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62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

57 In that regard, it should be noted that the condition that the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country, in so far as it has the effect, if not satisfied, of requiring the surrender of the requested person in order for that person to be prosecuted or to serve the custodial sentence ordered against him or her, contributes to the attainment of the objective of the European arrest warrant mechanism of preventing, within the area of freedom, security and justice, offences going unpunished (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2020, SF(European arrest warrant – Guarantee of return to the executing State), C‑314/18, EU:C:2020:191, paragraph 47, and, by analogy, judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 77).

62018CJ0314

SF.

47 In the first place, it should be borne in mind in this regard that, as noted in paragraph 38 above, Framework Decision 2002/584 seeks to establish a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law. In accordance with Article 1(1) of that framework decision, the aim of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is to enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person, in the light of the objective pursued by the framework decision, so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted or serves the custodial sentence ordered against him (judgment of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence), C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 39).

2020-03-11

62020CJ0665

X.

2021-04-29

43 It is therefore clear from the wording of Article 4 of the Framework Decision – in particular from the use of the verb ‘may’ together with the infinitive of the verb ‘refuse’, the subject of which is the executing judicial authority – that that authority must, itself, have a margin of discretion as to whether or not it is appropriate to refuse to execute the European arrest warrant on the grounds referred to in Article 4 (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, Sut, C‑514/17, EU:C:2018:1016, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0514

Ministère public v Marin-Simion Sut.

33 Furthermore, as the Court has previously found, it is clear from the wording of Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, in particular from the word ‘may’, that, where a Member State chooses to transpose that provision into domestic law, the executing judicial authority must, nevertheless, have a margin of discretion as to whether or not it is appropriate to refuse to execute the European arrest warrant. In that regard, that authority must take into consideration the objective of the ground for optional non-execution set out in that provision, which, according to the Court’s settled case-law, means enabling the executing judicial authority to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s chances of reintegrating into society when the sentence imposed on him expires (see judgment of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

2018-12-13

62019CJ0830

C.J. v Région wallonne.

2021-07-08

While, as is apparent from the order for reference, the holding at issue in the main proceedings takes the form of an association without legal personality, which includes, in addition to the applicant in the main proceedings, natural persons who are not young farmers, it must be noted that the wording of that provision does not either prejudge the legal form which such a holding may take (see, to this effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 42) or preclude the possibility of setting up as head of a holding with other farmers.

62011CJ0592

Anssi Ketelä.

42. It must be held that the wording of Article 22(1)(a) of Regulation No 1698/2005 which refer to ‘persons who … are setting up for the first time on an agricultural holding as head of the holding’ does not prejudge the legal form, corporate or not, taken by such a holding (see, by analogy, Case C-162/91 Tenuta il Bosco [1992] ECR I-5279, paragraph 12).

2012-10-25

62019CJ0830

C.J. v Région wallonne.

2021-07-08

In order to determine the scope of the criterion for determining the upper threshold for access to business start-up aid, under the third subparagraph of Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1305/2013, read in conjunction with Article 5(2) of Delegated Regulation No 807/2014, it is necessary to have regard first and foremost to the terms of the provisions interpreted, where necessary, in the light of the context to which they belong and the objectives of Regulation No 1305/2013 (judgment of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 39).

62011CJ0592

Anssi Ketelä.

39. The setting-up aid for young farmers is such a measure and the condition of eligibility relating to setting-up for the first time on an agricultural holding as head of the holding laid down by Article 22(1)(a) of Regulation No 1698/2005 is a specific condition for that measure. Thus, in order to determine the scope of that condition of eligibility, it is necessary to have regard first and foremost to the terms of the provision interpreted, where necessary, in the light of the context to which it belongs and the objectives of Regulation No 1698/2005.

2012-10-25

62019CJ0937

Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr v KA.

2021-07-08

Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 8(2) and Article 1(5)(d) of Regulation No 1072/2009, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0002

Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social v Jesús Crespo Rey.

41 Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of paragraph 2 of the section ‘Spain’ in Annex XI to Regulation No 883/2004, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 October 2017, Otero Ramos, C‑531/15, EU:C:2017:789, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

2018-06-28

62019CJ0937

Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr v KA.

2021-07-08

It should be observed that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (judgment of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0002

Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social v Jesús Crespo Rey.

40 It should be observed that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (judgment of 19 October 2017, Otero Ramos, C‑531/15, EU:C:2017:789, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

2018-06-28

62019CJ0937

Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr v KA.

2021-07-08

It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national courts before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, if the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may thus refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).

62011CJ0399

Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal.

29. The presumption of relevance attaching to questions referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court may be set aside only exceptionally, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of the provisions of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, inter alia Paint Graphos and Others , paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

2013-02-26

62019CJ0937

Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr v KA.

2021-07-08

It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national courts before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, if the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may thus refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).

62011CJ0399

Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal.

28. In that regard it should be recalled at the outset that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and Others [2011] ECR I-7611, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

2013-02-26

62020CJ0301

UE and HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank AG.

2021-07-01

Article 63(1) and (2)(a) of that regulation, concerning the purpose of the European Certificate of Succession, lists the persons who may use it, namely heirs, legatees having direct rights to the estate and executors of wills or administrators of the estate, to prove, in another Member State, in particular their status and/or succession rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2018, Mahnkopf, C‑558/16, EU:C:2018:138, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0558

Proceedings brought by Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf.

36 To that end, Regulation No 650/2012 provides for the creation of a European Certificate of Succession which must enable every heir, legatee or beneficiary mentioned in the certificate to prove in another Member State his status and succession rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2017, Kubicka, C‑218/16, EU:C:2017:755, paragraph 59).

2018-03-01