The Sun.
London, England, 1850-03-13 00:00:00

that is of such vital importance to the proper worl:-
ing of the measure. Very little responsibility wll
attach to each individual member, who may po.sibly
be influenced by other considerations than that o'
obtaining the most efficient men, best qualified to
discharge the arduous duties confided to their charge.
There will not therefore be the same security for a
pr,

_ .oper selection that will be afforded by the audit
committee proposed by the shareholders' Bill, where
five persons wholly unconnected with the
directors, each of whom must hold a
heavy stake in the undertaking—a stake

which would qualify him fur a seat at
the board—are collectively and individually respon-

sible to their brother proprietors for the competency
of the parties whom they may recommend, and who
would not, for their own sekes, venture to exercise
their franchise on trivial or insufficient ground?,
Again, if there should be an error committed in
the choice of the audit, it will practically he irreme
diable.

A person once elected will hold office for

life. He cannot be removed except by a vote of two-
thirds of the delegates, sanctioned by the board of
Railway Commissioners. We need not enter into any
prolonged argument to prove how difficult it would

be to obtain the votes of one hundred and

twenty-two persons having conflicting interests, and
throughout the entire country, to a resolution so in-
jurious to all individuals; and even if this were ob-
tained, nay, if the delegates were perfectly unani-
mous on the subject, the consent of the Railway Com •
missioners must still be obtained, which would not

be given if the person objected to made himself agree
able to their board, and obeyed their high behests,
with implicit and unreasoning obedience. An
enormous degree of influence will thus practically be
exercised by the Commissioners, although avowedly
the principle of Government interference is
asserted to be given up. On the other
hand, even if the audit committee should make a
mistake, if they should recommend a person
not fully qualified for the office, and that such a re-
commendation should be acted on by the shareholders,
the error could easily be amended; the auditor thus
selected would again appear before the proprietors in
the succeeding year, and after two years' tenure of
office, he would not be capable of re-election. New
blood would be infused into the auditory, and thus an
additional guarantee would be afforded of obtaining
competent persons not exposed to any undue or under-
hand influence.
Again, the principle of extraneous influence is just
as objectionable if exercised by the shareholders of
other companies, as it would be if entrusted to the
Government itself'. The party who owed
fromhis election
oneundertaking
to
w exertionsonlanaturally of
be a delegate
disposed to view the affairs of the company
in which his zealous supporter was interested with
greater lenieney and favour than those of a rival com-
pany, whose delegate had opposed his election ; secrets
of considerable importance might possibly be per-
mitted to ooze out, or even a direct pecuniary
consideration might lead to untoward revelations. It
is notorious that the intended reports of the railway
branch of the Board of Trade were known in various
quarters before they were publicly promulgated, and
that they led to heavy operations in the share mar-
ket. It is impos.iible to say that a greater degree of
secrecy would be observed by the members of the
audit board, or that the result of their inquisitorial
investigations would be kept wholly concealed within
their own breasts. And if so, the aggrieved parties
would have no mode of remedying the evil, and re-
moving the person whom they suspected of being
guilty of so base an act.
But the great and irresistible objection to the Go-
vernment Bill is the principle of " centralization"
involved therein. As Lord STANLEY justly ra-
m these persons should have in them-
selvesa re-
marked
such :-4 ,
No i
authority and control over all the rail-
ways of the country as would be given by the Bill.
Until these gentlemen were fully satisfied, no divi-
dend could possibly be declared. The expectant
shareholders might in vain endeavour to pacify their
clamorous creditors—to excuse the delays occasioned
by the default of the audit board, who had duties
imposed on them which they could not possibly dis-
charge. Many and general complaints would be the
inevitable adjuncts of the system, complaints which
would not emanate from shareholders only, but
would be uttered by all who were in any way con.
cerned with them in business, and who would suffer
from the necessary procrastination."
How could these persons possibly revise and scru-
tinise the accounts of one hundred and eighty-three
companies, so as to give two reports of any real
value of each within a single year ? It is proposed
that the board should report once in every half-year
to each company on these points :—" Whether their
financial transactions were regularly organized ?
whether their accounts of receipts and ex-
penditure were rightly set forth ? whether
the heads of capital and dividend were distinctly set
apart ? whether the dividends declared were or were
not injurious to the railway companies, and whether
the law charges were correct or not." It is also pro-
posed that they shall lay their reports before Parlia-
ment at the beginning of each year, and they will b 3
expected to inspect all books, papers, documents, and
vouchers, to enable them to form a perfect balance-
sheet of the receipts and expenditure of every com-
pany. This, too, must be done by the entire board in
each case, as two at least of their number must affix
their signatures to each report. It would, therefore,
be impossible for them to divide their labours. How
then could this important duty be discharged
for the 183 different companies ? A single
day could not be devoted to each, even
though no time whatever were allowed for travelling.
The duty would be got through in a slovenly and in-
efficient manner, or entrusted to irresponsible subor-
dinates, and the much vaunted board would confer
but little real security on the shareholders, or the
public, of having a scrutinizing, efficient, and ccn-
tinuous audit—which, too, of the companies should be
first served, and of which should the dividends be
postponed sine die, for if the dividends should be paid
before the report, there would be no security that they
had been fairly received. The übiquitous board
should be in every part of the kingdom, should be at
the principal station of every company—from the
Land's-end to John-u'-Groats—from Cape Clear to
the Giant's Causeway—in each and every half- year,
and some would necessarily be delayed until the
commencement of a new period.
We have thus put forward some of the most obvious,
but by no means all the objections to the Government
Bill. But we believe that these will be quite sufficient
to ensure its condemnation by the entire body of
in shareholders throughout the country.