The Sun.
London, England, 1823-04-15 00:00:00

tion being made, our representative refused, on the part
of this country, any interference by menace, stating that
the only ground that could justify any interference was,
the external question, which might be a fair subject of
mediation. However objectionable the conduct of the
allies in making this declaration was, it contained nothing
that necessarily led to the invasion of Spain: the first
cause of interference was, defence; the other two were
contingent. The measure of makinft this declaration
a false step, and might break off e diplomatic rela-
tions between Spain and the Allies, but that was not
war, 12.0 r a necessary cause of war. There were instances
in which diplomatic intercourse was broken oil without
forming any justifiable cause of war, and he might,
in
some cases, advise the breaking off of diplomatic inter-
course (though certainly, not in the case of Spain) and yet
not think it necessary to go to war. In the course then
taken by the Allies, the invasion of Spain by France did
not appear to be contemplated even at the breaking up of
the Congress of Verona. The whole policy of the Allies
as it regarded Spain, was wrong ; and much of it
was un-
just, but there was no step taken that shewed a direct in-
tention of invading Spain : the spirit of their policy was
a different question: On the breaking up of the Con-
gress it was obviously the policy of this country to en-
deavour, by every honourable means, to preserve peace;
and it was a conscious satisfaction to this country, that
we had made an offer of our mediation to France, although
it bad been rejected by her. But though the Govern-
ment of France did not accept our mediation, still the
communications received from it did not hold out the in-
vasion of Spain as an event likely to take place. and the
impression on the British Government almost to the
time it was announced by the King of France in his
Speech was, that it would not take place. What then
was the policy the British Government bound to pursue?
It was to make every effort to prevent the peace of the
world from being disturbed, particularly between France
and Spain, as if- once the peace of Europe was broken.
no man could say where the war would terminate. it
was therefere our duty to Spain, and France, and Europe,
and ourselves, to preserve peace if possible. About the
period he had last alluded to, we were applied to by Spain
to use our amicable, interference with Fmnce, not by
any menace of war, but even if' war between France and
Spain should take place, this country might remain at peace:
France, though she declined our mediation, still express-
ed a wish for our good offices. One object of Spain was
to have the army of observation withdrawn; and though
nothing had then been said of an invasion, yet some event
had taken place that furnished a plausible pretext fbr
France keeping that army on the frontiers of Spain ; but
it was clear that such an army mild not
be kept by
France without its exciting alarm and dissention in Spain.
France had a right to keep that army on her frontiers ;
and having adopted the measure, good or bad, it could
not be expected that she would abandon it, without some-
thing being done to account or give a reason for her
change of conduct. Nothing en earth could induce the
British Government to recommend to the Spanish Go-
vernment, even in the most amicable manner. to concede
one tittle of their Constitution that they considered ma-
terial ; but the British Government knew, as all the
world did—as every man in Spain must have known, that
some changes were necessary. The British Government
had to take the danger of Spain into account, and her
means of resisting the attack that was meditated on her ;
and though there was no reason to doubt that her means
of defence would be finally effectual, yet she was open
.to
invasion, and though she should be ultimately successful.
yet her success must be the effect of her suffering. Her
provinces must be over-run end desolated, ter such must
be the effect of way, whatever proclamations might be
issued to prevent it--(hear.) lf, therefore, Spain thought
that any part of their Constitution was a proper subject
of change, it was thought that they might do now what
they would have to do hereafter. Spain was not the first
object of the British Government; this country was
their first object; but that was his view of the situation
of. Spain. What was done by this country, was not pro-
posed to Spain as a demand, but as a suggestion ; not as
any thing a refusal to comply with which might subject
her to a penalty, but as what was best for herself: The
British Government, in making this suggestion, thought
it right to avail itself of the service which his Noble
Friend might render on such an important occasion.—
It' any country ever owed obligation to another country,
Spain did to his Noble Friend. He had rendered the
most important. service to that country—hei bad become
acquainted with her people. and her Constitution, dur-
ing the tremendous conflict lie sustained for her liberties ;
and his Noble Friend. would be the last person in the
world to recommend to Spain any disgraceful coiaession—
any thing inconsistent with her character and dignity.
This recommendation was made antecedently to any di•
rect menace on the part of France to invade Spain ; for
up to the •middle of January the Spanish Government
was impressed with the opinion that no invasion of,-their
country would take place ; and it was but a few days be-
fore the King of France's speech to the Chambers that
there was ground to believe Spain would be invaded.—
' The papers lie presented would shew what the British
Government had felt it their duty to do before that pe-
riod to prevent war. The King of France's speech, how-
ever, made a great alteration, and all hopes of an HCCOITI.
nusiation appeared to be at an end; but it would appear
by the papers, that even then France declared herself de-
simus of amicable arrangement, and solicited the good
offices of' this country, and professed a readiness, to give
the passage in the King's speech, that excited great and
just offence, a different interpretation. On the first day
of the,Session. he (Lord Liverpool) had stated, that he
conceived it would be criminal in the Ministers of this
country, as long as any hope remained that mediation
might be effectual to prevent hostilities, not to endea-
your, by every means in their power, to attain an ob-
ject so very desirable.—From the period of that speech
he felt it inconsistent with his duty to urge any thing be-
yond what he conceived the strict policy of this coun-
try; neutrality,—Now he conic to the most material part
of his statement, and what was most important for the
country to decide'upon. which was the course pursued by
the executive in this negociation. He would say now as
he had on a former occasion, that the policy of this coun-
try was neutrality; and the British Cabinet in every
[-stage of the negociation had avowed that policy; and it
had not only avowed it, but it had been acknowledged
and so understood by the Spanish Government. No de-
ception had been practised. Whatever had been done,
or whatever had been omitted to be done, had been on a
complete understanding with the Spanish Government.
It may be now expected of him to state the motives that
influenced himself' and his colleagues in adhering to neu-
trality. What he was convinced must weigh with every
man was, the consideration of the means and condition of
the country to engage in a war. On the first day of the
session he had said that if either the honour or the inte-
rests of the country would be compromised by remaining at
peace. we possessed ample means of carrying on war; and
he did not say that loosely or unadvisedly, as persons
when speaking might say upon general principles, that a
country like this must always possess the means of main.
raining a war; but he said it undoubtingly, and from his
' situation he was capable of judging of our resources in
time detail. But after a war of such unexampled mag-
nitude and extent as the last, when the commercial and
mercantile interests were again flourishing, after having
experienced a depression Which had been caused by it,
anti which had been more severely felt during the peace
than when the war was raging, and when time agricul-
tural interest was in some degree reviving, because the
last to suffer; by reason of these interests settling them-
selves upon the basis of peace ; it was most desirable to
maintain the tranquillity of the country. Their Lord-
ships were to consider, secondly, the nature of the
contest they would have to embark in, 4' toto ark:-
tint est in corpora /lei." Let them not suppose that
it was the mere fitting out of a fleet, or the grant-
ing of a subsidy, that would he required of England.
if she took part of the struggle between France and
Spain ; she must enter into it as she did in the last war,
engaging all her energies in support of it, and putting
forth all her resources. And he begged their Lordships
to recollect that a war carried on in-Spain is four times
more expensive than one conducted in any other country
in Europe ; and let them look on whom the battles fell, on
whom the sieges fell, on whom the exertions fell, in the
late contest—and let them not only look at the risks and
consequences of such a war, but to the magnitude and ex-
tent of it. On the former occasion, Slain was not the end,
lint the means. The battle of Europe was fought in
Spain ; it was not for the sake of Spain. but for the sake
of, restoring the balance of power and liberties of Europe.
of which she was an integral part. But Spain was then