The Sun.
London, England, 1833-06-01 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, JUNE 1, 1833.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF LORDS, MAY 31.

The Marquis of WESTMINSTER presented several
petitions, for the total abolition of slavery, from Cheshire.
The Duke of WELLINGTON presented a petition
from Birmingham, against the Game Act. The peti-
tioners stated that poaching had increased threefold since
the passing of the Act. He himself knew it to be the
fact. He hid kept up his preserves because he did not
wish to discharge servants, who could get no employment
elsewhere.

The Marquis of WESTMINSTER had no doubt that
where preserves had been kept to a considerable extent,
poaching had increased, and it was a temptation
to idle persons, but for himself, in that part of the country
with which he was connected, poaching had decreased.
The Earl of NIALMESBURY said that he agreed with
the Noble Duke that the Act had been productive
of evil. It had affected the gun-making trade, and deprived
gentlemen of their innocent and praiseworthy sport, and
given rise to the further extension of poaching. 'What-
ever alteration might be made in the Act, he must be un-
derstood as not wishing to return to the former state of
things.
Lord SEAGRAVE said, that as long as the present
liw remained in force, it would be impossible not only to
check poaching, but to preserve a single head of game,
un'e.s upon the largest estates.
The Duke si RICHMOND defended the Act, and said
that he did not bell, ve that poaching had increased, and
the principal intention of the Bill was to erase from our
statute book laws of great injustice, as the former laws
were, which allowed only the Nobility to enjoy the plea-
sure of eating pheasants, hares, &c. As to the distress
which it was said the gun-makers were undergoing from
the Act, he thought it was unfair, but if they com-
plained of not being able to sell their guns, let them
lower their present exorbitant prices.

the first and main principle is the convertibility of the
paper circulation issued by the Bank. It is only nn
this principle that there is any value in paper
as a medium of circulation ; and every departure
from this principle of convertibility must have the
worst effects on every interest, whether commercial, ma.
nufacturing, or agricultural. In the consideration, there-
fore, of the present subject, this principle the House
must keep constantly in view. Sir, the next point is
to secure the solvency of the Bank, which issues this cir-
culating medium. The importance, I apprehend, of these
two points, Sir, will not require from me any armament.
The great majority of this House are impressed with the
importance of the convertibility of a paper circulation,
and no one can doubt the great necessity, also, that
there is, that the solvency of the Bank should be secured.
But there is another part of this question which is scarcely
of 1-es importance to the interests of and prosperity of the
country than the solvency of the B ,nk, and that is the se-
curity which should be taken against undue fluctuations in
the amount of that currency, because, although the
ruin is immediate and inevitable, arising from the
insolvency of the Bank, the ruin is scarcely less
inevitable, which would take place from the undue fluctu-
ations in the amount of its currency. It destroys all corn,
menial confidence, and although it may encourage great
speculation, its only effect would be to bring destruction
on those who engage in it.--(Hear, hear.) It
is impossible, however, in any circulating paper medium,
►hat it should he altogether free from fluctuation.
only reasonable object which every Government can
think to obtain in regulating the circulating medium, is to
consider the means of having that circulation to fluctuate as
little as possible. The want of circulation must depend
on the demands of the country ; but in case of any in-
crease in the circulat ng medium, so as to produce a de-
pression of it, the only sure remedy that can be ap-
plied to that, is the effect of the foreign exchange
on the country.--(Hear, hear.) As long as you have
complete convertibility into bullion, the foreign exchange
will always rectify any excess in the calculation. It is
most de•irahle that in any arrangement that should take
place, little inrerruption should be given to the effect of
the for.ign exchange on the currency of the country.
Any endeavour to interfere with the export of bullion
from the country can only have a mischievous ten-
dency.—(Hear, hear.) Now, the quotation which the
House will . have to decide will tie, in what manner,
for the future, the source which supplies the paper currency
shall be regulated? At present it is perfectly well known
that the Bank of England, possessing at it does
the monopoly of the circulation, is the body on
which the whole of the circulation of the country must

turn. Whenever the foreign exchange has lien effected
so as to make it the interest of persons to send bullion
abroad, the circulation here has always been effected.
The first question, then, for the House to decide will be,
whether it is most desirable that the management of the
circulating medium of the country should he conducted
by a single body of b inhere, or whether it shall
be by a competition of different b inkers ? It ap-
pears to me, in looking at this question, that there
are advantages undoubtedly to be derived in favour
of both systems, and we must consider what is the case
as relates to both systems. In the competition of different
hankers it must be the interest of the bankers, assuming
their security as to solvency, to issue as much paper
circulation as is passible. They o ill circulate check
upon check ; and I imagine it to be perfectly clear, that
no one of those bankers will be able to issue
more than their due proportion, and if there be a state of
things in which competition exists, and if there be a
great demand, it will be in the power of each to increase
the circulation, so as that each individual franker
shall have not more than his due proportion. When,
in consequence of the depreciation of the currency, a
fall of credit takes place by a failure in the exchanges,
this company, looking to their ow❑ interests as compared
with the other hanks, will be obliged to contract their
issues. This is the point we ought to guard against, for
there would be considerable danger in such a competition.
Another point, OR which a B ink, having the control of a
large part of the circulation of the country, is of advan.
tage, is the assurance, that in times of distress it can give
relief to the commerce of the country. On those
occasions the exchanges turn in favour of this country.
There is no objection in those case+ for the Bank to in-
crease their circulation, but if you have several banks,
none of them would dare to come forward in competition
with their rivals. In all I have said, I have assumed
that the principles on which a single hank is conducted are
sound and good principles ; that the single bank does not
make undue profits, but looks to foreign exchanges, and
does not keep down the circulation by artificial means, but
looks to circumstances and the state of the country for the
purpose of regulating the amount of its issues. The inte-
rest of a single bank must be to keep as large an amount
of notes in circulation as it can do, and therefore it was
undoubtedly placing a great power in one body of indivi-
duals, having an interest certainly to abuse that power ;
it was placing in a particular body of individuals a very
great power. Ido not state that either the competition
of different banks, or intrusting the power to a single
bank, are utterly unobjectionable, but we must look at
the comparison of objections and die comparison of ad-
vantages on one side and on the other, and if we can find
such a check on a single bank a+ I have stated, I think it is
of advantage that you should confine the power to a
single bank rather than to a great many. Very
diff,rent modes have been taken into consideration,
to endeavour to effact this check and control over a
single bank. I have spoken of one bank of istiu.
without saying whether it should be under the control of
Government or not. It certainly is a ques ion, whether
it should be put under a body not legally responsible, or
whether it should be under the control of Government; and,
on the other hand, whether the profits should be held
by Government, or by a private company.—(Bear,
hear, hear.) The only advantage I have been able
to discover in a Government bank is, that instead of the
profits going io the one case to a private company, they
would go to the public revenue.—(Hear, hear, Lear.)
But I think these advantages are mole than counter-
balanced by the praetic a evils of the measure.—(Hear.)
The attempt, Sir, on the part of the Government, would
he attended with impracticability and extreme impolicy.
If that assistance hitherto given by means of the Bank of
England was once in the power of the Govern-
ment, if, in periods of distress and difficulty, such enormous
power was given to the Guyer nment, it would be almost
destructive to the institutions of the country. 1 think, Sir.
we ought to throw aside any question of establishing a
Government Bank. Then, Sir, another check has been men-
tioned, and has been very touch urged on some occasion•,
thatnet is, that private corporations should he the bank-
ing companies that ought to have the management of these
thing, and that the Government should have a control
over the management of their affairs. That, Sir, would
not be a vets, effectual mode of proceeding, as it
would he liable to objections to a certain extent ; and I
don't know the advantage that would result in having the
opinion of his M .jesty's Ministers on such matters. Then
I must say, if we look to the best expetience which we
have of the case in which the Bank have been supposed to
have mismanaged their property, if we look to the year,
1797, 1822, and 1825—without now meaning to give any
opinion whatever• as to the conduct of the Bank—whether
they have acted right or wrong—there is no doubt that great
objections have been made to their conduct on those occasions;
but think, Sir, no mm should be prepared to say, that
a those instances the Government were not cognizant of
heir conduct, and were as much to blame as the Bank.

—(Hear, hear, hear.) Sir, I don't think that the
control of the Government over the Bank would be
productive of such advantage as to make it desirable to
tastitwe such provisions. The only check, Sir, to which
the attention of the public has been directed, and the
only one in my opinion likely to be efficient, is the
publication of the accounts of the Bank. Such a check
,sou d, as appears to roe, be productive of the best conse-
quences.—(Hear, hear, and cheers.) Toe principles
on which the Bank have manag, d their concerns for the
last five or six years have been stated fairly to the public.
The grounds on which they have adopted that management
have been spin oved, and f believe in reason may be fairly so,
vis., the keeping of one third of bullion in comparison with
their liabilities, the non-enforcement of a circulation by
artificial means, and, as the bullion was taken out of
the country, the withdrawing of their circulating medium,
and increasing it as the bullion returned.—(Hear.)
By this means we shall prevent sudden changes from
at once affecting the circulation, and when circum-
stances which cannot be prevented unavoidably occur,
they will be made to act upon the country gradually.
We have experience also of what has been the effect of
this mode of management on the part of the Bank,
during a period of considerable difiSeulty, for the lions;

( PRICE 713.)

is aware that the exchanges were against this ceun ry
from August, 1830, till the beginning of 1832. I)urit g
the whole of that time there was a drain of gold going 0,,

from the country amounting on the whole 1070,000.0001.
I do not mean to say that this period was notone of considerable
pressure and distresi—a pressure produced in a great
degree by that drain, but still there was no such con-
vulsion as we have witnessed in former times. By
allotikenz the effect of a drain of gold to act
gradu.dly on the country; instead of endeavouring
to counteract it, we shall he able to avert any sudden

.bock, till th. exchanges turn in our favour—(Hear)—
when the circulation is again increased, as in the

beginning of 1832, and Cu accumulated in th-

Bank. The publicity which we propose to give to the
accounts at the Bank will enable the public to
judge whether the Rink will continue to act on this

principle, or not. It may be said that the Bank
Directors are not legally responsible for their conduct,
and that there is no punishment which can be
inflicted on them, in case of their departure from the

principle I have deseribed —(Hear,• hear.) But all
must, ►n the present day, admit that the responsibility
of all men to public opinion is so great, as tc exercise
a considerable control over their actions.--(Hear,

hear, heir.) And certainly the Bank Ditectors, moving
in the rank they do, will be subject to the influence of this
responsibility to a greater extent than they would be made
responsible by any provision we could devise. I am,
therefore, prepared to propose the continuation of a single
Balk of issue in the metropolis, subject to the control I
have stated. Even if we were for the first time instituting
a b mking system, I should think this the most advan-
tageous phn we emild adopt ; hat under existing circum-
.tanees, it ha. an additional and known advantage, and that
is, th st it effects the least change that c,sn be adopted,
and unless we can see a great benefit to result from mak

ing a change in our monetary system, nothing could be ,
more foolish than making such a change. —(Hear.
hear, hear.) My proposition is, then, that the Bank ,
of England should continue to have the monopoly
of the circulation of the metropolis, and I propose to con-
tinue it in that monopoly by the same means as have been
hitherto employed,that is, not allowing any banking comp fly
having more than six partners, to issue paper at less than
65 miles from the metropolis. Ido not place much stress
on the distance, but as the Bank Directors have a
strong desire that the distance should remain as at present
fixed, and as I do not think the public will lose by it, I
ant ready to yield to that desire. The next point to which
I intend to call the attention of the C mmittee, is the
duration of the new Charter to be granted to the Bank
I certainly think it desirable that the Government
of the country should not be tied up to this plan
for too long a period ; but, at the same time,
I am aware that the question should not be un -
la:Tess:6ly set afloat at too early a period. I propose,
therefore, that the Charter shall be continued to the
Bank of Engl old for twenty-one years, subject, how-
ever, to this condition, that if, at the end of ten years,
it shall seem fit to Government to give notice to the Bank
of England to that effect, the charter may expire at the
end of one year from that notice. I have already attended
to the next point, which is the publication of the
accounts. I propose, that the Bank should transmit,
every week to the Treasury, an account of the
bullion and securities it holds on the one band, and of the
paper and deposits on the other. At the end of every
quarter, an average of the amount of each alma be struck
and published in the Gazette in the succeeding quarter.
I do not propose a publication of the accounts rendered
weekly to the Treasury, because a temporary drain upon
the Bank will give a false impression to the public of
what the state of the Bank accounts is. The quarterly
averages, however, will afford a proof to the public, that
the Bank continues the system of management it ought.
I come now to a point upon which I feel there
will be some, and perhaps considerable, difference
of opinion in the House. I have stated that it is most
desirable that no interference should take place to prevent
a drain of gold out of the country, when the exchanges are
against us. This is necessary, in order that the currency
may lie left to regulate itself in a proper manner. But
an internal dr .in on the Bank for specie stands on a
different footing. I think it any thing but desirable to
give any encouragement or unnecessary facility to an
internal drain for gold. I have said that the convertibility
of the paper of the Bank of England into bullion
is essential to a sound principle—(Hear)—but hav-
ing secured the publicity of the Bank accounts,
and given every security to the public which can be de-
vised—if others can be found I shall be happy to consider
of them—l do not think there is any danger in giving to
the Bank of England paper every advantage consistent
with the principle I have mentioned. It is, therefore,
my intention to propose that Bank of England paper
should be a legal tender except to the Bank and its
branches.—(Hear.) Gentlemen may fear that this will
produce a depreciation of the Bank paper ; but as far as I
have been able to consider the subject, looking to the
rapid means of communication which exist in the
country, and how easy it would be to send in the paper
to the Bank, I do not think that such an effect
can take place.—(Hear, hear.) Certainly the risk
does not outweigh the advantages we shall derive from
the arrangement. In ordinary times Ido not be-
lieve it will have any effect the one way or the
other, but in case of a panic its advantages to
tothe counterbalance
plan
.:
thatm us ti
tb
we considerable.tilait(leth erdriAnc veo'uhtegr
olodt.rjecitintoi,,
perfectly well known, I grant, that paper and bullion of the
same denomination cannot circulate together, but we do not
propose to circulate notes of a lower denomination than Si.,
awl I do not think they will have the effect of driving out
the sovereigns. Another objection, and I admit it would
be a valid one, if well founded, is, that the measure
will have the effect of making banks in the country
less careful in the management of their haws,
the effects of a run upon them being by this means
rendered less detrimental. I cannot believe that such mill
he the effect of the plan, and certainly the risk of it
doer: not counterbalance the advantage of securing
hanks against any other drains for specie than that
produced by the effect of the foreign exchanges.
I believe it is admitted, but it certainly must be the case,

that at the period at which any bank expects
to have a run made upon it, it Fovides itself with
all the means of meeting such a run to the
utmost extent its resources will admit of. Therefore,
when a lon is going on, the country banker■ call
upon the Bank of England, not merely for
the amount of bullion which may be absolutely necessary
to meet the run, but in order to guard themselves, they
call upon t. em for a much larger amount. There-
fore, the effect of any one Bank bring established,
is to make a much larger internal trade than is re-
quired ; if, therefore, we can secure the constant
convertibility of the Bank of England paper, and by
that means prevent its depression, I think the balance
is very greatly in favour of the establishment of
one body for the regulation of the circulating medium.
Now, the next proposition of alteration which I shall have
to submit to the Committee, will affect not merely

the Bank of England, but all b inking establishments,
and be, I think, most advantageous to the commerce of the
country. It is most desirable that the B dik of England
should, when they wish to diminish the amount of dia
count, be able to check that by other means
than tbey have at present. They have at present the
means of raising the interest of discount, but the time is
cot long past when the interest of discount being higher
than the legal interest of money, there was no other means
of the Bank checking it, than by refusing to discount.
I propose, therefore, an alteration, to a certain extent, in
the provisions of the usury laws. I propose that all bills not
having more than three months to run should be exemptid
from the usury laws.—(Lout cheers.) Gentlemen who
have been long Members of this House know very well
that I have never been a strong friend or supporter of the
usury laws.—(Hear, bear.) I supported a motion of
an Honourable Gentleman, not now a Member of
this House, at one time, for the repeal of the
objections,usury 'tw s
not( laws—(Hear)—but
reasonable,but I
buktnoswtrong there aregrea
to t
objections
the entire abolition of these laws. (Hear, hear,
hear.) I do not think the class of persons who
make the greatest objection to the repeal of the 'Hwy
laws, feel objection so strongly with respect to bills of
exchange.—(Hear, bear.) That portion of the capital
of the country which is usually laid out upon mortgage, I
believe, is not very likely to be employed in the discounting
of bills, therefore I do not think it will materially inter-
fere with 'Loney usually so advanced. However it mty
ultimately interfere, at the present time it can have
no effect, inasmuch as the iatereet of money just
now, is not more than half the amount of legal in
terest.—(Hear, bear.) But it se very desirable. when it