The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, JULY 7, 1855.

letter. He had, however, sent a copy of the letter to Dr.
Hall and called for his answer to it.

Mr. DUNDA.S wished to say a few words in the way of
explanation. A Mort while ago, in the heat of debate, ho
was betrayed into an expression to which a different
meaning had been attached than that which he wished to
convey. He therefore regretted having made use of the
expression. (Hear, hear.) Whet he had meant to say was
simply this, that he hoped the right hon. baronet at the
head of the Home Thpartmetitwould not spare any effort
to maintain peace and order on Sunday next.
Mr. F. PEEL, replying to Lord W. Graham, said the
principle upon which the compensation was granted was
simply this,. the War-office first ascertained if the horse
had been lost in the public service, and that being proved
to the satisfaction of the ➢Minister, steps were taken to dis-
cover what was the value of the animal. (Hear, hear.)
With regard to what had fallen from the hon. member
(Mr. Stafford), there could be no doubt that if the letter
of the army surgeon was to he believed the hospitals in the
Crimea must be in a most discreditable state ; but at the
same time it was impossible for him to give any answer to
the allegations until he had had an opportunity of refer-
ring them to Dr. Hall and the other heads of the me-
dical department in the East. From the communications,
however, which had been received from the Crimea, Go-
vernment were led to suppose that the hospitals were well
supplied with everything that was necessary, while asfor the
attack of the 18th, a report had been received from Dr. Hall
which represented that every precaution was taken in an-
ticipation. of that event. He therefore could hardly bring
himself to believe that the statement cf this regimental
surgeon could be borne out ; but, as he had already men
tioned,•Government had sent out a cony of the letter to
Dr. Hall, and called upon him to furnish some explanation
about it. As to what had fallen frcm the hon. member for
Edinburgh, ho could add nothing to what he stated on the
same subject last week, but he might state that since then
further arrangements had been made forremoving the mi-
litia from the villages.
DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.
On the motion for going into committee of supply,
Mr. EWART called attention to the propriety of esta-
blishing some test in the examination for candidates who
wished to obtain employment in the diplomatic or consular
service.

Lord PALMERSTON said the subject had been under
consideration, but as yet no definite plan had been fixed on.

ACCIDENTS BY MACHINERY.
A conversation took place on the motion of Col. Dunne
for the production of papers connected with the death of a
workman in a mill at Oldham from unfenced machinery.
The Government had no objection to give the papers, and
Mr. Heywood, Mr. Fox, Mr. Cheetham, and others de-
fended the conduct of the masters and blamed the med-

dling interference of Parliament with the management of
factories. In the end, the papers were granted.
THE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA.
Mr. GIBSON rose to ask for explanations from the GO-
vernment relative totho opposition of her Majesty's Minis-
ters to the views of their colleague, the late British plenie
potentiary at the Vienna conferences, in reference to the
plan proposed by Austria to be submitted to Russia for
the purpose of putting " an and to Russian preponderance
in the Black Sea," as stated in the circular addressed by
Count Buol to thodiplomatic agents of Austria, dated Vi-
enna, May 25. The right hon. gentleman said he had made
some inquiries on Monday last relative to the policyof her
Majesty's Government in the Ea st, and to a certain statement
made in a diplomatic circular which had been published in
various continental newspapers. He was afraid the course he
then took did not harmonise with the feelings of the house,
although it might be technically within ther rules, consi-
dering the subject which had just been brought undertheir
notice. But if he had committed any breach of their rules
of decorum he now begged to apologise for having done so.
and tcestate that he had no' intention in any way to dis-
parage the character of the late commander•in-chief, or to
manifest indifference to the motion under consideration at
the time. (Hear.) The Prime Minister then said that he
would not bo led into a discussion which would rouse the
venom of the peace party. [Lord PALMERSTON- "No, I
said hostility."'] Ho had never mentioned the peace
party in his inquiries, which would, perhaps, have more
appropriately proceeded from a member of the war party,
as they related to the proceedings of the Government dur-
ing the recent occurrences at Vienna, and to matters upon
which every member of Parliament, whether he be-
longed to the war or to the peace party, had a right to
explanation. The noble lord the member for London ac-
cused him of having misrepresented facts, and if that
were so it was quite fitting that he should be set right ;
but he should be the last man in the house to make
any intentional misrepresentation, and he should bo
happy to retract any statements be had made which
were proved to be incorrect. His statements were
founded on public documents which had appeared in the
newspapers—authorities, no doubt, not so good as actual
access to the papers in the Foreign-office, but still the only
ones within his reach. He complained that during the
late debates, when the house was invited to come to a most
important decision as to the future prosecution of the war,
they had not been treated with the consideration and
openness they had a right to expect, and that they had not
been put in possession of all the occurrences which had
transpired at Vienna, or with the real opinions of her
11ajesty's Government, which they were entitled to hear,
in order that they might be guided to a wise conclusion.
They came to a unanimous vote, but was it clear that they
would have come to that vote if important facts that had
now peeped out indirectly through public documents from
other countries had been put into their possession—if they
had been told, for instance, that the British plenipotentiary
at Vienna differed from the Prime Minister, that the British
plenipotentiary thought that proposals had been made
which promised an honourable and safe solution of the dis-
pute between England and Russia? If they had been told
at the same time that this proposition had not been sub-
mitted to Russia, in consequence of the refusal of the noble
lord's colleagues to take tliet course, would not many mem-
bers have hesital ed before coming to the conclusion at
which they arrived, those facts not being before them ?
At any rate, if that were the case—and he had a right to
presume that it was—they wore now entitled to a frank
and candid avowal of the opinions of the members of the
Administration of the policy they were pursuing in the
East, and of the objects they were seeking to accomplish.
lie had observed that since the commencement of the war
almost every prediction to which the Government had lent
their sanction had been falsified. Whether he looked to
their alliances, to their military operations, or to their avowed
objects in the prosecution of the war, in almost every case
the 'events had been the very reverse of the predictions and
announcements of the Administration. Why, Sebastopol
was to fall last year; soon after Sir C. Napier arrived in the
Baltic the First Lord of the Admiralty stated, in reply to a
question of whether Cronstadt had been taken, that he had
not yet received official information of that fact. (Laugh-
ter.) Then with regard to their alliances, with what coun-
tries were they now associated ? Yet, they had been told ,
that Austria was to be their active ally, that Prussia was
to act with them, that Sweden was eager to lend her forces
for their assistance. Then, with regard to the avowed ob-
jects of the war, after they had been told by the Duke of
Newcastle, in a despatch, that no safe and honourable
peace could be concluded without the fall of Sebastopol,
did not a member of the Government of which the duke
was a member. and also of the Government now in rower,
go to Vienna fur the very purpose of making peace, with-
out a word about the fall of Sebastopol, or making that
condition a sine quei non? What, then, was the object of
the war? Sometimes it was the fall of Sebastopol,
sometimes it was merely the obtainment from the Go-
vernment of Russia of a stipulation, written on a piece
of paper, which every member of the house thought
would not be worth a straw as a security, but could
only be intended to humiliate and insult the enemy with
whom they were contending. Not one of the extravagant
expectations that the Government had sanctioned had been
realised. They had sanctioned the folly which hail been
talked about a war for liberty, for the restoration of
Poland, and the independence of Hungary, but the House
was still in doubt as to what was the object of the war,
and the nature of the policy the Government wero pursuing
and he felt, seeing the blood they were lavishly expending
and the treasure they were wasting, that he was but dis-
charging one of his first duties as a member of Parliament
when he incessantly asked them what were the advantages
they proposed to confer on the people of this country in
consideration of the enormous sacrifices which they called
upon the people to make. The Vines newspaper said that
the object of the war was so clear that a labouring man could
define it. But, although he had been always anxious to obtain
information on the subject, he had been unable to get at the
object of the war. If a labouring man were to ask him what
was the object of the war, and for what purpose he had
been called upon to snake the sacrifices he was now making
—to deny his children education, to curtail the comforts
of his humble home—the only answer he could make would
be that the British Government were endeavouring to at-
tach the Ottoman empire more completely to the equili-
brium of Europe, and to put an end to the preponderance
of Russia in the Black Sea, and that it was worth while for
labouring men to make what sacrifices they could to assist
in accomplishing those objects. He believed that the Go-
vernment had never told the country what their real ob-
ject was in the prosecution of this war. They were drifted
into it, and they kept drifting on. If ever they had a di-
vided Government in connection with the carrying on of
this war, it was his conscientious belief that they had a
divided Government now; and if success depended on
having a clear and united opinion in the Government in
such a matter as that of carrying on a great war, he saw
sufficient division of opinion in the present Government
to make success extremely problematical. To prove that
there was such a division in the Government, he need only
refer to the despatch addressed by Count Buol to' the diffe-
rent German Powers after the twelfth conference at,
Vienna—not the conference which finally concluded the
negotiations, but that at which the negotiations were
broken off. Count Buol stated, without any opposing re-
mark from either of the plenipotentiaries present, that al-
though the propositions made by Russia, might not be the
most desirable mode of settling the question in dispute,
and might not satisfy the third basis of the negotiations,
still he thought the proposition contained the elements of
solution, and that, in his opinion, it was especially the
duty of Austria to endeavour to find out a plan of ap-
proachingproposal which should satisfy the third
enablethird
peace to be re-established between
thet'n
belligerentsaditthuss
i a'son the basis of the four points. Count Buol
said—
" If, since the outbreak of hostilities, there was any one
moment when more than at another the restoration of peace
might be considered probable, it was the moment when Lord
John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys left our capital.
The conferences, it is true, had only led to the rejection of
the propositions made by the belligerent Powers, but upon
both sides it appeared to be admitted that these propositions
offered the elements of peace ; and we were not only able to
declare without opposition that we believed ourselves especi-
ally called to occupy ourselves:in seeking out the means of an
approximation, but we also put forward a draught of an ulti-
matum, which was to be sent to St. Petersburg, and which
we considered not inadmissible by Russia, since an immediate
limitation of Russia's sovereign rights in the Black Sea was
avoided, but which at the same time seemed So completely
to satisfy the object of the third stipulation, and put au end
to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, that the before-
named Ministers of France and England, in confidential in-
terviews, showed themselves decidedly inclined towards our
proposal, and undertook to recommend the same to their Go-
vernments with all their influence. This plan of an ultima-
tum, the rejection of which by Russia we declared ourselves
ready to make a cases UN, consisted of two distinct proposi-
tions, of which the Russian Government was to take its
choice."

He need not go through the details of the propositions.
They were much of the same kind as had been laid before
the house. The circular proceeded thus :
" Lord John Russell, before leaving Vienna, was made
acquainted by verbal communication with these proposals.
The French Minister, M. Drouyn de l'Huys, who left Vienna
some days later, received a written copy of our plan, and un-
dertook to submit it to the examination of his Sovereign and
also to bring it before the British Government. It is unne-
cessary to speak here 0 roAret with which, very soon

after, we received intelligence, not of the hoped for accept-
ance of England and France, but, instead, the opposition of
the English Ministers to the views of their colleague, and of
the resolution of the Emperor Napoleon to relinquish the ser-
vices of the Minister who had just won the admiration and
the confidence of the Austrian Court."
If this doeument contained a correct account of what
occurred, it would seem that at the very moment when the
Government were asking Parliament to agree to carry on
the war with vigour, the noble lord the member for
the city of London believed that the war was not a matter
of necessity, but that the means of solution were in his
hands, and that it was only for him to submit the proposal
which had been made to his Government, and thereby
enable the belligerents to settle the question in an honour-
able and satisfactory manner. Was not this a question,
then, sufficiently grave to claim the attention of Parlia-
ment? Were they prepared to say that there was any
man who wished war to be carried on one instant -longer
than necessity required, however anxious he might have
been in the first instance to take up arms ? It appeared
to him that the noble lord the member for the city of Lon-
don went to Vienna with the bona fide intention of mak-
ing an honourable peace. He (Mr. Gibson) approved en-
tirely of the declaration made.by that noble lord ; it was
a declaration of a statesman, and one which it was worthy
of an English Minister to make, when he'eald that the only
terms of peace which were desirable were those that were
consistent at once with the honour of Russia and
sufficient for the security of Europe. In that spirit it
appeared to him the noble lord was prepared to act ; but
his instructions, as he said, were exhausted. His col-
leagues appeared to entertain different views. They seemed
to desire to avoid the chance of making peace at Vienna,
and of preventing the noble lord from accomplishing what
he (Mr. Gibson) believed the noble lord earnestly desired
to accomplish—the putting an end to these unfortunate
hostilities. It was known that M. Drouyn deLhuys thought
it impossible for him any longer to hold the office he had
hitherto held in the French Government after the opinions
he had expressed at Vienna, and which opinions were pre-
cisely similar to those which had also been expressed by the
noble lord the member for the city of London. Therefore
was it that he (Mr. Gibson) asked how could that noble lord
reconcile the retention of office in the present Government
if he still retained the opinions he expressed at Vienna?
If, indeed, the noble lord had changed those opinions, and
if he no longer thought that the terms proposed by Austria
ought to be submitted to the consideration of the British
Government, let him frankly avow that change of opinion;
and if the noble lord did so he (Mr. Gibson) would not have
one word more to say on the subject. But he could not sit
silent while he saw the noble lord attached to a Govern-
ment which was pledged to the carrying on of a war for
the purpose of crippling Russia, being thoroughly con-
scious that that noble lord must believe that the war had
been carried on beyond the necessity of the ease, and there-
fore at a wanton sacrifice of the blood and treasure of this
country. They had been led to believe that some difficul-
ties had arisen in connection with this last proposal at
Vienna with our ally. Was it so ? Was it, or not, the fact
that the Emperor of the French, wishing to act in strict
accordance with this country, announced to hisministerthat
if the British Governmentwould agree to the proposition of
Austria being submitted to Russia as an ultimatum, he was
willing to acquiesce ? That had been asserted in the presence
of the British Minister, and it had not been contradicted.
It was stated by the honourable member for the West
Riding, and also by the right hon. baronet the member for
Carlisle. The right hon. gentleman said, " The Emperor
of the French was not unwilling to accept it ; he proposed
to the English Government that it should be accepted;
and that its rejection took place in consequence of the in-
fluence of the English Government being exerted against
it, and that consequently M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who thought
it acceptable, had retired from the Council of the Empe-
ror." If these assertions were incorrect, it was high time
that the Government should put the country straight, for
rumours of this kind must be pernicious if not founded on
fact. With regard to the zeal of Austria in her alliance
with this country, he confessed that he was no admirer of
Austrian institutions ; but he believed that the feeling en-
tertained with respect to Austria having been treacherous,
and of having failed to fulfil her engagements with this
country, had chiefly arisen from our having entertained ex-
travagant expectations of what Austria was prepared to
undertake—expectations which the Government of England
ought to have known were not sufficiently well founded.
He had referred to all the documents and to all the treaties
to which Austria had been in any way a party, and he did
not find in any of them a single paragraph to sustain such
expectations. There was not a word throughout the proto-
cols or the treaties which pledged Austria to do anything
which she had failed to do. He attributed, therefore, this
expression of disappointment to that habit which England
seemed to have of supposing that other countries were
equally ready to draw the sword in questions in which they
were not concerned as she herself was, and that Austria
and Prussia, and those various countries with which they
were allied, must of necessity see this war in the same point
of view as it was seen by Great Britain. The Austrian ,
Government, by the treaty of December, 1851, pledged it-
self to endeavour to make peace by reasonable negotiations.
He contended that Austria had fulfilled that engagement.
What were the terms of the treaty between Austria, Eng-
land, and Franco ? They were those :
" Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, his Majesty tLe Emperor of Austria,
and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, being animated
with the desire of terminating the present war at the earliest
possible moment, by the re-establishment of a general peace
on solid bases, affording to the whole of Europe every gua-
rantee against the return of the complications which have so
unhappily disturbed its repose. . . • . The high con-
tracting parties refer to the declarations contained in the
protocols of the 9th of April and the 23d of May of the present
year, and in the notes exchanged on the Bth of August last."
The allusion to these papers was merely a reference to the
four points as bases of negotiation; and it appeared to
him that the only engagement Austria entered into was to
endeavour to assist England. and France in negotiating a
peace and submitting proposals which, in its opinion,
would be considered reasonable by the Emperor of Russia,
with the view of settling the dispute ; and, in case of the
failure of these negotiations, all that Austria bound herself
to do was to ".deliberate without delay upon effectual
means for obtaining the object of their alliance." He
thought the most effectual means of obtaining the object of
that alliance was to submit to Russia the propositions
which Austria had drawn up, and which were approved
by the plenipotentiaries sent to Vienna by the various
Powers. What possible fault, then, could be found with
Austria? She submitted a plan which was approved by
the plenipotentiaries ; but the plenipotentiaries were
thrown over by their respective Governments, who turned
round upon Austria because she did not draw the sword,
and complained that she had broken her engagement. He
was afraid that, before this wars terminated, there would
be charges of treachery in other quarters. He did not be-
lieve they were going to uphold the integrity and inde-
pendence of the Ottoman empire, and he cautioned the
Prime Minister that a day of retribution would come. If
the expedition to the Crimea should end in signal disaster,
the Government might endeavour —as Governments had
done on former occasions—to throw the blame upon their
generals and admirals, but in the end the responsibility
would be fixed upon the executive Government, who were
alone responsible for that expedition. They sent out our
troops, contrary to the advice of their best generals and ad-
mirals ' • they had sacrificed the flower of the British army
—(hear)—they had sacrificed millions of the public trea-
sure ; they had concealed from Parliament material facts
wbjch transpired at the conferences of Vienna, and which
it was necessary Parliament should know for the guidance
of their opinion ; and he must say the course they were
pursuing seemed to him calculated to inspire want of con-
fidence in the Administration, and led him to tho conclu-
sion that they were destined to bring great disasters upon
the country, and his belief was that the country would
visit those disasters upon their heads.

Lord J. RITSSELLT-I am very glad the right hon. gon-

tleman has now made his imputations upon the conduct of
the Government at a time when those imputations can be
answered. I certainly was surprised when, the other day,
upon an occasion which I should have thought would have
induced the right hon. gentleman to refrain from bringing
before the house any question that could occasion contro-
versy, he introduced a topic of this nature and made
serious charges against the Government. Were it not for
the remark of Mr. Grattan, that persons are very often
tempted to make observations by the impropriety of the
occasion—(a laugh)—l should hardly have thought the
right hon. gentleman would have taken such an opportu-
nity of making his statement. As, however, the right hon.
gentleman has brought forward the subject now upon go.
ing into committee of supply, I cannot but own that he is
fully entitled to explanation, and that the correspondence
which has taken place with the Austrian Government on
this great question fitly deserves to obtain the atten-
tion of the house. Before I enter into that question, I
must refer to the right hon. gentleman's affirmation
that we have been disappointed in all our predictions,
and that the objects of the war are such as he has
been pleased to describe. Now, so far from being dis-
appointed by the events of the war, I will say that,
although the siege of Sebastopol has not hitherto been at-
I tended with the success we, anticipated, yet that the re-
pulse of Russia at the siege of Silistria, the evacuation of
the Danubian provinces, and the consent of Russia to aban-
don entirely and for ever all those special treaties which
gave her the pretence for interfering with Turkey, were
successes far beyond those which we had hoped to accom-
plish in so short a time. But then the right hon. gentle-
man says we believed that Cronstadt would fall immedi-
ately, and ho founds this assertion upon the declaration of
the First Lord of the Admiralty that he had no official in-
telligence of the fact. How the right hon. gentleman could
have formed upon such a statement the conclusion that we
expected to hear of the immediate fall of Cronstadt, is cer-
tainly beyond my comprehension. The right hon. gentle-
man went on to say that we proposed the restoration of
Poland and the independence of Hungary as two of the
objects of the war. We have never promised or held out
hopes of the restoration of Poland, for we have always
considered, in conformity with the declaration of the
First Lord of the Treasury, that, if that restoration
be accomplished at all, it will be accomplished by Austria.
Being on terms of intimacy with many Poles, when
they have spoken to me on this subject I have always told
them, "If Austria will take your part, and should consider
the restoration of Poland attainable, you may then enter-
tain some hopes of accomplising such a result but do not
imagine that England and France will alone undertake to
accomplish it." I stated recently to a Polish nobleman, of
whose friendship any one may be proud, that I had no con-
ception that England and France would attempt the re-
storation of Poland, and that, if they did not attempt it, I
thought it would be the greatest crime to encourage expec-
tations which must be disappointed. Then with regard to
the independence of Hungary, I must say that it would
when negotiating with
Ah auveet eaeano md e s t
seekingp res
themu p
at
lul
auns
eifo,
of Austria, we had sought
to obtain the' independence of Hungary. It has been
objects of
no such object has ever beenef
isatadteepdenthdaetheoen eofoaf theegoarbyj the war was to effect the
put forward by her Majesty s Government. (Hear, hear.)
The right honourable gentleman says he should find great
difficuly in explaining to a labouring man the objects
of the war, but it fortunately happens—for I have no doubt
the hon. gentleman is right in his statement—that the la-
bouring men, the artisans, the country have throughout
had a very clear conception of what the objects of the war
are. (Hear.) They know that the war was entered into
to prevent the further aggrandisement of Russia, to pro-
tect the territory and to maintain the independence of
t Turkey.hempeople have never deceived
object of the war—(hear)—
and, as to the accomplishment of that object, I must con-
fess that, before we entered into war, and up to the pre-
ev e
aTwh
thmass
regardes otfo ?hoe
pre-
sent time, I have always thought it an object of very great
difficulty, and only to be attained by great efforts. I
have thought so, because, as every one may conceive,
Russia is enormously powerful, her population is ani-
mated and strengthened by repeated successes, and for
centuries past she has, by treaties, been continually
adding something to her power. Turkey, on the con-
trary, is a Power which has of late years been crippled and
weakened—so much so indeed that when the war began

the armed force of Turkey was not one-tenth of that which
Russia possesses. Added to this was an additional source
of difficulty—namely, that some 10.000,000 of the subject
of Turkey were of the religious faith of the Emperor (.
Russia, and had been taught assiduously to look to th,
En;peror of Russia for protection. It has always appeare,.
to me that the task upon which we entered was a most dif-
ficult one. I do not think it will take long to show in what
respect it was difficult, and I think I can mention some
. _

difficulties which heti; in war and in peace must attend

the attainment of the object which we have in view.
Soma persons of high military authority thought at the
beginning of the war that it would bo quite sufficient, and
that it would be the most effective means of defence for

Turkey, if lines were drawn from the Black Sea to the Sea of
Marmora somewhat resembling the famous lines of Torres
Vedras But the circumstances were totally different. The
Duke of Wellington was enabled to defend the lines of
Torre. Vedras because the population were generally op-
posed the invasion, and the longer the invaders stayed in
the country the weaker their army became, and the less able
to obtain supplies. But if Russia had crossed the Balkan
and bad arrived within 20 miles of Constantinople, she
would. have had the moans of raising an insurrection
throughout the Christian population of the Turkish pro-
vinces, and she would have been strengthened every day
and every week in her attempt to destroy the independence
of Turkey. (Hear.) And now let us see what were the
difficulties that would have occurred in a time of peace.
We have had some discussions on former occasions with
respect to the Principalities. Those Principalities are in-
habited by Christians, and it has been said, naturally
enough, "Make a Christian State there, and thereby esta-
blish a barrier against Russia." But the Russian interest
is strong in these provinces, and there are so many persons
who are bound to Russia by the strongest ties that to
make an independent State there would only have
been to strengthen Russia, and to enable her to
pursue her projects with greater security. (Hear,
hear.) If, on the other hand, you give to Turkey all
she used to have, and admitted the Turkish army into the
principalities, you might secure their independence. Con-
sidering these things and many other questions of a similar
nature, it has always appeared to me that the end of this
war must be not merely a treaty between the belligerents
on one side—namely, France, Great Britain, and Turkey—
and Russia on the other, but that there must be a general
treaty in which the Powers of Europe could take part, and
in which each should give a fair security for the mainte-
nance of the integrity and independence of Turkey. Having
taken that view, it is obvious that I must consider the co-
operation of Austria as being of the highest value. That the
co-operation of Austria would be of great value during war
no one will deny. If at the present moment the Austrian
army were advancing into Bessarabia, 40,000 or 50,000
Russian troops would be unable to march into the Crimea;
if it were operating on the side of Galicia, that again would
prevent the Russian force from being sent from Poland to
the seat of war. And, Sir, in the !arrangements to be made
with regard to peace, I believe that the alliance and co-
operation of Austria woald be at the least as effective and
at the least as necessary. The pathway by which Russia
could send her land armies to the attack of Turkey is
across the Danube, by the side of the Austrian provinces,
and through the Balkan. That is the way in which, on
more than ,one occasion, she has attempted to invade Tur-
key, and it is the road by which, on the last occasion, hav-
ing crossed the Balkan, the Russian army reached Adrian.
ople. But if Austria undertook, ist alliance with France
and Great Britain, to prevent any such aggression, and to
oppose it by the force of arms, and if France and Great
Britain on their side had sufficient means of opposing a
naval aggression, we should then, to use the language of
Mr; Fox, which was quoted the other night by the hon.
gentleman the member for West Riding, " make it the
interest of Russia to maintain peace." I quite agree with
the opinion expressed in the extract read by the hon. gen-
tleman from Mr. Pox, thitt the best security against ag-
gression is the interest of a Power to maintain peace.
[Mr. Cobden.—" The only security."] Tho honourable
gentleman says, " the only security," but that is
a phrase liable to some qualification. I have al-
ways considered that, whatever arrangements may
be made for the security of Turkey in order to
have a durable peace, we ought to have Austria
and Prussia and the States of Germany parties to a gene-
ral alliance, by which Turkey would be secured from aggres-
sion. (Hear.) I now come to the mission with which I
was charged to Vienna. It appeared to me—and I remem-
ber that I expressed that opinion very strongly to Lord
'Cowley, her Majesty's ambassador at Paris—that I should
be able to ascertain what it was that Austria and Prussia
were ready to agree to. At the same time I thought that,
whatever might be the effect of the negotiations, it would
not be possible to come to any decision at Vienna, but
that it must be left to the Governments of France and
Great Britain to decide ultimately whether there were any
terms which they could assent to as terms on which to
conclude a safe and honourable peace. Upon my arrival
at Vienna there were, of course, two kinds of negotiations
to he entered into. There was the negotiation which was
to be conducted in conferences, and in conferences only,
between the three belligerent Powers and Austria, who
had signed the treaty of 2d of December, and Russia.
That was one part of the business upon which we were
to enter. But the other, and perhaps the more important
part, was to ascertain by repeated interviews and discus-
sions the views of the Austrian Government, and endea-
vour either to procure her assistance in concluding peace,
or to discover the terms upon which she would make an
ultimatum, to Russia. I find that a very few days after
my arrival at Vienna—so early as the 7th of March—l
discussed with Count Buol as well as with the French
Minister then resident there, Baron Bourquoney, and the.

_
English envoy, the various stipulations which came under
the denomination of the four points. Upon the mention
of the third point the French and English plenipoten-
tiaries declared that it appeared to us that the best
solution of that point was to obtain from Russia a
limitation of her forces in the Black Sea. We stated
that if that limitation were agreed to, the general rule
of the treaty of 1841—namely, the closing of the
Straits—might be maintained. We stated that it
would then be possible to withdraw the armies and
fleets from the "Flack Sea, because there would no
longer exist the Mreponderance of Russia—there would
no longer exist a standing menace to Turkey. Count Buol
so far agreed that he said, " Undoubtedly that is the best
solution of the third point. Undoubtedly the best security
you can have is the limitation of the Russian fleet. But,"
he added, " there is another solution, and that would be,
instead of weakening Russia, to strengthen Turkey. It is
the opinion of the Austrian Government that the third
point may be carded into effect either in one mode or the
other. The proposal you make is undoubtedly the best; we
should be very glad to See it assented to by Russia ; in the
conference we shall give it every support, but we will not
say that we do not reserve to ourselves the power of pro-
posing the other mode—namely, instead of a limitation of
Russian force, to have a counterpoise on the part of the
allies." So far, sir—and, indeed, I would say not only so
far, but throughout— I have no complaint to make, as the
right hon. gentleman supposes the Government to make, of
treachery against Austria. (Hear.) Her conduct I find
fault with—perhaps very great fault in some respects—but
I think there has been no treachery and no bad faith in the
matter. I think she was entitled to say, as a Power which
had not gone to war, as a Power which was at peace with
Russia, " We will endeiftsour to seek for the solution of
those difficulties by the attainment of all the four points,
which we consider necessary for peace, but we do not bind
ourselves to one particular mode of obtaining one of those
points. We think ourselves at liberty to propose another
mode, and if that other shall be found sufficient, wo will
not rely solely upon the one which you propound." I could
not but say that I thought the Austrian Government were
wrong in their supposition that the second mode of solu-
tion was as good as the first. I stated objections, and I
stated them over and over again at repeated interviews
with Count Buol—objections which are obvious enough—
to the propositions he made. One objection is, that
Great Britain and France might not always bo dis-
posed to go to the considerable expense which would be
necessary in order to maintain a fleet in the Black
Sea which could be at all reckoned as a-counterpoise
to the Russian fleet. Another objection is, that it would
obviously be placing Turkey, as it were, under the imme-
diate protection of those two Powers, and would thereby
in some respects weaken her position. But a third objec-
tion—which I still think a very strong one— is, that three
or four fleets—the fleets of Turkey, assisted by those of
France, England, and Austria on the one side, and the fleet
of Russia on tho other—would have all the appearance of a
competition for preponderance, and would thereby weaken
the general feeling in the solidity and duration of peace.
Well, discussions went on, as the house has seen by the
papers which have been laid before Parliament. The Aus-
trian Government, through Count Buol and Baron Pro-
kesch, its representatives at the conference, supported
with great force of argument the propositions which
were made for limitation, or else for making the Black
Sea a commercial sea. I should say, however, with re-
spect to this last proposition, that it was not cordially-
adopted by the Austrian Government, but they did cor-
dially adopt the proposal and support the arguments in
favour of limitation, which I was ordered by my instruc-
tions to put forward. The right hon. gentleman, having
read several extracts from Count Buol's circular, strangely
enough said he would not read the particular propositions
which Austria made, but he left it to the house to believe
or to infer that those propositions were the same which
were made by Russia. Now, I think a very few minutes
would suffice to show that, whether they were satisfactory
or unsatisfactory, whether they were adequate or inade-
quate, they were totally different from those of Russia.
The proposal of Russia at the time when I was at Vienna
was, that the fleets of all the Powers, their armed vessels,
should have liberty to go through the Straits. The propo-
sition they made after I left Vienna was that the closing of
the Straits should be maintained as a principle, and that
Turkey should have the power of calling on her allies when
she pleased to send her fleets there. Now, the Austrian
proposition dqes not at all resemble these two, upon which
I was not arguing, for they have been discussed in the
house upon former occasions, and the house, by a very
great majority, were of opinion that they were inade-
quate. The Austrian proposal was friunded upon that
which Count Buol had made to us when we first had an
interview with him. He proposed, in the first place, that
the rule of 1841 should be maintained, but that it should
be maintained with exceptions in favour of the allies, and
with no exceptions in favour of Russia. Thus, according
to that principle—which I certainly very much doubt
whether Russia was at that tim2.prepared to adopt—there
would have been the power on MUM occasions of sending
armed vessels—ships of the line - belonging to France, Great
Britain, and Austria into the Black Sea, while there would
have been no power on the part of Russia of sending her
vessels eitherfrom the Black Sea into the Mediterranean or
of sending vessels from the Baltic into the Mediterranean and
from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. The passage, in
short, would have been entirely closed to Russia ; it would
not be closed to powers which had not establishments in the
Black Sea. The particular mode in which the proposal was
to be carried into effect was this. (I do not conceive it is a
proposition on the part of Austria to be considered by her
allies, and of course the details were not finally settled.)
What she proposed was that, supposing—which seems to
have been ascertained by Admiral Lyons—that Russia had
six sail of the line in the Black Sea, while she had that
number and no more, England, France, and Austria should
each maintain two frigates in the Black Sea, and have
power to renew them from time to time. If Russia should
increase her force—for instance, if she should augment her
fleet from six to eight sail of the line--then half the num-
ber maintained by Russia might be maintained by the
three allied Powers, so that, while Turkey would have
eight sail of the line as an equivalent to the eight of Rus-
sia, England would have four and France four at the same
time. It was proposed in the same way that if Russia
should continue to augment her force—for instance, if she
had 12 sail of the line—each of the maritime Powers
should have six, while Austria would, of course, have
her own naval force, and thus we , should maintain a
counterpoise in regard to Russia. But, in addition to
this, Count Buol was ready, as I was told verbally on the
daybefore I left Vienna, to agree to the treaty which he
mentions in this circular between Austria, Great Britain,
and France, by which they should agree to give a
guaran-
tee for the independence and integrity of Turkey. That
was a point on which I had laboured during the time. 1
was at Vienna. When I first saw Count Buol, I told hum
my general opinion with regard to the limitation of the

fleet according to my instructions; but I said I thought
that, before the whole of these transactions were closed, it
would be very desirable to have security for the future by
an alliance between the three Powers. Count Buol was of

opinion that it would be better to have an article in the
zeneral treaty making Russia a party to that guarantee.
I was of a different opinion, but Count Buol maintained
his opinion, as I maintained mine. The day before I

left Vienne I was informed that Count Buol had come

to the opinion thA he has suggested here in his circu-
lar, that it was desirable that the three Powers should

enter into a united treaty of defence of Turkey, secur-
ing her independence and integrity. (Hear, hear.) It
was, of course, understood that Prussia might be a party to
that treaty, and that thereby greater security would be

obtained for the observance of that treaty. It appeared to
me that these two provisions did contain a security for
Turkey for the future. It appeared to me, if we had made
this arrangement with respect to the admission of ships of
war in the Black Saa, that Russia, so far from increasing
her fleet to its size before the commencement of the war,
would abstain from maintaining more than six ships of the
line, replacing them, if sbe thought proper, by larger and
stronger vessels, but not attempting to have a large fleet in
the Black Sees; for nothing could so tend to diminish the
opinion of the power of Russia in the East as the observa-
tion that other fleets, especially those of France and Groat
Britain, were present in the Black Sea as a check and a
counterpoise to her fleet. On the other hand, the security
on the land side against the advances of Russia by armies
similar to those which advanced in 1828 and 1829 would
have been obtained by the general treaty, and by the
consciousness that Russia would have that, no sooner
lid she attempt to do that which she has done within the
last two years and occupy the provinces of Turkey, than
such astep would be equivalent to a declaration of war
against all the great powers of Europe. In this manner I
certainly thought that the Austrian plan of counterpoise
was inferior to the plan of limitation that we 'proposed,
yet it might be a mode of concluding the war with honour
to the Allied Powers, and that it would give—l will not
say a certainty —but a very fair prospect of the duration
of peace. (" Hear, hoar," from Mr. Gibson.) The right
hon. gentleman asks me whether I have changed that opin-
ion. Sir, I have not changed that opinion. I think that
those terms were calculated either, on the one side, to
secure Austria to U 3 in the war, or, on the other, to ob-
tain a peace which, although it might be unpopular,
would have been a peace that would have afforded
. .

rity for the future. In making these propositions, the
Austrian Government declared that they were ready to
Make them an ultimatum—that is to say, they were ready
to send this alternative to St. Petersburg—either that Rus-
sia should consent to that plan of counterpoise that I have
described, or that she should consent to limit her naval

forces in the Black Sea to the number existing at the time
that these propositions were accepted. It was supposed that
Russia had no more than six sail of the line left, and that
she would consent to a condition made with Turkey,
but inserted in a treaty made with all the Powers that
she would not increase her naval force beyond that
number. I have already stated that the Russian Min-
ister would not consent to the limitation, and that this
plan was at once refused. With respect to the other the
assent of Russia was more doubtial, but it was thought
that Russia might have agreed to that proposition. If
Russia refused both propositions the Austrian Minister
was to have orders to leave St. Petersburg in eight hours,
the military convention with France was to be signed, and
the Austrian army was to be concentrated and placed
in such a position that it could commence the war at any
moment. The Austrian Government did not promise
that an immediate declaration of war should be made,
but it declared that it would regard the rejection of its
proposition as a casus belli. The Austrian Minister said
that it would bring on the war, and I have no doubt that
unless Russia had yielded at the last moment it would
have led to a war between Austria and Russia. Well, sir,
I have stated that there may be something in my own re-
collection of what took place which differs from that of
Count Buol, but I have no doubt that the statement of
Count Buol is in the main an accurate account of what I did
at Vienna. I said that I had no instructions that would
enable me to agree to such terms, and that the instructions
I had would lead me to suppose that such terms would not be
accepted ; but I said that my own opinion was that they
ought to be and might be accepted ; and I said to Count
Buol that I could assure him, and that he could convey that
assurance to the Emperor of? Austria, that I would lay the
case before the Cabinet of this country, and that I would
use my best endeavours to put these propositions in each a
light that they might hope for their adoption. (Hear.)
That promise I certainly performed. I stated to my Go-
vernment every detail of the propositions of which I was
the bearer. I said that I had not the written propositions,
but that, if they should be considered fit to form a basis
for agreement, I had no doubt the Austrian Minister at
this Court would furnish all the details of the articles to
be en oposed. I must say that the proposition was delibe-
rately considered by tho Cabinet. Everything that I stated
had, I must say, duo weight, and was fairly placed in op-
position to the disadvantages of such a peace. The Go-
vernment came to the conclusion that the peace proposed
would not be a safe peace, and that they could not recom-
mend its adoption. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman
says that he has heard from my right hon. friend the mem-
ber for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) that the French Govern-
ment were disposed to accept these.terms' but that they
had been induced by the rejection of them by this Govern-
ment to refuse to accept them. M. Dronyn de l'Huys ren •
dered a report to the Emperor of the French, stating the
advantage of the terms to be such as I have described;
but the Emperor would not accept his advice, and, before
he know the decision of the English Government, he deter-
mined to change his Minister and to reject the proposal of
Austria, as not affording a sufficient foundation for peace.
He therefore refused to adopt the proposal. I am not going
to enter into the case of Austria, and how far it was a good
ease or not. I have stated the case as fairly as I can, and
the house can judge for itself. The Austrian Government
then declared that they were ready to -carry into effect the
four points, but that they did not think the third point
admitted of only one solution, and that the two Govern-
ments of France and Great Britain had sufficient security
on this point—that they were ready to make a proposal to
Russia, but that since that proposal had been rejected by
the Allied Governments they no longer considered them-
selves bound to propose it, and that they were no longer
bound by the treaty of the 2d of December to go to war
with Russia. I believe in strictness those terms do admit
the construction that they are bound to go to war with
Russia. But the house will remember, when that treaty
was first mentioned, I rather opposed the general view
that Austria was bound at once to go to war with Russia
upon that treaty, and I said she was bound only to take
steps to carry into effect the four points. I think the two
Governments may call upon Austria to perform her engage-
ments ; but I think that, even if it is not a good case, and
even if it is not a sufficient case, for Austria, at least there
is much to be said in favour of the propositions which the
Austrian Ministers declared they were ready to make as an
ultimatum. (Hear.) Now, sir, the right hon. gentleman
asked a question, undoubtedly personal to myself, but
which he is fairly entitled to ask, and which I consider I
am bound to answer. The right honourable gentleman
now asks how, having had those opinions, if I had not
changed them—if I had not taken a totally altered view—
how could I remain in office in the present Administra-
tion ? (Hear.) I think in the first place that if I had left
office upon the decision of her Majesty's Government
which I have mentioned, I should not have been acting
consistently with that which I have repeatedly declared to
be the main guide of my conduct. In the last resort, when
it came to that great question of whether the proposal be-
fore us should be received or not, it eves for the two Go-
vernments, and not for a plenipotentiary, to. decide. And
if not for a plenipotentiary, neither was it for me to decide,
as having been employed in those negotiations, and as hav-
ing been a member of the Cabinet. But I must say that,
if I had thought that, having held that opinion, and being
overruled upon a question of such great importance, it was
my duty to tender my resignation to her Majesty, I con-
sider the circumstances of the time would have forbidden
my doing so. I must now refer to that which has taken
place since the commencement of this session, and which I
think must impress every man who takes part in public
affairs with very grave reflections. There have been several
changes since the commencement of this session. I myself
resigned my office at tho commencement of this session,
upon the ground that I could not resist the appointment of
a committee of inquiry. A vote of this house induced
Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues generally to resign their
offices a few clays afterwards. Lord Derby was called to
attend upon her Majesty, and he thought (I believe with
very sound judgment) that, unless ho obtained the assist-
ance of some of Lord Aberdeen's colleagues especially my
noble friend (Lord Palmerston) and the right hon. gentle-
man the member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Glad-
stone`—he could not obey her Majesty's commands and
forma Government which promised stability. I found
myself unable to form a Government when it was proposed
to me. My noble friend (Lord Palmerston) formed a Govern-
ment, and he obtained the assistance of some of those col-
leagues of Lord Aberdeen to whom I have referred. But in
a few days they resigned office upon the ground, the very op-
posite of that which I had taken, that the committee of in-
quiry, proposed by the hon. and learned member for
Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) was about to be granted. It
cannot be denied, sir, I think, that these circumstances
have given an appearance of instability to our councils—
an appearance of instability which ought above all things
to be avoided ; but, more than that, it was impossible for
me not to perceive, though at a distance, thetendency that
there was to cry down all authority, to distrust all persons
in whom the Administration might be placed. If there was
ono man more than another whom the country thought
ought to be intrusted wilh the supreme place in the coun-
cils of the Sovereign it was my noble friend who is now
First Lord of the Treasury, and yet no sooner had that ap-
pointment taken place, and, as far as I can see, with no
other reason than that held a place of authority in her
Majesty's Councils, he became subject to the most violent
attacks, and a very general endeavour was made to run
down his Administration and to deprive him of power.
(Hear, hear.) This was not the effect of the extreme vio-
lence of parties. Far from it. It would be wrong if I ac-
cused the great body of the Opposition of such conduct,
but it did show the tendency of the public mind—a
tendency much to be feared—to run down all authority, to
distrust all persons who might be the depositories of power,
and to give way to a restless desire for something different
without exactly knowing what. Now, Sir, I did conceive
that in that state of the public mind, whatever might be
my sentiments as to a great question—and a very great
question it was—it was my duty to give every support to
my noble friend, and I am sure that if I had then left
office, though I might have promised him every support, it
would have increased that instability to which I have made
allusion—it would have been considered as a symptom and
precursor of other changes. I believe that, whether it regards
our position abroad, or whether it regards our position at
home, it is the duty of the members of the Cabinet of my
noble friend to consider, as well asthey are able, the position
are fit
of affairs; to make the best decisions which they can;.lo_
reas
minority to yield to the majority, if there is allliiineul:e'neto
or a majority; for an individual to defer
„La's set
or leave
timents to those of the Cabinet in general ; 149
it to this house to decide whether or not they
be trusted with the conduct of public a with. him eve
that my noble friend and those who. w
we qualified to make those changein" :cm administrative
the conduct of public
business to make those reforms which lc
of men whom her •
business may require as setany-
that after • Majesty
may call to her councils.
!believe public mind.
a time that
persuasion will be fixed in thP if
any I believe it
would be a very great
misfortune," total change, to were to
take place, unless it were
's ange, to the men who
to her Majesty Government. If the house
are opposed better d
the eposito '
think they will be depositories of power, they
fidence and everyduty support given to them
in the execution
of
as they . I will not sa that these
affairs—important are, involving such great con-
sequences,bearingupon the • •
position of England in the
world, bearing her internal fate and the mainten-
ance of her in_s_t tutions—have not cost us many painful
reflections-h(Hea) I have made the best decision which,
with WY ligts, I have been able to make. That decision
,nay be contested. It be said
may by many that I be-
trayed the interests of
my country when I told Count
gaol I was ready to agree to terms—not officially,
but
these
but to recommend them
to the Government. It may be
said that, having so declared my concurrence I ought to
have • l•
peraisved to the end, and to have resigned office WI-