Star.
London, England, 1810-02-19 00:00:00

': M

_ ...

THE INQUIRY.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

FIFTH DAY, FEBRUARY 9.--(Concln led).
F.AY. C. R.Owee. EMI. Captain of his Majesty's ship the Clyde.
Examined by the cmontinee.
Commanded a division of the Flseiremployed io the late I:pe-
on:ion, to the Scheldt. His first instruction went te the cep-
t ree of the Island of Cadsand, ar.d afterwards to the blocking
the Ghent Channel. He received another instruction, given in
et consequence of the change of plan that recommended discretion
in proceeding, as it was probable the enemy's naval force might
in the first instance be directed immediately to Cadsand.
Relate what you did in consequence of timer instructions, as far
as relates to the operation against Cadsand.—My original instruc-
tion had been communicated to Lord Huntley or the moment
that I received it ; the second was communicated when his Lord-
ship embarked on the eetaiii g of the 27th July. My Lord
Huntley also showed ire eis instructions, and a question arove as
to the number of men that could be landed; Lord Huntley's in.
structions supposed that 1 had the means of land,ing 2000-men at
one operation; I had not the means for that number; the num-
ber for the men of war was 615, at the rate that we calculated
the boats to carry them ; but from some other means which
discovered, that number was carried to 700; the Transports
boats, if the weather had been fit for them to acte would have
doubled that =umber. My Lord Huntley was anxious to see the
Commander in Chief of the Army or General Brownrigg, the
A::jutant-General, to have those orders explained ; and as early
as the tide served on the morning of the lath, I furnished him
with a vessel to go tit the Commander in Chief. It will be neces-
sal v to say I had been detached a day or two before, ani lay at an
anchorage not inenediatety in the Downs. Lord Huntleyel un-
derstood, joined the Venerable, where the Commander in Chief
was, just as she we. genies under way, aed was directed to fol-
low her throu ;h the Coin Stream, nod that she would heave-to
when she wes clear of the Narrows; she passed me where I was
laying, fol.:mein r the Venerable, but the weather was then very
fo •gy ; I knew that orders nuts( be in their way to me to get
tinder way, ash! I had great fear of losing the vessel that Lord
I Wintry was hi, and that the troops would be left Without their
General, I therefore eel-ailed her. I received my orders very
shortly afterwards to weigh and proceed with the division ; we
arehered that Meta off Blatikeebtirg, in a fair position for pro-
ceidiee to Cadsand in the morning ; whilst the squadron was
getting under weigh in the moreing lOr that purpose, I had again
e rersat ion with Lord Huntley on the subject of the slow ram
• expected to he landed, and likewise upon the cautionary
Lordship wished to see the Generals of the division
4, Generals Dyott .uid alontresor, and they came on
consequence of Lord Huntley's instruction rust my
tie discretion, it was determined that the transports
ichnr low down in the Channel, whilst I proceeded tur-
a() a situation from which I could notice what passed
the channel I occupied, or the other entrance to Flushing
_ Duerluo • my reason few taking that position 'wee, that
given to understand my Lord Gardner, with a squadron of
cattle ships then before Flushing, was to co-operate with
o follow one through the channel by which I entered; I
!hat his Lordship's squadron was not in a situation to
ne through that channel, and tl.at if I had co-operation
it could be by the channel of the liuerloo. The ttetle, ,
that I entered the channel, it blew too strong for boats to
'here was too much serf upon the beach; disposition was
lauding on the morning of the 36th, at dawn of day.—
nended to take the last part of the ebb-tide in-shore, and
. low-water, which was between nide and ten o'clock;
iestion arose as to the number of men that I could actually
'iore. It blew then too strong for the transport boats to
: means of the men of war, were, as I said belere,limited
hundred, and my I.ord Huntley did not think, with the
instruction that he had, that he ought to risk the landing with so
force, especially as I coeld not insure the boats returning
second number of men under an hour; I think that it
Ave been considerably more ;I stated an hour at the time.
evening of the 21th, I had a letter from Sir Richard Stra-
and I returned an answer, pressing upon him, that my Lord
expected a grater force to land than I had the means of
on shore. On the evening of the 30th, I had another letter
Richard Strachan, desiring me to suspend our operationt
that side, until we had better help; my Lord Gardner's
was at that time at the entrance of the Duetloo. Ou
morning of tha 31st, another disposition was made fur land-
• measures wire taken for rimming the transports with
regiments, on shore, to fecifitate the operation; but the
• were then in considerable force, and it was still judged
wait for the assistance of Lord Gardner's boats; I there-
a letter to his Lordship, informing him that it was for
_ that we waited; and In return, his Lordship sent me
!en-act from his instructions jet which it appeared, he was or-
remain where he was; the conclusion j draw from that
. was, that it was intended we should proceed further and au
ititeinent was made for that purpose.
noon on the tietb, a signal was made to me that the
were bringing down field-pieces; and on the evening of
Ib, another signal was made to me for enemy's troops, in a
...station where they could he annoyed by gun-vessels. I went
immediately to the ship which made the signal, but the soldiers
then not to he seen; they had taken post behind the sand-,
and in a battery on one Bank of the beach where we In.
to land; the report of the officers of that ship, made item
or fourteen hundred that had been seen ; we saw men
in small parties of fifty and a hundred on the following
we could form no judgment of the whole force upon
iland.
stated, that you then imagined you were intended for a
destination; what further destination did you understand
tended ?—t concluded to pass into the Scheldt, and on the
.uenst I did receive an order to be ready to pass in under
the line-of-battle ships which Sir Richard Strachau in-
me it was his intention to lead in.
the goodness to state what were your subsequent opera-
-The letter I, have alluded to of the 241 of August, directed
Toceed as near to Flushing as I could without exposing
opens to risk front the enemy's fire, and to endeavour to
the communication between Cadsand and Flushing. I
forward some of the vessels that same night, but I was too
he whole division to move, and guard-boats were like-
for the same purpose; on the 3d the whole division
near as they could, without being exposed to the one-
. lon that evening received an order to send back the
of troops with my Lord Huntley, to the Veer Gat, but
remain myself for the purpose that had been before directed.—
Sat same day 1 observed vessels passing between Flushing
'adsand, and sent the boats in chace of them, the vessels
I believe, by running up the Scheldt, and the brig whose
made to cover the boats wits disabled In attempting to re-
in consequence of a shift of the wind; she afterwards
shore on the Ellebogg, outside of Flushing; the next morn-
en vessels to her assistance, and when she floated, went
and took that position myself; it was a position upon the
the Ellebogg which divides the channels of the Weill') and
luerloo; I considered it a good position for assisting in the
of Flushing, and 1 held that station the rest of the siege.
statement that I give in this manner upon recollection is im-
', but the C.:pomander its Chief has a ready call upon all the
imandera of divisions for narratives; mine has been deliver-
-I of course he is now in possession of my detailed narrative
whole proceedings.
•ou know whether, after you had taken that positional the
the Ellebogg, any vessels did pass from Cadsand tte Flush-
• was the blockade complete ?--The blockade was by no
complete; on the ftli several vessels passed over full of
4 ; I saw them preparing, and had the men of war ready to
eider way after them; -at the instant of their putting off, the
it hen and the Zenobia weighed by signal from Me, but the
vas so short and the wind so strong, that the vessels got
in spite of them, some gun-boats came down from the
, but also too late to cut them off; they took a position,
would prevent any more vessels passing; but it came to
strong that the gun-bout were driven from that station,
re obliged to seek shelter in the Slough. The same yes-
' attempted on the evening of the 6th also, to return to
Cadsand ; they were all cut off but one sehuyt and one boat, and
"urned again to Flushing; that schuyt sa the following morning
returned again to Hushing, full of troops, after the gun-boats had
- driven from their station. That was the last reinforcement
got in; from that time, I consider the blueeade to have been
complete. ..• .
De you imagine, that If such had been your instructions in the
first instance, or if you bad been provided with any different
description of force, it could have been possible to have invested
flushing on the sea-side without occupying Cadmium' ...It blew
strong between the 3d and the 7th of August, too strong for
gun-boats to have remained la that channel fur the greater part of

tunttey was
(knead. I
shertly after
arzhored tin
CO. lliag to C
getting uncle
a conversatit
were es
.ortier ; bib I.
under him, 0
board; in ce
orderto use
should a:ich•
ettr up low
either in the
railed the Di
I was given
line-of-battlo
me and to ft
oliserved th.
follow me t
from it, it c
the day that
And, there
made for la:
It seas inter
to land at it
but a qnesti
put on shot
act. The m
to seven hu
instruction
small a for(
with a seco
would have
On the eve]
ohan, and I
kluaittey ca
putting on
from Sir R
upon that .
squadron v
the morain
ing. and n
two regiro
enemy wel
better to w
tore sent a
his boats tl
an extract
dered to re
order was,
JitTansoner
About
enemy Wel
the stab, a
situation w
immedlatel
were then
•
hills, and
funded to I
twelve or f
arriving in
day, but
the island.
You state
furrher slei
to be totem
of Augt
Rorer of ti
formed me
Have tht
tions ?-r1
me to prod
the tramps
cut off the
pushed fun
hate for the
wise sent I
moved as n
my's fire.
division of
to remain n
Ou that sar
and Calsan
escaped, I I
signal I null
join me, in
ran on skier
ita•;, I sent N
d M to and I
end of the
the Duerlo
blockade of
The staterr
perfect, bu
Commands
rd, and au
of the win
Do you
cid of the
• it.g, or wa
niatis con
troops; I
get under
Nynllllen
Tun wall a
across in s
Slough, IN
whish wo
blow so at
and were
sets had at
Cadsand;
returned a
returned a
been chive
that got it
. complete.
Do you
first insta
descriptite
flushing
very strOr
gun-lsoats