The Sun.
London, England, 1852-08-30 00:00:00

THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE

BURMESE WAR.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—lt is of little use now to inquire whether
any other plan of operations than that actually pur-
sued by the authorities charged with the conduct of
the second Burmese war would have been more or
less successful. When after a melancholy expendi-
ture of life and treasure we had brought the first war
to a conclusion, we congratulated ourselves at least
on the experience that we nad gained. It was said
that a second Burmese war would be "an easy
affair ;" that a single vigorous campaign would bring
it to a triumphant conclusion ; that, knowing both
the temper of the court and the dangers of the
country, we should so shape our measures as to
humble the one and escape the other, by a prompt
attack on the chief cities of the empire—the main
movement being made from the Arracan side by way
of the Aeng Pass.
All this was confidently declared at the time by
the leading statesmen and soldiers of India ; and up
to a certain point, doubtless, they were right. But
it was necessary to the conclusion cf the war in a
single campaign that it should be commenced at the
right time. Unfortunately, Lord Dalhousie could
nt commence the war at the right time. The rup-
ture with the Court of Amareepaora occurred at an
untoward season. It is true, that when it occurred
we had all the i
cold weather—allus. the fighting months
But the blow could not be struck at
once. It
becoming
that political negotiations
should precede military Court should be operations—that the Burmese
„ping, by timely
coonwe,ea a fair opportunity of esi-
we were prepared to inflict"' the castigation which
sucWop-
portunity could base upon them. So
oNdmov.eorober.
been allowed to
commenced operations last them if we had
The attempted
wort4noffailed. But the
attempt was not the less
becau:,e it was unsuccessful. We ins,! great nation,
our time—the
loss %as in itself A disaster—but we
os es
demon-
strated our unwillingness to plunge intboadhhostilities seemed so likely to bear the accustomed fruit
—an uncoveted extension of empire.
It
was
,
that we should di,play this forbearance. It wasright
ex-
pedient, too, to avoid a collision, if it could be
avoided without any loss of national honour or any
serious injury to our national interests. India wants
nothing so much as peace. Lord Dalhousie made an
effort to maintain it, and, in doing so, he threw away
every chance of concluding the war in a single cam-

paign.
The only alternative, then, left to him was to
defer operations until the commencement of the
c-..1d season of the present year. This course seems
to have had some advocates in India, but its ad
vocacy was clearly a mistake. To have sat down
quietly for a year under the insults which the Bur-
mese had heaped, and, under the encouragement of
such forbearance, would have continued to heap upon
us, would have been interpreted by the nations of the
East, and perhaps of the West, into an evidence of
indecisionv and irresolution, of which every advantage
yoabuiladb have,. been. taken by our opponents. The
as „_ policy is not understood by such a people
Lue Burmese In their eyes, to delay is to hesi-
teatritek7to..beeisitate is to fear. Had we delayed to
known
tialao
bounds,
insolence and arrogance would have
upo,:tt a and we should have been calld
-which tncyienge a n accumulation of injuries, beside
been nieree already inflicted upon us would have
Burmese walseThtiv.,t_rifles. The chastisement of the
be done at all, 4;tuag to be done at once, or not to
the corurnencereen't°
orfe may have been objections to
time; but there we, ;sailibry operations at such a
postponement. greater objections to their
Clf etla:.r
him the Governor-Gen:No evils which lay before
paign
was commenced
a ertea chose the least. The cam-
cold season of 1851-52 saites and the close of the
the anticip-at'it:boate and imperfect.
Events had belied
statesmen of 1826, who prophei:is °f the soldiers and
Burmese war would be an a eas',..4 he
the second
been Up to this
complisbed in a single campaign."' %,,itinidr," to be ac-
er.wdietieved,
tain fell upon the first act of the drama. 5° the cur-
time, if no very striking successes havep
no great harm has been done. The
have set in, and the troops have been housed iin rain..
goon. At the date of the last advices the rain:tr.
been falling for a month, but the health of the trooad
had not suffered. " Tne soldiers and officers," pts said, ,4 are as healthy es they would have been
in Fort William." In thi4, at least, we may gPe
the results of
war.
It the experience gained in the
first
Ran-
goon tirat d t the climate of
of that
place killed 8 tiring our first
0 man- of our men • it was not the
. was
no
occupation
commisariat. One y - ?
medical profession t members of the
of the ablest
one no less distinguishedthat ever went out to India, an
graphy than as a
successful
as a writer on medical topo-
upon in 1839 by the essful practitioner, when called.
opinion of the climate
healthwer
of Lo
local Government to record his
effect upon thePegu, and the pro-
bable
by the Aeng Pass of the troops of an ad-
vancevrari throughout which declaredi; that in the last
e had served with the ,