The Sun.
London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

Cathay wiihout foehdatien. There was every rea-
son to believe that these reports were inveeted by
the enemy himself, and propagated by his parti-
zans and numerous spies in the camp. Yet such
was the only foundation for assuming his. belief
of the advance of a superior enemy. Those ‘e.llo
were not, responSible,, and who had no authentic
source of information, might be under the influ-
ence of such commuiriCations ; but it was the bit-
siness of the General to calculate, cornbine, and
compare these rumours, with his more. authen-
tic sources of intelligence. In all armies the
practice was common of fabricating intelligence
with the 'view of deceiving the etICIIIV.' lu the
late war this stratagem was pushed farther by the
}'french Commanders than ever before. "Cofild
he be guilty of a military offence in not hav-
ing blindly run into the snare laid to
.entrap
him, and in not havine+ followed a delusion
too evidently raised with a view- of misleading
him ? The reports in question bore every mark
of French fabrication : they weere Contradicted
by his, more authentic intelligence, and the. next
day brought with it their ,complete refutation.
He returned to the meaning of the words bet weeia
the 7th and the i 2th. His observations had been
hitherto directed 'to the: first interpretation which
might be put on them, namely, that the 7th was the
express clAy when he discovered and saw the impossi-
bility of success. To thesecond, that the intelligence •
whicti he was at once accused of-believing and diS:
regarding, was received between the 7th and-the
12th, he begged leave to draw the attention of
the Court. It was important that the time
should be more correctly and precisely stated, be-
cause his degree of guilt must nathrally depend
not only en the length of tune which he reinained,
but on'the distance of the enemy. For instance,
supposing the intelligence to have reached hint on
the 7th, he might be found guilty of lying idle .for
four days, and it the authentic intelligence reach-
ed him on the II th at night, by deferring orders
for embarkation till next morning; tin great degree
of blame could be attached teellim. But he needed
not this indulgence; for he would prove, not only
that he gave the necessary orders for embarkati_ n
on the night of the 1 lth, bat he could prove, by
the retufnof Lieut. Col. Williamson, that so far
from being idle, '26 pieces of artillery were re-em-
barked during that night and the morning of the
19th. As the Judge Advotate had not had it in
his power to put the Court in 'possession of the
first authentic intelligence of the movements of
the enemy, he would now give this information,
and expose to the view of the Corirt the whole
grounds of his conquct'at that period.
He knew to a certainty, even before the 7th,
that strong detachments of the enemy lead arrived
at Tortosa ; but this proved nothing, a:; that place
required reinforcements. Ott the Sdl douot as
to Marshal Suchet's march to the northward! was
removed. Oti the morning, of that day a mes-
senger arrived from Valencia, dispatched by one
of our most confidential agents, with the Certain
intelligence that' 9,000 men, front San Phelippee
and the banks of the,Xticar, had quitted Valen-
cia, and that the" Marshal himself on the 7th,
had followed them. The late political changes in
Spain fortunately enabled him to mention the name
of the meritorious individual who furnished the in-
formation, lion Vicente Larente, Inspector of
the Botanical Garden under the French Govern-
ment,. at Valencia. The original note was stillln
his •possession, and would be laid before the Court,
together-with a certificate of the payment of the
boat conveying this important messenger. 'With
, respect to the French .arnytir,ndteor
bUeeinner4
move_
Caen; it was rumoured, indeed,
ment, but could he ever have expected that it
. wOuld• not be united, and that his Moveable co-
lumns would have remained divided -at
Gerona;
Puizcerda, and Barcelona, unconcerned specta-
tors of the arrival of an army in the province ?
He knew, however, that it was not assembled on
the sth, and thatit had Hot reached Barcelona on
the evening of the 9th ; on the everting of the 10th,
he learned, that by forced marches it had reached
the Lobregat, and that it was advancing with ra-
pidity. This intelligence was given him by - Ge-
neral Copons,, whose division he found in move-
ment at Reuss, about four o'clock on that day.
In one of his dispatches he had said, that the
expectation of reinforcements was one of the
reasons. which induced him to continue the siege;
this. expectation certainly had some weight, and
had the reinforcements arrived, the result might
reinforcement, have been different. This
pro-
mised by Lord W. Bentinck in his letter of the
9th, was to sail in ten days, consisted of the 44th
regiment, and the 6th battalion of the German
Legion, together 2000, besides a emi.,iderable
number of the Italian Levy and Neapolitan troops ;
upon the whole nearly 3000, arid a regiment of
cavalry, which I thought would have augmented.
my force. Lord IV. Bentiuck had good grorinds
to change his intention, but of that change he
(Sir J. M.) was not aware till afterwards. Three
thousand men at that period would have been iii_
valuable ; be had a right to expect them, anti, in
case of their arrival, lie had determined on an ac-
tion, and, indeed, was ready to seek it with either
"of the enemy's columns with the force he then
had ; • and though the reinforcements would not
have placed him on a par with both the columns,
it would lave given.him a superiority:over either,
mid enabled him to prevent the junction of the
two foreei.

Sir J. MURRAY apologized for the length of his
address; but begged permission to re-state the
points he bad endeavoured to establish. He then
recapitulated the chief points of his defence, and
proceeded to state that he.was aware, at the time,
of the risk he incurred in- -continuing operations
after the Bth, and asked what military operations
Were free from them-? Every battle is a risk, and-
the expedition itself was nothing more than a risk.
The.greaCeSt 4El' of a good General is to risk with
judgment, taking care that the risk is not equal to
the object attempted: he applied this•to the case
in que§tion, send said he had only- risked -a few
stores and some iron guns, for the chance :of
accomplishing two of the objects of the Duke
of Wellington, besides other objects .of inferior
importance, though by no means trical. He hall
run this risk., whether-with judgment or not the
Court: would determine, but at all events tie did
it with deliberation, aid with -a perfect sense of
the danger to which he was exposed—but if such
a Cousidtration could have infitzeneve 14s-conduar,

he should richly hare deserved'the .ecasere of the
; such were his views of the subject, and
the line of conduct he had adopted, in his humble
opinion, with a view less to the success of an in-
dividual object than to the accomplishment of the
plan of the Duke of Wellington ; and therefore
he contended that -his conduct was not unmilitary,
arid so far front being in opposition to his instruc-
tions, it was not only rn the spirit, but even in
conformity to the very letter Of those instructions.
Although he felt satisfied that be stood fully ac-
quitted, and that the charge was entirely disprov-
ed, yet the deference lie felt due to the. Court,
and'the regiird'thieto his own character, induced
him to enter more at length into the subject, and
to state the miniver by which he was - actuated'
throughout the operation. From his-instructions
it was evident that the siege of. Tarragona had
two objects in view—first, 'the-capture of the
place ; and secondly, such a diversion itvfavour of
the'Diie del Pardue as would•enable him to force
the line of the' Xuear, and from. thence possess
himself 'of the kingdom of Valencia. .Suelt being
his view of the case; he had rio difficulty in landing
with all the expedition which the weather- Woold
permit ; and he believed that every thing that= was
lost was on shore before the 10th; even if it had
been proved that he then despaired of Suceess.The
charge was, " for landing, and permitting to re-
main on shore when landed." The latter part of
the Charge he had no hesitarion in admitting ; but
no evidence had been adduced to prove that any
guns had been landed after the 'loth. He would
confine himself, therefore, to permitting the ar-
tillery and stores to remain on shore/ He
hoped he had sufficiently demonstrated that
he never saw, till the night of the I 1 th,
any physical impossibility of success, and no
necessity' for embarkation could therefore, till
then, occur to him. It was only on the morn.-
ing of the Gth that the first batteries were open-
ed on the Puerte Real. On the 7th, in the.
evening-, another battery was .constructed, which
opened its fire on the morning of the Bth ;
and on the evening of that-day the first batterieS,
which were to play upon the- body of the place,
consisting of ten pieces of cannon, were com-
menced.' They opened their fire on the morning
of the I I th. Ltere, then, were no marks of de-
sponding; and while these, orks were going on,
it would hardly be urged that any of the guns
shauld he embarked. On the very-night of the
siege being raised, even fresh works would have
been begun, and probably completed. • In fact,
prospects of success were held out to the last.----
He acknowledged That he had been taught to ex-
pect something from the character of the Gover-
nor; but it was but justice to that Officer, how-
ever, to state, that the information which he re-
ceived upon this subject was false, no reasonable
hopes of success being deducible from that Of-
ficer's conduct.
Sir John Murray then proceeded to contend,
that from the opinion of Colonel Thackery, as
well as from-other circumstances, be was perfectly
justified in not despairing of success 7a feeling in
which he was upheld by the letter of his- instruc-
tions; froar which he was expected to push the
experiment, as to time, to the utmost extremity,
consistently with the safety of the 'army. With
these facts in' view, he would ask, if he had given
-up the siege on the 7thi or even the 9th, how he
could have answered to his Excellency; or to, the
country; for not having.made the experiment ?
He bad then noeertain knowledge of the advance
and 'near approach of Marshal Suchet ;, and, he,
therefore, could not on those days have adopted
so unwise and so pusilfanimousa line ofseondrict
he- could have no motive tor it but the fear of
clamour, -and a dread of the responsibility which
such clamour might occasion. -He hoped lie was
above such fears; and that he had, in the con-
scientious.tlischarge of his duty,unhesitatingly ex-
posed himself to all the illiberal arid unfounded at-
tacks which had been made upon him, was now
clearly established.
It appeared that Marshal Sachet, knowing the
importance of the positions he occupied, clung to
them to the last ; that he did not quit Valencia till
the 7th, and his troops did not reach Tortosa-till
the 10th. Now if he (Sir J. M.) had commenced
embarkation on the 7th,or even on the Bth or 9th,
what would have been the conduct of Marshal Su-
Oct He might boldly affirm, that he would in-
stantly have retraced his steps, and have instantly
established himself at Mogente and St. Filippe.—
This, however, would not have been the' only
misfortune : for the Duke del Parque would have
been immediately opposed to the whole weight of
the enemy's force. If he defended the position of
Castalla, he would inevitably have been defeated,
and in all probability.,would have had greardiffi-
culty to preVent the total dispersion of his army.
Under all these circumstances, the importance
of drawing Marshal Sachet's army to the greatest
possible; distance froni the Spanish corps was most
evident ; in fact, the further the Marshal could lie
drawn from the Xticar, the greater was the pro-
bability of the Allied Army returning in time to
support the Duke del Par-time—whilst. the, more
harassing the march became,. and the longer Su-
chet was detained in Catalonia, the less chance
was there of his -having either the inclination or
the power to retire from it, seeing the advanced
position which the grand army, under the personal
coMmand Of his Excellency the Commander of
the Forces was daily acquiring on his flank.
A precipitate abandonment. of the siege might
have produced consequences no less unfortunate,
in the eastern extremity of the Province—inas-
much RS the co-operation of Lord Exmouth had
been required, to make a diversion in favour of
the forces at Tarragona, by an -attack upon
the Bay of Rosas, And as his Lordship, had'
been' engaged in this Expedition, be (Sir John
Murray) felt himself bound in honour,,,as well as
iri duty, not to expose him to hazard, Whieh could
he avoided ;. and he felt it no less prudent to await
the event, and to profit by the consequences,
which, he conceived, must infallibly have resulted
from this operation.. Had Lord Exmouth's force
been crippled, then indeed would the clamour
have been formidable, and it would have become,
the more forcible as his (Sir John's) conscience
would have told -him it was just.
Had the plan been his own, lie might have acted
as he. pleased t but as that was not the case, and
as the sticcess•of the plan depended on his remain-
ing a 9; Tong as possible before Tarragoba, he bud

To • e:!oloe of action left. 17p to the I 1111, there
was no physical impracticability in conductinglt
siege, although there might be something to ap-
prehend, but there was• nothing to excite despair :
the enemy-was in march only on one flank, and
under such circumstrisuces, he would not have.
been justified•in abandoning the siege, after the
assurance that he had given the Duke of Welling-
ton, that he Would persevere till the last ; besides
the advance of the enemy was not unexpected; or
calculated to 'excite his alarm. From Idle ad-
vance of the enemy there was cause of anxiety,
but he Issouldmot admit that it wasp. grotifid of des-
pair. While Marshal Sachet was on his march, he
(Sir J. Murray) determined to attack the column
of Dccaen, and took steps .for the measure. De-
spimilencyforined no part of his feelings;olibe 'should
not ha-ve committed hitnself itt such decisive 'ope-
rations'. At nine o'clock on the night olthe I Itit.,
he. obtained int-on-nation that Stichet was on his
march Iran Tortosa,' and then, add n'ot till then;
he thoUght it would be flue height of temerity and'
folly to persevere in the sieee.. The'physicai•im- '
possibility then hecanie-iipparent, and all' hope of
capturing Tarragona •vaniShed. Nothing more:
was to be done,with Sachet, and then !!e gave the
necessarvoklers for the embarkation. lkit shOuld'he
proved that he afterivards neglected Tiny necessary
orders or steps to save the troops 'and stores, he
must be found guilty -of the Charge. 'So long as
he considered himself opposed only Decaen's
force, he determined tO attikk it;' and '6013r gave
up the intention on hearing of the march of Su- '
chat : he did not abandon the Siege till, in the
words of Sitchet,, " the fires of his army 'covering
the heights,• conveyed intelligence of Iris ap-•
proach." Till then the Allied Army could not
have abandoned the siege without disgrace to the
Commander and the Whole Army.
SECOND CHARGE.
The Defence 'to the SeCond Charge was then
entered into. The accusations contained in this
Charge surprised as much as they astonished Ge-
neral Murray. The FirSt Charge wilp more -of a
public nature, as it related to what m?ght be
deemm a failure in judgment. But this Charge
more immediately 'applied in a personal point of
view, as it charged him with direct disobedience
of orders—an imputation of error might be borne,
but the charge, of disobedience of positive orders '
could not be admitted. It' was a charge, which
had. never entered his mind—in vilin bad he per-
used over and over again the instructions of the
Duke of Wellington, to discover in what part he
had neglected or disobeyed them?-still he fowl&
no ordelethe're which' he• had disobeyed.' The
charge accused bitn of a neglect of duty, and
with disobedience of orders in not re-embarking
the troops 'after the capture of the Col de' Bala—
omer, and opille. CO the. relief of the armies in
Valencia. These charges he most peremptorily fle,
nied ; there, was nh 'to 'di the army
even after the siege' of
.Tarragoria should be ruin-
ed. Before those charges could be proved "miCtinsi •
him, it Was- necessary fo prove-that the writteli
:-orders of the Duke of Wellington had been
Olieved tlioSle'idliarges his defence would be
Made on three gronpals, although it would- be a •
good legal defencer,. if he only,prOVed that he had
-.not disobeyed airy ivritten order's ; • but 'this
fence he did not consider as sliffieient to satisfy
I.his (Iwn mind, and therefore-he prove;
_se.,
:Comity, that he did give orders for the embarka-'
tion of the troopSe as spoil aS. the siegelwaS raised ;
and, thirdly ; that he 'so acted as to assist, as far .
as was possible, .the unties in 'Valencia. Ile then
went into a deli'ill 'Of facts and arguments thereofir_
to prove what' he had stated, and in particular"
read the seventh .parauraph ,of his instruetionse
to spew that the Duke' of -Wellington saw the
difficulties of his .(Sir -.T;ill.'s) situation, and.ex-
pressly said, that the siege of Tarragona -was A
a question of time and means.

He then adduced a variety of argnMents; found.
ed on the strength and positions of the enemy, to
prove the prudence- of remaining so 'Ong before
Tarragona ; and urged, that by so doing be had
an opportunity of exercising that. discretional
power which• was given to him by the Duke of
Wellington's instructions from the 15th para-
graph of those instructions, it was clear that no
time for embarkation was fixed; and by the 22d
paragraph, it, was also evident that a discretionary
power was given ; and indeed as long as Sachet
was kept on the left bank of the Ebro, those in-
structions might be considered as obeyed, Those
paragraphs were all that applied to the return of
the army to Valencia, and it Was therefore ap-
parent, that no diSobedience of written orders had
been proved. With this he might conclude the
defence to the second Charge ; but this was not
enough to satisfy his own honour; he should there-
fore proceed to the. two remaining grounds. And
when personal animosity and misguided feeling
should have subsided, he hoped his defence would
be found to contain principles of action which
would be considered as worthy of approbation and
imitation.

General CLINTON, in his evidence, informed the
Court, that he came to head-quarters on the night
of the LI th, and found that orders had been issued
for raising the siege. This circumstance could
also be proved by all his St-afi. Officers, to whom he
communicated his intentions. However peremp-
tory the JndgeAdvoCate might have construed his
•orders for embarkation to be, yet surely be would not
deny, that the place where the_ embarkation was to
take place was to be left to his (Gen. Murray's) dis-;
cretion. It Was not necessary for him to state to the
Court his reasons for embarking the cavalry and
:artillery at- Balagner. It was enough that he
eonsidered this. the most safe measure for the
army which he could 'adopt. In consequence
of information, lie afterWardsi. received, that a
column of the enemy was at Bandillos, he fore-
saw that infantry would he necessary to cover-the
embarVation of the cavalry. Up to the 14th of
June no imputation of delay in the embarkation
could be imputed to him. Late in the evening
of that night the complexion of things changed.
He then received information that the detach-
men t of De Caen's army, which advanced to Villa-
franca, had retired to the Lobregat. Now lie
found himself opposed only to Marshal Suchet
and with the' view of -cutting off the division of
his army stationed -at Bandillos, he immediately
gave orders for attacking it. Here he had a
better prospect of forcing Suchet to retire from
the Lower Ebro, than by any other 110,friklo