Star.
London, England, 1810-03-05 00:00:00

THE IVUIRY.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCP..

Twn.FTH DAY—FEBRUARY 27.
Tz!. H ,n. the Earl of CII ATfl calierl in, and
ex,onineti by the Committee.
Tr ate: ter from Lord Castlereagh n your Lordship, dated the 2d
Rt o•etolier. t SOO, to he found in paper (A.) in No. 6, your Lord-
sh.r of rf),:it.ve instructiors relative to obstructing
ti nits.n..e.m of •he Scheldt ; the words arc these:—" lam to
x : :tier t.n tt.hip kis l'sl,jesty's confident persuasion that
pr.vite: • o your return, asul in conformity to your instructions,
Your 1:to io w•U co-operate with the navy in givirg effect to
at:) Sir Richard Straclian may think fit to adopt for ob-
stri:c ohm of the tictielcit ;" what steps did your
' 7 ..• • .•' 'v.. effect to that his:ruction ?—I bad it not in
my power to give any.
r. t .‘• employed from the taking of Flushing on
the I stli r.th of August, till their retreat svgs resolved on ?
The ::rtry was mit employed at all during that period; it could
inot b. en:plo..e.: during that period.
liefore, or at the dane of the sailingof the Expedition, was your
Lordship been:et:el to e Antwerp to be pregnable by a cm-o-
de-main ?—I had intell,gt nct: communicated to me, that the fir-
ti tic:t ions of Antwr rp wore in so bad a !•tate that perhaps it might
be open to a coup-de-roain.
It sure ss had attended the attack on the Arsenals of Antwerp
and the l'rench was your Lordship instructed to look to any
ulterior object ?-1 had no other nlstructions than are before the
Committee.
Your I .orelship haviog stated tha; 7•nti 'nod received information
that from the state oCilits works of Ain.w. p. Antwerp was liable
to be ::ikeit by a ceup-deon,iin;:rom whom did your Lordship re-
ceive tht•t iniormati..r?—h was it.. ietoroa, ken which has been
upu.: ; 1 received it front tes, Secretary of State or.-
any conversation between your Lordship and the Se-
eretary of State, te.on th: snbject of the nikitet of Aotwerp by a
coup-d.on;ain ?—I sio tut absolutely by a ;
but I had conversacioes as to whetic.r it might not be t:.ken with-
sat a regular siege, or withnat a hoinhardment.
ie 'Alto way was it proposed at that time that Antwerp
should he ty.liee, if not le; a coop de main yet without sli-ge: or
bomhar.lineie ?—lf ths.re had been an t:penieg for it from the
state of the works, and the we:at:less of tile garrison, prot•abiy
by
assault.
Did Lord Castlereagh eepross to your Lordship any expecta-
tion that A3twerp wmed he taken by assa'ilt ?—Flc certainly ex-
presses: such expectation, unAer tle: circumstances which I have
stated.
Those circurostauces mezr the intelligence to wiii :di your Lord-
*hie has reterred ...votks bei.-g in so ieid a state, and the
gar ri,on so weak as te a :mit of such a measure.
Did Lord Castlet eagh inform your Lord,hip that be supposed
the worics to be so weal:, and the garrison to be in such a ant:e
that year Lordship wculd be able to take it by assault ?—He
seemed est-cab:le to th:ri: that it alieht be possible under the fa-
vourable circumstances I have mentioned.
With all the intellhience submitted to your Lordship hy Lord
Castlereagh, you7Lordship ever entertain any expectation that
you shouldbe able to take Ant vverp by assaith ? if that ir.telligence,
which represented the very decayed state of the works, and the
sliserce of trooes to the great extent stated in some of the intclli •
genre, had menus! not to be true, i certainly thought it might have
been ptsi!ele to have taken Antwerp by some vigorous attack,
prshably
Will your t.oreship state to the Conunittee the narntx of any
Cem. rat (I`.li.o•rs with whom you converted on the subject of tak-
iu istewerp by assntilt ?-1 should thiuk I must have mentioned
it to all the General Officers, or to all probably wish whom 1 had
eui:versation Ott the sul.ject.
Yr evioes to sail'ng fir at any other time did your I.ordship ever
• h. the opinion of sir Eyre Coots:, as to tha practicability of tait-
' An e..erp by tv.sault, or the probability of success in that en-
?---I did noi ask apy formal opinion on the subject of Sir
-e; hut conversed with hint on different modes of ope-
see might pursue. •
, • Coeielis tee to mod-roans' that no opinion was ached of or
seas eiv. 1. by ;sir Eyre Coote on that paticular point ?—No formai
;.pi-Or-r at all, formal or informal, given to your Lord-
s'iip by For Kyr.: Come, on tl at subject ?—1 do not know that
thei 0 was any ..I.iti;on a a'.l wee!: ; cause I know that he cou-
sin:ll:J mu opt retiets sou-1 be rezalte.ed by citcurnstanees when

WV al
Can pitiV I .ordsliii, name any other General Officer besides Sir •
Eyre C. Jt..?-1 conceive, ai I bail before, that the questiot. must •
itrbeit in conversation with all the General Officers; we
talked getteraXy of the wear: of our forth :r operatitats, but ..o
di,titun opinion was asked, because I dud not conceive they could
give woe.
Does your Lordship recollect any marked conversation on that
subject w..t!! Lord
•?- —I lull a good det,l of conversation at -
dirt' rent ti:iles with i.orn i'a:-.t ;I do not re..-.11',.• any marked
cto.,veisation, that is, any ford.al or distinct opinion givin by lulu
upon drat suliject.
IV.,ttt :;eneral Gross.enor ?---I have had conversation with Ge-
net al Gt.svenur 611 ;so
ith Generfll.ltoworig.7 ?---I had.
. ;hat poinz ?—on that point.
l)oes your Lordship recollect the conversation that passed be-
e.... pair i.ortlsllip r.d GtPeral iirownrigg on that particular
? ceonot re,•o;:, et any parCcular conversation ;my con-
s wi Brownri2,g w. re very frequent.
J the inettioranclunt or stateirent, was the attack on Antwerp
described a: to be a simultaneous operation with the
dt.,ceitt island of Walcheren ?-- It certainly was.
not r.rlaor:lndurn also !lye a general description of
• t'le of which his 1142jesty's Government. at that time
10;5,„i,,n, with res.:fct to the tkiencts of the Schehlt,
of Autwrqi it die, as well as I

1)1d it not coniafir a genr.ral reference to certain military obata-
cUs that the Army :night exri..ii:t to nteet on their arrival before
A itwerp, to imped:• the complete execution of the service, and
fill it .iot parirculzirly cunieniplace the posePaility of the enemy's
being triatshid to avail himself of the yrotecricn of the guns of the
C,tacle: to secure euherthu whole or a part of the stirpti afloat;
and did not your •Lortfship understand that the decision upon the
policy of the .e.xpeditioli was formed, having those difficulties in
view ?-•-1 elicl.
Upon the information Lord Castlereagh was enabled to
lay before your Lords:11;, fere you left England, what degree of
hope did you feel you; is:t justified in entertaining, that the ulte-
rior objects of Ow Expedltiott might he sueeessfully accomplish-
tie! fleet all-via a: bantvliet upon the ssi August
—I think that if the imelligerce turned out to be a and that
every other eitcunistance also turned out favourably, I should have
entertained (:14 I believe I said when I was before examined) a
confident hope of success as to the result of the Expedition: by
circumstances t urainl out tavouralily, I meat, if the fleet could
Dave arrived by the ed or 2tl of August at aanevliet.
Suite to the Committee in a general way what number of days
you apprehend would terve-been necessary after the carps arrived
at Santvliet to disembark and advance it to Antwerp in a state
to Aorta the town, if the situation of the works admitted of such
en operation ?-.-I cannot poisibly state how long it would have
taken to have landed the Army, as it must have depended en-
tirety upon the nature of the beach, arid the naval means there
were for that puriose, but I conclude that it might have been
Slone in the course of ten or three slays.'
When slid the fir-it ;,;'l.earances of sicktiess to any extent chew
themselves in the army ?-.-1 think towards the 20th of August, to
Ifni: considerable degree.
Had the army been healthy prior to that period ?—lt had been
very healthy.
Suppose the army had been cart led up at once to Santvliet, and
diseinnarked there for carrying on operations against Antwerp,
hus your Lordship any reason to suppose that the health of the
array would have been exposed to sufferb g from the same disease
that alLeted the troops in Walcheren and South lieveland ?---1
believe that the vicinities of Antwerp (but I cannot speak from
soy own knowledge) is certainly healthier than the Islands of
South Devela-d and Waloheren, and that whilst the troops re-
n.ained embarked they certainly would not have been exposed to
at v sickness.
Your 1 crdship having stated that you did not conceive that
the Expedition the Schelslt Li:posed either the army or the navy
to immluen: hazard, will your Lordship have the goodness to
state generally to the Committee the grounds upon which that
opinion is formed, so far as *elates to military operations ?
There Blight be more or less loss, but T did not consider that
there was any very great risk in the expedition against Wa/clie-
cr in taking possessicn of South Beveland, or in the subse-
quent lAtidieg. of the army, awarding to ;be intelligence received

•
of the strength of the enemy ; and I was eontrmed in that *pi-
nion by the intelligence I afterwards received; there was no
force collected at Antwerp that I could consider as exposing the
army to imminent danger.
Is the Committee to understand your Lordship's opinion to be,
tha• in case the fleet bad arrived on the 3d at Baths, the army
mihht have been disembarked, and continued on shore from the
3st down to the 2 -,t;), withoat prejudice, hi your Lordship'r iudg-
.li, to, to its secure re-embarkation I—The army Might certainly
have continued to that period, bad it been collected in the field;
hut I am by no means sure it could have remained insecurity, em-
barked in any operations to that period, that would necessarily
here divided the army very much, and not placed it in a state to
mr.ite head against the enemy.
From the infer:nation your Lordship received, what do you
cenceive to be the composition of the enemy's force, in a military
point of view ?---There was certainty a very large part of that
force which, though applicable to garrison duty, would Rot haye
Leen formidable in the field.
Does your Lordship recollect information received by Sir John
Hope, which bears date the 23d of August, and which states the
enemy's force on both sides ot the Scheldt, including the garrisons
of Berger-op-Zoom and Antwerp, to amount to 21,780 men, ex-
clusive of the workmen of the Arsenals and the crews of the
ships ?—I think there was such intelligence received, that ac-
cords very much with all the rest of the intelligence, which
male the whole number about 35,000 men at the time of our ar-
rival at Bathz
Sueposivg your Lordship had found yourself in a situation to
land your army at Santvliet, at tilt:beginning instead of the close
of the month of August. what hope do you now feel yourself
justified in entertaining with respect to the prospects you should
have had of accomplishing the ulterior objects of the Expedition?
—lf the intelligence, which I am not able to speak positively to
had been true, respecting the state of Antwerp, which I received
in the communications from the Secretary of State, I could cer-
tainly have had considerable hopes of success; but if Antwerp
was in a state that the works were completely repaired, I should
certainly have thought that success, even if we had landed at the
early period named, to have been very doubtful indeed.
[Here follow several questions respecting former assaults upon
Antwerp]
la the Committee to understand your Lordship sailed with the I
Expedition from Deal, believing you should find the situation of
Antwerp accord with the information your Lordship had recei-
ved I—l knew nothing whatever of the truth of the intelligence,
of course I could only know whether it would turn out to be
true or not. When I arrived a: my destiration, I had no ground
for believing or disbelieving it ; I bad no means of knowing the
tiler the intelligence was from good sources or otherwise.
Did your Lordship believe that the ultimate success of the Ex
pedition against Antwerp depended upon the fleet arriving at Sant-
vliet by or about the Sd of August, according to the intelligence
which your Lordship had received:l-1 think it depended very
much on the early arrival of the army at Santvliet, as of course
the enemy would be in a state of less preparation.
Then, as your Lordship sailed from Deal; having received in-
formation that the fortifications of Antwerp were in a state of
decay, and that there was but a very small garrison there, and as
your I.ordship believed that the object of carrying Antwerp was'
mile likely to be attained by the speedy arrival of the armament
at 'sant-viler, did your Lordship make any arzangement, and
what, for disembarking the army, in the first instance, at Sant-
vliet I—That arrangement could only be made on the arrival
of the armament at Santvliet, in concert of course with the Ad-
miral.
Is the Committee to understand that your Lordship sailed
from Deal without making any arrargement for landing the ar-
my at Santvliet I—Without any decided arrangement for that
purpose, certainly none could possibly be made, from the nature
of the circumstauce.
Did your Lordship neon your sailing make any arrangement at
all for the landing of the army at Santvliet?—No detailed at-
arrment certainty ;1 did vet it was a thing that con' j
be made ; he'ere. I stilc<l ! bed no rt ci e know! dge where v•
should be to laud, or the me tire of tlt t landit.g.place, till it
reconnoitred, or whether the corps would arrive heather or bt
parately.
Did your Lordship receive any errections from the Eccotary
State to make such arrangement 1--i do net reeellact any.
In coneequence of the Admiral's communication re c.u--1 ~r
ship on the Bth of Aue,est, relative to rival co-onerati tt :
reduction of Flushing, did any thing pass bt tree a ye r ' ord le-
and the Admiral upon that subjce:?- I had so-'e to vasatie 0,11
think with the Admiral at that tine upon the et
If the Sett could have rise up the 5C1146 11•114.1'. veou!4 yqu r
Lordship have proceeded to at tbe tatissata object of the
armament, without waiting for tha:wedories •of Washing ; I
mean after the originally-prOpeeed plan of operatibes was frus
tested by the necessity of-carrying so aansiderable a partf tit.
armano to into the Reomput Ameba aas n? had relights etd Flu-
shing to so considerable an extent, and after additionlitrocps t
ad
been landed to accelerate the reductiou ot that fortress 1-1 err
tabily should.
Is the Committee to understand that the reason your Lortleh.,
remained so long on Walcheren, and allowed those troops ter:
were landed in addition to Sir Eyre Coote's original corps to de
so, eves, that until the whole armament xclus.ve of Sir Ey r.
Conte's force should arrive in the neighbourhood of Lathe, re
operation against Antwerp could be undertaken ; that the forwal-
ding of the armament to that point depended solely upon the na-
vy, and that the anxiety which your Lertithip felt upon ibis ;üb-
jt ct, arising from a conviction uf the infinite importance of et le-
rity towards final success, was from time to t'ytie conmmicatee
to the Adroiral in the urgent manner in which it was the heti:
pensible duty of the Commander in Chief of the land forces t•
make such representation ?—The corps under General Grosvt-
nor, which was the additional corps lauded, necessarily remain
until the transports could arrive to carry them tip the Scheid,
it was impossible for any operations of any sort to be under-mkt'
till the armament was collected, particuiariy the cavalry and et..
naece ships and the ships with the ammeter ion enO with the pro-
vidona : and therefore until the whsle was collected at Bathz, sot
questionably I should Gay it was impossible fur any opera:tee
whatever to have been undert ken, and therefore I remained fan
that reason at,Walcheren; the corps which bad been landed
remained on shore also for the same reason: with respect to
any communicatien I had to make to the Admiral on the sub-
' jest of the expeditimi, I urged to him the necessity of expedition
and I had every reason to believe he was imprestod with the
same sentiment.
Did your Lordship ever give any authority or instructions to
Lord Rosalyn or Sir John Hope, :o concert a:.d undertake any
operation with the Navy before you should arrive in pi rsou on
Smith Be.veland Z.-9r John Hope was landed for the execution
of a particular service, which oval merely to take the batteries,
and to open a way for the fleet, and to collect the resources in
provisions, cattle, and horses : I certainly never gave any orders
to Lord Rosalyn, who commanded there, after the landing of
Lord Huntly's diithion and his own, because it was impossible'
any operation of any sort or kind whatever could be undertaken
till the ordnance ships with the ammunition and provisions could
have beets carried up the river.
Did the Admiral communicate to your Lordship the older he
sent to Sir Richard Keates to concert operations with Lord
Rosllyn, and request your Lordship to give orders of a similar
description to that General ?—No, he did not ; the letter from sir
Richard Khates to Lord Rossiya was communicated to me by his
Lordship.
Was every possible arrangement for the speedy execution oh
the pi-ejected plan of operations made by your Lordship and your
Staff in such a manner, that if the naval means could have been
employed, no delay would have happened on the part of the
army ?—'There. certainly was.
After the whole of the army had assembled at Bathe, did not
all the intelligence your Lordship received represent the works
of Antwerp to be in such a state, and the garrison so strong, as to ,
make it impossible to take the place without a siege I—l think all
the intelligence went to that effect.
Did net the intelligence at this period also state that the enemy
had already collected between 30 and 40,000 men in Antwerp,
Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and that neighbourhood, including rise
force in Cadtand, that this force was daily increasing, and that
every preparation was making to oppose our landing at Sant.
vliet and Antwerp I—That was certainly the substance of all the:
intelligence I received; I had no very distinct intelligence as to
the extent of the preparations making to resist the landing at
Santvliet, but I understood the enemy had constructed several
batteries on the Dyke: the inundations too were reported to be'
very considerable.
Did not this intelligence, and the sickness of the army, and
your Lordship's own reasoning as to the use the enemy must me-
cassarily have made of the interval between your first arrival off
Walcheren and the period to which I allude, to ameliorate the
defences of Antwerp and the other forts, and to collect a consi-
derable defensive force from all quarters, determine your Lord-
ship's judgment against the practicability of then Wading Ant-
warp ?-I'hey aertabily did. •

•
Did WI year Ledo* Id die rfth of . Meat *bitable the
Lleeteneat-Oehreeh ti the Army lo a Cetera of Wir, and h
not their opinion auve before the Haeolto4 oteethhiedtbe Lien-
tenant-Generals oit than 27th of i Ample& 111111 I believe their opi-
nion is before the linusit.
Did your Lordship Satierstand thartbe Admiral altered treat
or concurred in that opinion ?-4 corseeired, certainly, that the
Admiral concurred in the opinion, thin nothing further could be
attempted.
What ind,ueed your Lordship to (orm, that conjeeture t—l re-
ceived a letter from the Admiral on the 42/th, the day the Coun-
cil of War *Amble], in which he distinctly stated that opinion.
Will your Lordship have the goodness to produce the Admi-
ral's letter of.the 27th of August ?—lt is a letter stating the rea-
sons of Sir Richard Strachan fur desiring his letter to be sent
home to the Admiralty ; it is in that letter he states a distinct
opinion that no further operations could, with any prospect of
success, be at that time undertaken.—(His Lordship Prodnced a
copy of the letter, Which was read.]
• cery Or SIR ILICIIMMATRACHAN'S [ATTU.
"'st. Domingo, Bathz, August 27, 1509.
"My Lord—ln consideration of your note I detain the cutter;
there are two others waiting for orders besides this, but I sremind
you,yoe have mot a week's provision fir the army, and we have not
above four for the navy, which, when we come to divide with you,
will reduce us to about sex days; it therefore becomes indispensa-
bly necessary I should call the attention of Government to this
circumstance, and I pray you to let me dispatch the vessel; two
shall wait your dispatches. We are now at two-thirds allowance;
the most serious consequences may arise from ary delay, when
you consider the vast number we have to victual, at least seventy
thousand, I ant sure your Lordship will be of my way of think-
ing" that not a moment should be lost in commuiticathl home."
All I shall say is, that you do not propose to go on to Antwerp for
the reason mentioned in your letter; and really, when I consider
the reduced state of the provisions, the increasing sickness, and
the increasing power of the enemy, little success can be,expeaed
from any operation; unless it is the intention of our country to
keep the army here to the accomplishment of the object, and re-
inforce it as circumstances may make necessary.
" I should have been on shore, but am not well; but nothing
should have prevented me if I could have been at all useful;
your Lordship may rest assured that I shall be ready to do every
thing you propose, and that the Navy is at your disposal for eirery
purpose to forward the public service.
" I have the honour to be, your Lordship's
- " most humble and obedient servant,
(Signed) R. I. S•rsAcuAn.
" To his Excellency the Right Hon. the Earl of Chatham."
." Your Lordship might write a slu'irt letter; but pray don't
prevent my sending the vessel home . I see the most serious con-
sequences likely to arise, front the GovernMent being ignorant of
the want of provisions."
(Here follows an examination shnilar to the former oae, rela-
tive to Antwerp, Fort I.illo, kc.)
Upon the receipt of Sir Richard's Straeban's letter of the 27th ,
of August, did your Lordship call upon the Commissary General
of the Army for a report of the state of the provisions, and did
it correspond with the estimate Sir Richard Strachan had given
of their amount ?-1 certainly thought it my duty to lose no tinee
in looking into the subject, not being at all aware of that b ins
1 the case, and I found it entirely erroneous, for that there were a
month's provisions for the troop% .
Has your Lor.ishlp reason to 'know that it was deliberately
deemed most advisable for the public service that the .supply of
provision should he progressively forwarded to the Army, so as
•;ot to encuml)rr their movcnivais wit". a greater proportion of
provisions a: any one time then the public service could possibly
require ?—I timiersto.xl that to be the intention ; and in point of
'act, we always had a sufileient supply et provisions.
itis faeltpslitets NARRATIVE.
Does-run Lordship recollect having delivered to his Mejesty
any Narrative of the proceedingei in Z aland on the 15th of Ja-
. -.eery ? --I did not deliver any Narrative of the proceedings in
.--,:i.teet to his Majesty, but 1 transmitted it to Lis Majesty at
V,. elF.s: en :he 15th of January. .
V,' --, : 't; isTerrative aceo.o,esnied ley any Letter ?—lt was rot
.- •.:• ~ :t.e .1 b; any letter ; titre was a note of transmission ; a
.. eCt loiael faylor, I tWrek.
Liss y ‘er Leriship sty copy of that note ?—I have not.
Do:-. yaer I erdsitep recollect having applied for that Narra-
tive to be reterned to soar I ordahip by his ?Vales:if ?-1 rt-
tneether havaig ex! ress4l a wish to hie Niajesty, at the Levt.e,
on ihr 7th cf Felt. city i denk, that lie woeid lexe the goodly,.
to return that Na.rative, I -cause I v ititcd to make sante al-
teration:, to lenVe eta a r as.sq, e there NVJO in it; audit Was so re •
turned.
Did your Lordship receive that Narrative bac!: on the 10th,
and in what mane, i ?—it was either on the 9th or the 10th, I
thedt. it was on the loth I received :t hack; it was merely sent
bark ss i Is a note from Colon. i -l'aylor, saying he had the King's
caramand to send it back; hut nothing else.
Did your Lordship tender the Narrative again to the King on
the 14th of February ?—I did.
Was it given by his Majesty at the same Levee at which it'
was tendered by your Lordship to his Majesty to the Secretary of
Mate ?—it was not given at the Levee ; it was given at as au-
dience after the Levee ; and I received his Majesty's comanendto
give it to the Secretary of State, which it did immediately.
Without Its passing Into his Majesty's hand ?—Yes ; his Ma-
jesty desired I would give it to the Secretary of State.
Has your lordship any toll of the Narrative as it .s4'as com-
municate dto his Majesty on the 15th of January?--1 have not.
Can ysur Lordship state the substance of the alteration I —I
really do not think, especially after so long an examination as
I have now gone through, that lean recollect perfectly the sub-
stance; it was a passage towards the close I.f the report, which
contained rather matter of eeninion or speculation, or rather dis-
cussion, which I thought.would he better out of the deport ; mid 1
wise cl his I‘.le.j.iszy's permission to leave that passage cut of the I
report, which I did. Ido not think, after so long an eiamina-.
:ion, I could take upon me to state the substance of that passage,
ur to recollect it ; but it related only to matter of opinion, and
was only one passage, which I though: would not accord in ally
respect with the rest oldie Narrativa, which was merely a state-
me,tr of facts
Does your Lordship recollect the purport of the note which
bad accompanied the Narrative when it was delivered on the
13th of January ?--it was a note of transmission, sending the
Narrative to Colonel Taylor for the King.
His Lordship was directed to withdraw.

lay before yt,
hope did yo
rior ol)jectb
11E6, .Aappl,bili
think th
every other ,
cntcrtained
confident h,
eireuinstaoc
Dave arrive,
State to t
you appreht
at Saiitvlict
'to itoriu th
en operatic,'
taken to hr
tircty Upon
were for th
Shine in the
When di
themselve,
istv: co.iside
Had the
very health.
Suppose
&sett-truck-
hls your L
army woul
that aff,:cte
believe tha
any own hi
South Ilev,
eni
at ♦ sieltnes
, Your 1
the Expedi
to immlui
state gcneJ
opini•n is
re al
there was
cr in
want /Atm