The Sun.
London, England, 1864-04-15 00:00:00

THE WAR IN DENMARK.

(From the 2imes Special Correspondent witli Vie Allted

Armies.)

BROACTIER, April 10.
At four o'clock this morning I was roused by the
alarm bugle, and hurried out in lull expectation
that the Danes had tardily resolved to attack their
enemy in the trenches—an attack which, were a
little more audacity and dash combined with the
numerous heroic qualities their friends attribute to
them, they would long ago have made. It seemed
unlikely, however, that, having neglected former
opportunities, they would now attempt to carry out
such a design. Batteries of rifled;guns and mortars
were last night to be established behind the second
parallel ; the work was doubtless done before the
alarm was given, and the Danes would have met a
warm reception. I hurried up to the church,how.
ever, to see in what direction the fighting was, but
found such a dense fog—the continuation of one
which lasted all yesterday—that I could not see a
hundred yards ahead. No sounds of cannon or
musketry were audible, and soon I learnt that a
counter order had been given and saw the troops
returning to their quarters. The order to turn out
was said to have come by telegraph from Graven-
stein, but what occasioned it to be given I have not
yet heard. The bombardment is expected to begin
at nine o'clock this morning ; and I am informed
that 100 pieces of artillery, mortars, heavy siege
guns, and rifled guns of various calibres up to 24-
pounders, carrying steel-pointed shells upwards of
501 b. is weigh*, will then be in a position and
playing upon the enemy in front and flank.

I yesterday got a packet of English papers up to
the 6th inst., this being the firs t time that a paper
has reached me here in due course of post. I per-
eeive that, as I expected, the bombardment of
Sonderborg causes a strong sensation in Englat d.
wtiicb, if all its eitcumstances are as related by
the Danes, is not at all eurpris:ng. I wrote to you
some time ago, just after the Prussians had thrown
a few shells into the town to ascertain if they could
reach it at will, that, when the assault on Duppel
forts took place Sonderborg would be burnt down;
and I still believe that it tnen was the intention to
leave the place unmolested until that supreme ace
of the siege. What has induced departure from
that decision lam unable to say. Bearing in mind
that, after the Duppel position is taken the Dines
have another strong one on the shores of Alsen Sund,
it is quite conceivable that the attacking party
should desire to produce confusion and dismay, and,
if necessary, convert retreat into rout by a conflag-
ration in the enemy's rear. But the object at the
present time of so prolonged a bombardment as the
telegrams from Uikebol end Copenhagen announce
to have taken place is to me a mystery. That the
Prussians should have bombarded on Saturday after-
noon and Sunday merning (the 2d and 3d inst.) is
intelligible, Their object was to occupy the atten-
tion of the Danes on this side while they effected
their crossing at Ballegaard. That they should have
prolonged their fire against Sonderborg for 48 hours
is iuexplicable ; still more so that they should have
done it (if this bo true) without giving to the civil
authorities of the place the notice customary in such
cases. Oa this latter point I have no official infor-
mation, and I of course cannot venture to contradict
the positive assertion from the other side on hearsay
evidence. I believe nobody hero was aware to
what an extent the town had been bombarded, and
at Flensburg the other day I heard the damage done
estimated at some 20 houses burnt down. The firing
is said to have been from more than one betteryond
it is scarcely possible exactly to ascertain thenuaaber
of shell need, but unless the Danes keep a regular
register of the projectiles as they fall I cannot
believe that 1,500 were thrown. The estimate here
is about one-sixth of that number. On Sunday
morning the fire was seen from this side to break
out in Sonderborg. The burning was in rear of the
Schloss, generally known as the barracks.. The vio-
lent gale which blew on that day probably pre-
vented the conflagration from extending itself to
the upper and principal portion of the town. The
fire seemed to commence with two or three houses
visible at the west of the barracks, behind which
large building it then spread, and its progresscoulo
he traced only by the flames and smoke s% hich the
wind drifted away far to the south-east. A
southerly wind would probably have reduced the
greater part of the town to ashes. As it is, from the
Observatory beyond the Gummelamark batteries,
whence the best view of Sonderborg is obtained,
no traces of the late disaster are to be detected, but
the town appears just as usual.

I am at present unable to explain or justify the
bombardments of Fredericia and Sonderborg,
neither of which appears to have been a military
necessity or to have yielded any advantage to the
allies. After throwing shell for two days into Fre-
dericia, they suddenly left the vicinity of the place,
drew back their outposts, headquarters came down
to Fleneburg, and the idea of taking the place seems
entirely laid aside. As regards the bombardment of
Sonderborg, the Prussians had a perfect right to
proceed to it if t hey thought that thereby they should
favour their attack on Dappel, deprive the enemy
of resources, reduce him to shifts for shelter, and
in other ways incommode and distress him. The
objectionable part of the proceeding is the not
having given notice of the intention, so as to en-
able the inhabitants to withdraw themselves and
their property. The onus is of course upon the
Prussian commanders to prove, if they can, that
they did what is customary and right in such cases.
If the shelling of Sonderborg, or at least its com-
mencement, was brought about by the desire to
favour the projected crossing at Ballegaard, it is a
strong additional reason for regretting that the pro-
ject in question should ever have been cenceived
and attempted to be carried out. There seem now
to be scarcely two opinions as to its rashness and
impracticability. The unlucky egg had been, I sus-
pect, for some time hatching, but the most profound
secrecy had been observed respecting it, On the
afternoon of the 2d I was going down to Flensburg,
and met, near Eckernsund, a staff officer of rank.
He spoke about the bridges hard by, of which one
had been taken up for repairs, and the other was to
have been removed, but perhaps would be allowed
to remain, as it seemed pretty strong. More heavy
artillery was expected up, and it was necessary to
see to the strength of the bridges. This struck me
as rather strange, as artillery usually comes up by
the high road from Gravenstein, which, although
longer, is far better adapted to the easy passage of
guns than the narrow and often heavy country
road from Treppe, by Eekernsund, to Broacker.
few hours later the second bridge was broken up
and the pontoons were on their way to Ballegaard.
But, secret though the plan was kept, the Danes
were warned in time. I see in a telegram of the sth
from Copenhagen the followingpiece of intelligence,
" A pontoon train has been seen near Ballegaard ;"
notaing more. They are sly dogs, those Danes. They
would have the Prussians believe this is all they
know, and by feigning ignorance lure them to a
second attempt, more disastrous perhaps than the
first. I know, from sure authority, that, little
more than 24 hours after the time the crossing was
to have been tried, there were abundant indications
on the Alen shore,—indications piain►y to be de-
tected through the glees from Ballegaard, that
the Danes were completely on their guard, as I
have little doubt that they equally were at the time
the 20,000 men were there assembled. There were
look outs, chains of posts, and at the doer of one
house sentries were posted, apparently indicating
the presencce of an officer of high rank. My belief is
—and it is that of not a few others—that the Danes
would desire no better than to see the Prussians
attempt the crossing in question.
I remark some natural disgust among the Prus-
sian officers at the falsehoods propagated by the
Danes with regard to the conduct of their men in
the field, of their refusing to go on, and of entreaties
and blows being employed, but in vain, to induce
them to advance against the enemy. When I first
joined the headquarters of the Prussian army,
somewhat against the wishes, as I believe, of its
principal commanders, and by the authorisation of a