The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-01 00:00:00

CLARK V. CLARK.

Dr. Deane, Q.C., for the petitioner, moved for an
order upon the respondent to submit to cross-exa-
mination with regard to the facts stated in his an-
swer to his wife's petition for alimonypendente lite.
The wife charged against him an income of about
£B,OOO a year, including an establishment and race
horses at Epsom, a lead mine, and a large amount of
money owed to him by various persons, for which he
held security. In his answer he admitted that he
had been in possession of this property, but said it
d nu lust, utla Ile
ad no income at present but an allowance of £3 a
week made to him by his principal creditor.
Dr. Phillimore, Q.C., for the respondent, opposed
the motion. The substance of the answer was that
in October last the respondent became so embar-
rassed in his circumstances that an execution was
issued against him, and he was in danger of arrest ;
that he could not have parted with his property
except at a great sacrifice, and that he applied to a
gentleman, who consented to advance £17,000 to
pay up the premiums upon his policies of insurance
and other pressing claims upon having as security
an assignment of all his real and personal estate.
He submitted that this was a sufficient answer.
His Lordship said the accounts were very com-
plicated, and he must take time to look into them.
BOYNTON V. BOYNTON.
Dr. Spinks (with whom was Mr. D. Keane)
moved for a rule nisi for a new trial in this case on
the ground that the verdict upon the issue of
cruelty was against evidence. The petition was
by Laura Elizabeth Boynton, for the dissolution of
her marriage with George Boynton on the ground
of adultery, coupled with cruelty, and it was tried
before the full court and a jury on the 27th of
January last. The jury found that the allegations
of cruelty as well as those of adultery had been
established. The learned counsel referred to dif-
ferent Darts of the evidence of Mrs. Boynton, and
to the letters she had written to her husband during
cohabitation, for the purpose of showing that no
such cruelty had been established as would hare
justified the court in granting a judicial separation,
and that she had never thought of making any
complaint of her husband's ill-treatment until her
indignation had been roused by his infidelity.
His Lordship was of opinion that there was no
ground for disturbing the verdict. The jury had
paid great attention to the case, and no complaint
was made of the summing up of the learned
judge, Mr. Justice Wightman. The fact that Mrs.
Boynton had allowed the ill-usage with which
she charged her husband to pass without notice for
a considerable time was well worthy the attention
of the jury, but it was left to their consideration,
and there could be no doubt that the adultery of
Captain Boynton remitted Mrs. Boynton to her
original position with regard to her right to com-
plain of that ill-usage if it had been committed.
Mrs. Boynton depose in positive terms to various
acts of violence ; she said she had been beaten on
four or five occasions, that she bad been dragged
about, that she had been violently shaken, that she
had received a heavy blow on her head which broke
her comb, and that she frequently had marks o
pinches or bruises on her arm ; and some parts o.
her evidence was corroborated by a female servan

The letters which were addressed to her husband in
1853, when he was in the Crimea, were remarkable
for the affectionate terms in which they were
written, but the learned judge pressed them upon
the consideration of the jury, and told them that
they showed either that Mrs. B. oynton had not
spoken truly, or that she was of a very forgiving
disposition. The jury must have adopted the latter
view. The fact that she made no complaints before
she discovered the adultery was consistent with that
view, for she might have condoned the acts of
was
against
j sence perpetrated.
id
cruelty when that last outrage 7.
The case went to the jury upon her
that of Capt. Boynton. It is painful to see a hus-
band and wife positively contradicting one another
upon oath, but it was for the jury to come to a con;
elusion as to which of them was telling the truth,
and he could not say that the conclusion at which
the jury had arrived was wrong, or that there was
not sufficient evidence to sustain it. He should,
therefore, refuse the application for a rule for a
new trial.