The Sun.
London, England, 1834-01-23 00:00:00

LOVEOROVE V. NELSON.

The parties in this case were contractors with the Post-
master-General, to horse the Royal Mail between London and
Stroud, and the bill was filed in order to have the partnership
accounts taken under the direction of the Court. It appeared
that in January, 1828, Mr. Nelson, the great coach con-
tractor and a Mr. Cox, the two defendants in the present
suit, entered into an agreement by which it was stipulated
between them and the Post-office, that they would severally
horse the Stroud mail at a certain rate of mileage, &c., in re-
spective distances, and it was arranged that Nelson should tra-
verse between Ludgate-hill and Benson, and that Cox, his
partner in the concern, should conduct the mail from that
town to Chalford, each being only liable to the Post-office for his
own default only. Matters proceeded in a regular and satisfac-
tory manner between the different parties till sometime in the
year 1831, when Mr. Nelson gave notice to the Post-office of his
determination to horse the mail only between London
and Maidenhead ; and upon that occasion the plaintiff
Lovegrove, at the suggestion, and it appeared on the recom-
mendation of Nelson, was adopted by the postmaster into
the concern, for the purpose of performing the intermediate
distance. He had continued to do so, and had incurred be-
yond what he received to the extent of nearly 200/., of which
the other two partners had enjoyed the benefit. The present
bill was filed for the purpose of having the partnership accounts
taken, in order that that sum, if it should appear to have been
advanced by him, might be refunded. This claim was resisted
by Nelson, on the ground that he had settled all accounts ; at
all events it was submitted that he could be only jointly liable
with the defendant Cox.
Mr. PEMBERTON appeared for the plaintiff.

Mr. TaFsLorE, for the defendant Cox, stated that Mr.
Lovegrove had never, with his knowledge or sanction, been'
adopted into the partnership. There might have been a sub-
contract between him and Nelson, to horse part of his distance,
and to that extent to participate in his profits; but the terms
of the contract originally entered into with the Postmaster.
General, and the reason of the case, gave him no power to
assert his claim in that respect against the general concern.
He had, in entering into the original agreement with Nelson,
done so in the confidence that he would perform the whole dis-
tance he had undertaken; and when Lovegrove's name had,
on two occasions, been introduced as a partner into the
share bills, Cox repudiated him altogether, and they were
finally adjusted and settled to his entire satisfaction,
in that respect. The original contract no doubt gave power
to the Postmaster-General, in case any of the subscrib-
ing parties died or became insolvent, or committed a breach
of duty to insist on his dismissal, but before any other indi-
vidual was appointed, notice was required to be given to the
other contracting parties, that they might have the option of
performing the duty of the defaulter, or appointing any other
person in whom they had confidence to do the work of the
party removed.

Mr. PEMBERTON, in reply, insisted that the terms of the
contract did not render it incumbent on the Postmaster-General
to give such a notice to the original contractors when any par-
ticular party, through default, was dismissed. It was, besides,
wholly inconsistent with the uniform practice of the trade pur.
sued on all such occasions. Indeed, such a thing, particularly
where the long mails were concerned, would be altogether im-
practicable. The contracting parties were all unknown to each
other, and were only individually responsible to the Postmaster.
Under the terms of the contract, the Postmaster had certainly
a right to appoint a person to do the duty of a defaulter, or a
retiring party, without communicating at all with the others.
The MASTER of the ROLLS Said this case involved a question
of very general importance to the Post-office, with respect to the
contracts into which they habitually enter with persons who
are employed in the conduct of the mails. There are two
questions—Does the contract, according to legal construction,
authorize the Postmaster-General, in default of one person,
to appoint another, who is to be considered as a partner in the
concern as if originally a party to the contract accord-
ing to the express terms, and has he appointed
such a person a partner in this particular instance ?
Does the expression of those terms require notice to be given
by the Postmaster-General to every other person who is party
to the contract originally, or has been subsequently introduced
before he can name any other individual as a partner ? Before
he can nominate any person as partner, those who are for
the time being actual partners have a right to prevent
that new appointment by undertaking to perform that part of
theccluty, by the neglect or default of which such authority is
given to the Postmaster-General. It being in the option of
the existing partners, therefore, to perform the duty before
any other can be named to perform it, I am of opinion, that
according to the true construction of the contract, notice must
be given by the Postmaster-General to every person then in-
terested in the concern before he make any new appointment.
It is extremely important that they should have notice. In
the first place, there is a confidence required in
the general business of the concern; they are naturally
to account for the expenses and for the receipts of the general
concern, and they have an obvious interest therefore in the
individual to be appointed. There is another reason still more
important, the Postmaster-General, by the terms of the contract,
it appears, has a right to pay to the person so newly introduced
the whole sum that is due to all the other partners in the con-
cern. Every partner having thus a most material interest in
the introduction of each new partner, I am of opinion that
there can be no such new partner introduced without notice
to all the others who are interested. But though no new
partner may be introduced without notice to the others, there
may be in this case, as in every other, a waver, on the part
of the other partners, of the objection which they were
legally entitled to take, and therefore the next consideration
in the case is, whether there has really been such a waver of
the objection, that due notice had not been given. No waver
of that objection is attributed to Mr. Cox. The moment
h e was informed that Lovegrove claimed to be a partner,
he repudiated him as such, and persevered in his
objection, until the end of the concern. But it
is said that Cox making this objection, Lovegrove had
been introduced by the authority given under the contract
to the Postmaster-General. If I had found evidence
that he had been so aware, I should have thought
he had imposed on him the duty of immediately noti.
fying to the Postmaster-General that he was himself
ready to undertake the work which had thus been con-
fided to Lovegrove. Ido not find, however, that such
was the fact. On these grounds it does not appear to
me that Lovegrove stands here in any relation which entitles
him to an account against Mr. Cox. I must therefore dismiss
the bill, with costs.

Since the last election for East Somerset no
less than sixty parishes in this division have been virtually
disfranchises!, through non•publication of the list of voters.
—Bristol Journal.