The Sun.
London, England, 1864-08-22 00:00:00

Gen. Grant will pass the summer and autumn in his
present location, and that the Northern States will
be amused for the next four months by the constant
cry that the "on lo Richmond" is proceeding most
satisfactorily, until President Lincoln is reinducted
on the 4th of November into the Presidential chair
as the presiding genius over operations which at
some unknown future period are to eventuate in the
capture of Richmond. As to Grant with his present
army taking Richmond or Petersburg, the child
born this day will be a stalwart man before he wit-
nesses such an event. if the Northerners are carry-
ing on this war with any other object than the re.
election of President Lincoln, they have no hope
unless they put at least 100,000 additional men,not
drugged or kidnapped, but earnest Yankees, into
Grant's ranks. As matters stand, I see no reason
why Lee should not send 20,000 additional men to
reinforce Early, in which case the latter may, after
he has collected and sent south as much loot as he
wants, march to Baltimore, or Philadelphia, or Pitts-
burg, or whither he likes. It is hard to say what
force is requisite to enable Gen. Lee to hold his pre-
sent lines at Petersburg against so loosely coupled
and downhearted an army as now oppose him. In
the words of a Richmond journal, " General Grant's
army is at this moment the object rather of pity than
of alarm." These words derive their significance
from the well known want of water under which,
in their present situation, the Federal troops are
suffering. The sewers of Petersburg empty into the
Appomattox, the sewers of Richmond into the James
River, and from these two streams the supply of
water employed by the troops which besiege Peters-
burg is derived. There is said along the whole
length of the Federal lines to be only one fine na,
tural spring of water. It may be conceived what
are the sufferings of troops mainly dependent, under
the vertical sun and exhausting heat of a Virginian
July, upon the hot and fcetid water drawn from these
impure sources, and served to them in barrels hauled
by waggons into their lines. It is probable that,
with their wonted spade industry, the Federals will
have sunk many wells, but in the existing long-
continued drought the supply of water thus obtained
cannot be abundant, The Confederates, on the other
hand, have at their command all the wells and
springs which supply the city of Petersburg. It is
universally believed here that the latter end of
August and September will be almost as fatal to
Grant's soldiers, unused to Soathern heats, and in
one of the most pestilential spots on the James
River, as were the tearful battles in the month of
May. It is not anticipated that Lee is likely to
waste his men's lives by butting against the strong
fortifications of his opponent. I see little probability
of any change in the situation of these two armies
for many weeks to come. The attempt to starve out
Richmond and force Lee's army to retreat or venture
upon a hazardous attack is an admitted failure.
Both the railroags which feed Richmond from the
South—the lines I mean which communicate with
Weldon and Danville—are again in operation—the
former for 14 days past, the latter since the 17th
inst. It will not be an easy task for Grant's cavalry
materially to interfere with these lines again.
The interest of the war, as it ebbs feebly round
Petersburg, is altogether superseded by the fiercer
excitement which attracts all eyes at this moment
to Georgia, where an immediate battle is expected
between Generals Sherman and Hood (the latter, as
I foreshadowed in my last letter, the successor of
Johnston) within four miles of the city of Atalanta.
The expectation in well-informed quarters here is
that the decisive battle,of which Atlanta is the prize,
will be fought to-day or tomorrow; but, judging
from previous experience, I shoald predict that it
will be longer delayed. It is hardly conceivable
that having retreated across 130 miles of most de-
fensible country, and abounding in natural fast-
nesses, General Johnston would have delivered
battle in the plain which surrounds Atlanta against
an enemy in intrenchments. is is because I believe
Sherman to be intrenched, and, therefore, little
likely to take the aggressive, that I doubt the near
proximity of the decisive battle. The importance of
its issue to the Federals cannot be overstated. It is
hardly possible that Sherman, able as he has shown
himself to be, could retreat with a beaten army
over the 130 miles which he has so successfully and
and incomprehensibly been allowed to traverse in
his advance. The result of the fall of Atlanta upon
the Confederate cause could only be the prolonga-
tion of the war. My belief is that the superiority
of morale possessed by Johnston's army over Sher-
man's is almost as marked as the superiority of
Lee's over Grant's ; but it is asserted by Johnston's
partisans in this town that the estimate of the
strength of his army, which is accepted in high
quarters here, is grossly exaggerated. The general,
and I have no doubt the correct, impression is that
there never has been anything like the disparity
between Johnston and Sherman that existed at the
commencement of May between Grant and Lee,
The displacement of General Johnston, and the sub-
stitution in his place of General Hood, is a step
which may lead to momentous consequences. It has
not been without much anxiety that this step has
been resolved on ; and, in addition to much cool
bravery, General Hood has the recommendation of
experience under General Lee, and of the advice of
General Gustavus A. Smith, a very competent offi-
cer, who is Hood's intimate friend, and who, though
shrinking from responsibility himself, is about as
capable an adviser as could be desired.

It is understood that General Bragg has lately
gone to the West, armed with the full confidence
of President Davis, to assist General Hood, and will
thence proceed to the Mississippi River, in order to
promote the passage from the western to the
eastern bank of General Kirby Smith and many of
the men who triumphed last spring over General
Banks. It is obvious that if a considerable portion
of Kirby Smith's army is brought across the Mis-
sissippi, and escapes the Federal gunboats which
patrol the mighty stream, a considerable difference
in the relations of the armies following Sherman
and Hood will be established. -My impression is
that General Kirby Smith, if he crosses the Missis-
sippi, will effect his passage not far from Memphis,
and will be apt to attack the bases of General Sher-
man's operations at Nashville and Cuattanooga.
Two of the most active and efficient officers in the
Confederate service, Generals Stephen D. Lee and
Forrest, are detained in Northern Mississippi by
the necessity imposed upon them of watching a
large body of Federals who are striving to march
from Memphis to reinforce Sherman before Atlanta,
and who have already received a slight defeat at
Tupelo. It will be remembered that, with less than
4,000 men, Forrest in May last scattered to the
winds a similar force to that which is now advan-
cing through Mississippi under General Wash.
burne, and which, numbering in strength 10,000
men, was then under the command of General
Sturgis. It is difficult for those unacquainted
with this continent to follow not only the operations
of the trunk armies under Lee and Hood, but also the
movements of legs and arms—as for instance of
Early in the neighbourhood of Washington, ofKirby
Smith on th© Mississippi, and elsewhere of S. D.
Lee and Forrest. If the map of the once United
States exhibits still the similitude of a seething plain
covered with molten lava, and coursed over by in-
carnate fiends, there are very patent indications
that upon both sides, the supply of combatants is
waning low, and that, unless the most strenuous
efforts are put forth by the Federals, the war can-
not be much longer prolonged. Is the temper of
the Northern people such as to admit of success
attending these efforts ? The answer to this question
can be given better in New York or London than
in Richmond, encompassed Eiti it is by the prejudices
and embittered by the venom which spring from '
fratricidal strife, but upon the correctness of the
answer depends the solution of the problem in
which England is chiefly interested,—will the
approaching autumn bring this weary strife to a
close, or is an other winter of trial and privation in
store for the Confederate States ? The more I see of
this American war the more inecretablo &es ail
fat urn event cecept the certainty of plennry inde.
pentlenee for these much-enduring Southerners
appear to me; and I must decline to hszard specu-
lation upon a subject which I am convinced is far
beyond the ken of any man in the Confederate
States.

nY
advices from hamburg the price of gold is 425 per mark and the short exchamr on London is 13.5; per £1 sterlin4.
tandard gold at the Eng,lish Mint price is, therefore, about
3-nths per cent, dearer In London than in Hamburg,

The Prospect of Peace,

(horn the _index.)

Our readers will acquit us of having ever been
unduly sanguine in our appreciations of the events
of the American war. While we have never for an
instant doubted the ultimate triumph of Confederate
independence, and while we have seldom been de-
ceived, even transiently, by the boastful impostures
of Federal newspapers and diplomatic documents,
we may modestly claim the credit of having been
substantially correct in the few predictions we have
ventured, and of never having encouraged false
hopes of peace based upon either the exhaustion of
the North, its financial collapse, its return to reason,
or even the successes of the Southern arms. We
have consistently held to the conviction that the
war, left to its own course, whatever might be its
vicissitudes, must be a long one; that no influence
from within, at least during the time of Mr. Lin-
coln's administration, would be potent enough to
end it; and that the only hope of shortening this
fated period lay in the wiedom and justice of Euro-
pean Powers, if, by recognising an inconteetible
political fact they had exchanged a false for a true
neutrality. Within the last two years and a half
this only hope seemed several times on the point of
realisation. Today none but a visionary wilt deny
that the idea of recognition is practically less pre-
sent to men's minds than it was twelve months ago.
Whether this arises from the frequent disappoint-
ment of well-founded expectations, or from a
strengthening conviction that the South now stands
in less need than formerly of even such moral aid
from abroad, we need not here inquire. Certain it
is that the South itself has long ceased to expect,
scarcely to desire, recognition ; and in inverse pro-
portion has grown the proud confidence in its own
Heaven-aided ability to accomplish the great work
of national salvation. Yet at this very moment,
when we once more acknowledge the fallacy of
the only hope upon which we had heretofore
dwelt seriously, we are able to say with all
calmness and soberness, that the prospects of
speedy peace were never so promising—so almost
absolutely certain. It is our sincere be-
lief that, unless some great disaster befalls the Con-
federate arms before the 29th of this month, the
Democratit party then assembling in Chicago will
nominate a peace candidate for the presidency, and
within three months after there will bean armistice.

It is not because the military situation presents
unprecdented features that we stake our judgment
upon so bold a predition. Another Confederate in-
vasion might possibly end in another Sharpsburg or
Gettysburg. Another period of reciprocal inactivity
might ensue, affording time for recruiting another
army in Ireland and Germany. Nor is it because
the financial condition so unmistakably indicates
that the bottom of the nation's pocket has been
reached. Federal finances have so often defied
rational calculations, so many grave crises have been
passed—not safel, but still passed—so buoyant and
sanguine is the American temperament, that we
would hesitate to deny the possibility of another
miracle, and, given a drawn battle or two, or some
illusory success, we are not sure but even this last
crisis might be tided over, and the inevitable ruin
carefully concealed by " shoddy" flowers from pub-
lic view, might be staved off for another season.
These embarrassments have become periodical
ever since the battle of Bull Run, aggravating with
each year. To a cool observer at a distance they
seemed fatal in 1861 ; they were worse in
1862 ; still worse in 1863. It is not because they
are worst in 1864 that we look for peace, but be-
cause in 1864 they correspond with embarrassments
of quite another kind—with a quadrennial civil
revolution which, even in ordinary times, puzzled
and perplexed the acutest understanding of Euro-
pean statesmanship. The curious feature of the
Amhrican federative system is its affectation of
mathematical mechanism. The Federal Govern-
ment is wound up, warranted to run four years.
It may run as wildly feat or as tamely slow as the
materials of its clock-work will admit, but at the
striking of a certain hour its motive power is ex-
hausted. At one second after twelve o'clock on
March 4 the four years' king is dead—four years'
life to the new king. Alas! however, for human
ingenuity, there is au interval between the winding
up again and the running down, and this interval
is an interregnum, The new king is elected in
November, the old one dies in March. In the four
months intervening, unless he happens to be his
own successor for another " term," the courtiers
desert the setting sun to worship the rising one.
The Federal Government has only a nominal head.
At noon of March 4 of next year Mr. Lincoln,
unless re-elected, loses the last semblance of power;
four months and four days earlier, on the first
Euesday of November next, the entire substance.
In the meanwhile the semblance and the substance
remain irremediably disunited, and therefore dor-
mant.

How slim are Mr. Lincoln's chances of
re-election may be seen by the indecent alacrity
with which the rats are scampering away
from his ship. Already he is opposed by
a candidate of his own party, one who is not on
the first lose of that party—its candidate when
Lincoln was not yet known outside his own village
—but one who represents that very section of the
party which by its rabid radicalism leavened the
rest, and in the heat of the fermentation flung Mr
Lincoln into power. Even the convention which
lately nominated Mr Lincoln, composed as it was of
his own office-holders, deemed it necessary to save
the appearance of self-respect by insulting him in
his Mexican policy. The most important com-
mittee of his own Congress has denounced him for
the attempted usurpation of arbitrary power for
the purpose of manufacturing fictitious votes from
the "rebellious" States ; and the two Houses
of Congress, as one body, have given practical
effect to this denunciation by a legislative enact-
ment that the votes of the "rebellious" States
shall not count in the ensuing election. In
Open feud with his Congress, at variance
with his party, deserted by his mercenary friends,
ridiculed by the press, despised by the public, his
favourite generals defeated in the field, his pet
schemes ending in disaster, Mr. Lincoln is nut a
very formidable competitor for the presidency. Add
to this that the Democratic opposition, keenly alive
to the possible turns of fortune in their favour, have
adjourned the nomination of their candidate to the
decision of the issue of the summer's campaign,
fixing it at a date barely eight weeks prior to the
November election. At that election the success-
ful candidate requires, since the votes of one-third
of the States are counted out, a numerical majority
of the actual votes cast, such as no president since
Washington has ever obtained.
The personal triumph or humiliation of Mr,
Abraham Lincoln is, however, merely an incident—
and in no sense an element—in our calculations for
peace. If the war against the South is to be
prosecuted, we prefer him as President of the
United States to any one of the four millions of
adult males in the population of Federal America.
Our prognostication assts upon the fact that a new
idea has entered the Northern mind, and that this
idea is the only practicable bridge from war to
peace. This idea scores of newspapers, which before
were eagerly clamouring for a more vigorous pro-
secution of the war, have within the last few weeks
taken up with utterance more or lees distinct. It
is in the minds and months of men of ah parties,
defended or denounced, but familiar to all. It is
reflected in the public correspondence of the Euro-
pean press from America ; it is sharply mapped out
in nine-tenths of the private letters which fill the
American mail-bags. it is like the confused sound
of many voices; unless a providential event hushes
it, it will have swollen, ere our printed pages
reach the other side of the Atlantic, into the
deafening chorus of millions of men. It is an idea
ail the more Powerful because it flatters American
vanity without being altogether chimerical and
cticahlo. It is an iclea which implies
solution, and not defeat. It is an idea which graft.
yea vague popular longings for revenge, and whien
yet promises colid material advantages.
This idea, in which we recognise the =retard-
seed of a lasting and prosperous peace,
mugs, when
stripped of its surplusage of words and eesteavagan-
cies of drapery, be succinctly describess somewhat
as follows. The North says to itself- —e
In the event
of success (e ri
(send no true Northere;( permits himself
ev
to doubt of eventual success), .
Pat shall we gain I'