The Sun.
London, England, 1864-12-13 00:00:00

Speech of General Cialdini.

The following is a literal translation of the full
report of the speech of Gen. Cialdini, published in
the Turin official Gazette:—

" It is with the greatest hesitation that I rise to
speak, gentlemen, on the project of law now under
discussion, not only from the respect with which the
Senate inspires me, but because this is the first time
of my addressing this grave assembly, to which must
also be added the importance of the question itself
and the groat and deserved authority of the Oppo.
sition, in whose ranks I see excellent and most die.
tinguished men whose talents, character, and ante.
cedents I highly honour and esteem. Stich consi.
derations ought, perhaps, to arrest the words on my
lips, and condemn me to silence, if my position as a
soldier and a citizen, my titles of General and Sena
tor, did not seem to impose on me the duty of ex.
preesing,without arrogance,but with a firm and clear
conviction, my opinion upon a bill of such great im.
portance, and which seems fated to exercise the
greatest influence on the destinies of the country.
As the hon. senator Mamiani well said in his speech
of elegant and enviable eloquence, this question,
which for nearly three months has been the theme
of the European press, been discussed at length in
the other House of Parliament, and now debated for
several days here, may be considered as completely
exhausted. It becomes, therefore, very difficult, if
not impossible, to speak of it without falling into a
continual repetition of what has been already said '
and written,and such repetitions are to be eschewed
as useless. Nevertheless, if nay memory does not be-
tray
me, in reading all that has been written on this
grave argument, I have vainly sought a clear and
logical exposition of the military ideas which in
my opinion, more than any other consideration of a
political or administrative order, counsel the trans.
for of the capital, even independently of the Conven.
tion of the 15th of Sept. This omission encourages.
determines me to speak ; not that I can hope to fill
it completely and usefully, but because I may at
least attempt to do so without incurring the risk of
the dreaded repetitions. As a soldier, intrusted with
a great command in the national army, from the
duties of my position, habits of study, love of my
country, and I confess, from an instinct of respond
sibility, I have necessarily had to take the defence
of the State into serious consideration. From the
beginning of 1862, after my return from Naples, I
have constantly reflected that we have an enemy
permanently established in our country, intrenched
in one of the most formidable military positions
known. The:enemy is powerful from the strength
of his armies, his vigorous organisation, his antique
traditions. There is no truce, no transaction with
him possible, so long as he has a foot in Italy. -War
is therefore inevitable sooner or later, and war, per.
haps, is only a question of opportunity both for him
and us. On the other hand, I reflected that we have
a fortunate and most useful alliance, but, perhaps,
a conditional and transitory one, because due to the
policy set forth by a great monarch, who may one
day or another disappear from the scene of the
world. Heaven avert such a misfortune ! but we
must think of it, precisely because it would be a
great misfortune. If the Emperor of the French, I
continued to think, were to die, he would leave the
French outposts on the Mount Cennis, at Sospello,
Soarena, and Turbia, all positions illustrated by the
Piedmontese arms, and which the history of Savoy
recalls with just pride, positions all of which we lost
by the cession of Nice and Savoy, and by the demar-
cation of our new frontier towards France, if on the
death of the Eneveror there ensued a charge of
policy inFrance,if there were a return to that policy
traditionally hostile to the idea of the resurrection
and unity of Italy, which even the Republican
Governments of Lamartine and Cavaignac main.
tained against us, if our friend became an enemy, to
what risks would not Turin, capital of the King-
dom, be exposed ? If, at the same time, Austria,
profiting by the altered circumstaneee, were sud-
denly to attack us, what terrible dangers, what tre-
mendous embarrassments, would not threaten Italy ?
Why do we not think seriously, why do we not
labour diligently, to create a new system of general
defence of the State, apt to protect it against these
different, perhaps distant, but possible eventuali-
ties; apt to ward off a disaster, a surprise, a coali.
tion,or an European reaction ? The wig() do not shut
their eyes to danger and await it unprepared.
Cowards only refuse to see it, and arc dismayed.
Political and military wisdom consists in calmly
scanning ins extent, considering the remedy, and
providing it. Such disturbing thoughts haunted
me, gentlemen, in my occupations and me daily
wales. ucti disturbing thoughts frequently
troubled my sleep at night. In this disposition of
mind and soul I received a letter from the Ministry
of War, inviting me and several Generals to report
our views concerning a project of defence against
Austria, concerning tetes•de poets to be constructed
here or there, this or that city to be fortified, and so
forth. I answered these various questions in detail,
but then,observing that this project was incomplete,
transitory, and restricted, while, according to me, a
wide, general, and permanent system was indispen-
sably necessary, I added some considerations of my
own, which, by a singular coincidence, are neither
foreign nor inapposite to the present discussion.
The Senate will allow me to communicate these,
remarking that I wrote and forwarded them to the
Ministry of War on the 4th of June, 1862, when:the
Convention of the 15th of September was not—could
not be foreseen, when I could not be suspected of
over deference to the Minghetti Ministry, or of
cowardly servility to France. This is what I said
to the Ministry, beyond answering the special
questions :
" The moment seems to me come for preparing the great
changes which the political eventualities to which we are
exposed must entail in our general system of defenca of the
State. We are now allied with France and in permanent
hostility toAustria. The death of the Emperor, the Eastern
question, that of Rome, or any other whatsoever, may one
day completely reverse existing alliances, and smooth down
ancient enmities, creating new views, combinations, inte.
rests, and sympathies both of peoples and governments.
By some strange accident we might to-morrow find our
selves the allies of Austria and. the enemies of France (I do
not admit the hypothesis as possible, but in considering the
general system of defence of the State, even the most remote
possibilities must be taken into account). Besides, the
transfer of the the capital would be henceforth a military,
if it were not even convenient politically. It is a question
of time. The cession of Nice and Savoy, the new demarca-
tion of our frontiers towards France, do not allow the capi-
tal of the kingdom to be any longer at Turin, on which
200,000 French may descend by different roads in a few
marches. The capital of Italy, if not Rome, ought certainly
to be Florence or Naples. It seems to me, therefore, that
our general system of defence of the State foreseeing a pos-
sible change of alliances, and a speedy removal of the capi-
tal, ought henceforth to embrace these most serious contin-
gencies, akd prepare us for the necessary transition. The
defence of the State can no longer bo considered from the
Piedmontese point of view exclusively modelled on the
ideas of Buonaparte, who, starting from France to conquer
Italy, was in a position diametrically opposed to ours. We
accept the precise conditions under which the Romans
lived, and militarily speaking, Italy must be regarded
from the point of view of that warlike people—that is
to say, completely reversing the actual system. The ca-
pital, the depots, the reserves, the magazines, the factories
the arsenals, the resources of every sort should be in
that part of the peninsula which lies in the midst of the sea.
Turning our backs on Southern Italy, we should fix our eyes
on the circle of the Alps, from which alone can descend the
enemies of Italy, whether German or of any other nation.
The Lombard and Piedmontese plains may still be the scene
of great battles against the invaders, without renouncing
beforehand the defence which the double slope of the Apen-
nines offers to whoever has skill and determination to profit
by it. On this general idea, which I have barely touched 1
would fain see discussed, planned cur, and established a wide
system of defence of the State, answering to the wants both
of to-day and to-morrow, and embracing all contingencies,
the present and the future, the near and the remote. Far from,
this, I only see narrow schemes, hardly sufficing for the po-
litical and military conditions in which the country actually
is, sufficing only while the Emperor of the French lives,
while France is our ally, while Austria is our enemy, end
has a footing in Italy,
while Turin is the Italian capital,' dee.
As I said, I wrote this to the Ministry on the 4th
of June, lti6 2. Two years and a half have gone by
since, and the lapse of time, far from weakening,
has only strengthened my conviction. Ido not pre.
tend to turn the Senate into a conference of Ge.
nerale, or a council of war, nor to submit to its ex.
amination and judgment a general system of de,
fence of the State, such as 1 see and feel ought to
exist. But I would fain demonstrate and make the
Senate comprehend how and why a good general
system of defence of the State exacts by implication
in my opinion the removal of the capital beyond