The Sun.
London, England, 1852-01-24 00:00:00

The Baron bases his armament ,on the data laid down
by Napoleon, and assumes that .150,000 men are the
true number required. If, however, in 1804-5 that
number was necssary, surely thE increase ot popula-
tion and intelligence would now- require a larger force
to subjugate us.

The invading army is to consist of:—
Infantry... ... ... ... 110,000
Cavalry ... ... ... ... 22.000
Artillery ... ~. ... 13.750
Engineers ... ... ... 3,000
13sggage train ... ... ... 3,050

151,800

Troop horses
Draught...

... ... 22
000
... ... 35,806

57,806

Field guns 450
biege ditto ... ... 86

Carriages of all sorts ...

7,376

These troops, with ammunition, engineer stores,
and provisions, are to be mustered, one half at Cher-
bourg, and one half at Brest. The next thing is to
provide for their transport across the Channel. For
this purpose he enumerates the French fleet as it
stood Ist June, 1850 :

SAILING VESSELS.
Ships of tho Liue*
Frigates
Corvettes

... ... ... 24
••• ... ... ••• 38
... ... 30
•• • ••• ..• 44
... ••• .00 38
••• ... 50

Brigs
Transporttf ...
Cutters, Sloops, &e.

AUXILIARY VESSELS.
Frigate (40 guns) ...
Corvettes ... ...
Sloop •• • ~. •••

giTEADI SHIPS.
Frigatebt
... 21
Ship (960 horse power) ... 1
Corvettes, Ist class... ... 2
Corvettes, 2d class ... ... 20
Paclivt boats, &c. ... ... 53

MERCHANT SERVICE.

Vr•
Steamers ... ... ... 291
Sailing vessels ... ... ... 362
Ditto ditto ... 4

- 657

Total ..• ... 982
* 74 to 120 guns. -1.500 to 800 tons.
450 to 640 horse power.
To these ho adds-
-291 commercial steamers as transports and tow-
boats, though we doubt if there are so many fit for
service in France. Besides this, the transport of the
army would require 368 sailing vessels, of the
greatest possible tonnage the merchant service could
afford.
The army he divides into three corps d'armee :-
Ist. 184 vessels, carrying 32,000 men, he directs on
Bristol, which he expects to reach in 30 or 34 hours,
or at the rate of nearly ten tulles an hour from
Brest. 2,1. 210 vessels, carrying 43,000 men,_ he
asserts will reach Plymouth in 17 hours from Brest.
3d. 584 vessels, carrying 76,000 men, are expected to
reach Rye in 14 hours from Cherbourg.
No resistance is expected at Bristol.
At Plymouth the line-of-battle ships are to bom-
bard the town, while the troops and large guns land
in Whitesand Bay, and the place is to fall after a few
days' siege.
Having thus secured his communication with
France the Ist and 2d corps proceed toward London,
taking Portsmouth on the way, M. Maurice assum-
ing that the wretched lines of Gosport could be
forced by a coup de main, and the dockyard burnt
and destroyed from that position.
The three corps then united to march on London,
and if; as our author anticipates, 60,000 or 70,000
could only be found to oppose the invaders, it is not
difficult to predict the fall of the capital and eventual
subjugation of the island.
We will now proceed to point out a few of the diffi-
culties which M. Maurice seems to have overlooked.
The Baron's calculations of success are based on the
attack being kept secret—this, we conceive is impos-
; firs', because he proposes to employ the whole
French navy (many of which are now abroad). A
long time would he required to man and fit out the
ships out of commission, and to navigate some of
them from Toulon to Cherbourg. Secondly, on ac-
count of the inconvenience and notoriety of with-
drawing from
,regular trade such a number as 291
merchant steamers, and 368 large merchant ships, and
concentrating them in two Channel ports, to say no
of the delay attending coaling and unloading.
The troops of the third division, which are to laud at
Rye from Cherbourg are to be sent from Paris partly
by rail ; they would, however, have a considerable
march to make, in some instances 140 to 170 miles,
so that, even allowing that no alarm is created by the
two large fleets assembled at Brest and Cherbourg,
still, after the troops were actually set in motion and
embarking, some days would elapse before they could
proceed across channel to the points of disembarka-
tion ; but for argument sake we will suppose that the
intention to invade this country is only known for
certain six days before the troops arrive off`our coasts;
this, surely, is allowing the French every chance.
To oppose these three corps d'armee landing at
Bristol, Plymouth, and Rye, we have at home about
steamers,f-bat tle ships,
and
50 frigates, 100 corvettes, &c.,
1,184 merchant steamers, one-
half of which, say 500, would be available as trans-
ports and gun-boats.
6100Oli wnea-ro
As it has been proved that a line-of-battle-ship
can be ready for sea at each of our large ports in
three, days, it is but fair to suppose that, before the
six days alluded to above were over, we would have,
with the ships already in commission, 2, sail of the
line, with 10 large steamers either at Cork or at
Pembroke ; 4 sail of the line at Plymouth, with four
war steamers; 4 ditto at Portsmouth, with 10 ditto ;
some from Southampton and a much larger fleet
augmenting daily at Sheerness, drawn from London,
Woolwich .and Chatham.
Some people will say that such a fleet cannot be
manned in so short a time at the three naval dock-
yards of Pembroke, Plymouth, and Portsmouth. The
marines and coast-guardsmen would form the prin-
cipal number, whilst, by liberal pay, say 3/. a month
for six months only, many sailors would join from
Liverpool, Bristol, and Southampton. To man the
principal fleet at Sheerness, the interest, energy, and
patriotism of the merchants of England must be de-
pended on.

- These four squadrons, viz , Pembroke, Plymouth,
Portsmouth, and Sheerness, would immediately attack
the enemy's ships; the three first merely engaging
the transports and smaller ships, but not the line-of-
battle ships.
The Mediterranean fleet would receive orders to pay
the south coast of France and Algeria a visit, and the
Lisbon squadron would sail for the Channel. But let
us even suppose that the French troops have lauded
without any very great loss on the seventh day.
Their 30 or 34 line-of-battle ships would soon after-
wards have to engage our combined squadrons, num-
bering by that time, with the Lisbon ships, some 24
line-of-battle ships, with many
.war steamers to sup-
port them. Their communication with France would
certainly be precarious; but let us now see what the
land forces would find to oppose them.
Exclusive of the marines, which would be required
to man the fleet and the dockyard battalions, which
number about .5,000 men, we have in Great Britain
and Ireland about 85,000 men, viz,

Regular army, of all arms
Armed out-pensioners
Yeomanry Cavalry
Irish armed constabulary
0
M 6 0000 c 0:0 000
1

85,000
At least 40,000 of these troops are stationed in Ire-
land, but it must be remembered that in the Baron's
plan the 2d corps trarmec is not to arrive at Bristol
till six and a-half days after the landing of the 3d
division at Plymouth, so as to allow that corps
d'armec time to take the place, and move out and
join the Ist corps on the great western road ; so that,
allowing some delay at Portsmouth, the three united
corps d'armec could not possibly be ready to move
on London till 14 days after the full knowledge of the
intended invasion was known in England. Surely, by
that time 20,000 of these troops might be sent to
Pembroke and London by steamers and railroads. Of
the ti;oops in England, say that 40,000 would, by that
time, be available at the theatre of war, thus there
would be, with the dockyard battalions, at least
65,000 regular troops. It is but natural to suppose
that great exertions would be made during these
fourteen days to increase our military force. The
most efficient of the out-pensioners would be called
out,and officered by old officers. It is calculated that
nearlylnT
30,000 he old soldiers could be raised in Eng-
a small farmers, gentry, and gamekeepers
could also be formed into companies of about sixty
each,under command of some iuiluential sportsman.
These volunteers, armed with fowling-pieces and cut-
lasses: should act a 5 light idwatry behind hedges;

NATIONAL al 3FENCES.
BY AN OFFICER OF ARTILLERY.
So much ha; been said and written of late about
the 3d, and the ease with
w d
ch4.o-unrceil s
le:ig hshtaotuersofeolunligi .Is%
jugate
us,
as
in
the
good times of William the Lu mqueror, that it is
worth while to inquire what plan of attack they
would follow, end what means Nwe have to repel such
an invasion. be Baron Emile Maurice de &lion, •
captain of engineers in the Pry ai.-th army, some time
zonquest of England,
3wghoicpublished
ililotl)ll)sentifnoprrolfilteab; ti to repeat in a con-
cise form, adding a few sugges thins on the best way
to counteract them.