The Sun.
London, England, 1867-08-28 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—" A leap in the dark" may be occa-
sionally a necessity in politics, but it is hard that
we should find it so in war. Yet we really do not
know what better description to give of that
Abyssinian campaign for which, as our military in-
telligence informs us, " preparations are now fairly
begun." We are going to throw a little army upon
a point on the east coast of Africa, thenca to march
by unknown roads into an unknown country, against
a barbarous and, possibly, inaccessible Sovereign.
Taken altogether, Abyssinia is perhaps, the mar t
out-of-the-way region of the 'earth fora regular
campaign. Not that it is very far off, or, as tar
its shores are concerned, unapproachable, but therees
is hardly a spot on the habitable globe of which
know less than we do of its interior. Of course there
are maps of the country, but
Tracksthev serveof on y to
render the darkness visible.with
hm
carefully
ing
laid clown, and marked at intervals xv,
“somllew somewhat
indefinite specifications of " wells" and ageds. '
A " great forest abounding in elephantsv'''
" country producing frankincense and myrrh," are
an a
notable features in the chart, as are also a
point where a certain river is lost in the sand
and another designated as the probable source
isurce of
the Blue Nile. Beyond these districts—that to
say, on the south-western frontier of King Theo-
dore's dominions—we pass on through a
"country
inhabited by pagan negroes" to the Mountains of
the Moon, a spur of which mysterious range seems
actually to enter the Abyssinian kingdom. The
"preparations" now announced from Woo wich are
excellently adapted to the occasion. We are making
ready for a battle, not against man, but against
nature. The object is to send out not merely artil-
lery, but portable artillery—guns which can be
carried on mules' backs, or possibly on men's shoul-
ders, over hills and through passes where no carriage
could move. The contrast between the implements
and the service in this case is most extraordinary.
We are actually building miniature cannon and
miniature carriages of polished steel for work in an
African desert. These weapons, hardly bigger than
children's toys, and we!ghing no more than the lug-
gage allowed to a first-class passenger on a railway,
will nevertheless throw a projectile of 71b., being
thus more effective than the cumbrous field pieces of
sixty years since. It has been discovered that they
will ride best on a mule at right angles to his back,
instead of in a parallel line, and so new-fashioned
pack saddles are to be manufactured accordingly.
The troops will carry their own arms, but in some
way or other there must be carried for them food
and drink, as it appears to be quite uncertain whe-
the water can be had on the march or not. Having
said this much, however, we have said nearly all in
the way of warning. So far as we can judge, there
will be little fighting to do, nor do we know that
the climate is dangerous or the population hostile.
King Theodore by the latest intelligence can
scarcely hold his own against his rebellious subjects,
and there is no reason why any class of these sub-
jects should regard us as enemies. We shall not be
exposed to the fanatical hatred of a whole people as
in China and Japan. An Abyssinian war ought not,
in short, to be so difficult or so deadly as an Ashantee
war, and yet we have managed Ashantee wars more
than once. The great obstacle in the matter is its
mystery. We shall be marching into a region
without any means of conjecturing what we may
find. It is understood that there are mountains in
the way ; indeed, the maps tell us that ; and we are
making preparations for warfare in passes and de-
files. But beyond that the campaign will be equi-
valent to au exploring expedition conducted on an
irresistible scale. Perhaps when we get across the
mountains we may find the difficulties of the coun-
try disappear, and at any rate, if we turn the season
to good account, as now seems probable, we shall
have an opportunity of making the discovery at our
leisure. The scene of action lies apparently in a
small compass, for King Theodore's dominions are
not very extensive, and the whole seaboard is at our
command. Where more than one mission has gone,
it is certain that an army can go if properly provi-
sioned, and for the rest the army can auwser foritself.
Nothing can In easier—we alight almoht say more

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STAMPED sd.

common-place—•than the despatch of an expedition
from India to the Red Sea. We have sent an In-
dian army to Egypt before now, and we sent one
to Persia only tea years ago. These Indian troops,
too, are inured to warfare in the wil lost and most
desolate regions. If at.y r:aders interested in this
question will but turn to the descriptions of Bhootan
scenery in the narratives of the late war, they will
think it impossible that any district in Abyssinia
can be more rugged, inaccessible, or dangerous.
Then the little war on the North-Western frontier,
only finished the other day, was fought under the
eatest difficulties of ground, and against an enemy
far more formidable than any we can anticipate in
Abyssinia. In fact, after sacking an Emperor's
palace in Tartary and establ;shine.. British gar-
risons in Japan, we can hardly regard any region
of the earth as beyond the reach of our soldiers.
There is no occasion, therefore, to look upon the
necessity before us with alarm ; but, on the other
hand, it is impossible to regard it from any
point of view with satisfaction. The gain must
be nothing ; the loss may be considerable, and the
expense will necessarily be great. An army cannot
be equipped at a slight charge for such an enterprise
as this. Batteries of steel guns form but a specimen'
of the means required. All the appliances at the
command of science and wealth will be put at the
service of our troops for the contingencies of the
expedition. The army will be a small one, but
every man and every department of the force will
be as well furnished and effective as possible. With
these preparations we may hope, at the best, either
to frighten King Theodore into reason, or to pene-
trate to the prison in which the captives are con-
fined and bring them out of bondage. If we can
-do that, we need give ourselveslittlo trouble *bent
other affairs in Abyssinia ; but if we fail we should
be committed to very unpleasant obligations. It
is urged, and not without reason, that we who
reign in India by virtue of reputation no less
than strength cannot afford to be defied by an
Eastern despot. if other Sovereigns and people
discover that King Theodore derides our protests
and challenges our power, they may be tempted
to follow his example, and it is therefore incum-
bent on us to dissipate such delusions by bring-
ing the offmlor to justice. This argument is en-
titled to weight, but we have only to observe that
its force will be infinitely increased when we have
actually embarked upon the expedition. The spec-
tacle of a British force retiring discomfited from
Abysssinia would be far more damaging to our
reputation than the fact that the enterprise had
never been undertaken. Perhaps the latter danger
may have been somewhat overrated, but it is im-
possible to exaggerate the mischief which might
arise from defeat or failure. When we have begun
we must needs go ou at any cost until we have ac-
complished something or other which can be repre-
sented as victory. Possibly this achievement may
be considerably easier than we now suppose, but it
must in any case be so costly, and is obviously so
uncertain, that we can only hope King Theodore
may listen prudently to the preliminary summons.
He has rejected all amicable overtures with the
savage caprice of an irresponsible tyrant, but he
may perhaps be more amenable to a peremptory
demand supported by threats of immediate and
irresistible force.