The Sun.
London, England, 1864-04-12 00:00:00

DENMARK.

Lord CAMPBELL called the attention of their
lordships to the correspondence presented to Parliament,
and moved that in the opinion of this house a conference
upon the Danish question in order to lead to a practical
result ought to be accompanied by such steps as may
seem calculated to inspire confidence in the resolution of
her Majesty's Government to adhere to the treaties in
which the Duchy of Schleswig had been guaranteed to
Denmark by Great Britain, He believed that the Confer-
ence about to be held abounded in the elements of failure,
and asked whether it was to be supposed that the obligations
of this country would be satisfied by an unsuccessful Con-
ference. Already our diplomacy had undergone a series of
reverses on this subject; and surely we could hardly afford
another that would be so cruelly disappointing to the Danes.
If the Conference separated without any satisfactory result,
there could not be a second, and the peace and tranquillity
of Europe would be placed in imminent danger. The noble
lord also observed that he thought a British fleet might be
usefully empl4ed in the Little Belt for the purpose of
guarding the island of Pullen from aggression.
The Duke of ARGYLL was at a loss to know how the
Government could have prevented war by threatening to
take part in it : yet that was what the noble lord meant, if
he meant anything. He apprehended that if they had taken
that course, instead of preventing they might have in-
creased the bloodshed. It was true that Great Britain
held a high position and had vast influence in Europe, but
she was not the arbitrator in all the quarrels of continental
nations. Our obligations towards Denmark were contained
in the treaty of 1852, which was not a treaty of guarantee
but of recognition, and had not been signed by England
alone. He regarded the bloodshed in the present war as
altogether unjustifiable, inasmuch as every object could
have been attained by negotiation, We should go into the
Conference, in the first place, to restore peace to Europe;
secondly, to secure as far as possible the local
liberties of the two Duchies ; and, thirdly, to re-
concile with that the integrity and independence of Den-
mark. He admitted that, all the obligations of Den-
mark towards the Duchies had not been adhered to ;
still, it should be remembered that the promises made by
Germany to Denmark had also been disregarded.

Earl GREY was not such a partisan of Denmark as to
say that she had the whole of the right on her side. So far
from that, he believed that if since 1852 she had governed
the Duchies in a wiser and more conciliatory spirit the pre-
sent crisis would never have arisen. Perhaps, however,
there were faults on both sides, and that, therefore, some
Conference was necessary. At the same time he was con-
vinced that 011ie .would have been no war had the English
Government pursued a firmer line of policy. The noble earl
also deprecated the manner in which the war had been con-
ducted by Austria and Prussia, and characterised it as a
barbarous, savage, most wanton, and gratuitous outrage
upon the feelings of the Danish people.
Earl RUSSELL—It now appears, I think, clearly from
my noble friend's speech, that we are arraigned, not for
not having prevented a war between Prussia and Austria
and Denmark, but that we have not really engaged in war.
The real subject of my noble friend's attack is, that we
are at peace. As I go on I will show how the proposals
of my noble friend would have failed, if they had been
adopted. My noble friend began by saying that he would
not enter into the Schleswig-Holstein question; but at the
same time, without entering into the question of Schleswig-
Holstein, it is difficult to see under what circumstances
those powers are now at war. In looking at the history of
this question, it seems that the arrangements of 1851, made
between Prussia and Austria, were most unfortunate and
complicated. They gave not only Austria and Prussia, but
the Powers of Germany, either the right of, or at all events
the pretext fur, interfet ing in the domestic concerns of the
two duchies, which could not but lead—unless there was
the greatest good temper and the greatest wish for concilia-
tion on both sides—to discussions of a most angry kind, and
finally to the breaking out of war. That has been the his-
tory of the transactions of the last 10 years. For my own
part, I will say, with regard to those matters, as they are of
great importance, I felt it my duty, holding the post of Se-
cretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to divest my mind of all
partisanship—(hear)—and to endeavour to meet that ques-
tion between the Powers with a fair and impartial mind, so
as, if possible, to form a clear and just judgment with re-
spect to them. Nothing I think is more discreditable to any
statesman than to rush at onee into a strong decision on the
one side or the other, without carefully investigating the
bearings of the question. With regard to this treaty the
Danish Government promised, in 1851, that it would keep
Schleswig very much as a separate State ; that it should
have separate provincial Estates for its own affairs; that it
should have a representative body, and that it should have
a Minister ; and that its administration should be con-
ducted solely in Schleswig. It was a very difficult matter
to keep those engagements when foreign troops
oceupied a part of her soil. I will not now, in these times
of her distress, point out in detail where her promises, I
think, were not fulfilled. But Germany, on her side, took
a most unfair advantage of what was done by Denmark ;
and on every occasion she put forward propositions which
it would have been impossible for Denmark to accede to,
because they would, in fact, have made a German majority
at the very seat of the Government, and thus have de-
stroyed, not nominally the integrity, but really the indee
pendenco, of Denmark. The dispute went on until, on the
ht of October last, Germany resolved on Federal execution,
Whatever may have been the difficulties, they were aggra•
vased tenfold upon the occasion of entering Schleswig.
Those is favour of German pretensions might well suppose
that the late King, having been governed by councillors of
Danish principles, and having himself not only a great love
for his country, but strong prejudices in favour of it, would
be partial in these matters. But the new King was not
liable to any suspicion of that kind, and I am persuaded,
even at this moment,that if Germany had temperately urged
the claims of Schleswig to certain rights and privileges
which Denmark had agreed to give, that the King of Den-
mark would have so regulated the provisions of the govern-
ment of his provinces that all real grounds of complaint
would have been done away with. But the conduct of
Germany was very different. As wo wished, above all, to
prevent war in Europe, at the same time it was
our object so to caunsel both as to come to scme
conciliatory end. Surely it was our part to see
that in our opinion Denmark was in the right. We,
however, proposed, that the constitution should be re-
voked. My noble friend found fault with our making
that representation without our being able to follow it
up with hostilities. If we had groat interests there,
and these were neglected, I allow we must defend
them ; but where there is only a benevolent desire
to maintain peace in Europe, and to see that each state has
its own rights, I cannot see any humiliation, but I think
there is comfort in thinking that we have urged over and
over again, by friendly advice, that peace should be pre-
served, and that these Powers should not injure each other.
In doing this it appeared to me that unless we were to
make ourselves alone the defenders of the liberties of Eu-
rope—unless we were to teko a course that none of the great
statesmen who have adopted a European policy for England
would have advocated, we were bunted to endeavour to ob-
tain allies. Now, the allies to whom we naturally looked
were France and Russia. I maintain that it would have
been unwise for the Government of this country to commit
itself to hostilities without having the assistance of the
other Powers of Europe. I wrote a despatch to thir French
Government, and I wrote a similar despatch to the Russian
Government, saying that there was a project in Germany
fur depriving Denmark of Holstein and the Duchy of Schles-
wig, and supposing that project is persevered in will you,
France, go with us in giving material aid to Denmark ?
will you, Russia, go with us in giving material aid to hen-
mark? That answers every part of my noble friend's re-
proach. The answer of France was to this effect, that she
was not opposed to nationality, hut that it might be that
some change in the provinces would be of advantage to the
maintenance of Denmark. The reply then went en to say
that war with Germany was a serious question for France,
and she preferred to keep herself at liberty ; but future mea-
sures she must take if the balance of power were really
in danger. The answer of Russia was that she wished to
preserve her liberty, wished to know what the position of
England was, but did not feel how far policy would
justify her in giving material assistance. Then the ques-
tion came to this, that England, France, Russia, and
Sweden having made a treaty by which they did not agree
to guarantee the integrity of the Danish monarchy, but
agreed to acknowledge the principle, [whether we alone,
l'ithout France and Russia, should take upon ourselves the
burden of supporting Denmark. The balance of power in
Europewl .is clearly of consequence to France and Russia, as
well as to England. Therefore it was not the interest of
England to undertake alone this defence. Only consider
what the state of Germany was. A state of violent enthu-
siasm prevailed for having Schleswig and Holstein sepa-
rated from Denmark. They did not care much about the
Prince of Augustenburg, but put him up as a Prince who '
would be the instrument of Germany for that purpose.
According to the views of my noble friend, if we were to
defend Denmark we should have Venetia making war in
the Adriatic; we should have Hungary delighted to
see England at war with Germany; and all this disturb-
ance of Europe, all this great war was to be undertaken
in the name of peace, and to prevent Schleswig being taken
(Cheers.) That is the prospect he proposes, but I rejoice
that we have not thrown a firebrand into Europe,
and we have not caused the eatenaive conflagration
the noble lord wanted. Well, then, my noble friend
says it would have been much better if England had
done what France did, and sail we do not mean
to interfere in any way on behalf of Denmark.
Now it is necessary to consider what has been effected.
It the representatives of the Government did not prevent
the war breaking out, they had pi educed this effect, that on
the 31st of January, before they wont into Schleswig,
these Powers informed England, France, and Russia
that they held to the treaty of 1852, and respected
the integrity of Denmark. That is a great point
gained. It appears to me that we can now go into the
conference, and clearly consider the Powers bound to re-
spect that treaty and, the integrity of Denmark. It is

by the firmness and moderation of our language that we
have obtained from them a determination to maintain that
treaty; and we consider that is the object we alwfiys keep
in view. I recollect perfectly well hearing Mr, Canning
say we must have war sooner or later. If th ►t be the case)

I say let it be later; but my noble friend says just the re-
verse. He says, "We must have war 833 L er or later, and
I say sooner." I say, with Mr. Canning, " later," and I
am quite content to abide by that. As the Conference is to
meet on the 20th of this month, I need not enter—nor
would it be right for me to enter—upon the questions which
are now before the house. It will be the endeavour of Eng-
land to modify the extreme pretensions, and prevent, if pos-
sible, the animosity of the different nations. In that view
I am not going to lay severe blame on the different parties
in this war. It has already been characterised by my noble
friend at the head of the Government as an iniquitous age
greasion. Nothing stronger could be said, even by my
noble friend opposite: With regard to the whole subject,
I must consider the many interests which we have spread
over the whole face of the globe, and the danger, if we were
at war with Germany, that other wars would spring up out
of it, and that our commerce might be intercepted by pri-
vateers under many different flags, and scouring the ocean
to destroy our commerce. It may be an unworthy consi-
deration in the eyes of my noble friend, but when I reflect
on the exposition made the other night of the magnificent
situation of this country, I am not inclined to hazard that
situation without a clear case of honour or of great and
mighty interests that called for armed intervention. Also
we must consider that, besides, if that exposition
of flourishing trade, and the improvement of our
finances, and all our material interests, there re-
mains the fact that we have no less than twenty-six millions
of interest of debt to pay, which was caused almost entirely
by the last two wars in which this country was engaged.
In 1764 the interest of our debt was £4,600,000, it is now
£26,200,000. May we not fairly be unwilling and cautious
before we add to that debt ? There was one of those wars
—the American war—which no man in these days will
defend. The other of those wars the father of my noble
friend (Earl Gray) most eloquently opposed as unjust and
unnecessary. Whether these wars were justified or not,
the cost and burden of them have been immense. While
that is no reason why we should desert any cause in which
we are bound to go forward, or why we should abandon
any friend whom we have any obligations to support, there
are reasons why we should pursue a pacific and not a war-
like course. I adhere to the policy of seeking alliances to
maintain the balance of power, and while I agree with the
great man to whom I have referred, that the destruction of
one of the States of Europe would be not only a great out-
rage, but a peril to the independence of the other States of
Europe, at the same time I do think that the policy the
least hostile we can make it ought to be pursued by this
country. I cannot, therefore, agree with the motion of my
noble friend, nor do I believe that the house will agree with
it. With regard to the treaty of 1852, it is our object to
maintain that treaty, and to have it again recognised by the
Powers of Europe. I trust that will be the result of the Con-
ference. The noble earl then referred to the policy of France,
and stated that their sympathy had always been the strongest
in favour of the Poles, while the sympathy of England
was strongest in favour of the Danes. The refusal of Eng-
land to join France in favour of the Poles, and the refusal
of France to join England in favour of Denmark, were due
to those sympathies. We have no reason to find fault with
France on that subject; but still if we are to defend Den-
mark on the grounds of the balance of power and the in-
terest of Europe, the Powers of Europe ought to go toge-
ther, and not leave us alone to undertake that great task,
The Earl of DERBY said he apprehended that the ob-
ect of the noble baron, in bringing forward his motion, was
to give his own individual opinion, and to enable other
members of the house to express their opinion of the policy
and conduct of her Majesty's Government. He doubted
wheiher that policy was not more likely to lead to serious
complications than a more resolute policy. They explained
that her Majesty's Government held out menaces and re-
monstrances of every description to foreign countries, while,
at the same time, conveying to those foreign countries the
conclusion that nothing would induce us to give material
aid, or take any other part than remonstrance Referring,
then, to the general question,the noble earl traced the course
of Prussia and Austria to mutual jealousy, acted on by the
democratic feeling in Germany, acting through the minor
powers. He would not repeat what had been said in the
evening in regard to the manner in which Germany had
availed herself of the difficulty caused by the death of
the late King to press upon Denmark conditions which
she could not possibly accept, He thought that course
was wholly ungenerous, but the question with which
they had to deal was not only the danger to Denmark,
but the effect of the course pursued by her Majesty's
Government for mitigating that danger, and the psalm
in which our interests stood in regard to Europe at the
present time. In looking through the documents he
found that to almost every country we had addressed suc-
cessively representations, remonstrances, and threats, and
used language going to the very verge of declaring that an
invasion of Schleswig would be regarded as a ground of war.
He did not assert that we had actually said that, but we
had gone to the very verge of it. Would it not have been
more generous and fair and candid to have said to Denmark,
" We advise you as friends to take such and such a course,
but recollect that from us you must expect no more than
our moral influence ?" It must be admitted that, according
to the terms of the treaty, we were not bound to come for-
ward to protect Denmark, and to take upon ourselves the
task of maintaining her integrity ; but then we had no right
to hold nut to Denmark such representations as had been
held out by the Prime Minister of this country in his place
in Parliament. From the moment that declaration was
made, the Danes said, and they had a right to say, " We
know the power of England; we have the pledge of the
Prime Minister of England that that power shall be exer-
cised in our defence; the honour of England has hitherto
been held inviolate in this case." (Hear, hear.) His lord-
ship then read from the despatches several passages show-
ing the representations made to the different Powers by the
noble earl the Secretary for War, and the replies which he
hal received, Just after the noble had quitted BerlinoSir
Andrew Buchanan was instructed to make several represen-
tations in the interests of peace to the Prussian Minister,
but all the points heurged were rejected, and he wrote home,
" There is an absolute persusion that England will not in-
terfere materially, and our counsel is regarded as totally im-
material, and of no weight." A few weeks before the meet-
ing of Parliament, the noble earl had declared that the mem-
bers of the Cabinet had not consulted together as to the
course they should pursue in the event of a military occu-
pation of Schleswig, but that his personal opinion was that
the feeling throughout the country would be such, that her
Majesty's Ministers would think proper to recommend the
active interference of this country. To Denmark the noble
earl held out expectations that if they complied ;with cer-
tain conditions they would have material aid from us—
while to Prussia ho held out that in the event of Schleswig
being occupied, he could not doubt that the friendly Powers
would assist Denmark in resisting such invasion.
Throughout the whole of the transactions measures
which were protested against in the strongest possible
terms had ben ultimately acquiesced in by her Ma-
jesty's Government. Stop after step had been taken,
converting the Federal execution into a material guarantee,
and lastly into an invasion and occupation of a country,
without a declaration of war, but accompanied with scenes
of barbarity and ferocity unparalleled in the annals of war.
He regretted to say that the Prussian army did not ap-
pear to have overcome that feeling of ferocity which gave
so much difficulty to the Duke of Wellington in 1814.
(Hear, hear.) The bombardment of Sonderborg was an
act of unparalleled atrocity if it were true, as he had
lately heard, that after the town had been laid in ruins a
pause ensued, and the inhabitants—having been induced
to go back to search for their goods among the ruins of
their homes, found themselves in a trap—the bombard-
ment was renewed. (Hear, hear,) He wished he could see
in the proposed Conference any great probability of a pros-
perous issue. That Conference would not assemble under
the most favourable auspices, because the patties who were
coming to it had declared views in total opposition to each
other. He wished to point out that the engagement of 1851-
2 was limited to Austria, Prussia, and Denmark; but the
Treaty of 1852 was entered into by all the great Powers, and
did not make the slightest reference to the previous engage-
ments, to which, consequently, the great Powers were no
parties. He was glad to hear that the noble earl did not con-
fine himself to securing what is called the integrity of Den-
mark, but that he alluded to the integrity and indepen-
dence of that country, for plausible arguments might be put
forward to secure the integrity of Danmark, and yet by some
means to entirely sacrifice its independence. (Hear, hear.)
He did justice to the motives of the noble earl (Russell) ;
but he could not conceal his conviction that, by the course
he had taken, he had confirmed the impression which was
already too prevalent, that England had ceased to be a great
Power—that her political and military position was to be
made subservient to her trading and commercial interests—
and that, however, she might bluster, there was not the
least danger of her interteru!g materially to exercise the
slightest influence or control in the affairs of Europe.
Lord WODEHOUSE stated that when he represented
this coantry at Copenhagen he constantly endeavoured to
impress upon the Danes the fact that they were not likely
to receive material aid from Great Britain. He believed
that it would have been far better for Denmark to have
made timely concessions than provoke war, but, unfortu-
nately, all the concessions she had made came too late.
Earl GRANVILLE observed, with respect to the Con-
ference, that most of the great Powers who were parties to
it, including Austria, were agreed that the first act of the
assembly must be the - immediate establishment of an
armistice.

Lord CAMPBELL then withdrew the motion, and
The house adjourned at a quarter to eleven o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS--Last Evening.
The SPEAxmt took the chair at four o'clock.
NEW MEMBER.

Mr. CARDIVELL, the newly appointed Colonial Secre-
taty, took the oaths and his seat for Oxford, on his re-
election.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

The following Lills were read a third time and passed :
The Caledonian Railway—East and West Junction Rail-
way—Holborn Valley Improvement—and North Eastern
Railway (Meckleford Branch),
THE DANO-GERMAN QUESTION.
Mr, HORSMAN asked the First Lord of the Treasury

whether, if it should be a result of the conference that Eng-
land was about to undertake new engagements with refer-
ence to Denmark and the Daches, her Majesty's Ministers
would be prepared to submit those engagements to the con-
sideration of Parliament before they advised their ratifica-
tion by the Crown.
Lord PALMERSTON said that, in a mixed constitution
like that of this country, it was almost impossible to draw
a line in reference to important questions like the present.
(Hear, hear.) There was not the slightest wish on the
part of the Government to prevent Parliament from consi•
dering this question fully.
THE ARMY ESTIMATES.

The Marquis of HARTINGTON, in reply to a ques-
tion, said that if he were not able to get into a committee
of supply on the Army Estimates this evening, he would
bring them on to-morrow,