The Sun.
London, England, 1815-01-30 00:00:00

SIR. WILLIAM SKEFFINGTON, BAItT.

Died, very deeply- lamented, at his house in
Clwles.street, Grosvenor-square, on Thursday
last, in the afternoon, January 29, between the
hours of three and four, after a long and painful
which he sustained with truly Chriitian
fortitodei Sir WILLIAM ell AIILES FARRELL EP-
FINGTON, Bart. in the 73d year of his age. .The
family of Farrell was originally of the province of
Connaught, in Ireland, and deScended from the
Princes of Annaly. The direct ancestor- of the
Sketlingtons was John de Skeffington, •in
1188, whose son, Sir Geoffrey de Skeffington, was,
in 1221, possessed of lands at Skeffington, in
Leicestershire. Sir William was born Jnne 24,
1742, and served in the First Regiment of Foot
Guards for tssenty-five years. He was appointed
one of the esquires to his Royal Highness Prince
Frederick Duke of York, at the Installation of
the Knights of the Most Hononrable Order of the
Bath, in 1772 ; he was a Deputy Lieutenant for
the County of Lei9ester ; and he was a Member
of the Antiquarian Society. 'At the important
crisis of 1794, Sir William was Colonel of the
Leicestershire Yeomanry Cavalry, which was the
.first regiment of yeomanry that was completed,
and made its returns to GovernMent.—Sir Wm.
Skeflington was distinguished ii) private society
for the urbanity of his manners ; and in public
life the duties of his station were upheld by ar-
dour, and maintained with firmness. He is suc-
ceeded in the.title- by his only son. •

The English in Paris Say that Coroners'. in-
(pests are dispensed with on drowned persons, as
there is no doubt of their being In-Seine.

AN ExTRAORDI NARY AQUATIC HUNT.—On Sa-
turday, a barge containing 50 barrels of turpen-
tine, sprung a leak, and stink in the river, near
Blackfriars-bridge, so suddenly, that all went to
the bottom,—In about a minute afterwards up pops
a.barrel, then another, and another, until the whole
of the barrels rose, and the tide being very rapid
Ott the ebb, they floated down the river with the
greatest velocity ; every boat about the place was
immediately manned, and went in chase. The
sight was one of the pleasantest witnessed for a
considerable time, and afforded much amusement
to several thousands of spectators on the bridges,
Several of the barrels were picked up before they
reached 'London Bridge, and many of them out-
stripped the boats until they went Its far as Dept-
ford.

Ou Friday last a Coroner's Inquest sat on -the
body of a young Gentleman of the name of Nu-
GENT, a clerk in the Army Pay Office; nho blew
4is brains out with a pistol on the preceding day.
The Jury returned a verdict of Lunacy. The
cause of this rash act is conjectured to be gam-
bling embarrassments.

IVINCIIESTER—EiGiITI-1 DAV, SATualmy, JAN. 28.

, •
General MURRAY resettled the reading of his
Defence, where he broke off yesterday, iii the
middle of the answer to the third charge.
The next point to be attended to (he said), was
the strength and equipment of the allied array ;
Mi this subject great misrepresentations had One
abroad. Returns had been published, including
corps which were never in Spain, and other corps
which, previous to the embarkation arrarragona,
had been sent hack to Sicily. The army of Ca-
talonia under his command, had been made as
large as that under the Duke of Wellington him:-
self. • While the numbers under him had been
heightened ; on the other the numbers of
the enemy had .been diminished. But the best con-
tradiction of these mistatemenrs would be afforded
by returns from the Adj .-Gen.'s Officer, which could
not he called in qtiestion. From these returns it
would appear, that the Anglo-Sicilian army
amounted to 12,818 infantry, and 698 cavalry, in
all 13,516 men of both armies, of all descriptions,_
and composed of troops of all nations. The num-
bers at embarkation and re-embarkation were
nearly the ; for not more than 56 men in all
were killed during the siege. This total included
the servants, and all thi)Se who were in the de-
partments of the hospitals, commissariat, Ike.—
But the composition of this army promised less
than its numbers. He felt it therefore necessary
to shetv the manner in which the army was actu-
ally composed. The British amounted to 3910,
the Germans to 1710, and in their ranks were men
of all nations. There were two regiments of. Ita-
Hatt deserters front the French, amounting to
1330, the Sicilians amounted to 980, the Cala-
brese to 490, and the remainder were 4398 Spa-
niards in Spanish and British pay, making in all,
as before stated, 12,818 infantry. The cavalry
was composed of 427 British, and 276 of the
Brunswick Hussars, in all 698. Such was. the
betorogencons mass of which the Anglo-Sicilian
army . was romposed. No reinforcements took
place from the period of these returns, and con-.
sequently the numbers were never inaeased.—
This circumstance would render any observations
on his part unnecessary. The only part of this
force on which any reliance could be placed,
was the British and Germans ; but their num-
hers,. it would be seen, were not great. Had
their numbers been even doubled, it might be
doabted whether he would have been on a par with
the French, who had an army of 20,500 at least.
But independently of what must be apparent to
every one on a first inspection, of this statement,
there were other circumstances %void' increased
the inefficiency of these troops. Success could
only.be expected front well equipped and steady
troops. .But the-re was no pact of this army which
fully answered this description. The British part
was even not altogether efficient, and none of the
others were efficient. He had as much confidence
in the gallantry of this army as any Officer possi-
bly could have; but this was no reason why he
should have been blind to its defects. To many of
the corps he was willing to pay testimony to their
gallantry whenever they had arty opportunity of
sheaving it ; but even these corps were deficient
in the necessary equipments. To the conduct of
other parts
.(tf the army, he could not speak in the
saute terms. The only other argument on this
subject, which he should trouble the Court with,
was the difficulty of provisioning the division of
General Whittioghain. On this point, he had re-
ceived an express .prohibitory order front the
Duke of Wellington. The difficulty which this
occasioned had been often keenly teft by him ;
but by `this prohibition, it could only be provided •
for in the sane manner with General Copon's
army. The next point was the equipment of this
army. When he took the command of this army
at Alicant, he might say that it was immova-
ble. One great difficulty then was, the low
state of the military chest. Previous, how-
ever, to 'the embarkation for Tarragona, the
deficiencies of this army were much removed.—
The artillery department bad been well equipped
with horses and mules; and the chief deficiency
was in the Commissariat. Department. When the
army landed at Tarragona, it was in an incom-
plete and, inefficient state in every part. On the
Commissariat equipments, little or nothing was
taken with them, as would appear by a letter.
front Mr. Daniel, of the Commissariat. As there
was a deficiency of room, preference was pro-
perly given to those things which were most es-
sential,for the immediate object of the expedition.
it was impossible for him to increase the num-
ber or enlarge the size of the transports. There
were left behind at Alicant 638 horses and mules,
and only 345 were brought with army, being only
about one-third of the complement. The num-
ber of tumbrils for the guns, the vehicles for the
conveyance- of ammunition, camp-kettles, Ste.-
were extremly deficient ; and with respect to wag-
gons for the removal of the sick and wounded,
and the hospital utensils, no provisiOn whatever
was made. On the approach of an enemy, all
.hopes of supply whatever for the army vanished,
for they had not an open country in their rear.
He was sensible of the great advantages which he
had in the composition of the Court, the members
of which knew the great importance of these ar-
ticles to an army.

With. such disc !vantages, and with such infor-
mation as he was in possession of respecting the
numbers of the enemy, would it have been pru-
dent in him to have Met the French.Conamander
in the field, when no adequate advantage could
have been gained to compensate for the hazard,
and when defeat on his part would have been fol-
lowed with absolute destruction ? The Duke of
Wellington had expressly stated to him that the
success of the campaign depended on the safety
of the whole of the armies, and that he would
pardon any thing sooner- than the defeat or dis-
persion of any of the corps. It had been said,
that besides the Anglo-Sicilian army, he had at
his disposal the Spanish Catalonian army. The
merits of this army had been very highly stated
by some of the evidence. lii order to shew what
little -stress. was to be laid on that evidence, he
would give, not his own opinion with respect to
the composition of that army, but the op►niou of
its own Commander. Surely it. could Hot be sup-

posea that
it %roma b* represented in a more imia ..
vourable light from this quarter than it deserved.
It would be seen how 'far the °pillion of its (*twit
Offirers corresponded with that gi,,r) by General
M'Kenzie. He wouild lay before the Court a Me-
morial dated the 14di March, 1813, drawn up by
Colonel Cabanez, the Chief of General Copoa's
Staff. In this report Ile stated that it was impos-
sible not to speak highly of the bravery of many
of the individuals of that army. It was necessary,
however, to speak the truth. The army, how-
ever %veil adapted for (be species of warfare carried
on in Catalonia, displayed a want of subordina-
tion and of discipline tvhich unfitted it for meeting
a regular army in the field. From the individual
bravery of the men, and their fitness for exec:l)6:lg
~
": rapid morenients, this want of discipline was not
' so much felt when the war was cattle(' on in
mountains. But the infantry were not 'instruct-
, eel in manoeuvring, diet, -cavalry were not suffi-
ciently ntimerous, the artillery wanted the means
of serving with effect, the sappers were yet hi
their infancy ; they possessed no magazines, and
' they were in want of clothing mid ammunition.—
: Such was the state of this army, according to Col.
Cahanez,. only ten weeKs previous to the diseni-•
barkation at Tarragona. 1-18 was ready to adin;t
the bravery of the individuals, tool the skill of
their commander, but from what lie had stated, it
must be evident to the Court, that they wanted
two of the most inilispensible requisites to ensure
victory—subordination and discipline. They were
only fit for a war carried on in' mountains or in de-
tached parties. The services which could be per- '
formed by such an many amounted to nothing
more than this, that the infantry could be employ-
ed in covering- the siege. The cavalry possessed
enthusiasm, but they were in no number. With re-
spect to their artillery, little could beexpected front
them ; they wanted the means of being terrible to
their enemies. Tie department of sappers. was only
in its cradle ; but this was not the moment to wait
for its maturity. The army was so composed that i.t
had neither magazines, clothing, nor ammunition,
nor money ; and the soldiers had no food but what
they could purchase. He had introduced. no
observations of • his own on this- subject, but
confined himself to the statements ' in this Me-
morial. He had no written opinion of General
Copons himself with respect to his army ;. but
this Memorial might be considered as having been
drawn up by his orders; and if he bad not ap- ,
proved of it, it certainly would never have been
communicated to General Murray. In the diffe-
rent conversations which - General Murray had
with General Copons, the latter always expressed
himself in nearly the same terms as those of the
Memorial. He always stated that his army could
not manoeuvre—rthat if they were placed in a'
strong position they would stand ; but unless .
they were placed so, or that a retreat was open
for them to the mountains, he could not think of
allowing them to be brought into action. He
could not blame General. Copons for this precau-
tion, for they most have been exposed to the hazard
of complete destruction on the embarkation. of the
Anglo-Sicilian army, if ' their retreat was cut off
from the northern part of the province. 'lt there-
fore became necessary that t he Spailish atmy should
always be kept at the northern extremity of the
allied army, to 'secure their retreat in case of raising .
the siege. General Murray saw the. impossibility
of the Spanish army ever affording that co-opera-
tion which was necessary to insure success in case .:
of attack. Another Spanish division, that of Ge-
neral Whittinghaut, was nearly in the same situa-
tion. With respect to the strength of the Spanish
Catalonian-army, he would refer to a return which
would accompany his address, signed by Colonel
Cahanez, of the date of the 11th 'of June 1813.
The numbers really efficient, it appeared, only
amounted to 5,933 men, including the two regi-
ments at the Col de Balaguer. He bad always -
taken Copons army at 6,000 men. The state of
a gallant Nation so' long overrun by an eueury,
was a stifficient apology for the state of this and ,

other Spanish armies but •it was no ..ipology for
those who wished hint to perform impossibilities
with such armies. Me only begged it to be recol-
lected, that weak as this army was, it could only
be kept in force for two or three days, and that
no co-operation could have been expected front
any other armies in Spain. With respect to the
state and composition of the Allied Army, he had
no other information to offer.

He bad already pointed out the consequences
which would have resulted from following the ad-
vice given by Admiral Hallowell. In the course
of his defence he had shewn, that one great ob-
ject of remaining before Tarragona, was to draw'
Marshal Suchet front Valencia a plan which had
been particularly directed by his Excellency the
Duke of .Wellington. A second motive was. the
hope that some chance of war would have thrown
the garrison into his power and the last was,
that he had'reason to hope the operations of the
enemy would have been so contused, as to pre-
vent them making a decided movement in any way.
All these prospects, however, ceased to exist on
the night of the 11th, Sachet having arrived with-
in one day's march of the lines of the Allied Army.
No accident had occurred which afforded a
chance of the fali of Tarragona. No reinforce-
ment had reached them, and the intention of
the enemy to advance seemed decided. Under
such circumstances, the preservation of the army,
entrusted to his care, in that state of effective
ness which would enable it to act in any sphere,
became his first care. If his. own judgment hod
not pointed out this course, the instructions of
his Excellency were too_ plain to be mistaken.—
The importance, of the I,riny to
the grand plan of the Mike of Weliington, :vas
in fact too manifest,--to be overlooked. Its ex-
istence put in activity the second
.4ild third Spa-
nish armies, and prevented the first from defeat.
Had these forces been dispersed' or paralysed,
Marshal Suchet would have been enabled to op-
pose, in the most decisive way, the arrangements
of the Commander-in-Chief, in whose rear he
would have moved, and thereby interrneited the
siege of St. Seba'st lan's, and the not less impOrtant
operations •,r Pampeluna. The at my of Alicanr, in
fact, would never be considered in any other he
it tit% erSiOn in favour of his Exceltenc.---
whese plays were alOne to be considered. ,He
(Sir J. Murray) had no Plan of his own to urn-
sitter, and he. had no right to put the army placcd
under his command in a situation to be beaten

v:ithout orders.- With these im-.
press:ons on his mind, it would ill become him
to hove listened to the advice of Admiral Hallo-
wt•ii ,and to have ha-larded the destruction of an
army upon which so touch depended. had he
suffered Os own personal feelings-to get the bet-
ter of his prudence; which had he obeyed the im-
poke of the moment in gilt have. been the case, he
Wave deserved reprobation. • The
pnblic, it was -true, might be silent, but' what
a9ology could he make to the Commander in
yvhose positive orders he had received ?
What excuse could he offer
..t.or having lost the
flower of his army, and, for the sake of saving a
tvw guns, have :,ad the hurses of the cavalry
slaughtered on the beach ? And who would be
I%i -1i enough to doubt that such would have been
the case, when the force•of the enemy advancing;
in‘iereodent of the garrison of Tarragona, was
known to be 12,000 of the best troops of France ?
Delea). would• have been almost certain, but its
probability (mild not be doubted. The expedi-
tion to Ostcnd.had not been forgotten„ and the
events at Corunna were still:fresh in our recol-
lectiun. The period was critical, and it was lucutn-
Lent on him to avoid a delay, which might have
been productive of the most fatal consequences.
If he had remained, and attempted to take off the
pins atall hazards, might not Marshal Suchet
have arrived on the beach ? And if he had, would
be have permitted the Allied Army to embark ?
And if this was prevented, he would have become
ni;ester of the field, and a decided blow would
have been given, to the hopes of success on the
eastern efast of Spain. A few hours might have
been of the utmost consequence ; and therefore
his refusal to meet the wishes of Admiral Hallo-
well, to wait till night, was, he trusted, satisfac-
torily accounted for. The enemy was on one side
atViila Franca, and on the other at l'crrella
and :'rum what there appeared there was Bulldog
prevent them from arriving at the beach at
the •very moment the embarkation bad com-
menced—a circumstance which would have en-
sured them almost infallible success. By the'
operatioos, as they did take place,. he (Sir
John .\ltaray) was enabled to seed the ca-
valry to the Col tic Balaguer—an opportu-
nity which, by the delay of a few hours more,
would .have been lost. • Upon the whole, when
the importance of the trust reposed in him was
taken into consideration, as well as. the irrepara-
ble injury which -would have resulted from anv
misfortune occurring to the army-under his coin,
rnann, he was satisfied the Court would agree with
him in thiukinr, that he would not have been jus-
tified in playing so desperate a game as that which
had been suggested by his Prosecutor. it only,.
in fact; requires! to refer to his instructious, which
painted consequences of his defeat, to bud the
measure of his punishment. The interest of Eu-
rope was interwoven in the success of the plans
of the Duke of Wellington ; and these operations
depended, in a great measure, in the safety of the
.51cilian army.

It YOBS not his part to calculate what the enemy
would, hut' what they could do—their approach
seemed unquestionable from all the sources of in-
formation which he •had ; and he could only ac-
count for their retreat by ascribing it to the arri-
val of Lord Exmouth in the Bay of Rosas.. Up
on this lie had no right to calculate, and nothing
could be considered less. probable than that the
enemy would retreat- after having made forced
marches for the purpose of obtaining au object
which seemed to be perfectly within their reach.
He had embarked his troops entire, and had
not left one man or one horse behind, neither.had
be left any one piece of field artillery.; 17 service-
able and unservireable, out of .91 pieces of ord-
nauce, haying been alone left behind. It was
true, the enemy might boast of this, to their use-
less prize, but how much more galling would have
been their boast,lf they had had the opportunity of
proclaiming the number of the death bodies of our
soldiers, the carcases of our horses, and the list
of our artillery in their possession, to which tro-
phies might be added, the colours of the Allied
Army. If such had been the case, blasted indeed
would have been the hopes of victory in Spain;
and well merited would have been the condemna-
tion of the unfortunate Commander, who, listen-
ing to the advice of shallow advisers, had, in agree-
ing to a proposition for•delay, sacrificed his own
judgment, and orsobeyed the orders of his Com-
mander. Before he concluded, he was desirous
of correcting two errors which had crept into. the
former part of his defence, the one was the state-
meat that the British had achieved on the 14th ;
this should have been the 13th, and the error was
attributable to the transaction. The other was,
that he should have stated his 011icers to have
seen the enemy on the 17th, and not the 6th, at
Vendrilla.

The gallant General then proceetied to corn-
ment on the evidence-for the prosecution ; that of
Captain Withers, 1-Joddart, and Inglefield all tend-
ed to the same point, and therefore only n single
observation was nmssary ; they proved his in-
tention to continue the attack on the fortress up"
to the night of the 1 Irk, to ‘vhich time, accord,-
ing to their evidence, the landing of stor6s and
guns did not cease. From the evidence: of Lieut.-
Col. Williamson, the fact appeared tlia.t'the rockets
ordered to he lauded were lying in the: boats for
t wo- days ; a circumstance which showed that the
beach was not always practicable for landing or cm,.
bark iug. This made for his case; and CaptAllithers's
evidence, relative to the requisition for boats on the
morning oft the 12(h, proved his anxiety to accele-
-I,*te the emarkation when once,
.4.l:ad been de-
tert”i! - on. II was also in proof that Gen. Doukin
spoke from liimselT when he announced the speedy
-o.rival of the enemy ; and it was equally proved
that-the enkany's advance could- mot have been.
checked on the beach roads t,y the fire.,of gun-
boats. He was most anxious to rebut the charge
of indecision, and be most positively denied that .
such, a charge could he inferred from his conduct.
Lie„tenant.Colonel Williamson's evidence rela-
tive to the position of the enemy, was only a re-
petition of the story of the peasant, which had
previinisly been found to be false. The.tieneral -
here compared the evidence of Colonel William-
son with that of Generals Mackenzie and Clinton,
and said, froei it was to tie gathered that his or-.
(lets to spike the guns wag contingent and condi-
tional.- Colonel . Thackery. was the next
hef. called'; he proved twat the attack on the

•
Puerto Beale was continued to the last moment
that any chance existed• of sehduing ',Laura-
gona: 'l4e algid proved that the enemy could ad-
vance by two rolls ; and, in opposition to the
opini,ms of the Naval O:litleis, he gave it as his
belief that it was impossinie, by marine force, to
intercept the enemy on tho,e roads. In all this
witness's tetittiony th.e General found nothing
in support of the prosecution, except that the
witness new of no reaion for raising the siege, and
indeed it was impossible he should,u oless he had pos-
sessed more- im-ormation relative to the trio% ements
of the enemy ; but this by no means proved that
no reason existed. Gen. Mackenzie's opinion of
:the brilliant success to be expected, in case of a
conflict with the enemy was toended on his know-
ledge extending only to the advance of De Caeu's
column. He had no knowledge of the advance or
even movements of Sachet. He admitted,that the
embarkation had been conducted without loss or
confusion, which wits proof that it was • not so
precipitate as had been described ; and, above all,
his opinion that 1200 men would •be sufficient to
mask the garrisoe of Tarragona, was sufficient to
chew the Court how precipitately his opinions had
been formed, and how little they deserved the
serious attention of the Court. Of the complete
state of the army and equipments he would not go
the length that General Mackenzie had done, in
speaking its praise ; some part of it he was well
aware could nor he spoken of in too high terms,
either as to gallantry or 'discipline ; but this was
not the case with all the troops, as might be col-
lected from the letters of Generals Mackenzie and
Clinton, front the latter csf whom he had been
informed that the men in the batteries had thrown
away their animunition as soon as they were ex-
posed to the tire of the enemy. Lord 1?. Ben-
tinek's evidence only went to one point, and on
that point he was certainly very ill informed.—
When be (Gen. Murray) saw Lord Bentinck
at his post he had been at the head-qearters of
Copons, eight miles in advance of Lord F.
Bentinck, whose memory died not appear to be
very perfect, fin •though he considered the ca-
valry completely covered by Copon's army, yet he
sent to Lund F. B. to keep out 'a stronger picket.
The last witness Called was Lieut. General
of the asperity of whose evidence he had am-
ple reason to complain. The tone and manner in
which it wets delivered equally shocked and stir-
pri,e!4 him.: General Clinton was the last min
from whoM he had a right to expect such evi-
dence ; -but. if the General complained of the end-
less change in the orderi given 'to General Mur-
ray, he could only account for that-continual
change, by the little activity displayed by General
Clinton in obeying and e'xeceting those orders.
If the General complained of a want of confidence
in he (general Murray) was -sorry for the
existence of such a feeling ; but his duty was not
to conciliate the private feelings of individuals,
but to attend to public service ; a service which
was not always advanced by a too liberal and in 7.
discriminate communication of secrets. The in-
jury done by the opinions given by so high a cha-
racter as General Clinton, must be acknowledged,
and %would be deeply felt : this injury, however,
would only extend to the country, it would. not
operate in that Court ; but wheit the day came;
as he was sure It would, when a fair judgment
would he lot reed upon the whole case, then the
acrimony of the witness would -become visible, his
want of information would be apparent, .and the
public would learn how to estimate such evidence,
even though coming from such a character as Sir
W. Clinton. But if General Clinton thought at
the time that the embarkation bad the appearance
at a disgraceful flight, he would ask, was it•not•
the duty of the General to have sought Lord
Win.,Bentinek the moment• he arrived, and have
called on him to institute a Court Martial upon
the spot ?. It was, not enough to -say, that from
Admiral Hallowell's letter, he saw that an inves-
tigation would take place ; and, indeed, he had
no right to know of that letter ; but in any ease
lie should upon such an opinion have demanded
inquiry, and if he (Sir J. M.) had not done his
(ay, General Clinton was the person to step for-
forward—he was the only legitimate- champion of
the army. _

The General concluded his defence with a com-
mentary on the last document produced by Admi-
ral Hallowell, and said, he had only then to lay
the documentary evidence before the Court, which
fur evident reasons of convenience he should ar-
range •as-' follows :7--First, he would -produce in
regular order all the information' he had received
and acted upon ; secondly, he would lay before
the Court, the orders he had received and given.-
and lastly, he would bring forward the general
evidence applicable to the whole case. He would
begin with the information, as the first in order. Sir
J. Murray then submitted to the Conti a great va-
riety of documentary evidence, referred to in the
course of the defence, consisting of information re-
ceived from Spanish Officers, Magistrates, and pea-
sants,togetherwithorders and instructions given and
received by himself, and correspondence between
the Duke of Wellington, Sir John Murray, Ad-
miral Hallowell, and other British and Spanish
Officers. • Those docuMents were not read, but
merely put in ; the dates, signatures, and trans-
lations being proved by Captain Milner, Colonel
Kennah, ;Captain Sharp, (Royal Nary), Colonel
D'Aguila, the Judge Advocate, .General Donkin,
and
.G.etieral Whittingham. The greater part of
them was received by the Court, though some
Were suspended for the future consideration of the
Court. Among the latter was one from Admiral
Hallowell, dated-the 9th of June. When ail the
documents were produced,

Admiral Hallowell asked permission to lay be-
fore the Court the answer to the letter which
had been presented, as addressed by him to
,Sir
John Alurray. lie wished the answer to be
.placed in the same situation as the letter itself.,
• Sir John Murray objected to the production of
this letter, or any other document from the prose-
tutor after the prosecution was closed.
The JUDGE ADVOCATE said, that it was not
only the practice of Courts Martial, •but of every
other Court, to admit evidence from the prose-
cutor after he had closed his case, when that evi
dencevent to oppose some new matter or evi-
jeace introduced in the course of the defence,
a-nd of which the prosecutor• could have no pre-,
vious knowledge.
.If the present was deemed to

be a ca*e hi twilit, the later of Ad.iliral Hallo-
well would be admitted by the Court.
Admiral Hallowell said, the letter he offered
came under the description of the. Judge Advo-
cate ,; it was to be opposed to the lettered evidence
by Sir John Murray, which was new matter in
th© Idefence.
Sir J. ?jitrrav dial not object. to the letter of-
fered, from itsuature, but lie objected to the prin-
ciple of admitting evidence after the prosecutor
had closed his case.

The JUDGE AovocATE said, where new matter
was introduced into a defence loosely, it was cus-
tomary to reply to it merely ; but where that !nat-
ter was supported by evidence, then the prosecutor
was allowed to answer such new, matter by evi-
dence for instance, there was- a case in the
books on this
.subject. When a soldier was
charged with 'mutiny,. and the charge was proved,
if the prisoner in his defence gave evidence to
prove that he was forced by others to commit the
act, and that it was not done of his own volun-
tary agency, then the prosecutor was at liberty
to produce new evidence to disprove such a state-
ment.

Earl Montressor said, that the mere- statement
or a defence was of no importance, and made no
impressive► on the Court, except so far as it was
supported by evidence.
Admiral Ila:lowell said, so many and such grave
accusations bad been made against him in the
course of his defence—accusations that he could
not haze anCcipattd ; that be trusted the• Court,
would see the iteee!,sity of- his bringing forward
evidence to repel those accusations,; this he must
do in justice 'to himself', and be was desirous of
being sworn, so that Sir John Murray. might have
an opportunity of cross-exan►ining him in the se-
veuest manner.

The JUDGE ADVOCATE, said, the proper time
for, Admiral Hallowell to offer this letter, or any
other evidence, would be when Sir J. Murray's
evidence was all decided upon by the Court, and
when it should be, read

The Court was about to proceed to the consi-
deration of the suspended papers, but it being
three o'clock, the Court adjourned till Monday at
ten o'clock.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE, JAN. 28.

Admiralty Office. Jan. 28, 1815,

Copy of a Letter frun► Captain Sir George It. Collier,
of L., Majesty's ship Leander, addressed to Rear-Adruiral
Griffith. _

His Majesty's ship Leander, Dec. 29, 1814.
.Slll,-1 have the pleasure to acquaint you, that
with the squadron under my orders, being in
quest of the. Anaerican ships of war which escaped
.during the late gales from the ports of Massa-
chussets, 1 had the good fortune, yesterday at
sunset, to capture the celebrated privateer Prince
de Neufchatel, hermaphrodite-rigged, pierced for
22 guns, and having 18 mounted, six of Which are
long. nine and 12-pounders, and the rest 12-
pounder carronades ; measures 330 tons, With a
crew of 130 men, under the command of Nicho-
las by birth a Frenchniatt, and one of su-
perior professional skill and enterprize.
She sailed from BostOn on the 21st inst. and is
the completest vessel Lever saw. The activity of
the Captains of the Newcastle and Acasta cut off
the chance .of escape from this cruizer during a
chase of ten hours, the wind plowing a hard gale.
I cannot refrain from congratulating you on the
capture of this vessel, as she had been chased
during former cruizes by upwards of 60 different
British 'men of war, and frequently under their
guns; nor did- she bring to, in the present in-
stance, till the shot from this ship and the New-
castle were flying over her. I have, &c.
GEO. R. COLLIER, Captain.
Rear. Admiral Griffith,

January
.23,. 1815.

• • .•
The Prince Regent has' been pleased, iii the name and on
the behalf of bis Majesty, to appoint the .Hon. Robert An-
nesley to be his ;Majesty's Consul at Antwerp,