The Sun.
London, England, 1852-05-05 00:00:00

out of 15,000, which were goner:My at home, and to
th:l3o numben they might add 5,300 marines. Ht wls,
however, told that he ou.ght not to compute the cineere,
the noncommissioned oftioer3 and the band. lie wanted

to know why they should no; b include) in the force
which constituted a combatant army? If he had m sde
these deductions he would be compelled to make similar
deductions from the army of the enemy. As yet he (Sir
de Lacy Evans) had said nothing about the 13,000
mounted yeomanry in this county. He considered,
however, that they were a very good force, and believed
that they would prove very troublesome customers in the
flank and rear of an invading army. With regard to the
French army, they were not, as had been stated,
400,000. The French estimates showed that they were
369,000, and from that number was to bo deducted
70,000 men for Algiers; so that here at once wore
100,000 men struck off this reputed force of 400,000.
Then, again, if he followed the practice which was
adopted with reference to the estimates fur our own
army, he should have to deduct from the remaining
300,000 the officers, non-commissioned officers, drum-
mers, and trumpeters—and these stood us follows:—
Officers, 16,000; non-commissioned (Incurs, 24,500; and
drummers and trumpeters, 23,000. Iu the next place,
he must deduct 21,000 gens d'armes, who were
a sort of local police force, and not available fur an in-
vading expedition. But if they were to be taken as
forming part of the army, ho saw no reason why we
should not also count the 10,000 or 12,000 police in Irs -
lan,l, who were better soldiers, in his opinion, than any
troops the French could bring against us. Allowing,
therefore, these deductions, and others on account of the
sick-list, the French army would be reduced to 200,000
men. Did Hun. Gentlemen thick, however, that the
whole even of this force was available for any sudden
exigency? No such thing. For of that number 100,000
men would be required for the garrison towns, and still
leave the important forts of Strasburg, Belfort, Dtetz,
Lille, and other places, without a garrison; and if all
these were properly garrisoned, be did not think 30,000
man could be seat us an invading fordagainst thiscouti-
try. With regard to the measure of her Majesty's
Ministers, he thought the force it proposed to raise was
a delusive force, that the Militia Bill of the late Govern-
ment was a less objectionable measure, and that in the
present state of the public mind a much more substan-
tial and effective addition might be made to our national
defences. As to war with France he did not think there
was the least probability of such an event occurring.
The fact was that since the year 1848 the French had
gone on reducing their army, and whereas it numbered
in that year 502,000 men, it was now but 369,000, so
that the amount of reduction in three years only was not
less than 132,000 men.

Mr. BERESFORD observed, that the original state
ment upon the subject of the army we could bring into
the field was made by the Home Secretary, who, not
without due consideration, and desirous to state the
highest amount equitable, placed it at 25,000. The Hon.
and Gallant Member (Sir D. L. Evans) placed it at
85,000; that included the officers, whom it was not
usual to reckon in official returns, bat thia could easily
be allowed for. The Hon. and Gallant Member in-
cluded the army in Ireland; the late Prime Minister the
other night excluded that from the force available for the
defence of Great Britain, and stated that no man re-
sponsible for the government of this country or for the
defence of Ireland would withdraw a man from Ireland
in case of invasion here; and in that he (Mr. Beresford)
agreed, and should exclude the 21,000 rank and filo iu
Ireland. The same reason would apply to the armed
police—a most efficient force, raised from the lower
classes there irrespective of creed, proving that Irish-
men might be trusted with arms and relied upon in the
case of need.—(Hear, hear.) But if that force was
necessary in Ireland now, in time of peace, it would be
equally necessary there in case of invasion.—(Hear,
hear.) There would be a great difficulty in bring-
ing over from Ireland the pensioners, of whom nearly
6,000 were in that country ; they would make
excellent troops in well chosen positions, but
they were not troops of such activity as would
make it desirable to remove them here and bring
them into the field. Then, leaving out the Irish force,
we should have in England 39,172 men. That included
5,029 cavalry; but the southern portion of England was
not that description of country where cavalry would be
exceedingly available to repel an invasion. Deducting
the cavalry, therefore, there would remain 34,143 in-
fantry, artillery, tappers and miners, and foot guards.
Now, on an average of six regiments in this country and
Ireland, it was found that, including recruits at drill,
there were about 205, or nearly one-fourth of the esta-
blishment, non-efficient; deducting the recruits (at this
moment very numerous) it was only 142, or one-sixth;
one-fifth would be a fair deduction to make to find the
number that could be brought into the field effective,
and this would reduce the available infantry and artil-
lery to 27,314. Now, the Hon. and Gallant Member
was severe upon the Right Hon. Member for South
Wilts for taking upon himself to sketch the distribution
of the army, but ho (Mr. Beresford) must do it. He
could not mention higher authority than that of the
Noble and Gallant Duke commanding the army, the
Noble and Gallant Officer at the head of the ordnance,
and the Gallant Officer at the head of the engineers.
The highest amounts of force which they respec-
tively calculated as necessary in case of invasion,
for holding arsenals and ports, were 33.000
infantry and artillery, 30,000, and 28,000. Taking
the last of these estimates, there would be required
for Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney, 5,000 men; for the
Thames, including Sheerness, Tilbury, the Tower,
Deptford, Woolwich, 8,000 men; for Dover and its
dependencies, 2,b00; for Portsmouth, 5,000; and for
Plymouth, 5,000; for Pembroke and other detached
places, 3,000. Adding the pensioners to the artillery
and infantry, an available force would be made up of
34,280 rank and file; and, deducting 28 000, the force
necessary for the defence of the arsenals and ports, there
would remain of infantry and artillery available fur other
purposes 6,280 rank and filo. There remained the
cavalry, which would not be so efficient a force to meet
an enemy in the southern part of England on account of
the enclosures; adding 4.023 cavalry and 261 sappers
and terriers to the 6,280 infantry, there would be 10,564
rank and file to meet an invading force. It must be al-
lowed that 10,500 men did not constitute a proper and
available force to meet an invasion. How, then, it would
be asked, would you make up an available force? He
would reply, by this very militia. By the existence of
such a force they would be enabled to hold the garrisons
and forts to which he had referred. The militia, whom
some called a rabble, were Englishmen, fit with
the addition of soldiers, to maintain those places.
They were an available force of infantry for that pur-
pose; and it was to get a proper and available force for
the field that the militia was desirable. If the Noble
Lord the late First Minister of the Crown found out in
April that there were 90,000 or 100,000 men available
for the defences of the country, why did ho not make
the discovery in January or February, when ho was
digesting a Militia Bill? It could not be supposed that
it was necessary for him to go into Opposition to ascer-
tain the available force at the service of the Government.
The Hon. Member for Richmond suggested another and
larger view; he made his force 200,000 men.
Mr. RICH remarked that the force tie stated was that
which might be available if the additions he suggested
were made.
Mr. BERESFORD would acknowledge in that case
that the militia would be useless. But it was not an
ideal force that was wanted. He would not have it said
that this was not a military nation. Where was the
country whose soldiers showed more devotion as well as
subordination? Those men who, on board the Birken-
head, did not flinch amid the terrors of the' vasty deep,
would not fail amid the excitement of the battlefield,
It had been said that ono great source of safety to
the country would be this difficulty of disembarkation;
and that in Montego Bay, which took ten days,
had been cited. It did not appear why, because that
disembarkation took ten days, a disembarkation on the
English coast should take ten days. First, the French
coast was near; secondly, steam power could be applied;
thirdly, on the disembarkation at Montego Bay there
was a heavy surf. One would think the HOD. and Gal-
lant Member (Sir D. L. Evans) was not aware (the Hon.
and Gallant Member, he was sure, however, was aware)
of a disembarkation made in 1814 in North America,
when an army under General Roses landed in one day,
the 19th of August, commenced its march on the 20th,
marched on the 21st, 22(1, and 23d, and, having marched
60 miles, fought on the 24th an action and gained a vic-
tory. That would show that it was not verydifficultirfouraedn
English army to disembark in one day; and ho trusted
thatthat the Hon. and Gallant Member had not forgotten the
services rendered by Lieutenant Evans as Quartermaster
General on that occasion—had not forgotten his own
cervices. The practice of the Hon. and Gallant Member
seemed better than his theory, his action in the field than
his counsel in the Senate. In the same year a disern-
darkation took place near New Orleans, which began
at six in the morning; 4,500 men were landed by
twelve o'clock, and engaged in action, after a march
of seven miles, at four P.M. If English troops
could disembark in so short a space, so might
others. He would not enter on the question of an
augmentation of the army, but he did not believe
that an augmentation could or would be retained, An
addition of 15,000 men, which was not sufficient for the
garrisons, would cost 600,0001, the first year, and
525,0001. the second, whereas the whole expense for the
militia, the first year, would be 350,0001, only. This force
had received the sanction of the highest military autho-
rities. The old militia papers justified the expec.ation
that a great body of men would enter the service for the
bounty. lie could not see why it should be supposed that
men would not be forthcoming in greater numbers than
at the time to which he referred, for the population had
increased. He did not think it would be necessary to
recur to the ballot. Neither did he believe the militia
would interfere with recruiting for the army. Some
of
the finest bodies of recruits during the Peninsular war
.
were sent from the militia. As to the alleged imrploseoomi
bility of making men taken from the plough or
good soldiers, he would refer to th© rapidity
with
Russia,which,
in 1813, Napoleon, after the loss of his army in
beginning
of
raised a force in January or the
Fe-
bruary, and, having marched 170,0001ag
ho thoseand
w,
onnwinn the
Germany in the month of Match,
following May the battle of fertzen. With non-commis-
sioned officers from the line. thsewfoortcke,tiof th)e,,ereasiisael rey .woHulde
be able to do great and glori.oue
was
me
men ore
likely
t ceat
believed that voluntary serve
independence of character among th
scr. than o tho rco n e
-
;ption o • f the ballot, nor could he admit it was any
ne to take up arms in defeaceof
their homes an
hardship to call
dontipiefirop,
country. That was an oblige.
out all
lt citizens, and it was a slur oa
Englishmen
lion which restedto say
theywere opposed to a Bill of this
nature, every clause
in which was of a mitigated cha
rector, -
brought forward as it had been by the Govern-
went in the honest desire to do their duty and in the
determination to show they would not leave this country
incapable c f defence.—(Hear.)
Mr. MAC G REG OR believed the statements of the lion.
and Gallant Member (Sir D. L. Evans) would bo cre-
dited generally, not only by this country, but on the
eoutineut. There Wtta no neoessity for the Bill before

the Home. All the States of Europe had keen dim i-
niehin;; their armies ever sinco 1848, under the prose are
of finsneial embarrassments, and the French nation in
particular had been stated by Marshal Soalt to have
become averse to war and military service. If the army
of the country was insufficient for its defector!, the people
would demand new estimates. He contended that the
statements made on a former occasion by the Secretory
of the Admiralty were not correct, and that, so far
from being inferior to other States in our naval pose er,
our fleet ass much greater than that of France or Russia,
added to which there was an enormous mercantile
steam navy, capable of defending cur shores in
time of peace. Those whom he represented de-
tested the very idea of a number of people
being led away from their homes as volunteers
for a period of four or six weeks, knowing that
it would demeraliz ) them much more than if they
enlisted in the regular army ; and, if there existed a
necessity for an increased military force, it would be far
better at once to increase the ri guler standing army.
Sir F. BARING was anxious to state why he should
vote against the amendment. The Secretary of the Ad-
miralty had stated th.at he considered it inconvenient for
the public service to furnish the information called for
by the Hen. Member. (Sir.F. Rating's) own expe-
rience lad him to cube it in that opinion. lie had him-
self on former occasions di clip ed giving retto ns of a
much less specific nature th mu these now asked for.
When the department of the Government %Lich was re-
sponsible declined to furnish such returns, it was never
tee practice to compel the production of them. These
were just the returns which au enemy (if there were
any) would be anxious to obtain. He was aware that it
would be said that an enemy could get the same informa-
tion elsewhere. So let him. Ile admitted that the publi-
city of the press in this country did enable parties abroad
to get a knowledge of the proceedings of the English Go-
vernment which could not be obtained concerning the
proceedings of foreign Governments by us. But lot us
not get into the practice of furnishing foreign countries
with every information they were anxious to obtain.
But that wits not the main object of the amendment.
The Hon. Member fur Manchester frankly stated
last night that he supported the amendment with a view
to get rid of the Bill altogether. He (Sir F. Baring)
voted for the second reading of the Bill. Without en-
tering into the war qatstion, he might observe that he
had concurred with the most eminent military authori-
ties—with the Government of Sir R. Peel, with that of
his Noble Friend (Lord J. Russell), and with the pre-
sent Government—as to the inadequacy of our present
military defences. There might be exaggeration in the
statements us to any immediate danger, but the ques-
tion really was, whether their defences were sufficient to
secure them against invasion. He admitted that it was
for the interest of every country to keep at peace, and
among the rest that it was fur the interest of the Presi-
dent at the head of the French Government to do 80;
but he was afraid, judging from the history of the world,
that the argument which the Hon. Member for Man-
chester had urged as to the impossibility of France en-
tertaining the notion of invading this country was scarcely
to be relied on. Ile would rather have the assurance that
we were in a position to defend ourselves. Even supposs
ing the return were granted, he could not see what would
be gained by it. With great respect to the Hon. Member
(Ur. Cobden), he dill not believe he would, even then, be
in possession of sufficient knowledge of public affairs to
enable him to judge of what would bo a proper distribu-
tion of the British fleet. It was the duty of the Govern-
ment to propose to Parliament the force which they con'
sidered adequate for the protection of the country. B
was rare indeed that Parliament took upon itself the re-
sponsibility of refusing to grant that force which the
Government required. Bus when the force had been
granted it was for the Government to apply it in a man-
ner best calculated to carry into effect 'het defence for
which they were responsible. He should very much re'
gret to see Parliament dictating to the Government la
what manner the ships constituting the fleet of this
country should be distributed. Without the necessary
information, it was impossible that any Hon. Member
should be able to form a judgment as to the distribution
of our ships. .He was afraid the Honourable Gentlemen
would not gain much by the adoption of some of the
proposal which he had made. It was not possible On
we understood the Right Honourable Baronet to say) ,t°
call all the line of battle ships home and station them in
the Channel. The Honourable Gentleman appeared 10
be under the impression that we had a great naval force
abroad, without being of any use whatever. The Hon.
Gentleman could not be aware of the number of appli-
cations by the commercial interests abroad for protec-
tion. He could assure the Hon. Gentleman that one of
the main reasons why our merchants were not injured
in some of the South American States was because the
people of those States knew that our ships would not
permit those merchants to be injured. He was glad to
avail himself of this opportunity of expressing his appro-
bation of the good judgment and discretion which our
naval officers had exercised in some of the States of
South America. The lion. Gentleman had also sug-
gested that ships sta ioned in the East Indies should be
recalled. All he (Sir F. Baring) would say with regard
to the present mode of employing those ships was, that
nothing conduced more to the spread of civilizstion
throughout the world than the keeping safe the hieliwaY
of commerce—the sea. With regard to the African
squadron, he would not now touch upon it. He did not
believe the people would at present consent to withdraw
that squadron, and when the Chancellor of the Exche"
quer the other night made, in his free-trade speecb!---4
(Cheers)—an allusion to the great advantages which
had arisen from the reduction of the duty on :8" Of
he (Sir F. Baring) rdlected with some ueg",,e„, to
satisfaction that that result was in a great dsgr'-nd
be attributed to the exertions of that squadron, t 1
that when he left office the slave trade wil9 The
lower ebb than it had been for many a long year.
Hon. Gentleman, iu commenting upon some observatiend
he (Sir F. Baring) made on a former occasion, aPPeareo
to have misunderstood him. He (Sir F. Baring) on Lb f
occasion, expressed his doubts as to the expediency
keeping up a large fleet in the Charnel. The grounds
of his doubts were these,—he apprehended that the °l°
jt et, of their naval defence was to secure their own safety
but, at the same time, to do so by means the least med-
dlesome and offensive possible to other parties. That
was the mode in which those who were anxious for the'
own safety, and also for peace, would distribute ant
force they had at command. Here he muss rentals:
upon a misunderstanding of what was stated by the last
Secretary but one of the Admiralty, the Hon. Membe.
for Tyrone (Mr. Corry.) If that Hon. Gentleman mean
i
to state that there was a superiority in the Channel e'
the French over the English force, then he (Sir
Baring) entirely differed from the Hon. Gentleman
as to the fact. But the Honourable Gentleman was
speaking of the whole force of the French
in the Mediterranean, as well as in the Channel,
and was comparing it with the British force in the
Channel only. Now, he (Sir F. Baring) stated distinctly
,
and deliberately that, at the time and before be left
office, and even so early as in December last, there was
ample power in the English force for manning ships en
as to secure to us a superiority in the Channel, es cores
pared, not with the French ships then in commission in
the Channel, for there were hardly any, but with the
French ships in port. With regard to the plan for man'
ning the ships which he had proposed, he regretted to
find that it was considered by the Admiralty to be ine.i
ficient. He should have had no reason to complain'
they thought the plan wrong, had they wished for anis'
to consider it, and postponed the adoption of the Or;
but he did regret that two officers of the Admiralty
should have condemned (and one of them in strong. 01--
guage, too) that plan, and yet that the Admiralty
should not have abandoned it. Abandon the scheme;
you please, but don't say you will try the plan, and the o'f
in the House of Commons, systematically 00133PIEtiLke
it. lie did not consider that fair play to any schema
that might be proposed.—(Hear.)
the
Captain DUNCOMBE was sorry to have raised b..
indignation of the Right Hon. Gentleman by his 0„,
servations with respect to the legacy left to their 6-„-i
cessors by the late Board of Admiralty, in the shsPrreb-,
the proposal for a reserve force for the navY• a-
House, however, would remember that those observen
Lions, made in the course of a preceding debate, had sbAe
called forth by the speech of a Gallant Admiral l"
mi
difficulty
irellucto
igaßtruy,eerihpnk,e Berkeley), one
evidentlynne of the
condemnedß ht Itihoen.pGinennthlieratussef
r)ryilngheouptrethsetinstehßeomaerdassap greatleete Admiralty,d by the
saw
seerY nc.
ton
• eervice. No one
tinned by any Officers employed the - than
seeing that the proposition was not sa _
subject, however, had had greater considerationn than
this, or bad been more maturely weighed, and th--°y
had perceived that there would be a very great difficult,se
in carrying it out so as to promote the welfare t L
navy. If the Right lion. Gentleman accused the Board"
of any double-faced dealing, he would state that the co
sideration of the scheme bad not yet been abandorer•
The Noble Duke at the bead of the Board had consulted
willing to carry the plan out to the fullest extent, if
_ _
with experienced officers on the subject, and was read/
and
it could be proved to be fur the benefit of the public!
service.—(Hetir.)
Sir F. BARING was not aware that he had used, an
any words the effect of which virol!
c!
now in office at the Admiralty. He thought it hardly
dtoidt hnroot winitmenpduttaotiuonse4on the honour of those who we.°
l
necessary to make this explanation, which must have
been rendered necessary by a mistake on the part of the
Hon. Gentleman opposite.
Mr. kaseue, having when this Militia Bill was dal
proposed by the Noble Lord then at the head of her
ai Government stated his objections to the princi
''OefsttYhe Bill, as not being consonant to the age in whit
we lived, and contrary to the feelings of the country ,
large, bad intended to content himself with that OPP°9dl;
tion and with voting against it on those gr°llll,l,
in every ono of its stages; hut there had been so'
extraordinary statements made in the course of the
preposterous,
debates that had ensued, and allegations (as he nOni
ceived) so utterly
allow this opportunity to pass without venturing
state the view he took of the question now before
the House. Ho could not conceive how
that he could not
information which was sought in the return movedbe
for by the lion. Member for the West Riding could
._e
called unnecessary. He admitted that the effect of the
motion would be to postpone the Bill, and his object,
__o,
like manner, was to postpone it until the present a Lite
as to invasion had left both the present and
the late
nn
Cabinet.—(Hear, hear.) The panic which prevail.. d
the subject of our national defences had been cancan,'
sort of cholera, for it came and nobody knew "r3lit he
went away and nobody knew how.—(A laugh.)
in
believed that, whatever might be the state of feeltn
the House, there was no such alarm out of doors; 'was
petitions had been presented sgainst the Bill, and
desired
most desirable to postpone it until we had the
that to
information. The House had been gravely told.
a to the
grant this return would he to.give informatio
similar information to this from
enemy, but, so far was . _ • to tbe
that in the appendix
having been kept secret, wows.
report the Naval Committee of 1848 they
to that
find given the
number of ships from 1828 tie
scar, the stations the ships were on, and