The Sun.
London, England, 1858-06-11 00:00:00

EXPARTE AS TO CERTAIN RESPONDENTS.

This id an appeal from a decree of the Lord Chancellor
of Ireland on further directions.

The Lord Coancellor said that the main point was,
whether the cum of 2,0001, contained in the marriage
settlement of Mrs. Gore wac a good charge against the
estates of the late Robert and Taomas Burrowes. The
sum of 500/. had been paid on her marriage. Interest
on the balance was also paid. The respondent pleaded
the statute of limitations. The Master in Chancery
found that Mrs. Gore's children's claim for the
balance, 1,5001. was a good claim against Mr. Bur-
rowes' estate. His lon.lship, altar considering the argu-
ments and pleadings of the parties, was of opinion that
the statute of limitations did not apply—that there was
a breach of trust in not paying this money in terms of
the marriage settlement, that the suit was properly in-
stituted, and the parties properly called.
Lord St. Leonards, Lord Cranworth, and Lord Wens-
leydale entirely concurred.

The Lord Chancellor affirmed the decree of the Lord
Chancellor of Ireland, and dismissed tho appeal,

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

:sittings in Banco before Lord Campbell, Mr. Justice
Wightman, Mr. Justice Erle, and Mr. Justice

Crompton.

HILL V. WRIGIIT-BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE-

JUDGMENT.

This was an action in which tho plaintiff Lab ella
Hall, sued tho defendant, George Wright, to recover
damages for a breach of promise to marry her within
a reasonable time.

The defendant pleaded—first, the general issue; se-
condly, that the said agreement, before breach, was
mutually rescinded by the parties ; and, thirdly, that
after the said agreement, and before breach, he became
and still was afficted with dangerous bodily disease, by
reason of which he became and ',till was incapable of
marriage without great danger of his life, and, there-
fore unfit for the married state, whereof the plaintiff
had notice before the commencement of the
action. At the trial, which took place some time
since before before Mr. Justice Erle, the jury found that
it would have been dangerous to the defendant's life to
marry the plaintiff, bat that the plaintiff had no notice
thereof. Upon this, Mr. Justice Erie directed a verdict
to be entered for the defendant, but gave the plaintiff
leave to move to enter a verdict in her favour for 1001.,
being the amount of damages assessed by the jury. A
rule was accordingly granted, and also for judgment,
notwithstanding the verdie.

The Court this na..)rning delivered judgment. t

Mr. Justice Crompton considered the plea of notice
bad, because it did not give sufficient excuse for the de-
fendant's non-performance of the contract. Inability
physically to perform the function of marriage gave the
right or option to the other party to rescind the con-
tract. The plea, however, in this case, gave no reason

for breaking off the marriage, and it must be taken as
no valid excuse for the non-performance of the contract.
His judgment was for.tbe plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Erle said that moral disease, mental
disease, or bodily disease no doubt voided a contract to
recovery. A contract to recovery was assumed in law
to be made for the purpose of mutual comfort, but was
voided if any act of God or other circumstances changed
the relative position of the parties before the given day
for marriage arrived. The promise to marry here was
to be within a reasonable time, and that he considered
was not to be meacured by the test of days, but from
the cause of the oliginal delay arising from an alteration
in the position of the parties when the supposed time of
marriage had arrived. It would, therefore, be urjust
to say that the time for marriage bad arrived when
marriage would probably be the cause of deatb, when a
little further delay would probably restore the party to
health or release him by death. His judgment was for
the defendant.
Mr. Justice Wightman also considered the judgment
should be for the defenJant4.
Lord Campbell was of opinion the plea of notice was
bad, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the damages
the jury bad assessed. The decision of the judges being
equally divided the junior judge, as was usual on such
occasion's, would be supposed to have withdra;n, and
that would give the majority in favour of the defendant.
With a view of enabling the parties to take the opinion
of the Cuurt of Error on the point, the judgtnent would
be for the defendant.
Judgment accordingly.
THE QUEEN V. THE DIRECTORS OP THE POOR OP ST.