The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-13 00:00:00

rnornin;

315
300
89
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I 31U
65

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13

1200
155
100
117
360

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280
I 2144

101%

21%
344
17;6
34
24
20%

6%
400

1/.los.

45•'
163,
12

11
16
2
40s
18s.

4%
Irk;
205

12%
Ibl

39%
40
130

105 i
Mk,
19
209

214

5
237
28
7414
15

45
23 l
3214
265

120%
5t

COURT OF QUEEN'''S BENCH, Jan. 12.
(Sittings in Banco.)
CAR FITE V. TUE LONDON AND BRIG HIGN RAILWAY
COM CAN Y.
This was an action brought by Dr. Carpue against the Lon-
don and Brighton Railway Company, to recover compensation
for the injuries suffered by him in consequence of the accident.
which occurred about two years ago, in the Copyhold Cutting,
to one of the trains by which Dr. Carpue was passenger. The
case was tried before Lord Denman in the sittings after Michael-
mas term, 1842, anti the jury had found for the plaintiff for
2501. damages. The Solicitor- General bad afterwards obtained
a rule nisi to set the verdict aside, and anew trial had or
a nonsuit entered, on the ground of misdirection by the Learned
Judge, and also on the ground that the action had not been
commenced within the time limited by the Act of Parliament,
and also that the proper notice of venue as required by the Act
had not been given.
Lord DENMAN having read the notes of the evidence, and of
the summing up, said that it would perhaps be more conve-
nient for the Court to hear the arguments on both sides as to
construction of the limitation section of the Act of Parliament
before proceeding to the other points.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL then proceeded to show cause
against the rule, contending that the 253elsection of the Brigh-
ton Railway Act was never intended to apply except with re-
ference to the Parliamentary powers of the Company to make
and continue the railway, and not to that business, the business,
namely, of carriers, which that Company carried on in common
with any other persons who went upon the railway. If their
Lordships would look at the declaration they would see
that the action had been brought against them as
carriers, and not -as proprietors sf the railway.
It had been brought against them, not as a railroad company,
hut as persons entitled in common with all her Majesty's sub-
jects, to carry on the business of carriers. The declaration stated
that they were proprietors of a certain railway, and of certain
carriages used thereon, for the purpose of conveying goods and
shattels, and passengers, upon the said railway; and also upon
certain other railways, to wit, upon the London and Greenwich
railway, and upon the London and Croydon railway.
Now, upon the London and Greenwich railway, and upon
the London and Croydon Railway they were only carriers, and
it would be odd if it should be held that they were under a dif-
ferent contract with their passengers with regard to that por-
ton of the journey which was performed over the London and
Greenwich or the London and Croydon, and that which was
performed over the London and Brighton Railway. The action
had been brought against them as carriers, and as carriers only.
They had contracted to convey the plaintiff upon other railways
besides their own, and the contract was one entire contract, and
the section of the Act of Parliament with regard to the limita-
tion to the time for bringing the action, and to the notice of
venue did not apply. They were sued as carriers, and as car-
riers they were responsible for travelling at a rapid rate when
the state of the railway was such as to render such a rate of t:-a•
yelling dangerous. As carriers they were bound to know that
the state of the road was not safe. If they were proprietors as
;sell as carriers, they had the better means of knowing the state
of the read. The 253 d section of the Act applied to them only
as proprietors, and not as carriers. The action had been
brought against them as carriers, and therefore the 253 d section
of the Act did not apply.
Mr. HAYES and another followed on the same side.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL its support of the rule contended
that the action had been brought against the defendants as
proprietors of the railway, and net as carriers. The evidence
which had been given at the trial had been given to prove the
faulty clnstrnction of the railway—now,
if the action had
been brought against them as carriers only, the evidence would
not apply to the case. In the summing up the Learned Judge
kad stated that the plaintiff was not bound to prove the cause of
the accident, inasmuch as the defendants having the whole con-
trol of the railway, negligence was to be presumed against them
in case of accident, and they were bound to show that the
accident had not been occasioned by any negligence on their
part. The case, had the trial proceeded, rested entirely upon the
assumption that the defendants were the proprietors of the
railway. If it had not proceeded upon that assumption, there
would have beets no case to go to the jury. The statement in
the declaration was that the defendants were the proprietors
and owners of a certain railway ; now, that statement could
not have been made against any other of her Majesty's subjects
carrying on the business of carriers. The averment was that
the accident had occurred on the railway of which the defend-
ants were proprietors. It was as proprietors only that the
action had been brought against them, and as such they were
entitled to notice.
Mr. Justice PATTESON—The section says that they shall
be entitled to notice in case of any action brought against them
for anything done or omitted t be done, in pursuance of the
Act. Now, as at present advised, I do not see that taking
people into carriages as passengers, driving them negligently,
and breaking their necks, can be called an omission. It is do-
ing something carelessly, not omitting to do, and certainly it is
not anything done in pursuance of the Act. A clause of this
sort ought to be construed very strictly.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL submitted that the action had
been brought against the Company for having omitted to keep
the read in proper repair, that that was an omission within the
meaning of the 253 d section of the Act, and that, therefore,
they were entitled to the notice. He therefore submitted that
the rule for a nonsuit must be made absolute.
Mr. SwAnie followed on the same side.
The COURT then called upon the Attorney-General to pro-
ceed with the other branch of the argument, but it was ulti-
mately arranged that the argument in that part of the case
should be deferred until to-morrow, as the Solicitor-General
was obliged to leave the Court.
HARE U. BARSTOW.
This was an action brought by Sir John Hare, against the
Secretary to the Yorkshire Insurance Cempany, to recover
the amount of insurance alleged to be due to him for the
damage done by fire to his oil mills, situated in Bristol, which
had been insured by the Society. The defendant had con-
tended that the insurance having been effected on the oil mill,
the plaintiff could only recover 2761., the amount of damage
done to that portion of the premises used for crushing linseed,
which sum was paid into Court, and that he had no right to
recover for damage done to zny other portion of the premises.
the case was tried before Lord Denman at the Guildhall in
1842, and the jury had found for the plaintiff for 2201. The
Attorney-General bad subsequently obtained a rule nisi for a
nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to go to the
jury, or for a new trial, on the ground that evidence had been
admitted as to the value of the ,machinery, which was inad-
missible.
Mr. ERLE now showed cause against the rule, and contended
that it was aquestion for the jury to decide whether the term oil-
mills" was used for the purpose of designating the whole of the
premises, or for the purpose of designating that portion
only which was used for crushing linseed ; and it would be seen
from the proposal that the term oil-mills had been used to de-
signate the entirety of the premises, which were known in
Bristol as Hare's oil mills; neither could there be any doubt that
Sir John Hare had intended to effect the insurance upon the
entirety of the premises, and that he had imagined that he had
so effected his insurance. In a case of that sort could it be
said the construction of the policy should be left to the
Judge alone, and that there was nothing to go to the
jury ? He apprehended not, and there was no ground
fur making the rule for a nonsuit absolute. With re-
spect to the evidence as to the value of the machinery,
question was one entirely of value,
ussible, and, as the contest was,
thehe a
epvpi rdeehneened
was
s that,clearly
whether the insurance was meant to cover the whole of the
it, evidence as to value was
identification. He therefore mac in
admissiblee ry ,
as o r onlyevid
en onece portion
of
sub-
mitted that this rule must be discharged.
ROBINSON followed on the same side.
Lord DENMAN said that the Court would hear the remainder
of the arguments to-morrow.

ADMIRALTY COURT, Jan. 12.
TILE SPIMP.—COLLISION.
This was a cross-action between the owners of the bark
Thames, of Newcastle, and those of the Speed, a large timber-
vessel, belonging to New Brunswick, to recover the amount
of damage which each vessel, had sustained in a collision that
bad occurred in the River St. Lawrence, near Orleans Island,
about 10 miles from Quebec, on the sth of October, 184'2.
The Thames was a vessel of 150 tons, laden with coals and
glass, bound for Quebec ; the Speed had a cargo of timber, and
was c.iming from the same place. On the part of the Thames,
was occasioned by the Speed's
ihteiwmasbceoinntgenpdoerdtedtht the.ainste collisionado being
starboarded. On the other
hand,: the owners of .the Speed alleged that the Thames had
run into that vessel owing to her not having luffed to wind-
ward, as it was her duty to have done. The evidence was, as
usual in these cases, totally at variance upon all essential points.
The Queen's Advocate and Dr. Haggard were for the
Thames, and Dr. Addams and DomHyford for the Speed.
The Trinity Masters, by wh the Court was assisted,
were of opinion that the Thames was exonerated from blame,
which rested solely with the Speed.
Dr. LUSHINGTON pronounced for the damage sought to be
recovered by the owners of the Thames, and dismissed them
from the' action brought against them by the owners of the
Speed in both cases, with their costs.