The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-14 00:00:00

LONDON, MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 1856.

It is positively stated that the reply from
Russia, transmitted throhgh Count STA.CKELBERC,
to the Austrian Propositions is of an evasive
character, probably intended to lead to new and
protracted negotiations. She does not, it is said,
altogether reject the conditions offered, but-there
are portions thereof to which she has given a de-
cided negative. The first point objected to re-
lates to the rectification of her frontier with Tur-
key in Europe, by which she should. surrender a
portion of her Bessarabian territory, commencing
in the vicinity of Chotym, and following the line
of mountains which extend in a south-easterly
Ellrection, and concluding at Lake Sasik. The
territory thus ceded would, of course, form a plr-
tion of the Danubian Principalities, now occupied
by Austria, and respecting which new questions
may be ventilated before the troops of FRANCIS
JOSEPH evacuate the position in which they have
hitherto exercised despotic power, ruling with a
rod of iron. Not even to conciliate Austria, how-
ever, will Russiayield the slightest portion of her for-
mer acquisitionP, no matter how recently or unfairly
obtained. Although she nominally assents to the
freedom of the Danube and its mouths, she
seems resolved to maintain her place as one of the
river/alp!, or river-bordering states, so that she
may always retain a pretext for interference. It
is almost unnecessary to say how completely the
value of the paper conditions would be neutralised
if such were the case, and that no " material

guarantee" were given for their observance. In
the obstinate refusal to remove the probable, in-

deed we may say the almost certain, cause of
future complications, the obstinate and (perverse
adhesion of Russia to the traditional policy may
be discerned. It is manifest that she has not
yet profited sufficiently by the painful lesson so
sharply aclrainisterr4l in the Crimea and at Kin-
burn ; and it is, therefore, doubly incumbent on
the Allies not to abate the slightest particle of the
far too moderate demands put forward through
the agency of Austria..

She has also, it is said, rejected the additional
or sth Article, which was added to the Proposi-
tions at the suggestion of the Western Powers,
and under which a stipulation against the recon-
truction of Bomarsund, or threatening demon-
strations against the Scandinavian Powers,
would be added to the compact. This is
also significant. It proves that, notwithstanding
the Treaty so recently effected with Sweden,
Russia still intends to maintain a menacing atti-
tude against her nearest neighbours on the Baltic
seaboard—a state of affairs that would render
any settlement that might be effected of a merely
temporary character, and lead to a speedy re-
newal of hostilities, under far less favourable
terms for the Maritime Powers. If Austria he
true to the professions and promises she has
made this refusal must completely break up the
arrangement. Russia must have well known that
France and England could not possibly have ac-
ceded to• any terms winch left the Bomarsund
question in abeyance. The concession of the
main points in which Austria is interested, while
there is a peremptory refusal to accede to the
very moderate and reasonable requests relating to
the Baltic side, can only be regarded as an artful
attempt to detach Austria from the side of the

Western Powers by playing on her selfish pro-
pensities,
so well known to be her weak side.
It is asserted that with these exceptions the
rest of the 'ultimatum has been accepted, some
slight modifications being introduced in the stipu-
lations respecting the neutralisation of the Black
Sea. Russia is also willing to restore to Turkey
Kars and the territory she has won in Asia during
the last campaign ; but in return she expects to
receive back the strong places and territories now
eccupied by the Allies. That is to say, Sebastopol
is to be given back to Russia, ready to be again
converted at a brief notice into " a standing
menace" to Constantinople and Europe. Kin-
bourn, too, the entrance to Nicolaieff, and Kher-
son, should also be surrendered ; so that Russia
could, without infringing any of the conditions,
construct a formidable war navy, ready to enter
at any moment the commercial Euxine, where
it would be completely irresistible in copse-
' quence of the absence of any competing force.
Enpatoria and Kertch, the entrance to the Sea of
Azoff, should also be yielded up ; and, for all
these important concessions, Kars is considered an
ample equivalent ! Verily, modesty does not ap-
pear to be a weakness that can fairly be imputed
to the CZAR or his advisers,

How, then, will Austria act under this virtual
rejection of her proposals ? It is said that
she will remain true to her present engagements,
and will not receive the counter propositions.
Nous verrons ! Time will tell. But we must con-
fess that we cannot believe that Austria will,
under any possible combination of circumstances,
adopt a manly or straightforward course, or join
heart in hand in the noble cause in which the
Allies have for some time been engaged. She may
withdraw her ambassador from St. .Petersburg,
but that is very different from drawing the sword
and co-operating zealously and energetically with
the opponents of Russia. We have seen too
much of her dedgery and duplicity to suppose that
she will, even at the eleventh hour, change her
traditional course and adopt a generous and manly
policy.
Let not the Allied Governments then abate a
single effort or a single precaution in the futile
expectation either of a permanent and honourable
peace, or of Austrian co-operation. Should they
do so, they will only deceive themselves. Their
motto in dealing with Russia and Austria should
be " blessed are they who expect little, for they
shall not be disappointed."

It is striking to notice the reluctance of Eng-
lishmen to blame their Admirals. Unlike the
fickle anti exacting Republicans, who anticipated
our naval exploits in the waters of the Egean,
and who " cut off the heads of some to en-
courage the others," and went no doubt to a cruel
extreme, we seem reluctant, on the other hand,
to wound even the feelings of the Admirals who
have disappointed us. It may he questioned,
indeed, whether a word of direct censure would
have been heard had not Sir Cwas. NAPIER'S pen
been so much more active than his sword. Perhaps
our navy has so long been our idol that we unwil-
linglyadmit it canhave failed. We may be 'secretly
willing rather to believe that Baltic fortresses are
impregnable to marine assaults than to suppose
that our NELSONS and RODNEYS have left no suc-
cessors. Unluckily, however, Puseyism in prac-
tical matters like the command of a fleet is an
impossibility. Successors of the Apostles, endued
with all the powers of Apostles, may be created by
the magic touch Episcopal, albeit they may want
every visible mark of apostolicity. Their humble
flocks can believe their power to regenerate and par-
don us poor sinners, and the faith, says the priest,
lig enough. The Admiralty and the QUEEN herself,
however, cannot emulate the Episcopate. The
official successors of our historical Admirals have
indeed been numerous enough. The Admiralty
and the Government of the day have duly conse-
crated them to the service of England's naval
honour, but the magic powers are wanting.
Official holiness will do for those who can believe
in it; but office irr the navy is not believed to
cunfer naval genius. Works are required of
Admirals, and it is useless to appeal to faith..
We who pay the 20,000,0001. recognise successors
of DRAKE and NELSON in those only who do the
work of DRAKE and NELSON.

Like the mass of our countrymen, however, we are
slow to enter into the question of our Baltic cam-
paigns ; the deeds of our favourite Admirals were
certainly not done there. The first went out, with
hopes on the part of some of us, that his very
name would frighten Russia into a peace. Her
ships, no doubt, did fly like mice from the cat,
where it was no easy task to reach them ; but
except the episode of the semi-military business
of Bomarsund, not a single naval feat in the
Baltic added during 1854 to the fame
of the British Navy. The nation was,
no doubt, very much disappointed. It seemed

inclined, notwithstanding, to lay th© fault any-
where rather than on an Admiral ; nor can we
resist the conviction that the ability of Sir JAMES
GRAHAM could, had he wished, have provided a
very different armament for his Commander in
the Baltic. One thing is certain, that between
the Admirally alid the Admiral the hopes of the
country came to the ground, and it must be
owned that they bore the heavy fall with won-
derful elasticity.

It was universally expected that 1855 would
show. the difference between Woof) and DU3rDAS,
and their predecessors, GRAHAM and NA PIER.
There were two differences. A much larger and
more costly fleet, with some mortar-boats on the

one hand, and that between the affairs of Bomar-
sund and Sweaborg on the other. Both expedi-
tious kept our own shores in safety, and almost
destroyed the marine commerce of Russia ; but
one destroyed a great outwork of Russian ambi-
tion, and captured .1,000 priso:sers ; the other
destroyed all that was inflammable of a more
important port, leaving it, however, to
become much stronger by next spring ;
it certainly does not appear as if the far more
costly expedition of 1855 effected so much as that
of 1854. Both, however, have done next to no-
thing compared with their cost ; had we merely
kept guard at the Sound, and nothing more, it
might have paid better, especially if we had in
consequence done our naval work more thoroughly
in the Black Sea.

We do not with to enter into the debates
between Sir CHARLES NAPIER and the Times,
or to decide between the views of nume-
rous correspondents of the Press. One
thing, however, must be confessed by all impar-
tial observers, that the naval genius for the occa-
sion has not yet appeared. The courage and
the skill, too, in details of service of our naval
commanders and seamen must be undoubted. The
Russians, at least, dare not meet them, even
when allured by inferior numbers. But the one
thing has been quite wanting. Who will believe
that one of our great Admirals of former wars
would have sailed about the Baltic with two
such fleets for two summers and have done, or
attempted no more? Genius displays itself most
in novel conditions. Where routine bravery and
routine perceptions fail, the divining glance of
native genius perceives and plans what is hidden