Star.
London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

nisters from this irnputation. 'The expeditroo ssisent
to the Scheldt not for selfish-purposes, but to operate
as a powerful diversion. Was this country, as affairs
then stood, to turn its back upon the Continent
They were bound to their allies to send an Expedition
to the Continent. It was their duty to send an army
to the opposite coast, even though it should not be Age
to make any considerable advance from it. Four dayi
before the expedition was determined on, Government
received news of the battle of Aspern, in which • the,
French were supposed to have lost 50,000 men. Were
they not justified in sending an army of 40,000 to the
Continent, at a moment when the fate of the world
depended on what was passing on the Danube. In con-
sequence of that battle France was drained a sec ond time
of the most efficient part of her military population.
The great battle, that followed, that of Wagram, ad-
verse as the result of it was'-to the Austrians, sheaved
the pers®n at the head of the French Government the
danger of committing his Crown to a second struggle.
The issue of that battle was only known to his Majes-
ty's Ministers the day before the expedition sailed. To
prove that the expedition operated a diversion in favour
of Austria, it was not necessary to short!, that troops were
sent from the Danube to oppose it. It was sufficient

admit of being compressed into a narrow compass.
The question was in a great degree professional in its
nature, and only to be travelled over with great diffi-
dence. He felt much indebted to the Noble Lord for
the opportunity he had afforded him of stating his
sentiments to the House. No other tribunal could
possibly have enabled him to bring his views of it be-
fore the Public. No other mode of discussing or exa-
mining it could have enabled him to separate that
mass of calumny that was attached to it. The public
fortunately were, or might be, in possession of the
whole of the evidence that was given at tbe Bar.
Hardly a question that was proposed was stopped, so
that they had every information before them precisely
as it was sought. The question which ought to be for
their consideration was not respecting an expedition
that had been tried and failed, but respecting an 'ex-
pedition which had not been tried. The latter part
of the expedition never had been reduced to practical
effect. Whether it might or might not have succeed-
ed,was merely a question of theoretical knowledge, the
issue of which was to be tried. As to the policy of
the measure, he entered upon the discussion with a
firm conviction that Government stood upon .a rock

that was not to be shaken. In the course of the exa,
mination, he had been asked his opinion as to the
opinions which came from the Horse Guards ; and
the impolicy of the attempt was endeavoured to be
inferred frurn the discourngin;,T nature of these opi-
nions. But did it not often happen, that there was
material difference between formal opinions and, those
_ that were given in the coarse of conversation ? There
was no mode less calculated to promote a service
than a formal opinion, given on certain data, which
would of course govern the nature of the opinion ;
there was none in which more useful information
could be obtained, than in detailed conversation.—
Lord Chatham, for instance, had given no' formal
the lb; of the Expedition ; but he did

if he could sliew that corps were prevented from join-
ing the army in Moravia. But it was a fact that
though no troops were detached from the Danube, the
garrisons of Custrin, Glogau, and the other fortresses
in Silesia, were concentrated and sent into the North
of Germany to oppose it. As to not sending the ex-
pedition in the first instance to that quarter, nothing
would have been more unjustifiable. In the first place
it would be necessary for them to create an army in
the North of Germany ; and, were they afterwards to
disgrace themselves by abandoning it ? Government,
whatever might be said, were rather inclined to the
generous side of the question, and to benefit the Con-
tinent, than serve their separate interests. It had
been imputed as blame to the - that they had

opinion on . subject _ ..le Expe. ;
it in a much more effectual way, in repeated inter-
views and conversations. What was the use of opi-
nions, but for the purpose of balancing all the risks
and gains of an Expedition ? This could not be done
by puffing a case on paper, which, from the very
ature of it, must be stated as drily as if it were pro-
s osed to a lawyer. He, for one, would not avail
himself of a formal opinion to obtain a shabby cloak
kr his conduct, whatever it might have been. But
the fact was, that though he could produce no formal
(pinions directly in favour of the late Expedition, he
• had a variety of conversations with different Officers
on•the Expedition. These were so satisfactory that
be mob the King's pleasure, on the 14th of June, on
the subject of the landing at gantvliet, though the
measure was not finally decided until the 21st of Juste.
There were only two lines of operation.; In his vie*
-rk Id be *- 'de r*-- :Ant one

Ministry
not taken more military opinions. They were not,
however, always to be relied-upon ; it was like laying
the title deeds of an estate before counsel ; he might
' deny the validity of the title deeds, and yet ten to
one but next morning he would set off and purchase
the estate.—(A laugh.) He was content, however,
to defend the object even of retaining Waicheren ; it
was no contemptible object, as it involved the posses-
sion of the port of Flushing, a port of the utmost naval
consequence to the enemy in every point of view. The
objection to die climate he should not now combat ;
he wished, indeed, that the medical department of the
Expedition should be totally reserved as a separate
question. This objection ,however,was often over-ruled
by a paramount interest; and the risk was considered in-
, ferior to the benefit which the possession of this island
procured. This had been proved to be the opinion,
of our ancestors in many cases. In the time of Queen

by which an attack cou. made on _werp ;
which should go directly to the Scheldt, another in.
volving a march across the Continent. The hitter he
zonsidercd as impracticable, not so the former. It
was not,' he would contend, necessary for Govern-
tnent to protect itself as to the policy of an Expedi-
tion, by the previous sanction of a military authority.
- Me could appeal to Gentlemen on the other side on
id he find any

Elizabeth it was retained ; in 1747 and 1794 .it wax
also kept possession of ; it had, indeed, been retained
by many 'different Administrations, and relinquished
rather on grounds of military interest than medical
inexpediency. The unwholesomeness of the climate
of Walcheren was not, 'however, to be imputed to
him as involving the fate of the whole army; it could
not at most only concern that part of it which was de-

'He never heard, ncr eon]

stined to the island itself ; and, of course, did not in-

volve that part which was destined to Antwerp, com-
paratively healthy. A hope, indeed, had been en-
tertained, that the ultimate object of the Expedition,
the seizure, or destruction of the ships, might have
been effected before they got above Antwerp, or
even under the protection of Liilo. This hope was
b• If those chances of war which it

frustrate )y one Ix
was impossible to foresee, and which therefore no
Ministry should be condemned for not guarding
against. The chief question now then to be considered
was, whether the advantages naturally to be expected

from the Expedition were -worthy of its adoption, and
in this point of •iew the risks were first to be consi-
dered. As to the risk of disease, it was only to be
judged of on the limited scale in which he had al-
ready considered it, and had proved to be much
greater than even medical men expected. As to the
expence of the Expedition, this had been at first im-
puted to Ministers, by the indignation of the city of
London, as exceeding 15 millions. When the de-
bate came cn in that House, those fifteen millions
dwindled down to five or six. Now he could posi-
tively, and without fear of contradiction, state, that
the additional expence entailed upon the country
by the Expedition, did not exceed one million ster-
ling. A great part of the force had been conveyed by
the navy, which was in regular pay, and a great esta-
blishment of transports was necessarily obliged to be
kept up in consequence of the possible emergencies
of our troops in the Peninsula. These considerations
necessarily diminished the supposed additional ex-
pence of the Expedition. Now, he would ask, was
one million a sum too great to risk for the accom-
';shment of the objects which they had in view It

might be said those objects were impossible. Go-
vernment had, however, acted upon the best possible'
information ; they had been enabled to know exactly
the situation of the enemy's force at a given period, ,
and were of court enabled to calculate the necessary
force to be opposed to it. The greatest possible force
of the enemy. even at the latest period, soldiers,
sailors, &c. included, did not amount to more than
30,000 men. We had, including seamen, a force of
46,000 to act against Antwerp. Tf any man was to
doubt, under , these- circumstances, the possibility of
executing our proposed purpose, it would be a foul de-
, preciation of the value of our forces. It was said, how-
ever, we had no plan, and the Noble Lord opposite
seemed td rely much on this supposed discovery. It
must however be recollected, that it was impossible for
General to be able to state, at the bar of that House,
a speculative plan, ready cut and dry, to be used withal
out any regard to time, place, or circumstances. A hope'
had been entertained that the Navy would be enabled
to co-operate in the higher bunches of the Scheldt,
and General Brownrigg had in his testimony fully
confirmed this opinion. This was, then, not to be
idered br

f Arrows t and
.44 had a great deal
. the hour was far ad.
Adjournment was put by the
the affirmative. The
at Half-past Two

_ -.Le ships
not to be expected thit un Administration was ne-
cessarily to know the exact soundings of every river
Ito which they might destine an Expedition ; but
still, even if the ships did go four miles up the river,
above Antwerp, it was no argument that they were
' therefore secure from attack ; they might be destroy- '
.ed from the banks of the Scheldt, supposing, as Mt
would have been the *case, that the country had been DAI
7 6si
in our possession, in consequence of a protracted mi- ,uer .
litary operation. The Noble Lord here commented
on the strange circumstance of Lord Porchester's not We have thil morning received German Papers to
having ever thought proper to call in evidence the th rt 3 1 •
e tl, Paris Papers to the 2lst, and Dutch to the
Quarter Master General, from whom the fullest in- 24th
instant. The private letters from the Elbe are
formation might have been expected, and by whose
documentary testimony the House had been so ac- filled with details respecting the vigour with which
curately instructed. He neglected also to call either the interdiction of commercial intercourse with this
the Commanding Officer of the Artillery, or of the country and her colonies, is enforced. At Hamburgh
Engineers, who, one would have supposed, were so
and the other Northern 'parts of Germany, corporal
capable of giving adequate assistance in any dim-
i
cut All these Officers ' ' fully - in the punishment besides mprisoninent for one, two or

o'clock, tc, this titsY.l

'I

E EVENI

GS'.

LONDON.
-. •
TUESDAY, MARCH 27.
. PRICE OF STOCKS THIS DAY AT ONE O'CLOCK *
3 per. Cent Cons. For money 68113—ace. 69 to 69i.
per Cent. Navy 99.1}—Exchequer Ss. to lOs. prem.

•

ity, - ----- bad agreed
possibility of taking Antwerp b'y a coup.&-main. That three months, is the certain consequence to any per-
a coupde-main was not incompatible -with i siege, son who is found with sugar, tea, coffee, or tobacco,
he proved by reading several military opinions, and in his possession. - The German Papers contain at
particularly that of General Ligonier en the trial of
fun length the Decree of tle King of Paussta against
Sit John Mordaunt, concerning the siege of Rochefort.
the commerce of this country, a correct abstract of
Having then the information which they had, and the
sanguine hopes in which they were in consequence so which, appeared in the 'STAR of yesterday.
The Paris Papers contain a detailed account of the
wellgrounded, itwould have been culpable in Ministers
to have doubted of their prospect of success; it would ceremonies performed at Vienna on the marriage by
have been a prodigality, indeed, of our military force
proxy, of the Emperor of FRANCE, to the Princess of
to place them, with any doubt, in competition with
AusTara.—Th:s will be found in our front page.
the motley corps of soldiers, sailots, conscripts, and
custom-house officers, which composed the enemy. e
!•
The Dutch Papers state the departure of the Vice-
f Italy fin- Paris, to be present at the marriaa•
The division of Dutch troops under General Gration, Ro
c,

which went to Stralsund, had not to Holland i
until the month of September. He believed at the time I
the Expedition arrived, the Dutch had very few more The American frigate, John Adams, which has
been kept waiting at Cowes in the Isle of Wight, for
troopsthanwerenecessary to garrison BergenopZoom. .
dispatches frdm Mr. PINKNEY, the American Minis-
The Emperor of France had himself acknowledged in
the Moxiteur, that there was at that time a great fer- ;ter, sailed yesterday,
ment and disaffection in many of the departments. He Dispatches were yesterday received at the Foreign
saw no reason for believing In the Morning Chronicle of yesterday there was, that the garrison of Ant- Office, from Spain.
weep was at all respectable in numbers prior to the .
21st.—The force that was destined to attack them a long article stating that, in the course of last week,
was 23,000 choice troops, aided by near 20,000 sea-
various negociations were carrying on to extend or to
men, and this force, greaea% it was, would have been alter the basis of the Administration. We have been
still further reinforced after the fall of Waicheren --at some pains to ascertain the correctness of the state-
He
He considered that the private information which Go-
ment to which we have alluded, and we feel it a
vernment bad, was far superior in value to the se-
duty which we owe to the public to assert that it is
collection of Sir William Erskine, of the state in not founded in truth.
which Antwerp was 16 years ago. It had been ob• ARMY..—Sir LUCAS PEPYS, late Physician General,
served by many, that the Expedition had been long is President of the Royal College of Ph)hicians of
and Ph- - -to the Kin;

. .

4 thi enemy. The fact, however, was, that
_.geral Monet was afraid of an invasion in the month
of April, before any such measure was resolved on ;
it was from the corps of General Crawford that they
expected this invasion, although the real destination
,of his troops was for Portugal. He believed, how-
ever, that they had no information at all respecting
the real , of the Expedition, and that instead

destination
of HoHaul, they believed it was proceeding to the

London, ysician lg.
Mr. KBATE, late Surgeon General, receives £lOOO
per annum for tke Surgeoncy cf Chelsea Hospital—
is Surgeon to the Prince of Wales and to the Duke
of York, and is Master of the College of Surgeons of
London.
We are sorry to hear that General Fox had lately
I a from his horse at Portsmouth, whither he bad
Government.

Nortis of Germany. He thonlit the' merits of
the question. in a military point of view, would be
best estimated from the speculative opinions of mili-
tary men, and although he was ready to bear testi.
molly to the merits of- Sir William Erskine, _yet he
would not say that his account of Antwerp, from
what he had seen sixteen years ago, ought to outweigh

the recollection atid opinion Of all the other Military
characters, who had as good an opportunity o(eing
acquainted with Antwerp as he possessed. He
thought that, considering all the circumstances of the
had _ _
-)f

Expedition, it _ a fair and reasonable prospect of
success at the time that it sailed. If he bad shrunk
from advising the expedition, tinder these circum-
stances. he should have conceived hiinself guilty of
a gross violation of duty. It was not to be argued
that Ministers should never venture an expedition
without a mathematical certainty of success. It
was not by this cautious, policy that our navy had
added so much honour to the country, and that Nel-
son atchieved such splendid victories. Risks must be
run when the object was equal to them. Our army
had lately rivalled the exploits of the navy, and when
Sir John Stuart won the memorable battle of Maida,
or when our armies drove the French from Egypt
and from Portugal, those important advantages were
not obtained without considc'able risk. He did not
mean to say that Ministers would be justified in send
ing our armies on wild romantic expeditions, at-
tended-ivith great risk ;' but when the risk was not su-
perior to the object, they would be criminal in not ex-
erting the power of the country, whether it was far
the attainment of British objects alone, or whether it
was for objects combined with the interests of our

of the armies of

'.. ' - ' ,•• - . - .
-
Ptiiiiiit ; bat ileteaiiingh Mink* aldialhisiabe '-errhirig Wag tere freqsanferks of ,
on a bombardment, ' still,- dating that opariakia, thd Mr. Pdosouby, haviagatated that he in
ships on the stocks might ,be ;destroyed, the -arsenal Co say on the ilubject; and that the hot
il
burned, anti even the fleet afloat receive much 4unoy- vanced, the question of Adjournment t
ante. There was not a single probable proof to shew SPEAKER, and carried in the affir
that the ships had even got Above the Citadel. It was House watt of _course. adjourned, at I
, . . • _____,_ --- -- —,A.--.1. ...a .1::. .I—.. *1