The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-23 00:00:00

" Not one hour passes without my obtaining addi-
tional proofs of his inimical feelings."—P. 43.
On occasion of Nor:r's dissatisfaction at Col. Pottin-
gee's professing that British friendship was offered equally
to all the Ameers, he (Col. P.) says, " What he (Noor)
meant by our friendship being equal, was my refusal to
break our treaties with them at his request. . . . I sent
him back an answer, that friendship was a thing that
could not be served out in bits ; that I had met with
none whatsoever from him since I came to Hyderabad ;
that the most trifling request was cavilled at and pro-
crastinated ; and that he must not suppose I was to be
blinded by his sending me dinners and fruit, and talking
of his devotion to our cause."
"In addition to these unequivocal proofs of Noor
Mahomed's unabatul enmity and treachery, my moonshee
was told by a person who was present within these few
«lays, when Noor Muhomed Khan said to his cousin,
Meer Meer Mahomed, that it was useless to trouble
themselves any longer by studying our wishes, and that
in his, Noor Mahomed's, opinion, the best course was at
once to send me away, and declarge their allegiance to
Persia."

Meer Mahomed, however, refused to join him.—P. 49.
Terms had been proposed by Col. Pottinger for the
purpose of confirming Noor Mahoined's supremacy, but,
(adds he) " he has proved himself so totally unworthy
of the confidence and support we have bestowed on him,
that I respectfully recommend that I may be authorised,
when a fitting opportunity shall occur, to amend the
agreements, by omitting the words in question."—P. 50.
" They (the Moonshees) told him as I had directed
them, that if he fancied his having agreed to receive a
British Resident had led to our armies coming into
Sinde, he was entirely mistaken—that under all circum-
stances we should have required a road through this
province, so that there was nothing contrary to friend-
ship in doing so.
An unexpected message from Noor, of his great
anxiety to meet our wishes in every way, surprised
Colonel Pottinger, but (says he), " the cause of this
sudden change I had no difficulty in divining the next
morning, when I heard that the Ameers had received
intelligence, to which they gave full credence, the pre-
ceding afternoon from several quarters, that Mahomed
Shah (of Persia) had gone back from Herat."—P. 51.
"Noor Mahomed abused the King of Persia and the
chiefs of Candahar and Caubul as faithless rulers, who
had met with their proper reward, and evinced that
utter absence of all shame or veracity which has formed
so striking a feature of his recent demeanour."—P. 51.
He praises Nusseer Khan thus—" Of Nusseer Khan
I should say that he is well disposed towards us, but
that his religious bigotry and the influence which Noor
Mahomed has established over him led him away. There is
a warmth and sincerity in Nusseer Khan towards us that
none of the other Ameers ever evince," and he then
describes his manner.
He also speaks favourably of Meer Meer Mahomed Khan
and Sobdar Khan, saying, " they are both always kind
and polite in their intercourse with me, and I think they
are well inclined to be friends with us."
" The Chief of Meerpore, Sheer Mahomed, is a low,
violent, and ignorant Beloochee. He is said to view our
intercourse with Sinde with great dislike, so I believe
there is not the least doubt but he has been of late en-
deavouring to prevail on all the other Ameers to come to
an open rupture with us ; should he attempt to interfere
in any arrangements which his Lordship may direct to
be made, either here or at Khyrpore, I would strongly
advise his being instantly called to account, and if any of
the other Ameers support him they must stand the con-
sequences.''— P. 52.
After recapitulating Noor's misconduct in various in-
stances, which " form altogether in my humble judgment
a concatenation of circumstances that, laying all the
secret intelligence aside, and supposing that no one steps
forward to make further disclosures, places Noor Ma-
homed at the mercy of the Governor-General."
" I think it also more than probable that some of the
Ameers of this place will object to our troops remaining
at Shikarpore, and to our forming any new treaty with
Meer Roostum Khan (of Khyrpose), in a manner that
may oblige us to use force to put them down."—P. 53.
He then speaks of Roostum (the chief Ameer of Khyr-
pore), to Sir A. Burnes, in reply to his proposing "to
take that principality under our protection :—" I cannot
help viewing it as saddling ourselves with a serious and
troublesome responsibility in favour of a family who were
at the very instant betraying their want of confidence in
us by the minuteness and tautology of the terms which
they required, who were assuming a tone of equality and
dignity totally opposed to their relative station with the
British Government, and who had not (and have not as
far as I can discover), made any single sacrifice, or
evinced any single sentiment that gave them a shadow of
claim to the vast boon of our protection.
" My own decided opinion is, and it also strikes me
that it accords with the intention of his Lordship the
Governor-General of India, that any new treaty which
we may vouchsafe to Meer Roostum Khan And his fa-
mily should have as the basis of it a distinct and un-
equivocal renunciation of their adherence to, and all
connexion, save friendly intercourse, with the Ameers
of Hyderabad ; that they should further bind themselves
to hold no correspondence with the said Ameers or any
other foreign State, on political topics, without • our
knowledge ; that they should pledge their fidelity and
allegiance to us ; and finally that they should agree to
submit such disputes as they may have at present or
hereafter with foreign States to our arbitration."—P. 57.
"Experience has taught me to place little or no value
on the outward demonstrations of the friendly feelings
of the Sindees. Ido net intend by these remarks to
impugn Meer Roostum Khan's individual sincerity, but
I most certainly do doubt that of Meer Moobaruck, as
I am obliged to dissent in logo from the opinion you have
expressed in the 6th paragraph of your letter to Mr.
M‘Naughten, above quoted, namely, that Roosium's
letter to Noor was ' a very explicit document.'" Colonel
Pottinger then states his own opinion of the letter thus
—" As to the nature of the letter from Meer Roostum
to Noor Mahomed Khan, it seems to me to be a speci-
men of the most abject servility, and there is no expres-
sion in it that conveys, in my estimation, the least cor-
diality towards us."—p. 58.
" I stated in my letter of the 9th inst. (October),. that.
I was sure Noor Mahomed would join oar enemies to-
morrow, did he see they were stronger than we, and
every day's events have confirmed that opinion."—P. 59.
Alluding to a letter and messenger from Roostum to
himself, Colonel Pottinger says—" You may imagine=
that I was greatly surprised at this important communi-;
cation. I conceive that it was chiefly his (Roostum
Khan's) duty, had he been sincere, to have apprised hit
agent of the change in his views and ideas which had
subsequently taken place ; and to forbid him to lend his
weight to the unfriendly and disgraceful course which
the Hyderabad Durbar has adopted." —P. 62.
" I have had the honour- to receive your letter of the
28th ult. Nothing that it contains has tended in the
least degree to alter my opinion of the absence of sin-
cerity in the Chief of Khyrpore."—P. 64.
" Since I have been here, Meer Roostum has allowed
a most insolent and threatening letter, addressed to him
by that low Beloochee, Shere Mahomed of Meerpore,
to be sent here for the purpose of being used in intimi-
dating and insulting me. He (Roostum Khan) has
written, as well as his relations, the most slavish and
obsequious assurances that the Persian language can ex-
press, of their readiness to be guided by Noor Mahomed
Khan's orders with regard to us ; and he (Roostum
Khan) has deputed a person to support and comfort this
Government (Hyderabad) in its heartless and shameless
conduct towards the British Resident," &c.—P. 64.
To conclude, I can only repeat my intention to re-
vise our treaty with Meer Itoostum Khan, when I shall
obtain satisfactory and unequivocal proofs of his having
acted up to his professions, but not till then."—P; 65.
"In closing this letter, I may respectfully observe,
that two courses strike me as being now open to his
Lordship—the one, to order me to return to Cutch, and
to declare all friendly relations with Noor Mahomed
Khan to have ceased; the other, to direct certain de-
mands, such as his Lordship shall see fit, to be made on
the Hyderabad Government, with an intimation that if
they are not complied with, we shall enforce them. . . .
Perhaps the best demand that could be made, with re-
ference to our future supremacy in this country, would
be for a cession, say Kurachee, or tribute, to cover, in
part, the expense of a body of troops." He then states
the great difficulties that would attend any plan, and
ends thus :—" One point, I hope, however, will be in-
sisted upon from all parties, namely, the free and un-
limited use of the Indus for merchants, and the total
abolition of every description of toll between Roopur And
the sea."—P. 65. _

" I said that had the Ameer met us half way, we
should have been obliged to him, and felt sure of his
friendship ; that had the road (through Sinde) not been
given, we should have taken it."—P. 73.
"To believe that there is any sincerity in his (Noor's)
professions would be absurd. . . . . Ilis fears will now,
I think, keep him in the right path ; but on them alone
can we calculate for doing so ; an were he a single
ruler at the head of this country, I should unhesitatingly
recommend our setting him aside."
He then states the difficulties of remodelling this Go-
vernment without crushing the innocent as well as
the guilty,—that he can offer no better suggestion than
" to keep a body of our troops always in this pro-
vince, and oblige the Ameers to pay a part of the ex-

pense."—P. 74.
" I particularly pointed to the warnings I had about
treachery. I distinctly stated that had anything of the
sort been attempted, the race and name of Talpoor
would have been extinguished ; that no man would have
dared to say he belonged to it, and that it would here-
after have been spoken of as a tribe, only known for
their infamous attacks on ambassadors at their Court.
I declared over and over again, that I was ready to quit
Ilyeerabad, if Noor Mahomed Khan desired it, that
very day ; that we would take a road through Sinde,
were it not given, and do as we considered necessary for
the great interests we had at stake."—P. 81.
" I think it incumbent on me to remark that I can-
not reconcile to Meer Roosturn Khan'a, professions of
devotion and friendship towards us, his having asked you
to fix Ghotkee as the point at which the Bengal armies
were to cross the Indus."
The reason is that Colonel Pottinger doubted the
possibility of effecting the crossing of the troops there.
—P. 87.
" I feel his Lordship must be fatigued with the perusal
of the bare-faced falsehoods, and unblushing assertions
of firm and devoted frindship,' in which Noor Mahomed
Khan persists, with a degree of pertinacity such as is
quite wonderful."—P. 87.
" To all these observations the moonshees replied at.
great length, by pointing out the innumerable and con-
current proofs• of his (Noor's) unfriendliness and actual
treachery."—P. SS.
" On this subject (the strength 'of the subsidiary
force) I have bestowed a good deal of reflection since the
receiptof your letter of the 29th ultimo, and I am of
opinion that we should demand from the Ameers of
Sinde, the .cession of all the country, lying on the right
bank of the Indus, south of an imaginary line, to be
drai'n due west from that river, at a point ten miles
(more or less) north of Tatta, until it meets the frontiers
of Beloochistan, at the base of the mountains. This would

give us a compact territory, the complete command of
the' river, and possession of the only sea-port.- At a very
rough estimate, I calculate that the cession I have in-
dicated, would yield at first, a revenue of from four to
five lacs of rupees, but it is one that would rapidly im-
prove under our rule, and, in a few years, I see no reason
to doubt that Tatta would spring into much of its former
opulence, and become a vast emporium of trade and
wealth." tie then states the advantages Of this plan to
the Government and to the country itself and proceeds
thus—" My plan therefore would be, to have a regiment
of Native Infantry and a company of Artillery at Kura-
ace, and all the rest of the troops at Tette, where there
is an admirable site on the Muskalla hills (west of the
city) for a cantonment. I shall also propose that a
strong detachment of Bengal troops (equal perhaps to
the Kurachee one) should be kept at Sukkur on the
Indus, to which I suppose the Khyrpore Chiefs will
gladly give their assent. With these troops and British
agents residing at Hyderabad and Khyrpore, I look en
it that our perfect supremacy throughout Siude, will be
us fully established as though we had entirely subjugated
it—a measure which, for the reasons recorded in some
of my former dispatches, I could by no means recommend
to his Lordship."—P. 89.
" I wrote them" (letters to the Governor• General)
" under the impression which I still entertain, that it
is the intention of the Governor-General that the force
which I expect shortly, under the personal command of
the Commander-in-Chief, shall compel the Ameers into
acquiescence with whatever terms are to be prescribed to
them, and after that is done, the troops enumerated in
my first letter, above alluded to, will, I conceive, be
ample to uphold our supremacy tinder all possible con-
tingencies."—P. 90.
" And that I was astonished after these proofs of his
(Moor's) continued treachery and want of reliance in,
or friendship for me, he ventured to ask my advice or
opinion on any subject w hatever."—P. 95.
In alluding to a letter from Noor, to one of his offi-
cers at Shikarpore, supposed to relate to secret corres-
pondence of a hostile kind, Colonel Pottinger says:—
" I think it very possible, if not probable, that the ori-
ginal ureeza to Mahomed Shah of Persia, may be
amongst the expected letters, and at all events these will
doubtless be communications of a most secret nature
from the Candahar chiefs. I need not therefore point
out to you the great importance of getting hold of them."
—P. 96.

" On the 4th inst. I obtained positive information that
the surmise which I made in my letter of the 28th ult.
to Major-General Willshire and Lieut. Eastwick, of
Noor Mahomed Khan having secretly ordered no one to
serve us, was strictly correct."—P. 99.
Alluding to Noor having granted authority for the
hire of camels, &c., and then privately prohibiting it,
Colonel Pottinger says=-.".1 considered this to be a case
of gross perfidy, such as was susceptible neither of expla-
nation nor palliation ;" and he sends to tell Noor so, and
to add, that "if the camels were not speedily forthcoming,
I should suggest to his Excellency. Sir John Keane to
send a detachment and take possession of Kurachee."---
P. 99.

"I am sorry to report that the demeanour of Meer
Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, has been of late equally
insulting and unfriendly." He then states cases of wrong
done by Shere Mahomed and his officers, and says that
" there can be no doubt, however, that our credit and
character throughout Sinde will suffer by such indigni-
ties being winked at even for a time."—P. 101.
" My intelligence from Hyderabad, up to the 13th inst.,
leads me to believe that the Ameers there, excepting
Sobdar, are now really exerting themselves to obtain
carriage for the army, as the only means that offers of
getting rid of it. At the same time they are adopting
all sorts of precautions, which evince a total distrust of
our design, and have already assembled a considerable
body of their rabble of troops at the capital. They have
also written to all the chiefs, whether Beloochees or not,
to he in readiness with their quotas, in case of neces-
sity."—P. 101.
Speaking of Noor's abject state of alarm, Colonel
Pottinger says—" But even when labouring under his
worst apprehensions, it will be observed that no such
idea has apparently ever crossed his mind, as that our
ultimate plan was to station even a company of Sepoys
in Sinde, and the moment that intention is announced,
I think it will be the signal for a cordial coalition to
oppose our arrangements. Although Sobdar has
stood neutral in all the angry negotiations, and
has announced his determination to do so ; that de-
claration has invariably been accompanied by the proviso
that he is iirkto be disturbed in his present possessions.
Neither he nor any other of the Ameers has expressed
a heartfelt sentiment that bespeaks his or their admis-
sion of the justice and necessity of the cause in which we
have embarked ; and it is to me obvious that their sole
object is to save themselves by doing as little as possible
to further our views. Nor do I believe that any one of
them, or the whole collectively, would willingly give
10,000 rupees at this instant, to see the Governor-
General's measures perfected to the fullest extent of his
Lordship's desires."—P. 101.
"Even had I authority to offer them our guarantee of
their territories individually, without paying one farthing
for it, but stipulating that we were at our own expense
to keep a force in this province, I think they would re-
ject our proposal ; and, therefore, to expect that they
will, without coercion, consent to make the smallest pecu-
niary sacrifice, or to agree to our having a single regi-
ment in their country, seems to me to be hopeless. They
have acted all along, and are now doing so, as though we
had put their friendship and forbearance to the last test, by
requiring a passage for our troops through their country ;
and their recent anxiety to get me to fix the sum they are
to pay the Shah, does not, I am satisfied, spring from
the sense they entertain of our friendly interposition,
but from a dread that his Majesty will, before he ad-
vances from Shikarpore, compel them too terms less rea-
sonable than we should prescribe. I am quite convinced
that were they sure the King would quit Scinde without
enforcing any demand, they would run all future risks,
rather than come down with one rupee, and that it is the
present pressure alone which weighs with them."—
p. 102. _ _ __ _ _

In speaking of the Ameers (including Sobdar), ad-
mitting the subsidiary force, as paying part of the ex-
pense, he says—" But I think my late dispatch will have
intend t
tt
o o
demonstrated to his Lordship that that is not the case,
and that if we ask for anything beyond what we have
donne
sa already,vingts •
b Imust no
lay
means our
accounts
bbeaud venteorestxoaodct
t. i
ithat I believe the Ameers are inclined to go to war with us.
l.On the contrary, my belief is, that they are well aware of
'our power and perseverance, and it is the dread of both
that has made them succumb even to the degree they
have done ; but we should make no demand of them.
especially at this period, that we are not resolved to en-
force ; and my former letter, particularly that of the
26th ultimo, to the Bombay Government, will have ex-
plained that I always have considered the force now
here, under Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, to be
available for the settlement of Sinde."
He then states that the proposed_ subsidiary force alone
could not do that duty, &c.—P. 102.
" I am still more decidedly of opinion that the disclo-
sure of the Governor-General's plan regarding Sinde will
be highly ill-advised and premature, for of course the news
will be forthwith conveyed to Hyderabad ; and if it does
not cause the Ameers themselves to break with us at once,
it will at least enable them to make preparations for the
best resistance in their power."—P. 103.
• . . He (Shere Alahemed) had already committed
direct acts of hostility and insult towards the British Go-
vern men t."-13. 104.

" Since this letter was written, I had a further commu-
nication with Sir John Keane, and in consideration of
the decidedly hostile disposition of the Ameers," &c., he
advises the dispatch of troops from Bombay to Kurachee.
He then proceeds thui—" I haft) no doubt the Ameers
will consider these arrangements tantamount to a decla-
ration of war on our part ; but they have, I conceive, left
me no alternative."—P. 104.
" It is my present intention to await the receipt of fur-
ther instructions from the Governor-General of India,
and should they not reach me before I am required to
act, to do so on the principle laid down in my dispatch
of the 23d ultimo, with the view, under all circumstances,
of establishing our supremacy in Sinde. The Ameers
will have the option of avoiding war by acceding to our
demands; and if they refuse, I conceive we must settle
this province to our entire satisfaction, before we can
move into Affghanistan." He then further proposes that
the Company's rupees should be made " a legal tender
throughout Sinde, and likewise that the Ameers shall
provide and make over to us 5,000 camels," &c. —P. 105.
" So far as it is possible to form an opinion on the in-
formation'i now possess, nix idea is, that we must settle
Sinde to our entire satisfaction, even should the Aineers
force us to subjugate it, before we look beyond it"—
P. 115.
" My dispatches, &c., subsequent to the 23d of No-
vember, will have shown the Governor-General that the
Ameers of Hyderabad are already resolved on not al-
lowing us to keep a force on any terms in this province,
and I have not the smallest doubt but the reserve force
will be opposed in its debarkation at Kurachee, even
should the news from Herat not cause the Ameers to
break with us before it arrives."—P. 115.
" Certain as I am of this resolution, I shall adhere to

my opinion (in which the Commander-in- Chief con-
curs), that it is my wisest course to refrain from making
any disclosure of his Lordship's instructions now before
me, in the hope that previous to this force advancing to
Hyderabad, I may receive others suited to present cir-
cumstances, which appears to me to dictate the neces-
sity of carrying our objects here at all ventures."—
Pp. 115, 116.
" You will tell the Ameers that Sinde forms a natural
and integral portion of Ilindostan, that the supremacy of
that empire has devolved on us, and that we cannot, and
will not, allow any other Power to intermeddle ; that
it thence follows, that they have now no option left to
them of binding their interests irrevocably with ours,
and, that if they neglect the opportunity, they may
deeply repent it, when it is too late."—Pp. 119, 120.
" Their jealous and suspicious feelings will probably
induce their Highnesses to ask, supposing they agree to
our present terms, what security they have for our not
going further hereafter. The reply to this query, or
anything of the same tenor, is so obvious, that I need
,
hardly direct your attention to it. It is the strong in-
stance of our good faith, and wish to preserve our ami-
cable relations, as exemplified in the treaty you convey
to them. They cannot doubt our power to do as we
like, and some of thew, at least, must feel, that their acts
deserve severe retributary measures, instead of which we
tender them our renewed friendship and protection on such
moderate terms, and accompanied by so many advan-
tages, that their refusal of the former will show to the
world their resolution not to meet us half way, and
oblige us to take by force what we ask as friends and
protectors."—P. 120.
Some of the articles of the treaty stipulated for depots
and facilities for landing public stores at Kuraelsee, to
which articles he anticipates objections being msde -by
the Ameers, and says, " You will explain to them that
it is a necessary result of our determination to keep a
force in Siude, that we should have the benefit of a com-
munication by that post whenever it suits us; that we
know perfectly well that they have no means of defend-
ing that place against us," &e.—P. 120.
•