The Sun.
London, England, 1864-08-25 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

TIMES.—It was only in sarcasm that a political
novice was once invited to see by what men the
world was governed ; but it is in sober truth that we
are now asked to observe on what simple principles
the art of government depends. One of the most
experienced, successful, and popular Ministers of
modern times has just explained to his consituents
the maxims by which his policy has been shaped,
and they consist in leaving people to themselves at
home, and keeping the country out of mischief
abroad. In this country, said Lord Palmerston at
Tiverton, " all that Government has to do is to
leave things alone." The science of politics thus
regarded is like one of the best conceptions of the
science of medicine, which looks upon physicians
as little more than scavengers whose duty is to
remove such obstacles as are in Nature's way, and
let her work out her own cure. If commerce
is unrestricted and industry undisturbed, if capi-
tal is secure and credit stable, then men may
be safely left to pursue their own interests after
their own designs, without aid or guidance from
authority, and the Jesuit will be public prosperity
and national wealth. So far there is no policy like
that of inaction. A Government which will care-
fully remove obstructions in the way of industry,
and abstain from meddling any further, will do all
that is necessary to be done. But these are not all
the functions of a nation's life. A country may be
occasionally called upon to suspend these pleasant
and productive works of peace. and assume obliga-
tions of a very different kind. Not only national
interests, but national honour and national duty
may summon a people to the sacrifices and suffer-
ings of war. Nor can this command, when founded
on justice, be disregarded without danger. Lord
Palmerston believes, indeed, that the "peace-at.
any-price" party eXists among us no longer, and
that there is now no section of Englishmen which
would shrink from war if the honour and dignity of
the country required the sacrifice. But how is such
a question to be determined ?There we do, indeed,

encounter difficulties; but still there are no State
secrets in such problems. True political wisdom
consists, not in enunciating a "policy" in sonorous
phrases, but in applying to each question as it
occurs the rules of common sense and prudence.
Lord Palmerston frankly acknowledges that in the
three cases which have recently arisen there were
considerable differences of opinion ; in fact, he
asserts only of the decisions of Government that,
upon the whole, and after calm reflection, they will
commend themselves to the public as right. It is
not to be denied that there has been a feeling of
misgiving in the popular mind. The country is
sometimes but half satisfied with. itself. True,
we are enjoying a safe and prosperous peace in-
stead of battling with the charges and necessities
of war, but have we purchased this happiness at too
dear a price ? Have we evaded our duties when
we were called upon to prevent oppression, and
cause right to be done ? We are sure it will be
the ultimate conviction that we have incurred no
such reproach. No doubt a different policy would
have gratified many at the time, but that proves
nothing. It has been said that two things are in-
variably popular at first—a war and a peace ; and
there is, perhaps, hardly a question on which a
defiant or Quixotic policy would not command a
certain amount of approval. The point for decision
concerned, not the transitory feelings of a party,
but the permanent interests of the State, and by
this time we believe the policy adopted has been
recognised as the best that could be embraced.
We may almost put out of the question the case
of the American belligerents. Nobody could well
maintain that it was the duty of England to
interfere in such a contest, and events have suffi'
ciently proved that it was net our interest to do
so. By intervention we should, as Lord Palmerston
observed, " have added thousands of our own sons
to the hecatomb of victims which that calamitous
and bloody slaughtering war has sacrificed," while
it is doubtful if by this expenditure we could have
liberated the cotton supplies of the South, and quite
certain that even it' we had done so the result would
not have been worth the cost. The paralysis of the
cotton industry has cost us literally nothing—that
is to say, our national trade is just as large and 08
lucrative as it was before, whereas a war with
America might have cost us more than any man
could reckon. The Polish question was nut so clear,
but it turned mainly on sympathies, and such sym-
pathies rarely constitute a sufficient cause for war.
Lord Palmerston admits that a war for the rescue
of the Poles would have commanded " great acqui-
escence in popular feeling," and it is also well under-
stood that it might have been undertaken with the
oosoperation of France. But, measuring interests
against interests,'and looking calmly at the probable
condition of the struggle, we cannot say that Eng-
land was called upon to intervene, or that she
neglected any duty by declining to do so. However
the case may be regarded it certainly was not a case
of duty or honour. The Danish question was more
difficult, for our power appeared greater while our
obligations seemed more distinct. It seemed far
more practicable to send a fleet to the Baltic than
to tear a continental province from the Russian
Empire, and it was undeniable that the chief
Powers of Europe had made a contract with Den-
mark, which, if it did not amount to an absolute
guarantee, did certainly imply a recognition of the
pretensions asserted by the Danes. In this case,
indeed, our Government was prepared to co-operate
with the other Powers in securing the observance
of the engagement, but no other Power would bear
its share in the undertaking. It then became a ques-
tion of might as well as right, and we had to ask
ourselves not only whether we were bound to pre-
serve the Duchies for Denmark, but whether we
had the power of doing so if we wished. The unani-
mous decision of the Governments whose engages
ments were identical with our own showed to how
slight an extent thetfreaty was held to be operative,
while as regards our competence to perform the work
Lord Palmerston placed the question beyond dispute.
The season would not admit of our sending a fleet
to the scene of action, nor, if we had sent a fleet,
could it have stopped the march of the armies which
were invading Denmark. The war was to be fought
out on land, and the utmost that we could have
done would have been to oppose a contingent of
30,000 or 40,000 men to armies which the enemy
could have raised with ease to 300,000 or 400,000.
Such was the aspect of the question when viewed
by the light of practical common sense. There
is, however, always an escape from such
arguments, though it lies in a prophecy only. The
advocates of a war policy rarely venture on advo-
cating the thing itself. They tell us that a mere
threat would do the business. They say that if
England would only threaten to go to war, the war
would never be provoked, and that we should gain
our ends at the cheap cost of a bold front and a few
strong words. But that was not the case 10 years
ago on the Turkish question, nor do we believe that
Russia would have been found any more pliable in
the question of Poland. In the Danish question
it is now almost certain that one of the German
Powers at anyrate could not have been turned aside
by anything short, of superior force. From what
has transpired of the policy of Prussia it is rea-
sonable to suppose that she was fully prepared to
encounter the extremities of war rather thaa desist
from her purpose, and that the quarrel, if
once undertaken, must have been fought out to
the end. We put out of the question for the mo-
ment the manifold and weighty considerations of
ancient alliances and permanent interests which any
European war must involve, but, ho cecver things
had gone, or whatever might have been the policy of
the party in power, we could certainly never have
done all three of the things which it is maintained
that we ought to have done, if we had gone to
war with Russia on behalf of Poland, it is perfectly
certain that we could never have so much as enter.
tained the question of a second war with the United
States, or a third with Germany. One of these
" obligations" would infallibly have so satisfied us
that we should have had little consideration for the
others. 'War is a very exhausting occupation even
to countries which make it more their business to be
prepared for it than we do, and when we see how
impossible it is to carry it on everywhere, we may
perhaps feel better contented at letting it alone
altogether.
DAILY NEWS.—The alliance and accord between
Austria and Prussia by no means implies, or even
advances German unity. It is simply an agreement
between military powers for military ends. Instead
of the Cedant armta, which might have been hoped
from the great industrial progress of Germany, it is
on the contrary civil improvement, and even coma
rnercial development, that is sacrificed to aims of
military organisation and agglomeration. Had the
old policy and politicians survived that extended
the commercial sway and influence of Prussia so far
beyond its frontiers, they would have taken advan
Cage of the late successes to push the limits of the
groat Commercial Union even to the Sound. But
M. de Bismark cares for nothing but military ports,
arsenals, and contingents. Whilst he is eseablish-
,ing these beyond the Eider, the hold which Prussia
had for well nigh half a century maintained over
the South is loosened if not lost. All the States of
North Germany—those at least which belonged to
the Zellverein—hve consented to its renewal.
Even Hanover, which objected .... so strongly to the
treaty with France, had waived objections. Not
so the two minor kingdoms of the South. Bavaria
and Wurtemburg still hold aloof. And as the
Prussian Government does not take the least pains
to conciliate them, and seems not to care whether
they go or stay, it is not improbable that the re-
newed Zoliverein will not extend south of the
Danube. This indifference, real or feigned, of Prus-
sia to the extension of its Commercial Union even
over its old limits in the South, gives rise to many
suspicions. One obvious fear is, that it has given

its consent to a dualism, or division of Germany
into North and South—the former to be sub-
jected to the authority of Prussia, the latter
destined to undergo the Austrian yoke. The
Prussian Minister may plead that the accession of
Bavaria and Wurtemburg to the Union adds
nothing to the common revenue ; on the contrary,
those States receive more than the share they
bring. But there are many circumstances which.
compensate for this, and which should be taken
into account, North Germany, like the Northern
States of America, has constituted itself the factor
of the South. The colonial produce which it COB*
sumes, as well as its other wants, are provided by
the merchants of Hamburg and Leipsic. It the
Southern kingdoms quit the Zollverein, they will
be supplied from Trieste or from France. The pro-
bability is that if Bavaria and Wurtemburg decide
upon a commercial secession from Prussia and its
Union, they will join Austria in a counter Zollve-
rein, nu event that must be attended by political as
well as commercial results of extreme importance.
It is singular enough that, at a time when these
Northern kingdoms of Germany are called upon to
take a decision of such magnitude, they should have
both fallen under the rule of new sovereigns. ,A 9
much of the immediate future of Germany must
depend upon the part which its four minor kings
play—those, we mean, of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover,
and Wurtemburg—it is important to consider the
character of the new monarchs, and the influences
likely to prevail with them. The death of the late
King Maximilian of Bavaria was considered an ad-
vantage to Prussia, since it removed a personal
antagonist and rival of the Hohenzollerns. But
King Maximilian, though petulant and resentful,
was not formidable, being a scholar rather than 5
soldier, and far more fitted to carry on an academic
than a military war. The youth who has succeeded
him is spirited and lively, and may one day play a
leading part, but for the present he is through Ills
relations under the influence of the clergy, whose
antipathy to Prussia is of the strongest. The able
Minister, Von der Pfordten, is equally opposed to
the policy of Berlin. But as that policy seems to
confine itself to the North, and to have the support
of Austria, Bavaria may be content to maintalls•
the rights and influence of the minor Princes is the
Bund. The new King of Wurtemburg cannot plea',:
infancy. It is long since he reached maturity, but
his father kept him so estranged from public busi-
ness or political influence that he is almost like s'
Turkish prince ascending the throne. His Queen
is the Grand Duchess Olga of Russia. Nevertheless
the new reign follows the steps of the old with re-
gard to the Bond and the SleswipHolstein succes-
sion. And the Duke of Oldenburg, who roade a tour
incognito through the little country of the centre
and south,was ili-received every where,even at Stutt,-
gard ; in many places, indeed, not received at all.
The mingled fears and rivalry which animated the
minor kingdoms against the great ones, and against
Prussia especially, have led to some good resolves
and to a sounder policy. All agree, for example,
that in she face of Bismark treading down the 139-
tional representation, their business is to be on good
terms with their Chambers, and to keep true to the
constitution. The Wurtemburg Chambers met, 89
their fundamental law enjoins, on the King's death.
After the new monarch swearing to the constitution
they took the oath of allegiance to him. Then fol-
lowed the address, and the debate on the addressftill
which the extreme Right, the extreme Left, and iuu
moderate or middle party showed themselves. The
extreme Left was for denouncing Austria and Prus:
sia, and forming a third pure German party to resist
them, and a vote in that sense was passed by the
Wurtemburg Chambers in February. The Med"
rates, however, deprecated any raising of a separate
banner against Austria and Prussia, it being will
to assume that the rights of the Confederation w°ie
be respected, and the wishes of the German Pup.
W
duly considered. These opinions and debates of the
Chambers, which are only just closed,
,
seem to show how moderate and measured is liku'Yf
to be any parliamentary resistance on the part
the lesser towards the greater Powers. Austria can
alone act as a counterpoise to prevent Prussia from
carrying its advantage and its ambition too far.
Should, however, those two great Powers have
agreed upon "going halves" in Germany, dividing
influence and empire between them, nothing can
save the minor States from absorption except the
timidity or prudence of the great sovereigns.
to Austria, it can have no idea of absorbing, suet? aa
country as Bavaria. All it requires is Bavay.l e
support and adhesion_ In the North it is otherwise.
•
There M. de Bismark would gladly and greedily
swallow w up Hanover, Saxony, and Mecklenburg ;
nay, he would at once annex Schleswig-
Holstein
but for the hesitations of King William. And for
this not a few Prussians loudly censure the King,
whilst ready to applaud his unscrupulous Minister.