The Sun.
London, England, 1844-07-11 00:00:00

ROKEBT.

" Matilda of Rokeby," " Redmond,"
Lady Mary Campbell. Mr. Sturt.
LAY OF THE LAST MDISTREL.
" Margaret of Branksome," "Lord Cranstown,"
Lady Geurgiana Kerr. Lord Cranstown.
FORTUNES OF NIGEL.
" Margaret Ramsey," " Nigel, Lord Glenvarloeb,"
Miss Dawson Darner. Mr. Dudley Carleton.
" Lady liermione," . " Lord Dalgarno,"
Miss Roma M'Leod. Hon. G. Browne.
WOODSTOCK.

" Alice Lee," " Everard,"
Miss Macdonald. Hon. G. Smythe.
PEVERIL OF THE PEAK.

" Alice Bridgenorth," " Peveril of the Peak,"
Lady Rachel Russell. Mr. Wayland.
" Fenella," " Duke of Buckingham,"
Lady Clementina Villiers. Hon. E. Fane.
THE LEGEND OF MONTROSE.
" Annah Lyle," " Earl of Monteith,"
Lady Olivia Taylour. Mr. G. Egerton.
OLD MORTALITY.
" Edith Bellenden," " Henry Morton,"
Lady Caroline Cust. Hon. George Barrington.
REDGAUNTLET.
" Lilies Redgauntlet,"
Miss Morrett.

" Alan Fairford,"
➢ir. Hugh Seymour.

ROB ROY.

" Diana Vernon," " Frank Osbaldeston,"
Miss Macdonald. Viscount Lascelles,
" Helen Macgregor," " Rob Roy,"
Hon. Charlotte lianburv. Mr. Harry Erskine.
GUY kANNERING.
" Julia Mannering" " Henry Bertram,"
lion. Miss Cholmondeley. Hon. Mr. Astley.
" Lucy Bertram," . " Charles Hazelwood,"
Miss Balfour. Baron Talleyrand.
THE ANTIQUARY.
" Isabella Wardonr," " Lord Geraldine,"
Miss Clive Mr. Hogg.
THE BRIDE OF LAMMERMOOR.
" Lucy Ashton," " Ravenswood,"
Miss Fitzgibbon. • Mr. Tomline.
THE BLACK DWARF.
" Isabella de Vere," " Earnscliffe,"
Lady Jane Grimston. Mr. Hugo Mild:nay.
THE HEART OF MM LOTHIAN.
" Jennie Deans," . " Reuben Butler,"
Miss Fielding. Captain Lyon.
WAVERLEY.
" Flora M'lvor," " Fergus M'lvor,"
Lady Lucy Herbert. ' Campbell of Islay.
" Rose Bradwardine," " Waverley."
Miss Wyndham. Hon. H. St. John.
On the march having concluded the following position was
taken up by the quadrille : .
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THE WAVEBLEY

QUADRILLE

I(The Marchioness of

LONDONDERRY'S).

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The master of the ceremonies, Deplanque, having gained
the desired room for the dance, Tolbecque's band brought
forward an exquisite quadrille, composed by that artist ex-
pressly for the ball, denominated. the " Waverley Quadrille,"
and dancing commenced.
We are enabled to say that " the measure" was gone
through most successfully. It is due to 'the Marchioness of
Londonderry to remark, at this stage of our notice, that all
those persons of fashion who participated, not only in her
quadrille, but in the pleasures of the night, are greatly in-
debted to her ladyship for the great attraction and rare en-
tertainment she undertook to complete. Had her ladyship
possessed regal influence it could not have been more splendid
or successful. The dresses were scrupulously correct in all
the details. _

The faneysituidrilles of Lady, Caroline ,Sandford and the
Hon. Mrs. Leicester Stafiholie were neat danced iesucces-

sion. They were most effective in all respects, but want o
space prevents us from giving the lists.
Their loyal Highness the Duke ofCambridge and Duchess
of Gloucester remained for these quadrilles; and then retired,
the intense heat of the room, no doubt, accelerating their de-
parture. The Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh
Strelitz left about half-past eleven.
The Duke of Wellington, as usual at all the balls he
now attends, retired early. On leaving the staircase, the
Noble and Gallant Duke was asked his opinion of the ball as
a spectacle. His Grace's answer was brief but to the point—
" It is the most beautiful ball I ever saw."

The ladies patronesses, after the three fancy quadrilles
were finished, demanded a polka, from the orchestra, and
then descended to the supper room, where Scotch reels and
country dances were gone through, an extra band being
stationed there.

Dancing was prolonged until five o'clock yesterday morn-
ing, no less than 26 sets having been danced in the principal
bull-room.

In the course of the night a new waltz was performed, and
greatly admired, Londres et Paris, composed by Tolbecque,
of which the Queen has been pleased to accept the dedication.
We hear that, although many of the ladies lost some of
their diamonds in the room, with one or two exceptions they
were found and restored during yesterday.

THE CONVICT BARBER.

THE STATE TRIALS.

(SIXTH DAY.)

WRIT OF ERROR.
HOUSE OF LORDS, July 10.
THE QUEEN AGAINST O'CONNELL AND OTHERS.

Mr. KELLY resumed his reply at about it quarter
past ten. The Learned Counsel commenced by saying
he felt that their Lordships' decision, in reference to
the point upon which he addressed them last night,
might be grounded—first, upon authority—seccincllly,
upon practice—and lastly, if neither authority nor prac-
tice -were decisive of the question, upon legal principles.
It seemed right, therefore, in order to prevent all possi-
bility of misapprehension, that he should shortly refer
their Lordships to those authorities which alone had any
bearing on the question ; and he referred to these cases
Merely to show that in what the judges had stated
it was quite impossible that they could have
referred to a writ of error in which there
had been a conviction upon several offences,
but that they must have referred to the well-known
practice upon motions in arrest of judgment. The first
case to which be should refer their Lordships was that
of " Peat and Oldham," in Ist Cooper's Reports, p. 270.
In that case Lord Mansfield, after lamenting that a mere
slip of counsel, who were not always sufficiently careful
as to the count on which judgment should be taken,
should be fatal, contrary to the truth and justice of the
case, went on to say, " However, in civil cases, the rule
most certainly is settled, that where a verdict is taken
generally, if any one count is bad it vitiates the whole.
It has always struck me that the rule would have been
much more proper to have said, ' that if there is any
one count to support the verdict it shall stand good,
notwithstanding all the rest are bad.' lii criminal cases
the rule is so." What was the meaning of saying in
criminal cases the rule is so ? Why, that where there
was a verdict upon an indictment or information with
several counts, a general verdict ofguilty would follow, and
the court was called upon to pass sentence. If one count
were good it supported the verdict, and entitled the
court to give judgment. But what did this meat! ?
Did it mean that upon motions in arrest of judgment
the court were called upon to give judgment on the good
count alone, or on all the counts, bad as well as good ?
Their Lordships would find' that in some other cases to
which he had referred, the very reason and principle of
the rule was, that where the court had the whole record
before them, standing in the position of a jury if they
found any one offence well laid in any
one count of the indictment, they would do per-
fect justice by inflicting punishment for that offence.
Having power to do so, it was their duty to do so, and
the judgment which they gave was given only on the
one good count. This was the only meaning which could
be given to the expression of Lord Mansfield. The
moment they supposed the case of its application to a
writ of error, where three counts showing three distinct
offences were before the court, although two of those
counts were bad, judgment was entered on the bad count
as well as the good, the whole reason and foundation of
the observation fell to the ground. So far from doing
justice they would then be doing injustice, for they
would be awarding punishment not only for the offence
of which the party had legally been convicted, but for
the other offences of which he had not been legally con-
victed. Throughout the whole of the language of Lord
Mansfield there was no reference to a writ of error. In
civil cases the rule was, where the judgment was taken
generally; in criminal cases, if there were one good count
judgment was passed and punishment inflicted for the
offence stated in that count. Another case to which he
begged to refer was that of "Grant and Hassell." It was
there laid down that if there were one good count, and
the other counts were bad, the judgment should be taken
for the fictitious reason that the jury had assessed the
damages on the good count. There was another case
bearing on this point, the "King v. Ingram," which was
decisive of the question.
Lord BROUGHAM thought that a Court of Error
would "intend" that a fine must have been applied on
the count of the indictment that was a good one.
Mr. KELLY said the whole great question with which
they had now been occupied for a considerable part of
the six days the hearing had occupie I was this very
point—was there any authority for such an intendment,
ens did the practice exist that would support it ? The
moment they assumed that where one of several offences
was well laid, and the court decide 1 in a motion for
arrest of judgment on that one, but nevertheless entered
up that judgment. not on one but on all, the moment
that was the fact, they gave aloundation for an intend-
ment which if Made withotit foundation was an intend-
ment false, in fact, injurious in its consequences, and en-
tirely without foundation either in principle or practice.
He should comprise all he had to say on this point, as to
the practice, in a very few observations. for the point
was simple and clear, and bevuni all doubt. lle should
show that what the Noble and Learned Lord had thrown
out was not the fact, and if it was assumed to be the
fact they might on that build up a superstructure of
error, which would be productive of incalculable mischief.
Lord Brtoncuan—You put a case of a motion for
arrest of judgment; but put a case in which there was no
motion for arrest of judgment.

Lord CAMPBELL—There may have been a motion for
arrest of judgment, and the court may have held one
count to be good, and have pronounced judgment upon
it. Nothing more may appear on the record.
Mr. KELLY—Clearly not; if the indictment contained
three counts, setting forth separate•olfences, and the de-
fendant was convicted for all three, and on a motion for
amst of judgment the court was of opinion that the
whole were well laid, and therefore should pronounce a
triple sentence—if the court considered each offence
finable with 5001., it would impose one fine of 1,500/., so
that one judgment and one fine would be imposed. Now,
supposing that two of the counts should turn out to be
bad, that two or the offences were illegal, then came the
question whether there was any rule that would com-
pel their Lordships to presume contrary to-the prin-
ciples of justice that the court had imposed the
fine of 1,5001. for the one count that was good.
It was impossible that any court possessed of the
smallest particle of understanding could so act and de-
tvrmine. Then let their Lordships see what the next
consequence would be. Their Lordships could only hold
the judgment to be put upon the presumption that the
whole fine was imposed in respect of the good count, and
the defendant would be supposed to have suffered
punishment only for the one count. Supposing that he
was indicted afterwards on the other two counts and
found guilty, he could not plead autrefois convict, but
must suffer the punishment and fine over again.
Lord BROUGHAM—Suppose there are three counts,
one good and two bad, and suppose there is a motion; in
arrest of judgment, and the court was in favour of the
party against whom the judgment had been given, and
would let the defendant go free but for the good count,
does the record show the arrest of judgment on the bad
count and the giving of the judgment on the good?
Mr. KELLY—Supposing it was a perfect record, the
judgment ought to appear upon it.
Lord BROUGHAM—It is just possible that the court
might say there is no r,ecessity for entering up judgment
on the bad counts, because there-is one good count! to
hold.

Lord CAMPBELL—The arrest of judgment on Qne
count was well known to the law:
Mr. Knutv said that there were two instances which
bore upon the present point: The "King and .110c1-
son," sth Term Reports. There the court gave
j udgment on the good counts, and judgment
for the defendants on the bad count. Then there was
Mr. Fearems O'Connor's case. In that case the judg-
inent had never been completely entered up, because the
Attorney-General had not called for it ; but there was no
doubt the judgment would have been given on the gOod
counts, and fur the defendant on the bad. In all cases,
whether at assizes, or at courts of quarter sessions, or
the Queen's Bench, whether in trials for felonies or mis
demeanours, the same course was pursued. If there had
been any record made up in any of the courts of Wisst.
minster Halli-that would have suited the case of his'
Learned Friends, the counsel for the Crown, they would
• have been brought forward in abundance. But the truth
was, there was no such record. In the " Kinii.e• v. Collins,"
the counts were expressly stated' upon which the judg-
ment was to be entered up. Now supposing that! the
judgment had been entered. up on the whole courts,
would it have been supposed that sentence had been
passed upon the whole of them?'
Lord BROUGHAM recollected a case, in which he was
counsel ; when he was carping at some of the counts, Mr.
Baron Wood said, "There no use in that ; for there
is clearly one good count; arid that will support the Wig-
. ment." And the court of er.sor would always presume
• that the court had given judgment on the good count.
Lord CAMPBELL—It would he correct to do so at that
stage, because then the court could enter up judgment,
upon which count they chose.
Mr. KELLY—That was precisely the difference.
There was a great • difference. There was a great
and terrible mistake in confounding the proceed-
ings when a party was brought up for judgment
with the proceedings in error sihen judgment had been
pronounced. If he had been convicted but of one offence
it was at the option of the court to give him judgment
in the counts which they suppoied good in law. But
- here was a case of a court doing that which he should
• satisfy their Lordships a court had no right to do----:that
was, where it was manifest to the court that bnt ono,
offence had been well laid on which the court could 'pro-
nounce judgment, they entered up judgment not only on
that count, but on another count laying a different
offence, which count was bad in law. Were they right
Or wrong in doing this? It could not be- disputed, bat
• that any man who was about to receive a, verdict, much
more any man who was about to' receive a judgment in
a •verdict, had a right to insist upon the counsel for the
Crown selecting one count and abiding by it.
The Crown had no right to obtain a verdict
and enter up judgment upon several counts.
when the jury could nut return a verdict upon more
than one. Hence arose the practice of defendants in-
sisting upon having a verctict upon one count only, and
calling upon the eouusel for the Crown to elect. He had
taken that course him:elf frequently, and he was speak•
• inn before a Learned Judge who, in a case of conspiracy,
a few weeks ago, when he was counsel for the accused,
and had called upon the prosecution to elect, decided he
had no right so to calf upon. them, and the counsel for
the Crown acceied and did so elect. The defendant had
a right to call upon the jury .to give a verdict upon
every separate count. They- had a right to compel the
- jury to give a verdict on those counts only on which they
could find him guilty.
• LOrd CAMPBELL—In strictness, where there is only'
one c.junt, and that alleges several offences, some of
which are not true, the defendant has a right to insist
• upon a verdict being entered for him on those parts
are not true. •
r:1 tj.l lidik'--3-411es, My Lord.
-Iscd7;C,A7r7Mo'.l.—l doubt if the Jaw recognises the
< Onrts. It is one presentment by the
Aran) ,fury, hut 'Vass presentment is se'verable, and the.
jury way acquit oria part.
. .

(r-,\''

Mr. KELLY said there could be no doubt of it ; for in-
stance, a man might be indicted on one count for murder,
and on another for manslaughter ; he might be ac-
quitted of the murder and found guilty of the man-
slaughter. He might be indicted for burglary and lar-
ceny, and acquitted of the burglary and found guilty of
the larceny. In cases of libel, a man might be found
guilty of composing and publishing, but not of printing.
In all these cases it was perfectly clear that no judgment
could be given except upon the verdict returned. He
would call their Lordships' attention to the case of "Fox
v. Austin," to be found in Lawes's Reports, 'p. 59. It was
an information against Austin and others for engrossing
a thousand quarters of corn. The plea was not guilty.
The jury found on: of the defendants guilty for seven
hundred quarters, and not guilty for the residue, and
found the others not guilty for all. Now here was a
case of engrossing, it might be of stealing, in which the
jury returned a verdict of guilty as to seven hundred,
but not guilty as to the residue. In most cases it was
not necessary that there should be any such verdict, be-
cause the punishment would bo the same for stealing
corn, whether seven hundred, two hundred, or a thou-
sand quarters. But it might be important to the prisoner
to have the verdict so entered, because he might
be suspected of having stolen another 1,000 quar-
ters of corn, and therefore he had a right to
insist upon having the verdict and the judgment
entered up precisely according to the fact. It was
there important to the prosecution, because under the
old law he was entitled to his writ of restitution.
Either party had a right to have the precise matter
found entered upon the record, and to require that judg-
meeit should be prove for that and that only of which he
had. L'leen found guilty, and that that, and that only for
which _he was suffering punishment,.should appear upon
the reco.^d. His Learned Friend the Attorney-General
had assere'ed, with that confidence with which he always
made such assertions when he had no authorities to
produce, that it appeared that the practice was universal
of entering up judgment upon all such counts. He
(Mr. Kelly) said ,that there was no such practice. There
was no authority produced for it, and wherever such
practice did exist it was against the law, against the
rights of the Crown, against the rights of the prisoner,
and, he said it with a'.ll submisSion, against the duty of
the court. The judgme.it ought to be entered up on
that count which was good; and on that count only, and
on the other counts he was entitled to have entered up
either a verdict of acquittal o' eat sine die. The only
case in which there was an opponent were cases in
which, in fact, the record was not made up, such as
cases in arrest of judgment, and one ocher case.
Lord BROUGHAM—Yon mean when a point is reserved
at the assizes ?
Mr. KELLY meant that case. Then, is consequence
of their being no court of appeal, the whale matter was
reserved, and the point argued before the judg-es, as if it
had just arisen.
Lord BROUGHAM—Sentence is never pronourrAli there
until afterwards.
Mr. KELLY—The court in that case received the evi-
dence and the verdict, and if they found the party it.'lY
convicted of any one offence on any one count, the,v
passed judgment for that one offence on that one count
In the case of the " King and Fuller," there was this
sentence bearing upon the same point, " but in the cir-
cumstances in which the prisoner now stands, there being
a conviction on the first count of the indictment to which
no sound objection has-been taken, and on which judg-
ment must be pronounced against him, it is not necessary
that judgment should be given on the last count." The
whole matter being before the Court, it was for them to
determine whether any one offence was well laid in
any part of the indictment, and then to give
judgment on that part. Now he had gone
through the whole authorities, and there was not -
one to be found which would apply in reason or by
analogy to the proceedings of a writ in error. Neither
of his Learned Friends on the -other side, nor his
Learned Friends who were on the same side with him,
were able to produce any records to shoW whet the
practice had been after.entering up judgment upon mo-
tion in arrest of judgment ; and it arose from this, that
whether in the Court of Queen's Bench, or in the'Cen-
tral Criminal Court, or at the assizes, there were not
ten cases out of the ten thousand in which the records
were ever actually made up, and in those few eases in
which they were made up they were made up for a pur-
pose which would throw no light on this subject. With
regard to cases upon writs of error, they were go very
few, that in the whole of the books which they could re-
fer to, he was not aware of a single instance to be found
in those books in which, after motion in arrest of judg-
ment, the records had been completely made up, where
the Court had found one or more of the counts, and one
of. the counts only, to be good ; and under those cir-
cumstances, there being no authority actually bearing
on this case, their. Lordships must decide it upon prin
ciple. His Learned Friends on the other side next chal
lenged them to state the mode in which a judgment could
be entered after motion in arrest ofjudgment of the Crown
in one count, and for the defendants in the other. Tie (Mr.
Kelly) did not see any difficulty about it, and their
Lordships would find several instances given in Davis's
Pleas of the Crown, 393. From those it appeared,
that all judgments in favour of the defendants must be
expressed by those words—eat sine die. Now, after
exhausting the point'of authority on this subject, and
after showing the total absence of all precedents, he had
only a few words, to add upon the principle. , He felt
that it was upon the principle involved in the question
that'their Lordihips must decide. There was no autho-
rity, there was no settled practice, and therefore the
question must be determined upon principle. He
had urged upon their Lordships, in opening the
case on behalf of his clients, that if this doctrine pre-
vailed, that one good count would sustain judg-
ment before a court of error, the defendant would
suffer punishment for three offences. He was met by a
statement that he had only put hypothetical cases, and
that the cases supposed were of an extreme, improbable,
or even impossible character. If that were the fact, he
was content that their Lordships' judgment should be
against him on that point. He would therefore apply
himself one moment, not to what was matter of hypo-
thesis, but matter of actual experience and fact. In a
case in which a great political conspiracy was alleged, he
had felt bound to state that this doctrine would be fatal
to justice, remembering that in political conspiracies the
object might be lawful, and yet each ten men out of
one hundred might endeavour to obtain that object by
different means ranging. from the most venial offence,
such as a common public house. drunken meeting up to a
conspiracy to commit high treason and murder. It was
impossible to say that he was now putting an improbable
or merely hypothetical case, because conspiracies, differ-
ing thus in their nature; had actuallybeen formed in this
country within the last few years. His Learned Friends
wrapping themsel vea up in the vague generalities befitting
such an argument, said that if a judge were to find a pri-
soner indicted for two or three different offences of a
different character,. he would put the prosecutor to his
election. Now be believed there was no power of
that kind vested in 'the judge in case of
misdemeanour, unless it were the power of recommendinee
The jury were sworn to try three or more issues, and
try those issues they must, unless both parties consented
to a release.

Vv
The LORD CHANCELLOR—Do you mean to say that
the judge is bound to take all the issues together ?
Mr. KELLY submitted that that
,was so.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said it would be done if it
were necessary to prevent the party from being entangled
in his defence. What power was,there in the other case ?
" Mr. KELLY said it arose from the practice of 200

years.
The Loan CnaNcst.t.on said that the objects were to
protect the party charged ; it applied equally to the one
crime as to the other...
. Mr. KELLY said the misfortune was, that with all the
anxiety of the judges to do justice, the practice was not
as his Lordship supposed. He must entreat their Lord-
ships' attention for a moment to this point, otherwise a
very grievous misapprehension, from which those he
represented might suffer deeply and irreparably, might
prevail in their minds. .He was quite aware that
if two totally distinct misdemeanours were
charged, such for instance as a libel against one
individual, anti a conspiracy to murder another, in
one and the same indictment, the judge would recom-
mend, and probaby his-recorninendation would be adopted,
that either the one or the other should be _abandoned ;
but they were not then considering a case of that na-
ture. In a case tried last week before the Lard Chief
Justice of England, there were three totally distinct
offences charged. There was a conspiracy to deprive
the prosecutor of property of immense value by influenc-
ing a foreign Legislature, which, if entered into at all,
must have been entered into in 1828 ; a conspiracy to
deprive the same indiridual of the benefit of a valuable
lease, and to place another person in possbssion of it,
which could not have been formed before the beginning
of the year 1829, nearly two years after the first ; and
t•ben there was a charge of a totally different conspiracy,
by circulating reports injurious to the credit of the pro-
secutor, and bringing. his mercantile house in Landon
into discredit, and tending to impoverish himself. The
offence laid in the first indictment was completed in 1828.
The other came up to the very end of Decemner, 1829,
nearly two years after the first ; and the third could
hardly be fixefas to time, as the evidence relating to it
extended over a period of six or seven years. ,
The LORD CSANcELLoit---But what took place on the
trial?
Mr. KELLY --Ever ychargdwasfully gone into. Two days
were occupied with the hearing, and he himself (Mr.
Kell7) had the painful duty of defending the eminent
parties charged., After he had addressed the jury, the
Lord Chief Just-ice-told the jury there was no evidence
to be left to them insupport a the last charge. He then
referred to a correspondence of rather a voluminous
character, and, ultimately expressed his opinion to the
jury, tki.tthere was no evidence in support of the second
charge, and the case:went to:the jury on the earlier con-
spiracy. 'But the counsel in the case had to address the
jury on all the charges of the indictment.
The Soap CHANCELLOR was sorry the case had not
been mentioned when the Lord Chief Justice was pre-
sent, as he (the Lord Chancellor) had a distinct im-
pression that the Lord-Chief Justice had told the jury
to direct their:, attention ta,on.e.-of the charges only, and
that an electiohl was male."
Mr. KELLY said he did -not direct the jury to one
charge till the summing up.
The LORD enaiwELLonL--Did the counsel for the de-
fendants at an earlier stage of the trial suggest such an
election?

Mr. KELLY—No, my Lord ; how could he do so?
The LORD CHANCELLOR said he had a distinct im-
pression of what the Chief Justice had stated as to this
trial. He regretted, therefore, that it had not been
mentioned when the Lora Chief Justice was present.
Mr. KELLY said he hid mentioned the case on the
first day he addressed their Lordships, as a proof that
persons might be indicted, tried, and convicted, for three
totally different offences, committed at intervals of years.
On that very case, whatever might be his Lordship's
impression derived from what had fallen from the Chief
Justice— • _ _

The LORD CHANCELLOR said the statement had no
prance to this case, as this communication was made

before it came on for hearing, and he, being engaged on
other matters, did not pay so much attention to it as he
might have done.
Mr. KELLY—If his Lordship's impression was that an
election was offered to the parties, and that the whole of
these counts were not left to the jury, he was bound to
say that the impression was an erroneous one. It was only on
summing up, on the close of the second long day of the trial,
that the Lord Chief Justice told the jury that one charge
only must be left to them, because the evidence on the
two greater charges had altogether failed. In that very
case those individuals, instead of being the high and
honourable parties they were, might have been really
guilty, and might have been found guilty of all
three of these objections. Ile then ,quoted the
language of Lord Ellenborough in a case from the 2d of
Campbell's Reports, in which his Lordship laid it down
that a man might be tried for several offences under one
indictment, if those offences were all of the same sort.
That was the only limitation. Men might be charged,
and evidence given against them, for several libels, seve-
ral assaults, or several frauds. Let them not be told
then that judges put defendants to their election as to
the charges. They do not put them to such election
where the offences are of the same description. He re-
ferred to a recent trial before Justice Holroyd, in which
there was an indictment for three libels, published at in-
tervals of three and four months, against a Dissenting
minister.
Lord BROUGHAM—That was one of the first actions in
which the question was raised whether the truth might
be pleaded in mitigation of damages.
Mr. KELLY—He was not now putting hypothe-
tical, or merely possible cases at all. Where
there was no authority to bind or guide that House
—where they found the practice silent, and where
they knew what the practice ought to be, but where
there were neither authority or practice, and when they
came to principles, and applied them to practice—he
would ask whether it was arguable that where a rerson
was convicted of several offences under one indictment,
which rendered it necessary for the court to pass a
heavier sentence for the number of offences than it
would for one, and where, upon error, the party stated
that he was suffering for those offences of which he was
not guilty, could their Lordships say that upon principle
and upon reason he should continue to suffer that
punishment. If such a rule existed, which he contended
there did not, it was against reason and justice, and even
if it had existed for centuries, it would be the duty of
their Lordships to over-rule it. On these grounds he
submitted that the proposition contended for on
the part of the defendants was good; that if one
count in the indictment was bad the judgment
was vitiated, and must be reversed, and the effect
of that would be, not that the parties who
were really guilty should go unpunished, because they
must be tried and convicted of any of the offences on
the record of the court—all that they prayed was, that
their Lordship would relieve them from the present
sentence of any offences 'for which they were suffering
punishment, but of which they had not been found
legally guilty. Ile would advert no more to this point,
but would proceed to the consideration of the two counts
of the indictment . to which he had before alluded. He
had submitted that the 6th count was bad. That count
e,harged the defendants with conspiring to procure, by
assembling large numbers of persons, and by intimida-
tion and the exhibition of physical force, a change in
th e laws and constitution of the realm. The real ob-
jection to this count had not been met by the other side.
The ohlection was not that the name of the parties was
not neet.tioned, but the objection was, that the count
charge d conspiracy to intimidate, but did not mention
the naLuet Of the persons to be intimidated.
Here their Lordships consulted together for a short
time, dining which' Mr. Kelly did not proceed with his
argument.
The LORD, CHAIicELLOR—Go on with your argument,
Mr. Kelly. 'We are attending to what you say, although
we occasiona '.l)- consult among ourselves upon the points
as they arise. •
Mr. KELLY tlo ntended that this sixth count was bad,
because it was ~not stated on what particular class Of
persons it was itets'nded the, intimidation should operate.
It-Was a 'general ctearge of intimidation, without stating
the party on whom , t was intended to operate, and the
result was, that if wil.st species of intimidation ci,uld be
created by a legal wet ling with a legal intention, the
count was bad. The oiu.'e had not been fairly argued by
his Learned Friends ou the other side. They had said
that that was legal for one which it was illegal for many
to do.—(Elere their Lords hi es again engaged in conver-
sation, and Mr. Kelly pausoit
Lord BROUGHAM—Mr. K,seiy, go on, go on.
Mr. KELLY—His Learned 74ends had referred to cases
which he admitted in which e'a mes had not been men-
tioned in indictments. But ait.ttough names had been
omitted, classes of persons had aft 'ays been mentioned.
No doubt in cases of conspiracies tt.` defraud, it might
be impossible to name the parties. .F.or example, if per-
sons were indicted for a conspiracy tee rob on the high-
way, the names of the 'persons to be Irobbed could not
be mentioned. But there could be no .4oubt that the
conspiracy would be illegal. In the fir.at place it was
illegal to rob at all ; and in the next plseco the conspi-
racy would be laid as a conspiracy to rob a 1.4. the Queen's
subjects who should pass on a certain highw a,y. Again,
in case of a conspiracy to defraud, which hen been tried
before Mr. Justice Williams, although no in .a,n es were
mentioned, the class of persons to be defrauded as dis-
tinguished as all persons who could be induced ts.' give
the defendants credit. That indictment was good, be-
cause it alleged an illegal agreement to affect an ill ,'al
object. It was definite, for it so distinguished the pat -
ties as to enable the defendants to prepare their de-
fence. But in the present case there was nothing to
give the slightest information as to what was the
nature of the intimidation, on whom it was to net, or that
it was unlawful, and therefore the count was bad for
generality. For instance, if a count charged a con-
spiracy to use threats and menaces, and there was no-
thing to show whether they were lawful or unlawful, if
in any conceivable case the employment of threats
could be lawful, the count would be bad. Here there
was nothing to enable the parties to meet the charge.
It was not said whether it was intended to intimidate
the Sovereign, the Parliament, or the Queen's subjects
generally. The case of the King v. Hill' and others,
2d Barnewall and Alderson, page 204, had been decided
by the Court if Queen's Bench to have gone to the
extreme verge of the law. The defendants had been
found guilty of conspiring by false pretences, to obtain
from D. B. divers large sums of money of
his property, and to cheat and defraud him
of the same. There the party came into court, knowing
whom he was charged to cheat and defraud. The only
complaint was, that the means were not sufficiently set
forth. The answer was, it isprima facie criminal to cheat
any person. The subtle means and devices must be within
your own knowledge, and might be such as could not be
stated in an indictment. The party knew whom he was
charged with defrauding, and that was sufficient to en-
able him to prepare his defence. That case, however,
went to the extreme verge of the law. He could not
help observing that, in touching upon this part of the
ease, the Attorney-General for Ireland could scarcely
utter a sentence, without mentioning some class of per-
sons to be intimidated. Now, if that had been stated
in the indictment, the defendants would have known the
charge against which they had to defend themselves ;
but as it was, if it were possible to imagine a case in
which intimidation might be lawful by means of a law-
ful meeting, the count would be bad for generality.
He would not report the case which he had already
put on that point, but the Counsel for the Crown
had stated, that if it could have been proved at
the trial that such had been the nature of the
intimidation they would have been entitled to a verdict
of acquittal, and if such were the case he would under-
take to prove to their Lordships that this count was a
bad one. The charge was to cause and procure a large
assemblage of persons to meet for the unlawful and sedi-
tious purpose of obtaining, by means of intimidation,
charges in the laws and constitution of the realm. Now,
how could any one sentence of that be disproved by evi-
dence which would show that the assemblage was for the
purpose of causing intimidation in aid of the Legislature,
that they might not be prevented from passing an Act
of Parliament. If that count' were good, any meeting
was unlawful ; no matter who were to be intimidated, no
matter whether they were wrong-doers. If one species
of intimidation was lawful, and another unlawful,
they must show that the intimidation was unlawful
to make it a criminal charge, and here he
begged again to refer to the case of " the Queen
le Peck," the principle of whieh case was, that the
count was bad, 'because it did not show that
the purpose was necessarily criminal. His Learned
Friends on the other side had referred to the prosecu-
tion of Feargus O'Connor. He begged their Lordships
to look to the count in his case, which was of so doubt-
ful a character that the Court of Queen's Bench had not
pronounced judgment upon it. The count, in that case,
was far superior, in point of legal precision, to the count
now under consideration, and yet it was by the court
considered so general, that his Learned Friend the At-
torney-Genera had not called the party up to receive
judgment. The Learned Gentleman then referred to the
language of Lord Kenyon, in reference to criminal charges
in general, and particularly to the charge of conspiracy
in ihe case of "the King v. Holland," in sth Term Re-
ports, page 653. The eighth count of the indictment was
that which charged the defendants with conspiring to"
bring the tribunals established by law in Ireland, into
hatred and contempt, and to withdraw the adjudication of
differences from those courts„ and to transfer them to
others. He believed their Lordships were of
opinion that this was not necessarily illegal,
and had nothing approaching to illegality in it.
His object might be to bring the judges themselves into
hatred ; but here a mitigated character was given to the
act by its being stated that the intent was to induce the
people to submit their differences to other tribunals. His
Learned Friends had observed that they had put extreme
cases by referring to the time of the Charleses and the
Jatneses ; but it was necessary to put such cases when
applying a test to ascertain what was lawful and what
was unlawful, as a means of correcting an abuse. If the
courts of this country were at one period of such a cha-
racter as to require the
-most powerful efforts to change
the system, it was important to ascertain the
legality of the means which might be resorted to
fur that purpose. With regard to, the cases cited
on the other side, he dismissed them all with the single
observation, " that they were all cases in which a spe-
cific. violation of the law was charged in the indictment."
No one would dispute that a libel in court was a misde-
meanour, but, as in this case, the means were not stated,
the object was not, necessarily illegal. He submitted,
therefore, that this count was bad, and that it would
vitiate the judgment. He had next to observe upon
what was called the triple finding. That point lay in a
very narrow compass. His Learned Friends had not
contended that there were not three distinct findings,
and it was perfectly clear that here was a conviction
for three different conspiracies, and judgment passed
thereon. The findings were all equally good in law, and
which would they choose, and which would they, reject ?
There was no more power in that court to reject one
than to reject the whole. the finding ought to

have been of one offence, only, and in the one count.
The principle of law was as applicable to misdemeanours
as to felonies. The argument of the Attorney-General
was, that there was something in a charge of conspiracy
which distinguished it from any other charge with re-
gard to the number of defendants who might be found
guilty on such a charge. He was not aware of any dis-
tiection between conspiracy and other misdemeanours.
The question here was, not whether in the same indict-
ment in which there was a sufficient number of counts,
they could find A B guilty of one count, and C D guilty
of another —that could be done if there were a sufficient
number of counts—but the question was whether, under
one count, charging one offence, they could carve out a
multiplicity of offences? For that there was no authority
used, and it was opposed to the principles of common
sense. In coming to a conclusion on this point he would
again advert to the case of Feargus O'Connor. He had
read what fell from Mr. Baron Rolfe on that trial, but he
had since been referred by one of his Learned Friends
who was present at the trial to the same point which
arose. It would be found in page 180 of the printed re-
port of the trial of the sixty-nine Chartists. The
Attorney-General suggested that in case of a mis-
demeanour it was not at all necessary that all the
defendants should be convicted on every count of
the same indictment. Mr. Baron Rolfe said no, but you
cannot have an indictment against A, B, and C for one
offence, and convict A of one offence, B of another, and
C of a third, aed the case was so left to the
jury at last. In the present case, several issues
were left to the jury on one count. Ile submitted.
therefore, that the objection appeared here in a clear and
simple form. One offence was stated in the count ; three
offences were found by the verdict. One judgment' was
passed upon all the offences aforesaid. It came before
their Lordships as one indivisible judgment on two more
offences than were ever presented by the grand jury. It
was impossible their Lordships could reject one or an-
other. The jury had divided on all, and, as it was im-
possible to distinguish them, he submitted that there
was no alternative but to reverse that judgment.
He must now make one or two observations, but
one or two only, on the point of discontinuance.
It was quite unnecessary to trouble their Lordships with a
reference to those authorities which had been gone into
by his Learned Friend Mr. Peacock. Others had been
adverted to by the Attorney-General, but the result of
the whole of the authorities was this,'that a discontinu-
ance, after a verdict had been given, and where the
parties were waiting for judgment only, could not be
caused by appearance. It had been stated, that from
the particular form of those proceedings, there had been
no discontinuance at all. But this went to limit the
operation of the statute in a'very extraordinary manner.
The argument was, that the statute extended the term,
and made that extension the same for all purposes as
if that extension had taken place within the term.
Well, then, it was said that this was for the purpose of
trial only, and therefore the trial taking place in vacation,
that it was the trial only the court had power to hold in
vacation, and that they had no power to enter into a con-
tinuance. Why, must not the power that was given to
them be not only for the purpose of the trial itself, but
for the purpose of subpoenaing the witnesses, and giving
force and effect to every trial connected
with the trial and all its incidents. If the court
was sepposed to have no other power than to
hold-the trial out of vacation, they would have no power
to record the verdicts. The Legislature must have pre-
sumed, in giving this authority, to have known the prac-
tice of the courts, and that these proceedings were in-
tended by it to be adapted to all forms. On those
grounds he submitted that whatever authority the court
had in term, it had out of it, and that what they might have
done in an ordinary case they might have done in the pre-
sent. The discontinuance, therefore, not appearing in the
record, there was manifest error, and the judgment must
be reversed. The manner in which the discontinuance
should have been entered in the record clearly applied
in the case of h- Hart and White," in the State Trials,
and in the case of the " King and Robinson," in 2d
13tirre114. There was another point to which his Learned
Friend had thought it necessary to advert, and which, if
not is the present, in many cases might become a point
of great importance. The point of the judgment of ac-
quittal to which many of the defendants were entitled, as
in many matters contained in this record, there had been
no judgment at all, and such being the case, they could
not ph ad autrefois acquit to relieve them from it. In his
opinion it was utterly impossible to imagine a record
more utterly defective in most important particulars than
the present. Under such circumstances the defendants were
entitled to take any objection to the record, however techni-
cal. His Learned Friend had stated that it was true that
defendants had, no power to enter an acquittal, but that
that House, sitting in error could do so. He (Mr. K.)
apprehended that that House, sitting in error, had no
right to amend a judgment in any criminal case, and on
that ground he would submit also that the judgment on
that particular point ought to be reversed. There was ano-
ther point to which; although both his Learned Friends
had adverted, he felt it his duty,
.considering its im-
portance, to make a few observations, and that was
with respect to the right of challenging the array. The
facts of that appeared in the record. They were that
the recorder ought to have delivered to the clerk of the
peace a list of the juries for the year, that from that list
a book should have been made, and that from that book
the panel ought to have been taken by the sheriff. Now
it was said, on the one side, that he never made out such
a list—that if he did, he never delivered it to
the clerk of the peace. It was said that he
did deliver it to the clerk of the peace, but that
some of the names might have been wrongly placed.
Now be conceived that when the allegation appeared
upon• the record, in the language of the statute, the
meaning of the allegation was, that the substance of the
statute had or had not been complied with. if the Crown
isa 3 taken issue upon that, and it had appeared that a
list substantially within the meaning of the statute, al-
tho'soh some of the names might have been misplaced,
and tai,'e or two omitted, had been given in, there would
have bet 'n a verdict given for the Crown. But if it had
appeared that the Recorder had never delivered a list,
and the
letnel had been made out on a fabrica-
that would be an abundant ground of chal-
lengeor
suppose the Recorder had strictly
t in
performedo , ;
(1 his .ItY, and had delivered in a list contain-
ing the mines of all the jurors, but that there the chain
tirlgs had ended, and some third un-
known from which the panel had been
of regular proceea
person .had interfered and furnished the sheriff
struck.wtha fraudulent
odunleentconkl doubt but that would furnish
abundant ground of challenge for trial by jury
would be a mere mOckery if jurors could be
selected from a fabricased list. The great ques-
tion- was, if challenge of the array was the right
remedy or not, and their 'Lordships were told, by
reason of a multitude of ancii, t authorities relating to
proceedings before special juries eel/4. re known, that it was
only by reason of some'charge against the sheriff that a
challenge to the array could be allowed.. He appre-
hendedb that that doctrine was founded upon an
incorrect proposition—in point of law. The chal-
lenge of the , array was given to the subject
in order that 'he might secure to hiinself a fel,- and im •
partial trial by jury ; and as long as the jury, was not
selected by statute, but by the sheriff or his officers, so
long the subject could be entitled to his challenge or ar-
ray only in consequence of default on the part of the
sheriffs. But when the statute created a new state of
things, and intended to provide for the subject a greater
safeguard, by providing due laws of a better character,
and when for that purpose the statute had superadded
to the shrriff other officers to be concerned in the pre-
paration of the jury list, without taking away the chal-
lenge of array, it was clear that the subject
was- entitled' to the challenge of array on account of
the indifferency of those officers to whom the duty of
sheriff had been entrusted, as he would have been under
the common Jaw, on account of the unindifferency of the
sheriff himself. Therefore, in this case, they were as
much entitled to a challenge of the array, on account of
the default of the Recorder, as they would have been on
account of the default of the sheriff; and when asked
what must be the award if this challenge to the array
were allowed, he would answer, that if the Recorder had
duly made out the list, the award should be to the Re-
corder to deliver that list, that the jury panel might be
farmed from it, If they were of opinion that the
Recorder had not duly made out the list,
then the award should be to the proper officer -
to make out the book, and if, in consequence
of any difficulty at any stage of the proceedings,
it should appear that no good jury list could be
made out for this year, then the award should be to the
sheriffs to produce the jury list of last year. He sub-
mitted therefore that the challenge to the array ought
to be allowed, and that on that ground also the judg-
ment ought to be reversed. He would now briefly ad-
vert to the point of the recognisances. The case of
Hunt and White showed that in cases of misdemeanour
it was competent for the court to order defendants to
enter into recognisances to keep the peace, but it must be
for a reasonable time. But in this instance it was uncer-
tain for what tithe, they were bound to keep the peace.
No time was specified, except.from the time of giving the
recognisances. This was entirely against all practice
and precedent, and it was further ordered that they
should be imprisoned until they entered into their own
recognisances, so that if they were never able to find
sureties it was a sentence of perpetual imprisonment.
It was different in cases of fine. Magna Charta required
that no man should be fined beyond his ability to pay,
therefore, when a man was sentenced to be imprisoned
until his fine was paid, the law presumed that he was
able to pay and free himself if he chose. But the enter-
ing into recognisances with sureties did not de-
pend on the parties themselves. Magna Charta did not '
compel any man's friends to come forward as sureties.
He contended that the whole judgment ought to be re-
versed, because there was uncertainty as to the time of
giving and taking the recognisances. It was said on the
other side, that this would only vitiateahe judgment in
part; but if it was bad in part, he held that it was bad in
the whole, because the court of error had no power of
altering the sentence which the court below pronounced.
and that the judgment must be reversed on this ground
also. There was only one other point which he would
shortly advert to—that was, the point that the witnesses
were sworn before the grand jury, and not in open
court, which was in contravention of the Act of Victoria,
and, in his opinion, the still more important point, that
the foreman had not certified to the court
that the witnesses were sworn, and had not
endorsed the names of the witnesses on the bill.
The authorities cited showed only that no error in fact
was originally assignable in the Court of Exchequer
Chamber as a court of error. His Learned Friends
contended that this error ought to be made the subject
of a plea in abatement; buthe had clearly stated that he
declined so to make it. The defendants having no
means of discovering the • error till after the trial, could
not be bound to plead it in a plea in abatement. The
Learned Counsel then referred to a case tried before
Mr. Baron Parke, in which there being some irregula-
rity in the swearing of the witnesses before the grand
jury, a new special commission was issued, and the
parties were tried over again. They had the opinion of
all the judges that if the witnesses were not duly sworn,

a conviction upon their evidence would be an illegal one.
A decision of Baron Alderson in the North of England
was to the same effect. He should venture to assume
then, that if it was possible to assign any fact in error, it
was the fact of a party put on his trial on a
bill found by the grand jury, which bill was void
by reason that it was not founded on the testimony
of witnesses on oath, which the statutes—at least in
Ireland—imperatively required. The -forms of law were
the safeguards of society. But here they were not deal-
ing with mere forms ; it was a vital provision, which gave
security to the court, that the bills on which it put people
on their trial perhaps for their lives, were supported by
evidence on oath before the proper officers of the law.
He had heard no contradiction to this general position—
he had not heard it disputed that the object of the Act
of Parliament was the important one he had stated. He
did then venture to ask on what imaginable grounds the
House was called on to hold that this objection
had been defeated? Suppose this case bad been one of a
capital offence, of which, if the parties had been found
guilty, they would have been liable to sentence of death;
here was a bill brought down which the law made null,
unless it should have been founded on the evidence of
witnesses sworn in court; but here the court had no means
of ascertaining whether the witnesses had been sworn or
not. And if this provision was not essential, why was
it introduced into the statute? The Learned Counsel
then proceeded to argue that the Act of Parliament did
not include the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland, and
concluded by stating that those whom he represented had
entire and unbounded confidence in the decision their
Lordships might pronounce on this momentous question.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL would not insist upon his
right of reply, but hoped that this case would not be
drawn into a precedent on that point.
Lords CAMPBELL and BROUGHAM considered that the
Crown had no right to reply ; but the right of the
Crown would remain as it was before this case.
The LORD CHANCELLOR then stated that their Lord-
ships had prepared certain questions to be submitted
to the judges, and handed a paper containing the ques-
tions, to Lord Chief Justice Tindal.

Lord Chief Justice Timms, prayed th©: judges mi ht
be allowed time to consider.

The LORD CHANCELLOR—CertainIy ; and in the
name of the House I thank the judges for their attend-
ance, which, has been given at great personal incon-
venience.—(Hear, hear, from Lord Brougham.)
Their Lordships then adjourned.

POLICE INTELLIGENCE.
(YESTERDAY.)
MANSION-HOUSE.

A solicitor made an application to Alderman Thomas
Wood upon the part of certain creditors, who had been
most extensively plundered by a fraudulent debtor, to
be enabled to carry into effect the Acts made in the
Convention between this country and France, by which
persons in either country may be apprehended and
brought to justice in the country in which the frauds
have been committed.

The case was one in which a sum between 14,000/ and
15,000 i. was stated to have been pocketed by the debtor.
and—

Alderman THOMAS WOOD, upon hearing the particu-
lars, decided upon granting the authentication of the
City seal, which, although it might not be within the
requisites of the statute, still might afford facilities in the
proceedings in a foreign court for the recovery of the
money. He stated that he considered it to be the duty
of the magistrate toy do everything in his power to give
efficacy to the excellent object of the new law, which was
calculated to interfere most vigorously with the prac-
tices of fraudulent debtors.

The City seal was accordingly affixed.
A young man named Charles Holloway was charged
by Joseph Hodges (policeman No. 31), with having ob-
structed him in the execution of his duty.
Policeman No. 651 stated that on Tuesday night a
Spaniard, who happened to be a most dangerous lunatic,
was given into his custody, for having cut open the eye
of a person in Billingsgate. The unfortunate lunatic
was handcuffed upon manifesting a disposition to do
more mischief, but he dashed the handcuffs with such
violence against a post as to render them completely
useless, and it was with extreme difficulty six or seven
men so far overcame his strength as to succeed in lodg-
ing him in the station-house, where he continued to
rare all night. Policeman No. 31 assisted in the morn-
ing in bringing the madman to the Mansion House, but
a crowd of idle fellows began to cry out " shame," and
the mob took up the word, greatly to the impediment an
annoyance of the constables. Amongst the most con-
spicuous was the defendant
The defendant said he did not think it could do the
police any harm to cry out " shame," but he had
learned since that he had done wrong, and he should
take care not to interfere in such a manner again.
Alderman T. WooD—We punish the police with
great severity when we find that they act improperly,
and we are bound to protect them when they are as-
sailed or abused, or interrupted in the execution of their
very disagreeable duties. It was your duty, in such a
case as this, to have assisted the policeman, but you
have endeavoured to excite the mob against him. I fine
you forty shillings for, this very serious offence.
Defendant—l can't pay the money. All I did was to
cry out " shame."
Alderman T. Woon—l know how ready people like
you are to interfere in that way. You must pay the
money, or go to prison for one month.

The defendant was then committed for a month.
WORSHIP-STREET.

Thomas Barnes, a carman in the service of Messrs.
Sutton and Co., carriers, in Whitecross street, was
charged before Mr. Combe, the sitting magistrate, with
having driven over and caused the death of a child named
Mary Ann Viers, three years of age.
Thomas Miller stated that between five and six o'clock
on the preceding evening he saw the defendant driving
a horse and cart, which was proceeding at a very slow
pace along Ironmonger-row, St. Luke's. Hear-
ing a loud scream immediately after it passed him,
he turned round and observed a female child lying under
the horse's feet, and, before he had time to raise an
alarm, the wheel of the cart passed over its head and
killed it on the spot. He felt satisfied that not the
slightest blame attached to the defendant, who instantly
stopped the horse, and rendered every assistance it was
in his power to afford.
Sergeant Brannan said, that from inquiries he had
made on the spot, there could be no doubt that the un-
fortunate occurrence was purely accidental, and that the
defendant had used his best efforts to arrest the calamity.
The defendant's master also spoke in high terms as to
his general conduct as a steady and cautious driver, and
having offered himself as bail for the defendant's ap-
pearance at the termination of the inquest,
The Magistrate acceded to the application, and the
defendant was discharged out of custody.

MORTALITY in the METROPOLIS

The following are the results of "A Table of Mortality
in the Metropolis, showing the Number of Deaths from
all Causes registered in the Week ending Saturday, the
Gth of July, 1844." The Table is issued from the Office
of the Reg►strar-General:—

CAUSES OF DEATH. Total. AWvereaegkel3ol
Five years.
Epidemic, Endemic, and Contagious Diseases 191 178
Diseases of variable or uncertain seat 9B 111
Diseases of the Brain, Nerves, and Senses 157 157
Diseases of the Lungs, and other Organs of
Respiration 238 286
Diseases of the Heart and Blood-vessels 27 21
Diseases of the Stomach, Liver, and other
Organs of Digestion 7B 69
Diseases of the Kidneys, &c 2 5
Childbirth, Diseases of the Uterus, &c. 7 10
Diseases of the Joints, Bones, and Muscles 3 6
Diseases of the Skin, &e. ....... ..
Old Age, or Natural Decay 46 71
By Violence, Privation, or Intemperance
Causes specified B7O 942
Deaths from all Causes B7l 946
DEATHS FROM THE PRINCIPAL DISEASES INCLUDED UNDER