The Sun.
London, England, 1864-09-17 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—The last reports of General Sherman's
movements before Atlanta were so confused that
they required the explanation now received by the
China to be intelligible. The town was stated to
be in the possession of the Federal forces, but no-
thing was known of any assault on the place. It
now appears that Atlanta has been abandoned by
the Confederate commander, under circumstances
which considerably diminish the weight of the
blow, if it had been struck sooner, or the town
taken by a sudden attack. It has been so long
threatened that General Hood has had time to pre-
pare for its surrender with the least possible loss.
For a period that may be almost reckoned by weeks,
the Southerners have probably seen the danger im-
pending. Atlanta was an important depot of sup-
lies and stores of all kinds, and, being the point of
juncture of four railroads, of which three runeast
and south, could be drawn upon for materiel by
widely separated armies. It was, beyond question,
an important position to the Confederates, but per.
haps less capable of long defence than Richmond.
At all events, the fortune of war has favoured Gee
neral Sherman with a success denied to General
Grant, despite the enormous sacrifice of life he has
incurred during his long campaign. But still this
success is qualified. The Federals hoped, and
might fairly calculate, that Atlanta would fall into
their hands with all its magazines well furnished.
But while the defence was protracted, General
Hood, who must have had strong reasons for the
measure, was removing the supplies of every kind,
or destroying all he could not send away. He then
blew up the works, and retired from the city,leave
ink only 14 cannon to fall into the hands of his op-
ponents. In w hat direction he has retired and
whither he has conveyed his stores is not known.
The details of the operation that compelled the
abandonment of the town are clearly described.
Sherman, whose force was posted to the north of
Atlanta on the 30th of August, had probably dis-
covered that it was not easily assailable from that
direction. He therefore made a sweep round it, just
as Grant has several times moved in successive
curves round Richmond. Sherman's detour brought
him by the west side of Atlanta, a little to the south
of it. Crossing the line of railroad to West Point,
and leaving it behind him, he pressed on due east,
to Jonesborough, a station on the Macon Railway,
a few miles more southward. At Jonesborough the
Confederates held some works, from which they
were dislodged, after a sharp engagement, attended
by considerable loss on both sides. But this advan-
tage was evident on the side of the Federals, as they
were, by the result of the battle, enabled to place
their army between Macon and Atlanta, an opera.
tion which seems to have compelled General Hood
to the final measure of evacuating the town. On
the 2d of September the Federals occupied it, but
in a thoroughly dismantled condition. The posses-
sion of Atlanta is hailed by the North as a great
success, and a heavy blow to " the rebellion." An
important position has passed into the hands of the
Federals, not by a direct attack, but as the result of
an engagement in its vicinity. Compared with the
great battles of the war, the action at Jonesborough
is little more than a skirmish. Yet it has been more
decisive in effect than all the fighting and bloodshed
of Grant's campaign. President Lincoln once de-
clared that the great want of his Cabinet was sec.
cesa in the prosecution of the war. General Sherman
by land, and Admiral Faragut by sea, have obtained
something of what the President desired, It is true
that Mobile is not taken, but the attack by the
Federal fleet contrasts favourably with the attack on
Charleston. The cfficial party will make the utmost
possible use of the gleam of good fortune. The two
events are already turned into political capital in the
contest for the Presidency. Mr. Lincoln has recom-
mended a 'general thanksgiving in all the churches
for the success of the Federal arms, and salutes have
been fired from all the navy-yards and arsenals
in Federal possession" in honour of the recent
victories. One of the salutes, indeed, was not
limited to blank cartridge. General Grant cele-
brated the occupation of Atlanta by " shelling
Petersburg," with what effect is not stated. Every
act and declaration of the Government must now
be regarded as an election manoeuvre, whether they
waken the pulpits of the churches or the guns of
the forts. Mr. Lincoln is under the necessity of
doing nothing that might injure his chance of re-
election. Ho could not have enforced his own pro..
clamation, calling for a draught of 500,000 men,
without coming into collision with that portion of
the population which must have furnished it. We
are not, therefore, in the slightest degree surprised
to learn that the levy of men which was to have
commenced on the sth inst. has been "postponed."
It is more likely the measure has been given up as
impossible to put in execution. Further time is
given for " filling the quotas by volunteering." It
is being discovered that the different States have
already large " credits" for men enlisted. New
York is especially lucky, though for many weeks
past the journals of all parties have commented on
the visible reluctance of the people to enter the
service. The number of men due to the ranks in
the city of New York is somehow reduced to the
low figure of 1,114 men. If the statement is correct,
the number is scarcely sufficient to feed one hour of
one of Grant's battled. Still better is another dis-
covery, announced by Mr. Seward in what is evi-
dently an electioneering speech. He declares that
no draught will be necessary, "as the armies are
heing recruited as -apidly as required by volunteer-
ing." The tactics of the great political campaign will
justify almost anything in the eyes of Americans.
They do not ask for an explanation of the most in-
credible statement, provided it " tells" for the ob-
ject of their party. But Mr. Seward's declaration
cannot be reconciled with the manifestations of
public opinion during the weeks that have elapsed
since the call for hundreds of thousands of men,
without whom the war could not be continued, We
have heard one unvarying tale of the general reluc-
tance to enlist. The highest bounties offered by the
Central Government, the several States, the city cor-
porations, and private societies, had not influence
enough to draw men into the ranks. The recruiting
in Europe, and the attempts to raise more black
regiments, confirm the reports of the difficulty. We
have heard of no revival of enthusiasm to account
for the sudden change of feeling that must have
taken place if Mr Seward's statement is correct. If
the call for 500,000 men was not necessary, it was
impolitic to make it. It is quite possible that the
forced levy may still be necessary, but its impolicy
has been discovered. Ever since the proclamation
was issued the Government has endeavoured to abate
the public apprehensions on the subject. It was
found that the convenient " credits" of the States
would reduce the total force required to 300,000
men, Then these States were said not to be so much
in arrear with their quotas as was supposed. Now
the draught is postponed, with an official assurance
that it will not be necessary at all. But that 300,000
men, or any considerable fraction of that number,
have voluntarily enlisted since the date of the Pre-
sident's proclamation we cannot believe. In the
same speech Mr Seward asserted that the salvation
of the Union depended on the reelection of Mr
Lincoln. It depends a good deal, we think, on the
will of the Southern States, whoever may be Presie
dent of the North. The only possible end of such an
obstinate conflict must be a compromise. In 1860,
before the actual war broke out, Mr Seward, in
answer to the question " Who can save the Union ?"
declared the Union " would be saved by no one in
particular," He probably meant that it was too
firmly established to require individual advocacy or
defence. It was a political system strong enough to
save itself. Now it depends on the destiny of Mr
Lincoln. But as the first prediction has been falsified
so may the last. Another declaration made by Mr
Lincoln's Foreign Minister is more credible, and in-
dicates that t he extreme Abolitionists of the Repub-
lican party may now be thrown over and defied.
Mr Seward says, " Slavery is no longer an issue of
the war, and will not be interfered with after peace
is restored." This reads like an appeal to the
moderate section who exhibit an inclination to
coalesce with the Democrats. But, whatever may
be the Republican policy, if the election gives the
party another lease of power, it is satisfactory to
find Mr. Seward speaking of the restoration of
peace as possible. We should rejoice to see it
openly avowed as the chief object of both sides in
the political conflict.
Post--From the accounts received by last mail
it appears that the war in New Zealand continues
to be carried on with an activity and bitterness un-
abated, with but little more of conclusiveness as re-
gards results, and en the part or the natives with

hopes considerably raised and confidence noels
augmented by the victory which they obtained in
the conflict of the Gate Pah, by the unhappy rain'
conduct, to use the mildest expression, of one of out
own regiments, who however, we are glad to learn,
have done much in their last engagement to remove
the stigma to which their disgraceful panic on the
former occasion had subjected them. Still, the
state of things is very unsatisfactory. The action
is described as hard fought and hardly won, not
does it appear that it has brought us any nearer the
termination of the war. It is only in this condi'
tion that hostilities are said to be suspended till the
spring. They are not concluded, and the colonial
papers seem to rest their hope of conclusion maul'
upon the probability of the local Government being I
able between now and then, to put an end to wet
by pacificatory steps or conciliatory measures. It',
singular, and as unsatisfactory as it is remarkable'
that notwithstanding the lessons we might halve
learnt, one would have thought, in the old Amer°
can wars, notwithstanding our more recent es
periences in our long and frequent campaign'
with the Kaffirs, we have made no visible advance
or improvement in our modes of carrying ell
war with savages in uncleared countries.
It is essential, with savage peoples, to impress thetut.
most absolutely with a sense of our power, and It;
is especially important that our movements shoal,
be indicative of a settled purpose from wete:
nothing will turn us; that our blows should be
rapid, strong, and decisive. There has bee!'
nothing of this either in our policy or in its adrall
nistration. We have sent insufficient bodies e"
troops against forces numerically large and consist'
ing of men physically strong, resolute, well sole ,
and possessing a considerabis natural aptitude fel
war. The consequence is, that when we gain e
victory we do it hardly and with but little to spell
and that we do not seldom fail in oar object, an,o
sometimes are positively defeated. What ought la
be a short, decisive campaign, thus degenerate,"
into a war dragging a weary length along throng':
a series of unsatisfactory conflicts, which damage:
our prestige, giving the native population a Ter'
erroneous idea of our real power and resources,
and takes a great deal of money out of our pockete;
with comparatively small results in exchange foe
the expenditure. We sow a good deal in
aggregate, but we sow the seed in driblets, all
we naturally reap a very small and unsatisfactori
harvest. This defective mode of conducting 011 t
wars arises partly from the unfortunate circumstanic;
that we have never been able to make up our Mir;
as to the principle upon which our colonial adallet
stration ought to be conducted, and more particularli
upon the very important question of the amount et
aid and protection which it ie right or politic the,
the Mother Country should afford to her dependent
cies. Oar opinions and our conduct on this poi:6
are for ever in a state of fluctuation. Sometilt e
we blow hot, sometimes we blow cold; now 'l.
assure a colony that it cannot walk without 0
" go-cart" provided by the Parent State; then I/
repudiate all claims to assistance, vow the 011
has attained to years of discretion, or is a Fool,
Minerva issuing forth at once all-armed and a'
wise, and button up our pockets with a look
grim determination against responsibility and lent
bills. We do these things alternately, to the besc
derment of nation and colonists, placing sometinl_,'
one and sometimes the other in ascendancy; or 1;
do worse—we adopt and carry out a policy of en
promise—a very favourite way of getting throng 4
a difficulty with representative Governments--4„,",
we send to the colony an insufficient assistall''
under pretest. We despatch a handful of trooPel
just enough to keep the war alive, but quite inenlilt;
petent to bring it rapidly to an issue of such absolute
success as to make pacification conclusive, and„er
render the superiority of the European race a Ena"/.
of universal and proverbial recognition. Thus bait'
we been acting in New Zealand. Indecision ,
Parliament, absence of interest and lack of knnebe
ledge in the country, produced half action on 'pi
part of the Executive. Driblets of soldiers, Otto
insufficient, reinforced from time to time with nt'!„,
drib!ets, supplies with reluctance, and a sort oft
15
definite hope, like Sir Anthony Absolute's in :1,1
play, that " perhaps the fire would go out of its !",'O,
have, after a series of struggles very ingloon°ol
expensive in valuable life and costly in onager,'
money, landed us on a sort of debatable land, vi.hed
we may talk of victory without being contradtel •
perhaps, but from which we may certainly e"
vista of new contests in the distance.