The Sun.
London, England, 1858-12-30 00:00:00

ERE SUN, LONDOA, THURSDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 00, 18583

of destruction impending, whether by fire or other
danger incidental to the sea.
We shall be at once told that in the itroWelea
emigrant or troopshie our remedy vir'oilldi be inap-
plicable, since a sufficient number of boats licould not
be stowed on board. We are prepared to maintain
that sufficient boats can be stowed to carry the ful-
lest complement of passengers or troops Conveyed
in any ship, and that it is therefore as much the
duty of the Legislature to require that such boats
shall be carried, as it is to limit the number of per-
sans conveyed by any land carriage to such a num-
ber as may be safely carried by it. A similar law
requiring that no ship should carry more persons
on board than she had boat accommodation for,
would very quickly produce the desired result, and
difficulties which appeared insurmountable when
seen through the mingled and conflicting atmos-
phere of Christian duty and worldly interest would
spedily disappear when viewed in the unobscured
light of commercial enterprise.
The spirit of emulation and competition, and the
keen desire for pecuniary profit would soon, as by
magic, build boats and rig davits, and find out
blank spaces of stowage-room. We must not, how-
ever, be satisfied with vague generalities, or
trust even to the all-potent motive of worldly
interest, which more frequently busies itself
in seeking to evade the law than in endeavouring
to turn it to best account. It is, therefore, indispen-
sable in the first place that the
,number, size,
description, and place of stowage of every boat on
board a ship should be exactly defined and subject
to official inspection and approval, so as to leave no
loophole through which they who would dis-
honestly evade the :law might obtain advantage
at the expense of those who conscientiously abided
by it. The necessity of such definition being
granted, we will proceed to explain the exact
character of those requirements which we think
might be advantageously defined and rigorously
insisted on.
I. That there should be a sufficient number of
boats to carry every person on board a ship, each
fitted as a lifeboat, of the size and description as
per given standard, hoisted to davits at the vessel's
sides, fitted with Clifford's or other sanctioned im-
proved lowering apparatus, and having always in
her such articles of equipment as should be defined
by law.
11. That every such boat should have painted on
her exterior, in legible and conspicuous characters,
the number of persons she was legally authorized
carry; in order that every passenger, or other
person on board, could, at any time, by adding the
total numbers together, satisfy himself that there
was lifeboat accommodation for all. It would also
be a manifest advantage that every boat should be
of corresponding size, so as to take an equal num-
ber of persons on board. Thus, if each was autho-
rized to carry 30 persons, it would be readily cal-
culated that 10 :boats would carry 300, and
the number would be so familiar to every one, that
in the hurry of taking to the boats, the regulated
safe cargo of each would be more certainly known
and less likely to be departed from.
111. That on leaving port, and at certain inter.
vale during every long voyage, the captain of the
ship should muster all hands, and call over the
names of the officer to take charge, the crew to
work, and the passengers to embark in each boat
individually specified;
IV. That the boats of every passenger ship
should be especially and carefully inspected and
reported on by the appointed Government Inspec-
tor previous to each voyage. A t present, the
inspection of ships' lifeboats is of no service, as
there is no fixed standard, and it is notorious that
the generality of those in passenger ships, and
nearly or quite all of those in our coast passenger
steamers, are a mere sham, unentitled to the name
of lifeboats.
We will offer some remarks on the above recom-
mendations to make plain their practicability, and
to meet any objections which may be made against
them.
lstly. As to the number of boats to be carried,
and their places of stowage, How and where
could a sufficient number be stowed to suffice for
a full cargo of passengers ? In reply to this
question, we must acknowledge that there might
be difficulty in stowing a sufficient number of
ordinary boats to take on board them all the
denizens of a crowded passenger ship; if, therefore,
such boats only are carried, the rights of humanity
call for the interference of the law, which should
allow no more passengers to be carried than should
be proportional to the number of boats. But by
the aid of the Berthon collapsible lifeboat, the diffi-
culty of stowage can be at once got over, and any
passenger ship may carry on board, in readiness for
instantaneous lowering on the occurrence of danger,
as many boats as she could carry passengers to
occupy them. Thus, it will be acknowledged that
a ship of 2,500 tons, such as the Austria, could
readily carry, if a screw vessel, six pairs of boats'
davits along each of her sides, or if a paddle-steamer,
five pairs besides those of her paddlebox-boats. This
number, supposing each boat on board capable of
carrying 30 persons, would give boat accommoda-
tion for 360 persons. But we showed in the 25th
jNumber of this Journal, to which we must refer
our readers, that a Berthon's collapsible lifeboat
can be easily stowed at the inner part of every
pair of davits, against the ship's side, the other
ordinary boats being hoisted up to the davit ends,
the latter being first lowered, and the former then
in readiness for lowering. We have thus the boat
accommodation doubled, and in the case of such a
vessel as the Austria we have boats for 720 persons,
all hoisted to davits at the vessel's sides ready for
instantaneous lowering. Here, then, we have at
once an important source of safety—" there are
boats enough for all on board."
But, 2dly, each of these boats should be life-boats
of a standard description, as defined by the Legis-
lature. The Berthon boats are life-boats of a supe-
rior description, but every other boat should be
also a life-boat after a given standard, or no life-
boats worth the name will ever be provided by
shipowners. For a review of the whole question
of the importance of a " Standard Life-boat," we
must refer our readers to a paper on that subject in
the 23d number of this journal. It will be suffi-
cient here to point out the advantages to be de-
rived from every boat being a life-boat, not only in
name, but in reality. In addition to the greater
safety of such boats in the event of bad weather
dvertaking them after their leaving a sinking or
burning ship, there would be this immediate advan-
tage, that if such boats were upset in lowering,
they would not founder, and if several such boats
capsized in lowering, they might be again righted
by the aid of the remaining boats that had been
safely lowered, which could ii3t be done with com-
mon open boats : this capability would still further
diminish the evils of a panic.
3rdly. Those boats should lie all fitted with
Clifford's lowering apparatus, which has been
proved to be superior to all other similar inventions,
and which, as an additional source of security, would
be a further means to prevent or allay a panic.
4thly. The advantage of a legalised number of
persons to' be carried by each boat, and of painting
that number in legible characters on the exterior
of every boat, will be sufficiently obvious without
further observation.
othly. The periodical mustering and stationing
of the passengers, officers, and ship's company to
the several boats would have the advantage, be-
sides those already mentioned, of making the
officer, crew, and passengers of each boat familiar
with each other's personal appearance, which would
be a means of preventing confusion, and therefore
of lessening the chances of a panic in the hour
of danger.

6thli. The advantages of inspection by autho-
rised and qualified Government officers are too
obvious to require; comment.
There are two incidents in the history of this
disaster deserving of notice. The one, that the only
boat which it is reported was safely lowered from
the davits full of people was a Francis's metallic
life-boat. The other, that two or three of the boats
were drawn towards the screw by the stream of
water which always tends to it, and were thus
upset. _ . _

-An account of Francis's galvanised iron life-boats
will be found in the 22d number of this Journal;
their great strength, their unliability to leak or rot,
and their being to a great extent fire-proof, give
them strong claims to the attention of shipowners.
They, however, requires considerable modification
of their interior fittings, and increase of " extra
buoyancy" to make them what a ship's lifeboat
ought to be.

The danger of destruction by the action of the
screw-propeller is a novelty in the history of these
disasters ; it may, however, be readily guarded
against by a simple precaution, which also adds
much to the safety of the process of lowering a boat
at sea in other respects. Every boat should have
its " painter' " or some other rope from its bow, fast
to the vessel at some distance before it ; any boat
will be safer hoisted up or lowered by adoptinc,
this precaution, as it steadies a boat greatly in the '
act of lowering or hoisting, and thus prevents her
being damaged against the vessel's side, whilst, as
soon as she is in the water, she is prevented going
adrift., and can be immediately, by the use of the
rudder, kept away from the vessel's side, or brought
close to it at will. Every boat would thus not
only be prevented from being drawn within the
action of the screw, but would be retained alongside
the ship, even if upset, until she had her proper
cargo of passengers on board : by. the aid of a small
hatchet, to be kept in the bow of each boat, this
rope might then be cut at the Tight moment, and
the boat at once steered clear of the ship.
There remains but one Serious obstacle to be
alluded to, but it is one which surely ought to be.

, .
no obstacle at all allude to the expense of
proN,idilig it, sufficient number of lifeboats for every
ship. Undoubtedly a considerable additional ex-
pense would be incurred; but should expense be
pitted against hum life ? Surely it is. a secon-
dary question! Besides, if feqttired ftoiii.allaliKFti
it would give rid adVatitage to one shipowner over
.another, and the additional outlay would, in. fact,
be paid for by the passengers themselves; who, by
a small addition to their passagemoney, would)
after a few voyages, have paid fOr the whole cost
of the boats ofa ship.
We have now considered this, most important
subject in all its bearings. We consider it
to be one the importance of which cannot be ex-
aggerated ; one in which the national character is
implicated. We have now, as
,on several previous
occasions, raised our feeble voice to urge its serious
consideration by the authorities of the land. We
earnestly hope that we may not have given
utttcrance to it altogether in vain.

THE NAVIES OF ENGLAND AND OF
FRANCE.

(Franz the Conversations Lexicon, Leipzig, 1858.)
The history of the last ten years has exhibited
two mighty Powers playing a part which has asto-
nished the world. Within that period of time, and
mainly by the instrumentality of these Powers, the
serious political complications which had shortly
before disturbed all Europe were brought for the
present, at least, to a close, and at all events,
Europe has to thank those Powers that the Eastern
war was so speedily concluded. We allude to the
fleets of the two Western empires, whose enormous
display of forces gave the world a sight such as it
had never until then witnessed, and whose impos-
ing 'power astounded at the same time that it
showed how much can be accomplished by deter-
mination and earnest efforts.
From centuries back we are accustomed to see
England great at sea. From the days of Queen
Elizabeth she has claimed the reputation of being
the first Power on the seas, with her numerous
fleets, to exercise lordship over them, and has
proudly made true the lines-of her national hymn,
"Rule, Britannia." &c. Derived from the peculiar
geographical position of Great Britain, become
necessary for the requirements of her trading inha-
bitants, essential for the maintenance of the State,
called for by the people, and intimately connected
with their growth, the English navy is no political
measure of modern date, nor any means of satisfy-
ing the national pride ; but it is a natural pheno-
menon, growing out of the peculiar conditions of
the country. From that time forward when this
necessity was recognised, and Henry VII. united
in one national navy the contingent of ships which
the five principal ports of England were called
upon to furnish for the protection of the country,
continually advancing in its development, the Eng-
lish navy has always recovered itself in a very short
time from the blows which it may have received
from other fleets, and especially from the immortal
naval heroes of Holland, and has gradually grown
to a magnitude which enabled it with truth to take
the first rank among navies, and to retain that
position for centuries.
Looking at the enormous extent of her merchant
marine, the inexhaustible financial resources of the
country, and the well-known tenacity of the cha-
racter of the English nation in following out any
determinate object, we cannot much wonder that
during the events of late years we have seen Eng-
land's •fleet attain -in number and power that posi-
tion which we should have expected it would do
from its antecedents. But so much the more must
we wonder to witness a naval Power rise up by
the side of England, which, as it were, raised from
nothing, and called into life with magical rapidity
by the iron will of one man, has in a few years been
elevated to a position which is not only command-
ing general attention, but which demands loudly
from England a share in the command of the seas.
From the remembrance o 2 the continual wars of
these two rivals from the days of Louis XIV. down
to the end of the empire of Napoleon 1., in which
the French were almost always beaten, we have
involuntarily formed a very unfavourable opinion
of the French navy, and it became the general opi•
nion that the latter could never take up any com-
manding position at sea, assuming commonly as
the reason that the French were not a seafaring
people.
Nowhere, however, was this view of the subject
more deeply-rooted than in England itself, where.,
dwelling on the past glory of Nelson at Aboukir
and Trafalgar, they till recently beheld with com-
passionate shrugs of the shoulder the efforts of
France in this direction, and made merry over the
struggles of their neighbour on this side of the
Channel. The Eastern war first opened the eyes of
England, and let them, :to their no small alarm, see
their error. Individual voices had, it is true, during
the Presidency of Louis Napoleon, made themselves
heard, and far-seeing persons had pointed out the
threatening possibility of a French invasion of the
British islands. The national pride of England
alone, .however, derided all such warnings, until
1854 revealed 38 French ships of the line ready for
action, with 66 frigates and corvettes, and thus si-
lenced all scoffs. In three years Louis Napoleon had
built 24 sail of the line; and in the course of 1854
alone were 13 ships' of war launched, of !which
nine were ships of the line, and 52 taken in hand,
of which three were of the line and six frigates.
The English had not only the vexation of leaving
their allies to take precedence on land, but also of
seeing in them an equality of rivalship by sea where
they had hoped for an undoubted supremacy.
These painful convictions established at once in
England a complete revolution of public opion, and
just as they had previously looked disparagingly
on the navy of France, now for the first time they
watched her progress with serious attention, which
was far from free from anxiety, as Was more than
once shown in the public press. Tilt neighbour
which with little noise, but with all the more en-
ergy, was extending itself, defeated the efforts of
the English press, which laboured to make its
readers acquainted with the newest details, and
with each progressive step of the French navy, and
despite the entente cordiale to place prominently,
forward the threatening danger of a French inva-
sion. The, apprehension of the latter has become so
prevalent that even after the last visit of Napoleon
111. to Osborne (1857), which, however, in the
general opinion was only viewed as a new strength-
ening of the Engligi and French friendly alliance,
voices have been loudly raised in Parliament which
With plain undisguised words pointed out the
threatening probability of such an invasion, and
when, moreover, the English Prime Minister re-
pelled these insinuations with becoming hauteur,
he seemed himself not the less imbued with simi-
lar thought..
Germany, however, is also interested in casting
a glance at the neighbouring navies, in order to
arrive at an impartial judgment as to their powers
of action by a comparison of their respective navies
as the outward appearance alone of a fleet gives no
true criterion of its intrinsic value.
We have before observed that the navy of Eng-
land, from the earliest period, has been making
continued progress, -and that its developmsnt was
only for a short time ever delayed by anfdefeats
which it experienced, the whole existence of the
British empire being involved in a powerful navy.
These conditions we do not find in France. Although
her navy is older than that of England, and reaches
back to the days of Coesar's triimphant campaigns,
hers has suffered the greatest variety of fate and
condition. At one time we see her rise like a shin-
ing meteor, at another time sink into a nullity;
and while the navy of England sprang from the
people, lived with their life, and advanced step by
step with their gradual growth, we find that of
France altogether distinct from the people and only
the plaything of her rulers. While Gallia of old
possessed a numerous fleet and held the neighbour-
ing coasts in perpetual terror, we find her as a naval
power, after the conquest of Caesar, entirely retire
from the political gtage, and so remain until the
days of Charlemagne. Under the Carlovingians the
navy first recovered. Later, during the crusades,
under Philip 11. and- Louis IX., and subsequently
under Philip of Valois, it attained a certain im-
portance ; only,
Louis XII. however, despite the efforts of
, Francis 1., and Louis XIII., who fitted
out large squadrons, soon again to decay.
. As Louis XIV. appeared on the political horizon,
and with
France, so also a new era opened for her navy.
him commenced a glorious century for
Under Colbert's administration the French saw
with pride a new fleet of 40 sail-of-the-line and 60
frigates arise. Several arsenals and ports were
constructed, and the maritime war which broke out
under Louis XIV. perfected in every respect the
work of that great Minister. In the years 1680-82
the navy of France numbered 100 sail-of-the-line,
and this host was commanded by such men as
d'Estrees, Duquesne, Jean Bart, Tourville, and
others, who carried the honour of the flag of their
fatherland into all seas. A highly-gifted ship-
builder, Chateau Renault, who without Colbert
would have remained unknown, essentially im-
proved the construction of the ships, and invented
the bomb vessels, with which France checked the
Barbary States. What the celebrated Vauban was
for land fortresses, that Renault was for the navy.
Moreover, a new administration was established
for the navy, and every point, even to the minutest
detail, laid down.
Under Louis XV. the navy could not be kept up
at the same high point which it had assumed under
the bqore-mentioned leaders. The Ministers
Dubois and Fleury .let it entirely droop. But
under Louis XVI. the French fleet again-rose, and,
under Napoleon 1., took part in the unfortunate
but glorious engagements, such as those of Aboukir

and Trafalgar, which will ever remain memorable
in history. These battles of themselves had utterly
rained the naval. pnwer df VsFinge; and While ibngz,
land in the year 1816 in her Lieet 177
ships of the line; 238 frigates, and 328 smaller yes--
kis—ill all '1,15- salt Hi itavf consisted of
only, 69 ships of war, of which the greater ntimbei
were small and not seaworthy. Th continual de-
feats by sea, in which France had suffered excessive
lessps; liatl sty diSheartelied dild shaken their reliance
on their navy, that they for many years hesitated
to bring it again to that point which her geogra-
phical situation and political power as a nation
imperatively called for. On the contrary, the fleet
was totally neglected. It numbered in the year
1820 but 48, and in 1833 actually only 33 ships of
war—a low figure such as it had scarcely ever
stood at.* The war with Algiers had, it is-true,in
the year 1830, rendered some exertions necessary ;
but they were not followed up, and, for the first
time, in 1839 the . state of affairs in the East.
and the war of Mehemet Ali with the Sublime
Porte demanded a reawakening of the power of
France, and the building a new navy was under-
taken with energy. While the . French squadron
at first consisted of only three ships of the line, it
was increased in six months-to 13, and already in
the spring of 1840 to 40 sail of the line. From that
year dates mainly the present French fleet, a cir-
cumstance which has great weight in favour of
France in any comparison with the English navy.
The value and power of a fleet consist of two
points—of the materiel, in which have to be consi-
dered the quantity and quality of the ships and of
the artillery, and of the personel.
Let us now turn our attention to the materiel of
the two States, which is, and often with reason, con-
sidered as the test of efficiency 'in a navy, and-we
find on the list of the English navy for the year
1857 the number of 546 ships of all descriptions,
to which must be added also 162 steam gunboats ;
while the official French accounts give the state of
the French navy at 450 ships of war and 30 steam
gunboats. The number of ships of the line, on
. which the issue •of the larger and more decisive
naval actions more or less depends, stands by these
accounts at 78 for England against 63 for France,
the proportion of screw and sailing ships of the line
being'about like. . France is, therefore, as regards
England, in a minority of 15 sail of the line, 100
smaller vessels;'and 60 steam gunboats.
Were one only to look at this minority, which of
itself comes to the amount of a whole second-rate
navy, the anxiety of England at the superiority of
France would appear to be unfounded. However,
it cannot, as observed, be forgotten that not alone
the number, but also, to an equal degree, the quality
of the ships establishes the strength of a navy.
Keeping this in view the comparison becomes far
better as regards France. For while in the English
list of ships all the vessels of war are reckoned
which she possesses, whether they are unrigged or
in commission, whether old or new—and we find
Still included among them ships of the line and
others, such as the Victory, which were built either
in the last century or in the commencement of the
present—the French navy, which, as we have be-
fore observed, first came into existence in 1840, pos-
sesses scarcely any ship over 20 years old. This is,
however, of considerable importance, and is a circum-
stance of much weight in favour ofFrance. Although
each old English ship appears on the list as sea-
worthy and fit for action, still they are, as Admiral
Sir C. Napier pointed out, in his celebrated letter to
the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1849, either
utterly useless, or it must be taken into account that
their durability as old ships in real warfare must be
only slightly relied upon. Apart from the introduc-
tion of the screw, the armament, as well as the con-
struction of ships of war, has experienced such a
change in 50 years that a modern ship of the line of
120 guns with the calibre now in use could maintain
a fight with 10 such as the Victory and come off
victorious. If we reckon the number of old English
ships of the line at 20; that, of unfit frigates at 40,
and. of the bad smaller vessels at 60, certainly not
too low a reckoning, while France possesses at the
most 10 old ships of the line and 20 frigates and
corvettes, since in 1833 her whole navy consisted
but of 33 vessels'; the amount of materiel in the two
nations may be considered as equal, so long as the
important difference in the number of steam gun-
boats, 160 to 30, is left out .of the calculation ; but
we shall return to these. later.
We turn now to the second and more important
aspect of the materiel, to the oonstruction and to
the goodness of the timber employed in 'building
the ships.- There can be no doubt that up to some
years balk the- English ships far exceeded French
ones in durability and strength. The continued de-
feats which the French sustained from the-English
in the wars dating from the outbreak of the Revo-
lution were by no means the result of less bravery
on the part of the French, nor yet so entirely of the
want of professional capacity, as is very commonly
assumed, but mainly the consequence of worse ships
and guns. It. is a known fact, and is also much in-
sisted upon by English historians, that the French
were not deficient in battle either in courage or en-
durance. On the contrary, the annals of naval war-
fare reveal an extraordinary number of examples of
French captains only striking their flag at the mo-
ment that their ship was sinking under them, or
was so battered as to be incapable of further 'con-
test.. These destructions of French ships in action
happened, however, so frequently, because the ships
were slighter built, worse fitted out, and had not
the power of tenacity ofEnglish ships. Compare the
individual accounts in the history of each battle,
and it will be found that the hulls of the English
ships were not less riddled by shot than those of
the French ships, while, however, the latter sunk,
and the former, in consequence of their superior
material, floated through all, and remained mas-
ters of the field. When Nelson at Trafalgar
formed bold plan of attack, and, contrary to
all the rules of naval tactics; bore down before
the wind on She line of battle of the united French
and Spanish fleets, he knew well what he was about,
as by this m'anceuvre lie exposed his ships for a long
time to a frightful raking fire. He knew his ships
could endure the enemy's broadsides without sink-
ing, but that the enemy's ships, when he had once
broken through their line, and opened an effectual
fire, could not similarly support his fire. How! cor-
rectly the English Admiral had calculated is proved
by the result of the battle, which ended in the cap-
ture of 13 French and Spanish ships of the line, of
which half sunk.
While, hoWever, the English ships everywhere
exceeded the French in strength, the latter, on the
other hand, distinguished themselves as faster
sailers. • This was thoroughly recognised by the
English, and they consequently not only built
henceforth mainly after French models, but added
to their navy all such French captured ships as
could in any way be repaired.
So find we the respective positions up to the year
1844. About this time a man stepped into the chief
command of the French marine who united to a
thorough knowledge of the subject a high patriotism,
and addressed himself with rare devotedness and
all his talents to the welfare and progress of. the
navy. His keen glance detected the former failings
—he made the country acquainted with them
through his writings—he applied himself energeti-
cally to their removal, and laid the foundations for
the present naval power of France. This man was
the Prince de Joinville, who, it is true, as the son
of a king, had a *favourable position and could do
more than others. He achieved.wha4 up to that
time no French leader had done. Remade the navy
popular, and thereby improved it. Previously it
was only an ornament—one shining jewel more in
the crown of the splendour-loving kings of France ;
and Louis XIV. himself, under whom the limy
reached its zenith, only desired to make by it one
more show of the power of his rule, although Col-
bert had prepared it for an altogether different
..and nobler destination. Neither leads nor people
had as yet become aware that for every mer-
cantile and seaboard State a corresponding navy
is a condition of its existence and prosperity;
and a political necessity. The Prince de Joinville
made great efforts to convince the -French nation of
these facts, and he seems 'to have succeeded. The
road cut out by him has been also wisely followed
by Louis Napoleon, and the nation now looks with
pride on the work Which, completed by his will and
efforts, has now given to France so imposing a po-
sition. Napoleon 111. has prepared the materiel in an
energetic manner ; but the credit of having raised
up the inner kernel and condition of the fleet, as
well as the corps of officers, belongs alone to the
Prince de Joinville and to his instructor, the Admiral
Lalande ; and this, moreover, is well known to the
French. Shortly after the banishment of the Bour-
bons the Delegate Collas proposed, in his brilliant
critique on the budget of the navy, from the Tribune
of the National Assembly, a vote of thanks from the
country to the Prince for his patriotic exertions.
Equally practically as philosophically educated,
Joinville turned his attention especially to the con-
struction of ships, tried carefully all the new inven-
tions in naval matters, and adopted them when they
had been proved. He .more particularly kept in
view the steam navy, and France produced under
his auspices real masterpieces of construction, which
the English afterwards not only equalled in every
respect, but even exceeded. And truly these results
were attained with a far smaller expenditure than is
the case in England, for there was system---they
avoided the failures of the English shipwrights, and
even turned them to account. The same spirit which
pervades the English Reople also governs the English
Admiralty. As each new discovery finds applause.
everywhere, and money is found to work it out, be
it ever so problematic, so the Admiralty appears to

*This number relates only to seaworthy ships of the line
and frigates, which alone in war can be taken into any kind
of account. Including useless and small vessels, the num-
ber is brought up to 110.

spare neither trouble, nor cost, nor money, in bring-
ing into use and to perfection any promising pro -
Went for the tiaty, The object once in view will
liefe tilsO lie followed mit with the well-knoWn Eng-
lish pertinacity which tielibef waits for the popular
opinion, nor is frightened back by doubtful §ticQess,
• Wlit,n we look at the new English ships, such as
the Sovereign, the fi'lgatte Imperieuse, Euryalus and
others, we must, above all, admit that such works
are capable of furnishing wonderful results ; but
take into dccotiiit other portions of the English
navy, and no one can say that the results answer to
the incredible cost. The fabulous sums of uselessly
spent money must be a matter of astonishment;
which have been lost on so-called failures, or other
unfortunate experiments. We have before observed
that the
_extent of the English fleet in the year
1815 consisted of 743 seaworthy ships of war,
without reckoning those building and transports,
while the present number of English ships-of-war
consists of 546—a diminution of 200 ships. The
:aggregate expenditure for the navy from 1815 to
the breaking out of the Eastern war amounted to
£160,000,000 sterling, and, as the cost of materiel
as compared with personel , is generally taken as 5
to 4, England has spent £90,000,000 to bring down
the fleet of 1815 to its present state. This compa-
rison comes put much more favourably for France.
The French navy increased from 1833 to 1857
by 400 sail, at an expenditure of 1,660,000,000
francs, which, at the previously quoted
proportion for materiel,, gives d. sum total of
900,000,000 f., or £36,000,000 sterling. It is true
that the French Administration cannot always
boast of economy or discretion, but the facts which
we have instanced must point it out as a wise one
compared with that of England. Admiral Napier
reckoned, in the presence of the First Lord of the
'Admiralty, that since 1815 13 three-deckers, 144
two-deckers, 21 frigates, of the first-class, 155 of
the second, 50 of the third, and 334 smaller vessels
—in all 717 ships-of-war—had altogether disap-
peared. - In the same manner Mr. Hume was able
in the House of Commons to make the assertion,
without receiving contradiction from either side,
that England. from 1828 to 1843 had built 308
ships-of-war, of which a third turned out to be
useless.
In the'same extravagant and reckless manner,
also, was the construction of steam vessels under-
taken. While England had already in the year 1822
commenced building-paddlewheel steam vesseli for
war purposes, it was not until the year 1840, when
the French steam frigate brought the King Louis
Philippe to England, that they built after its
pattern, the Terrible, a ship which expressed
its object, and even surpassed its French model.
Previously, however, eight steam frigates had
proved unsuccessful. In the year 1850 England
possessed 20 paddlewheel steam frigates, each of
which was constructed to carry 32 guns of heavy
calibre. Three only, however, of them—the Ter-
rible, Sidon, and Odin—could carry their armament
—all the rest were too weak for their between deck
batteries. and could- only receive their six upper
deck guns. The French navy numbered at the
same time 22 steam frigates of a similar armament,
which could perfectly carry them.
At the same time England built at once 30 iron
steamers. Scarcely were they ready when it was
discovered that iron was not suitable as a material
for ships of war, and that the ships were therefore
not available for the purpose for which they had
been intended. This Was a useless experiment
which cost the country three millions, while France
kept to her wooden ships.
It also demanded great expenditure and effort
before the screw could be 'introduced and adopted
in the English navy. In the year 1846 the sailing
frigate Amphion was fitted with a screw; but not-
withstanding a double building, which cost 800,000
dollars (£120,000), it was requisite to put her on'
one side as completely unfit for the service. It
fared not much better with the altered ships of the
line Blenheim and Sanspareil, whose screws cost
500,000 dollars (£75,000)' without giving a greater
speed than eight knots. The frigates Imperieuse,
Euryalus, and Shannon, which arose about this
time, succeeded, however, perfectly ; and the new
ships, as well as the altered ones, began henceforth
to answer better. The Wellington, Arrogant, Con-
queror, Agamemnon, and others, have given evi-
dence that they are really masterpieces.
The French, on the other hand, did not hurry
in the use of the screw, but tested the new dis-
covery by small experiments. Their constructors,
more scientifically educated than the English,
pondered beforehand: ere they built, and only
when the screw was recognised in France as
successful did they begin to introduce it.
From that time, however, they proceeded ener-
getically to work. After the French constructors
had had the glory of having, in the Napoleon,
built the first screw ship of the line, and of having
also produced in her a pattern ship, there have
been, under Louis Napoleon, not only 20 new screw
ships of the line, 20 frigates, and more than double
that number of corvettes and smaller vessels built,
but also all the not unfit sailing ships of the line
have been generally fitted with screws, without
there having been, so far as we know, one single
failure.

After such bitter experience one would have
hought that the English Admiralty and their
builders wonld have become more cautious, but still
in the years 1853 to 1856 the same precipitation
and negligence took place, and especially in the
class of gunboats. Being, then, convinced that the
Russian fleet would not leave the harbour of Cron-
stadt to measure their strength with the allies on
the high seas, and that Cronstadt itself could only
be attacked by small vessels, the building of screw
gunboats was undertaken in England with a perfect
furore, and foreign countries saw with astonish-
ment of what development of power a nation is
capable which is determined to aceomplish its ob-
ject. Soon 100 gunboats were ready, and their
number eventually reached 162. Half only, how-
ever, of these gunboats attained their object, and
in general they were built too light for their heavy
armament (a 92c wt. 68-pounder shell gun), although
they proved quick and handy. The French, it is
true, produced no masterpiece, for, they fell into
the opposite error, and built a third of their boats
too heavy. However, they built in all only 30,
and the failure with them amounted to only 10,
while, with the English it reached 80 gunboats.
Besides, the French boats which answerel were
superior to those of the English.
The same spectacle was repeated with the floating
batteries of both countries, and with the screw trans-
ports. The English batteries were complete failures,
and could not even be propelled ; the French, on
the contrary, were excellent, and answered their
purpose. In transports France possesses 26 of
the best iron screw steamers, expressly built
for this object, of which each can conveniently
carry 1,000 troops ; so that with these alone she can
readily throw 26,000 men on any selected post of
an enemy's coast. Take, besides, the 22 paddle
steam frigates, of which one in the year 1849 con-
veyed in 30 hours one whole regiment of infantry.
from Toulon to Civita Vecchia' and another a com-
plete regiment of cavalry, and France has means of
transport for 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry,
independent of her ships of the line, screw frigates,
and corvettes. England, on the other hand, suf-
fers under her unfortunate transport ships, as, for
example, is exemplified in her thrice-returning
Transit. It became, in fact, necessary to hire pri-
vate shipping in order to send only 10,000 men to
India.
We gather from all these facts the conviction
that England is not wrong when as regards one
part of tho ship's materiel—namely, the quantity or
quality of the shipping—she looks with anxiety
towards France and watches closely the remarkable
development of her neighbour's navy, which, al-
though" it has often taken a temporary stride, had
never yet taken one so durable and systematic as it
has done at the present time. Let us now, however,
turn, as regards both navies, to the other not less
important part of the materiel—namely, the arti
lery.

Under. the artillery of a ship we include not only
the number of the guns and the size of their calibre,
but also their crew, which in battle is the main
point. We take as the ground of our opinion the
history of naval actions, and from several single
actions as well as large battles arrive at one conclu-
sion, which is in favour of the English, and which
can only result from their superior artillery. This is
the remarkable and uniform difference between the

loss of men in English ships compared with the loss of
the of all the other nations with whom England
was at war. We will, in illustration, take only a
few instances. In April, 1798, the English ship Mars
took the French slip Hercule ; the first had 90
killed and wounded, the latter 290. In February
of the same year the English ship Sybille engaged
the French ship Forte, in which action the first
had 21 killed and wounded, the last 143. In March,
1806, the English ship London took the French
ship Marengo ; the first with a loss of 32, the latter
of 145 men. On the 4th of November, 1805, an
engagement took place between four French and
five English ships of the line, in which the English
lost 135, the French 730 men. On the 14th of
February, 1797, a battle took place between English
and Spanish ships. The English lost 300, the
Spaniards 800 men. On the 11th of October of the
same year followed the battle of emperdown be-
£ween the English and Dutch. The first lost 825,
the last 1,160 men. On the sth-of July, 1808, the
English frigate Seahorse took the Turkish frigate
ZUffer_... The first 105t.15, the last 370 men.
Finally., in the same year a Russian ship of the
line, the Sewolod, was taken by two English ships,
in, which the Russian lost 303, and the English
only 62 men.

This comparatively smaller loss on the part of