The Sun.
London, England, 1847-06-16 00:00:00

tit
Qittle; d 0,., Was precisely an internal quarrel, arieing-
Ittne_u_esti• O causes, and could not, therefore, justify
Neeee,r_terence on the part of any other country.
teeeo,4,nnilY at a loss to understand what poesible dan-
t° eees".4 lave come over the minds of the Government
Oot-nce them that what was wrong on the 6th of
es.d7 WSS right on the 6th of April; or how the Noble
tleas,iftt the head of the Foreign Department, had suc
beloln Convincing himself that the arguments which
pea ofrrsed were entirely fallacious. Up to the pe
ti e sth of April, the interference was only that
mediator ; but, after that period, it became ar
leeticilPtervention; up to that period there was no
L" oomplaiuin of the want of impartiality on
Part of this g but that
"EN country, after the matter took
14Zuerent turn • it was no longer a mediation, but
eftetell.tion accompanied by an armed intervention.
firmsn,_ were tendered to the Crown, upon the ac-
tteek 17 of which the Government were ready to pro-
t° till.l,t_N3ole the refusal, on the part of the Queen,
Weep-retn those terms, the Government could with-
Si from its ineffectual attempt at interference. The
these7f by the Government to the Junta was this :
tot sZu the terms presented ; accept them ; if you do
tltertii9t the terms without limitation, and without
otnr we will come down upon you with the forces
IltaZace and Spain, and compel you to accept them.
pftrti all equitable interference between two contend-
Stie ea, struggling together ou an affair purely do-
,and internal internal ?—(Hear, hear.) The state of the
4104 artily was described by Sir H. Seymour and
the Wylde as miserable in the last extreme ;
flecitsver the Queen's troops went they carried off the
the Junta
the crops of the country, while the troops of
titese''",te were well fed and well clothed. It was under
tojet:rcnrastances that the Government thought proper
in conjunction with the forces of France and
haki 130der these circumstances it was that the Go-
ttgst ent had sanctioned an invasion of the soil of Por-
?he ; !mad could their Lordships tell him upon what
itt Was that the Government vindicated
by eelt
Tressive interference with this country—
kote: country which had hitherto been the
hy. :elm of liberty. He had heard some reasons stated
they s country should interfere, but he thought that
twere
he ere based upon such low grounds that no states-
t 7Ould venture to interfere. It had been said that
feti4l country did net interfere other nations would.
kferf e°llntries? France or Spain? Would they have
tt Itoekreti without the sanction of England? If so,
erelt not be the duty of Eegland to prohibit such in.
itteke„nne? But he did not believe that any such inter-
h would have taken place on the part of France,
otter, felt confirmed in this opinion by the statement
to p Guizot, who expected the return of Don Miguel
ithkragel, and, in the event of such an occurrence
the Place, the Government of France would apply to
%%ries to the Quaduple Alliance upon the subject,
nth sat that Government was ready to concert measures
14_4 ettPaitl, Portugal, and England. In a dispatch dated
1.L.a„.0f August, from M. Guizot to Lord Palmerston,
lakeee'lzot admitted that the treaty of the Quadruple Al-
"IS not at all applicable to the affairs of Por-
'Me Sir H. Seymour, when he got credit for i.npar-
the " though he appeared to lean towards
Illppearallse of the Queen of Portugal, and to
'ta t the intentions of the British Government,
that the French Minister at Lisbon had offered
the aid of France, and that it had been declined. On
the newsreaching England, Lord Palmerston called upon
he et.:eneh Ambassador for an explanation, and in reply
lauktcre that it was a mistake to say that the support
-`Kae of France had been offered to the Queen of eor-
Rear.) So much for France. The interference
tvele„;4l The interference of Spain, in her present
thjei,,s"cn, in the affairs of Portugal ! That Spain should
Whv''',ll,. to interfere at all was altogether impossible.
bldi"the Government had said, " the first Spanish
ttithei that crosses the frontier will he the signal of war
Ilefeeengland," did they think that Spain would have so
ls,e"fgetten herself, and her lamentable condition, as to
lioblaellt a single soldier across the frontier ? (The
kitee Lord here read a dispatch from the Spanish Mi-
lieselare stating that the Queen of Spain would adopt no
(14:8 Course without the consent of England.—
that and cheers.) Everything, therefore, showed
4.ve lain would not act independenlty of England,
titi the cause of the Queen of Portugal was unaided
401,1 arms of England, and Spain had marched an
the into Portugal, such an act would have protracted
Its pPe'esent state of the country, and would have caused
eitt °pie to rise up against such an invasion, and a war
/it 0h e most disastrous and bloody character would have
14,1,n1ee broken out between the two countries. They
tioe.;s°wever, undoubtedly succeeded in their interven-
kee'e .4 had they advanced any nearer the final settle-
Wh;, of the question in which they had interfered?
had they gained for Portugal? what had they
for themselves?—(Hear, hear.) Had they gained
Pe 114ra°nal gratitude of the sovereign of Portugal?
140,eraPs they might; they had saved hr throne, which
kellt__was in danger except from her own misgovern-
Ills (Hear, hear)—they had saved her throne, which
kiinlight have saved herself by a proper course of
'I; but whilst they had saved the throne, they had
14
,411,
witted the sovereign--(Hear, hear)—she bad been
atuj 7 of a long course of unconstitutional acts,
teed had exasperated her people.—(Flear, hear.)
Poo °IV, then, gained the affections of the
%it of Portugal ?—(f leer.) Did they think they had
which had
the old feeling of attachment and friendship
anti-,- had heretofore subsisted between this country
of lit-ortugal ? Had they not rather given to the people
evernagal henceforth reason to say, " Tyranny may,
tse its way in Portugal, secure that at the last mo•
imntitwill be protected from the just consequences of the
lignation of the people by the interfere nee of forces
moil by England.—(Cheers.) henceforth the liberty
Pee !reedom of Portugal are but shadows—but a name.
be.....'.l;hwever unanimous the feelings of the nation may
hes. cowever determined their struggle fur liberty, and
li-
p rsuccessful the result—at the last moment
p rtY
will be snatched from them by the interference of
llranee and Spain, aided by Councils, and by the arms of
ga,nd•—(Cheers.) England is no longer our power-
ful"il% under whom we were said to rest, and of whose
timeecthll " were sure when oppressed." From this
eneeeiet:Y would look upon England as leagued with her
e evheth
Inquire .—(Hear, hear.) He did not stop to
were fair and whether
d by Eneland
the terms propose
faith-
fully carried out, equitable, whether they would be faith-
hether the national lovers of freedom
might., be satisfied, whether the Junta would have acted
Otherwise than they had expressed themselves, but he
could not forbear inquiring when they anticipated that
whether
could withdraw their forces from Portugal, and
twonether, when they bad done so, those of France might
t enter the country, whether it was not probable that
4' the voice of the nations of the continent they might
called upon to continue that intervention to a greater
t"):•tent than they could now anticipate? By the treaty
hafieY were pledged to afford aid to the Queen until she
dThae,complished the pacification of her dominions, but
hat stipulation mean the total suppression of the
power 710 w arrayed against the Queen—the suppression
n civil rebellion- ; or did it mean the removal of the
eau
she-Ses which had led to this outbreak ; or did it mean
esr, Pacification of the people, not. . physical. but
tn.:Cat!. o n as
n mental, and the conciliation of the
of the people of Portugal ? Did they
the to frame the laws of the country, to interfere in
t e elections, to interfere in the internal affairs of For.-
etiPl—that the tribunals of justice should not be prosta-
t etCl to power—that the voters should not be overborne
Of 1,13,1-ce, or prostituted by the bribery or undue influence
) Government? but if they did not do this, they
11-I;ee no guarantee to the people of Portugal that their
onf.etY would be protected. Then with respect to the
rencesuppose it should consist of Costa Cabral
•;:re
and others of the extreme party, how would they act?
they prepared to see another revolution commence,
iwilieby the exercise of their authority to protect public
To hie and to make themselves rulers and arbitrators?
cher.inL it appeared an intervention of an intolerable
far ; but it seemed to him that it would become
more intolerable if they were going to do all
this,
10. He saw nothing but embarrassment and jea-
"„szea, which they would find it difficult to
teniave. He hoped that the faith of the Crown might
Maintained—that the electoral law might be passed
▪ that the Cortes might be summoned—and that they
might respect the feelings of the people ; he hoped that
those feelings would not carry them beyond patience,
and.h, lead them to the adoption of extreme measures.
what had been done was irredeemable, and must be
execrated; and if, on the contrary to his apprehensions,
it led to a restoration of tranquillity and the establish-
ment of constitutional liberty in Portugal, he should be
Clad. He, however, felt confident in his own mind, that
the course they were now pursuing was impolitic, and
he could not think it consistent with his own duty to
shrink from bringing the subject forward, and he trusted
their Lordships would not consider it consistent with
their duty to abstain from vindicating themselves I
in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of
posterity against a participation in the course which
aer Majesty's Government were pursuing, and that they
Would express their sense of the reckless injustice of
the course which the Government had pursued, and that
t►et
thewould vote against that which appeared to him an
ofgreat injustice, and at variance with the fundamen-
tal principles of the laws of nations. (The Noble Lord
resumed his seat amidst loud cheers after submitting his
motion to the House.)
The Marquis of LANSDOWNE thought it his duty
to offer his most decided protest against the motion of
the Noble Lord. When the Noble Lord, in adverting to
the cruelties which had been committed, stated that Mr.
ISoutheron had been most active in alleviating them, he
forgot to state that his conduct had been directed and
PaiLlted out by her Majesty's Government. He felt, in
entering upon this subject, he was not called upon by
tiuY observations made by the Noble Lord to vindicate
the expediency, under certain circumstances, of interfer-
g in the affairs of other nations. Although the opi-
nion that no interference in the quarrels and discords of
Other nations should take place had been always held by
a
Beeman minority in this country, yet all those who de-
fervenl the name of good and sound politicians, were in
Of the contrary principle, and thought that
sosn'etention in the affairs of other nations was
Iu e4,,lnes not only expedient but necessary.
call me first instance, he felt it necessary to
whiche attention of their Lordships to the relation in
1)e this country stood with respect to Portugal. That
sllliar connexion was founded upon the geographical
tieol Wens of
the two countries, and upon the system of
tieranlerce which was carried on, and for ages that rela-
ierre. They ,;_n had remained nearly the same down to the present
e 3, practically knew that in the more distant coun
a_r, such as Japan or China, the consequence of wars
rp. revolutions could not affect this country, but expe-
rience beetaught them that in no ono instance had Portugal
thetouched without immediately and strongly affecting
:tee Interests of this country. The Noble Lord had, in
course of his observations, inferred that this country
was not only a consenting party, but gave that approba-_
was implied by silence to that course of
ntil_ _
the ',.,,tan_ces which had been described as leaditrg ;0
disturbances which had taken place. . They wereh
i;, to refrain from giving any indications
.whic
""
" Matrkted into a support of the proceedings of

consider also what course it was fitting to pursue with
reference to the. general interests of humanity, and the
restoration of aomcstic peace in a country in the internal
peace of which we were entitled to take a deep interest.
Was there a prospect of an early termination of these
quarrels ? Were not parties so equally balanced, that
this conflict having continued from the 7th of October,
there was every probability that, if we and other powers
also stood aloof,—if we had said to the Portuguese,
" You shall fight it out," we must have been witnesses of
a terrible struggle, impeding industry, engendering per-
manent discord between members of the same nation,
almost members of the same family, without a prospect
of any termination, through the superiority of one party
or the other.—(Cheers). I wish to take nothing what-
ever for granted. I wish to state to the House what is
the evidence which has brought me to the conclusion
that, had I been a member of the Government, having to
act in the latter days of March, lam by no means pre-
pared to say that I would not have taken the course
which, under great difficulties, her Majesty's Govern-
ment finally determined to take.—(Cheers). After the
free and unrestricted communication of every letter writ-
ten at an early period, it were easy, from the pens of
those who wrote dispatches and the mouths of those who
uttered opinions, to convict Government apparently on
their own evidence. Up to the sth of April you de-
precated intervention. You thought it unwise ; you wished
to prevent France and Spain from intervention ;
of course you used every argument against it; but when
necessity forced on you intervention, then, no doubt, the I
arguments you used against intervention appeared ap-
plicable to your own course; and it would be easy in
this way to convict you of inconsistency and condemn
you on that account. But, admitting the policy of ab-
staining from intervention ourselves, and discouraging
intervention on the part of France and Spain, the simple
question is, whether, towards the latter end of March, a
change of policy was not rendered necessary by the state
of the case?—(Cheers.) I look to the question, first, as
far as the general interests of humanity are concerned.
You cannot doubt that, with respect to this country, with
which you have had treaties for 400 years, you might
abstain from all interference on the most rigid principle
of non-intervention. You might say, "We have misery
enough on our own hands; we have distress enough in
the west of Scotland; we will not encumber ourselves
with the responsibility of interfering in Portugal; we
will not interfere." A Government might take that
course; but I venture to say, if you had taken that
course other countries would have interfered, and in
their interference they would have carried with them the
sympathies of half of Europe.—(Cheers.) Portugal
has special claims on us. She stood on our side in the
greatest conflict that ever threatened the repose and
liberties of Europe; she gave us the advantage of mili-
tary positions from which, as at Torres Vedras, that il-
lustrious commander did so much to achieve ultimately
the liberties of Europe.—(Cheers.) It is impossible you can
view with indifference or disregard the position of Por-
tugal. I admit it is not enough that the motive is good;
I must show that the acts were calculated to promote
tranquillity. What, then, was the position of Portugal,
its internal position, towards the latter end of March?
I take the accounts which reached the Government at
the moment when the necessity for decision had arrived.
Here is a dispatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, and
dates are very important. It is dated the 14th of March
—received by the Government on the 22d. lam now
justifying a conclusion to which I come from a reference
to the condition of that country, and its imperative
claims upon some interference on our part in the general
interests of humanity, apart from all obligations of treaty.
Sir Hamilton Seymour, writing on the 14th of March, in
a dispatch received on the 22d, says, " Every day serves
to aggravate the miseries of the country. To present
want and distress future famine will be added if those
who ought to be employed in cultivating are to be en-
gaged in laying waste the land."—(Cheers.) But this
state of things had continued from October to March.
There was no sufficient superiority in either party, ap-
parently, to terminate the state of things. We were
suffering from famine at home; and here was a country,
our immediate neighbour—for in such a case the sea
constitutes neighbourhood—were we to permit Portugal,
on account of intestine feuds, to be laid waste, and an
additional strain to be laid on her more happily circum-
stanced neighbours?—(Cheers.) Then again, on the
19th of March, Sir H. Seymour writes, in a dispatch
received on the 28th, " The financial condition of
the
country is daily becoming worse ; before this reaches
your Lordship the discount of notes will probably be 50
per cent. Extensive importations of corn have been
lately made, the most considerable from Liverpool."
Well, just consider what was the demand in the Liver-
pool market; what was the price of corn there; the ne-
cessity we had ourselves for preserving as much of
Liverpool corn as we could for the maintenance of our
own people.—(Hear, hear.) What must have been the
condition of that people when it is said, "Of the scar-
city and dearness of bread you will form some idea by
the fact, that the last cargoes from Liverpool were sold
at a profit to the importer of 30 per cent?"—(Cheers.)
That cora was sold at a profit of 30 per cent. The people
who ought to have been cultivating the soil, were engaged
in cutting each other's throats, without the prospect of
bringing that to a conclusion.—(Hear, hear.) What
was to be the prospect of that country, with reference to
the sustenance of the people, if that state of things was
to go on; and we, relying on the principle of rigid non-
intervention, had refused to interfere by any act by
which that state of affairs might be put an end to?—
(Cheers.) The English Consul, Mr. Johnson, in a letter
received by the Government on the 15th of March,
states, "In Viana the authorities have seized corn;
they broke open the stores of Mr. Russell, an English-
man. The state of affairs on the Douro is very vexa-
tious to our merchants; the merchants can neither bring
down their wines nor send pipes or staves to Regos."
Here there was a proof that the continuance of these
civil commotions materially interfered with the security
of British property, and by interrupting commerce di-
rectly affected the interests of British subjects. Now the
testimony lam about to quote is very important. It is
written at a subsequent date, but such was the disposi-
tion of the people in the very neighbourhood of Lisbon
that Sir H. Seymour thus describes the plans of what he
calls " the anarchists ":
" The plan of the anarchists was to set fire to some old
houses in various parts of the town, to force the pri-
son doors, and let loose some 1,200 or 1,400 prisoners.
When a populous town is to be fired at various points,
and when the confusion which ensues is to be increased
by the presence of all the vilest malefactors in the hands
of justice, it is idle to inquire what precise political ob-
jects are sought for, or at what exact points conflagration
and excesses are to cease."
Well, you had the British fleet in the Tagus ; you
heard from your Minister that the plan of the anarchists
was to set fire to Lisbon in different parts of the town,
to discharge the vilest malefactors to the number of
1,400. I ask you if, having that fleet in the Tagus, we
could remain perfectly passive, and permit Lisbon to be
destroyed by the malefactors turned out of the gaols?—
(Cheers.) I say nothing of the manifest intention of
France and Spain to interfere. I think that the
of France and Spain manifested a confidence in this
country. I think that the Government cannot found
their vindication on any assurance that France or Spain
would interfere separately. But then I say the force of
circumstances would have caused their interference. If
the Queen of Portugal had said, "I will give guarantees
for future good government ; I will give an amnesty ; I
will recal obnoxious edicts ; I intend to govern consti-
tutionally ;" if the British Admiral having received
these guarantees, had permitted Lisbon to be fired,
and malefactors to be turned out and destroy property
in the streets, Spain and France would have inter-
fered. They would have rescued the Queen ; they
would have rescued property from such depredation. I
again say, the assent and sympathy of Europe would
have been with them, and you would have been blamed
for permitting such outrages in that country which, to
a certain extent, you have virtually taken under your
protection. You might have been able in such a case to
make out a good defence on the rigid principle of non-
intervention; but the blood of the British House of Com-
mons would have risen—(Cheers)—and you would have
had no credit for your rigid adherence to the principle
of non-intervention.—(Loud cheers.) But then again I
ask, what security had you that the cause of liberty
would have triumphed—what security had you
tat the
that the
insurgents would triumph? I say, none w.
I say that the probability was that the Queen's cause
would have triumphed rather than the insurgents had . Onot
b-
serve what has taken place. Although Spain
directly interfered, she had a force on the frontier. She
was lending the moral authority of Spain to the Queen
and her Government. She had not only marched her
forces to the frontier; she had facilitated the passage of
the Queen's troops through part of her dominions. Her
forces on the frontier were thus ready to act. Had events
taken a sudden turn, had the fortunate moment for the
entrance of Don Miguel within Portugal arisen, Spain
would not only have interfered, but she had a right to in-
terfere, and then she was prepared for that act of
interference.—(Cheers.) :that she was lending the coun•
tenance of the Spanish Government to the Queen of
Portugal, by having her army on the frontier. A pro-
position was made for the enlistment of a Spanish army,
to be officered by Portuguese, and employed in the cause
of the Queen. You say Spain will not interfere; but
Colonel Wylde.writes on the:2lst of March a dispatch
received on the 28th of that month, in which he says,
" Saldanha's demand to be allowed to raise a legion in
Spain has been acceded to by the Government here.
That was direct Spanish intervention. The Spanish
Government, acting in concert with the Portuguese Go-
vernment, had permitted Saldanha to raise a legion to
act in Portugal,—that was a direct Spanish intervention.
If the authority of the Portuguese Government had been
upheld, the upholding of that Govern
Government
as would
en and ve
been due to Spain. Spanish interf giv
how was this to be resisted? Colonel Wyldo went on to
say, " I have no doubt, if this measure is carried into
effect, that none but ready-made soldiers will be enlisted,
and that every facility will be afforded him by the Spa-
nish Government for obtaining them by allowing men
to volunteer from the regular army." That was the in-
formation which, on the 22d of March, the Govern-
ment were in possession of.—(Cheers.) I take for
granted that the official accounts are correct. I have no
information except that which I derive from the official
papers.
Mr. HUME—Saldanha only demanded to be allowed
to raise a legion.
Sir R. PEEL—Colonel Wyldo says, " Saldanho:s
has de-
been
mand to be allowed to raise a legion in Spain
acceded to by the Government here."—(Cheers.) Why,
Government has to act on probabilities, and come to a
sudden decision on information like this; and, if you
found that there had been a legion of Spaniards engaged
inn Portugal you would have found it too late to remon-
strate, and most difficult to carry any remonstrance into
effect ; and, unless you chose to send a military force
to Portugal, and identified yourself with the insurgent
force against that of the monarchy, you would have
no means of effectual resistance against the invasion of
Spain.—(Cheers.) Now, what are the indications that
the insurgent cause was likely to triumph ? Sir H.
Seymour, in a dispatch dated th, itith of March, re-
egyed the lith of Marob, says— •

" Events of such nature are taking place here as to 1 And what language will you hold to the other
make it evident that a crisis of some sort must be at ' parties to the convention ? You declared to them
hand. Marshal Saldanha writes to the Queen announcing that the necessity for interference had occurred. You
his intention of resigning his seat in the Council, in the knew that no separate interference was desired, and,
event either of the Queen's refusal to sanction an appli- although you denied the obligations of the quadruple
cation for the assistance of Spain, or of any attempt treaty, and although you did not think a cases fcederis
being made to come to terms with the insurgents." had arisen, yet, in deference to the principle of that
Consider: what was the position of the Portuguese Go- treaty, by the advice of her Ministers, the Queen of Eng-
yernment at that time? The Queen, it is admitted, was land invited France and Spain to be parties to the inter-
menaced with dangers. The Commander-in- Chief and vention. When, then, you have told them that the Queen
the Prime Minister had threatened to send in their re- of England can no longer fulfil her engagements, you d
signations if she did not early make application to Spain not intend to prohibit them from pursuing the
for assistance. How great, then, was her motive to seek policy which with you they commenced ?—(Hear, hear.)
from Spain direct military assistance, when such was the After having crept out of your obligations, you do not
counsel of her Ministers, and when this was the threat expect that France and Spain who entered into the agree-
they had made to her!—(Hear, hear.) On the 19th of ment at your suggestion, will now withdraw? You do not
March, in a letter received on the 28th of March, Sir H. think that the French Government will say to the Chem-
Seymour says; " I cannot doubt that an application to bers, "We interfered at the solicitation of the Queen of
Spain for assistance will be made." Well, supposing the England; we were willing to give our aid; but she says
Queen had been victorious, what was your guarantee in she can't fulfil her part in the convention, and she tells
that case for constitutional liberty?—(flear, hear.) us also, that it is not possible we can fulfil ours?"—
There was some doubts about the result, and you will (Hear, hear.) Is it at all probable that the French
find strong evidence in looking over these letters, al- Government will be guided by your resolution? No;
though the Junta at Oporto was very firm, that yet the consequence will be, that Spain and France will alone
there were intestine divi,eons in the Junta, that the carry out the intervention. How is the Queen of Eng-
people were undecided, and that in the province of Beira land to remonstrate? The very danger, therefore, that
there was no wish to encourage the insurgents. With you have apprehended, viz., the exclusion of your own
the Portuguese forces under the command of Saldanha, influence, and the establishment of the authority of
backed by the countenance of Spain, I say that the pro- France and Spain in Portugal, will inevitably take place
bability was, on the 28th of March, that the Queen under your eyes; and I defy you, in accordance with the
would have been victorious.—(Hear, hear.) And when principle of any international law, to make any remon-
the Government was exulting in unexpected victory, what strance.—(Efear, hear.) I say it is infinitely better we
security would you have had for moderation and for- should continue to act in concurrence with the other
bearance or constitutional order? Observe—who would Governments, bringing to bear upon the question the
have been the Government? The Government would moral influence of the three great powers who established
have been composed of those who had advised the trans- the throne of Donna Maria and of the Queen of Spain.
portation of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras—of —(Hear, hear.) In deference to motives of public
those who had counselled the issuing of decrees by which policy it is infinitely better we should not attempt to
men taken in arms should be instantly shot. If these control the Executive Government, acting under consi-
things had been done in the green tree, what would have derable difficulties, by any resolution which would in-
been done in the dry?—(Hear, hear.) If you had re- solve a course undignified and impracticable.—(Cheers.)
fused all intervention—if you had said to the Queen of It is infinitely better that we should leave the Govern-
Portugal, "We stand aloof, we leave you to settle the meat to decide unencumbered and unembarrassed by our
question;" and supposing she had triumphed, what right advice.—(Hear.) An amendment has been moved; I
would you then have had to interpose to prevent her am ready to vote against the motion without any amend-
reaping the fruits of the victory? My conviction is that, ment. I will deal with the subject on its abstract
if you had held aloof and the Queen had triumphed, the merits. If I were a member of the Government,
same motives which led to those decrees with respect to I would not take an amendment which, after
arresting persons taken in arms and the transportation all, will be passing by this censure.—(Hear, hear.) To
of prisoners would have again operated, and would have the principle of the motion of the Hon. Gentleman the
given you no security whatever, either for the return of Member for Finsbury I have no objection; the question
constitutional liberty, or even for the exhibition of decent of affirming it by the House of Commons is another
forbearance or generosity towards the vanquished.— matter.—(Hear, hear.) The Government said to the
(Hear, hear.) There were, too, many motives that in- Queen of Portugal, "The conditions which we must have
tluenced your decision. You saw all the objections to trom you are, complete and entire amnesty and exemp-
intervention. You feared all the dangers of having to tion from penal consequences for every person engaged
make use of a Spanish force; and, on the other hand, in this insurrection; we make no exception; we will try
you calculated the danger of a victory of one cause over to prevent, as far as we can, any future cause for dissen-
the other, and all the consequences which, as we know sion, arising from the absence of a complete act of
from experience, generally follow such triumphs; and I oblivion; we require you to withdraw every decree
cannot, in justice, join in the condemnation of a Govern- since the 6th of October at variance with the established
ment which, balancing these conflicting considerations, constitution; we also require you to constitute a Go-
came to the conclusion that it was, on the whole, better vernment which shall inspire general confidence, and
Ito make proposals which, as I admit, if rejected, led to from which we desire there shat
populal be
distru exclud
st; ed e
and, very
tlone
1 the necessity of a further intervention.—(Hear.) There liable to public suspicion or r lasy.
was every probability that the proposals you made would we earnestly implore you to remove that person who has
have been accepted, and that no after-intervention occupied a prominent place in the palace, and whose ai-
would have arisen. You took that chance, and it tuation in Portugal exposes him to suspicion." These
was impossible for any one or any Government to pro- were the terms on which the intervention was based;
teed otherwise than on probabilities. Having prevailed and having received an assurance from the Government
on the Queen's Government to offer those conditions, you of Portugal that these conditions should be fulfilled, hay-
had no alternative, if they were rejected, but to assist ing, moreover, invited the insurgent party to lay down
her in enforcing obedience from her revolted subjects. their arms upon the assurance that those conditions
There was again another danger to be guarded against; should be respected, Ido say, in concurrence with the
there was the danger of France and Spain interfering if principle of the resolution, that the honour of England
you remained neutral. I have already said that I think is involved in their strict observance.—(Cheers.) I
the conduct, both of France and Spain, in these negotia- think it would be a breach of faith towards the insurgent
tions, proves a disposition to show every confidence in party (I regret the necessity) if you did not commit the
this Government.—(Hear, hear.) They have through- ons= of England to the maintenance of the condi-
out evinced no inclination to obtain any advantage to tions which you
yourselves proffered.—(Hear, hear.)
themselves by an interference separate from this coun- That portion of the dispatches which gives me the best
affairsassurance
testimon}pp,
eas t i hayeiepep
),, tt ehremni
nn
sa
ot terminationi t teod thesemuonnfyo,r twu
which
try ; and I am glad that the Noble Lord withdrew the
Trench Government, in respect to a supposed desire to I find to be borne to the personal dispositions of the So-
have an independent intervention. I saw it with the vereigns of Portugal. I, myself, attribute the misfor-
greatest satisfaction, and Ido believe that, even after tunes that have occurred to the pernicious advice they
those unfortunate differences which had prevailed be- have received. It is usual, :on all occasions, in eonsti-
tvveen this country and France, in respect to which I tutional and loyal states, to presume justice and hu-
think France in the wrong, there was yet every wish on manity on the part of crowned heads; but Ido find in
the part of France to take an early opportunity of ex- these papers conclusive proof that you may fairly attri-
pressing a desire to act in unison with us in any inter- bute the acts that
Queen of have been d
rtone, l
not to
her Coe pe
sort, but to
rsonal dis-
ferenco in the affairs of Portugal. Ido not think positions of the Pouga or
that M. Guizot ever wished, or that he ever con- the bad counsel they received from the Government of
y Cabral and those who were leagued with it.—(Hear.)
templated, a separate intervention, and I can hardly
believe that the Minister of Louis Philippe, considering I find that Sir H. Seymour, in a dispatch of March 21,
what is the foundatien of his throne—(Hear, hear)— affords an unsuspicious testimony to the good faith of
would have advised a wanton or unnecessary inter- the queen and the character of the King. He says--
ference in the internal affairs of another nation.—(Hear, e The King has given a fresh proof of the wise and con-
hear.) Remember, however, that the Minister of France, ciliatory disposition by which he has been distinguished
disposed to show confidence in this Government, did, in the Council, by addressing yesterday a letter to Mar-
nevertheless, declare his opinion to be that the Porte- steal Saldanha, calling upon him to make peaceful over-
guese Government was entitled to receive aid from the tures to the Oporto Junta. That was the act of the
Spanish Government. M. Guizot entertained an opi- King in council. His suggestion was, not an'appeal to
nion, and I think a sincere one, that under the quadruple arms, but that conciliatory overtures should be made to
treaty, the three Governments might have justified in-
the insurgents.—(Hear, hear.) Those overtures were
terference. Even if a cases faderis had not arisen, M. not made; but whose was the fault? That of the men
Guizot said that the principle which had dictated the who threatened to resign should the course advised by
signatures to that treaty still remained, and I recollect the King be taken.—(Hear.) With this evidence before
particularly that he dwells on this fact—that General them, they were bound to make every allowance for the
Povoas, the Miguelite General, had been admitted to conduct of their Majesties, having, as it was shown, been
great influence at Oporto, and he considered that circum- placed in so critical a position. Mr. Southern says, in
stance most material in justifying the Portuguese Go-
againsthis disp
vernment in asking aid from Spain. Therefore I gived
tdhree sis3re
ids
oan noteers
takenpro-
a thetch
terse,
entire credit to the Governments of France and Spain at Torres Vedras, and that the subject had been re-
forone testingo ftransportation thaetihoandoat
the confidence they displayed. I believe that the peatedly under deliberation in the Cabinet, and his corn-
object of M. Pacheco was to act cordially with us, and ment is, "I am happy to think that the benevolent
I acquit M. Guizot and the French Government of any feelings of their Majesties induces them to support my
intention to obtain particular advantages for themselves. views; but the opinion of the Cabinet, to which some
But, in the state of things which would have ensued, if extraneous persons were admitted, finally prevailed, on
such acts as those to which I have referred had been being backed by a threat of immediate resignation on the
perpetrated—if Lisbon had been fired, if the malefactors part of the Ministry." Thus it was clear the Sovereign
had been turned loose, then France and Spain would had interfered on behalf of the prisoners, but. those who
have been fully justified in interfering, even had you directed their counsels having threatened re siguation, they
refused; and I again say, that if these events had oc- were unable to effect their own charitable wishes.—
a th
cur red, I doubt if France and Spain would not have found
(Hear, hear.) Again, Sir H. Seymour says. on the
support and approval in the public opinion of Europe.— of May, speaking of the action of the Ist of May, when
(Hear, hear.) It may be to us and to our interests a the insurgents sustained a loss of 500 killed and
matter of indifference what takes place in Pcrtugal ; wounded—" Many of the wounded insurgents, in cora-
but, consider Spain. The dynasty of Spain holds its piny with the wounded of the Queen's forces, have been
authority by nearly the same tenure with the dynasty of removed to the hospital at Lisbon. On the 3d inst. the
Portugal. Spain could not depart from all consideration hospital was visited by the Queen and King, who spoke
of the quadruple treaty. Placing ourselves, however, to many of the wounded, and gave special orders that
in the position of Spain, seeing the identity of interests every attention should be paid to all alike:' Such evi-
which prevailed between the dynasty in the possession dente of justice and moderation on the part of these
of the throne of Spain, and the dynasty in the possession Royal personages inspires me with the hope
of the throne of Portugal, apart from the quadruple that if they are surrounded by more honest
treaty, and every other consideration, I think a common, advisers there is a prospect of returning peace
interest and the necessity of preventing anarchy in
I or- and tranquillity to Portugal.—(Cheers.) Now, I trust
tugal constitute a case which, itself, would justify, on that nothing I have said will lay me open to the
all grounds, Spanish interference, if such a calamity as suspicion that I approve of the measures which were
that of which I have made mention had occurred.— adopted by the Government of Portugal since the 7th of
(Hear, hear.) And, turning to the other alternative, October.—(Hear, hear.)h6h I
of tohointokbothratlBt4h6e
,the
of
supposing, instead of the Queen's force!, the insurgent Government on the 6th e sudden
troops had been successful, I see no evidence whateverme a, and the mode in
removal of the Duke de tral 11 ' which
that a greater degree of moderation would have been
that removal was effected, were calculated to lessen the
exercised in that case. I see nothing in the pro-
respect of the people for
.the throne.—(Hear, hear.)
of the Junta forces, nothing in the course e
e. have come to the conclusion that on the whole e it i
portion desirable that the .
power of England should be exerted
theyhave prevailed had they been victorious. Why, the
took, to assure me that justice or generosity would
for the purpose of quelling these troubles ; but I do not
proposal that there should be no Commander-in- think it should be lent to giving countenance and sup.
Chief, that there should be different corps acting port to arbitrary proceedings.—(Hear.) I have seen, I
under different generals, and, considering that the had almost said with shame and regret, that illustrious
Queen's army was in possession of Lisbon, the proposi- man, the Duke of Palmella, an exile from his own coun-
tion that the Government should be handed over to the try and in banishment.—(Hear, hear.) I see with regret
insurgents, for them to accept any terms of accommo- that wisest politician of all the Portuguese—the man
dation, convince me that in the hour of victory little who was a political ornament to his country—the man.
reliance could be placed on either their moderation or who in 1814-15 was associated with the leading diplo-
their sense of right.— (Hear, hear.) And, therefore, I matists of Europe for the purpose of laying the founds.-
leave you to choose either alternative, the triumph of dons of that general peace which has endured 27 years
the Queen's cause, or the triumph of the insurgents; it —I do see with deep pain that that man, the most emi-
is possible you might have gained an advantage in the nent of the subjects of the Queen of Portugal, is an.
termination of a harassing civil conflict; but you would exile from his native country. And for what? Because
have found in either case no guarantee for the restora- he wished to govern on constitutional principles—
tion of constitutional liberty—that accommodation, that
oblivion of past crimes, that mutual generosity, on which (Hear)—because, in his intercourse with public men,
with the statesmen of Europe, he had learned, perhaps,
alone can the hopes of future peace be founded.—(Hear, better principles for the conduct of constitutional go-
hear.) Then upon these three considerations, seeing vernment than those who have been the ordinary coun-
the probability that this strife would have long continued cillors of the Portuguese Sovereign.—(Che.er
wrotweg s.).cili
Lord
not suppressed by your means—remembering that it to the advice he gave, and to the language
was speaks of the progress he e
made
hi
ar
—dlssee
the
was for the interests of humanity that you should inter-
Ihraeadd madhis law of eleo
fere, looking to the great likelihood that, if you had
not restoration of peace.—(Hear.)
the cot .
interposed, France and Spain would not only have
de- tions—l see his resolution to summon
aired, but have been compelled to interfere—knowing his advice not to resort to acts of severity—l see these
the further probability that in either issue, whether the things, and I think it a reflection on public men that he
result were a triumph to the Queen or to the insurgents, should be an exile from his native country.—(Cheers.)
moderation and justice would not have been maintained Sir, I think that the Portuguese Government, on the
—in the midst of these conflicting considerations, all of 6th of October, committed the greatest mistake that a
which had to be weighed by the Government, again I Government can commit, when, in anticipation of some
say I will not consent to visit with condemnation those fancied dangers, they resorted to what is called a coup
who, under such circumstances, deemed it expedient to &lot, that is, attempted to avert threatened danger by
decide upon offering British intervention.—(Cheers.) the assumption of unconstitutional power.—(Hear, hear.)
And it is upon these grounds that I shall give my vote That was the mistake that was made by the Government
against the motion of the Hon. Gentleman. I think it of Charles X., and it is the mistake that has been made
inconsistent with justice to visit the Government with by those councillors who advised the dismissal of that
censure. I think they have done nothing in the conelu- faithful subject of the Queen and attached friend of peace,
sion to which they came which disentitles them to the the ',Duke of Palmella.—(Hear, hear.) It would have
confidence of this House so far as their conduct in these been the true policy of the Government, even if these dan-
affairs is concerned.—(Cheers). Well, now, as to the gers were real, to have met them, and not attempted to
question of public policy, which is a far more im- avert them by the assumption of unconstitutional powers.
portant subject for our deliberation,—is it wise, while —(Hear, hear.) These advisers of coups (fetal have taken
all these transactions are pending, and while the plans credit to themselves for firmness and decision ; they
are being carried into execution, to control, by a deci- refer to the case of Louis XVI., and say that the cause
sion of the House of Commons, the executive Govern-
ment, and to say that this policy must be abandoned decision. They pride them,eelves on their decision
of monarchy was then lost by a want of firmness and
Perhaps it must not be abandoned, perhaps it must be and energy, but they do not see the danger of resorting
continued. By whom ? I say the hand is palsied that
the House which they may lead to.—(Hear, hear.) They pointed
to these extreme acts of violence, or the consequences
has to execute it if struck by a resolution of
at the programme of the Septembrists, but I believe
au a proposed change in regard
of Commons adverse to it. What do
after having adopted this resolution ?---(He .._ . t .g.
you
Ineaalir r do
hat was nothin more th
seems to me to be unwarrantable in principle, and likely to electoral districts; and I contend that any apprehen-
to lead to serious and most mischievous consequences. sions entertained in regard to that programme were not
What would be the consequence to the public policy of sufficient to set aside the constitutional liberty of Por-
the country if you pass such a declaration ? Witl you tugal.—(llear, hear.) That was a grievous mistake;
will y°9 and what is the consequence of resorting to such acts of
release Das Antes and the insurgent forces, or
continue them prisoners of war ? What is the practical power? You alienate from yourselves the sympathies
will, meet and resort to unconstitutional acts, be you
force of that you propose to do ? You surely ill of Europe.—(2lear, hear.) Let your enemies, if they
Will you replac
say
went,' andWe are
ee
cwoinlltelenatvwe itthhehmavtoinggect
as best they may ?" Das Antas an3d
eonusetu of the
d‘G‘'iffioveeurlnt-
content to apply the powers which the constitution gives
you, and then the good feeling of other countries, aye,
been in
we have the and of your own subjects, will rally around you if the
to Oporto, and say, " Gentlemen,
his 2,500 men in the British steamers, take them back
attack upon you be an unjust one; but if the friends of
and will violate the law in antmiceieptatiaonng
wrong ; the monarchy will attempt to d
and so we return you exactly to the position which it is right we should make you compensation,
originally you occupied ; .
any damage we have done to eorflecTenc ogueprss
angers, then,
•wethere
you or your cause we are willing to repair ;
them—(Cheers)—that is the mode by which thrones are
fore bring you back to Oporto, and will let you fight more endangercd than by disloyalty and disaffection oe
it out !" Is that the course you would now take ? If fulfilled that which. I
you thepart of thepeople. I have now
have done wrong and you do not wish to inflict in- I have spoken my
justice, you have no means of repairing the mischief ; • •
said I would do, openly and frankly,
individual; after a perusal of those
it will not be enough merely to release Das Antis.— opinions as a private_
I cannot assent to a vet© of censure on
(Hear, hear.) Will you then retain him in custody, will papers before mte,
I cannot consent to interfere with that
you still hold him and his followers as prisoners of war ? the
which Government, ensrnnmowin,
course of action ; but while I take that
1 know not, indeed, what course the Executive is to take course, while I would not interfere to put a stop to that
in the midst of these proceedings, when so soon as to- intervention which has taken place, I must at the sane
morrow night it may be necessary to give instructions time say that of the acts of the Portuguese Government
or answer some dispatch they may receive, if there is I cannot speak without condemnation.—(Cheers.) And
not a distinct explanation on the part of the House of I say, in conclusion, that unless those evil councillors
Commons of the motive by which it is guided in coming who have been placed around the Portuguese throne are
to this conclusion.—(Cheers.) Is it to be left to the Mi- banished—
'Aster of the Crown to say, " I have entered into this en- An HoN. MEMBER—They will be banished.
Tan • I must fir R. PEEL-4 belie!e that if that faction
that calls
gagement,l must creep out of it as well as e c , t d?"
avoid the fulfilment of the conditions I 19evP e