The Sun.
London, England, 1841-01-30 00:00:00

QUEEN'S BENCH,-(THIS DAY.)

(Sittings in Banco.)
THE QUEEN V. rewss

This was a rule calling upon the defendant to show
cause why an information in the nature of a quo warranto
should not be exhibited against him, to show by what au-
thority be exercised the office of town clerk of the borough
of Reigate.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL (With Mr. ERIE) DOw ap-
peered to show cause against the rule. The facts of the
case were these. The defendant was a councillor of the
borough, but resigned that situation, On the 28th of
September an election for the office of town clerk took
place, but three clear days' notice of the meeting had
not been given, and he (the Attorney-General),
therefore submitted that the proceedings under that
election were void, The numbers at that election
-were—for Mr. Dawes, 7 ; for Mr. Jenner, 5. It vas,
however, objected to Mr. Dawes that he had not paid the
fine, and must still be held to be a Councillor. A second
election took place on the sth of October, of which due
notice had been given, and on that occasion the fine having
been previously paid, Mr. Dawes was elected by a majority.
The objection taken was, that Mr. Jenner had been duly
elected at the first election, Mr. Dawes not being then
eligible.
Sir F. Pommel( was heard in support of the rule, and
the Court made the rule absolute.
THE QUEEN U. lIETHERINGTON—JUDGMENT.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL prayed the judgment of the
Court upon Henry Hetherington, who had been convicted
during the sittings of the last term of selling a blas-
phemous publication, entitled " Haslam's Letters to the
Clergy of all Denominations."
Lord DENMAN having read the minutes of the trial,
and the passages which the Jury found to be blasphemous
libels,
Mr. THOMAS, on behalf of the defendant, was instructed
to move the Court in arrest of judgment, or for a rule to
show cause why there should not be a new trial. The
ground on which be moved was that the offence laid
in the indictment was not punishable at common law.
The indictment referred only to that part of the
Scriptures called the Old Testament, and there never
was a case of an indictment against a publication which
discussed matters relative to the Old Testament
only; it was not an offence which was punishable at common
law. Although not exactly bearing on the case, he would re-
mind the Court of the observation made by the defendant
at the trial, that the doctrine of Christianity being parcel
of the law of the land originated in a mistranslation of a
case in the Year Book in the 3d and 4th Henry VI., and
that error had been copied into all the succeeding cases.
He would now refer the Court to the judgment of Chief
Justice Hale in the case of the four witches who had been
hanged in the reign of James the First, th.t. Learned
Judge asserting that there was no doubt of their existence.
The Court was aware that during ,the reign of James the
First, when the law originated, there was no end of the
legal murders that took place under the charges cf witch-
craft and blasphemy. The law certainly could not be
traced further back, and had its origin in religious or poli-
tical animosities, when Judges were found to carry into
effect the wishes of persons in power or authority. In the
case of the King v. \Voolstone, who was tried for a libel
impugning the miracles of Jesus Christ, the objection was
taken that it was an offence not indictable at common kw,
but the objection was overruled by the Court, on the ground
that the Christian religion was part of the law of the land.
The Learned Counsel then referred to the bases
of Jacob, Peter, Arnett, Wilks, and the King and Williams ;
in the latter case the Court held that the libel was
indictable at common law, because the libel denied the
authority of the Holy Scriptures, and that the Christian
religion was part and parcel of the law of the land. In
all these cases the divinity of Christ, and the authority of
the Scriptures generally, were questioned ; but he sub-
mitted that where the Old Testament only was called in
question, the rule laid down in these cases did not
apply, as it did not call in question the great truths
of the Christian religion. Ha would now refer the
Court to the able work of the Archbishop of Dublin on
the subject, in which he referred to the Old Testa-
ment as a great historical narrative, and, in a
great measure, distinct from the Christian re-
ligion. Bishop Taylor also said that there were so

many errors, Mistakes, and mistranslations of the Old
Testament, that it was open to the discussion of any party.
The Court would ace from these authorities that there was
a license given to persons to discuss meters contained in
the Old Testament ; and to that portion of the Scriptures
only did the libel of the defendant refer. He believed
there was no case on record where a party had been tried
in that Court for a matter which had no reference to the
Christian religion. Another objection was, that the Learned
Judge had put it to the Jury to say whether the publication
was a libel upon the Christian religion, although the libel
had no reference whatever to that matter. Now, inas-
much as the law proceeded on the ground that the obliga-
tions of civil society were injured and loosened by bringing
the Scriptures into contempt, Jurors and witnesses being
sworn upon the New Testament, any controversy upon
matters contained in the Old Testament which had no re-
ference whatever to Christ (the Christian religion being
altogether independent of the Old Testament), could not
be said to come within the rule laid down in these cases.
The COURT did not think there was any ground for the
rule. There was that connexion between the Old and the
New Testament that one part of it could not be assailed and
vilified without reflecting upon Christianity generally. It
was their duty to take the law as it was laid down in the
statute. book, and there was nothing in these statutes to
take the case before them out of the ordinary rule. It
had always been considered an off nee of the highest mag-
nitude to make attacks of that sort upon the Christian re-
ligion, and the Jury had found that the publication in
question was A. libel of that nature.
Affidavits in mitigation having been put in and read,
Mr. HETHERINGTON applied to the Csurt for leave to
address it in mitigation, which being assented to, he said
he could first rely upon the fact set forth in the affidavits,
namely, that it was a common practice in the trade
to insert on the title page the name of a
publisher like himself for the purpose of serving him, that
had been done in the present case—his name had been put
to the title-page without his knowledge or consent, and he
could safely assert that he hid never read a line of it until
he had been informed that the book contained a libellous
passage. It was clear from that. that there could be no
criminal intent in selling the book, as he had merely done
so in the usual course of his business. When truth
was the object in discussions of this sort, be fully
=treed that decorum and respect for the feelings of
others should be observed, and he avowed that he
did not stand there as the apologist of the
passages contained in that publication. Nay, the author
had given a candid admission of his error, in having with-
drawn these offensive passages in a recent edition. How,
then, could the Court punish him for the sale of a work of
the contents of which he was ignorant? He admitted that
legally he was the publisher of the work, but the statement
that his name was to the book went to the Jury unaccom-
panied by the explanation that he was not the original pub.
lisher. Mr. Heywood bad, at a trial in Manchester,
pleaded guilty to being the original publisher, and had been
discharged, after giving bail to appear when called upon.
All he asked was, that the same punishment might be im-
posed upon him, and he felt confident they would never
have to call upon him. He humbly trusted the Court
would not take him from his home and his family in a case
where there was an absence of all criminal intention, and
he left the casein their hands.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL said it was for the Court to
say whether the prosecution was not one which ought to
have been instituted. It was only necessary for him to re-
fer to some of the passages in the libel to show their
mischievous and blasphemous tendency. Mr. Hether-
ington had not in his affidavit stated that when
he asceriaieed the libellous nature of the publication
he had withdrawn it from publication, and had ceased
to sell it. Whatever had been done in the case of Mr