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TUESDAY MORNING, MAY 2, 1854.

THE WAR.

ALMOST every day we have telegraphic de-
spatches from the seat of war in the East, and yet
it is difficult to point to any prominent fact which
may be said to have an important influence on
future operations. The allied fleets in the Baltic
Sea were, by the last accounts, on their way to
Odessa to commence active hostilities against this
once busy seaport ; but its destruction would do
but little real injury to Russia, inasmuch as its
trade was chiefly in the hands of Greeks, Turks,
and our own countrymen. The contingents of
English and French troops were on their way to
the scene' of contest, but some time must yet
~elapse before they can take any active part in the
strife. In the meantime, the EMPEROR of RUSSIA.
has been augmenting his forces and maintaining
his podtion on both sides of the Danube, the
Turkish forces, under OMAR PA.cire., not being
sufficiently powerful to prevent any effectual re-
sistance until they have been reinforced by their
allies. It is firmly believed, however, that the
CZAR is sadly deficient in pecuniary resources, and,
in the existing state of Europe, he has no means
of recruiting his exhausted Exchequer. He ap-
pears to have relied on the possibility of gaining
his object by a decisive blow in the East, which
the valour of the Turkish troops has hitherto
enabled them to baffle, and also by the arts of
diplomacy operating on the selfish policy of the
German Courts. In this attempt also he has been
unsuccessful, though the vacillating policy pur-
sued by the KING OF PRUSSIA tended materially
to increase the difficulties of the Allied Powers in
deciding upon a course of action. Both Austria
and Prussia have a mutual jealousy of each other,
and both hesitated to break with Russia, by de-
claring their adhesion to the policy of the Western
Powers, through fear that the other might seize
the opportunity to enter into closer alliance with
Russia. In this strife of mutual distrust, the
KING or PRUSSIA has occupied by far the worse
position ; but now that -a treaty between the two,
offensive and defensive, las been agreed to, it is to
be hoped that, if we receive but little assistance
from them as allies, we have little to dread from
them as enemies.

In the Baltic Sea, the English fleet, under Sir
CHARLES NAPIER, to be reinforced shortly by the
French fleet, now on its way thither, is establish-
ing a rigorous blockade of all the ports and gulfs
and many Russian merchant vessels have been
captured. These are not protected by the orders
in Council, which apply 'to Russian ships on their
way to or from British ports, or to Russian goods
on board British or neutral vessels, so that the
-trade of this country should be as little interfered
with as possible. No opportunity has yet been
afforded for a trial of strength with the Russian
.fleet, but from the immense naval force which is
now afloat in the Baltic, their superiority in steam
power, and the spirit which animates the crews,
but little doubt is felt as to the issue of the con-
test. An attack upon Cronstadt would, of course,
involve far more hazard, but the importance of
.sucha conquest, in exposing the capital of Russia
to hostile attacks, will be an inducement to attempt
it, should such a course be considered practicable,
Great caution will, however, be requisite in advanc-
ing northward in the Baltic Sea, as it is of more
consequence to prevent the Russian fleet from
escaping through the passages of the Sound and
the Great and Little Belts, which constitute the
,only means of egress. Notwithstanding the extent
of preparations to carry on the war with vigour, it
still presents many difficulties ; and, in addition to
the effective resistance in the Black Sea and the
Danubian provinces, much will depend on the
effective blockade maintained in the Baltic Sea—
an operation requiring not only a powerful naval
fore, but great skill and prudence on the part of
the officer in command. With reference to the
possible results of the war, should the EMPER©R
OF RUSSIA persevere in his insane opposition to the
united -voice of Europe, we give the following from
the Economist :
" Every information we can collect, both from parties
who know the country, and parties who are in constant
communication with Russian celebrities, lead us to con-
clude, with positive conviction, that the Emperor has re-
solved on the safe course of purely defensive operations ;
that he is preparing for a long, obstinate, unyielding
struggle ; and that he intends to take refuge in his in-
accessibility, and to defy the Western Powers to compel
him to make peace. His ildherents say, ' You may burn
our ships, you may destroy our harbours ; you may even,
at the vast cost of life, take Sebastopol and Cronstadt ; you
may drive us back across the Danube, and even across the
Pruth, though in order to effect all this you must put forth
your strength in a very different manner from anything
which you have yet done ; but when you have done all this
you cannot force us to negotiate. We shall retire within
our frontiers, where you dare not follow us ; we shall thus
compel you to keep up your armies and navies, at a vast
expense, along our shores and boundaries; for the moment
you retire we shall again advance, and we shall thus weary
you out by an interminable war at a distance from your
homes, and amid inhospitable seas and pestilential
marshes. We shall thus have two immense advantages
over you ; we shall be at home, you will be abroad ; you
will be playing your game of chess with knights, and we
with pawns, for in economic value one Englishman or
Frenchman is equal to ten Russians ; we can replace our
men, you cannot replace yours ; and a state of war which
will be costly, harrassing, and annoying in the last degree to
you, will scarcely derange, in any perceptible degree, the
ordinary habits and comforts of our semi-barbarous popu-
lation. In the Meantime the English will grow tired of
the war ; their merchants will become discontented with
commercial interruptions ; the people will grumble at
additional taxation ; and the two new allies, unaccustomed
to act together, will disagree among themselves; coldness
and quarrels will ensue, and the game will be ultimately
won by Russia.' This is the policy we have to fear on the
part of Russia. It is subtle and well-judged, and we have
only one way of meeting it. We must not only beat her
promptly and effectually, but we must weaken her so de-
cidedly that she will no longer be formidable; that, when
once defeated and driven back into her deserts, it will no
longer be necessary for us to keep up an army on her
frontier in order to prevent her re-issuing to recover what
she has lost. We must strengthen her conterminous
neighbours, as well as weaken her, so that they may
henceforth be enabled to hold her in check without the aid
(by land) of the distant Western Powers. Georgia must
be rescued and replaced, and Circassia maintained as an
independent barrier, to keep Russia for' ever on this side
of the Caucasus. The Crimea must be taken also, and
there captured or destro
Sebastopol stormed at any cost, and the navy sheltered
of her emancipation, and would probably rise on the first
Yed. Bessarabia longs for the day
thorough disaster that happened to the Russian arms, if
assured of the faithful and pernianent support of the allies.
leoviee;
of flalaAlonodd
must
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be
ee
Irleesldtor eedi
The Danubian Principalities must be freed from the curse
of Russian occupation and of Russian protectorate for
Fonglawl," either by bSweden
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ord the
b y