The Sun.
London, England, 1823-03-29 00:00:00

[MORNING HERALD.)

A faint notion prevails that the invasion of
Spain is still in suspense and may be prevented.
We know not upon what grounds this notion
rests, whether upon the -slender thread of the
bare possibility of peace, which the two leading
Ministers in both Houses have recently thrown
out, or ratherreserved, in their guaetled phrases
—or on positive intelligence from, abroad. It is
true the French papers say that M. de Mar-
tignac, who attends the army as Extraordinary
Civil Commissioner of War, was to be intrusted
with a misson to the Spanish Government, pre-
vious to the commencement of hostilities.. What
the nature of this person's functions, at the pre-
sent crisis, with the French army can be, it is
hard to conceive. Such functionaries were
first employed by the Terrorist Government
of France, and seta to the armies as spies
upon the Generals. There can hardly be any
occasion for such services at present. The
Duke. of Angouleme is not likely to play the
part of Duinorier, and go over to the enemy.—
It is possibli, therefore, that though M. Mar-
tignac is invested with this name, his functions
are to be purely • diplomatic. As fur as we'ean
judge of him, however, lie is one of I
persons likely to 'conduce towards an- ac-
comntodation. in the Chamber of Deputies
he has expressed the most extravagant Ultra
opinions, in that tone of Gaseon, aristocracy,
for which the peaty deigneurs of 'a', provincial
village, were ridiculous,even in the time of Moliere.
It was he who, in conjunction, 'with General
, Dupont) brought `up ,two &Torts,- in the De-

puties; onprojels of law relating to the invasion,
when it was remarked that the Civilian (for M. !
tie Martignac is a law officer of the Provincial
Courts) made a tremendous flourish of trumpets,
victories,- and fields of carnage, whilst the
General confined himself to the strict matter
of the Report. From the character and the qua-
lifications of M.' de Martignac, we should think
it much more likely that he is to treat diplo-
matically with the Regency of Urgel than with
the Cortes. But whether there be communica-
tions or not between the French and Spaniards
before the commencement of hostilities, it
is still likely that we shall not hear, during
the recess of Parliament, of the crossing
of the frontier. There may be still, there-
fore, some short space left for Ministers to
exert themselves. Lord Liverpool said inciden-
tally in the House of Lords, a few nights
since, that neutrality is the position of this
country. It cannot long continue so ; England
never true been long neutral in any serious w aeon the
Continent; and there never were circumstances in
which neutrality would be more difficult than the
present. She must either join the alliance or
oppose it ultimately, and probably at no great
distance.. She must take her stand either with
the Monarchical league formecl against the great
masses of physical force, and prevalent opinion,
which are struggling-with more or less force, for
a limitation and definition of -the rights of Sove.
reigns and subjects throughout Europe, or she
must join the latter against the former.

PROVINCIAL JOURNALS.

[Front The Liverpool Courier, March 26.1
SVarst.—The answers to the questions put to Ministers, in
each House of Parliament, on the hopes they entertained of the
success of their negociations to prevent, is possible, the actual
commencement of hostilities 'between France and Spain, have
nearly extinguished the feeble expectations which might linger
in the public mind, that this calamity would be averted. • The
papers which will be laid before Parliament, after the recess,
will chew the ground which has been taken in this proceeding,
the only subject about which, we apprehend, there can be any
mystery; for it is sufficiently clear, that Government does not
intend to declare war against France, should the invasion of
Spelt) actually take place, simply on the ground of that aggres-
sion, though, of course, other circumstances may arise to In-
duce a change of policy. On two points,. it is evident, the
Opposition intend to make their attack. The first is, the
attempt cat the part of Ministers to induce Spain.to modify her
constitution in any degree, should it have been made; the
Second, on their determination to maintain a neutrality. On
' the first it would be premature to remark, because the factitself
is doubtful, and, if there were sufficient reason to admit it, it
is impossible, at present, to speak, except hypothetically. We
shall, therefore, wait fur the information which, in so short
a time, will be communicated to Parliament- The second is
open to discussion, and, as war is so loudly called for by those
who, when the, independence of Spain was subverted by Buo-
raiparte, were most clamorous for peace and submission,
the principle on which it is waged may be examined. Of the
conduct of France we have already expressed our abhorrence
and regret, and in this the country generally,'and parties most
opposed to each other, have cordially united. The public;
preis has also been;for the most part) unanimous, though a few
prints, respectable for their ability and. or their principles,
have dimented from the Collimon feeling, and done thernselveit
little crdit by palliating the violation of one of the most sacred
principles 'of ' international' justice, and writing rather as the
partisans of the French Cabinet than in the honest spirit of
English freedoms. In that.unitninious cipiession of sentiment
in both }louses, which characterized the debate on his Majesty's
speech, it wan, however, easy to perceive, that, at a certain
point, the views of the speakers branched off. The principle
of foreign interference with the domestic concerns of an inde-
pendent people was condemned; on that there was no difference
of opinion. The conduct of the French Cabinet was repro-
bated ; on that there was unanimity ; but as to ulterior measures,
should the unp.rinciplcd procedure of time Bourbons of Franco
be persevered in, there was a inailifeat difference. The most
'violent members of Opposition were for a decleration of hos-
tilities against. France, should mho persist in her aggressive
policy :.'Ministers and the moderate party looked to hostilities
only In case of circumstances arising additional to the fact of a
mere. nvasion of. Spain, and such as involved the honour and
interests of this countryl and- this appears to be the present
state of the views and feelings of each party. It was then
pretty Clear, that the tinahimity would not very long be pre-
eerved, anti it is now newly certidn, that. the Opposition will
clamour for war, and that it will be the task of Ministers to
defend their resolution to keep the country, its long as possible,
Ina state of peace. TO form a calm and rational opinion on
this ifuestion,•.let us consider the proceeding's of France in dif.
fcrent views, varying in the degree in which they ought to
laces this. country. One is that under which they actually
present themselves, in' the professed intention of time French
Cabinet in declaring war against Spain—to free. Ferdinand
from the controul of the Cortex, or, in other worde, to restore
Win to absolute power, and to give back
,to Sp* political
and the inguiiiition. Another to render this sub-
eervient to the political Influence of Friuice, by -making the
new-medelleil Spanish noverninent dependent upon her; thus
commanding, through an imbecile Monarch., the resources of
Spain, and controlling her counsels. A third is to pursue pro-
jects of conquest in that country. In the event of either the
second or third of these results, we think that it is most evident
that 'a ground of belligent- interference by this country would
helaid, and that we.should be called upon most imperatively
td assistance to Spain iu her Struggle for independence.
The balance of power would then be seriously affected, and
Fiance would be able, in any future contest with us, to corn.
mand.tlie fleets, the ports, and the army Of Spain, against us,
and, even in time of peace to controul our commerce both with
that country and with Portogal Provided, therefore, that
Spain fall under the power of the French; and-Ferdinand should
be placed in possession of a power, for the continuance of which
he will be indebted to the constant support of France,and French
troops should be continued to defend him ngninst his subjects,
as in the case of NaPleae where the Austrian army has been
obliged to remain ; the ground of our interference would be,
that, in. point of fact, the independence of Spain is destroyed,
and that tier counsels are under the military controul of France.
Such a military occupation of Spain, after the object of testor-
ing Ferdinand has been gained, would ho tantamount to the
conquest of Spain ; and who does not see, that, if France were
to set out with dclaring her intention to march an 'army into
Spain to annex it to time French Crown, we should at once
forbid it, and buckle on the hernees ? So lonk however, as the
object professed is no more titan to change the Spanish =sil-
tation, detestible as the principle is, and degraded as the French
Court has made itself; we do not see that the interests of this
country are so compromised as to warrant, on our part, a decla-
mtion of war against France. The
.qttestion, in that case,
revolves itself into this, whether the injuries which one country
alas inflict upon another lay a jUstillable ground of war, when
s'iettlier the balance of power, nor any great interest of a third
.power, is violated. We-think not ; war.know no reason why a
nation should go a knight-errantil in aid of! captive patriots
• and'tern up paper constitutions. Far cart only be justified in
ordinary cases by injuries actually inflicted, or clearly preparing
to be inflicted, or in defence agaitiat overgrown empire, which
•is the principle of the importance attached to a due balance of
power, as far as it is a . just consideration. To this tangible i
state of thing, as it affecta us,' the war, befiveen Fiance and
Spain has not yet cornet and there is the less reason for a hasty
determination on our part; becituie if, in reality, the'Spaniards,
amt a people, feel interested in the political changes which have
'taken place in their government, they are adequate Ultimately
to work out their own deliverance. If they-have no iumieit .of
sufficient strength to -meet the enemy in the field, yet if the
struggle be a naliand one; they cannot but inicceed by irre-
gular end partisan warfare. If the whole has been the work of
a few, we see no reason at all why we ilideld incur the eipen-
'diture of war to support a cause to which the country at large is
indifferent. But though, as yet, there is no just 'ground of our
hostilely interfering in this most unjust :aggression of .:France
on Spain, (for none can feel a deeper conviction of its
attrociousnessithan ourselves,) it is exceedingly Probable,' that
we'may ultimately be obliged to depart from a neutral position.
If -the revolution' has been the work of a few only, the work of
many will ke soon accomplished; the, French armies may be
withdrawn as soon as they have rescued Ferdinand; and the
tiPallillrds may,go back to thelnquisition; Inlet:del exactions,
and to bed government, till they spore unanirnetisly resolve to
assert their freedom. But if so much of publte; etiittt aheitild be
found in Spain, that a French army, must remain ,to support a
state of things ''has'bein -famed upon the einintry, then
Spein becomes in fact A part of France, and we have the right to
unite with the patriotic Spaniards to recover their liberties.—
We shall not only, in that ease, be able to show jusit cause of
war-With France, but it will become solemn duty, hind -any

Ministry would betray the country, 'did they not call forth all
its energy to repel, not only an unjust aggression upon a friendly
power, but an attempt to enlarge the power of France by the
resources of Spain. Into this dilemma, too, France has proba-
bly plunked herself. She may restore Ferdinand; but she must
immediately withdraw her armies, unless she would force
England into a war. It is not, indeed, probable, that Ferdinand
will be able to maintain his ground, without foreign assistance.
If then the French withdraw, a counter-revolution must take
place ; if they do not,' it appears to us, . that we must declare
war, for we cannot permit the French to have the military oc-
cupation of Spain. It ;mar be asked, why then not prevent
this by threatening hostilities, should the French pass the Py-
renees The answer is, that until we know whether France
will attempt to do more than she professes, that is, to change
the Spanish Constitution, no ground is laid for our interfering
in, a hostile manner, because, that in itself neither affects the
balanee of power, nor inflicts any injury on us.