The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-06 00:00:00

Bessarabia. The house would recollect that when Austria
proposed a basis for negotiation, a lino was drawn which
divided Bessarabia into two parts, from Kichenau in the
north-west to the Seleyk Lake on the borders of the Black
Sea. The length of the district was about 250 miles, and
the lino as nearly as possible bisected Bessarabia. But when
this question was discussed at the conferences in Paris, to
his great surprise he found that the Russian plenipoten-
tiaries suggested the ceding of something like a fourth of
the quantity of territory which Austria promised should
be given back to Turkey. That was of course at once
stifled ; but, to cut the matter short, Count Walewski, al-
though he could not consent to the sacrifice asked of the
allies by the proposition of Baron Brunow, said there
was such a thing as a principle of compensation, and if
Russia gave up some other part of Bessarabia for what
was kept back, as proposed, the proposition would be ac-
ceded to. What did their lordships suppose was the come
pensation that was given in return for all that was con-
ceded ? It bore the same proportion to the whole as his (Lord
Malmesbury's) thumb nail did to the whole of his arm.
That was about the proportion which the territory Russia
proposed to give up bore to the whole of that which had
been agreed to by Russia when proposed by Austria. In
fact, we had given her back a line of territory 250 miles in
length and 40 or 50 wide ; but it was one of essential con-
sequence, for the line as proposed by Austria gave Turkey
both banks of the Danube; it gave to the Bessarabians
belonging to Turkey a passage through Austria, and it
passed by the Russian magazines at Kichenau, which were
driven back upon the Dniester. All that was given up in
exchange for a line of half the distance which gave up one
of the two banks of the Danube and the Pruth, and left
some 120 miles of the Pruth, belonging half to Russia and
half to Turkey. There must have been some very strong
reasons for such a change in the distribution of territory as
that. Why was this important boundary barrier against
Russian aggression lost to the allies ? Rumours wore
rife that the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that we
were not in the position then that we were when Austria
made her propositions, for they had now got Kars, the
key of Anatolia, and had one foot in Asia Minor, and if
over we were to have attempted to take it again it would
have cost us as much trouble as it did to take Sebastopol.
They were aware of the advantages of the position they
had gained, and had a right therefore to better terms. It
was hinted at in the protocols that the restoration of Kars
must be considered in the negotiations when the question
of the frontier came on. It appeared that his noble friend
gave way, and he obtained exactly half of what had been
promised by the French and Austrian Governments when
the original propositions were laid before the English Ca-
binet, and yet he (Lord Malinesbury) was asked to assent
to an expression of joy and satisfaction, and to say that
such a result fulfilled all the objects of the war. He
was afraid the objects of the war were not considered
at Paris, but the objects of the peace. His noble
friend seemed to have forgotten that ono of the
main objects of the war was the possession of Bessa-
rabia. In plain English, what the first article meant was,
" Here is Kars, what will you give us for it ?" It was a
fashion lately with the Government and their supporters
to say that Kars was of very little consequence, and had
no weight in the operations of the war. When one road
the protocols and the result of the negotiations it was im-
possible not to see that there was some pressure which
obliged the noble earl and the other plenipotentiaries of
the allies to give up points to which it was inteuded to
keep. He would not go into the gossip which had circa-
kited iu this country on the subject, but he would say
what he believed was the advantage Russia had, and that
was that having got Kars it lot us part of Bessarabia,
and we in consequence of that circumstance gave up every
advantage which might otherwise have been miintained.
He was not about to go into the whole question of the
campaign of Kars, but would confine himself to the loss
of that city, which he charged to the want of fore-
sight and neglect by the Government, and he would
maintain that the loss of Kars had prevented the
attainment of such a treaty as this c tuntry wished, and
which he knew his noble friend wished to carry out. The
campaign which ended with the loss of that city might be
divided into two epochs—the first was the 10 months from
the time at which Gen. Williams was first sent out and
that at which he left Erzeroum to go and defend Kars,
during any part of which Kars ought to have been saved,
not by sending an army there, for that was not necessary,
or by sending any English troops or contingents, but by
sending provisions amid ammunition. What he would say
would be borne out by General Williams himself, for he
had said as much in his despatches, and by Dr. Sandwith,
who had said as much in his book. He would not encumber
the question now with the second epoch, when Kars was
invested and when it would have been necessary to have
relieved it by weans of an army; but he would confine him-
self to the period when it only needed provisions and am-
munition, and when there were good soldiers well command-
ed within its walls. At the that) when he (Lord M shnesbury)
saw that war was inevitable he asked himself who was
to conduct this great war for this country. That great
wan who used to occupy that chair (pointing to the place
generally occupied in his latter days by the Duke of Wel-
lington) was no more, and he left no successor. It was only
to Providence they could trust to raise up a statesman and
a general to direct the country in this great calamity. He
did not think that it had pleased the Almighty to favour
the country with such a blessing. Looking to the immense
extent likely to be covered by the war, from Finland to
Asia Minor, he could not say that the Government had
been able to bring it all within their view. From the
first Asia Minor was neglected, and our efforts were en-
tirely directed to other psrts. He did not say this was
wrong—he was no soldier, and could not venture on an opi-
nion on military strategy ; but still he thought the Govern-
ment held Asia Minor too cheap. It might have been a pen-
dant to the operations in the Crimea, and if that had been
done in time Kars would have been saved. Warnings
on that point were not wanting, for in the war of 1829,
which was followed by the treaty of Adrianople, it was
far more the victories of Diebitsch in Asia Minor than
those of the Russians in European Turkey which gave him
the advantages he obtained Early in 1851 attention was
directed to that part of the question by a noble friend of
his (Lord Ellenborough), who urged the necessity of a cam-
paign in Asia ; but it was not until after the Turks had
been defeated, and on the 2d of August in that year, that
his noble friend (Lord Clarendon) sent out an agent who
was certainly well chosen—Gen. Williams—to Asia MMor.
After opening corumnnications with Lord Stratford and
Lord Raglan, Gen. Williams went to Erzeroum, where he
examinee into the state of the Turkish army, and then he
went on to Kars, and proceeded to put the town into a
bettor state of defence than had been done oven by Gen.
Guyon and the other officers with him in the previous
sifting. On the 2d August, 1854, his noble friend
directed Lord Stratford to send General Williams
to the Turkish army as commissioner of the Queen.
Lord Stratford wrote an answer on the Isth, stating
that he apprehended there would be no difficulty
in making the necessary arrangements for sending
General Williams properly authorised ; but on the 3d of
October, six weeks afterwards, he wrote that " Reechid
Pacha had requested to be informed officially of the name
of the Queen's commissioner." So that six weeks after he
had received his noble friend's letter Reschid Pacha, the
Prime Minister, or the Vizier of the Sultan, did not know
the name of the Queen's commissioner. In the meantime
Gen. Williamshad gone on to Erzeroum. He was well re-
ceived. His scarlet uniform had secured him a good re-
ception. But when ho began to meddle with the affairs of
the Turkish army he was asked to show his authority, and
lie had none to show. It was most extraordinary that on
the 3d December, he had still no authority, and it was
said by the Turkish generals that he was a mere colonel,
without any special character. During this time Kars
and Anatolia might have been victualled. On the 2d
of September his noble friend had written, stating that
it was desirable that General Williams should be given
high rank in the Turkish army. That was asked for
by Lord Stratford on the 15th of November, or soveu
weeks after the date of Lord Clarendon's letter. Delays
continued. M. Pisani went repeatedly to the Porto ask-
ing for this authority, and he was told that it had been
sent; but General Williams. in a letter, stated that he
had received an such authority, and that he could do no-
thing ; if ho had it he could do anything, but yet he 'sever
obtained any authority till the 23d of January, 1855. Tho
third authority that General Williams asked was to be
made director of supplies, for on that hinged the safety of
Kars. He asked, on the 29th of January, Lord Stratford
to obtain it for him. Lord Stratford did not do se, but
he lost four or five weeks by referring the application to
the Foreign-office. Of course, by return of post the noble
earl wrote to say that he was to get the office for General
Williams if he could. By the time that letter was re-
ceived the 20th of March had arrived, and then General
Williams again complained that he had not got the autho-
rity in question, and that he might do anything if he
had it. Nothing, however, was done, and he was never
made director of supplies, and was left entirely to his own
energy and resources. April passed away, and on the 10th
May there was only °Lie week's provisions in Kane. The
English officers at Kars wrote to Gen. Williams, at Erze-
roam, for provisions. The Russians were then within a
month's march of Kars; for it was on the 9th of June that
the place war invested. Gen. Williams was still at Erze-
roum, and not having obtained the necessary authority, he
could send no provisions; but seeing that the Russians
awe advancing upon Kars, he left Erzerontn in what he
described as an isolated position. Nevertheless, he took
the matter into his own hands, and got supplies into Kars
by the exercise of that wouderful energy which was de-
scribed by Dr. Sand with. Four months' provisions were got
into Kars, and by that means Kars was for the time saved
as well as Erzeroum and Anatolia, and probably the whole
of Asia Minor. For if the Russians had attacked Kars only
a week sooner it would have fallen, and they would have
had the whole summer to march upon the Bosphorus.
Those were not his (Lord Malmesbury's) sentiments alone.
Let the house listen to what Dr. Sandwith said.—(The
noble earl then read an extract from the work of Dr.
Sandwith, in which he described the great exertions made
by Gen. Williams to obtain supplies, and the lamentable
condition to which the garrison was reduced.) How the
food was economised their lordships knew, and that the
garrison, officers, and men, were reduced to eat dogs. No
wen came out of this war with such a reputation as Gon.
Williams. Ho was not eloquent enough to do justice to
his merits; he would only say that his name was engritronf
in the history of his country. When he
Malmesbury) made this accusation against thethanes"ofiliegaerdl
(Clarendon) and against his ambassador,
to do when he read this book, their lordshaisp
w(The noble
lie
would expect
him to quote some extracts to bear him
t "complaining of
earl then read Colonel William
want of support in the duties be wa'ss plegrrsming,insufficient
authority, absence of supplies in money, food, and ammuni-
tion, and of the neglect of Lord Stratford in in not answering
for any man accus-
tomed communications.) It was impossible
torned to the amenities of civilised life to understand the
reason of this extraordinary neglect on the part of the am-
bassador, and there could be two men only in the world
who could ex-plain the cause—viz., Lord Stratford himself
and the noble lord opposite. lie would make no guesses at
it, but leave it to the noble lord himself to explain. It was
clear Lord Stratford was open to blame ; and as according
to his constitutional view the arnbessador was responsible
to the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Minister bad not
recalled him, the noble lord (Clarendon) was responsible to
Parliament. The whole Cabinet must have concurred in
the despatch of the noble earl's blaming Lord Stratford ;
nevertheless, Lord Palmerston, so late as May 3, in the
House of Commons, defended Lord Stratford, declaring
that ho was ready to take his share of the responsibility
that might attach to those who had not thought fit to re-
call him. He (the Earl of Mahnesbury) had withdrawn
his motion the other night in reference to the fall of
Kars, and of course tie present was not the time or the
place to move one like it ; but his impression wile, if any-
thing, stronger than before, that the Government were
Most blameable for not having attended to the position of
Asia Minor, and the importance of defending the Turkish
possessions there. But their conduct had been marked by
vacillation throughout, and that vacillation was crowned
when they saw the Foreign Minister writing a despatch
condemnatory of any ambassador, and the Prime Minister
getting up in the House of Commons and completely exo-
aerating the seine person. He would not further (let: in
their lordships but to congratulate them upon the peace,
which, however, ho was happy to say, found England
stronger than she was when she began the war. He thought
the terms of the address as proposed were exaggerated,
and not such as their lordships could justly concur in; but