The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-03 00:00:00

LADIES' DRESSES.

COUNTESS COLLOREDO.
A train of cerise glace, richly trimmed with deep black
lace and bows of ribbon, over a petticoat of the same,
trimmed with deep flounces of black lace ; corsage
trimmed alike. Headdress of white jasmin and cerise
belles de jour, two magnificent tiaras of diamonds and
riviere, court plumes and lappets, and necklace of perles
fines and diamonds.

MADAME VAN DE WEYER.
Train of rich black poult de 'sok, liaed with black
also*, and trimmed with ruches of tulle and blank jet ;
petticoat or rich black glace, with tulle bouillone over,
looped with wreaths of jet and large nceuds of crape
ribbon. Black scarf, for head, spotted with jet, black
plume ; diamond ornaments.
DUCHESS OF NORTHUMBERLAND.
Train of blue moire antique, lined with glace and
trimmed with point lace ; petticoat of blue tulle over
glace, with flounces of Brussels point, trimmed with
bouquets of white azalias. Head-dress, feathers and
lace lappets ; ornaments, diamonds and pearls.
MARCHIONESS OF BREADALBANE.
Train of maize glace, covered and trimmed with tulle
and Brussels point ; pettic)at of maize moire antique,
trimmed with tulle and flounces of magnificent Brussels
lace. Head-dress, feathers and veil ; ornaments, sto-
macher, necklace, and tiara of sapphires and diamonds.
COUNTESS OF DERBY.
Train of rich blue brocade, lined with white glace, and
trimmed round with tulle bouillons, ncends of ribbon,
and fine Brussels lace ; petticoat of rich white moire
antique, trimmed en tablier, with fine Brussels lace,
white Canadian apple-blossom, and nceuds of blue velvet.
Brussels lappets, white plume ; diamond ornaments.
LADY PET°.
Costume de cour, composed of a green and silver rich
brocaded train, trimmed with bouffants of crape, agraffed
with bouquets of accacia, dewdrops, and silver
;
dress of Islay green silk, covered with two
Head-dress, Court plume and parure of magnificent
Brussels lace flounces, Brussels lace bertha, and lappets. diamonds and
emeralds.

PURCHASE OF THE BIRKENHEAD DOCKS ET TV,:
LIVERPOOL CORPORATION.—Liverpool, May 2.--Ae-atf ttenr.
usual monthly meeting of the Town Council this
oti a-
noon, the Mayor, M. J. A. Tobin, stated that
ne Which
tions for the purchase of the Birkenhead Docks,t i
me t 0
had been continued from time to time, and from
time broken off, had been rediscussed, and were now in
such a shape that they could towne to the o,nsi-
deration of the council. The-clerk (Mr. Shuttle-
worth) was at present in London, preparing certain
heads of additional agreements, but on his return in a
few days a special' meeting of the council would be
called, at which the whole matter would be fully de-
La Plata, Captain Weller,
bated. The intelligence was received with apparent
satisfaction by the council.
Mexican,
---Ornallearrte °YI
Ta MAILS.—SOUTHAMPTON, Mayan2dw,
lMefatilthCisornartaernnyo'sonstweairh-sthhiepusual West India,
2 5'50/. ditto in quick-
and Pacific mails, 63 passengers, among
Cap-
tain Hankey, Lieutenant Macauley,
silver, 3,628/. in jewellery, 'anci
herd, 15,600/. value in specie . Ir. S. Shep-
th
cargo. The Avon, with the Braziliane average general
the 16th inst. The Peninsula mails, is due on
steam ship Madrid, with Mailsr and Oriental Company's
Lisbon, Oporto, and Vigo, •
from Gibraltar, Cadiz,
even-
ing. She will bonvey is expected to-morrow
the 7th instant. The e outward Peninsular mails of
the India
)
kits% China, and Medicrraileala map, of the 20th

(From tire Times of this day.)
nil evidence of Sir John Burgoyne before the Crimean
Committee brings us as near as we are likely to arrive
at the council-chamber of the Commander-in-Chief.
Whether we are destined to receive any more authentic
intelligence must depend on the hazards and chances of
war, and on a hundred contingencies impossible to fore.
see. We must therefore make the best of the informa-
tion we have, and we are bound to say that the aged
Lieutenant-General has given his opinions to the Com-
mittee with mush frankness and straightforwardness.
We cannot often agree with his opinions, and we are
sometimes surprised at the extent of his admissions, but
it must be allowed that he had a difficult part to play
in defending himself and Lord Raglan, and conciliating
that defence with candour and fairness. Let us take_
this remarkable series of admissions in order of time.
The question is why nothing was done in the fine season
towards making a road ? The first answer is, that we
hoped we should not be detained in the Crimea till the
bad weather came. "I was in hopes we should take the
place at once, but directly I saw its strength I. altered
my opinion." This was after the conclusion of the first
day's fire. War is an art that should not be carried on
upon hopes or conjectures ; the best general is he who
trusts the least to fortune, and the worst he who, in
order to snatch an immediate advantage, places the
safety or perdition of his army at the disposal of causes
1 over which he has no control. The hope of taking
Sebastopol is no justification for not resorting to the
means requisite for safety if we did not take it, any
more than the expectation of winning a bet justifies a
man in risking a sum which if he lose he will ba unable
to pay. Surely, also, this hope would have been more
justifiable if a little more pains had been taken to make
its accompliehment probable by preventing the Russians
from throning up before our eyes those very earthworks
so
which have proved irresistible a barrier to our
progres4.
Still, however, on the 17th of October hope was at an
end, and from that time Siroa Jtnoohnßurgoyne altered his
opinion completely. gow
then, that we con-
tinued for six months from that it,t carry on the
siege on precisely the same principles and with exactly
the same prospects of success as those which we had be-
fore the 17th of October ? Surely, svhenin
trhd Raglan
saw that the place could not be taken manner
proposed, it was time to adopt some decisive re
so order to meet the altered state of our hopes sandit"?ll
cir-
cumstances ? To carry on operations after we hadgiven
up all hope of taking the place before the winter, and
after, indeed, we had good reason to entertain very
slight hope of taking it at all, is a course of conduct
wholly inexplicable by any of the principles which ordi-
narily guide human action. Was it resolved to continue
the siege ? Such a resolution necessarily involved the
retaining our then position during the winter, and re-
quired as an obvious 'consequence the immediate forma-
tion of a road for the purpose of transporting supplies
and ammunition. Yet it was not till after November
8 that Sir John Burgoyne heard that we were to winter
in the Crimea ; indeed, the resolution was not adopted
till that day. Yet where else were we to winter ? We
were going on with a siege, the success of which we
knew to be hopeless, and yet neglecting all precaution
just as much as if we expected it to terminate in a few
days. No road was made before the 17th of October
because we expected to take the place—no road was
made before the Bth of November because, though we
knew we could not take it, our General bad not made
up his mind to act upon his knowledge, and still found
consolation in behaving as if his hopes were not sure to
be disappointed. But, at least, after the Bth of No-
vember there could be no doubt. On that day it
was formally decided that the army should winter
before the town ; indeed, Sir John Burgoyne
thinks there was no alternative. Why, then, were
not the troops immediately set to construct the road ?
Because they were wanted in the trenches, and because
we had, for some reason not explained, undertaken more
work than we were able to get through. But what were
the trenches for ? To besiege a town of the capture of
which within any reasonable time we had given up all
hopes. So that, on Sir John Burgoyne's own showing,
we were losing our communication with our only base of
operations—the sea, and incurring the risk of starvation
for our army, in order to carry on siege operations from
which we had no present hope of success against improved
works, and by reopening a cannonade which had already
failed. Surely the work in tha trenches, is no excuse for
not making the road unless the trenches were necessary,
and the trenches could not have been necessary unless
there was some prospect of success. Thus, then, after
delusive hope and culpable remissness had done their
worst, our men were prevented from making a road ne-
cessary for their very existence by labour in the trenches,
which those who imposed it expected and believed must
end in nothing! But, if this were so, why not withdraw
our army to Balaklava, where they would have been
close to their supplies, and might have waited in comfort
and security till the spring ? Or, if bolder councils pre-
vailed, why did we not then take the field, and seek by
operations against the Russian protecting force to shorten
the supplies and disperse the forces that protected the
town ? It is, unhappily, only too evident that our gal-
lant army has been sacrificed, first to an overweening
and unreasonable confidence, and then to that want of
promptitude and decision which makes men the slaves of
an idea which they have once taken up, and forces them
to adhere to it after all the circumstances which induced
them to entertain it have been altered or reversed.
It was thus that the Athenians adhered to the siege
of Syracuse long after they themselves had given
up all hope of taking the place, merely from ina-
bility to shake off the torpor of disappointment, and to
rouse themselves to the comprehension of the perils of
their new position. If Sebastopol was not to be taken,
a winter campaign became unnecessary, and the waste of
our army in the trenches was a wanton caste of heroic

life, justified by no necessity, palliated by no einergEncy.
After we had ceased to hope we continued to act as it'
we hoped still. Our generals deliberately shut their
eyes to impending ruin, and when it fell upon them they
were unable to devise any expedient to arrest its course. _
Even if they were determined, fur some inscrutable rea-
son, to wear out the whole army in the trenches by
undertaking more work than they were able to perform,
and were therefore unable to spare a man for the labour
so plainly necessary for its preservation, still they might
have taken some m.teps to palliate the evil. A steamer
despatched to England on the 18th of October might
have returned in a little more than a month, bringing
with her a number of experienced workmen, capable of
saving the men from all labour except that of the
trenches, and of making in a few days a road sufficient
for the transport of provisions and ammunition. This is
now admitted, but at the time we were told it was not
thought of ; indeed, its very mention elicits a faint
flicker of the old military spirit in the remark how in-
convenient it would have been to mix up civilians in
military matters. Or, lastly, Sebastopol is only two
days' sail from Constantinople, where any number of
strong Armenians might have been procured to assist
the labours of the soldiers—a race in every respect dif-
ferent, and, as far as regards the capacity of labour,
superior to the Turks. Thus have we lost half our gal-
lant army—first, because our general could not ; next,
because he would not, recognise our true position. It is
a melancholy retrospect, but still more melancholy the
prospect, that to the same hands our Government and
our Legislature still commit the fortune of our army,
and no inconsiderable portion of the honour of the
nation.