The Sun.
London, England, 1851-12-26 00:00:00

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY'S REPLIES.

Question I.—Do you suppose it probable that Sir
John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing
his expedition, still survive, and, if so, in what
direction ?
Answer.—l am of opinion that neither Sir John
Franklin, or any portion of the expedition, can be
now alive.

Question 2.—What are your grounds for forming
that opinion ?
Answer.—First, from the fact that on leaving
Whale Fish Islands in June, 1845, the expedition
was then provisioned for three years. It was, pro-
bably, August, 1846, when they quitted Beechey
Island. Thus they had less than two years' provi-
sions left to last them up to the present time ; even
allowing that their numbers diminished, I main-
tain that no English constitution, or people habi-
tuated to civilized life, could exist so long on reduced
allowance.
Secondly, I place no reliance upon the support
they are likely to procure from the quantity of game
or animals found in those regions. The whole amount
of game procured near our winter quarters this
summer amounted to about one bird a man for the
whole expedition, although parties were sent out ex-
pressly to shoot; and bear in mind these were obtained
with some labour by people in good health. Ad-
mitting that there are birds and animals—the former
are migratory, as are most of the latter—then there
are but eight weeks out of the whole year on which
you can depend for this supply. There is nothing to
induce me to suppose that any party could kill suffi-
cient food to sustain them for the remaining ten
months. The numerous old Esquimaux settlements
met with along the south shores of the Parry group
lead me to believe that a change has taken place in
those seas, in the course of time, which, becoming
blocked up with ice for a longer period of the year,
deprived the natives of the means of living, which
caused them to emigrate eastward. I consider the

opinions of Continental travellers on this subject as
fallacious, for it does not follow that because animal
life abounds on the American continent, the same
should be found 400 or 500 miles further north. I
see no analogy between the two countries—the coast
of America and Parry group.
Thirdly, if they abandoned their ships northward
of the Parry group, in all probability their travelling
parties would have retraced their steps towards their
first winter quarters, or made for Melville Island,
where it appears there is more animal life, of which
they, of course, were quite aware from Parry's voyage.
Lastly, there are reasons to suppose they did not
prosecute the north-west passage after leaving Bee-
chey Island. We know that three of their men
(young men) died the first year, from which we may
infer they were not enjoying perfect health. It is
supposed that their preserved meats were of an inferior
quality. No records being left does not look like ad-
vancing, as Sir John Franklin and Captain Crozier—
the latter of whom has served in four expeditions—
were alive to the importance of depositing records.
Again, look at the position of Cape Riley ; they
had made little progress in the object of their voy-
age ; all their work was still before them, for I regard
that position merely as the threshold of the north-
west passage. Under these circumstances, and sup-
posing that Franklin had examined the seas beyond
Cape Walker in the fall of 1845, and by travelling
parties found this impenetrable barrier of ice across
the Wellington Channel, spoken of by Penny's expe-
dition, what other course had Franklin left but to re-
treat ? That two ships could be lost in the ice
without meeting a vestige of them afterwards is a
catastrophe I can easily conceive possible, especially if
the two ships happened to be beset close to each other.
Assuming that they did advance through the Wel-
lington Channel, and became blocked up in some in-
accessible place, my firm conviction is, that none can
now survive; for I think it impossible for the consti-
tution to endure the climate and the privations ne-
cessarily exposed to, even with a moderate allowance
of provisions for so long a period.
Question 3 —Should a further search he decided
on, what measures do you recommend for this pur-
pose, and in what direction ?

Answer.—Should another search be considered de-
sirable, I would recommend that the expedition be
composed of vessels fitted with screw-propellers, so as
to act without the encumbrance of a sailing-vessel
after reaching the ground of operations.
From the indefinite statements made with regard
to the channel seen by Mr. Penny's expedition since
his return to England, and the impression excited in
consequence on the public mind about a navigable sea
in that direction—viz., north-westward of the Wel-
lington Channel, it seems to me to require a further
examination. To accomplish this, two questions pre-
sent themselves :—" First, whether it would be re-
quisite to provide for a prolonged absence ? Secondly,
whether it would not be more desirable to arrange for
a rapid execution of this service ? In the former case
it would involve the necessity of a depot ship being
stationed at Beechey Island ; in the other, I would
be attended with one depot ship to accompany the

26, 1851

steamers as far as practicable, so as to secure her re-
turn to England the same season.

My firm conviction is, that if ever the Wellington
Channel is navigable to any considerable distance, it
must be only on an occasional open season. Should
an expedition be so favoured as to bit on such a sea-
son the year of its departure from England, we should
gain an advanced position, from whence an extensive
search would be effected i❑ the ensuing spring; ac-
cordingly I would recommend preparing an expedi-
tion for rapid movements.
I propose having two steam screw-propelling ves-
sels; they cannot have much power because you
want all the space you can gain for your crew and
provisions ; to accomplish a rate of seven knots per
hour at full speed is quite sufficient, and in my opi-
nion, their size should not exceed 500 or 600 tons,
drawing about 12 or 13 feet water. They should not
be so long as our last steamers were, and broader in
proportion, being so constructed, as far as may be
pracricable, preserving her efficiency as a steamer, to
possess all the qualities of a sailing-vessel—one that
would work quickly in narrow lanes of water in the
event of being solely dependent on the use of sails.
They ought to spread more canvas than our last
steamers, and be provided with square sails on the
mainmast. Vessels of this description would require
to use their steam less frequently than we did on the
late expedition.

To stow the same proportion of fuel, on reaching
the Arctic seas, as was effected by our last steamers, is
ample; being unencumbered with a sailing-vessel,
that quantity, or even less, would produce a greater
result in distance than before, and I am satisfied, as
before stated, be less frequently used.
As a depot-ship to carry out the ultimate supplies
for these two steamers, I would take the Assistance,
which is ready prepared for such a service ; she has
great capacity, and will stow 100 tons more than on
the last voyage. Let her have 50 working hands,
with a limited number of officers. She should ac-
company these steamers, as far as the nature of the
season would admit of, to the entrance of Lancaster
Sound, if possible. Port Dundas, which I visited,
near Cape Warrender, would be a good position to
complete up with fuel and provisions. This accom-
plished, the Assistance would return, and the steamers
proceed with the search.

The Assistance would have to carry 300 tons of
fuel, independently of the stores and provisions for
the steamers. This would be effected by removing
the warming apparatus, dispensing with unnecessary
anchors, cables, boats, &c., and all the stores which
we carried for three years' use, would in this case be
substituted for by provisions, and with only sufficient
executive officers, a large space would also be gained;
she would be quite adequate to answer this purpose.
Should it prove a very favourable season, I would
carry the depot ship as far as 13eechey Island, there
complete up, and make a depot on shore as well before
advancing.
From my experience, and looking to all previous
Arctic navigation, it is impossible to follow up any
previously defined line of operations to pursue; no two
seasons are ever alike; whoever he may be he must
be guided by circumstances ; assuming that we reach
Cape Riley (which may not be gained in all seasons
—refer to Sir John Ross's Expedition, and to the
North Star) with the two steamers, efficient in all
respects, and with leads before you up the channel,
then I should push forward while the season lasted to
gain the most advanced position for wintering in, and
with travelling parties would in all probability effect
the desired search.

But taking such a season as we met with, there
is no alteration but to winter at Beechey Island,
from whence it would also be practicable by travel-
ling (through the experience of the late expedition)
to set at rest the question respecting the channel seen
by Mr. Penny ; it may terminate in a deep gulf,
which I not unprepared for, from what I re-
marked about the tides in Wellingto❑ Channel.
Another proposition here presents itself; you find
the Wellington Channel blocked up, but all promises
well for advancing to the westward; as some people
express a wish for Banks Land to be explored, the
leader of the expedition might have authority for de-
taching one vessel in that direction.

I would not recommend advancing up the Wel-
lington Channel a second time, unless certain of your
retreat again, for it almost amounts to a certainty
that the vessels would be blocked up, as may have
been the fate of Franklin.

Having gained an advanced position to the north-
westward of the Wellington Channel in 1852, in an
open season, in all probability a succession of close
seasons will follow, leaving the expedition blocked up.
We must, therefore, be prepared to sacrifice the
ships. The spring of 1854 would, therefore, be' the
period to abandon the ships, and retreat with the
crews to Port Leopold and the depot left by the North
Star near Admiralty Inlet.
I have no faith in the theory of a Polar basin, con-
sequently my opinion is that the success of a search-
ing expedition to the north-westward of the Wel-
llington Channel depends entirely on the state of the
navigation next year. The commander of the expe-
-1 dawn should have full discretionary power, and every
one who joins must understand that their lives are to
be risked, not only with a hope to save others, but to
ascertai❑ the fate of the missing expedition.
The travelling gear should be of the most perfect
description, and in ample quantity, availing ourselves
of all the improvements recommended by myself and
the officers of the late expedition, and given in to
Captain Austin at his request; the details of all the
travelling equipments have, I believe, been all laid
before you.
Some description of light boat on runners, for car-
rying over ice, would be most desirable.
A large quantity of Bickford's fuze should be car-
ried for ice blasting. We bad to prepare all our
charges, which involved loss of time, and the occupa-
tion of two or three working hands when most re-
quired. These might be prepared by the Ordnance
of the proper weight, and stowed in cases, ready for
use and the application of the fuze. We found the
blasting most invaluable in clearing away a short
trip, and I recommend it for all future Arctic expe-
ditions.

The expedition ought not to be less efficiently
equipped than the last, which in all respects was most
complete. There was a superabundance, perhaps, of
some stores, which might be dispensed with. The
provisions and vegetables might consist of a greater
variety with great advantage ; and the salt provisions,
the beef particularly, should be cured without so
much saltpetre. Travelling boots should be prepared
before starting. Glass shades for the protection of
the eyes for all the crew should be supplied, and of the
best description.

I would recommend that no more officers than are
actually necessary be employed. The non-executives
only occupy space, require attendance, and curtail the
accommodation for the crew. It is also important that
the officers should be well versed in practical astro-
nomy, with some knowledge of surveying, sufficient
to lay down a coast line correctly. The engineers
must be ready to perform any other duty when not
navigating, or at work about their engines. It is my
decided opinion that none but naval officers should be
employed on such a service, selecting those who have
already proved themselves competent to undergo the
privations in the former expeditions, and by their
ability and dispositions adapted for such peculiar ser-
vice. More time should be allowed for fitting out the
expedition than we had; and I consider the middle or
end of May quite early enough to sail. The selection
of men is most important, and I much prefer the
" man-of-war's man." The system of having ice
quarter-masters answered admirably, and I would re-
commend the same again.
In selecting steam-vessels such as I have described,
for independent operations, it will be necessary to
provide for a larger crew and more officers ; but they
should not exceed GOO tons, and seven knots is the
utmost limit of speed required. A large steamer
should accompany the expedition to the edge of the
ice or disco.

I have thus stated my general opinion for a further
search on the basis of rapid operations, which I con-
sider, under the present circumstances, is all that is
required. As we are i❑ possession of all the details
necessary for equipping an Arctic expedition, it is
needless here to enter into them. The officer, se-
lected from former experience, will be fully compe-
tent to make his own arrangements, as was done in
the late expedition under Captain Austin ; and of
all things, let the officer in command be unfettered
from co-operation with other expeditions.
ERASMUS OMMANNEY, Captain R.N.,
Late her Majesty's ship Assistance.
London, Nov. 12, 1851.