Star.
London, England, 1810-02-28 00:00:00

~iE #NQUTRY:

5 .
MINUTES dF EVIDENCE; . •
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, -----,
ELEVENTH DAY—FEBEUARY 22.—etConducied4 e 5
stitatenctat.Geaeral the Right Nonearabk the Earl of
"CIIATIIAbt called int and examined by the Committee:
Had your Lerdship formed no calculation when 'Lou sailed of
the probable time non might arrive with your army at Antwerp,
after landing at Snit.,liet ?-1 had certainly coMidered sfery fay
various operations which might be to take place, but I have aln.ady
said, that very possibly the prelimimuy sieges of Lilloiand Lief- I'
kenshoeik might take place before any attack upon -Aitiverkee.
poseibly they night not.
. What tune dbes your Landslip inuigine the preliminory lint s
of Lille and Lielkeinhoeik might have, required, supposing your
Lordship to have arrived wishing four days at nantvliet f—.t is
rather diffichlt to answer that question, because I was not per-
fecter/ 'lnterned what was the state of Liiloand Liefeenslioeik,oe
what garrison was in Lilo tiro Liefkenshoeik, or whit was the '
natont oil the communicatioas. •• - _ • • .. ,
Were the military opiniuns delivered to the Coroinandee In
-Chief, and by himed GOverument, submitted to yOur Lordship,
and at what time?--I really do not recollect at what time ; I saw
theist prohably at the time they were first de ivered.
Hark your Lonlehaseany communication with the General OS.
cers who had given thdr opinions on the subject of those opinions?
-1 hid sonic. • , .
.N% your Lordship have the goodneis to state veith which Of-
ficers, and whit was the nature of those conversations ? Ile na-
ture of the conveisatiens were very general; they were nut sub- ,
mined to me for opinion; toe papers were submitted 'to the Ca.
binet: I had geheral conversations, from being acqtraitnesi With ,
all the Officernbut nothing more. I
Did your Lordship ask stir any information respecting the diffi-
culties of the enterprize which are alluded to in tuosc opinions?
—1 do not perfectly understand the cnestion.
Had your Lordship any conversation with Sir David Dundee
Upon the subject tit his opinion ?-1 had none general converse-
teon with hint.
• From the result of thoie conversations did your Lordship no.
derstaad that sir David let tides had changed his opinion with re.
sem to the did:cultics that he apprehended would attend the exe-
cution of this project ?—I had no-reason to suppose that be had
changed any opinions he might have Liven. I
Dtd your Lordship require any more detailed explanation of the
general difficulties stated in those opinions to attend this opera-
doe ?—I do not know what particular difficulties are alluded to;
the opinion of Sir David Dundas I understood to be direeted to
the preference between two different modes of operation. .1
Does your Lordship recollect the exeression in Cohmel Got.
don's opinion, that the Expedition by the Scheldt, though prefer- i
able to the other modes, was a desperate eutererite ?—I do not
recollect that expression. Ido not recollect particularly Colonel 1
Gordon's report at this moment.
Your Lordship states in your narrative, that you yOurstlf enter-
tained great doubts of the practicability of this enterprize until
you had seen the opinions of the Admiralty; will your Lordship
state upon what those doubts were grounded ?—They were doubts
of a general nature. I had always understood that the mov-
ing a very large fleet upon the enemy's coast, and to enter a navi.
nation that was not perfectly known, was a very difficult enter-
prize, and I had great doubts whether it was probable they would
arrive within a very short time at their destination; those doubts I
were removed by the opinion giVen by the Leeds of the Admi-
ralty. I had also entertained ctruidereble doubts with respect to
the practicability of landing artillery, cavalry, &c. upon the hanks
of the Scheidt near nantvhet, but they %vete removed also by the
• same opinion.
Were those the only causes your Lordsinp had to doubt of the
practicability of this enterprize ?—1 . believe the doubts stated in
my paper are confined entirely to the progress of the armament
• up the selieldt.
In poin of fact, was that the only ground your Lordship, as a
military nun, had to doubt of the probability of succeeding in
this rnterprize ? —There were merry other circumstances of doubt
certainly. For instance, whether all the inteldeince was strictly
true; whether it turned out that there stns such an absence of
force; whether the state of Antwerp turned out as described in
that intelligence; certainly they were all subjects of doubt • if
trey had all turned out favourably I shored certainly have had a
confident opinion as to the success of the enterprize; but there
was great doubt whether they would all turn out to be perfectly
favourable.
Then your Lordship-did, at the time you sailed, entertain con-
siderable doubt whether that intormation wes or was not to be
relied upon ?—Tbat is not who' 1 meant at all to say. What I
meant to say was, that it might be very doubtful whether the en-
terprize would sueceedebenitioe it required the concurrence of so
Many favourable circumstances.! &emit mean to express any doub: •
as to the truth of the inetnigenoen het it was a cencder:.tion to
imake use doubt whether tit wouid peeved or not; whether all
,these circumstances would tuft one exact!). as was. wished.
1,. Did your I.oreship conceive that the success of this enterprise
depended entirely on the c'iociiirineirais.of ai, great many cireume
stances.% hick in t heir own nature were veep sioubtful ?-1 apetre-
I bend that almost al, en•erpriees in war rinst be subject to great
doubt; it was impossible to know beforehand how all those cir-
sointstances would, turn out. ...
Did the mil lacy opinions suggest co doubts to your Lordship
other than those which you have stated ? f hey might suggest
some doubts, but I do not exactly know of what description, they
represented the enterprize as very difficu'o, which undoubtedly I
conceived it to be.
It is said in the report of Colonel Cordon " that this would he
a desperate enterprize cannot be doulned, and that in the attempt
whether succtesful or otherwise, a very laiee proportion of our
naval and military means would be put to imminent hated:" did
that opinion suggest no doubts to Out Lordship's mind which in
your oyielon required further discussion !---1 did not conceive.
that either the naval or the military means of the country were
exposed by, the Expedition to imminent hazard.
Did your Lordship understand that the possession of Fluelang
was necessary to the ulterior objects of the Etpedition ?—ldid.
Will your I.ordship have the goodness tp state what nurnbee of
troops were destined to the siege of flushing and the occupation
of Walcheren ?—Thc corps of troops in the first instance consisted
of twelve thousand men under Sir Eyre Coot! that went
cumber of -teen were destined
to be disembarked at tiantvliet for the attack of Anttlferp ?
Nearly, the whole of the remaining force of the Ariiiir "
firaC think,in Portsmouth.Lort
en your ship state what
Was not a Portion of the Army destined to garritonCadsand,
during the siege of Flushlog ?—.No part of theArnegAseigir, do.
alined to have gone on in advance.
Was that part included in the twelve thousand men tbiltlrere
destined fur Walcht•ren'?•lt wan never absolutely decided that
[ Cadsand should be maintained daring the siege' of Emitting, it
',middy might have been necessary to have done so, or might
have been advantageous to have done to, but it was not destined
to be occupied by aey part of the corps destined to destroy the
batteries, they were all to proceed to Santvhet.
Were not the it strectiens given to Lord Huntley, that he was
to occupy Cailsand until tilt reduction of Flushing? —The icstruc-
tions to Lord Huntley were, that he was to take such measures
(and he had an
engineer with him for that purpose) as might ena-
ble a small corps to maintain themselves at Cadsand, if it should
be found necessary to meiutein it during the Siege of Flushing ;
but it was distinctly stated, that the Whole of the &pa under II
Lord Huntley was to have gone on to Sono/het, and that If it had
been thought desirable to maintain any post at gadsand during '
the siege, it would either have been furnished by the marines of
Abe fleet, or it would have been (twiddled, under the concert be-
tween Admiral Otway and Sir Eyre Conte, front the .12,000 men
that were making the siege of Flushing,; eny pied opitilon cer-
niinly wase that there was no :tree:Sony toeneintairt any post there
nuidees it bad been the desire. Of. the Adintraleth 4 to; end I
stated distinctly, that I coulst,,utd,isayf anyof elif cove of Lord
Pbesues there. •,' oee._ , • i.e. •s e k
independent of the force la Witcheren, sos.ilit net ,
.nriginal
North
to detnch iorne force to oncupy the isiend a *owe!, and
North and South Beveland ?—I did net consider it as ;pi Rut of
the original to 'occupy more eleannoutb BeVeland ; t4p,(„ccip.
potion of Setten and North 4,:,f4.44,ar..0# eiitirolynketeef as
circurystancea there. ~, „ 1
Allowing for welt detachinents as'Were inecontemplitan ori-
-1 ginally to have beat made for the occtipaOtelS of Welchem and
South Beveland, whet st es the amoutit of Nu. with which your
Looishlp hoped, that,upder favourable clre,einitancps, in tour days
you
rot have arrived. as. Santvbet ?;•I ShoiOd wfilh first
ya state
•
that entertgned 'eery great hopes It mead not 'hive beOitpeces.
,ary tp have O,OD hen or neer so wr a!Osto as that at
l'alcheren, lint itni)ool4 that N. 4?ve beers !eftli::lY,nneet
so mote woad We born ilit4Ont to hires th neve•
.Wbitk would poPhably; bar siva obbyt it.sist ap,ooo
okadit oiaidoo. ~. ... ~ „to irfri•vir•

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