The Sun.
London, England, 1847-11-09 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF CHANCERY, Nov. 8.
CURSON V. BELLWORTHT.

This appeal from the Vice-Chancellor of England
was argued some time ago. The bill was to set aside
a conveyance of ten acres of land at South Tawton,
in Devonshire. The estate was devised by the grand-
father of the plaintiff to his father in tail male, and
was subject to a mortgage of 1204, with interest. The
father died in 1840, leaving the plaintiff; his eldest son
and heir male. It was alleged that he was a person of
weak mind, very illiterate, and easily imposed on, and
that the defendant, a man of substance in the neigh
bourhood, had taken advantage of this circumstance
to impose on him. The evidence showed that the
plaintiff, being in want of money, during his father's
lifetime entered into a negotiation with the defendant
to sell his contingent interest in the farm for 401.;
that he went to the office of the defendant's solicitor
in Crediton to have an agreement for that purpose
drawn up; and that at various times the defendant
advanced small sums of money on account
of the proposed purchase. At a subsequent
period the plaintiff placed his mark on a
paper, which, as he alleged, he thought to be
an agreement for the sale of his contingent inte-
rest. On the death of the father the plaintiff com-
pleted the agreement for the sale, but received 40/.
in addition to the original 401., it being found out
that the paper which he had signed before was
merely a bond to secure the money advanced. On
this ground, and that of inadequate value, the bill asked
to have the contract set aside. At the hearing in the
court below, the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that
the proof of fraud had failed, and that a mere case of
inadequacy of value was not sufficient to set aside a
conveyance when ouceicompleted. His Honour there-
fore dismissed the bill with costs.
The LORD CHASCELLOR now gave judgment. The
bill was filed to set aside, on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation, an agreement for the sale and con-
veyance of a farm alleged to have been executed on
the 24th .of September, 1840. In order to entitle the
plaintiff to that description of relief which he
prayed, the alleged fraud must, in his Lord-
ship's opinion, appear clearly on the face of the bill.
To entitle the plaintiff to succeed, it must appear he
has proved the fraud so alleged in such a manner as
to take from the defendant the legal title he has ac-
quired, and if this was t) be done in consequence of
admissions made by the defendant, he could not make
use of such admissions unle7s they have been specifi-
cally charged in the bill, fer otherwise the defendant
would not know until it was too late in what manner
he was to meet the case made against him. This was
a rule hi: Lordship had frequently laid down. The
case made by the bill res"-d mainly on the ground
of a want of adequate consideration, and a kind
of misunderstanding, arising out of certain transac-
tions between the parties when money was borrowed
in 1838. It was not very easy to understand how
the lending of money on bond could be understood
as a contract for sale. That, however, was the only
equity made by
:the bill, and on which the Court was
asked to set aside the sale. The plaintiff also based
his claim to equity on certain conversations that were
set forth in the answer of the defendant. If the case
made by the plaintiff in his bill had been sus-
tained, then conversations might have been of im-
portance, but they could not of themselves support
the claim for relief, and there was in opposition to
them the clear evidence that the plaintiff knew well
in 1839 and 1840 all that was going on with respect
to the farm, and that the deed was actually read to
him. The case for the defendant mainly depeneed
on the worst of all evidence of the charges containcd
in the bill, and his Lordship was clearly of opinion
that the charge of fraud against the defendant wholly
failed. It was, perhaps, to be regretted that any
sale should have taken place under such circumstances,
but-if the plaintiff had an equity, he had mistaken
the course to obtain it. Tha order of the Vice-
Chancellor was the proper one, and the decree must
be affirmed, with costs.
BELL AMY C. SABLNE.

This was an appeal from the Vice-Chancellor
Knight Bruce, also argued some time ago. The
plaintiff was tenant for life of estates in Dorset, and
being in debt, joined with his son, by the advice of
Sabine (the defendant) in cutting off the entail. The
estates were conveyed to Sabine, in consideration of
his making a provision for the joint lives of the father
and son, and of the grandchildren. No such provision
was made, but some trifling RIM were given to the
Bellamys, and Sabine raised money for the payment of
his own claims. Edward Bellamy, the eldest son, died,
and a bill was filed by Francis Bellamy, his next
brother, to set aside the conveyance to Sabine. The
cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor, when
Master of the Rolls, and a decree was pronounced,
declaring the conveyance inoperative, but holding the
sums raised by Sabine to be incumbrances on the
estate, and referring the matter to the master to take
the usual accounts. Pending these proceedings, Bel-
lamy, the father, filed the present bill to have the
money raised by Sabine handed over to him, on the
ground of the decree in the former suit being unfa-
vourable to Sabine. The Vice-Chancellor Knight
Bruce dismissed this bill, but qualified the dismissal
with a declaration that although the plaintiff was not
entitled to a specific performance, yet that there
might be a reference to the Master to inquire how far
the question at issue was affected by any circum-
stances or acts of the father or son, subsequent to
June, 1837, when the transactions with Sabine com-
menced.
His LORDSHIP now gave judgment on the appeal.
His Lordship observed, that before he considered the
main question in the cause, be thought it necessary to
advert to two points whida appeared in the decree of
the Court below, on which 'he bill, as it stood on the
file of the court, did not a7pear to have asked the
Court to carry into effect. It appeared by the decree
of August, 1844, that the plaintiff obtained liberty
to amend his bill, by adding a new prayer to it, and
that although the defendant did not object to that
amendment, yet that he did not give his assent to it,
nor put in any further answer in consequence of it.
His Lordship felt it necessary to say in the outset,
that such an alteration in the record, at such a time,
was highly irregular, and that it ought not, on err,
occasion, to be used as an authority for such a pro-
ceeding in future. The other point to which he
thought it necessary to direct attention was, that the
bill appeared to rest the case of the plaintiff on the
agreement made between the two elder Bellamys and
Sabine in June, 1827. That agreement, therefore,
put in issue the whole rights of the parties, and enabled
the Court to decide on them. Now, the decree
of the Vice-Chancellor was a decision against
the claim of the plaintiff, although at the
same time it directed a reference to the Master to
inquire into subsequent transactions. This proceeding
would have the effect of putting the parties in a con-
dition to make out a fresh case before the Master,
and one altogether independent of the case already
raised by the bill. His Lordship thought this also to
be very irregular, and not calculated to make a de-
cree secundum allegata et probata, but producing
results at variance with those contemplated by the
parties, and introducing disorder, uncertainty, and
confusion into the rules of the court. The judgment
did not proceed on either of these points, but on the
merits, and the decree, by refusing relief, did not, as
was alleged, leave the plaintiff to his single legal
remedy, because the bill was not for a specific per-
formance, but to carry out a something arising out
of the decree already pronounced at the Rolls. That
decree directed a conveyance to Francis Bellamy in
fee, and it concluded the rights of the parties, as far
as the agreement was concerned. His Lordship was
of opinion that the direction and the decree of the
Vice-Chancellor would be inconsistent with the decree

at the Rolls ; and as he still considered the decree
made it'the Rolls to be the proper one, he thought
the decree of the Vice-Chancellor ought to be re-
versed to such an extent as to make it in accordance
with the decree at the Rolls.

VICE-CHANCERY COURTS. Nov. 8.
(Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR Of ENGLAND.)
. TRH GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. THE
BIRMINGHAM AND OXFORD JUNCTION RAILWAY
CONMAN Y.
Sir F TZROT KELLY resumed this morning his ar-
guraeut in this cause. The governing bodies of the
two companies,
Wolver-
hampton, and luadlled of
.the • Birmingham, Wolver-
a contract on the 12th of
Dudley Railway Company, entered into
it NVIS agreed that thel3.
November, 1846, by which
the Birmingham and Dudley iiningham and Oxford and
amalgamated, and that the Companies should be
be purchased by the Great We
lines of railway should
the latter now sought to have stern.
This agreement
and the question whether the CosuPecically performed,
enforce its performance was now Chancery would
neral demurrer filed by he defendantsargued
upon
a ge-
bill. The Birmingham and Oxford t
i,tathe plaintiffs'
Com-
pany was incorporated by an Act of Railway
Passed in July, 1846, and it was authorisedarlianaent,
make a railway from Oxford to al to
Fenny Compton, in Warwickshire, witl3:c: called
a million sterling. About the same time the litPital of
irming-
ham, Wolverhampton, and Dudley Railway coin_
pane, with a capital of 700,0001., was similarly in-
corporated. The, agreement of November blended
700
these two capitals into one of 1 , ,000/ , which w„,
divided into 85,000 shares of 20/. each, and fixed
the purchase-money
at 30/. ss. per share, to be paid
upon l.
the completion of the line, or, at all events,
before July, 1850. The first objection taken by the
Learned Counsel to the contract was, that it was not
binding on the shareholders of the several companies.
--1 Eli s. i' ~ , The parties to it were the governing bodies of the
/-----_-\,,.-., ,_..1 companies, whose powers were limited to the scope
f",- ~,<::,F=-21 and objects for which they had been constituted, and
"4/__`,- —_ consequently did not extend to authorise their enter.
....c--. ing into such a contract as the present. The directors,
in
..,:-, . entering into it, had clearly exceeded their powers,
~... .- • nsequentl it
~-_-,,,:e.i....Y did not bind the company
t_-_,t, gent iy, nor would it, although a majority of the
ja---
1,--"r.....---
tc e olders were to ratify it. The Learned Counsel