The Sun.
London, England, 1833-01-11 00:00:00

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

(From the Columbian Sentinel of Dec. 14.)
PROCLAMATION. BY GENERAL JACKSON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Whereas a Convention, assembled in the State of South
Carolina, have passed an ordinance, by which they declare
'6 That the several Acts and parts of Acts of the Congress
of the United States, purporting to he laws for the im-
posing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign
commodities, and now having actual operation and effect
within the United States, and more especially two Acts,
for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828,
and on the 14th July, 1532, are unauthorised by toe Con-
stitution of the United States, and violate the true mean-
ing and intent thereof, and are null and void and no law,ncr
binding on the citizens of that State or its officers :" and
by the said Ordinance it is further declared to be unlawful
for any of the constituted authorities of the State, or of
the United States, to enforce the payment of the duties
imposed by the said Acts within the same State, and that
it is the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may
be necessary to give full effect to the said Ordinance :
And whereas, by the said Ordinance it is further or-
dained, that, in no case of law or equity, decided in the
Courts of said State, wherein shall he drawn in question
the validity of the said Ordinance, or of the Acts of the
Legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the
said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed
to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any
copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that pur-
pose ; and that any person attempting to take such appeal
shall be punished as for a contempt of Court:—
And, finally, the said Ordinance declares that the people
of South Carolina will maintain the said Ordinance at
every hazard ; and that they will consider the passage of
any Act by Congress, abolishing or closing the ports of the
said State,or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress
of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other of the
Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her
ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the
said Acts otherwise than through the Civil Tribunals of
the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance
of South Carolina in the Union ; and that the people of
the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved
from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their
political connexion with the people of the other States,
and will forthwith proceed to organise a separate Govern-
ment, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and
independent States may of right do:—
And whereas the said Ordinance prescribes to the peo-
ple of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct vio-
lation of their duty as citizens of the United States, con-
trary to the laws of their country, subversive of its
Constitution, and having for its object the destruction of
the Union—that Union which, coeval with our politics]
existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite
them than those of patriotism and a common cause, through
a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence—that
sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our
happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favour of
heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consider-
ation abroad, rarely, if ever equalled in the history of na-
tions. To preserve this bond of our political existence
from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national
honour and prosperity, and to justify the confidence any
fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson,
President of the United States, have thought proper to
issue this my proclamation, stating my views of the Con•
stitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by
the Convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons
they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course
which duty will ri quire me to pursue, and, appealing to the
understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of
the consequences that must inevitably result from an ob-
servance of the dictates of the Convention.
Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the
exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may
hereafter be, invested, for preserving the peace of the
Union, and for tho-execution of the laws. But the im-
posing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case,
by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest
which the people of the United States must all feel in
preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a
hope that anything will be yielded in reasoning and re•
monstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify a
full exposition to South Carolina and the nation, of the
views I entertain of this important question, as well as a
distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty
will require me to pursue.
The Ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right
of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too
oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position, that
any one State may not only declare an act of Congress
void, but prohibit its execution—that they may do this
consistently with the Constitution—that the true construc-
tion of that instrument permit a State to retain its place in
the Unios, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than
those it may choose to consider as constitutional. It i 3
true, they add, that, to justify this abrogation of a law, it
must be palpably contrary to the Constitution ; but it is
evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that
description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to de-
cide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power
of resisting all laws ; for as by the theory there is no
appeal, the reason alleged by the State, good or bad, must
prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a suffi-
cient check against the abuse of this power, it may be
asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against
the passage of an unconstitutional Act by Con
gress ? There is, however, a restraint in this last
case, which makes the assumed power of a State
more indefensible, and which does not exist in
the other, There are two appeals from an unconstitu-
tional Act passed by Congress—one to the Judiciary, the
other to the people and the States. There is no appeal
from the State decision in theory ; and the practical illus-
tration shows that the Courts are closed against an appli-
cation to review it, both Judges and Jurors being sworn to
decide in its favour. But reasoning on this subject is su-
perfluous, when our social comp ict in express terms de-
clares that the laws of the United States, its Constitu-
tion, and Treaties made under it, are the supreme law of
the land ; and, for greater caution, adds, " that the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding." And it may be asserted, without fear of re-
futation, that no Federative Government could exist
without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the
consequence. If South Carolina considers the Revenue
Laws unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their
execution in the port of Charleston, there wiiuld be a clear
constitutional objection to their collection in every other
port, and no revenue could be collected any where, for all
imposts must be eqnal. It is no answer to repeat that an
unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of
its legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every
law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be
perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconsti-
tutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.
If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day,
the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The
excise law in Pensylvania, the embargo and non.inter-
course law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Vir-
g—
ia were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more
unequal in their operation than any of the laws now com-
plained of , but, fortunately, none of those States dis-
covered that they had the right now claimed by South
Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to sup-
port the dignity of the nation and the rights of
our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace, in-
stead of victory and honour, if the States, who supposed
it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought
they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it
was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution.
Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several
members of the Union, to the Legislatures of none did
this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest
itself. The discovery of this important feature in our
constitution was reserved to the present day. To the
statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and
upon the citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the
evils of reducing it to practice.
If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the
Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable
absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abun-
dant proof that it would have been repudiated with indig-
nation, had it been proposed to form a featnre in our
Government.
In our colonial State, although dependent on on another
Power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by
common interest with each other. Leagues were formed
for common defence, and before the declaration of Inde-
pendence, we were known in our aggregate character as
the United Colonies of America. That decisive and im
portant step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a
nation by a joint, not by several acts ; and when the
terms of our Confederation were reduced to form, it was
in that of a solemn league of several States, by which
they agreed that they would, collectively, form one nation,
for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic con-
cern.; and all foreign relations. the instrument form-
ing that Union, is found an article, which declares that
" every state shall abide by the determination of Congress
on all questions which, by that Confederation, should be
submitted to them."
Under the Confederation, then, no State could legally
annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to

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its execution ; but no provision was made to enforce these
decisions. Congress-rnade requisitions, but they were nut
complied with. The Government could not operate on
individuals. They had no judiciary—no means of col-
lecting revenue.
But the defects of the Confederation need not he de-
tailed. Under its operation, we could scarcely be called a
nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor con-
sideration abroad. This state of things could not be en-
dured, and our present happy Constitution was formed ;
but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was
formed for important objects that are announced in the
preamble made in the name and by the authority of the
I people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and
whose Conventions approved it. The most important
among these objects—that which is placed first in rank,
on which all the others rest, is " to form a more perfect
Union." Now, is it possible that, even if there were no
express provision giving supremacy to the Constitution
and laws of the United States over those of the States, it
can be conceived that an instrument made for the purpose
of " forming a more perfect Union" than that of the Con
federatio❑ could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom
of our country as to substitute for that Confederation a
form of Government, dependent for its existence 011 the
local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevail
ing faction in a State ? Every man of plain, unso-
phisticated understanding, who hears the question, will
give such a❑ answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphy-
sical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could
alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the
United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with
the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the
letter of the Constitution, unauthorised by its spirit—in-
consistent with every principle on which it was founded,
and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.
After this general view of the leading principle, we
must examine the particular application of it which is
made in the ordinance.
The preamble rests its justification on these grounds :
It assumes as a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although
they purport to be laws for raising revenue, were in
reality intended for the protection of manufactures, which
purpose it asserts to he unconstitutional ; that the opera-
tion of these laws is unequal ; that the amount raised by
them is greater tha❑ is required by the wants of the Go-
vernment ; and, finally, that the proceeds are to be ap-
plied to objects unauthorized by the Constitution. These
are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition to
the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the
Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them.
The first virtually acknowledges that the law in question
was passed under a power expressly given by the Consti-
tutio❑ to lay and collect imposts ; but its constitutionality
is drawn in question from the motives of those who
passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in
the present case, nothing can be more dangerous
than to admit the position that an unconstitutional
purpose, entertained by the Members who assent to
a law enacted under a constitutional power, shall make
that law void ; for low is that purpose to be ascertained ?
Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may bad pur-
poses be falsely imputed ? In how many cases are they
concealed by false professions ? In how many is no de-
claration of motive made? Admit this doctrine, and you
give to the Statemen uncontrolled right to decide, end
every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, there-
fore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be ad-
mitted, that a State may annul an unconstitutional law,
or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present

case.
The next objection is, that the laws in question operate
unequally. This objection may be made will truth to
every law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom
of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would
operate will perfect equality. If the unequal operation
of a law makes it unconsitutional, and if all laws of that
description may be abrogated by any State for that cause,
then, indeed, is the Federal Constitution unworthy of the
slightest effort for its preservation. We have hitherto relied
on it as the perpetual bond of our union. We have received
it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We
have trusted to it as the sheet-anchor of our safety in thestormy
times of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have
looked to it with a sacred awe as the palladium of our li-
berties, and, with all the solemnities of religion have
pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and
our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and sup-
port. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching
this importance to the Constitution of our country?
Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient, clumsy
contrivance which this new doctrine would make it?—
Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing
—a bubble that must be blown away by the first breath
of disaffection ? Was this self-destroying, visionary theory,
the work of the profound Statesmen, the exalted patriots,
to whom the task of Constitutional Reform was en-
trusted ? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the
States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the his-
tory of fundamental legislation ? No. We were
not mistaken ! The letter of this great instrument
is free from this radical fault ; its language directly
contradicts the imputation ; its spirit—its evident intent
contradicts it. No, we did not err ! Our Constitution does
not contain the absurdity to make laws, and another
power to resist them. The sages, whose memory will
always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and, as
they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The
father of his country did not affix his revered name to so
p elpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they
severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto
on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or
that they could exercise it by implication. Search the
debates in all their Conventions—examine the speeches of
the most zealous opposers of feelers! authority—look at the
amendments that were proposed. They are all silent—
not a syllable tittered, not a vote given, not a motion
made, to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws
of the Union over those of the States—or to show that
implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No,
we have not erred ! The Constitution is still the object
of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defence in
danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall
dtscend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophisti-
cal construction, to our posterity ; and the sacrifices of
local interest, of State prejudices, of personal animosities,
that were made to bring into existence, will again be pa•
triotically offered for its support.
The two remaining objections made by the Ordinance
to these laws are, that the sums intended to be raised by
them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds
will be unconstitutionally employed. The Constitution
has given expressly to Congress the right of raising reve-
nue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will
require. The States will have no controul over the exer-
cise of this right, other than that which results from the
power of changing the Representatives who abuse it, and
thus procure redress. Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse
this discretionary power, but the same may be said of others
with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist
somewhere. The Constitution has given it to the Repre-
sentatives of the people, checked by the Representatives of
the States, and by the Executive Power. The South
Carolina construction gives it to the Legislature or the
Convention of a single State, where neither the people of the
different States, nor the States in their separate capacity, nor
the Chief Magistrate elected by the people, have any represen-
tation. Which is the most discreet disposition of the power?
I do not ask you, fellow-citizens, which is the constitutional
disposition—that instrument speaks a language not to be
iqinderstood. But if you were assembled in general
convention which would you think the safest depository of
this discretionary power in the last resort? Would you
add a clause giving it to each of the States, or would you
sanction the wise provisions already made by your Con-
stitution ? If this should be the result of your deliberations
when providing for the future, are you—can you—be
ready to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a tern
porary and a local purpose,. that which you must acknow-
ledge to be destructive and even absurd, as a general pro-
vision ? Carry out the consequences of this right vested in
the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis
your conduct presents at this day would recur whenever
any law of the United States- displeased any of the States,
and that we should soon cease to be a nation.
The Ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future
that characterises a former objection, tells you that the
proceeds of the tax will be unconstitutionally applied. If
this could be ascertained with certainty, the objection
would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so
applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against
the laws levying the duty.
These are the allegations contained in the Ordinance.
Examine them seriously, my fellow-citizens—judge for
yourselves. I appeal to you to determine whether they
are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their
correctness; and even if you should come to this conclu-
sion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive course
which you are directed to pursue. Review these objec-
tions, and the conclusions drawn from them, one more.
What are they ? Every law, then, for raising revenue,
• according to the South Carolina Ordinance, may be right-
fully annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will
or can be framed: Congress have a right to pass laws for
raising revenue, and each State has a • right to oppose their
execution—two rights directly opposed to each other ; and
yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instru-
ment drawn for the express purpose of avoiding collisions
between the States and the General Government, by an

•,_~

assembly of the most enlightened Statesmen and purett
patriots ever embodied fur a similar purpose.
In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises—in vain have they provided that they shall have
' power to pass laws which shall be necessary and proper
to early those powers into execution ; that those laws and
that Constitution shall be the " supreme law of the land ;
and that the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding." In vain have the people of
the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions.
made them their paramount law, and individually sworn
to support them whenever they were called on to execute
any office. Vain provisions! ineffectual restrictions!
vile profanation of oaths ! miserable mockery of legisla-
tion ! If a bare majority of the voters in ,ny one State
may, on a real or supposed knowledge of the intent with
which a law has been passed, declare themselves free from
its operation—say here it gives too little, there too much,
and operates unequally—here it suffers articles to he free
that ought to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to
be free. In this case the proceeds are intended to be ap-
plied to purposes which we do not approve— in that the
amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress,
it is true, are invested by the Constitution with
the right of deciding these questions, according
to their sound discretion. Congress is composed
of the Representatives of all the States, and of all
all the people of all the States ; but we, part of the people
of one State, to whom the Constitution has given no
power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken
it
away—we, who have solemnly agreed that this Constitu
tion shall be our law—we, most of whom have sworn to
support it—we now abrogate this law, and swear, and
force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed—and we
do this, not because Congress have no right to pass such
laws; this we do not allege ; but because they have passed
them with improper views. They are unconstitutional
from the motives of those who passed them, which we
can never with certainty know, from their unequal opera-
tion; although it is impossible from the nature of things
that they should be equal—and from the disposition which
we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that
disposition has not been declared. This is the plaiu
meaning of the Ordinance in relation to laws which it
abrogates for alleged unconstitutionality. But it does not
stop there. It repeals, in express terms, an important part of
the Constitution it-elf, and of laws passed to give it effect,
which have never been alleged to be unconstitutional. The
Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United
States extend to cases arising under the laws of the
United States, and that such laws, the Constitution,
and treaties, shall be paramount to the State Constitutions
and laws. The Judiciary Act prescribes the mode by
which the case may be brought before a Court of the
United States by appeal, when a State tribunal shall de
cide against this provision of the Constitution. The
Ordinance declares there shall he no appeal, makes the
State law paramount to the Constitution and laws of the
United States; forces Jndges and Jurors to swear that they
will disregard their provisions ; and even makes it penal
in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares
that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United
States or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties
imposed by the revenue laws within its limits.
Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended
to be unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a small
majority of the voters of a single State. Here is a pro-
vision of the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated by
the same authority.
On such expositions and reasonings the Ordinance
grounds not only an assertion of the right to annul the
laws of which it complains, but to enforce it by a thi eat of
seceding from the Union, if an attempt is made to execute
them.

This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the
Constitution, which, they say is a compact between sove-
reign States, who have preserved their whole sovereignty,
and, therefore, are subject to no superior ; that, because
they made the compact, they can break it when, in
their opinion, it has been departed from by the other
States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it en-
lists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest preju-
dices of those who have not studied the nature of our
Government sufficiently to see the radical error on which
it rests,
The people of the United States formed the Constitu-
tion, acting through the State Legislature in making the
compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in
separate conventions when they ratified those provisions ;
but the terms used in its construction show it to be a Go-
vernment in which the people of all the States collectively
are represented. We are one people in the choice of the
President and Vice-President. Here the States have no
other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes
shall be given. The candidates having a majority of all
the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of States
may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet
another may be chosen. The people, then, and not the
States, are represented in the Executive branch.
In the House of Representatives there is this difference ;
the people of one State do not, as in the case of President
and Vice-President, all vote for the same officers. The
people of all the States do not vote for all the Members,
each State electing only its own Representatives. But this
creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are
all Representatives of the United States, not Representa-
tatives of the particular State from which they come. They
are paid by the United States, not by the State ; nor are
they accountable to it for any act done in the performance
of their legislative functions; and, however they may in
practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the
interests of their particular constituents when they come
in conflict with any other partial or local interest, yet it is
their first and highest duty, as Representatives of the
United States, to promote the general good.
The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a
Government, not a league ; and whether it be formed by
compact between the States, or in any other manner, its
character is the same. It is a Government in whicb all
the people are represented, which operates directly on the
people individually, not upon the States ; they retained all
the power they did not grant. But each State having
expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute
jointly with the other States a single nation, cannot froth
that period possess any right to secede, because such seces-
sion does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a
nation, and any injury to that unity is not only a breach
which would result from the contravention of a compact,
but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that
any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to
say that the United States are not a nation ; because it
would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation
might dissolve its connection with the other parts, to their
.injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Seces-
sion, like any other revolutionary act, may he morally
justified by the extremity of oppression ; but to call it
a constitutional right is confounding the meaning of terms,
and can only he done through gross error, or to deceive
; those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause
• before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties con-
sequent on a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said
the parties to that compact may, when they feel them-
selves aggrieved, depart from it:; but it is precisely because
it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is an agree-
ment or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a
sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it
contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other
consequence than moral guilt : if it have a sanction, then
.the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A
league between independent nations, generally, has no sanc-
tion other than a moral one; or, if it should contain a pe-
nalty, as there is no common superior, it cannot be en-
forced. A Government, on the contrary, always has a
sanction, express or implied ; and in our case it is both
necessarily implied and expressly given. An attempt by
force of arms to destroy a Government, is an offence, by
whatever means the constitutional compact may have been
formed ; and such Government has the right, by the law
of stlf-defence, to pass Acts for punishing the offender,
unless that right is modified, restrained, or resumed, by the
Constitutional Act. In our system, although it is modi-
fied in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly given
to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect,
and under this grant, provision has been made for punish-
ing acts which obstruct the due administration of the laws.
It would seem superfluous to add anything to show the
nature of that Union which connects us; but as erroneous
opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines the
most destructive to our peace, I must give some further
development to my views on this subject. No one, fellow-
ciOzens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of
the States than the Magistrate who now addresses you.
No one would make greater personal sacrifices, or official
exertions, to defend them from violation ; but equal care
must be taken to prevent on their part an improper inter-
ference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested
in the nation. The line Las nit been so distinctly drawn
as to avoid doubts in some cases of the exercise of power.
Men of the best intentions and soundest views may differ
in their construction of some parts of the Constitution ;
but there are others on which dispassionate reflection can
leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the as-
isumed right of secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the
alleged undivided Sovereignty of the States, and on their
having formed, in this sovereign capacity, a compact
which is called the Constitution, from which, because they
made it, they have the right to secede. Both of these