The Sun.
London, England, 1833-04-26 00:00:00

and there was no fear that promises of that kind should
ever be brokern-e-(Hear, hear, hear.) Here they had
the final result of all this. promise-breaking and men
dacity whiels the ballot was pretended to entail upoi
us. It was purely fanciful—a Bloomy fiction of deco
or error. But let him ask, was there no promise-break
ing now, under open voting ?—( Hear, hear.) They
was scarcely a single election contest which did not exhibi
not only compulsory promise-making, but compulsory
promise-breaking in abundance: Dillit not eternally
happen that a dependant was compelled by his superior t•
break a promise which he had voluntarily made to another?
Our dictators of votes, whose exquisite ingeniousnes
shuddered at the very thought of concealment, extolled it
the skies the sanctity of a compulsory promise made t•
themselves. These very men would trample in the du-
the vo untary promises made by the voter himself.—
(Hear., Be had already shown that the ballot wool,
shut out extorted promises—he now showed them farther.
that it would shut out erorted violations of voluntary
promises, and this at least was a gain instead of a loss.
The more they looked at the subject, the less would the)
be disposed to connect secret voting with falsehood ant!
duplicity, or mien voting with truth-telling and ingenu-
ousness. Stoaking in a whisper was not synonymou,
wan lying ; much less was speaking aloud synonytnou-
with truth- telEng.—(Hear.) There were cases, ni
doubt, in which secrecy was conducive to fraud and de-
ception ; but there were also cases in which it was th
only- sure road to the truth. The same coniideratios
which made them exclude it in the former should mak:
them tenacious of it in the latter. Where a man was
called as a witness to depose to certain facts, or to relate
narrative of actual events, there it was essential tha
his testimony sh uld be delivered in public—tor it was
only by a public hearing that they could obtain th,
opportunity of confronting him with others, vviii
might have be n cognizant of the same facts, and of veri-
fying hie assertions by a comparison with the known law
of nature. But where they wanted to learn lroin a mare
not any matter of fact, hut simply his own private ju.ig
ment and opinion, of which no one aould he cognizant ex
cept himself; where, besides, he had no motive ab int,u
to deceive you, there they were much more likely to lievi
the truth by making his communication strictly confi ien-
tiel. It perpetually happened in private lie, that they
it necessary to ask tr e opinion of A or B, with respect t
the inrecrity, or the skill, or the commercial solvency of
C or D, and every man to whom this necessity nceni r•
knew well that the only way to get a perfectly frank an.
geou'ne opinion, was to put the question in strict privacy
and confidence. Now, apply these well-known maxims or
ordinary lite to the case of voting at elections. They di.
not want to learn from the voter any facts whatever. The)
simply wanted to known the state of his opinion with re-
gard to the comparasise merits of the candidates before
him. Of this opinion on one could be cognizant except
himself; and he himself had no motive, ab intra, to tell
them wrong.. If he did tell them wrong, it could b•
only by the force of sonic compulsion acting upon him
from without. What, then, was the rule which pa udenci
prescribed ? To exclude altogether all such extraneous
compulsion, to receive his opinion in strict privacy, and to
let him see plainly that he had nothing to apprehend from
disclosing to them unreservedly the state of his conscience.
This was the single and sure way to make him speak
the truth : and it became not the sagacity of legis-
lators to run away with a blind and undistinguisli
ing antipathy against secrecy, as if secrecy were in
every case subservient to mendacity and crime.—(Hear,
hear, hear.) The same gentlemen, who thundered
so loudly against secrecy, were profuse in extolling
the frankness, the ingenuousness, the manliness Di
open voting.—(Hear.) Were they really simple enough
to believe, that because the voter spoke aloud, be there-
fore of necessity spoke from his heart? He asserted, that
it was the very mischief of which he complained, that
the voter was in numberless cases constrained to speak the
opinion of another, net his own. And was there any
thing frank and manly in this compulsory voting? Was
it not in its very essence tyrannical, fraudulent, and ser•
vile? Frankness indeed there was, in some few cases,
where a dependent voter braved ejectment and ruin, be-
cause Le would not sully bis conscience with a dishonest
vote. There was frankness, indeed, combined with the
constancy of a patriot and a martyr. But how fared the
man who behaved thus nobly better or worse than others?
He suffered the full amount of injury which an offended
superior could inflict, while the complaisant or unprin-
cipled voter, who surrendered his conscience without a
murmur, swam along prosperously in all the favour and
bounty of those above him. " Look on this picture and
on that," and then say, whether open voting, instead of
being frank and ingenuous, did not operate as the severest
penalty on frankness and ingenuouness ? Whether it did
not hold out an irresistable premium to servile and dis-
honest compliance? He knew that there were some
gentlemen who objected to the ballot on a ground very
different from any which he bad hitherto touched upon.
They alleged that the elective franchise is a trust; that
every elector is responsible to the nation for the way
in which he exercises that trust, and that this respon-
sibility carries with it the necessity of publicly run-
ciiing the trust, in order that the great body of non-
electors may see whether he exercises it to their satisfac-
tion. It would, indeed, be a weighty argument, if gentle-
men could show th',2l open voting was either a security or
A benefit to the grea't mass, of non-electors. But he thought
be cou.d show them that this was not the fact, and that
the argument above stated involved a misconception of
the nature of the electoral trust. What was the real na-
ture of that trust ? Wherein did a man discharge it faith-
fully—and wherein did he fail of doing so ? It consisted
in this-sabot a man should announce his genuine and con-
scientious preference between two or more candidates at
the poll. His preference must be genuine—that is, it
must be his own, not the preference of another man ex-
pressed with his voice ; it must also be conscienti6us—
that is., not derived from any sinister temptations held out
to him individually, apart from the rest of the community.
When an elector had delivered at the poll his own genuine
and conscientious preference, he then executed his duty
fully, whether he agreed or diff red with others. One of
two things must be supposed. The general body of elec •
tors, if li-ft to themselves, aid to their own free will, will
either be disposed to execute the trust faithfully, or they
will not. Ether they have taken as a body, a piramourit
interest in good government, or they have not. If they
have, no better security was wanted for the faithful dis-
charge of their trust ; care only must be taken that they
are not either individually coerced by menaces, or indivi-
dually tempted by bribes. If they have not, they will be
found, of themselves, disposed to choose dishonestly. But,
assuming this to be the case, can they be forced to choose
honestly by merely making them choose in public? He
contended that it was totally impracticable. That which
was sought from the voter, namely, an honest exptes-
men of opinion, could never be obtained, except from his
own free will. The utmost extremity of force could not
wring it from him, if he were not disposed to give it
freely. It was a secret of his own conscience, which no
human being could fathom, and which none but himself
eoulii disclose. If an e'ector sere disposed to vote dis-
honestly, lie might do so just as easily in the face of the
fullest congregation, as in his own closet. The wisdom of
his vote might be judged by others ; the honesty of his
vote could never be. he known except to himssli. No
pqman supervision could force a man to deliver an honest
vote, if lie woull not do it of his own accord, because no
human dist-priori:int csuld ascertain whether his vote be
honest or not. Therefore would he m iintain, that so far
as reearded the attainment of honest and conscientious
voting, publicity was utterly fruitless and impotent, if they
supposed the voter to be himself dishonestly inclined.
But he should go further, and show that plitilicity of
votes, as the means toward responsibility of voters, though
impotent towards good, was most potent and effective
towards mischief. It could not convert a single voter
from dishonesty to honesty, but it made thousands of
honest voters dishonest against their inclinations. For so
rem as votes were individually known, the door was
open. 24 for tampering with voters as individuals, and each
voter became controllable by one or a few private masters,
who exercised a paramount influence over hishappiness. This
was the real, the mighty, the all subduing coutroul to which
publicity condemned the elector. Under the mask
of responsibility to the public, you fastened upon him the
base and dismal chain of private dependence. Such was
the ignominious subjection publicity entailed in one form
or another upon half the vo ere who came to the poll.
nut look once again at this pretended responsibility.
From what quarter was it to come? By wh,t parties
NV as it to be enforced? The voters (they were told) are
to be accountable to the non voters : the non-voters are to
watch over the voters, and to keep them straight in the
path of duty against the voters' own inclinations. Did
they really Imagine that the non-voters were competent
to this arduous task? Why, the only ground fort their
non-voters—the being only reason whereby they ato
excluded trim. the elective franchise—was their presumed
incapacity of forming any judgment on political subjects.
Whether this presumption were a true one or not, it was
thj
e common ground, and the only just ground, for debar-
ring them from the elective franchise. Now reasoning
upon this presumption, how Wab it possib:e to suppose
that these 'poor incapables could be qualified to exercise
surveillance over voters, to (live into the bottom of their
heal ts, and to restrain them from giving those dishou,st
votes to which tlltey were supposed to be inclined ? Why,
this was a surveillance possible only to guardian angels—
to beings of a higher stamp, like Minus or Rhivialnantbu')