The Sun.
London, England, 1852-05-04 00:00:00

bate to the naval foree suddenly available. There were at
Toulon seven ships o± the line fully manned by 6,000 men.
It would be the height of rashness to send those crews round
by sea, but they might be conveyed overland complete. By
sending their crews overland, the whole of -the French navy
in reserve might be directed against our shores. But the
main advantage was in the difference of the distribution of
the French navy as compared with that of England.
This country had most important colonial and mercantile
interests to protect, while those of France were compara-
tively small. The consequence was, that the greater part
of the navy of France was on the shores of France, at the
command of her Government, while the greater part of the
English navy was cut of reach, and was unable to give us
any assistance in case of attack upon our shores. - (Hear,
hear.) On the Ist of January, 1852, the distribution of
the naval force of the two countries was as follows:
England had 138 sea-going ships in commission, ee:clusive of
packets, with 33,000 men afloat. The French had 137 ships
and 25,000 men. The English ships upon foreign stations
were 108, with 21,000 men; while the French had, incled-
ing the Levant, only 57 ships abroad, with 7,000 men.
England had at home, including the Lisbon squadron,
ordered home, 30 shies, with 12,000 nr-n, if their comple-
ments were full, while the French had at home, including
the Toulon division, 70 ships, with 18,00 J men. The real
criterion was the amount of actual force, and the proportion
was as 33 to 25 between England and France, but the pro-
portion abroad was as 21 to 7, while in the force at home it
was as 12 to 18. So that while the total force of England
was one quarter more than that of France. we had abroad
three times as great a force, but only two-thirds as great a
force at home.—(Hear, bear.) The House would observe
that, with less than double the number of ships abroad,
England sent three times the number of seamen to foreign
stations. This arose from our sending the greater part of
our large ships, sailing and steam-vessels, to foreign stations,
while the French retained the whole of their larger ships and
steamers for the home station. The French had not a single
ship of the line, nor a single steam-frigate, nor even a first-
class steam corvette abroad. The largest steam-vessel Which
France had upon a foreign station was the smallest class of
corvettes, of which she had only six abroad. England,' on
the contrary, maintained the greater part of her most power-
ful steam-frigates and steam-corvettes abroad. France had
two steam line-of-battle ships, 11 steam-frigates, and 19
corvettes, making 32 in commission, of which only six cor-
vettes were abroad. England had three steam line-of-
battle ships, 12 frigates, and 28 corvettes in commission,
of which only 14 were at home, and 29 abroad. Of the lat-
ter there were one of 800 horse-power, one of 650, four from
500 to 600, seven from 403 to 500, five from 300 to 400,
eleven front 200 to, 300 horse-power. Excluding packets,
England had in commission 64 steamers of 18,900 horse-
power, while France had 77 steamers of 17,500 horse-power.
Of steamers ready for commission, England had 31 of 10,500
horse-power, while France had 30 steamers of 82,000
horse-power. The total number of ships in commission and
ready was, in England, 95, with 29,400 horse-power ; and
in France, 107, with 25,700 horse-power. But England had
abroad 47 steamers of 13,300 horse-power, while France
had only 21 steamers of 3,000 horse-power. England
had at home, including the Lisbon squadron, 17 of
5,634 horse-power; while France had no less than 56 of
14,400 horse-power.—(Hear, hear.) The merchant steam
navy had been spoken of as useful for the defence of the
country, but when war broke out, if the Government
took a North American, or West Indian, or Mediterra-
nean steamer, how could a communication be kept up
between England and her colonies?—.(Hear, hear.) The
French also, under their maritime system, could man their
navy with greater facility than we could man ours, and
had a large reserve of sailors, well trained, available to be
called upon at any time to serve in the navy. By the last
French register, after deducting the men in the navy in
the merchant service, there were 45,000 liable to be re-
quired of whom about one-half had already served a term of
tour years ; but we, with a registry of 210,000 seamen, found
it difficult to raise 30,000 men, and all untrained; whereas
the French had enough trained to man the whole reserve.
Under these circumstances it was obvious that we ought not
to trust our national defence exclusively to our navy, and
therefore he was anxious to support this Bill. As to our
land force, his Right Hon. Friend the Member for Wilts had
the other night demolished its supposed efficiency; for it
turned out, that instead of having an army of 105,000, or
even 60,000, we had only somewhere about 20,000 ; and
when Hon. Gentlemen talked of the military defence of our
shores, and our mercantile marine, they should recollect it
was impossible for merchant steamers, our dockyard batta-
lions, or our Royal Marines, to be in two places at once.
The dockyard men were very valuable for the local defence
of our dockyards; but they could not be removed from the
dockyard to the field—(Hear, hear)—and it was the same
with the coast-guard. They would be required for the re-
venue purposes, and, therefore, the steamers could not be
manned with them. The Hon. Member for Westminster claimed
the marines as an auxiliary to the army ; but if a war took
place, so far from the marines going to increase the army
we should have 3,000 less, because they would be required
for our ships. For these reasons he thought we ought to
have a Militia Bill, and he preferred that mode, because if
the regular army were increased, after two or three years
passed over it would be reduced; and, secondly, because,
although militiamen might not, in the first instance, be fit
to be trusted in the field, they would take off a great deal of
garrison duty from the regular troops, and leave a larger
number, therefore, for actual service. He trusted, however,
that if this increase of force were agreed to, the Govern-
ment would not relax in their regard for naval defences,
which must be considered as the most important. Upon
that part of the question he, to a certain extent, agreed
with the Hon. Member for the West Riding. He thought a
great addition might be made to our home squadron,
not so much by reducing the number of ships on foreign
stations as by reducing the force on those stations.—( Hear.)
On some stations steamers of 200-horse power would do as
well as those of 800—(Hear)—for it had happened that in all
our operations since steam was introduced into the navy all
the work had been done by small steamers.—(Hear, hear.)
It was s in China, Parana, Burmah, and the other day at
Lagos. He thought we ought to maintain a large squadron
en the home station, and that it was a strange arrangement
that British interests in all parts of the world should be pro-
tected, and those. at home neglected. He hoped, therefore,
the Government would maintain on the home station a re-
spectable squadron. As to the question of national defence,
none could be more important. In that respect he was a com-
plete Protectionist, and he trusted the Government would not
be deterred by any consideration from adopting such measures
as they might think necessary to secure the defence of our
shores.

Mr. CARTER (who, it will be observed, took the oaths
and his seat in the early part of the evening) said, he should
not have so soon addressed the House had it not been that
the session was likely to be so short that he might not have
many chances of speaking.—(Laughter.) It seemed to him
that the speeches of the two Hon. Gentlemen who had spoken
were no answers to the motion for returns of our naval forces ;
and, indeed, went rather to support it, for they went to show
that the greater part of our naval forces were abroad, and the
obvious inference was that they ought to be brought home.
He certainly did not think the mere fact of the Hon. Member
for the West Riding being a member of the Peace Society a
bar to his forming a just estimate of the position of our mili-
tary establishments. In conclusion, the Hon. Member said
he rejoiced that upon this, the first occasion of addressing the
House, he was enabled to lift up his voice in favour of peace,
and in deprecation of that expensive system of armaments
which had so long oppressed the people of this country.
Captain BOLDERO said that the present motion pre-
tended one thing, but really meant another.—(Hear, hear.)
It was part of the political creed of the Hon. Member (Mr.
Cobden) to oppose all estimates, more particularly those
relating to the military defences of the country—(Hear,
hear)—and whatever might be the nature of the Militia
Bill, that Honourable Member would be found voting against
it. That part of the motion which asked for information as
to the present state of our defences was wholly superfluous.
The Navy List actually supplied all the information that
could be desired. Then, what was the real object of the mo-
tion ? Delay. Even had the Government supplied the
required statistics, this motion would have been pressed by
Hon. Gentlemen, who, whilst they clamoured for a dissolu-
tion, lost no opportunity of obstructing public business
—(Hear, hear.) Such factious conduct, he thought, came
with a peculiarly bad grace from the Manchester school.—
(Hear, hear.) The Right Hon. Gentleman the Member for
Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) had, the other night, attempted
to fix a charge of inconsistency on the Noble Lord the
Member for London, inasmuch as that, in 1848, he advo-
cated an addition to our standing army, and he deprecated a
similar proceeding in 1852. But in 1848 we had 15,000 more
rank and file than in the beginning of 1852. He (Captain
Boldero) should prefer an addition to the army to having
recourse to the militia, ,and would adopt the plan suggested
by the Honourable and Gallant Officer the Member for
Windsor (General Reid) for recruiting in advance. It had
been contended that France was making no military pre-
parations. They had recently learned, however, that the
French Government were augmenting the Chasseurs de
Vincennes by 7,000 men, and were forming a local corps of
20,000 men in Algeria. With regard to the militia force. btoe
thought that by limiting the term of five years' service
_,
three an advantage would accrue. A bounty of 6a/-
__...1:
spread over the latter period would yield about los. week
and this would be felt quite a boon by thetharurtatlhporpouwlaaatiouno.
He agreed with the Manchester Schoolear,
from
the Man-
immediate cause of fear of invasion. (he
chester party.) The apprehension that—
mexoimsteendt.waAs
ud foundedhat
on the political state of France at . this
mdlnbgeaerkeodf
was the state of France? An unmitigated dasespeaotis
by an army of hirelings. But there
Louis Napoleon invading our s If he did, however,
and we were only tree to ourselves, he would assuredly not
succeed.—(Hear, hear.) Admiraltyehnets hadh
Mr. BRIGHT said, the Secretary
taken upon himself to lecture, or s
Hon. Member for the West Riding, touching the accurate
yt arl evt
liadh oniyhbio_enhine office six
information he. had obtained about naval. affairs..—(Hear.)
As the Secretary to the Admiralty
weeks, never having been previously known be very pro-
foundly versed in naval sir
.1*
ase4atine Member he West Rid-
' seemed in a position to
ing, who, at all events, had 'for three years fortebeen a close at-
g) h I yT
The
eo
Icon.investigate
Gentleman
who master
had
tendant upon the Committee of that House which had made
it a special busißeeassrpthhooraoru.
the subject.— ba
just spoken said that the object of this motion was delay;
but be contendedh that it. was to place before the
House exist-
ingwit factsregard to the means of defence, so that, hav-
jog them plainly
v before them, the House would be in a better
position to discuss the propriety_ of any further expenditure
for military purposes. He maintained that it was one of the
propositions Important that could be mostsubmitted
to the House, for it involved this striking circu
rn"'
stance, that it was intended nearly to double the
num-
ber
of persons who were connected with arms, and notwith-
standing that the preamble of the 42d of George 111,
set
forth that a military force under the command of officers
possessing landed property within Great Britain w
that all
I till to the Constitution, he took the liberty of statingas essen-
otiou to
and be
military establishments beyond what could be shown
absolutely necessary were contrary to the Constitution
to the spirit of representative institutions
was
.
(Hear, hear.)
He maintained that the measure of the Government
hostile to the industry of the country, and
injuriousw d t on
not e
free-
dom, and that there was no interest which
prejudiced by the establishment of a militia, unless it could
be proved to be absolutely necessary for the safety of the
1 country. He would discuss this question, however, only
upon the principles of expediency_ and policy.' They were
asked to spend 350,0001. more. The 15,.0100,000/. already
voted left us in a most insecure and position, but
add this 350,0001. and we might rest stPvei3rsifi:jeduustuhr England
was sale from invasion.—(A laugh.)
interest upon a principal sum of 1"),000,00°01 , Nsvoastltiahtet,
having already invested 1,200,00004/. ofthe 'property of
the country, this 12,000,000/. was to be add to make us
perfectly safe. Before they could ask for thise
were bound to show him either that there wasm money
yie new
danger, or that there had been discovered some insecurity
of which Parliament had been hitherto ignorant. If there
were a new danger, where was it? The Noble Lord the
Member for London had himself dwelt on our peaceful rela-
tions with foreign countries, and the Noble Member for
Tiverton, and the Right Hon. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, had been equally emphatic on the same
subject. Where, then, was the new danger? The Hon.
and Learned Member for Sheffield had repudiated all that,
and intimated that those distinguished men really did not
mean what they said—that it was a disguise—that the fact
a' was, that they had great fears of au attach from Frauce,
1,.