The Sun.
London, England, 1867-03-13 00:00:00

on the scale assumed. This done, the second pro-
' blem followed—how to get a reserve force out of
these two. And here it should be observed that if
no very comprehensive scheme is suggested, neither
is any great outlay proposed. The %%hole project
stands for only £50,000 in the estimates ; and its
effect, according to Gen. Peel, would be this—that
we should be enabled, at a moment's notice, to fill
up every battalion stationed in these islands to a
strength of 1,009 men. - Assuming that we had 50
b ittalions at home, this vi ould give us 50,019 regu-
lar troops, who would be supported by 91,000 mili-
tia, and 150,000 volunteers—in all a force of 300,090
men available for the defence of the kingdom. So
far, therefore, the object of a reserve would be at-
tained, and it is, we imagine, of no great avail to
argue that, beyond this, very little is accomplished.
It must be admitted, that while Gen. Peel's propo-
sals will give usa respectable army of reserve for
shores,vasi of another they will not give
uthseaprroesteercrtieonaromfyofuor ortlhven
in
coun-
try. We should remain nearly as incapable as be-
fore of undertaking any great military expedition ;
but on this it must be observed that no estimates
likely to be approved by the House of Commons
could much affect our competence. If our military
establishments are to be organised on a scale ad-
mitting of offensive warfare at short notice, we must
be prepared for figures very different from those
now presented. But, however forcibly the case may
be put, it may be taken for granted that the neces-
sity will not be admitted by the public. We are alive
to the need of defending ourselves, but not to that
of attacking others. We see from the estimates be-
fore us that armies cost more than formerly, and
that the charge may increase though the establish-
ments remain stationary. Gen. Pea had enough to
do to provide fin his 140,0J0 regulars and his
120,000 militia, without taking into his considd-
ration the p2ssible requirements of an offensive
war. The real gist of the estimates, we repeat, is
the maintenance of our military forces as they
are, or rather as they ought to be. We have not
really got all our regular troops nor our militia,
though we are supposed to have them, and General
Peel would spend half a million in converting the
supposition into a reality. The rest of the adl-
tional charge is either the inevitable incident of a
time of high prices, or a provision for establishing
a reserve on a moderate scale, but at an equally
moderate cost. . The true way to look at the pro-
posals is by the light of our actual position. If the
estimates of last year really
.supplied us with the
establishments assumed, the estimates of the present
year, which profess to. do no mor, and yet are
heavier in charge, would not be defensible. But
the facts are otherwise. The army cannot be kept
up to its strength ; the militia is 30,000 Short of its
numbers, and the extraordinary demand now made
is for the purpose of placing both forces on their
proper footing. In reality, therefore, though their
is no apparent increase in strength, there would be
an actual increase. We should pay more money,
but we should get, what we did not get before, a
full return ; and if this were the sole result of the
scheme it would not be a slight one. When we
have got our regular forces and our Militia com-
plete in numbers and well organised, it will not be
difficult to discover the framework of a good
reserve.