The Sun.
London, England, 1851-04-11 00:00:00

Tberf
diture on account of them had been 645,213/. ,1
fore, in 1845-7 the mileary force in these colostee
or
exceeded b 3 4,374 men the force which had beep
sidered sufficient in 1835, and that excess ho!litoi
this country about 300 000/. Last year the
force in thee) colonies had been about the same as bo
been in 1846 7. He understood that it was sciess.,°lo,
less this year. Why had the military force in the die
nies been augmented? It had been first atignienhajos
consequence of the rebellion in Canada That re-0004
had been occasioned by Colonial.office misevern
ed
arid the people of this country had been very Justly
2.000,000/. fez- it. The result of that rebellioa7e,
been that the North American colonies had obtaiee,Oe,
sponsible government, and in fact at the presee7e,
inent they possessed the almost uncontrolled insvea
mint of their local affairs, and enjoyed in some re_sPei,b,
a greater amount of selfaeovernment than the nstk
bouring sates of the American Union. Be
credit that he thought Lord Grey dessrved great eniet
wise and judicious conduct with regard to these et"tte
especially fur his determination to surrender 4 tie
Legislature o' CAnada the power of dealing n'`i,el
clergy reserves. It was said that it was neceiosiii
to maintain tro ps in the North Accerieststin° loch
for the purpose of preventieg annexadon. 11800
tended that there was no dancer of annelbeto
unless the majority of the colonies were
it, and it such were their desire it would be fo otser
t-eapt to prevent it by force, which ctuld have n° ova
effect than to prolong a bitter and disastrous 00010
But there was no isnineoiate danger of such tina'veeeo
long as the wise and prudent policy of Earl LT, c'e'e fro
pursued. Again, the necessity of a military of"e"ddell
insisted on to guard against the possibility of 6" 00
attack from the United States. But what 1" egetlo
amount of the regular military force maintained "„loeti
United States? Last year he believed 10,000:0
alone were maintained to protect the whole of °epe
territories of that power, extending from the 51.60 p
rence to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atl,a°,
favouentoo
the Pacific. But under a wise and prudent riot'
eheerillene colonists themselves would willingly and
sist such an aggression were it attempted. It wseie)ile
times said that Quebec and Halifax were irnporniSsoted.
teary posts, and therefore required to be well gale, fa
Admitting this, he thought that 3,500 might 0000
the North American colonies, by which a Tee
might be efF.eted to the amount of 400,0001. los
He now came to the West Indies, where °erse!
sixteen colonies, for the protection of which 6,2610 t',oool'
were employed in 1846-7, at a cost of 4'efe
a year to this country, an amount equal t°oo,
sixths of our exports to them, and to six-sevset
their local revenue. For what were these treef rja
quired? He could understand their necessity
I,u.ticisol
the existence of slavery; but the same argument 7,000
exist now. If the force was preserved for the Piothe
of preserving peace and tranquillity, according 100
argument which he had used, these were strictly or!
objects, and ought to be defrayed by the local Pitser
ments, for most of them possessed representative ,fa
tutioes. But were there any Imperial puiree.?ll
which troops might be required in the West Inch; te
was argued, with respect to the West Indies as whited
gard to the North American colonies, that in 4400
force was required to guard against sudden' aggrrbd°
from the United States; but to this his reply vieol'oelli
same as with reference to the latter colonies-en ode'
that there would be no danger, unless the inhabiin'tiol
sired separation; and if they did so, it would b° or°
to resist them by force of arms. Even supposing
politic to adopt such a course, as most of these cm" bOO
were islands, the best mode of defending them w,912'7,0
naval force; and as no reduction had been made Lei':
force, there was no fear of aggression against th°,-edoe'
Dies from any quarter. But it was said that Bar,.-es,
was an important naval station, and that there ve,etieorl
important stations in Jamaica, and that Imperis' "4001
ought, therefore, to be maintained there for reirP°a"tiPl
Imperial policy. But even here he thought n ;00
might be effected of 250,000/. a-year. He nowns-10°
the Australian colonies, from which he excepted d
Diemen's Land, which was still a convict colonel, °with'
which England was, consequently, bound to PaY,‘,oo,,
out attempting to form an estimate as to what Ou'of
the expense incurred for troops in that colony hen WS
observe, that in determining that question try" ee'
ought to be borne in mind—first, that we hadjuil
it representative institutions—and secondly, tm
,80
the
vast majority of its inhabitants were opposed 'll to/
transportation of convicts to their shores, vehiceol
would probably resist as soon as they bad the We," gr o'
—(Hear, hear.) In 1846 and 1847 the istnn",„"ecer
troops in Australia was 2,236 ; since then the g'4lo
part had been withdrawn, and he was exceedinelfdeter
to find that the Government had intimated their 0101
urination that no troops should be kept in these deel
nies at the expense of the mother country, excePr "ijee
which might be required for a guard in tell
bourne and Sydney. In a dispatch withhst 1/1
retina to New Zealand, Lord Grey observed teeniso
the earlier days of British colonisation the c°l;pre
were left to depend, in a far greater degree than °dill°
sent, ueou their own exertions. The inhabitant! "00
present United States were left with exceedingly 0104
assistance from the mother country to defend th°°)e.Bl)o°
against the numerous warlike tribes of Indians Vest .
they were surrounded. That was precisely w'',3 idea
wished to see established. He should like to se,toB
colonies dependent on their own exertions, at tatiee oof
tune giving them representative institutions. P 01,
came to New Zealand, and he was sorry to obser'weie
unfortunately toe greater portion of the trooloe eta,
had been withdrawn from New South Wales lint'atabe't
been transferred to that colony. In 1846-7 then
wail 1,629, at a cost of 85,0004, which had been inure'
in 1848 to 2.948 men, at a cost of 150,0001. a Yell
elusive of 20,0004 or 30:000/. voted for the e'' -t,ll
poses of those colonies, an amount considerably teee
log cur expos ts there, and three or four times 650
as their local revenue. The House would be ah", ate
judge how preposterous was the number when :11
termed them that in the northern island, where 'deo°
troops were stationed, the number of adult Eurceed:.
wales not soldiers amounted only to 3,157 men; easel' lar't
ing the number of troops by only 209 men; audio be"
in New Ulster the number of military in leir
amounted to 1.798 men, and exceeded by 298 men thenetar
her of adult European males not military. For ve''' tn°
pose were those troops required? For wars viii!ebb be
natives? He would reserve the observations w"1,10 be
had to make with regard to war with natives 'no lie
arrived at the colony of the Cape of Good 11013kfiestini:
would only express his conviction that with free
thine the troops might be withdrawn from New ei
be
at least from New Munster, and the colonists we,:i teice
t
fully capable of defending themselves, and WOOO
care to keep peace with the natives. Lastly, benoe
consider the military cost of our South African 1,.
.ions. The Committee of 1834 on colonial milits'2,oo'
penditure had approved of a reduction of Wu' oiel
men, and cost in 1832 about 100,000/. Since 03°,0 01
had been a large increase both in the military for-rxe
expenditure for that colony, chiefly in conseenee
Kafir wars. In 1835 there had been a Kafir vOr'B46l'
a military expenditure of about 240,000/. Ine 16,196
there had been another Kafir war; we had had taer
regular troops in the colony, and expended eenj see
685,000/., a sum amounting to 265. in the P°°"tlioh,
our exports to that colony in 1849, and equal West 1:
times its local revenue. The last Kafir war
i; eget;
2,000,0004 The present Kafir war seemed to be
ti"
more formidable than the last, and, thereic"o'beu
likely to cost a still larger sum of money. 11,f,
to call the most serious attention of the 11°-",;ar
the subject of the present Kafir war, for it ill08"ne.:(
and confirmed all the positions which he bad
os
vosired to maintain; and its outbreak had been "eetiv
0
the chief reasons which had induced him to giv° 70titel
of the resolution which ho should propose to the idito
There were three important questions with regard
First, who would have to pay for it? Secondly, wr Asie.
to it, and who was to blame for it? and, thirdly'
steps should be taken to relieve this country as sPe,eoo,,`
as possible from any expense on account of similar „Or
With rag :rd to the first question—if the principlen,-,3
he had Lid down were correct, we were not entiti'don
throw the whole burden of the present Kafir war oet°
the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but were bonobie
bear a very considerate,- portion of it, because the 'ee
bitant of the Cape of Good Hope did not possess reithe
sentetive institutions, but were governed directly bribes
Colonial-office, and the relations with the Katie ''delf
had been conducted by Sir H. Smith, and very strslolo
too. Secondly, we were not entitled to throw the tboei
expense of this war upon the colony of the Cape of
joie
Hope, because it had broken out in British Neff
which was no part or portion of the colony
oeveirneet:
Cape of Good Hope, but a separate province g
by Sir Harry Smith, under a commission separate Irool
that under which he was governor of the Cape of esOf
Hope. He then asked what had been the cause
that war, and who was to blame for it? The Pltoi
lately presented to the House clearly proved one °fig 0+
things—either that Sir H. Smith was very ignersk
the state of British Kafraria, and of the feelings his
Kafirs, or that the outbreak had been produced bldell'
mismanagement. In every one of the dispatchear Ibis'
vered to lisn. Members at the commencement 00
session,ll
Sir H. Smith described in glowing lan.a 011
" the unprecedented state of tranquillity" Of -131e0131°!
Kafraris. He consoled Lord Grey for the faiinfoocu
his attempt to transport convicts to the Cape °ftbilif
Hope by the gratifying intelligence that " ever/. ut
progressed most satisfactorily on the eastern fr°llPott
this colony; that the Kafir police was most use- 0
frontier depredations were almost unknown; t",,-.4111,
are overcoming withcraft"—(A laugh)—and thtrule.
Kalifs were contented and happy under the Brillesnd
the
Lord Grey was delighted at that intelligence, so
sden'
Noble Lord declared that he had no doubt of the v' 010'
•
of Sir Harry's arrangements and of their beneficial to
~00cet
Thus relying on the statement of the Colenh,l'onsten
they had begun this session under the happy " disc":
dint British Kafraria was a sort of terrestrial parflo, that
that our eastern trentier, was safe—and, above ,ilarefore,
our pockets were Bare front Kafir inroads, and tm-nbee'
that we might enjoy a squabble amongst ourselves "tao'r
the disposal of a surplus revenue. Alas! all was midi
changed. The wise arrangements of Sir Sari"' was ti
were upset, the frontier system of Lord Greg l vie,'
failure, tho zusegunie auticipations of tee Nohl°.'hilsei
disappointed, the Elysium of British Kafrarin beieg
come a Tartarus, our pockets were in the at end the
picked, our surplus revenue was disposed et; CDC!!
Gdonial-office—no longer exulting, but at its Wit tell
—came crying to Parliament for a Committee, t_.°led 10
what to do. What were the causes which had le
this sad change? He thought they Intght ~,ropCol32
underoon
the tlharnede
ofh etandes
afifirrsst,; encroachments u" teP.
of Sir Harry Smith, approved of by
and which consisted in a perpetual and irritating l'e_t7Siag
rence with the affairs of the Kafirs, and in an nye: their
attempt to subvert the influence and authority o',.
sir
8.
chiefs. Thirdly, the complete ignorance of
Cooo
Smith, and the coat equent ignorance of the cs to
office, of the feelings of the Kafirs with regesst
Sir Harry and his proceedings. Now,- first, afro thethe frontage
Colonial- 0
diqiutes between Europeans and ;lair() tribes:PlP"