The Sun.
London, England, 1864-01-11 00:00:00

THE CASE OF THE ALEXANDRA,

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.-(THIS DAY).

The announcement that judgment would be given in the
Alexandra case attracted a very large attendance of tho

public. On the learned Judges—the Lord Chief Baron and

Barons Channel!, Bramwell, and Pigott, taking their

seats,

The Lord Chief Baron proceeded to give his judgment in

the case. He said the present was an information against

`le ship Alexandra charging ;that the defendants, with

others, had been guilty of a violation of the Foreign En-
listment Act. The Alexandra had been built and partly

rigged at Liverpool, and seized by an officer of the Customs

for a breach of the Act alluded to. The defendants joined

issue, and pleaded that the ship was not forfeited. The

information charged the defendants with every possible vio-

lation of the Act as to the furnishing, equipping, &c., but

said nothing about arming. The question arose, whether

that established the warlike character of the

vessel.

It was urged that the vessel was not

adapted for warlike purposes, and althought it might be
used as a yacht, it was doubtless intended to be used by the

Confederate States of America against a Power with which

her Majesty was friendly. It was also urged that there was

an intention to sell to one of the belligerents the hull of a

vessel suitable for war but unarmed, but to do any warlike

act whatever was a violation. His direction to the jury

was that in such a case the defendants were neither within

the meaning of the Act, but if the commerce of this coun-

try in ships, for peace or war, was to continue, and a ship
left the ports of this country in a condition to cruise out or

to commit hostilities, though it might be of a warlike cha-
racter, he should hoid that there had been no violation of

statute, and that the verdict of the jury was right.
This was the substance of the case between the Crown and
the defendants stripped of all technicalities. The learned
judge went at some length into the nature of his direction
to the jury at the trial, in the course of which he stated
that if the ship had not been equipped, furnished, and
fitted out, the case did not come within the meaning of
the act, and there had been no violation of the statute.
There had been no direct evidence that it was intended to
arm the Alexandra in any British port for the purposes of
cruising or committing hostilities; indeed, there was no
charge in the information on the subject of arming at all.
He, however, left the question to the jury in the terms
of the act of Parliament, and they found a verdict for
the defendants, on which the Attorney- General obtained
a rule nisi for a new trial. Cause was shown during
term, and the arguments lasted six days. It would be
natural, he thought, in the first place, to call attention
to the various charges in the information, consisting of
98 counts, The first eight counts were repeated 12 times,
varying the charges of equipping, furnishing, fitting out,
&c., thus making 96 counts. The Attorney-General had,
in fact, stated that the first eight counts represented all the
rest. The charges therefore resolved themselves into what
was meant by furnishing, equipping, &c., with intent. The
question then arose, which was the true construction of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, and what was meant by the pro-
hibition to cruise or to commit hostilities. It should be
borne in mind that under the act the property was not to be
forfeited unless the crime specified had been committed ;
and he might remark that neither on the trial nor during
the argument had any one suggested by name who had
committed the crime, what he did in committing the
crime, or what were the acts, and who were the
persons by whose conduct the ship Alexandra had
become forfeited to the Crown. If the statute made
out that the defendants had done a crime, they did not want
the dicta of jurists or the decisions of American courts to
decide whether the case was within the statute, and no
appeal to jurists or decisions of foreign courts ought to in-
duce the judge to declare whether or not the scope or object,
the spirit and intention of the act included the case under
consideration. The learned judge next quoted from Black-
stone, to show that judges were bound to decide such cases
according to the strict letter of the law. The institutions
of the country, he believed, were never more secure than
now, but he thought the country could not afford to Jose
any of the grounds of security. No calamity could be
greater than to render elastic such a statute to serve a
special or temporary purpose. He thought the judges of
that Court had nothing to do with the political consequences
of their decision, or with the dissatisfaction it might
create in any quarter whatever, and he could not help ex-
pressing his regret, not unmixed with some surprize that
the Attorney-General had more than once adverted to the
consequences that might arise if the judges decided that
what the defendants had done, was not contrary to inter.
national law, he (the Attorney-General) had distinctly
stated and he had made it the foundation of an argument in
another place, as it was called, the foreign nations had no
right to complain of it as a violation of the
law of nations. The Attorney-General said on
the second that the legislature had declared
that the peace and welfare of the kingdom and of the world
would depend upon the decision of that court. When his
attention was directed to the observation, he admitted he
had gone too far, and he (the Chief Baron) really thought
he had, for there was nothing whatever in the
preamble of the act about the peace of the world.
The learned judge then proceeded to inquire what was the
real interpretation of the words used in the statute, and held
that unless the alleged crime was plainly within the statute
the Court ought to decline to interfere. In his judgment
it was not within the statute, and that it was never con-
templated by those who framed the law. He thought
that he might declare that it was lawful to build ships in
this country even for warlike purposes. Ship-builders
in this country had for a century built ships for
every country in the world, and for all purposes. Ship-
building was one of the most important of our industrial
pursuits, and the building of ships, even for warlike pur-
poses, was not unlawful, provided that they were not
equipped, furnished, or fitted out in our ports, with the
intent stated in the Act. Reverting to the Foreign Enlist •
ment Act, the learned judge said they were familiar inWest-
minsterHall with the phrase " to drive a coach and six through
an Act of Parliament. It would not, he thought, be difficult
to sail a whole feet of ships through the act, so clumsily
was it constructed." With respect to the rule, he was of
opinion that none of the grounds on which it was applied
for were made out, and that the rule ought, therefore, for a
new trial, to be discharged.

Baron Bramwell thought that the act ought not to be
made to extend to anything which waa not clearly within
its meaning, The word "intent" seemed to explain what
was the intention of the Legislature, but he did not like to
rely on one word. If, therefore, the word was omitted it
would be necessary, to bring the case within the meaning
of the aet, that the vessel should have been equipped, fur-
nished, and fitted out. Building the ship or selling it was
not prohibited by the act. He thought the construction put
by the Crown upon the act was wrong, and that the direction
of the Lord Chief Baron to the jury was substantially, if
not verbally, correct. Interpreting the statute as he did,
he had no doubt the verdict of the jury was right. He had
no doubt the Alexandra was being built for the Confederate
States to be used against the Federals ; but he did not think
there was any intention to arm or equip her in the Queen's
dominions. On the contrary, he believed it was intended
to evade not to infringe the statute, and consequently he
thought that the rule should be discharged.
Baron Channell said he had come to a different conclu-
sion, and he held that the conduct of the defendants consti-
tuted a violation of the act, their intention being to equip
and furnish the ship. He thought a new trial ought to Jae
granted on the ground of misdirection.
Baron Pigott also was of opinion that a new trial ought

to be granted.
The Attorney-General said, as the Court was divided,
ho had to apply that the rule might be discharged or
made absolute, so that there might be a definite judg-
ment on which an appeal might be founded.
The Lord Chief Baron said that according to practice
there might be an appeal either way, but perhaps it would
be better that there should be au apparent judgment.

After some conversation,
Baron Pigott withdrew his judgment, and there then
being two to one the rule was discharged.
The Attorney-General intimated his intention to appeal.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
Mr. Justice Shee was, this morning, sworn as a judge of
the Court before the Lord Chief Justice.
The mandamus calling upon the Governors of St. Bar-
tholomew's Hospital to show why they refused to appoint
Alderman Rose president of the hospital, was, with the
assent of Sir F. Kelly, who represented the hospital autho-
rities, ordered to issue, so that the whole matter mignt now
be fully discussed.