The Sun.
London, England, 1847-01-16 00:00:00

SECTION 4.

We have been, and we shall continue to be, true to
the policy which we have adopted, and to the engage-
ments we have entered into, respecting the marriage
either of Queen Isabella or of Donna Fernando.

But, it the existing state of things should continue, or
should lead to any further results, we may be placed
abruptly in a contingency, in which we shall be-
1. Subjected to the absolute necessity of preventing
our policy from receiving, by the marriage either of the
Queen or the Infanta, a blow to which we could not
consent to submit.

2. Released from all engage nent with respect to either
marriage.

Which would be the result, in case the marriage,
either of the Queen or of the Infanta, with Prince Leo-
pold of Saxe Coburg, or with any other Prince not
descended from Philip V., should become probable or
imminent.

In that case we should be released from all engage-
ment, and free to act immediately in our own defence,
by demanding the hand either of the Queen or the In-
fanta, for the Duke de Montpensier.

SECTION 5.
We sincerely and fervently desire that things may not
come to this extremity.
We see but one way of preventing it; viz., that the
English Cabinet should unite actively with us,
1. In endeavouring to restore to a position befitting a
pretender to the hand of the Queen of Spain one of the
descendants of Philip V., whether the Duke of Seville,
the Duke of Cadiz, or the Count of Trappani, and to
bring about his marriage with Queen Isabella.
2. In preventing, in the meantime, the marriage of
the Infanta with Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg', or
with any other Prince not descended from Philip V.
We think that this end may be attained by the active
and firm co-operation of the two Cabinets. And we
deem ourselves called upon in honour to forewarn the
English Cabinet that, without such co-operation, we
may find ourselves obliged to act, and justified in acting,
in the manner I have just indicated.

M. GUIZOT TO COUNT BRESSON.
(PRIVATE.)

Paris, Dec. 10, 1845.
The basis of our policy with regard to
Spain in general, and in particular on the question of
the marriage of the Queen and the Infanta, is the firm
desire of preventing the revival of that active rivalry,
those vehement and obstinate struggles between the two
principal allies of Spain, France and England, which
have caused, and would again cause, so much mischief to
Spain in the first place, and finally to all Europe.
This policy is for the interest of Spain, as well as for
that of France.

Spain has now two main and predominant interests, to
which all others ought to be subordinate:-
1. The interest of her domestic policy, which is, to
establish her Government and her Administration; to
secure her tranquillity, her prosperity, and her internal
strength.
2. The interest of her foreign policy, which is, I do
not hesitate to say, to form an intimate union with
France, and by that means to regain her rank in
Europe, while she maintains her independence and se-
cures her repose. With a view to these two great in-
terests of Spain, it is extremely desirable that all active
and vehement struggles between France and England
should cease.

Our policy therefore is, in its general principle, no
less Spanish than French ; and is in conformity with
the paramount and common interest of the two countries.

If, therefore, in the particular question of the marriage
either of the Queen or of the Infanta, we reject every
combination which might have the effect of placing
France and England once more in a hostile attitude on
the domain of Spanish affairs; Spain, so far from making
this a subject of complaint or of offence, ought to approve
our conduct, and to second it to the utmost of her power
for by this conduct we must and do actually sacrifice in-
terest and inclination very dear to us, to the paramount
and common interest of the two countries ; we disregard
those iuterests and inclinations in favour of the highest
and wisest (large and sound) reasons of state.
This policy, however, can be practicable and successful
only on the supposition that it is accepted and practised
on both sides, by England as well as by France, with the
same moderation and the same good faith.
If then, white we are labouring to avert any combina-
tion, either in the marriage of the Queen or in that of the
Infanta, which might revive the conflict between France
and England in Spain, the other party did not act in the
same manner—if, on the contrary, they made, or suf-
fered others to make, unresisted, any arrangement con-
trary to the principle we have proclaimed. viz.—that the
throne of Spain should not be alienated from the de-
scendants of Philip V.—an arrangement which would
compel us ourselves to revive the contest wo wish to
allay—it is evident that we could not, and it is certain
that we should not, acquiesce in the positions in which it
would place us.
The more closely I observe what is passing, the more
firmly I am convinced that there are in and about Spain
active and incessant efforts to bring about the marriage
of a Prince of Saxe Coburg either with the Queen or
with the Infanta. It is true the English Government
employs no positive means to bring about this marriage;
but it also uses none to prevent it. It does not put a
peremptory veto oa every project which would place a
Prince of Coburg on the throne of Spain, as we have
done on our side with regard to a French Prince.
On the other hand, Queen Christina and the Spanish
Government wish to make use of the fear wo entertain
of a Coburg marriage, in order to secure the Montpensier
marriage, at the same time keeping in reserve the pos-
sibility of the Coburg marriage in case the Montpensier
marriage were to fail.
We cannot consent to be dupes in this matter. We
shall continue in perfect sincerity to pursue the policy
we have announced, that, namely, of opposing every
combination which might tend to rekindle the conflict
between France and England with regard to Spain. But
if we perceive that the conduct on the other side is
not as clear and decided as cur own; if, for example,
either from the inertness of the English Government,
or from the exertions of its friends in Spain and around
Spain, a marriage were in preparation, whether for the
Queen or the Infanta, which endangered our principle
(the exclusive eligibility of the descendants of Philip
V.), and if that combination had a chance of succeed-
ing with the Spanish Government, we should immedi-
ately come forward without reserve, and should plainly
and openly demand the preference for the Duke de
Moutpensier.
Such is our plan of conduct. There is nothing in it
which is not perfectly consistent and upright; while, at
the same time, it is effective as a means of defeating,
either beforehand or at the critical moment, any scheme
for bringing about the Coburg marriage, or any other. I
confide the execution of it to you with perfect confi-
dence. Yuu are thus armed both for the present and
the future. You will, lam sure, make no use of your
various weapons, except in case of necessity and at the
fitting moment. Maintain our policy steadily, so long
as it is not rendered impossible by an attempt on the
other side to bring about an arrangement contrary to
our principle; and, if you find yourself reduced to that
extremity, defeat such an attempt by the means I now
put into your hands.

Our space, unfortunately, will not allow us to pub-
lish the documents respecting the annexation of Cracow.
They are, however, of much inferior interest to those
we have already published, and the following summary
e
of them will probably be sufficient to satisfy the curiosity
of our readers:—
The communications relative to Cracow made to the
French Chambers number:—No.l. —Extract
are nine in
of a letter from Prince Metternich to the Count d'AP
pony, Austrian Minister at the Court of France, dated
-
ethe 20th of February, 1846, in which the latter is re-
quested to communicate to the French Minister the fact
of
the
military occupation of Cracow, with some of the
reasons for it; and the Prince encloses a circular dispatch,
of the same date, on the same subject, and to the same
effect. Nos. 2 and 3 are letters from M. Guizot to the
Count de Flahault, dated the 23d of March, 1846, inwhich
the former, adverting to the preceding documents,
requests the Count to communicate to the Austrian
Prime Minister the regret of the French Government
at what had taken place, and its apprehensions that
matters were in train for a serious disturbance of the
Treaty of Vienna, though placing great reliance on the
prudence and moderation of the Court of Vienna. No.
4.—A private note from Count Flahault to M. Guizot,
dated Vienna, April 1, 1846, in which the Count says
that he had received from Prince Metternich an assur-
ance that the occupation was a military measure die.
tated by necessity, and justified by the dangerous state
of the Republic, but would not be continued beyond the
pressure of that danger. No. s.—Letter
3r, 1846, fom M. Hunti-
-
mann to M. Guizot, dated Vienna, April i
mating that the Prussian Minister had given to the former
assurances similar to those received by Count Flahault
from the Austrian Minister. No. 6.—A dispatch from
Prince Metternich to M. de Thom (representing
ember Austria
at the Court of France), dated Vienna,
Nov 6,
announcing the annexation of Cracow to the Austrian
empire, and enclosing the declaration of the three
ific G
a-
o-
vernments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in
tion of that proceeding. The latter has appeared in all
the journals, and has been extensively commented upon
by the press of England and France. No. 7.—untn
M.
Guizot to the Count de Jarnac (in the absence of C 1846 o
de St. Aulaire), dated Paris, November 19, , i
which the French Mininister for Foreign Affairs desires
the Count to lay before Lord Palmerston a copy of his
speech in the Chamber of Peers on the 2cl of Juy last,
as an exosition of his sentiments on the affairs lof Po-
p