The Sun.
London, England, 1858-05-21 00:00:00

that my first impression was right—viz., that the sub-
stance of this proclamation is impolitic. (Hear, hear.)
I beg the house to remember the circumstances under
which the proclamation was considered in the early part
of April by her Majesty's present advisers. The procla-
mation is decidedly at variance with an instruction sent
out by the Cabinet on the 24th March with respect to
the policy to be pursued on the capture of Lucknow. The
passage has been read before, bnt still it seems to me
so important that if it is not wearying the house I shall
quote it again. (Hear, hear.) Here, then, are the terms
of the instruction given to Lord Canning by the Cabinet
at the date I have named :

" To us it appears that whenever open resistance shall
have ceased it would be prudent in awarding punishment
rather to follow the practice which prevails after the con-
quest <of a country which has defended itself to the last by
deeper ate war, than that which may perhaps be lawfully
adopted after the suppression of mutiny and rebellion—such
acts always being exempted from forgiveness or mitigation
of pu.nishment as have exceeded the license of legitimate
hostilities."

The despatch next recommends a general disarmament and
as fax as passible a general amnesty, and then goes on to
decl are that—

" Ten every amnestied district the ordinary administration
of the law should as soon as possible be restored."
Now, try the proclamation as the Cabinet tried it early in
April, by the terms of that instruction, and I think you will
see that it is diametrically opposed to the spirit of that
instruction. (Cheers.) Arriving thus unexpectedly, and
violating an instruction already given by her Majesty's
Ministers, you must also bear in mind what were the
peculiar circumstances attending this proclamation. No
covering letter giving any official explanation of it ; all
private communications with reference to it, from no fault
of Lord Canning—who was unaware of the ehange of
Ministry—addrese3d to their political opponents, and from
some accident or misconception, on which I should be
most sorry to dwell, no portion of those representations to
the late Government bearing upon the subject were made
known to her Majesty's present advisers. Remember,
likewise, that the mitigating passage in the proclamation,
which has been advisedly added in consequence of the re-
presentations made to Lord Canning in India, was unknown
to the Cabinet when their despatch was written. (Hear.)
Recollect, moreover, that the Cabinet consented to that
despatch being transmitted in a particular form which
exists only with respect to despatches sent to India —viz..
through the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.
They believed that secrecy would be religiously observed ;
and with all my objections to the passages relating to
Oude, with which I shall deal presently, I am not of opi-
nion that, under the seal of secrecy, any of the topics
touched upon in that (It watch as a warning to the Governor-
General in regard to the danger of the proclamation were
improperly introduced. (Hear.) But is this the whole?
By no means. At the same time that the proclamation
reached the Government information of a very painful—
at all events of a very anxious kind—came to hand. It is
vain to dissemble it ; a very serious difference has arisen
between the civil and military authorities in India.
(Hear.) It is quite plain that the entire scheme of the
military campaign against the judgment of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, by the over-ruling authority of
the Governor-General, has not only been changed, but in-
verted. (Hear.) After that most splendid operation which
has warmed the heart and gratified the feelings of every
Englishman, when by a bold advance with a handful of
men Sir Colin Campbell at infinite risk relieved the belea-
guered garrison of Lucknow, the Commander-in-Chief's
own plan was not then to march upon the capital of Oude,
but, leaving that capital as thecentre open at a future period
to be attacked by his united force, rather to deal first with
the insurrection in the extremities, to tread out the mutiny
at its furthermost points, and afterwards to return to
Lucknow with its concentrated strength. (Hear.) The
Governor-General, however, from the purest motives, but
from political reasons, interfered with the strategy of the
Commander-in Chief, and called upon him instantly to at-
tack Lucknow, and thus to depart from his preconcerted
movements. Now, it is necereary to be just. This intelli-
gence reached the Cabinet simultaneously with the procla-
mation. There is a division between the civil and military
authorities; the Governor-General, acting on his own re-
sponsibility, with a high hand directs the military opera-
tions; and he issues this proclamation, or avows his inten-
tion to issue it. We know already—to-morrow we shall
know more accurately—upon the official information of the
Secretary of the Board of Control, that Sir James Outram
protested strongly against this proclamation. (Cheers.)
Who is Sir James tram ? He was the civil commis-
sioner of Oude in 1853 under Lord Dalhousie. He had
the most intimate kilo reledge at that period of the state of
feeling in that country, as well as of its social condition.
More than that, dropping his civil capacity, during a later
period when the military difficulties became great, he acted
as second in comnaand, and was himself exposed to all the
dangers of that groat centre of the revolt. He could, there-
fore, best appreciate what werethe sentiments of the landed
proprietors of Oude—he bast understood by experience
what had been their conduct. Yet knowing them well, both
by his earlier civil and later military experience, he in the
strongest and +lost decided manner objected to this pro-
clamation, an I pressed upon the Governor-General the po-
licy of abandon:lag it. (Cheers.) So much for the view taken
by Sir J. Outreur. Well, who is the next highest military
authority ? Sir John Lawrence. (Hear.) We have all heard
from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and are all
aware that Sir J. Lawrence pressed for a discriminating
amnesty indeed, and also objected to this proclamation.
(Cheers.) The statements I now make rest upon official
authority. I don't like to mention my own sources of
information, but I have reason to know that General Mans-
field, the chief of Sir Colin Campbell's Staff, has likewise
expressed in strong terms his doubts with respect to the
policy of this proclamation. (Cheers.) We have reason,
also, to belie v3—it has indeed been unequivocally stated by
the First Lore of the Admiralty—that General Franks, who
has just retuned fresh from most gallant and distinguished
military servi:e rendered at Lucknow, declares his indivi-
dual opinion that this proclamation is an unfortunate
step. (Cheese.) So much, then, for the conflict of autho-
rity as to the expediency of the proclamation we are now
discussing ' • so much as to the weight of evidence that
would lead ut to pause before. we give an opinion directly
or indirectly *suctioning this pro matien and condemn-
ing the csutian of the Government in taking measures
with reference to its revision and limitation. Now,
what is the correct interpretation of this proclamation ?
We have !vent a great deal of argument meant to prove
that confiscation does not mean confiscation—(hear,
hear) —that proprietary rights in the soil of Indian pro-
vinces dues rot imply ownership of the land. (Hear, hear.)
Now, in En ;land wo understand English, in India all men
may not ; but, although those who i.sued the proclamation
might notexectly have understood the exact purport of
its terms, what is most important for us to consider is,
how will ,he people who read it understand it ? (Hear,
hear.) 'The hon. member for Northampton} has read to us
extracts 'rem the Indian newspapers, but really there is
no newspaper which has arrived from India by the last
mail wh.ch does not give to the term "proprietary rights"
as broad a construction as has been given to 11 by any gen-
tleman who has addressed this house. (Hear.) Now, sir,
what isthe object of this proclamation? (Hear.) It is
suppoesd by some persons to be a gre it stroke of policy,
and it s,ertainly has the characteristic of novelty. (Hear,
hear.) It is, I must say, a new course of proceeding. No
doubt, if what was sought to be effected could be effected
without danger, it would be the interest of every conqueror
to effiot it. And what was that ? Why, it was simply
to covert the tenure of land in a conquered province from
tenarey for life, or for a longer period, at a quit rent, to
tenancy at will. (Hear, hear.) Doubtless, if that could
be efficted without risk it would be a great advantage to
any cmqueror, but from the earliest period of history, nei-
ther u Europe or in India has auy conqueror attempted
to pe form so difficult and dangerous an operation. (Hear,
hear) Neither Aurungzebe, Tamerlane nor Nadir Shah
everattempted such a proceeding. (firer, hear.) The
righ hon. gentleman the member for Radnor has described
theßritiab rule in India from 1764 to 1784 as a period of
rapicity sc ‘rcely ever known, and yet during that period
no 3ritish conqueror in India ever attempted an operation
of his nature. (Hear, hear.) Now, sir, I cannot help
thiikieg that, in consequence of difference of opinion be-
twten the civil and military authorities in India, Lord
Celuing in herniae this proclamation has yielded his better
jusguient to the influence of certain civilians who surround
hie. (Hear, hear.) As regards the value of the opinions of
eitilians, I will read to the house the opinion of a great
ustitary authority whose frien *ship I had the happiness to
enoy, I mean Sir John Malcolm. Sir John Malcolm

els :
" Listen not to general reasoners, or, what we term here
Srcarees. They are always right on paper, and always
wrong in action. . . There is not a human being
(certainly no Nabob or Maharajah) whcim I half dread so
se much as an able Calcutta civilian, whose travels are
linited to two or three hundred miles, with a hookah iu
ha mouth, some good but abstract maxims in his head,
tle Regulations iu his right hand, the Company's charter
it his left, and a quire of wire-wove foolscap before him."
(iioul laughter.) Now, that was the opinion which Sir
J. Malcolm wrote to a Governor-General of India, warning
him as to the value to be attached to the advice of
civilians on matters of this description. (Hear, hear.)
What, too, was the opinion of Lord Wellesley, one of the
Oast and holiest Governors-General who ever wielded
sower in belie? Was he of opinion that innexing a
province was to be followed by confiscation of private
rights? (Hear.) What was the advice which the Duke
of Wellington geve ? He said, if you conquer a province
deal lightly with individuals, but grind the State—that is
to say, respect the rights of in tividuels, but deal as
harshly as you may think expedient with the sovereign
power. 'What did the great commander who conquered
&hale ? He, following__ the advice of hie great chief,
- 'nester, aria instructor, dealt lightly with in lividuals, but
ho ground the Amours. Sir W. Napier has very recently
placed on record the actual measures which were adopted
by his brother end he describes the course pursued by
that dist niuished man in these words :
`` He proclaimed at once that all rights and possessions
would be safe from confiscation. His expression was that
'the conquest of a country was sufficient convulsion for
any people to endure, without adding thereto abrupt in-
novations en their social habits.' Ho even confirmed all
the Government servants in their employments. The
only exception he made was the Lugharee chief, and
that by an especial order of Lord Ellenborough, on the
ground of his having treacherously assailed the Residency.
Even this man, because he only acted under the orders of
his Sovereign, Sir Charles afterwards restored. No doubt
he threatened to confiscate the estates of one or two other
chiefs who continued hostilities after the war was virtually
over; but this was simply as a war measure to induce
them to surrender. "Thus." went on Sir IV. Napier to
say, that " Sir Charles Napier's policy was both vitally
and literally the reverse of Lord Canning s, and founded
upon an essenti illy different state of affairs. Tho one con-
fiscated tae whole property of the country with but seven
or eight mentioned exceptions; the other confirmed all
men in their possessions, with one or two exceptions for
especial
(Hear, bear.) The doctrine of confiscation is the most
dangerous which any conqueror call adopt. Villemain
tells us that Napoleon on his return from Elba in the first,
flush of anger determined to issu a proeatuation confis-
cating the property of Talleyraad, Augereau, and about
15 of her per.ons, but his honest and faithful friend and
follower Bertrana, who true in adversity as in prosperity,
followed his gnat waster to St. Helena, and shared his
capt:viiy with him, refused to countersign the ordinance.
He said to Napoleon that the man who would advise the
Env e.or to begin a system of confiscation was his most
cruel enemy. Lebadoyere also gave the Emperor similar
advice. In the middle ages this doctrine of confiscation
was often had recourse to, and, although I cannot pre-
tend to give the words themselvesal must remind the house
of the opinion that was expressed by one of the wisest of
mankind, at the same time begging it to remember that
human feelings and human passions are the same iu India
that they are in Europe. ([leer, hear.) That philosopher
said that it is not safe to confiscate a man's property un-
less you ire also prepared to deprive him of his life. (Hear,
hear.) He said that a son could bear with great com-
placency the death of his father, while the loss of his in-
heritance might drive him to despair. Now, that is a
principal which history has taught us, and I cannot