The Sun.
London, England, 1847-10-18 00:00:00

THE SUN,

on the 15th of this month, will comprise the follow-
ing regulations for consideration :—The junction of
rnilways for accelerating the transmission. A mutual
agreement for a uniform rate of postage. The op-
tional prepayments or non-prepayment of letters. The
mutual exemption from postage of the correspondence
of the governing Royal Families and their houses.
The exemption from postage of Royal official letters.
The rate of postage according to weight. An equal
standard of weights. A standard model for the trans-
mission from the branch offices. Regulations re-
specting the transmission of money and articles of
value. Many other rates and regulations referring
to the above heads will be taken into consideration by
the Postal Commissioners. The improvements which
are to be adopted will greatly facilitate the corres-
pondence, but the postage will also be reduced. All
the Governments of Germany nominated their dele-
gates.—German Papers, Oct. 13.

BANK OF ENGLAND NOTES.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE MORNING POST.
Sir,—The political wiseacres who write for the
" Thunderer" denounce the issue of Bank-notes, on
the plea that it would increase the difficulties of our
situation by affording temporary relief at the expense
of a more fearful crisis.
For the want of a more intelligible cause, the
financial geniuses of the Times attribute our present
distress to the over-speculation in railways, whereas
it is proved that the large firms that have stopped
payment have been led to do so from the difficulties
of obtaining reasonable discounts, and not from having
their cash locked up in railway adventures.
The defenders of the Act of 1844 blow hot and
cold almost at the same breath—at one time all our
national wealth is laid to the benefits of free trade ;
at another period, to a vast import of food and
foreign commodities is laid the drain for gold and the
pressure on the money market. Railway under-
takings make up the loss of revenue by increased
consumption of exciseable articles. Railway under-
takings lock up money and ruin the country. This
is not the first pressure on the money market, nor
the first crisis the country has passed through.
In 1832, the then Governor of the Bank of Eng-
land, in his evidence before the Committee on the
Bank Charter, when asked to what particular cause
he attributed the panic of 1825, replied that " the
first step towards the excitement was the reduction
of the interest upon the Government securities."—
" He always considered that reduction of interest in
1823 and 1824, one-fifth in one case, and one-eighth
in the other, to have created that feverish feeling in
the minds of the public at large which prompted
almost everybody to entertain any proposition for in-
vestment, however absurd, which was tendered."
Sir R. Peel has always had a penchant for meddling
with the currency, and the reduction of the rate of
interest on Government securities, lately carried out
by him, may have had the effect of adding to the
pressure of 1847, as the same thing is alleged by Mr.
Horsley Palmer to have occurred in 1825. Then,
again, as to the issue of Bank-notes, the Governor, in
reply to the question—You think that in the event of
such a crisis as that, the power of the country bankers
to pay in Bank of England notes would not be a
sufficient remedy, unless the Bank of England were
empowered at the same time to issue 1/. notes ? thus
answered :
"Now it would; the 11. notes having been with-
drawn I believe that a 51. note of the Bank of Eng-
land, if it were a legal tender, would be a total bar
to any demand for gold in the interior, in times of
commercial discredit."
When the issue of Bank-notes is denounced by the
" Thunderer," it may be as well to refer to the evi-
dence of practical and intelligent men as to the cir-
culation of notes to meet the panic of 1825 and its
immediate effects. First, what says Lord Ash-
burton :
" Although the Bank had no specie left, a large
additional issue of notes was made, and about
1,500,0001., of those of 11., which were accidentally
found to be in existence, were circulated; the relief
was immediate, the country received a circulating
currency iL, which everybody had entire confidence,
and the useless gold was returned to the Bank. The
notes by this proceeding were increased from
19,748,0001. in December, 1825, to 24,479,0001. in
March, 1826 ; and having served to relieve the pres-
sure, they gradually subsided before the end of that
year to their ordinary amount again of 19,951,0001.,
while the bullion in the Bank was successively in-
creased by this increase of paper, in opposition to the
theory of 1844, which presumes from such cause a
necessary diminution."
One would imagine that to be sufficiently conclu-
sive for the Times, but for fear that quotation should
not be considered sufficient, I will adduce other testi-
mony.
Samuel Jones Loyd, Esq., in his evidence before
the Committee previously mentioned, on being asked
whether he conceived that any part of what had been
called the commercial discredit, in the year 1825,
consisted in a doubt as to the solvency of the Bank of
England, replied thus :
" Not the slightest ; and the best proof of that is,
that when they had no further sovereigns that they
could issue, they luckily found a large quantity of 11.
notes, and the public were perfectly satisfied with the
11 notes."
I will now turn to the recorded opinion of Samuel
Gurney, Esq., on the same occasion. On being in-
terrogated as to whether he thought that the persons
in the country who received at that time 11. Bank of
England notes in payment, inferred from thence that
gold was very scarce in the coffers of the Bank, thus
enlightened the Committee :
" The receivers of these notes were of a class of
persons that knew or thought very little about the
Bank of England and its stock of gold ; the imme
diate effect of that issue was the stoppage of the
demand."
What is now wanted is gold—in one department of
the Bank of Engtand. The gold is either sent out
of the country, locked up, or hoarded; and by the
banking Act of 1844 the directors of the Bank are
powerless to afford relief to the present pressure, and
thus avert mercantile failures by an increased circula-
tion of notes.
Having cited the views of men of standing and ex-
perience, I will conclude this letter by quoting an
extract from a speech of Matthias Attwood, Esq.,
the eminent banker. Mr. Attwood for the past forty
years has given much attention to the currency ques-
tion, and both in the press and in his place in Parliament
has illustrated the subject in its every phase. His
speeches abound with a vast amount of financial ex-
positions. The opinion of such a thoroughly prac-
tical financier may be of service at such a moment.
On the debate of the currency question in 1830, in
referring to the Act of 1819, Mr. Attwood thus
spoke :
" We have dealt with our money more in reference
to the material which composed the money than to
the functions it discharged. Money of paper we have
called it—money of rags—and have treated it as we
would treat rags or paper, and forgotten that in dealing
with money, however composed, we affected the most
important organ in the social body. I cite another
evidence, Mr. Vansittart himself, the principal mover
in these transactions. Mr. Vansittart, speaking of
1816 and 1818, in 1821, a period when the calamities
of 1816 were all renewed, and by similar means, uses
these words :
" The peace followed, and that very standard was
restored, at which, by another process, the country
had since arrived. A second depreciation took place,
which probably arose from the large loan the Go-
vernment had of the Bank on account of the repeal of
the Property-tax. It was never very considerable.'
" Here, then, is the standard restored—admitted
by him who restored it—in 1816 restored, as in 1820
and 1821, and as now. A second depreciation took
place :" it was never very considerable.' But if the
price of bullion be taken as its measure, Mr. Van-
sittart here falls into the error of the bullionists. The
depreciation was as considerable as at any period of
the war. The prices of property and of commo-
dities were as high, and the prosperity as great. But
the prosperity of 1818 was transient. Why did not
that prosperity endure ? Whence came it that
the prosperity of 1818 was not as permanent as
that of the war ? The depreciation did not so long
endure. Does any man believe that the prosperity of
the war would not have ceased before the war, if the
Bank Restriction Act had sooner ceased ? The pros-
perity of 1824 and 1825, the Right Hon. Baronet
opposite told us, was also short-lived. I will give
him the reason ; because his Bill was long-lived. The
prosperity of the country and the security of his Bill
have not existed, and cannot exist together. The
Act of 1819 brought the prosperity of 1818 to a close,
by bringing back the old standard. I fear no charge
of exaggeration whilst I describe the consequences of
that measure. That Act fell on the calm prosperity
and labours of the people—on the prosperous industry
of the country-- to confound, and disorder, and
destroy. All the calamities of 1816 were renewed.
The blow was first felt on the manufacturing popu-
lation. Without employment—without wages—
without the means of subsistence—suffering from
artificial famine in the midst of plenty—ignorant
from whence the blow came—by thousands and tens
of thousands the manufacturing population prepared
for resistance."
When our theorists can view matters in a less pre-
judiced light, the truths promulgated by Mr. Attwood
will be self-evident. ANTI-CROOKED.

THE " SMITH" FAMILY.—The Boston Post states
that there was to have been a great meeting of Smiths
on
ain sgrlinoaosntt:f;no found trill:lhr the
enmeeinneotui ;:ha twrocahhs
branch of the family fell heir to a certain property. in
last, to ascertai❑ what
h NaVvi.nGg obseseenttklnaosetkwedeedko
to attend.
mw
down
altiddnwj
theoi uthr
innnauendrase,erbar.eissort
srtuheseet
anxiousplaceac
yc i
Sirdent,
cab, by which he received some bruises, and had his left
arm broken.