The Sun.
London, England, 1867-03-18 00:00:00

liberty, and their civilisation (ti-. 9 bien, tr. 3 bien).
Universal monarchy, which is the worst of all kinds
of despotism, and which, in fact, ends in absolute
power, because the master ever seeks to increase his
power in proportion to the extent of his dominion,

stifles the natural instincts of peoples; it becomes
the embodiment of their vices represented in a foolish
and cruel court. Then, when the master has for a
considerable time depraved his subjects—when the
subject has during the same time depraved their
master—universal monarchy ends as it did at Rome
under the barbarians, and as at Constantinople under
the sword of the Turks (ire bien, tres bien). It is
from that policy that Europe has happily escaped ;
and there we shall behold the greatness of our
country, and her providential mission. The con-
formation of modern Europe is very different from
that of olden times. The ancient world was com-
posed of states ranged round the shores of the Medi-
terranean, which, of ter having served the ends of
conquests, might also serve the ends of tyranny in
rallying round them the states of the Roman empire.
Modern Europe, on the contrary—composed of vast
continental states—hag its centre occupiel by a
nation great, powerful, heroic—the French nation
—which has always been an obstacle to universal
domination in Europe ; which has, at times, thought
for herself, and which has become the greatest actor
in the drama of modern history. It was against
France—it was to surround and overwhelm her—
that the first attempt was made to establish the
system of universal monarchy in Europe."
M. Thiers then entered into a long historical argu-
ment with a view to prove that from the time of
Charles V. down to the period of Louise Seize
France had fought, and fought successfully, to main-
tain the European equilibrium, and that her defeats
and disasters arose solely from her abandoning her
traditional policy of upholding the " equilibrium."
When Louis XIV., departing from the " traditional
policy," went to war " for a principle for the
Stuarts," he experienced the great disaster of La
Hogue. The first rule of "traditional policy" was
to keep exclusively in view the interests of the state.
The second, and most important, was to support
small states. If France had not ever pursued that
policy there would at the present time be only three
or four great states in Europe. It was owing to his
destruction of small states, and his pursuing the
system of " great agglomeration," thus disturbing
the balance of power, that a reaction set in against
him, and France was reduced to the frontiers of
1789, whilst the other great powers kept all they
had gained. He then went on to say :
" Well, after these great agglomerations of states

—so quickly accomplished but equally soon punished
—what has become of the equilibrium of Europe ?
France has been brought back to the limits of her
boundaries as they existed before 1789, whilst all
the neighbouring states have been aggrandised. No
doubt we ought to take the treaties of 1815 ; but we
must take tham with an intelligent hatred lest we
should replace them with treaties still more detest-
ible. Nevertheless, after the treaties of 1815, those
great agglomerations of states did not render the
European equilibrium impossible ? It was still en-
tire—in
fact, what could be feared ? Not the am-
bition of Austria or of England. England and Aus-
tria were satisfied ; and we have recently witnessed
illustrations of the fact so far as the former power
is concerned—first, in the abandonmentof theionian
Islands, and afterwards in the declaration that she
would only defend Canada so long as that colony
choose to be defended by the mother country. What,
then, were the ambitions that we had to dread ?
That of Russia in the East and of Prussia in Germany.
+haven preserve me from offending those two coun-
tries in stating the fact! Ambition is the characteristic
of young nations—it is the principle of their vita-
lity ; it would be puerile to blame them, still more
so not to be on our guard (trLs Bien, tres Lien !)
What counterpoise, then, could be brought to bear
against those two dangers ? If Russia advanced in
the East, Austria and England could resist her;
and if they were not sufficiently strong France
would unite her force to theirs, and the result could
not be doubted. If Prussia menaced Germany,
Austria—not then dismembered--in allying herself
with the Germanic Confederation, might have re-
sisted, and with France maintained the European
equilibrium. The scales were in the hands of
France. I ask pardon of those who rejoice to see
the treaties of 1815 destroyed, but I think we have
reason to regret them. (Interruption.) Allow me,
gentlemen ; there were in those treaties two distinct
things : first, the frontiers (and on that point they
can never be remembered without sorrow ; but you
know whom we are to blame for that) ; then the
European equilibrium, now a dead letter. Was

that equilibrium compromised by the treaties of
1815 ? No ; for the increased armaments you are
now asked for, what are they to be employed in but
to restore it ? That equilibrium was false, I con-
fess, during the existence of the Holy Alliance ; but
from the time that alliance ceased to exist France,
having received the boon of constitutional govern-
ment—first in 1814, then in 1830—has been the
representative of liberty in Europe. On that ac-
count she was put under the ban, and the whole
Continent remained united against her. England
on some occasions united her force with ours ; on
others against us. When she was with us matters
went on easily enough ; when ranged against us I
must confess they became difficult of solution.
But that liberty which constituted the danger of
France also constituted her strength. She had
Governments against her, but the peoples were
on her side (ties bien). From this tribune, which
has been restored to us, I thank the Sovereign and

all those who have contributed to its restoration.
(Applause.) From this tribune—sometimes accused,
but of which history will relate that if the greatness of
France has been menaced the fault was not her own
—during a period of 40 years flowed a current of libe-
ral ideas which dissolved that conspiracy of foreign
governments, and those governments were in 1848
scattered like chaff by the blast which rose from France
(Partial applause.) The equilibrium has been re-
established, and we reaped the fruit in the Crimea.
In that war Russia was alone ; interest had replaced
prejudice ; Austria and Prussia remained neutral ;
the first power sensibly leaning towards France, the
second against Russia. We triumphed, and for my
part, I have always paid a tribute of homage to the
Imperial Government for having undertaken that
war; for, in my eyes, the first interest to be consi-

. .
dered was the interest of the country. (Tres Bien.)
Yes ; thanks to that liberal breath from France
which dissolved the Governments of old-fashioned
prejudices—thanks to the Crimean war—the equili-
brium was re-established, and the counterpoise re-
stored. But why did we not rest satisfied with that?
Suppose that since the Crimean war we had not ex-
pended thousands of lives and hundreds of
millions of money for the Italian and Mexican

expeditions, to what height would not our grandeur
have risen? (Partial applause.) We should not have
a single difficulty to contend with. How came we to
abandon a policy which, at the time of the Crimean
war, made us so great and so powerful? That policy
was abandoned because the country was not in the
enjoyment of its liberties. (Slight uproar.) Weil,
we have been told that all our liberties would be
successively restored to us, and I am heartily grate-
ful to whomsoever does so; but if they are restored
to us, it is clear that we must have been deprive of
them at some previous time. (Uproar.) It is a
favourite saying just now that the concentration of
power conduces to the grandeur of states. You will
see that such is not the case. What is real liberty
judged by its results? Why, it amounts to this—
the country transacting its own business. (Applause.)
When the country is free a wide field is thrown open
to national activity; the country is both actor and
spectator in the national drama of political life.
Well, it was requisite to find a substitute for the
suspended liberties of the country, and hence the
departure from the sound foreign policy to which I
have just adverted. Now, when I had first the honour
of addressing you in 1864 you permitted me to
point out that liberty was very difficult and very
' costly to replace. One of the first substitutes was
great public works, entailing vast expenditure. (No.)
Then it was found necessary to discover other sub-
stitutes, and a new-fangled pg)licy of nationalities
and great agglomerations of -peoples' was resorted
to. French liberalism had all the defects, as well
as the qualities, of the national character, and to
my mind it has shown itself faR too enthusiastic and

cosmopolitan with regard to foreign affairs. First,
it took up with warm interest the cause of Poland ;
next, it conceived an ardent passion for Italy. Now
we are all sincere friends of liberty, and wished
Italy to be free, to be released from the miserable,
petty tyrannies which doomed her to a regime alien
to our age. But I have always thought that the
consequences of the Crimean war would alone be
sufficient to enable Italy to achieve that degree of
liberty she was fit for, and that on more lasting and
substantial bases than those on which she now rests.
(Partial applause.) As for Italian unity I have
never hesitated. I, too, have numbered illustrious
Italians among my friends; most are now dead;
but some few, though arrived at the furthest limits
of old age, are still able to hear me. I told them :
The unity of your country—never ! If I had the
honour of directing the affairs of France, all the
energy I may possess I would devote to preventing
the unification of Italy. (Uproar.) Her freedom,
yes ! her unity, no ! Thus an attempt was made to
ground our foreign policy on the emancipation of
Poland and the unity of Italy. No doubt it met
with some applause. The press, unable to write a
line about liberty in France, wrote about the liberty
of Italy and about the liberty of Poland. (Laughter
and uproar.) I am not censuring—l am only ex-
plaining. A current was thus created which dragged
its creators with it, and the wise men, whose convic-
tions I respect, without sharing them on that point
—the wise men who dread the freedom of the press
had an opportunity of discovering that a press when
not free can do quite as much mischief as if it were.
Well, this current dragged everybody along with it.
(Interruption.) Why, gentlemen, I am suggesting
an excuse for very serious faults—you should accept
it. But it was not deemed sufficient to make the
principle of nationalities and the great agglomera-
tions of States a theme for discussion—they were
converted into formidable realities. But before I
proceed to show how from mere theory that policy
went on to practice, so thoroughly as to achieve the
unity of Italy and Germany, I wish to say some-
thing about this principle of nationalities."
[M. Thiers then went on to demolish the doctrine
that identity of race and language alone constitutes
separate nationalities ; and went out of his way en
passant to have a fling at Italy and Prussia ; and
finally came to the " sad realities" which were the
natural result of the introduction of these fancy
principles into politics.]
" Europe, as an impartial judge, holds that we,
and we alone, have made Italy.' It would be re-
plied, he knew, that it was necessary to do so ; and
all the old arguments would again be pressed into
the service, that it was necessary in order to pacify
Europe, which would never be pacified while Italy
was not completed. Well, see how you have paci-
fied Europe (sensation). It was necessary to
weaken Austria.' See what you have gained by
weakening her. Again, we were securing Italy as
a faithful ally ; last year you saw Italy did not hesi-
tate to strike a fatal blow at our policy, by forming
an alliance with Prussia. Italy, it is true, declared
that she bad no such intention. She had autho-
rised. our Ministers to proclaim it, but she had done
it nevertheless (sensation). So you see you have
not pacified Europe. You have gained nothing by
weakening Austria ; and you have not gained an
ally. Then there was another argument—the rights
of peoples. Really that is not serious ; a people is
never an isolated abstract community; if it has its
rights, the rights of its neighbours are equally en-
titled to respect. Suppose that to-day the Eastern
Christians wished to throw themselves into the
arms of Russia—there could be no doubt as to their
right—but would you allow them to do so ? (sensa-
tion). The right of a people is founded with their
blood. If the Italians had single-handed been able
to achieve their unity, then, without absolutely ac-
knowledging their right I could understand their
pretensions ; but with what have they founded their
unity? With the blood of France. What was
their right founded on ? Identity of language
—and on such grounds you have expended the
blood and treasure of France in au under-
taking the results of which will turn against you.
Yes, you made Italy, without securing any guarantee
for France, and without any lawful right on her part
to claim your aid. But are those the only dangers
to which the unity of Italy leaves you exposed ?
Three years ago, in this Chamber, I pointed out
that Italian unity would surely beget German unity ;
would stultify your policy by compelling you to
turn against Austria, whose alliance is necessary to
you both in the East and in Germany. Those were
my words three years ago ; have they not been veri-
fied ? (Sensation.) Let us, therefore, hear no
more about the force of circumstances— it was you
who were the real force of circumstances in Italy.
But how about Germany ? In Germany unitarian
ideas had more than once manifested themselves.
Under what circumstances? When the Germans
feared the phantom of French ambition those ideas
rapidly spread throughout the country. But the
phantom disappeared, the alarm subsided, and the
aspirations towards unity simultaneously vanished.
Some trace of them may have lingered, but in what
degree and under what form ? Those aspirations
were to be found among the Prussians, whose
craving for unity was natural. That constitutes
their greatness. But even in Prussia the Demo-
cratic party had sense enough to understand that
unity under Prussia meant despotism, and therefore
that party would have none of it. It wished for a
unity in the shape of a Federal Parliament—a form
which was least obnoxious to us. There was also
the German Liberal party which is the most nume-
rous ; in spite of the successes and the repression
of lucky despotism, that party wished for liberty
under the rule of its princes. Like the Democratic
party it had the good sense of perceiving that unity
under Prussia would be despotism under its most
onerous form, and now• the small states are pain-
fully aware that they are about to be taxed three
times more heavily in men and money than they
used to be under their own princes. What the
members of that party wanted was quiet, secure,
and cheap liberty. Further, they were anxious to
preserve their old customs, their old-fashioned quiet
ways, their various modes of worship, their various
fruitfulness of mind, which last century gave Ger-
many so many illustrious men—Liebnitz .in Han-
over, Kant at Koenigsberg, Schiller and Goethe at
Weimar, and Mozart at Vienna. That party should
have been kept up ; it should not have been de-
prived of its chief alliance—that of Austria. But
the blind hatred of Austria prevailed with
our political innovators. They imagined that
they could achieve Italian unity without bringing
about German unity. Therefore Count Cavour
and King Victor Emmanuel were allowed to take
Tuscany. In virtue of what right ? Because at
Florence Italian was spoken as at Turin—in fact,
rather better—(laughter)—but like at Turin. For
the same excellent reasons they were permitted to
take Naples and Palermo, and a portion of the States
of the Church ; and yet it was actually supposed
that this new system would not cross the Alps, and
that there would not be found in Germany a Minis-
ter and a King who would feel tempted to apply the
same doctrine to the smaller German States. Such
an expectation betrayed, if 1 may say so, a degree
of trustfulness amounting to simplicity. Well, what
happened ? The Danish throne having become va-
cant, a general cry was raised throughout Germany
—not that the whole of Germany uttered th-at cry ;
but there, as elsewhere, it is sufficient that one party
should shout for the clamour to be set down as
' the voice of the nation.' (Laughter.) Well, they
shouted, they speak German in the Duchies, so
the Duchies belong to us !' I defy it to be proved
that Prussia had any other right over the Duchies
—that she had a snore legitimate right than that of
Victor Emmanuel over the Italian provinces now
annexed. And now the Duchies belong to Prussia ;
nevertheless, the interest of Europe required that
Denmark should retain the Duchies, and she would
have retained them but for France. Let us suppose
that France had not existed, Prussia would never
have ventured to withstand Russia, Sweden, and
England. But France existed. Had she had the
courage of being inconsistent, and said, I found
the principle of nationalities a good thing in Italy ;
but I think it a bad thing in Germany ;' and if she
had joined England and Russia, Denmark had been
saved ; but France had not the courage of being in-
consistent. She declared that the populations must
, be consulted. Denmark was sacrificed. We were

told at the time that the peace of Europe had been
thus preserved. It was preserved when it stood in

no danger ; it was sacrificed when it would have

been requisite to save it at any price. But when the

weak is sacrificed an avenger remains in the shape

of the victim's spoils, which brings about inevitably
a quarrel among the spoilers." (Loud applause.)

Here the sitting was suspended for a short time.
On resuming, M. Thiers said
"In considering recent events, I am tempted to exclaim
with Bossuet, 'A man was found.' Not that I wish to
establish any comparison between Cromwell, to whom the

quotation applies, and the bold Minister who has so rapidly
raised Prussia to greatness. The parallel would make M.
de Bismarck a worse, but also a greater man than he is.
(Laughter.) But, considering how wonderfully adapted
he has shown himself to the task he has undertaken, I
cannot help saying, Yes ; a man has been found endowed
with rare political sagacity, still greater boldness, and
whom his countrymen must consider as a great patriot.'
He should have been terrified at the idea of finding him-
self backed by nineteen millions of Prussians only, with
thirty-six millions of Austrians and fifty millions of Ger-
man confederates arrayed against him. Prussia then
thought him mad, but the Minister had perfectly judged
the situation: He saw that Austria was utterly unpre-
pared, and could only oppose him with half her forces, the
other half being engaged in Italy. He also discerned that
not only Italy compelled Austria to divide her forces, but
that she paralysed the forces of Prance, involved in the
meshes of her policy. To this sound view M. de Bis-
marck owed his success. Why did wo not see thinks as
clearly as he did ? Had we done so his triumph might
have been converted into disaster. All that we required
to do was to discern that, whatever the issue of the war,
it would bo unfortunate for us ; that the equilibrium of
Europe would be upset ; that the position of Franco would
be affected ; that in no case could there be any profit—
and, above all, any territorial profit—for her; and, finally,
that we had but one word to say to prevent the war. It
was easy to justify these assertions. As regards any
amount of profit, and especially any territorial advantage,
that France could hope to derive from the war, it was
well known that the ruling passion in Germany was to
retain possession of every inch of German soil. Whoever
won the conqueror must be a German, and you know what
Prussia, who was in a better position than any other power
to make such a sacrifice, replied to us on the morrow of
Sadowa, 'No ! I cannot, without ruining my prestige in the
eyes of Gormn.ny, part with the smallest particleo of
national territory.' Therefore, take it how we would, we
could hope for no territorial advantage (tres bien). But it
may be questioned that a word from France would have
sufficed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. It was not
necessary that that word should have been arrogant. There
could be no arrogance on the part of France to tell Italy,
have created you ; you are indebted to me for your exist-
ence; I cannot consent to perturbations which must alter
the balance of European power at my expense.' I repeat,
would it have been arrogant on the part of France to have
thus addressed Italy ? (No, no.) And, as regards Germany,
we were equally justified in speaking the word that would
have prevented the war. The treaties by which we gua-
ranteed the Germanic Confederation conferred upon us the
right of declaring that our forces would be turned against
any aggressors of the Confederation. Austria, who only
went to war out of a sense of honour, as Venetia was de-
manded of her, even without fighting, would have hailed
such a declaration as fallen from Ilefeen ; and Prussia,
who considered her alliance with Italy a pledge for the
neutrality of France, would also have held back, and there
would have been no war. I know it has been said—and it is
a calumny which circulates in unguarded terms when pub-
lic and in very broad terms in private—that that word had
become impossible ; it has been said that this Chamber had
so energetically pronounced in favour of peace that the
Government could no longer utter that indispensable word.
I appeal to the Chamber—whilst expressing ita wishes in
favour of peace, did it refer to that cowardly and shameful
peace which would have reduced the Government to say in
substance—' Let the Italians, the Austrians, and the Prus-
sians cut each other's throats, and the balance of power take
care of itself ?' Is that, I repeat, the kind of peace the Cham-
ber wanted ?
" A Number of Voices—No, no.
" M. Rouher Certainly not.
" M. Thiers—Yes, the Chamber was anxious for peace

—but the peace of Europe, not the peace of France alone.
(Loud applause). The Chamber had very clearly discerned
that war was desired not by. Austria, who reluctantly made
up her mind to it, but by Italy and Prussia. The uhambcr
saw clearly that only one word was required which Prussia
and Italy should understand, and wanted that word to be
spoken. (Sensation.) It is alleged that the Chamber
paralysed the Government. Well, although I have not the
honour of representing the majority of this house, I say
that if the Government had come down and asked you for
supplies to enable it to speak that word, you would have
voted them with acclamations. (‘ We would, we would.)
aTphpiesar
a,h calumny,eie therefore,has
also
been a talk
vanishes' I trust never to re-
of another policy which
I had stigmatised beforehand, and which consisted in con-
tracting an alliance with Prussia, with a view to earn the
reward of such en union. But that policy can never have
existed. What ! to France's dishonour, her Government
would have accepted same fragment of Germany as a bribe
to acquiesce in German unity. The proof that that policy
can never have existed is that no one has been found to
avow it, and it were a great shame were it otherwise.
"A Voice—Then why allude to it ?
"M. Thiers—Here is what has occurred. Our Govern-
ment waited, dawdled, and trifled, hoping that something
would turn up. Something has turned up—the greatness
of Prussia. (Sensation.) But we are told that it was im-
possible to foresee the course of events. This is quite
true, and nothing can be more rash than to indulge in pre-
dictions on the eve of a battle; but there is one thing that
could bo foreseen, that the issue, whatever it might be
would be unfortunate for us, and that is why the war
should have been prevented. (hear, hear.) It is also
said that Prussia displayed qualities she was not suspected
of possessing. In the first place, a Government is gene-
rally provided with means of knowing what takes place
abroad. But, however, let us not dwell upon that. People
talk of the new armament of the Prussian armies, but you
should have known all about that. But was it the arma-
ment that decided the fate of tho battle of Sadowa ? It is
now nototions that up to two o'clock in the afternoon the
advantage was in favour of the Austrians. What prevented
their carrying the day ? The want of forty or fifty thou-
sand men on their right to check the advance of the Grown
Prince of Pruss,ia, who, had he arrived ono hour later,
might have arrived too late. Now where were these
50,000 missing Austrians? Why they were at Custozza—
and it was not only 50,000, but 110,000 who were fighting
the Italians between the Mincio and the Adige. Draw your
own conclusions. It was Italy that decided the course of
events in Germany, and I repeat that I regret that a boldly
inconsistent course on the part of France should not have
been adopted to prevent such a calamity as the unity of Ger-
many following close upon that of Italy."

Here M. Thiers gave a sketch of the resources which the
North German Confederation placed at Prussia's command,
and noting the tendency of the Southern States to join the
North, pointed out that practically the Cabinet of Berlin
had the control of 40,000,000 of Germans on the French

frontier. He also referred to the Eastern queseon, and,
disclaiming any intention to hurt the feelings of Russia, he
pointed out the danger of Constantinople falling into the
hands of Russia, and argued that sound policy should be
directed to prevent such a contingency. He denounced
the idea of creating a Christian empire at Constantinople,
as a chimerical scheme, worthy only the advocates of the
principle of nationalities, and then proceeded:—
" Commonsense, therefore, indicates that we should keep

the Turks there, not that we like them, but because they
are there. But it is said they are barbarians. Yes, they
are, but they are not more so than those who seek to re-
place them. A statesman of the most lofty intellect deli-
vered the other day on this subject a speech full of sound
practical sense. I could wish that there should be at Constan-
tinople a Power more congenial to our views and custoi,ls,
but commonsense commands us to accommodate ourselves
to circumstances, and consequently maintain the Turks at
Constantinople. The most sagacious men ask themselves if
a treaty of alliance does not already exist between Prussia
and Russia. I know not, but I know there is something
mere grave than a treaty of alliance —unison of interests—
and it is that which constitutes theveritable alliance. (Par-
tial applause.) There was no treaty of alliance between
Italy and Prussia early in the month of April last, and that
treaty was concluded in 24 hours, because there existed
unison of interests between the two countries. This con-
stitutes the double danger of Europe at present. It is true
that the Emperor of Russia is wise, and that M. do
Bismarck is an able man. Neither seeks to precipitate
events ; but the situation of Europe depends, it would ap-
pear, upon the wisdom of a sovereign and the prurience of
an ambitious minister. Events, last year, were in the hands
of France, and now they are in hands of Prussia and
Russia. This is the change that has taken place in the situa-
tion. (Partial applause). What course of conduct, then,
must wo follow ? I admit that in such a position we can-
not attempt to work miracles. We have two political sys-
tems to choose from, and ono of those I unequivocally re-
pudiate, and which it would be iniquitous on the part of
France to pursue. I mean the policy which has for its ob-
ject the agglomeration of States—the policy which con-
sents to follow the ambitious. France, in adopting such
a policy, would render 'herself odious to tho whole world.
German unity would become accomplished ; the East
would be invaded ; and whilst Prussia and Russia would
meet with little effective opposition on the part of Austria
and Turkey. France would encounter serious difficulties in
advancing towards the Scheldt. Such a policy, as I have
said, would be iniquitous. We should be at the same time
the most guilty and the most severely punished. (Partial
applause.) The most wise and reasonable policy would be
to place France at the head of all threatened interests ;
and to revent the occurrence of further injustice. (Tres
Bien, tres Lien.) 1 do not desire war; it would only be an
extravagance on our part which would precipitate events.
Let us, then, admit what has been done, but let us also de-
clare that we will tolerate nothing further. War ? No ;
a thousand times no. Peace suffices, as is proved by the
guarded attitude which Prussia maintains towards us. She
avoids wounding our national susceptibilities ; she finds