The Sun.
London, England, 1864-08-25 00:00:00

The Herring Fishing.

ANSTRIMIER, August 23.—Though the fishing
here this morningis not quite so heavy as on Satur•
day, it is yet good, there being an average to 250
boats of about 7 or 8 crans—giving a total of about
1800 crane. The quality is middling, their being a
large mixture of small fish. A great number of
stranger boats are now coming here from all parts of
the Firth. The general price to-day is 18s. per
crap. A few boats that had spent fish sold for 16s.
At this date the fishing is about 3,000 crans above
last year, and about equal to the average of the last
seven years.

PITTENWEEM, August 23.—The fishing here this
morning was very irregular, a good many boats
having takes of from 10 to 20 crane, while a great
part of them (and principally the stranger boats)
came in almost clean. The quality of the fish is
very inferior. Prices still continue high : current
price to-day, 18s. 6d. per cran.
DUNBAR, August 23.—0n1y two boats went out
for the Monday's fishing and returned nearly clean.
The fishermen were beginning to be of opinion that
the northerly wind and the heavy swell had driven
or would drive the fish into quieter quarters. How-
ever this morning all the boats came in with quan-
tities from a basket up to four barrels of splendid
fish, not one spent herring being visible over the
whole catch. They were quickly bought up for
the cresh markets at 28s. to 30s. per cran. At these
prices there is no curing. The whole have again
been taken to the east.

FALKLAND,—The labours of the harvest are
closely attended to here, and all along the Howe
of Fife stooks stud the landscape. Mr Russell,
Falkland Wood, had several fields cut last week,

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

TIMES.—It was only in sarcasm that a political
novice was once invited to see by what men the
world was governed; but it is in sober truth that we

are now asked to observe on what simple principles
the art of government depends. One of the most
experienced, successful, and popular Ministers of
modern times has just explained to his consituents
the maxims by which his policy has been shaped,
and they consist in leaving people to themselves at
home, and keeping the country out of mischief
abroad. In this country, said Lord Palmerston at
Tiverton, "all that Government has to do is to
leave things alone." The science of politics thus
regarded is like one of the best conceptions of the
science of medicine, which looks upon physicians
as little more than scavengers whose duty is to
remove such obstacles as are in Nature's way, and
let her work out her own cure. If commerce
is unrestricted and industry undisturbed, if capi-
tal is secure and credit stable, then men may
be safely left to pursue their own interests after
their own designs, without aid or guidance from
authority, and the result will be public prosperity
and national wealth. So far there is no policy lr.ke
that of inaction. A Government which will care-
fully remove obstructions in the way of industry,
and abstain from meddling any further, wilt do all
that is necessary to be done. But these are not all
the functions of a nation's life. A country may be
occasionally called upon to suspend these pleasant
and productive works of peace, and assume obliga-
tions of a very different kind. Not only national
interests, but national honour and national duty
may summon a people to the sacrifices and suff'er-
ings of war. Nor can this command, when founded
on justice, be disregarded without danger. Lord
Palmerston believes, indeed, that the "peace-at.
any-price" party exists among us no longer, and
that there is now no section of Englishmen which
would shrink from war if the honour and dignity of
the country required the sacrifice. But how is such
a question to be determined ? There we do, indeed,
encounter difficulties; but still there are no State
secrets in such problems. True political wisdom
consists, not in enunciating a " policy" in sonorous
phrases, but in applying to each question as it
occurs the rules of common sense and prudence.
Lord Palmerston frankly acknowledges that in the
three cases which have recently arisen there were
considerable differences of opinion ; in fact, he
asserts only of the decisions of Government that,
upon the whole, and after calm reflection, they will
commend themselves to the public as right. It is
not to be denied that there has been a feeling of
misgiving in the popular mind. The country is
sometimes but half satisfied with itself. True,
we are enjoying a safe and prosperous peace in-
stead of battling with the charges and necessities
of war, but have we pur chased this happiness at too
dear a price ? Have we evaded our duties when
we were called upon to prevent oppression, and
cause right to be done ? We are sure it will be
the ultimate conviction that we have incurred no
such reproach. No doubt a different policy would
have gratified many at the time, but that proves
nothing. It has been said that two things are in-
variably popular at first—a war and a peace; and
there is, perhaps, hardly a question on which a
defiant or Quixotic policy would not command a
certain amount of approval. The point for decision
concerned, not the transitory feelings of a party,
but the permanent interests of the State, and by
this time we believe the policy adopted has been
recognised as the beat that could be embraced.
We may almost put out of the question the case
of the American belligerents. Nobody could well
maintain that it was the duty of England to
interfere in such a contest, and events have suffis
ciently proved that it was nit our interest to do
so. By intervention we should, as Lord Palmerston
observed, " have added thousands of our own sons
to the hecatomb of victims which that calamitous
and bloody slaughtering war has sacrificed," while
it is doubtful if by this expenditure we could have
liberated the cotton supplies of the South, and quite
certain that even if we had done so the result would
not have been worth the cost. The paralysis of the
cotton industry has cost us literally nothing—that
is to say, our national trade is just as large and as
lucrative as it was before, whereas a war with
America might have cost us more than any man
could reckon. The Polish question was not so clear,
but it turned mainly on sympathies, and such sym-
pathies rarely constitute a sufficient cause for war.
Lord Palmerston admits that a war for the rescue
of the Poles would have commanded " great acqui-
escence in popular feeling," and it is also well under-
stood that it might have been undertaken with the
oo.operation of France. But, measuring interests
against intereste,,and looking calmly at the probable
condition of the struggle, we cannot say that Eng-
land was called upon to intervene, or that she
neglected any duty by declining to do so. However
the case may be regarded it certainly was not a case
of duty or honour. The Danish question was more
difficult, for our power appeared greater while our
obligations seemed more distinct. It seemed far
more practicable to send a fleet to the Baltic than
to tear a continental province from the Russian
Empire, and it was undeniable that the chief
Powers of Europe had made a contract with Den-
mark, which, if it did not amount to an absolute
guarantee, did certainly imply a recognition of the
pretensions asserted by the Danes. In this case,
indeed, our Government was prepared to co-operate
with the other Powers in securing the observance
of the engagement, but no other Power would bear
its share in the undertaking. It then became a ques-
tion of might as well as right, and we had to ask
ourselves not only whether we were bound to pre.
serve the Duchies for Denmark, but whether we
had the power of doing so if we wished. The unani-
mous decision of the Governments whose engage.
ments were identical with our own showed to how
slight an extent the Treaty was held to be operative,
while as regards our competence to perform the work
Lord Palmerston placed the question beyond dispute.
The season would not admit of our sending a fleet
to the scene of action, nor, if we had sent a fleet,
could it have stopped the march of the armies which
were invading Denmark. The war was to be fought
out on land, and the utmost that we could have
done would have been to oppose a contingent of
30,000 or 40,000 men to armies which the enemy
could have raised with ease to 300,000 or 400,000.
Such was the aspect of the question when viewed
by the light of practical common sense. There
is, however, always an escape from such
arguments, though it lies in a prophecy only. The
advocates of a war policy rarely venture on adv.:)•
eating the thing itself. They tell us that a mere
threat would do the business. They say that it
England would only threaten to go to war, the war
would never be provoked, and that we should gain
our ends at the cheep cost of a bold front and a few
strong words. But that was not the case 10 years
ago on the Turkish question, nor do we believe that
Russia would have been found any more pliable in
the question of Poland. In the Danish question
it is now almost certain that one of the German
Powers at anyrate could not have been turned aside
by anything short,of superior force. From what
has transpired of the policy of Prussia it is rea•
sonable to suppose that she was fully prepared to
encounter the extremities of war rather than desist
from her purpose, and that the quarrel, if
once undertaken, must have been fought out to
the end. We put out of the question for the mo-
ment the manifold and weighty considerations of
ancient alliances and permanent interests which any
European war must involve, but, however things
had gone, or whatever might have been the policy of
the party in power, we could certainly never have
done all three of the things which it is maintained
that we ought to have done. if we had gone to
war with Russia on behalf of Poland, it is perfectly
certain that we could never have so much as enter.
tained the question of a second war with the United
States, or a third with Germany. One of these
‘: obligations" would infallibly have so satisfied us
that we should have had little consideration for the
others. War is a very exhausting occupation even
to countries which make it more their business to be
prepared for it than we do, and when we see how
impossible it is to carry it on everywhere, we may
perhaps feel better contented at letting it alone
altogether.
DAILY NEWS.—The alliance and accord between
Austria and Prussia by no means implies, or even
advances German unity. It is simply an agreement
between military powers for military ends. Instead
of the Cedant arms, which might have been hoped
from the great industrial progress of Germany, it is
on the contrary civil improvement, and even come
mercial development, that is sacrificed to aims of
military organisation and agglomeration. Had the
old policy and politicians survived that extended
the commercial sway and influence of Prussia so far
beyond its frontiers, they would have taken advan ••
tage of the late successes to push the limits of the
great Commercial Union even to the Sound. But
M. de Bismark cares for nothing but military ports,
arsenals, and contingents. Whilst he is establish-
ing these beyond the Eider, the hold which Prussia
had for well nigh half a century maintained over
the South is loosened if not lost. All the States of
North Germany—those at least which belonged to
the Zollverein—have consented to its renewal.
Even Hanover, which ebjcted so strongly to the
treaty with France, had waived objections. Not
e
so the two minor kingdoms of the South. Bavaria
and Wurtemburg still hold aloof. And as the
Prussian Government does not take the least pains
to conciliate them, and seems not to care whether
they go or stay, it is not improbable that the re-
newed Zollverein will not extend south of the
Danube. This indifference, real or feigned, of Prus-
sia to the extension of its Commercial Union even
over its old limits in the South, gives rise to many
suspicions, One obvious fear is, that it has given

its consent to a dualism, or division of Germany
into North and South—the former to be sub•
jected to the authority of Prussia, the latter
destined to undergo the Austrian yoke. The
Prussian Minister may plead that the accession of
Bavaria and Wurtsmhurg to the Union adds
nothing to the common revenue ; on the contrary,
those States receive more than the share they
bring. But there are many circumstances which
compensate for this, and which should be taken
into account, North Germany, like the Northern
States of America, has constituted itself the factor
of the South. The colonial produce which it cur.
sumes, as well as its other wants, are provided by
the merchants of Hamburg and Leipsic. It the
Southern kingdoms quit the Zollverein, they will
be supplied from Trieste or from France. The pro-
bability is that if Bavaria and Wurtemburg decide
its
Union, a commercial secession from Prussia and
Union, they will join Austria in a counter Zollvc-
, rein, an event that must be attended by political es
well as commercial results of extreme importance.
It is singular enough that, at a time when these
Northern kingdoms of Germany are called upon to
take a decision of such magnitude, they should have
both fallen under the rule of new sovereigns. As
much of the immediate future of Germany must
depend upon the part which its four minor kings
play—those, we mean, of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover,
and Wurtemburg—it is important to consider the
character of the new monarchs, and the influences
likely to prevail with them. The death of the late
King Maximilian of Bavaria was considered an ad-
vantage to Prussia, since it removed a personal
antagonist and rival of the Hohenzollerns. But
King Maximilian, though petulant and resentful,
was not formidable, being a scholar rather than a
soldier, and far more fitted to carry on an academic
than a military war. The youth who has succeeded
him is spirited and lively, and may one day play
.e
leading part, but for the present he is through his
relations under the influence of the clergy, whose
antipathy to Prussia is of the strongest. The able
Minister, Von der Pfordten, is equally opposed to
the policy of Berlin. But as that policy seems to
confine itself to the North, and to have the support
of Austria, Bavaria may he content to maintain
the rights and influence of the minor Princes in the
Bund. The new King of Wurtemburg cannot plead
infancy. It is long since he reached maturity, but
his father kept him so estranged from public busi-
ness or political influence that he is almost like
Turkish prince ascending the throne. His Queen
is the Grand Duchess Olga of Russia. Nevertheless
the new reign follows the steps of the old with re-
gard to the Bund and the Sleswig.Holstein succes'
sion. And the Duke of Oldenburg, who made a tour
incognito through the little country of the centre
and eouth,was ill-received every where,even at Suitt,"
gard ; in many places, indeed, not received at el"
The mingled fears and rivalry which animated the
minor kingdoms against the great ones, and against
Prussia especially, have led to some good resolves
and to a sounder policy. All agree, for example,
that in the face of Bismark treading down the na-
tional representation, their business is to be on good
terms with their Chambers, and to keep true to the
constitution. The Wurtemburg Chambers met, es
their fundamental law enjoins, on the King's death.
After the new monarch swearing to the constitution
they took the oath of allegiance to him. Then fe'
lowed the address, and the debate on the addrcsB,lll
which the extreme Right, the extreme Left, and the
moderate or middle party showed themselves. The
extreme Left was for denouncing Austria and Pri?:
sut, and forming a third pure German party to resist
them, them, and a vote in that sense was passed by th
Wurtemburg Chambers in February. The Modes
rates, however, deprecated any raising of a separate
banner against Austria and Prussia, it being wiser
to assume that the rights of the Confederation won,
be respected, and the wishes of the German people
duly considered. These opinions and debates of thed
Wurtemburg Chambers, which are only just
seem to show how moderate and measured is likely
to be any parliamentary resistance on the part of
the lesser towards the greater Powers. Austria can
alone act as a counterpoise to prevent Prussia from
carrying its advantage and its ambition too far.
Should, however, those two great Powers have
agreed upon "going halves" in Germany, dividing
influence and empire between them, nothing can
save the minor States from absorption except the
timidity or prudence of the great sovereigns. As
to Austria, it can have no idea of absorbing such a
country as Bavaria. All it requires is Bavarian
support and adhesion. In the North it is otherwise.
'There M. de Bismark would gladly and greedily
swallow up Hanover, Saxony, and Mecklenburg;
nay, he would at once annex Schleswig-Holstein
but for the hesitations of King William. And for
this not a few Prussians loudly censure the King,
whilst ready to applaud his unscrupulous Minister.

COUNTRY MARKETS,

~1,-.^..-----

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE-TUESDAY.

Harvest work has commenced in earnest in the county
of Northumberland this week, and reaping machines have
been called into active requisition. This morning at our
market the wheat trade was slow, and prices ruled at about
the same as last Saturday. We had a large arrival of oats
(Scotch), and a fair business was done at the quotations of
last week.