The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-15 00:00:00

Cubitt and other city pergonP, which fke"
company in considerable expense. Wh,
Parliamentary committee it was inapos4ibl.
pcuse, except by withdrawing the bill, which ihipld..
in many cases, vary unde4ra'Ae. Thestrictest economy
had been exercised in the office expenses, which were
not-more than absolutely neces,ary.
Mr. JONES having withdrawn some of his observations,
and gr. BELL having commented upon the course adopt-
ed by him, the resolution for the adoption of the report
was: carried,
Two of the retiring directors, Mr. Dicey and Mr.
Pries. were re-elected ; and Mr. Matins retired from
the direction.

Mr. ARMSTRONG, the auditor, contended that the ae
counts lead been most carefully audited, and said them
could be no doubt of their correctness.
The meeting then separated.

NAPOLEON 111. ON TBE CRIMEAN
C A M.P.,4 lON.

In M. de Bazancourt's history of :the expedition
to the Crimea, just published, is to be found the
following letter from the Emperor of the French,
which Commandant Faye had been charged to
deliver to General Canrobert, Commandant-in-
Chief of the French army in the East, after the
rupture of the Conferences of Vienna. It may be
remembered that the Emperor had resolved to
proceed in person to the Crimea to share the fatigues
and perils of the French army, but had been pre-
vented by grave reasons of State. . The following
letter'communicates teGeneral Canrobert the plan
of campaign on which the Emperor intended to
act, had he gone there. It says

"April 28th, 1854.
"The fire which has been opened against Sebastopol
will by this time have either succeeded or failed. In
either case, it is absolutely necessary to quit the defen-
sive position in which the army has remained during the
last six months. For this purpose, in accord with the
English Government, I would have the troops divided
into three armies—one siege army, and two of opera-
tions. The first is destined to protect Kamiesh and
to-blockade the garrison of Sob-istopol ; the secotid`to
operate at a short distance from Ba,laklava, and, in case
of need, to take possession of the heights of ilackenzie ;
and the third is intended to effect a diversion (1). If, as
I have reason to think, the Russians have 35,000 men
in Sebastopol, 15,68'0 to the north of Eupatoria, and
70,000 between Simpheropol, the Belbek, and the
Tchernaya, it will suffice to have 60,000 good troops to
destroy all the Russian army, which •night be taken in
the rear before it could unite all its forces, and even
should it be able to unite them the numbers would be
almost equal ; for.tbat great principle of war must not
be forgotten, that if a diversion is made at a certain dis-
tance from the base of operations, it is necessary that
the troops etnp'oyed in such a diversion should be in
sufficient number to be able of themselves to resist the
army of the enemy, who might unite all its efforts
against them. All this being well considered, I would
have sent into the valley of the Baidar the 40,000
men taken from the army of ' Seba.4topol ; and, sup-
ported by Lord Raglan, I would have occupied, from
Skelia as far as the bridge of Teul6 and Tchorgoun, the
four roads which cross the Tchernaya ; we should'
thus have had so many tetes-de-pont, threatening
the left of the Russians established on the heights of
Mackenzie. After 'this movement, I would have left
Lard finglan master of all the positions on the left of the
Tehernaya from Skelia as far as Tchorgoun ; I would
have assembled in the rear of the lines occupied by the
English the 40,000 men of the active army, with the
cavalry, and the means of transport at my disposal,-
a aiting in that position for the arrival of my corps d'ar-
m6e, which, coaling from Constantinople, would have
received orders to reconnoitre Cape Phorus (2). What
would have been our position as regarded the Russians I
The movement on Baidar, by giving us the passages;
oser the Tchernaya, would have threatened their left and
led them to suppose that it was our intention to dislodge
them from the heights of Inkerman and Mackenzie. '
The Russians would have been thus kept in check, and
their attention drawn on Inkerman and Perekop., Our
positions would have been excellent, and my plans
being unknown, if anything bad deranged them, no-
thing would have been compromised. But supposing
that nothing had opposed the general plan, it would have
been carried out in the following manner :—As soon as
the fleet, bringing the 25,000 men of the reser had g
been seen approaching, orders would have been a
for them to proceed to Alouchta, the beach at whi
tin‘
place, having been secretly examined, was found fa-
vourable for a landing. A first body of 3,000 men
would immediately on their landing establish themselves
three leagues from Aleuchta, beyond the defile of Ayen.
No others would be landed until information had been
received of the occupation of that defile. After finch in-
formation had been received, the remainder of the 25,000
men would land, and the 40,000aassembled at Baidar
would receive orders to march along the road which
skirts the seacoast by Yalta. In three days, that is to
say two days after the landing of the army at Alouchta,
she 40,000 men from Baidar would have joined under
the walls of Simpheropol the 25,000 just landed ; the
t iwn would have been taken possession of, and a suffi-
cient garrison left in'it, or a good position would have
been taken up on is Aroad we had just passed, to secure
the rear of the arnal..., Now, of two things, one—either
the Russian army before Sebastopol would have aban-
. Pined taut forannable position to meet the army which
would advance from the side of Bakshi-Serai, end
then the first army of operation, under the orders of
Lord Raglan, would push forward, and take possession
of the position of Inkerman ; or the Russians would
await in their lines the arrival of the army advanc-
ing from Simpheropol, and then the latter, advancing
from Bakshi-Serai on Sebastopol, always supporting
its left on the inoun-aine, would term a junction with
the army of Marshal Raglan, who had advanced from
Bai•Jar on Albat, repulse the Russian army, and drive it
back into Sebastopol or into the sea. This plan appears
to me to possess great advantages. In the first place.
the army as far as Simpheropol, which is only nine
leagues from Alouchta, would be in communication with
the sea ; the country is very healthy, and better sups
plied with water than any other part of the Crimea ;
its rear would be always secure ; it would occupy ground
where our inferiority in cavalry would be less sensibly
felt ; and, lastly, it would be all at once on the Russian
line of operations, and cut off all the supplies, by pro-
bably taking possession of their parks of reserve. If the
defile of Ayen—an indispensable element in the success
of the plan—should be so fortified as not to be able to
be taken, the 3,000 men who advanced for that pur-
pose would have been re-embarked ; the army of re-
serve would then have been landed at Balaklava, and
the diversion which it was intended to snake on Sim-
pherepol would have been made by Baidar, but with
fewer advantages. As so the march of the 40,000
men from Baidar to Alouchta, it would have been
without danger, as the ground is protected by al-
most inaccessible mountains, and is at a distance
from the Russian army. Our army might, during
almost all the distance along the sea-shore, have been
followed by steamers to receive the sick (3). If, on the
contrary, it had been wished to make a diversion by
Eupatoria, my opinion is that nothing could have been
more dangerous or more opposed to the rules of art and
to the counsels of prudence. In order to operate from
Eupatoria on Simpheropol, the army so engaged would
be in an men and unhealthy country, and almost with-
out water; it would be on ground where the Russian
cavalry, !Mob is very numerous, would have every
chance of success ; and it would have to make a march
of 16 leagues in face of an enemy which might come
from the north as well as from the south, fall on the
columns, and cut off all retreat. The wings of the army
would have no support from the nature of the ground.
In order to go from Eupatoria to Simpheropol, it should
carry with it all its provisions and all its ammunition, for
when once the army bad left Eupatoria, the 15,000 Rus-
sians in that neighbourhood, and most of whom are ca-
valry, would harass their rear, and prevent the arrival of
any convoys. If it should meet with any resistance. at
Simpheropol, and the Russian army should by a change
of front have taken a position on the road over which
the army had passed, that army would be either annihi-
lated or starved out. There is besides another absolute

principle, and that is, that a flank march is not possible
unless at a distance from the enemy, and when sheltered
by the nature of the ground. The army which would
operate from Eupatoria to Simpheropol would conse-
qutntly have no line 3f operations nor any defence as-
sured for its flanks, nor any means of retreat, nor fa-
vourable field of battle, nor any means of procuring food.
Lastly, this army of operation, instead of being Coln.
pact, composed of soldiers of the same ration, corn.
mended by a single chief, would be formed in great part
of Turks ; and as 901118 allied divisions would 13,2 added
to it, there would be neither unity, nor security, nor
absolute confidence. If, ins cad of marching on Sim-
pheropol, the army leaving Eupatoria should desire to
proceed direct to Sebastopol, it must recommence under
disadvai,tageous conditions the campaign which we
made in disembarking in the Crimea. It should carry
the formidable positions of the Alma, of the Katcba,
and of the Belbek. This enterprise is impo-sible, for
it would be diEastrouß. Hence follows the absolute
necessity of only leaving at Eupatoria the number
of Turks Strictly indispensable to defend the place. Such
is the plan which I wished to execute at the head of the
brave troop-s which you have hitherto commanded, and
It is with the most, profounl and acute sorrow that I
find that graver interests force toe to remain in Europe.
" NAPOLEON."

(1) let, The siege army, composed of 30,000 French and
30,000 Turks, without counting 10,000 men who cannot be
disposed of ; 2d, the first army of operation under Lord
Raglan, of 25,000 English, 15,000 Piedmentese, 5,000
French, and 10,000 TurkS ; and 3d, the second army of
operation, of 40,00 J French of the army of Sebastopol, and
25,000 of the army of reserve at Constantinople.
(2) The active army would be thus organised :—General
Canrobert, general-in-chief ; Ist corps d'arineo, General
Bosquet, with 4 divisions of infantry and 1 of light ca-
valry; 2d corps d'armee, General Itegnauld de St. Jean
d'Angely, with 2 divisions of infantry, 1 division of the
guard, and 1 division of heavy cavalry.
.Gen. Pelissier
would have continued to command the besieging army.
(3) On the other hand, the Minister of War would have
had collected at Constantinople rations of moat, gun-
powder, and other objects occupying little space, in order
that the soldiers by leaving all their other baggage might
have each carried eight days' provisions, with a shirt and
a greatcoat. The corps d'armee of reserve would follow
the army of Baidar, would carry• the same quantity, so
that the 60,010 men in commencing the movement would
have 16 days' provisions assured to them. When once
they had reached Sinapheropol, the carriages might re-
victual the army from Alouchta.

AIornoPoLITAN BOARD OF WORKS.—Yesterday the
board wet to consider tbe dro.ing,re of the districts south
of the Tbc,rnes. The consideration of the subject was, in
the end, adj-Aimed until Wedno.day next.

iv P
'4Y
-Q*144,,,i0A011,
l