The Sun.
London, England, 1847-04-29 00:00:00

BROAD GAUGE,

The LORD CHANCELLOR gave judgment to-day in
this case, which was argued before him a few days since upon
(a,
vn
earl:.
up
leianlgfrao md
etnh l
ue
rr decisioner, o
put fh
in t
be C
they ice-
defendant,haricel i orE otfotnhgel
and.
Bill
filed by the plaintiffs. We have already given a length-
ened account of the facts of the case, and it will,
therefore, be unnecessary to repeat them here. Ilia
Lordship, in giving judgment to-day, said, that this
was a case in which two -persons, not alleging dis-
tinctly that they were shareholders in a railway
company, but describing themselves as such, had tiled a bill
in which they alleged, that owing to circumstances to which
it was not necessary his Lordship should further allude.
certain individuals who were originally appointed
directors ought to have ballotted out four of their
number and elected four others ; that they had
omitted to do so, and that, consequently, they were not now
a body of directors, such as was contemplated by the Act of
Parliament : and the bill prayed an injunction to
restrain them from voting Or acting as directors
of the Railway Company, and that they might be
ordered to place the common seal of the Company in
the hands of six other persons, whom he alleged had been
appointed directors under the provisions; of the Act of Parlia-
ment, authorising the increase of the number of directors
from twelve to eighteen. The result, therefore, of
granting the injunction prayed by the Bill, would
be to restrain twelve out of eighteen of the directors
from acting, and permitting the whole duty of directors to be
performed by the other six. There was nothing in the Bill
praying the Court to set aside what might be an error,
but the Bill assumed that the whole twelve were illegally
exercising the functions of directors, and that they ail
ought to be restrained. Great difficulty arose with respect
to the construction of the Act, but upon that it was not his
intention to give any opinion, because in his way of viewing
the case he thought it to be his duty to allow the demurrer
without any reference to the Act at all. He thought it was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court to take that matter into
its consideration. Years ago there could be no doubt that
the present Bill was demarrable. The rules of the Court of late
years had been relaxed to suit modern times, but the relaxation
of those rules ought not, and never had been extended be-
yond the exigencies of the case itself. Now, in the pre-
sent instance, there was no case of necessity stated
in the bill, but the most obvious mode of cor-
recting the grievance discussed is the bill, were
to be found in the allegations of the bill itself ;
added to this, if such a bill as the present was permitted to
be on the files of the Court, every shareholder in every corn-
pany, might file a similar bill, and the Court be inundated
with them. Even if there were no other objections to the
bill than the one to which his Lordship had adverted,
he thought that would befatal, although there was no doubt
that that might be easily corrected; hut there were in his
Lordship's opinion many other objections to the Bill. First,
that which was complained of by the Bill was not personal
at all to the parties who had filed it. What was the
complaint? Why a usurpation of the rights of the corpo-
ration, and it was prayed that the party that had done so
should be ordered to hand over the seal of the company to
the party whom they alleged were the proper
directors of the company. The case of " Foss and
Harbott le," decided by Vice-Chancellor Wigram was precisely
like the present, it was stronger, because there there was
malversation, and in that case the Vice-Chancellor Wigram
decided that the bill could not be supported, and in that
decision his Lordship perfectly concurred. In the
present case, for anything that appeared in the
bill, the Company might file a bill, and ask for relief as a
properly constituted body. The present was the first
attempt that had ever been made to call upon the
court to exercise a jurisdiction under such circum-
stances. None of his (the Lord Chancellor's) predecessors
had ever exercised such a jurisdiction as he was now asked
to do, and he would not be the first to adopt such a course;
the question in the case was, whether these parties
were proper corporate bodies ? Now, that was purely
a question of law, and not of equity. If his
Lordship was to grant what was now asked by the bill, it
would have the effect of putting an end to the railway com-
pany altogether. On the whole, without expressing any
opinion upon the merits of the case, his Lordship was clearly
of opinion that his duty was to allow both the demurrers.
Sir F. KELLY said that, such being his Lordship's
judgment, the Court would, as a matter of course, order the
injunction that had been granted by the Vice-Chancellor of
England to be dissolved.

The LORD CHANCELLOR—Yes. The Court also ordered
the costs of the motion for the injunction in the court below
to he paid by the parties applying for it.
The court, was crowded to excess during the delivery of
the judgment, and among those present we noticed Mr. C.
Russell, M.P., Mr. Muntz, M.P., and Mr. Spooner, M.P.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER April 28.
(Sittings in Banco.)
LEWIS V. ITTXLET.
This was a special case, arising out of a devise in a will
and which came before the Court by the direction of Vice.
Chancellor Bruce, but the particulars possessed no feature o
public interest.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, April 27.
MUNDEN V. THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.
This case came before the Court upon a special de-
murrer to the replication.
The action was brought by the plaintiff, Mrs. Char-
lotte Munden, against his Serene Highness, Charles
Frederick Augustus William Duke of Brunswick and
Luneburg, to recover payment of an annuity of 2001.,
which the defendant had secured to her by deed on cer-
tain conditions ; amongst others, that the plaintiff
should be content therewith, and acknowledge it to be in
discharge of all claims which she might have on the de-
fendant ; that she should not write to the defendant
concerning past transactions between the parties, and on
several other conditions, the breach of which was to ren-
der the deed void. The declaration fully set out the deed
and alleged a breach.
The defendant, in person, pleaded a plea to the ju-
risdiction of the Court, alleging, that at the time of the
making of the said deed he was a Sovereign Prince—to
wit, the reigning Duke of the Duchy of Brunswick
and Luneburg ; and that the said deed was made by
him in his dominions; and that from the time of making
the said deed be had been, and still was, justly entitled
to all the rights, prerogatives, and privileges apper-
taining to him as the Duke of Brunswick and Lunt--
burg, &c., and prayed judgment if the Court here
ought to take cognizance of this action. The
replication alleged that the Court ought not to be barred
from taking cognisance of the said action, because
the contract was not made with the defendant in respect
of any matter appertaining to the state and Govern-
ment, or policy of the said duchy of Brunswick and
Luneburg, but that the said debt was a private debt
owing from the defendant, in his private capacity, to the
plaintiff; that after the making of the said deed, and be-
fore the accruing of the said debt, the defendant quitted
the said duchy, and was domiciled within the jurisdic-
tion of this Court, not as a Sovereign Prince, but as a pri-
vate subject of, and owing obedience to, her Majesty the
Queen. To this replication the defendant demurred,
and several points for argument were raised by the de-
murrer.
Mr. Lusts, in support of the demurrer, said the de-
fendant was a Sovereign Prince, and as Such he was
not liable to be sued in a court in this country for any
act done by him while a Sovereign Prince, and acting as
a Sovereign. The delendant was the Duke of Brunswick
and Luneburg, and was no more liable to be sued in
an English court than the Emperor of Russia or the
King of Prussia. The defendant alleged that he was
still entitled to all the rights, privileges, and preroga-
tives of the Duke of Brunswick; that part of
the plea was not traversed by the replication—
it was admitted. There was no averment that he
had abandoned his country, there was nothing
inconsistent with his averment that he was
still a Sovereign Prince. The question then was, could
a Sovereign Prince be sued in the courts of this his
country? He contended that he could not. There were
not many authorities on this subject, and the chief was
the case- of the "Duke of Brunswick v. the King_ of
Hanover" (6 Bevans' R. p. 9), in which a bill in Chan-
cery had been filed to set aside an act of state done by
the King of Hanover; and there was a general demurrer
for want of equity, and it was held by Lord Langdale,
the Master of the Rolls, that the Court had no
power
to relieve. The Master of the Rolls, in giving his judg-
ment, entered fully into the discussion of the question,
and he decided that he could not interfere in such a case.
The immunities of Sovereign Princes were grounded on
the same reasons as the immunities granted to ambas-
sadors. He submitted that the ruling by the Master of
the Rolls was correct, and should be followed in this
case. It was admitted on the record that the act was
done while the defendant was a Sovereign, and it ought
to be presumed that it was done by him in his capacity
of Sovereign. A Sovereign Prince domiciled in this
country was prima facie not liable to be sued in the
English courts.
Mr. Justice PATTESON—Primit facie, a Sovereign
Prince is not liable to be sued even in his own dominions.
Mr. Luset—The plaintiff ought to show that he was
so liable, for if he was not liable to be sued in his own
country he could not be in this. It was for the plaintiff
to show that, the defendant had ceased to be a Sovereign
Prince, and had become a subject of her Majesty. She
had failed to do so. The Duke of Brunswick's stay in
this country was only temporary, and he had not aban-
doned his rights as a Sovereign Prince. On these
grounds he submitted that the demurrer would be
sustained.
Mr. Bormit., in support of the replication. The
pleadings bad been framed in accordance with the de-
cision of the Master of the Rolls, and he was surprised
that his Learned Friend relied upon that decision for his
defence. His Learned Friend did not deny that the
defendant would be liable for what took place in this
country. The Duke of Brunswick was now domiciled
in this country, and was responsible for acts done in bis
private capacity, when in his own country. In the case
of the " Duke of Brunswick v. the King of Hanover," it
was considered that the acts done were acts of state; but
that was avoided in this case, by replying that the debt
was a private debt, owing by the defendant in his private
and personal capacity to the plaintiff! The regal of
the decision of the Master of the Rolls was, that Minis-
ters were responsible for the acts of their Sovereigns.
The decision in the case of the King of Hanover was,
that if there was a contract not made by him in that
character, but as a private individual, he was liable to
be sued here. lie relied upon that authority. The
plea was one in abatement, and that no court in this
country had any jurisdiction. lie contended that the
plea was misconceived; it should have been in bar, and
not in abatement. A plea in abatement, which did not
give a better writ, was bad.
Mr. Justice WIGHTMA.N—This is a plea to the juris-
diction, and it concludes as such.
Mr. Boyne—As the defendant relied on a personal
privilege be must show that he was a Sovereign Prince.
The plea alleged, that at the time of the making of the
contract the defendant was a Sovereign Prince, but he
did not allege that he was still a Sovereign Prince—he
only alleged that he was entitled to all the rights, &c.,
without showing how he was entitled. The defendant
did not aver, that by the law of Brunswick he was not
liable on this deed, and if he was liable in Brunswick he
was liable in England.
Mr. Lusts, in reply, said, that the plea was a plea to
the jurisdiction. The reason why parties were liable
here for contracts made abroad was because theywere liable
there, and their liability went with them vrherever