The Sun.
London, England, 1860-12-18 00:00:00

?BE XEW ZEALAND WAR.

FROM A CORRESPONDENT OF THE TIMES.

111ELBOURNE,0CT, 25.
The latest intelligence from Taranaki is far from
satisfactory. There has, indeed, been a slight suc-
cess on the part of the forces under Gen. Pratt, but
nothing decisive, so as to change the aspect of the
war, or to eradicate the contempt which the natives
have conceived for the Queen's troops,
The news is up to the 12th of this month. On the
previous day a detachment of the troops had taken
three smalls palls in succession. Not a man was
killed on our side, but several were wounded, and I
among them Capt. Pasley, of the Royal Engineers,
severely, but not dangerously, in the thig:i. Capt.
Pasley came out to this colony a few years ago to
fill the then newly-created office of Government
Engineer. This office he resigned early in the pre-
sent year, and was about to return to headquarters.
Woolwich, when the war in New Zealand assumed

so serious an aspect as to demand the immediate
presence of General Pratt. Capt. Pasley at once
volunteered to service in New Zealand, and accom-
panied the general in July last. He has since done
good service. It is reported that the natives have
suffered considerably on this last occasion from the
artillery. General Pratt was making preparations
to follow up this success by an attack on the Wairia
pah, about 17 miles south of New Plymouth, and
had ordered a supply of provisions for the troops
sufficient foe 10 days. This looks like more vigour
than has hitherto marked the general's proceedings.
Indeed, he has had his own way in removing the
only two serious difficulties that beset his path. 1.
He has received carte blanche from the Governor,
who has waived the Downing street regulations in
the general's favour. He has forcibly removed the
women and children. For this he has been
much censured by the local press; but, as far as
I can see, it was a necessary measure. At all
events, the two points gained placed the general
in this position,—the whole responsibility now
rests with him. Ho cannot now say,—" If I had
not been fettered by instructions' and crippled
by impedimenta I could have done so and so." He

is now expected to restore the prestige of the
Queen's troops, of which former commanders had

allowed them to be shorn.

It is said that the bulk of Wirimu Kingi's fol-
[owers—i. e. all but his own people—have retired
their kainga (homesteads) to plant potatoes.

This is quite consistent with the native practice of
war. Potatoes are planted by the natives till the

rata comes into blossom, about the 17th of Decem-

ber. After that we may expect the war to recom-
mence with vigour. This is very disadvantageous
to our troops, unless in the meantime Kingi should
be successfully dealt with. Unless the whole
native population were armed against us, we can-
not treat those peaceful potato planters as our foes.

The instant the Maori puts aside his gun, and
takes up the spade or his grubbinghoe, he becomes
a non-belligerent, and cannot be identified as a
ci decant foe. After his work is done be may come
down upon our troops without warning, and his
first attack is likely to be a success.
But there is a far greater danger than this, and
one which is far from improbable. There can be
no doubt that the native mind is disturbed through-
out the northern island, and the absence of any
decided success on the part of our forces has gene-
rated an opinion that Kingi is a match, and even
more than a match, for the troops. The Maori
king party among the Waikattos, are watching
this contest, in order to turn it to their own advan-
tage, on a favourable opportunity presenting itself.

It was hoped that on the death of Te Whero-Whero
(Potatan) the king movement would die out. This,

however, has not been the case. The Waikattos
have chosen his son under the name of Potatan 11.

At the date of the latest intelligence a body of
Waikattos, at least 400 Strong (some accounts say

800) was moving southward to joi❑ Kingi. Some
small parties of 20 or 30 of Kingi's connections
near 'Wellington were also on the move t.-) join

him. In the Wairarapa-valley, to the eastward
of Wellington, the natives are discussing the
policy of an attack on the settlers in that valley in

December or January—this is after the planting
season is over. The natives of Auriri, or Hawkes-
bay on the east coast north of Wairurapa, openly
declare that they intend an attack about the same

time. I learn these facts from a private letter on
which I can rely. Whether these threats will be
carried into execution or not will depend mainly

on the success or failure of Kingi, at Taranaki.
The arriTal of the 14th Regiment early in December

may influence the native mind to some extent, bit
nothing will do so effectually except some signal
success on the part of Gen. Pratt, and if this be
done with the force now at Taranaki—which far
outnumbers the natives—l feel pretty certain that

it will confine the character of the war to what it
is at present, and prevent it from becoming gene-
ral. The natives are as readily depressed by a
reverse as they are elated by success. If by any
decisive success of the Minds at Taranaki the war
should become general, a simultaneous attack upon
Wairarapa and Auriri, besides being most disas-
trous to the settlers there, would seriously embar-
rass the commander of the troops. Auckland itself
I is not without alarms on the same score, and even
Wellington, though the natives there seem as
friendly as ever, might be involved in a similar dis-
aster, inasmuch as it is quite impossible to predict
how they might be influenced by simultaneous at-
tacks in other places. It should be observed that all
these threatenings and rumours point at one and

the same time—December, and that is the time
for renewing or commencing hostilities according
to native custom. If these threatened attacks should

take place, any considerable, though not universal,
success, would be seized upon by the Maori king
party to take decided parts, and Pototan 11. is not a
worn-out of chief, like his predecessor, but a man in
the vigour of manhood. At present he appears well
disposed towards the settlers. He holds the language
of peace ; but the events which I have alluded to as
quite possible, and even probable, would undoubt-
edly change his policy; for he would be quite unable,
even if he were so disposed, to stem the tide of Maori
opinion. In the moment of elation Wirimu Kingi
gave out that he should first beat the soldiers, then
the fighting men among the Pakshas (Militia and
Volunteers), and then the settlers. This is the
account given by the natives of Wararepa and
Hawkes-bay. No doubt this at present is mere
boast, boasting being a native habit. -Whether it
will ripen into action will, I again repeat, depend
on General Pratt's success or failure.

If, in consequence of the events of the next two
months, the threatened attacks do not take place
during the two summer months, I do not think the
war will afterwards extend beyond Taranaki. In a
balanced state of things the arrival of the 14th will
turn the scale. After that, even with fluctuating
successes, now on One side, now on the other, I shall
expect the war to linger, and then die out. I do
not believe the Maoris can sustain the war for any
great length of time. All their planting of potatoes
" till the rata flowers" will not produce that supply
of food which a period of peace secures. I believe
that their defective commissariat will beat them in
the end. I should rely on this, even should the
threatened attacks of December actually take place.
But what consolation will the distresses and war
diseases of these deluded people—deluded by their
own erroneous estimates of our power, or rather of
our weakness—afford, if in the meantime they can
reproduce the frightful sufferings of the Taranaki
settlers in two or three other localities ?
Let it not be lost sight of for one moment that
the European population of N, w Zealand and
their representatives have no voice whatever in
the management of native affairs. It has been the
theory of the Colonial-office that the settlers,
or rather their representAives, would, by their dif-
ferences with the natives, ?lave repeatedly forced
the Government into wars. My own impression is
that if native management had besn confided to the
local Governments and Legislature their strong in
terest in peace would have found means to preserve
peace. It is said that the Governor, in
all these
h.as
recent proceedings
,which led to the wars,
taken the advice of his Ministers."
tallied with his policy, and so he adopted The advice
it. Would
he have done so if the advice had been contrary to
his views or his instructions ? or if the Governor
had not acted on their advice would his Ministers