The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-04 00:00:00

upon the anniversaries of Alma, of Balaklava, of Inker-
man, and of the confused calamities which made up the
history of the past winter. In short, though but a year
ago this season was judged suitable for the commence-
ment of a great enterprise, experience has shown that
it must bring with it the speedy close of military opera-
tions. Six more weeks are all that can be counted
upon with certainty by the besiegers of Sebastopol ;
rain may perhaps be delayed till November, and thus
they will have two months for the execution of their
plans. But, on the other hand, even September may
interrupt the labour of both troops and workmen by the
heavy gales and the storms of rain which sometimes ac-
company the autumnal equinox.
Divided command now begins to be felt inconvenient.
The line from Baidar to Inkerman, a distance of twelve
miles, is occupied by French, Sardinians, and Turks,
with, we believe, a part of the English cavalry. The
troops of each nation have their own commander, totally
independent of all the others. Report speaks of a plan
for uniting the commands of the troops on the Tchernaya
in one hand. A Russian attack may be repeated which
it will be necessary to repel, or a demonstration made
which the allies may have the power to change into a
hurried retreat. In any case, the will of a single com-
mander is necessary for rapid combinations along such
an extended line. For offensive movements, particularly
for pursuit after a victory, such an unity of authority
seems almost indispensable. The rumours which pre-
vail on the subject may be founded in error, but they
show that an evil is felt which it requires no military
knowledge to appreciate. The departure of Omer Pasha
seems to have deprived the Turks of all efficient com-
mand whatever. Probably believing that his absence
would be of short duration, he left Osman Pasha with,
apparently, very detai;ed instructions, so as almost en-
tirely to control his liberty of action. As no successor
Ito the late Commander-in-Chief has been appointed,
Osman Pasha must remain as a lieutenant, and continue
bound by instructions which hamper his movements,
and render impossible the co-operation of the Turks in
any plane of their allies. But up to the present time
the allies have acted strictly on the defensive, and no
movement has been contemplated but such as might
more efficiently protect their extended lines both on the
side of the Tchernaya and Sebastopol. On the great pre-
parations of the last ten weeks the hopes of the French
and British Generals are fixed, and indeed the fire that
will open, when they shall judge that the fitting time is
come, will be unexampled in the history of warfare.
The cannonade of October last was trifling to that of
April ; April was surpassed by the two days which pre-
ceded the capture of the Mamelon ; but all will sink
into insignificance compared with the iron tempest which
will shortly be poured on the besieged city. The weight
and range of the guns, the number and size of the mor-
tars, the new positions of the batteries won by the steady
progress which has marked the summer, will try the
endurance of the Russians to the utmost. The great
scale on which such a bombardment is carried on, and
the preparations necessary for its execution, render the
delays which precede it a matter of little surprise. In
April the allies threw against Sebastopol, within nine
days, 550,000 shot and shell ; the cost of the British
ammunition alone was 300,0001. Yet April is now
looked back upon as a time when we undervalued the
enemy and did not know what Sebastopol was. Even
on ordinary days the Russians will often fire some 4,000
shot i❑ the 24 hours., and throw 600 shell into one part
of the British position. Yet their general fire is cor-
rectly described as slack in comparison with ours. What
may be their resources, and the strength of the work at
which they labour day and night, we cannot judge ; but
there can be no doubt that a struggle is approaching
which will determine the fate of Sebastopol for this win•
ter at least. No one can pretend to foretell the issue ;
all that is spoken of with certainty is, that the line-of-
battle ships will be destroyed, or at least driven from
their position, so as to he made powerless against the
assaulting troops. Whether we shall take the Malakhoff,
whether we can keep it, whether it will lead to the im-
mediate capture of the town, or only to ulterior success,
are all matters of doubt. The chances are in favour of
the allies, who are superior in the character of their men,
in the science they can command, and even in numbers ;
but, should ♦ictory not favour their arms, they will pro-
bably be forced to wait in inactivity till another spring
and another system of tactics assure the success which
they probably might have commanded earlier. Our
generals have set all on the hazard of a doubtful struggle
at a single point, and we must wait the result.

(From the Daily News of this day.)
Our Generals in the Crimea have been sorely annoyed
by the surveillance which the newspaper press has exer-
cised over all their operations. They forget that they
owe to this publicity a comparative exemption from acts
of injustice to which the Russian Generals are frequently
subjected. The authorities in St. Petersburg, after
twisting and turning the news of the battle of the Tcher-
naya into every possible shape, and after finding that by
no legerdemain anything could be made of it, but a de-
feat, have set themselves to invent excuses for the dis-
agreeable fact. Prince Gortschaknff, it would appear, is
to be made the scape-goat. The St. Petersburg corres-
pondent of Le Nord has been instructed to write to that
journal, that " an impatient desire of measuring his
strength with the enemy hurried Prince Gortschakoff on
beyond the limits of prudence." In Russia this false ac-
cusation is certain to be believed, for there no one dare
publish the fact that Prince Gortchakoff, instead of
being hurried away by an impatient desire of battle,
merely carried into effect instructions received from St.
Petersburg, in a letter from the Emperor, which was
read to the troops before going into action. It is true
that a somewhat similar trick was tried by Sir James
Graham. when he attempted to throw upon Sir Charles
Napier the whole blame of the resultless campaign of
1854, while Sir Charles had been merely acting in con-
formity to the instructions of the Admiralty. But the
disingenuous finesse of Sir James having been exposed,
no other minister will attempt to repeat it. Our Admi-
rals and Generals are henceforth safe from such unworthy
treatment. Not se with the Admirals and Generals of
Russia. Others of them have experienced the same
treatment as Prince,Gortschakoff before now ; and others
will experience it hereafter as often as obedience to the
commands of their government leads to di,aster and de-
feat. The much-decried publicity, for which England
is indebted to its newspaper press, secures to our com-
manders by sea and land fair play at the hands of
Government, and secures to the public that efficient
service which can only be rendered by men who are
sure of having justice done them provided they do their
duty.

It is as well, however, to note that in the present case
any sympathy for Prince Gortschakoff would be entirely
thrown away. "Even-handed justice has commended
the contents of his poisoned chalice to his own lips."
He has merely been treated by his Government as he
has himself treated a braver and a better officer. Among
the Russian officers who fell at the battle of the Tcher-
naya was General Read. "Dead men tell no tales ;"
and accordingly Prince Gortschakoff has resolved that
General Read shall bear the blame of his failure. " I
then proceeded," says the Prince, in his report pub-
lished in the Invalids Russe, "to that redoubt (the re-
doubt on the Telegraph Hill), to examine the ground in
person, to give my final instructions for the operations
of the troops, when I was startled by a violent platoon
firing on our right wing. General Read, with his two
divisions, bad attacked the Fedukhine heights. It is
impossible for me to explain the motive which deter-
mined that General to make the attack contrary to the
adopted plan, without having received my orders to do
so, for very soon afterwards he himself and the chief of
his staff were killed." Now, singularly enough, no no-
tice is taken of this grave charge against Gen. Read in
the abstract of Prince Gortschakoff's report, which origi-
nally appeared in the Invalids Russe. General Read, it
will be recollected, was not killed outright, but was con-
veyed to the French camp, and lingered some time be-
fore he expired. The full report of Prince Gortscbakoff,
published in the Invalids Russe, has, therefore, all the
appearance of a second and amended edition, prepared
after the Prince had ascertained that death had incapa-
citated the man on whom he now seeks to throw the blame
of his repulse from contradicting him. What a picture
of courtly baseness and falsehood does this shifting of the
blame from shoulder to shoulder present! The parasites
of the Court first accuse Prince Gortschakoff of rashness,
whereas it appears that he simplycarried into effect the posi-
tive commands of the Emperor ; and the only way the
Prince can devise of warding off a misrepresentation
which he knew awaited him, is, not to toll the real
truth, but in his turn to invent a lie against a dead
officer. And it is pretty Blear that such falsehood and
dishonesty is not confined to the soil of Russia, but that
it would flourish as luxuriantly in this our own land,
were there not a public opinion to keep it in check.
Selfish cruelty and falsehood are the vices of slaves.
They prompt the Russians to slander the absent and the
dead, and to turn their guns on their own wounded,
abandoned on the field of battle, rather than that the
enemy should have the credit of relieving them.
There is another important lesson to be drawn from
the report of Prince Gortsohakoff. The allusion made
by General Pelissier, in his order of the day issued after
the battle of the Tchernaya, to his desire to economise
the blood of his soldiers, betrayed a lurking uneasiness
lest he should be accused of not having followed up his
victory with sufficient promptitude. The elaborate report
of Admiral Druat, published a short time afterwards, has
much the appearance of having been got up to meet
such a charge by anticipation. And now the report of
Prince Gortschakoff shows how the Russians have been
able to turn to account the failure to pursue them. In
a tone of braggadocio the Prince declares that he made
a stand upon the Mackenzie heights, but that the enemy
" dared not attempt" to assail him. Whenever the
Allies have grappled with the Russians in earnest, the
latter have shrunk from the contest ; but whenever the
Allies have failed to follow up their advantage, the Rus-
sians have had the audacity to claim a semi-victory. The
Muscovites must be dealt with as the old doggrel ad-
vises dealing with a nettle :
If you gently touch a nettle,
It will burn and sting you still ;
Grasp it, like a man of mettle,
And the rogue obeys your will.

(From the Morning Herald of this day.)
With the latest intelligence from Odessa appears the
following statement :—" The Russians are busy fortify-
in and intercepting the passes communicating with the
Putrid Sea." It would seem that not until we were
masters of the towns and fortifications in the Straits of
Kertch did the thought strike the commanders of the
expedition that the possession of the Putrid Sea is a
matter of even greater consequence than the occupation
of the Azoff. By the Spit of Arabat, and across the
wooden causeway, constructed of late years, the Rus-
sians have been able to move their supplies and rein-
forcements into the Crimea at pleasure, and may do so
still for that matter, for all we know to the contrary.
The Sivash flows up to the very rampart of Perekop,
spreading into maul)), lagunes along the northern coast.
The successful navigation of such waters could only be
attempted by means of a fleet of flat-bottomed boats ;
and for such craft there is work to do, and plenty of it,