The Sun.
London, England, 1847-01-14 00:00:00

SUN', LONDON, T,IIIInSDAY EVEN'INtIi JANUARY 14, 1A47

Madrid upon the marriage of. Queen Isabella; and that,
this proposal' " was hardly consistent with the steps.
taken at Madrid by France singly ;" since, according to
him, we had at the same time ordered Count Bresson to
endeavour to bring about the Queen's marriage with
one particular candidate (the Infante Don Francisco
d'Assis), and that, consequently, the question upon
which the French Charge d'Affaires was offering to de-
liberate in London had been already decided by the in-
structions which had been sent to the French Ambas-
sador at Madrid.
An accurate statemeut of facts will demonstrate the
groundlessness of this accusation.
It is true, that in the month of July I proppSed to the
Cabinet of London to come to an agreement to act in
concert at Madrid, in order that we might give our joint
support specially to the two Infants, sons of Don Fran-
cisco de Paula. The claims of these two Princes, as
descendants of Philip V. were admitted by us, and, as
Spanish Princes, by England; while the Court of Madrid
appeared to be more favourably disposed towards them.
I therefore proposed to the English Government to give
them our joint support, and I declared at the same time
that, for our part, we had no objection to either of those
Princes, and that the one of them who might be agree-
able to Spain and to the Queen would also be agreeable

to us.
I have addressed the same language to Madrid as to
London. Count Bresson has always had instructions to
support the pretensions of the two Infants, and to de-
clare beforehand that we should entirely acquiesce in
the choice which the Queen might make between them.
His Majesty's Ambassador has punctually fulfilled his
instructions.
What took place when, more than a month after my
proposal of co-operation in favour of the sons of Don
Francisco de Paula, Lord Palmerston at length sent me
his answer. He asked us to unite with him in giving
exclusive support at Madrid to Don Enrique, " the only
one fit " (as the dispatch of the 22d of August, commu-
nicated to me by Lord Normanby on the 28th, affirms)
1" to become the consort of the Queen." I expressed to
Lord Normanby, and I instructed you to express to
Lord Palmerston, my astonishment at this exclusive de-
signation of Don Enrique, and the impossibility of our
uniting in it, for we had always said, and we persist in
saying, that either of the two Infants was agree-
able to us; that it was for the Queen of Spain to decide
between them, and that we were ready to approve of
her choice, upon whichsoever of them it might fall.
It can be matter of surprise to no one that our ac-
ceptance of both the Infants as candidates should have
turned out to be for the special advantage of the elder of
them, Don Francisco d'Assis. That Prince was occupy-
ing a becoming and honourable position in Spain, and
observing towards the Queen, her Government, and the
Queen Mother a perfectly respectful line of conduct. The
Infante Don Enrique had not taken means so well fitted to
the attainment of his end. When he passed through
Paris the King himself had given him his advice on this
subject; he had reminded him where his place, his
duty, and his best prospects of success were to
be found, and had offered to use his endeavours to
reinstate him in the position he had lost at Madrid. The
Infante did not follow this advice, and no influence was
sufficiently powerful to counteract the unfavourable
situation in which that young Prince had placed himself.
But, indeed, there was nothing in this course of events
which might not easily have been foreseen. There was
no need of private instructions to Count Bresson to de-
termine the choice of the Court of Madrid in favour of
Don Francisco d'Assis, rather than of Don Enrique. As
to the charge of having given exclusive support to one of
the Infants, and of having forced that one upon the
choice of Queen Isabella, against whom can it justly be
alleged? Have we not, on our side, observed all the re-
spect due to the Queen's dignity, to the freedom of her
choice, and to the considerations by which it was deter-
mined.

The Infante Don Enrique has had the misfortune to
fall under the influence of the blindest and most violent
section of the Progressita party in Spain. That party
wished to make use of the name, the situation, and the
matrimonial chances of the Infante as means to the re-
establishment of its own power. For the attainment of
that end, it has contrived and prepared intrigues of all
kinds, calculated to rekindle insurrection and civil war
in Spain. The designs of the party have been clearly
revealed by its organs. What could be more natural
then than such facts should influence the resolution
formed by the Spanish Government to decide without
delay the question of the Queen's marriage, on which all
parties founded their speculations and thir hopes?
Other motives, not less legitimate, contribute to this
result. _ _ _

From the very first, the King (as Lord Palmerston re •
marks in his dispatch) had voluntarily declared that he
should not solicit the hand of the Queen of Spain for
any of his sons. He at the same time expressed the
firm hope that the crown of Spain would not be per-
mitted to go out of the house of Bourbon, and that the
Queen would choose her consort from among the de-
scendants of Philip V.
The King's Government bas declared, openly and
uniformly, that this was the rule of its policy. He
wished that the principles by which our conduct was to
be guided, if we should be called upon to act, should be
well known beforehand by all Europe, and especially
by Spain and England, our allies.
There was nothing in this language which could in
the smallest degree prejudice the independence of Spain,
of ber Queen, or her Government. For that independ-
ence we have a profound respect. By communicating
to the Court of Madrid, from the first moment, all our
opinions and views on this subject, we rather gave it a
mark of the high value we attach to those it may enter-
tain, as well as of our sincere and anxious friendship.
The Cabinet of London appeared at that time favour-
ably impressed with the motives which influenced our
conduct, and gave us reason to expect that it would
send advice conceived in a similar spirit to the Court of
Madrid,

So long as the various projects for the marriage of
Queen Isabella did not endanger our well-known policy,
we simply seconded that one of those projects which
appeared to have the best chance of success.
As soon, however, as we saw that projects whiAi
seemed to us to threaten a departure from the rule, that
the Queen's consort should be chosen from among the
descendants of Philip V., and that the throne of Spain
should remain in the house of Bourbon, were seriously
entertained, we made known (on the 27th of February
last), at London and at Madrid, that if these projects
appeared likely to be realised, we should consider our-
selves released from every engagement, and at liberty to
demand the hand either of the Queen or of the Infanta
for the Duke de Montpensier.
We are determined then, as at the first origin of the
question, to announce openly and beforehand bow we
meant to act. _ _

In the month of May last we were informed with.cer-
tainty that the Spanish Government had just sent to the
reigning Duke of Saxe Coburg, then on a visit at the
Court of Lisbon, a message, requesting him to negotiate
the marriage of the Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg with
Queen Isabella.
We learned, at the same time, and with the same cer-
tainty, that this message had been first communicated to
Mr. Bulwer, the English Minister at Madrid, and had
received his approbation.
The King's Government immediately made known to
the Courts of London and of Madrid the surprise and
anxiety it felt. It received from Lord Aberdeen as-
surances which proved the frankness and uprightness of
his character and intentions. But, shortly after, Lord
Aberdeen went out of office, and the information we re-
ceived did not permit us to doubt that the efforts to
bring about the marriage of Queen Isabella with the
Prince of Coburg were actively continued.
It was under these circumstances, and the anxiety
with which they filled us, that I received from you,
Monsieur le Comte, the dispatch which was addressed on
the 19th July by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer, and
which you were instructed to communicate to me con-
fidentially.
I do not think (to advert to a charge insinuated by
Lord Palmerston) that the confidential nature of that
dispatch ought to have prevented my making it known,
also in confidence, to the King's Ambassador at Madrid,
to whom that knowledge was indispensable for the due
understanding of the new situation in which that dis-
patch placed us, and who (as was his duty) made no
public or official use of it.
" The candidates for the Queen's hand" (say the in-
structions addressed on the 19th July by Lord Palmers-
to to Mr. Bulwer) " are reduced to three—Prince
Leopold of Saxe Coburg, and the two sons of Don Fran-
cisco de Paula. I omit all mention of the Count de Tra-
pani and the Count de Montemolin, because there seems
to be no chance that the choice will fall on either of
them."

According to the dispatch of the 22d of September,
which has just been communicated to me, Lord Pal-
-1 merston, in thus placing Prince Leopold of Saxe Co.l
burg at the head of the three only remaining candidates
for the Queen's hand, did nothing more than " designate
that Prince as one of those who had been publicly talked
of as a possible consort for the Queen of Spain, and did
not at all mean to imply that he was put forward or
recommended by the British Government."
But in the dispatch of the 19th of July, after the pa-
ragraph which I have just quoted, I find the following :
—"Among the three candidates above mentioned (Prince
Leopold of Coburg, and the two sons of Don Francisco
de Paula), her Majesty's Government has only to express
its sincere desire that the choice may fall upon the one
who may be most able to secure the happiness of the
Queen and the prosperity of the Spanish nation."
Assuredly, if it may be said that the former of these
paragraphs simply states a fact, viz., that the Prince of
Saxe Coburg is a candidate for the Queen's hand (a fact
which had not, till then, been officially authenticated
and proclaimed), it is impossible to deny that by the
second paragraph the pretensions of that Prince are
admitted in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as those of the Infants, sons of Don Francisco do Paula;
that no objection was raised to the one any more than
to the others ; and that thus all three are mentioned,
for the first time, with equal and indiscriminating appro-

bation.
We might, perhaps, be justified in remarking that this
is an implied recommendation—an indirect manner of
reaching the end which was not deemed expedient to
pursue directly. " Good faith," says Lord Palmerston,
in his dispatch of the 22d of September, " requires that
what has been relinquished in one way should not be
sought after in another." To this principle the King's

Government entirely assents.
Admitting that Lord Palmerston did not intend to
propose or to recommend Prince Leopold of Coburg, he
will certainly admit that he said nothing calculated to
induce him to withdraw his pretensions, or to discourage
the projeet of the Spanish Government. Now we may
ask, what would have happened, if the Court of Madrid,
relying on the language which (after the dispatch of the
19th of July) Mr. Bulwer would undoubtedly have held,
had persisted in the offer it made to that Prince ? It
might have been said that this was the unbiassed choice,
the free will, of the Queen of Spain and her Govern
meat ; the terms of the dispatch of the 18th of July, in
which the English Government, though disclaiming any

desire to determine this choice, had announced that it
had no objection to it, might have been appealed to ;
and, without direct support or active co-operation, by
simply remaining passive, the end would have been
attained.
The King's Government could not deceive itself as to
the real situation of things. It took the most legitimate
and direct means of preventing the consequences. It
made an appeal to the free choice and independent will
of Queen Isabella and of her Government. It placed
before the Court of Madrid another arrangement, in-
stead of the one contemplated ; which last was mani-
festly at variance with its professed policy. It was at
full liberty to pursue this course, for it had openly and
positively reserved to itself the right to do so. It was
bound to pursue it ; for the hypothetical case for which
it had made that reservation, and which it had provided
against in its instructions to Madrid as well as in its
declarations to London, was becoming more and more
probable. The Queen of Spain and her Government
have adopted this arrangement. The Cortes have given
it their almost unanimous approbation. The double
marriage of Queen Isabella with the Duke of Cadiz, and
of the Infanta, Dona Luisa Fernanda with the Duke of
Montpensier, has been arranged and concluded with the
most entire liberty of action, and from the most urgent
motives.
I therefore fulfil, hi, le Comte, the most imperative
duty in repelling with an energy of which my language
is but a faint expression the strange accusation brought
by Lord Palmerston in his dispatch against the King's
Ambassador at Madrid, of having, in virtue of his in-
structions, used "moral coercion" in order to force the
Queen of Spain to accept the Duke of Cadiz as her con-
sort. I might confine myself to a very short and simple
answer, and one which would be admitted by the whole
world. In no court, in no family, is the liberty of mar-
riage and of domestic life better understood, or more
scrupulously respected, than at the Court of the Tuileries,
and in the Royal Family of France. The sentiments
which inspire and guide the conduct of the King at
Paris and towards his own children, inspire and guide
that which he observes towards the Court of
Madrid and his Royal nieces. And the King's Govern-
ment is jealous of the honour of evincing everywhere,
and on every occasion, that respect for domestic ties of
which it has so exalted an example before it. But, I
must also ask with what consistency can the charge of
using "moral coercion" be brought against us by those
who, a month ago, asked us to use our influence with
Queen Isabella in exclusive favour of a Prince who was
notoriously labouring under her displeasure, and was
intimately connected with the most ardent enemies of
her Government ?

The Queen's choice of the Duke of Cadiz was per-
fectly free ; the approbation of the Queen's choice,
voted by the Cortes after a debate as unbiassed as it was
solemn, was also perfectly free ; and during that im-
portant deliberation the public tranquillity was as per-
fect as the freedom in the interior of the palace, or in
the assembly of the nation. Assuredly, neither insti-
gations nor motives to disorder are wanting in Spain at
this moment. Pretensions, ambitions, schemes, and
conspiracies of every kind, have been at work to re-
kindle insurrection and civil war. At present, they
have not, whether separately or combined, succeeded in
giving a commencement of execution to their designs.
What more striking proof can be given of the senti-
ments of the great majority of the Spanish people, and
of their free assent to the choice of their Queen, and
the vote of their representatives ?
" Her Majesty's Government," says Lord Palmerston
in his dispatch of. the 22d of Septhmber, " rejoice to
think that the British Government was no party to that
arrangement." The King's Government, on the con-
trary, sees reasons, founded on the interests of Spain,
of its allies, and of all Europe, for congratulating itself
on the part it took in that event. The Duke of Cadiz
is not only a descendant of Philip V., he is by birth
and by sentiments a Spanish Prince. He has shown in-
variable respect for constitutional government, and for
the principles of the Spanish Monarchy. Spain and
Europe, the liberties of the Peninsula, and the inter-
rests of general order and tranquillity, find in his union
with Queen Isabella all the securities that a prudent and
lung-sighted policy can demand.
But although the marriage of Queen Isabella with the
Duke of Cadiz has called forth this expression of disap-
probation, it is, according to the dispatch of the 22d of
September, the marriage of the Infanta with the Duke
de Montpensier that has mainly necessitated, in the eyes
of the English Government, the communication which it
has just made, and the representations and protests it has
just addressed to us.
The King's Government will always esteem it its duty
to receive and to discuss, in a spirit of perfect fairness,
the representations which another Government, and
more especially a friendly Government, may think fit to
make on behalf of its interests or its policy. But pro•
tests must be founded upon rights. No one can be
admitted to protest against an event merely because it
does not suit his views. Every protest must rest upon
an anterior right.
Thus, th'b English Government assumes as the basis
of its protest the Treaty of Utrecht, and the rules laid
down by that treaty for the succession to the crown of
Spain, with a view to the preservation of the peace of
Europe, and the balance of power.
The King's Government is of opinion that the Treaty of
Utrecht in no wise justifies such an assumption.
After the long and bloody war of the succession, and
with a view to re-establish -the peace of Europe, the two-
fold object (distinctly recognised and proclaimed) of that
treaty was :
1. To secure the crown of Spain to Philip V. and his
descendants.
2. To prevent the possibility of the union of the crowns
of France and Spain on one head.
It is only necessary to review the negotiations which
preceded the Treaty of Utrecht, or even to read the do-
cument itself (art. vi.), to be convinced that such was its
intention and meaning.
By the marriage of the Infanta with the Duke of
Montpensier, the crown of Spain is secured from all risk
of alienation from the house of Bourbon and the des-
cendants of Philip V. ; while, at the same time, the pro-
visions against the possibility of a union of the crowns
of France and Spain remain in full force. The twofold
object of the Treaty of Utrecht is, therefore, fulfilled.
It would be strange to appeal, as against us, to those
of the provisions of this treaty which go to prevent the
union of the two crowns, and to disregard those which
secure the throne of Spain to Philip V. and his des-

cendants.
Such, however, would be the result of the interpreta-
tion which Lord Palmerston, in his dispatch of the 22d
of September, seeks to put upon the treaty.
Up to the present day such an interpretation was not
only never admitted, but never imagined or advanced.
It is repugnant to facts, no less than to the text.
Never was the Treaty of Utrecht cited as creating an
obstacle to marriage between the several branches of the
French houso of Bourbon and the several branches of
the Bourbons of Spain.
Examples of such marriages abound. I shall content
myself for the moment with specifying three, the dates
of which are nearest to that of the Treaty of Utrecht.
) 1. Louis 1., King of Spain, the eldest son of Philip V.,
married, on the 20th of January, 1721, Louisa Elizabeth
of Orleans, Mademoiselle de
the2sth of August, 1739, Louisa
Montpensier, fourth
daughter of the Regent Duke of Orleans;
Philip,2. The Duke of Parma, son of
Philip V.,
Elizabeth of France, eldest daughter of Louis XV.
mn Infant
(1,0 Donn
3. The Dauphin,
son of Louis XV., married, on the
233 of February, 1745, Maria Teresa Antonia, Infanta of
Spain, daughter of Philip V.
The last example is very remarkable; for it is that of
the immediate heir to the crown of France marrying one
of the heiresses to the crown of Spain.
Nor can it be alleged that the law proclaimed in 1713
by Philip V., with the view of changing the order of
succession in Spain, had deprived the Infanta Maria
Teresa Antonia of her eventual rights; that law was
only a semi-Salle law, admitting, it is true, the succession
of female descendants only in the event of the entire
failure of heirs male, but in that event admitting it fully.
The Infantas, therefore, in the marriages I have just
cited, and in all other analogous marriages, brought a
positive, though contingent, right to the crown of Spain.
Nobody in Europe thought of making this right an
objection to those marriages, nor of demanding that
fresh stipulations should be added to the Treaty of
Utrecht, in order to prevent the consequences of them.
On the occasion of the marriage of the Infanta Dona
Luisa Fernando, with the Duke of Montpensier, there
is no reason whatsoever for thinking or acting dif-
ferently; since the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht
would suffice hereafter, as they have sufficed hitherto,
for the preservation of' the peace of Europe and the ba-
lance of power.
Consequently, no legitimate protest can be founded on
the text of treaty, or on its consequences, or on the in-
terpretation to be given to it in conformity with facts.
But Lord Palmerston does not found his protest solely
on the Treaty of Utrecht. The marriage of the Duke de
Montpensier tends, according to him, to connect the fo-
reign policy of Spain with the foreign policy of France
in a manner dangerous to the independence of Spain, to
the balance of power in Europe, and to the interests of
other States.
Spain has proved that she was able to maintain her
independence, and to preserve her weight in the balance
of Eurepe. It would perhaps betray a want of memory,
as well as of justice, to tell her that she is no longer able
to do so.
She is, on the contrary, more competent than ever to
the maintenance of her own independence and dignity.
She now possesses a free and constitutional Government
—a Government little favourable to the spirit of aggres-
sion and conquest, but very favourable to the mainte-
nance
of independence, and to the neutralizing of foreign
influences.
The King's Government, on its side, has proved that
nothing was further from its thoughts than the desire of
encroaching on the independence of Spain, or of inter-
fering in her affairs. The facts which have proved her
firm resolution on this point are recent and obvious, and
not to admit them betrays also, perhaps, some want of
memory and of justice.
But, at the same time, we do not hesitate to declare
that the King's Government desires and seeks to estab-
lish a sincere and solid friendship between France and
Spain. The geographical position of the two States,
their traditions, their manners and religion (in short, all
their essential interests, moral or material), render this
friendshi
• p natural and necessary—necessary, not indeed
to a policy aiming at the extension of either State at the
expense of the other, or of both combined at the ex-
pense of other States, but necessary to a policy aiming
at security and peace for the benefit of both, and that of
all Europe.
As connected with the marriage of Queen Isabella. ,
and the Duke of Cadiz, the marriage of the Infanta with
the Duke de Montpensier is at once a manifestation of
the desire of the two countries to draw closer the bonds
of that friendship, and a pledge of its duration. So far is
it from affecting the independence of Spain and its Go-
vernment, or the indispensable conditions of the Euro-
pean balance of power, that it will contribute to guaran-
tee those amicable and intimate relations between France

and Spain which tend to promote the welfare of the two
nations, and secure the repose of Europe. It appears to.
us that every country which is guided by a generous and
long-sighted policy has reasons to congratulate itself on
this result.
The King's Government, therefore, finds no serious
and legitimate foundation for the representations ad-
dressed to it by the Government of her Britannic Ma-
jesty ; nor, consequently, can it accept them, or take
them as a rule for its conduct. We regret this disagree-
ment. But as we are imperatively called on to decide
and to act, we have done, with the free concurrence of
the Spanish Government, what was consistent with our
rights, with our lawful interests, and with the natisral
and pacific policy of our country ; nor have we done
anything which infringes on the rights, the lawful inter-
ests, or the peace of other States. We are convinced
that on this subject the people of France concur with
their Government, and everything conduces to prove that
the great majority of the Spanish people share the sen-
timents of their rulers. We are confident that the sound
judgment, awl the spirit of fairness which distinguish
the Government and people of Great Britain will sa-
tisfy them that the high and generous motives which
led to the establishment of good understanding and
friendship between France, England, and Spain, rise far
above this special difkrence, and can in no wise be im-
paired by it.
I request you to present a copy of this dispatch to
Lord Palmerston, after having read it to him.
I am, &c.

LORD PALMERSTON TO MR. BULWER.
(EXTRACT.)
Foreign-office, July 19, 1846.
The candidates for the hand of the Qucen of Spain are
reduced to three, namely, the Prince Leopold of Saxe
Coburg, and the two sous of Don Francisco de Paula.
I omit Count Trapani and Count Montemolin, as there
appears to be no chance of the choice falling upon either
of them.
As between the three candidates above-mentioned, her
Majesty's Government have only to express their sin-
cere wish that the choice may fall upon the one who
may be the most likely to secure the happiness of the
Queen, and to promote the welfare of the Spanish nation.

M. GUIZOT TO COUNT DE JARNAC.

Paris, Oct. 11, 1846.

, .
Monsieur le Comte,—Before I forwarded to you the
dispatch which I had the honour of writing to you on
the sth instant, I read it to his Excellency the English
Ambassador. When I had finished reading it, Lord Nor-
manby confined himself to a few short observations, re-
ferring to the answer which, he said, Lord Palmerston
would probab!y make, and to the discussion which
would probably take place between the two Govern-
ments on the subject. He afterwards told me that he
had orders to communicate to me a note, without date,
which Mr. Bulwer is instructed to lay before the Spa-
nish Government. In this note, the Cabinet of London
protest against the possible succession of the descendants
of the Duke de Montpensier and the Infanta to the
throne of Spain. It declares that it does not recognise
the rights in virtue of which that succession would be
claimed, in default of issue of Queen Isabella; that,
with a view to this event, England reserves to herself
the liberty of taking whatever part she may deem ex
pedient in the discussions to which such a state of
things may give rise; and that she makes this reserva-
tion at the present moment to secure herself against any
future reproach of having kept her intentions secret.
Such is the object and the general meaning of the Eng-
lish note, the exact terms and details of which I cannot,
however, repeat to you. It is to the Spanish Govern-
ment that this note is to be delivered, and it is the
business of that Government to reply to it. But, since
it has been communicated to me, we have the right,
and, indeed, it is our duty, to express our opinion
upon it.
Such a protest, presented in virtue of the Treaty of
Utrecht. and of the renunciations annexed to that treaty
(or, more especially, in virtue of the renunciation by the
Duke of Orleans in 1712 of his contingent rights to the
throne of Spain) is, in our opinion, without any
foundation. I have told you, in my dispatch of the sth
instant, what was the true character of the Treaty of
Utrecht, and what was the twofold purpose of its au-
thors in framing the clause relative to the Spanish suc-
cession. On the one side, the object was to secure the
throne to the descendants f Philip V., on the other, to
prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain on
one head. That was the oqject of the renunciations de-
manded on the one side from Philip V., and on the other
from the Dukes of Berry and Orleans. This object,
therefore, determines the true sense and import of these
renunciations. They contain all that is necessary for
effecting the purpose of the Treaty of Utrecht, but they
cannot extend, and in fact do not extend, beyond that
purpose.
According:to this principle, which is incontestable in
itself, and which, moreover, is perfectly consistent with
the text of the document in question, the renunciation
on the part of the Duke of Orleans imports that, in case
the throne of Spain should fall vacant by the extinction
of the posterity of Philip V. (to which it is secured by
the Treaty of Utrecht), the descendants of the Duke of
Orleans could in no wise claim it. In consideration of
the renunciation made by Philip, V. for himself and his
descendants of his contingent rights to the crown of
France, the Duke of Orleans abandoned his contingent
rights to the crown of Spain, preferring to these the
contingent rights which his birth gave him to the crown
of France, but which had been deemed incompatible with
the former and with the peace and interests of Europe.
Such is the real and the reasonable meaning of the
renunciation.

Does it follow from this that the descendants of Philip
V., upon whom the crown may devolve naturally and
lawfully, and in virtue of rights founded on the Treaty
of Utrecht itself, ought (with their posterity) to be ex-
cluded from it, because they may happen (or their an-
cestors may have happened), to intermarry with de-
scendants of the Duke of Orleans ? In other words,
should the positive incontestable right of the descendants
of Philip V. be set aside, because they may have con-
tracted alliances with a family whicn has renounced
its own?

Such a proposition is manifestly untenable; and, to
demonstrate the error of it, nothing more is necessary
than to state it with precision.

Such, nevertheless; is the purport of the English note,
when reduced to its true and essential terms. It is upon
this argument, and this only, that the protest rests.
In principle, therefore, it is wholly without fourula-
tion, and facts demonstrate that up to this time Europe
has always been of this opinion. In my dispatch of the
sth inst. I cited three examples of marriage between
descendants of Philip V. and princes of other branches
of the house of Bourbon which had renounced their
rights -to the throne of Spain. I might multiply such
examples. Never had it been maintained, or even ima-
gined, that, in consequence of these marriages, the inca•
pacity resulting from the renunciation (as if contagious,
and flying [communicable] from one branch to an,7ther)
had annulled the rights of those descendants of Philip V.
to the throne of Spain.
Nor is the proposition more tenable at the present
day; for the state of things consequent on the marriage
of the Infanta with the Duke de ,aontpensier in nowise
affects that which the Treaty of Utrecht has established,
and which, in fact as well as in law, has received the
assent of all Europe. After twelve years of war the
European Powers, and England above all, thought that
a grandson of Louis XIV. and his descendants might,
without danger to the balance of power, occupy the
throne of Spain, whilst the descendants of Louis XIV.
should be seated on the throne of France. This degree
of kindred between the two crowns, with the ties be-
tween the two States which might result from it, was
fully accepted at the beginning of the last century by all
the Powers of Europe; and the guarantees inserted in
the Treaty of Utrecht to prevent the unions of the
crowns of France and Spain on one head appeared to
them fully sufficient for the protection of their legiti-
mate interests. Such is the public law of Europe; such
the state of things assented to and determined in the
name of the European balance of power. The marriages
which have just been concluded in nowise affect, I must
repeat, this state of things. They add nothing to the
degree of kindred between the crowns of France and
Spain. They subtract nothing from the guarantees sti-
pulatei by treaties against the union of these two crowns.
They cannot, therefore, afford any legitimate ground for
a protest founded on those treaties and on the public law
of Europe.
Have the goodness, Monsieur le Comte, to read this
dispatch to Lord Palmerston.
I beg you, &c.

EASTERN UNION AND HADLEIGH
JUNCTION RAILWAY.
The first general meeting of the proprietors of the East-
ern Union and lladleigh Junction Railway was held yes-
terday afternoon, at the offices of the company in King
William street; Mr J. Allen Ransome, deputy-chairman
of the board of directors, in the chair.
The report stated that the directors had arranged to
sell the line to the Eastern Union Railway Company, and
if the proprietors sanctioned the sale, steps would be
taken for the early dissclution of the company. The di.
rectors had recently been imgaged in promoting an exten-
sion in the direction of Lavenham, but for the present
the undertaking had been abandoned. The expenses,
however, consequent upon that proceeding would not fall
upon the shareholders of this company. The engineer had
reported that the line would be ready for traffic in the
autumn of the present year, and held out expectations
that the cost of the works would be considerably less
than the capital authorised to be raised by the Act of
Parliament. The gross receipts amounted to 18,1391.
7s. 10d., and the expenditure to 6,676/. 17s. 4d., leaving
a balance in hand of 11,4621. 10i. 6d.
On the motion of the CHAIRMAN, the report was una-
nimously adopted.
The usual routine business of a first ordinary meeting,
namely, the appointment of directors with a renrunera-
, tion of 400/. per annum, two auditors at 101. each, and
a secretary with a salary of 200/. per annum, having
been gone through, the shareholders resolved themselves
into a special meeting for the purpose of considering the
terms of sale to the Eastern Union Company.
The agreement stated that the Eastern Union and
Hadleigh Junction Railway should become the property
of the Eastern Union Company upon the following con-
ditions:—The Hadleigh proprietors to construct their
line under the advice and direction of the Easter❑ Union
directors, who were to have power to control the ex-
penditure. The line to be completed and delivered to
the Eastern Union Company within twelve months.
The Hadleigh Company to call up 61. 13s. 4d. upon each
of their shares, or such proportion thereof, not being
less than 5/. per share, as the works would require, in-
cluding the deposit of 11. Is., and to borrow or call up
the residue of the capital as might hereafter be thought
proper. The Eastern Union Company to pay the
cost price of the line, including every description
of expenses, the money to be paid in three thousand
Eastern Union quarter shares of 12/. 10s. each, that
amount being considered as paid up. Interest was to be
allowed at the rate of 4f per cent. on all calls till the
completion of the line.
The agreement was approved of, and the meeting
terminated with the customary vote of thanks to the
Chairman.

RAILWAY SHARE MARKETS.
MANCHESTER, JANUARY 13.

STOCK EXCHANGE.—The sales are—Ambergate, Not-
tingham, and Boston, par—Birkenhead, Lancashire, and
Cheshire, 1 1-16 p.—Birmingham and Oxford Junction,
101/2—Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Stour Valley, 31/2
p.—East Lancashire, 3 3-16 p.—Fleetwood, Preston, and West
Riding, % p.—Great Northern (London and York), Regis.
tered, 11-16 p.—Leeds and Thirsk Preferentials, 1 p.—
London, Manchester, and Birmingham, Quarters (A), 7%
p.—Ditto (B), 7% p.—Manchester, Sheffield, and Grimsby,
201. Shares, 1 dis.—Manchester and Southampton, 1A dis.
—North Staffordshire, 3% p.—North-Western, 3a c. p.—
Northern Counties Union, % dis.—Shrewsbury and Birming •
ham (A), 2 p.—South-Eastern and Dover, 40—West Riding
Union, 2% p.
LEEDS, JANUARY 13.
STOCK EXCHANGE.—The sales are—Ambergate, Notting-
ham, and Boston, 4s. 6d. n. p.—Birmingham and Oxford
Junction, 10% p.—Eastern Counties, York Extension, 11/2
p.—East Lancashire, 31/ c. p.—Ditto, New Scrip, 1% p.—
East and West Yorkshire, 4s. dis.—Glasgow and Dumfries,
1% p.—Great Northern (late London and York), 11/ s. p
Ditto, Extensions, ss. p.—Huddersfield and Manchester,
Thirds, 275. n. p.—Leeds and Thirsk, New, Is. n. dis.—Ditto,
Preference, 28s. p. —Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle
Junction, 2s. 6d. p.—Malton and Driffield unction, 255. 6d.
p.—North British, Thirds, 2% p.—Ditto, Quarters ( late
Carlisle Branch ), 41s. p.—Ditto, Extension (scrip), 17s. 6d.
p.—North Staffordshire, 3% n. p.—Northern Counties Union,
15s. 6d. dis.—North-Western, 12s. 6d. p.—Sheffield, Rother-
ham, and Goole, Os. p.—Wharfdale Junction, 7s. dis.— York
and Newcastle, c. p.—Leeds, Wakefield, and Midland,
103. dis.—Leicester and Bedford, 4s. dis.—West Riding Union,
41. 7s.—Buckinghamshire, 15s. n. p.
HULL, JANUARY 13.

STOCK EXCHANGE.—The sales are—North British, Thirds,
565. p.—Buckinghamshire, % p.—Great Northern (London
and York), 3 t4—North-Western, 58 p.—North Staffordshire,
3/. 18c. p.—Northern Counties Union, 31s.—Derby, Stafford-
shire, &c., 14s. new scrip.
NE W CASTL E-UP ON-TYNE, JANUARY 13.

STOCK EXCHANGE.-The sales are-Buckinghamshire, 1/9
p.-Glasgow, Dumfries, and Carlisle, 325. p.- Great North-
ern (London and York Regd.), 13s. 6d. p.-Leicester and
Bedford, 3s. 6d. dis. -Liverpoal, Manchester, and Newcastle
Junction, ls. p.-Newcastle and Berwick (North Shields),
133/8-Northern Counties Union, 3/4 dis.-North British,
Thirds, 2% p.-Ditto, Qnarters, 445. p.-Ditto Extension,
p.
SHEFFIELD, JANUARY 13.
STOCK EXCHANGE.-The sales are-East Lincolnshire, 2/.
6s. p. c.- Manchester Grimsby, and Sheffield, 31. dis.-Ditto,
121. 10s. shares, 235. 6d. dis.-Ditto, Sheffield and Lincoln,
% dis.-Leeds, Wakefield, and Midland, dis.-Man-
chaster and Southampton, Is. 3d. dis.-South Yorkshire,
Doncaster, and Goole, 6s. p.
EDINBURGH, JANUARY 12.
STOCK EKCHANGE.-The sales are-Aberdeen, 25/. 10s.-
Airdrie and Bathgate, 4/. Bs.-Arbroath and Forfar, 28/.-
Ditto, Halves, 15/. 55.-Armagh and Portrush, 6s. 6d.-
Ayr and Galloway, 2/. 10s.-Caledonian, 301.-Ditto, New, 3/.
55.-Caledonian and Dumbartonshire, 2'. 55.-Clydesdale
Junction, 391. 55.-Deeside, 3/. 55.-Direct Northern. 3/.
3s. 6d.-Dunblane, Donne, and Callender, 1/. 145.-Dun-
dee and Arbroath, 41/. ex new-Ditto, New, No. 1. 31/.-
Ditto. New, No. 2, 25/.-Ditto, New, No. 3, st. 155.-
Dundee and Perth, 23/. 55.-Ditto, New, 14/. 7s. 6d. -East
of Fife, 2/. 135.-East Lothian Central, 2/. 17s. 6d.-Edin-
burgh and Bathgate, 3/. ls.-Edinburgh and Glasgow. 791.
-Ditto, Halves, 221.-Ditto, Quarters, 19/. 12s. 6d.-Edin-
burgh, Leith, and Granton, 201. Ms.-Ditto, Preference, 21/.
12s. 6d.-Edinburgh and Northern, 15/. ss. ex new-Ditto,
New., 4/. 18s.-Ditto, Newport, 6/. Bs. ex new-Ditto, ditto,
New, 31. 10s.-Edinburgh and Perth, 1/. I Bs. 6d.-Ditto,
2/. 175.-Glasgow and Ayrshire, 70/.-Ditto, New Stock, 381.
155.-Ditto, Quarters, 171. 7s. 6d.-Ditto, Halves, 91. 10s.
-Glasgow, Dumfries, and Carlisle, 6/. 12e. 6d.-Glasgow
and Dundee Junction, 1/. 165.-Glasgow and Garnkirk,4l/.
-Glasgow General Terminus, 12/. 10s.-Glasgow and
Greenock, 19/-Ditto, Halves, 91.-Ditto, Preference, 8/. ss.
-Glasgow, Kilmarnock, and Ardrossan, 51.-Great North
of England, 238/.-Great North of Scotland, 2/. 17s. 6d.-
Great Western, 1261.-London, Bristol, and South Wales, 1/.
3s. 61.-London and York, 3/. 55.-Ditto, Extensions (scrip ),
2/. 155.-Manchester and Leeds lOU-Ditto, Sixteenths,
81.-Ditto, Extensions, 31.75.-Newcastle and Berwick, 35/.
55.-North British, 36/: 55.-Ditto, Halves, 15/. IN.-Ditto,
Thirds, 3/. 175.-Ditto, Quarters, 3/. 10s. 6d.-Ditto, New
Quarters (scrip). 1/. 125.-Ditto, Fifths, 71. 2s. 6d.-Scot.
tish Central, 221.-Scottish Grand Junction, 1/. 10s.-Scot-
tish Midland, 141. 155.-Shrewsbury and Hereford, 158.-
Shrewsbury, Oswestry, and Chester, 71. 55.-Ditto, New,
1/. 45.-Stirling and Dunfermline, 3/. 175.-Stirling and
Midland, 2/. 10s.-Strathern Junction, 4/. 45.-Wishaw and
Coltness. 501.-York and Newcastle, 38/. ex new-Ditto,
New, 15/. 55.-Ditto, Preference, 71. 12s. 6d.-Direct Bom-
bay and Madras, 4s. 9d.-East Indian, I ls. 6d.-Greaf North
of India, 4s. 3d.-Great Southern of Madras, 53.-Madras,
Nellore, and Arcot, 2s. 9d.
GLASGOW, JANUARY 12.

STOCK EXCHANGE.—The sales are—Aberdeen, 25%—Ayr
and Galloway, 45s.—Caledonian, 301.—Ditto, New, 595.
Caledonian and Dumbartonshire, 445. 6d. ex int.—Direct
Northern (scrip), 60s.—Dundee and Perth, 281.—Ditto, New,
14%—East Lothian Central, 58s. 6d.—Edinburgh and Perth,
58s.—Glasgow, Kilmarnock, and Ayr, 37% —Ditto, Halves,
9%—Glasgow, Dumfries, and Carlisle, 61. 14s.—Glasgow
Greenock, Preference, 365. 6d.—Glasgow, Kilmarnock, and
Ardrossan, 4i/2—Great Northern (late Direct Northern
Reg.), 85s.—Great Southern of Madras, 4s. 6d.—Kilmarnock
and Ayr Direct, 625. 6d,—Manchester and Southampton,
39s.—North British, Halves, 15.74—Ditto, New Quarters
(scrip), 325. 6d.—Scottish Central, 21%—Scottish Grand
Junction, 28s.