The Sun.
London, England, 1840-11-30 00:00:00

v,4' negotiations, and in pursuing sincerely and cordially the ()Neel

that we had in view,

The scentsit duty wa4 to inform the Cab.nci

exactly of all the cane of the success or failure of its. policy ;
to Mace clear:y before it at every moment the true siate of
r.ft Ts, in order that it should be able to make its de-
ciions in conformity with the vatious turns of the ;
that it tniglit modify its resolutions, and exercise a discretion ae.

cording to the necessities imposed by the course of events. The
litinetirable M. Thiers y. sterday cited the desp Itches and the
letters in which I inferined him of my hoses for the success of
ths policy with which I was charged. He was right; I had
hop se Several times in the course of that negotiation I had E;fe.
seenshe-possibility of attaining our object—that is to say, a peace-
ful negotiation between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, which
shoule accomplish, in a great measure, the project of arrangement
proposet in September by the Cabinet of the 1 eth of May, and
which was adopted by the Cabinet of the Ist of 31 irch. Seice the
hopes that I had formed have been brought under the notice of the
Chamber, I am compelled to place my doubts in like manner before
it. On the I tith of March I wrote the following letter to the Pre-
tests nt of the Council. (H. Guizot here read this tette:. It
expresses in it his hope that the Powers would make c is.
esseions, but at the same time expresses Lie fear lest Eng.
!Isis interests should become the ground of serious ne-
tt:tete or long delay. He also read a letter of the 17411
of March, in which he directs the attention of his Govern-
ment to the observations contained in his letter of the
16th, and adds, that France shout t endeavour to come to an un-
ties...deeding with Englanil on the Syrian question by means ef a
compromise, as, if this was not done, France would expose herself
to the chance of being isolated on the E (stern question, and seeing
An arrangement concluded between the Four Powers without her.)
It was on the 17th of March that I thus pointed out as a very pre.
bable chairce, and as a contingency for which it was right the Ca-
lettet should be prepared, and on which it should not deceive itself
—the tour-fold arrangement, if we did not succeed in an ameement
nit the Syrian question. I did not the less persevere in my efforts
Mr the success of the scheme of arrangement which the Cabinet 01
the Ist of March had adopted, and which consisted, as the Chamber
knows, in securing to the Paella the hereditary possession of
Egyet and Syria, and only asking of him the restitution of the island
of Candia, cf Astoria, and the Holy Cities. As I saie a few
minutes ego, Iliad at onetime the hope that the plan would succeed.
I made a statement to that effect to the President of the Council.
In the beginning of April, in ene of those moments—in the mo.
meat perhaps when I had most hope—and in the letter
dated Zel April, which expressed the most, and thus concluded :
" I went out, leaving Lord Palmerston very much impressed, I
think, wits. the subject of cur discourse. Ile said nothing to IT,
which anthorises me to imagine that his intentions are really
changed, or on the point of changing ; but if I do not deceive my.
self, it is the first time that the possibility of an arrangement,
which should give to 31ehenaet Ali the hereditary possession of
Syria as well as Egypt, and the restitution of Candia, Adana, and
the Holy Cities, to the P. rte, presented itself to his mind without
revolting his amour propre, and without his peremptorily repelling
it. 1 beg your Excellency not to give to my words any greater
scope than they have in my mind. I make you fully aware of all
the oscillations, good or evil, of a difficult and complex situation, in
which time danger is always imminent, and in which, up to the
present period, we have rather succeeded in shaking our adversaties
on their own grounds, than in drawing them to ours."--( Move.
ment.) The Chamber will perceive from this that the expression
of the doubt 4s linked very closely with the expression of the
hope, for the reason that I considered it my duty to make the
whole truth known.—(Very well.) I could lay before the
Chamber two or three other despatches of the same nature,
hut this will suffice, as there is no other in contradiction to
it. In the course of this negotiation, and amidst the oscillations
of hope and fear through which I was obliged to pass, several train
sactions were proposed- I must say for the sake of truth, and
that it should be known by my country, that it is my firm con-
viction that England, as well as the other Powers, but England,
above all, was Sincerely desirous of an amicable arrangement with
France. lam convinced that not only. the English people, but the
English Goreennaent and Lord Palmerston himself, have the French
alliance at heart,—(Hear.)
A voice from the Left—lsievertheless, facts have spoken clearly.
el. Guizot continued—l stand in this tribune to speak what
Believe to be the truth, and never was it of more importance to
my country to know it. What, gentlemen !—the Government of
the King firmly adhered to its first proposition, of arrangement ;
it would not depart from them, and yet it would not have it said that
it had not the English alliance at heart. The Hon. 111 Thiers
knows better than anybody else what importance is attached to it,
and it was right. Nevertheless, it held firm as regards the East,
to its ideas, and to its first propositions. This is what England
herself did. Why should you conclude from this that England
ha. not the French alliance at heart? England might retort
upon you the reproach.—(Exclamations from the Left.) From
what I have here said, Gentlemen, I only intend to draw this con.
elusion, that on both sides the desire of an approximation was sin-
Pere ; that c u both sides, if there has not been an approximation, it
*as because to the point of difference there was attached on both
eillea an titteetne, and in my °Onion exaggerated, importance
:(Exelathations from the Left, while from the other side many
vele:es exclaimed, " But it is evident.") 31. Guizot continued :
the first serious effert at an arrangement was the offer to add to
the hereditary possession of Egypt the Pachalic of St. Jean d' Acre
and its fortress for the life of Mehemet Ali. Every one had at.
(ached an extreme importance to the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre;
everybody had said from the commencement of this affair that St.
Jean d'Acre was the key ofS, ria, and that he who possessed it could
at any (hue easily retake Syria. I heard this said in every
discussion which took place on this great question ; and
when the Cabinet of the loth of May had separated the
propositem of the hereditary concession from the life-poe.
session of the Pachalic of St. Joan d'Acre, it was because
the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre was not comprised in it, and
that without the fortress the Pachalic appeared insignificant. I
must now make the Chamber acquainted with the disposition in
which I found Lord Palmerston when he made this proposal of a
transaction. I stated it in these terms to the Cabinet on the Sth of
May: —" It evidently cost Much to Lord Palmerston to give up the
fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. Ile made-up for it to himself by tell-
ing me what I knew, that for this arrangement, and if the Pacha
refused to accede to it, Austria consented to have recourse to co-
ercive measures, by joining her flag to those of England and Rus-
sia. He then developed his plan of coercion, which consists in a
triple blockade of Alexandria, of the coasts of Syria, and of the
Red sea I saw Lord Palmerston not only annoyed at the idea of
Abandoning $C Jean d'Acre, but at the same time rendered con li.
dent by the adhesion of Austria to the employment of coercive tnea.
sures." I only cite this passage to the Chamber to show the
importance which the English Cabinet, either right or
'Smug, placed upon the concession which it then made, and
the sincerity of the hope of arrangement which animated
i
These details were known to the Cabinet. The pro-
isositnin see, set
aside a month afterwards. The Cabinet
ales illit think it its duty to accept it. On the part of Lord Pahn-
erston there was tio other direct and formal proposition. But
Overtures were made to me in conversation by the Ministers of
Prussia and Austria. Their reelect was to add a life possession of
Syria to the hereditary possession of Egypt. The Honoureb:e
it. Thiess stated yesterday that there was even a time when these
Ministers, and especially one of them, had looked on the hereditary
possession of Syria as a possible thing. It is true that this appeared
once or twice in conversation, and I made it known in
: nmesYmmo.
msnts of hope ; but I owe it to truth to say that this Me
in
my eyes assumed any consistency in the minds of these pleniP oten
tiaries. I confess that when I was enabled to perceive ata
lance, in a very doubtful way, that our projects of arrangement
accept might be adopted, it was always on one condition—on the condition
that we should pledge ourselves directly towards the four other
Powers to employ force agaiinvistatisitenPvearclattiatiitilakieo
hurt
eep accept
that
them: if he refused to do so.
I insisted on the ado •
we Meld this arrangement
condition, and every
time that
"If the Pacha of our
rangement, and that it was asked of u 's, T'' do
yeti instantly pledge yourselves ?—if
force against
will you engage with us to
emi
" to say. The ov ht
er.
orcler to constrain !inn to it ?" I had nothing
tete oi the I fe.possession of Stela was made to ire then as an idea
to which the two Cabinets of Austria and Prussia would employ
themselves actively to decide Lord Palmerston, if the adhesion of
preliminary condition—the
France could be reckoned upon. The
mild adhere to
necessary condition ef this plan was, that France 5h
0.
him
to
it, and that it could be said to Lord Palmerston, in pressine
decide, " this finishes the question—France adheres—the arrange-
mete is terminated in a firm solid form " It was with this engage-
ment tin 4 Austria and Prtessia gave reason to hope that they would
Pre" Lord Palmerston to decide. In communicating to the Ca-
hinet this overture, I Weimer.' it at the same time in very distinct
"rein I believe, what appearee to me to be the consequence of its
rejection I bee , the Chamber to observe that an Ambassador is
not a Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he has no part to take, that
t is not he wlio resolves questions or adopts resolutions, not having
the power. The following are the terms on which, on the 24th of
June, I gave an account to et. Thiers on the state of theater " We
are perhaps upon the point of the crisis. This step in advance of which
I spoke to you rn a former letter, andwhicll consists, on the part of
Austria and Plusses in casing to Lora Palmerston that 1-e inust
content himself with leaving sena to the Pacha for life, and .making
this great concession to France—this step, I say, is being taken, if
I am not Misinformed, at this moment.Colleagues of Lord -Pal-
merston on one side, the Austrian and Prussian Ministers on the
other, are going to press upon him to induce him to agree to it. If
they do so they -would believe, both one and the other, that they