The Sun.
London, England, 1841-11-12 00:00:00

WILLIAMS V. JONES.

This was an action to recover a sum of 2561., being
the amount of an attorney's bill of costs for work and
labour done in the Court of Chancery and the Court of
Commo❑ Pleas. • The declaration alleged that the de-
fendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum for
work and labour done in prosecuting divers suits at law
and in equity ; there was also a count for money paid,
and upon an account stated. To these the defendant
had pleaded, in substance, that at the time the cause of
action mentioned in the declaration accrued, the plaintiff
was not duly admitted and enrolled an attorney of the
Court of Chancery ; and to the count for work done in
the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant pleaded that
at the time the cause of action accrued in that Court,
the defendant was not duly admitted and enrolled an at-
torney of that Court. To these pleas the plaintiff had
demurred specially, and
Mr. KELLY now appeared in support of the demurrer.
He submitted that the pleas were bad for ambiguity and
uncertainty, and for this reason, that it neither admitted
nor denied that he was an attorney at the time, because
it may be that the plaintiff was an attorney, but that
there was some irregularity or illegality in his enrol-
ment. The plaintiff claimed compensation for certain
work and labour done, and had a good cause of
action, unless the defendant by his pleas set up a
good cause of action in point of law and fact.
The plea stated that at the time the cause
of action accrued the plaintiff was not duly ad-
mitted and enrolled an attorney; but admitting for a
moment that he was not an attorney at the time, their
Lordships would immediately perceive that it would not
be an answer to the action. It was quite possible that
the plaintiff might not be an attorney at the time the
cause of action accrued, but the question the Court would
have to decide was, whether at the time he carried on
these suits and performed that work he was an attorney.
Now it appeared to him that for that ambiguity the plea
was bad, and could not be maintained. Suppose, as was
quite consistent with everything that appeared on the
record, the plaintiff had undertaken to carry on certain
suits, and that he would not ask for payment until a
certain sum had been recovered out of Chancery,
he would have carried on that business at a time when he
was duly admitted and enrolled, and the business having
terminated, he might have ceased to be a solicitor—then
perhaps a month afterwards the defendant received his
money out of Chancery, and the plaintiff applied fur
payment—it would be clearly no defence to the action
then, that the plaintiff had ceased to be a solicitor, and
had no right to recover. In every conceivable case in
which a solicitor did business for his client, and in which
he gave credit—whether for a month or till the end of
the suit—whether for a time certain or conditional—in
every single case in which credit was given, the cause of
action did not accrue till the suit had terminated. The
Learned Counsel, after citing several authorities on the
subject, concluded by submitting that the pleas were bad,
and that the judgment of the Court must be for the de-
fendant. _ _ _

Mr. CRESWELL, for the defendant, contended that
none of the objections of his Learned Friend were
tenable. The declaration was not for work and labour done
in the ordinary terms, but for work and labour done for
the defendant as his agent, and upon his retainer and re •
quest in prosecuting and defending divers suits at law
and in equity. It was, in plain terms, for work done in
his capacity of an attorney, and which he could not do
unless he was authorised by enrolment, and he thought
that must be held to be a good defence to the action.
The COURT was of opinion that the pleas were bad
for the defects pointed out by the Learned Counsel, in
the first place, because there was a duplicity in them,
there being not less than three distinct facts alleged,
either of which, if sustained, would have been a sufficient
answer to the action. Thiii with regard to the plea of
time, it appeared to them that the objection was valid,
inasmuch as they could not tell when the cause of action
had commenced or accrued. It was possible that it might
have accrued in consequence of credit given, and for that
uncertainty, and the reasons already stated, the Court
was of opinion that the pleas were bad, and their judg-
ment must be for the plaintiff.

EXCHEQUER.-(THIS DAY.)
At the sitting of the Court this tnorning the Right
Hon. Henry Goulburn cane upon the bench in his
robes of office, and took the oaths of allegiance, &c., ap-
pointed to be taken by any one appointed to the office of
Chancellor of the Exchequer.