The Sun.
London, England, 1802-05-14 00:00:00

DEFINITIVE TREATY.

Mr. WI ND H AM tHor'e4 the Order of Day for tak-
ing into consideration the Definitive Treaty Between
Great Britain and the French Spain, and
Holland.

Mr. IVIN1.)11.4111 said, the sublet!): had been so
much under discussion, that it was unneceisary co
say much upon this, which was the last part of the
proceeding adopted by hini and his Hon. Friends.
The course they had adopted, he contended, was
the best, as Gentlemen, who attended those dis_
cussions, came. now with their minds better pre_
pared to form an opini•on upon the Whole of the
rablca under com,ideration, The simpil course
of' proceeding which lukd beef" adopted, was to -
aniii-,e separatoy, in order, to judge jointly, Many
points, had, been discussed, and those he must now
go hastily over. With resreel to Malta, he c01.:4-

plainer of the want of precise stipulations : we had
! left it to the option of the Enemy, and had, in fad,
placed the Island in the hands of France. We had
carried on a sort of war against those principles
which we professed to defend. If ever there was
an Order containing more of the substance of those
principles than another, it was that of Malta : it
was a sort of phial containing all their essence,
which we had uncorked, and diluted the liquid
with a base admixture. So much was this the case,
that he believed the Getman Knights had refused
to associate with an Order which, they considered
to be degraded. With respell to the Garrison, it
was a perfed syllogism, that if Malta was to be
garrisoned by Neapolitans, and Naples was under
the dominion-of France, Malta was, beyond dis-
pute, placed in the hands of France. The whole
transaCtion threw a ridicule upon the proceedinas
of Government. Malta was lost, and it was much
worse than if we had surrendered it to France :
if we had surrendered it we might have had soma
objed in return, but in this case we had given it
up without compensation, and with the ridicule
charged upon it, that we had not given it op.--
With resped to the Cape, there was certainly a
very marked difference !between the Preliminary
and the Definitive Treaty. It was understood
that the Cape• was to be- declared a free port ;
some thought it had better not, but all concurred
in opinion, that the option ought to be left to this
country ; instead of this, however, the option was
left to France. As it was at present, the Batavian
Republic might to-morrow put in a French gar-
rison, and make the Cape over to France : thus it
was a complete loss. It might be said, that the
Cape could only be considered with respel to this
country as a tavern ; but it .would be recolleded,
that it was the only tavern there was during a
voyage of five or six months, where troops sent to
India could refresh, and it thus became an object
of importance. The only other place
_to touch at
in those voyages was the Brazils, and what hope
had Gentle Men of that being open to us in a future
war? Then we should not be able to send to
India, for the defence of our Empire there, a
Regiment, much less a considerable Armament,
without their being rendered unable to ad
for at least six weeks after their landing.—
France had now the Cape and Cochin, where
they might make hostile preparations against the
possessions of this Country in India, and from
whence an explosion might be ready to burst out
before we were in any degree aware of it. He
should now say a few words as to the boundaries of
Portuguese and French Guiana. This transattion
would best explain the sort of policy pursued by
France : he would just state the transactions which
took place. The Arawari was now understood to
be the boundary of the French possessions in Guia-
na, bur might not that have been as well so stated
in the Preliminary Treaty ? This boundary, he un.
derstood, was completely different from any known
before ; it certainly did not exist before the War,
and was, in fad, fixed for the first time by the De-
finitive Treaty. It might as well have been stated
in the Preliminary Treaty, because the Noble Lord
(Hawaaattuay) had stated to the House, that this
was the boundary : he must contend, however, that
the House were to look to the formal documents be-
fore them, and not to an answer made to a question
in that manner. He would not say there was a fraud
on the part of the French Government, as it would
only be a fraud if the subjea was not understood
between this Country and France ; but there cer-
tainly was a fraud attempted on the part of the
French Government. They endeavoured to esta.
blish as a Boundary that fixed. by the Treaty of
Madrid, which was signed only two days before
the Preliminary Treaty : it was true they did not
adhere to it, but here they sheaved considerable
Generalship ; they brought forward their fraud to
cover their finesse. They said, we ask this but
we will take less, and thus they obtained what
they wished fur. Why could not His Majesty's
Ministers say at once, that the Boundary of Form- '
guese Guiana was to be the Arawari, instead of
bringing forward the integrity of Portugal ? The
Boundary thus sett'ed was not one jot better than
that Which we had given up, nor was there any
more advantage to be derived from this Boundary
than from that which we had made a merit of
giving up; for France had obtained the com-
mand of the River Amazons, which was all
she ! wanted. The cession of Louisiana next
called fur his notice, but it was of such vast mag.
nitude, that it almost deterred him from saying any
thing about it. We had nearly given France pos-
session of a fourth part of the Globe : We had
established them in a possession which but for /his
they could not have had. • He did not mean to say
that they, were not in some measure established
a there at fbrmer period, that they had not pos-
sessions there before, but certainly nothing in com-
parison with what they possessed there now. He
did not mean to say that the French, placed in that
Continent, with an indefinite wilderness behind
them, could suddenly become powerfld there ; but
what had we done ? We had given them possession
of the two greatest rivers in America, the Missis-
sippi and the AniazoPs, the one giving them the
,command of North America, the other of South
America : we had given them the possession of
both, and had made them a present of a brace of
Continents. In what. situation must this Country
be placed in consequence of such a cession, which he
feared would prove the severest blow we had ever
sustained ? There were several other points which
it might be necessary to advert to, the principal of
which was the non-revival of former Treaties.
This was a complete subversion of former pradice,
and of what must be considered -as the public law
of nations ; and it was incumbent on those who
had done it, to shew that it could be done with
safety. They were to shew that such an omission
could be made without injury ; they were to slim
that it did not aft-ea our interests at the Bay of
Honduras, and above all, that it did not shake the
fbundation of our power in India. With respeft
to Indiai, he was glad there had been some pre-
lirninary discussion upon that subject ; his Hon.
Friend (Mr. Doxleas) had shewn, by the change
of his opinion, the uncertainty which existed as
to the fad itself, His Hon. Friend had had, she
2.111ie4 brought before him at a former period ; it '
was: tao,va again brought before him,, and the uncer,7!

minty of opinion in a mind so well it-Armed, certainly
chewed the uncertainty of the thing itself. His Hon.
Friend had said a good deal oldie Convention oft 787,
not forgetting the Treaties of 1783 and of 1703.
With respe& to the claims of the Enemy, many very
pompous assertions were made as to our rights ; but
every one who spoke upon the subjetl considered our
cause as perfeetly good. it was in this case, a com-
bat without an adversary. Many questions that came
before that Hotise might be said to come coraris non
judice; it was not what we said, but what they said.
If any man's claims could be settled upon his own
assertion, there- would be little or nothing to do in
Westminster-hall ; but in carne the adversary and
disputed these claims : so much for assertion. His
Hon. Friend had laid about him, like another Ajax,
amongst some poor harmless cattle, whom, in the
fervor of his imagination, he had conceived to be so
m-any warlike Trojans, but he had better reserve
his artillery for another opportunity. But to re-
turn to the Convention of 1787, the Noble Lord
(HAwicEsßoßr) had admitted that France had
founded her claims upon other documents besides the
Treaty of 1783; she certainly did; she founded them
upon the ancient firmans. It might be asked, why
should our claims he disputed I He would ask,
why not ? Those claims were arranged in some-
, what an indefinite manner in the Treaty of 1783 :
it happened at that period as in 18oz, there was a
disposition to slur over a great many points, the
language was, we say so, and you say so, and when
the time collies when it is necessary to settle
the point, , then we will settle it. This gave
rise to the Convention of 1,787, by which our
rights were more clearly and better acknowledged :
this however was not an abandonment of the claims
of the Enemy, but only an abandonment of the
means of inforcing those claims : it was only de-
barring them from the use of those means by which
they could support their claims. His Hon. Friend
had talked of drawing swords in support of our
claims ; but, perhaps, his Honourable Friend 'had
been hurried away by the warmth of his imagi.
nation.---His Honourable Friend seemed to have
forgotten the situation we were placed in, and
to have imagined that he had the War Sword in his
hand'. This was not, perhaps, exactly the moment
when we could say, " here we stand upon our So-
vereignty, touch us who dare ;" we might have
negotiated with some effett with the Cape and
Cochin in our hands, but we had given them up to
France. It was not, however, because our claims
lay in India that they must be decided there ; the
cause might be brought from India to Europe, and
it was not the first time that a squeeze given us
in Europe had compelled us to vomit forth all
the acquisitions we had made in other parts. With
respect to the Isle of Elba, the policy of France had
been most conspicuously dkplayed. The Archduke
had been sent away from Tuscany, for the purpose
of substituting another figure, under_the name of a
King. This Country', however, thought that the
Territories of that State would remain the same :
Austria was of the same opinion, but by a stroke
of policy peculiar to herself, France secured
Porto -Ferrajo for her own use. , 1-le would nor
dwell longer upon these. topics. Upon the two
Treaties which were before the House, any mea.
sure might be pursued which the House chose to
adopt. The Treaties, however important, embraced
subjects so immense, that he knew rint how it was
possible to discuss them even in a summary manner
in one day. With resped to the French Republic,
it was important to know what she could do, and
what site would do, and this might be ascertained
from what she had done, and what she had willed ;
they must also know what Great Britain had
done, and what she would do. As to France, they
could only judge of her situation and resources from
that period of history, which, however remote,
was familiar to Gentlemen in that House, the time
when the Romans were at the height of their
power. They could only from that period form
an idea of the power and resources of this body
of modern Romans. France had attained that
height of power in ten years, which the Romans had
only accomplished in several centuries. Let it be
recolleded what Montesquieu had said relative
to attaining a greatness of power ; his principles
were so completely exemplified by what had hap-
pened in the present day, that it might be supposed
the French had taken 'this hook as their ma-
nual. As to what they would do, they told us in
plain language what they intended to do. When
we looked to the Continent, there seemed only two
Powers that were capable of making -a stand against
the power of France, and one of those was, per-
haps, prote&ed only by its distance from that •
Power. Austria was still strong, and perhaps its
resources were undiminished ; hut so bereft of aid,
that it was probable in the first shock of the vessel,
it would go by the board. Great Britain had, it
is true, made head against the power of France,
but even this country had, in some measure, given
way to it. Many perhaps might console them-
selves and say, " Europe is gone ; peace go with
her : but thank God we are placed on an Island,
and we can take to out boat and go wherever
we please." This might be said, but we should
meet with France wherever we went ; in no
part of the world should we be secure from be-
ing haunted by her ghost ; whether we went to
America or to the East Indies, still the spedre
of French greatness would pursue us. When- he
looked to the West Indies, he found,those interested
in the property of those Islands so struck by panic,
that it absorbed every other consideration. They felt
danger between a Negro insurrection and French
power ; if the Negroes gained possession of these
Islands, they were entirely lost, but if the French
conquered, it was not perhaps a loss to individuals,
but a loss to the Country. We had agreed to assist
them with regard to St.. Domingo, but why should
we give them possession of Fort Hillsborough,
which was capable of containing vessels that might
annoy our trade with the utmost facility, so as to ren-
der our trading vessels insecure without strong Con
voys ? The means which France possessed to carry
their vast plans into execution, were almost indefi-
nite : they stood possessed of a large portion of the
two Continents of America, whilst to the rower
they possessed there we had little means of resistance.
Added to this, their, power in America gave them an
immense influence over the .American States ; we
wets perfectly aware, what a growing Power the

blieniiLdeiSitaintetshoefhAanmdesr(i)cfaysr7nsc,e,ansdo:tefl)t.l,letylic ur'eerlerr:
more than ever reason to be jealous. Thus far
to the means of France. He really believed,
ever, strange as it might apeear, that a grtat pr
of the approbation to this fatal Treaty was fhtin` eo
upon the fanciful opinion, that France would be so
far occupied with the conquests Uhe
give no interruption to our Commerce and Man
,°`
fattures : how such an opinion could be entertain.'
ed, he was at a loss to know. It seemed, as if wie
had made, as
had kept our terms, but lost our tone. France bat.:
shewn a determined disposition to attain universtn
Empire, in pursuance of which she would destrnrc
this Country, that being necessarily a part of Itc..
plan. France displayed her sentiments upon the su •
b
Jed; she had marked out-her plan and taken her post;
!ions, and this so ev idenay, that her oh em could on.c
be mistaken. We had a war of arms, now we weri
to have a way of customhouses ; the attach
s
France, which were lately made against our tall"):
ries were now levelled at the commerce of the Bri
tish Empire. This being the situation' of France'
it remained to be inquired what was the situationt
of Great Britain, and what she could do, and Ivi,ll_
She ought to do. In considering this poititf they
must take into their view what had -been
:crs
exertions of this Country, what were the fee",n°
which had been aroused by • those exertills.'
and what was the judgment formed as to Our exertion,
toe exertions. It seemed, that by a sort argre:see-
ral law, even every animal Was enabled to
do
danger, and to provide against it. Speakulgiod
this general question, he thought this County},„T
been rather defedive in foreseeing, and rtnrl.ae.l
against future' danger. By taking a view °' 't
hadpast, they might form a judgment of what was
come. In this, however, they were defe6liceer',
they had observed the consequences which had hesc
produced in other countries by the effea °f 111°,21
principles, which had operated as -an twiv
cerja
menstruum, dissolving every thing. that °m,
contad with it, but they said it was of no OJCI of
quence, it would pass over Britain, the porergele of
that ft
hoet hpe
ec oguonktir i eosf. •
the Bristish nulpire would withstand the. Nr"- set
the 0,1
that menstruum, which had dissolved
could not Withstand the adion of this mens itutl
train anYa
sma ewt
more than the baser metals of other countries—le
the War ensued. We got into the War, and tl
condud of that War would shew its chataeterc.
There were two views in which the question, re);
live to that War, presented itself—it was to,,st
considered either as a common War of nation agan,
.nation, ( r as a War of the good of all
against the bad of all nations. Those who
therllTryit issr rldoollst\vest
sidered it in the first point of view, conceitiv,
it was to he condueled in the common 1."0/01
by seizing the Ships. of the nation with owoo,,
we were at War, and by impoverishing-thatOod
don in every way in which such injury 004.
be effeded. Those, on the other hand, %%4° `',l it
sidered it in the second point of view, believ.erelf,
to be a war against the body of France lice,
There were at the same time some points tae lice,
these two opinions were consolidated; tir t, tolcv
considered it as a war of opinion, wished nor
ships, and to use every other means of W31:0 the
only that they might in the meantime , fur'
resources of the Country, but that they wig- artY
ther the objet`} in view, and at the same tinle
public opinion along with them; whilst thole no
considered it as a common war, would havlnce:.
objection to the restoration of Monarchy in s r`ijer-
the whole question was, which was to be c°('ot go
ed as secondary and subordinate ? He woul", rionso
into a discussion of* the merits of those oi'ni,hr,
but simply state them : which of them vco r
(0
must for ever remain a question. With rcsrpont
the measures pursued in the conduct of rheiltion
with the exception of the unsuccessful .exTe`ii•tioo
to Quiberon, and having mentioned the EV.e'elie
to Quiberon, against which a loud cry ot, loon'
clamour was raised, he would observe, that 114
said,
Friend, the late Chancellor of the Excheqoer fon
he would take his share of the blame arisiog
that Expedition, yet some difference of °Pin° here
iqed between him and his Colleaguese—he
interrupted by e
II soh"
Mr. PITT, who Spoke to Order. ''`„ rela-
mitted to the House, whether on a propositio;esent
tive to a Peace concluded by His Majestys 1. as to
Ministers, they could entertain a discussi;sl7ar
the.measures pursued in the conduit of the ,ed
His Majesty's late Ministers ?He also nis
that ,the obligation of secrecy
imposed
Majesty's o.
Servants, although they were 00t e Con,
lice, could not he dispensed with, without 01
sent of His Majesty. o s3P
Mr. WIND HAM said, he was agent
that he took,the blame of that Expedition ,
-
to himself.
He 53
Mr. PITT again spoke to OrJer•
siiesee'
the very point urged by his lion. Frien`" t ntrea
the propriety of the Call to Order. Ile
the generosity of his Hon. Friend's mind ; heoeieet
not conceive that an explanation upon such a
could, be allowed in the present discussion. meant
Mr. WINDHAM prc,ceeded—he said, l'
peipe,ti"
to state that he took all the blame of that 010
tion to himself, and that himself and his "uile'it'tga9
e
held different opinions upon the subjeet• , "dl ever
also about to observe, that this Country r
formed a proper judgment of its situation, .s es'
• '''
propet foresight of the dangers to which it teat the
posed. rt
efred of this he thought was, , tvy
Country never properly understood or fel' wi,?ere rl4
were at War : they were told that ev %‘-'"re
War for security, but the fad was, that t rhey
at War because they could not be at Pejacri,
were at sea because they could not be a a_ess of till
perhaps was to be attributed to the rcgc,cotrieigg.
War itself, it threw off, in a kind 01
ioints,
force, .succes:es were gained in variousstill the question was left too moat cover:;
why we were at war, namely, because ;iin ,„:1
men! of France was. endeavouring to t
the
world.' This -error had pursued itsd nv el;
which We had come into,• as it' we 11 that
sight of the consequences. He belie."' jive V`.s
dangers arising from this Peace' might
. •ree.
g,
foreseen, if we had looked for them. esn
r
p
a very imperfed fbresight of the f,loge rs
oun,ry. e
ink faun the adual situation a the -

. Intended,to • that the War had been unsuccessful as
itcs objea, and, certainly, no man could deny
At let this peace was to bt taken as the result of it.
hat
tue same time, it did not follow that the system
th'avtsued in the condua of the War was wrong ; it might
have failed, but snot constat, that any other might
lion,
succeeded; experience had not decided the ques-
cent; The same error in opinion existed in the
itry, at the present moment, as to its exertions
0, toe late contest : he had rather, however, that
4,Ys Should err •on the side of exertion, than that
were
feelings should have fallen • short. There
tvere two opinions upon - the subject : the one
vi as, that this Country had, at all times, a just
teeelw. °F its situation ; that- it displayed a proper.
le nig) and a correspondent
.exertion. His opia
there
was the other way :—He was of opinion that
bedwas not a sufficient degree of feeling displayed, •
I,e !hat our exertions, .however great they might
Were not great as compared with the real ob_
tilt at stake. He wanted to know if any war had
ofer been carried on before with so universal a cry
eh.eace as the present ? When was there a war in
en 'as like the present, a contempt was 'thrown
as tne gallant exploits of our Fleet and Army, sO•
ee to render it a' matter
.of doubt whether the!.
ser,e'n, °IV of commemorating these Victories would.
site be received with disapprobation, and when
e" Vidories were received with such cold ap.
jt4use ?' He could bring Newspapers to sheets's-
thee sentiments that were uttered in favour of
pseenemy ; and he defied any one to. shew any
:„ N in which such language had been published
e'ltring the late War. It was' likewise to. be ob-
satved, that such prints could pot exist without
tilTniters. When we talked of the great exera
ks of the country, he thought we were too much
en the habit of applauding ourselves, and it was a
truthe upon such a stibjeCl. • When they talked of-
Cr's,e greatness of exertion, it was necessary to
IVllpare it with the greatness of the objeCt. If the
ar was
unjust and unnecessary, as was contended
11'1 s""es then every exertion was too great ; but if
Wareas he thought, was necessary, then the ex-
ktii°ns of the Country were not great by any means.
hen the magnitude of our exertions was spoken
't,vvas necessary to consider the resources of the
tt,c3nutry, and what effect those exertions had upon
sete'°. Had they suffered ? On the contrary, our Com-
sa 'to and Manufa&ures.had increased, and our re-
sainfees had -grown with the War.. Much had been.
44 io the course of the War of its ruinous tendency,
aa .the distress it brought on the labourer and arti-
tlb'?; this.was in the true spitit of Jacobinism, the,
el of which was to concentrate all the causes of
at;eanotent for the purpose of controlling the Exe-
,kt"Ye
e. Government.. And what was the distress
tliinich so many declamations had pointed ? No-
tli-er but .what naturally arose out. of the wealth of
• af ountry, and which was a necessary concomitant
gi.:)ur opulence. Great wealth produced great luxury,
se at luxury produced great exPence, and great ex.
essse
t° , Produced poverty, which was a natural secretion
an wealth. These reasons besides applied to all wars,
te;rl°t particularly to the late War. But it was said,
saeii'vealth of this Country was in few hands,
vet St the mass of the people were in a state of po_
NJ' Wealth could not be -in few hands in any
tsC•ntrY; and the fad was, there was no country in
, wealth was more generally diffused than in
se4-3. 'lt seemed ts 'be too much the disposition of
Lanny to say, ,g what have we to do with the ba-
' jone-e of power, or any other dispute, so as-we en-
th'e,,ircommerce ?". But the question was, whe-
lk; we could enjoy it under such circumstances ?
of said "yes,,, but France said " no." Was it
,e 1 tilportance that France should dittate to us
sueLe:e,rrns of Peace, that she should take from us the
the—rterity of our Flag, and that she should take
pc); cockades out of our hats, as she had done in
pat-tug4l? He thought the Country was less
eao-tful than before, and that the fee simple of the
BredlntY was, on the 3oth of September, of a much
t
et value than at present. The Bond,
.how.
ietve,•'' was signed and sealed, and we must abide by
Chid all its changes. But this ought not to pre_
e us from taking those measures which yet re-
in 4'ned to us, and which in sound wisdom we ought
ese•r:'ke, to prevent those fatal consequences
jhdi`~were likely to result to our Empire in •
ti/(11' Whatever opinion any one might entertain
the claims of France in India, those claims had
tl,l7teu before brought forward, and no man could
ee;r himself that they might not le brought for-
; rd Was it riot better, therefore, to as-.
the question, , and to have our rights sic-
e'wledged, and that this should be done before we
LL:otetikitred -Malta, and before we gave out of our
tine the. Cape and Cochin, rather than reserve
ht: Point for discussion till the period, when
i'tl4nCe `vas possessed of those places? it might be
that the French had shewn no disposition
as'tile to our rights in India, but in ihis no confi-
t,i;ce could be placed. Was there Lot a probability,
in the non-revival of Treaties, the French
order hat
view the Convention of 1787, in
ows"' that they might renew their claims ?. -They
• aB, not,suppose France wanting in any means of
<„,gandi4ealeilt. They stewed their disposition
pes reseed. to India, by their anxiety to gain
ge:e. ssion of the Cape ; but above all by their
bac" PrOiea of an Expedition to Egypt, by
stem of of which they hoped to march from con-
'ss to conquest, till' they reached our Empire
judias What was more easy than to ques-
akes
verue_tl France as to her intentions before we deli-
. pos u°tlt of our hands those securities which we
these,sse4 ? They should bewate how they suffered
()Or,ountry to be soothed by imaginary benefits :
far `-•°tnmerce might not suffer immediately, or not
been me years to come; but though predictions had
inpn ridiculed, yet those which had been made dur-
faWe American War had been fulfilled and were
eseuidings Had we notv possessed America, France
ing eh Probably not have had the means of continu-
with late contest., He believed it was an idea
ssetliesTile at the present moment, that the Country
fee
aullast their lives, and that it would continue
upon 'mg time to supply food to the animalcUli
mint
is surface ; but let them beware, our dangers
Spain Collie on in a short time. Let them look ai
raec w
sitade peace, and became the vassal of
ehardly date the loss of her inde_
derve
"nde u
cad lamity might reach this Country

even in our own time. He concluded by moving an
Address to His Majesty, stating ‘‘ That they had
taken into their serious consideration, the Definitive
Treaty of Peace. That they would keep inviolate
the Public Faith, as pledged in the engagements en-
tered into by His Majesty, but that they could not
help feeling regret at the nature of certain of those
-engagements, relying on His Majesty's paternal
wisdom to take such measures as -might avert the
danger arising 'from such engagements, expressing
their readiness to support His Majesty in such en-
gagements as he should deem necessary for that pur-
pose, and recommending to His Majesty to keep a
Naval and Military Power sufficient to meet such
danger."

Lord FOLKESTONE, after endeavoiiring
thew that by the late Treaty we have given our
sanction to jaccbinical principles, deserted our Al-
lies, and abandoned our commercial advantages,
concluded with seconding the Address.
Lord HAWKESBURY then rose ; he said, that
he had listened with great attention to his Right
Hon. Friend's Speech ; he owned that it was
• throughout ingenious, but not always to the point ;
• and therefore it could not be expected his answer
should follow him through all the digressions he
had Made from the subjed. For his Own part, he
assured the Right Honourable Gentleman, that
•if 'he had thought there was any thing in the
Treaty dishonourable to this Country or detri.
Mental. to its- interests, he should. have been
theforemost to lift up his voice against it ; but
convinced as he was that instead of being dis-
honourable or prejudicial, it was advantageous
and glorious to this Country, he found himself
called upon tdoppose the present Address. He did
not mean to defend the Peace on the ground that we
could not hare better terms; but he was to defend
the Peace as being honourable, wise, and expedient.
He was happy that the whole subject had been now
brought at once before the House ; and he was also
happy that the ingenuity of his Hon. Friend had
been able to find no other objection to it, than that
Which applied equally to all Treaties, that one
point •had been given up in order to maintain ano-
ther. Before, however, proceeding to a particular
consideration of the objections advanced against the
Treaty, it would be proper previously to consider
the circumstances that led to it. Immediately upon
the present Ministry accepting their offices, they
heard of a great battle lost by our, Ally the Em-
peror, which was quickly followed by the-Treaty
of Luneville, and the ratification of that Treaty by
the Germanic Empire. The state of Europe, with re-
gard to Great Britain, was now changed. Instead
of a great confederacy under
,her influence, directed
against France, a•formidable confederacy was now
formed, under the direction of France, against this
Country. At that period, almost every man in the
Country thought it expedient to open Negotiations
-for Peace. Peace was called for alike by all ranks
and all parties. Under these circumstances, Ministers,
after some previous preparation for' enforcing our
claims, and after sending a Fleet to the Baltic, open-
ed Negotiations with the French Government.—
But in such circumstances, was it to be expected
that by any Treaty of Peace we should be able to settle
the disorders of the Continent, after the Treaty of
-Luneville had been signed and •ratified by the Ger-
manic Body ? It was enough at that time for Great
Britain to take care of her own interests and those
of her Allies, without .attempting to fix a political
system for Europe. The objects which we could
hope, or then wish to obtain by Treaty, were,
First, The complete integrity of the British Em-
pire in all its parts ; Second, To maintain gobd
faith towards our 'Allies ; Third, To retain out
of the conquests we had made, an equivalent for
the accessions of .territory acquired by France.
At the time when we opened the Nego:iations, it
was not likely that we could procure such cOndis
tions ; but the Naval Victories of Copenhagen and
the Nile, which then took place, opened a new
prosped of obtaining these advantages. As the
Preliminary Treaty which followed, had been al.-
ready approved by the House, he did not Mean to
enter into its merits at present. He only wished
to skew what the. circumstances were which led to
the
.present Treaty—a" Treaty, which, as it secured
the,intcgrity of Great Britain, obtained better con-
ditions than could have been expected for her Al-
lies, and had besides acquired her two most im-
portant- possessions in the East and \Vest Indies,
could not be considered as less than honourable. In
the eyes of his Right Hon: Friend, however, it
would not appear so, and if his views were allowed
to be right, no terms, however advantageous, could
be justified, if they were concluded with the pre-
sent Government of France. Lord HAWKESBURY
then proceeded to divide the subject into two heads :
And first, he was to consider how far the Govern-
ment, after having concluded the Preliminaries,
ought to have been induced by the circumstances
-which have occurred since that time, to have refused
to conclude the Definitive Treaty on the basis pro-
posed. He said he had no difficulty in owning that
he regretted several things which had intervened,
not so much on account of their intrinsic import-
ance, as, the spirit they manifested in the French
Government. But we must consider how far they
are consistent with the principles on which the Pre-
liminary Treaty was concluded, and how far they
would have justified ourbreaking off the Negotiations
for Peace. What his Hon. Friend had advanced, went
to say, that when any Continental Power, however
unconneded with us, became involved with France,
we must step forward to its assistance, whether it
wished for such interference or not: For his own part,
he did not, as some did, think we ought to remain as
isolated in our politics as we were in our situation ;
he thought we should consider ourselves deeply
concerned in the policy of the Continent ; but he
thought our interference with its quarrels was to be
considered as a matter of choice, not of necessity,
not of a point of honour. We must- take -into
• consideration, whether such interference he consist-
ent' with our external or internal interests; more
.especially at present, after being exhausted by a
nine years War, deserted by all our Allies, and
forced at last to negotiate a separate Peace. In
such a state, there surely could be no obligation on
us to give up our own immediate interests for the
remote advantages of others. If we advert to
what has -been said with regard to Italy ;—if it
was not expedient for us to continue the War on

ac:ount of Holland and the -Netherlands, much less
can it be expedient to continue it on account of
Italy, But it may be said, that circumstances may
so concur, as to render a smaller objea of more im.
portance than agreater. But is this the case at pre-
sent ? The first intimation which His Majesty's
Ministers received of the new Constitution of the
Italian Republic, was immediately followed by ac-
counts of the congratulations of the Court of Ber-
lin, the acquiescence of that of Vienna, and the as-
surances of Russia, that she would not intermeddle
in the arrangement. Under these circumstances,
would any one say, that it was justifiable to con-
tinue the war on account of the new Constitution of
the Italian Republic ? Another subjea insisted upon
was the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France. This
event could not indeed be viewed with indifference,
but it was to be considered how it could justify our
refusing to continue the Negotiation for Peace. It
had originally been a French Colony, and the Mis-
sissippi was then the boundary between it and Great
Britain. It had been ceded in a private Convention
to Spain by France between the Preliminaries and
Definitive Treaty in 1763. This shewed, that such
transaaions, though not to be approVed, were not
now first heard of. Louisiana had even been men_
tinned in the Preliminaries. to that Treaty, which
it had not been •in the present. It was then to be
considered, if Louisiana, thus voluntarily ceded,
and thus originally, situated, was an object which
called for a contiruiition of the War. If we consi-
der its value, it is i,resent almost nothing. But
it maybe s; id, what may not .-the industry of the
Freud) e;TetSt ? 'When it was formerly in the pos.-
session of the French, they were able to make
nothing of it, while they rendered their other
West Indian possessions of infinite value. As a
naval station, the best informed represent it to be of
no consequence. With regard to the political effeets
prediiied from its cession, in laying open America to
the 'influence of France, it must be observed,
that -it has hitherto been the 'policy of America
to maintain an even balance of power in that
quarter of the Globe, between Great Britain
and France. America must, by the cession of
Louisiana, conider,this balance as destroyed, and
of consequence become more jealous of France, and
more attached to Great Britain than ever. Some
imagined that this new possession of the French
might endanger the safety of America ; but when
we recolleaed her efforts in 1756, when alone and
unsupported, we could not surely fear mhh- for
her safety in her 'present state cf power and
resources. Ail these circumstances considered,
the House might judge if it was expedient to con-
tinue the War on account of the cession of Louisi-
ana by Spain to France. The Noble Lord then
proceeded in the second place to consider whether
the Definitive Treaty had been settled on the basis
of the Preliminary Treaty, and whether it was such
as in consequence of the Preliminary Treaty the
Country had a right to expect. He, allowed that
there were many things which might justly be ex-
peaed to be arranged in'a Definitive Treaty, though
wholly omitted in the , Preliminary. Two faults
might therefore be imputed to a Definitive Treaty,
those of omission and commission. Of the first,
the chief.one objeaed to in the present Definitive
Treaty was the non-renewal of Treaties, political
and commercial, , and particular Conventions.
With regard to political Treaties, the principle
on which these had been renewed by iformcr
Treaties did not appear to be well understood. By
the Trefty of Westphalia, Europe had been placed
in a different state from what it had previously been,
and therefore, in order to ascertain the relative si-
tuations of the several Powers, it had been custo-
mary to renew that Treaty, and also any particular
Conventions subsequent to it. Many arguments
might be advanced for this general renewal of Trea-
ties, but many might also he advanced against it.
In the first place, by renewing many doubtful en.
gagements, and consequently increasing the occa.
sions of dispute, it destroyed the san6tity of Trea-
ties, and by bringing them into disrepute, di-
minished' the obligation to fulfil them.—The
'renewal of former Treaties was, in another
point of view, more disadvantageous to Great
Britain than to ,any other -Nation, because - we
adhere more religiously to our engagements, and
therefore should be more cautious ' in consider-
ing what we enter into. Yet putting these consi-
derations out of the question, there were many of.
the stipulations, the utility of retaining which
might be questioned from the change of circum-
stances. Some, indeed, might be advantageous,
but it Was necessary to consider whether these
would overbalance those of an opposite nature. - It
was to be considered, that formerly all preceding
Treaties had been renewed by the other Powers of
Europe as well as by us ; but in the present War,
no other European Power had done so. If under
• these circumstances we renewed former Treaties, we
should alone be bound by former Treaties, while the
other Nations were free. The manner in which former
Treaties-had usually been renewed, was to renew such
Treaties generally, and then follow up this renewal
by particular exceptions. If we followed this rule
on the present occasion, what would be the conse-
quence ? We should first have guaranteed the Inte-
grity of the Germanic Empire, and then have been.
obliged to guarantee to France.all the conquests she
had made on that Empire. The same would have
happened with regard to Sardinia and Holland. We
could not have avoided this; we had formerly gua-
.ranteed the'lntegrity of the Germanic Empire, and
yet in the same Treaty guaranteed Silesia to Prus-
sia. In the same manner, a renewal of former Trea-
ties would have forced us to give our sanaion to all
the encroachments of France. Would it have been
consistent with the interests, the feelings of this
Country, thus to have confirmed the aggrandizement
of our rival ? We have it now in our power to, say
at least, that if we have' not been able to set Europe
to rights, we have not contributed to its confusion ;
if we have not been able. to prevent encroach-
ments, we have not san6lioned them. But it must.
further be considered, that by a renewal of Treaties,
and the necessary , exceptions, we should not only
have confirmed what. we-knew and. understood, but
what was yet not settled or defined. By sanaion-
ing the Treaty of Luneville, we should have made
ourselves a parts' to the disthemberment of the Ger-
manic Fmrite, yet fo take place in consequence of
chat Treaty. With regard to Conimercial Treaties,

. .
t ivas impossible in the.pter,ent circumstances, to re--
e.v them, without renewing stipulations respettini,
rights %of neutrality anti personal privileges ex-
tremely disadvantageous to us. Even if Commer-
cial Treaties were deemed beneficial, so many-
things were to be adjusted, .that it was more proper
to refer the matter to future discussion, than delay
the 'Definitive Treaty till all matters could be ar.
ranged, as this delay had already occasioned much
inconvenience.. With regard to the benefit expected
from Commercial Treaties, it might be observed
that our trade to the Continent of Europe during
the war had been as flourishing as while these
Treaties were in force. The prohibition of our
manufadures could still lesS• be carried into effect
in Peace than in War, and therefore our commerce
in spite of them must he extended. 'lf we were
driven to a War of Duties, the advantage was
plainly on our side. The exclusion of French
wines and brandy by us would be a •more
severe loss to France than the exclusion of our ma.
nufgtures by her; because we had many other
markets to resort to, but we were her only Mer-
chants for these commodities. With regard to the
separate Conventions to be renewed, the two prin.
cipally alluded to were those relative to the East
India Trade, and that relating to the cutting of
Logwood in the Bay of Honduras ; to which he ,
should add, that with regard to the Flag, which
had been most grossly mistaken. So much had last
night been said with regard to the East Indian
trade, that it was trmecessary for him to dwelt on
that subjel. He should observe, however, that
though our rights in the East Indies had been ori-
ginally the same with those of France, yet by
conquests, and other events, we had l:come Sove-
reigns of that country. France had acknowledged
us to be so, by receiving from us a right to trade,
and stipulations regulating their Commerce in tte
Treaty 011783. This Sovereignty was not in con-
sequence of any stipulation with France, but • ac-
knowledged by her as the foundation of stipula-
tions. It therefore remained now to us as perfed as
ever. . The Convention of 1787, was certainly wise,
and proper at the time, in removing the causes of
quarrel which had arisen from. the Treaty. of 1783;
bat circumstances had so changed, that the objec-
tionable points in it greatly preponderated over
those which were proper to be renewed. With re-
gard to cutting logivood in the Bay of Honduras,
we remained in the same situation as before the
War. Complete occupancy
,had fornierly been
conceded to us in consequence of specific sacrifices.
We did not then hold it, as subjel to Spain and
secured by particular Conventions. 'We held it of
right, and as the Definitive Treaty had nowise
done that right away, it remained to us on the same
footing as heretofore. But above all other things,
what regarded our Flag had been completely mis-
understood. This Country has for centuries claimed
a right to the Sovereignty of the Seas, and from
this Sovereignty arose the demand that other na-
tions should lower their Flag to us. This Sove-
reignty inferred a claim with regard to all other
nations as well as Holland ; but a particular
stipulation with regard to the acknowledgment
of it by time latter nation, was introduced
into -one of our Treaties with her, in conse.
quence of the preceding War having arisen
from an attempt on het part to dispute it. This
particular' stipulation had never been introduced
into any Treaty with France or Spain; from whence
it followed, that -by renewing such a stipulation
with regard to Holland, we virtually renounced ,it
with regard to these Powers. Was it not therefore
better to retain our former Rights, in their full vi-
gour,• than to call them in question by stipulations
for their acknowledgment by a particular and a weak
Power ?

The next question to he considered was, How far
the Definitive Treaty agreed with the Preliminary
Articles of Peace ? His Right Hon. Friend had di-
vided this part of the subject into five heads : the
firSt related to Prisoners of \Var. This point had
been left to be settled by the Definitive Treaty, ac-
cording to the Law of Nations, and in the regula.
tions which had been adopted, that principle had
been completely adhered to. The principle 'of each
Country maintaining its own Prisoners was first in-
troduced in the Treaty of 1763, and it certainly
Was conformable to the opinion of the best writers
on the Law of. Nations, and the wisest men. It was,
however, in some degree resisted upon this occasion
on the part of France, for she proposed to extend.
it to Allies in general, a proposition which was
not acceded to on the part of this Country.—
France then proposed to extend this principle
to such Troops as had been, during the War, in
the pay, and at the disposal of Great Britain.
To this proposition we could not refuse to agree—
and if France had no such Troops to provide ,for in
return, we could not object to let. it go to the ac-
count of her Prisoners of War. The next subjed
was, the situation of Portugal. The limits of her
territories were arranged in the Definitive Treaty,
according: to the stipulations of the Preliminaries.—
It had been contended, that we had not kept our
faith with Portugal ; but there appeared to him not
the slightest foundation for such an assertion. In
consequence of the state of the War, it became
cessary to send a large, force to Egypr, and the
wisdom of that measure had, he believed, never
been called in, question. Nis Majesty's Ministers
upon that occasion judge4and in his opinion judged
wisely, that it would 'be.better to send the whole
of our force to Egypt, rathet.3l9n to divide it, and
to send part to Egypt and to:keep part in Portugal,
by which means both our objea\S might be defeat-
ed. But the consequence of our sending so large a
force to Egypt, rendered it ibssible -that we
could leave a sufficient number omen for the de-
fence of Portugal. In the Treaty:Of Peace which
that Country concluded for herself; perhaps her Go-
vernment was not free from every degree of blame.
When he had the honour of being appointed one of
His Majesty's Confidential Ministers,* had occa-
sion to communicate with the Government of that
Country, in which he offered some advice upon the
proper means to be adopted for the defence of that
Country. One part of that advice he thought it
necessary to state, though he felt it extremely un-
pleasant to make any observations that refleaed
upon any indiVidual—but the advice was, that the
command of the Portuguese Army should be given
to some able and atlive Officer. The person who