The Sun.
London, England, 1867-06-17 00:00:00

TILE CUMULATIVE VO7E.

The following letter has been addressed to the
Editor of the Times :—Sir,—ln February last you

were so good as to insert a letter from me on the
subject of the Cumulative Vote, in which I com-
bated the notion which at that time entertained in

some quarters that this method of voting would be
applicable to all constituencies possessing more than
one member, and that it would prove a panacea

against the evils of democracy.
May I now address to you a few lines on that
more logical and moderate idea which appears now
to express the views of those in favour of Cumula-
tive Voting, and which confines its operation to
a limited number of constituencies, large enough to

be represented by three membein? On the notice
paper of the House of Commons these views seem
to be represented by the motion of Mr. Laing to

give a third member to six boroughs and 25 county
constituencies containing populations above 150,000,
and the amendment and motion of Mr. Hughes
that wherever three members are or shall be re-

turned each elector shall have the power of distri-
buting his votes in any manner he may think fit
among the candidates. As there are now nine con-
situencics returning three or more members, this
would produce a total of 40 constituencies endowed
with the Cumulative Vote. Exception may be taken

to the large number of counties selected for the
honour, as compared with the small number of
boroughs. and it may be fai.rly utged that, no-elec-
tors are much more numerous in boroughs in pro-

portion to the inhabitants, the borough standard of
population ought to be much lower than that of the
counties ; but otherwise the scheme before us shows
the cumulative principle under its best form, and in
a shape most advantageous for candid discussion.
Logically the proposal appears fair. The effect
would be that in each constituency one-fourth of
the electors voting would be able to return one of

the three members, and so secure one-third of the
representation. This seems rather too large a pro-
portion, yet not enough to excite much observation.
But change the proposal into figures, testing it by
En example of large numbers, and its-extraordinary
character becomes apparent. Suppose a cOnsti-

tuency in which 10,000 come to the poll ; the pro
posal is that 2,501 of these electors, by cumulating
their three votes apiece, shalt be able to return a
member against 7,500 voting for three candidates
on the other side. So insignificant a minority is to
carry the day, as regards one member, against the
overwhelming majority of three times their number.
This is opposed to all our old-fashioned notions, and
I must confess, appears an excessive concession to
the minority. Surely it would be wiser to propose
that each voter should only have the right of giving
one additional vote to any one candidate. In that
case one-third of the electors would return one-third
of the members, and the result would be more per-
fect in theory as well as less at variance with our
prejudices.
But it is not enough to have a logical theory ;
the scheme ought also to work well in practice.
Until the practical working has been well looked
into, it is impossible to predict success. The very
best schemes in theory can often be shown to be
unworkable in practice ; for instance—pace Mr.
Mill—the elaborate perfection devised by Mr. Hare.
Looking into its practical operation, we find that
the cumulative vote will work best where the majo-
rity is a large one, and the minority small. In such
cases the machinery will be used just as its proposers
desire. The downtrodden Conservatives of Bir-
mingham will plump their three votes as one man
to force a Tory partner into the hitherto Radical
firm of Scholefield and Bright. The little flock of
Radicals in South Devon will move like a phalanx
to impose a manhood-suffrage colleague on Sir Law-
rence Palk. But wherever parties are nearly
balanced a difficulty will occur, which has not
been foreseen, and to which I wish to call your
attention.
The difficulty is-this. In an evenly-balanced con-
stituency it will be useless for either party to start
three candidates. Ther opponents aro certain to
return one of the members, and will run them hard
for a second member. The struggle will be to re-
turn the odd member. This can best be done by
starting only two candidates. For instance, sup-
pose an election iu which 7,000 electors vote on each
side ; if three candidates are started by either party
they canonly receive 7,000 votes apiece ; -but if two
candidates are proposed by the other party they
have 21,000 votes to divide between them, and, by
first-rate management and luck may poll 10,500
apiece, so winning the odd member in a canter. To
start a third candidate will clearly be to renounce
the odd seat; and it will become an axiom of elec-
tioneering that, in three-cornered constituencies
where a sharp fight is expected, only two candi-
dates can be put forward. A second axiom will
be that the utmost care must be exercised to in-
duce the electors to divide their third vote equally
between the two candidates. That is to say, half
of them, or as nearly half as possible, must be
got to give their third vote to one candidate,
and the other half to the other candidate. If much
more than half give them to the favourite candidate,
the other is left with much less than half, and a gap
created which may let in the two candidates of the
- enemy and lose the odd trick. It is like riding two
horses at once—you must keep them exactly abreast
or you come to grief.
To illustrate the case by an example. Suppose a
constituency of 18,000 electors, of whom rather
more than 14,000 actually come to the poll. Sup-
pose that 7,200 of these electors are Blues, and poll
dutifully for their two Blue candidates, and that
7,000 electors are Yellows and vote for the two