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No. 16,057. LONDON, MONDAY EVENING SUN, _FEBRUARY 121 1844.

THE SUN is Published EVERY MORNING at FIVE O'CLOCK, in Time for the EARLY TRAINS and TOWN. DELIVERY; a SECOND EDITION
(Evening Sun) is Published in Time for the AFTERNOON TRAINS,
and a THIRD EDITION at SEVEN O'CLOCK, for POST, containing PARLIAMENTARY and all other NEWS in LONDON up to that Hour.

ONE CHARGE.

opinion with Lord Denman, not only in the judgment he gave,
but also in the rule which he laid down and adopted as the
foundation of his judgment. Su far with regard to the
statement of ipsc dixit, and nut only because the same cir-
cumstance in several other cases in which it became neces-
sary to consider the law of conspiracy, and judicial opinion
pronounced from the Bench severally, and given seriutirn by
eachindividual Judge, in which one and all concur in
thejustice of the rule, and they pronounce the judg-
ment in their respective cases, according to their common
opinion. The same rule is laid down before Lord Deninan's
time by the late Lord Chief Justice of this Court. He also,
in the Court of Queen's Bench, in this country, adopted the
same rule in precisely the same terms. The only imputa-
tion that ever was cast—and it is the mistake into which
Mi. Fe zaibbon fell—the only imputation that, ever was cast
by Lord Denman en that rule, I will now advert to. The
rule was cited in the progress of argument by (I think) a
Mr. Carrington, a gentleman of the English bar. He stated
the rule to be as 1 have stated it to be—a conspiracy is
either the agreement of two or more persons to procule t; be
done an unlawful act, or a lawful act to be dune by unlaw-
ful means— .and, says Lord Denman, " I doubt the correct-
ness of the argument." That is the whole of what. Lord
Denman says ; and which is brought forward and cited in
this Court as giving judgment against all the concurrent deci-
sions of other Judges. Everybody knows Lord Denman to be
a most learned and accurate scholar ; and what he meant by
this expression was, that an exception might be taken. All
the Judges in England before whom the question has ever
since been raised (it has occurred very frequently) have
reiterated and restated the existence of the same rule, and
have acted on it accordingly. Mr. Fitzgibbon, with a good
deal of seriousness—perhaps I may say, solemnity—an-
nounced the law not to be such as I have stated ; and he
found fault with his friend, Mr. Moore, who was for
another traverser in the same interest with him, for having
admitted the law as the Attorney-General had declared it.
He said, with an earnestness to excite your attention,
that that was not the law—that by the law as existing so long
ago as the reign of Edward 1., nothing could he termed
a conspiracy except by respecting any other detraction but a
certain one mentioned in an old Act of Parliament of that
time. We learn from that it was said that nothing is a con-
spiracy except an unlawful association of men bound together
by oath or other illegal obligation, for the purpose of im-
posing a false accusation on another man—it was something to
this effect was said. Mr. Fitzgibbon then referred to a pas-
sage by way of pointing out the law as to conspiracy, but
there would not necessarily have been been treachery if the
law had been so stated as laid down by Hawkins, and taken
from the old Act of Parliament of Edward 111. Mr. Fitzgibbon
forgot to add, that in two pages after that to which he referred,
Mr. Kerwold, a gentleman of the bar, who published the last
edition of Hawkins, records this passage—" Modern cases have
certainly stretched the doctrine of conspiracy far beyond the
old mule of law." That was the observation when a case
of conspiracy against two or more persons was brought for-
ward. The offence was considered to consist in purposing by
the combination of several persons to convict an innocent per-
son by a perversion of the law ; but, Gentlemen, it has been
very properly stated that the ancient law has been extended far
beyond the cases mentioned. I need not multiply instances in
which that extension of the law has been established and acted
on by courts of justice. It is by no means necessary that
treachery or secrecy should form an ingredient in the crime of
conspiracy as the law now stands. Now, Gentlemen, having
told you to take the law from a certain report. and having
explicitly shown what the law of conspiracy is, and what
it is not, I forbear troubling you with such cases respect
ing a subject in which I and the rest of my brethren
concur in opinion. Having thus stated to you what it
is the travcrsers are accused of, I think it will be right for me
also to lay down a few other rules with regard to conspiracy,
that you may afterwards see the proper beating of this case.
In order to convict the traversers, or any of them, of the
charge of conspiracy, it is necessary that you should be satis-
fied—l do not mean to say that you should have ground to sur-
mise, but that you should have such evidence before you as
would convince your consciences that the traversers, or some of
them, did respectively and in common combine or agree to do
an unlawful act, whether that act be unlawful in itself, in its
original design, or whether it became so by the unlawful means
by which it was agreed it should be brought about. That is one
observation. Another observation is this—that, to constitute
the crime of conspiracy, it is not necessary that the unlawful
thin; agreed to should be effected—the crime of conspiracy
is complete, though, in point of fact, the criminal end was
never obtained. I will also lay down this—that, if you are
satisfied that an unlawful agreement has taken place of the
nature I have stated, either to do an act unlawful of itself, or
cause it to be done by unlawful means, though the act
itself, per sc, should not be criminal; but if you be once
satisfied that such an agreement—a criminal agreement—
has taken place, and from thenceforward the acts of each one
associating in that conspiracy arc, respectively, evidence
against the other, if conducive to the same criminal end,
though it be not proved that each and all of the several con-
spirators have either participated in each individual act, or
though it be not proved that each and every of the several
traversers charged with the conspiracy have been guilty of
the perpetration of any particular act towards the common
illegal end. I will go further, Gentlemen, and lay down
another rule for you:—" It is not necessary"—and I am
now using the language of a very eminent English Judge,
in one of the late trials, which took place in 1837, in giving
his charge to the jury—" It is not necessary that it should
be proved that the several parties charged with a common
conspiracy met to concert this scheme, nor that they
should have originated it. Who the parties were who
met to concoct the illegal agreement, it is not necessary
should be absolutely proved to you ; it is enough for you
to see whether, from the acts that have been proved, you
are satisfied that those defendants were acting in concert
in this matter. If you are satisfied that there was a con-
cert between them (that is, an illegal concert), I am bound
to say, that being convinced of the conspiracy, it is not
necessary that you should find both the traversers doing
each particular act, as, after the fact of the conspiracy is
once established in your mind', whatever is either said
or done by either of the defendants, in pursuance of the com-
mon design, is both in law and common sense to be considered
the act of beth." I will lay down another rule which you will
also bear in mind, as bearing, perhaps, more particularly upon
the instance of the Rev. Mr. Tierney than any body else. It,
is not necessary that it should be proved that those defendants
went to concoct this scheme, nor is it necessary that they
should have originated it. It is said of Mr. Tierney that he
did not join the Association until the 2d of October. If a
conspiracy be already formed, and a party joins it afterwards, he
is equally guilty—certainly he is equally guilty if he adopts the
already formed conspiracy, as it then stood. Ido not by any
means impugn the doctrine of Judge Coleridge, in the general
way in which he laid down that proposition ; but you have to
decide the question 'whether or not Mr. Tierney, who does
not appear to have joined the Association until the 2d of Oc-
tober, is or is not to be visited with the previous acts of that
Association. I would put this to you on that subject—did he
adopt those acts when he joined that Association ? You will
recollect this, that almost all the charges of crime for which tke
several traversers are here upon their trial, as imputed to them,
were, for the most part, committed before the 2d of October,
1843. The general way in which Judge Coleridge has laid
down the proposition which I have read to you, would, as a
matter of course, involve the party in the previous guilt who
had not joined the Association till elate time. If you are sa-
tisfied that he (Mr. Tierney) did join them, did he at. that time
adopt the Association as it then stood, with all its acts and cri-
minalities, if such existed, as they then did exist ? I might as well
here make that observation with regard to Mr. Tierney, because
I find, on reading the judgment of judge Coleridge in this
case of the Queen v. Murphy, that I might make what.. I may
sail a qualification—l do not mean of what Judge Coleridge
has said—but in this case 1 should prefer now leaving it to you
to consider and pronounce whether or not the qualification ap-
plies to the Rcv. Mr. Tierney. Now, we come to the ques-
tion of the traversers at large. I hope you have taken down
those observations which I laid down to you with regard to
the law of conspiracy. Before I go into the observations
in this particular case, I would like to read you some ob-
servations from an authority quoted by Mr. Sheil, and which
I will adopt as my own; it is from the case of the King against
Kirwan—Mr. Peter Burrowes was counsel for the defendant.
I fully concur with regard to the statements which have been
made concerning that most eminent man. This observation,
which I shall read to you, is not inapplicable to the present
cane. In page 203, in his address to the jury, he says—" That
to assume such a right as to represent the people, or any part
of them, would be an encroachment on the exclusive pre-
rogative of the House of Onnmons, and that any person
who should exercise the function, legislative or judicial,
would be guilty of a high misdemeanour." Now, Gentle-
men, I fully subscribe to that position. These arc sound con-
stitutional principles, thus inculcated by an eminent man
and constitutional lawyer. He is no more now, but lie has
left these behind. Mr. Sheil—and I thank him for
it—has referred to this speech in his very able
speech, no doubt as having his assent to the principles in-
culcated by this eminent man. What is the law and the
circumstances which we arc called upon to bring into
judgment ? The law as its exists—the law as it has existed
for the last forty-three years—the law which her gracious
Majesty is by her coronation oath bound and sworn to main-
tain? Gentlemen, I will read you the coronation oath, at
least part of it, as I find in Blackstone's Commentaries,
page 243 :—" The Archbishop or Bishop shall say ' Will you
solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this
kingdom of England and the dominions attached thereto be-
longing according to the Statutes in Parliament agreed on and
the laws and customs °tithe same ? The Queen or King shall
say, ' I solemnly promise and swear.' " Gentlemen,
is the coronation oath. Now, with regard to this country
and its connection with Great Britain, are the Statutes
which she bath sworn by her coronation oath to abide
by, administer, and preserve, applicable to this country.
We have heard a monstrous deal of assertion—we have
heard a monstrous deal of declamation —we have
a monstrous deal of complaint of grievances—and we have
heard a great deal of what the law ought to be. We have
heard you called upon to decide whether such a law ought to
continuo, as if you had any power on the subject at all. The
law of the realm as it stands and is settled by the Act of Union,
until that Act is repealed, is the only law yon can take into your
consideration on the subject. This is the Act which the Queen,
by her coronation oath, has sworn to preserve ; and it is idle
to say that the Queen, if she thinks proper, may depart from
this law, and call a Parliament of her own in Ireland,supposing
her own desire accorded with the people, and set up a new law
and new constitution for this country, in direct violation of the
Act of Union, which I shall now state to you. This is the Act,
the 40th George 111., c. 38:—
" An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland:—
Whereat, in pursuance of his Majesty's most gracious
recommendation to the two Houses of Parliament in Great
Britain and Ireland respectivell, to consider of such measures
as might tend to strengthen Itid consolidate the connexion
between the two kingdoms, the two Houses of Parliament of
Great Britain and the two Houses of Parliament of Ireland
have severally agreed and resolved that, in order to promote
and secure the essential interests of Great Britain and Ireland,
and to consolidate the strength, power, and resources of the
British empire, it will be advisable to concur in such measures
as may best tend to unite the two kingdoms of Great Britain
and Ireland into one kingdom, in such manner, and on such
terms and conditions, as may be established by the acts of the
respective Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland."
There is the recital of the national compact called the union
of the two countries of [Great Britain and Ireland, and sanc-
tioned by their respective Legislatures in the same rlemn
way in which the Act of Union between Great Britain and