Star.
London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

up by the 4th, the objects of the Expedition A.
have been attained ; but it had been stated by ak„
Commander in Chief of the Expedition, that it wee
impossible for the army to have arrived at Santvßea
before the 6th. When asked as to the practicability
of taking Antwerp by a bombardment, Geneed
Macleod stated, that on that point he could not be
certain ; but as to the destruction of the ships, he hadl
given it as his opinion that by the effects of a born..
bardment lie inhabitants of the town and the garri-
son might be so overawed, as to induce them to sur-
render the ships; though he admitted that object to be
hopeless, who) the ships had been taken up above the
town. As to the idea. of over-awing the inhabitants
and the garrison, could it be for a moment supposed,
that, in the present state of military strictness and dis-
cipline in the French territory, any such event could
take place ? or that the inhabitants and the military
of Antwerp would, in order to escape the dangers of
our bombardment, expose themselves to the ven-
geance of their master ? Besides, all General
Macleod's calculations were founded on the suppo-
sition of good roads, of which, however, he knew
nothing; and it was since known, that out of twenty-
five miles of road, five miles were over a causeway,
and the rest a deep sand. When asked what his
opinion would be of the success of the expedition, if
the roads had been as good as he supposed, and the
other circumstances favourable, under the actual
state of preparation of the enemy. General Macleod
answered, that he had put the enemy entirely out of
the question. The House could not but perceive,
that to leave the enemy out of the question in calcu-
lations respecting the operations of war, was a very
accommodating principle. It also appeared, from
General Macleod's evidence, that considering the
length of the town, and the distance at which batteries
could alone be constructed, there could be little
chance of destroying the arsenal or docks, when the
shells should be thrown a distance of above one mile
and a half at objects not distinctly discernible : that
the place was not to be taken by a coup-de-main, as-
sailable only by a bombardment, and then not to be
expected to surrender till a lodgment should be made
on the glacis.
Having thus disposed of the different plans of at-
tack, as shewn in the evidence, he had next to ob-
serve upon the plan of Lord Castlereagh, which, ac-
cording to that Noble Lord's own statement, was not
to consist of long protracted operations, and yet was
to have a powerful effect upon the affairs of the Con-
tinent, which was not to be directed to remote objects
or a distant scene, and yet was amazingly to derange
all the projects of Bonaparte ; which was to take
effect by a coode-maiss, and yet the troops were to be
brought away in the moment of success. The Noble
Lord, relying on the information he had received;
expected that Antwerp could have been taken by as-
sault ; a circumstance actually impossible, according
to the evidence of Sir William Erskine. The infor-
mation received and acted upon by the Noble Lord
Lad been produced before the Secret Committee, and
by them reported to the House. Though it appeared.
by th.st information that the ditch was in some parts
dry, owing to the falling in of the reveternent, yet,
mother parts there was water, and- Sir William Er.
:line had given it as his opined &lithe breaches in
the revetenient might, in Ne boorsdsorepailed by the
ma :ins of the town, and the water is the ditch might 1
in one tide be raised from thole to five feet deep,
which that officer would consider a wet ditch. When I
they considered that there existed but one or two
pastes, made use of particularly by smugglers, prat- I
ticah a f.,r the purposes of assault, and that these pas-
ses could so easily be secured, the House would -be
•sees.ble th. t t!,erenever had been a chance of success by i
assault. But the Noble Lord stated, that in the event
of the assault proving unsuccessful, the_object was to
be attained by a bombardment. And here the Noble
'Lord, with his accustomed versatility, was determined '
to have two strings to his bow—he was to have a 1
bombardment, and a battering in breach ; and,
whilst sen ling the whole disposable force of the coun-
try on a h..peless Expedition, employed himself in
devising the means of executing his vigorous projects i
in every alternative. With this impression, the Noble
Lard must in every case have his train of 30 pieces of
miliel; and with them proposed to effect his soup- ;
deoeie ; but when asked what his idea of a coup-de-
twie was, it appeared that it was to include an in-
vestment, a battering train, and a bombardment. It
Lad been asked by the Noble Lord, whether the for-
tress of Schweindnitz had not been taken by a coati-
ift-arin p but he might as well have asked, whether
Troy had not been taken in that manner, as apply the
term coup-de-Will to such a. military operation as he
had ,n Tiew.
Next in the order of successicfn he had to notice
Lord Chatham's projects. That Noble Lord, how-
ever, had no plan at all. He had been, to be sure,
t Butz ; but though he had remained a month in the
ountry, he had never formed any plan whatever.
lie had himself stated, that he had not formed any
plan in detail ; that the mode of attack upon Antwerp
was to depend upon circumstances ; and that he had
rot thought of any plan for that purpose, because the
army had not landed on the Continent. Strange it
appeared to him that a General should defer devising
any plan until he approached the end of his opera-
tions. But the ulterior objects had been given up,
because the Commander apprehended that before he
could proceed to accomplish them, he should have to
undertake, perhaps, two preliminary sieges. The
trPedition, he contended, ought never to have been
sent out, unless his Majesty's Ministers had been well
Informed of the actual state of Antwerp, as well' as
the number of sieges that must necessarily be under-
taken, before operations could be commenced against
that city. One might have thought that a General;
t out at the head of such an Expedition es that, in
libith the whole disposable force of the nation was
employed, should have formed some idea of the ope-
rat(as he was to conduct, and the sieges.he had to
undertake. It never had entered the heads of any set
of men but his Majesty's Ministers to send out an
Expedition in such a way. The whole army, he ap-
prehended, was sacrificed, by its having been sent
out without knowing that the Expedition could not
succeed but after several sieges, when the only chance
of success rested upon the possibility of-accomplish.
log its object 'without such previous sieges. The
ffound stated by Lord Chatham for relinquishing
s ulterior objects, was the information he received
that Antw
att erP was not in the state he supposed ,on
the dep
* jure with the Expedition, its works having
been rep
red about the period of the sailing of the