The Sun.
London, England, 1863-12-01 00:00:00

THE POLISH INSURRECTION,

WARSAW, Nov. 11.
I spoke in a recent letter of the feverish anxiety
with which the speech of the Emperor Napoleon
was looked forward to in Warsaw. The day before

the opening of the French Chambers numbers of
persons went to church and prayed that God would
enlighten the the Emperor and turn his heart to-
wards Poland. On the evening of the sth the most

curiously contradictory rumours were in circulation
as to what his Majesty had said, and when the
German papers arrived with the text of the speech

equally opposite interpretations were given 'to it.
On the whole, however, the speech is much admired

and is considered encouraging, dope,—"the miser-
able have no other inedine,
but only hope,"—still
remains to the P-;ies ;
they cling now to the straw
held out t!:, them in the shape of a projected Cons
gres7,, which if it were to take place could scarcely
tail to bring on war. No regular war could injure
the Poles so much as the war against national and

'amily ties, as well as against life and property, o

which their unhappy country is now the scene.
Even if the Polish nation were to perish in the con-
flict, it would at least perish arms in hand ; but the
fact is it is difficult to think of any combination for
war purposes by which it would not almost cer-
tainly profit.

No Pole imagines that the Polish question can
be settled, as he would like to see it settled, by
peaceful means, and the universal desire in Poland
is, of course, that France should end by going to
war with Russia. This does not prevent some of

the Poles from reflecting that France is not likely
to take such a step without an ally, nor from re-
membering that it is not very long since Russia
and France were on remarkably good terms. More
than that, when the Austrian Diet of Princes was
convened, Poles supposed to have close relations
with the French f.iovernment were of opinion that

the friendly understanding might be renewed, and
that if Russia could be tempted to make important
concessions to the Kingdom by the promise of
French assistance for projects of her own, Austria
could be forced to give Cracow, and Prussia might
even be induced to part with a small portion of the
Duchy of Posen—keeping, of course, for herself the
city with its strong fortress. In forming this pro-
ject of a restored Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in nar-
rower limits and under a Russian Prince, its
authors counted not only without Russia, but also
without the Polish nation, which at that time was
convinced that the insurrection would lead inevi-
tably to a general war, or at least that the three
Powers who had engaged in a hopeless diplomatic
intervention would finally be compelled to assume a
hostile and menacing attitude towards Russia, even

if all did not go to the length of taking up arms
Of such a result the Poles must have ceased to
think, and it is at least more possible now than it
was two months ago that if France can gain nothing
for them by the sword, they would as a last chance
accept what France might be able to procure for
them by good offices, and by coining to terms with
their great oppressor on other questions.
The Poles, it must be remembered, take it for
granted that the Emperor Napoleon, for the sake of
his own position in France, must do something for
them, and, therefore, it is argued that if he finds
himself left to act entirely alone on their behalf
he will have no course open to him but to offer
the hand of friendship once more to Russia, and
make the best possible friendly bargain for them,
even at the expense of Austria. In thinking of
such a solution as this the Poles, no doubt, reflect
that if Austria has not helped the Russians to
suppress the present insurrectio❑ quite so openly
as the Prussians, she has at least aided them to a
very considerable extent, and of late to a greater
extent than ever. Thus every endeavour is made to
prevent the Galician bands from reaching the fron-
tier. They are fired upon as they go across, and
their passage made known to the Russian troops on
the other side ; their numbers and position are tele-
graphed from Lemberg to the Russian authorities
at Warsaw, and when they are driven back and seek
refuge on Austrian territory, they are disarmed and
imprisoned.
A most magnificent offer, however, would have
to be made to Russia before she could be persuaded
to allow a self-governing Kingdom of Poland to
come into existence as large or larger than the one
which has already caused her so much trouble, and
proved to her such a fertile source of disgrace. Nor
do the Poles, however intolerable their actual posi-
tion may be, ask at present for concessions from
Russia. The object of their desire is not good go-
vernment under the Russian Crown, but separation
from the Russians, whom they hale just now (and
with reason) more than they ever hated them
before. Moreover they feel themselves bound in
honour to accept no terms from Russia, unless the
Lithuanians, who have suffered more even than
the inhabitants of Poland proper during the
insurrection, are included in the compact. Even
if the most valuable and improbable liberties were
offered to them they could not declare themselves
satisfied with them, while the Lithuanians are not
allowed to make use of the Polish language, and are
imprisoned for establishing Polish schools. Yet it
has been surmised that the somewhat vague in-
quiry in the Emperor's speech, " Is it not urgent
to recognise by new conventions what is irre-
vocably accomplished ?" may refer to the Lithu-
anian and Ruthenian provinces, which have been
governed for the last 30 years on the same system
as the rest of the Russian Empire, though by the
Treaty of Vienna " national and representative
institutions" are distinctly promised to them as to
all other portions of " the Poland of 1772." But
the fact is, Russia must care very little in the pre-
sent day whether her right to abolish the language
of all the educated classes in these provinces be
questioned or not. She can get on very well with-
out treaties as far as Poland is concerned, and better
without them than with them. Even Russia her-
self seems inclined to admit that she has not ob-
served the treaties of 1815 with any great fidelity,
for in the edition of the Imperial speech, prepared
for the use of paternally-governed Pcland, and pub-
of There lished in the Official Journal of Warsaw, I find the
words " does not respect them" given as an admis-
Ibis equivalent for " les Joule au pied."
...n arrangementconcessions to
representation
Napoleon-4h
circumstances
is, moreover, this great difficulty in the way
. by which Russia should make
their attitude of trust ell)
trust towards Russia.
at Polandtmi in conformity with a friendly
on the subject from the Emperor
would
concessions made under such
must wilih, above all things,to to
the Poles in
is,chaerdist France and of di.-
trust Government
o diminish, and, it pos-