The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-07 00:00:00

Exchequer had raised a question as to which he *mild at-
tempt to give an answer. The right hon. gentleman said it
was the policy of the constitution of the country that all
the financial plans for the year should not be reviewed by
the Lords. Now, if the budget of the Minister was a matter
between Downing-street and the House of Commons the
' interference of the Lords might be consider( d a trouble-
some intrusion; but if the question were in reality one be-
tween the House of Commons and the c ntry, it ought
not to be decided by the House of Commons alone, but the
House of Lords then should exercise that right which the

constitution had vested in them. (Hear, hear.) Was it
not the first law of the constitution that there was no power
in this country without being subject to control ? But

where would be the check upon the House of Commons re-

cently elected and that had five years to live? It might in
matters of finance run riot and ruin the country before a
dissolution could take place. Therefore it was that the
Lords had a power to review and to check the financiel po-
licy of the Commons. (Hear.) But it was, he must admit,

a power which should only be exercised upon rare and spe-
cial occasions. He would not go into the precedents, because
any hon. member might quote reasons for either view, but
he would simply refer to the reasons given by the Lords in
the remarkable controversy which the committee had
thought it right to set forth at length in their report. The

Lords then passed certain resolutions that it was their un-

doubted right to review the bills sent up to them, and they

said that the writs issued at the commencement of a Par-

liament called them together to give counsel upon all ques-
tions which might arise, without any exception. (Hear.)
Thus the Lords asserted their constitutional claim, and
whenever such right came into collision with the Commons
the result must be an appeal to the nation, and if they were

in the right they would override the decision of the Lords;

but if they should be essentially in the wrong the Lords
might correct the proceedings of the Commons. (Hear,
hear.) The real authority, however, rested in the nation,
which was the court of ultimate appeal. (Hear, hear.) It
was said most truly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer
that this was not the mere rejection of a money bill. It was
admitted that the budget was the reversal of a policy which
had long prevailed, and it was in that character that he had
viewed it, and as such the house had condemned it. It was
a scheme of innovation of financial policy, and it was remark-
able for two reasons ; first it contained a remission of taxes
when there was a deficiency in the Exchequer ; and secondly
there was substituted direct for indirect taxation, upon a
principle capable of an indefinite extension, and that was in
reality what the House of Lords had checked and controlled
when they rejected the Paper Duties Bill, the passing of
which they believed to be opposed to the national sentiment
as it was opposed to the national interests. (Hear, hear.)
The question which had lately arisen had been noticed by
Hallam in his " Constitutional History," and he clearly
showed that the House of Lords had during the last century
rejected bills, and that both houses exercised their alleged
privileges when occasion arose, while at other times their
claims were placed in abeyance, and by the common con-
sent on all occasions matters had been compromised, there

having been no extreme assertion on either side. The prece•
dents referred to were unimportant, and for this reason, be•
cause they could not be analogous to this case, nor applica.
ble to the time in which they lived. The precedents to be
found were not the growth of laws, but of time and the
production of accident, and therefore a precedent applica-
ble at one time could not apply to another. For instance,
the precedent of 1678 was framed at a time when there
were no responsible ministers—when there was no Go-
vernment as it now existed—when there were no annual
budgets, and when there was no complete statement
of income and expenditure of the country. Consequently,
there was no elaborate review of the principles which the
Chancellor of the Exchequer might thick fit to adopt.
Again, the revenue was voted for the natural life of the so-
vereign, and the control of the Commons over the affairs
of the country was extremely limited; and, further, the
power of the house was small. It was, then, no wonder
that the Commons should be tenacious in their power over
money bills; for if money bills could have been originated
in or modified by the Lords, the Commons would have lost
their power entirely over the supplies of the country. He
therefore believed that the opposition of the Commons in
past times had not so much been directed against the
Lords as against the Crown—(hear)—because the Crown
endeavoured to act upon the Commons through the Lords,
the facilities for doing so teing greater in that matter than
directly upon the Commons. If they went to the other
branch of the Legislature they would find sti'l greater
charges in the relations of the Lords to the Crown and the
Commons. He was surprised to hear the hon. and
learned member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) say that the
revolution of 1688 made no change in the Parliamentary
government of the country. He had always understood
that that event made a great change in Parliamentary Go-
vernment. It was the revolution of 1688 which placed the
Government of England in the hands of great families, and
from that period to 1832 the power of the peerage was im-
mense. Then peers made and unmade Goverrments by
their influence at court and their wealth, being relatively
so much greater before the extension of commerce, by their
close eonnexion with the landed gentry, and by their abso-
lute sway in many boroughs; they threw down Cabinets
with a Dower far greater than that either of
the Commons. Therefore there was no necessity for ex •
citing a jealousy between the two Houses of Parliament
by the discussion of finance and money bills. The
financial arrangements of the country at that time developed
themselves in the House of Commons, and the House of
Lords by their indirect influence accomplished all they
wished with regard to finance. No financial burdens were
imposed upon them as peers. As landlords they had a close
alliance and sympathy with the landed interest in the House
of Commons, and their feeling and interest as peers, on
matters of taxation and finance, were identical with those
of the dominant party in the House of Commons. But the
act of 1832, which was the constitution under which they
now lived, and which had strangely been overlooked and
fergotten by the assertors of privilege on this occasion,
changed all that. It made a great transfer in the powers of
the State to the middle classes and the constituencies that
elected the House of Commons. The Lords no longer di-
rectly or indirectly ruled the Commons; the landed inte-
rest was no longer dominant in the Commons. The com-
mercial interest obtained their due share of power, and in
the present session they had seen that they had obtained
something more. (Laughter.) The effect of the act of 1832
on the Lords was fully as great as upon the Commons. The
Commons became a truer representation of the nation be-
cause they ceased to be a representation of the Lords. In
proportion as the Commons were strengthened the Lords
were weakened ; but in the same degree in which the act of
1832 deprived the peers of the powers which they had
usurped it became only more necessary to secure and
strengthen that legitimate authority which the constitution
had intended they should possess. Losing their territorial
ascendancy, they were thrown back on those functional ser-
vices which became the condition of their existence. They
were established as the second council of the nation, in
order to provide for the nation that security which all con-
stitutional governments sought for in the existence of a
second chamber, viz., as a safeguard against the despo-
tism of democracy. (Opposition cheers.) But gentlemen
around him forgot those changes—forgot that the Cora
mons, instead of being the weakest, was now the strongest
power in the state, and instead of defending its own rights,
threatened to override and absorb all other rights, and to
assume the whole government of the country. The Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, in his speech, last night, spoke in
the spirit, if not in the language, of those who looked upon
the House of Lords as something of an anomaly, to be tole-
rated only so long as they aro conscious of their inferiority,
so long as they consented to register the edicts of the Com-
mons, and to receive from the assertors of privilege that
certificate of good behaviour which graciously prolonged to
them an existence on sufferance. The resolutions of the
noble lord were of greater importance from their dubious
character, as they suggested an inquiry which could not
long be delayed as to the real character of the constitution,
and the powers and functions of the other House. The
House of Lords had no exclusive privileges whatever that
he was aware of. The members of that house were country
gentlemen, owing their influence in their respective dis-
tricts to precisely the same cause as other country gentle •
men, not to the titles they bore, but to the property they
possessed. In their collective capacity, as a legislative
body, they were a national institution created by opinion,
and existing by opinion, and exercising no power exclu-
sively for themselves. Their power they exercised not in
their own name, nor by their own authority, but in the
name and by the authority of the people of the country, of
whom they are a part, just as much as they (the House of
Commons) were a part, and whom they represented consti-
tutionally just as much as they did. The right hon. gen-
tleman having <luau' the opinion of Burke in support of
that view, went on to observe that the peers of England,
as contrasted with the peerage of any other country,
which was easily swept away by the first storm, had this
particular element of strength, that they were a body of
landowners, deriving their wealth from agriculture, which
was the greatest trade in the country. They were identified
intimately with the progress and improvement of the people.
They were eminently distinguished by their habits of busi-
ness, by their knowledge of agriculture, by the management
and the improvement of their estates, and by an acquantance
with farmer and labourers, by their general knowledge, in-
terests, and feelings, and it was impossible to overrate the
deep and enduring sympathy which those qualities had won
for them from the people at large. The Lords discharged
functions absolutely essential to parliamentary government.
It was a mistake to suppose that because they were not
elective they were therefore not a representative body. If
there was no House of Peers in the country, it would be
necessary to create one. They exercised their power in the
name of the people, by the authority of the people, and even
as part of the people. (Hear.) That was not only a fiction;
in these days it was absolutely essential that it should also
be acknowledged to be the practice of the constitution, be-
cause if it were not, the peerage was a fiction and could not
he maintained. The House of Peers had of late years
ne anceaxed to originate great public measures, especially when
they involved any policy of State as well as financia'
bills,
gdovthene::: House
;use of Commons now virtually directed the
Government of England. The Crown and the Lords no
i
they moderated and regulated but they
didor
not supply the movements of the state ; and it was this
moderating influence which alone secured England from
the despotism of an
uncontrolled 01l ed popular assembly.
(Cheers.) But as their influence could no longer be