The Sun.
London, England, 1868-05-21 00:00:00

71IE POLICY OF COUNT BISMARCK.

The Historisch-Politische Bliitter is of opinion
that Count Bismarck has given vent to his
ideas on the unity of Germany, in a very origi-
nal fashion, in answer to a speech of Herr
Waldeck in the Prussian Chambers. That
deputy is a democrat, a warm partizan of
German-Prussian unity. In his zeal for this
unity he reproached the Prussian Government
with being, on account of its anti-Liberal
tendencies, the greatest obstacle to this beauti-
ful dream. " The South," he said, repels the
idea of a confederation with the North, because
it regards the Prussian Government as a
feudal and absolutist Government. The South
Germans do not wish for unity at the expense
of liberty. Count Bismarck, without troubling
himself to inquire whether there were any
advantage or not in being Liberal, put the
question differently : " Why," said he, " do
not the South Germans wish to come to us ;
it is not in my idea because we are not Liberal,
but because we are too Liberal." The ratioci-
nation of Count Bismarck is very simple.
Reviewing the Southern States, he perceives
that the most Liberal of these States is also
the one where the Prussian tendencies are the
most pronounced. The State he is alluding
to is the Grand Duchy of Baden. And is
Count Bismarck not right in concluding that
the Liberals of the South want nothing better
than to be united to Prussia, whereas it is the
Conservatives or the reactionary party who do
not desire such a union ? Herr Waldeck,
the Liberal, was refuted on the spot. But
Count Bismarck did not content himself with
this easy triumph, and going on he explained
one of the motives of his policy, which it con-
cerns us to note : " If we would or if we could
make some concessions in favour of the South
in a reactionary sense, we could easily obtain
a majority in favour of a junction with the
Confederation of the North." These words
ought to make Austria reflect, for it is not a
matter of doubt that Count Bismarck finds
great elements of success for Prussia in the
Liberal stupidities which abound in Vienna.
On the morrow of this passage of arms between
Deputy Waldeck and Count Bismarck, the
Berlin correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse
of Vienna, after having recalled the fact that
on that day fifty years ago, the emigrants
from Salzbourg entered Berlin amidst the accla-
mations of the people—a more signal triumph
for the Prussian monarchy than that of Sadowa
—thus sorrowfully bewails the present state of
things in Berlin : " The Church bells are ring-
ing still, a tridnum of prayers is ordered. In
the morning there will be High Mass, in the
next,
a eveningsesromleomnn
onß doingenedi penance, and all onction, and on Sunday
account of the deplorable state of the Church
—in Austria. Verily, Catholicism may cast
a glance of satisfaction on itself in the metropolis
of Protestantism. Before 1848, in the whole
of the province of Brandenburg, there were
only three Catholic churches, and according
to the saying of Pope Gregory XVI., that of
Berlin was a stable, that of Spandau a shed,
and that of Frankfort a workshop. Now, in
Berlin alone, the Catholics have the church
of St. Hedwiges and that of St. Michael.
This latter, the largest and most beautiful
church in Prussia Proper, is situated in the
most populous quarter of the capital. There
is, besides, belonging to religious communities,
the church of the Ursulines, that of St. Charles
Borromeo, that of the hospital of the Sisters
of Charity, a chapel in the Kaiser Strasse.
On the other side, among orthodox Protest-
ants, hitherto occupied in carrying on war
in the name of the Bible against the Missal,
Puseyism is sensibly gaining ground ; and we
see the Kreutz Zeitung advocating an alliance
between Puseyism and Ultramontanism. If
things go on in this manner for twenty years,
it will be necessary to go to Vienna to look for
civilization and reason. Berlin will have
become the stronghold of Ultramontanism."
" We leave," says the Historisch-Politische
Bleitter, " to the correspondent of the Viennese
paper, the responsibility for this estimate of the
state of things. The facts, however, which he
cites are very remarkable. It is certain that
there is a movement in Prussia, and notably
in Berlin, which cannot fail to engage the
attention of Count Bismarck. Count Bismarck
has no fear lest the glorious victory of Liberal-
ism in Austria might throw the power of
Prussia into the shade. He does not fear the
attraction which the Liberalism of Vienna
might exercise on the Southern States or on
the least well-disposed members of the Con-
federation of the North. He thoroughly un-
derstands that Viennese Liberalism is working
for the King of Prussia, because he knows
from personal experience what would have
become of Prussia if it had enjoyed a Liberal
Government during the crises which have
followed one another since 1862. The more
Liberal Austria becomes, the weaker will she
be in internal policy, and the more corrupt
and disorganized will she be at home. This is
a truth which has for Count Bismarck the cer-
tainty of a mathematical truth." -
It is beyond question that the triumph of
the professors and advocates of Vienna has
had its rebound in South Germany. The
dominant party which was for an instant dis-
appointed by the result of the elections for the
Customs' Parliament, feared lest the Govern-
ments should open their eyes and see the
abyss open before their feet. But this anxiety
was not of long duration. The news from
Vienna reassured the Liberals of the South.
They said to themselves that they would easily
succeed in doing what was done in Austria,
and all that was necessary
was to go quickly
to work, so as to give no timefor the popular
voice, which had spoken so distinctly in the
elections, to make itself heard. Count Bis-
marck is not ignorant of the state of things ;
he watches with pleasure the
issue of the con-
test, and, therefore, it was that he had no hesi-
tation in his speech, on the union of Prussia
and South Germany, to make
known his views.
The meaning of this speech at bottom is that
it would be easy for Prussia to assume the part
which Austria has renounced
of a Conservative
power and of a supporter of the Catholic
Church. Count Bismarck did not say this in
so many words ; but it is clear that he means
this when he speaks of the guarantees to be
given to South Germany. Moreover, he did
not say that he was disposed that Prussia
should assume this part or give these guaran-
tees ; but he allowed it to be understood that
if these guarantees were not given it was be-
cause he thought it an unnecessary thing to do
in order to gain over South Germany. Why
pay for a thing which would come as a free
gift ? From his stand-point Count Bismarck
is right. For Prussia to remain just as it is,
which will not be difficult, after its double
victory, internal and external, of 1866, and to
avoid the contagion of Liberalism and the
despotism of the middle and professional classes,
which in Austria and South. Germany has turned
everything topsy-turvy, it has only to mend its
own affairs. All those whom Liberalism has
not yet besotted will. then be convinced that
a sound political sense is only to be found in

Berlin ; and such a conviction might very
quickly lead to serious consequences. We may
then see much sooner than we imagine the
most violent adversaries of Prussia imploring
its protection with outstretched arms. In
this sense what is now taking place in Vienna
may be of immense importance for the rest of
Germany. Count Bismarck is perfectly right
when he says that the Liberals of the South
wish to be united with Prussia, whilst the
Conservatives are opposed to such a union.
In fact, the Conservatives will be the only
supporters of the South German Governments
if these Governments make up their minds to
preserve their independence. This is known
at Berlin, and Count Bismarck has no hesita-
tion in avowing that the Conservatives were in
a majority in South Germany. The Liberals
reply, indeed, that this majority is composed
of the least intelligent part of the population;
but Count Bismarck does not care for this
distinction. He only values people as they
pay taxes and furnish soldiers. He knows that
in a constitutional country, the will—enlight-
ened or not—of the people ought to be pre-
ponderant, and that in imposing by means of
Parliamentary forms, the will of the minority
on the country, is the sure road to anarchy.
It is on this account that Count Bismarck treats
the Liberals with such disdain. After having
said that Prussia might, if it wished, make
concessions to the Conservatives or the reac-
tionists, as they are called, he hastened to add
that it could not do so to the Liberals without
sacrificing its main object;, therefore, counting
the Liberals for nothing, he looked upon South
Germany an Conservative, and thus it is that
he could say : Why do the South Germans
not wish to unite with us ? It is not because
they do not find us Liberal enough, but be-
cause they find we are too much so. The
Historisch-Politische Bleitter, in explaining this
paradox, says it is certain that the Prussian
Government is not Liberal in the ordinary ac-
ceptation of the word. Count Bismarck does
not hesitate to avow it, and hence it is that
the Liberals of South Germany make it, at
least in appearance, an absolute condition of
their adherence that Prussia should become
Liberal. They want guarantees that unity
should not be brought about at the expense
of liberty ; that is to say, in reality, they want
to secure the absolute domination at Berlin
of the middle and professional classes, of which
their party is chiefly composed. The Prussian
Government does not yield to this Liberalism.
It was not Liberal ideas which gained the
battles of Bohemia. On the contrary, it was
those very ideas which, before the illumination
of Sadowa, prompted as many petitions against
the warlike policy of Count Bismarck as the
King of Prussia had soldiers under arms.
The only essential relationship between the
new policy of Prussia and. Liberalism is the
contempt of every right and of every law as
often as it is thought that they may be
violated without danger. On this score, it is
certain that the policy of Count Bismarck is
much too liberal for the Conservatives of South
Germany. The annexations of the North only
showed too well the close relationship which
exists between the recent policy of Prussia
and vulgar Liberalism. If the Southern States
were not annexed. at the same time as Hanover,
Nassau, Electoral Hesse and Frankfort, it was
because of the fear of France ; this much, at
least, is proved. and. avowed.
The Liberals of South Germany seem bent
on driving the people into the arms of Prussia.
But the South Germans say that one despotism
is better than two, and. since they know the
weight of Liberal despotism, they might well
prefer the despotism of Prussia. This is Count
Bismarck's hope, who cannot watch but with
pleasure the activity of Liberalism in the
South. The moment that the Conservatives
are more worried by Liberal
.despotism than
frightened by Prussian despotism, Prussia has
gained the day.
After stating that Austria
i declines hence-
forth taking an active part n the affairs of
Germany, and that it is turning its attention
more and more towards the Magyars, and that
it has abdicated its claims as a Catholic power,
the Historisch Politische Bliitter thus concludes
its remarks on the Bismarckian policy—" If
Prussia could obtain the continuance of peace,
it might meet the future without unquietude.
At Berlin everything is to be feared from, a
war. We may envy the assurance with which
Count Bismarck refuses to make concessions
to South Germany. But who will answer for
it that, in
_its love for peace, Prussia will not
arrive at an understanding with France by
concessions which will make Prussia, indeed,
larger, but Germany smaller? This has already
happened at Luxemburg. The surrender of
North Schleswig, in conformity with the trea-
ties, will be a second step in the same direc-
tion. Thus it is that Prussian policy suffers the
penalty of its community of principles, and
of its alliance with Liberalism. If, after the
victory of Sadowa, regard had been paid to
existing and historic rights, there would have
been no need to have had recourse to the
treacherous and two-edged principle of nation-
alities. Germany would have remained united;
every pretext for intervention would have been
taken away from the Emperor of the French,
and the article concerning North Schleswig
would have had. no place in the treaty of
,eacc."