The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-25 00:00:00

WARNE V. SMITH.

The whole morning was occupied with the arguments
in this case, which came before the Court upon au ap-
plication on the part of the plaintiff, for an injunction to
restrain the defendant from selling or manufacturing
articles called antigropalus, or mud boots. Both parties
carry on business at Wellingborough, and the defendant
was formerly in the employ of the plaintiff.
There was, however, a previous application for
an injunction in this case, which the Court granted ex
parte, but ultimately dissolved, upon a mi,tion for that
purpose. The plaintiff has, however, now filed a new
bill, bringing before Court an amended state of facts.
The arguments had not concluded when went to press.

QUEEN'S BENCH.-(THIS DAY.
(Sittings in Banco.)

THE CUSTOM-HOUSE FRAUDS.-THE QUEEN V. BLAKB.

The defendant in this case, who had filled the situa-
tion of landing waiter in the Custom-house, had been
indicted for conspiring with a person named Tye, a
Custom-house agent, who had not surrendered to take
his trial, to defraud the Queen of certain duties payable
upon certain goods, wares, and merchandise which had
been imported from foreign countries. The case was
tried at the Guildhall, before Lord Denman, and the Jury
found the defendant guilty. He was this day brought
up for judgment, when
Mr. COCKBURN moved for a rule calling upon the pro-
secutors to show cause why the verdict should not be
set aside and a new trial granted, on the ground of the
improper admission of evidence, or why the judgment
should not be arrested, on the ground that the indictment
itself was bad. With regard to the first, his Lordship
wonld no doubt recollect that at the time of the trial he
had objected to the admission of Tye's ledger as evidence
against Blake. At the time that the ledger was offered
in evidence no proof whatever had been given of any
connection between Blake and Tye, and in the absence
of such proof he contended that it was impossible to give
proof of the acts of one in evidence against the other,
and although it might have been good evidence
against Tye, yet as Tye was not present, and
not on his trial, it ought not to have
been received as evidence against Blake. Again
the counterfoil of Tye's cheque-book had been
received as evidence against Blake—that counterfoil
containing a memorandum of a cheque drawn in favour
of D. 8., and also of the various sums from which the
sum total was made up. Now, he submitted that in such
a case as this, the counterfoil of a cheque was not evi-
dence. A memorandum made by a party paying money
was a memorandum made by him for his own guidance,
and not in furtherance of any common transaction in
which he might be engaged with other parties. If Tye
had even written or stated to a third person, " I paid
Blake such or such a sum of money for such and such
purposes," still that would not be admissible as evidence.
It would be nothing but hearsay. At the time the cheque-
book had been received, e o evidence had been given of
the transactions to which it referred. All. those were
subsequent transactions. Now, the connexion between
the parties ought clearly to have been shown before such
evidence could be admitted. It could not be admitted
for the purpose of showing the connexion. In
order to make it evidence, previous connexion
between the parties, or the subsequent adoption by the
one of the acts of the other, ought to be shown. His
Lordship would recollect that the cheque-book had
been three times offered in evidence by the counsel for
the Crown ; and had been twice withdrawn, in conse-
quence of A strong intimation from the, Lqrkl Chief
Justice, of his, opinion of its inadmissibility ; bui..the
counsel for the Crown at length felt themselves so
pressed that they were obliged to urge the reception of
thin cheque-book,, which was received accordingly. It
was a matter of the utmost importance, and he -trusted
the Court would grant him a rule.

Lord DEN3tAti admitted that the oiriewas one' of the
utmost importance as regarded the laW of evidence.
He would not now give any opinion on the subject, but
he would state the grounds on which he had proceeded
at the trial. The charge was for conspiring to withdraw
certain duties from the Crown, to which the Crown was
entitled, and he thought that the statements in the led-
ger, showing the transactions which had taken place
between the importer and his employer, might be re-
ceived as evidence of the fact whether or not certain
goods had been withdrawn which were liable to duty.
Then with regard to the reception of the counterfoils, he
had entertained in the first instance a strong opinion that
they were not admissible, and if they had remained as
mere memorandums upon the counterfoil, he should have
most probably continued of that opinion ; but looking at
the strong ease of conspiracy which had been made out,
the proof which had been given of the withdrawal of
goods, without payment of duty, and the proof which
had been given that Blake had actually received the
produce of the cheque, he thought it might be given in
proof of the proceedings of the parties ; and that view
of the case had enabled him to get over the difficulty
which he had at first felt as to the propriety of admitting
the counterfoil in evidence. It was, however, a matter of
great, importance, and the Court would take time
to consider the point before either granting or refusing
the application. With regard to the motion in arrest
of judgment, the Court would be happy to hear Mr.
Cockburn proceed to argue that point at once.
Mr. CociirtuuN then moved that the judgment should
be arrested, on the ground that the indictment was bad
upon the face of it. It charged the parties with having
conspired together to withdraw certain goods, wares,
and merchandise, which were liable to duty, without the
payment of such duty to the Crown. Now he contended
that the indictment ought to be more certain. The
nature of the goods, wares, and merchandise, on which
the duty was payable, ought to have been more certainly
specified. It was clear, from the averments in the in-
dictment, that these goods had already been imported,
and, therefore, their qualities must have been known to
the prosecutor, and ought to have been stated. There
was no such offence at common law, inasmuch as goods
were not liable to duty at common law. They were
only liable to duty by statute, and the nature of the
goods ought to have been stated, in order that the Court
might know whether they were liable to duty or not.
Lord DENmAN—I have not the smallest doubt of the
goodness of the indictment. The gist of the indictment
is conspiracy to convey away certain goods liable to
duty. Now it was very possible that those persons
might have so conspired without knowing exactly what
those goods were,
Mr. Justice Patteson and Mr. Justice Wightman were
also of opinion that the indictment was good.
Motion in arrest of judgment refused.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL—I hope, my Lord, the case
will not go into the new trial paper.
Lord DENBIAN—The Court has not yet decided to
grant the rule nisi for a new trial. We will consider.

EXCHEQUER.—(THIS DAY.)
(Sittings in Banco.)
The attention of the Court this morning was devoted
to hearing motions for new trials in cases devoid of public
interest.