The Sun.
London, England, 1847-01-15 00:00:00

BROOKS V. DOCKET.
Rule absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant.
CONSPIRACY.-THE QUEEN V. CHARLES WRIGHT AND
SOPHIA. FENNELL.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL applied to have judgment
arrested in this case. The defendant (Wright) was in
court, bat as the female defendant had not received any
notice of the proceeding, be only applied to the Court
on behalf of Wright. An outlawry against the de-
fendants was reversed by consent last term. The general
charge against them was, obtaining a fraudulent transfer,
by means of false letters of administration, certain East
India Stock. The first count alleged, that on the day
mentioned there was standing in the books of the East
India Company, in the name of Charles Campbell, cer-
tain interest or shares in the stock of the company, of the
value of 9651. It appeared that Campbell died, and that
his wife Mary survived him, but she died without
taking out letters of administration. Sophia was one of
their children, and was married to George Fennell ; and
it was charged that she and other defendants conspired
to obtain letters of administration from the Prerogative
Court, in the name of Fennell, in order to get " means
and power " to obtain the said stock. He apprehended
that the Court would be of opinion that this term was
far too vague and general. All the counts, with the
exception of two, were open to objection, as they did
not state who was to be defrauded, nor whom the stock
belonged to.
The COURT acceded to the application.
SPINES V. BARDELL.
_ _

Mr. Sergeant Wlmums applied for a venire de novo,
• or for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict for the
plaintiff was against the evidence. The case was tried at
the last sitting at Guildhall before Lord Denman, and
was brought to recover the keep of a horse, which the
defendant had sent back to the plaintiff from whom he
had bought it, because it had " farcy," " rowelled," and
was a perfect "nuisance." The case will, no doubt, be
in the recollection of our readers. A cross action was
brought in the Common Pleas, which was decided the
other way.
Lord DENmAx considered that the verdict was correct,
but when he cameautoce:five. the dates his opinion was
strengthened. The plaintiff acted, he thought, perfectly
bond fide. lie, however, granted a rule.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff; the well
known advertising agent, to recover from the defendant,
a provisional committeeman, the amount of a bill con-
tracted by the company
in the
he was connected,
for advertising their project the newspapers. It was
tried at the last sittings at London, but the jury found
a verdict for the defendant.
Mr. COCKUURN, Q.C., now moved for a rule calling
upon the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict should
not be set aside and a new trial had, on the ground of
misdirection by the Lord Chief Justice. The question
at issue was whether the defendant had or had not re-
voked a consent which he gave to the secretary to place
his name on the provisional committee before the debt
in question was Cont
braCtuetd.evildtenwcaesweaosntaednddueced
dthaatt
the
had given no consent to have his name placed on the
managing committee,
trial to show that he had acted in that capacity, The
misdirection of which he complained was this :—One of
the questions left to the jury was, and ho submitted it
was incorrect, with some little hesitation as his Lord-
ship's opinion was consonant with the opinion of the
Exchequer.
siloenftal tocotmhemitymwanasatththise,
Lord DENNtANT—I consider all my directions to have
been conformable with the opinions of the Court of
his consent at the time, that they should find for the
time, and if they considered that he had not revoked
,Evaxschtehqeuedre.fenTdha:nae t qauei.,srtioovni

plaintiff.
Mr. Coexnuitzi held that this was an incorrect way
to put the question. The question for the consideration
of the jury was, whether the defendant authorised his
name to be put down in the Provisional Committee, and
what liability he incurred in consequence of this act.
Now, he submitted, that it wus no question to the jury
to say what was the liability of a Provisional Committee-
man. The duty and responsibility of such an office was
not defined, and, therefore, the jury had no right to

. ,
assume their nature.
Lord DENMAN considered that a jury had a right to
bring their experience to bear upon the matter, and to
say, to the best of their ability, what were the responsi-
bilities of such lan office.
Mr. COCKBURN went on—lf they were to go back to
1845, they woukl not find two men to agree on such a
question. Then again, even up to this time, no definite
view had been agreed to by the courts of law on the
matter. Then how much more difficult was it to satisfy
the minds of twelve men on the subject, seeing different

opinions prevailed.
Lord Datimaav said the Learned Counsel for the de-
fendant contended that they should not take the respell.
sibilities considered to attach to the office at the time of
the trial, but at the time the contract was made. He
thought that a just observation, and adopted it. He
called the attention of the jury to the prospectus.
The Court took time to decide the point.

BAIL COURT, j". 14.
THE QUEEN V. HINCKLEY.
Sir F. THESLGER, on the part of Mr. Hall, a magis-
trate for the counties of Stafford and Derby, moved for
a criminal infora3ation to be filed against Arthur
Hinckley, clerk of the peace for the county of Stafford,
for endeavouring tao
provoke Mr. Hall to a breach of the
peace. It appeared that the parties had long been at
feud on account of the removal of a fence, and that
Hinckley had adopted all sorts of methods of annoying
Hall, and at length applied the terms felon and coward
to that gentleman.,
Mr. Justice Elam—There is sufficient for a rule to
show cause.

THE QUEEN V. THE: CHURCHWARDIZNE OF THE PARISH OF

BT.. DUNSTAN, STEPNEY.
The ATTORNF.YsGENERAL in this case, which was
ono of disputed church-rates, obtained a rule calling upon
the churchwardens of theparish of St. Dunstan, Stepney,
to show cause
',y a mandamus should not issue
commanding them to allow Mr. Edward Horton, a
parishioner, to inspect the vestry book, containing the
proceedings of a vestry meeting which took place in
December last, at which a church-rate was proposed and
carried.
COW?

T OF _EXCHEQUER, Jan. 14.
AtEaT v. HEATH.
This cause was hied before the Lord Chief Baron at
he last sittings aft er term at Guildhall, and a verdict
found for the plaintiff.
MA MARTIN ROW moved fora rule nisi to set aside

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Jan. 14.
Lord DENMAN, at the sitting of the Court, gave
judgment in the following cases :
POLLET V. FORREST.
This was a writ of error from the Common Pleas.
The case was tried at Lancaster, and the verdict was for
the defendant. The error was alleged to be the insufficiency
of the instrument by which the defendant held a certain
piece of land, and the question at issue, whether the plaintiff
could receive 2s. 6d. per yard for all the hay sold by the
defendant in the shape of a penalty, or as a rent service.
A distress was put in, and the jury found for the arrears
due, the present plaintiff being in the position of a de-
fendant. The present plaintiff contended that the money
must be recovered as a penalty, and not as a rent service
as it was found. The Court considered that the present
defendant was entitled to judgment in his behalf.
HOPE V. HARMAN.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff, Alexander
Beresford Hope, against the executors of his late uncle,
Philip John Hope, to recover the possession of a large
quantity of jewels of great value, which he contended
were left him by his uncle's will. Two questions were
raised in the case—whether the deceased intended the
instrument by which the jewels were alleged to have
been demised to the plaintiff to have effect; and
whether certain alterations which were made could be
considered legal, ;and consequently binding upon the
defendant, who was the deceased's executor. To the
verdict, which was for the plaintiff, various objections
were raised. It appeared that the instrument was never
out of the possession of Mr. Hope, the deceased, and
that the alterations referred to were attested by a
witness. The Court had no doubt that the deceased
intended the will for legal operation, whatever
the nature of the bequests might be. There was a differ-
ence of opinion amongst the witnesses with respect to
the box in which the goods were deposited, and conse-
quently an important question was raised with respect
to documents, or other things, which betrayed a change
of outward appearance ; but an instrument, which
bore the signature of an attesting witness, ought
to be considered as regular in every respect, ex-
cept the contrary was proved in evidence. There was
another extraordinary fact in the case, namely, that the
attestation stated that certain words in the margin of
the will were signed with the initials of the deceased,
when in fact it appeared that he had signed his name
at length, but, nevertheless, that the additions were in
the signature of the deceased and properly at-
tested. was perfectly clear. Mr. Justice Patteson,
Mr. Justice Coleridge, and the late Mr. Justice Wil-
liams thought the verdict warranted by the evidence ad-
duced, and that it was the only verdict so warranted.
The Court, however, paused before giving judgment in
the ease, in order that they might consider the number
of objections discussed, but particularly whether the in-
strument could be considered to convey anything, and
whether the attestation being only by one person, did not
invalidate it ; but the rule was obtained on the ground
that the verdict was against evidence, and therefore that
was the point which the Court was called upon to de-
cide, and they felt it impossible to come to the conclu-
sion that the verdict for the plaintiff was against the
evidence adduced. They considered, also, that there
was no misdirection, and therefore the judgment of the
Court was in favour of the plaintiff.
WILLIAMSON v. HAGGARTH.
This was an action against the defendant for disposing
of turf to which he had no right. He had pleaded that
he acted under the instructions of another, and a rule
for a new trial was sought.
The COURT acceded to the application, and considered
that the defendant should offer a plea of abatement.
SMITH V. HOPPER.

This was an action against the defendant to recover
damages for breaking the plaintiff's gates, and a verdict
was found for him with considerable damages. The defend-
ant claimed a nonsuit on the ground that he had not re-
ceived the notice of the action specified in conformity
with the Highway Act. The defendant contended that
he had acted boni fide, but several cases went to show
that bona fide was not sufficient to bring the act within
the meaning of the Highway Act.
The COURT considered that the defendant, who was a
public officer, might have thought himself justified in the
course he adopted, and that the clauses of the Act ought
to receive a liberal construction. They must, however,
discharge the rule.
DOR DEM GOODY V. CARTER.
Rule discharged.
LORD DOWN V. THOMPSON.
Rule discharged.