The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-13 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF CHANCERY, .lan. 10.

The Lord Chancellor heard cause and lunatic petitions
to-day, but no case of any interest came before his Lord-
ship previous to the rising of the Court.

• . VICE-CHANCERY COURT, Jan. 12.
Unopposed petitions and short causes occupied his
Honour the Vice-Chancellor of England the whole
morning.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Jan. 12.
(Sittings in Banco.)
CARPUE V. THE LONDON AND BRIGHTCN RAILWAY
COMPANY.

This was an action brought by Dr. Carpue against the Lon-
don and Brighton Railway Company, to recover compensation
for the injuries suffered by him in consequence of the accident.
which occnrred about two years ago, in the Copyhold Cutting,
to one of the trains by which Dr. Carpue was passenger. The
case was tried before LordDenman in the sittings after Michael-
mas term, 1842, and the jury had found for the plaintiff for
250/. damages. The Solicitor-General had afterwards obtained
a rule nisi to set the verdict aside, and a new trial had or
a nonsuit entered, on the ground ofmisdirection by the Learned
Judge, and also on the ground that the action had not been
commenced within the time limited by the Aet of Parliament,
and also that the proper notice of venue as required by the Act
had not been given.
Lord DENMA N having read the notes of the evidence, and of
the summing up, said that it would perhaps bo mere conve-
nient for the Court to hear the arguments on both sides as to
construction of the limitation section of the Act of Parliament
before proceeding to the other points.
The ATTORNEY- GEN ERA 11. then, proceeded to show cause
against the rule, contending that the 253 d section of the Brigh-
ton Railway Act was never intended to apply except with re-
ference to the Parliamentary powers of the Company to make
and continue the railway, and not to that business, the business,
namely, of carriers, which that Company carried on in common
with any other persons who went upon the railway. If their
Lordships would look at the declaration they would see
that the action had been brought against them as
carriers, and not as proprietors of the railway.
It had been brought against them, not as a railroad company,
but as persons entitled in common with all her Majesty's sub-
jeets, to carry on the business of carriers. The declaration stated
that they were proprietors of a certain railway, and of certain
carriages used thereon, for the purpose of conveying goods and
chattels, and passengers, upon the said railway; and also upon
certain other railways, to wit, upon the London and Greenwich
railway, and upon the London and Croydon railway.
Now, upon the London and Greenwich railway, and upon
the London and Croydon Railway they were only carriers, and
it would be odd if it should be held that they were under a dif-
ferent contract with their passengers with regard to that por-
tion of the journey which was performed over the London and
Greenwich or the London and Croydon, and that which was
performed over the London and Brighton Railway. The action
had been brought against them as carriers, and as carriers only.
They had contracted to convey the plaintiff upon other railways
besides their own, and the contract was one entire contract, and
the section of the Act of Parliament with regard to the limita-
tion of the time for bringing the action, and to the notice of
venue did not apply. They were sued as carriers, and as car-
riers they were responsible for travelling at a rapid rate when
the state of the railway was such as to render such a rate of tra-
velling dangerous. As carriers they were bound to know that
the state of the road was not safe. If they were proprietors as
well as carriers, they had the bettor means of knowing the state
of the read. The 2534 section of the Act applied to them only
as proprietors, and not as carriers. The action had been
brought against them as carriers, and therefore the 253 d section
of the Act did not apply.
Mr. HAY ES and another followed on the same side.
The SOLICITOR.- GENERAL in support of the rule contended
that the action had been brought against the defendants as
proprietors of the railway, and net as carriers. The evidence
which had been given at the trial had been given to prove the
faulty construction of the railway—now, if the action had
been brought against them as carriers only, the evidence would
not apply to the case. In the summing up the Learned Judge
had stated that the plaintiff was not bound to prove the cause of
the accident, inasmuch as the defendant's having the whole con-
trol of the railway, negligence was to be presumed against them
in case of accident, and they were bound to show that the
accident had not been occasioned by any negligence on their
part. The case, had the trial proceeded, rested entirely upon the
assumption that the defendants were the proprietors of the
railway. If it had not proceeded upon that assumption, there
would have been no case-to go to the jury. The statement in
the declaration was that the defendants were the proprietors
and owners of a certain railway ; now, that statement could
not have been made against any other of her Majesty's subjects
carry ing on the business of carriers. The averment was that
the accident had occurred on the railway of which the defend-
ants were proprietors. It was as proprietors only that the
action had been brought against them, anti as such they were
entitled to nottee.
Mr. Justice PATTESON—The section says that they shall
be entitled to notice in case of any action brought against them
for anything done or omitted t a be done, in pursuance of the
Act. Now, as at present advised, Ido not see that taking
people into carriages as passengers, driving them negligently,
anti breaking their necks, can be called an omission. It is do-
ing something cal elessly, not omitting to do, and certainly it is
not anything done in pursuance of the Act. A clause of this
sort ought to be construed very strictly.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL submitted that the Wien had
been brought against the Company for having omitted to keep
the read in proper repair, that that was an omission within the
meaning of the 253 d section of the Act, and that, therefore,
they were entitled to the notice. Lie therefore submitted that
the rule for a nonsuit must be made absolute.
Mr. Swasist followed on the same side. _

The CounT thon called upon the Attorney-General to pro-
ceed with the other branch of the argument, but it was ulti-
mately arranged that the argument in that part of the case
should be deferred until to-morrow, as the Selicitor-General
was obliged to leave the Court.