The Sun.
London, England, 1868-03-20 00:00:00

PANTOMIMES.

Although one or two of the usual Christmas
entertainments still linger on the stage the season
of pantomimes has really terminated, and it may be
interesting, and not now out of place, to consider
them in their origin, their progress with us and
their future application. Pantomime, as its Greek
derivation conveys, is, or rather was, the art of
expressing the passions, sentiments, and ideas by
action and attitude, without having recourse to the
use of speech. With the Greeks it was never more
than an accessory to the dance, but with the
Romans it was highly esteemed and separately
cultivated. In their funeral ceremonies, the
manners and principal events in the life of the de-
ceased were thus represented. In the time of Cicero,
the famous Roscius portrayed, by an expressive
pantomime, the most eloquent discourses of that
Roman orator. In the reign of Augustus, Fylades
and Bathylles were celebrated—the one for tragic,
the other for comic, delineations ; each one estab-
lished a separate school, and public applause was
divided between them. Nero himself figured
amongst the pantornimists, and frequently the en-
thusiasm produced by celebrated actors gave rise to
rival factions, and the perpetration of deplorable
excesses. In the middle ages pantomime NI as re-
vived in Italy, the celebrate I Scaramouche being
highly distinguished in this style of acting. From
Italy it passed to France, and ultimately to this
country.

The vulgar association of the word pantomime
with us is that of a harlequinade. We have had it
connected with the dance in manner of the Greeks,
which is also of Italian revival, but it has never
been really popular on our stage as the means of
representing a drama ; in fact, we believe that many
years have elapsed since its last essay. Formerly
the harlequinade occupied almost the entire length
of the performance—the burlesque being but its
brief prelude or introduction. In these days, how-
ever, the public taste appears to be growing weary
of its ceaseless noise and unmeaning bustle,—its
endless dancing, fighting, tumbling, and purloining,
and, year by year, burlesque has grown into greater
importance. It is now no longer a mere prelude.
[t is established as the most important part of the
performance, and the harlequinade, dwindling in
proportion, is but its adjunct, frequently most in-
artistically connected, The objects of burlesque
are manifold. It jumbles past and present manners
together, bringing them into immediate and hu-
morous contrast. It caricatures every station of
life, most especially monarchs and their courts —to
which we beg to draw the attention of the politi-
cian. It is made the vehicle of displ ty—of splendid
scenery, gorgeous decorations and a most liberal
exposure of the female form under every variety of
light; but of morals it has none, and this is its
great defect. In this respect, it is as barren as the
tiarlequinade itself.
Such, then, is the state of pantomime at present,
and we, who hold to our ancient predilection for
clown, pantaloon, harlequin And columbine, would

be glad to see it placed in a position of better secu-
rity on our boards. We love the motley and are
apprehensive about its future fate, fearing as we do
that each accession of fresh patrons of the stage will
be more and more set against its contortions and
grimaces, and, in our anxiety for its preservation,
suggest that a moral motive should be given to its
performance. We see no reason why the harlequi-
nade shoull not be placed, in respect to the stage,
in a situation analogous to that of the humorous
critic in respect to the ordinary writers of public
events, or of the caricaturist to the regular artists.
It might be made the means of impressing on the
public its follies, failings, and even faults. It might
exhibit the unscrupulous struggle for political power,
the dishonest grasping after wealth,—either through
companies or by trade,—and the management of our
poor-law and other boards,—in short, represent all
that might make us better acquainted with ourselves,
and that in an attractive, yet whimsical, form. It
would then afford not only subjects for mirth but
for reflection, and would be useful—more beneficial,
perhaps, than many a well-intentioned sermon. It
is true the tumbler and the dancer would have to be
replaced by the burlesque performer, but we should
preserve the costume, and we must admit to have
more affection for that than for the unmeaning
grimace and action it at present covers. Let us
have for each scene some worthy object—some hum-
bug of the day humorously represented, and if such
changes be deemed too sudden, let it alternate with
what is now extant on our boards. It is true two dis-
tinct sets of performers would have then to be engaged
—the comic and the tumbling, but two sets of the
latter have frequently been employed, and managers
generally appear to be utterly regardless of the
number engaged in our pantomimes. In con-
clusion, were we not thoroughly convinced that
such alteration would be appreciated by the public,
and thereby prove lucrative to theatrical lessees, we
should not have ventured to make the suggestion.
Harlequinade might then trespass on burlesque,
instead of being quietly squeezed out of existence
by the latter ; and motley would continue the fa-
vourite amusement of our winter nights,—should
we be right in our conviction.-I?ucing Times and
Amateur Dramatic Chronicle.

THE PRESIDENT'S DEFEN!,`E•.

The President sent to the Senate the following
message on the 24th February, which was read in
secret session, laid ou the table, and ordered to be
printed. The Senate removed from it the injunc-
tion of secresy :—To the Senate of the United
States :—I have received a copy of a resolution
adopted by the Senate on the 21st instant, as fol-
lows :—" Whereas, the Senate have received and
considered the communication of the President,
stating that he had removed Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War, and had designated the Adju-
tant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of
War, ad interim ; therefore, Resolved, by the Senate
of the United States that under the Constitution
and the laws of the United States *the President has
no power to remove the Secretary of War, or de-
signate any other pet son to perform the duties of
that office, ad interim." This resolution is confined
to the power of the President to remove the Secre-
tary of War and to designate another officer to
perform the duties of the officer, ad interim, and by
its preamble is made expressly applicable to the re-
moval of Mr. Stanton and the designation to act,
ad interim, of the Adjutant-General of the Army.
Without, therefore, attempting to discuss the gene-
ral power of removal as to all the officers, upon
which subject no expression of opinion is contained
in the resolution, I shall confine myself to the
question as thus limited, the power to remove the
Secretary of War. It is declared in the resolution,
"That under the Constitution and laws of the United
States the President has no power to remove the
Secretary of War and designate any other officer to
perform the duties of that office, ad interim." As to
the question of power under the Constitution, I do
not propose at present to enter upon its discussion.
The uniform practice from the beginning of the Go-
vernment as established by every President who has
exercised the office, and the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, have settled the ques-
tion in favour of the power of the President to
remove all officers, excepting a class holding ap-
pointments of judicial character. No practice or
any decision has ever excepted a Secretary of War
from this general power of the President to make
removals from office. It is only necessary, then,
that I should refer to the power of the Executive
under the laws of the United States to remove from
office a Secretary of War. The resolution denies
that under these laws this power has any existence.
In other words, it affirms that no such authority is
recognized or given by the statutes of the country.
What, then, are the laws of the United States
which deny the President the power to remove that
officer? I know but two laws which bear upon
this question: —The first in the order of time is the
Act of August 7, 1789, creating the Department
of War, which, after providing for a Secretary as
its principal officer, proceeds as follows :—" Sec-
tion 2d. And be it further enacted, That there
shall be in said Department an inferior officer, to
be appointed by the said principal officer, to be
employed therein as he shall deem proper, and
to be called the Chief Clerk in the Department of
War, and who, whenever the said principal officer
shall be removed from office by the President of the
United States, or in any other case of vacancy,
shall, during such vacancy, have the charge and
custody of all records, books, and papers, apper-
taining to said Department." It is clear that this
Act, passed by a Congress many of whose members
participated in the formation of the Constitution,
so far from denying the power of the President to
remove the Secretary of War, recognizes it as exist-
ing in the Executive alone, without the concurrence
of the Senate, or of any other Department of the
Government. Furthermore, this Act does not pur-
port to confer power by legislative authority, nor,
iu fact, was there any other existing legislation
through which it was bestowed upon the Executive.
The recognition of power by this Act is therefore
complete as a recognition under the Constitution
itself, for there was no other source or authority
from which it could be derived. The other Act
which refers to this question is that regulating the
tenure of certain civil officers, passed by Congress
on the 2d day of March, 1867. 1 he first section
of that Act is in the following words :—" That
every person holding any civil office to which he
has been appointed by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, and any person who shall here-
after be appointed to any such office and shall be-
come duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be
entitled to hold such-office until a successor shall
have been in like manner appointed and duly qua-
lified, except asherein otherwise provided ; provided
that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of
War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Post-
master-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold
their offices respectively for and during the term of
the President by whom they may have been appointed
and for one month thereafter, subject to removal
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."
The fourth section of the same Act restricts the time
of office to the limit prescribed by the law creating
them. That part of the first section which precedes
the proviso declares that every person holding a
civil office to which he has been or may be appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall hold such office until a successor shall have
been in like manner appointed. It purports to take
from the Executive during the fixed time established
for tenure of office the independent power of re-
moval, and to require for such removal the concur-
rent action of the President and Senate. The pro-
viso that follows proceeds to fix the term of office
of the seven heads of the departments, whose tenure
never had been defined before, by prescribing that
they " shall hold their office respectively for and
during the term of the President by whom they may
have been appointed and for one month thereafter,
subject to removal by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate." Thus, as to those enumerated
officers, the proviso takes from the President the
power of removal except with the advice and
consent of the Senate. By its terms, however,
~efore he can be deprived of power to displace
them, it must appear that he himself has appointed
them, It L wily in that MO that they bare any

tenure of office or any independent right to hold
during the term of the President and for one
month after the cessation of his official functions.
The proviso, therefore, gives no tenure of office
to any one of those officers who has been appointed
by the President beyond one mouth after the
accession of his successor. In the case of Mr.
Stanton, the only appointment under which he
held the office of Secretary of War was that con-
ferred upon him by my immediate predecessor, Mr.
Lincoln, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
He has never held from me any appointment as fie
head of the War Department. Whatever right he
bad to the office was derived from that original ap-
pointment and my own sufferance. The law was
not intended to protect such an incumbent of the
War Department by taking from the President the
power to remove him. This, in my judgment, is per-
fectly clear, and the law itself admits of no other just
eonseruction. We find in all that portion of the
first section which precedes the proviso, that as to
civil officers generally the President is deprived of
the power of removal ; and it is plain that if
there had been no proviso that power would just as
clearly have been taken from him, so far as it applies
to the seven heads of Departments ; but for reasons,
which were no doubt satisfactory to Congress, these
principal officers were specially provided for, and
as to them the expressed and only requirement is that
the President who has appointed them shall not,
without the advice and consent of the Senate, re-
move them from office. The consequence is that,
as to my Cabinet, embracing the same officers de-
signated in the Ist section, the Act takes from ere
the power, without the concurrence of the Senate,
to remove any one of them that I have appointed,
but it does not protect such of them as I did not
appoint, nor give to them any tenure of office be-
yond my pleasure. An examination of this Act,
then, shows that while in one part of the section
provision is made for officers generally, in another
clause there is a class of officers designated by
their official titles, who are exempted from the
general terms of the law, and in reference to
whom a clear distinction is made as to the gene-
ral power of removal, limited in the first clause of
the section. This distinction is that as to such
of these enumerated officers as hold office under
the appointment of the President, the power of re-
moval can only be exercised by him, with the con-
sent of the Senate ; while as to those who have not
been appointed by him, there is no like denial of his
power to displace them. It would be a violation of
the plain meaning of this enactment to place i\ir•
Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of
departments who have been appointed by myself.
As to him, thiS law gives him no tenure of office.
The members of my Cabinet, who have been ap-
pointed by me, are by this act entitled to hold to
one month after the term of my office should cease;
but Mr. Stanton could not, against the wishes of
my successor, hold a moment thereafter. If he
were permitted by that successor to hold for the
first two weeks, would that snccessor have ne
power to remove him? But the power of my suc-
cessor over him could be no greater than my own.
If my successor would have the power to remove
Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a
period of two weeks, because he was not appointed
by him but by his predecessor, I, who have tole-
rated Mr. Stanton more than two years, certainly
have the same right of removing him, and upon the
same ground, namely, that he was not appointed by
me, but by my predecessor. Under this construe-
' tiun of the Tenure-of-Office Act, I have never
doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton. Whether
the Act was constitutional or not, it was always ou
opinion that it did not secure him from removal. I
was aware, however, that there were doubts as to
the construction of the law, and from the first deemed
it desirable that at the earliest possible moment these
doubts should be settled and the true construction of
the Act fixed by the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States. My order of suspension ill
August last was intended to place the case in such
a position as would make a resort to judicial deci-
sion both necessary and proper. My understand-
ing and wishes, however, under that order of sus-
pension were frustrated, and the late order for Mr.
Stanton's removal was a further step towards the
accomplishment of that purpose. I repeat that riIY
own convictions as to the true construction of tho
law, and as to the constitutionality, were well settled
and were sustained by every member of my Cabipetl
including Mr. Stanton himself. Upon the question
of the constitutionality each one in turn deliberately
advised me that the Tenure-of-Office Act was un-
constitutional. Upon the question whether as to
those members who are appointed by my predeces-
sor that Act took from me the power to remove
them, one of those members emphatically stated. in
the presence of the others, sitting in Cabinet, that
they did not come within the provision of the Act,
and that it was no protection to them. No ene
dissented from 'this construction, and I understood
them all to acquiesce in its correctness.