The Sun.
London, England, 1834-09-02 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 18,34

- -
three kinds of libel, and award three kinds of punishment
to them severally, in such a manner that I should not be
able to put a case of an offence falling within the lowest
description of the scale, which should be more aggravated,
and require a greater punishment, than another offence
which fell within the highest description of the scale.
Would not that apply equally to cases of embezzlement
and larceny ?—And accordingly that consequence is only
avoided in cases of embezzlement and larceny by giving to
the judges a power of punishing- a person for the smaller
offence of the higher order by a month's imprisonment, or
fOr the graver offence of the lower order by transportation
Oar life, imprisoning for the felony of theft; and transporting
Air the misdemeanour of perjury.
Has not it occurred, that owing the vagueness of the
English law of libel, persons have been convicted of libel
for acts which ought not, under any good system of law, to
have been punished at all ?—Either this question relates to
d classification of the crime, with a view to apportion a dif-
ferent punishment to different classes of the crime, or it does
not ; if it relates to that, I have answered it to-day ; if it
does not relate to that, it is merely a repetition of the in-
(Wiry as to definition, and I have answered it on the former
day when I stated the difficulty of framing a definition. If
it is not meant to classify for the purpose of making a cor-
elative scale of punishment, then the only use of classifica-
tion is for the purpose of definition.
May not cases occur in which, from the want of a defini-
tion, persons that ought not to have been the subject of any
Punishment at all have been punished in particular instances
in consequence of the vague sort of feeling which has gone
abroad upon the subject of libel ?—That comes within the
answer which I gave upon the first day of my examination
as to defining libel : there is no difference between classify-
ing and defining in this sense of the word. I have no he-
sitation in saying that it would be a very great advantage if
you could so define a libel as to make it quite clear, the
moment a certain publication was laid before a court and
jury, so that they could say at once, by referring to the de-
finition, " This comes within it, or this does not come within
it." But I before stated that it would be exceedingly diffi-
cult, and I also added, and further reflection has confirmed
me in the opinion, that, practically speaking, I have not
found this to be the point in which the law of libel is defi-
cient ; that I have fonnd many other and grave defects in
it, but that this is a defect which in practice is not seen to
produce any material disadvantage. I do not remember a case
where the jury has been bewildered by not knowing the
proper definition of a libel : they have often been bewildered
by not knowing whether the thing was libel or not but that
is quit 6 another matter ; they might just as well have been
bewildered if they had had the most logical definition that
could be -devised, because still the question would be of ap-
plying the general rule to the particular case.
Is there not also under the law of England, from the ex-
treme vagueness, this great evil,—that persons have often
been convicted of libel for acts which ought not to have
been been punishable ?—My belief is, that persons have
frequently been convicted of libel who ought not to have
been convicted, but I am not of opinion that this was owing
to the want of a definition ; and I have no hope of ever
seeing any definition which would make libel a more pre-
cise and definite offence than assaults and other offences
which are defined more or less vaguely, and where yet the
vagueness of the definition is never supposed to give rise to
any injustice in practice. People talk of libel as if it were
the only thing not defined ; but I should like to know what
definition can be given of assault, or cheat, or conspiracy,
that is not vague ?
What would be your Lordship's opinion of a definition of
libel, describing it as that which tends reasonably and pro-
perly to excite and wound the feelings of living persons ?
That is liable to many observations. In the first place, the
words " reasonably or properly" would in every case give
rise to just as much discussion as the word " libel" now
does ; tnd we should feel the want of a definition of what
ought reasonably and what ought properly to give offence,
just as much as we now do of a definition of the word
" libel." But, secondly and chiefly, I do not think the
having that test would: carry You a step on your way, be-
cause you do not want a test to show what is a libel. Now,
it is impossible to say that that only is libel which reason-
ably affects the feelings of living persons, because it is pos-
sible to conceive many libels which do not affect the feelings
of living persons.
Does your Lordship think that a writer ought to be pu-
nished:Or commenting upon the public functionaries ?.—That
is, I say it with all respect, one of the most vague questions
I ever heard put. Under the description of commentary
upon tie conduct of public functionaries may come every
species of publication, the most innocent, the most laudable,
the mast doubtful, and the most wicked. A comment
upol the conduct of a public functionary may be perfectly
justifiable, but it may be the very reverse. I will put at
.once a case :—Mr. So-and-so, or Lord So-and-so, First
Lord of the Admiralty, is grievously to blame. for sending
a fine regiment of his Majesty's best soldiers to sea in an
unseaworthy ship : this shall be published, and it shall risk
a mutiny, and it shall be such a libel that the Attorney-
General shall be really compelled to prosecute it ; yet
would it come within the definition of a commentary by a
public writer upon the conduct of a public man ?
In Ttae qUestion the word " comment" was used in order
to exclude false imputation of fact ?—Comment consists of
imputation ; if it is not favourable, it means imputation, or
it means nothing. The question of false or true does not
depend upon using the word " comment ;" it depends upon
what the nature of the comment is ; but I am supposing
the case of no direct statement of fact, but saying, " What
a grievous evil, in a country like this, for our fine soldiers
to be subject to such a pernicious and cruel Administra-
tion ; here is "the Secretary at War starves the troops by
the effects of the order of such a date ; and here the First
Lord of the .Admiralty has thrown away their lives by the
contracts made with bad shipbuilders." It is impossible to
deny that this is a comment. A comment may be an im-
putation, and an imputation must be a comment. A com-
ment is a remark, and an imputation is an unfavourable re-
mark.

If a composition does not contain the imputation of a
fact which is false, should the writer be prosecuted 2—We
are not now upon the question of false or not—this has been
discussed before ; we are now upon the question of defining
a libel. If it is meant to say that no public writer shall be
prosecuted for any comment which he makes upon a public
man's public conduct, provided he imputes nothing to that
public man, I believe Sir Vicary Gibbs himself would have
agreed with this. Nobody objects to comment if it does
not impute anything. There is no definition of libel that
can be conceived that would make a comment libellous
unless it contained imputation : no public writer was ever
punished for a comment that imputed nothing ; it is for an
injurious comment. This is exactly the old mistake of
saying that libel means a little book : it does not mean a
little book ; it means a slanderous or defamatory little book.
Might not the distinction be drawn between merely ex-
pressing an unfavourable opinion of the conduct of a public
functionary, and imputing to him all kinds of bad conduct
in general terms, and imputing to him some distinct and
specific offence ?—Then that would lead to this distinction
—that you could not with impunity ascribe a specific charge
to a public officer, but that you might with perfect impu-
nity make all manner of injurious remarks, provided you
confined yourself to imputation in general terms. Now, as
one public functionary, I freely confess that I most decidedly
should prefer to be libelled in the way whiCh it is now sug-
gested ought to be punishable, rather than in the way
which it is said ought to go unpunished ; I would infinitely
rather have a specific charge brought against me than a
general vague charge, which it is impossible to meet. I
moreover consider that those vaiue charges may be as
damnatory to the character of a man as anY specific charge
that can be imagined. To say of a person that he is cor-
rupt, that he is oppressive, that he is cruel, that he his
tyrannical, that he is blood-thirsty, that he is cowardly,
that be is impotent as a minister, that his understanding is
emasculated, that he has not the nerves of an old woman,
but is as bloody-minded as a tiger—all this is vague general
abuse, and yet it is impossible to deny that it is exceedingly
injurious to the character of a person, and painful to his
feelings and those of his family. Some of these words are
such as I believe no person who holds that any specific
charge ought to be made the subject of prosecution would
deny ought to be made the subject of prosecution. Suppose
a person were to use the expressions, a scoundrelly, a cow-
ardly, incapable, blood-thirsty, villain of a minister ; I
would only ask, would much good be done to the public by
discussions carried on in that spirit, and ought it not to be
visited by punishment ?

Does your Lordship think that such expressions on the
Ministers any harm in public estimation ?—lf there is_no-
thin& else against them than this, I do not think it would
do 6them much harm : but Ministers are not the -only
public functionaries ; the same law must apply to Mini-
sters as to any other class. Take the case of the parson
of a parish, the churchwardens and overseers of the poor,
who have often a difficult duty to perform ; take the case
of excise and custom-house officers, and of the returning
officers at elections, and you will make their places too hot
to hold them, if you allow the provincial papers to abuse
them in the manner referred to. A Minister may afford to
despise them, but those persons cannot.
Would not the feelings of society protect public officers
against such language as that ?—The feelings of society at
present would protect them, but what would -be the conse-
quence to the feelings of society, if society were to be put
under a new and iron reign—namely, the reign of an un-
restrained and unlimited circulation of abuse and slander ?
Would not the feelings of society be injured, if the whole
atmosphere was impregnated with scurrility of every kind ?
At any rate, those feelings would become callous to abuse
which was daily poured forth in, all directions. How could
the judges or the other magistrates execute justice, or even
continue to sit on the,benoh, 'if every paper were allowed
to say, " That scoupdrel, Ban S,o-and-ao " Tha' iillY

ass, Justice So-and-so ." " That profligate villain, Lord
So-and-so ?" They could not stand it a week.
Does not your Lordship think that it is not right and
advantageous—to the public-that the press should have the
most perfect liberty of commenting upon the manner in
which the magistrates of a county discharge their duty ?
Certainly.

Can your Lordship fix any definition of the proper kind
of language in which those comments should be made ?—I
think that question answers itself. The question is, can I
fix any definition of the language in which editors of news-
papers shall speak of justices of the peace ? Now, that
must mean—can I lay down a dictionary of all the parti-
lar words and phrases which editors of newspapers may
safely use in discussing the character of magistrates ; how
is it possible to do so ? But, on the other hand, I have no
hesitation in saying that there ought to be the fullest dis-
cussion of the character and proceedings of magistrates. It
should be attended by the salutary fear of prosecution, if
it exceeds the limits of fair and reasonable discussion : for
instance, that its authors should not give way to gross and
general abuse. So far from saying that a line should be
drawn, to leave on the unpunished side all general attacks, and
on the punished side all specific charges, if I were to draw
a line between the two classes, I would rather draw it the
other way, and say, that they might bring any specific
charge, so it were true, but that any general and vague
abuse they should not be allowed to pour out. I do not
think even that would be a satisfactory line, but I Am quite
sure it is much better than the other.
May not the present law, which leaves it to the judge
and jury to decide what is temperate and fair discussion, be
productive of a great deal of abuse ?—lf any way could be
shown of deciding what is temperate and legitimate, I
should be glad to see it and consider it ; but I have never yet
been able to devise any. It comes back to the question of
the impossibility of defining a libel ; I certainly have seen
no definition which at all satisfied me of the possibility.
(Conclusion of the Lord Chancellor's evidence.)

THE " CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT" ACT,
TO REGULATE TRIALS AT THE OLD BAILEY,
TO TAKE EFFECT ON THE FIRST OF NOVEMBER.

PREAMBLE.

Whereas it is expedient, for the more effective and uni-
form administration of justice in criminal cases, that offences
committed in the metropolis, and certain parts adjoining
thereto, should be tried by Justices and Judges of Oyer
and Terminer and Gaol Delivery in the City of -London ;
be it therefore enacted, that the Lord Mayor of the said
City, the Lord Chancellor, all the Judges, for the time
being, of the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer,
the Chief Judge and the two other Judges in Bankruptcy,
the Judge of the Admiralty, the Dean of the Arches, the
Aldermen of the City of London, the Recorder, the Com-
mon Serjeant, the Judge of the Sheriffs' Court of the City
of London, and any person or persons who may have been
Lord Chancellor, or a Judge of the Superior Courts of
Westminster, together with such others as the King shall
from time to time appoint by a general Commission, shall
be the Judges of a Court, to be called the " Central Cri-
minal Court."
It is next enacted, that it shall be lawful for the King,
from time to time, to issue Commissions of Oyer and Ter-
miner, to try all treasons, murders, felonies, and misde-
meanors, committed within London and Middlesex, and
those parts of Essex, Kent, and Surt'ey, within the parishes
of Barking, East Ham, West Ham, Little Ilford, Low
Layton, Walthamstow, Wanstead St. Mary, Woodford and
Chingford, in Essex ; Charlton, Lee, Lewisham, Green-
wich, Woolwich, Eltham, Plumstead, St. Nicholas (Dept-
ford), that part of St. Paul, Deptford, which is within
Kent, the liberty of Kidbrook, and the hamlet of Motting-
ham, in Kent ; and the borough of Southwark, the parishes
of Battersea, Bermondsey, Camberwell, Christchurch, Clap-
ham, Lambeth, St. Mary (Newington), Rotherhithe, Strea-
tham, Barnes, Putney, that part of St. Paul, Deptford,
which is within Surrey ; Tooting Graveney, Wandsworth,
Merton, Mortlake, Kew, Richmond, Wimbledon, the Clink
Liberty, and the district of Lambeth, in Surrey ; and also
Commissions of Gaol Delivery, to deliver the gaol of New-
gate. And it shall be lawful for any two or more of the
Judges of the Central Criminal Court to try all offences
committed within the aforesaid limits, at such times and
places, in the City of London or the suburbs thereof, as
shall be appointed by the said< Commissions.
It is futher enacted, that the districts situated within the
aforesaid limits shall, in all cases tried before the said
Judge, be deemed one county for all purposes of venue,
local description, trial, judgment, and execution ; and that
in all indictments and presentments preferred before the
said Judges, the venue laid in the margin shall be " Cen-
tral Criminal Court to wit," and all offences committed in
the aforesaid limits shall be averred to have taken place
" within the jurisdiction of the said Court."
The fourth Clause enacts that the Sheriffs of London,
Middlesex, Essex, Kent, and Surrey, shall obey the Judges'
precepts, directing them to return a competent number of
persons qualified to act as Jurors ; such persons to he taken
either from London or the counties, or from both indiscri-
minately; and every Juror who may be summoned from
any part of the three counties within the limits of the Act,
to be exempt for twelve calendar months after such• service,

from attending any Jury in any Court (except the Sessions
of the Peace) to be holden for the county in which Juror
may reside.
The fifth clause enacts, for the more convenient distri-
bution of prisoners, as well before trial as after, and for
rendering more effectual the punishment of imprisonment,
it shall be lawful for the King, in Privy Council, to direct
in what prison, within the limits of the Act, any_ prisoner
shall be imprisoned and that all Judges, Justices of the
Peaee, Coroners, and other Magistrates,' acting within the
limits of the Act, shall commit all prisoners brought before
them to the gaols pointed out in the King's directions, not-
withstanding any law or custom to the contrary ; provided
that the county or place in which the offence was com-
mitted. shall be charged with the expense of maintaining the
prisoner during his imprisonment at the rate which may be
directed by his Majesty, to be paid by the Treasurer of the
county or place ; Middlesex, Westminster, and the Liberty
of the Tower of London not being liable for the support of
any prisoner apprehended in these districts and committed
to Newgate.

The sixth Clause enacts that the General Penitentiary
shall be one of the prisons in which the King may direct
prisoners to be confined.

The seventh Clause enacts that persons sentenced to im-
prisonment beyond the limits of this Act may be removed
to the said Penitentiary:
The eighth clause enacts that all regulations in the dif-
ferent Penitentiary Acts shall apply to prisoners confined
there by the authority of this Act.
The 9th clause enacts that persons convicted under this
Act may be imprisoned either in the county gaol or in
Newgate, when no Order in Council has been issued.
The 10th clause enacts that, till the King in' Council
direct in what prison offenders under the Act shall be im-
prisoned, Justices and Coroners in Essex and Kent shall
commit offenders to Newgate, and in Surrey to Horse-
monger-lane.
The 11th clause enacts that Justices and. Coroners shall
specify in the commitment that the persons charged are
committed under this Aet ; and the Sheriff of Surrey shall,
six days before the sitting of the Central Criminal Court,
cause the prisoners confined in the county gaol to be con-
veyed to Newgate.

'The 12th clause empowers the Judges to order payment
of expenses to prosecutors and witnesses ; the Treasurer of
the County, or his agent, to attend the Court to pay orders,
The 13th clause enacts that no bill of indictment shall
he presented to the Grand Jury summoned under authority
of this Act, unless the prosecutor has been bound by recog-
nizance to prosecute at the Sessions held under this Act.

The 14th clause empowers the Court of the Lord Mayor
and Aldermen of London to contract with the Justices of
Essex, Kent, and Surrey, for the support of their prisoners
in Newgate ; but if they catmot come to any agreement,
the Judges are to settle the amount.
The 15th clause enacts that the Judges of the Central
Criminal Court shall hold a Session at least twelve times in
each and every year (and oftener, if need be) ; such times
to be fixed by general orders of the said Court.
The 16th clause enacts that indictments found at the
Sessions of the Peace may be removed before the Judges
of the Central Criminal Court. _

The 17th clause enacts, " That the Justices of the Peace
for London and Westminster, the Liberty of the Tower of
London, Southwark, and the counties of Middlesex, Essex,
Kent, and Surrey, shall not at their respective General or
Quarter Sessions of the Peace, or any adjournment thereof,
try any person or persons charged with any capital offence,
or with any of the following offences committed or alleged to
be committed within the limits of this Act--that is to say,
housebr6aking, stealing above the value of M. in a dwelling-
house, horse-stealing, sheep-stealing, cattle-stealing, mali-
ciously wounding cattle, bigamy, forgery, perjury, conspiracy,
assault with intent to commit any felony, administering or
'attempting to administer poison with intent to kill or do some
grievous bodily harm, .administering drugs or other things
or doing anything with intent to cause or procure abortion,
manslaughter, destroying or damaging ships or vessels, the
breaking of shops, warehouses, counting-houses, and build-
ings within the curtilage .of, dwelling-houses, killing sheep
with intent to steal the carcases, the uttering of all forged
instruments and the various offences enumerated in the Act
passed in the first year of the reign of his present Majesty,
intituled ' An Act for reducing into one Act all such for-
geries as shall henceforth be punished with death ; and for
otherwise amending the laws relative to forgery,' forgigg
the assay marks on gold or silver plate, and all the offences
relating to coin enumerated in the Act passed in the second
year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled An Act
for consolidating and amending the
,Laws. against offences
relating to Coin,' the abduction of women, binkrupts not ,

surrendering under their commission or concealing their
effects, breaking down bridges and banks of rivers, takleea,
rewards for helping to stolen goods, personating any fie
seaman, or other persons .in order to. receive anY
gay, allowance, or prize-money due or supposed to be
or any out-pensioner of Greenwich Hospital in order !Y
receive any out-pension allowance due or supposed totobr:
due, sending threatening letters and using threats to exce
money, larceny on navigable rivers and canals, and stole!
and. destroying goods in progress of manufacture,
nies after a previous conviction, embezzlement, lareencY,lc_Y.,
clerks and servants, and receivers of stolen goods, svh
such person or persons shall be charged as principal
°
ders, or as accessories before or after the fact.
ed
The 18th clause enacts, that Avery recognizance e. „its
into before Sessions of the Peace is to be obligatorY
(j,ei
of certiorari on parties bound to appear before the Ju be
of the Central Criminal Court, and that notice le t°
given to parties of change of Court. ing
he
,19th, clause enacts, that Justices of the peace f
deliver over indictments found at Sessions to inage6°
Central Criminal Court. f r the
The 20th clause enacts, that it shall be lawful no, of
Judges of the Central Criminal Court to settle at,
and ler. _
fees and allowances for the several officers of the said Co`A).,. to
and from time to time to alter the same, as may appear
just and reasonable.
The 21st clause enacts, that the Sessions of the peace
not to be affected by the Sessions holden in pursuance -
this Act. zecei
The 22d clause authorizes the Court -to try (4-
committed on the high seas.
The 23d clause enacts that nothing in this Act obeli Pre,
judice the rights and privileges of London. tie.
The 24th enacts, that the Act shall commence and
effect from and after the 31st day of October, 1834.