Star.
London, England, 1821-11-14 00:00:00

do it at your own risk. I have.the power to puni.h
you if you again offend, and shall enforce it.
The COURT asked whether the defendant ventured
to say in her affidavit that there was nothing objec-
tionable in the remainder of her defence?

Mr. COOPER said she did not say so.
The CHIEF JUSTICE held that she was bound to
say so much ; there might be the most offensive blas-
phemy behind.
Mr. COOPER said, the defendant could only have
spoken as to her own judgment.
The CIIIEF Joricit said, the Court could not give
up its common understanding even to the arguments
of Gentlemen at the Bar; the defendant could tell
whether there was anything remaining similar to that
which she had already been told .vas improper and

inadmissible.
Mr. COOPER assured his Lordship he was far from
desiring the Court to surrender their understanding
to him; he had a very high opinion of their Lord-
ships' understanding; he considered them as not only
having common but very uncommon understanding!
The CHIEF-JUSTICE—WeII, Sir, go on, go on !
Mr. COOPER resumed.—He wits confident that the
Learned Judge had stated everything as correctly as.
his memory enabled him; but he assured his Lord-
ship the defendant had no adviser. He (Mr. Cooper)
did not go out of Court to advise her.
Mr. Justice Besr.—l did not state that you did,
Mr. Cooper! I said there was a friend, or some
person, with the defendant, who went out with her ;
and I told the defendant any Gentleman at the Bar
wculd give her advice.
Mr. COOPER.-1 believe, my Lord, she would not
have found any Gentleman at the Bar to assist her.
Mr. Justice BEST,-1 believe, Mr. Cooper, you do
the Bar injustice.
Mr. COOPER.—My Lord, in this case, I believe nat.
Mr. Justice BEST.— ram certain you do.
Mr. 'ILA TT.—My Lord, it may not be improper
for me to state, that I was near the defendant and
offered her my humble advice and assistance; but
she declined to accept it.
Mr. COOPER.—My Lord, I am sorry I did my
Learned Friend injustice, but was entirely ignorant
of the fact. The Learned Counsel then proceeded to
re-urge his arguments, that before the Learned Judge
interposed to stop the defence, he should have suf.-
fered the defendant to proceed, and have stopped the
objectionable parts as she proceeded, and therefore
that she was entitled to a new trial. _

-...—.-
The CHIEF JUSTSCE observed, .this was manifestly
a struggle, as in a former case, to try whether a pe!.
son charged with publishing blasphemy and sedition
might not, in au open Court of Justice, under the
pretence of making his defence, give utterance and
publicity to as much more aggravated blasphemous
and seditious matter as he should think fit. In the
present case, it appealed that the defendant had her
written defence prepared, and delivered it to the Of-
ficer to read. On the objectionable passages being
read, the Learned Judge who presided acted with
the greatest kindness towards her. So far from stop-
ping her defence, he advised her to withdraw, con-
sult her friends, and expunge that part of hcr defence
which was objectionable, and could only tend to in-
jure her. She did accordingly retire, and after a
time returned. She had not, however, altered her
defence, nor did she condescend to say that what re-
mained was not of the same objectionable kind. But
instead of doing so, handed up to the Court the writ-
ten declaration which the Learned Judge had read,
declaring that was her defence, and that she had no
other ; and if she was not allowed to proceed with it
as it was, she must abide the consequence. That paper
claimed a right to utter whatever she thought fit in
her defence, whether legal or illegal, seditious or
blasphemous. He could only say he knew of no such
law. If any such existed, it could only.exist as a
disgrace to our Legislators, to those who proposed it,
to our Courts of Law, and to those who would con-
sent to preside there under such a provision. In the
present case, the defendant was pursuing this course.
The interference of the Judge was only the discharge
of his duty ; and there were not the slightest grounds
for the present application.
Mr. Justice BAYLEY hoped the time would never
arrive when a defendant should be prevented from
stating everything necessary to his defence ; and wal
sure the time would never arrive when there could
not be found Gentlemen at the Bar ready fearlessly
to discharge their duty in defence of their clients.
At the same time, it was indispensably necessary that
such defences should be confined within proper
bounds—the bounds of decency and decorum. The
Learned Judge proceeded to comment on the course
adopted by the defendant in this case, as being en-
tirely illegal and unjustifiable; and declared his opi-
nion, that the Learned Judge had properly interposed
to stop her, and that there were no grounds for a
new trial.
Mr. Justice Houtorn considered there were no
grounds for a new trial. It was the duty of the Judge
presiding to prevent the utterance of sedition and
blasphemy, or any noxious matter introduced by a
defendant into his defence for sinister motives and
purposes. The Learned Judge in this case 'had dime
no more than his duty.
Mr. Justice Bes T.—l have confined myself to
stating the facts of the case, and have taken no other
part in this discussion.—Rule for a new trial refused.
• COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, NOVEMBER. 15.
GILMAN V. ELTON.

This was an action of trover, tried at the Sittings I
at Guildhall, to recover the value of certain goods
seized by the defendant in a distress for rent, in which
a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the
decision of the Court on a case, which was afterwards
turned into a special case for argument, and now
came nn to be heard before their Lordships.
Before the case was gone into, Mr. Serjeant LAW-ES,
for the defendant, said, that possibly there might be
no occasion for going through with it, as the plaintiff
had died since the commencement of the action.
Mr. Serjeant MAusitALL, for the plaintiff, said, it
' was quite common in every day's practice to have the
opinion of the Court on a case where either of the
patties died between the verdict and the judgment.
• The circumstances of the present case were these :
In 1819, Mr. Gilman, the plaintiff, who was a bum-
basin manufacturer at Norwich, sent a quantity of
goods to a persOn named Milne, who was his factor
in London. He forwarded with the goods a regular
I invoice, and drew upon Milne a bill for £2OO on ac-
. count, which was regularly accepted, and sent hack
Ito him in the country. The plaintiff got the bill tbs.