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London, England, 1827-10-04 00:00:00

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Mr 1 •
Alan, 'Li

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4, 1827.

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'EZELL'S LIFE in LONDON and SPORTISG
CHRONICLE of Strusar, October 7, will contain an EN-
GRAVED PLAN of the IMPROVRIIRNTS now in progress
la the PARK, accurately reduced front the Original Plan which
was approved of, and ordered by the House of Commons to be
Engraved and Printed.
Ben's life in London is published at No. Id% Strand, every
Saturday afternoon, at Four o'Clock ; and on-Sunday Mornings,
at Four o'Clorit ; the price Is Sevenpence only.

nation oat to lay down his arms until the Republic
should recognize the province of Monte Video a,
Aiss'iotegrel part of the Empire. The probabilities
ass which the Government suppised that he would
Viet upon the bash of the independence of the
!Venda Orieatal, had thus completely disappeared..-;
'Whatever might be the intentions of the Emperte,
'tweeting the fate of that province, he wish 4
lobe able to execute them of his ownvontaneous will ;
I but to appear to be obliged to do Otis by the Republic,
was what he had resolved to resist to ihe•last extremity,'
a resolution in the support of which he had shown more
obstinacy *hue the reverses of his arens,..the honour of
with he wished to recover at all hazards. To be 14
it - obioletely -

BUENOS A'

•
A SUCCINCT EXPOSITION OF cowriccr-Pz CITIZEN
DON MANUEL JOSE GARCIA, Ai MINISTER PLENIPO-
TENTIARY OP THE REPUBLIC, FOE IMIGOTIATIIII3
PEACE Serwssir IT, AND HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR
OP BRAZIL.

Extraordioary and difficult must be the situation of
a Plenipotentiary who finds himself to '
his official condoct in public, and to
streets the reasons which ought to
only in the Cabinet. But such is the
lam at present placed. lam bound to
in a moment of entiv - and I

did negotiate, . of coarse that he must depart
from the letter. __ instructions, and put to hazard hiss
tranquillity and personal repntatiori. • This considera-
tion was net to be disregarded when a g. and national
interest was at stake. The sole question to be considered'
was, whether the cooditians specified by the Govertt-
ment in his inrructions was of such a mature, that being
once altered, that great national ihtei est would also be
comprised? Because, if merely ao inferior interest
was in question, it was clear that such might be sa-
crificed to the securing of the great object, the essential
right of the State, which is its existence. The ques-
tion then was reduced to the common and ordinary cam
in which Governments desist from their pretensions-in
exchange, I do not ssy for saving their compromised
existence, but for enjoying the natural advantages of
peace. Let us now examine this important question.
The Emperor of Brazil is not willing to be obliged to
yield any one of the
.rights of sovereignty which he
.pretends to have acquired, and justly to possess, in coo-
sequence of the union, which he calls spontaneous, of
the inhabitants of Monte Video, and of the sacrifices
made in consequence thereof by the Empire, -to fulfil
on its part the compact entered into with the said inhii-
'bitants. Tire Governitieot of the It-public, cloying the
legitimacy of this title, on account of the non-existence
of the alleged volunt..ry union, and testing its claim on
the right which its ancient posseision, constantly sus-
tained by the blood and the fortune of the citizens of
the Republic, not less h'uhe free and spontaneous will,
without any kind of .coe4ten real or apparent, of the*
inhabitants of the province. agreed to cede its rights, but
on the condition that the said province should be esta•
bri-hed into an indeperieera State, separa.e from Brazil
and the Republic ; coosequently the province of Monte
Video might ceaseaerforna an integral part of the 114•
lion without injury to the nation's essential rights; ot,
what is the same thing,. the Republic might renounce
its eight of sovereignty over the Banda Oriental with-
out compromising its existence by such renunciation.
I. may, however, be LAW, That even though the Re-
public might exist perfectly well without the Oriental
province, it would nevertheless have its existewe im.
minently threatened if that province were occupied by
a foreign poser different from its present inhabitants,
and then the condition specified in the instructions
would have reference to an essential right ; but such
is not the fact, nor did the Governmeot of the Re-
public consider the subject in such a light. This is de-
monstrable, because the Government bad resolved tti
make, not a partial renunciation, but a complete and'
absolute cession of its sovereignty, without meriting to
itself any eventful right—without imposing any kind of
condition on a new State, which was to be erected in
the Oriental province. That State was to have of
course full and absolute liberty to enter into what sti-
pulations it might think proper with neighbouring
States, or with any other, to adopt the system of policy
best suited to its interest; to avail itself without any
obstacle of the advantages of its situation and territory.:.
and without any obligation of paying any attention to
are prejudices or disadvantages which might arise
therefrom to the prosperity or security of the Republic. 11
The Government, in thus ceding its rights, neither had,
nor could have had, any other object in view thanthat
of extric sting itself from the difficult" of a ruinous war,
b: the honourable expedient of yielding to a third.
party the sovereignty, disputed by arms. Secondly,l
because the Government was to make this cession, not-
withstanding it was fully aware of the almost insuper-
able difficulties which opposed the formation of an in•
dependent state in the Oriental proviaces, of the trou-
bles which it would produce, of the pretensions to
which it would probably give birth in other provinces,
and of the results which such a state of things might
have for the future. The Masons which the Govern-
ment has for taking this view of the subject are the
same as those which have been published to demonstrate
the impossibility and dangetof governing the provinces
federally, besides othe.• more powerful reasons, which
it is not here necessaiy to explain. k may then be
deduced, from the whole of what has been said, that
the renunciation of the rights of sovereignty of the Ite-.
public over the Oriental, even without the con-
ditions specified is the text of the instructions, would
not compromise tte essential rights' of the nation, a •
that the Republic might make this renunciation, always
supposing that by such a proceeding tf.e national ex-
istence, which at that time was compromised, might be
saved. Having well weighed all these lemons, the
Plenipotentiary conceived that he was .in a situation,
which authorised him to negotiate, modifying on his.
own responsibility the only article of his instructions,,
which was directly opposed to the object of his mission
and he resolved so to do, considering that ht • might
thus secure to the Republic a benefit which was itigent-
ly necessary, without the fear of compromising it by
any obligation ; and since according to the law of na-
tions, obligation by treaties is the result only of the stet
of ratification.

k now remains to be examined whether the preliminary Con-
ventionwhich, in consequence of the above resolution was con-
cluded by the Plenipotentiary at the :Court' of Brea; departed
greatly from his instructions: whether positive advantages were
acquired by it, or whether it saerificed essential rights and wounded
the national gononr? On carefully analysing Artioles I and 2 of
the Convention, it appears, in the Ark plate, that though, by the
tenour of the instructions given to the fienipotentierp, the Repub-
lic was prepared to renounce uomicolitinnally all its sights to the.
province of Monte Video without any reserve, yet by iheyrelimi.
nary Convention it ragweed " only conditionally' eke rights yrbkh

~~ti

. .
!lteltal aw
it might claim." Me reb.olllon tie Saahnincimaha Mi
public of the rlglein MAIM le AI& itiefiletAo did Oat
those natural and poilltical PION silikti the Orientit p -
Wows and defebtfs. The Entpietor at Beata haieirmAy
ded his presensions, Which Ate thew—the inletibirechgabod
liesuei his right of possession of perfect sovereignty avert ' zidi
Monte Video, a right which he holds to be actioired . 4Se Vona
famous union of the Inhabitants of that rountry to the plie,-ind
la virtue of which the Republic cannot take port of imeratre Id
its drain without committing a manifest aggression. This rllibt,
of which the Emperor of Brazil supposes himself In pus?esdrin, it
2ece
NM connected with conditions ,especially operant to ' enter.,
and favourable to the natural and political rights of the to
of Monte Video, by giving to the Repubic a'Sser,rithi„ 4
In the right of its own preservation, to interfereatidaeca# 'ileirts
`leipeeting the mode of existence of the Ciriesititprovltlce. IL cps,:
Mutably to the tenout Of the Instructions, thi ISitchi,Prittital bad
-41 constituted a separate and independent State, It ml!' t SIVT4
with ' - wbetever etihdi
were tO heel aliP
clreamstaiitteept
' •• heat

sovwelgi
itself with the

lit .itereogargenntsts; since it b..
boundary beyond which no °over:intent can, without s
pass. By ankle 3d, the Republic engages to withdraw itt ern
the (*tentsl province, and reduce it to the peace eetahlichn'ain.
The Judge who is to decide upon the peace establishment Is 444
the Romper of Brazil, but the Government of the Republik ;
does the article prevent armiug in case of impending ev..r with iome
eele-r Power. It is a ntere stipulatits• of fort* Amon nations
which has never been considered ignominious ; anti whatever eft.
planations might still have been tholght necessary, tftlikt easily
have b.en introduced Into the definitive treaty. fly aerie!: 4,
the Republic is obliged to maintain the Wand of Marlin thirtia
in Asps quo—that is, as it always: has been, destroying ;be
temporary fortifications erected in cots.equeace of the war.--
This is precisely whet the Government would' do in the case of
peace, and to engage to dolt now is noway injurious. Stipulations
of this nature, and malty much more serious, are qtritte common Ift.
treaties and conventions, without ever being calk-delishondtlrable.
By article 5, the Republic is obliged to pay the value of the prises
proved to have been taken by acts of piracy. This article is honour-
able to the Government, and is consistent with the principles
'which it has proclaimed respecting hostlisties by privatrerft=s
The obligation, however, would amount to alines' nothing, beeftine
we have reason to believe that the crime of piracy is very rare
among our cruisers; and if any happen, it is but just that the sure.
ties which the Government requires froin the owners should be
answerable. Therefore; article o has for its object the adjudication
and rendering more equitable the execution of the preceding article.
Article 7 requires no particular observation., Article 8, without
containing any thing offensive to the national dignity, presents very
condderable advantages. It guarantees tbe.-free na of the. •
river, withoet imposing on the Republic the` ich'lts'
would be necessary to enter into from tax Moment of the lusion
of peace for the obtaining of this object, and which would be very
burdensome during the first years. In cases of war, especially is
those which would most prOhably occur during the tito Meet tars,
the Republic would be afek to elude the effects of the neat Haslet
and vigorous hostility which an enemy is capable of making. -11 y
Article 9, the blockade was to be raised in 24 boars alter the raid&
catien, and holitlitjes against the subject? of the empire might be
prosecuted at sailor eighty days more. The Republic was thus
immediately relieved from the most sericite injury which the ~toy
could inflict upon it, sod yet it would note obliged to restore the
pi izeisahich, during, so long a period, might .he taken. Article 10
stipulates the, term withiu which the co,ersntion was to be ratifieds
and the place of exchatige,—both sdpulations calculated to enable
the Republic to enjoy as speedily as possible the effects of a peace
supposed to be necessary.
It results Num this analysis—lst. That the preliminary conven-
tion contains no article by which the essential rightf uf the nations
are compromised. "fiat it presents impnnact advantages. 3d..
That if the Republic does not obtain the whole object- of the Warp
as little does the empire preserve all the tights which it claimed
and exercised before the war. Conventions and treatks far more
onerous have been concluded by nations most jealous of their glary,
when they have considered them calculated to prevent dander to
their national existence, to obtain great benefits, or to gain a more
advantageous position. That a treaty is only advantageous or dis-
advantageous according to the circumstances under which it is rati-
Owl, and the respective situations of those who conttacx it; is are.
calved doctrine among all nations, aqd is supported by consmon
'sense. To do the best that is po•sibk, is elocution the duty of every
'.filiniater, and he is responsible for what he does. The preliminary
convention has been partially judged. All those puints.have been
fastened upon which were calculated to stir up national aohno.sily,
and every one censures the Minister for having acceded to them;
but few have inquired what were the circumstances tidier which
that Minister was sent to rrgociate, and this is precisely the tiolot
which ought to be taken into considerations I well put UM case
hypothetically. Suppose our disasters to have bees such that only
one or two provinces of the Republic could support the burden of
the war that the other provinces could nut er froth not assist thefts;
that from some powerful motive, whitever it might hey instead of
aididt they opposed theist: if the treasury and reloarceswine en-
tirely exhausted, credit utterly ruined, the niktionsi audit/fiats die.
obeyed, accused, and insulted, and the army participiting in
these disorders, anti wasting itself even by itk
out- any hope of iniproveiuent—if for these-reissent x peebr or
a ince were indispensably necessary to sive the courant,' front
the last degree of degradation in such an extremity a (Winn,
sufficiently,patriotie to take upon himself the dangeromi task,of pe.
satiating a peace which could nut be glorious, should pqaerit the
lereliminary tunvention, would* be just to reject it es irritimPrsili:e,
disgraceful, and subversive of the essential interests ortlkftititile ?
Would it be fair to criminate the negotiator, who, fully understand.
log his country's interests, should conclude a peace unier such cir-
cumstances, risking only his personal reputation, arid rio way
comprontisilig the Government? But let it be further suppostd,
that during the absence of the Plenipotentiary, decisive viieurlev,
powerful allies; and abundant resources had been-obtained; that
the most cordial union among the provinces of the Republic, the
most exalted enthusiasm in the inhabitants, and unlithited'confi-
detiee in the national authorities and chiefs of the army, should have
entirely chauged the situation of the Republic—in such a ease,
should the preliminary ••conventien be accepted? Perhaps nut
'lle Government would see whether such a convention, which had
been advantageous in the disastrous situation of the ouuutryswould
be disadvantageous in its bettered condition. It might be re erred,
not as being odious, degrading,ond destructive of the hieour and
existence of the nation, but as disadvantageotts, coosiderleititt
circumstances of the Repeblic. 'The citizens, unmindful:in their
past misfortunes, and thinking only of
.their present prosperity,
might censure the plenipotentiary, and lie deaf to the argon tent; in
his defence ; but they would scarcely cant *their initialer •so far as
'to impute to him the worst of climes.

The Plenipotentiary' cluaged to negotiate the peace with Brasil,
under circumstances perhaps the most critical th.t the Rem*lie
ever presented, conceived that be could not satisfy the confidence
reposed In him by the Government, nor fulfil the expectatiore of • .
the country, if be did not hazard even his personal repetailonln ne.
gotiating the 'cessation of hostilities, and signing a eftertiden that
might be of the utmost impel twice to the welfare of die nation, and
which did not impose any obligation on the Government till after
its ratific.tion: I repeat once more, that the 63Vt rnment was placed
under no tizgagettlect. A treaty of peace, a preliminary convention,
dried by jilenipotentiaries„ does not bind the respective Gofern.
meals for whom it it negotiated, after it has been attentively
examined and formally ratified. The engagements entered into by
the negotiators are to be regarded as merely conditional promises
until aftet the act of ratification. Besides, a preliminary conven-
tion, even after being solemnly ratified, is will a provisional treaty.
he principal object Is to obtain a cessation of hostilities, and to fie
bases fore definitive treaty. If this do not take place, the conven-
tion or preliminary treaty falls to the ground. Unhappily, with re-
gard to the present convention, die fundamental question has not
been examined, without the examination. of Which it Is impossible to
judge properly of transaction of this nature. •!'here Wanly one case
in which the Republic ought to take nu counsel but of its costrageoind
in which no treaty or convention it admissible ; and that is, whet) the
essential rights of the nation are attacked. As, for example, if a
powerild- neighbour should' attempt to subjugate the Republic..—.
With the exception of such CMS, it Debugs to the discretion of
Governments to decide. They are hotrod to sacrifice every thing
.to the existence of the nation. To preserve the ltepublic, to avoid
greater cvirs by kpoydai boiv to nuke war and negytiate is

stiouleonatedintku.tetan
II Sell:bra
the
eanderaptnird7e.utre3rt Vtatwbant, It mi
ever csrpre
tened to, then. was .abiolstely necessary to adopt wen
and difficult must be the situation of somber coorse ; nor hed I the resource of temporizing. *Weaved to it proper. Or if the kaiperor wee. to aim? i
who finds himself obliged to defend because of the
.danger 'Which delay presented in the -military weapirtm -et-the province %mdse. etrinmstaticcept
bar t.ea those which
b Pte abfaavywourbaoblerieztiouteo win...tell:tyre. .
et in public,' and to proclaioi to the sitiation of the Republic, and because the Eapperar,
s which might to be deliberated upon.
.resbiog with zeal into the war, Could nor 'suffer the seater renounced, unconditionally all gright, the new emirs
et. But such is the situation is which. reeurretwessf uncertainties *NA might neutralitte the stare !fitted in the Birds Mental might dispose of itself with rho
:laced. lam bound to reason trinity measures he Ward to carry into effect. In seek a state wine Independence at the Repubne WAS to have di posed a ir...;.,
nthusiasm,and I caq not in my defence of thins there !reStilsed noshing for the negutipror to 1:Ilbe rideleinarY C°".5111111* the RcPetat lost . Illitaki al
..,..7. . .___, tbat if ~004 baubcaln no taking up ems; but it. Alps HT
U the resources whi.o- tltalOil . . AlikeVirn. it Hi 411114iiii.•.- U 4ba• dativeteim.a. 4g ‘ittbout igoiri to the province of m
,--even in this extreme case, I Owe to leer 'the principal object of his mild n Was defeated benefits possible for It to . and if, obtain • In doing this, t ijilt
:rice which is necessary in several int- and he might ccnipromi.e the national existence. If he .bas ryes compromised its existence, no one could defy . slat it Sad
I, however, willingly resigb myself did negotiate, kJ-allowed of course that he must depart mbrrably its its tnilogatrtinia:il3C, it hweditarrived at dm
bouedndar
a the full confidence that my coentry- from the letter of his insttucti-ins, and put to hazsrsi his yam Byyarticyle SJ, the Republic eZabgesnito withdrawe id_ arrr/ Nen
t the maxim of one of the most illus- tranquillity and personal reputation.. This considera the O,j.ntal province, and reduce it to the peace est,thlishnSot.—
tor Congress—it that to deliberate and tion was oat to be disregarded wiles' ag' and national The Judge who is to decide upon the peace establidirient Is n‘t
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