The Sun.
London, England, 1847-12-31 00:00:00

CAUSES OF THE WAR.

of New Mexico, in north latitude about 32 degrees,
and to obtain a cession to the United States of the
provinces of New Mexico and the Californias, and the
privilege of the right of way across the isthmus of
Tehuantepec. The boundary of the Rio Grande,
and the cession to the United States of New Mexico
and Upper California, constituted an ultimatum,
which our Commissioner was, under no circumstances,
to yield.
That it might be manifested not only to Mexico,
but to all other nations, that the United States were
not disposed to take advantage of a feeble power by
insisting upon wresting from her all the other pro-
vinces, including many of her principal towns and
cities, which we had conquered and held in our mili-
tary occupation, but were willing to conclude a treaty
in a spirit of liberality, our Commissioner was autho-
rised to stipulate for the restoration to Mexico of all
our other conquests.
As the territory to be acquired by the boundary
proposed might be estimated to be of greater value
than a fair equivalent for our just demands, our Com-
missioner was authorised to stipulate for the payment
of such additional pecuniary consideration as was
deemed reasonable.

Gulf to its intersection with the southern boundary

with full powers to enter upon negotiations, and to
conclude a just and honourable treaty of peace.
He was not directed to make any new overtures
of peace, but was the bearer of a dispatch from the
Secretary of State of the United States to the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, in reply to one
received from the latter of the 22d of February, 1847,
in which the Mexican Government was informed of
his appointment, and of his presence at the head-
quarters of our army, and that he was invested with full
power to conclude a definite treaty of peace, when-
ever the Mexican Government might signify a desire
to do so. While I was unwilling to subject the
United States to another indignant refusal, I was
yet resolved that the evils of the war should not be
protracted a day longer than might be rendered ab-
solutely necessary by the Mexican Government.
Care was taken to give no instructions to the Com-
missioner which could in any way interfere with our
military operations, or relax our en9rgies in the pro-
secution of the war. He possessed no authority in
any manner to control these operations. He was
authorised to exhibit his instructions to the General
in command of the army, and in the event of a treaty
being concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico,
he \a as directed to give him notice of that fact. On
the happening of such contingency, and on receiving
notice thereof, the General in command was instructed
by the Secretary of War to suspend further active
military operations until further orders. These in -
structiona were given with a view to intermit hos-
tilities, until the treaty thus ratified by Mexico could
be transmitted to Washington, and receive the
sanction of the Government of the United States.
The Commissioner was also directed, on reaching
the army, to deliver to the General in command the
dispatch which he bore from the Secretary of State
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, and
on receiving it, the General was instructed by the
Secretary of War to cause it to be transmitted to the
Commander of the Mexican forces, with a request
that it might be communicated to his Government.
The Commissioner did not reach the head-quarters
of the army until after another brilliant victory had
crowned our arms at Cerro Gordo.
The dispatch which he bore from the Secretary of
War to the General in command of the army was
received by that officer, then at Jalapa, on the 7th
day of May, 1847, together with the dispatch from
t e Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign
- {fairs of Mexico, having been transmitted to him
f.
•om Vera Cruz. The Commissioner arrived at the
h,.U-quarters of the army a few days afterwards
His presence with the army, and his diplomatic
character, were made known to the Mexican Go-
vernment, from Puebla, on the 12th of June, 1847,
by the transmission of the dispatch from the Secretary
of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico.

Many weeks elapsed after its receipt, and no over-
tures were made, nor was any desire expressed by the
Mexican Government to enter into negotiations for
peace.
Our army pursued its march upon the capital, and,
as it approached it;was met by formi:lable resistance.
Our forces first encountered the enemy, and achieved
signal victories, in the severely contested battles of
Contreras and Churubusco. It was not until after
these actions had resulted in decisive victories, and the
capital of the enemy was within our power, that the
Mexican Government manifested any disposition to
enter into negotiations for peace ; and even then, as
events have proved, there is to much reason to believe
they were insincere, and that in agreeing to go through
the forms of negotiation, the object was to gain time
to strengthen the defences of their capital, and to pre-
pare for fresh resistance.
The General in command of the army deemed it
expedient to suspend hostilities temporarily, by enter-
ing into an armistice with a view to the opening of
negotiations. Commissioners were appointed on the
part of Mexico to meet the Commissioners on the part
of the United States. The result of the conferences
which took place between these functionaries of the
two Governments was a failure to conclude a treaty
of peace.
THEORY UPON TREATIES AND INDEM-

INADMISSIBILITY OF THE MEXICAN
TERMS.

The terms of a treaty proposed by the Mexican
Commissioners were wholly inadmissible. They
negociated as if Mexico was the victorious, and
not the vanquished party. They must have
known that their ultimatum could never be ac-
cepted. It required the United States to dismem-
ber Texas, by surrendering to Mexico that part of
the territory of that state lying between the Nueces
and the Rio Grande, included within her limits by
her laws when she was an independent republic, and
when she was annexed to the United States awl ad-
mitted by Congress as one of the states of our Union.
It contained no provision for the payment by Alexico
of the just claims of our citizens. It required in-
demnity to Mexican citizens for injuries they may
have sustained by our troops in the prosecution of the
war. It demanded the right for Mexico to levy and
collect the Mexican tariff of duties on gods im-
ported into her ports while in our military occupation
during the war, and the owners of which had paid to
officers of the United States the military contribu-
tions which had been levied upon them ; and it oflered
to cede to the United States, for a pecuniary consi-
deration, that part of Upper California lying north
of latitude 37 degrees. Such were the unreasonable
terms propose i by the Mexican Commissioners.
The cession to the United States, by Mexico, of
•

the provinces of New Alcxico and the Californias, as
proposed by the Commissioner of the United States,
it was believed, would be more in accordance with

the convenience and interests of both nations, than
any other cession of territory which it Wai probable
Mexico would be induced to make.

It is manifest to all who ha'e observed the actual
condition of the Mexican Government for some years
past, and at preient, that if these provinces should he
retained by her she could not long continue to hold
and govern them. Mexico is too feeble a power to
govern these provinces, lying as they do at a distance
of more than 1,000 miles from her capital, and if
attempted to be retained by her, they would consti-
tute but for a short time, even nominally, a part of
her dominions.

This would be especially the case with Upper Cali-
fornia. The sagacity of powerful European nations
has long since directed their attention to the commer-
cial importance of that province, and there can be
little doubt that the moment the United States shall
relinquish their present occupation of it, and their
claim to it as an indemnity, an !effort would be made
by some foreign power to possess it, either by con-
quest or by purchase. If no foreign government
should acquire it in either of these modes, an inde-
pendent revolutionary Government would probably be
established by the inhabitants, and such foreigners as
may remain in or remove to the country, as soon as it
shall be known that the United States have abandoned'
it. Such a Government would be too feeble long t 6
maintain its separate independent existence, and would
finally become annexed to or be a dependent colony
of some more powerful state.
Should any foreign Government attempt to possess
it as a colony, or otherwise to incorporate it with
itself, the principle avowed by President Munroe, in
1824, and reaffirmed in my first annual message, that
no foreign Power shall, with our consent, be per-
mitted to plant or establish any new colony or domi-
nion on any part of the North American continent,
must be maintained. In maintaining this principle,
and in resisting its invasion by any foreign power,
we might be involved in other wars more expensive
and more difficult than that in which we are now
engaged.
The provinces of New Mexico and the Californias
are contiguous to the territories of the United States,
and if brought under the government of our laws,
their resources—mineral, agricultural, manufacturing,
and commercial—would soon be developed.
Upper California is baunded on the north by our
Oregon possessions, and if held by the United States
would soon be settled by a hardy, enterprising, and
intelligent portion of our population. The Bay ofl
San Francisco and other harbours along the Califor-
nian coast, would afford shelter for our navy, for our
numerous whale ships and other merchant vessels
employed in the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short
period become the marts of an extensive and profit-
able commerce with China, and other countries of
the East.
These advantages, in which the whole commercial
world would participate, would at once be secured to
the United States by the cession of this territory ;
while it is certain that, as long as it remains a part of
the Mexican dominions, they can be enjoyed neither
by Mexico herself, nor any other nation.
New Mexico is a frontier province, and has never
been of any considerable value to Mexico. From its
locality it is naturally connected with our western
settlements. The territorial limits of the state of
Texas, too, as defined by her laws, before her admis-
sion into our union, embrace all that portion of New
Mexico lying east of the Ric Grande, while Mexico
still claims to hold this territory as a part of her do-
minions. The adjustment of this question of boundary
is important.
There is another consideration which induced the be-
lief that the Mexican Government might even desire to
place this province uader the protection of the Govern-
ment of the United States. Numerous bands of
fierce and warlike savages wander over it, and upon
its borders. Mexico has been, and must continue
to be, too feeble to restrain them from committing
depredations, robberies, and murders, not only upon
the inhabitants of New Mexico itself, but upon
those of the other northern states of Mexico. It
would be a blessing to all these northern states to
have their citizens protected against them by the
power of the United States. At this moment many
Mexicans, principally females and children, are in
captivity among them. If New Mexico were held
and governed by the United States, we could effec-
tually prevent these trijaes from committing such
outrages, and compel them to release these captives,
and restore them to their families and friends.
In proposing to acquire New Mexico and the Cali-
fornias, it was known that but an inconsiderable por-
tion of the Mexican people would be transferred with
them, the country embraced within these provinces
being chiefly an uninhabited region.
FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS.

It is sufficient on the present occasion to say that
the wanton violation of the rights of person and pro-
perty of our citizens committed by Mexico, her re-
peated acts of bad faith, through a long series of
years, and her disregard of solemn treaties, stipulating
for indemnity to our injured citizens, not only con-
stituted ample cause of war on our part, but were of
such an aggravated character as would have justified us
before the whole world in resorting to this extreme
remedy. With an anxious desire to avoid a rup-
ture between the two countries, we forbore for years
to assert our clear rights by force, and continued to
seek redress for the wrongs we had suffered by ami-
cable negotiation, in the hope that Mexico might
yield to pacific councils and the demands of justice.
In this hope we were disappointed. Our minister of
peace sent to Mexico WAS insultingly rejected. The
Mexican Government refused even to hear the terms
of adjustment which he was authorised to propose ;
and, finally, under wholly unjustifiable pretexts, in-
volved the two countries in war, by invading the
territory of the state of Texas, striking the first blow,
and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own toil.
Though the United States was the aggrieved
nation, Mexico commenced the war, and we were
compelled, in self-defence, to repel the invader, and to
vindicate the national honour and interests by pro-
secuting it with vigour, until we could obtain a just
and honourable peace.
On learning that the hostilities had been com-
menced by !Mexico, I promptly communicated that
fact, accompanied with a succinct statement of our
other causes of complaint against Mexico to C at-
gress ; and that body by the Act of the 18th of May,
1846, declared that "by the Act of the Republic of
Mexico, a state of war exists between that Govern•
ment and the United St rtes"—this Act declaring
" the war to exist by the Act of the Republic of
Mexico," and making provision for its prosecution
"to a speedy and successful termination," was
passed with great unanimity by Congress, there being
but two negative votes in the Senate, and but fourteen
in the House of Representatives.
The existence of the war having thus been de-
clared by Congress, it became my duty, under the
constitution and the laws, to conduct and prosecute it.
This duty has been performed; and though, at every
stage of its progress, I have manifested a willingness
to terminate it by a just peace, Mexico has refused to
accede to any terms which could be accepted by the
United States, consistently with the national honour
and interest.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY, &c.

These were the leading considerations which in-
duced me to authorise the terms of peace which were
proposed to Mexico. They were rejected, and nego-
tiations being at an end hostilities were renewed.
An assault was made by our gallant army upon the
strongly fortified places near the gates of the city of
Mexico, and upon the city itself ; and after several
days of severe conflict the Mexican forces, ♦astly su-
perior in number to our own, were driven from the
city, and it was occupied by our troops.
Immediately after information was received of the
unfavourable result of the negotiations, believing that
his continued presence with the army could be pro-
ductive of no good, I determined to recal our Com-
missioner. A dispatch to this effect was transmitted to
him on the 6th of October last. The- Mexican
Government will be informed of his recal; and that
in the existing state of things, I shall not deem it
proper to make any further overtures of peace, but
shall be at all times ready to receive and consider any
proposals which may be made by Mexico.
Since the liberal proposition (11 the United States
was authorised to be made in April last, large ex-
penditures have been incurred, and the precious blood
of many of our patriotic fellow citizens has been shed
in the prosecution of the war. This consideration and
the obstinate perseverance of Mexico in protract-
ing the war, must influence the terms of peace which
it may be deemed proper hereafter to accept.
Our arms having been everywhere victorious, hav-
ing subjected to our military occupation a large
portion of the enemy's country, including his capital,
and negotiations for peace having failed, the impor-
tant questions arise—in what manner the war ought
to be prosecuted ? and what should be our future
policy ? I cannot doubt that we should secure and
render available the conquests which we have already
made : and that, with this view, we should hold and
occupy, by our naval and military forces, all the
ports, towns, cities, and provinces now in our occu-
pation, or which may hereafter fall into our pos-
session ; that we should press forward our military
operations, and levy such military contributions on
the enemy as may, as far as practicable, defray the
future expenses of the war.
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINES.

The rapid and brilliant successes of our arms, and
the vast extent of the enemy's territory, which had
been overrun and conquered, before the close of the
last session of Congress, were fully known to that
body. Since that time the war had been prosecuted
with increased energy, and I am gratified to state,
with a success which commands universal admiration.
History presents no parallel of so many glorious
victories achieved by any nation within so short a
period. Our army, regulars and volunteers. have
covered themselves with imperishable honours. When •
ever and wherever our forces have encountered the
enemy, though he was in vastly superior numbers,
and often entrenched in fortified positions of his own
selection, and of great strength, he has been defeated.
Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon our officers
an dnTi, regulars and volunteers, for their gallantry,
discipline, indomitable courage, and perseverance, all
'
seeking the post of danger, and vieing with each
other in deeds of noble daring.
While every patriot's
boson, heart must exult, and a just
national pride animate every beholdinge
the
high proofs of courage, consummate military skill,
steady discipline, and humanity to the vanquished
enemy, exhibited by our gallant army, the nation is
called to mourn over the loss of many brave officers
and soldiers who have fallen in defence of their coun-
try's honour and interests. The brave dead met their
melancholy fate in a foreign land,' nobly discharging
their duty, and with their country s flag waving tri-
umphantly in the face of the foe. Their patriotic
deeds are justly appreciated, and will long be rpmen,
bered by their grateful countrymen. The parente
care of the Government they loved and served should
be Extended to their surviving families.
Shortly after the adjournment of the last session of
Congress, the gratifying intelligence was received of
.
the signal victory of Buena Vista, and of the fall of
the city of Vera Cruz, and with it the strong castle
of San Juan de Ulloa, by which it was defended.
Believing that after these and other successes, so
honourable to our arms, and so disastrous to Mexico,
the'period was propitious to afford her another opp,r-
tunity, if she thought proper to embrace it, to enter
into negotiations for peace, a Commissioner was ap-
pointed to proceed to the head-quarters of our army,

Had thy Govcrnm.,rt n,--;1,,1 to "'in
,itiitablu and lit;e:..d 1, ,i•
a aknient would 1, 1:(4 LLe.. :x., ].
having declined to do this, and failed to offer any
other terms which could be accepted by the United
States, the national honour, no less than the public

TtiE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING., DECEMBER 31, 1847.

interests, requires that the war should be prosecuis-
with increased energy and power, until a just and sat as
factory peace can be obtained. In the mean time'
Mexico refuses all indemnity, we should adopt measures
to indemnify ourselves,by appropriating permanently a
portion of her territory. Early after the commence-
ment of the war, New Mexico and the Californias
were taken possession of by our forces. Our mili -
tary and naval commanders were ordered to conquer
and hold them, subject to be disposed of by a treaty
of peace.

per for our commanding generals in the field to -give
encouragement and assurances of protection to the
friends of peace in Mexico in the establishment and
maintenance of a free republican Government of their
own choice ;Able and willing to conclude a peace which
would be just to them, and secure to us the indemnity
we demand: This may become the only mode of obtain-
ing such a peace. Should such be the result, the war
which Mexico has forced upon us would thus be con-
verted into an enduring blessing to herself. After
finding her torn and distressed by factions, and ruled
by military usurpers, we should then leave her with a
Republican Government, in the enjoyment of real inde-
pendence and domestic peace and prosperity, perform-
ing all her relagve duties in the great family of nations,
and promoting her own happiness by wise laws and
their faithful execution.

These provinces are now in our undisputed occupa-
tion, and have been so for many months ; all resist-
ance on the part of Mexico having ceased within their
limits, I am satisfied that they should never be sur-
rendered to Mexico. Should Congress concur with
me in this opinion, and that they should be retained
by the United States as indemnity, I can perceive
no good reason why the civil jurisdiction and laws of
the United States should not at once be extended
over them. To wait for a treaty of peace, such as we
are willing to make, by which our relations towards
them would not be changed, cannot be good policy ;
whilst our own interest, and that of the people inha-
biting them, require that a stable, responsible,
and free government under our authority
should, as soon as possible, be established
over them. Should Congress, therefore, deter-
mine to hold these provinces permanently, and
that they shall hereafter be considered as constituent
parts of our country, the early establishment of terri •
torial governments over them will be important for
the more perfect protection of persons and property ;
and I recommend that such territorial governments
be established. It will promote peace and tranquillity
among the inhabitants, by allaying all apprehension
that they may still entertain of being again subjected
to the jurisdiction of Mexico. I invite the early and
favourable consideration of Congress to this important
subject.
Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are
other Mexican provinces which have been reduced to
our possession by conquest. These other Mexican
provinces are now governed by our military and
naval commanders, under the general authority which
is conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war.
They should continue to be held as a means of
coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace.
Civil as well as military officers are required to con-
duct such a government. Adequate compensation to
be drawn from contributions levied on the enemy
should he fixed by law for such officers as may be
thus employed ; what further provision may becom e
necessary, and what final disposition it may be proper
to make of them, must depend on the future progress
of the war, and the course which Mexico may think
proper hereafter to pursue.
With the views I entertain, I cannot favour the
policy which has been suggested, either to withdraw
our army altogether, or to retire to a designated line,
and simply hold and defend it. To withdraw our
army altogether from the conquests they have made
by deeds of unparalleled bravery, and at the expense
of so much blood and treasure, in a just war on our
part, and one which, by the act of the enemy, we
Could not honourably have avoided, would be to
degrade the nation in its own estimation anti in that
of the world.

IF, after affording this encouragement and protec -
tion, and after all the perseverance and sincere efforts
we have made, from the moment Mexico commenced
this war, and prior to that time, to adjust our differ-
ences with her, we shall ultimately fail, then we shall
have exhausted all honourable means in pursuit of
peace, and must continue to occupy her country with
our troops, taking the full measure of indemnity into
our own hands, and must enforce the terms which our
honour demands.

To act otherwise in the existing state of things in
Mexico, and to withdraw our army without a peace,
would not only leave all the wrongs of which we corn-
plain unredressed, but would be the signal for new
and fierce civil dissensions and new revolutions—all
alike hostile to peaceful relations with the United
States.

To retire to a line, and simply hold and defend i
would not terminate the war. On the contrary,

Besides, there is danger, if our troops were with-
drawn before a peace was concluded, that the Mexi
can people, wearied with successive revolutions, and
deprived of protection for their persons and property,
might at length he inclined to yield to foreign influ-
ence, and to cast themselves into the arms of some
European monarch for protection from the anarchy
and suffering which would ensue. This, for our own
safety, and in pursuance of our established policy, we
should be compelled to resist. We could never con-
sent that Mexico should be thus converted into a
monarchy governed by a foreign prince.
Mexico is our near neighbour, and her boundaries
are co-terminous with our own through the whole
extent across the North American continent, from
ocean to ocean. Both politically and commercially
we have the deepest interest in her regeneration and
prosperity. Indeed, it is impossible that, with any
just regard to our own safety, we can ever become in-
different to her fate.

would encourage Mexico to persevere, and tend to
protract it indefinitely. It is not to be expected that
Mexico, after refusing to establish such a line as a
permanent boundary, when our victorious army are
in possession of her capital, and in the heart of her
country, would permit us to hold it without resist-
ance. That she would continue the war, and in the
most harassing and annoying forms, there can be no
doubt. A border warfare of the most savage character,
extending over a long line, would be incessantly waged.
It would require a large army to be kept constantly in
the field, stationed at posts and garrisons along such
a line, to protect and defend it. The enemy, relieved
from the pressure of our arms on his coasts and in the
populous parts of the interior, would direct his atten-
tion to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for
attack, would concentrate his forces upon it. This
would be a condition of affairs which the Mexicans,
pursuing their favourite system of guerilla warfare,
would probably prefer to any other. Were we t)
assume a defensive attitude on such a line, all the ad-
vantages of suih a state of warfare would be on the
side of the enemy. We could levy no contributions
upon him, or in any other way make him feel the
pressure of the war, but must remain inactive and
await his approach, being in constant uncertainty at
what point on the line, or at what time he might make
an assault. He may assemble and organize an over-
whelming force in the interior on his own side of the
line, and concealing his purpose, make a sudden as-
sault upon some one of our posts, so distant from any
other as to prevent the possibility of timely succour
or reinforcements ; and in this way our gallant army
would be exposed to the danger of being cut off in
detail ; or if, by their unequalled bravery and prowess
everywhere exhibited during this war, they should
repulse the enemy, their numbers stationed at
any one post may be too small to pursue him.
If the enemy be repulsed in one attack, he would have
nothing to do but to retreat to his own side of the
line, and being in no fear of a pursuing army may
reinforce himself at leisure for another attack on the
same or some other post. He may, too, cross the line
between our posts, make rapid incursions into the
country which we hold, murder the inhabitants,
commit depredations on them, and then retreat to
the interior before a sufficient force can he concen-
trated to pursue him. Such would probably be the
harassing character of a mere defensive war on our
part. If our forces, when attacked or threatened
with attack, be permitted to cross the line, drive back
the enemy, and conquer him, this would be again to
invade the enemy's country, after having lost all the
advantages of the conquests we have already made,
by having voluntarily abandoned them. To hold such
a line successfully and in security, it is far from being
certain that it would not require as large an army as
would be necessary to hold all the conquests we have
already made, and to continue the prosecution of the
war in the heart of the enemy's country. It is also
far from being certain that the expenses of the war
would be diminished by such a policy.
RECOMMENDATION TO PROSECUTE THE
WAR.

It may be that the Mexican Government and people
have misconstrued or misunderstood our forbearance,
and our objects, in desiring to conclude an amicable
adjustment of the existing differences between the two
countries. They may have supposed that we would
submit to terms degrading to the nation; or they may
have drawn false inferences from the supposed division
of opinion in the United States on the subject of the
war, and may have calculated to gain much by pro-
tracting it; and, indeed, that we might ultimately
abandon it altogether, without insisting on any in-
de►nnity, territorial or otherwise. Whatever may be
the false impressions under which they have acted,
the adoption and prosecution of the energetic policy
proposed must soon undeceive them.
In the future prosecution of the war, the enemy
must be made to feel its pressure more than they
have heretofore done. At its commencement, it was

deemed proper to conduct it in a spirit of forbearance
and liberality. With this end in view, early measures
were adopted to conciliate, as far as a state of war would
permit, the masa of the Mexican population ; to con-
vince them that the war was waged not against the

I am persuaded that the best means of vindicating
the national honour and interest, and of bringing the
war to an honourable close, will be to prosecute it
with increased energy and power in the vital parts of
the enemy's country-
In my annual message to Congress of December
last, I declared that "the war has not been waged
with a view to conquest ; but having been commenced
by Mexico, it has been carried into the enemy's
country, and will be vigorously prosecuted there,
with a view to obtain an honourable peace, and thereby
secureample indemnity for the expenses of the
war,as
weto
asour
much-injured citizens, who
hold large pecuniary demands against Mexico."
Such, in my judgment, continues to be our true
policy—indeed, the only policy which will probably
secure a permanent peace.
It has never been contemplated by me, as an
object of the war, to make a permanent conquest
of the republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her
separate existence as an independent nation. On
the contrary, it has ever been my desire that she
should maintain her nationality, and, under a good
Government, adapted to her condition, be a free, in-
dependent, and prosperous republic. The United
States were the first among the nations to recognise
her independence, and have always desired to be on
terms of amity and good neighbourhood with her.
This she would not suffer. By her own conduct we
have been compelled to engage in the present war. In
its prosecution, we seek not her overthrow as a nation ;
but, in vindicating our national honour, we seek to
obtain redress for the wrongs she has done us, and
indemnity for our just demands against her. We
demand an honourable_ peace; and that peace must
bring with it indemnity for the past, and security
for the future. Hitherto Mexico has refused all
accommodation by which such a peace could be ob-

peaceful inhabitants of Mexico, but against their faith-
less Government, which had commenced hostilities; to
remove from their minds the false impressions which
their designing and interested rulers had artfully at-
tempted to make that the war on our part was one of
conquest: that it was a war against their religion and
their churches, which were to be desecrated and over-
thrown ; and that their rights of person and private
property would be violated. To remove these false
impressions our commanders in the field were directed
scrupulously to respect their religion, their churches,
and their church property, which were in no manner
to be violated; they were directed also to respect the
rights of the persons and property of all who should
not take up arms against us.
Assurances to this effect were given to the Mexican
people by Major-General Taylor, in a proclamation
issued in pursuance of instructions from the Secre-
tary-of-War, in the month of June, 1846, and again
by Major-General Scott, who acted upon his own
convictions of the propriety of issuing it in a pro-
clamation of the 11th of May, 1847.
In this spirit of liberality and conciliation, and with
a view to prevent the body of the Mexican population
from taking up arms against us, was the war con-
ducted on our part. Provisions and other supplies
furnished to our army by Mexican citizens were paid
for at fair and liberal prices agreed upon by the
parties. After the lapse of a few months it became
apparent that these assurances and this mild treat-
ment had failed to produce the desired effect upon
I the Mexican population. While the war had been
I ;conducted in our part according to the most humane
and liberal principles observed by civilized nations,
it was waged in a far different spirit on the part of
Mexico. Not appreciating our forbearance, the
Mexican people generally became hostile to the
United States, and availed themselves of every oppor-
tunity to commit the most savage excesses upon our
troops. Large numbers of the population took up
arms, and, engaging in guerilla warfare, robbed and
murdered in the most cruel manner individual sol-
diers, or small parties, whom accident or other causes
had separated from the main body of our army ;
bands of guerilleros and robbers infested the roads,
harassed our trains, and, whenever it was in their
power, cut off our supplies.
The Mexicans having thus shown themselves to be
wholly incapable of appreciating our forbearance and
liberality, it was deemed proper to change the manner
of conducting the war, by making them feel its pres-
sure according to the usages observed under similar
circumstances by all other civilized nations.
Accordingly, as early as the 22d of September,
1846, instructions were given by the Secretary of
War to Major-General Taylor to "draw supplies"
for our army "from the enemy, without paying for
them, and to require contributions for its support," if
in that way he was satisfied he could "get abundant
supplies for his forces." In directing the execution
of these instruction, much was necessarily left to the
discretion of the commanding officer, who was best
acquainted with the circumstances by which he was
surrounded, the wants of the army, and the practica-
bility of enforcing the measure.
General Taylor, on the 25th of October, 1846, re
plied, from Monterey, that " It would have been im-
possible hitherto, and is so now, to sustain the army
to any extent by forced contributions of money or
supplies," For the reasons assigned by him, he did
not adopt the policy of his instructions, but declared
his readiness to do so, "should the army, in its future
operations, reach a portion of the country whichy may
be made to supply the troops with advantag!. lie
continued to pay for the articles of supply which were
drawn from the enemy's country.
Similar instructions were forwarded to Major-Gen.
Scott on the 3d of April, 1847, who replied from
Jalapa, on the 20th of May, 1847, that if it be ex-
pected that " the army is to support itself by forced
contributions levied upon the country, we may ruin
and exasperate the inhabitants and starve ourselves."
The same discretion was given to him that had been
to General Taylor in this respect. General Scott,
for the reason assigned by him, also continued to pay
for the articles of supply for the army which were
drawn from the enemy.
After the army had reached the heart of the most
wealthy portion of Mexico, it was supposed that the
obstacles which had before that time prevented it
would not be such as to render impracticable the levy
of forced contributions for its support; and on the Ist
of September, and again on the 6th of October, 1847,
the order was repeated in dispatches addressed by the
Secretary of War to General Scott, and his attention
was again called to the importance of making the
enemy bear the burdens of the war by requiring them
to furnish the means of supporting our army ; and
he was directed to adopt this policy, unless by doing
so there was danger of depriving the army of the ne-
cessary supplies. Copies of these dispatches were
forwarded to General Taylor for his government.
On the 31st of March last I caused an order to be
issued to our military and naval commanders to levy
and collect a military contribution upon vessels
and merchandise which might enter any of the ports
of Mexico in our military occupation, and to apply
such contributions towards defraying the expenses of
the war. By virtue of the right of conquest and the
laws of war, the conqueror, consulting his own safety
and convenience, may either exclude foreign commerce
altogether from all such ports, or permit it upon
such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.
Before the principal ports of Mexico were blockaded
by our navy, the revenue derived from import duties,
under the laws of Mexico, was paid into the Mexican
treasury. After these ports had fallen into our mili-
tary possession, the blockade was raised, and commerce
with them permitted upon prescribed terms and ,
con-
ditions. They were opened to the trade of all natiois
upon the payment of duties -more moderate in their
amount than those which had been previously levied
by Mexico ; and the revenue, which was formerly
paid into the Mexican treasury, was directed to be
collected by our military and naval officers, and ap-
plied to the use of our army and navy. Care was
taken that the officers, soldiers, and sailors of our
army and navy should be exempted from the opera-
tions of the order; and as the merchandise imported
upon which the order operated must he consumed by
Mexican. citizens, the contributions exacted were, in
effect, the seizure of the public revenues of Mexico,
and the application of them to our own use. In
directing this measure, the object was to compel the

tained.
Whilst our armies have advanced from victory to
victory, from the commencement of the war, it has
always been with the olive branch of peace in their
hands ; and it has been in the power of Mexico, at
every step, to arrest hostilities by accepting it.
One great obstacle to the attainment of peace has
undoubtedly arisen from the fact, that Mexico has
been so long held in subjection by one faction or
military usurper after another, and such has been the
condition of insecurity in which their successive
Governments have been placed, that each has been
deterred from making peace, lest, for this very cause,
a rival faction might expel it from power. Such was
the fate of President Herrera's Administration in
1845 for being disposed even to listen to the overtures
of the United States to prevent the war, as is fully
confirmed by an official correspondence which took
place in the month of August last, between him and
his Government, a copy of which is herewith commu-
nicated. For this cause alone the revolution which
displaced him from power was set on foot by General
may be the condition of insecurity of
the present Government.
Paredes.
T here
can cbe no doubt that the peaceable and
well-disposed inhabitants of Mexico are convinced
that it is the true interest of their country to conclude
an honourable peace with the United States, but the
apprehension of becoming the victims of some mili
tary faction or usurper may have prevented them
from manifesting their feelings by any public act.
The removal of any such apprehension would pro-
bably cause them to speak their sentiments freely,
'oadopt the measures necessary for the re4A-a•
(1. With a people di-tracted
‘'7!,'n 5?,4- factions, and a GA-owl-Lc:l° ~ulT.:ct to
constant changes, by successive revolutions, the con-.
tinued successes of our arms may fail to secure a sa-
tisfactory peace. In such event it may become pro-

enemy to contribute, az; far as practicable, towards

the expenses of the war.
For the amount of contributions which have been
levied in this form, I refer you to the accompanying
reports of the Secretary of War and of the Secre-
tary of the Navy, which it appears that a sum,
exceeding half a million of dollars has been collected.
This amount would undoubtedly have been much
larger but for the difficulty of keeping open commu-
nications between the coast and the interior, so as to

enable the owners of the merchandise imported to
transport and vend it to the inhabitants of the coun-
try. It is confidently expected that this difficulty
will, to a great extent, be soon removed by our in-
creased forces, which have been sent to the field.
Measures have recently been adopted, by which
the internal as well as the external revenues cf
Mexico, in all places in our military occupation, will
be seized and appropriated to the use of our army
and navy.
The policy of levying upon the enemy contribu-
tions in every form, consistently with the laws of
nations, which it may be practicable for our military
commanders to adopt, should, in my judgment, be
rigidly enforced; and orders to this effixt have accord-
ingly been given. By such a policy, at the same
tine that our own Treasury will be relieved from a
heavy drain, the Mexican people will be made to feel
the burdens of the war, and, consulting their own in-
tere.st, may be induced the more readily to require
their rulers to accede to a just peace.