The Sun.
London, England, 1844-02-13 00:00:00

(Cheers)—and to which were superadded, in an eminent
degree, in the person of Sir C. Napier, skill, judgment, and
talent,—( Hear, hear.) He felt very great pleasure in seconds
ing the motion.—( Loud Cheers. )
The SPEA E a having put the motion,
Lord HOWICK said it was with the most infinite regret
that he felt himself under the necessity of opposing that motion
in which the Right Hon. Gentleman called upon the House to
concur.—Marks of disapprobation.) It was painful to him
to take this coarse, but he felt it to be his imperative duty to
do so, and lie felt bound to state to the House the grounds upon
which, in his opinion, the thanks of the House ought to be
withheld from Sir Charles Napier. It was most painful to
him, because he could fairly say that the Right Hon. Baronet
enuld not more admire than hi n the military skill displayed by
Sir Charles Napier. In short, during that decisive campaign
which took place, he had an opportunity of showing some
of the 'greatest qualities which could distinguish a military
cemmander.—( Hear, hear.) The prompt decision and energy
—the undoubted bravery—the consummate military skill—and
beyond all, that power which particularly appertained to dis-
tinguished commanders, which belonged to superior minds, he
meant that of infusing that spirit into the hearts of his men
with which he himself was animated.—(Cheers.) In all these
encomiums he most cordially concurred with the Right Hon.
Baronet, but it was utterly impossible for him to think that Sir
Charles Napier was not a General only.—( Hear, hear.) The
Right Honourable Baronet said that this motion had nothing
to do with politics. The Governor-General, it was said, was
responsible for all the measures adopted, and Sir C. Napier
was merely called upon to carry into effect the coarse of policy
decided upon by Lord Ellenborough. The House might re-
member that the speech of the Right Hon. Baronet was not
throughout consistent, for a few minutes after he said that it
was not his military skill he so much admired, that Sir C.
Napier had exercised judgment and wisdom—in fact, that Sir
C. Napier bad exercised power and resronsibility of a very
different kind from mere generalship. He found, on reading
the Indian papers, that Sir C. Napier was, in a letter from the
Governor-General, dated 26th August, 1842, entrusted with
civil as well as military power. It was quite plain that Sir C.
Napier had exereised a separate discretion in the affair of Itiajor
Outrun, and a very sound discretion it proved to be. The
Noble Lord proceeded to read other extracts from the Blue
Book, proving that Sir Charles Napier had exercised a power
independent of the Governor-General ; and in the policy in-
volved in the exercise of that power he (Lord Howick) could
rut at all agree. In the case of Lord-Keane, it was perfectly com-
petent for all parties to agree, for though they disapproved of
the Affghanistan war they might concur in thanking Sir John
Keane tor his bravery. But with Sir C. Napier the case was
far otherwise—he was placed at the head of a large force, with
directions to effect a certain object, by peaceable means if he
could—if not, by force ; and, in fact, he was equally responsible
as the Governor-General for all that took place in Sinde. Such
being the case, it was utterly impossible for him to concur in
the motion. A great deal had been said about the treachery of
the Ameers. Treacherous they certainly were, and cunning
and vindictive; but who made them so? Was it not ourselves?
—( Hear, hear.) And was it not the policy pursued by Sir
Charles Napier in Sinde which made those strong measures
afterwards so necessary ? This was the impression which a
perusal of the papers bad made upon his mind ; and this his in-
dividual opinion was greatly strengthened when he found that
those persons who possessed the best means of giving a correct
notion of the state of affairs in that country concurred with
him in the view he had taken. When he found by these letters
that Sir Henry Pottinger and Major Outram took the same
view that he did, he felt perfectly satisfied that there was not
merely strong ground, but an absolute justification for the
opinions he entertained. In a little work, too, written by
Captain Eastwick, which had lately been published, and which
was remarkable for the strong ability, the high tone of morality
which pervaded its pages, he was further justified in the posi-
tion he had taken up. He said, "As an independent man
giving an independent opinion, I consider, that Sir C. Napier's
ignorance of the language, manners, and habits of the
natives, his want of experience of the native character, and,
above all, his total want of sympathy—(Hear, hear ) —with the
unfortunate Ameers, as the main cause of all the fatal events
which took place." In the opinion here quoted from Captain
Eastwick's volume he (Lord Howick) entirely concurred. At
the same time he knew the difficulty of forming anything like
a correct judgment on matters of this kind, especially by men
like himself, personally unacquainted with affairs in the East.
He should feel he was not justified in giving expression to his
own opinion, were it not justified by the opinions of men really
competent to the duty. Nor would he now ask the House to
adopt the course he propounded to it, could it be supposed
that, in so doing, they must necessarily pass judgment against
Sir Charles Napier. But he denied that such
would be the effect of following the suggestions he
now offered. Hon. Gentlemen might be surprised at the
opinions which he now expressed; but he (Lord Howick)
thought he could make the principle which governed him more
clear to the House, by referring to what actually pissed in
another transaction. He believed Honourable Members gene-
rally would admit that the battle of Navarino was, as a feat of
arms, highly honourable to the British navy, and that the skill
and valour of the officers and men on that occasion had never
been surpassed.—( Hear hear.) The Administration of that
day, however, did not think fit to propose the thanks of Perlis-
liament on that occasion. They determined not to do so, and
indeed commented on it with strong disapprobation. Amongst
others who now sat on the bench beside him, the Right Hon.
Member for Nottingham ( Sir J. Hobhouse), then the Member
for Westminster, came forward, and proposed to the House to
vote its thanks to Sir Edward Codrington and his gallant
companions in arms. The Government, on that occasion,
opposed the motion. Mr. Huskisson, at that time Secretary
of State for the Colonies; and War, moved the previous
question ; and, after a lengthened debate, the motion was w:th-
drawn without a division. The position taken by Mr. Huskisson
that they should be particularly careful in voting thanks for
events growing out of an accident, lest officers in command
should create tee easily accidents which might afford them op-
portunities of distinguishing themselves, and so getting honours
they would otherwise not have the chance of obtaining—that
was the ground taken by Mr. Huskisson. What was the ground
taken by the Right Hon. Baronet (Sir Robert Peel), who
formed part of that Administration ? After agreeing in the
position taken by Mr. Huskisson, the Right Hon. Baronet ad-
vanced the principle, that except in a declared war, the thanks
of that House never had been, and never ought to be voted for
any victory our arms obtained. Amongt the instances in sup
port of his argument, the Right Hon. Baronet had brought
forward that of the battle of Toulouse, where the thanks of Par-
liamend were withheld from Lord Wellington, because the war
had actually terminated, although the hostile commanders
could neither of them be aware of that fact. A battle so
fought was to be considered a misfortune, and there-
fore no matter how gallant the bearing and conduct
of the troops might have been, thanks could
not be proposed in that House. The principle then was,
that for a battle after peace thanks could not be given—and
for a battle—a victory—without a declaration of war—as
at Navarino—thanks could not be voted. Why, this was just
the position in which the gallant officer, Sir Charles Napier,
had placed himself. The words of the gallant officer, in one of
the dispatches under his own hand-writing, were—" War has
not been declared, and I do not think it necessary to declare
it."—( Hear, hear.) Now, if the great and wholesome rule
seaiandrdel
oenr
or days—if
ryes Fkaintf
hyi troolicuca:dhs
occasions—why
twwhh.e y
L wereettprecedenthtehmey
remember at so enunciated by the Right Hon. Baronet had been acted on in
spou sh
manyitt the times,
nmoens
posi-
tion of Sir Charles Napier. It was referred to him to decide
whether military operations were to be commenced or not—on
him it depended whether there was to be a collision with the
Ameers or not. ' To Sir Charles Napier great military ;means
were given, and he was directed to obtain whatever might be
requisite to the safety of our possessions and the honour of our
naive without resorting to arms. With such instructions, and
without deeming it necessary to declare war, he had com-
menced war, and now it was proposed to that House to vote
thanks to him. He asked the House to act on the principles
laid down by Mr. Huskisson and by the Right Hon. Baronet
(Sir R. Peel)—to act now, so that, in after times,
similar results should occur as seldom as possible.
Let them consider how important this was in India, where it
was necessary, in the case of Sir C. Napier, and had frequently
been necessary before, and would frequently, no doubt, be neces-
sary again, to entrust negotiations to Generals at the head of
large armies. Was it possible to doubt that when a brave
and enterprising General, conscious
of his high
talents—burning for an occasion to display them—pantinmilitaryg for
distinction—surrounded by officers, all animated by the same
spirit as himself—commanding a gallant and eager army, in
which he placed implicit confidence—was it in human nature
to expect that such a man, so circumstanced, treating with
Oriental rulers, with whom deceit and procrastination were
habitual, and finding that they were drawing their proceedings
to a most interminable length—was it possible that such a man,
so circumstanced, would not feel a strong disposition rather to
cut the Gordian knot of such interminable negotiations with
the sword, than disentangle them with patience and forbear-
ance?—( Hear, hear.) They all knew how strong was the
passion for military glory in the breast of the soldier; knowing
that, could they doubt that a General, in the situation he
had described, was placed in a position of great dilliculty, and
of great trial ? Could they believe that there would not be
a strong bias upon his mind to bring the matter
in dispute to a bloody termination ? If this were so,
was he (Lord Howick) not justified in appealing to the princi-
ple so well laid down by Mr. Huskisson ? He would quote the
language which had been used by Mr. Huskisson, and in doing
so, he would substitute the words " unfortunate negotiations"
fur the word " accident," and he would ask them whether the
passage of Mr. Huskisson's speech was not strongly applicable
to the present case. Mr. Huskisson said, "Be cautious before
you create a precedent of thanks for events which grew out of
unfortunate negotiations, lest the °Geer looking to the single
benefit conferred upon him by receiving such thanks should
cherish a disposition to create failures in negotiations, by which
consequences might result which the country might have to
regret." He (Lord Howick) would ask whether the principle
of Mr. Huskisson's argument was not strongly applicable--
aye, applicable with increased force, to the case ,be-
fore them ; because an accident occurring in Europe
between two Beets of civilised Powers must be of comparatively
rare occurrence, but in India Generals must be engaged at the
head of large armies, and such events must be of frequent oc-
eurrence. He confessed that he thought this question derived
additional importance from what passed on a former evening.
He thought that what fell from the Right Hon. Gentleman
opposite, in the course of the debate last week, made it pecu-
liarly imperative upon that House to beware how they did any-
thing which might tend in the remotest degree to encourage
for the future in India a system which he must call unscru-
pulous aggrandisement. He agreed with the Noble Lord, the
Member for the City of London, in the surprise be had ex-
pressed at what had fallen from the Right Hen. Baronet, The
Right Hon. Baronet said there was an uncontrollable principle
which led to the gradual absorption by civilised and powerful
States of the dominlon of their weaker and more barbarous
neighbours, and that the laws of nations, such as they were
understood in Europe, could not be strictly observed in India.
He (Lord Howick) must say that this was- a doctrine against
which he for one should most decidedly protest. He could
not believe that this uncontrollable principle was so far clear
to us now as to be looked upon with favour. He could not
find that they had been applied by other nations as an excuse
for their conduct. If this principle could be applied, it might
be advanced in justification of the Russians quartering them-
selves upon their barbarous neighbours, or of France encroach?
ing upon Algiers. He firmly believed that if this " uncap.
trolable principle" were to be admitted, that such would be
the encroachments of the French on the African shore, that
the Cabinet of the Right Hon. Baronet would think itself war-
ranted in interfering. He protested against the cicctrine. fie
was anxious to show the effect of the words used by the Right
800, eentleinan, because he did not attribute to the Right
Hon. Baronet anything but a want of caution.—( Laughter. )
He could not' help thinking that these had been
incautious words of the Right Hon. 6entleman, The House
should beware how they gave any encouragement to a repeti-
tion of such events as those which had lately occurred in Sinde.
fie believed that by giving the vote of thanks they would be
teaching military anti naval officers that when they were en-
gaged in negotiations, if by thejr own conduct the
negotiations failed, and a centici unfortunately renlied?
they had only to .succeed—they had only tO (lisp*
valour when the contest had actually commenced, and
then that House and the country would not scrutinise with
yes y close eyes the justice of the means by which the conflict
was KOtlersissl. That was the lesson they were reading to naval
and military ofilderi by adgpting the vote of thanks proposed.
He for one looked with feelings efitilythltlg lAseeisitisfaptken even
at those brilliant battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad, tirilal4
in a military point of view they undoubtedly were ; but he
could not help fearing that, in the eye of the Almighty, they
were stained with guilt, or unnecessary and wanton blood-
shea. bhottley helieved that if they then thanked those by
1 whom thOs been fought, that a portion of that
•iRE