The Sun.
London, England, 1840-11-23 00:00:00

EVENING EDITION.

Siiortridge, in his turn, has since obtained an order for 1
uoother trial before the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.
The Chevalier de I..dollerus arrived here last week 43
Dutch Charge d'Affaires, and has been presented to the
Queen, A Minieter ;is shortly expected from Brussels.
The Marseillaise was sung at San Carlos a few days
sines, where a piece called " The Last Days of Venice,"
in which Napoleon figures as one of the personages of
the drama, is in course of representation. One would
111,.T thought the recollection of the consequences of
fraternizing with the French could not yet have been
forgotten even by the polite mob of Lisbon.
Tne suspension of guarant2es expired yesterd sy. The
_Director and C'orreio journals have re-appeared, and
the.-e arc hopes of the -Vaciwzal.
Tne steam-packet with the London mail of the 7th
has not yet arrived, but I learn that she has just been
signalled as " off the rock."--illortzing Paper.

FRENCH CHAMBER OF PEERS.

DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.

SITTING OF NOV. 18.

We gave In Saturday's columns a report (necessarily
hurried, and, consequently, imperfect) of M. Guizot's j
speech in the Chamber of Peers, on the debate of the
address, but its great importance induces us to make the
follossing translation of it from the Moniteur Unieersel
of Thiiretlay :
M. Guizot—Gentlemen, I hesitated to address you. It
is not my province to interfere in discussions which may
arise between preceding Cabinets. I have as yet, with
respect to the present Cabinet, nothing to say ; there is
nethinss to defend of the past, and the utmost reserve is
imposed upon me with respect to the future. I cannot, nor
ought not, reply to any of the questions that have been,
or that might he, addressed to rne. I have, therefore,
candidly speaking, but a minor part to assume in the de-
bate. However, it is necessary, I think, to come to a de-
termination as to the position which the Cabinet assumes,
and the opinion which it forms of the momentous affairs
confided to its charge. That position is adopted, Gentlemen,
end that opinion is pointed out in the speech of the
Crown, the only public act of the Cabinet in the question.
The speech premises by clearly circumscribing and
defining the object of the Treaty. It refers to measures
resorted to by Four Powers, in order to regulate in
concert the relations of the Sultan and of the Pacha of
Eisyps : nothing more, nothing less. There is no question
thinein either of a general remodelling of the East,
or of any political coalition against France, or of any
preparation for a division of the Ottoman empire. The
intervention of Four Powers, on the Sultan's demand, in
order to regulate his relations with the Pacha of Egypt,
his vassal, is the only true and sole object of the treaty.
It has been so stated mad written. I am convinced of it.
The speech of the Crown is in this the exact expression of
the fact. However, that treaty is attended with danger,
special and limited as it is. Quite another matter may
arise than what is sought for. The Powers may be led,
urged on, and prevailed upon to do more than they have
ondertakein Hence the necessity for armaments which
the king's Government has ordered—armaments of pre-
cauti 's and foresight which arc destined to guarantee the
security of Feance and the maintenance of her rank in the
world.—armaments that are necessary on that score and in
those bounds, for the future is obscure and harassing—arma-
ments which, up to the present time, are only necessary,
fer we hope chat the possible danger will not be realised—
see hape that peace will be honourably maintained. We
believe it, and we are doing cur utmost for that purpose.
L is our policy, which has been openly proclaimed and
sincerely put in force. —( Great applause.) There,
Gentlemen, in the language of the speech, and by
the simplest of commentaries, there is the position
which the Cabinet assumes ; there is the opinion
which it forms of the affair that the Treaty of July has had
the,' pretension to regulate. We believe that that posi-
tion is the only one that is wise, suitable, and in accord-
ance with the facts. We believe that the facts, being de-
tailed and well understood, clearly define it. In 1833 an
analagous situ:tion hinged upon a transaction—upon the
transaction of Kutaye, Europe remained in peace, and
the East remained in peace under that transaction. More
than once peace has been threatened ; more than once, on
both side, on the part of the Sultan and of that of the
Paella, there has been a desire to break it. The Paella
has hal a certain indecisive leaning for independence.
The Sultan has an inclination to resume the territories
that he had abandoned. During six years those opposite
wishes were suppressed. It is deplorable that they were
not so in 1839, as they had been during six years. France
has nothing to reproach herself with in that respect. At
Alexandria, at Constantinople, she did all that she could
fur peace to be respected. Her language has been con_
atantly in accordance with her acts. Her real influence
has never thwarted her official councils. The language
of her Ambassadors has never differed from that of her
Ministers. France wished for the maintenance of peace.
She does not bear the responsibility of the war that
broke cut in 1839. When that war broke out
France resumed the policy which triumphed in
1833—the policy of negotiation. France demanded that
a fresh negotiation, with a view to the pretensions and in-
tereats of the two parties, should insure to the East a new
era of peace. With respect to the suspension of the war,
the most complete understanding has existed between the
Powers. England and France immediately interceded
with the Sultan and the Paella to interdict the promulga-
tion of hostilities. With respect to the question of Con-
stantinople, the abolition of every exclusive protectorate
at Constantinople, France and England were alike of one
iopinion. I have no need to enter into details of precau-
tions and measures that have been prepared on that sub-
ject. It is evident, it is plainly defined, that the same
opinion, the same desire, and the same policy animated
both Governments. Their dissension arose ou the basis of
the fresh negotiation which it was necessary to impose on
the Pacha and the Sultan. Here, Gentlemen, I shall
state with perfect sincerity, that it is in my opinion a seri-
ous error on both sides to have listened to that dissension,
to have abandoned themselves thereto, and to have ni)de it
td knot of the qusatien and of the situation. A great
'policy has been sacrificed to a minor one, and superior in-
terest to that of a secondary consideration. The great po-
licy, the superior interest of Europe and of all the Powers
in Europe, is the maintenance of peace everywhere and al-
ways; the maintenance of security in the minds as well as
tranquillity in the acts. It is not only necessary for the
material well-being of society, but for the moral and politi-
cal good, for the moral and political progress of all nations
in Europe. That policy was qualified yesterday as being
egotistical and paltry. I regret to differ essentially in opi-
nion on that point with my sincere and honourable friend
Count de Montalembert. It is with a conviction equally
profound and equally sincere that I shall state that it is
my opinion therein/consists the most open, moral, and uni-
versal policy ; if 1-te allowed me to alter hie language, I
should say the most catholic that is possible in our time.—
( Very w, II.) M. de Montalembert is not ignorant that
for the last fifty years an immense shock agitates the
world ; the most important, the most salutary results have
sprung up from that shock, and our country especially has
made the most useful, the most glorious conquests in con-
sequence. But the shock has been great, and it has cost
dear. The results that have been obtained stand in great
Bneed of being consolidated. The evils that the shock has
used and left stand in much need of being remedied. In
order to consolidate the results that have been obtained
—in order to remedy the evils that subsist—peace,
a long duration of order, and a tranquil state of affairs,
therein consists, perhaps, the only true remedy. What
-has been the principal evil of the state in which we
have lived for such a length of time? The reign of passion
and strength. That is what must be contended against.
:For the reign of passion and strength must be substituted
that of justice, of right, of the right maintained and de-
fended by the only arms of understanding, without re-
course to material force, by the on' y peaceable and regular
xacans of government. Our epoch is in much need thereof,
and that is how you can contend against the deep evil that
instigates it. And that is, Gentlemen, what makes the
greatness, the morality, of the policy of peace ; that is the
means by which it has deserved every sacrifice that we have
made for it ; that is the means by which it has shot such deep
roots in the minds of nations. Do not believe that it is solely
to maintain material repose, and to defend their fortnne,
that so many men are at the present time so smitten with
order and peace ; the true reason, the great reason is, that
thaiy do not wish to see those times of passion and violence
xestored; they do not wish to see the influence of ma-
terial force, of disorganised force; they wish to see the
rule prevail in the heart of society ; believe me therein con-
siits a moral as well as useful policy, great as well as salu-
tary,_( Very well ) That policy has been deviated from
le the East ; it has been forgotten that from the present
time henceforward there will be no private question in
Europe.—no question which is worth the sacrifice of
genereal peace. It was remembered for the West, it was
Put. in force in the Westobut it was forgotten in the East,
Andone is at bottom so impressed with the danger of such
forgetfulness, that at the very moment when it was com-
mitted there was an endeavour to escape the consequences.
The endeavours and the attempts of negotiation and ar-
rangement multiplied. France made three. France
offered, to prevail taper' the Pacha to give up the district
of Actana, Candi
hand Arabia, provided that Egypt and
Syria were left toa
maintenance
heirsbips. France offered the
pure and simple m
guarantee of the Ave European °Pt* the status quo, with the
,owers. In short, latterly,
after the Treaty was concluded, France allowed it to be
inferred that she would prevailupaon the Pacha to be satis-
fied with Egypt as an heirship,
ert unrdes Syria for life. On
her part England also made oa
; she
s grantedt.
Jean
d Egypt,Ae
as an heirship; she added the pachan, of
exception of the town ; she afterwards added the
with the
body said was the ke t of
town itself, that town which every
it granted
Syria, and that the possessor:of St.Jeand'Acre was master
over Syria. The British Cabinet considered that conces-
sion as something very considerable, which
with a viqw of France resuming
power ng her position - m
the
affair. Being uneasy as to
Egypt, being evidently jealous of pof the Pacharestraining it, it
him the town ofcoSn-
sinered it granted a deal by giving
Jean d'Aere, and it did it solely under the influence of
that that great, that profound desire for peace which exists in
all Governments, and in every country in Europe. Every
negotiation failed ; England would not have that of
France ; France would not have that of England. It is a
great misfortune, for each was worth more than the
ksttatee
of affairs in which matters have merged. But to take
events as a whole, and in their definitive consequences,
there is not one of the propped negotiations, whether by
France or England, which ought not to have been ac-
cepted on one side and the other with eagerness, if the
rotate of things allowed it. But the Treaty being concluded,
the great Policy abandoned, and the isolation of France
consummated, there is, I repeat it, no other position to ,
be adopted than that which has been assumed by the
Cabinet in the speech of the Crown—a position which
it maintains, and
will maintain—the pacific position, I
armed by preeautiont ant foresight, and in expectancy.
) i
(Sensation.
is stated that that is not
sufficient. It is stated that ourpana
ineter,ests in the East,
that our relations with the
that the insult
we have received from the Treaty, and that the interest of
our Influence in the world, impose
on
us something else.
Ido not think so. With respect to our interests in the
East, it is evident, Ventlemen, that the question of know.
hit; what will be tlao division of territory in the heart of

the Ottoman empire betweeii the Sultan and his Pach'as,
that the question of knowing whether Syria will belong
to the Sultan or to the Pacha of Egypi, is not of much
moment to France---that it is not, at least, an affair
from which war ought to arise. Not only it is not so,
but we have always stated it the policy of every Cabinet,
at every period, has been that the division of the terri-
tories between the Mussulmans, in the interior of the
Ottoman empire, was of little consequence to us ; the
maintenance of peace, the maintenance of the independ-
ence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, as a whole,
with respect to the great European Powers, that is what
concerns us —( Very well.) We have no formal engage-
ment with the Pacha; no one infers so at the present
time ; but it is stated that we have moral engagements, that
the support which we gave him, what we have done for him,
binds us to go further. Further We have supported the
Pacha in most of his pretensions ; we claimed for him Egypt
and Syria as heirships ; we stated that nothing must be im-
posed on him by force—that his pacific adhesion to a nego-
' nation must be obtained, as in 1833. That was stated by
all the Cabinets at every period. For him, and on ac•
count of him, in order to maintain him in the position
which 1 have just described, we accepted the coolness of
our best Allies—we accepted isolation—we accepted con-
siderable armaments and the enormous expenses that ac-
company them—we have accepted the chances of a general
war—we have done all that influence can do, and it is not
enough. We must have war a general war, as if the
matter referred to our most intimate Allies, to our fron-
tiers, or that our own provinces or national existence were
in question That is contrary to the most simple common
sense. We have strenuously supported and served the
Pacha ; we have resolutely put forth for him all the in-
fluence of France ; we have accepted on his account a
difficult and dangerous situation. That is not sufficient in
order to accomplish all the good that we wish him ; we
assuredly do not owe him more; and never, at any period,
has any Power more pledged and compromised itself for
so distant and uncertain an Ally.—( Sensation.) I now
go to the affront—( Hear bear)—a motive which would be
decisive if it existed. The Chamber knows the facts ; it
knows how matters were before the conclusion of the Treaty

of the lath of July ; it knows that on one side and the
ether there were long and sincere efforts, in order to be
of one accord ; it knows that up to the end of June no-
thing was concealed—that every means of negotiation and
arrangement were attempted, and attempted openly. In
the latter end of the month of June the following was the
state of things. Every endeavour at negotiation proposed
by France or England had failed. The news arrived of
an attempt of a direct arrangement between Alexandria
and Constantinople. Nobody can deny that that attempt
was in formal contradiction to the note of the 27th July,
which stated to the Porte—Do not enter into any direct
arrangement with the Paella ; we take upon ourselves
to settle affsirs. It was known in London in the course
of the month of June. It was thought, very wrongfully,
and against my most formal and persevering protesta-
tions, that that attempt was the work of France ; it was
thought that France, abandoning the policy of the
27th July, bad attempted to assume to herself an iso-
lated policy, an isolated success. I stated, I repeated es-
pecially that it was false. I was not believed.—( Sensa-
tion.) Therein was grounded an obstinate error which has
exercised over the events very great influence. It was said
since France wished to assume an isolated policy, and to
derive success apart, we may as well do as much. The
arrangement for four, which remained in suspense for a
length oF time, which, I have the presumption to say, I as-
sisted in keeping in suspense, according to the orders anal
instructions of the King's Government, that arrangement
was resumed with extreme vivacity. At the same time
arrived the news of the insurrection of Syria. The attempt
at a direct arrangement caused much ill-will, the insu.rec-
tion of Syria gave much hope. The projects of negotia-
tion which were yet pursued by some of the plenipoten.
tiaries, were cooled down, and failed, owing to that very
circumstance ; and at the very instant the arrangement for
four, which had been strenuously urged, and assisted by
the facts which I have already detailed to the Chamber,
was concluded ; it was concluded without the knowledge
of France.—( Sensation ) During the last eight or ten
days that the conclusion of the arrangement was pending
France was put on one side. The four Powers, and I
must add they had a right to state that they were convinced
that the attempts at negotiation had failed definitively,
had constantly repeated, " If you do not decide, if you do
not come to an understanding with us, we shall conclude
an arrangement for four ; we shall end the affair by
" four." It has been ended by four, as stated, but without
giving a final notice to Fiance. Ido not hesitate to say
that there has been towards France a want of courtesy,
which her conduct and attitude must evince by a proper
feeling. It might have been thought that the right existed
to conclude the arrangement for four to sign without France.
It wag suitable, it was just, towards an old and intimate ally
to give it notice that the signing was about to take place—
to ask it whether definitively it suited it or not to be asso-
ciated in the undertaking. There was not evinced for
France at that moment, for her Government, all the cour-
tesywhieh she had a right to.—( Ver3 well, verywell.) Gen-
tlemen, that is not fair proceeding, but it is not an affront;
it is not a political insult. There never was an intention
during the whole course of the affair-1 beg the Chamber
will pay attention to these words which I make use of after
having maturely considered them—there never was an in-

tention either to deceive, to defy, or to. isolate France ;
no bad intention existed against her, no hostile feeling;
it was thought that there was no means of coming to an un-
derstanding with France on the basis of the negotiation.
He had been repeatedly told, and it was repeated to him
a little before the conclusion, that if an understanding was
not come to with her on the basis of the negotiation,
an engagement for four would be concluded. It has been
made, and she must have expected it ; it has nut been
made with all the courtesy which she had a right to ex-
pect. It is a wrong no doubt—a wrong which we have
a right to complain of; but I ask the Chamber—l ask
the most susceptible and delicate in point of national ho-
nour, and who, however, retain and will retain their judg-
ment in the appreciation of facts, whether that is a cause
for war? I have spoken of our interests in the East, of
our engagements with the Pacha, and of what is termed
the insult made to France. The last point remains—our
influence in the world. It is said that it will be lost—that
France will be humiliated if she does not exact from that
Treaty a striking reparation. Gentlemen, since 1830 it
has become, for certain persons, a common topic of con-
versation, and almost of the Tribune, to say that France is
without influence in Europe—that the influence of France
has incessantly declined. In my opinion the contrary is
the truth. France has had, since 1830, on the affairs of
Europe a great, a very great, influence. She has done
more than any other Power in Europe, and she has no
right to complain of her situation, nor of her influence for
the last ten years. Since the last ten years France has
morally and politically allied Belgium, which was hos-
tile to her; France has allied Switzerland, which was
hostile to her; and France has allied Spain, which was

hostile to her.—(The Marquis de Breze attempts
to speak.) I request M. de Dreux Breze to al.
low me to go on to the end. I forsee all that he can say.
I affirm, however, that since 1830 France has gained to

her alliance Spain, a conquest which may be of mere or
less value, or which may be more or less dear, but which
is not the less true. A Government analogous with the
institutions and general ideas of the French Government

has been established in Spain. That fact alone, that pre•
vailing fact, will one day bear the fruits of its results.
I do not hesitate in affirming that since 1630, around

her, in the countries that surround her, the influence of
France has become infinitely more important than for-
merly. Let one of the great European Powers be pointed
out to me that has made the same progress ; let one
of the great Powers of Europe be pointed out to me
by whose means such great alterations have been effseted
in the States that surround her. There is not one.
France has made Europe accept her own situation and
analogous situations in three or four of the States that
surround her. Is that a loss of influence—an humiliation
of France ? With respect to the particular fact which we
are upon, it is not, Gentlemen, so strange, so unheard
of, as is pretended. It is not the first time that a great
State thus aids, without taking part and waging war, in
events which, however, concern it. In 1826 a Greece
was created, a State dismembered from the Ottoman em-
pire, and which adjoined the frontiers of Austria: Eng-
land, Russia, and France, conclude a Treaty to protect
that State ; Austria remains neuter. Austria considers
that it coincides with her policy not to take pert in the
Treaty which creates Greece. Has Austria disappeared
from the number of the great Powers of Europe ? Does
she not retain considerable rank and influence in the des
times of Europe ? I take another example of a Power
more susceptible, more ambitious, than Austria—England.
In 1823 a large French expedition enters Spain, in order
to destroy a regime which England protected : not only it
enters, but it occupies Spain. It occupies for several
years Cadiz, one of the objects of vigilance and jealousy
of England. What does Mr. Canning do, the most po- 1
pular Minister of England ? He remains in peace ; he
deems it wiser for England not to wage war for such an
event. He did as we do ; he employed to prevent that
event all his means of influence ; he negotiated, he raised
obstacles ; but ashen the event was accomplished, be had
the good sense to understand that the interest of the coun-
try was not on that account to engage in a general war i
he had the good sense to understand it and to say it, and
now England ackn swledg es that Mr. Canning at
that period ruled well over her destinies. Persons corn-
plained of him ; he was accused of want of fore-sight,
blindness, and weakness ; be persisted; England remained
passive, and in expectancy ; and now it is acknowledged
that she is by no means the loser in strength or dignity.
Gentlemen, France must not be deceived as to her means
of influence in Europe. I think there exists in that re-
spect much prejudice and routine. We have had for a
great length of time two great means of influence in
Europe—revolution and war. Ido not accuse them,
be sure of it. They have been necessary for a length of
time, and legitimate, in order to ensure to France the re-
gime at home which she stood in need of, and the inde-
pendence abroad to which she had a right. But, in short,
revolution and war, as means of influence in Europe, are
\
!verri out for France. She would do herself immense in-
jury if she persisted in resorting to them. The means
of influence for France now consist in peace ; it is
the spectacle of a good Government, in the heart of
great libert
conqueredY,forFrancei
by a revolution. The means
of influence
men ; it i, t
o 'a to reign over the minds of
conquer everywhere, not territo-
ries, but understanding and soul. It is thereby that
France is called upon to extend her power in Europe, her
credit and her storren:,,atrh twiallnd at the moment of danger
when the proof
arise for a good cause, for a
great and just cause,quFersatnzebwi I reap the benefits of her
slow and mental conquests, but are not the lass real
—of those conquests which e.O nnoott derived from pro-
vinces and tributes, but which
L,
~et,he less tend to an
I increase of strength and power. a
to our country 7tier.er me. Gentlemen,
territories to be
let us not speak
great revenge
goosed; lot us not speak of great wars, of
Per, lei her
to be evinced. Pie ; let France pros
rich, intelligent, and animated, without any disturbances,
free,
and we shall not have to complain that sheet in warn,rosi
influence in the world.—(Loud and contid applause.)
'The Count de Montalembert expressed
.his surprise at
hearing M. Guizot say so much of peace as the Only
policy for France, and nothing of Justice or honour.
M. Guizot—l thank the Count de Montalembert for en.
abiing me to give to ray words their right sense. r !

V.