The Sun.
London, England, 1847-02-08 00:00:00

tHE SUN

THE FRENCH CHAMBERS.
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, Fon. 4.
The President took the Chair at two o'clock.
The order of the day was the adjourned discussion on the
Address.
The President observed, that as paragraphs 3,4, 5,6, had
been disposed of, paragraph 2, which had been reserved,
would now come under discussion.
M. Thiera ascended the tribune amidst marks of general
atteation,
and spoke as follows :—lf the Chamber deigns to
Pay attention to my actions, it must have perceived the
extreme repugnance which I have for some days past exhi-
bited to interfere in this discussion—though not because I
can find in the subject which occupies us any cause for em-
barrassment. How, in fact, can it be possible for us, the
Members of the Opposition, who are not the authors of the
present situation, to be embarrassed in expressing our eenti-
rnente? That situation, as you are aware, is this—that
France, by the deplorable event of Cracow, is separated from
the continental powers, and by the Spanish marriages is em-
broiled with England; so that the isolation which a few
years back we recommended to her as a momentary policy—
as a dignified means of re-entering the European concert, and
which the Government then rejected as altogether objec-
tionable, is new forcedly the policy of France.—(Hear,
hear.) Nor is that all ; at home a bad harvest, which is
the fault of no one, coinciding with a financial position,
which is the fault of some one, has rendered the internal
situation of the country as disastrous as the foreign one. All
this the Opposition certainly has not caused, and therefore
could not feel embarrassment in alluding to it in presence of
the persons whose duty it was to act. The object of my
hesitation was therefore different—it was an apprehension
of aggravating by my words the inconveniences of the situ-
ation. But in a representative government it is impossible
to pass over in silence events so important as those which
now occupy our attention. I come forward, therefore, to
speak, not that I pretend to succeed the Hon. Minister of
Foreign Affairs—long since I have given up all ideas of that
kind—not because I imagine that I can express myself better
than has been already done by gentlemen noted for their
talents and reasoning powers, but because I have my own
views to expose and defend. It is my custom to think
aloud—to speak freely ; and since these events have occurred
I have not concealed my opinion—it has been published. If,
therefore, at the grand moment of discussion I were to hesi-
tate, I should expose myself to the charge of weakness. I
have beheld in what was going on a most lamentable con-
fusion of ideas, and I cannot disguise from the Chamber of
Deputies my sentiments on the subject.—(Hear. hear.) It
is now 17 years since I have taken part in public affairs, and
if during that period I have learned in some degree the art
of stating matters difficult to be exposed I shall employ it
to-day while infusing into my language all the reserve
that is desirable. If you do me the honour to
listen to me patiently to the end, I shall testify to you my
gratitude both by the moderation and, pardon me
for adding, the utility of my words. I now proceed to ex-
amine the whole situation, characterised principally by the
two facts of the Spanish marriages and the incorporation of
Cracow. As to the former, my opinion is that the union of
Queen Isabella with the Infante Don Francisco de Assis is
good; but that the marriage of the Duke de Montpensier
with the Infanta Donna Luisa was attended in several re-
spects with grave inconveniences—that it was premature—
and that it will complicate the situation. It will be said, and
I ant prepared for the assertion, that this opinion serves the
pretensions of a foreign Government. I bring to this place
the most perfect impartiality, and I have always thought
that the interests of Spain were closely united to ours; and
it was with that idea that I was one of the authors of the
treaty of quadruple alliance. That treaty had two objects—
the first, to prevent a counter-revolution in Spain; the
second, to establish good relations with England on a ques-
tion of a most difficult character, and at the same time most
likely to create differences between the two countries. The
first object was but imperfectly attained—Spain was only
partially saved from a counter-revolution. In the second we
were more fortunate, as the two nations entered on a struggle
for influence in Spain, France patronising the Moderado
Party, and England the Progressi3t. That was an unfortu-
nate policy ; for, in adopting it, France and England ex-
posed themselves to protect only the intrigants of both
parties. It was on the marriage question, in particular,
that this struggle of influence was certain to manifest
itself. Permit me to state to you the object pursued severally
with respect to this matter, by France. by Spain, and by
England. France laid down the principle that the choice of
the Queen could only fall on one of the descendants of the
House of Bourbon. I will not repeat what has been said on
that point; I will only make one observation, and that is,
that formerly such an exigency might have been understood ;
but since one part of the house of Bourbon is engaged in the
principles of the revolution, the other in those of the counter..
revolution, how is it possible to law down so absolute a prin-
ciple ? I can understand that I shall be asked—" What
would you have said if the pretensions of the Prince of
Saxe-Coburg had triumphed?" I should, it is true, have
blamed you. But permit me to ask what you yourselves
would hare said, if, conquered by events, you had not been
able to prevent the Prince of Coburg from obtaining the
hand of Queen Isabella ? Would you not have said—" The
Prince of Coburg is closely allied to the Royal Family of
France; the Prince of Coburg adopts the principles if the
revolution; the head of the house of Coburg occupies a
constitutional throne at the very frontier of France ?" But
you have done well to exclude the Prince of Coburg ; good.
prance desired a prince of the house of Bourbon ; good again.
And what did Spain desire? Spain in this case was repre-
sented by Queen Christina, by the sovereign who had long
governed the country, and who, moreover, is the mother of
the Queen, and, as such, had rights worthy of respect.
What then did Queen Christina desire? She, above all, was
opposed to her nephews. This I declared last year, but the
assertion was treated as erroneous; the documents have
since shown that I was right. She had first thought of ob-
taining for the Queen the hand of the Duke de Montpensier.
When it was proved to her by French and European reasons
that such a union was impossible, she turned towards the
Prince of Coburg, and demanded him from everbody in the
warmest manner. It was only when Queen Christina, the real
head of the Moderado party in Spain, had learned, to use
-Lord Cowley's expression, that a union with a prince of
Coburg would fling you into consternation, that she gave
lip the idea. In order to obtain that prince, two consents
—that of the house of Coburg, and that of France—were
necessary. The house of Coburg saw in such an alliance
fresh ties uniting it with the two countries with which it
wan connected; it saw in it the completion of its great-
ness. Nevertheless, not to give offence to either of the two
nations, it refused ; or, what amounts to the same thing,
made its consent dependent on that of France. As to
England, she would assuredly have desired that a prince
of the house of Coburg might be placed on the throne of
Spain. But, considering the unheard-of vivacity with
which France repulsed the candidateship of the Prince of
Coburg. Queen Christina understood that, if France and
Spain became embroiled, the advantages of the marriage of
the Queen with the Prince of Coburg were not to be placed
in comparison with the dangers which it might produce to the
tranquillity of Europe. She, therefore, renounced the idea,
and sought another union for her daughter. It was then
that she entered on the policy which I blame, and turned
her attention to a Prince who had placed himself at the
head of the Progressist party. Don Enrique was, however,
soon abandoned. You did not consider him a very dan-
gerous candidate, since you did not think of opposing him.
But I agree with you that above all things it was important
to remove the Prince of Coburg. This, then, was what was
desired by the three Powers—France wished for a Bourbon ;
Spain, represented by Queen Christina, for a Coburg ; and
England the same, but she afterwards gave up that desire,
and to indemnity herself demanded Don Enrique. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that a kind of under-
standing was come to at Eu on the subject of the Spanish
marriages. I shall not discuss the object of that arrange-
ment, but I shall state on what points it bears. According
to it, France renounced the hand of the Queen for the Duke
de Montpensier, and declared furthermore that she should
not put forward any pretensions for the hand of the Infanta,
except is the event of the Queen giving heirs to the Crown.
As the price of these concessions, the French Cabinet de-
manded that England should not support the marriage of
Queen Isabella with the Prince of Coburg, The Hon. Minister
pretends that he observed those engagements faithfully as
long as those agreed to by England remained inviolate.
'Well, then, I have read all the documents, and I sincerely
declare that they absolutely contradict the double allegation
of the Hon. Minister. They appear to me to prove that the
conduct both of the Whigs and Tories was absolutely the
same with regard to the Spanish marriages, and that if there
were any difference it was that the Whigs showed them-
selves more opposed than the Tories to the marriage of the
Queen to the Prince of Coburg.—(Murmurs.) I shall not read
the documents to the Chamber, but shall merely give a brief
analysis of them. If any thing I say is contested as being
inexact or incomplete, I can reply by reading the part in
question. In the first place, in the dispatches of Lord Aber-
deen to Lord Cowley, was there anything in contradiction
to this--that the question of the Spanish marriages is a
Purely Spanish one, with which no one had any right to in-
terfere? and Lord Cowley never went beyond the assurance
that a candidate of the house of Bourbon would meet with
no opposition on the part of England. You see that the
Tories confined themselves to simple inaction. On a commu-
nication from the Spanish Cabinet, the Tories replied that
that Government was free to choose the candidate which ap-
peared to it the most suitable, and that if it selected one not
belonging to the house of Bourbon, it might, in order to
maintain the independence of its choice, reckon on the warm
ayrnpathies of England. Lord Aberdeen and the Tories ap-
pear to me in this instance to have departed from that in-
difference attributed to them by the Minister of Foreign
Allairs The Whigs afterwards carne into power. I shall, at
a later period, explain myself more at length on what is im-
properly called the English alliance, but for the moment I
shall confine myself to the Spanish question. The Whigs
succeeded to power; they were still beneath the weight of
the reminiscences of 1840; they were full of regrets; they
felt that they had not followed a sound line of policy, and
that that fault had nearly prevented their return to power.
In the state of the world, at that time, it was a fortunate
circumstance that the Whigs came into power in that frame
of mind. For my own part, I think it would have been easy
for the French Government to have come to an understanding
with the Whigs, if the former had not been influenced by a
feeling of distrust. What was the conduct of the Whig Go-
vernment? It declared in its turnd to Spain that she was
perfectly free to act; and onlyda dressed to her some repre-
sentations on certain unwise
which every onebTti violent measures of its Go-
vernment,mded. It is true that the Prince
of Coburg is pointed out in thea
this
of the 19th of July
was not doing more than
in the list of candidates. But
hair a
been done by Lord Aberdeenvin he assured
Spain of the warm sympathies of England in the event of
her choice falling on a prince not of the housewl'i
of Bourbon.
I admit that the dispatch of the 19th July
measure equivocal ; but immediately after aadiisncussffl'ne
stn
arose between the English and French Cabinets. Francee
rticular
spoke of the engagements at Eu ; Lord Palmerston replied ;
I know nothing of them England bas no we candidate ; but if you wish to know our opinion, we prefer
Dori Enrique." The answer of France was--o If you
wish for Don Enrique, unite with us at Madrid to promote
his candidateship." I find dispatches dated 29th July,
and the 3d, 16th, and 22d of August, and these all begin
with these words—" I told DI. de Jarnac ;" so that the
contents
of the dispatches addressed to Mr. Bulwer
enn_l_cl
Prince be no secret to us. All of these dispatches said—
that
we accept a Prince of the house of Bourbon, August
we desire
to be Don Enrique," On the 3d of Lord
sPalmerston
_ wrote to Mr. Bulwer " We should desire the
Queen to choose the Prince: of Saxe-Coburg,' if that choice
should bebaugreeable to Spain, and should not embroil us with
preferable cat in
France •
the present state of things Don Enrique is a
ston
addressednidate." On the 22d of August, Lord Palmer-
substance was that commu-
nicated to M.dispatch to Mr. Bulwer, which was commu-
izot
of a Prince of thea-
hY Lord Normanby on the 28th. Its
of that house—th " England adhered to the candidateship
England of Bourbon ; there were three Princes
, he did no
possible to choosee Count de Montemolin, whom it was urn-
rancisco de As
Queen; Don F
.t recognise the rights of the
which
?
recommend ; and Don En • us, whom England could not
What was the reply of whom she recommended."
adhere to the condition
ference to one of the two brothers That " he could not
an exclusive pre-
, but that he had no ob-
4ection to make to the candidatesehip_ of Don Enrique; that
itt
tte willinglytwo brothers
tos m of England, on condition
put forwa "
gbehtpboelicesiyually
Parat terms on which matters stood on the 28thrd.
the dis-
tro the • •
eatusince taken place? I shall not any ;Such
readof August.
17470 ad, and consult the official facts. At Madrid at this
Via 4 limn that the Duke of 61,46•Coburg null

not give one of his children out of regard to France. and that
England desired Don Enrique, chief of the Progressists. It
was in this situation of things that M. Bresson came on the
scene. It has keen said in England that he has acted most
shamefully, and in France that he has done marvels. Gene
tlemen, I 'know Count de Bresson, and I can say that he is
incapable of doing unworthy things; but he had no need on
this occazion to achieve wonders. He addressed himself to
M. Isturitz, one of the leaders of the Moderado party, and
showed him that France and England were agreed to favour
the candidateship of the chief of the Progressists. Queen
Christina was aware both of the refusal of the Prince of Co-
burg and of the agreement of the two countries to make the
Queen marry one of her cousins. Her resolution was taken.
In the night of August 28th a Council was called, and it was
decided to marry the young Queen with Don Francisco, chief
of the Moderado party. This first result was excellent for us.
We had thrown out the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, and Don
Enrique, chief of the Progressists. So far all was well ; for
though I blame the policy which identifies itself with one of
the parties that divide a foreign country, I believe that when
such a policy is once entered on it must be followed up until
the triumph of the party is assured. Up to this point, there-
fore, all was in our favour, but there the success ought to
have stopped. I am, above all, a partizan of the policy of my
country, but I have no need to remind you that we should
remain within certain limits. There remained to effect the
second marriage, that or the Infanta Donee Luisa with the
Duke de Montpensier. The Moderados desired it in order
to exclude Don Enrique, chief of the Progressists, from the
second rank, as they had excluded him from the first. In
this desire we coincided. We alt desire, as sincere partizans
of the oynaety, whatever may contribute to the happiness
and distinction of the Royal Family.—(Hear.) The Infanta
Doane Luisa joins to qualities that every one knows, the
most illustrious birth. Yeu were, then, right to desire
this marriage. We should have desired it ourselves; but on
the condition that it involved nothing contrary to the policy
of France ; but in the circumstances in which you concluded
it, it did not possess that character. It has been said that
the simultaneousness of the two marriages was an essential
condition of the first. I have searched everywhere for the
proof of this condition, and I have not been able to find it ;
but I have found direct proofs of the contrary.—( Hear.) If
Queen Christina, in presenting to you the two marriages at
the same time, had said (excuse the frivolity of the ex-
pression), " You must either take it or leave it," I should
have understood that we ought perhaps to have ceded. But
nothing of the kind took place. Everything attests that the
two marriages were determined on the condition that they
should be celebrated at the same time, if possible, or, to use
the expression of the contract, autant que faire se pourrait.
The official facts completely deny the :contrary pretension.
It was in the night of the 28th of August that the first mar-
riage was settled, and in the morning of the 29th it was offi-
cially announced in the Medrid Gazette in these words:—
" I, Isabella 11., announee to Spain, that I have chosen for
my husband my cousin, the Prince Don Francisco d'Assis,
and I convoke the Cortes for September 14." Thus, on the
morning of the 29th of August the first marriage was a fait
accompli. It was your duty to use all your efforts to cause
the second marriage to be postponed. It is said that the
Cortes could have annulled the first marriage. But what
were the Cortes at that time? Out of 180 members there
were 100 Moderados, and was it to be expected that that
majority would have declared against the marriage which
placed their chief on the throne? As to the Progressists,
they were 20, and it was natural that they should refrain
from pressing the conclusion of a marriage which excluded
their chief from the second rank, as from the first. It is
said—" But if there was nothing to fear from the Cortes,
out-of-door movements and insurrections were to be dreaded."
It is forgotten, then, that what excited the reclamations of
the press, and the excesses that had to be suppressed by
arbitrary means, was the person selected for the second
marriage.
M. de Lavergne rose, and said a few words which we found
it impossible to catch, from the uproar caused by M. Thiers
being interrupted.
M. Thiers—You do wrong to interrupt me; this cause has
no need of such help as yours; it is defended by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.—(Laughter.) The first marriage, then,
was definitively settled by the proclamation of the Queen of
Spain, dated 29th August. The second marriage was to be
concluded so far as was possible. Those were the expressions
of the Hon. Minister in the Chamber of Peers. What was
the situation ? The French Ministry was in presence of the
English Cabinet and the engagements of Eu. The Hon.
Minister pretends that he felt himself at liberty by the
attempts of the Whigs in favour of the Prince of Coburg.
But if that were the case he ought to have said to them—
"We are free." But the common action was accepted
up to August 28. On September 1 the Hon. Minister re-
ceived a visit from the English Ambassador, and on that
gentleman inquiring it the marriages were to be celebrated
at the same time, he was told by. M. Guizot—" No, not at
the same time."—(Laughter.) He, in fact, left in the Am-
bassador's mind a firm conviction on the subject. The
Hon. Minister declares that the order to celebrate the
two marriages at the same time was only dispatched
on September the 11th. I may remark, en passent, that
this is a proof that you were still free to act on September
2d, on which day the English Ambassador communicated to
you a dispatch. At last came September 4th, and the Mi-
nister, who on the previous evening was in accord with the
English Cabinet, gives the order to celebrate the marriages
at the same time. You were, you say, conquered by circum-
stances. Well, on the sth of September you should have
sent for the Ambassador, and told him the truth; but, in-
stead of that, time is allowed to run on, and the press of
Europe is permitted to learn the facts, and comment on them ;
and then, when on the 25th the English Ambassador comes
to remonstrate, the Hon. Minister replies, " It is too late."
The Minister and the Ambassador then separate to remain in
the relations with which the Chamber is acquainted. Permit
me, gentlemen. a simple reminiscence. In 1840, when I sus-
tained a policy that for my part I found too bold, but which
I believed good for the honour of the country, a vic-
tim was required to expiate the backward step that was made
in the path in which I was engaged with others. Then it
was said—not, it is true, in this tribune, but in another—
that I had deceived England. Ah! gentlemen, I have no
desire to recriminate, and I will not do so; but I can say that
assuredly I did nothing like what has been done in this affair
of the Spamish marriages.—(Sensation.) In my convictions
the Government did well in bringing about a first and second
displeasure for England—in foiling her in any desire she
might have had for the Prince of Coburg, and in her pre-
ference of Don Enrique; but as to the third, which consisted
in celebrating the two marriages immediately, it ceded to a
movement of inconsiderate haste. I rejoice at the joys of
the Royal Family when not contrary to the interests of the
country; but in this case the duty of the Ministers clearly
was to arrest the accomplishment of that measure. I firmly
believe, that in effecting the two marriages together the
Government has done a thing either null or dangerous; and
when I shall have proved that to you, I shall examine if it
has not done wrong to compromise our relations with Eng-
land, and if the moment was well chosen to compromise
them. ( Here the sitting was suspended for some minutes,
after which the Hon. Gentleman resumed his speech as ful-
lows):— I shall now examine in a threefold point of view
our relations on this question with Spain, with England,
and with the Continent. As to Spain, your policy is either
null or dangerous. You continually talk of the policy of
Louis XIV. Permit me to say a few words on that point.
What, to my thinking, our history clearly shows, is, that it is
the first interest of France to maintain herself constantly in
such relations with Spain as to prevent the latter from being
our enemy. You know that if whilst we fight on the Rhine
we have Spain as an enemy, we are as an army taken
between two fires. We had an example of that in 1814,
when Napoleon fought in Champagne with a handful of men,
but when the armies of Marshals Soult and Suchet were
fighting in the south. If the troops of these generals had
been united to his, the face of things would probably have
been changed. We must then hare a friend in Spain ; and,
in consequence, our policy towards her must be a friendly
one. That is the first point. The second is this: When the
Spanish character is examined, there may be remarked in it
a great aversion to foreign influence. That feeling i 4 derived
from the geographical position of Spain and from her his-
torical traditions. The Spaniards have always been subjected
to foreign dynasties—those of Germany and France. If we
wish to find a political friend in Spain, we must not pretend
to exercise any influence over the Spanish Government. The
Spaniards, though tractable towards their rulers, are un-
governable with regard to foreigners. There must not be
permitted to exist at Madrid a policy necessarily inimical to
us; but beyond that no influence must be attempted in Spain
The worst means, therefore, of exercising any influence in
Spain is by marriages. The political results of the policy of
Louis XIV. towards Spain were compromised by his having
founded them on his relationship, and it was precisely that re-
lationship, uniting as it did the two crowns, which after the
death of that monarch threw Spain into the German alliance.
It was not until a later period that that Power, enlightened
by its true interests, attached itself more closely to us. It
again estranged itself to once more and definitively attach
itself to us in those latter days under the influence of the re-
volution. What (night to have been our conduct after the
Revolution of July? I declare loudly that our part is
pointed out to us by a comtnon revolution. There was be-
tween France and Spain an evident community of interests;
each of the two nations has its Pretender; the Duke de
Bordeaux in one, and the Count de Montemolin in the
other. In the midst, also, of the desperate struggle between
the Moderados and the Progressists, when the treaty of the
15th of July was signed and war was spoken of, the most
violent of the Spanish journals changed their language in
the most apparent manner. When France was seen to be in
otdifaotniti gtin
caael
n.l dp
parts
rtota,,s eoasfsc
ne
sdeptEaoiunnri opypuiehnithreatened
antt
espoused
Fn
pi
osutrsoeeodkch the cause
ao.ul u-
si
et
was also in Belgium. The public mind in those countries
comprehended that a common revolution created common
interest, and imposed common duties. Such was the way
in which France ought to exercise her influence over other
nations. I do not wish to recriminate, but I may
say that when Spain demanded your real support
you refused it ; you would not do anything
whatever to prevent counter-revolution. 'What, then,
do you hope for from the Spanish marriages ?
It is not to-day, for the first time, that I say the position of a
French Prince in Spain is a difficult one, and I will give
you a proof of it. Queen Christina is not French and yetgo into Spain, and from Bayonne to Cadiz you will be told
that the greatest difficulty experienced by her is that she is
regarded as the agent of French policy. What, therefore,
would the Duke de Montpensier do in Spain? His supe-
riority even would be an obstacle ; he would often be a
living impediment for his brother-in-law and for the Queen.
You thought, like me, since you recalled the Duke, and de-
clared that you had only given France an additional Prin-
cess. You have, therefore, done an act which is, politically
speaking, null. But you will perhaps say, why then attack
thatit? :Lis because you have not only done an act which is
null, but because 'it is dangerous. Let us suppose, then,
al!alnareo if
at,ivlQueencreated
c toifonnSesPe* dad: hasannwo nt
remark
er nomor
na
khh children—and 1
here
err
ree
ena
setion)—but it is not I—tythaoanf
Laughter)—what difficulties will you not
the lees true that, the hypothesis of
the Queen having nod children you have created great cause
of embarrassment an
English alliance,
done a thing which compromised peace. You have, there-
fore,price have you paid for it? You
null and dangerous, and what
tdul
rclowoedlingtolta admit
msehniet.
for whicth you have. made so many sacrifices.
alliance, was the moment,thatl ou have paid the price of the
chosen?—(Move-
ment.) I have alwae's b
Therefore, in admitting you might have renounced that
may ask, well
alliance, and I have given been
taken advantage of this fepeTiono aof it. My enemies have
;.t partizan of the English
let me, therefore, be allowed tog to render me unpopular;
avail myself of their at-
tacks to repeat that such has 1 always been. my predilection.
I do not seek pepulakiitnyg, I; rlesipnecclwtinell,)opinions of my coun-
try the one as I do
,mbyut to both I will
maryeTfercroeomsa tlmieyleang any
trya
befores
the
h respect sopt ehcecr
_opinion
frankly. If I obtain from the nation
an injurious
; but I
heeoimnjeusrious portion of their esteem, that will be
would not purchase that esteem by giving
coun-
sel. It has been frequently said—. It
who for many years sought to embroil France andyEun
to reproach us with not having set sufficient value &anti:"e
English alliance !" To that I might reply—" It is very well
for you, who have done everything to preserve the English
alliance, and have consented to so many sacrifices, to now
hold it so cheaply !" I am, I repeat, an advocate for the
English alliance, because it is useful to the progress ofliberty
in the world, because it is the best guarantee for the in-
dependence of states, and that is our cause—the cause of
the Opposition.—(Approbation on the Left.) When you see
Switzerland threatened in her liberty by three Powers, do
ins 113 itcl that your on frontiers are threatened?—(Re-