The Sun.
London, England, 1864-11-15 00:00:00

THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

(From the Times' Special Correspondent.)
WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, Sept. 22.
I have rarely essayed to lift the curtain of the
future, or to venture upon prophecies in regard to
this mighty and inscrutable conclusion, which
laughing philosophers like Mr Seward pronounced
a 00 days' erneute, which many a Southerner, bee
lieving in the kingship of cotton, regarded as a
struggle in which, before six months had flown,
the principals would be England and the Northern
States, but which may now be unhesitatingly de-
scribed as the most momentous incident of the
nineteenth century. But it needs no prophet at
this moment to announce that it is impossible the
next six months can pass without entirely altering
the aspect of the war and the attitude of the weary
and exhausted combatants. There is universally a
sense of the critical and compromising nature of the
circumstances which surround both Governments
such as I have never witnessed before. The spring
of 1865 will have seen either the abandonment by
Mr Lincoln of his impossible undertaking, or the
capture of Petersburg, if not of Richmond, by Gen.
Grant, and the assumption of a new attitude by the
Southerners in the resistance which for generations
to come they will never cease to offer, rather than
be trodden down under a heel such as has recently
crushed the life out of Poland.
It is probable that the onward march of Sherman
into Georgia will be arrested at Atlanta. In several
of my previous letters (many of which I have reason
to believe have recently been unsuccessful in
piercing the blockade with safety) I have pointed
out the embarrassments with which Sherman was
beset when undertaking by far the most hazardous
enterprise yet attempted by the Federals in this
war. It would be gross injustice to deny to Sher-
man the credit which his success in ,capturing
Atlanta deserves—a success which is largely due
to his personal attributes, or, as they are phrased by
Northern newspaper correspondents (between whom
and Sheridan there is much such harmony as exists
between lambs and wolves), his " eccentricities." To
have conducted a campaign from a base distant 300
miles away from Atlanta, the object of his operations
I refer to Nashville in Central Tennessee—to have
kept open for six months his communication along
this entire distance upon a single line of railway,
crossing several great rieera and numberless creeks,
and traversing a country every foot of which is in-
habited by a hostile population—to have dispensed
with all such assistance as is contributed to Grant
by the Potomac and James rivers, and to have
finally prevailed in the proximate object of the cam-
paign—that is to say, in the capture of Atlanta, is
no mean achievement. Nor is the fall credit to
which Sherman is entitled less freely accorded to
him in Richmond than in Washington, whatever
may be the opinions entertained in the former city
as to the fiendish inhumanity of several of his let•
ters and public utterances. It is difficult to conceive
how a believer in the Republican axiom that Go-
vernments derive their just powers from the consent
of the governed can reconcile to its conscience such
measures as Gen. Sherman has not scrupled to adopt
towards the helpless non-combatants who hale
fallen into his bands.
Bat, in according to Sherman the praise which is
justly his due as an able and tenacious General, it
must not be forgotten that there is all the difference
in the world between Georgia and Virginia. In the
latter State it has never been possible for the Fede-
rals to keep open oven 40 miles of railroad with a
view of supplying their army along it. If it be
practicable for Sherman to keep cpen a line of
railroad from Nashville to Atlanta, why has it never
been possible for M'Clellan or any of his successors
to keep open a line from Washington to Richmond,
which are divided from each other by only 120 miles ?
The distance from Acqua Creek, on the Potomac, to
Richmond, via Fredericksburg, is little more than
60 miles, with a line of railroad already in existence
at the commencement of the war, es was the case
between Nashville and Atlanta. And yet the Fe-
derals have never been able to avail themselves of
any portion of this railroad, with the exception of
the ten miles between Acqua Creek and Fredericks-
burg. The inference is irresistible that the Georgians
and Virginians are made of different stuff. I am not
blind to the fact that the far sparser population of
Tennessee and Northern Georgia than of Virginia is
an element highly favourable to Sherman: But I
have long been of opinion that of the two great
armies of the Federals, their Western army is coma
posed of much finer material than their Eastern,
whereas the Confederates under General Lee have
al ways been vastly superior to these in the West who
have successively obeyed Sydney Johnson, Beaure-
gard, Bragg, Joseph E. Johnson, and Hood. General
Grant finds it almost impossible to keep up tele-
graphic lines between Petersburg and Norfolk, end
has been betrayed into impetuous outbursts of me-
nace against the residents in those counties of Vir-
ginia which are situated along the Southern bank
of the James River between City point and Norfolk,
because certain of General Lee's scouts have inter-
fered with the telegraph wires. It is obvious that
Grant might as well threaten and storm, because
General Hampton and the Confederate cavalry have
recently picked up 2,500 head of cattle behind the
Federal lines—hut the wrath of the Federal General
against the inhabitants of Surrey and Nansemond
counties indicates of what stuff aro the men by
which these counties are peopled. Refuges, ejected
from their homes in Northern Georgia, and turned
adrift in a desolate and uninhabited region, have not
the resources which await outcasts in a more densely
peopled territory, like Virginia, and are, therefore,
more easily terrified by a Sherman into passive ac-
quiesence in the presence of a hated foe. But, in
addition to this, there is beyond question a stubborn-
ness in the temper of men, women, and children in
Virginia which they are proud to attribute to the
fact that good English blood runs undefiled in their
veins to an extent unknown in any other State of
the old Union. When the census of 1850 was taken
it was found that out of a population in Virginia
rather exceeding one million there were only 20,000
persons who had not been born within the State,
The spirited and lofty endurance of the Old Domi-
nion throughout this war is a fact of which Eng,.
land might justly claim to be as proud as she was
of the unshrinking vigour with which her sons and
daughters confronted the mutiny in Hindostan, and
triumphed over dangers and against odds which
have never been paralleled.
It is possible many of your readers, taking their
impressions from Mr Seward's recent speech at
Auburn and from the tone of the Northern journals,
may believe that Grant's army is growing from day
to day and from week to seek, while Lee is suffering
from disease, desertion, and depression to the extent
represented in the same veracious chronicles. lam
in a position to throw some light upon this subject,
and I may here remark that the extent of informa-
tion possessed by Gen. Lee as to the movements
and numbers of the enemy (and, as I doubt not,
possessed also by Gen. Grant on the same subject)
is probably unexampled since armies faced each
other in the field. This may probably be attributable
to the fact that no such war between men speaking
the same tongue has been witnessed ; and also to
the light imparted to the Governments and
generals upon either side by the journals issuing
daily from Richmond and New York, and inter-
changed almost before the ink with which they are
printed is dry, There is not a transport or war
vessel which goes up or down the James River
whose name, armament, tonnage, cargo, and (if she
carries troops) number of wssengers are not approxi.
mately known to General Lee. It is not necessary
that I should state more than that Grant had last
week five army corps in front of Lee. It is a
liberal computation to estimate each of these corps
at 10.000 men.,
_lf Lee regarded his troops as Grant
-views his army, and were disposed to sacrifice them
with analogous callousness, I do not hesitate to
concur in the opinion of most of Lee's inferior
officers that Grant would hive been in full retreat
before the Ist of October. The Weldon railroad,
new held with loud pee ins of self-laudation by
Warren's Federals, could, in General Beauregard's
judgment, be regained with a loss of at most 1,500
Confederates. But it is felt while the end of this war,
or Southern independence, is being slowly reached
by the gradual inertness of resistance which bars the
oor to Richmond, it ig little less than murder to
throw troops against intrenchmcnts which it will

serve no purpose for the Confederates to carry. The
conditions under which the war is carried on by
North and by South vary essentially in this re-
spect., If the South stands still she is every day a
gainer; with the North it is emphatically true that
non progredi est regredi. From the very first the
constant efforts of the journals in Mr Lincoln's in-
terest has been to prove that the Union troops are
always gaining ground, and many a general (as, for in-
stance, Burnside at Fredericksburg) has been goaded
on to his ruin by the cry, " Defeat is better than
inaction." That Grant is no nearer to the capture
of Richmond than he was when he crossed the
Rapidan is the counter assertion of the Richmond
journals every week. With the exception of the
inevitable weariness incident to so unremitting a
campaign as Lee's troops have sustained since the
4th of May, his strength at this hour, thanks to his
careful economy and judicious handling of his men,
compares very favourably with his strength on the
first day of this year's campaign. It will be sees,
therefore, that Lee's ability to hold Richmond and
(if it seem desirable) Petersburg throughout the
winter hinges upon the two questions whether he
can supply his army as well as the inhabitants of
the two principal cities of Virginia ; and, secondly,
whether the army of General Grant during the
winter months can be reinforced to the extent of
from 100,000 to 150,000 men. Less than the for-
mer number, added to Grant's present force, will
have no chance against the earthworks which girdle
Richmond, and which I have so often described.
It is the universal belief of thoughtful men in the
South that Virginia will be the chief scene of Mr
Lincoln's efforts during the remainder of this year.
Large bodies of Federal troops have lately been
withdrawn from the Mississippi River—as, for ex.
ample, the troops in Northern Mississippi, which
have been held in check in the neighbourhood of
Tupelo and Oxford by General Forrest for the last
six months—and it was at first believed that they
would be added to the strength of General Sherman.
Bat there is reason now to suppose that Sherman's
force has been diminished rather than increased,
and that these reinforcements are designed for Vir•
ginia, and are on their road to Grant or Sheridan.
One result of the withdrawal of this Federal force
from Northern Mississippi will be to liberate the
ablest, most active, and most efficient cavalry cap-
tain whom the Confederate States have as yet pro-
duced. General Forrest is a rough, uncultivated
Western man, but in force of character, in promp-
titude of action, and in adaptation to the wild
and fatiguing warfare in which he is engaged,
it is doubtful whether a more formidable guerilla
chief ever drove spur into a horse's flank. It
is said that since the commencement of the
war he has had thirty horses killed under
him. I never entertained much expec-
tation of the achievements which Gen. Wheeler and
the Confederate horsemen under his charge would
accomplish, but I shall be surprised if Gen. Forrest
does not exert a disturbing influence upon Sherman's
communications.
But a point of greater interest either than Rich•
mond or Atlanta_seems likely before long to be the
very spot from which lam now writing. It is
doubtful whether any other town in Secessia, not
even Richmond or Augusta, with its contribution of
10,000 lb. of gunpowder per diem, has exercised such
an influence upon the fortunes of this war as the
insignificant little port of Wilmington, from which
before the war only one shipment of 200 bales of
cotton direct to Europe had ever been made, but
from which the sinews of war, in the guise of cotton
bales, have flowed out uninterruptedly to England
for three years past, while an amount of war mate-
rial and of supplies of all kinds has been sucked in
through this same gate to an extent of which your
readers have little concention. There is no other
port which existed in 1861 so favourable to blockade
runners as Wilmington and the mouth of the
Cape Fear River. The astonishing want of enter•
prise which charecterised the Yankee navy during
the first 12 months of the war led to the disregard
of a river the mouth of which was for many
months defended only by two or three email field-
pieces, with half a dczen rounds of ammunition to
each. If, instead of indulging the spite of Boston
against Charleston, in April, 1863, the whole power
of the Federal navy had been turned against Wil-
mington, the course of this war might have been
more influenced than by burning ten cities like
Charleston, or capturing half a dozcnVickeburgs. As
matters now stand, the capture at present of
mington (were it possible) would, for reasons which
it is net necessary to state, produce no result ; and
secondly, Wilmington, long unmolested, has grown
into such a fortress as to defy the utmost efforts of
the Yankees from the sea. I have in vain urged
upon your readers the importance to England of
bring represented by one or two of her ablest milis
tary engineers, to learn aright the lessons of this
war; but I may mention that in constructing the
forts at Duppel a capable Prussian engineer adapted
the peculiar system of earthwork and traverses which
he had seen at the mouth of the Cape Fear River,
and proved that European military engineers may
learn with advantage from the skill of a Beauregard
and a Whiting as much as was taught them by the
genius of Todleben. Talk of the experiments in
rifled cannon at Shoeburyness! An English artillery-
man might watch the firing of the Armstrong shunt
gun, of the Whitworth, of the Brook gun, and of
every variety of smoothbore at the mouth of Cape
Fear with the additional enlightenment which real
war confers beyond the experience gained from a
sham rehearsal.
So long as Wilmington was merely a point of
entry and of exit for blockade runners it received
comparatively little attention from that Old Man of
the Sea, Mr Gideon V; elles ; but the recent media
from this port and the return hither of the Talla-
hassee, after playing the questionable part of Paul
Jones off the harbour of New York, seem to have
attracted hither the notice of those active spirits in
the North who have conducted this war through-
out upon the principle of shutting the stable door
when the steed is stolen. It is universally expected
here that a formidable attack, probably conducted
by that renegade son of Virginia, Admiral
Farragut, is shortly imminent. I can promise
him that ample cheer awaits him here, and that
he has got a harder nut to crack than Forts
Morgan and Gaines at Mobile. There has been
much laughter and chuckling hero about the recent
entry into this port of Captain Taylor IV ood, after
his successful cruise in the Tallahassee. Captain
Wood came one dark night right through the
Yankee blockaders, and was fired upon like an ordi-
nary blockade runner. He immediately responded
by firing his broadside in the direction of the flash
of the gun which he had seen. The Federal Cap-
tain naturally concluded that he had fired upon one
of his own associates, and showed a red light
Captan Wood fired at the red light. Another
Federal captain then showed a blue light. Captain
Wood fired at the blue light. This led to a general
cannonading from the Yankee vessels all round, and
Captain Wood left them firing upon each other and
in blind and perplexing confusion, long after he
had slipped away from their vicinity and was safely
anchored under the guns of Fort Fisher.

September 24.
Since the above letter was written information
has been received that a disaster, occasioned appa-
rently by General Early's contemptuous estimate of
his enemy, has overtaken his army, which will long
be memorable as having cost the Confederacy one of
its most valuable lives. It appears that Early, hav-
ing been weakened by the withdrawal from uis
ranks of that portion of Anderson's (late Long-
street's) corps which had been sent two months ago
to the Valley, continued, with very inferior forces
as compared with Sheridan's, to occupy his old lines
between Winchester and Berryville, instead of fall-
ing back to the very strong position some 20 miles
in the rear, which has long been regarded as the
key to the Valley, and which is at a place called
Fisher's-hill, in the neighbourhood of Strasburg.
Upon the 19th inst. Sheridan, inspirited, as it is
here believed, by a visit from Grant, who was with
him on the preceding day, attacked Early in
very heavy
force, and after flanking the little
Confederate army with a large body of cavalry com.
pelled Early to retrsat to Strasburg. The action,
of which I have received no detail.' appears to have
been one of the sharpest of the war, and is to be
bewailed principally in connection with the death
of General modes, one of the most pron3sinc,e' Major
Generals in the Confederate service, . It will be