The Sun.
London, England, 1864-06-14 00:00:00

much assurance, to inquire a little into the hypo'
thetic:ll questions which it raises. What, then,
would the Conservatives have done if they heldl
office for the last two or three years, which would
have placed the country in a better position than
i that which it holds now? The answer s verysimple. They would have known their own miude.
They would have determined how far it was the
.
duty and interest of England to defend Denmark;
and they would have intimated their decision in
clear and unmistakeable terms to Denmark herself
and to Germany. If both the Powers had known
before passions grew warm that the objects were
09:
wele
for which England had resolved to fight, I
it
vioasly improbable that any serious contest would
have arisen. The mistaken persistency with which,
in the earlier part of the controversy, Denmark
contested some points of mere detail, upon which
needless acrimony was engendered,was produced by
i
a conviction which Lord Russell had left n the
mind of the Danish Minister that England was
pledged, come what might, to uphold the integrity
i
of the Danish monarchy. The absolute ndifft
rence to English threats with which Germany.hoe
trodden under foot the plainest treaty obligations
and the most elementary national rights was simply
the result of a profound conviction that Enghl.c°,
would not fight for anything. That
based upon the issue of the Polish negociatione!
was disseminated widely through Europe, and
has been fully justified by the result. But its
existence, with all its fatal consequences, WSS,
wholly due to the misconduct of the
Ministers. If Ministers in power had been lees
addicted to bluster and more sensitive to du:
honour, both parties in the present dispute would
have known from the first exactly what they might
depend on, and how far they might go. Denmark
would have known to what extent she might count,
upon English aid, and upon what points she must
trust to her own strength. Germany would have
known that there was a limit beyond which she
present
might not step without encountering the whole. of
England's power. Forewarned beforehand, neither
would have drifted into this fatal struggle, from
which embittered feeling and compromised hearer
now forbids either to retreat. The Conservatives
have strong ground, therefore, for censuring the
Ministry, and looking simply to the past. There
is no need to inquire whether the policy the Govern'
went are now following—if they are following any
at all—is a right or a wrong one. It is not ague!:
tion of present policy. The question is how the
men who now hold office are fit to be trusted wit,
"
any policy at all. They are simply incomper.'
"
Their conduct upon the Danish and Polish questions
has shown them to be unfit depositaries of poifer•
They have dragged England's honour through the,
diit. They have threatened where they dared not
strike, and their timidity has betrayed to val.n
nations of men far nobler than themselves, They
have brought matters to that pass that England , hl:
arm is no longer feared, and England's words fail tO
inspire confidence. If no alteration of policy what
ever were to ensue from a change of GovernmensD
still a change is indispensable, because, if the future
conduct of men may be judged by what they We
done in the past, new dishonour awaits England 8.
the result of any negociation these Ministers we/
undertake. It is probable, however, that nevr mail
would bring to some extent new measures, though'
of course, it is difficult to speculate upon the
nature or extent of any probable change of polifif,
unless the precise point could be fixed at which t", 3:,
new corners would have to take up the throw'
of negociation. In any case, however, 111 n
assuming that a new Government found itself 0"
much bound by its predecessors' acts as to be die'
abled for the moment from going back upon rights
and claims that have drifted into history, still a
change of Government would bring considerable
assistance to the Danes. Their position would be
better fitted, their hands would be more free, even
for the task of negociation. In dealing with o°'
vernments of a despotic type personal feeling goes
for a great deal. Now, Lord Russell has cones
trived to make himself personally detestable to the
two potentates whose voice will principally decide
the future progress of this war. To Austria ine
party is traditionally unacceptable, and a personal
point has been given to the general feeling by the
extravagant and inconsiderate partizanship of the
Government during the disturbances of which Italy
has recently been the theatre. With France hill
position ought to have been better. He
has no
no
tra-
ditional predilections to contend against, and
great question of national policy has arisen on which
he could well take a side openly antagonistic to the
Emperor Napoleon. But what he wanted in oppora
tunity he has made up by ingenuity. He has con-
trived to offer to the Emperor a deep personal offence upon a matter of simple form. There is no
doubt, that ever since the appearance of the caustic
and rude dispatch in which Lord Russell rejected
the proposal for a Congress, the Emperor has been
unwilling to take any public step in conjunction
with a statesman from whom he had received EO
gratuitous an affront. A now Foreign Secretary
would come into office exempt from these disadvana
teges, and free from the personal ignominy which
our ancient Pistol has justly earned. It will be
something to have a Foreign Minister whose dip-
lomatic obligations have not been protested as dia.
honoured in every Chancellerie in Europe. He will
strike with more effect if vigorous measures are
needed; and if the path of negociation be still open
he will have a better hope of pursuing it to the at-
tainment of an honourab'e settlement.