The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-09 00:00:00

SIR CHARLES NA PIER AND THE

" TIMES."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
MR. EDITOR,—In your leading article of the 2d of
January you attack statesmen, admirals, and generals.
You say you will set before them what the country ex-
pects at their hands.

I will leave the statesmen and generals to speak for
themselves, but I will not remain silent and pee the
whole navy condemned as cowards and imbeciles.
I know the risk I run in making observations oncyour
articles ; but I will run that risk, and tell you plainly,
Mr. Editor, that you know nothing of the subject on
which you write.

I will venture to affirm that there is as much talent,
courage, and dash in the British navy now as there was
in the days of Nelson.

You say, Mr. Editor, in the last war the ships of
England went everywhere and did everything with in-
credible daring and success, with only the uncertain
winds and treacherous waves to rely on ; they entered
every harbour and scrutinised every creek ; and, pro-
vided they could get in, never troubled themselves with
the superfluous consideration of how they were to get
out again.

Now, Mr. Editor, I served 15 years last war, and it
never was the custom for the ships to approach batteries ,
at all. No admiral even ventured to take his feet into
an enemy's port except Lord Nelson : he went into Co-
penhagen, gained a victory, and was well pleased to get
out, and he never tried it again ; ho did not take his
lumbering fleet, as you call them, to Carlscrona, or to
the Swedish waters ; he never went higher up the Gulf
of Finland than Nargen.
Sir James Saumarez, who was a most enterprising
officer (little short of Nelson), and lost a line-of-battle
ship in attacking Algesiras, never even went up to
Cronstadt, nor did he attack either Riga, Revel, or Port
Baltic. Lord Nelson remained several years off Toulon,
and never thought of attacking it : he never thought of
running his fleet into Cadiz, nor did Lord St. Vincent
or Lord Collingwood, though it was by no means strong.
Lord Hotham never tried Toulon, neither did Lord St.
Vincent, Sir Chas. Cotton, nor Lord Exmouth ; nor did
Sir Chas. Cotton try the Tagus.
Lora Howe, Lord Bridport, Lord Gardner, Sir Chas. •c:
Cotton, Lord St. Vincent, Lord Gambier, and Admiral
Cornwallis treated Brest, Rochefort, and L'Orient with
the greatest respect. Tne dashing Cochrane burnt
and drove on shore the French ships in Basque-
roads' and many brilliant things were done by frigates,
and daring enterprises effected by boats, but by ships
never, except at Algiers and Acre, and those forts were
defended by inexperienced Algerines and Egyptians. •
Admiral Young and Sir Sidney Smith, when they were
captains, got their ships cut up severely by two round
towers, one in Corsica and the other on the coast of
Naples, mounting one or two guns. Lord Nelson did
not dare to attack with his ships the batteries at Bou-
logne, but tried his boats and was defeated ; he did not
dare to attack Teneriffe with his ships, but did by boats,
was defeated, and lost his arm.

After this statement you must not mislead the country
again, and throw odium on her officers.

-If enough has not been done on the Baltic by the
navy to satisfy you, Mr. Editor, why don't you put the
saddle on the r;ght horse— "the Admiralty 7" In 1854
a fleet was sent to the Baltic very badly manned, hastily
got together, and inexperienced ; without pilots (fur those
we bad knew nothing), and with very indifferent charts.
Yet we managed to get that fleet in, amongst rocks and
shoals, up to Cronstad,, and found there was n,,t water
to float them ; and had there been water, we were igno•
rant of the passage up, and the batteries were much too
strong for our ships. At Sweaborg we knew nothing
of the passage, and then again the batteries were tre-
mendously strong.

What would you have done, Mr. Editcr ?
What we did do, was to point out to the Admiralty
the proper way of attack. This was in June, 1854. The
fleet then threaded their way through the labyrinth of
rocks up to Bomarsund, landed the troops in an incre-
dibly short time, and took it. Sweaborg was again well
reconnoitred, and the plan of attack repeated. You, Mr.
Editor, seem to have known better than the English and
French admirals or the marshal, and thought it could
be attacked; and the Lords of tha Admiralty agreed
with you. You had both heard of the fall of Sebastopol,
and lost your heads, and then had not the honesty to
apologise to the admiral you had insulted when you
heard the fall of Sebastopol was a hoax. There was
some excuse for the Admiralty not furnishing the proper
materials for attack the first campaign, but none the
second. They were warned of what was wanted ; and
though they knew that Sebastopol had held out for eleven
months against an unparalleled bombardment, and in the
last 24 hours received 70,000 shot and 16,000 shells, they
sent 20 mortar vessels and 15 or 16 gun vessels to attack
a place as strong as Sebastopol. They did not even
support the mortar-vessels with the ,fleet ; they were
dispersed over the Baltic, the Gulfs of Finland and
Bothnia ; and when the few mortar vessels had set
the place in flames, there was no fleet to take ad-
vantage of the confusion that must have attended
the conflagration and the explosion. Now, as the admi-
rals have hauled down their flags, and been compli-
mented by the Admiralty for their conduct, it is clear
that the plan of the campaign must have been settled at
the board, and on it must rest the failure—fir,t, for not
sending gun and mortar vessels sufficient ; and,
secondly, for not having the fleet at hand to take ad-
vantage of the conflagration and explosion. I was
told in 1854 a few mortar vessels or even Lancaster
guns more or less could not make the difference between
the possibility or the impossibility of attacking Swea-
borg ; and in 1855 the Admiralty appear to have thought
a few line-of-battle ships more or less could not make
the difference either between the possible and the im-
possible. Now, Mr. Editor, the long and short of it
is this : in 1854 the Admiralty sent a fleet to the
Baltic, without gun and mortar vessels to assist
them and clear the way ; and in 1855 they sent a
few gun anl mortar vessels to the Baltic, and had
not the fleet at hand to support them. In fact, they
were so ignorant of the art of war that they did not
expect the 13-inch mortars would do so much damage. -
All they hoped to do was to file away their shells and
not be laughed at for bringing them back, and when
they found that the mortars bad almost all burst, they
sent a fresh supply at the very time Admiral Dundas was
very wisely sending his vessels home ; and so deplorably
ignorant w ere they, that they did not know the mortar
vessels would go through the Kiel Canal, but positively
sent them round the Scaw.

Now, sir, I ask, were the Government serious in their
wishes to cripple Russia in 1854, and were they serious
in 1855 ? for certainly no one, judging by their actions,
can think so.

You tell us, Mr. Editor, a mortar vessel has been
built and armed in three weeks ; surely, then, 100 could
have been built in a year ; and in 1855 the same force
that is preparing for 1856 might have been ready, and
Sweaborg totally destroyed.
Now, I don't blame Sir Charles Wood or Lord Pal-
merston, for they were not in their present offices when
the Baltic fleet was fitted out. They appear, however,
now in downright earnest, if I may judge by the power-
ful flotilla they are now preparing; and we must hope
that we are not too late.

As you, Mr, Editor, have passed a pretty severe eon.
sure on the navy, the best thing the Government ca►n do
is to fallow the example of the French at the beginning
of the Revolution, and send a commissioner to see the
admirals do their duty.

You, Mr. Editor, have your own correspondents,
and I see no reason why you should not have your own
commissioners, and as I have reason to think my former
friend is the writer of these articles abusing the admirals,
he would be the fittest person to fill the office of com-
missioner ; and I will venture to say whoever commands
the fleet will strictly obey his orders, and take care at
the same time that he bball occupy as warm a berth as
his heart can wish.
It the fleet was not lost the first campaign it was the
fault neither of the Admiralty nor of my friend. They
did their best to lose it. The second campaign the
Admiralty took good care Admiral Dundas should not
destroy Sweaborg. The third campaign had better be
under my friend, and we shall see if he is as powerful
with his sword as he was with his pen.—l remain, 3 our
obedient servant, CHARLES NAPIER.
18, Albemarle street, Jan. 8, 1856.

BEACON FIRE ON THE MALVERN HILLS.—It has been
decided that the lighting the beacon fire on the Malvern
Bills shall take place to-morrow evening (11th inst.) at 7
o'clock precisely, weather permitting. Blue and red
fires will precede the lighting of the beacon, the actual
moment of which will be announced by the firing of 50
rockets. Should the night proposed be wet, misty, or
windy, the lighting will take place on the first suitable
night after the Mks