The Sun.
London, England, 1858-08-28 00:00:00

TO TILE EDITOR OF nu SUN.

has been asked what did we see at Cherbourg ?
I will tell you. On approaching the land a magnificent
breakwater appeared rising from the sea, defended by four
strong batteries, mounting many heavy guns, and so insu-
lated that in the event of the breakwater being boarded
they could not be taken by escalade.
Oa the starboard hand going in is the fort of Querque-
Ti 11 e, between it and Fort Hornet, with its four tiers of
guns; on every projecting point are earthen works, close
to the water's edge (the most dangerous of all for ships),
mounting many heavy guns. From Fort Hornet to the
Place d'Armes there is a continuation of batteries (some
not finished), along the sea front to the line wall which
surrounds the town. Inside of these fortifications lies the
dockyard (about double the size of Portsmouth), having
three basins, capable of containing sixty sail of the line,
thirty of which can lay alongside the jetties. There are, I
think, ten building slips and six docks fit to receive the
largest sized ships. Round the basins, at convenient dis-
tances, are large storehouses and workshops of every de-
scription, built with stone excavated from the basins.
On one of these slips was a 90-gun ship, the City of
Nantes, ready for launching. It was intended to let the
water in with a great rush and fill the basin at once, to
accomplish which a mound of sand was constructed at some
distance from the gates of the outer basin, that was to be
gradually filled by sluices, and the pressure was supposed to
be sufficient to carry away the mound and let the water in

like a torrent.
In the event of the pressure not being sufficient the
mound was mined, ready to spring at the appointed time;
unfortunately for the grand display, when the sluices were
opened some part of the mound, aavA way, and it gradually
crumbled down, and the grand spectacle failed; but the
basin was filled in time, and the ship was launched amidst
loud cheers of " Vive Napoleon," and "Vive l'lrnperatrice."
To the eastward of the Place d'Arnees is the Merchants'
Harbour, where lay 20 gunboats. This harbour is approached
between two long piers nearly dry at low water; at high
water vessels enter the basin, which is capable of containing
a considerable number of merchant vessels. The Mercantile
Harbour is entirely separate from the public establishments.
At a considerable distance to the eastward, of the harbour is
a very strong fortification, mounting many heavy guns ;
further on, and opposite the fort on the east end of the
breakwater is another very strong fortification of three
tiers of guns, resembling Fort Hornet, All these works are
commanded, or will be commanded, by a chain of redoubts
on the surrounding hills, in the centre of which stands the
Citnclel La Rolle, which has a magnificent view of the
harbour and surrounding country.

We bad not time to count the guns, nor perhaps would it
have been prudent; but, judging from the great extent of
fortifications, and the ground they covered, there could not
have been less than 2,000, and, from the loud reports, they
must have been of very heavy calibre. So many guns, and
so many different forts at considerable distances from each
other, would require a large army to defend, and a still
larger army and fleet to attack ; and the probability is,
Cherbourg would not be seriously attacked with a view to
its capture, but it might be so tormented that a fleet could
not lie there with impunity.
France may be asked, What is all this for ? and she would
no doubt reply, We have no Isle of Wight for the protec-
tion of our roads, and the Emperor has made one. We have
no Portsmouth harbour, and he has made three basins, and
is about to make a fourth, which he has a right to do—it is
no business of ours; but it is our business to take care of
ourselves, and that can only be done by a strong and power-
ful fleet.

Let us now examine in what way Cherbourg will affect
our safety. In former wars Prance collected her Channel
fleet in Brest, and off that port we spent many an anxious
day and night. Plymouth breakwater did not then exist,
and when hard pressed we only had Torbay to run for, and
the moment the wind came to the eastward we were off to
our old station. This gave us great experience, made good
sailors and smart officers, but it wore out both men and
ships, and did not keep the enemy in port, for they sailed
when they pleased.

In another war, if France means mischief abroad, she will
keep her fleets in the western ports ready to put to sea ; if
she means mischief at home, she will collect her forces at
Cherbourg, and we will watch her from Alderney, Portland,
and St. Helen's, and save wear and tear ; so far we shall be
better off.

If she means invasion, she must collect her steamers to
carry troops, and these steamers must be covered by a fleet,
and before she can land we must have a regular stand-up
fight, and I have no fear for the result; but, sir, what I
fear is, that in time of profound peace, France, having a
large army at command, a large fleet, and a large number
of seamen always ready, may suddenly make an attack on

this country from Brest, Cherbourg, Boulogne, or any
other Channel port she pleases. Remember, this does not
now require ships of war (though she is preparing steam
transports to carry 15,000 cavalry)—she would only have to
seize steamers—no matter who they belonged to—collect
them at Cherbourg, and this is only 60 miles from Port-
land.

I do not say France would do this, but we were told last
summer by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we were
within a few hours of war. The same thing has happened
once or twice before and may happen again, and this great
and rich country ought to leave nothing to chance. We
must either arrange with France to keep up a moderate
navy, or we must keep up a well-manned and well-dis-
ciplined Channel fleet; and this may be done at a very
moderate expense. At last we have a Channel squadron of
six sail of the line, but that is not sufficient; we ought to
have ten sail of the line, manned by first-rate seamen--
there ought not to be a landsman amongst them. Only 100

marines should be embarked in each ship, and their number
filled up with able seamen.

Our marines should be increased 5,000 men (which I see

we are about to do), and all our seaport towns garrisoned
by them. This I pointed out years ago. We ought always
to have ten sail of the line in reserve, and ready, so that in
the event of war, or armament, the Channel fleet should
turn over one watch to the reserve, fill both up with officers,
marines, and boys, call out the coast volunteers for lands-
men, aad we should have 20 sail of the line better manned
than the generality of our ships last war.
That is not all; we have, or will soon have 10,000 coast

guardsmen. They are for the protectionof the revenue, and
must not be disturbed unless in case of emergency. They
are all told off and ready to be put on board a ship; but we
have no ships to receive them, for I do not call the block-
ships fit for that purpose. Three of them are tolerable, but
the rest are worse than useless.

Ab soon as we bad efficient ships ready (and I see we have
ordered four three-deckers to be cut down and converted

into screws—bad ships they will be, but it cannot be helped
—the French are doing the same), they ought to be stationed
along the coast to receive the coast guardsmen. Thus would
be ready to put to sea at any moment thirty sail of the line.
And with such a farce at the beginning of a war, we could
defy the world. And if this is done with care and economy,
I do not see there would be occasion to very much increase

the estimates. But even if it costs money it must be done.
Anything is better than commissioning ships one day and
paying them off the next—foolishly spending money with-
out efficiency, and disgusting both officers and men.
I have as yet said nothing of the French fleet we found

lying under the breakwater. But as I cannot entirely
agree with Mr. Lindsay I must say something on that
subject.

Mr. Lindsay says that the number of ships he saw at
Cherbourg were Rot to be compared to what he saw at the
review at Spithead; but Mr. Lindsay forgets that when the
fleet was reviewed at Spithead it was immediately after the
Russian war, and not a ship had been paid off. The
French fleet he saw at Cherbourg, nine sail of the line, was
the squadron of evolution, the Toulon squadron ; the Brest
squadron did not even come to Cherbourg. Mr. Lindsay
left at Spithead five sail of the line, just fitted out, and
anchored any how ; and he found at Cherbourg nine sail of
the line, that have been in cemmissien upwards of two
years, moored in a beautiful bow and quarter-line, not a
ship above a few fathoms out of her station. I cannot say
the ships, as a whole, struck me as being very inferior to
our own ; I thought they were very fine ships, and looked
very much like men-of-war; five of them were built for
screws, and four were sailing ships transformed into screws.
Three of the ships we left at Spithead were also sailing ships
transformed into screws. The Renown and Orion were
built for screws, and very fine ships they are, and two of
the French ships very much resemble them.
There was no manoeuvring, and we were not on board of
any but the flag-ship, and therefore could not judge either
of their discipline or crews. I went with Mr. Lindsay
and I agree with him she is a
was no preparation for us; quite
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the contrary, the men were at their bags, dressing to receive
the Queen, but everything seemed in the highest order, and
the ship was beautifully fitted. Indeed, all French ships
are; they are all alike, and everything in its place.
Whether the men were sailors or not I cannot say, but
they appeared to me to be strong, healthy men. Mr.
Lindsay compares the Royal Albert with the Bretagne,
and he says, if both were manned with Frenchmen, the
Royal Albert would sink the Bretagne; but he don't tell us
why. The Bretagne is a much larger ship, and mounts
more guns, and bps gore men, therefore it ought to be quite