The Sun.
London, England, 1852-04-27 00:00:00

SUN,

1" E

and to chastise parties if guilty. A great evil in a
neighbouring country might be produced from this
cause. There might be this reason alleged for our criti-
cisms, that we did not sympathise with the operations of
the French nation. But that was no reason why we
should doubt that the French nation were perfectly con-
tent with their present form of government, and with
the person whom they had appointed to ffl the highest
post. With regard to diplomacy, in that he admitted ho
hail more confi,lcnoe, because its duty vas to inform ie-elf
of the state of relations with foreign powers. Any want of
vigilance or due exercise of caution would be sure to be
visited with censure. That department acted under
heavy responsibility, and whoa therefore he found that
two Governments had called on the country to consent
to a Militia Act, ha felt he could not refuse his assent
to it.—(Hear, hear.) The Noble Lord (Lord Palmer-
ston) spoke of the difference in our insular position.
He would not expatiate on that observation. So long
as the wind blew from the west, and it did this for three
parts of the year—(Leughter)—certainly the wind had
lately blown from the east nearly a quarter of a year,
but there were three still to come, and the wind might
change—but it used to be so long as the wind blew
from the wee, all who had the responsibility of guard-
ing our coast, by securing the safety ot the Chasnol,
might sleep in peace—that time had gone by. We had
at present a navy preeminent in efficiency throughout
the world. France had a powerful navy, and was the
maritime power next in importance to Great Britain. It
w" said, however, that the French navy was inferior in
a
numbers, and, perhaps ho might add, skill, but it had the
over our vessels, scattered over the world, of '
concentration. France had only one important station
to guard, the Mediterranean station. ,She could
carry materials of war from her magazines and
deed a with more facility. We must also not leave out
of account, in calculating the probability of a war, the
porta from which an invading force might be sent; and
we must also see how far our defences are complete;
and where they are placed as protection to our coasts.
efficient state—in a greater
stateW e
hosfd e
efficiency*vY i thana avery
ever was known. He agreed in
that opinion; but our navy was our first line, and
if that wore broken through it became them to
consider what force they had to compensate
for that disaster, and to resist oppression on our shores.
—(Hear, hear.) A return which had been much used
in debate—moved for, he believed, by the Hon. Member
for Montrose—gave, as he would show, a very false im-
pression of the amount of force in our possession to re-
sist invasion. The return was moved for in an unusual
form, for the Hon. Member moved for a return of the
largest amount of force in full pay at present ; the re-
turn showed a force of 51,000 men and 17,000 artillery,
making a total of 63,000 men. Now, the usual returns
always distinguished rank and file from servants, band,
and casualtie,3, which together formed a considerable
body of en.:The new return did nothing of the sort, and
Was therefore a delusion so far as 68,000 alleged effective
force was concerned. The pensioners were set down at
16,000-9,000 or 10,000 of this number wore in Eng-
in:id, Ireland, or Scotland, and were the utmost that
could be reckoned upon. Marines ashore were stated to
be 5,000, but when war approached what would become
of these 5,000 men?—(Hear, hear.) It was these men
we depended upon for manning our steam-fleet. How
could they be reckoned among the defenders ashore?
—(Hear, hear.) Then 5,000 set down for coast guard.
He doubted whether the revenue could dispense
with their service. Then the dockyard men in time of
war, he suspected, could not be spared from the chips'
sides.—(Hear, hear.) The Irish constabulary were tan
thousand strong, and a most efficient body of men. But
he would ask the House whether the state of Ireland was
such—whether war would make such a difference in that
state as to render it safe or prudent to withdraw that
body of men?—(Hear, hear.) For the metropolitan po-
lice seven thousand was set down; but he suspected the
men would be wanted for their beats in London,—(Hear,
hear.) When these bodies of men were enumerated, he
wondered the country police and gamekeepers were not
at the same time added, because they were just as avail-
able as the bodies he had enumerated, and more easy to
be got at. He would state the amount of force we really
did possess for defence against invasion. We had, with
artilleiy, about sixty-seven thousand men. From this
number must be deducted twenty-two thousand, the
number of troops in Ireland; for he doubted whether,
in the case of war, we could withdraw those troops
from Ireland. This left us forty-five thousand men.
From this number we must deduct the sick, the
deserters, the recruits, officers' servants, and
others nut produceable in line. He would put the
number at one-seventh. Competent officers had va-
ried between one-fifth and one-eighth ; he, however,
took the number at one-seventh, and that left us with
38,000 men. From this number must be deducted 5,000
for the defence of the Channel' islands, Guernsey, Jersey,
&c. There were other deductions, which would reduce
the available number to 29,000; but to this number
must be added the pensioners, which, after deducting the
old and unserviceable petitioners, would give an addition
of between 7,000 and 8,000 men, making the effective
strength for defence about 37,140 meta. But then we
must have men to defend our forts and arsenals. Ports-
mouth would require 5,000 men, Plymouth 5,000 men,
Pembroke 3 000. Then there was Sheerness, Chatham,
Woolwich, Deptford, Purlleet, and Tilbury, which would
require at least 10,000 men. In short, with yeomanry
and constabulary, he did not think, including infantry
and cavalry, we could depend on more than 28,000 men
for defence. Now, this was not a force that might be
considered as perfect in efficiency. It would be found
to be composed of small bodies unaccustomed to act to-
gether, and not, therefore, so efficient as if trained and
disciplined to act in concert. It must also be
recollected that in Great Britain there were
constant demands for troops to aid the civil
power. In large and populous districts, should war be
declared, trade would receive a check, employment would
cease, food would rise. Would the workman, not alto-
gether tractable in peace, rest tractable in war, with all
his discontents aggravated? By denuding those counties
of the small force now required, Government would run
great risks. He wanted to ask the House to consider by
what methods this deficiency of defence was to be met?
Tho Noble Lord the Member for London proposed an
augmentation of the pensioners, but he thought the
number of pensioners was not capable of any very great
augmentation; in fact,
if an increase, instead of a de-
crease, as anticipated by the late Secretary at War,
was anticipated, he thought the hope would prove a delu-
sion. The Noble Lord did not object to 10,000 embodied
militia. Some Hon. Gentleman proposed an augmenta-
tion of the regular army. There was a particular school
which objected to a standing army, but the standing army
received an almost unanimity of praise. The regular
soldier was more efficient, but his cost was much more,
than the militiaman. The question to decide was whe-
ther the greater efficiency of the regular soldier was com-
pensated by the greater outlay. The object to look at was
which was the best and cheapest peace establishment—
the best able to be enlarged to a war establishment if the
necessity should arise—which was the most suscep-
tible of enlargement, a standing army without the assist-
ance, or with the assistance of a militia, suppose war
was to take place, and it became requisite to enlarge the
army to 80,000 men ? In 1846 the largest number of
soldiers were enlisted in one year, to meet the demand,
owing to wars in India; the number enlisted was between
22,000 and 23,000 men. To enlarge a force of 12,000
men to 80,000, would, at that rate, require three years.
Now, we had this experience with militia, that in the
last war 100,000 militia volunteered into the line. These
men would not have been had if they bad not been ita
the militia. In 1813, 19,000 militia went into
the regular army. lie would ask was it not part of the
system to depend on the militia for recruiting the army?
In battles in Portugal and in Europe, the militia
occupied important posts. The battle of Waterloo
was gained with only about 18,000 regular infantry,
the rest of the British troops being militia drafted into
the line. He stated these things to show that it was not
proper to call the militia a useless force. It was said
by some Hon. Member that it was not advisable to train
men for the militia, as that system would tend to
create a dangerous population. Other Honourable
Members said militia could not be turned to account in
case of invasion. Both these arguments be thought
could not be tenable. As far as the Bill went, ho re-
gretted that both Bills were not consolidated. Seiteral
parts might bo improved, but as they were discussing
the principle, he would not go into details. In the
first place, he considered the force required might he
got by volunteers. The experience ot 1809-10-11-12
and 13 proved that militia could be raised by bounty.
The ballot was used in the country, but in London the
militia was raised by bounty and not by ballot. The
Hon. Member for Manchester said that was in the
dark ages of George 111. But • so recently as 1831
Colonel Wood raised 1,100 men in the county of'. Mid-
dlesex by bounty and not by ballot. He did not see
Why the same facilities should not now exist. No sys-
tem" w--
heartywithout its disadvantages. Tne question
establishment of a
'Norte. they had to decide respected the balance
meet the wants
danger and difficulty. Without giving any
ohis pinion es to the details of the Bill ho should give it
honouartt
Support as far es the principle of it was the
nation,._
militia force elastic enough to
the pric©, the (Hear') (Rear.)
of the country in an emergency. In
fact, he looked on •
as an insurance of property—of in-
dustry.--ee
everything that constituted the
welfare of the
wizs,vvbere undeserving of the to pay If they were unwilling
tion.—(Hear.) It
protec-
enjoying great wealth and feared, too true that a nation
wealth, found it a difficult matter luxuries which followed
it
vt ea rt
etdo make
o luxurythe sa e
troi fif co es requisite to preserve it,
would be disgraceful, it
would be a groat stigma on their boasted
b civilization, if
they showed themselves soßeant
as-
get their duty to the institutions and
their country, and if they showed an unthwV'eligion of
oingnese, to
make those efforts—attended with some ieel
he would admit—to place their country in such ae,,:itiaete of
nee,
defence as would secure it against attempts to invade
it
—(Hear, hear.) He hoped they would not show them-.
selves like the people in Holy Writ, who lived careless
and quiet, but whose land being good, the invader came
and put them to the sword.—(Hear, hear.) They had,
by their discussions on the subject, advertised their
mouths of Mohr Governments
weakness. and through the
necessity for some additional militaryhad proclaimed the neces
fell b
theyac without
force; and having done so, k
making an attempt to remedy the deficiency w
ould -be
had not only admitted, but proclaimed, y w
the hich they
country.
guilty of treason to the welfare of their
Mr. STANFORD had listened to the able and ulo,
(pent speech of the Right Hon. Gentleman, but wished.whichhe had explained what was the species of danger siri4e
they were called on to guard against. It was out of the
question to believe that the French could ever meditate
the conquest of England, with the view of permanently
settling themselves in it. The danger apprehended,
therefore, was Some sort of incursion, for the purpose of
mischief and plunder. Every man would admit that we
should take steps to guard the country against such a
danger; and the question wa® whether a militia force
vees !no one bee!. irlietilated to ni"et the emergency, His
own opinion was rather in favour of increasing the re-
gular army, but as no proposal a that kind had been

LON DON,

made, and not wishing to throw obstacles in the wti,y of
the present measure, he should not refuse giving it his
humble support.—(Hear.)
Mr. H. BERKELEY thought that in the present state
of Europe we ought to take measures for protectinq: our
country; but ho was opposed to-the calling out the
militia. Teat was a step which was viewed with alarm
and jealousy by a large portion of the community. He
knew that they would infinitely prefer increasing the
regular army to 05ying a force upon which no el,-
prudence could be placed. Tno better and more agree-
able course would be to increase the army and to man
the navy. He objected on moral and social grounds to
th 3 militia being called out. He had heard magistrates
complain of the great increase of crime that took place
after the last embodiment of militia, in consequence of
tho class of pershs discharged. Attention ought to be
paid to the putting of efficient weapons into the hands of
our soldiers, and also to the improving of our st.eam
navy. Volunteer forces should he encouraged, and they
should be allowed to make themselves acquainted with
the use of the modern rifle. A volunteer force and a
small increase of the army would, in his opinion, super-
sede the necessity of a militia, and he thought itwould
he advisable to dismount our yeomanry corps and make
riflemen of them. _ .

Su. C. BURRELL was of opinion that a militia was
the best force that could be organised at the present
moment, and that it would be the least expensive to the
country.
Mr. ROEBUCK said, that as the representative of a
large manufacturing population, be thought it right to
express his opiniun upon that important subject. There
were two points raised by that discustitm The first was
whether there was any necessity at all at the present
moment for increasing our national defences; and the
second was, what was the best mode of effecting taut in-
crease, if any necessity for it existed? With respect to
the first Fiat he should state that he believed great una-
nimity of opinion prevailed among the generality of po-
liticians. Ho had formerly thought that the Noble Lord
the Member for London had been of that opinion.—
(Loud cries of " Hear, hear," from the ministerial
benches). He found that Right Hon. Gentlemen oppo-
site were of that opinion. He understood that the neces-
sity in their belief was immediate—that there was some-
thing abroad which rendered it necessary for them to
take immediate steps for the national defence. So the
Noble Lord the Member for London had also thought
—(Hear, hear)—and he had, thereupon- proposed a
Militia Bill. But after he had left office, and another
Militia Bill had been proposed by another Government
the Noble Lord appeared to have modified his pre-con-
ceived opinion, and to have come to the conclusion that
whatever might be the necessity for measures of defence,
that necessity was not immediate. He (Mr. Roebuck)
believed that there was a vague manner of talking about
that question. He wanted to know out of what that
necessity arose? How was it that all of them, with the
exception of the members of one particular school, when
talking together in private upon that subject, spoke only
of one people and pointed only at ono man—the people,
the people of France—the man, the President of the
French Republic. They all knew unfortunately that
there was a feeling among the French people which a
bad man might take advantage of; and they all said,
and he for his part believed, that that bad man was
at present in power in France.—(Some low murmurs
and marks of disapprobation). It was all very well to
object to such an avowal; but what, ho would ask, did
they say to one another in private?—(Hear, hear.)
They all said to one another that there was at present
in power in France a man who had arrive at his position
by breaking through all the ordinary sanctions by which
men wo bound; they said to one another that he had
reached that position, and that be maintained it solely
by fostering many of the prejudices of his countrymen;
and they said to one another, that of those prejudices
one of the strongest unfortunately was a jealousy of this
country. The person to whom he referred had at the
present moment a largo army; on the opinion of that
army hie power rested: and they all felt that his popu•
larity with that army might be indefinitely increased by
invading England.—(Hear, hear.) That was the diffi-
culty before them. Had not that been the meaning of
ta
stated
t broughta t
e denGottiGovernment
rufpTuocAr
mrechwndseeedayntnrhtwdt
heoaafrhps
diFrrsneerenssMaietonenitt
col
that
enbta.mit
eta
eehtnßahas
deiaul
fl
rr,
eaameaning
although
i
the statement of the Noble Lord the Member for London
hwehb'nadbonoh
twtlh6Been4raBehe,
et haawhodeaydo
fahhfaetr
hfadoiedribeforearrived
h ap.
tt
rdivWe
Mr. M. GIBSON here observed that a Militia Bill
had been introduced before that period.
Mr. ROEBUCK continued—Ho said that although
that measure had been propounded before, they bad had
no clear idea of danger—none of that panic which bad
there referred.
w a s
a And
man thenin
of late been so much talked of—until the events to which
hees
r hadag
the
eme positionthe
whiches t i h
o n—e shu
apd-
pdescribed—let it be a phantasy if they liked—supposing
there was
milesap
powerful
of ourerfula Shores—supposing of
res 500,000 men
n
in
a there w
countryasin
within 26 n
that country a people jealous and desirous of revenge for
past reverses—supposing they had arrived at, a period of
the world when the means of military aggression had
been immeasurably increased—then came the question,
what were they to do under those circumstances? Al-
lusions had been made to the events of the year 1804.
At that time there had been ruling in France a
mind, gigantic almost beyond the conception of
man, the first of generals the world had over
known, and commanding an army whose ex-
ploits had never been surpassed. In that year, by
the mere accident that Villeneuve had not been
bold enough to proceed up the Channel, Napoleon had
been prevented from attempting to invades our shores.
He had had under his command 60,000 men, whom he
could have put on board a flotilla in twenty minutes;
and, as he had himself stated, all that he had wanted for
an invasion of England had been that he should have
found the Channel free for twenty-tour hours. But the
fortune of this country had prevailed, and he had not had
the twenty-four hours. But had not steam since given
these twenty-four hours, if the men and the army should
again be found ? Some people, however, told him that in
the midst of those circumstances he ought to advocate
the doctrine of peace upon all occasions. But he wanted
to know why he was saved es he walked along the
streets fr m being robbed and knocked down?—(Hear,
and laughter.) Did he owe his safety to the principles
of the Gospel, or to the interference of the police?—(Re-
newed cries of " Hear, hear," and laughter.) For his
part he believed that peace was promoted by a person's
making himself exceedingly formidable to any body
who might attack him.—(Hear, hear.). He bad received
a pamphlet, in which it was', stated that if the French
invaded us we ought to remain perfectly peaceable, and
let the invaders grow ashamed of themselves, and retire
in a state of absolute confusion.—(Hear, hear, and
C
obdwhich
laughter.) That was the sort of vie
Member for the West Riding. ) (Mr. .Cen the Hon.
took of
the subject.—(Renewed laughter.)
it had always been,
He wanted to know
whether, if human nature was what
danger did not at present exist in this country, and
whether it would not be reasonable to provide against
it? They had here riches, almost beyond the riches of
imagination; and if they were not prepared to protect
their riches, how could an army in et neighbouring
country, powerful almost beyond conception, bes ?
ex-
pected to resist the tetuptatiort to become invader
re
d.
did not doubt the goodness of human nature; had
uea
ing history, he found that every nation that be
n
rich and weak had suceumbecl. He wanted to sso it is
country proclaiming and practising peace and justice,
but at the same time saying " Touch me if you:a
the
—(Hear, hear.) How disastrous would b
consequences not only to England, but to mankind
in general, if a marauding army were to encamp
in London.—(Hear, hear.) And when he was told that
that was not likely to happen, let him state this fact—
that London was the only capital in European which a
French army had not planted its standards.—(eal)
It was all very well to talk of peace; but that arniy had
roamed over Europe, checked only by the frost first, and
then by England; and the French people were at pre-
sent more desirous than ever to have their revenge.
Contemplating that question, not as an Englishman, but
as one interested in the destinies of humanity, he said
that the friends of peace ought to afford their aid in
the effort to strengthen England for the purposes of
peace itself.—(Hear, hear.) He believed that there was
danger, and that that danger ought to be provided
against. But he felt persuaded that the best mode of
attaining that object would be in the first place to make
our own army and navy properly available.—(Hear.)
A large portion of our navy was at present cruising
in the Mediterranean.—(Hear, hear.) Why should it
be there? If there was any danger to England, he
wanted to know why the great mass of our naval force
was not in the Channel? He wanted to know, in the
next place, why our colonies were so governed that our
great military establishments were abroad.—(hear,
hear.) If these two questions should be satisfactorily
answered, he should afterwards proceed to consider
what was the beat mode of meeting immediate danger,
if it should exist. It was his opinion that fighting was
very much like every other business, and that he who
was bred to it would fight best.—(Hear, hoar.) He had
not much faith in the military capacity of what was
called a militia.—(Hear, bear.) The Noble Lord the
Member for London had said that the art of war had
been wonderfully improved of late years; and ho (Mr.
Roebuck) should say he believed that there had never
been so great a distinction between a rabble and an army
as at the present day. • If, therefore, there were any
danger to England, and any necessity for increasing
our defences, he should say that after seeing
that our present forces were properly employed,
we ought to increase our national army. It was
said there was a danger in a standing army, and
France was pointed to as an exemplification of
that danger. But he believed that the army of France
at present expressed the opinions of the people
of France, and that the Government established there
was exactly what the French people wanted. He should
further say that if a large increase were made to-mor-
row to the English army, he, for one, should have no
fear for the liberties of England.—(Hear, hear.) But he
ea told that the beat mode of providing for the national
defence would be to have the militia. Now upon that
subject be should confess
that he had been surprised to
find that the Noble L erd the Member for Tiverton (Lord
Pelmerston),
human nature, had expressed his belief that those who
might haye se
Militia Bill, wonueldted the bounty under the present
part at their posts. whend wanted, be found for the most
Did
any one believe that the class
of persons who would ac
when: one would wishc
t e
pt the bounty would be per-
sonsshape of muskets, or thanteatrust with power in the
in time of danger they
Would be the persons most likel
certainly could not believe it, and
tond be found? lie
he could not
think that there were twentya
House who could be of that opinion. Blnutenwha in the
would
be the use of men if they would not be forthcoming
when wanted? He believed, however, thateraing
he
could suggest another plan by which they could obtain
the stivattiges of a regular army and the numbers to he
found in a militia. Let them, if they pleased, add 10,000
or 12,000 men to the regular army; and Let them then