Star.
London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

;

that the country would not 'be satisfied
such an armament stop short with -
a success as the seizure of Walcheren.
grave was very ardent, and the Admiral
of their The Chancellor of the Ex
also desciv3i' of sending out an expedit
sheaved no disposition to send it to any quarter
rope where it might be connected with,
Important diversion in aid of those.great
rations which were deciding the fate of
of the world. For some years past,
been employed in increasing our regular
number far beyond any that we had
before, in order to be prepared for a .
terference with continental operations.
time enough to plan and arrange every thing _
views, yet when they at last sent over the army, they
forgot that bullion was a necessary article, and that,
indeed, it was sometimes as needful and as useful in
such operations as even powder and shot. What plan
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was more
particularly attached to, he could not tell—but it was
probable, that just at that time, he had -some little

In the Seem Committee
[ that our men of war might
transports coed not go I,y
. fire from that place. The.
Ant Weep, Ministers said had
the late unfortunate atteinFt
!hem a tatinniteobject,* and pet
:0 the preliminary and indis-
consideration, whether the defences of the
Schetdrtould "be passed, or Ikbetiier they
(Year'!)` The occupation
considered to be essential, auf
gate him some kind of plea-
because it brought to mind
of pat t of the' natal service
..0 meant the gallant conduct of
„aptain _ , cif the Raven ; but how did ire•
represent the ;natter? the shells of Flushing, said the
truly gallant Captain, came aboard- him, while the
round shot from Cadsand went through him I---,
1( Hear, hear.) Sir Richard Strachan told themlar,
ther, that the ship was crippled and grounded.—
Thui we sent to force that passage without considet-
- the of ' ! Then • 'me at Luc.

quiry. -.The letter of Lord Castlereagh to the Com-
mander in Chief was the next point of evidence.—
The advisers of this unfortunate measure, having re-
solved that they should have an Expedition, turned,
to ask the advice of professional men ; but it would
appear as if they asked it for the express purpose of
acting against it. His Lordship's letter says, that
the plan had been long in agitation : he takes away
from himself all the excuse that might flow from
piste, or want of time for digesting his plan. The
letter stated that no certain intelligence had been ob-
tained of the number of troops in Holland, or of the
state of the general military preparations there ; but
that the greater number of the troops for the defence
of the coast had been marched into the interior, and.
left the coast more naked than it had been ever before,
or probably, would ever be again. Sir D. Dundas, not
relying solely on his own opin►on in an affair of such
importance, took that of five military men of experi-
ence ; his.answer follows the letter paragraph by pa-
ragraph ; he expresses himself unwilling to give an
- caffie'-nt information has'been had ;

:rigate ; _ they
had but one pit Sir Richard Strachan could not
find him when he wanted him. Lord Gardner's fleet
thought that tcpass up theScheldt without possessing
Cadsand, &c. would be destruction. The person
examined had likewise"mjnutely stated the winds ye.
quired, particularly of two points between North and
South, r

opinion len no sufficient
he thinks that nothing but the clearest, most distittct,
and perfect information can be a ground for proceed-
ing ; and then taking it for granted that such infor-
mation is to -be procured, details two modes of at-
tack, one-by a march over land, and the other by a
course similar to that which was afterwards followed.
He observes, that the actual strength. and situation
of fortresses, and troops, must be fully known before
any thing could be undertaken with a calculation of
success. He then conceives the army to have arrived
before Antwerp, where he was once as a Comman-
der. ,'his he speaks of as a strong town, and capable
of standing a regular siege, at least till the whole ,
force of France and Flanders came pouring upon
the British. This was, one would suppose, enough
to have awakened the Noble Lord ; this might have
stopped his ambition ; this might have shaken him
from his idle dream of pernicious enterprize, and
taught the enthusiast that his laurels were not to
be gathered on the bloody fields of Zealand ; this
might have taught him not to risk the last dispose-
able army which he had, which he could create, and
risk it on an expedition more disastrous than that
from which it had but just returned. Sir D. Dundas
-.711?

plan of his own, which he did not communicate to his
colleagues. The Admiral appeared to have * plan.;
but the Commander in Chief 'appeared to have no
plan at all. The Noble Lord .had• felt it' difficult to
settle what plan he should pursue on. the.present oc-
casion ; but he should then endeavour to 'follow up
what seemed to have been the' intention of the Go-
vernment. The general understanding of the busi-
ness seemed to be; that part of` nut army was in the
first instance to take possession of the isl And of Wat-
chmen, and to take Cadsand by another corps: The
main body was to advance to Santvliet to about the
number of 21,000, including however eight detach-
ments to be sent to South Beveland. This was so
far the apparent plan, which, however, related, ac-
cording to documents before the House, in not very
intelligible language,. to 44 a second, ulterior, s;multane-
out, subsequent operation .1" (Hear, hear.) Now it was
necessary that the main body. should get to Santvliet
as speedily as possible ; and accordingly four days
were calculated for its passage from the Downs to
Santvliet. Sir R. Strachan had said, that'll wind
and weather were favourable it might be done in a
week ; but atter all, with every precaution thathad
vessels - behind, and some

necessary for going up the river to .Batz. This
acumstance became still more important in prckeed-
ing up the river, which was so very winding, that to
realize the calculations of his Majesty's Ministers they
ought to have priwided relays of favourable winds
at all its turnings: The Slough passage was very
difficult of navigation even-for merchant vessels Tuna
ivithaut the proper winds in the Scheldt, the whole
object most. have been speedily abandoned. We
seemed to have forgotten the time to be lost itt:tak-
ing South Bevelanci; yet the capture of that and Batz
were silisolutely-necessary. Although they were ac-
quired so-soon, that was not a -matter to be depended
upon ; for Sir Richard StraFhan was surprized on
receiving information from Sir Join Hope of the sur-
render of ffatz, which the General thought might
have held out some days, and our means of reducing
which we !were even obliged to land at the distance
of some miles from the place. Thus we neglected to
alloW•for probable and unavoidable accidents, for the
manning of the flotilla, for the eking of South *Dive-
land, and for the reduction of Betz. The calculations
of General Brownrigg, who did think success doubt-
ful, we=e favourable only upon the supposition of our
landing on the Ist, 2d, or 3d of August, but no far-

ag means , effecting if. we can._
to Santvliet, another step in this romance of a cam,
paign ; for a rotnance it was, and, like a very cele.
brated production of that nature, contained, .among
.other curious particulars, something about an attack
on a wind-mill.—(Heiv.)—Sir Home 'Popham had'
stated, truly enonglii that *Fort Lillo was a desirable
object in making xvay to Antwerp ; and that Officer
seemed to think that the introduction of a few rockets
and shells would have influence enough with the pee-
ple of that city to induce them to press for the
sue-
'render of the place; but it is not shewn how
(commanded as they were by a garrison and a cita-
I del, and even by those very ships, which, by taking
out their guns, could be carried above the city
towards Dendermonde) the rockets were to persuade
them to press the military for this surrender. Sir
Tome Popham, it appeared, would first mask Lillo,
then, perhaps, he would mask Antwerp, and go
after the ships and attack them, if they were moved
,up the river. The cpinion of General Sontag was
'pretty sanguine. The General had been, he under-
stood, in foreign as well as British service, and was
said. to have seen military operations upon a large
s:ale ; but his Lordship did not know that his opi-
.

urges Lord Castlereagh to consider the delay and the
disparity of force .which might make the expedition
ruinous and disgraceful. The next evidence is that
of General Calvert ; and his evidence deserved par-
ticular notice, as he had, what Ministers egregiously
had not a knowledge of, the local. He says plainly,
that the most rapid movements must be liable to
much impediment ; that the forts on the Scheldt
must be taken before the fleet could pass up the river
—and that the ignorance respecting the force which
the enemy could bring down, precluded any thing
like the formaLion-of a fair estimate of the chances of
success. It appears that the measure of information
which Lord Castlereagh felt enough to make him
hazard fleets and armies, was not enough for even the

been taken, some were 1, _-
stranded. In addition to that cause of delay, it was
found quite necessary to take South Beveland, since
the enemy had batteries on that island all up the river
as far as it went ; and besides, Batz might hold out
for some time. The Noble Lord then referred to a
letter of Lord Castlereagh to the Commander in
Chief, of the 23d of June, stating, that, on the 21st,
he had received the King's pleasure that the expedi-
tion should go forward. The ardent zeal of the Se-
cretary of State had outrun the royal sanction ; for
he had, previously to obtaining it, told Sir David
Dundas to hold- the army in readiness. The great
objects of the expedition were stated to be, the cap-
ture or destruction of the enemy's ships at Antwerp,

ther. ft was supposed that Batz would be-taken in-an
hour or two. As for Cadsand, a nortr-west wind WAS
wanted ; but then that rude north-wester produced a
surf on a lee-shore. General 13rownrigg thought
success doubtful, from wind, weather, &c. but that
on the 3d August there would have been a fair pro-
spect.of the further success of our operations. Being
asked more particularly as to those causes which tea-
dered the completion of the proposed cbjects so very
doubtful, General Brownrigg had stated the unfortu-
nate necessity they were under of- assembling ;he
armament in the Roompot—a circumstance, he added,
which would not have Occurred, had they been ac-
quainted with the great inconveniences of the Slough
Passage. the ' of So'

nion in this case was much better for that circum-
stance. He had been at Antwerp in the times of Pi-
chegru ; but we were now only considering the case
of an expeditiou of 17,000 men against Antwerp.—
The French Empire could not have been so low in
respect to military resources in this quarter, as to be
unable to collect a copsiderable force speedily from
Holland, from Flanders, from Westphalia, or from
the vicinity of the capital itself, in a quarter, too*
where it was acknowledged there are so many chan-
nels of communication. It was reported that there
were very few troops left in Antwerp. Why, there
might not possibly be more than one regiment in
Portsmouth; but would Bonaparte send such an ex-
pedition, if he could, to attack Portsmouth_ upon

..... enough for ___
adventurous spirit of military men. He was of opi-
nion that the sieges of the towns must at all events
occupy a period sufficient to allow the collecting of
the wh.,le force of the Dutch and Flemish garrisons,
to over, helm the few troops that must be dispersed
through' that most difficult country. Colonel Gor-
don's evidence declares that the data, which to Lord
Castlereagh's military ardour gave all satisfaction,
did not give him (Colonel Gordon) room for even a
guess at the strength of the defence which might be
opposed to the British troops. He supposed that the
chief force of the line had gone towards Germany ;
but he knew nothing of the militia, which might be
broug%t forward on an emergency. He thought that
Cadsand and South Beveland ought to be occupied,
that the fleet might have no difficulty in going up the
river. The letter concluded by declaring, in the most
impressive and decided terms, that the enterprize was
one of the most desperate nature, and that it was not
to be doubted, that it was one which must put a large
proportion of our naval and military means into im-
minent danger. General Broderick's evidence-esta-
blished the conclusion which had been derived from
the former authorities. General Hope's opinion began"
by making a variety of assumptions, on which, sow-
ever, the whole difficulty of the attempt lay. He as-
sumed that the precise extent of the danger tirss
known, and that the precise forte to meet that danger
was in full preparation. Having disembarrassed him-
self of these difficulties, he assumed that the destina-
tion of the service was the destruction of the fleet and
arsenal at Antwerp. He thought Lillo and the other
forts must be taken before a safe approach could be
made ; and, upon a mature weighing of the whale
matter, decided upon it, that the attempt would be
- mischief.
-if it failed,

and in the Scheldt ; and, if possible, the rendering
of the River Scheldt no longer navigable—and this,
they now told us, was to be done by a coup-de-
swain. This was the object on which their eyes
had been•-fixed for so long a period. Another ob-
ject was the arsenals and depots at Tergoes and
Flushing, though perhaps nobody knew any thing of
such arsenals. As to the scheme of destroying the
navigation of the Scheldt, it was impracticable. As
soon as Flushing was gained, reinforcements were to
be sent forward, it being still deemed important un-
der many contingencies, to hold the island of Wal-
eleven. This Expedition must surely have been con-
sidered as a powerful diversion upon the Continent.
He could not but request the House, when they look-
ed at it in that point of view, to'consider that the main
body of it- consisted of not more than 17,000 men,
who were to return directly after they had accom-
, plished the specific object of Antwerp. The Noble
Secretary of State, however, hopes confidently that'
all the difficukiei will be overcome. How ? Not by
methods provided or foreseen by Government, but
forsooth, by the valour and energy of his Majesty's
troops ! He could not, however, omit a principal
point, the probability of those ships being protected'
by the enemy. He then prudently considers difficul-
ties and possible failure, and yet points out not the
slightest method by which to overcome them. He
followed this up by saying, although the objects of
our Expedition could be removed farther from us at
the discretion of the enemy, yet it was deemed' neces-
sary to recommend the undertaking of the Expedi-
tion. The House should bear in mind that we could
not go from Santvliet to Antwerp with safety, but
with the possession of one of the banks of the Scheldt.
The north bank of that river and the possession of

such information ? Could we not, even though, per-
haps, we' have not above 10,000 regular effective
troops in the country, collect our militia and other
means of resistance ? Of our great army, not more
than 17,000 could ever get to Antwerp ; and yet we
had been told, that 4.0000 men would be requisite
to besiege it. General Don had said, that great
alarm was excited in Antwerp by the terror of the
British fleet. As for the people of Antwerp, they were
not so formidable from their numbers. The popnla.
don, which had long been falling off, could not have
received any great recent increase, unless we consider-
ed the number of military or naval persons stationed
there, who were not in the usual estimate of resident
population. Every body knew that Antwerp was fot
a long time past only the monument of departed great•
ness. A gallant General being asked how he could
have reduced Antwerp, answered, by vigoroas at-
tacks on all the weak points ; then came something
about the windmill. But had we an army of such an
amount to carry on the battaringia breach ? Was all
this to be attempted on the 'faith of recollection, not
quite accurate, of Genenal Sontag I -It, was said, by
bringing up a great number of guns. Very proper
certainly ! Then, how take Lino ? Why with cannon
and mortars I But could not the enemy make use of
dikes, and inundate a considerable part of the land in
their defence ? But then, by what vigour, under all
these circumstances, we were to get up to the ships
and destroy them, if they were moi'ed high erup the
river, was a poser that had not been distinctly an-
swered.. In all has calculations, General Brownrigg
proceeded. upon the supposition that 30 pieces of ord-
nance was to be employed. In one instance, how•
ever, that _officer had stated, that of these fifteen

Lord Castlereagh, , Secretary .rate,
being examined in the House, as to the time he calm
lated upon to be taken in the passage of the Expedi-
tion, had said, that he expected that it might arrive
there in a few days from the Downs. Being asked an
important question respecting his. information con.
cerning the strength and movements of the enemy's
forces in drat quarter, and the probable nature and ex-
tent of the resistance he might expect him to make, his
Lordship had answered, that he could not presume to
judge-of the movements of the enemy. That Noble
Lord had certainly- a right tb decline giving an an-
swer to that question, for obvious
_reasons, had he
chosen to do so ; but, having given that answer, he
would venture to say, that that Noble Lord stood •
condemned upon his own testimony. Was he not to
calculate with care the time that might be necessary
for forwarding the operations of this great expedition,
to acquire some knowledge of the strength of the
enemy, and his means of augmenting that strength,
and to take these important circumstances fully into
his consideration ? Was lie to send an Officer and
troops abroad, not knowing what they were to meet
with ? That was the great point for strict judgment,
and for conclusive information, before he sent out the
armaments ; a point, indeed, on which essentially de,
pended die fate of .our gallant army, and on which
might have depended the fate of the kingdom !
(Hear!) The Noble Lord (Purchester) came next to
the examination of a Noble Earl (Chatham) who
was the Commander in Chief of this expedition.—
The Noble Earl was certainly very prudent and cal-
tious in respect to giving any opinion ; bf had no
wish to engage in that sort of .campaig4 but what
had come from him was certainly, in its effect,' very I
like a sarcasm upon his colleagues in the Ministry..-
_ -

full of hazard, likely to do much .
little good if it succeeded, and leaving us this conso-
lation, in not making the attempt, that nothing of se•
rious advantage was lost by our leaving the matter as
it was. Of five military men, four were directly ad-
verse, and one unfriendly to the plan; but the Ministers,
in the spirit of their ruinous enthusiasm, must exhibit
a mad perseverance ; they melt-have naval opinion&
Sir Home Popham was summoned to state his ideas
on the attack of Antwerp. In his answer, giving a
plan of the Expedition, he particularly pressed three
••points ; one, that the troops should be embarked in
ships of war, as the transports must impede the ope-
rations ; the second, that few horses should be em-
barked ' • and the third, that the Expedition should be
-pushed forward immediately ; that it should not be
relayed be Id the middle Of June,_ when the

South Beveland were thought to be indispensable.—
Sir Home Popham had given it as his opinion, that)
with every circumstance of wind, ecc: being favour-
able, we might be on the coast-from the Downs in
I.24.'hours, and in 48 hours afterwards at Santvlief.--.
lir Richard Strachan had said, that -we could not do
' •vritbon;lgreat darTer and loss to our ships and.
is from Bate' 'which inesit therefdre be taken, and
!Where Sir John ilopebadstttedthere were 14 or 15
guns mounted: South Bevelind and Batz must,
-therefore,be taken.. Sir Richard .IC:rats, one of the
gllta
most experienced Naval Officers, 'held, * high Coin.
iuttknd in the Expedition, but does `nor appear that
b:hie lilts in any respectpreviously &insulted. He lead,
tbolitorer,- made a communication to Lord Castle.l
-,' litho,- shewed but little disposition to consult
-
---ts; it

Some facts, indeed, the Noble—Earl had stated:to tha
House ; one of which wasi that you could not pro
teed up the Scheldt, unless .you had the advantage of
a westerly wind : and he also added, that with that
desired westerly wind you were under the necessity
of meeting with a high surf, that rendered your land-
ing extremely.difficult, .. Being asked further respect-
ing the difficulties of: ring' up the river Scheldt, he
had told them' 'that. he had always understood that,
the entering and advancing with an armament up a
winding river,,,:where .navigation was not perfectly
known to those who wished to get up it, was an un-
dertaking of very great difficulty and of danger...—.
His Lordship, however, had further stated, that in lua
opinion it was not possible tohave landedthe army
with its artillery, its. stores, &c. at • Santiliet .on the.
General

should be heavy artillery and fifteen mortars. But
this division seemed only to have been adopted for
the purpose of introducing a high sounding exprcs•
sion-in the sentence, immediately following, namely,
that .it would be necessary for the reduction of Ant-
werp; to assail it by a vigorons bombardment and
blockade."-In the same examination General Brown.
rigg, argning-hypothetically ae to the arrival of the
thfferentdivithons -of the itrrny,' with their ordnance
and stores-at the intended palms, gave it as his opi.
nion,that Antwerp might haerbeen ttken by assault,
if tbnartny, -&c. had been np on the 6th ; and so far
he sanctioned. the confident etztoecrations of the Noble
lord as.tb the mode of conduedtig the operations of
Ilaks campaign, eirtpatticipate it, the tarrigume views
eespecting the-effect's of the born-
enslyittrivat of the

delayer Ton &lists
were shortest and the moon at ate .16r by.dexy_
in the advance of the season, they omit have tg.
'en-
counter the most formidable of All opposition, that4f
• the elements. But the Noble advisers, plannern.and
directors of this grand act of Ministerial folly. Willed
it otherwise : they ordered that the troops shol44,§e
put on board transports in their movements up the
Scheldt ; they enibarked horses- •
te quicken the rapi-
dity of the attack ;and, initead4 sailing in the tnid.
_ _

Atgh,
With hitch Sir Richard •Keats; it seethed, was in fa-
*our of proceedidg•to the ulterior libieett and not for
'Wasting 'time or triitipitin;Walcheterr.:q. This cirnnm-
ristang would prn4 Material, in mime respects; in re-
rlewinKthe whole-ea& '; toted as to the time
betcotapield-ai Sirgichard 'said is depended
Clatirely on the itate'of the weather.' and was subject
'id rainy thence§ that WiDatz were defended, it might
*fielded the' a fekvidays. Utdeinswe
WWl' "the - of the -•

sixth ;: but is Macleod .and General :Filers
thought of .being before Antwerp on the 10thiltati•
presumed the‘lancling at .Bantvliet on the 4,tb.ifillre.
House would see Dow thele great eharaeteisaioltehd
as to the practicability of the means employed .Ha
had thus endeaveurett to shew that four days Were
not sufficient far the purpisse intended, and in thishis
opinion was conoborated, by That of the Earl of ch 4-.
thami::the Commander in Chief ; but Ministeriorisid
' _ • _ - dine

vand the e. .ty . _ troops. It
...aid be recoilectede what iiapillesion this opinion
had-made tin the Honseirins• th mho, practicability of
the objeit of the Espetlitioft big then afterwards,
that Officer had stated itvanstoti4or-atwither question,
:that-it had never been his opinion, that Antwerp could
bee mrtainirsectneadbrlthontbardetent ; and
~• be acintittethhawbatheught it would
-4'4"111 they could be
In

Wipeditien a ...
di of June, the Expedition Lty loitering on our. shores !landed , great reltrity, Vitt efforts • enemy evidently _,. Avant:me: dineklerint __ or -talteurupthe river shave thetitaidaalf;ikntwerp. ,
- till The 28th of July ! Sir- Richard Strachan, in. his I might make-I•tthimate *intent...doubtful, and even four preltminary•circumenmces (whir hhe had already, another part of his:eitidenee tecikge had stated, that
- answer, urged the importance of -speedy esertionj the ' though we arrived in time. off' lanttlietofiet the na- noticed), and ett- intricate, `flange and diffidgt by &bombardment Kik off,tha materiels for ship-
probability of the French troops gathering in the tear tore of the Expedtliutti rs?leculiaily•subject .to navigation. •The sameacatt. of sashssee&and preeipi- ,baildingonkhLabek)deetVoyeditilutt that it was net
of our army ; and, lastly, the fact, that the hostile : chances; and the ixtebabihtrWas dna Shine chances tation:which was •evidentiar tho flen,ef Ministers, :possilleiscrey thetilocksrerpthe'carsenal by such
fleet could go above Antwerp, and lie under the. guns might happen which• might redder success very un- was- Ist a distinguished feitture)iim the inede of car- boon;. Initiriuevidebeeci.ahlefore, they bad
of the Citadel. Of this fact Lord Mulgrave appeared certain. • He said that *e cdtoelnot go up the Scheldt I ryiag.it into 'execution. • They:had formed. a greet tlmstapinital.lof /Geneva& iihmenriggothat the great
to be totally ignorant. • The gallant Admiral, who with less than eighty gun-boats, to enable us to cope! plan for iattiteking Antwerpr• the capture and de- Is* the Ettpadttion >were/impracticable, so far
would have courted enterprise, finished by saying, with thenumerous French flotilla. You might pass; struction of the- French ships, the arsenals, depots, as respected the destruction of the ships and the der
that he thought the armament must be satisfied with over from Deal to santvliet in four days, but you ate &c. and various ether important objects ; and yet it malhion of the arsenal.
stopping at Walcheren. Lord Mulgrave's answer reminded by Sir Richard that you must stop in the was not until after orders were given to prepare the The next part of 'the evidence ha bad to notice,
was one which, it was to be expected, that the deci- Scheldt and arm your gun-boats. He armed 26 of troops for this serviceg that they had begun to ar- s that of General, Macleod,- who seemed to think
&ion of that House would force him to hear and feel—. them in one day. His Majesty's Minister:, in *sir, range a plea of operations for making goad ay.r that it the 'libelee:my had been, as it was projected'
- .. - •
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~..!4ftt 4,..:1.. ' , ~,i.. ' 1

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lb,

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led 4ftiflebig talittliiidas, had reclsonsid Oa. > i it ltt ce into- the-siieldt.
1 so impiefeit there Woe the easiele and quiokeft of finsiligits 'the Hotrke had boon•told
n. Dird Mull. -over, and nu the larid,.there iveres the melt excel- ss FluOing ; hsitlhat
ralty had siplatt lent roads: They calculated the progrtss of the in the face oithe enemy's
Exchequer wes Expedition by a Dort of -time-keeper, without--fric- naval establishment at Al
burhe tion ; but a. little friction occurred on entering into been growing for years
r quarter.of Eu- the Scheldt, which- they never dreamed of : a ship had long beetivith them
vith, or offer an laden with suns to arm the gun-boats, was behind- they had not attended to
!at military ope- hand, andinipeded their proceedings. Intelligence pensable consideration,. '
of the war, and had been in the Secret Committee, by a-persotr river Schetdrtould "be
t, Ministers had who was. ctly acquainted with the navigation of could easily be forced !
ilar army to a the Schel and it was singular that Ministers seem- .of Cadsand WAS consk
ever possessed ed to kneireothing about the Went Scheldt and the so it was+ and it gaiti
t more direct in Sloiigh Faiiage. -This pilot had said, .that the pas- sure. to' mention it, be
Dns. They had sage might' be made to Bata in-48 hours, with no the Meritoriodrttriduct
m'y thing to their delays,' buts`--;ghat lt.was necessary to have a pilot on in the affair theft. He 1
r the army, they board every ihip of the line and frigate; and they Captain Hanchett, tl