Star.
London, England, 1810-02-14 00:00:00

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

FIUATH DAY, FEBRUARY B.—(Continned.)

Lieutenant-Colonel GORDON goat called in, and examined
by the Committee. • ,
Did you not act as Secretary to the Commander in Chief pre-
viously to the month of July did.
Were you consulted by the Commander In Chief, or by any
Member of the Administration, isespeeting the projected Expesli-
uou to th 6 Scheldt ?—I was by the Commander in Chief.
Did you give your opinion, in writing or verbally l—The Corn-
mend* in Chief desired me to put my sentiments in writing ; 1
•
did sa, and delivered them to him.

reunse opinion delivered in by Lieutenant' eolonel Gordon was
ad.]
Memorandum upon the supposed practicability of dwroyi,,r,
the French ships and vessels its the Schelsk,and in the Ar-
senals at Antwerp, May 31,1809 :
og The only practicable modes by which an attempt to this
elect could be made with any prospect of success, appear to he,
" First, by a conjunct operation of the Navy and Army, the
former acting In the river, and the latter lags '-sg on the coast and
moving direct upon Antwerp.
" Second, by a maritime operation exclus vely from mr ships
Ad vessels in the River Scheldt, and acting from them %%Oh our
land forces against such places on either bank of the Scheldt, as
may be netessary to facilitate the operation upon the city at Ant-
werp.
" Tile primary considerations upon both the above moles are
the extent of our means compared with that of the enemy and
the eb,tacles we should have opposed to our attempts both by
land and Water. •
" There does not appear to be any datum that can lead to any
probable guess at the extent of the fort.: which the enemy may
possess at Antwerp and the strong towns adj-tc•mt, or even at the
extent of the armed population or militia of the neighbouring
.tricts, bur it is imagined from various concurring tv,tiir.oilies
that the whole regular force has been drawn off towards Get'-
many, and that the courtry its the vicinity of Antwerp has beta
left more destitute of troops than at any former period' This
appears to he the utmost extent of our information, and upon the
"accuracy of which must depend the success or ailure of our
project.
" The means which we could employ upon this service are as
e.
Qtr Ships of the line, capable of containing sash 500 soldiers.
S MOM ships of the hue.

0 MOM mac.
30 Ships of the line.
" l'rleates atid smaller Vessels of War, capable of cor.tai:Jng
14 Sono ..oldiers.
" Making conveyanceoa board ships of war far al army of
25,000 CAM:try.
• " 'the utmost extent dLana Forces that could be sparee' from.
the United Kingdom for this service is as follows, v:z.
80,000 Infantry
apoo Cavalry
Total 3'i,000 Land Fortes.
as l'o this must be added the usual proportion cif felei artillery,
sae 12 brigades at least, sue four troops of horse artillery, the
hems of which may be calculated, at least at 2000. o this
must be added a curtain proven:on of guns of larger call re,
which with the; equipage might requis e SGO horses more. rr to
this is added zoo horses rno:e for the Staff and other services of
the army, the land force wiilainourt, as follows, viz.
Men. Horses.
Infantry 30,003 You
Cavalry 6,000 6,000
Ordnance 2,G00 '4700
—.—
Total 314,000 fy:CO
" Of the *hove the ships of war could rOnVey f.?3,0e0 infantry.
" Transport tonnage must therefore lose •;.rovided for 141,000
men and 0.000 horses, besides ordnance and camp stores.
" The whole of the above force huiog embarked, it must then
be conducted to its final destination, which may be supposed near•
ly as follows, viz.
" it must he evident, that if a land operation is to he attempt-
ed, on part of the above iltree can be spared for any purpose of co.
opera! mu with the seamen by partial descent. front the fleet upon
shores of the Scheldt, but it must be wholly and solely ap.
propriared for the attainment of its object by a march through
the enemy's country. The plac.s for disembarkation of this land
force appear to he Ostend and Blackenburg ; and though it may
be supposing a great deal, it must, to render the preject at all
possible, Hr
,stipensed that Ostend, on the appearance et such an
imposing force opens its gates without opposition. The army
could not move forward without having a place d'armes for its
'tot es, &c. &c. and least of all, kavLg a awing place of
defence in its rear in the hands of the enemy. It must be there-
fore a fixed thing, that before the army moves forward, Ostend
must be in ourpossession.
" Front Ostend to Antwerp there are two great roads, viz.
" The, one by eruges, Ghent and Lokeren, and the whole
distance el-out sixty miles ; but it must be observed that this
route, besides leading .lillough a low country intersected with ca-
nals, only bringe you to the banks of the Scheldt opposite to Am.
weep, and the means of passing the river having been probabiy
removed, very considerable delay must ensue heiore even as at.
tempt could be made by us towurd the object of our tot( ize.
1 his route therefore must rot be followed.
" The other road, and that by which the wile mutt March,
leads from Ostend, through Thoroue, Oudenarde, Aloft or Brunt
sets, Malines to Antwerp, end is about leo or 110 miles.
" When iris coesideted teat the melt mentioned capital towns,
or rather fortresses, are within three days forced march of any
pert df our line of operations, viz. Lisle, Tournay, Valenciennes,
Melts. Ghent, it must be evident, that even admitting the utmost
possible success to attend our advance, that a retreat by the same
route would be, it practicable, one cominted battle throughout
the whole march, against the collective force ef that whole
country.
" If this reasoiting is correct, it follows, that against the de-
steuction of the enemy's fleet at Antwerp, must be put the risk
of the loss of the whole disposable force of the empire, and with
this addition to the comparison that the risk Must be suffered, and
the ohj..ct may not be attained, and that unless the army could be
embarked at Antwerp, and proceed down the Scheldt, the loss
a the greater part of it would be almost certain.
" It must also he. observed, that in the foregoing estimation of
the- enemy's resourrese, no stress Las been laid upon the Mice he
brine front the other side of the Scheldt, from the, neigh-
eoarhood of Bergen cp-Zoom and Breda.
" lit leev fir the Navy might ce-operate with us, by enter-
ing the ecleldt, and how far they might be able to navigate
it, must he ',,ft for naval opinions to determine; but it would
Ippear that al 'es, we were in possession of Walcheren, Cadsand,
or the Shure on one hank of the river, that our ships of suer cottid
net afford us -Ley effectual or indeed any asststatee at ell.
". N ;w to enable the 11-et to possess themselves of any of the
above advantegee the assistance of a floating land force is indis-
fen Age, and it has been shtwn that we have nut tuff ekta torch
'for tot pui•pos... The whole success of this operation would de-
?mane:rely t ;eel our military means, the extent of which, and
the erobeble mode or t maloying them, if diseosed of for this pur-
pose has heels already fully set forth.
"'t'he setord mode for consideration is the maritime opera-
by Wire- xith a land force from our steps and vessels of was
he batiks cef the lever Schelet.
'She force rut this purpose may be stlected front that' above
n''eret;letel, to the -vent judged neceseary. The first opera-
iietie that voted he necessary appear to be the possession of Wai
cee len and !•ott.h Beveland, or of Cadeand and South Beveland;
the possession of Ihe latter appears to be indispensable.
" It is imegieed that the disembarkation of the troops :nigh
be. protected as high as Sanelvliet, which is within 4:0 miles o
Antuterp. Kens could he done, and a landing in some force ef
feted at Santivliet, it might be possible to search direct tem
Antwerte, et the eante tin: that a coips endeavoured to take pen
gesslon of the forts and batteries upon the rimer, and that th
'boats of the fleet well-manned, armed, and towing imbeciles wit
troops, pi ocecded with the tide direct t. the city.
That this would be a wost desperate erne:prize cannot it
doubted, and that in the attempt, whether successful or other
wee, a very large proportion of our Naval and Military niter
would be put to imminent hazard; but it appears to be an enter
prise of less risk, and one which could be brought to an earlie
belie and attended with less espence, than that which has bee
eunsitlered in the first part of this paper. (Signed)
" 1. W. Goitoon."
At the time you vr!re asked your opinion was the infonaut&
iffseifiammisso of Ceevernmeat, stated to you upon which to foil