The Sun.
London, England, 1847-02-09 00:00:00

THE SUN

THE FRENCH CHAMBERS.
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, FEB. 4.
The President took the Chair at two o'clock.
The order of the day was the adjourned discussion on the
Address.
The President observed, that as paragraphs 3,4, 5,6, hadbeen disposed of, paragraph 2, which had been reserved,
would now come under discussion.
M. Thiers ascended the tribune arnlidestchmaamrkho. ns generalto
attention, and spoke as follows.:t—t
must have perceived the
serordei
pay attention to my
extreme repugnance whaiccthilshaive.
on—though not because I
for some days past exhi-
bited to interfere in this discussion—though
can find in the subject which
occupies us any cause for em-
pit be possible for us, the
barrassment.
Member e Opposition, who are not the authors of the
present Alllitnt to be embarrassed in expressing our senti-
ments? That situation, as you are aware, is this—that
France, by the deplorable event of Cracow, is separated from
the continental powers, and by the Spanish marriages is em-
broiledwith England ; so that the isolation which a few
years back we recommended to her as a momentary policy—
as a dignified means of re-entering the European concert, and
which the Government then rejected as altogether objec-
tionable, is new forcedly the policy of France.—( Hear,
hear.) Nor is that all ; at home a bad harvest, which is
the fault of no one, coinciding with a financial position,
which is the fault of some one, has rendered the internal
situation of the country as disastrous as the fureign one. All
this the Opposition certainly has not caused, and therefore
could not feel embarrassment in alluding to it in presence of
the persons whose duty it was to act. The object of my
hesitation was therefore different—it was an apprehension
of aggravating by my words the inconveniences of the situ-
ation. But in a representative government it is impossible
to pass over in silence events so important as those which
now occupy our attention. I come forward, therefore, to
speak, not that I pretend to succeed the Hon. Minister of
Foreign Affiirs—long since I have given up all ideas of that
kind—not because I imagine that I can express myself better
than has been already done by gentlemen noted for their
talents and reasoning powers, but because I have my own
views to expose and defend. It is my custom to think
aloud—to speak freely; and since these events have occurred
I have not concealed my opinion—it has been published. If,
therefore, at the grand moment of discussion I were to hesi-
tate, I should expose myself to the charge of weakness. I
have beheld in what was going on a most lamentable con-
fusion of ideas, and I cannot disguise from the Chamber of
Deputies my sentiments on the subject.—(Hear, hear.) It
is now 17 years since I have taken part in public affairs, and
if during that period I have learned in some degree the art
of stating matters difficult to be exposed I shall employ it
to-day while infusing into my language all the reserve
that is deeirable. If you do me the honour to
listen to me patiently to the end, I shall testify to you my
gratitude both by the moderation and, pardon me
fur adding, the utility of my words. I now proceed to ex-
amine the whole situation, characterised principally by the
two facts of the Spanish marriages and the incorporation of
Cracow. As to the former, my opinion is that the union of
Queen Isabella with the Infante Dun Francisco de Anis is
good; but that the marriage of the Duke de Montpensier
with the Infanta Donna Luisa was attended in several re-
spects with grave inconveniences—that it was premature—
and that it will complicate the situation. It will be said, and
lan prepared for the assertion, that this opinion serves the
pretensions of a foreign Government. I bring to this place
the most perfect impartiality, and I have always thought
that the interests of Spain were closely united to ours; and
it was with that idea that I was one of the authors of the I
treaty of quadruple alliance. That treaty had two objects—
the first, to prevent a counter-revolution in Spain ; the
second, to establish good relations with England on a ques-
tion of a most difficult character, and at the same time most
likely to create differences between the two countries. The
first object was but imperfectly attained—Spain was only
partially saved from a counter-revolution. In the second we
were more fortunate, as the two nations entered on a struggle
for influence in Spain, France patronising the Moderado
party, and England the Progressiat. That was an unfortu-
nate policy ; fur, in adopting it, France and England ex-
posed themselves to protect only the intrigants of both
parties. It was on the marriage question, in particular,
that this struggle of influence was certain to manifest
itself. Permit me to state to you the object pursued severally
with respect to this matter, by France. by Spain, and by
England. France laid down the principle that the choice of
the Queen could only fall on one of the descendants of the
House of Bourbon. I will not repeat what has been said on
that point; I will only make one observation, and that le,
that formerly such an exigency might have been understood ;
but since one part of the house of Bourbon is engaged in the
principles of the revolution, the other in those of the counter-
revolution, how is it possible to lay down so absolute a prin-
ciple ? I can understand that I shall be asked—" What
would you hare said if the pretensions of the Prince of
Saxe-Coburg had triumphed ?' I should, it is true, have
blamed you. But permit ma to ask what you yourselves
would have said, if, conquered by events, you had not been
able to prevent the Prince of Coburg from obtaining the
hand of Queen Isabella ? Would you not have said—" The
Prince of Coburg is closely allied to the Royal
g(FamilY of
France; the Prince of Coburg adopts the principles of the
revolution; the head of the house of C
constitutional throne at the very frontier of Francehoccupies ?"
vote have done well to exclude the Prince of Coburg;oot
France desired a prince of the house of Bourbon , gagain
d.
And what did Spain desire. Spain in this cars as
e
sented by Queen Christina, by the sovereign who hadlo)rn7s
governed the country, and who, moreover, is the mogur of
the Queen, and, as such, had rights worthy of respect.
What then did Queen Christina desire? She, above all,
wan
opposed to her nephews. This I declared last year, but the
assertion was treated as erroneous ; the documents have
since shown that I was right. She had first thought of ob-
taining for the Queen the hand of the Duke de Illontpensier.
When it was preyed to her by French and European reasons
that such a union was impossible, she turned towards the
Prince of Coburg, and demanded him from everbody in the
warmest manner. It was only when Queen Christina, the real
head of the Moderado party in Spain, had learned, to use
Lard Cowley's expression, that a union with a prince of
Coburg would fling you into consternation, that she gave
up the idea. In order to obtain that prince, two consents
—that of the house of Coburg, and that of France—were
necessary. The house of Coburg saw in such an alliance
fresh ties uniting it with the two countries with AS lila it
was connected; it saw in it the completion of its great-
ness. Nevertheless, not to give offence to either of the two
nations, it refused ; or, what amounts to the same thing,
made its consent dependent on that of France. As td
England, she would assuredly have desired that a prince
of the house of Coburg might be placed on the throne of
Spain. But, considering the unheard-of vivacity with
which France repulsed the candidateship if the Prince of
Coburg, Queen Christina understood that, if France and
Spain became embroiled, the advantages of the marriage of
the Queen with the Prince of Coburg were not to be placed
in comparison with the dangers which it might produce to the
tranquillity of Europe. She, therefore, renounced the idea,
and sought another union for her daughter. It was then
that she entered on the policy which I blame, and turned
her attention to a Prince who had placed himself at the
head of the Progressist party. Don Enrique was, however,
soon abandoned. You did not consider him a very dan-
gerous candidate, since you did not think of opposing him.
But I agree with you that above all things it was important
to remove the Prince of Coburg. This, then, was what was
desired by the three Powers—France wished a Bourbon ;
Spain, represented by Queen Christina, for a Coburg ; and
England the same, but she afterwards gave up that desire,
and to indemnify herself demanded Don Enrique. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that a kind of under-
standing was come to at Eu on the subject of the Spanish
marriages. I shall not discuss the object of that arrange-
ment, but I shall state on what points it bears, According
to it, France renounced the hand of the Queen for the Duke
de Montpensier, and declared furthermore that she should
not put forward any pretensions for the hand of the Infanta,
except in the event of the Queen giving heirs to the Crown.
As the price of these concessions, the French Cabinet de-
manded that England should not support the marriage of
Queen Isabella with the Prince of Coburg, The llon. Minister
pretends that he observed those engagements faithfully as
long as those agreed to by England remained inviolate.
Well, then, I have read all the documents, and I sincerely
declare that they absolutely contradict the double allegation
of the lion. Minister. They appear to me to prove that the
conduct both of the Whigs and Tories was absolutely the
same with regard to the Spanish marriages, and that if there
were any difference it was that the Whigs showed them-
selves more opposed than the Tories to the marriage of the
Queen to the I'rince of Coburg.—(Murmurs.) I shall not read
the documents to the Chamber, but shall merely give a brief
analysis of them. If anything I say is contested as being
inexact or incomplete, I can reply by reading the part in
question. In the first place, in the dispatches of Lord Aber-
deen to Lord Cowley, was there anything in contradiction
to this—that the question of the Spanish marriages is a
purely Spanish ose, with which no one had any right to in-
terfere? and Lord Cowley never went beyond the assurance
that a candidate of the house of Bourbon would meet with
no opposition on the part of England. You see that the
Tories confined themselves to simple inaction. On a commu-
nication from the Spanish Cabinet, the Tories replied that
that Government was free to choose the candidate which ap-
peared to it the most suitable, and that if it selected one not
belonging to the house of Bourbon, it might, in order to
maintain the independence of its choice, reckun on the warm
sympathies of England. Lord Aberdeen and the Tories ap-
pear to me in this instance to have departed from that in-
difference attributed to them by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. The Whigs afterwards came into power. I shall, at
a later period, explain myself more at length on what is im-
properly called the English. alliance, but for the moment I
shall confine myself to the Spanish question. The Whigs
succeeded to power; they were still beneath the weight of
the reminiscences of 1840 ; they were full of regrets; they
felt that they had not followed a sound line of policy, and
that that fault had nearly prevented their return to power.
In the state of the world, at that time, it was a fortunate ,
circumstance that the Whigs came into power in that frame
of mind. For my own part, I think it would have been easy
for the French Government to have come to an understanding
with the Whigs, if the former had not been influenced by a
feeling of distrust. What was the conduct of the 11, lug Go-
vernment? It declared in its turn to Spain that she was
perfectly free to act; and only addressed to her some repre-
sentations on certain unwise and violent measures of its Go-
vernment, which every one blamed. It is true that the I, rnc e
of Coburg is pointed out in the dispatch of the 19th of Julyi
in the list of candidates. But this was not doing more than
what had been done by Lord Aberdeen when he assured
Spain of the warm sympathies of England in the event of
her choice falling on a prince not of the house of Bourbon.
I admit that the dispatch of the 19th .July was in some
measure equivocal - but immediately after a discussion
arose
between the English and French Cabinets. France
spokl
knotty
of the engagements lsa atEu ; iordp
almerston replied
candidate ; but if gof them ; England has no particular
Don Enrique." vz wish to know our opinion, we prefer
wish for Don Enrique, Unite of France was—" If you
" f adispatches dated 29th iitne With us at Madrid to promote
Lid candidateship.
and the 3d, Itith. and July,
with these words---" I told NIAugust, and these all begin
contents of the dispatches Jarnac ;" so that the
could he no secret to us. All of trlessed to Mr. Bulwer
We accept a Prince of the house of Bourdonatches said—
that Prince to be Dun letirirre," On thelly and we desire
Palmerston wrote to Mr. Oilwer, "We ehooofiAugust Lord
Queen to choose the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, jiesire the
should be agreeable to Spain, and should not embroil choice
France; but in the present state of things Don F.nri " with
preferable candidate." On the 22d of August, Lord 111:1misera-
ston addressed a dispatch to Mr. Bulwer, which was commu-
nicated to M. Guizot by Lord Normanby on the 25th. Its
the ei •
was that " England adheredto can heateship
substance
there were three •
I' 'rice of the house of Bourbon; Princes
of a ri
e Montemolin, whom it was im-
of that hoese—the Count d
possible to choose, as lie did not recognise the rights of the
Queen Don Francisco
de ASSiS, whom England could not
;
whorn she recommended."
recommend ; and Don `Enrique,
lie cou
What was the reply of M. Guizot?
That "
gave an exclusiveld prenot
-
adhere to the condition which
ference to one of the two
brothers, butt that he had no ob-
hi )
jection to make to the candidates 1_ of Don Enrique; that
he willingly agreed to the policy of England, on condition
that the two brothers might be equally put forward." Such
are the terms on which matters stood on the 28th of August.
t saw • read the What has since taken place? I shall no at
this
dis-
patches and consult the official facts. At Madrid,
Coburg would
period, is was known that the Duke of Saxe-

not give one of his children out of regard to France, and that
England desired Don Enrique, chief of the Progressists. It
was in this situation of things that M. Bresson came on the
scene. It has been said in England that he has acted most
shamefully, and in France that he has done marvels. Gen-
tlemen, I know Count de Bresson, and I can say that he is
incapable of doing unworthy things; but he had no need on
this occasion to achieve wonders. Me addressed himself to
M. Isturitz, one of the leaders of the Moderado party, and
showed him that France and England were agreed to favour
the candidateship of the chief of the Progressists. Queen
' Christina was aware both of the refusal of the Prince of Co-
burg and of the agreement of the two countries to make the
Queen marry one of her cousins. Her resolution was taken.
In the night of August 28th a Council was called, and it was
decided to marry the young Queen with Don Francisco, chief
of the hloderado party. This first result was excellent for us.
We had thrown out the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, and Don
Enrique, chief of the Progressists. So far all was well ; for
though I blame the policy which identifies itself with one of
the parties that divide a foreign country, I believe that when
such a policy is once entered on it must be followed up until
the triumph of the party is assured. Up to this point, there-
fore, all was is our favour, but there the success ought to
have stopped. I am, above all, a partizan of the policy of my
country, but I have no need to remind you that we should
remain within certain limits. There remained to effect the
second marriage, that of the Infanta Donna Luisa with the
Duke de Alontpensier. The Moderados desired it in order
to exclude 1)on Enrique, chief of the Progressists, from the
second rank, as they had excluded him from the first. In
this desire we coincided. We all desire, as sincere partizans
of the dynasty, whatever may contribute to the happiness
and distinction of the Royal Family.—(llear.) The Infanta
Donna Luisa joins to qualities that every one knows, the
most illustrious birth. You were, then, right to desire
this marriage. We should have desired it ourselves; but on
the condition that it involved nothing contrary to the policy
of France ; but in the circumstances in which you concluded
it, it did not possess that character. It has been said that
the simultaneousness of the two marriages was an essential
condition of the first. I have searched everywhere for the
proof of this condition, and I have not been able to find it ;
but I have found direct proofs of the contrary.—(Hear.) If

Queen Christina, in presenting to you the two marriages at
the same time, had said (excuse the frivolity of the ex-
pression), " You must either take it or leave it," I should
have understood that we ought perhaps to have ceded. But
nothing of the kind took place. Everything attests that the
two marriages were determined on the condition that they
should be celebrated at the same time, if possible, or, to use
the expression of the contract, autant que faire se pourrtit.
The official facts completely deny the :contrary pretension.
It was in the night of the 28th of August that the first mar-
riage was settled, and in the morning of the 29th it was offi-
cially announced in the Madrid Gazette in these words:—
" I, Isabella 11., announce to Spain, that I have chosen for
my husband my cousin, the Prince Don Francisco d'Assis,
and I convoke the Cortes for September 14." Thus, on the
morning of the 29th of August the first marriage was a fait
accompli. It was your duty to use all your efforts to cause
the second marriage to be postponed. It is said that the
Cortes could have annulled the first marriage. But what
were the Cortes at that time? Out of 180 members there
were 100 Moderados, and was it to be expected that that
majority would have declared against the marriage which
placed their chief on the throne? As to the Profi-'ressists,
they were 20, and it was natural that they should refrain
from pressing the conclusion of a marriage which excluded '
their chief from the second rank, as from the first. It is
said—" But if there was nothing to fear from the Cortes,
out-of-door movements and insurrections were to be dreaded."
It is forgotten, then, that what excited the reclamations of
the press, and the excesses that had to be suppressed by
arbitrary means, was the person selected for the second
marriage. _ _

M. de Lavergne rose, and said a few words which we found
it impossible to catch, from the uproar caused by M. Thiers
being interrupted.
M. Thiers—You do wrong to interrupt me ; this cause has
no need of such help as yours; it is defended by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.—( Laughter.) The first marriage, then,
was definitively settled by the proclamation of the Queen of '
Spain, dated 29th August. The second marriage was to be
concluded so far as was possible. Those were the expressions
of the Hon. Minister in the Chamber of Peers. What was
the situation ? The French Ministry was in presence of the
English Cabinet and the engagements of Eu. The Hon.
Minister pretends that he felt himself at liberty by the
attempts of the Whigs in favour of the Prince of Coburg.
But if that were the case be ought to have said to them—
"We are free." But the common action was accepted
up to August 28. On September 1 the Hon. Minister re-
ceived a visit from the English Ambassador, and on that
gentleman inquiring it the marriages were to be celebrated
at the same time, he was told by M. Guisot—" No, not at
the same time."—(Laughter.) Ile, in fact, left in the Am-
bassador's mind a firm conviction on the subject. The
Hon. Minister declares that the order to celebrate the
two marriages at the same time was only dispatched
on September the 11th. I may remark, en passent, that
this is a proof that you were still free to act on September
2d, on which (ley the English Ambassador communicated to
you a dispatch. At last came September 4th, and the DE-
nieter, who on the previous evening was in accord with the
English Cabinet, gives the order to celebrate the marriages
at the same time. You were, you say, conquered by circum-
stances. Well, on the sth f September you should have
sent for the Ambassador, and told him the truth ; but, in-
stead of that, time is allowed to run on, and the press of
Europe is permitted to learn the facts, and comment on them;
and then, when on the 25th the English Ambassador comes
to remonstrate, the Hon. Minister replies, " It is too late."
The Minister and the Ambassador then separate to remain in
the relations with which the Chamber is acquainted. Permit
me, gentlemen. a simple reminiscence. In 1840, when I sus-
tained a policy that for my part I found too bold, but which
I believed good for the honour of the country, a vic-
tim was required to expiate the backward step that was made
in the path in which I was engaged with others. Then it
was said—not, it is true, in this tribune, but is another—
that I had deceived England. Ala! gentlemen, I have no
desire to recriminate, and I will Rot do so; but I can say that
assuredly 1 did nothing like what has been done in this affair.
of the Soamish marriages.—(Sensation.) In my convictions
the Government did well in bringing about a first and second
displeasure for England—in foiling her iu any desire she
might have had ter the Prince of Coburg, and in her pre•
ference of Dun Enrique ; but as to the third, which consisted
in celebrating the two marriages immediately, it ceded to a
movement of inconsiderate haste. I rejoice at the joss; of
the Royal Family when not contrary to the interests of the
country; but in this case the duty of the Ministers clearly
was to arrest the accomplishment of that measure. I firmly
believe, that in effecting the two marriages together the
Government has done a thing either null or dangerous; anti
when I shall have proved that to you, I shall examine if it
l has not done wrong to compromise our relations with Eng-
land, and if the moment was well chosen to compromise
them. (Here the sitting was suspended for some minutes,
after which the Hon. Gentleman resumed his speech as fol-
lows):—I shall now examine in a threefold point of view
our relations on this question with Spain, with England,
and with the Continent. As to Spain, your policy is either
null or dangerous. You continually talk of the policy of
Louis XIV. Permit me to say a few words on that point.
What, to my thinking, our history clearly shows, is, that it is
the first interest of France to maintain herself constantly in
such relations with Spain as to prevent the latter from being
our enemy. You know that if whilst we fight on the Rhine
we have Spain as an enemy, we are as an army taken
between two fires. We had an example of that in 1814,
when Napoleon fought in Champagne with a handful of men,
but when the armies of Marshals Soult and Suchet were
fighting in the south. If the troops of these generals had
been united to his, the face of things would probably have
been changed. We must then have a friend in Spain : and,
in consequence, our policy towards her must be a friendly
one. That is the first point. The second is this: When the
Spanish character is examined, there may be remarked in it
a great aversion to foreign influence. That feeling i, derived
from the geographical position of Spain and from her his-
torical traditions. The Spaniards have always been subjected
to foreign dynasties—those of Germany and France. If we
wish to find a political friend in Spain, we must not pretend
to exercise any influence over the Spanish Government. The
Spaniards, though tractable towards their rulers, are un-
governable with regard to foreigners. There must not be
permitted to exist at Madrid a policy necessarily inimical to
us; but beyond that no influence must be attempted in Spain.
The worst meane, therefore, of exercising any influence in
Spain is by marriages. The political results of the policy of
Louis XI V.. towards Spain were compromised by his having
founded them on his relationship, and it was precisely that re-
lationship, uniting as it did the two crowns, which after the
death of that monarch threw Spain into the German alliance.
It was not until a later period that that Power, enlightened
by its true interests, attached itself more closely to us. It
again estranged itself to once more and definitively attach
itself to us in those latter days under the influence of the re-
volution. What ought to have been our conduct after the
Revolution of July? I declare loudly that our part is
pointed out to us by a common revolution. There was be-
tween France and Spain an evident community of interests;
each of the two nations has its Pretender; the Duke de
Bordeaux in one, and the Count de Montemolin in the
other. In the midst, also, of the desperate struggle between
the Moderados and the Progressists, when the treaty of the
15th of July was signed and war was spoken of, the most
violent of the Spanish journals changed their language in
the most apparent manner. When France was seen to be in
danger, and coalesced Europe threatened the French revolu-
tion, in all parts of Spain public opinion espoused the cause
of France. It was not only in Spain that this took place; it
was also in Belgium. The public mind in those countries
comprehended that a common revolution created common
interest, and imposed common duties. Such was the way
in which France ought to exercise her influence over other
nations. I do not wish to recriminate, but I may
say that when Spain demanded your real support
you refused it ; you would not do anything
whatever to prevent counter-revolution. What, then,
do you hope for from the Spanish marriages ?
It is not to-day, for the first time that I say the position of a
French Prince in Spain is a difficult one, and I will give
you a proof of it. Queen Christina is not French ; and yet
go o into Spain, and from Bayonne to Cadiz you will be told
that the greatest difficulty experienced by her is that she is
regarded as the agent of French policy. What, therefore,
would the Duke de Montpensier do in Spain? his supe-
riority even would be an obstacle; he would often be a
living impediment for his brother-in law and for the Queen.
You thought, like me, since you recalled the Duke, and de-
clared that you had only given France an additional Prin-
cess. You have, therefore, done an act which is, politically
speaking, null. But you will perhaps say, why then attack
it? It is because von have not only done an act which is
null, but because it is dangerous. Let us suppose, then,
that the Queen of Spain has no children—and God grant she
inlloyt-oaudninoitt
m ern(elesda ungolitt erre)m—a
remark
hmaav3e' hcreated'av e
s° hahterdeiflitch'adttilesdwo
of
Utrecht—(Sen-
sation)—but it is not the lees true that, in the hypothesis
any of the objectionArawn from:the treaty of
the Queen having no children you have created great cause
of embarrassment and compromised peace. You have, there-
fore, done a thing which is both null and dangerous, and what
price have You paid for it? You have paid the price of the
English alliance, for which you have made so many sacrifices.
Therefore, in admitting that you might have renounced that
alliance, was the moment, I may ask, well chosen ?—(Move-
ment.) I have always been a partizan of the English
alliance, and I have given proofs of it. My enemies have
taken advantage of this feeling to render me unpopular;
let me, therefore, be allowed to avail myself of their at-
tacks to repert that such has always been my predilection.
before the
1(i, ether, eort,,tai,ittr,t to
1 do not seek p velarity, I respect the opinions of my coun-
try as I respect my King ; I • • I d
frankly,portifin of their esteem,
would not
sel. It has been f bothinicliNnvieltbeefxopreretslsie
ior inye as
opinion o
from the nation and from the King any
purchase
that-, that will be my recompense ; but I
who for many yearsrseCiingerlY us with notn
Englishgalliance!" To tha
esteem by giving an injurious coun-
said—" It becomes you truly,
it to embroil France and Englanit,
having set sufficient value on the
for you, who have done eve might reply—" It is very well
alliance, and have cousenteP thing
to preserve the English
hold it so cheaply :" I am, to so many sacrifices, to now
English alliance, because it is usrcyat t, an advocate for the
in the world, because it is the best o the
progress ofliberty
dependence of states, and that is our guarantee for the in-
the Opposition.—(Approbation on the Left.) cause of
Switzerland threatened in her liberty by three hen you see
I
you not feel that your own frontiers are threaten
Powers, do
threatened