The Sun.
London, England, 1840-12-05 00:00:00

FRANCE.

CHAMBER OE DEPUTIES.—SITTING OF DEC. 2.
M. de Remusat, in continuation—To preserve the English
alliance was the last desideratum of French policy. But this
was impossible. France alone had the wish to preserve peace' •
the other Powers, on the contrary, did not shrink from violence
and war. M. Remusat deprecated the policy of seeking to
settle these questions in a conference where the rest of Europe
was represented. For in such a case, ten to one, France would
find herself alone against the rest. M. Remusat then recapi-
tulated the state of things under Marshal Smiles former
Ministry, which had refused all measures of coercion, and had
rejected every territorial demarcation. It had insisted on Syria
and Egypt in hereditary right for the Pacha. How could the
Thiers' Cabinet accept less ? Why should it have yielded the
hereditary right to Syria? How could it have joined England
in driving Mehemet from Syria ? It was said there would have
been no war, that the Pacha would have yielded. He did
not believe he would. But, at any rate, it was but fair
to consult the Pacha first, and to counsel him to make peace
and accept conditions. This was what they had done. In
fine, Gentlemen, this policy did not succeed, and the Treaty of
-July was concluded. lie was sorry to utterhua+ilo w...c-tla but
he could not approve the apologies uttered in favour of the
Treaty. It may be puerile to examine if the Treaty was an
insult which provoked war. No one thought that. The
Treaty was the rupture of the English alliance, as England
herself avowed; for England compared to it its rap-
ture with the other Powers of Europe in the question of Bel.
gium and Antwerp. In the Belgium and other questions
France had yielded, and for the interests of internal peace she
could yield no more. The Thiers Cabinet was now reproached
with having made war, and net having made war : it was said
they should have convoked the Chambers. But this would have
been war. A protestation or a manifesto would also have been a
war. He could understand that the republic of Cracow should
protest without war—but for France to protest was war.
M. de Remusat then insisted that the note of the Bth October
did cover Egypt and did fix a cases Belli, although it was stigma-
tized as the Waterloo of French diplomacy. But all this is now
to be abandoned, and those injurious predictions are realised
which declared that France would make a noise and no more. M.
Lamartine said yesterday that while France was arming,
the other Powers did not roll a cannon. This was because
they knew us better than we did ourselves. And now events
are accomplished and Syria is lost; the Pacha, it is said, will
yield, and we are to council him to yield ; he thought it would
be more dignified to give him no counsel at all. France is now
in a state of isolation, but there were two kinds of isolation, the
one humble, the other silent, distrustful, and proud. He would
prefer the last. France should not contribute either to ac•
complisli or to facilitate, or soften the results of the Treaty of
July. As to the consolation that was offered, that the English
and Russian alliance would not endure, they had better not be
too certain of this. Russia had sacrificed the Treaty of Ur.kiar
Skelessi, but her influence at Constantinople depended not
upon Treaties, but upon geographical position. A lasting accord
might be made between England and Russia, the one establishing
its influence over the south of the Turkish empire, the other over
the north. The coalition of other Powers, independent of France,
is solidly formed; and if England showed any wish to break from
this coalition, depend upon it the other Powers would do their
utmost, and make all sacrifices to maintain England in it. This
coalition does not menace France at present, but it menaces
her for the future. It is a precautionary Holy Alliance. It
was against this that he, M. Remusat, had counselled an arma-
ment, and not for any petty portion of Syria. He denied that
it was the press that had inflamed the country. It was eve nts,
it was the armaments, the necessary armaments.
M. Gamier Pages—My task is a difficult one, for I am going
to say what has not yet been said, perhaps even what no one has
dared to say. It is difficult, because I do not believe that the
faults which have been committed are to be imputed to one
Ministry more than to another. I shall not demand of Minis-
ters what they haie formerly done ; with regard to some
France knows but too well. I shall only ask them what they
have done since the 27th July. My indignation is as great as
that of the speakers who have preceded me. It is not with me
a feeling of yesterday, for I am anxious that our great
country should preserve the rank which she ought to oc•
cupy in the world. If the Egyptian question is not brought
to a termination by the victories which have been gained over
the Pease., what is now going on is but the commence.
ment of what will take place soon. Two great Powers will
go on increasing their territories, and the grandeur of France
will at the same time go on lessening. The Cabinet of the
12th of May would not consent to forcing the passage of the
Dardanelles. The Cabinet of the Ist of March were not aware
of the strength of Egypt and Syria; they were ignorant of the
disposition of the public mind there, and hence arose the faults
which have been committed. It was thought that we might
go on until the spring, that there would be time for prepara-
tions. You know what has been the result of this error.
What ! said he, did the Cabinet entering office send as Am-
bassador a member of the Cabinet which it succeeded, whose
opposition it feared? The Ambassador, you know, expresses
himself with reserve; he gives no personal opinion; he con.
fines himself to saying, it is thought, it is believed! but ! if !
—and the Government lives in ignorance of what is really go-
ing on, takes false steps, is deceived, and loses the country,
—( Agitation.) The faalt of the Cabinet of the Ist of March in
the Eastern affair has been greater that it has allowed, and
less serious than has been thought. It has been greater than it al-
lows, because when it wrote the note of the Bth of October it
knew it could no longer obtain what it wished, because it was
warlike when it had nothing more to fear, because it hid made
out a cue for war when a war was no longer practicable. I
have to upbraid the Cabinet of the Ist of March, with having
deceived the country. [Here M. Gamier Pages, turning towards
M. Thiess, said]--You have French words on your tongue, but
for the last ten years I Gave in vain looked to you for acts of a
truly French and national character.—( Agitation.) M. Thiers
has told you that he twice proposed the same thing, and was
twice refused. It was therefore his duty to resign, for from
that moment he was no longer Minister.—( Agitation.) Yes,
Gentlemen, I repeat that he was no longs? a Minister. He
was so, de facto, if you like, but lie had no power of action,
and yet was still constitutionally responsible. May it not,
therefore, be permitted me to reproach M. Thiers wish having
cont'nued in office under such circumstances? I will now say
to the Chamber, remember your origin ; do not forget that you
have been sent here to assert the Parliamentary will.
f M. Guisot—You have just heard that there were in the
oreign policy of France certain impossibilities ; that there were
things which the Ministers were anxious to do, but they were
denied the power of action. What is meant by thews insinua-
tions ? This is one of the characteristic evils of the press now
penetrating into the Chamber. In the constitutional govern-
ment that has existed for the last ten years we know of none
but responsible Ministers. It is important beyond the power
of expression that such things as this should not be stated, that
we should not allow the insinuations of the press to find utter-
ance iu this Assembly,— (Applause.) We must prevent this,
or there will be no free discussion possible. When insinuations
inch as thee are permitted, It may be said the acts performed
in the name of a Cabinet were not its own ; and then it may
be added, that they we-e not the acts of the nation, and that
France never would have acted so. Such language, Gentle-
men, cannot be permitted here. We are France ; here is the
grennd of discussie n—on one side the majority—on the other
the Opposiek.n ; the struggle is beteveep OM! In this dis-
pssion faets come out, and approbation or blame is bestowed
where it Is due. Here is the strength, here is the will of the
country ; to say the contrary, is to calumniate it in the persons
of its representatives. I shall not again enter into the question
before the Chamber. I ascended the Wibupp §oleli lo; tie

; purpose of making the observations which you have just heard
—of showing where responsibility is incurred, and what is irre-
sponsible.—( Great applause. )
M. Mauguin next ascended the tribune. The demand for
the close of the general discussion was now made from several
parts of the Chamber, and some Deputies exclaimed that M.
.11auguin should reserve his observations for the discussion on
the paragraphs. M. Mauguin then said—Gentlemen, what I
' have to observe will not be applicable to the discussion on the
paragraphs. I beg, then, that you will allow me to speak on
the general discussion.—(Speak, speak.) M. Mauguin com-
menced by expressing his opinion that, in the affair of the East,
as far as the question of principle was concerned, France was
on one side, and all the foreign Powers on the other ; bat as
regarded the question of territory, there was no reason why
she should be without allies. In support of this po-
sition, he went through all the principal facts connected
with the policy of the foreign Powers from the French
revolution of 1789, and particularly from that of 1830, in
order to show that there was a decided variance of prin-
ciple. He then said, "Is the Treaty of the 15th of July a
Holy Alliance? Ido not think it is, and that for several rea-
sons ; first, because the Cabinets of Europe have been for some
time past exclusively occupied with the question of the East,
and not at all with principles of revolution or social organrza •
tion ; and. secondly, because the Powers were not prepared for
war, which they would have been if they had intended to im-
pose a new Government and new institutions upon France. Is
the Treaty of the 15th July a partition ? Ido not think it is,
for, in order to bring about a partition, all the parties must have
been agreed. Now, at this moment, Russia is not disposed to
take possession of Constantinople, and, on the other hand,
England is not disposed to make such a sacrifice to Rus-
sia. London, Gentlemen, is a maritime position, but Con-
stantinople is more than that, it is both maritime and
continental. The Russians once at Constantinople with their
army, their discipline, their physical and moral force, would
soon overrun Asia Minor and Persia, and would then inevi-
tably rush upon the British possessions in India. If the Rus-
sians had possession of Constantinople, they would environ the
frontiers of Austria, and profit perhaps by this aggrandisement
to bind to themselves the Bohemian and Selavonian popula-
tions, and, once in possession of that formidable position, they
would soon reduce Greece to the state of a Russian province.
It cannot be supposed, therefor's., that England and the other
Powers of Europe, and particularly England, would consent to
a partition of the East which would give Constantinople to Rus-
sia. The true objection to the Treaty of the 16th July is not that
it is a second Holy Alliance or a treaty of partition ; it is that it
destroys the influence of France, and transfers all influence ex-
clusively to other Powers. According to England we have too
much influence in the Mediterranean ; she wishes to destroy
our ascendancy on that sea, and she has commenced, and is
on the point of attaining
.the object of her wishes. But the
prejudice: which has been done to France, in this question,
does not end here ; among the European Powers which are en-
gaged in the question of the East, she no longer occupies any
other than the lowest rank ; and this is not the greatest preju-
dice which has been inflicted upon it. The Pacha of Egypt
was the only obstacle to a coalition against us.—(Ah, ah !)
Yes, Gentlemen, his power, his forces compelled Russia to
keep up a corps of observation upon Syria of 200,000, men.
Now that the Pacha is destroyed, all tke forces of Russia are
disposable, and she can direct them against whom she pleases.
This is the case also with the other Powers. There are now
three navies in the Mediterranean, as there are three in the
ocean.—[lll. Mauguin then proceeded to state that the French
had no interests at Constantinople, and that all her interests lay at
Alexandria.] He thought the French Government ought to have
induced the Pacha to accede to the views which France enter-
tained as to the Eastern question, on condition of his being pro-
tected, and having a reasonable portion of territory. If England,
he said, had refused an arrangement of this kind, then the
French, insteasi of holding the Pacha back, should have urged
him to cross the Taurus. But, added M. Mauguin, it is said,
that this would have been war—well, and what have you ob-
tained? Is it peace ! No. You have looked on while a friend,
an ally, was being destroyed, and instead of exerting your
power in his support, you entered into deplorable negotiations.
You were wrong, very wrong, M. le President of the Cabi-
net of the Ist of March, to have placed so much confidence in
a British Ministry which went to war with the Chinese be-
cause they would not allow themselves to be poisoned.
When M. Mauguin had concluded, there were loud cries for
adjournment ; and, it being six o'clock, the Chamber ad-
journed till to-morrow.