The Sun.
London, England, 1864-07-28 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, THURSDAY EVENING, JULY 28, 1864.

THE YELVERTON MARRIAGE CASE,

JUDGMENT.
HOUSE OF LORDS-(THIS
YELVERTON V. TELVERTON (OR LONGWORTR).

This morning their lordships assembled to deliver judg-
ment In the long litigated case of Yelverton v. Yelverton
(or Longworth). It was an appeal against the decision of
the Courts below that the marriage of the Hon. Major
elvertela with Miss Teresa Longworth was a valid one,
The case was go regularly reported in this journal daring
its progress that no abstract of the proceedings is necessary.

There were present this morning the Lord Chancellor,
Lord Kingsdown, Lord Wensleydale, and Lord Chelms •
ford. Lord Brougham was absent. Mr Roll, Q.C., the
Lord Advocate, the Attorney-Ganeral, Sir H. Cairns, Q.C,,
Mr Whiteside, , and the other (*tinsel in the case,

were present.
The Lord Chancellor first delivered his judgment, He
said that on this painful case he desired to make no obser-
vation which was not absolutely necessary to define the legal
position of the parties to the suit. The respondent sought
in the court below to establish the fact of a marriage be-
tween herself and the appellant, first, on the ground of a
mutual promise made when in Scotland, and, secondly, on
the alternative of the evidence not being sufficient to prove
an immediate contract; the respondent pleaded that there
was a performance of marriage followed by cohabitation on
the faith of that promise. The respondent affirmed on
the record that a e eligious ceremony took place between the
parties in Ireland which amounted to a marriage if there
had been none before, but she was content in the Court be,
low to say that this ceremony did not constitute a valid
marriage, and having submitted so far it was not compe-
tent for her to take a different view of the case in that
Court of Appeal. He should therefore give no opinion
of what passed betweon the parties in Ireland, or whether
that was sufficient to constitute marriage, it being
plain that that point had been withdrawn. The case
of the respondent is reduced to the two proposi-
tions, the first being that there was an immediate present
contract of marriage by the exchange of mutual consent
made at Edinburgh, on the 20th April, 1857. As to the
nature of the consent which is to constitute marriage, I
accept the observations of the Lord President, that it must
be given mutually with a view and for the purpose of creat-
ing henceforth the relations of husband and wife. It is
not necessary that the contract made should be followed by
cohabitation. With respect to the evidence which shall be
sufficient to prove that a marriage was so constituted great
latitude is allowed by the law of Scotland. But I cannot
agree with the Lord President in what seems to have been
his opinion that it the respondent fail to substantiate an
exchange of present consent at the particular time and
place which are assigned, the Court is not warranted in
declaring that a marriage was contracted between the
parties. In my judgment, when the marriage is pleaded
as having been contracted by parties in Scotland by
means of an interchange of deliberate consent, it is not
necessary to prove the particular place in Scotland, or the
exact date when and where such consent was exchanged.
The case of the respondent is that on Sunday, April 27,
1857, at a house in Scotland, a form of marriage was
gone through, the form being the reading aloud by the
appellant from the Prayer-book of the marriage service
used by the Church of England. The Lord President
insists that persons in a humble sphere of life, when
contracting marriage in such a manner, seek to pre-
serve evidence of it by interchange of writings or by the
presence and confirmation of witnesses. The respondent's
case rests upon her statement, because it is neither said nor
proved by the respondent that there was any writing inter-
changed or that there was any person present at this
alleged interchange of consent. It is true that this
admission has very much weakened the respondent's
power and means of proving her case. But the omission
itself is entirely in accordance with the truth and con-
sistency of that case. Her case is, and it is proved by
various parts of the correspondence that the marriage took
place between herself and the appellant, was to be kept
secret, and not even answered in their mutual letters for fear
of question, a caution which seems to have been observed
until 1553, when we fiad the appellant for the first time
writing to the respondent as " Madame Yelverton." But

this occurs in the subsequent correspondence, and is a re-
markable confirmation of the respondent's statement that
some engagement or promise relative to marriage took place
upon the 13th of April. In a letter written on the 12th
of July, the respondent reminds the appellant that his right
to call her his own commenced exactly three months ego,
namely, on the 12th of April. her words are, "My ears
ache to hear the Inia, though I am convinced you might say

it with perfect truth now and for exactly three months
past." I regard this letter of the 12th July as a full proof
of the truth of the respondent's chief allegation, namely,
that there had been a marriage by mutual consent entered
into at Edinburgh on the 12th April, 1857, but that there
had not been cohabitation in consequence ce the refusal of
the respondent to consent to cohabitation until a religious
ceremony had been performed. The appellantindeed affirmed
that there was sexual intercourse between himself and the
respondent before in Edinburgh, 's7—on allegation which
the judges in the court below refuse to give credence to, and
contains to me a strong proof of the truth and honour of the
respondent that she has denied that which the appellant
affirms, for it was plainly her interest in one view of the case
to have admitted that cohabitation did take place before
she left Scotland iu April, 1857, inasmuch as it appears
to me, and such I infer from his judgment would have been
the opinion of the Lord President, that there would then
have been no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion upon
the evidence of the appellant subsequent that there had
been a promise to marry given in Scotland, on the faith of
which cohabitation, also, in Scotland had taken place be-
tween the parties. Bat before proceeding further respect-
ing the evidence, it is necessary to advert to the arguments
so much pressed on the part of the appellant that it is in
the highest degree improbable that any matrimonial con•
nection would be followed between the respondent and
the appellant, inasmuch as there is evidence from the corre-
spondence which took place between himself and the respon-
dent for three or four years previous to the respondent's
arrival in Edinburgh, that the respondent had made the
most indelicate advances to the appellant and was willing
to be his mistress without a promise or ceremony of mar-
riage. Many hours were spent by the appellant's counsel
in the attempt to give this colour to the correspondence. I
abstain from making any other observation upon this most
laboured part of the appellant's contention, than that it is
in soy deliberate judgment most unwarranted and unjust.
An amatory character is first given to the correspondence
by the appellant. He addresses her as dear Theresa. When
the lady proposes that the correspondence should terminate
the appellant insists that it should be continued. The noble
and learned lord here read several extracts from the corre-
spondence to show that the respondent's view of the posi-
tion was other than that alleged by the appellant in the part
of his counsel's argument. He proceeded thereupon to say
—I concur with the judgment of Lord Curriehill that it was
at the request or from the encouragement of the appellant
that the respondent came to Edinburgh in Feb , 1857; that
there had not then been any promise to marry, but that there
had been pending for years an honourable courtship. There-
fore in my judgment there is nothing in the case to render
it impossible ; but, on the contrary, much to render possible
the allegation of a secret marriage having taken place, or at
all events that the promise to marry had been mutually
given. I return to the inquiry whether the respondent has
given sufficient legal evidence of the marriage in Scotland
by the exchange of present consent. The version of the
appellant is that an illicit intercourse took place shortly
after her arrival in Edinburgh in February. The appellant
leas not even attempted to sustain his charge. It was,
as I have already stated, disbelieved by the judges,
and it appears to me to be wholly unjustified. The
evidence. showed that the appellant was a constant visitor in
the house where the respondent resided, and he was regarded
by the persons who lived there as the respondent's accepted
suitor. Evidence of a marriage must, therefore, be looked
for subsequent to this, and must, if it exists, be found on
the subsequent acts and correspondence between the time
the respondent was in Edinburgh about the 15th or 16th of
April, 1857, and her joining the appellant in the month
following. In considering these letters it is most important
to bear in mind that fact of which I am fully convinced in
common with the judges of the Court below, namely, that
no sexual intercourse had taken place between the appellant
a Roman Catholic place cf worship, which was to be satis •
factory to her conscience. This, with the fact, that there
had hitherto been no consummation appear to me to in-
terpret the whole of the subsequent correspondence up
to the time of their meeting in Ireland in accordance with
the version of the respondent. It is difficult rightly to draw
conclusions from the correspondence subsequent to this,
because many letters have been destroyed or at least have
net been produced; and also the letters being expressed in
general terms, it is difficult to say that particular expree-