The Sun.
London, England, 1841-04-17 00:00:00

NICHOLSON v. FALL

Sir F. POLLOCK said this was an action brought by the
assignees of a bankrupt to recover the amount of an execution,
on the ground of its being a fraudulent preference. The case
was tried before Mr. Justice Coleridge, on the sth of February
last, and a verdict was had for the plaintiff, and the Learned
Counsel now moved to set aside the verdict, on the ground of
the admissibility of improper evidence. The defendant was a
relation of the bankrupt, and in order to show the state of the
bankrupt's affairs at the time, which was the most material
point in the case, Counsel for the plaintiffs called the attorney
under the commission, in order that by his evidence he might
contrast the amount of the dividend actually paid w ith the
amount of the debts proved under the commission. The
Learned Counsel cited several authorities to 'how that such
evidence was inadmissible.

The Court would confer with the Learned Judge before
whom the trial took place, and then give its decision.

THE QUEEN" V. THE JUSTICES OF LANCASHIRE.
Mr. CRESSWELL moved in this case for a rule to show cause
why a writ of certiorari should not issue to bring up an order
of two Justices of the County of Lancaster. His application
was grounded upon the I I Ith section of the Municipal Act. It
appeared that the Borough Justices made an order for the removal
of a pauper and an appeal was made to the County Justices, who
heard and determined the ap peal, quash ing the former order. Now,
he apprehended that the County Justices had no jurisdiction at
all, because the section distinctly provided, that the County
Magistrates should have jurisdiction only in these cases where
there was no separate jurisdiction is the borough. If there
was any appeal, it should have been to the Borough Justices.
After referring to the section in question, the COURT
granted the tole.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, APRIL 16.
(Sittings in Banco.)
HODGES V. COOPER.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff, a
linen-draper, against the defendant, a gentleman of independ-
ent fortune, for goods furnished to the wife of the latter. The
defence was that Mrs. Cooper was separated from her husband
with a maintenance, and that the goods furnished by the plain-
tiff, who was alleged to be cognizant of the separation, were not
necessaries.

The case was tried before Mr. Justice Erskine, and a ver-
dict was found for the plaintiff in damages, 1491.
Mr. Sergeant CHANNEL this day abtained a rule nisi, for a
new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.
The Court rose at a quarter past twelve o'clock.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, 11PBIL 16.
(Sittings in Banco.)
ROADKNIGHT V. GREEN.

Mr. HUMFREY showed cause against a rule obtained by
Mr. Watson, which called upon the Master to review his taxa-
tion. The Learned Gentleman said it was an action for as-
sault and battery, which was tried at the Warwick A ssizes in
1837, when the Jury gave only ls. damages. The Learned
Judge who tried the cause refused to certify, in order to allow
the petitioner to recover his costs, and under such circum-
stances he, of course, had not had them taxed, nor had he
thought it worth his while to sign judgment. In the mean
time Lord Denman's Act was passed by the Legislature, which
repealed the statutes of Charles 11. and Elizabeth referring
to costs in personal actions, and they being as if they had never
existed, he knew of nothing which would prevent them from
now obtaining their costs.
Mr. Baron PARKE—The Act repeals these Acts, and con-
tains no proviso for cases where judgment has not been en-
tered up.
Mr. HUMFREY—Certainly. The act wholly repealed the
former statutes, and it had been often laid down that a sta-
tute when repealed became as if it had never existed, and as
the law now stood he knew of nothing to prevent them from
obtaining their costs. The plaintiff had not signed judg-
ment until the 20th of January, 1841. He was not compel-
led to do so before—there was no Rule of Court requiring him
to do so until he pleased. The defendant might have ruled
him to do so, but had neglected that, and having signed
the judgment, as he was entitled to do, on the 20th of January,
1841, they must take the law as it then was.

Mr. 13a...1-on PARKE—If you succeed, this Act will prove a
large bonus to all who have brought frivolous actions,—at all
events (luring the last twenty years.
Mr. llUMFREY—Certainly. No doubt neither the noble
author of the Bill nor the Legislature intended to grant such
a boon, but their Lordships must administer the law as
they found it.
• Mr. Baron ALDERSON—If you succeed Vlere will be avast
influx of business in the Courts.

Mr. HumF RE v—Unless a Commission were issued to ascer-
tain the number of such actions, and stop all proceedings, no-
thing else, he contended, could prevent the plaintiff in the
present action from recovering his cost, for the statutes which
prevented him were now repealed. The Learned Gentleman
cited several cases, in order to show that the Courts had held
that plaintiff had a right to sign judgment when he pleased,
and that they were bound to apply the law which was in force
when such judgment was signed. He trusted the rule would
be discharged.
Mr. WATSON supported the rule, and at great length en-
deavoured to construe the words, Shall recover by verdict
of a Jury," to mean " Recover through, or by means of a
verdict." He also contended that the Act of Lord Den-
man ' did not apply to an old verdict. The verdict
given in 1837 must be satisfied according to the law
as it then stood. The plaintiff was entitled to sign judgment
on the first day of Banco, after the verdict of Nisi Prins, and
his judgment must date from that day when Lord Denman's
Act was not thought of, and he was entitled to no more costs
than he would have been on that day. He further contended
that the Act of Lord Denman repealed the statute in respect of
all future actions, but it left all former actions under the law
which was in force at the time of verdict. That was the clear
intention of the framer of the Act, and the Legislature in
passing it, and their Lordships would carry out such intentions
by making the Rule absolute.
The Court took time to consider the case.