The Sun.
London, England, 1858-04-07 00:00:00

BAILWAY INTELLIGENCE.

OXFORD, WORCESTER, AND WOLVER-

HAMPTON. .
The receipts of this company, including the
Stourbridge Extension Canal, for the fortnight
ending the 28th of March have been 7, 584/ , while
those for the corresponding fortnight of 1857
amounted to 7,6021., and the expenditure, also in-
cluding that of the Stourbridge Extension Canal,
3,781/., being at the rate of 49.84 per cent., while
those for the c,n.responding fortnight of 1557
amounted to 3,7921., or at the rate of 49.87 per
cent. The sum of 38,4721., being receipts for the
first five fortnights and three days of the half-year,
added to the 7,584/. as above, makes a total receipt
of 46,056/. as against 47,7951. for the correspond-
ing five fortnights and four days of the pi evious
year. Aid the sum of 19,356/ , being expenses
for the first five fortnights and three days of the
half-year, added to the 3,7811. as above, m,.kcs a
total expenditure of 23,1381., b:-ing at the rate of
50.01 rerr cent, as against 23,7751. for the corres-
ponding five fortnights and four days of the pre-
vious year, or at the rate of 49.74 per cent.

BOMBAY, BARODA, AND CENTRAL INDIA.
It appeals that the earthworks of 150 miles of
this line from Sur it to Ahmedabad, are on the
point of completion ; that several miles of the per-
manent way have been Lid down, and the engines
were at work halla,ting the line. She fir,t large
iron bridge on this section was nearly compl,ted.
The working drawings were hp ing prepared for the
section lately conceded to the company between
Surat and Bombay, preparatory to the commence-
ment of the works.

IMPORTANCE OF RAILWAYS IN INDIA.

Lieutenant-Colonel KENNEDY, R.E., at a meet-
ing recently held in the United service Institu-
tion, entered very fully into the importance of
having a sufficient length of railway construct, d in
India, both in a military and commercial point of
view ; but more particularly as respected military
operations, in which the saving of troops and ex-
penditure would be considerable. Taking the pro-
portion of railways as existing in the United States
of America, for railways in India, of one mile of
railway to 112 square miles of country, which he
considered was the lowest scale that should be
applied to any inhabited country even where
the general industry was limited to agriculture, if
the railways were uniformly laid down iu that prc-
portion, the more distant points would be 60 miles
from a railway. The proportion of railways in the
United Kingdom was 1 mile to about 137 square
miles, and would make the most distant points on
the average about 6i- miles from any railway.
The population of America averaged 9 to the squat
mile, the population of India 124 to the square
mile, and of the United liiegelem 226 to the square
mile. The density of the population in India
was 14 times greater than in America, and there-
fore as many times greater was the nece-si,y
for railways in In(lie According to the Ameri-
can scale, about 12,423 miles of railway were abso-
lutely required for India. So urgent did the consi-
derations of railway communication in India appear
to him, both as regarded its industrial progress and
military protection and defence, that on his niurn
from that country in 1852, after having held the
appoiatment of Military Secretary to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, as well as that of cinsultiog en-
gineer to the Supreme Government in the railway
department, he felt bound to address a report,
dated 14th of September, 1852, on the subject of
railways to the Home Government of India, in
which he fully explained the advantages of rail-
way communication for military purposes, and
stated that in India marching or campaigning in
summer was out of the question, except at a fearful
expense of life and health to European troops. It
was shown in that report that a proper system of
railways (while inereas;ng the efficiency of the
army) would enable a reduction to be made in the
military'esablishmknt of India equal to 2,332,4827.
per annum. This would represent a capital of
58,312,0001., if raised at 4 per cent., and if in-
vested in railways, at an average cost of 6,0001.
per mile, would furnish 9,718 miles of rail-
way. The report was sent by Govern-
ment to India arid circulated to the auele,rities
there, and it was likewise laid before Parlia-
ment. Had the principles therein urged been
adopted with the energy exemplified in the United
States of America, 2,000 miles of rail way peranuurn
might have been opened during the last three years
in lnclia, which would have placed the authorities
ina c ,nditiou to deal effectually with the mutiny of
the Bengal army, if it would not have altogether
prevente the occurrence of that mutiny. At the
breaking out of the mutiny in 1857 the force of
the Bri' ish Government in India was 240,872
men of all arms, of weom 42,500 were Europe +its
and 204,372 natives distributed at 228 sta,ions,
giving a ratio of native troops to Eur .peen
troops of nearly live to one. By another return
made to the House of Commons in Apt il, 1852, the
Queen's and Company's European troops amounted
to 49,408 men, the Company's native troops, in-
cluding contingents, to 276,432 men ; making a
total of 325,840 men, and giving a ratio of above
51 natives to 1 European. The Name return stated
the military resources of native Princes at 398,918
it n, making the gross ratio of Company's and native
Princes' tro ips to European troops to 1. It like-
wise staled the European artillery at 7,436 men, tire
Company's native ar illery at 9,004 men,and native
Princes' artillery at 12,962 men ; makine the Com-
pany's and native Princes' artillery together cern-
pared to European artillery as three to one. The
European cavalry were stated at 4,133 men, the
Company's native cavalry, including cow iugents,
at 39,758 men, and the native Princes' cavalry at
69,303 men ; making the ratio of Company's and
native Princes' cavalry to European cavalry over
twenty-six to one. The average of four years
glowed that the annual military charges f. r the
325,840 men, not including buildings, amounted to
10,106,6801. He assumed from the experience they
bad had that henceforth the native troops in the In-
dian army should not be allowed to exceed those of
Europeans, but that they might be safely employe l
in equal numbers—the Artillery, Engineers, and
Sappers, however, being exclusively European.

. .
lie remarked that even under these arrangeraents
the force, although secure, would not be as eflec-
tive for occupation purpoes as the larger proprtion
of natives would make it, iu consequence of the
effects of climate on Europeans. With a proper
system of railway intercourse, the operations and
strength of the aamy would be greatly increased,
by enabling troops rapidly to penetrate every
district, so that the most distant points of the
country might be on the average only sixty miles
from the nearest railway. This would require
but six ordinary or three forced marches to
roach any point from the railway, or base of
all military operations in India—a base of
extraordinary strength from the rapidity with
which every part of it could be furnished with the
required amount of troops, provisions, and stores.
About 12.000 milt s of r ailway, us before mentioee 1,
would suffice on that scale, 6,000 miles being main
lines, along which the army might be assum,- d to he
distribu,ed at equal intervals in brigades. The length
of those intervals would depeed upon the aggrn_tve
strength of the army. The remaining 6,000 miles
' would consist of second-class lines, branching from
the main lines of railway to provide communica ion
throughout the local districts. On comparing the
power of concentrating troops efficiently prodded
with provisions and military stores upon the most de-
cisive point or points of India in the shortest time
and at the smallest cost, with and without railways,
ho assumed that in either case the army of occupa-
tion should be posted in brigetes of one European
regiment, one native regiment, one squadron of
European cavalry, on© squadron of native cavalry,
and a European field battery of artillery of four
guns and two howitzers, at equal intervals along
the main lines of 6,000 miles. It would require 48
days without railways to concentrate by marching
a force of 53,000 men from an aggregate army of
325,840 men, which, composed as above, would
cost annually 13,785,7601., whereas au equal force
c,)uld be concentrated by railway in seven days
from an aggregate army of only 100,000 men,
costing only 6,214,5301. par aenum. Thug,
the 53,000 men could be brought to any
one given point by railway in about one-
seventh of the time, from an army under one-third
of the strength, and costing under ono-half of the
amount, as compared with the assembly of a simi-
lar force at the same point from the larger army
without railways. To assemble by marching 53,000
:nen from an equally distributed army of only
100,000 men would occupy nearly six months, in-
stead of seven days by railway. The advantrigieis
of railway transport for troops in India overma
ing as regarded time in concentrating a field
n,f;-rliicric:
were as 24 to 1 ; as regarded the economy .
I,t rded tha I
tary establi:liments over 2 to 1 ;
Power of reducing the nurnerical,forffa:.seulo7fot.:l:laisr:nays'
and consequently the nualbeat:iwafyi:L 'regarded
3to 1. The advantages of _roira fa al exposure to
the protection of Europeans.rr
:averting of those
d successful issue
oclfiemvaetrey, as
warre g
orl r
conflictde d
:i.iced war and disturbance,
stahlishment of railways
Equally striking results
other department of the
contingenciesm,ere beyon catlireatitiiir.p;.t
trieotiej
would atttnd t
e„vde above all it would. appear iu
Government, a,
of . ,
the develoPtnen,, ti
as
re
e a rgd oc dthoug h t itlu uwsatsrye'letarra dtellatandwitomut-
die army in India could not safely
uie
bera
iirwedayusced below its former numerical establish-
ment of about 325,060 men, and that of this gross
rtihuemNl,b,ehroolenec-0118atilnf I half, 162,000, must be Europeans,
per annum, while