The Sun.
London, England, 1864-09-24 00:00:00

THE CONFEDERATE STATES.

(From the Times' Spceial Correspondent.)
RICHMOND, Aug. 23.

I :s•ill not disguise the fact that, in common with
many ethers, I have been surprised at the energy
and revival of spirit which were evinced by Gen.
Grant and a portion of his army in front of Peters.
burg two days ago. I have often in previous letters
pointed out to your readers that Grant has never
dared to elongate his line before Petersburg, and to
stretch his left across the Weldon Railroad, for
fear, if his lines were too long and too weak, of
having his centre pierced, and (as I have before
phrased it) of having Austerlitz repeated upon the
banks of the James. For some weeks past you are
aware that, instead of reaching as far as possible
with his left, and thus interfering seriously with
the circulation of trains upon the Weldon Railroad,
Gant has contracted his lines and drawn closer to
City Point, so as to leave the Weldon Railroad as
free from molestation as it was before the Federals
crossed the James River. Previous to the spring-
ing of his mine on July 30 Grant's attenticn seemed
more drawn to the north than to the south side of
the James. And here it may be desirable to point
out what cannot fail long ago to have struck mili-
tary students possessed of good maps—to wit, that
the configuration of the ground and the geographi.
cal position of Richmond and Petersburg in refer-
ence to the Appomattox and James rivers, give to
the Federal far greater advantages than to the Con-
federate army. Gen. Grant is operating along the
chord, Gen. Lea along the arc or circumference of a
semi-circle. By means of his pontoon bridge thrown
across the James from Bermuda Hundereds to Deep
Bottom, Grant can, at will, transfer his whole army
from the south to the north of the river, and land
his entire force any morning within 12 miles of
Richmond. In order to get back from before
Petersburg, with a view to interposing between
Grant and Richmond, Lee has from 20 to 24 miles
to traverse. Grant can, at will, throw out a power.
ful feeler, amounting, if he likes, to his whole army
at either end of a straight line of from 12 to 15 miles.
Lee, acting on the defensive, and having Peters.
burg and the railroads as
swell as Richmond to
cover, is obliged to stretch over vastly more than
12 or 15 miles, and in reinforcing from one end of
his line to the other has double that distance to
traverse. Throughout the struggles of the Federals
and Confederates in Virginia your readers cannot
have failed to perceive what advantages have been
possessed by the former, by reason of the navigable
rivers which make up towards the west from Che-
sapeake Bay. It would have been a bold man who
at the commencement of this struggle had dared to
believe that, with the free navigation cf the Poto-
mac, the Rappahanoek, the York, the James, the
Elizabeth rivers, and also of the North Carolina
Sounds, in possession of the Federals, the twelve
hundred and thirtieth day since the first cannon
shot at Fort Sumter would find Richmond still in
the Confederate grasp. If the Federals fail in this
.mighty war (and few rational people doubt that
they will fail) they may rest assured that it is in-
conceivable that they can ever again engage in a
strife where the odds at the commencement will be
so largely in their :favour. Unhealthy as is the
camping ground of his army, Grant has hitherto
had the best of the position in a military sense, in.
asmuch as, acting along a short and straight line,
he threatens Richmond, Petersburg, and a network
of railroads, without exposing to his enemy any.
thing vital. His gunboats, his entrenchments, and
the shortness of his line have kept him safe, Lee
has, as usual, the odds against him ; and yet at no
moment has the confidence of Secessia in the secu-
rity of Richmond and Petersburg been more serene.

I have said that previous to the 3Uth of Jaly
Grant seemed inclined to operate upon the north
rather than the south of the river; or, in other
words, to act with his right rather than with his
left wing. His motive has long been obvious. He
wished to force Lee to withdraw men to the north of
the river, in order that when the mine was sprung
on the Baxter road (that is to say, on the Confe-
rate right) most of the Confederates might be absent
upon their extreme left. We all know the history
of the bloody repulse which the Federals sustained
after the explosion of their mine; and some of ;our
readers may have observed the confirmation which
the events of that day gave to the assertion which I
hazarded, that it would be difficult to estimate the
minimum of men requisite to hold Gen. Lee's lines
before Petersburg or before Richmond. It is certain
that a handful of Confederates drove out five or six
times their number free the salient in which tle
mines exploded. For some time subsequent to the
30th July Grant showed symptoms of being greatly
staggered and stupified by the incidents which ac-
companied the unmasking of his great Napoleonic
device. At the same time he gave no indications of
slackening tenacity or infirmity of purpose. At a
moment wheel Washington was in infinitely greater
peril than Richmond Grant never relaxed for en
instant his clutch upon the James River, which is
the throat of Richmond. For pertinacity, unexam-
pled in any other prominent Federal General, it
would be unjust to deny credit to Gen. Grant. Bat
it is difficult, in presence of the admitted fact that
Gen. Grant is an ame damnee of President Lincoln's,
to believe that the vigour and tenacity which he
has displayed have reference so much to the success
of the Union cause as to the re-election of President
Lincoln.

When Grant recovered from the languor and va-
cillation into which his fiasco of the 30th July had
thrown him he again addressed his attention chiefly
to the north side of the river. It was the general
impression in Richmond that whereas Grant had
deceived Lee before the 30th July, and induced him
to throw men uselessly to the north of the James,
there was verisimilitude in the notion that Grant
meant real mischief against Richmond when for the
second time he threw a large force to the north of
the river, Accordingly Lee met this second move
of Grant's by covering Richmond effectually.
Availing himself of the advantages which I have
already pointed out, Grant during last week secretly
massed most of his army on his extreme left, while
Leo was keeping an unnecessarily large force be.
tween Richmond and the Federal right. Attention
was first called to Grant's operations against the
Weldon Railroad on Friday iast, the 19:h inst. Lee
attacked him with two brigades on Friday afternoon,
and drove back his foremost lines and secured a haul
of 2,700 prisoners; but Grants main entrenchments
—which stretched across the Weldon Railroad—
were held firmly by the main body of the Federals,
who were far too strong in numbers and in position
for the two Confeaerate brigades to interfere with.
Finding his enemy strongly massed on the Confede-
rate right, Lce had the difficulty which I have
already pointed out toencounter—l mean the length
of line over which it was necessary for him to rein-
force. Saturday, the 20th inst., was passed by Lee

in gathering together his troops, and (contrary to
the usual traditions of the Confederate army) there
was much talk and publicity in regard to the in.
tended attack of the next day. Meantime, the
Federals worked like beavers during the whole of

Saturday and Saturday night, got several cannon
into position, covered their flanks and rear with
massive intrenchmen ts, and held their extreme left
with fully 30,000 men. Lee's attaek at nine in the
morning of Sunday the 21st was made with far too
insufficient a force to prevail against such large odds.
It was repulsed with a loss to the Confederates, ac-
cording to general rumour (I have not yet seen the
official report) of about 1000 in killed, wounded, and
prisoners. Such is the simple narrative of the
events of last Sunday, upon which (in the existing
dearth of Federal successes) there is little doubt but
the Northern journals, especially those which are
designed for Europe, will rear a fabric as towering
as though a victory like Austerlitz had been won.
But, if your readers have followed me thus far,
they will perceive that, by extending his left across
the Weldon Railroad, Grant has materially altered
the position of affairs. To begin—he has
withdrawn entirely from the north bank of the
river, leaving only enough men to guard the
northern end of his pontoon at Deep Bottom.
Secondly, by extending across the Weldon Railroad
to what is called the Vaughan•road, he has length-
ened his lines so far as to carry his extreme left 18
miles, instead of 12 miles, away from City Point.
It is known that he has received no reinforcements,
and therefore, with an army which is believed not