The Sun.
London, England, 1850-09-10 00:00:00

tended to the lowest ranks,, have of late of a Sunday
thinned the public-houses, and crowded the parks and
fie'ds in the neighbourhood of London. Now, however,
the beneficial agency has advanced another and a most
important step, and we may confidently anticipate
from the change a corresponding and beneficial alter-
ation in the health of the metropolis. Every summer
the hot weather sends myriads to the sea-side
fur change of air, yet the very class that
necessarily remains behind is the very class that
most requires the change. To this class it is that
these cheap excursions are a very God-send, and,
calling this to mind, we repeat that science is become
a tutelary divinity to the hard-worked and closely-
confined multitude, who form the great majority and
are the strength and sinew of " the People." Consi-
dered under this aspect, every new invention is no
longer only a matter of individual interest to a few,
or gratifying only to the intellectual vanity of man.
Experience teaches us that the good of one and the
good of all are identical—a lesson repeatedly enforced
by the loving precepts of Revelation—a lesson which
every incident of history has continually corrobo-
rated, yet a lesson shish mankind has been very slow
to learn. At the present day its truth is more than
ever evident, and that truth is at once a consolation
and a stimulus.

In addition to the other grave mistakes committed
by the authors of the Act of 1844, to which we have
already directed public attention, there is another
alluded to in the report of the Lords' Committee, to

which some of the witnesses attributed the pressure

on the Bank resources, and the subsequent panic in

1847, viz., the publication of the Bank accounts, in-
cluding the reserve of the notes in the banking de-
partment. The Governor of the Bank spoke strongly
on this point. He had felt its practical incon-
veniences ; he bad seen the effect it had on the
public mind, and the alarm thereby occasioned when
the unemployed notes sunk below the usual amount
of 4,000,0001., and it became manifest that there was
a deficiency to be drawn in from the public, for which
" the screw" will probably be applied. The old pro.
verb bath it, " that a little learning is a dangerous
thing." Although we do not altogether acknowledge
the accuracy of that venerable apophthegm, it is un-
questionably correct in this instance. The directors
know perfectly well that there are certain seasons of
the year in which the reserve falls to the lowest, and
when by a regular law the tide is turned, and begins
to flew into the coffers of the establishment.

Being aware that the beneficial stream had set
" backward," they are perfectly easy in their minds.
But the public, those who watch the state of the
reserve, as affording the best index to the actual con-
dition of the Bank, know nothing of the improved
prospects. They see—they look to nothing but the
amount of notes unemployed ; and when that is un-
usually low considerable alarm is excited, which
speedily degenerates into wild panic., and a run upon
the Bank's resources, at the time when they should
be assisted as far as practicable. The Governor at-
tributed the danger which arose in 1847 to this
cause, an opinion in which Mr. Tooke, whose
admirable work on prices attracted so much
attention, fully participated. Indeed, when it
it is considered that the avowed object of the
Act was to place the banking department on the
same footing as that of a private establishment, that
in that respect it was to be " untouched and unin-
terfered with," to manage its affairs according to its
own discretion, like any other banking concern, it is
difficult to understand why it should be bound to
publish its private affairs, and the amount of its bank-
ing reserve, any more than the other bankers with
whom it was placed in competition. The Governor,
who desires tha c the Act should be maintained with
as little alteration as possible, proposed that the
whole of the accounts should be published,
with the exception of the reserve ; but this
was most properly objected to by the Committee,
who clearly pointed out the objections to such a
course, which they considered " wholly inadmissible"
—for " such accounts must practically furnish the ele-
ments or data from which the amount of reserve may,
with a greater or less degree of accuracy, be deduced
or inferred. If the amount of reserve could thus be
accurately calculated, the proposed remedy would be
no corrective of the system complained of. If the
amount of reserve were to be inferred inaccurately,
such a proceeding would be an aggravation of
the inconvenience, rather than a safe or effectual re-
medy." It is impossible not to coincide with this
reasoning, or to dissent from the conclskion arrived at
by the Committee, " that it would appear more in
accordance with legislative wisdom to reconsider the
rule itself, against which there can hardly be stronger
presumptive evidence than the suggested necessity of
concealing the consequences to which it leads."
Having thus clearly pointed out the total failure of
the Act in attaining the objects contemplated by its

framers—having shown the injurious consequences o
many of its provisions, and their fa►al effect on the
national prosperity, it might be supposed that the
Committee would strongly recommend its total
and unqualified repeal. In this respect, however,
they exhibit a strange delicacy in dealing with this
part of the subject. They state that "an attempt to
enforce by law, under all circumstances, one fixed and
inflexible rule for the management of a bank of issue,
seems inconsistent with the best written authorities.
with the general principles of economical science, as
well as with the testimony of many witnesses of
practical knowledge and experience ;" and add, "it
can hardly fail to be productive of most serious evils,
more especially when a continuation of issues, indis-
pensable in a state of adverse foreign exchanges, is
rendered imperative, as it is by the Act of
1844, under circumstances which may be wholly
opposite." They show the impolicy of letving
" cases which may arise once in five or six years, or
even at periods more remote," to be dealt with by
" the irregular exercise of the mere authority of the
Crown and its advisers." In place, however, of the
total repeal of this most mischievous Act, they pro-
pose the introduction of "a discretionary relaxing
power, to be exercised only during the existence of a
favourable foreign exchange." As to the modes in
which " this relaxing power;" which our readers will
recollect was urged so strongly by the metropolitan
bankers previous to the passing of the Act, may be ex-
ercised, three plans are suggested by which the object
might be attained, viz.—" a legalised authority
vested in the Government—in the Government and in
the Bank conjointly, or in the Bank of England
alone. The Committee greatly prefer the latter al-
ternative. They show the danger of leaving the
power exclusively in the Government, which is
" liable to be influenced by political rather than eco-
nomical considerations ;" and add, " it is to be appree
headed that the exercise of an undefined and extra-
ordinary power would depend too much on the per-
sonal character or position of the Minister for the
time being." They had manifestly an eye to
the Exchequer when penning this passage.
What possible use could there be in leaving
such a power in the hands of Sir CHARLES WOOD,
who, up to the 20th of October, 1847, could not dis-
cover that there was any pressure whatsoever on the
commercial interests, or any difficulty in obtaining
cash advances on suitable securities ? It would be
but a further mockery to place the remedy in the
hands of such a man, who would not administer it
until the patient had expired. Considering, there-
fore, " with how little wisdom the world is governed,"
and the incompetent and mulish blockheads who oc-
casionally wriggle themselves into high and respon-
sible situations, there cannot be much doubt but that
the Committee were justified in recommending that
the relaxing power should not be placed in the hands
of the Government.
On the second point they were equally correct in
wishing it not to be placed in the Government and
Bank conjointly. There would be the divided re-
sponsibility, which, according to the Committee,
"frequently becomes no responsibility at all." " The
Government might cast the responsibility on the
Bank, the Bank on the Government, and, in the
conflict, the interest of the public would be forgotten
or defeated." There is quite sufficient force in
this objection to induce us to coincide with the
Committee to pass on to the next mode,
which, however, we cannot regard with much greater
favour than either of its predecessors. If the relax-
ing power is to be vested in the Bank authorities, to
be exercised at their mere will and pleasure, what, we
ask, is the use of the restriction that can thus easily
be dispensed with ? Why should it be retained if it
can be set aside with impunity on the first unfavour-

THE SUN,