The Sun.
London, England, 1804-06-28 00:00:00

two tides, they rose up like, an, eternal barrier to
the incursions-of either: So far reached, the Preroga.
• tive ot Majesty. Thus far was the privilege of the
-Peer to come. And here stood the People, formidable
their strength, to maintain the balance of both,
determined to support, for each, and for all, Liberty.
Ands.o long as they are thus checked and balanced
by the pOwer 'of • each other, the Commons cannot
become Republican, the Nobles Aristocratic, nor
the Monarch- a Tyrant. lioWever, though by the
joint operations of their wisdom, and by their
• united assent,. all laws are established ; yet the
KING alone is the executor of these laws. And
hence he req{iires all the force and j tint aid of
wisdom to give energy and moderation to his ac-
tions. He is therefore invested with various Preroga.
tives, whose Bounds may be extended, but cannot be
coniraded ; and amongst others, with that of ap-
pointing his Ministers. But, though the Executive
Power appoints, it is the Parliament which pays
His Majesty's Ministers. For were they to appoint
them they would become the Executive Power, and
the.government would he Republican. And were
they to appoint, and to pay the Ministers, it would
be most highly dangerous. For those appointments,
in such a Republican system, would soon be guided
by Party, and the same Factious influence, which
should prevail in the one instance, would not with..
hold the wages of iniquity, nor restrain the opines.
sions of the Minister in another : hoping soon .to
possess the same power themselves, and to enjoy the
same reward and the same immunity.
It is therefore constitutional, and it is altogether
agreeable to right reason and justice, that as the
Ministers are the Confidential Servants of His MA.,
J ESTY, called to aid him in his councils and execti:
tive trust, he alone should nominate them. For, by
the Constitution, though they be answerable for
their administration, and he can do no wrong, that
is, his person is inviolable, yet the Revolution
hath taught us that the cmdttd 'of the Mini-
ster, which is Obedience to the Monarch, has shaken
the Monarch from the throne. &mold nor the So..
vereign, therefore, have the exclusive, uninterrupt-
ed, unbiassed nomination of that Servant whose ape.
rations must always afea his Government, and may
perhaps endanger his NiOnarcitical power ? It is
his Constitutional Right : 'it is a reasonable Preto-
gative of Majesty.
The power of impeaching those Ministers is,
however, lodged with the Coornons ; because the
Executive Power exists but for the advantage of the
Poblic. If the Minister, however, of that Power,
direct it not to the good but to the hurt of the Pub-
lic, then it behoves the Representatives of the Peo.
ple, who are-their immediate Guardians, and with
whom the sacred trust of their Rights is deposited,
to step'forward and prosecute this Nlal-administra.
tion. AU laws and conventions, with resped to
the limitations of Regal Power may be broken : the
refusal of Subsidies, however, in such cases, which
,is an immediate weapon against the King in the
hands of the Commons, might afred the whole State,
and therefore ought not to be with-held: but Sub-
sidies, when obtained; may likewise be applied dif-
ferently to their design.: as the dernier resort, and
the engine of salvation against such abuses of Power,
the Minister is answerable with his head. The
People, who are the sinews of Government, have
'consequently committed their strength into the
hands of their Representatives, arming them with
the collcdive powers of the Nation ; and the Con-
stitution authorizes and commands the Commons to

thunder forth their vengeance in Impeachments,
sum, tnoning'His Majesty'. Mitisters to death when
guilty of public crimes. Such is the Right of the
Commons. .

The importance of deciding on crimes of such
magnitude is best fitted to the supremacy of the
Peers, who form the High Court of Judicature in
other causes. Hence they are Judges in the first
instance, from whose decision in the last there lies
no appeal. Nor can we sufficiently admire the
wisdom of the, Constitution, which has established
this judicial power. High dignity and circumstances
of ratik render. these Judges independent : their ho-
nour springs up with'and gathers strength froni ele-
vation : they judge openly befpre the Public, 'fling
open their doors tor their admission, and print'their
proceedings for their inspeCtinn ; they axe partly
composed of, and always attended by the ablest In-
terpreters of the Law. Can imagination devise a
Court superior in its arrangements can the present
wisdom of the Universe, or all the Monument of

Antiqujty, boast its equal ? Such is the exalted Fri.
vilege of the Peers.

(in 'these solid gtotinds, acc'rding to the Consti.
Lotion, are the-Peers to shin judgment on Mini-
sters,-and the Commons to prosecute them. But if,
contrary to the great principles of the Constitu.
Lion; the Commons were both to nominate and to
prosecute, or the• Lords to nominate and to judge,
then the King might pardon his Ministers. Where.
as, now the impeachment is brought against the
Ministers of the Monarch; nominated by hiinse?f, for
the purposes of Executive Power, and this impeach.
ment may be founded even on obedience to his man.

dates. He, therefore, ought not to interfere. For
thus he would support his own illegal corrsmands,
by setting aside the condemnation of his Ministers.
Thus too he would mock the Power of the People,
by shielding his Minister's head, that only objel
for national vengeance and example. For on the
Minister alone can the Commons by impeachment
invoke, or the Peers by judicial authority pro-
nounce sentence ; and not on the Sovereign. This
would be to invest themselves with Executive

Power ; because, as the Sovereign alone has the
_.. . _ _ _

Right of Mercy and Pardon, so it is his awful Fiat
that gives force to a Dcath.warrant. Whoever

assumes that right over him, becomes ipso fado the
Supreme anti Executive Power; and with the KING
the Monarchy expires. Hence that wise maxim,
" the KING can do no wrong."
These Constitutional reasons are, I conceive, suf-
ficient and satisfaCtory ; to which, however a mul-

titude of ethers could he adduced, to display the
wisdom of the Sovereign's sole Prerogative to nomi-
nate his Ministers, the Right of the Commons to
prosecute their crimes, and the privilege of the Peers
to judge them. Any deviation from these fixed
principles of our Monarchical Government, by,
either or both House; of Parliament interfering