The Sun.
London, England, 1847-06-16 00:00:00

tion made in the course of this debate, that the deci-
sion to which the House should come ought to be a
decision on the abstract merits of the auestion. I
agree that no consideration of the position of her
Majesty's Government, or of the pendency of a general
election, or of the embarrassment that might arise from
a sudden change of a Ilinistry, ought to induce the
House to give its sanction to the policy of the Govern-
ment, or withhold its assent from the motion that has
been made, if this House does really believe that the
object of the recent intervention has been to support ab-
solute power in Portugal, or that the consequence of
persevering in that intervention will be to endanger the
public tranquillity in Portugal, or involve this country in
imminent peril of war. There are many motions of light
importance in respect to which the decision may, I
think, be fairly influenced by extrinsic considerations;
but this is not one of them. This question is of too
much importance to be treated or decided upon any other
grounds than its own intrinsic merits; upon that prin-
ciple alone I shall give my vote upon it. Sir, we are
called on by the motion to affirm that, in the opinion of
this House, an armed interference between political par-
ties in Portugal is unwarrantable in principle, and
likely to be attended with serious and mischievous
consequences. That vote will be a vote of censure, if not
direct, yet implied, upon the Government ; and the con-
sequence of it will be practically, in my opinion, the re-
versal of the policy on which the Government has en-
tered. An adverse expression of opinion on the part of
this House will completely paralyze the hands which
direct it. And the question is, whether I am justified,
on considerations of justice and publid policy, in affirm-
ing a proposition which implies not only a censure bn
the Government, but an abandonment of the policy
which is at this moment in the course of execution ?
Sir, I am about to exercise a privilege which is most
agreeable to me; I am about to give my opinion without
any of that circumspection and reserve which necesarily
fetter the members of an administration and the leaders
of a party. I am going to state the opinion which,
after an attentive perusal of these papers, and after lis-
tening to this debate, I individually hold. I speak no
other man's opinion ;
I know not what may be the
opinion or the vote of any other man ; I undertake
only to give my own honest and conscientious judgment
on this matter, without reference to any extrinsiccircum•
stance or consideration. I first ask what was the motive of
her Majesty's Government in interfering in the domestic
concerns of Portugal I I separate the motives and objects
of the Government from their acts and proceedings. I
have read these papers ; and if I believed, with the Hon.
Gentleman who makes this motion, that there had been
a wanton departure from the principle of non-interference
—if I believed that the object of the Government had
been to range itself on the side of despotic power—and
to crush the struggling liberties of Portugal, I would
have most cordially concurred in a vote of censure. But,
after reading these papers—and speaking now of the mo-
tives of the Government as distinguished from its sets—
I acquit it of any other intention than to support an an-
cient monarchy, and at the same time to combine with
the support of that ancient monarchy guarantees for the
constitutional liberties of the people. With respect to
many painful, transactions the Government had given
advice to the Government of Portugal before it com-
mitted itself to any active interference ; was it wise to
give that advice or not ? It would certainly be a plain
and simple course to decline giving any advice even to a
friendly Government, to have said, " We have enough
to do to manago our own affairs, without concerning our-
selves with yours ;" it was possible to take that course,
and it would have relieved the Government of a great
responsibility. But that has not been the course taken
in former times with respect either to the Go-
vernments of Portugal or of Spain. I speak
without prejudice on this subject, for I was no
party to the quadruple treaty; I objected to the obli-
gations you incurred by that treaty; I thought it unwise
to enter into them; better at that time to permit the
people of Spain and Portugal to decide for themselves
between the rival branches of the houses of Bourbon and
Braganca; I am, therefore, free from any prejudice on
this subject. But I cannot enter into the consideration
of what has been recently done without remembering
that the quadruple treaty has been entered into. You
have contracted these special obligations to which the
four powers are parties; you have guaranteed the
thrones of Spain and Portugal to the present possessors
against the other two brances, and if Don Miguel were
to reappear in Portugal, or a descendant of Don Carlos
in Spain, then you would be bound by the obligations
of that treaty to interfere, not certainly for the purpose
of establising a particular party in the ,domestjc govern-
ment of either country, but to take part in a civil war
for the maintenance of one branch of the family on the
throne against another. In deciding, therefore, on the
recent policy of the Government, either in giving advice
to Portugal or interfering actively with its affairs, we
must bear in mind, not only our ancient relations with
that country, the importance of Portugal from its !geo-
graphical position, and the long connexion between us,
but also the special obligations by which we are bound
in certain cases to a joint action with other countries.
It has not been usual to abstain from friendly inter-
vention, either with respect to Spain or Portugal.
When Mr. Canning was Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
the Duke of Wellington being a member of the Cabinet,
Lord Fitzroy Somerset was expressly dispatched in 1823
to give advice to the Spanish Government, and dispatched
too to advise it to modify the too liberal constitution, to
give increased power to the sovereign, and to alter the
terms of the constitution, that were supposed to be too
favourable to the democratic power. Lord Fitzroy So-
merset was the bearer of a letter addressed by the Duke
of Wellington to the leading men in Spain; the object of
that letter came under discussion in 1823, and when
Parliament, at the instance of Mr. Canning, rejected the
motion made by Sir James Macdonald, and affirmed the
policy of Mr. Cunning, the tact was before the House of
Commons that we had attempted, no doubt from the
most friendly feelings, to avert from Spain the danger
of threatened invasion from France, by advising the mo-
dification of her constitution. Therefore, I say the prac-
tice of advising the Governments both of Spain and Por-
tugal has not met, in former times, with the censure of
this House. Then, Sir, if I look at the nature of the ad-
vice given to Portugal as in the dispatches of the Noble
Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I see not
a word in that advice of which a British Minister has
reason to be ashamed. lam speaking now of the ad-
vice given before we had committed ourselves to forcible
intervention. What was that advice ? When it was in-
tended to commit that act which we cannot hear without
shame at this period of civilisation—(Cheers)—when it
was intended to transport men who had engaged in a
civil contest, but who had capitulated on the assurance
that they should be treated as prisoners of war—
(Cheers)—when it was attempted to transport these
men, gallant soldiers, though they may have been mis-
taken in the construction of their duty—when it was
attempted, in violation of good faith, to transport these
men to an unhealthy climate, I find the British Govern-
ment remonstrating against that act, and earnestly ad-
vising that, both with reference to the interests of huma-
nity, and an enlarged and comprehensive view of the in-
terests of the Portuguese monarchy, such an atrocity
should not be perpetrated.—(Cheers.) Sir, I think that
the Government was justified in making that remon-
strance and giving that advice.—(Cheers.) Then, again
I find the British Government remonstrating against
the shameful decree that all prisoners taken in arms
should be instantly shot—(Cheers)—wisely and properly
leaving the Portuguese Government to draw the inference
that it was impossible for us to countenance or support
them, or show them any sympathy, if acts of that kind
were committed, endangering the throne in the estima-
tion of its own subjects, and bringing upon the Go-
vernment the indignation of every civilised country.
In every instance in which advice was given I find it to
be in favour of forbearance—in favour of lenity and mo-
deration—(Cheers)--and, inferring the motives from the
advice, I cannot think it consistent with justice to visit
the Government with the condemnation which this
motion implies.—(Cheers.) Then, Sir, I come to the
acts of the Government, and I am perectly willing to
admit that it is not sufficient that the motives and inten-
tions should have been good if the acts were in them-
selves unwise. You may acquit the Government of
intentional misconduct, but if their acts be at variance
with justice or sound policy you are perfectly at liberty,
if not to censure the Government, at least to compel the
revocation of the acts. In reviewing the acts of the
Government, the sth of April is a day of the utmost
importance.—(Hear, hear.) Up to the sth of April we
had limited ourselves to friendly advice, to warnings,
and to remonstrances, and up to the sth of April I think
there can be few persons disposed to censure Govern-
ment on account of any stop they had then taken, or any
advice they had given. In viewing the subsequent acts
of the Government, I certainly should attach consider-
able weight to the motives and intentions by which they
were dictated—not that good motives and intentions
would justify acts which are impolitic, but in consider-
ing the acts I should have material regard to the motives
and intentions which influenced them. The question is,
whether en the sth of April, when it is clear that the
Government departed from its former course and under-
took not merely to give advice, but to make proposals
which in certain contingencies involved the necessity of
armed intervention, there is a sufficient vindication for
this change of policy? Now, first of all, it is to be ob-
served, that we who are in the position of judges after
the event have a great advantage over those who had to
form a decision, providing against very complicated and
uncertain contingencies.—(Cheers.) That which was
then obscure is now as light as day. Upon all those
combinations which had then to be considered, and of
which the issue appeared very doubtful, the light of
history has been shed. It is now easy to see the
ig a knowledge of all
in a very different
mis-
takes that may have been committed. The judge, being
ahllutehetafkaecnts,p.hlacavei, s n
situation from those who had to decide under uncertain
and doubtful circumstances.—(Cheers.) Sir, I place
myself in the position of a Government which, on receiv-
itnhe possession events whoicfh
receiv-
ing the representations of the Portuguese Government,
had to decide what course they would pursue; and, to I
do justice to their case, it is absolutely necessary to at-
tempt to forget all we now know, and consider what we
would have done with the information before us which
they had in the early part of April.—(Cheers.) Sir, I
cannot conceive a decision more difficult to be arrived at.
On the one hand there was a Government which had
done acts that merited disapprobation—(Cheers)—there
was every argument against forcible intervention in the
domestic concerns of Portugal; there was the danger,
also, that, by intervention, we might set the precedent
for other and future interventions, from which very
serious embarrassments might arise; and no doubt these
were considerations that ought to be maturely weighed.
--(Cheers.) Tbere is no man in this House who feels
more strongly than I do the grave objections that apply
to a wanton and unnecessary intervention in the affairs
of other countries. The danger is, that by that inter-
vention you are not propping up the throne in favour of
which you interfere—you may be sowing the seeds of
weakness, instead of strengthening the cause you espouse.
But, on the other hand, it becomes a Government
responsible for the aininistratiou of public sffeirs to

consider also what course it was fitting to pursue with
reference to the general interests of humanity, and the
restoration of domestic peace in a country in the internal
peace of which we were entitled to take a deep interest.
Was there a prospect of an early termination of these
quarrels ? Were not parties so equally balanced, that
this conflict having continued from the 7th of October,
there was every probability that, if we and other powers
also' stood aloof,—if we had said to the Portuguese,
" You shall fight it out," we must have been witnesses of
a terrible struggle, impeding industry, engendering per-
manent discord between members of the same nation,
almost members of the same family, without a prospect
of any termination, through the superiority of one party
or the other.—(Cheers). I wish to take nothing what-
ever for granted. I wish to state to the House what is
the evidence which has brought me to the conclusion
that, had I been a member of the Government, having to
act in the latter days of March, lam by no means pre-
pared to say that I would not have taken the course
which, under great difficulties, her Majesty's Govern-
ment finally determined to take.—(Cheers). After the
free and unrestricted communication of every letter writ-
ten at an early period, it were easy, from the pens of
those who wrote dispatches and the mouths of those who
uttered opinions, to convict Government apparently on
their own evidence. Up to the sth of April you de-
precated intervention. You thoughtit unwise ; you wished
to prevent France and Spain from intervention ;
of course you used every argument against it; but when
necessity forced on you intervention, then, no doubt, the
arguments you used against intervention appeared ap-
plicable to your own course; and it would be easy in
this way to convict you of inconsistency and condemn
you on that account. But, admitting the policy of ab-
staining from intervention ourselves, and discouraging
intervention on the part of France and Spain, the simple
question is, whether, towards the latter end of March, a
change of policy was not rendered necessary by the state
of the case?—(Cheers.) I look to the question, first, as
far as the general interests of humanity are concerned.
You cannot doubt that, with respect to this country, with
which you have had treaties for 400 years, you might
abstain from all interference on the most rigid principle
of non-intervention. You might say, "We have misery
enough on our own hands; we have distress enough in
the west of Scotland; we will not encumber ourselves
with the responsibility of interfering in Portugal; we
will not interfere." A Government might take that
course; but I venture to say, if you had taken that
course other countries would have interfered, and in
their interference they would have carried with them the
sympathies of half of Europe.—(Cheers.) Portugal
has special claims on us. She stood on our side in the
greatest conflict that ever threatened the repose and
liberties of Europe; she gave us the advantage of mili-
tary positions from which, as at Torres Vedras, that il-
lustrious commander did so much to achieve ultimately
the liberties of Europe.—(Cheers.) It is impossible you can
view with indifference or disregard the position of Por-
tugal. I admit it is not enough that the motive is good;
I must show that the acts were calculated to promote
tranquillity. What, then, was the position of Portugal,
its internal position, towards the latter end of March?
I take the accounts which reached the Government at
the moment when the necessity for decision had arrived.
Here is a dispatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, and
dates are very important. It is dated the 14th of March
—received by the Government on the 22d. lam now
justifying a conclusion to which I come from a reference
to the condition of that country, and its imperative
claims upon some interference on our part in the general
interests of humanity, apart from all obligations of treaty.
Sir Hamilton Seymour, writing on the 14th of March, in
a dispatch received on the 22d, says, " Every day serves
to aggravate the miseries of the country. To present
want and distress future famine will be added if those
who ought to be employed in cultivating are to be en-
gaged in laying waste the land."—(Cheers.) But this
state of things had continued from October to March.
There was no sufficient superiority in either party, ap-
parently, to terminate the state of things. We were
suffering from famine at home; and here was a country,
our immediate neighbour—for in such a case the sea
constitutes neighbourhood—were we to permit Portugal,
on account of intestine feuds, to be laid waste, and an
additional strain to be laid on her more happily circum-
stanced neighbours?—(Cheers.) Then again, on the
19th of March, Sir H. Seymour writes, in a dispatch
received on the 28th, " The financial condition of the
country is daily becoming worse ; before this reaches
your Lordship the discount of notes will probably be 50
per cent. Extensive importations of corn have been
lately made, the most considerable from Liverpool."
Well, just consider what was the demand in the Liver-
pool market; what was the price of corn there; the ne-
cessity we had ourselves for preserving as much of
Liverpool corn as we could for the maintenance of our
own people.—(Hear, hear.) What must have been the
condition of that people when it is said, "Of the scar-
city and dearness of bread you will form some idea by
the fact, that the last cargoes from Liverpool were sold
at a profit to the importer of 30 per cent?"—(Cheers.)
That cora was sold at a profit of 30 per cent. The people
who ought to have been cultivating the soil, were engaged
in cutting each other's throats, without the prospect of
bringing that to a conclusion.—(Hear, hear.) What
was to be the prospect of that country, with reference to
the sustenance of the people, if that state of things was
to go on; and we, relying on the principle of rigid non-
intervention, had refused to interfere by any act by
which that state of affairs might be put an end to?—
(Cheers.) The English Consul, Mr. Johnson, in a letter
received by the Government on the 15th of March,
states, "In Viena the authorities have seized corn;
they broke open the stores of Mr. Russell, an English-
man. The state of affairs on the Douro is very vexa-
tious to our merchants; the merchants can neither bring
down their wines nor send pipes or staves to Regoa."
Here there was a proof that the continuance of these
civil commotions materially interfered with the security
of British property, and by interrupting commerce di-
rectly affected the interests of British subjects. Now the
testimony I am about to quote is very important. It is
written at a subsequent date, but such was the disposi-
tion of the people in the very neighbourhood of Lisbon
that Sir 11. Seymour thus describes the plans of what he
calls " the anarchists ":
" The plan of the anarchists was to set fire to some old
houses in various parts of the town, to force the pri-
son doors, and let loose some 1,200 or 1,400 prisoners.
When a populous town is to be fired at various points,
and when the confusion which ensues is to be increased
by the presence of all the vilest malefactors in the hands
of justice, it is idle to inquire what precise political ob-
jects are sought for, or at what exact points conflagration
and excesses are to cease."
Well, you had the British fleet in the Tagus ; you
heard from your Minister that the plan of the anarchists
was to set fire to Lisbon in different parts of the town,
to discharge the vilest malefactors to the number of
1,400. I ask you if, having that fleet in the Tagus, we
could remain perfectly passive, and permit Lisbon to be
destroyed by the malefactors turned out of the gaols?—
(Cheers.) I say nothing of the manifest intention of
France and Spain to interfere. I think that the conduct
of France and Spain manifested a confidence in this
country. I think that the Government cannot found
their vindication on any assurance that France or Spain
would interfere separately. But then I say the force of
circumstances would have caused their interference. If
the Queen of Portugal had said, " I will give guarantees
for future good government ; I will give an amnesty ; I
will recal obnoxious edicts ; I intend to govern consti-
tutionally ;" if the British Admiral having received
these guarantees, had permitted Lisbon to be fired,
and malefactors to be turned out and destroy property
in the streets, Spain and France would have inter-
fered. They would have rescued the Queen ; they
would have rescued property from such depredation. I
again say, the assent and sympathy of Europe would
have been with them, and you would have been blamed
for permitting such outrages in that country which, to
a certain extent, you have virtually taken under your
protection. You might have been able in such a case to
make out a good defence on the rigid principle of non-
intervention; but the blood of the British House of Com-
mons would have risen—(Cheers)—and you would have
had no credit for your rigid adherence to the principle
of non-intervention.—(Loud cheers.) But then again I
ask, what security had you that the cause of liberty
would have triumphod—what security had you that the
insurgents would triumph? I say, none whatsoever.
I say that the probability was that the Queen's cause
would have triumphed rather than the insurgents. Ob-
serve what has taken place. Although Spain had not
directly interfered, she had a force on the frontier. She
was lending the moral authority of Spain to the Queen
and her Government. She had not only marched her
forces to the frontier; she had facilitated the passage of
the Queen's troops through part of her dominions. Her
forces on the frontier were thus ready to act. Had events
taken a sudden turn, had the fortunate moment for the
entrance of Don Miguel within Portugal arisen, Spain
would not only have interfered, but she had a right to in-
terfere, and then she was "prepared for that act of
interference.—(Cheers.) But she was lending the coun-
tenance of the Spanish Government to the Queen of
Portugal, by having her army on the frontier. A pro-
position was made for the enlistment of a Spanish army,
to be officered by Portuguese, and employed in the cause
of the Queen. You say Spain will not interfere; but
Colonel Wylde.writes on the.2lst of March a dispatch
received on the 28th of that month, in which he says,
" Saldanha's demand to be allowed to raise a legion in
Spain has been acceded to by the Government here."
That was direct Spanish intervention. The Spanish
Government, acting in concert with the Portuguese Go-
vernment, had permitted Saldanha to raise a legion to
act in Portugal,—that was a direct Spanish intervention.
If the authority of the Portuguese Government had been
upheld, the upholding of that Government would have
been due to Spain. Spanish interference was given, and
how was this to be resisted? Colonel Wylde went on to
say, " I have no doubt, if this measure is carried into
effect, that none but ready-made soldiers will be enlisted,
and that every facility will be afforded him by the Spa-
nish Government for obtaining them by allowing men
to volunteer from the regular army." That was the in-
formation which, on the 22d of March, the Govern-
ment were in possession of.-.-(Cheers.) I take for
granted that the official accounts are correct. I have no
information except that which I derive from the official
papers.
Mr. HUME—Saldanha only demanded to be allowed
to raise a legion.
Sir R. PEEL—Colonel Wylde says, °' Saldanha's de-
mand to be allowed to raise a legion in Spain has been
acceded to by the Government here."—(Cheers.) Why,
Government has to act on probabilities, and come to a
sudden decision on information like this; and, if you
found that there had been a legion of Spaniards engaged
in Portugal you would have found it too late to remon-
strate, and most difficult to carry any remonstrance into
effect ; and, unless you chose to send a military force
to Portugal, and identified yourself with the insurgent
force against that of the monarchy, you would have had
no means of effectual resistance against the invasion of
spain.—(Cheers.) Now, w hat are the indications that
insurgent cause was likely to triumph ? Sir U.
thethe nurgent cause was likely to triumph P Sir U.
Seymour in a dispatch dated the lsth of March, re.
eeived the lath of_lAlsrch, says—

" Events of such nature are taking place here as to
make it evident that a crisis of some sort must be at
hand. Marshal Saldanha writes to the Queen announcing
his intention of resigning his seat in the Council, in the
event either of the Queen's refusal to sanction an appli-
cation for the assistance of Spain, or of any attempt
being made to come to terms with the insurgents."
Consider: what was the position of the Portuguese Go-
vernment at that time? The Queen, it is admitted, was
menaced with dangers. The Commander-in. Chief and
the Prime Minister had threatened to send in their re-
signations if she did not early make application to Spain
for assistance. How great, then, was her motive to seek
from Spain direct military assistance, when such was the
counsel of her Ministers, and when this was the threat
they had made to her!—(Hear, hear.) On the 19th of
March, in a letter received on the 28th of March, Sir H.
Seymour says; " I cannot doubt that an application to
Spain for assistance will be made." Well, supposing the
Queen had been victorious, what was your guarantee in
that case for constitutional Liberty?—(hear, hear.)
There was some doubts about the result, and you will
find strong evidence in looking over these letters, al-
though the Junta at Oporto was very firm, that yet
there were intestine divisions in the Junta, that the
people were undecided, and that in the province of Beira
there was no wish to encourage the insurgents. With
the Portuguese forces under the command of Saldanha,
backed by the countenance of Spain, I say that the pro-
bability was, on the 28th of March, that the Queen
would have been victorious.—(Hear, hear.) And when
the Government was exulting in unexpected victory, what
security would you have had for moderation and for-
bearance or constitutional order? Observe—who would
have been the Government? The Government would
have been composed of those who had advised the trans •
portation of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras—of
those who had counselled the issuing of decrees by which
men taken in arms should be instantly shot. If these
things had been done in the green tree, what would have
been done in the dry?—(Hear, hear.) If you had re-
fused all intervention—if you had said to the Queen of
Portugal, "We stand aloof, we leave you to settle the
question;" and supposing she had triumphed, what right
would you then have had to interpose to prevent her
reaping the fruits of the victory? My conviction is that,
if you had held aloof and the Queen had triumphed, the
same motives which led to those decrees with respect to
arresting persons taken in arms and the transportation
of prisoners would have again operated, and would have
given you no security whatever, either for the return of
constitutional liberty, or even for the exhibition of decent
forbearance or generosity towards the vanquished.—
(Hear, hear.) There were, too, many motives that in-
fluenced your decision. You saw all the objections to
intervention. You feared all the dangers of having to
make use of a Spanish force; and, on the other hand,
you calculated the danger of a victory of one cause over
the other, and all the consequences which, as we know
from experience, generally follow such triumphs; and I
cannot, in justice, join in the condemnation of a Govern-
ment which, balancing these conflicting considerations,
came to the conclusion that it was, on the whole, better
to make proposals which, as I admit, if rejected, led to
the necessity of a further intervention.—(Hear.) There
was every probability that the proposals you made would
have been accepted, and that no after-intervention
would have arisen. You took that chance, and it
was impossible for any one or any Government to pro-
cheaedtdhnoo no alternative,
Government
on probabilities. Having prevailed
on
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oassist
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her in enforcing obedience from her revolted subjects.
There was again another danger to be guarded against;
there was the danger of France sad Spain interfering if
you remained neutral. I have already said that I think
the conduct, both of France and Spain, in these negotia-
tions, proves a disposition to show every confidence in
this Government.—(Hear, hear.) They have through-
out evinced no inclination to obtain any advantage to
themselves by an interference separate from this coun-
try ; and I am glad that the Noble Lord withdrew the
imputation which had been cast upon M. Guisot and the
French Government, in respect to a supposed desire to
have an independent intervention. I saw it with the
greatest satisfaction, and I do believe that, even after
those unfortunate differences which had prevailed be-
tween this country and France, in respect to which I
think France in the wrong, there was yet every wish on
the part of France to take an early opportunity of ex-
pressing a desire to act in unison with us in any inter-
ference in the affairs of Portugal. Ido not think
that M. Guisot ever wished, or that he ever con-
templated, a separate intervention, and I can hardly
believe that the Minister of Louis Philippe, considering
what is the foundation of his throne—(Hear, hear)—
would have advised a wanton or unnecessary inter-
ference in the internal affairs of another nation.—(Hear,
hear.) Remember, however, that the Minister of France,
disposed to show confidence in this Government, did,
nevertheless, declare his opinion to be that the Portu-
guese Government was entitled to receive aid from the
Spanish Government. M. Guisot entertained an opi-
nion, and I think a sincere one, that under the quadruple
treaty, the three Governments might have justified in-
terference. Even if a cases fcrderis had not arisen, M. '
Guisot said that the principle which had dictated the
signatures to that treaty still remained, and I recollect
particularly that he dwells on this fact—that General
Povoas, the Miguelite General, had been admitted to
great influence at Oporto, and he considered that circum-
stance most material in justifying the Portuguese Go-
vernment in asking aid from Spain. Therefore I give
entire credit to the Governments of France and Spain
for the confidence they displayed. I believe that the
object of M. Pacheco was to act cordially with us, and
I acquit M. Guisot and the French Government of any
intention to obtain particular advantages for themselves.
But, in the state of things which would have ensued, if
such acts as those to which I have referred had been
perpetrated—if Lisbon had been fired, if the malefactors
had been turned loose, then France and Spain would
have been fully justified in interfering, even had you
refused; and I again say, that if these events had oc-
curred, I doubt if France and Spain would not have found
support and approval in the public opinion of Europe.—
(Hear, hear.) It may be to us and to our interests a
matter of indifference what takes place in Portugal ;
but, consider Spain. The dynasty of Spain holds its
authority by nearly the same tenure with the dynasty of
Portugal. Spain could not depart from all consideration
of the quadruple treaty. Placing ourselves, however,
in the position of Spain, seeing the identity f interests
which prevailed between the dynasty in the possession
of the throne of Spain, and the dynasty in the possession
of the throne of Portugal, apart from the quadruple
treaty, and every other consideration, I think a common
interest and the necessity of preventing anarchy in Por-
tugal constitute a case which, itself, would justify, on
all grounds, Spanish interference, if such a calamity as
that of which I have made mention had occurred.—
(Hear, hear.) And, turning to the other alternative,
supposing, instead of the Queen's forces, the insurgent
troops had been successful, I see no evidence whatever
that a greater degree of moderation would have been
exercised in that case. I see nothing in the pro-
portion of the Junta forces, nothing in the course
they took, to assure me that justice or generosity would
have prevailed bad they been victorious. Why, the
proposal that there should be no Commander-in-
Chief, that there should be different corps acting
under different generals, and, considering that the
Queen's army was in possession of Lisbon, the proposi-
tion that the Government should be handed over to the
insurgents, for them to accept any terms of accommo-
dation, convince me that in the hour of victory little
reliance could be placed on either their moderation or
their sense of right.— (Hear, hear.) And, therefore, I
leave you to choose either alternative, the triumph of
the Queen's cause, or the triumph of the insurgents; it
is possible you might have gained an advantage in the
termination of a harassing civil conflict; but you would
have found in either case no guarantee for the restora-
tion of constitutional liberty—that accommodation, that
oblivion of past crimes, that mutual generosity, on which
alone can the hopes of future peace be founded.—(Hear,
hear.) Then upon these three considerations, seeing
the probability that this strife would have long continued
if not suppressed by your means—remembering that it
was for the interests of humanity that you should inter-
fere, looking to the great likelihood that, if you had not
interposed, France and Spain would not only have de-
sired, but have been compelled to interfere—knowing
the further probability that in either issue, whether the
result were a triumph to the Queen or to the insurgents,
moderation and justice would not have been maintained
—in the midst of these conflicting considerations, all of
which had to be weighed by the Government, again I
say I will not consent to visit with condemnation those
who, under such circumstances, deemed it expedient to
decide upon offering British intervention.—(Cheers.)
And it is upon these grounds that I shall give my vote
against the motion of the Hon. Gentleman. I think it
inconsistent with justice to visit the Government with
censure. I think they have done nothing in the conclu-
sion to which they came which disentitles them to the
confidence of this House so far as their conduct in these
affairs is concerned.—(Cheers). Well, now, as to the
question of public policy, which is a far more im-
portant subject for our deliberation,—is it wise, while
all these transactions are pending, and while the plans
are being carried into execution, to control, by a deci-
sion of the House of Commons, the executive Govern-
ment, and to say that this policy mast be abandoned ?
Perhaps it must not be abandoned, perhaps it must be
continued. By whose ? I say the hand is palsied that
has to execute it if struck by a resolution of the House
of Commons adverse to it. What do you mean to do
after having adopted this resolution ?—(Rear.) It
seems to me to be unwarrantable in principle, and likely
to lead to sericus and most mischievous consequences.
What would be the consequence to the public policy of
the country if you pass such a declaration ? Will you
release Das Antos and the insurgent forces, or will you
continue them prisoners of war ? What is the practical
force of that you propose to do ? You surely will not
say.." We are content with having censured the Govern-
ment, and we will leave them to get out of the difficulty
as best they may ?" Will you replace Das Antes and
his 2,500 men in the British steamers, take them back
to Oporto, and say, " Gentlemen, we have been in the
wrong ; it is right we should make you compensation,
and so we return you exactly to the position which
originally you occupied ; any damage we have done to
you or your cause we are willing to repair ; we there •
fore bring you back to Oporto, and will let you fight
it out 1" Is that the course you would now take 1 If
you have done wrong and you do not wish to inflict in-
justice, you have no means of repairing the mischief ;
it will not be enough merely to release Das Antas.—
(Hear, hear.) Will you then retain him in custody, will
you still hold him and his followers as prisoners of ar ?
I know not, indeed, what course the Executive is to take
in the midst of these proceedings, when so soon as to-
morrow night it may be necesrary to give instructions
or answer some dispatch they may receive, if there is
not a distinct explanation on the part of the House of
Commons of the motive by which it is guided in coming
to this conclusion.—(Cheers.) Is it to be left to the Mi-
nister of the Crown to say, " I have entered into this en-
gagement,l must creep out of it as well as I can ; I must,
avoid the fulfilment of the conditions I accepted?

And what language will you bold to the oth et
parties to the convention ? You declared to them
that the necessity for interference had occurred. You
knew that no separate interference was desired, and,
although you denied the obligations of the quadruple
treaty, and although you did not think a cases ficderis
had arisen, yet, in deference to the principle of that
treaty, by the advice of her Ministers, the Queen of Eng-
land invited France and Spain to be parties to the inter-
vention. When, then, you have told them that the Queen
of England can no longer fulfil her engagements, you d
not intend to prohibit them from pursuing the
policy which with you they commenced ?—(Hear, hear.)
After having crept out of your obligations, you do not
expect that France and Spain who entered into the agree-
ment at your suggestion, will now withdraw? You do not
think that the French Government will say to the Chem-
hers, "We interfered at the solicitation of the Queen of
England; we were willing to give our aid; but she says
she can't fulfil her part in the convention, and she tells
us also, that it is not possible we can fulfil ours?"--
(Hear, hear.) Is it at all probable that the French
Government will be guided by your resolution? No;
the consequence will be, that Spain and France will alone
carry out the intervention. How is the Queen of En
land to remonstrate? The very danger, therefore, thgat-
you have apprehended, viz., the exclusion of your own.
influence, and the establishment of the authority al•
France and Spain in Portugal, will inevitably take plea,
under your eyes; and I defy you, in accordance with the
principle of any international law, to make any rens on-
strance.—(Hear, hear.) I say it is infinitely better we
should continue to act in concurrence with the other
Governments, bringing to bear upon the question the
moral influence of the three great powers who established
the threne of Donna Maria and of the Queen of Spain.
—(Hear, hear.) In deference to motives of public
policy it is infinitely better we should not attempt to
control the Executive Government, acting under consi-
derable difficulties, by any resolution which would in-
volve a course undignified and impracticable.—(Cheers.)
It is infinitely better that we should leave the Govern-
ment to decide unencumbered and unembarrassed by our
advice.—(Hear.) An amendment has been moved; I
am ready to vote against the motion without any amend-
ment. I will deal with the subject on its abstract
merits. If I were a member of the Government,
I would not take an amendment which, after
all, will be passing by this censure.—(Hear, hear.) To
the principle of the motion of the lion. Gentleman the
Member for Finsbury I have no objection; the question
of affirming it by the House of Commons is another
matter.—(Hear, hear.) The Government said to the
Queen of Portugal, "The conditions which we must have
from you are, complete and entire amnesty and exemp-
tion from penal consequences for every person engaged
in this insurrection; we make no exception; we will try
to prevent, as far as we can, any future cause for disten-
sion, arising from the absence of a complete act of
oblivion; we require you to withdraw every decree
since the 6th of October at variance with the established
constitution; we also require you to constitute a Go-
vernment which shall inspire general confidence, and
from which we desire there shall be excluded every one
liable to public suspicion or popular distrust; and, lastly.
we earnestly implore you to remove that person who has
occupied a prominent place in the palace, and whose si-
tuation in Portugal exposes him to suspicion." These
were the terms on which the intervention was based;
and having received an assurance from the Government
of Portugal that these conditions should be fulfilled, hav-
ing, moreover, invited the insurgent party to lay down
their arms upon the assurance that those conditions
should be respected, I do say, in concurrence with the
principle of the resolution, that the honour of England
is involved in their strict observance.—(Cheers.) I
think it would be a breach of faith towards the insurgent
party (I regret the necessity) if you did not commit the
honour of England to the maintenance of the condi-
tions which you yourselves proffered.—(Hear, hear.)
That portion of the dispatches which gives me the boat
assurance of a happy termination to these unfortunate
affairs is the testimony, the unsolicited testimony, which,
I find to be borne to the personal dispositions of the So-
vereigns of Portugal. I, myself, attribute the misfor-
tunes that have occurred to the pernicious advice they
have received. It is usual, :on all occasions, in consti-
tutional and loyal states, to presume justice and hu-
manity on the part of crowned heads; but I do find in
these papers conclusive proof that you may fairly attri-
bute the acts that have been done, not to the personal dis-
positions of the Queen of Portugal or her Consort, but t.
the bad counsel they received from the Government of
Cabral and those who were leagued with it.—(Hear.;)
I find that Sir H. Seymour, in a dispatch of March et,
affords an unsuspicious testimony to the good faith of
the queen and the character of the King. He says--
"The King has given a fresh proof of the wise and con-
ciliatory disposition by which he has been distinguished
in the Council, by addressing yesterday a letter to Mar-
shal Saldanha, calling upon him to make peaceful over-
tures to the Oporto Junta." That was the act of the
King in council. His suggestion was, not an:appeal to
arms, but that conciliatory overtures should be made to
the insurgents.—(Hear, hear.) Those overtures were
not made; but whose was the fault? That of the men,
who threatened to resign should the course advised by
the King be taken.—(Hear.) With this evidence before
them, they were bound to make every allowance for the
conduct of their Majesties, having, as it was shown, been
placed in so critical a position. Mr. Southern says, in
one of his dispatches, that he had addressed a note pro-
testing against the transportation of the prisoners taken
at Torres Vedras, and that the subject had been re-
peatedly under deliberation in the Cabinet, and his com-
ment is, "I am happy to think that the benevolent
feelings of their Majesties induces them to support my
views; but the opinion of the Cabinet, to which some
extraneous persons were admitted, finally prevailed, on
being backed by a threat of immediate resignation on the
part of the Ministry." Thus it was clear the Sovereign
, had interfered on behalf of the prisoners, but those who
directed their counsels having threateeed resignation, they
were unable to effect their own charitable wishes.—
(Hear, hear.) Again, Sir H. Seymour says, on the lith
of May, speaking of the action of the Ist of May, when
oinfsusrrentsk,ililned
eoixtanid.
wt
oen
n d insurgentscd
—I a
ns
yu s
ot af i
teheed wao u loss d
pany with the wounded of the Queen's forces, have been
removed to the hospital at Lisbon. On the 3d inst. the
hospital was visited by the Queen and King, who spoke
to many of the wounded, and gave special orders that
every attention should be paid to all alike." Such evi-
dence of justice and moderation on the part of these
Royal personages inspires me with the hope
that if they are surrounded by more honest
advisers there is a prospect of returning peace
and tranquillity to Portugal—(Cheers.) Now, I trust
that nothing I have said will lay me open to the&
suspicion that I approve of the measures which were
adopted by the Government of Portugal since the 7th of
October.—(Hear, hear.) I think that the change of
Government on the 6th of October, 1846, the sudden
removal of the Duke de Palmella, and the mode in which
that removal was effected, were calculated to lessen the
respect of the people for the throne.--(Hear, hear.)
I have come to the conclusion that on the whole it is
desirable that the power of England should be exerted
for the purpose of quelling these troubles ; but I do not
think it should be lent to giving countenance and sup-
port to arbitrary proceedings.—(Hear.) I have seen, I
had almost said with shame and regret, that illustrious
man, the Duke of Palmella, an exile from his own coun-
try and in banishment.—(Hear, hear.) I see with regret
that wisest politician of all the Portuguese—the man
who was a political ornament to his country—the man
who in 1814-15 was associated with the leading diplo-
matists of Europe for the purpose of laying the founda-
tions of that general peace which has endured 27 year,
—I do see with deep pain that that man, the most emi-
nent of the subjects of the Queen of Portugal, is an
exile from his native country. And for what? Because
he wished to govern on constitutional principles—
(Hear)—because, in his intercourse with public men,
with the statesmen of Europe, he had learned, perhaps,
better principles for the conduct of constitutional go-
vernment than those who hove been the ordinary coun-
cillors of the Portuguese Sovereign.—(Cheers.) I look
to the advice he gave, and to the language in which Lord
Howard speaks of the progress he had made towards the
restoration of peace.—(Hear.) I read his law of elec-
tions—l see his resolution to summon the Cortes—l see
his advice not to resort to acts of severity—l see these
things, and I think it a reflection on public men that he
should be an exile from his native country.—(Cheers.)
Sir, I think that the Portuguese Government, on the
6th of October, committed the greatest mistake that a
Government can commit, when, in anticipation of some
fancied dangers, they resorted to what is called a
dlliat, that is, attempted to avert threatened danger by
the assumption of unconstitutional power.—(Hear, hear.)
That was the mistake that was made by the Government
of Charles X., and it is the mistake that has been made
by those councillors who advised the dismissal of that,
faithful subjectof the Queen and attached friendof peace,
the ',Duke of Palmella.—(Hear, hear.) It would have
been the true policy of the Government, even if these dan-
gers were real, to have met them, and not attempted to
avert them by the assumption of unconstitutional powers.
--(Hear, hear.) These advisers of coups cilia have taken
credit to themselves for firmness and decision ; they
refer to the case of Louis XVL, and say that the cause
decision. They
rchyrhweays
ptehiedne ltohsetmsbeylvaeswaonnt firmness
decision
and energy, but they do not see the danger of resorting
to these extreme acts of violence, or the consequences
which they may lead to.—(Hear, hear.) They pointed
at the programme of the Septembrists, but I believe
that was nothing more than a proposed change in regard
to electoral districts; and I contend that any apprehen-
eogrnsnr
gieaetnlhvt:oem acts,us
enemies,
sympathies
mistake;
st a k e ;
sions entertained in regard to that programme were not
sufficient to set aside the constitutional liberty of Poe-
e
atopwunfoi gdy:El a.
will,
ur.
oea (ept Hte
se_aoatnurh(d,
rceihear.)eeoa resort
ashear.)
atoe, Trrno. :en :01,3
yourselves
usrtatresi
ssyt
eouaituvai
bp..,111 cfea tttl,sayhteooeyufe
n tel then the good feeling
to
apPlythepowerswhich the constitution gives
cyoent,e natn
of other countries, aye,
and of your own subjects, will rally around you if the
attack upon you be an unjust one; but if the friends of
the monarchy will attempt to meet danger by coups dada,
and will violate the law in anticipation of dangers, then,
in that case, the sympathies of Europe will not be with
them—(Cheers)—that is the mode by which thrones are
more endangered than by disloyalty ainddistaffstownhoinehoal
said I would do, openly and frankly,
the part of the people. I have now fulfilled
that
"dual; after a perusal of those
papers before me, I cannot in
assent to a vot • f e o censure on
spoken my
opinions as a privatech
•
which is now in course of action ; but while I take that
the Government, I cannot consent to interfere with that
course, while I would not interfere to put a stop to that
intervention which has taken place, I must at the same
time say that of the acts of the Portuguese Government
I cannot speak without condemnation.—(Cheers.) And
I say, in conclusion, that unless those evil councillors
who have been placed around the Portuguese throne are
banished--A
An lioN. MEMBER—They will be banished.
Sir R. PEEL—I believe that if that fa,ctizqlthit