The National Register.
London, England, 1808-07-31 00:00:00

JULY 31.

the sophistry mat artifices of the common enemy can-
not disi;oise them. They are like the sun, which a
transient cloud may obscure, but which bursts through
the thin vapour with brighter splendour. But where
arc these facts ? they are to be seen in the very Bul-
letins of the French army, in the o' fficial and semi-dicial
papers of the Tyrant. Oa witnessing the rhodomantades,
and contradictioas of Sir John Falstaff, have we any doubt
that the blustering bully is a most shameless egregious liar.
Is it necessary to have been before acquainted with the
circumstance of Harry taking away front him his ill-ac-
quired boo v, to be convinced that the Knight is telling a
most flagrant untruth. His very tone, his manner, con-
vey conviction. Read the diary of Madrid—read the
letter from the Elbe—and read all their other diaries and
bite.% and remark their contradictions and blusternors,
and every man of common experience and judgment
itll
pronounce isosispAaTE as notorious and infamous a liar.
Oh ! wnat pleasure must it afford to every man of integrity
and ieelia-4, whether Briton, Spaniard, or German, to see
that iusoient, imperious upstart reduced to that last state
of degradation and infamy, to lose his prey, and afterwards
to neap one falsehood upon another, in order to cover his
ignominy. " trick, what device, what starting hole
" cans! thou now find out, to hide thee from this open and
" apparent shame ?" Such is then the issue of all his
crimes and atrocities. With the superior abilities he possess-
ed, with the influence he could easily have acquired over the
public opinion of Europe, he might have done more good
to mankind than any man we have ever read of in history.
But now the career is closed ; and though he may at the
extremity of it, shed torrents of blood, and inundate Spain
with slaur,whter and devastation, he is however reduced to
the diabolical predicament, that the gate of reformation
and mercy is shut to him for ever. The army he can
employ against Spain, as we have repeatedly observed, is
entirely incompetent for that purpose. We have also ob-
served, that he would be compelled to divide his army for
want of provisions : these divisions will not receive a mo-
ment's respite from the Patriotic Generals. His foraging
parties will be harrassed by the armed peasants. If he
draws supplies from France, he must have armies to protect
them; or they fall into the hands of the Patriots. This
scarcity of provisions will compel him to divide his army
into still smaller divisions, and it will crumble to pieces
without even the honour of a general engagement. He
may raise the conscripts of the years 1809 and 1810, they
will never he able to supply. the loss of his veteran aro)),
and they are inferior, even in point of discipline, to the
Spanisa Patriots. If he has not been able as yet even to
resist successfully the isolated efforts of the Spaniards, what
means will he be able to oppose to the Spanish insurrec-
tion, when it is better organized, and aided by our nume-
rous expeditions. On account of our superiority at sea,
and the good wishes of the natives, we shall not meet with
the same difficulty of subsisting our army. This wit'
enable them to act occasionally M a body, when their num-
ber, bravery, and discipline, will overwhelm any corps the
french NV be able to oppose to them. However the highest
policy would suggest the expediency of compelling him to
employ a considerable part of his army and recruits along
the 1: reach coasts: we should have, as was already observed
in this Paper, flying squadrons from Calais to Bayonne,
with about ten thousand of our best soldiers on boar's', and
make partial descents on every part of the French coast :
these squadrons may unite or act separately. as the service
may require. It is said that Lord Nelson highly approved
of this mode of annoying the French. We know it from
experience, that the French, during the Prussian and
ustrian war, did not retain a single soldier in France,
ex-
cept such as were necessary for drilling the conscripts. anti
for defending Brest and Boulogne" and even a part of this
service was confided to the new raised national guards. lle
cannot rely even on this resource at present. There were
never twenty thousand organized at any period. The
Yiench papers, it is true, asserted the contrary ; but that