The Sun.
London, England, 1871-02-07 00:00:00

THE LATE FIGHTING IN THE EAST OF
FRANCE.

The special correspondent of the Standard thus writes
from Pontarlien, January 29 :—The original plan of cam-
paign, conceived by Lieutenant-Colonel de Bigot, chief of
staff of the 7th Military Division at Besancon, offered
great probabilities of success. We were close upon the heels
of the Prussians when we reached Lure after a most fatiguing
march. During the night there was an alerte ; in attempt
on the part of the enemy to cut cff our Armstrong
battery, but he was beaten back, and towards midnight
the men were allowed to break ranks and cluster around
the fires. At last the dawn broke, and we could see the
Prussians at Chenebier throwing out their skirmishers,
and preparing to resist our attack. At half-
past seven General Tevis deployed his brigade on
the heights, and began with his mountain guns ; the
enemy answered immediately, and almost at the
same time we could hear the thunder of Bonnet's
attack on Chagey rolling in our rear. For two hours our
cannonade lasted, and then. as the Prussian fire slackened,
the 86th was ordered to fix bayonets. The men were frll
of fight, and we knew that there were only 8,000 to meet
us on the other side, but just as the line
was about to advance, Cremer sent orders to
suspend operations. It is only a feint, he said, to
keep us back from Mandrevillars, and we must not waste
our munitions. Then the 32nd was sent over the hill
top to Chagey, and we waited for the result. At noon
the regiment was driven back, and the division com-
mander was obliged to confess that it was no feint, but a
serious attack. Still he delayed his movement, although
for two hours dense columns of Prussian infantry had
been gaining our left by the Frahier road and were ad-
vancing on Etobon. We were lost if he occupied this
position, for the road over the mountain in our rear
was impracticable for artillery. At half-past
one three batteries opened on us. The Germans had
dragged their guns up into the woods opposite at 3,000
metres, and our fourteen mountain rifles were use-
less. Matters went on from bad to worse, a hail
of projectiles swept the plateau, where there was
not even a shrub to shelter our men. At 2.30
General Tevis perceived that the enemy's left was
unguarded ; the 83rd was sent forward under cover
of the the hill side, the Mobiles crept up in
the snow to within 300 yards of the Germans, and
began a furious fire : they were raw troops, but they held
the crest for three-quarters of an hour; then their colonel
fell with a ball through his heart, and they broke in dis-
order. The General rallied them, however, and just then
we heard the welcome sound of the drums of the
57th advancing to their support. One of General
Tevis's gendarmes was dismounted by a shell
which cut his horse in two. In five minutes the
poor beast was cut into steaks by the reserve. In this
rush the General was thrown down and contusioned, but
he was held up by two of the men, and again we ad-
vanced. Down came the 57th, shouting " Vive la
France !"—there was not one cry of " Vive la Repub.
lique "—the Ist battalion of the 86th joined the line, and
in ten minutes Chenebier was won, just as Admiral Pen-
hoet's division of the 18th Corps carried Etobon. It was
a brilliant, although a fruitless victory, for it was
not followed up, and the carelessness of Admiral Penhoet
rendered it necessary for us to recapture Chenebier next
morning, and to fight for our suppers the same night, as
the intendance mistook the road and led our convoy
of provisions into the Prussian lines, losing forty
waggons. However, it proved that the Mobiles
could and would fight if well led. Forty-eight
hours afterwards the whole Army of the East was re-
treating towards Besancon, leaving its woun3ed to the tender
mercies of the Prussians. Never was sight snore welcome
than were the gloomy fortifications of Besancon ; but
even here we were not doomed to idleness. General
de Bressolles, with the 24th Corps, had abandoned.
Baume lee Dames, and was flying to Pontarher,
and again was our division sent to stop the gap at
itself,
but It was a trifling affair in
but it saved the army for the time being. The 2nd
Brigade carried the heights of Torpes and the woods
in their front, on the 23rd, with the bayonet, and. every-
thing was made ready to attack Dannemane next
morning at daybreak. By 2 a.m
i . Bourbaki sent
orders for us to fall back. That evening he shot him-
self. It is useless and almost impossible to describethe retreat of the Ist Army towards the Swiss frontier.
All the horrors of the retreat from Moscow were rea-
lised, arid as the men stumbled through three feet of
snow, but one hope was expressed by all—that they
might be driven across the frontier into Switzerland.
mils was a brilliantly conceived campaign lost
against inferior forces, after a series of complete victories,
through the negligence and incapacity of a General who
never made a serious reconnaissance, and never established
a reserve, and through the maladministration of the
quartermaster's department, which left our troops without
forage, food, and ammunition.