The Sun.
London, England, 1847-01-15 00:00:00

THE SUN,
~I,OI\TDON, FRIDAY MORNING, JANUARY 15, 1847

have been expressed in London to ascertain the sent-
' rents of the British Government on this matter pro-
' fesscdly with a view that, the two Governments might
• be enabled to tcl:e a common coule?, while at the saute
• time such precipitation was displayed at Madtid in hur-
rying on a course which the French Government had
been informer: was one in a hich the co-operetion of the
British Government was not to be expected.
But the marriage of the Queen of Spain is a matter
which concerns Spain chiefly, and other countries only
indirectly; and at teough her Majesty's Governmeut
Env have its own opinion as to the manner in which
that marriage has been settled, they would probably rot
have thought it necessary to make any oflioial commu-
nication to the French Government on that matter, if it
had been an insulated transaction, and had not been
coupled with the projected marriage of the Infanta to
the Duke of Montpensier; thus forming part of a most
objectionable political arrangement.
It is the projected marriage cf the Duke of Mont-
pensier to the Infanta which renders the present com-
munication necessary, and it is against that marriage
that the British Government must formally remonstrate I
and protest.
Such a marriage would give just cause of politic ti
.jealousy to other powers, and unless accompanied by
public acts in France and in Spain, of which as yet no
mention has been made, might give rise to questions
calculated to disturb the peace of Europe. .
The British Government hopes that the Queen of
Spain may live many years to enjoy a long and pros-
perous reign, and wishes that her approaching marriage
may be blessed with an ample succession to the Spanish
Crown ; but the uncertainty of human affaire renders it
necessary to contemplate the possibility that the Crown
of Spain might devolve upon the Infanta.
If this should happen, the Infanta being married to
the Duke of Montpensier, that Prince would be placed
in that very position of consort to the Queen of Spain
which the Kim-, of the French three or four years ago,
himself, as I bare before stated, practically acknowledged
that no son of his ought to occupy, and thus, in cense-
quence of such a marriage, that event which the King of
the French declined to arrive at by direct means might
by indirect means be brought, to pens ; and it appears to
her Majesty's Government that good faith requires that
what has been •reliequiehed in one way should not he
sought after in another.
But if the, line of Queen Isabella were to fail, and if
there should at the same time exist issue of the marriage
of the Infanta with the Duke of Montpensier, a serious
question might arise respecting the succession to the
Spanish Crown. For it is perfectly clear, that by virtue
of the renunciation made at the peace of Utrecht by the I
Duke of Orleans of that day, all his " descendants, male
and femalie; from that time and for ever, are excluded,
disabled, andiriCapecitated from succeeding to the throne
of Spain in what manner soever the succession might
fall to their line," and therefore the children and de-
scendants of the Duke of Montpensier would, in conse-
quence thereof, be excluded from succeeding to the
Spanish Crown. But,. however plain the words, and
however positive the effect, of that renunciation must be
acknowledged to be, the children or descendants of this
marriage might endeavour to set up a claim in virtue of
the rights which they might allege to have inherited
from the Infanta, and thus, unless all pretence for doubt
on this point were at once removed by some valid act of
renunciation on the part of the Infanta for herself and
her descendants, the stipulation of the Treaty of Utrecht
might be set aside by an evasion, or the peace of Europe
might be disturbed by another war on account of the
succession to the throne of Spain.
But these considerations might also give rise to it
question of more immediate practical application, be-
cause there seems good ground for the assertion which
has been made in Spain, that in consequence of the ex-
clusion of the line of Orleans by the transaction of
Utrecht, the marriage of the Infanta to the Duke of
Montpensier would be contrary to the law and constitu-
tion of Spain.
Her Majesty's Government can scarcely believe that
a Government so anxious as that of France has pro-
fessed itself to be to respect the tranquillity of neigh-
bouring states, and to preserve the peace of Europe, can
insist upon the completion of a marriage which threa-
tens immmediate danster to the one, and is calculated to
place in serious Jeopardy the other.
But even if the objections to this marriage which are
founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht and the law of
Spain were as weak and untenable as the British Go-
vernment considers them strong and conclusive, the
British Government would still protest against this
marriage as inconsistent with a due regard to the ba-
lance of power in Europe, and as necessarily tending to
affect injuriously the nature and character of the rela-
tions between England and France.
It is impossible for the British Government to look
upon this marriage as a mere domestic arrangement be-
tween two royal families. It is a political transaction
between two great European Powers; and it would tend
to link the policy of the one to that of the other in re-
gard to the foreign relations of both in a manner which
would be dangerous to other States.
The British Government attaches great importance to
the maintenance of friendly relations both with France
and with Spain; and as long as the British Government
in its dealings with France shall have to consider only I
what may be justly due to the interests and honour of
France; and in its dealings-with Spain shall only have
to show a similar respect for the honour and interests of
Spain; there is reason to expect that flee spirit of justice
and moderation which it may be hoped will always
direct the councils of England will secure the continu-
ance of peace between Great Britain and those two
Powers. But, if Spanish interests are to sway the
foreign policy of France, or, if French interests are to
sway the foreign policy of Spain, Great Britain may
find herself involved in serious differences with one of
those Powers, without having given it any well-founded
cause of complaint, and may be unable to re-establish
friendly relations with the ono without submitting to
what may be unreasonable and unjust demands on the
part of the other.
The British Government considers the projected mar-
riage of the Duke of Montpensier to the Infanta as cal-
culated thus to link together the policy of France and
Spain ; and as France must be admitted, without any
disparagement to Spain, to be the greatest power of the
two, this marriage would tend to affect, most injuriously
for the interests of other States, the political indepen-
dence of Spain.
But the injurious effects of this marriage would not
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net
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evlßeoii
between
be confined to their direct operation on the foreign re•
lations of Spain. They would be felt also through the
medium of her internal concerns.
Past experience does not warrant any confident ex-
pectation that Spain will in future be entirely free from
those violent outbreaks which have so often taken place
within her territory of late years.
The French Government has wisely laid it down as
a rule of conduct to abstain from any armed interference
t
d
e
in the internal
idimromne
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onaleoemgffnxs affairs
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involve
should
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the national passions of the Spanish people, but may also
lead other powers again to make Spain one of the battle-
fields of Europe ?
It is impossible that Great Britain can be an indif-

ferent observer of au event. which may lead to such re-
sults ; and it is not in the nature of thin,4s that an event
so brovglit to pass, and calculated to produce such
results, should not exercise a most injurious influence
upon the relations between Great Britain and France.
The manner in which this projected marriage has been
arranged, the political views in regard to the future which
it discloses, the possible consequences which it might
produce, not only to the friendly relations between Great
Britain and France, but in m iny supposable cases to the
peace of Europe, induce the British Government ear-
nestly to remonstrate against it, and to express their
anxious hope that it may not be concluded.
Your Excellency is instructed to assure the French
Government that the strong objections which the British
Government feels to this marriage do not spring from
any unworthy jealousy of the natural greatness or of the
just power of France.
In a great European crisis, not very long since gone
by, Great Britain was the foremost to acknowledge the
great importance of maintaining the French monarchy
unimpaired as an essential element in the balance of
power in Europe. The present Government of Great
Britain fully share, i❑ this respect, the sentiments of
their predecessors of that day. The British Govern.
ment will rejoice to see Francs happy, prosperous, and
powerful. But France possesses Vk ithin her own ample
territory, and in her own immense resources, the means
of maintaining that high position which Providence has
destined her to occupy among the nations of the world;
and all attempts on her part to establish, by indirect
methods, an illegitimate influence over other States,
which, though not so powerful as herself, are equally en-
titled to perfect national independence, must, from the
very nature of things, end at last in disappointment and
failure. But the struggles through which that failure
will be brought about must be productive of evil to
France as well as to all the other States that may be in-
volved in them.
Her Majesty's Government being desirous of giving
to this communication the most friendly form which is
consistent with a full and authentic expression of their
sentiments, do not instruct you to embody the sub-
stance of this dispatch in a note, but I am to desire
that you will read this dispatch to M. Guizot, and that
you will send him, officially, a copy of it.

I am, &c•

M. GUIZOT TO M. LE COMTE DE JARNAC.
Paris, Oct. 5, 1846.
Monsieur le Comte,—The English Ambassador called
on me some days ago (25th of September) to communi-
cate a dispatch, dated the 22d of September, addressed
to him by Lord Palmerston, on the subject of the mar-
riages of the Queen of Spain with the Infante Don Fran-
cisco d'Assis and of the Infanta Don Luisa Fernanda
with the Duke de Montpensier. You will find a copy
annexed. I have laid it before the King in Council ;
and I send you the answer of the King's Government
to this communication, begging you to lay it before the
Principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Mjesty.
At the conclusion of his dispatch, Lord Palmerston says,
that" the Governinent of her Britannic Majesty is (1,-
sirous of giving to this communication the most friendly
form which is consistent with a full and authentic ex-
pression of its sentiments." You will assure Lord Pal-
merston that the King's Government also entertains fek.l-
- of the most sincere friendship towards England
and its Government, though it feels it its duty to
maintain the rights and interests. of France against
complaints and representations which appear to it
unfounded.

I um anxious, in the first place, to free myself from a
charge which Lord Palmerston, at tine beginning of his
dispatch, brought against the King's Government, and
which has, I confess, occasioned me some surprise. lle
remarks that we, not long ago, proposed to the English
Government to come to an agreement and to act in
unison as. to the advice to be given to the Court of

Madrid upon the marrial-,,e of Queen Isabella; and that
this proposal " was hat dly consistent with the steps
taken at Madrid by Frar Ice singly ;" since, according to
him, we had at the same time ordered Count Bresson to
endeavour to bring about the Queen's marriage with
one particular candidati (the Infante Don Francisco
d'Assis), and that, consequently, the question upon
..vhich the French Charge d'Affaires was offering to de-
liberate in London had been already decided by the in-
structions which had 'ueen sent to the French Anabas-
seder at Madrid.
An accurate statem' nit of facts will demonstrate the
groundlessness of this accusation.
It is true, that in th month of July I proposed to the
Cabinet of Loncl.on to come to an agreement to act in
c'ncert at Madrid, in order that we might give our joint
support specially to tiie two Infants, sans of Don Fran-
cisco de Paula. Th'a claims of these two Princes, as
descendants of Philip V., were admitted by us, and, as
Spanish Princes, by England; while the Court of Madrid
appeared to be more fa-.-oitrably disposed towards them.
I therefore proposed to the English Government to give
them our joint support, and I declared at the same time
that, for our part, we liad no objection to either of those
Princes, and that the one of them who might be agree-
able to Spain and to the Queen would also be agreeable
to us.
I have addressed the Same language to Madrid as to
London. Count Bresson has always had;instructions to
support the pretensions of the two Infants,.. and to de
dare beforehand that we should .entirely acquiesce in
the choice which the Queen might make between them.
His Majesty's Ambassador has punctually fulfilled his
instructions.

What took place when, more than a month after my
proposal of co-operation in favour of Vas• sons of Don
Francisco de Paula, Lard Palmerston at length sent me
his answer. He asked us to unite with -him in giving
exclusive support at Madrid to Don Enrique, " the only
one fit " (as the dispatch of the 22d of Arsa,ust, comma-
; Merited to me by Lord Normanby on the 28th, affirms)
to becornewthe consort of the Queen." I expressed to
Lard Norrnanby, and I instructed you to express to
Lord Pfilartirstcr, rev astonishment 9t this; ,exelive de.
sit,,twion of Doii Enrique, and the itn:,o,sibility of our
tii,iting, in it, for we had al,,ays acid, and -we persist in
s!iving, that either of the two Infants: was agree-
to us; that it was for the Queen of Spain to decide
between them, and that we were ready to approve of
her choice, upon whichsoever of them it might fall.
It can be matter of surprise to no one that our ac-
ceptance of both the Infants as candidates, should have
turned out to be for the special advantage of the elder of
them, Don Francisco d'Assis. That Prince was occupy-
in.- a becoming and honourable position in Spain, and
observing' towards the Queen, her Government, and the
Queen Mother a perfectly respectful line of conduct. The
Infante Don Enrique had not taken means ao well fitted to
the attainment of his end. When he pissed through
Paris the King himself had given him his advice on this
subject; he had reminded him where his place, his
duty, and his best prospects of success were to
be found, and had offered to use his endeavours to
reinstate him in the position he had lost at Madrid. The
Infante did not follow this advice, and no, influence was
sufficiently powerful to counteract the unfavourable
situation in which that young Prince had placed himself.
Bur, indeed, there wits nothing in this course of events
which might not easily have been foreseen. There was
no need of private instructions to Count Bresson to de-
termine the choice of the Court of Madrid in favour of
Don Francisco d'Assis, rather than of Don Enrique. As
to the charge of having given exclusive support to one of
the Infants, and of having forced that one upon the
choice of Queen Isabella, against whom can it justly be
alleged? Have we not, on our side, observed all the re-
spect due to the Queen's dignity, to the freedom of her
choice, and to the considerations by whip it was deter-
mined.
The Infante Don Enrique has had the misfortune to
fall under the influence of the blindest and most violent
section of the Progressita party in Spain,. That party
wished to make use of the name, the situation, and the
matrimonial chances of the Infante as means to the re-
establishment of its own power. For the attainment of
that end, it has contrived and prepared intrigues of all
kinds, eutculated to rekindle insurrection and civil war
in Spain. The designs of the party have been clearly
revealed by its organs. What could be more natural
then than such facts should influence the resolution
formed by the Spanish Government to decide without
delay the question of the Queen's marriage, on which all
parties founded their speculations and their hopes?
Other motives, not less legitimate, contribute to this
result.
From the very first, the King (as Lord Palmerston re
marks in his dispatch) had voluntarily declared that he
should not solicit the hand of the Queen of Spain for
any of his sons. He at the same time expressed the
firm hope that the crown of Spain would not be per-
mitted to go out of the house of Bourbon, and that the
Queen would choose her consort from among the de-
scendants of .Philip V.
The King's Government has declared, openly and
uniformly, that this was the rule of its policy. He
wished that the principles by which cur conduct was to
be guided, if we should be called upon to act, should be
well known beforehand by all Europe, and especially
by Spain and England, our allies.
There was nothing in this language which could in
the smallest degree prejudice the independence of Spain,
of her Queen, or her Government. For that independ-
ence we have a profound respect. By communicating
to the Court of Madrid, from the first moment, all our
opinions and views on this subject, we rather gave it a
mark of the high value we attach to those it may enter-
tain, as well as of our sincere and anxious friendship.
The Cabinet of London appeared at that time favour-
ably impressed with the motives which influenced our
conduct, and gave us reason to expect that it would
send advice conceived in a similar spirit to the Court of
Madrid.
So long as the various projects for the marriage of
Queen Isabella did not endanger our welt•known policy,
we simply seconded that one of those projects which
appeared to have the best chance of success.
As soon, however, as we saw that projects which
seemed to us to threaten a departure from the rule, that
the Queen's consort should be chosen from among the
descendants of Philip V., and that the throne of Spain
should remain in the house of Bourbon, were seriously
appearedthe
nuketh ehlikelydeterminedde realised,ndmnpteneof
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Queene
We
are
hand
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eithert
h o should d
entertained, we made known (on the 27th of February
last),
sho u
at London and at Madrid, that if these projects
consider n
thes id r
Infanta
for our-
selves released from every engagement, and at liberty to
demand
as at the first origin of the
question, to announce openly and beforehand how we
meant to act.

In the month of May last we were informed with cer-
tainty that the Spanish Government had just sent to the
reigning Duke of Saxe Coburg, then on a visit at the
Court of Lisbon, a message, requesting him to negotiate
the marriage of the Prince Laopold of Saxe Coburg with
Queen Isabella.
We learned, at the same time, and with the same cer-
tainty, that this message had been first communicated to
Mr. Bulwer, the English Minister at Madrid, and had
received his approbation.
The King's Government immediately made known to
the Courts of London and of Madrid the surprise and
anxiety it felt. It received from Lord Aberdeen as-
surances which proved the frankness an 4, uprightness of
his character and intentions. But, shortly after, Lord
Aberdeen went out of office, and the information we re-
ceived did not permit us to doubt that the efforts to
bring about the marriage of Queen Isabella with the
Prince of Coburg were actively continued. t
It was under these circumstances, and the anxiety
with which they filled us, that I received from you,
Monsieur le Comte, the dispatch which was addressed on
the 19th July oy Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer, and

which you were instructed to communicate to me con-
fidentially.
Ido not think (to advert to a charge insinuated by
Lord Palmerston) that the confidential nature of that
dispatch ought to have prevented my making it known,
also in confidence, to the King's Ambassador at Madrid,
to whom that knowledge was indispensable tor the due
understanding of the new situation in which that dis-
patch placed us, and who (as was his duty) made no
pubis or official use ofi t.
" The candidates or the Queen's hand" (say the in-
structions adiiressed on the 19th July by Lord Pahiners
to to Mr. Bulwer) " are reduced to three—Prince
Leopold of Saxe Coburg, and the two sons of Don Fran-
cisco de Paula. I omit all mention of the Count de Tra-
pani and the Count de Montemolin, because there seems
to be no chance that the choice will fall on either of
them."

According to the dispatch of the 22d of September,
which has just been communicated to me, Lord Pal-
meraton, in thus placing Prince Leopold of Saxe Co-
burg at the head of the three only remaining candidates
far the Queen's hand, did nothing more than " designate
that Prince as one of those who had been publicly talked
ofasapossi
ble
n)cfto imply thatnsortorthe he was pu
Queen of St forwardpain,an
and did
not at all or
recommended by the British Government."
But in the dispatch of the 19th of July, after the pa-
ragraph which I have just quoted, I find the following :
—"Among the three candidates above mentioned (Prince
Leopold of Coburg, and the two sons of Don Francisco
de Paula), her Majesty's Government has only to express
its sincere desire that the choice may fall upon the one
who may be most able to secure the happiness of the
Queen-and the prosperity of the Spanish nation."
Assuredly, if it may be said that the former of these
paragraphs simply states a fact, viz., that the Prince of
Saxe Coburg is a candidate for the Queen's hand (a fact
which had not, till then, been officially authenticated
and proclaimed), it is impossible to deny that by the
second paragraph the pretensions of that Prince are
admitted in the same mariner, and to the same extent,
as those of the Infants, sons of Don Francisco de Paula;
that no objection was raised to the one any more than
to the others ; and that thus all three are mentioned,
for the first time, with equal and indiscriminating appro-
bation.
We might, perhaps, be justified in remarking that this
is an implied recommendation—an indirect manner of
reaching the end which was not deemed expedient to
pursue directly. 6` Good faith, says Lord Palmerston,
in his dispatch of the 22d of September, " requires that
what has been relinquished in one way should not be
sought after in another." To this principle the King's
Government entirely assents.
Admitting that Lord Palmerston did not intend to
nropose or to recommend Prince Leopold of Coburg, he
induct:will c e certainly n admitm
to withdraw thathis
i
l e saidt n si nothing
to calculated
to
ethe project of the Spanish Government. Now we may
ask, what would have happened, if the Court of Madrid,
pretensions,
relying on the language which (after the dispatch of the
19th of July) Mr.Bulwer. would undoubtedly have held,
had persisted in the offer it made to that Prince ? It
might hive been said that this was the unbiassed choice,
the free will, of the Queen of Spain and her Govern
ment ; the terms of the dispatch of the 18th of July, in
which the English Government, though disclaiming any

desire to determine this choice, had announced that it
bad no objection to it, might have been appealed to ;
and, without direct support or active co-operation, by
simply remaining passive, the end would have been
attained.
The King's Government could not deceive itself as to
the real situation of things. It toDk the most legitimate•
and direct means of preventing the consequences. It
made an appeal to the free choice and independent will
of Queen Isabella and of her Government. It placed
before the Court of Madrid another arrangement, in-
stead of the one contemplated ; which last was mani-
festly at variance with its professed policy. It was at.
full liberty to pursue this course, for it had openly and
positively reserved to itself the right to do so. It was
bound to pursue it ; for the hypothetical case for which,
1
it had made that reservation, and which it had provided
against in its instructions to Madrid as well as in its
declarations to London, was becoming more and more
probable. The Green of Spain and her Government
have adopted this arrangement. The Cortes have given
it their almost unanimous approbation. The double
marriage of Queen Isabella with the Duke of Cadiz, and
of the Infanta Dana Luisa Fernanda with the Duke of
Montpensier, has been arranged and concluded with the
most entire liberty cf action, and from the most urgent
motives.

I therefore fulfil, 111. le Comte, the most imperative
duty in repelling a ith an energy of which my language
is but a faint expression the strange accusation brought
by Lord Palmerston in his dispatch against the King's
Arabassador at Madrid, of having, in virtue of his in-
structions, used "moral coercion" in order to force the
Queen of Spain to accept the Duke of Cadia as her con-
sort. I might confine myself to a very short and simple
answer, and one which would be admitted by the whole
world. In no court, in no family, is the liberty of mar-
riage and of domestic lire better understood, or more
scrupulously respected, than at the Court of the Tuileries,
and in the Royal Family of France. The sentiments
which inspire and guide the conduct of the King at
Paris and towards his own children, inspire and guide
that which he observes towards the Court of
Madrid and his Royal nieers_ And the King's Govern-
avant 1-; jealous of the honour of evincing everywhe,rf.
soil on every occasion, that respect for domestic ties of
which it his so exalted an example before it. But, l
must also ask with what consistency can the charge of
using "moral coercion" be brought against us by those
who, a month ae,,, asked us to use our influence with
Queen Isabella in exclusive favour of a Prince who was
notoriously labouring under her displeasure, and was
intimately connected with the most ardent enemies of
her Government ?
The Queen's choice of the Duke of Cadiz was per-
fectly free ; the approbation of the Queen's choice,
voted by the Cortes after a debate as unbiassed as it was
solemn, was also perfectly free ; and during that im-
portant deliberation. the public tranquillity was as per-
fect as the freedom in the interior of the palace, or in
the assembly of the nation. Assuredly, neither insti-
gations nor motives to disorder are wanting in Spain at
this moment. Pretensions, ambitions, schemes, and
conspiracies of every kind, have been at work to re-
kindle insurrection and civil war. At present, they
have not, whether separately or combined, succeeded in
giving a commencement of execution to their designs.
What more striking proof can be given of the senti-
ments of the great majority of the Spanish people, and
of their free assent to the choice of their Queen, and
the vote of their representatives ?
" Her Majesty's Goveienment," says Lord Palmerston
in his dispatch of the 22d of Septhmber, rejoice to
think that the British Government was no party to that
arrangement." The King's Government, on the con-
trary, sees reasons, founded on the interests of Spain,
of its allies, and of all Europe, for congratulating itself'
on the part it took in that event. The Duke of Cadiz
is not only a descendant of Philip V., he is by birth
and by sentiments a Spanish Prince. He has shown in-
variable respect for constitutional government, and for
the principles of the Spanish Monarchy. Spain and
Europe. the liberties of the Peninsula, and the inter-
rests of general order and tranquillity, find in his union
with Queen Isabella all the securities that a prudent and
lung-sighted policy can demand.
But although the marriage of Queen Isabella with the
Duke of Cadiz has called forth this expression of disap-
probation, it is, according to the dispatch of the 22d of
September, the marriage of the Infanta with the Duke
de Montpensier that has mainly necessitated, in the eyes
of the English Government, the communication which it
has just made, and the representations and protests it has
just addressed to us.
The King's Government will always esteem it its duty
to receive and to discuss, in a spirit of perfect fairness,
the representations which another Government, and
more especially a friendly Government, may think fit to
make on behalf of its interests or its policy. But pro
tests must be founded upon rights. No one can be
admitted to protest against an event merely because it
does not suit his views. Every protect must rest upon
an anterior right.
Thus, the English Government assumes as the basis
of its protest the Treaty of Utrecht, and the rules laid
down by that treaty for the succession to the crown of
Spain, with a view to the preservation of the peace of
Europe, and the balance of power.
The King's Government is of opinion that the Treaty of
Utrecht in no wise justifies such an assumption.

After the long and bloody war of the succession, and
with a view to re-establish the peace of Europe, the two-
fold object (distinctly recognised and proclaimed) of that
treaty was :
1. To secure the crown of Spain to Philip V. and his
descendants.

2. To prevent the possibility of the union of the crowns
of France and Spain on one head.
It is only necessary to review the negotiations which
preceded the Treaty of Utrecht, or even to read the do
current itself (art. vi.), to be convinced that such was its
intention and meaning.
By the marriage of the Infants with the Duke of
Montpensier, the crown of Spain is secured from all risk
of alienation from the house of Bourbon 'and the des-
cendants of Philip V. ; while, at the same time, the pro-
visions against the possibility of a union of the crowns
of France and Spain remain in full force. The twofold
object of the Treaty of Utrecht is, therefore, fulfilled.
It would be strange to appeal, as against us, to e
those
of the provisions of this treaty which go to prevent th
union of the two crowns, and to disregard those which
secure the throne of Spain to Philip V. and his des-
cendants.
Such, however, would be the result of the interpreta-
tion which Lord Palmerston, in his dispatch of the 22d
of September, seeks to put upon the treaty.
Up to the present day such an interpretation was not
only never admitted, but never imagined or advanced.
It is repugnant to facts, no less than to the text.
Never was the Treaty of Utrecht cited as creating an
obstacle to marriage between the several branches of the
French house of Bourbon and the several branches of
the Bourbons of .13ain.
Examples of such marriages abound. I shall content
myself for the moment with specifying three, the dates
of which are nearest to that of the Treaty of Utrecht.
1. Louis 1., King of Spain, the eldest son of Philip V.,
married, on the 20th of January, 1721, Louisa Elizabeth
of Orleans, Mademoiselle de Montpensier, fourth
daughter of the Regent Duke of Orleans;
2. The Infant Don Philip, Duke of Farms, son of
Philip V., married, on the 25th of August, 1739, Louisa
Elizabeth of France, eldest daughter of Louis XV.
3. The Dauphin, son of Louis XV., married, on the
23c1 of February, 1745, Maria Teresa Antonia, Infanta of
Spain, daughter of Philip V.
The last example is very remarkable; for it is that of
the immediate heir to the crown of France marrying one
of the heiresses to the crown of Spain. 1713
Nor can it be alleged that the law proclaimed in
of
by Philip V., with the view of changing the order
succession in Spain, had deprived the Infant.% Maria
Teresa Antonia of her eventual rights; that law w
only a semi-Salic law, admitting, it is true, the succession
of female descendants only in the event of the. i
failure of heirs male, but in that event admitting it fully.
The Infantas, therefore, in the marriages I have just
cited, and in all other analogous marriageosw' brought a
n of Spain.
positive, though contingent, right to tkhecr
g this right an
Nobody in Europe thought of
objection to those marriages, making
findemaudieg that
fresh stipulations should be added to the Treaty of
Utrecht, in order to prevent the consequences of them._
On the occasion of the marriage of the Infanta Dona
Luisa Fernando with the Duke of Montpensier, there
is no reason whatsoever for thinking or acting dif-
ferently; since the stipulations of the Treaty d
hithertoof Utrecht
would suffice hereafter, as they have s
for the preservation of the peace of Europe and the ba-
lance of power.
Consequently, no legitimate protest can be founded on
the text of treaty, or on its consequences,cou_ormity nwEitohnftaheetei:n..
terpretatiou to be given to it in
The marriage
connect
nthneeeDt utbkee
fo-
reign But Lord Palmerston does not found his protest solely
on the Treaty of Utrecht.
olicy of France
Montpensier tends,
, isecewoirtdbintbgetofehreimi
policy of Spa
in a manner dangerous to the independence of Spain, to
the balance of power in Europe, and to the interests of
other States.
s betrweight in the balance
Spain has proved that she was able to maintain her
a want of memor,
of Europe. It would
independence, and to prerve her
se
as well as of justice, toPetrebllager thant)s'he is no longer able
to do so.
She is, on the contrary, more competent than ever to
free and constitutional Governmenty
the maintenance of her ova Independence and dignit
She now possesses a
—a Government little favourable to the spirit of aggres-
sion and conquest, but very favourable to the mainte
nance of independence, and to the neutralizing of fort
Hance
The King's Government, on its side, has proved that
nothing was further from its thoughtsthanthe
r of
desireot
encroaching 011 the independence
of Spain,rr9ved her
)
inter-
fering in her affairs. The facts which have
firm resolution on this point are recent and
somen vl
obvious,
want antio f not to admit them betrays also, perhaps,
memory and of justice.
But, at the same time, we do not hesitate to declare
that the King's Government desires and seeks to estab-
lish a siecere and solid friendship between Franca
Spain. The geographical position of the two
States, and
their traditions, their manners and tow
their essential interests, moral or material), (in short, all
friendship natural and necessary—necessary,a), render this
to a policy aiming at the extension of either
not indeed
expense of the other, or of both
combined at the ex-
pense of other States, but necessary t
at security and peace for the benefit of a policy aiming
Beth, and that of
all Europe.
As connected with the marriage
and the Duke of Cadiz, the marriage of Queen Isabella
the Duke de Montpensier is at
ones
of the Infanta with
the desire of the two countries to drawe a manifestation of
of that friendship, and a pledge
of
its
sd closer the bonds
it from affe,:ting the independence of
Spainuration. So far is
verninent, or the indisp:nsable eonditi and its Go-
E of the
Euro-
pean balance ut power, that will °'
S
Watch,
tee those amicable and intimate relationsMe to gttat ;Att
between France

and. Spain which tend to promote the welfare of the two
nations, and secure the repose of Europe. It appears to
us that every country which is guided by a generous and
long-sighted policy has reasons to congratulate itself on
this result.

The King's Government, therefore, finds no serious
and legitimate foundation for the representations ad-
dressed to it by the Government of her Britannic Ma-
jesty ; nor, consequently, can it accept them, or take
them as a rule for its conduct. We regret this disagree-
ment. But as we are imperatively called on to decide
and to act, we have done, with the free concurrence of
the Spanish Government, what was consistent with our
rights, with. our lawful interests, and with the natural
and pacific policy of our country ; nor have we done
anything which infringes on the rights, the lawful inter-
ests, or the peace of other States. We are convinced
that. on this subject the people of France concur with
thiir Government, and everything conduces to prove that
the great majority of the Spanish people share the sen-
timents of their rulers. We are confident that the sound
judgment, and the spirit of fairness which distinguish
the Government and people of Great Britain will sa-
tisfy them that the high and generous motives which
led to the establishment of good understanding and
friendship between France, England; and Spain, rise far
above this special difkrence, and can in no wise be im-
paired by it,
I request you to present a copy of this dispatch to
Lord Palmerston, after having read it to him. -

I am, &c.

LORD PALMERSTON TO MR. BULWER.
(EXTRACT.)
Foreign-office, July 19, 1846.
The candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain are
reduced to three,b namely, the Prince Leopold of Saxe
Coburg, and the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula.
I omit Count Trapani and Count Montemolin, as there
appears to be no chance of the choice falling upon either
of them.

As between the three candidates above-mentioned, her
Majesty's Government have only to express their sin-
cere wish that the choice may fall upon the one who
may be the niw,t likely to secure the happiness of the
gnpen, and to promote thr welfare of the Spanish nation.

M. GITIZOT TO COUN r DE jAIINAC.
Paris, Oct. t I, 1846.
Monsieur le Comte,—Before I forwarded to you the
dispatch which I had the honour of writing to you on
the sth instant, I read it to his Excellency the English
Ambassador. When I had finished reading it, Lord Nor-
manby confined himself to a few short observations, re-
ferring to the answer which, he said, Lord Palmerston
would probably make, and to the discussion which
would probably take place between the two Govern-
ments on the subject. He afterwards told me that he
bad orders to communicate to me a note, without date,
which Mr. Bulwer is instructed to lay before the Spa-
nish Government. In this note, the Cabinet of London
protest against the possible succession of the descendants
of the Duke de Montpensier and the Infanta to the
throne of Spain. It declares that it does not recognise
the rights in virtue of which that succession would be
claimed, in default of issue of Queen Isabella; that,
with a view to this event, England reserves to herself
the liberty of taking whatever part she may deem ex-
pedient in the discussions to which such a state of
things may give rise; and that she makes this reserva-
tion at the present moment to secure herself against any
future reproach of having kept her intentions secret.
Such is the object and the general meaning of the Erg-
fish note, the exact terms and details of which I cannot,
however, repeat to you. It is to the Spanish Govern-
ment that this note is to be delivered, and it is the
business of that Government to reply to it. But, since
it has been communicated to me, we have the right, '
and, indeed, it is our duty, to express our opinion
upon it.

Such a protest, presented in virtue of the Treaty of
Utrecht, and of the renunciations annexed to that treaty
(or, more especially, in virtue of the renunciation by the
Duke of Orleans in 1712 of his contingent rights to the
throne of Spain) is, in our opinion, without any
foundation. I have told you, in my dispatch of the sih
instant, what was the true character of the Treaty of
Utret;ht, and what was the twofold purpose of its au-
thors in framing the clause relative to the Spanish suc-
cession. On the one side, the object was to secure the
throne to the descendants of Philip V., on the other, to
prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain on
one head. That was the oqject of the renunciations de-
manded on the one aide from Philip V., and on the other
from the Dukes of Berry and Orleans. This object,
therefore, determines the true sense and import of these
renunciations. They contain all that is necessary for
effecting the purpose of the Treaty of Utrecht, but they
cannot extend, and in fact do not extend, beyond that
purpose.

.?iccording'to this principle, which is incontestable in
itself, and which, moreover, is perfectly consistent with
the text of the document in question, the renunciation
on the part of the Duke of Orleans imports that, in case
the throne of Spain should fall vacant by the extinction
of the posterity of Philip V. (to which it is secured by
the Treaty of Utrecht), the descendants of the Duke of
Orleans could in no wise claim it. In consideration of
the renunciation made by Philip V. for himself and his
descendants of his contingent rights to the crown of
France, the Duke of Orleans abandoned his contingent
rights to the crown of Spain, preferring to these the
contingent rights which his birth gave him to the crown
of France, but which had been deemed incompatible with
the former and with the peace and interests of Europe.
Such is the real and the reasonable meaning of the
renunciation.

Does it follow from this that the descendants of Philip
V., upon whom the crown may devolve naturally and
lawfully, and in virtue of rights founded on the Treaty
of Utrecht itself, ought (with their posterity) to be ex-
cluded from it, because they may happen (or their an-
cestors may have happened), to intermarry with de-
scendants of the Duke of Orleans ? In other words,
should the positive incontestable right of the descendants
of Philip V. be set aside, because they may have con-
tracted alliances with a family which has renounced
its own?

Such a proposition is manifestly untenable; and, to
demonstrate the error of it, nothing more is necessary
than to state it with precision.
Such, nevertheless, is the purport of the English note,
when reduced to its true and essential terms. It is upon
this argument, and this only, that the protest rests.
In principle, therefore, it is wholly without founda-
tion, and facts demonstrate that up to this time Europe
has always been of this opinion. In my dispatch of the
sth inst. I cited three examples of marriage between
descendants of Philip V. and princes of other branches
of the house of Bourbon which had renounced their
rights to the throne of Spain. I might multiply such
examples. Never had it been maintained, or even ima-
gined, that, in consequence of these marriages, the inca-
pacity resulting from the renunciation (as if contagious,
g [communicable] from one branch to another)
aPnd flying
had annulledfli the rights of those descendants of Philip V.
to the throne of Spain.
Nor is the proposition more tenable at the present
day; for the state of things consequent on the marriage
of the Infanta with the Duke de ,uontpensier in nowise
affects that which the Treaty of Utrecht has established,
and which, in fact as well as in law, has received the
assent of all Europe. After twelve years of war the
European Powers, and England above all, thought that
a grandson of Louis XIV. and his descendants might,
without danger to the balance of power, occupy the
throne of Spain, whilst the descendants of Louis XIV.
should be seated on the throne of France. This degree
of kindred between the two crowns, with the ties be-
tween the two States which might result from it, was
fully accepted at the beginning of the last century by all
the Powers of Europe; and the guarantees inserted in
the Treaty of Utrecht to prevent the unions of the
crowns of France and Spain on one head appeared to
them fully sufficient for the protection of their legiti-
mate interests. Such is the public law of Europe; such
the state of things assented to and determined in the
name of the European balance of power. The marriages
wnich have just been concluded in nowise affect, I must
repeat, this state of things. They add nothing to the
degree of kindred between the crowns of France and
Spain. They subtract nothing from the guarantees sti-
pulated by treaties against the union of these two crowns.
They cannot, therefore, afford any legitimate ground for
a protest founded on those treaties and on the public law
of Europe.
Have the goodness, Monsieur le Comte, to read this
dispatch to Lord Palmerston.
I beg you, &c.

REPRESENTATION OF MANCHES-
TER.—MEETING OF LORD LINCOLN'S SUP-
PORTERS.
MANCHESTER, WEDNESDAY JAN. 13.—Last evening a pub-
lic meeting was held in the WEDNESDAY,
Exchange, for the purpose
of affording Lord Lincoln an opportunity of explaining his
political opinions. Admission was by ticket, and the room
was densely crowded, about 2,500 persons being present.
Lord Lincoln entered the building shortly before seven
o'clock, along with a considerable number of his committee,
and was received with a round of hearty applause. Mr.
Alderman Neild, chairman of his Lordship's committee, took
the chair, supported on his right by Lord Lincoln, Messrs. J.
Peel, W. Gibb, Captain Carnegie, M.P. Messrs. T. Cooke,
jun., T. B. Potter, W. Stewart, Captain'Cleather, Alderman Hopkins, ' IT. Sowler, P. Berlyn, M. Ross, J. Dunn, John
Sale, George Shaw, Dr. Bell ;
on his left by Messrs. J. As-
pins! Turner, Alderman Potter, Thomas Cooke, Alderman
Willert, John Pool -y, jun., Richard Birley, Wm. Hill, jun.,
P. Dudgeon, Dr, Radford, Wm. Gray, S. Lowcock,
Capes, E. T. Lellhouse, Edward Norris, Hugh Beaver, Dr.
Goodwin, John Hunt, W. W. Heap, Thomas L. Williams,
C. H. Rickards, Frank Rickards, John Carver, jun., John
Andrew, Edward Cardwell, William Bryan, John Wadding-
ton, William Coveney, William Marsdcn, Joshua Ronchetti,
jun., Henry Pope, Henry Wren, sen., John Harling, Charles
Ashmore, A. Pooley, John P. Cooke.
Mr. Alderman Nstua, on taking the chair, attempted,
amid much interruption, to vindicate Sir Robert Peel and
Lord Lincoln from the charge of insincerity, based on their
sudden conversion to free-trade doctrines, and concluded by
introducing his Lordship to the meeting.
The Earl of LINCOLN then presented himself to the meet-
ing, and aas most enthusiastically applauded. Several
minutes elapsed before the applause of the auditory sub-
sided. The Noble Earl spoke as follows :—Gentlemen, I
should indeed be ashamed of myself, if, upon an occasion
like I his, I should seek for hacknied phrases, or if I could
condescend to make use of exaggerated expressions; but
believe me, that I merely speak the words of truth, spring-
ing from the feelings of my heart, when I assure you, that
the enthusiasm with which you have been pleased, just now,
to receive the expression of my name, has so nearly over-
whelmed me, that, accustomed to a certain extent as I-have
been of late, not unused at least, to meet assemblages of this
description, and to address them upon the subjects of antici-
pated contests(' election., you have almost deprived me of
the. pow -T to give any pression —you have ely de-
prived ins of the po:crr to gwe adequate expres-i,,n—to those
sentiments which f nor, feel, of gratitude. and of plea-um—
( Hear, hear.) Proud. ioilced, gentlemen. I may will be of
the occurrence of tin: evening; elevated, iodeed, far beyond
any humble merits of my own, when I look upon the as-
sembly before me,—when I contemplate the cause for
which you are assembled,—when I look round over this
vast multitude, and see the eyes of all turned upon me—
a stranger—(Hear, hear)—and when I reflect that the
cause of your assembling, and the cause of my standing upon
this spot, is a proposal which has emanated from yourselves,
that you should confer upon me the highest prize which
it is in your power, as Britons, to bestow.—(Cheers.) I
said that lam a stranger here. lam a stranger, personally,
to almost all in this room. I feel the delicacy and the
awkwardness of that position. I am in that sense, as
regards the personal knowledge of almost all whom I am
addressing, a stranger to Manchester. But, gentlemen, can
any one who has studied the recent history of his country,
can anyone who has read the great book of social existence,
and of the mutual dependence of all classes of society in this
great country, nay, in the world—can, I say, such a one
plead justly to being an entire stranger to Manchester and
its interests? 1 certainly feel that such is not the case, at
any rate, as regards myself.—(Loud cheers.) Locally
unconnected with this town to a much greater extent than
I could have desired, and personally unacquainted, as I said
before, with the great majority of its inhabitants, 1 trust I
have not spent fourteen years in the House of Commons, in
the performance of public duties, and yet remain what I can,
in a political sense, call a stranger to Manchester.—(Hear,
hear, and cheers.) I can well remember the first occasion
upon which I ever set foot in this wonderful town. I was
then but nine years old. I do not pretend, certainly at this dis-
tance of time, to retain a lively recollection of the details of all
I then saw; but having passed several days, even at that early
age, in this town, I must say (and I say it frankly to yon)that it did produce impressions upon my mind, perhaps
stronger impressions upon account of my youth, which I be-
lieve never can be obliterated.— (Much applause.) And upon
every successive occasion, when i have either passed through
or lingered in your town—as I have approached or as I
have left it—and again this very day, as I entered it, for the
purpose of attending this meeting—l have asked myself, is
it possible that any one, reflecting upon the state of affairs in
the whole world, could fail to be deeply impressed with
what he here saw ?—(flear, hear.) I certainly have been—
(Hear.) Whether I look at the state of industry of all
that I saw around me, whether I look at the extent of their
public buildings and the magnificence of their works,
whetter I look at those gigantic places of industry,—whether
I look at the traffic which is perpetually passing and repas-
sing, both internal and external, of the town,—l say, I see
everything colossal, everything progressive ; and I believe
that here you may witness what in ne other town in the
world may be seen, as regards those particular features
to which I have alluded.—(Cheers.) I believe I am not
exaggerating the importance of this town, when I say, that
as regards its population, it exceeds some of the independent
states of the continent; and, as regards its wealth, it greatly
exceeds many of those states.—(Hear, hear, and cheers.)—
I hardly know, gentlemen, whether the chairman has suf
ficiently explained to you the position in which I under-
stand I appear before you. I appear before you by
the desire of the committee of gentlemen who have been
kind enough to form themselves into a body for conducting
the requisition which is to be presented to me. I have at-
tended here this day at their desire.—(Hear, hear.) I am
informed that the canvass has not yet been completed, and
that it is their desire, until it is completed, the requisition
should not be presented to me.—(Hear, hear.) And al-
though I am informed the requisition contains a number of
signatures, exceeding, I believe, the number on any similar
document ever presented to a candidate before, yet, in con-
sequence of its non-presentation, I am not entitled to address
you in the exact position of a candidate.—( Hear, hear.) I
must say, gentlemen, that, individually, I rejoice at this
decision of the committee. I rejoice they have been kind
enough to place me in a position, which may, at once and for
ever, give a contradiction to assertions which have been
made—not in this town, but elsewhere—assertions which, I
can assure you, make but little impression upon me, but at
the same timel should be most sorry if there existed in the
mind of any man, the impression, that 1 am anxious to ap-
pear here under false colours.—(Hear, hear.) Proud, gen-
tlemen, as I should be of the honour of representing
Manchester—(Hear, hear)—proud as I should be of that
high and enviable distinction, I should yet grieve that
one single vote should be given to me under any false pre-
tences whatever.—(Cheers.) I therefore appear before you,
gentlemen, here this evening, to explain to you my political
opinions—(Hear, hear)—and I say that I rejoice at the op-
portunity, which has thus early been given me of doing so,
because I am too well aware, in the case of a humble indivi-
dual like myself, it is impossible but a vast majority of such
a constituency as this cannot have sufficiently watched my
course in Parliament to be able to form an entirely accurate
and conclusive opinion with regard to them.—(Hear, hear.)
Gentlemen, I will endeavour, as far as in me lies, to lay
before you a fair, a full, and explicit declaration upon all
those points which I believe are likely to excite any interest
in your minds at present; and I can only say, that when I
have done so, I shall be equally ready to give a fair and can-
did answer to any questions that any elector may desire to
put.—(Loud cheers, and cries of " bravo.") I know, gen-
tlemen, whom I am addressing. I know that it never
would answer my purpose, if, I felt inclined to condescend to
such tricks, not to be candid and explicit with vou ; but I
say I know whom I am addressing, and I will endeavour to
be candid and explicit with you.---(Hear, hear, and loud
cheers.) I know you neither desire I should flatter you, or
that I should endeavour to obtain your good opinion by con-
cealing any opinions of my own. At the same time, gentle-
men, 1 am bound to say that I do feel this additional diffi-
culty, over and above those which must influence me in
addressing such a constituency as this at any other time. I
say I do feel this additional difficulty at the present moment,
upon account of the peculiar position in which you, and the
political world at large, are placed by recent events.— (Hear.)
It is easy generally to address an audience when some great
war-cry is raging among them. It may be easy to address
an audience when there is something for which they are
earnestly contending, and which they are very anxious to
obtain for themselves, or when there is something neces-
sary to withhold. But it is less easy when there are no
great and specially exciting topics before the public mind.
I know it places one in my situation in a disadvantageous
position before the constituency. But, gentlemen, I neither
profess to be an orator, nor do I desire upon this, or upon
any other occasion, to embellish what I have to say, or to
state anything but in the fairest and the plainest words.—
(Hear.) Now, gentlemen, 1 have been accused of great im-
modesty in being prepared to present myself before the con-
stituency of Manchester; and I say at once that I should
most readily acquiesce in that commendation if I could, for
one moment, have dreamt of voluntarily aspiringito such an
honour.—(Cheers.) When, gentlemen, I look round this
platform—when I know how many there are locally con-
nected with you, who have the highest claims to your
suffrages, and who would most worthily have represented
you if they had been selficted, I do confess freely I am not
surprised that strangers to this town should tax me with
immodesty in even acquiescing in the request to come for-
ward.—(Hear, hear.) But, gentlemen, I beg that I may be
distinctly understood—that I have come forward, at least I
am here this evening, and if eventually I should accept the
requisition, I shall then be a candidate upon the demand of
a large body of this constituency, and not from any self-
sought or voluntary effort on my part. If I come forward,
gentlemen, I shall come forward not to oppose this or that
candidate, but in obedience to the general wish of the con-
stituency of Manchester. Unconnected with you, it would
be indecent upon my part to come forward in any other
position. If I come forward at all it must be as your can-
didate.—(Cheers, and much applause.) Now, gentlemen,
two most opposite objections have been raised to me as a can-
didate for your suffrages. You have been told, I believe, by
speeches in this town, that I have been all my life an opponent
of all reform, and, therefore, I am totally unfitted for the re-
presentation of Manchester.—(Hear, hear, and some intima-
tions of assent.) Well, gentlemen, if that is intended as a
recognition of that objection, let me ask how you can recon-
cile with that the opposite objection which has been raised
by the press in London—namely, that I am one who has
evinced such destructive tendencies in his political course,
that no candidate who could be selected, and none who could
come forward, of whatever Radical opinions, that would
not be preferable to me ?—(Loud cheers, and great
applause.) I have no doubt that many of you are too
much engaged, and too well engaged, to read all that
ema-
nates from a certain portion of the London press; bu_sat
assure you these are the objections which have b
must aeeynthat I
to me as a candidate for your suffrages.
cannot recognise the justice of either of I
the o
the first place, let me deal with the objection bjec . In
Btionsthat I have
been the opponent of all reforms, and that
Whn
gentlemen,thereforeun
un-
fitted to be a Member fur Manchester.
what has been the course pursued
duringGovtehrewehnotl; time Did
that I held office in Sir Robert Peel's Government?
not that Government, from the very date of its formation,
commence that great economical reform, whichii terminated,
in the repeal of the corn-laws last 3 ear? —( _Ales of ‘ es,
yes," with some exclamations of " No.") I say, gentlemen,
that this reform—that this great economical reform, was list
of recent date, but that it commenced in the year 1842 ; and,
although occupying an inferior situation in that Government
I gave to those measures my most earnest and most zealous
support.—(Great cheering from all sides.) And, gentlemen,
what have been the results of that most economical reform
as regards the taxation of the country? Why. that be-
tween the year 1842, and the moment in which I am now
speaking, on upwards of 500 articles the duty has been en-
tirely repealed, and on 720 other articles the duty has been
most materially relieved.--(Great cheers.) Call you this no
reform? Call you this no reform in that particular direction
which was most essentially required, and particularly desired
by the; industrious classes of this great community?—(lm-
mense cheering.) For whom was this great economical reform
undertaken, and for whom was it effected? Why-, for the
lower and the middle classes, and more especially for the be-
nefit of the lower classes.—(Tremendous applause.) I believe
that one may fairly characterise this as one of the greatest
moral and social revolutions, peaceably attained, which any
country ever saw—(Renewed cheers)—and, let me say, it
is not only to the glory of England, but to the glory of the