The Sun.
London, England, 1840-10-13 00:00:00

4:VENING EDiTION.

HE FRENCH MANIFESTO.

/-;PLY OF M. TRIERS TO THE MEMO-
RANDUNI OF LORD PALMERSTON, OF
AUGUST 30.

HE " PARIS, OCTOBER 3, 1840.
I'PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, NUN'S-
ER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE AM-
ASSADOR OF FRANCE IN LONDON.
" Alonsieur I'Ambassadeur, You have been
acquainted with the despatch addressed by
oard Palmerston to :\,lr. Bulwer, to explain the
'nduct of the British Government in the import-
alit negotiation NN hich terminated with the treaty of
the lath of July. That despatch, notwithstand-
ithe moderation and propriety of language,
tio'ed I gladly acknowledge, in it, contains asser-
tsl„ and reasonings which the King's Govern-
t" cannot allow to be established. No doubt,
it avoid aggravating the threatening aspect of affairs,
without
be better to allow the past to be forgotten
heen "'°ut re-opening controversies which have already
too often renewed ; but, besides that Lord
Palmer has a right to expect a reply to his
itso tu"nication, it is important to represent, in
co true colours, the respective conduct of each
realerurar.t(situoirting this important negotiation. Lord
's despatch, which was sent to all the
iillgeltitl°us in a printed form, has been already made
it. Ire', It was, therefore, iudispensable to answer
-'ne answer I now transmit to you is one which
t 5 rtimSt
the British Cabinet may find no reason to
tvh4'.rilai_ln of, whilst it ascribes to the occurrences
)4,1' have taken place between the different Ca-
be:tsthe real meaning which they appear to us to
of will have the goodness to leave a copy
111 with the Secretary of State of her Britannic
aiesty,
they If I rightly understand the general tenour of
kaystkatetnent put forward by Lord Palmerston, it
're:ue summed up as follows ;
ed( That' Great Britain being completely disinte-
loie Lill the question of the East, has pursued one
Ottorh°uject--the independence and integrity of the
her t'"all empire. This was the object proposed by
they all the Courts, adopted by them, pursued by
110;'' all, and by France as well as by the other
to rpriera• With this object in view, it was necessary
ts;24lce the excessive pretensions of the Viceroy of
te'',a'Pt within narrower limits ; it was necessary to
tio:ve the possessions and the armies of that ambi-
Th:ivassal as far as possible from the Taurus.
tlielest means was to place the Desert between
lleto'lltan and the Pacha—that is, to restrict I\le-
Ssltet Ali to Egypt, and to restore Syria to the
the an Abdul Aledgid. The Syrian Desert would
have served as a barrier between the two
tilt"' and secured the Ottoman Empire, and
tac°lll interested in the safety of that empire,
(11.Ist, the ambition of the Egyptian family.'
lark; 4nat ' such has been the declaration of
at every period of this negotiation. France,
the
e collective note signed at Constantinople on
ti7th of July, 1839, and by a circular addressed
'e 17th of the same month to all the Courts—
prionce had appeared to adhere to the common
Cabe-IPle, by proclaiming as absolutely as the other
Ott 'nets the independence and integrity of the
o(,o(muan Empire. But she subsequently departed
th this principle, by demanding in favour
ht Viceroy a dismemberment of the empire,)
er, •
De-
the iirous Is incompatible with its existence. e-
lf), t, of securing the co-operation of France,
tee -clottr Powers who have signed the Treaty of
to .I:sth of July have made reiterated attempts
had ring her to join in their views. They
kideedven made considerable sacrifices to her, for they
fto Egypt, hereditarily granted, the Pachalic
~:o,,acre without the fortress, and they afterwards
ilt7ented to join the fortress itself to their former
PraPusal• But all these sacrifices were of no avail ;
ti nee persisted in her departure from the prin-
dui}
ta which the Five Cabinets had thought it their
to proclaim in common.'
ati" That the other Courts could not follow her
it„ this course. However they might desire to se-
ire her co-operation, they were driven to separate
,atil her, and to sian an act, which ought not to
Prise her, for France had been warned more than
that if they did not come to an understanding
14 would, after all, be necessary for the Four
trot ors to settle a question on which the Five could
ti agree.'
11hat Lord Palmerston had, in fact, carefully
o:it(1, to the French Ambassador that the pro-
°f •Tuly"'" contained in the Treaty of the 15th
'Pow was his ultimatum, and that, if this pro-
r, vas refused, he should make no other. It
Aotria“necesB„,.._
uty to proceed, and not to allow the Ot-
tron, to perish by too protracted hesita-
bteht• 'l:he other Courts cannot be accused of any
l'otli.-el" of offending France on this occasion.
the Chabihets having agreed upon a quest:loni
importance,Rite est could not make an in efi-
_.
laters-crifice of their views and their perfectly dts-
n els,tied intentions to a Fifth.'
:Pour 0.14 t, moreover, whilst they acted, thus,.
the
Illonti,-ahinets remembered that France had the
of September, 1839, proposed a plan of ar-
heoedulent through her Ambassador at London,
ittielse,hd upon nearly the same basis as the Treaty of
10th,,-;°1 July ; that subsequently, while she objected
P'an Put forward by England,she had admitted
the
itisetting aside the difficulty and the danger of
lestabelans of execution, that plan would be incon-
tvery Y preferable to any other ; lastly, that on
%ppo' .uecasion she had manifested the intention of
The sping nti obstacles to the means of execution.
:tthat if•°,ur cabinets had, therefore, reason to think
',1:6111 motives peculiar to herself, she refused
liferj'enl in measures of coercion against Mehe-
'to `CIIC', she would at least put forward no obstacle
tYtheelrefForts, and that she would even second them
t•exereise of her moral influence at Alexandria.
'of the our Powers still hope that, when the Treaty
:again e 15th of July has been fulfilled, France will
:taairit
eunite with them to secure definitively the
" srialhce of the Ottoman Empire.'
:NON ilea is, if I am not mistaken, the accurate and
:aterst(tils analysis of the statement which Lord Pal-
la to till and the Four Powers do not cease to make
9tiestieinegotiations to which the Turco-Egyptian
`t Itu "as given rise.
would result from this statement--
'tTk
tt t France has been inconsistent ;
'tll .That she had desired, and desires no longer,
Ttrei;ttegrity and independence of the Ottoman mu-
at tile Four Powers have made repeated sa.
ito her views;
eased flat they at last offered her an ultimatum,
48(lor
.4011 a former proposal of her own Ambas•
~t1t,,, at they did not proceed further until that
:4T-1471z had been refused.
kana "It they have reason to be surprised at the
L'ierqiu which France has received the Treaty of
eelaratiof July, since, in accordance with her own
it might be expected that she would
'ent, awes to this Treaty more than a passive as-
ki at least her moral support.
, Precise narrative of the facts will completely
t 11 WI 4 mode of presenting the negotiations.es
ag
'•e° the Porte, ill-advised, renewed hostile-
? lati'alllt''st tile Viceroy, and lost at once its army
adileq a,,n(-1 its fleet—when to all these losses was
%vas '''e death of the Sultan Mahmoud, what
veto
at that eaded by England and by France, who
t;
Tas lest me perfectly united ? Their dread
,a4o, Ibrahim, victorious, should cross the
the It • •
menace Constantinople, and instantly
nptre•.„,
ussians into the capital of the Ottoman
Bur _,-the most enlightened minds throughout
Nri'
Shat
11 are d ill this apprehension.
134 this at were the proposals of Lord Painters:on
time . subje
the ct ? Once in his own name, a second
France name of his Cabinet, he proposed to
to rt..' to combine an English and a French fleet,
tli des
them e two „.letn to the coast of Syria, to summon
to suoent,tberent parties in order to compel them
tnarithine''" hostilities, to support this summons by
brace ice
01"„eans, then to unite the two fleets at the
hrated
,sa.st the Dardanelles, and to force that cele-
tihte Pacijhasage vi et antis, if the contest between
4ssialls t aiLd the Sultan should have brought the
What ,t2onstantiiiople.
deist state 1-I,ngland, and with England all provi-
anti in men, then understood by the integrity
pre,ervaP.tlldetice of the Ottoinan empire, was to
11uS
~Bran.from the exclusive protection of the
Potion fiiro 'Thes, and, in order to prevent this pro-
e'tri taking place, to prevent the Viceroy
'tered il-ei Ing upon Constantinople. France fully
with m ,ll° this notion. She used her influence
~e"criousuret Ali and his son to stop the victo-
oi,ier
togYptian army : her efforts succeeded, and in
the It o,s•vard off the more serious dan,er of seeing
aat iatl armies at Constantinople, sheproposed
deillvalAll'ary means, before forcing the Dardanelles,
tile consent of th© Porte to the entrance

of the two fleets, in case a body of Russian troops
should have crossed the Bosphorus.
" England acceded to these proposals, and the
two Cabinets weie perfectly agreed. The words
independence and integrity of the Ottoman em•
pire' did not then mean (it cannot be remarked too
often) that such or such a part of the territories then
occupied by Mehemet Ali were to be wrested from
him, but that he should he prevented front march-
ing upon the capital of the empire, and bringing
down the presence of Russian soldiers by :he pre-
sence of Egyptian soldiers
" The Secretary of Sta'e of her Britannic Ma-
jesty, conversing on this subject with M. de Hour-
queney on the 25th of May and the 20th of June,
acknowledged that an opinion favourable to the
Egyptian family existed both in France and in
England ; that in France this opinion was far more
generally received ; that consequently the Ft ench
Government must be much more favourable to Me-
hemet Ali titan the English Government ; tha, this
was doubtless ore of the difficulties of the posture
of affairs, but that it was a consideration of se-
condary importance ; that a consideration of para-
mount importance ought to prevail over all others,
namely, the necessity of saving the Ottoman em-
pire from an exclusive protection which would
prove fatal to it, sooner or later, if France and Eng-
land were. not agreed.
" France entertained the same ideas. Herpolicy,
consequently, tended to a double end—that of ar-
resting the progress of the Paella, whenever he
changed his character of a powerful but obedient
vassal for that of a disobedient vassal menacing his
master's throne, and of substituting in the place of
the exclusive protection of one Power, that of the
Five Powers preponderating in Europe.
" It was with these views that she signed, con-
jointly, the note of the 27th of July, which pur-
posed to place the protection of the Five Courts
between the vanquished Sultan and the victorious
Pacha—it was with these views that she addressed
on the 17th of July a circular to all the Courts for
the purpose of eliciting a joint profession of respect
for the integrity of the Ottoman empire ; it was
with these views that she herself, the first, pro•
posed to associate Austria, Prussia, and Russia
herself in all the resolutions relative to the Turco-
Egyptian question.
" Lord Palmerston will doubtless recollect, that
he was less disposed than France to bring about
this general concurrence of the Five Powers ; and
it is only with the liveliest regret, when comparing
that period with the present one, that the French
Cabinet recals to mind that it was more especially
upon France that the English Cabinet considered
that it ought to rely in order to insure the safety of
the Turkisli empire.
" No one was at that time disposed to consider
that the integrity of the Ottoman empire consisted
in the limit which might separate the possessions of
the Sultan and the Viceroy in Syria. Every one
considered it to consist in these two facts—the
preventing Ibrahim from menacing the capital, and
the dispensing the Russians from coining to its suc-
cour. France partook in this opinion in common
with all the Cabinets, and she has remained true
to it.

" Austria and Prussia adhered to the views of
France and England. The Court of Russia refused
to take any part in the conferences which were to
be held at Vienna for the purpose of generalizing;
the European protectorate given to the Sultan. ft
was far from approving the eagerness of the West-
ern Powers to interfere in the question of the East.
The Emperor,' said M. de Nesselrode, in a de-
spatch written the Gth of August, 1839, to M. de
Aledem, and officially communicated to the French
Government, the Emperor in no way despairs of
the safety of the Porte, provided that the Powers of
Europe do but leave it in repose, and do not by their
untimely agitation compromise its tranquillity
in their desire to secure it.' The Court of Russia
consequently judged that an interposition between
the Sultan and the Pacha was not what should be
done, conceived it sufficient to prevent the Vice-
roy from menacing Constantinople, and appeared to
look upon a direct arrangement as the most suitable
resource in this posture of affairs. Besides,' said
M. de Nesselrode to the French Ambassador at the
commencement of August, 1839, a little more or
a little less of Syria given to er taken from the
Pacha affects us but little ; our only condition is,

that the Porte should be free in the consent it may
give.'
" At this epoch, consequently, the Four. Courts,
who have since signed the treaty of the 15th of
July, were not, as would now be given to under-
stand, united in their views, whilst France was the
only dissentient Power, and prevented all agreement
by her perpetual refusals.
" The danger had been removed when Ibrahim
had suspended his victorious march. The two bel-
ligerent parties were in presence of one another—
the Paella all-powerful, the Sultan vanquished, and
without resources, but both motionless, thanks to
the intervention of France. The British Cabinet
proposed to force the Turkish fleet out of the hands
of Mehemet Ali. France refused its assent to
this, fearing that it would excite fresh hostilities ;
and then commenced that fatal disagreement which
has separated France and England, and which must
be ever regretted in the interests of the peace and
civilisation of the world.
" The ill-feeling of the British Cabinet towards
the Viceroy of Egypt manifested itself with much
vivacity, and France sought to moderate it. The
British Cabinet, at the representation of France,
comprehending the danger of an act of violence,
renounced the idea of recovering the Turkish fleet,
by forcible means. This proposition was not fol-
lowed up.
"It had now become necessary to come to an
explanation in order to know in what manner the
territorial question between the Sultan and the
Viceroy should be arranged. The difference of
opinion between the views of France and those of
England manifested itself more and more. Lord
Palmerston declared, that according to him the
Viceroy ought to receive the hereditary possession
of Egypt, but that, as a compensation for this, he
ought to abandon immediately the holy cities, the
island of Candia, the district of Adana, and the
whole of Syria. He modified, however, his first
views in a slight degree, and consented to add to
the hereditary possession of Egypt the possession
(also hereditary) of the Pachalic of Acre, except-
ing the fortress of Acre.
" France did not accede to these propositions ;
she considered that the Viceroy, after having van-
quished the Sultan at Nezib, without having been
the aggressor, and having moreover consented to
stop his course, merited to be better dealt with.
She thought that it would be hardly just on the
part of the Powers who had induced him in
1833 to accept the conditions of Kiutaya to
impose far more rigorous conditions upon him
when he had done nothing to be deprived of
the benefit of this arrangement. She conceived
that if deprived of the holy cities, the
island of Candia, and the district of Adana (an
offensive position which, when restored to the Porte
would grant it every security), he ought to be al-
lowed to retain the hereditary possession of Egypt
and Syria. The victory of Nezib, gained without
any aggression on his part, might alone have earned
for him the hereditary right to his possessions from
the Nile to the Taurus. But in considering the
victory of Nezib as non-existent, and making Me-
hemet Ali purchase this hereditary possession at
the price of a part of his possessions at the time, it
was only strict justice not to deprive him of more
than Candle, Adana, and the holy cities. France,
moreover, asked by what means the submission of
Mehemet Ali was to be effected. The European
Cabinets without doubt were strong agaiest him,
when desirous of menacing Constantinople : in this
case the fleets in the Sea of Marmora were sufficient
to stop him. But what means were there for
taking Syria from him ? Measures of very little
efficacy, such as blockade—of no very legitimate
nature, such as excitements to insurrection--are
very dangerous and contrary to the end proposed,
even as a Russian army ! France proposed, then,
in September, 1839, to grant the Viceroy the here-
ditary possession of Egypt and and the hereditary
possession of Syria.
Never at any epoch of the negotiation has
France proposed anything else, except a short time
ago when she advised the Viceroy to content him-
self with the possession of Syria for life. I have
examined the despatches anterior to my Adminis-
tration, and I cannot find in them anywhere tat
General Sebastiani was authorised to propose the
limitation established by the treaty of the 15th of
July, or that he had ever taken upon himself sponta-
neously to propose it. I have asked him himself what
his recollections were upon this point, and he
affirmed that he never made any proposition of the

kind. France proposed then, in 1839, to give the
Viceroy the hereditary possession of Egypt and the
hereditary possession of Syria. Unfortunately she
found herself in a complete difference of opinion
with England.
This difference of opinion, for ever to be re-
gretted, was soon known to ail Europe. All at
once, and, as if by enchantmeut, it put an end to
all the various differences which had separated
the Four Courts, and produced a sudden state of
common accord between them. Austria, which
at first had given full concurrence to our pro-
positions, and which, when upon the point of
notifying this concurrence in London, had
only, she told us, suspended this notification in
order to give us-time to come to an agreement with
England—Austria began to say that between France
and England she should incline to the side of that
one of the two Courts which granted the greatest
extent of territory to the Sultan. It is true that
at that time she protested against all idea of having
recurrence to coercive measures, the danger of which
she was the very first to proclaim. Prussia adopted
the opinion of Austria. Russia sent M. de Bru-
now to London in September, 1839, in order to
make proposals. Russia, which formerly repelled
as unsuitable all idea of an European intervention
between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and appeared
to consider that the:e was no resource but in a
direct arrangement, now concurred in the territorial
arrangements which England had chosen to adopt,
and demanded that in case of a recommencement of
hostilities, she should be allowed, in the name of
the Five Courts to cover Constantinople by an
army, whilst the English and French fleets block-
aded Syria.
" These propositions realized exactly that com-
bination which England had until then regarded as
the most dangerous for the Ottoman empire—the
protection, namely of a Russian army—a combina-
tion to be dreaded, not on account of the possibi-
lity of a Russian army being inclined to remain
definitively at Constantinople, but simply because
Russia, by thus adding to what occurred in 1833 a
second occurrence precisely similar, would have
established in her favour the authority of precedent.
" These propositions were not accepted. M. de
Brunow quitted London, and returned in January,
1840, with fresh proposals. They differed from
the first, inasmuch as they granted France and
England the power of introducing three vessels each
into a limited part of the Sea of Marmora whilst
the Russian troops occupied Constantinople.
The negotiation remained at this point for se-
veral months, from the month of February, namely,
to that of July, 1840. In this interval a new Mi-
nistry and a new Ambassador were empowered to
direct the affairs of France. The French Cabinet
has never ceased to repeat that it did not consider
it just that Syria should be cut off from the number
of the Egyptian possessions ; that if it were possi-
ble for the Viceroy to consent to this, France would
' not have more ambition for the Viceroy than he
had for himself ; but that, if it was found necessary
to take Syria from him by force, the French Go-
vernmsnt saw no other means of succeeding in this
measure but such as were inefficacious or danger-
ous, and that, in this case, it would isolate itself
from the other Courts and pursue a perfectly sepa-
rate line of conduct.
" Whilst the French Cabinet continued frankly
and perseveringly this line of argument at London,
the French Ambassador at Constantinople never
sought to negotiate a direct arrangement between
the Sultan and the Viceroy. He never was the
fist, as Lord Palmerston appears inclined to be-
lieve, although without venturing to affirm it, to
give the example of a separation.
" Our representative at Constantinople has never
pursued that line of conduct which has been laid
to his charge. The instructions of the King's Go-
vernment have never directed him to take any step
of the kind. Without a doubt, France has never
discontinued her efforts to effect a reconcilement be-
tween the Sultan and the Viceroy, to dispose both
one and the other to make reasonable concessions,
and to facilitate by this means that delicate task
which Europe had undertaken to accomplish ; but
we have constantly recommended both the Count
de Pontois and M. Cochelet to avoid with the
greatest possible care everything that might be
looked upon as an attempt to set the other
Powers aside, and they have scrupulously observed
these instructions.
England had to choose between Russia offering
to give up the Viceroy upon the condition of the
adoption of the proposals of M. de Brunow, that
is to say, the execution of the Treaty of Unkiar
'Skelessi with the consent of Europe, and France
demanding only an equitable and moderate negotia-
tion between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali—a-ne-
gotiation which prevented fresh hostilities, and
what might follow upon these hostilities, namely,
the most dangerous event for the integrity of the
Ottoman empire—the direct and material protection
of one powerful State.
" Before making its definitive choice between
Russia and France, the Cabinet of London did not
make us those reiterated offers of which mention has
been made in order to bring us over to its views.
These endeavours were limited to one single pro-
posal.
" In 1839 the hereditary possession of Egypt
and of the Pachalic of Acre (without the fortress)
was granted the Viceroy. In 1840 Lord Palmer-
ston proposed to us to grant him the Pachalic of
Acre, with the fortress in addition, but without the
hereditary possession. This was most assuredly
retrenching from the first offer more than was added;
and it could not possibly be said to be a new pro-
posal—still less an advantageous one.
" But this proposal is unworthy the name of a
fresh proposition ; for it contained no new advan-
tage, had nothing in it of the character of an ulti-
matum. It was not at all presented to us in that
light ; and so far were we from considering it as
such, that upon an idea suggested by Messrs.
de Bulow and de Neumann, we entertained the
hope of obtaining for the Viceroy the possession
for life of all Syria, joined to the hereditary posses-
sion of Egypt.
" Upon the affirmation of Messrs. de Bulow and
de Neumann, that this proposal, if it were made,
would be the last concession of Lord Palmerston,
we sent M. Eugene Perier to Alexandria, in order
to induce the Viceroy to consent to an arrangement,
which appeared to us the last one possible. It was
not, as Lord Palmerston had said, making the ne-
gotiation depend upon the will of a Pacha of Egypt,
it was an endeavour to make an arrangement be-
tween the opposing determinations, and to bring
them to an amicable settlement, which might have
prevented the unhappy spectacle which is now laid
before the world.
" France had every right to suppose that so
long a negotiation would not be terminated
without some last explanation ; that the great
and advantageous alliance which had bound
her for the last ten years to England
would not be broken asunder without a last
attempt at coming to some agreement. The
suggestions which had been made to her, tending
to induce her to believe that perhaps the possession
of Syria for life would be granted to the Viceroy,
could not but confirm her in this expectation. All
at once, on the 17th of July, Lord Palmerston in-
vites the Ambassador of France to come to the
Foreign-office, and informs him that the treaty had
been signed two days before, and that without ac•
quainting him with the text of the treaty. The
French Cabinet could not but be surprised at this.
It was certainly not ignorant that the three con-
tinental Courts had concurred in the views of Eng-
land, and that an arrangement between the Four
l et
hwi ist 1
ai or
ruatnFg reamn
ecie,
t,
IC)uoturitts we 'oaus
1,
dc onnos: q
suppose ot
shsai bt
would take place without its being previously ad-
vised of it, and that the French alliance would be
thus promptly sacrificed.
"The offer made by the Viceroy to the Sultan
in the month of June, to restore the Turkish
fleet, which was feared to be the opening, for
a direct arrangement proposed by us, and
the possibility which presented itself at that
epoch of effecting an insurrection in Syria,
appear to have been the two motives which in-
duced the English Cabinet, after a long state
of inaction, to come all at once to a sudden reso-
lution. If the British Cabinet had chosen to have
a-last frank explanation with us, the French Cabi-
net would have been able to prove to it that the
offer of sending back the fleet was not a combina-
tion of France in order to bring about a direct ar-
rangement, for she was ignorant of this offer until
after it, was made ; and it might have succeeded
alscsin persuading it that the revolt of Syria was
a measure which was neither a dignified nos a sure

Q rte.
Such arc the facts, which Fiance affirms to be

the truth with all the sincerity and loyalty which
become a great nation.
" It results from them evidently—
" 1. That at the commencement of the negotia-
tion the independence and integrity of the Ottoman
empire were understood, as France to this day
understands them—not as a territorial limit of
greater or lesser advantage between the Sultan and
the Viceroy, but a 3 a guarantee of the Five Courts
against offensive measures on the part of Mehemet
Ali, and against the exclusive protection of one of
the Five Powers.
" 2. That France, far from modifying her opi-
nions in opposition to a constant union of views,
intentions, and expressions of opinion on the part
of the Four Courts, has always, on the contrary, re-
garded the Turco-Egyptian Question in one and the
same light, while she has seen the Four Courts,
although at first at variance, afterwards agree in the
intention of sacrificing the Viceroy, and England,
satisfied with sacrifice, coming to terms with the
three others, and forming a union which, it is true,
is now most persevering in its views, and most sud-
den and alarming in its resolutions.
4, 3. That repeated sacrifices have not beer.
uncle to France ill order to bring her over to the
plans of the Four Courts, since nothing more has
been done than to off'r her, in 1839, to add to
Egypt the Pachalic of Acre, without the fortress of
Acre, but with the hereditary possession of the
Pachalic, and to offer her, in 1840, the Pachalic of
Acre with the citadel, but without the hereditary
possession.
"4. That she was not forewarned, as is asserted,
that the Four Courts would proceed without her ii
she did not adhere to their views ; that, on the con-
, trary, she had reason to expect to receive fresh pro-
posals, when, upon the news of the departure of
Sami Bey for Constantinople. and the insurrection
of Syria, the Treaty of the 15th July was suddenly
' signed without her being previously, informed, and
she was only made acquainted with it after it had
been signed, and received the communication of it
only two months afterwards.
" 5. That no one has a right to count upon her
passive concurrence in the execution of the Treaty ;
and if she has insisted more especially upon the
difficulties attendant upon the means of execution,
she has never professed an indifference either as to
the end or the means—an indifference which would
admit of the conclusion that she would in no case
interfere in what might take place in the East ;
that, far from it, she has always declared that she
would withdraw herself from the Four other Powers,

if certain resolutions were adopted, that none of her
agents has erer been authorised to say anything
which might lead to the conclusion that this iso•
lated position would be one of inaction, and that
she has always intended, as she still intends, to
preserve her full liberty in this respect.
" The French Cabinet would not have reverted
to contestations of this kind had not the note of
Lord Palmerston made it an imperative duty. But
. .

it is ready to throw them into total oblivion in
order to put the question on its true bottom, and
attract the attention of the Secretary of State of
her Britannic Majesty to the really serious side of
the situation of things.
" The existence of the Turkish empire is in peril ;
England is alarmed by this state of things, and has
every right to be so ; all the Powers who are de-
sirous of peace cannot but share in that alarm; but
what measures ought to be taken in order to esta-
blish the empire firmly ? When the Sultans of Con-
stantinople, no longer in possession of sufficient
force to govern the vast provinces dependent upon
them, saw Moldavia, Wallachia, and still more
ine It would
re-
cently Greece, slip insensibly from their hands, what
was done ? Were efforts made by a decision of
Europe, backed by Russian troops and English fleets,
tlronturesttiotereir topntwheerS?ultcrfaanestliinel
y t 11b jt
.chave
beenimpossibilities.
dirteoctatatdemmipntistratinitnftiie provincest who
The possession
h c
and slipped
h
detached themselves from the empire were not re-
stored to it. It has retained only an almost''tlittni-
nal sovereignty in Wallachia and Moldavia, and
was entirely dispossessed of Greece. And was
this done in a spirit of injustice ? Assuredly not.
But the force of facts, which is stronger than the
resolutions of Cabinets, prevented the restitution of
either the direct sovereignty of Moldavia and Wal-
lachia, or even the indirect administration of Greece,
to the Porte, and the Porte had no tranquillity
until this sacrifice was frankly effected. What
were the views which directed the conduct of the
Cabinets in these sacrifices ? Those of rendering
independent those portions of the Turkish empire
which severed themselves from it, and withdrawing
them from the ambition of the neighbourino. States.
It being impossible to remake one great whole, what
was desired was, that the detached parts should be
States independent of the neighbouring Empires.,
" The facts which have occurred for some years
past relative to Egypt and Syria are similar. No
one call suppose that Egypt has ever been really
under the dominion of the Sultans, and no one
would at this day ever believe in the possibility of
its being directly governed by Constantinople. Such
is apparently the general opinion, sioce the Four
Courts give to Mehemet Ali the hereditary pos-
session, reserving, however, the sove-
reigt; o
off theEg"tSultan. In that they look upon
the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the same
point of view as France ; they do no more than
parts.sjr
es 1 11,1 tee yF desire, sir e,
Courts, i n fact,g r allanotnhga that France
fortunate t
y.
Exist es
y much'‘'
desireatita to
o preserve
etat to
irnektaionf f
unders
vassalage
i a
Igtiest alloolll
oltdrhiat t it would be
as possible between the empire and its detached
vassal, who has found dig means of governing
Egypt, the hereditary possession of this province,
orant him at the same time the Pachalic of Acre ;
but they refuse him the three other Pachalics of
Syria, those of Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli—
and this they call preserving the integrity of the
Ottoman empire !
6' Thus the integrity of the Ottoman empire is
saved even when Egypt and the Pachalic of Acre
are taken away ; but destroyed if Tripoli, Da-
mascus, and Aleppo are likewise detached from it !
Such a proposition, we frankly state, cannot be
which'
us-
seriously sustained in Europe.
eltpiaseehia,iitsnteattliiabte
taken
ns
away
yA from
Mehemet Ali are reasons of equity and policy. The
the:
"The
Viceroy of Egypt has founded a vassal state with
genius and with perseverance. He has found
means to govern Egypt and even Syria, which
tghievenontloy.orre
sulman race, whose proper spirit has long
been humiliated, look upon him as a renowe'd
the Sultans never could govern.
Prince, who revives the consciousness of their
own strength. Why should we weaken this useful
vassal, who, when once he is separated from the
States of his master by a well-chosen line of a,.
mareation, would become the most valuable of his
auxiliaries ? He assisted the Sultan in his contest
with Greece ; why should he not assist him in a
contest with neighbours of a religion hostile to his
own ? If his fidelity he doubtful, his interest is a
sufficient security. When Constantinople is threat-
ened, Alexandria is i" danger. Mehemet Ali is
aware of this fact, and proves every day how well
he understands it.
" To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire from Constantinople to Alexandria, both
the Sultan and the Paella of Egypt are needed, the
latter subjected to the former by a bond of vassalage.
line of separation The Taurus is theon indicated be-
it is intended to deprive the Paella
tween them. But
the keys ofaurus—be
of Egypt of tne the T it so ; let
them be restored to the Porte, and for that purpose
let the district of Adana be taken from Mehemet
Ali. It is intended to deprive hi, of the
key of the Archipelago ; let Candia be denied
him ; he consents to the arrangement. France,
who had not promised her moral
support to the
Treaty of the 15th of July, but who oweajler whole
support to the maintenance of peace, has advised
Mehemet Ali to make these sacrifices ; and they
13ut indeed, to deprive him of two
have been made.
or three more
Pachalics, and to give them over, not
to the Sultan but to anarchy ; to secure this singu-
lar triumph of the integrity of an empire already
strip ped of Greece,Egypt, and the Pachalic of Acre;
to call down uponit the only serious danger by
which it is threatened--a danger which England
thought so serious last year that she proposed to
force the Dardanelles in order to prevent it—are
very singular means of settling these great interests.
Let us admit, for an instant, that the views of
the British Cabinet are more judicious than those of
the French Cabinet ;
but is the alliance of France
Ottoman
empire worth more for the integrity of tile
empire and for the peace of the world, than this or
that line of demarcation in Syria? The integrity of
the Ottoman Wire would,uot be a subject of much

apprehension, if there was no ground to fear
great territorial disturbances in the world—if there
was no around to fear war, which can alone render
these great disturbances possible. To prevent them,
what was the most effectual combination ? Was it
not the alliance of France and England ? Ask the
nations from Cadiz to the banks of the Oder and

the Danube—ask them what they think, and they
will answer that it is this alliance which has for ten
years saved the peace and independence of the States
of Europe without impairing their freedom.
" It is said that this alliance is not broken, that
it will be revived as soon as the object of the
Treaty of the 15th of July has been accomplished.
When Four Powers have pursued, without us, and
in spite of us, an object bad in itself, or at least
which we have thought and believed to be bad—
when that object has been pursued by an alliance
too similar to those coalitions which fifty years
ago began to cover Europe with blood, to suppose
that France will entertain no mistrust and no re-
sentment for such a slight, is to conceive an opinion
of her natianal spirit which she has at no time given
to the world.
" Thus an alliance which has maintained the

independence and integrity of the_Ottoman empire
far more securely than the Treaty of the 15th of
July has been wantonly sacrificed for a secondary
purpose. It may be said that France might make
the same reflection, and that if the limits of Syria
appeared to her to be a secondary question, she had
It in her power to give way to the views of Eng-
land, and to purchase by this sacrifice the mainte-
nance of the Alliance.

" To this objection the answer is very plain.
France, when once agreed with her allies as to the
object, would have made, not those essential sacri-
fices which no nation owes to another, but that of
her views on certain questions of demarcation. She
has proved it by the concessions which she has de-
manded and obtained from the Viceroy. But no choice
was left to her. She was made acquainted with a new
alliance after it had been already concluded. Thence-
Forward she wasbound to stand alone : such has been
her course, but then, and then only, did she adopt it.
Ever since, she has remained faithful to her pacific
policy, and has not ceased to. counsel the most
complete moderation to the Paella of Egypt. Al-
though she is armed, and free to act, all her efforts
will be employed to avert the calamities and ca-
tastrophes from the world. She will make all the
sacrifices in her power for the maintenance of

peace short .of those which touch her honour ;
and if she holds this language at the present
moment to the British Cabinet, it is less for the
purpose of complaint than for that of proving the
frankness of her policy, not to Great Britain only,
but to the world, whose opinion no State, however
powerful, can at this time despise. The Secretary of
State of her Britannic Majesty has sought to prove
his right ; the Secretary of State of his Majesty
the King of the French owes it no less to his King
and country to prove the consistency an►l the
frankness of the policy of France in the serious
question of the East.
" Accept, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, &c.,
"A. THIERS,
" President of the Cluneil, Minister of foreign Affa

PARIS, OCT. 8.

P.S.—While writing this despatch deplorable
events have come to-day to add to the gravity of
the situation. To the conciliatory advances of the
Pacha of Egypt they have answered by the most
violent hostilities.
rhe Porte, yielding to evil counsels, has pro-
nounced his deposition. It is not sought alone
to restrain the power of Mehemet Ali ; they seek
to make it disappear from the face of the political

world.
'lf such were the serious intentions of the Powers
united in the treaty of the 15th July—if we are to
see in what has just happened anything beyond
the entrainement, almost involuntarily, of a false
situation, of which the consequences could not be
foreseen, we might despair of the re establishment
of harmony between the great Powers.
"In consequence I think it my duty to add to
the present-communication the subjoined note.
" A. THIERS."