The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-11 00:00:00

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Wa liirVE, at last received the exact text of the
conditions of peace tendered by the Allied Power!!
to Russia. The definite answer cannot, we are in-
formed, be received before the 15th of this present
month. Are these terms destined to form a mee
morable epoch in the history of European civilisa-
tion, or are they destined to be consigned to the
limbo of abortive projects with the treaty of Ux-
bridge or
tho armistice of Chatillon ? Is the
present war destined here to come to an end, while
it yet retains somewhat of the dispassionate. and
almost judicial calmness and reluctance with which
it was commenced ; or is it to take henceforth a
new beginning, with the avowed object no longer
of merely protecting the Ottoman dominions from
the immediate attacks of Russia, but of depriving
her of the power of repeating a similar outrage
That will depend on the result of the conflict
between the war and peace 'sixties; in the Cabinet
of the Czar—on the natural struggle between
the wish to relieve an exhaneted people, a
ruined trade, arid a 'bankrupt exchequer, and
the stubborn determination to carry out the
plan of universal monarchy, and rather to risk the
subversion of the whole framework of society than
to recede from a single pretension or forego a single
dream of conquest, glory, or annexation that
Peter, Catherine, Alexander, or Nicholas may
have entertained.
Regarded from our point of view, the ;term ap-
-1 pear sufficiently reasonable and moderate, and
I couched in language studiously measured, so as to
give the least possible offence to the suspeetibility
of our antagonists. When we consider the objects
for which we most unwillingly took up arms, we
can hardly imagine that Russia herself can expect
that we should be content with a less extensive
basis of negotiation, unless, inclecd, the fortune of
war had declared decidedly against us. It is diffi-
cult to put ourselves in the position of o'ir enemies,
and clearly to represent to our minds with what
feelings a patriotic Russian must regard such an
offer, though even he, we should suppose,
must fel that in the demand of su:h teims
there is nothing either arrogant or presump-
tuous. No one can suppose, we should
think, that after what has occurred the Allied
Sovereigns could leave the Danubian Principali-
ties in their present disjointed and disorganised
condition. They must be governed, and governed
by a Power in no respect subject to Russian in-
fluence, if they are not to become again in a few
years once more the Belgium of the East of Europe,
the battle-field on which the advance of Russ a is
to be checked, as that of Louis XIV. was on the
plains of Flanders. Neith©r can it be expec e I
that the Allies should leave it in the power of Rus-
sia again to place a ligature on the in du artery of
Germany by blocking up the Sulina mouth of the
Danube, and thus cutting off the principal line of
communication between the East and the West.
Nor is it conceivable how this is to Lappet), without
requiring the surrender of these fortresses and that
territory which gave Russia. the command of the
river from tae erubouchere of the Pruth to the sea.
The cornple'e neutralisation of the Black Sea
would also seem the easiest and least offensive
mode of putting an end to Russian domination in
those waters. Limitation carries with it the notion
of the continual pressure of a superior force, and
counterpoise is but a thin veil thrown over a con-
tinued state of hostility ; but the mutual agree-
ment to emancipate the Black Sea for ever from
the presence of hostile fleets, to forbear from the
erection of fortifications, and to admit the Consuls
of the Allied Powers into Russian ports is, we
should imagine, less offensive and less galling to the
pride of our enemy than any other manner in which
the inevitable cur rtilineut of her aggressive powers
can be effected.
While tile matter is yet uncersain we challenge
the advocates of Russia or of peace to show that we
ask anything to which we are cot well entitled, or
abuse the powers which a series of brilliant suc-
cesses has placed in our hands. The very mode-
ration of these terms makes them the fairest test of
the real dispositions of Russia. If sLe be content
to live, as other Powers live, in peace aud good-
will with all mankind, improving her vast territory,
and seeking in the pursuits of peace and commerce
au indemnification for a century and a half of end-
less war and conflict, she will accept the opportu-
nity to escape from a struggle from which the calm
judgment of her statesmen and warriors must
assure her she has nothing to expect of glory or
success, while, if she still cherishes the wild dreams
of her traditionary ambition, she will yet tempt
once more the fortune of arms. We could nut
desire matters to he brought to a fairer issue.
Peace must not be made while Russia pos-
sesses both the will and the power to injure us.
We are content to make peace if she possess the
power without the will, or else forced to continue
the war until she no longer possesses the power. We
are unwilling at such a moment to assume a vaunt-
ing or a threatening tone in speaking of what wo
have achieved and what may be looked for in
the next campaign. We hardly venture to expect
that Russia will give her unqualified acquiescence
to the terms proposed, but anticipate a counter
proposition, dexterously framed, so as, if possible,
to disunite the Allies fling Austria back into her
former inaction, and introduce discord into the
counsels of France and England. We have said
that these terms are moderate, and in no respect to
go beyond that which, in the most modest view of
our own position, we have a right to demand.
Should, then, the answer of Russia amount to a
direct repudiation of any substantial part of the
terms offered by the Allies, the course of honour and
interest is clear. They are bound to pro 'Gad
vigorously with the war, and try what effeet an-
other year's operations may have in changing the
counsels of the enemy. Should, on the other
hand, the answer amount substantially to "Yea,"
we are convinced that no idle- punctilio, no adhe-
sion to a formal and verbal consistency, will
stand in the way of mutual agreement. The set-
tlement, if settlement there is to le, must be
prompt and definite. We cannot affi.rd t repeat
in this year the diplomatic, any more then
the military and naval mistakes, of the last, and
do not intend to be tricked in council out of terms
which we believe ourselves able to win in the field.
For the event, notwithstanding Mr. Cobden, we
have no fear. We may not indeed b. able to pene-
trate to Moscow, or even to St. Petersburg. We
may not feel ourselves in a position to plunge
armies into the vast wilderness, like Charles XII.
or Napoleon, but the process of exhaustion is
surely and steadily going on. Men, money, com-
merce, means of transport, arms, ammunition,
manufactures, and agriculture being gradually ex-
hausted—an exhaustion which can hardly be pressed
beyond a certain point without bursting the bonds
of military subjection which held the mighty mass
of Russian domination together. If the fear of the
sword be once removed the manumission of the
serfs must follow, and, with it, the destruction of
the territorial aristocracy, and a disintegration and
disruption of the mighty mass which the sword
alone has held together. If Russia has yet a des-
tiny, if she is to be a principal agent in the annals
of the times that are yet to come, she will seize the
present moment of making peace ; if she be des-
tined to expiate her ambition and aggression by
premature revolution and decay, she will doggedly
adhere to the course to which she is at present
committed.