The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-15 00:00:00

tors—that while a Protestant repealer is quietly struck off the
panel, a Roman Catholic repealer shall be continued thereon,
on pain of a universal outcry? The clamour amounts to this
acknowledgment, and no less—viz., that all Roman CatholiCs,
without exception, are to be considered as de facto conspirators
against the union ; that their religion is at once to absolve them
from the consequences of all transgressions, both temporal and
eternal—to guard their persons in every conflict with human
law, and to confer on them a charter of impunity. Our justifi-
cation of this reasoning wa do not scruple to state—namely,
that one and all of the individuals excluded in this instance by
peremptory challenge of the Crown were avowed and known
members of the Repeal conspiracy; against the collective
words and deeds of which conspiracy the State prosecution has
been directed. Dispute this, and legal government is brought
to a speedy end. We may just add, that, from the most
recent proceedings of the town council, the speech of the late
Lord Mayor, and his proposed petition for an act of amnesty to
the firebrands of the Corn Exchange, appear to have had some-
what more of trickery and somewhat less of gratuitous childish-
ness than we at first suspected. The siraple-souled alderman
appears to have hatched a plot for purloining an set of grace
to the Repealers, that they might the more easily, as a return
for the Royal mercy, carry OR their seditious Mil:1030TO un-
molested.— Times.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
ROLLS' COURT, Jan. 13.

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK V. THE KING OF HANOVER.
The M A STYR of the ROLLS gave judgment in this case, which
was argued last term. The suit was instituted by the Duke
of Brunswick, who was deprived of his duchy by a revolu-
tionary movement in 1830, while the Duke of Cambridge
was Viceroy of Hanover. At a convention of the Germanic
Diet, the plaintiff's brother (William) was invited to take
unon himself the government provisionally, but the diet left
it to the legitimate agnati of the family to provide for the
future government of the duchy. In 1831 King William IV.
and the Duke of Cambridge claimed to be the legitimate agnati
of the family. The plaintiff was then deposed, and his brother
William was recognized as Duke of Brunswick. By a deed
made in March, 1833, signed by his Majesty King William
IV. and the Duke of Cambridge, it was decreed that the Duke
of Brunswick, having wasted the fortune which he possessed
ie enterprises alike impossible and dangerous both to himself
and other persons in seeking to damage the just claims which
certain persons interested might have upon his property, they
considered that the only method of preserving his fortune
from ruin was to appoint a guardian over him. This deed
then appointed the Duke of Cambridge guardian, which office
he accepted, and took possession of all his property. Upon the
death of King William IV., the office of guardian was trans-
ferred by the Duke of Cambridge to the Duke of Cumberland,
who had become King of Hanover, and the Duke of Cam-
bridge accounted to the King of Hanover for the receipt and
application of the income of the estates. 'The King of Hanover
then took possession of the estates and property of the plaintiff,
and the bill stated that applications had been made to him to
account for the income, cs hich amounted to several hundred
thousand pounds, but his Majesty had refused to reeder any
account. The present suit was therefore instituted against
the King of Hanover, praying that the instrument which
had been executed by the agnati of the family, appointing
the defendant curator of his estates and property, might be
declared void, according to the laws of Brunswick, Hano-
ver, and Great Britain, and to obtain an account of the
receipts and payments. Upon the late visit of the King
of Hanover to this country he was served with process
in this suit, upon which he applied to the Lord Chancellor
to stop the proceedings in limine ; but the application was
refused, and his Majesty then filed a demurrer to the bill for
want of equity, and denying that the court of equity had any
jurisdiction. His Lordship, after stating the circumstances of
the case, went at great length through the various arguments
used on both sides. He said the plaintiff had contended, first,
that as the defendant had appeared to the bill, that ought to
be considered proof of his submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Court ; secondly, that the Lord Chancellor having refused
to stop the suit, that was a desision that the defendant might
be sued. Upon this subject his Lordship had applied to the
Lord Chancellor, who stated that he had no intention of
giving any opinion as to jurisdiction. The defendant had con-
tended, first, that as a sovereign prince, he was not liable to
be sued ; secondly, that such exemption was not confined to
his own country ; thirdly, that such exemption was not lost by
his being temporarily resident in a foreign country ; fourthly,
that, if liable to be sued for some things, he was not liable to
be sued on such a case as this ; fifthly, if liable to be sued in
such a case, that the matter was not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court of equity, but could only be tried by some
particular court, expressly appointed for the purpose. The plain-
tiff had contended that this suit ought to be allowed the same
as between two natural-born subjects of this realm—that being
a subject of Great Britain, he could not throw off his allegiance
upon becoming Sovereign of a
foreign country—that the law
of England did not prevent foreign sovereigns from being sued
here—that the law of nations and the interest of mankind
showed that justice should be done all over the world—that the
Queen of England was liable to be sued in a proper form. His
Lordship said, what had been established as to the right of a
foreign prince living in this country was involved in some
difficulty ; when a foreign prince prosecuted a bill here, he
certainly might be made party to a cross suit in the same
matter. There had been occasions in this Court where
some funds were to be distributed, and, for the justice of
the case, it had been found necessary to make foreign
princes parties, but it had never been decided that a foreign
prince could be compelled to come in
,and submit to a decree
in this Court, but only to be allowed to make a claim ; failing
to do so, after an opportunity had been given him, he
would not perhaps afterwards be able to make another
In the present case the defendant insisted that under no circum-
stances could a foreign prince be compelled to submit to a decree,
and that any such attempt would be an aggression against the
state and people of which he was sovereign, and might lead
to a war • and that such risks ought to be avoided. The most
influential argument in his Lordship's mind was, as to the im-
munity of ambassadors. It was said that the law having
granted immunity to ambassadors would not refuse it to So-
vereigns themselves ; on the other side it was said, ambassa-
dors who came upon business ought to have immunity in cer-
tain matters, but princes who came upon pleasure needed not
such immunity. There was, however, no English law upon
the subject, and the question could only be determined accord-
ing to the law of nations. It was said by some writers that
the only guide we bad in such cases was reason. It was very
difficult here to come to a satisfactory conclusion ; the whole
case was replete with difficulties. It was admitted that am-
bassadors should have immunity because they could be punished
by their own sovereign, but a prince not being subject to any
one in his own country could not be punished at all; but, on
the other hand, if the Court were to make a decree against a
foreign prince it could have no power to enforce its orders. Jus-
tice could only be administered under a jurisdiction having power
to enforce its decisions. His Lordship said he had given the case
his fullest consideration, and he thought it must be considered
upon the whole, according to the law of nations, that a foreign
prince was exempt from the jurisdiction of the court of the
country in which the prince may be residing. The interest
of mankind required that justice should be done to all, but
where obedience could not be compelled, and justice was not
provided for by treaty or otherwise, and enforcing it by means
of the state would be the cause of war, an exception must be
made. Cases had occurred where an ambassador had been a
subject of the sovereign to whom he was accredited, and it had
been agreed that then he would not enjoy total immunity. It
was said that an ambassador continued to be a subject where
ho was before a subject, but according to what was considered
the law of nations it must be seen what acts of his were the
subject of discussion. The most general rule was, that every
person should be liable to the courts of justice, and amenable
to the law of the country where he resided. It was clear
that a sovereign, having been formerly a subject of an-
other country, could not be released from that legal
subjection which he previously owed. His Lordship thought
it was not contrary to any of the opinions to consider
that the immunity of the King of Hanover was modified by
his duty to the Queen of England. He had always continued
his liability and subjection to the law of England, and since
he had become King of Hanover he had been, so far from
renouncing his claim as a subject, owing allegiance to the
Queeen of England, that he had actually come ever here, and
renewed his oath of allegiance, and had taken his seat again as
an English Peer. He came to this country, not as King of
Hanover only, but as a subject of the Queen of England • and
he, therefore, ought not to be exempt from the power Of the
Queen of England. It could never be consistent with justice
that exemption should be allowed to any person without there
being some power also in return. The King of Hanover
might come to England, might be guilty of acts contrary to the
law—he might even sit in the Privy Council, and give impro-
per advice to the Queen—it could 'not be supposed that he
should hold himself free from the Courts of this country and
yet commit any illegal acts he thought fit ; he could not be al-
lowed to enforce contracts or make claims here without being
liable to submit to the law of the country. The defendant
was a Sovereign Prince, and inviolate ;in his own do-
minions, as well as in the dominions of any other prince to
whom he was not also a subject, but in this country he still
remained a subject, and as such he owed a duty to this country.
His Lordship said, in his opinion nothing would prevent the
defendant from being compelled to do justice in his character
of a subject, but still he thought the defendant was exempt
from being sued here in respect of acts done by him as King
of Hanover, although liable for any acts done by him as a
British subject. In such a suit as this against a Sovereign
Prince, being also a British subject, it was imperative that the
bill should show that the deciee sought was against him as a
subject, and it ought to appear on the bill that the case was
one to which special immunity ought not to be extended.
There were strong reasons to believe that only as King of
Hanover was the defendant appointed guardian to the Duke of
Brunswick ; and, connecting all the acts, his Lordship was dis-
posed to think that the deed was connected with State affairs ;
but on this occasion it was not necessary for him to give an
opinion upon that. The question he had to consider was
whether, under the circumstances of this case, the Court had
jurisdiction, and his Lordship's
opinion was that the acts of
the defendant were net acts in respect of which the defendant
was liable to be sued in this Court. The demurrer must,
therefore, be allowed.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Jan. 13.
(Sittings in Banco.)
caaroa e. THE LONDON AND BRIGHTON RAILWAY
COIITANY.
The arguments in this part-heard case were resumed this
morning. _ . .

Mr. tnESIGER, on the part of the defendant, said they had no
wish to disturb the verdict, and therefore they would not
trouble the Court with any arguments on the second point,
but they were very desirous to
have the opinion of the Court
as to the first point, namely, whether under the provisions of
the 153 section of the Act, notice was or was not necessary.
The COURT baring expressed a wish to hear the Counsel of
the plaintiff in reply to the observations of the Solicitor-
General on the point of notice.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL shortly addressed the Court,
and in reply to that part of the Solicitor-General's argument
which went to show that, because evidence had been given as
to the state of the road, therefore, it was to be presumed that
the action had been brought against the Company in the capa-
city of proprietors of the road,
and that they were entitled to
notice, contended—that if that objection were worth anything
it should have been taken at the trial to the admissibility of
to give evidence as to the state
of the road, in order to show
the evidence, but that it could not be taken to the form of the
action ; besides, it was necessary
negligence on the part of de•
fendants in driving over it at too rapid a rate.
The COURT teok time to consider its judgment.