The Sun.
London, England, 1867-02-21 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS

TlMES.—Dockyard debates are almost as mysti-
fying as dockyard accounts, but it may, perhaps,
simplify the present controversy if we explain and
discriminate between the complaints of the public,
the apologies of officials, and the promised measures
of reform. On the first point there is very little
uncertainty, for even the stanchest defenders of the
existing system have no difficulty in discerning and
expressing the opinions prevailing around them.
The general idea, says.the Duke of Somerset, is that
" an enormous sum of money is annually expended
on the navy, and that the country does not receive
an equivalent return—does not, in fact, get the
money's worth." The notion floating about, says
Stansfeld, is that " dockyards, if not nests of
jobbery, are at least scenes of waste which, in its
economical effect, is almost as serious." No doubt,

these are correct representations of the popular be
lief. Mr. Seely himself could not have stated the
case against the Admiralty more plainly, and such,
indeed, is the reputation of the board that, as Mr.
Stansfeld frankly added, " somehow or other, Idon't
know why, everybody seems inclined to believe every-
thing that is said against it, and nobody seemsready
to believe anything that is said for it." The ques-
tion therefore is whether, and to what extent, this
universal opinion is erroneous. It will be in the
.reader's recollection that the Duke of Somerset, who
is now credited with the authorship of the pamphlet
ou Naval Expenditure to which we recently referred,
described the Admiralty as the victim of a prejudice
created by resentment on the part of disappointed
officers and impatience on the part of taxpayersput
we shall find quite enough in Tuesday's debate to
give another colour to the conclusions of the coun-
try. Mr. Stansfeld's apology for the Department
was based upon the improvements which had been
effected since its condemnation by the Report of a
Committee seven years ago. The language then em-
ployed in speaking of the Admiralty was not, be said,
applicable to it at present. Yet he agreed directly
afterwards with Mr. Seely himself, and admitted, in
the very terms of the proposition before the House,
that there actually was " a want of efficiency in the
control and management of the dockyards." All he
contended for was that the defect was due, not to
the constitution of the Board, but to the bad organi-
sation of the subordinate departments, and the ab-
sence of due responsibility ; so that he acknow-
ledged the evil, but disputed the remedy. At the
same time, he seemed desirous, as did other
speakers,
of mitigating or qualifying the imputa-
tions attaching to the department, and on this
point, therefore, we had better at once appeal to the
authority of the First Lord himself, who spoke on
the occasion with remarkable plainness and candour.
I pledged myself last year," said he, " that I
would endeavour to ascertain what were the real
errors in our dockyard system, and what remedies
could be found. I have tried to redeem that pledge,
sparing no pains in making inquiries both in the
dockyards and elsewhere, and the conclusion I have
arrived at is this—that the worst thing we have to
complain of is a certain laxity which characterises
the whole system ; that laxity I attribute mainly to
the fact, which you cannot disguise, that these are
vast establishments.carried on for the most part by
Ipersons who have no direct pecuniary interest in
economy." • We can only observe that if this is the
" worst thing," it is quite bad enough, and that it
is amply sufficient to account for the expenditure of
money without the production of money's worth.
But, now it must be asked how far this laxity of
system is inevitable, or to what extent it may admit
of correction, and we shall soon find that the in-
quiry will lead us to the very pith and marrow of
the controversy. The Duke of Somerset, Sir
John Pakington, Mr. Stansfeld, and Mr. Childers
all concur in impressing upon us that we cannot
reasonably expect the economy of a private esta-
blishment in a public dockyard. It is not merely
that we miss the close and energetic supervision
given to affairs " where every shilling tells on
the profits of those who manage them," but that
the national establishments are, in point of
fact, required to do much more than is done in the
yards of private shipbuilders. The dockyards are
not merely places in which ships can be built at lei-
sure. They are, and they must be, establishments
equal to the support, maintenance, and repair of the
fleet in times of emergency. Their resources ;mist
not only be at any time in apparent excess, perhaps,
of actual needs, but capable of sudden expansion.
The cost, therefore, of the work performed in them
cannot justly be measured by that of work done in
a yard where nothing is required except to build a
particular ship as economically as possibi'. That, in
in a few words, is the standing defence of the Ad-
miralty whenever it is said that a ship which could
be built for £150,000 by contract costs £200,000 at
Portsmouth ; and to a certain extent the justifica-
tion is complete. But the complaint of the public is,
not that there should be an excess of charge arising
from this inevitable obligation, but that nobody can
tell whether the excess is reasonable, or, indeed,
what it actually amounts to. And when it is asked
how this mystery comes about w e are referred to
the system of " dockyard accounts" as being at once
imperfect and unintelligible. To this point Sir J.
Pakington fearlessly went. There is an officer called
the Controller of the Navy—at this moment, by
common consent, a most efficient man. With him
Sir John took counsel, remarking that in theory, and
according to presumption, he was " the head of the
dockyards,': and " really controlled and managed"
them. So, " I asked him," says Sir John, " Can
you do it ?' He said ' I cannot do it.'" Here, there-
fore, by the description and confession of the First
Lord of the Admiralty, we have " vast establish-
ments" in which no person is under any inducement

to practise economy, and which are practically be-
yond the control of the officer reputed to be their
controller. Is it any wonder that for the "enor-
mous sums of money annually expended on the
navy" the country should " receive no equivalent
return ?" Is it necessary to imagine a popular
prejudice in explanation of the public discon-
tent ? Is there not rather an antecedent pro-

bability in favour of all that is said by Mr. Seely
and his supporters ? What, however, is the remedy ?
Sir John Yakington consistently looks for it in an
accurate, comprehensive, and intelligible system of
accounts, and to obtain this he naturally looks for
a qualified accountant. Accordingly, he proposes
the appointment of a Superintendent of Dockyard
Accounts, who is " to give his whole time, with such
reasonable assistance as he may require, to the con-
stantcontrol and management and superintendence
of the great financial expenditure which the Dock-
yards incur." By this method it is hoped that we
shall get plain facts and figures to go by, and, if the
expectation is fulfilled, we shall then be able to see
whether the outlay on our Fleet expresses extrava-
gant waste or only unavoidable costliness. But we
should be understating the question if we repre-
sented it as financial only. It turns mainly upon
money, no doubt, but still there would probably be
little debate about our naval " expenditure" if the
country were satisfied with its Navy. Mr. Seely,
however, justly observed that the Admiralty could
not " challenge us on the results." The Fleet pro-
duced by all this outlay is not a good Fleet. We do
not mean to disparage our present fighting ships,
but simply to say that the Navy is never aeknow-
ledged by naval men to be at any given moment

such a Navy as it ought to be. Just now we are
perhaps less in arrear of the age than usual, but the
First Lord of the Admiralty, however he may
qualify his words, has said enough to show that our
position is not satisfactory. We complain, there-
fore, not only of expenditure, but mismanagement;
and, indeed, it is mainly for the purposes of ad-
ministrative reform that a verification of expendi-
ture will be useful. This verification, as the first
step to improvement, we hope soon to see, but in the
meantime we must protest against the charges of
exaggeration and credulity which some very young
officials brought against the press and the public.
Enough was said in the debate, enough has been
quoted in these remarks, to justify all the discon-
tent expressed out of doors. We have no doubt
that the Dockyards contain, as Sir John Pakington
plaintively alleged, " gentlemen of as high honour
and as sensitive feeling" as Mr. Seely himself ; but
when it is admitted that they are all working with-
out the least motive for economy, and with a laxity
characterising the whole system, it is surely
reasonable in those who must pay the bill to find
some fault in the proceedings, and to require some

effectual reform.
THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE ON THE DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

—There is often a close connection between the
domestic and the foreign policy of sovereignty.
A monarch that shows little regard for the rights
of his subjects, little regard for the feelings and
the interests of the several orders of the State,
will not be very scrupulous in the observance
of treaties, or very equitable in his dealings with
neighbouring nations. Thus, to give but one
example, the flagitious partition of Poland by
the Governments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria
in the last century, was but a too faithful
symptom of their violent assaults on the civil
liberties of their people, the rights of the Church,
and the doctrines of Christianity. And ass the
Constituent Assembly of 1789 developed the re-
volutionary maxims of despotic sovereigns in regard
to the Church and the people, so that Assembly
and its successors failed not to carry out the
lessons of international law which they had learned
from the same • 'august authorities. The foreign
policy of the present Emperor of the French has
been determined by his internal system of go-
vernment. I attempted to show on the last occa-
sion the course which he might have pursued, and
which would have redounded to the happiness of
France, and might, I think, have eventually proved
beneficial to his family. And I did not conceal
the fact that even with the best intentions the re-
vival of the Imperial rule was beset with the most
formidable difficulties. These difficulties, how-
ever, which from the state of parties in 1850, and
by reason of the failure of issue on the part of the
Duke de Bordeaux, and on account of the unpopu-
larity of the House of Orleans with the Catho-
lics of France, were not so great as they might
at first appear—might by honesty and wisdom
have been overcome. Imperialism, founded on
popular election, possesses not the same stability
as Royalty, based on hereditary succession ; and
when, moreover, it has by its policy alienated
from itself the clergy, the nobility, and the wealthy
and intellectual classes, it must seek its support
sometimes in the disorganised masses, devoid as
they are in France of all corporate rights ; some-
times in the military force, making the one or the
other the instrument of its ambition. And an Im-
perialism, the heir of so much martial glory, and
withal of so much civil tyranny and disorder, was,
perforce, driven into a policy of aggression to-
wards other States. It was cradled and nurtured
in war, and by war it must live and flnurisli.
When in November, 1799, the illustrious Gorres,
then a young man, had, with others, been deputed
by his Rhenish countrymen to lay a complaint
before the First Consul, Bonaparte, he wrote to a
friend, after an interview, that Bonaparte's staring
eye and restless gait made him augur ill for the
future peace of Europe. And though I must say
that in 1850 I was one of those who put faith in
the promises of Napoleon 111, yet when he declared
after his election to the Imperial throne, that he
had prayed by his uncle's tomb, and there sought
inspiration for his futury policy, I began to have
serious misgivings for the happiness of France and
the peace of Europe. Napoleon I. was a sort of
saint in whose patronage, I must confess, I had
little trust. The first war into which the Emperor
of the French dragged Europe, was one provoked
by the imprudence of the Russian Government—
I mean the Crimean war. Its object was specious,
and deceived, many well-thinking men. It was
designed, as was alleged, to check the 'ambitious
aims of Russia in the East, to protect the com-
merce of the other nations in the Mediterranean,
and to rescue from • destruction the Catholic mis-
sions in the Levant. These objects were laud-
able; and the victory of. the Allies in the,Criniea
insured a temporary success to their policy. But
the same results, as I shall show, could have been
obtained by other means. Instead of a wise and
definitive settlement of the Eastern queStion, to
be brought about by a happy concert among the
Christian Powers of Europe, what were the imme-
diate results of the. Crimean war? The decrepit
empire of Turkey, destined (as Napoleon TII. well
foresaw) to be the source of fresh contests and
fresh complications, was artificially upheld in Eu-
rope ;—Greece, with an unnatural distribution
.of territory, was left in a false, embarrassed posi-
tion ;—Austria and Russia were henceforth bit-
terly divided ;—Prussia was enabled to pursue
more easily her cherished scheme of ascendancy in
.I.Termany ; the revolutionary Government of
- Piedmont was introduced to the flattering notice
of Europe ; England, partly by her fatal patron-
age of revolutionary principles, partly by the loss
of the Austrian alliance, was more and more
shunned,., more and more isolated from the coun-
cils of the Continent ; and lastly, France was
rendered for a time the arbitress of Europe. The
French Emperor had succeeded in his object. The
European alliance, weakened by the disastrous
events of 1830, was now Utterly destroyed. That
alliance, if it had committed some faults, had, on
the whole, preserved the independence of States,
and crushedout the embers of the anti-Christian
and anti-social revolution. Its destruction left the
revolutionary field open to the game of politics,
and to schemes of aggressive ambition. Viewed
now by the light of subsequent events, the Cri-
mean war appears an immense mistake. The happy
solution of the Eastern question would have
been, I think, first, the expulsion from Europeof
those Tartars, " encamped, as M. de Bonald once
happily said, on the soil of Greece," and which
after four centuries they have not settled, nor
even tilled ; next, a redistribution of the territory
of ;the kingdom of Greece, including those portions
of Europe still under Turkish dominion ; again,
an open trade to all the Western States. After the
termination of the war in the Crimea :there was a
temporary lull in Europe. The French Emperor
cast about his falcon eyes to see what kingdom would
next be his prey. The fears of innocent people were
quieted by the famous declaration at Bordeaux,
" L'Empire c'est la paix." But, as the same
authority has more than once, like the ancient ora-
cles, indulged in dark, enigmatic sayings, are not
these words susceptible of two interpretations ?
'They may mean, as is commonly supposed, that
the Second Empire, different from the First,
shall be pacific. But may they not also signify
that Peace is the Empire, or is Imperial—that
is to say, that peace can be secured only by
a compact or well-extended empire that shall
have swallowed up neighbouring States, or
at least reduced them to extreme weakness? The
like ambiguities are certainly found in the sibilline
oracles, and later events would seem to authorise
the second interpretation of the famous words I
have cited. Certainly, the Pax Imperii of the
Romans was the result of universal conquest.
There were some hints in the French press to show
that the idea of an invasion of England was not
quite foreign to the French Emperor's mind. A
vague suspicion of such a scheme certainly flashed
across the popular mind of England. But the
noble rising of her people—the prompt arming of
the different corps of volunteers—one of the most