The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-04 00:00:00

were superseded by officers in the Queen's service, but I
am informed that it arose from the number of officers on
_the: ats appOin Mien tic: arid that the charge was necenarst-
in order that .thiCglme.ll s:Tti India eh-odd-be made the
more dB& ent. With reference to the next question—
namely, the bounty given to the recruits, that is a subject
to which my attention was called by the Commander-in-
Chief when the act was first introduCed. My noble friend
asked if it was intended to sanction the principle that men
enlisting under the new act should recoive the same bounty
as the men who enlisted under the act of 1847. After ma-
turely considering the subject—taking into view the fact
that the men enlisted under the act of 1447 were enlisted
at the age of 18 for 10 or 12 years, that they had the op-
portunity, after 5 years' service, of acquiring an addition
to their pay for good service, and that they had the oppor-
tunity, after the expiration of their first term of
service, of re-engaging themselves-for a second period ;
taking also into consideration that none of these ad-
vantages will accrue to the men who enlist at the age of
24 for a service of two or three years, that the men who
nfrtol
ym
dtrhi habit of
oonft laasb onutrr,o
nwg o
mu ledo
deivdenn
oiti
would enlist would probably be between the ages of 24 and
71051 weffihocie
feel myself justified in giving to those men a lower rate of
r
bounty. It must be remembered, too, that none of these
are permanent, but may be varied according
to
circumstances ; and if I find that that arrangement is such
as to create discontent or prevent the enlistment of young
men of 18 years and upwards, I may consider whether
some alteration may not be required. With regard,
ray
lords, to a general increase of bounty, Ipei fectlyagree with
the noble earl that an increased bounty will, at all times,
obtain an increased nimber of recruits, and probably be
fore very long I may have to propose to your lordships
to increase the bounty in order to augment the army.
But it is natural that I should not wish to take that
course until it is absolutely necessary. With regard
to the question of navvies, it is the intention of
the Government to forrt a corps of navvies, not for the pur-
pose of working specially iu the trenches, but for carrying
on the general work of the army, which has hitherto been
done by the Sappers and Miners and by the private soldiers,
and the execution of which I am sorry to say has hitherto
been detrimental to the health of the men. In order to
obviate the difficulties suggested, and to carry out the views
of the nobh3 earl of having as many fighting men as pos-
sible at our disposal, it is intended to attach, under the
command of the engineers, a body of navvies of stout work-
ing men, who will be sent out for the purpose of working
either in the trenches or in the camp, as circumstances may
require, while the army is engaged in the siege. No defi-
nite sum has been fixed upon as the amount of payment to
these individuals ; but it is utterly impossible to expect
that men will come from civil employments, either in the
capacity of labourers or of directors, for the usual pay
given to persons in her Majeity's service. I have only this
to say, that I shall endeavour, if I think it for the public
service, to obtain proper men at the lowest possible remu-
neration ; and I shall not recommend the adoption of any
such corps unless I am convinced that the benefit likely to
result from its adoption will be so great as to counterpoise
the inconvenience that cannot fail to arise from employing
individuals at a higher rate of pay than that paid to the
officers and men belonging to her Majesty's service. These
men would be under the command of Major-General Jones;
all the arrangements would be directed entirely by him,
the men being at the same time under the immediate con-
trol of their own superintendents.
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGII said that the appoint-
ment of her Majesty's officers on the staff of the Indian

army was not an eiceptional case, but was in consequence
of the adoption of a new principle ; there must however,
have been sufficient authority to warrant that alteration

of the rule. No doubt the iiucity of officers in the Indian
at my might have been the cause of the alteration, but it
certainly involved altogether a now principle.
EMBARK ATION OF TROOPS TO THE CRIMEA.

The Marquis of SALISBURY rose for the purpose of
repeating the question which he put to the noble lord the
Secretary for War on a previous evening. The noble lord
on that occasion comphined that the notice of the question
he (the Marquis of Salisbury) intended to put was not suf-

ticiently explicit. He could assure the noble lord that it
was not from any want of courtesy that he did not in his

notice enter mire into detail. The whole matter was

comprised in the very smallest compass, as it was simply
reminding the noble lord what must have passed through
his own office. With regard to what occurred the other
. . .

night, their lordships must be convinced of one fact,
namely, that the noble baton knew nothing of the circum•
stances of the case. On that occasion the noble baron laid

the whole Llame of the transaction on the quartermaster-
general. Whether that was just or not it was not for him
. .

to say ; but he thought, afteithat imputation by the noble
lord, the country had a right to know on
,whoin the blame

ought to rest, and who -were the parties by whom a
body 'of troops were despatched for foreign service. He
had always understood that, when the Minister for War
had received her Majesty's commands for such a purpose,
he communicated with the Commander•in-Chief at the

Horse Guards, and that, after conferring together they
made an application to the Admiralty for the transport of
those troops ; the quartermaster-general was then directed
to take measures for their removal. It was es,entially ne-
cessary to know who was to blame in this matter, and
why the Guards were sent to Portsmouth for embarkation

befere the ship Alma-v;nsrread;TO-;;;Ii; them. ^The
blame of this transaction had been shifted from one quar-
ter to another until it was impossible to find to whom it
should attach. He hoped, therefore, the noble baron would
be able to give their lordships some information on the
subject.
Lord PANMURE said, nothing had been further from.
his intention than to contradict anything which the noble
marquis had stated. What •ho had said w s, that he had
heard for the first time from the noble marquis that the
events t,-) which he had called attention bad taken place.
If the noble marquis had giver, him notice of his inten

tion to call attention to those events, he would have pm-
pared himself to give an explanation of them, and would
nave entered into the details of the facts the other night;

but all the not ce he had received was, that the noble mar-
quis intended to put a question with regard to the embar-
cation of the Guards on board the Alma. The noble mar-

quis asked what were the regulations for the embarkation
of troops for foreign service? It rested with the Comman-
der-in-Chief to make arrangements with the Admiralty
and the other authorities as to the embarkation of the
troops that might be required ; and the War Department,
having signified to the Transport Board the number of
troops that were to embark and the time of the embarka-
tion, the Transport Board provided tonnage for tilt-me
troops by the day named. On the 20th of March the
Admiralty had notified to tho War Department that the
Alma would be ready about the sth of April to receive
1,420 men. The Alma was fitted at Liverpool, and 420
men of uhe 18th, 71st, and 50th Regiments were embarked
there ' • she then went to Portsmouth to embark the
Guards. She hail been surveyed by the officer attached
to the transport department at Lverpool, and re-
ported to be fitted to carry 1,420 men, and she had also
been passed by Colonel Scott, the inspecting officer at Li-
ve' po,d, as fitted to carry that number. When she went
round to Portsmouth she was reported by the officer there

to be incapable of carrying that number, and he believed
this report arose from the fact that, while at Liverpool
they had calculated that a certain number of men would
be canstantly on deck and upon watch, they had not taken

that circumstance into consideration at Portsmouth. The

authorities therefore determined that the vessel could not

carry more than 1,048 men. In consequence of this re-
port the detachment of the 18th, 71st and 40th Regi-
ments were disembarked at P, rtsmouth, were marchel
into barracks, and remained at the depot waiting for
further orders. His noble friend (Lord Hardinge) re-
minded him that the commanding officer at Liverpool
had written to say that the ship was capable of cairy-
ing 1,120 men. After some delay—which he thought had
been somewhat exaggerated—in landing the detachments
and embarking the Girtrds, the vessel had sailed. A
statement had been made that a large portion of the
baggage of the troops which had disembarked were carried
in the Alma to the Crimea. He had found, upon inquiry,
that nothing belonging to those troops was carried off, ex-
cept a couple of articles belonging to two officers, and he
was sure that if they had taken the smallest pains both of
those articles would have been rescued. There had been
some mistake with regard to the embarkation of the baggage
belonging, not to the detachment of the Guards which then
embarked, but to the Guards already in the Crimea. With
regard to the orders and counter orders which had been
issued, be had to state, that two of these counter orders
had arisen from the fact that a' storm had taken place at
Portsmouth, which had prevented the Alma from being
brought into a position proper for the embarkation of the
troops, but due notice of this circumstance had been
given to the troops before they had left Loudon. He had
received communications from officers who sailed in the
vessel, to the effect that, whether as regarded their ac-
commodation or that of the men, none of them had ever'
experienced more comfort in a transport, nor had the
health of the men ever been a subject of less anxiety than
while they had been on board the Alma. With regard to
another question of the noble marquis, he begged to state,
that it was his impression that every regiment which, had
embarked from this country had embarked with the Minie
rifles. He was happy to state that all the men who em-
barked for the East, whether in regiments or detachments
were, as far as possible, trained to the use of the Minie
rifle. It was desirable to carry on the usual drill on board
the vessel, and they were armed with the smooth-bore
musket, which they exchanged at' Constantinople fur the
Minie rifle, which was kept in store there for that purpose
He thought this a sufficient explanation of the circum-
stances ; and be hat further to say, that the result of the
inquiries he had made convinced him that the Quarter-
master-General was free from all personal blame in the
matter, and that if any confusion had taken place it lay
between the district officers at Livepool and at Ports-
mouth, who had reported differently as to the capa-
city of the ship and the number of men she could
properly carry. There was a desire to send the men
on board as quickly as possible, and if an error had been
made it was on the right side—namely, to adopt that ar-
rangement which enabled the troops to be conveyed with
the greatest comfort. The result was that there had been

no Complaint of overcrowding, and, indeed, none could
arise in this cage.

The Earl of HARDWICKE regarded the present discus-
sion as throwing some light on the present state of the War
Department. It was curious to see a noble lord entering
upon details connected with a great branch of the service
who had been brought up to civil life (for his having been
bred a soldier was an accident) while the Commander-iu-
Chief of the army, who ...as one of tte most distinguished
soldiers in Europe, and who had all the details of the army
at his fingers' ends, had to sit by and tutor a civilian as to
what he was to say. The War Department seemed roe e
a bit of machinery that would not work.' It appar
that the Secretaiy for War wrote to the Transport Board,
and they informed the Admiralty ; then the Secretar
then
for War informed the Commander-in-Chief, and
the embarkation took place. This seemed to be less simple
than the former mode, when the communication was on y
between the Cmumander-in-Chief and the Admiralty.
Lord PANDIURE said that the mode formerly was for
NI
lfi
ctosetrn‘t,
ii
omea. t e
ttohetiSteecAredtrauriyr
EArl GREY—The Secretary of State for the Colonies
flol tfySttlt requirements itrilLiCeuult°snoifeBt hhei tpn
uused to sinif to the Admiralty that such and such regi.
meuts were to be embarked at such a place On such a day.
The A., 'niiralty then made the necessary at raugements.
Earl N(INTO would confirm this statement Lf the former
practice.
The Earl of HARDWICKE bad thought that
c•
cations were at present required between three otra:s111:,'n11
stead of two, as formerly ; but that appeared
there would have been
take. It was singular that a ship
men at Liverpool would onlylp citornwrvibeviyeedhl., Wao 0: :rte.
to timbve3all::°°B.
ailed that she could
arrived at Portsmouth. If
Liverpool, it seemed that 's°l)3 had embarked
the troupe 0 wen
whenshe
notu h
con-
vey her
over-
crowding ; but when the ship
t'ot to besonmoe cleartonnaged efini
thetio hadsna
mas e st
noo
umtu
htlibec
ehr. diui i :
Ought
there
per ton, and hnumber of men who
Or DOt ?He saw a ly'
ether they were were to be em-
barkedsoldiers goin f ship of 23000 toss • h
to be under deck
a a
fro Cm . with a cargo of 4,000
were placed in tiers Constantinople to Samos,
and but the men
and lio zultn was fed by others,
allowed to move who went round,
from his place. If this