The Sun.
London, England, 1834-03-19 00:00:00

that no one attempted to carry it into effect. The hon.
and learned member had shown the defects of the law,
but he had not pointed out how they were to be remedied.
There was one thing of which he complained in the hon.
and learned member's speech. The hon. and learned
member seemed to be thinking more of the repression
of slander—certainly a very good thing in itself—than of
the establishment of free and unshackled discussion of
political matters. The hon. and learned member talked
of regulating the actions brought against the circulators
of libels, meaning the newsvendors. At present an action
might be brought against a newsvendor, and although the
prosecutor should obtain only a farthing damages, the
defendant might, unless the judge would certify, which he
believed had never happened yet, be saddled with costs to
the amount of 1001. or 2001. The only mode of putting
stop to frivolous actions was to compel the prosecutor
to pay costs in all such cases. The hon. and learned
member had complained that there was no definition of
libel, but had not endeavoured to supply the defect. Every
other branch of the criminal law was defined, and why
-,bould not the same principle be applied to this branch ?
Nothing could more elucidate the state of the law than
what had been said with respect to Mr. Fox's bill. By that
bill it was intended that the question of law, as well as
the fact, should be left to the jury ; but ever since then
the practice had been that the judges laid down their
opinion as to the law, and impressed the jury so strongly
that the alleged offence was a libel, that there was little,
if any, chance of acquittal. lie mentioned this fact to
-how the ill effects of leaving the law almost wholly in
the bands of judges, as it was at present. It "was of the
utmost importance that the offence of libel should be well
defined. All other offences cognizable by law were fully
defined except that. Slander was well defined. It was
slander to impute to any man the commission of a crime,
or to state of him that he was unfit for his profession ;
but in all his practice he had not met any adequate defi-
nition of' what was a libel. As to the discussion of public
questions, he thought it ought to be as free as possible
where no charge was made against any individual. If
there was a charge of misgovernment in any particular
instance, that must attach to some individual, and the
party making it might be brought before a jury, but there
the party ought to be allowed to prove the truth of his
allegation. He admitted that it would be a monstrous
proposition to say that the truth should be a justi-
fication in every case ; but it would be still more mon-
strous to say, that in no case should the truth be
allowed to go to the jury.—(Hear, hear.) He agreed
with the honourable and learned gentleman, that in
such an instance as he had adduced, which, whether
drawn from fact or from imagination, was a
strong illustration of his point, a mere proof of the
truth would be no justification of the libeller ; but that
would not show the justice of excluding the proof of truth
in every case. He would not follow the hon. and learned
gentleman into all his details, but he must protest against
his defence of criminal information. It was the worst
possible way of eliciting truth, for it went on the principle
of trying facts by affidavits. In such a case there was
scarcely a chance of acquittal, for the judge, in allowing
the information, pronounced on the libel before trial. As
to cx officio informations, he thought that as a grand
' jury would be a sufficient protection against frivolous in-
formations, the crown ought not to have the power of
tormenting defendants in that way. With respect to the
practice in Ireland of the Attorney-General summoning
parties before him against whom it was intended to pro-
ceed by ex officio informations, he would say that it was
not general. It was done with the view of making terms
with parties, but it was a practice which could not be
applauded. In the general topics introduced by the hon.
and learned gentleman he fully concurred, for no man
could doubt that the law, as it now stood, required to be
amended in most points. One object which he (Mr.
O'Connell) had in view in his bill was to prevent vexa-
tious actions by allowing costs against the plaintiff in
certain cases. In conclusion the hon. and learned gentle-
man expressed his full concurrence in the appointment of
the committee, but he hoped that it would not be com-
posed of individuals who were all of one way of thinking
on the subject.
Sir F. VINCENT protested against the doctrine that
ex officio informations were consistent with the princi-
ples of our constitution.
Same of the most eminent of
our lawyers bad laid it down that such precautions would
not bear inquiry. He would support the motion for the
committee, and he hoped the result would be found ad-
vantageous to the public.

Sir W. HORNE would not oppose a motion so ably
and temperately introduced as that of hishon. and learned
friend. When he recollected the influence of the law of
libel on public liberty and happiness, he was glad that
there was a chance of having it examined in a fair and
dispassionate manner, aril that it was likely to receive
such improvements as it was capable of, and as were most
desirable.

Mr. PRYME hoped that the law relating to the truth
as a ground of defence in cases of libel, might be so al-
tered as that a party really guilty should not be allowed to
escape on a mere technical objection. He would mention
a case in illustration of what be meant—a magistrate,
before whom three very young children were brought,
charged with pulling up a few vegetables in a field. The
magistrate sentenced them to a punishment which was
considered severe, out of all proportion to the nature of
the acts of children of their tender years. S ime com-
ments were made on this in (we believe) a newspaper,
The magistrate brought his action for libel, to which a
justification was pleaded ; but on the trial, as it was
proved that only two of the three children had been so
punished, the justification was not admitted, and a ver-
dict passed for the plaintiff. This was a stats of law
which should not be allowed to continue.

Mr. SHEIL regretted that after the very luminous
statement made by the hon. and learned Solicitor-General
in introducing this question, he had not at once moved
for leave to bring in a bill, rather than the more tedious
process of an inquiry. lie thought that so strong was
the general impression as to the very defective state of the
law of I,bel, that a previous inquiry was not necessary to
induce parliament to consent to its amendment. He
could not concur in some parts, particularly as to what
was said with respect to libel in public cases. Was it
intended .by the Solicitor-General that truth should be
allowed to be given in evidence in cases of libel against
public men ? As to private libels, he (Mr. Shell) thought
that the truth of the alleged libel should he allowed to be
given in evidence, leaving it to the jury to say how far the
party was influenced by malice in publishing it ; but in
cases of charges against public men, he thought that proof
of the truth ought to be allowed ; and if the bill to result
from the committee should have that effect, it would be a
great public benefit. As to ex officio informations, he
owned that he thought they ought not to be continued,
for they afforded no fair substitute for a grand jury. Iu
cases of criminal information for private libels, there was
some substitution in the affidavit of the plaintiff and the
discretionary power of the judges; but
.in ex officio in-
formations there was nothing but the will of the law
officers of the crown. He woulri riot oppose the appoint-
ment of the committee, but be must again express his
regret that the hon. and learned gentleman did not at
once move for leave to bring in the bill.
Lord ALTHORP said, that his hon. and learned friend
(the Solicitorijeneral) had not stated any fixed point as
to any intended alteration of the law. He had called the
attention of the house to the defects of the law generally
without pointing out particular remedies. He bad
admitted that there was no definition of what libel was,
and marked it as one defect in the law, but without
pointing out what the definition should be. All he bad
insisted on was, that on this, as well as on many other
points, they ought to ga into an inquiry. As to ex officio
informations, he (Lord Althorp) owned that he was not
partial to them : but at the same time he thought the
government should not be without the power of laying
them. The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Shell)
seemed to think that these informations left no substitute
for the intervention of a grand jury. He thought they
did. In the first place, it was not at all probable that any
ex officio information would be laid, except in cases in
which a grand jury would have no difficulty in finding a
bill if it were laid before them ; though for many seasons
it might in some cases be advisable to lay the information
rather than go before a grand jury with a bill. Then it
should be considered that no such information could be
laid except on the responsibility of the advisers of the
Crown, and that in itself was a substitute for the inter-
vention of a grand jury. He would not admit that
this was so good a substitute, speaking generally, as
that in the case of criminal informations for private
libels ; but still, though net partial to its use,
he repeated that he thought it was a power which
the Crown ought not to be deprived of. With re-
spect to cases of libel against public men for their public
conduct, lie should say that in almost every case the truth
of the allegation ought to be allowed to be given in
evidence, but still he could cite an instance in which such
a course would not meet the justice of the case. In the
last war a writer, at a time when an expedition was in
preparation, stated, with reference to the transports used
for conveying troops in a former expedition, that they
were not seaworthy. That was the fact; yet, when the
circumstances were considered that another expedition
was in preparation, and that the object of the writer was
to excite a mutiny in the troops about to be sent out, no
one could doubt that allowing the party to prove the
former fact would be no good justification This would