The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-08 00:00:00

A USTRIA AND FRANCE.

The following is the reply of Count de Rech-
berg, already more than once spoken of, to"the de,
spatch sent by M.Thouvenel to the Marquis de
Moustier relative to the affairs of Italy :
To PRINCE DE METTERNICH, AMBASSADOR AT
PARIS.

Vi, Feb. 17.
" The Marquis de Moustier" hasenna read to me, and
left me a copy of, two despatches, the text of which
I have the honour of transmitting. to your Excel-
lency.
" The first of these documents, addressed to
Count de Persigny, speaks of the favourable recep-
tion given by the French Government to the four
propositions of the English Cabinet, which have
for object to pacify Central Italy, and of the con-
tents of which your Excellency is aware from my
despatch of the 30th of January. .The second, ad-
dressed to the Marquis de Moustier, is intended to
deve;op in detail the motives which induced the
Emperor Napoleon to consider the plan of pacifica-
tion of the English Government as an an accept-
able solution, although this plan is in contradic-
tion for the stipulations of the treaty of Villafranca
and Zurich.
" I hastened to submit to the Emperor, our
august master, the despatches which the French
ambassador left with me, and I am now prepared
to make known to you the impression which they
produced on his Majesty's mind.
" My despatch to Count Aponyi of the 20th of
Jan., and which you have communicated to M.
Thouvenel, already indicates the reasons which pre-
vent us from accepting the combination proposed
by the English Cabinet. These reasons are so evi-
dent that they could not have escaped the perspica-
city of the French Government. The latter does
not, therefore, ask for our approbation of the pro-
ject of making the future destinies of Central Italy
depend on a vote of the people, but confines itself
to expressing a wish that we should abstain from
any formal opposition to the execution of this plan.
" In expressing that opinion, we readily do jus-
tice to the enlightened judgment of M. Thouvenel,
who himself forms so just an estimate of the
exigencies of our position. Let us throw a glance
on the state of affairs, end go back in idea to the
date which serves as the starting point for the Mi-
nister of Foreign Affairs.
" At the period of the signature of the prelimi-
naries of Villafranca the Epperor Napoleon, as M.
Thouvenel states, conceived the hope that the new
organisation of Italy might be reconciled with the
re-establishment of the legitimate powers. That,
hope, which in the mind of the Emperor Francis
Joseph amounted to a conviction, animated the two
Sovereigns when they took each other's hand to put
an end to the effusion of blood. The Emperor, our
august master, thus consented to make a painful
sacrifice, but under the condition that the legitimate
authorities would be reinstated in Central Italy.
" In the interest of the restoration of peace, and
in the hope that it would be consolidated by a com-
plete understanding with his old adversary, and be
rich in salutary results, he decided on renouncing
those rights and titles on which he might have sup-
ported himself, but he positively refused to consent
to combinations which would have injured the
rights of third parties, and particularly of princes
who had calculated on his alliance. To oppose a
barrier to the more and more encroaching progress
of revolution by the restoration of the dethroned
sovereigns, and to assist the efforts of the Emperor
of the French, who had a project of satisfying the
aspirations of national feelings by a close union of
the Governments of the Italian Peninsula, by means
of a federative alliance—such was the two-fold ob-
jects of the acts of Villafranca and Zurich, as well
as of the exchange of ideas which took place be-
tween the two Cabinets at Biarritz, with the prin-
cipal intention of following a uniform course in
order to secure the execution of the political part of
the stipulations of peace.
" The Emperor has not changed his opinion as to
the situation cf Italy. His Majesty still thinks, as
at Villafranca, that it would be cherishing a dan-
gerous illusion to flatter one's self with the possi-
bility of founding a durable and regular order of
things by a flagrant infringement of rights con-
secrated by centuries and by European treaties.
France,' says M. Thouvenel, yields to none in her
regard for the sanctity of obligations contracted.'
We also entertain the same sentiment, and it is
precisely on that account that we should deeply re-
gret to see the treaty which has just been conclu-
ded between ourselves and France remain unexe-
cuted in its stipulations of considerable importance.
Of course, if the restoration should not be realized,
the Confederation would also remain a dead letter.
" What would be the consequence P The gener-
ous thought in which the two Emperors met at
Villafranca would be condemned to remain sterile.
And what are the obstacles which cause its failure ?
Without any intention to under-estimate them, we
are very far from thinking them so insurmountable
as they appear to M. Thouvenel. We reserve for
a future despatch whatever more sve have to say
upon this subject.
"Lastly, the Emperor, for his own part, thinks
the solution of the question is to be sought on the
bases of the preliminaries of Villafranca, all the
stipulations of which, in a legal point of view, form
but one complete whole. We could never consent
to co-operate in any combinations which should not
take into account the reserves made in the Treaty
of Zurich in favour of the rights of the dethroned
Sovereigns. In the presence of results so opposed
to our legitimate expectations we should feel it
morally impossible for us to sanction them by our
assent. This attitude _and the French Govern-
ment itself is too just, lam convinced, not to ap-
prove of it—is in the eyes of the Emperor, our
august master, not only a question of honour, but
also the expression of a profound political convic-
tion

" The greater the hope which a cordial under-
standing with France gave birth to for putting an
end to the complications of Italy, the more we re-
gret our inability to coincide in the opinion which
the Cabinet of the Tuileries seems to hold relative
to the fourth English proposition. But, if-3,-ve de-
plore this divergence of opinion, we cherish the
hope of which M. Thouvenel has been the elegant
organ in saying that if a difference of opinion
could and sometimes must lead to a different judg-
ment, it was not necessary, when the honour of
both parties is safe, that it should result in disas
trous conflicts so far from the intentions of both
France and Austria.'
" Your Excellency will please to read this de-
spatch to M. Thouvenel, and, if he wishes it, leave
him a copy.—Accept, &c.,

"DE RECHBERG."

The Gazette de Danube, from which we have taken
the above despatch, also publishes a second of the
same date, and, strange to say, also addressed by
Count de Rechberg to Prince de Metternich. It is
thus worded :

" Vienna, Feb. 17.

"The French Government, before definitively
stating its opinion on the fourth English proposi-
tion, has deemed it indispensable to retrace and jus-
tify its situation towards ourselves, and the Courts
of Berlin and St. Petersburg.
" We are too mindful of the care which M. Thou-
vend has devoted to the accomplishment of this
task not to attach, on our parts, some importance to
completely explaining the motives of the attitude
which we think it our duty to assume. With this
view, we shall follow M. Thouvenel in the historical
exposition contained in his despatch.
"Among the obstacles which have arisen against
the realisation of the hope conceived by the Empe-
rorJsrapoleon of being abled to conciliate the new
organisation of Italy with the preceding dynasties,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs mentions the inac-
tion and passive attitude of the chiefs of those dy-
nasties, the hesitation of the Sovereign of the States
of the Church to grant reforms, and, lastly, the
silence which Austria has obstinately kept on the
subject of the generous intentions which were ex-
pressed to the Emperor Napoleon relative to the
administration of Venetia.
_ _

" Let us be allowed to ask in what manner the de-
throned princes could have acted in the situation in
which they had been placed. It is useless to re-enu-
merate the causes which led to the insurrection of
Central Italy. Those events now belong to the do-
main of history. It was Sardinia who, after preparing
the movement a long time before, made herself mas-
ter of it in order to make it serve her purposes. It
was the Sardinian agent who reorganised the admini-
stration by proscription of all the elements suspected
of attachment to the old order of things; it was
Sardinian officers who formed the army of the
League. Even now it is the Minister of War of his
Sardinian Majesty, who is at the same time the
general in-chief of the army of the League, and
several Sardinian generals now direct the military
preparations going on at Bologna.
" The insurgent provinces are placed under the
system of military dictatorship. Any step in favour
of the legitimate Sovereigns is prosecuted as a crime
of high treason. Five-sixths of the population are
excluded from the operation of voting, and those
who have been admitted to exercise their electoral