The Sun.
London, England, 1864-11-18 00:00:00

THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

(From a Correspondent of the Times)

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, Sept. 23.

I write from the capital of the state of South Ca-
rolina, one of the fairest towns of the Confederate
States, 200 miles from the army of Gen. Hood, and
over 490 from the forces under command of General
Lee, and from Charleston distant some 120 miles.
Although the war has raged for now nearly four
years, the State of South Carolina almost alone has
been exempted from the unwelcome presence of the
enemy, and were it not for the many crippled sol•
diem the eye meets in the streets of this town, one
might suppose himself to be in the midst of peace
and plenty.
Nearly one month has now elapsed since General
Sherman took possession of Atlanta, a central town
in the northwestern portion of the State of Georgia,
and as yet nothing indicates that the Federal gene.
ral is about to take that advantage of his success
which his own laudations to his army led us to ex-
pect would surely follow. On the other hand, the
Confederates have borne their reverse with great
fortitude; their army is perfectly intact, and un.
donbtedly ready to meet the enemy on his advance.
Gen. Sherman's success does not repay him for the
extraordinary loss of 60,000 men his army has sus-
tained since he left his base of operations at Chat-
tanooga upon his march to the objective point, At•
lenta. That this loss is as great as has been stated
there cannot be the shadow of a doubt. Muster-
rolls of the enemy recently obtained by Gen. Hood
and which were by him compared with the data he
possessed of the original strength of the Federal
army, disclose the startling fact of a loss of nearly
two-thirds to the Federal ranks, although many
regiments had previously been recruited to their
full authorised strength in the Northern States.
There is no hesitation in stating that since his suc-
cess General Sherman, far from being able to pro.
secute his march, now finds himself both unable to
advance, and doubtful what to do. Vastly superior
in strength hitherto to his gallant adversary, he has
by dint of well-executed flanking manoeuvres forced
the Confederate generals back upon Atlanta—but
now, when the casualties of war have reduced his
host to nearly the strength of the Confederates, he
prudently hesitates and awaits reinforcementerthus
not only giving to the Confederates time to recupe-
rate, but also exposing himself to the imminent
dangers even now culminating in his rear.
The necessitj of halting after reaching the objec-
tive point,when his adversary is still unbroken and
in the highest state of discipline, encamped within
a few miles, has furnished the excuse to General
Sherman of perpetrating one of the most extraordi-
nary actions the history of any nation presents—l
mean the ordering of the entire population of a city
to leave their homes and all they possess—old men,
women, and children, and when the rigorous season
is already near at hand and the horrors of famine
staring these unfortunate beings in the face. This
unexampled severity was based upon the plan of the
" necessities " of the United States, but, in fact, is
only a strong indication of his military weakness
and gloomy anticipations. It will be recollected
how much the reputation of Marshal Davoust suf.
fered when, in order to hold the city of Hamburg
against the Russian General Benningsen, he or-
dered the exile of some 20,000 of its inhabitants
during the severe wiutur of 1813.14, and how
much this cruelty contributed in rousing the spirit
of the German people. For Marshal Davoust, what.
ever bitter pangs he inflicted upon that unfortunate
population, some excuse may yet be found. When•
ever we concede it to be one of the first duties of
a commander to preserve his troops by all pos.
bible means, we must confess, if his action was
bitterly felt, it was necessary to keep together his
army. It was in absolute danger of starvation,
and the expulsion of 20,000 non-combatants from a
beleagured fortress not only materially prolonged
his defence, but obviated a surrender. Gen. Sherman
has no such grounds of excuse. He neither holds a
fortress nor are his troops in danger of starvation.
His act must be characterised by every impartial
judge as one of atrocious cruelty, and so it will be
recorded in history. Gen. Hood, who had no voice
in the matter, was obliged to accept the exiled popu-
lation, and has done everything to relieve the imme-
diate necessities of these poor homeless wanderers.
It may be asked in England, how is it that Gcn.
Sherman was permitted unmolested to advance on
both sides of the railway which connects his bnse
with his objective point ; it being, moreover, the
only line of communication which supplied him
materials of war ? Was there no possibility of cuts
ting th e communication and delivering Gen, Sher-
man over to the horrors of a retreat through mono•
'rains and defiles which might have become as
disastrous as any operation the annals of warfare
have chronicled ?

It is now well known that whsn Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston assumed the command of the Army of
Tennessee, after Gen. Braxton Bragg's withdrawal,
the former urgently and repeatedly requested that
his corps of cavalry might be increased, represent.
ing that, as he had barely sufficient to cover his
flanks, none was left him to harass Gen. Sherman's
rear and break upon his line of operation. This
application does not appear to have been answered
at Richmond in any practical manner, the Govern.
ment, 600 miles away from the seat of war, believing,
in imitation of the celebrated Aulic Council, that
Gen. Johnston could not estimate his own wants,
and to the neglect of this important request the fall
of Atlanta must now be ascribed. The demonstra.
Cons of Gen. Johnston were necessarily few and
feeble ; he contented himself with holding the
enemy in check along the extent of his line, and to
save himself from being flanked, step by step, with ,
inimitable sang froid and success, fell back upon
Atlanta. This continued retreating on the part of
General Johnston at last, and needlessly, as the
sequel showed—for Atlanta was given up after all
—alarmed the people, and it Was even rumoured
that the steadiness of the army was affected, which,
however, I have no sufficient grounds for crediting.
General Bragg at this crisis, in his capacity of Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces, repaired
to Atlanta, consulted with General Johnston, who
would not give the unqualified assurance required
to hold Atlanta. and hence his removal and the ap-
pointment of General Hood to the command of the
Army of Tennessee. This young general, but little
over 30 years of age, who, whatever his military
talents may be, is not surpassed by any Confederate
general in point of bravery, was willingly received
by the people and the army, and all needful sup -
port was cheerfully given him. Since the loss of
Atlanta, however, a reaction has taken place, and I
should not be surprised if the Confederate executive
was forced either to reappoint Johnston or to pro.
mote General Beauregard to the command of an
independent army. Whether now General Hood
gave his unqualified promise to hold Atlanta, we
have no means of ascertaining. At any rate, he at
once repaired the supposed omission of the former
commander-in chief, and, it is charged, sent his
whole cavalry to the roar, uncovered his flanks,
and permitted General Sherman to press him to
the south of Atlanta. It is, morever, stated the
Confederate general committed another blunder—
viz., that of dividing his forces, which led to the
overpowering of General Hardee, who had been
sent to cover the railway to Macon. The Fede•
ral general solely attributes his success to the
uncovering of General Hood's flanks. As the
Confederate Government has long since ceased
to permit the publication of the military reports
of its generals, es 3 are obliged for the
pre.
sent to rely almost entirely upon newspaper reports
and the statements of the Federals, both, we have
often experienced, not always to be
implicitly
adopted.
Three principal railways issue from Atlanta. The
first line leads to the south-west, and unites the city
with Montgomery end Mobile, both in Alabama. It
is now in the possession of the Federals. The second
line runs in a southern direction to Macon, another
railway centre in the State of Georgia, whence it
proceeds to the seaport of Savannah. Upon this
railroad, some 30 miles to the south of Atlanta, now
rests the left flank of Gcn. Hood. The third railway,
and in my estimation the most important line, leads
to Augusta, in Georgia,thence to Columbia, in South
Carolina, and is the direct line to the capital of the
Confederacy, Richmond. Upon this road, 20 miles
to the east.of Atlanta, now rests the extreme right