The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1838-08-14 00:00:00

THE GRAND JCRY.

The Hon. Ricuann BOOTLE IyILBRAIIAM, 11. P., Leathern

House,

Foreman.

Peter Ainsworth, Esq., M.P., Smithell's Hall.
Sir Thomas Birch, Burt._, The Hazles.
Sir Thomas Brancker, Knight, Liverpool.
Hugh Hornby Birley, Esq., Swinton.
William Bolling, Esq., M.P. Bolton.
John Bourne, Esq Liverpool.

John Entwistle, Esq., Foxholes.
Richard Edwards, Esq., Roby Hall.
William Gale, Esq., Lightburne House.
William Gerard, Esq., Ditton Grave.
James Heywood, Acresfield.
Adam Hodgson, Esq., Everton Breck.
Robert Gregge Hopwood, Esq., Efopwood.
Richard Leyland, Esq., Walton Flail.
John Moss, Esq., Otterspool.
Joseph Ridgway, Esq., Ridgmont,
Clement Iloyds, Esq., Rochdale.
Samuel Taylor, Esq., Eccleston Hall.
Georse William Wood, Esq, M.P., Singleton Lodge:
Wilitarn Gerard Walmsley, Esq., The Platts.
John Wright, Esq , Liverpool. •
The Mayors of Wigan and Ashton-under Lyne were each
fined £5 for not answering to their names when called over.
:Mr. Baron Alderson said it was necessary that they should
acknowledge her Majesty's commission; though it need not
on all occasions be done in person. If therefore some person
on their behalf should appear, the fine might be remitted.

The proclamation against vice, profaneness, and immora-
lity haying been read,
ills Lint DSHIP then delivered his charge to the Grand
Jury, which was to the following effect : He was very glad
to see so full an attendance of the gentlemen of the county;
fur undoubtedly the business with which they would have to
deal would require the utmost attention, for, he regretted to
say, the calendarcontained charges which would require care-
ful investigation, and calm and dispassionate consideration.
He regretted greatly to see the contrast with this division of
the county of Lancaster presented when compared with that
from which they had just come, and he would impress on
their minds the necessity of consideration as to what might
be the cause which made so great a distinction between two
parts of the saute county. lii the one he found no capital case
at all—no case of manslaughter even which was thought fit-
ting after the investigation of the Grand Jury to be put in the
course of trial. Thar...as—sate rsea slight charges in which,
umaer his ausiee; the Grand Jury hail veto property thuught
it necessary to.ptit the parties on their trial,—the rest con-
sisting of small offences such as were usually tried at quarter
sessions, and even those cases were very few in number. This
was all that came before' the tribunal of the assize iu the
northern division of the county of Lancaster, and here, coining
into another part of the same county, he found a calendar of
a very different nature, presenting a proof of viciousness,
which spread its branches over the whole face of this part of
the county. The gentlemen of the county should look about
them to see if anythiug could account for it,—and if any thing,
—being accounted for,—could be done to remedy it. He
urged this upon them as gentlemen most interested in preser-
ving the peace and prosperity of the county—most interested
in the repression of crime, and he hoped they would take the
matter into their most serious consideration when they went
to their own homes. The calendar contained the names of
not fewer than ten individuals accused of the crime of murder.
The Grand Jury would have to investigate carefully one of
these cases, which included the names of seven individuals
and the point fur consideration would be whether the offence
with which the prisoners stood charged amounted to the crime
of murder, or fell short of it, and was properly reduced to that
of manslaughter only. The distinction between the one and
the other would require their careful attention. They knew
perfectly well that the crime of murder consisted in the kill-
ing of one individual by another with malice aforethought;
but that malice aforethought was not confined to a determi-
nation to kilt the individual by reason of a preconceived
grudge. It might be that the general charge of malice might
be implied from the circumstances of the case, and it was to
this latter species of malice that their attention would he di.
reeled. If a person intending to kill another did kill him
without provocation, or without that justification which would
reduce it below the crime of murder, it was clear that a bill
should be found for the mnreer, provided there was an inten-
tion to kill, and a killing. But it' there was no such intent to
kill manifested by a previous determination expressed, they
might still infer a determination to kill, and couple that de-
termination with the killing, if the nature of the circumstan-
ces showed that the party must have had such intention either
to kill or to do some grievous and violent bodily harm. which
would probably issue in death. Now, if a man used a deadly
weapon, it was clear—unless, indeed, he was a madman—that
if a person of sound understanding used a deadly weapon
and killed, no one could infer any thing else than that in
using the deadly weapon he intended that the death following
front it should follow, and, therefore, that he must have in-
tended the death. If a man shot at them with a pistol and
they died, who can doubt that his intent was to kill? If a
man stabbed them with a dagger or cut them down with
a sword, the same consequence followed. So, if a man
used a deadly weapon, like a knife, for instance, and stab-
bed a party, unless under circumstances to which he
would allude by and by, without provocation, so that
death ensued, the offence would be murder. He now
came to another and a different class of cases. Ile would
take that of a man who used no weapons but those which God
and nature had given him—his fists, and with them occa-
sioned death. This was an ambiguous act. It might be that
a person who used his fists, struck and killed, might have in-
tended no such thing as to kill or inflict any grievous bodily
harm; he might have intended to hurt the party, to knock
him down, or prevent his following, but if he used his fists
contirmously after the party was at his mercy, after he must
have known, if he had any understanding left, that the blows
then inflicted must of necessity end in death, or in such bo-
dily injury as would probably terminate iu death, then the
continuance of the blows made him equally guilty of murder
as if he had used a deadly weapon, for the continuance of the
beating, and the continuance of the ill-usage was the same
in effect, the expressed intention of the party to kill. So if a
man used a bludgeon, which was the intermediate case be-
tween the use of fists, and the use of a deadly weapon, he
might use that bludgeon as to reader it as deadly a Weapon
as if he had stabbed, shot, or cut down the party with a sword,
and if the use he made of it showed that he intended to kill
or to inflict such injury as would occasiou death, then he who
so used it was undoubtedly guilty of murder; and if many
persons were together, all engaged in one violent and illegal
purpose, and the violence used all conduced to the coinple-'
tion of the attempt in which they were engaged—if, for, in-
Stance, the parties had a common intent to attack a police-
man, who unfortunately received his death wound, they
would then consider whether the violence used towards him
could be used with any other intent than the intent of killing.
If they thought it was used simply for the purpose of punish-
ment. though that would be improper—tor the purpose of
hurting him, though that would be wrong, and if death en-
sued, that would be manslaughter only ; but if they found
that such violence was used and so continued that rational
persons must have concluded that death was likely to follow
such violence, then the parties were undoubtedly guilty of
murder. So much for that case; but there was a case in
which death had followed from the use of the fists only, and
which appeared to him rather to fall tinder the more merci-
ful classification than under that of murder. 'l' hey would
have. to consider this, and the case might turn out more
strongly than appeared from the depositions. It was the
case of a man from Manchester, who struck another with his
fists only, so that he died. The blow was given in a very
vital part—behind the ear. and they must consider whether
the prisoner intended to kill, or used such violence with an
intention that death should follow. If they thought that that
was not made out, it would be their duty to put the prisoner
on his trial for manslaughter only. On reading the deposi-
tions he should come to that conclusion himself, but the case
might come out more strongly in evidence, and if it did, it
would be their duty to find a bill ler murder. With respect
to the police case, though the weapon used—a bludgeon—
was not a deadly. one in the ordinary acceptation of the term,
it might have been used for such a time, and so violently, us
to render it a deadly weapon, and to show that the intent was
to kill. A third class of cases consisted of persons charged
with stabbing with a knife. They would consider whether
there was aoy provocation that could reduce the offence to
manslaughter. Supposing the use of a deadly weapon to be
proved against the party, they would ' then consider whether
any thing arose on the case before them to show that the
man had received such provocation as would not indeed jus-
tify the act, but might reduce the crime from one class to the
other. But this must he a provocation, not by word of
month, but by blows and violence; if such provocation were
given the offence would be manslaughter, though a deadly
weapon was used—but if a deadly weapon were used without
such circumstances of palliation, it would be murder.
There was another case which was unquestionably one of
murder. He need make no comment on the law, which was
clear, for the only doubt was whether the party accused was
lie who committed the act. The question was one of fact
only—was he or was he not the guilty person—and on that
they would decide iu the first instance. There was another
class of cases which he was sorry to see so numerous—that of
stabbing in which death had not ensued. They should exa-
mine all these cases carefully, and see whether the indict-
ment contained a count charging the person with intent to
murder. They would enquire whether the infent to mustier
existed; if it did, they should take care that it was charged
in the indictment. whilst on the other hand they should throw
it out of the indictment in cases in which they were not satis-
fied on that point, because there was now a distinction be-
tween the crime if charged with intent to murder, or not
with any particular intent, being a capital crime in the one
case, and not in the other. It was therefore necessary that
they should make the distinction now, though it was not so
formerly. With respect to the other count, it was now no
longer necessary, as it bad been before, that they should be
satisfied that the stabbing, cutting, or wounding took place
under such circumstances that, if death had ensued, the
crime would have amounted to murder. It was so formerly,
but it was so no longer, for if death ensued, the crime would
have been manslaughter only; still, if the party maliciously
used a deadly weapon, with the intent charged—if he used it
under circumstances of showing that he intended to do some
grievous bodily harm—if he used it with the intent of maim-
ing or disabling—in all these cases it was necessary to find
the intent, even though provocation had been given, which,
if death had ensued, would have reduced the crime to man-
slaughter • for malice, in the sense in which the word was
used in these acts of parliament and according to the laws of
England, did not consist in a preconceived grudge, but in
every act which was done maliciously, which was done wil-
fully and without a justifiable excuse. By that criterion they
would judge. Every death following the commission of an
unlawful act amounted to manslaughter. If persons agreed
to fight with their Ssts and death ensued, the offence was
manslaughter, because it was unlawful to fight. If death
ensued from furious driving—from the speed with which the
horses were compelled to go by the act of the coachman or
driver—then the driver was responsible. If carelessness
were used by those who had the conduct of machinery, and
in consequence of that carelessness death ensued, the party
using such carelessness was guilty of manslaughter. if, in
administering medicine, it was administered with careless-
ness, negligence, or gross ignorance, the party so adminis-
tering, it was guilty of manslaughter. With all these cases
they were no doubt familiar, and only required that their
memory should be refreshed when cases of this sort came
before them. It was only necessary for him to detain them
with observations on two other cases—in one of which the
prisoner was charged with the commission of an unnatural
offence—in the other with rape. They knew what was ne-
cessaiy in order to prove the completion of these offences.
With respect to one of them, they would have to consider
whether the evidence was such as to induce them to think
that the jury, which would ultimately pass its decision on the
case of the prisoner, must come to such a conclusion as would
lead to his conviction. If they thought that would be the
result, it would be their duty to find the bill; but if they bad
any reasonable doubt on that point, it would be better, as he
always told a grand jury in such cases, that the country should
be spared the ignominy and shame of such an investigation.
He feared, however, that this was not a case of that nature.
With respect to the charge of rape, they would consider
whether the offence had been completed or not, and also
whether it was with the consent of the party or nut. If it
were with her consent, though it was a great and heavy sin,
it was no offence known to the laws of the land, and they
must throw out the bill; but if they were satisfied that the
offence was fully completed, and without her consent, then
they must find the bill. Before he concluded these observa-
tions, which were all he intended to make with reference to
the calendar, he must express his surprise at the vast num-
ber of persons charged with bigamy, and his intention to
make some severe examples, in order that the crime might
be put down, for he saw that it was increasing. He wished

to call their attention to a subject which he had much at
heart, and which this seemed a good opportunity to notice—
he meant the subject of prison discipline. It must be ob-
vious to all, when they considered what prisons were in-
tended for,lhat a good deal must depend upon the classifi-
cation of prisoners to be subjected to discipline. It was
manifest that the discipline for persons kept in custody on
civil process, as they were in this county at present, must be
essentially different from that which should prevail in a gaol
of punishment for crime committed against the state; for iu
the former case a person was detained in order that he might
be induced by his detention to satisfy his creditors with the
money or property which he withheld from them—for if he
did not withhold it, there was no reason to detain him at all.
A distinction ought to be made between the debtor who is
fraudulent and the debtor who was willing to give up his
property for the benefit of all his creditors together; but it
ryas to cif .t
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within a prison which might properly be called a peniten-
tiary. There was another class, also; he meant those who
were put into
.prison in order that they might be detained to
take their trial; these persons might be innocent; and
why, then, subject them to the same penalties'as those who
had been found guilty of the crime with which they were
charged? As long as the same prison contained the class of
debtors, the class of persons accused, and the class of per-
sons convicted—manifestly they could not carry out that
course of discipline for each which ought to be uniform in
every respect. There was also another observation ; the
person who was very properly qualified to manage one
class of prisoners might be a very improper person to
have charge of another, fur a man might have a
taste, a genius and disposition to govern persons who
were subjected to penalties for offences of which they had
been convicted. In somedegree a prison of that sort should
be a place of reform as well as terror; a place of reform, in
order that criminals might amend their ways—a place of ter-
ror, in order that those without its walls might be deterred
from the commission of offences. Until they divided pri-
soners, and had a prison for one purpose and a prison for
another, it seemed to be that there would be very
.great diffi-
culty in carrying out any good plan of prison dicipline. Iu
this county, however, they had a great advantage. He had
already told them of the happy state of the northern division
of the county. There were only eleven prisoners for trial,
but there was a gaol capable of holding six hundred persons,
which was in truth, a penitentiary for the county of Lancas-
ter; and if it contained but few persons accused and detained
to take their trial, it would not be difficult to devote as much
of it as possible for the safe custody of prisoners from all
parts of the county, and so render it a penitentiary for the
county of Lancaster. This hint seemed to him worthy of
consideration, though it would not carry into effect all that
was desired, because it was necessary to have a penitentiary
for children, a penitentiary for women, and a penitentiary
for men, and they should abolish a county gaol, so to speak,
and have penitentiaries for districts. It appeared to him
tkat they mtgbt in this county carry clre,tiwiewan experiment.
He threw out the suggestion very humbly, and with a wish
that it might be of use if attended to,—as no doubt it would
be, with their assistance, and the benefit of their superior
judgment. If it were adopted, then this black calendar—
this heavy assize—might nut have been without its effect.
His LORDSHIP then dismissed the Grand Jury to their
labours.