The Sun.
London, England, 1856-04-29 00:00:00

FALL OF KARS.

Mr. WHITESIDE then, in a full house, rose to move
the following resolution :
" That, while this house feels it to be its duty to express
its admiration of the gallantry of the Turkish soldiery, and
of the devotion of the British officers at the Siege of Kars, it
feels it to be equally a duty to express its conviction that the
capitulation of that fortress, and the surrender of the army
which defended it, thereby endangering the safety of the
Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, were in a great measure owing
to the wient of foresight and energy on the part of her Ma-
jesty's Administration."

The hon. and learned gentleman spoke as follows :
I claim, sir, the indulgence of the house while I endea-
your to prove that the resolution which I have risen to
propose ought to be affirmed by its members. I have but
slender claims upon the notice of those hon. gentlemen
whom I address, but it is my hope that, owing to the
importance and the magnitude of the subject with which
I am about to deal, I shall receive that consideration
and attention which under other circumstances I mil-Flit
not be entitled to expect. From inquiry into the fall of
Kars, and into the circumstances and the policy which
led to that event, it would be impossible to escape, and if
in the prosecution of that inquiry it should be found ne-
cessary to comment upon the political conduct or cha-
racter of public men, that duty, however disagreeable,
must be performed, if to dkcbarge it be essential-to the
interests of the country. (Hear, hear.) The hon. gentle-
man who opened our proceedings this present session of
Parliament alluded in an eloquent and graceful speech
to the position of that minister who by a glorious peace
should terminate a glorious war. He said, and with
some truth, that a minister so fortunate might well be
contented to repose upon his laurels. I accept the
sentiment, but I fear I must disturb the delusion which
seeks to apply it to the circumstances of our day. Mine
must to-night be a gioomy retrospect. I have to call
the attention of my hearers to a splendid opportunity
lost, I fear, for ever ; to the sacrifices of a gallant army;
to the abandonment of the bravest of our countrymen ;
to the military triumph of Russia ; and to the disap-
pointment of the fond hopes of the nation. The attitude
exhibited by Parliament during the last few months
must, I apprehend, have produced a feeling of respect
among the states of Europe for representative govern.
ment. Calm, dignified, forbearing, Parliament has ab-
stained from observation upon questions of the deepest
political importance, when to debate or to make COM-
ment upon them appeared to be prejudicial to the inte-
rests of the public. (Hear.) That forbearance must
not, however, be confounded with indolence or with
apathy. This house can be alive and active in the per-
formance of its duties and in the assertion of its autho-
rity when a suitable time for the exercise of its high
functions has arrived. That time has now come. I can
conceive no responsibility more awful than that which
devolves upon a minister of the Crown who undertakes
to advise his Sovereign to embark upon that which may
be a bloody and a protracted war. No great war ever
left a nation in the same position in which it found her ;
and the advantages, therefore, expected to be derived
from its prosecution ought to be proportionate to the sa-
crifice and to the loss which it must inevitably entail.
(Hear.) I can conceive a minister consulted upon this
question revolving in his mind the answer which he should
give to his Royarmistress. I can conceive that minister
retiring into his closet, glancing over the history of
Russia—passing in review the provinces which she has
annexed, the kingdoms which she has incorporated, the
nations she has conquered. I can then conceive him
turning his eye--the eye of a statesman—upon the map
of Russia in the East, and rising from its contemplation
with a feeling of consternation and amazement—of con-
sternation at the result, of amazement at the infatuated
policy by which that result was brought about. I can
further conceive that Minister (arriving at a clear and
satisfactory conclusion that it was his duty to his Sove-
reign to advise her—under God's blessing—to grapple
with an enemy to whose aggression submission would be
dangerous. The question which I am about to lay before
the house cannot be commenced at once by an immediate
reference to the blue book upon the table. There are
arguments historic, political, and geographical, all tend-
ing to prove that if war broke out between Russia and
Turkey it would become the paramount duty of a Mi-
nister who was alive to the responsibility of his position
to assist at the right time, and with the right means, a
Power which in reality was supporting English interests.
About 30 years ago an experienced officer of the country
published a tract called "England, Russia, and Persia."
The object of the judicious author of that tract was to
prove the interest which each of those states possessed
in relation to the others, and to establish that which
ought to be the true policy of England in reference to
Perks, anti in oPPoiti" t 9 929 designs Qf Russia, e

advocates no aggressive policy, but he says it was the
first duty of England, by the aid of judicious counsels
and by the employment of judicious agents, to attach
Persia to her interests—to develore her resources, to
strengthen her army, and so to obtain an, influence
over her Government by the adoption of wise
measures that might constitute her a formidable barrier
against the aggression of Russia in the East. The
Whigs adopted that view, and the memorable expedi-
tion to Affghanistan was justified upon the principle
which it involves. Acting upon that principle, Sir John
Cam Hobhouse—whose scholarship I have often had
reason to admire, and who was well acquainted with the
affairs of the East—went the length of contending that if
Russia sought to obtain influence in Persia and to secure
Herat—a city of great importance from its position in
Central Asia—this country would be justified, with a
view to the protection of India, in declaring war against
the Czar. Sir J. C. Hobhouse makes some further ob-
servations upon the subject, which I shall read to the
house :--

" The intervention which I particularly allude to was
the intervention on the part of the representatives of the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which was totally incompatible
with the very safety of India. Count Simonich advised the
advance upon Herat. Hoe. gentlemen are now so familiar
with the importance of that city and state from its posi-
tion in Central Asia, that it is unnecessary for me to dwel
o❑ it. This, however, I must state, that the best autho
rities had laid it down as an indisputable fact, that that
city and its immediate dependencies are the most import.
ant of all the cities and states of Central Asia, and that
the master of Herat is in a position, both in reference to
Persia and to the Affghan States, to hold the balance, if
ho has any considerable power, between the parties wh•
might contend for empire much further, and with much
greater proximity to India. But Count Simonich did
not confine himself to giving advice. At the very time
that the British minister, in consequence of instruction
from Lord Palmerston, retired after fruitless endeavours
to prevail upon the Shah to relinquish his intentions,
Count Simonich remained in the neighbourhood, and ac-
tually, it might be said, superintended the siege, and an
officer of distinction who had been in the Russian service
assisted at the siege, and I think I recollect, was killed
there. But it did not stop there. The intervention of
Russia did not stop with the mere appearance of the Rus-
sian ambassador at the siege of Herat. Forsooth a treaty
was entered into—it will be found in the papers before the
house- by which in the most summary way the lawful
Sovereign of Herat (the real representative of the ancient
dynasty) was to be dethroned, and his dominions were
given to one of the princes of Candahar, a brother of Dost
Hahomed. By that treaty an entire change was to occur
in the whole of that important part of Central Asia ; and
who does the House of Commons think was the guarantee
of that treaty? No less a person than the Russian am-
bassador, and I hold a proof of it in my hand."
That was a very strong argument to maintain in this
house, but still he justified a sanguinary war upon that
ground. lam now going to quote a letter, which was
not in the published papers, but which is completely
confirmatory of these opinions. It is a letter which was
sent to me by Lord Auckland, and which Sir A. Burnes,
after his retirement from Cabuol, wrote to Sir W.
111`Naghten, no unf rtunate but not undistinguished
countryman of my own. It is in these terms :-

" Jan. 3, 1835.
"It is clear thar the British Government cannot, with
any credit or justice to itself, permit the present state of
affairs in Cabool to continue. The counteraction applied
must, however, extend beyond Dost Maimed Khan, and
to both Persia and Russia. A demand of explanation
from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would, I conceive, be
met. by an evasive answer, and gain for us no credit; be-
sides the policy of Russia is now fairly developed, and re-
quires no explanation, for it explains itself, since that Go-
vernment is clearly resolved upon using the influence she
possesses in Persia (which is as great there as what O„
British command in India) to extend her power eastws.„rd.
It had better, therefore, be assumed at once that sued are
her plans, and remonstrate accordingly."
Now no political writer I have been able to cons Litt, and
no experienced officer of the Government, has, ever yet
argued that you could consider this questi ot, with
re-
ference to Persia or to Asiatic Turkey akrae. Their in-
terests are not merely incidentally but sii..bstantially con-
nected, and all the authorities upon t'ae subject argue
with irresistible force that the past history of Russia
shows that when she wishes to mal".e war on Persia she
leaves Turkey at peace, and that when she wishes to
make war on Turkey she leaves Persia at peace, because
the combination of both migh's be inconvenient to her in
the execution of her plans.. The noble lord opposite
knows better than I do w' eat passed after the peace of
1314. A promise had b,een given by Russia to restore
the territory she had trskea from Persia ; and Lord Cath-
cart endeavoured at 'St. Petersburg to obtain the fulfil-
ment of that promis.e. But Russia evaded the obliga-
tion on the gr ound that she never restored
what she had one,e obtained. She afterwards said to Per-
sia that the Arr .xes would form a convenient boundary
between her and that state, and insisted that it
should be adopted. I heard an hon. gentleman a few
nights ago ask the noble lord at the head of the Govern-
ment wh'sther he had taken any means to have the road
completed between Trebizond and Bayazid, for the pur-
P'',6 'of promoting the interests of commerce in that re-
gio-4. If the hon. gentleman who put that question will
rrin his eye along the map from Trebizond to Erzeroum,
and from Erzeroum to Bayazid, and from Bayazid to-
wards Persia, he will find he will arrive at the town of
Hoe, which is the entrance for our manufactures into
Persia. The road employed for purposes of commerce
runs through that town. There is no fort between it and
the Caspian Sea ; but there is one a little above it at
Abarrabard, where Russia has placed a strong fort. That
tort is the same distance from line that Kars is from
Gumri—namely, about 23 miles. The constant policy
of Russia in that quarter of the world has been that after
she has made war upon another state she exacts an in•
demnity at its termination, and if the indemnity cannot
be paid she lakes a province as a "material guarantee"
for the fulfilment of the engagement. In fact, she obtains
a mortgage which she intends to foreclose, leaving the
mortgagor no equity of redemption. But her position
now is that she holds the fortress of Abarrabard, within
23 miles of Hoe, and that whenever she pleases she can
extinguish your trade by seizing on the town of Hoe.
That was the state of things at the outbreak cf th• war in
1853. Now a word with respect to the condition of
Asiatic Turkey. It is not. necessary to remind the
house of the territory which Russia has already seized in
Asiatic Turkey. It is a principle of ,her policy, never
lost sight of or forgotten, that the vital strength of Tur-
key consists in her Asiatic provinces, and that, there-
, fere, whenever a war begins between her and Turkey she
must strike at that Asiatic territory. That is a funda-
mental principle of Russian policy. But there is a
geographical consideration in the case, and a very serious
one. What is the route of Russian power as against the
Eastern empire of England, against Persia, and against
Asiatic Tin key ? It is Georgia. But how can she get
to Georgia ? She gets across the steppes of Southern
Russia, passing along a causeway constructed by the
Euapress Catherine; and the defiles which her troops
have to traverse iu that quarter are commanded by hos-
tile tribes. ller great difficulty, therefore, has ever
been to maintain a sufficient force in Georgia to enable
her to carry out her designs against Persia and Turkey.
The consequence was that the late Emperor Alexander
d. Glared Ise had no object of aggression, that he had
already too much territory, and that be on'y wanted to
concentrate the power ho had already acquired. He
looked about him and saw on the Black Sea', PLO,
Anapa, and the river Rion. They suited his purpose
and he took them. From their neighbourhood a road
passes on to Georgia, and thus Russia obtains an en-
trance to that province which she could otherwise
oaiy enter by the perilous passes of the Caucasus.
These are facts- which cannot be disputed, and to
which any British Minister must at the cutbreak of
the war have directed his attention. I believe
there is no more interesting or instructive study
in connection with this question than that of the
campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1328-9. Military
men have written volumes upon that subject, and base
expatiated at great length on the consummate ability
with which Russia has worked out her plans in that re-
gion. They tell us how Prince Paskiewitch seized on
the strongholds of Asiatic Turkey in a shorter time than
had ever before been known, and conquered one fortress
after another until he was left in a difficulty as to whe-
ther he should march from Erzeroum on Constantinople,
or whether he should, as the Emperor, it is said, in-
tended, conquer all the vast countries stretching towards
the Persian Gulf. Those provinces he ultimately left
untouched, in consequence of the apprehended oppo-
sition of England to their seizure. It has been asked
why Prince Paskiewitch. did not march on Trebizond ;
and the question is important on account of some
astounding revelations contained in this blue book.
lie had instructions to march en that city ; and
why did he not do so with his victorious army ?
The reason why he did not do so was that he
found the road to Trebizond almost impracticable for
artillery. I am not aware whether any doubt has
been cast on the authenticity of that singular docu-
ment known as the will of Peter the Great. lam not
n a condition to say whether or not it be genuine ;

but it is at least a remarkable circumstance that the

author of that document bequeaths to the successors of
Peter, as a policy never to be forgotten, that Russia
was to march towards the East ; that she was to
overthrow Persia; to conquer Turkey; and then, it
was added, that the power which ruled at Constantinople
must govern the world. All these facts were patent to
the English ministry, who had to consider, when the
war broke out between Russia and Turkey, what course
they should advise her Majesty to pursue. I forgot to
state that the lieutenant of Prince Paskiewitch, in that
famous campaign, was an officer known by the name of
Mouravieff, and Russia, knowing how to put the right
man in the right place, placed him at the head of her
army in the same quarter at the outbreak of the
late war, leaving him to accomplish the work which
Prince Paskiewitch bad left undone. (Hear, hear.)
I do not feel it necessary to enter, upon this occasion,
into any. review of the origin of the war. I will
adopt upon that subject the views of the statesmen who
first embarked in it, and treat it as essentially a de-
fensive war—a war undertaken for the purpose of main-
taining the independence and integrity of Turkey.
What was our policy at the commencement of the war
in the year 1853? A French gentleman said to me last
autumn—" I so admire the book of your Seymour; it
is so droll." However this might be, there was vie
thing in these despatches which was not droll. The Rus-
sian Minister bad said to Sir H. Seymour that it would be
impossible to settle with Turkey till she had been set-
tled with by a defeat. To this the reply was, a reply
which he (Mr. Whiteside) could not admire—that
as long as the ends required were attained, it did
not matter about the means. This was au answer
he could not reconcile with justice or policy.
What had been the condition of Turkey in 1829 ?
Her troops were disorganised, her spirits broken,
her people dispirited. In 1853, on the contrary, the
people were enthusiastic, the name of Mahomet was in-
voked, the people threw money into the Treasury, and
the universal feeling among the Turks was, that it was
better to negotiate with Russia on the Pruth than on the
Danube. England had interposed and prevented this—
it might have been right for her to do so, but it then be-
cam° the bouudea dalof geglauci to, geist;l2er ally in