The Sun.
London, England, 1864-03-25 00:00:00

The Catastrophe at Sheffield,
The inquest was resumed at the Town-hall yesterday be-
fore Mr. J. Webster, coroner.
Matthew B. Jackson, of Sheffield, civil and mechanical
engineer, said—l have been engaged in the construction o
reservoirs in Australia, I was chief engineer of the Mel
bourne Waterworks, consulting engineer of the City o
Adelaide Works, Ballarat Corporation Wat erworks, and
first engineer for the Bendego Waterworks. I was on the
embankment at Bradfield a few hours after the accident, and
three times since I have examined it, in special reference to
this inquiry. I am of opinion there is no fault to be found
with the quantity of material on the slopes. The material
was ample and the slope sufficient. Perhaps in my own
practice I should have preferred a slope of 3to 1 inside. The
puddle was good and sufficient. I have put in a greater pro-
portion of puddle, and I do not think at all that any acci-
dent would have arisen from that. I have no fault to find
with the by-wash. I have examined the embankment. I
should not have formed an embankment in the same way. I
should distinctly prohibit the use of railway waggons on a
bank, more especially on the inside slope, because, in the
first place, I should make the bank in layers of not more
than two feet thick. Railway waggons always travel in
the same line and tend t 3 consolidate the embankment un-
equally. Dobbins and carts, on the other hand, travel
in different parts, and tend to consolidate the embankment
equally. On the inside slope I should have insisted that
layers, not exceeding two feet each, should have been
carried over and through, each being perfectly finished
before another was commenced, On the outside slope I
would not object to a tip of three feet, because it is not so
necessary to have tho outer posts so impervious to water.
It is better open, to let water have free exit. I mean by
open, that it should be composed of more porous material.
The embankment had not been erected in that manner.
There are railway waggons on it now, showing that they
have been used, and it is obvious the layers have been put
on of a greater thickness than two feet. At the embank-
ment at Agden the layers are not being put down and
completed consecutively; and if the one at Bradfield was
constructed in the same way, I should apprehend th,t there
would be an unequal settlement, I did not measure the tips
at Agden , I saw they very much exceeded the measurement
I have given. Unequal settlement is dangerous, because it
may cause a slip. It is peculiarly dangerous if there are
pipes passing under the bank in trenches. It might be
possible to pass them safely through in a culvert. The
danger is that the unequal settlement may break the pipes
or spring the joints, so as to produce leakage. The depth
of the tips I have mentioned is rather an extreme one. In
constructing another bank I should take the specifications
of Mr. Leslie, of Edinburgh, which are the best I ever read.
lie restricts the tips to G inches, one layer to be finished be.•
fore another is begun, and waggons to be prohibited. They
are safer than mine, but more expensive. I approve Mr.
Leslie's stipulation that the puddle wall should be brought
up to and kept on a level of Gin, above the adjoining portion
of the embankment. At my works at Melbourne I had two
fractured pipes. They were under the embankment in the
solid ground. They were laid on flags to the edge of the
puddle trench, and in passing through the puddle each pipe
of each main, which was only 6ft. Gin, in length, was sup-
ported on an ashlar pillar. The pipes were pwidled all round.
The fracture in that caso I have no doubt arose from an
unequal settlement of the embankment, though made with
the limited tips I have mentioned. An embankment settles
more in the centre from its length than at the sides, and,
consequently, if the pipes were laid straight through the
embankment, they would bend and break by the unequal
settling, My plan of putting in the pipes at Melbourne
was a bad one, but not so bad as the plan at Bradfield.
There was no puddle between the flags and pipes at Mel-
bourne ; it would not have made any difference if there
had been. I have not the least doubt that the structure
of the Bradfield dam caused an unequal pressure, frac-
tured the pipes, and so produced a leakage. There is this
difference. The way my pipesawere laid at Melbourne was
more liable to cause fracture of the pipes. Mr. Gunson's
plan was more likely to cause a drawn joint. I heard the
mode described yesterday of keeping down the water in the
puddle trench. The evidence of Mr. Gunson to a great ex-
tent dispelled a doubt I previously entertained. The doubt
was as to whether the water had got under the puddle
trench and risen immediately under the outside slope, in-
ducing a settlement and slip immediately before the burst.
I am inclined to think that such was not the case, and that
the puddle trench was a good job, though I scarcely think
the evidence of Mr. Leather and Mr. Gunson showed that
inclined to think
that, on the reservoir being filled, the unequal settlement
of the embankment occasioned a springing, or starting, or
drawing of the pipe joints. If a joint were once sprung, the
internal pressure of the water itself would be sufficient to
bow the lead out. Having the pipes cast narrower at the
entrance to the socket is a good precaution. It is moreover
possible for the pressure of the water on the valve which
was outside the reservoir to have started a joint between
the valves and the puddle wall. Tbo opening or closing of
the valves would increase the probability of this.
having expressed a wish to
there ll,l r.
sir.
wLGaesaanat hsnoey:
such waswasappealed
dl
it,toy, and he said he did nut think
.
make some explanation. He was beginning to say that he
had been misunderstood on the previous day in reference
to the water seen behind the embankment. He did not
think it had come from the reservoir.
The Coroner stated that he was quite satisfied with the
note which he had taken on that point.
Mr. Gunson was then examined as to the variance which
had taken place in the actual work from the specifications.
These, it appeared, had been considerable. A specification,
he said, was simply a guide; and when the specifications of
the Bradfield Reservoir were drawn up, Mr. Leather was not
aware of the material& to be got in the excavation of the re-

servoir.
By a Juryman—Mr. Leather was more than twice—per-
haps six times at Bradfield—during the construction of the
work. I used to go over and see him. He had to come
once a year at least to report.
The Coroner—He is a " consulting engineer," an orna-
mental officer. He is expected to do nothing but simply
present a report.
Examination continued—We are not, as provided by the
specifications, carrying up the puddle wall at Agden simul-
taneously with the embankment, because that was impos-
sible. Stones may fall among the puddle if the embank-
ment be carried up before the puddle wall, but I have taken
every means to prevent it.
A specification, he said, they would
froTmhtehCe osrpoenceifircastrongly denounced the departure made
understand in future, was not a guide, but a farce and a
deception. Here was one made for the purpose of not being
carried out. He was out of all patience. If the reservoir
at Bradfield had been constructed in the same way as this
one was being made at Agden, he was not surprised at what
had occurred. It would not be so bad if the water com-
pany would admit they had made a single mistake. They
assumed that everything had been perfect.
The examination continued—Mr Gunson said Mr.
Leather came over, and saw some of that work in progress
where the specifications were departed from.
The Coroner—Then he ought to be ashamed of himself.
A Juryman— Mr. Coroner, take it more deliberately.
The Coroner—lt is difficult to do so when there is the
broad fact diet the work has destroyed nearly 300 of our
fellow citizens. (Tc Mr. Smith)—Have you any witnesses.
Mr. Smith—l wili say, if the jury are not satisfied, the
company will be at the expense of calling the most eminent
engineers in the world. The company court inquiry into
the disaster. As to the evidence of Mr. Jackson, he had
shown that the points questioned in the construction of the
work were matters of doubt.
The Coroner—lf you cannot pint out a reason for the
embankment breaking, we have a right to assume that it

has failed from bad management.
Mr. Smith—l don't think that. One conjecture was that
it arose from a natural failure of the ground.
The Foreman, addressing the coroner, said he had made
a statement that morning which must have relieved Mr.
Leather's mind, which was that the jury believed he had
not been guilty of criminal neglect, Perhaps he would now

ask Mr. Leather if he had formed any additional conjecture the destruction of the bank—one of them, or more of them
as to the cause of the disaster ? combined, may have done it. My opinion is that it was the
Mr. Leather—l have heard the evidence this morning most fatal mistake to lay the pipes in the centre of the em-
as to those pipes, and I think it possible such a thing may bankment upon an artificially formed compressible material.
have happened at the drawing of the joints, At the same I think also that 3-ft. layers are much too thick, and that
time, I think if such a thing took place the result must have 6-in, layers, as suggested by Mr. Leslie, are the only safe
shown itself long before, at the foot of the bank or in the way of making the embankment.
value-house. The theory seems very doubtful, but the By Mr; Smith—There are many instances, especially of
gentleman spoke so confidently that it may be entitled to late, in which pipes are not made through the embankment.
some credit. I still think that the accident has been At Dublin the culvert plan round the embankment is being
caused by a slip of land outside the bank. It may have made; I think also at the Rivington reservoirs.
taken place and been covered with the ruins of the em- Nathaniel Beardmore, civil engineer, London—l was
bankment, requested by Sir George Grey to come down and assist Mr.
Mr. B. Smith said the original contract was £27,469, Rawlinson in examining the reservoir, with the object of
About £l,OOO was added on the change of situation of the making a report. I have examined both the Bradfield and
embankment. The extras are upwards of £6,000, and they Agden reservoirs. I have heard the evidence of Mr. Raw-
are going on still. Mr. Leather certifies for the extras on Mason, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Leather, and Mr. Gunson. I
the reports of Mr. Gunson, occasionally coming over to look agree substantially with the evidence of Mr. Rawlinson. I
at the work himself. do not think the Agden embankment is being made in the
Mr R. Rawlinaon, Government engineer, was sworn and secure manner necessary for such a work. In dealing with
said—l have had experience in the construction of water- water security should be taken against the remotest con-
works. I have executed waterworks at Wigan, Berwick-on- tingency of accidents, It would be very difficult to get
Tweed, Swansea, and other places. As inspector, I have everybody to agree as to the immediate cause of the burst-
made myself acquainted with the great works erected during of the reservoir. The disruption being so great, it
ing the last 20 years, and have personally inspected many will be difficult to discover the difference between causes
of them, including those at Liverpool, designed and exe- and effects. My impression is that the puddle is a most ex-
cuted by Mr. Hawksley, and those at Manchester, designed cellent work, I think that the immense depth excavated
and executed by Mr. Bateman. I have inspected carefully must have removed danger from the springs, and the probe.
the Bradfield reservoir, which has failed, and other reser- bilities must point to the pipes being the source, if not the
voirs of the company, and the reservoir at Agden now being cause, of the accident. The description itself implies an
constructed. I have also carefully looked over the specifie immediate volume of water blowing up the material of the
cations. As a practical engineer, I think no waterworks embankment. To my mind, the most material conclusion
embankment ought to have pipes laid through it so as to is that the pipe leads the water to do that mischief. Tel-
prevent repair or renewal when necessary. The engineer fourd, the great engineer, never, I believe, put pipes
should be master of his work, not let it be master of him. through the embankment of a dam. I agree generally with
I know of many instances of failure where pipes and cul- Mr. Rawlinson and Mr. Jackson as to the dangers arising
verts have been laid through the main embankment. Cast- from putting pipes under embankments.
iron pipes having plain socket joints. although previously After retiring 20 minutes the jury returned into court,
tested to four times the head of water they may have to and
carry, are occasionally found fractured and defective when The Coroner said they had made up their minds. He
the water is turned on, although in the street trenches in was glad he had no occasion to sum up, because he should
which they are laid they have only 4ft of earth to bear. have spoken in a manner that would perhaps have been die-
With the most careful jointing, the joints are sometimes agreeable to some persons.
found to be blown or defective Pipes laid in the streets The verdict was as follows :—" We find that Thomas
can be repaired without much damage. A defective pipe Ellstone came to his death by drowning in the inundation
in this embankment may have worked the destruction we
caused by the bursting of the Bradfield reservoir on the
have witnessed, and no human ingenuity could prevent it 12th inst. ; that in our opinion there had not been that en-
under the circumstances in which those pipes exist. I did gineering skill and that attention to the construction of the
not say that it did so, I wish that to be clearly understood. works which their magnitude and importance demanded ;
That, therefore, is not a legitimate way in which to lay that in our opinion the Legislature ought to take such
pipes for the making of a reservoir. In my own practice, action as will result in a Governmental inspection of all
I have formed a tunnel or culvert through the solid stra- works of this character, and that such inspection ought to
tification on one side of the valley and perfectly free be frequent, regular, and sufficient ; and that we cannot
from the loose earth of the embankment. That culvert separate without expressing our deep regret at the fearful
is executed in the very best possible manner with hydraulic loss of life which has occurred from the disruption of the
lime, and puddled to make it perfectly watertight over Bradfield reservoir."
the top. Within that culvert or tunnel the outlet
pipes are ultimately laid. Provision is made for closing
the pipes inside the reservoir. The centre portion of
the tunnel—viz,, that under the heaviest portion of the
embankment—is close Iby brickwork set in cement, so as
to make a perfectly watertight plug at that point. Valves
are placed at the outer end of the pipes in the usual way,
to work the pipes. On the inner shaft arrangements are
made to draw the water at various heights is the reservoir,
or to exclude it from the shaft, so as to enable the pipes to
be examined. Such an arrangement renders any accident to
the pipe for mischief absolutely impossible. Where I have
laid cast iron pipes through puddle under small heads of
water, as pipes leading to a valley syphon, I have found it
necessary, in order to prevent the water creeping along the
outer surface of the pipe, I put on collar shields, as described
by Mr Jackson. I have done this because I found I could
not make puddle, adhere to the cast iron pipe so as to be
watertight, even under only five feet of pressure. Unless
those precautions are taken the water does creep along the
surface of the pipe. In laud draining, where ordinary drain
pipes are laid in a clay subsoil, the best drainers make no
provision for an open substratum. They know that water
will find its way to the pipes, and I believe the pipes drain
as much by their outer subsoi. as by the inner capacity. I
believe there is an outer creep along every pipe, The result
of that experiences teaches us that a smooth line of cast iron
pipes, with joints such as are described by Mr Gunson, are
not to be trusted as certain to be watertight in such an em-
bankment, although lined the whole length with puddle. I
heard Mr Gunson's evidence as to the mode in which he had
laid pipes through the embankment. I expected to learn
that the crossing of the puddle trenchhad been provided for,
so as to give a bearing to the pipes uniform with that a the
solid ground on either side. I was surprised to learn that in
place of this an artificial trench had been excavated, at a fiat
slope from the bottom of the puddle trench, until at the sur-
face line it exceeded 200 ft in length; that this had been
filled with puddle to the depth of 20ft in the puddle trench,
thinning itself to 18 inches of puddle on the solid at either
end, leaving upwards of 200 ft of pipes, in 9ft lengths,
with no bottom support other than the puddle beneath them.
This would be in that portion of the embankment where
there would be the greatest possible weight—namely, under
the apex. I have had considerable experience on railway
work. 1 have seen 60ft. embankments—and this was 90ft.
—carried apparently over solid ground ; I have executed
bridges and culverts on such ground beneath those em-
bankments. Serious fractures always, total destruction
occasionally, resulted. I have known it settle so much as
to move grass surface 300 feet away on either side. That
occurring in a naturally compressible stratum, I should
dread placing jointed pipes in an artificially formed com-
pressible substratum. If that line of pipes has been depressed
into the puddle, in all human probability it has not gone
down equally in the puddle trench and under the loose em-
bankment. But if it can be proved it has gone down equally
as a bow would bend, and not drawn a joint, in my opinion
it has lett a cavity in the puddle trench above it, because the
puddle is an artificially and carefully formed material, made
so solid that if the puddle is as perfect as I believe, it could
not follow the compression of the pipe equally on either side
of the puddle wall. We have been told that the bank was
formed on the same plan as the Agden reservoir in course of
construction; the material not being watertight on each side.
The inference is, that the water as it rose would penetrate
the bank, and search out its weakest point. The reason the
embankment did not show signs of failure on the first
admission of the first 40ft. of water would arise from the
fact that the lower half, being upwards of 200 ft. wide, may
have been sufficiently tight to prevent any access of water to
the puddle wall. As the water rose foot by foot in the reser-
voir it narrowed the intervening space between the water and
the puddle wall 2flt. ; and from my inspection of that hank,
and from its state as it exists now, to be seen by anyone, it is
obvious that the upper half of the bank is not made of water-
tight material, but contains a very large proportion of rubble
stone. I measured some not on the surface more than 4ft,long,
2ft. wide, and 9 inch a thick, The water would thus pene-
trate to the puddle wall, gradually creep vertically down
the face of the puddle wall, and inevitably find out the
weakest point, On the opposite side of the puddle wall
there is the same detective arrangement of rubble stone,
dangerously close to the puddle wall. That this was so
through the deepest part of the bank is evidenced by the
description of the ultimate breaking down of the top of the
bank. The first top water has been described as coming
over in sheets and waves et foam. That water did not flow
down the slope of the embankment, but was absorbed ver-
tically into it. We have been told this reservoir embank-
ment was made exactly as the Agden embankment. The
mode of tipping the waggons and the material tipped I have
no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the substance
of that bank is as porous as a sieve. The specification
limits the tips to three feet each in thickness ; the tips at
present in work are at least double that height. This
method of working rolls the largest stones continually to
the foot of the tips, and makes, in fact, a rubble embank-
ment open and porous in layers, With regard to the mode
of obtaining material to make the embankment, I hold it is
most objectionable to take the material for making your em-
bankment from within the reservoir and below the water-
mark, excepting a trial shaft has shown that that material
is in its whole substance water-tight. In the Bradfield re-
servoir several acres of surface have been bared by excava-
tion. Many square yards of fissured rock have been bared.
Into that rock I found by examination that surface water
readily flows without pressure. With pressure the flow of
water into them would be greater. No engineer can tell
what is to become of that water. It may waste itself harm-
lessly below, but there is a possibility of its communicating
with fissures beneath the external slope of the embankment.
In such a case the engineer has no right to run the risk of
letting water into the substrata, because the water will be
beyond his control, and it will be impossible for him to tell
what will become of it, except by experience. I do not un-
dertake to say that water has done any injury. I have no
evidence, neither can anybody say it has not done injury.
I have examined the by-water, and do not think it adequate
to convey away the flood-water. I would have made a very
much larger by-wash. In this case the by-wash has not
been the cause of any injury, as the water never rose to it.
I do not approve of a sloping by •wash such as the whole of
the Sheffield Waterworks possess. I think it is always
better to break your by-wash channel by a series of steps.
I think for such a capacity of water and such a drainage
area the two 18-inch pipes totally inadequate to give safety
to the bank in the case of anticipated danger. To take away
the incoming water of a flood from the reservoir the by-
wash and pipes ought always to be equal to safely removing
the greatest possible flood on a full reservoir. I have no
wish to make statements away from this special question,
but shall be glad to answer questions.
By the Jury—l would not have put pipes in the embank-
ment. Wherever put the pipes should have been longer.
It is a fatal objection to the scheme that there have not been
valves to shut the water off from the pipes. The pipes and
by-wash would not carry away a flood coming when the
reservoir was full. There ought to be a golt to carry away
the flood-water when the dam was full. I am surprised that
the engineers destroyed the one they used while the em-
bankment was being made.
By the Coroner—Several causes may have led to the
catastrophe—a fractured pipe, a blown or drawn joint, a
creep along the pipes, a pressing down of the pipes in the
puddle trench by the heavy material on both sides of it; or
a washing away of the outer elope, as suggested by Mr.
Leather ; but a landslip, caused by undiscovered fissures
and springs in communication with the interior of the re-
servoir, which fissures and springs, if the existed and had
such communication, would become active for mischief as
the water rose in the reservoir. These are the methods
which occur to my mind as agents which may have caused

THE WAR IN DENMARK.

;From the limes Special Correspon4nt with the Danish

Army.)
SONDERBORG, March 18.
There was some slack and lazy firing this morn-
ing from the Prussian batteries at Broagerland.
The cannonade began shortly after 10 o'clock, and
all was silent at about 2 p.m. All the efforts of the
Prussian artillery were directed against the bastions
of the Dybbol position ; but up to this time, so far
as I learn, no serious impression has been made on
the D.nish works. The shots fired may have been
about 200, ball and shell. The Dybbol bastions
answered with no great earnestness, as if grudging
or disdaining a useless waste of gunpowder.
I went out to the Dybbol Mill, wi"h a hope to see
a general engagement, but the windmill is one of
the most conspicuous objects in the landscape, and
as it is well known that the command of the out-
posts and many of the troops destined for action are
generally concentrated there, the spot is, of course,
the aim of all the enemy's artillery. I next found a
safer and far better view from the shore leading to
the Sonderborg Ladegaard, a position from which I
could look into the very bosom of the beautiful Vem-
mingbund, and the Prussian batteries posted on the
cliffs overhanging its waters. We all fell into a
mistake when we thought that the Germans had

been making their preparations on the very west of
the Broager peninsula. When their batteries were
unmasked, they were found to be not on the sum-
mit of the hills, but on the brow of the somewhat
abrupt and craggy coast, as near to the Danish bas-
tions across the bay as they could be contrived. The
batteries which fired this morning were only three.
However adroitly placed the batteries may be, and
however great the power of the modern artillery
with which they are armed, the Prussians must be
aware that their fire can have, at the distance of
about a mile and a half, no very permanent and
irreparable Es ffeet on mere earthworks. This is pos-
sibly the reason why they attached so much import-
ance to the capture of Dybbol village and of the
summit of Avnbj erg, two positions n hich were left
in their hands as the result of the heavy fight of all

yesterday, and of which the Danes have made no
attempt to dispute the possession to-day.
The line of bastions at Dy bbol was constructed
by engineers who knew nothing of recent inven-
tions, and calculated distance according to the range
of the old-fashioned ordnance. The peninsula of
Broagerland was left out of their reckoning, as
placed altogether out of reach and out of harm's
way. Consider their surprise on seeing the balls
and shells of the Prussian 24-pounders sweeping
from that same peninsula not only all across the
Vemmingbund, but also all over the line of bastions,
so as to hit with unerring aim the parapets of bat-
tery Ne. 10, placed almost near the coast of the
Alssund, three English miles from the spot where
the piece was fired. Consider also that about 200
shots fired at bastion No. 5 all took effect upon
their object (many of them penetrating the block-
house, though without fatal effects, as it had been
abandoeed) with an accuracy which the old
Danish artillery cannot even dream of emulating.
So long as they fire only from Broagerland the re-
butt cannot be so very momentous ; but what will
it be if within three or four days they erect their
batteries on the Avnbjerg, and exchange shots
with the bastions at Dybbol-hill, within the dis-
tance of about two-thirds of an English mile ?
Moved by these considerations the Danes no sooner
were aware of their great loss yesterday than they
turned their efforts to recover their lost position on
Avnbjerg; and, as a preliminary movement, they
attacked Dybbol village, by securing which they
might have enabled themselves to make an onset
upon Avnbjerg in front and in flank. The attempt
failed, however, in spite of the bravery of the
troops engaged. The first regiment sent against
Dybbol village went three times to the charge, and
was thrice repulsed by the Prussians, who sustained
yesterday a hand to hand conflict with a bravery to
which the Danes are ready to do justice.
But, although the attack on Dybbol village was
unsuccessful yesterday, hardly any one of us went
to bed in the night without the certain expectation
that the experiment would be renewed in the morn-
ing. I was awake and up at 6, and already felt con-
fident that the cannon of Dybbol-hill would open fire
on Dybbol village with earliest dawn. All was quiet
till 10 o'clock, however, and then, as I have already
said, it was the Prussians who began the cannonade.
Nearly all the Danish troops were turned out at an
early hour, nevertheless, and I and most men,
astonished at the silence of the Danish batteries,
thought the village was rather to be taken with the
bayonet than with the cannon; but as the day ad-
vanced, and no movement occurred, the terrible
truth began to be spoken aloud, that no fresh endea-
vours should be made to recover the lost position of
Dybbol village and Avnbjerg. Should this really
be the case, and should the Prussians remain in
possession of the latter-named hill, so as to have
leisure to construct their batteries, it is not easy to
foresee what chance the old fashioned Danish smooth
bores would have against the Prussian rifled pieces.
The bravest men in the Danish army look grave as
they discuss these matters. All they know is that
they will hold the position to the last drop of their
blood, but they hardly dare to tell how long their
heroic resolution will be of any avail.
1, who did not hesitate from the beginning to
press my opinion that the abandonment to the
enemy of the Broagerland, at the time of the re.
treat from the Dannewerk would prove fatal to the
defenders of Dy bbol, shall not now conceal my con-
viction that the possession of the Avnbjerg is a great
frump card the Prussians have turned up in their
bloody game against their enemy.
The affair of yesterday cost very dear to the Danes.
The wounded brought in were 270, although many
were by no means seriously hurt. It is, perhaps,
not unreasonable to compute the whole number of
men put hors de combat at 400. The wounded
officers are stated at no more than six or seven.
The Prussians can hardly have suffered less, seeing
that it was they who asked fora few hourb' aroais,