The Sun.
London, England, 1823-09-18 00:00:00

[MORNING HERALD.]

On Monday we gave a long account of a din-
ner which had been given at Glasgow to Messrs.
Brougham and Denman. We could discover in
the speeches made on the occaSion very little
different to what has been said at dinner meetings
of a similar 'nature for these last twenty years.
The principal novelty in one or two of the speeches
was an insinuation to the effect, that England was
abandoning the proud situation she had held for
more than a century, of being comparatively the
arbitiess of Europe, and of assisting the weaker
States, when struggling for their liberty,
against despotic ones. By this, no doubt, Spain
is meant. But here a curious question arises.—
We will imagine, fora moment, that England did
all she could in her negociations at Verona, and
afterwards at Paris, to settle tbe differences be-
tween France and Spain, or between the Consti-
tutionalists and those opposed to the new Con-
stitution, so as to give Spain a Constitution that
should please all parties, including the Holy
Alliance. We will suppose that England did
strive all she could to bring about such a desir-
able settlement of affairs. Is it. to be imagined
that the English Ministers have so little of states-
men in their composition, as not to have anxious-
ly endeavoured to settle the affair amicably ?
Can any thing in a political respect, both now
and hereafter, be more awkward for England,
than that France, or any other European power,
should possess Spain ? Will not the junction of
Spain to France destroy in some degree, and as
far as that goes, the balance of power, which
England for so many centuries has been endea-
vouring to persevere in Europe. We may not
feel the effects for many years to come of such
a political junction of Spain, and afterwards,
in all 'nobility, of Portugal with France. But
will not such a junction formidably increase
the power of France, the professed rival of Eng-
land ? And after France has accomplished such
an accession of power, may she not, having the
example of not only Buonaparte, but of all con-
querors who have preceded Buonaparte, turn her
attention towards the further increase of her
power in other quarters, to the annoyance of
England ? In which, if she succeed, who can tell
of what political consequences it may be eventu-
ally to this country, which the French people must
needs hate, inasmuch as we got rid of their idol,
Buonaparte, and took the advantageovhen we
placed Louis 'XVIII. on the Throne, of exacting
contributions from the French ? ust not our
Statesmen have had thoughts of this nature when
they endeavoured to settle the differences we
have named ? To suppose that they bad not
such thoughts would be to suppose them igiforant
indeed. And to suppose that in the negociation
they were not guided by such thoughts, and that
they therefore did not do their utmost to avert
the marching of the French troops into Spain,
would be 'supposing them to be most dishonest
men.

[MORNING POST.]

The French Ministers have perceived the in-
ference which might be drawn from the uncon-
tradicted statement that Colonel Garces, taken
at the 'Trocadero, had been allowed on his parole
to re-enter Cadiz, and had returned with Gene-
ral Alava, bearing, propositions of peace. They
saw that the initiative was generally considered
to have been taken by the Duke of Angoulerne,
and that it was deemed a proof that he
did not rate the value of his late triumph
very high. The Journal des Debate has there-
fore taken. upon itself to deny the correctness
of a statement which had been suffered to
circulate several days without refutation. It
now declares that Colonel Garces was not sent
back to Cadiz, but on the contrary was on his
march with the other prisoners to Fiance, which
shows at least that they remained faithful to the
Constitution, and refused to serve the Mock
Regency, though the reward would be free-
dom. It then states that General Alava had
come over with a flag of truce in the night of
the 4th to the sth instant, and had brought a
letter .from the King of Spain to the Duke of
Angouleme, thus making it appear that the
first overture had proceeded from the Spanish
side. On the truth Or falsehood of this state.'
ment the issue of the negotiation may be consi-
dered to depend. For if any thing have occurred
to change the 'hitherto fixed resolution of the
Cortes, and it be true that they have made offers
to treat, it would be idle to expect that they-
would long stand out as to terms. If, on the
other handf they, only sent an avower to the pro.,
posals of the enemy, nothing decisive could be
inferred from a measure, which, though it may
sometimes lead to important results, is gene-
rally regarded as little, more than one of the
courtesies of war. Whether the overture
e4ginated with the French_ or not, there
%+!#s a difference in the treatment- of- the
messengers employed; which seems to announce
te existence of a greater d'is'position to concill.
a n on the part of the Spaniards than on that of
the enemy. -General • Alava Was not personally
received by the Duke of 'Angouleme, whilst the
Duke de Guiche, who careied. his Royal High,
ness's -answer,- was not only -admitted to the
King's presence, but was kept the whole of
the day, and.was allowed to dine with his Ma-
jesty. Thus far do the French Ministerial JoUr-
nals state as from authority. They add Some par-
Oculars -out of private letters, to explain the
causes of the sudden' chauge reported to have
taken place in the determination of the Cortes.
'According to these, 'on which however no
reliance .Can be pla-Ced, there had been an
insurrection in Cadiz in corisequence of the
capture of the Trocadero. The Deputies,
whose lives. were threatened, had taken refuge
in their Hall, and declared themselves' a perms-
vent body; and the- efforts of Governor 'Val-

dez to repress the tumult having failed, though
he is said to have had -recourse to the dreadful
expedient of firing on the people, he had as-
sembled his Council of War, and declared " that
he could no longer maintain the defence of the
place."--Should these representations be correct,
the Cortes might indeed negociate, but would
scarcely be able to obtain any terms. For the
honour of Spain, for the advancement of justice,
and for the triumph of national freedom over un-
principled'aggression, we therefore trust that the
statements of these private letters areas unfounded
as the cause of the enemy is iniquitous.

[BRITISH PRESS.]
According to the Journal des Dads, Valdez
had assembled his Council of War, and declared
to them that Cadiz was no longer defensible by
him—whereas not a single defence of the city
has yet been impaired. Cadiz cannot be bom-
barded from Fort Matagorda ; and her ram-
parts, artillery, garrison, and supplies are yet
powerful and unshaken. That a rabble may
have collected in its streets we do not doubt ;
they are the bane of every large city. Valdez may
have exclaimed to them, like Caius Martins,
44 Off, ye vile mob !" But we are persuaded he
did not fire upon them, as the French Paper al-
leges. Cadiz may surrender or fall by force, but
its fall will not tranquillize Spain. Ferdinand,
if he survives, will be loosed from within its
walls, with the whole collected host of fanaticism,
vengeance, and civil fury, in his train. The Con-
stitutionalists throughout Spain must then hold
their arms for their own safety. If the French
troops withdraw, Spain, through all her provinces,
will be a scene of renewed contention and blood,
and all will be to do again : liberty has taken
too deep a root there to be destroyed by a faction.
The " manolos" of Madrid and the rabble of
Seville may yell for the deaths of the Constitu-
tionalists and the restoration of th 9 Inquisition ;
but all that is enlightened within the Pyrenees
are advocates of freedom, of rational religion, and
the present Constitution. The memorable Andu-
far decree against the Regency traitors has been
pared away and explained down by a new docu-
ment from Guilleminot, which reduces it to al-
most nothing ; in fact, the decree was executed in
few places ; it was resisted by D'Espagne, and the
Faith banditti In arms, and the dungeons through
Spain were as full of victims as ever. Should
Cadiz fall, and Ferdinand survive, Spain will
swim in blood. The French will withdraw from
the horrible scenes they created, and leave be-
hind them murders, tyranny, and wide-spread
horror. Should Cadiz hold firmly out with the
approaching winter, the whole state of things
may change. Catalonia is still completely unsub-
dued ; Ballasteros's convention with -Molitor is
positively asserted to have been only a suspension
of arms; the Empecinado is nctive in Soria,
Zamora, Cucuca, and elsewhere ; Riego, so
violently abused by the French Ultra Papers,
had arrived at Malaga,, and taken the command
of Zayas' division. If • the French fall before
Cadiz, all Spain will arm against them ; if they
succeed by treachery or force, the submission of
the rest of the country, we fear, must follow.