The Sun.
London, England, 1856-09-20 00:00:00

THE NEAPOLITAN DIFFICULTIES.

(Front the Morning Post of this day )
Our Paris Correspondent informed us yesterday,
in the letter which appeared in our second edition,
that the French Government, unless some unforeseen
event occur, is about to recall M. Brenier and the
whole of the embassy from Naples. To this we may
now add that a similar course will, we are enabled
to state, be taken by the Queen's Government.
The whole of our diplomacy will be recalled from
the Neapolitan Court. We shall send, as will the
French, two line-of-battle ships and a correspond-
ing force of frigates. These will be the representa-
tives of the Alliance—these will protect the interests
of the subjects of both Powers—through these alone
will either communicate with the King. It will be
seen from these facts that there is no doubt of the
correctness of our Correspondent's statement. He
goes on to to add, that the last despatches of the
French diplomatist do not now hold out any
hopes of au amicable settlement of the Neapoli-
tan difficulties. In this assertion we are quite
convinced that both he and the diplomatist are
warranted by the truth. It is not likely that
the unwise and cunning obstinacy which the
King has always hitherto displayed, and in which
he is supported by the few evil councillors
on whom he leans, should leave him Budd, nly on
the arguments of England and France. It is not
likely that the doubtful mediation of Austria would
change more than the words of that unhappy
Monarch who is cursed with the domination of a
country whieh God has made the fairest, and which
his terrible misrule has made the most wretched, on
the face of the earth. We believe, therefore, that
there is np likelihood of a return to friendship
between the Court of Naples and those of France
and England. Wuat part these great Allied Powers
may be ultimately compelled to take in the settle-
ment of Neapolitan and of Italian affairs remains
to be determined.

The question of interference in the infernal con-
cerns of foreign States, of meddling with their
misgovernment, is, without doubt, delicate and
difficult. We avoid doing this ; and, urCess we
did so most strictly, unless we laid down a
broad line on the subject, we should be perpetually
at war. We allow kings and subjects, as a rule, to
settle these matters between themselves. We
merely give to the former advice which we think will
save them from the effecis of the madness of the
latter when they have raised it by long perse-
vetance in ill-treatment. But, when advice of this
sort. is treated with scorn—when it is met by inso-
lence or evasion—when the certain consequences of
the course are such as threaten the peace of Europe,
the Great Alliance which has undertaken to keep
that peace is bound to make some effort beyond that
of using words which have been used again and
again, and have been found ineffectual. The
Allied Powers do not interfere between the Govern-
ment and those whom it so grievously misgoverns.
That is a measure which can only be warranted by
a very extreme state of things, by the absolute ne-
cessity of a general agreement to restore order, if it
be found necessary, by force.
We have, however, undoubtedly in such a case as
that of Naples, the right to withdraw our diplomatic
force, to decline all further communication according
to the usual forms of peace, to abstain from givinc,,
by our presence as a State, our encouragement and
our sanction to a policy which is ruining the fairest
country in the world, which persists in condemning
to a torture, on which we shudder to think, some of
its best and noblest citizens. No State, no man, can
accuse us of hasty dealing or precipitation in this
matter. We have tried with the greatest care and
patience to make ourselves heard and understood
by the Monarch of a third-rate State. We have
utterly failed in all our attempts. We have awaited
calmly the effects of the mediation of another
power. That has also failed. We have nothing
left but to decline any guise of friendly relations
with a system which is abhorrent to us; •to with-
draw from all official communication with the au-
thor of that system ; to protect our subjects and
our interest's by the presence of a strong armed
force, such as can fully control any mischief that
the Cing of Naples may devise. A short time will
show us how that Sovereign will comprehend and
how he will act on this last and strongest argu-
ment of the Western Alliance.