The Sun.
London, England, 1850-03-09 00:00:00

detailed to the House the various successive increases
which had been made to our military and navel estab-
lishments from the year 1836 to the year 18 4S, for the
purpose of meeting certain special emergencies; and he
had then pointed out, as he should again remind the
House, that when those emergencies, such as the Oregon
boundary dispute, the Marine boundary dispute, the
M'Leod affair, and others, had passed awa3, the expen-
diture which had been incurred for the purpose of
meeting them had remained unchanged. They came to
the discussion of the subject at that moment with the
additional value of another year's experience. They
were another year further removed from that great
crisis in the history 'of Europe which almost every
body had expected was to lead to the most
calamitous consequences in the form of inter-
national wars. Now, he thought, thee if there
was one consoling feature —one drop of sweetness
in the cup of gall, which had been poured out upon
Europe during the last two years, it was that they
had elicited from all that turmoil and convulsion
the fact that there was no disposition among the great
bulkiof the people of any nation to pass their freptiers
and to make war upon neighbouring states.—(Hear,
hear.) He spoke of the people as distinguished from
their governments. They had always been told that
when Louis Phillippe should die the French people
would break their prison-bars and ravage Europe; but
they ha l seen that when the French people had got the
reins into their own hands they had manifested no in-
clination to carry war into their neighbours' territoriee
Now, he did not want to assume that the millees:umlhad
come, and that there could never again be an inter-
national war; and neither did he ask them totally to dis-
mantle their ships, and to leave their ports defenceless;
but he asked them to concur with him in this—that the
experience of the last twelve months had rather con-
firmed than invalidated the statement he had made last
year as to the safety of our effecting a gradual reduction
of our armaments. He had alluded last year to the state
of our relations with our colonies, and a most important
change bad since been proposed by the Noble Lord at the
head of the Government in those relations. The Noble
Lord had lately proposed that a system of self-government
should be extended to the colonies—that the people there
should have the right of forming their own constitutions, of
levying their own taxes, and fixing their own tariffs—
powers which the Government of the United States did
not grant to the different Members of their union; and
he would put it to the Noble Lord whether, after those
concessions had been made to the inhabitants of our co-
lonies, he could expect that the more highly-taxed and
less-prosperous people of this country would continue to
defray the expenses of the troops who acted there solely
as a military police?--(Hear, hear.) He (Mr. Cobden)
believed that no Minister with a head on his shoulders
could entertain any such expectation. He knew no mo-
tive which could account for the continuance of such a
system, except a desire on the part of the heads of our
Government to retain a certain amount of patronage in
Downing-street. He believed that by the withdrawal
of the forces in our distant colonies, the consequent di-
minution of duty in our army, and the saving of the
service of the troops constantly traversing the seas on
the way-to and from those colonies, we might effect a
reduction in our army of 20,000 bayonets. Then, again,
they should recollect that the multiplication of railways
in this country, since 1835, had vastly increased the
efficiency of our military force. General Gordon had
stated, before a Committee of that House, that the faci-
lity of communication afforded by railways enabled a
battalion to do the work of a small army; for by that
means troops could be conveyed from London
to Manchester in nine hours—that is to say, they could
be conveyed in that brief period over a distance over
which they could not march in less than 17 days. Then,
again, the construction of railways bad greatly dimi-
nished the necessity for accumulating ordnance stores in
different parts of the country, as those stores could be
easily and rapidly conveyed from place to place. He did
not wish to assume that in this country the army was to
bo looked upon as a means of maintaining order, for he
clung to the belief—which had been the belief of the
Whig party thirty years ago—that a free and constitu-
tional state ought not to rely upon an army for any such
purpose; but he said that in any case a bayonet at pre-
sent was capable of doing far more than a bayonet in
the year 1835. But that was not his only reason for
believing that they might safely effect a reduction in our
army. He found that since the year 1835 our armed
force had been largely increased in various ways. We
had, for instance, 14,800 pensioners prepared for military
service; we had 9,200 dockyard men enrolled in bat-
talions and regularly drilled, and we had 3,000 county
constabulary. Then they had an increase of more than
26,000 armed men, and there had besides been a large
increase of the constabulary in Ireland. Now let them
look at the case of Ireland. The unhappy state of
that country had always been made an excuse for
keeping up a large army. But Ireland was at
present tranquil. It was proposed that they should
pass a measure for giving to Ireland a better repre-
sentative system, and he believed that such a measure
would do more than the presence of a dozen regi-
ments in that country to keep the peace there. Ireland
was about to be brought within a short day's journey of
London. and he thought it need not be treated in any
respect for the future as a conquered province.—(Hear,
hear.) There were at present in Ireland '25,000 regular
troops; there was an increase of 5,000 in the Irish con-
stabulary; and there were more than 5,000 available
pensioners; so that there were altogether in that country
between 35,000 and 36,000 armed men. He believed
that was double the amount of the armed fore in Ireland
in the year 1835. He saki, therefore, that the army in
that country might be very much reduced. He believed
that our army generally might not only be reduced, but
that considerable economy might be practised in its or-
ganization. He would venture to say that the organize-
dun of our army was the most expensive in Europe, and
was maintained more especially for officers.—(Hear,
hear.) lie found that a reduction had been effect- din
the number of our rank and file, but he did not find that
a corresponding reduction had been effected in the num-
ber of our officers' A reduction to the amount of 1,800
men was at present announced; but in that instance also
he saw no indication of a corresponding reduction in the
numbers sf the superior grades of our army. In our
cavalry regiments especially he thought that a more eco-
nomical organiz ition could be effected. He had shown to
an Austrian general offi ler, who had taken a distinguished
pert in the Hungarian war, a list of the men and
officers in our cavalry regiments, and on seeing it, that
general officer had laughed outright. He had stated to
him (Mr. Cobden) the number of officers in the cavilry
regiments of Austria as compared with the number in
the cavalry regiments of this country; and the result of
that statement was, that in the Austrian cavalry
m i
regi-
ments there was one officer to 28 men, while n the
En,;lish Guards there was one officer to 11 men; and in
our cavalry regiments of the line there was one officer
offionceers than two Austrian cavalry
English cavalry regimnt had
2toolp2ermeeetin;
cent. so
more
regiments.—(Hear, hear.) He should advise her Ma-
jesty's Ministers to alter that system if it were only for
that
the purpose of taking away an argument used by the
Liverpool Financial Reform Association, where they
alleged that our army was kept up for the purpose of
providing situations for our aristocracy. Let them
recollect that while they diminished the number of
their men, and yet retained their officers, they would
part with their most effective force, and preserve only
that which was most expensive. He should pass to
a consideration of the state of our navy. That
navy had been immensely increased since the year
1835; the cost of maintaining it had been increased
since that year from 4,099,0001. to 6,942,0001. If
they compared the state of our navy with that of
the United States, they would find that while that coun-
try had only one line-of-battle ship at sea, and bad a
number of smaller vessels, which were the best fitted for
acting as a police force for merchant ships, we kept at
sea a number of enormous line-of-battle ships, which
were no more fitted for acting as a police force on the
ocean, than a military force with a park of artillery
would be fitted for pursuing pickpockets in the streets
and alleys of London._(gear, hear, and a laugh.) He
feared that our Government had only kept up those
enormous vessels in order to find preferment fur the
members of our higher classes. There war one great
reason why they should reduce our navy at present, and
which reason did not exist in the year 1835. Since that
year there had been constructed in this country a vast
number of mercantile steam-vessels which might. if ne-
cessary, be employed for the national defence; and in
that way our means of meeting any dangerous emer-
gency had been greatly increased. It had been ascer-
tained by a Committee of that House last year that we.
had 180 mercantile steameressels of 400 tons,
and 35 mercantile steam-vessels of more than
1,000 tons, each of which could be made
' available for warlike purpose in the course of six
or eight weeks. He saw, therefore, in the present
state of the naval resources of this country
ample reasons why we should diminish our naval esta-
blishment ; and he should add that he certainly did not
think that our fleet was at present doing us any use or
any credit.—(dear, hear.) He did not think there
would be any great cause for regret if those Government
line-of-battle ships at present in the Piraeus were laid
up in ordinary, or on the stocks. He thought we would
do well to imitate the polioy of the United States, which
maintained a small naval force in commission, but which
from the resources and prosperity of her inhabitants—a
prosperity which was, in a great measure, owing to the
lightness of her taxation—were known to be formidable,
and were consequently respected by other powers. Mo-
ney formed the sinews of war, and a wealthy and
flourishing country like the United States, without great
armaments might be more formidable than countries like
France or Austria, encumbered with bayonets, but pos-
sessing only empty excbequers. But let it be remem-
bered that he was not advocating disarmament ; he only
wished that our naval and military forces should be re-
duced to an amount which would enable us to maintain
them for 10,000,0001. instead of 15,000,0001., the sum
expended on them last year. Then, again, there was
the ordnance department. He believed that, even in the
service as well as among the public, a belief prevailed
that the arraneements in that department might be ma-
terially improved. It had been ascertained by a Com-
mittee, of which he had been a member, that 15 per cent.
might be saved in the cost of our ordnance stores, with-
out any diminution in the efficiency of that branch of the
public service. Theo, again, he believed that valuable
reforms might be effected in the arrangements with re-
spect to our artillery, our sappers and miners, and engi-
neers. He had beets told by a high military authority
might be effected if a large
that a very great saving
number of our artillery corps were stationed in such
places as Malta and Gibraltar, where they could be very
usefully employed, and where troops of the line were at
'
present kept on a space too limited to allow of their
going through the manoeuvers which would ensure to
tof discipline. He proposed
them the highest amount
that the cost of our armaments should be fixed at
10,000,0001. a year. Now, let it be remembered that
that was eearly twice as much as the whole expense
of the Government of the United States before the
Mexican war, and that it was more than the whole
expense of the Prussian Government. Would any-
body tell him that, under these circumstances, he was