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[ "holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility", "holding the facility had certain powers despite fact that statute did not expressly confer those powers because facility does not derive power solely from statute", "recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b", "holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively", "holding that the board of supervisors possesses only those powers expressly conferred by statute or necessarily implied therefrom" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged", "holding that there is no appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant recusal when the judge learned negative facts about the defendant from a social gathering held by a prosecutor in a former case involving the defendant", "holding recusal not required", "holding that the jurors alleged discussion about the possibility that the defendant would hire someone to kill them was inadmissible because the defendant had not shown that the jury learned of the threat from an outside source", "holding that an appearance of impropriety existed where the deputy district attorney had an altercation with the defendant at the time of the defendants arrest" ]

[ "holding that an effort of the defendant by words of persuasion alone to induce the plaintiff to grant him the favor of sexual intercourse was not an assault", "holding in the context of a sexual assault charge that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the first basic and essential element of the offense namely that an act of intercourse involving the victim had occurred and further stating that that fact had to be proved even if the defendant was not disputing that particular element of the offense", "holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct", "holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault", "holding that evidence was insufficient where the victim testified that she was awake and communicated her desire not to have sexual intercourse with the defendant" ]

[ "holding that im proper means may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation or a recognized rule of common law or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession", "holding that the parentsubsidiary privilege could be lost by using wrongful means including fraud misrepresentation threats violence defamation trespass restraint of trade intimidation molestation or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or common law", "holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute", "holding that interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review", "holding that the other source of law might be a moneymandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been violated or an express or implied contract with the united states" ]

[ "holding that deadly force was justified where a suspect violently resisted arrest physically attacked the officer and grabbed the officers gun", "holding that officers positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force", "holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure", "holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded", "holding that deadly force was reasonable where the plaintiff attacked a border patrol agent with a rock and stick" ]

[ "holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police", "holding affidavit insufficient to support probable cause when one cannot learn from the affidavit when the past activities occurred and when the observations were made", "holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction", "holding affidavit that failed to recite when incident described took place insufficient to support issuance of search warrant", "holding affidavit insufficient when it failed to state when affiant received information from informant when informant obtained information or when described incident took place" ]

[ "holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery", "holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period", "recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available", "holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law" ]

[ "holding that the acceleration clause was not cognizable as a large and unjustified payment", "holding claim is cognizable", "holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment", "holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable", "holding claim is not cognizable" ]

[ "holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements", "holding the alj did not err in declining to refer to treating physicians opinion where he originally opined that plaintiff could perform sedentary work and then changed his opinion without providing any supporting objective medical evidence", "holding that an alj may discount a treating physicians opinion where the physician has offered inconsistent opinions", "holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations", "holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician" ]

[ "recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot", "holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot", "holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot", "holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger", "holding that an officer may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot" ]

[ "holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim", "holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay", "holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "holding that new york law applies to this matter", "holding that new york alcoholic beverage control law preempted local law", "holding that cwa preempted vermont nuisance law to extent that vermont law sought to impose liability on new york point source", "holding that a state election law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law" ]

[ "holding that a request made within 180 days of a modified confirmation order entered three months after the original confirmation order but more than 180 days after the original confirmation order was timebarred", "holding that a debtor cannot appeal a confirmation order on the basis that it unfairly discriminates against a class of claims", "holding that ordinance restricting use of foreign languages on business signs overtly discriminates on the basis of national origin", "holding in the instant case although creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay it failed to object or appeal from the confirmation order accordingly creditor is bound by the confirmation order", "holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor" ]

[ "holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result", "holding that a defendant must make a colorable showing that an ex parte communication occurred", "holding that prejudice must be shown from an ex parte communication", "holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them", "holding that the defendant must show that improper communication of extrinsic information had likely occurred" ]

[ "holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice", "holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection", "holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal", "holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "holding that because the defendant failed to make any objection at the close of voir dire he waived his batson claim" ]

[ "holding that when a state provides a first appeal as of right due process requires that defendants receive the effective assistance of counsel during that appeal", "holding on equal protection grounds that meaningful first appeal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants", "holding that an indigent litigants right to appointed counsel has been recognized to exist only where she may be deprived of her physical liberty that the constitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parentalstatus termination proceeding and that the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel is to be answered in the first instance by the trial court subject to appellate review", "holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court", "holding that the constitution does not require the appointment of two attorneys for indigent capital defendants" ]

[ "holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings", "holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning", "holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation", "holding regulations entitled to chevron deference", "holding that the bia should be accorded chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of casebycase adjudication" ]

[ "holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction", "holding that personal jurisdiction over defendant car manufacturer was inappropriate when defendants only contacts with the forum resulted from plaintiffs unilateral activity of driving defendants product into another state", "holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where defendant assignee received patents from assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction in part because the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state", "holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction", "holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle", "holding action did not arise under the patent laws", "holding that tort law claim for injuries allegedly sustained because of negligently improper denial of coverage did not arise under act", "holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme", "holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service" ]

[ "holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort", "holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference", "holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge", "holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive", "holding that when the employers decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears this is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age as pension status typically is" ]

[ "holding that the government was to be treated as a private person and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the agents exceeded their ability to arrest because while a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant given probable cause a private person may only arrest someone for a crime committed in his presence", "holding that private person requested to assist known police officer in making arrest is not liable if in his acts he confines himself to the order and direction of the sheriff", "holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs", "holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause", "holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself" ]

[ "holding that court may seal documents if publics right of access is outweighed by competing interests", "holding that rule 2004 requires court to balance competing interests weighing necessity of information sought", "recognizing such balance of interests", "holding that court should balance competing interests", "recognizing that competing interests of parents children and the state requires additional analysis" ]

[ "holding that the facts that the vehicle described in the tip was parked outside the home that allen gave inconsistent answers to officers questioning and that in addition the defendant fit the physical description of the suspect were sufficient to support the officers reasonable inference that the defendant was actually the suspect and therefore that there was probable cause to arrest him", "holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning", "holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking", "holding that an officer engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when he asked a suspect to identify clothing found at a crime scene after the suspect was in custody and had invoked his right to silence regardless of the officers intentions", "holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect" ]

[ "holding that in case of a short term marriage a presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises but such presumption is rebuttable", "holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him", "holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination", "recognizing presumption", "holding that if intoxicants have been used by a juror a presumption arises in favor of the convicted defendant that it resulted injuriously to him" ]

[ "holding that freeman is inapplicable to defendants sentenced under 4b11 seeking a sentence reduction based on amendments to the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses", "holding that the recent amendment to the crack cocaine guidelines does not qualify defendant for a sentencing reduction under 3582c2 because defendant was originally sentenced pursuant to the guideline range for career offenders", "holding that the defendants sentence was based on the career offender guidelines despite the fact that the district court calculated an offense level pursuant to the crack guidelines", "holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack", "holding that a district court lacks authority under 3582c2 to reduce a defendants sentence when the defendant was sentenced under 4b11 as a career offender" ]

[ "holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming", "holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis", "holding that the omission of an element from jury in structions was not plain error where the underlying fact supporting the element was undisputed based on the uncontradicted testimony of a government witness", "holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge", "holding that omission was not plain error" ]

[ "holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted", "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under erisa", "holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies", "holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted" ]

[ "holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties", "holding the parol evidence rule applicable where contractual obligations are at issue but noting that in some cases it is unclear whether third parties can rely on the rule", "holding rule applicable to witness", "holding that parol evidence can be presented when the terms of the agreement are ambiguous", "holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous" ]

[ "holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence", "holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination", "holding intent to intimidate or threaten may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as ones conduct or statements", "recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence", "holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent" ]

[ "holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case", "holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an award of sanctions entered against attorney because the notice of appeal did not provide that attorney was appealing in his own name", "holding that an attorney could obtain a judgment for attorney fees against his own client in the divorce division of the circuit court of cook county where there was no objection", "holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term", "recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client" ]

[ "holding that the time within which suit may be brought after disallowance of a claim by irs is not controlled by a statute of limitation as generally understood but on conditions under which the united states has consented to be sued", "holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations", "holding that wjaiver of the right to remove must be clear and unequivocal and that standard was not met by an agreement in which defendants consented to filing of suit in state court but which did not address removal", "recognizing that under illinois law parties are free to contract for a time period within which a suit may be brought which is less than the general statute of limitation period applicable to written contracts", "holding that six employees bringing suit under title vii were not in privity with the united states which had brought a previous suit against the same employer because the employees sought a type of relief which the united states had not sought" ]

[ "holding but for requirement not satisfied where investigation had no unique special factual features that but for the requirement of the act would have permitted a quick termination if the investigation were conducted outside the act", "holding that there is nothing improper with defendants purchase of sponsored links when defendants actually sell plaintiffs products on their website", "holding that a competitive commercial purpose is not of itself improper", "holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement", "holding that the commercial use requirement is not satisfied where defendants site itself had no outside links" ]

[ "holding that the term sold requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration", "holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim", "holding that a misappropriation under morevstat 417450ba requires both an improper acquisition and ultimate disclosure", "holding that term sold requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration", "holding the term misappropriation of an advertising idea to be unambiguous" ]

[ "holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county", "holding that county lacked constitutional standing to assert against gun manufacturers negligence claims seeking compensation for manufacturers alleged reckless and negligent handgun marketing and distribution because its theory of causation involved a great number of links in the causal chain and county would have been required to show that causation was not severed by distributor retailer or purchaser illegal conduct or gun theft", "holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct", "holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept", "recognizing county officers as those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions " ]

[ "holding that single paragraph asserting that plaintiffs based their information and belief on investigation of sec filings analysts reports press releases and discussions with consultants neither provided required facts underlying complaints allegations nor directed court to where facts could be found", "holding no scienter had been alleged where the plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendants had access to information that specifically informed them of the alleged flaws in the preparation of pxres loss estimate reports", "holding that such information is not material under securities law", "holding that plaintiffs need only allege that defendants provided information to the securities analysts upon which the reports were based", "holding that plaintiffs must specifically allege defendants knowledge of facts or access to information contradicting their public statements" ]

[ "holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "holding that an indictment under 922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient", "holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language", "holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction", "holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance" ]

[ "holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement", "holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement", "holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added", "holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration", "holding that a private arbitration agreement does not affect the scope of the eeocs federal court suit at all" ]

[ "holding that counselors had no duty to prevent suicides of noncustodial clients", "holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "holding the issue of negligence was properly submitted to the jury and its finding of negligence was a reasonable inference because decedent had known suicidal tendencies and committed suicide while a patient at a psychiatric hospital", "holding doc and its personnel had independent legal duty to prevent prisoner from committing suicide", "holding a psychotherapist had no duty for the suicide of a patient in a noncustodial setting" ]

[ "holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment", "recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict", "holding that the court may set aside agency action only in extremely limited circumstances", "holding that family courts conclusions will not be set aside if supported by findings", "holding statute did not create claim to set aside improper conveyance" ]

[ "holding that a claim filed after the last date fixed for the filing of claims was not a covered claim and noting that the requirement in the statute that claims be presented before the filing deadline evidences an intent on the part of the legislature to provide a cutoff date after which the association is no longer obligated to accept claims", "holding that ordinarily courts are not obligated to review evidence presented for the first time on appeal", "holding that the timely filing of an administrative charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit", "holding that attorneys are obligated to monitor the courts docket and the failure to do so will not excuse the lack of a timely filing", "holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision" ]

[ "holding no actionable hostile work environment based on defendants inappropriate sexual comments taking a photograph of plaintiffs rear end and giving plaintiff undesirable work assignments", "holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute", "recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983", "recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context", "holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments" ]

[ "holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons", "holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination", "holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination", "holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim", "holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel" ]

[ "holding that feeshifting is permitted under the fair housing act where prevailing defendant shows that suit is frivolous unreasonable or without foundation", "holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith", "holding that courts may award prevailing title vii defendant attorney fees upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith and fees also may be awarded if plaintiff continued to litigate after its action clearly became frivolous unreasonable or without foundation", "recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race", "holding that a plaintiff who wins any measure of damages is a prevailing party for the purposes of feeshifting statutes" ]

[ "holding that healthcare plan established by the state of vermont for eligible employees qualified for governmental plan exclusion", "holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions", "holding that a group benefits policy purchased by the city for employees was a governmental plan even though the plan was offered and administered by a private insurer", "holding that disability plan established by state university for benefit of employees qualified for governmental plan exclusion", "holding that county governments healthcare plan qualified for governmental plan exclusion" ]

[ "holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate", "holding directors and officers liability policy was property of the estate because the estate was worth more with indemnification coverage than without the coverage", "holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate", "holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate", "holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate" ]

[ "holding that permitting a strip mine within the department of transportations rightofway without warning the public providing lighting or erecting a guardrail did not create a dangerous condition within the meaning of the real property exception to sovereign immunity", "holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983", "holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity", "holding that a public entitys property refers to the public entity that owns the property where a dangerous condition exists" ]

[ "holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "holding that the defendants oral motion challenging the venire was insufficient to preserve the issue for review", "holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only with the existence of the alleged oral contract", "holding that an oral challenge to the venire is insufficient", "holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control" ]

[ "holding that a 14 month delay was unreasonable", "holding that a five month delay was unreasonable", "holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable", "holding that a six month delay was unreasonable", "holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length" ]

[ "holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence", "holding that necessary expenses such as living expenses are not considered a squandering or secreting of marital property such that reimbursement or a setoff should be ordered", "holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses", "holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary" ]

[ "holding that erisa does not preempt revstatmo 51343010e because it is entirely consistent with both erisa and the bankruptcy code", "holding that erisa does not preempt section 22213b7", "holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan", "holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims", "holding that to the extent revstatmo 51343010e affects erisa it is preempted" ]

[ "holding that district courts delegation of voir dire to magistrate judge is inconsistent with 28 usc 636b3 where defendant does not consent", "holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice", "holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "holding that defense counsel may decide whether to consent to voir dire proceedings before a federal magistrate", "holding that voir dire of jury may be delegated to magistrate judge where defendant consents to the delegation because the district court retains the ultimate decision on empaneling the jury" ]

[ "holding that state did not submit sufficient evidence to establish amount of restitution to victim for medical bills incurred when it did not introduce any medical bills", "holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy", "holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract", "holding that statute does not alleviate plaintiffs burden to provide additional evidence that medical bills were reasonable and necessary", "holding that statute provides medical bills are admissible as evidence of necessary fair and reasonable charges" ]

[ "holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions", "holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional", "holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996", "holding that habeas jurisdiction under 2241 was not repealed by the illegal immigration reform and immigrant responsibility act of 1996 iirira", "holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights" ]

[ "holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met", "holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively", "recognizing that the standard is extremely difficult to apply", "recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard", "holding that an oral warning may be sufficient where the harassing conduct is not extremely serious" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged", "holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner", "holding that the kentucky supreme court erroneously put the burden on the defendant to show eed when it was actually the governments obligation to prove a lack of eed", "holding that the taxpayer has the burden to prove the governments tax assessment is incorrect" ]

[ "holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse warranted reversal where the childs otherwise uncorroborated testimony was the sole basis for conviction and the hearsay augmented the childs testimony with additional detail in certain areas", "holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses", "holding that the court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony from adults concerning a childs statements to them regarding her fathers sexual abuse", "holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony from two witnesses whose testimony was brief and consistent with the victims testimony did not constitute drumbeat repetition of the victims statements", "holding that defendants absence from courtroom during childs testimony to jury instead of presenting videotape of childs testimony to jury with defendant present violated confrontation clause in absence of necessity or defendants consent" ]

[ "holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel", "holding that the plain language of the eaja requires the fee award payable to counsel as any other reading would render the savings clause nonsensical", "holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted", "holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made", "holding that incurred within the meaning of the eaja requires an express or implied arrangement that the fee will be paid over to a legal representative" ]

[ "holding that although the express warranty claim was not federally preempted the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts for the claim to survive dismissal under rule 8 where the pjlaintiff alleged no facts demonstrating that defendants made any affirmations specifically to plaintiff or her physician so as to form the basis of the bargain", "holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra", "holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements", "holding that the pslra particularity requirement compels plaintiffs to allege severe recklessness", "holding that the group pleading doctrine did not survive the pslra because it cannot be reconciled with the pslras requirement that plaintiff state facts with particularity as to each alleged act or omission by the defendant" ]

[ "holding that the rationale of the consent decree cases was fully applicable where a stipulated dismissal and settlement resolved pending patent litigation and there were other licensees and alleged infringers who had an incentive to challenge the patents validity", "recognizing that in patent infringement eases a finding of noninfringement prevents a court from reaching an affirmative defense asserting the patents invalidity because the validity issue becomes immaterial to the disposition of the case and that any determination of the patents validity by the district court in such a case should be vacated", "holding that applicable federal patent law made patents personal and unassignable without consent of the licensor", "holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked", "holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement" ]

[ "holding that indictment alleging serious bodily injury caused by motor vehicle colliding with a fixed object provides sufficient notice of states intent to seek deadly weapon finding", "holding floor can be used as deadly weapon", "holding a motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon by the manner of its use", "holding hand can be deadly weapon", "recognizing that motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter case for purposes of providing notice in indictment" ]

[ "holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights", "holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute", "holding that it is not extortion to threaten economic harm when you have a legal right to engage in the activity you threaten", "holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action", "holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous" ]

[ "holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test", "recognizing the test for business nexus is distinct from transactional nexus and its test for dissociation", "recognizing the logical nexus test as appropriate", "holding that foster parents are not state actors", "holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors" ]

[ "holding that a professor who suffered a fatal fall collecting soil samples in antarctica was not engaged in public work within the meaning of the dba", "holding that insider transaction did not fall within scope of 547c2", "holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption", "holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions", "holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption" ]

[ "holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error", "holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error", "holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error", "holding the appropriate standard is that to establish prejudice a protestor must show that had it not been for the alleged error in the procurement process there was a reasonable likelihood that the protestor would have been awarded the contract this is a refinement and clarification of the substantial chance language", "holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error" ]

[ "holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record", "holding parole board has no duty to examine validity of prisoners convictions", "holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless", "holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession", "holding that a trial court has a duty to examine the entire record including all physical documentary evidence in order to reach an equitable result" ]

[ "holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references", "holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority", "holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned", "holding an issue abandoned in a counseled case where although the defendant made passing references to issues in his brief he did not devote a discrete section of his brief to the argument and the references were undertaken as background to claims that he had expressly advanced", "holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue" ]

[ "holding that a judgment and sentence become final when direct review proceedings are concluded and jurisdiction returns to the trial court to entertain motions for postconviction relief", "holding that for purposes of 2255 motions a federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires", "holding that jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to icr 33c expires when the judgment of conviction becomes final ie when an appeal is concluded or in the absence of an appeal when the time for appeal has expired", "holding that a judgment and sentence which are not appealed become final when the thirtyday period for taking an appeal has expired", "holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence" ]

[ "holding that a consequence instruction was properly refused", "holding a consequence instruction is not necessary because the consequences of the verdict have no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant", "holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given", "holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction", "holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel" ]

[ "holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of 4b12a2 following johnson", "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines notwithstanding the governments position that the residual clause of 4b12a was unconstitutionally vague following johnson", "holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg 4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another", "holding that johnson did not support the defendants collateral challenge under 28 usc 2255 to his sentence enhanced under the residual clause of the ussg", "holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of 4b12a2" ]

[ "recognizing secondary effects as sufficient basis for governmental regulation of sexually oriented businesses", "recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act", "holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary", "recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation", "recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials" ]

[ "holding that visual depictions of a suspects appearance soon after arrest are admissible because officers could testify to the facts depicted", "holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest", "holding that police officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a warrant", "holding that officers reasonable mistake as to a suspects identity entitled the officers to do what the law would have allowed had the correct suspect been arrested ie perform a search incident to arrest", "holding an agents false statements reckless because she was aware of the true facts surrounding the suspects arrest" ]

[ "holding that in order to prevail under 1983 a plaintiff must show 1 that defendants deprived him or her of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the united states and 2 that in doing so defendants acted under color of state law internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states", "holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under 1983", "recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc 1983 and suits under united states constitution", "holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action" ]

[ "holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries", "recognizing property of the estate to include the estates chose in action against its auditor", "holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate", "holding that the claims to a statutory benefit had not yet vested when the legislature eliminated the benefit", "holding that even though estates are not among the beneficiaries enumerated in the public safety officers benefits act the estate of a claimant who died before her claim had been processed could collect the statutory benefit" ]

[ "holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry", "holding evidence found pursuant to warrant based on probable cause provided by prior illegal entry was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree", "holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry", "holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry", "holding that the related independent source rule could potentially apply on remand despite illegal police entry into a warehouse containing marijuana where police had legitimately gained probable cause prior to entry and separately obtained a warrant for entry if the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence" ]

[ "holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals", "holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal", "holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "recognizing the general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that a court of appeals may only do so when an appeal has been raised by an existing party to the case" ]

[ "holding that tennessee rule of civil procedure 24 is not applicable to proceedings in juvenile court", "holding that by vesting jurisdiction of gtla actions in circuit court where the tennessee rules of civil procedure applied the legislature intended to allow the tennessee rules of civil procedure to apply to gtla actions", "holding rule applicable to witness", "holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure", "holding a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to follow florida rule of juvenile procedure 8150 the juvenile rule equivalent of florida rule of criminal procedure 3830" ]

[ "holding that an appeal from an order vacating an award while directing a rehearing is an appeal improvidently taken", "holding that an order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable", "holding that order vacating award and ordering rehearing is analogous to order granting new trial", "holding that barring appeal from an order that vacates an arbitration award and directs a rehearing is consistent with the policy of barring an immediate appeal from the granting of a new trial in a civil case", "holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial" ]

[ "recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges", "holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log", "recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised", "holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver", "recognizing that attorneys disclosure of confidential information may be judicially compelled in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorneyclient and work product privileges" ]

[ "recognizing that congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a child who becomes an american citizen has a real relationship with a family unit and with the united states", "recognizing that where insured has been paid in full insurer is the real party in interest", "holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states", "holding that upon approval by congress a compact between states becomes federal law that binds the states", "recognizing statutory nature of stay but concluding that court still has interest in ensuring compliance" ]

[ "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency", "holding that the agency is obligated to offer more explanation when the record suggests strong arguments for the petitioner that the agency has not considered", "holding that the sanction the agency imposed was not rationally arrived at on this record and was wholly disproportionate to the error petitioner committed where inter alia the agency did not explain why it had not taken the same position in similar circumstances in the past", "holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits", "holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue" ]

[ "holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint", "holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely", "holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner", "holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "recognizing that officials failure timely to respond to grievance could be basis for prisoner to show he exhausted available administrative remedies" ]

[ "holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo", "holding it is an abuse of discretion to grant a preliminary injunction because difficult legal issues are present without even considering likelihood of success", "holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court", "holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion" ]

[ "holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim", "recognizing that statute of limitations may be tolled indefinitely for legally incompetent persons", "holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations", "recognizing potential abuse inherent in permitting the use of fictitious names to toll limitations indefinitely while the plaintiff perfects his case" ]

[ "holding that defendants mere allegations of ineffective assistance were insufficient to prevail on such a claim", "holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim", "holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant", "holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations", "holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred" ]

[ "recognizing superior court must conduct an on the record examination to determine defendants voluntariness and knowledge", "recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law", "recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances", "holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal", "holding that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of miranda rights a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances" ]

[ "holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live", "holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant", "holding that a defendant did not otherwise defend even though he had appeared before the court", "holding that adult child who maintained his own residence separate from his fathers household but regularly vacationed and kept gear at his fathers vacation home was not a resident of his fathers household and therefore not an insured under his fathers insurance policy covering the vacation home", "holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body" ]

[ "holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment", "holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release", "holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release", "holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses", "holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated" ]

[ "holding that a photograph of the hands of the murder victim tied behind her back was properly admitted because it showed the considerable pain inflicted upon the victim by the defendant", "holding photograph showing victim with his family photograph fell within the prosecutors latitude in showing victim and was not unduly prejudicial", "holding autopsy photograph of victim was admissible even if defendant stipulated identity of victim", "holding that because the photograph of the victim was for identification purposes only and the victims military service was never discussed at trial even if the photograph did evoke sympathy from the jury it was not reversible error to admit it", "holding that a photograph of the body of the victim at the scene was relevant and admissible because it illustrated clarified and corroborated the testimony of various witnesses" ]

[ "holding that the court will not remand if i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence", "holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by giving summary consideration to evidence presented in a motion to reopen particularly when dealing with evidence which the bia is asked to repeatedly consider", "holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate", "holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte", "holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it" ]

[ "holding that coparties become opposing parties emphasis added within the meaning of fedrcivp 13a after one such party pleads an initial crossclaim against the other with no discussion of whether an opposing party must be deemed a defendant", "holding that a party that engages in protracted litigation waives his right to arbitrate when an order compelling arbitration would result in prejudice to the party opposing arbitration", "holding that a court may consider a theory raised for the first time in a posttrial brief unless it is precluded by the pleadings or it prejudices the opposing party", "holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause", "holding that a party waives its right to arbitration when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices the opposing party emphasis added" ]

[ "holding that opinion testimony was inadmissible to prove a persons character or character trait when maine rule of evidence 405 permitted only evidence of reputation or specific instances of conduct", "holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered", "holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous", "recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing", "recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness" ]

[ "holding that a plaintiff stated a fourth amendment claim where consecutive bodycavity searches were unnecessary", "holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment", "holding that bodycavity searches of prisoners are not unreasonable", "holding that fourth amendment applicable in administrative searches for safety inspections", "holding that consensual suspicionless searches of government employees personal belongings in the workplace were searches even though refusal to consent carried no criminal penalty and the searches were not for law enforcement purposes" ]

[ "holding that a court may construe a section 1983 complaint as a habeas petition and vice versa", "holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a 1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition", "holding 1 that the district court properly construed one 1983 claim as a habeas petition but improperly summarily dismissed it and 2 that the district court should have construed another 1983 claim as a habeas petition", "holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc 1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition", "recognizing our ability to construe a pretrial habeas petition filed under 2254 as being brought under 2241" ]

[ "holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts", "holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable", "holding alien not denied judicial review because habeas was available", "holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available", "holding that judicial review is not available of the governments certification under 18 usc 5032 as required to initiate a juvenile delinquency proceeding that inter alia an appropriate court of a state does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles" ]

[ "holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond", "holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale", "holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser", "holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property", "holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien" ]

[ "holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction", "holding appellate courts have no authority to review actual controversies that have expired", "holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "recognizing that appellate courts that have applied rule 16 have afforded wide discretion to district courts applications of that rule", "holding that there is no due process right to appellate review" ]

[ "holding that even if the statements were improperly admitted any error was harmless since there was overwhelming evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy", "holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error", "holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming", "holding that overwhelming evidence of element of crime rendered miranda error harmless when improperly admitted statement went to same element", "holding that jury instruction improperly defined element of rico conspiracy charge by not using language consistent with the operation or management test but concluding that the error was harmless" ]

[ "holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states", "recognizing that any party who voluntarily approaches an ins station cannot be said to have been found or discovered in the united states", "holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party", "recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states", "holding that when a defendant voluntarily approached the immigration officer at the airport it cannot be said that he was discovered in or found in the united states" ]

[ "holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws", "recognizing that immunity may be waived", "holding that tribal corporation waived immunity due to express provision within its charter allowing it to be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction", "holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court", "holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity" ]

[ "holding that debtor could not avoid a judicial lien where after accounting for unavoidable liens and mortgages he had no equity in the property and therefore no interest on which to avoid the judicial lien", "holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien", "holding that chapter 13 debtors were unable to avoid a creditors unperfected secured claim because they lacked standing", "holding that a chapter 13 debtor lacked standing to avoid a mortgage under 544a3", "holding that the chapter 13 trustee had standing to avoid liens as impairing exemptions to prevent inequitable distribution of payments caused by debtors failure to avoid lien as impairing exemption" ]