Star.
London, England, 1826-10-04 00:00:00

THE BURMESE WAR.

CALCUTTA, Aram 10.
trhe restoration of tranquillity will, no doubt, be
welcomed with the most general and cordialsatisfam-
tion. The termination ot hostilities with the Burmese,
has long been desired, for it was felt, that we had fully
maintained our national honour, that we had exacted a
due retribution for the aggressions which provoked the
war, and that we had annexed to our empire, as much
territory as was desirable to retain ; in short, that wd
bad achieved indemnity for the past, and security for
the future. The war had, therefore, ceased to have any
object beyond that which necessarily resulted from the
perseverance of the enemy in, an attitude of defiance ;
the moment this was abandoned, hostility was at an
end, and the return to the relations of peace involved
only the lightest possible penalty for the provocation
which had compelled us to have recourse to arms., We
entertain oo doubt that the consequences of the war
will be as beneficial: to the vancinisbed as to the victors.
Its immediate effect is (o free a considerable extent of
territory, adapted to be the happy abode of a numerous
population, frowsi syvem of misrule that has converted
them into solitary wastes, or the asylums of the brute
creation alone. Their restoration to prhspcpity will
shew their late masters what justice and moderation can
effect, and may incluse them to practise the lesson in
favour of their own subject,. The improved intercourse
that must follow our immediate vicinity, is likely to
diffuse commercial prosperity, and to bring the advan-
tages of civilized life within the • reach of new nations
and the experience which the Burmese have now bad of
our superiority in arms, must tend to wean them from
those feelings of angry rivalry, and those visions of con-
quest which they have cherished so long, and which
were the causes of the war.

The spirit of patty may assert. but even it 'cannot
credit, that we went to war with the Burmese for a
Sand Bank in the Bu rra m poor, or the revenues of an un-
inhabited island. We went to war to put a period to a
series of aggression and insult, which forbearance only
aggravated, and which, was only to be terminated by
that appeal to arms which it was intended to provoke.
(he brilliant career of the Burmese, for a long period
of years, had inspired them with the keen love of a
game that they had so successfully played, and a con&
dence in their fortunes, which urged them to new and
daring enterprise. They had completely subjugated
Pegu, wrested considerable portions of territot y from
Siam, repelled victoriously a Chinese invasion, curs
gutted Arracan, and recently added Casay and Assam
to their dentinitms. By the possession of these latter
countries they were brought into contact with a state of
whose fame they were jealous, of whose resources they
were ignorant, and whose necessary opposition to their
victorious course they were determined, as they were
confident, to overcome—they therefore sought to induce
a war, and the manner in which their insolence was
met, served only to confirm their purpose, and inspire
them with mistaken notions of their relative strength.
We have had personal opportunities of appreciating this •
feeling amongst the people, and have good authority to
know, that it prevailed at Court. The conquest of Bri-
tish India was the favoirite topic of conversation
amongst the principal officers of state, and the mem-
bers of the Royal Family, and the doubt of its feasibility
was never admitted. On one occasion, the eWest sister
of the present King, a Princess, well acquainted with
the sentiments of the palace, replied to an intelligent re-
presentation of the power, and resources of the British
Government, that it was evidently false. It was contra-
dicted, she observed, by the conduct of the British
thewselves, who had always evaded provocation by re-
monstrance, and could only have evinced such anxiety
to negociate, because they were afraid to fight.
That such has been, for many years, the disposition
of the Court of Ave, is, however, established, not only
by individual testimony, but by acts of the Burman
Government, both open and unavowed. A reference
to the Papers, printed by order of the House of Com•
mons, will shew, that the public functionaries of the
Burman Kingdom, threatened us repeatedly with inva-
sion, that our frontier was violated on more than ON
occasion, both in Arracan and Assam, that a large
force had, at one time, actually marched from Umme-
rapoora, with an intention to assail the British terri-
tories, and that Burmese emissaries were perpetually
traversing the country, to excite the Native powers to
take up arms against us. With all these facts fully in
their possession, the forbearance of the Government, for
so many years, did, in some measure, warrant the infer-
ence of the Burmese Court, that they were afraid of
the encounter.

But, although consideration of expedience deferred
the moment of actual collision, the papers that have been
published likewise chew, that the Government of this
country was fully prepared for its occurrence, and that
during the prevalence of the most pacific councils, war
with the Burmese was regarded as almost desirable.
The Governor General, in Council, in 1812, thus