The Sun.
London, England, 1864-03-11 00:00:00

SPIRIT OP THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

Timm—Among the many troubles incident to
the present position of Denmark, perhaps the least
evil is that everybody considers that he has a right
to offer her advice. There is something gratifying
to our natural love of superiority in lecturing our

neighbours; it costs so little, and it does ns so
much credit. If we advise them to be brave, we
feel so valiant ourselves; if we advise them to be

prudent, we feel such thorough confidence in our
own wisdom and foresight. We do not pretend to
be more free from these foibles than our neighbours,

and therefore shall presuma in our turn to offer a
word of counsel to a nation which many persons
are endeavouring to lead astray in this the supreme
moment of her destiny. There are not wanting
those who tender to Denmark the advice usually

given to the smaller boy in a street fight to " go ins'
and overthrow his gigantic antagonist. The advice
is easily given, the whole difficulty is in the execu-
tion, with which the bystanders have no concern.
There is something very agreeable in watching the
process of a gallant defence against superior power,
"How can a man die better," says Macaulay," than

in facing fearful odds ?'"rhe question we wish to
raise with Denmark is, not what is the best method

of dying, but whether it is absolutely necessary to
die at all. Before she accepts the advice of these

fire-eating counsellors, Denmark would do wisely to
consider what aid they are willing to extend to her
in the struggle for life and death in which she is
involved. Will they risk their lives, will they
stake their money, will they so much as wet their
fret, for the sake of a cause for which they urge
Denmark to sacrifice her last dollar and her last

man ? If her cause is so good, and the sympathy
of other countries is so warm, why is itthat_she

stands alone among such unexampled perils ? Why

is it that even Sweden, whose very existence is
threatened by the events that are now passing in
the Cimbric Peninsula, makes no effort for her
assistance? Let Denmark take a calm review of

her present position. Like the Southern States of
America, she doubtless at one time entertained a
hope that some Power would come to her aid.
But time wears on, and the expected aid comes not.
She is alone in the world, confronted by two great
military Powers, before either of whom it would be
no disgrace for her to yield. It is quite clear that
France, for whom she did and suffered so much in
the wars of the Great Napoleon, has no intention
of doing or suffering anything for her. It is
equally clear that England does not understand
the violation of a Treaty to which no guarantee
was attached, or a matrimonial alliance which
forms a link between two Royal families, as
calling upon her to come to the rescue. Denmark
is alone in the world, and all that we have been
able to obtain for her is the offer of a Conference to
be carried on without any cessation of hostilities.
Let her pause before she rejects that offer, let her
consider how she is for any long time to encounter
the attack of Powers able to put ten men into the
field against her one. Enough, and far more than
enough, has been done for honour. Before the statue
of that insatiable Moloch blood. has been already
poured forth in reckless and over-abundant sacri-
fice. Denmark has confirmed for herself the etm•
ratter which she long ago won in the face of Europe
for steady and stubborn bravery, which adverse
fortune can neither daunt nor depress. A further
prolongation of hostilities cannot add materially to
her renown, but may inflict such injury on her
resources as centuries may not redeem. To push
the struggle any further is to risk the destruction
in battle of the flower and manhood of a scanty
population without the possibility of inflicting a
corresponding loss on her invaders, and to cripple
the finances of a Monarchy by incurring a debt
which every day of continued war renders her less
able to pay. The struggle may doubtless be pro-
tracted, but success—such success as may enable
Denmark to come out of the war in the condition
which she desires—is scarcely within the range of
possibility. Hope may suggest insurrections, re-
volutions, and civil wars; but all these belong to
the domain of speculation, upon which no prudent
man or wise kingdom presumes to build. If the
Danish people will only look back to the last 12
years, they will see that it is from the very obsti-
nate and unbinding temper which we are now depre-
cating the present unfortunate position of the coun-
try has arisen. If Denmark would have listened
during the last twelve years to such demands of
Germany as were founded in reason and good faith,
she would have averted that invasion which has
been effected with such brutal and lawless violence.
The sovereign people, who have so recently obtained
absolute power, have yet to learn how necessary it
is to control the popular will, and how easy it is for
that will to encounter other wills as overbearing
and headstrong as itself. After all, what is Den-
mark called upon to yield ? At the present moment
she may, we believe, obtain peace on terms which
leave not only her honour untarnished, but her ma-
terial interests prejudiced in a very slight degree.
Denmark, we are told, hes only to make up her
mind to a personal union between herself and the
two Duchies—to a union such as existed for a hun-
dred years between England and Scotland—and
she will be redeemed at once from the midst of the
deadly perils which surround her. If such terms
can be obtained, let Denmark compare her own de-
mands with that whioh it is in her power at once
to secure, and duly estimate how much she may
gain by how small a concession. The real difficulty
of her position lies in the feeling of the populations
towards her. If the people in Schleswig are well
disposed, they will be a valuable accession to the
strength of the Monarchy under a personal union; if
their feelings are alienated, they will add little to her
power though they be grappled to her with links of
steel. We do not write as apologists of Germany.
Were the question one to be decided before a judicial
tribunal, we should have every confidence that the
cause of Denmark would succeed. But the ques-
tion is not one of justice, but of expediency. It
would be little consolation to Denmark that she
were ruined even in defence of her just rights. The
injured do not necessarily succeed because they feel
themselves entitled to revenge, and an appeal to
force is scarcely ever made in the interest of the
weaker party. If the present opportunity be ne-
glected, no one can say that it will ever recur. The
torrent of war once set loose sweeps before it all
landmarks, and Denmark may neglect to negotiate
for peace till nothing is left for negotiation. Tia'Z'
Power that will not seize the opportunities of Dres-
den and Chatillon must look for a Fontainebleau,
when no terms will be accepted. Denmark has
had ample experience of the harsh and cruel spirit
in which Germany is disposed to treat her. What
mercy will she have to expect when her force is
beaten down, and her kingdom lies at the feet of
arrogant and imperious conquerors, who have found,
for te first time, a point of union in their com-
mon desire for her humiliation, if not for her dew
struetion ? Let not the Danish nation suppose that
we offer this counsel under the influence of any in-
terested motives whatever. We are thoroughly
persuaded, notwithstanding the warlike eloquence
of the House of Peers, that Denmark has no rea•
terial assistance to expect from England. The re-
jection of our counsels will not alienate us. 'I heir
acceptance will not bring us the least nearer to
war. We have cautioned the Danes against the
advice of those who urge them to their extreme
peril without the slightest intention of partaking
it. We may with consistency recommend them
advice which presses upon them the adoption of
that peace which those who give it are determined
to observe.
POST.—Although the House of Commons refused
to demand the production of the correspondence
which passed between our Government and that of
the United States on the subject of the detention of
the steam-rams, the public are not left altogether
ignorant of the circumstances under which that de-
tention took place. A blue-book has now been pre-
sented to Parliament which contains much impor-
tant correspondence upon the subbject. It includes
despatches either addressed to, or written by, the
English Foreign Secretary, the American Minister,
our Ambassador at Washington, and Mr. Stewart,
respectively. The only point on which the public
were desirous of being enlightened is made abun-
dantly clear by the papers which are now published.
Whether the Government were strictly justified in
ordering the seizure of the rams, or whether they
could subsequently establish the truth of their as-
sumption that they were intended for the service of
the Confederate Government, were matters on
which, of necessity, great diversity of opinion pre
veiled. But it was suggested—and the suggestion
was not devoid of plausibility—that the Govern•
ment had seized the rams, not because they believed
that they bad satisfactory grounds for adopting
such a course, but for the mere sake of acceding to
certain requirements, made in no very courteous
tone by the American Government. However will-
ing the people of this country may be that their
laws should be strictly enforced, even though
they may press with increased weight on
the weaker of the two American federations,
still they not unnaturally resented what ap-
peared a compliance with foreign dictation.
The Foreign Enlistment Act may have been (though
some of the highest legal authorities doubt it) in-
tended for the protection of belligerent States at
amity with this country; but even assuming such
to be the case, the English Government must be
the sole judges of the expediency of putting it in
operation. If a belligerent possessed the right of
demanding the sequestration of every vessel which
by any possibility might be enlisted in the service
of his opponent, shipbuilding in a neutral State
would practically cease in time of war. A belli-
gerent is entitled through his ambassador to acquaint
a neutral Government of circumstances lending to
the conclusion that certain vessels are intended to
be employed against him. and to request that any

laws (if such exist) prohibiting such proceedings
shall be enforced. But whether a prima facie ease
of violation of the law has been established is for the
neutral Government to determine. If such a case is
made out, it is then the duty of the neutral State to
put its laws in operation ; but if otherwise, then any
compliance with the demands of the belligerent
Power amounts to a pure abandonment of national
independence. In a despatch, dated Sept. 5, Mr.
Layard informed Mr. Stewart; that on that day her
Majesty's Government had directed. the Commis-
sioner of Customs at Liverpool to detain the •
steam rams. In the same letter, however, the Under-
Secretary states that the orders had been trate."
mitted previous to the receipt of Mr. Adams's
despatch of the same date pressing the Government
to adopt that course. Unless, therefore, we can
suppose that the Under-Secretary made a deliberate
misstatement, which of course cannot for a moment
be supposed, we must conclude that the transmission
of the orders for the detention of the rams preceded
the receipt of the American Minister's despatch.
There exists nt.; doubt that the Government gave
directions for the seine() of the ironclads of the sth
of September; and as Mr. letter bears date
on the same day, it is more reaso;:able to suppose
that the despatch was received after the decision of
the Government had been arrived at, than thet the
Foreign Secretary should have, immediately on IN
receipt, determined on modifying his policy, though
in the absence of any additional evidence bearing on
the ultimate destination of the suspected vessels.
But, whatever may have been thought of the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence on which the Government
acted in the month of September last, it is impos-
sible to deny that subsequent events have justified
their conduct. We now waive the consideration
of whether the building and equipping of these
vessels does, in fact, constitute an infringement of
the Foreign Enlistment Act—that is a question
which still remains to be decided. But assuming
that this statute is not a dead letter, and until it is
proved to be so the Government are bound to pre-
sume that it is not, the Executive is unquestionably
bound to put it in operation when acts are done
which to all appearances it was intended to pro-
hibit. That the iron-clads in process of construction
in Mr. Laird's dockyard at Birkenhead were not
intended for the Viceroy of Egypt, as was at first
alleged, but were in truth designed for the service
of the Confederate Government, the Secretary of
the Navy of that Government has himself expressly
admitted. His admissions wiil, of course, be value-
less as against those who claim to be the owners of
the vessels on the trial of a criminal information in.
an English court, but they will go far to satisfy the
public of the soundness of the suspicions en Pertained
by the British Government when they gave orders
to their officers of customs to detain the rams.
Earl Russell, with no little dexterity, appeals to
the report of the Confederate Naval Secretary as
affording the most convincing proof that in the
discharge of their neutral obligations the English
Government have furnished no cause for complaint
to that of the United States. If Mr. Mallroy, in
the name of President Davis's Administration, com-
plains of "the unfriendly construction" which we
have put upon our laws, and ascribes to that cause
theinability of the Confederate Government to
procure a formidable navy, it raises a strong pre-
sumption that England has not, as the Federal Go-
vernment are never tired of reiterating, treated
witn favouritism the Southern States. The North
provided itself in the English markets with every
description of munition of war of which it had need,
but although our markets are equally open to the
South, the command of the sea possessed by the
Federal Government necessarily prevented it from
turning the advantages we offered to equal account.
No one bat a Federalist will, for one moment, con-
tend that since the commencement of the civil war
the Confederates have derived one-fiftieth part of
the material assistance afforded by British manu-
facturers to the Government of the Northern States.
But the fact is that, whether with or without cause,
a Yankee Government must, if only for the sake of
popularity, vituperate Great Britain. We are
blamed for recognising the belligerent character of
the Confederates, though they have for upwards of
three years waged war in vindication of their in-
dependence, and are still unsubdued. We are re-
proached for permitting any of the natives of the
Southern States to reside in our dominions, and
these reproaches come from a Government which,
like our own, prides itself on the hospitality which
it offers to the political exile. It must be a source
of regret to us that we have failed to give satisfac-
tion to either of the belligerent republics, but the
fact that we have not done so would seem to de-
monstrate the strictness of the neutrality we have
endeavoured to maintain.