The Sun.
London, England, 1849-12-18 00:00:00

VUESDA Y EVENING,

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

COMMIT TW: OP THE PRIVY
COUNCIL, Dec. 17.

CORLIAM V. TILE BISHOP OF EXETER.
(Caatinued from our Afternoon E itiOri of yesterday.

111 r.-B trismEr continued to say that his learned
friends the counsel for the appellant had rested
their case almost entirely on the Articles
of the Church of England. They did not
allow the Prayer-book to be relid on as a declaration
of doctrine, if the Articles themselves were silent.
He apprehended that was an entirely erroneous view.
So far as the Prayer-book was concerned he
apprehended it stood on precisely the same footing
as the Articles of the Church of England, that they
were both to be looked at concurrently, that the one
was not to supersede the other, and that if the mean-
ing of the one was not sufficiently clear or needed ex.
planation, that explanation was to be sought for from
the other. When he said they were both of equal
authority, there could be very little doubt that that
was so, for both emanated from convocation, and
both were confirmed by statute. It had teen over
and over again said by the counsel for the appellant
that the Articles of the Church of England were her
code of faith. lie (Mr. Badeley) fully admitted that the
Articles did explicitly and completely state the doctrine
upon any particular point; but if the Book of Com-
mon Prayer spoke of any doctrine and explained it
more fully, he must stand by that explanation of the
Articles rather than by the Articles themselves. A
very little examination of the Articles would show
that some of them were not drawn up with any very
severe precision ; some six of them were, but there were
many that were not so, for instance that upon the
Sacrament. The 25th Article said, " There are two
Sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the
Gospel, that is to say, baptism and the Supper of the
Lord. hose five commonly called Sacraments,
that is to say, confimation, penance, orders, ma-
trimony, and extreme unction are not to be
counted for sacraments of the Gospel, being such as
have grown partly of the corrupt fallowing of the
apostles, partly are states of life allowed in the
Scriptures ; but yet have not like nature of Sacra-
ments with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, for
that they have not any visible sign or
ceremony ordained of God." Now upon that
let their Lordships take the doctrine of
confirmation. No doubt confirmation was a rite of
the Church, that bishops were bound to administer it,
and that the clergy were bound to bring the children
in their congregations to receive- it. If the doctrine
of baptismal regeneration was not plainly put forth by
the Church of England, there was no doctrine that the
Church of England had put forward. She seemed
most particularly to have enunciated that doctrine ;
and certainly there was none more plainly advanced
by her. The Learned Counsel, in support of this
assertion, read portions of the offices of the Church of
England for infant and adult baptism, and of the
homilies. He contended that the spiritual regeneration
of infants at baptism was a doctrine which had been
held by St. Augustine and all the early Christian
fathers„and from their time down to the Reformation,
and thence to the present time; and was therefore to
be regarded as the absolute unqualified and declared
doctrine of the Church of England.
The Vice-Chancellor KNIGHT BRUCE asked Mr.
Badeley if the term prevenient grace was anywhere to
be found in theological writings, except those of Mr.
Gorham ?

fir. iADELEY replied that he had not found the
tern used in any of the Articles or formularies
of the Church of England, nor indeed in
any theological writings with which he was
acquainted. The term preventive grace was
to be found in the Articles, but never the words pre-
venient grace. The Learned Counsel proceeded at
great length to contend that the plain teaching of the
Church of England on the matter of infant baptism
ought to be taken, accepted, and acted on in its plain
and literal construction, and that if any latitude of in •
terpretation were to be allowed among the clergy on
this most fundamental point, maxim tot hotnines tot
sententiee would prevail with respect to it, and there
would be no end to the mischiefs which would ensue.

The Learned Counsel kid not concluded his argu•
ment at five o'clock, when the Council rose. The
hearing stands adjourned until to-morrow (this)
morning, at ten o'clock.

COURT OF CHANCERY, Dec. 17.

JUDGMENT.-THE ATTORNEY GENERAL V. THE COEPO•
RATION OF LONDON.

The LORD CHANCELLOR gave judgment in thi;
case this morning. The appeal was from the decision
of the Master of the Rolls, who had disallowed ex-
ceptions taken on the part of the defendants to the
Master's report, under these circumstances :—The
Attorney General, on behalf of the Crown, instituted
the suit against the Corporation of London and
others, for the purpose of testing the right of the
Crown to the shores of the river Thames between
high and low water mark, and to restrain the Corpo-
ration from granting licences for the erection of em-
bankments in the river, as they were calculated, the
bill alleged, to impede the navigation; and also to
restrain the parties to whom such licences had been
granted from erecting embankments in pursuance
thereof. The information filed by the Attorney-
General rested the case on behalf of the Crown on the
right possessed by the roynl prerogative to the soil of
the coasts and shores of the sea round the kingdom
and every navigable river thereof, into which the
sea ebbs and flows • while, on the other hand, the
Corporation in their answer claimed by right
of prescription, from time immemorial, the
bed and the soil of the river Thames, from a
place called Yenland, otherwise Yenleet, in the county
of Kent, to Staines bridge, in the county of Middle-
sex. On the part of the Crown a charge was inserted
in the information filed by the Attorney-General, to
the effect that whatever rights the Corporation of
London had over the river Thames, and the land or
soil thereof, they acquired such rights solely by
charter or letters patent from some of her Majesty's
predecessors, and therefore discovery from the defen-
dants respecting all such charters or letters patent
was claimed by the Crown. The Corporation, how-
ever, contended that they were protected from such
discovery by the common law principle, which de-
mands that the claimant of an estate or freehold should
recover by the strength of his own title, and should
have no right to a discovery of the title by' which such
estate might then be held. The Crown objected to
the answer on the ground of insufficiency, and the
Master in his report having held that the Corporation
should make discovery of title, the matter was argued
before the Master of the Rolls upon exceptions taken
by the corporation to the I'laster's report, and his
Lordship (the Master of the Rolls) having decided
in favour of the Master's report, the Corporation
appealed from his decision.
the LORD CHANCELLOR, in giving judgment, said
the proceedings were commenced by a bill of discovery
to compel the defendants, who denied the title of the
Crown, to produce the charters or other documents
under which they claimed the ownership of the bed
and soil of the river. The bill first of all set forth the
general proposition, that the Crown was entitled to
the ground and soil of all navigable rivers, and it
stated particularly that her Majesty was seized of the
haven and port of London, not only as a navigable
river, but as an arm of the sea. It then stated that
the Mayor and Corporation of London were the con-
servators of the river, and that the Corporation
claimed a right to the bed and soil of the river, and
had made certain grants under which, from time im-
memorial, certain acts had been done. To anticipate
the defence of the Corporation the bill stated that that
body never had a grant from the Crown, and that no
charter or other document could be produced to prove
their alleged right. The Corporation stated that they
had a charter in particular from Henry VI., which re-
cognised their title to the bed and soil of the river; but
that was denied by the Crown ; and it was to hare that
charter, and any other documents on which the
defendants relied, produced, that the bill was filed.
The defendants contented themselves with simply
denying the title of the Crown, without specifying
particularly, or indeed at all, what title they had
themselves beyond mere possession. In the face of
that general denial nothing could be more clear than
that the plaintiff was entitled to his discovery, not
only for the purpose of supporting his own case, but
also for the purpose of repelling the defence of the
Corporation; and that doctrine had been laid down
by Lord Redesdale and other authorities. The bill
had only two objects, the one to discover the title
of the plaintiff, and the other to ascertain the defence
of the Corporation. The plaintiff had a right to
know upon what documents the defendants relied in
support of their title. The defendants had not
stated what documents gave them the title. As can-
servators of the river they certainly had no title ; and
in the exercise of their authority as conservators they
might commit many acts prejudicial to the naviga-
tion of the river; and it was the right of the Crown
to interfere on the part of the public, and ascertain
whether they had any title, as owners of the bed and
soil of the river, which gate them the right to commit
such acts. Unless the Corporation claimed under
charters or letters patent from the Crown, they had
no title; and as they did not specify what charters or
letters patent they possessed, the Crown was entitled
to see the documents upon which they relied, that it
might have an opportunity of judging of the validity
of the title claimed. The defendants were asked "Do
you claim under a charter ?" and the answer was,
" I won't tell you ;" and they were further asked what
their defence was, and plain the answer is " I won't
tell you." There was no doubt that certain acts had
been committed by the defendants, but the question
was whether they did so in their capacity as conser-
vators of the river, or as owners of its bed and soil ;
and in order to ascertain that it was necessary that the
discovery sought by the bill should be made. His
Lordship concluded by saying that under these cir-
cumstances the discovery must be allowed and the