The Sun.
London, England, 1840-11-13 00:00:00

FIFTH BUREAU.

M. Odillon Barrot said, that as the President of the
Cabinet of March 1, formed one of that bureau, it would
be necessary for him to speak first, in order to supply the
elements of discussion. _ _

NI. Thiers said that the explanations which he had to
give were very long, and very considerable, and of such a
delicate nature that he could only give them before the
Chamber ; that he was afraid, besides, to give them before
a bureau, because, in general, all that was said in the bu-
reaux was burlesqued, and that his explanations being of
a very delicate nature, he would not expose himself to
have them incorrectly reported ; that, however, if the
bureau wanted summary explanations, he would give them,
requesting those who would hear him to be kind enough to
retain them correctly, and also to tell him what lie had
stated ! _ _ .

The bureau having persisted, M. Thiers complied with
the wish that was expressed, and gave the following
explanations :—" I entered the Cabinet of the Ist of
March with the utmost regret. At home the majority
was at an end, abroad a very momentous question
had just arisen, and the numerous despatches which
I wrote will prove that from the first day I augured
unfavourably of the conclusion of the Eastern affair How-
ever, I accepted office, and I must therefore make known
in a few words what was the state of the Eastern question
when I took the helm of affairs. 1 hope I shall say nothing
which can in any way wound the feelings of my predeces-
sors; but it must be understood that in this affair 1 will
only take upon myself my portion of the responsibility.
The alliance between England and France was at an end.
England was completely united to Russia, Austria, and
Prussia in the Eastern question; France stood alone in
her opinion against the Four other Powers ; she bad asked
in the moat (urinal and positive manner for the hereditary
possession of Egypt and for Syria as a life interest ; she
had even stated that she completely separated herself from
England and the other Powers rather than give in on that
point. Ido not mean to say by that that she has taken an
irrevocable part, but, in short, that when I took office I
found France alone against those Four European Powers,
and maintaining a policy which none of them would
admit. The only line of conduct which appeared to me
advisable in that situation was to gain time in order that the
amour propre of the coalesced negotiators might develope
itself. M. Guizot was Ambassador in London. I do not
think be can complain of the instructions which I gave
him ; at all events, I shall wait for the public debate ; but
I shall say that his efforts and mine have been the means
of averting the fatal resolution of the 15th of July. We
broke down, because the course by England was irrevoca-
bly taken. Lord Palmerston had alwayS viewed the Vice-
roy's power as fatal, and he always declared at every
period that the only good policy was to reduce it to Egypt.
The Three Powers of the Continent having promised to
join him as soon as they saw that France and England
were divided, he was in a position quite strong enough to
make no sacrifice to France. It is very true, as some per-
sons said, who had derived the information from a source
unknown to me, that the Prussian and Austrian Ministers
had insinuated to M. Guizot that perhaps Lord Palmerston
might be induced to yield Syria as a life interest to the
Viceroy. They stated that they would do their utmost
to induce the British Minister to accomplish that object,
but they never succeeded, for that proposal which we
had reason to expect was never made. At all events.
I recommended M. Guizot not to reject, but to
accept it, ad referendum, and I sought to prevail upon the
Viceroy to accept it, when the Treaty of the 1541 of July
was signed. That Treaty was concealed from France. It
is very true that M. Guizot knew that some matter of im-
portance was being prepared in the Cabinet, that he was
warned of it, and that he gave notice thereof to his Govern-
ment; but a mystery was made of it, and he was not in-
formed of the signing of the Treaty until after it had takes
place. I looked upon the affair not as an insult to France,
but as an ill-advised proceeding, and as a rupture of the
alliance, and that she had a right to bo offended. Yet
such a proceeding was not of a nature to provoke war.
This is my motive for the line of conduct which I pursued.
Four Powers had just entered into a coalition, not like
those who united in '92 to cross the Rhine the following
spring, but to ruin our influence in the most important
question which had arisen for a length of time. In a
question in which France had a 'greater interest than
the majority of the Powers who would have undertaken
to resolve it she could not allow herself to be
put aside. I, therefore considered that France
ought to place herself in a position to obtain a mo-
dification of the resolutions which had been adopted in
London. I should not have asked for a concession which
would be a humiliation to the Four Powers, for others
must not be humiliated when one does not wish to he so
oneself; but some concession was necessary, in order to
preserve the honour and influence of France. She re-
quired it, besides, out of respect for the Viceroy, for if she
had not interfered in his affairs at the outset of the nego-
tiations, he would have unquestionably subjected the Porte,
and obtained from her what he might have wished for.
Such was the object of the armaments. Assuredly, ac-
cording to nay views, it was not with the view of prevent-
ing the Rhine from being crossed, for no one in Europe
would have been sufficiently bold t 3 do it spontaneously,
but they were for the purpose of enabling France to ne-
gotiate efficaciously. But, in order that these armaments
alight possess some importance, it was requisite for
them to be made in earnest ; a semi-armament could
be but an empty measure, expensive, compromis-
ing, and not over honourable ; it was sheer bom-
bast. Nothing could be efficacious but a complete arma-
ment, which would be the only means of making Eu-
rope understand that if negotiations were not entered into
on an equitable and moderate basis war might ensue. No
doubt with that policy war was possible, only possible, and
not certain ; but to wish at once to obtain a result in con-
formity to our honour, and to preserve the certainty of
peace. is a thing impossible. To wish to act on the world,
especially when there is one against four, and to wish at tho
same time to preserve the certainty of peace, is a contradic-
tion unworthy of politicians. There was no need to enter
into the Eastern question, but, having done so, it became
necessary to extricate oneself with honour. My colleagues
and myself were resolved upon the (armament of France.
France was not ready, and could not be so before the spring.
Until then I wished to gain time. I had resolved upon
committing no rash act until the preparations appeared
to be sufficiently advanced. I hoped that the Pacha of
Egypt would confine himself to a vigorous defensive course,
arid that if he was only half successful in the same, France,
putting herself forward as an armed mediatrix, had the
chance of obtaining a concession, however moderate it might
be. Provided it was acknowledged that it was due to
France, the honour of the latter would have appeared to
me to be saved. When the bombardment of Beyrout took
place, that event, which it was easy to foresee, surprised
us in no way, and altered none of our resolutions; but it
proved still more that activity must be resorted to. Then
I asked the Crown for three things : first, to complete the
armament ; secondly to convoke the Chambers forthwith,
in order to ask for the cornpletement of the armament;
thirdly, for the fleet to be sent to Alexandria, in order to
protect that important place, and to maintain the moral
1
power of the Egypt,ans. Those proposals were rejected.
y colleagues and I tendered our resignations. Ai
e
Duke do Broglie was called in ; a transactdioanysi,oinodntna‘estor.evke;endTtehfdit ioarrt
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ay, as
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twh2aeSstiahngteOrrecveladolbttelhiret fleet should be concentrated under the
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preparations which had been comme
filmed ; and that with, respect to the
e course would be adopted at the
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complete them, a definitive
to the act of drawn out. On that
was agreed upon, which
but in which there was no idea of adbeapnodsoinngingot'Sytrhica. Pacha,
the authentic version will
was be known,
on that score.
also agreed that, the time o
Speech from
no doubt can rfermtahien
the Crown having arrived, if the Crown ac-
ceded to the proposals of the n L"ab'l t the latter would re-
main in office, otherwise it woulde 'resign; but that the
Members of the two Chambers being then assembled; the