The Sun.
London, England, 1864-06-28 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT

HOUSE OF LORDS—Last Evening,
The appearance of thelobbies leading to the House of Peers
presented a very animated scene last evening, in consequence
of the importance attached to the statement to be made by
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs relative to the position
of matters with respect to the Dano-German war. Persons
who had been fortunate enough to secure members' orders
attended in large numbers, and on the opening of the
strangers' gallery the rush was terrific. The interior of the
house presented a very unusual appearance from the large
number of elegantly dressed ladies who filled the galleries
extending he entire length of either side of the magnificent
chamber. The space in front of the throne was also crowded,
and altogether the scene of animation presented was one
not often seen within the walls of Parliament. The attend-
ance of peers was very large.
The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack at
4 o'clock.

THE DANO-GERMAN WAR,
THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
Earl RUSSELL, after laying on the table the protocols
of the recent Conference, was understood to commence by
referring to the course pursued by the Government of Lord
Liverpool in 1823, atter the invasion of Spain by France,
which was followed by the Conference of Verona. The
Government of that eay had declared that the invasion of
Spain was contrary to the interests of Europe, and had pro-
tested against it, while at the same time they thought it
advisable to preserve peace, and declare neutrality between
France and Spain. Upon the present occasion (continued
the noble earl) I have to discuss a question of a very com-
plicated character, and one which it was hoped might have
remained in suspense for many years without exciting any
conflict. For the last year it has, however, been in a very
critical state. In 1852 a treaty was, as your lordship& are
aware, concluded, with reference to the succession to the
Danish throne. It is necessary, however, not only that a I
treaty should have the signature of ministers and the rati-
ficaitons of sovereigns, but that in its wording it ehould be
made to agree with the sentiments and wishes of the people
who are to be governed by it. Unfortunately the treaty and
the arrangements previously entered into in 1851 were in
their operation exceedingly unsatisfactory. It has been
alleged against Denmark, both previously and lately in the
Conference, that, contrary to the treaty and to sound policy
she endeavoured to make the people of Schleswig change
their nationality—that she interfered with their churches—
that she kept up a perpetual vexation and irritation, and
thereby violated the spirit of the treaty. It is certain that
great discontent prevailed in both Schleswig and Holstein
in regard to the manner in which they were governed. The
fact, I am afraid, is, that by an impolitic course at all events
the Danish Government produced a feeling in Germany
that the German subjects of the King of Denmark were not
fairly treated. Oppression there was none. The Govern-
ment was a free Government, and generally speaking, the
people were well off. But there was in the two Duchies
much of that irritation which prevailed in Belgium previous
to its separation from Holland. On the other hand, Ger-
many, instead of asking that which might have fairly been
asked, that the engagements of 1551 and 1852 entered into
by Denmark should be kept, made proposals which were
inconsistent with those engagements, and would have ren-
dered Denmark subject to Germany. One of the chief of
these proposals was that the 900,000 people said to be of
German race in Schleswig and Holstein, and even the
50,000 people in Lauenberg, should have a representation
equal to that of the 1,600,000 people in the kingdom of
Denmark. This was so unfair, and would have been so
destructive to the Danish nationality, that Denmark refused
to accede to it. The consequence of these disputes was, that
there was a kind of never-ceasing irritation, and ae Germany
was immensely more powerful than Denmark, it was only
too probable that Denmark would have to suffer one day on
account of the complaints to which she gave rise. It was
in consequence of seeing this that, in September, 1862, I
made certain proposals which, if they had been accepted by
Denmark, would have put an end for ever to the demand
that at Copenhagen there should sit a Parliament containing
a majority of German representatives, and would have satis-
fied the people of those Duchies that while remaining under
the King of Denmark their self-government should not be
subject to invasion. Unfortunately the Danish Government
rejected that proposal. At length, in October, 1863, the
German Governments declared at Frankfort that they
must proceed to Federal execution. , Had that been
grounded on the misgovernment of &Holstein, and on
the violation of the rights of the Confederation
in Holstein, no power could have complained of it
or contested it. But the Federal execution was in fact
based upon complaints much wider than this, and which, in
the opinion of the British Government, did not form the
proper ground of Federal execution. Matters, however,
remained in suspense until the death of the King of Den-
mark, which promised an entire change in the state of affairs.
It was then contended, on the part of Germany, that they
should at once proclaim that the King of Denmark had no
right to succeed to the Duchies; and that, by the Federal
law, the Prince of Augustenburg was heir to the crown.
Thrls declaration was adopted throughout Germany by per •
sons of all parties and all ranks ; and every Government that
pretended to adhere to the treaty of 1852 was denounced as
traitors to the cause of Germany. Austria and Prussia, in
the beginning, declared that they would proceed to Federal
execution ; thereby, to all appearance, making the King of
Denmark responsible for all that was done by the late king,
and thus acknowledge his title over Holstein and Schles-
wig. They at the same time, somewhat privately and with-
out the knowledge of Europe, declared that they reserved
the question of succession. It did not appear either to the
Danish Government or the English Government that
Federal execution could be resisted without increasing the
evils of the situation. But presently Austria and Prussia
declared that they must occupy the duchy of Schleswig
to obtain the fulfilment of the engagements of 1852.
Your lordships are well aware that, shortly before that
communication was made, the Government of Denmark
declared that they were ready to repeal the constitution
of 1863, which was apparently the cause of the proposed
measure. Unfortunately, they had not acceded to that
proposition when Lord Wodehouse was at Copenhagen,
and when the concession might have been of some use. The
German Governments, in a hurry to go to war and to
gratify the German sentiment, took no heed of the proposal
when it was made by the British Government, supported by
France and Russia, that a protocol should be signed, bind-
ing the different Governments and Denmark to the repeal
of the constitution. The Austrian and Prussian troops
entered the duchy of Schleswig. It is impossible to have
but one opinion as to that. It is evidently the invasion of
territory which did not belong to Germany, and to which
Denmark had the fullest right. Your lordships are aware
of the subsequent events of the war. The Austrian Govern-
ment had always said that they were ready to have a Con-
ference. The Prussian Government adhered to that pro-
posal. The Austrian Government not only proposed, but
constantly urged the putting a speedy termination to hos-
tilities. The English Government therefore proposed that
a Conference should take place. The Danish Government
expressed their readiness to enter a Conference, but in the
first instance refused to consent to an armistice. Eventu-
ally, however, they agreed to this. The German States
and France wished that a plenipotentiary from the German
Confederation should attend the Conference. This was
assented to, and the Conference met on the 25th April.
Some delay took place with the view of obtaining a sus•
pension of arms, or an armistice. The Danish Govern-
ment would not agree to an armistice, but would agree
to a suspension of arms fur a limited period. It was dif-
ficult, in matters so intricate, and in which passions had
been so much amused, to come to an agreement. But
her Majesty's Government thought it their duty, in the
interests of peace, to proceed to a Conference. On the
12th of May. after the suspension of arms had been
agreed to, I asked the Austrian and Prussian Governments
to declare what they required in the interests of peace.
Be it observed that although the Prussian and Aus•
trian Governments had continually declared that
they had certain engagements to insist upon which had
not been fulfilled, they never agreed to specify what these
engagements were, or what the terms were with which they
would be satisfied. When Lord Wodehouse went to Berlin
on his way to Copenhagen he endeavoured, in accordance
with instructions he had received, to have an explanation
from the Prussian Government on this point. The Prus-
siaa Government first replied that the Danish Government
should first repeal the November constitution, and "we will
then," said they, " see what arrangements the Danish Go-
vernment proposed to put in place of it. We must consider
those arrangements before we pronounce our opinion upon
them," Nothing, I mint say, could be less explicit or less
a justification of the course they were pursuing; because,
at the same time, they were ready to carry war to an extre-
mity, and use all means to invade Schleswig with all the
dreadful consequences, but without making an express de-
claration of their demands. When, however, the Powers
were assembled at the Conference—when Austria and
Prussia were obliged to meet the plenipotentiaries of France,
Russia, Sweden, as well as those of the other neutral
Powers, they found themselves obliged to make some state-
ment of their claims. Be it observed that, up to the 31st of
January, the two German Governments had declared that
they adhered to the treaty of London, and the execution
and occupation were proof that they adhered to the integrity
of the Danish monarchy. Her Majesty's Government,
therefore, had no reason to suppose that their propositionslea
would be of a different character. But we were to
though not officially, yet upon what seemedSchleswig to bean
wahuatht autho-
rity—that there was an intention of prop.
call eda pweerrseontdal
baunuinoint,ed, an
n
and
the
d thatfrom j
navy of the latter were to be separatemark ;
namely,
delythat the Holsteinied and
army
and that the King of Denmark was scarcely to any
that the Duchies were to have a complete self-government ent ;
influence over them. At one of the meetings of the Con-
ference the Danish plenipotentiary declared that if that pee..
had ever been proposed it would have been
sonal union
im-
possible for Denmark to agree to it. Therefore, though
nominally adhering to the integrity of Denmark and the
treaty of 1852, the proposition of a personal union would
be an actual separation of the Duchies from Denmark under
an independent Government. That, however, was not the,
exact proposal of the German plenipotentaries at the meet-
ing of the Conference on the 12th of May. The Prussian
plenipotentiary declared that what the Austrian sad rrus-

sian Governments wanted was a specification which would
wast not
e phrase, a little
secure absolute guarantees to the
Duchies against foreign
aggression, and against the real mrence of revelation
and
war. These guarantees can enl: ybe obtained by the co
ni
arohe. the part
Your of the.icr
dsh Gtpe loanpriw
ill
h
plete political independence of fete Duchies. This declara-
rteiomn n
ahl
"absolute guarantees agains t any foreign aggression."
Those words evidently had reference to the late King of
Denmark, who was also Duke of Holstein, and whose title
was never disputed. At the mime time there was a general
requisition for security agairtne war. Those two Powers
Austria and Prussia—to whom the other Powers of Europe
had a right to look for respect for treaties, asked the Go-
vernment to declare at once. that the government of the
Duchies should he excluded from all disputes tending
to revolution and war. That demand on the part
of the German Powers was considered so ambiguous
in the minds of the plenipotentiaries that they could
not tell what they meant. The D inieh plenipoten iary
asked what those words meant. The French plenipoten-
tiary also inquired as to their roeaninn, and for a long
time the plenipotentiaries were unable to escertain what
was really intended by the German Powers, and at last it
was asked who was to be the sovereign of the two Duchies,
The answer given on the part of Austria was that that was
a question to be decided by the German Diet. Now, both
Austria and Prussia had declared by the treaty of '52 that
question had been decided, and the King of Denmark had
a right to settle the succession, and that his decision in
favour of Prince Christian, the present King of Denmark,
would be respected. It was equally notorious that the Diet
might by a considerable majority declare against any title
of the King of Denmark, and Count Bernstorff did not deny
that the majority of the Diet would never consent to an are
rangement which would unconditionally restore the union
between Denmark and the Duchies. Thus, while the two
Powers were, in appearance, consenting to the treaty and
to the succession devolving upon Prince Christian, the
plenipotentaries of Germany, who had greater power in
effect than Austria and Prussia, declared that they never
would consent to a restoration of the union. At the next
meeting of the Conference, which took place on the 17th
of May, Austria and Prussia declared that they could no
longer acknowledge the King of Denmark ; that they
thought the duchies should be separated from Denmark and
placed under the sovereignty of theDake of Augustenburg ;
and that he should be declared the rightful possessor of
the throne of the Duchies. Before this declaration was
made, and in anticipation of such an event, the plenipoten-
tiaries of the neutral Powers had to consider the situation.
The Government of France, which had many communica-
tions with the Government of this country, declared that
they thought that a personal union would not be the found-
ation of a lasting peace; that the only mode of obtaining
such a condition would be by separating the German
nationality from the Danish nationality, and endeavour to
make peace upon that ground. After this communication
I consulted the other plenipotentiaries, and we came to the
conclusion that it was useless to propose that the two
Duchies should remain under the King of Denmark—that
it was obvious, unless we were prepared to carry on a great
war for the purpose, that after the hostilities that had taken
place after the declaration of the German Powers, if any-
thing like a personal union were established, that there
would have been at once a declaration on the part of the
Duchies, and on the part of the German Confederation,
supported by Austria and Prussia, that the Prince of Au-
gustenburg Mae entitled to the whole of the Duchies, and
that if any Danish troops entered the Duchies to dispute his
title, it was obvious that Austria and Prussia, and the whole
of the German Confederation, would have resisted them.
We had therefore to consider what was the best arrange-
ment to propose in consequence of the difficult position in
which Denmark was placed. We accordingly prepared a
statement, which I, as president of the Conference, was
asked to draw up, proposing such an arrangement as we
thought would be supported by the neutral Powers, among
whom was the Russian plenipotentiary, although he had
not then received definite instructions. What we proposed
was that the King of Denmark should leave to Germany the
duchy of Holstein and the southern part of the duchy of
Schleswig—that the boundary should be drawn as far as the
Schlei, and that it should go along the line of theDannewerke
—that there should be no menacing fortress in the territory
—that the German Powers should not interfere any further
in the internal affairs of Denmark—and that a general gua-
rantee should be given by the European Powers for the
rest of the Danish possessions. With regard to this pro-
posal, the Danish Government made a concession which I
think did the Government the highest credit. They declared
that the King of Denmark had accepted the crown in the
expectation of the treaty of 1852 being carried out, but as
the surrender of a portion of his territory was now de-
manded from him he was willing to make that concession
provided future independence and self-government were
left to the remainder of his possessions. (Hear.) The King
of Denmark declared that he was ready to accept the line of
the Schlei, and that without defining it, it would be neces-
sary to have a military and commercial line drawn for the
sake of the protection of Denmark, and he declared, more-
over, that there should be an European guarantee for the
possession of the rest of his territory. The German Powers,
while they accepted the principle of the partition of Soles-
wig, and they no longer demanded the whole of that duchy,
yet they declared that, according to their view of the line
of demarcation, the line must go farther north, and that
they could not accede to the line proposed by the neutral
Powers. They declared, at the same time, that, while they
were unwilling to have any restriction, they were perfectly
ready to agree that, with regard to the rest of the territory
to be left to the King of Denmark, there should be no inter-
ference whatever. I confess, my lords, it appears to me
that, upon principle, this was the best arrangement that
could be made. It was not to be expected that these duchies
could be retained under the nominal sovereignty of the
King of Denmark, without giving rise to fresh disputes and
fresh complications. It was obvious likewise that if the
sovereignty were to continue to he vested in the King of
Denmark there would be constant interference on the part
of the German Powers. These disputes may go on for
years, and it would be far better for Denmark to retain a
restricted territory with the conditions that the Danish Go-
vernment should have aholute control over such territory
without being subject to the perpetual interference and
control on the part of the German Powers. The French
Government, mere especially, took that view of the case.
The French plenipotentiary declared, in the fairest
terms, that it was always the opinion of his Govern-
ment that the union of the nationalities was the cruse of
all the complications which had taken place, and that nothing
could be settled without some division of them. But then
the plenipotentiary declared, in the name of the Emperor,
that at the same time it was necessary that great forbearance
should be shown towards Denmark us the weaker Power—.
(hear, hear)—that that part which was confessedly German
should be given to Holstein, but that with regard to the
mixed districts, that they should be left to Denmark, as a
means of preserving her independence and giving her com-
mercial freedom. Unhappily, my lords, upon this question,
as throughout all the questions, the German Powers, instead
of taking that view of generosity and forbearance which had
been so well urged by the Emperor of the French, had been
determined to insist upon their rights of conquest—the vic-
tories they had gained on the disputed territory over a Power
so disproportioned. (Hear, hear.) 'With respect to gene.;
rosity and forbearance—with respect to due consideration
for the pence of Europe, and the absence of a desire to rush
again into war in order to obtain their demands by right of
arms—l should be wanting in sincerity if I were to say that
any such generosity, that any such forbearance, any such
regard for the Peace of Europe, were manifested on the part
of the German Powers. (Hoar, hear.) The Danish Go.
vernment considered that this which we—toy noble friend
(Lord Clarendon) and myself—proposed on the part of the
neutral Powers, and which was to be the basis of pacifica-
tion, was an English proposal, by which England was bound
to abide. Nothing of the kind was ever stated by an Eng-
lish plenipotentiary, and nothing of the kind has Denmark a
right to expect. I did inform the Danish plenipotentiary,
when there was a prospect of continuing the armistice,that I
would not propose any division of the line without the con-
sent of Denmark, but I never gave him the least reason to
hope that England would support that line otherwise than by
urging its adoption in conjunctionwith otherneutral Powers.
At a recent meeting of the Conference the Russian pleni•
potentiary, after stating that he would adhere to the pro-
posal of the neutral powers, as advanced by England, de-
clared, on the part of his Government, that the Emperor of
Russia had renounced all his claims to the duchy of Schles-
wig in favour of the Duke of Oldenburg. The Danes de-
clared that they could make no further concessions. In this
situation of affairs, not knowing whether the German
Powers would concede any other boundary line, the Prus-
sian plenipotentiary said he was ready to recommend to his
Government a line from the north of Flensburg to Tonberg.
The Austrian plenipotentiary did not agree to that proposi-
tion at first; but afterwards he concurred in it. The Danes,
however, refused it at once. It then remained to be consi-
dered whether, without proposing any other line, there was
not some mode by which peace might still be maintained.
We considered that question most anxiously. It was obvi-
ous that many difficulties had been already removed. The
King of Denmark was ready to give up a part of his domi-
nions, and, on the other hand. the German plenipotentiaries
were willing that a part of the duchy of Schleswig should
remain under the dominion of the Ring of Denmark. Both
powers also were ready to accept the proposal that there
should be no interference in the internal affairs of Denmark,
and all the Powers would have been prepared, if there had
been au agreement on other points, to give an European
guarantee to Denmark, who would then have been left
without indeed any sovereignty over the German popula-
tion of the Duchies, but still possessed of a territory entirely
free from foreign interference. Well, under the circum-
stances, we thought that the spirit of the protocol of Paris
might be adopted. The protocol of Paris said that when
serious differences arose between Powers, after other
means of reconciliation had failed, the good offices
of a friendly Power might be resorted to. It ap-
peared to us that sooner than this unequal contest should
be resume. d it would be well to seek the good offices of a
friendly
Power, under the condition that both the parties
should submit to the line decided upon by the arbitrator.
New, Rey lords, I cannot believe but that any impartial
arbitrator would have fixed upon a lino far more favour-
able to Denmark than any which tho German Powers had
proposed—that a Power impartial and without passion
would probably have given not a line to the north of ihns.