The Sun.
London, England, 1840-02-05 00:00:00

rected to them. The petitioners then set forth that a writ
of inquiry was directed to them, in consequence of the
verdict of the Court of Queen's Bench, that judg-
ment was entered, and a jury empanelled to assess the da-
meges in consequence of the default of the defendant ; that
the writ of inquiry was executed before one of their officers,
the Under_ Sheriff, and the Jury returned a verdict of 6001.
damages. The petitioners then set forth a resolution of
the other House of Parliament, asserting that, by the
law of the privileges of Parliament, the House had
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine on
its privileges ; and that the institution of any suit
or action, for the purpose of bringing those privi-
leges into discussion in any other place than Parlia-
ment was a high contempt, and rendered the parties ame-
nable to punishment. So that the Chief Justice who tried
the case, the Judges before whom the demurrer was ar-
gued, the Counsel who argued the demurrer, and the
solicitor who instructed those Counsel, were unishable for
enforcing the law of the land, provided it brought in
question the alleged privileges of the House of Commons.
The petitioners then proceeded to state that instructions
were nevertheless given to the Attorney-General to appear
and defend an action in which the rights and privileges of
the House of Commons were brought into question, not-
withstanding that after a discussion of three or four days
the House had resolved that parties were punishable for
bringing actions which involved the question of privi-
leges, or the alleged privileges of the House of Commons.
Instead of proceeding, in the first instance, to punish the
breach of privilege, they appeared, according to the state-
ment taken from their own books, to have made themselves
parties and accomplices to that which eight-and-forty hours
before they had declared to be highly culpable.—( Hear.)
Well, then, Mr. Attorney-General was instructed to plead,
and a demurrer was put on the record. Now, that was as
much as to plead that they admitted the fact as to the po-
sition in which the parties stood to each other. But they
denied that the publication was beyond the privilege
of the House. Why, that raised the whole question.—
( Hear, hevr, hear.) It brought the whole matter
before the Court of Queen's Bench.—(Hear, hear.) It
entitled the Judges of that Court to become parties to the
question, which could not be if the House of Commons
had not instructed the Attorney-General to plead—
( Hear, hear)—thus putting it to the Court to decide
upon the question upon which the House of Commons
and the plaintiff were at issue, the Attorney-General
having been ordered to bring the question of privilege
before the Court of Queen's Bench for its decision—
whereas, eighty-and-forty hours before the House of
Commons had declared it to be a highly punishable offence
for any individual to question the privileges of Parliament.
The petitioners further set forth that the question was
fully argued, and that the judgment was given for
the plaintiff. On that occasion the Court allowed
the demurrer—that is, disallowed the plea set up by the
Attorney-General, acting under the orders of the House
of Commons. They then set forth, that the afore-
said proceedings were liable to be reviewed,
and that, if there were any error in the de-
cision of the Court of Queen's Bench, that might be
brought before the other Judges sitting in the Exchequer
Chamber as a Court of Error, or before their Lordships'
House sitting as the highest Court of Appeal.—( Hear.)
But that no writ of error had yet been prosecuted ; and fur-
ther, that as the House of Commons had allowed the deci-
sion of the Court of Queen's Bench to stand without appeal,
as far as the petitioners knew the law of the land, the pri-
vilege must be held to offer no defence. The petitioners
then state that after the writ of inquiry had been executed,
and judgment had been given—after the execution had
been taken out, and a levy made to the amount of the sum
in question, the fruit of the sale of the property
of the defendant in the suit—they state that
in consequence of that amount being in their
hands to be made over according to a writ of ficri
facies, and having been levied by them in obedience to
that writ which they had sworn to obey, the House of
Commons, as appears by their printed votes, passed
a resolution, stating that it appeared that an execu-
tion in the case of Stockdalc v. Hansard, had been
Levied to the amount of 6401. by a sale of the
property of the defendant in contempt of these privileges
of the House, and that such money now remains in
the hands of the Sheriffs of Middlesex—that said She-
riffs be ordered to refund the said amount forthwith to
the defendants. Then the Sheriffs had a writ directed
to them—the Queen's writ issued by this authority
of the Court of Queen's Bench, which they were bound to
obey, and which they had also sworn faithfully to execrate.
That writ had called on them to pay the money, not to the
House of Commons. but to the plaintiffs. Accordingly
when they had been ordered to pay the money to the de-
fendants, contrary to their oaths, to their duty, and
to their office, they refused to do so, but kept it for
the parties to whom it wax due by the law.—( Hear. )
They, not having expressed their intention to comply with
the order were committed by the Sergeant-at-Arms to
custody, where they still were. They humbly submit that
the order was invalid, in pint of law, and an infringement
of the rights of the Crown, inasmuch as it was an infringe-
ment on the rights of the party as decided on by a Court
of Law. They then set out that a writ of Habeas
Corpus had been applied for for the purpose of bringing
them before the Court of Queen's Bench--that they were
brought up, and that the writ of Habeas Corpus was re-
turned, because the warrant did not set forth specifically
the grounds of their commitment, but merely set forte
generally that they had been confined by an order or
warrant of the House of Commons, for a breach of privi-
lege and a contempt of that House, without stating in
what that contempt consisted, so that it was a matter of
course they should remain in custody, because they could
not tell why they lied been committed. If any Court
chose to conceal the cause of its writ, or to wrap its war-
rant in general terms, no other Court had then the power
to inquire into it by going further into the case
than the warrant had set forth. These were
the grounds on which the Court of Queen's Bench
had proceeded, and which would have equally ap-
pled to any other Court—would equally apply to a writ from
the Court of Common Pleas. No matter how absurd the
grounds on which the warrant had been issued, there was
nothing to be done when the ground of it had not been
stated. The Court of Queen's Bench had accordingly
been prevented by the warrant in question from proceeding
any further. The prisoners were still in custody, and had no
power of being released, and they, consequently, wished
to throw themselves on the protection of the House. They
concluded their statement as fellows :—" Wherefore,
throwing ourselves on the justice aid protection of
the highest Court of judicature in the realm, your
petitioners humbly pray your Lordships' House to
afford them such assistance in the circumstances of
the case as to your Lordships' House will seem fit, to the
end that the petitioners, being officers of the law, and sworn
to execute it in obedience to a writ to them directed,
may not suffer in their persons for the necessary
discharge of their duties according to their oaths,
and which, if they had failed to do, they would have been
liable by the law to tho severest punishment." The Noble
Lord proceeded to say that he had not eta the entire of
the case, but had merely given the substance of the com-
plaint of those parties. Ile had now only to add that he
felt anxiety and, he should say, sorrow at their unhappy
lot, because of the peculiar circumstances of the case, sad
in the relation in which their Lordships stood to the other
House of Parliament, via., as a co-equal and not inferior
Chamber of Parliament, on a point of privilege, he did not
see, however great their inclination might be to rescue
those gentlemen from the embarrassments of their position,
—he did not sec how their Lordships could proceed in the
case. Every man who had examined the nature of the
proceedings would find proper and just palliatives in the
conduct of the Sheriffs. He, therefore, for fear he should
exceed that measure of opinion which could be drawn by
any one who had inquired into those proceedings, and for
fear he should, on the other hand, fail in stating
that opinion, he would only refer to them and say,
that those proceedings, and such proceedings, whatever
may be their nature, left the Sheriffs remediless in their
Lordships' House. They could afford them no protection
it was true, but they were bound to listen to the prayers
of those petitioners. He might observe that if no peti-
tions were presented unless when it was thought they
would be of use, much of their Lordships time would be
spared. He wished to express the feeling which he en-
tertained with respect to the powers of the House, because
he found that they might he precisely in the same situa-
tion in which the other House was now, and that that
other House had claimed for their Lordships the same
privileges which they bad claimed for themselves. God
forbid, however, that he should ever be called upon to act
on that precedent. God forbid that their Lordships, the
highest Court of Justice in the kingdom, and an assembly
of rational men—( A laugh)—should be ever called on," he
would not say to imitate the proceedings adopted else-
where, but to take such steps as had followed
from the prosecution of such proceedings. He
would not say one word on the decision of the Court of
Queen's Bench, which bad been given after the fullest ar-
guments, not only on the part of Counsel,
itself, to justify
but after the
fullest arguments on the part of the Bench
its decision. If he were now to state what was his opinion
d
on the law of the case, he should be doing what woul
bbe-
e
presumptuous as well as superfluous ;—presumptuous,
cause the Court of Queen's Bench had decided the case -
had
and superfluous, because the House of Commonsac-
quiesced in that decision. He had other reasons, how-
ever, for not giving his opinion.
He might be called on
hereafter, as a member of their Lordships
Judge on the matter. The other House might
their
determination, be influ-
encedinationp, and their Lordships might then
perhaps by opinions from without to
bave a changedif-
ferent ' House, to bea
course to adopt; and he knew not but as another
house had, in the course of forty-eight hours, changed its
own course and its own sentiments, and as it had come
down and descended from high privileges to the constitu-
tional law of the land—for all that he knew their
Lordships' judgment might yet be appealed to
and it might be to reverse the decision
adopted elsewhere. He would not interfere with the
Court of Queen's Bench, and he should add that when-
ever their Lordships might be in the same situation as the
other House, they would have the consistency and the
manliness in the first place to act on Thursday, according
to their declared and solemn decision on Tuesday. In the
next place be hoped they would avoid saying that whoever
went to law in such a manner as to bring
own servant to go to law,
guilty of a breach of privilege,
in question, before that Court of Law should be considered
their privileges
and then ordering their
and to place a plea on record in
that very Court of Law, pleading their privileges, and thus
bringing those very privileges under the cognizance of the
Court—and then saying that the Court of Law was guilty
of a breach of privilege for deciding on the very question
which they themselves had brought before the Court. He
hoped also that they would have the manliness and the
courage, and the justice, if any oficer of any Court of Law
be it high or be it low, should obey the order of his lawful
superiors, the Courts of Law,
and should bring any act
of his in obedience to their orders, and to the
obligation of his oath, or any act which they
might deem a breach of the
privileges—he trusted they
would have the courage as well as the justice to proceed
against the originators and not against the agent, to attack
the master and not the servant, to commit the Judges riot
the Sheriffs.--( Cheers.) If the Sheriffs had not obeyed
the orders of the Court they might have been committed—
they were bound to obey the orders of the Courts of Law,
and they had only done their duty according to the law