The Sun.
London, England, 1864-09-20 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—A bold and novel scheme, involving a
revolution in the construction of vessels of war, has
lately been submitted to the Admiralty by Mr. A.
M'Laine, a naval architect in Belfast. It is probably
one of many similar contributions to the pending
contest between armour-plating and rifled ordnance
but it has the merit of being simple, if not original,
in conception, and capable, if sound in principle,
of adaptation to existing models. Its main feature,
is the abandonment of broadside guns and even of

revolving turrets, and the substitution of fore and
aft guns, "to fire only on the line of the keel." The
advantage alleged to be gained by the adoption of
this expedient is twofold. In the first place a ship
thus armed and carried into action would present

to the enemy her breadth only, instead of her
length—that is, a front of some fifty feet instead of
a front of some two hundred and MT. She would
become, as Mr. M'Laine contends, " five times more
difficult to hit, and where hit" (owing to the differ.
ence in the angle of impact) " perhaps five times
more difficult of penetration." In the second place,
her aggressive power would be proportionably in-
creased by the enormous weight that might be given
to guns mounted on the new principle. The practical
limit to the calibre of broadside batteries is the
range of their " lateral training," but Mr. M'Laine
proposes that his guns should have no training at
all, in the ordinary sense. They would be incapable
of firing except in one direction, and while the
elevation of each would still be regulated by the
captain of the gun, it would be virtually pointed by
the steersman. The effect of this system, if it should
realise ail the hopes of its inventor, would be to
solve two great difficulties by one stroke—the diffi-
culty of making efficient seagoing vessels with in-
vulnerable sides, and the difficulty of making such
vessels of such a form as to carry, not only 600 e
pounders, but the still more Titanic artillery which
engineers assure us will soon be forged. Having
explained the ends which Mr M'Laine sets before
himself, we must now describe the means by which
he promises to accomplish them. A commander
may intend to fight his vessel "end on," but his
antagonist may baffi -3 him as Admiral Farragut's
fleet beffi!d the Tennessee. A ship may be
mounted with guns of fabulous calibre on the fore•
and-aft-principle, but without elaborate mechanical
arrangements she may be quite unable to use them.
'fo meet the first object, Mr. M'Laine advocates
the universal employment of twin•screws in ships
of war, which would " enable them to be turned
on their keels and kept in the strongest position
for defence." The only objection which he re-
cognises is the supposed inferiority of the double
screw in respect of speed, and this he undertakes
to overcome " by suitably designing the after end
of the vessel," and especially by keeping the
screws deeply immersed. He does not, however,
rely exclusively on the screws for rapid turn-
ing, since he suggests the use of a centrifugal
pump at the bow to act as a supplementary motor.
To effect the second object—that of making guns
"of unlimited weight" perfectly available for
attack—he contemplates the suspension of them on
fore-and-aft railways, supported on stanchions or
diagonal framework, and so laid that the gun could
not be capsized by a roll of 70 dugs, each way. For
this purpose the rails must be wide apart and incline
inwards, while the wheels of the gun carriage must
be deeply grooved,and the gun itself must hang low.
The recoil could be received on a hydraulic cylinder,
and the captain of the gun—who would be the acting
captain of the vessel, as he would have to control the
steersmen—would be provided with a seat behind
the gun, and would oscillate with it forwards and
backwards. The loading would be performed by
machinery, and Mr M'Laine indulges the belief that
two or four guns, at most, thus handled, "with their
muzzles depressed over an invulnerable bow," would
sink tee strongest ship afloat in one discharge.
How they would be secured against the effects
of pitching during a naval action, travelling as
they would along rails which would favour that
motion, he does not state ; but it must be ad.
mitted that, when not required for service, they
might be carried amidships and there lashed with
great facility. It should be added that Mr. M'Laine
has designed a vessel of war on this theory. the es-
timated speed of which is 15 knots an hour, It is
obvious that such a proposal as this turns wholly
and solely on practical considerations. It purports,
no doubt, to satisfy a grand desideratum by enabling
the shipbuilder to keep pace with the demands of
the artillerist up to any conceivable point. Float-
ing fortresses may always be constructed long
enough and buoyant enough to carry any weight
that the future Armstrongs and Whitworths can
put upon them, and, if all other obstacles were
( ffectually removed, they might always engage land
torts on favourable terms, since they would have
the choice of position. It may bo granted, too, that
if a ship could concentrate her armament in her
bow, and keep the bow constuntly turned towards
an enemy whose broadside was exposed, she
would make short work of the engagement ; but
then the very same thing might be said of a steam
ram. The difficulty is to force the game in which,
according to the rules, you must infallibly win.
When Mr M'Laine asserts that a vessel of this type,
carrying eight 6uo-pounders, "would be of more
service to the country than a whole fleet of ordi-
nary broadside or turret vessels carrying smaller
guns," we must take it as a figure of speech. Not
to insist on the fact that a single ship cannot be on
every ocean or guarding every port at the same
time, no ship that we are able to imagine can be
absolutely invulnerable. The Achilles of Homeric
story was invulnerable as any ironclad can ever be
made, yet even a poet would not have ventured to
represent Achilles as a match for the whole Trojan
host. It is simply impossible for one vessel to
keep her head to a number of antagonists at the
same time, and while she was pointing her invulner-
able prow to one, another would be firing shells
into her vulnerable sides. Suppose the steering
apparatus of Mr M`Laine's vessel were knocked out
of gear by a shot, what would be her position ?
Certainly not so good as that of a vessel similarly
disabled but armed with broadside batteries, for her
guns would be pointing the wrong way if an attempt
were made to board her. We are quite aware that
Mr M'Laine, fertile in resources, maintains that,
thanks to the centrifugal pump, she would still be
quite under command with both rudders shot away.
It may be so, but this is just the sort of assumption
that requires to be rigorously verified by actual ex-
periment. No one can study Mr M‘Laine's elabo-
rate diagrams and explanations without perceiving
that, like most other simple inventions, it depends
for its success on a variety of complicated details.
Difficulties of detail, however, are made to be over-
come, and may safely be left to professional inge-
nuity. The question for the Admiralty with respect
to every new idea brought before them is, of course,
whether it is worth entertaining and expending
money upon. Of this no landsman can yet form a
just opinion, but it certainly appears a cast in the
right direction. Some years ago Sir A. Slane, in a
remarkable pamphlet, pointed out that naval tacti-
cians, in these days of steam, might borrow many
hints from the seamanship of that age when navies
consisted of triremes, propelled by oars. Mr
M'Laine's plan, if it were carried out everywhere,
would tend to assimilate warfare to the sea fights
of which we read in " Thucydides." In the mean-
time it may perhaps be tested more gradually, as
for instance by the addition of a bow battery to one
of our present war steamers. It often happens that
a new theory justifies its claim to attention by mo-
difying the existing system, though it may fail
altogether to supersede it.
POST.—Next to a great victory may be accounted
a successful retreat. The predecessor of " fighting
Hood" at Atlanta played the Fabian policy, and
failed. He was relieved of his command, and Ge-
neral Hood, scarcely recovered from his wounds,
was deputed to defend the city. At that time the
place was beleagurod by a numerous foe, and sup-
posed to be in imminent peril ; but Hood, with
characteristic bravery, determined to defend it to
the uttermost, and turned upon his assailants even
before reinforcements reached him. He inflicted
considerable loss on the enemy, while at the same
time he restored the confidence of the garrison.
But General Sherman has accomplished by strategy
what he had previously failed to effect by open as-
sault. The Confederate force despatched to Jones-
borough to protect the road by which their supplies
were derived was beaten by Federal General
Howard, but instead of falling back on Atlanta, re.
tired upon a position it had entrenched at Jones-
borough. This, too, was subsequently carried by
assault. General Hood was not slow to perceive
that, with his base of supplies in the possession of
the enemy, it would be impossible for him any
longer to defend Atlanta. He therefore resolved to
leave the Federals nothing but a pile of blood-
stained ruins. Leisurely he removed nearly the
whole of the serviceable artillery and ammunition.
destroyed all the provisions and materiel of war
which he could not carry away, blew up locomo-
tives End railway carriages, and quietly evacuated
the place. The enemy appear to have been in pro.
found ignorance of these important movements.
General Sherman is compelled to admit that he
does not even know in wta!, direction his enemy
retired. Thus much for the fall of Atlanta. But

although the Federals have lost sight of Hood for
the present, the probability is that he will turn eP
again in some unexpected quarter, and endeavour,
to repair the disaster of the past. The arsenal a
Atlanta was not essentially necessary to the
Confederates. Other more defensible places Will
be found in which to manufacture the
vil-
lainous saltpetre and deadly missiles by which war
is carried on. The loss of the city must, however',
seriously damage the prestige of the South, although
there is no reason to believe that it will in sol
essential degree contribute to the termination of the
war. Its immediate effect will probably be to coo'
plicate yet more the difficult position in which the,
Government of Mr. Lincoln is placed. The fall 01
Atlanta, and the partial success of the attack ell
Mobile, will revive the drooping hopes of the pre:,
sident and his Cabinet. The 4th of November
close at hand, and a good election cry is invaluable
at such a moment. The friends of Mr. Lincoln Intl',
therefore, with some truth affirm that the Preside''t
has at length "put his foot down" and is crushisg
out the embers of rebellion. They may ask for les
another " ninety days" in which to complete the
subjugation of the South, and they may proem;e
within that time to raise the old Union flag over
the hitherto unconquered Sumter. At Chicago, ton'
.1
the Peace Party may find themselves checkmate:
by the untimely loss of the Confederate arsenal.
would be manifestly to their advantage that the
South should be able to hold its own until after the
day of the election. In the present conjunoture el
affairs the announcement of a signal success by
General Lee, or even of the capture of Washingtee
by a coup de main, would be received with philr
sophic composure, if not hailed with positive eatlr
faction. The Democrats likewise, who have castle
their lot with the Peace Party simply because they
are not strong enough to act alone, may profit by
the change of circumstance and alter their tactic!:
What, if they were to take up the idol of the het
and run General Sherman for the Presidency ? Tblo
would be a bold stroke, and with mercurial pee
like the Americans might be found to answeLr'
Meantime the Chicago Convention appears to be
bent upon aiming at an impossibility. It be°,
laid down a Utopian basis, from which peace cane
not be expected to come. It is contending for tit;
Union as it was, and for the Constitution 65 it
should be. But, after the experience of the lee;
four years, the blood that has been shed, the atili
cities that have been committed 'by the Fedora.,
armies, the hatred engendered, and the sacrifice;
incurred, what rational hope can be entertained thee
such a programme can be realised P We confess /1.,
are not amongst those who believe that peace
about to be restored throughout the length e„c„
breadth of what were once the United States. v;
the contrary, there is abandant reason to believe
that before the day of the presidential election
,0
arrives the South will have determined yet 10.10
energetically to achieve its independ(nce; wbla
the North will become a prey to contending factieell
all endeavouring to obtain political power, but et
equally resolved not to submit to the only teruis s
compromise upon which peace is possible. The 61,1
vernment of Mr Lincoln, finding itself hard proses;
may at the last moment use the enormous powers
its disposal to tamper with the ballot box. Eve'tl:l
man in the army has a vote, and we all know
what extent the military suffrage may be influence _74
But should the Government in an evil hour leld
itself to so unconstitutional a proceeding. and should
Lincoln be returned by the bayonets of soldle6
t",
instead of by the free votes of the people, his tent,
of power will be short-lived. But little prescieSrli
is required to penetrate the future. A reaction vi'ei
be the result, and the Old World may yet witetd,
the last act of this deplorable tragedy—a revel
tion within a revolution, which may sweep away of
its impetuous course the remaining landmark"'
that glorious Constitution which Washington 6.eci
his compatriots modelled upon principles Wbldi
they believed to be enduring, and which they 'lgo
cated to the genius of Liberty. In any event, se
cannot see, either in the reverse which the Co%
derates have unquestionably sustained, or in tb
forthcoming struggle for political power in
North, any indications of that peace which
land, in common with all the nations of Europe,
so anxious to behold.