The Sun.
London, England, 1864-01-19 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

POST.—The course pursued by Austria end I
Prussia in separating themselves from the other
German Powers is one which appears dictated as
much by the instinct of self-preservation as by hos-
tility to Denmark. Of course, as between Denmark
and those Powers, the delivery of an ultimatum,
with a threat of immediate war, can only be re-
garded in one light. If the Danish Government
refuses, as is most probable, to comply with the
peremptory demand of the two German Powers,
and the latter thereupon proceed to execute their
threat, war must ensue. But the singular course
which evtnts have taken at Frankfort, and the dis-
sension which has arisen in the Diet, compel in-
different spectators to form an estimate of the
Austro-Prussian policy not as it stands alone, but as
compared with that which the almost unanimous
voice of Germany appears to demand. Considered
purely and simply, nothing can be less defensible
than the demands made by Austria and Prussia
upon Denmark. Assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, that the November Constitution cannot be
fully justified by the Danish Government, it does
not supply either the German Confederation or any
of the States composing it with a reasonable cause
for invading Denmark. As regards the Confede-
ration, it does not in its Federal capacity possess
jurisdiction in either Denmark proper or Schleswig,
and, by the terms of its constitution, was never
intended to possess the power of directing an aggres-
sive war. Austria and Prussia, as independent
Powers, might of course set forth any pretext, how-
ever shallow, for invading Denmark or any other
State; but, according to the modern code of inter-
national morality, they could not avoid the condem-
nation of Europe should they throw down the gage
of battle in the false character of champions of

es ee.e.e
constitutional government. It is not, however, on
its abstract merits that the present conduct of
Austria and Prussia must be judged. It is impos-
sible to avoid feeling that, whether rightly or
wrongly, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin have
come to the conclusion that a choice of evils was
forced upon them, and they have chosen what they
consider to be the least. It may be taken as an
incontestable fact that those Cabinets have at no
time favoured the pretensions of the Duke of
Augustenbnrg. This is shown by their proposal
in the Diet that the Duke should be compelled
to withdraw from Holstein, and by their still
later proposal to make the invasion of Schleswig
contingent alone on the non-withdrawal of the
November Constitution. If, on the accession of
Christian IX., the Austrian and Prussian Govern-
ments affected to make his recognition dependent
on the fulfilment of certain obligations, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that they merely employed
an empty threat to obtain concessions from the
Danish Monarch. Not only formal obligations, but
the strongest motives of self interest, bind Austria
and Prussia to discourage the pretensions of the
Duke of Augustenburg. Such, then, being the
policy of the two leading Powers of the Confedera-
tion, let us see the state of circumstances with which
they had to deal. Whatever influence Austria and
Prussia may have hitherto exercised at Frankfort,
the events of the past few weeks have shown them
that in the present crisis that influence is seriously
diminished. When, on the death of the late King
of Denmark, the Duke of Augustenburg laid claim
to the Duchies, the question of Federal execution
was pending in the Diet. When, however,
the chief powers proposed that Federal execution
should be cartied out, it was by a very narrow ma-
jority that the proposal was sanctioned, the mino-
rity having been of opinion that the Federal forces
should enter Holstein, nut with the object of ob-
taining redress from Christian IX., but with th-t
of placing the Duke of Augustenburg upon the
throne. Subsequent events proved that many of
those States which on that occasion supported Aus-
tria and Prussia did 83 less from an intention to re-
cognise the claims of the Danish Monarch than from
a desire to obtain easier access to the Duchy of
Holstein. Unless the Diet professed to be simply
enforcing domestic discipline, the Danes would not
have evacuated the Duchy, and, consequently, such
of the States as then supported the leading Powers,
but have since opposed them, pursued a course re-
markable for its ingenuity. No sooner had the
Federal forces obtained possession of Holstein than
these States threw off the mask, and, without for-
mally declaring themselves in favour of the Duke
of Angustenburg, offered a strenuous opposition to
all proposals based on the assumption that Christian
of Denmark was amenable, in the quality of a Ger-
man Prince, to the jurisdiction of the Confederation.
The two chief Powers then found themselves in a
minority. The resolution that the Pretender should
he called upon to quit Holstein was rejected by a
email majority, and Austria and Prussia for the first
time found that they had lost the leadership of
the Great Council at Frankfort. Events, however,
seriously affecting the status quo were meanwhile
rapidly accumulating. In Holstein a revolution
had been accomplished in favour of the Duke of
Augustenburg, and nothing remained but for the
Federal Commissioners to transfer to him the au-
thority which they were exercising in the name of
the Diet. The Federal forces, having traversed
Holstein, were massed on the banks of the Eider,
and nothing remained but for the majority in the
Diet to give expression to their desires and bid
their. troops cross the Danish frontier. In this
juncture no course was open to the leading Powers
save to forestall, if possible, the conclusion at which
the Diet was to all appearances on the point of ar-
riving, by making the casus belli with Denmark
rest on grounds distinct from the claims of the
Duke of Augustenburg. In their attempt to do
this Austria and Prussia were however again foiled.
In this emergency the great Powers doubtless came
to the conclusion that nothing was left to them as a
means of preventing Garreany from entering on a
war of succession but to act independently of the
Diet, and to rest the cause of quarrel with Denmark,
not upon the supposed usurpation of the King, but
upon the violation of obligations incidental to his
sovereignty in the Duchies. This they have done
by offering to the Danish Government the ultima-
tum which we announced to the public yesterday.
That Denmark will refuse to comply with the de-
mands of the two German Powers thereis no reason
to doubt. If she has hitherto set at defiance the
entire Confederation, it is not probable that she will
accede to the demands now made by Austria and
Prussia. The Austrian and Prussian representa-
tives will doubtless quit Copenhagen, and war may
be formally declared; but it is still possible that
active hostilities may not instantly follow. The
allied Powers of Prussia and Austria on one side,
and Denmark on the other, would be the bellige-
rent parties; and the German Confederation—that
is to say, the minor German Powers,would no longer
have a right to interpose in the pending dispute.
Austria and Prussia would be the sole arbiters of
the conditions on which they would bo willing to
conclude peace, Neither Austria nor Prussia can
possibly wish for a serious war with Denmark, and
we suspect that their present policy, however dan-
gerous, is pursued from a sole desire, in consequence
of their defeat in the Diet, to become, so far as re-
gards the other German Powers, masters of the
present situation.
HERALD.—It seems to be an essential of the Dano-
German quarrel that it should be unintelligible to
the last. Even previously to the accession of King
Christian IX. to the throne of Denmark the
Schleswig-Holstein affair was a puzzle to every
European diplomatist, and an unfathomable mystery
to the uninitiated public; but within the last month
it has become more and more complicated every
day ; and we are now on the brink of an European
war, in which in all probability this country will
be compelled to choose sides, without the remotest
knowledge us to who are to be the parties to the
struggle, what are its objects, and what it is all
about. We could understand something of the
quarrel when it concerned Denmark and the Diet,
and fancied we knew what the latter really wanted.
But now one is fairly bewildered by the game of
cross purposes which all the Powers interested and
involved in the affair seem to be playing, and one
looks in vain for any solution except that of war.
Take the Treaty of 1852, a schemn engagement
entered into by all the Great Powers for the speci-
fied purpose of providing for the contingency which
has arisen—the death of Frederic VII. of Denmark.
We have England standing by it almost alone,
France declaring it a failure, Prussia and Austria
treating it as a conditional obligation, Saxony re-
, pudiatiug it altogether. When it becomes a ques-
tion of supporting the treaty the whole responsi-
bility is left to Denmark. And yet the treaty is
barely ten years old, and the whole European sus•
tem rests upon the due fulfilment of treaty obliga-
tions. The inconsistency is remarkable, out it is a
trifling matter compared with the confused action
of the German Powers. We have heard a great
deal of German unity. If ever there was a question
on which Vaterland would be unanimous this was
the one. Yet it is impossible to conceive a more
hopeless contrarity of opinion than has been exhi-
oited in the German Diet. We give the whole
German people due credit for their' magnanimous
disregard of treaties. Prussians, Saxons, and Co-
burgers agree on this point. But it is strange that
the very first menace of collision with a neighbouring
Power should, as it were necessarily, be followed by
the immediate split up of the Diet. At present there
is almost a doubt whether the arms of Austria and
Prussia are to be turned against the Danes or
against the minor German Powers. Austria and
Prussia are supposed—why we cannot imagine—to
rbe very anxious to maintain the Treaty of 1852.
.1 he minor German Powers are openly in favour of
its repudiation. Austria and Prussia decline the
occupation of holstein and substitute execution. A
fortnight later the same Powers propose the occu-
pation of Schleswig, and the minor States refuse