The Sun.
London, England, 1844-07-10 00:00:00

that they should all be pronounced guilty, there was
nothing inconsistent in saying that some might be guilty
of the whole and some in part, and if that was without
the issue it puts an end to the objection. As to the dis-
continuance point their Lordships had received no answer
of any entries that had been made in accordance with
the ancient custom.

The LORD CHANCELLOR said, that if the Hon. Gentle-
man the Attorney-General for Ireland had any point
on which he wished to remark, their Lordships would
hear it when they re-assembled in an hour and a half.
The further hearing was then adjourned till half-
past six.

Their Lordships then re-assembled at a few minutes
after seven o'clock.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (fur Ireland) resumed. He
then proceeded to cite authorities in support of the pro-
, position which he had laid down previous to the adjourn-
ment, and also re-statel his argument in reference to
repugnancy. On these grounds he submitted that suf-
ficient cause;had not been shown for revising the judg-
, ment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland.
The. Learned Counsel closed the case for the Crown at
half-past seven.
Sir T. WILDE, before proceeding to address their
Lordships apologised for not appearing in his wig, re-
questing that he might be excesed from wearing it on
the ground that it produced headache.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said, himselfand the Learned
Judges felt the same inconvenience. This permission
must not be taken as a precedent, and what the Learned
Counsel curtailed in the wig was not to be added to
the argument.—(Laughter.)
Sir T. WILDE then proceeded with his reply on behalf
of the defendants. He said, some of his Learned
Friends on the opposite side had remarked upon the
State trials and the circumstances which had attended
some of them. He coulJ not help thinking, that if the
present judgment were affirmed, it must be referred to a
period two hundred years back. The indictment charged
the defendants with certain political conspiracies in
terms as general as any which could be found. The
charge was one which might be made at almost any
time against a political opponent. It was spread over
nine or ten counts, supported by the speeches of diffe-
rent persons, and the contents of newspapers. A charge
of that nature could at any time be brought against a
political opponent. But not only was this case brought
forward in a form suited to the worst of times and the
worst of places, but if their Lordships yielded to
the arguments on the other side, the challenge of the
jury was entirely gone in Ireland. His Learned Friends,
who appeared on behalf of the Crown, had supported
their case by more positive assertions than he had ever
before heard in a case of that nature. Every difficulty
was removed by a statement that so and so was the
settled practice, the constant usage, and this statement
was accompanied by an absolute inability to produce a
single precedent. He had before stated, that this was
the first case in which counts so generally framed had
been brought before the House of Lords. It was im-
possible to produce an instance in which the court had
ever given judgment upon an entire record, without ex-
amining what counts were good. The judgment
was always entered upon a good count, and
the difficulty in doing so was altogether ima-
ginary on the part of his Learned Friends. Cases in
point had recently occurred. Now, his Learned Friends
had first to meet the general charge that this indictment
did not contain, at least in some of its counts, a suffi-
ciently distinct legal charge. He was free to admit, that
acts which individuals might innocently do separately
were made criminal by combination. Such was the case
where the agreement was calculated to oppress a par-
tieular person. If the officers of the East India Com-
pany entered into a confederacy to embarrass and
injure the Company by all resigning at one time,
he admitted that though each might lawfully
have resigned at his discretion, a confederacy to
resign would be illegal. So also he admitted
that if a certain number of persons combined not to
deal with a particular tradesman, that would be an
offence in law. Ile would not ask the Counsel for the
Crown to say, whether there was any such conspiracy
in these counts. It had been said that there were cer-
tain articles in a literary work which were calculated to
disturb the public peace. He admitted that there were
several matters charged which might tend to disturb the
public peace. But he asked, were these rightly charged
in the indictment, or rightly found in the verdict ? Take
the count which charged with conspiring to stir up
hatred and jealousy between the subjects of the Crown,
and dissatisfaction and hatred towards the Government.
What could be more general than this ? every
Opposition to the Government was accused by
those in power of the same offence. But how
was a man to know of what he was accused under a
count like this? If this could hold good, any man taking
part in politics might be entangled—no man could be
safe from the charge of conspiracy. Looking at the
nature of the evidence by which such charges were sup-
ported, their Lordships were to look to the terms in
which the charge was stated in the indictment, and
whether it waz enough to enable the accused to know
what he was called on to answer. There was scarcely
any political discussion that would not be liable to the same
imputation of stirring up hatred and between dif-
ferent classes of her Majesty's subjects. Why should
it be made a matter of conspiracy for men to join in
endeavouring to obtain a repeal of the Act of Union or
of any other Act ? He hoped that these words were too
vague to be tolerated by their Lordships. Now with
respect to the meetings to intimidate—Mr. Justice
Burton stated that they were the more dangerous be-
cause they were so peaceable. They were as quiet as
Quakers, and quite as dangerous. The only object of
those meetings was to show the concurrence of mind of
great numbers in one common object. It was ad-
mitted that there was no alarm, no intimidation?
Had not those persons a right to ask what
is the intimidation with which you charge
us ? There were no arms, no violence, no dis-
order, no intimidation. Bat was it a legal charge to
say that men conspired to intimidate, when they took
every precaution that there should be no intimidation?
He submitted that this charge was so vague that no
subject of a free country ought to be put upon his trial
for it. The calling of large meetings to show the extent
of public opinion on the corn-laws, the Reform Bill, or
any other, was not liable to such a charge. He thus dis-
posed of the sixth count. The seventh count charged
them with conspiring to effect the repeal of the union by
a great demonstration of physical force. That demon-
stration was to be found in the large meetings, which
gave none of the alarm which intimidation implied. It
did net even shake the nerves of the Government. The
object—the avowed object of those who called the
meetings—was to demonstrate what numbers were de-
sirous of the repeal, and that object was perfectly legal.
It was not asserted in the indictment that the object was
illegal. The next count (the eighth) was that they
conspired to set aside the authority of the courts of law
in Ireland. How had the defendants done this? They had
done no more to bring the courts of law into contempt,
or to set aside their authority, than to recommend arbi-
tration, instead of an appeal to the expensive and un-
certain law courts. But he would admit that such a
legal object might be sought by illegal means. But then
you should show the illegal means—you should prove
that they were resorted.to, or were intended to be resorted
to. It was quite competent to any man, or body of
men, to point out the inefficiency of the existing courts,
and to suggest a substitute for them. That might be
done in unbecoming language, and in. an illegal manner,
but no such thing was charged in this count. The next
count charged the defendants with conspiring to assume
and usurp the prerogative of the Crown, in the establish-
ment of courts for the administration of the law. All
that he would say of that clause was, that it was so
vague and general, that it was unnecessary for him to
occupy their Lordships by one word more than calling
their attention to it. He submitted that these counts
were substantially bad. He owned that he had heard
with surprise the Learned Attorney-General for Ireland
say that their Lordships were to take their law from
the Courts below. He had always thought that the Courts
below were to take their law from their Lordships.
When a course of proceeding has arisen in the courts
below, and which crane before their Lordships, it was
new to him to hear that their Lordships were to take
their law from the courts below. Considerable looseness
had been allowed to creep into indictments for con-
spiracy of a private nature ; it was now sought to allow
it to creep into indictments for political conspiracies.
This might lead to very serious consequences. There
was extreme danger In allowing a loose practice
to creep into a law under the idea that it must be

correct, because it had not been appealed from,
when they must recollect the enormous expense
parties were 'put to before they could obtain
the benefit of their Lordships' opinion—a great luxury,
he admitted, when they did get it, but a very high priced
one, and out of the reach of those who couT.d not afford
to spend hundreds of pounds to obtain it. He then
called their attention to the third count. His Learned
Friends had stated that if the indictments were noteene-
ral it would lead to many criminals escaping. But he
referred them, for the very form of the process of setting
aside a verdict, to Hales' Pleas of the Crown, ch. 29, in
the case of Vaux, who was indicted for murder, pre-
cured the first verdict to be set aside, was tried de
novo, and was hanged. Lord Hale considering that it
was a hard case, as he ought to have been able to plead
his former trial. In this case would be found the regu-
lar forms of the judgment and the discharge of the pri-
soner, by reason of the defect in the indictment. me
jury is bound to decide upon every point of the indict-
ment, and if they found the accused guilty of only one
part, they were bound to acquit him of the rest. With
respect to the third count, what was the meaning of the
finding? Nothing could be more precise or distinct
than this, that the finding convicted the defendants on
all the matters charged against them on the premises,
and not only of the whole matter, but in the manner
and form in which the:premises were charged. The
matter charged was a conspiracy with a certain number
of persons. But an acquittal of A for conspiracy
with B, did not . prevent A from being afterwards
indicted for conspiring with C, D, E, or F, or any num-
ber of letters. And here Mr. O'Connell, Mr. Barrett,
and Mr. Duffy were found guilty of conspi ring with Mr.
J. O'Connell, Mr. Steele, Mr. Ray, Mr. Gray, and Mr.
Tierney. Now if Ais acquitted on a charge of conspir-
ing with B, they must acquit B of conspiring with A;
one man could not be guilty of conspiring with himself.
So if Mr. D. O'Connell. Mr. Barrett, and -Mr. Duffy are
charged with conspiring with Mr. Steele, Mr. Ray, Mr.
Gray, and Mr. TiernPy, and these last are acquitted of
conspiring with the former, that finding negatives the
verdict of guilty against Mr. D. O'Connell, Mr. Barrett,
and Mr. Duffy ; the record showed the finding to be re-
pugnant. The subject of the challenge was a fearful
point. It was a fearful point to hear his Learned Friend
say that the Act of Parliament had taken away the right
of challenge to the array.

The LORD CHANCELLOR-It does not tece away the
right.
Sir T. WILDE said it did not, but he had understood
his Learned Friend to say so. However, be would not
further discus* it, although the 4rgunien4 'pt a long