The Sun.
London, England, 1852-11-04 00:00:00

(Before the Lords Justices of Appeal.)

IN RE HALLS ESTATE AND THE HUDDERSFIELD AND
MANCHESTER RAILWAY AND CANAL COMPANY.
Mr. Foster, at the request of Sir George Turner, sub-
mitted for the opinion of their lordships an important
question of evidence arising in this case. It appeared
that, fur the purpose of putting in evidence certain facts
of the case, copies of extracts from a parish register were
produced, which were signed and certified as true copies
by the curate only of the perish, there being at the time
a resident rector or vicar there. The late act, 14 and 15
Victoria, cap. 99, sec. 14), provides that before such
copies can be received in evidence, they must be signed
and certified as true copies or extracts by the officer to
whose custody the original is entrusted. The question
was whether, under the circumstances, the curate was
the proper officer to sign the copies within the meaning

of tile act.
Their Lordships said, it would be useful and convenient
that the act should be construed liberally; and they held
that the curate was the proper officer within the act.
The copies tendered were accordiu2ly admitted as
evidence of the facts they were produced to provo.
(Before the Master of the Rolla.)
MOAN IL GORDON.

His Honour gave judgment in this case. The bill was
filed for the administration of the estate of Henry Baines
Lot, who was formerly a banker in Honiton, in partner-
ship with Mr. Christopher Flood and others. In February
1827, plaintiff deposited 1001. in the bank, taking a pro-
missory note for the amount. In 1830, Mr. Christopher
Small Flood was admitted into the partnership which
continued till the 20th June, 1833, when Mr. Henry
Bathes Lnt died, and on his death the partnership con-
sisted of Christopher Flood, Edward Lot, and Christopher
Small Flood Henry Baines Lot had made a will, in which,
after making certain bequests, he gave all his real and
personal estate not already disposed of to Charles Gordon
and Henry Buckland Lot, the defendants, upon certain
trusts. Shortly afterwards Henry Buckland Lot iwas
admitted a partner. In February, 1837, Edward Lot
died, and the surviving partners continued to carry on
the bank till March, 1843, when Christopher Flood, the
last surviving partner when the note was given, died. In
November, 1847, the bank stopped payment, and shortly
afterwards the partners were made bankrupts, and
plaintiff had proved his debt of 1001. under their bank-
ruptcy. Defendant had never made any claim against
the estate of the testator until the filing of his bill, but
he had received his interest at the bank regularly every
half year. Under these circumstances, the question was,
whether he was entitled to the relief which he sought
against the testator's estate, or whether he was not de-
barred by the lapse of time. On the part of the plain•
tiff it was argued that the bank having paid interest on
the note until within two years of the filing of the bill,
they must for that purpose be admitted as the agents of
the testator ; and if the Court should be adverse to the
plaintiff on this argument, then it was contended that
the testator, by his will, created an express trust for the
payment of his debts out of his real estate. If the bank
were agents, they must have been so either by express
authority or by implication, and he did not consider
that there was evidence of either the one or the other. It
was clear that Henry Buckland Lot made the payments
in his character of partner, and ❑ot as executor, for they
appeared in the accounts of the bank, and not in the ac-
counts of the partnership. It was obvious that the bank-
ers considered themselves liable to this debt, and no
doubt it was taken into account in ascertaining what was
due to or from the testator. But, even if this objection
did not apply, he considered that plaintiff's remedy
against the personal estate of the testator was debarred
by lapse of time, seeing that the testator died in March,
1843, and the bill was not filed till June, 1849. He was
likewise of opinion that plaintiff had no remedy against
the real estate, Plaintiff had accepted the bank as his
debtors, and had made no claim against the testator's
estate ; and, if it were admitted
.now, a re-distribution
of the estate might be requisite. The bill must, there-
fore, be admitted with costs.
(Before Vice-Chancellor Kindersley.)
cox 9. TAYLOR.--/ONES •. WOOD,—THE NEW CHANCERY
ACTIC E.

The Vice• Chancellor said ho had consulted with the
other Chancery judges as to the question raised in these
cases. The applications were for orders to revive, under
the 22d section of the new Chancery Act, both suits hay.
jug become abated before the new Act came into opera-
tion. The words of the sections applicable to the case
aro these Upon any suit in the said court becoming
abated by death, marriage, or otherwise, or defective by
reason of some change or transmission of interest or
liability, it shall not be necessary to exhibit any bill of
reviver or supplemental bill, in order to obtain the usual
order to revive such suit, on the usual or necessary
decree or order to carry on the proceedings; but an order
to the effect of the usual order to revive, or of the usual
supplemental decree, may be obtained, as of course, upon
an allegation of the abatement of such suit, or of the
same haying become defective, and of the change or
transmission of interest or liability." His Honour said
that the other judges agreed with him in thinking that
these suits, which had abated before the Act came into
operation, were within the 52d section, and the order
thereby pointed out would, therefore, be made in both
cases.

PARKER V. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

♦ SCENE IX COURT.

This was an action against the Great Western Rail-
way Company to recover the amount of a great number
of alleged over-charges made by them upon the carriage
of parcels, and when the case came on for trial before
Lord Truro, he ordered it to be referred to arbitration,
contrary to the expressed wish of the plaintiff, who
wished it to be tried by a jury. At length, however, he
agreed to take an amount to settle the matter, but after
that soma questions arose as to the principle upon which
the costs should be taxed, and the matter was again
several times brought under the notice of tne court during
last term.
Mr. Parker, the plaintiff, now moved for a rule,
calling upon Mr. Henry Walker, who was formerly
his attorney, to show cause why the Master should
not review his taxation, having regard to an agree-
ment between the plaintiff and Mr. Walker. and why
170/. 9s. 3d. paid into court, by order of Mr. Justice
Wightman, should not be paid to the plaintiff, with
such further sum as he might be found to be en-
titled to upon the taxation of the bill. Mr. Parker ad-
dressed the court at considerable length, and with some
warmth, but the facts as far as they could be gathered,
seemed to be these:—After four and a-half years of arbi-
tration, Mr. Parker having mortgaged his claim against
the company for 6001., was compelled by the mortgagee
to compromise the matter for 400/. and costs. Mr.
Walker was Mr. Parker's attorney when the action was
commenced, but Mr. Parker having changed his attorney,
Mr. Walker's costs were taxed as between attorney and
client. When Mr. Walker agreed to take the matter up
he also verbally agreed that Mr. Parker should pay all
money oat of pocket, and that Mr. Walker should have
what he could get from the defendants, and should have
no more. It was now objected that certain things the
Master had allowed for had not been done—that some
things done were not necessary, and that part of the
work Mr. Parker had done himself, and he claimed under
his agreement with Mr. Walker the amount of these
items. Mr. Parker also complained that their lordships
had never understood the case ; that he had great
reason to complain of the Court, for through their
misunderstanding of the matter he had lost 10,0001; and
it would have been a great mercy to him if, instead of
Lord Truro persisting in referring the case, there had
been a verdict against him at once. He assured their
lordships that it was the last time he would trouble
them, for, if he once got out, he would never come into
the Court of Common Pleas again as long as he breath-
ed. It would be better to submit to anything than do
so, for in such a position you were not only in danger
of losing the coat and the cloak, but the shirt also. He
certainly would never come into the Common Pleas
again.
Mr. Justice Maule—But you may be dragged in; and
you should not thus proclaim your dislike to the Court,
a
for everybody who shall hereafter bring an action
a Company.
The acquainted
od
when he was not informed of the objections to them.
against you will bring it in the Common Pleas. (A
laugh.)
Mr. Parker said he had carried on businesafo
urmeoanly
years without having anything to do with
and Courts,
how
r
items,
hw t hadthe
accursed
The Chief Justice said that he was of opinion that
theyth
eresasyhotuhledmbaestnero
wrauslewirnontghisin f
case
allowing
; in
Gtore law
Western since
C
Mr. Parker—Your lordship is wrong in saying that
no objection was made ; as wrong as every judge was.
The Chief Justice—I did not say so ; but that these
particular objections were not made. The first answer
to the second ground of objection was this—that these
objections were not pointed out to Master Parke, and
you cannot say he was wrong when he was not informed
of them, If Master Parke bad been told that the work
had not been done by the attorney, he would not have
allowed for it; and it was not to be permitted that Mr.
Parke should stand by, during the taxation, and see how
much could be got from the pockets of the Great Western
Company, and then turn round and see what could bo
got back from the attorney.
Mr. Parker—lt is a direct injustice to say that. I was
no party to draw money from the Great Western, and
it ought not to go forth to the world. lam no party to
any juggle, and I have told your lordships so ; and, if
need be, I will tell you in yet plainer words.
The Chief Justioe.—You had better not go on so.
Mr Parker.—Circumscribe your words, then, my lord.
I cannot stand here and hear any judge represent that
which has not taken place. You ought not to cast sus-
p cion by stating that which did not take place.
Mr. Justice Maule.—l believe that my lord thinks
the grounds which he has been stating very suspicious ;
cal I think so, too ; but he is justified, and not only
that, but bound, to do as ho has done under the circum-
stances.
Mr. Parker.—There is no ground for it, I say.
Mr. Justice Maule.—But you must behave with
decency.
Mr. P will go out of court, for I cannot let
such imp stations be made in my presence.
The Chief Justine.—You had better be quiet.
Mr. Parker (hurriedly leaving the court).—I will, but
I shall do as I like when I get out of court. (A laugh.)
Hula refused.