The Sun.
London, England, 1864-02-12 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALL,

POST.—If the Danes have been compelled by
superior numbers to abandon the greater portion of
the Duchy of Schleswig to the allied armies of
Austria and Prussia, they have at all events gained
that breathing time of which they were so much in
need. The agony of suspense has at length been
terminated. Much was supposed to depend, not
merely strategically, bui politically, on their con-
tinued occupation of the Daneveirke, and so long as
it was held hopes were entertained that England, or
some other neutral State, would interveue to pre-
vent the consummation of what, out of Germany,
was universally stigmatised as an atrocious crime.
If, indeed, the Danes had succeeded in holding the
entrance of the peninsula against their opponents
for a month or six weeks, it is possible that the
desired assistance might have been received from
abroad, and the occupation of Schleswig by the
German Powers have been prevented. It is one
thing, however, to interpose to prevent a State being
despoiled, and another and entirely different one to
aid it to reconcile, r lost territory. In so far, there-
fore, as the abandonment of the Duchy renders
foreign aid less immediately probable than before,
the forced retreat from the Danewirke must be re-
garded by the Danes as a serious reverse; but in
every other respect we cannot help thinking that
they have become positive gainers by what haw
taken place. That they could, under any circum-
stances, have held the Danewirke and the Schlei
until foreign aid reached them, we do not believe ;
and, such being the case, the Danish army, as the
weaker of the two, must have suffered most by the
prolongation of hostilities on the frontier. Now,
ho wever, that the Danes have retreated to the
wall, they can retire no farther, and their efforts
will be exclusively devoted to securing their own
personal safety. Whether the allied armies will
seriously attempt to seize the fortifications of
Duppel, and pursue the Danish army into the
Island of Alsen, is extremely doubtful; but con-
sidering the advantages possessed by the Danes
through their command of the sea, it is most
unlikely that such an attempt would be
crowned with success. From the telegrams we
learn that a considerable portion of the Danish
army has proceeded northwards, leaving Duppel on
its right. These troops are doubtless proceeding to
Fredericia, which, as we took occasion a few days
since to explain, stands to the Island of Funen in
the same relation as Duppel to Alsen. The division
thus made of the Danish forces might seem injudi-
cious in the presence of the vast numbers composing
the invading armies, but on the other hand it mani-
fests a confidence in what may be termed their coast
defences, which furnishes the strongest evidence
that the Danes still hope to be able for a considerable
time to protract a defensive war against the German
Powers. In Schleswig we find that precisely the
same course has been adopted by the agents of the
Duke of Augustenburg as that taken by them in
the Duchy of Holstein. The Pretender has been
proclaimed at Eckernforde and in the town of
Schleswig, and it would be idle to deny that a por-
tion of the population of both Duchies anxiously
desire their severance from the Danish monarchy.
It is not more than fifteen years since both the
Duchies were in open revolt against the Danish
Crown, and no small proportion of those who took
part in that revolt must be at the present moment
capable of giving effect to sentiments which are still
unchanged. We are accustomed to regard with
peculiar jealousy so-called popular demonstrations,
knowing with what ease ten thousand people can be
found, who will noisily endorse the most untenable
opinions, If one considers, for example, the feel-
ings of the British nation in respect to the Ameri-
can war, none can doubt that our sympathies are for
the most part given to the South ; but still neither
Mr. Bright nor Mr. Ward Beecher ever found any
difficulty in collecting an assemblage of some thou-
sands who listened with approval to assurances that
the North had drawn the sword in vindication of civil
and political liberty. There are however, no grounds
for supposing that the demonstrations in favour of
the Duke of Augustenburg in Holstein and
Southern Schleswig do not correctly indicate the
feelings of a great section of the population. It is
not in any way discreditable to the Danish Govern-
ment that a revolution should have burst forth the
moment that their troops were withdrawn ; nor
does it furnish any presumption that the popula •
tion of the Duchies had good reason to be dissatis-
fied with the system of government to which they
were subjected. The revolution has been accom-
plished purely and simply because the people were
of a different race to those under whose authority
they had been placed, and were of the same race
with those who came amongst them in the character
of deliverers. The renunciation of allegiance to
Christian IX. no more indicated antipathy to that
Monarch than did the proclamation of the Duke of
Augustenburg evince affection or loyalty for that
Prince. The majority of the inhabitants of both
Duchies are Germans, and. as such, they desire to
be placed under a German Sovereign. This is the
simple explanation of the joyful manifestations
with which both Schleswigers and Helsteiners have
hailed the departure of the Penes and the arrival of
those whom th.ey look upon as their compatriots.
Ia forming conjectures of the ultimate destiny of
the Dachiee, persons for the most part base their
conclusions on the particular opinions which they
entertain of the probable policy of the Austrian and
Prussian Cabinets, or the inftuecce of the National
party in Germany. The evasive reply for it was
a joint one) given by Austria and Prussia to the
English Cabinet, when called upon to declare
whether they intended to respect the Treaty of
1852, has prepared us for excuses for setting it at
nought. It is nut improbable, however, that the
" accomplished fact" of a revolution in the Duchies
may furnish even a stronger pretence for an attempt
to perpetuate their severance from Danmark than
any which can be advanced either by the Cabinets
of Berlin and Vienna or by the popular party in
Germany. It may be easy to tell the latter that
they can, if they please, realise their dream of unity
without absorbing the Duchies, whilst the former
may be assured that the conditions on which the
"material guarantee" was seized have been fulfilled.
There will still, however, remain difficult questions
for solution, and this Dano-German dispute has
give rise to so many complications, that, numerous
as they now are, we do not yet believe that the list
is complete.
TlMES.—Artillery science is undoubtedly in a
state of transition, but though that condition neo
cessariiy places us under great difficulties in deter-
mining the character of our armaments, it is im-
portant to observe that events are furnishing us
with invaluable information in aid of our decisions.
At this critical conjuncture, when the whole sys-
tem of warfare may possibly be revolutionised, it
happens that both in Europe and America great
military Powers are actually at war. The invasions
of Schleswig has its professional as well as its poli-
tical aspect, and it concerns us deeply to observe
that two large armies have undertaken a winter
campaign against an enemy strongly intrenched in
a difficult country and a most inclement region. We
should also remember that the Austrians are now
taking the field in the fifth year after a war
in which they learnt by experience the novelties of
modern tactics, and that the Prussians,though they
have had no such practice, were among the first
nations of the Continent in recognising the deve-
lopments of gunnery. Now, what are the cannon
and what the muskets which these armies are em-
ploying ? What is the organisation of their artil-
lery, and how far has it been found effective? The
Prussians have certainly breech-loading rifles—the
Austrians are, perhaps, giving gun-cotton another
trial, and we may conjecture, at any rate, that some
of the inventions and devices which the new study
of projectiles has suggested have been put to the
test in the campaign. It is a campaign, too, in
which, though the contending armies were un-
equally matched, the organisation of both must
have been severely tried. The weather has been
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earned in the question have availed themselves of
the opportunities of instruction so unexpectedly
provided. Knowledge should b
wherever it can be found. We e appropriated
look upon this
German war with regret and
Germany will fight, We may
but if
m
can from her campaigning,
learn what we
The contest has not
yet extended to the sea, so that we have less chance
of improving our information
on the subject of naval
ordnance, but the short debate in the House of
Lords on Tuesday last h
we have to do in sowed not only how much
this matter, but how much
we have to learn. It
was admitted that no gun had
been actually issued
for sea service which could be
relied upon as effective at long range against such
armour as is carried by our own iron-cased frigates
—4l-inch plates of
that such gunssolid metal. We are not sure
exist in any other service. The
Americans have no such armour, and therefore we
"annot measure the power of their artillery. We
only know that they rely upon very heavy shot
propelled with small ' velocity, and are, consequently,
Compelled to use guns
so ponderous that it is doubt-
ful whether they could be carried in sea-going ships.
France has
adopted a different, and, as we surmise,
a sounder principle. The French frigates carry
guns of very moderate weight and calibre, but these
guns are so rifled as to have a long range, and are
supplied with shot of a peculiar material for special
use against iron plates. Our own 68 pounders have
considerable power at close quarters, but no range ;
our 110 pounders have, long range and great accu-
racy, but were not found effective against solid