The Sun.
London, England, 1851-12-26 00:00:00

THE ARCTIC EXPEDITION.

REPLIES OF CAPTAINS AUSTIN, OMMAN-
NEY, AND PENNY, AS TO THE FATE OF
FRANKLIN.
CAPTAIN AUSTIN'S REPLIES.

First Question.—Do you s uppose it probable that
Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews com•
posing his expedition, still survive ? If so, in what
direction ?

Reply.—Having most carefully and most anxiously
given this question the fullest consideration, lam
compelled, with deep regret, to state, " I do not be-
lieve, nor suppose it probable, that Sir John Franklin,
or any portion of the crews composing his expedition,
still survive."

Second Question.—What are your grounds for
forming that opinion ?
Reply.-1. The protracted period of their absence
—a period of six years in July last having elapsed
since the expedition of Sir John Franklin left the
Whale Fish Islands, provisioned at that time for three
years.

2. From my own knowledge, and from the opinions
and reports of the officers made to me during the
time they were actually in the performance of duties
under the responsibility of my orders. Those re-
ports were to the effect that resources could not be
obtained for the support of a party either in the
neighbourhood of our winter quarters, or of ice parts
visited by any one of the expedition under my charge.
This conclusion is borne out by the circumstance,
that although native encampments have been con-
stantly met with by our parties, yet nothing has been
seen to indicate the existence of a human being for a
lengtheried period ; from which I assume, that the
inability of the natives to procure subsistence had com-
pelled them to abandon these parts for others.
2. The ill effects of a second winter on the mind
and body, arising from the want of fresh food (both
animal and vegetable), are much greater than is gene-
rally considered, and are much greater than even those
who have experienced its intensity are willing to ac-
knowledge when they are no longer undergoing the
privations. Our crews were free from scurvy, yet at
the close of the winter season they had, I am sure,
lost a considerable portion of their original physical
strength, and to such an extent in some that they could
not proceed with the travelling parties ; and my belief
is, that those individuals would not have survived a
second winter.
4. It further occurs to me, that even after a second
winter, although Sir John Franklin's crews would
have been much debilitated and rendered less capable
of encountering the fatigue of travelling, yet still
that some individuals amongst those crews would have
been dispatched in the hope of effecting a communi •
cation with whalers, or for the purpose of reaching
Melville Island (as they knew that animals had been
seen there), or that they would have pushed forward
for the American Continent.
This opinion may be considered as opposed to the
representation that has been made to the committee,
that Sir John Franklin had " gone away in clear
water beyond our reach" (say 500 miles). From my
experience lam unable to place any confidence in
such a representation, and I believe that those who
are thoroughly conversant with Arctic navigation will
entertain similar distrust.
5. In addition to the grounds which I have offered
for supposing it to be impossible that Sir John Frank-
lin and his crews are now alive, I beg to refer to the
opinion of Captain Penny—not the opinion adopted
by Captain Penny since his return to England, and
after communication with other parties—but I beg to
refer to the opinion of Captain Penny, written by him
upon the spot, in his letter to me of the 4th of
August, 1851, at his winter quarters. After ex-
pressing his intention of returning to England, Cap-
tain Penny concludes his letter thus—" Poor Lady
Franklin, and the friends of those brave men whose
fate will ever remain in oblivion! Was it not a strong
conviction of my sense of duty, the very thought of
meeting any of them without intelligence would
almost tempt me to another winter." This letter is
in the hands of the committee.
Third Question.—Shauld a further search be de-
cided on, what measures do you recommend for this
purpose, and in what direction ?
Reply.—lt is with much diffidence that I offer any
opinion on this subject. But first as to the direction :
any search up the Wellington Strait would in my
opinion be fruitless. I cannot bring myself to search
at all with the hope of success in any direction. I
found this conclusion on the circumstance of the late
extensive search, having discovered no traces beyond
those in the neighbourhood of the first winter quar-
ters ; and I cannot resist the conviction that the mis-
sing expedition did not advance in the second season
beyond Beechey Island.
I am confirmed in this belief by the following con-
siderations :—Assuming that my opinion is correct,
that Sir John Franklin did not advance in the second
season beyond Beechey Island ; I have then to observe
that he had failed in prosecuting his discovery during
the previous season, even as far as had been accom-
plished by the expedition of 1819 ; that expedition
reached Melville Island, and it was the generally re-
ceived opinion that that point might be reached every
season, and under every circumstance, and did not
depend upon favourable seasons and ice navigation.
Sir John Franklin would, therefore, have tocom-

mence his second season, with his crews suffering
from the prejudicial effects of an Arctic winter,
with the additional discouragement of their success
not having been equal to even what had been accom-
plished twenty-five years before.
It is also reasonable to suppose that Wellington
Channel was blocked when
_hie ships took up their
winter quarters in 1845. Impressed with these con-
siderations, I feel that a prudent commander, duly
regarding his responsibily, would not have considered
himself justified in prosecuting north-west in an
unknown region, bearing too in mind that he bad
only some twenty months' provisions, in search of a
passage to the Pacific, a distance of 1,100 or 1,200
miles of ice navigation, and approaching 3,000 miles
from any place where supplies could be obtained, and
that difficult navigation to be accomplished in the five
or six weeks only which is open during each year for
that purpose.
With regard to Wellington Channel it will be seen
from my report that that channel was blocked in Sep-
tember,
than
erl
thirty and that, although aided by steam, not
more rty miles of direct advance to the west-
ward in Barrow's Strait (a far more extensive channel)
was made ; and although Wellington Channel was re-
ported favourably from aloft in 1819 and 1820, yet
knowing that in Arctic navigation how frequently the
reports of a clear sea from the crow's nest in narrow
waters are followed by the end of the lead or a block
being seen within an hour, it was not a sufficient in-
ducement for a former very experienced Arctic navi-
gator either to prosecute in that direction, or to ex-
amine the extent of the water seen, in the hope of suc-
cess in the object of a north-west passage.
Furthermore, I am convinced by late experience
that the navigation of Wellington Channel is most
critical ; as all narrow straits in icy seas are, more
or less, of which good proof is furnished in the cases
of Griper, Fury, Victory, and Terror. In that of
the Fury, my recollections are fully alive to our state
of helplessness.
In passing Radstock Bay in the Resolute, in Au-
gust, 1850, the ice came in so rapidly towards the
shore, that had not steam been at hand, she might have
been beset and carried to the eastward. A similar
event occurred to the Intrepid. The Pioneer, when
rounding Beechey Island with the Resolute in tow,
in August, 1850, found the effect of the ice in motion
was such that she was driven into shoal water, where
she grounded; and it was not until after considerable
labour that she was hove off at the expiration of two
days. The Resolute nearly experienced a similar
disaster at the same time, gaining the fast ice with
considerable difficulty, and avoiding being set on
shore or drifted out of the channel. The Assistance
and her tender were subject to very severe pressure
in Wellington Channel, when the Intrepid had her
rudderhead carried away ; afterwards, from the
easterly set with pressure off Cape Hotham,
the Assistance was in a very critical position.
Lieut. De Haven informed me that in September,
1850, while attempting to make his way up the
channel, when near Point Innes, his vessels were in
considerable danger from the movement of the ice
when affected by wind or tide ; indeed, he of neces-
sity employed every effort to reach security in Barlow
Inlet. The situation of the Resolute and her tender
in September, 1850, when drifting from above Barlow
Inlet out of the strait, I consider was very critical
and helpless; had they been nearer in they might have
been torced on shore, and, had it not been for the aid
of steam, I believe that they would have been carried
away to the south-east in the pack—the pack being
all but tied together for the winter. In the case of
Captain Penny, when crossing from Union Bay in
September, 1850, his brigs were nearly forced on
shore at Cape Spencer.
The accounts that have recently been received of
the drifting of the American expedition in Welllington
Channel appear to confirm these views. _ _ ,

If Wellington Channel gave much hope for ad-
vancing in the second season, is it not fair to infer
that parties would have been dispatched if only to re-
connoitre for places of security as the expedition pro-
ceeded ? but it appears that these did not extend
beyond Cape Bowden to the northward, and Caswell's
Tower to the eastward. A bottle was found at Cape
Bowden; meat canisters at Caswell's Tower; the re-
mains of a coal fire at Cape Spencer (most probably
of a shooting party) ; and more extensive remains at
Cape Riley ; but in no case beyond those places. And
I would submit as a just inference that if it had been
Sir John Franklin's object to prosecute up 'Welling-
ton Channel, economy of his fuel would have been a
matter of most rigid care and anxiety, and that he
would not have left at his winter quarters a quantity
of materials that would have served for fuel, and
which at the time did not escape remark.
Further, it appears most probable that if Sir John
Franklin's expedition had proceeded up Wellington

Channel, a record of it would have been left. It is
also reasonable to consider that vessels could not have
passed through a narrow passage between the islands
which appear in Captain Penny's chart without de-
tention ; and (being new discovery) possession would
have been taken and some mark of such discovery left
on them. I may also mention that Sir John Ross,
Captain Ommanney, Lieutenant De Haven, and
Captain Penny, all left the Wellington Channel and
proceeded towards the south-west.
I have now offered my views of Wellington Chan-
nel, and expressed some of the grounds upon which I
entertain them ; but there are other grounds—there
are opinions which have influenced and guided me—
there are recorded opinions of our most eminent
Arctic navigators and men of science far from favour-
ing the search for Sir John Franklin by the way of
the Wellington Channel. The committee will re-
member that the orders to Sir John Frankli❑ himself
laid no stress upon the importance of that channel, but
pointed his especial attention to another direction.
I may here remark, as bearing upon the present in-
quiry, that Lady Franklin in a letter to me upon my
departure expressed her anxiety that particulor search
should be directed to the south-west of Cape Walker;
but not one word of Wellington Channel.
With all these important considerations before me
I am at a loss to account for the strong feeling that
is abroad in favour of a further search for the missing
ships in the direction of Wellington Channel. With
reference to the extent of open water reported in the
upper part of Wellingto❑ Channel, it is well known
to those accustomed to ice navigation, that much de-
ception arises from ice covered by water being mis-
taken for open water, particularly in the months of
June and July; the snow being melted on the sur-
face of the ice, the latter becomes transparent and
acquires a sea tint; and has, combined with the al-
most constant deceptive state of the atmosphere, not
only the appearance of water, but with numerous
pools upon it presents also the appearance of an open
sea, in which the undulating wave can almost be fully
recognised; and it is to this optical deception that
much that is said to have been seen may be fairly
ascribed. Beyond six or eight miles the fbe ice upon
the horizon frequently presents such a peculiar sur-
face, that much caution and determination is neces-
sary to avoid being led into error.
In explanation of the water said to have been seen
" on each shore, and for some miles distant from the
places of observation," without its following that
there was a navigable sea or outlet, I would observe
that the situation of our wintering corresponded in a
manner with that of the head of Wellington Channel,
and although much limited in extent, the west side
being formed by islands, and a bay with an outlet at
the head, yet water made to the northward two to
three miles from our position, while we were fixed to a
fixed barrier, and blocked in to the southward. The
Intrepid afterwards sailed in this water, which then
proved of limited extent. It had before given the
idea of an extensive navigable space, and although
there was much more water in Barrow's Strait in the
autumn of 1851 than in that of 1850, yet there was
very little difference as to the power of navigating
Wellington Channel.
Having therefore very naturally weighed all these
circumstances, I cannot but be strongly impressed
that Sir John Franklin did jnot prosecute beyond
Beechy Island, but that leaving his winter quar-
ters, he was either beset on that occasion, or was
attempting to return to England. The loss of
whalers in the pack will fully account for
the complete destruction of any vessel or vessels ;
and if at a period of winter instead of summer, also
for the total loss of the crews. Contact with bergs
would also sufficiently account for the disappearance
of the ships, with all on board. Many whalers
having large numbers of casks on board have been
destroyed in Baffin's Bay, without scarcely a vestige
having ever been found, and I am not aware that any
part of the hull or the spars of the Fury have ever
been found.

In reply to that portion of the third question which
requires what measures I should recommend if a fur-
ther search be decided on, I have to say that the two
ships and the two steam-vessels which composed the
late expedition under my orders were found to be
well adapted for the service upon which they were
then employed ; and that (except in some little mat-
ters of detail) I have no improvements in their equip-
ment to suggest.
I have now completed my answers to the written
inquiries of the committee, and i have endeavoured to
lay before them, through the medium of those an-
swers, not only all the information in my power, but
every opinion and answer which my own experience
has suggested. If from inadvertence or forgetfulness
I have failed in affording the committee all that they
may require, I will at once supply the omission as
soon as I am made acquainted with their wishes.
HORATIO T. AUSTIN, Captain R.N.,
Late of her Majesty's ship Resolute, and in
charge of the Arctic Expedition.
London, Nov. 15, 1851.