The Sun.
London, England, 1815-07-28 00:00:00

t;ERNIAN PArERS.

ViiiNNA, follotvilg is ae,"e;;;
tract.fr6at a:letter, dated at the e.ita-tplart ers of
the Allied Nlottatelis, a 1 Saatborg; tlie 3:1 of

mopth

-----
It is seldom that a vast political plan has.been
excente,i with-So much tmanimitv, tic:tile-ill', and
success by those velio formed it, a:sthat.which has
been developed by the military and Political events
of the last three moot hs. \o higher importance
was attributed even for a moment to gitonapai.te',•..
enterprize, than it merited. The Declarations of
the 13th of March and I.2th May, express ac +veil
the invariable sentiments of the Allied Sovereigns;
as to just appreciation of the resources of the dis-
rnrber of the world on his
.return from the Island
of Elba. •

" Nobody ever imagined that hiS -appearance
would have durable influence. The peace of Eu-
rope was.establistied ; the enterprize of Iluona-'
parte was rather a disorder ot police, than a po,
litical otherthrow of
~the general tranquillity ; it
was the first solemn occasion on :which all the
States. of Europe were able to shety that they
again formed one ,wefl.united body. Their com-
mon enettiv► too weak to overturn a Work built
on such solid foundations, was still strong enough •
to cause for a time incalculable evils. It was,
therefore,.the moment to prove, by the energy of
the means employed by Europe against the last
at tetiipt to set it in a flame by all unworthy plot,
that the alliance of tire Sovereigns.would be dur-
able, and that amidst the difficult discussions on
the Mine and Thine, and the private pretensions
of each separately, the grand public spirit Of the
years 1813 and 1814, still b•entained unalterable.
" Every doubt on this head has been for ever
relined by ev.ents themselves.
" The political and military tactics of Napoleon
were well known': they consisted ill dividing in'
order to reign, in separating his adversaries.in
political point of view by negociai ions with each
ot them in particular, and in a military view by
partial attacks executed with all his forces. Ile
has followed this plan the more exactly in his late
enterprize as he could reckon on thesupport (if his-,
adherents in til.o Cpllllllssioil of_criines, and iiiact-
ing with the energy of despair ; and because the
union of the Pritres opposed to hint, seemed more
difficult
_to he preserved among so many part can.,
interests and the number of new parties who had
a share in the union.
His first political attacks were directed, as
bad been foreseen, against :-‘nstria. In a situa-
thm so critical as his, nothing less than the de-
fection of Su great a power as Austria conidturn
thescalc in his favour. Ile called lip the moat
sacred private feelitigs,which had long beeli :con-
fined within ti)eir due bound in,tlte great lteart
ot hint whom he desighed to IW, V,O by thvirmeans.
gave clearly to tioderstatiA the immenv
atl-
vat►tage.s which.Aititria would, for the lown.rot,
derive from no alliance with hint. gt:t.ali his at-
tempts were fruitless.
wilfdr vide tv het bet Aust rills)) as con ,
chided In WillUrably t tvokty years' coutest, and
whether it. has torgotteo the old stippotts of its
throne-tjostice, and the scrupulous delicacy of
irs .police ; at a nutmeat when it was oifereil nn
indubitable preponderance, which short.. sighted
Cabinets usually regard as the most desirable ob-
ject: Posterity will il:Avci uo lia itatimiu in form-
ing an opinion, except 'on the point whethyr Aus-
tria lets shewn Inure maguanitnity in adversity or

prosperity. • '
‘• In .a, tuilitary point of view, a concentrated
attack was to be expected with certainty from.the
enemy upon one of the two wings of the grand
theatre of %vat., which extended Iron the Appe-
nines and the dips the Lower Rhine. Italy,
and the Low Countries, unnAt necrss,trilv be•t he
first object of his operations, The world has seen
how, by a remarkable ranion "of political,and mi-
litary activity, Italy tUrg et:•i:;)peti him, so that
Ow Alps, front whose summit 3, Slypred by his
only Ally, he:thought to Menace his adversaries,
are becoure the-weakest part of his frontiers.
The 'lane difficult it was for him
,to remove-
from.Paris, when it was.decided that he must for
eier.renotince Italy, the" none rnviniahly did he
see the plan of operations •marhed out to him
which he had to follow, and which was to lead
hint to his ruin.
" The forces which most nearly threatened
Paris, were by this, plan to be, if not anoihilated,,
at least rendered blab lent.
" According to .the original plan of the Allies,
three armies were to cute; France, indepepslent of
each other, butt acting sO as to tend to a comnron
centre. That of the Upper Rhine commanded by
Prince Schwartzenberg, that of the Lower Rhine
by Prince Blucher, and that of the Netherlands
by the Duke trt Tne Rusilan armies,
which, according to common calculations, could
not come tip till a later period, were to form the
reserve ; and.the army of Italy, as soon as it had
finished the couguest of that country, was to eider
the South of Fraud: as an auxiliary.
" The course of events in Italy made the great
English Conimander earnestly press. the union of
the armies of the Lower Rhine and the Nether-

" The must brilliant success has proved %vial
what mutual contitience this union, this Belle
Alliance, was effected, without either of the two'
-Commanders being subordinate to the other, and..
with.what ability the military plan was Conceived,
which formed the basis of it. Europe has not
been sutprised at the heroism anti energy displayed
by the two Generals and the two armies..
Dot if that the Lower Rhine could he left
open without danger during•the whole.enterprise,
and thrit the urgent de.sires Of the 'Duke of Wel-
linOon could be gratified, is owing to the extra-
ortiinary efforts of the Rnssian Onverntnent,
which had upon the, Rhine,- before the „end of
June, :1 force that, aCetirditi,7, to ustutl 1611i1-
liOllS, would have done wonders, if it had ertivei!
froll4 its distant quarters at the saute early period
upon the Elbe, so that it Nvits able immediately to
ewer into the grand line of operations, and flil up
the interval between the united army of the .Ne-
thellands and that of the Upper Rhine.
I Thus by the complete union of the effo:ls
of
1 all the principal 'POWttrS of EurTe, Lidonaparte

sz;

t .

1 • •
,as been lie.aten.ll.4l) ;n the caliiiiet ati.l 0
- -,
reint•nti.krancy of i is gritaterie,ct,'
rift/ t4.1t).-ions for 11)',:"k8ovet.,,i.gn,i (11
the 0p.6•L1::,:),‘ itexei- be t ft teed.
wlvel) cf.;:ett:pl:-tt.ing -the cawie Of cveatiSii'le'or,
ackno how much it
ell in partienitti• to his Nlajesty the Dill)9l'
An-stria!' - •

1