The Sun.
London, England, 1841-03-26 00:00:00

cision there can be no difference. In the language of the
Constitution " all the legislative
_powers" which it grants
" are vested in the Congress of the United States." It would
be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is
.not included in the whole.
It may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has given to
the Executive the power to annul the ac's of the legislative
body by refusing to them his assent. So a similar power ha
necessarily resulted from that instrument to the judiciary ;
and yet the judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There
is.it is true, this difference between these grants of power; the
Executive can put his negative upon the Acts of the Legisla-
ture for other cause than that of want of confirmity to the
Constitution, whilst the judiciary can only declare void those
which violate the instrument. But the decision of the judiciary
is final in such a ease; whereas, in every instance where the
veto of the Executive is applied, it nese, he overcome by a vote
of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress. 'The negative upon
the Acts of the Legislature, by the Executive aetherity, and
that in the hands of one individual. would seem to he an in-
congruity in our own system. Like some others of a similar
character, however, it appears to be highly expedient ; and if
used only with forbearance, and in the spirit which was in•
tended by its authors, it may be producti e of great good, and
be found one of the best safe-guards to the Union.
At the period of the formation of the Constitution, the prin-
ciple does not appear to have enjoyed much favour in the
State Governments. It existed but in two, and in one of
these there was a Mural Executive. If we would search for
the motive which operated upon the purely patriotic and en-
lightened assembly
.which framed the Constitution, for the
adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the lead-
ing democratic principle, that the majority should govern,
we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any
benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too
well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the
people, and the enlightened character of the State Legislatures
not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by
them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and,
of course, that they would require no aid in conceiving and
maturing the measures which the circumstances of the coun-
try might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a
thought could for a moment could have been entertained that
the President, placed at the capital, he the centre of the coun-
try, could better understand the wants and wishes of the
people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a
part of every year among them, living with them, often la-
bouring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of
interest, duty, and affection. To assist or control Congress,
then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have
been the motive for con erring the veto power on the Pre si
dent. This argument acquires additional force from the fact
of its never having been thus used by the first six Presideats—
end two of them were Members of the Convention, one pre-
siding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger
share in consummating the labours of that august body than
any other person. But if Bits were never returned to Con-
gress by either of the Presidents above referred -to, upon the
ground of their being inexpedient, or inot"as well adapted as
they might be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied
upon that cf want of conformity to the Constitution, or because
errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment.
There is another ground for the adoption of the veto principle,
which had probably more influence in recommending it to the
Convention than any other. I refer to the security which it,
gives to the just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all
parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the
Contention that in a country so extensive, embracing so great
a variety of sod and climate, and consequently of products, and
which, from-the same causes, must ever exhibit a great differ-
ence in the amount of the population of its various sections,
calling for a great diversity in the employments of the people,
that the legislation of the majanity might not always justly re-
gard the rights and interests of the minority. And that Acts
of this character might be passed, under an express grant by
the words of the Constitution, and, therefore, not within the
competency of the judiciary to declare void. That however
enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past expe-
rience; the Members of Congress might be, and however
largely partaking in general of the liberal feeling of the people,
i 1 was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should
not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional
feelings. It was proper therefore to provide some umpire,
from whose situation and mode of appointment snore inde-
pendence and freedom from such influences might be ex-
pected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive department
constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that
office having his constituents in every section, state, and sub-
division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the
most solemn sanctions to guard, protect, and defend the rights
of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice
and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, there-
fore, given by the constitution of the Executive of the United
States, 'solely as a conservative power. To be used only, Ist,
to protect the Constitution from violation ; 2dly, the people,
from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been
probably disregarded or not wee understood ; and, 3dly, to
prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of
minorities. In reference to the second of the objects I may
observe, that I consider it the right and privilege of the people
to decide disputed points of the Constitution, arising from the
general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the
powers expressly given. And 1 believe, with Mr. Madison,
" that repeated recognitions under varied circumstances, in
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
Government, accompanied by indications in different modes of
the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording
to the President sufficient authority for his considering such
disputed points as settled."
Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of
our present form of government. It would be an object more
highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of spe-
culative statesmen, if its precise situation could. be ascertained,
a fair exhibit made of the operations of each of its departments,
of the powers which they respectively claim and exercise, of
the collisions which have occurred between them, or between
the whole Government and those of the States, or either of
them. We could then compare our actual condition, after
fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the corn-
utencement of its operations, and rscertain whether the pre-
dictions of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confi-
dent hopes of its advocates, have been best realized. The
great dread of the former seems to have been, that the re-
served powers of the States would be absorbed by those
of the Federal Govetnment, and a consolidated power
established, leaving to the States the shadow only of that
independent action for which they had so zealously
contended, and on the preservation of which they
relied as the last hope of liberty. Without denying. that the
result to which they looked with so much apprehension is in
the way of being realized, it is obvious that they did not
clearly see the mode of its accomplishment. The general Go-
vernment has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the
States. As far as any open warfare has gone, the State au-
thorities have amply maintained their rights. To a casual ob-
server, our system presents no appearance of discord between
the different members which compose it. Even the addition
of many new ones has produced no jarring. They move in
their respective orbits in perfect harmony with the central
head, and with each o her. But there is still an under-current
at work, by which, if not seasonably checked, the worst appre-
hensions of our anti-federal patriots will be realized. And not
only Is ill the State authorities be overshadowed by the great
increase of power in the Executive department of the general
Government, but the character of that Government, if not its
designation, be essentially and radically changed.
This state of things has been in part effected by causes inhe-
rent in the Constitutton, and in part by the never-failing ten-
dency of political powerto increase itself. By making the Pre-
sident the sole distributor of all the patranage cf the Govern-
ment, the framers of the Constitution do not appear to have an-
ticipated at how short a period it would become a formidable
-instrument to control the free operations of the State Govern-
ments. Of trifling importance at first, it had, early in Mr. Jef-
ferson's administration, become so powerful as to create great
alarm in the mind of that patriot, from the po ent influence it
might exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise.
If such could then have been the effects of its influence, how
much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in
amount, as it certainly is, and more completely under the con-
trol of the executive will lean their construction of their powers
allo ed, or the forbearing characters of all the early
Presidents permitted them to make? But it is not by
the extent of its patronage alone that the Executive de-
partment has become dangerous, but by the use which it ap-
pears may be made of the appointing power, to bring
under its control the whole revenue of the country.—The
Constitution has declared it to be the duty of the President to
see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the com-
mander-in-chief of the armies and navy of the United Stat. s.
If the opinion of the most approved writers upon that species
of mixed government, which in modern Europe is termed
monarchy, in contrachstinction despotism is correct, there was
wanting no other addition to the powers of our Chief Magis-
trate to stamp a monarchical character on our Government
but the control of the public finances. And to me it appears
strange, indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire con-
trol which the President possesses over the officers who have
the custody of the public money, by the power of removal with
or without cause does, for all mischievous purposes at least,
subject the treasure also to his disposal.
The first Roman Emperor, in his attempt to seize the sacred
treasure, silenced the opposition of the officer to whose charge
it had been committed, by a significant allusion to his sword.
By a selection of political instruments for the care of the public
money, a reference to their commissions by a President would
be quite as effectual an argument as that of Caesar to the Roman
knight. lam not insensible of the great difficulty in devising
a proper plan for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the
public revenues, and I know the importance which has been
attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce,
as it is called, of the Treasury from the banking institutions.
It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the unhal •
lowed union of the Treasury with the executive department
which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to
our republican institutions, and that created by the influence
given to the Executive through the instrumentality of the
federal officers, I propose to apply all the remedies which
may be at my command. It was certainly a great
error in the framers of the Constitution, not to have
made the officer at the head of the Treasury department en-
tirely independent of- the Executive. He should, at least,
have been removable only upon the demand of the popular
branch of the Legislature. I have determined never to remove
the Secretary of the Treasury without communicating ail the
circumstances attending such removal to both Houses of Con-
gress. The influence of the Executive in controlling the
freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the
public officers can be effectually checked by renewing the pro-
hibition published by Mr. Jefferson. forbidding their interfe-
rence in elections further than giving their own votes; and
their own independence secured by an assurance of perfect
immunity, in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under
the dictates of their own unbiassed judgments. Never, with
my consent, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his
services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of
Executive will.

There is no part of the means placed in the hands of the
Executive which might be used with greater effect, for un-
hallowed purposes, than the control of the public press. The
maxim which our ancestors derived from the mother country,
that " the freedom of the press is the great bulwark of civil
and religious liberty," is one of the most precious legacies
which they have lest 113. We have learned, too, from our own
as well as the experience of other countries, that golden
shackles, by whomsoever or by whatever pretence imposed,
are as fatal to it as the iron bonds of despotism. The presses
in the necessary employment of the Government, should never
be " used to clear the guilty, or to varnidi crimes." A decent
and manly examination of the acts of the Government should
be not only tolerated but encouraged.
Upon another occasion I have given my. opionion, at some
length, upon the impropriety of Executive interference in the
legislation of Congress ; that the article in the Constitution,
making it the duty of the President to communicate informa-
tion, and authorising him to recommend measures, was not in-
tended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular,
that he should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It
would be very strange, indeed, that the Constitution should
have strictly forbidden one branch of the Legislature from in-
terfering in the origination of such Bills, and that it should be
considered proper that an altogether, different department of
the Government shoull be permitted to do so. Some of our
best political maxims and opinions have been drawn from our
parent isle. There are others, however, which cannot be in-
trodue:d in our system without siegular ineor.gruity, and
the production of much mischief. And this I conceive
to be one. No matter in which of the Houses of Parlia-
ment a Bill may originate, nor by whom introduced,
a Minister, or a Member a the Opposition, by the fiction
of law, or rather of constitutional principle, the Sovereign
is ‘lipposed to have prepared it agreeably to his will, and then
submitted it to Parliament for their advice and consent. Now
the very reveM is the case here, not only with regard to the