The Sun.
London, England, 1852-11-23 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

HOUSE OF LORDS.—Nov. 22.
APPEALS-GIELS V. DICKENSON.

This was an appeal from the Scotch courts, and
involved the quTition whether a wife who has ob-
tained a divorce a puma et there in the Ecclesiastical
Courts in England can obtain a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii in the Scotch courts. The appellant is Mr.
J. E. Giels, the son of Colonel Giels, who was the
proprietor of an estate called Dumbuck, in Dumbarton-
shire. He was born in 1813, and in 1834, being then
about 21 years old, obtained a commission in the 4th
Light Dragoons, joined his regiment in India, and re-
turned to England in 1837, when he passed some time
at his father's house in Dumbartonshire. In June, 1838,
being in England, he became acquainted with Miss
Dickenson, a lady of large fortune, about 18 years of
age, and a ward in Chancery, and in October of that year
he married her, at Shinfield, in Berkshire, where her pro-
perty was situated. After the marriage they had no settled
residence, but lived in a furnished house, and went on a
visit to olonel Giels, in Scotland. In Feb., 1843, by the
death of his father, Mr. Giels, the appellant, succeeded
to the estate of Dumbuck, in Dumbartonshire. In
September, 1845, the parties being then in England,
Mrs. Giels separated from her husband and insisted on a
divorce. In October, 1845, the husband instituted a
suit in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England for a restitu-
tion of conjugal rights. By the modern practice of the
ConsistoriaL Court, if a wife resists such a suit on 'the
ground of adultery or cruelty, she does not institute a
cross suit, but puts in a responsive allegation, which
concludes with a prayer for separation a mensa et thoro ;
and this throws the initiative and the onus of evidence
on her. This was done by Mrs. Giels, and a final decree
was pronounced by the Arches Court for a separation a
mensa et thoro in April, 1848. In May, 1849, Mrs.
Giels, the present respondent, brought an action in the
Court of Session in Scotland for a divorce a vinculo matri-
monii. Mr. Giels, her husband, the defender in that
suit, put in several pleas, of which the two first were
now in question—viz., "that the pursuer, his wife, was
a native of England, and that the marriage was con-
tracted and solemnised in England, and, therefore, that
the Scotch courts had no jurisdiction or power to dissolve
the marriage ;" and, secondly, "that the pursuer had in-
stituted a suit against him (the defender) in the Arches
Court in England, and that a sentence of separation a
mensa et thoro had been decreed by that court, which
was a bar to the action." In November, 1849, the Lord
Ordinary, by an interlocutor (which was not in the pre-
sent appeal), repelled the first defence as to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and reserved the second defence. On
appeal to the Inner House that judgment was confirmed
in December, 1849, and the cause was remitted to the
court below to proceed on the second plea. In July,
1850, the Lord Ordinary repelled the second plea by his
interlocutor, and on an appeal to the Inner House his
judgment was confirmed—thus establishing the right of
the wife to proceed in the Scotch courts for a divorce,
notwithstanding the sentence of the English Ecclesiasti-
cal Court for a separation, a mean et thoro. Against
this decision the appeal now came before their lordships.
At the conclusion of the argument, their lordships
postponed judgment.

QUEEN'S BENCH.— Nov. 22.
ACHILLI V. NEWMAN.
(Continued from our Third Edition of yesterday.)
Sir Alexander Cockburn then moved for a rule to show
cause why a new trial should not be granted in this case
on the ground of misdirection, of the verdict being
against evidence; and of the exclusion of evidence.
The Attorney-Gene'ral said he thought his learned
friend was out of order in moving for a new trial now.
Such an application ought to have been made within the
first four days of term.
Lord Campbell said that it was never too late for jus-
tice to be done. In the present case the Court would
overrule the objection, but it was most desirable to main-
tain the rules of Court, and all applications in future
must be made within the usual time.
Sir A. Cockburn then proceeded to comment on all
the charges brought against Dr. Achilli, on all of which,
except the 19th, the jury had pronounced him innocent.
The learned counsel relied most particularly on the case
of the woman Principe, who deposed that Dr. Achilli had
had criminal intercourse with her in the sacristy of a
church at Naples. All these charges, he contended,
were proved most satisfactorily, and none but the twelve
gentlemen in the box could have refused to credit.them.
It was evident that there existed a strong religious bias
in the minds of the jury—(applause in the gallery)—
and he firmly believed that in consequence of that
justice had not been done. With regard to the misdi-
rection, he rested that upon the fact that the Lord
Chief-Justice, who had tried the case, had directed
the jury to receive the judgment of the Inquisition
put in by the defence, simply as evidence of the fact that
such a judgment had been pronounced, but not as any
evidence of the facts on which the judgment was alleged
to have been pronounced. The allegation of exclusion
of evidence he grounded upon the exclusion by the Lord
Chief-Justice of the article in the Dublin Review, con-
taining the same libel as that which was the subject of
the present prosecution, and published a year and a half
before it.

The Court having' consulted together, _
Lord Campbell said the learned counsel might take a
rule nisi, on the ground of the verdict being against evi-
dence only.
Rule nisi accordingly.
This announcement was received with applause from
the galleries. Dr. Newman, during the whole of the
proceedings, sat under his counsel, and appeared to be
engaged in reading the "Office."

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS—Nov. 22.
HARRIS V. THOMPSON-SLANDER.
This was an action of slander, and was tried before
the Chief Justice at the sittings in Middlesex after last
term, when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for
1501. Early in the present term, however, a rule was
obtained to enter a verdict for the defendant, or for a
new trial, and to-day this rule came on for argument.
The facts out of which the action arose were these :
The plaintiff was formerly secretary to the Brewers and
Distillers' Insurance Company, and also auditor of the
London Necropolis Company, and' the defendant was a
director of each of these companies. The plaintiff had
some charges preferred against him as secretary to the
insurance company, and was dismissed, and subsequently
the defendant brought this circumstanee before the
Necropolis directors in the plaintiff's absence, and stated
that he had been dismissed from the secretaryship for
obtaining money under felse pretences from the solici-
-1 tors to take up a bill of his own, and for giving an
I 0 U of his own for a petty cash debt due from the
company. The defendant on this occasion proposed that
the plaintiff should be dismissed from the office of audi-
tor, but upon the suggestion of the chairman it was re-
solved that the matter should be investigated, and that
the plaintiff should have notice of the meeting for that
purpose. The consequence was that the plaintiff at-
tended with his solicitor, but the defendant declined to
make any statement in the presence of the solicitor,
and upon that gentleman offering to withdraw he also
declined to make his charges in the presence of the plain-
tiff himself. At the trial his lordship was of opinion
that the communication made by the defendant to the
Necropolis directors was privileged ; and he left it to
the jury to say whether the defendant had acted malici-
ously, and they were of opinion that he had so acted.
The principal point now for the consideration of the
Court was, whether there was any evidence of malice,
which was left to the jury.

The Chief Justice said he was of opinion that he was
wrong in leaving this case to the jury ; and that he ought
to have witl4rawn it from their consideration, upon the
ground that there was no evidence of express malice for
their consideration.
Rule absolute accordingly.