The Sun.
London, England, 1840-11-30 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30. 18'0.

had gained a great victory, and arrived at very reasonable decided. There are a great disagreement and agitation in the 1
propositions of arrangement. It is important, then, that I should Cabinet: some Ministers insist strongly that they should await the I
be well acquainted with your intentions upon this subject, for, on I news from Constantinople; those whose opinion is floating show
my language, however reserved it may be, may depend, either the I themselves inclined for this delay. There are still, therefore,
prompt adoption of an arrangement upon these foundations, or a 1 many chances that effective and definitive resolutions will not be
backsliding by which Lord Palmerston, profiting by the disappoint. I immediately arrived at." This is the phrase that M. Thicrs ale
ment and ill.hinnour of his colleagues and the other Plenipoten. 1 hided to a short time ago.
tiaries, might engage them suddenly in his system, and make them M. Thicrs—There arc others. •
adopt as a four.fold agreement his project of withdrawing Syria M. Guizot—Ycs, to the same purpose.
from the Pacha, and the employment, if necessary, of means of M. Thiers—No; more precize.
coercion. A great deal will be done in the Cabinet; and among M. Guizot— I take them as you will.
the Plenipotentiaries, in order only to act in a five-fold arrange- M. Thiers—You wrote me, I think on the 6th, 9th, and 14th
mcnt in concert with us, and without coercion. I
no not answer of July, always laying before me such facts as these t —The Eng-
for it that everything will be done, nor that a sudde fourfold cone liele Cabinet deliberates—there is great agitation—there is a crisis,
elusion is impossible.—(Strong sensation )We may be all at once but nothing is yet decided—two plans have been prepared; one
placed in this alternative; Egypt given hereditarily and Syria for five-fold which contains the maximum of the concessions to be
life to the Pacha, under the condition of the cession of the Holy made to France to attach her to it ; and one feuhold, on the r up.
Cities, of Candia, and Adana, by a fivefold arrangement; or, Syria position that France will not consent to the propositions to he
withdrawn from the Pacha by a fourfold arrangement, and by means made to her. All the letters which you have written Yo mg—all
of coercion if necessary." You see, Gentlemen, that without al- the official despatches which you have•addressed to me contained
lowing myself to give any counsel, I clearly pointed out the con- the supposition that, before signing the treaty, a previous proposi-
sequences of the rejection of this overture. 1 added, that it was lion would be made to Fiance, and I, counting upon this step being
t
necessary for this overture to have a chance of success to be ac- taken, waited to elicit in the Cabinet a definitive resolution. 1
cepted and vigorously carried out. The certainty of the adhesion will add that you produce here as a determining motive, having
of France was necessary. Withrtut that certainl the author of acted upon the English Cabinet, only the false interpretation irieen
, y
to the retreat of the Paella of Egypt. I will prove again, by quota.the overture could not make that serious and persevering cillirt
lions not merely front official despatches, but from private letters,
upon the British Cabinet which was indispensable to bring it to a
decision. The followin is the answer which I received from H. that the true motive in your opinion was the news of the insurrec-
g
tiers in Syria, and the discovery, not yet made, of an efficacious
Thiers, dated the 30th of June :—" When I spoke to you of a
great conquest which should change our attitude, I meant the here-
method, which was neither the sending of an English nor of a Rue-
sian ermy.
(Mary possession of Egypt and the hereditary possession of Syria.
M. de Lamar tine—What method ?
However, I have consulted the Cabinet upon the overture of which
M. Guizot—l have just read to the Chamber, without any emir..
you have spoken tome of late ; Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life.
sirens, the despatches, in which I insist equally on the two motives
They are deliberating, but with small leaning towards a'concession.
which brought on that conclusion—the attempt at direct arrange.
However, we shall see. Defer explaining yourself. We shall see what I"
/ ment, anti the insurrectien in Syria. I have just read the details
will happen; nothing is deelded."—(Various interruptions.)
Lord Palmerston received of the insurrection in Syria, the hopes he
remained, and it was my duty to remain, in the situation pre-
conceived of it, and the reasons which urged him to conclude an ar-
cribed to me. I did not abandon the chance which had opened
pursued both by the Ministers . rangement, lam about also to ley before the Chamber the motives
before me. It continued to be
of Austria and Prussia, and by some Members of the Cabinet, of indecision which still acted upon the English Cabinet ; the
chances I yet believed to exist of gaining thee, in order that nothing
but very feebly, and without any display of his energy or eager-
ness, which, in my firm conviction were
wirh to were indispensable to its sue. should be immediately and definitively settle& I have not the
ems ; when I say to its success,
slighteA intention to dissimilate ina word that I soy upon this sub-
ject. Itecal, if you please, what had occurred in the affair at this
tinctly. The lion. M. Thiers asked me yesterday if I believed, or
if I had believed, that it was ever pmsible to obtain from Lord epoch ; the Chamber knows perfectly well in the last days of the
negotiation something was concealed from France. I wrote it : I
Paltnerston the CClleeiSioll of Syria for life? As I stand here to
said so before another tribunal ; I said every Where that something
speak the truth, I shall say that I do not believe it.—(Prothund
sensation. I doubt that Lord Palmerston could heve been per-
was concealed from France. It turned out that I Was not exactly and
, completely informed of what passed in the interior of the Cabinet—l
assailed tn) the concession of all Syria, even for life, to the Peelle.
What I believe is, that if that course had teen entered upon, if the
men who had made the overture had been strongly engaged in it,
they woel4 trace obtained for the Pacha a slice of cyria better
than that of the treaty or the lath of Jigy.—(Renewed movement.)
My slicers conviction is that we rniAht have succeeded in forcing
a share of Syria more favourable to the Pacha than Mato( the lath
°fluty, and I shall tell you how. Englried has always regarded
in thiaqueetion of Syria the particular situation of Bagdad, at the
same time that she was strongly preoccupied with Constantinople, I could not give certainties when I had them not. I coul.l not
i knew it nearly, and I sent exact ly what I knew, neither more nor less.
speak with precision when it was not in my thoughts. Something
was concealed. Here I concealed that Slits was its my opinion ill
treatment? ,No; I spoke loudly-of it elsewhere. I believed like
M. Thicrs ; liked*, I hied a right tse believe that before a defini
live signature, when the project of an arrangement was to he li.-
lofted to four, it would have been communicated to France—that it
would have been delayed—anti that she would, for the last time,
i have had an opportunity to explain. Undoubtedly, I believed it.
and with the fear that the mated) of the Pacha into Asia Minor
should call the Russians to Constantinople. She was particularly N. Thiers—And you made me believe it.
afraid of the Pacha on account of Bagdad; and the conquests of M. Gtezot—lf I had net believed it, if M. Thiers had not - be.
tile Pacha in the East, in D:arbekir, toward; Mesopotamia, and on 1 hewed it, we shoulthnot have had to regret ill treatment. •
the borders of the Diphrates, disgoieted her much. There was A voice on the Lefl—Say an injury.
that divisien of Syria which g :re satistaetioa to England upon this M. Guizot—l will adeert by and by to the question of the nature
point, and which took away completely frorn the Pacha rhe course of that course. At present I only speak of the fart. Un-'
doubtedly I believed that the treaty would have been comment.
of the Euphrates. 1 f the Porte had recovered the Pachalics of I
vatted to us heforg it was signed, and this was a ground of very lee
Aleppo and Dernescus, or at least the •greater part of the Pachalic
r gitimate complaint, anti the reasons why I was the interpreter, the
of Damascus, it would hays remained mistress of the Euphrates,
'active organ of your comolaints. I think with you upon this point,.
'fine Pacha on this side had no communication. The Porte in that
direction corn:ramie:tett freely with its dominions of Arabia, but you have nothing to complain of against me. I could not tell
There was security for it, and security for England, and i' was then you what I did not know. I could oat express an opinion
possible to contemplate fir the Peelle the concession of the Paehelic to you contrary to my own and yours. Like you, I waited
till the last moment before the signature, exacting it to be corn-
erfripoli added to the Pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre and a portion of i
municated to us, and that the signature of it would beateleyed;
time Pactalic of Damascus. While thr affair was thus in suspense
1 believe that they did u.; wets: g. I believe that this is ilt- treat.'
the news arrived in London that the Pacha, learning the deposition
metal of which we have a right to complain; bu" you cannot be sur-
of Kliosrew Pacha, had sent Samy Bey to Constantinople, offered
I prised that I did not announce what I did not know and what I
the restoration of the fleet, and attempted a direct arrangement
with the Porte. This fact was announced to me by M. Tigers in did not suppose. With the evil course to which I have adverted,
the Treaty was signed, and it was communicated to me on the 17th.
the terms which I will communicate. M. Thicrs wrote me on the
30th of June, " I have just received from Egypt the accompanying A Atomiser on the Left—You are mistaken.
dispatch, of which I send you a copy (it is the despatch which ass. ' M. Guizot—l am rnistakeu in strictness ;it was not the Treaty,
' but the fact of the -arrangement width was communicated to me.
noundeJ the demand of the Peelle). It is of importance not to 1. t
;
it he known in London, in order that the English may not ',event I The Treaty was not communicated to me for six weeks or two
after the ratification.
a direct arrangement.—(lronical laughter on the extreme left.) The months after, a
news will speedily be known, but not for eight days. In the inter- A Member—Say, after the execution. -
vat the English will be able to de nothing, and we are sure that they N. Guizot— I wish to open a portfolio which is in ray place, and
will be too late if they wieh to write to Constantinople. You will which contains' an account of the conversation I had with Lord
make use, however, of this news to prevent a resolution, if there Palmerston, u lien he communicated to me the fact the 'Fr 'sty.
is any wish to take one, relative to the plan on which you have I wish to pace before the eyes of the Chamber, with What view
consulted me of late—Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life." and in what language I expressed the opinions
.of the King's Go-
' Abotrt the same time when the arrival of the news of the Paella's vernment at this difficult moment.—(Au usher carried the port-
attempt at a direct arrangement, arrived the news of the itteureece folio to the Minister.)
lion in Syria. I have nothing to add to what has been said on the
subject of this insurrection by M. Thiers. I hove more than once
complained strongly to the English Cabinet of the efforts which I
believe it was making underhand to excite this insurrection. The
following is the despatch in which I gave an account of the effect
which these two pieces of intelligence produced in London. I beg
the Chamber to listen attentively to this despatch--(llear, hear)
—'S Since the proposition of dividing Syr:a in two, in giving to
Mehemet Ali the fortress and a part of the Pachalic of St. Jean
d' Acre, has been set aside, Lord Palmerston has appeared to shun
conversation on the affairs of the East. I have engaged him in it
once or twice, rather to establish the policy of the King than to
attempt to make by discussion one advance in the question. Lord
Palmerston answered me like a maze who persists in his ideas, but
who does not think the moment propitious for action, and wishes
to gaits time. When we wished to gain time Lord Palmerston was
pressing. When Lord Palmerston wished to gain time I think
that our interest was to be pressing. We never were so at any
period. "

". The 17th July, half past eleven at night.

.. _
" Lord Palmerston wrote to me, at one o'clock, that he wished 1 '
to speak to me before the end of the morning, I went to the Po.
reign Office. He told me that the Cabinet, pressed by events, had
just alopted aresolution'touching the affairs of. the East ; that he
had a communication to make to me on the subject, and in order
to make sure that ho expressed exactly and completely his thoughts,
he bad put them in writing. He then read me the paper -of:
which I here insert a copy. (It was the memorandum of the
17th July,. which has been publiShed, and which it is none. •
cessary to read.) I listened to Lord Palmerston without •
interruption, and at length taking the pap^r from his hands,' My
Lord (said I), on the foundation of the resolution you have brought ,
to my knowledge, I shall add nothing to what I have often had the'
honour of sa3inz,,. I do not wish un the first reading, to discuss all
the paper I have just heard contains; but some Points strike
me on which I hasten to express my sentiments. They arc these.'
I objected particularly to this passage :—' Notwithstanding latterly
the Four Cturts have proposod to France ally herselwith them to
effect an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali,
founded upon ideas which were uttered towards the. close of the
last 3,,..5r by the French Ambassador in London ; nevertheless the
French Government did not believe she could tale part in such
ar re. yv h had
f,
ant ge mh
iecnt .' . No
rs basis i
tdoubt you
theher abd
e allude,ano nmm my Lord,
to h
ttoep
thea
cia of
arrange_,
m
the Pachalic of St. Jean d'A-re, comprehending the fortress,
and it will result from this ;,aragraph that the French Go.
vcrnment after making this proposition, did not believe it
could be accepted. I cannot admit, on the part of the Govern-
ment of the K ng, such a reproach of inconsistency. The ideas re.
(erred to were never officially uttered by the Ambassador of France
in London on the part of the Government of the King—neither
by ITIC, nor my in edecenr. ,r. They might have becn broachc4 in
conversation like ninny other hypotheses : they were never pre-
sented under a form nor in a character which authorised the :Is-
' section or the belief that the Government of the King first put
them forward, and afterwards repudiated them.' The following is
my second observation. 'You say that the French Government has
many times declared that it has nothing to object to the arrange.

M. Thiers—You should have said so.
M. Guixot—The Honourable M. Thiers, " You should have said
so." I think that I slid say so.
M. Thiers—Since you acknowledge my interruption, I hes to
make an observation. I shall prove by documents, since lam
forced to justify myself before the Ambassador who read my orders,
and ought to have given me his advices. I shall prove, I say, by
documents, that you said to me on the very 14th of July that we
still had time, and that nothing was precipitated.
M. Guizot—l shall say so myself presently.—(A voice from the
Left--" Why not now ?") I cannot accept the words of M. Thiers.
He has not to justify himself hese before me. I ail here as a
Deputy, obliged to give my opinion, and to give the Chamber in-
formation as to the part I have acted its the great affair in question.
None of us arejustifying ourselves; we are all explaining ourselves
before the Chamber and before the country.—(Approbation.) The
matter does not concern me. I was under the orders of the Ho.
nourable M. Thiers. I have received his Instructions—l have
executed them. I have given him all the information which I
could possibly collect.
M. Thiers—Never your opinion. .
M. Guizot—The Hon. M. Thiers says I have never given him
any opinion. Ido not understand his objection. Ihave just read
to the Chamber a despatch, in which I said, "If this overture is
not accepted, such and such things will happen. It is probable
that there will be a fourfold arrangement which will perhaps be
suddenly concluded."—(Movement.) If I am not deceived, this
was an opinion as much as it was consistent with propriety for me
to give.—(From the Centre, " Very well.") If I had been more
explicit, I might, I think, have failed in propriety, and invoiced
my personal responsibility more than I ought. I should have
tailed in prudence as well as in propriety, if I had done more.—
(Expressions of assent.) I resume the reading of the despatch
which I had the honour to communicate to the Chamber :—" Lord
Palmerston has not, indeed, for several weeks, as I have already
told your Excellency, either discussed in the Cabinet the affairs of
the East, nor even communicated to his colleagues the last note of
Chekib-Effendi. Nevertheless, the efforts of several Members of the
Cabinet and corps diplomatique in favour of an arrangement which
should have for its basis the hereditary concession of Egypt, and
the life concession of Syria to the Pacha, were still continued.
I followed their progress without mixing itself up with
them, conformably to the instructions of your Excellency. I
never received this idea, nor discouraged, by any absolute declara.
tion on my part, those who sought the success of it. It was in this
state of the affair, and of men's minds, that the news arrived here of
the dismissal of Kosrew Pacha, and the direct steps taken by Mehe-
met Ali at the Court of the Sultan. This news did not surprise me.
Your Excellency had communicated to me a despatch from M.
Cochelet, of 26th May, announcing this intention on the part of
the Pacha. I kept this despatch entirely secret , but I since learned
that a letter of M. le Comte d'Appony, dated 16th June, if I am
rightly informed had announced to the Baron de Nicumann the
prediction of H Cochelet. The despatch by which the last men.
tioned gentleman informed your Excellency of the step taken by
Mehemet Ali was also dated on the 16th of June, so that by a sin-
g,ilai coincidence, the same day that M. Cochelet wrote from Alex-
andria, as a fact which had taken place that which the Ambassador
of Austria wrote of from Paris as a fact probable and near
at hand. When certain intelligence of the fact arrived at Lon.
don Lord Palmerston and the three other Plenipotentiaries
were scarcely more surprised at it than I was myself. They
saw in it, or at least they thought they had no right to see any
more in it, than an act long cemented between the Pacha and
France, which at Constantinople, as well as at Alexandria, had la-
boured to prepare it. The effect of the act experienced from it a
remarkable alteration. Not only did it lose some of the importance
which its spontaneity and its novelty ought to have assured it, but
the dispositions of Lord Palmerston and the three other Plenipo-
tentiaries were •isibly modified by it. They considered the step
taken by Mehemet Ali and its success as the ruin of the note of
.he 07th of July, 1839, and of the joint action of the Five Powers.
and also as the complete and personal triumph of France at Alex-
andria and at Constantinople. From that time those who prose-
cuted with the hope of obtaining the joint action of the Five
Powers, the arrangement that was based on the hereditary conces-
sion of Egypt and the life c ncession of Syria, stopped in their
endeavours without altogether renouncing them. On his part
Lord Palmerston suddenly showed himself disposed for action,
and in two successive Councils, held on the 4th and Bth
of this month, presented to the Cabinet with a most perse-
vering ardour his ideas and his plan of proceeding in case of a
four-fold arrangement by the Powers. Nothing was resolved
upon, the Cabinet was divided. The adversaries of the plan of
Lord Palmerston insisted on the necessity of waiting for news from
Constantinople, and the question was adjourned until a new Coun
/
cit. But Lord Palmerston is pressing. The Powers, says he, are
engaged in honour to regulate the affairs of the East by their inter-
vention in the manlier most favourable to the Porte. They pro-
mised to the Sultan and to each other to do so. The step taker. by
Mehemet Ali cannot turn them from it. It is an act which at
bottom signifies very little, which does not promise on the part of
the Pacha any important concessions, which will not change either
the situation or the policy of the Porte, which will not, therefore,
`lead to the pacificatim which is hoped from it, and will have no
other effect than to fetter, if care be not taken, negotiations be-
tween the Powers, and to hinder them from ,proceeding them-
selves to the object which they proposed. Nevertheless the oppar.
tunity of acting is favourable ; the insurrection in Syria is se-
rious, Lord Palmerston avails himself much of the information
that the insurgents are numerous and vigorous, and that
the administration of Ibrahim is violent, vexatious,
and detested, in order to finish the affair promptly."
There are some details a hich I will suppress containing, in-
form ation received by Lord:Palmerston from Syria in private letters.
" Every time that an opportunity presents itself, whenever I can
enter into conversation with any men ofintluence on the question,
I warmly combat these ideas. I repeat all the arguments that I
' have advanced f.r four months, but with which I will not again
fatigue your Excellency. II am surprised at the interpretation
which is attempted to be given to the step just taken by Mehemet
Ali. What was more natural, more easy to foresee, and more in-
evitable than that step ? For nearly a year the Powers have been
treine to regulate the affairs of the East, but without success. The
Paella on his side had declared thai the presence of Khosrew in
P,wer he considered the principal obstacle to his own confiding and
decisive re'..urn to his al,eeiance Khosrew wes set aside. Was
I
i there c any occasion to suppose .a
long preparation or any diplo-
, out to him to do.
I ;,","':,i Y. to explain what the Pacha had done ? lie did what
i advice at AtexandriaF,rbanutceadviticeis
'1 _ •a he would do, and what the plainest good sense pointed
oft moderation
ohraastiigniven,
and anodoosotoislsligooiv—es
1 advice which has no other object than to re-establish peace
II in the East, and in, t;hde beso:n of the Ottoman empire a
good understanding a,
strength as well as of
pmuctetion,
It
sole securities of
Iwould be . very,
sinent of
strange
to see the Powers oppose themselves tothe re-estatiliss
peace, not wish her return unless. she is
brought
own bends, and throw themselves a second tiine i,
et
„. becn a c k
the
suet.
their
Irain, and his vassal, to separate them at the moment when they were
coming together. It is a year since :his intervention -rts imagined.
1 It might have beets feared that the Porte, worn out and cast
cast down
would have delivered I • ,
by its recent defeat,
i
I foot to the
Pacha, and accepted conditions dangerous to her future
what took place a e
repose; but now, after
t when the Pacha ar-
ago' when the Porte
i has again found suppor , . a himself with an eager
•tiative cf reconciliation,what
1 moderation takes the int motive, what
to oppose it, to retard it Dar a single day
pretext can be alleged i th • ?
makes an impression o i those to whom I
language generally .
This cannot hold it as loudly as I could wish, for
address myself, but I
affording Ile an opportunity. The ef...
people endeavour to avoid _ . .
staW of CMS; nothing, I repeat,
fair is thus at this momcnt in a

mentF which the Four Powers desire should be accepted by Me.

hernet Ali, if ,Mehemet Ali consents to them, and that in no case
will France oppose the measures which the Four Powers, in concert
with the Sultan, may judge necessary to obtain the adhesion of the
Pacha of Egypt. I cannot, my Lord, - accept this expression `in
no case,' and. I am. certain that. I neier said any, thing to nu.
tho. ise it. The Government of the King assuredly does not make
me the armed champion of any one, and will never compromise,
for the single interest of the Pacha of Egypt, the peace and the
interests of France; but if the measures adopted against the
Paella by the Four. Powers had, in the eyes of his Majesty's Go-
vernment, that character or that consequence that the actual
balance of the European States should be altered by them, it
could not consent to them. It would see then what was fitting to
do, and it will always preserve in this 'respect its full liberty.'—
(Very well.) I made further comments upon some expressions in
the Memorandum, several remarks of little importance; and with-
out entering deeply into the discussion, I added, ' My Lord, the
King's Government has always thought that the question whether
two or three I'achalics of Syria should appertain to the Sultan o:
to the Pacha was by no means worth the risk which the employ-
ment of force and the return of war in the East might produce
both to the East and to Europe. You have judged differently.
If you are mistaken we shall not partake of the responsi-
bility ; we shall use all our endeavours to maintain peace
and our general alliances, and to overcome for the benefit of
all the difficulties, the dangers, perhaps, which may be pro-
duced by the new situation into which you will enter.' " In an-
swer to this memorandum, I received from , the Honourable Presi-
dent of the Council the French counter memorandum of the 24th of
July, with orders to give a perusal of it to Lord Palmerston, and to
leave a copy with him. The Chamber knows it, and I shall ,only
read from it one passage which interests me as characterising the
opinion which the President of the Council had, and doubtless still
has, of the proceeding of which we justly complain. After having
repeated the language which the French Government had held,
either directly or through me (NI. Guizot) as its organ, and as to
what he thought on the general principle of the affair, he said,
" The opinion that France had held on this subject she still ad-
tiered to, and she had some reason to believe that that opinion was
not exclusively her own. She had had addressed to her in the lat-
ter state of things no positive proposition on which she was
called upon to explain herself. It is not proper, then, to impute
to her a refusal whi:lt she was not in a comlition to make as
to the determination which England communicated to her in the
name of the Four Powers. But, moreover, without insisting upon
the question that might arise as to this manner of proceeding to-
wards her, France declared herself anew, that she considered it as
unreflecting and imprudent to take a line of proceeding which con.
sisted in adopting resolutions without the means of executing them,
or to execute them by insufficient and dangerous means." If Ido
not deceive myself, we have a right to infer from this language that
the President of the Council thought as I did, that there was in the
last act of the conduct of the Four Powers towards France an un-
handsome procedure, a procedure of which France had a right to
complain, and to feel wounded ; but that he had riot seen in it,
any more than myself, an insult, an affront, one of those grave out-
rages which have between people and states, as between individuals,
essentially different results than complaint, coolness, or isolation.
I do not wish, I rtneat, to draw from this psssage any other
Consequence, but that which I have stated 1 believe myself
justified in drawing. The treaty signed, the dissatisfaction mani-
fested by France was, I have no hesitation in affirming it, as great
as the President of tlfe Council could desire; I have approved of it
and I have seconded it as far as it became me to do so—in the
attitude, the preparations, and the armaments which have been
adopted by the Government of the King. I thought as I yet think
that in the state of coolness and isolation in which France had been
placed, and with the chances before her as to the result to which the
proceedings adopted in the Eass might lead, that it was indispensable
that France should be placed in the most complete and perfect
state of an armed peace. I use designedly the word peace, for I
have not thought, nor do I at present think, that in what has passed
in this epoch, there has been any just, legitimate, or a sufficient
motive ; I do not say to break immediately peace, but to prepare
ourselves to break it on a future day.—(Numerous marks of assent,
laughter, and murmurs on the Left.) I consider that in remaining in
this attitude of coolness, isolation, and armed peace, France would be,
to a certain extent, sufficiently prepared to meet the chances of the
events that might arise; but if, on the contrary, she went before
those events by the attitude she took by her armaments and by the
display of her forces, she might lead them on.—(Murmurs on the
L .ft.) lam convinced that the Powers that signed the Treaty of
the 15th of July had not in that Treaty any hostile intention, or
any menacing after-thought Corriere pcnscc) towards France and
her Government.—(Renewed exclamations.) I am satisfied that
there has been between the Allied Powers and France upon the
question of the East, with respect to the relations existing between
the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, and as to the best manner of
regulating them, a difference which I deplore; nothing more.—
(Laughter from the Left.) I find merely that others think differ-
ently from myself; but if my opinion has any value, and only from
the position in which I am placed, the Chamber has some interest
in knowing it.—(Very wall, very well ) Whenever there happens
to occur in France a movement a little lively, a little beyond ordi.
nary, Europe sees init a revolution ; whenever the Powers unite
together and agree together for some determined object, France sees
. pa it a coalition. This is very plain, very natural, on one side as
well as the other, and no one has a right to complain, but men of
sense—men who are called upon to influence the affairs of their
country, ought to judge these facts coolly as well as other matters.
—(Marks ofas,ent.) Yes, the treaty of the 15th of July has
placed France in a difficult situation ; the treaty of the 15th of July
has placed France upon an important question in a state of isola-
tion in Europe, and of coolness towards her best and her surest ally.
—(murmurs on the left.) such is the fact in its truth and its ex.
tent ; such is the fact for which it is necessary to make provision,
and for which it is necessary to take a certain attitude, and to adopt
certain preparations. But if you adopt an attitude, if you make
preparations which correspond with it, not with regard to this state
of things, but to other circumstances ; to circumstances much more
grave, much more menacing, much more pressing—then, gentle-
men, you place France yourselves in the perilous situation in which
you state that she is ; you are yourselves the authors of the danger ;
you prepare yourselves the coalition of which you speak.—(Loud
applause from the ranks of the majority.)
. .

M. Arago—That is not true.
M Guizot—lt is necessary that I should state to you what I have
seen; it is necessary I should repeat to you what I have heard.
I spoke to you just 110 w of those very false and exaggerated
terrors which seize Europe when France is agitated; I have
mu thew, I have heard theta. What could I hive said, Oen.

themen, if, instead of a peaceful armament; if, instead of adopting l should not be partitioned, and that it should remain eltire in
a firm attitude; if, instead of this, we had seen a warlike an,. i the hands of the Paella]. There was only (continued the lion.
ment, if we had seen levied in France 630,000 regular to,eps, 1 Member) one mall In this Assembly who maintained that France
and 300,000 National Guards, what answer could I have made to • cou'et have no interest in Egypt and Syria; he alone maintained it,
men who woutd have said to me, "It is revolution—it is a revolti- I anal it was necessary to have his immense talent and great repute.
tionary menace, it is a return to the time of the empire end the re-1 lion for any one to take upon Aiimself to make such an assertion.
public ?—(Murmurs on the Left.) Whitcou 11111111
ld I have said ? That ' The Chamber was lITIGUS . this point ; there was unanimity
those who believe that it is essential to the security, and to the he. I from the press of the Left, whose support the Cabinet of the Ist
nour of France, to avenge, or, as it has been expressed, to wash March did not disavow. I a.n neither embarrassed with, ner
out in some great enterprise, in soots great adventure, what they i ashamed of, the sepport of the Left.—(Ali, ah, from the Centre.)
call the weakness—and I believe that word has also been uttered I 1 lie Left supported me ; the press, which was in its interest, sup-
-the dishonour of the last few years ; that those who enter- Ported me; it supported me in writing, and I bete the imputation
of its support, and accepted it, upon the points on which we
taut this opinion should wish for an armament of 9001100, I can
comprehend this is consistent with reason ; but that those who do I agreed, namely, sYmnalhY for my cottony, for our revolu-
not believe this—that those wko believe that France has nothing to tion ; for I am a revolutionist, an honest revolutionist.—(Ex.
arrange—that she has nothing to demand reparation for, but hat clamation.) None but an ill-educated parvenu is ashamed
what she has to do is to develteee her institutions, .t SCcurAler lof his 'Nigh); I am not ashamed of mine.—(Approbation.)
government, to increase her prOarieraty and jittery:at 's-tr"-.cltila;fii„,l I The Chamber, the press, and the country, have felt . that
to give an example to Europe n,n goodlievenemeeeneenee,f4eat 1 we were greatly interested in preventing the separation of Egypt
prosperity—those who thus thitilartannonisenve. teset4e.:ere,
..., et . and Syria. It was a sentiment felt by all, and on which there was
of 900,000 is necessary to give ttfraneene.e- a, tfide„f::,:vittia. no doubt felt by any one.—(Yes, yes.) Thir opinion I maintained.
meat of peace. Those who cntotain.thle opincoWwith mAsh
The Cal,inet of the 12th of May had three times demanded, in the
face of all the world, the hereditary government of Egypt and
to be matted to answer when' ter ereespokers to as thhe
aggressive spirit of France. 0
_l've, trance his done ring 1 Syria for the Neha. Three times it had been refused. I was,
I but what she was called ul nto die Tor _liar own sec ty. I therefore, pledged; nevertheless, on entering office, I did not adopt
France has only provided for, he chainees that may arise cut I any irrevocable plan. You know the policy I adopted.—(M. Thiess
of the solution which you have*lopten for the Eastern quesPon, I here alluded to the instructions which he gave to his Ambassador,
A
as she did not wish to be teen-A unprepared. When Freince IM. Guizot, on his accession to office on the Ist of March. Exa-
is united to England 300,00Ve sufficient for her as a ieace 1 mining the conduct of N. Guizot, he complained that he had not
establishment, but when she stands alene it is necessary;that I furnished him with ample particulars—that he had not kept him
she should have 400,000 or 5000 men for her attitude off an i au courant of events—that he had not made him sufficiently ac.
armament of pence. I have, then, gentlemen,
so fir adhere:4 Iqu tinted with men and things.) N. Guizot, added AL TOiers,
without limiting the expression ttetlic attitude, and to the arena_ observed yesterday, that, as an Ambassador, he had no opinion to
ment combined within the limits-which I'have itelicated..' But.
express. I think he is mistaken, and there are several examples in
when I believed I saw another itetpuls& sot of the Government it-
support of my view. Under the Cabinet of the Path of May, el. de
self, but from without, tending to tarry my country' and its Go- Saint Atilaire, the Fiend] Ambassador, wrote to his Government:
v eminent along with it; When hasp thatein ifentitation in which, " Tile policy which has been a,lopted is false and dangerous, and
in my opinion, the maintenance of peace %ant 'etisentialen that ~people will turn everybody against you." N. de Iteyneval, the French
were rushing to war, to inevitable war, I stopped short. My ad- Ambassador in Spain, also gave his opinion openly upon the effects
hesion to and my acting with the Cabinet was thus stopped, arid a produced by the policy of the Cabinet. He wrote that Spain would
man, whom 111. .Thiers named yesterday from this tribunal, and be sooner or later lost to Fiance, if the line of conduct which had
who is my friend, as he is his (I mean AL le Dec de Broglie) was been followed were te 'be persisted in. Gentle:Fen, I think these
made acquainted with the state of my nend, and whet I representatives acted properly. This Is the way in Which I under-
thought of the situation and of tile dangers which roe- stand the duty of an Ambassador. Ile is on the spot, he sees what
naced us. lie was made acquainted with it, and if I *en, is passing, he is acquainted with the actors in the scenes which he
not mistaken nfor I requested him, and authorised him so witnesses, and must be better able to judge of effects than the Ti-
to do), he informed the President of the Council and some of his Meer who issues orders at a distance. Ile is able, Gentle-
colleegues on the ~,,hjeet. • e-sOislied at the end of the month of Men, to judge and to form an opinion, and he is _bound to
September, andiat the ceinmencernent of October, that the Cabinet state that opinion frankly, and to blame or approve of the con-
should know that I felt uncesy as to the direction in which I be- duct of his Government. This was not what was done towards
never' myself drawii.a—(Niiisen I wrote this letter that this might me. It is possible that 1 may have been mistaken in my views,
be knewn.—(_Marl.;, of approbation, ant cries of " Read, wail.") but, if I was mistaken, it is. because I was not sufficiently in-
" I ;:m rendered uneasy, very uneasy, more by what is occuring at hound of what war p ,ssing. If, continued M. Thiess, M. Guizot
home. than by whit is going on abroad."—N:3vement, and cries of had written to me, " Make haste, time press, s ; if you do not
"The date, the date.") 'There are twd letters, the first dated the make haste you are lost," I should not have temporised a; I did :
23d aeptember, the other the 13th of October. "We are evi- but I felt persuaded, from what the Ambassador wrote to me, that
dently returning to 1831eand to a state of things when the revo:it_ a preposition would be made, and that it would be left to me to
tionary spirit takes advantage of the national enthusiasm,—(Cries accept or refuse the li te.governm ent of Syria for the Pane offgypt.
from the Centre of " Bravo," " Very good, very good,")--ond urg_ M. Guizot wrote to me, during the hew days which immediately
in; it to war." I beg the Chamber to permit me to pause a nto- proceeded the Treaty' of Jun* 13, that nothing pressed, that we had
ment on these two words, " the revolutionary spirit and the national time. What was Ito doe for I believed him ?—(At this pat of the
enthusiasm."- I respect, I honour the national enthusiasm ever, speech M. Thiere real letters from N. Gu.zot of the tith, Bth, 10th,
when it goes astray, But thin is no( a reaciii for giving ourselves and II th July, in which the Ambassador announces that the Cabinet
blindly up to rational enthusiasm. Alter great political shocks there had still time; and having read these letters, M. Thiers added)
reisiainnin so.cielysennethingrehichis not at all national enthusiasm, . But M. Guizet, tree myself, was deceived. The Powers had rc-
' which hes nothing in common with it, something which Ido net .1 solved on keeping the intention of enteting into this Tree's, a
hourcor, which Ido not love, which I dread deeply—a revolutionary secret from the French (lovernment. Let us, however, lay aside
spirit.—(Appleuse.) 'What has happenel not only to-day, but at these wretched personal discussions, and return to lac's. It was,
I before said, the determination of the Powers to conceal the Treaty
so mane other. periods, and which occasions the difficulty ofnur
situation, is that contact of the revolutionary spirit with the Da; 'trent France. But why was this Treaty concluded ? It is im-
portant that the country should know. It was founded on two
them' entliudasm. It , is,the revolutionary spirit that has free
considerations—the insurrection in Syria, and the conviction that
quently endeavoured to- lay hold, to overrule, and to turn to its
France would not act agairSt the Allies. Yes, Gentlemen, those
owu purposes the sincere • and generous ustional enthusiasm. Front
the motives which led to the Treaty. But forthe itisurree-
(Freslt marks of approbation.) This is the great danger against
trait iti Syria it never would have taken place, because, without
which. we' have several times had to defend ourselves, and of the
revival of which I entertained a' sincere and firm conviction I that it would have been nezessary to summon the Russians to
saConstantinople, and to this England never would have con-
with the reading the letter—" The revolutionary spirit turnw the symptoms. I halm no; explained, end wiil proceed •
seated. The Treaty was signed because foreign Powers ha m
, to
a notion of the weakness of France—because it was affrays
without own purposee the national enthusiasm, and draws on a war
thought that France would not act with vigour on this cc-
witliout legitimate motives, aid it Mink reasonable chances or
casion, and would leave the Four Powers to arrange affairs
success, with the sole abject and sole hope of revolution. I say
according to their own pleasure. This appears even from a letter
without legitimate motives; :the question of Syria is not a logiti.
mate case of war. I consider this to be evident.
from M. Guizot, written on the 23d of July, after the signature
did not make war to free Poland from IltissiaFranc—(Move-
e
of the treaty. These were the true motives which actuated the
meat on the Left)—or Italy from Austria, and she .
Four Powers. Yes, Gentlemen, the true cause is the weakness of
_
cannot reasonably go to war, in order that Syi is may be the policy of the last ten years. I will speak the truth. De you
in the hands or the Pacha instead of those of the Sultan.—("That know what your enemies say ? " You are weak at home—you can.
is very true.," from several voices.) The policy hitherto expressed not go to war—you are torn by factions." You give your mimic;
reason to say so ; you adopt their opinion, and you say, we are not
and suaportea by France with respect to the East does not promote
it. We nave loudly and constantly said that the dist ributionof ter-
strong enough to go to war.--(Cries of " Oh, oh !" from the
`•
ritories between the Sultan and thee Paella Was of little importance Yes, yes," from the Left.") I have always be-
to us ; that if the Pectin wished to give up Syria we should not Centre, and of
lieved that it was necessary to display great vigour, that we should
assume an imposing attitude towards Foreign Fowers. This is why
object to it ; . that the foreseeing his refusal, his resis'ance and the
I proposed the armaments, and the conduct of the Allies has fully
danger which would result from them to the Ottoman empire and
proved they were perfectly justifiable. You have secti them day alter
the peace of Europe, (vas the sole motive' of our opposition to the
Means of coercion, . Iu nI
day proceeding in their course with increased brutality*. I wished to
ncingeetar to: preserve Syria to the Pacha,
we should
check them by placing France in an imposing attitude. I wished
have been- in , open -contradiction to ourselves ; one
of those :enntradiettione...whicho by being exposed, weakens to arm in order to obtain a modification of the treaty; 1 resolved
the pasty seekimgethep. No ,other iptestion has hitherto been on obtaining it, and I should have oleained it; and if I had not
I declare now that I would have gone to war, for the honour and
raised with regard to princiPle by thenConventiMi of the 15th
interest of my country commanded it. When I saw that the treaty
July—in tatetsetiy, itrioexecution. No great interest of Francehas
was being betas:ly executed, I wrote as fo:lows to N. Guizot :
been attacked., neither her independence, ior her •Government, nor
her instittitienkPntii` her Waits, nor her free activity, nor her nWe arc arming, constantly arming; and when Franc. shall lee
wealth,- Wltateif attenapted in the East may -lead to other things ready, if an arrangement does not take place, we shall have war.—
(Great sensation ) Ido not hesitate in adopting an extreme course
than what, are Ineaot. Questions teat,' arise then events may
when I see that the honour of my country is about to be coin-
eprieg up ton whieloFraticecannot remain a stranger.- Thi. is it '
reener....for arming and. being in readiness. It is not a reason for promised "—(Great approbation.) Yes, Gentlemen, I would
our rasing' On 'in
.the West events and questions still more grave, have demanded the modification of the treaty. I would have
Rod which ovpoltli nit rise natorall
Y. Small account has been held . demanded it when France was ready for action; and if it had
of the friendship of France. She is hurt, and very justly so. cum, been then refused, although, as a statesman, I know perfectly well ,
is a reason fir 1 tirLIAWA. i separation' for a perfectly independent and how terrible the word war is for a country, I would have
aputelY Iletni?rq!OtFl)os, 1,4 is not a case for sear. The offence is cried, " War, war!" and I should have found an echo in France.
not one of those which command and justify war. They wished —("Bravo, bravo," from the Lett, and great agitation in the
neither to insult, nor-ten defy eChamber.) Let me be kept from power, let me banished for ever,
eor to deceive France. TlieO de.
but let it not be said that, as a French Minister, I would have
mended ghee concurrence; she refused it on the terms proposed,
ever permitted language insulting to the honour of France. Yes,
They proceeded Icy themselves with little courtesy. This was a
d say to
mauvais precede, but not. an affront. For these ten years wo,have
Gen
us, " tle:nen, whenever Europe, the whole of
You do not choose such or such a thing, we wil Europe,l
doshoul it without
been saying it is to the honour of our Government that
you, and in spite of you," I would cry " War." Let us be what
iininediately titter a resolution we were able to maintain
our rights without anywhere appealing to the 'cessions , our fathers were, and let us never descend from the rank to which
that we created our Government by resistance, and yet ma_ they raised us.
The applause from. the partisans of M. Tillers at the close of his
lured it by order and peace. Shall we cease to hold this tau- '
speech was veryanti vehement. A tong agitation succeeded
gunge ? Shall we change our conduct ? That is not possible. 1 loud
in the Chamber, and the Sitting was suspended for a quarter of an
see from a distance the movement, and can do nothing to reslA it.
lam determined not to mire myself up in it. I wrote to you three I..ur•
At a quarter past four the Sitting was resumed, when the Presi.
weeks ago. I cannot j.alge of the state oh' feelii.g in Frat.ce, nor
appreciate what it prescribes or permits to the Gore nment. It dent announced that M. Villemain, Minister of 'Public Instruction,
would next address the Chamber.
may be that war, which does , not appear to inc demanded by the
state of things, may be rendered inevitable by the state of public N. Villemain, Minister of Public Instruction, spoke as
opinion and sentiment. If that were the case I should no longer follows :—ln addresnng the Chamber upon the occasion of
so solemn a debate, I avail myself of the Woo emitted by N.
connect myself with a policy which I should consider full of errors
. „
and dangerin "I should keel, myself aloof from it. I have coetis Thiers, when he said that this debate should not be lowered
deneein the,Charnbers.. I hare always seen, in very critical mo. . to a mere question of persons, but should rise to the height
of the public interest. Persoaalities ! Who is there here
mentOthe sentiment of danger, of dutv, andof responsibility, take
that wishes to indulge !n them ? For my own part I attach too
possession 'of the Chamber, arid give them* an intelligence, a courage,
much importance to the duty of preserving for each man of ability
and an energy, which in trangoi,ltimes
,would have failed them, as
and Courage all the estimation that is due to him. For all that,
they do the rest of the world. This is 'ailiathappenened in 1831.
We have often said, to, ourselves, without. the Chambers,"l • wi .1. •
however, I tio not intend to avoid combating M. Thiers. I will
out their piesence, without, their co-operation, without that le- notindulge in any personelities against him,but I will endeavour
gel explosion ; that organised Strife of the public passions and rea. to draw him out of an error which may become dangerous to the
son, the GoOerninent never count . have resisted this warlike and country; I will put him in presence of himself, and I will remind
revolutionary tendency, then so strong and so natural. The emu- 'him of his antecedent actions. The Honourable AL Passy has
try never could have found within Itself so much wisdom and worthily justified the Cabinet of the 12th May ; his noble and cou-
energy to maintain its ,goverriment. Are we on the eve of a se.. rageous language has raised the Ministry from the unjust accusations
cond ' trial ? May we hope a second success ?—(Many voices, that were heaped upon it. It is now made a reproach to us, that
" Yes, yes.")
.I do not know emy anxiety is greet, but my con- we are come here to do a thing before which others would have
Silence is the same.—(sensation.) lt ;
4,4 the Chambers alone hesitated and.given way; we are4however, under the influence of
by their support—by the Complete and sincere discussion which events already accomplished; and M. Thiers said so himself at a
takes place in their bosono—that the country can be enlightened tune, when he had not, in a fit of gaffe de cccur, marred the tor-
and danger averted.—(" Very well," " Bravo," prolonged marks of tune of France—(Explosion of murmurs from the Left; Yes, yes,
assent. The Minister, in descending from the tribune, was sue- from the Centre, Order, order )
rounded by a great number of Deputies, we h
e made him their con. M. Thiers rose, and endeavoured to reply to the Minister of
gratulations.) Public Instruction, but could not obtain a hearing, mid sat down.
The debate was then adjourned. —(The cries of " Order" were redoubled.)
The Minister of Putlic Instruction—Thera is nobody in France
who has wished that the country should lose in consideration; no.
body has wished it to be said that France was weak, that the
Powers would do what she might( protest against, and that they
would in all questions act without and in spite of her. M. Thiers
has said—" France for ten years has not interfered in great events
abroad." The fault of that partly lies with himself. At the
moment when the revonition of July seas again fermenting, It was
he, it was his eloquence, which laboured to check this movement,
which from having been a regenerating one threatened to inundate
all Europe; it was he who in his explanations said, that in order
to maintain an army of a million of men, the whole revolt'_
tionary power must be brought into play. Who in that case could
say to u-hat an extent this great revolution might err —who would
not think it necessary to guard against the possibility of such
errors ? These dangers we admit are now no hunger possible, and
we ask M. Thiers if this is a proper occasion to give way to that
national excitement which lie formerly attempted to suppress ?
[The Minister here went through the different phases of the Eastern
qu.stcrn, and, in concluding this part of his address, demanded if,
• When M. Thiers had advanced so much and realised so little, he had
any right to make an acccusation against others ? Addressing
himself to the President of the Cabinet of the Ist March, M. Vile-
man] reproached him with having come to no decision, with having
made no preparations at his debut, when a great commercial and
territorial interest wos threatened. He then blamed the Cabinet of
the Ist alerch for having entertained the idea of an armament of
935,000 meu when everything was at an end ; he also blamed it for
having the intention of waiting until the spring before it should act.
Do you think, gentlemen, that it would have been reasonable
in the approaching spring with his innumerable army, Syria being
lost to the Pacha, a loss which was inevitable, to have said, " We
are resolved on re-establishing the power of the Pacha ?" No—,
such an idea is inadmissible; there is something in it revolting
to sensible minds. A grave fault has been committed; that of
menacing much and doing nothing—of being unprepared for ac.
tion, and yet speaking in the language of dictation, There wits a
better course to have been adopted ; it was that of not being satin.
tied with permitting the existence de jure of the power of the
Pacha, and at the same time allowing it to be destroyed de fact o
It was felt in the whole of the East that nothing was done as to
the present, and that a question pregnant with peril was left ex-
posed to the future. This was said and written to M. Thiess by
an agent of Fiance, an honourable man, who has not the quality of
Ambassador, but whose councils arc wise and prudent, and ought
to be listened to. (N. Vilicmain here read a letter, dated the
12th of October, written by this agent, in Which he says that
the French squadron ought to show itself on the coast of Egypt,
that the mountaineers would receive the French cordiaty, and
that they reploached France for leaving her ships on the coast of
Greece. 31. Villemain then passed in review the conduct of the
Cabinet of the Ist of March, and continued as follows) :—The C.-1.
',met of the Ist of March placed itself in the eventuality of a war
which it did not wish for ; and not having the merit of a prudent
policy, it was without even the merit of the imprudence upon
which it was rushing.—(lnteruption.) If there had been a defi-
nitive resolution in the Cabinet,and more foresight, it would have
been prepared before the period when it commenced its armaments,
The Cabinet of the Ist of March never had the resolution which it
pretends to have have had, and, not having had that resolution, it
cannot make a ground of accusation against us for our not being
williug to complete what it says it was preparing for. At what
period of civilisation, I would ask, have we ever heard or read of
an armament of 900,000 men as a prelude to negotionsi'a we
have heard a great deal of the effect which this armament . was to
produce. We will say what effect we think it would have
produced., It' would have led to a- conviction that France,
while pretending to be negociating, was in reality preparing for
war, and the necessary consequence of such an attitude would
have been a general coalition against us. What did the C
of the Ist of March do ? Did it not remain inactive until tabinet
too late to assume an air of boldness ? and when it did dare wase
to
assume a menacing altitude, was it not too late to
hassume it with
effect ? We have now been told, gentlemen, at the plans
of this Cabinet were. T t hey consisted in an - effort greater than
the greatest efforts of the Empire. This effort was
an armament
of 935,000 men, and what was the object of it ? The object'of
it, gentlemen, we are told, was for the purpose
the spring for the cession of Syria to thPtof negotiating
g°ti—(ating in
oclia Egypt A
laugh.) This plan, good or bad-in itself, had about mo t•t one.great de-
fect—it came too late. The. Cabinet ought t o have inquired whe-
ther in the spring Syria would be in
a state of independence to ren-
der a negotiation of the kind possible. I now ask the late Cabinet
if it really intended to go to
war, how it would have commenced
It ? We wish to know in what quarter M. Tillers would have
Opened a campaign in order to indemnify , himself for that 1
Syria
which he had allowed to be lost ?—(Applause from the
Centre.) Are we to be told, is this great nation of 33,000,000 of
souls to be told that they were, for such a cause as (hit which has
been laid down as a motive for war to be subjected to a military ,
dictation ? You (the Cabinet of the Ist of March) have left this
question in a much worse situation than when it came into your
hands. You are not to attempt to extricate yourselves from a diffi.
culty by saying, " After us, govern who can."—(A laugh.) you
have wantonly excited that national enthusiasm which &honkd only
be excited for great events. We shall not imitate your conduct
—we shall not appeal to national enthusiasm, unless we shall
be required to do so in a struggle against a power which is
Loth guropean and Asiatic. • Europe will then turn with •

SITTING OF NOVEMBER 27.

The President took the chair at one o',
the adjourned discussion on the ad-
dress.
M. Th
•
ice opened the debate ,he said the Chamber-will d nibt-
less appreciate the motives which have induced me again to ad-
dress clock
-.
The Order of the Day .
it. Yesterday you heard from the lion. M. Passy his exp'ana.
tions of the policy of the Cabinet of the 12th May. .1 feel it neces-
sary in the first instance to make some observations or, his state-
meet. I have never wished to throw the responsibility of my acts
u; on my predecessors. Such conduct on my part would have been
unworthy, and I think every person must have observed the care I
took not to attack them in my memorandum. I have attacked a
Policy, not my predecessors. ,I shall, therefore, say only a few words
i in reply to the speech of M. Passy ; we are agreed, generally, as
to the facts which he has stated, but there are some points on
which we diff.r. I thought I had seen by the anterior docu-
ments that the offer to force the Dardanelles had been made; M.
must have been in error when
Posy thinks the contrary, and, therefore, that M. de Bourquency
he put forth this assertion. Ido
not think so, for I cannot believe that an agent of the Government
could have made a mistake on so grave and important a
proposition—to have supposed it possible for him so •to have
acted, is to suppose that he is without intelligence. What did
Lord Palmerston propose? Two things—an intimate union with
France, and an immediate solution ; he desired, that in the event of
the Russians approaching Constantinople, they should be called on
to withdraw, and be apprised of the consequences of their refusal.
Now this, for me, is even a graver point than the offer to force the
Dardanelles (M. Thiele here read a letter from the French
Charge d'Affaires,
in which he states, that in the opinion of Lord
Pahnerston, the French and the British sqnadrons ought, in the
event of the Russians approaching Censtantinopte, to appear off t tat
capital as friends, lithe Sultan accepted their assistance, and in the
event of his not doing so, that they should force the Dardanelles.)
The proof, added M. 'niers, thatM. deßeurqueney did not make any
mistake as to this proposition is,
that in a communication from Lord
Granville, the text of the instructions given to the Admirals contains
the hypothesis of the forcing the Dardanelles; the case, therefore,
had evidently been provided for, and the intention of the Eng-
lish Cabinet was clearly such as it was stated- to be by our represen.
the friendly entraneeanodf
tative, and as I stated it upon his authority. The Cabinet of the
Dardanelles should be forced in the event of the Russians enter.
lug the BosphorusPerfectly that England was of opinion that the
permission for
The Cabinet of the leth Ma • substituted for
terruption.) '1 he Cabinet of the 12th May
Englandjand the instructions)knew it; but it pre-
ferred to adopt a difthrent course. Ido not blame it. It thought
otfhethle.reStuiclhtalla'sndreEfuts,gitliigshhsisquadro,,,.— c
hi.
that it would be more advisable to request an entrance from the
Sultan, or to negotiate so as to prevent the march of the Russians.
the proposition of
the object of which was to obtain from the Sultan the facility of
entering the Dardanelles, and this negotiation was successful
(11e- c M. Titers read several letters of Adurral Roussin, and several
despatches, i
•n support of this assertion, and then added.) But let
us lay aside this miserable discussion sufllce it to say that the
given to its Admirals, a negotiation,
French Cabinet rejecte 1 the proposition of England. England
proposed to force the Dardanelles and that was one of the most
rash and decisive acts which could be proposed.
M. Villemain,
Minister -of Public la:truction—Do not thus
distort the nature of acts.

M.Cabinet of the 12th M 0
M Thicrs—The
propo-
sition. lam not expressing an 1.,• •on as to its conduct, and
shall now abandon the point and opinion
to' the anterior nego-
tiations. (M. Thiers now passed the negotiations in review, and
endeavoured to show that the Cabinet
of the 12th May had com-
pletely realised the object of England, viz., that of rendering the
protectorship over Turkey generai, which he said was much more
in the interest of England than of France.) The abolition of the
exclusive protectorship of Russia,-added M. Thiers was not the
question of moat importance to France.---(Murmurs.) I do not
say that we have no interest in Constantinople.—(N°,
no.) But I
do say that all the Powers bad as much if not more interest than
we in t his question ; and the proof of it is, that at Constantinopler, --, Z
every body was on our side. —(Yes, yes.) But the most important
question for us Was Egypt.—(Marks of approbation.) We were
Morcott that ground. It was there that our interest stood alone;
t het shore, when we came to that question, the Powers abandoned US,
we found ourselves isolated. When we had brought the Powers to
concur with Us on the question of Constantinople, instead of unit.
ing with us on the question of Egypt, they withdrew themselves
from us. These are the facts just as they transPired ; these are
the facts set forth in their true character. 1 Fay, then, that the
Cabinet of May 12 served England in generalising the protector-
ship over Turkey, as from that moment she showed herself very
exacting with regard to us, and towards the Paella. She proposed
to remove by force the two fleets in the port of Alexandria—you
refused—l approve of that refusal, and honour you for it. You
and: 1, although partisans of alliancewith England, have resisted
her. We have both opposed her, and we have done right; we
had better have gone on to an open rupture, than have made con-
cessions to her which would have been disastrous to our country.—
(Approbation.) When the question as to
territorial limits came
to be discussed, we no longer found any one to support us, and that
may be readily accounted for•-•:•we alone felt much interest In
that question. (M. Thiers here entered into some dctails tend.
ing to prove that it was highly important to France (bat 51114