The Sun.
London, England, 1841-02-20 00:00:00

CHANGES.

The Earl of Liverpool, at Pitchford Hall, near Shrewsbury,
from a visit to the Earl Fitzwilliatn, at Milton House, near
Peterborough ; Earl Kentnare, in town, from Ireland ; Col.
and Lady Katharine Harcourt, at St. Clair, Isle of Wight,
from a visit to the Archbishop of York, at Wareham, Oxford-
shire.

MAJOR CLIBBORN'S AFFAIR.

EXONERATION OF THAT OFFICER FROM FLAME AND

ATTACHMENT OF BLAME TO LORD KEANE.
(The following is the report allude.] to by Sir John
Hobhouse in the House of Commons on Friday last, as
having been improperly published in India.)
REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION.
Sukkur, Nor. 20, 1840.
The Court having carefully investigated everything
connected with the unfortunate affair of Nufoosk come
to the following coeclusion.
1-. That the remote and original cause of the disaster
rested with Lord Keane, his Excellency hexing re-
ducel the number of troops and crippled ti.c Commis-
sariat to such a degree that the former were not able
to occupy the posts in sufficient force to protect theta-
selves, much less to act offensively, should such a
measure become necessary, and the latter front want of
means were prohibized the possibility of furnishing the
supplies absch tely requisite far their auppoit.
2. Owing to the above causes tl:e month of May
had arrived before even the small detachment under
Captain Brown was established at Kahun, although
Major-General Sir Thomras Wiltshire had determined
that a farce of double the strength should be seat early
in March.
3. To an error of judgment on the part of Brigadier
Stevenson in pushing a force within the Hills at such a
season, when I.e knew he had not the means of feeding
them, and no inconvenience either in a political or mill.
tary view could have arisen from the delay of a few
months, when all rill, of the subsequent misfortunes
would have been avoided. He, appareaey, did not
consider that the arrangements bad been det.zrmiced
on at a favourable season, and with the supposition of
full means.
4. To the want of information even to Capt. Brown,
by Brigadier Steve ison, and after his death by Major
Forbes, for although Capt. Brown early in August
made the most urgent application for supplies, and the
season was so unfavourable that they ought in the opi-
nion of the Court to have sent him orders at once to
place his garrison on half or even quarter rations, which
would have enabled him to hold out until the favour-
able season for relief came. round.
5. To the want of an understanding between Briga•
dier Stevenson and Iseut. Postans, the assistant poli-
tical agent in immediate charge of Northern Cutchce ;
the former having cle:.ermined on throwing in supplies
without any communication with the political authori-
ties, and actually equipped a force of 1,200 bayonets,
6 guns, and a strong body of irregular horse for that
purpose.
6. To the want of foresight and judgment of Major
Forbes, (who commanded after the death of Brigadier
Stevenson), who sent out 1,200 camels and 600 bill-
locks under about half the number of troops ordered
for this service by his predecessor, and without any con-
sultation with the political authorities. This measure
the Court unhesitatingly condemns. Orders scut to
Captain Brown to put his men on quarter rations, would
have answered every purpose, for he had provisions, as
events subsequently proved, to enable him to hold until
until the 15th October without such a precaution. Nor
can the Court avoid noticing the uselessness of such an
enormous convoy, when 200 camels would have sup-
plied the garrison of Kahuo with provisions for three
months.
7. Tim Court consider Lieutenant Postans, the poli-
tical agent, in immediate charge of the country they
were to pass through, highly culpable for not having
accompanied the convoy, and in having, in the only com-
munication placed on record, which is a private one, so
far misled Major Forbes as to state that, in his opinion,
400 infantry and 200 horse would prove sufficient to
pretect the convoy proeeeding to Kahun against any
force the Murrees could bring against it.
8. The first point to be noticed with reference to
Major Clibborn, is his opinion as to the adequacy
of his detachment for the duty entrusted to him. He
st ites, that it was his conviction 2,000 men would not
suffice for the duty to be performed, but that he made
no application for an increase to his strength, because,
ho says, he knew that none could be afforded, nor did
he request any reduction to the amount of the supplies.
This statement is most unsatisfactory—'.a slight calcu-
lation would have shown him how wholly unnecessary
was the immense charged entrusted to him, and the same
force destined for service by Brigadier Stevenson might
have been employed by Major Forbes.
9. The second point relates to the route selecte Iby
Major Clibborn from Phoolajee and Kahun. The Court
differ entirely from him as to the obstacles he would
have had to encounter by Deyrah; accurate surveys of
the three routes from Phoolajee and Lhiero to Kahun
were made last year by Lieut. Jacob, of the artillery,
and Dr. Kirk; in addition to these, the latter officer had
mlide careful drawings of the three passes and gorges,
which presented the chief obstructions to the advance
of troops. A reference to Captain Jacob's reports
will show that the road over the Nufoosk Pass was
made by him, and until he constructed it, the Pass
was impracticable excepting to foot passengers. Now,
before Major Clibborn entered the Hills he received
information from Captain Brown that the Murrces
were assembling in force at Nufoosk, and destroying
the road : on these grounds alone he ought not to have
selected the route in question. But there is another
instance of the want of judgment of Major Clibborn—
he was warned by Lieutenant Postans not to place re-
liance in Meer Hussain, and hehimself doubted his
fidelity. The man earnestly pressed the ads ance to
Nufoosk ; he was heard communicating with the
enemy, yet Major Clibborn allowed himself to be led
into the toil. Major Clibborn; beyond a doubt, should
have gone by Dcyrah ; the only difficulty along the
whole course is a narrow gorge a mile and a half be-
yond Deyrali. At that place there is abundance of
water and forage, and in the event of resistance, he
might have halted any length of time, and taken steps for
turning or forcing the pass. The only remaining point
to be noticed. is Major Clibborn's conduct previous to
and during the engagement. Here be, in the first
instance, fell into the fatal, but too common, error