Star.
London, England, 1810-02-24 00:00:00

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

EIGHTH DAY, FEBRUARY 19.
Rear-Admiral Sir Riciimin KE.AIS examined.
((.oncluded from yesterday's Sr.ta.)
Da you know whether any difficulty was experienced from the
want of sufficient pilots by any part of the fleet ?--Frolit the ex-
perience I have had, I think myself justified in saying, that of all
classes of men in society, or at least of men attached to the Navy,
Pilots are the least to be trusted to, and I ehuuld not have thought
of taking a fleet up either of the Scheldts, upon the most positive
assurances of pilots, without having examined the ttavigation and
satisfied myself; my experience of pilots nukes that caution ne-
cessary.
_ _

How long do you think it would require to have nude that exa-
Vnination of the navigation, as far as Santvliet ?—ln examining
the navigation, very great advantage would have been derived
from the survey with which we were supplied by the Admiralty,
a very excellent survey ; the time that it would have taken to
have examined the t.•:vigation, must have depended greatly upon
the weather : under favourable circumstance*, being, as we were
in possessi.nt of South Beveland, cii the Ist of August, I should
suppoie a very few days would hate been requisite, for we were
♦cry well supplied with the means, small vessels, buorboats,
masters, attendants, and people accustomed to sound and buoy
navigation; it would he very unjust not so say that Government
Lad very abundantly supplied us, in my opinion, with the requi-
site means

Were you acquainted with the state of Ulla, and the boom
across the river at that place ?-1 had the advaneoge only of seeing
1.1110 within a few miles from the ship in which my Bag was
hoisted, and on my approaching nearer it in smaller vessels ; I
was never nearer, I presume, than three miles and a half, or foot
miles; the boom was early thrown across, I ant not certain
of the day, for I ant not sure that we perceived it immedi-
ately, but l think it must have been thrown across the 14th
_of August.
Do you mean that it was not thrown across the river earlier than
the 14th of August?—Their flotilla retired to Lillo on the 11th,
on the arrival of our flotilla, and, I think, on the 13th, went
above the boom. 1 think, on the 1::th, or the 14th, the boom was
thrown across, when their flotilla was all above the boom.

It was then that the boom was closed ; probably it had been
constructed some time before ?—1 presume it is always in con-
struction, ready to be thrown cross

Were you consulted with respect to the possibility of forcing
the passage ?—i was present at a conversation on the subjetet of
Lino and Liefkenskoeik, with my Lord Chatham, Sir Richard
Strachau, and several General Officers, on the 2tith of Auguse.
State what took place in that conversation ?—lt respected the
advance of the army, and the measures to be taken for getting
posse-lion of Lillo and Liefkenshoeik, but the navigation being
open to where the river narrows, a little below Doh, it was con-
sidered liy Sir Richard Strachan that no further measures could
be taken in prosecution of the ultimate object, but in conjunction
with the army.
Was it your opinion that the boom could have been forced ?
If the boom could have been forced, I see no possible good that
could have resulted from it, except the forts of Lillo and Lief.
kenshoeik could have been Aiken possession of.
Supposiag it possible for the shipping to have proceeded up the
Scheldt towards Antwerp, in case the army were compelled to
retreat, would it have been possible for the large vessels to have
effected their retreat, except with a very favourable wind ?—i hold
it impossible fur the fleet to have passed up the Scheldt unaccom-
panied by the army. Their► return, in the event of the army re-
treating, in that narrow navigation, must have been greatly de-
pendent upon the winds; for I believe the ch Lima is in some
places so narrow, that it would have been impracticable to have
tided it down.

The, these would have been danget.that the fleet, in its re.
ereat, would not have -kept pace with theletreat tpf the army ?
I think, with strong westerly winds, the fleet might not have been
ato.e to have got down but with a change of wind.
Isit your opinion that the fleet could not have proceeded up to
Antwerp, unless the army were in possession both of Lillo and
Lief ken.4hoeik ?--it is.

Supposing the army in possession of those forts, could the fleet
have proceeded and returned with safety, if the French were in
possession of one bank of the river, between the forts and Ant•
werp 1-1 think there would have been considerable risk; but
with. such an object in view, I am of opinion Sir Richard Strachan
would have attempted it.
Considering the extent of the armament, and the number of
transports, is it not probiLle that a considerable space of time
would have elapsed, from the period of the fleet sailing from
Deal, till the time when the troops could have been all disem-
barked at Santeliet ?—lc must have been dependent upon weather;
One of thi.,e measures that is subject to great chance.
Is not Vie chance of delay considerably increased by the nar-
oowness, the vrindini!, and the intr:cacy of the mwigatioe ?—Cer-
tainly ; but the channels once buoyed, with the strength of tide
there is in the Scheldt, the ina,ters of transports being generally
much accustomed to tide up and down rivers, I think the diffi-
culties would have been got over.
Would it not have occasioned sotto delay to buoy those chan-
nels ?—it might, under favourable circumstances of weather ; I
think two days, with the advantages which I have before enu-
merated, which we possessed.
lVoold there not have been considerable difficulty in carrying
so large an armament up the Scheldt with several winds ?—lt
would have been more difficult with foul than with fair winds,
and certainly considerable difficulties must have been expected,
and would have been experienced, in moving so large a fleet up ;
but t'ley would have been surmounted, our means being great.

!sit by the East or We 4 Scheldt, you imagine the armament
could have proceeded with the greatest expedition, supposing Sant-
vliet and Antwerp their objects was et opinion, judging
from the charts only, before I sailed from England, that it would
have been more advantageous to have moved the Eapedition up
the Eastern than the Western Scheldt, but the knowledge I now
possess inclines me to give the preference to the Western Scheldt.
From the knowledge you have of the Western Scheldt, do you
think it probable that so large an armament couldbe conveyed up
to the landing place, and from thence proceed by sea and by land
up to Antwerp, without giving the enemy a very considerable
for preparation ?--.lconcee, under favourable eirenmatan.
if weather, the armament having arrived on the Illth of July,
it is possible it might have been at Santvliet in three days.
you include buoying the channel?--I include bodying the
ine
o you include taking possession of the batteries either of
:hem or Cadsand ?—The batteries of South Beveland were
nui possession • bet for a &et of transports to have gone up
Western Scheldt. I conceive the .possession of Plismbhig or
'anti would have been requisite; hut I understood it to be the
inal intention, that all the troops intended to proceed up the
t tick-tat were to be embarked in men of war, which 1 eon-
rd, being in possession, as we were, of South Beveland, might
passed into the Western Sitheldt, notwithstanding Cadsand
'gushing were both in possession of the enemy. In reference
Former question, I would beg to have it understood, that, in
7vent of going up the Scheldt with a fleet of transports, the
,er I gave was supposing Cadsand or Hushing to be in our
I would not attempt to take a fleet of transports up
Cadsand and Flushing in the possession of the enemy; hut
troops, which, I understood, were to be in men of war, I do
tonsider eintsand or Flushing at all material.
point of fact, were the troops which were to land at Sant-
tunveyed in men of war ?—The arrangement, I believe, was
• to take thent all in men of war,; but, by some mistake, at
line of embarkation. sante troops, intended to have gone in
hf war for the Western Scheldt, were embarked in trut-
h • -
ail events, must not the ordnance, the mortars, and the ar.
horses, have been conveyed in transports ?—I believe that
vision was made for their being conveyed in transports.
"hen it would have b.:en necessary for an army to have pro.
with a view to besiege Antwerp, with all that was neces-
Tnr that siege, to have been in possession eiths:r of Flushing
Cadsand ?-11orsea might have been kindest on South_Beve--
and marched to the other end of the island, and the number
insports in whkh the artillery and mortars would have been
irked, I ,hotild eoreeive might have beet towed by the men
at, or taken wins the mesa of war.
'could the the•t ore; AtiOUS have been considerably retarded,
fort at Baths bad liven defended as it might have been ?--
would have been retarded; I presume Bathz was a work
the army v. QUI% have got into in the course 44 a few days,
ugh it had been defended. •
4el you Una:l.rand that Lillo and Lientenshoelk were capable
sitsiderable defence?-1 understood such to be the opinkm of
cary ; the vitt* of August. at Baths; 1 believe they
arca,: that COliki nut hat been rtdaced by the Ma,/ y.

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