The Sun.
London, England, 1864-12-13 00:00:00

the Apennines. As the ideas and considerations on
which this system rests are of the greatest clear.
ness and simplicity, as they do not require special
knowledge nor technical language to be understood,
as every senator, doubtless. has the general struc-
ture and configuration of our country impressed on
his mind, as love for it and its interests are engraved
his heart, I hope to be easily followed in my lea.
soning. Italy, gentlemen, has two•thirds and more
of her frontier washed by the sea. The other third
is joined to the continent by the circle of the Alps.
In a sublime contrast at the foot of these gigantic
and snowy Alps stretch out the vast and fertile
plains of Lombardy and Piedmont. The Appe.
nines, as if weary of the Mediterranean, bend back
and cross over to the Adriatic, forming a great cur-
tain, an immense towering curtain between the two
seas, from Genoa to La Cattolica. After this rapid
glance, let us reflect. In front of the Apennines
you have the vast and beautiful valley of the Po,
in which you find the Austrian encamped in his
strong quadrilateral, end of which—l mean the
valley of the Pc—we can neither fortify nor
defend the principal outlets, because they are
not in our hands. The valley of the Po
therefore shows us an enemy solidly established
in a house which has its door open to whoever
chooses to enter. Can it be pretended or desired
that the capital of the kingdom should be in this
valley of the Po ? On this point I remember that
the honourable Farina,said that he desired to con•
serve the capital at Turin, that it might perpetually
remain under the protection of the French empire.
I have a great regard and esteem for the honourable
Farina, and was therefore deeply grieved to hear
from his lips a thought, an idea, so wounding to my
sentiments as a soldier and a citizen. I see with
regret that there is an abyss between me and
the honourable Farina. I see that we are at
the antipodes. Ho desires the capital of the Italian
kingdom under the perpetual protection of the
French empire. I desire to see it placed under the
sole protection of our own bayonets, of Italian arms,
and Italian valour. (Applause.) I beg pardon of the
Senate, but at this moment I remember another
point. Yesterday the honourable Farina quoted
a sentence of Napoleon, taken from the memorial
of St, Helena. I confess that I did not quite seize
the sense of that phrase, that maxim, nor have I
had time to refer to it to understand it perfectly.
Its meaning, however, seemed to be that Florence
was not sufficiently central to become the capital of
Italy, I fully concur in that opinion, and exactly
for that reason I desire and hope to go to Rome.
But, gentlemen, if Florence is not central enough
to be even the provisional capital of Italy, what
shall be said of Turin ? Returning to the basis of
my reasoning, I will tell you that behind the Apen-
nines you have, on the contrary, a territory sure
rounded by the sea, and closed in by the Apennines
themselves, easy of defence, without an enemy,
unless you choose to qualify as such the army about
to be enlisted by the Court of Rome, which can
never be of a force to excite serious apprehension.

It seems to me, gentlemen, that a doubt is, not
permitted, that hesitation is not possible. Let
us hasten to remove behind the Apen-
nines, not only the capital, but the arse-
nals,-the depots, the, reserves, all our resources,
all our most vital interests ; then let the passes of
the Appenines be put in a state of defence. From
Genoa to La Cattolica the roads across them are
only seven or eight. All these roads, gentlemen,
offer gorges, defiles which are real Thermopylae,
where a few earthworks, a few guns, and a hand.
fat of brave men can arrest a whole army. Let us
erect some solid fortifications at La Cattolica to
secure the flank, and then multiply-as far as pos.
sible the permanent and portable means of passing
from oue bauk of the Po to the other, and thus pre-
pare the possibility of useful, rapid, and decisive
manoeuvres. Whenever this general system of de-
fence of the State is accepted and carried out, the
destinies of Italy can never depend upon the uncer-
tain issue of a battle. At our pleasure, and accord.
ing to circumstances, we can retire behind the Po
and beyond the Apennines to await better days, or
if it suits us, if we are in a position
to fight, we may come down and try the
fate of arms in the valley of the Po. The
political action of the Government will acquire
strength and power from the very solidity of our mili-
tary system ; whereas the want of a connected and
strong military system does not allow our policy to
take a bold flight, to follow a brave inspiration,
without putting the State to the greatest peril,
without compromising the country and the throne.
As to my ideas concerning Venice, the means of
" 4-•.lrilateral, and of directing a
new war against Austria, with rffinva to the trans.
fer of the capital, I do not deem it prudent or copper..
tune to explain them. As I already said, the Senate
is not a council of war, and, besides, the Senators
know that there are questions not to be treated
of here nor made public, (Bravo.) A great mass
ter, an extraordinary genius for war, dictated a
maxim at St. Helena, a sentence which, ill.inter-
preted or ill-applied, might one day become most
injurious to our country. Napoleon said, ' The fate
of Italy is decided on the Po,' and the honour.
able Ricotti invoked the precept in erudite
and conscientious language, and the honourable
Durand() recalled it in his grand and profound
speech. In order well to understand and to appre-
ciate at its just value the import of that maxim we
must first put ourselves in the point of view of him
who wrote it; we must recollect what Italy was in
his day. Napoleon spoke as a master, but he spoke
as a conqueror who twice came from France to
snatch Italy from the Austrian domination. His
maxim is everything for foreign armies, contending
for the possession of Italy. And, in fact, let us
reflect. Whence, from what part, can foreign
armies come down into Italy P Only from the
gorges of the Alps. What is the base of operations,
what the possible line of retreat of these
foreign armies ? Evidently the way by which they
came, or an analogous and neighbouring one ; at
any rate one of the roads which cross the Alps. It is
therefore clear that foreign armies entering Italy

to contend for or seize dominion over her are neces.
sarily tied down to the line of the Po, to guard

their base of operations or to cover their line
of retreat, till one of the two armies has been beaten
by the other, till one has retired and yielded the
field to the victor. In the Italy of those days there
was no State with means and will to oppose a
serious resistance to an army triumphant on the Po,
which thus, after its victory, easily obtained the
entire submission of all Italy. From this point of
view there is no doubt that the maxim of Bona,
parte is true and correct. The fate of Italy is
decided on the Po when Italy is incapable of fight-
ing and defending herself ; when Italy, unarmed,
unwarlike, cowardly, looks on inactively at the
struggle of two foreign armies, to fall a victim to
whichever of them is victorious on the Po—oh !
then, gentlemen, the precept of Bonaparte is just,
the destinies of Italy decided on the Po. (Bravo
Very well.) But the campaign of Hannibal—
the most memorable of ancient or modern times,
because that great man first dared to brave

obstacles not overcome before his day and
held to be insuperable, because he first
dared strike at the heart of the most powers
ful and warlike peop!e that ever existed—the cam.
paign of Hannibal, I say, gives the lie to that pre-
cept, too absolute, too general, too exclusive. The
battle of the Trebbia, won by Hannibal in the 'val-
ley of the Po, did not decide the Roman destinies.
Hannibal won two other battles still more terrible
and bloody, at Thrasymene and at amuse, and
Rome did not go down either then or after; on the
contrary, Hannibal, the first captain in the world,
was forced to retreat, was forced to abandon his
enterprise. Gentlemen, I insist much, too much,
perhaps, on this argument, because I should grieve,
most deeply grieve, if a fatal error could prevail it
Italian minds—if it were believed in Italy there is
no defence, no safety out of the valley of the Po.
Fortunately, great changes, great novelties, have
occurred in Italy since that time. Passing over the
electric telegraphs and railways which enrich the
defence with extraordinary resources, I allude to
points of far greater importance. Italy, inert for
many centuries, has sprung up bounding with life,
with aspirations, with national ardour. The land
of the dead has seen 300,000 soldiers, with 500 or
800cannon,start forth from her cemeteries. (Bravo.)
The land of the dead counts 200 battalions of mobi-