The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-07 00:00:00

Exchequer had raised a question as to which he Would at-
tempt to give an answer. The right EOn. gentleman said it
was the policy of the constitution of the country that all
the financial plane for the year should not be reviewed by
the Lords. Now, if the budget of the Minister was a matter

between. Downing-street and the House of Commons the

interference of the Lords might be considered a trouble-

some intrusion ; but if the question were in reality one be-
tween the House of Commons and the c z ntry, it ought
not to be decided by the House of Commons alone, but the
House of Lords then should exercise that right which the
constitution had vested in them. (Hear, hear.) Was it
not the first law of the constitution that there was no power
in this country without being subject to control ? But
where would be the check upon the House of Commons re-
cently elected and that had five years to live? It might in

matters of finance run riot and ruin the country before a

dissolution could take place. Therefore it was that the
Lords had a power to review and to check the financial po-
licy of the Commons. (Hear.) But it was, he must admit,

a power which should only be exercised upon rare and spe-
cial occasions. He would not go into the precedents, because
any hon. member might quote reasons for either view, but
he would simply refer to the reasons given by the Lords in
the remarkable controversy which the committee had
thought it right to set forth at length in their report. The

Lords then passed certain resolutions that it was their un-

doubted right to review the bills sent up to them, and they

said that the writs issued at the commencement of a Par-

liament called them together to give counsel upon all ques-
tions which might arise, without any exception. (Hear.)
Thus the Lords asserted their constitutional claim, and
whenever such right came into collision with the Commons
the result must be an appeal to the nation, and if they were

'm the right they would override the decision of the Lords,

but if they should be essentially in the wrong the Lords
might correct the proceedings of the Commons. (Hear,
hear.) The real authority, however, rested in the nation,
which was the court of ultimate appeal. (Hear, hear.) It
was said most truly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer
that this was not the mere rejection of a money bill. It was
admitted that the budget was the reversal of a policy which
had long prevailed, and it was in that character that he had
viewed it, and as such the house had condemned it. It was
a scheme of innovation of financial policy, and it was remark-
able for two reasons; first it contained a remission of taxes
when there was a deficiency in the Exchequer ; and secondly
there was substituted direct for indirect taxation, upon a
principle capable of an indefinite extension, and that was in
reality what the House of Lords had checked and controlled
when they rejected the Paper Duties Bill, the passing of
which they believed to be opposed to the national sentiment
as it was opposed to the national interests. (Hear, hear.)
The question which had lately arisen had been noticed by
Hallam in his " Constitutional History," and he clearly
showed that the House of Lords had during the last century
rejected bills, and that both houses exercised their alleged
privileges when occasion arose, while at other times their
claims were placed in abeyance, and by the common con-
sent on all occasions natters had been compromised, there
having been no extreme assertion on either side. The prece-
dents referred to were unimportant, and for this reason, be-
cause they could not be analogous to this case, nor applica-
ble to the time in which they lived. The precedents to be
found were not the growth of laws, but of time and the
production of accident, and therefore a precedent applica-
ble at one time could not apply to another. For instance,
the precedent of 1678 was framed at a time when there
were no responsible ministers—when there was no Go-
vernment as it now existed—when there were no annual
budgets, and when there was no complete statement
of income and expenditure of the country. Consequently,
there was no elaborate review of the principles which the
Chancellor of the Exchequer might think fit to adopt.
Again, the revenue was voted for the natural life of the so-
vereign, and the control of the Commons over the affairs
of the country was extremely limited; and, further, the
power of the house was small. It was, then, no wonder
that the Commons should be tenacious in their power over
money bills ; for if money bills could have been originated
in or modified by the Lords, the Commons would have lost
their power entirely over the supplies of the country. He
therefore believed that the opposition of the Commons in
past times had not so much been directed against the
Lords as against the Crown—(hear)—because the Crown
endeavoured to act upon the Commons through the Lords,
the facilities for doing so teing greater in that matter than
directly upon the Commons. If they went to the other
branch of the Legislature they would find still greater
charges in the relations of the Lords to the Crown and the
Commons. He was surprised to hear the hon. and
learned member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) say that the
revolution of 1688 made no change in the Parliamentary
government of the country. He had always understood
that that event made a great change in Parliamentary Go-
vernment. It was the revolution of 1688 which placed the
Government of England in the hands of great families, and
from that period to 1832 the power of the peerage was im-
mense. Then peers made and unmade Governments by
their influence at court and their wealth, being relatively
so much greater before the extension of commerce, by their
close eonnexion with the landed gentry, and by their abso-
lute sway in many boroughs; they threw down Cabinets
with a power far greater than that either of the Crown or
the Commons. Therefore there was no necessity for ex •
citing a jealousy between the two Houses of Parliament
by the discussion of finance and money bills. The
financial arrangements of the country at that timedeveloped
themselves in the House of Commons, and the House of
Lords by their indirect influence accomplished all they
wished with regard to finance. No financial burdens were
imposed upon them as peers. As landlords they had a close
alliance and sympathy with the landed interest in the House
of Commons, and their feeling and interest as peers, on
matters of taxation and finance, were identical with those
of the dominant party in the House of Commons. But the
act of 1832, which was the constitution under which they
now lived, and which had strangely been overlooked and
forgotten by the assertors of privilege on this occasion,
changed all that. It made a great transfer in the powers of
the State to the middle classes and the constituencies that
elected the House of Commons. The Lords no longer di-
rectly or indirectly ruled the Commons; the landed inte-
rest was no longer dominant in the Commons. The com-
mercial interest obtained their due share of power, and in
the present session they had seen that they had obtained
something more. (Laughter.) The effect of the act of 1832
on the Lords was fully as great as upon the Commons. The
Commons became a truer representation of the nation be-
cause they ceased to be a representation of the Lords. In
proportion as the Commons were strengthened the Lords
were weakened ; but in the same degree in which the act of
1832 deprived the peers of the powers which they had
usurped it became only more necessary to secure and
strengthen that legitimate authority which the constitution
had intended they should possess. Losing their territorial
ascendancy, they were thrown back on those functional ser-
vices which became the condition of their existence. They
were established as the second council of the nation, in
order to provide for the nation that security which all con-
stitutional governments sought for in the existence of a
second chamber, viz., as a safeguard against the despo-
tism of democracy. (Opposition cheers.) But gentlemen
around him forgot those changes—forgot that the Com
mons, instead of being the weakest, was now the strongest
power in the state, and instead of defending its own rights,
threatened to override and absorb all other rights, and to
assume the whole government of the country. The Chan-
cellor of tho Exchequer, in his speech, last night, spoke in
the spirit, if not in the language, of those who looked upon
the House of Lords as something of an anomaly, to be tole-
rated only so long as they are conscious of their inferiority,
so long as they consented to register the edicts of the Com-
mons, and to receive from the assertors of privilege that
certificate of good behaviour which graciously prolonged to
them an existence on sufferance. The resolutions of the
noble lord were of greater importance from their dubious
character, as they suggested an inquiry which could not
long be delayed as to the real character of the constitution,
and the powers and functions of the other House. The
House of Lords had no exclusive privileges whatever that
he was aware of. The members of that house were country
gentlemen, owing their influence in their respective dis-
tricts to precisely the same cause as other country gentle •
men, not to the titles they bore, but to the property they
possessed. In their collective capacity, as a legislative
body, they were a national institution created by opinion,
and existing by opinion, and exercising no power exclu-
sively for themselves. Their power they exercised not in
their own name, nor by their own authority, but in the
name and by the authority of the people of the country, of
whom they are a part, just as much as they (the House of
Commons) were a part, and whom they represented consti-
tutionally just as much as they did.
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tleman having quoted the opinion
that view, went on to observe that the peers of England,
as contrasted with the peerage of any other country,
which was easily swept away by the first storm, had this
particular element of strength, that they were a body of
landowners, deriving their wealth from agriculture, which
was the greatest trade in the country. They were identified
intimately with the progress and improvement of the people,
They were erninantly distinguished by their habits of busi-
ness, by their knowledge of agriculture, by the management
and the improvement of their estates, and byan acquantance
with farmer and labourers, by their general knowledge, in-
terests, and feelings, and it was impossible to overrate the
deep and enduring sympathy which those qualities had won
for them from the people at large. The Lords discharged
functions absolutely essential to parliamentary government.
It was a mistake to suppose that because they were not
elective they were therefore not a representative body. If
there was no House of Peers in the country, it would be
necessary to create one. They exercised their power in the
name of the people, by the authority of the people, and even
as part of the people. (Hear.) That was not only a fiction;
in these days it was absolutely essential that it should also
be acknowledged to be the practice of the constitution, be-
cause if it were not, the peerage was'n fiction and could net
be maintained. The House of Peers had of late years
ceased to originate great public measures, especially when
they involved any policy of State as well as financial
bills, and the House of Commons now virtually directed the
Government of England. The Crown an.d the Lords no
longer governed ; .they moderated and regulated but they
andidixe:sio
supply3tn
i the movements of the stale; and it was this
th(Cheers.) But ng
Binfluerece which alone secured England from
d
of an uncontrolled, popular assembly.
as their influence could no longer be

brought to bear indirectly upon the Commons, it was the
more necessary that this direct influence on their part
should be strengthened and secured. The history of all
forms of constitutional government from the earliest times
showed the necessity for a second institution, separate and
distinct, which should not control legislation, or resist the
progress of improvement, but demand time for considera-
tion, compel the moving power to think twice, sad appeal

from excitement to sobriety. (Cheers.) Now he would
be asked how all this bore on the question of privilege ?
(Hear.) He would explain. If the Lords only claimed

s ,
that which he was sure the members of the House of Com-
mons could not deny them—identity of feelings and interest
with the nation at large—if they claimed only to be the

servants of the nation, employed in the same business as
the Commons, charged with the same interests, obedient to
the same authority, responsible to the same tribunal of opi-
nion, what interest could the country have in dispensing with
their services on great occasions, as auditors of finance ?

The nation had decreed that its business should be trans-

acted by two chambers ; the one popularly elected and
moved by every gale of public opinion. It was a mistake
to say that because the Lords were a permanent and inde-
pendent body they were, therefore, altogether irresponsible.
On the contrary, he believed there was no body responsi-

ble. They were the only important public body who held
power on the tenure of good conduct. A very few mis-
takes would jeopardise their position, and they discovered
that fact in 1832, when their defence of the rotton boroughs

brought them into so much disfavour. They had since re-
covered their position, and he believed that of the two
branches of the legislature they were really the most
popular at the present moment. At the same time
they were profoundly conscious of this fruth, that
they could only effectually oppose tke House of Commons
for one purpose, namely, to give time for the more matured

and decided manifestation of the national will. (Hear,
hear.) He could not conceive a more genuine responsi-
bility than that which their lordships exercised. They had
always acted upon it, and every impartial student of his-
tory must admit that there was no institution which, as a
whole, had shown so profound and correct a knowledge of
the feeling and movement of the nation, and had so steadily
in all times of political turmoil made the national sentiment
the basis of its own conduct. (Hear, hear.) Then upon
what grounds were they to exclude the Lords from their
share of national legislation ? Financial legislation in these
days assumed very different proportions to what it did two
centuries ago. It was now by far the largest and most im-
portant branch of the duties of the legislature, and to ex-
clude the Lords from finance was really to exclude them
from more than half of the legislative business of the coun-
try. (Hear, hear.) Were the Commons infallible in finance ?
Was there no hasty, no ill-considered, and no selfish legis-
lation on finance ? He believed himself that financial ques-
tions, especially those which must ultimately fall to the
lot of the Commons to decide, required the balancing and
regulating action of the Peers. He admitted, as everybody
must admit, that all financial legislation should originate
with the Commons, but it was no less aecessai y that there
should exist the reviewing power of a separate and inde-
pendent chamber. So strongly did he feel this, that even
if law and precedent combined, which assuredly they did
' not, to exclude the Lords from all share in financial legisla-
tion, he should say that as the effect of the Reform Act was
to give the predominance of power to the Commons, and as
the further effect of any other reform bill must be in the same
direction, it would be wise to arrive at some adjustment of
the relations and functions of the two Houses of Parliament
so as to secure their harmonious co-operation. When that
time did arrive, instead of limiting the action of the peers, it
would be better to relax instead of to tighten the restric-
tions which were now enforced. Such being his view of the
functions of the peers, he asked upon what grounds they
could challenge this last exercise of the undoubted legal
powers of the House of Lords ? The bill for the repeal of
the paper duty was submitted to the peers as part of a
scheme of financial policy based on the commercial treaty;
and if it were really and truly the opinion of the peers that
the promises held out by the Government were based on
treacherous calculations; that the privileges offered were
too dearly purchased ; that our manufacturers were still wait-
ing in the ante-chambers of the French court for the ad-
vantage originally held out to them ; that their roaring
trade was a bubble ; that while the trumpet of war was all
but sounding we durst not disregard the signal, and parsi-
moniously neglect our national defences ; that by the addi-
tion of a penny to the income-tax the House of Commons
would revolutionize our whole system of finance ; that the
promised surplus had become an inevitable deficiency; that
so far from remitting taxes it was the duty of the Ministers
to augment them ; if such were the convictions of the peers
what could they have done other than that which they had
done ? (Cheers.) They had simply done that which as
sworn and responsible legislators they were bound to do.
To their honoar be it said they had never for a single in-
stant hesitated, but by a majority unprecedented, and one
which derived still more importance from its character than
its numbers, they interposed that veto which checked the
Commons in its headlong, precipitate, and mad career ;
and they challenged for their act the verdict of the cows-
try. (Cheers.) Hon. members on that (the Ministerial)
side of the house said the peers had taken upon themselves
to impose a new tax, and to increase the burdens of the
country. That was a fallacy easy of explanation; for it
was notorious that the Lords had accepted the expendi-
ture of the country according to the estimate of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer as sanctioned and approved
by the House of Commons. They had not pretended to in-
terfere with the exclusive right of the House of Commons
to say what that expenditure should be, or to increase
the expenditure by a single shilling, but believing that the
credit of the country could not be maintained if the paper
duty were repealed they had not thought it their duty to
share the responsibility of leaving the country in an em-
barrassing position. The peers had not pretended to make
a budget, but they had distrusted the calculations of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had suspected the opera-
tion of his scheme until it had been submitted to the test
of time. All they had done had been to take a wide, neces-
sary, and just security that under the apparent remission
of one tax the necessity should not be established of im-
posing another of a more objectionable character. (Op-
position cheers.) The House of Commons was itself daily
assuming more power by establishing new precedents. At
the present moment all bills virtually originated in the
Commons, but it was only the natural and inevitable result
of the historic working of our system. This last act of the
Lords had not been dictated by any desire on their part to
brave and affront the Commons, but it was simply
the natural working of the constitution to meet and remedy
a definite emergency. The budget was in reality a financial
revolution into which the House of Commons had been
partly charmed and partly coerced. Many of those who voted
in the major:ty had their misgivings, but they did not see
their remedy. Their only remedy was the House of Lords,
which instinctively, from the nature of the circumstances,
supplied a remedy. The act of the peers was perfectly
natural and constitutional,and was a happy illustration of the
practical self-working of the English constitution. (Cheers.)
It was the unconscious encroachment of the Commons that
had quickened into life the dormant powers and latent quali-
ties of the Lords; and this admirable and healthful vitality
of the constitution, developing spontaneously new processes
to counteract new tendencies to disease, was the best
guarantee for its safety and durability. (Cheers.) But
this was not the constitution which the advocates of
"action" wished to defend ; their constitution was the
despotism of the House of Commons, the tyranny of a single
chamber, the absolute dominion of an unchained, uncon-
trolled, irresponsible democracy. (Cheers and disapproba-
tion.) That was a constitution which would indeed be an
anomaly, ruinous to England, fatal to every interest from
the highest to the lowest, from the peer down to the trader
and artisan ; for when the upper house of legislature lostits
independence, the lower would soon cease to represent the
true interests of the country. For this reason, because he
believed that the act of 1832 gave as much power to the
Commons as relatively they ought to have, and because he
agreed in what the noble lord the Prime Minister had
said, that the dangers to public liberty in the future were
more to be apprehended from the encroachments of the
Commons than from the usurpations of the Lords, he was
glad to find a majority of the house, tinder the noble lord's
guidance, prepared to justify the course which the Lords
had pursued. It was not a dangerous precedent if the
House of Lords had checked the House of Commons, when
the House of Commons had not consulted the interests of
the nation; and he only hoped that precedent would be
faithfully recorded and followed if any such occasion here-
after arose. It was for such occasions that the House of
Lords existed, to be sane when the Commons were wild—
(great cheering from the Opposition benches)—to postpone
an irrevocable mischief till the country had time to come to
its senses. They were the guardians of the constitution,
and on this occasion they had kept faithful watch, and
sounded an alarm which had raised the nation and arrested
the Commons in their irregular course. (Renewed cheer-
ing.) And if that arrest had been illegal, why did not the
Government and the House of Commons appeal to their
judges out of doors ? Was it because they knew that those
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the nation, and the Commons represented a Ministerial ma-
jority—that majority itself being of an equivocal and pre-
carious nature; for as the noble lord himself had shown, it
was a vanishing quantity; the third trial would have con-
verted it into a minority, and he was not sure that in that
division the noble lord would not have been found in the
opposite lobby to his own Chancellor of the Exchequer.
(Cheers and laughter.) The fact was, that they had on
this occasion no materials for a contest with the Lords. The
attempt had lamentably broken down. The law was not
with them ; the precedents were not for them ; constitu-
tional principle and policy were both against them—and as
for the country, if they appealed to that, the nation would
affirm what history would certainly record, that this ses-
sion of 1860 had been doubly memorable for the rashness,
the recklessness, the ruinous disregard of consequences that
had' marked the proceedings of the Commons—(cheers and
disapprobation)—and for the calmer courage, the dignity,
and patriotism that had shed alustre on the saving wisdom of
the House of Lords. (Great clamour and cheering.).
Mr. BRIGHT, who was much cheered on rising, said that
he was struck with a certain inconsistency in the right hon.
gentleman who had just resumed his seat. He was sur-
prised that the right hon. gentleman had not concluded by
moving that certain words of the first resolution should be
left out, and, indeed, that the declaration which the house