The Sun.
London, England, 1864-05-05 00:00:00

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Danish Official Report of the Captdie di S
Dybbol,
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Tha following official report of the capture of the
DybbJl position by the Prussians upon the 18ill
April, has been issued from the Danish Ministry of

War :

For nearly three months the army had held the Dybbal
position with enduring courage against an enemy far supe-
rior in numbers and resources. Ho had been compelled to
proceed to a regular siege of the field position, to obtain
the prospect of overcoming its dere-I(l6re. During the last
few weeks his numerous and excellent artillery—with which
ours could not cope, save with the certainty of total
destruction before the storm—hal played upon the
position front various points with cpnatintly in-
creasing vehemence. The most essential conditions
for successful defence, consisting in the efficient state of the
artillery,. formidable passive obstacles, the energy of the I,v-
-mg defenders, and uninterrupted readiness of the garrison
to repel attack, could not possibly be maintained in full
vigour.

These unfavourable circarn4ances were greatly increased
by the bombardment of the position, lasting from tae 17th
ult, to far on in the forenoon of the 18th, the most severe
and continuous to which it had been exposed. The fire was
especially concentrated against Forts 3,4, 5, and 6. Their
parapets were entirely demolished and their palisade works
shot away. To remain in them was impossible. The re-
turn fire of our guns was reduced to a minimum, without
possibility of renewal or repair of the defences. Added to
this, several officers, some of rank, had been killed or
wounded on the left wing on the morning of the 18th.
Meanwhile the enemy worked in his trenches and in the
nearest parallel, 'Which, through connection with our rifle-
pits, the same night was rapidly formed into a continuous
line from the extreme left wing to before Fort 8. lie had
thus gained a covered way and a protected position to
within 260 yards, in some places in front of Fort 5 to within
200 yards, from our works.

When guard was relieved upon the evening of the 17th
the position was occupied by the following divisions :
Upon the left wing, from Forts 1 to 6 inclusive, the Ist
brigade (the 2d and 22d Regiments); on the right wing,
Forts 7 to 10, the 3d brigade (16th and 17th Regiments) ;
upon the ground near the barracks was the Bth brigade (9111
and 20th Regiments), as first line of reserve ; in the tete-de-
pont were three battalions of the 2d brigade (3d and 18th
Regiments) ; while another battalion of the 3d Regiment
was posted as reserve behind Forts 9 and 10, upon the road
to Aabenraa.

The infantry garrison had previously been permitted
during the day, and whenever the bombardment was very
violent, to seek cover in the ground immediately in rear of
the works. This permission was possibly made use of in
most of the forts, as several hours in the forenoon of the
18th passed without any apparent diminution in
the violence of the bombardment, which seemed indeed
rather to increase. About 10 o'clock the enemy broke forth
along his whole line, from Forts Ito G. Fort 5, one of the
most severely injured, was the first reached, and seems to
have been surprised and captured without a shot being
fired. Almost simultaneously Fort 6 was stormed with
scarcely any check. The garrison running into the trenches
found the enemy already on the parapet. Fort 4 was taken
a little later, but here the resistance is said to have been
greater. The same seems also, at least in part, to have
been the case with the remaining works on the left wing.
The small-arm fire now brought up the reserve. General
Da Plat, commanding the position, hurried to the front.
The Bth brigade was instantly sent forward to occupy the
second line of entrenchments, but the enemy was already
far advanced upon the extreme left wing. The brigade
commander at this point, Colonel Lesson, as well as both
battalion commanders of the 22nd Regiment, had fallen, and
several officers were wounded; consequently the resistance
was not successful in checking the enemy outside the second
entrenched line, which had also lost its natural support in
Fort 6, and the fleche of the high road, setae hundred pacts
in the rear.

The 20th regiment, whi,:h rapidly hurried to meet the
enemy, encountered him 200 yards on this side the en-
trenched line, but drove him back to a hedge in its front,
where his resources had already arrived. The general of
the division in person was present in the sharp engagement
which took place here about 11 o'clock, upon the ground
both south and notth of the main road between llybbol
mill and the barracks. He brought up the Bth brigade,
and endeavoured to check the enemy's advance until notice
had been given to the right wing to commence a general
and tactical retreat.

Upon the left wing one battalion of the 17th Regiment had
occupied the trenches between Forts 7 and 8, with the latter
fort; the second battalion held the trenches between forts
8 and 9. Daring the storm Fort 8 did not fire a shot, but
when at 10.15 the enemy debouched from the line between
5 and 6, and advanced in columns against the entrenched
line of 6 to 7, a heavy fire was poured into his flank from the
Ist battalion of the 17th Regiment in Fort 7. The line from
6 to 7 had been intended to be occupied by the brigade in
the i.ete-de-pont, as soon as this was relieved by the brigade
advancing from Sundsmark. Bat as this force had not yet
come up, and the resistance in the first line was not strong
enough to admit the reserves to deploy, the enemy succeeded
in penetrating the second entrenched line. He passed
through the line from Forts 6 to 7, and entered Fort 7 !rem
the rear. Trenches 7 to 8 were thus enfiladed, and became
untenable. Col. Bernstorff then ordered an attack to recover
Fort 7, which was not successful. The colonel was mor-
tally wounded, and the line from six to seven obliged to
be given up, the garrison retreating, skirmishing from
hedge to hedge. Meantime the 2d battalion of the
regiment held its post, and not being attacked in front
faced about and took the enemy in flank, as he showed him-
self in rear of Fort 7. At about 11 o'clock the 17th Regi-
ment began the retreat, which the 16th Regiment hal
already commenced, while one battalion of the 3d had taken
up its post upon the Aabenraa road, to cover the retiring
brigade.
The retreat from the Dybbol position was thus about to
commence along the whole line, when the commander• in-
chief arrived. Warned by the small a= fire in the position,
before receiving a report of the state of affairs—foo a break-
down of the telegraph had necessitated the report being
brought to Ulkibol by hand—he had given orders to the
different divisions in the cantonments to advance according
to the arrangements already made„

The commanding general took up his post upon an ele-
vation to the north of Sonderborg, whence he could over-
look the engagement; the chief of the staff went to the nor-
thern tete-de-pont, where General Steinmann EOM after-
wards arrived to take command of the right wing. The
sub. chief, Major Rosen, had hastened to the front, and was
in search of General Du Plat, near the barracks.

The enemy continued to send forward larger masses of
troops, and strong bodies of trailleurs came up upon his left
flank. The Btk brigade could no longer hold its ground.
General Du Plat fell mortally wounded ; Major Rosen met
the same fate, as he was hurrying up to assist his comman-
der. Major Shau, the chief of the divisional staff, was also
wounded, and these distinguished officers shortly after-
wards fell into the enemy's hands.

Towards 12 o'clock the remainder of the left wing
reached the tete-de-pont, which, together with the bat-
teries outside and at Sonderborg, and the Rolf Brake,
directed a powerful fire upon the advancing enemy, holding
him in check, and forcing him to seek cover.
The Commander•in•Chief then took the necessary steps
to secure the retreat of the right wing, which was not yet
in sight from the tcte•de.poht, and to organise the retiring
troops—most deprived of their leaders—in a defensive
position across the Sund. The adjutant at headquarters
carried out this task, and at the same time assigned places
to the troops arriving from the cantonments. The Guards
were posted in the trenches from the northern bridge to
the castle; field batteries 2,8, and 10—in all 18 guns—
were mounted in the works already prepared in the church-
yardoe the 3d Regiment,
and near the castle, and the 11th battery was sent out
in front of the Mill-hill to fire into the enemy's right flank.
An advance of the Guards to cover the retreAt of the right
wing, which had been intended, was not necessary, as the
constantly
3d brigade and the battalion
engaged, succeeded in effecting their retreat, in part along
the shore, the 17th
ilogiwent suffering heavy loss.
The 3d brigade was ordered by General Steinmann times
the north bridge to occupy the entrenchments along the Ale
Sound as far as the flahk battery, and the defence from this
time (12.30 p.m') was limited to the fight around the letes-
de pont, occupied by the 3d and the 18th Regiments. This
was mainly an artillery duel; the enemy had planted his
field batteries upon Dybbol heights, whence they directed
their fire upon the northern !ete-de-pont, while at the same
time the batteries at Sattrup and Broager kept ups violent
cross-fire upon the bridges and Sonderborg. An attempt
to storm the trenches outside the north tetc-dc-pont was
repulsed by two companies of the 3d Regiment, and an
effective small arm fire was brought to bear upon the
enemy's flank from the trenches upon Ale. It is believed
that his loss at this point was considerable.
In the meantime. however, it became evident that he
tetes gle- pont, in themselves weak, could not long be held.
The artilleryfire upon them became more and more vehe-
ment , their sides were enfiladed from Dybbol•mill, their
guns dismounted, and as longer defence would have ren-
dered it doubtful whether the enemy, in a determined at-
tack, might not cross the bridges simultaneously with our
troops, it was determined to commence the evacuation, for
which the repulsed attack just mentioned afforded an op.
portunity. The evacuation was then carried out from the
wings, and the bridges were detached, the northern first,
bath under a heavy fire, but with exemplary quiet and
order.

The fire continued for above an hour with undiminished
vigour, then slackened, but did not finally clear until dusk.
Tho Commander-in-Chief has not yet been able to mention
by name those who distinguished themselves on this bloody
day, and terminated a long episode filled with hardships,
sufferings, and the most grievous proofs of heroism ; but he
has reported to the ministry the unreserved and devoted
courage with which the officers of the army, from the gene-
ral to the lowest subaltern, went into action at the head of
their men. Aithough the day has not been fortunate for
our valiant army, it has at any rate not lessened the repu-
tation it had already acquired by its defence of the Dybbol
position.
The Commander-in-Chief cannot precisely specify the
extent of our losses, but they cannot be estimated at less
than upwards of 4,00 men in killed, wounded, and missing.
The enemy's loss must also have been great,