The Sun.
London, England, 1858-12-30 00:00:00

spare neither trouble, nor cost, nor money, in bring-
ing into use and to perfection any promising pro-
blem for the navy. The 'object once in view will
here also 'be followed out with the well-known Eng-
lish pertinacity which neither waits for the popular
opinion nor is frightened back by doubtful success.
When we look at the new English ships, such as
the Sovereign, the frigates Imperieuse, Euryalus and
others, we must, above all, admit that such works
are capable of furnishing wonderful results ; but
take into account other portions of the English
navy, and no one can say that the results answer to
the incredible cost. The fabulous sums of uselessly
spent money must be a matter of astonishment,
which have been lost on so-called failures, or other
unfortunate experiments. We have before observed
that the extent of the English fleet in the year
1815 consisted of 743 seaworthy ships of war,
without reckoning those building and transports,
while the present number of English ships-of-war
consists of 546—a diminution of 200 ships. The
aggregate expenditure for the navy from 1815 to
the breaking out of the Eastern war amounted to
£160,000,000 sterling, and, as the cost of materiel
as compared with personel, is generally taken as 5
to 4, England has spent £90,000,000 to bring down
the fleet of 1815 to its present state. This compa-
rison comes out much more favourably for France.
The French navy, increased from 1833 to 1857
by 400 sail, at an expenditure of 1,660,000,000
francs, which, at the previously quoted
proportion for materiel, gives a sum total of
900,000,000 f., or £36,000,000 sterling. It is true
that the French Administration cannot always
boast of economy or discretion, but the facts whie,h
we have instanced must point it out as a wise one
compared with that of England. Admiral Napier
reckoned, in the presence of the First Lord of the
Admiralty, that since 1815 13 three-deckers, 144
two-deckers, 21 frigates, of the first-class,, 155 of
the second, 50 of the third, and 334 smaller vessels
—in all 717 ships-of-war—had altogether disap-
peared. In the same manner Mr. Hume was able
in the House of Commons to make the assertion,
without receiving contradiction from either side,
that England from 1828 to 1843 had built 308
ships-of-war, of which a third turned out to be
useless.

In the same extravagant and reckless manner,
also, was the construction of steam vessels under-
taken. While England had already in the year 1822
commenced building paddlewheel steam vessels for
war purposes, it was not until the year 1840, when
the French steam• frigate brought the King Louis
Philippe to England, that they built after its
pattern, the Terrible, a ship which expressed
its object, and even surpassed its French model.
Previously, however, eight steam frigates had
proved unsuccessful. In the year 1850 England
possessed 20 paddlewheel steam frigates, each of
which was constructed to carry 32 guns of heavy
calibre. Three only, however, of them—the Ter-
rible, Sidon, and Odin—could carry their armament
—all the rest were too weak for their between deck
batteries, and could only receive their six upper
deck guns. The French navy numbered at the ,
same time 22 steam frigates of a similar armament,
which could perfectly carry them.
At the same time England built at once 30 iron
steamers. Scarcely were they ready when it was
discovered that iron was not suitable as a material
for ships of war, and that the ships were therefore
not available for the purpose for which they had
been intended. This was a useless experiment
which cost the country three millions, while France
kept to her wooden ships.

It also demanded great expenditure and effort
before the screw could be introduced and adopted
in the English navy. In the year 1846 the sailing
frigate Amphion was fitted with a screw, but not-
withstanding ii double building, which cost 800,000
dollars (£120,000), it was requisite to put her on
one side as completely unfit for the service. It
fared not much better with the altered ships of the
line Blenheim and Sanspareil, whose screws cost
500,000 dollars (£75,000), without. giving a greater
speed than eight knots. The frigates Imperieuse,
Euryalus, and Shannon, which arose about this
time, succeeded, however, perfectly ; and the new
ships, as well as the altered ones, began henceforth
to answer better. The Wellington, Arrogant, Con-
queror, Agamemnon, and others, have given evi-
dence that they are really masterpieces.
The French, on the other hand, did not hurry
in the use of the screw, but tested the new dis-
covery by small experiments. Their constructors,
more scientifically educated than the English,
pondered beforehand ere they built, and only
when the screw was recognised in France as
successful did they begin to introduce it.
From that time, however, they proceeded ener-
getically to work. After the French constructors
had had the glory of having, in the Napoleon,
built the first screw ship of the line, and of having
also produced in her a pattern ship, there have
been, under Louis Napoleon, not only 20 new screw
ships of the line, 20 frigates, and more than double
that number of corvettes and smaller vessels built,
but also all the not unfit sailing ships of the line
have been generally- fitted with screws, without
there having been, so far as we know, one single
failure.
After such bitter experience one would have
thought that the English Admiralty and their
builders wonld have become more cautious, but still
in the years 1853. to 1856 the same precipitation
and negligence took place, and especially in the
class of gunboats. Being, then, convinced that the
Russian fleet would not leave the harbour of Cron-
stadt to measure their strength with the allies on
the high seas, and that Cronstadt itself could only
be attacked by small vessels, the building of screw
gunboats was undertaken in England with a perfect
furore, and foreign countries saw with astonish-
ment of what development of power a nation is
capable which is determined to aceomplish its ob-
ject. Soon 100 gunboats were ready, and their
number eventually reached 162. Half only, how-
ever, of these gunboats attained their object, and
in general they were built too light for their heavy
armament (a 92cw t 68-pounder shell gun), although
they proVed quick and handy. The French, it is
true, produced no masterpiece, for they fell into
the opposite error, and built a third of their boats
too heavy. However, they built in all only 30,
and the failure with them amounted to only 10,
while, with the English it reached 80 gunboats.
Besides, the French boats which answered were
superior to those of the English.
The same spectacle was repeated with the floating
batteries of both countries, and with the screw trans-
ports. The English batteries were complete failures,
and could not even be propelled; the French, on
the contrary, were excellent, and answered their
purpose. In transports France possesses 26 of
the best iron screw steamers, expressly built
for this object, of which each can conveniently
carry 1,000 troops ; so that with these alone she can
readily throw 26,000 men on any selected post of
an enemy's coast. Take, besides, the 22 paddle
steam frigates, of which one in the year 1849 con-
veyed in 30 hours one whole regiment of infantry
from Toulon to Civita Vecchia, and another a com-
plete regiment of cavalry, and France has means of
transport for 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry,
independent of her ships of the line, screw frigates,
and corvettes. England, on the other hand, suf-
fers under her unfortunate transport ships, as, for
example, is exemplified in her thrice-returning
Transit. It became, in fact, necessary to hire pri-
vate shipping in order to send only 10,000 men to
India.

We gather from all these facts the conviction
that England is not wrong when as regards one
part of tho ship's materiel—namely, the quantity or
quality of the • shipping—she looks with anxiety
towards France, and watches closely the remarkable
development of her neighbour's navy, which, al-
though it has often taken a temporary stride, had
never yet taken one so durable and systematic as it
has done at the present time. Let us now, however,
turn, as regards both navies, to the other not less
important part of the materiel—namely, the artil•
lery.

Under the artillery of a. ship we include not only
the number of the guns and the size of their calibre,
but also their crew, which in battle is the main
point. We take as the ground of our opinion the
history of naval actions, and from several single
actions as well as large battles arrive at one conclu-
sion, which is in favour of the English, and which
can only result from their superior artillery. This is
the remarkable and uniform difference between the
loss of men in English ships compared with the loss of
the ships of all the other nations with whom England
was at war. We will, in illustration, take only a
few instances. In April, 1798, the Englishship Mars
took the French ship Hercule ; the first had 90
killed and wounded, the latter 290. In February
of the same year the English ship Sybille engaged
the French ship Forte, in which action the first
had 21 killed and wounded, the last 143. In March,
1806, the English ship London took the French
ship Marengo ; the first with a loss of 32, the latter
of 145 men. On the 4th of November, 1805, an
engagement took place between four French and
five English ships of the line, in which the English
lost 135, the French 730 men. On the 14th of
February, 1797, a battle took place between English
and Spanish ships. The English lost 300, the
Spaniards 800 men. On the 11th of October of the
same year followed the battle of Canperdown be-
tween the English and Dutch. The first lost 825,
the last 1,160 men. On the sth of July, 1808, the
English frigate Seahorse took the Turkish frigate
Badere Zuffer. The first lost 15, filo last 370 men.
Finally, in the same 3'ear a Russian ship of the
line, the Sewolod, was taken by two English ships,
in which the Russian lost 303, aild the English
only 62 wen,

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