The Sun.
London, England, 1841-11-06 00:00:00

ROLLS' COURT.-(THIS DAY.)

GURDEN V. BADCOCK.
Lord LANGDALE, after hearing Mr. Pemberton in re-
ply to this case, which was reported in our paper yester-
day, said that he did not think he should be satisfied to
make an order without further information as to the de-
crees and directions of the Court in the suit. It ap-
peared that in 1791 a testator named Smithers
charged his estate with certain debts and an-
nuities, and, subject to the payment of these,
devised it to his son, with remainder to the plain-
tiffs, if his son should die before attaining the
age of 21 years. Testator died, and his son also
died before attaining the age of twenty-one years A
bill was then filed to administer the trusts of the will,
and for the purpose of procuring payment of the bequests,
to those who were entitled under the will, and Mr. Dray-
son was appointed receiver of the rents and profits of the
estate in the year 1806, and was continued as receiver
by a decree made in February, 1808. In his life-time
Mr. Drayson passed two accounts, and paid into Court
the money chargeable to him on the balance. After his
death his executor and executrix applied to the Court
for leave to pay into Court the balance due from the
roceiver, which application was made with full know-
ledge of his assets ; and upon their petition an or-
der was made for an inquiry, by which it appeared
that the sum of 992/. was due from them on account of
the receiver. This report was made in 1812, and the
Master afterw Irds made his general report, and when
the case came on for further direction it appeared that
Mr. Bice, one of the persons entitled to the estate sub-
ject to the charges, was in possession of the estate,
but what provision was made for payment of the charges
did not appear. He (his Lordship), therefore, wished to
see the decrees to know what was done. But it appeared
to him that the charges provided for, and intended to
be paid, still subsisted, and the money was due from the
executors of the receiver which they were entitled to pay.
There was then subsisting the order to pay
into Court the sum of 9921., and unsatisfied claims to-
wards the satisfaction of which this sum was liable. In
this state of things all the persons concerned in the case
seemed to have abandoned attention to it. Mrs.
Saunders, one of the persons entitled to an annuity
under the will died in the year 1829 ; the conduct
of the cause was given to the petitioners in 1830,
and in 1841 they discovered that the sum of 9921. which
ought to have been paid into Court in 1812 , had never
been paid. It was said that it was extremely hard to
come upon the parties after so great a length
of time, but was there ever a time in which the
executor did not know the state of the case ?
It was matter of consideration over and over
again, and instead of considering what it was their
duty to perform the executors and his solicitor seemed
to have considered it their duty to enter into an arrange-
ment with the tenant for life, and to set off this sum in
part of payments made to him. If the receiver had taken
upon himself to see that the charges on the estate were sa-
tisfied, and had then thought fit to make the payment there
might be no reflection on him ; but he had thought fit
to make this arrangement without regard to those who
had prior claims. He (his Lordship) should not give a
final opinion, but he was strongly impressed that the
money must be brought into Court to satisfy those
claims.

QUEEN.S BENCH-(THIS DAY.)

PHILIP JOHN MILES V. BOUGH.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff as trea-
surer of the Clifton Suspension Bridge Company, of
Bristol, to recover the amount of calls upon certain
shares in that Company. The case was tried before
Mr. Baron Maule at the last Gloucester Assizes, and a
verdict had for the plaintiff for 171.105.
Mr. Sergeant BOMPAS now moved fora rule to show
cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a non.
suit entered, on the ground of the admission of improper
evidence. The Company was formed some years since
for the purpose of carrying into effect a plan for
building a suspension bridge across the river Avon
below Bristol, to the opposite shore of Somerset. A
sum of money had been originally bequeathed by
a gentleman for that purpose, which having accumulated
to between 10,000/. and 15,000 L, an Act of Parliament
was obtained, and a Company formed, with power to
raise money upon loan or otherwise. At the trial the
books of the Company were produced, but the resolution
authorizing the calls was not signed by the Chairman as
it ought to have been. Now, in the case of the South-
ampton Railway v. Richards, the same point had been
raised. and it was decreed in that case that the books
shculd be signed by the Chairman at the time when the
meeting was ht 11 at which the calls were authorize l.
Another objection was that there were -no Trustees
within the meaning of the Act, as it was not proved that
they had been regularly sworn.
The COURT thought the Learned Gentleman was en-
titled to the rule, but as the question was one of some im-
portance, they would see Mr. Baron Maule in the first
instance.

COATES AND ANOTHER V. BURCH.
This was an action for an escape out of custody upon
an execution. It was tried before Mr. Justice Wight-
man, at the last Liverpool assizes, and a verdict had for
the plaintiff for 831.
Mr. CRESWELL now moved for a rule to show cause
why the verdict should not be set. aside, and a nonsuit
entered, for although the Learned Judge had decided
the point which had been raised in favour.of the plaintiff,
if it was ruled the other way the plaintiff must have
been nonsuited. It appeared at the trial that there were
two writs against the party—one in the hands of the
officer, and the other in the Sheriff's-office, and in order
to connect the Sheriff with the arrest it was necessary
to prove the warrant. Keely, the officer, was called and
was asked if he had the warrant, and he said he had
not. The defendant's attorney was then called, and he
was asked whether he had got the warrant. He (Mr.
Creswell) objected to his being asked that question until
he had first answered the question of whether all the
papers which had come to him connected with the
case had not come to him from his client for the purpose
of defending the action. He replied in the affirmative,
and the objection was then raised that answering such a
question was a controversion of the privileges of his
client, and that whatever passed between the attorney
and client in reference to the case ought not to be dis-
closed. The Learned Judge, however, was of opinion
that his having or not having the warrant was a question
of fact to which he might speak. The Learned Coun-
sel referred to some authorities bearing upon the same
point, but
The COURT was of opinion that the question having
been decided in a former case the other way, it would
not be right in them now te raise a doubt. The rule,
berefore, must be refused.