The Sun.
London, England, 1834-01-21 00:00:00

THE EARL OF DURHAM V. THE NEWCASTLE JOURNAL.

Last term a rule nisi was obtained in the above case, for a
libel which charged the Noble Earl with threatening to sweep
the village of Philadelphia from the face of the earth.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL now moved that it be made ab-
solute.

Mr. PLATT showed cause. He commenced by reading the
affidavits upon which the rule nisi was obtained, and also the
libel. He then read a letter from Lord Durham to his solicitor,
directing him to institute these proceedings, and also a state.
ment from the journal in question, expressing the regret of the
Editor that such a statement as the one complained of had in-
advertently found its way into his paper, and accounted for it
by saying that reports to such an effect were in general
circulation at Chester relative to the village of Watton
in place of Philadelphia, and concluded by expressing
the wish of the Editor at all times to exclude from his paper all
matters that were not based upon truth. The Learned
Counsel then said that the first intimation the defendant
had of the want of truth in the alleged libel was from a
letter published in a rival newspaper, written by the Noble
plaintiff to his Solicitor, denying the truth of the libel, and
directing him to institute proceedings against the defendant.
The moment the defendant saw that letter he made all
amends in his power, by at once publishing the state-
ment he had already alluded to, and under those circum-
stances he would contend that there was nothing that called
for the interference of the Court by way ofcriminal information.
The rank of the Noble Earl did not entitle him to claim such in-
terference, instead of going before a Grand Jury. After the
explanation given by the defendant, he had hoped that the
rule would never have been moved for, and even now
he hoped that the Solicitor-General would consent to its
being discharged upon payment of costs, as in his opinion that
would be sufficient punishment for the defendant. The defend-
ant in his affidavits denied having ever published in his paper
any thing respecting the domestic conduct of the Noble
Earl. His remarks had been confined entirely to his poll_
tical character, upon which he had a right to comment.
He (Mr. P.) again asked would the Solicitor. General consent
to his proposition. (The Solicitor-General took no notice of this
offer.) His Learnel Friend " made no sign." Was he to appre-
hend from that that his offer was not assented to ? If so, he must
make some remarks upon the alleged libel itself. It commenced
with the words " The Liberal Earl of Durham," and spoke
of him throughout in that character. Was it a libel to call
him a liberal? In the new comedy of The Wedding Gown,
a housemaid, speaking of patriots, said they were all a set of
seedy fellows, and they were so, sure enough, for patriotism
was now going out of fashion. All that had been said of
the Noble Earl was in his character of a Liberal—surely
he was not already ashamed of that character—a character
that he had professed in public and advanced in private—or did
he mean that his liberality extended merely to the protection
of himself? The question after all was what constituted a libel ?
It was not everything that might chance to give a man offence
that was to be called a libel. Was it a libel to say that a
man threatened to pull down his own property, or " to sweep
it from the face of the earth." There was nothing in the libel
addressed to the pitmen calculated to disturb public peace, or
anything that had such a tendency ; it did not excite persons to
any breach of the law, and he would contend that there was no-
thing in it that could be construed into a libel, and he therefore
called upon their Lordships to discharge the rule.
The SOLICITORAIENERAL said the Noble Earl would be
wanting in the duty he owed to himself if he did not call
upon their Lordships to make this rule absolute.
The Court interrupted the Learned Gentleman, and said that
the alleged explanation was a mere re.as,ertion of the
libel. It says "that inasmuch as the Noble Earl denies the
story we are bound to believe the truth of his statement." This
was an inference that the defendant still believed the truth of
the charge. The rule must therefore be made absolute.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER-(THIS DAY.)

A soap-maker, named George Dommit, appeared in Court, at
its sitting, to plead to an information filed against him by the
Attorney-General for penalties alleged to have been incurred
by him in the conduct of his business. The information was
read by one of the side clerks. It contained twenty-seven
counts, and took upwards of an hour in the reading. The
penalties sought to be recovered amounted to upwards of
10,0001. The defendant pleaded (in person) Not Guilty, which
plea was recorded by order of the Court.

BEST V. GOMPERTZ.

Mr. JOHN JARVIS moved that the defendant in this case,
who was brought up by habeas corpus from the King's Bench
Prison, be charged in execution.
Mr. HUNIPIIRIES, for the defendant, objected to it on the
ground that a writ of error had been allowed, and that
the same defendant had been brought up under similar cir-
cumstances only last week, when he was only remanded to the
same custody. He trusted that the same course would be
pursued then.
Mr. JARVIS said he had an affidavit that would set that matter
to rights. It was sworn that the judgment was upon a cognovit
in which the defendant had bound himself not to bring any
writ of error, nor to take any one step for the purpose of delay.
It was clear such was the object here, and the cases had laid it
down over and over again that error obtained in such a man-
ner as against good faith would not act as a supersedeas.
The matter stood over for a short time in order to afford Mr.
Humphrey time to make inquiries and to give him an oppor-
tunity to answer the plaintiff's affidavit ; but he not being able
to do so, the defendant was ultimately handed over to the care
of the Warden of the Fleet in execution of 3,000/. upon a
number of actions.