The Sun.
London, England, 1852-04-06 00:00:00

are, and in that of troops exposed as our troops would be in
the open field for military operations. I feel confident,
• however, that the health of the troops would not be liable
to such loss as it was in the late war. But there are other
circumstances very disadvantageous to us at present, as
compared with the former occasion. Rangoon was then
attacked by surprise, and not more than 17,000 Burmese
were then in Arracan. Rangoon MU attacked by 10,000
men, and was captured without loss. We then proceeded
to fortify our position and to• occupy the great Pagoda,
which at once protected and was the key to it. What is
the case now? By our operations, untoward as they are, we
have indicated the point of attack. We have had a col-
lision with the Burmese on that point, and, without finding
any fault with the officers in command, we have twice most
unfortunately retired, after a collision, from the conflict.
Now the mere circumstance of our retiring under such cir-
cumstances must give encouragement to the Burmese. The
town of Rangoon, which we occupied before, is now de-
stroyed, and another town, four miles from the river, is
built beyond the reach of our steamers, and the whole of
the Pagoda to which I have before a,luded, with terraces of
brick each rising 15 feet above the other, now rises to a
height of 200 feet above the level of the river, and com-
mands all the ground in the neighbourhood—a position
which is now fortified and stockaded in every direc-
tion, and defended by 100 guns. It is impossible not to ex-
pect that great loss will be incurred in taking it; and it is
to be attacked, not by 10,000 men as formerly, but by only
7,000. Moreover, the circumstances are particularly un-
fortunate under which we are called on to carry our army
there. The Punjaub ii not yet so settled as to enable us
to withdraw any considerable force from it, and, without
drawing troops from Bengal, we have not three regiments
available to be sent there with safety. I regret, my Lords,
to find that one regiment hss been sent from Fort William—

for there is only-one regiment left to supply its place,
and that another has been sent from Furt St.

David, which is left without European troops
at the very moment when we may be about
to engage in another war ; so that in the front
of the Nepaulese we are withdrawing the only regi-
ment which we have to defend Calcutta. There is also ano-
ther circumstance to be considered, which I take to be one of

a very serious nature. In the last war all the operations in
Ava were carried on by the Madras army, and a number of
the soldiers who composed it were brought from that presi-
dency owing, as I firmly believe, to the great personal influ-
ence and the great personal ability of Sir Ihomas Mont.&
Without his influence I think that the Government would

not have been able to withdraw from that presidency 23,000
men. [A. Noble Lord said—" 28,000 men."] Yes, 28,000
men, including Europeans. I remember, with regret, cer-
tain passages in the recent history of the Madras army
which make me doubt whether we can dispatch a large
force of it from that presidency on service beyond the sea.
The Bengal soldier is accustomed to leave his wile and
family in his native village when called into active service,
but the soldiers of the Madras army take their wives and
children with them into the camp; so that, when they go
beyond the sea, all their families form a village, which is
left without means of support. When I arrived, some years
ago, at Madras. I found two regiments there--I will not
Bay in a State of mutiuy, but so disinclined to proceed to
China that it became a matter of deep anxiety and appre-
hension to the Government; and the cause of this disincli-
nation was the terrible state of misery and distress in
which the wives and children of the men of the regiments
which had already sailed for China ware left. I see, my
Lords, no alteration in the regulations of the service which
can relieve these persons from the distress which they suffer
when their husbands and fathers proceed beyond the sea.
Notwithstanding all this, I will assume, for I doubt it not,
that we have entire success in the war. What will be the
consequence of that success? The result will be the en-
tire dissolution of the Burmese empire, and then it will be
for our Government in India to consider what it
will do under such circumstances. I know, my Lords, that
the Governor-General will be placed in circumstances under
which a great pressure will be brought to bear on him as
to the policy which he ought to adopt. First, there
are certain enteprising British merchants, who having
exhausted all the forests on one bank of the river and its tri..
butaries, are very desirous of possessing the teak forests on
the other side, for the purpose of carrying on and extending
their trade by Rangoon; and they are in concert and con-
nexion with the press of Calcutta, the movements of which I
view with anxiety and distrust. They say that in conse-
quence of our occupying the whole Burmese empire an over-
land intercourse with China may be established, and that
great advantage would accrue to our trade from its extension
along that Burmese frontier. That is a feeling which actuates
the press of Calcutta. I hope that my Right Honourable
Friend the Governor-General of India will treat that press
with the disregard which it deserves. Bet, my Lords,
there is also another serious pressure which my Right
Honourable Friend ought to disregard, and which it will
be more difficult I am afraid for him to resist ; that is the
pressure of a part of the civil and of the whole military
service. They have before their eyes the occupation
n 0 r refused
and
interference
ha .
whom
paymentah.uo thisgnfhoo r
of Affghanistan, which produced a complete revolution
in the army of Bengal. That will always be the case where
a great territory is to be occupied even for a time, and still
more where a new territory is to be annexed to, and brought
under our dominion. Young officers are then placed in com-
mand of districts—others are placed in political employ-
ments, where they actually direct the operations of troops
under the command of their superiors. Great rewards and
distinctions are obtained—great talents exhibited; and every
man, with a natural ambition, looks forward to the promo-
tion he may attain; and thus the idea of a new war, likely
to terminate is new conquests, is dear to that army—an
army full of enterprise, and of those feelings which naturally
excite military men to great actions. Under such circum-
stances, I view with great alarm the annexation to our em-
pire of a large portion—ay, or even of any portion—of the
Burmese territory. It is essentially a false position. My
Lords, you must have seen before now that, with great
ability on the part of our generals, with great courage on
the part of our soldiers, and with the most perfect equip-
ment on the part of our army, it is very difficult to retain
an eminently false position. A false position is as danger-
ous to an empire as it is to an army, and always ultimately
vindicates its power over those who sin against the first
principles of true policy. I feel, my Lords, perfectly satis-
fied that the annexation of Ave, drawing in that direction a
large portion of the vital resources of the British empire in
India, will naturally impair both its civil and military
strength. It is because I entertain these apprehensions of
the consequences of the military occupation of Ave, and of
the fatal effects of our most complete success, that I request
you, my Lords, to call on her Majesty's Ministers to produce
such papers on this subject as can be produced without detri-
ment to the public service, for the purpose of making us
acquainted with the causes of this war. I have not heard
that any trustworthy military officer on the part of the Go-
vernment has been sent to Rangoon to ascertain the facts out
of , hich it has arisen. They rest entirely on the authority
of persons who went with Colonel Ogle to that country.
What value is to be attributed to their statements we
know not; for it is stated, with a degree of con-
fidence almtst inclining us to treat it as a certain-y, that
the total amount of the indemnity which we require from
the Government of Ava is only 9001. ; and yet to obtain that
sum all these public dangers which I have recounted are to
be encountered. Now, my Lords, when I look at the cha-
racter of the trade carried on at Rangoon, I cannot help
looking with suspicion at the statements made. One of
the most considerable traders at Rangoon is a person of
mm
reasonsodore
I have
Lam-
bert
frmbe,ryedanidn
the name of Crisp. That man, as soon as be knew of
the probability of war, freighted a schooner with arms
and sold it to the Governor at Rangoon. When the Gover-
tahtepmrehseenwt,enfotrtotn)
requested him to p
The Governor of Rangoon the
This is a description of one of the
Burmese Government. . ,
and
to of
it tdheew inn j
in
nry the
bll inflicted
to übpeonpahiodi
great war is to be undertaken, and I,
camsequence 100/. for this mans
lhead., andd I. confess, for one,
that I should not have been
This is
y grieve if he had got it.—
.ti)r. be at stake, no matter
but if there is not an overwhelming neces-
(tph:erlisroeenfairef,oralonwodk to it as a matter of great danger. If our
war
how-
ever small the Injury., must be submitted to, and we
we heard several months ago, were likely
s ttyfor reputation
our
stated, I think we ought not to interfere. The services of
to be engaged in a different affair with the Nizam. W e
heard that the Indian Govern
tnblaes:feanddruasre
army,i
Government, as a creditor of the
Nizam, had required him to pay a certain sum of money, and
that if he did not pay it by a certain day his territory was
to be occupied and his troops put down. I think that the
Governor-General should not have made such a demand
without having a certainty that he had the Madras army in
hand • for
, the town of Hyderabad is in the hands of the
Arabs, and SO are all the for in •
ts the neighbourhood. They
will defend them with bravery, and, unless we postpone the
demand for that payment, it will be difficult for the Madras
army to carry into effect two distinct and distant operations
at the same time. I hope, my Lords, that my Noble Friend
opposite will not think it inconsistent with his duty to lay
the papers to which I have referred on the table, in order
that we may know on what grounds the British Govern-
ment is proceeding in this war.
The Earl of DERBY—With regard to all military opera-
tions in India, my Noble Friend speaks with a knowledge
that gives him great advantage over us. Whatever may be
the difficulties attending the operations now going on in Ave
—which I am afraid I must agree with my Noble Friend in
characterising as a war—l am sure my Noble Friend would
be the last man to desire, if protection were required by her
Majesty's subjects, that war should not be engaged in if ne-
cessary for that object.—(Hear, hear.) Whatever may be
the pressure of the Calcutta press, or of any portion of those
enterprising merchants, or of that army desirous of fresh
laurels, I am sure that the Noble Earl himself is not more
anxious than the Governor-General is to avoid any accession
—(Hear I agree with the Noble Earl in
of territory..)
thinking that such an accession as that alluded to, so far
from being an advantage, would be a disadvantage. To a
certain extent I shall be able to produce the papers required
by the Noble Earl; andi when they are produced, I hope he
will be satisfied that, as on the one side there has been no
desire to incur the hazards of a war, but, on the contrary, a
unanimous desire to try all means to avoid it; so, on the
other hand, the measures taken by the Governor-General
have been so prompt and effective as to lead to
the very reasonable conclusion that no protracted
hostilities will take place with the Burmese empire; and
that no such consequence as the disruption of the Burmese
empire is likely to follow from what the Noble Earl calls the
complete success—but which, in that case might be con-
sidered the lamentable success—of our forces employed
There is no doubt we were justified in making our claims.
I am not in a position to enter into a discussion of the mel.it...e
of those claims. Rut the justice of them was IV ey,',,Ye
1 ceased upon the Bing of Ma by former andGovernorse,e the
Ring those
King of Ave not only acquiesced in the justic
__wing
claims, but he admitted the justice of them by
moving
claims, whatever
one Governor and substitutiug another. So that
._ actei4 case
may be the policy of the matter, here is a prta_",y„nrecog.
to prove
porthat our claims of 9,000 rupees_awnenrearyn" -
Commodore
nised unfounded. About the 6th J
of
Lambert, in the execution of his instructions, proceeded up
the river for the purpose of communicating
with the •new
Governor of Rangoon. These communications were not of.
an unfrieddly hischaracter, a received a deputation from
and he
vessel, though the parties were
not of high rank
the Governor on board
then
sent
Commander Fishbourne
. e
11 to demand compliance with the
to the Governor, formally
;,„ commander Fishbourne and the
terms sent to b..--
subjected to insults •
were and in-
officer with him British officer acting under the orders
of no
1 dignit.ies,w
Sovereign
could submit to. Whether these
of his e p•oni a mistaken sense
of dignity on. the
indignities a
, Governorr°s of Rangoon I will not part co the , .say, but the
ware kept waiting •
British officers
were subjected to insults and indignities, which could be
taken in no other sense than as premeditated. A refusalwas
given to the othcers to the effect that they could not be
communicated with as the Governor was
whole of the communications from the Burmese were those
of a superior to au inferior • the language in which the
communications were couched altogether claimed supe-
riority for the Burmese, though no people are more sensi-
tive as to dignity and forms than the Burmese. On re-
ceiving a letter of instructions, Commodore Lambert, in re-
taliation for the insults from the Burmese, took upon him-
self—without, however, having received precise instructions
to seize on a vessel belonging to the King of Ava, which
he carried with him. While engaged as, this proceeding,
the commodore's ship was fired at from a stockade, and as
violent hostilities had commenced on the part of the Burmese
it Wad the imperative duty of Commodore Lambert not to