The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1853-08-23 00:00:00

LIVERPOOL ASS.

ZES

rCONTINUED PROM ODE SECOND PAGE

CROWN COURT, MONDAY.
(Before Mr. Justice WightTg;

e took hi:

seat at nin
the follow

evicted

Willia;7i Royle and William Hill, turn-c _
maliciously and unlawfully wounding Mr. James Cromp-

Lt Pendleton, seven years' trans;

William Demeza, on three indictments for forgery,
ten years' transportation on the first indictment, and one
month's imprisonment on each of the other two.
Samuel While' for burglary, twelve months' imprison-
ment. with hard labour.

Mary Sullivan, for bigamy, six months' imprisonment,
with hard labour.
Elizabeth Fisher, for bigamy, twelve months' impri-
sonment, with hard labour.
Saint. Smith, for burglary, seven years' transportation.
John Ainscow, for manslaughter, two months' im-
prisonment. .

r---- -----
Wallicam Collins,l3, for burglary, six months' impri-
sonment, with hard labour, on the first indictment ; and
two months' imprisonment, with hard labour, on the

second indictme
Thomas Wil

limns, for burglary, twelve mouths' im-
prisonment, w. h hard labour.
James Hewitt, for burglary, twelve months' imprison-
-1h hard labour.
Philip Barlow, relieving officer of the
for embezzling the funds of the Guardians, eight
imprisonment, with hard labour.
Daniel Leigh, for cutting and wo
+roi do grievous bodily harm,: six mouths

ment, wi'

Salford Unio'

cling, with intent

imprisolimen

with hard labour.
John McGarry, for larceny, six months' imprisonment,
with hard labour.
David Smith, for bigamy, nine months' imprisonment,
with hard labour.
Eliza Wriyht, and Jas. Cook, for bigamy, two months'
imprisonment, with hard labour.
Thomas Ratctiffe and William Curtis, for bigamy,
four months' imprisonment, with hard labour.
Ellen Plumpton, for perjury, twelve months' imprison-
ment, with hard labour.
This closed the Crown business, and his Lordship pro-
ceeded to try civil causes.
EATON v. Coosa.—This was an action to recover the
sum of 245 lls., the value of ten casks of American linseed
cake, sold to the defendants. Mr. Atherton, Q.C., and
Mr. Aspinall were foi the plaintiff, an& Mr. Overend and
Mr. Millward for the defendants. The plaintiff, Mr.
Joseph Eaton, is a general broker, residing in this town,
and the defendant, Mr. Jas. Cooke,. resides-at Shrewsbury.
In January in the' present year, the plaintiff had a quantity
of linseed cake for sale, and employed a person named

Rowbotham, a commission agent, at Birmingham, to dis
pose of the same. Rowbotham went to Shrewsbury, and
agreed with the defendant to sell him ten casks of the oil
cake, on behalf of the plaintiff. On the 31st of January
the goods were delivered at the wharf at Liverpool, accord-
ing to the defendant's directions, and would be- delivered
at Shrewsbury on the following day. On the 9th-of Feb.,
the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant, to the
effect that the oil cake was damaged, and he would not
take it. The letter further stated that the oil cake was
lying at the wharf at Shrewsbury, at the plaintiff's risk.
Evidence having been adduced on behalf of the plaintiff,
Mr. Millward addressed' the jury for the defendant, who
was afterwards examined, and stated that on the oil cake
arriving at Shrewsbury, it was examined and found to be
damp, and not according to sample. Other witnesses
having been examined, Mr. Atherton replied, after which
his Lordship carefully went over the evidence on both
sides. The jury, after a-few moments' deliberation, founil
a verdict for the defendant.
DIGLISH AND OTHERS V; RANSON.— IMPORTANT
QUESTION ON THE STATUTE OP LIMITATIONS.—The
plaintiffs in this cause were Mr. Robert Daglish, sen.,
Mr. Robert Daglish, jun., and Mr. Thomsen ; and the
defendant was Mr. Ranson. The action was brought
on an agreement, and to recover compensation for
breach of such agreement on the part of the defendant.
The damages in the declaration were laid at £3,000. The
defendant had put in several: pleas ; but the de-
fence was based mainly on the statute of limita-
tions, which, it was alleged,. barred the plaintiffs'
right of action. Mr. Attorney-General Knowles and
Mr. Millward were counsel for- the plaintiffs ; and Mr.,
James, Q.C., and Mr. Manesty, appeared for the defendant.
In the absence of Mr. Knowles, Q.C., Mr. Millward stated
the case on behalf of the plaintifil, wlio were engineers and
boiler-makers, residing at St. Helens ; and the de-
fendant was a cotton-spinner in Wigan. On the 19th of
September, 1845, the plaintiff& entered into an agreement
to make and erect two condensing steam-engines for a new
cotton-mill, which the defendant was erecting at Wigan.
The engines were to be equal to thirty horses' power, and
the cost of each of them was to be £l,lOO. The first
of the engines was to be proceeded with at once, and the
second in the spring of the following year, 1846. One-half
of the first engine was to be paid for on-the delivery of the
boilers, and the remainder inthe following March. Under
the terms of this agreement the plaintiffs proceeded with
the first engine, and in doing so certain castings were
made, and several of the most expensive parts of the second
engine were proceeded with; and delivered to the de-
fendants simultaneously with the first.. The portions of
the second engine so completed were fixed up in the de-
fendants' mill, along with the whole of the first engine,
and the plaintiffs were ready to put up the other portions
of the second engine whenever the defendant was ready to
receive them in the mill. Whilst the plaintiffs were going
on erecting the first engine a letter was received by them
from the defendant, to the effect that he did not wish them
to send any more parts of the second engine until the first
was completed and set up. In answer to this letter the
plaintiffs stated to the defendant that they had prepared
all the material parts cf the second engine, and that it
was desirable to have them set up along with the first
engine, but the defendant still refused to allow any fur-
ther portions of the second . engine, to be sent, on the
ground that, according to his . agreement with the
plaintiff, the second engine was not to be delivered
until the machinery in the mill was ready to receive it.
The first instalment of £550 for the first engine was paid
by the defendant on the 4th of June; 1846, and subsequent
payments were afterwards paid, covering the full amount
for the first engine; but with reference to the second
engine, the defendanthad committed a breach of the con-
tract, by refusing to receive it, at least only a part of it. A
part of that engine remained in the hands of the plaintiffs,
and the other part of it in the hands of the defendant, and
the plaintiffs had not been able to obtain a settlement,
even for that pail of the engine which had been delivered
to the defendant. Whilst the, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs was proceeding in his statement of the case, his
Lordship remarked that it was quite clear that the statute
of limitations was the ground, upon which the action
should be tried, and he had understood that the learned
counsel on both sides agreed in, that. The question, there-
fore, was this,—from what time did the statute of limita-
tions in the ease run f—Mr. Millward, in reply, said it was
from the time when the breach was first made by the:
defendant. A writ was servedon the defendant on the 15th
March last.—The Judge : The objection under the statute
of limitations, then, must da beforethelsth;March,lB47.7--
Mr. Millward said that was.so, and he would show that the
breach was not made until after that period. On the 2:50.
of February, 1847, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant
setting forth the state oftbn account. The second engine
was then completed, and. the greater portion of it on. the
plaintiffs' premises, and in their way. On the 4th of
March the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs stating that
he would forward• them a check on the general. account,
and on the 17th of March he forwarded a check for
£250, which was acknowledged on the 18th—the following
day. On the 23d of April the plaintiffs again wrote to
the defendant, asking him to forward £550, according to
the agreement, for- the second engine. On the- 27th of
April the plaintiffs received an answer from the defendant
stating that he could not receive the second engine until
the first was loaded—that is, until the fall- quantity of
machinery which it was to turn was in the,mill ; and he
stated that the gloomy prospects of the trade had obliged
him to give up all idea of carrying on the. business he had
intended, but that as soon as there was such a revival
of trade as to justify him in prudence to receive the
second engine, he would write to them. Some time
after this a letter was sent round to.the defendant's cre-
ditors, stating that he was not ablato.meet his engage-
ments ; and subsequently the plaintiffs were consenting
parties to an arrangement allowing the defendant to go
on, and make as much as he could, for his creditors and
himself. He did so, and since that time had relieved
himself of all his difficulties. He (the learned counsel)
named this in order to chew the reason why the plaintiffs
had allowed the matter to stand over for such a length of
time. If, then, he proved that the plaintiffs had good
ground of action on the question of the statute of limi-
tations, he should then ask the jury for the damage the
plaintiffs had sustained for that, part of the second engine
which had been sent to the defendant, as well as for that
part of it which had been. thrown useless on their hands.—
Mr. James, for the defendant, observed that her proposed
to go into the question of the efficiency of :the first
engine, as well as avail himself of the question of the
statute of limitation.—The Judge here expressed his
opinion that the question was not one for the jury, but
was rather one of law on the point raised by the defen-
dant under the statute of limitations.:—A conversation
then took place between the learned counsel, which ended
in his lordship's suggestion being adapted ; and, after the
examination of a witness on behalf of the plaintiffe, who
deposed to the circumstances under which the contract
took place, Mr. Milward put in a number of letters
which had passed between the plaintiffs and the de-
fendant, commencing on the Bth of September, 1845,
and ending on the 27th of April, 1847, in order to
prove that the terms of the contract were under-
stood to be in force up to the last-named date, and that
the' plaintiff's claim could not, therefore, be prejudiced by
the statute of limitations, which had been set up as a
bar to the action.—The Judge : Now, you rely on
these letters, and the parole evidence you have given as
an answer to the defence set up under the statute of limi-
tations.—Mr. Millward intimated assent.—Mr. James then
stated that his argument was, that the operation of the
statute of limitations must date from the date of the con-
tract originally ; secondly, if not so, it must date from
the first breach on the part of the defendant.—The Judge :
Then you agree it must date from the breach ?—Mr.
James : In the first place, I say it must date from the
date of the contract. But, in order to meet the effect of
the court above ruling that I am wrong on this,-point,
then I say that the breach was committed more
than six years before the action was brought, that
is, in June, 1846. On the face of one of the defendant's
letters, dated June, 1846, he then receded from the contract,
and, therefore, that was a breach of the contract. And
from that time he would never afterwards consent to con-
sider the terms of the contract any longer in force.—The
Judge : Then the point for the consideration of the court
above would be, whether the objection raised by the
learned counsel for the defence could be sustained. If the
opinion of the court should be with the learned counsel
on the statute of limitations, a verdict would be given for
the defendant. If the opinion of the court should be
against thedefendant,thenthe amount ofdamages which the
plaintiff had sustained would be leftto reference.—A verdict
was then taken forthe plaintiff for £3,000, the sum named
in the declaration, subject to the opinion of the court
above on the point of law, and to reference on the question
of damages, which both parties agreed should be submit-
ted to Mr, Fairl,4llT: of MAnchotcr, wigat' veri-_-Attorueys