Star.
London, England, 1810-02-19 00:00:00

the time;
posed -

from the

(safety by any .
could have been _ me . _ -
ow( ._ . bons,
eelty from the tl
__ busts Was not Wm the want oft
but the wind Blowing extremely hord directly off ;he
'their means of towing not being Breit, thet would flgt I
much propr•_ss, and there was danger of their being drifted undei
the - ati tries which vlere at the other exteesnity of the beach whim
it wa intended to land.
.. ...- \ft
I\
• •
If yi u had heen provided witha sufficing number , Ai I
competent description, could you have affected a ti Mai
dent force for the purposes of the Etpetlition, on the gOtia ......
Tile qnestion was to land 2000 men ; fur that we must hate had
a much greater force of men of war; the Men of war we had,
had their full complement of boats—as many as. hey could well
Wcarry.
hit was your destination after the surrender of Flushing f--
A tier the surrender of Flushing, I was detached with a small '
squadron to the side of Prowers-haven upon Scowen.
Are the Committee to understand, that the projected operation
,of the landing 2000 men of Lord. Huotiey's division was defeat-
ed for the want of a proper description of boats ?--I was hbver
pe-pared to expect that it was necessary that 2000 men oboulabo
:anded ; I never heatir of ouch an expectation until lord Hum.
ley had embaibed, all the arrangements had been made for some
day.
- I)7d you understand frog,/,ord Huntley, that he had an ex-
i?ectation of being able to land two thousand men at one op,.
ration ?—Never, until the evening of the 27th.
_ -

—i\ .1, u ..... _
But on the evening of the 47th you did understand so N—Cer-
..ainly on the evening of the 27th; but as I have stated, the at.
rangentents were made some days before; on the 24th, 1 gave
my instructions to the Captains under me, and on the 25th I sent
a copy of those instructions to my Commanderin-Chief.
Was the squadron under, your command provided with flat-
boats for landing troops, in addition to your own hosts?—lt woos
State, as far as you know, the designation of the fire-ships
under the command of Captain Tomlinson destined to yactill
Walcheren, so far as belongs to the present question ?—Thilet
vessels formed no part of the squadron under my orders-T-thep
joined me in The Weilin Channel, and I attached a gun-bsis
to them for their protection; of their subsequent movements I
'know nothing.
Can you form any opinion of the number of troops that were
transported from Cadsand to Walcheren, on the 6th of August
and the following day ?—The number was considerable ; but
cannot judge of them.
, Were the batteries on the coast of Cadsand in such number
and of such& description as to render it very difficult for troops
, tus land upon that Island ?—The batteries were not strong on the
part of Cadsand ; where I was the troops might have been co-
vered well; but the tides were very strong, and there was dan-
ger If boats could not move rapidly across it, that they might be
drifted within the fire of those batteries.
Is the Committee to understand, that there are parts of the
island of Cadsand where troops might be landed without being
exposed to the fire of any batteries whatever ? No, but the troop,
might have been coveted by the ships of. war.
Under all circumstances you are in possession of, do you th?nk
it would have been advisable in a military point of view to have
attacked the French at Cadsand ?—lt certainly was desirable to
disarm the batteries at Cadsand. _ _ _

Was it in your opinion advisable, under all the circumstances
that you know to have misted ?-0n the morning of the soth, 1
think it might have been attacked with success, the enemy had not
then shown any force.
Were the batteries on the coast of Cadsand close or open batte-
ries ?—They were open ; I am not clear that there was not aim-
lisade in the rear—there was no intrenchment behind them.
If the Island of Cadsand had been in our possession, would it
have been possible for the transports to have proceeded up the
Scheldt without molestation front the guns of Flashing ?—i think
it would.
You hare stated, that you cannot ascertain the precise nurnßer
of men which the boats of Lord Gardner's division might have
carried, without ascertaining the precise number of men they
would have carried ; have you any means of knoWing whether
those boats would. with your own, have been able to lard the
2000 men which Lord Huntley required ?—They would no
doubt whether the whole number landed.by my beats sad those
of Lord Gardner's division would have exceeded one thot sol.

I understand you to have stated, that you think if the landing
had been effected at Cadsand on the 30th,lt would not then have
been opposed by a force that would have resisted ?—There was
no appearance of force on the morning of the SOth.
If it bad not been for the violent state of the wind on that mor-
ning, would not that landing have been effected ?—1 think it
would; some stress was laid on Lord Huntley's Instructions to
land 2000 men ; but still I think the landing would have been
carried into effect.
Ho many men of war had you under your cothmand?—Tbere
were five frigates, five sloops, I think three or four gun vessels,
and I was joined there by a bomb ; the sloops were for the most
part a small class of brig which has not boats for landing troops.
Do you happen to know whether Lord Gardner's squadron
had flat boats ?—1 understood sot generally; there might have
been a few, but not generally.
Do you happen to know whether Lord Gardner bad sit or
eight sail of the line ?—I am not certain by any means; but I
think six.
In the conversation you had with Lord Huntley on the 27th of
July, did you understand I.ord Huntley MA reason to expect
that you would have had the means of landing 20(X) men ?—My
Lord Huntley's instructions expressed that expectation.
I think you have stated in your evidence that it was Sir Ri-
chard Strachan's intention to have gone up the Scheldt on the sd
of August; what day did the frigates and line-of-battle ships pass
up the Scheldt ?_The order for the frigates to pass was received
on the Bth ; they passed on the 11th ; there had been a previous
order which was countermanded: the line-of battle ships did not
pass through until the day after the batteries were opened against
Flushing, but they came to the inner part of the Ducrloo on the
day the trigates passed through.
Can you state to the Committee the reason why they did not
' pass sooner ?—From the Bib to the 11th the wird wulotil, they
/mild not go ; Sir Richard Strarban's intention to pass through
with the line of battle ships I have stated was expressed to me in
a letter dated the 2d.

Can you state the reason why they did not pass up between the
2.1 and the Bth cannot.
You do not know any reason why they could not have passed
up between the2d and the nth ?—There were many days on
which they could have passed, there were some days en which
they could not ; the intention of Sir Rickard Strachan's letter on
the 2d was to hold the ships in readiness to push up, after the
retreat of the Frew. line of battle ships had been cut of by our
troops at Baths; whether the French ships having passed Baths
made any change in the plan I really do nut know.
You have stated, that notwithstanding some stress was hid
upon the subject of Lord Huntley's intstructione from the •30th,
you would have landed the 2000 men ; in what numbers did you_
mean to disembark these men?--I think if I could have premis-
ed a rapid return of the boats, that they would have landed with
the 700 men.
Then, according to I.erd Huntley's instructions, you and Lord
Huntley would, notwithstanding those instructions, have risked
that landing, contrary to your sense of the instructions?--What I
state is matter of opinion, gathered from the terms in which the
conversation was held; my Lord Huntley was anxious for the
performance of the service and would, I have no doubt, have
taken upon Mm that discretion Which every officer at a distance'
from his superior must do.
You have stated to the Committee,that you had in eontempla-
don to have run transports on shore, for the purpose of landing
two regiments. but were prevented in consequence of the accu-
mulated force that appeared to be collected at Cadsand ; if you
had thought of this measure a little owner, might not you have
put the teen on shore by the same means 1--There was an objec-
tion to the running the transports on shore while the enemy was
in force, and the weather was unsettled; it would not have made
the number actually landed'greater; the intention was tole* the
boats return more rapidly, but on the Mtth the wittiwas diesetly
off the laud, and it would have been difilcutt inset the transports

there.
At whit distance from the shore do you imagine the trans-
ports would have grounded ?—The shore was more steep than I
expected to havefound it, but I really cannot say how near the
transports would have gene without rounding.
Is it your opinion that it a landing had been, dttempted on the
rank of 790 men, Carload wookl have been in possession of the
British Army ?—We should have made our lending good--the
enemy had $ forte there on the mow evening. . •
How early in• the day amid the isadlagprobably have bass
made good ?--Betwees alas and tea fa the morolug.

alt, Vat I ii4diaaiti.fatifit .
issita .
ism
lot
cadsiod
was,.
*II
sathinka,7l:uur'at 5h0u114.16.
hat:c.rera5i0nan".:::":011:7;;;;meL4414161"41:Chatk77..c.......',1"4:11114'rtie1itib...0nge...11.1.„...77, t&nubt:lll4llgiet; loeltril
went
*c:Miltml"unthicC In::
j of
700
men !f.ig::e email::: . it".: aerfttlieThl7, de:
t—i
.wen:ralYon'earboatdo rd the Thalia
7
... Tp-rirlillit7.4,lll4 .1"-1 delivered:tot::
. 0....tt;
...cd a 6.. ....64 of .-era on
eeekilarbed the kited* on shore that was intended—the phoenZo&i..4-_matctig
. *bale frifade ate vr,its
f.. td
Did you coraniehicato this vision. to Lord' Huntley ?--I told oh bosedthe haadAttattoesahir
Cadtgliteit.liellaelinbeh the Ex4tedidone " what
Theareiv2! itedt of3filtllye, aFAlablev'tit
• WIT Lord Handily Aliat thertfmight be a retain of she hints
,in
• about an hour, but not in less than thee.
Did the same objection which you .stated to employ the o'elOck, we anchored abreak of Blankenburgh, which Is at a liQ
Ira:upon boats, apply to thooloollotiog the let-boats you with ' distance tom Cadsand.
your squedroa 1--By so Apia; the flatefelets were takeninto the On the morning of the 9414 had yeti
.on opportunity
cif
os.
calculation of the 700 men. serving what was the state of the batteries: r bf the enemy's int:.
you room on board row sliladron for more flat-boats than in Cadsand i---On the 30th I went on bitsrd the beediaantrl
ilesised P--I think not ; Iliad the transports examined, they were ship, and waked on the .IVlattluis of Huntley ; I had an oppurt,
alt of too small a size to carry Bat boats. nity of observing tisestite'of the batteries, lint not of the enemy's
1 ' State whether, after Lord Huntley communicated to you his force ; the state of thellatteiles nearly ininfinned that I bad sei i
listructions not to attempt a landinguniest he could put on shore of &moue of the sosethefere, when I went to reconnoitre it, i,4;
Sono men at one trip, you had an opportunis7 of commootnatilet I had an oppormattypt observing sow few gun's the second • ;
'thin pert of the initructions to Mr Richard racban, or in point which I did Dot observe the first time I was sent eheie.
ilffact, did comotesicate that part of the instruction so Sir Kich. From the observations you made ttft the kith, did you think it
Strachan 1----1 did not consider the instruction was not to land would have been practicable or prudent to have attacked th„a
unless 2000 men could be put on shore ' • but it did state an tepee- batteries by landing detachinents of-not snore than 700 men at a
tatitm that I could land that number; I did not know.it until late
rime ?--The batteries appeared to me to have very li t e stronttf
in the evening of the 27th, and had so opportunity to communi- in themselves, but the propriety of attacking them with 7cp e„,..
case it. would depend entirely upon the enemy's force, which I rano:
vouch for; I do not know what force the enemy had them; the
What was the distance between your squadron and that of
Lord Gardner on the morning of the 30th f---Lord Gardner's batteries appeared to me to be open batteries:
squadron was in sight to leeward, hot that was Olin the eotirse of Do you know the reason why the debarkation did net take
the forenoon ; it took its statiou off the Merle*. ptace !-- I know the orders that were given with regard to the (In
h
Do you know the state of the French force as to skips of wartrkation, but I cannot say that I know the reason why those
in the basin of Flushing, at the time you speak of their ounobers,
orders were not executed;
forte, and state of equipment ?---There were no vessels in the i Whet were the orders that were given ?---The day of the 30th
basin - she enemy's Beet it was understood when we sailed was at'' was principally spent in making arrangements for the landing;
Flushing, but I had learned from a cutter on the evening of the I orders we-e given that the i.tli regiment was to land in nnate,asii
28th, that the ships bad returned to the Schtkit ; I saw three sail : orders ;ante that night (I do not recollect at what hour of inn
1 which I supposed to be of the line in the Scheldt, there was a t night, but on the night of the 30th, that the transports ronrain.
frigate and some gun-boats on Hushing. 1 ing the two other battalions of General Montresorn brigade,
which were the Seth and 4.sid, were to run on shore, while the
i In your *Mon was the previous capture of Flushing necessary 1
pub land's' in•boate : on the mornittg of the 31st the soldier were
1 to the laureled attack upon Antwerp ?--As matter of opinion I
think not, but chit .opinion is formed since the event; I beg fur- ready to step irto tbe hoattewith two days provisions cooked sc•
'her to state that in the employment 1 was, r could take but a
•.
cording to orders g yen, Old the Ships stood it: closer to the coast
' very natruw view of of the proceedings or intentions. • on the morning of Ore Sint ; afterwards those orders were culla.
' In your onirtion, considering the other points et descent that • termanded, but Ido not•know the reason why.
were within our power, did not the debarkation upon WAlche- • Is it your opinion that the snips of war could have approached
rem mischievotiely as well as unnecessarily retard the objects of near enough to the coast to have covered the riche, kation of au
the Exnedition. . . detachment on the :title or '3lst 1.-I thou)), think the Naval
Officers are the best judges of that question ;but it appears to n:e
(The Witness was desired to withdraw, and a warm Dzbat,
ensued.] there was no difficulty in landing, unless what might arise trom
The Witness was again called in, and the question innPoted• the enemy having a greater force than we could oppose to them in
To answer that question, I think I should at the time he in the first instance.; of the enemy's force lam not a judge.
possession of more than I actually know ;I am not at all, aware W 23 that detachment provided with the intrencbmg tools which
of the objects of the Expedition, but from common report the might have been wanted for that service ?—The lielarqui, of
view in which the Comtoander in Chief saw it then must be very of Huntley did not communicate to me his intentions, or the ra-
Afferent from that in which be would see it liow ; I humbly sob- ture of the operations that were likely to be executed by the divi..
snit this is a question I cannot answer. a -ion ; hut we bad intrenching tools enough to make batteries, to
Thie object stated In the question related so a former mica:Jones take auy small post.
in which. the main object is stated tb be the destniction of the I Did you, at any time on the .oth or 31st, state to the Marquis
arsenals at Antwerp ; was not that object. mischievously and un- of Huntley, that there was a deficiency in the intrenching tools,if
necessarily retarded by the debarkation •at "Walcharan ?"---if the 1 any field works were to be raised 1-There were twosntall ordnance
same troops were afterwards to proceed to Antwerp, it must of i vessels fitted out with Intrenching tools, woe for the Marquis of
couse be a very great delay'; in the way 1 then saw at, nlusisiOn i Huntley'sdivision, the other for Sir John Hope's; the arrival of
seemed to be a very primary object. i those vessels was reported to me on the 30th, when we were
Are you correctly understood to have stated, if it had not been lying off Cadsand • I had the day before, officially reported to the
for the unfavourable state of the wind, the boats of the Men of I Marquis of Huntley, that in consequence of the want of intrench-
War together with the boats of the Transports, might have ing tools, the engineer's department was entirely inefficient, but
lauded 1400 men at once I—They worn'. ' this difficulty was obviated by the arrival of the vessels I have moo
in point of fact, by the return of the men of war's boats might cloned on the 20th.
nor the whole 2000 men have been landed in three hours 1-1 Do you know of any report.rnade to the Marquis of Huntley
thi•A they would not have been landed in 3 hours. I thick we upon the day intended for his landing, that the enemy were rery
should have found difficulty in getting the boats back.• strong in Cadsand ?—The isfyinphen frigate was lying in-shore ;
That is supposing that the men of war's boats should have re- she made signals with regard to the enemy's force by onegraph,
turned no-It would have been an hour at least before they could which signal was read by every frigate, consequently I heard
have returned ; I think from the state of the weather it would the pinport of the intelligence communicated by Captain Max-
have been more. well in that way.
In the communication made by you to Lord Gardner, did you . What intelligence did that frigate convey by telegraphic signal?
ask for the boats of Lord Gardner's squadron to be sent to you, It was I think on the 30th, but I am not positive, thit be tele-
or did you ask for the junction of Lord Gardner's squadron with graphed that there were 1,500 men 'seen on shore; at another
your's ?—1 wrote for his Lordship's co-operation; lat the some time that there wore some field-pieces seen on shore.
time stated that his boats were what I wanted ; and I made the What distance of time was there between those two communit
conunuoication, thinking they might conic when the ships could cations ?--The 1,500 men were telegraphed on the 30th, and the
not. field-pieces on the Slat '; but he was making constant signals, Idid
What were the contents of Lord Gardner's letter inclosing the not attend to them in general.
extract front his Instructions ? -It was a letter of form,. merely Do you know that the Marquis of Huntley himself recon-
laclosing the instruction; and acknowledging the receipt of mine. mitred that forte reported by the frigate, or sent any Orme WI
Is the Committee to understand, that that extract from the in- his Staff to reconnoitre it 1-.1 do not know that lie dial 1 mime
structions implied an order to Lord Gardner not to detach his on board the head-quirters ship.
boats from hie squadron no-The order was for Lord Gardner to At what hour on the Mith did those two vessels with the
keep the situation he then held, and that perhaps it might not be trenching tools on board report themselves to you ?—I do net
' necessary at that time for the troops to be landed at Cadsand. remember the hour, it was in the morning. I believe that these
Was the in the instruction, or was that only the inference vessels came in the convoy with us, but I did not perceive them
drawn from the instruction?--It was In the instruction. in so large a convoy, and nobody else knew any think akin
Hay, you got that original extract, or have you a copy Of that them.
extract with you ?--it is in town; I have no copy with ewe.
[No. 0, beinn the Sixth day's examination, entirely consists of
How far were the ships you commanded from the intended
certain Mentor:lona delivered in by Sir Hoene Popham relative to
place of landing ?---The first station I took was from two to three
his knowledge of the navigation of the Scheldt. The substance
miles from the place n it was intended to move the ships,•and to
of three Memoranda have been already given in the examinatioa
go wi:hin half a mihnof the beach. of that officer.
Was the state of the wind on the morning of the 30th of July, .
e
such as to enable the Boats of the men of war and the fiat busts
lei effect a lauding P--it was; they would have been some time
in re wing in.
You have stated, that at noon on the 30th of July, a signal was
made for Fieldpieces coming down to the shore ; would it, in
your opinion, have been prudent to have larded seven hundred
men, stating as you do the difficulty of getting the boats off to
'mid 700 others?---At that time the idea of !audios had been
abandoned for the day.
You have stated, that if the English Fleet had passed flushing
they might nave proceeded to Antwerp ; state to the Committee
whether you think they cesuli have passed I.illo before they had
got to Autwerp, without the capture of Lillo I—lhaire not stated
that they could have gone to Antwerp.
You have stated that on the morning of the 30th of July you.
could have landed in the boats of the men of wee under your
command, about 700 British troops; at thet time had you any
reason to know what the strength of the enemy in Cadsand was ?
—1 have stated that we saw no force at that time. ,
Enke Witness was (Greeted to withdraw ]
Brigadier-Genera! MONTRESOR examined.
Were you not's General Officer under the coinntaod,of the
Marquis of Huntley in the late Expedition 1-1 was. . 7
Did Lord Huntley communicate to you his instructions ?-.-He
did. • ,
What were these Inetructione 'relative to the landing in Cad-
, sand ?-411'hat the larding in Cadsand was intrusted to the wish
•,.
stodb men, to hi tinder my command. ,
[The witness went on to state that it was considered unsafe nal
land this body of men, unless at one trip, on account of the nuns.'
bets of the enemy, but that there Was not a euffielent number of
boats provided for the purpose ]
Did Lord Hantley express to you, in sonversatton, any dliale.i
pointment in finding there were not boats to enable him to carry
into execution that which he had understood from General
/Samaria he was to carry into effect, namely, the landing 9000!
um atone time ?-No man could express greater disappoloment.
What passed in that converiadon ?
[The witness was directed to withdraw, and a long discussion
as to the propriety of the question took place.]
The Witness was again called tc, and the citation proposed.
He expressed great surprize that the boats were not in number
suffacis.nt to land the 2000 at he had expected. The Cotintiodore
said, he could not depend upon the eransport boats, ai they COuld
nor row on shore if the weather was rough; there was nothing
further that I recollect that was material.
• Was that the only conversation in which
ley express any surprize and
not* sufficient nt
one trip ?---He
day when I sa*
with that 10.-- "
Do you ..__
turitt_one*
merle k
CRAMS
lie
-I wail '
ilk
tinig -

,M R. GOSS, Surgeon, has the honour to inform.
his Friends and Correspondents, that from the continuer
increase of g.plicationsforthe treatmeat and cure of VENEREAL.
COMPLAINTS and DEBILITY, he hasbeen induced to take a
Partner, and the Concern will henceforgi be conducte4 under the
firm of Goss and Co. He assures them also, that the same princi-
ples Of Integrity, Secrecy and Delicacy, will be invariably observ-
ed, which hitherto have marked a Practice as successful, its it is
widely extended. Letters from the Country, containingo Bank-
note, describing particulars of the case, age and usual mode of
living, punctually attended to, and Advice and Medicine sent to
any part of the Kingdom.
No. Is, Bouverie-street, Fleet-street, Feb. Lt IMO.

IMPORTANT DISCOVERY.
THE Advantage the Public must always derive
from regularly educated professional men directing almost
exclusively their studies t. one species of malady, was nevermore
clearly demonstrated than by the unexampled success which has
attended the administration of their new reined,', aid the extraor-
dinary cures it bas performed. For along aeries of years Messrs.
Coital! and Co. Surgeons; formerly in his hl;;jcsty's service, have
made the Venereal Disease the particular object of their investi-
gation, and are happy in having discovered a medicine superior to
mercury, in the cure of that complaint ; it Is sufficient to obsffve,
dui the effects of this remedy are diametrically opposite to those
of mercury, for though it completely eradicates every vestige of
the virus, in its most confirmed stages, yet it does not in the least
injure the constitution on the contrary, It renovates the System
in all its natural functions, promotes appetite, and facilitates d:-
gestion; thes instead of reducing a strong and vigorous constini-
thin to the frightful condition that mercury does, it not only pre"
serves that constitution in its primitive state, but restores a weak
and debilitat.ll one to its natural strength and vigour. Nunt'arr-
less instances are on recent record of the superior efficacy as
medicine. ittlnherent and specific virtues acting as a perpttiA
corrective to bodily debility, whether proceeding from an ex:of
of conjugal or illicit pleasure, sir from the more insidl,,as, 0000
'not less destructive, ii ulgenee of incautious rutls of both
In a certain pernicious habit. Amidst the meiatteltnly variety are
el
disorders which arc the conirequence of this solitary vice, there
none more afflicting than that distressir.g state of debility and de'
Acielice which prevents or embitters the matrimonial state;
thL
Unhappy safferer broods over his misfortune, ashamed to seek ie-
._
reduced to such of we.:kness 'as to raider
rt
• of
that

"ID

, .
I. • .
•
et
&if ci Meld affle twaeb rib g' atfli SAO iiiii aheitei Sit el* *OA
the time; itn? tell et "141 -
'posed tlf the enemy's fittritiledelde Without posmiliss al Ciii.• . Wisell44lllllll,VlllPkwillo Nl* IR She
sand must eettahttrhatelsesb garat44o/14011. *-, "4 T . sees at taw • desk OR tl
si egret 01 erer., ,8; , , r•
You state, that on thelOth le !go TVS 1 ..; • • `4,, •
•
from the transports boats • &OM hh b*ess • - : ititlefax eplitis2oo, NI, 1121. !Wald jame Waft
safety by any other descAPthsis of boats 'ion ilkit'ilay ?—.Thep in altars sfiviellessa.?f OD own t..—.,we e
mr toitaid.
co
coal: Kaye been landed' front doe sneer saf wiz% boats; the dia. ' Ili ft' issir ft,,• Meteor*
citify Irom the trapsporks lusts Was Nat frOas the want of Gareth *Awed a lan of. theta divisions a 700 men IndeekolliWe
. . . ... . . . _ . ~_..-1-. —lr .1... 1....1 arasi ...MA hall! had the brirada on shore that was listen

bat I recollect that was mamas. ..
hat the only conversatiOn in which you heard Lordffunt• belt 'at" be is reduced "J."O a state 431 w"kncss *a' to '"—
Ns any surprise and disappoimMent at finding there were life oppressive. To such persons it mast be a consoling rtil,.C.
Eden number of boats provided to land %/CO mien itt' tion to know, that they may now, by a hew infallible mode Of
?—s-lie repeated his surprise afu:rwards, the following treatment, be restated t.n that greatest of all humanblessingll3
iii
n I sa* him, that the squadron had not been furnished strong, manly and v iirous constitution.
t number abeam . in all Cases of debility, deficiency., from whatever cause gristle,
in not know, that Transport Boats are Usually employed t. as well as in every species of venereal infection, Messrs. Currie
lebarkation of troops t-r They are 'ganerally;' but this i and Co., may be consulted by patients of eithr sex with the
i opien Roadsted, the landing trempl is transpeet hops i penes: secrecy, and honour, at their house, No. lin, Hatto9-
:we precarious. f ' Garden.. • Patients la the
hr country, describing the parricalsra of
their com .
l'aP, . i ' plaints„by letter pi's; paid. enclosing a Bulk notes
Xs WILLIAM PAISLEY, will
Zii" CaPiaila ill flit a &lie theneeessary medicine and agile= seat to soy Part of th.
Evineers.—.Examined Ay Its GOlNS:iil.fie : kiar.,dom. No. 107, Hatton-1;m it
you Chief Engineer in Lord Huntley's shtijes —.I + -------:
you employed to reconnoitre the .defences . •
tp4oyed to reconnoitre span the praeticabilityisf a land!ng LONDON i Printed and pablishis4 by LEV AL KENT, ei„, ea"
md. . terburysl)lace, Lambeth at the 81-AA-Orrice, No. 1. mart
was your repart, spun that subject t—i pt: stator the salt-
e tract. Published also at the YiTarrOrrsch,Tetufle la'
. , ..