The Sun.
London, England, 1815-05-26 00:00:00

Treaty of Paris, which, or the Treaty founded on
its basis at Vienna ought to govern the affairs of
tarope. Whatever. then might be said by
Lim, on the subject 'of these treaties, In the
course of his statement, the Howe would still.
'be left perfectly master of ita own 'opinions re-
tyccting them. He was only Amximis, that in•stat-
ing what he had now submitted to.. the House,
Ire should not hie considered at all to shritat-from
Meeting the 4uestion which ml ht be raised 'on
them, lie believed in his ton. .once, that after
such a war as the last, and after -111 Europe had
been thrown-into that state of d • :at ion which
tad grown out of it, that the-arra tuepts which.
tad been made were the most ,for her
peaee and happiness that could ha, -en devised.
In putting them aside then for this night, he
trusted it would not be supposed that be 'shrunk.
from their defence. When the proper period ar-
rived, he was prepared. to justify them as carry-
ing into execution, not only in sabstance, but al-
most in all the details, that plan. whidli;liad been
-forintql by a statesman for .whom he, and those
svho acted with him, must ever feel the highest
'deference and admirition—Mr. He (Jla
Fitt) when contemplating the possible success of
great confederation against France, had consi-
. tiered that general arrangement which had been
in a great measure carried into effect, to be that
which would prove most 'conducive to the happi-
ness cf Europe.--lle (Lord Castlereagh) was
prepared to strew when the question came before
the House, that, the decisions which 'bad been
suade with respect to the immediate interests Of
this country were more advantageous than Apse
fondly contemplated by Mr. Pitt as the conse-
quences of successful-war. 'He had. not hoped that
such good,conditions could be obtained for Hot.
- land a had been secured at the Congress. Mr.
Pitt bad considered it necessary to extend the
power of Prussia beyond the Rhine, and the an-
ttexat ion of Genoa with Piedmont was a part of
iris plan, mach-as-that -arrangetnent had of late
been censured- by-those -in opposition to the pre-
sent Governtnent. At an early period of the late
war, at least when the successes of the Allies had
first 'given a prospect of a successful termination
of the struggle against. France, soon after the,
Russian arms' had crossed the Vistula, he (Lord
Castlereagh) had transmitted a copy dis;
patch of. Air. 'Pitt to the Ambassadoraaf The -Ent—
peror Alexander, and desired to be apprised if
any, and what alteration had taken place in the
views of. Russia with respect to that plan in the
event of the contest being brought to a successful
issue. The answer to this communication 'in-
formed him, that '' the Emperor of Russia had
'othing to state in departure from the principles
of the arrangentew laid down by Mr. Pitt io 805."---
-This was some proof of their solidity, and on
these principles England had gone into 'the con-
test closely united in the views with her Allies.
Acting on those feelings which had regulated his
conduct, however lie might be sensible that it was
not possible an arrangement with any particular
power could fix the relations of Europe ; and
feeling as he did that as all Europe must co-
operate in the great work, it could only be effect-
ed in a spirit of compromise ; yet it was no small
satisfaCtion to him, and to all who reverenced the
Politics of- that great Statesman, Mr. Pitt, as he
did, that they had lived to see that reduced to.
practice which,his-great mind, when given to the
-consideration of this important question, had
tawny imagined in the abstract as the utmost "ob-
ject of his wishes. His plan for checking the
power of France had been embodied - in that ar-
rangement which had been attacked, as he (Lord
Castlereagh) must always think, unfairly, at a time -
-when the House had not been regularly informed
on the subject, and for this it was that it bad been
endeavoured to heap obloquy on the 'present Go-
vernment, Wishing then to-, narrow the ques-
tion, he would call for no opinion on the Treaty
61 Vienna. That, when eompleted,would be laid- be-
'fore them, .and it would be for them to pron Ounce
their judgment on it, but in the present state of
things it would be idle to maintain Ow they ought
to shut their eyes to passing events, and was
in a state of comparative inactivity till information
of all that had taken place at Vienna had been laid.
before the house. He wished at ()lice to bring;
the House to the pnly point at present submitted
to their consideration. He should call upontheir
to give their support to the Crown} in the war in
Avbich we were engaged—(Hear, hear l)---for the
question was not now, whether or trot we should
go to war, but whether, being at war, we.should
treat for peace with France separate from the Al-
lies, by departing from those principles On -vi,;hiell
the anti determined on entering- into a nor `con-
test,? In the debates which had incidentally taken
place on this subject, it had not been denied, that.
if it were considered expedient to take such a
coarse, just grounds existed for going-to war.—
Nothing could be more obvious, than that Eng-
land ant the Allies had aright to go;to,war with
France if the French people supported the power
of Buonaparte. Ire proportion as it might be con-
ten- -,t that every nation has a right to choose its
own Goverurrrat, so lunch stronger was the right
of the Allies to make war on France. In-the
choice of a Government, so that choice did "dot
effect the safety of others, no man was disposed to
admit, in the largest sense, the right of every na-
tion to act for itself, more than he wag. In propor-
tion as the restoration of Buonaparte was made the
act of tharench nation,the offence of France against
the Allies was the greater. If it could be proved,
which he did not believe it could, 'that Buona-
parte was at present at the head of the nation
4-- tits. -ttr4-F-Z•Crid&, of
1.4:: Treaty of Paris would- be greater, as by that
solemn act they were bound (and this was in fact
the basis of it), to establish another-Gdaernment.
And really kite should be in a situation somewhat
ludicrous ~vitit respect to that individual who now
presumed he was at the bead of the French Na-
tion, if it were attempted. to make the treaty of
Paris a treaty between 4'ngland and him. What
was that treaty ?—The first article in it stipulated
t hat he should 'not reign over Ft ance;.-:_-V,Vhat„.
then, was he to become the conservator 'Cifthis
Treaty ? Could the Allies confide to him-the &lies
cation of it, when the first article, and indeed the
whole substance of it,' went to exclude him from
the Sovereignty of France, and -greater benefits
were given to that country than would have' been
given bad he-remained at the head of it, as it'was

Supposed twat tinder another Government trance
would be more disposed for peace than it was reas
sonable to expect she could ever be under him.
The Question was not now, whether the Allies
should declare war, but 'whether they should open
negociations witli Buonaparte, as the Beall of-the
French, whorls they by a solemn Treaty had ex-
cluded from that situation. They had now to
consider whether. they wtinltl recognise, as the
Sovereign of France, a person so proscribed; whe-
ther they would admit him into all the compli-
cations of theaffairs of Europe, 'and leave him
to make the most of his .reserves, so- that he
might go to war with then! at that period when
to do so might best suit the purposes Of his
ambition. iVe (the Allies and ~England) were
then in a state of war with Bunnapatte, and con-
sequently with France, if he were the head of it.
However the situation of ,those individoals might
be lamented who were not friendly to his Govern-
ment, lint would, tie involved in the calamity
which his unprincipled conduct brought on the
Nation (though the AllieS must be tlesiSons to
soften the rigours of it as much its possibls), no
consideration for theist could alter the general
relations between France. and the Allies. He
certainly felt that nothing hut a case of extreme
necessity ought to urge one country to go to war
on account of the persdnal character of the So-
vereign of another. Hc felt that in proportion as
every 'Country elahned the right of settling their
own internal affairs, it was possible the motives
of the Allies would be misrepresented,, and they
svcculd be described to have departed from those
principles. which fist united theM in arms against
Buouapatte. lii a case, however, so extreme as
the preSetit, they could not separate the Govern-
ment from the Nation, and the conduct of the in-
dividual who was placed at the head of the former,
was sufficient to justify that appeal to the sword
which was about to be made. The case was,
how-
ever strengthened by the consideration that be
had beets placed at the head of the Government
by the French Army, who considered it essen-
tial to their interests that their Chief should
not be -of a pacific disposition, and inclined,
to abide by thole treaties which Louis was dis-
posed to maintain. The Whole course of events
which had marked the extraordinary career of
Buonaparte, proved that peace was not to be ex-
pected with him. Admitting his talents to be,
great, these hut increased the Oanger, and went
not only to affect the interests, but to endanger%i
the safety of this,country. If they watched bins
through his whole career, it would beseen that
in war or peace, in prosperity or adversity, still
the same perseverance and unrelenting system of
policy was distinguishable. A wish to govern all
countries seemed constantly to actuate him, and
led hiur to attempt to extend the Slominion of
France over all surrounding countries. This ob-
ject, it would be seen, lie had constantly pursued,
even in what , lie called a state of peace, and
greater acquisitions had been made by him while
profesSedly at peace, than bad ever been _gained
by war. It was during peace 'that he had pro-
cured the annexation of Holland, of the Ligurian
Republic, and virtually, though not actually,
Switzerland to France.. The thirty-second
litary division was thus added to France ; and it
was in peace that the greatest and most malignant
acts of aggression of his whole system had been
ventured upon—he Ineaut his attack upon the, in-
dependence of Spain and Portugal, in contempt
of treaties, and while bound to them by f 5051-
tive stipulations. , It was at Fontainbleau, a
place fated to he celebrated for Treaties con-
cluded to be aunulled and neglected, that he
concluded those -Treaties which preceded his
entrance into the Peninsula. Admitted into
Spain by 4 base Minister, he had duo ac-
quired a footing in that country, which gained,
helmd not hesitated to attempt to subject it to
the dotniniort of France. This was his conduct
to a country whose only fault had been that of
unqualified sub Mission to his will. -Thus con-
stantly he had pursued the objects of his ambi-
tion in peace, as in war, and more successfully in
the. former, than in the latter. le all circutus
stances, the restless ambition of this ektraordi.:
.nary man had been unrelentingly the same. Ever
seeking anew object, it appeared that he was
destined to run a course against the happiness of
all nations. If they look at him, the very.acsne
of his fortune immediately after the Peace of .1111
sit, then ail the Powers of Europe seemed inca-
pable of 'affecting his security—when he became
allied with one of the most ancient families of the
Continent—When in ,short every thing seemed to
conspire to meet his wishes, instead of sitting
down satisfied with his good fortune, he remained
discontented as ever. Nay, 413 if to spew how
impoSsihle it was for him to be at rest, when his
hands were as it would be thought, sufficiently full
with the war in Spain, •that moment had lie ses
lected for the most' gigantic of all his, projects,
that which bad ultimately turned to his ruin, the
expedition to Russia. `Then, though the peaceftil
disposition of theßussian Monarch had inclined him
to abstain from war, so long as it was possible to
avoid it. .Buonaparte, notwithstanding the diffi-
culties with which he had to contend in Spain,
marched to annihilate the independence of the 14%t
Country that remained hi Europe which had not
telt the yoke of France. If they followed his
course through' this contest—when,they saw him
swept from Russia, driven out of Germany, beaten
in France, and forced to fly before the Allies in
his own country, still it would be found that his
disposition was the same, and that when he treat-
ed with the Ministers of the Allied Powers at
Chatillon, his conduct wits marked by his accus-
tomed sacrifice,.of every principle, and tbc sane,.
tion of every diplomatic fraud that could. disgraCe •
a Sovereign. On a former night he (Lord Castle-
reagh), had anverted to a docuMent which bad
come into his possession, and which, however it
might be called in question, he firmly believed to
be genuine, and bad therefore no hesitation in
submitting it to the House. In this it would
clearly be seen, that the object of litionaparte,
instead of giving peace to the world, was only to
ga4l time, that lie might be able to break the en-
igltgimematteuitisit‘etilscohhe might enter into. What his
were, might be collected front
his anxiety to preserve those three places which
"opened to' him an entrance into the heart of Ger-
many, into the heart of.ltaly, and into the North
of Europe, especially that part of it most

connected with the interests_ of this country.--
Miens such a man was restored to the Govern-
ment of trance, by an army who felt the pacific
disposition ofLouis --X.VIII. to be incompatible with.
its interests, he would ask, whether,:from the
character of the individual, if it Was not necessary
to resist his - pretensions if -we wished to preserve
our'own independenct% His Lordship then read
the'docnurent to which he had referred-, premis-
ing, that the defence which it contained for the
breach of
it
tontemnlated by Buonaparte, by
comparing; it with what had taken place at Dant-
Zic and Dresden, whose garrisons had capitulated,
but the capitulations had not been ratified by the
Commanders, whose approbation was necessary,
threw a strong light on the character of the man,
since, on these; he could feel himself justified in
.concluding a treaty, which he proposed to violate,
though It was worthy of observation, that at
Danttic -and at Dresden, the Commanders con-
cerned had taken all possible care to-place the gar-
risons in the same situation in which they were
before they surrendered, nottvithstanding their
sense of duty forbade them to ratify the Con-
ventions concluded without their concurrence.—
This course of reasoning, on the part of Buona-
parte, it' was the more important to notice; as
when it was seen, that on his military power he
did not hesitate to annul and break any engage-
ment he might make, how hopeless tvould, be our
situation if our dependence was upon any thing
which he might call an emsagement. The paper
was dated 19th of March, 1813, was addressed by
the Duke of Bassano to the Duke of Vicenza, and
consisted of instructions from Buonaparte to the
latter. In this paper which was written at the
time when Buonaparte was placed in a most criti-
cal situation between the armies of Blucher and
Schwartzenberg, Caulincourt was ordered not to
come to a final adjustment, but -to.keep things daps
It Bas, that he (Buonaparte) might have an op;
immunity of breaking through: whatever arrange-
ments might have been ..agreed to. The transla-
tion of the letter Irons the Duke of Bassano to the
Duke of Vicenza, (in the cypher of theEnuperor,•
with his Ministers) was as follows :
March 19, 1814.
"Sts—lour Excellency will hare received, or will, doubt-
less, in the course of to-day, receive the dispatch from
Rheims, of whiCh sl. FrOchot was the bearer, and which Wa,
accompanied by a letter frOm the Emperor. The Emperor
desires that you would avoid explaining yodrself clearly upon
every thing which may relate to delivering up the fortresses
of Antwerp, Alayence, and Alexandria, if you should be•
obliged to consent to these cessions. His Majesty, intending.,.
ever thwt4rh he .should have raoijird thr Treaty, to be guided
by the military situation of affairs. Wait till the last mo •
ment. file bad faith of the Allies in respect to the capitula-
tions of Dresden, Dantzick, and Gorcuw, authorizes us to
endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, these laes,.
lions to a military arrangement, as was done, at Presburgh,
Vienna, and Tilsit. His Majesty desires that you would 'not
lose sight of the disposition which he•will feel, not to deliver
up those three keys of .France, if military events, on'which
he is willing still to rely, should permit him not to do so,
even; if he should have signed the cession of all those pro,
vinces. In a word, his 'Majesty wishes to be able, after the
Treaty, to be guided by existing. circumstances to the last
moment. Be orders you to burn this letter at soon as you
have read it."
He fully believed this letter to begenuine: Than
it would be
,denied by the enemy was a thing to.
be expected as a matter of• course. This was a
part of Baonapartes system which was•incorpor-
ated with falsehood. Fabrications and false-state-
ments were things that occarred in the ordinary
course of his affairs. When he was at-Langres, '
on one occasion; French Papers came to band,
and he' rear! .them to the people at one of their
-coffee-houses, which described the enthusiasm of
.the people, and the great efforts which they had
made in behalf of Buonapartes, Government,
though the greatest apathy had prevailed there
during the whole contest. These forgeries, how-
ever, were quite regular, and were constantly _in-
serted in the Journals, even though the depart-
• *ments from which if-Was pretended the news had
come were in the possession of the Allies.—But
he was aware what- Ire had advanced would not
justify a war, uniessit should appear that it might
be commenced with a rational prospect
.of success.
The grounds on' which success was to be looked.
for,. he would briefly state, and it might be right
to mention, that with respect to economy, ,
a war which might be short, was to he pre-
ferred- to an armed peace, which knight bst.
sucteeded by a-war of longer duration. But it
was thought the forces of the Continental
Powers -had been diminished since last year, or;t1.
,he admitted that if this were the- case; or that
there was a division ins' the- councils of the Con-
tinental Powers—that, ins fact, if they had any
doubt of its being their interest, at once to have
recourse to- arms, the ljne of conduct which it
would be wisest for this country to pursUe in
that case, would be to wait for •tire. danger, and
resist it when it came. Assuming this to be the
course which Euglaad ought to pursue, he could,
state, that the Allies had no doubt, for he cook'
assure the Ilouse that England had done nothing
to excite, to persuade or to provoke the Allies to
cogage in the contest. England being
_the coun-
try
least menaced by the danger, and possessed
of the most undoubted resources to meet it, it
was not for. her to incite them to action. Her ,
language had been, " do that which you think ,
best for your own interests ; if you determine on
war we are ready to embark with you, and will
Cover leave you ; but- above all; do not divide
your strength, nor look on the contest as but the
struggle of a day, but considered it as likely to
be attended with great dilliculties. This was
the language which had been held to the A-
l- on the part of this country, and they had
deliberately decided on war as necessary to their
existence. The result of all their delibera-
tions -had been this, that no safety for the world
p%ia- arst
et he l . o
,rb
erme peihd f e
p,roimn
these
decisions,itio
itnsvith Buona-
were the
strongest proofs of the greatest unanimity amongst
the great
,PoWers of the Continent, perhaps,
that the bistory•Of Europe had ever disclosed. All
were united in this sentiment, that where Buo.s,
naparte was concerned, safety could only be fonnd
in resistance. lie now came to .speak of .the.,
means with which the Allies were about to corn--.
mence the war.. To say that contest was not 'in
the bandrof Providence, and that in • this, as- in
other wars, the result might not baffle all calcu-
lation,ljians %fv
the parties, idle, but speaking of the relative
if succesaon the part of the
Allies were probable its the former contest, "that
prosnbitity,was now greatly increased. No. man
was more disposed than himself- to admit the
;mighty efforts which a great ceuutry united, and

40,11
'6nSidteo
rillg
repela foreigninvader :
itself its own s"' ha
snake
the example of France herself ; but 11181 k I:0°5
lowanees for the success with which the 6e love
there practised might in some instancesn of
been crowned, he contended the situ° those
that country was not such as to lead t° 0 ex'
exertions which might formerly have bethe
pected from her. There wan something which
state .of France so distinct from that in or die
she was placed at the commencement, i° Wet'.
former war, that any man who won't to tO,
that the conduct of the people in oppositi° 0,041'
Confederation would be what it was theaater
draw a most unwarrantable inference. After'
calling their legitimate Sovereign, wh°s-t bee
a
of this ail?,
al,
had been one of mercy, and who bad "„
unmindful of ttie libertieS of the people' id
portion of them had become sincerely att.°e',. pre'.
him, and this, notwithstanding she intlitain; ale
sense of the army of Baonaparte, hat! "--„
nifetecr in a variety of instances. It woalcerre
they. were not attached to. the pi esent :oate
meat, and the revolutionary 'spirit on wine pa'
calculated had almost • wholly died away ha;
perished through the horrors to which
given birth. From all the information be beta
ceived, he was satisfied that France, with
faults, had not turned from the Monarch t°l. bet'
she had sworn allegiance, sincerely t° attae"oloat
self to that man, and that army by whom his.P,lo(l
had been subverted. France in former wt"ons'the
been accustomed to calculate, not onlYha ireter
extent of her own means, but on
called her " external resources," the :{:ese 11°
other nations. She could reckon 00 rwide".
!linger, and was therefore now in a situate Tat 111°'
ly differing from that in which- she stn". vale,
and
rod when all her great conquests wer:= liyhaft
and in a situation not at all better than °ate( tb'
she held' in the last campaign. Wha'lte;- talat
issue of the present campaign might 're, toe
be Admitted the Allies were in sutlicig"C '1- • ,Air
occupy a considerable portion of Fianeeh'ici, tc;
those places to Which they miglit be 0'
advance Would be nullified to ;lite Irtet°9i, the
France; and as funds ''ere indial•lensibirl aeCea
support of such a contest, every-pla'eae ta;-'00Y•":1
pied; or every place where, fawn. rife 'urge"
.the Allies, the ishabitants might be enc°acarcJ
:to withhold the payment of the'impof,ts reiljaao'
of them, would tend to cripple:the m'cil33 I° 0'66 •
napii•te, and many he knew-there were, vr 'aafirt
far from being disposed to support li;Plat
its-
though they were not brave enough to ar•ce"-'
overthrow. Under these circumstances titsctt'ior"
• "ii) It
mate present situation of France wlt
Ther-,state, was to reason most
.fallaciooll;„"eeef
the other hana, great mOral. feding W 35 11'00'
throughout Europe. Not only the (.;°"irae
of al) the countries on the COntinent, ht" "ritiore4
pulation of each felt, that as all the nlistif°o the
which they had had to deplore proceeded 16,o'verie'
ambition and wickedness of the French a bailie
ment, all their hopes depended On the w3reatasr
so closed, that the resources of one of the g felt at
tcrienn(tiirsipesosianiEoifiroßpileotslahpoauilide, no lon errecatle
He (L ,t of IV
reagh), had anxiously inquired into the 01.0,1104
Confederation, and he found that at no Paeraitilitili
they ever been disposed to put forth their "(Ica
against France with more ardour. ISiineisei°o
Treaty of Paris, circumstances had tenlie'
to augment. the forces of the Allies, flat ke Elsa,
,
numbers, burin every thing that could way
effective. Similar augmentations of tb,e.oloess,
armies had not taken plaCe., for France °lv, dr
affected bye arrangements to•be made sohjec„ 01)044
signing of the Treaty, and Louis; anxious. rove
by his engagements, had been the first Le S. St)!
nation the 'advantage of a- stii;.e. of Pele: raced °II'
only were the armies of the Alliei-cOns°'''before!,
a higher scale than ever they had • bee"„rteti
but most important measures had been ).o"ealcak
in the event ‘of,failurea to guard 'against th power
of the bloarwhich they meditated against t„iliciaes
otalinonapatte. In the whole-til the eol"Dale
'the; Rhine, -and indeed. throughout the '‘,ro;
GertnirYc:the Militia, called the tandstr for the'
been/stalked out to form a.defensive force lolef
r of •
protection of each • country. The Ale eediag4
'were . such a scale during the Prpciaiblea
of the Congress, that he had somethnes tracarrie‘i
to reflect, , that their deliberations weteiaies
,On is the midst of one vast camp, the a, I be l-
wale independent of those of France,theo t, •
sure he did not exaggerate, in stating' oleo it'
contain no fewer than a million of 00'13:
ststruts_struts_.,• altaegular soldiers, under the seve
sot&
tenaates there assembled. These tiiing^looo
it ,must be felt; that if the great struggle! "or ktri
Made at some period or other, a time eoll:ia'aa
iz
rive when it could be .ventured upon with htlt -
-aard. Had Buon, •ae Ina
apai te • delayed
single month, he believed it Would ka 01)
:; s, •
the tit"
vast difference in the.attitude of
instead of her applying now in their Ita"`
would . hive to re-create their armies at „ale'
his return 0
cook •
mense ex pence, as France. -was now liolea • ,
to do by Buonaparte; from small establisi 6,0( ,
military Nip'".
There was no reason to suppose the oft
of Europe opposed to France-iiaa nat
tuous cause,: as the -Allies thought wes"`as the"
able to act with success. Such a frcti`j'a
possessed must appear adequate td s wo -
blow, and such arrangeineuts were, 113040' inPle;
securc its being always kept'iip to its f
meat. Thepopnlation of each country, °,:st th
as it was, would be SLIM ient to guard tigaiento/0'
being again overrun bylinonaparte thcev
sA(ldell •
verseas being eapvieneed by the Alliesaand'es or.
• A
rush nitempted by the French.- If tbe
01l 15 •
not nowaprepared for War., there were " 100"
re
for' thinking they would be -prepared at 9. ryas 11-
~
period, tanaf therefore the only a • lternative
„ aaa'ahe P tie
wait till their present Italians were
the Confederation, now unanimous,
vide(' in opinion —till the French Ruler, xT
ed 41 •
directed by his own armies, but enccf,l,agte e;e
a.
some event which for a time thigh t
Allies from each other, take advantage q'oe
circumstance again to fill Europe with wa. ri.,a it
prepared to admit that some might cons" c spo
to go to war With France, and vet be' tug- o,re
,asiies deara. •
to support that war by aTanting. st• aht. ao
reign Mowers. however unsound he 1111s.r t!.,1
policy,their yet they might vote in faY°`.i ices 'IL
Address to-night, without bin-dins.- thc""el'
aostg'
any manner to the other part of thc