The Sun.
London, England, 1864-02-05 00:00:00

, , SUN, LON DON, FRIDA Y E V ENING, FEBRUARY 5, 1864.

that the noble earl considerably increased the differences
and embarrassments of the situation by founding the de.
mands of England on a right which we have derived from
a treaty, the non-fulfilment of which must place us iu an
awkward relation to Russia. The representations of France
and Austria were made in a very different sense, but with
the same object and intention as ours, I ventured also to
ask the noble earl at the time whether France, Austria, and

England were entirely in accord as to the steps which
should be taken in the event of the joint representations to
the Emperor of Russia being disregarded; and I pointed
out the extreme inconvenience which must result from
such a combination if the parties were not agreed as to the
manner in which they would give effect to the recommen-
dations. Well, to add to the difficulties of the case, at the
very moment when we were waiting with anxiety for the
account of the Emperor of Russia's receipt of our represen-
tations, couched in that persuasive style, and containing
those conciliatory arguments to which I have adveried, the
noble earl took the opportunity of stating in this house
that deeply as he sympathised with Poland, and
although he had demanded from Russia concessions under
a treaty which he had the right to enforce, yet whatever
might be the reply of Russia, he would not go to war with
her on account of Poland, and the Poles must not expect
any armed assistance from us under any circumstances.
This conduct on the part of the noble earl was ruin to
Poland—more than that, it was an aggravation of her inju-
ries. (Hear.) He must have known that when we said we
would not lend a helping hand, France and Austria would
equally refrain, and that as far as their means went the Poles
were absolutely powerless to make effectual resistance. At
the same time, however, the noble lord gave the Poles an
amount of encouragement which protracted the struggle,
aggravated their sufferings, and brought on that unhappy
country even greater calamities than it was then enduring.
(Hear, hear.) But what, my lords, was the result to Eng-
land ? The demands of England, ceiling for the fulfilment
of a treaty, were met by a rejoinder in that tone of stinging
courtesy for which Russian diplomacy is so eminently cele•
brated, The noble earl received a decided rebuff. (Hear,
hear.) He war told that England had better mind its own
business, that the Emperor of Russia knew best how to deal
with his oe n subjects, and that he would not submit to any
foreign interference in that respect. And then, forgettingall
his magniloquent threats, and not carrying his high words
into action, the noble earl told this house that the Emperor
of Russia had done a beneficent act towards his subjects.
But the noble earl's pacific declaration was not made until
Francs and. Austria had been committed to participation in
that policy, and they were consequently placed in the pain-
ful situation of having to follow our steps, and to share the
humiliation which attended them. (Hear, hear.) That is
the third instance in which we have assumed an atti-
tude not calculated to add to the cordiality of our rela-
tions with France. At the same time I doubt whether
these circumstances would be likely to put you on much
. better terms with the Power to whom you addressed such
an insulting demand. Very recently, in the presence of
increasing differences and embarrassments occurring
in so many parts of Europe, the Emperor of
the French made a proposition for a general Congress, in
which these various questions might be considered and an
attempt made to bring about a common understanding in
regard to them. I concur with the noble earl in thinking
that there would have been great difficulty in accomplishing
that aim. The objections which would be raised had not, per-
haps, been sufficiently contemplated by the Emperor of the
French when he first made his proposal. If, however, there
was a country in all Europe which had less reason than
another for giving a positive refusal to have anything to do
with the Congress it was England, because there was no
question which could by any possibility be decided by it
which directly affected our interests. The course which
should have been pursued by the Government was to recog-
nise the laudable and beneficent intention of the Emperor
of the French in making such a proposal; to point out that
England had no interest to set ve by opposing it, if there
was any prospect of success ; to declare that we should be
only too happy to co-operate in so excellent and well-mean-
ing a design as the settlement by arbitration of the difficul ties
which disturbed Europe if the other countries whose affairs
would be brought before the Congress would submit to its
authority and abide by its decision. If after that, the
scheme of a Congress had failed, it could not have been
attributed to the hostility of England, but to the inhtrent
difficulties of the case. (Hear, bear.) But as it was, in
the face of Europe, when every other Power expressed
more or less a readiness to concur in carrying out the ob-
jects in view, the noble earl opposite met the proposition
by a blank refusal to have anything to do with it, and by
pointing out in the strongest possible terms all the objec-
tions that could possibly be entertained to the meeting
of such a Congress. Moreover, to add to the discourtesy—
say nothing now of the impolicy—to add to the pain-
ful feelings with which the Emperor of the French and
the French people were likely to be impressed, by the
course pursued by the noble earl in giving an abso-
lute refusal, the first intimation—and I am sure that I shall
not be contradicted by the noble earl when I make this
statement—the first intimation which the Emperor of the
French received of the decision of the English Cabinet was
by reading the despatch in the Times newspaper. (Hear.)
Now, if you treat great Powers with this utter disregard of
their feelings and wishes, if you bluntly refuse to lend them
a helping hand in order that they may at any rate tide over
possible difficulties, supposing that there was no other in-
tention in the Congress but that, how can you expect when
you are in a position of difficulty,and when you call on them
that they will give you mutual assistance and advice in
cases not affecting their personal or national interests ?
(Hear, hear.) But there is another great and grave reason
why the noble earl should have considered deeply before re-
fusing to entertain the proposition of a Congress. He must
have known that there was one questien impending of the
greatest gravity and the most urgent interest. He mutt
have known that a question long maintained between the
Danish monarch and the people of Germany was coming to
a point of the greatest, most critical, and deepest interest ;
and if the Congress, or the proposition to hold a Congress,
had only postponed for three or four months the active
struggle which has since taken place, there would in that
case have been a better prospect than I fear there now is of
preserving, or I should rather say of restoring—for it is too
late to speak of preserving—the peace which is already
broken. (Hear.) With respect to this grave question which
is the subject of all engrossing interest at the present mo-
meat, I,do not think that any one reading the Speech from
the Throne, and who is not very familiar with the case be-
forehand, would have been able to collect from the Speech
what really is the question of pressing difficulty at the ex-
isting moment, and threatening the interruption of
friendly relations. Her Majesty's Speech recites, with very
great and very unusual minuteness, the names of all those
who were parties to the Treaty of 1852 for securing the suc-
cession to the throne of Denmark. The recital is somewhat
unusual; but Ido not complain of that. I presume that
the object was to show how many parties have pledged them-
selves to the arranged succession to the throne of Denmark.
I would, however, in passing, make one observation in refer-
ence to the statement that the treaty was acceded to by the
King of Saxony. Though Ido not lay much stress on the
argument, yet it is stated on the part of that Sovereign that
he never acceded to the treaty, but gave his assent to it.
But that very fact made it the more binding than accession
to the treaty with reservations, for the assent was pur et
simple, recognising the wisdom of the treaty, and makes no
reservation, at the same time, with respect to some possible
contingent claim on the part of the King of Saxony's own
House to a portion of the small duchy of Lanenburg. It
could not be said that when the assent was given that any
possible reservation was made, and the King of Saxony,
therefore, precluded himself from using that argument in
the subsequent discussion. I cannot help thinking, in so
solemn a document as the Speech from the Throne, which
recites the object of the treaty, and also with so much
minuteness the names of the parties to it, that it would
have been as well if the very words of the treaty had been
given, and the more especially because the omission of
the words had afforded the opportunity of inserting in
one of the paragraphs such language as does not often
appear even in a Speech from the Throne. (Laughter.)
The Queen's Speech states :—" That treaty declared that it
is conducive to the preservation of the balance of power
and of the peace of Europe that the integrity of the
Danish monarchy should be maintained, and that the
several territories which have hitherto been under the sway
of the King of Denmark should continue so to remain."
That is the substance of the treaty certainly, but it would
have been better to quote the precise words. The treaty goes
on to declare the arrangements according to which it Was
thought that the succession to the whole of the dominions
then united under the Crown of Denmark, in the male line
to the exclusion of the female, would be the beat means of
securing the integrity of that monarchy. The object was
to secure the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and the
making a change in the course of succession was supposed
to be the best means of carrying out that intention. I cer-
tainly think that, instead of using that elegant phrase in the
Queen's Speech, that " the several territories which have
hitherto been under the sway of the King of Denmark
should continue to remain so," it would have been mush
better to have given the terms of the treaty, though I do not
question that the actual meaning is expressed, and make no
quibble on that point, The Queen's Speech goes on to say
that " Her Majesty, actuated by the same desire to preserve
the peace of Europe, which was one of the declared objects
of all the Powers who were parties to that treaty, has been
unremitting in her endeavours to bring about a peaceful
settlement of the differences which on this matter have
arisen between Germany and Denmark." Now, the diffi-
culties which have arisen between Germany and Denmark
have nothing to do with this treaty, They have nothing to
do with the succession, but with a cause totally and en-
tirely different, and it was not until the death of the late
King of Denmark that the question of the succession was
introduced to complicate the original grounds of
the discussion. (Hear, hear.) It is very important
to draw a distinction between these two questions, which
aro entirely different. The question so long at issue was
the fulfilment or non-fulfilment by Denmark of engage-
ments entered into in 1851, to which the Treaty of 1852
made no reference, I do not deny that so far as Austria
and Prussia are concerned, those engagements were in-
ducements to lead them to concur in the treaty; but, at the
same time the treaty is not conditional on those arrange-
ments, Her Majesty's Speech is, therefore, made to state on
this point that which is not the fact. Now, this is a matter
of very considerable importance, because the case' is con-

siderably complicated by the different positions which, since
tha death of the late King of Denmark,. have been taken up
by the greater Powers and the smaller Powers in Germany.
At the present moment there are two interventions, if I may
call them so, in Denmark, and these two interventions are
being carried on by different parties, and for evidently diffe-
rent objects. The engagements had reference to rights
claimed on behalf of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig,
and the question remains, how far has Denmark contravened
the engagements as to the rights, liberties, and privileges
she was to give to those Ducbies,and under nu circumstances
to incorporate Schleswig with the Danish Monarchy, or to
take any step tending to that result? These were the whole
of the questions which, up to the present year, were in dis•
pute between the Powers of Germany and Denmark. Since
the death of the late King of Denmark a Federal occupa-
tion of Holstein has taken place, and that occupation is ad-
mitted to be legal for the purpose of securing the fulfilment
of the engagements of 851 in reference to the rights of the
Duchies ; but under the cover of that occupation or execu-
tion claims, with respect to which I would say nothing, to
the throne of the Duchies have been put forward, claims
which had been actually rejected and repudiated, and never
until this moment brought forward since the Treaty of 1852.
The parties now proceeding against Denmark do not reef
their claim on any opposition to the treaty. On the con-
trary, they proclaim that they are proceeding in the spirit
of the treaty. They have been outvoted by the Diet, and
they proceeded to take the matter into their own hands.
Professing an open and undisguised respect for the treaty,
they aro acting entirely without the consent of the Diet.
We have the King of trassia taking up arms in strenuous
defence of constitutional rights—(a laugh)—and we have
the Emperor of Austria joining in a crusade for the pro-
tection of oppressed nationalities. (Renewed laughter and
cheers.) And these two Powers, recognising a treaty which
the minor Powers wish to set aside, are undertaking, as the
mandatories of these minor Powers, to attack and carry on
war against Denmark for considerations and objects totally
different from those contemplated by the Diet. (Hear) This
isthe state of the question at the present moment; but I
cannot avoid thinking that with a little good judgment, a
little good management, and a little good temper, it ought
to have been settled without a frightful appeal to areas.
(Cheerf%) Surely it could have been no difficult fact to as-
certain—if the parties were willing to listen to reason—
(hear, hear)—as the case was one in which the intervention
of a friendly Power might be applied—whether a certain
engagement entered into by Denmark had or had not been
fulfilled, or whether one of the parties was not demanding
more than it was entitled to. Ido not question the right
of Prussia to ask for a fulfilment of those engagements to
the utmost; Ido not question the duty cf Denmark to
fulfil them as far as actually possible—to fulfil them as far
as that is not rendered impossible by one of the parties
opposed to Denmark; but I say that if when this question
arose this country had occupied the position she ought, she
would have been in a position to play the part of mediator,
and that the circumstances might have been adjusted by
a little good management on the part of the Foreign-office
of England. (Hear, hear.) But how could you have ex-
pected that Germany would yield to your interference in
this case ? In this quarrel there is a people who believe
they are struggling for their liberty and independence.
That fact will gain them great sympathy in Europe,
more especially because they are carrying on the struggle
with a force disproportionate to the necessities Of
the case ; but how could you have expected that your inter-
ference would be effectual when you had alienated France,
offended Russia, and more or less quarreled with every Power
in Europe ?—when you had not a Power you could call your
friend, and, moreover, when the danger which threatened
you in this complication was a dangerous and destructive
war between England and the united powers of Germany ?
(Hear,) What could be more threatening to the peace of
Europe than England being committed to a sanguinary
quarrel with the whole of Germany in a case in which,
whether rightly or wrongly, the feelings of the people of
Germany are enlisted on ono side ? (Hear.) For my part
1 certainly should shrink from such a war as one of the
greatest disasters that could happen to this country. (Cheers.)
I do hope that the noble earl, Who must this night give us
a clear indication of the course which her Majesty's Go-
vernment propose to take in respect of their foreign policy,
more especially on this question—will be able to assure us
that we are not committed by the Government, on the one
hand, to a disastrous quarrel with Germany, or, on the other,
to a betrayal and abandonment of an ally who has trusted

to our support. (Hear.) I have not seen it argued, and in-
deed I think it could hardly be alleged, that Patliament
should indicate the policy which the Government should
adopt. There is a sound and constitutional doctrine that it
is for the Government—for the responsible Ministers of the
Crown—to take a decided course, and then to announce
that course and submit it for the consideration of Parlia-
ment. Ido not pretend to know the position of affairs we
stand in ; but, as far as I can see, we are between the horns
of a dilemma of a most formidable character—namely,
the sacrifice of the honour of the country on the
one side, and engagement in a most perilous and san•
guinary war on the other. (Hear, hear.) My lords,
while I regard this as a subject of the most painful interest
to England, I would implore Germany to consider what con-
sequences such a war must entail on her, not only in break_
ing up of old relations, the severing of friendships—the
severing of ties between countries in which there exist
almost ties of consanguinity,—but also in giving an oppor-
tunity to all those opposed to the stability of her institutions
—all those who are desirous to profit by anything that may
tend to disorder and confusion,—to all who envy that grow-
ing prosperity of Austria which is owing to the constitu-
tional course she has so wisely entered upon. A war with

England would stop Austria in that course, and England
would be in the unhappy position of being an unwilling and

unconscious participator in pouring forth that torrent of evil
which certainly would be set flowing. And without cast-
ing the slightest imputation upon the present intentions or

possible designs of France, Germany must see that a war

with England would leave her in such a position as that
France would be master of the situation. If France does

entertain ambitious designs, the moment would be one to
Germany of the greatest peril, and to France of the greatest
temptation. My lords, I brought this subject forward with
all the grave, earnest, and deep importance that attaches to
it. I will not comment on other portions of the Speech.

There will be other cpportunities for discussing the subjects
to which they relate. _ I will not allude to what has taken

place in China, nor what has taken place in Japan, further
than to say, with regard to the former empire, that I
think this country was saved by an act of the Emperor
of China from the most serious embarrassment. 1 rejoice
that his Imperial Majesty rejused to accept the assist-
ance of a British squadron under such circumstances as

only it could have been given to him. Ido not blame
Captain Sherard Osborn ; on the contrary. I commend
him for the judgment and prudence which he exhibited in
refusing to place himself under the orders of a mandarin,
and becoming responsible for the acts of such an official; but
it seems incredible to me how the idea could ever have en-
tered the minds of politicians that the emperor of an inde-
pendent country would accept the offer of a force on the
understanding that his orders to that force were only to be
obeyed when forwarded through a civil commissioner, who
was to have the power of sending or withholding them.
That would be a question entirely incompatible with that of
a free Sovereign; and if such an arrangement were carried
out it would create difficulty. (Hear, hear.) I am only
afraid, from accounts which have been received within the
last few days, that assistance given by this country in the
civil war in China has placed us in an unpleasant and a
painful position. I will not comment on that extraordinary
piece of diplomacy—namely, the surrender of the lonian
Islands to the kingdom of Greece. I say nothing to the Fur-
render itself, but only as to the mode in which it has taken
place. The whole proceeding seems to have been involved
in inextricable confusion. The promises which the noble
earl made and the expectations which he held out have been

set at nought; and an agreement has been come to with the
other Powers to hand over the islands without any condition
whatever to the kingdom of Greece, that kingdom being in
a state of anarchy, and in a state which renders it quite in-
capable of conducting its own affairs without assistance and

n
being under the government of an illustrious Prince, a
earl,youn young
th man,more wh
ouoc,lraamafraid, a
ge
thanthe
discretion, undertook a task
dais in every case in
fficu3. We find,
emr i ca
afraid in carryingl m
whichtoowhich, thtahlt eitnnhoitnbhlkies, earlh! he
r willthianus Imafirendedda !se extremely,
as
hei awae sl ol ff en d e d not on I y on e
side, but both sides. (A laugh.) Again, it
appears that, not-
withstanding the concessions which the noble earl has made
ustcall one-sided
callsto t the e
neutrality,Federal
neutrality, he has received from these States not thanks,
because I believe that papers which have been before the
Senate of the United States show we were met by demands
buttat e States
of
what AIT America
and menaoes, which .I. should be much astonished if any one
calling himself a British Minister must not have felt a diffi-
culty in receiving when the despatches containing them were
placed in his hands. Since then we are not only told that
the American Government will hold us responsible for any
damage which their commerce may have sustained by the
acts of the Alabama; but if I have not misread the papers
laid before Co 2gress they state that if we do not put a stop
to the sale of vessels of this kind in this country, the result
must be that the Federal Government will take the law into
their own hands, that their cruisers will follow these vessels
into British ports, and will, in British waters, maintain
their own interests. My lords, I hope the noble earl will
be able to show that he answered that despatch in a manner

which will put an end to such monstrous demands for the
future. (Hear, hear.) But, if lam not mistaken, the last
despatch from Washington was written about August, and
was received here towards the latter end of August, and
early in September the noble earl took the strong step of
seizing the so-called Confederate rams in the Mersey upon
that very suspicion as to which, a year before, the Attorney-
General informed Parliament that the Government would

not be warranted in interfering. (Hear, hear.) Well,
then, my lords, if you have not satisfied the Federals, neither
have you satisfied the Confederate States. (Hear.) You
have not satisfied the Poles and you have offended Russia.

You have not very well pleased Denmark, and you have
quarrelled with Prussia and Austria. You have not satisfied
the lonian Islands or Greece, although you have given t
both of them all and more than they have asked ; but you
have contrived to couple it with conditions very proper in
themselves, and which are mutually unpalatable, and which

up to a very late moment led to the refusal by the Greek

Government, such as it is, to accept your gift of the lonian

Islands burdened with those conditions. (Hear, hear,) I
cannot say that in looking hack at the general line of policy
adopted by the noble earl, and the degree of success which
has attended his efforts as the head of the Foreign-office,
such a retrospect is calcu'ated to diminish my apprehen-
sions of the present, or to inspire much confidence for the
future. I hope and pray that the Government may be able
to satisfy this house and the country that they have neither
taken any course likely to involve us in a war the issue of
which no man can foresee, nor, on the other hand, have led
on and then deserted a weak Power, which, confiding in
our protection, and acting upon our advice, now finds itself
abandoned in the hour of its utmost need. (Hear.) This is
my earnest hope ; yet I cannot but see that the vessel of our
State is in a most perilous position, that it is surrounded
by breakers and dangers on every side; and for my own
part I have not—l wish I had—the consolation of being able
to repose any confidence in the competence of the hands in
which its navigation is now placed. (Cheers.)
Earl RUSSELL—The noble earl commenced his speech
by some remarks, in which he compared wit and facts; but
I may, I think, on the present occasion say, with Sheridan,
when retorting on his opponent, that the noble earl drew on
his imagination for the facts and upon his memory for the
wit--(laughter)—for I think the house will agree with me
that the wit with which the noble earl regaled the house
was not his, but Shakspere's. (Renewed laughter.) With
regard to her Majesty's Government having lost the con-
fidence and friendship of other sovereign powers, so far
from that being the case, we are in most friendly relations
with them, and communications of the most amicable cha-
racter are being daily carried on with Governments who
place their trust and confidence in us. The noble earl
stated that our policy consisted in non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries, and in an alliance with
France. I must confess that with regard to the prin.
ciple of non-intervention, the practice of intervening in
the internal affairs of other countries is not only objec-
tionable in itself, but always fails in its object, and aggra-
vates the evils it was intended to cure. The experience
which we have had of late only tends to confirm me in that
view. (Hear.) The noble lord goes on to say that so far
from carrying out our line of policy we have diverged from
and offended France. If the noble lord wishes us to adopt
the policy which is attributed to the leader of his party in
the House of Commons, we should indeed accept whatever
France chose to suggest—we should have no opinion but
French opinion—no will but French will—no policy but
French policy— but I say that that is a policy which we
cannot accept. (Cheers.) With regard to the expedition
to Mexico, we stated from the beginning that we did not go
there to interfere with the internal affairs of that country.
It came to be a question with the French what should be
the future government of that ;country, but we said that
that was not the question which we had come to settle, that
upon that point we should separate from France, because
we simply went there to obtain redress for our grievances
and reparation for the injuries we had suffered. We did not
go there to set up an emperor, or any other potentate, to
rule over the people. (Hear.)
The Earl of DERBY—I beg the noble earl's pardon. I
said distinctly that when the objects of the expedition were
extended, I did not blame her Majesty's Government for
withdrawing from that expedition.
Earl RUSSELL—If the noble earl does not blame us,
why did he mention that topic? If it was an offence to
France how could we help differing from them on that sub-
ject ? My opinion on that question is vory different from
that of the noble earl, and I think that the Emperor of the
French, though his policy might be different from ours,
gave full weight to the considerations and the policy of the
British Government. I believe that he is too just to attri.
bute the adoption of the policy [which we thought righ

to adopt to differences we had with him. The noble earl
says that we differed with France about the recognition
of the Southern States—but no proposal was ever made
by us on that subject. There was a proposal,
indeed, made for mediation, in order to reconcile the
Southern States with the Northern States, and if it had
been deemed proper to propose such a mediation it
might have led ultimately to a proposal for the recognition
of the SOuthern States. It was not, however, considered
advisable to make such a proposal, it being thought that if
France made the proposal alone there would be a much
better chance of reconciliation than if it were a joint pro-
posal. (Hear, hear.) I believed that the whole country ap-
proved of the resolution to which her Majesty's Government
came upon that question. The noble earl referred to a par-
ticularly painful subject—l mean Poland—and he said that
her Majesty's Government had disappointed Austria and
France in its policy with respect to that country, and more
than that, that we had by the encouragement we had given
to the Poles aggravated the horrors of their position. That
is only one among the many incorrect statements which
have been made on this subject. It was not the fact that we
were acting entirely by ourselves, and differing from Aus-
tria on this subject. On the contrary, there were constant

communications between Vienna and London, and we be-
came aware that Austria would be most unwilling, on Aus-
trian considerations alone, on questions which had reference
to Austrian finance, and others which had reference to the
rights of Polish subjects of Austria. to put their differences
with Russia to the arbitrament of war. (Hear, hear.) And
what was the general aspect of the question? My belief is
that you would have had not to recognise Poland, not to
fight for the Poles, but to make a Poland, and in making a
Poland you would have had to make it as the insurgents of
the country wished it to be made, not only to constitute a
new kingdom of Poland, but so toconstitute it as to include
those western provinces of Prussia which were formerly
Polish. (Hear, hear.) But that would have been a ques-
tion so enormous, involving ad it did the dismemberment of
the Russian empire, that it was not to be undertaken with.

out the clearest view that the object aimed at could be
obtained, and without the full consideration of the great
sacrifices that would have to be made. The Government
were of opinion that it was not advisable to enter into
.that war, and therefore I confess that, in concert with
Austria, we declined to take any step which might involve
us in the further step of hostilities against Russia. When
it was proposed to us to write an identical note, we declined
to join in it. When it was proposed to consider what further
measures should be adopted in ease Russia should refuse
our proposal, her Majesty's Government, in concert with
Austria, declined to join in it. Were we wrong in not me-
ditating or intending war for the sake of this Poland, in
confining ourselves to sympathy with these brave people
and refusing to commit ourselves to hostilities ? I believe
the opinion of this country was at that time—and it is still
more strong at this moment—against going to war for Po-
land. (Hear.) The noble earl said that the course the
Government took in this respect was calculated to aggravate
the evils of the Polish insurgents. I thought differently.
I thought the telling the Poles that it was our determina-
tion not to go to war for them was the way to induce them
not to expect an exercise of our arms in their favour, and I
think it is one of the most cruel things in the world to lead
people to take up arms in the expectation of your support,
when you do not intend to give it them. Entertaining that
opinion 1 declared plainly in this house last session that it
was not our intention to go to war for the Poles. This de-
cision may have disappointed the Government of France at
the moment, but I believe that the Government of France
is now persuaded that the French people were by no means
willing to enter into that war, that the inclination of the
French people—and I am happy to dee that such is the case
----is in favour of peace with foreign nations, and they
would not have approved of a costly and burdensome war.
Then the noble earl taunted us with not having agreed
with the Emperor of the French on the subject of the con-
gress. I confess I considered the proposal was made to us
as an invitation. I did not consider there was an obliga-
tion upon us to accept it—l considered that it was free to
us to accept or decline it. If that was the case, and I con-
sider that such was the intention of the Emperor of the
French, we had to consider what was intended to be done
at that congress. We asked, therefore, in the first place,
what were the topics to be brought forward, and how it
was expected that the difficulties were to be solved ? When
we received an answer to that despatch we considered the
matter again ; we considered it most carefully and most se-
riously, and' we came to the conclusion that the solution
was not likely to he pacific, and that if it were not to be
pacific it would be a great disappointment to the powers of
Europe that the works of the congress should be entirely
null and void. (Hear, hear.) The two main topics to be
brought forward were the topics of Poland and Venetia.
With regard to Poland, it would have had reference to the

course pursued lay Russia. I put a question to the Russian
ambassador on the subject, and I found that the Emperor
would not maintain that which he had already maintained
in his correspondence with France, Great Britain,and Aus-

tria. I asked the Austrian ambassador what would be the

course of his Government with reference to a proposal in
respect to Venetia. He said the Austrian Government
were determined not to listen to a proposal for the cession

or exchange of Venetia. Then upon these two great topics
had we made proposals to Russia on the subject of Poland,
the answer would have been a refusal, and if we had made

proposals to Austria on the subject of Venetia, the answer

would also have been a refusal. What then was to be the
end of the congress ? Were we to be brought into a war in

consequence of those refusals, or were we to be satisfied
with nothing being done? Those were our objections to the
congress—those were our honest opinions. The noble lord

seems to think that our answer was very rude and curt.

But we had expressed our opinion, and had given our rea-

sons in long despatches, and in our first despatch we gave
credit to the Emperor of the French for the motives by
which he was actuated—for his desire to put an end
to discord, and to establish the general peace of Europe upon

a more solid foundation. But with regard to the reasons

put forth for such a congress, is not the British Govern-

went entitled to form its ow►n ()Onion or to use its own

arguments when a great plan like this is proposed, which
is published to Europe without any notice to or concert

with her Majesty's Government ? Was this Government

entitled to consider for itself whether such a plan was likely
to promote the peace of Europe or to have a contrary effect?
Upon this question, and also upon the questions with regard
to Mexico and the United States of America, I claim that
which is not a great deal to claim for a power like England,
that she should have the right of framing her own policy,
and of being governed by her own views of the interests of
Europe, not borrowing them from any other power, how-
ever great that power may be. (Cheers.) The noble earl has
made many comments, but not altogether correct as to facts,
with respect to the great subject on which every one must
bo anxious—namely, the question of the differences between