The Sun.
London, England, 1852-02-12 00:00:00

LONDON)

extending the blessings of civilization to the most re-
mote skirts of the globe, will cerso to have oxis{ence
except in the page of history.—Lardner on the Stearn
Engine.

TILE REGAL OF SIR HARRY SMITH.
The following copy of a dispatch from Earl Grey
to Governor Sir H. G. Smith, Bart., G.C.8., is
printed among the papers on the Kafir war recently
presented to both Houses of Parliament :
" Downing street, Jan. 14, 1852.
" Sir,—l have received and laid before the Queen
your dispatches of the sth and 19th of November, re-
porting the results of the operations of the war since the
date of your dispatches by the previous mail.
"2. I learn from these dispatches that another month
of this distressing warfare has passed away, and though
the force at your disposal had been increased to a very
considerable amount no advantage of any real import-
ance has been gained over the enemy, while the loss of
her Majesty's troops has been exceedingly heavy, that
very distinguished officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fordyce,
being included among those who have fallen.
"3. I have said that no real advantage has been
gained, because, while you state that positions of ex-
traordinary strength have been stormed, and it is clear
that the most determined courage has bean shown by
her Majesty's troopt, these successes (if they can be
called so) have been entirely barren of useful results;
and it appears from the reports of Major-
General Somercet, and particulary from his dispatch
dated the 9th of November, that the ground thus hardly
won could not be retained, and that the position which
was carried at the price of such heavy loss to the 74th
Regiiasent on the 6:h of November, was only held until
the Major-General withdrew the troops iu the after-
noon,' when it would seem that there was no obstacle
to its being re-occupied by the enemy, and that in fact it
was so.
" For several months your dispatches have been of a
similar character. You have described to me opera-
tions which I have constantly been assured had boon
attended with success, and had inflicted heavy loss
upon the enemy, while there could be no doubt that
the troops had fought with their accustomed gal-
lantry; but at the same time I am quite unable to
discover that any ground had really been gained,
while it was obvious that the enemy, far from being dis-
couraged by their supposed defeats, were from month to
month increasing in boldness and determination; and the
list of casualties but too clearly proved that the loss
they had inflicted was at least as certain, and bore no
small proportion to that which they were believed to
have sustained.
"5. It was impossible that I should continue to re-
ceive intelligence of this description by many succes-
sive mails without being led to entertain very serious
doubts whether the war had been conducted with the
energy and the judgment which were necessary
to bring it to an early and successful issue; but distress-
ing as was the anxiety which these doubts occasioned, I
have not hitherto allowed them to induce me to deprive
you of that support which I know it is of the utmost
importance to the public service that those in high mili-
tary commands should be able to rely on not having
lightly withdrawn from them by the advisers of the
Crown, when, in situations of difficulty and danger, suc-
cess does not at once attend their exertions.
" 6. But the information I have now received has con-
verted what was before only a very serious doubt into con-
viction; and it is my painful duty to inform you that,
having consulted my colleagues on the subject, they have
concurred with me in coming to the conclusion that, upon
a careful review of the events of the war and those which
preceded its breaking out, there is evidence, which it is
impossible longer to resist, that you have failed in show-
ing that foresight, energy, and judgment which your very
difficult position required, and that therefore we should
not be justified in shrinking from tendering fo the Queen
our humble advice that the Government of the Cape of
Good Hope and the conduct of the war should be placed
in other hands. It has accordingly been my duty to
submit to her Majesty my advice that Major-General
Cathcart should be appointed to relieve you, of which
her Majesty has been pleased to approve, and that
officer will very shortly proceed to the Cape for that
purpose.
4' 7. I need hardly assure you that I cannot make this
communication without groat pain and sincere reluer
tenet., and that nothing but a sense of imperative duty
would have led my colleagues and myself to take the
course we have felt ourselves compelled to adopt.
" We do full justice to the ardent zeal for her Ma-
jesty's service which you have uniformly displayed ; we
have not forgotten how greatly you have distinguished
yourself on former occasions, and what a high military
reputation you have deservedly obtained; but we have
been compelled to believe that, perhaps from the failure
of your health, and your being no longer able to ex-
ercise as close a personal superintendence as formerly
over the conduct of affairs, you have failed in giving,
either to your military operations or to your political
measures bearing upon the war, that character of
vigour and judgment which are necessary to in-
spire confidence in the inhabitants and troops
and to command success. I must remind you that the
first error which was committed, and to which I believe
the failure of a policy otherwise sound and the calamity of
the war are mainly attributable, was the premature reduc-
tion of the British force under your command. I must take
upon myself a share of the blame for this mistake, inas-
much as I had probably too often and too strongly pressed
upon you the importance of reducing the number of
troops as soon as this could be safely done. Still your
discretion was unlettered, you were lett to decide for
yourself when the troops should be sent home, since this
was a point on which a judgment could only be formed
on the spot; and the error, therefore, was your own of
supposing that a large proportion of the force which you
found in the colony could without danger so sown be dis-
pensed with.
"8. I must also remind you that, up to the eve of the
actual breaking out of hostilities, you continued to send
roe the strongest as,urances that there existed no real
danger, and that the apprehensions expressed by the
frontier farmers were unfounded. Even when the war
began you were so little aware of its true cha-
racter that you made no application to me fur
additional force ; and neither in your public nor
y our private letters did you give me the slightest
intimation that such aid was required; and the rein-
forcements which were immediately dispatched, as well
as those which have been subsequently sent, have all,
with the exception of the last, anticipated your demands
for them. It is not for me to express any opinion on
the detail of your military operations; but it must
strike even an unprofessional observer that, by the
employment of means which you considered
adequate for the purpose, no serious impres-
sion appears to have been made on the enemy. It fol-
lows that you have either been entirely mistaken in
your judgment, and have consequently led her Majesty's
Government into error as to the character of the war
and the amount of force required, or else that you have
failed in using with effect the force at your disposal.
"9. With regard to the political measures bearing
upon the results of the war, I must refer you to the
dispatch which I have been compelled to address to
you by the present mail on the neglect of the pre-
cautions obviously required in order to obstruct
the supply of ammunication to the enemy. The
fault in this respect must no doubt be in part attri-
buted to the Celonial Secretary, whom you had left
in charge of the Government at Cape Town, but
if you had intimated to me that Mr. Montagu could not
alone adequately discharge the arduous duties which
devolved upon him in your absence, I should not have
failed immediately to have afforded you further assist-
ance, by the appointment of a civil Lieutenaat-Go-
vernor, to reside at Cape Town during the war—a step
I propose adopting now the necessity for it has thus
been disclosed to me.
"10. I must also observe that you have, I believe,
truly represented to me, that if you had had the Kafirs
only to contend with, the war would long since have
been brought to a close; and that what has made them
such formidable enemies has been the assistance they
have derived from the rebel Hottentots, too
many of whom had been trained as soldiers in
the ranks of the British army. But if this is,
as I believe, a correct view of the subject, I must regard
it as a most fatal error that the first instances of treason
among this class of inhabitants of the Cape were not
dealt with more promptly and more severely. I
cannot resist the belief that, had this been done,
the contagion of disaffection would have been
stayed, as the prompt punishnieat of the real traitors
would have calmed the fears naturally excited among
the white inhabitants. by a eeing their impunity,
and would thus have prevented the colonists of European
de-cent from being led to entertt du and display that in-
discriminate jealousy of their c oloured fellow-subjects,
which has been, as there is too e such reason to fear, the
means of driving into dissatisfaction many of the latter,
who were not originally inclined to it.
" 11. Lastly, I must regard it as a grievous error that
you have allowed the administration of the Orange
River territory to remtiintoolong
to the task,inthehandso and of an
toructebryinthyirarnd other mistakes
unequal mistakes in your management
of the Dutch inhabitants of the frontier districts,
you have failed to conciliate that important
class, by whose cordial co-operation there can be no
doubt that you would have been enabled to bring the
war to a mulch more earlier termination than there is now
a prospect of; while, on the contrary. by the distracted
condition of the sovereignty, your difficulties in liafra-
ria have bee n very seriously Increased. The:manner in
which, by j udicious management, Mr. Pine has suc-
ceeded in 1g atal in securing the confidence and attach-
ment of th e Dutch farmers, as described in your dis-
patch proves that, if properly treated,
loyal and useful subjects of the
heyhat bs7. I
)(3 193,
rendered clearly
Crown.
" 19. It has been with much reluctance that I have
entered into ) this review of the errors which you seem to
me to have committed, but I have thought it due to
3 our positit )t t and to your high reputation to show that
her Majesty's servants have not determined to advise
the Queen u supersede you in the midst of the war
without sufii .lient cause for doing so; and for this
reason,aue.paartnof
nue' asof it has beenl tohamvoe
yourself
censure, thoeowaritoeomtopeylloeud
n
your judge
cut 'd.
to point o ut
been betra the errors into
to be able •
) ;( ' add, that I have no doubt it has been
oun t o haveme
cut only hich has been in fault,
tu Inc bee
It is however somawhsaictihsfaci
of your ability,yon have e
to quit
edit)" r tor do I doubt that in more regular
warfare al Ninst a civilised enemy, and if your mili-
tary had been less complicated'O by political
endeavoured
cult
of Buttes of no ordinary diffi-
i, you would have achieved the same success
(tiaiiiirycoolptieer:
by which sou had formerly been so much distinguished.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) " GREY.
Lietacv, ant-General Sir H. G. Smith,

'AVERT°, ')L7 I.VEDNESDA.T.--The United States
steam-ship
Lt.lantic, Captain West, sailed to-day for New
A
York with tb e nsuAl