The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-23 00:00:00

The report of the Committee on the army before Sebastopol
consists, as all Such documents must, of two parts—the facts
established by the evidence, and the result traceable fr re
them. Upon the facts there exists, we apprehend, very little
difference of opinion. 411 those statements that were so
fiercely controverted when they first appeared in our columns
are now the axioms and data from which all parties alike are
content to reason. But, starting from this common point of
departure, different minds have arrived at strikingly different
conclusions. Mr. Roebuck does not scruple to strike at in-
dividuals, however high in office or in station -; the Adminis-
tration, the Commander-in-Chief, tke Staff, the Medical De-
partment, the Commissariat, all come successively under his
lash. General Peel attributes our miseries and disasters
mainly to faults of system, for which, of course, no one is to
blame, while Lord Seymour, with a truer insight and a more
judicious discrimination, steers amiddlo course between the
two, and endeavours to distribute the blame in just propor-
tions between the misconduct of individuals and the absurdi-
ties of the system. Of Mr. Drummond's essay we say nothing
for until it be done, into English, or at least reduced in some
degree within the rules of universal grammar, it would be ex-
tremely difficult to say whether it has or has not any mean-
ing at all. Let any one read any of Mr. Dreimmond's speeches,
as reported in our columns, and compare it with the draught
report he has produced, and he will then bo probably aware
of the debt which that unthankful gentleman owes to the
press, which makes him every night speak that English lan-
guage correctly which he seems so utterly incapable of
writing'
The Committee seem to have done wisely in adopting
Lord Seymour's draught. It was conceived on the best
and most comprehensive plan, and executed with that
ability which its author has so often evinced in so many
delicate and difficult investigations. Yet, after all, the
report is far more successful in stating effects than in
tracing out causes—la pointing out errors than in duly allot-
ting the responsibility for them.' This incompleteness the
Committee themselves admit, and allege in excuse of it two
reasons—first, that many of the individuals most reflected on
were not present to defend themselves ; and, secondly, that
considerations of State policy prohibited the following up the
i ivestigation to its legitimate results. These objections, how-
ever, did not prevent the Committee from, delivering a very
strong opinion as to the responsibility of the Administration
for the misfortunes of the expedition, and do'not, it appears
to us. justify the rejection of another paragraph moved by
Mr. Roebuck with worse success, conveying an equally de-
cided opinion that not only the Administration, but the com-
mander of the expedition, was liable to severe censure. Mr.
Roebuck moved an amendment censuring, Lord Raglan as in
a great degree immediately responsible for the sufferings of
the army :
" Had the requisite firmness and prudence been shown by
him, much of the misery resulting from the want of land
transport, from the want of a road from Balaklava to the
camp, from the want of an efficient ambulance, from ineffi-
cient and improper food, from the want of shelter, clothing,
and fuel, might have been prevented. It is but too plain that
Lord Raglan did. not keep the Administration duly informed
of the actual condition of the army under his command.
There seems to have been no head to conceive what was neces-
sary for the army, and no hand to execute the thing needed,
even if it had been foreseen."
These propositions were put to the Committee, and nega-
tived by a majority of 9to 1, Mr. Layard's being the only
vote that was given in their favour. We presume this must have
been done either because these things were considered not to
be true, or else on the grourds of State policy or of fairness
to Lord Raglan, who was not there to make his defence. We
can see no validity in any of these excuses. We have forborne
from expressing any opinion while the inquiry was pending;
but now that it has terminated without any decision there
is no reason why we should be anylonger silent. Lord Rag-
lan is no more exempted from censure by his absence than
De. Hall, who has received a most just rebuke from the com-
mittee for sending in a false report of the state of the hospi-
tals at Scutari, while Lord Raglan, who kept the Ministry,
ignorant of the true state of the army, and so retarded the
means of remedying its wants and relieving-its miseries, -passes
without observation.
Every impartial person must feel in reading the report that
up to a certain point it is clear and logical, and follows the
thread of investigation. net till it is broken off altogether,
but till some insuperable obstacle seems to intervene and pro-
hibit the attempt to go along with it any further. The rays
all converge to one centre —the atoms all gravitate to one pole
of motion and of equilibrium. Bad as our departments were,
bad as their system, bad as their heads, and bad as their
staff, it is absolutely incredible that things should have gone
on as they did had there: been at the head of the expedition a
man active, capable, and energetic, seeing wit his own eyes,
hearing with his own ears, calculating and foreseeing events,
and keeping the Government thoroughly aware of his wants
and the army of his solicitude and attention to its interests.
What is the use of lavishing our indignation on the small fry
of the public service—on Dr. Hall, or on Dr. Menzies, ou
Admiral Boxer, on Captain Christie, on commissariat officers,
or quartermaster-generals—while we allow the really respon•
sible officers to escape us altogether ? The report of the com-
mittee is too much like the spider's web, which firmly en-
closes the small flies within its meshes while it permits the
largo ones to break through and escape. There is also a vio-
lation of historical truth in 'such a silence, for, by fixing on
some persons, and being silent as to others, there is implied
a difficulty in tracing out the truth which does not really
exist, and thus a document designed, no doubt, as a basis
for future history, will tend almost as tnrkelx to puzzi.e
as to enlighten the crtndid-Aeareher after truth who
shall consult it. Those minor personages to whom so much
blame is attributed aro unmeaning puppets, unless a master
hand directed their motions, and combined them to one
common end. The notion that an army can bo worked by
departments each acting within its own sphere, and recipro-
cally controlling and being controlled by its neighbour. is as
preposterous as the idea id making a watch go without a
mainspring, or the solar system act without the law of gravi-
tation.
The ablest leader may be baffled by a confused and jarring
system, or thwarted by the incapacity of his subordinates';
but these things are not to be assumed—they must be proved;
and the very first step in the proof is to show that the leader
had a plan, and that the heads of departments under him
thwarted its execution. Now, wo confess that we see no evi-
dence either that Lord Raglan ever bad any plan forrelieving
the sufferings of the army, or that there existed any insur-
mountable difficulty to the accomplishment of such a plan,
had he entertained it. His errors seem to have been simply
faults of omission—not so much that he did wrong as that he
did nothing. We know of no steps that he took to provide
land transport, to repair the road, to feed, to shelter, or to
warm the army. These things 'seem to have been allowed to
take care of themselves, and consequently not to have been
taken care of at all. At the Alma the Russians presented
themselves before him, and he fought precisely under the con-
ditions and with the disadvantages they prescribed. Victory
declared for him, but it was a barren victory, for the enemy
disappeared from before him, and left him to his own dispo-
sition, which naturally shrank from taking the initiative. lie
appeared before Sebastopol ; Sebastopol was his ; but he bad
not sufficient spontaneous effort to take it. He waited till
the enemy had constructed defences, and then attacked their
defences with means utterly inadequate. This discovery de-
manded fresh resolutions, but he clung to his position with
the tenacity of a man not possessed of sufficient resolution
to rally and rouse his energies and adapt hims If to altered
circumstances. The attack of the 26th of October gave full
notice of the defenceless state of his right wing. but Lord
Raglan could not be induced to spare men to fortify it. The
battle of Inkerman came, and of the battle that gave him a
Field-Marshal's baton Lord Raglan was a passive spectator.
The soldiers won it in their own way, and no attempt was
made to derive any advantage from the panic that must have
been inspired by so fearful a blow. It is said, and we believe
with some truth, that 1 ord Raglan first learnt the true state
of his army from the pages of this journal. With such ante-
cedents, we feel that we have only too much ground for the
conjecture that wo owe to this same passive temperament,
which seems destined always to follow the lead, and never to
take it, the sanguinary repulse we have just experiencel. A
little support on the 7th of June, when the full tide of victory
bore our soldiers to the Redan, might possibly have saved us
the reverse of the 18th. But a single advantage was enough
for a single day, and so the enemy were allowed 10 days more
to prepare for that assault, which even the paucity of our
numbers scarcely caused to fail on the former occasion. We
have age and experience in our commander, but we pay for
them a heavy price in a mechanical and spiritless system,
without vigour, without originality, without energy, and
therefore without success.

(From the Daily News of this day.)

The motion of which Mr. Roebuck gave notice yesterday
will test the sincerity of the House of Commons in its
profession of zo d for the vindication of the national honour
in the sanguinary struggle in which we are engaged. A brave
and generous people never manifest true courage or magnae
nimity more conspicuously than in the hour of unavertable
defeat. It is part of the moral greatness of their character to
bear unforeseen reverses with fortitude, and to look upon
trivial errors with leniency and forbearance. But in proper-
tion as they are forgiving and forgetful of casual faults in
those who undertake the responsibilities of guidance in the
council or the field, they are disposed to visit with severe
condemnation the selfish arrogan'co and negligence whose con-
sequencee in peace aro costly, in war " horrible and heart-
rending." Without theorising on the matter, the people feel
that for their own and their children's sake they cannot afford
to affect indifference to such offences against the well-being of
the State ; and their instinct of justice, more unerring than
the fine-spun inductions of political philosophy, tells them
that it is neither safe nor just to permit any set of men to
trifle with the vital interests of the nation. Public senti-
ment has long ago been expressed in unequivocal terms re-
garding the fearful consequences of Ministerial misconduct
during the last campaign—so unequivocal that even the pre-
sent House of Commons succumbed with a shudder when
called upon last January to appoint a Committee of In-
quiry into the Condition of the camp of Sebastopol. No
evasions or expostulations on the part of the accused
availed to prevent the impanelling of the special jury ;
and, as the result has proved, no arts of packing could avail
to prevent it from doing its duty in the main, or from
the "true verdict given according to the evidence" laid
before it. That verdict is now before the country ; 'whatever
its minor deficiencies may be, it is felt to be sound and true ;
and the question that inevitably suggests itself to every up-
right and uncorrupted mind in the community is—when shall
judgment thereupon be given?
The House of Commons is the tribunal to which wo na-
turally look for that appropriate sequence and judicial action.
When called upon at the commencement of the session, the
house declared itself to be in sympathy with the people, but
to be wholly incompetent to go into detailed investigation of
the facts alleged. There was, indeed, some talk cf hearing
evidence at the bar; but the idea was laid aside on the.
ground of inconvenience to all parties, and of unfairness to
the accused. Eventually a great majority decided that a
select committee of eleven" should sit upstairs, not merely to
inquire but to report to the house what had occurred, and
who was tQ blame. What did that vote imply? Did it
mean nothing, or next to nothing? Was it agreed to in a
non-natural souse, or with suppressed equivocation, or mental
reservation ? Was it not avowedly resisted on the plea
that even to investigate the charges laid :It the door of the
CAbinet implied too grave a censure to be acquiesced in ?
What, " then, if the charges have actually been proved,
and if the guilt of conscious incompetency, accompanied
by obstinate tenacity of °face, has actually been
brought home to the doors of those inculpated?
Can the ionise, having gene thin; far, now recede': Cau it
:abaieate.its functions a judge ;4fter baving.solentuly assumed
Ilio;,e fetictioiv, and deliberately ;intborised a trial to-falze