The Sun.
London, England, 1840-09-30 00:00:00

his protector, and his defeat in St. Jean d'Acrc gave
Syria up to the Egyptian army.
This is the history of what we should call the most
regular Government of all the Governments instituted
or authorised in Syria by the Ottoman Porte. Every-
where else Governments are born of chance and force.
The parties are adventurers, who profit by disord-r to
gain one day of power and fortune. Thus, at Tripoli,
an old servant of the Emir of Druse, whose business was
to attend to the fields of olives, became Pacha through
a wager. One day, playing with his comrades, he as-
sumed the character of a Judge, and made them kiss
his hand. " Even if you were Governor of Tripoli," said
one, " I would not kiss your hand." " Very well," said
Mustapha, " I will be Governor of Syria, and you shall
kiss my hand." Shortly after a popular movement
burst out against the Turkish Governor ; Mustapha
profited by it to drive him out, take his place, and win
his wager : for the Porte, according to custom, con-
firmed it. But according to custom also, Mustapha re-
volted, and refused to pay tribute. The Pacha of
Acre, Abdallah, came and besieged him ; and after a
long siege he was forced to grant him a capitulation.
Mustapha, they say, still lives. Tne Four Powers can
restore to Tripoli the old guardian of olive trees. In
the mountain of Naplouse, an Arab Sheik, Hussein,
before the conquest of the Egyptians, had seiz.d upon
the government. He was rich and generous ; and the
Porte, seeing him powerful, named him chief of the
mountain of Naplouse. Ahdallah, Pacha of Acre, tried
to overturn this power, which was inimical to his o ;
he invited the Sheik to St. Jean d'Acre, who was re-
pairing thither in confidence, when he was warned on
the road that his host intended to destroy him ; he
e,caped, thanks to the fleetness of his horse, and de-
c.ared war against Abdallah. We should never have
d one were we to give the history of all the petty tyrairs,
now. forgotten, who disputed in Syria the power to pil.
lage and ruin the people. Sometimes an adventurer,
who, at the head of thirty horsemen, would seize upon
a city, levy contributions, cause his power to be ac-
knowledged, and retire with impunity, enriched ; at an-
other a Bedouin chief would establish himself upon a
part of the territory, capture travellers and merchandise
which crossed this territory, keep prisoners those who
were unable to pay, and threaten to burn them alive if
their relations did not ransom them. Add to these evils
the tribes of the Kurds and Turcomans, who levied a
tribute on condition of not pillaging, and pillaged after
receiving tribute. Let us not forget also the Turkish
Pachas, who profited by the short time in a hieh their
authority was acknowledged to ruin the country by ex-
tot tions—that is to say. by sudden fines inflicted upon a
city or an individual. Such was the situation of Syria
under Turkish domination. From hence the barren.
ness of the best lands, abandoned ; what use was there
in sowing when the harvest would not belong to he who
sowed ? From hence the want of cattle in places best
suited to pasture. To have cattle was to appear rich,
and to appear rich was to excite the cupidity of the
Pacha, the Kurd, or the Bedouin. From hence, in
fact, the increasing diminution of the population.
Wearied with this desolating anarchy, the Syrians at
first received favourably the troops of Ibrahim ; but
they soon found the Egyptian yoke as severe as the
Turkish, and revolts ensued. This was the great
mistake of Mehemet, the application to the moun-
tains of Syria of a plan of culture and govern-
ment only fitted to the plains of Egypt. In Egypt
the central authority must take care of the cultiva-
tion. In Syria a field, amidst the rocks and on
the declivities, can only be rendered fertile and
irrigated by the individual labour of the possessor.
Hence the independence of the population. Besides,
Syria, as the Duke of Ragusa remarks, has facilities
for resisting oppression which Egypt has not. "It is
mountainous ; its mountains are difficult of access, and
at each step the insurgents find, as it were, a natural
intrenchment, behind which they can defend themselves."
Egypt, on the contrary, is a country which may be
overrun with ease. A fleet of a few armed boats,4,ooo
infantry, 2,000 horse, and twelve pieces of cannon
might keep it in subjection, or restore tranquillity in
case of revolt. On this account Egypt is a country for
submission and large cultivation, whereas Syria is a
country for resistance and small cultivation. It is then
to be regretted that Mehemet Ali should have thought
the same system proper for both. This error now costs
him dear.
The spirit of independence and the habits of division
natural to Syria are obstacles to the submission which
the Pacha of Egypt exacts ; but these also destroy
union and discipline in insurrection. Thus the natural
anarchy of the country, which causes Mehemet Ali not
to be obeyed, creates resources for him when a revolt
bursts forth. It is that, perhaps, which the English did
not remark sufficiently when they were in such haste to
believe in the success of the insurrection in Syria. Syria
has always been in arms against whatever power go-
verned her, whether the Ottoman Porte or Egypt ; but
this revolt has always been put down, because there has.
never been a good understanding between the revolters,
and the master has always been able to make use of one
to crush the other. This has again happened in the
last insurrection.
It was with the assistance of the proses and the
Emir Besehir, that Ibrahim was able to repress the
revolt.
God forbid that we should approve the mad oppres-
sion with which Mehemet Ali weighs down the Syrians!
What we wish to show is, that to restore Syria to the
Sultan is not the way to cure the evils of this unhappy
country ; it is to change them, and nothing mote ; it
is to restore a provinee,to anarchy and:confusion.; it is,
to'restore that social diiOrd'er ,which is; lied ' Tu~kislr
adnaioinistrutiou, of Which' Sisin 'otreied' an ixainple ten
years ago, and of which-Albapiitis Dow a perfect model,

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

(From the Revue de Paris.)
When Rifaat Bey received the refusal of Mehemet
Ali to the first proposition on the part of the Porte and
the Four Powers relative to Syria, he secretly advised
the Viceroy to make some concessions, and assured hint
that the Sultan was willing to give up to him some pa-
(thanes beyond those stipulated in the ultimatum ; he
further proposed to carry himself to the Sultan the
counter-proposals which Mehemet Ali might feel dis-
posed to make. It was in consequence of this that
the latter communicated these overtures to the Con-
suls, but they told him that they had no authority
to receive any counter-propositions, and refused to
send off a steamer to Constantinople with the Vice-
roy's proposals. Mehemet Ali then summoned the
French Consul, M. Cochelet, to ask his advice on
the subject ; but that functionary felt hurt at not
having been summoned before, and allowed himself
to receive two messages before be went to the Pa-
lace. When there he strongly recommended Mehemet
Ali to follow the suggestions of Rifaat Bey, and
aided by M. \Valor ski, succeeded in prevailing on him
to consent, first of all, to abandon Adana and then
Candia to the Porte. Mehemet AU made great difficulty
about Candia, not because he derived much revenue
from it, but because he thought that the Porte could
never retain possession of it ; that the Greek population
would gain the upper hand over the Turkish in it, and
that the island might ultimately become either an inde-
pendent State like Samos, or else might fall into the
hands of the English. M. Cochelet yielded to M.
Walewski's suggestion, that it would be better to des-
patch him to Constantinople, in order to inform M. de
Pont ois exactly of how toasters stood at Alexandria, and
he accordingly set off, after receiving the instructions of
his Consul and the Viceroy. The prevalent belief at
Alexandria, this periodical adds, is, that the prepositions
of Mehemet Ali will be accepted by the Divan ; and it
says that even Admiral Stopford has expressed his Opi-
nion that too much violence and rigour is used against the
Viceroy. The Revue, however, dada: es its own opi-
nion to be that these overtures will be unsuccessful, be-
cause the Divan is no longer able to deliberate freely,
but is completely under the tutelage of Russia and Eng-
land. It hence draws the inference that France is bound
to go on with her armaments, and to make them upon a
large scale, as being the more likely thereby to avoid
expense and difficulty in the end, from their being cal-
culated to deter the Powers from going to war. It
adds, that the fortifications of Paris are of the first ne-
cessity, though, if France had possession of Belgium,
and had the Rhine for a frontier, that necessity would
not be so evident ; and it further says that France nei-
ther can nor will allow of Egypt, Syria, and the posses-
sion of Constantinople, to be disposed of without her
intervention.
The Journal de Franefort, which has the reputation
of being a semi-official organ of the Russiaa Govern-
ment, declares that the proposition of Mehemet Ali to
hold the whole of Syria, for his lik cannot be ente:-
tained a moment by the Porte and its allies.

IVIEREAIET ALI AND THE PORTE

CONSTANTINOPLE, SEPT. 10.—Itifaat Bey bears the
following letter for the Sublime Porte from Mehemet
Ali for the Grand Vizier : _ _

_ ..
" The 9th Regeb, 1256 (Sept. 3, 1840).
" HIGIINESS,—The decision of the Four great
Powers—Russia, Prussia, England, and Austria, with
respect to the Eastern question, concluded in London
by the four Ambassadors, was communicated to me, with
a Vizier's order, by your servant Rifaat Bey, one of the
Ministers of the Sublime Porte, now on a mission at my
Court. I received it with the utmost reverence. As,
in this decision, the hereditary pachalic of Egypt
only was granted me, I accepted it with gratitude
towards the high Powers, and with all dutiful obedience
to your divine shadow. I have not allowed the term
of twenty days to elapse in order to accept this fa-
j your, since it is necessary that I should submit to the
1 decision of the high Powers, and to the orders of my
I august master and Sovereign. Before this term of twenty
days had expired, I accepted the treaty with many sin..
cere thanks. His Excellency Rifaat Bey was present
at this act. Let not the procrastination here be wrongly
interpreted, or ascribed to any unwillingness to execute
j the will of the high Powers, and of my august master.
This delay was rather in the hope that I might obtain
an assent to my proposals from the magnanimity and
1 grandeur of the high Powers, for whom I profess the
greatest regard. When all this shall have come to the