The Sun.
London, England, 1864-04-12 00:00:00

DENMARK.
Lord CAMPBELL called the attention of their
lordshipa to the correspondence presented to Parliament,
and moved that in the opinion of this house a conference
upon the Danish question in order to lead to a practical
result ought to be accompanied by such steps as may
seem calculated to inspire confidence in the resolution of
her Majesty's Government to adhere to the treaties in
which the Duchy of Schleswig had been guaranteed to
Denmark by Great Britain, He believed that the Confer-
ence about to be held abounded in the elements of failure,
and asked whether it was to be supposed that the obligations
of this country would be satisfied by an unsuccessful Con-
ference. Already our diplomacy had undergone a series of
reverses on this subject; and surely we could hardly afford
another that would be so cruelly disappointing to the Danes.
If the Conference separated without any satisfactory result,
there could not be a second, and the peace and tranquillity
of Europe would be placed in imminent danger. The noble
lord also observed that he thought a British fleet might be
usefully employed in the Little Belt for the purpose of
guarding the island of Funen from aggression.
The Dukee ARGYLL was at a loss to know how the
Government could have prevented war by threatening to
take part in it: yet that was what the noble lord meant, if
he meant anything. He apprehended that if they had taken
that course, instead of preventing they might have in-
creased the bloodshed. It was true that Great Britain
held a high position and had vast influence in Europe, but
she was not the arbitrator in all the quarrels of continental
nations. Oar obligations towards Denmark were contained
in the treaty of 1852, which was not a treaty of guarantee
but of zee,ognition, and had not been signed by England
alone. He regarded the bloodshed in the present war as
altogether unjustifiable, inasmuch as every object could
have be en attained by negotiation. We should go into the
Conference, in the first place, to restore peace to Europe ;
secondly, to secure as far as possible the local
libertios of the two Duchies ; and, thirdly, to re-
concile with that the integrity and independence of Den-
mark. He admitted that all the obligations of Den-
mark towards the Duchies had not been adhered to ;
still, it should be remembered that the promises made by
Germany to Denmark had also been disregarded.
Earl GREY was not each a partisan of Denmark as to
say that she had the whole of the right on her side. So far
from eaat, he believed that if since 1852 she had governed
the Datchies in a wiser and more conciliatory spirit the pre-
sent crisis would never have arisen. Perhaps, however,
there were faults on both sides, and that, therefore, some
Conference was necessary. At the same time he was con-
vinced that there would have been no war had the English
Government pursued a firmer line of policy. The noble earl
also deprecated the manner in which the war had been con-
ducted by Austria and Prussia, and characterised it as a
barbarous, savage, most wanton, and gratuitous outrage
upon the feelings of the Danish people.
Earl RUSSELL—It now appears, I think, clearly from
my noble friend's speech, that we are arraigned, not for
not having prevented a war between Prussia and Austria
and Denmark, but that we have not really engaged in war.
The real subject of my noble friend's attack is, that we
are at peace. As I go on I will show how the proposals
of my noble friend would have failed, if they had been
adopted. My noble friend began by saying that he would
not enter into the Schleswig-Holstein question; but at the
same time, without entering into the question of Schleswig-
Holstein, it is difficult to see under what circumstances
those powers aro now at war. In looking at the history of
this question, it seems that the arrangements of 1551, made
between Prussia and Austria, were most unfortunate and
complicated. They gave not only Austria and Prussia, but
the Powers of Germany, either the right of, or at all events
the pretext for, interfering in the domestic concerns of the
two duchies, which could not but lead—unless there was
the greatest good temper and the greatest wish for concilia-
tion on both sides—to discussions of a mcst angry kind, and
finally to the breaking out of war. That has been the his-
tol yof the transactions of the last 1C years. For my own
part, I will say, with regard to those matters, as they are of
great importance, I felt it my duty, holding the post of Se-
cretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to divest my mind of all
partisanship—(hear)—and to endeavour to meet that ques-
tion between the Powers with a fair and impartial mind, so
as, if possible, to form a clear and just judgment with re-

spect to them. Nothing I think is more discreditable to any
statesman than to rush at once into a strong decision on the
one side or the other, without carefully havestigeting the
bearings of the question. With regard to this treaty the
Danish Government promised, in 1351, that it would keep
Schleswig very much as a separate State ; that it should
have separate provincial Estates for its own affairs; that it
;should have a representative body, and that it should have
a Minister; and that its administration should be con-
ducted solely in Schleswig. It was a very difficult matter
to keep those engagements when foreign troops
oee-apied a part of her soil. I will not now, in these times
of her distress, point out in detail where her promises, I
think, were not fulfilled. But Germany, on her side, took
a most unfair advantage of what was dens by Denmark ;
and on every occasion she put forward propositions which
it would have been irnponsible for Deetnark to accede to,
:because they would, in fact, have made a German majority
at the very scat of thn Government, and thus have de-
:stroyed, not nominally the integrity, but really the India
pendence, of Denmark. The dispute wont on until, on the
Ist of October last, Germany resolved on Federal execution,
Whatever may have been the difficulties, they were aggra •
wilted tenfold, upon the occasion of entering Schleswig,
Those in favour of German pretensions might well suppose
that the late King, having been governed by councillors of
-Danish principles, and having himself not only a great love
for his country, but strong prejudices in favour of it, would
be partial in these matters. But the new King was not
liable to any suspicion of that kind, and I am persuaded,
even at this moreent,that if Germany had temperately urged
the claims of Schleswig to certain rights and privileges
which Denmark had agreed to give, that the King of Den-
mark would have so regulated the provisions of the govern-
ment of his provinces that all real grounds of complaint
would have been done away with, But the conduct of
Germany was very different. As we wished, above all, to
prevent war in Europe, at the same time it was
our object so to counsel both as to come to acme
conciliatory end. Surely it was our part to see
that in our opinion Denmark was in the right. We,
however, proposed, that the constitution should be re-
voked. My noble friend found fault with our making
that representation without our being able to follow it
nip with hostilities. If we had great interests there,
And these were neglected, I allow we must defend
them ; but where there is only a benevolent desire
to maintain peace in Europe, and to see that each state has
its own rights, I cannot see any humiliation, but I think
there is comfort in thinking that we have urged over and
over again, by friendly advice, that peace should be pre-
served, and that these Powers should not injure each other,
in doing this it appeared to me that unless we were to
make ourselves alone the defenders of the liberties of Eu-
rope—unless we were to teke a course that none of the great
statesmen who have adopted a European roliey for England
ayould have advocated, we were bound to endeavour to ob-
eain allies. Now, the allies to whom we naturally looked
were France and Russia. I maintain that it would have
been unwise for the Government of this country to commit
itself to hostilities without having the assistance of the
other Powers of Europe. I wrote a despatch to the French
Government, and I wrote a similar despatch to the Russian
'Government, saying that there was a project in Germany
for depriving Denmark of Holstein and the Duchy of Schles-
wig, and supposing that project is persevered in will you,
France, go with us in giving material aid to Denmark ?
will you, Russia, go with us in giving material aid to Den-
mark ? That answers every part of my noble friend's re-
proach. The answer of France was to this effect, that she
was not opposed to nationality, hut that it might be that
come change is the provinces would be of advantage to the
maintenance of Denmark. The reply then went on to say
that war with Germany was a serious question for France,
and she preferred to keep herself at liberty ; but future mea-
sures she must take if the balance of power were really
in danger. The answer of Russia was that she wished to
preserte her liberty, wished to know what the position of
England was, but did not feel how far policy would
justify her in giving material assistance. Then the ques-
tion came to this, that England, France, Russia, and
Sweden having made a treaty by which they did not agree
to guarantee the integrity of the Danish monarchy, but
agreed to acknowledge the principle, ',whether we alone,
without France and Russia, should take upon ourselves the
burden of supporting Denmark. The balance of power in
Europa is Clearly of consequence to France and Russia, as
well as to England. Therefore it was not the interest of
England to undertake alone this defence. Only consider
what the state of Germany was. A state of violent enthu-
siasm prevailed for havieg Schleswig and Holstein sepa-
rated from Denmark. They did not care much about the
Prince of Augusteuburin but put him up as a Prince who
would be the instrument of Germany for that purpose.
According to the views of my noble friend, if we were to
defend Denmark we should have Venetia making war in
the Adriatic; we should have Hungary delighted to
see England at war with Germany; and all this disturb-
ance)
of Europe, all this great war was to be undertaken
in the name of peace, and to prevent Schleswig being taken
(Cheers.) That is the prospect he Noposets,
but I rejoice
that we have not thrown a firebrand into Europe,
and wo have not caused, the ea'ensivo conflagration
friend
the noble lord wanted. Well, then, toy noble
says it would have been much better if England had
done what France did, and sail we do not mean
to interfere in any way on behalf of Denmark.
Now it is necessary to consider what has been effected.
If the representatives of the Government did not prevent
the war breaking out, they had produced this effect, that on
the 31st of January, before they went into Schleswig,
these Powers informed England, France, and Russia
that they held to the treaty of 1852, and respected
the integrity of Denmark. 'That is a great point
gained. It appears to me that we can now go into the
conference, and Clearly consider the Powers bound to re-
spect that treaty and, the integrity of Denmark, It is