The Sun.
London, England, 1841-01-18 00:00:00

aid of experience, but we cannot conceal from ourselves
that the project contains many grave questions, of which
the following are the principal :-Ist. Is not the state
of things in which Paris should be menaced by the
enemy an exceptional one ? 2d. Supposing that Paris
were thus menaced, ought it not to be defended by per-
manent works ? 3d. If Paris is to be defended by
permanent works, is it to he hoped that, in arming the
population, there can also be imparted to it the courage
and sang froid that are necessary for the defence of
ramparts? 4th. Supposing this question to be answered
affirmatively; might not such a work, by the enormous
expense it would occasion, exceed the means of a
great nation ? sth. Might not the advantages to be de-
rived from the fortifications become dangerous to the
cause of liberty ? With respect to the first question we
must observe that Vauban was the first man who thought
of fortifying Paris in a regular manner, and assuredly
France at that time was not in a revolution. Coalitions
were formed against France in 1792, 1798, 1805, 1809,
1813,and 1815,under pretext of combating our revo-
lutionary principles. This state of hostility ceased under
the restoration, because Europe then hoped that the
elder branch of the house of Bourbon, transported from
exile to the throne, would keep within bounds the spirit
of the revolution, and would not seek to recover what
France had lost. But the revolution broke out afresh
in 1830, overturned the dynasty charged with keeping
it down, and gave itself a new Government. What
has this Government done within the last ten years to
justify the patent in latent hostility of Europe? Nothing
assuredly, for it has neither been ambitious, nor has it
sought to provoke disorder. And yet at the present
moment it stands alone in Europe, as it did during the
coalitions of 1792 and 1813. If our fortresses in 1792
protracted the invasion, and gave France time for or-
ganisation ; if in 1815 they occasioned the enemy
much loss of time and blood ; if they diminished one-
fourth the armies advancing on Paris—they did not do
all that was requisite, for our capital, owing to its being
exposed, was finally invaded. What is to be inferred
from this? Why, that however useful and indispensable
fortified frontiers mare he, they are not all-sufficient,
and that capitals should be defended. la support of
this argument we have the authority of Napoleon, who
was aware that if Vienna, Berl a, and Madrid had
been fortified, he would have failed in his campaigns of
Austria, Prussia, and Spain. Having shown that Paris
ought to be fortified, the next and a very important
question is the means of execution. Some persons
have said that all that is necessary is to protect France
from a coup-de-main. Napoleon, they say, did not
I contemplate any more than this in 1815, but if he did
not, it was because he had not time. His intention
was to establish permanent fortifications at a later

period. What we should never lose sight of is the ne-
cessity of protecting the capital against the chalices of
a coup-de-main. With permanent fortifications it would
no longer be a coup•de-main or a battle that Paris
would have to dread, but a regular siege. Now an army
does not carry on a siege in an enemy's country with
ordinary means. It is difficult even in one's own coun-
try for an army to carry with it all that is necessary for
a siege, and it is still more difficult to do so in an
enemy's country. This is the consideration which
has induced the Committee to adopt the principle
of permanent fortifications. Paris once capable
of resisting a siege, is for ever delivered from the
dangers and terrors of a Beige. But, it is said, it is
impossible to think of making Paris a fortified place,
and to expose a million of inhabitants to all the horrors
of a siege, and of a bombardment. How, it is said,
could you in such extremities lock yourselves up in
Paris with its inhabitants, the Government, the Cham-
bers and the agents of publicity ? How could you
block up all these elements, and subject them to mili-
tary Government? These objections vanish on exa-
tnination. If we succeed in making the capital capable
of resisting a siege, we at the vane time deliver it from
all the dangers of a siege. But again it is said, the
inhabitants of large cities are not capable of resisting a
siege, and why not ? We deny this positively and
openly, in the name of the inhabitants of Paris. Recal
to mind how many combats have taken place in Paris
within the last 50 years. Have you not seen in all
these events the most striking proofs of the bravery of
the Parisian population ? In 1830 they fought for the
charter, and triumphed. In 1832 and 1834 the nati-
ons! guard fought bravely for order and the laws, against
those delu led men who:in this contest displayed a de-
plorable courage. In these events, was a sense of dan-
ger exhibited by either the attacked or the attacking
party ? But without dwelling upon these reminis-
cences of civil war, let us go back to the year
1814. Did the Parisian then show that he was afraid
of danger ? We have consulted ocular witnesses of
these events, and they have told us that on all hands
the people of Paris demanded arms. Officers have
told us that under their eyes the inhabitants of the fan-
bourgs placed themselves near the walls, and profiting by
their position, bravely acted the part of tirailleurs. In
such circumstances an energetic and zealous chief has
only to present himself, and to stamp with his foot
upon the earth, and soldiers will spring forth. When
in 1723, Lille and Valenciennes underwent a siege, in
the sacred defence of the country, the inhabitants
thought little of the inconveniences of the siege for
themselves, and Paris would do the same, We aro
asked, however, how such a capital as Parisi could find
provisions in a state of siege? We have consulted all the
necessary documents, and have arrived at the conviction
that if a capital has more wants it has also more resources.
Trailers, in the hope of gain, would not hesitate to Mae
bli4 largo depots. Itusaians knew this when they burnt
Moscow. The Chamber will now permit me to quote from
official documents. The flour which the bakers are com-
pelled to have in reserve, and that deposited in the grenier
d'abondance, must always suffice for a consumption of
thirty-five days? Whet-e are besides commercial depots
which bring up the store of flour to the consumption of
forty-six days. Paris has generally a large quantity of
silt meat. The greatest difficulty would be as to
the fresh meat ; of this I shall speak by and by,
There is always in Paris a six months' etore of fuel,
wines, and spirit. These facts being known, wo have
inquired whether it would be possible to provision
Paris for ($0 days, supposing a population of 1,300,000
souls. This fact appears, in our opinion, to l o Trite
possible. Now no enemy mild ever heaiege. paris for RI
I,or s,ippo;ing " its army to consist of only
230,000 the invaders, and not the inhabitants
of Paris, would he starved, for to provision a besieg-
ing army of 250,000 men, several armies and immense
magazines would be necessary ; but the hypothesis of
a siege of p,n 44p nc:t: tQ coti.vitiilateii. We
have supposed a population of 1,300,000 inhabitants,
whereas the regular population within the walls
would not be more than 1,000,000. When we add,
1 300,000 for the inhabitants of the environs who
might seek refuge in Paris, and for the garrit;;;;;;; via
* eingt,e-yoria what wouldfie possible.
It has been said, that in order to fortify Paris there
must be five hundred fronts of fortifications, and that
these would cost, each 1,000,0001., labour and mate-
rials being dearer in Paris than elsewhere, tlefe it i
said, is at once an expenee of 5q9,q0p0 4 mf. "
itrsr place, w; moat e,bspeye the expenditure of
5t10,000,000f. would, in 181:x, have appeared a great