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[ "holding that the special duty doctrine as an exception to the public duty doctrine was a concept distinct from immunity and did not serve to resurrect an otherwise immune claim", "holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school", "holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody", "holding that liability foreclosed because there exists no class in the sense that would justify invoking the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine", "holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists" ]

[ "recognizing that a statutes use of may when describing the courts authority generally connotes discre tion", "recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority", "holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent", "recognizing only state courts may authoritatively construe state statutes", "recognizing that cases have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses" ]

[ "holding that to be valid and binding a release must be executed with full knowledge of the import of what is being signed and with the intent to discharge from liability", "holding that to be competent under ford a prisoner must have a rational understanding of what it means to be executed", "holding that a trial courts finding of a fraudulent lien must be supported by competent evidence", "holding that the test of competency is whether he the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that speculation while permissible must be rational" ]

[ "recognizing that public policy favors limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to encourage a transition toward independence", "holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy", "recognizingpublic policy favors arbitration", "recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts", "holding that public policy favors reasonable conduct by consumers regardless of whether a product is defective and does not relieve a consumer of the responsibility to act reasonably" ]

[ "holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority", "holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed", "holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them", "holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules", "holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed" ]

[ "holding that a receiver is not liable when he acts as would an ordinarily prudent man in the management of his own affairs", "holding that the fourth amendment was not violated when police officers with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home prevented that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant", "recognizing exigency to permit warrantless home entry where officer entered home to protect victim of domestic battery who contacted police saying that she was afraid that her boyfriend would seriously harm her", "holding that it was not foreseeable that an abusive boyfriend would be waiting to attack another man that his girlfriend brought home one night", "holding defendants girlfriend had authority to consent to search as a joint occupant" ]

[ "holding that because claimant had asserted fifth amendment during discovery he may not submit affidavits in opposition to governments motion for summary judgment", "holding that district court had ample authority to strike claimants affidavit offered in opposition to governments motion for summary judgment in forfeiture action after claimant invoked fifth amendment and refused to answer governments deposition questions", "holding that party may not rely on its own testimony or affidavits to support its version of disputed fact issue in connection with summary judgment motion where party has asserted fifth amendment right not to answer questions concerning that veiy issue", "holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court", "holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived" ]

[ "holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony", "holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination", "holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony", "holding that a legitimate factual dispute or credibility determination is presented by the crossexamination of a witness for the director which raises a legitimate credibility dilemma with respect to a material aspect of the directors case", "holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness" ]

[ "holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted", "holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process", "holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review", "holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus" ]

[ "holding evidence insufficient to support kidnapping in four rapes in which 1 attacker held knife to victim and forced her into car where he raped her 2 assailants forced their way into victims home walked victim through dining room into kitchen put dish towel over her face and raped her 3 attackers forced way into victims apartment one pulled out gun took victim to couch for oral sex then took her into adjoining bathroom raped her and threatened to rip out phone and 4 assailants forced their way into victims apartment at gunpoint put hand over victims mouth walked her toward kitchen and then to bedroom checking first to see if anyone was present and then raped her", "holding the defendant was not entitled to a charge of involuntary manslaughter where there was no evidence that he involuntarily pulled his gun and shot the victim noting the act must be unintentional to constitute criminal negligence", "holding removal of victim from one room to another was not mere asportation but sufficient evidence of a separate and independent act", "holding evidence sufficient for recklessly endangering another person where the appellant grabbed the victim around the neck and pulled her into a room", "holding that defendants mother had common authority over defendants room in her house even though defendant paid rent and installed a lock in his room where he sought her permission to install the lock and gave her the only other key to the room" ]

[ "holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief", "holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence", "holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution", "holding that unsubstantiated personal opinions expressing generalized concerns about the aesthetic and visual impacts on the neighborhood do not amount to substantial evidence", "holding that an objectors generalized concerns do not constitute substantial evidence" ]

[ "recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively", "holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules", "recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony", "holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law", "holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996" ]

[ "holding that pornography depicting actual children can be prescribed whether or not the images are obscene because of the states interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process", "holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents", "holding that the first amendment does not protect obscenity or pornography produced with actual children", "holding that virtual child pornography which did not use images of actual minors was protected expressive speech under the first amendment because it did not harm any real children through its production and continued existence", "holding that the language of the ohio statute prohibits only images depicting actual children and thus does not violate the first amendment" ]

[ "holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice", "holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state", "holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment", "holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction", "holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code" ]

[ "holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept", "holding that once initial consent to search has been given passive acquiescence broadens the scope of search", "holding consent knowing sheriff had already seen marijuana in prior illegal search was acquiescence to authority", "holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search", "holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search" ]

[ "holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record", "holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations", "holding that the testimony of a nonexamining medical advisor does not constitute evidence sufficient to override the treating physicians diagnosis", "holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs", "holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four" ]

[ "holding in a case involving denial of coverage under an insurance contract that the location of documentary evidence related to insurance coverage mattered less than the location of the underlying tort suits", "holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage", "recognizing that the virginia supreme court has consistently applied the one year statute of limitation to defamation actions ", "recognizing that the supreme court has consistently applied an analysis keyed to economic realities ", "recognizing that the supreme court in hayes consistently limited its holding that the mva title provisions applied instead of the ucc to cases involving tort law and liability insurance coverage " ]

[ "holding that an error in guideline calculation seriously affected the defendants substantial rights because the starting point for consideration of 3553a factors was five months higher than it should have been", "holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights", "holding that although the guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark of calculating a proper sentence the district court should then consider all of the 3553a factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party", "holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings", "recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings" ]

[ "holding that after the then twoyear limitation period for the filing of a refund application had passed the state was entitled to assume that its tax revenues need not be refunded under any circumstance", "holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate", "holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted", "holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim", "holding that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability because the ultimate source of the irss claim to the amount erroneously refunded is a tax owed" ]

[ "holding that liberty interests are involved only when separation from the military is carried out in such a fashion as to stigmatize the separated member typically this would be a dishonorable discharge", "holding that liberty interests that are protected by procedural due process are generally limited to freedom from restraint", "holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state", "holding that because the legislature had set up no machinery by which taxation of leasehold interests in public property could be carried into effect the legislature had not exercised its power to tax such interests and thus an injunction against maricopa countys assessment of taxes on such interests was appropriate", "recognizing trial courts flexibility to fashion an award that keeps both parents involved in decisionmaking when such an award is in the best interests of the child" ]

[ "holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief", "holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief", "holding that an extraneous document was not incorporated by a brief reference to it in one paragraph of the complaint", "holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived", "holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief" ]

[ "holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider", "holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor", "holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors", "holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death", "holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence" ]

[ "holding that to offset a jurys damage award a separate thirdparty insurance award must cover the same loss which served as the basis for the jury award", "holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set", "holding that the state circuit court did not have the authority to award prejudgment interest for matters occurring prior to arbitration award", "holding that under plain statutory language starting point for computing deadline to file objections to commissioners award is actual filing date of the award irrespective of whether the state which filed award for commissioners had failed to timely file award pursuant to section 21048" ]

[ "holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act", "holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters", "holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act", "holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period", "holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts" ]

[ "holding that the failure to articulate orally that conditions 5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions", "recognizing district courts wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions", "holding that 3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release", "holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release", "recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release" ]

[ "holding that regulations pur porting to reach wetlands whose degradation or destruction could affect interstate or foreign commerce were beyond statutory authorization because they would include intrastate waters that need have nothing to do with navigable or interstate waters", "holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters", "holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca", "holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters", "holding that the evident breadth of congressional coneern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems supported the army corps of engineers interpretation of waters of the united states to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined" ]

[ "holding that the sixth circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state courts upholding of jury instructions and verdict forms regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law citation and internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law", "holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states", "holding that state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law", "holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law" ]

[ "holding that there is no right of recovery against individual defendants under the ada", "holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government", "holding that there is no individual liability under title vii", "holding no individual liability under the adea", "holding there was no individual liability under titles i ii or iii of the ada" ]

[ "holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent", "holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations", "holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent", "holding that plaintiff could not pursue an action for private nuisance against an adjoining landowner who intentionally placed debris and an uninhabitable trailer in close proximity to main entrance to developers property in order to create an eyesore", "holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility" ]

[ "holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right", "holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful", "holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right", "holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity", "holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right" ]

[ "holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute", "holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive", "recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context", "recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims", "recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983" ]

[ "holding that the bureau classification of petitioner as a sex offender was final where petitioners scheduled release was only weeks away", "holding a substantial issue remained despite mootness as to whether conditions could be imposed on a defendants release from state hospital when he was scheduled to stand trial", "holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial", "holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial", "holding that the effect of witnesss refusal to testify was virtually the same as if he had not physically taken the witness stand and if he had not taken the stand his prior testimony could not be deemed inconsistent " ]

[ "holding that the transfer of property by the debtor to his spouse while insolvent while retaining use and enjoyment of the property is a classic badge of fraud", "holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate", "holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred", "holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate", "holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor" ]

[ "holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction", "holding that although plaintiffs claims were masked in various legal theories they were premised on a single claim of product liability and therefore fell under north carolinas product liability statute", "holding that a plaintiff may not rely on an unadorned stream of commerce theory to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants", "holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury", "holding that personal jurisdiction can be premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce" ]

[ "holding that the ats does not waive the united states sovereign immunity", "holding that the lanham act did not waive states sovereign immunity", "holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity", "holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations", "holding that although the requirement of filing a complaint within sixty days is a period of limitations and not jurisdictional it must be strictly construed as it is a condition on which the united states agreed to waive its sovereign immunity" ]

[ "holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency", "holding that privately operated prisons may not be sued under the bivens doctrine", "holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency", "holding no action lies under bivens against a private corporation operating a halfway house under a contract with the bureau of prisons", "holding that municipal pension boards may not be sued" ]

[ "holding that where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendants first appeal the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand", "holding defendants statement that she would work through the issues raised by plaintiffs about the deal prior to execution of a loan mortgage agreement could not be construed as a clear and unambiguous promise citing media sport arts srl 1997 wl 473968 at 13", "holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal", "holding that only issues not known at the time of the original trial or issues not available on direct appeal may be properly raised through postconviction proceedings", "holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal" ]

[ "holding that properly filed application for statecourt discretionary review tolls aedpa limitations period", "holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "holding only intervals in which proceeding or appeal is actually pending toll aedpa limitations period", "holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions", "holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending" ]

[ "holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating", "holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution is commenced that is at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings", "holding that because the violation of probation vop hearing was neither a criminal prosecution nor a formal trial the sixth amendment does not apply", "holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution", "holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial" ]

[ "holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony", "holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity", "holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims", "holding that the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for any delays or inadequacies in their conduct of the investigation after 1983 plaintiff had been convicted but that they were absolutely immune for their posiinvestigation failure to go into court to seek guzmans release", "holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence" ]

[ "holding that the other party must have adequate notice of the claim in order to defend against it", "holding that under the implied covenant of good faith neither party to a contract shall do anything which has the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract", "holding that a promisor impliedly pledges that it shall not do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the promise", "holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services", "recognizing the viability of the coconspirator exception for statements regarding the concealment of evidence or fruits of the crime after the paramount object of the conspiracy has been attained" ]

[ "holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds", "holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it", "holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only with the existence of the alleged oral contract", "holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds" ]

[ "holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred", "holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy", "holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction", "holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness", "holding that employer did not have duty to protect allegedly intoxicated employee from risk that employee would have automobile accident after leaving work" ]

[ "holding that provision is a statute of repose and noting that the word extinguished is emphasized because of its substantive effect", "holding that provision is a statute of repose because by its own terms the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim it substantively extinguishes the cause of action", "holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose", "holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose", "holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed" ]

[ "holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made", "holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles", "holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former code 161269e was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review that complied with due process as spelled out in kent required that juveniles convictions be vacated", "recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings", "holding that the court without violating due process of the law may conduct a hearing to determine whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction even if the juvenile fails to appear if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juveniles behalf" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution", "holding that malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause", "holding that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that the criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause", "holding that a necessary element for malicious prosecution under virginia law is lack of probable cause", "holding that the plaintiff must show that the person instituting or maintaining the prosecution lacked probable cause for bringing the action" ]

[ "holding that good cause did not exist where movant was on notice of information that with some investigation would have led to timely discovery of the basis for the motion to amend", "holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm", "holding litigation process substantially invoked where movant conducted extensive discovery about every aspect of the merits", "holding that government was not substantially justified in its litigation position where government conducted a poor investigation of claim failed to verify claimants story unreasonably delayed pursuing and processing litigation of forfeiture claim for thirteen months and where court ultimately found at trial which occurred four years after initial seizure that seized property had independent source and had not been used illegally", "holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law" ]

[ "holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment", "holding that consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period", "holding that a statutory time period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions", "holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included", "holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order" ]

[ "holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "holding that the trial court did not violate the first offender act by imposing a 15year probated sentence which included as a special condition confinement in a detention center for a designated time", "holding that imposition of a habitual offender sentence on remand after the trial courts pronouncement of a nonhabitual sentence in the original proceeding does not violate double jeopardy" ]

[ "holding evidence insufficient to establish defendant had physical or constructive possession of heroin when no drugs were found on his person and the only drugs discovered on the premises which he shared with the codefendant were secreted out of plain view", "holding that proof of the discovery of illegal drugs in plain view in the presence or two or more joint occupants of the premises is sufficient to support a conviction for constructive possession", "holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises", "holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession", "holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added" ]

[ "holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced", "recognizing that a contract which is incomplete uncertain or indefinite in its material terms will not be specifically enforced in equity", "holding that restrictive covenants are not favored by the law and should be strictly construed as they are an interference with an owners free and full enjoyment of his property", "recognizing that an insurance contract will generally be enforced as written unless to do so would violate the law or public policy", "holding settlements are highly favored and will be enforced whenever possible" ]

[ "holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules", "holding that a state procedural default will not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar", "holding that district court correctly applied state law procedural bar to petitioners jury challenge despite state courts failure to indicate that its denial of petition rested on procedural grounds where petitioner never raised facially sufficient jury challenge before any state court and state courts denial of petition could not be construed as a decision on the merits", "holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application without regard to the merits of the petition", "holding that where state procedural rule was mandatory and unwaivable and where government filed motion to dismiss habeas petition based solely on noncompliance with this procedural rule which state court granted without explanation decision appeared to rest primarily on state law" ]

[ "holding that any confession obtained by interrogation reinitiated by police in the absence of counsel is inadmissible unless the defendant reinitiates discussion with police and then confesses", "holding in a plurality opinion that a confession obtained through a twostep questions first interrogation technique whereby the police deliberately questioned a defendant in custody until that defendant confessed followed by a miranda warning and reiteration of the confession was inadmissible because the police strategy undermined the effectiveness of the miranda warning", "holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible", "recognizing that not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation", "holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation" ]

[ "holding that court must examine totality of circumstances to determine whether substantial evidence supports issuance of search warrant", "holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent", "holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances", "holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding", "recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances" ]

[ "recognizing privilege", "recognizing a federal mediation privilege", "holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege", "recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination", "recognizing privilege under federal rules" ]

[ "holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing", "holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply", "holding that confrontation clause protections do not extend to sentencing hearings", "recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings", "holding preliminary hearings in colorado do not provide adequate opportunity for crossexamination" ]

[ "holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify", "recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor", "holding that an alleged oral agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor lacked mutuality of obligation and was enforceable where the distributor had no obligation to sell any specific quantity and no obligation to meet any quotas", "holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable" ]

[ "holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted", "holding that although the movant need not establish an ironclad claim or defense which will guarantee success at trial it must at least establish that it possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense which if proven will bring success in its wake", "holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success", "holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class", "holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction" ]

[ "holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements", "holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement", "holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity", "holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet rule 9bs particularity requirement where they did not present any evidence at an individualized transactional level", "holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees" ]

[ "holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "holding that it was error for the district court to overrule appellants motion for summary judgment without reference to the qualified immunity defense", "holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived", "holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "holding district court did not err by considering a contract central to the dispute without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment" ]

[ "holding that the trial courts rule 54b ala r civ p certification of its partial summary judgment on a single claim leaving open the amount of damages was erroneous therefore the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no final judgment", "holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment", "holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification", "holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees", "holding if a judgment determines the applicable law while leaving open questions of fact it is not a final judgment" ]

[ "holding rehabilitation act applicable", "holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary", "holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective", "holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable", "holding that an act of the legislature limiting the height of buildings was not applicable where substantial rights of a party had vested before the act was enacted" ]

[ "holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony", "holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred", "holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg 4b12a", "holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg 4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within 4b12ls force clause", "holding that battery under wyoming law did not necessarily qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" ]

[ "holding that there is no individual liability under title vii", "holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii", "holding that title vii incorporates statutory epa defenses", "holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original", "holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration" ]

[ "holding that a conviction under 22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach", "holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach", "holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach", "holding that the categorical approach applies to 924c", "holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc 16" ]

[ "holding that when a defendant raises a nonfrivolous argument for a lower sentence the record must show that the district court considered it and explained the basis for rejecting it", "holding that the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendants argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it", "holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it", "holding that even if the district court erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for rejecting boulwares argument for a belowguidelines sentence we are quite confident that the district court undertook that analysis and considered boulwares argument", "holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court" ]

[ "holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable", "holding that the plain meaning of 2244d2 is that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any properly filed federal habeas corpus petition", "holding that section 236e does not strip the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioners habeas corpus petition", "holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition", "holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract", "holding in the context of a forumselection provision that the balancing of procedural and substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider each questionable forumselection clause on a casebycase basis and precludes the development of a brightline rule", "holding claim of unconscionability requires showing of both procedural and substantive elements", "holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim", "holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision" ]

[ "holding that a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review without the need for later objection", "holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal", "holding litigant preserves an issue on appeal where substance of the objection has been thoroughly explored during the hearing on the motion in limine", "holding grant or denial of motion in limine is preliminary ruling and normally preserves nothing for appellate review", "holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial" ]

[ "holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law", "holding as a matter of maryland law that employerretained radiologists who observed abnormalities owed a duty of care and breached it by failing to notify the examinee", "recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee", "holding that in the absence of a product malfunction a plaintiff cannot establish that a defendant breached any duty owed", "holding that the issue of whether or not a defendant airline breached its duty of due care by failing to transfer a pregnant employee from a flight precluded summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiffs negligence claim" ]

[ "holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees", "holding state action comparable even though it did not seek monetary sanction", "holding that appellant had standing to appeal because it was bound by the judgment even though it did not meet the second requirement", "holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction of 25000 after counsel disregarded the courts previous admonishments", "holding that state prisoner seeking only monetary damages in 1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 1997e if such remedies do not provide for the award of monetary relief" ]

[ "holding remand proper on circuit courts own motion in a workers compensation case where the commission failed to make essential findings of fact because to hold otherwise would in such cases make the determination of the rights of the parties turn upon the neglect of the commission to make essential findings of fact or require the appellate court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute forbids", "holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it", "recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings" ]

[ "holding defendant was in custody under miranda while being detained under terry", "holding a defendant was not in custody for purposes of miranda after he consented to go to police headquarters", "holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody", "holding that miranda was constitutionally based but declining to go further than miranda to establish a constitutional right", "holding on habeas review that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes and reciting among other facts that defendant was transported to a police station for questioning in an unmarked police car which was not equipped with a shield inside the car" ]

[ "recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations", "holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places", "holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default", "recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death", "recognizing that a declaration filed under subsection 1 protects even the nonfiling debtor" ]

[ "holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute", "holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee", "holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection", "holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his 1 claim", "holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney" ]

[ "holding that the court may only make a facial inquiry into the validity of the certification", "holding that individualized factual determinations precluded finding that common issues predominate reversing the class certification order", "holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions", "holding that common issues of fact did not predominate because it was necessary to make an individualized inquiry into equitable circumstances", "holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry" ]

[ "holding that even if a particular privacy interest is minor nondisclosure remains justified where the public interest in disclosure is virtually nonexistent", "recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters", "holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant", "holding that bargaining unit employees have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their home addresses under the freedom of information act and concluding that that interest substantially outweighed the virtually nonexistent public interest in disclosure under foia and the privacy act not the nlra", "recognizing the public interest exception" ]

[ "holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review", "holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment", "holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a prima facie case under title vii", "holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case", "holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant" ]

[ "holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation", "holding that plaintiff states a cause of action under 1981 by alleging that defendant harassed and retaliated against him for filing eeoc claim and otherwise attempting to receive redress for disparate treatment", "holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under 1981", "holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge", "holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under 1981" ]

[ "holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right", "holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee", "holding that any doubt as to the propriety of granting relief must be resolved in favor of the party when the party is not responsible for the error that caused the default judgment", "holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial", "holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor" ]

[ "holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness", "holding that lay witness opinion as to guilt of defendant inadmissible", "holding that the trial court properly allowed lay witness testimony concerning the operation of a gps device including authentication of the gpss data", "holding that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to sustain the states objection where questions to a witness go to his understanding of the law concerning parole and call for the legal knowledge of a lay witness", "holding that the admissibility of lay witness identification testimony turns on a number of factors" ]

[ "holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse", "holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida", "holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry", "holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee", "holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime" ]

[ "recognizing implied duty to market", "recognizing implied obligation to use reasonable diligence", "holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product", "recognizing implied covenant to market gas", "recognizing an implied fourth amendment action for damages" ]

[ "holding that court did not err by refusing to charge jury with exercise of judgment instruction where issue was whether nurse had duty to constantly monitor patient because case did not involve selection between one of two courses of treatment or two schools of thought", "holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel", "holding that trial court did not err", "holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence", "holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession" ]

[ "holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule", "holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant", "recognizing that the district court may make drug quantity findings by a preponderance of the evidence to calculate an advisory guidelines sentence for a 841b1c offense", "holding harmless any error in district courts drug quantity determination where undisputed quantity of drugs was enough to place defendant at the base offense level calculated by the district court", "holding that where seized currency appears by a preponderance of the evidence to be the proceeds of narcotics trafficking a district court may consider the market price for the drugs in which the defendant trafficked in determining the drug quantity represented by that currency" ]

[ "holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment that taxpayers were not liable for any type of federal income tax or to issue injunction permanently removing the tax liens on property and levies on wages", "holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge", "holding as frivolous taxpayers argument that he was not subject to the income tax because he is a non resident alien and awarding sanctions of 8000", "holding that wages are subject to oregons personal income tax and that a taxpayers argument to the contrary was frivolous", "holding that an appeal by taxpayers in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government from collecting income tax deficiencies was mooted because the taxpayers had paid the deficiencies pending the appeal" ]

[ "holding that payments made by third parties on behalf of debtors are disbursements notwithstanding the debtors lack of control over the funds", "holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties", "holding that prepayments the debtor made to a lender pursuant to modified settlement agreement that reduced the balance of loan and accrual of interest were considered disbursements for purposes of calculating the quarterly fee", "holding that because the quarterly fee payments are not 503b claims chapter 7 administrative expenses and the quarterly fee payments have the same priority", "holding that disbursements for purposes of calculating the quarterly fee included payments made by third parties on the debtors behalf" ]

[ "holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge", "recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties", "holding that presumption of regularity is afforded to clerks of court performing their official duties", "holding that evidence that va sent appellant an election card when combined with presumption of regularity accorded to the official acts of public officers including mailings was enough to discharge any 7722 duty assuming there was one", "holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty" ]

[ "holding in termination of fathers rights that evidence was sufficient to support finding children were removed for abuse or neglect when previous decree reflected trial court made findings that children were removed from mother under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect", "holding an incarcerated fathers actions satisfied the standard for neglect who initially made arrangements for his children to receive adequate care but failed to provide sufficient legal protection so that the childrens drugaddicted mother could not take custody over them", "holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree", "holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right", "holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals" ]

[ "holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding", "holding that inconsistencies adequately support the administrative law judges alj adverse credibility finding", "holding that material alterations in the applicants account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding", "holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding", "holding that the record did not support the agencys adverse credibility finding in the absence of additional probing" ]

[ "holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted", "holding that infer ence cannot be based on timing alone but must take into account other evidence", "holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant", "holding in a race discrimination case that close timing is an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case but insufficient on its own to rebut a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that explains the action and its timing", "holding that evidence to prove a conspiracy need only be such that reasonable jurors could infer that the parties entered into an unlawful agreement" ]

[ "recognizing that the purpose of abortion laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the states interest in protecting the womans health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus", "holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens", "holding that laws that are administered with an unequal hand and an evil eye are unconstitutional", "holding that laws with the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion are invalid", "holding that a ceremonial marriage performed under the laws of a foreign power by a foreign consular officer on united states territory was invalid because it did not comply with the laws of new york state" ]

[ "holding that the board cannot be liable for punitive damages citations omitted", "holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages", "holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested", "holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable", "holding that actor who was featured on the cover of an adult magazine without his consent could assert injury because the measure of damages available for misappropriation claims includes the economic value of the use of an individuals name and likeness and sjection 3344 specifically provides that a plaintiff may recover any profits from the unauthorized use in addition to actual damages or the 750 minimum statutory damage amount and punitive damages internal citations omitted" ]

[ "holding that the dismissal of an indictment did not negate the presumption of probable cause", "holding the fact that officers belief proved to be mistaken does not negate a finding of probable cause", "holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes", "holding that a suspects ability to proffer an innocent explanation for the facts does not negate probable cause", "holding without qualification that djeception does not negate consent" ]

[ "holding that failure to train officers to disarm suspects rendered foreseeable the injuries to a suspect shot by an officer who did not attempt to disarm him", "holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot", "holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station", "holding that deadly force was unreasonable where according to the plaintiffs version of facts the decedent possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot him", "holding that a fleeing suspect in a car was seized only when an officer actually shot him not when several officers previously shot his vehicles tires in an effort to stop him" ]

[ "holding that only provisions relating to work specifications and performance were incorporated into the subcontract because the relevant clauses limited the incorporation of the terms insofar as they relate to the work undertaken herein", "holding that the specifications reference to commercially available vacuum sensors constituted sufficient structure as one skilled in the art would have understood the reference", "holding that unless otherwise specified language in the contracts specifications referred to the drawings and served to modify the specifications direction to only apply paint so that the instructions would also include applying a liquid glaze coating on some of the walls in accordance with the drawings", "holding that subcontract requirement that work be performed in accordance with specifications in prime contract meant that prime contract governed the manner of the performance of the work not the basis for computing the amount to be paid the subcontractor", "holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term" ]

[ "holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction", "holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest", "holding that even when likelihood of success has been established the absence of irreparable injury standing alone makes preliminary injunctive relief improper", "holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury", "holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm" ]

[ "holding that erroneous instruction that flight from the scene of the crime implied guilt was harmless because there was other evidence to sustain a conviction", "holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent", "holding that although evidence of a defendants flight is admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt it is improper for the trial judge to instruct the jury on the law of flight because such an instruction oftentimes has the potential for creating more problems than solutions as it places undue emphasis upon that part of circumstantial evidence", "holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination", "recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt" ]

[ "recognizing the language permitting the enjoining of any claim or demand that is to be paid in whole or in part by a trust does not appear to permit the enjoining of contribution claims", "recognizing that the usfs has the authority to cancel suspend or modify a grazing permit or lease in whole or in part pursuant to the terms and conditions thereof", "recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope", "holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884", "holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof which is the subject of litigation" ]

[ "recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights", "holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child", "recognizing emotional bond between foster parents and child although ultimately determining foster parents did not have rights of parents in dependency action under chapter 2644 rcw", "holding that natural parents could not lose parental rights to foster parents where the foster agreement contemplates a surrender of custody for only a temporary period of time", "holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights" ]