The Sun.
London, England, 1815-05-24 00:00:00

aveie tcrated to Ole succeeding novet ilent.
tnaintaitid, therefore, from the whole bearing irf
rite toonsaction-, from the nature of the engag
.
trient and its accompanying circumstances, it was
no itidispntsble condition and the moral 'condi--
lion, the principle of the Treaty of Fontainhlearn
and that upon which the Senate proteeded, that
the dissolution of Buonaparte's Government
avast-6 be the fundamental part and liasis upon
which all 'these arrangements were built ; every
one of which he-, -without any adequate pretence
taf necessity, fundamentally violated _on his part.
The Allies were therefore absolved from the cow-
alitiout of those treaties, and if they chose to avail
hettiselves of tire consideration, We're placed in a
a.tate of war with the now existing Govcrinnent
of France; so far as the point related to a mere
xplestion of justice. He aihnitted, however, that
it was not enough to satisfy'the House as to the
..justice of the case as it referred
,tet the enemy.
He was called upon farther to prove, that the
alternative of war was just with respect to
those countries who- were. to, or nay be, the
other patties in it ; and ire trusted, on this
head, lie could 'thaw, that under all the cir-
cesostattee, of the case, there teas a paramount
=ll upon them, in the views of a true sense
of their own security, the conservation of their
.deareit interests and a sense of, imminent and
eventual danger, to enter into a state of war.—
In this part of the question, the first considera-
tion was,—Was there any prospect of this coon.
try or of Europe remaining at peace with France,
ss long as the person now at the head of its Go-
verimont rent:toted in that situation 1. 11 there
was no such prospect, there could be no safety in
delay. in argning this position, they bad the me-
lancholy advantage of the experience of fourteen
or fifteen years, winch sheaved to them that there
was no engagement-ever concluded with that per-
son than was not grossly violated by hiatithat his
system- was'one of general spoliation and univer-
sal aggrandizement ; to be regirlarly and posi-
lively, attached by conquest and force of armsea.—
Whim at one period- of the Revolution the vanity
of the French was flattered by time novel principle
of extending theircountry to what was called its
natural limits, such as the Alps, the Pyrenees,
and the. Rhine; about that time the present Ruler
of France obtained the power cif the Government,
and by the Treaty of Latneville; he was enabled to
• achieve that which was contemplated by the-ante=
cedent Government. All rea-onable men in Eu-
' Tope at the time looked with alarin Vat such an i
crease of the cerritories. But in sitbsequeurTrea-
ties, various small Stares were recognised rode-
. pendent Republics, ass the Ligurian, Helvetian.
'Load 'others Shut tliese existed not long, for every
one of these Treaties were violated, and the terri-
tories of each were successively either incorporate.
ed with Prance herself, or placed in a state of
- vassalage or subjugation to her controul. Every
one-aaw what little reliance was to be placed on
treaties • formed with the Ruler of France ; they
afterwards saw what 'Switzerland, what Holland,
add var:ous other countries had suffered. Nu de-
vdtion, no submission, on the part of any State,
sufficed to prevent its becoming the victim of his
audition. Let them more particularly look to
.what the conduct of that person was with respect
to a country whose statelaccopied many hourii
of their discussion—he meant Spain. 'Spain, which
was not only the Ally, but in habits of the most
entire sobmision to France. Let the conduct of
_its Rider towards that country, its King, and its
Nobility, be considered. There was no limits' to
his unpriaciplecl aggrandisements, his 'insatiable
- ambition. Let they look to, and consider the
, grounds and objects, as well as the pretences of
his invasion of Russia. No man who considered
those could entertain a doubt of Buonaparte's lust
'of universal rule and boundless dominion. A
state of peace with one who throughout and uni-
formly manifested himself to be actuated by such
-a principle, was not to be expected for any length
of lime. By some it might possibly be held, that
since his return to power, Or previous to it, a
change in his principles'and :objects may be in-
duced : but even the circumstances tinder which
that return took place, were such as should give
alarm and anxiety to every Government of 'Etta
Co e. 'Tim. nation at large',were,' at the time, sa-
tisfied and happy under the Government of their
Bing ; whence did the change arise ? The army
were discontented, and the present Rader of
Trance came' back, and preceded merely by'the
power of the army, who,felt,perpaps, their glory
had been in some degree tarnished ; but they felt
their, dissatisfaction, and they wished for the Go-
vernment of a military Chief—why ? Because they
wished for a military Government, whose ruling
principle they knew wowid be war--.-a state of
things they wished for from motives of personal
Interest-and feeling. (Hear, hear !) Under such
circumstances, could they look with indifference
at such a state of things ? Could they consider the
course of events which had occured in Europe it-
self in consequence of the aggressive ambition of
the French Ruler, and not fearfully anticipate
what must ensue, if not checked and counteract-
ed ? CoultFthey imagine—could they put any faith
in the prOlessions of a person-, 'who had so
gently seized the Onvernment 'or Prance at Iho
head of a military power; that the lore of peace
would be the ruling principle of his conduct
But they had heard further of a prospect' of tbs.
cstablishnicnt of a limited Monarchy France,
and which would go to afford some security for the-
Maintenance of peace. He .Must doubt, bowevera.
on viewing the course of !hinge Ins' the last -
twenty-five years in France, whether in time
of peace, a limited Monarchy or a free 'Go-
vernment could ex* in that country together
with. -such a large military bl• esta ishment as
would be kept up and he would undertake to say,
that a free Government could not exist in France,
Tvith a Chief who owed his -title to the sword—
whose- fame and power were founded in conquest
tdone- Could they-so absolutely shut their eyes—
divest themselves of all observation and reflection
—or be so blind to all that passed for the
_last 15
years, and imagine or believe that a state of re-
pose and tranquillity could be enjoyed by Europe
:Ind this country while the Government of France
was in the hands of its present Ruler ? Notwith-
standing- those views of the question, the, risks
end d:aiculties of war were duly considered by
lmito ; and there were sou may advise, con-
trasting tbs evils of war with the blessings of

peate, drat clap alrer should be tried with the in-
dividual tit:At/at the head of the FrencliGovernment,
before the awful alternative should be decided;
In saying this Ire was endeavouring to state the
argument fairly, and a et'aY which some would
probably meet it. He was really to admit, that
the alternative of War, all circarustatices consider=
ed, was of so dreadful a nature,- that if any rational
prospect of peace existed, it would be better to
embrace it ; bat on that point. he had already
stated his opinion. The circumstances under
which war may be resoled upon with a view to
its rational prospect of .success, then naturally
come under consideration, and in that view he
held it to be a favourable eitcutustante, that the
present Ruler of France should have returned,
while the Allied Sovereigns .vere still assembled
at Vienna, and hefare several of the armies of
Europe were reduced to peace establishments
while they were in a state of concert, and in a
general state of preparation, which enabled them
the more effectually to meet the difficulties.' Stich
was the situatiou in which they were placed.
They knew that in all Europe, and atuoag the
Allied Sovereigns .but one sentinamt existed on
the subject. They well knew the means now
existed, as well as the will, to give effect to
their resolves. But were they to change and
adopt the policy of peace--to let Bdonaparte
establish his power and re-create his atrinies
let the Allied Sovereigns return home, and put
their armies on a peace establishment, and the
moment would never return when the blow could
be struck with so much advantage as under the
present circumstances !" Let the history of Eu-
rope'be looked to, and see iu what length of time
so grand a confederacy of, its leading Powers was
formed, as was to be fcruud at present. - The fa-
lents'and powers of some. of the greatest States-
men that ever direcaal the affairs of this country.,
were in vain exerted to -form such a confederacy
as now existed—that great object could not be
obtained till the year 1813. With such expc-
rience'and such au example before them, why
should they not avail themselves of the present
advantages ; if these were now relinquished,
what prospect had they of a like •return. We
have against France a just, cause of war, from a
violation on the part of the enemy of every fun-
damental principle on which the peace was formed,
and a Government was reinstated which experience
proved to be incansi,tent with the peace and
tranquillity el Europe. But it may possibly be
objected to him that the Allies were prepared to
treat with the present Ruler of France so late as
the 17th of March, at Chatiliona; a few-remarks
on that point may be necessary ; the individual
was then in indispnted possession of the Govern-
ment of France. Thoughthe Allies had advanced
some way into that country, the far greater part
of it was then in the possession of B7toilaparte ;
in his bands were also all the fortresses of Italy,
as Mantua, Genoa and Turin: He had been
• master of every fortress on the .Rhine, and of
many on the Elbe On the side of' Holland and
the Netherlands he had Antwerp, Luxeinbourg,
and Bergen-op-Zoom—in short, all the places of
great military strength in that quarter of Europe.
Those who looked coolly and deliberately oa that
transaction-4hCasaw the dangers to which the
Allied Armies might have beet) reduced, if any
reverse had occurred, the difficulties to which, in
such a caae,Aey would have been -reduced without
a single fortress in their possession, editor Buona--
-parte would have been able to dictate the peace, or
carried on with iucrcascd adVantage his own opa-
rations. It was then judged better to sacrifice
the lesser consideration with a view to ensure a
greater. Such were the causes that led to that
negociation. Upon the whole, ander .the existing
circumstances, there was no hope of obtaining
that state of tranquillity and repose which was al-'
most synonitnotts with peace in the ancient ac-•
ceptation of that word. A state of preparation, a
species of armed truce, attended with a feverish
apprehension of being attacked or compelled at
no great distance-of time, to engage with InanifoM
disadvantages in a state of war, would evidently
be much more disadvantageous than engaging: in
war, 'under such encouraging Circumstances 'as
presented themselves---but still more would it be
preferable, when we were conscious of 'the send-
timent that pervaded our Allies, when we knew
we possessed the means of striking-the blow effec-
tually now, an opporttinity had little prospect
of seeing return again—on -a ground of economy.
also, the engaging in such a state now would be •
far the more preferable; the preparation which
already existed presented a great advantages while
the disadvantage of being.cotnpelled to- increase
our ftirces from a state of peace establishment to
a scale adequate to the prosecution of hostilities,
would operate incalculably against us. Every thing
favourable now presented itself; the dispositioas
of the Allies were sura% as could be wished. It
was -not, as he had already stated, the object of
,the. Prince Regent's Government to .indace the
Allies to a more extensive line of polity; than-in
their own deliberate view of the subject they
should think proper to adopt. This principle was
most. emphatically acted upon, and the necessity
of the aberpative of war was a point on which
Melt reconsideration was repeatedly urged, and
their most, delibarate and repeatetlly considered
opinions led to that decision which was eommuni-
cited to Parliament. With respect to the late
Government of France, it was his decided-opiniona
that a greatmajority of the people of Ranee
were in favour of thc return of their foaMer,legi,
timate Goveipment. He firmly believed that
such a sentiment prevailed in the South, West,
and Northern parts of .France ; and this be judged
from every
,information that Caine to his know-
ledge on thc subject.• It was also his full convic-•
don, that such a restoration would the best tend
to the general security of Europe is and _he
should be ashamed if he hesitated to • avow
that opinion. At the same time the object was
not to interfere with the choice of the people. of
France in constituting their form of Government ;
though he must observe, we had so far a
right. to interfere under general circumstances,
as to endeavour to set aside a Government which
may be incompatible with the security 9f others.
We had not on such a,principle, the right to say
what should Ir—hut whit should not be the par-
ticular' Government ? . The Allies and the Confe-
deracy being nOw'perfcctly agreed and decided as
to the line of policy to be adopted, he trusted that

ihe litattsirGovernment erOtild not nave to- ming
upon itself the responsibility, nay the odium, by
its ennduct of counteracting the decision and that
lineOf policy, which he trusted would eventually
tend fn the establishment of that state of things,
Which Would ensure the general peace, tranquil&
ay, and happiness of Europe. The Noble Earl
concluded a very argumentative and eloquent
speech, by moving an Address to the Pr lime Re,
gent, corresponding with his most gracious Mss-
sage ; and assuring him of the Cordial Coneut,
reoce of their Lordships, in enabling leis Reiyal
Highness to adopt those measures which May be
necessary, in Conjunction with his Majesty's Al-
lies, against the Common Enemy.
On the question,
Earl GREY commenced a speech of considerable
length, by observing, the Noble-Earl seemed to
address the I-louse, as feeling a confident antici-
pation of success, without 'taking into his view'
the necessary consideration at the other side of
the question ; and :at,the same time, he seemed to.
resolve the n hole into a question of feeling. Lle-
thongla it rather too much to come to such a vote'
as was proposed, when the House did not clearly,
from any thing that had fallen from the Noble
Earl, know yet exactly in what state the country
was placed as to the actual relations of war. The
Address proposed called upon the House to pledge
itself to support an interminable war, except in
case of the destruction of the present Goveknment
of France. Ile then proceeded to discuss the.
question of the right of war with France on the
'part of this country, which. he argued could not
exist without a proof of its necessity, which alone
constituted the right ; and on a-principle a:Jvanced
by the Noble Earl himself, reparation or satisfac-
tion should be demanded for real or supposed in-
juries, and that satisfaction refused, before a
right of war could, exist ; a line of procedure
which he observed was not adopted in,the ques-
tion between this country and France. In -sup-
port of the principles he adtautced, the Noble
Earl -quoted largely the authorities of Gro-
tious, Vattel, and other Writers on the Law of
Nations. What did Buonaparte say in his first
Proclamation ? clearly and expressly asserted,
that from the breaches towards him of the Treaty
of'Fontainbleau, he felt himself ahsolved from all'
obligations on his part, and that these violations.
hajl restored him to his throne and his rights. And
he added that he had known it to be in the con-
templation of the Allies to seize Mink) his asylum,
and remove him to some other place of safety.
The- Noble Lord had told us to recollect " what
the-extent of the obligation was, which
.we had a
right to enforce by the Treaty of Paris against the
Government of Buonaparte." But he (Earl Grey)
would say, that the right „r nations to choosetheir
own form of Government is generally ccnsidered.
and spoken of as a sacred right, and does not abrp-,,,
gate a treaty with any State, unless done in viola
tiHn of the terms of such Treaty ; and then the
contravention of it must :be precise and accurate
to authorise hostilities, and must not be in-
ferred from construction. Now, on looking'
at the Treaty, did we find any guarantee for
the exch:sion of any particular form of Govern-
ment in France, or any demand for the
proscription of any particular man ? Certainly
trot : Therefore the people of Paris were left
to choose whatever Chief or Government they,
,pleased, with the single exception of Buonaparte.
When the famous Declaration of the 13th of
March had bet-n adverted to, as a resolve (port a
War of extermination, the Noble Lord had stated,
that it bore no such construction, and that it did
not go beyond legitimate war. But the Treaty
which their Lordships were this night called on to
approve of, expressly refers to a particularattiele
of that Declaration, in which- it is distinctly
stated, that by violating- the Treaty, in quitting
Elba, Buonaparte had destroyed the only legal*
title on which his existence depended, and the.
Allied Powers in consequence declared, that he:
had thereby put himself beyond the pale of civil
and social relations, and had rendered himself
liable to public vengeance... No such principle as
this hail ever before been proclaitneeto the-WorK
that there exists at the head of a great nation
person who must be overthrown; and we coinz.
mitred ourselves by -declaring, that we never
would make peace or truce with him. But
,when our Allies deserted us, as they bad done on
former occasions, and when those who now
supported Ministers in that House would sup-
port them no longer, then they would come to
the other alternative, and incur the -humiliation,
and disgrace of making peace with the man they
had proscribed. 'lf such a man should ultimately
triuMph, though lie might not be actuated by all,
those had passions that had been attributed to'
Buonaparte, what hope could they have of favour
front him ? It would then be thought that it would
have been much better to have confined ourselves
to the taking of such securities as were demanded.
But he had never yet heard What these securities
were ; and he was.prepa7d to contend, that the
most perfect security we could have was to be
obtained by leaving France confined to the limits
of her ancient power, and by the-reduction of the.
power of Buonaparte, as her chief, by such a
Treaty as that Of- Chmsrpont. - From KR -the in-
formation which he (Lord Grey), had re-
ceived, the effect of the re-appearance of Buo-
naparte was such as to lend a belief that
the people, and not merely the military, were
adverse to the Government 'of the Bourbons ;
and that so great 'was' the danger before Buona-
parte's return, that the general impression of the
persons Who visited France in the last summer
was, that if that Government existed during the
life of (lie Kianagl, iat ‘nveotivt,ldrebveoalisi.tlioonngua.ostiitidpobsosiibbl4lyt
consequence of his demise. M. de Chabannes has'
said, that the Clergy and Nobles were. for the
King, but the military, 'and those who had ac-;
quired national property, were against him, be,.
came they were convioced of the insecurity or
their property--and,. considering the great pro-
pOrtion of people who were connected With the
revolutions in the government, and in favour of
Buonaparte, he (Lord G.) was not, of dplaion that it
was a military revolution. There was riot any thing
which could .show the disposition Oil the part of'
Frauce to tavourthe attempts of the'A flied Arms, brit
the reverse, by oppressing. and extingoishiog the
very spirit that was hoped for by the measures they
wet about to adopt,: Llia Lordship then alluded

~lAst i 4
it; tut:
swards the Bourbons, while they 'versed sale,
power, mid repeated, that aggression &stoic'
would he likely to cause oppressiona" the figilt:
tion, while moderation and respect for
of the people could alone effect the 'yr ourte
object. We ought to consider ho" or
.sotirces for carrying on war were better
of Off
hisotal t I
campaigne sY p proceedings were
ei bid
tracing his career eitßfifgultsselst.fei ettla in ilet‘Beos loc0:230":11v:le:;51:licSeeirt3;i:1 it:11114.
-Silesia, and argued,
and 1813, the-FrenchGovernment had ",e,
itself in such straits. .When the Alitte.'ved rori:
France it had been ,stated, and he
~boe',leooollle'
reedy, that not less than a force of :4`-ssist.„.anil
had been cut off from affeading
.and that the whole defence Of France tvas -•
tert
to about 1G ,000.
Allies united, couhrlifinicaottil.l)tyll:nibse•iers'icti'hi:leaefstlie'rciselhselesr:lttt'rnl
540,000.;, this was stated at the time to or tb
• ajnpunt, without including the Swedes
left eltitYlfi
;;Esssedwebr, as %veil as other troops
to
garrison. But supposing this statenlOtte:
been erroneous, as calculatiOna, on.
Irally are, it was fair fo 081 t",•retl°
not of the Allied Armies in France 'll° tares
340,000, which would be a fair deductiolop.oso
aggeration ; but this invading army wansnegreocil;
of victorious troops, against only fie 10°
who were harassed and worn ant c:o'
and disastrous warfare of the two prece°',e;"
paigus.. It appeared, however, that SP3,lll.otil
ft:ureic ailt, adnAl S:o•et claepuplei aar ilraotsti.gitnhectrl t h PeelvilCr,
of Leese:lolV;
could produce anf troops. We were i° foe t1:01
. millions of Subsidy, to be divided hets.s.„•iil,
three principal Powers ; but the Noble '‘-fot.l)v.,
mad
accession
~oan
Yost
eaf.
rt forcei eiutt
wvtt iss wereni g httc-, a
as
could not have their aseseirstta:onc'eleiif:vi'etc;4l4::::°::„llaisib'l'itattlYtbi:lii
them ; they were all desirous of oblainiriestr,
golden heads which had been so profuse 70e re
bated by England on former occasions• f si,;r•
cessity.of guarding her new aclinisition °tdt
way might probably prevent Sweden fr°111,61.11
paring in the war on the Continetit. 0
' bo
might certainly furnish 20,900 brave ;net cial
they could not be produced for the alio 10;g
paign, and as to Spain, her troops, che jito,
crone so little on their °Seri soil, could "
it. ss..
Dlcla,
ksc calculated
thelaotfe dßwruietpiiics:lnni
gastvrolnntleyn
nnwyti
itilloconlsrgtaeawrt:
nfr,ovri otiiirttg
at the conclusion of the late cOritest! evol
.at toes. ma I,r
those brave and invincible, legions whic" els
.bled him to gain such imperishable 1811ritrYV0
lOrilself, and such immortality for ili9 C°llll byt:o
Z 1 o,ifthey were dispersed and exhaastei ere
im war with Atiitrica ; and we
e Pr ;40
. able to product tinder that illustrious •-'B,ites.lif
than 20,000 or 30,000 British-trootss "%ercsal'o
those were of a very different deScripticacar9co
heroes of the Peninsula. The Noble
alluded to the letter of Lord Castlereagh' t'10010:"
,Hardenbeirg, respecting the partition cci
Self a
and accused his Lordship of setting bi 10510,1,1
as second Minos, to judge antiproclolr, r,
towards whole countries, according .t°
ideas of political morality, vvithout all col& el
tions visit ings of conscience afthe acts to
presumed to give his fiat He then ree3l;sisic't
mF;ny of his forme' eer 11.6'4
had said enough to shew that after
-wit ichivve had escaped in France, awe eoafe, to
to reflect whether the situation of the nec 0.0 ir.,
the dse'erlol'',
racy was such as to enable us to enter flvFy.
war with-any hopes of similar advantags, -ilit'll3,
we had lately gained. He condeinned tit
peratelanguage so generally used towart oieticLoot
parte, and was of opinion that the Pr.epsv..i of,
of
so much abuse implicated the sound°T-„r 95
cause. He declared he would go al
man to resist the ambition of BitonaP3.r`-e'iccns
we could not see into the heart of mall' lot 71,
not say that a change in his moral con4lodelio
impossible. He was no believer in tlic,,eseigh6
tion of his desires ; but if there was a° -re el"osa
• his disposition, was it not possible that the' el'
"ag° 17°
be some change in his policy, when reflect' ,fore.a
causes of his former ruin ? lie might thel"
iag
convinced of the necessity of abando's% once,.
errors for which he paid so dear. The dirodgfts,
his age was another, inducement for. even 0
tion ; he passed a life so full of greagitbellied
• - that he could not resume his exertions.s.t9;
great exhaustion of • strength and sPrl
iri fee •
stte dos,
though his iron frame make the of 0
;,.ist,'•his physical powers mist fail. Aware ea,
• it- was probable that he would cheerfAill,'Llefe'la
all the security we could wish for.---A`fe-reas"C'
Ire
it was impossible for cis, by our intelt givefbif
establish such a Government as A170'6 -to •:s.sr
least prospect of a permanent poce tbe -tor
country. Did we meau to prosecuteof tio
for the extermination of Bllonol°llF'it of olig
the • extermination of the military sP° .e gavv,
French people ! If for the latter, "rfestr°l
to know that the spirit can only •bd eve„ll4l
.ed by the extinction of the body; a",'
- the Bourbons were restored,. they 0015-`t-f.pr;',ol
to this spirit, which would not catt reo- vcc
He next touched upon the prohabilitY ° before cu.
of hostilities. on the part of America, ffrail
had
long been engaged in cite w
e ae.wit 3.00101
and after eulogising the policy of 13
the
which had induced him to abolisili.oot !",ais
Trade, he digressed to deplore tae frees
of Ireland; whose people could-not :;111/1-terly
act to be done by the,Ciovernment of t',l,,,eiclrf.t,/;t1
to. reinove the disqualifications unsier.;;;3ogto,',,•se •
!laboured, and lay the foundation of '' All
and affection in that part of the EmPire'oo-ias.s
circumstances, he repeated-his hope, "'°,or,•
ter
the House to pause before they rcsolvle"and it' on
'log the country into an irreconcilah .1.,4 4.5
Minable war. He concluded b • Flit/v.l—
14'g
00 is
tlitairleasts she' ulii-laeeresented t° hishe.
ness the Prince Itey,ent,_ thanking. his ito74t cictece'l °;
tt"t),o.st gracious Message, and expressing. the L.' ,vt: ito
of that House t 9 support all such ineasorte crow:rs
cessary to suppurt the honour anti cligmity of tbri#
all'
tFoveistalish that intimate concert with the G.r.e.,-'4sf
."Pe, which was essential to the sectlrP) jea'sj'te-wel
'though tiuty were :ti ways ready to concur ill ttieo):•tereo
GC.i'.try for these poroose,z, the could ,nts e!',oll'
i" giYing th, ,p;:. tro e Mt' •
into colsequen:ly ton't,i;e-tt'utakiota of the CoUyitt
kesvecting the deruil3 of illucti thet were total.l