The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-15 00:00:00

NAPOLEON 111. ON THE CRIMEAN
CAMPAIGN.

In M. de Bazancourt's history of the expedition
.o the Crimea, just published, is to be found the
following letter from the Emperor of the French,
which Commandant Faye had been charged to
deliver to General Canrobert, Commandant-in-
Chief of the French army in the East, after a•
rupture of the Conferences of Vienna. It may be
remembered that the Emperor had resolved to
proceed in person to the Crimea to share the fatigues
and perils of the French army, but had been pre-
vented by grave reasons of State. The following
letter communicates to General Canrobert the plan
of campaign on which the Emperor intended to
act, had he gone there. It says
"April 28th, 1854.
" The fire which has been opened against Sebastopol
will by this time have either succeeded or failed. In
either case, it is absolutely necessary to quit the defen-
sive position in which the army has remained during the
last six months. For this purpose, in accord with the
English Government, I would have the troops divided
into three armies—one siege army, and two of opera-
tions. The fi tis destined to protect Kamiesh and
to blockade thFgarrison of Sebastopol ; the second to
operate at a short distance from Balaklava, and, in case
of need, to take possession of the heights of Mackenzie ;
and the third is intended to effect a diversion (1). If, as
I have reason to think, the Russians have 35,000 men
in Sebastopol, 15,000 to the north of Eupatoria, and
70,000 between Simpheropol, the Belbek, and the
Tchernaya, it will suffice to have 60,000 good troops to
destroy all the Russian army, which might be taken in
the rear before it could unite all its forces, and even
should it be able to unite them the numbers would be
almost equal ; for that great principle of war must not
be forgotten, that if a diversion is made at a certain dis-
tance from the base of operations, it is necessary that
the troops employed in such a diversion should be in
sufficient number to be able of themselves to resist the
army of the enemy, who might unite all its efforts
against them. All this being well considered, I would
have sent into the valley of the Baidar the 40,000
men taken from the army of Sebastopol ; and, sup.
ported by Lord Raglan, I would have occupied, from
Skelia as far as the bridge of Teuld and Tchorgoun, the
four roads which cross the Tchernaya ; we should
thus have had so many tetes-de-pont, threatening
the left of the Russians established on the heights of
Mackenzie. After this movement, I would have left
Lord Raglan master of all the positions on the left of the
Tchernaya from Skelia as far as Tchorgoun ; I would
have assembled in the rear of the lines occupied by the
English the 40,000 men of the active army, with the
cavalry, and the means of transport at my disposal,
waLing in that position for the arrival of my corps d'ar-
m6e, which, coming from Constantinople, would have
received orders to reconnoitre Cape Phoros (2). What
would have been our position as regarded the Russians !
The movement on Baidar, by giving us the passages
over the Tchernaya, would have threatened their left and
led them to suppose that it was our intention to dislodge
them from the heights of Inkerman and Mackenzie.
The Russians would have been thus kept in check, and
their attention drawn on Inkerman and Perekop. Our
positions would have been excellent, and my plans
being unknown, if anything had deranged them, no-
thing would have been compromised. But supposing
that nothing had opposed the general plan, it would have
been carried out in the following manner :—As soon as
the fleet, bringing the 25,000 men of the reserve, had
been seen approaching, orders would have been given
for them to proceed to Alouchta, the beach at which
place, having been secretly examined, was found fa-
vourable for a landing. A first body of 3,000 men
would immediately on their landing establish themselves
three leagues from Aleuchta, beyond the defile of Ayen.
No others would be landed until information had been
received of the occupation of that defile. After such in-
formation had been received, the remainder of tee 25,000
men would land, and the 40,000 assembled at Balder
would receive orders to march along the road which
skirts the seacoast by Yalta. In three days, that is to
say two days after the landing of the army at Alouchta,
the 40,000 men from Baidar would have joined under
the walls of Simpheropol the 25,000 just landed ; the
town would have been taken possession of, and a suffi-
cient garrison left in it, or a good position would have
been taken up on the road we had just passed, to secure
the rear of the army. Now, of two things, one—either
the Russian army before Sebastopol would have aban-
doned that formidable position to meet the army which
would advance from the side of Bakshi-Serai, and
then the first army of operation, under the orders of
Lord Raglan, would push forward, and take possession
of the position of Inkerman ; or the Russians would
await in their lines the arrival of the army advanc-
ing from Simpheropol, and then the latter, advancing
from Bak:lii-Serai on Sebastopol, always supporting
its left on the mountains, would form a junction with
the army of Marshal Raglan, who had advanced from
Pai lax on Albat, repulse the Russian army, and drive it
back into Sebastopol or into the sea. This plan appears
to me to possess great advantages. In the first place,
the army as far as Simpheropol, which is only nine
leagues from Alouchta, would be in communication with
the sea ; the country is very healthy, and better sup-
plied with water than any other part of the Crimea ;
its rear would he always secure ; it would occupy ground
where our inferiority in cavalry would be less sensibly
felt ; and, lastly, it would be all at once on the Russian

line of operations, and cut off all the supplies, by pro•
bably taking possession of their parks of reserve. If the
defile of Ayen—an indispensable element in the success
of the plan—should be so fortified as not to be able to
be taken, the 3,000 men who advanced for that pur-
pose would have been re-emba.ked ; the army of re-
serve would then have been landed at Balaklava, and
the diversion which it was intended to make on Sim-
pheropol would have been made by Baidar, but with
fewer advantages. As so the march of the 40,000
men from Baidar to Alouchta, it would have been
without danger, as the ground is protected by al-
most inaccessible mountains, and is at a distance
from the Russian army. Our army might, during
almost all the distance along the sea-shore, have been
followed by steamers to receive the sick (3). If, on the
contrary, it bad been wished to make a diversion by
Eupatoria, my opinion is that nothing could have been
more dangerous or more opposed to the rules of art and
to the counsels of prudence. In order to operate from
Eupatoria on Simpheropol, the army so engaged would
be in an open and unhealthy country, and almost with-
out water ; it would be on ground where the Russian
cavalry, which is very numerous, would have every
chance of success ; and it would have to make a march
of 16 leagues in flee of an enemy which might come
from the north as well as from the south, fall on the
columns, and cut off all retreat. The winos of the army
would have no support from the nature of the ground.
In order to go from Eupatoria to Simpheropol, it should
carry with it all its provisions and all its ammunition, for
when once the army had left Eupatoria, the 15,000 Rus-
sians in that neighbourhood, and most of whom are ca-
valry, would harass their rear, and prevent the arrival of
any convoys. If it should meet with any resistance at
Simpheropol, and the Russian army should by a change
of front have taken a position on the road over which
the army had passed, that army would be either annihi-
lated or starved out. There is besides another absolute
principle, and that is. that a flank march is not possible
unless at a distance from the enemy, and when sheltered
by the nature of the ground. The army which would
operate from Eupatoria to Simpheropol would conse.
quently have no line of operations nor any defence as-
sured for its flanks, nor any means of retreat, nor fa-
vourable field of battle, nor any means of procuring food.
La tly, instead of being com-
pact, sy , this m c
omp oasery o d
of
soldiers
operation,olditrsot the same nation, coin-
inanded by
a single chief, would be formed in great part
of Turks ; and as some allied divisions would be added
to it, there would be neither unity, nor security, nor
absolute confidence. If, instead of marching on Sim-
pheropol, the army leaving Eupatoria should desire to
proceed direct to Sebastopol, it must recommence under
disadvantageous conditions the campaign which we
made in disembarking iu the Crimea. It should carry
the formidable positions of the Alma, of the Katcha,
and of the Belbek. This enterprise is impossible, for
it would be disastrous. Hence follows the absolute
necessity of only leaving at Eupatoria the number
of Turks strictly indispensable to defend the place. Such
is the plan which I wished to execute at the head of the
brave troops which you have hitherto commanded, and
it is with the most profound and acute sorrow that I
find that graver interests force me to remain in Europe.
" NAPOLEON."