Star.
London, England, 1803-05-24 00:00:00

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eat. Now /with reference to the prifreffion of Malta,
k was of confequence to afccrtain whether Mini tiers
had always enrefented it as the grand objet of dif
pote betwixt the two governments. In paper R.; of
the correfpondence he found that the acceptance of
a projet relative to Malta would, according to the re-
prefentation of a Noble Secretary of State (Lord
Hawkethoirv), remove one of the moll material of
the difficulties exifting between the two Governments.
For himfelf, he was ready to confers, that there was
an objefl much dearer to his heart than the pofTtaion
of Malta, important as he confidered it. This was
the maintenance of the corillitution and the liberties
of his country. One tingle iota of tilde liberties and
that Connitution he would on no account content to
telinquith : and any attack on them, on the part of a
foreign power, he would confider as a ground of war
on which no pollible diverfity of opinion could pre-
vail. He did not think that, in the principle on which
the retention of Malta was required, Minifters were
juftified. Their argument was, that becatife, fence
the fignature of the Definitive Treaty, France bad
received a confiderable acceffion of power, therefore I
England was required to hold Malta by way of ad-
ditional fecurity. To fuch a principle as this he never
could give his approbation. He would put a cafe to
the candour of their Lordfhips, from which fome
ides might be formed of the principle which Mini fters
fit up in defence of the retention of Malta. Suppof.
ing that Cuba bad during the intermediate period
been ceded to this country by Spiin, or Sicily by the
King of Naples, what would any of their Lordfhips
think if Bonaparte had come to this country with a
demand for additional fecurity iu confeglience of this
aion ? Was there a Tingle individual having a
drop of English blood in his bofom, who would not I
have indignantly fpurned at fuch a requifition ? How
then were Minillers to be juflified in the principle
which they had laid down for the retention of Malta?
As it appeared to him the whole of their argument
fell to the ground. But he was ready to admit, for
the fake of argument, the principle which Miniaers
teemed fo anxious to eftablifh, and all that he had
to require on his part was, that if their propolition
was true in principle, they would have no objet ion to
his contending that it ought to be. equally true in
point of fart. With this undertlanding he fhould
contend, that inftead of the power of France being
augmented fence the peace, it had been materially
decreafed. In Europe it might. indeed, be Paid,
that it had been increafed, but this was a neceffary
confequence of antecedent events. After the battle
of Marengo and Hohenlinden, all the fubordinate
States of Europe were virtually under her controul,
and any formal ceffion was merely a nominal, not a
real accealon of power. But, he begged their Lord-
(hips to confider what was the decreafe of influence
and power, which the French Government had fiall
rained in other parts of the world. Did their Lord.
(hips bear in mind, that !ince the fignature of the
Definitive Treaty, the important colony of St. Do.;
ming°, a colony, in point of real value and impor.
tance, fuperior to all the other French poffeffions
to
the Welt Indies, had been loft to France ? In Rating
the debtor and creditor fide of the account, this was
a eircumaance deferring of peculiar attention. His
Liardthip in this part of his argument took occasion
to refer to the exertion of a well known fociety at
Paris (Vitali: der Noir), who, with the moil phi-
lanthropic views, had eftablithed a fyftem as appli-
cable to the Blacks in the Weft Indies, which if car-
ried into full effeft might have been produftive of the
moll ferious confequences. The Negroes might have
been conciliated and effeltually trained to arms. A
numerous and formidable body of foldiers might
have been employed in attempting a defcent on fome
tine or other of our Welt India iflands. Jamaica
itfelf might have fallen in a warfare fo condufied.—
On the molt refpedtable authorities it had been Rated,
that (hips with quantities of ammunition and a pro-
portion:lc number of troops might have been land-
ed in tome one of our Wands before fuch an event
could be anticipated, and the moll difaftrous-cohfe-
qitences might have enfued. The exilletice of our
whole Well India polliffions might have been expofed
to:the molt imminent peril ; but now all this danger
had entirely difappeared. By the unwifc conduit of
the Firft Conful, for whatever was contrary to the
rights of man, he mud always confider unwire ; a fyf.
tem of extermination had been purfued, by which
the indignation of the Blacks was exafperated to mad-
nefs, and France was deprived of one of the richeft
and- the faireft colonies of the world. But Miniflers
after. all this Rill reverted to the views of Bonaparte
refpelting Egypt. Putting this queftion fairly and
candidly he withed to ark their Lordfhips, whether it
was meant to be infinuated, that the predileflion of
alonaparte for Egypt was any thing novel ? Was it
not well enough afcertained that the poffeflion of it
was one of his molt favourite objcas ? Did he nut,
for the accomplithment of this objeit, facrifice one
of the bravell armies that ever followed the fortunes
of a favourite General ? Becaufe the Chief Conful
bad at one time expreffed a very ftrong inclination
to obtain poffetlien of Egypt, he did not think that
this was a fufficient ground for the retention of Malta
in the way in which it was by Minifters propofed to
be retained. He defired their Loulthips to race on
this circumnance, that a favourable change might be
introduced into the fentiments and views of the Chief
Conful. He had not (hewn himfelf to be guided by
any fyllematic or invariable principles. It was idl-
poifible trom what he had done to-day to calculate
what he fhould do to-morrow. This might with
lonic perfons be a ground of cenfure ; but he liked
the Chief Conful the better for this difpolition.—
There appeared to him, his Lurdihip atgiled, fome-
thing laughable in the whole of the arrangements re-
lative to the retention of Malta. The ultimatum of
Minifters was, that Malta should remain in our pot-
teffion for ten years. Now be would beg to know
vshat was the ohjea of fuch arrangement ?—Was
there any thing myfterions in having Malta in our
poffellinn by a bond for ten yews ? He (tumid with
to be informed, whether any important national ad-
yawn/could refult from it? After the ten years
were expired, were the ambitious views of Bonaparte
to be moderated ? Was lie to dived himfelf of all the
qualities which were now the objefts of anxiety and
alarm ? He certainly entertained no fort of doubt of
the views of the Fascb Goveramsat iefpeiling
Egypt. would be the WI man in the world
to • . -127'; kw to the fcswity of oar tall-
-4.; f_ of Egypt 14 Fiance was
•'-' ftly to be deplored. He
.r. * Mit 0011 tkis point, in das

mall decided manner. He differed from them on the
simple principle, that Malta ought to be kept in per-
petuity by this country. But how had Mittiners den-
dated the difeuflion? Their conduct, as he had before
hinted, was ridiculous in the higheft eleg.ree. It apt-
peared in page t to of the correfpondence,in a difpateS
dated as near to the prefent day as the txth of
May, that at the time when Lord Whitworth was
preparing to Pet out from Paris, M. Talleyrand
brought forward a propofition, holding out a prof-
pea of allowing us to retain Malta in perpetuity for
a valuable confideration. The anfwer to this pro-
pofition was of a very Pimple defcription. Lord
Whitworth folicited for his paffports, and left Paris
without any explanation. This he could not help
thinking contrary to all the wifeft maxims of policy.
It appeared to him, indeed, to violate the plaineft
principles of common fenfe. In judging of this quef-
noni he thought that he could not have a better cri-
terion of judgment than by putting himfelf in the
fuppofcd flotation of an arbitrator. Aging in this
capacity, if be were called on to decide on the differ-
ences of two individuals, he (hould begin by afeer-
taining what were the particular objeds to which
they refpdtively laid claim. If he found that the
claims of both referred to the fame objed, his arbi-
tration might then appear frnitlefs. lf, however, he
found on the contrary, that their wilhes were dired-
ed to different and unconneaed objeas, the talk of
arbitration would become eafy. Tie (honld in this
cafe a& the parties, what they refpedively wanted ?
He should make an equitable adjuttment, and leave
them to fettle the difference. But Minifters did not
reft their cafe with Malta. They had a long firing
of complaints againft the French Government re-
fpeding the curtailment of the Liberty of the Prefs,'
the difmiffal of Emigrants, and the (editions publica-
tions of Bi(hops. The infolence of Bonaparte, in re-
quiring thefe coneeffions to his haughty demands,
had been made a fubjed of a very general complaint.
He was ready to declare, that after having perufed
the papers with the greaten poffible attention, that he
law no proof of his infolence in the correfpondence
betwixt the two Governments. If the French Go-
vernment really required that the liberty of the prefs
, (hould be curtailed, that the freedom of difcuffion in
both Houfes of Parliament fhould be limited, then he
declared that Minifters ought to have infifted on an
immediate and diftini explanation. If the anfwer
of the French Government was not fatisfadory, what
was to be the condo& purfued by Minifters ? They
ought to have recalled our Minifter that day, and on
the fueceeding day our cannon ought to have roared
to avenge the infult offered to the national honour.—
fcarcely thought it neceffary for him to declare his
attachment to the Liberty of the Prefs. There was
no conftitntional privilege to which he was more
ftrongly attached. He had even written a pamphlet
in its defence. It was a privilege which he would
furrender only with his life.—But while he was an',
advocate for the Liberty of the Prefs, be was not to
(land up for its licentioufnefs. He gave the Noble
Lord who opened the difcuffion credit for the candour
and the opennefs with which he had fpoken on the
Cubic& The Noble Lord allowed that he had Peen
Come late publications of a molt mifchievous tenden-
cy. This he could fay from his own knowledge—
Come taf thefe publications were indeed of a nature
which could not be juftified on any principle of re-
gard to the rights of independent States. It was of
great importance that the Liberty of the Preis, as it
ought to be exercifed, ought to be clearly and ao-
curately defined. He wi(hed to (late to their Lord-
fhips what were the views which he entertained on
the fubjed. The criterion betwist what was Falk,
fcandalous, and fcurrilous, was what would be tole-
rated with refped to the Minifters of the Crown.—
What could not be applied to their condos% it was un-
fair and criminal to apply to the condud of the &It ma-
gistrates of otherpowers. On this point he thought the
Firft Conful of France had a right to complain, be-
mire it does not appear that any fptcific cafe of info-
lence on the part of the Government of France was
eflablifhed. The plain objedion againft Minifters was
this, that they did not make a fpeeific remonftranee.
They fuffered part injuries to pats over unnoticed.—
They continued to negotiate about Malta, and they
have no ground now to hold up thefe as real grounds
of war. His Lordfhip next touched upon the arma-
ments defcribed in the ports of France and Holland,
alluded to in his Majefty's firft Meliage. Here he
thought the matter lay in a very narrow compafs.—
Mini fters afferted the exigence of armaments without
producing even an intimation of preparations. The
French Government denies the of ertion of Minifters,
and appeals to fads in fupport of their affection.—
The defence on thispoint was what the public anxioully
looked for on as early a day as poffible. His Lost-
(hip, after a few more obfervations, concluded by lay-
ing, that he (hould vote again(' the Addrefs, as it was
now formed, whatever his fcntiments of indignation
were again ft French ambition. Before he fat down,he
paid fume high compliments to a Right Hon. Gen-
tleman (Mr. Addington), whole uprightnell of con•
duet demanded the higheft approbation. He was
confident of that Right Hon. Gentleman's fineere
defire of peace, and thought that even Rill an effort
' might be made to maintain the continuance of tran-
quillity betwixt the Governments.
The Doke of CLARChCI.—" My Lords, having
I been pert-many alluded to in the entitle of the prof-cot
debate, I tile to requeft your Lordfhips' attention to
the re;fons which will induce me to give my vote to
i'the Addrefs which has been moved with Co much
eloquence and ability by the noble Secretary of State.
In giving thefe realms, I (ball beg leave to go ball,,
anel-take a view of the fituation of the country for
film: time antecedent to the figning the Preliminary
Treaty of Peace. I beg to call your Lordihips' reeol.
section to the three expeditious againft Belkioe, Fer-
rol end Cadiz j the ill fuceefs of which, added to the
long continuation of the war, had made fo deep an
impreffion on the minds of the People, that there was
an almost univerfal clamour for Peace. In this &n-
--ation of things, his Majefty's prefent Minifters firft
came into office ; std it was then that they found
themfelves almoli immediately prompted by the ur-
gency of affairs to fign the Preliminary Treaty. It
was entirely owing to my feting the country in the
fituation it then was, and the wilhes of the people fo
ardently bent on Puce, that weighed with me to
give my vote in favour f the Preliminary Articles.
Strange &ems, however, were ailed in Italy between
the time of finning the preliminary articles, and that
of the Definitive Treaty. Two things there were in
that Treaty which weal very mash to ray heart. I

could not hut feel the cleepeft and meft-fincere regret.
when I law that by it this country had neglected to
procure any indemnity for its old and faithful ally
the King of Sardinia ; and in the next place, that we
had agreed to give up Malta. The importance of that
place struck my mind mak forcibly, but Rill viewing
the flotation of the country in the fame light as I had
before done, I confidered the ceffion as an aft of ne-
ceffity ; and asiPeace was fo univerfally confidered of
the utmoft importance to the heft interefts of the
country, I concealed what I then thought on the
fubjed, and as I gave no vote on the Definitive Trea-
ty, my fentiments on the &Nee were never known.
My Lords, I thought it neceffary to fay thus much
as to the reafons on which I grounded my conduit
in approving the &It meafures purfued -by his Ma-1
jefty's prefent Minifters. I Ihall now, my Lords,
take a view of what they have done since that pe-
riod, in order to thew why I (hall give my vote for I
the prefent Addrefs, and lwftl begin by calling your
Lordfhips' attention to fevers' notes which have
palled on the fubjee, and which appear in paje 44 :
.all which, it gives me the greateft fatisfaetion to find,
breathe an amazing delire to keep firmly to the faith
of Treaties. I no* come, my Lords, to the conver-
fation held by the Firft Conful with Lord Whitworth,
in which he complains againft this country ; firfl, for
not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as we were
bound to do by Treaty ; fecondly, with refpea
to the Liberty of the Prefs in this Country. And on
that point, my Lords, I agree with the Noble Earl
who fpoke Taft, that no nation ought to interfere
with another in refpett to what concerns its internal
'laws and regulations ; therefore the Firft Conful
having made this a fubjeet of diplomatic interference,
has given an early fpecimer. of that hotlile di fpolition
againft this country, which he has never ceafed to
difplay in various inftances, lance the time of figning
!the Definitive Treaty. With regard to Malta, my
Lords, equally unj uft is it to fay, that we have re-
futed to give it upin defiance of a treaty. In what
way was Malta to be evacuated by our troops ; and
what. were the conditions on which it was to be
given up by the Treaty ? It was not agreed to give it
to France—No : it was to he ceded to the Knights
of the Order of St. John of Jerufalem ; and there is an
exprefs ftipulation for the independence of that Order,
and for that of the 'Rand. This independence is gua•
ranteed by three of the fidt Powers in Europe, Ord
certainly forms one of the molt important points of
Ripulation in the whole treaty ; and nothing in my
mind can be more clear, than that Minifters never
would have figned the Treaty,if they had not thought
that thereby the independence of Malta was abfo•
body fecured. I now come, my Lords, to the infa-
mous report of the man who has been ftyled the Com-
mercial Agent of the Firft Conful in Egypt. I do
not hefitate, my Lords, to call it infassow, becaufe it
well merits that epithet—becnufe it contains the Wilt
falfehoods, and the groffeft libels on the honour and
dignity of his Majefly's Government, and on our
brave army, and its Generals: yet when Monfieur
Talleyrand was fpoke to on the fubjeft, he laid his
miffion related to Commercial motives only ; and,.
notw ith anding the repeated remonitrances that have
been made on this fubjee, no fatisfa&ory anfwer has
been returned, but it has always been evaded and
palled over in loch a manner, as if it was withed to
add infult to injury. I (hall now, my Lords, requeft
your attention to page 38, where you will find the
converfation between the Fidt Conful and Lord
Whitworth, part of which I beg. leave to read to
your Lordfhips : u He (theConful) now went back to
Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the fir.alleft
inclination to take polreffion of it by by force, he
might have done it a month ago, by fending 25,000
men to Aboukir, who would have pained ihemfelves
of the whole country, in defiance of the four thoufand
Britith in Alexandria. That inftead of that garrifon
being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only fur-
nithing him with a pretence for invading it. This
he flsould nos do, whatever night be hit drive to have it du
a colony, beeassfe he id not thin 4 it worth the rj/k of a war,
is which be mirk iseriapi, he conisdered at the aggryfir,
and by cithsch he Amid loft wore than he could gain Am
former or later, Agypt would helots: to France, either' by the
folks: to pieta of the TuriYh &ntisire, or by fosse arrange-
ment with ihe Porte."—liete, my Lords, is the fullelt
difplay of the mind of the Firft Conful. which clear-
ly (hews that his views have unceafingly been bent.
towards Egypt; that he has never for a moment loft
fight of it, and that he withed molt ardently, of
courfe, to have Egypt out of our poffeffion, as form-
ing the greatelt fecurity• for his not only obtaining,
but fecuriag his favourite objea. In another part of
Ithe fame ounverfation, my Lords, the Firit Conful
proceeds to fay, that " As a proof of his defire to
maintain peace, he wifbed to know what he had to
gain by going to war with England ? A defcent was
the only means of offence he had, and that he was
' determined to attempt by putting hi•nfelf at the head
of the expedition. But how could it be fu poled, that
after having gained the height on which he flood. he
would rifle his life and reputation on loch a hazao.
does attempt, unlefs forced to it by neceffity, when
the chances were that he and the greateft part of the
expedition would co to the bottom of the fea ? He
talked much on this fubjett, but never affeeted to di-
mini()) the danger. He acknowledged that there were
one hundred chances to one sigma him, but Rill he
was determined to attempt it. if war thisuld be the
confequence of the relent difcuffion ; and that fuch
was the difpofition of the troops, that army after ar-
my would be found for the enterprife. He then expa-
tiated much on the national farce of the two countries.
France with an army of four. hundred thoufand men,
for to this amount it is. he (aid, to be immediately
completed, all ready for the molt defperate enter-
prifes • and England with a fleet that made her mif-
trefs Of the fees, and which he did not think he should
be able to equal in lets than tea years. It was now
come to the point whether we &odd have peace or
war. To prefer', peace the Treaty of Amiens mull
be fulfilled ; the abufe of the public prints, if not to.
tally fuppreffed, at leaft kept within bounds, and
confined to the Englifli papers; and the proteltion
fo openly given to his moll implacable enemies
(alluding to Georges and perfons of that defcription)
mutt be withdrawn. He now made the tour of Europe
to prove to me, that in its prefent Rate there was no
Power with which we could coalefce for the purpofe of
making war againft France, confequently it was our
intereft to gain time, and if we had any point to gain.
to renew the war when circumllances were more fa-
Towable." And when Lord Whitworth, in orderer to
him, was rocccdiag to lama tht astaisoo of tar-

ritory and influence gained by France fiuce the treaty,
the Confid interrupted him, by laying, -‘ I fteppote
you mean Piedmont and Switzerland, Cs Ant tits
bagasslles ; audit muff have been feen wink the
tic ty was pending." My Lords, I have read
not fo much to prove his hottility, as the contimiel
determination (hewn by him to proceed in the fyileus
of encroachment .with whit trheiet out freest:beams
of finning the Treaty, and the •" Cs feat Ist laze. \
tag' is aknutch as to fay. his Career was not to be
ftopPed by England—t•.is is the tranflatinn of thofe
.few French 'words. Becaufe his blajtily's Mittitters
have endeavoured to do this, and have refuted to
' deliver up Malta till Come fecuritylhall be'given for
its indePendence, and as Come counterpone to the
encroachments he has made on the different powers
of Europe. he charges them with having broke the
Treaty; but, my Lords, I deny the charge.- I
fay it is as falfe as it is groundlefs, and that Crest
Britain has not broke the Treaty. His Niajetly's
Minifters have done every thing in their poweg
to bring things to an amicable termination, but
to all their jun remonflrances nothing bad berm
returned but prevarication and evafion. It, there.
fore, became neceiTary to (peak in a more decifivis
tone; and the Meffage of his Majefly on the fubjes
has my entire approbation. I think your Lord.
(hips will all agree with me, that from the 9th of
March, his Majefly's Miniflers, whilft they have
acted with the greaten coolnels and moderation is
urging the different points in difeuffion, have Cup.
potted the honour and dignity of the King; and if
they had not recalled the Ambalthdor when they did;
they would have difgraced themfelves, and betrayed
the bee and deareft interetls of the nation. MT
Lords, every one of your Lordfhips mull think with
me on this point, that it is abfelutely neceffary this
country fhould have a port in the Mediterranean,
the confequence of Malta in this refped. was an
doubt clearly teen, and perfectly underitood, before
the finning of the Treaty of Amiens; and I am of opi-
nion that the great length to which the negotiati9o;
-era fprotraded, was owing to the cfiftuffions relative to
Malta. It was clearly underttoodi that the greatobjed
of thefe difcuffions was to obtain a fufficient guarantee
for the independence of that ifland. It was not to
belong either to France or England; it was to be
ceded to the Knights of the Order of St. -John, and
to be entirely neutral to both countries. Since the
fining of the Treaty, however, Inch changes have
taken place in the relative fituation of France, with
refpeet to the acceffion of power, that the peeled in-
dependence of Malta is become more neee that
ever ;—but fuch alterations have taken plies tele-
tive to the Order that its independence is rea-
l! diminifhed ;—aud therefore it behoves his Ma-
Minifters to take care it does not. go out et
our cußody till the completes fecurity is obtaiset
for its independence; they have, no doubt the
eft reafons at prefent for detaining it, and I have
ftrongelt hope and reliance th it Malta will yet prove
the faivation of the liberties of Europe. My Lori
it is with the moo heartfelt fatisfaltion that lemmas.
piste the Rate we are in at the commence eat of
the prefent difpute. The country is at this sonde
in a (fate of the greaten contents and the peopla
unanimouny united in zeal and ardour to repel*
and repel the turbulent think of a on and
encroachment which the Fire Conful witEit extend-
to this country in the fame way he has done to the
other Powers of Europe; but L hope and truft we
(hall convince him of his error—and- fe far from
thrinking at his menaces, I glory in the day that this
country does go to war. A Noble Earl has this night
mentioned the lofs of St. Domingo by the Firft Con-
ful ; but I differ with that Noble Earl as to the can&
of that lofs. I attribute it to the efforts of Great..
Britain, and I hope we (hall be able to tell him, in
plain terms, you fha nt have St. Domingo, pee llsa'ne
have Louifiana—to tell the Spaniards, you them
have the Floridas—and to fay to all thofe who airs
protected by this Almighty Conful, you (ball barn
nothing but what Great Britain chafes to let you have,.
I with to fee this country exert the raft refources it
has within itfelf, to convince this mighty Coded that
we are able to contend fingle.handed againn Fannon
and all her acceflions. I . with to fee Great Britain
chaftife France.—lt is pot the fire time we have doses
fo ; and if the war is conducted with Vigour and wil-
dom, I think it cannot left long. Thefe, my Leeds.
are the reafons why I flail give the Addrefs my cor-
dial fupport.
Lord MULOILAVII.—The prefent (object, which
involves both the interett and independence of Great
Britain, is of too much importance not to excite the
feelings and command the moo ferious confiderition
of every Englifhman. Before I proceed farther. I
will return thanks to his Majefty's Minillers for their
forbearance, for their conciliatory fpirit, and for their
eflimation of the feelings of this Houle and of the
Country. I will follow their example. and abilain
from any comments that would irritate or provoke.
becaufe I think it beneath the dignity of the Houfe
to exprefs its feelings upon the infults offered by
France, on the courth of her ambition, and eye:that
various aggreflions. I Mall notice part of the fpeeeh
of a Noble Earl (Stanhope), which was one of the
molt extraordinary I have ever heard. If in his own
perfon he wifhed to provoke a debate in the Hook.
be could sot refort to more effedual means than biz
expreffion of Englith fentiments and French parti-
ality. The Noble Earl would give up Guernky sad
Jerfey to the Firft Conlin for biatta ; he would yield
the poffedlon of thofe • Iflands for the bate& of pur-
poles—he would barter them in order to appeafe the
French Government—he would furrender up. their
inhabitants, whole loyalty to his Majefty, and at-
tachment to this.country, is unqueftionable. Having
read the negotiation, my Lords, with dote atten-
tion, as I am Cure each of you has, I will afk, Whe-
ther the Rate of affairs, whether circumnances being
maturely weighed, it ought not to be matter of ex-
ultation that the Treaty of Amiens no longer exiftsl
I was one of thofe who had withed for peace, and
deprecated war as the greaten of calamities; but I
have confidered the loth Article of the Treaty of
Amiens as incapable of execution in its real fenk and
fpirit ; but as it has been figned, and as the honour
of his Majetty and of the Country are committed, it
ought to be adhered to. Yes, my Lords, treaties
&mild be (acted. But, if one of the Contracting Par-
ties departs from it, then the other is no longer
bound. I would elk you, my Lords, I would alk
my country. and all Europe, whether there were
nut difpofitions manifelted, whether ads of hanky
were not committed by the French Goverommt•

which viblated the treaty, and juaifies this Country
in demanding fecurity againft the gigantic (irides of
its infatiable ambition ? It is impoffible. from the
purview of this Treaty, and of the eircunfilances at-
tending it,that it can continue any longer. Let me call
your attention, my Lords, to the loth Article of the
Treaty ofAmiens,and confider i t in every point of view.
w has the French Government aided in conformity
o the fpirit and meaning of it? Why, my Lords, on
e i ith of September thou, Piedmont was annexed
Vthe
to France. Is this, my Lords, a bagatelle? Piedmont
is a country of ;rater importance than it is gene-
rally fuppofed ; its refources are great for its extent,
and its produltions abundant. We know that its
Prince!, fupported by the ardour of the people. ferved
as a counterpoife uphill Auntie in former Wars;
and (hall we admit as a mere bagatelle, that the re-
fources of a country capable of being dangerous, in the
hands of France, agaidt Germany, and confequently
againfl Europe, at prefent (hall be fo employed—fhall
see confider this as a bagatelle ?—" ces font les baga-
telles." Is not this a reafon why this country (hould
demand explanation and additional fecurity in conk-
quence of the annexation of this valuable territory ?'
—The Helvetic Republic was to have been indepen.
dent, it was to have the power of legillating for itfelf
—but fee it reduced to the vaffalage of France, trod.
den upon by her armies, and obliged to accept a con-
filtution. What is the mate of Holland ? Compelled
to feed and pay the armies of its great ally and pro-
teCtor, it groans under the weight of its flavery.—
What are we to underfand by tlavery ? If a coun-
try cannot eel in conformity to its own willies, if it
cannot legiflate for itfelf, if it be obliged to give up,
when called upon, every thing it poffefes. under the
pretence of friendfliip, to an ambitious and powerful
neighbour—what is this but flavery ? 'And fuch is
the condition of Holland, or, as it is nick-named, the
Batavian Republic. Can (he be dillinguifind in any-
refped from 'France ? Is (he not completely profirat-
ed ? I do therefore call upon you, my. Lords, to fay,
whether the aggregate, at lealk of the ambitious and
domineering alts of the French Government, in Eu-
rope, and its views refpetting Afla and India, lhould
not be well weighed ; and before I would commence
on this occafion, I (hould weigh the conclufion very
deliberately. But, my Lords, the conclufion is molt
clear and decifive, and his Majefty's Minifiers have
declared, that notwithitanding.the many incitements
to irritation and hoftility they had received, mill that
they preferred the bleffings of peace, confillent with
the dignity c the Crown, and the honour and wel.
fare of the country, to every other confederation, and
did ingenuoufly profefs an intention to execute the
Treaty of Amiens. But in the purview of this
Treaty the independence of Malta was to be gua-
ranteed ; a Grind Mailer was to be appointed—by
whom t---by the Langues, and to be confirmed by the
Pope. View this fubjett in its proper point of view,
my Lords—the Grand Mailer was to be confirmed
in his fituation by the Pope. The guarantee of the
Pope, my Lords, in pall ages, might have been fut.-
ficient fecurity, when he could fay to one power—
you (hall fubmit to my mandate' or I will excommu-
cate you, and abfolve all your fubjeits from their al'
legiance.—But without dwelling on the power of
Popes in former ages, what is his power at prefent ?
Is be not the vaffal of the French Republic ? Is be not
the inflrument of its ambition ? Is he not all things
unto all men, when the Conful commands ? But, my
Lords, there is fomewhat extraordinary in the hillory
of the Leagues of Malta. I (hall inftance one, in
order to (hew the infecurity of any treaty that might
be fubjett to its ratification, as far as the articles re-
(pelting it may be extended. i, A Grand Mailer had
offended the League,: in confeqbence,as they thought,
they had a right to do. they fufpended him ; he ap-
pealed to the Pope, who remonfirated, but in vain ;
the Grand Mailer, appointed by the Langues, con-
tinued in his office until death." This, my Lords; is
an hillorical and unequivocal proof of the holiiiity of
the Knights of Malta to the Papal Power. It is evi-
dent, under the circumftances of the prefent cafe, that
the Pope cannot be a fufficient guarantee for the in-
dependence of Malta ; without power, without terri-
tory, without even fpiritual influence, what fecurity
can be afforded by him to the Britifli Empire ? I (hall
now, my Lords, tall your attention to Colonel Se-
bafliani's report—a report which was given officially,
but was it given in the fpirit of commercial rivalry ?
No, my Lords, difregarding the ties by which both
countries ought to be united, he proceeds on his ex-
pedition. He panes from Africa to Aha ; he vifits
Ghezar Paeha, as he acknowledges, at the ri(k of his
life—fo anxious was he to perform his employer's m if-
fion. Having made his arrangements and impreffions
in that quarter. he proceeded to the lonian Wands,
in which, having detrained his influence, he in-
forms the Firll Conful that the inhabitants will be
ready at any favourable opportunity to (hake off the
Boke ; in this view of the fubjed can it be Paid, that
naparte has executed the Treaty of Amiens ? No,
my Lords. conformably to it, the independence of
the lonian blends was fecured. Conformably to its
Ripulations, the integrity of the Turkifh Empire was
,to be confirmed, but how does it accord with the mill
Pion of Sebaßiani ? Surely not, my Lords, but allow
sue to obferve on the converfation of the FUR Conful
with Lord Whitworth—[Here the Noble Lord re-
cited the converfation from the printed papers]-...
Under thefe circumßances allow me to ant, Whether
we are declaring war againft Prance, or France a-
gainft us ? Are there not grounds at leak my Lords,
of apprehenfion ? And why &mild Great Britain. for
an inaant, hefitate to bring the point to an iffue ?
But confider this fubjea a little farther. In turning
over the pages of the negbriation, I find a note from
M. Otto, requefting Co fend away from this country
the princes, bifhops, and other emigrants, who had
facrificed thcir comforts, their property. their con-1
nations, and in fine, all that was dear to them. to
their honour and principles. The Government of
this country was called upon to bani(h them, to re-
title them the rights of hofpitality, and ejea them
from its as outcails of fociety, doomed to encounter
the horrors of degradation, poverty. and perhaps
perfecution. But, my Lords, what language is this?
Is it not (peaking to the Government of this coun-
try, as to the King of Naples ? Is it not commanding
us in a manner to fuccumb to the yoke, and bear
the iron rod. Then we may expert to be under the
pro.confulate of Arthur O'Connor—" (born, and to
the quick indeed." But he goes farther; be calls
upon you to &limy the palladium of our liberties ;
he demands that we (ball regulate it in a manner un-
known in this country. Talleyrand, the regulator

of the affairs of Europe, tells us we fhall do fo ; and
Bonaparte, the regttlator-geoeral of the univoifis.
demands Malta fi-ir bin:deli. What fort of conduit
is this from one independent country to another? I
have now to- apologize to the Houle for trefpalfing
In long on its patience; but I hope I thall be enured,
on an occafion of Ibis kind, for indulging a little in
Englifh feeling and Englith fentiments, arcing from a
will to preferve our con ft itution,our liberty, and rights.
Lord Matviut 11 role to give his heart, concur-
rence to the Addrefs, which had been moved by the
Noble Lord, and in pledging himfelf to fupport his
Majeily in the maintenance of the juft rights and in-
teretts of the country, he begged leave to explain, in
a few words, the fentimeats-he entertained upon his
important fubjed In alluding to what had been laid
relpeCting Malta, he obferved, -that this queltion was
now freed from much of the difficulty and perplexity
in which it had been involved. He rejoiced molt
heartily that' nobody could (land up to deny that the
loth article of the treaty of Amiens was totally in
capable of being carried into execution. He congra-
tulated‘the Houle—he congratulated the country
that it was ra incapable of being executed—nay, he
thought it matter of congratulation that the French,
by their obftinacy, had prevented any new and ade-
quate arrangement for the independence of Malta
from being fubftituted in the room of that which cir-
cumltances had fo completely rendered impraltica-
ble. What indeed would have been the fituation of
Malta with all its guarantees? Was the guarantee I
of Spain, of Pruffia,"bf France, to be relied upon ?
It would not be pretended that fuch fecurities were of
any avail. The only guarantee of importance, and
which could have any efficacy, was that of Ruffia,
in conjunetion with Great Britain. He (poke of the
importance of Ruffia in fuch an arrangement with
the greateft fatisfaftion, for he confidered it mutually
for the intereft of the two countries to cherith the
ftrieteft union and alliance. Neverthelefs he was
happy that the guarantee of Ruffia was not to be at.
tacked to an arrangement in every way fo inadequate
to the object it had in view. It was in faCt molt ad-
vadtagedus for Ruffia that Malta lhould be under the
proteCtion of Great Britain. It was Great Britain
alone which, by its naval fuperiority, by its capacity
to avail itfelf of the harbours and naval Ration of
Malta, was calculated to be the cuftodier of Malta.
Every other plan for its protection and for its inde-
pendence was futile and inadequate. Now indeed he
was at liberty to contemplate the pollibility of realiz-
ing an objeft of Co much importance as the Settle-
ment of Malta under Britith protection. Well did
he remember the melancholy moments he had pallid
when, after reading the Definitive Treaty, he found
Malta expofed tst fo much danger of falling into the
hands of a power that would employ it for our de-.
ftruition The importance of that ifland had long
appeared to him to be very great, and Europe had in
the molt decifive inftances witneffed it. By means
of Malta it was that the French had attacked and
made themfelves mallets of Egypt. By Malta it was
that we had been enabled to recover that poffeffion.
If Malta remained in our bands, it was impoffible that
all the effotts of France, that allihe armaments the
could fend forth could obtain poffeffion of Egypt,
While we, with a fuperior navy, had the opportunity
of availing ourfelves of the harbours of Malta. Malta,
therefore, was to be confidered as of infinite impor-
tance to the ftrengthening and fecurity of our Empire
in India. He contidered it as a great tower ereaed in
the Mediterranean; on which the flag of Great Bri-
tain, difplayed and floating, would hold forth an in-
vitation to the people of the Mediterranean, of the
Ad. iatie, and of the Levant Seas, to rally round it,
and to avail themfelves of the protetlion of this Coun-
try. It therefore was a fubjea of congratulation that,
with nit any charge upon our good faith, an oppor-
tunity had occurred in which the loth article of the
treaty of Amiens could not be executed. As we were
now going to war, and as Malta formed one of the
main objeas of the war,he willed that its value fhould
be fully underftood, and that we fhould likewife
keep in view the neceffity of availing ourfelves of
its advantages to the utmoft. He hoped to hear
no more of the Order being reflored ; or of the
independence of the ifland being in any manner gua-
ranteed. While Great Britain was able to keep a
fuperior fleet in the harbours of Malta, in the protec-
tion of Great Britain it would be fecure. It was
evident how great intereas depended upon the retell-
tion of Malta ; were we then to give up that pottier-
lion which was fo effen ial to thofe interefls ? If, then,
we were going to war for Malta, it was an objea to
animate the courage and reward the achievements of
our fleets and armies. We fhould go to war, there-
fore upon this ground as a broad queftion both of
right and of general policy. In this view it was mat.
ter of congratulation that Malta was to be confidered
as a Britifh objea. We had now got rid of any con.
fideration of the Knights of St. John. What was the
fituation of thole Knights when we obtained poffeffion
of the Mind ? They had degraded and overthrown
their Order by an alt of perfidy; nor could they be I
reftored without the feverell injury to the people of
the ifland. The Order had become odious to the Mal-
tefe by the aft of treachery by which they had put
them under the Government of France, and it was
doubtful whether the Mahe& would not have deemed
themfelves lee unfortunate in being transferred to
' France, than in being Again placed under the com-
mand of an Order which they had lb much reafon to
hate and to diftrttft. Betides, it was to be confidered
that we went to the aid of the Maltefe, previoufly
engaged in the reduaion of the French ; and it was
greatly again It the withes of-the people that the Order
was to be reinftated upon any terms. We ought
therefore to fecure to the Maltefe a wife and fuitable
form of Civil Government, to be enjoyed by them
under the protedlion of the Britifh power. This oh-
jell ought to be profecuted and fettled without any
delay, fo that whenever any new negotiation &mild
be fet on foot, we might be enabled to fay that the
people of Malta, under the form of Government
agreeable to their withes, were now eftabliftied under
the proteaion of Great Britain. He willed it to be
underftood that he confidered the retention of Malta
for ever tabe a molt cicada' objea, and one to which,
in the relative circumftances of Prance and this coun-
try, we were fully entitled to profecute by war. In
voting for the Addrefs we therefore voted our con-
currence in the war, of which that was the principal
objea. The attainment of it would be of the utmoft
benefit to all the Oates of the Levant, and under our
protein= Wu Malta could be rendered independent
and happy.

The Duke of RICHMOND confidered t' a demands 0
made by Minifters in the Mittaium which doled the .
negociation as not adequate motives for going to
war ; and that he did nct confider the polfeffiou of
Malta for ten years, or the ifland of Lampcdofa, as
fufficient grounds for war.
The Marquisof Lawsoowxs laid that he was to con-
fider thegroundsof war dated in the Declaration which
had been publithed as the real grounds of war,and was
not to draw in any rumours to twellout the cafe. With
refped to Holland, it was known when the Treaty
of Amiens was concluded, that Holland was entirely
in the power of France. Switzerland, though an in.
terefting part of Europe, lay too remote to be greatly
affilted by the friendfhip of Great Britain. It was an
objet which more properly belonged to the Houle of
Auftria. Parma and Placentia were likewife objeas
remote from us, and not fully within the fphere of
our political influence. Ruffia, it was laid, had
elponfed the caufe of the King of Sardinia. Was not
Ruffia a Power able to fupport his rights with effen ?
The maintenance of his interefts, therefore, did not
immediately call for our interpofition. The Report
of Seballiani was Rated among the castles of the war.
It certainly was true that this publication contained
much that was offenfive in the manner, but furely
there was nothing new ir. the nature of fuch a Report.
Had it not been ufual for every country to fend per-
lons to inquire into the fituatiGn of other countries
with which they were conneded ? Had not France
fent perfons of that defcription to this country, and
we, on the other hand, fimilar perfons to France ?
As to views of ambition, it might be true that the
Firß Conful was ambitious. 'But who in fuch a litua-
tion would not be aauated by views of ambition ?
Was it to be expeded that, in the fituation of France
and of Europe, all views of ambition Ihould be ex-
tinguifhed in the breaft of the FiritConful? He wasfar
from condemning the whole of that r.rfon's charader
—No honelt man, he believed, could approve of his
conduct. Yet it was not becaufe the Firfl Conful
had developed views of ambition that we ought to
conclude that he intended to go to war with us. Our
bufinefs however was, not to allow ourfelves to be
hurried away by difapprobation of the Firft Confes
meafures, or by an exaggerated alarm at his ambi-
* tion, but to follow a Ready courfe of national policy.
Malta certainly was an objed of importance ; but he
doubted whether it was of that immenfe importance
attached to it by Lord Melville. About five years
ago, he underftood that an offer was made by the
Grand Mailer of the Order, to this Country, on
certain conditions; but it was not thought advifable
by the Cablhet to accept the offer. But granting it
to be of value, was it neceffary to go to war for it,•
when, perhaps, by flcilful negociation we might have
obtained it?

The Duke of NORFOLK remarked, that it had been
(fated as fubjel of congratulation, that we had made
a treaty which could not, and ought not, to be ful-
filled. This, however, was to expofe the national
faith, which bound us to fulfil contratfts, though it
might be difcovercd that we might have made a bet-
ter bargain. In his Grace's opinion, if the loth ar-
ticle of the Treaty of Amiens could have been put
under the guarantee of the Powers mentioned in it,
particularly Ruffle, we thould have had as much fe-
entity for the peace as the eireumftances of Europe
would permit. He (till hoped that tome means might
be difeovered for ,maintaining peace, and he thought
that if any opportunity thould offer, it ought to be
embraced. At the fame time, if we are to go to
war, he was confident that every Englithman would.
join heart and hand in repelling the attack of a fo
reign enemy attempting to invade the country. The
Addrefs did not entirely meet his ideas; he wifhed
that it thould fate that the Houfe would fee with
fatisfaelion his Majefty arairhinsfelf of any opening,
either by negotiation or mediation, calculated to
avoid the neeeffity of war.
Lord MetviLia was anxious to explain that be did
not fate that it would have been proper not to execute
the loth Article of the Treaty of Amiens; it could
have been executed, but he thought that fence eir-
cumftances in which this country had no concern had
rendered its execution impaible, a new negotiation,
fuitable to the change of circumfances, was to be en-
tered upon, and therefore be confidered the country
juftified in retaining Malta.
Lord Kiwo raid, that though the titration of Eu-
rope, and the power of France, were fuch as to be
alarming to this country, he did not fee that the pre-
fent moment was favourable for attempting to redrers
what was wrong. Single-handed we never could
make any great irnpreffon on France; nor could the
capture of her colonies ferioolly reduce her power.—
France was not made up of various, feparate, and
detached fettlemects. Nor did her refources depend
fo much on diftant colonies, or foreign commerce.
France was a great territorial and military power,
and therefore not to be greatly repreffed by a power
of a different dereription, like that of England. His
Lordfhip, therefore, doubted greatly the prudence of
!going to war at this junaure without an immediate
and preEng n.ceffity. He confidered the war now
entered upon as a war for aerating the errors of the
Treaty of Amiens. Malta was an important objea,
but he did not think it worth being purehared at the
expence of war. He therefore waited that all means.
for effe/ting peace might not be abandoned. Fur this
purpofe he propofed an amendment, the objea of
which was to leave out the greateft part of the Ad-
drefs, and to fubftitute rouse new paragraphs, the
purport of which was, that the Houfe would fee with
fatisfatftioo, that his Majefty mould liften to any far.
ther offer of amicable Cettkment, confident with the
honour and interefts of the country.
Lord Essaasoaouoie f-id, it had been afked,
where were the caufea that jullified our going to war?
He would anfwer, that if we had not at prefent ade-
quate juttification of war, he knew not what intuits,
provocations, or dangers could juftify Cluiftian men
in appealing to the laws of Celt defence. What was the
objea of the war ? He would fay broadly that it was
a war to redrefs all our wrongs, and to repel all our
dangers. It was not a war merely for Lampedafa,
as a Noble Duke (Richmond) had raid, though as
the Noble Duke might have looked at that °Nett as
a fruitful 'Utica of -future fortification, he ought not
to have held it fo dcfpicabk. We were going to
war not for inch inferior confederations. but the
greaten lake of civil foeiety—for every thing which
an independent nation could prize—for the right of
legidating for ourfelves, which the enemy had pro-
pored to submit to the Rendud of their arbitrary
principles. He trailed, Insister, that inch Taloa&

privileges we would never abltrinn to the dieateilf
any sovereign, whether lawful or ufurping. or N
any mars of men huwever formidable in power. ' Hie
Lordihip alluded with the higheft praise to the no*
of Lord Hawkefbnry, in anfwer to M. Otto's note:
and fait/, that it entitled Miniders to the thanks and

gratitude of the country. It was necelfary to con-
fider, whether the War was juft for owvilefs that
was found, all the reti was hollow. 'if ut he con-

tended, that for Malta alnne, independent of wher
circunillances, we had a jult giound of wat. The
loth article of the Treaty could not be carried into

neeution. The Order seas degraded by the confif-
cation of their revenues; the guarantees were with-
held, fo that it could not be executed. By every
principle both of the law of nations and of common
law, it was necetfary to execute the contra& as near-
ly in the fpirit and fenfe, if not iwthe form•intended.

Ant it was necelfary too that time and conference

(hould be employed to that end. Upon taking Up
the Treaty on the ground of its being imprafticable.
France could not with jußice demand the evacua-
tion of Malta, fince nothing has continued in the
fame Rate as when the former arrangement was eon-
chided. It had been laid, wish fume ridicule, that
ate nomination of the new Grand Matter of Malta

was left to the Pope. But was not the nomination
of the Pope, from a lift prefented by the Cabinet of
Ruffia, as likely to be fati.faCtory as the choice of
the Priories, fuch as they are now constituted ; and
betides, that arrangement was agreed to before the
hoftile and ambitious views of the 19rft Conful wets
developed. But fince it had been (hewn that Malta
was of the utmoft importance to the prefervation of
the interefts of this country, could it be expelled that
Malta thould be given up after Sebaftiani's Repott
furnifhed us with fuch decisive information of his inten-
tions ? In his converfation with Lord Whitworth, on
the gth of February, the Firft Conful informed us that
he had 25,000 men which might have been fent to
Egypt, and the hint gave fufficient warning that
tome other of the 500,000 men he boated to have in
arms might be converted to that purport. Befides,
the aggrandifement of France fince the peace emit.
led us to new fecurities and compenfation. By the
Law of Nature and Nations even an aggrandizement
'by fucceffion or otherwife might have been ground
of jeoloufy and fufpicion ; but when that aggrandise.
ment had been obtained by violence and injoltice, it
could no longer be doubted that we were entitled to
make new demands. His Lordfhip then alluded to
the feizure of Britilh veffels on the molt frivolous
pretences. He likewife dwelt upon the conduit of
France to Switzerland. He denied that the pro.
pofal of accepting Lampedofa in fovereignty. and.
Malta for ten years, was one that was to be rated by
the mere value of thefe objeas. The objea gained
would have been fecurity that the danger which the
ambition of France threatened would be guarded
againft for ten years—that Europe would have ob-
tained a breathing time ;—that means might have
been deviled for frefh fecurities. It was for• great
objeas like thefe, and nut merely poffefflon of a Ra-
tion for ten years, that was required. He was aware
of the burdens which the conceit would involve, and
no man regretted them more than he did --but be
knew alto the refources of the country to be equal to
any neceCGty. If we had not the chivalry and gal-
lantry of Creffy, Poiitiers, and Agincourt, we had to
oppofe to the enemy the heroes of Aboukir, of the
Ni of St. Jean D'Acre, of St. Vincent, of Cain-
perlown. Similar heroifm and limner achievements.
he trolled, would fignalize the prefent conteß ; and
with fuch refources ought we to (dnk to , in.
Cults? To the energies of the people, Parliament, he
tru Red, would fupply wifdom, counlel,and unanimous
refolution, to withftand the common enemy, without
being influenced by any low tonfiderations of party.
Earl Motes acknowledged the jußice of the pie;
lure which tome Noble Lords had drawn of all the
calamities attendant on a Rate of war. It was jibe
the peßilential blall of the •clefert, which withered
every thing before it. He alto agreed with the fen-
timents of the Noble Lord who psopofed the amend-
ment, that their Lordfhips had not merely to decide
upon their own kelingi and interefts, but how far the
feelings of the people of the country were congenial.
and how far their interefts were to be affedted. How-
ever, though be coincided in this pofition, and fin-
cerely approved the motives which generally a&uated
the conduEt of that Noble Lord, yet he could not help
regretting that any amendment fhould hive been pen.
pofed which could tend to produce the kali divetfity
of fentiment, upon an occalion when unanimity Vris
fo very clearable, and might be produaiye of, he lift
eonfequence to the fate of the country. Palfing frem
this amendment, which the Noble Earl erpreffed lies
hope would not be prelied, he took notice of the
manner in which a Noble and Learned Judge hid
treated the complaints of the French Government
with refpedt to the publications in this country. re.
(erring to its administration; and upon this point he
was ready to admit the candour of the Ncble Secre-
tary of State as to the offenfive tendency of the ge-
neral tenor of thofe publications—for offenfive many
of them certainly were. Among thole, however,
be did no: mean fo much to dwell upon the fen-
tirnents of the Englifh newfpapers, as upon thee,
which appeared in French newfpapers.publithed
London, particularly the Courier Jr Lave. a piper
anderftood to be is a great degree under the pecu-
liar patronage of his Idajefty'slilinifters. If fo, the
French Government had very jolt rearm to com-
plain. It was reviled in the groffea terms of abufe
m this publication, and why, he would alit. &mid
a paper, which could not be employed for any put.-
pals of atnu_fing or informing the peoplc.of this cowl-
aichbe —ffat4 to purfue that fyfiem of conduit
muff operate to difturb the amity fubfiking
between the two Governments, more particularly
when Government bad power, under the Alien Adt,
to (end the Editor out of the country. if it chofe to dif-
countenance fuch proceedings t Their declining to
do fo was not Ids a juftification of the remonerances
of the French Government upon this fubjedt than a
ground of fufpicion to this country as to the' difpofi-
mu of his Majefty's ldinilten.Thofe obfervations
he thought a fufficient reply to the argonsents ad-
vanced by the learned Judge on the Mini tterialßench.
With refputt to the very animated obfervations of au
illudrious pevfonage who (poke early in the debate.
they had his heartfelt approbation ; be perfatay
agreed with his Royal Highnek, that we were not
in that Sate in which we were to confider merely
Ithe jollies or expediency of the war, bat whether
this eenntry braid golden* Ojoy that lids•