis Heinsberg.

26 That provision does not make any distinction between the means by which the driving licence is issued, namely following success in the tests laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2006/126 or following an exchange pursuant to Article 11(1) of that directive, the principle of mutual recognition applies equally as regards the driving licence issued from such an exchange, subject to the exceptions laid down by that directive.

2020-10-28

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

In that regard, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States. That provision imposes on those Member States a clear and precise obligation which leaves them no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (judgments of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and of 28 October 2020, Kreis Heinsberg, C‑112/19, EU:C:2020:864, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0112

Marvin M. v Kreis Heinsberg.

25 According to the Court’s well-established case-law, that provision provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

2020-10-28

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

Admittedly, as the European Commission notes in its written observations, it is also apparent from the case-law of the Court that a Member State cannot make the recognition of the validity of a driving licence issued in another Member State subject to a condition set by the legislation of the first Member State for the issue of licences, such as the production of a medical-psychological expert’s report, where that licence has been issued after the withdrawal by the first Member State of an earlier driving licence, after the expiry of any period of prohibition from applying for a new licence (see, to that effect, as regards Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1) – which was replaced by Directive 2006/126 – judgment of 19 February 2009, Schwarz, C‑321/07, EU:C:2009:104, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited, and, as regards Directive 2006/126, judgment of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 84).

62007CJ0321

Criminal proceedings against Karl Schwarz.

91. Thus, the Court has held that a Member State may not refuse to recognise, in its territory, the right to drive stemming from a driving licence issued in another Member State and, therefore, the validity of that licence, so long as the licence holder has not satisfied the necessary conditions in that first Member State for the issue of a new licence following withdrawal of the licence previously obtained there, including the examination of fitness to drive certifying that the grounds justifying the withdrawal are no longer in existence (see Wiedemann and Funk , paragraph 64, and Zerche and Others , paragraph 61; orders in Halbritter , paragraph 32, and Kremer , paragraph 38).

2009-02-19

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

In such a situation, after all, the unfitness to drive, punished by withdrawal of the driving licence in the first Member State, was lifted by the test of fitness carried out by another Member State when a driving licence was subsequently issued. On that occasion, the issuing Member State, as is recalled in paragraph 27 of the present judgment, must, in particular, verify, in accordance with Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, that the candidate satisfies the minimum standards of physical and mental fitness for driving (see, to that effect, as regards Article 7(1) of Directive 91/439, which corresponds to Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, judgment of 19 February 2009, Schwarz, C‑321/07, EU:C:2009:104, paragraphs 92 and 93).

62007CJ0321

Criminal proceedings against Karl Schwarz.

92. In those cases, the unfitness to drive, punished by withdrawal of the driving licence in a Member State, was set aside by the test of fitness carried out by another Member State when the later driving licence was issued.

2009-02-19

62020CJ0047

F. v Stadt Karlsruhe.

2021-04-29

In such a situation, after all, the unfitness to drive, punished by withdrawal of the driving licence in the first Member State, was lifted by the test of fitness carried out by another Member State when a driving licence was subsequently issued. On that occasion, the issuing Member State, as is recalled in paragraph 27 of the present judgment, must, in particular, verify, in accordance with Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, that the candidate satisfies the minimum standards of physical and mental fitness for driving (see, to that effect, as regards Article 7(1) of Directive 91/439, which corresponds to Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, judgment of 19 February 2009, Schwarz, C‑321/07, EU:C:2009:104, paragraphs 92 and 93).

62007CJ0321

Criminal proceedings against Karl Schwarz.

93. At that time, the issuing Member State, as is pointed out in paragraph 76 of the present judgment, must, in particular, verify, in accordance with Article 7(1) of Directive 91/439, that the candidate satisfies the minimum standards of physical and mental fitness for driving.

2009-02-19

62020CJ0053

Hengstenberg GmbH & Co. KG v Spreewaldverein eV.

2021-04-15

43 En outre, les dispositions du règlement no 1151/2012 ont vocation à empêcher qu’il soit fait un usage abusif des appellations d’origine protégées et des indications géographiques protégées, et ce non seulement dans l’intérêt des acheteurs, mais également dans l’intérêt des producteurs qui ont consenti des efforts pour garantir les qualités attendues des produits portant légalement de telles indications (voir, par analogie, arrêt du 7 juin 2018, Scotch Whisky Association, C‑44/17, EU:C:2018:415, point 38 et jurisprudence citée).

62017CJ0044

Scotch Whisky Association v Michael Klotz.

38 Thus, as the Advocate General has noted in point 38 of his Opinion, the aim of the provisions of Regulation No 110/2008, in particular of Article 16, is to prevent the misuse of protected geographical indications, not only in the interests of consumers, but also in the interests of producers who have striven to guarantee the qualities expected of products lawfully bearing such indications (see, by analogy, judgments of 14 September 2017, EUIPO v Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto, C‑56/16 P, EU:C:2017:693, paragraph 82, and of 20 December 2017, Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne, C‑393/16, EU:C:2017:991, paragraph 38). In that context, Article 16(a) prohibits, more specifically, operators from making commercial use of a registered geographical indication in respect of products that are not covered by the registration, in particular with the aim of taking unfair advantage of that geographical indication.

2018-06-07

62020CJ0053

Hengstenberg GmbH & Co. KG v Spreewaldverein eV.

2021-04-15

32 À titre liminaire, il convient de rappeler que les demandes de modification non mineure du cahier des charges d’un produit bénéficiant d’une indication géographique protégée, telles que celle en cause au principal, sont, en vertu du renvoi opéré par l’article 53, paragraphe 2, premier alinéa, du règlement no 1151/2012, soumises à la même procédure que celle applicable à l’enregistrement d’une indication géographique protégée (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 janvier 2020, GAEC Jeanningros, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, point 29), de telle sorte que la notion d’« intérêt légitime », au sens de l’article 49, paragraphe 3, premier alinéa, et paragraphe 4, deuxième alinéa, du règlement no 1151/2012, lu en combinaison avec l’article 53, paragraphe 2, premier alinéa, de celui-ci, appelle une interprétation identique, que la procédure engagée soit une procédure d’enregistrement d’une indication géographique protégée ou qu’il s’agisse d’une procédure de demande de modification non mineure du cahier des charges d’un produit bénéficiant d’une telle indication.

62018CJ0785

GAEC Jeanningros v Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO) and Others.

29 In that connection, as regards applications for amendments to a product specification for a PDO which are not minor, it has been noted in the aforementioned paragraph 21 that, by virtue of the reference made in the first subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, those applications are subject to the same procedure as that applicable to the registration of a PDO.

2020-01-29

62020CJ0053

Hengstenberg GmbH & Co. KG v Spreewaldverein eV.

2021-04-15

37 En deuxième lieu, s’agissant du contexte, il y a lieu de rappeler que le règlement no 1151/2012 instaure un système de partage des compétences, en ce sens que, en particulier, la décision d’enregistrer une dénomination en tant qu’indication géographique protégée ne peut être prise par la Commission que si l’État membre concerné lui a soumis une demande à cette fin et qu’une telle demande ne peut être faite que si cet État membre a vérifié qu’elle était justifiée. Ce système de partage des compétences s’explique notamment par le fait que l’enregistrement d’une indication géographique protégée présuppose la vérification qu’un certain nombre de conditions sont réunies, ce qui exige, dans une large mesure, des connaissances approfondies d’éléments particuliers audit État membre, que les autorités compétentes de celui-ci sont les mieux placées pour vérifier (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 janvier 2020, GAEC Jeanningros, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, point 24 et jurisprudence citée).

62018CJ0785

GAEC Jeanningros v Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO) and Others.

24 The Court has held that Council Regulation (EEC) No 2018/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 1992 L 208, p. 1) — which laid down a registration procedure corresponding, in essence, to the registration procedure set out in Articles 49 to 52 of Regulation No 1151/2012 — created a system of division of powers, in the sense that, in particular, the decision to register a name as a PDO could be made by the Commission only if the Member State concerned had submitted to it an application for that purpose, and that such an application could be made only if that Member State had checked that the application was justified. That system of division of powers is attributable particularly to the fact that registration assumes that it has been verified that a certain number of conditions have been met, which requires, to a large extent, detailed knowledge of matters particular to that Member State, which the competent authorities thereof are best placed to check (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 53, and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 66).

2020-01-29

62020CJ0056

AR v Stadt Pforzheim.

2021-04-29

It should also be borne in mind, in that regard, that the Court has held that, although Directive 2006/126 provides only for a minimum degree of harmonisation of the national provisions relating to the conditions under which a driving licence may be issued, that directive does, however, bring about exhaustive harmonisation of documents proving the existence of a right to drive which must be recognised by the Member States pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0195

Criminal proceedings against I.

57 In the present case, whilst Directive 2006/126 provides only for a minimum degree of harmonisation of the national provisions relating to the conditions under which a driving licence may be issued (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2012, Akyüz, C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 53), that directive does, however, bring about exhaustive harmonisation of documents proving the existence of a right to drive which must be recognised by the Member States pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof.

2017-10-26

62020CJ0056

AR v Stadt Pforzheim.

2021-04-29

In that regard, it should be recalled that, in paragraph 71 of the judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul (C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257), the Court found that Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 were to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State in whose territory the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State is staying temporarily is not precluded from refusing to recognise the validity of that driving licence on account of unlawful conduct on the part of its holder in the territory of the first Member State after that driving licence has been issued that results, under the national law of the first Member State, in unfitness to drive motor vehicles.

62013CJ0260

Sevda Aykul v Land Baden-Württemberg.

71. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first and second questions and to part (a) of the fourth question is that Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State in whose territory the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State is staying temporarily is not precluded from refusing to recognise the validity of that driving licence on account of unlawful conduct on the part of its holder in the territory of the first Member State after that driving licence has been issued that results, under the national law of the first Member State, in unfitness to drive motor vehicles. The third question and part (b) of the fourth question

2015-04-23

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

In that regard, as the Advocate General observed in point 26 of his Opinion, the arguments raised by both Ireland and the Polish Government relate to the substance of the action brought by the applicant in the main proceedings. It must however be recalled that arguments which concern matters relating to the substance of an action cannot affect the admissibility of the questions referred (see, to that effect, the judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 111).

62018CJ0585

A. K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy.

111 However, the arguments thus put forward, which concern matters of substance, cannot affect the admissibility of the questions referred.

2019-11-19

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

Accordingly, the Court alone may, exceptionally and for overriding considerations of legal certainty, grant a provisional suspension of the effects of a rule of EU law with regard to a national law that is contrary to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

62015CJ0379

Association France Nature Environnement v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie.

33 So far as concerns the concerns expressed by the referring court relating to possible adverse environmental consequences of an annulment of the domestic law provisions held to be incompatible with EU law, it is apparent from paragraphs 66 and 67 of the judgment of 8 September 2010 in Winner Wetten (C‑409/06, EU:C:2010:503) that the Court alone may, exceptionally and for overriding considerations of legal certainty, grant a provisional suspension of the ousting effect which a rule of EU law has on national law that is contrary thereto. If national courts had the power to give national provisions primacy in relation to EU law contrary to those national provisions, even provisionally, the uniform application of EU law would be damaged.

2016-07-28

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

Until Directive 2001/82 is repealed by that regulation, the provisions of the directive remain binding for so long as the Court of Justice has not ruled that they are invalid (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 1979, Granaria, 101/78, EU:C:1979:38, paragraph 5, and of 21 September 1989, Hoechst v Commission, 46/87 and 227/88, EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 64).

61978CJ0101

Granaria BV v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten.

5THUS IT FOLLOWS FROM THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY THAT , ALTHOUGH RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW WITHIN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT ENTAILS FOR PERSONS AMENABLE TO COMMUNITY LAW THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS BY LEGAL ACTION , THAT PRINCIPLE ALSO IMPOSES UPON ALL PERSONS SUBJECT TO COMMUNITY LAW THE OBLIGATION TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT REGULATIONS ARE FULLY EFFECTIVE SO LONG AS THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DECLARED TO BE INVALID BY A COMPETENT COURT .

1979-02-13

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

In that regard, it must be recalled that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty, under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU, to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgments of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited; of 4 October 2018, Link Logistik N&N, C‑384/17, EU:C:2018:810, paragraph 57, and of 13 December 2018, Hein, C‑385/17, EU:C:2018:1018, paragraph 49).

62014CJ0441

Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen.

30 While it is true that, in relation to disputes between individuals, the Court has consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual (see, inter alia, judgments in Marshall, 152/84, EU:C:1986:84, paragraph 48; Faccini Dori, C‑91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paragraph 20; and Pfeiffer and Others, C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 108), the fact nonetheless remains that the Court has also consistently held that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments in von Colson and Kamann, 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, paragraph 26, and Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 47).

2016-04-19

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

In that regard, it must be recalled that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty, under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU, to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgments of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited; of 4 October 2018, Link Logistik N&N, C‑384/17, EU:C:2018:810, paragraph 57, and of 13 December 2018, Hein, C‑385/17, EU:C:2018:1018, paragraph 49).

62017CJ0385

Torsten Hein v Albert Holzkamm GmbH & Co.

49 In that regard, the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

2018-12-13

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

Moreover, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions as to the interpretation of EU law which are referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not for this Court to verify, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgment of 2 February 2021, Consob, C‑481/19, EU:C:2021:84, paragraph 29). That presumption of relevance cannot be rebutted by the possibility that the applicant might ultimately be unsuccessful in the main proceedings before the national court, in particular on the basis of an interpretation of EU law adopted by the Court.

62019CJ0481

DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob).

According to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law or the assessment of its validity that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it and to understand the reasons for the referring court’s view that it needs answers to those questions in order to rule in the dispute before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 November 2009, Filipiak, C‑314/08, EU:C:2009:719, paragraphs 40 to 42, and of 12 December 2019, Slovenské elektrárne, C‑376/18, EU:C:2019:1068, paragraph 24).

2021-02-02

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

Until Directive 2001/82 is repealed by that regulation, the provisions of the directive remain binding for so long as the Court of Justice has not ruled that they are invalid (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 1979, Granaria, 101/78, EU:C:1979:38, paragraph 5, and of 21 September 1989, Hoechst v Commission, 46/87 and 227/88, EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 64).

61987CJ0046

Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities.

64 Such conduct is incompatible with the obligation imposed upon all persons subject to Community law to acknowledge that measures adopted by the institutions are fully effective so long as they have not been declared invalid by the Court and to recognize their enforceability unless the Court has decided to suspend the operation of the said measures ( see, in particular, the judgment of 13 February 1979 in Case 101/78 Granaria v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten (( 1979 )) ECR 623, paragraph 5 ) and cannot be justified on the basis of superior legal interests .

1989-09-21

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

In that regard, it should nevertheless be recalled that, as the referring court has found that Directive 2001/82 was incorrectly transposed, it is required to take all the appropriate general and particular measures to ensure that the result prescribed by that directive is attained (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 1996, Kraaijeveld and Others, C‑72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 55).

61995CJ0072

Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland.

55 First of all it should be recalled that the obligation of a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty and by the directive itself (see Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen [1977] ECR 113, paragraph 22, and Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48). That duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8).

1996-10-24

62020CJ0064

UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.

2021-03-17

In that regard, it must be recalled that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty, under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU, to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgments of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited; of 4 October 2018, Link Logistik N&N, C‑384/17, EU:C:2018:810, paragraph 57, and of 13 December 2018, Hein, C‑385/17, EU:C:2018:1018, paragraph 49).

62017CJ0384

Dooel Uvoz-Izvoz Skopje Link Logistic N&N v Budapest Rendőrfőkapitánya.

57 It should be recalled, however, that according to settled case-law the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 September 2016, Martínez Andrés and Castrejana López, C‑184/15 and C‑197/15, EU:C:2016:680, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 24 January 2018, Pantuso and Others, C‑616/16 and C‑617/16, EU:C:2018:32, paragraph 42).

2018-10-04

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

Il appartient, en définitive, à la juridiction de renvoi, seule compétente pour apprécier les faits de l’affaire dont elle est saisie, de vérifier si l’entreprise concernée se trouve dans une telle « situation particulière ». Cela étant, il revient à la Cour de fournir à cette juridiction toute indication utile afin de résoudre le litige qui lui est soumis (voir, en ce sens et par analogie, arrêt du 4 juillet 2019, Tronex, C–624/17, EU:C:2019:564, point 25 et jurisprudence citée).

62017CJ0624

Openbaar Ministerie v Tronex BV.

25 It is ultimately for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to assess the facts of the case before it, to verify whether the holder of the object or substance in question did in fact intend to ‘discard’ it, taking into account all the facts of the case, while ensuring compliance with the objective of Directive 2008/98. That being so, it is for the Court of Justice to provide that court with any helpful guidance to resolve the dispute before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Brady, C‑113/12, EU:C:2013:627, paragraph 47, and of 12 December 2013, Shell Nederland, C‑241/12 and C‑242/12, EU:C:2013:821, paragraph 48).

2019-07-04

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

Selon ladite juridiction, au regard de l’approche suivie par la Cour dans l’arrêt du 12 février 2004, Hamann International (C–337/01, EU:C:2004:90, points 34 et 35), de telles circonstances pourraient exister en l’occurrence. En effet, compte tenu du fonctionnement du régime de perfectionnement actif accordé rétroactivement à Rottendorf Pharma, cette dernière, qui n’avait été autorisée préalablement qu’à exporter des marchandises communautaires en tant qu’exportatrice agréée, se serait trouvée dans une « situation complexe ». Les règles énoncées à l’article 900, paragraphe 1, sous e) et f), du règlement no 2454/93 pourraient également conforter une telle interprétation.

62001CJ0337

Hamann International GmbH Spedition + Logistik v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.

35. In the main proceedings, it is for the national court to ascertain whether the conditions for repayment of the duties at issue, as laid down in Article 239 of the Customs Code, are met.

2004-02-12

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

Selon ladite juridiction, au regard de l’approche suivie par la Cour dans l’arrêt du 12 février 2004, Hamann International (C–337/01, EU:C:2004:90, points 34 et 35), de telles circonstances pourraient exister en l’occurrence. En effet, compte tenu du fonctionnement du régime de perfectionnement actif accordé rétroactivement à Rottendorf Pharma, cette dernière, qui n’avait été autorisée préalablement qu’à exporter des marchandises communautaires en tant qu’exportatrice agréée, se serait trouvée dans une « situation complexe ». Les règles énoncées à l’article 900, paragraphe 1, sous e) et f), du règlement no 2454/93 pourraient également conforter une telle interprétation.

62001CJ0337

Hamann International GmbH Spedition + Logistik v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.

34. Moreover, the financial nature of the import duties does not preclude a customs debt from being incurred on the basis of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings. As pointed out by the Commission, Article 239 of that code provides for the repayment or remission of duties legally owed, subject to certain conditions.

2004-02-12

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

S’agissant de la référence, faite par la juridiction de renvoi, à l’arrêt du 12 février 2004, Hamann International (C–337/01, EU:C:2004:90), il suffit de relever que, outre le fait que, au point 34 de cet arrêt, la Cour s’est limitée à relever qu’il appartenait à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier si les conditions d’un remboursement des droits de douane concernés, prévues à l’article 239 du code des douanes, étaient remplies dans cette affaire, ledit arrêt concernait une situation qui ne peut être assimilée à celle du litige au principal. En effet, ainsi que la Commission le fait observer, l’opérateur économique concerné dans cette affaire avait omis de respecter une obligation que le législateur de l’Union avait décidé d’abolir au moment où les faits ayant donné lieu au même arrêt se sont déroulés.

62001CJ0337

Hamann International GmbH Spedition + Logistik v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.

34. Moreover, the financial nature of the import duties does not preclude a customs debt from being incurred on the basis of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings. As pointed out by the Commission, Article 239 of that code provides for the repayment or remission of duties legally owed, subject to certain conditions.

2004-02-12

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

L’article 239 du code des douanes constitue une clause générale d’équité impliquant la remise de droits de douane à l’importation dès lors que deux conditions sont satisfaites, à savoir l’existence d’une situation particulière ainsi que l’absence de négligence manifeste et de manœuvre de la part du redevable (arrêt du 29 juillet 2019, Prenatal, C‑589/17, EU:C:2019:631, point 37 et jurisprudence citée).

62017CJ0589

Prenatal S.A. v Tribunal Económico Administrativo Regional de Cataluña (TEARC).

37 Quant à l’article 239 du code des douanes, il constitue, selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, une clause générale d’équité impliquant la remise de droits à l’importation dès lors que deux conditions sont satisfaites, à savoir l’existence d’une situation particulière et l’absence de négligence manifeste et de manœuvre de la part du redevable (arrêt du 25 juillet 2018, Commission/Combaro, C‑574/17 P, EU:C:2018:598, point 45 et jurisprudence citée).

2019-07-29

62020CJ0092

Rottendorf Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.

2021-02-03

S’agissant de la condition afférente à l’absence de négligence manifeste et de manœuvre de la part du redevable et, plus particulièrement, eu égard aux doutes exprimés, tant par le bureau principal des douanes que par la Commission européenne, concernant l’appréciation de la juridiction de renvoi selon laquelle il n’y avait pas eu de négligence manifeste de la part de Rottendorf Pharma, il convient de relever qu’il s’agit d’une question de fait, relevant de l’appréciation de la juridiction de renvoi. Au demeurant, cette juridiction n’interroge pas la Cour sur l’interprétation de la notion de « négligence manifeste ». Dans ces conditions, il n’y a pas lieu pour la Cour d’examiner cette question (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 1er octobre 2019, Planet49, C–673/17, EU:C:2019:801, point 64).

62017CJ0673

Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände - Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. v Planet49 GmbH.

64 Lastly, it should be noted that the referring court has not referred to the Court the question whether it is compatible with the requirement that consent be ‘freely given’, within the meaning of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46 and of Article 4(11) and Article 7(4) of Regulation 2016/679, for a user’s consent to the processing of his personal data for advertising purposes to be a prerequisite to that user’s participation in a promotional lottery, as appears to be the case in the main proceedings, according to the order for reference, at least as far as concerns the first checkbox. In those circumstances, it is not appropriate for the Court to consider that question.

2019-10-01

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

Thus, it has been held that, notwithstanding the fact that birth is a condition giving rise to a right to parental leave, that right is not linked to the date on which the child was born, with the result that it is not necessary for that birth to have occurred after the date of entry into force of Directive 96/34 in a Member State in order for the parents of that child to be able to avail themselves of a right to parental leave under that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 47, and of 16 September 2010, Chatzi, C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraph 50).

62010CJ0149

Zoi Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon.

50. So far as concerns the purport of Commission v Luxembourg , it is clear on reading paragraph 47 of that judgment that, in interpreting clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement as meaning that the grant of parental leave is subject not to birth but to the condition that a child has been born, the Court sought to indicate that the right to parental leave is not connected with the date of birth and that it is not necessary for the child to have been born after the entry into force of Directive 96/34 in the Member State concerned. The Court thus ruled on the temporal application of Directive 96/34 and not on whether, in the event of a multiple birth, a number of periods of parental leave equal to the number of children born must be granted.

2010-09-16

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 16 July 2015, Maïstrellis, C‑222/14, EU:C:2015:473, paragraph 30, and of 3 October 2019, Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland and Others, C‑197/18, EU:C:2019:824, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

62018CJ0197

Proceedings brought by Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland and Others.

48 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

2019-10-03

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

Thus, it has been held that, notwithstanding the fact that birth is a condition giving rise to a right to parental leave, that right is not linked to the date on which the child was born, with the result that it is not necessary for that birth to have occurred after the date of entry into force of Directive 96/34 in a Member State in order for the parents of that child to be able to avail themselves of a right to parental leave under that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 47, and of 16 September 2010, Chatzi, C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraph 50).

62003CJ0519

Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

47. It follows that the right to parental leave is granted by Directive 96/34 to all parents having a child below a certain age limit. Since that directive provides that entitlement to parental leave is available during a certain period, until the child has reached the age set by the Member State concerned, the fact that the child was born before or after the time-limit laid down for the implementation of that directive is not relevant in this regard. The right to parental leave is not connected with the birth or adoption of the child considered as facts which, by reason of the date at which they occurred, give rise to entitlement to such leave. It is true that the text of the framework agreement states that the right to parental leave is conferred ‘on the grounds of the birth or adoption’ of a child, but such wording reflects only the fact that the grant of parental leave is subject to the condition that a child has been born or adopted. This does not imply that for the right to parental leave to be justified, the birth or adoption of the child must have occurred after that directive has come into force in the Member State concerned.

2005-04-14

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 16 July 2015, Maïstrellis, C‑222/14, EU:C:2015:473, paragraph 30, and of 3 October 2019, Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland and Others, C‑197/18, EU:C:2019:824, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

62014CJ0222

Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton.

30. According to the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgments in Adidas , C‑223/98, EU:C:1999:500, paragraph 23; SGAE , C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 34; and Hoštická and Others , C‑561/13, EU:C:2014:2287, paragraph 29).

2015-07-16

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that a new rule of law applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and, while it does not apply to legal situations that have arisen and become definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects, and to new legal situations. It is otherwise, subject to the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal acts, only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application. In particular, procedural rules are generally taken to apply from the date on which they enter into force, as opposed to substantive rules, which are usually interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such an effect must be given to them (judgment of 26 March 2015, Commission v Moravia Gas Storage, C‑596/13 P, EU:C:2015:203, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

62013CJ0596

European Commission v Moravia Gas Storage a.s.

32. A new rule of law applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and, while it does not apply to legal situations that have arisen and become definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects, and to new legal situations. It is otherwise, subject to the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal acts, only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application (judgment in Gemeinde Altrip and Others , C‑72/12, EU:C:2013:712, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

2015-03-26

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that a new rule of law applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and, while it does not apply to legal situations that have arisen and become definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects, and to new legal situations. It is otherwise, subject to the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal acts, only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application. In particular, procedural rules are generally taken to apply from the date on which they enter into force, as opposed to substantive rules, which are usually interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such an effect must be given to them (judgment of 26 March 2015, Commission v Moravia Gas Storage, C‑596/13 P, EU:C:2015:203, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

62013CJ0596

European Commission v Moravia Gas Storage a.s.

33. In particular, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally taken to apply from the date on which they enter into force (judgment in Commission v Spain , C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), as opposed to substantive rules, which are usually interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such an effect must be given to them (see judgments in Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others , 212/80 to 217/80, EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 9; Molenbergnatie , C‑201/04, EU:C:2006:136, paragraph 31; and Commission v Freistaat Sachsen , C‑334/07 P, EU:C:2008:709, paragraph 44).

2015-03-26

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it (judgment of 21 October 2020, Eco TLC, C‑556/19, EU:C:2020:844, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is for the Court to determine at the outset whether the dispute in the main proceedings is governed by Directive 96/34 or by Directive 2010/18, which repeals and replaces Directive 96/34, and, if necessary, to reformulate the question referred.

62019CJ0556

Société Eco TLC v Ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire and Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances.

20 Moreover, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With that in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 2 April 2020, Ruska Rederacjia, C‑897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

2020-10-21

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

As regards, in the first place, the question of whether those clauses of the revised Framework Agreement preclude national legislation which makes the grant of a right to parental leave subject to the condition that the parent is employed without interruption for a period of at least 12 months immediately prior to the start of that parental leave, it must be observed that it is apparent from the wording of clause 3.1(b) of the revised Framework Agreement that the Member States may make the grant of parental leave subject to the condition of a prior period of work that may not exceed one year. Given the use of the words ‘period of work’ in the first part of that provision and the fact that that provision provides, in the second part, that the sum of successive fixed-term contracts with the same employer is to be taken into account for the purpose of calculating that period, the Member States may require that the period in question be continuous. In addition, since an application for parental leave seeks to secure, on the part of the applicant, a suspension of his or her employment relationship (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2013, Hliddal and Bornand, C‑216/12 and C‑217/12, EU:C:2013:568, paragraph 53), the Member States may require that the prior period of work immediately precedes the start of the parental leave. Accordingly, clauses 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and 3.1(b) of the revised Framework Agreement do not preclude national legislation which makes the grant of a right to parental leave subject to the condition that the parent concerned is employed without interruption for a period of at least 12 months immediately preceding the start of that parental leave.

62012CJ0216

Caisse nationale des prestations familiales v Fjola Hliddal (C‑216/12) and Pierre-Louis Bornand (C‑217/12).

53. However, that is not the position in the case of a person receiving a parental leave allowance such as the allowance at issue in the main proceedings. That person has not lost his employment, but has merely decided to suspend the employment relationship.

2013-09-19

62020CJ0129

XI v Caisse pour l'avenir des enfants.

2021-02-25

Having regard to that context and those objectives, the individual right of each working parent to parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child, enshrined in clause 2.1 of the revised Framework Agreement, must be interpreted as articulating a particularly important EU social right which, moreover, is laid down in Article 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It follows that that right cannot be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Lyreco Belgium, C‑588/12, EU:C:2014:99, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

62012CJ0588

Lyreco Belgium NV v Sophie Rogiers.

36. Having regard to the objective pursued by the Framework Agreement, as recalled in paragraphs 30 and 31 above, to offer both men and women an opportunity to reconcile their work responsibilities with family obligations, clause 2.4 must be interpreted as articulating a particularly important European Union social right and it may not, therefore, be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, Meerts , paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols , paragraph 54).

2014-02-27

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Furthermore, in the absence of harmonisation of the conditions under which a pre-trial detention measure may be issued and maintained in respect of a person who is the subject of a criminal prosecution (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 47, and of 28 November 2019, Spetsializirana prokuratura, C‑653/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1024, paragraph 28), it is only under the conditions laid down in its national law that the court having jurisdiction may decide to adopt such a measure and, where appropriate, interrupt its execution if it finds that those conditions are no longer satisfied.

62018CJ0310

Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev.

47 Accordingly, in the light of the minimal degree of harmonisation pursued therein, Directive 2016/343 cannot be interpreted as being a complete and exhaustive instrument intended to lay down all the conditions for the adoption of decisions on pre-trial detention.

2018-09-19

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

As the Court has stated, judicial review of the decision taken by an authority other than a court to issue a European arrest warrant is not a condition for classification of that authority as an issuing judicial authority within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584. That requirement does not fall within the scope of the statutory rules and institutional framework of that authority, but concerns the procedure for issuing such a warrant, which must satisfy the requirement of effective judicial protection (judgment of 24 November 2020, AZ (Forgery of documents), C‑510/19, EU:C:2020:953, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0510

Criminal proceedings against AZ.

In that regard, the Court has stated that the existence of a judicial remedy against the decision taken by an authority other than a court to issue a European arrest warrant is not a condition for classification of that authority as an issuing judicial authority within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584. That requirement does not fall within the scope of the statutory rules and institutional framework of that authority, but concerns the procedure for issuing such a warrant, which must satisfy the requirement of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors’ Offices, Lyons and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraphs 48 and 63, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor's Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraphs 30 and 53).

2020-11-24

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In the second place, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the main proceedings is, on the date the request for a preliminary ruling is lodged, deprived of his or her liberty and that his or her continuing detention depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices, Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 38, and of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 99).

62018CJ0508

Minister for Justice and Equality v OG and PI.

38 In the second place, according to the case-law of the Court, it is appropriate to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question of whether he remains in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Poltorak, C‑452/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:858, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). According to the explanations provided by the referring court, the detention measure to which PI is subject was ordered in the context of the execution of the European arrest warrant issued in respect of him.

2019-05-27

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

By contrast, the referring court does not cast doubt on the classification of the public prosecutor as an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, in the light of the criteria identified by the Court of Justice in order to be eligible for that classification, that is to say, first, its participation in the administration of criminal justice and, secondly, its independence in the execution of those of its responsibilities which are inherent in the issuing of a European arrest warrant (see, in that regard, judgments of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices, Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraphs 51 and 74, and of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 52).

62018CJ0508

Minister for Justice and Equality v OG and PI.

51 It follows that the concept of a ‘judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, is capable of including authorities of a Member State which, although not necessarily judges or courts, participate in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State.

2019-05-27

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Thus, as regards a measure, such as the issuing of a European arrest warrant, which is capable of impinging on the right to liberty of the person concerned, that protection means that a decision meeting the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection should be adopted, at least, at one of the two levels of that protection (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 60, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 39).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

Thus, as regards a measure, such as the issuing of a European arrest warrant, which is capable of impinging on the right to liberty of the person concerned, that protection means that a decision meeting the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection should be adopted, at least, at one of the two levels of that protection (judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 68).

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In addition, the second level of protection of the rights of the person concerned requires that the issuing judicial authority review observance of the conditions to be met when issuing a European arrest warrant and examine objectively – taking into account all incriminatory and exculpatory evidence, without being exposed to the risk of being subject to external instructions, in particular from the executive – whether it is proportionate to issue that warrant (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 61, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 40).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

In particular, the second level of protection of the rights of the person concerned requires that the issuing judicial authority review observance of the conditions to be met when issuing a European arrest warrant and examine objectively — taking into account all incriminatory and exculpatory evidence, without being exposed to the risk of being subject to external instructions, in particular from the executive — whether it is proportionate to issue that warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraphs 71 and 73).

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

By contrast, the referring court does not cast doubt on the classification of the public prosecutor as an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, in the light of the criteria identified by the Court of Justice in order to be eligible for that classification, that is to say, first, its participation in the administration of criminal justice and, secondly, its independence in the execution of those of its responsibilities which are inherent in the issuing of a European arrest warrant (see, in that regard, judgments of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices, Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraphs 51 and 74, and of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 52).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

Thus, the Court has held that the term ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, is capable of including authorities of a Member State which, although not necessarily judges or courts, participate in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State and act independently in the execution of those of their responsibilities which are inherent in the issuing of a European arrest warrant, that independence requiring that there are statutory rules and an institutional framework capable of guaranteeing that the issuing judicial authority is not exposed, when adopting a decision to issue such an arrest warrant, to any risk of being subject, inter alia, to an instruction in a specific case from the executive (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraphs 51 and 74).

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Consequently, the inclusion in the national legal system of procedural rules whereby the conditions under which a European arrest warrant was issued and, inter alia, its proportionality, may be subject to review by a court in the issuing Member State before, after, or at the same time as its adoption, meets the requirement of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

The inclusion of such procedural rules in the French legal system thus demonstrates that the proportionality of the decision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to issue a European arrest warrant may be subject to judicial review before or almost at the same time as it is issued and, in any event, after the European arrest warrant has been issued, since such scrutiny may take place, depending on the circumstances, before or after the actual surrender of the requested person.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In that context, introducing a separate right of appeal against the decision to issue a European arrest warrant taken by a judicial authority other than a court is just one possibility in that regard (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 65, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 44).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

In particular, introducing a separate right of appeal against the decision to issue a European arrest warrant taken by a judicial authority other than a court is just one possibility in that regard.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Consequently, the inclusion in the national legal system of procedural rules whereby the conditions under which a European arrest warrant was issued and, inter alia, its proportionality, may be subject to review by a court in the issuing Member State before, after, or at the same time as its adoption, meets the requirement of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62019CJ0566

JR and YC.

Such a system therefore meets the requirement of effective judicial protection.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In accordance with Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the aim of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is to enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person, in the light of the objective pursued by that framework decision, so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted or serves the custodial sentence ordered against him or her (judgment of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence), C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 39).

62018CJ0551

IK.

39 Thus, in accordance with Article 1(1) of that framework decision, the aim of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is to enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person, in the light of the objective pursued by the framework decision, so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted or serves the custodial sentence ordered against him.

2018-12-06

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In that regard, as the Court has already held, as regards proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant, observance of the rights of the person whose surrender is requested falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be complying with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law (judgments of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 50, and of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence), C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 66).

62018CJ0551

IK.

66 Lastly, as the Court has previously held, as regards proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant, observance of the rights of the person whose surrender is requested falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be compliant with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law (judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 50).

2018-12-06

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

As regards, in the second place, what must be understood by the term ‘judicial decision’, it has been held that that term covers all the decisions of the Member State authorities that administer criminal justice, but not the police services (judgment of 10 November 2016, Özçelik, C‑453/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:860, paragraph 33).

62016CJ0453

Openbaar Ministerie v Halil Ibrahim Özçelik.

33 Given the need to ensure consistency between the interpretations of the various provisions of the Framework Decision, the above interpretation appears, in principle, transposable to Article 8(1)(c) thereof. That provision must, therefore, be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘judicial decision’ covers decisions of the Member State authorities that administer criminal justice, but not the police services.

2016-11-10

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

While Framework Decision 2002/584 leaves the national authorities some discretion, in accordance with the procedural autonomy which they enjoy, as to the specific manner of implementation of the objectives it pursues, with respect inter alia to the possibility of providing for a certain type of appeal against decisions relating to a European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, F, C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 52), the fact remains that the Member States must ensure that they do not frustrate the requirements flowing from that framework decision, in particular regarding the judicial protection which underlies it.

62013CJ0168

Jeremy F. v Premier ministre.

52. In the absence of further detail in the actual provisions of the Framework Decision, and having regard to Article 34 EU, which leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods needed to achieve the desired results of framework decisions, it must be concluded that the Framework Decision leaves the national authorities a discretion as to the specific manner of implementation of the objectives it pursues, with respect inter alia to the possibility of providing for an appeal with suspensive effect against decisions relating to a European arrest warrant.

2013-05-30

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

The principles of mutual recognition and mutual confidence which form the basis of the European arrest warrant system are founded inter alia on the premiss that the European arrest warrant concerned has been issued in conformity with the minimum requirements necessary for it to be valid, which include the requirement laid down in Article 8(1)(c) of Framework Decision 2002/584. The dual level of judicial protection is, in principle, lacking in a situation where a procedure to issue a European arrest warrant has been applied without a decision, such as a decision to issue a national arrest warrant on which the European arrest warrant is based, having been taken by a national judicial authority, before the issuing of the European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 57).

62015CJ0241

Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi.

57 That dual level of judicial protection is lacking, in principle, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which a ‘simplified’ European arrest warrant procedure is applied, since, under that procedure, no decision, such as a decision to issue a national arrest warrant on which the European arrest warrant will be based, has been taken by a national judicial authority before the European arrest warrant is issued.

2016-06-01

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the principle of mutual recognition on which the European arrest warrant system is based is founded on the mutual confidence between the Member States that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognised at EU level, particularly in the Charter (judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

62015CJ0241

Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi.

33 The principle of mutual recognition on which the European arrest warrant system is based is itself founded on the mutual confidence between the Member States that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognised at EU level, particularly in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (judgment of 5 April 2016 in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

2016-06-01

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In addition, it should be observed that compliance with the Charter is binding, as is stated in Article 51(1) of the Charter, on the Member States and, consequently, on their courts, when they are implementing EU law, which is the case when the issuing judicial authority and the executing judicial authority are applying the provisions of national law adopted to transpose Framework Decision 2002/584 (judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). That must also be the case when what is at issue is the effectiveness of the judicial review that must be carried out, directly or indirectly, with regard to decisions relating to the European arrest warrant.

62015CJ0241

Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi.

34 Lastly, it should be observed that compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is binding, as is stated in Article 51(1) of the Charter, on the Member States and, consequently, on their courts, when they are implementing EU law, which is the case when the issuing judicial authority and the executing judicial authority are applying the provisions of national law adopted to transpose the Framework Decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2016 in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 84).

2016-06-01

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

It should be borne in mind that, whereas Framework Decision 2002/584 does not provide a precise definition of the concept of an ‘arrest warrant or … enforceable judicial decision having the same effect’, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that that concept refers, in the first place, to a national measure that is distinct from the European arrest warrant decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 58).

62015CJ0241

Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi.

58 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision is to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘arrest warrant’, as used in that provision, must be understood as referring to a national arrest warrant that is distinct from the European arrest warrant.

2016-06-01

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Furthermore, in the absence of harmonisation of the conditions under which a pre-trial detention measure may be issued and maintained in respect of a person who is the subject of a criminal prosecution (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 47, and of 28 November 2019, Spetsializirana prokuratura, C‑653/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1024, paragraph 28), it is only under the conditions laid down in its national law that the court having jurisdiction may decide to adopt such a measure and, where appropriate, interrupt its execution if it finds that those conditions are no longer satisfied.

62019CJ0653

Criminal proceedings against Spetsializirana prokuratura.

28 However, it is important to recall that, in the light of the minimal degree of harmonisation pursued by that directive, it cannot be interpreted as being a complete and exhaustive instrument intended to lay down all the conditions for the adoption of decisions on detention on remand pending trial (judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 47, and order of 12 February 2019, RH, C‑8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, paragraph 59).

2019-11-28

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Accordingly, it is for the Member States to ensure that their legal orders effectively safeguard the level of judicial protection required by Framework Decision 2002/584, as interpreted by the Court’s case-law, by means of remedies which they implement and which may vary from one system to another (judgment of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 43).

62019CJ0625

XD.

43 Il revient, dès lors, aux États membres de veiller à ce que leurs ordres juridiques garantissent de manière effective le niveau de protection juridictionnelle requis par la décision-cadre 2002/584 telle qu’interprétée par la jurisprudence de la Cour, au moyen des voies de recours qu’ils mettent en œuvre et qui peuvent différer d’un système à l’autre.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that the European arrest warrant system entails a dual level of protection of procedural rights and fundamental rights which must be enjoyed by the requested person, since, in addition to the judicial protection provided at the first level, at which a national decision, such as a national arrest warrant, is adopted, there is the protection that must be afforded at the second level, at which a European arrest warrant is issued, which may occur, depending on the circumstances, shortly after the adoption of the national judicial decision (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 59, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 38).

62019CJ0625

XD.

38 À cet égard, il ressort de cette jurisprudence que le système du mandat d’arrêt européen comporte une protection à deux niveaux des droits en matière de procédure et des droits fondamentaux dont doit bénéficier la personne recherchée, dès lors que, à la protection judiciaire prévue au premier niveau, lors de l’adoption d’une décision nationale, telle qu’un mandat d’arrêt national, s’ajoute celle devant être assurée au second niveau, lors de l’émission du mandat d’arrêt européen, laquelle peut intervenir, le cas échéant, dans des délais brefs, après l’adoption de ladite décision judiciaire nationale [arrêt du 27 mai 2019, OG et PI (Parquets de Lübeck et de Zwickau), C‑508/18 et C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, point 67 et jurisprudence citée].

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Consequently, the inclusion in the national legal system of procedural rules whereby the conditions under which a European arrest warrant was issued and, inter alia, its proportionality, may be subject to review by a court in the issuing Member State before, after, or at the same time as its adoption, meets the requirement of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62019CJ0625

XD.

52 La présence, dans l’ordre juridique suédois, de telles règles procédurales permet de constater que, même en l’absence de voie de recours distincte contre la décision du procureur d’émettre un mandat d’arrêt européen, ses conditions d’émission et, notamment, son caractère proportionné peuvent faire l’objet d’un contrôle juridictionnel dans l’État membre d’émission, avant ou de manière concomitante à son adoption, mais également ultérieurement.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In that context, introducing a separate right of appeal against the decision to issue a European arrest warrant taken by a judicial authority other than a court is just one possibility in that regard (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 65, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 44).

62019CJ0625

XD.

44 En particulier, l’instauration d’un droit de recours distinct contre la décision d’émettre un mandat d’arrêt européen prise par une autorité judiciaire autre qu’une juridiction ne constitue qu’une possibilité à cet égard.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Consequently, the inclusion in the national legal system of procedural rules whereby the conditions under which a European arrest warrant was issued and, inter alia, its proportionality, may be subject to review by a court in the issuing Member State before, after, or at the same time as its adoption, meets the requirement of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62019CJ0625

XD.

53 Un tel système répond, dès lors, à l’exigence d’une protection juridictionnelle effective.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, where the law of the issuing Member State confers the competence to issue a European arrest warrant on an authority which, whilst participating in the administration of justice in that Member State, is not itself a court, the decision to issue such an arrest warrant and, inter alia, the proportionality of such a decision must be capable of being the subject, in the Member State, of court proceedings which meet in full the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection (judgment of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0625

XD.

41 Par ailleurs, lorsque le droit de l’État membre d’émission attribue la compétence pour émettre un mandat d’arrêt européen à une autorité qui, tout en participant à l’administration de la justice de cet État membre, n’est pas elle-même une juridiction, la décision d’émettre un tel mandat d’arrêt et, notamment, le caractère proportionné d’une telle décision doivent pouvoir être soumis, dans ledit État membre, à un recours juridictionnel qui satisfait pleinement aux exigences inhérentes à une protection juridictionnelle effective [arrêt du 27 mai 2019, OG et PI (Parquets de Lübeck et de Zwickau), C‑508/18 et C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, point 75].

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Thus, as regards a measure, such as the issuing of a European arrest warrant, which is capable of impinging on the right to liberty of the person concerned, that protection means that a decision meeting the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection should be adopted, at least, at one of the two levels of that protection (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 60, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 39).

62019CJ0625

XD.

39 Ainsi, s’agissant d’une mesure qui, telle que l’émission d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, est de nature à porter atteinte au droit à la liberté de la personne concernée, cette protection implique qu’une décision satisfaisant aux exigences inhérentes à une protection juridictionnelle effective soit adoptée, à tout le moins, à l’un des deux niveaux de ladite protection [arrêt du 27 mai 2019, OG et PI (Parquets de Lübeck et de Zwickau), C‑508/18 et C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, point 68].

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In addition, the second level of protection of the rights of the person concerned requires that the issuing judicial authority review observance of the conditions to be met when issuing a European arrest warrant and examine objectively – taking into account all incriminatory and exculpatory evidence, without being exposed to the risk of being subject to external instructions, in particular from the executive – whether it is proportionate to issue that warrant (judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), C‑566/19 PPU and C‑626/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1077, paragraph 61, and of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 40).

62019CJ0625

XD.

40 En particulier, le second niveau de protection des droits de la personne concernée suppose que l’autorité judiciaire d’émission contrôle le respect des conditions nécessaires à cette émission et examine de façon objective, en prenant en compte tous les éléments à charge et à décharge, et sans être exposée au risque d’être soumise à des instructions extérieures, notamment de la part du pouvoir exécutif, si ladite émission revêt un caractère proportionné [voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 27 mai 2019, OG et PI (Parquets de Lübeck et de Zwickau), C‑508/18 et C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, points 71 et 73].

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

Such proceedings against a decision to issue a European arrest warrant for the purposes of a criminal prosecution taken by an authority which, whilst participating in the administration of justice and having the necessary independence from the executive, does not constitute a court serve to ensure that the review by a court of that decision and of the conditions to be met when issuing that warrant and, in particular, the proportionality of such a warrant complies with the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection (judgment of 12 December 2019, Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office), C‑625/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1078, paragraph 42).

62019CJ0625

XD.

42 Un tel recours contre la décision d’émettre un mandat d’arrêt européen aux fins de poursuites pénales prise par une autorité qui, tout en participant à l’administration de la justice et jouissant de l’indépendance requise par rapport au pouvoir exécutif, ne constitue pas une juridiction vise à garantir que le contrôle juridictionnel de cette décision et des conditions nécessaires de l’émission de ce mandat, notamment de son caractère proportionné, respecte les exigences inhérentes à une protection juridictionnelle effective.

2019-12-12

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In the second place, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the main proceedings is, on the date the request for a preliminary ruling is lodged, deprived of his or her liberty and that his or her continuing detention depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices, Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 38, and of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 99).

62019CJ0924

FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság.

As regards, in the second place, the condition relating to urgency, it should be emphasised, first, that that condition is satisfied, in particular, when the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his or her liberty and when his or her continuing detention depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings. In that regard, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 17 March 2016, Mirza, C‑695/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:188, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

2020-05-14

62020CJ0414

Criminal proceedings against MM.

2021-01-13

In that regard, as the Court has already held, as regards proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant, observance of the rights of the person whose surrender is requested falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be complying with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law (judgments of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 50, and of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence), C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 66).

62016CJ0367

Dawid Piotrowski.

50 Nevertheless, in so far as proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant are concerned, observance of those rights falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be complying with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191 and the case-law cited).

2018-01-23

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

119. The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter also requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002 (the Kadi judgment, paragraph 336), the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually (see, to that effect, the judgment of 23 April 2013 in Joined Cases C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P Gbagbo and Others v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 56), is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis (see, to that effect, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraph 68). That entails a verification of the allegations factored in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision (see to that effect, E and F , paragraph 57), with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

76 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

118. The Courts of the European Union must, further, determine whether the competent European Union authority has complied with the procedural safeguards set out in paragraphs 111 to 114 of this judgment and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU, as mentioned in paragraph 116 of this judgment, and, in particular, whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

112 With regard to the fourth reason, concerning the fact that FEE, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank Mellat, is covered by Resolution 1929 (2010), the General Court found, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that it was based on mere allegations. The Council did not produce any evidence that would have enabled the General Court to determine whether that reason was well founded. In such a situation, it is impossible for the Courts of the European Union — which are called upon to review whether the grounds for listing are well founded in fact, taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory evidence produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent EU authority to those observations — to find that those reasons are well founded, and consequently those reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the contested listing decision (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 137).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

137. On the other hand, the fact that the competent European Union authority does not make accessible to the person concerned and, subsequently, to the Courts of the European Union information or evidence which is in the sole possession of the Sanctions Committee or the Member of the UN concerned and which relates to the summary of reasons underpinning the decision at issue, cannot, as such, justify a finding that those rights have been infringed. However, in such a situation, the Courts of the European Union, which are called upon to review whether the reasons contained in the summary provided by the Sanctions Committee are well founded in fact, taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory evidence produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent European Union authority to those observations, will not have available to it supplementary information or evidence. Consequently, if it is impossible for the Courts to find that those reasons are well founded, those reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the contested listing decision.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

110 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

120. To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see, by analogy, ZZ , paragraph 59).

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

111 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

123. If the competent European Union authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them, namely, in this case, the indications contained in the narrative summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, the observations and exculpatory evidence that may have been produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent European Union authority to those observations. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

76 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

116. Lastly, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the individual concerned (see, to that effect, Al‑Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraph 141), the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circum s tances, not least when the reasons stated for the European Union measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures (see, to that effect, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al‑Aqsa , paragraphs 140 and 142, and Council v Bamba , paragraphs 49 to 53).

2013-07-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

39 As the Advocate General noted at points 32 and 33 of her Opinion, while the terminology used to designate the time limits laid down in Article 51 of the Rules of Procedure is a reminder that those time limits were intended to compensate for the time required by the postal services depending on physical distance from the Court, those time limits have been single fixed periods since the amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 28 November 2000 (OJ 2000 L 322, p. 1) (see, to that effect, judgment in Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 63).

62011CJ0478

Laurent Gbagbo (C‑478/11 P), Katinan Justin Koné (C‑479/11 P), Akissi Danièle Boni-Claverie (C‑480/11 P), Alcide Djédjé (C‑481/11 P) and Affi Pascal N’Guessan (C‑482/11 P) v Council of the European Union.

63. As regards, lastly, the appellants’ argument that the extension of the time-limit on account of distance by ten days as provided for in Article 102(2) of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure cannot be applied to them because they are established in a non-Member State, suffice it to observe that that argument is invalidated by the fact that the extension is for a single fixed period. It follows that the fact that the appellants were, during the period for bringing proceedings, in a non‑Member State, does not, in itself, mean that they were in a situation which was objectively different, with regard to the application of that time-limit, from the situation of persons and entities established within the European Union who were the subject of restrictive measures of the same kind.

2013-04-23

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

111 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

68. Si l’autorité compétente de l’Union est dans l’impossibilité d’accéder à la demande du juge de l’Union, il appartient alors à ce dernier de se fonder sur les seuls éléments qui lui ont été communiqués, à savoir, en l’occurrence, la motivation de l’acte attaqué, les observations et les éléments à décharge éventuellement produits par la personne concernée ainsi que la réponse de l’autorité compétente de l’Union à ces observations. Si ces éléments ne permettent pas de constater le bien-fondé d’un motif, le juge de l’Union écarte ce dernier en tant que support de la décision d’inscription ou de maintien de l’inscription en cause (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 123).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

110 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

65. À cette fin, il incombe au juge de l’Union de procéder à cet examen en demandant, le cas échéant, à l’autorité compétente de l’Union de produire des informations ou des éléments de preuve, confidentiels ou non, pertinents aux fins d’un tel examen (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 120 et jurisprudence citée).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

64. L’effectivité du contrôle juridictionnel garanti par l’article 47 de la Charte exige notamment que le juge de l’Union s’assure que la décision, qui revêt une portée individuelle pour la personne ou l’entité concernée, repose sur une base factuelle suffisamment solide. Cela implique une vérification des faits allégués dans l’exposé des motifs qui sous-tend ladite décision, de sorte que le contrôle juridictionnel ne soit pas limité à l’appréciation de la vraisemblance abstraite des motifs invoqués, mais porte sur le point de savoir si ces motifs, ou, à tout le moins, l’un d’eux considéré comme suffisant en soi pour soutenir cette même décision, sont étayés (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 119).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

73. Par ailleurs, l’effectivité du contrôle juridictionnel garanti par l’article 47 de la Charte exige également que le juge de l’Union s’assure que la décision, qui revêt une portée individuelle pour la personne ou l’entité concernée, repose sur une base factuelle suffisamment solide. Cela implique une vérification des faits allégués dans l’exposé des motifs qui sous-tend ladite décision, de sorte que le contrôle juridictionnel ne soit pas limité à l’appréciation de la vraisemblance abstraite des motifs invoqués, mais porte sur le point de savoir si ces motifs, ou, à tout le moins, l’un d’eux considéré comme suffisant en soi pour soutenir cette même décision, sont étayés (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 119).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

51 As regards pleas alleging a manifest error of assessment or a breach of the general principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the question whether a State entity is entitled to invoke them is one that relates to the merits of the case (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 51).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

51. C’est dès lors à bon droit que le Tribunal a considéré, au point 45 de l’arrêt attaqué, que l’argumentation relative à la possibilité, pour Kala Naft, d’invoquer les protections et les garanties liées aux droits fondamentaux ne concernait pas la recevabilité du recours ni même d’un moyen, mais avait trait au fond du litige.

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

75 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

71. En particulier, un acte faisant grief est suffisamment motivé dès lors qu’il est intervenu dans un contexte connu de l’intéressé, qui lui permet de comprendre la portée de la mesure prise à son égard (arrêt Conseil/Bamba, précité, point 54).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

48 It must be pointed out that the action brought by Bank Mellat falls within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 50).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

50. Ainsi que l’a relevé M. l’avocat général au point 59 de ses conclusions, le recours de Kala Naft s’inscrivait dans le cadre de l’article 275, second alinéa, TFUE. Cette société avait la qualité pour contester, devant le juge de l’Union, son inscription sur la liste figurant dans les actes litigieux, cette inscription la concernant directement et individuellement au sens de l’article 263, quatrième alinéa, TFUE. Son intérêt à agir ne pouvait, de ce fait, être contesté.

2013-11-28

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62013CJ0605

Issam Anbouba v Council of the European Union.

45. In that regard, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning the acts at issue, in order to review whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support those acts, is substantiated (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73).

2015-04-21

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

75 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71).

62011CJ0417

Council of the European Union v Nadiany Bamba.

53. The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63; Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraph 150; and Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraphs 139 and 140).

2012-11-15

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

74 According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

62011CJ0417

Council of the European Union v Nadiany Bamba.

49. According to a consistent body of case‑law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the European Union judicature and, second, to enable that judicature to review the legality of that act (see Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I‑11177, paragraph 145; Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 462; and Case C‑521/09 P Elf Aquitaine v Commission [2011] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 148).

2012-11-15

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62014CJ0535

Vadzim Ipatau v Council of the European Union.

42. Regarding the evidence that Mr Ipatau’s listing was well founded, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council , C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 45; and Anbouba v Council , C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

2015-06-18

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

45 It asserts that the General Court also erred in law when it found that there was no evidence to show that Bank Mellat does actually constitute a governmental organisation. In this regard, the Council refers to: — the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which the specific factual and legal context must be carefully assessed in order to determine whether an entity is a governmental organisation or entity or a non-governmental one; — the work of the United Nations International Law Commission, and in particular the commentaries relating to Article 2(b) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their property, adopted on 2 December 2004, according to which the concept of ‘agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities’ may include State enterprises or other entities established by the State performing commercial transactions; and — the case-law of the Court of Justice on State aid (judgment in France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55).

61999CJ0482

French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.

55 For those reasons, it must be accepted that the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken. In that respect, the Court has already taken into consideration the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking account of the requirements of the public authorities (see, in particular, Van der Kooy, paragraph 37) or the fact that, apart from factors of an organic nature which linked the public undertakings to the State, those undertakings, through the intermediary of which aid had been granted, had to take account of directives issued by a Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE) (Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 11 and 12; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 13 and 14).

2002-05-16