The Sun.
London, England, 1841-02-20 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1841.

MAJOR CLIBBORN'S AFFAIR.

EXONERATION OF THAT OFFICER FROM BLAME AND
ATTACHMENT OF BLAME TO LORD KEANE.
(The following is the report alluded to by Sir John
Hobhouse in the House of Commons on Friday last, as
having been improperly published in India.)
REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION.
Sukkur, N0v.20, 1840.
The Court having carefully investigated everything
connected with the unfortunate affair of Nufoosk come
to the following conclusion.
1. That the remote andoriginal cause of the disaster
rested with Lord Keane, his Excellency having re-
duced the number of troops and crippled the Commis-
sariat to such a degree that the former were not able
to occupy the posts in sufficient force to protect them-
selves, much less to act offensively, should such a
measure become necessary, and the latter from want of
means were prohibited the possibility of furnishing the
supplies absoletely requisite for their support.
2. Owing to the above causes tFe month of May
had arrived before even the small detachment under
Captain Brown was established at Kahun, although
Major-General Sir Thomas Willshire had determined
that a force of double the strength should be sent e Irly
in March.
3. To an error of judgment on the part of Brigadier
Stevenson in pushing a force within the Hills at such a
season, when he knew he had not the means of feeding
them, and no inconvenience either in a political or mil .
tary view could have arisen from the delay of a few
months, when all risk of the subsequent misfortunes
would have been avoided. He, apparently, did not
consider that the arrangements had been determined
on at a favourable season, and with the supposition of
full means.
4. To the want of information given to Capt. Brown,
by Brigadier Stevenson, and after his death by Major
Forbes, for although Capt. Brown early in August
made the most urgent application for supplies, and the
season was so unfavourable that they ought in the opi-
nion of the Court to have sent him orders at once to
place his garrison on half or even quarter rations, which
would have enabled him to hold out until the favour-
able season for relief came round.
5. To the want of an understanding between Briga•
dier Stevenson and Lieut. Poston!, the assistant poli-
tical agent in immediate charge of Northern Cutchee ;
the former having determined on throwing in supplies
without any communication with the political authori-
ties, and actually equipped a force of 1,200 bayonets,
6 guns, and a strong body of irregular horse for that
purpose.
6. To the want of foresight and judgment of Major
Forbes, (who commanded after the death of Brigadier
Stevenson), who sent'out 1,200 camels and GOO bul-
locks under about half the number of troops ordered
for this service by his predecessor, and without any con-
sultation with the political authorities. This measure
the Court unhesitatingly condemns. Orders sent to
Captain Brown to put his men on quarter rations, would
have answered every purpose, for be had provisions, as
events subsequently proved, to enable him to hold until
until the 15th October without such a precaution. Nor
can the Court avoid noticing the uselessness of such an
enormous convoy, when 200 camels would have sup-
plied the garrison of Kahuo with provisions for three
months.
7. The Court consider Lieutenant Postans, the poli-
tical agent, in immediate charge of the country they
were to pass through, highly culpable for not having
accompanied the convoy, and in having, in the only com-
munication placed on record, which is a private one, so
far misled Major Forbes as to state that, in his opinion,
400 infantry and 200 horse would prove sufficient to
pretect the convoy proceeding to Kahun against any
force the Murrees could bring against it.
8. The first point to be noticed with reference to
Major Clibborn, is his opinion as to the adequacy
of his detachment for the duty entrusted to him. He
st des, that it was his conviction 2,000 men would not
suffice for the duty to be performed, but that he made
no application for an increase to his strength, because,
he says, he knew that none could be afforded, nor did
he request any reduction to the amount of the supplies.
This statement is most unsatisfactory—a slight calcu-
lation would have shown him how wholly unnecessary
was the immense charged entrusted to him, and the same
force destined for service by Brigadier Stevenson might
have been employed.by Major Forbes.
9. The second point rel des to the route seieetel. by
Major Clibborn from Phoolajee and Kellum The Court
differ entirely from him as to the obstacles he would
have had to encounter by Deyrah ; accurate surveys of
the three routes from Phoolajee and Lhiere to Kahun
were made last year by Lieut. Jacob, of the artillery,
and Dr. Kirk; in addition to these, the latter officer had
made careful drawings of the three passes and gorges,
which presented the chief obstructions to the advance
of troops. A reference to Captain Jacob's reports
will show that the road over the Nufoosk Pass was
made by him, and until he constructed it, the Pass
was impracticable excepting to foot passengers. Now,
before Major Clibborn entered the Hills he received
information from Captain Brown that the Murraes
were assembling in force at Nefoosk, and. destroying,
thesnesal.:Lfir jritream4e nitric- luesaight:itst 40-Uve
selected the route: in question. But there is another
instance of the want of judgment of Major Clibborn—
he was warned by Lieutenant Postans not to place re-
liance in Meer Hussain, and he himself doubted his
fidelity. The man earnestly pressed the advance to
NufOosk ; be was heard communicating with the
enemy, )et Major Clibborn allowed himself' to be led
into the toil. Major Clibborn, beyond a doubt, should
have gone by Deyrah ; the only difficulty along the
whole course is a narrow gorge a mile and a half be-
yond Deyrah. At that place there is abundance of
water and forage, and in the event of resistance, he
might have halted any length of time, and taken steps for
turning or forcing the pass. The only remaining oint
to be noticed is Major Clibborn's conduct' previ to
and during the engagement. Here he, in- th , first
instance, fell into the fatal, but too common
rror
of holding his enemy in contempt. His plan of attack
t
was most injudicious : he admits the pass might have
been turned from the left, but gives as a reason for his
not having attempted it, that it would have required to
detach 400 infantry. The Court entirely differ with
Major Clibborn on this point : if two flank companies
were considered by him sufficient to make a direct
attack on the whole concentrated force of the enemy fir
front, with every description of artificial, as well as
natural obstacles to overcome, the same number of men
would have been capable of turning the position ; and
had Major Clibborn adopted this plan, making, et the
same time, a false attack in front, to be convorted into
a real one, when he saw our troops crowning the height',
there can be no doubt the pass of Nufoosk would have
been carried with comparafvely little loss on our side.
The Court is also of opinion, that Major Clibborn did
not sufficiently reconnoitre in search of water, but
trusted too much to reports. There were trees and
herbage within 300 yards of his position, which in such
a desolate region ought to have attracted his notice,
and had he searched, it is now known be would have
found water on the spot.
Having performed a painful duty in animadverting on
the conduct of various individuals, we have increased
pleasure in recording our opinion of the patient endur-
ing fortitude, and. determined gallantry of every indivi-
dual of this brave, but unfortunate detachment, which
is above all praise. It is true our arms have mct with
a reverse, but the honour of the Bombay troops remains
untarnished.

(Signed)
Major-Gen. G. B. BROOKES, President.
Brig. T. VALIANT, H.M. 40th Regt.
Lieut.-Col. G. WYMER,;tOth Bengal N. I.
Major F. G. FARRELL, 6th N. I.
Major J. LLOYD, Artillery.

TILE FRENCH NA VY.—The Courrier Fran-
cais publishes a long letter from a Correspondent at Tou-
contbining statements to prove that the various dock-
ards of France are very inadequately supplied with timber
'fur the vessels repairing or building. He calculate, that
in the naval ports on the western and southern coasts of
France there are not more than 80,000 steres of timber
(the store is the cubic metre of 35:f cubic English f,et)
now collected ; of which only 50,000 steres I are really
ready for naval constructions; and he adds that this timber
is so ill assorted, that it would he impossible at the present
moment to put on the stocks five first-rates, or even to re-
pair them af.er an engagement. He then proceeds to
show, on the same date, that the number cf vessels ordered
to be built this year is impossible to be executed. Ede at-
tributes the cause of this wan. of tiinber to two circum-
stances, the abolition of the sys'em of marking trees for
ELT-
L' building in forests, which took place in 1828, andithe
abolition of At roudissernents Forestiers for the navy in 1837.
AWFUL FIRE.--A dreadful fire recently broke
out at the mill of Mr. M'Clelland near Derby. Of seven
persons who were dreadfully burned, two have since died.
The damage done to the property is not considerable. At
one time, when all hope of getting the tire under was
past, a simultaneous rush was made to the door, which
unfortunately had, contrary to custom, been locked ; but
°nwowingthta()
t the
eey excitement:or ey
lconsequent on their situation,
roasting alive, joined to the
sense of suffueation experieaced, it aal some time before
any of them could lay his hand on the key ; but, this
done, a poor fellow, in Ids maddened eagerness to get it
turned, pulled it out of the lock, and, it failing from his
protracted their suffering:, and made th, it titu:-
tion still more perilour, nut, as God would have it (a few
seconds or, at most, a few minutes more, and all would
have been over with them), the key was found, the door
uolocked, and as many as could rushed out, and some of
them bad to return to drag out the remainder of tle suf.
ferers, who, having been overpowered by the flames and
smoke, had fallen down.

The Echo du Cantal states, that Al. Manhes,
formerly Captain in the Imperil Guard and Officer of the
Legion of Honour, hadjust died at Aurillac. " A corpo-
ral of infantry at the siege of Toulon," continues tie Echo,
"he saw the Major of Ariillery, Bonaparte, wo :nded and
incapable of protecting himself from tFe eherny's hull. ty.
To start forward, take him in hi; raiae him on hii
should rs, and place him in a secure quarter, was the atlAir

of a moment."
THE BRITISH EAfBASSY IN PARIS._ The
hotel of the British Embassy, in the Faubourg St. Honore,
is about to undergo a complete repair and restoration. The
works will commence iu about a fortnight.