The Sun.
London, England, 1864-02-05 00:00:00

riiE SUN, LOI\DON, FRIDAY EVENING, FEERUARY 5, 1864.

amount of stock maintained in tho agricultural districts.
The cause of that diminution I take to be this—the necessi-
ties of the small farmers have been so great that they have
been compelled to sell off their stock at an earlier age than
usual, and the stock has consequently been reduced, the
farmers not retaining a sufficient breed to keep up the quan-
tity. (Hear, hear,) But, my lords, there is another circum-
stance connected with Irish distress which must not be
overlooked on the present occasion, viz., that enormous and
unparalleled emigration which has recently taken place from
Ireland—an emigration so extensive that nothing has ever
approached it--an emigration, too, the more to bo regretted
because I am afraid a large proportion of those who emigrate
will really servo to feed the unhappy and desolating war in
North America. (Hear, hear.) lam afraid that many who
are going away in the hope of finding peaceful employment
will find those hopes disappointed, and will entail upon
themselves and their families great misery, while they are
entering into an atmosphere which is not likely to improve
their love and affection for the land of their birth. (Hear
hear.) With respect, my lords, to the prospects of legisla-
tion for the present session, I cannot say that the Speech is
very encouraging. (A laugh) We are told that various
measures will bo submitted for our consideration, That is
all, and therefore I think I may say that in this case the
performances of her Majesty's Government cannot possibly
fall short of their promises. (A laugh,) The only action
which the Government announce themselves to have taken
is the appointment of commissioners to inquire into the
various forms of subscription and declaration required to be
made by the clerical members of the Church. A copy of the
commission is to be laid before us, and therefore I shall not
now presume to comment upon what its scope and object
may be; but from what I have heard, I am afraid that the
object of it is so extremely minute, as compared with the
magnitude of the machinery put into operation, that it will
do but little to settle any of those questions to which public
attention has recently been attracted. I am sure it is not suf-
ficient to satisfy my noble friend who has so frequently
brought the subject of subscription under our notice, while,
on the other hand, I am afraid it may lead to the renewal of a
critical agitation without producing any but trifling results.
(Hear.) So much, my lords, for the prospects of domestic
lrgislation, and for the present internal condition of the
count y. I proceed now to a much more serious and much
more anxious question—viz., the position in which we stand
with regard to foreign countries, and the perilous position
in which the peace of Europe is at this moment placed.
(Hear, hear.) My lords, foreign policy has been for the last
two or three years that upon which her Majesty's Govern-
ment have mainly rested their claims to public confidence.
(Hoar, hear.) As coon as that very ingenious, if I cannot
say very ingenuous, stratagem by which the noble earl
opposite obtained office had served its purpose—as soon as
he had obtained office by the declaration that Parliament
was dissatisfied with the modicum of Parliamentary reform
offered by his predecessors, and that the country could never
be satisfied, and ought never to be satisfied, until a much
more extensive measure were carried by the Government—
from the moment at which that pretext had served its pur-
pose, I need not remind your lordships how feebly, how
faintly, the noble earl and his colleagues attempted to
realize their programme. Nor need I remind your lordships
that the great expectations held out by the noble earl were
defeated, not by the opposition of his predecessors, but by
the voluntary abandonment of himself and of hts supporters
in the House of Commons ; and that a very short time ago,
when the noble earl, after retiring from his labours in the
Lower House to the serener atmosphere of your lordships'
benches, pronounced the funeral oration of his defeated bill,
he sang its requiescat in pace, and while congratulating
himself on having attained the summit of his wishes de-
clared that he was now disposed and advised his friends to
"rest and be thankful." (Cheers and laughter.) From
that time foreign policy has been the main groundwork
of the confidence which the country was called on to
place in hor Majesty's Government. I trust that in
the position in which we stand it will not be thought
that I am wandering from the subject if, in order to
enable your lordships to judge of the full gravity
of that position. I examine somewhat at length what
has been the course of policy pursued by her Majesty's
Government; and what is the degree of consideration which
they have obtained for us in foreign countries, (Hear.) My
lords, I think that at the commencement the foreign policy
of the noble earl opposite might be summed up in the affir-
mation of the principle of non. intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries, the extension of Liberal principles
by the exercise of our moral interference, and above all, the
maintenance of uninterrupted and cordial relations with the
Emperor of the French. We were told more than once that
the present. Ministry was the only one ;to maintain a good
understanding with the French Emperor, or, at least, that
its predecessor could not possibly have done so, and that if
the country desired to preserve cordial relations between
itself and France, her Majesty's present advisers, and espe-
cially the noble earl opposite, were the only persons qualified
to secure that most desirable object. (Hear, and a laugh.)
Now, my lords, as to non• intervention in the internal affairs
of other countries, when I look around me I fail to see what
country there is in the internal affairs of which the noble
earl has not interfered. (Cheers and laughter) Katl in-
tactumreliquit nihil tetiget quod, I cannot say non ornavit)
but non conturbavit. (Laughter.) Or the foreign policy
of the noble earl, as far as the principle of non-intervention
is concerned, may be summed up in two homely but ex-
pressive words—" meddle and muddle." (Great cheering
and laughter.) During the whole course of his diplomatic
correspondence, wherever ho has interfered—and he has in-
terfered everywhere—he has been lecturing, scolding, blus-
tering, and retreating. (A laugh) In fact, I cannot think
of the foreign policy pursued by the noble earl and his col-
leagues without being reminded of another very distin-
guished body of actors commemorated, as your lordships are
aware, in "A Midsummer Night's Dream." Of that cele-
brated troupe the two chief ornaments were Bottom, the
weaver, and Snug, the joiner. It appears to me the noble
earl opposite combines the qualities which are attributed to
both those distinguished personages. (A laugh.) Like
Bottom, the weaver, he is ready to play every part, not even
excepting that which he has alt early played most satis-
factorily—via., "Moonshine." (Great laughter.) But his
favourite part is the part of the lion. " Oh," says the noble
earl, let me play the Lion. I will roar so that it will do
any man's heart good to hear me; I will roar so that I will
make the Duke say, Let him roar again; let him roar
again.'" (Continued laughter.) The noble earl, too, knows
as well as anyone, how, like Bottom, to "aggravate his
voice," so that he will "roar you as gently as any sucking
dove ;" and, moreover, he has had recourse more than once
to the ingenious and somewhat original device of letting half
his face be seen through the lion's neck, as if to say, " For
all my roaring I am no lion at all, but only Snug the joiner.
(Renewed laughter.) There is, however, one point of diffe-
rence which I would have you observe, because it is rather
important. Bottom, the weaver, and Snug, the joiner, were
possessed of an earnest desire not to alarm the ladies too
much, and consequently they gave due warning at the out-
set. On the other hand, the noble earl's disclosure that
though the roar was like that of a lion, the face was only
that of the noble lord himself—(a laugh)—was not made
betimes in order that the audience might not be frightened
but only because he found that all the roaring in the world
would not frighten them. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Se-
riously, for though there may be something ludicrous about
it, the matter is of too great importance to be treated only
in a light and jocular manner—seriously, then, I cannot
hut feel as an Englishman that I am lowered and humi-
liated in my own estimation and in that of other nations by
the result of the noble earl's administration of foreign
affairs. Thanks to the noble earl and the present Govern-
ment we have at this moment not one single friend in
Europe—(hear, hear)—and more than that, this country,
the chief fault of which was that it went too direct and
straightforward at what it aimed, which never gave a pro-
mise without the intention of performing, which never
threatened without a ful: determination of striking, which
never made a demand without being prepared to enforce it,
this country is now in such a position that its menaces are
disregarded, its magniloquent language ridiculed, and its
remonstrances are treated with contemptuous indifference
by the small as well as by the great Powers of the Conti-
nent. (Hear, hear.) We have heard a great deal of har-
mony and good understanding with France. If we really
are on a footing of cordial understanding with France, all I
can say is that the Emperor must be the most forgiving and
forbearing of all devoted friends, because there is scarcely a
question of recent times on which we have not, I will not
say purposely, but at least uniformly, opposed his policy
and placed him in a situation which must have been pain-
ful to his feelings and very humiliating to his pride. (Hear
hear.) I find no fault with the noble earl for withdrawing
from co-operation in regard to the affairs of Mexico as soon
as a considerable change was apparent in the project. At
the same time, when this question was first under discussion
I took the liberty of expressing regret that we should have
exposed ourselves to possible inconvenience and embarrass-
ments by the course we took,and that we did not on our own
part make demands and enforce our claims. And, although
I do not blame then oble earl for withdrawing from the enter-
prise, still that was an act which exposed our conduct to un-
favourable consideration on the part, at all events, of the
people of France, and added to the difficulties of the Em-
peror of the French in carrying out the scheme. (Hear, hear.)
Then, my lords, it is notorious that the Emperor was very
desirous of taking steps, at any rate, towards the recognition
of the Confederate States. Rightly or wrongly, the noble
earl opposed that idea, and the Emperor, with an earnest
wish to co-operate as far as possible with this country,
shaped his policy in accordance with ours, and accommo-
dated his views to it. I roust now, my lords, call your atten-
tion to a matter which has had some grave consequences.
What was the next quest ion into which we were brought into
intimate combination with the Emperor of the French. ?
It was the painful, embarrassing and difficult question of
last year—the condition of Poland, and the representations
to be made on the subject to Russia. There is no doubt
that in this country and in France also there was a very
serious and cordial sympathy with Poland. (Hear.) There
was a very earnest respect for the gallantry, bravery, and
patience with which the Poles had fought the battles of their
country, and there was a general conviction that they were
euffering from an amount of oppression that was sufficient
to rouse the feelings and excite the indignation of Europe.
It was determined that the Emperor of the French, the
Emperor of Austria, and her Majesty should engage in a
joint representation to the Emperor of Russia in favour of
Poland. The terms of that representation were not identi-
cal, and I cannot but think, as I ventured to say last year,

that the noble earl considerably increased the differences
and embarrassments of the situation by founding the de•
mends of England on a right which we have derived from
a treaty, the non-fulfilment of which must place UR in an
awkward relation to Russia. The representations of France
and Austria were made in a very different sense, hut with
the same object and intention as ours, I ventured also to
ask the noble earl at the time whether France, Austria, and
England were entirely in accord as to the steps which
should be taken in the event of the joint representations to
the Emperor of Russia being disregarded; and I pointed
out the extreme inconvenience which must result from
such a combination if the parties were not agreed as to the
manner in which they would give effect to the recommen-
dations. Well, to add to the difficulties of the case, at the
very moment when we were waiting with anxiety for the
account of the Emperor of Russia's receipt of our represen-
tations, couched in that persuasive style, and containing
those conciliatory arguments to which I have adverted, the
noble earl took the opportunity of stating in this house
that deeply as he sympathised with Poland, and I
although he had demanded from Russia concessions under
a treaty which he had the right to enforce, yet whatever
might be the reply of Russia, he would not go to war with
her on account of Poland, and the Poles must not expect
any armed assistance from us under any circumstances.
This conduct on the part of the noble earl was ruin to
Poland—more than that, it was an aggravation of her inju-
ries. (Hear.) He must have known that when we said we
would not lend a helping hand, Fran i° and Austria would
equally refrain, and that as far as their means went the Poles
were absolutely powerless to make effectual resistance. At
the same time, however, the noble lord gave the Poles an
amount of encouragement which protracted the struggle,
aggravated their sufferings, and brought on that unhappy
country even greater calamities than it was then enduring.
(Hear, hear.) But what, my lords, was the result to Eng-
land ? The demands of England, calling for the fulfilment
of a treaty, were met by a rejoinder in that tone of stinging
courtesy for which Russian diplomacy is so eminently cele•
brated. The noble earl received a decided rebuff. (Hear,
hear.) He was told that England had better mind its own
business, that the Emperor of Russia knew best how to deal
with his oc n subjects, and that he would not submit to any
foreign interference in that respect. And then, forgettingall
his magniloquent threats, and not carrying his high words
into action, the noble earl told this house that the Emperor
of Russia had done a beneficent act towards his subjects.
But the noble earl's pacific declaration was not made until
France and Austria had been committed to participation in
that policy, and they wore consequently placed in the pain-
ful situation of having to follow our steps, and to share the
humiliation which attended them. (Hear, hear.) That is
the third instance in which we have assumed an atti-
tude not calculated to add to the cordiality of our rela-
tions with Franco. At the same time I doubt whether
these circumstances would be likely to put you on much
better terms with the Power to whom you addressed such
an insulting demand. Very recently, in the presence of
increasing differences and embarrassments occurring
in so many parts of Europe, the Emperor of
the French made a proposition for a general Congress, in
which these various questions might be considered and an
attempt made to bring about a common understanding in
regard to them. I concur with the noble earl in thinking
that there would have been great difficulty in accomplishing
that aim. The objections which would be raised had not, per-
haps, been sufficiently contemplated by the Emperor of the
French when to first made his proposal. If, however, there
was a country in all Europe which had less reason than
another for giving a positive refusal to have anything to do
with the Congress it was England, because there was no
question which could by any possibility be decided by it
which directly affected our interests. The course which
should have been pursued by the Government was to recog-
nise the laudable and beneficent intention of the Emperor
of the French in making such a proposal ; to point out that
England had no interest to salve by opposing it, if there
was any prospect of success ; to declare that we should be
only too happy to co-operate in so excellent and well-mean-
ing a design as the settlement by arbitration of the difficulties
which disturbed Europe if the other countries whose affairs
would be brought before the Congress would submit to its
authority and abide by its decision. If after that, the
scheme of a Congress had failed, it could not have been
attributed to the hostility of England, but to the inherent
difficulties of the case. (Hear, hear.) But as it was, in
the face of Europe, when every other Power expressed
more or less a readiness to concur in carrying out the ob-
jects in view, the noble earl opposite met the proposition
by a blank refusal to have anything to do with it, and by
pointing out in the strongest possible terms all the objec-
tions that could possibly be entertained to the meeting
of such a Congress. Moreover, to add to the discourtesy—
T say nothing now of the impolicy—to add to the pain-
ful feelings with which the Emperor of the French and
the French people were likely to be impressed, by the
course pursued by the noble earl in giving an al'so-
lute refusal, the first intimation—and I am sure that I shall
not be contradicted by the noble earl when I make this
statement—the first intimation which the Emperor of the
French received of the decision of the English Cabinet was
by reading the despatch in the Times newspaper. (Hear.)
Now, if you treat great Powers with this utter disregard of
their feelings and wishes, if you bluntly refuse to lend them
a helping hand in order that they may at any rate tide over
possible difficulties, supposing that there was no other in-
tention in the Congress but that, how can you expect when
you are in a position:of difficulty,and when you call on them
that they will give you mutual assistance and advice in
cases not affecting their personal or national interests?
(Hear, hear.) But there is another great and grave reason
why the noble earl should have considered deeply before re-
fusing to entertain the proposition of a Congress. He must
have known that there was one question impending of the
greatest gravity and the most urgent interest. He must
have known that a question long maintained between the
Danish monarch and the people of Germany was coming to
a point of the greatest, most critical, and deepest interest ;
and if the Congress, or the proposition to hold a Congress,
had only postponed for three or four months the active
struggle which has since taken place, there would in.that
case have been a better prospect than I fear there now is of
preserving, or I should rather say of restoring—for it is too
late to speak of preserving—the peace which is already
broken. (Hear.) With respect to this grave question which
is the subject of all engrossing interest at the present mo-
meat, ',do not think that any one reading the Speech from
the Throne, and who is not very familiar with the case be-
forehand, would have been able to collect from the Speech
what really is the question of pressing difficulty at the ex-
isting moment, and threatening the interruption of
friendly relations. Her Majesty's Speech recites, with very
great and very unusual minuteness, the names of all those
who were parties to the Treaty of 1852 for securing the suc-
cession to the throne of Denmark. The recital is somewhat
unusual; but Ido not complain of that. I presume that
the object was to show how many parties have pledged them-
selves to the arranged succession to the throne of Denmark.
I would, however, in passing, make one observation in refer-
ence to the statement that the treaty was acceded to by the
King of Saxony. Though Ido not lay much stress on the
argument, yet it is stated on the part of that Sovereign that
he never acceded to the treaty, but gave his assent to it.
But that very fact made it the more binding than accession
to the treaty with reservations, for the assent was pur et
simple, recognising the wisdom of the treaty, and makes no
reservation, at the same time, with respect to some possible
contingent claim on the part of the King of Saxony's own
House to a portion of the small duchy of Lanenburg. It
could not be said that when the assent was given that any
possible reservation was made, and the King of Saxony,
therefore, precluded himself from using that argument in
the subsequent discussion. I cannot help thinking, in so
solemn a document as the Speech from the Throne, which
recites the object of the treaty, and also with so much
minuteness the names of the parties to it, that it would
have been as well if the very words of the treaty had been
given, and the more especially because the omission of
the words had afforded the opportunity of inserting in
one of the paragraphs such language as does not often
appear en en in a Speech from the Throne. (Laughter.)
The Queen's Speech states :—" That treaty declared that it
is conducive to the preservation of the balance of power
and of the peace of Europe that the integrity of the
Danish monarchy should be maintained, and that the
several territories which have hitherto been under the sway
of the King of Denmark should continue so to remain."
That is the substance of the treaty certainly, but it would
have been better to quote the precise words. The treaty goes
on to declare the arrangements according to which it was
thought that the succession to the whole of the dominions
then united under the Crown of Denmark, in the male line
to the exclusion of the female, would be the best means of
securing the integrity of that monarchy. The object was
to secure the Integrity of the Danish monarchy, and the
making a change in the course of succession was supposed
to be the best means of carrying out that intention. I cer-
tainly think that, instead of using that elegant phrase in the
Queen's Speech, that " the several territories which have
hitherto been under the sway of the King of Denmark
should continue to remain so," it would have been much
better to him given the terms of the treaty, though I do not
question that the actual meaning is expressed, and make no
quibble en that point. The Queen's Speech goes on to say
that " Her Majesty, actuated by the same desire to preserve
the peace of Europe, which was ono of the declared objects
of all the Powers who were parties to that treaty, has been
unremitting in her endeavours to bring about a peaceful
settlement of the differences which on this matter have
arisen between Germany and Denmark." Now, the diffi-
culties which have arisen between Germany and Denmark
have nothing to do with this treaty. They have nothing to
do with the succession, but with a cause totally and en-
tirely different, and it was not until the death of the late
King of Denmark that the question of the succession was
introduced to complicate the original grounds of
the discussion. (Hear, hear.) It is very important
to draw a distinction between these two questions, which
are entirely different. The question so long at issue was
the fulfilment or non-fulfilment by Denmark of engage-
ments entered into in 1851, to which the Treaty of 1852
made no reference. I do not deny that so far as Austria
and Prussia aro concerned, those engagements were in-
ducements to lead them to concur in the treaty; but, at the
Ramo time the treaty is not conditional on those arrange-
ments, Her Majesty's Speech is, therefore, made to state on
this point that which is not the fact. Now, this is a matter
of very considerablo importance, because the case is con-

siderably complicated by the different positions which, since
the death of the late King of Denmark, have been taken up
by the greater Powers and the smaller Powers in Germany.
At the present moment there are two interventions; if I may
call them so, in Denmark, and these two interventions aro
being carried on by different parties, and for evidently diffe-
rent objects. The engagements had reference to rights
claimed on behalf of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig,
and the question remains, how far has Denmark contravened
the engagements as to the rights, liberties, and privileges
she was to give to those Duchies,and under no circumstances
to incorporate Schleswig with the Danish Monarchy, or to
take any step tending to that result? These were the whole
of the questions which, up to the present year, were in dis-
pute between the Powers of Germany and Denmark. Since
the death of the late King of Denmark a Federal occupa-
tion of Holstein has taken place, and that occupation is ad.
witted to be legal for the purpose of securing the fulfilment
of the engagements of 1851 in reference to the rights of the
Duchies ; but under the cover of that occupation or execu-
tion claims, with respect to which I would say nothing, to
the throne of the Duchies have been put forward, claims
which had been actually rejected and repudiated, and never
until this moment brought forward since the Treaty of 1852.
The parties now proceeding against Denmark do not rest
their claim on any opposition to the treaty. On the con-
trary, they proclaim that they are proceeding in the spirit
of the treaty. They have been outvoted by the Diet, and
they proceeded to take the matter into their own hands.
Professing an open and undisguised respect for the treaty,
they are acting entirely without the consent of the Diet.
We have the King of Prussia taking up arms in strenuous
defence of constitutional rights---(a laugh)—and we have
the Emperor of Austria joining in a crusade for the pro-
tection of oppressed nationalities. (Renewed laughter and
cheers.) And these two Powers, recognising a treaty which
the minor Powers wish to set aside, are undertaking, as the
mandatories of these minor Powers, to attack and carry on
war against Denmark for cor siderations and objects totally
different from those contemplated by the Diet. (Hear) This
isthe state of the question at the present moment; but I
cannot avoid thinking that with a little good judgment, a
little good management, and a little good temper, it ought
to have been settled without a frightful appeal to anus.
(Cheers.) Surely it could have been no difficult fact to as-
certain—if the parties were willing to listen to reason—
(hear, hear)—as the case was one in which. the intervention
of a friendly Power might be applied—whether a certain
engagement entered into by Denmark had or had not been
fulfilled, or whether one of the parties was not demanding
more than it was entitled to. Ido not question the right
of Prussia to ask for a fulfilment of those engagements to
the utmost; I do not question the duty cf Denmark to
fulfil them as far as actually possible—to fulfil them as far
as that is not rendered impossible by one of the parties
opposed to Denmark; but I say that if when this question
arose this country had occupied the position she ought, she
would have been in a position to play the part of mediator,
and that the circumstances might have been adjusted by
a little good management on the part of the Foreign-office
of England. (Hear, hear.) But how could you have ex-
pected that Germany would yield to your interference in
this ease ? In this quarrel there is a people who believe
they are struggling for their liberty and independence.
That fact will gain them great sympathy in Europe,
more especially because they are carrying on the struggle
with a force disproportionate to the necessities Of
the case ; but how could you have expected that your inter-
ference would be effectual when you had alienated France,
offended Russia, and more or less.quarreled with every Power
in Europe ?—when you had not a Power you could call your
friend, and, moreover, when the danger which threatened
you in this complication was a dangerous and destructive
war between England and the united powers of Germany ?
(Hear,) What could be more threatening to the peace of
Europe than England being committed to a sanguinary
quarrel with the whole of Germany in a case in which,
whether rightly or wrongly, the teelings of the people of
Germany are enlisted on one side ? (Hear.) For my part
I certainly should shrink from such a war as one of the
greatest disasters that could happen to this country. (Cheers.)
I do hope that the noble earl, who must this night give us
a clear indication of the course which her Majesty's Go-
vernment propose to take in respect of their foreign policy,
more especially on this question—will be able to assure us
that we are not committed by the Government, on the one
hand, to a disastrous quarrel with Germany, or, on the other,
to a betrayal and abandonment of an ally who has trusted
to our support. (Hear.) I have not seen it argued, and in-
deed I think it could hardly be alleged, that Parliament
should indicate the policy which the Government should
adopt. There is a sound and constitutional doctrine that it
is for the Government—for the responsible Ministers of the
Crown—to take a decided course, and then to announce
that course and submit it for the consideration of Parlia-
ment. Ido not pretend to know the position of affairs we
stand in ; but, as far as I can see, we are between the horns
of a dilemma of a most formidable character—namely,
the sacrifice of the honour of the country on the
one side, and engagement in a most perilous and san-
guinary war on the other. (Hear, hear.) My lords,
while I regard this as a subject of the most painful interest
to England, I would implore Germany to consider what con-
sequences such a war must entail on her, not only in break-
ing up of old relations, the severing of friendships—the
severing of ties between countries in which there exist
almost ties of consanguinity,—but also in giving en oppor-
tunity to all those opposed to the stability of her institutions
—all those who are desirous to profit by anything that may
tend to disorder and confusion,—to all who envy that grow-
ing prosperity of Austria which is owing to the constitu-
tional course she has so wisely entered upon. A war with
England would stop Austria in that course, and England
would be in the unhappy position of being an unwilling and
unconscious participator in pouring forth that torrent of evil
which certainly would be set flowing. And without cast-
ing the slightest imputation upon the present intentions or
possible designs of France, Germany must see that a war
with England would leave her in such a position as that
France would be master of the situation. If France does
entertain ambitious designs, the moment would be one to
Germany of the greatest peril, and to France of the greatest
temptation. My lords, I brought this subject forward with
all the grave, earnest, and deep importance that attaches to
it. I will not comment on other portions of the Speech.
There will be other opportunities for discussing the subjects
to which they relate. I will not allude to what has taken
place in China, nor what has taken place in Japan, further
than to say, with regard to the former empire, that I
think this country was saved by an act of the Emperor
of China from the most serious embarrassment. I rejoice
that his imperial Majesty rejused to accept the assist-
ance of a British squadron under such circumstances as
only it could have been given to him. Ido not blame
Captain Sherard Osborn ; on the contrary. I commend
him for the judgment and prudence which he exhibited in
refusing to place himself under the orders of a mandarin,
and becoming responsible for the acts of such an official ; but
it seems incredible to me how the idea could ever have en-
tered the minds of politicians that the emperor of an inde-
pendent country would accept the offer of a force on the
understanding that his orders to that force were only to be
obeyed when forwarded through a civil commissioner, who
was to have the power of
.y i sending or withholding them.
incompatible with that of
GaTuha
free
out it
would
t would Sovereign; b
create
a
anddifficulty.ifsueen ht entirely
(Hear, hear.) I am only
arrangement were carried
afraid, from accounts which have been received within the
last given
in ivell by this country in the
civil few
war in Chinadays, that at
has assistance
an unpleasant and a
painful position. I will not comment on that extraordinary
dat
piece of diplomacy—namely, the surrender of the lonian
Islands to the kingdom of Greece. I say nothing to the sur-
render itself, but only as to the mode in which it has taken
placed
place. The whole proceeding seems to have been involved
in Inextricable confusion. The promises which the noble
earl made and the expectations which he held out have been
set at nought ; and an agreement has been come to with the
other Powers to hand over the islands without any condition
whatever to the kingdom of Greece, that kingdom being in
a state of anarchy, and in a state which renders it quite in-
capable of conducting its own affairs without assistance and
being under the government of an illustrious Prince, a
young man, who, I am afraid, on the advice of the noble
adiscretion, undertook a task
which,r , with
I h morei
kn, he
w couragell P.nd
extremely
difficult, We find,
too, that in this particular case, as well as in every
case in
earl,
twhich thenoble earl has meddled,he h -
asoffended not only one
side, but both sides. (A laugh.) Again, it
appears that, not-
withstanding the concessions which the noble earl has made
to the Federal States of America in carrying out what he
calls neutrality, but what I am afraid I must call one-sided
neutrality, he has received from these States not thanks,
because I believe that papers which have been before the
Senate of the United States show we were met by demands
and menaces, which I should be much astonished if any one
calling himself a British Minister must not have felt a diffi-
culty in receiving when the despatches containing them were
placed in his hands. Since then we are not only told that
the American Government will hold us responsible for any
damage which their commerce may have sustained by the
acts of the Alabama ; but if I have not misread the papers
laid before Co.,
Congress they state that if we do not put a stop
to the sale of vessels of this kind in this country, the result'
must be that the Federal Government wilt take the law into
their own hands, that their cruisers will follow these vessels
into British ports, and will, in British waters, maintain
their own interests. My lords, I hope the noble earl will
be able to show that he answered that despatch in a manner
which will put an end to such monstrous demands for the
future. (Hear, hear.) But, if lam not mistaken, the last
despatch from Washington was written about August, and
was received here towards the latter end of August, and
early in September the noble earl took the strong step of
seizing the so-called Confederate rams in the Mersey upon
that very suspicion as to which, a year before, the Attorney-
General informed Parliament that the Government would
not be warranted in interfering. (Hear, hear.) Well,
then, my lords, if you have not satisfies the Federals, neither
have you satisfied the Confederate States. (Hear.) You
have not satisfied the Poles and you have offended Russia.
You have not very well pleased Denmark, and you have
quarrelled with Prussia and Austria. You have not satisfied
the lonian Islands or Greece, although you have given t
both of them all and more than they have asked ; but you
have contrived to couple it with conditions very proper in
themselves, and which are mutually unpalatable, and which
up to a very late moment led to the refusal by the Greek
Government, such as it is, to accept your gift of the lonian

islands burdened with those conditions. (Hear, hear.) I
cannot say that in looking hack at the general line of policy
adopter] by the noble earl, and the degree of success which
has attended his efforts as the head of the Foreign-office,
such a retrospect is calculated to diminish my apprehen-
sions of the present, or to inspire much confidence for the
future. I hope and pray that the Government may be able
to satisfy this house and the country that they have neither
taken any course likely to involve us in a war the issue of
which no man can foresee, nor, on the other hand, have led
on and then deserted a weak Power, which, confiding in
our protection, and acting up on our advice, now finds itself
abandoned in the hour of its utmost need. (Hear.) This is
my earnest hope ; yet I cannot but see that the vessel of our
State is in a most perilous position, that it is surrounded
by breakers and dangers on every side; and for my own
part I have not---I wish I had—the consolation of being able
to repose any confidence in the competence of the hands in
which its navigation is now placed. (Cheers.)
Earl RUSSELL—The noble earl commenced his speech
by some remarks, in which he compared wit and facts; but
I may, I think, on the present occasion say, with Sheridan,
when retorting on his opponent, that the noble earl drew on
his imagination for the facts and upon his memory for the
wit—(laughter)—for I think the house will agree with me
that the wit with which the noble earl regaled the house
was not his, but Shakspere's. (Renewed laughter.) With
regard, to her Majesty's Government having lost the con-
fidence, and friendship of other sovereign powers, so far
from that being the case, we are in most friendly relations
with them, and communications of the most amicable cha-
racter are being daily carried on with Governments who
place their trust and confidence in us. The noble earl
;stated that our policy consisted in non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries, and in an alliance with
France. I must confess that with regard to the prin..
ciple of non-intervention, the practice of intervening in
the internal affairs of other countries is not only objec-
tionable in itself, but always fails in its object, and aggra-
vates the evils it was intended to cure. The experience
which we have had of late only tends to confirm me in that
view. (Hear.) The noble lord goes on to say that se far
from carrying out our line of policy we have diverged from
and offended France. If the noble lord wishes us to adopt
the policy which is attributed to the leader of his party in
the House of Commons, we should indeed accept whatever
France chose to suggest—we should have no opinion but
French opinion—no will but French will—no policy but
French policy—but I say that that is a policy which we
cannot accept. (Cheers.) With regard to the expedition
to Mexico, we stated from the beginning that we did not go
there to interfere with the internal affairs of that country.
It same to be a question with the French what should be
the future government of that 'country, but we said that
that was not the question which we had come to settle, that
upon that point we should separate from France, because
we simply went there to obtain redress for our grievances
and reparation for the injuries we had suffered. We did not
go there to set up an emperor, or any other potentate, to
rule over the people. (Hear.)
The Earl of DERBY—I beg the noble earl's pardon. I
said distinctly that when the objects of the expedition were
extended, I did not blame her Majesty's Government for
withdrawing from that expedition.
Earl RUSSELL—If the noble earl does not blame us,
why did he mention that topic? If it was an offence to
France how could we help differing from them on that sub-
ject ? My opinion on that question is vary different from
that of the noble earl, and I think that the Emperor of the
French, though his policy might be different from ours,
gave full weight to the considerations and the policy of the
British Government. I believe that he is too just to attri-
bute the adoption of the polies, which we thought right
to adopt to differences we had with him. The noble earl
says that we differed with France about the recognition
of the Southern States—but no proposal was ever made
by us on that subject. There was a proposal,
indeed, made for mediation, in order to reconcile the
Southern States with the Northern States, and if it had
been deemed proper to propose such a mediation it
might have led ultimately to a proposal for the recognition
of the Southern States. It was not, however, considered
advisable to make such a proposal, it being thought that if
France made the proposal alone there would be a much
better chance of reconciliation than if it were a joint pro-
posal. (Hear, hear.) I believed that the whole country ap-
proved of the resolution to which her Majesty's Government
came upon that question. The noble earl referred to a par-
ticularly painful subject—l mean Poland—and he said that
her Majesty's Government had disappointed Austria and
France in its policy with respect to that country, and more
than that, that we had by the encouragement we had given
to the Poles aggravated the horrors of their position. That
is only one among the many incorrect statements which
have been made on this subject. It was not the fact that we
were acting entirely by ourselves, and differing from Aus-
tria on this subject. On the contrary, there were constant
communications between Vienna and London, and we be-
came aware that Austria would be most unwilling, on Aus-
trian considerations alone, on questions which had reference
to Austrian finance, and others which had reference to the
rights of Polish subjects of Austria, to put their differences
with Russia to the arbitrament of war. (Hear, hear.) And
what was the general aspect of the question ? My belief is
that you would have had not to recognise Poland, not to
fight for the Poles, but to make a Poland, and in making a
Poland you would have had to make it as the insurgents of
the country wished it to be made, not only to constitute a
new kingdom of Poland, but so toconstitute it as to include
those western provinces of Prussia which were formerly,
Polish. (Hear, hear.) But that would have been a ques-
tion so enormous, involving as it did the dismemberment of
the Russian empire, that it was not to be undertaken with.
out the clearest view that the object aimed at could be
obtained, and without the full consideration of the great
sacrifices that would have to be made. The Government
were of opinion that it was not advisable to enter into
that war, and therefore I confess that, in concert with
Austria, we declined to take any step which might involve
us in the further step of hostilities against Russia. When
it was proposed to us to write an identical note, we declined
to join in it. When it was proposed to consider what further
measures should ba adopted in case Russia should refuse
our proposal, her Majesty's Government, in concert with
Austria, declined to join in it. Were we wrong in not me-
ditating or intending war for the sake of this Poland, in
confining ourselves to sympathy with these brave people
and refusing to commit ourselves to hostilities ? I believe
the opinion of this country was at that time—and it is still
more strong at this moment—against going to war for Po-
land. (Hear.) The noble earl said that the course the
Government took in this respect was calculated to aggravate
the evils of the Polish insurgents. I thought differently.
I thought the telling the Poles that it was our determina-
tion not to go to war for them was the way to induce them
not to expect an exercise of our arms in their favour, and I
think it is one of the most cruel things in the world to lead
people to take up arms in the expectation of your support,
when you do not intend to give it them, Entertaining that
opinion 1 declared plainly in this house last session that it
was not our intention to go to war for the Poles. This de-
cision may have disappointed the Government of France at
the moment, but I believe that the Government of France
is now persuaded that the French people were by no means
willing to enter into that war, that the inclination of the
French people—and lam happy to dee that such is the case
—is in favour of peace with foreign nations, and they
would not have approved of a costly and burdensome war.
Then the noble earl taunted us with not having agreed
with the Emperor of the French on the subject of the con-
gress. I confess I considered the proposal was made to us
as an invitation. I did not consider there was an obliga-
tion upon us to accept it—l considered that it was free to
us to accept or decline it. If that was the case, and I con-
sider that such was the intention of the Emperor of the
French, we had to consider what was intended to be done
at that congress. We asked, therefore, in the first place,
what were the topics to be brought forward, and how it
was expected that the difficulties were to be solved P When
we received an answer to that despatch we considered the
matter again; we considered it most carefully and most se-
riously, and we came to the conclusion that the solution
was not likely to be pacific, and that if it were not to be
pacific it would be a great disappointment to the powers of
Europe that the works of the congress should be entirely
null and void. (Hear, hear.) The two main topics to be
brought forward were the topics of Poland and Venetia.
With regard to Poland, it would have had reference to the
course pursued lay Russia. I put a question to the Russian
ambassador on the subject, and I found that the Emperor
would not maintain that which he had already maintained
in his correspondence with France, Great Britain,and Aus-
tria. I asked the Austrian ambassador what would be the
course of his Government with reference to a proposal in
respect to Venetia. He said the Austrian Government
were determined not to listen to a proposal for the cession
or exchange of Venetia. Then upon these two great topics
had we made proposals to Russia on the subject of Poland,
the answer would have been a refusal, and if we had made
proposals to Austria on the subject of Venetia, the answer
would also have been a refusal. What then was to be the
end of the congress ? Were we to be brought into a war in
consequence of those refusals, or were we to be satisfied
with nothing being done ? Those were our objections to the
congress— those were our honest opinions. The noble lord
seems to think that our answer was very rude and curt.
But we had expressed our opinion, and had given our rea-
sons in long despatches, and in our first despatch we gave
credit to the Emperor of the French for the motives by
which he was actuated—for his desire to put an end
to discord, and to establish the general peace of Europe upon
a more solid foundation. But with regard to the reasons
put forth for such a congress, is not the British Govern-
ment entitled to form its own opinion or to use its own
arguments when a great plan like this is proposed, which
is published to Europe without any notice to or concert
with her Majesty's Government ? Was this Government
entitled to consider for itself whether such a plan was likely
to promote the peace of Europe or to have a contrary effect?
Upon this question, and also upon the questions with regard
to Mexico and the United States of America, I claim that
which is not a great deal to claim for a power like England,
that she should have the right of framing her own policy,
and of being governed by her own views of the interests of
Europe, not borrowing them from any other power, how-
ever great that power may be. (Cheers.) The noble earl has
made many comments, but not altogether correct as to facts,
with respect to the great subject on which every one must
be anxious—namely, the question of the differences between

Germany and Denmark. (Hear.) Upon that subject I can
only give your lordships a bare outline of the course which
has been taken, of the views taken by the German powers,
and of the views which her Majesty's Government have
taken. In the first place, during the reign of the late King
of Denmark the Diet of Frankfort came to a resolution upon
the subject. But before Igo into the details-I must state
that there were two in fact separate questions, although
they have been very much mixed up with each other. In
the year 1850, in the month of July, there was a meeting at
the Foreign-office, at which Austria, France, Great Britain,
and Russia were represented, at which it was agreed—at
least by Great Britain, France, and Russia—that the main-
tenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy was an
object connected with the balance of power and conducive
to the peace of Europe. On the 2d of August of the same
year that proposition was reduced to a protocol, consisting
of several articles, one of which was specially directed to
the desirability of maintaining the integrity of the Danish
monarchy, and another commended the wisdom of the King
of Denmark in endeavouring to provide and arrange such a
succession to the crown of Denmark as might enable his
successor to fulfil his federal obligations. On the 23d of
August Austria acceded to that. The war in Holstein, and
the negotiations which took place afterwards, all ended in
the treaty of May, 1852, which proceeded upon the state-
ments made in 1850—the treaty signed by the noble earl
opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury)—and which recognised
the succession to the crown of Denmark, and all the terri-
tories then under the sceptre of Denmark, in the person of
Prince Christian, now Christian IX, of Denmark. It is true,
the Government of Saxony did not use the term "accede,"
but used the term "assent," and they used it with an appli-
cation of terms of eulogy upon the framers of the treaty
which would:havelnduced:any Government —either the pre-
sent Government or that of the noble earl opposite—to ex-
pect that this power would have been one of the first to main-
tain and recognise the benefits of the treaty of 1852, With
the despatch of the minister of the King of Saxony of Dec.
9, 1852, before them, the least that any Government of
Europe could expect would have been that the first to ris t in
favour of the treaty would have been the King of Saxony.
Yet one of the main movers and agitators against the treaty
of 1852 has been this very Saxon minister that signed the
letter to which I have alluded. I hope this will be taken as
an instance of the difficulties which any Government must
experience in dealing with a question under these circura •
stances—of the difficulty which must be found in maintain-
ing a treaty, when the very persons who acknowledged its
powers and obligations are among the first to destroy its
provisions and to denounce its tendency. (Hear, hear.)
There are other engagements with which her Majesty's Go-
vernment have nothing directly to do, which were a conse-
quence of the war carried on in Schleswig, and engagements
taken by the King with regard to certain portions of his do-
minions. The King engaged to fulfil all his federal obliga-
tions, and Austria and Prussia engaged, on their part, to
respect the decision of the King of Denmark that Holstein
and Schleswig should be entirely separated and not reunited.
I quite agree with the noble earl in his expression of regret
that these engagements did not form part of any treaty or
convention, but were contained only in the notes of the
Austrian and Prussian ministers on the one side and of the
Danish minister on the other, They were followed up by a
proclamation of the King of Denmark, which is considered
by the Germans to be in accordance with and in pursuance
of the treaty. There has been ever since 1851 a controversy
going on between Germany and Denmark, Germany re-
proaches Denmark with not having fulfilled her part of the
obligations, with not having governed Holstein according
to the federal ties. The Danes on their side say that the
demands made by Germany and their interpretation of the
engagements of the treaty were such that it would be im-
possible for Denmark to comply with them. I believe there
is a great deal of truth in both these accusations. Lord
Wodehouse, who spoke last year on the subject, said the
King of Denmark was bound in honour to fulfil his engage-
ments, but that Germany was bound not to make it impos-
sible for him to fulfil them. such being the state of the
case, with this constant and bitter controversy going on, the
German Diet came to the conclusion on the Ist of October
to order the federal execution to take place. But they did not
observe the rule which they ought to have observed, that
the only territory of Holstein, and that they ought not
therefore to go beyond its limits. They, on the contrary,
put into the decree various other decrees which had since
1858 been passed by the Federal Diet, one of which was
that there should be a common constitution in which each
of the four parts of the Danish dominion should have a
separate government and constitution, not dependent upon
the rest. The interpretation which the Germans had given
to this was that the Danes being the majority, and the Ger-
mans the minority in the proportion of 10 to 16, the minority
should have the power in the general parliament of Copen-
hagen of becoming a majority and governing the whole
kingdom. Her Majesty's Government represented to the
Diet that it was impossible that part of the decree could
stand, and that it was destructive to the interests of the
Danish monarchy. That proposition has been with drawn
and is no longer, as I understand insisted upon, That decree
was in course of execution when on the 15th Nov. the King
of Denmark died. From that moment there has been increased
agitation in Germany, and the subject of that agitation has
not been the federal rights which from 1851 have formed the
matter in dispute, not the fulfilment by Denmark of her en-
gagements with respect to Sleswig and Holstein, but the
question of the succession to the crown, a question most hap-
pily and wisely settled by the treaty of 1852. The German
Diet had taken a very extraordinary course in the question,
and when I say so I do not except the great powers of Aus-
tria and Prussia, because I really think their course has
been most unintelligible. It is obvious that there were two
courses to be taken. Germany might have said, we entirely
repel the treaty of 1852, we acknowledge the Prince
of Augustenburg as Duke of Holstein, and we will send our
armies to ensure to him the succession of the duchy of
Schleswig which he claims as well. That would have been
a course which would have been inconsistent with the treaties
that have been signed, it would have been a course involv-
ing the destruction of Denmark—it would have destroyed
the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and it would have
establish the supremacy of Germany in Denmark, but at
the same time it would have been a clear and decided course
There is another course which everybody expected, that at
least Austria and Prussia would have followed, which was
to say, "We have already decided to recognize Prince
Christian as the successor to the Danish monarchy and to
the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, we will not depart
from our engagements in that respect, we knew perfectly
well the right of the Diet when we signed these treaties,
and we did not regard them as at all controlling our power
or diminishing our rights, We hold to the succession as
established, and while we agree in the federal obligations
we cannot for a moment listen to these pretensions." They
did not take that course—Austria and Prussia were left
almost alone, but they concurred that the question of the
succession should be suspended. Now the fact is that this
impression was at the bottom of the whole dispute. What,
then, became the character of the federal execution? On the
one side it was execution against the King of Denmark as
rightful Duke of Holstein, and it was justly said that, as he
had inherited the rights he also inherited the wrongs of his
predecessor, and that if the late king had not governed Hol-
stein according to federal rights, federal execution was neces-
sary. But, unhappily, Saxony and some other powers who
were to take part in that execution did not recognize Prince
Christian, and Prussia herself did not receive him in Berlin.
When the foreign troops arrived in Holstein all the royal
insignia of the King of Denmark were torn down, and the
Duko of Augustenburg was allowed to canvass the whole
country. Nothing could be more inconvenient than this
double course of the two powers—Austria and Prussia ;
but on the 13th January they made another proposition,
and that was that they should hold Schleswig as a material
guarantee in order to enable the German Diet to enforce the
obligations of nil. The other Powers said that that would
be inconsistent with their declaration that the Duke of
Augustenburg was Duke of Schleswig, because if you go
into Schleswig on these grounds you acknowledge the right
of Denmark, Austria, and Prussia to go into Schleswig to
maintain the material guarantee; but, at the same time,
there is obviously some disposition to promote the cause of
the Duke of Augustenburg. On the Ist October I pointed
out in what way the federal execution went beyond the
powers of the Diet, and we afterwards proposed a conference,
at which all the Powers that had signed the treaty of Lon-
don should be represented, and on the 31st December fol-
lowing a despatch was communicated, in which we recom-
mended the Diet rather to submit the question in dispute to
friendly Powers than to force on a war of which no one could
foresee the issue. (Hear.) That proposition was referred
to a committee, but that committee has, I believe, never re-
ported. Several persons have told us that it would be quite
impossible to send representatives to any conference, because
they differed so much amongst themselves that it would be
quite impossible for any individual properly to represent
them. (Hear, hear.) At the same time, however, the pro-
ceedings of Austria and Prussia went on, and I cannot won-
der that Austria and Prussia should take the matter into
their own hands, and refuse to submit to the Diet ; for when
you consider what these Powers are, and the extent of their
resources, it would be ridiculous to suppose that they would
leave the decision of such questions io the Duke of Coburg
or other small potentates. It would have been really too
much to expect. (Hear, hear.) But the conduct of Austria
and Prussia themselves has been almost as unintelligible es
that of the smaller Powers, and, I must add, nearly as re-
prehensible, because, having determined upon going into
Holstein they sent to Denmark a. requisition to revoke the
constitution of November last in 48 hours. We were of
opinion that this constitution was inconsistent with the
engagements of 1851, and in November or December
we discovered that other persons were of
otfhensuasnosiae
opinion, for the Government of the Emperor
then communicated to us a proposal that a person should
be sent from the Russian corn t to congratulate Kin.. Chris-
tian on his accession, and at the same time to advise° the re-
vocation of the constitution of 1863, as being inconsistent
with the constitution of 1851, The French Government re-
commended the same course, and accordingly my noble
friend (Lord .Wodehouse) proceeded to Copenhagen and ad-
vised the revocation of the constitution, whilst the French
and Swedish envoys, without making any particular recom-
mendation as to that constitution, urged upon the King of
Denmark to do everything to conciliate the German Gover-
nments, and to fulfil all his engagements. The mission was
not at first successful. Most unfortunately, the Minister
who had then for some time ruled in Denmark under the
late King, being no doubt moat patriotic in his views, was

ene.
most extreme and violent in his views in favour of th
Danish people, which views were hardly consistent with
justice to the King's German subjects. On the advice of
this Minister the King refused the proposition, and dis-
solved the Parliament; but a few days after he changed his
Minister and appointed M. Monrad, who was able to find a
colleague in the person who had formerly been envoy at
Berlin. Frum that time the whole course of Danish polies-
was changes', and the Danish Ministers showed their readi-
ness to make any concession that wa,g compatible with the
integrity of the Danish monarchy. -Um'ertunatelynhowever,
this was not to be done very quickly. The King of Den-
mark was bound by the obligations of a constitutional King
and could not take any course which sva.y inconsistent with
the constitution of the country. He could only ask for a
revocation of the constitution in a constin alone: manner—
namely, by summoning the Rigsdag, and thus postponing
the question for some weeks. At the seine time the new
Minister told the Rigsdag that if they expected the integrity
of the Danish monarchy to be maintained they must ob-
serve all the engagements which the late King had left
unsatisfied. But the more willing the Danes were to give
way, the less Austria and Prussia were disposed to give
time; and I may say that when we proposed that six weeks
should be given to the Danish Government the proposition
was peremptorily rejected both at Berlin and Vienna. We
then, in order to give security to Austria and Prussia, pro-
posed that a protocol should be prepared in the names of
France. Great Britain, Russia, and Swed en, recording
the intention of the Danish Governm, ant with re-
spect to the revocation of the constitution, s.) that if that
constitution was not immediately revoked Denmark would
no longer have any excuse. Both these steps had the con-
currence of France, Russia, and Sweden as to time time to be
given, although not as to the revocation of the constitution.
The first proposal, to grant six weeks, was made byFrance,
the next was made by Great Britain, and the third by Russia
and each and every one was met by a peremptory refusal on
the part of Austria and Prussia. Now, I must say, con-
sidering what has followed—considering especially how
Austria has hitherto valued the peace of Europe—consider-
ing that she has always been the conservative power in the
centre of Europe, I am surprised that she did not hesitate
before rejecting the propositions made by France and Rus-
sia, and that her readiness to rush into this war hassome-
thing in it as unintelligible as it is melancholy. (Hear, lean)
Austria and Prussia now declare that is too late to-main-
tain peace, and their excuses aro, I confess, such as to give
me extreme pain. But there is a point in all the despatches
upon which both Austria and Prussia emphatically dwell,
and that is their own position in Germany. They represent
that if,having prepared o invadeSchleswig, they had stopped
in their course,there would have been such a commotion in
Germany, such a marching of volunteer armies in Holstein
as would have exposed them to the risk of civil war. This
may be true, but one cannot help thinking it hard that
Denmark, not for refusing conciliatory propositions, not for
any misconduct on her own part, not because there was any
reason to suppose that in six weeks or in three months
she would not give satisfaction to all the German dens rods,
but because there were fears of German disaffection, Imust
be invaded, and must bear the brunt of an assault -which
was intended to prevent commotion elsewhere. (hear,
hear.) The statements made by the Germans are than they
are for Germany becoming one great empire; but surely,
if that be their object, why, in God's name, cannot :lorty
millions of people effect that object without attac king
Denmark andinvading Schleswig ? (Hear, hear.) I say that
the fate of Denmark is an unhappy one, between thee( two
parties. One parry says, "We wish to be a united .Ger•
many, therefore, let us attack Denmark;" the other E ay's.
"We wish to stop democratic agitation in Germany,, a d
therefore let us go and attack Denmark." (Hear.) WI ether
by democrats or conservatives, the destruction of Den mark
seems to be equally determined on. I certainly cann, )t ad-
mire those feelings, and when it was at last proposed that
there should be an invasion of Schleswig, I thought it; ne-
cessary to ask whether those two powers—more espeoTally
the more conservative of the two—whether they ack n ow-
ledged the Treaty of London of 1852, or whether they 'were
about to march into Schleswig for some purpose inconsis tent
with it. I had a right to ask this question, for those two
great Powers had in no way repudiated the Treaty of Lon-
don, and, on the other hand, they had consented that the
question of the succession in Denmark should be kept in
abeyance. I have received to-day the answer to that ques-
tion, and I shall take the liberty of reading both the ques-
tion we asked and the answer we received, leaving it to
your lordships and to future events to decipher and inter-
pret the fair meaning of that answer. The question put by
Sir A. Buchanan was as follows:—" The undersigned CAn-
hassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her Britannic
Majesty has the honour to acquaint his excellency M. de
Bismarck Schonhausen, the minister resident and Minister
for Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the King of Prussia, that
the Government of the Queen his august sovereign, havin g
been informed that the Governments of Austria and Prussia,
have addressed a threatening summons to Denmark, he has
been instructed to ask for a formal declaration on the part
of the Prussian Government that it adheres to the
principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy." And
to it we received the following answer
" Be-lin, January 31, 1864..
" 111. Le Comte,—The government of the King, by basing
on the stipulations of 1851-2 the rights which, in concert wit Ii
Austria, it is proceeding to enforce upon Denmark, has 1):,v
this very aet recognised the principle of the integrity of the.
Danish monarchy as established by the transactions of
1851-52. The Government of the King, in proceeding to the
! occupation of Schleswig., does not intend to depart from this
principle. If, however, in consequence of complications
which may be brought about by the persistence of the
Danish Government in its refusal to accomplish its promines
of 1852, or by the armed intervention of other Powers in
the Dano-German conflict, the King's Government was to
find itself compelled to renounce combinations which would
no longer offer a result proportionate to the sacrifices which
events might impose upon the German Powers, no definitive
arrangements could be made without the concurrence of
the Powers who signed the treaty of London. T.ho
British Government would then find the King's Govern-
ment ready to come to an agreement with them as to the
definitive arrangement of the Dano-German questic n.
Your Excellency is requested to read and give a covey
of this despatch to Earl Russell.—(Signed) BISMARCK."
I have already said it would depend on events to give an
interpretation to that answer. It may be that, hay.ing
occupied Schleswig, or only part of Schleswig, Austria amid
Prussia would be ready to consider with other Powers what
may be fairly demanded of Denmark consistently with the
integrity of the Danish monarchy. If they should be mode-
rate in their propssals, and if the other powers of Europe
be anxious for peace, as I believe them to be, it may be
Bible to arrive at a permanent and advantageous arrange-
ment of this difficult affair ; and her Majesty's Governmei rt
would greatly rejoice at such an issue. We have made man y
—some will say too many—efforts towards the preservation
of peace in the way of advising the various parties to make
concessions, whilst at the same time we have not advised
anything which does not put Denmark in a better position
by putting her in the right. " Thrice is he armed who
hath his quarrel just." We advised no concession to Den-
mark which it was not right for her to yield, and at no
time have we given any assistance, nor even hopes of ma,
terial assistance. The Danish minister has repeatedly said
to me, " We expect no material assistance from this coun-
try, all we expect is sympathy." That is the state of our
engagements as regards Denmark, but what the future ;nay
bring forth it would be rash for me to predict. It would' be
rash even to attempt an outline of what may happen with
the troops actually fighting in the disputed territory. Ido
ask to-night, having stated in as far as I could what has
e taken place, and intending as soon as possible to givelrth
ac-
tual papers that have passed, Ido ask that your dshi
for the peace of Europe, for the welfare of Denmark
rrme of Gy, earnmclanicr.
shallosan
I
may agree to decide, as events may arise, whatbest
a be
i :s.yin-
dependentth ngd i
n 1 uk'
there°malsoforthe
great
dang real
erfor
we
o rolfea
Germany
Europe in the present transactions which are taking place
in those different countries, It is obvious that for some
years—perhaps not for many years—but for some 30 or 40
years—the people of Europe has not chosen to sit down with
despotism and not wished to adopt republican forms of go..
vernment. They have fallen back upon that which, if wisely
framed and conducted with moderation, is the best form of
government, and is the most consistent with true liberty,
and the best interests of man--the form of constitutional
government. But at the same time it is a difficult form of
government, and especially so if not conducted with modera-
tion, for it is apt to break out with violent acts of authorili
upon one side, and violent acts of rebellion upon the otker.
Happily for the interests of this country, for the past t svo
centuries moderation has been the distinguishing char: ec-
teristic of our conflicts, and the issue to these realms has
been a constitutional and peaceful solution. But to speak of
other countries, let Us turn to Greece. There it was thought
necessary to change the monarch, because the people wevn
not satisfied he was following a constitutional course. Then,
again, look at Spain, there the friends of liberty have taken
a course which they think favourable to liberty, but it is not
consistent with our ideas, for they have adopted the course
of not presenting the budget to the Cortes, There is evi-
dently the greatest confusion in that country upon the sub-
ject. Then, again, turn to Prussia. It is said that if the
budget be adopted by two out of the bodies which comp- 5.9
the state, it is complete. But that is not quite con-
sistent with the power allowed in England to the House of
Commons. But in Prussia the House of Commons is as
extravagant on the other side. It is the constitutiomil
right of the monarch to make treaties, ; but the House of
Commons of Prussia think they ought to throw aside rho
treaty made by the King and thus deprive him of his con-
stitutional powers. I mention these t hings as being incon-
sistencies existing in reference to conssatutional government
solution or
in Germany, and they may lead tea a happy
of
last
—and these are questions which are. now being discussed.
lead to a bloody and a long conflict. In the course
g, and
the the Emperor of Austria propose A some refoira
the King of Prussia declared for c,onstitutiornnament,
and
govern-
ment, and also proposed another feral of Tee
suggestions
your lordships may depend upon it that
willr before long
made will not fall to the ground.
great plague to
be seen whether Germany is to
become
These are the pies-
herself, or a great terror to all E
ur°l9of Europe. The Ent-
arise a great demand for German praareleira:ments,
ques-
tions which really affect the: fut;rhe
sagacity
and
wis-
dom, of the French, I belie ye, wtor greathispeople, and it will
but he is like
has aiven greater p
the philosopher who had power to
of truth, and could only