The Sun.
London, England, 1867-12-19 00:00:00

FRAUDS ON THE TREASURY.

It is well and publicly known that enormous
frauds have been perpetrated on the Treasury, and
that colossal fortunes have been made at the public
expense. This species of corruption has increased,
is increasing, and if not diminished will soon bring
us into total ruin and disgrace. Public creditors
and taxpayers are alike interested in an honest ad-
ministration of finances, and neither class will long
endure the large-handed robberies of the recent
past. For this discreditable state of things there
are several causes. Some of the taxes are so laid out
as to present an irresistible temptation to evade
payment. The great sums which officers may win
by connivance at fraud create a pressure which is
more than the virtue of many cAu withstand, and
there can be no doubt that the open disregard of the
constitutional obligations avowed by some of the
highest and most influential men in the country has
greatly weakened the moral sense of those who
serve in subordinate places.

PRESIDENT'S POWER TO APPOINT OR REIIOVE SUBOR-

DINATES.

The expenses of the United States, including the
interest on the public debt, are more than six time,
as much as they were seven years ago. To collect

and disburse this vast amount requires careful super-
vision, as well as systematic vigilance. Our system,
never perfected, was much disorganised by the
Tenure of Office Bill, which has almost destroyed
official accountability. The President may be
thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable,
dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution, but,
under the law which I have named, the utmos`, -we
can do is to complain to the Senate and ask the
privilege of supplying his place with a better: man.
If the Senate be regarded as personally car Politi-
cally hostile to the President, it is naturt,i, akd not
altogether unreasonable, for that offi•-.ar to expect
that it will take his part as far as poisible, restore
him to his place, and give him a triumph over his
executive superior. An officer has other chances of
impunity arising from accidental defects of evidence,
modes of investigating it, and secrecy of hearing.
It is not wonderful that official malfeasance should
become bold in proportion as delinquents ail];
themselves safe. I ant entirely persuaded that un'ler
such a rule the President nannot•perform the great
duty :IE-signed to him of seeing the laws faikhfrtily
executed, and that disables hint most especially
from enforcing that rigid accountability which is
necessary to the due txecutiou • of the revenue
laws. The Constitution invests the President wi b.
authority to decide whether a removal should be
made in any given case. The Act of Congress de-
clares in substance that he shall only accuse such
as he supposes to be unworthy of their trust. The
Constitution makes him sole judge in the premises,
but the statute takes away his jurisdiction, transfers
it to the Senate, and leaves him nothing but the
odious and sometimes impracticable duty of becom-
ing a prosecutor. Prosecution is to be conducted
before a tribunal whose members are not, like him,
reponsible to the whole people, but to seporate con-
stituent bodies, and who may hear 'his accusation,
without great disfavour. The Senate is absolritely
without any known standard of decision applicable
to such a case. Its judgment cannot be anticipated,
for it is not governed by any rule. The law doea
not define what shall be deemed good cause for re-
moval. It is impossible -.even to conjecture. what
may or may not be so considered by the Senate.
The nature of the subject forbids clear proof. If
the charge be incapacity, what evidencJe will sup-
port it? Fidelity to the constitution. may be un-
derstood or misundersiood in a thousand different
ways, and by violent party :men in violent party
times, unfaithfulness to the constitution may even
come to be considered Meritorious. If an officer be
accused of dishonesty, how shall it be made out ?
Will it be inferred from acts unconnected with pub-
lic duty, from private history, or from genera repu-
tation ; or must the President await the commission
of an actual misdemeanour in office? Shall he, in the
meantime, risk the character and the interests of
the nation in the hand of men to whom be cannot
give his confidence ? Must he forbear his complaint
until the mischief is done and cannot be prevented?
If his zeal in the public service should impel him to
anticipate an overt act, must he move at the peril of
being tried himself for the offence of slandering his
subordinate? In the present circumstances of the
country some one must be held responsible for offi-
cial delinquencies of every kind. It is extremely
difficult to say where that responsibility should be
thrown if it be not left where it has been placed by
the constitution. But all just men will admit that
the President ought to be entirely relieved from
such responsibility if he cannot meet it by reason of
restrictions placed by law upon his actions. Unre-
stricted power of removal from office is a very great
one to be trusted even to a magistrate chosen by
the general suffrage of the whole people, and ac-
countable directly to them for his acts. It is un-
doubtedly liable to abuse, and at some periods of our
history perhaps has been abused. If it be thought
desirable and constitutional that it should be so
limited as to make the President merely a common
informer against other public agents, he should at
lead be permitted to act in that capacity before
some open tribunal, independent of party politics,
ready to investigate the merits of every ease, fur-
nished with the means of taking evidence, end
bouLd to dt Chic according w established rules.
This would guarantee the safety of the accuser
when he acts in good faith, and at the same tune
seeure, the rights of the other party. I speak, of
course, with all proper' respect for the present Se-
nate; but it does not seem to m: that. any legis:a-
tive body can be so constituted as to insure its fit-
ness for these functions. It is not the thewy of.
this Government that the public offices are the
pm operty of those who hold them. They are given
merely as a trust for the public benefit, sometimes
for a fixed period, sometimes during good beha-
viour; but generally they are liable to be tenni-
' nated at the-pleasure of the appointing power,
which represents the collective majesty and speaks
the will of the people. The forced retention in
office of a single dishonest person may work great
injury to public interest. Danger to the public
service comes not from the power to remove, but
from the power to appoint ; therefore it was that
the framers of the constitution left the power of re-
moval unrestricted, while they gave the Senate the
right to reject all appointments which, in its opi-
nion, were not fit to be made. A little reflection
on this subject will probably satisfy all who have
the good of the country at heart that our best
course is to take the constitution for our guide, and
walk in the path marked out by the founders of the
Republic, and obey the rules made sacred by the
observance of our great predecessors.