The Sun.
London, England, 1824-01-22 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

COURT OF CHANCERY, JAN. 21.

EX-PARTE GItIM2TEAI) IN THE MATTER. OF HOWARD

AND GIBBS.

Mr. HART resumed his argument in this case this morn-
ing. lie examined minutely the charge of the Chief-Justice
of the Common Pleas on the trial which took place in that
Court. He endeavoured to shew that the Chief-Justice had
misled the Jury by the course of observations which he indulged
in, and which the state of the evidence did not justify. He
then came to the consideration of the pass-book, in which the
transactions between the parties were entered, and which form-
ed an important part of the evidence produced at the trial, as
also on the hearing of the petition before the Vice-Chancellor.
—The entries in this book formed the ground for charging the
transaction with the taint of usury. It appeared that in this book
Mr. Grimstead got credit for various sums at different times
under different denominations. That which gave rise to most
suspicion was the word " produce," which the adversaries of
Mr. Grimstead stated could never have been used in an account
where the transaction referred to annuities. There were various

' sums set down as the produce of such and such sums for short
intervals, in some cases for a few days. The Learned Gentle-
man proceeded to argue that these entries by no means destroy-
ed the supposition of the money being laid out in annuities,
for he contended that the sums did not amount to more than
the proportion of interest, which would arise from a legal and
preper investment of the particular sums. The complaint was,
therefOre, that the Judge was not sufficiently precise in his
charge to the Jury. The Learned Counsel then submitted,
that a question of this complicated nature was unfit to be de-
cided in the Courts of Law. In those Courts, neither the
Judge nor the Jury could, in the nature of things, go through
the difficult windings of a case of this nature with that patience
and detail, that circumspection and diligence, which a Judge
in a Court of Equity was in the habit of exercisin.e.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said that he should repeat an
observation whicl- he believed would hold good, if he were to
remain there for 600 years, that where that Court directed an
issue to the Courts below, it was bound to explain itself in the
fullest manner, and to let the Judge at law into complete pos-
session of the precise point upon which he wanted information.
He would say that the great proportion of issues directed from
that Court wanted that important feature. The same observa-
tion applied to the generality of cases that also went from that
Court to the Nisi Prius Court. He could remember one case,
in which a Learned Counsel, since raised to the office of one
of the Barons of the Exchequer, was employed, and which was
sent from the Court of Chancery to the Court of Exchequer for
decision, and be would venture to say that neither the Judge
nor any one of the Learned Persons employed in that cause,
had the slightest notion of the points upon which they were
called upon to decide.
Mr. HART said that this was one of those cases which fre-
quently came before the Court of Equity, and which presented
all those difficulties and peculiarities which were not usually
overcome by the obtuse heads of Juries, and which were to be
successfully encountered only by capacities fitted for such exer-
cises by early enlightenment, and long intellectual practice. He
then proceeded to examine the charge of the Judge to the other
parts which related to the evidence. lie entirely differed from
the views laid down by the Judge in his construction of the
evidence bearing on the charge of usury. The explanation
of the Judge upon the case were founded on a supposition
that Mr. Grimstead was a man of business, and must be pre-
sumed to be acquainted with all the matters that form parts
of a transaction of this nature, just as the Jury themselves were.
This was not a just view of the case. It was put by him as
a case of presumption, which supposed a variety of circum-
stances that were inconsistent with the probable state of the case.
But to support a charge of usury, circumstantial evidence
of so vague a nature as this would not do. The contract
between the parties must be openly and directly made to
appear.
The LORD CnANCELLOR—It strikes me that the point
whiCh should have been put to the Jury, and which I don't
see was put by the Judge, was whether or not the frequency
with which the book passed from one party to the other must
be taken as a proof Grimstearl's having taken to the contract
proposed by Gibbs.
Mr. HonerE—This is the way we put our case.
Mr. Heuer continued—After concluding his comments on
the Judge's charge, he submitted that sending this case hack
to a Jury would answer no useful purpose, and that the case
ought to he terminated here.
Mr. HEALD followed on the same side. After the case had
been so fully gone through by his Learned Friend he felt it ne-
cessary to confine himself to that part of the case which came
before the Vice-Chancellor. He need not now state what was
the fate of the petition presented to his Honour. But the fact
was that the evidence which came before his Honour on that
occasion was all on one side, so that when his Honour decided
that the case should go to a Jury, he decided not only against
the only evidence that was adduced in the case, but, in fact,
without hearing the Counsel on the same side. The question
then to which lie would addres3 himself on this occasion was,
whether Grimstead ought to be at liberty to prove his debt ?
For this purpose he would examine the evidence. If items
were allowed to be selected, and taken separately, as they ap-
peared in the pass-book, they would, no doubt, favour the
notion of an usurious contract. But he was satisfied that no
one could take the whole together, subject to such illustrations
as the collateral evidence afforded, without being of opinion that
no such contract existed between the parties. For instance, items
were pointed out in this pass-book where credit was given to Mr.
Grimstead, for produce of certain sums for a short time; for in-
stance, for three days, for one month, &c. Then the Gentlemen
on the other side said, .. This is evidence of a contract of usury ;
for if the contract were for annuities, how is it possible that the
party could get credit for produce for a few days only ?" This
was then the inference of those Gentlemen, and an inference
that must be received, because the case was not capable of sus-
taining any other. Now he entirely differed with this view.
The Court was not warranted in presuming usury here, be-
cause the items could be satisfactorily explained without allow-
ing any such conclusion. Was it not as reasonable to suppose
that Mr. Grimstead made a contract of this nature :—" I hand
at least you will
you over a sum, suppose of 1,0001., to be laid out in annuities;
pay me annuity interest for it, and 1 will
agree never to recall the principal sum • 1 can confide in you :
I do not care who the granter of die annuity may be;
look to you as the person from whom I am to expect the
interest of an annuity ?" Here then was a supposition, as
reasonably arising from the examination of the case, as
the other inference, and the Court was more bound to ad-
mit the inference which contemplated an innocent course of
dealing, as that conclusion which led to a charge of usury.
The whole of the items, and the explanations presented
with respect to them, were in complete subservience to this
view of the case. He then read the evidence of Gibbs before
the Commissioners, in which the bankrupt stated that lie made
a great many false entries for the purpose of deceiving Mr.
Grimstead. Was not this then to be taken as evidence that a
contract had been entered into, and that that contract was as
to annuities ; because, however Gibbs really laid out the
money, his object was to support the appearance of the money
being laid out in annuities, and that, therefore, such was the
impression of Grimstead. He proceeded for a considerable
length to examine the documentary evidence, and urged the
conclusion on the Court, that no contract for usury appeared on
the face of these proceedings.
Mr. MONTAGUE followed on the same side. He enlarged
upon several branches of the subject which were already
touched upon by the preceding Counsel.
The LOHDCHANCELLOR rose at six o'clock, and intimated
that he would resume the hearing of this case to-morrow.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, JAN. 21.
The Court was employed during the day in hearing Petitions
of no general interest.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, JAN. 21.
THE KING V. ARCHIBALD HOOK.
This was an indictment against an officer in the army, of
above 50 years of age, charging him with indecently exposing
his person to Sarah Ann Wordsworth, a little girl, the daughter
of a tradesman in Martlet-court, as he was riding with her in
the Kentish-town stage, between Broad-street, St. Giles's, and
Bow-street, on the 25th of September last.
On the part of the defendant, witnesses were called who
proved that he was labouring under a most painful infirmity of
body, from the effects of which the mistake had probably arisen,
and that he had always borne a high character for delicacy and
propriety of demeanour.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said, he had no doubt that the
whole charge originated in mistake ; but if the Jury doubted, '
he would read over the evidence.
The Jury declared themselves quite satisfied, and imme-
diately returned a verdict of Not Guilty.
GAMBLING.
WILLANS, WHO SUES, &c. V. TAYLOR.
This was an action of debt on the Statute 9 Ann, c, 14, s. 2,
which enacts that any person who shall at any time or sitting, by
playing at cards, dice, or other game or games whatsoever, or by
betting on the sides or hands of such as do play at any of the games
aforesaid, lose in the whole the sum or value of 101., and pay
the same, the person so losing and paying shall be set at liberty
within three months then next, to sue for and recover the
money or goods lost by action of debt; and in case the loser
shall not, within that time, really and bona fide sue for, and
prosecute with effect for the same, it shall be lawful for any per-
son to sue for the same and treble the value thereof, against the
winner ; one moiety for his own use, and the other for the use
of the poor of the parish in which the money shall be won. The