The Sun.
London, England, 1867-03-18 00:00:00

told at the time that the peace of Europe bad been
thus preserved. It was preserved when it stood in
no danger ; it was sacrificed when it would have
been requisite to save it at any price. But when the
weak is sacrificed an avenger remains in the shape
of the victim's spoils, which brings about inevitably
a quarrel among the spoilers." (Loud applause.)
Here the sitting was suspended for a short time.
On resuming, M. Thiers said :
"In considering recent events, I am tempted to exclaim
with Bossuet, 'A man was found.' Not that I wish to
establish any comparison between Cromwell, to whom the
quotation applies, and the bold Minister who has so rapidly
raised Prussia to greatness. The parallel would make M.
de Bismarck a worse, but also a greater man than he is.
(Laughter.) But, considering how wonderfully adapted
he has shown himself to the task he has undertaken, I
cannot help saying, ' Yes ; a man has been found endowed
with rare political sagacity, still greater boldness, and
whom his countrymen must consider as a great patriot.'
He should have been terrified at the idea of finding him-
self backed by nineteen millions of Prussians only, with
thirty-six millions of Austrians and fifty millions of Ger-
man confederates arrayed against him. Prussia then
thought, him mad, but the Minister had perfectly judged
the situation. He saw that Austria was utterly unpre-
pared, and could only oppose him with half her forces, the
other half being engaged in Italy. He also discerned that
not only Italy compelled Austria to divide her forces, but
that she paralysed the forces of France, involved in the
meshes of her policy. To this sound view M. de Bis-
marck owed his success. Why did we not see thinks as
Clearly as he did ? Had we done so his triumph might
have been converted into disaster. All that we required
to do was to discern •that, whatever the issue of the war,
it would be unfortunate for us ; that the equilibrium of
Europe would be upset ; that the position of France would
be affected ; that in no case could there be any profit—
and, above all, any territorial profit—for her; and, finally,
that we had but one word to say to prevent the war. It
was easy to justify these assertions. As regards any
amount of profit, and especially any territorial advantago,
that France could hope to derive from the war, it was
well known that the ruling passion in Germany was to
retain possession of every inch of German soil. Whoever
won the conqueror must be a German, and you know what
Prussia, who was in a better position than any other power
to make such a sacrifice, replied to us on the morrow of
Sadowa, 'No ! I cannot, without ruining my prestige in the
eyes of Germany, part with the smallest particle of
national territory.' Therefore, take it how we would, we
could hope for no territorial advantage (tres bien). But it
may be questioned that a word from France would have
sufficed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. It was not
necessary that that word should have been arrogant. There
could be no arrogance on the part of France to tell Italy,
I have created you ; you are indebted to me for your exist-
ence; I cannot consent to perturbations which must alter
the balance of European power at my expense.' I repeat,
would it have been arrogant on the part of France to have
thus addressed Italy ? (No, no.) And, as regards Germany,
we were equally justified in speaking the word that would
have prevented the war. The treaties by which we gua-
ranteed the Germanic Confederation conferred upon us the
right of declaring that our forces would be turned against
any aggressors of the Confederation. Austria, who only
went to war out of a sense of honour, as Venetia was de-
manded of her, even without fighting; would have hailed
such a declaration as fallen from Heaven; and Prussia,
who considered her alliance with Italy a pledge for the
neutrality of France, would also have held back, and there
would have been no war. I know it has been said—and it is
a calumny which circulates in unguarded terms when pub-
lic and in very broad terms in private—that that word had
become impossible; it has been said that this Chamber had
so energetically pronounced in favour of peace that the
Government could no longer utter that indispensable word.
I appeal to the Chamber—whilst expressing it 3 wishes in
favour of peace, did it refer to that cowardly and shameful
peace which would have reduced the Government to say iu
sebstance—' Let the Italians, the Austrians, and the Prus-
sians cut each other's throats, and the balance of power take
care of itself ?' Is that, I repeat, the kind of peace the Cham-
ber wanted ?

" A Number of Voices—No, no.
" M. Rouher—Certainly not.

" M. Thiers—Yes, the Chamber was anxious for peace
—but the peace of Europe, not the peace of France alone.
(Loud applause). The Chamber had very clearly discerned
that war was desired not by Austria, who reluctantly made
-.p her mind to it, but by Italy and Prussia. The uhambt r
saw clearly that only one word was required which Prussia
and Italy should understand, and wanted that word to be
spoken. (Sensation.) It is alleged that the Chamber
paralysed the Government. Well, although I have not the
honour of representing the majority of this house, I say
that if the Government had come down and asked you for
supplies to enable it to speak that word, you would have
voted them with acclamations. (` We would, we would.')
This calumny, therefore, vanishes, I trust never to re-
appear. There has also been a talk of another policy which
I had stigmatised beforehand, and which consisted in con-
tracting an alliance with Prussia, with a view to earn the
reward of rush au union. But that policy can never have
existed. What ! to France's dishonour, her Government
would have accepted some fragment of Germany as a bribe
to acquiesce in German unity. The proof that thatpolicy
cap never have existed is that no one has been found to
avow it, and it were a great shame were it otherwise.
"A Voice—Then why allude to it?
"M. Thiers—Here is what has occurred. Our Govern-
ment waited, dawdled, and trifled, hoping that something
would turn up. Something has turned up--the greatness
of Prussia. (Sensation.) But we are told that it was im-
possible to foresee the course of events. - This is quite
true, and nothing can be more rash than to indulge in pre-
dictions on the eve of a battle ; but there is one thing that
could be foreseen, that the issue, whatever it might be
would be unfortunate for us, and that is why the war
should have been prevented. (Hear, hear.) It is also
said that Prussia displayed qualities she was not suspected
of possessing. In-the first place, a Government is gene-
rally provided with means of knowing what takes place
abroad. But, however, let us not dwell upon that. People
talk of the new armament of the Prussian armies, but you
should have known all about that. But was it the arma-
ment that decided the fate of the battle of Sadowa ? It is
now notorious that up to two o'clock in the afternoon the
advantage was in favour of the Austrians. What prevented
their carrying the day ? The want of forty or fifty thou-
sand men on their right to check the advance of the grown
Prince of Prussia, who, had he arrived one hour later,
might have arrived too late. Now where were these
50,000 missing Austrians? Why they were at Custozza—
and it was not only 50,000, but 110,000 who were fighting
the Italians between the Minolta and the Adige. Draw your
own conclusions. It was Italy that decided the course of
events in Germany, and I repeat that I regret that a boldly
inconsistent course on the part of Prance should not have
been adopted to prevent such a calamity as the unity of Ger-
many following close upon that of Italy."
Here M. Thiers gave a sketch of the resources which the
North Gorman Confederation placed at Prussia's command,
and noting the tendency of the Southern States to join the
North, pointed out that practically the Cabinet of Berlin
bad the control of 40,000,000 of Germans on the French
frontier. He also referred to the Eastern question, and,
disclaiming any intention to hurt the feelings of Russia, he
pointed out the danger of Constantinople falling into the
hands of Russia, and argued that sound policy should be
directed to prevent such a contingency. He denounced
the idea of creating a Christian empire at Constantinople,
as a chimerical scheme, worthy only the advocates of the
principle of nationalities, and then proceeded:—
"Commonsense, therefore, indicates that we should keen
the Turks there, not that we like them, but because they
are there. But it is said they are barbarians. Yes, they
are, but they are not more so than those who seek to re-
place them. A statesman of the most lofty intellect deli-
vered the other day on this subject a speech full of sound
practical sense. I could wish that there should be at Constan-
tinople a Power more congenial to our views and customs,
but commonsense commands us to accommodate ourselves
to circumstances, and consequently maintain the Turks at
Constantinople. Tho most sagacious men ask themselves if
a treaty of alliance does not already exist between Prussia
and Russia. I know not, but I know there is something
more grave than a treaty of alliance—unison of interests—
and it is that which constitutes theveritable alliance. (Par-
tial applause.) There was no treaty of alliance between
Italy and Prussia early in the month of April last, and that
treaty was concluded in 24 hours, because there existed
unison of interests between the two countries. This con-
stitutes the double danger of Europe at present. It is true
that the Emperor of Russia is wise, and that M. de
Bismarck is an able man. Neither seeks to precipitate
events ; but the situation of Europe depends, it would ap-
pear, upon the wisdom of a sovereign and the prudence of
an ambitious minister. Events, last year, were in the hands
of France, and now they aro in hands of Prussia and
Russia. This is the change that has taken place in the situa-
tion. (Partial applause). What course of conduct, then,
must we follow ? I admit that in such a position we can-
not attempt to work miracles. We have two political sys-
tems to choose from, and one of those I unequivocally re-
pudiate, and which it would be iniquitous on the part of
Franco to pursue. I mean the policy which has for its ob-
ject the agglomeratiou of States—the policy which con-
sents to follow the ambitious. France, in adopting such
a policy, would render herself odious to the whole world.
German unity would become accomplished ; the East
would be invaded ; and whilst Pruseia and Russia would
meet with little effective opposition on the part of Austria
and Turkey, France would' encounter serious difficulties in
advancing towards the Scheldt. Such a policy, as I have
said, would be iniquitous. We should be at the same time
the most guilty and the most severely punished. (Partial
applause.) The most wise and reasonable policy would be
to place France at the head of all threatened interests ;
and to Drevent the occurrence of further injustice. (Tres
bien, tres bien.) 1 do not desire war; it would only be an
extravagance on our part which would precipitate events.
Let us, then, admit what has been done, but let us alsode-
dare that we will tolerate nothing further. War ? No ;
a thousand times no. Peace suffices, as is proved by the
guarded attitude which Prussia maintains towards us. She
avoids wounding our national susceptibilities ; she finds