The Sun.
London, England, 1864-07-06 00:00:00

GOVERNMENT ORDNANCE.

Sir J. HAY asked the Under Secretary of State for War
to lay upon the table of the house a return showing the
number of guns in store and in use of such a nature
as the late experiments show can be effectually used
against armour-clad ships of the Warrior class ; and
asked what steps Government were taking to provide a
sufficient supply of guns for the armament of our forts and
fleets, of such a nature as late experiments show can
be effectually used against armour-clad ships and forts,
specifying as follows :—the calibre of gun ; whether rifled
or smooth• bore; the construction of gun; cast-iron, coil,
steel, or wrought-iron ; the weight of gun ; the length of
bore; the weight of shot and shell; and, the service charge
of powler.
The Marquis of HART IN GI ON said that such details as
were asked for by the hon. baronet could not advisably be
subwitted to public inspection. Efforts were being made
to rive 2 an adr (plate supply of rifled guns to the service.
THE RUMOURS 1N REFERENCE TO ALSEN.
Ire reply to Lord R. MONTAGU,
Mr LAYARD said that no official information on the
subject had been received by the Government on this
sul,jcct.
THE DANO-GERMAN QUESTION.
ADJOURNED DEBATE,

Mr COBDEN, who on rising was greeted with loud
cheers, said—Mr Speaker : W e are indebted to the two hon.
gentlemen who have moved amendments for having en-
larged the subject of our deliberations. The hon. member
for Bridgewater has proposed at a future time to move an
amendment for the approval of this house of the course her
Majesty's Government has taken in the affairs of Denmark.
That is an amendment which, though not endorsing the
steps or proceedings by which we arrived at the result, the
house is pretty generally inclined to endorse. The hon.
member for Warwickshire has proposed an amendment
that this country shall guarantee to Denmark the disputed
possessions of Schleswig and Holstein, left in dispute after
the Conference, thus raising the issue aye or no whether
this country shall adopt a policy of intervention and war in
the case of Denmark.
Mr NEWDEGATE—My proposal was that the pro-
posal of the neutral Powers in the Conference be sup-
ported by this house.
Mr COBDEN—J apprehend the hen. gentleman means
to support that policy by war. That is all I meant to infer.
(Hear, hear.) The hon. gentleman has not got up to con-
tradict me. The right lion, gentleman who brought forward
this motion has not confined himself to a declaration of fact,
or a statement of judgment of this house upon the conduct
of Government, which I think he could have wisely done ;
but he has rather sought to lead us into what I would call
the region of prophecy, fur he proposed for our assent a
declaration that the couilse of policy which the Government
has pursued has had the effect of lowering us in the
councils of nations, and has diminished securities of peace.
Now, sir, whether we have been lowered, or are to he lowered,
in the councils of nations, much depends upon our own
future conduct. (Hear, hear) For the present moment
I am constrained to admit that as far as the conduct of
our Foreign Office is concerned, we do not stand
in a satisfactory position. (Opposition cheers.) In
regard to the declaration that the course that has
been taken will have the effect of diminishing the
securities for peace, I join issue distinctly with the right
hon. gentleman. (Hear, hear.) lam of opinion that what
has happened—the exposure we have had of the utter futi•
lity of our foreign policy—the complete break down of our
diplomacy—(hear, hear)—will have the effect of transferring
these ques'ions for evermpre from the dark recesses of the
Foreign Office to the publicity of this house, which will
afford us a better guarantee for peace than we have ever had.
(Hear, hear.) But while I say that Ido not wish it to be
understood that I come here to endorse:or excuse the coarse
the Foreign Office has taken in the late negotiations—for I
consider it to have been deplorable and most unsatisfactory
do not speak with censure or harshness of any attempt
by the Government to promote peace. I do not even quarrel
with them for hawking about in every capital of Europe
their importunities for peace, but what has struck ma in
reading these volumineus despatches is the great want of
sagacity on the part of our Foreign Minister, (Hear, hear.)
It is the want of knowledge and appreciation of the motives
and forces whiten guide and control the actions of foreign
nation-, and which appear to me to be so transparent that
even a child itself might perceive them. (Hear, hear.)
Under these circumstances it is that the head of the Foreign
Office has I think undoubtedly exposed himself to rejections,
to rebuffs, and I might say,
as far as that department is
concerned, to humiliation in all parts of the world. (Cheers.)
Now, Sir, so much for the lineation, which lies very much
between the. f rant bench on the.other side and the front
bench on this side of the house; bat there is a question much
beyond that which interests aspirants fir power and office,
and if there was not I should cake no part in this discussion.
Now, Sir, there arises out of this tphoeliaedditio,cislaeihy question ofis
principle as affecting our foreign y, r
question of Denmark and Germany these two issantelase, which
i
have tormented us so long, brought be fore ns_nthis
um.,
the
of the dynastic, secret, end irresponsible en
gage-
ments ,(1
of oar Foreign Office; and we have also
question which is not ancient but new—the question of our
foreign
policy at this time--I mean the question of nation.
silty, By nationaiity 1 mean the instinct which is now so
powerful, leading communities to seek to live together be-
e;,use they are of the same race, language, and religion.
Now, Sir, what is this treaty of 1b.5 of which we have heard
so much, and which forms the positive basis of these dis-
cussions ? Eight gentlemen met t tgether in London, at that
celebrated round table, to decide the destinies of a million of
people who were never consulted upon the question at issue.
(Hear, hear.) Now, let us take note of this. It is the last
p ige in a long history of diplornE.tic action. It cannot be
repeated again. Every man there will never again join in a
successful conference-1 me an a conference meeting together
to dispose of a population whose interests and wishes they
do not take into account. There never will be another held

in Europe, probably, iu the history of the world, Now, let
it be borne in mind it is upon the policy of secret irrespons-
ible diplomacy and the question of nationalities that cur de-
bate turns. We ail know what followed the attempt to force
a papulation to live in conditions which were not acceptable

to them. Ti Le Government of Denmark itself is now ad-
mitted on all hands not merely to have failed ih its obliga-
tions, but fi died in its engagements. in the, • tment of
the Schleswii e-Hols ein population, which 'erns u t ?innately
confined to t. ie rule of that dynasty by treaty. Io which we
are referring.. The Danes troubled aege haeese, d the people
of Schleswig ,-Holestin in a way ',let et peculiarly
painful, and which always affeeeta us most s, nsitively as a
people—l '.neap they interfer,ed with the use of their lan-
guage. IJenmark trouble' the Schleswig-Holstein popula-
tion with functionaries repeaking the Danish language ; they
sought to constrain &Air youth to learn the Danish lan-
guage when it was 'Ala their wish to do so. They sought to
gain advantage fnr their own university, against the wishes
of the F,chlefeeng-Holstein people, Well, they tried again
precise sly e7ne same thing which had been so unsuccessful
in tb case of Holland, when Holland tried to force her
lan gunge on the people of Belgium. The consequence was
a great grievance—and the German people, sympathising
with people of their own race in Schleswig-Holstein, took
up the cry that was raised in these provinces. Is there a
public man who has taken part in public affairs for years
past who hes not been flooded with the grievances of the
Schleswig-Holstein population; I declare I could measure
those which have reached me almost by cubic yard. I am
afraid 1 have not been a very diligent reader of them ; but
we must not forget that at the bottom of this question there
lies a grievance, and there lies a grievance of a small popu-
lation against a powerful one. This interest of the Germans
in the Schleswig-Holstein question continued for 10 or 12
years. )'et length it culminated in a state of violent utter-
ances, that you may almost say the Government of Ger-
many, fearing there might be a revolutionary movement in
Germany in favour of the Schleswig-Holstein population,
summoned the Diet together, with the view of taking the
matter into their own hands. The Diet is a slow body, with
a very imperfect organisation, and before they could act the
ewe great Powers of Austria and Prussia interfered in this
affair between the Schleswig-Holstein people and the Ger-
man people, and invaded that country, for they had their
standing armies--which are the standing evils, you may
say, of Enrolee at this time. (Hear, hear.) Now do not
let us forget, when we arrive at this point, that because the
absolute Governments of Austria and Prussia entered into
conteen they did not affect the original merits of the question.
It is difficult for us to conceive any action taken for a cause of
libeety or nationality of which Austria or Prussia are the
cb impious ; our very gorge rises at the idea of the Austrian
Government taking an army of Hungarian, Croatian,Bohe-
rnian, and perhaps Italian soldiers into Schleswig-Holstein,
to fight the battles of nationality, (Hear.) These two Govern-
ments have been playing the demagogues to the German
people ; there is noneso subservient to the passion of the people
as your sceptred demagogues, I am noc going to trouble the
house with a single quotation from our blue-books, and I
hope to propitiate the favour of my and ence by removing
all dread of that infliction; but in order to show the change
which has taken place in the progress of society in Europe,
in order to show to what a degree the democratic principle,
or, if that term is offensive, popular sovereignty in Europe,
has progressed during the last 30 or 40 years, allow me to
read, in connection with their invasion of Schleswig-Hol-
stein, to do the behests of the German people, an extract
from a manifesto to the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and
Prussia, dated Layback, May 12, 1821—that was the time
of the Holy Alliance. It says :—" Useful or necessary
changes in legislation, and in the administration of States,
ought only to emanate from the free will, and the intelligent
and well-weighed convictions of those whom God has ren-
dered responsible for power. All that deviates from this line
necessarily tends to disorder, commotion, and evils far more
unsufferable than those which it was intended to remedy."
Penetrated with this eternal truth, the sovereigns have not
hesitated to say it with frankness and vigour. They declare
that "in respecting the rights and independence of all legi••
timate Powers, they regard as legally null, and as disavowed
bythe principles which constitute the public right of Europe
all pretended reforms operated by revolt and open hosti•
lity." That was the doctrine of the absolute sovereigns in
1821. Now we are told, not only upon the authority of our
own representatives, but upon the authority of the repre-
sentatives of Austria and Prussia themselves, that they are
constrained in the course they are now following by the ne-
cessity they are under—the pressure, to use the term of the
Foreign Secretary, they are under from the German popu-
lations. Now, I mention this most significant and pregnant
fact because it shows how completely the state of Europe
has changed. It shows how we need be under no apprehen-
sion, in future, of holy alliances of sovereigns. There
may be holy alliances of the people, though that does not
seem very likely yet. Now I come to our own course in
those proceedings. What were we to do when these two
great military Powers went into Schleswig Holstein ? IVere
we right in offering our mediation ? I think there can be no
office more dignified, as there ought to be no office more safe
than that of a mediator. (Hear.) If there be a blessing at-
tending on any one, it is, as we are told, on the peacemaker or
the attempted peacemaker. Now, what I find in this coun-
try's policy—whether advocated by one side or the other—
what has been unfortunately the tendency of this country is
this—that when we set up fur the office of mediator, we seem
never to know the line which separates the mediator from
the partisan. No sooner have we entered into this Schles-
wig Holstein question, simply with a view of attempting to
keep the peace, than parties here, both speakers and public
writers, instantly take up the attitude of partisans, and,
forming their own views by their own counsel, they are for
transferring themselves into the attitude of belligerents.
Nothing could be more unfortunate for the cause of peace
than that the principle should be recognised that, when you
attempt to serve as mediator, it involves the risk of being
dragged into the position of a principal. Why, even in the
old days of duelling, except in the most barbarous times of
the Ireland of the past century, it was considered rather
sharp practice, because a gentleman went out as a second,
that he was obliged to take part as principal with the other
second. (Laughter.) Now, lam going to say what those
who speak for mere popularity would not care to say, viz.,
that the great fault we commit in these things always is
that we allow ourselves to be betrayed into something like
menace without duly measuring the power we had to carry
out our menace. (Opposition cheers.) There is a policy
of menace in this country. (Hear.) It is familiar to all
who read certain journals and who hear certain questions
put in this house by those who talk about where our
fleets are, and those who in another house—or in another
place—(laughter)—who ought to know better, and whose
voices ought to be heard in other accents than those of
incendiaries—(hear, hear)—those who talk about sending
out our fleets. Now, I intend to treat this question in the
way in which other countries treat it, for we should be the
merest Chinese in the world if we did not look the matter
fairly in the face ourselves. Those who talk of our enter-
ing into these affairs in conflict, and settling them id a
spirit of dictation, have they considered what our power is
to carry out our will in any way on the continent of Europe ?
No doubt for our own defence, in our own island home,
our powers are, if I may say it without irreverence,
all but omnipotent. All the world could not assail you
with success in this country. (Rear, hear.) But when
you talk of the power to coerce military nations on the
Continent, your powers are very limited indeed. Send a
fleet to the Baltic, was the utterance which I heard in
another place. What would a fleet do in the Baltic ?
(Hear, hear.) Blockade the Prussian ports. Well, tut
railways had all but rendered blockades practically inopera-
tive, except in such an extraordinary case as that in
America, where the blockading party also commands the
internal communications of the country. But I must not
forget to mention that we are liable to attack in that way.
Recent experience has taught us that you cannot localise
war by sea. We should be liable to retaliation on the ocean.
What can we do in this case of the Prussian war ? Our war
would be with the German people. Recollect what I told
you, that the Austrian and Prussian Governments are mere
demagogues doing the behests of the German people. They
have an honest sympathy with the inhabitants of Schleswig
and Holstein. They are actuated by, I believe, generous
motives, and I dare say a very large portion of them are
heartily ashamed of the champions who forced themselves
into their service. But what could you do in a war with 40
millions of Germans to carry out your will with reference
to this question ? lam speaking now in answer to the hon.
member opposite (Mr Newdegate). What could you do to
maintain that slice of land in Scleswig for the Danes ? You
would have to fight the whole of the German people in a
frenzy of excitement and thoroughly in earnest, imbued
with convictions the growth of 10 or 12 years' constant
pamphleteering and newspaper writing. You could attack
Austria and dismember her from her outlying provinces;
but do you think that the Germans would greatly grieve to
see the extra-Teutonic limbs of Austria cut away? It would
not affect the German population. The grievance to-
wards you would be with the German race. I put it to
both sides of this house, is it not high time that there was
some mode by which the Government should know the
wish of this house upon this and kindred questions? Be-
cause we do not know to what extent this very war which
is now raging may extend. It may be half over Europe, and
that is the question which we have to ask ourselves, and
the only point I feel any interest in debating on this occasion,
because you know I have said for two years past that, whe-
ther the present noble lord is in office or whether Lord Derby
is, is a matter to which I attach no importance whatever. I
think you (to the Opposition) are very wrong in attempting
to remove the noble lord, as he does your work better than
Len' Derby would. (Laughter and cheers.) He throws
a• -relit on reform. (Hear.) He derides the 220 gentle-
men who are pledged to vote. for the ballot, and, as the
gallant officer (Gen. Peel) said yesterday, he spends more
wll
.1:1;1:ety,0 ,daonidie
Life riv7rocrien e(x,ffitreaev. agi3nets,idthesanal
iwtehissh,olfuyldoualwloi
ghi-ovne. himgen rill,
n(thea th, and
if, instead of killing hire, as the right
you °Pare him the pangs of dissolution, and allow him to
die a natural dents, speaking
of the Exchequer) said
glor
efficially, I am confident
that, when he has deai6",.;edly demoralised his own party,
he intends, when he makes his political will, to hand over
office to you as residuary legatees, (Loud laughter.)
tNhoewFyreonuchsecealll Ptherefe'eltsirtutlantdicen4lt'and what our neighbours
spective of party feeling, which has long been dead in
this house, to consider the importance ant
gwraanvtityyou, irre-
of these
foreign questions. They will trouble you when you come
into office. Recollect there are only two classes of questions
upon which Governments when itt office fall. The one is
the class of foreign questions, the other that' of financial
questions. (Murmurs.) You will not find a Government
fall from any other cause. (A. voice--How about reform ?)

Oh, no, they dont go out on reform. (Loud laughter.) It
is only you who do that. (Renewed laughter.) Now, is it
not worth our while to consider these questions, and, at the
only time when we can draw serious attention to our foreign
policy, to try to enunciate a principle for our better guid-
ance in future. What is the ground of our foreign policy.
Why do we interfere in these affairs abroad ? There is not,
I believe, one treaty binding us to go to war on the Conti-
nent. There was only one treaty in the settlement of
Vienna, and that was a treaty entered into by England,
Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in which they bound them-
selves solemnly, in theurame of the Holy Trinity, by force
of arms, if necessary, to prevent for aver any member of the
Bonaparte family from sitting on the throne of France. (A
laugh.) lam not•aware of any other treaty. (An Hon.
Member—Belgium,) Then Belgium is an exception. Then
why do we trouble ourselves with these continental politics ?
We have no interest there territorially. We gain nothing
there by your diplomatic meddling. Our general excuse is
—it is a phrase which is stereotyped in thedespatches of the
noble lord the Foreign Secretary—that we have a policy
founded on what is called the balance of power, which I
never could understand, but I believe it is a figment which
is supposed to have grown out of the settlement of Vienna,
which I call the great unsettlement of Vienna. Can we, in
the face of these growing popular interests, any longer base
our foreign policy upon that treaty of Vienna ? We are not
bound to do anything by force to maintain that treaty. All
we are hound to do is not to violate its undertakings.
What has that treaty done for Europe ? I hold in my hand a
short extract from the writings of a great Italian, one of the
noblest, most disinterested most accomplished, and bravest of
the patriots of modern times, and who bore the heat and
burden of the day—the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio.
Writing in 1847, he says—" I believe all the disturbances
which have agitated Europe from 1815 to the present time,
all the discontent and revolutions of those 32 years, and all
the moral inquietude which more or less agitates society,
have been caused by the unnatural and forced partition of
Europe by the Congress of Vienna. Its measures for the
establishment of peace and tranquillity in Europe were the
germ of all the wars and revolutions which have since oc-
curred, because the only interests then cared for were those
of dynasties, families, and privileged classes, without any
consideration of national feeling, or the inevitable wants of
that new state of society which the revolution has created."
Nt w, if that was written in 1847, and if you have since had
a period which convulsed all Europe, full of dynastic
changes and fearful revolution, two years afterwards, is it
not necessary that we should discard the idea of entering
again into negotiations abroad, with a view of maintaining
the balance of power as settled by the treaty of Vienna ?
(Hear, hear.) We all have our pet projects for interference
abroad. One party wishes us to interfere for Poland,
another for Hungary, and another for Italy, while some
would even have us go to America, and interfere in the
terrible struggle now going on there. Now, if we were to
take up a foreign policy for the redress of great wrongs,
and if I were called upon to say what would be my pro-
ject, I should say that Venice has the first claim on this
country, (Cheers.) Venice had for a thousand years a
glorious existence. She was a commercial nation, with a
career somewhat analogous to our own; and if her history
were fairly written, and a comparison was made between
her and other countries at the time she existed, she cer •
tainly had the best title to existence of any country cn
the Continent, and especially at our hands. And yet the
sign and seal of England is attached to the treaty whieh
assigned Venice to Austria, If there is one country which
has more claims upon us than another, it is the country to
which I have referred. But to undo the wrong we did to
Venice we should have to fight against our own engage.
ments and our own signature. Now where are we landed ?
We have here a country requiring peace. Some people
think it is very degrading and base that an Englishman
should speak of his own country as requiring peace, and as
being entitled to enjoy the blessings of peace; and if we
allude to our enormous commercial and industrial engage-
ments as a reason why we should avoid these petty quarrels
and disturbances, then we are told we are selfish and gro-
velling in our politics. But I say we were very wrong to
take measures to extend our commerce:unless we et ere pre-
pared to use those prudential precautions which were
calculated to keep our vast commercial and manufacturing
operations from being troubled with unnecessary wars.
You have in this country engagements of the most extensive
and complicated kind. You have enlarged your operations to
such an extent that you are now actually exporting three
times as much as you did 25 years ago. Your commerce
and manufactures have grown in a quarter of a century twice
as much as they grew in a thousand years previously. Is
not this a motive why we should take all reasonable pre-
cautions for avoiding these Continental quarrels ? And,
therefore, I say I am justified in laying this statement be-
fore you, in the hope that, outside of this party conflict,
something may corn e calculated to put us on a better foot-
ing with regard to our Continental relation. I have taken
very little interest in the party question at issue. I think
the greater question is the effect which this dilemma is to
have on our policy for the future. I maintain that we must
have a change in the relations of this country to our Foreign
Office and to foreign countries. The present system of dip-
lomacy has broken down. (Hear, hear.) Our Foreign Office
has lost its credit with foreign countries. (Opposition cheers.)
From this time you cannot apprcach a foreign country
on any question of foreign politics in which you will not be
looked upon with a want of consideration, and indeed with
mistrust. (Cheers.) And why ? Because foreign countries
feel that while they are dealing with the Foreign-office the
Foreign-office in fact had not the power. The power is
here; and foreign Governments more than suspect that our
Foreign Minister is often playing a game with them to suit
the policy anu the prospects of the Government in this
House. (Cheers.) Such being the case, I maintain that it
behoves us to adopt a different policy, to let it be known
what that policy is, and to make the Government feel it was
necessary to act up to our views. I repeat, the present ay's-
tem cannot go on. It requires a change, not only in the
interests of this country, but in the interests of our neigh-
bours. liay, it requires a change on far higher grounds, in
the interests of peace, civilisation, and humanity. (Loud
cheers.)

Lord R. CECIL remarked upon the fact that, notwith-
standing the speech just delivered by Mr. Cobden, it was
the intention of the hon. gentleman to give Ministers his
material support, in that respect reversing the policy of the
Government, who had been lavish of threats and menaces
in behalf of Denmark, but whon the time arrived for giving
her material aid withheld it and deserted their ally. One
thing he readily granted. He believed that if Mr. Cobden
had been Fore gn Secretary, instead of Earl Russell, this
country would have occupied a position proud and noble
compared with that it now filled. His complaint of the
policy of the Government was that it was founded upon no
definite principle, bat was oscillating, vague, and fluctu-
ating. Referring to the recent speech of Lord Palmerston,
in which the noble viscount, casting aside all his previous
threats against Germany and declarations in favour
of the independence and integrity of Denmark, said
that if Copenhagen were subjected to the horrors of an
assault and the King were made prisoner of war, then the
Government would "reconsider" what was to be done in
the matter, the noble lord observed that a more melancholy
exhibition had never been witnessed since the time when
ancient Pistol swallowed his leek, buttered with the reflec-
tion that he did it for revenge. Henceforward we should
be unable to persuade foreign powers that we were in ear-
nest; and this loss of dignity and honour was not a loss of
a mere sentiment, but of actual power—a loss of power
which we should have to buy back hereafter at the cost of
the blood and treasure of England. With regard to the
future, he agreed with General Peel and Mr Cobden, that
if did not mean to fight we must not interfere, and that was
the only question involved in the censure which the reso-
lution passed upon the Government. If the house could
nut save Denmark at least it might rescue this country from
the danger of again suffering similar dishonour by placing
the resolution of Mr Disraeli on its journals.
Mr. W. E. FORSTER observed that Lord Robert had
not told the house what should have been the policy of the
Government, and what the Opposition would do. Mr.
Disraeli had dealt only in vague generalities. He would,
he had said, secure the honour of England and the peace
of Europe ; hut the house should know by what means,
The motion was a vote of censure, and it was
necessary that the, house should make up its mind
whether it had confidence in the Opposition or not. A vote
of censure for the pest was a vote of confidence for the
future. In the consequences of the treaty of 1852,
and in the Schleswig-Holstein question, we had, he thought,
received a great lesson,—that it was oar business to make
the rule of non-intervention the guide of our foreign policy,
The time had come to replace that meddling,dishonest sys-
tem of apparent intervention, but real non-intervention, by
an honest, a dignified, and an open system of non-interven-
tion.

Mr. B. JOHNSTONE, after replying to the speeches of
the Chanceilor of the Exchequer and the Lord Advocate
on the previous evening, complained of the mystery in
which the policy of the Government had been enveloped
during the late transactions. He did not defend the con-
duct of the German Powers, he said, which had been
marked by overbearing violence; but what the Government
ought to have done two years ago was to come to a distinct
conclusion as to whether this country should interfere or
not. Instead of that they had adopted a mysterious policy,
marked by a tissue of blunders, and the house, he thought,
was bound to record a solemn protest against the manner in
which our foreign policy had been conducted.
Lord H. VANE observed that the Government had been
blamed for recommending certain c aicessions to be made by
Denmark, whereas he was of opinion that those concessions
would have placed her in a better position H 3 could find
no proof of any hopes of assistance to Denmark held out
from this country. Our office had been that of a muliator,
and after the refusal of France, which was not unnatural,
all we could do was to remonstrate. He did not blame the
Opp sition for their motion, but they had not declared what
would be their policy. The Government bad done all they
were called upon to do, and although they had not been
successful, he did not see that we had suffered any
humili,tion.

Mr. LIDDELL, in supporting the motion, observed that
the great argument of the other side was that the Opposition
had no poll y ; but it had been asserted by them on another
occasion, that it was not the function of an Opposi •
►,ion to declare their policy. That the policy of the Go-
vernment was that of interference was, he considered, proved
by the papers, and he pointed out the evils which had been