The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-23 00:00:00

HEADING FOR THE EXTRACTS.

" I beg to distinctly record that I anticipate no such
event; but, if we are ever again obliged to exert our mi-
litary strength in Sinde, it must be carried to subjugat-
ing the country."—Col. Pottinger's Dispatch to the Se-
cretary with the Governor-General, dated Sinde Resi-
dency, Feb. 13, 1839.—81ue Book, p. 149.

When alluding to the disposition of the Ameers to
form an alliance with Persia, Sir H. Pottinger writes as
follows:—" I shall not fail to tell them (the Ameers)
distinctly that the day they connect themselves with any
other Power, will be the last of their independent au-
thority, if not of their rule; for that we have the ready
power to crush and annihilate them, and will not hesi-
tate to cell it into action should it appear requisite, how-
ever re:notely, for either the integrity or safety of our
own empire or its frontier."—P. 11.
He doubts whether we could depend on their not
throwing obstacles in the way of our communication
with :he armies, " unless they saw and knew that we
were prepared to enforce our wishes and to punish all
opposition to our plans."
" Noor Mahomed's (the chief Ameer) deep duplicity
with respect to his late correspondence with the Shah of
&c., &c., have greatly shaken my confidence in
hire, and unwillingly oblige me to question his good
fitah and sincerity towards us, and to apprehend that
oar chief tie on him hereafter must be through his fears."
—P. 14. _ _ _

;lieje I have to deal with a whole nation divided into
parties, or split into deadly feuds, headed by uncivilised
and barbarous chiefs, to whom nothing would be so
agreeable and cheering as a state of anarchy and warfare."
" For the reasons I have I fear imperfectly adduced
in this letter, and also because I am almost convinced
that sooner or later the precaution will be requisite—l
mean to request the Government of Bombay to take
early steps to prepare a force for eventual serviee in
Sinde."
" Should the Ameers seem inclined, either by their
avowed hostility, or backwardness in the cause, to oblige
us to occupy their territories, I shall lose no time in ap-
prising the Bombay Government," &c.—P. 15.
" * • * whatever sentiments they (the Ameers) may
profess, their good-will and friendship towards us must
henceforward be considered to be merely lip-deep."—P. 20.
Having announced to the Ameers that combinations
hostile to the British Government had been formed by
the Powers to the west of India, and the necessity of
frustrating them, he states the measures that are to be
carried into effect, and adds—" The Ameers must like-
wise perfectly understand that the measures described in
this memorandum are not open to further consideration,
but have been finally resolved upon, and that any hesi-
tation on their part, or that of any other Power, to com-
ply with what is asked of them, must be deemed to be a
refusal, and immediate steps taken to remedy it, which it
is obvious can only be done by calling in additional
troops, which are all ready both in the Bngal and Bom-
bay territories."—P. 23.
One of the measures required was the passage of
Shah Soojah's and the British army through Sinde, and
the preparation of supplies and means of transport by the
Ameers; and referring to this, he says—" He begs to
mention that the King's and British armies will march
in the course of fifteen days from Loodiana, and that
there is consequently, as before stated, neither occasion
nor time for lengthened negotiation."
In consequence of their (the Ameers) having addressed
" a slavieh ureeza (petition) to Mahomed Shah of Persia,
in which they express their anxiety for the Shah's suc-
cess, and intimate their devotion to his cause," he tells
them "they have no right to expect that the British
Government will look upon them in the light it has
hitherto done, either as friends or as rulers."—P. 25.
" My only plan is to adhere rigidty to the terms of the
secret memorandum, which leaves all future measures de-
pendent on the pleasure or commands of the Governor-
General. It is from no personal consideration, I need
hardly say, that I do not at once denounce Noor Maho-
med and his advisers."
"To open a communication with Sobdar (supposed
friendly), even supposing he is ready to listen to it, at the
expense of his colleague in power, would be utterly fruit-
less, without the means of supporting our plans."
He gives the following account of Noor's falsehoods :
—" He one moment allows he made use of the expres-
sions to the native agent, and the next protests he did
nothing of the kind." "I have had
no difficulty in making him and his supporters contra-
dict themselves on all these points over and over again.
But still it perplexes, and one can hardly tell men of
their rank and station that they are uttering barefaced
falsehoods, however clearly that may_be inferred to be
our opinion."—P. 26.
" The events of every succeeding hour satisfy me that
we have nothing to look to from the cordial co-operation
and sincere friendship of the Government of Sinde. I
annex some extracts from my diary, which will serve to
show you the temper, the falsehood, the weakness, and
the absurd boasting of the Ameers, better than I could
explain them by a long letter." He then gives passages
from his diary, and details a violent attack made by the
populace on him and his suite, insulting and pelting them
with stones, and he treats it as the act of the Ameers.

—P. 28.
He speaks of the " faithless Durbar :"—" I have my
self hardly a doubt, though I see little chance of proving
it, that the plot (the attack of the mob) was got up by
Noor Mahomed himself," &c.—P. 31.
" It would be foolish to hope for the cordial co-opera-
tion or sincere friendship of their Government. I think
it has shown that it would join our enemies to-morrow,
did it see they were stronger than we, and the assist-
ance it is about to afford (if such it can be called) is the
fruit of its fears, and not of real good-will.
"Noor Mahomed has continued to evince the same
suspicious, unfriendly, and despicable conduct." . . .
" Oa hearing my message about the residency, Noor
Mahomed most distinctly and positively refused to allow
anything of the kind." (The message was to ask leave
to choose a site for it.)—P. 32.
" The decided and unvaried language I have held to
them has satisfied them that we are prepared to take,
should they not give, a passage through their country,
both for the Bengal and Bombay armies."
" The great difficulty I have, in arriving at any posi-
tive conclusion, as to what Noor Mahomed Khan will do,
springs from his utter and abandoned want of either
truth or shame."
" I surmise that Noor Mahomed has written to Meer
Rooctum to say that if he will forbid the approach of
the Bengal army, the Bombay troops shall be prohibited,
and if necessary opposed, in their advance up the Indies.
I have, therefore, resolved in such case to demand my
passports and quit Sinde. This deruier resort may
open their eyes, even at the twelfth hour, or they may
refuse to let me depart ; but I shall take care to let
them clearly understand that my detention will make no
change in the measures of my Government-except ren-
dering them more decided and rapid."
" I see no immediate chance of the Ameers breaking
with us, and our doing so with them depends on the
command of the Governor-General."—P. 35.
" Their plans and evasions have varied a dozen of
times each day. At one time I have thought I could
get nothing done, and that the next step would force me
to demand my passport and quit the country, and the
next I shoul€l have supposed (had I been ignorant of all
that had previously passed) that the Government of
Bombay could not have been more ready than the
Ameers, to second and aid in the Governor-General's
measures."—P. 36.
" I expressed my astonishment that he, the Nawab,
(Noor's Prime Mintster,) should fancy it possible that
the British Government should place its good faith in
the hands of such a peon as Noor Mahomed Khan."—
P 8.
" His (Noor's) perverseness no doubt springs from
his innate suspicions and treacherous disposition, but
chiefly, I should infer, from his feeling that the matters
referred to in the secret memorandum are hanging
over him. I cannot, however, even form a conjecture
as to what he can hope from the course he is follow.
ing, for he must see that every new scneme only exposes
him to contempt. It is impossible to trust his word
in the smallest degree."—P. :39.
" Now. Mahomed told me himself he had dispatched
orders for every civility to be shown to Mr. Leech; but
it is impossible to believe a word he utters ; and the
treatment Lieut. Leech experienced is in good keeping
itk whit I myself experienced at this place."