The Sun.
London, England, 1847-12-04 00:00:00

YON Do N" SATU RD A EVENING, DECEMBER 4, 1847.

was this: if at the commencement of the month of Oc-
teb.-r, it had considered merely its own interest it would
base allowed the paper which it had lent to be repaid
i:hout making fresh loans, and it would then have
been in a state of security, having a sufficient amount of
reserve. But, pressed on all sides to afford some relief
to the suffering credit and commerce of the country, the
B ink made large advances to houses which they con-
sidered solvent. At the middle of the week which
ended with the 23d of October, I began to think
that the chief difficulties had been surmounted,
as confidence was beginning to prevail in Lon-
don. But there succeeded great panic and distrust in
the country. There was the breaking of a bank at New-
castle, and a run upon another powerful and wealthy
bank in the same town, upon which the industry of the
whole neighbourhood depended. The gentleman who
was the agent of the Bank of England in that town, ad-
vanced to the latter bank all the gold that he had in his
possession, and, in addition, he sent to Leeds for 40,000
sovereigns. This bank got over its difficulties, but there
were well-founded rumours of similar difficulties in other
parts of the country. The state of the Bank was then
what the Right lion. Gentleman had stated. While the
bullion in the issue department was 7,865,0001. the
amount of the notes and gold and silver coin taken to-
gether was 1,994,5161. ; the notes alone amounting to
1,547,2701. Nov, under these circumstances, it appeared
to me that if there should arise similar runs upon banks
and similar pressure from commercial firms in any of
our great cities, and applications to the Bank for relief
should be refused, there would be not only a panic, but
a dreadful convulsion in the country, which could not
fail to affect very much the metropolis, while even the
Bank itself could hardly be safe. Sir, the opinion of the
Bank was not that which I have stated, their opinion, as
oonveyed in a formal resolution on the 25th, was that they
could comply with the provisions of the law and maintain
their position. At the same time the Governor of the
Bank frankly confessed to us that if such cases as those to
which I have alluded should arise, or such as had oc-
curred at Liverpool a little while before, they could not
give further accommodation, and they might probably
be obliged still further to restrict the accommodation

which they gave. Now, under these circumstances, we
consider that the time had arrived when, in order to pre-
vent the evil which was sure to arise from the perusal of
the Bank returns, which must have appeared in the
Gazette of the following Friday, it was necessary to
adopt some extraordinary measure. I must say that in
the course of this debate the prudence of our so acting
has hardly been disputed.—(Hear, hear.) My Hon.
Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets did, indeed,
throw some doubts upon that proceeding, but nothing has
occurred since, which has in the least tended to shake
my opinion that the step taken was calculated to restore
confidence, and that although it was necessarily attended
with evils, the evils were much less than those which
would have resulted from a contrary course.—(Hear,
hear.) It has been said we ought not to have mentioned
any particular rate of interest. I must confess that
I had before my eyes, during the whole of that
anxious period, the danger lest by some false step
we might encourage unfounded speculation, and thus
place the convertible currency in the greatest danger.
At that moment we had the exchanges in our favour ;
gold was coming in, and, it was probable, if there had
been time, that even without any extraordinary measure
the Bank would have been in a ;position to extend its
discount, and to give further effectual assistance to com-
merce. Well, but then we had the fear before our
eyes lest by any imprudent measure of ours we might
turn the course of the exchanges against as, and pro-
duce a state of things from which it would be impossible
for us to escape without, on the one hand, a sudden con-
traction of the currency, or, on the other, a suspension
of cash payments. It was under that apprehension that
I. for my part, willingly agreed that we should take
the step, which I at once admitted to be contrary to all
rule, of recommending a high rate of interest to be re-
quired by the Bank. It seemed to me that the effect of
that step could not fail to be that there would be less
fear of accident arising from undue pressure for discounts,
and that the exchanges would be more likely to continue
favourable whilst the imports of gold would certainly not
cease. Those, in fact, have been, as we expected they
would be, the results. The influx of gold has continued,
and the reserve in the Bank is now no less, I believe, than
six millions. I have no confidence that, if we had not
insisted on the condition I have described, the same
results would have occurred. I scarcely believe they
would. Our object was to restore confidence without
giving rise to improvident speculation; and in that re
spect I believe it will be generally allowed that our
measure was quite suocessful.—(Hear,) But then the
Right Hon. Gentleman who spoke last wishes for a
measure by which we may prevent the recurrence of the
difficulty we have escaped, and may guard against all
misfortunes in times to come without fixing any limits
to the issues of the Bank; and another Hon. Gentle-
man, the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring) like-
wise called on me the other night to tell him whether
we did not mean to allow the Bank a still greater liberty
of assisting the great commercial houses of the country,
should they be found to require such assistance at a
future period. Now, Sir, when lam asked these ques-
tions, I am obliged to inquire in return whether these
Honourable Gentlemen really have fixed in their
own minds what they wish to do, and to what end
their propositions would lead? (Hear, hear.)
They are both advocates of a currency convertible into
gold upon demand ; they would see with alarm and
dread the recurrence of a suspension of cash payments
by the Bank.—(Hear, hear.) Well, then, you must
allow that there must be some mode by which that re-
currence must be prevented.—(Hear, hear.) You may
say that the mode proposed by the Bill of 1844—that
the great commercial breakwater erected by the Act of
Parliament—is useless and mischievous; but you cannot
help admitting that there must be a certain degree of
prudence exercised by the Bank, or else that it will be
impossible to guard against the mischiefs which led to
suspensions on former occasions.—(Cheers.) Mr. Pitt,
when he required large loans for the Bank, during the
long period in which he administered the affairs of this
country, was obliged to have recourse to measures which
the Bank did not approve. But Mr. Pitt never meant
that those measures should lead to a suspension of cash
payments.—(Hear, hear.) It was surely no part of
the policy of a statesman who conducted the affairs of
this country with so much skill, and with such
steady aim and purpose, to resort, as an ultimate
measure, to a currency not payable upon demand.
Neither, I will presume to say, was it his desire to find
himself at that point when in 1797, in the midst of the
operations of a war, he was forced by circumstances to
resort to that extreme and most disasfrous measure.—
(Cheers.) And if this were so, let us, Sir, reflect that
the same danger which was incurred in that instance by
requiring heavy loans from the Bank for the use of
Government, would be equally incurred if you laid
the Bank open to the demands from commercial houses
for the purpose of supporting or propping up their
credit.—(Cheers.) Yet this is the course the Hon.
Gentlemen would advise us to pursue.—(Renewed
cheers.) However much they may abhor the idea of a
suspension of cash payments, the measures they would
propose, without meaning or intending it, would neces-
sarily, from the lax administration of the Bank, lead to
a state of things which must result either in a contrac
tion, which would ruin half' the commercial houses 01
the country, or else to a suspension of cash payments, by
which alone so great an evil could be averted. A Right
Hon. Gentleman has spolcen to-night of the differences
in the opinions of writers of great ability and of great
experience upon this question. Now, Ido not wish to
enter into the matters of theory discussed by Tooke and
Fullerton on the one side, and by Mr. Jones Loyd and
Norman upon the other. They have all discussed the
question with great ability. But that which concerns us
far more than their theoretical views is the practical
course they recommend with regard to the administra
tion of the Bank. Now, although these writers differ
as to the Act of 1844, I find no greater difference be-
tween them as to the way in which the principle of the
Act should be carried out. They are agreed that when-
ever the Bank finds the drain of gold going on, and the
exchanges becornieg adverse, that it is the duty of the
Bank then to take measures gradually and prudently to
stop the drain, and to keep the Bank in a steady position.
Both Mr. Tooke and Mr. Jones Loyd are agreed that this
should be the end the Bank should seek to attain. It may
fairly be a question whether by the enactment of 1844
you are able to attain this end; but certainly there are
none who have ever thought much upon the currency
who have not agreed, that when there is a drain of gold
it is incumbent on the Bank to adopt a course of pru-
dence. It may be doubted whether the Act of 1844
sufficiently provides for the exercise of that prudence
by any certain rule. For my part, I think, that on these
subjects you not only require a rule, but persons who
are impressed with its value to administer that rule. I
concur, therefore, in what was said by a Right Hon.
Friend to-night, that this Committee,: if appointed,
ought to consider, first, how far the provisions of the
law are sufficient ; and, second, how far we can obtain a
steadier administration on the part of the Banlc, by
preventing the control of parties who attend the meeting
of directors only occasionally, and who hold varied
opinions upon the subject of the law.—(Hear.) But,
whatever the House may do with regard to this inquiry,
I hope, Sir, above all, that it will not consent to adopt
the advice of the Right Hon. Gentleman who spoke
last, and commit itself at once to a decided opinion.
Although, as he justly said. from the year 1810 to the
present time, this subject has employed some of the
ablest men of England—although it has been directed by
the views of Lord Grenville and Mr. Huskisson, of Mr.
Horner, Mr. Canning, and of some of the ablest living
writers, yet I believe, that on a subject so diffi-
cult, so intricate, and so important, there
are still many and most potent truths to be
acquired. It is possible, should it seem desirable, t.o
n r modificationsrn n n
yof
ff
the the
nationgr a t planmay obf
elwB
04
r4k,
dn
ommroadrkeeer somethat
steadilyt the
c and securely.—(Hear, hear.) That is
aqauyi t e
withp os sibl
regarde, should it e
Abnet desirable.
sa b4l4e;thßattuh
AdSoiert,slwmh considerui
which
that Act to be a great improvement on
t—
o
which the Bank was likely to be left without a single
answeredipnreocpeedreadt ioi its purpose—and hhu aar ptt olws ode be
nledi enveev thateirt Ibilefiaensnd,
inn i
that
tr ieptaots hasidtei
ogbnreeeienn,
sovereign in its coffers.—(Cheers.) Though the Act of
1844
itherefore, e maymue
much
ottok haveeep cured
the
affected by the evils attendingconvul-
sion,mbein
cheers.) Holding this view, I beg the House to appoint
commerce.—(Renewed
commercialreiicyf from
afiCuoiratymoi to consider soberly and calmly the whole
bearings of the subject, and not by passing any sudden
of the
orttitll)t i psi
cr.
tehsctei
aptiitdaat
re
d oe
intentionsf resolution nto cause
parliament
r t
o eetnn a
itnolteadiEno
ourbdt w
the
resumedn ne tvheerr.
his seat amid
Mr. J. REYNOLDnsastai?idrlt---.t)ia(tTihne N
tes attention seemed to have been theu Noble
muchpaper
cheering.)
h currencyer jnand to preserve the rne-
ytedtosteleietleaffntelcotroifrtehlean
asdiffevbeecal
dlicntg of 1844
of d courseitrheactt e
dAofeetxthaceslusie:
only. He had heard not
Irish.
pSuotoantinofrit
1844 upon England
ean tpearsysieedw,
he, as a member of an Ir.

with the Right Hon. Baronet on the;subject of its opera-
tion; but all that he received from him was a display of
the extreme courtesy tied great patience for which, as
he understood, the Right Hun. Baronet was so peculiarly
remarkable.—(A laugh.) He could testify that the
operation of the Act of 1845 had been most injurious
to the Bank of Ireland, and as a matter of consequence
to the commerce and trade of that country. The Right
Hon. Gentleman (Sir It. Peel), indeed, had, in an inter-
view on the subject, when he complained of the rests is
lions imposed upon the Bank of Ireland by that measure,
reminded him that the Irish bankers could issue notes to
the extent of their bullion; but, as a practical man, he
urged upon the Right lion. Baronet that the profits of
the bankers upon circulation might very well be more than
balanced by the loss upon the locked up bullion. It must
be borne in mind that banking profits arose in a great
degree from trading upon One's credit, in contradistinc7
tion to one's capital.— (Great laughter.) Before this
patchwolle legislation came into operation the rule with
bankers in Ireland had been simply this—the entire
liabilities of the particular bank to the public were cal-
culated, and then, in times of ease, the minimum amount
of gold and silver retained to meet those liabilities was
one-third, or 6s. Bd. in the pound. This rule had been
found to work well ; and it had yet to be proved to him
that the Act of 1844 for England and 1845 for Ireland
had effected any improvement in the matter. The
Government letter of October, about which there were
such contending opinions, he regarded with entire ap-
probation. He trusted now to find in the Right Hon.
Baronet a strenuous advocate for the emancipation of
money. Where there was free trade in everything else
there could surely be no valid resistance to free trade in
money. As an Irishman, he would more emphatically
call upon the Legislature to release banking in Ireland
from the oppressive restrictions to which it bad been
subjected, restrictions which, in their consequences, im-
posed upon many an industrious, struggling farmer or
trader the payment of full 15 per cent. interest for
advances. The position of the Irish farmer was singu-
larly hard. At a time when the banks of Scotland,
having to provide for a population under 2} millions,
had banking means, in capital and deposits, of not less
than 37 millions, the banks in Ireland had but 10
millions for a population exceeding 8 millions. The
Right Hon. Baronet, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
had attributed the late panic mainly to two causes—
to the money expended in procuring foreign
corn, amounting in 14 months to 33 millions sterling;
and to the amount of capital invested in railways,
which he stated at 50 millions sterling. The latter
investment might be regarded as seed which, at some
future date, sooner or later, would produce ample fruit,
He was not very wrong in saying thatof 33,000,000/. paid
by this country for corn, at least one half was expended
for Ireland. He trusted the Right Hon. Baronet, now
that his Bill bad been proved to be fallacious, would abro-
gate it altogether. The Irish population, previous to the
autumn of 1845, lived entirely upon potatoes, while they
sent their corn their butter, their pork, and other agri-
cultural produce, to this country, to the extent of
15,000,0001. annually. For this large export they took
no gold, but they took English manufactures—cotton,
woollens, silks, hardware, Staffordshire ware, &c. In
fact, almost every manufactured article used in Ireland
was imported from England. The destruction of the
potato crop put an end to this export of English manu-
factures, and there was a double drain, for we were
obliged to send 15,000,000/. or 16,000,000/, worth of
corn to Ireland to feed the people, while we ceased to
receive the 15,000,0001. or 16,000,000/. of Irish produce
in exchange for so much of our manufactures. He be-
lieved that this had very much to do with the commer-
cial difficulty in this country.—(Hear, hear.) He hoped
this statement would have the effect of directing the
attention of the House to the necessity that existed for
better government in Ireland, in order that her re-
sources might be developed. Ireland was undoubtedly
the best market England possessed ; no country con,
sumed so extensively and so advantageously her menu
factures.

Sir R. PEEL—Mr. Speaker, I trust, Sir, that any
observation I may have to make on the subject now
under the consideration of the House will be made in
that temper arid dispassionate spirit which characterised
the speeches of the Noble Lord and his Right Hon.
Friend.—(Hear, hear.) I cannot but express, in corn-
soon with the House generally, my pleasure at the re-
turn to this House of my Right Hon. Friend the Member
for Stamford (Mr. Herries), and my congratulations that
by that return the house will have the benefit, in
matters of this kind, of his great intelligence and great
practical ability.—(Cheers) Before I address myself'
to the subject—the immediate subject—of debate, I wish
to clear the way by a reference to the chaige that was
made against ire last night by the Hon. Gentleman the
Hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Urquhart), and which
has been repeated to-night by another Hon. Gentleman
—certainly in the most courteous manner in which it is
possible to prefer an accusation. The charge made by
both those lion. Gentlemen is this, that in bringing
forward the Act of 1844, as the organ of the Govern-
ment, I gave a public assurance that the banking
establishments of Ireland and Scotland should not
be affected, but that the Bill of 1844 should refer exclu-
sively to this part of the United Kingdom; and the
Hon. Gentleman the Member for Stafford, went so far as
to say that an insidious advantage had been taken of
Scotland—that the suspicion and jealousy of the people
of Scotland, which had been peculiarly excited on the
subject of banking, had been allayed by that assurance;
and in figurative language, the Hon. Gentleman added,
that the banking system of Scotland had received from
me a stab in the back. The Hon. Gentleman supported
that charge by a reference to the first clause of the
Act of 1844, and having asserted that I had publicly
directed in 1844 that the banking system of Scotland was
not to be in the slightest degree affected by that Act, he
asked what would the House think of the Right Hon.
Gentleman, who, having given that assurance, inserted
in the Act surreptitiously that first clause which pro-
vides that no bank in any part of the United Kingdom
which up to May, 1844, did not issue notes, should not
be allowed to issue them for the future, and the Hon.
Gentleman went on to quote from my speech the pas-
sage in which I said "Of Ireland and Scotland I
have made no mention Proposing to reserve for sopa-
rate legislation the state of the currency in each of those
countries." From that statement, supported on such
authority, the House might naturally have inferred that
the accusation was well founded, but what will the
House think of the Hon. Gentleman who, having read
that passage, omitted to read the next, which was to the
following effect? "The prohibition
against the estab-
lishment of new banks of issue will extend both to Scot-
land and Ireland—(Cheers) —both of which will be in-
cluded in those enactments, which will require the per.
formance for the future of certain conditions prelimi-
nary to of new joint-stock banks."—(Hear,
hear.) the mufloarthing
there
be,
on the part of a Minister bring-
ing forward a measure, a more distinct and formal
avowal, that, though the currency under 51. was to be
reserved in Scotland and in Ireland for separate legisla-
tion, yet that the Act, as applied to this country in re-
vect to the prohibition of the new banks of issue, should
extend to all parts of the United Kingdom?—(Cheers.)
But, moreover, not only was that statement given by
a speech, but it being necessary to found the
Bill on preliminary resolutions, to which the con-
sent of the House must be given, in the eighth reso-
resolution, which I moved on the night when I brought
forward tho question, and which resolution was unani-
mously assented to by the House—not on the night on
which it was offered, but after the interval of some days
after it had been printed and communicated to the
Scotch and Irish bankers, and published in every news-
paper in the United Kingdom; the eight resolution was
to this effect:—

4, That it is expedient to prohibit by law the issue of pro-
missory notes, payable to bearer on demand by any bank
not issuing such notes on the 6th of May, 1844, or by any
bank thereafter to be established in any part of the United
Kingdom."

Now, I think I shall have satisfied the House that if a
stab were given to the banking system of Scotland, at
any rate it was not given in the dark.—(Cheers.) And
the Hon: Gentleman says he undertook, in a letter
written, in 1844, to enlighten the people of Scotland on
the subject of the Bill of that year, to warn them of what
must happen in the year 1845. I shall reply tohis
attack by giving
him this friendly advice; that when
next he addresses the people of Scotland on the subject
of a Bill pending in this House, he first takes the pre
caution of reading both the resolution and the Bill.—
(Hear.) Her 'Majesty's Government have addressed
themselves to the particular question of whether or no
a Committee shall be appointed to consider the causes
of the recent commercial distress, including the laws
which regulate banking. Sir, when a Government ap-
peals to this House for the exercise of those powers of
inquiry which peculiarly belong to it, I conceive that
whatever opinions I, as an individual, may form as to
the probable results of inquiry, still it is impossible to
refuse that appeal.— (Ilear, hear.) The functions of
inquiry are our constitutional functions, and if the Execu-
tive Government be of opinion that there are not grounds
of legislation without inquiry, then, I say, it is impos-
sible to refuse their appeal. An amendment has been
moved on the motion of the Noble Lord, restricting in-
quiry specifically to banking. I have experience enough
to know that, even if the amendment were carried, it
would be impossible to exclude other branches of
inquiry. When the Committee of 1836 was ap-
pointed, specifically to inquire into the laws re-
gulating banks of issue, that Committe sat
during the whole of 1836, was re-appointed in
1837, and did not furnish a report until August,
tS3B. When I state this, I think it will be admitted
that it serves no practical object to limit the rubjects
for inquiry.—(Hear, hear.) I, therefore, shall vote for
the proposal of the Government, because I think that
if there is to be an inquiry, none of the causes of the
present commercial distress ought to be excluded from
such inquiry—(Hear, hear.) I feel it my duty to state
to the House that I mean to devolve on no other party,
on whom it does not justly fall, the responsibility which
attaches to me for the part I have taken either with
respect to the restoration of the standard in 1819, or
the attempt to mitigate the evils which accompanied our
system of banking and currency previous to 1844. I
feel that I did no more than my duty in 1819 and in
1844 in calling the attention of the House to those
points. Therefore, I do not wish to devolve on others
my responsibility, because in reverting to those mea-
sures I do not in the slightest degree repent
the course I then took.—(Hear, hear.) But I
must submit it to this House whether it is
quite decorous, quite respectable to the character
of a deliberative assembly, to attempt to make one
individual Member responsible for any particular course
of legislation.—(Hear, hear.). Many Members of this
House are not in their individual capacities responsible
for the Bill of 1844, but in their corporate capacity they
deliberate on all public questions, and nothing could tend
more to depreciate the character of the Houses of Com
mons and Lords than to countenance the impression
that, in matters of this kind, involving the most im-
portant interests, being in themselves of the most com-
plicated nature, a measure deliberately . adopted by the
Lords and Commons, the whole responsibility of a mea-

sure should be thrown on the individual Member who
had happened to propose it.— (IL ar, hear.) What are
the facie with respeet to this ;Leasure? In 1819 the
measure for the restoration of the. standard was pro-
posed by me as a private Member of Parliament,
wholly unconnected with the Government. It was the
result of the inquiries of two Committees—Commons
and Lords. The report of the Committee of the
House of Commons, recommending the restoration of
the standard, was carried with only one dissentient
voice; and that of the Lords was, I believe, unanimous.
Again, when I proposed the measure of 1819 in the
House of Commons, there was not one single division
against the Bill ; and, so far as votes were concerned,
the measure received unanimous concurrence. Objec-
tions were, indeed, raised by the Right lion. Member
for. Coventry ; but, if I recollect right, on the questions
that the Bill be read a second and third time, there were
no divisions. In the Lords there was unanimous ac-
quiescences, excepting on the part of one Member of the
House of Peers, who moved an amendment, that whereas
the Bill proposed that cash payments should not be re-
sumed until 1823—Lord Holland moved that 1820 should
be substituted. He was not content to wait until 1823,
but wished the Bill to come into full operation at once.
Now, as I said before, the restoration of the standard as
the remedy for the evils of inconvertible paper were
wise measures for the security of property, and for
providing a just remuneration for industry : and I do
not attempt to relieve myself from their responsi-
bility ; but I think I am only asserting the character
of both branches of the Legislature when I invite them
not tacitly to relieve themselves from what was the fruit
of their unanimous assent.--(Hear, hear.) Well, then,
we come to the Act of 1844. I was then at the head of
the Government, the Bank Charter was about to expire,
and it was necessary that some proposal should be made
to the House with reference to it. It was certainly then
competent for us to have relieved ourselves from direct
and immediate responsibility by proposing another in-
quiry. But I beg to remind the House, that when, in
the year 1844, I proposed a particular measure for its
consideration, in five preceding years there had been
five different Committees—in 1836, 1837, 1838, 1840,
and 1841. I hear it now said that the subject was not
exhausted, that there had not been inquiry sufficient,
and that further inquiry was necessary. But in 1844 I
found that the subjects of currency and banks of issue
had taken up 3,000 questions and 3,000 an-
swers in 1836 ; that, not satisfied with that mass
of information, the inquiry was resumed in 1837,
and 4,570 were added to the stock. Even that
was not enough. The Committee was re appointed in
1838, when 1,700 questions were asked and answered,
and even yet no practical resolution was arrived at. In
1840 the expiration of the Bank Charter approached;
the Committee over which the Right Hon. the Chancellor
of the Exchequer had presided with so much intelligence
was re-appointed, and to the stock of nearly 9,000 ques-
tions and answers already accamulated, 3,859 were
added, each question leading to a long and elaborately
reasoned answer. In 1841, the questions and answers
then amounting to nearly 14,000, another Committee was
appointed, and that Committee closed without any par •
ticular or specific recommendation.—(Hear and laughter.)
Mr. Tooke, Mr. Jones Loyd, Mr. Horsley Palmer, and
other eminent authorities had been examined, and it ap-
peared to the Government that the best course would be
to submit a measure to the House of Commons for the
regulation of the currency, preparatory to the termina-
tion of the Bank Charter, and to invite the House
to come at last to some specific decision.—(Loud
cries of " Hear, hear.") The House did come to a
decision. Ido not believe that there ever was a ques-
tion carried by much larger majorities. I think, if I
recollect rightly, that not more than thirty Honourable
Members ever voted against the proposal of 1844, In
the Lords, the measure passed without opposition.—
(Hear, hear.) I say again, therefore, that the House of
Commons cannot justify itself in a matter of this kind,
which ought to be kept free from all party considerations,
and concerning which it had ample means of informa-
tion, for having lightly and inconsiderately given its
consent to the proposal of the Government. The sub-
ject is now perfectly open to reconsideration.—(Hear.)
It would ba unwise in any one irrevocably to bind him-
self to opinions given in 1844. Nothing could be more
injurious than that any man should now refuse to come
to a different conclusion from that of 1844, if, after all
the experience we have acquired since on a question so
complicated, he should see just cause to alter his opinion.
The House of Commons would be justified in taking ad-
vantage of all this information, but it would hardly be
justified in saying that on any occasion it had
blindly given its assent to the proposal of any Mi-
nister or Ministers.—(Hear, hear.) I think that there
has been some misrepresentation as to the objects of
this measure. Ido not deny that one of its objects was
to prevent the convulsions which theretofore had occurred
in consequence of the neglect of the Bank of England
to take earnest precautions against undue issues of its
treasure. I certainly did hope that although no impe-
rative obligation was imposed on the Bank for the regu-
lation of its conduct in the banking department, yet that,
after the experience of 1836 and 1839, the Bank would
conform to the principles of banking which its directors
had acknowledged to be just, and from which they ad-
mitted they had departed, although they had been
prescribed as rules for their regulation. From the
number of mercantile houses that have failed—from the
general insolvency which has occurred, I am bound to
admit that I have been disappointed in my hope w'th
respect to the main object of the Bill; but, even so, I
must contend that it was in the power of the Bank to
have alleviated much of the distress that was suffered.
—(Hear, hear.) If the Bank had taken early precau-
tions, which it was in their power to have taken—if
they had had energy and resolution to meet the first
difficulty by timely perseverance and determination—
by raising the rate of discount—my firm persuasion
is, that the necessity for that extraordinary interven-
tion to which her Majesty's Government had resorted
last October, would never have existed. I cannot there-
fore say that the state to which the country has been
lately reduced was the effect of the Bill of 1844 ex-
clusively. I believe that the executive instruments, by
whom that Bill was to have been carried into operation,
might, by persevering and energetic measures, have
prevented the necessity of violating its provisions.
(Hear.) It was said that the whole object of tho Bill
was to control the Bank of England and prevent the
recurrence of former panics. I distinctly said, upon the
second reading of the Bill, that such a result would not
necessarily follow. Towards the close of my speech
upon the second reading, I expressed this opinion:—
" No Minister could be wild enough to suppose that this
measure would prevent all undue speculation in paper
currency, but there was a species of speculation, inde-
pendent of paper currency, which, it was hoped, the
Bill would be capable of checking." There was no at-
tempt to cripple or control legitimate speculation. The
object of the Bill was a triple one. In the first,
I admitted already, it had failed, but is the
two others, which are of, at least, as great
importance, I say it has succeeded completely; and
my firm belief is, that the difficulties which have
lately beset us would have been infinitely aggravated
if you had not wisely and judiciously taken the pre-
caution of limiting your paper currency. The Hon.
Member for the city of Dublin spoke of the grievous
injuries sustained by Ireland in consequence of the in-.
terference with the privileges of bankers in that part of
the United Kingdom. The Hon. Gentleman's authority
was of course entitled to respect, but his statements
wore certainly somewhat new. He said that banking
business in Ireland was carried on not upon capital, but
upon credit. I have great respect for the lion. Gentle-
man's statements—as founder of the National Bank of
Ireland they are deserving of consideration, but I must
tell that Hon. Gentleman, with gravity. hut with sua-
vity and courtesy, that I should mud rather have his
capital than his credit.—(Laughter.) If there ever was
a country on the face of the earth, the poorer classes of
which had suffered the utmost amount of misery and
misfortune from the abuses of banking, it was that
country of which the Hon. Gentleman had spoken.
But I will give you an eminent authority on the sub-
ject of Irish banking—an Irishman too. Sir Henry
Parnell, writing on that subject in 1827, said ; " The
losses that Ireland has sustained by the failure of
her beaks, might be described in a very few words.
There were in 1804, as appeared by the report of the
Committee upon Irish exchanges, fifty registered
banks. Since that year a great many more had been
established-20 more probably, making 70 in all. With
the exception of a few which withdrew from business,
and four in Dublin, three in Belfast, and one in Mallow,
the whole had failed one after the other, involving the
country in the greatest misery and distress." I recollect,
Sir, in 1820, the failures almost in one day of eleven
banks whose notes had circulation .through almost the
whole of Ireland, but at all events through the southern
and western parts. I was in the west of Ireland about
ten days afterwards, and I could not possibly describe
anything like the misery and destitution I witnessed
The Hun. Gentleman (Mr. Reynolds) said the banking
in Ireland was carried on upon the principle that they
reserved gold to cover one-third of their liabilities ; my
recollection on that subject is entirely at variance with
that of the Hon. Gentleman. I think if he had stated
that Irish bankers held one tenth of gold in
proportion to the whole extent of their liabilities it
would have been nearer the mark. I should like to
know whether the A gricultural Bank of Ireland
kept one-third, but if Irish bankers wished
to adopt precautions against insolvency and ruin, the
Bill of 1844 onlyaided them in doing so. The country at
largo was now suffering from failures, general distress,
and the restriction of capital. The first impulse is to
visit with blame that very measure only for which lam
convinced your difficulties would have been fifty times
greater. I shall now, with the permission of the House,
read one or two extracts from the writings of as eminent
a financier as ever lived. Adam Smith, in his well-
known work, " The Wealth of Nations," says—" No
complaint, however, is more common than that of a scar-
city of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce
with those who have neither wherewithal to buyit, nor
credit to borrow it. Those who have either will seldom

be in want either of the money or of tha wine which
they have occasion for. This complaint, however, of the
scarcity of money, is not always confined to improvident
spendthrifts. It is sometimes general through a whole
mercantile town and the country in its neighbourhood.
Over-trading is the common cause of it. Sober men,
whose projects have been disproportioned to their capi-
tals, are as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy
money nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals whose ex-
pense has been disproportioned to their r venue. Before
their projects can be brought to bear their stock
is gone and their credit with it. They run
about everywhere to borrow money, and every-
body tells them that they have none to lend."
Now that is the precise condition in which we are ; we
run about in all directions to borrow money, and we are
told by everybody he has "none to lend."—(lleac, hear.)
I will undertake to prove beyond doubt that at all times
a low rate of interest and an apparent prosperity have
led exactly to the same result. You say that it is free
trade, the Act of 1844, and various other causes that
have brought about the present state of things ; but

how do you account for this ? Take the history of the
last sixty years, and I will show you that at the time
when protection was at the highest—in times of peace, ia
times of war, in times before the standard of value was
established—nay, in the times of an inconvertible
currency—in all these times, I will show you that appa-
rent prosperity and a low rate of interest led to the same
want of money that you are experiencing at this moment.
—(Dear, hear.) Take, for instance, the year 1784. You
had then your old standard ; you had then the power
of paying in silver up to the amount of 25/. and yet, in
1784, in order to protect the convertibility of its
notes, the Bank of England was compelled to
refuse advances upon the loan, and to reduce its
notes from 9,000,0001. to 6,000,0001. Previous to 1784
there had been years of prosperity, and there had been
great speculations, but you had in consequence undue
excitement, and violent action OR the part of the Bank
to protect its treasure from exhaustion.—(Hear, hear.)
Then in the year 1793, when the standard remained
the same, when the currency was convertible, when
there had been great prosperity, yet before the war
broke out distress began. Will the House allow me to
read an account of the diStress which existed in the
latter part of 1792, and you will see how it corresponds
with the distress in 1846. This is a quotation made
use of by Mr. Tooke in his work to which reference
has already been made. He says—" From the opera-
tion of causes which I will not pretend to explain,
there were an unprecedented number of bankruptcies
in 1792, prodigiously exceeding in amount those of
any former period. In March there were 105 bank-
ruptcies, there were 188 in April, 209 in May,
158 in June, and 108 in July. Many houses of
established credit failed, and their fall involved
vast numbers of their correspondents and connexions.
Houses of undoubted solidity, and possessing ample
funds, which in a little time enabled them to pay every ,
shilling of their debts, were obliged to stop payment,
and many bankers were obliged to make a pause. It
was impossible to raise any money on the security of
machinery, for the value of such property seemed to be
annihilated, commerce and manufactures were at a stand,
and those who had any money, not knowing where to
place it in safety, kept it unemployed, and locked it up
in their coffers." Does not that account correspond
with the state of things existing in 1846? (" No, no"
from Mr. Blewitt.) In what respect does it differ?—
(Hear, hear.) In the year 1810 you had the command
of the whole commerce of the world—you had incon-
vertible paper, but that did not rescue you from the
same distress you suffered in 1793. In 1819 the
standard was restored. If you are about to repeal the
existing Act, you are about to restore the unlimited and
uncontrolled discretion of the Bank of England, to re-
store to joint-stock banks the privilege of an unre-
strained issue, and I presume you would permit in that
case the revival of private banks, giving to them the same
right of issuing notes. Before you do that you will do
well to read the accounts of the transactions of the
Northern and Central Joint-Stock Bank, of the Norfolk
and Norwich Joint-Stock Bank, and of the Manches-
ter Joint-Stock Bank, and others that issued notes
which professed to be convertible into gold, and
you will find that the unrestricted issue of convertible
paper did not prevent serious abuses which called for
the immediate interference of the Government. But the
simple repeal of the Act of 1844 will restore to the Bank
of England the exercise of full discretion, without Par-
liamentary interference. Thus, in 1826, the Bank had
this unlimited discretion, and the advantage of the issue
of 11. notes also. Now I will give you an account of the
state of affairs in 1826. I take that account from an
unexceptionable authority, whose name, however we
may differ from him, must command universal respect.
This is the account given by Mr. Alexander Baring
the present Lord Ashburton, of the state of affairs
in 1826, in consequence of undue excitement and
apparent prosperity. Mr. Baring says :—" I have
no hesitation in attributing the distress of the country to
the extent to which paper circulation was put eighteen
months ago, and for which the country bankers and the
Bank of England are answerable. The latter appeared
to have a dangerous redundancy of money—that gave
rise to wild speculations in every part of the country.
It seemed as if Bedlam had broken loose upon the Royal
Exchange—all seemed actuated by the same desire—to
lay out money in whatever way they could; when all
of a sudden the reverse came, and a panic seized the
public. Men would not part with their mouey on any
account. Others, of wealth and known capital, were
seen walking the streets of London, not knowing whether
they would be able to meet their engagements the next
day, and if the crisis was allowed to pass without speak-
ing the truth, it would only lay the foundation for
future evil." This was in 1826. Then, in 1836, the
proceedings of the Bank of England almost en-
dangered the stability of that establishment, and
the President of the Chamber of Comnitrce at Man-
chester declared that in consequence a loss of 40,000,000/.
on the great materials of cotton, wool, and silk was to
be attributed. Then in 1839 they had been obliged to
apply for the intervention of the Bank of France, the
gold in the Bank of England being reduced to
2,000,000/4 and again the evils that followed were attri-
buted to the departure by the Bank of England from
those rules which they themselves had established for
their own security. Thus, then, I have shown that in
1784, in 1793, in 1810, in 1826, in 1836, and in 1839,
you will find the same causes as now—prosperity, low
rate of interest, great excitement, leading to immense
engagements, which, when tried by the test of a metallic
standard, you find them to collapse, and that stagnation
and distress followed. The same causes, in my opinion,
are operating now.—(Hear,) There has now been the
same prosperity, low rate of interest, undue speculation
—there has been a mode of conducting business—of
issuing paper—of re-discounting bills—(Hear, hear)—
which I believe to be quite novel in the commercial
history of this country.—(Hear, hear.) In this great
country you chose to erect a greater superstructure of
paper currency and credit on a smaller basis than any
European nation.—(Hear, hear.) This country and the
United States attempt, with a small comparative amount
of the precious metals, to have an enormous structure of
promissory notes and paper currency. There is no
country in Europe, in proportion to the extent of its
paper credit, including notes and bills of exchange, that
puts itself to so small at expense by a foundation of
bullion. This gives, no doubt, great facilities to enter-
prise; but at the same time it is accompanied by great
corresponding evils.—(Hear, hear.) The largeness of
credit, the extent of our colonial empire, is such that
when there is prosperity—when there is a low rate of
interest, the temptation of both is encouraged by that
great establishment, the Bank, which is the centre of
credit, The consequences which follow are inevitable.
Establish what rule you please, I know that you will not
go to the expense of greatly widening the basis of your
currency. Why, you are now calling out for relaxation
rather than for restriction—you want more paper in pro-
portion to your gold thsu you have at present; the more
paper.you have, greater will be your present ease, but
if you insist upon having it, more frequent will be the
recurrence of these disasters.—(Hear, hear.) The
United States attempts the same thing ; and the United
States, with its enormous advantages, its great extent of
land, its growing commerce—because it has a smaller
foundation fbr its superstructure than even you have—
is exposed to more rapid and more disastrous vicissi-
tudes than you are. But such is the state of your cur•
rency ; and the great object is to reconcile as much of
of ease and of relaxation as possible, with a
permanent guarantee for convertibility. And it
was only after the experience of those years
of distress, then patent to you, that you were led to
accede to any measure having for its object the pre-
vention of these recurrences ; it was while the
memory of those years was present to your mind,
that you willingly acquiesced in any measure which
should fetter the discretion of the Bank, and appear
to give new facilities, along with a guarantee against
such excesses as might endanger convertibility. It is,
no doubt, painful to refer to individual houses ; but
I have the less reluctance in doing it when I have
seen published, on the highest authority, comparisons
of their liabilities with their assets.—(Hear, hear.)
And I hesitate not to say, that if the commerce of the
country is conducted on such principles, in vain may you
look to any legislative regulations, or any regulation but
discretion, to prevent the evils which must flow from
such a reckless course of conducting commercial affairs.
—(Cheers.) Sir, when I see amongst the mass of houses
(I will not mention names, though they have been pub-
lished in the public papers)—when I see one whose
liabilities are to the extent of 50,000/., and its assets to
the extent of 3,oool.—(Bear, hear)—l say, if that is
the practice of your commerce, don't complain of the
Act of 1844.—(Loud cheers.) Is it not monstrous that
the standard of this country should be endangered, in
order to cover or facilitate such transactions as these ?
What security can I give to a bank that has 600,000/.
of paid-up capital, and lends 500,000/. of that capital
to one house?—(Hear, hear.) What is it to me that
the shareholders repose discretion and confidence in
their directors ?—(Hear, hear.) Why do they not
take an active part in the conduct of their own
affairs? They fail; and then, like this gentleman whose
liabilities are to the extent of 50,0001., and his assets
3,000/., they exclaim—" This infernal Act of 1844, this
detestable restriction Act of Peel's is the cause of all
our difficulties."—(Cheers and laughter.) We want
money, and the Act of 1844 prevents our getting U."—
(Hear, hear.) To such persons I would say—thank the
Act of 1844 that your difficulties are not aggravated.
Just consider what would have been the state of affairs
if "northern and central banks," and "Manchester
banks," and "Norfolk and Norwich banks," had been
entitled to foster all these speculations by an unlimited
issue of paper,:—(Hear, hear.) But you will have these
excitements and these stagnations; and, depend upon it,
under ordinary circumstances, the native energies of
country would enable you to overcome this. Why, you
had just the same prophecies in all these years of dis-
tress. We were told "The sun of England is set; there

is no chance of future prosperity; here are perfectly
solvent persons who cannot get accommodation or money
at even 10 or 15 per cent."—(Hear, hear.) And some
gentlemen, from whom I should have expected better
things, tell us that the commerce of this country cannot
be conducted if people are to pay 10 per cent. for
their money; and the Government is blamed for
causing it. Why should not the commerce of this
country pay for money what that money is worth ?
(Hear, hear.) If it is hard that they should pay eight
or ten per cent., pray, tell me, by what law you would
prevent it. You would make the usury-laws more
stringent, you say. I think there is great reason to
doubt whether the retention of a portion of the usury-
laws is not telling most injuriously upon those who are
affected by it. (Hear, hear.) We had experiene of
the evil effects of the usury-laws in 1826.—(Hear.)
Many houses of the first respectability and solvency
sank, in 1825 and 1826, because of the usury-laws—
because there was not a power of borrowing money
and giving for it what it was worth. What was the
consequence ? Those who obeyed the law could not
lend their money ; and those who evaded it required a
still greater interest in order to cover the risk which
they incurred.—(Hear, hear.) Then, how can you
possibly prevent this high rate of interest ? But, we

are told that it is restricting our export trade in cotton
goods. No doubt it is; no doubt it is a novel thing that
persons engaged in commercial enterprise should pay
ten per cent. for money ; but no issue of
bank-notes will remedy that evil. The dearth again
is a dearth of capital—(Hear, hear)—and while capital
is scarce, pass what laws you please, you must pay for it.
—(Hear, hear.) But, as happened in the six cases to
which I have referred before, the native energies; of this
country would have enabled you to bear all this, -without
that severity of suffering which you now endure, had it
not been that, in the midst of this commercial disaster,
there did supervene an unforeseen cause, which but ag-
gravated tenfold the difficulties of your position, and has
augmented that depression which has been the conse-
quence of over-excitement. Why how is it possible to
state that 33 millions sterling have been spent, in the
course of a few months—of little more than a year—for
the purpose of providing subsistence for the people of
this country, without seeing that, under any circum-
stances, even had it been a time of great prosperity, the
evil must have been most intensely felt, the suffering
must have been most severe ? And when the investment
of capital, for the purpose of purchasing food, came con-
currently with the exhaustion of capital, in consequence
of improvident commercial engagements, it does require
all the energies of this country to bear that double simul-
taneous burthen.—(Hear, hear.) Well, Sir, but there
has been a still further cause of difficulty; concurrently
with those two, there has been the adaptation of an un-
usual amount of capital to a new species of enterprise,l—
namely, the railways. Ido not estimate the effect of
that application of capital so highly as some gentlemen
have done. I think that, under ordinary circumstances,
oughttoau preprl agi
nothing would have been more advantageous than such
an application.—(Hear, hear.) I think that, by the ex-
tension f
railwayst
onYfo ddQu are laying the foundation of
deduct
upv
ciettraylf
rmot
mou c
anyailw doubtsae)v,i whet
awh h
iae
yt hc
he
have
at
hyo
eer
sng uor det wte
nfe
r
caused all that which otherwise would have been caused
by the employment of a like amount of capitalin foreign
railways, and in foreign securities generally —(llear
hear.) I believe that, had we not had the -demand fo;
food—had we not had the loss of capital, or, at least,
the suspension of engagements in consequence of ins-
provident commercial enterprise--you would have
been able to bear the diversion of capital to railways
with very little derangement of our monetary affairs.
For Ido not conceive that will be a dead loss. The
time will shortly come, those railways being completed,
when they may, I hope, be productive to those engaged
in them. And when I think what will be the saving to
the country in the conveyance of goods, the saving of
time in transport and locomotion, I cannot think that
railways ultimately, though at present a means of
heightening our difficulties, can fail to be a source of
great improvement and gain to the country.—(Hear,
hear.) Country banks, joint-stock banks, are nothiag
more than the intervening agents between those who
possess capital and those who employ it; they receive
deposits from all classes of individuals; heretofore they
have been accustomed, as the media between capital and
its employers, to divert almost the whole of it to com-
mercial enterprise. Suddenly, a large portion of this
capital is diverted to a new species of enterprise; and,
no doubt, this must for a time add still more to the
scarcity of capital, and so far increase the difficulties
under which we labour. Therefore, it appears to me
that the concurrence of those three causes—the last only
in a minor degree, the two former more heavily—is suf-
ficient to account for the stagnation we now feel.
Now, Sir, I must say a word with reference to the let-
ter of the Noble Lord at the head of the Government
I am bound to say, as not being one of the Noble Lord's
ordinary supporters, that I do cordially approve of the
course Government has taken on that matter.—(Cheers.)
I think they were perfectly right in not issuing that
letter sooner than they did.—(Hear, hear.) The true
remedy for the state of things under which we are suf-
fering, is individual exertion, the contraction of engage-
ments, the cessation of all demands which can create
embarrassment; and had the Government at an earlier
period signified an intention to relax the law they would
have materially discouraged those individual exertions,
which, after all, must be our main reliance.—(Hear,
hear.) But when we were in a state of panic—a state
which cannot be foreseen or provided against by law—
then I think the authority of the Executive Govern-
ment to prevent the consequences of that increasing
panic was properly exercised.—(Hear.) I consider the
issue of that letter is no necessary impeachment of the
law. I entirely differ trom those who say that the
necessity for issuing that letter is a conclusive
proof that there ought to have been a discretionary
power confided in the Bank.—(Hear, hear.) It is one
of those cases in which, as was foreseen by Mr. Hue-
kisson, not legislation, but the discretion of the Go-
vernment must apply. I think the Government, there-
fore, was justified in issuing that letter. I think they
acted with the strictest regard to all constitutional
scruples in summoning Parliament when they did. If
there had been a violation of the law, I think the first
appeal ought to have been to Parliament to give them an
indemnity; but as there was none, I do not know bow it
was possible to draw up an application for an indemnity.
—(Laughter.) As far as there was any danger, it is
obviated by calling Parliament together, aid I for one
say there is no necessity for an indemnity.—(A laugh.)
I also think the Government were right in not leaving a
discretion to the Bank. I think it was a better course
for them to take, to sanction a violation of the law if it
was necessary, but themselves to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which the law should be violated—to
sanction the violation of the law, and throw upon the
Bank the responsibility of demanding a high interest.—
(Hear, hear.) The Right Hon. Baronet proceeded to
say that he would not discuss the question, which would
be considered maturely in the Committee, as to whether
there should be any alteration in the Act of 1844. He
should be acting a part unworthy of a Member of Par-
liament if he permitted any mere consideration of con-
sistency to prevent him from giving full consideration
to the Act of 1844.—(Hear, hear.) His own impres-
sion was in favour of the main principles of that Act.
He thought the restriction should be continued on the
joint-stock banks of keeping a stock of bullion. Some
restriction was surely necessary, after the experience
of this crisis of 1839, of 1836, and of 1826. It was
thought the Act of 1844 was the best mode of im-
posing ;that restriction, and he knew no better.—
(Hear.) He heard with great satisfaction the speech
of his Right lion. Friend (Mr. Herries) in which he de-
clared his inviolate adherence to the principle of a me-
tallic currency and of convertibility. He had no great
apprehension on that head, whatever he might hear in
that House. He hoped for the security of property and
commercial enterprise some of the opinions which be
had heard in the course of the debate would not prevail.
The Hon Member for Wakefield had said he thought, on
the recommendation of the House, the Government
should pay off its debt of 14,000,0001. to the Bank in in-
convertible paper. If the Government were to set that
example of paying to the Bank a debt which was due
and convertible in paper for which there was to be no
other equivalent than other paper, he foresaw that indi-
viduals in the same difficulty would be too glad to adopt
the same course.—(Hear.) But he could not believe
that that House would sanction such injustice.—(Hear.)
The Hon. Member for Stafford had proposed that they
should have convertible paper but with a fluctuating
standard. There seemed a contradiction in the terms.—
(Laughter.) What was the moaning of it ? prac-
tically that of assignats ifs France—notes and gold
at the market price of gold meant nothing more or
less than a temptation to depreciate the value of the
gold by the issue of paper, and then to pay your debt
in that depreciated value. If they imposed a limit
to the issue of paper currency, there must be some limit
to the price of gold; but an unlimited paper currency
to be paid in a fluctuating standard meant no more or
less than the restoration of that system under which
the paper currency of France was depreciated some four
or five hundred per cent. His impression was that the
House would imitate the example of its predecessors.
In 1822, when the motion for an inquiry was made, Mr.
Huskisson moved, and that House assented to it, that
they should follow the example of Parliament in the
year 1697, and they resolved that they would not con-
sent to make as alteration in the standard coin of the
realm. Again, in 1833, upon the motion of Lord Al-
thorp, the House re-asserted that principle. It there
should be a necessity for it, he felt convinced that the
House, on the most enlarged considerations of policy, lad
with regard to strict justice, would re-affirea that pro-
test.--(Hear.) There was nothing in the argument that
the commercial transactions of this country had so in-
creased that the ancient standard was insufficient. They
were in error when they talked about the price of gold ;
the promissory note was a promise to pay a defined
weight of gold, and nothing else ; and if they chose to
make their Si. note promise what the 10/. note did, they
would not in the slightest degree alter the nature of the
currency. With the standar of value, what had been
the increase in the prosperity of the country
?W
hen
the
or
they found, with the present standard of value,u,
which
decennial increase in the declared value of ex p ,
he thought from 1831 was not more than a 6,0000004
had increased in the next decennial period to 46,000,0004,
and within the last three years was not less than
that with
Id see conclusive proof
59,000,0001., they won
the ancient standard of valuethey
most enlarged commerce that this country was capable
of. Whatever might be their minute alterations in
this law of 1844, his hope was that the How* would
snow
that they had the same regard to justice
and good faith which had been shown by their
Predecessors ; and remembering that whether the
policy of the Act of 1844 was or was not a wise
policy, the transactions which had been entered into
since 1822 were as ninety-nine to one,
when compared
with the transactions which took place before that period,
and which still remained unliquidated, he trusted a re-
gard to their own character—a regard for
justice—for
the permar t
aen interests of the country—a regard, above
all, for the condition of h t ose who earned by their in-
detstry the wages of labour, would induce the House of
Commons to uphold the standard which, after long
struggling, had been established by the wisdom of Par-
lianaeut.—(Loud cheers.)
Mr. STUART (Newark) moved the adjournment of
the debate. The House then divided—
For the adjournment 45
Against
Majority —2l2
Mr. WILSON then withdrew his amendment, and the
original motion, for the appointment of a Committee,
was agreed to. _

The'House then adjourned at a Quarter past One.

KING'S COLLEGE HOSPITAL.—Some idea of the
extent of the prevalence of influenza may be formed
from the great increase of out-patients at the above
hospital during the past two weeks. Many days little
less than 800 apply; and on one occasion (Tuesday last)
upwards of that t- umber received medical treatment
aad medicine fr,om the dispensary. The attendance of
women and children on the same day was 250, of whom
the larger proportion wore suffering from the prevailing
epidemic.