Star.
London, England, 1810-02-13 00:00:00

far as I can judge froi the reports
ti Officers, the result of the inquiry on
i V..ty Was—that the troops were not fit. for

(

state the number it—l can hardly state the
r ; there arc some corps stated to be to a: cer-
,!...;;..e fit for service, and some reported unfit for
!.orne are reported to be out Of the hospital,
' 'gate to be ut for active duty; other
• ....9orted to be, at the time, fit for active

r

. the Commander-in-Chief call upon you,
e ab‘,ut the 21st of May, for a return to
Government of the amount of disposable
t ~;,at time fit for service ?—The documents
G.1„1 prove he did ; and 1 was going on to
narn.t>er fit for service on the 23d of May.
• , the disposable force which on the 23d
Commander-in-Chief was enabled, by
..,,sentation, to state to Government to be fit
„ ---What I have before stated, 8369 caval-
-30,',22. infantry t • that was the result. of the
r.:ade the 23d (%f May ; it might be, the 20th
it was given in.
r,?collect a force of 25,000 infantry, and
• try being reported to Government as fit for
~,' Counnander.in-Chief somewhere about
t 'e May ?—I should rather suppose not; I
• 1:•!:-sr:ledge of it.
you at any time consulted with respect to
le ...,e.heacy of an expedition to the Scheldt, or the
t e was;. not, in regard tothe
hfOitibn to the Scheicit,lin
t::•2 ri,,de of.conductifig it. • •
• ;,-;trd t-) the expediency of an attack on Ant-
ic, • --t)!I the mode of conducting it.
u ere you consulted ?—By the Comman-
d;

'~~r '-

. ........_
give an :limier in writing ?—I did.
• - Oiiit Answer with you ?—I have not ; I

:t ;s giver, in.
opitli.,n delivered by General Calvert to the
was read.]
tiir.MOßA,'bUl.f.

ET 71! ANtITANT-.6CtiEItAL TO THE COMMAIN..
On rut str JUNE, 1809.
which would have attended a debarkation
:...agaittide necessary for the performance of the
on an open beach, and froth thence corn-
o i:-‘t an operation through a large track of coun-
strength has been augmented by all the ad.
of the las! century, have been so ably and
v—ed, that I apprehend it remains only to consider
„ , • of the .:111:a service being effected by a conjioct
. ...!! • a.tti Army t and in this-case the liondt or.
hit presents itstif as the channel through
d.
• .!

i tit

iir.:)( i!:!e to enter upfn, any Atllailed reasoning
:.rt vvithoat prcriously ancertainift to
circlang nets wculd permit of naval c)-opera-
g ‘4l.6ees; sonnd:rii.',.and other puioti im-
:(iWith that servlce, cast only lie karnt4l by a
ize.t cscert. of the navy. But on a general view

r

.c...;,:.• N.:ix:a 4p.-ur ir.dispeusahly necessary to possess
Il' A-:. i frt ':c ou;11 cod, if rot of the whole of the island of
1,.••'•:.. nnd !...11i reTvlzi.nd : and from thimee- with the aid
a. ::..: race, ?tld ;:n txtensi7e c:lttimand of small craft-, it migllt,
I r.'.:..i: -:Te,1,:•!,..1,,i1.h, to land a body of troops at Sandvliet, cont.
v •-..., t-b ti..:t. i:s winch to Antwerp, and to the reduction of
1.i1:- -n:d ti etl.,r forts on the right bank of the Scheldt. It
tr.l•• ::..e.c, rLc retrula,A, that the citadel of Antwerp is f0r-
?1i.!.:11,.. ail.: t 1;;: wt:7lis of the town itself such as would depand

ar.(7 a •-ain of artillery, could nct

• .
::tie and labour, unless we could se•
7r r.ivigatier oft!:, :-;:heldr, which could only he assured
•t p3.-eies,ion of t!ie fortq, rn tlw left as well as on the right
urthe rivrr. Frcm tae moment MIT fleet and army appear
I the enemy u-t necessarily be apprized of the ob-
'-.7 st*:!:e crtel;:riz.! ; and having once as:-rained how large a
plir9 bf our (.I.l4posuble force was engaged in it, he would be at
Iv y to reurtn:ra'• all his mans of cafence, which would be
I)) the canals of the country, and the general coarse of
L.!ivets.

no data to go on, in respect to thoenemy's face• no
r7tar.;nt oti `sec t red on that point ; but it may be presumed,
11„?.. ea %lye: an occa,i.vi he would not hesi•ate immediately to
tor his troops from the fortresses in Holland, the Nether
and Friuch Mande: s, and from more remote quarters, if
sislicient time for the purpose. The service •.would be
eLqus. :131 the troops onployed on it must unavoidably be ex-
ited to considerable risk ; but I humbly conceive the operaticin
this point of view, dots not present the same insuperable diffi-
:„Hes, wldclt I must be of opinion, would attend an'attempt to
r:;11:in the sante service by a debarkation at or in the vicinity
I: Ostend, and by a movement from thence to the point of attack.
(Stned) " n. ca hvF.itor."
V. a; that the opinion delivered by you to the Corn-
tl.r.s.e.,7 in Chief ? It was. •

11.tve you seen any reason to alter any part of that
(1.:;:m E—No, I really h:tve not.
II tiat.opinion it is stated, that there were no data:
A,,, the enemy's force ; was any information coni-
trttice.ed to you as to the enemy's force, when yon
'..-..•• c.11:,-,1 upon to give that opinion ?—lt was ge-
itq4 .;::ited, that it was imagined the country was
tn. 'ow of troops at that time.
V.t,.t:iy thing more precise or positive stated ?—;
"',:l : :., my recollection.
~,11, is 2ny plan sehmitted to your consideration ?
11.2,11!:e subject was conversed upon, the Comman-
'jet ill chit. h.td a pl.tn of the navigation of the Scheldt
).!,,,e him.

'II ret.:l to the formidable state of the fortifica-
-1",2s of Antwerp ; from what do you infer the forti-
ScAtm. r.s were In that state ?—From my own observa-
Nrh haring been there in 1794, and from having
.card that the fortifications had been improved since
it's time, and that the defects whichs*were apparent
den had been remedied ; I do not knsiw from whom
I hAcl heard it, but as general infortration.
What was the state of the fortifications of Ant
in the pear 179-4 which fell withilt your knowled7rei
—The kt,l:cct that appeared toe at that time, was
•-f great extent of the works, and many of them not
being in a g.)oti.butte of repair.; the citadel is detach-
i'4tr,itn the town, and preseoti a much More forini-
, Oofenco. than the, ti does, but Iby no means
L.rt competent togive a decided opinion upon.
11'4 s,lkjccr, as it w'as..rorrely in occasional .visits to
tili"^wn when the arrgewas in that neighbourhood
At l had an opportunity of making my observation
tirm it.
At that period the town regularly fortified, and
clZlild it rlnly hataetbeen taken by a regular siege ?
~:at 'las a matter of opinion that probably officers
-sed in that kind of service would be called upon
An opinion upon'; I do not know that, visit-
ttnvn only two or three times, I am compe-
"g 10 give an opinion.

e .
. ,
Did you coneider it a fortress ?--Undoubtedly, ibe C 'lodated to hold 14000, including the garrison of
That the citadel was a regular work ?—The cita-• ttegen-op-room.
del, to the best of my opinion, was a regular work. • i Who was present at the discussion between the
Do you consider it a matter of notoriety that the Commander in Chief and yourself, to which you have
works had been augmented since that. period ? I -referred, when the map of the ctfurse of the.Scheldt
have understood so from conversation, with persons • was before you ? —I really cannot recollect so as to
that came from that country, that, since the French ', speak positively; I rather think that General Hope,
have been in possession of it, they have repaired the ; the Deputy Quarter-master General was pretent, and
works. 1 I think Colonel Gordon, who was at that ti rife Secte-
Do von understand it to be a matter of notoriety, ' tary to the Commander in Chief; but it was a sub-
that the French have throughout all those provinces, . ject that was talked of more than once, it was a con-
a coneiderable.organieed National Guard or Militia, • • versation that occurred more than once ; It was not a
in lependent of their regular. force ?--LI have under- council or any thing of that kind.
stood that a force of that kind exists throughout the a Are you certain that Colonel Gordon was present ?
whole of the French Empire. —No, I have stated that I cannot be certain, but I
Would not a force of that description be applicable rather think he was.
to garrison service within a fortress ?—I conceive it I Or at any ether discussion upon this subject ?—I
would. . am certain that Thad conversation with Colonel Gor-
.
Would not detachments of seamen, marines, and don upon the subject, and I rather think in the pre-
artificers, be also applicable to garrison service within sence of the Commander in Chief.
a fortress ?—Certainly. 1 Are you certain whether General Hope was. pre-
You having stated that you were in Antwerp in sent at that discussion, or any other, upon this subject?
1791, did you happen to know whether the province I certainly have conversed with General Hope upon
of Zealand, and especially the island of Walcheren, the subject, and I ant equally certain that I have in
were unhealthy in the latter end of the summer and.l the presence of the Commander in Chief.
the autumn ?—it was generally reported so to be. Was General Brownrigg present at that discussion?
Did you consider it as a matter of notoriety that f —To the best of my recollection General Brownribbr,
the island, of Walcheren was an unhealthy situation was indisposed at that particular time. •
for soldiers at thatiod of the year at the time you I Did those discussions take place previously to your
gavbthe opinion w r ich has been read ?—The heal. giving in that opinion which has been read at. the
thiness or unhealthiness of the island of Walcheren table ?—Conversations of that nature occurred both
certainly bad no influence upon that opinion one way previously to my giving in that paper, and subse-
or the other, it was merely a military question. quently to it.
Was it within your knowledge at that period, that Did that particular discussion, when the map lay
that island was unhealthy for soldiers ? Certainly. upon the table, take place previously to your giving
When you gave that opinion, did you take into your in that opinidb or subsequently ?—That with other
consideration the means of transporting artillery from maps generally lay upon the table in the Commander
Santvliet to Antwerp ? I did ; and conceived it to in Chief's room.
afford one bf the greatest difficulties of the service. You have mentioned a particular discussion with
Would it not have required a great deal of time to the Commander in Chief, when a patlicular map lay
have collected the beasts of draft, and to have drawn upon the table, and .was consulted ; did that consulta-
, the artilery from Santvliet to Antwerp ?—lt certainly tion which you so alluded to take place previously
would ; the quantity of time must depend upon the to your giving in the information which has been read
operations of the enemy, if we were to collect our at the table, or subsequently to its ?,--I think previously
means of transporting our artillery in that country, to it, and subsequently to it likewise.
and what state the country was in to prevent our col- Am I correct in understanding that you had heard
I letting those means of transportation. of an intention to send a large force to the Scheldt
Do you thi: it would have been possible, by any previously to your being caned upon to give that opi-
means,. to have conveyed an army adequate to the nior.-2es.
siege of Antwerp, with the ordnance requisite for that What was the amount of the disposable force re-
siege, from this country by Santvliet to Antwerp, • maining in the country after the expedition had sailed?
without giving the enemy considerable time for pre- Of infantry little or nothing, of cavalry there was a
paration ?—Certainly it would not be possible: more considerable force ; but that can be given with
In case of a failure, or even in case of success, the greatest accuracy by a return.
would not the retreat of that army be exposed to con- In the different conversations you state yourself to
siderable difficulty ?—I conceive that must .depend so have had with other officers on the subject of the pro:-
much upon the operations of the enemy, and the state posed expedition, was your opinion as to the probable
the country was in, that I hardly know how to give difficulties of carrying it into execution diminished or
an opinion on the question, which is so very vague ; increased ?—They certainly were not diminished.
the retreat of an army from any country must be at- In consequence of those conversations with other
tended with dfficulty, but that must depend as to de. military officers, did you conceive a favourable or un-
greearpon the means the enemy have to assail that favourable opinion of the probable result of that ex-
army pedition ?—My opinion was, that Walcheren would
You say that at the time 'you conversed with the fall ; and I had great doubts with regard to the 11l-
Commander in Chief upon the proposed mode of timate operations, as is expressed in my written
making the attack, namely, by the course of the opinion.
Scheldt, there was a map of the course of Scheldt Had you much intelligence relative to the strength
laid before him ; was there any accompanying infer- of the army, and the local situation of the country,
rnetiolowitli regard to the state of those forts and previous to the opinion you gave to the Commander
fortif.cations which command, at different places, in Chief ?—I certainly had not • and I think I stated
the passage of the Scheldt up to Antwerp ?—To the in my opinion, that for want of data, 1 felt it imp os-
best of my recollection there was not. . , , sible to form an accurate opinir=ni. , •
Neither as to their actual state for offence or de. You have stated to the Coßmittee, that between
fence, or the amount of the garrisons then occupying the return of the army from Spain, and ihe sailing of
them ?—To the best of my recollection there was the late expedition, requisitions were made at the in-
not. , stance of Government from your office, to the officers
• From your knowledge of the country, having sere- commanding regiments. to know in what state the
ed there, is not Antwerp so situated as to be capable army was, and. to press their preparation for service ;
of receiving reinforcements in a very bhort period of upon a full consideration of the result of all the pre-
time from a considerable distance of the surrounding vious returns, did it not appear to you upon confer-
country, owing to canals anetrivers ?---elt is. ence with Lord Castlereagh, when the letter of the
Is it not peculiarly so ?—The course of those rivers '23d of May was written, that the 10th of June was
which connect France with Flanders, as well as the the earliest day that there could be any reasonable
expectation of the great body of the army being ready
canals of the country, is in favour of the enemy en-
for service ?—lt certainly did.
deavouring to succour Antwerp.
Was not that letter of the 23d of May addressed to
After your opinion had been delivered to :Govern-
all the Commanding Officers of the regiments that
meet, by the Commander in Chief, were you ever
were included in the first force of 25,000 men ordered
called upon to explain any part of that opinion ?—I
for service ?—The letter of the 23d of May was ad-
beenreallv did not know till lately that. my opinion had
dressed to the Commanding Officers of districts, not
delivered to Government, but I never was called
to the Commanding Officers of Regiments.
upon to explain any part of that opinion.
Then after that o With a view to its being circulated to those regi-
on for any further inion
opinionoat
ou never were called
relativeup_
to the Expedition meets ?—Certainly ; the names of the regiments are
in the margin; the letter of the 9.3 d of May was writ-
to the Scheldt-?—I never was called upon for any
ion.. . ten with a reference to all the regiments supposed en
further opin
be preparing for service, except those few light corps
Was the opinion given by you, which has been read,
which had been previously inspected and reported
an opinion arising from a discussion with the Corn-
upon by Sir John Hope, in consequence of a letter of
mander in Chief's Staff, on the subject of the propos-
the 27th of April.
ed Expedition to the Scheldt, or was it only your own
individual opinion, without any consultation. with Were not those light corps fitted for Portugal, and'
other Officers ?—lt was my own individual opinion, not with a view to the proposed service in the Scheldt?
I
but I certainly had had conversation on that subject • —They were at that time intended for Portugal. 1
well other Officers. Was not it ie point of fact found that eeveral of
Could the supplies and reinforcements be cut off the regiments could not be ready for service so soon (
from Antwerp except by an army commanding both I as the eoth of June, and that the equipment el some 1
banks of the Scheldt ?—I apprehend not. of them remained incomplete till the end of that !
Would it not have required a very large force so to I month ?—There were several regiments, particularly
have invested Antwerp with security to the besieging i second battalions, reported unfit for service as late as
army ?—As far as my opinion goes, it would. • I the result of the inquiry of the 23d of May.
Would it not have been necessary to have secured In your opinion, did the state of the Army admit
our communication with 'that army and its retreat, to of its being earlier sent upon service ?—I really con- j
have detached a considerable force to occupy intei- ccived the 10th of June to be as early a day as the
vetting posts ?s—l conceive it would. I main body of the Army could be considered fit for
What do you conceive would be a competent gar- i active service.
risen ftn Antwerp ? I really have not local informa- i You have stated that you were consulted upon the
tion enough to answer that question: . 1 late Expedition to the Scheldt, is it in the ordinary
You have stated that it would require a very large 4 course of service for his Majesty's Ministers to take
force to invest Antveerp ; to what amount do you sop- the opinion of the Adjutant-General of the Army as
pose that force must be :'--I really think it is hardly : to proposed Expeditions which may bi from time to
possible for a person to give an opinion upon such a time sent forth ?--I conceive it to be entirely optional
subject without having time to consider the situation with his Majesty's Ministers whom they please to con-
of the place, the nature of its resources, the nature of : suit with ; by no means with the Adjutant-General
its defences, and the nature of the country round it. unless they please so to do ; there is nothing in his
'ln order to invest Antwerp, would it not be neces- office which entitles him to it.
•sary to detach cores to mask Bergen-op-Zoom, and When the state of the defences of Antwerp were
the other fortresses in that neighbourhood ?—I conceive discussed, did you represent to the Commander in
it would. Chief, or to the Government, that you had under-
Can you form any opinion what the amount of stood the works of the place had undergone any im•
those detachments mast be ?—lt roust entirely de- provement, and what, subsequent to the -period you
peed upon the force that the enemy had in those gar- had seen them in 1794 ?—I really do not recollect any.
risons. . . discussion upon the state of the defences of Antwerp.*
Supposing those fortresses to be competently gar-' You have stated that in your opinion, much of the
risoned ? Bergen-op-Zoom itself if competently difficulty of operating against Antwerp, would have
garrisoned, I believe would require 6or 7000 men ; arisen from the delay that must necessarily have hap-
the lines from Bergen-op-:Lom to Steenbergen might petted in conveying the necessery . artillery from

•.

' S

aid draught cattle nece-esary For tie- .
that artillery; are you aware filet the ho: s,
quisite for the transport of the :winery deter:
necessary for the attaelrof that town, were previ ..; •
at home, and accompanied the Expedition on service
—I was perfectly aware of it, but the mode in wh.c::
the question was put to me • did not give me. the l•-
berty of mentioning it; I eeas asked merely an ab-
stract question.
•Have you not known places more respectable in
their defences than Antwerp, that have been reduced
by an army with adequate means appearing before
them, without the necessity of undertaking a siege t f
a more regular description ?—I conceive a fortress
cannot be taken without treachery, without' a siege.
Have not fortresses been- reduced by bombard-
ment ?—A bombardment implies some degree of •
siege ; but I should suppose a very extensive fortrese,
if it is defended as it ought to be, should not surren-
der from a bombardment.
Was not the fortress of Copenhagen reduced by a
bombardment of three days, and was not Copen-
hagen a place more respectable in its defences than
Antwerp is when you inspected the works ?eel
really do not feel competent to answer that question ;'
I do not know sufficient of the defences of Copen-
hagen, to say what they were.
Do you recollect that Antwerp, including the
citadel, was reduced or surrendered, although de-
fended by an Austrian garrison, to the army of He-
mish Patriots in the year 1790 ?—1 know it is a fact
without knowing, any of the circumstances connected
with it.
From the local knowledge you acquired of Ant-
werp in the year 179 t, do you think it was either pro-
bable or possible to take it by a coup de main ?—I do
not think it probable such a fortress should be taken
by a coup de main, the works being very extensive ;
I will not say it was impossible, but I should think
it very improbable.
Generally speaking if a place is regularly fortified
with a ditch, etc. and all its ramparts armed, would
any officer. venture upon attempting to take that -
place by assault until a practical breach had been
first made in the walls, supposing the place.to be
properly defended ?—I conceive a fortress under those
circumstances could not be attacked by assault with
prudence, till a practical breach was made.
Do you consider Antwerp, strictly speaking. a re-
gular fortification, and do you know that the bath:.:
ries of Antwerp were armed it' the manner described
in the last question ?—I really have not sufficient
knowledge of Antwerp to answer the first part of
that question exactly, and I have no knowledge
whatever of the latter part of the question,
Does not a correct answer to all the preceding
questions depend upon a correct knowledge of the
nature and number of the garrison of Antwerp ?---I
think it does very much depend upon those circum-.
stances.
Do you know any circumstances that might have
prevented a coup de main on Antwerp being success-
ful, supposing all the army, except the division ne-
cessary for the siege of Flushing, could have been
landed at Santvliet, in the course of a week or ten
days after they left this country'?—None but those
naturally resulting from the nature of the place itself.
State what you consider those circumstances to be ?
—lts l'ortifications.
Explain more distinctly what you' consider as its
fortifications, were there any outworks ?—I have not
a sufficient local knowledge to go into the description
of Antwerp, but it is generally impressed upon my
mind that Antwerp is in such a state as would have
made it difficult to take it by assault without any
previous attack, but that is more the result of infor-
mation I have received from others, than any per-
sonal knowledge.
Do you not consider Schovednitz, in Silesia, to
have been a very strong place ?—I have always heard
it so represented.
Was not that taken by Marshal Loudohn by a
coup de main ?—lt is an historical fact that can easily
be turned to ; I really have not it so correctly in my
mind, as to be able to state it in evidence.
Might not the terror of a bombardment in a city so
ropulous as Antwerp, where the inhabitants may be
supposed not well affected to the French Government,
and the garrison not of regular troops, bn
Burghers, have produced a surreaader rom
what would be expected from it fortress with a smaller
population, with a garrison of regular troops
beg to state, that the answers I have given have been
in a military point of view, when I have been asked
questions asto the place being taken by bombardment ;
certainly, in a military point of view, a fortress should
not surrender on a bombardment ; but if you put the
case of a rich and populous town such as Copenhagen,
it is not merely a military question, but a political one.
Can any answer you have made, strictly confining
yourself to a military point of view of this subject,
be applicable to a populous city where the inhabitants
may have a great influence upon the \garrison ?—I
conceive in exact proportion as the inhabitants have
an influence upon that garrison, the replies will not
•
be applicable.
Are you able to state from your own 'knowledge,
what the proportion of the armed French force to
overawe the sentiments of the inhabitants of Antwerp
was 'at that period ?—I really have no knowledge
whatever of the garrison of Antwerp, whether of
armed burghers or others.
Have you any reason to believe that the inhabi-
tants of Antwerp were ill affected to the government
of Bonaparte ?—No further than I should suppose all
inhabitants of towns of that kind would be ill affected
to his Government.
Did you consider the possession of the town of
Flushing as necessary to the ulterior operations in the
Scheldt ?—I should conceive that to be a question that
can be answered only by Naval Officers, as connected
entirely with naval services.
Did the country between Santvliet and Antwerp
present any obstacles to the. advance of an army .
I never passed through that country, and do not
know ; there is the fcrtress of Lillo on the right bank
of the river.
Have you any information upon that subject ?
I have not.
Do you know whether a considerable part 4 that
country cannot be inundated ?—I have always un-
derstood that it could, but I have no personal know-
ledge of k.
[The Witness was directed to withdraw.]
(To be coeineee )

rl4

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 12.

Mr. WARDLE moved to discharge the order, made on his
+ Motion of the 29 of January, respecting the sums lvanced from
various funds for the support of our West India Colonies ; and
he moved for a return in a more explicit form.
The same Honourable Member gave notice of a motion on
Wednesday, for papers, to shew the means whereby situations
were otrained in the Civil departments of the Navy and Barrack
Offices, with a view to prove that abuses have existed in appoint-
ing the salaries of such situations, and the pensions to superannu-
ated officers

Mr.HUTCHINSON moved for some documents respecting the
state of Antwerp, previouly to the sailing of the late expedition.
He observed, that it appeared from the letter of the Noble Com-
mander in Chief on that expedition, dated the 29th of August,
that tht ulterior objects of the expedition were totally impracti-
cable, because so formidable was the defensive state of Antwerp,
that it would he in vain to attempt its reduction Without a regular
siege. Now what he wished to ask of Ministers was, the produc-
tion of any plan or plans they had received, spewing the state of
Antwerp and Fort Lillo, with the condition and extent of their
respective fortifications. The Ministers had loaded the table
with a variety of papers, none of which threw any light upon the
subject, but were merely intended to confuse the Members.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER opposed the tno-
tion as premature and unnecessary in the present stage of the
business.

Sir JOHN NEWPORT said lie could see but one motive for
withholding the information, and that waF, not to keep knowledge
from the enemy, but to sonceal from Parliament facts indipen-
sable to its information.

Mr. YORKE suiported the argument of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.
General TARLETON spoke in support of the motion.
Mr. WH rr BREAD said, if the candour and fidelity of the Se-
cret Committee was supposed to be impeached, or their office
anticipated, it was not by the motion of his Honourable Friend
behind him, but by a Noble Lord (Lord Castlereagh) on the op-
posite side, who, on a former day, moved for the substance of
the in for:eation received from Rotterdam. The Right Honourable
Gemlenun opposite to him (Mr. Yorke) seemed to shake his
tread when a plan was mentioned; and if he could draw any in-
ference from this, it seemed to imply that Ministers bad no plan ;
and, indeed, the Right Hon. Gentleman referred Members to
the map shops for plans accessible to any body.
Mr. HU ICHINSON pledged himself to proye that Ministers,
in sending off the Expedition, had acted under the grossest igno-
rance of the state and strength of Antwerp.
Lord PORCHES !'ER was less anxious about the result or the
motion, than surprised at the resistance given to it by the Right
Honourable Gentleman; as he had no doubt the information re-
quired must be ultimately given.
After a few words from Mr. WINDTIA hi and the CTIANCILLOR
of the EYCHIQUER, the previous question was put and carried.

PENAL LAWS.
Sir S. ROMILLY brought up the Bills which he had obtained
leave to bring in, and the object of which has been already
stated. He, at the same time, took occasion to correct an 'PAC-
curacy in his former statement. In the numbers which he had
:tared as committed for the capital felonies, out of which one
only had been executed, he had included those committed for
petty larcenies. He had been led into this mistake by the form
of the return, and he thought proper to notice the inaccuracy
because it might bear upon the argument. He adverted to the
facilities which he had found in the prosecution of his object in
the Secretary of State's office ; and expressed his thanks for the
attention which had been paid to his wishes. He would move
the second reading of the Bills for Monday next; intending,
however, to postpone it to a furher day if necessary. Some
other returns were coming which it would he proper to have on
the table before the second reading. The deliy in presenting
them, he believed, resulted from the desire to render them as
accurate as possible.
The Bills were then read a first time, and ordered to be read a
second time on Monday next.