The Sun.
London, England, 1857-05-02 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1867

At the close of the last War wall China, we
blundered enormothly. It is an old story enough,
but now, at the beginnieg of a new War with
China, it is really worth while telling all over
again. It may fortunately be condensed into a
wry few words ; and when the a .tement is once
clearly and distinctly made, we du most earnestly
trust that it may prove what our Yankee Cousic,-,
on the ether side of the herring-pond, call—

Cautionary !
Briefly, then, and t 3 come to the point at once
—During the contest which took place in 1841
and 1842, between the Chinese and ourselves,
we, the British, took possession of, and held for a
considerable time, the Island of Chusan. We
might, had we so pleased, have t ken possession
just as easily, and have held, quite simultane-
ously, the Chinese portion, if not the entire, of
the still larger and still more important Nand of
Formosa. That—however—we did not. Bt t---
as we have already distinctly remarked—during
the war of '4l '42 we did take Chusan ; and what
is more, we not only " took" Chusan, but for
some considerable time afterwards, we retained it
in our possession. Ultiuntely, however, wo
gave it up. Absurdly, foolishly, preposterously,

we restored it to the Chinese. We protested

against this proceeding at the time, Lnerktically,
and perseverinly. It was in,'ist3d by The Stm
from day to fact, until the evil h bc-

come irreparable, until Chusan bad been actually

restored to the Chinese—that the notion of yield-

ing up so very meekly, and so very weakly, such
a conquest would be literally nothing less than
a fully and an ex!.ravagance. Nevertheless,
Chusan was yit.lled up ultimately by the English

to the Chinese—as the former since then have had
bitter cause to remember. And Eagland, instead
of retaining possession of that fertile island com-
manding the Grand Canal and the Yan g-tse-kian g—
and through Nankin, Pekin ; and through the
Yellow Sea, the Gulf of Pachelee—contented her-

self with the retention of Hong Kong ! Review-
ing these fruits of that miserable Treaty, no
wonder the Government organ acknowledges to-
day, in so many words, that in it " too ranch
concession was made" to the Chines. 3 Govern-
ment ! True—but now is our opportunity for
efftctually repairing the errors we notoriously

then committed. Now—when a new war with
China is actually being c)mmenced, la us do now
what we failed to do then. Lot us retake Chusan,
and from the date of its second capture let us
hold it permanently in our possession. Let us
net merely seize and " hold" Chusan, but—mid-
way upon our movement thither from Hong Kong
I —let us tarry "to some purpose" at a much
\grander, a much richer, a much more important
i island than Chusan—one we have already men-
-1 tioned—the Island of Formon.

Formosa, or Tae-wan, belongs, or at least the
western part of it, belongs to the Chinese. It is
wonderfully productive, among other things, of
rice and of sugar. It has recently been found to
possess a rich coal deposit. It commands, by its
peculiarly central position, the whole sweep of the
eastern coast of China Proper—from Nankin to
Canton, or, more widely remote still, from Pekin
to Tonquin. It is the very place for us ! It
would be the most desirable basis for all our com-
mercial operations with the Chinese. For the
China commerce, it must be remembered, has
become a positive necessity not, only to the Eng-
lish, but to the Europeans generally. As the
Tea Producers of the world—the Chinese hold an
enormous trade in their own hands to their own
profit, and to the convenience of the tea consum-
ing races in both hemispheres. Conspicuous above
all their Cast amers—north, south, east, and
west—being beyond all doubt the race of Eng-
lishmen. Wherefore, it is perfectly obvious that
the amicable maintenance of all the rights of com-
merce between the English and the Chinese, is an
ulterior object most desirable to both—equally
desirable to both. And those rights—events
of late years have proved this—can only be
permanently secured by the acquisition on
the part of Great Britain of a sufficiently solid
and secure basis in the Chinese seas for all our
mercantile operations. Hong Kong for this purpose
is totally inadequate. It is inadequate in itself
and in its geographical position. It is too small
and too far south. Chusan is essential to us
henceforth. It must be secured and retained.
And together with Chusan—Formosa! The
latter, Formosa, might be our coaling depot in
those regions—another rice producing colony—a
new Oriental sugar plantation—and beyond all
this the Watch Tower, the Pharos, the Beacon,
' the Stronghold of British Commerce with the
Chinese !

England has only to " will" that they are
hers—those islands of Unman. and Formosa—and
they are in her possession. She has fleets, gun-
floating-batteries, enough and to spare. Let
her use them—and let her so use them that her
warlike doings in this new contest with the
Chinese shall, at the very least, be prompt and
thorough.

An intelligent correspondent of one of our
morning contemporaries has exhibited some per-
tinent interrogations respecting the Russian Rail-
way " swindle," which should be calmly consi-
dered by every person who may contemplate in-
vesting his money in that specious scheme. He
says :—" The cost is assumed to be 45,000,0001., •
upon which the Russian Government have guar-
anteed a dividend of, say 5 per cent., or
2,250,000/. per annum. Will the subscribers of
the above-named sum of 45,000,000/. obtain the
said guarantee of 2,250,0001. irrespective cf the
cost of the lines or any other contingencies, as
would the hollers of guaranteed stocks in Eng-
lish railways ? Supposing these Russian railways
were to ca-t 90,000,0001. instead of 45,000,000/.,
who would have to pay the difference ? If the
original subscribers, would not the per cent tiro on
their investment be reduced in exact proportion ?"
We pointed out this serious difficulty, at the first
introduction of the project. The Russian engi-
neers, on whose calculations the estimates were
framed, were bound to make things very pleasant
to their Autocratic master. Those whose con-
sciences were tio tender to permit their co-opera-
tion in spoiling the Modern Egyptians, would la -
ceive very unpleasant hints as to the necessity of
conforming t) the wishes of the CZAR. Summary
and exemplary castigation would inevitably be in-
flicted on those whose " qualms" might interfere
with the carrying the darling project of the EM-
PEROR into practical execution, while they
might safely defy the consequences of the
most transparent mendacity, which conduced
to that great object. There is, therefore, no
adequate guarantee for the amount of the out-
lay. The CZAR promises 5 per cent. on
45,000,000/. sterling, from which the amount of
the sinking fund—say per cent. is to be de-
ducted. Under the most favourable circumstances,
therefore, the best that can be obtained under the
guarantee is 4i per cent.—less, by the way, than
can at present be got in very eligible investments
at home, or in our colonies.
But to gain this, the work must all be com-
pleted within the stipulated time. Russia has
always a sufficient stock of grievances on hand to
produce a cases belli at a moment's notice. Sup-
posing the portals of the Temple of Janus should
and an European war pro_
again be expanded,
claimed within the period, what would be the fate
of the shareholders ? The work could not poF.-
sibly be completed, and the previous outlay would
be completely thrown away ? We grant that no
honourable party would take advantage of such a
contingency, but we have seen enough of Musco-
vite quibbles in respect of solemn contracts, to
desire some better security for our hardly earned
savings ! There would thus be a positive risk of
total los., quite sufficient to deter a man of ordi-
nary prudence from placing his money in the
scheme.

But supposing that "all was serene" in the political
atmosphere—that there was no disturbance from
either wars, or rumours of wars—the next point to
be considered'is, will the expenditure be kept within
the estimates, or may net a much larger sum than
45,000,000/. be required for the completion of
this gigantic undertaking
We are, as we have already slated, altogether
&pendent on the honesty and accuracy of the
Muscovite Engineers on this pal t of the case. If
they choose intentionally to deceive us, we have
no r(medy. We must, according to the old pro•