The Sun.
London, England, 1841-01-22 00:00:00

MORISON'S PILLS-MORISON V. SALMON.

In this ease an action was brought by the plaintiff to
recover damages from the defendant for selling a certain
&lig under the name of Marison's Pills, to the infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's rights. It was tried at Guildhall
at the sittings after Michaelmas last, and a verdict was
given for the plainntiff in damages one farthing. The de
fendant subsequently applied for a ne.v trial which was
refused, and this day
Mr. Serjcant TALFOURD applied fora rule to show cause
why the plaintiff should not be deprived of his costs, not-
withstanding the certificate of the Learned Judge ( Mr.
Justine Manic), before whom the case was tried. The
ground of this application was that the certificate was con.
teary to the meaning of the Statute of 3 and 4 Victoria,
commonly called Lord Denman's Act, which enacts that
the Judge shall have power to certify in cases of damages
less than 40s. for libel, slander, assault, tresspass,
only when the action was brought to try a right,
other than the right to damages, or where there was malice.
The Learned Sergeant contended that in this case there
was no right beyond the common law right which every
man had to sell his own goods, and that was the right
merely to the damages which the Jury assessed. But
there was no peculiar or private right, such as the Act
contemplated in the exceptive words, authorising the
Judge to certify.
The LORD CHIEF JusrtcE did not sae any right which
the plaintiff had beyond the common law right, which was
the right to damages, as indicated by the Act. If so, cer-
tainly the costs should not be certified.
Rule to show cause granted.

LAMUOURSE V. CROWDEN.

This was an action for work and labour done against
the Star (Gravesend) Steam-packet Company. It ap-
peared that the plaintiff, being himself a shareholder in the
Company, was appointed in the year 1837 superintendent
of the packets, at a salary of 1501. Differences arising
between he and the defendant, who was Chairman of the
Board of Directors, the plaintiff wrote to the Board, com-
plaining of the coniuct of Mr. Crowden towards him,
and declining to attend any future meeting at which that
Director should preside, or to obey any orders given to
him otherwise than in writing. Upon this letter his resig.
nation was accepted, and the Company refused to pay him
the sum of 291., which he demanded as the balance of his
salary, from the date of the above-mentioned letter up to
the time of his actually quitting his office. The case was
tried before the Lord Chief Justice, who received a
verdict for the plaintiff, on the general issue (non assump-
sit), but directed a nonsuit, on the ground the the
plaintiff having been engaged as a yearly servant, at a sa-
lary to be paid in apportional periods of the year, was
not entitled to wages for the expired portion of any pe-
riod within the year, during which he chose to resign or
refuse to do his duty, without just cause. The plaintiff

last term obtained a rule to show cause why the nonsuit
should not be set aside, and the verdict entered in his
favour. accorliorr to .Iv. 7enfrßl finiing of •be Jury-
Mr. Sergeant SHEA LUIS day showed cause againg the
rule, and cited a number of cases, in support of the law as
laid down by the Lord Chief Justice.

Mr. Sergeant ACKERLY replied at great length, con.
tending that the contrect bad been altered in the course of
the year by mutual consent, and he cited a number of
cases to show that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to the
benefit of a general contract, just as if no special contract
had ever exited. It bad been laid down that the special
contract was rescinded virtually by the plaintiff's being
continued in his office after he refused to act upon that
contract, and he was entitled to salary in the mean time.
The rule for a nonsuit, and to enter a verdict for plain-
tiff, was refused ; but a rule absolute was granted for a
new trial, on a point omitted in the Learned Judge's di-
rection.

(Sittings at Guildhall, before Mr. Justice COLTMAN and a
Common Jury.)
MORGAN V. PROCTER.

This was an action to recover lON., the amount of a
promissory note, and the sum of 3731, which sums had been
lent by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintff, Mary
Morgan, who has now arrived at an advanced age, was
formerly the servant of the defendant, and must have been
of very thrifty and frugal habits, for it was out of the
savings of her wages earned by previous servitudes that
she was enabled to lend the defendant the above amount.
The defendant had pleaded as to the promissory note that
it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation on the
part of the plaintiff; and as to the sum of 3731., that the
statute of limitation would prevent the plaintiff recovering
it. The promissory note did not become payable till the
4th of January, 1835, and the present action having been
commenced before the 4th of January in the present year,
it was brought. within the siz years after the cause of
action bad occurred, and therefore the statute of limitation
could not apply to that, as was admitted by the defendant's
Counsel. The other leg of defence was completely shot
from under Mr. Procter by acknowledgment of the debt
contained in letters addressed by him to the plaintiff, in
answer to her repeated applications.
Mr. BRANSWELL (in the absence of Mr. Sergeant
Bompas) conducted the case nn the part of the plaintiff,
and designated the conduct of the defendant in placing
upon the record such pleas as he had done, as most dis-
honest and disreputable.
The only witness called was a Mr. Cuff, a relative of
the defendant, who proved that the promissory note and
the sevcrd letters show❑ to him were in the handwriting of
the defendant. This witness, who was a relation of the
defendant, stated the defendant formerly, he believed,
lived in Size-lane, and very reluctantly confessed that the
defendant was now living at a place called Sutton Coal-
field. Whether he was carrying on any business he could
not tell, although in his letters the defendant talked very
much about his African trade.

Mr. Sergeant TA LFOURD, who appeared for the defen-
dant, admitted that he could not answer the plaintiff,' case,
and therefore would not trouble the Jury with any ob-
servations

The Learned Jucca then very shortly directed the
Jury, and a verdict was given for the sum of 565/. 193.,
as being the amount due to the plaintiff for principal money
and interest.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, JAN, 2h
(Sittings in Banco.)
TA PSEL V CROSSKEY.

The defendant in this c;ise was a surveyor of highways
of a parish in the caumty of Sussex, and in that character
had entered upon and taken materials from the land in the
occupation of the plaintiff, without any notice or the autho-
rity of a Magistrate. The action was tried before Lord
Abinger at Lewes, when a verdict was found for the
plaintiff.
Mr. PLATT bad obtained a rule nisi for a nonsuit, which
was now argued.
Cause was shown against the rule by Mr. Thesiger,
Mr. Peacock, and another gentleman, who contended
that the verdict ought not to be disturbed, arthey held that
the Act of Parliament, in speaking of " enclosed lands,"
meant any private land, in contradistinction to waste or
common lands. If the Court could put such a construc-
tion upon the words of the Act, the action could be main-
tained ; if not, then in Sussex the Surveyors of Highways
would have power to enter upon thousands of acres, for on
the Downs there was not a fence, by mutual agreement,
for probably ten miles.
Mr. PLATT supported the rule, and stood upon the
strict words of the law. It was a public good that the
power was given for, and no doubt the Legislature were
fully aware of the effect of the words they used.
A gentleman behind the bar was about to follow, but
was interrupted by
The CoCßT,who said that, however reluctantly, they had
conic to the conclusion that the rule must be made abso-
lute. However inconvenient such a decision might be,
they were bound by the law as they found • it. The diffi.
culty had arisen from the Legislature using very obscure
words, viz.—" enclosed lands," without giving any distinct
meaning to them. Probably that decision might lead to
an amendment of the law.—Rule absolute.