The Sun.
London, England, 1823-01-14 00:00:00

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

It would be, repeating matter already notorious to enter into
the reasons upon whiCh the system of Europe was settled by
the treaty of Vienna. If the settlement of that period was not
perfect'upon every point, it was unquestionably the best that
could be pmcured, under the circumstances then existing, to
preserve the future peace of Europe. The congress of Sove-
reigns, if it must be so called, grew, in fact, out of the circum-
stances of that period. The greater number of the European
sovereigns had personally accompanied their own armies into
France, and had assisted, and /superintended, the conclusion of
those treaties at Paris, which prepared the way for the final and
more complete settlement at Vienna. The community of sen.
timent which at that time characterised these illustrious perso-
nages,,suggested the obvious inference, that the same means
might be adopted to maintain the system which had so happily
been employed to put it together. Such, in point of fact, was
the origin of what is now called the Congress of Sovereigns.—s
Its object is to maintain the system at that time established, but
more particularly to preserve the peace of the,continent. Its
principle, or rather its means, may be stated in a sentence.—
It i the maintenance of the general peace of Europe
by the personal amity of the sovereigns, and by a system
of mediation and amicable diaeussion, which should, on the•
one side, recognize the perfect independence of the several
states in their own internal concerns ; and, upon the other,
should hoid 'forth their common interest, and therein their
common obligation, to consult the general polYcy of Europe in
all questions affecting the safety of the whole.
It is a most uncandid representation of the character of this
system to assert, that the allied powers, and England amongst
them, have in this Congress formed a confederacy to controul
the internal concerns of ogler states, or to act the authoritative
arbitrator in dissensions between state and state, upon interests
belonging only to themselves. It is a gill more malicious and
unjust assertion, tlutt the European sovereigns, and that Eng-
land, in conjunction with them, have bound themselves, in
this Congress, to guarantee to each other the actual degree of
monarchical power possessed by each over his own subjects. As
regards England, and as regards the other princes, the Con-
Krems is, in fact? nothing but an amicable conference of sove-
reigns upon their particular and common Interest ; it is a mere
council of discussion—but, in no degree, a league and confe-
deracy for the purposes of action. That is to say, so far as
Great Britain is concerned, there exists no convention, either
secret orexpressed, by which one member is bound tosupport any
particular object of the others, or to give any conjoint effect to the
vote of the majority. To say al in a word, it is a mere friendly
conference, and in no degree a diet or confederacy. There exists
no article, express or understood.; nothing in the nature of a
resolution ; nothing of a general understanding, nor admitted
obligation, that one sovereign should have the right to call upon
another to Interfere in his own domestic administration, (if al
any time adverse to his interests and inclinations,) or to demand
the power of Congress to suppress any merely civil contest be-
tween such sovereign and his subjects. , The Congress, as such,
and in the sense in which England consents to becothe a mem-
ber, and to be present at its discussions, admits only such sub-
jects as palpably menace the general tranquillity of Europe,
and threaten to re-introde4e, in their dangerous exceie, those
principles of anarchy, spoliation, and, let it be added, that sys.
tematic regicide, that infatuated destruction of all religious faith
and establishment, which characterised the French revolu-
tion. In a word, the avowed and understood object of Con-
gress is assuredly to keep down and to suppress the all-
destroying spirit of French jaco binism ; for why should not the
name be used where it so well expresses the thing ? and, second-
ly, to maintain the peace of Europe by amicable mediation and
discussion.

Such, in brief terms, is the nature of this Congress; a sys-
tem of mediation and. discussion, and in no degree an offensive
or defensive alliance. When any question is introduced into
this conference, the first consideration is, Does it affect either
of the objects of Congress? If it he palpably a jacobinical insur-
rection, for the purpose of expelling kings, nobles, and the
clergy, the next inquiry is, whether it exists in such excess as
to require the common aid of Europe to put it down. If it be a
mere difference between two states, it is manifestly matter of
friendly mediation, and such mediation is applied upon the
same principle- as it would be applied if there existed no Con-
gress at all. The only difference is, that both parties are pre-
sent before the friends of each, and are all present by themselves
as well as by their ministers. If it be a mere internal concern,
which a sovereign in his discretion deems proper to introduce,
it is a subject only of friendly advice.

It was upon these principles that his Majesty's Ministers
may be-presumed to have regulated their ovrn conduct in the
part they bore in an affair not yet terminated. The contest
between Spain and her subjects was introduced in the late Con.
gress at Verona. Without the aid of any other facts upon this
subject than what events have rendered sufficiently known, it
manifestly appears, that France claimed the consent of Europe
ir. the first Place, and the common tdd, if eventually necessary,
to suppress a revolution so directly affe.cting the general objects
of the Congress. The ministers,' representidg the person of
their sovereign, insisted, and assuredly with a strong appear.
ance of truth, that this contest fell immediately within the two
objects of Congress—That the Congress, at France understOod
it, proposed two immediate ends ; the suppression in origin of
all revolutionary and antisocial principles, and the maintenance
of the general peace of Europe; but that both these objects were
alike endan6ie4l by the present condition of Spain. That it
was a jacobinical revolution. That if a jacobinical revolution.
had Any distinctive characters, they were three. A revolution
is necessarily such, when it is effected by a military de-

fection ; when it restrains and consequently endangers the
person of the king and his family ; and when it ope-
rates in a system of irreligion and spol4tion of the church.
v—But that all these characteristic distinctions were ma.
nifest upon the face of the Spanish revolution. The Spa-
" nish revolutitin had
.notoriously commenced with the general
defection of the 'army from the sovereign. His Catholic ...Ma-
jesty had no longer any control over his own soldiers. The
Spanish army was no longer the arinypf Ferdinand, but of
Mina and the Cortes. The restraint upon the person of the
king was equally notorious. He possesses as little the choice of
his ministers as the command of his army. He is compelled to
sign the warrants for the execution, or rather murder, of his
most faithful end zealous adherents. It is notorious to all Eu-
ropa thathis Catholic Majesty is but the nominal head of his
own kingdom. The Spanish princes were living in a state of
daily peril and anxiety for their lives and fortunes. Is it
possible that the example of a rebellion so successful should not
affect the safety of the French crown ? It had not been with-
out difficulty that the French government had succeeded in
repressing the revolutionary spirit in the capital and provinces.
If the Spanish revolution should be permitted to complete and
consolidate itself into some form of government founded upon
the principles of anarchy, the example would extend beyond
France, and there would 'scarcely be force enough in Europe
to contend against a system of successful and recognised Ja.
cobinism., And what, in fact, did France require P.—Her Go-
vernment required nothing more than what belonged, as mat.
ter of public right, to every independent nation. The King
believed the security of his throne and the tranquillity of his
people to be brought into danger by the revolutionary princi-
pies and practices of an adjacent power ; he believed that the
condition of Spain required France to resort to the means of
self-defence, and he claimed a right to employ these means.—
Austria and Naples afforded a case in point. If one of the
powers of Congress had not• assented to the principle upon
which the revolutionary movements' in Naples and Piedment
were opposed by the common force of Europe, the other Soya.
reigns had come forward, with alacrity, to assist Austria in
a contest, the magnitude of which she had overrated, though
she had certainly not undervalued the danger of the principle.
The King of France claimed no right to interpose in the in-
ternal affairs of another people, except where such affairs
were conducted upon principles which menaced the safety
of all other Governments, and of France in particular--
IV-as it 'possible to deny, that in such a state of things, and
under such a degree of danger, he possessed the right of declaring
war against Spain. and of forcibly putting down an example
which directly assailed his own safety ? It was' certainly an.
other question whether the sovereigns of Europe would co-ope-
rate with their several armies in this efrort. The determination
of this question must depend upon the opinion entertained
amongst those sovereigns, how far their own safety was corn.
patible with the success of such principles, and how long the
general peace might be supposed to endure under the influence
of such an example.

Whatever might be the general truth of these representations
on the part of the French Government, and. whatever respect
might be due to the immediate interests of France, it was ma-
•nifest that her proposed appeal to arms would be at once a
great present evil, and, what was more to be dreadede might
terminate In an extreme and unforeseen issue. Possibly,
therefore, the representations of her ministers were answered
by the ministers, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, by ad-
mitting the general question of right to act as an independent
power, but appealing to her *Worn and moderation. It was
possibly admitted, that the objects of the European confer-
ence, at that time assembled at Verona,
to maintain a general peace by amicable discuss
itteln resuscitationble
danger from
don ; anal, in the event of any great common
were uionnqanuesatimonedabiswlys
general safety. But
that tills latter abject
was manifestly
urged, at the same time,
su r measures th ro fthet
eepecting the ancient and establish-
edlimited by the necessity of r
he revolutionary principle,it to adopt
doubtless
ternal proceedings of any government _
of Europe, it is the right an contrary to the common safety
resort to means of self-defence, and to
duty of every Sovereign to
by
force
principle of the independence of nations.orpeop lieVhaerree
dithrece
jpuusttifdyoisvtnlchsuacphoactaii,etcut,iovethminisgcshaireef
alwaysbectsiarrys;
theßuaterstto,
the existence of such principles ; and secondly, their existence
in such a form, and in such a degree of strength, as to consti-
tute a necessity to appeal to arms. It is only by such neces-
sity, and under such a case of self-defence, that one nation
could be justified in interfering in the internal concerns of
another. Without this limation, the independence of nations
would be but a name ; and another, and most fertile source
of future war would be opened, to the destruction of every
Government in Europe. It was possibly acknowledged that
the Spanish Revolution had proceeded upon principles most
strongly objectionable, and had exhibited actions and incidents
justly alanning to every established Government. But was
it not very questionable whether the danger were so extreme as
was apprehended by the French Government ? Was it not
rather the contest of two parties, than a Jacobinical revo-
lution ? His Most Catholic Majesty still possessed his per--
sons! liberty ; his Royal authority was still acknowledged ;
and if his
.prerogatives were abridged, and the exercise of
his royal rights controlled, it was certainly an unhappy con.
juncture in the internal affairs of Spain, but assuredly it did
not constitute a case of general appeal to arms. It was not a
case of the kind contemplated by the Congress of Sovereigns as
falling within the objects of theirunion. The European So-
verigns had at present two great objects: the first, to maintain
the general peace; and the second, not to provoke a ghneral
exasperation amongst the subjects of free States, by confirm-
ing tin opinion, (now industriously cherished and spread) that
the Congress was, in fact, a Confederacy of Kings, to prevent
and put down all reforms on the part of subjects, and aogua-
rantee td .
" every Sovereign his actual state of monarchial power.
-It was necessary to give an effectual answer to this malicious
representation of the object of the Congress. of Sovereigns, and
not to provoke those associations, secret or public, in free
states, which would be infinitely more dangerous.because
composed of more respectable individuals—than the Jacobinital
fraternities of Spain and Italy. One object of Congress would
necessarily be interrupted by the proposed appeal to arms
on the part of France; it would be a termination, in fact,
of the existing general peace of Europe. The risk was great,
the success uncertain, and the extent and consequences
wholly unforseen. Tire war would assuredly net end with the
oecupationef 31a4rid, whilst Cadiz adhered to the party of the
Cortes ; and former experience had proved the almost im-
pregnable strength of Cadiz. The whole power of France—and
at a period when France could unite with herself a great por-
tion of Europe—had been foiled before Cadiz ; and with every,
respect for the tried coureee of the French armies, ;t was
scarcely questionable whether the French Government could
justify itself, in prudence, for a long enduring siege of tine
fortrees. The operations, therefore, would not be confined to
one compaigne With every ivh:h for the welfare of France;
with every desire for the perinanent security of her throne, and
'for her consolidation in public order and tranquillity..-it was
impossible for the ministers of his Britannic Majesty to hold
forth any promise of co-operation in such a war. If France
embarked in it, it must be, as respected England, upon her own •
ground, and with all the eventual risk* of the contest.
Such we presume to have been the language of the English
Ministers upon the application of France for the common and of
Europe in a war with Spain.
It is impomeible to deny the right of France, as an indepen-
dent nation, to enter upon such war, if her government should
deem it to be matter of self-defence, and if the Spanish govern-
ment., de facto, should refuse such modifications as France may
think alone compatible with her safety. Our Ministers, there-
fore, did not deny the existence of the right ; but they guest
tioned, and still must be allowed to question, the existence of
such right under the actual state of France and Spein, and, in.
deed of Europe generally, They esteem the general peace at
too high a value to interrupt it from the appreeeneion of remote
danger. They recognise, at the same time, the ancient prir
ciple of the independence of nations in their own in con-
cerns ; and they deem this principle to be so intimately con.
netted with the security of the general peace, and the per-
manent interests of mankind, that they are unwilling to admit
any other exception to it than a case of necessity extreme in all
its circumstances; that is to say, unquestionable in its existence,
formidable in its magnitude, and at once certain and extensive
in its operation.