The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-09 00:00:00

Spirit of the Public Journals.

Mit. COBDEN'S PEACE P.A.MPHLET.
( From, the Times of this day.)
Everybody knows that Mr. Cobden has many
strong points. He can argue, he can declaim, he
can sophisticate a plain question, and apparently.
resolve a difficult one by sliding dexterously ov
its tender places, and he has a faculty of throwing
in observations which prejudice the cause he dia-
putes without tendering any distinct or tangible
issue. But one faculty Mr. Cobden undoubtedly
does not possess. He is an orator, but he is no
prophet. Whether it be from a defect of imagi-
nation, from the impossibility
.he labours under of
stating, a case more fairly to himself than ha does
to the public, or from what other cause, wa know
not, but Mr. Cobden is assuredly, of all men, the
least prescient, and, even if we were to allow him
to be right as to the present, the least able to form
sound opinions concerning thefuturo. When, there-
fore, we received a pamphlet with the rather arro-
gant title, " What Next and Next t" implying that
its gifted author can see the immediate future, and,
taking his stand on that future, as if it were already
present, can also unfold to us the events that are
to arise out of events that have not yet arisen, the
last name we should expect to see subscribed to
such a high effort of the prophetic faculty is that of
Richard Cobden. Even as Liston believed himself
to be a misunderstood tragedian, and Tetrarch de-
spised his Italian verses, which everybody reads,
and trusted his immortality to his Latin poems,
which nobody can endure, so does Mr. Cobden
come forth to show us the things that are to be
hereafter. What, then, is next, and what is next
tcs that t We are to attack Nicholaieff, and it is
graaated that we may take it ; Perekop will
be _invested, the forts of the Danube attacked,
Odessa occupied, every place within fifty miles
of the Black Sea may, Mr. Cobden thinks,
fall into the hands of the allies —we may
inarch to Tiflis, drive the Russians from Georgia
and their Transcaucasian provinces ;—" This is
the next,"—the paulo-post-futurunt of the advo-
cate of peace, and a very pretty prospect too. Most
people will think such a future worth many toils
and many sacrifices, and Russia has but little
reason to exult in the destiny which her advocate
and her prophet foresees for her. For our part,
we wish that Mr. Cobden had not made these pre-
dictions, for we have a thorough confidence that
what he foretells will never come to pass, and be-
gin to despair of the fortune of the country so
soon as he takes it under his patronage.
Now comes the grand problem. Granted all
these circumstances, what will Russia do " She
will never submit," says Mr. Cobden, " because we
cannot capture her capital"—a bad argument
enough, for the fate of Napoleon warns us that the
captare of the capital is not alone sufficient to
bring her to terms ; and, secondly, because it is
not in our power to put upon her a pressure by
destroying her commerce and cutting off the sources
.of her revenue. This argument Mr. Cobden ex-
pounds at great length. Russia is a Protectionist
country, and it is edifying to see the old leader
of the Anti-Corn Law League arguing that the
Protectionist policy of Russia has indicted upon her
commercial isolation, and thus made her indepen-
dent of foreign trade in time of war. We congra-
tulate Lord Derby on the possession of such a con-
vert, and rejoice that the cause of free trade no
longer stands in need of such defence as Mr.
Cobden's pacific notions can allow him to give it.
Then Russia has a large internal trade and an
overland commerce with Asia, which no block-
ading squadron can reach—forced, indeed, and
unnatural, but on that account, as it now seems
to the advocate of unrestricted commerce, the
more sure and reliable in time of pressure. Then
comes Mr. Gladstone's topic—the patriotism of
Russia, and the ardour with which her religion
inspires a naturally peaceful people in the cause
of armed aggression and territorial annexation.
But Russia has another safeguard equally strong,
and, to-our mind, still more paradoxical. Russia
is excessively poor, and therefore not formidable
as an aggressive Power ; but she can raise every-
thing in kind from her own territories, and there-
fore is still able to support a protracted struggle.
Here, then, is the sum of Mr. Cobden's argument :
Russia is Protectionist, forces her trade into a
wrong channel ; her people are ignorant, nn war-
like, and fanatical ; her revenues are scanty, and
her only resource is the robbing her people of those
raw materials for which she cannot pay, and from
these elements of strength we are to conclude that
no amount of pressure put upon her by the allies
will induce her to come to such terms as are pro-
posed to her by Austria, whose pacific tendencies
Mr. Cobden at one time could not too much ad-
mire. Had she been highly commercial, with a
flourishing trade, an intelligent, warlike, and en-
lightened people, an increasing revenue, and large
accumulated capital, would not the proposition
have been easier of proof ? It matters not to Mr.
Cobden—he could have demonstrated it by one
contrary, but, as he has not got that, he is equally
able to demonstrate it by the other.
His view of the power of the allies presents the
exact complement of the paradox. The allies are
wealthy, and therefore cannot afford to spend
money ; their people are well off, and therefore
will not fight ; have large commercial interests,
and therefore cannot afford to risk them ; have rea-
lised the advantages of manufactures and commerce,
and therefore are better off than if, as at the be-
ginning of the last war, they were only going to
realise them ; and, although a paper currency will
enable Russia indefinitely to prolong the struggle,
England and France can neither forego this expe-
dient nor have recourse to it without certain ruin.
Thus, in war, wealth is poverty and poverty is
wealth. False principles of government are
stronger and better than true. Slavery is more
powerful than freedom, superstition than en-
lightenment, and, in a word, barbarism than civili-
sation.

Having finished prophesying, Mr. Cobden betakes
himself to practical admonition, and tells us what
he will do if we will only be wise enough to place
our destinies in his prudent and consistent hands.
First, we will withdraw every soldier from Russian
ground. The reason given is cogent to a pacific,
but scarcely persuasive to a magnanimous mind.
We can now bring them away with safety, but it
may not always be so. It may not indeed. Let
us run away for fear of danger, and then, what-
ever becomes of our credit, we shall, at any rate,
save our lives. Secondly, as to the terms of peace.
The solution is simple. We are to have no terms
at all. If we ask terms Russia won't grant them ;
if she grant them she won't keep them. Why, then,
ask for terms ? Difficulties vanish at every step.
We have disbanded our army, sent our negotiators
about their business, and are now confronting
Russia, with her half-million of soldiers without
attempting to make either peace or war. The atti-
tude is novel and dignified. Thirdly, by nay of
bringing the matter to a speedy and satisfactory
conclusion, we should plunge into German politics,
and try and persuade Austria and. Prussia, " who
are too wise and selfish" (convertible terms, in Mr.
Cobden's opinion) " to fight now," that Germany
had better make a league to resist the encroach-
ments of Russia for the future. This, together
with our assurance that we do not intend to fight
ourselves, having found the operations more un-
pleasant than we expected, will, no doubt, rouse
the German nation to vigorous and united action,
and strike a terror into the councils of Russia which
the capture " of part of Sebastopol " has failed to
inspire. If we fail in this mission, as even Mr.
Cobden admits that we may, we must reconsider
our Views—conclude, on the authority of Russian-
ised Germany, that our alarm was unfounded, and
repent in sackcloth and ashes for having doubted
the good intentions of the Czar. Then follows an act
of penance. The United States keep no ships of war
of their own, and naturally do not like our keeping
any. We must please them at any price; and, h tlion,
it would be degrading to Russia to reduce a single
ship at the bidding of a foreign State, such a course
would be both honourable and expedient to Eng-
and.

This, then, is Mr. Cobden's advice :—Withdraw
your army, disarm your fleet, try to bring Ger-
many over to your opinion, and, if you cannot do
that, adopt hers ; but, whatever you do, leave the
Russian army and the Russian fleet intact, demand
no terms from Russia, but leave Turkey, Sweden,
and Norway to her vengeance, and spin cottons
and calicoes until the inevitable hour shall arrive
when by a pacific triumph—for a nation that has
done this can never draw the sword again—the
Greek cross shall flaunt from the dome of St. Paul's,
and a Picture of the Trinity be worshipped by our
"lightened conquerors in the Cathedral of West-
minster.

(Prom the Daily
News of this day.)
Of course soniethinu must
Cobden's Pamphlet, he said about Mr.
because it is Mr. Cobden's.
Had it been anonymous,
no one would have deemed
it worthy of a remark--no one would have taken
the trouble to toil through its forty-
eight closely
printed pages of irrelevant statistics, self-contradic-
tions, and conclusions which have nothing to do
with their premises: But as Mr. Cobden's name
is on the title-page people will talk about it, and
will ins:st upon being told what others think of it.
We will attempt to describe it. More we cannot
pretend to do. It is one of those rambling, inco-
herent, misty productions, which convince nobody,
and yet cannot be answered, because they present
nothing tangible to lay hold of.
Mr. Cobden begins by declaring that he will
leave out of view altogether the objects of the wai,.
" In the following remaks all allusion to the ori-
ginal cause of the war with Russia has been stu-