The Sun.
London, England, 1841-01-26 00:00:00

FRANCE.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES,_SITTINo of JAN. 22.
Marshal Soult, in continuation, said—Circumstances
have occurred to unveil all the ideas which I formed ten
years since on the subject of the defence of Paris. My
opinion was that the defences of Paris should be on the out-
side, and that they would be more or less efficacious ac-
cording to the distances they were placed, and that, if they
were too close, the danger of the capital would be thereby
increased. I will explain this twofold idea. It was evi-
dent to me that in placing the defences of Paris as far as
possible on the outside, and giving them a solid basis, which
I consider I should obtain by the establishment of my en-
trenched camp, I should compel the enemy, however nu-
merous, at the same time to keep at a distance from it ; and
that should he resolve on attempting to gain possession
of it, it would not be so easy a matter, from the valour
of my troops and the permanent storks of 'fortifi-
cation by which they would have been supported. If I
had need of examples, I could have found them in the
campaign of Austerlitz, where, with 25,000 men of the
corps d'armees brought. from Boulogne, I traversed the
Russian army its three lines, and, having divided it, threw
the greater part into the Lake of Mceeitz. There was
also another grand advantage which I should derive from
my position. The investing of Paris became, in my opi-
nion, impossible, and provisions would be constantly sup-
plied to it without the possibility of the enemy cutting off
the communications. This accounts for my not attaching
so much importance as the honourable reporter of the Com-
mittee to the subject of provisioning Paris; for, according to
my plan, I was always certain of a supply. I have said that
in
and
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the nearer the defences were brought to Paris, the greater
the danger to the capital would be. This proposition is so
self-evident, that, I think, it is only necessary to be men-
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ble able reporter is more recent, and would, I confess, have more
weight for me if, without raising a doubt upon the authen-
ticity of the memoirs of St. Helena, I had not some observa-
tions to make respecting them. I will admit that the Em-
peror said at St. Helena what has been represented as to the
defence of capitals, but I will ask how it was that when he
was in Europe, and at the pinnacle of power, he did not
carry these ideas into execution. It has been said that all
the capitals which were attacked by Napoleon were not
fortified. This is true as to the greater number of them,
but I remember very well that in 1805, after Ulm, the
Emperor presented himself before Vienna, which had been
fortified from the sixth century, and was defended by a re-
gular bastioned wall with an escarpment, yet it made no
resistance, and the authorities came out and delivered the
keys. They had probably ascertained that a bastioned
wall was not sufficient for the defence of the capital, with-
out an addition or entrenched camp, which permitted the
Austrians to await under the walls. The Marshal next
alluded to the events of Toulouse in 1814, when be found
himself with 21,000 men opposed to 71,000, and said that
instead of shutting himself up in Toulouse, and being
blockaded and unable to check the march of the enemy,
he proposed occupying the hills round Toulouse, where,
throwing up entrenchments, he impeded the progress of
the enemy, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his
own forces. He then said, I have accepted, and I still ac-
cept the continuous wall, such as it is recommended in the
modified report of the Committee, for the following rea-
sons :—When I entered office a few weeks ago, I found
this question settled and in full execution, and a large por-
tion of the population of Paris appeared to be in favour of
the bastioned wall, under an impression that they would,
in the event of invasion, be thus well protected against
the enemy. At the same time, I found my own project
of an entrenched camp, with St. Denis and Charenton
well fortified, adopted. I asked much less formerly, for
in the war department we had adopted a great system of
economy, but I am not sorry that recent events have
brought the question to maturity, and given to my country
so great and important a measure for its defence as the for-
tification of the capital. I would reject still the system of
a continuous wall it it were at the sacrifice of an entrenched
camp, but I certainly regard it as a very useful completion
of such a means of defence. I renew this declaration,
adding that the detached works of the entrenched camp,
and those of the continuous wail connected with them,
will be carried on simultaneously or otherwise, as the Go-
vernment shall think most opportune. I shall now con-
clude by earnestly entreating the Chamber to look only at
the great object in view, au to lay aside all differenoe of
opinion, all consideration of private interest, in giving to
Prance the first rampart of strength and independence.
M. Thiers (reporter of the Commission).—I owe to it
and myself the duty of establishing the true sense of the
deliberations which have taken place, and to which Marshal
Soult had been called. I must say I feel some surprise,
and I think all the members of the Commission have felt
with me, in hearing what Marshal Soult has just said. It
would seem that the Commission has in a manner extorted
front the Minister of War a project which he did not ap-
prove, and which was not his own. lam nearly sure that
the Marshal, on being asked his opinion, said that his pro-
ject of 1831 agreed perfectly with that now proposed. I
remember that upon the question of the enceinte, and par-
ticularly upon this question, we asked the opinion of Mar-
shal Soult, and he replied, I accept the project without the
enceinte, I accept it more willingly with the encein'e, for
it is stronger.
Marshal Soult then rose and said, I perfectly remember
all I said, and all the observations I made in the Commis-
sion. I spoke of the external defence of Paris ; I gave
with respect to that ample details. I was asked if I ac-
cepted the continued enceinte? I said yes; and I do not
think that in what I have just pronounced anything con.
trary to that can be found ; beg the reporter to remem-
ber that I said on that occasion, I should be foolish to re-
fuse an advantageous alliance, because they wished to
double the dowry. I presented the project of law, and I
said just now that I would defend it. I had a right, in my
milita
in an
military character,
opinion
whichtoper ncesistcointrhnd my honour.eefirstlpart of
Ba
my dis-
course t
as Minister of War it was my duty to defend the project of
law. Is that a contradiction ?
M. Barrot said there ought to be a new meeting be-
tween the Ministers and the Commission, in order to come
to a new understanding as to the simultaneous execution
of the works. For what the Marshal had said threw
doubts upon the intention of the Government.
The Chamber then adjourned.

SITTING OF JAN. 23,

M. Salvandy, Vice-President, took the chair.
The Order of the Day was the continuation of the de-
bate upon the Paris Fortifications Bill.
M. Bechard addressed the Chamber against the project
of law. The Hon. Deputy observed that the discussion
had made rapid strides at the last two sittings, so as to
leave little to be said in refutation of the arguments relied
on by the partisans of this wild and useless measure. The
fact was that by erecting a line of fortifications round Paris,
in case of a war the capital would be subjected to a state
of blockade, provisions would be prevented from arriving,
the greatest confusion and misery would be the conse-
quence, the efforts of the National Guards would be pare-
lised. There might have been a shadow of a pretence for
this project in the first moment of excitement, but, upon
due reflection, he wondered how any man in his senses
could support so ruinous and useless a plan. It had been
wisely remarked by Louis XI V., that a great nation and
a great capital ought to have no ramparts, and it was not
to ramparts that that renowned monarch owed his military
glory. It would indeed be a strange spectacle to see Paris
in the present century occupied in building walls round
the city, instead of promoting the cause of liberty and civi-
lisation.—( Hear.) For his part, he relied on the good
sense of the representatives of the nation, to save them
from a project which would have the effect of ruining and
enslaving Paris.
M. Thiers, reporter of the Committee, requested per-
mission to explain some points relative to what had passed
in Committee since the last sitting. The explanations
which had taken place were of a serious nature, all the
members of the Commission were perfectly agreed upon
their original conclusions, there had been no conces-
sions made on their part or that of the Government,
and the determination come to was considered the best
flar the interests and defence of the capital. Since yes-
terday Marshal Soult again attended the Committee, and
on being asked for an explanation of what he had stated
at Friday's sitting, declared that ho was still of the same
opinion, namely, that both works, i. e. the forts and the
continuous wall should be executed at the same time, and
that the latter would be of great utility and add to the
solidity of the other fortifications.—(Marks of asto-
nishment.)
General Paixhans spoke in support of the measure. In
his opinion this safeguard of their liberties and indepen-
dence should no longer be neglected, and he was firmly
convinced that with a good army of reserve, an efficient
navy, and a well fortified capital, France would be able to
defend herself from any future coalition.
M. de Tracy said, I declare that I rise to combat the
project, because, in my opinion, it goes wide of its mark,
and in the only case in which it might be useful it would
at the same time be fatal to my country.
M. Thiers--Allow me a simple observation which I am
forced to make. He who has the honour of speaking to you
has no military career or historic reputation, but he has
the right to express himself, having devoted his weak ser-
vices to his country in good as well as bad fortune. I
have lately heard the system of old times despised—the
old system of war, and the methodical system which is
qualified as a narrow-minded system. Nevertheless, what
was the result of this system? Conquests which have re-
mained to us. We still have Franche-Comte and Alsace.
How many of the hundred and thirty-five departments re-
main to us which compeeed the French empire
M. de Remusat thought the question was a simple one,
and that good sense was sufficient to fathom it. Civilians
were competent to discuss it. The executive of war re.
quired military experience, but general questions of war
were quite of the competence of a general assembly. Paris
ought to be able to defend itself, for if the army is obliged
to think of a defence of Paris, it cannot take the enemy in
flank, nor be free in its movements. Marshal Soult was
wrong in supposing the intention to be that the army
should shut itself up in the walls of Paris, and he opposed
it by saying that the army should defend Paris in the open
country. It was said that the French character was for
offensive not defensive war, and that once a great battle
lost, the French retreated with fear and despaired. This
was the very reason for fortifying the capital, in order that
the loss of one great battle might not prove decisive.
If revolutionary means are feared, these are much
more likely to b:; had recourse to by Paris
unfortified than by Paris fortified ; for if the
town is open the people may demand arms and begin
a tumultuous defence. By regulating that defence you
avoid tumult. I do not know if what I am going to say
is Parliamentary, but I will say it; If Paris was besieged
the King would remain in it.—( Bravos.) It is a kind of
theme given to students, and with it a plan of France,
I and the students arc to draw up a composition detailing- a

plan for marching upon Paris. You must destroy this
idea by making it known that Paris is impregnable.
Establish this idea, and you will have no coalition against
France. The rejection of the law would be the greatest
blow to France, and it would oust the Ministry. Ido not
like the Ministry, but 1 would rather see it live than have
it overthrown by the rejection of the law.
_ _

After a speech from M. de Mornay, the sitting con.
eluded.

FLANDERS MAIL.

BRUSSELS, JAN. 23.—The Chamber voted yester.
day the budget of the Department of Finance, amount-
ing to 14,828,535 francs, and to-day it voted the budget
of the Department of the Interior.

ROME, JAN. S.—With reference to the previous ac-
counts of an unpleasant rencontre in the Apollo The-
atre between two distinguished members of the diplo-
matic body, when the Queen Royal of Spain visited
that theatre, I have to state that the dispute was
not at all personal between these gentlemen, but be-
tween their servants, and became so violent that the
armed force had to interfere. Several of the mili-
tary who were on duty have been put under arrest in
consequence.

The Queen will shortly go to Florence to visit her
sister, the Grand Duchess, and then return to Rome,
where she means to make a long stay. It is expected
that the presence of the Queen will have a considerable
influence on the affairs of Spain.

DUTCH FUND3.—AMSTERDAM, JAN. 22.
Money. Blils.
4ctual Debt, 234 per Cent
Ditto, ditto 5 per cent.
A mei t Syndic, 4},i per cent BO% 87
Ditto, ditto, 3% per cent 70% 71% li
Commercial Company, 434 per cent 1604 160%
Ditto (1835 and 1837) 5 per cent.
Loan 1637, 5 per cent. 94% 95
Exchange on London, One month l9 0
Two months
Dutch Papers, Jan. 23.
BELGIAN FUNDS—BnUeme, JAN. 23.
Actual Debt, 2% per Cent.
Rothschild's Loan, 5 per Cent 97
Loan of Thirty Millions, 4 per• Cent. 6B
(1840).......
_.-- 3 per Cent.
--oThirty.seyen-- B9
Loan of City, 1832, 4 per Cent. 9O
Society of Commerce, 4 ;.i per Cent lO2
Bank of Belgium, 5 per Cent...... .......
National Society .
..._
Exchange on London (short)
—Brussels Papers, Jan. 23.
AUSTRIAN FUNDS.—VIENNA, JAN.I3
Five per Cents. Metalliques
boar per Cents.
Three per Cents.
Bank Shares
—.Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 18.
HAMBURG BORSENHALLE, JAN. 191. _

Bills. Money
Austrian 5 per Cents.
Bank Shares l6Th
Anglo-Russian Loan 1065( 1001
Russian 5 per Cent. Ist series, Co„rti ficate
Inscription, Ist Series lO3
Russian 5 per Cent. Hope and Co. 3d and 4th
Series 963 96
Ditto in Certificates
Dutch Actual Debt, 2% per Cent 49 ....
Ditto 5 per Cent —
Polish Bonds
New Picket
Anglo-Danish Loan, 3 per Cent 74% 74
Norwegian Loan, 1834, 4 per Cvnt... lOl
Spanish, New 3 per Cents. IBIA
XCHANGES ON LONDON.
HAMBURG, JAN. 13.-13 4.—Two months, 13 '2
LEIPSIC, JAN. 15.—Two months, 6. 173(.
VIENNA, JAN 12.—Three months. 9. 44%,
BREMEN; J,N. s,—Two months, 614.
PRUSSIAN FUNDS.—BERLIN, JAN, 19,
Bills, Monoy.
St. Schuld. Sch., 4,5, per cent, 103% 103%
Prussian English Loan, 1830, 4 per cent 1004 ii 16014
Itixchange on Landon, three months,,, 6 17%
—Prussian State Gazette, Jan. 20.