The Sun.
London, England, 1841-03-25 00:00:00

ec,nisni'°tiTcP can be no difference. In the language of the
)413'
-ion " all the lcgisiat:ve powers" which i- grants
are'vested in the Coneress of the United state:." It would
solecism in lsnguage to ety that any p rtion of these is
not included in the whole.
It Pens be said inili•ed that the Constitution has given to
the P•/eentive tht' power 'to annul the acts of the legial Aive
ootslysby.reliesing to them his as ent. So a similar peeves. has
° clot 'he resulted from that instrument to the judiciary ;
judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. 'I here
sesexiet 13 true, this different,. between these grants of power ; the
cutive can past his negative upon the Acts of the Legisla-
,,re. for other cause than that of want of conformity to the
nstitution, whilst the judiciary can only declare void those
ist
njeh violate site instrument. But the decision of the judiciary
reunal in such a case; whereas, in every instance where the
nt'iO...Oft.b.e Executive is applied, it may te_overcome by a vote
te:wo-Tnirds of both Houses of Congress. The negative upon
tur Acts of the Legislature, by the Executive asthority, and
41% in the hands of one indivelusl, would seem to be an in-
en,'lgroity in our own system. Like some others of a similar
uaracter, however, it appears to be highly expedient ; and if
sed only with forbearance, and in the spirit which was in.
',ended by its authors, it may be producti e of great good, and
be found one of the best safe-guards to the Union.
ei At he period of the formation of the Constitution, the prin-
ser:Le does- not appear to ha' e enjoyed much favour in the
te Governments. It existed but in two, and in one of
‘, 'se there was a t•lural Executive. If we would search for
i:114ell motive which operated upon the purely patriotic and en-
teued assembl which framed the Constitution, for the
ad°Prionof • • s a provision so apparently repugnant to the lead-
Nng principle, that the majority should govern,
I,:en,tnuo reject the idea that they anticipated from it any
•••'‘, .fit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too
well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the
Pe'Ple, and the enlightened character of the State Legislatures
ft
to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by
their would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and,
of course that they would require no aid in conceiving and
maturing' the measures which the circumstances of the coun-
"0? might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a
tight could for a moment ceuld have been entertained that
Pre
'Went, placed at the capital, in the centre of the coun-
, !mild better understand the wants and wishes of the
Pe ie than their own immediate representatives, who spend a
etter°f evert- year among them, living wish them, often la-
, ;•I Ing with them, and bound to thm by the triple tie of
erest, duty,
Thee . y, and affection. To assist or control Congres.,
IIR its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have
Zu,. the motive for con 'erring the veto power on the Presi-
J?' This argument acquires additional force from the fact
- its two end t vet having been thus used by the first six
Fsl
Iv°
°f them were Members of the Conventin, ne re-
g Over its deliberations, and the other haviongo a larpger
1;7 in consummating the labours of that august body than
ereY 03' other person. But if Bil's were never returned to Con-
gress either of the Presidents above referred to, uron the
keiland of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as
beY blight be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied
JeZ that cf want of conformity to the Constitution, or because
The had been committed from a too hasty enactment.
re is ante+ her ground for the adoption of the veto principle,
Coo
had probably more influence in recommending it to the
Zotrention than any other. I refer to the security which it
pa," to the just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all
t0,,;t7 °f the Union. It could not but have occurred to the
etition that in a country so extensive, embracing so great
,;,iety of soil and climate, and consequently of products, and
weh, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great differ-
e I._
ea% u the amount of the population of its various sections,
tteatng for a great diversity in the employments of the people,
garethe legislation of the majority might not always justly re-
of the rights and interests of the minority. And that Acts
the words
character might be passed, under an express grant by
envtnuords of the Constitution, and, therefore, not within the
eteil;ftency of the judiciary to declare void. That however
sernk"tenett and patriotic they might suppose, from past expe-
ktroce, the Members of Congress might be, and however
t'y'elY partaking in general of the liberal feeling of the people,
nt impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should
feet, sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional
erofts• It was proper therefore to provide some umpire,
whose situation and mode of appointment
.more inde-
-11;qt once and freedom from such influences might be ex-
ice ‘eu• Such a one was afforded by the Executive department
ntilstituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that
dier having his constituents in every section, state, and sub-
eon 'ion of the Union, must consider himself bound by the
of :11 solemn sanctions to uard, protect, and defend the rights
• : and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice
lore "Peression of the rest. I consider the veto power, there-
St litvsol en
ly by the constitution of the Executive of the United
eas a centservative power. To be used only, Ist,
eeeprotect the Constitution from violation ; 2dly, the people,
rtit the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been
pee ably disregarded or not well understood ; and, idly, to
es; 'erg the effects of combinations violative of the rights of
-4.l4;:ncTities. In reference to the second of the objects I may
geP've that I consider it the right and privilege of the people
oecitle disputed points of the Constitution, arising from the
penneeral grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the
4eh as expressly given. And 1 believe, with Mr. Madison,
Bets at repeatede recognitions under varied. circumstances, in
'Q„ of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
tec'ernment, accompanied by indications in different modes of
to ,p3ncurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording
ei toe President sufficient authority for his considering such
spited points as settled."
t :Awards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of
tresent form of :government. It would be an object more
ighdesirable than the gratification of the curiosity of spe-
lt 4i
2ve statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained,
of tbr exhibit made of the operations of each of its departments,
the
e°lPl e
is owers which th respectivel claim and exercise, of
ions which have occurred between them, or between
e
tG:hole Government and those of the States, or either of
tilyle \Ye
.could then compare our actual condition, after
Ale years trial of our system, with what it was in the com-
teetn.eetnent of its operations, and ascertain whether the pre-
itnt,ts of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confi-
er'' 'lopes of its advocates, have been best realized. The
eerat dread of the firmer seems to have been, that the re-
ef eett powers of the States would be absorbed by those
ettse`",,e Federal Government, and a consolidated power
ied-"shed, leaving to the States the shadow only of that
eo2endent action for which they had so zealously
rerended, and on the preservation of which they
t.es'47.l as the last hope of liberty. Without denying that the
'tee t to which they looked with so much apprehension is in
el sswi aY of being realized, it is obvious that they did not
tee-1 see the mode of its accomplishment. The general Go-
tineot has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the
ItOs• As far as any open warfare has gone, the State au-
server our system
see';nles have amply maintained their rights. To a casual ob-
presents no appearance of discord between
of e".'fferent members which compose it. Even the addition
111,,geaue new ones has produced no jarring. They move in
hfte- respective orbits in perfect hatmony with the central
Itt "(1 with each other. But there is still an under-current
10.4::rlt, by which, if Snot seasonably checked, the worst appre-
rose of our anti-federal patriots will be realized. And not
1112.1,01 the State authorities be overshadowed by the great
Vet74se of power in the Executive department of the general
tleeernment, but the character of that Government, if not its
pation, be essentially and radically changed.
letitetis state of things has been in part.effected by causes
'lee: the Constitution, and in part by the never.failing ten-
tiieeti of political power to increase itself. By making the Pre-
reeet" the sole distributor of all the patranage of the Govern-
!tei the framers of the Cons'itution do not appear to have an-
tlred at how short a period it would become a formidable
ken:intent to control the free operations of the State Govern-
feta:: Of trifling importance at first, it had, early in Mr. Jef-
kla " administration, become so powerful as to create great
ra, in
Neet the mind of that patriot, from the potent influence it
If Zeeeexert in controlling the freedom of the elective franehse.
tatieh" Could then have been the effects of its influence, how.
,4110,egsreatee must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in
'tor, IS it certainly is, and more completely under the con-
tee: theexecutive will than their construction of their powers
l're ieede' or the forbearing characters of all the early
the 4-nts permitted them to make? But it is not by
het eatent of its patronage alone that the Executive de-
Ne: ent has become dangerous, but by the use which it ap-
!bY be made of the appointing power, to bring
t. lts control the whole revenue of the country.—The
tee dation has declared it to be the duty of the President to
karitcliett the laws are executed, and it makes him the corn-
If teeer-,neehief of the armies and navy of the United States.
nt °Pinion of the most approved writers upon that species
teon:pleis't government, which in modern Europe is termed
11:atiti-he"Y, in contradistinction despotism is correct, there was
;rat ;4 00 o'her additioa to the powers of our Chief Magis-
°nteteT,stamp
streeee control monarchical character on our Government
aofmtreapreuhblic fineness. And to me it appears
trot gee, indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire con-
the rwnieh the President possesses over the officers who have
Or eilltestAs of the public money, by the power of removal with
selee-,.`,atit rause does, for all mischievous purposes at least,
ith`..t the treasure also to his disposal.
!tea; first Roman Emperor, in his attempt to seize the sacred
at had're, silenced the opposition of the officer to whose charge
ti en be
Y a se, committed, by a significant allusion to his sword.
keee ten of political instruments for the care of the public
e rek!'ea, a reference to their commissions by a President would
fighte as effectual an argument as that of Caesar to the Roman
4 ps am nut insensible of the great difficulty in devising
Palse'l'rr Plan for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the
4ttaeeseitetwenues, and I know the importance which has been
41‘ it °Y men of great abilities wet patriotism to the divorce,
t i ealled, of th. Treasury from the banking institutions.
tlowe`
divorce which is complained of, but the unhal-
'olio, "Own of the Treasury with the executive. department
%'°' -43 Created such extensive alarm. To this danger to
tive:ePublican institutions, and that created by the influenrie
44,41.° the Executive through the instrumentality of the
ltky cer s I propose to apply all the remedies. which
,eite •7, at 'm
ommand. It was certainly a great
eikl4l4„n the fyrameers of the Constitution, not to have
i7,1,,ee officer at the head of the. 'Treasury department en-
: e "n pendent of the Executive. He
dshould,e at least,
the Se
removable crily upcn the dem.an o h popular
sge Se the Legislature. 1 have determined never to remove
ejt•eueretary of the Treasur • without communicating all the
st,r:s‘kir4 staTnhees attending such Treasury
to. both. Houses of Con-
-ego% e influence of the Executive in controlling the
pttl,liCor the elective franchise through the medium of the
retlers can be effectually checked by renewing the pro-
reeee°.° Published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interfe-
:heir
out elections further than giving their own votes; and
in secured by an assurance of perfect
tti o exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under
eeY eer„ 'es of their own unbiassed judgmen.s. Never, with.
-.'"iees'een,.t, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his
'e'en "" of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of
• The -ve
re
nch'
ourpart of the means placed in the hands of the
wnieft might be used with greater effect, for un-
xile PnrP°,es, than the control of the public press. The
tee' teeancestors derived from the mother country,
eh', retie,
ousel"ledom of the press is the great bul.wark of civil
e_ tee he berty," is one of the most precious legacies
;71 "eY have le t' us. We have learned, too, from our own
eel'lles 7 'he experience of other countries, that golden
•-e as sa'„lY whemsoever or by whatever pretence imposed,
ire
ethe 11,41 to it as the iron bonds of despotism. The presses
and oseeeetse'rY employment of the Government, should never
be tnani c ear the guilty, or to varnish crimes." A decent
not cs Y, examination of ihe acts of the Government should
ie lipenn..'Y tolerated but encouraged.
jeneete, eutiother occasion I have given my opionion, at. some
te-414a1ir?,, tee impropriety of Executive interferi nee in the
ti tug it4l' emgress ; that the article in the Constitution,
ter°, arid „'"e duty ef the President to communicate informa-
th 'dee to 4othorising him to recommend measures, was not in-
le 41. he slnake him the source of legislation, and, in particular,
hoOttle beerold never be looked to tor schemes of finance. lt
tervse SteieiirY strange, indeed, that the Constitution should
eon'eteee itY forbidden one branch of the Legislature from in-
tee't'dei%e eriginatiou of such Bale. and that it should be
he,t 'ov.eetWeper that an alto ether dfferent department of
per 1'0144,4 should be permitted to do so. Some of our
t,etteet maxims and opinions have been drawn from our
the neat in ere are others, however, which cannot be in-
to blireeneti our it and
system without singular incocgru y,
ten: 'Me. °en of much mischief. And this I conceive
eftnia plirioma matter in
.which of the H. owes of Parlia-
es stee Y origina e, nor by whom introduced,
ei awe or
_or a Member of the Opposition, by the fiction
set°PPosedrtather of constitutional principle, the Sovereign
she sever'flitte itPve prcpared it agreeably to his -Will, and then
' very
.arliament for their advice and consent. Now
e is the case here, not only with regard to the .