The Sun.
London, England, 1858-07-07 00:00:00

LOS' DON, WED:NESDAY EVENING, JULY 1858.

growth of the British Empire, that it had_now reached a
point when it beeeme a subject cif speculation as to
what power might be intriguing against us. The enemy
might stand in positive geographical communication
with cur frontier, and it had become a serious matter for
Modern statesmen to consider whether an army in
Europe might not bo carried to India. The conse-
quence etas, that wars bad been advisedly for local in-
fluences, but having far more reference to Europen in-
terests, and on that account it was necessary the house
should seriously contemplate the imposition of such a
restriction as that which he was about to suggest. He
would refer to two invances of wars in India as illustra-
tions of his argument. They were the war with Afighan-
istan and the war with Persia. What was the political
effect of those operations ? What was the magnitude
of the scale on which they were conducted ? The
war with Aflghanistan was the subj-ct of long pre-
vious consideration ; it was not a sudden unforeseen
necessity ; it was the fruit of long and deliberate con-
sideration, and if it had been necessary to appeal to
Parliament before it was commenced there was no
doubt it could have beau done without the least danger
or inconvenience. It was entered upon without such a
reference, athough a large section of the House of
Commons disapproved of it—so much so indeed that at
one time while it was in progress the right honourable
baronet the member for Carlisle gave notice of his inten-
tion to challenge the Minister upon the subject; but, from
motives of state policy, it was found impossible to bring
the motion on, and Parliament was excluded from pro-
nouncing an opinion upon a war that involved the lives
of as many subjects of the Queen as the Russian war,
and added between 12,000.0001. and 15,000,0001 to the
debt of India. Let the war have been right and neces-
sary, it did not matter for his purpose ; that was not his
point. What be said was that it was a matter upon
which Parliament ought to have something to say ; but
no opportunity was afforded for saying it. It was impoF-
sible to refer to the judgment of Parliament after the
war had commenced. At a much later date an attempt
was made to challenge the judgment of Parliament upon
it, but it failed. With regard to the Persian war, the
case was still more apparent ; it came nearer home by
many degrees to the rights of the British people and the
privileges of the house. When the Government of the
day gave orders for their military operations in Persia,
they appeared to have felt that it would be unjust to
impose on the people of India the entire burden of the
war. Accordingly, they made an arrangement under
which the immediate cost of the war was to devolve upon
the East India Company, but a portion of that cost was
to be reimbursed by Parliament. In the autumn of
1856 the order was sent out for commencing military
operations in Persia ; in February, 1857, Parliament
met, but there was no special or direct reference to the
war in the speech from the throne or the address. The
Government were asked whether they inteided to take
any vote upon it, and they replied that they did not.
The Parliament which existed when the war with Persia
was begun was dissolved without its having had an op-
portunity of saying whether it was an assenting party
to the operations ; and yet it was during the existence
of that Parliament that the whole expenditure was in-
curred. Again, he would not say one word upon the
policy of the war—he would assume, if they liked, that
there was a public necessity for alt the measures taken.
His doctrine was simply this, they were measures to
which Parliament ought to have been a party. If such
a precedent were allowed to grow into a practice it
would amount to a perfect nullification of the privileges
of the House of Commons, which were most vitally con-
nected with the liberties of the people, and therefore he
strongly urged upon the house the necessity of placing
some restraint in this respect upon the future ac ion of
the Government. He concluded by moving the follow-
ing clause, viz. :—" Except for repelling actual invasion,
or under other sudden and urgent necessity, her Ma-
jesty's forces in the East Indies shall not be employed
in any military operation beyond the external frontier
of her Majesty's Indian possessions without the consent
of Parliament to the purposes thereof."
Lord STANLEY did not rise to reply to the argu-
ments of his right hon. friend, but merely to observe that
though he did not quite go the length of his illustrations,
he yet concurred with him in the opinions he had ex-
pressed, and should therefore offer no opposition to the
introduction of the clause. The reason such a clause
was not introduced into the original bill was this ; it was
felt that although such a clause would be valuable as a
declaration of the intentions and opinions of Parliament,
still, as a practical check upon the Minister, it would
not have much force. It was a matter of importance,
however, that there should be placed formally on record
some notice of the intentions and feelings of Parliament
on the subject, and as such a declaration he accepted
this clause. In that light ho regarded it, in that sense
he accepted it.
Sir G. C. LEWIS said that if this clause was adopt-
ed, it should be considered in what way Parliament
should give its oonsent to an Indian war, in which it was
not necessary to vote supplies. It was unconstitutional
for Parliament to interfere directly.

Lord PALMERSTON would not argue the question
in regard to the past wars to which his right hop.
friend (Mr. Gladstone) had alluded, except to observe that
the war with Persia more especially was announced to
Parliament in the most formal manner in the Queen's
speech at the opening of the session, and that any mem-
ber who chose to do so had thus the opportunity afforded
to him of raising the question, and taking the opinion of
Parliament upon it. He concurred with his right hon.
friend that it was not in accordance with the principle
of the constitution to require the assent of Parliament
to be obtained previous to declaring war. The funda-
mental principle of the constitution was that the declar-
ing ef war and the making of peace rested with the
Crown upon the responsibility of the advisers of the
Crown, arid it would be to introduce a principle destruc-
tive of the British censtitution to maintain that the as-
sent of Parliament was necessary either for the declaring
of war or the making of peace. (Hear, hear.) He was
astonished, therefore, that the Minister of the Crown
did no rise and protest against doctrines so incsn4istsnt
wi!li the principles of the constitution. (Hear.) But apart
from the constitutional question, he wished to address
himself for a moment to the wording of the clause. First,
his right hon. friend proposed to enact that her Majesty's
forces in the East Indies shall not be empl, yed in any
military operations beyond the external portion of her
Majesty's Indian possessions without the consent of
Parliament, except to repel invasion. Now, invasion
could only he repelled within the dominions of the coun-
try invaded. This part of the clause, therefore, was some-
thing like what, had it emanated from some hon. gen-
tleman from the other side of the Channel, would have
been called a bull. (A laugh.) Bnt what was meant
by her Majesty's forces in the East Indies I Was it the
local army or the Queen's troops, being part of the regu-
lar army, but stati ,ned in India for the time, that these
words were intended to refer He imagined that the
restriction was meant co apply only to the Indian army,
because if not, it would prevent any of the Queen's
troops serving in India from being nieved to carry on
military operations in other parts of the world without
the previous steps required by the clause. But suppose
a war was to break out with China or with Turkey, and
it was found necessary to remove some of the Queen's
troops serving in India to take part in suck war—was it
intended that those troops should be placed regara to
their employment on a different footing from the troops
at the Cape, the Mauritius, or any other part of the
Q teen's dominions Ile presumed that the, at all
event,, was not what the noble lord (Stanley) intended,
and if riot, be would re,pectfully submit to the noble
lord that he had been somewhat hasty in Adopting this
clause, and that it would be well it he would take fur-
ther time to consider it. (Hear.)
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER—The
noble lord says that by the constitution of the country
the Sovereign alone possesses the power of peace and
war, and therefore he objects to the prise:pie of this
clause. No doubt the constitution places in the hands
of the Crown the power of declaring war and making
peace, but what we have been considering is a state of
affairs which is not under the consti•ution of this coun-
try. (Cheers.) Though the power of peace and war rest
with the Sovereign, practically the constitution gives to
the House of Commons the control in the power of vot-
ing or withholding the supplies for carrying on war. But
in the case of India, if the power of declaring war and
making peace is left with the Sovereign entirely,when that
power is once exercised there are no means of control,
and a policy might be pursued which might be extremely
injurious to the interns sof the country. The instances
to which the noble lord referred as showing the incon-
venience which might arise from accepting this clause do
not, in my opinion, apply. The noble lord argued that if
any portion of the Queen '+ troops serving in India should
be wanted to carry on military operations in China or in
Turkey, we could not, under this clause, so employ them.
My answer to that is that if the Queen's ttoops should
be so required in China or in Turkey, it must be in
consequence of the exercise of the prerogative of the
crown under the constitution of this country in declar-
ing war— (hear)—and in that case the Housoof Contemns
would have the power of exercising its constitutional
privilege by voting or withholding the supplies and con.
trolling the powers of the crown—(hear, hear)—there-
fore, although perhaps some alteration may be necessary
in the language of the clause, I am of opinion that it is
not, as the noble lord supposes, an attack upon the pre-
rogative of the crown, but a wise and politic provision.
(Cheers.)

Lord J. RUSSELL concurred in the general policy
of the clause, fpr the reasons which the right hon. gentle-
man had stated. If the clause passed in its present
form it would prevent the sending of any of her Majesty's
f trees in India beyond the frontier without the consent
of Parliament, and the deity and publicity consequent
on bringing the matter before Parliament might lead to
the failure of an operation such as the capture of .Java.
Therefore, whilst agreeing in the policy of the clause,
he thought some alteration was required in the wording.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL would submit to the
right hon. gentleman (ittr. Gladstone) whether his
object might not be effected in a more satisfactory
manner by inserting, instead of the words, "in the East
Indies," "maintained out of the revenues of the East
Indies." (Rear. bear.)

Mr. WILSON said, that what he presumed his right
hon. friend (Mr. Gladstone) wished to provide was, that
a similar check should be had in the ease of Indian wars
to that which exiAted in the case of European ware. Ho
thought that object would be best effected by inserting,
instead of the word, " her Majesty's forces in the East
Indies," &c., the words, "the revenues of India shell
not be employed," hc.
Mr. GLADSTONE said he bad no objection to snake
the alteration suggested by the Solicitor General, which
he thought would meet the case. He did not think
the alteration suggested by his hon. friend (Mr. Wilson)
was a desirable one.

Lord PALMERSTON would remind his right hon.
frirnd (Mr. Gladstone) that the Queen's troops stationed
in India were paid out of tbo revenues of that country
as well as those of the Indian army.
Mr. GLADSTONE ob,erved that the noble lord's
tatment w quite correct, but the hioratat the