The Sun.
London, England, 1840-01-23 00:00:00

EVENING EDITION.

ing, would such a course be likely to have any weight
with the Bench ? Hansard could certainly have been
enabled to show that, in acting as he had done,
he was entirely exempt from any moral offence,
but the Court of Queen's Bench would have
paid no attention to such a defence. (Cries of
" Hear, hear.") In the abstract, it might be fairly
contended that the Sheriffs had only executed their
orders, and paid obedience to the duties of their situa-
tion ; but as it regarded the privileges of that House,
they were undoubtedly guilty of having committed a
breach of them, and have incurred the penalty which
the vindication of this authority had called for.—
(Hear, hear.) He assured the lion. Member who had
just sat down, that nothing but the intimate conviction
that it was absolutely necessary for that House to vin-
dicate their privileges and to support their authority
would have reconciled him to take a determined course
on that occasion.—(Hear, hear.) His opinions, from
the commencement of those proceedings, had undergone
no change, and he would never shrink from adopting
every means which the law and Constitution would
permit, to justify the course that, in his opinion, they
ought to have adopted in vindication of their privi-
leges. The powers the Constitution gave them
are within their reach ; let them grasp with con-
fidence, and as he said before, he would not
refuse to adopt the exercise of any powers which the
law and Constitution gave them to support them.—
( Hear.) He would then feel a consolation in his breast
that he lent his assistance in preventing the effort then
made to compromise one of their most important privi-
leges, and not abandon that power which the Constitu-
tion of the country gave them.—(Great cheering.)
1 Mr. DARBY said, that recollecting what had fallen
from the Right Hon. Baronet who had just sat down,
he was surprised at the course that Gentleman had
thought proper to take on the present occasion. As he
(the Right Hon. Baronet) was generally considered by
that House and the country as the great Conservative
leader in that House, it was very extraordinary that
he should think proper to desert his class. There was
one part of the Baronet's speech which he was sorry it
had fallen to his (Mr. Darby's) lot to comment upon.
The question before the Judges was not whether a
Member of Parliament had the power of vindicating his
own conduct, but whether the House of Commons had
the power of giving the general orders to the Messrs.
Hansard, or in other words, to give a power to one man
to libel every other man in the country. He thought
that it was an assumption of power by that House
which they could not support.—( Hear, hear.) This
, particular privilege claimed by the House of Com-
mons, it appeared, was denied by a Court of Law ;
he did not deny their right to attempt a vindication of
their privileges, but he denied that they possessed such
an extensive privilege at all. He could not help re-
marking upon the inconsistencies of the Right Hon.
Baronet, who, upon the 17th of June, 1839, made a
speech in that House which he begged to read for
them. (Here the Hon. Gentleman read a quotation
from Sr R. Peel's speech, which seemed to discounte-
nance the idea of proceeding against any party except
the Court or Tribunal by which the case was enter-
tained : that the superiors of the party should be cora-
-1 mitted, and not the inferior officers.) He (Mr. Darby)
did not wish to charge the Right Hon. Baronet with in-
consistency, as that Hon. Gentleman had always fol-
lowed a consistent course, with that exception he (Mr.
Derby) had just alluded to ; and as he (Sir R. Peel)
had great power in the country, the Conservative party
'''
will naturally look up to him for his opinions on this
great matter. These were the whole of the observa-
tions he then wished to make.
&r ROBERT PEEL, hi explanation, said, it was
necessary to enlighten certain Members of that house
1 upon particular subjects, and still more necessary the
public at large. He was very much mistaken if he did
not make h;s Hon. Friend Mr. Darby learn how dan-
gerous it was t. be making particular quotations. In
charging bins (Sir R. Peel) with inconsistency he (Mr.
Darby) had taken every means he could to promote his
1 views. With respect to the speech of June last—and
he wished that every Gentleman charged with implied
inconsistency 'night be as well able to disprove it as he
(Sir Robert Peel) could they had not acted in
the case of Stoekdale v. Hansard according to the
advice he gave them ; he advised them to commit the
plaintiff in the action, without consulting the Courts of
' Law, for as it was decided in the case of Burdett v.
Abbott, it was ruled that they had the right of deciding
upon their chrn privileges, and they should have com-
mitted Stockdale rather than have pleaded before the
Court. (Here Sir Robert Peel read a quotation front
the speech mentioned by Mr. Darby as having been
spoken by the Right Hon. Baronet last June, and in
which he expressed his opinion that the Sheriffs
should not be arrested :—" If they allowed it
to be supposed that the House of Commons
only held their privileges by sufferance, it would be
better to suspend the exercise of those privileges alto-
gether.") Ile (Sir R. Peel) would now ask it be were
1 as inconsistent as the Honourable Member would sup-
; pose ? He stated at that time what his opinions were
en the subject, and foresaw the possibility of a new case
arising, and he advised that llouse not to submit it to
a Court of Law by pleading, but to let it be decided
by the House of Commons itself. He thought it would
' leave been most dishonest of him, with his present views,
to other any advice to so great a party in that House as
were so dreadfully troubled with the ghost of Han-
( surd.—(Cheers, and laughter.) He would not
hesitate, as he had often done before, from certain
f circumstances which had occurred to change the opi-
-1 nions which he had previously held, if he felt convinced,
that he was wrong. In this case, however, he was per-
fectly consistent, and had advised the commitment of
Stoekdale in the first instance, but his advice was over-
ruled by the Right Hon. the Attorney-General, who
taougnt otnerwise.
I Mr. GODSON begged leave to bring back their at-
tention to the question whether the attorney who is
brought before the House was to be committed or not.
If that House possessed those privileges, surely they
were sufficiently vindicated. The Hon. and Learned
Attorney-General had misled the House in a point of fact,
in arguing the case as if Mr. Howard issued the writ him-
self. He did no such thing, for Mr. Hansard himself
said that the writ was issued by this John Joseph
Stockdale in person, on the 26th of August, but the
subsequent proceedings were carried on by Mr.
Howard, of Norfolk-street, Strand, for the said John
Joseph Stockdale. He understood the reason for calling
the attorney before the bar of that House was for the
purpose of making an example, and to prevent other
• attorneys acting in a similar manner. The attorney
did not bring this action, nor did he act until
it was absolutely necessary for an attorney to act
It was the duty of an attorney to attend and prosecute
upon a retainer, and he had no more right to refuse to
do so than a counsel had a right to refuse to defend and
iman. In acting as Mr. Howard had done, he acted
purely ministerially, and as an officer of the Court.
The very next step that was to be taken after Mr.
, Howard interfered, counsel would be called upon to
) sign the pleadings. In so doing, he also acted merely
ministerially ; and if they committed the attorney,
they must go on from one officer of the Court to ano-
ther, until they came to the Judges. It would be
in the recollection of most Members that there had
been a case of a Queen in this country who had been a
defendant. In what a state would she have been
placed, had her counsel reined to render her their assist-
ance until they had first seen whether she were
guilty of treason . or not ? The cases were
precisely similar ; for if a counsel were nut called
upon to inquire into a case before they lent
their legal assistance, how could they possibly insist
upon an attorney doing so ? If they called Mr. Howard,
the attorney in the action, to their bar, he promised
them that their difficulties were only beginning, for he
would try the question with them whether the Judges
of the Court of Queen's Bench ought not to be examined
at their bar.—(Hear.) He assured them that they
would not be able to put down the inferior officer, and
by so doing strike at the independence of the bar with-
out trying their strength with the Judges. He was
• sorry that his Learned Friend tho Attorney-General was
not present, for he could have assured him, as he now
did the House, that the Judges had not the slightest
hesitation on the subject, but that Lord Denman, with
his tine and commanding countenance, and in his maul
y
and musical voice, at once and without hesitation
I
gave his able judgment, and stated that what the
jakiges waited for was merely for the purpose '
of sending an inquiry into Mr. Justice Paulson in the
other Court, to know why he had refused to interfere in
the case at Chambers. The answer was that he thought
it a case that ought not to be argued before a single
Judge at Chambers. The Attorney-General had said
that he had no confidence in the opinion of the Judges.
Let him carry the case a little further. On Saturday
those very five Judges in whom the House of Commons
had no confidence might form a majority of 9 ; possibly
the whole 13 might sit, but it might also he that only 9
would sit, and that those 3 would form the majority of
the Court that were to decide upon that point of law
reserved in favour of Mr. Frost and the other Chartist
prisoners ; they might decide that point against dingo
prisoners, and upon that judgment they would have to
i die, and yet in that majority the House of Commons bad
no confidence. True,it was said by the Learned Attorney-
General, that it was only in cases of privilege that the
House had withdrawn their confidence from the Judges ;
hut by so doing did they not proclaim to the world -that
the Government, the great heads of the Conservative
party, with. a large majority in that House, had with-
drawn their confidence in the Judges on a point of law.
They were going to punish Mr. Howard for ignorance,
yet he was supported in his view of the matter by five
Judges of the land, who said that he was perfectly'
in advising his client to go on ; yet they were goir', to
punish him for the very same act as had been committed
by the five Judges. They were about to lay clown -
law that it might be right in five Judges to be wsarr- ;
:is
but if an attorney should err on the same point, in
the same degree, aid to the seine extent, he must be
punished.
Mr. BERNAL thought the Honourable and Learned
Gentleman had introduced subjects which most cer-
tainly had not the slightest connection with the
case then before the House. What he would ask

had the unfortunate case of Mr. Frost to do with
the question whether Mr. Howard should appear at the
bar of the House of Commons? It was not for him
(Mr. Bernal) to say that the gentleman would not be
committed, it was enough for him to state that the
question before the Honse was merely that he appear at
the bar, in order to give some explanation of certain
transactions between him and Mr. Stockdale, which it
was highly necessary that the House should inquire into
at an early period. He,with many other Hon. Members,
lamented the being obliged to take the course which his
duty compelled him to do ; but, because he lamented it,
did the Hon. and Learned Gentleman suppose for
an instant that he or others were to be frightened
by the fear of popular clamour from a course which
was absolutely necessary for them to pursue
in order to maintain the highest privileges of the
Mouse. The Hon. and Learned Member for Ripon,
in the Committee up stairs, at the end of last Session,
had recommended a Declaratory Act, but the time for
that course to be pursued was past. It was now too
late in the day for them to take that course, for they
had entered upon another, and they must pursue it or
for ever throw away their high privileges, which were
necessary, absolutely necessary, for the due perform-
ance of their duties. Suppose the case of a repre-
sentative for an important county, or a large borough :
any Gentleman placed in such a situation must know
that he was under the imperative necessity of commu-
nicating great part of what took place before Commit-
tees of that House to his constituents ; they all knew
that much matter there might be construed into libel,
yet it was held by the Judges of the Queen's Bench
that any communication of the proceedings, whether by
sale or otherwise, was a libel and punishable. It had
been asked why proceed against an inferior officer of the
Court and not against the Judges ? Ho would most
unfeignedly state that he would be most sorry to pro-
ceed against them, but if a high privilege of such im-
portance could not otherwise be maintained, it would be
his duty, however painful, to give his vote for calling
them to the bar. He lamented to have read such a
judgment as that delivered by Lord Denman. He was
not surprised that it should not be upheld by any one
lawyer in that House, for it was not borne out by either
Statute Law, Common Law, or Parliamentary Law.
These privileges of the House were held for the benefit
of the country at large, and without they could not be
useful, and they might as well shut up the doors
of the House as allow them to be invaded.
He was surprised to hear the terms oppressive and ty-
rannical applied to the conduct of a majority of the
House. It was said that popular feeling was against
them ; and were not the terms they used calculated to
excite public opinion against the House ?—(Hear,
hear.) He asked whether the course they pursued
was not fitted to awaken opinion out of doors against
them ? He would ask whether the grounds on which
the opposition to the majority of the House had been
put, and the expressions which had been used, might not
direct public opinion against those Members who were
endeavouring to support their honest and conscientious
convictions? Hon. Gentlemen opposite should not,
however, think that he denied the conscientious mo-
tives on which they were acting ; but he thought that
these gentlemen should equally believe in the sincerity
and in the purity of intention with which others were
acting. At the same time, he should say that they
were guilty of a great and important error, when they
abused their position to talk of- revenge and tyranny,
rand unjustifiable assumption.—(Hear, hear.) These
expressions on the part of Hon. Gentlemen opposite,
had a good deal of the appearance of bitterness, and of
tt. want of sincerity for which he, (Mr. Bernal)
was willing to give them credit ; and he thought
Ciat such language would not do good with regard to the
refection of their opinions out of doors. i-ion. Members
might be assured that there were individuals out of that
House who could analyse the opinions and expressions of
those within it, and who could separate the chaff from that
which was solid, and who could distinguish between the
true nature of things from that false glare which might be
thrown round them.—( Cheers.) It was now, he felt, too
late to enter at length into the question. The proceed-
ings had been already drawn out in a most elaborate, and,
perhaps, an unnecessary manner. It was a matter, how-
ever, regarding the privileges of the House, and one
which merited their serious attention, and he was sure that
ever; man in the House, whatever might be his opinions,
would decide as he thought most likely to contribute to
the good of the country. The House of Commons could
not abandon its privileges without injury to the Constitu-
tion. No one could know the issue of this unfoi tnnate
struggle ; they should, however, do their duty. They
should not loo:k either to the right or to the left—they
should not trust solely to the opinion that might exist
either out of doors or in-doors. Ho knew that the true
sense of the situation in which they were placed, and of
the difficulties which surrounded this question, could not
be easily estimated. Let them act earnestly and tempe-
rately, but at the same time with firmness, assuring them-
selves that they would not then have to regret the issue.
Mr. PE MBE RT ON said that he should apologize to
the House for venturing to iaim again their attention.
It was not, however, in his opinion, an ordinary case—he
might he entirely mistaken, and he trusted he was ; but he
did in his heart and conseie nee believe that the question
now at issue was neither more nor less—he knew it was
not so considered by Hon. Gentlemen on the other side ;
but he did believe that the question now was neither more
nor leas than this, narcely, whether the people of this
country were hereafter to live under the rule of the law,
or whether they were to be subjected to an uncontrolled
authority. Ho was anxious to address to the House a few
observations on the subject. He would assume that the
House of Commons had the privilege of publication which
it claimed—he would assume that it was their duty to
vindicate that privilege, not by legislation nor by law,
bnt by force. Assuming all these things to be so, he
would apply himself to this, and to this alone—whether
the course they were now proposing to pursue was con-
sistent even with their own notion of the law. It could
scarcely be said that the privilege which they had claimed
was consistent with the law of precedent. He was per-
fectly persuaded that Hon. Members opposite had
no other object in view than to perform what
they believed to be their duty to their country.
On the other hand, he claimed for himself the same favour-
able opinion, and he claimed for himself the merit that,
from the earliest moment this question was introduced,
from the year 1837, when the Resolutions which they were
now acting on were first submitted to the House—he had
declared that he considered them illegal. The question
was not whether they had the right of publication—for the
sake of argument he would assume that they had such a
right ; nor was the question whether the Judges of the
Court of Queen's Bench were justified in giving the deci-
sion they had made—for the purpose of argument he would
also assume that they were wrong. He thought, however,
that
_unjust conclusions had been drawn in those
admissions. They had been told that no lawyer had at-
tempted to support the opinion of the Court of Queen's
Bench regarding the limits of the privilege of publication
claimed by the House. That was not, however, a fair
view of the state of the question. The right of publica-
tion, and the subjection of that right to the cognizance of
the Courts of Law, were two totally different questions.
The great question was, whether the Court of Queen's
Bench, in an action brought by an individual against an
officer of the House, had or had not the right of inquiry.
That seas one question. The other question was, whe-
ther, assuming that the Court of Queen's Bench had the
jurisdiction, it had come to a just conclusion. He
had heard it held that the publications in cuestion were pri-
vileged, because they were published under the authority of a
privileged body. That, however, was an entirely distinct
question—every body must see that. The one subject for
their decision was, whether the Courts of Law were capable
of entering into the examination of their publications ;
the other was whether, being capable of that examination,
their publications were to be held privileged or not. The
Court of Queen's Bench decided that they had the right
of examination, and they afterwards held that the publica-
tions should not be looked on as privileged. On the
one point he would say, without the fear of contradiction,
that with respect to the right of examination, ninety-nine
out of every hundred of the barristers in Westminster
Hall, were of opinion that the Judges had not the right of
inquiring into those publications. He did not believe that
any one could entertain a different opinion on that subject.
He believed that the profession was agreed upon it, end the
Hon. Member for Chester, notwithstanding his vote in '
1837, would not be thought now to deny that position.
It was, however, a very important question whether the
Court of Queen's Bench was right or wrong on that point,
but it did not follow that because the unanimous decision
of the bar was against them on that subject that
they were therefore wrong on the other point. What he
now wished to draw the attention of the Honse to was this
—that supposing all the lawyers in Westminster Hall were
unanimous against the right he alluded to on the part of the
Judges, it would not follow, in the second place, that the
House would be justified in pursuit)g the course it had
adopted if that judgment were impeached. He should say
that he had himself expressed no opinion on that second
point. ill he should say was, that it was a point of great
difficulty. On the question of the resolutions of 1837,
there were great doubts and difficulties on which lawyers
might entertain different opinions, and on which he would
not pronounce an opinion. He believed that if they had
carried that question by writ of error before the other
Judges and before the House of Lords, a different con-
teheenseiso
celnutsricoan might have been come to. He begged leave to
eeitlotuhsee
case,
oseconsider whether,. if this were a fair
statemtentht
attempting to take was'
and with their own views of theirn tuerstewhich they were then
rmtlhegetlsi.eir
Howenimopbjleocretsd,
in what position the case now stoodi
of them to consider what it was they weree now
Courts doing,
o of Law,
aandw,
and before the public, and in what situation situation they were
othought
ii
themselves placed. lion. Gentlemen 5
that the right of publication was essential'psit to the
He only begged of them to consider whether wlatotnehseei
were doing would not drag them into the utmostwhat
to say the least of it, and whether it would not be 11)etrtter,
to pause in their proceedings. In the action to which lie
alluded, the question of the right of publication had not
been raised at all—they had never brought it before the
Court of Queen's Bench in any form whatever. The case
of law stood thus :—An action had been brought with re-
spect to which a Court of competent judisdiction had pro-
nounced its opinion, while the House had acquiesed iu
had brought no writ of error—tiwy
had yielded They
the decision. A similar action was again
brought. and what (he would ask) had they done? They
had permitted judgment to go by default. The Judges
had not the opportunity of considering whether that case
differed from the last, or if it did not differ, whether their
decision was right or not. As the ease appeared before
them they did not known under what circumstances the
publication had taken place. All they know er could
know, was that a certain action had been brought for a
certain cause. The defendant had admitted the fact—had
admitted the rule, and the jury having been called on to
ascertain the amount of injury thus admitted, had stated it

at G4O/. In that state of the proceedings an officer of a
Court of Justice was called on to execute the writ which
had been issued by a competent authority. The question
was whether or not it was part of the privileges of the
Commons—whether it was part of the privileges of Par-
liament—that they might make an order in a case pending
in a Court of Justice, and command the Sheriffs to disobey
the authority of a Court of which they were the sworn
officers. The question was whether that ,course which
they were now called on to take was consistent or not with
the law of the land—whether it was allowed them by their
privileges to stay the execution of a proceeding, and having
stayed it, to commit the attorney who had acted on the
occasion? Was that part of their privileges? Was it
consistent with the common forms, or the common sub-
stance of justice to take that strong course (he might at
least call it so) to which he alluded ? A few days ago
be invited Honourable Gentlemen on the other side of the
House to point out a single case since that of Ashby
and White, in which the House had made an order staying
the prosecution of a proceeding before a Court of Law in
an action pending between individuals. Had any case of
this kind been produced ? He would ask an answer to
that question from the Noble Lord to whom were com-
mitted the peace and safety of the kingdom—in greater
danger he believed than was conceived. He entreated the
House to consider whether any such case could be produced
—whether there was a single instance in which that House
had cited parties before it, attempting to stay proceedings
in a Court of Justice in an action still pending between
the individuals concerned.—( Hear hear.) The question
was this and this only—could the House, consistently with
the usages to which it referred, consistently with the pre-
oedents which he invited them to produce, maintain its
present proceedings ? There was one case of analogy which
had been referred to, and only one, and without which he
should not have presumed to address the House. It was most
important, however, that whatever they did, they should do
for reasons that would justify them, and that they should
not rest on false analogy. Their proceedings could not
be confined to themselves—they would Le scanned most
accurately—they would be examined, at all events, as
being an infraction of the rights of the subject. The
question would be brought before a Court, when whatever
was most profound in law, or most acute in ingenuity,
would be employed in sifting and examining the grounds
on which they had proceeded. Now the only
analogy which could justify the House in the
course it was pursuing, was one drawn from the
Court of Chancery. They had been told that inasmuch
as the Sheriffs obeyed an order of the Court of Chancery,
and refused to execute a writ suspended by that Court,
they might equally refuse to execute the order of the
Court of Queen's Bench, to which the House had opposed
itself. That was the way in which the Attorney-General
and the Noble Lord had stated the case. Was the
House, it was said, inferior to the Court of Chancery.
and were their privileges to be violated in con-
sequence ? He ( Mr. Pemberton) entreated the at-
tention of the House to that matter. He would
observe, in answer to the case which had been put, that
the House had no authority to make orders in any case
which might come before any Court of Justice. The
Sheriffs, in the instance alluded to, were obeying a
Queen's writ, which they were bound to do by their oaths ;
but they were not so bound with regard to an order of the
House of Commons, for that would be violating their
oaths. The writ of the Court of Chancery was not
obeyed, because that Court was superior to the law—it
was not founded on any breach of privilege—it
was nothing more than the Queen's own order
addressed to the Queen's own officers. The same
thing, however, could not, in any way, be said
of the proceedings of the House of Commons, and
the cases were, consequently, totally different.
The writ was not addressed by the Judges of one Court to
another, but by the Queen herself. Now observe what it
was which the Sheriffs were bound to do : to execute all
the Queen's writs, and in the case of the interference of the
Court of Chancery it was one writ issued under the authc.
rity of the Queen, interfering to prevent or suspend the
execution of a previous one. In such case there was no
contest between the Courts. The Sheriff was merely, in
such case, obeying the order which, upon a further investi-
gation of the merits of the case, might be issued from the
Court of Chancery, but in that there was no violation of
his oath. He contended, therefore, that it was impossible
to maintain the position that there was any analogy in their
proceedings. Was that House a Court of Law? Did it
assume or pretend to any analogy with the Courts of Law ?
Why, their whole proceedings were entirely in opposition
to the proceedings of Courts of Justice. In Court; of
Justice there was no evidence taken except upos
oath, and when he heard it urged that that
House possessed every power necessary to en-
able it to circulate the truth, they must admit that the
power of elucidating it by examinations upon oath, did not
belong to it in such cases. The Courts of Justice had no
power to compel witnesses to criminate themselves. The
House of Commons proceeded in a different course. The
Courts of Justice allowed parties to be heard bcfcre they
were committed—they allowed them the benefit and as-
sistance of Counsel, but the House of Commons pursued s,
different course. They did all that, because they were
not a Court of Justice, and, not being a Court of Justice,
they could not claim the powers or privileges of such
Court. It appeared to him that there was not the slightest
foundation in law for the course they were pursuing. Was
that course likely to be effectual, or to produce the re-
sults they anticipated ? Did they believe that commit
ting the attorney would prevent him from bringing
another action ? In the cell of the Sergeant-at-
Arms he could proceed with it.—(Cheers.) They could
not deprive him of one particle of the power which, as an
attorney, he possessed. The only way they could do tba•
effectually, would be to strike him off the rolls, but the,
had no power to do so. Did they believe they could deter
others from doing the same thing ? The declaration of his
lion. and Learned Friend ( Mr. Freshfield) was conclu
sive on that point. Instead of deterring, they would ra-
ther instigate hundreds of them to come forward. Tin-
, attorneys—nay, the counsel—were anxious to become
martyrs. Let them talk of their privileges after to-day,
when they were told before the public in a Court of Jus-
tice, by a legal gentleman, that he knew he was commit-
ting a gross breach of the privileges of the House, and that he
he defied it. Why ? Because, if they committed him, hun-
dreds of them would come forward, and they must enlarge
the cell of the House of Commons.—( Hear.) They might
depend en it that the struggle was but commencing.—
( Cheers.) They had not ventured to attack the bar, who were
certainly the most guilty of the two, because the attorney
had merely acted in the discharge of his duty. In the
first action Stockdale sued as a pauper, and had counsel
and attorney assigned to him. Would they imprison th
counsel and attorney so assigned, and who could not refuse
to act? Let them search Westminster Hall, and they
would not find a single man in it who would refuse Co
move for a writ of Habeas Corpus in the case of the
Sheriffs. They could not find such a man in all West-
minster Hall.—( Hear, hear.) In that state of thing:
would they imprison the wretched attorney when there
were hundreds of others openly defying them ? He
believed that they would have, if they persevered,
in that course, a petition signed by every member of the
bar. Not many days would elapse before they would
have a petition signed by mote barristers than had ever
attached their names to a petition. In the city of London
and throughout the country the deepest interest and anxiety
existed with respect to the course they ware pursuing.
Let them not disregard those opinions, because they did
not come from roaring demagogues, or noisy declaimers,
who were anxiously courting martyrdom, and setting
themselves up in opposition to the House of Commons.
There were hundreds, like himself, who would, even if
the punishment were a thousand times greater than
than any they possessed, and really it was not very formi-
dable, but whatever it was, he and they would rather
submit to these punishments, than to what he believed
would be the inevitable consequence of a submission to
that House, the contempt and scorn of the profession to
which they belonged, and of the community of which the v
were sworn to be the advocates when called upon.--
(Cheers.) He asked them calmly and dispassionately
to look back to the most ancient times, and tell him
whether upon any one occasion, whether right or wrong,
when they had come into conflict with the Courts of Jus-
tice, the people of that country had been able to maintain
the privileges of the House of Commons against the Judges
and the law of the land.—( Hear, hear.) In the case of
Stowell, that House had been obliged to resort to a
false entry in its Journals, because its committals
had been at that period so numerous, that Stowell refused
to attend, and they entered on their Journals that Stowell
was sick, and that he be allowed three weeks to attend.—
( Hear, hear.) They wished to prevent Stockdale re-
ceiving his damages in the present case, but he had already
received them, or very soon would receive them. The
Sheriffs had been imprisoned for refusing to hand over
these damages, but he trusted the House had not subjected
them to the indignity of being imprisoned in the same cell,
and snaking them the associates of Stockdale.—(Cries of
" No, no.") They had sent them to prison for doing what
every honourable and honest man in that House had de-
clared would have been his conduct under similar circum-
stances.—( Hear, hear.) The prorogation of a single
day would defeat their object, and they might
rest assured that ere long they would have the
throne besieged with petitions praying that Parliament
might be prorogued, if but for a day, because that day
would set them at liberty.—( Hear, hear.) Why did they
not make these proceedings lawful by Act of Parliament ?
Why did they not establish an authority which the Judges
of the land might consistently with their oaths obey, ai,d
thus put an end to a conflict beginning with Stockdale and
his attorney, but ending, he verily believed, with the people?
Mr. PIG OTT thought the whole of the Hon. and
Learned Gentleman's speech had been addressed rather to
the case which had been already decided upon by the
House than to the present. The question was not now
whether the Sheriffs should be committed--the question
was, whether, having committed the Sheriffs, they were
now to stop short in that which appeared to him the nee, s-
sary sequel of what had already been done.—( Hear, hear. )
It had been urged that they had no right to interfere be-
tween the subject and his legal right of action in the Courts
of Law. The answer to that was, that the House of Com-
mons, as a portion of the Constitution, was itself a Court,
and entitled to decide upon its privileges without any in-
terference from any inferior Court of Law. The jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Chancery' was precisely analogous.
When an injunction was issued by the Court, the party
who in violation of that proceeded with his action was
attached and imprisoned for
In
n contempt o
on
f the
m Court
tof
Ltred
attachmentE ld s i e
wasin si el
eCahseanceefryc.—re(wHtheearr,vh.
aside on the ground of irregularity. The party who set
aside the attachment brought an action against the person
who had arrested him, and that action he was entitled to
ear.)
Lawrence,
maintain in a Court of Law. It was contended that
no legal right vested in him to recover damages
in a Court of Law, and an application was marls
to the Court of Chancery to stop the action. What said
Lord Eldon ? " The defendant, after the attachment was
discharged, brought an action at law f,r damages. and a
motion was made for an injunction to restrain him breci
menu, from
Lord then went on to show the importance of the subj et
go ng on with it." The Noble and Learned
possessing the right to brine' an action of damages when
he had been deprived of his 'liberty, and after adrnittiez
that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was very
great, he observed that it did not extend so far, and that it