The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-03 00:00:00

G(- 7 ,~

`~~

por NVIAZrEM RAOURD

?he evidence of SifraJe 0271,171 B.; uergrilAyl:le6tibeYfre the Crimean
Co 1111 l littee brings us as near as we'nre likely te arrive/
at the council-chamber of the Commander-in-Ciiief;
Whether we are destined to receive any more authentic
intelligence must depend on the hazards and chances of
war, and on a hundred contingencies impossible to fore•
see. We must therefore make the best of the informs.•
tion we have, awl we are bound to say that, the aged
Lieutenant-General has given his opinions to the Com•
mittee with much frankness and straightforiardness.
We cannot of en agree with his opinione,' and, are are
sometimes surprised at the extent of his admissions, but
it must be allowed thet he had a difficult part 'to play
in defending himself and Lord Raglan, and conciliating
that defence with candour and fairness. Let us take
this remarks' lc series of admissions in order of time.
The question is why nothing wrs done in the fine season
towards making a road I The first answer is; that we
hoped we should not be detained in the Crimea till the
Lad weather came. "I was in hopes we ehould take the
place at once, but directly I saw its strength I altered
my opinion."
This was after the conclusion of the first
day's fire. War is an art that should not be carried on
upon hopes or conjectures ; the best general is he who
trusts the least to fortcne, and the wont be who, in
order to snatch an immediate advantage, places the
safety or p:rdition of his army at the disposel.of causes
over which he has no control. The hope of taking
Sebastopol is no justification for not resorting to the
means requisite for safety if we did not take it, any
more than the expectation of winning a bet justifies a
Man in risking a sum which if he lose he will be unable
to pay. Surely, also, this hope would have been more
justifiable if a little mote pain. had been taken to make
its accomplishment probable by preventing the Russians
from throwing up before our eyes those very earthworks
.pfrrienneisethlyattitiiemsea,Snier
principles Johnohn
which have proved so irresistible a barrier to our
el:,
do rats: ed
hoveeirer, on the 17th of October hope was at an
toiliniuneiilonforsi x completely, tnr'e h s roowmcat'huaet ittil3muterlig:t; o'r'iliteh•at carry'we re
,oexddr,,:cp'h: n!theissiege on
the same pr 'spectre of success as thostewalnitclvivwitel -
had-beY., fore the
t, 17th of October
? Surely, when Lord Raglan
saw tha the place could not be taken •in the manner proposed, it was time to adopt some decisive resolution
in order to meet the altered state of our hopes and cir-
cumstances ? To carry on operations after ac4ft,uerieweofhao4dngiiivneens
up all hope of taking the place before the winter, and
alter, indeed, we had good reason to entertain very
watill'lt hope of y
iladekibnyg aintyaet'falthe principles which ordi-
narily guide human action. Vas it resoh cd to continue
the siege f Such a resolution necessarily involved the
reteihing our then position during the winter, and re-
quired a+ an obvious conwevence the immediate forma-
tion of a road for the purpose of transpertine supplies
and ammunition. Yet it mai not till atter November
8 that Sir John Burg, yee heard that we were to Winter
in the Crimea ;. indeed, the re,:olittion was net adopted
till that day. Ye t w here else were we to winter ? We
were going on a ith a siege, tile success of which we
knew to be hop, less, and yet neglecting all precaution
just as much a- if we expected it to tenni' ate in a few
days. Ni. road was made before the I 7th of October
hecaue we expected to take the place—no read was
made before the Bth of November because, though we
knew we could not take it., our General had nut made
up his mind to act upon his knowledge, and still found
consolationiii behaving as if his hopes were not sure to
be disappointed. But, at least, -after the Bth of No-
vember there could be no doubt. Ou that day it
was formally decided that the ermy should winter
before the town ; indeed, Sir John Burgoyne •
thinks there was no alternatike. Why, then, were
not the troops immediately set to cons'ruct the road ?
Because they were wanted in the trenches, and because
we had, for some reason nct esplained, undertaken more
work ti,an we were able to get through. But what were
the trenches for? To besiege a town of the capture of
which within any reasonable time we ha-1 given up all
hopes. So that, on Sir John Burgoyne's own showing,
we w, re losing our communication with our only base of
operations—the sea, and incurring the risk of starvation

for our army, in order to carry on siege operations from
which we bad no present hope of success agaimt improved
works, and by reopening a cannonade which had already
failed. Surely the work in tha trenches is no excuse for
not making the road unless the trenches were necessary,
and the trenches could not have been necessary unless
there was some prospect of success. Thus, then, after
delusive hope and culpable remissness had done their
wort, our men were prevented from making a road ne-
cessary for their very existence by labour in the trenches,
which those who imposed it expected and believed must
end in nothing! But, if this were so, why not withdraw
our army to Balaklava, where they would have been
close to their supplies, awl might have waited in comfort
and security till the spring 1 Or, if bolder councils pre-
vailed, why did we not then take the field, and seek by
operations against the Russian protecting force to shorten
the supplies and disperse the forces that protected the
Own 1 It is, unhappily, only too evident that our gal-
lant army has been sacrificed, first to an oierweening
and unrea'onable confidence, and then to that want of
promptitude and decision which makes men the slaves of
an idea which they have once taken up, and forces them
to adhere to it after all the circumstances which induced
them to entertain it have been altered or reversed.
It was thus that the Athenians adhered to the siege
of Syracuse long • after they themselves had given
up all hope of taking the plare, merely from ina-
bility tai rhake off the torpor of di...appointment, and to
rouse them. elves to the comprelp•iision of the peril.. of
their new position. It Selia-tulnil ea* 'Jot to I e taken,
a winter monplign became annece•sary, end the waste of
our army in the trenches was a want ma tote of heroic
. .

„. ..,...
life,
.ju..titi,-(1 by no necessity, palliated by no emerge.' ,y„
A ft. r we had ceased to hope we continued to Het as at
we hoped still. Our generale deliberately shut their
eyes to impending ruin, and ..Len it hell upon them they
wore unable to devise any expedient to I.rrest its course.
Even if they were deternaintd, fear some inscrutable rea-
son, to wear out the whole army in the trenches by
undertaking snore work than they were able to perform,
and sere therefore unable to spare a man for the labour
so piainly necooary for its preservation, still they might
have taken some steps to palliate the evil. A steamer
despatched to England on the 18th of October might
have returned in .. little more than a m ii.th, bringing
with her a number of experienced workmen, capable of
saving the intli from all labour except that of the
trenches, and of making in a few days a read sufficient
for the tiancpoit of provtiait ns and ammunition. This is
now admived, but at the time we were told it was not
thought of ; indeed, its very mention elicits a faint
flicker of the old to ilitary spirit in the remark how in-
convenient it would love been to mix up civilians in
military matters. Or, lastly, Seba topol is only two
days' sail from Constantinople, s here any number of
strong Armeuians might Lave been procured to assist
the labours of the soldiers—a race in every respect dd.-
ferent, and, as far as regards the capacity of labour,
superior to the Turks. Thus have we lost half our gal-
lant army—first, because our general could not ; next,
because he would not, recognise our true position. It is
a melancholy retrospect, but still snore melancholy the
prospect, that to the same hands our Government and
our Legislature still commit the fortune of our army,
anal no inconsiderable portion of the honour of the
nation.

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF SEBASTOFOL.

The following letter has been addressed to the editor
of the Times :

Sir,—ln his examination yesterday by the committee
for inquiring into the state of the army before Sebastopol,
h' Sir John Burgoyne broadly stated that theltussian works
before that place were not constructed according to my
system of fortification. As this statement was made
under an evident misconception —which is, I dare s-ay,
shared I y many others—of what I did propose, perhaps
you will allow me to state as briefly as I can in what
my spite n really col aids.
My first proposal was to do away entirely with all_
bastions, ravelins, and all that complicated syseinerfivoe:
f
outworks, which are nut only so enormously e
but have always hitherto /moved to be only traps
to the ad-
sure the defeat of the besieged, and, accotrh.ciinreg
reduction of
mission of engineers themselves, render alto
within 21 or
every fortified place a matter of certal to in-
-31rw0,1001 :oenkal
,yl
tgi 1 seol
u,ienpa:ol s:;:ct,
orit,:hleti
cescuegaic,:sui: ei 1
tipnn:fra.pythoi
and
abtsotiejeensxrd.,it?eqiubi
isu.,,r
eietcilrb,dl;hoseot:wiw,
substitute :anti
,hea n),
the
htfienoaunfel
garrison iwoon lafoirtuttehlhdde.
12/. per ton ;
timeHe vxp,icii,.ol,eti.if:`,:ll:it,iiiituge,,,lal-et(clieleavt,'
e:t)sashinel
and that
e la ,
at's
neglected
.r
supply of guns. They cot.
tliottniey
ty, and which
~,,,,,,,bdze,.l the fire of the rhTeeh'ey
:ei it
"I'77' peas
::181 ::::s.nt:ri:aetl:ilfc'e:::u:rs: ' thane Cc:
li
,',4canl;l; ill .ri I:vt a 1 :::::,1 t "I"ki 'tn i teatoere kaWtadt 'e
' it) c:dk 1 down i
ht"nactoagairivil P°aeil ;avhnt°seolli i . should
etol :a(
hs:onlea
del buld,r, efie telqtripblul Ps
etornhor
tat.
1y
t Sebastopol, while usirg ltacedtwo
bet v‘ce
the
t ant ties,
haanved tio.eeknteph,eu.ttb.oph
heavfeu fullest
ee oto u
nab:, v. eceni rey. I
whenA rg e gaarris'n'f
materialto eonn'ill:lY,4;clititildPhort, a liviin;
chea; er and moreiaseoffirieticisttni\vioesee:—enit,s, it mud be prepared in
ected in this ire twee.
;eyrsltleatPuB'of fortititati ,n. call such simple prin•
cctiifil:ltititeisi:a::: lea of common
but itticlet.,l rtdati.thillyiee
sit
_.7, re to
tohitlisieadnieleeureceatrilperateeiT,
(ell,%ll,itce:ltit.e,t:ll,, -ii,
Ilk end
istcle I ' te:e'l,astopol has Principles, mind these only,
t my owa I: '''
1Y Litlif rt ) been con-
is this time case do; I never,
lin , hare been able to suggest an
fence : t 4, . yrovemeot in the line and niude of de.
1"11ted by tie Rus,iang
Sella . clail never heard Orf line oral my
Itl. t possible, indeed b. 1;1 that the defenders of
works, but I feel
c 'live iced that it is becau.e tin y, in 1854, have ccmle to
the f. 4 me conclusion that I airived at 10 years ago that
the p' ace did not fall into the bam;s (if the Allies, as Sir
"1111 iinigoyne expect, dit would, in October last. And
7, 1.. tivtei fla,
ithatsena
from'a ost
ourall tehne
.
tasat e.::ra3tri2lacm:avtori ih)ejeincluitaiall();e'
ginetr., expecting that the seige would be COTlClllebed CM
buth rid Ira at.cording to thewe shal lh
antiquatedy principles
rii n
in ours schools.
It 's too late now to remedy this enter as far an Sebas-
topol 43 concerned, but though the lesson has ineanome.
&Bon to :regret
do, c f the expwrience we are thus gaining.
t"hiel4it ;ria.cued eiltyhtaa:cgobstt uns; if we avail ourselves
as
We
solinua
Your obedient servant,
20, , Langbam-place, May 2.
a:ciples
taught

J. FERGIISSCW.