The Sun.
London, England, 1864-09-24 00:00:00

But Mr Seward's speech had its good parts, and
was singularly and gratuitously chivalrous towards
his colleagues, He positively went out of his way
to champion Mr Secretary Welles and Mr Secretary

Stanton, who are boyond doubt the two most un-
popular men in America. To Mr Welles—known
in the navy and to the newspapers as " Rip Van

Winkle "—the man of a bygone age, and not at this

moment half awake—is attributed by popular opi-

nion the damaging fact that a few Confederate war

steamers have been enabled to drive American corn.

meree fromlhe ocean, or Bend it into British bot-
toms—and to Mr. Stanton is, in like manner, earl.•
bated every failure and reverse of the Federal arms
that has occurred since the diamsssal of Mr. Simon
Ca

,moron to the splendid exile of the embassy to St.
Petersburg. For these maligned and persecuted
Ministers, Mr. Seward has nothing but words of
graciousness. Like a good fairy, he drops pearls
from his mouth, and like Ophelia in her madness
he turns every affliction into favour and prettiness.
The victory in Mobile Bay is not so much due to
Admiral Farragut as to Secretary Welles. " Far-
ragut's fleet," says Mr. Seward, " did not make it-
self, nor did Farragut make it. It was prepared by
the Secretary of the Navy." And as for Mr Stanton
—a man whose war dispatches are no mote accu-
rate than Seward's orations, tho world is ignorant
of its greatest men. "He that shall record the
history of this war truthfully and impartially,"
exclaims the joyous sage of Auburn, " will write
that, since the days of Carnot, no man has organ-
ised victory with ability equal to that of Stanton."
But alas ! what is the use of ability if it be nnac-

companied by success? Carnet was successful, and
Stanton is not. Richmond is yet uncaptured, and
Washington on Mr. Seward's own showing is still
beleagured. These facts reduce the ability of the
War Secretary to a point at which its value ceases
to be appreciable to the fervent patriotism of the
public.
The military situation no longer commends itself
to the exultation of sensible people. Mr. Seward's
" eggshell " has still some vitality in it, and may yet
be hatched into a very formidable cockatrice. Gen-
eral Sherman admits that although he has taken
Atlanta, he did not consider it prudent to attack
the undefeated army of the Confederates in the new
position which they have assumed at 30 miles south
of that city; and Secretary Stanton, aware of the
fact, notifies the public, through General Dix, that
he supposes it to be General Sherman's design to
withdraw his advance columns, give his army rest
in Atlanta, and re-establish his communications
with his bases of supplies, which have been broken
by the Confederate Generals Wheeler and Forrest.
General Sherman, in a letter that reads as if it were
not quite genuine, says it he has not achieved a vic-
tory, he does not know what a victory is; but if the
capture of a city from which the enemy had removed
all the valuables long before, and the occupation by
the said enemy of a new position cf his own choice
and in which his opponent does not see fit to assail
him, is a great victory, it is difficult to define what
can be meant by a small one. Evidently the great
battle of the Georgian campaign has yet to be
fought, and Sherman's position, 140 miles from his
true base, and with enemies in front and rear and all
around, cannot well be considered by any impartial
critic or spectator as wholly devoid of peril. At
Petersburg and Richmond there is no change,
though there are many indications of a renewed

conflict for the possession of that portion of the
Weldon Railroad which the Federal army continues
to hold. Even should the Confederates deem
wise to leave Grant in unmolested occupation of
that point, the necessity lies heavy upon Grant of
making a movement of some kind, with or without
reinforcements. Burmuda Hundred is proverbially
unhealthy. The autumnal damps and fogs will
soon be upon it, and his men must either die, fight,
or remove to a healthier abiding place. It would
appear, however, that the initiative of fighting
will not be taken by General Lee; that a por.
lion of General Early's corps has returned from
the Shenandoah to take part in the onslaught, and
that news of a great battle may be expected every
day. General Grant, in a singular letter to a pri-
vate friend, which has been sent to all the journals
for publication, asserts that " the rebels have now in
their ranks their last man, and that they have robbed
the cradle and the grave equally to get their present
force." This is a strong figure of speech, and if there
be really babies and dead men in the Confederate
ranks, as the General says, Grant will have an easy
victory. It is not exactly the military style of writ-
ing, but it has a flavour of the Far West, and is
hugely popular. Grant, however,',is not a states-
man, a speaker, or a writer, and has yet to prove
that he is much of a soldier in anything but in
tenacity of purpose. This quality may be a virtue,
if not carried too far. It remains to be teen whether
Grant's tenacity, which has already cost 100,000
men, may not cost him, before all is over, one half
of his remaining army and the last shred of his
military reputation.

Mr. Aytoun, M,P., on the Danish Question

nGp ereserdv aayl
e,
ntth
throughout
ooung.
hou t
In an address to his censtiTuente at Kirkaldy, on Wed-
man question, he thought that the feeling was generally
the gentleman
country u said—Withn try that Gr adne:
de-
clining to involve us in war, had arrived at a sound and
wise conclusion. (Applause.) Government,
vg
ea
rrnd
mt to thent, in
He was of opinion that very
considerable misapprehension had prevailed for a long time
as to the quarrel between Germany and Denmark with re-
spect to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. He thought
that at the time the negotiations were going on, and until
the debate in July had given an opportunity for the ex-
pression of the ideas of persons who held different, and, in
some cases, diametrically opposite opinions upon this sub-
ject, the whole question was very considerably misunder-
stood. And to his mind one of the most extraordinary and
most erroneous impressions which prevailed was that we
might have conferred a great boon upon the Danes; that
we might have gone to their assistance and enabled them to
escape the calamities which had befallen them without in•
earring any great risk, or at all events without being in-
volved in a war of any great magnitude or any very long
duration. Now, he thought that this was a most erroneous
impression. Some people imagined that in undertaking a
war in defence of the Danes we should have had:to oppose
the force of the two despotic Germanic Powers—Austria
and Prussia. And he had heard Lord Palmerston blamed
since the conclusion of the session for taking what was
called " low rground" on this matter. Lord Palmerston
stated that in the event of us having gone to war we should
only have been able to send 40,000 or 50,000 soldiers to the
Duchies to defend the Danes, and that we should have been
opposed to an army of such magnitude that our 40,000 or
50,000 would not have been able to effect any considerable
result against the force that would have been opposed to it.
Now it appeared to him that Lord Palmerston was quite
justified in the assertion which he made. He (Mr Aytoun)
did not think it could rightly be described as taking " low
ground," for a nation before going to war, to form an esti-
mate of the forces which it could spare for the struggle,
and of the strength of the force which it had to meet.
(Applause.) With regard, again, to the impression which
had prevailed that we should only have had to oppose the
two great despotic Powers, he must also be allowed
to say that that was also a complete mistake. He
bolieyed that we should not only have been opposed to
those Powers, but also to the entire population
of Germany. Mr Aytoun proceeded to give a
lengthy statement of the history of the Deno-German pies.
ion, and to sketch the circumstances out of which the dif-
ferences across that tilt iwately issued in the war in D. numb..
He traced the connection which had existed between Den
mark and the Duchiee, and showed that the relationship
between them had always been of a complicated character,
arising, among ()there, out of the different orders of succes-
sion that prevailed in Denmark and the Duchies. lie be-
lieved that for the last 20 years great dissatisfaction had pre-
vailed in the Duchies against the Government of Denmark,
He begged it moreover to be borne in mind that in Germany
what was called the principle of nationalities had been
adopted with great ardour by the people. Ov( r all Europe,
in fact, there seemed at present a great desire among popula-
tions of the same race to become united under the same Go-
vernment. A feeling prevailed among the German people,
not only to unite all the different members of the Confede-
tion more closely together, but to draw into that unint those

other populations, such as Holstein, which was already a
portion of the Confederation, and of Schleswig, which
was not included in the Confederation. The question of
embracing these Duchies had deeply engrossed the mind
of the whole democratic class of the German population.
It was, +therefore, he urged perfectly clear that this
party in Germany would have supported their Government
in whatever course they took. This question of the duchies
was, in short, one of those very few questions on which the
Democratic party in Germany could possibly have united
with the two despotic powers of Austria and Prussia. It
was therefore perfectly clear that if we had gone to war we
should have found ourselves opposed not only to the two
great Powers he had mentioned, but likewise to the whole
population of Germany. It could not fail acoordingly to
strike every one that it would have been a war which we
could not have carried on without attacking the dominions
of the Powers to which we were opposed in other parts
of Europe. If we made war with the whole of Germany
and Austria and Prussia, we should have been obliged to
blockade the ports of the Baltic and to have attacked
the Austrian dominions in the Adriatic ; so that we
would not only have waged a war of the very greatest
dimensions, carried on in various parts of the world, but
a war, the duration of which no one could possibly foresee,
and the results of which would have been most uncertain.
After sketching the history of the treaty of 1852, ho went
on to say that even supposing that we had disregarded the
consequences of war—that we were willing to incur all the
risks and losses which war inevitably entails upon those
who were engaged in it, we should in the event of proving
successful and defeating the Germans, have not known what
to do with the Duchies. ii' we had succeeded in driving
the Germans out of the Duchies. we should then have been
reduced to the necessity of saying to the people of these
Duchies, "You must accept a Government whom you do not
wish to be placed over you." He did not believe that any
Liberal or Conservative Government would have adopted
such a course, or if they had, that the people of this coun-
try would have, tolerated it. It might be that the people of
the Duchies might yet find themselves much worse off
under the rule of Prussia than under that of Denmark; but
he thought it could not be denied that the Danes had pur-
sued a very unwise course in connection with this matter.
He did not defend the course which had been pursued by
the two great despotic powers, for he thought they had done
a great deal which was entirely indefensible ; but he thought
that the Government of this country in deciding not to
enter upon a disastrous European war had come to a wise
conclusion ; and he believed that public opinion through.
out the country had already pronounced in favour of the
position which the Government had taken up in this
matter. (Cheers.) The next most important matter after this
Dano-German question which came before Parliament, was
the Budget. Now, he believed that the remission of taxa-
tion which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made in the
Budget was perhaps, upon the whole, as satisfactory an ar-
rangement as the people under the circumstances expected.
The remission of the duties on sugar was calculated to give
relief to all classes; and the remission of ld on the income
tax, small as it was, would, he had no doubt, likewise gene-
really be considered satisfactory. But there was one point
in the Budget, which he did not think was equally satisfac-
tory, and that was the manner in which the duties on fire
insurance had been dealt with. (Applause.) He thought
that this was one of the worst taxes by which the public
revenue of this country was collected. It was a tax, so to
speak, upon prudence. It tended to check the habit of
saving money, in order to provide against the contingency
of destruction of property by fire, and as being opposed to
the cultivation of a prudent habit he thought it might be
called one of the worst taxes in the country. There were two
courses open to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which he
might with advantage have adopted. He might either have
reduced the duties upon all classes of property upon which
duty was paid, or he might have made a larger remission
on one class, and left for the present the duty as it was
upon the other classes of property. The Chancellor had
adopted the latter course, and diminished the duty on fire
insurances on stocks in trade, while he left the duty upon
houses and furniture. This, he thought, was a defect in
the Budget, but he did not think it offered a sufficient reason
for compelling the Government to reconstruct the entire
Budget. He hoped the duty on fire insurance would be
reduced at no distant time upon other classes of property,
as well as upon stocks in trade. He would like now to be
allowed to say a few words upon the colonial policy of this
country. lie thought that at present this subject was
occupying more attention than it formerly did, more espe-
cially in the House of Commons ; and he was rejoiced to see
this, because he was convinced that if we were to reduce the
expenditure of the country it must be in reforms in our colo-
nial policy as well as in the policy we pursued in tho semi-
civilised countries of the East. There were some persons in
this country who argued that the.colonies were of no use,
and who considered, simply upon economical grounds, that
they Aid not pay, and ought to be given up by the mother
country. Now, he did not agree with these persons. Ile
thought that having founded colonies in distant parts, and
having induced our countrymen to go out to these colonies,
we were bound to afford these countrymen that protection
which they were led to expect when they went out to settle
in those distant places. But he maintained that as these
colonies increased in wealth and strength. they were bound
to take a share in the expenses attendant upon their own
defence. Let him ask whether this course had been pur-
sued with respect to our different colonies? If it had been
pursued we should have found that our more advanced colo-
nies would now have been paying considerable sums to the
mother country, or would have been providing largely in
the shape of local troops or militia for their own defence.
We found, however, that in Canada nothing of this kind
had taken place. When we sent out a considerable force:to
Canada after the affair of the Trent, and when there was a
fear of hostilities with the United States, it was expected
that the colonies would have made great exertions, and
would have raised such a force as—acting in conjunction
with the regular troops which we sent there—would have
rendered Canada quite safe from attack. We found
however, that the Canadians did nothing of the kind ; but,
on the contrary, rested all the obligations of defence on this
country. All the recommendations sent out to them to in-
crease their forces had produced no effect upon them what-
ever. At one time we were told, as an excuse for their
doing so little for their own defence, that this resulted from
certain political complications, and that when these com-
plications were at an end the Canadians would raise a very
large and effective militia. In reality, however, it had turned
out that the people of that country seemed to imagine that
it was not their duty to provide in any considerable degree
for their own defence; or, if this were not the case, they at
least seemed to think that no force was requisite for thispur-
pose. The Canadians told us that if they become involved
in any war with the United States, it would be from their
connection with the mother country. They said that they
could not be attacked by the people of the United States for
any other reason than that the people of the United States
had some ground of quarrel with the people of Great Bri-
tain. The Canadians, in effect, said, "When we were ex-
posed to danger in connection with that affair of the Trent,
it was only in consequence of a quarrel which was not ours
but yours; therefore you should provide for our safety.'
He thought that was a view of the question which could not
be sustained by argument. We could not be united with a
country on such conditions as these. It could not for a mo-
ment be held that whenever the people of Canada had any
favour to ask from this country—whenever they wanted
money at a cheap rate for the construction of their railways
—whenever they wanted anything done to:promote their ma-
terial interests, that we should do our best to fulfil their
wishes; while, when we go to them and say that we ate
willing to assist you— that it is your duty in the first instance
to provide for the safety of your own territory, they turn
round and tell us that their sole danger arises, not from
their own quarrels, but from those of the mother country.
Ho thought that such a state of things could not continue.
Ile thought that the Government of this country, in not
urging more strenuously upon the people of Canada to pro-
vide for their own defence, and in not telling them that
there might be an alteration in this respect, were doing
more to endanger the connection between this country and
the colonies, and doing more to shorten the period during
which the mother country and the colonies might be united,
than all the writers such as Professor Goldwin Smith, who
had written in favour of separation on the ground of econo-
my. After referring to the recent loan granted to New Zea-
land, and condemning the policy of granting loans as a
most erroneous policy, Mr Aytoun proceeded to make some
remarks upon the war which is at present raging in New
Zealand. Ho said that, being involved in the war, nothing
remained to us but to bring it to a conclusion as soon as
possible. The remedy which he thought the British Go-
vernment should bring into operation, with a view to pre-
venting future wars in the colonies, was this. The Go-
vernment should say to the colonies—" We shall assist you
to defend yourselves in the lands which you at present oo-
cupy ; but if you insist upon going beyond your limits and
taking possession of lands other than those you at present
possess, you must do so at your own risk and at your own
cost," (Applause.) It was almost a self-evident proposi-
tion that wherever the people of a country found that they
could make war without any considerable expense to them-
selves that they would be very careless in avoiding, as
they ought to do, all causes of collision. He believed thac
we would never be free from these colonial wars until we
made up our minds to throw upon the people of the colo-
nies the entire cost of these wars, which it was in their
power, more than in ours, to avoid. Passing next t
interest to the
consideration of our policy in the East, he expressed his opi-
nion that it was our duty as well as our topreserve
a policy of strict neutrality in eastern countries similar to
i
the policy which we pursued in Europe and
n America.
He was very much afraid, however, that the policy of non-
interference which we carry ,out in regard to civilised
nations we were neglecting to carry out in the East.
British subjects had been allowed by an Order in Cowie
cil, which was now repealed, to take commissions in