The Sun.
London, England, 1867-04-04 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TRIES.—Mr. Childers and Mr. Stansfeld deserve
credit for having placed our Naval Expenditure
during the recent debate in a very clear light, and
enabled the country to consider the Estimates from
a comprehensive and important point of view. At
this moment we are at peace with all the world, and
likely, it may be hoped, to remain so. It has been
agreed on all sides that there is no present proba-
bility of a naval war, and it has also been conceded
that our naval force is certainly not in arrear, as far
as strength goes, of that of other countries. This
being our position, and there being no special obli-
gation pressing upon us or suggesting unusual exer-
tion, we are asked for eleven millions of money for
the service of the Navy. Mr. Stansfeld then bids
us say, if we can, what is the justification for this
enormous outlay. Must we really spend so much
for purely peace purposes—that is, for maintaining
the police of the seas and protecting our commercial
interests in various parts of the world ? It is im-
possible, replies Mr. Stansfeld, to venture on any
such assertion. No naval man, he thinks, would
allow it for a moment. Then,. what is our motive
or warrant for such expenditure ? Clearly this,
he answers,—that we should be prepared for the
not impossible contingency of a
,great naval war, in
which we might have to fight for the independence
or existence of the nation. In other words, it is our
true policy to assert and maintain our ascendancy
at sea, and that cannot be done without an expense
commensurate with that incurred by other Powers
on their military forces. This conclusion corresponds
no doubt with the instincts of the public as well as
the traditions of the country ; but then Mr. Stans-
feld proceeds to argue that our practice is not at
all in conformity with any such theory, and that,
instead of spending all these millions on a
powerful fleet to assure and establish our naval
dominion, we are really frittering them away upon
small squadrons and peace services, to the neglect of
substantial strength and efficiency. What the public
safety requires is that we should be prepared at brief
notice with an overpowering naval force for decisive
action, whereas we have not got this force, and are
not, with all our outlay, going the right way to get
it. A few years ago, when men-of-war were repre-
sented by wooden two-deckers, and their armaments
by 32-pounders, we had only to provide reserves of
men, and we were safe ; for we could then send such
squadrons to sea as no rival could hope to encounter
with success. But all that is now past. We have
got the men—in fact, we are voting 70,000 this very
year—but we have not got the guns, which are now
300-pounders instead of 32's, or the ships, which
must be ironclads instead of two-deckers. Nor is
our vast expenditure directed to the recovery of this
lost power. It is lavished on small establishments
at foreign stations, and these are the very establish-
ments which Mr. Childers has called in question.
Mr. Stansfeld says that eleven millions a year make
an outlay too great for mere peace purposes ; Mr.
Childers says that these very purposes are injudi-
ciously considered and imperfectly fulfilled. At
various points of the globe, and on a variety of
pretences, we maintain a large number of ships
and men ; in fact, with the exception of the Chan-
nel and Mediterranean Fleets, our whole force
afloat may be said to be distributed among these
establishments. If we ask for a more precise de-
finition of the service which these squadrons are sup-
posed to perform, we are told that they " protect
British interests," or " keep the police of the seas."
It is not easy, however, to understand how the
former condition is fulfilled. The interests of our
merchants might be occasionally jeopardised, no
doubt, in foreign ports by the injustice of foreign
Governments, and possibly the presence of a British
man-of-war or two might produce a good effect, as
at Vera Cruz, for instance, or at Jeddo. But Mr.
Childers, while admitting that we, a nation of
traders, may be called upon to intervene for the
protection of trade, alleges that our precautions are
taken not only on the most expensive, but the least
effective system for the purpose. If the theory is
good for anything, it must mean this—that in the
event of a resort to extremities the British squadron
on the station will be at hand to insure the safety
of British interests. But the fact is, according to
Mr. Childers, that we enjoy no such guarantee. lie
tells us tha in the actual event of any such con-
tingency the British squadron would, in the majority
of cases, simply have to " cut and run" to avoid
capture by an overpowering forces. Mr. Kinnaird,
too, reminded the House on Monday that a practi-
cal illustration of the case occurred the other day at
Valparaiso, where the British squadron had not
been strong enough to go into action, and British
interests on the spot were left to suffer in conse-
quence. Nor was the conclusion drawn by Mr.
Kinnaird otherwise than logical. He said that we
should either maintain adequate squadrons abroad
or none at all. That is obvious • but an " adequate"
squadron would mean a squadron always strong
enough at every point to meet the hostile force
forthcoming at that point--a standard of force
which it would be impossible to keep up all over the
world. There remains the alternative of keeping
no foreign squadrons at all ; but this would not be
satisfactory, and so Mr. Childers suggested his
third course, as combining superior efficiency with
a considerable saving of money,
THE " WESTMINSTER GAZETTE" ON THE CONDI-
TION OF MERCHANT SEAMEN.—There are 350,000
seamen of all classes serving under the British
flag in all parts of the world. 197,000 of these
serve in registered ships trading directly from
or, at least, coming occasionally to, the United
Kingdom. The remainder man intercolonial and
other vessels entitled to bear the British flag, but
having no direct communication with the home
ports. Nine months in every year—for all the
best years of the lives of seamen—are spent on
shipboard, whilst a great portion of this time is
actually served on the high seas. Withdrawn
thus from the protection of the laws under which
we live, and from the still more potent safe-
guard of a healthy and well-informed public
opinion, it should be no subject of surprise that
seamen suffer physical ills from which we are
happily protected. It is under these circumstances
that the governance of the mercantile marine
becomes the subject of exceptional legislation.
.The Merchant Shipping Act, wisely conceived in
many respects, has remained in many important
particulars, a dead letter. The very existence of
some of the laws intended for his protection is un-
known to the seaman, whilst the machinery for
the application of others is so little adapted to
the case, that they are seldom set in motion.
Even in the most important matter with which
human laws deal, even life itself, the seaman is
denied that protection extended to the rest of his
countrymen. When an Englishman dies on shore
from accidental or suspicious causes it is alike the
interest and the duty of a certain public officer
to institute a legal inquest into the circumstances
attending death. But, in the case of seamen far
away from the watchfulness of the public eye,
they may—and many frequently do—meet their
death by preventible accidents, by brutality, or,
still oftener, by a slow poisoning process result-
ing from a well-known dietary arrangement de-
structive to health and fatal to life. Yet, in no
such case occurring on the high seas can any in-
quiry be instituted unless the body is embalmed
and brought to land. It would be futile to ex-
pect the captain to embalm what would, in too
many cases, be criminating evidence against
himself, or against his master, the owner. True,
in some of the more wholesale losses of life,
where it is also attended with loss of property,
occasional but most unsatisfactory inquiries are
instituted, in which there are none of the cha-
racteristics of a prosecution, no cross-examination
of witnesses, and no persons put on their trial.
The unsatisfactory nature of these proceedings,
even in the few cases in which they are instituted,
is well illustrated by the ineffective investigation
which followed such a conspicuous loss as that of
the " London," and which was well characterized
in the House of Commons as a " whitewashing in-
quiry." The infrequency of even such whitewash-
ing inquiries is well evidenced by the experienced
of a recent convict. It was notorious on 'Change,
and well known to the police, that the shipowner
in question had been concerned in the wilful
destruction of fifteen excessively insured ships,
under conditions necessarily so extremely dan-
gerous to life, that, though we are not told so,
it is difficult to conceive how the ships could
have been wilfully destroyed by the agency-of
rock or tempest without the sacrifice of human
life. Yet no conviction followed this, by no means
singular, criminal, until after the destruction of
the sixteenth ship. Then an accomplice, who had
frequently been similarly employed, dissatisfied
with his share of the profits, gave such testi-
mony as brought his master, the shipowner, and
others within the reach of the ordinary courts of
justice. A conviction was thus, at the end of a
long-notorious career, secured, and twenty years'
penal servitude righteously inflicted. The assump-
tion in every case of shipwreck should be, that the
ship is built to float on the surface and not to go
to the bottom, and that she is intended to be
navigated in safe waters and not on the top of the
rocks. When the ship fails . to comply with

x,."‘•
these af_:_--ariptions, and founder at sir Io
shattered on the rocks, the officers and such 01
the crew as are within reach should be tried in
the new Vice-Admiralty Courts, in the same wal
as the officers and crews of any of her Majesty:,,
ships are tried by court-martial, however obvi-
ously excusable may be the loss of their vessel.
The accused should thus be obliged to defend
themselves, and if they can throw off the blame
on the shipowner, the underwriters, or others,
they will, no doubt, endeavour to do so—truth
will be elicited, and the guilty party punished.
If reasonable protection be denied to the seaman a
life, such as is given by the law to that of the
landsman, we need not be surprised that iu the,
lesser matters of physical and moral health, and of
property, still less security is afforded
True, in some details, good laws have been,
framed, but with conditions which have rendered
them wholly inoperative. The seaman himself i 9
sometimes expected to institute proceedings under
practically impossible conditions, and to be
acquainted with the particulars of Acts of Par'
liament, couched in legal language, and contain'
ing upwards of six hundred articles. But law's
are chiefly meant for wilful evildoers, for the
unrighteous, and are rarely called into opera'
tion in the ordinary affairs of every-day life bi
the more respectable members of the communiti.
Public opinion, social usages, and religions
influences, shield us on all sides, and exert 5
beneficial silent authority, the extent of which We
hardly recognize until we are withdrawn front
their shelter. It is to the absence of these
gentle but powerful influences, and to the presence,
of baneful customs, that we must trace many of
the evils incidental to the seaman's isolated and
unfriended poSition. The British shipowner is
commonly understood to be the millionaire
princely owner of a splendid fleet—the pride of
his country, the envy of the world. But though.
there are a few such gentlemen in possession of
noble and well-found ships, and a few large,
and liberal navigation companies, of whose fleets
the country may well be proud, these are only
the happy exceptions amongst a less wealthy o',
less liberal class. Ships are frequently owned
in many shares by small tradesmen, retired sea
officers, and other men of small means, who
engage in this trade for speculative -purposes, 4
and know their seamen only as so mall,
objectionable figures on the wrong side 01
their account. Nay, even amongst the larger
owners, few have any personal acquaintance what.
ever of the seamen whom they employ. Indeed •
the crews are so changed every voyage that it je
somewhat difficult for even the officers to knoll
anything but the names of the men under their
command. Personal influence on the part of the
officers is thus reduced to a minimum, and on the
part of the great majority of the owners has 11°'
existence at all. The softening sway of the better
portion of the fairer sex is also, unhappilif
withdrawn during the seaman's long absences fronl
home; whilst his family, if he has any, are My
known to, uncared for, and unprotected by his
employers. The difficulties that surround the
sailor's married life are thus magnified, matrimony
is discouraged, and vice in its very worst fornisi
with all its moral, physical, and spiritual penali'
ties, fostered and promoted. With, too often, grasp'
ing and rapacious employers who have no knoll,'
ledge of or interest in their seamen ; with, fre:
quently, ignorant, uneducated, and ungoverned
officers ; with an urgent competitive rage for cheap'
ening supplies ; and with strong incentives t°
carry the largest possible cargo-load, what wonder
that seamen are constantly lodged in deleterious
holes, unfit for the carriage of cargo, and hardly 0
for brutes, fed on meat which would be eon_,
'
demned by the market inspectors, given fOT,
water to drink, and treated with a brutality which
is a disgrace to Christianity, to civilizatiollt
and to humanity. What wonder, then, if the race
becomes demoralized degraded, and even brutal;
ized. And if a spirit of opposition and even of
enemity is engendered between the seaman all
his officers, and between both and the owner
The owner declares the seaman to be an un'
grateful, hopeless, blackguard. The seaman be',
lieves the owner to be a grinding, selfish monster',
actuated by unlimited hostility to his class'
Both alike personally unknown to, and mutually
t
ignorant of, one another ; and both equally
fault. A little more heart, and a little more ink'
vidualizing interest, would promote a far better
relation btween these hostile heads and hands
the sphere of labour at sea, than any amount o'
compulsory legislation. Let the owner remember,
that, if the seaman be a degraded and debase':
Englishman, he is very much what his employer
have made him. He started in life with all the
advantages of school and Church and family
ence enjoyed by his brethren on shore ; he has
been withdrawn from all these aids, and he has.
reached the unhappy goal indicated, from avoidable
circumstances entirely within control. These,
brutalizing circumstances are not found in the
Royal Navy ; they are not found in the great
ships companies' and in several other liberal eum
ploys; they are not found in many foreign mer;
cantilc services ; and there is no reason whatever
why they should find shelter in any vessel uncle'
the zegis of the British flag.