The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-09 00:00:00

RIGHTS OF NBUT.RALS.

(Front the New York Journal of Commerce).
The liberality of the belligerents in their construction
of the restrictions imposed on neutral nations by the
precepts of public law has averted, thus far in the pre-
sent conflict, most of those embarrassing questions
which in previous wars have either threatened to bring
new parties into the contest or have laid the foundation
of future reclamations or quarrels. Both sides have
shown an eagerness to conciliate the sympathies of other
nations, and have sought to avoid grounds of dissatis-
faetion ; and, if either has provoked the just resentment
of a friendly Power, as was the case when England at-
tempted to enlist recruits for her army in the United
States, the wrong has been redressed by prompt disa-
vowal of intentional offence and unqualified assurance
against its repetition. The case was very different in
the great wars waged in the early part of the present
century, in which France and England were parties on
opposite sides, and each of whom in prosecuting hostili-
ties manifested an overbearing and insolent disregard
of the rights and defiance of the power of neutral
nations. The orders and decrees of successive French
Governments—those of the Directory, Consulate, and
Empire—resulted in depredations on our commerce
that after many years of negotiation were atoned
for by a partial indemnity of $5,000,000, paid by
France in 1836. The practical assertion of a pre-
tended right to search our ships and impress our
seamen by the cruisers of Great Britain was a still
more irritating and oppressive proceeding on the
part of that Power, and its persistent exorcise
ultimately forced us to the arbitrement of war, in
which we happily succeeded in achieving the esta-
blishment of the freedom of the seas. But the French
indemnity did not compensate the sufferers to the extent
of more than one-third of their just claims ; and a com-
plete prostration of commerce was only one of the im-
portant sacrifices that resulted upon the vindication of
our rights invaded by the greatest maritime Power of
the world. Experience admonishes us that it is better
to seek to prevent a wrong and to "avoid entrance into
~g4P.ltrillr retie!' Makrasetiqlie Amesleatigial2ipso
curred. Happily, in the conflicts that were forced
upon us we so bore ourselves that to secure henceforth
freedom from foreign molestation there is no occa
'don for manifesting the spirit of our people or the
prowess of the nation. The exercise of magnanimity
in making liberal allowances in favour of the exigencies
of either of the belligerents in the present war will not
be miscontrued into want of confidence in an ability to
maintain our own rights ; nor will prudence in the con-
duct of our foreign relations be imputed to any other
sentiment than that ennobling one which goes beyond
patriotism to comprehend philanthropy in its regard,
and seeks to reconcile the promotion of the national in-
terests with which it is primarily concerned with the re-
storation of universal harmony and the progress of
civilisation among mankind.
At the commencement of the war waging, the subject
of neutral right was one of considerable interest and
.anxiety to maritime nations throughout the world.
Apprehension, however, was speedily allayed, by the
declarations of the British and French Governments
of their determination to yield most of the con-
cessions claimed to he demanded by the expansion of
commercial interests and by the progressive humanity
of the age. These concessions essentially modified the
more restrictive provisions of public law, which had
operated with chief severity in former wars on the
transactions of trade. Russia gave a theoretical con-
sent to a still mere liberal construction of the inter-
national code. In no case was there any claim advanced
on either side, as respects neutrals, which bad not
the sanction of previous practice and of the highest
legal authority. The altered state of affairs pro-
duced by the actual pendency of war suggested pri-
vate mercantile enterprises and adventures, whose pro-
jectors, in some instances, sought to secure for them
the guarantee to be derived from a declaration of their
legality by the British Government. Day after day the
English papers published letters seeking assurance from
the Government in respect to some new point which the
change in affairs presented for solution. With a prudence
characteristic of British statesmen, a commendable re-
serve was maintained in respect to all those cases in:which
the rights of others than a party to the application, whe-
ther citizens or foreigners, might be affected by the deci-
sion. The Government replied that it was the pr.avince
of the judicial tribunals of the country to interpre t the
law in its application to such cases as were present( d for
their decision in the ordinary course of business, sand re-
fused to commit itself by assurances that the courts were
competent to overrule. The applicants were refers ed to
their private legal advisers, and told that they muse. ine nr
the risk that attends all transactions as regards thee) r con-
formity to law. The Government claimed no po o'er to
alter the public law so far as the rights of otht it par-
ties might be affected Ly its provisions, except to et large
those rights by granting privileges as against itself., It
declared a willingness to waive to a certain exten t its
own rights, or rather those controverted claims w hich
belligerents in former times had practically asserted,, to
the great injury of neutral trade ; but it did not assume
to confer upon its subjects other rights than those which.
belonged to it to bestow.
confessedly belong
wisdom and prudent anticipation of poi
sibly embarrassing consequences have not always chsi-
racterised the course of our own Government. A cease
in point occurred during Mr. Fillmore'e Administration,
when perhaps the greatest statesman that ever directed'
our counsels was at the head of the Department of
State. A great mercantile adventure was undertaken,
with the assurance given by that eminent man, to which%
his official position was supposed erroneously to attach.
peculiar weight, that the Government of Peru bad no
such property in the Chischa Islands as entitled it to
control the exportation of guano therefrom. The enter-
prise involved all the parties to it in disaster. Peru. as-
serted and maintained her exclusive right. The Govern-
ment of the United States was drawn into the presenta-
tion of a claim from which it was subsequently forced
to recede. The private citizens at whose cost the
theex
-
dition was fitted out are now asking indemnity of
Government for losses incurred in its prosecution.
glhwsoeanlsd
We attach no great practical imporeanoe trnoet:lre=ti
promulgation of an opinion by Mr. Atto
Cushing that sale of a belligerent ship to as
hold good even if effected in transit upo
which the declaration of such an opinion has to establish
so that the sale be in good faith, beyond the tendency
a precedent that inn future practice might. commit the
ntheeotlrlai
could otherwise properly avoid. The claim advanced
Government to embarrassing controversies which it
by the Attorney-General in this enmeion is at.least a
likely to arise, to test its application. Our countrymen
controverted one, and no case has arisen, or is very
are not likely to purchase Russian ships exposed to cap•
tura by French and British d' of
upon the high seas,
except at a price that, instead of establishing the good
faith of the transaction, would tend rather to show that it
was a mere evasion of the liabilities of a belligerent.
But, if such gi case should occur, its prejudieation by the
ipse dixit of the Attorney-General would in no manner
control the decision of the Court charged with jurisdic-
tion of it, while it might involve the United States' Go-
vernment in the discussion of difficult questions with
England, and, if the sale were pronounced illegal, would
inevitably expose it to the importunities for indemnity
of the party who had paid his money without securing
the purchase.

CRYSTAL PALACE, JAN. 8 (ONE SHILLING DAY).—
Admissions on payment, 831 ; ditto by season tickets,
205 total visitors, 1,036.

Spirit of the Public Journals.

MR. COBDEN'S PEACE PAMPHLET.
(From the Times of this day.)
Everybody knows that Mr. Cobden has many
strong points. He can argue, he can declaim, he
can sophisticate a plain question, and apparently
resolve a difficult one by sliding dexterously over
its tender places, and he has a faculty of throwing
in observations which prejudice the cause ho dis-
putes without tendering any distinct or tangible
issue. But one faculty Mr. Cobden undoubtedly
does not possess. .He is an orator, but he
iis no
prophet. Whether it be from a defect of magi- I
nation, from the impossibility he labours under of
stating a case more fairly to himself than he does
to the public, or from what other cause, we know
not, but Mr. Cobden is assuredly, of all men, the
least prescient, and, even if we were to allow him
to be right as to the present, the least able to form
sound opinions concerning the future. When, there-
fore, we received a pamphlet with the,i
rather arro-
gant title, " What Next and Next implying that
its gifted author can see the immediate future, and,
taking his stand on that future, as if it were already
present, can also unfold to us the events that are
to arise out of events that have not yet arisen, the
last name we should expect to see subscribed to
such a high effort of the prophetic faculty is that of
Richard Cobden. Even as Liston believed himself
to be a misunderstood tragedian, and Petrarch de-
spised his Italian verses, which everybody reads,
and trusted his immortality to his Latin poems,
which nobody can endure, so does Mr. Cobden
come forth to show us the things that are to be
hereafter. What, then, is next, and what is next
to that t We are to attack Nicholaieff, and it is
granted that we may take it ; Perekop will
be invested, the forts of the Danube attacked,
Odessa occupied, every place within fifty miles
of the Black Sea may, Mr. Cobden thinks,
fall into the hands of the allies —we may
march to Tiflis, drive the Russians from Georgia
and their Transcaucasian provinces ;—" This is
the next,"—the Paulo-postefuturum of the advo-
cate of peace, and a very pretty prospect too. Most
people will think such a future worth many toils
and many sacrifices, and Russia has but little
reason to exult in the destiny which her advocate
and her prophet foresees for her. For our part,
we wish that Mr. Cobden had not made these pre-
dictions, for we have a thorough confidence that
what he foretells will never come to pass, and be-
gin to despair of the fortune of the country so
soon as he takes it under his patronage.
Now comes the grand problem. Granted all
these circumstances, what will Russia do ? " She
will never submit," says Mr. Cobden, " because we
cannot capture her capital"—a bad argument
enough, for the fate of Napoleon warns us that the
capture of the capital is not alone sufficient to
bring her to terms ; and, secondly, because it is
not in our power to put upon her a pressure by
destroying her commerce and cutting oft the sources
of her revenue. This argument Mr. Cobden ex-
pounds at great length. Russia is a Protectionist
country, and it is edifying to see the old leader
of the Anti-Corn Law League arguing that the
Protectionist policy of Russia has inflicted upon her
commercial isolation, and thus made her indepen-
dent of foreign trade in time of war. We congra-
tulate Lord Derby on the possession of such 4 con-
vert, and rejoice that the cause of free trade no
longer stands in need of such defence as Mr.
Cobden's pacific notions can allow him to give it.
Then Russia has a large internal trade and an
overland commerce with Asia, which no block-
ading squadron can reach—forced, indeed, and
unnatural, but on that account, as it now seems
to the advocate of unrestricted commerce, the
more sure and reliable in time of pressure. Then
comes Mr. Gladstone's topic—the patriotism of
R. ussia, and the ardour with which her religion
inspires a naturally peaceful people in the cause
of armed aggression and territorial annexation.
But Russia has another safeguard equally strong,
and, to our mind, still more paradoxical. Russia
is excessively poor, and therefore not formidable
as an aggressive Power ; but she can raise every-
thing in kind from her own territories, and there-
fore is still able to support a protracted struggle.
Here, then, is the sum of Mr. Cobden's argument :
Russia is Protectionist, forces her trade into a
wrong channel ; her people are ignorant, unwar-
like, and fanatical ; her revenues are scanty, and
her only resource is the robbing her people of those
raw materials for which she cannot pay, and from
these elements of strength we are to conclude t hat
no amount of pressure put upon her by the allies
will induce her to come to such terms as are pro-
posed to her by Austria, whose pacific tendencies
Mr. Cobden at one time could not too much ad-
mire. Had she been highly commercial, with a
flourishing trade, an intelligent, warlike, and en-
lightened people, an increasing revenue, and large
accumulated capital, would not the proposition
have been easier of proof ? It matters not to Mr.
Cobden—he could have demnn tr,ted it hy
uuv, 0.1 ne nes not got filet, ne is equally
able able to demonstrate it by tho other.
His view of the power of the allies presents the
exact complement of the paradox. The allies are
wealthy, and therefore cannot afford to spend
money ; their people are well off, and therefore
will not fight ; have large commercial interests,
and therefore cannot afford to risk them ; have rea-
lised the advantages of manufactures and commerce,
and therefore are better off than if, as at the be-
ginning of the last war, they were only going to
realise them ; and, although a paper currency will
enable Russia indefinitely to prolong the struggle,
England and France can neither forego this expe-
dient nor hare recourse to it without certain ruin.
Thus, in war, wealth is poverty and poverty is
wealth. False principles of government are
stronger and better than true. Slavery is more
powerful than freedom, superstition than en-
lightenment, and, in a word, barbarism than civili-
sation.
Having finished prophesying, Mr. Cobden betakes
himself to practical admonition, and tells us what
he will do if we will only be wise enough to place
our destinies in his prudent and consistent hands.
First, we will withdraw every soldier from Russian
ground. The reason given is cogent to a pacific,
but scarcely persuasive to a magnanimous mind.
We can now bring them away with safety, but it
may not always be so. It may not indeed. Let
us run away for fear of danger, and then, what-
ever becomes of our credit, we shall, at any rate,
save our lives. Secondly, as to the terms of peace.
The solution is simple. We are to have no terms
a t all. If we ask terms Russia won't grant them ;
if she grant them she won't keep them. Why, then,
ask for terms l Difficulties vanish at every step.
We have disbanded our army, sent our negotiators
about their business, and are now confronting
Russia, with her half-million of soldiers without
attempting to make either peace or war. The atti-
tude is novel and dignified. Thirdly, by eay (5f
bringing the matter to a speedy and satisfactory
conclusion, we should plunge into German politics,
and try and persuade Austria and Prussia, " who
are too wise and selfish" (convertible terms, in Mr.
Cobden's opinion) " to fight now," that Germany
had better make a league to resist the encroach-
ments of Russia for the future. Tins, together
with our assurance that we do not intend to fight
ourselves, having found the operations more un-
pleasant than we expected, will, no doubt, rouse
the German nation to vigorous and united action,
and strike a terror into the councils of Russia which
the capture "of part of Sebastopol " has failed to
inspire. If we fail in this mission, as even Mr.
Cobden admits that we may, we must reconsider
our views—conclude, on the authority of Russian-
Iced Germany, that our alarm was unfounded, and
. repent in sackcloth and ashes for having doubted
the good intentions of the Czar. Then follows an act
of penance. The United States keep no ships of war
of their own, and naturallv laonm)tlik our keeping
4 any. We must pleasethematc
RussiaY price; and,though
it would be degrading to
State,
a single
ship at the bidding of a foreign such. a course
would be both honourable ad. expedient to Eng-
and.

This, then, is Mr. Cobden's advice :—Withdraw
your army, disarm your fleet, try to bring Ger-
many over to your opinion, and, if you cannot do
that, adopt hers ; but, whatever you do, leave the
Russian army and the Russian fleet intact, demand
no terms from Russia, but leave Turkey, Sweden,
and Norway to her vengeance, acid spin cottons
And calicoes until the inevitable hour shall arrive
when by a pacific triumph—for a nation that has
done this can never draw the sword again—the
Greek cross shall flaunt from the dome of St. Paul's,
and a picture of the Trinity be worshipped by our
enlightened conquerors in the Cathedral of West-
minster.

(Front the Daily News of this day.)
Of course something must be C
said about Mr.
Cobden's Pamphlet, because itis Mr. ohdeice.,
Had it been anonymous, no one would have deemed
it worthy of a remark—no one would have taken
tho trouble to toil through its forty-eight closely
printed pages of irrelevant Statistics, self-contradic-
tions, and conclusions which have nothing to do
with their premises. But as Mr. Cobden's name
is on the title-page people will talk about it, and
will ins:st upen being told what others think of it.
We will attempt to describe it. More we cannot
pretend to do. It is one of those rambling, inco-
herent, misty productions, which convince nobody,
and yet cannot be answered, because they present
nothing tangible to lay hold of.
Mr. Cobden begins by declaring that he will
leave out of view altogether the objects of the war.
" In the following remake all allusion to the ori-
ginal cause of the war with Russia has been stu-

odiously avoided, and I therefore venture to hope
that the most strenuous supporters of the war and
-the most ardent advocates of peace may meet on
common ground to discuss the probabilities of the
future." It would certainly be convenient for Mr.
Cobden if he could persuade the supporters of the
-war to agree to this proposal. His aim is to show
-that to coerce Russia is a difficult and dangerous
-undertaking. This nobody denies ; though few
-Think it quite so difficult and dangerous as Mr.
Cobden professes to do. Now the only valid rea-
:son men can have for engaging in any dangerous
or difficult enterprise is the importance of the ob-
jects sought to be attained. When Mr. Cobden,
therefore, invites the supporters of the war to leave
-its objects out of consideration, he coolly invites
them to take part in a one-sided debate, in which
he shall be at liberty to bring forward all his argu-
ments and they shall not be allowed to state theirs.
With singular inconsequence, Mr. Cobden, after
declaring that ho will leave out of view the objects
of the war, proceeds to declare in the very next
page that " the war entered into by France and
England must be carried on without intermission
until peace is concluded with Turkey." This axiom
he follows up by what is meant to be a demonstra-
tion that France and England cannot compel Rus-
sia to make peace with Turkey. What is this but
to argue that the war ought to be abandoned be-
cause its object is unattainable ? And this is what
Mr. Cobden calls " studiously avoiding all allusion
to the original cause of the war." The attempt to
demonstrate that the object of the war is unattain-
able is quite worthy of this flagrant inconsistency.
Mr. Cobden maintains that Russia cannot be com-
pelled to come to terms, unless by the occupation
of its metropolis or the blockade of its ports. Its
metropolis, he maintains, is unassailable, because
" the example and fate of Napoleon will for ever
forbid an invasion of the interior of Russia," and
" Petersburg stands twenty miles above Cronstadt,
on a shallow river." The blockade of its ports,
Mr. Cobden declares, will be perfectly inefficient,
because the protectionist policy of Russia has ren-
t dered it independent of sea-borne commerce. Be-
fore making this assertion Mr. Cobden ought to
have taken the trouble to inquire what proportion
the Customs duties of Russia bear to the whole
revenue of the empire, and what proportion the
Customs duties levied in the ports bear to the whole
revenue derived from Customs duties. On this point
he maintains a prudent silence. It is not without
a reason that he shirks this important part of the
question. He assumes that Russia can protract the
struggle indefinitely, because it grows more than
1 enough of food to provision its armies. He ]eaves
out of view, that even in Russia money must be
paid for munitions of war, for the transport of sol-
diers and military stores, and for other purposes ;
and that to this end the Government must have
money as well as corn and beeves.
In the dozen pages which Mr. Cobden devotes to
a dissertation on the Protectionist policy of Russia
and its internal trade—which might not be alto-
gether valueless in a discussion on commercial
policy, but which is rendered inapplicable to the
question of war or peace by the suppressions we
nave pointed out—a passage occurs too character-
istic to be passed over without notice. Alluding to
some writers who have published remarks on Russia,
he says, sneeringly;—" These gentlemen have, I
doubt not, travelled longer and further in Russia
than myself. My only advantage has been, that I
had possibly an eye and ear more open to the com-
mercial movements and the economical resources
of the country." Mr. Cobden likes to put down an
antagonist, when debating about any foreign coun-
try, by declaring he has seen it with his own eyes.
In this he reminds us of a Scotch humourist of our
acquaintance, who on the strength of his having
once crossed the Tweed, and spent half-an-hour in
England, took upon him to lay down the law on
all questions regarding English pronunciation.
What our deceased friend did in jest Mr. Cobden
is continually doing in dead earnest. He has visited
several foreign countries, lout has not resided in
any one long enough to know it from personal ob-
servation. His flying visit to Russia was comical
enough. He does not speak or understand one word
of the language. His departure from Berlin was
telegraphed to St. Petersburg. He was taken
possession of at the frontier by a Government
official appointed to receive him ; and passed
from the hands of one official to another, like a
bale of goods, till he left the country. He saw
nothing but what they were pleased he should see;
everything he was told was interpreted to him by
them. He spent one forenoon at the fair of Nishnei-
Novgorod, and remained in each of the other places
he visited a corresponding length of time. He
proceeded straight from the Prussian frontier to
Moscow and Nishnei-Novgorod, and thence to St.
Petersburg. In short, he saw as much of Russia,
and had as good opportunities of making observa-
tions while in it, as Lord Ma.cartney and his suite
enjoyed in China on their mission to Pekin. And
on the strength of this he presumes to pass off his
plentiful lack of knowledge on the public as irre-
frNfr2lNitrinext proceeds to descant on the pa-
triotism and love of country of the Russians, and
the finances of Russia. He scarcely makes an as-
sertion that is not contradicted by well-known
facts, or by himself in some subsequent page, or
that does not rest upon confessedly unreliable
evidence. " There is no greater delusion in the
world than that which attributes to the Russian
people a desire to overrun and occupy, like the
Goths and Huns, any part of Western Europe."
To what, then, are we to attribute the annexation
of Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland and Bessa-
rabia to the empire ?—to what the repeated attempts
to seize on Wallachia and Moldavia?—to what the
machinations which had in view the annexation of
Hungary ? " The Russian," he says again, " pos-
sesses in an eminent degree the organ to which
phrenologists have given the name of ' adhesive-
ness.' He is passionately wedded to his village
home." Yet in another page we find him asserting,
" There is no other country, with the exception of
the United States, where the inhabitants will un-
dertake such long journeys by road or river as in
Russia." Again ; " With the exception of the dis-
position to encroach upon neighbouring Mahometan
countries" such as Finland, the Baltic provinces,
and Poland], " the people feel no interest iu fo-
reign politics, and the intervention in the affairs
of Europe excites no sympathy in Russia. On
the contrary, I found among the ' old Russian
party' at Moscow a spirit of hostility to the in-
cessant interference of the Czar in the politics of
the West. In fact, the foreign policy of the late
reign was very much the offspring of the personal
character of Nicholas." Wherein did the foreign
policy of the reign of Nicholas differ from that of
the reigns of Peter 1., Catherine 11., and Alexander
I.? Were not the ministers of these monarchs
Menschikoffs, Orloffs' and Potemkins ? What is
the foreign policy of the reign of Alexander II.?
This last question Mr. Cobden has himself answered.
" There is not a fact or conjecture respecting the
finances of France that has not been passed in re-
view at St. Petersburg, where everything con-
nected with the resources of the Allies in men and
nts,ney is as well known as in Paris or London."
Could this information be obtained without the
aid of a permanently organised system of local
espionage ? And does the maintenance of such a
eystem look like a want of interest in the politics
of Western Europe ? As an illustration of Mr.
Cobden's estimate of the value of his own authori-
ties, take the following :—" I subjoin a detailed
account of the income and expenditure of the Rus-
sian Government, which I obtained at St. Peters-
burg. The accounts are of old date, and for various
years; and although I have no reason to doubt in
the main. their correctness, yet I do not offer them
as of any statistical value." And yet he expects
his readers to accept the inferences ho draws from
these out-of-date, unreliable documents. He could
have got more recent and more trustworthy ac-
counts in von Reden ; but then he could not have
prefaced them with, " I obtained them at St.
Petersburg."
But we must hasten to Mr. Cobden's exposition
of " what course I should take if I were, without
reference to the oast, responsible for the policy of
the country." Mr. Cobden's scheme of a future
foreign policy for England has, indeed, no con-
ceivable connection with the previous disser-
tation, but it may be an object of curiosity as the
programme of Cobden the expectant Premier of
Great Britain.
In the first place, then, Mr. Cobden " would
seek., above all things, to withdraw every British
soldier from Russian territory." The reason lie
assn,,oi
r Itiagnyan
the
eiai
tsyls:seo—cuboetn"
dafOou
p.ru,lt,rah
:ear: ml
,ey, s s ronra yd i
snc or
ew bd i
t. e boI brought
of a peace I should attacl‘h'i
the promises of Russia. with regard
value tow htahtee
v e r ttermso
"
In the third place, he would rely
partite treaty of Austria with France
and
o En
nag l
at
rrtid-
to make Germany the bulwark of Western Europe
against Russian aggression.
In the fourth place, if he could not prevail Il° n
Austria to enter into such a treaty, be "should i
ho
-
d'sposed to reconsider his own views on the sub 1
ject, arid doubt whether he had not been led
away by au exaggerated alarm." Mr. Cobden, it
is obvious, has studied honest Dogberry to good
purpose.
Dogberry. * * * This is your charge ; you shall
comprehend all vagrorn men ; you are to bid every man
stand in the Prince's name.
2d Watch. But if 'a will not stand ?
Dogberry. Why, then take no note of him, but let
him go ; and presently cal the rest of ail watch to-
gether, and thank God you are rid of a knave.
And lastly, in the fifth place, " I would not risk
the life of an Englishman, or .4pend another f;hil-