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and her poor motivation, undermined her credibility — also is supported by the record. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.2 easons for giving less weight to the contradicted opinion of treating physician Dr. Nelson where: the opinion was conclusory, see Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113-14 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); the opinion relied in part on Smith’s
[ "holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected", "holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements", "holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements", "holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence", "holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim" ]
00
decided” by the prior jury. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009). Usually, a special verdict clarifies which issues the jury necessarily decided. But in cases involving general verdicts, such as this one, courts must review the entire record, including “the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue Cir.1993) (“Although the principles of estoppel may apply to the retrial of a ‘hung’ count, ... they apply only when ‘an issue of fact has ... been determined [in the defendant’s favor] by a valid and final judgment.” (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Salamone, 902 F.2d 237, 240-41 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In sum, to successfully meet the
[ "holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial", "holding that the defendant could appeal the district courts order granting a new trial because his right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place", "holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them", "holding that drug offenses and taxevasion offenses were properly joined for trial because the likely source of income for which defendant had evaded taxes was drug distribution", "holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking" ]
00
that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the
[ "holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff", "holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review", "holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review", "holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record", "holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan" ]
22
(7th Cir.2002). Counsel first considers whether Romero could argue that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Counsel, though, is unable to articulate any conceivable disagreement with the court’s ruling, and nor are we. A defendant convicted of committing a crime of violence or controlled substance offense qualifies as a career offender if he was at least 18 years old at the time and already had two or more felony convictions for such crimes. Id. § 4Bl.l(a); United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2008). Romero is 36, and his felony convictions for threatening to murder a magistrate judge and threatening to harm a corrections supervisor are crimes of violence, see United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a) (defining
[ "holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person", "holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate", "holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence", "holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred", "holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence" ]
44
the clergy were more qualified than the civil courts in resolving and interpreting ecclesiastical law and religious faith. Id. The Watson Court, concluding that the local Presbyterian congregation was part of a hierarchical church struc ture, ordered deference to the policies of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Id. at 726, 738-34. In subsequent rulings, the United States Supreme Court continued to establish limits on judicial determinations of religious congregation disputes. See Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872) (in a congregational church an “expulsion of the majority by the minority [was] a void act”); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (<HOLDING>); Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
[ "holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract", "holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction in dispute relating to archbishops refusal to appoint a candidate to chaplaincy position because he was seeking relief as beneficiary of a trust but further finding that the determination of what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them was an ecclesiastical matter which will be accepted as conclusive in secular courts", "holding that because the contract dispute between the parties in this case constitutes a justiciable matter that is cognizable in our trial courts our courts had subject matter jurisdiction", "holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act", "holding that where an objection was made and trial courts ruling was treated as conclusive by state and defense counsel there was no need for further objections when evidence was presented to jury" ]
11
an explosive in terms of its primary or common purpose, we hold that the Government need not show that a device is actually able to explode to prove that a defendant knowingly possessed an explosive under § 842(i)(l); it need only prove that the defendant knew he possessed dynamite or other chemical compound, mixture, or device that was primarily designed to function by explosion. Finally, Mr. Markey argues that because he believed in good faith that the dynamite could not explode, he should be exonerated. This contention appears to be one of ignorance of the law — “I thought the law applied differently than it does.” See United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir.1996). This type of argument is “easily rejected.” See United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, evidence concerning Mr. Markey’s
[ "holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim", "holding that a good faith belief that a firearm is inoperable is not a viable defense to 18 usc 922g", "holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc 1001", "holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b", "holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief" ]
11
A. 598 (1935), this Court held that a graduated-rate income tax violated the Uniformity Clause. The statute in that case taxed income below $5,000 at a rate of 2%, income between $5,000 and $10,000 at a rate of 2.5%, and income between $10,000 and $25,000 at a rate of 3%. The Kelley Court explained that the tax was non-uniform because it “resulted] in taxing those whose incomes arise above a stated figure merely for the reason that in the discretion of the Legislature their incomes are sufficiently great to be taxed.” Id. at 602. Relying upon Kelley, we subsequently struck down a city ordinance that taxed “every individual engaged in an occupation ... whose gross earnings would amount to $600 or more during the year.” Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964) (<HOLDING>). More recently, in Amidon, supra, this Court
[ "recognizing that the equal protection clause proscribes discrimination against whiteanglos", "holding that a graduatedrate income tax violates the uniformity clause", "holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances", "holding that unlike the uniformity clause the united states constitution does not require equalization across all potential subclassifications of real property", "holding that the uniformity clause proscribes the unequal treatment of certain individuals based upon their income" ]
44
The State Defendants also cite to cases from other circuits refusing to apply Ex Parte Young in suits challenging statutorily-created private rights of action. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 416-24; Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (6th Cir.1996); see also Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342. Their holdings are unsurprising given that no state officials were charged with enforcing those laws. However, in the case before me, certain state officials are expressly charged with enforcing the law. Indeed, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits distinguished the cases before them from cases challenging penal laws enforceable by state officials, finding the latter suitable for application of Ex Parte Young. See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1337-41 (<HOLDING>); Deters, 92 F.3d at 1416 n. 10 (distinguishing
[ "holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause", "holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence", "holding that an offender convicted under the bestiality portion of the criminal sodomy statute does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of die portion of the statute that criminalizes homosexual conduct", "holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate", "holding that ex parte young applied to plaintiffs claims against the criminal portion of the statute" ]
44
If the reliability test is not met and the methods or techniques are deemed unreliable, any expert testimony based upon such techniques is also considered unreliable and therefore inadmissible. See Franklin, 1999 UT 61 at ¶ 18, 987 P.2d 22. ¶ 22 Thus, the question before us is whether canine accelerant detection is novel scientific evidence. Scientific methods or tech- ñiques are not considered novel if they are “of the sort that ha[s] ‘attained general acceptance in ... the relevant scientific community.’ ” Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 16, 977 P.2d 1193 (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted). If scientific testimony is not based on novel scientific principles or techniques, the Rimmasch test is not implicated. See id.; see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ¶ 16, 5 P.3d 642 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the testimony must simply comply
[ "holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge", "holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed", "recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony", "recognizing that rimmasch is not intended to apply to all expert testimony but only for testimony based on newly discovered principles quotations and citation omitted" ]
44
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) stated in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, the CDA “simply identifies the person to whom the dispute is to be ‘submitted’ for a final decision” and that, “once a claim is made, the parties must ‘commit’ the claim to the contracting officer and ‘yield’ to his authority to make a final decision.” 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed.Cir.1991) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc., 60 F.3d at 1579. With these principles in mind, the court addresses whether Kemron submitted a “claim” to the contracting officer such that it satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to asserting a CDA claim for nonmonetary relief. Record Steel & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 508, 520 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Todd Constr., L.P., 85 Fed.Cl. at 42
[ "holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added", "holding that an application is pending from the time it is first filed emphasis added", "holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added", "holding that a litigant did not waive a claim because it was the appellee in the intermediate appellate court emphasis added", "holding that the court possesses jurisdiction to review contractor performance evaluations if the pertinent requirements of the cda are met emphasis added" ]
44
Pa.R.A.P. 3781(a). After the Liquidator issued a notice of determination (NOD) that allowed the claim at priority level (e) for benefits paid under a reinsurance policy, and disallowed the claim for post-judgment interest, AIGA filed an objection in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3781(c). AIGA asserted that the entire amount, including the post judgment interest, should be allowed and assigned priority level (b). This Court assigned a referee, who opined that, in Pennsylvania, the characterization of the Reliance policy as either direct insurance or reinsurance is governed by the recent decision in CSAC Excess Insurance Authority v. Reliance Insurance Co., (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 1 REL 2007, filed November 8, 2012) (single judge opinion), aff'd, 621 Pa. 424, 78 A.3d 1058 (2013) (per curiam order) (<HOLDING>). The referee rejected as waived AIGA’s
[ "holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested", "holding that issue in motion for rehearing is waived if original brief is not sufficient to acquaint the court with the issue and does not present an argument that would allow the court to decide the issue", "holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court", "holding that a policy nearly identical to that at issue in the present case was reinsurance", "holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts" ]
33
sorts of factors that courts have long charged the Board with balancing. We conclude that the broad legal views outlined in Otis II are reasonably defensible approaches for determining when plant re-locations are mandatory bargaining subjects under the NLRA. IV. Analysis of the Present Case Having determined that Otis II is not fatally flawed on its face, our inquiry is not over. It remains to determine whether the Otis standard, acceptable in its broad outlines, has been properly applied to the particular facts of the case before us. Despite the deference we owe the Board, for reasons that follow, we conclude that its decision in this case falls short of the standards of reasoned decisionmaking that we customarily require in judicial review. A. The Findings of the ALJ 7, 958 (1986) (<HOLDING>); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1986)
[ "holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying inter alia costs for internal copying of documents by prevailing defendants counsel produced for discovery", "holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim", "holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted", "holding that a decision to move did not turn upon labor costs but rather was motivated by inter alia a foreclosure action" ]
44
if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ...”); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school’s window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus.
[ "holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable", "holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial", "holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence", "holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case", "holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review" ]
00
official immunity existed only in the cramped sense used by the court of appeals, its qualified promise against personal civil liability to public officers would be hollow indeed. The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect public officers from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. Ministerial acts are those: [ w]here the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discreti .App.—Dallas 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (explaining that officers were not entitled to immunity because “their actions in the pursuit did not involve matters within their discret L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 227 (describing
[ "holding that officers positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force", "holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot", "holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car", "holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure", "holding that injury of plaintiff who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible" ]
00
susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. “Only knew” clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next — “didn’t know anything about investments.” “Hated helping clients” also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a “pejorative implication” that a reasonable listener would perceive “as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor.” Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement “invested her in all of the
[ "holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement", "holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident", "holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law", "holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement", "holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr 3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service" ]
33
judges, the trial management techniques needed to control these lawyers may seem harsh, even abusive. A rigorous standard that restricts sanctions to instances of clearly abusive behavior will reduce the likelihood that councils will sanction appropriate behavior out of inexperience. And quite apart from the problem of inexperience, even judges can act unfairly — indeed vindictively — towards colleagues. A rigorous standard will reduce, though of course it cannot eliminate, the possibility that judicial discipline will be used to sanction unpopular judges engaged in appropriate behavior. Third, judicial discipline, like civil liability for judicial acts, can chill the proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams v. United States, 156 F.3d 86,
[ "holding that imposing civil liability for acts committed to judicial discretion would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation", "holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts", "recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction", "holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation", "holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional" ]
00
hearing are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). A trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). In the present case, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: that on or about July 6, 2004 . . . Officer Henderson, a 27 year veteran of the Burlington Police Dept, had received a call of a suspicious activity at Coy’s Exxon on the comer of Graham-Hopedale Rd. and N. Church St. That location has had numerous calls for shopliftingy fights[,] and other activity. Also there is numerous gang and graffiti act S.E.2d 412, 418 (2004), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The State argues “ [i]t is clear from the
[ "holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support an investigatory stop of a vehicle where the defendant and driver were observed loitering at a closed shopping center shortly before midnight no other vehicles were in the parking lot and the two men abruptly and hurriedly returned to their vehicle which was parked out of general public view", "holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes", "holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity", "holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area", "holding that a mere parking violation justified the investigatory stop of choudrys vehicle" ]
00
health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor’s homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor’s property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980)
[ "holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign", "holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead", "holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property", "holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property", "holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate" ]
00
Appellants asserted below. See Harper, 138 Fed.Appx. at 132-33 (dismissing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1316 (S.D.Fla.2011) (dismissing a RICO claim under Rooker-Feldman); Distant v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 09-61460-CIV, 2010 WL 1249129, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) (unpublished)(“AIthough plead as conspiracy claims ..., Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to invalidate the state court action by ruling that the state court foreclosure judgment is somehow void. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, ... this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff seeks a de facto appeal of a previously litigated state court matter.”); Simpson v. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank of Carmel, 20 F.Supp.2d 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Wayne Weinberger, P.C., 994 F.Supp.
[ "holding that a party is not entitled to pursue a separate action for deficiency judgment where the foreclosure complaint includes a prayer for a deficiency judgment and the foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment", "holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final", "holding that a foreclosure judgment was not subject to federal review under rookerfeldman and noting that the fact that plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud and conspiracy does not change that result", "holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale", "holding that 24 foreclosure was substantial under the facts of that case" ]
22
under the TVPA: “[R]esponsibility for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts — anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.” S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 9. Thus, theories of liability under domestic law are available to support TVPA claims by providing a theory of tort liability when the defendant did not personally commit the underlying act. (3) Standards for Aiding and Abetting Liability When considering whether the secondary theories of liability are met, we turn to federal common law for the relevant standards. Our opinion in Cabello, 402 F.3d 1148, forms the basis for aiding and abetting liability in this circuit. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315-16 (<HOLDING>). In Cabello, we addressed whether claims based
[ "holding that a panel of this court cannot overturn a prior panels decision", "holding that precedent set by our panels binds all subsequent panels", "holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels", "recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels", "recognizing that our decision in cabello binds all subsequent panels of this court as to aiding and abetting liability" ]
44
his partner Officer Lilly. When the dissent argues that there was no one else at the setting to whom a purse with unknown contents could be given, it ignores the presence of Officer Stewart’s partner, Officer Lilly- ¶ 19 Further, nothing in the actual facts of this ease supports Officer Stewart’s immediate search of the purse before attempting to assess the situation. Thus, when the dissent engages in a worst-case scenario of what might have subsequently transpired had the purse been returned to Appellant before it was searched, it is pure speculation. The officers might have determined there was no danger in returning the purse to Appellant because the situation was never as exigent as the 9-1-1 report suggested. See State v. Gissendaner, 177 Ariz. 81, 83, 865 P.2d 125, 127 (App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Alternately, the officers might have had time
[ "holding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry where officers were faced with a call reporting burglary in progress", "holding that police in responding to a domestic violence call were not justified in engaging in a warrantless entry because the assault was over and there was no real danger that the assault was about to resume", "holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry", "holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry", "holding that counsel was deficient when he failed to object to error in jury charge referring to aggravated assault when the charge was assault on a public servant" ]
11
§ 2252A and that a conviction for both offenses based on the same conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1374-75 (citations omitted). That said, the Eleventh Circuit found in Bobb that the defendant’s convictions for both receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his convictions were “based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different statutes.” Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375; see also United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 697-98 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that conviction for receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the convictions were based on separate conduct); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158-59 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wendehake, No. 06-14040-CR,
[ "holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count", "holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court", "holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing", "holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated", "holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy" ]
00
subjective, although it is usually proved by inference from the acts of the accused. Thus, intentionally entering or intentionally remaining unlawfully upon the described premises with the intent to commit any crime against a person or property rights constituted burglary, and therefore, it cannot logically be said that specifying the particular crime intended to be committed is, under our statutes, an essential element which must be alleged in order to charge the crime of burglary actual commission of a second underlying offense, in order to sufficiently charge the offense, it is incumbent on the State to allege the essential elements of the underlying offense; identification of the offense by name or statutory reference will not suffice. Cf. Elliott, 77 Hawaii at 312, 884 P.2d at 375 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we adopt the rule set out in
[ "holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number", "holding that a charge not taken under oath or affirmation is not a valid charge", "holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review", "holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence", "holding that statutory references in charge did not cure the omission of essential elements in the challenged counts of the charge" ]
44
ease provides in part: Court commissioners are quasi-judicial officers of courts of record and have judicial authority as provided by this section and rules of the Judicial Council. It further states: Upon the informed consent of the defendant, the court commissioner may conduct a jury or nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner may impose sentence and enter final judgment. The judgment entered by the commissioner shall be the final judgment of the court for all purposes, including appeal. Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, much like article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution, provides that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in the courts. However, unlike its federal counterpart, the Utah Constit (<HOLDING>); In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d
[ "holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated", "holding that utah const art vi 1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others", "holding legislatures intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power", "holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body", "recognizing that the general assembly can delegate discretionary functions to administrative bodies and officers and holding that a statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes an intelligible principle to which the administrative body or officer must conform and if it establishes a procedure for effective review" ]
11
its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial
[ "holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional 3583e2 modification", "holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment", "holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody", "holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody", "holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan" ]
44
only when it is shown that the confidence reposed by one person was actually accepted by the other, and merely reposing confidence in another may not, of itself, create the relationship”) (footnotes omitted). Although the courts of Kansas have suggested that a somewhat more protective approach may be used when one party is under a disability or disadvantage, Cor-nett v. Roth, 233 Kan. 936, 941, 666 P.2d 1182, 1186 (1983), Wedman v. Home Nat. Bank of Arkansas City, No. 88-1439-K (D.Kan., Jan. 25, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990 WL 7501), this more protective approach will ordinarily not be utilized as between two or more business people or business entities who each possess the capacity to protect themselves. See Ritchie Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.Kan.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of Kansas has cautioned
[ "holding that a sellers superior knowledge of a product does not justify imposition of a fiduciary relationship in the absence of a conscious assumption of fiduciary duties", "holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of 523a4", "holding that under delaware law the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors", "holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of 523a4", "recognizing that fiduciary liability requires not onlya repose of trust but an assumption of a duty and breach of that duty" ]
00
his Fourth Amendment protections. See id. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Crowder did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Mustang after he turned it over to the shipper. The doors were left unlocked, the driver of the car carrier was given the keys, and Crowder knew that the driver would enter the Mustang and drive it. We conclude that no one could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a vehicle under those circumstances. Although there is no evidence that Crowder directly authorized the driver to search the vehicle, in light of the circumstances described above it is clear that the driver was “authorized to act in direct contravention to” Crowder’s privacy interest. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Crowder argues that United States v.
[ "holding attorney must have express authority to settle a clients claims", "holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car", "holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in utility records under either state or federal constitution", "holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a package sent via federal express when the defendant signed an air bill that gave federal express the authority to search the package", "holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth" ]
33
pumping cases and the body cavity search cases have generally involved searches of prison inmates and searches at the United States border. See id. at 124. In both contexts, the suspect’s expectation of privacy is thought to be less reasonable and the government’s interest thought to be greater. See id. at 125, 144-61 (and cases cited therein); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-40, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381, 388-90 (1985) (“[N]ot only is the expectation of privacy less at the border ... the Fourth Amendment balance between the interest of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the border.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393, 402-03 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In light of these authorities, Lewis contends
[ "holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells", "holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells", "holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records", "holding under smith that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata", "holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy" ]
11
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir.2014). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Winter’s claim for wrongfulforeclosure because Winter failed to allege facts sufficient to show a lack of default. See id. at 785 (“Nevada law requires that a trustor or mortgagor show a lack of default in order to proceed with a wrongful foreclosure claim.”). Moreover, Winter’s contention that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.’s (“MERS”) involvement rendered the assignment of the deed of trust and note invalid is foreclosed by Nevada law. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, — Nev. —, 286 P.3d 249, 259-60 (2012) (<HOLDING>), The district court properly dismissed
[ "holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee", "holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan", "holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed", "holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given", "holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act" ]
11
to present' concrete plans showing their intent to file those requests. One way for a plaintiff to make this showing -is to “dem upp.2d 233, 262 (D.D.C.2012) (“Recent cases have clarified that, where a FOIA requester challenges an alleged ongoing policy or practice and can demonstrate that it has pending claims that are likely to implicate that policy or practice, future injury is satisfied.”). By the same token, in Citizens for Responsi-bilityand Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Judge Lamberth held that no case or controversy existed in part because “CREW [did] not allege anywhere ... that it has a FOIA request pending with the [agency].” 527 F.Supp.2d 101, 106 (D.D.C.2007); see also Coleman, 134 F.Supp.3d at 306-08, 2015 WL 5730707, at *8-9 (<HOLDING>). If a plaintiff does not have a separate FOIA
[ "holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents", "holding that only the person or entity whose name appears in the foia request is the real party in interest and thus has standing to bring subsequent foia enforcement action", "holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing", "holding that where a foia plaintiff seeks sensitive foreignaffairs information the court should give substantial weight to a government affidavit that the information is exempt from foia but nevertheless consider contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff", "holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents" ]
22
include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).” § 4B1.2 app. n. 1. A shotgun modified so that it “has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length” is a firearm described in § 5845(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). As Lipscomb’s instant offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as an element and is not an enumerated offense, the issue here is whether Lipscomb’s present offense “otherwise involves conduct presenting a serious risk of injury to another” under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 862 & n. 6 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Applicability of the Categorical Approach
[ "holding that north carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline", "holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of 4b12a2 following johnson", "holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of 4b12a2", "holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg 4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another", "holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime" ]
22
from the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (requiring the sentencing court to state its reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the Guidelines). As indicated above, Mr. Johnson argues that his sentence is proeedurally unreasonable because: (1) the probation officer’s extrapolation was flawed and should not have been considered in determining the sentence; (2) he did not receive notice of the probation officer’s extrapolation memorandum ; and (3) the district judge did not adequately explain his reasons for imposing the 8 year sentence. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Johnson never raised these arguments in the district court. Therefore, we review them for plain error. See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099,
[ "recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard", "holding that plain error review is used for unpreserved challenges to the method by which the district court arrived at a sentence including arguments that the sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed under the statutory factors in 3553a", "holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable", "holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum", "holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of 3553a" ]
11
that Bartholdi’s claims of privilege were not properly raised before the Commission. Section 405 of the Communications Act provides that the Commission must be afforded an “opportunity to pass” on an issue as a condition precedent to judicial review. 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2). In this case, Bartholdi raised its privilege claims, if at all, only before the WTB. Bartholdi’s application for review to the Commission made no mention of either the attorney-client or work-product privilege. Under the plain language of Section 405, an issue cannot be preserved for judicial review simply by raising it before a Bureau of the FCC. It is “the Commission” itself that must be afforded the opportunity to pass on the issue. Id.; cf. Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Bartholdi contends that it preserved the
[ "holding that issue raised before alj but not nlrb was not preserved", "holding that despite the merits of the argument the appellant raised on appeal the issue was not preserved for judicial review because it was not raised before the administrative agency", "holding issues not raised before the district court are not preserved for appeal", "holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed", "holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review" ]
00
247 Fed.Appx. 730, 734 (6th Cir.2007). Instead, he merely argued that the Cl “was the person that formed the facts for the issuance of the search warrant,” and so “[i]n order to present any viable defense,” the requested information was necessary. (Mot. for Discovery, R. 40, PagelD 164). Further, on appeal, Ray has not demonstrated to this Court how disclosure would have assisted him at trial; he only asserts that the Cl could have testified at trial about the details of the alleged purchase during the controlled buy, even though Ray was never charged for that alleged sale. The only record evidence of the role played by the Cl in this case -is that the Cl supplied the information to law enforcement that ultimately led to a fruitful search. See Beals, 698 F.3d 248, 270 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Similar to Beals, in this case, Ray was not
[ "holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police", "holding that trial court improperly dismissed charges pretrial because the state did not disclose the identity of a confidential informant", "holding that because the defendants offer of proof failed to show that the affiant was untruthful the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of the informant", "holding that the district court was within its discretion not to order disclosure of the governments confidential informant where the informant only helped orchestrate the search that led to discovery of incriminating evidence not the crimes themselves and could not testify to any relevant fact", "holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction" ]
33
many of which are the same as those it considers in making appropriate unit determinations in initial representation cases, include: “integration of operations, centralized control of management and labor relations, geographic proximity, similarity of terms and conditions of employment, similarity of skills and functions, physical contact among employees, collective bargaining history, degree of separate daily supervision, and degree of employee interchange.” Frontier Tel., 344 N.L.R.B. at 1271. The “ ‘two most important factors’ — indeed, the two factors that have been identified as ‘critical’ to an accretion finding — are employee interchange and common day-to-day supervision.” Id. (quoting E.I. Du Pont, 341 N.L.R.B. at 608); see Super Valu Stores, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 134, 136 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ rejected Dean’s accretion argument
[ "holding that accretion had not occurred notwithstanding that there was integration of operations similarity of employee skills functions and working conditions and contact between employees at separate locations because there was neither employee interchange nor common supervision", "holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation", "holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga 349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action", "holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury", "holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date" ]
00
that Cook County was justified in discharging Bodenstab because “[i]t would have been too risky to chance returning [Bodenstab] to his previous position as a Doctor of Anesthesiology at Stroger Hospital in view of the recommendations and observations made by PRC Staff.” Thus, the Hearing Officer’s decision does not support Bodenstab’s claim of pretext. Bodenstab also claims that he presented sufficient evidence of pretext, as well as circumstantial evidence of discrimination, by showing that Cook County failed to follow its own internal policies and by pointing to inconsistencies in various witnesses’ testimony. Bodenstab, however, did not develop these arguments until his reply brief and thus has waived any such argument. See United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the evidence Bodenstab
[ "holding arguments not appropriately developed in brief are waived", "holding arguments first raised in reply brief are forfeited", "holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited", "holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived", "holding that arguments not fully developed until a reply brief are waived" ]
44
of leaving the license at home.” Id. It also considered the scant risk of erroneous conviction, remarking that: “We find it nearly impossible to believe that [the accused] had such a license but withheld it, subjecting himself to the risk of a mandatory term of imprisonment” — “ ‘[s]uch an absurd game.does not contribute to a search for truth....’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970)). In the end, the Jones court found “no unfairness in [its] traditional rule.” Id. Given that the section 10 firearms offense remains a general prohibition crime in the Commonwealth, it comes as no surprise to us that the SJC in Powell’s direct appeal decided to abide by the due process analysis in Jones. Cf. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91-93, 54 S.Ct. 281 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, between the time of Jones and
[ "holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence", "holding the standard of review in juvenile adjudication is whether after viewing evidence in light most favorable to the state any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding that state courts determination that the petitioner was competent to waive his right to pursue further postconviction review of his claims was a factual one and therefore presumed correct under the federal habeas corpus statute", "holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding that the state crime under review was not one of general prohibition before considering whether the evidence had any sinister significance in relation to the presumed culpability component" ]
44
it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court’s decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant’s confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging them function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [Id. at 272, 294 A.2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A.2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant’s statements and rejecting defendant’s invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J.Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A.2d 908 (App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the
[ "holding prosecutors statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendants two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave hampton charge because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutors statement", "holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge", "holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statement", "holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony", "holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error" ]
00
to argue on appeal his waiver and sua sponte dismissal issues, we should then reject the petitioner’s arguments on the merits. In my judgment, the district court acted in conformity not only with AEDPA but also with the caselaw construing AED-PA. Congress intended AEDPA to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (stating that “there is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines [comity, finality, and federalism]”). Consistent with such purpose, Congress created a one-year limitations period that was meant to streamline the habeas review process and to lend finality to state court convictions. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111
[ "recognizing that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statute serves as only effective deterrent of such violations", "recognizing as well that such uninhibited communication serves the public interest by facilitating the administration of appropriate treatment", "recognizing that the 1 year limitation period of 2244d1 quite plainly serves the wellrecognized interest in the finality of state court judgments", "holding that appellate court may raise issues of default sua sponte where necessary to protect inter alia the finality of federal criminal judgments", "holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest or failed to file a claim with the state within a twenty year period" ]
22
for the Florida Supreme Court to review the imposition of the death sentence with “rationality and consistency,” Proffitt, supra, 428 U.S. at 259, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, defendants and their counsel must be aware of all the material under consideration by the court. Not only is the defendant’s right to counsel implicated, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), but so is the right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The receipt of psychiatric and psychological reports from the Department of Corrections also implicates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). By considering nonrecord information without
[ "recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent", "recognizing fifth amendment right to be informed of right to remain silent to have questions cease and to consult with an attorney before being subjected to psychiatric examination that may be used against defendant in capital sentencing proceedings", "holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease", "holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed", "holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer" ]
11
“others” are not enough to plead the requisite pattern of fraud. In Emery v. American General Finance, Inc. (“Emery I”), 71 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir.1995), we encountered facts substantially similar to those in the case at hand: The plaintiff pleaded with adequate particularity the fraud directed against her, but with regard to other customers of American General Finance alleged merely that the company did the same thing to them. There are no names or dates or other details of transactions involving any other customers besides Emery. These details ... are necessary to identify a violation of RICO, which requires ... more than one fraud and only one is alleged to have been perpetrated against Emery herself. Id. at 1348; see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974
[ "holding that defendant who was associated with the enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when he repeatedly violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was not liable under 1962c because he had no part in directing the enterprises affairs", "holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity", "holding that wire and mail fraud statutes are construed identically", "holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes", "holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant engaged in multiple instances of mail and wire fraud did not allege pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity" ]
44
the evidence of Robertson’s alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence “is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory
[ "holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted", "holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder", "holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify ", "holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful", "holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime" ]
33
she sought treatment with, at least, seven (7) different doctors, and none gave her a written recommendation indicating that her impairments required a change in territory. See Findings of Fact, Section I, infra, ¶ 37. That is, although Plaintiff categorizes this transfer as a “reasonable accommodation,” she never explains how this change in territory actually amounted to an accommodation that was both reasonable and would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job, or provided any medical evidence in support of her contention. “All that [plainitff] can present in support of her reasonable accommodation claim is her own self-serving testimony, and in this case, that is just not sufficient....” McPhaul v. Board of Com’rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, McPhaul v. Board of Com’rs of
[ "holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act", "holding that the appellant failed to establish that she was entitled to an accommodation under the ada because there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that she could not perform the functions and activities of daily life or that her impairment and symptoms substantially limited her functions and activities", "holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada", "holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job", "holding that employee allegedly suffering from fibromyalgia was not qualified individual and thus could not maintain ada claim challenging transfer and termination inasmuch as she was unable to perform essential functions of those positions with or without accommodation employee did not dispute supervisors evaluations documenting her performance deficiencies and provided no medical evidence that requested accommodation would have improved her performance" ]
44
than recommended. 19 . CCP argues, without citing any authority, that gel coat is not merchandise because it is not mass produced for sale to the general public and is not a product the average person would know how to use. This argument is not persuasive. The fact that CCP markets its gel coat for sale to manufactures rather than household users is insignificant because the Act is expressly not limited to the sale of items for "personal, family, or household use.” Hundred E. Credit Corp., 212 N.J.Super. at 354, 515 A.2d 246. Moreover, contrary to CCP's assertion, there is no requirement that "the average person walking down the street" know how to use a product for it to be considered "merchandise" under the Act. See, e.g., Coastal Group, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. at 174, 643 A.2d 649 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the gel coat at
[ "holding that a purchaser of prefabricated wall panels for installation could bring a claim under the njcfa", "holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child", "holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim", "holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea", "holding child could bring action for enticement of parent" ]
00
as that act is subject to innumerable interpretations.”). Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in some cases, whether a
[ "holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error", "holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty", "holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt", "holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt", "holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty" ]
33
Clauses of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions because paragraph P of the parole agreement constituted involuntary consent. The State argued the search was reasonable because Baldón consented to the searches by signing the parole agreement. It asserted Baldón was still serv 0) (avoiding consent issue by relying on the special needs doctrine to justify a parolee search); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (adopting Samson instead of analyzing the parole agreement’s search condition under a consent framework); State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn.Ct.App.2012) (“By agreeing to [the search] condition of parole, appellant diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d 763, 765-66 (1972) (<HOLDING>); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401
[ "recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial", "holding that imposing supervised release condition that defendant report to his probation officer upon reentry into the united states is not plain error", "holding parolee voluntarily agreed to consentsearch provision as a condition of release into society", "holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation", "recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law" ]
22
that the officer’s observation of Kaigler sitting in his car was an insufficient basis for establishing a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity — in other words, that the stop was-illegal. After the trial court ordered the cocaine suppressed, defense counsel argued that the other two counts should be-dismissed because the State could no longer prove a statutory element of each of these charges: that the officer was “in the lawful execution of any legal duty,” § 843.01 (resisting with violence), or “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties,” § 784.07(2) (battery of a law enforcement officer). The court’s denial of the motion to dismiss these remaining counts forms the basis of this appeal. Narrowly stated, the question p an v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (<HOLDING>), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002). But
[ "holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had", "holding that while the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer", "holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial", "holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884", "holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty" ]
11
factors); Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 11.493 (2007) (discussing similar factors in assessing the value of survey evidence). The Coulter-Renken Study is based on a sample of 3,116 internet survey respondents. However, the study itself does not provide any indication of how this sample was selected. (Rao Deck ¶ 17.) There is no indication of whether the universe from which these respondents were chosen was a properly defined universe, or whether the 3,116 respondents constituted a representative sample of that universe. Without any information as to the composition and selection methodology of the survey sample, the Coulter-Renken Study is simply not probative of irreparable injury. See Vista Food Exch., Inc., 2005 WL 2371958, at *6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42541, at *18-19 (<HOLDING>). For all of these reasons, the Court finds
[ "holding that survey with improperly idefined sample was not probative", "holding that plain error review was not available for alleged improperly admitted testimony", "holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion", "holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative", "holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness" ]
00
that their complaints about working conditions were protected by the First Amendment: A “public employee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.” “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the public would be interested in the topic of the speech at issue but rather is “whether the purpose of the [the plaintiffs] speech was to raise issues of public concern.’ ”... The record in this case reveals that the speech of [plaintiffs], while ostensibly intermingled with issues of child safety and DeKalb DFCS mismanagement, was not intended to address matters of public concern from the perspective of a citizen. See White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 510 F.3d at 1344-45 (some internal citations
[ "recognizing that even as to an issue that could arguably be viewed as a matter of public concern if the employee has raised the issue solely in order to further his own employment interest his first amendment right to comment on that issue is entitled to little weight", "holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it ", "holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief", "holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal", "holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech" ]
00
where the petitioner is in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed). In addition, we agree with the Commonwealth that to the extent that due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard on her ineffectiveness claim, Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard within the limitations imposed by the PCRA under the facts of this case: she was sentenced January 14, 2008; declined to raise her ineffectiveness claims on direc't appeal pursuant to Bomar; filed a PCRA petition on January 12, 2009; and raised the claim on which the PCRA court ultimately granted relief a mere eleven days prior to the expiration of her two-year probationary sentence. During the two years of her sentence, PCRA relief was available. See Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>). Yet Petitioner neither requested expedited
[ "holding that the denial of pcra relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel", "holding that under section 9543a1 a pcra petitioner is not eligible for relief where the petitioner has completed serving the sentence before final adjudication on the petition", "holding pcra statute requires that petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment parole or probation on underlying crime not only when petition is filed but also when decision on petition is rendered", "holding that the plain language of this section requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his sentence", "holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner did not satisfy the procedural requirements for his motion in part because petitioner failed to submit a completed application for relief" ]
11
behavior of which they were aware); Gallo v. Wonderly Co., Inc., 2014 WL 36628, *8 (N.D.N.Y.2014) (a person may be liable under § 296 for taking no action to remedy discriminatory behavior); Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Autk, 77 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (“the case law establishes beyond cavil that a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of ‘actual participation’ under HRL § 296(6)”) accord Cid v. ASA Institute of Business & Computer Technology, Inc., 2013 WL 1193056, *6 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (failure to investigate complaints of discrimination provides sufficient basis for aiding and abetting liability under New York City Human Rights law) (citations omitted); cf. Morgan v. NYS Atty. Gen. ’s Office, 2013 WL 491525, *13 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendant also argues that his alleged
[ "recognizing that in this circuit a plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the ats", "holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 1985 for failure to allege a meeting of the minds", "recognizing aiding and abetting conversion", "holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position", "recognizing that the failure to investigate could constitute aid and abetting liability but finding this plaintiff failed to allege that he ever brought the discriminatory conduct to his superiors" ]
44
regarding Ragnoli. App. 79. The letter explained that Ragnoli had requested that the BOP run his federal sentence concurrently with his state sentence. The BOP could accomplish this by retroactively designating the state prison as the institution for service of Ragnoli’s federal sentence. This retroactive designation would reduce the total amount of time Ragnoli spent in custody, as the State Court had ordered. The letter indicated that it is the BOP’s “preference” to obtain the federal sentencing court’s position on any such retroactive designations, but that the BOP would make its own decision if it had not heard back from the District Court within 60 days. If the District Court stated its position within 60 days, the BOP would designate Ragnoli’s place of imprisonment acco ir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Since the District Court’s letter was not an
[ "holding that the portion of a district courts order that included a specific place of imprisonment was only a nonbinding recommendation to the bop and therefore not appealable", "holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation", "holding that district courts nonbinding recommendations to the bop are not appealable", "holding that a district courts recommendation that the bop not credit the defendant for his time in state custody was not appealable because the district courts recommendation was not binding on the bop", "holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error" ]
33
and to allow it to brief the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled as to potential opt-in plaintiffs in this action. ECF No. 14. The motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs response, and defendant’s reply amount to the' very briefing of the issue that the motion seeks. See ECF Nos. 14, 15 and 16. It boils down to a simple proposition, succinctly summarized by Judge Blackburn in a case cited by the defendant: “Tolling is available' only ‘when [a plaintiff] diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.’” Young v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-cv-REB-MJW, 2013 WL 1223613, R *2 (D. Colo. March 25, 2013). Cf. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, we have a district court order in the
[ "holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence", "holding that 2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates 1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005", "holding that extraordinary circumstances did not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application", "holding in a habeas case that tolling is available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control", "holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence" ]
33
a pending criminal investigation, we conclude that a remand to the trial court is appropriate to allow the City an opportunity to review the field interview cards and to submit to the trial court for in camera review those cards or portions of cards which the City maintains are involved in an ongoing criminal investigation and exempt from disclosure. Petitioners shall be granted immediate access to all field interview cards not submitted to the trial court for in camera review. The trial court shall determine which of the field interview cards or portions of them are exempt from disclosure. An entire field interview card should not be deemed exempt simply because it contains some exempt information. Rather, redaction of the exempt information is appropriate. Eldridge, 86 S.W.3d at 574 (<HOLDING>). The trial court has discretion to prescribe
[ "recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records", "recognizing medical records contain the same protected confidential information as a physicians direct testimony about the communications", "holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential", "holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information", "holding that county could redact from public records any information made confidential by statute with any redaction subject to review by the chancellor" ]
44
that Nusspickel was guilty of the aggravated battery charges even though the jury convicted her on each charge of the lesser-included offense of simple battery and (2) misconduct that had not been charged and proved relating to her alleged contact with one of the victims after the charged incidents. She also asserts that the State cannot carry its burden to show that the judge did not rely on these impermissible considerations. Generally, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. State, 216 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA
[ "recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard", "holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable", "recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence", "holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the limits prescribed by statute which is not the result of oppression prejudice or corrupt motive", "holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant according to the states sentencing guidelines" ]
22
should be excluded as part of his motion to dismiss, which the trial court again denied. This case can be distinguished from Stewart, supra, and Cole, supra, because Hilton did make a contemporaneous objection when the contested evidence was introduced. Although there are no cases involving the particular situation in this case, a review of Stewart, Cole, and other cases leads us to the conclusion that Hilton’s argument is preserved for our review. See Vaughn v. State, 338 Ark. 220, 992 S.W.2d 785 (1999) (stating that where defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress that was not ruled upon, defendant was required to renew objection and obtain ruling when that evidence was introduced at trial to preserve issue for appeal); Holt v. State, 15 Ark. App. 269, 692 S.W.2d 265 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In reviewing the denial of a motion to
[ "holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence and autocentro did not even do that if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence", "holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence", "holding that a statute of limitations defense first raised in a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs evidence was untimely", "holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion", "holding that a litigants summary judgment motion does not satisfy the requirement for a motion for jmol at the close of the evidence" ]
11
2010 WL 877569, at *3; Hart, 1999 WL 225956, at *2). The court reasoned that because Samshi Homes acknowledged that the documents filed by De Leon were in the form of mechanics liens, the documents were instruments “provided by the ... laws of this state” and were “therefore not presumed to be fraudulent under section 51.901(c)(2)(A).” Id. The court concluded, “Samshi Homes[’s] complaints based on section 53.054 are therefore beyond the scope of the current proceedings.” Id. at 668. The court further concluded that “Sam-shi Homes’ substantive evidentiary claims — that it, rather than Kama, owned the subject properties and that Kama never entered into an agreement with De Leon — are also beyond the scope of the section 51.903 proceedings.” Id. (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *3 (<HOLDING>)). Although it is factually distinct from the
[ "holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action", "holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured", "holding that movant converted his motion for judicial review into an action seeking declaratory judgment by requesting rulings on underlying rights of the parties", "holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits", "holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment" ]
22
had consented in cases of direct appeal to review post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where a record in the trial court was sufficient to permit appellate review. Id. The court declined Mr. Wheat’s argument and held that the new rule explicitly provides the “exclusive procedure” by which a person may seek relief in the sentencing court for ineffective assistance of counsel, and “failure to file such motion constitutes a complete waiver of the right.” Id. at 157-58. A change to the Rule 29.15 timing requirement does not change its plain language, which continues to provide the exclusive means by which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be raised. And this has been confirmed in cases decided since Wheat. See, e.g., Brown, 438 S.W.3d at 506 n.5 (<HOLDING>); State v. Celis-Garcia, 420 S.W.3d 723, 731
[ "holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not cognizable on direct appeal because it was not presented under the postconviction procedures set forth in rules2915 or 24035 which allow for the development of a full and complete record", "holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal", "holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced", "holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record", "holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record" ]
00
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we consider, below, under the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ actions violate their due process rights. 5. Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs raise a number of procedural due process violations against Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants force them to participate in the five-phase treatment program at Atascadero; force them to take medication in non-emergency situations; and subject them to privilege reductions, access level reductions, and re-classifications. Plaintiffs allege that these deprivations occur without adequate notice of or opportunity to respond to accusations of alleged sanctionable conduct. The Fourte (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiffs may have a liberty interest
[ "holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest", "holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field", "holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest", "holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison", "holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges" ]
44
the issue, and whether the issue was proffered by one and controverted by another. See Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis.2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519, 525 (1973). The Wisconsin Supreme Court considers an issue to be “joined” between the parties when one party has served a formal pleading asking for relief against the other party. See id. (first co-defendant who served cross-claim for contribution on second co-defendant had joined the issue of their respective liability to the plaintiff; thus, first co-defendant was bound by judgment in that action, which dismissed second co-defendant). The formal-pleading requirement serves to ensure that the parties joined the issue between them by requesting relief, and that either party can enforce such requested relief. See, e.g., Goldblatt, 417 N.W.2d at 419 (<HOLDING>). The Streitzes and Marshall were not formal
[ "holding that claim preclusion did not bar fire insurer from bringing a second action against its coplaintiff in first action", "holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action", "holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second", "holding that entire controversy doctrine did not bar second lawsuit against defendant who was not party to first lawsuit in another state", "holding res judicata precluded landlord from bringing second action for damages of unpaid future rents after a final judgment determined tenants damages arising out of the breach of lease in landlords first action" ]
00
that there is no coverage for diminished value claims are: Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 00-1503 (Fla. App. 4th Dist.6/13/2001), 788 So.2d 355 (finding no ambiguity and concluding there was no reading of the policy that obligated the insurer to pay for inherent diminution in market value where the insurer’s liability was limited to the lesser of the actual cash value of the property or the “amount necessary to repair or replace the property with other of the like kind and quality;” this loss is simply not the type of damage that is subject to repair and, thus, is not a covered loss where the policy |islimits the insurer’s liability to the amount necessary to repair the vehicle); Rezevskis v. Aries Ins. Co., 2000-1985 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 3/14/2001), 784 So.2d 472, 474 (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.,
[ "holding that the repair or replace limitation of liability capped the insurers liability at the amount necessary to return the car to substantially the same condition as before the loss and did not include liability for loss due to stigma on resale", "holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation", "holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous", "holding car lessee specifically contracted with car lessor for liability for any and all loss or damage to rental car thus barring recovery from insurer under exclusion for liability assumed by contract", "holding that if the insurer has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss that liability is for the face amount of the policy citation omitted emphasis in original" ]
00
(1934), 356 Ill. 340, 343-46 (deficient signatures on petition in court-approved annexation challenged by quo warranta; burden of justification was on defendant); accord People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 438, 441 (collateral attack upon proceedings of county court purporting to establish fire district permissible to reach jurisdictional defect in petition); People ex rel. Mills v. Fairfield Community High School District No. 225 (1947), 397 Ill. 233 (in annexation case, where record of court proceedings showed court did not have jurisdiction of subject matter because of defective petition, attempted judgment was a nullity that could be challenged by quo warranta despite court’s finding that it had jurisdiction); see City of Wood Dale, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 834-36 (<HOLDING>); People ex rel. Village of Long Grove v.
[ "holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction", "holding that deficient jurisdictional facts insufficient number of valid signatures in petition will not confer subjectmatter jurisdiction for court to act", "holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction", "holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction", "holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case" ]
11
as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the
[ "holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms", "recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment", "holding that it may not", "holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration", "holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo" ]
33
from this guard which, in combination, may suggest an ethnicity or national origin-based animosity predating the August incident. In light of these combined facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was, in fact, selected either as the target, or at least the “subject,” of the call precisely because of his known ethnicity or national origin. As noted in the Report, it has long been settled that “[prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause ... from invidious discrimination.” Report at 57 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). These rights, extend, for example, to claims based on denial of a right to participate in specific prison work assignments based on race. LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In a recent decision, a district court relied
[ "holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population", "holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison", "holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison", "holding that an inmate has no right to any particular prison job but prison officials cannot discriminate against him on the basis of his race in work assignments", "holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials" ]
33
Hill’s case, Ischa the drug dog was called out to inspect Hill’s car after Hill had already been arrested. Since the use of a canine here did not result in any seizure of Hill or his car beyond what he would have otherwise endured, officers did not need any justification for holding the car pending the canine inspection. By Edwards’s account, Ischa alerted on the outside of the car. Given Hill’s nervous behavior, his warrant for a controlled substance crime, his reputation for engaging in drug activity, and, most importantly, the indication from a qualified drug dog that drugs were in the vehicle, we hold the district court did not err in finding there was probable cause to search the vehicle’s interior for such contraband. See United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Munroe, 143 F.3d 1113, 1116
[ "holding that where a qualified drug dog alerts to the presence of contraband in a vehicle officers have probable cause to search the vehicle", "holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes", "holding that officers had probable cause to arrest driver and two passengers where cocaine and contraband were found in glove compartment and backseat armrest of vehicle and none of the men offered any information regarding the ownership of the drugs and contraband on the ground that the drugs and contraband could have been in the possession of any one of the three vehicle occupants or all three of them jointly", "holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle", "holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle" ]
00
references to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 2 A "Johnny cab" is a private vehicle driven by a retired person who provides an informal, unlicensed transportation service for a fee. 3 The Supreme Court has specifically held that Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.32(1), as interpreted by this court, meets the constitutional requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 440 (1988). 4 The current rule contains a more detailed procedure and several additional provisions than the version in effect at the time of Allen's no-merit appeal. See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.32 (2007-08). 5 See Wis. Stat. § 809.32(l)(b) (2007-08). 6 See State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 7 In State v. Tillman, the court of appeals
[ "holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus", "holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition challenging a 1231a5 reinstatement proceeding explaining the appropriate court of appeals is the sole and exclusive means to review a 1231a5 order reinstating a prior removal order", "holding that a habeas petition in the court of appeals is the exclusive remedy for challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel", "holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction", "holding habeas petition challenging denial of custody credits is not related to the conditions of confinement and was properly brought in the district of conviction" ]
22
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remand for the entry of an order dismissing Walker’s complaint. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Ellington, C. J., and Phipps, P. J., concur. Decided September 6, 2012. Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Hube & Tucker, Josh D. Tucker, Douglas G. Exley, for appellee. 1 See Welch v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 276 Ga. App. 664, 665 (624 SE2d 177) (2005) (“We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the de novo standard of review.” (punctuation omitted)). 2 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). 3 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (4). 4 Id. 5 Cummings v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 2 86 SE2d 826) (1997) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Camp v. Coweta County, 280 Ga. 199, 201
[ "holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice", "holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute", "holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after", "holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice", "recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required" ]
22
803 So.2d 598, 605-07 (Fla.2001); Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 511 (Fla.2005) (citing Escobar for the proposition that “police misrepresentations alone do not necessarily render a confession involuntary,” but rendering this holding in the context of a case in which the police investigator misrepresented the extent of the inculpatory evidence in the case he was actually investigating)-, Davis v. State, 859 So.2d 465, 472 (Fla.2003) (confession voluntary despite law enforcement’s characterization of the situation confronting the defendant as a “missing-person ease”; the detectives accurately informed the defendant of the identity of the missing person and simply neglected to inform him that they already knew the victim was dead); Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521-22 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). In short, the common theme linking each of
[ "holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless", "recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion", "holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature", "holding confession voluntary despite police misrepresentation of the thenunknown inculpatory nature of the applicable dna evidence", "holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue" ]
33
on the meaning of this phrase. We disagree with Sachs's argument that the sale of only UPCM's stock and not its real property assets automatically places this transaction outside the reach of UREBA. Despite the fact that stocks or shares in a corporation are generally considered personal property, there are occasions when their transfer is entirely secondary to the transfer of real property assets. See J.I. Kislak v. Carol Mgmt. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 428, 184 N.Y.S.2d 815, 318 (N.Y.App.Div.1959) ("A sale of all of the stock of a corporation has been held to be a sale of its assets.") (internal quotation marks omitted). A number of jurisdictions analyze such transactions in terms of their substance rather than their form. See, e.g., Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 86-89 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Shochet See., Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663
[ "holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale", "holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made", "holding the real estate sale proceeds", "holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale", "holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale" ]
44
1068 (1952) (free speech and equal protection); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (equal protection). The government argues that the parts of the regulations authorizing cable operators to deny access to indecent material do not trigger First or Fifth Amendment analysis because a private cable operator — not the government — would be denying access to indecent material. See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief at 16. However, even where it is the decision of a private person which ultimately triggers the abridgment of speech, or effects the challenged discrimination, the state may nevertheless be held responsible if it significantly encouraged the private actor to commit the infringement. See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 592 n. 38 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). We hold that section 10 significantly
[ "holding governments encouragement through witness protection program of mothers decision to keep children from father constituted state action", "holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother placed children with father who lived transient lifestyle with children", "holding evidence supported termination of mothers parental rights where among other factors mother knowingly allowed abusive and sexually deviant father to have access to children", "holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree", "holding fathers pleadings representing himself to be the father of the children constituted a judicial admission" ]
00
injuries, except her aff concerning the degree of disability associated with the preexisting condition versus that arising from the falls, the Commission was not compelled to believe it and could reject all or any part of it which it did not consider credible. Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. S.D.1986). “The degree of disability resulting from an injury and preexisting conditions are questions of fact resolved by the Commission.” Carter v. Frito-Lay, 913 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). “The decision to accept one of two conflicting medical opinions is an issue of fact for the Commission.” Johnson v. Denton Constr. Co., 911 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo.banc 1995); see also Duncan v. Springfield R-12 Sch. Dist., 897 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo.App. S.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Commission chose to accept the testimony
[ "holding that the weight of a classification determination depends upon all those factors which give it power to persuade", "holding that the interests of two insurance companies were adverse under wis stat 102231a 19891990 relating to workers compensation when the respective liability of the two insurance companies depends on the determination of the date of injury", "holding that under the doctrine the district court should have stayed the diversityjurisdiction case pending the state workers compensation commissions final decision on whether the defendant properly paid certain workers compensation claims", "holding that wjhere the right to compensation depends upon which of two conflicting medical theories should be accepted the issue is peculiarly for commissions determination", "holding that deference to the guidelines depends on the thoroughness of the commissions analysis and the validity of its reasoning" ]
33
appeared in court on December 7, 2007, and the court dismissed the cases for failure to prosecute because the State had not filed any charging documents in either case. The court subsequently entered orders dismissing the cases with prejudice, because “[t]he State failed to file the charging documents or take any action to prosecute the case.” [¶ 4] The district court generally has jurisdiction to hear criminal eases under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(1), but in this case the issue is whether the court could dismiss a criminal action under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) when a charging document has not been filed. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). See City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 5, 586 N.W.2d 494 (<HOLDING>); State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D.1976)
[ "recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal", "holding that the value of stolen blank money orders may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the market value for filled in money orders and the fact that the defendants had the necessary equipment to fill in the money orders and to make the completed orders appear valid", "holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders", "holding the state may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information", "holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc 1291" ]
33
As will be discussed below, although (A) the FAA air traffic controllers had a duty to disseminate certain weather related information to Flight 2745, they (B) did not breach this duty as to any CWAs or PIREPs. Furthermore, (C) the controllers did not have a duty to disseminate MISs or the information contained therein. A. Duty to Disseminate Certain Weather Information The existence of a duty in . is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.”). Air traffic controllers are “required to do what a reasonable air traffic controller of their experience and training would have done under the totality of the circumstances.” Kelley v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-31, 2009 WL 1439896 at *5 (E.D.Va. Mar. 26, 2009) (<HOLDING>); see Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 270. Here, the
[ "holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn", "holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area is negligible", "holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel", "holding that an air traffic controllers failure to report weather conditions from another faa location to a planes pilot was not negligent", "holding that during investigatory stop police may transport seized property to another location" ]
33
Moreover, under the present law, the Debtor will not receive a discharge unless he completes performance of the Plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5). Thus, if the Debtor were unable to perform the Plan, Osh-untola would suffer little prejudice from its having been confirmed. 4 . The Court does not read 11 U.S.C. § 108 as extending this period. 5 . Oshuntola did not object to confirmation on this ground. However, the Court has an independent duty to confirm a plan only if satisfies the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Great Northwest Recreation Center, Inc., 74 B.R. 846, 852 (Bankr.D.Mont.1987). 6 . Courts differed as to whether an individual debtor could retain exempt property without violating the "absolute priority” rule. See In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541, 544-45 (Bankr.D.Conn.2007)(<HOLDING>). 7 .The modification concludes with the phrase
[ "holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate", "holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover", "holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate", "holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate", "recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate" ]
33
areas constitute a residence subject to a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Government contends that exigent circumstances warranted the entry into the apartment building. (Id. at 16.) The Government bases this exigency on threats to law enforcement and the general public, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances. (Id.) Aside from these contentions, the Government primarily contends that Defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the common areas of the apartment building. (Id. at 7.) Because it is a threshold issue, this latter contention serves as the focus for the Court’s Fourth Amendment inquiry. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a multiunit apartment building. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d
[ "holding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment bmldings common entrance", "holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building", "holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship", "holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the hallway of an apartment building where the building door was unlocked and the hallway was easily accessible to the public", "holding that defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of residential building" ]
11
Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 40, 919 P.2d at 302. “Such damage means simply that the product has not met the customer’s expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received ‘insufficient product value.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Under the economic loss rule, “a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.” Leis Family Ltd. P’ship v. Silversword Eng’rg, 126 Hawai’i 532, 538-39, 273 P.3d 1218, 1224-25 (Haw.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 39, 919 P.2d at 301). The rule also applies to negligent design and/or manufacture theory, Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 40, 919 P.2d at 302, and negligent misrepresentation. City Express, 87 Hawai’i at 470, 959 P.2d at 840 (<HOLDING>). The most recent Hawaii Supreme Court case
[ "holding that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic damages not property damages within insureds policy", "holding that an architect whose negligent design and supervision of construction render a building unfit for use may be liable in tort to a commercial tenant who suffers economic loss as a result", "holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional", "holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract", "holding that the economic loss doctrine barred a negligence claim without regard to whether the parties were in privity of contract" ]
22
therein ...” 392 U.S., at 436, [88 S.Ct., at 2201]. One of the “rights enumerated” in § 1 is “the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens_” 14 Stat. 27. Id. As a result, the Court concluded: Just as in Jones a Negro’s § 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to [him] solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro’s § 1 right to “make and enforce contracts” is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to [him], solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees. Id. 427 U.S. at 170-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2594. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n,
[ "holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination", "holding that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as nonwhites", "holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee", "holding unequivocally that 1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment", "holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under 1981" ]
00
Amendment claim because the record demonstrates that there are several disputed issues of material fact. We agree. We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the releva h Cir.1998) (en banc) (explaining that “we tolerate informalities from civil pro se litigants”). A careful look at Christman’s “Opposition to Summary Judgment” reveals that it served as a statement of controverted facts. In addition, Plaintiffs’ verified complaint constituted an opposing affidavit. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Christman presented
[ "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering successive motions for summary judgment when each of fdics motions reflected material changes in the posture of this litigation and was grounded on meritorious contentions", "holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions", "holding that a declaration signed under penalty of perjury and verifying the allegations set forth in the complaint were true and correct was competent summary judgment evidence", "holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct", "holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed" ]
33
motion for attorneys’ fees based on the proposal for settlement filed by Rebeca Ipox in her individual capacity. In a wrongful death case where there are joint personal representatives, the joint personal representatives are the party plaintiffs. As the party plaintiffs, only the joint personal representatives — acting in that capacity— are entitled to make a valid demand for judgment. The demand for judgment at issue here therefore was invalid. See §§ 768.20, 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2001); Reid, 888 So.2d at 103. Appellees claim that Rebeca Ipox’s act in serving her proposal for settlement should be deemed to be the act of both joint personal representatives. This argument is totally unwarranted. The proposal for settlement expressly stated that it was made by Rebeca Ipox in her 984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, there was no evidence that
[ "recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical", "holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries", "holding that a copersonal representative could not unilaterally file a notice of appeal without concurrence of the other copersonal representative", "recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim", "holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class" ]
22
those of Legal Defense Fund lawyers. The only material difference is that here employees must choose between the lawsuit and a conciliation offer while in Button there had been no conciliation and offer. The people attending the meetings held by the Legal Defense Fund lawyers in Button, however, did have to choose between initiating a lawsuit and not participating in a lawsuit. The type of choice the people would have to make here and in Button is not so different that the solicitation that could have occurred in this case was outside the scope of activity protected by Button. The characteristics of the solicitation that brought it within constitutional protection in Button are equally present in this case. See also Great Western Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F.Supp. 827 (N.D.I11.1979) (<HOLDING>). The continued vitality of Button was recently
[ "holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment", "recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations", "holding rule similar to district courts order constitutionally inapplicable to nonprofit solicitation", "holding that the majority of courts to address this issue have decided that the 100mile rule is inapplicable to parties and party officers", "holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith" ]
22
that the burglary occur in a dwelling.” Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973. Taylor sets forth a categorical approach, which “generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Using that approach, Rodriguez’s California first degree burglary conviction does not constitute generic burglary because California Penal Code Sections 459 and 460 do not require “unlawful or unprivileged entry” for a burglary conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“A few States’ burglary statutes, however, define burglary more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful.”); see also People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the state burglary statute is
[ "holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent", "holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim", "holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary", "holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcategorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry", "holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary" ]
00
Affirmed. WEBSTER, J., concurs. BENTON, J., dissents with opinion. BENTON, J., dissenting. Because the order on appeal fails to afford the opinion of the expert medical advisor the presumption of correctness to which it is entitled, I respectfully dissent. Absent clear and convincing evidence of adequate grounds for rejecting it, the opinion of the expert medical advisor binds the judge of compensation claims. See Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Cabrera, 698 So.2d 1352, 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The opinion of the expert medical advis- or is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the judge of compensation claims. § 440.13(9)(c), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). See Walgreen Co. v. Carver, 770 So.2d 172, 174-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Jacaranda Manor v. Randolph, 755 So.2d 781,
[ "holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings", "holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error", "recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome", "holding that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness owed to the trial courts findings", "holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness" ]
44
a noninvasive procedure which posed little risk of harm. He had done similar tests many times on, in his view, similarly rusty boilers without cooling them down first. And nothing in his observations or discussions with Mr. Nelson suggested that this particular boiler posed a heightened risk of danger. Mr. Reimer’s version of events will, of course, be subject to challenge by defendants, but, at this stage, these facts create a genuine issue as to Mr. Reimer’s actual knowledge of the risk in this case. See Kraft, 136 F.3d at 586 (reversing summary judgment to defendant and finding significant to appreciation of risk element that plaintiff “had placed her hands and feet into this gap before without incident.”); Piotrowski v. Southworbh Prods. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. S. Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442
[ "holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk", "holding that plaintiff who was injured in fall from table did not have actual knowledge of a known risk and he did not make the choice to chance the risk rather than avoid it where he and other employees had similarly stood or stomped on the lift table without incident for seven months", "holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment", "holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it", "holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known" ]
11
or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). B. ANALYSIS Equitable tolling is generally available in two types of situations: (1) “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period,” or (2) “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 45 98) (en bane) (<HOLDING>). In Jaquay, a veteran executed a motion for
[ "holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling", "holding that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling cannot apply to extend the 120day noa filing period set forth in 38 usc 7266a", "holding that in light of irwin previous statements that equitable tolling is unavailable against 38 usc 7266 are overruled", "holding that issue of whether the 120day judicialappeal period prescribed by 38 usc 7266a for seeking judicial review of a board decision is subject to equitable tolling is a legal question", "holding that irwin overruled all prior ninth circuit cases that denied equitable tolling under statutes and regulations relating to federal employee discrimination suits including one which had denied tolling under 7703b2" ]
22
had reached age 55, in order to make them eligible for benefits (Katz Aff. Ex. 45), establishes that Pan Am in fact interpreted its Plan as requiring employees to have reached the age of 55 to receive subsidized benefits, regardless of how their employment ended. If the Plan provided the subsidized benefit to employees involuntarily terminated before age 55, there would have been no need to re-hire laid-off employees after that age to qualify them for benefits. Pan Am’s generosity in accommodating laid-off employees to allow them to receive higher benefits was completely gratuitous, and could not have resulted in an obligation on Pan Am’s part to employ this practice with every employee, or in a modification of the Plan’s terms. See Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 224-25 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, PBGC’s interpretation of the Plan’s
[ "recognizing that pension plan administrators have the ability to fashion their own plan formulas", "holding that employer may not orally modify a pension plan and citing 29 usc 1102a1 which provides that all plan terms must be in writing", "holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets", "holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions", "holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan" ]
11
as true.” See United States v. Young, 694 F.Supp.2d 25, 27 (D.Me.2010) (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n. 16, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952)). The Court must consider whether the allegations in the indictment are sufficient to inform a jury as to the charged offense. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76, 83 S.Ct. 173, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962); United States v. Barker Steel Co., Inc., 985 F.2d 1123, 1125 (1st Cir.1993). “[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. U 0 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Teleguz court upheld section 922(k)
[ "holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime", "holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce", "holding that the commerce clause does not provide congress with authority to enact a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivat ed violence because the crime was noneconomic contained no jurisdictional element and the aggregate impact of such crime was based on an attenuated effect upon interstate commerce", "holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce", "holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act" ]
22
this conclusion, we are mindful of decisions in other jurisdictions rejecting the argument that changes to the juvenile justice system have altered its parens patriae character. See Valdez v. State, 33 Ark. App. 94, 801 S.W.2d 659 (1991); In re Myresheia W., 61 Cal. App. 4th 734, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1998); In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001); State, ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002) (dissenting justice concluded changes to system required a jury trial); State v. G 971) (upholding statute that required juvenile trials to be heard by the court; concurring justice acknowledged that if juvenile code became only a punitive tool, then a juiy trial might be justified under state constitution); State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 887, 889-90, 919, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998) (<HOLDING>). While there is wide variability in the
[ "holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals", "recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings", "holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials", "holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights", "holding juveniles do not have right to jury trial because it is a civil proceeding under states parens patriae authority four justices dissented" ]
00
and Recommendation (“Report”) suggesting denying Dickey-Williams’ motion and granting the Commissioner for Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) motion. Report, ECF No. 13. Dickey-Williams filed three timely objections to the Report. She argues the Report improperly dismissed the ALJ’s failure to apply the treating physician rule to the opinions of Dr. Clague; the Report did not properly consider the opinions of psychologist Ross Thayer; and the report overlooked the ALJ’s failure to discuss whether Dickey-Williams’ migraines affected her residual function capacity. Objection at 2-7, ECF No. 14. Civil Rule 72 does not require the Court to hold a hearing when reviewing a magistrate judge’s findings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Estate of Wyatt v. WAMU/JP Morgan
[ "holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised", "recognizing de novo standard of review", "holding 28 usc 636 did not require a hearing for de novo review of a magistrates findings", "holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo", "holding that the error caused by the magistrate judges unauthorized postjudgment order was cured by the district courts later de novo review of the magistrates findings and conclusions" ]
22
in fact, consumers will not necessarily get less tar” due to “such behavior as compensatory smoking.” Ibid. This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading representations of Cambridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a fed eral statute is not the same as a policy of approval. Cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51 (2002) (<HOLDING>). More telling are the FTC’s recent statements
[ "holding that private security guards unsolicited call to police did not establish agency", "holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims", "holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts", "holding that the safety act and fmvss 108 did not impliedly preempt commonlaw conspicuity tort based on inadequate lighting and reflectors on truck trailer", "holding that the coast guards decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly preempt petitioners tort claims" ]
44
limitations will not commence to run until the contract has been finished.” In the instant case, Freberg was never allowed to deliver a finished product or service to Dr. Robert Thomason. Consequently, up to the date of July 25,1973, the day after Dr. Elizabeth died, Freberg’s cause of action against the Thomasons had not accrued, or in other words, limitations had not begun to run. Indeed, Freberg’s limitations did not begin to run until after he was first prevented from continuing his tasks. See Scott v. Walker, supra. To hold that Freberg’s cause of action accrued after each day’s work would unduly fragment the time of accrual for each of these indivisible tasks. Compare Jones v. Lewis, 11 Tex. 359 (1854); Caldwell v. Jones, 63 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1933, writ ref’d) (<HOLDING>); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 251, 253 (1965).
[ "recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case", "holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf", "holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies", "holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed", "holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001" ]
33
by other inmates to say that Bishop, who had solicited the murder, did not know the murder had occurred until after it happened. The district court denied Bishop’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explaining that the evidence that Bishop alleged should have been presented at sentencing, did not bear on two of three aggravating factors, each of which was independently relied on by the state sentencing court, and that Bishop failed to show that the omitted evidence would have affected the state sentencing court’s departure analysis. Thus the district court declined to disturb the decision of the state post-conviction court, which had denied relief on the basis that Bishop failed to show prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
[ "holding that a state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law", "holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law", "holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states", "holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution", "holding that state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law" ]
22
if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). We lack jurisdiction to review either of the district court’s orders because they are not final judgments for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; they are not among the type of orders listed in § 1292(a); they were not certified by the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to be final appealable orders; and they do not fall within a jurisprudential exception, such as the collateral-order doctrine, that would render them final, appealable orders. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957-59 (5th Cir. 1988); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Macon Uplands Venture, 624 F.2d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551,
[ "holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right", "holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable" ]
00
under an exception to the statute was either waived or resolved in the workers’ compensation case. Neither of these circumstances apply in the instant case. a. Compensability is not an issue. Vallejos elected his remedy by filing a petition for benefits, receiving payments, and negotiating a settlement. All of the following cases that Vallejos cites can be distinguished because they deal with workers’ compensation claims where the compensability of the claim or the status of the employee at the time of the injury was contested: Vasquez v. Sorrells Grove Care, Inc., 962 So.2d 411, 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and whether Vasquez was an employee); Hernandez v. United Contractors Corp., 766 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Lowry v. Logan, 650 So.2d 653, 658 (Fla. 1st
[ "recognizing that cue may be based on a showing that there was no evidence before the adjudicator that could have supported a denial of the claim on the merits that is that all of the evidence militated in support of the claim", "holding that because the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and took the position that there was no evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course and scope of hernandezs employment there was no conclusion on the merits", "holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment", "holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence", "holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment" ]
11
scared” and “[s]ome of those questions were too hard.” J.A. at 108-25 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 299-816). Spies listened to the recording of Vaughn’s interrogation of Harris as soon as she arrived at the police station and before she ordered Harris’s arrest. J.A. at 559-60 (Urban Dep. at 586-40). Accordingly, she should have known that Harris’s confession was suspect and inherently untrustworthy because it was- extracted from a twelve-year-old child with no previous law-enforcement experience, outside the presence of his mother, through the use of intensive interrogation techniques. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the confession provided support for Spies’s finding of probable cause for the arrest. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) (<HOLDING>). After the elimination of Harris’s confession
[ "holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed", "holding that a probable cause determination should consider the facts and circumstances known to the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information", "holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant", "holding that whether an arrest is supported by probable cause turns upon whether at the moment of the arrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting officials knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense emphasis added", "holding that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense in situations where the arresting officer has not observed the operation of the vehicle such facts and circumstances would necessarily have to include a relationship between the time there was evidence to show the influence of intoxicants and the time of operation of the vehicle internal citations omitted" ]
33
meets the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court.” State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn.App.2011) (quotation omitted). A victim may request restitution if the defendant is convicted of a crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). When considering restitution requests, courts look at, among other factors, “the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012). This court has interpreted the statute to require that the claimed loss be “directly caused by the conduct, for which the defendant was convicted.” State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn.App.1999) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Willis does not dispute that P.H. should
[ "holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted", "holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted", "holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses ", "holding that restitution is proper under 2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses", "holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc 3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction" ]
11
Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (B.I.A.1992) (“[T]he Board ordinarily will not consider a discretionary grant of a motion to remand unless the moving party meets a ‘heavy burden’ and presents evidence of such a nature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the immigration judge were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.”)). Accordingly, the BIA did not commit legal error, and we lack jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the BIA’s conclusion that the § 212(c) factors did not warrant a grant of discretionary relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i);De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 144, 146-47 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135,
[ "holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship", "holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law", "holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations", "holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of removal and that sjection 106 of the real id act does not override the jurisdictiondenying provision of 8 usc 1252a2b unless the petitioner raises a constitutional claim or question of law within the meaning of 8 usc 1252a2d", "holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations" ]
33
OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. I. JURISDICTION Thomas J. Capano appeals from an order entered in the district court on June 27,1997, holding that he waived the attorney work product privilege with respect to certain documents he created which the United States seized from a third party pursuant to a subpoena. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction to review the order of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1073-77 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In July
[ "holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena", "holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc 7602 may challenge the subpoena", "holding that denial of motion to vacate discovery order and to quash subpoena issued pursuant to 28 usc 1782 constitutes final appealable decision", "holding that a denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not final and therefore not appealable", "holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a 1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable" ]
00
regarding lack of consent of the owner, there was no evidence as to who was authorized to give consent to use the vehicle because the identity of the owner was never conclusively established, as there was no connection established between the car appellant was driving and the car that was stolen from Ms. Hautala. The government argues that lack of consent may be established by circumstantial evidence, and contends that appellant’s flight, the testimony of Ms. Hautala, the broken window and the different VINs on the car and registration card provided ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the car belonged to someone else and that appellant did not have permission to operate it. See Powell v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 258, 418 F.2d 470, 474 (1969) (<HOLDING>). While the government is correct that lack of
[ "holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence", "holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent", "holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination", "holding that conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence", "holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence" ]
00
does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.” Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 165. Moreover, a witness’s "general and hopeful expectation of leniency is not enough to create an agreement or an understanding that [he] would, in fact, receive leniency in exchange for [his] testimony.” Id. at 163 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . Respondent advises that Deyo’s CPL § 440.10 motion was denied following a hearing. R. Mem. at 28, n. 7. 10 . As respondent notes, Deyo’s affidavit in support of his own § 440.10 motion also was not part of the record on appeal in petitioner’s direct appeal. R. Mem. at 32. 11 . Citation is to the pagination provided by CM/ECF. 12 . Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029; see Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir.2007)
[ "holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred", "holding when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim a coa may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether 1 the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right and 2 the district courts procedural ruling was correct", "holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original", "holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct", "holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would conclude it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct" ]
22
pursuant to a lawful warrant that the police obtained in the interim with information that was unrelated to the war-rantless entry. The Court refused to suppress the evidence, not because of a lack of causal relationship to the conduct of the search, but because the search was lawful in every respect. The search was conducted pursuant to what the Court determined to be a lawful warrant and was conducted in a lawful manner. See id. at 813-14, 104 S.Ct. 3380. The attenuation applied only to the 19-hour-old initial entry. Here, of course, the entire point is that the search that produced the seized evidence was con ducted with excessive force and was, accordingly, unlawful. Third, United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2007), does not compel the majority’s holding. Id. at 1154-55 (<HOLDING>). If officers violate their obligation to serve
[ "holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant", "holding that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for officers failure to serve a warrant to the defendant before during or immediately after the search", "holding that violation of knockandannounce rule during execution of valid search warrant warranted suppression of evidence seized in search following violation", "holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression", "holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation" ]
11