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[ "holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda", "holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee", "holding that punitive damages may be awarded under 1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others", "holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others", "holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed" ]

[ "holding that constitution requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case", "holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant", "holding if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing the adversary process itself is presumptively unreliable", "holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner", "holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith" ]

[ "holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable", "holding quasiestoppel did not apply when boards actions were not unconscionable without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstance", "holding quasiestoppel did not apply when department did not take an inconsistent position without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstances", "holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable", "holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants" ]

[ "holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments", "holding that appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive", "holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal", "holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive" ]

[ "recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists", "recognizing that an actual express judgment of acquittal precludes retrial regardless of any defects in the process leading to the judgment", "holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections", "holding on summary judgment that an attorney who failed to timely file an answer leading to a default judgment was on notice that a malpractice claim might be filed against him", "recognizing that an appeal from a final judgment permits an attack against any nonfinal order or ruling leading up to it" ]

[ "recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment", "holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will", "holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law", "holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill", "holding that employee guidebook did not create an implied employment contract as it contained a clearlystated boldfaced disclaimer and statement that employment was atwill" ]

[ "holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice", "holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard", "holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury", "holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury", "holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists" ]

[ "recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment", "holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment", "holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment", "holding that where an employee is fatally injured in an unexplained assault there is a rebuttable presumption that the employees death arose out of the employment", "holding that in determining whether an accident arose out of employment the issue is whether the employees employment brought him in contact with the risk that in fact caused his injuries" ]

[ "holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims", "holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory", "holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim", "holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed", "holding that heck barred appellants excessive force claim where his complaint maintained that he did not resist arrest and did nothing wrong and provided no alternative pleading or theory of recovery" ]

[ "holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility", "holding that allegations of tampering went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility", "holding statistical conclusions admissible and questions regarding the size of a tests database goes to the weight not admissibility of the evidence", "holding that in face of expert testimony that database was valid questions concerning size of database and statistical conclusions drawn from it went to weight not admissibility of evidence", "holding that questions regarding size of fbis population databases was matter of weight once principle that frequency calculations could be made from an adequate database was determined to be generally accepted" ]

[ "holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility", "holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state", "holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges", "holding it is proper for a trial court to grant leniency in sentencing a defendant who by his plea ensured prompt and certain application of correctional measures to him acknowledged his guilt and showed a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct", "holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari" ]

[ "holding that void order must exceed courts authority to act and not be merely erroneous", "recognizing that acts made in violation of statutory authority are void", "holding void judgment must be vacated", "recognizing collateral attack on void order", "recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous" ]

[ "holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan", "holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious", "holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment", "holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable", "holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard performs its usual role of assuring factual support in a case involving a nhtsa decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard" ]

[ "holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac remcode 38001 to maritime contract disputes", "holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law", "holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions", "holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law", "holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present", "holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection", "holding that if a judge believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his summary contempt power", "holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment", "holding that the commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a patent if he believes that doing so would be contrary to law" ]

[ "holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added", "holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt emphasis added", "holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "holding that the investigators belief that a crime had been committed does not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence", "holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable" ]

[ "holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for 1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor", "holding that foster parents are not state actors", "holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct", "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability", "holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors" ]

[ "holding that the method used to distribute retirement benefits was properly a matter within the trial courts discretion", "recognizing offset method", "holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method", "recognizing this method of submission", "recognizing this method" ]

[ "holding that a summary judgment motion must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion", "holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable ", "holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied", "holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion", "holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable" ]

[ "holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board", "recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board", "holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself", "holding that the board as constituted on the date that the original complaint was filed is the board for purposes of evaluating whether demand is required or excused", "holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings" ]

[ "holding noncapital murder and injury to a child not same offenses for doublejeopardy purposes noting murder requires proof of death while injury to a child does not", "holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill", "holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child", "holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child", "holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute" ]

[ "recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation", "holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation", "holding that the trust fund and denuding theories of recovery were considered to belong to the debtor corporation because each action was created for the benefit of the corporation ie to vindicate injury to the corporation caused by improper actions by control persons", "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "holding that claims against corporate officers for mismanagement belong to the corporation" ]

[ "holding that an isolated incident in which an employee used profanity in a telephone conversation with her supervisor did not constitute misconduct sufficient to cut off unemployment benefits", "holding that isolated incident in which claimant raised voice at his supervisor in private office but in front of two other employees and possibly used profanity did not constitute misconduct sufficient to deny unemployment compensation benefits", "holding that leaving work early without permission after having been previously warned constitutes misconduct", "holding that single incident of leaving work early without receiving permission from supervisor to address problem of impending termination of electrical service to his home by employee on probation due to poor attendance record constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits", "holding that single incident of failing to return to work after doctors visit without permission due to employees professed anxiety after being informed she may have skin cancer constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits" ]

[ "holding that rule does not apply where defendant made false representations", "holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b", "holding that pleading fraud with particularity in this circuit requires time place and contents of the false representations as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby ", "holding that rule 9b requires a pleader to set forth the time place and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation", "holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter" ]

[ "holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding", "holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question", "holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument", "holding appellate court must when evaluating actual malice in libel case independently determine whether the evidence in the record is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of first amendment protection", "recognizing that appellate court is in same position as trial court to assess evidence when all of the proof is contained in the record by deposition" ]

[ "holding that damages in a fela action are limited strictly to the financial loss thus sustained overturning a jury award for the loss of society and companionship", "holding that plaintiffs own testimony that he was embarrassed and humiliated by defendants conduct was sufficient to support compensatory damages award", "holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss", "holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand", "holding that a title vii plaintiffs testimony that her employment discharge resulted in sleep loss smoking and weight loss was sufficient to support an award of 100000 in compensatory damages" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity", "holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant", "holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract", "holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract", "holding that limitation of liability clause in construction contract that is not unconscionable or in violation of public policy is valid so long as parties had a fair opportunity to accept reject or modify limitation and affirming summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had presented no evidence that it had had no such opportunity" ]

[ "holding that a bona fide purchaser may be considered in privity with its predecessor", "holding bona fide error defense barred claim for fdpca violation which arose from mistake of law", "recognizing that if a creditors claim is subject to a bona fide dispute that creditor lacks standing to file an involuntary petition", "holding that bona fide dispute over whether bank actually possessed property belonging to taxpayer is reasonable cause", "holding that unsatisfied execution creditor had rights in property superior to all but prior secured creditors and bona fide purchasers for value" ]

[ "holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding", "holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding", "holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding", "holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding", "holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding" ]

[ "holding that the eighth amendment forbids life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense", "holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole", "holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc 924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense", "holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses violates the eighth amendment", "recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences" ]

[ "holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access", "holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking", "holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation", "recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property", "holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property" ]

[ "recognizing that the general assembly can delegate discretionary functions to administrative bodies and officers and holding that a statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes an intelligible principle to which the administrative body or officer must conform and if it establishes a procedure for effective review", "holding that the secretary may only delegate the powers and duties of the office to a natural person not to an administration or entity other than a natural person", "holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality", "holding that utah const art vi 1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others", "holding that a district court may review successive or abusive claims but only if petitioner establishes cause and prejudice" ]

[ "recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge", "holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea", "holding that damages are not available for a facial challenge to a gun control law", "holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract", "holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff" ]

[ "holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes", "holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes", "holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case", "holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case", "holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case" ]

[ "holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy", "holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him", "holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added", "holding without citing to justice oconnors concurrence in smith that a juror who was a 15year secretarial employee in the civil division of the prosecuting agency was impliedly biased" ]

[ "holding that universities can consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant and that a diverse student body is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify such use of race", "holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case", "recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination", "holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant", "holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck" ]

[ "holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold", "holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts", "holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "holding that a federal court in absence of a state supreme court pronouncement on a subject of state substantive law must determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state" ]

[ "holding that bankruptcy courts can authorize creditors committees in chapter 11 proceedings to sue derivatively to avoid fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the estate notwithstanding hartford underwriters", "holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions", "holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory", "holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets", "holding that derivative standing is available to a creditor to pursue avoidance actions when it shows that a chapter 7 trustee or debtorinpossession in the case of chapter 11 is unable or unwilling to do so notwithstanding hartford underwriters" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court", "holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration", "holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case", "holding that upon a finding of grave risk the district court did not have to consider undertakings", "holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" ]

[ "holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds", "holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy", "recognizing an agreement whose sole purpose is to prevent competition per se is void as a matter of public policy", "holding physicians covenants not to compete are unenforceable and void as a matter of public policy", "holding that where agreement prohibits recovery of attorneys fees in civil rights case the relevant portions of the arbitration policy are therefore void as against public policy" ]

[ "holding that the finders of fact are free to believe all some or none of the evidence presented to it and are further the sole resolvers of issues of credibility decisions made by finders of fact in these regards will not be disturbed on appeal", "holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony", "holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion", "holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others", "holding mere conflict in testimony does not render evidence insufficient to support verdict because it is with province of fact finder to determine weight to be given to testimony and to believe all part or none of evidence" ]

[ "holding state rule barring review of postconviction petitioners claims where petitioner failed to provide supporting documentation is adequate procedural ground on which to bar federal habeas review", "holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal", "holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground", "holding occas declination of jurisdiction over appeal from denial of postconviction relief based on petitioners failure to comply with occa rule 52 was adequate and independent state ground", "holding that 15a1419a3 is an independent and adequate state ground for a state courts finding of procedural default" ]

[ "holding that lists of persons who visited with inmates are exempt from disclosure because information is confidential by constitutional law", "holding that the names of thirdparty inmates within memoranda were categorically exempt from disclosure absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by the bop", "holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege", "holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia", "holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential" ]

[ "recognizing that the expectation of finality and tranquility is an interest protected by the prohibition on double jeopardy", "holding that correction of trial courts miscalculation giving credit to defendant for time not actually served did not violate double jeopardy because defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality", "holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy", "holding that correction of sentence to conform with plea agreement did not violate double jeopardy because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality", "holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation" ]

[ "holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted", "holding authority to control limits duty to control", "holding that to establish a prima facie case of control person liability a plaintiff must establish that the alleged control person actually participated in ie exercised control over the operations of the primary violator in general internal quotations omitted", "recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it", "recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition" ]

[ "holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony", "holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive", "recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract", "holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions" ]

[ "holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals", "holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case", "holding that plain language of subsection 15003c requires court of appeals to make its own determination of the propriety of joinder under subsection 15003a with no deference to the trial courts ruling emphasis added appellate court is not constrained solely to review the pleadings and affidavits but should consider the entire record including any evidence presented at the hearing", "holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports", "holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial" ]

[ "holding that an appellate court viewing the evidence and all inferences of fact in light most favorable to nonmoving party can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party", "recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party", "holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor", "holding that an appellate court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and grants the state all reasonable inferences", "holding that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all doubts are resolved against the moving party" ]

[ "holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law", "holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion", "holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop", "holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion", "holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion" ]

[ "holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution", "holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court", "holding that the impact fee there imposed did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment using the rational basis test we discuss here", "holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection" ]

[ "holding such intoxication to be voluntary", "holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense", "holding that the subject of section 1710444 is voluntary annexation", "holding that title vii is subject to the transfer provisions of section 1404a", "holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary" ]

[ "holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences", "recognizing the right to waive a jury trial", "holding with or without a local rule so requiring failure to file motion to withdraw the reference when jury demanded was a waiver of right to jury trial", "holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury", "holding that a trial courts refusal to withdraw a jury waiver ordinarily does not implicate the federal constitutional right to a jury trial" ]

[ "recognizing emergency exception", "recognizing exception", "recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue", "recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement", "holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration", "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint", "holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion" ]

[ "recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child", "recognizing that the purpose of abortion laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the states interest in protecting the womans health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus", "recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof", "holding that laws with the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion are invalid", "holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents" ]

[ "holding a claim for money damages is an adequate remedy at law and so it does not provide a sufficient basis for injunctive relief notwithstanding the possibility that a money judgment will be uncollectible", "holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment", "holding that action for lien seeks money damages because its goal is to seize or attach money in the hands of the government as compensation ", "holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief", "recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money" ]

[ "holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity", "holding that attorney who was retained by city to assist in conducting official investigation into firefighters potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity in firefighters 1983 claim because official investigation of state employee was activity of the type entitled to qualified immunity", "holding that official defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and noting that legal uncertainty about the meaning of a supreme court decision was reflected in the decisions of the lower federal courts", "recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts", "holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity" ]

[ "holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions", "holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence", "holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa", "holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement", "holding that such provisions are valid" ]

[ "holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact", "holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact", "holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal", "holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment", "holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal" ]

[ "holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years", "holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all 1983 actions brought in pennsylvania", "holding that because the dtpa is the only way of pursuing an implied warranty claim for repairs to existing tangible goods such a claim must necessarily be brought within the twoyear dtpa limitations period", "holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty", "holding that an implied warranty to perform services in a good and workmanlike manner is an action available under the dtpa and is subject to the twoyear limitations provided by the dtpa" ]

[ "holding that although the resident defendant had not been formally served prior to removal the resident defendant had made a voluntary appearance in state court and therefore jurisdiction was not proper under 1441b", "holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice", "holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense", "holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined", "holding that fraudulent joinder required a finding that either there was no possibility that the plaintiff could prove a cause of action against the resident defendant or that the plaintiff fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts in order to subject that resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court" ]

[ "holding 18 usc 922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause", "holding that michigans imposition of flat 100 annual fee on trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling was valid exercise of states police power which did not violate dormant commerce clause", "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause", "holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce", "recognizing that congress had the power to regulate boxcars that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent mobility and connection to interstate commerce it is no objection to such an exertion of commerce clause power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise in whole or in part out of matters connected with intrastate commerce" ]

[ "holding death caused by unknown object provides sufficient notice", "holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law", "holding that governments choice to publish notice in the new york times did not violate statutory publication requirements even though publication in the houston chronicle would have been more likely to provide notice to the claimant", "holding that notice published in the new york times and the wall street journal was sufficient to satisfy due process owed to unknown creditors", "holding publication in the wall street journal sufficient notice to unknown creditor injured in louisiana" ]

[ "holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code", "holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective", "holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional", "holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn", "holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act" ]

[ "holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment", "holding that a verified complaint can be considered as summary judgment evidence only to the extent that it comports with the requirements of rule 56e", "holding that a verified complaint is treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and considered in determining whether material issues of fact exist", "holding that rule 56e requires that summary judgment affidavits be based upon personal knowledge contain admissible evidence and affirmatively demonstrate the competency of the affiant to testify as to the matters contained therein", "holding that facts were not disputed because nonmovant failed to contest them with specific sworn evidence as required under rule 56e" ]

[ "recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions", "holding that the medical review panel is authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendants treatment of a patient and that while a medical malpractice plaintiff must as a prerequisite to filing suit present the proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim", "holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment", "holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide", "holding unconstitutional the wyoming medical review panel act" ]

[ "holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony", "holding defendant not entitled toa hearing on his motion for a new trial where he failed to prove that his new evidence was in fact newly discovered and that its recent discovery was in no way attributable to a previous lack of diligence", "holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted", "holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant" ]

[ "holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under 1983", "holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims", "holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983", "holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the recovery of monetary damages under rluipa when state officials are sued in their official capacities", "holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under 1983" ]

[ "holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials", "recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances", "holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances", "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances", "recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances" ]

[ "holding that because no real property interest was transferred to the agent by virtue of her redeeming the property the statute of frauds was inapplicable", "holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony", "holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted", "holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property", "holding that where a bankrupt wife transferred a certain lot to her husband the husband being already the equitable owner of the transferred property it cannot be said that the lot was transferred to him without consideration" ]

[ "holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract", "holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing", "holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty", "holding when an insurers alleged breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its insured involves facts and circumstances within the common knowledge or ordinary experience of an average juror an insured need not introduce expert testimony to establish a bad faith claim", "holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act" ]

[ "holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction", "holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present", "holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given", "holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel", "holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one" ]

[ "holding that military retirement benefits are to be considered deferred pay for past services", "holding pension conferred cola was an accrued benefit and not ancillary because it was intended to provide retirement income commenced only at retirement and was a benefit generally transferrable to succeeding employers", "holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service", "holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits", "holding that disposable retirement pay from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes" ]

[ "holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding", "holding that a witness who testifies in one proceeding may not be compelled to give further testimony in a different proceeding", "holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding", "holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding", "holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding" ]

[ "holding unfair trade practices and consumer protection law applicable to residential leases", "recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant", "holding that a cause of action exists under the connecticut unfair trade practices act for violations of the cuipa", "holding that plaintiffs statelaw claim was completely preempted under federal statute even though relief soughtan injunctionwas not available under the federal statute", "holding connecticut statelaw unfair trade practices claim to be subject to noerr immunity because connecticut statute was coextensive with federal statute subject to noerr" ]

[ "holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance", "holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force", "holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride", "holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force", "holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights" ]

[ "holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents", "holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate", "holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted", "holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of 1926b", "holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled" ]

[ "holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing", "holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge", "holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase", "holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount", "holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties", "holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act", "holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her", "holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment" ]

[ "holding that a general statute should not be interpreted as repealing a specific statute albsent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary", "recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern", "holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained", "holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls", "holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively" ]

[ "holding that when a spouse has given separate property to the marital community section 2640 preserves to the contributing spouse the equity value of his or her separate property contribution unless that retained interest is waived", "holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value", "holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value", "holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens", "holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property" ]

[ "recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater", "recognizing that watershed isolation or acquisition serves to prevent and control water contamination", "holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially", "recognizing that water retained within a watershed is susceptible to multiple use because all water uses are not consumptive uses", "holding authority to control limits duty to control" ]

[ "holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly", "holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same", "holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports", "holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure", "holding that preservation for review requires a fair ruling or decision by the district court in order to provide the lower court with an opportunity to correct any mistake give the opposing party an opportunity to demonstrate why the district court should rule in its favor and create a record which enables this court to make informed decisions" ]

[ "recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements", "recognizing existence of two tests", "recognizing first two exceptions", "recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact", "recognizing the existence of the special relationship" ]

[ "holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees", "holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs", "holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer", "holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot", "holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties" ]

[ "holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm", "holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others", "holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon", "holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon", "recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown" ]

[ "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution", "holding a manufacturer had no postsale duty to warn of dangers associated with an auger because numerous hodder factors were not present", "recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known", "holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of smoking because the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community", "holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers" ]

[ "holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails", "holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination", "holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency", "holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum", "holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true" ]

[ "recognizing that exception to requirement of timely filing of notice of appeal exists in cases where defendant either was not told of right to appeal or was not furnished attorney to exercise those rights or was furnished attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete appeal", "holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal", "holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information", "holding defendant did not waive appeal and that record in which trial judge district attorney and defendants attorney repeatedly made statements agreeing defendant would be permitted to appeal directly contradicted and rebutted any presumption raised by terms of boiler plate plea form defendant signed", "holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not" ]

[ "holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies", "holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory", "holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence", "holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions", "holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment" ]

[ "holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy", "holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts", "holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order", "holding without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid", "holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government" ]

[ "holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper", "holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle", "holding that because marijuana has a distinct smell the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage", "holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs", "holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle" ]

[ "holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights", "holding police officer is a public official", "holding that texas democratic party was subject to the fourteenth amendment as a state actor and rejecting as a slight change in form defendants argument that because the democratic party was a private entity it was not a state actor", "recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer", "holding that bail bondsman was state actor where he searched a home for a felon with a police officer the court wrote that in cases where a private party and a public official act jointly to produce the constitutional violation both parts of the lugar test are simultaneously satisfied" ]

[ "holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages", "recognizing that customer lists may be protectable trade secrets", "holding that the logs of trade secrets is usually considered an irreparable harm that cannot be measured in money damages alterations in original internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana", "holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages" ]

[ "holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda ", "holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent", "holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime", "holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent", "holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion" ]

[ "holding that section 212c relief is unavailable to a lawful permanent resident convicted of a firearms offense qualifying under 8 usc 1227a2c", "holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident", "holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief", "holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c", "holding that an alien is only lawfully admitted for permanent residence for purposes of the ina if his or her adjustment to lawful permanent resident complied with substantive legal requirements and that because the alien failed to show that she had complied with the relevant substantive legal requirements the ij correctly determined that she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and was not entitled to 212c relief" ]

[ "holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities", "holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt", "holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa", "holding that the fdcpa did not apply to a collection agency retained by a hospital seeking medicaid reimbursement because the underlying debt was not in default even though the agency identified itself as a debtcollector", "holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under 1692gb" ]

[ "holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to return of firearms or to have firearms held in trust by third party", "holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to have firearms returned held in trust or sold for his profit", "holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence", "holding that a convicted felon may sue a municipal government to recover the value of seized firearms that he owned", "holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy" ]

[ "holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support an inference of constructive notice where plaintiff who slipped on an unknown substance could not say that the substance was placed there by employees of defendant that its presence was known to them or that it was there for an appreciable time before accident", "holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law", "holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger", "holding defendants not liable for negligence under either an invitee or licensee standard where danger of spiral staircase was obvious to plaintiff defendants had installed a guardrail area was welllit and there was no foreign substance on the stairs", "holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger" ]

[ "holding that a prior north carolina conviction was for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year", "holding something more than denial of receipt is required", "holding that a one month delay is acceptable", "holding abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier", "holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim" ]