The Sun.
London, England, 1855-03-30 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.
( From the Times of this day.)

Although we have studiously abstained from any remarks
which might throw discredit on the negotiations now going
on at Vienna, or indicate our distrust of their result, we have
never lost sight of the difficulties by which this Conference of
the belligerent Powers is inevitably beset, and, though willing
to accept an honourable peace, we have not disguised our
opinion that the highest interests of this nation and of Europe
may require a vigorous prosecution of the war. The inter-
ruption which is now understood to have taken place in the
deliberations of the Conference on the third point, and the
reference said to have been made by the Plenipotentiaries to
their respective Courts, confirm the suspicion which has uni-
formly been entertained in this country by those who are
most acquainted with the real course of public affairs. The
discussion of the third point in the articles submitted to the
Conference, and interpreted by the Western Powers, has
checked the progress of the negotiation, and has given rise
to strong doubts of its ultimate success. The Russian Pleni-
potentiaries appear not to have been authorised to accede to
the terms on which Lord John Russell and M. de Bourqueney
were prepared to insist as to the abatement of the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea; and it now rests with
the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to determine whether the Con-
ference is to persevere in its pacific labours, or to abandon
.for the present the attempt.
Undoubtedly, it has been argued that the attempt to ter-
minate this contest was premature, that the fortune of war
had not sufficiently solved the difficulties of these questions,
and that, in reality, neither party was prepared to recede
from the demands which had induced it to resort to arms.
Nevertheless, it was thought by the Cabinets of London and
Paris that no opportunity should be neglected which held out
any prospect of the honourable termination of a struggle
so injurious to the best interests of Europe, and that it was
due to the Powers already associated by treaty with our just
demands to exhaust all the means which held out any hope
of the restoration of peace. With this view and for this pur-
pose the tone of the Western Powers in these Conferences has
been extremely temperate, and they have been disposed to
carry concessions to their furthest limits. This motive alone
can have induced them to omit the reduction'ef the fortress
of Sebastopol from the conditions they required, and to con-
template the possibility of an evacuation of the Russian ter-
teritory, provided they obtained effectual security for the
limitation of that naval force which has threatened for seve-
ral years the existence and independence of the Ottoman em-
pire. It is not for us to determine whether any such effec-
tual security could be obtained as long as Sebastopol remains
stronger than ever from its prolonged defence, and armed at
all points against the power of Turkey. But, in consenting
to negotiate at all upon a basis which did not include the re-
duction of Sebastopol, the Western Powers have unquestion-
ably given the strongest imaginable proof of their sincere de-
sire for the restoration of peace. During the earlier stages
of this negotiation we have not raised our voice against even
this concession, because we felt that the previous success of
our arms did not warrant us in insisting on a condition which
the fortune of war had not placed in our hands. But, should
the Conferences be suspended and ultimately broken off by
no fault of the Allied Governments. then we feel more than
ever that the success of our operations in the Crimea is
the test of our power, and the arguments by which we
originally urged the expedition against Sepastopol recur
with tenfold force, and compel 'us to strain every nerve
for its demolition. We knew that we were playing for
a great stake ; we knew that the existence of the great for-
tified works of Sebastopol is the basis of preponderance of
R ssia, not only in the Black Sea, but over the East ; and,
until that obstacle is conquered and removed, we cannot hope
to have destroyed the causes of this couteet. The failure of
the negotiation would therefore materially increase the im-
portance attached to our operations in the Crimea, and their
result would become the real criterion of success or defeat.
To these considerations are added others of scarcely inferior
moment, with reference to the position and future conduct
of the German Powers. leis true that in order to obtain the
support of Austria, and to execute with punctilious fidelity
the engagements which bind us and her to the objects of the
treaty of the 2d of December, the Western States have con-
ceded much of their just demands. If the rejection by Rus-
sia of the terms now under discussion puts an end to the
labours of the Conference, on the ground that she refuses to
submit to that diminution of her power in the Black Sea
which the other Powers have proclaimed to be essential to
the peace of Europe, it can scarcely be contended that Austria
is not bound to support to their fullest extent the propositions
she had previously approved. If, on the contrary, the ne-
gotiations for peace were interrupted by excessive pretens'ons
on the si le of the allies, Austria might avail herself of such a
state of things to prolong her neutrality or to oppose their
demands. It becomes, therefore, a matter of great nicety
and moment to decide whether the responsibility of this de-
termination is justly to rest on the side of our adversary or of
our own Ministers. Russia has hitherto been the sole origi;
nator of this war, and each successive step in our proceed.
ings has been regulated by her own. We apprehend that if
the Vienna Conferences come to an unsuccessful termination
it will be seen that it is not on our side that sincerity and a
disposition to make sacrifices for peace have been wanting.
There is, however, yet another element indirectly engaged
in these transactions which cannot be entirely lost sight of.
It is by the secession Prussia from the policy of the allies that
the confederacy of the great European Powers has lost that
unity of purpose it would otherwise have possessed. Prussia
has exerted herself with unscrupulous activity to divide and
paralyse the resources of Germany. Prussia, excluded by
her own fault from the Conferences, has assumed within the
last few weeks in her communications, both with Austria and
with France, an asperity of language which betrays at mile
the keenness of her disappointment and the malice of her
revenge. These sentiments have rather, increased since the
death of the Emperor Nicholas removed from the scene a
man whom the King of Prussia regarded with more fear than
affection, and paced his own nephew on the Imperial throne.
The dissolution of the Vienna Conferences, if that event is to
be anticipated, will dissipate into thin air the scheme of paci-
fication based upon the Four. Points, and will put an end to
that obscure and indeterminate condition in which the Gen-
man Powers have continued to fluctuate. They might hope
to preserve their neutrality through one or two campaigns,
to be terminated at no distant period by a compromise, but,
if the war assumes a more decided and extended charac-
ter, their own interests will compel them to take more
positive measures. We have the assurance of Austria that,
anxious as she is for peace, that peace is not to be
obtained for her by the arms of other Powers. We
have the positive engagement by treaty of Austria
that she will be prepared, on the failure of the negotiations,
thoi whichs s hTeh ams
ot
raek epni plias
sr ti
awl
leans
th
an thes to atlhl iee tuos
sui
anni tea herlian ecefferts
the
more Austria is led towards the Western States, for the action
and counteraction of these two Powers unhappily constitute
the mechanism of German politics. Thus, if the war continues
it can hardly be anticipated that the union of Germany will
be preserved. There is, however, one further chance of ne-
gotiation, though a faint one. It is not altogether impossible
that the answer expected from St. Petersburg may be in the
form of some counter-project on which discussion' may be re-
newed. We, however, do not expect that any proposal likely
to be put forward by the Russian Government at this time
can be regarded as practicable or sincere, and we believe it
will fail when it is brought to the test of the measures which
can alone secure the permanence of that peace which we de-
sire to obtain.

THE MISMANAGEMENT OF THE WAR.
(From the Times Of yesterday.)
We are aware that we are thought ridiculously obstinate
for always hammering at the same old story about Crimean
mismanagement. If it wore only a question of taste—if the
conduct of the expedition could be treated like a quarrel be-
tween two rival theatres, or an arterial system of drainage, or
a, controversy on the best mode of cleaning pictures, we
should perhaps consult the pleasure of the public by dropping
the subject for a time. Unfortunately theroprevails a temper
in the regions of office that does not allow us to drop the sub-
ject. There is a spirit of contradiction which is bad enough and
provoking enough in its way,but which we shouldnot care so
much about if the contradiction had no other effect than to stag-
ger the House of Commons, bewilderthe public, and procure a
momentary triumph. But unfortunately the men who launch
out a contradiction in this off-hand way, and who proclaim
that every specific statement has been contradicted, deceive
not only some of their hearers, but also themselves. The spirit
of self-complacency which can bring a body of statesmen to
go about saying that there is nothing the matter, that there
has been'much ado about nothing, that there has been no
disaster, and no loss to speak of ; that all is right, and that
the public may safely leave Government alone, is dangerous.
It is a mistake, for things are not yet all right ; and, even if
it were not so great a mistake as it is, we should think little
of a sensitiveness which resented all inquiries and suggestions
as an insult to the Government. But we don't know how it
is ; whether it is that it is thought safe to make any assertion
when the subject matter is three thousand miles off, and it
must be many week; before the arrival of proof or disproof,
or whether it is thought that in the general confusion of war
a contradiction may always be hazarded,—so it is, denials
and excuses aro taking the place of improvement, and we
I really cannot say that, ou the whole, our prospects are decidedly
! better than they were two months ago.
Let our readers just notice how matters now stand. It is
evident that at this season of the year the Russians can bring
up reinforcements by land quite as fast as we can by sea ; or
rather it is a race ; the facilities aro about equal, and the
more zealous of the two sides will win. 'The Russians are
}Hinging up reinforcements by Perekop, and also by Anapa.
The result is, that " every day," says our correspondent,
" the Russian camps on the north of SebastOpol increase
and spread out. Each night new watchfires strike the eye.
We hear that a formidable army has assembled round
Eupatoria, and it is certain that the country between that
town and Sebastopol is constantly traversed by parties of
horse and foot, who are sometimes seen from the sea in very
great numbers. The actual works of the siege make no pro-
gress to justify one in prophesying." Our correspondent
then goes on to state an increasing impression that Sebastopol
is not to be taken by assault ; that we must first disperse the
army in the field, and so command the country, or invest the
place and take it by blockade. It is evident that.in the mat-
ter t f earthworks we are continually out•generalled, and, in
fact, the enemy is gaining on us, and not we on them. As
for Eupatoria, Omer Pasha the other day paid a visit to the