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CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation", "holding that plaintiff could recover both treble damages under state racketeering statute and punitive damages under fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims because the statute provided that actions brought under it are remedial and not punitive and that civil remedies provided under it are supplemental and not mutually exclusive", "holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct", "holding that where plaintiffs were entitled to recover both treble damages and punitive damages under the illinois nursing home care reform act both issues could be submitted to the jury and the plaintiff could choose which award to be reflected in the judgment", "holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages" ]

[ "holding that a recorder connected to an extension phone which was activated automatically when the extension phone handset was lifted was an interception device where there was no evidence that the recorder could have operated independently of the telephone", "holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger", "holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence", "holding that it was error to admit into evidence a gun purchased by the defendant which was not connected with the charged crimes", "holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable" ]

[ "holding that it was not against public policy to enforce an agreement providing for deferred royalties on an invention whether or not a patent was ultimately granted", "holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent", "holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b", "recognizing a public policy against discrimination but not providing for an independent cause of action", "holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement" ]

[ "holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth", "holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to physical characteristics which he or she routinely exposes to public view", "recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications", "holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim", "holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy" ]

[ "holding that absent exceptional circumstances arguments not raised before the bankruptcy court in the first instance are waived", "holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice", "holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances", "holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances", "holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice" ]

[ "holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts", "holding that when making such a guess under erie r r co v tompkins 304 us 64 58 sct 817 82 led 1188 1938 a federal court is bound by an intermediate state appellate court decision unless convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise", "holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state", "holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise" ]

[ "holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendants substantial rights", "holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence of his conduct", "holding destruction of trial transcript pursuant to court rule ten years after defendants escape disadvantaged defendant due to his own culpable misconduct", "holding appellants deposition testimony that he believed his oral contract would exist for another eight to ten years was unenforceable pursuant to statute of frauds", "holding that arbitrators failure to disclose his prior business dealings with defendant some twenty years earlier did not amount to misconduct" ]

[ "holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant", "holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father", "holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle", "holding that adult child who maintained his own residence separate from his fathers household but regularly vacationed and kept gear at his fathers vacation home was not a resident of his fathers household and therefore not an insured under his fathers insurance policy covering the vacation home", "holding defendant who was employee of and had key to his fathers business premises searched lacked standing to challenge search of building his father owned" ]

[ "holding that under the mailbox rule the date that a motion is placed into the hands of prison officials for filing is the date that the motion is considered filed", "holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint", "holding that once a liquidating court establishes a definitive bar date the ohio insurance guaranty association becomes statutorily obligated to observe the finality of that date and noting that were we to hold otherwise the specific filing deadline set forth in the ohio statute would be rendered meaningless", "holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due", "holding that a claim filed after the last date fixed for the filing of claims was not a covered claim and noting that the requirement in the statute that claims be presented before the filing deadline evidences an intent on the part of the legislature to provide a cutoff date after which the association is no longer obligated to accept claims" ]

[ "holding that depreciation could not be deducted from cost to repair building to its condition prior to fire under actual cash value policy", "holding measure of damages for unabated nuisance affecting greenhouse was the depreciation of the market value by reason of the continuance of a permanent nuisance", "holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss where the policy limited liability to the cost to repair or replace the property with other of like kind and quality less depreciation", "holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable", "holding plaintiff entitled to depreciation after repairs in determining the vehicles value at the time of the theft allowance must be made for depreciation then accrued" ]

[ "holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment", "holding that bodycavity searches of prisoners are not unreasonable", "holding that a plaintiff stated a fourth amendment claim where consecutive bodycavity searches were unnecessary", "holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells", "holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable" ]

[ "holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial", "holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice", "holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred", "holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal", "holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury" ]

[ "holding that the legislature did not intend the state to be bound by local zoning regulations when constructing a communications tower because the legislature neither named the state nor manifested an intention that it be bound by the provisions of the enabling act which granted zoning authority to the city", "holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40 25", "holding that an improved public street is a structure within the meaning of illinois workers compensation law", "holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "recognizing that philadelphia as a home rule city derives its power generally to govern itself and to enact zoning regulations from the home rule act 53 ps 13101 but that to the extent that provisions of the zoning enabling act 53 ps 14752 are not inconsistent with philadelphias zoning regulations they remain in force" ]

[ "holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report", "holding that investigative report regarding potential premises liability claim was protected work product", "holding that police chiefs suspen sion with pay was not an adverseemployment action", "holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible", "holding that investigative report into police chiefs conduct was protected as private personnel data" ]

[ "holding that a defendant who scored more than sixty points on his sentencing scoresheet and was not convicted of an offense specifically referenced in the drug offender probation statute was ineligible to receive drug offender probation", "holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation", "recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged", "holding that probation is not a sentence", "recognizing the state may impose reasonable conditions of probation but holding that a probation condition requiring a sex offender who was convicted of operating while intoxicated to be subjected to a penile plethysmograph exam for sexual arousal was unreasonable" ]

[ "holding that service and notice in a technical sense are incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of parties and their participation is accomplished", "holding purpose of setback restriction is to create easement of unobstructed air light and vision and to insure uniformity of appearance", "holding that party waived special appearance", "holding that court should interpret statute in light of purpose of whole instrument", "holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance" ]

[ "holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed", "holding that third state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed", "holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed", "holding that although louisiana court held postconviction petition untimely filed statutory exceptions to filing requirement rendered petition properly filed for purposes of 2244d", "holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application without regard to the merits of the petition" ]

[ "holding board properly exercised jurisdiction when employer controlled the basic bargaining subjects wages seniority grievance procedures vacation insurance and retirement plans", "holding that opening day and duty days were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining", "holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable", "holding that the terms and conditions placed on applicants are not subjects of mandatory bargaining", "holding that many courts have recognized that an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the retirement plans of its employees" ]

[ "holding that although we typically review award or denial of attorneys fees and costs for an abuse of discretion where district court denies attorneys fees and costs based upon legal determination that a party is not a prevailing party we review the determination de novo", "holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees", "holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party", "holding medical liability insurer with policy calling for payment of all costs taxed against insured was not obligated to pay prevailing party attorneys fees" ]

[ "holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error", "holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture", "holding that the defendant conceded the accuracy of his prior convictions in his psi report by failing to object to the report", "holding invalid forfeiture of 357000 for failing to report exported currency affecting only the government and in a relatively minor way", "holding that to establish a pattern of unlawful activity in a ease involving currency transaction report violations the government must prove that the currency transaction report violations were both repeated and related to one another" ]

[ "recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation", "recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act", "holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id 101106e", "recognizing the indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the authorized person to pursue some endeavor as common in the enumerated items", "holding that while qui tam actions by private parties could be on behalf of or for a governmental unit they are not actions by a governmental unit as required by the bankruptcy code" ]

[ "holding there is a strong presumption of verity for solemn declarations in court", "recognizing rule 403s strong presumption in favor of admissibility", "recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability", "recognizing strong presumption against interlocutory appeals", "recognizing presumption" ]

[ "holding that a client is vicariously liable for an attorneys allegedly intentional tortious conduct if the attorney acted as the clients agent", "holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes", "holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party", "holding that licensed agent is in privity with principal for purpose of establishing identity of parties record establishes classic employeremployee relationship in which corporation is vicariously liable for conduct of agent", "holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal" ]

[ "recognizing implicit overruling of wehr", "recognizing the overruling of milford township", "recognizing the effective overruling of bankes", "recognizing implicit waiver of the attorney client privilege where the plaintiff has placed in issue a communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy", "recognizing prandinis overruling" ]

[ "holding that rochez did not foreclose respondeat superior liability for brokerdealers for the fraudulent acts of their employees", "holding that employees violation of his employers policy against drinking on the job does not preclude liability under respondeat superior", "recognizing respondeat superior liability", "holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers", "holding that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior because a supervisor can be liable only for his own acts or omissions" ]

[ "recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels", "holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels", "holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels", "holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels", "holding that decisions by prior panels are binding" ]

[ "holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment on grounds not raised on appeal", "holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error", "holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error", "recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law", "holding that an appellate court may not review errors that have not been assigned by a party or a point of error" ]

[ "holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges", "recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge", "holding that a state may not exercise a prior restraint on publishing a newspaper", "holding that in deciding on a facial constitutional challenge it is improper to consider only limited hypothetical applications", "holding that exhaustion of arbitration procedure is not necessary before the district court could consider a facial constitutional challenge" ]

[ "holding that the tobacco inspection act which imposed uniform standards of classification and inspection of tobacco sold at auction preempted the field and left no room for the georgia tobacco identification act which also imposed tobacco classification regulations", "holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship", "holding that lack of notice regarding the classification of the disability did not prejudice the respondent", "holding that prisoner had no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in prisoninmate classification system process where director of department of corrections retained unfettered discretion in classification and housing of prisoners", "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the washington classification of an outofstate conviction the state must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendants criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence" ]

[ "holding that case law had made clear that masturbating in car on public road was sufficiently open", "holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway", "holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic", "holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public", "holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car" ]

[ "holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction", "holding that government could not impeach witness with prior statement because he refused to answer any questions and thus gave no testimony in court with which the prior statement could be judged to be inconsistent", "holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions", "recognizing discretion and declining to answer propounded questions because the statement of facts accompanying the certification were not specific enough", "recognizing other state courts have declined to answer certified questions that would not be determinative of the action that were based on conflicting facts or that had already been decided by the state appellate court" ]

[ "holding that in the absence of a crossappeal an appellee may urge affirmance of the lower courts ruling on any basis appearing in the record but may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that the failure to file a petition for crossappeal within the statutory time limit is a jurisdictional defect that bars the court from hearing the crossappeal", "holding that the crossappeal time limit is jurisdictional", "holding that an appellee who did not address an argument in the answering brief had waived that issue", "holding that failure of an appellee to crossappeal ordinarily precludes review where an appellee seeks to enlarge his rights or lessen those of an adversary but is not a jurisdictional bar" ]

[ "holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims", "holding that the plaintiffs claims against volkswagen and others did not necessarily raise a federal question since they were also based on the assertion that the plaintiffs vehicle did not comply with state law", "holding that the plaintiffs state statutory claim against volkswagen did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction under grable since the claim was based on alternative theories some of which had no necessary federal element", "holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court", "holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law" ]

[ "holding that neither rule 18 nor section 30002 allowed the successor to an electoral loser to file findings when the transition did not happen during the period in which the trial court was obligated to file findings", "holding that rule 18 grants authority to some successor judges to file findings", "holding that rule 18 granted a successor to a deceased judge the power to file findings", "holding that rule 18 granted a successor to a resigned judge the power to file findings when a case was transferred between districts", "holding that not even the successor to a retiring judge may file findings because retirement is not listed in rule 18 and has a statutorily distinct meaning from resignation" ]

[ "holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations", "holding the alj may discredit complaints of claimant where inconsistencies appear in record", "holding that an alj may consider a claimants household activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain", "holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record", "holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record" ]

[ "holding tenants leasing house by oral agreement were coinsureds both landlord and tenants had liability insurance", "holding that tenants had standing to bring fourth amendment claim where tenants were threatened with eviction unless they consented to allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches", "holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent", "holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights", "holding tenants vacating premises allegedly in breach of a lease was not enough to trigger c 93a liability" ]

[ "holding that plaintiff bears burden of production as well as persuasion", "holding that employer bears the full burden of persuasion for the facts requisite to an exemption", "recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant", "holding that a debtor bears the burden of persuasion under 1325a", "holding that even if a state employees termination is properly appealed the employee bears the burden of persuasion that the alleged conduct did not occur" ]

[ "holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense", "holding that under the district courts construction of lldpe resins within the classes of mlldpe vldpe and uldpe can also broadly be characterized as lldpe resins", "holding that the employment of some noncivil servants can properly be characterized as noncommercial", "holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty", "recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony", "holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend where the movant presents no new facts but only new theories and provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally", "holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "holding that district court erred in denying leave to amend complaint to add new legal theories even though trial was approaching", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice" ]

[ "holding of the court is the position taken by member who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds", "holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits", "holding that when a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taking by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds", "holding of fragmented court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds", "holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious" ]

[ "holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines", "holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation", "holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation", "holding that the district court had the discretion to grant a downward departure for postsentence rehabilitation", "recognizing that aberrant criminal behavior may justify downward variance" ]

[ "recognizing that the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that an employer violates the nlra when it fails to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that although the lower court had properly excluded evidence that the whole farm or a substantial portion of it could be subdivided in the near future there was sufficient evidence that the property was adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future for home site development along the road internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "holding that erroneous admission of evidence was harmless where it had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury verdict judged in relation to the total evidence on the issue in question internal quotation marks omitted", "holding with respect to a general motion for directed verdict that it raised the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on venue an essential part of the governments case internal quotation marks and citation omitted" ]

[ "holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language", "holding that a statute relates to erisa plans for the purposes of preemption if it requires the plans to purchase the benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy", "holding that pbgc acts as trustee for plans subject to termination except when it calculates guaranteed amounts under 1322", "holding that the trustee of a nominee trust functions more as an agent than as a true trustee", "holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans" ]

[ "holding that plaintiff must establish that had she learned of impairment during her pregnancy she would have terminated pregnancy", "holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex", "holding infertility is a pregnancy related condition where plaintiff claimed she was terminated because she took time off work to undergo in vitro fertilization", "holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination", "holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired" ]

[ "holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law", "holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant", "holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible", "holding that texas rule of evidence 702 does not permit an expert to give an opinion that the complainant or class of persons to which the complainant belongs is truthful", "recognizing that the expert was particularly qualified to give his opinion" ]

[ "recognizing first two exceptions", "recognizing constitutionally mandated exceptions to that statutory principle", "recognizing three exceptions to atwill doctrine", "recognizing exceptions to immunity", "recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment" ]

[ "holding that the parentchild relationship is far more precious than any property rights", "holding that where the claimants were servicemen injured or killed while on active duty due to the negligence of others in the armed forces they could not seek recovery under the ftca for injuries sustained that arose out of or were incident to their military service", "holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later", "holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain", "holding that a difference in the procedural protections offered to certain claimants violated 1123a4 because some claimants were accorded far more effective recovery rights than others" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged", "holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired", "holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim", "holding that a sentencing decision will be affirmed if challenged factor is permissible and other factors are not challenged", "holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice" ]

[ "holding that exclusionary rule does not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials", "holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment", "holding that the attachment statute which did not expressly reach property beyond territorial limits of state would not be construed to apply to property outside state", "holding that rule b attachment does not extend to afteracquired property", "holding that the waiver of immunity from other liability did not explicitly waive immunity from prejudgment attachment but supporting the attachment on other grounds" ]

[ "holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them", "holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit", "holding party did not waive right to arbitrate despite moving to dismiss and moving for summary judgment on opponents claim", "recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court" ]

[ "holding that ones presence in a high crime area late at night without more will not justify an investigatory stop", "holding that the fact that an investigatory stop took place in a high crime area is pertinent to a terry analysis", "holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop", "holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest", "holding that in a high crime area unprovoked headlong flight from police can form the basis for reasonable suspicion under terry" ]

[ "holding the amount of procedural unconscionability was limited by the fact that the arbitration agreement was presented as a separate two page document", "holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision", "holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable", "holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract", "holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish unconscionability based upon the alleged excessive cost of arbitration because they failed to supply information as to the actual costs that might be incurred" ]

[ "holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment", "holding that opinion that fuel oil on her shoes caused her to fall is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts", "holding that a wifes net worth of approximately 62000 demonstrated her ability to pay her own attorneys fees notwithstanding her objection that her assets were illiquid in the form of home equity and a state retirement account", "holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion", "holding that the plaintiffs claim of being startled by a child on a slide did not prevent summary judgment in her case because t he simple fact wa s that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall prior to encountering it" ]

[ "holding that an arrest requires either physical force or where that is absent submission to the assertion of authority", "holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon", "holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment 111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force", "holding there must be either a show of authority or a use of force which must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting escape", "recognizing that an arrest requires either physical force or where physical force is absent submission to the assertion of authority" ]

[ "holding that amendments to procedure apply to both pending and future matters", "holding that all related matters must be arbitrated", "holding that criminal defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under the oregon vehicle code", "holding trial court erred by imposing sanctions under section 9 of civil practice and remedies code because claim for sanctions was based solely on section 10 of code and rule 13 of rules of civil procedure", "holding under code of criminal procedure record refers to all matters developed at trial" ]

[ "holding 1001 prosecution for false statements in unemployment benefits not precluded by unemployment benefits statute specifically addressing topic", "holding that medical expenses and wages paid pursuant to employment contract were collateral sources and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits", "holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits", "holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits", "holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments" ]

[ "recognizing an insurers right to rescind an insurance contract where the insured has made fraudulent or material misrepresentation in insurance application", "holding that defendant insurance company could not be held liable in negligence to a plaintiff for failure to disclose the insureds medical condition where defendant insurance company had not assumed a professional and expert position with respect to the insureds physical condition", "holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor", "holding an insurance company waived the right to rescind coverage when it continued to accept premiums with knowledge of grounds for rescission", "holding that insureds failure to list his brother as a member of the household was a material misrepresentation that provided the insurance company with grounds to rescind the policy" ]

[ "holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length", "holding new trial required after judges ex parte communication with jury in response to jury question during deliberations because there was no way of reaching a conclusion about what transpired other than by adopting the judges recollection", "holding that under the circumstances the deception was so unfair as to be coercive", "holding that judges remarks relating to length of trial expense involved importance of case and setting time limit on deliberations was coercive", "holding that allen charge given by court was coercive and required a new trial" ]

[ "holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother endangered childs physical and emotional wellbeing by leaving child alone overnight with known cocaine abusers", "holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section e for endangering physical wellbeing of child based in part on evidence that mother remained with physically abusive person while she was pregnant", "holding evidence supported terminating mothers parental rights under section d based in part on evidence that mother could not adequately protect or provide financially for children", "holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother placed children with father who lived transient lifestyle with children", "holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree" ]

[ "recognizing this texas rule", "recognizing this rule", "recognizing this as the general rule", "recognizing a split of authority on this issue", "recognizing exceptions to this rule when allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government which is not applicable in this situation" ]

[ "holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest will not do", "holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest", "holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment", "holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest", "holding that a lawful custodial arrest is a prerequisite to a search since the arrest is the authority of law justifying the search" ]

[ "holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca", "holding that a similar instruction reduced the states burden of proof", "holding that similar burden of proof was properly placed on appellant in administrative appeal brought under provisions of comparable statute concerning the allocation of positions in the state personnel system", "holding that in the absence of an express statutory allocation of the burden of proof the board of immigration appealss placement of the burden on the alien was reasonable under chevron", "holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant" ]

[ "holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review", "holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law", "holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same", "holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment", "holding that a coa is deemed denied if the district court does not address its issuance within thirty days" ]

[ "holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party", "holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds", "holding that evidence which is relevant to a pleaded issue as well as an unpleaded issue does not give opposing party adequate notice that the unpleaded issue is entering the case", "holding that implied consent is not established merely one party introduced evidence relevant to an unpleaded issue and the opposing party failed to object", "holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm" ]

[ "holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained ", "holding that statutory damages under 504c could not be awarded in conjunction with a default judgment without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts", "holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact", "holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment without first holding evidentiary hearing where there was no uncertainty about the amounts at issue the pleadings contained specific dollar figures and the court requested and received affidavits in support of the default judgment" ]

[ "holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination", "holding that an asylum applicants submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings", "holding that the failure to list two collateral incidents on an asylum application did not provide substantial evidence for an adverse credibility finding", "holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination", "holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum" ]

[ "holding contract for sale of law practice which included duty on part of selling attorney to refer clients as consideration for the sale violated rpc", "holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable", "holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made", "holding that an agreement in which one party promised to make monthly payments to the other partys attorney as part of an asset sale contract was for the direct benefit of the attorney", "holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale" ]

[ "recognizing that the trial court is not precluded from enforcing its judgment even though an appeal is pending", "recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable", "holding that a determination that precluded an alien from even applying for relief under section 1255 is a purely legal question that is reviewable", "holding that for purposes of section 523a2b the reasonableness of a creditors reliance is a question of fact which is reviewable only for clear error", "holding that whether a city has the authority to enact a particular statutory scheme is a purely legal question" ]

[ "holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws", "holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws", "holding that antideficiency laws protection is nonwaivable", "holding that a temporarily totally disabled person may invoke protection under disability discrimination laws", "holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause" ]

[ "holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable", "holding employment agreement consisting entirely of a covenant not to compete unenforceable because the covenant must be supported by valuable consideration", "holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable", "holding that covenant in settlement agreement whereby defendants agreed not to contest validity of patent was unenforceable because in direct conflict with strong federal policy", "holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable" ]

[ "recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994", "holding that although contempt and sanctions are not identical the principles the supreme court articulated for cases of contempt in international union united mine workers of america v bagwell 512 us 821 114 sct 2552 129 led2d 642 1994 guide our determination of what procedural protections are necessary in imposing sanctions under a courts inherent powers", "holding as meritless a claim that the standard jury instructions which refer to the jury as advisory and refer to jurys verdict as a recommendation violate caldwell", "holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review", "holding that regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny quoting turner broad sys inc v fed commcn commn 512 us 622 642 114 sct 2445 129 led2d 497 1994 plurality opinion" ]

[ "holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc 287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc 1341 1343", "holding that amtrak is an agency of the government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government", "holding that wire and mail fraud statutes are construed identically", "holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud", "holding that where defendant made false representations to attain government contract but performed satisfactorily the government had been deprived of money or property for purposes of mail and wire fraud" ]

[ "holding the state law claims were not preempted", "holding that erisa preempted a state law claim because the courts inquiry centered on the employee benefits plan at issue", "holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan", "holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy", "holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted" ]

[ "holding that the district courts swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment prevented the improper comment from materially affecting the verdict", "holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire", "holding that a judges comment on the issues in the case although not technically correct could be cured by instruction", "holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction", "holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard" ]

[ "holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant according to the states sentencing guidelines", "holding that the district court may enhance a sentence for the use of a deadly weapon or under the habitual criminal statute but not both", "holding that the whole point in hale is that once the habitual offender sentencing scheme is utilized to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum on one or more counts arising from a single criminal episode consecutive sentencing may not be used to further lengthen the overall sentence and certifying conflict with davis", "holding that all facts that would enhance the defendants sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury" ]

[ "holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent", "holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus", "holding that almost a year between plaintiffs eeo activity and the adverse employment decision is too great a length of time to support an inference of reprisal", "holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination", "holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient" ]

[ "holding that where father who killed his wife had relinquished his children for adoption prior to his conviction the maternal grandparents of the children who had legal custody at the time of the adoption had standing to petition to unseal the adoption records this court vacated the orphans courts order that held the grandparents lacked standing and directed that on remand the orphans court determine whether the grandparents had shown cause under section 2905a to unseal the records", "holding that when children had resided with grandparents for several months during pendency of divorce proceedings grandparents had standing to intervene and seek managing conservatorship under former section 102004b and section 1020039", "holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship", "holding that parties not related to the child could not file an adoption petition and later prove the unfitness of the natural parents because the child was not available for adoption as defined in the adoption act parents had to be found unfit before petition could be filed", "holding that grandparents standing to bring suit under a custody statute was not a jurisdictional question that the court of appeals could raise on its own motion" ]

[ "holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the bid protest provisions of section 1491 to enjoin a contracting agencys termination of a contract", "holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated ", "holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract", "holding that the awardee of a contract may not challenge the decision to terminate that contract by invoking the courts bid protest jurisdiction", "holding that a denial of a bid protest without holding a hearing did not deprive a disappointed bidder of any property rights because there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a government contract unless the contract actually is awarded" ]

[ "holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it", "holding that the plaintiff waived an objection to the defendants failure to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense", "holding that unpleaded affirmative defense was properly considered by the district court where plaintiff had notice of the defense and an opportunity to respond", "holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice", "holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense" ]

[ "holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation", "holding that the average number of days to payment nearly doubled between the historical period and the preference period which based on the facts of that particular case made the payments outside the ordinary course of dealings between the plaintiff and defendant", "holding that two separate incidents of rape were perpetrated against the same victim where an appreciable period of time elapsed between the incidents and intervening events occurred during the interim", "holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation", "holding sorna inapplicable to a defendant who traveled during the gap period between enactment and issuance of the interim rule and was indicted on march 15 2007" ]

[ "holding that because plaintiffs speech occurred in the reception area of the judge executives office it was only the nature of that limited area and not the general public nature of fiscal court budding within which the office was located that was determinative of the forum", "holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees", "holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected", "holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner", "holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness" ]

[ "holding that physicians were specifically excluded from the ocspa but hospitals were not so they must abide by the ocspa", "holding that extraneous documents were not part of contract with voters created by voter approval of bond proposition", "holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court we must assume that they were considered", "holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint", "holding that unauthenticated documents may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment where the documents were not objected to or their authenticity disputed" ]

[ "holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendants credibility was not harmless error noting that defendant to go free needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses who testified in exchange for leniency were not", "holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible", "holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt", "holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial", "holding that evidence consisting of the testimony of three witnesses who each had motives to lie was not overwhelming and that prosecutorial misconduct therefore was not harmless error" ]

[ "holding that the fourteenth amendment was not an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate states immunity and reversing district courts rejection of new yorks eleventh amendment argument", "holding that congress exceeded its authority under 5 of the fourteenth amendment in attempting to abrogate the states eleventh amendment immunity in adea suits", "holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "holding that the tia does not abrogate states immunity under the eleventh amendment", "holding that the nyshrl does not waive the new yorks eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court" ]

[ "holding that if a fireman contributed to a pension fund on the basis of his salary plus longevity payments he would be entitled to pension payments computed on the same basis", "holding that salary is unconstitutionally withheld if on the basis of protected activities", "holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex", "holding the freedom of speech assembly and petition guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights", "holding that peaceful picketing is protected through the first and fourteenth amendments on the basis of five supreme court decisions examining the question" ]

[ "holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed", "holding that intermediate appellate courts have jurisdiction to address merits of appeal when amended notice of appeal is filed before briefs are filed", "holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court", "holding that this court has jurisdiction when the appellant has filed a docketing statement indicating an intent to appeal a particular order within the time for filing an appeal", "holding that section 7263 authorizes this court to review fee agreements when appeal is properly before this court and when fee agreement has been filed with court at time appeal is filed" ]

[ "recognizing that the section does not authorize suits for cancellation in the district courts", "holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts", "holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations", "holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties", "recognizing that a number of federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late in the day and opining that federal courts can and should protect states from dilatory or speculative suits" ]

[ "holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students", "holding that random search of students locker was justified because there were shooting incidents on school grounds and school had policy allowing for searches of lockers for any reason", "holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school", "holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district are acting in conjunction with school officials", "holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours" ]

[ "holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous", "holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous", "holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent", "holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous", "holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties" ]

[ "holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa", "holding that the employer was not the insurers agent", "holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work", "holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation", "holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration" ]

[ "recognizing property of the estate to include the estates chose in action against its auditor", "recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate", "holding a decedents estate is not a legal entity and only individuals administering the estate can be sued on estates behalf", "holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate", "holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought", "holding a school principal seeking recovery for defamation has the burden of showing actual malice", "recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant", "holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies", "holding in defamation context that first amendment protects speech regarding a public official unless made with actual malice" ]

[ "holding sec decision reviewable when commission has reviewed staff decision", "recognizing that the decision of whether to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "holding that the commission applied its technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented and the commissioners decision should be afforded deference when the commission conducted investigations reviewed accounting practices and solicited comments from several agencies and organizations involved in the regulatory process in the course of balancing the interests of the public utility and the public to reach its decision", "holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious", "holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision" ]

[ "holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of 523a4", "holding that to establish an exception to the statute of frauds it must first be shown that an agreement to convey was actually reached that an oral contract must be established by clear and convincing evidence and that the chapter 7 trustee failed to establish that there was any parol contract for conveyance of property from debtors parents to the debtor", "holding that the end of a conspiracy must be affirmatively shown", "holding that to establish a fiduciary relationship under restatement of torts and missouri law it must be shown that the cleric possessed or managed things of value", "holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty" ]

[ "recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination", "holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination", "holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case", "holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific", "recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial" ]

[ "holding that a warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause where it was based almost exclusively on the uncorroborated testimony of an unproven informant", "holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction", "holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant", "holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant", "holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid" ]

[ "holding that a claim of inadvertent errors in administration of election procedure without some allegation of intentional discriminatory conduct did not properly allege a denial of equal protection of the laws", "holding that denial of development permit to mine sand and gravel on thirtytwo acres of property did not deny owner equal protection of laws", "holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws", "holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment", "holding a similar peer review confidentiality statute did not deny the plaintiffs equal protection" ]

[ "holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation", "holding that the colorado constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change add to or diminish the qualifications for constitutionally created offices", "holding that a court may not legislate or by interpretation add to legislation matters which the legislature saw fit not to include", "holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language", "recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice" ]

[ "holding that motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demon strating reasonable likelihood that requirements for relief have been satisfied", "recognizing that failure to offer evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground for denying a motion to reopen", "holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen", "holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1", "holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied" ]

[ "holding that all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive", "holding that in order to sustain death sentence as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and this balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding that no single factor controls and that all factors must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the circumstances of the case", "holding that a district court should decide a motion for expedited discovery on the entirety of the record to date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances unless the circumstances are such that the notaro factors apply", "holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence" ]