The Sun.
London, England, 1863-09-16 00:00:00

TUB SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVE''

Earl Russell's Dispatch to Russia,

THE POLISH INSURRECTION.

4-
(Flom the Speeia; Correspondent of the Tint 63.)
CRACOW, Sept. 10.

The iniurrEction Las rcceived. a Lcvere blow in the
Owen-latent of Lublin, where it was known to exist
in fgreater force than in any other parts of Poland.
I hear hem a person who took part in an action
fought by Lelewel on the 6th against an overpow-
ering force of Russians, that the detachment was
beaten with great loss, and that the gallant chief,
h o fer months past bad made " Lubelski," or
Lublin country, such terribly unsafe ground for the
enemy, is now among the slain. Ido not think my
informant belongs to that class of insurgents who
mistake their own private fears for general danger,
and fancy that when they run those of their com-
rades who are fighting, not from passing enthu-
siasm, but from a profound sense of duty, are
likely to dlow them. There were few, if any,
such men in the detachment of Lolerrei, ho seems
to have known how to choose MR followers cid io
have caused it to ba generally understood tart
with him there would be no skirmishing on the
frontier, but on the contrary, the hardest possible
fighting in the heart of the contested country. No
chief, probably no two chiefs together, had met the
Russians so often as Lelewel, and he generally con-
trived to attack them with all the chances of success
in his favour. The rapidity with which he moved
and the certainty with which he took advantage of
the slightest imprudence or mistake committed by
the enemy, rendered him a more formidable oppe-
nent than other leaders who had forces thrice as
numerous under their command. He is said, more-
over, to have understood the art of conciliating
the peasantry otherwise than by hanging them.
Nevertheless, it was in all probability his great
and lasting success that made the peasantry in the
scene of his operations inclined to give him the
assistance which as a rule they avoid giving until
they are driven into fair• dealing towards their fel-
low-countrymen, either by threats or by actual com-

pulsion.
Since the defeat of Taczanowski, the principal
commander in the west of the Kingdom, the great
object of the Russians has of course been to surround
and crush Lelewel, the principal commander in the
east. The Russians, with all their weaknesses, have
since the time of Langiewicz succeeded in encircling
and destroying every Polish detachment which has
once gained a particular reputation and become an
object of interest and attention in Europe. Lelewel
for some months fought without attracting much
attention, and without risking any great battle. At
times his men, or a portion of them, were engaged
almost daily, but he never humiliated the Russians
by inflicting upon them such a defeat in regular
combat as 3,000 Russian troops sustained at
Kebylanka from JEzioranski, Smiechowski, and
WaUgorski, with a force of only 700insurgents—
insurg ants, however, of the best quality, known to
one ancther, knowing their officers, and many of
them known. at least by name, throughout the
whole country. But, although Lelowel fought no
great battl.9s—
at least not until his last action, of
which the de tails are not yet known in Cracow—he
found himself twice in such a position that he was
obliged to brew lc up and disperse his detachment,
though not in such a position that he was unable to
save his men, as o.le would imagine they ought
always to be saved when an evidently irresistible
force is being brought against them. It is highly
probable that the military spirit of many of the
Polish chiefs may have do.ne more harm than good
to the Polish insurrection. J'hey sometimes refuse
to retreat when retreat is nec•easary, and save their
military honour at a cost whici they cannot afford,
the still greater expenditure of ,men to which the
Russians may at the same time be put being as
nothing compared to the inexhaustible numbers:still
at their disposal. Lelewel, however seems to have
decided that it was his business to worry his enemy,
make his life intolerable, and only strike a blow at
him when he saw that, if aimed with proper force
and skill, it would do him an injury, while leaving
him unable to return it.

After breaking up his band for the second time,
Letewel re-formed it in Galicia, principally from old
and well-tried materials, but partly also from new
ones. He took back with him in all 800 men, fight-
ing his way into the Kingdom at their head. These
entries from Galicia are seldom successful. Indeed
I do not now why I should say seldom, for oat of
the numerous detachments that have crossed from
Galicia into the Kingdom during the last six months
not one has established itself for more than a few
days. Jezioranski, after gaining a most brilliant
victory, remained in the Kingdom for about a week
—that is to say, long enough for the Russian gene-
rals—urged and threatened by an indignant officer
in the Imperial Guard and aide-de-camp of the
Emperor, who had witnessed the battle from the
Galician side—to bring overwhelming forces against
him. But out of upwards of 20 detachments, great
and small, which have left Galicia for the Kingdom
since Easter, very few have been able to exist, even
for a day, on the other side of the frontier. Gene-
rally they have retired without being pursued, after
fighting a drawn battle. SDmetimes they have
beaten the Russians, but have found it impossible
to advance into the interior. More than once, and
always when they have entered in great force, they
have suffered great losses, and their retreat has been
most disastrous. It is true that the Polish papers
in dealing with these affairs have mentioned the
entries without saying anything about the exits;
or
,they have simply chronicled the return of " a
portion" of a detachment. Unfortunately the re-
turning " portions" have included all who were able
to get back. _ _

L.,lewel's successful entry the other day was looked
upon, until the news was received this evening of
his defeat and death, as a great triumph. I fancy
now that Lelewel was caught in a trap, and that
this time the Russians fell back at his approach—
they who had so often fallen back before him for
more direct reasons—that they might draw him into
the country and surround him.
The Poles in losing Lelewel have lost their best
guerilla leader, the man who was always pointed
out as the model chief for carrying on the Polish wai
" it was long since determined it ought to be carried
°n: But no system has yet been devised by which
i
di"so.o ill-armed and undisciplined, or imperfectly
etPlined, Pules, fighting as if in a foreign land,
can ix,
: ~ made to beat 10,000 well-armed, well-dis-
ciponea
It is very Russians, fighting as if on their own soil.
formal
e:eagY to say that the Poles ought to avoid
views
or
tho:niters with tho Russians; but the
be taken into account.
on this subject must also
of battles desire as msnyaebe"nt. The Russians, of course,
fighting power as possible, knowing the
speaking,
to bo limited, while theirs
id, comoaratively
unlimited. The Polish
chiefs, whatever their own ° particular intentions
may be, are sure to R4'2
u themselves compelled,
come day or other, to meet
superior numbers in
regular battle, and hitherto ite
hief has only had to
gain a certain amount of celebrity for the Russians
to bear down upon him at ()nee _
tilt: in .
'-'1 overwhelming
numbers. Another and a priraury difficulty in
keeping up the guerilla mode of whtf_ .
Poland
is found in the contemptible, or at least pitiable
character of the peasants. Degraded as
they are
by foreign rule, they have long cea.,,ed to feel that
healthy hatred for foreign intruders whieli ani-
mates the peasantry of other eivilind and teacivi.
lised lands, and by their notorious attitude have
caused the Poles to invent the perhaps consoling
but certainly untrue saying that tale peasant in all
countries sides with the strong. "-Le PaYsan eat
touiours du cute (13 pouvoir," "'Le paysan partout
4, °belt qic' a IaOI .
J Ce,u are sayings that every one
who has been in Poland during the present insurrec-
tion must have heard This
over and over again.
fallacy of these pretended truisms can be proved
without going out of Poland, for in Posen, where the
peasint has long been his
own master, and has more-
over received a certain measure of education, he has
the feelings of a true Pole;
and in the districts of the
Kingdom bordering upon Posen the peasants have
joined the insurrection in comps rati -
vely large num-
bers, whereas in the districts bordering upon Ga-
.iicia it has been necessary to treat them -
with great
severity in order to deter them from rendering un-
due assistance to the Russians and from betraying
the insurgents into their hands. On the whole, the
ry
Russians, if it suited them to do so from a military
point of view, could carry on a guerilla war in
Poland more advautageouely than the Polo, As

it is, their object, of course, is not to worry, but to
destroy the Poles, in order to avoid being worried
themselves, and the death of the brave L 4ewel and
the dispersion of his gallant band will undoubtedly
be a great relief to the Russian troops uting in the
palatinate of Lublin.
_ _ _

Once more, now that they have strack down Tao-
zanowski on their right and Lelewel on the left,
the Russians may be expected to announce that the
insurrection is suppressed, and that they have at
present nothing to do but to give out the constitu-
tion. Humanity would seem to demand that if the
document in question is to be published at all it
should be produced at once. But the fact is it
would have no more effect in stopping the insur-
rection—which, as the Russians know, still exists,
and may soon have a fresh impetus given to it—
than the amnesty had two months ago. Poles and
Russians seem quite agreed on one point—that, as
long as the insurrection lasts, no concessions need
be offered to Poland. The Russian Government is,
no doubt, influenced by a false and pedantic notion
of quite modern origin, that it is impossible for a
sovereign to treat and make terms with revolted
subj,:tts. The Poles, on their side, are not fighting
for a con.qitution—they have not asked for a con-
stitution—aind they will attach no value to the one
which it is pre''''ased to give them as soon as the
massacres and ext:eution are quite finished. .
ll no w
As to the course w hich the insurrection vsi.
take, I may mention West a general levy is expected
to be proclaimed in the cou.vse of the
to arms
easier, however, to call all the
populationmonth. It is
than to make them come, and it would be easier to_or them after
make them come than to find arm .t
s
their arrival. It is said that the National
govern-
ment will issue no more permissions to leaco the
that absentee proprietorskingdom, and it is a fact
are ordered back, and are command
whe d ty
the wives thei
and
families back with them. T.
o bring r
and brothers are
clear ; but the husbands, fath o danger is not very
children are to be exposed t
-ice in the field, for
ers,
t orders and news,
wanted,the tran isfmni
sti
of oar iomf mGe
odvi aetren
ras e
for receiving insurgents, for guiding, detachments
through their particular districts, for ;tiding them
in the woods, and arranging to supply them with
food ; finally, for giving confidence to the p'eople in
the neighbourhood, especially those in their enfrasY:
The National Government still enjoins all P celes
to refuse payment of taxes to the Russians, and the
Russians are beginning to levy for the two quarters
now due. The insurrectionary or revolutionary edict
on this subject seems to have been framed for the
express purpose of ruining the proprietors, It
would have been condemned throughout Europe
had it been the work of Berg or Mouravieff, whereas
coming as it does from the mysterious power which
the Poles recognise, and willingly or unwillingly
obey, it is generally looked upon as a model of
cleverness. The National Government, it may be
remembered, ordered some four months ago that no
one should pay taxes, and that if the property of
defaulters were seized and offered for sale no one,
under the severest penalties, should bid for it. I
suggested at the time that it would be difficult to
prevent the Cossacks from making bide, and that as
there would be no other competitors the lots would
be knocked down to them very cheap. I hear now
of cows being sold at a few Polish florins (sixpences)
a head, and there is no reason why cavalry regi-
ments should not be mounted at the rate of a penny
a horse if the auctioneer and the purchasers so
arrange it between them. It may be inconvenient
to the Russians to have to take cattle and agricul-
tural produce in lieu of money, but this inconve-
nience is compensated for by the privilege which
the National Government virtually allows them, of
taking as much of everything as they please. I
heard a " mixed subject"—a Pole who has the ad-
vantage of living under two foreign Governments,
instead of only one—complain bitterly the other
day that he was not permitted to pay his taxes in
the kingdom of Poland. " I pay more than a third
of my income in Galicia in taxes to the Austrian
Government," he said

"I pay 50 per cent. on the Austrian tax to the National
Government of Poland. I have subscribed the sum appor-
tioned to me as my contribution towards the forced loan,
and all I want now is to be suffered to pay the taxes due for
the last two quarters to the Government of Russia."_

This unpatriotic and wicked wish proceeded from a
conviction that if the Russians proceeded to execu-
tion they would sell property to the extent of fifty
times the amount claimed. In some instances the
Russians, when the taxes demanded by them have
not been forthcoming, have quartered soldiers on
the defaulter without proceeding at ones to a sale.
Bat on the great majority of estates the proprietors
are ruined, and cannot possibly pay, however much
time may be allowed to them.
Before seizing property it appears that the
" sequestrator," who travels about accompanied by a
guard of soldiers, inquires what rent is due from the
peasants. The peasants are then ordered to pay up
within a certain time, and thus the Government
gets its taxes in money, while the peasants receive
a practical proof that, whatever the intentions of the
proprietors may be, they cannot even give away
their own property 'without the permission and
sanction of the Government. When the insurrec-
tion is at an end, the farm land will doubtless be
given back to the peasant. But the Government
wishes him to understand that he can only receive
it as a gift from the Russian Emperor, and some
day we shall perhaps be told (as the peasant most
assuredly
will) that the Polish nobility wished to
maintain serfdom in Poland, and that it Was only
through the unexampled generosity of the Czar that
they were set free and endowed with land.
Sanguine persons think that the demands now
made upon the peasant by the Russian Government
may cause him to turn towards his fellow-country-
men and join the insurrection in earnest. Despon-
dent persons, on the other hand, are of opinion that
the Russian Government understands very well what
it is about; that its attitude towards the peasantry
is a proof that it does not fear them in the least,
and that this attitude is indeed calculated to inspire
them with respect, though not of course with love,
which, however, is a sentiment not particularly
valued by the Government in question. If the Polish
peasant can only be persuaded that the Polish pro-
prietor is his enemy, and has always wished to keep
him a slave, it matters very little whether he likes
the Government or hates it. The ono great object
is to divide the country against itself.

According to the Czas, Warsaw is about to be
shut up for ten days, no one under any pretext being
allowed to enter, and no one under any pretext
allowed to go out. If this unhappy city could be
closed, like the caves of Dahra, and the inhabitants
stifled, one great step towards the pacification of
Poland would have been taken. There is nothing
which forbids such a measure in the Treaty of
Vienna, and the destruction of Warsaw—but by
fire, not by smoke—was one of the Emperor
Nicholas's favourite threats. The present object in
shutting up the capital of Poland is probably, how-
ever, to discover whether the Secret Government
resides there or not, and what the effect on the in-
surrection will be of cutting off all communication
between it and the country outside.
The paragraph in the Constitutionnel stating that
for some months past Prince Czartoryski has not
been received by the Emperor has caused much sur-
prise here. The Poles have been ander the impres-
sion that Napoleon 111. was constantly giving as-
surances to some member or members of the Polish
emigration in Paris that—first, when Puebla was
taken, then when Mexico was taken, then when the
Nielie.an question was settled, then in the autumn,
now
ported spring—France, supported or unsup-
, would positively intervene on behalf of
Poland.
omisinformed
astoProbablythe chances
Poles of Poland have been
of an intervention, as
the Poles of London and
Paris have certainly been
misinformed as to the
magnitude and general cha-
racter of the insurrectionary war.

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-40-
The Lo;2clon Gazdtc of last night contains the follow-

ing :

FOREIGN. OFFICE, SEPT. 11.
The following dispatch has been addressed by Earl Rus-
sell to Lord Napier, her Majesty's ambassador at St. Peter-
sburg :

" Foreign-office, Aug. 11, 1863.
My Lord,—On the 18th of last month Baron Brunnow
communicated to me a dispatch which he had received the
evening before from Prince Gortschakoff.
This dispatch, of which I enclose a copy,
is far
from
being a satisfactory answer to the representation which, in
concert with France and Austria, her Majesty's Govern-
ment addressed to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.
The dispatch begins, indeed, by stating that " the Im-
perial Cabinet admits the principle that every power sign-
ing a treaty has a right to interpret its sense from its own
point of view, provided that the interpretation remains
within the limits of the meaning that it is possible to put
upon it according to the text itself." Prince Gortsehakolf
adds, " In virtue of this principle the Imperial Cabinet doeg
not dispute this right an the part of any one of the eight
powers which have concurred in the General Act of Vienna
of 1815."
Prince Gortschakoff, however, departing widely from the
question of the interpretation of the treaty of Vienna, pro-
ceeds to describe the continuance of the insurrection in
Poland to the moral and material assistance which it re-
ceives from without ; admits vaguely the six points ; rejects
the proposed suspension of hostilities; refuses to accept a
conference of the eight powers who signed the treaty; and,
finally, declares that the re-establishment of order must
precede the serious application of any measures destined for
the pacification of Poland.
Her Majesty's Government will now proceed to examine
; calmly the principal topics of Prince Gortschakoff's reply
to the considerations brought before him in my dispatch.
Prince Gortschakoff, while he admits that confidence on
the part of the governed, and the ascendancy of law over
arbitrary power, must be the foundation of order and sta-
bility, adds that the indispensable corollary to these prin-

ciples is respect for authority. But the Russian Cabine.

,!lannot be ignorant that clemency and conciliation are often
mord effective in establishing respect for authority than
material force. It would be a lamentable error to seek to
restore that :eopect by force of arms alone, without tho
addition of some Odequate security for the political and re-
ligious rights of the Objects of the King of Poland. Such
security the proposals of the three powers held out to Rus-
sia and to Poland alike. . _

It has pleased the Cabinet of St. Petersburg not to avail
itself of this mode of restoring respect for authority.
2. Prince Gartschakoff affirms—and this view is the
theme of the beginning and end of his despatch--that the
re-establishment of order in Poland is dependent upon a
candition to which he had called the attention of the Go-
vernment of her Britannic Majesty, " and which is not only
uLefulfilled, but is not even alluded to in the despatch of
Lord Russell; we refer to the material assistance and
moral att.'?
uragementa obtained from abroad by the insur-
gents."
Her Majesty's government would have been glad to have
avoided this topic, an 1. instead of commenting on the past,
to refer only to healing
Prince Gortschakoff reference
But, thus compelled by
,:easures for the future.
to allude to the subject, her Ma,'"'BtY's Government have
no hesitation in declaring their cony:: tion that the prin-
cipal obstacle to the re-establishment of order in Poland is
not the assistance obtained by the insurgents frem abroad,
but the conduct of the Russian Government itself.
The Empress Catherine in 1772 promised to the PoTos the
maintenance of their religion. The Emperor Alexander I.
in 1815 promised to the Poles national representation and
national administration.
These promises have not been fulfilled. During many
years the religion of the Poles was attacked, and to the pre-
sent hour they are not in possession of the political rights
assured to them by the treaty of 1815, and the constitution
of the same year.
The violation of these solemn engagements on the part
of the Russian Government produced disaffection, and the
sudden invasion of the homes of Warsaw, in a night of
January last, was the immediate cause of the present insure
rection.
Unless the general feeling in Poland had been estranged
from Russia the moral and material assistance afforded from
abroad would have availed the insurgents little. It is true,
however, that lively sympathy has been excited in Europe
in favour of the Poles, In every considerable state where
there exists a national representation—in England, in
France, in Austria, in Prussia, in Italy, in Spain, Portugal,
in Sweden. in Denmark—that sympathy has been mani•
fested. Wherever there is a national administration, the
administration has shared, though with prudence and re-
serve in expression, the feelings of the legislature and the
nation.
Russia ought to take into account these sympathies, and
profit by the lesson which they teach.
3. Prince Gortschakoff lays much stress on the fact,
' which cannot bo denied, that " the insurgents demand
neither an amnesty, nor an autonomy, nor a representation:
mora or less complete."
But it would be a mistake to suppose that in cases of this
kind there are only two parties, viz., the Government occu-
pied in suppressing the insurrection, and the loaders of the
insurgents busy in fomenting and extending it. Besides
these parties there is always in such cases a large floating
mass who would be quite contented to see persons and pro-
perty secure under a just and beneficent administration.
The confidence of this great mass has not been obtained,
and their continued inaction can hardly bo depended upon.
Her Majesty's Government must again represent theex-
treme urgency of attempting at once the work of concilia-
tion which is so necessary for the general interest.
In profiting by the loyal and disinterested assistance
which is offered her by Austria, France, and Great Britain,
the Court of Ruisia secures to herself the most powerful
means towards making ideas of moderation prevail in
Poland, and thus laying the foundations of permanent
peace.

4. In referring to the treaty of Vienna Prince Gortscha-

koff says—" IV; should not be so far from the truth if we
affirmed that the Ist article of the treaty of Vienna was pie-
pared by and directly emanated from his Majesty the Em-
peror Alexander I."

Her Majesty's Government readily admit the probability
of this supposition. In 1815 Great Britain, Austria, France,
and Prussia would have preferred to the arrangement finally
made a restoration of the ancient kingdom of Poland as it
existed prior to the first partition of 1772, or even the estab-
lishment of a new independent kingdom of Poland, with the
same limits as the present kingdom.
The great army which the Emperor Alexander then had
in Poland, the important services which Russia had ren-
dered to the alliance, and, above all, a fear of the renewal of
war in Europe, combined to make Great Britain, Austria,
and Prussia accept the arrangement proposed by the Em-
peror
Alexander, although it was, in their eyes, of the three
arrangements in contemplation, the one least likely to pro-
duce permanent peace and security in Europe.
But the more her Majesty's Government see in the deci-
sion adopted the prevailing influence of Russia, the more
they are impressed with the conviction that the Emperor of
Russia ought to be, of all Sovereigns, the most desirous to
observe the conditions of that arrangement.
It would not be open to Russia to enjoy all the benefits
of a largo addition to her dominions, and to repudiate the
terms of the instrument upon which her tenuro depends.
In stating these terms Frince Gortschakoff says that the
only stipulation which can have made it appear doubtful
that the Emperor of Russia possessed the kingdom of Po-
land by the same title as that by which he holds his other
possessions, the only one which could make his rights de-
pendent upon any condition whatever, is contained in two
passages which he proceeds to quote.

But there is another passage whica ho dons not quote.
It is found iu the beginning of the First Article, and
says :

" The duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of the pro-
vinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of by the
following articles, is united to the Russian empire, to
which it shall be irrevocably attached by its constitution,
and be possessed by his Mdesty the Emperor of all the
Russian, his heirs and successors in perpetuity,"
Were not a national representation intended by this arti •
cle it would have been suilicient to say "to which it shall
be irrevocably attached," without any mention of a consti-
tution.

It is therefore evident that the constitution is the link by
which Poland was connected with Russia. It is important
to know what this constitution was which united Poland
and Russia. It was not prescribed by the treaty, it was not
promulgated by the European Powers, its construction was
left entirely to the Emperor Alexander ; but nevertheless,
when once promulgated, it must be taken to be the consti-
tution meant by the framers of the treaty of Vienna.
It was for this reason that her Majesty's Government
proposed as the second of the six points laid before the Go-
vernment of Russia, "national representation with powers
similar to those which are fixed by the charter of the 15-27th
November, 1816."

5. Passing to the specific propositions of her Majesty's
Government, Prince Gortschakoff says in regard to the six
points, that the greater part of the measures which were
pointed out by the three Powers "have already been either
decreed or prepared on the initiative of our august master."
Towards the end of the despatch an allusion is made to
"the measures which his Majesty's adheres to, both in the
germs already laid down, and in the development of them
which he has allowed to be foreseen."
This passage, though far from being a definite assurance
either of a national representation with efficacious means of
control, or of national administration, gives some hope that
the Emperor Alexander will ultimately listen to the inspi-
ration of his own benevolent disposition and to the counsels
of Europe.
The proposal of a suspension of hostilities is rejected "in
justice to the Emperor's faithful army, to the peaceable
majority of Poles, and to Russia, on whom these agitations
impose painful sacrifices."
The proposal of a conference of the powers who signed
of
timmpehelliceatoefatnhd friendly
In isfair concert.
and
eguitable
the treaty of Vienna is rejected, and with it the prospect
proposal, the Rus-

• See "Correspondence respecting the insurrection in
261
PolandlBoU, 180,'' put rv,, premitod to rupumt, JFIY
.