The Sun.
London, England, 1856-12-31 00:00:00

dinary.
We considered that form to be the most becoming for
the recognition of those friendly sentereaftwhich his
Majesty the Emperor of the'French had manifested to-
wards Switzerland upon this occasion, and that it: was a
favourable opportunity for giving more explicit explana-
tions respecting the position that Sw-itzerlanc must
assume.
M. Dufour took 9harge of this mission with biausual
patriotic devotion, any the hon. 'general acquitted him-
self of the task in a most eionscientious and meritoriouwere
s
manner. The instructions ;:iven to the general
substantially conceived as follow;
tt The General will above all explain to the Emperor
that the Federal Council has fully appreeiated the in-
terest evinced by the Emperor in Switzerland, as well
as the efforts he is making with a view to effect a seta-
-1 tion of the Neuchatel question, and that it is grateful to
his Majesty for this.
"Nevertheless, the Federal Council regrets that it is
unable to comply with the Emperor's wish, so far as it
concerns the immediate liberation of the prisoners ; on
the contrary, the Federal Council must adhere to those
bases which at the initiative of England it has commu-
nicated to the British Cabinet, and which it has else
made known to the French Government." •
In support of this mode of viewing the questien at
issue, the following points were brought more promi-
nently into relief :
Supposing even that the King of Prussia had any
rights over Neuchatel, Switzerland has some likewise,
especially with regard to the authors of the late insur-
rection. To demand of her that she should proclaim an
amnesty without obtaining simultaneously from the
King of Prussia the assurance of some compensation,
would be to misapprehend the position of the two
parties, to the disadvantage of Switzerland, and to ex-
pect of the latter that she should desist from her right
of jurisdiction over acts committed in her territory, and
consequently that she should renounce her sovereignty.
If the King of Prussia believes his honour to be at
stake on this question it must not be forgotten also that
Switzerland has likewise to maintain intact her honour
and esteem in the eyes of the world. It is not to her that
can be imputed those causes which led to the changes of
1848 ; she cannot be made responsible for the culpable
enterprise which recently took place against the order of
things existing in the canton of Neuchatel and the Con-
federation. To require of her that she should expunge
the consequences resulting from that culpable act, with-
out offering her at the same time an equivalent compen-
sation, would be tantamount to treating her as guilty of
au injustice, and compelling her to accept as a matter of
favour only what might be subsequently offered to her.
A satisfaction of this kind is the more inadmissible,
seeing that the King of Prussia claims the amnesty as a
right, and accompanies his demand with threats. Be-
sides, the confidential circular of Prussia to the States
of the German Diet, under date of Sept. 29, already
made Mention of serious measures in case of non-com-
pliance with the demand of the liberation of the prisoners.
In this state of things an amnesty without compensa-
tion would no longer be looked upon by the world as a
spontaneous act of generosity, but as an act enforced by
fear.
The Federal Council puts the most entire faith in the
assurance of the Emperor, which state that, in case of
the immediate liberation of the prisoners, he would un-
dertake to procure a solution of the question to Switz-
erland's advantage. But the Council cannot entertain
tile same confidence in the intentions of the King of
Prussia, in the face of the above-menticned circular
addressed by Prussia to the States of the German Diet,
and in which it is clearly given to be understood that the
liberation of the prisoners would only be a first con-
quest or concession. Switzerland is right in asking her-
self what then would be her position if, after the Jibe.
rati"n required, the renunciation of the rights which are
set up should not take pace, or if the King should not
choose to pronounce it save on conditions not acceptable
or onerous to Switzerland ; or if the King of Prussia
should still persist, afterwards as well as before, in main-
taining the status ab ante in the expectation of more
favourable European conjunctures.
If, in return for the previous amnesty of the prisoners,
we have a renunciation or an arrangement to Switzer-
land's advantage held out to us, it behoves the Confede-
ration to know, before everything else, what special con-
ditions will be created by such a renunciation. The
following points are indicated as the chief bases which
might serve for an arrangement :
There must be no reservation implying any dependence
on a foreign power. There must he no reservation
carrying with it any restriction affecting legislation or
administration of int: mai affairs.
We gave it to be understood, moreover, that we
required to know belorehand whether the King of Peussia
means to append any fiLancial condition to the plan of
arrangement, and It so what this condition is ; whether
it is conceived toot the amnesty is to comprise, indepen-
dently of the remission of penalties, a remission ales of
the costs, and in what proportion.
It has appeared the more necessary to direct attention
to this subject, seeing that the negotiations might break
down subsequently at the points where these and other
analogous points would occur, and that the King might
take advantage of them to refuse all renunciation and all
arrangement. This is why it has, appeared absolutely
indispensable,fcr S wi'z.,rland that these conditions should
be clearly laid down beforehand, if she does not wish to
expose herself to the risk of being dependent on the
good-will of the adverse party, when once the amnesty
shall have been proclaimed.
Now, a renunciation upon such bases, when it is posi-
tively determined on, ought to be officially declared
by the King of Prussia at the same time that the am•
hesty is declared by Switzerland, or, at all events, it is
requisite to give for this renunciation the assurances and
guarantees required in the communication lately made
to the English and French cabinets, or, in short, some
assurances and guarantees of corresponding effect. Such
a basis being wanting, the Federal Council would find
itself unable to submit the proposal of an amnesty to the
Legislative Councils. It would be unable to present for
that measure any political and judicial motive wherewith
to meet the feeling unanimously displayed at the last
session of the Council's, aid which the latest acts of
Prussia are not calculated to diminish. Such a proposal
woula be sure to be rejected in the most peremptory

manner.
You have learned, Mr. President and gentlemen, from
the public papers the reception—so friendly with regard
to Switzerland and its envoy extraordinary--which has
been given to General Dufour on the part of his Majesty.
the Emperor of the French. In the private interviews
between them our delegate succeeded in his efforts to
set aside certain points which had threatened a consider-
aWe complication of the difficulties.
In conferences with the ministers of France and Eng-
land, it was provisionally understood that France and
England would require, without precisely guaranteeing
it, that the liberation of Neuchatel from every foreign
claim should be considered as the equivalent of an am-
nesty previously granted, and that a renunciation on the
part of Prussia might accordingly be considered as toler-
ably certain.
Nevertheless, the English cabinet, from motives that
will hereafter be explained, did not deem it right to ac-
cede to these collective measures against Switzerland,
and it appeared at the time that the plan discussed at the
Conferences could not be realised, or at least not such
as it had been understood at the beginning by our en
voy ; but if once the negotiations should have reached
that point, we thought we should be able, without
lowering the dignity of Switzerland, to advance another
step in the path of conciliation. Yon remember, Mr.
President and gentlemen, that in the instructions pre-'
sented to our envoy extraordinary, it was stated, that if
the guarantee required, as mentioned in our communi-
cations to the English and French cabinets, could not
be obtained, assurances and guarantees of corresponding
value would be accepted.
Moved by this consideratior, we authorised our envoy
to enter into negotiations on this third kind of assur-
ances, having a corresponding value.
On this subject, we shall observe that we were bound
to place a high value on the fact of the two powers
(England and France) acting in concert, and on the fact
that the assurance required would not emanate from one
of those two powers alone. It was not necessary, in onr
opinion, that their note itself should require or recom
mend the amnesty, but it should fully acknowledge the
right of a free determination on the part of Switzerland,
by declaring, for instance, that if the Confederation
liberated the prisoners, England and France would un-
dertake to use their efforts for obtaining a renunciation
on the part of the King of Prussia.
The mere assurance of good offices given in a vague
Manner could not satisfy us. It was necessary at the
least to express that France and England would engage
to
nnd bringsgwi
about such a transaction as should not impose
on Switzerland conditions incompatible with her honour
and dignity, and that if Prussia did not consent to such
di
an arrangement, England and France would declare that
they believed themselves to be no longer bound by the
Londoo protocol, and that they were unwilling to per-
mit that Prueeia should make an attack against Swit-
zerland upon the ground of her claims on Neuchatel, or
generally to permit that she should take hostile measures
against the Confederation.
We drew up the instructions within these limits, leay.
ing, however, to our envoythe power of choosing cr
adopting other forms. If we communicate to you all
these details, it is espe=cially with the view of proving to
to you that we did not wish to exclude ourselves from
the path of conciliation by over-scrupulous difficulties,
but that, on the coo trery, we were ready to make every
concession consistent with our dinette towarle the Swiss
nation and its representatives. We declared solemnly
at that period, that is to say, on the 17th of November,
that we were ready to assist in effecting any arrange-
ment calculated to attain our object—the recognition of
the independence of Neuchatel—tee instant we could do
so in a form and manner that would compromise in no
respect the dignity and honour of Switzerland.
Our envoy extraordinary united his efforts to those of
our resident minister at Paris for the purpose of obtain.
ing a unity of views on the main question between France
and England. It did not appear probable that this ob-
ject could be attained, since England disagreed with