{{위키데이터 속성 추적}}

'''입증 책임'''([[라틴어]]: '''''onus probandi''''', ''Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat'' – 입증 책임은 말하는 이에게 있지, 부정하는 이에게 있지 않다)은 분쟁의 당사자가 자신의 입장에 대한 유효한 [[툴민 논증모형|보증]]을 제공하여야 하는 의무이다.

== 책임의 소지 ==
양측이 [[토론]] 중에 있고 한 측이 상대측이 부정하는 [[주장]]을 내세울 때, 각별하게는 상대측이 그 주장에 이의를 제기하였을 때, 주장을 내세우는 한 측은 통상적으로 입증 책임을 가진다.<ref>{{저널 인용|title=On the burden of proof|journal=[[Philosophy (journal)|Philosophy]]|last=Cargile|first=James|date=January 1997|volume=72|issue=279|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|pages=59–83|doi=10.1017/s0031819100056655|jstor=3751305|s2cid=170772287}}</ref> 그것은 히친스의 면도날에도 명시되었다. [[칼 세이건]]은 『[[특별한 주장을 하려면 특별한 증거가 필요하다]]. ''Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence''』(ECREE)라는 [[아포리즘]]을 제안하였다.<ref>Marc Kaufman, ''First Contact: Scientific Breakthroughs in the Hunt for Life Beyond Earth'', Simon and Schuster, p. 124.</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics|last=Craig|first=William Lane|year=2008|publisher=Crossway|isbn=9781433501159|ref=Craig|orig-date=1994}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/896344862|title=Evidence for Psi: Thirteen Empirical Research Reports|last1=Goertzel|first1=Ben|last2=Goertzel|first2=Joe|date=2015|editor2=Goertzel B.|publisher=McFarland|pages=291–301|chapter=Skeptical Responses to Psi Research|isbn=9780786478286|oclc=896344862|ref=Broderick|editor1=Broderick D.}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|url=https://archive.org/details/firstcontactscie00marc|title=First Contact: Scientific Breakthroughs in the Hunt for Life Beyond Earth|last=Kaufman|first=Marc|year=2012|edition=Reprint|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=9781439109014|ref=Kaufman|url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=The Legitimacy of Miracle|last=Larmer|first=Robert A.|date=2013|publisher=Lexington Books|isbn=9780739184219|ref=Larmer}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3uqZ_81If4UC&pg=PA6|title=Sample Size Calculations: Practical Methods for Engineers and Scientists|last=Matthews|first=Paul|year=2010|publisher=Mathews Malnar and Bailey|isbn=9780615324616|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230902010353/https://books.google.com/books?id=3uqZ_81If4UC&pg=PA6|archive-date=September 2, 2023|url-status=live|access-date=March 19, 2023|ref=Matthews}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Social and Conceptual Issues in Astrobiology|last=McMahon|first=Sean|date=2020|editor2=Mariscal C.|publisher=Oxford University Press|pages=117–129|chapter=Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?|isbn=9780190915650|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141003/https://books.google.com/books?id=E4_UDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA117#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=October 28, 2023|url-status=live|access-date=October 22, 2023|ref=McMahon|editor1=Smith K. C.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E4_UDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA117}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|url=https://archive.org/details/brocasbrainroman0000saga/page/62/mode/2up|title=Broca's Brain: The Romance of Science|last=Sagan|first=Carl|date=1979|publisher=Hodder and Stoughton|isbn=9780394501697|ref=Sagan}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sJgONrua8IkC|title=Pseudoscience and Extraordinary Claims of the Paranormal: A Critical Thinker's Toolkit|last=Smith|first=Jonathan C.|year=2011|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=9781444358940|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141004/https://books.google.com/books?id=sJgONrua8IkC|archive-date=October 28, 2023|url-status=live|access-date=March 19, 2023|ref=Smith}}</ref>

[[삼단논법]] 같은 특정한 종류의 논증은 수학적인 [[증명 (수학)|증명]] 또는 엄격하게 논리적인 [[증명]]을 요구하지만, 입증 책임을 만족하게 하는 [[증거]]는 대개는 맥락 그리고 공동체의 보편과 관습에 의하여 결정지어진다.<ref>{{저널 인용|title=A localist solution to the regress of justification|journal=[[Australasian Journal of Philosophy]]|last=Leite|first=Adam|year=2005|volume=83|issue=3|pages=395–421 [p. 418]|doi=10.1080/00048400500191974|quote=[t]he point of articulating reasons in defense of one's belief is to establish that one is justified in believing as one does.|s2cid=170261121}}</ref><ref>{{저널 인용|title=A localist solution to the regress of justification|journal=[[Australasian Journal of Philosophy]]|last=Leite|first=Adam|year=2005|volume=83|issue=3|pages=395–421 [p. 403]|doi=10.1080/00048400500191974|quote=justificatory conversation...[is]...characterized by a person's sincere attempt to vindicate his or her entitlement to a belief by providing adequate reasons in its defense and responding to objections.|s2cid=170261121}}</ref>

철학의 토론은 그 어느 누군가가 특정한 주장에 대한 입증 책임을 가지었는지로 비화할 수 있다. 이것은 「입증 테니스」 또는 「책임 게임」이라고 묘사되어왔다.<ref>{{저널 인용|title=Review of ''Psychosemantics'' by Jerry Fodor|journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy]]|last=Dennett|first=Daniel C.|author-link=Daniel Dennett|url=http://cogprints.org/253/1/fodor.htm|date=July 1988|volume=85|issue=7|pages=384–389 (389)|doi=10.2307/2026956|jstor=2026956|quote=Fodor is too wise to think his series of arguments can flat disprove the claims of the opposition, so time and again he resorts to claims about shifting the burden of proof, begging the question, outsmarting by embracing the conclusions of reductios, and other exploitations of the rules of the game. The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher's pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now? Fodor mostly plays solitaire burden-tennis, against an imaginary opponent often personified as Granny or Aunty, which permits him to express the opposition view in terms that suit his rebuttal, without having to address the issue of whether this is a sympathetic rendering of any real opponent's claims.}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments|last=Rodych|first=Victor|date=1996|editor1-last=Shanker|editor1-first=Stuart|editor1-link=Stuart Shanker|editor2-last=Kilfoyle|editor2-first=David|volume=2. The later Wittgenstein: from ''Philosophical investigations'' to ''On certainty''|publisher=[[Routledge]]|location=London; New York|pages=232–265 ([//books.google.com/books?id=1MQaXJHzBooC&pg=PA261 261])|chapter=Wittgenstein's inversion of Gödel's theorem|orig-year=1986|isbn=0415149150|oclc=47938413|quote=Thus, in 1991 Wang seems to understand ''why'' Wittgenstein rejects GIT, but, apparently favouring the "onus game" (or "burden tennis"), he unfortunately concludes (pp. 257–58) that "the burden of proof falls ... squarely on Wittgenstein's side" because of Wang's own 'principle of presumed innocence'.}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Statistics as principled argument|last=Abelson|first=Robert P.|author-link=Robert Abelson|date=1995|publisher=[[Lawrence Erlbaum Associates]]|location=Hillsdale, NJ|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yQLFl1ILjZwC&pg=PA170 170]|chapter=Credibility of argument|isbn=0805805273|oclc=31011850|quote=When research presentations advance claims that many or most readers deem incredible, these claims are vulnerable to severe challenge. In response, there will typically be a rebuttal by the investigator, and then a fresh round of criticism. The burden of proof shifts back and forth between the investigator and the critic in what might be called the game of 'burden tennis'.}}</ref>

== 응용 ==

=== 공개된 담론에서 ===
입증 책임의 메커니즘은 담론에 참여한 모든 측이 적합한 [[논거]]를 들면서 생산적으로 참여할 수 있게 보장한다.<ref>{{저널 인용|title=Argumentation and social epistemology|journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy]]|last=Goldman|first=Alvin|year=1994|volume=91|issue=1|pages=27–49|doi=10.2307/2940949|jstor=2940949}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=A systematic theory of argumentation|last1=van Eemeren|first1=Frans H.|last2=Grootendorst|first2=Rob|year=2004|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|location=Cambridge, UK; New York|page=60|isbn=0521830753|quote=[t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point.|author-link1=Frans H. van Eemeren|author-link2=Rob Grootendorst}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Making it explicit|last=Brandom|first=Robert|year=1994|publisher=[[Harvard University Press]]|location=Cambridge, MA|page=222|isbn=067454319X|quote=[t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lightning frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community—they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged.}}</ref><ref>{{서적 인용|title=Belief's own ethics|last=Adler|first=Jonathan E.|year=2002|publisher=[[MIT Press]]|location=Cambridge, MA|pages=164–167|isbn=0262011921}}</ref>

=== 법학에서 ===
{{본문|입증 책임}}

== 같이 보기 ==
* [[일견]]
* [[입증책임]]
* [[러셀의 찻주전자]]
== 각주 ==
{{각주}}

{{전거 통제}}
[[분류:인식론 개념]]
[[분류:증거]]
[[분류:이성]]