Star.
London, England, 1818-08-18 00:00:00

EXTRACTS FRom THE SECRET MEMORIAL,
EXPOSING THE PRETEXTS AND TIIE OBJECTS
OF THE LAST CONSPIRACY.

VIEW OF TILE SITUATION OF FRANCE IN TILE NfONTI!

OP_MARCII, 1818.

" In the month of August, 1816, and in the same
month, 1817, we endeavoured in the Notes which we
transmitted to the four Allied Courts, to shew br
what course of events the Government of France had
gradually wandered from the line of conduct which
might have firmly established the King, and to make
it evident that by the neglect of the means necessary
for establishing the Throne, preparation was made
for the triumph of Revolution.
" These sentiments then appeared partial, and found
contradictors in those who had not suffis..ently 013-
served France, the progress of opinion, and the na-
ture of the' Government then in experiment. Now
the evil is such, revolutionary intentions are so openly
discovered and so publicly avowed, that the most
obstinate minds have been obliged to yield to the'
evidence, and none can now refuse to declare that
the King is placed without support in the midst of
the torrent of Revolution.

" In fact, Revolution is every where disseminated
from the Cabinet of the King, which is become the
focus of it, down to the lowest classes of the nation,
which it agitates with violence.
" Principles destructive of our Monarchy, are pro-
fessed at the Tribune by Ministers of the King *.—
Audacious writings are sapping all the foundations
of social order t, and repressive laws prove impe-
diments only to those writers who support monarchy
and legitimacy—the judgments of those tribunals,
which °have ever been regarded as the most sacred
of human institutions, have been given up to the
most virulent diatribes -4t —all the bonds of the social
state are relaxed—the Government appears to pro-
Iced only through the impulse given by a power no
longer existing, and the Presence of foreign troops—.
in short, every thing combines to drive away the
House of Bourbon, and bring a war upon Europe.
" So unanimous an agreement, with respect to the
evil, would appear necessarily to imply an unani-
mous disposition with respect to the remedies still to
be applied to it. This, however, is not the case. The
minds of men, variously pre-occupied by antecedent
-circumstances which they will not forget, because no
one will confess that he has been mistaken, view in
many different lights the means to be adopted for re-
pairing the evil already done, and preserving us from
that Which threatens Europe.
" In order, however, to treat of this important
question, in which is involved the safety or the ruin
of all, it is sufficient, without recrimination on the
past, to set out from the actual point, from this un-
animous sentiment and avowal :—" The position and
present mode of proceeding of the Government of
il
France lead to the certain and speedy triumph of
Revolutioa."

" In this state of things there are for Europe but
two hypotheses. Either France must be left to all
the eruptions of the volcano, while attempts arc
made to preserve the exterior from them, or an en-
deavour must be made to save France herself from
the ravages which menace her.
Ia examining the first, we may readily conceive
that the Allied Courts which have twice roused Eu-,
rope, and poured forth the blood and treasure of
their subjects to overthrow this Revolution, and the,
Sovereigns who have twice conquered it, and who'
believed in their wisdom, and the purity of their
iatcntions, that they had traced out such a line of
policy as would for ever prevent its return—we-may
readi!y conceive, I say, that these Courts and these

e fee the Speech of the Minister of the Police on the Liberty
of the Press, and that of the !dlinister of War on the Law of
Recruitiaj.
f Sueh as 'Cie Minerva, The Collection of Historical Pieces,
Th-: Norman Letters, &c. &c.
t Sea the Memoir of Cllonel Fabvier on the events at Lyons,
the Letters of Benjamin Constant in the affair of Wilfrid Res.
fault, and some articles in the works noticed above.

Sovereigns must feel worn ont at seeing it spi
again and again; and produce new heads as
tiie old ones are crushed.

" But in this terrible combat nothing is dons
aught remains to do, and 1%-e sufficiently pro,
the Note of August, 1817, how foolish it
hope to overcome the conflagration after giving
France for fuel. .How can we expect hereab
preserve ourselves from it, when it has increa'
acquired force, eve,i wl.ilst the troops and (
of. Europe occupied the territory of trance,
rected the political conduct of her Governmt.
Who can venture to' trtist in any defence agai
*hen it shall come on with all its strength ar
knee, since we know not how to extinguish
first rekindling ? -
" The actual occupation of terrimry was .j 1
by the circumstances in which it was resertved

the guaratee wanting to Bank, by the
even of'France; but, notwithstanding, the inconve
'nlences were felt which it was not known " how ri
prevent, insomuch chat those most interested in ;
regarded it afterwards as impossible and useless to
defend Europe from the Revolution of France.—
What, then, are the means which may be considered
as capable of being employed to arrest those Revo-
lutionary explosions from which alone the presence
of foreign armies has secured us ? Is it thought
that armies less numerous, stationed on the outside
of our frontiers, or collected in imposing masses upon
some of their points, will prove better ramparts?—
Why do they appear to offer more security to us ?
‘' ill they possess more of unity when under the same
or even a more efficient chief? When the lines shall,
have been prolonged on an estent three times as
great, will their action be more rapid on the centre
of France than before it might have been ? Is it said
that this occupation, converted into blockade, will be
less irritating to the spirit of the nation ?—No. The
salutary fear which those armies had impressed would
be diminished in proportion as it was more distanced,
more dispersed, more divided, and the irritation
which might be created in those within its immediate
operation would be still stronger, because the means
of attack would be more disposable and certain ; be-
cause this menacing state tnwards them would ap-
pear less justifiable, its duration less determinable,
the union of Powers less assured : and, finally, be-
cause this system of compression would in reality be
more hostile. Let us not deceive ourselves. We shall
exchange those cmsarrassments and inconveniences
which we have learned to estimate, for others which
would not be preferred, but that we are unable to ap-
preciate diem. In fine, the idea of abandoning France
to the horrors of the Revolution is unjust and cruel ;
it would debase the majesty of Kings ; it would efface
the honour which Crowns had recovered in the glo-
rious epoch of 1814 and 1815, and destroy the finest
page of their history. We cannot suppose such a de-
termination as thi,.

" We canuot, then, aJrnit that Europe is guaran-
teed from the revolution, if that revolution is to re-
sume its power, forces, and ;.ctivity in France; for all
the methods that might be tried to oppose it would
either be impracticable or ineffectual. There can
exist no hope of safety but in well concerted efforts
to prevent the explosion in the bosom of France her-
self. Thus it folb;ws that we are arrived at the exa-
mination of the second hypothesis. J.:,t us discover
the means of saving France from revolutionary hor-
rors, fot the preservation of the world, and what are
the means to be resorted to.

" If we embrace by imagivation all possible corn-
binations on this subject, vie shall perceive that there
are five which may otter themselves to different minds

" 1. Some, perhaps, think to extinguish the revolution by the
partition of FrAlice, or her military occupation.
" t. Others have imagined they would attain the same object,
by endeavoutiag to place a new Dynasty on the Thtone.

" 3. Some may believe that the representative Government has
formed the great obstacle of the establishment of the Throne,
and that it is necessary io destroy it.

6. 4. Others have hoped that it was practicable to recal the
King and his pros it Miniiters w those principles which m.ioild
consolidate the Monarchy.. _ .

" 5. Lastly, there remain those who are of opinion, that the
revolutim will not be concluded till that day when the system
of Government shall be altered by chanziog the idinist.!i., who
direct it.

" I. TO PARTITION FRANCE, OR TO OCCUPY IT MILI,

TARILY.

" I confess that my blood, entirely French, boils at
this idea, and that I cannot discuss it politically ; be-
sides, the elects of so execrable a design are demon-
strated in the note of the 15th of August, 1817, to
which I refer.
" 2. TO PLACE A NEW DYNASTY UPON TIIE THRONE.

" What is to become of the principles of legiti-
macy so solemnly proclaimed ? What, I say, is to
become of the eternal principles of the preservation
of people and of thrones ? What is it which one can
hope from this novel subversion?
The Revolution, we shall be told, will amalga-
mate better with a reoolationaryKing. At first, the
Revolution did not agree with any King. In the
next place, though the Revolution may overturn. it
cannot construct, it cannot establish, it cannot pre-
serve any thing, and if it could, has it not already
shewn us its effects ? Let it not pretend that the reign
of Bonaparte was one of its effects. The reign of Bo-
naparte was no more one of its effects than the reign
of Tamerlane, .n• of Gengis Khan. And will the great
mass of French Royalists who had placed their every
hope upon the restoration of lexitimate men and le-
gitimate principles; will they agree to lose all those
hopes which are so dear to them after being again so
deceived? \That support could this new Sovereign
have which is necessary for a King? How could this
King find that in his station which it was itself defi-
cient in ? It would be necessary, under such circum-
stances, to garrison France with some hundred thou-
sand foreign troops, and the effects of such a mea-
sure are painted is their proper colours in the note
just cited.

"3. TO DESTROY TUE n EERESENTATIvr. GOVERNMENT.
" There arc inconsiitcacies carried to such a degree
that they cannot be pardoned, and wilcu they place

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PRICE SEVEN -PENC ''. , . t ! • JAI
mormili
pring up as the foundation of a system of Government, two ; . 11l iN
s fast as principles which are opposite, the effects must neces-
sarily be discordant. this is what has happened in
it 1i
ne while the affairs of France. The Allied Powers have given
,
roved in to France with tire same hand, and at the same mo- i
.
was to meat, a Representative Government, which was adap- 1
ing it all teal to it, and to the King that pretended system of
miter to equilibrium between the parties which should enable
ased and him to rule over or to crush them.t All the uncer-
councils
taimy, all the weakness of the King's Government, ,
and di- arises from the impossibility of reconciling those two
rent ?--; Contradictory principles. .
,1 • .
neinst it, " his certain that if Trance had not altogether
alai lace lost all traces of her ancient institutions ;if the people.
. lit on its could biir a mere independent yoke, I would veil- -
,li /e Ilf ,
-- • • - lin& say more absolute ;if property was-less equally ''
It I
justified divided; if the information was less-generally ex-
i
id on, by panded; if the whole populatiein had been less &ems-
interest tamed to interest themselves in the actions of Govern-. " elt
intone- meat, io discuss and to judge. them, it would not have ' • p
; 1 i
how • been deed necessary to give France a Renresenta
1
ted in it tive Government; there would have been no tribune .
{
iseless to for harangues, where parties might come.with all the i 1
ranee.— heat of passion and self-love to sharpen their wca- - .
.
nsidered pons, to arouse the interests which divide the nation,
,:,;', •• ,
se Revo- and call the two parties to combat ; then, and only ..
presence then, might this system of equilibrium be advised
and
1: • 1
thought and adopted, and it would have destroyed useless an
i outside isolated opposition, 'it would have drawn"
over the ff
ises upon one and discouraged the other. i it
carts?— " What violence would it "not require to wrest at SL
. . 4
y to us ? this moment from France the concessions which she
t
the same has received from the Frog ? They have been con-
ii,.
1
nes shall' secrated by the Powers who have placed him on the
times as Throne—by the use which is made of them—by the • 1
le centre guarantees which are found in them; in fine, by their ki '
Is it said free and entire adoption on the part of those who .4
a will be were least prepared: This question did appear doubt-
o. ' I \
i The fill in 1811 ; it was to be again discussed in IblB / .
d would Then, however, things might be viewed in another . n
istanced, point of view.. Then there was a numerous elms of
irritation honourable men who had preserved the memory of
mediate the past, they were embellished for them by every
se means beauty of poetry and history, and with every charm ' s i
Lain ; be- which the period of their youth could bring ; with
i
ould ap- them it might have been attempted, but perhaps at-
I.
minable, tempted in vain; to replace the Throne on the ruins
ally, be- of ancient foundations ; but at present these nume-
eality be rous partisans of Royalty, pursued and persecuted 4
We shall by the Ministry, have found no asylum but in the
reniences preservative of new institutions ; they have freely _ .
rs which adopted them, they have proclaimed them, they ,
ileto ap. have sworn to them, and they have never sworn ia i !
g France vain. how could it -be expected to establish with-
id cruel ; out themto establish in opposition to them, that I
ild efface which would perhaps have been uselessly attempted •,I 1 i
I, i ,
the glo- four years back with their consent ?
the finest " Every thing would be difficult, every thing ‘
I ich a de- would be impossible, in such an attempt ; they could ' 1
not re-establish that which they call the ancient re- - i'• ? j
, {
,!,
guaran- gime; all its elements are destroyed; and even its i
is to re- ashes are scattered. They would not retrieve even st i
1.
e; for all the shadow of those gloat props of the State, who,
it would sincerely defending the rights of the Crown and the
Isere can privileges of the people, balanced themselves in the
efforts II; ;,.
d circle which was marked out for them, and gave the
nice her- surest guarantee for the liberties cf the nation, and
the exa. the inviolability of the Throne. It would then be a
i discover despotism naked and hideous which should replace ii
.
Lary For- those excellent and irrecoverable Institutions cf an-
what are emelt times—a mere despotism, without force, t-ith- 4 , 'I. `.
out institutions, without guarantees—a desnetism
ble corn- such as Prance had never known, and could never
hat there support—a despotism, in fine, which it would be ne- , I'
,
it minds cessary to uphold by arms, and which would attach i
ion by the to legitimacy all the inconveniencies and evils of an ..1
.1 1
ii
usurpation. Such a Government would be re ; I
1'
me object, pug- i ~.'
cant to all France, and still more so to the noble cha-
le.
.iimmt ins ratter of legitimate Princes. i ' ;'
Le Throne, " Who sliould dare under such a system to under- 4
take to demand from France those sacrifices which
o recut the severe circumstances impose upon her, when she
ich m.eate
might almost find the means in the concurrence of ;
i, that the lice will and her exertions ? What would be the re- s
the system sources of credit to which slue is condemned thisslong
Jae,. who time ? The impo,:sibility of adopting such a measure 11,1
IT MILI-
appears beyond a doubt. p
" Arid in favour of whom would it be pictended r' i
boils at
to execute such a subversion ? It would not be for i
all ; be-
the interests of the country, which would no longer
y
find in the legitimate Government any pledge of stet-.i in : ke, 1:
denion-
1
1817, to
bility ;it would not be the interest of Europe, which -
i
had pledged itself to sustain by force the Govern- .fi
HRONE.
ment which it had imposed by force ; it would not be
s I
• I
the interest of certain persons, who might believe
>i• le lii- t
that they could thus more easily maintain themselves . .
in pov.•er. Alike iguorant in their ideas of preserving
Lys is to
erivation
it, as they are in its exercise, Ministers would be est( -
one can . i
rushed to discover that these constitutional forms,
antai
..t. which they looked Drop as obstacles, were their only
first,
support , and to themselvesweakened file supp find
In the tion as those useful harriers were broken down. t
-num it -.1. TO BRING BACK. THE KING AND HIS PRESENT MI.. i
NIsTERS TO SUCH PRINCIPLES As MAY ESTABLISH
! I snot pre-
THE H MONARCY. e %
already We
" have sufficiently explained in the Notes of ...
the reign
~ n n 1816 and 1817, by what concurrence of circum- V
in of o-
Ire
reign stances the King and the present Ministers were drawn h' 4 !
he great away from all Monarchical doctrines, and led into
measures wholly opposed to the establishment of the i k.i i e
stander every
Throne. They knew that the Government felt no ‘O. '; '
le-
apprehension at seeing that all the sacrifices which it i
all tliose
made to the Revolution could: not succeed in attach-
'
again so . . ..
. rug it to the legitimate Throne, but that, on the con- ~.
overeignvary, the Revolution availed itself of these conces-
;ions to put on against the Government a more hostile e -
oseullfddtelifii-s
f circum-
aspect ; they hoped, in fine, that the King and his I 4 i
.- ' 1
. o
Ministers would put an end to this lir just. and impo- " ' '
ed thou-
litic contest which they ware carrying on against the , .1
I a !TWA-
friends of and that they would win them the note
over to their support."—( To le continued.) t
RNMENT.
• Proclamation of the 17,m pero r of Itufgia, Aril, 1514. •
.4 I.'
•I• latter of the four Milist.cEN to thy Duke do Richelieu, of
a degree , 4
the 40th Novend•yr, 18' 5. (..):Lial lute of die four Aunis.,,r,,
ley place dated rat uarl 10, 1617. .
t
.
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