The Sun.
London, England, 1833-07-04 00:00:00

OF HIS IMPF.RIAL MAJESTY TILE DUKE OF BRAGAISZA

I strongly supported and voted for the question of an
expeTtion agtrnst Lisbon, which I considered would,
without doubt, prove at once advantageous and decisive
for the Portuguese cause.
On the supposition that this expedition took place, it
would be necessary for the Emperor to command it in
person. No one who counselled the contrary could be his
friend. I have already been reproached for this declara-
tion, but I again repeat it, and take credit to myself for '
having made it. As his Majesty could not go with the
expedition, it was necessarily renounced. But in order
to prove that I in no respect intended to compromise the
honour of any brother officer to whom the command of
Oporto might have been intrusted, I shall here state the
proposition which I repeatedly made to his Nlajesty and his
Alinisters, namely,—that I would willingly take upon
myself the !irection of the expedition to Lisbon, with
5,000 min, and that I had the most perfect conviction
of brim; able to make myself master of that capital within
three days after my landing. I added, that if any fear
was entertained fur the safety of Oporto, or for our com-
munications with the sea, I was in that case voiding to
take the command of the troops left behind, and that I
would answer with my head for the security of this noble
cite, and even for the preservation of all our fortified
pest tons down to tire place of debar kation.
Coming now 'to the point in discussion, I vote for the
third question, to which I more than ever adhere.
Reckoning, as I do, on the intr., pidity of the troops who
de'end the Constitutional cause, I may venture to assert
that we should not lose fifty men in forcing the lines, for
1 well know the demoralized spirit of the troops we shall
have to combat, and I am convinced that they will not
make a stand in the two or three intrenched camps which
supl.ort their lines, as soon as they find themselves out-
flankid or turned by our columns. As I stated two days
ago, the enemy has only 13,000 men on the right bank
of the river, from 1,200 to 1,500 men having been
detached to the left bank, and we have it in our power
to attack them with nearly 10,000 of our brave f ]lows,
for al: the corps of the artery are destined to take part in
the action.

'the attack is, besides, so planned, that the fate of the
army will not be hazarded, it being always practicable to
limit the movement to a simple reconnoissance if tile
enemy should oppose a resistance, which I am fir from
anticipating. Oar left being constantly under the pro-
tection of the cannon which defend cur lines, or our ad-
vanced works, I shall he enabled to follow up our advan-
tzge,, and completely route the enemy ; or, at all events,
to return to our intrencbments without experiencing any
considerable loss.

The enemy being beaten, as I have reason to hope he
will be, the soldiers of the Liberating Army, when pro-
ceeding on some other expedition, will carry with them
into the heart of the provicutes the news of their exploits,
and make known the entire defeat of the Miguelites.
They will then rnu•;e the enthusiasm of all good citizen•,
and easily rally ►hetn around the constitutional standard.
Bat what can they now say to excite the zeal of the
partisans of our cause? What can they say, except that
to escape front Oporto they are obliged to pass under a
shower of shot and shells?
Your squadron will probably have to fight. Should
it, as I expect, prove victorious, the ships will neverthe-
less require repairs. But the port of Vigo being shut
against us, it will be necessary to send them to England.
In that case a single brig will be sufficient to prevent any
landing. You have lately seen that the effect of the stews
of the sailing of three gunboats from Mathczinhos was to
deprive us during four days of all communication with the
sea. Thus, by carrying into effect the expedition now
projected, the unfortunate inhabitants of Oporto will have
no other resource than to wait for their deliverance until
the general officer in command shall be able to collect a
force sufficient to beat the enemy who blockades Oporto. I
most at dently wish, but do not expect, this to be the result.
Headquarters, Oporto, June 11.
A true extract, made conformably to the minutes of the
Coun it of War. SOLIGNAC.

LETTER FROM MARSHAL SOLIGNAC TO TIDE DUKE Of'

BRAGANZA.

Sire,—Your Majesty was pleased to communicate to
me the three military questions which you proposed should
be submitted to your Ministers, and the principal officers
of the army for their opinion. I thought that the plan
for an expedition to Lisbon ought to be preferred to every
other, as being capable of more prompt, easy, and decisive
execution. Such was also the opinion of almost all the
officers whom your Majesty thought proper to consult.
This glorious expedition, however, could not take place
unless our august chief commanded! t in person. The
Ministers declared that you ought nott o leave Oporto, and
your Majesty considered yourself bound to give your assent
to this decision. Hence it became necessary to renounce
an operation. in wbich=l had the greatest confidence.
,Oa ti,e other band, I was perfectly convince 1 ihat it
was still proper to try the fate of arms, and not to abandon
the project of beating the enemy who blockades Oporto,
until after the impracticability of defeating him should be
recognized. Your Majesty will recollect what I diil myself
the honour of stating to you yesterday morning, which was,
that if it were possible to bring about the adoption of the
plan of an attack to the north of the Douro, it ini.tht
be executed forthwith. It was then ready, us I had
been during thel atter days of last month, to enrage the
enemy. The troops of the Liberating Army would have
passed the lines during the night, the enemy wou.d have
been attacked before day-break, and I am confident that
the affair would have been decided to our advantage. But
it has been otherwise determined ; and the decision
adopted yesterday by a majority, consisting of all your
Majesty's Ministers and several superior or gen, ral officers
has, by pronouncing against my opinion, expressed in the
most formal manner, placed me in a situation in which I
cannot longer remain with the army. This, I flatter
myself, your Majesty will recognise.
". It also will not have escaped your Majesty, that it
results from the preamble, which serves as the basis of the
adopted decision, that the army which remains at Oporto
is in a situation which condernus it to the most cmoplete
inactivity, and that it must depend for every 'hit:l;l44on
the fraction of the army now embarking under the orders
of the Duke of Terceira.
" In the first place I protested, and I still protest,
against an operation in which, though solely p',posed, as
I am gratified to believe, in the interest of the Queen, I
can see nothing to prevent any considering as the most
dangerous and the least useful enterprise which could be
undertaken at the present moment. Disapproving it,
therefore, most seriously as I do, I cannot continue with
the army and take upon myself the responsibility of the
events and disasters which it may have for its results.
" 1 must add, Sire, that after having organized tde
army, after having prepared everything fur a raimating
honourably a lor.g protracted contrst, I cannot iv i .it honour
remain at the head of the army while the comIL41(1 of the