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London, England, 1810-01-24 00:00:00

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point so which o
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aves been diree. uxam nepled calamities, his Weary's Mini :
tcd, was another subject mature cnsderation.— the greater number of whom the terrors of impeach,-
Discontents had shewn themselves in many places— ment were impending, should dare to remain in office.
in the North of Germany and elsewhere. To take (Hear, Hear !)—But if Parliament should, without
advantage of these ought to have been our object— any regard to their past conduct, think proper to giVe
but instead of that we delayed our expeditions till its support to such rulers, or lend its sanction to such
the hopes of Austria were destroyed, and then sent measures, nothing could more clearly evince that ,
them on destinations where our resources were squan- silent but actual and alarming change which said I
dered, our brave troops sacrificed, and all our enter- to have taken place in the British Constitution : no- I
prises attended with complete failure. Continued thing could more indisputably shew the resemblance I
disgraces betel the country, and accumulated discs- between the government of this country and those old I
ters marked its Government ; but of all our calami- governments of Europe, which, weighed down hr the
ties, the Expeditions to Spain and Walcheren claimed influence of corruption and imbecility, fell successively
the pre-eminence. The failure of the Campaign of a certain and easy prey to the superior wisdom and I
180 i in Spain, seemed to have no other consequence energies of the power which has enslaved them.—
than
to induce Ministers to risk its repetition. At Having made these general observations upon the '
that periods though we had brave troops and good subject at large, he proposed to apply himself more.
Generals, still a superior force opposed to us, and a particularly to what appeared to him to be the main
Goveinment aiding us by Decrees which it was too question under consideration=-the conduct of the war. i
vieek to enforce, should have shewn us the impolicy Every Gentleman who heard him must be aware, that 1
of our operations. During the whole Campaign Sir since the last session of Parliament the conduct of the !
Jelin Moore was never succoured by a single Spanish war in every quarter had been attended by failures'
army : indeed every day gave us more occasion to more complete, disgraces more signal, and losses
admire the valour and regret the fate of that lament- more deplorable, than had ever been paralleled in
ed officer. All the skill and perseverance which he any war in which this country had been engaged--
tvinced were only sufficient to facilitate the retreat of That was the plain, but true statement of the case, 1
oer ill-fated army. What was the result of this cape- which, though it might be attempted to palliate, it 1
rience ? Only to confirm our Ministers in their infatua- was absolutely impossible satisfaCtorily to account for, 1
tion (Hear)—only to induce them to send fresh forces or successfully to justify. As that House must he'
to a country where we had failed before, and to a Go- sensible how much such a state of things must impli.
vernment with which no previous arrangement had , cate the conduct of those entrusted with the admini.
been nude. Even the pompous embassyofLord Wel- stration of affairs—how far it must affect the charac-
ltelee proved abortive; that embassy which promised ter of the nation—it was was one of it most important
e, mud' and performed so little (Near) returned and essential duties to institute an immediate, vigi.
after a battle which was followed by a retreat—a slant, and severe inquiry into the real causes of the na.
~;:ery which was marked with all the calamitous eon- tional calamities, and even to carry up the result of
gc ql tcii e e s of a defeat ! (Hear, Hear.) After this, such inquiry to the foot of the Throne, in an Address
oar celebrated expedition to the Scheldt was prepared to his Majesty, stating that they could no longer re-
-an expedition formidable, certainly, in expence, and pose confidence in those Ministers whose conduct had
whose expectation was of course commensurate with produced such lamentable instances of public die- j
tic, magnitude of its preparation ? It was sent out aster and disgrace. But without entering into the'
after the Austrian armisttce, and therefore destitute detail, jest then, he must be allowed to make one
of any foreign object. Its design was, then, as the general remark, that the number, the nature, and
sreeh informed us, purely British ; and this design, the succession of their failures, were prima faciel
30 plattsible in appearance, how was it accomplished? evidence of the incapacity and ignorance of his Ma-
Did we conciliate a foreign country, or did we bene- jesty's Ministers ; for, though he should not con-
fit our own ? No I After having met no opposition tend that failure was in all cases a proof of want
in its progress, our army returned with diminished of wisdom or of imbecility, yet he must contend,
numbers fioin the demolition of' a single fort, which that where failures have been constant, frequent, and
a few weeks can re-establish ! Even in its original invariable, they afford the strongest presumption
foundation, this Expedition was erroneously planned, of the weakness and incapacity of those, whose mea-
as appeared.from the- dispatches of Lord Chatham, sures thus uniformly terminate in disappointment
who was:compelled to abandon its objects, in cause- and disaster—(Hear, hear.) That such had been
fiance of finding Antwerp in a defensible state— the issue of all the measures of his Majesty's present
the dozen ships,- which it was our object to destroy, Ministers, he need only appeal to their history for a
moored in safety under the citadel—and even the ha- demonstration. If he were to go into any detailed
tarot of a landing un the continent dangerous in the proofs of this assertion, it would be an insult to the
estreme. How was this error remedied ? Was it by enlightened Assembly he was addressing ; to the re-
the quick withdrawing of the troops ? Alas ! no ; that collection •of every one of whom, innumerable in.
would have too glaringly exposed the weakness of our stances to illustrate it must be familiar. What mea-
government ; and so the brave soldiers were doomed sure of theirs, during the last 12 or 18 months, could
to lingering destruction in a climate notoriously pesti- be contemplated that had not ended in failure and
lential. Two circumstances might. have shewn Mi- disgrace ?—(Hear, hear !) The calamitous retreat
nines: its fatal influence ; the first was.the publication of the army under Sir John Moore was one memo-
of a book on the subject by Sir John Pringle, in which rable instance, and that but a few months before
be gave a catalogue of its incidental diseases, and was preceded by the disgraceful Convention of
stated the average of sick there in 17/7 to be as four Cintra ; in short, every where, and in every possible
to ore. What they were in the late expedition re- way, and under all possible circumstances, they had
mined yet to be decided. The second circumstance most deplorably failed. Success had never crowned
which mould have warned Ministers, was the stipu- their measures but in their ever-memorable attack
lotion which the Dutch were obliged to enter into upon Copenhagen.— ( Hear, hear.).— Against the
with all the foreign troops in their pay, not to employ enemy every operation of theirs proved abortive ; it •
them in Zealand during the fatal season our Govern- was only in their attacks upon friends that their mea-
mein had selected. (Hear.) He should now con- sures were not characterised by failure. ( Hear, hear,
elude, without touching on many remaining grievous hear.) it was impossible that such continued failures
charges, which he left to abler hands than his. What could be ascribed to accident, to a miracle, or to any
he had already stated, was, he conceived, a sufficient thing but their own weakness and incompetence. That
ground for an ameftdment, for the purpose of moving man must possess a mind of an extraordinary descrip-
which he had risen. The statement which he made, tion, who could ascribe the Convention of Cintra, the
even inexperience might have undertaken without expulsion of the British army from Gallicia, the dis-
vanity, as the cause in which it originated must call; graceful termination of the Expedition to Walche-
fort% instinctive and unqualified condemnation. He ten, and the late disasters in Spain, to accident, er
concluded by moving that the word cc expedition" any othet cause than the measures of the seises: and
should be omitted, and words to the following effect most vigorous Administration this country had ever
Mould be inserted : possessed. (Loud cries of hear, hear, hear.) If this
" Tice House sees with sorrow and nsaignatton expeditions country had really had a firm, a connected, and a
indertakeo, in which our resources were lost, and our troops wise Administration, such as that even which existed
*liked in enterprises, theconsequences of which were injuritnis, . Pitt, whosePi measures, the offspring
under the late Mr.
i.si whi:h only occasioned a repetition of former valour, produc-
t: gno other effect than the expesut eof our Councils to the deri- of a great mind such as he had, were directed to the
Sol of our enemies: Thatnow the House demands, as the only accomplishment of great national objects, the country
ronement to an injured and insulted people, that the most would not have to lament the disgrace that had been
Lomas enquiry into such disgraceful expeditions should be in- brought upon it. But, no ; the Government was a
cituted."
The Hon. Mr. WARD, in rising to second the Government of departments. The Noble Lord at the
Amendment proposed by his Noble Friend, begged to I head of it, more distinguished for virtues than to-
nsure the House that it was not his wish unneces- lents, enfeebled .by age and bodily sufferings, was in-
wily to trespass upon its attention, or, upon light duced to add the weight of office to the infirmities
wounds, to disturb that unanimity which Gentlemen of age, and to embitter the last moments of a decli-
esmed so anxious for on the present occasion. But ning life with the toils of business, for the purpose of
I'llen he adverted to the nature of the measures keeping together an Administration, the Members of
which had been pursued by his Majesty's Govern- which entertained at the same time the greatest
) Men, who, con-
raont—when he considered the weakness and impo- tempt for each other (hear, hear,
/ear .
leT of their wholes stem
of conduct, he felt himself as could be proved, even by their own documents,
imperiously called upon to declare his decided disap-
passed the time they should have devoted to the pubs
l'Phation of the Address. It appeared to him that
lic service, in dark machiavelian intrigues, and in de-
tne pact afforded sufficient groundsenot alone to con-
vising schemes for parcelling out the public depart-
der° the policy.upon which it turned, but to enable ments.— (Hear, hear, bear.) It was from their divi-
the House to farm an adequate judgment of the fu-' glens at home, and their disgraces abroad, that Par-
.
tore measures of those men by whom the resources of
liament was to infer the evidence of their wisdom ;
fee •
nation had been so shamefully misapplied. 11 and if they should only make the estimate according
•
that House were to ato the rules which prevailed in common life, the pre-
tie Noble Mover, it ree to the Address proposed wouldby
in effect resolve to address,
sumption must be, that failures constant and uniform
can only be ascribed to ignorance, incapacity, or ne-
aft steer the calamities which had been suffered, for the
tontintiance of that
express in that instance b policy and those measures t 0 glect. When he considered their own shameful dissen-
which alone those calamities were to be ascribed. If tions ; when he contemplated the calamitous transac-
ons that had been the consequence' of their measures
that House were not to
.
• transactions which, when recorded in history, would
ether resentment for the past, or anxiety for the fu-
reflect disgrace upon posterity—he could not hesitate
tyre—if they w not to 'expression to their ten-
-if ex
ti to assert that they were not fit persons to be entrusted
urns with respect to the authors and the causes of ,
th*
e great public distress, he was convinced that they iwith the Government of this country.—(Hear, hear.)
A Government that was weak aid thus divided,
t"'lld be wanting in duty, both to the public and
ti.s. , could expect no issue to their measures but failure;
-emseives. So far, therefore, from supposing that they
would a• •
giee to the Address originally proposed, he and such a Government it was the duty of every
was • Member of that House to endeavour to turn out by
serseaded that they would be convinced of the
all lawful means. In the view he took of their con-
and of addressing his Majesty in another form,
and duct, he found that the more he sifted and examined
Consequently adopt the Amendment moved by
their measures, the more reason he found to em-
it% Noble Friend. If the Parliament was ever to
and to withdraWe all confidence from
act
it should act at the present moment ; and if demo them,
R should not he was sure it would not persons who had so misconducted themselves in the
4ct at all. If thiatmwHousewere to resign its in- Administration of public affairs—(Hear, hear.)—
• '—lt was not his intention to enter into any detailed
"tutorial power as to the acts of any set of men,
view of the particular miscarriages which he con-
y controul which it
ld to renounce the salutar used
to • demned. This he hoped would be done by persons
le exercise over the Servants of the Crown, it would,
More competent .
to it than himself. He wished only
hew convinced, be a proof of the decay ot parlia-
mentto call the attentson • -of the House to one or two
~ aryvirtue, and an unerring symptom o f the de-cineof he ••• of e • • Points - Ist, He wished' to notice the conduct of the
t .trne Twit the onstitution. It wits r . .. .
fisher ' ' sign in 'apasi and Portugal. This was easy in,
of astonishment, that after such a Nees of camPa

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• •
•
' kW. bemuse all the eirendistances or it were before
the Honse, to enable Gentlemen to form a correct
judgment upon it. The only difficulty would be to
account for the conduct of Goternment, according
Ito any intelligible principle or theory. Whatever
might have been the ground of the first expedition to
Spain, he could not conceive why Ministers had en-
gagd in the second campaign in that country,
against every principle of reason and experience.—
If they had looked to the past, they would have had
the benefit of authority and experience to deter them
from such a course ; and yet, notwithstanding such
authority and dear-bought experience, they had
thought proper to act against both. They could not
have been insensible to the example presented by the
former campaign, in the sufferings and retreat of a
British army, under one of the ablest Generals this
country had ever produced ; when that army, instead
of inspiring and animating,seemed only to have chilled
the ardour of the natives ; when our liberal aid —libe-
ral towards them, but injurious to us, could not in-
duce them to look upon us in any other:light than as
intruders. 'When Ministers were aware of all this, as
well as of the nature of the country in which they
were to act, and of the effect produced by the charac-
ter, good or bad, of our troops, he was at a loss to
conceive why they had determined upon this second
campaign. If, as had been asserted in this country,
we had the whole of the people of Spain with us ; it.,
they were disposed to welcome us as deliverers, and
could be animated by the presence of a British
force to an ebullition of zeal, or to make, the neces:
sary sacrifices in the unequal struggle' in which
they were engaged, then indeed the best feelings of
our nature, a sense of compassion for them, and
a love of freedom in virselvel, would induce us
to make another effort in their cause. In cons&
aeration of the blood that had been shed, one might
wish that more might be spilt in furtherance of their
glorious object. But the conduct of the Spaniards
wm the reverse of what had been held out, as instead
of their receiving us with enthusiasm, they contented
themselves with shewing a bare preference to England
over France. All we had gained were some tardy
and unimportant concessions from the Supreme Junta,
yet, in this state of things, Sir John Moore was or-
dered to advance ; and instead of being supported by
the Spanish armies, he met with none of their troops
but a few miserable bodies, which crossed him on his
route, and served only to embarrass his march. Thus
far they were informed by all the documents they had
seen and read, and thus far they were borne out by
the communications from Sir John Moore, and the ex-
perience exemplified in his life and by his death. Not-
withstanding all this weight of authority and experi-
ence, his Majesty's Ministers thought proper to march
another army into Spain. It could hardly be sup-
posed that Ministers did not repose confidence in a
General to whom they had entrusted such an army,
upon such a service; yet if any doubt should exist
on that head, he would give up the argument he meant
to found upon it. He would not take the trouble to
refute those, who, in the desire of calumniating
ablest General this country could produce, repre-
sented him as influenced by the pedantry of the ser-
vice—as the admirer of Bonaparte—as unfavourable
to the cause and character of the Spaniards—a man
who could not be made the dupe of the treasons of
Don Thomas Morla (hear, hear !)—he whose illustrious
name survived his signal services, and whose charac-
ter would ever put to shame the base calumniators,
who dared to detract from his eroinent merits, (hear,
hear!) Leaving, that illustrious authority, therefore.!
out of' the question, he would defy his Majesty's Mi-
nisters to produce any one officer, who had served
under that General, whose opinion was opposed to
that of Sir John Moore; unless, perhaps, they relied
more upon the authority of the military missionaries
whom they had spread over Spain, than upon that
illustrious officer, and preferred the opinion of Colo-
nel Carrol to that of Sir John Moore. The only way,
therefore, in which they could justify their conduct,
was by proving that a change had taken place in the
sentiments of the people of Spain. The contrary he-be-
lieved to be the case, and the most disgraceful character
of their revolution was,thatit had produced no eminent
soldier or statesman, and which had never been able
to create an army adequate for its defence ; for it ap-
peared, that this universal Spanish nation, every hand
in which was to be raised in its just cause, had never
raised more than 100,000 men. The Supreme Junta
had not done any thing ; and the imbecile Go-
vernment of Charles IV. had never been weaker,
more contemptible, and disgraced. What in-
ducement then had his Majesty's Ministers to send
a second army into Spain ? Was it the result of
the battle of Medellin ? Or did the swamps and
morasses of Estremadura hold out any temptations
for the entrance of an army into that province in
1 the summer months ? Was not the energy of the
country paralised by the base spirit of its Rulers,
whose every measure was characterized by weak-
ness ? Was it to be expected that a people, fin- so
Many ages sunk in a state of slavery, would have
spirit and resolution sufficient to establish a vigorous
Government, capable of managing their affairs with
'ability, and competent to the expulsion of the enemy'
from the country ? (Hear, hear.) But with such mew
as formed the Junta, was it possible that any such
results could have been expected ?—with men who
proposed to assemble the Cortes (the representatives
of the nation, from whose exertions alone the salva-
tion of the country was to be hoped for) at a period,
when, according to any probable calculation, the
progress of the enemy would have involved the Junta
and the nation in or indiscriminate ruin, unless acci-
dent, England, or a miracle, were to save them ?
What good was to be expected from men who behaved
in this manner, instead of giving to every man of the
nation, what they had not before, an interest in the
salvation of his country ? In this situation of affairs,
however, the second Expedition was determinedon, the
success of which must necessarily have depended on
the full and cordial co-operation of the Spanish nation.
It might be said, that the renewal of the war in,ger-
many opened a new prospect for Spain, aisit that
Bonaparte would be obliged to withdraw sorbed his
troops from Spain, to prosecute designs against
Austria. But if so, why had the ElltMition not been
conducted upon a scale correspondenrwith the forces
by which wars in Europe are usually carried on ?
Why, instead of employing 10,000 men on the coasts
of the Adriatic, and 40,00 men in Wakheren, had
not the whole of the British disposeable army been
concentrated in Spain, for the purpose of driving the
enemy out of that country ? Why had only 25,000

, the-I

. -
men, a force so mach inferior to'iirtii-tuaintaitted by
France at all times is that minify, been employed
in that Expedition to Spain ? It might be said, as
indeed it had already been said, that the country could
not support a larger force ; but that was a very goad
argument against sending an army to Spain, not
for sending only one-half the force that was necessary
to be employed there. The capital error in A obb
operations in Spain was the supposition that the t.
nish troops would co-operate with our armies.
whole of the evidence of Sir John Moore, and all the
experience we had had of the Spaniards, chewed the
fallacy of that supposition, and that the Spanish
armies could not co-operate with ours. At the same
time 'the French were always able to concentrate their
whole force to act against ours, by withdrawing their
different detachments from districts, which they could
afterwards easily repossess ; and thus the British army
must have been left to contend against them alone
and unassisted. The Spanish troops, inured to the
climate and acquainted with the country, were pe-
culiarly fitted to act in small detachments : the
British troops, on the contrary, not possessing the
same advantages, but depending ois their firmness
and discipline, could 'act effectually in large bodies;
the Spaniards could act only in detail ; the British.
en a great scale, suited to the operations of a re-
vlar army, for which it was impossible that the
Spanish troops could be fit. No blame was, bow.
*ever. imputable to the Spaniards for their not having
a regular army. It was the necessary consequence of
their late detestable Government, which consisted of
Court favourites and nobody else ( heer, hear, hear. )
Ali their Officers bad gone over to Joseph;; and it
was obvious to every one that a regular arms was not
to be rapidly created. It required the care of a vigi.
hint Government, and the operation of wise and wadi.
' concerted .measures, to establish an army ; and those
were characteristics that did not belong to the Spanish
Government. The House must observe, that the
whole of his observations applied to the conduct of
the war, so far as it regarded the measures of his
Majesty's Ministers. Though be was. sensible of
many weighty objections to the military operations
of the war, he should leave the discussion of that
part of the question to abler hands ; but Ministers
had sa completely cummittei themselves upon
this head with the General, (lord Wellington),
that they must stand or call with him. If Lord
Wellington had been defeated, then Ministers might
defend themselves by saying, that the defeat was
only the fortune of war ; that they had done their
duty in providing a sufficient army and skilful offi-
cers, and that they were not responsible for the fate
of war. A sliqrt time before, Lord Wellington had
'defeated the French upon the oouro, aid then at Ta.
iavera,tar which he was raised szo the peerage. But
though the valour of British troops, in both instances,
was diplayed with its wonted superiority, these victo-
ries had led to no result but what was to be ex.
' pected from defeat : these victories left Europe in
the same state of despair in which they found it ;
the British army was obliged to leave its sick atid
wounded on the very spot where it bad conquered ;
and the general result was the abandonment of
Spain and the renunciation of the great objects of
the war. If the Generals of former times, the
Cadogans, Athlones, and Marlboroughs had acted
upon the same principles as Lord Wellington,
France would-long since have been Mistress at'e,
world, and England must have sunk under the weight
of her Victories. But they had acted upon. far other
principles, and the consequences of their victories led
to far different results. It was a' well-known obser.
vation of historians respecting King William, that
though he might suffer a defeat, he always took cape
that it could not lead to any ruinous consequences.
The plans of our modern Generals were far different ;
for though a defeat at Talavera would have been
utter destruction, the victory did not advance our ob-
ject one step further. He was ready to ascribe every
credit to the individual valour of the British troops;
but he must lament the absence of the art of that
great man, who could prevent a retreat from being
ruinous, and rendered even victories unavailing. He
could not account for the conduct of the Government,
in sending the second expedition to Spain ; unless
upon that mischievous principle of keeping the dis-
-1 poseable force of the country in action, upon the folly,
infatuation, and madness of being stirring and doing
something ; a conduct which resembled the despe. .
rate phrenzy of a losing gamester, rather than the de-
liberate determination of reason—the
Monstnau pulls virtute redemptum."
As to the Expedition to Walcheren, he did not mean
to enter into any detail, either as to the manner in
which it had been originally concerted, or finally aban--
doned. History contained nothing so disgraceful. At
first, the object of that expedition was to seize some
ships, and to make a diversion in favour of Austria;
But if the object was to oblige Bonaparte to withdraw
any part of his troops from the Danube, the expedi•-
don. should have been sent, and the British force em.
ployed, upon softie point as near as possible to the
scene of action. At all events, the British army
should have been directed to some point, where it
would have bad to contend with some of the best troops
.of France, where it might produce relief-to our Allies
.in that scene where upon the issue of the struggle
every thing depended. But the army had been sent
to a point most distant from that scene, where the
enemy was fully prepared to meet them, and whence
if even we had been successful, we should have been
compelled to return. But even supposing we could
have remained, did his Majesty's Ministers suppose
that that great and consummate General and States.
man, Bonaparte, would have detached any part of his
principal force from the Danube, before the ac compli sh.
meat of his great object in that quarter ? Did they
imagine that he would have done, what no Subaltern
in his army, what even they themselves, wise as they
were, would not have done; that for the sake of a
few towni in Zealand, he would have arrested his
brilliant career, and lost the opportunity of fighting
such a battle as that of Wagram ? If any effort
was to be expected from the Expedition, the North oe.re,,
Europe was its proper destination, as nearer to Vet r:
grand scene, and because its .population was ready 4./
and willing to aid and second our operations. It was 'is .1
not surprizing, that a Government should have other .
views: .but Gentlemenwould recollect, how bitted*:
the members of the present Government complained •
of their predecessots. in office, for not having sent
a force to some point near the scene of action, •
previous..to the battle of Eyieu. It would be ret
mechbered how this accusation, (armed, for two success