The Sun.
London, England, 1847-01-25 00:00:00

SPEECH OF M. GUIZOT ON THE
MONTPENSIER MARRIAGE, DELIVERED IN
THE CHAMBER OF PEERS, JAN. 20.
The MINISTER Of FOREIGN AFFAIRS ascended
_:the
tribune amidst marks of the greatest interest, and said:—
Gentlemen, I have to claim your indulgence, for lam
somewhat hoarse, and have much to say. Ido not stand
here to defend our policy. It has been strongly
attacked, and as energetically defended, first by our
friends, and next by men whom I regret not to reckon
amongst our supporters, but whom I am happy not to
have to-day to enrol amongst our adversaries. I shall
not speak of the past so much as of the present, as the
idea which now occupies every mind, is the influence
exercised *.by the Spanish marriages on our relations
with Great Britain. lam fully aware that my words
may have some iafitience on the present delicate situa-
tion, and I pray the Chamber to imagine what my
position really is, and to go freely with me both in my
frankness and my reserve. The Chamber has often
given us its support when accusations were heaped
on us of being wanting in firmness and dignity towards
England, and it will now do the same when the
charge against us is that we have been deficient in
good faith and prudence.—(Hear, hear.) In presence
of the Chambers, of France, of England, and of the
King, I am about to give a plain recital of the policy
followed by the French Cabinet, and when I have done
that you can all form your own judgment. From the
origin of the marriage question the policy of the King s
government has been of a double character—very de-
cided and very public. In neither case was the accusa-
tion well-founded, and as we have on many an occasion
justified ourselves against the first, so I am now anxious
to reject the other in the face of France and of Europe.
The principle of that policy, with respect to Spain, is
well known—not to allow the crown of Spain to pass out
of the house of Bourbon. All our diplomatic antece-
dents, the balance of power in Europe, as well as the
dignity of the French crown, called on us to insist on
that point. That principle I have made the basis of our
policy, and I have always clearly explained our view at all
the courts of Europe. M. Pageot has been the interpreter
of our sentiments at Berlin and Vienna, and M. Casimir
Perier at St. Petersburg. Therefore there could not
possibly be any doubt or hesitation felt relative to our
views—(Here the Duke d'Aumale and the Prince de
Joinville entered the Chamber, and the Peers rose to
receive them.)—That principle I declared to the Cham-
bers from the very beginning. I announced it in 1841,
1842, and 1843—it was, in fact, the constant rule of my
language. Yet we were not ignorant what difficulties
this line of conduct involved ; it might be turned against
us, and used to arouse the national susceptibilities of
the Spanish nation ; but as we conceived that our policy
was good and national, we firmly maintained it. We
knew the dangers of that policy, bat we knew that it was
national, and we did not hesitate therefore to proclaim
it with boldness. We have not hesitated to tie ourselves
down in advance, and that embarrasses us. But at the
same time that the policy of France was thus decided
and public, it was moderate and conciliating. We espe-
cially recognised the rights of the country ; we served
and aided Spanish interests even when not favourable to
us. I defended General Espartero from this place ; I
maintained with him friendly relations. We lived well
w,th the Progressists, and we were at the same time clear
and moderate. In fine, when a favourable occasion pre-
sented itself for bringing together the opposing parties—
for uniting, for instance, the Moderados with the Pro-
gressists—we afforded them our counsels, and exercised
influence amongst them of the most moderate character.
Have we faileSeither, as far as Spain is concerned, in
moderation towards Europe ? Every body knows that
the three Northern Courts supported a candidate to the
hand of the Queen, the Count de Montemolin. We did not
exclude him, although our conduct in that respect has
drawn upon us many reproaches in France. I wrote on
April la, 1842, to the Count de Flahault that that idea was
a good one for bringing about a fusion of the two rights, and
for bringing Spain into communication with the rest of
Burope. fpointed out, however, the dangers of that
combination to Spain, by saying that it would be badly
received by the Progressists, and even by the Moderados.
I showed that parties in that country hal even begun to
be agitated at the probability of that union. I added,
that the Queen Isabella was for us the legitimate sove-
reign of Spain. and that we wished for no arrangement
that should not be agreeable to Spain herself. Lastly, I
terminated by saying that any prince of the house of
Bourbon, who should be agreeable to the Queen Isabella
would be agreeable to us. (M. Guizot here read the
despatch to the Count de Fahaut, and proceeded.) The
Chamber sees that in declaring ourselves in favour of
this combination we made prowl of impartiality. At a
later period, on September 21st, 1843, I resumed in a
note, also addressed to the Count de Flahaut, the rules
of conduct adopted in common by France and England.
In this note it was said that no formal exclusion was pro-
nounced by either Cabinet, but that if the candidateship
of the Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg should be proposed,
that would be for France a signal to resuscitate that of
the Duke d'Aumale. Between the descendants of Philip
V. the French Government did not intend to take the
initiative; it accepted them all, abandoning to Spain—
that is the numerous and most enlightened part of her
population—the choice to be made between the several
candidates to the Queen's hand. These conditions being
laid down, the first candidate that presented himself was
the Comte de Trapani. This caudidateship was not set
up by either France or England. We had no opposi-
tion to make to it. It had the consent of Queen Chris-
tina; it secured to Spain the recognition of Naples; and
it drew closer the ties between the three branches of the
house of Bourbon reigning in Europe. As to England,
we always offered her our united operation in Spain. No
one is more convinced than myself that the struggle for
influence in Spain between England and France is
disastrous to her. There, as elsewhere, we may live iu
good intelligence with our allies on the other side
the Channel. Never has England entered frankly
into the concert; her policy was one of reserve and
procrastination; she did not oppose us, but she did not
co-operate with us. By the fall of Espartero, the
English policy received a check in Spain; at the
same time a report was current that the Spanish Go-
vernment might demand for the Queen the hand of the
Duke d'Aumale. This circumstance aroused the atten-
tion of the English Government, who, in her turn, made
advances to us to solicit our co-operation. (The Hon.
Minister here read a dispatch which contained these
ouertures from the English Government, dated July 21,
1343, as well as the reply made to it by the French
Cabinet.) The result was that the offer of the English
Government was accepted with pleasure. Those are the
very words of the answer. Tho nature of the arrange-
ment made was, that the two Governments agreed to
admit that the question of the marriage of the Queen
should be considered as one completely and exclusively
Spanish. We could not but approve of that combination,
we did, in fact, approve of it, that is to say, on the sole
condition that it should have the manifest support of the
young Queen of the Spanish nation, and that it should
be submitted to legal and constitutional forms. This
combination, however, met with very serious ob-
stacles in the midst of the struggles and pretensions
of political parties in Spain. Besides, there was
nothing urgent in the matter ; it might well
be postponed ; the Queen was still young, and in
consequence it was put off. The question remained in
this state until the summer of 1844, a period at which
we had occasion to give the English Government a fresh
proof of the good faith of our policy ; we declared
officially the renunciation or the Duke d'Aumale to the
hand of the Queen. This, it will be allowed, was a
good card less in cur game.—(Smiles.) At this time
the Spanish Cabinet made a first overture, tending to
the simultaneous marriages of the Count de Trapani
with the Queen and the Duke de Montpensier with the
Infanta. We did not listen to this overture, and our
motives were explained in a dispatch which I addressed
on the 26th November, 1844, to Count Bresson, our
Ambassador at Madrid. The news thereof, nevertheless,
got noised abroad, and caused some uneasiness to the
Cabinet of London. That was a little before the second
visit of the Queen Victoria to the Chateau d'Eu. That
visit supplied us a natural occasion for entering into ex-
planations in this respect, in the same manner as I had
done to Count Bresson. We did not conceal the fact that
the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier with the In-
fanta of Spain would be perfectly agreeable to the
Xing of the French, but we positively declared
that we did not intend to profit by that project to
thwart the general policy adopted in concert by the two
Governments, and the marriage of the Duke of Ment-
pensier should take place not only after that of the
Queen, but not until her Majesty's marriage should
have given a successor to the throne of Spain. Lord
Aberdeen acknowledged the perfect frankness of our
declarations, and made no objection. The concert and
ea:mon action of the two Governments remained there-
fore intact. After the conferences of Eu, the question
pursued its course. The candidateship of the Count de
Trapani continued to occupy the attention of the Go-
vernment of Madrid; but, at the same time, other names
began to be pronounced, not through foreign, but Spanish,
influence. The name of the Prince Leopold of Saxe
Coburg appeared most frequently. and his appearance
naturally caused us disquietude. I communicated with
Lord Aberdeen, who assured me that we had nothing
to fear from that quarter. I was, nevertheless, obliged
to give new instructions to Count Bresson, recom-
mending him to be careful, and to protest
against that combination if it should acquire any
probability. The Neapolitan combination lost ground
more and more; and the Cabinet of Narvaez was
then about being broken up. I will allow not this occa-
Sion to pass of rendering to General Narvaez, who is no
longer ul power, but who lives in retirement, the testi-
mony which the uprightness and the energy, of testi-
monywhich he
made proof •
this question, justly merit. lie showed
himse f, I fear not
than any nt to say,
more capable of political firm-
nesstte statesmen who have since entered
the government of
be placed the in. It is at this period that is to
memorandumond
of the 27th -February,which
our Ambassador at L
En 13,, the Count de Saint-Aulaire,
placed before the
which, repeating the gl.l abinet; a memorandum
instructionsknown to
which we had given to
Count Bresson, made
the English Govern-
ment the conduct that we meant
to if the now
combination proposed at Madrid shouldP become serious.
A. new overture was then made to ua Cabinet; it consisted in marrying the DueY th
Mont
Spanish
slier immediately before the marriagetsde
the ontpen..
qn.
We rejected this second overture as we h uee
lla('
first. It was in the month of May only
that Count Bresson called my serious attenytio:titl to
the menacing exertions that were being made at Madrid
in favour of the Prince of Coburg; and I learned at
the same time that a communication of the same nature
had been addressed by
.the Spanish Government to that
of England. My surprise, I avow, was very great; and
I hastened to express it to Lord Aberdeen, who denied
that he had taken the least part in that unforeseen act.
What, then, had produced the Coburg combination? Its
origin must be sought in Spain herself. We had at two
different times rejected the propositions of her Govern-
ment, one tending to the simultaneous marriages, the
other to the immediate and preliminary marriage of the
Dec de Montpensier. This double refusal offended the
Spanish Government, who therefore tamed all at Pee t 9