The Sun.
London, England, 1840-12-15 00:00:00

CHANCERY COURT-(THIS DAY).

IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAAI BAINES OF LE/MS.—CHURCH.
RATES.—JUDGMENT.
The Loan CHANCELLOR gave judgment to-day in this
important and interesting case, which was argued heore
the Court last week. His Lordship said, that when the
case was first mentioned to him, he suggested that the
question upon the significavit in the Ecclesiastical Court
had usually been made the subject of discussion before the
Chancellor upon an application to discharge or quash the
writ de contumace capiendo. The party, however, had
preferred, as be had an undoubted right to do, to rest his
case upon the return to the habeas corpus, and therefore
his Lordship's consideration must be directed not to what
bad actually taken place in the Ecclesiastical Court, of
which he knew nothing, except from the certificate which
the Court had sent to him, but to what was stated in the
significavit as having taken place. It was important to
keep in view toe great difference between the
Coast assuming the jurisdiction, which did not properly
belong to it, and improperly exercising that jurisdiction
with which it was legally invested. His Lordship's duty
was, upon this habeas, to protect the prisoner against the
former, if it should appear to have occurred, and another
and very different course would be to be pursued if neces-
sary, for the purpose of correcting the latter. The fi.at
objection to the significavit was that it did not show the
sum which the prisoner was ordered to pay was a Church-
rate. H.s Lordship thought that was sufficiently stated,
both with respect to the terms used, and to the form pre-
scribed by the Act. The significavit stated the command
to be " to pay 2/. 55., rated and assessed upom him, pur-
suant to a monition duly issued under the seal of the
Arches' Cilia, en a certain cause or businsss of
the abstraction of Church-rates," Of its being stated
with sufficient certainty, his Lordship had no doubt,
nor did it appear consistently with the form prescribed
in the schedule to the Act it could have been more
specifically stated. Connected with that object was an-
other, that the" amount of the rate appeared to be under
101 , and that the Ecclesiastical Court had, by the 531 of
George 111., been deprived of its jurisdiction in Church-
rates, unless the sum demanded exceeded that sum, or the
validity of the rate or the liability of the party was in dis-
pute. To raise that objection it must be assumed that the
jurisdiction was to be taken away; such the Judges of the
Queen's Bench stated to be their opinion in the case of
Ricketts v. Rodman, but that opinion did not regulate
their judgment in that case, for had it been different the
judgment would have been tho same. It was not his
Lordship's intention to raise any doubts upon that point ;
in that case, however, it was decided that a previous
proceeding before Magistrates was not necessary to
give the Ecclesiastical Court jurisdictien in cases
of Church-rates under 10/., if the validity or liability was
a question. It would seem, therefore, that it must be com-
petent to institute the suit, for without suits in such a case
there might be no means to show the validity or liability
was in dispute. It was also decided in such a case,
although the proceedings did not show the validity or lia-
bility was in question, the party sued was not entitled
to prohibition, and it seemed to have been the opinion of
the Judges that for that purpose, after a sentence in the
Arches' Court, unless a want of jurisdiction appeared upon
the proceedings, it would not be intended. His Lordship
could not, consistently with that doctrine, bold that the
significavit did not state a suit in which the Ecclesiastical
Court had jurisdiction. Another objection much relied
on was that the significavit stated the party prosecuted had
never appeared, and that, without appearance, the Court
was not authorised to proceed to judgment on the merits.
In considering that objection it must be assumed the Court
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if so, the ob-
jection, if well founded, would amount only to this, that
the Court had improperly exercised such a jurisdiction to
pronounce a legal judgment. There might be very many
grounds on which a judgment might be illegal ; and in
one sense, the Court, in pronouncing such judgment, ex-
ceeds its jurisdiction ; but that was not the sense
in which the expression was used when applied to such a
case as the present. The object of the jurisdiction his
Lordship was then exercising was to keep the Ecclesiasti-
cal Court within the jurisdiction the law had assigned, and
not to correct any error into which it might have fallen. If
that distinction were not carefully kept in view, every
Court and Judge having authority to issue an
habeas corpus, would become a Com t of appeal from
the Court by whose authority the party was
imprisoned. In Dr. Beck's case, Lord Hardwicke very
clearly made the distinction, saying it was not necessary
for the Ecclesiastical Court to show they had rightly pro-
ceeded. His Lordship did not say that the proceediegs
might not be so inconsistent with all principle as to jus-
tify him in treating it as a nullity ; but that could not be
said in the present case, in which the course of proceed-
ing had beets one which had been held as legal in other
Courts, and which was essential to the due administration
of justice, namely, proceeding to judgment in a cause in
which the defendant, in full knowledge of the suit and its
objects, did not choose to appear. His. Lordship observed
that during the argument he had been told, and with per.
feet accuracy, that lie could not judicially know any-
thing of the Ecclesiastical Court, and therefore
that he could not know what was meant by the term
" usual intimation" yet he had been referred to many
books of practice in the Ecclesiastical Court for the pur-
pose of proving that the Court was not justified in pro-
nouncing any decree in absence. If that; were so, it was
not within his province to correct it. It was then argued
that the term " usual" was so uncertain, as to make
the significavit bad on the authority of the decision
that the term " usual penance" had been held to be too
uncertain. No doubt it would be so if it were essential
for the Court to know what the intimation was, as it must,
in the case referred to, have been to know what
the penance inflicted was ; but as part of the nar-
rative of proceeding in a matter over which
the Court had jurisdiction, it was not material to know
what the intimation: was, inasmuch as it would not be
competent for him to exercise any judgment as to whether
it was the usual intimation or not. besides which, it was
stated the party was " duly cited," which expression was
as vague as the other, although it had not been made the
subject of observation. Another objection was, that the
significavit was in the name of Sir Herbert Jenncr, the
!an of Arches, and not in the name of the Archbishop
of Canterbury ; all doubt was removed from his mind by
the information he had received from the proper office
that the Dean of Arches had always signed the significavit
in his own name. One other objection remained which
might be disposed of in a few words. The Act of Eliza-
beth directed the writ should be brought into the Queen's
Bench, and, in the presence of the Judges, should be
"opened and delivered as of record," but the memorandum
only stated the writ was ‘• allowed, enrolled, and delivered
before cur Lady the Queen at Westminster, according to
the terms of the statute in such cases made and provided,"
omitting to state it had been opened. The memorandum
could not have been proved if there had been any founda-
tion for the fact assumed for the purpose of the
objection, but nothing had been stated to have
been done contrary to the Act, and therefore the rule
einniu presumuntur solemniter esse acfa applied to the ob-
jection. Fur these reasons his Lordship was of opinion
that none of the objections to the signficavit could be sup-
ported, and the prisoner must be remanded.