The Sun.
London, England, 1867-11-20 00:00:00

opinion that the course pursued was not the most desir-
able, but the greater part of the observations of the noble
lord referred to a period far antecedent to that for which
her Majesty's Government are responsible. He objected
to the mission of Mr. Rassam, and thought that a
Minister charged with the important function of repre-
senting the Crown should have been sent to Abyssinia
with a small escort of cavalry. I can only say that if my
noble friend had volunteered to undertake such a
mission with a troop of the Hampshire Yeomanry —(laugh-
ter)—l should not have had the least objection to his try-
ing his persuasive powers on King Theodore. (Laughter.)
No more certain plan could be adopted to lead to absolute
discredit and failure than the sending out of a Minister
with a small escort, incapable of protecting themselves,
and certain, if Theodore objected to the mission, of being
altogether destroyed or taken into captivity. Mr. Ras-
sam was sent out because he was considered perfectly
competent to deal with the question. He was received
with great cordiality and attention by King Theodore, and
then suddenly, from some of those caprices which seize
the minds of semi-barbarous people, he thought fit to
change his tone, and to prove the depth of his attachment
by putting Mr. Rassam in prison. Mr. Rassam was the
bearer of letters from the Queen, which were treated by this
potentate with utter contempt. He was the bearer also of
presents, but falling under the displeasure of the King, he
was informed that he and other prisoners should be de-
tained until certain artificers, whom he desired to instruct
his troops, were sent out. That was the position of
affairs when we acceded to office. Mr. Flad arrived in
July, and in October he returned to Massowah, bearing an
autograph letter from the Queen, and also bearing with
him certain presents, an assurance that if the prisoners
were released her Majesty would overlook the past, and
continue to entertain for him sentiments of friendship. At
the same time we sent out a certain number of artificers,
who were to be handed over to the Emperor on the delivery
of the captives. Upon the arrival of the artificers at Mas-
sowah he expressed great pleasure at receiving the presents
but he said nothing about the release of the captives, and
that being considered by Colonel Merewether a one-sided
proceeding, he was informed that the presents would not
be delivered until the prisoners wero released. In the
month of April, 1867, my noble friend and relative at the
head of the Foreign Department sent a peremptory de-
mand requiring the release of the prisoners, and three
months wore given to Theodore for deliberation. The
papers were received by him on the 13th of June, but
from that time to this not the slightest notice has been
taken of the communication. Now, my lords, so stood
matters when Parliament was about to be prorogued ; and
as some question has been raised, partly with regard to
whether all other means had been exhausted, and also
whether Parliament had been fairly dealt with by the
Government in the matter, I hope your lordships will
allow me to refer to a debate which took place in the House
of Commons on the subject on the 6th of July. The noble
lord then quoted at length from the debate in question, and
in which Mr. Henry Seymour, by whom it was initiated,
Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Mr. Layard declared that an
armed expedition was absolutely necessary for the release
of the Abyssinian captives. It is said that the first inti-
mation of the intended expedition was on the prorogation
of Parliament. The explanation of that is perfectly simple.
In the commencement of the month of June my noble
relative applied to obtain the most, perfect information
which could be obtained from India and from other sources.
That information was not received till the 13th of August,
when we first received the intelligence which led us to
believe that we might with a very reasonable prospect of
success send an expedition for the accomplishment of our
object. On the 21st of August Parliament was prorogued,
and it was not till the 19th that we came to the determi-
nation to send out the expedition. We therefore on the
21st gave Parliament the earliest possible intimation of our
intention. There has been no desire to conceal anything
from Parliament, and there has been no contradiction be-
tween the language of Lord Stanley before obtaining in-
formation and the subsequent decision of the Government
to send out an expedition when we did obtain informa-
tion. We determined that the expedition should be sent
out from India, and, for the purpose of having undivided
control, we appointed to the chief command an officer
who bad gained the highest reputation in India, and on
whose ability and talents we placed entire reliance. We
left to Sir Robert Napier to say what force he required,
what amount cf equipment and armament of every
description. Your lordships will find from a blue-book
shortly to be laid upon the table that the greatest possible
pains have been taken that the expedition should be sent
out with every means and appliance which could possibly
be suggested. I may say here that that expedition is en-
tirely of an Imperial character. It has been supposed
that there was no power on the part of the Crown to em-
ploy Indian troops except in India. That, however, is a
misapprehension. The prohibition is as to the Crown
applying any portion of the revenues of India fcr the pur-
pose of paying troops for any external war, and thereby
withdrawing from Parliament the consideration and the
control which Parliament ought to exercise with regard
to furnishing the means of carrying on war. There is
nothing in the Crown employing Indian troops, but it is
illegal to apply Indian revenue to the payment of the
troops, except with the consent of Parliament. Now, we
do not intend to impose one shilling of burden on the
revenue of India. India will only have to furnish the ordi-
nary pay of the troops, as if they were still in India ; every
other charge will be borne by the Imperial revenue. With
regard to the object and purpose of that expedition, I
thought nothing could bo more emphatic than the lan-
guage of the Speech. that the expedition had been sent for
the release of the prisoners, and for that alone. Having
effected the release of the prisoners, the force will at once
retire from Abyssinia. As to the suggestions of occupying
that country, establishing sanatoriums, and God knows
what besides, such ideas never crossed the minds of her
Majesty's Government. We have not the slightest inten-
tion of going one step beyond the release of the prisoners.
(Hear, hear.) I turn now to one or two of the other
topics of the Speech. The noble lord who last sat down
expressed regret at the paragraph containing a
hope that the Emperor of the French might find him-
self able to withdraw his troop■ from Rome as early
as possible, and thus remove every ground of misunder

. -
standing between the Governments of France and

Italy. I am glad to find from the Emperor's Speech
that Lis view entirely coincides with the view
expressed by her Majesty's Government, and that he sees
the near-approach of a time when his troops, having ac-
complished their object, may be withdrawn. The noble
earl (Russell) has commented on the September Conven-
tion, and on the arrangement which enabled the Popo to
employ a number of mercenary troops. Her Majesty's
Government were no parties to that convention, and it
is not the duty either of her Majesty's Government or of
any British statesman to comment on the terms of a con-

vention between Franco and Italy alone, and which they
alone are bound by. Neither does her Majesty's Govern-
ment think it necessary to express any opinion as to the
Emperor of the French in sending an expedition, which
ho no doubt felt called upon to send, for the purpose of
protecting the Pope, not against the Italian troops or the
King of Italy, but against bands of invaders who bad

escaped the vigilance of the Italian Government. Having
effected that object, I think I may say on the part of the
Emperor that the earliest opportunity will be taken of pre-
venting auy future misunderstanding by withdrawing the
French troops. A noble baron opposite expressed the
opinion that no hasty decision would be come to with re-
gard to the Conference on the Italian question. We have
received an invitation to join in the Conference which the

Emperor of the French proposes. We have neither ac.
_ _ _

cepted nor declined that invitation. In the firstvplace we
should be most happy to second the efforts of the Emperor
of the French to restore peace and secure Italy against
future complications, aid on personal grounds I am bound
to say we should feel it a satisfaction to be enabled in the

slightest degree to relieve the Emperor of the French from
the state of embarrassment in which this matter involves
him in his own country, in return for the cordial friend-
ship and goodwill which he has never failed to exhibit
towards this country—(hear, hear)—but there are various

subjects which are necessary to be considered. First, is
the Conference acceded to and accepted by Italy and the
Pope ? To call for a Conference to arrange the affairs
' '

of two countries, neither of which concur in being re-
presented in that Conference, and neither of which

would hold themselves bound by the decision, would be
a superfluous waste of diplomatic energy and ability.
(bar.) Again, where the points of divergence are so

groat as between the programmes of Italy and the Pope,
we may reasonably desire to know, before entering into a
Conference, what is the basis on which it is proposed the
decision shall rest. To proceed without such a basis, or to
discuss the affairs of Italy and the Papal See, would be
only to launch on an interminable sea of difficulty, which
leads, not to ultimate success, but to ultimate disaster.

The answer we have sent to the invitation of the Emperor
of the French is a desire to know whether the consent of
Italy and the Pope has been obtained to that Conference ;
and next, whether any basis is to bo submitted. I turn

with regret to the next paragraph of the Speech, which
treats of the Fenian conspiracy. I regret, too, that the
nada earl (Russell) should have cast an undeserved impu-
tation on the Government first, and then on the local autho_

rities of Manchester, for what he considers great remiss-

ness in respect to guarding the Fenian prisoners. If there
is any blame, which I do not admit, it dons not attach to
her Iti,jesty's Government, because it is entirely attribut-
able to the courso pursued by the local police at Manches-

ter. The noble earl misapprehends and misrepresents the
course which was pursued. He says these Fenians were
sent under the protection of three policemen alone. That
is not the case. They were sent under the special guard
of twelve policemen, some on the van itself, and others
following in a cab, for the purpose of affording assistance ,•.
but it never was conjectured by the local authorities in
Manchester that an attack would be made in broad day-
light, in what may be called the middle of the town of
Manchester, of so determined and violent a character, and
therefore the policemen were only armed with their ordi-
nary weapon, and of course were no match for fifty or sixty
men armed with revolvers, and quite prepared to take life,
if necessary, for the purpose of effecting their object.
(Hear, hear.) Ido not think, therefore, the police of Man-
chester are liable to the imputation of recklessly discharg-
ing their duty.

Earl RUSSELL - Was not a telegram sent from Dublin
to Manchester, giving warning of the intended rescue?

Earl of LE BY-ZThere iaa a notio)
.from Dublin to