The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY EVEMNG, JULY 14, 1855.

VIENNA CONFERENCES.

The additional papers containing the communications
which passed between the English Ministers and the
Austrian Government have been laid before Parliament.
They consist of twenty-three documents, and date
from the 3d of April to the end of June, 1855 : --
No 1.
TLIE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
Foreign-office, April 3, 1855.
My Lord,—Count Colloredo has read to me a despatch
from Count Buol on the subject of the third point, which
forms the greatest difficulty iu the negotiations, and which is
about to be taken into consideration by the Conference.
Count Buol observes that, Russia having admitted the
principle that her preponderance in the Black Sea is to be put
an end to, there can be no doubt that apparently the simplest
and most direct mode of attaining the end which the allies
have in view would be by the limitation of the naval forces of
Russia in that sea. This result might be obtained by Russia
engaging either to reduce her fleet to a fixed number of ves-
sels, or not to increase their actual number; and the latter
alternative, while it would make the sacrifice more easy,
would come to nearly the same result, as half the fleet at Se-
bastopol has already been sunk by the Russians themselves.
But Count Buol thinks that there may be Feason to ap-
prehend that Russia may oppose this solution of the ques-
tion, on the ground of its affecting her dignity and national
honour, which the Emperor Alexander will have to consult as
much, or perhaps even more, than his predecessor.
He argues, therefore, that it will be necessary to provide

for the case of Russia refusing categorically to enter.into any
positive engagement to reduce her naval forces. In such an
event, and supposing that a complete agreement had been
come to on the three other points, would the belligerent
Powers, Count Buol asks, consider it indispensable to con-
tinue the war on that account? But be adds that, whatever

their decision might be, Austria, for her part, not being at
present engaged in hostilities, would have no sufficient mo-
tive to declare war against Russia, if the solo obstacle to
peace were the refusal of that Power to consent to the direct
limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.

In order, then, to arrive at a practical solution of the ques-
tion, Count Buol is of opinion that recourse must be had to
the system of counterpoise. For this purpose he says that
several possible combinations present themselves.
Russia and Turkey might enter into reciprocal engagements
not to maintain in the Black Sea more than an equal number
of ships of war.
In this case the only other point to be considered would be
the revision of the treaty of 1841, so far as to concede to the
other Powers the right of maintaining a limited number of
ships of war in the Black Sea, with the special object of watch.
ing over the due execution of the arrangements for keeping
clear the navigation of the Danube at its mouths.
If, however, Count Buol adds, the naval forces of Turkey
and Russia in the Euxine could not be placed in this manner
on a footing of equality, the Porte might, while maintaining
the principle of the closing of the Straits as a general rule, re-
serve to herself the right of calling into the Black Sea, as an
exceptional:measure, even in time of peace, as many ships of
war of friendly Powers as sho might consider necessary when-
ever she found herself menaced.

If Russia persisted in maintaining in the Black Sea a fleet
larger than could be required for purposes of defence, and
refused to consent to any kind of limitation of them, it
would be impossible to contest the right of Europe to consi-
der the maintenance of such force as a permanent danger to
Turkey ; in this case the exception would become the rule,
and the Porte would have continually reasons for giving fir-
mans to the ships of war of friendly Powers to pass the Straits.
Such a state of things would, Count Buol thinks, be little
agreeable to Russia ; and it is by strongly supporting this
argument that it may be possible to convince Russia that it
is more for her own interest to prefer either a direct or bull-
act system of limitation.
I told Count Collerodo that I had listened to Count Buol's
despatch with equal surprise as concern, as it was nothing short
of an announcement that Austria would not adhere to the
treaty of December 2, if the Western Powers persisted in car-
rying the third basis into effect, for Count Buol must be aware
that his proposed system of counterpoise was both inadequate
and impracticable. A reciprocal engagement between Russia
and Turkey to maintain an equal number of ships in the
Black Sea would secure the preponderance of Russia,
whose ships would always be better manned, better armed,
and in a better condition than those of Turkey ; but Count
Buol proposed that at the same time other Powers should
maintain a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea,
for the special object of keeping clear the navigation of the
Danube, and upon that I begge to observe that the special
object might or might not be the real one, and Count Buol
might be sure that England and France would not profess
one thing while they intended another. If Count Buol's
proposals were really to be adopted, I could only say that
ships of war would be utterly useless at the mouths of the
- - .

laimbe to watch over the fulfilment of stipulations that a
commission was appointed to carry out; that if these ships
moved away from the mouths of the Danube Russia would
have just ground for complaint, and that if England and
France were suddenly to be at war with Russia this
limited force might at once be overpowered by the force
that Russia would be suffered to retain. But if England
and France, under pretext of watching the Danube, were
to send a force into the Black Sea to protect Turkey and
keep Russia in check, then we should simply be continuing
the present system, which effectually scares both these ob-
jects, but which system we are on every account desirous to
put an end to.
Count Buol's next proposal, that Turkey should call in as
many foreign ships of war as she thought necessary, whenever
she found herself menaced, appeared p me, I said, even more
objectionable ;"fox it would impose upon the Western Powers
the duties of perpetual police, while it would relieve Turkey
from the care of providing for her own protection, as she
would consider that 'she had acquired a right by treaty to
call upon England and France for aid whenever she thought
herself in danger, without reference to the cost and inconve-
nience to them or to the distance at which their fleets might
happen to be stationed. As Count Buol, however, abandoned
the notion of limiting the naval force of Russia, and conse-
quently of preventing its indefinite augmentation, Turkey
would always be in danger, and consequently would always
consider herself menoced.

But what was the meaning, I asked, of this right to call
upon foreign Powers Surely it could not be intended to
uphold the independence of the Ottoman empire by a stipu-
lation which made its existence dependent upon foreign as-
sistance ? And what were England and France to do in the
event of their obeying these calls, which might constantly be
repeated Why, they would have to send into the Black Sea
on each occasion armaments as powerful as they now main-
tain there, in order to be o❑ a footing of equality with Rus-
sia, and they must always be expecting and bo prepared to
go to war with Russia.
But Russia will be mistress of her own policy, and her own
actions, and will know how best to carry out her own de-
signs at the right moment.
So far from menacing Turkey, sho might establish the most
friendly relations with her ; she might lull her into false se-
curity, and within three days after she had picked a quarrel
with Turkey a Russian army might be in possession of Con-
stantinople and occupied in fortifying the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles; and while the navies• of England and
France were upon a peace establishment a Russian
fleet of 27 or 30 sail of the line might suddenly issue from the
Baltic and sweep the British seas.

The Porto would then learn, Europe would then learn, but
too late, the value of that delusive right which it is proposed
to confer on Turkey of calling in her allies at the approach of
danger.
Yet such were the terms, I said, upon which Count Buol
seemed desirous to conclude a peace that was to behonourable
and just, that was to maintain the independence and integrity
of Turkey-, and that was to furnish solid guarantees for the
future tranquillity of Europe, but I need hardly say that in
such arrangements her Majesty's Government could take no
part.
If the war went on it would be for Austria to consider her
own position, not only during its continuance after the pre-
parationg she had made, the language she had held, and
the engagements she had entered into, but also at its con-
clusion when peace was made between the four belligerent
Powers. She may rest assured, however, that, even though
England and France were deprived of the immense advan-
tage of Austrian co-operation in a cause that is essentially
Austrian, they will not abandon that cause, but they will use
every means at their command, and will shrink from no sac-
rifice, to obtain their demands, which are founded on justice,
and which have the safety of Europe for their object.—l am,
&c., CLARENDON.

(No. 2.)
THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
(Extract.) Foreign-office, April 3, 1855.
The Baron de Bourqueney's despatches having led the
French Government to doubt whether it was the intention of
Russia to accept the third basis in the sense in which it has
always been understood by England and France, it occurred
to M. Drouyn de l'Huys that the object in view might be
effectually attained, and that the dignity of Russia might be
better consulted, by excluding all ships of war from the
Black Sea.

M. Drouyn do l'Huys accordingly prepared a memorandum
upon the means of giving effect to the " neutralisation" of 1
the Black Sea, and he proposed that, with the concurrence
of her Majesty's Government, this project should be sub-
mitted to the Conference as a proof of the desire entertained
by England and France to meet any reasonable objections on
the part of Russia, and of the sincerity with which they la-
bour to bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion.
I acquainted your Lordship by telegraph on the 24th ult.
that her Majesty's Government acceded to the project of the
French Government.
The Baron de Bourqueney informed his Government that
the project had not bean favourably received at Vienna, and
M. Drouyn de l'Huys, after taking the orders of the Emperor,
determined to proceem himself to Vienna for the purpose of
but to come in the first
instanceexplain i n
tgo and
London supportingin
order his
to vieewstsa,blish a complete under-
standing between the two Governments as to the course that
it would be expedient to pursue. M. Drouyn de l'Huys ac-
cordingly left Paris on the 29th ult., and on the following day
a meeting was held here, at which were present the French
Ambassador, M. Drouyn de rHuys, Lord Palmerston, Lord
Lansdowne, and myself.
The questions of the neutralisation of the Black Sea
and that of the limitation of the Russian naval force in that
sea were fully discussed. .
With respect to the first (neutralisation), it was agreed to
propose :-
1. That Russia and Turkey should have no ships of war in
the Black Sea, nor in the Sea of Azoff, excepting some few
small vessels, for the purpose of sea police, to prevent piracy;
and that, as regarded the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus,
an understanding should be come to with the Porte, with a
view to ascertain whether the Porte would not be willing to
include those waters in the arrangement if it should be neces-
sary to do so, in order to obtain the consent of Russia to the
application of the principle of neutrality to the Black Sea and
to the Sea of Azoff.
2. That the ports of the two Powers in the Black Sea and
the Sea of Azoff should be solely commercial ports.
3. That foreign Powers should be allowed to have consuls
in those ports.
4. That there should be no menacing assemblage of troops
by either PoWer on the shores of the Black Sea.
5. That the allied Powers (England, France, and Austria)
should have the right to send their naval forces into the
Black Sea if the provisions of the treaty should be violated.
6. That the two Powers (Russia and Turkey) should have
the right to maintain a fixed number of light vessels for the
police of the Black Sea, and unarmed transports exclusively
adapted for the conveyance of troops. •
With respect to the second question, viz., the limitation of
the naval force of Russia, it was agreed to propose :-
1, That Russia and Turkey 'should each of .them maintain

in the Black Sea, and in the Sea of .zofl, no more than four
sail of the line and four frigates, witla proportionate number
of light vessels for the police of thof seas, and of unarmed
transports exclusively adapted for to conveyance of troops,
and that this same limitation ihoulapply to the naval force
which Turkey should maintain in 0 Bosphorus and in the
Sea of Marmora.

2. That Englaw], France, and kustria should each be
permitttd to maintain half that umber of ships in the
Black Sea, that is to say, two sail f the lie, and two fri-
gates, and some smaller vessels for ach of e three Powers
if they should think fit so to statiouthem. nssian ships of
ts
war not to be allowed to enter the Bospho , nor to pass
through the Straits into the Meditetanean.
3. That, in case of danger to Turley, and on the demand of
the Porte, all the naval forces of Eglaud, France, and Aus-
tria, should be allowed to enter the ;lack Sea, to assist in de-
fending, the Turkish empire.
4. That the contracting Powers sbuld be allowed to have
consuls at all the Russian and Turkiii ports in the Black Sea
and in the Sea of Azoff. te.
It was then agreed-
-1.. That the, two systems, namely that of the neutralisa-
tion of the Black Sea, and that of th limitation of the naval
forces of 'Russia and Turkey in Ur Black Sea should be
explained to Austria, and that she would be asked whether
she would adopt either the one or'the other,' so as to co-
operate with France and England in proposing it to Russia,
undertaking further to co-operate it war with France and
England if the plan so proposed shoud be rejected by Russia.
2d. That it should be understood pat France and England.
would prefer the system of inentralisition if Austria should
leave the choice to England and Franc. •

3d. That if Austria -should refuse to bind herself to co-
operate in war with France and Egland, in the event of
Russia rejecting that one of the two proposals which Austria
might concur with France and Eughad in proposing, then
France and England should propose he plan of neutralisa.;
tion, and if it be rejected by Russia tie negotiation must be
broken off.

I have only further to add that her Majesty's Government
rely with confidence upon the best ororts of your Lordship
'and of Lord Westmoreland, being used for carrying into effect
the agreement which they have oomktowiththc Government
of the Emperor of the French. •

No. 3.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL. TO TILE EARL OF CLARENDON.—(RECEIVED
ARRIL 13.)
Vienna, April 10, 1855.

(Extract.)

_
After the 'Conference yesterday K. Airouyn de Lhuys,
Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmoreland, and I met Count
Buol and Baron Prokesch in Count Buol's official apartment.
Count Buol addressed us in a very formal manner, and told
us that he was about to explain to usfullY (a fond) the policy
of the Austrian Government on the third point. He Said that
the plan of neutralisation as develo)ed by M. Drouyn de
Lhuys appeared to him on reflection .4 come within the third
point, and to attain its object vol.! completely; that he
should have no difficulty in saying that Austria would be glad
to see it accepted. He had not, however, any hope that Rus-
sia would accept it, as she would thereby be disarmed iu the
Black Sea, while Turkey would be armed in the Bosphorus,
or at all events in the Mediterranean.

He should, in like manner, be glad to see Russia consent
to limit her forces. But, looking at the concessions Russia
01
had made on the first and second point, and the pro pity
of her acquiescence in what might be settled on the urth
point, Austria was not prepared to go' to war on acc unt of
the refusal of Russia to limit her naval force in the Pluck Sea.
That force had been already nearly destroyed ; whaf remained
was blocked up, and Russia would hereafter be afrd,id.to give
offence to France and England, for fear of similar contiNuences.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered these observations very ably.
He laid it down as a principle that the value of a treaty or
agreement of any kind is that each article, instead of being
the cause of the separate members, became the cause of the
whole ; that, without any treaty, Austria might have defended
the Principalities, and the maritime Powers have sought to
21
put an end to the Russian preponderance in the 131 k Sea ;
that the value of the treaty consisted in the unioi objects
and of efforts. In this spirit France and England h ' efeaded
the free navigation of the Danube, and had A been
thwarted in her endeavours on that subjecther allica ld have
been prepared to continue the war in her support ; t at he ex-
pected, in like manner, Austria would urge the adop on of the
third point, which was very clear and positive in its te s; that,
unless she did so the alliance would lose all binding force, and
would soon crumble to pieces. He explained and defended the
plan of neutralisation, which he conceived to be beneficial to
the whole world. He, therefore, asked Count Buol very
pointedly what he would do in support of the third point,
which was essential to the conclusion of a durable peace.
Before Count Buol could answer, I requested his attention
to what I conceived to be the position of Austria. From the
first moment of Prince Menschikoff's leaving Constantinople
I had thought that, with the assistance of Austria, we might
easily defeat the designs of Russia in the East; that without
Austria we should have a. long, though doubtless a victorious
contest. I remarked that there were three roads by which
Russia might reach her long-cherished object—the possession
of Constantinople ; one by Asia, the second by the Princi-
palities and Bessarabia, the third by the Black Sea ; that
the Asiatic route might be put out of consideration for the
present purpose ; that the route by the Principalities was
stopped by Austria and the Allies ; and the third route re-
mains to be considered.

Marshal Marmont had gone into this question as a military
man, and had shown how, by embarking 10,000 men with 25
sail of the line at Sebastopol, and a march of 60,030 men by
Bessarabia, Constantinople might be seized by Russia. He ar-
gued, however, that all depended on priority—this time we
had the priority, another time Russia might have it. !might
be told that Austria would intercept the invasion by,laud ; she
had, however, not haerrup Led the passageot the-Dariinte or the
siege of Silistria, and she might he equally" slow on another
occasion.

•I showed that the project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as
we could not always have a large fleet at hand ; humiliating to
Turkey, if she were always to lean on France and England; un-
safe for Europe, which would be kept in the perpetual ferment
of preparation for war. We had, however, examined this
plan carefully, in conformity with the desire of Austria, and
only gave it up from being convinced of its inadequacy.
I said M. Drouyn do l'Huys, had so ably explained the plan
of neutralisation that no more need be said. Wo were
however, ready to adopt the plan of limitation if Austria, on
its rejection, would join us in the war. _ _

I alluded, lastly, to public opinion in England. I said we
considered this as an European cause ; and that, both as a
great Eilropean Power and from her position, Austria was
called upon to take a leading part in defence of Turkey ; that
we had made allowances for the difficulties of Austria, but we
had felt deeply that, when she was prepared for war in July
last, she had allowed division after division to be taken from
Bessarabia to the Crimea, without attempting any diversion
in our favour ; that we had still hoped, and the voices against
Austria were few. But, if new, after the treaty of the 2d of
December, Austria escaped its engagements by relying solely
on the letter of that treaty, the irritation against Austria in
England would be very great; that it would be impossible to
revive confidence, or to, fasten again the parts of a cable which
had failed to hold. It was the decisive moment for an alli-
ance which, if kept together, would accor9plish a great object.
After some time spent in discussion, Count Buol seemed
to me to depart from the course he had taken at first. He
no longer said that Austria was determined not to support us
in case of a rupture. Ho spoke of, treating the third point
like the two former ; of coming to no previous resolution re-
specting war ; and of not engaging in hostilities for two ships
more or less.
Another meeting for Wednesday, with the assistance of
Aali Pasha' was proposed and settled.
This has been, in my opinion, an attempt on the part of
Austria to induce the Western Powers to relinquish their pro-
posals on the third point. As such, it has entirely

No. 4.
LORD JOIIN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(RECEIVED APRIL 15.)
(Extract.) Vienna, April 12, 1855.
Another meeting was held yesterday at Count Buors, at
which Aali Pasha and Arif Pasha were present.
Count Buol read to us a paper which ho had drawn up.
I afterwards asked him for a copy of this paper, but he
declined to give it me, saying it had no official character, and
had not been seen by the Emperor.
The paper, however, contained the present resolution of
the Cabinet. This resolution is to hear the propositions of
the Court 'of St. Petersburg before committing themselves
further. It may be that the answer of the Russian Emperor
may be so unfavourable and so peremptory that Austria will
at once concert with her allies on the mode of breaking off
the negotiations, and stating to Russia a casus bell~. But it
may be that the Russian answer will admit of further discus.
sion in Conference, with a hope of pacific settlement. The
Austrian Government declines, therefore, to give any further

pledge at the present moment.
• This resolution, natural enough in itself, was based upon
very unsound reasoning. Count Buol maintained, that in
the first draught of the four points it was stated that the
treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interest of the balance
of power, but that the plan of reducing, Russian power in
the Black Sea was an afterthought, and had been adopted
by the Austrian Government rather to please her allies than
from any conviction of its necessity ; that, while, they were
ready to support the proposal in conference, they were not
prepared from personal regard to their allies to go to war
without a case of proved necessity.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys and I combated this reasoning. We
stated that the views of the French and English Governments
were no secret to Austria or to the world. Speeches in Par-
Ipivambleienhted in
onthtekepa;itonefittenher Bonngitihshe
part of the French, had Government, official notes
attested in the most public manner, six or eight months ago,
mouearnape
opfrephreonvlidoinsng onfgethineet it. We appealed to Aali Pasha asdaoger, and our estimate of the
to the reality of the danger of an attack on the Bosphorus by
a Russian fleet and army, and he fully confirmed oar views
by his own emphatic statements.
Count Buol argued that it was not necessary to make Tur-
key equal to Russia, as in the s/stem of the baland of power
small States could preserve their independence in the neigh-
bourhood of States far superior to them in the number of
their armies and the extent of their resources.
But this was answered by pointing to the Pocnliar situa-
tion of the Black Sea, where Russia had kept up a great
naval force without any commerce to guard, in the presence
of no rival Power, and too evidently for purposes of aggres-
sion.
Count Buol told us he had not Pressed the neutrality of
the islands at the mouth of the Danube, as he NI as u
he had done so, the Russian Minister would have broskerne , u if
p
the Conference. He said he could not propose war to the
Diet at Frankfort for two ships more or less. •
lamanswered d
a that,hadAustria
haertln neutrality
rr o ali tyf
the Conference of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, and
should not have argued in
cenrehtaken
place,
I insisted on t
the British Parliament that this was a point which only con-
cerned Austria, but I should have represented it as the cause
of an ally ; and I was sure that three-fourths of both houses
would have supported her Majesty's Governmennn such a
quarrel.
M. Drouyn de Plauys observed that sour treaty'of Dee. 2
was not with the Diet of Frankfort, but with Austria.
VeboortthhantpoefallieluditatotiAonuse cases be
Austria to makil, and
eitheplauexpl neutrali-
sationess
ed our
belief that if this was done Russia would at once gite way.
Count Buol positively declined to accede to this proposal,
and maintained his former reserves.
~
While I consider this course as not unnatural on the part
of a Power which has hitherto kept out of the war, and is
very averse to plunge into it, I conceive the Policy of such
reserve to be unwise in itself, and unjust to her allies,—
unwise, because Russia, after so many sacrifices of her pride
and military position in the Principalities to please Austria,
would nearly to a certainty give way, and thereby secure
the peace Pit mach desired; W4llO t° .her allkc Incase

after the sacrifices they have made and are making, it is due
to them that their armaments should not retire from the
Black Sea without obtaining in the conditions of peace some
special security against Russian preponderance in that sea.
The interests of Austria may be fairly supposed to outweigh
in the Austrian Cabinet the general interests of Europe.
There is, however, some chance that at the last moment Aus-
tria may prove firm. It seems to me that Russia must either
refuse to limit her naval force in the Black Sea on the ground
of her dignity and her greatness, or she must consent to make
her limitation effectual for its objeCt. In either case our po-
sition is a good one. Our present business is to concert with
the French and Turkish Plenipotentiaries the exact mode in
whiCh we shall act in the Conference, and leave it to Prince
Gortschakoff to declare the purport of the instructions which
he may receive from St. Petersburg.
Should these be of a nature to meet our proposals half way,
M. Drouyn de l'Huys and I intend to 'declare at once what
wo would accept, without any further discussion. If this is
refused, we break off; if a fresh reference to St. Petersburg
is asked we intend to say that we can only consent to" Such
reference on condition that the answer must be a decided yes
or no. 'For such an answer M. Drouyn de l'lluys and I should
not wait.
In relating what passed at the meeting I have omitted to,
say that Count Buol, in the paper which he read to us, 'de
Glared that if Russia were to refuse to guarantee the integrity
of Turkey it, would be a casus belli with Austria.

No. 5.
Lord Clarendon approves Lord John Russell's language in
reply to Count Buol, as reported in No. 3.

No. 6.
LORD JOHN RIM LL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON--(RECEIVED

APRIL 17.)
Vienna, April 16, 1855.
My Lord—The Russian messenger will arrive to-day; con-
ference will probably take place to morrow. The Austrian
Minister wishes it to adjourn for further deliberation till next
day.
If other hope is lost I wish to propose to the Conference
the following plan. The French Minister is favourable to it.
Austria will not support any demand for cession of, territory.
1. As the existence of au aggressive Russian fleet in the
Black Sea would be in flagrant contradiction with the as-
surance so often given by Russia that she does not wish to
impair the integrity of the Ottoman empire, it is agreed :
(1.) That with the exceptions stated in the following arti-
cles, the rule of closing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, re-
cognised by the treaty of 1841, shall be in force so long as
the Russian naval force in the Black Sea shall not exceed four
sail of the line, four frigates, and six smaller vessels.
(2.) That while the said rule subsists two sail of the line,
two frigates, and three smaller vessels of any Power which
has no establishment in the Black Sea, and which is in amity
with the Sultan, may enter the Black Sea upon giving four
days' notice to the Ottoman Government.
(3.) Upon any inercas*f the Russian naval forces beyond
mit
the number specified ill, Article , or on the existence of a
larger Russian force twin', as a larger number of
ships of war of the allies of the Su pes ma , •-s through the
Straits into the Black Sea, in conformityl, 'll,, e desires of
the Sultan, and in the proportions to be ire 4 from time
to time by agreement with th• Ottoman Port • ; such increase
not .to form, at any time, a legitimate /subject of remonstrance
on the part of Russia. •
(4.) At no time shall any ships of foreign nations, beyond
the small ships belonging to the Embassies admitted hitherto,
anchor in the Golden Horn, nor shall any number of line of-
battle ships belonging to foreign Powers not having establish-
ments in the Black Sea excee ling four, pass at one time before
the capital in •their passage from the Dardanelles to the Black
Sea, or from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles, while the Sul-
tan is at peace.
2. The cession to Turkey of the islands at the month of the
Danube surrendered by the treaty of Adrianople.
3. The Asiatic frontier, on the side of Russia, to be newly
laid down and defined. .

4. An European guarantee of the territorial circumscription
of the Ottoman empire in Europe as defined iu the treat y.
5. The forts on the Asiatic coast, now abandoned by Rus-
sia, not to be re-occupied.—l have, &c.,
J. RUSSELL.

No. 7.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD Jons RUSSELL.
(Extract.) Foreign-office, AprillB, 1855.
We think that the limitation of the Russian fleet should
be absolute, and that it would bo made too conditional by
the plan you wish to propose. We must avoid as much as
possible the system of counterpoise, the objections to which
you have explained fully to the Austrian Government.

No. 8.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.—
(RscElvEn Anna 21.)
(Extract) Vienna, April 16, 1855.
Wo bad yesterday a meeting of four hours' duration at
Count Buol's. M. Drouyn de l'Huys, Baron Bourqueney,
Lord Westmoreland and I were present.
Count Buol, having been earnestly called upon by M. Drouyn
de l'Huys to join the Western Powers in case of rupture, had
prepared an ultimatum of the Austrian Cabinet. It was ob-
vious that great care had been taken iu preparing the ground
upon which Austria means to take up her position. Count
Bud dwelt especially on the importance of closing the Dar-
danelles, and the value of an European guarantee of the
Turkish empire. But the real point of his discourse lay in
the declaration that Austria would not assent to press Rus-
sia on the question of limitation further than the restoration
of the s(atus quo of the Russian fleet before the war:
The question was put in this way : If order to tarry into
effect the third point, Count Buol -proposed the following
to be-ma/warted Lo the Conference The clos-
ing of the Straits. 2d. The guarantee of Europe for the terri-
torial circumscription of the Ottoman empire. 3d. The prin-
ciple of a limitation of the Russian naval forces- in the Black
Sea. In presenting this third measure as a cants belli to
Russia, it was to be thus stated :—Limitation fixed at the
number of the fleet before the war, to be completed according
to the system of a balance of power. By this last phrase I
understood was meant that as fast as the Russians should
build ships, Turkey should be allowed to introduce ships
into the Black Sea ; so that in some years, if Russia should
have 15 ships of the line at Sebastopol, Turkey might have
15 sail of the line cruising in the Black Sea.
It would be difficult and wearisome to give the details of a
conversation which lasted for four hours. I will endeavour,
therefore, to give an abstract of the arguments employed.
Count Buol set before us the insignificance of the danger
to be feared from the presenCe in the Black Sea of ten ships
of the line not yet in existence, nor likely to be so for some
time, compared with the advantages to be derived from a peace
attended with such important concessions by Russia. He ex-
tolled the security which Turkey would obtain by the Euro-
pean guarantee. He spoke of the means which Turkey pos-
sessed for her defence. He again declared that the limitation
of the naval forces of Russia had not entered into the original
definition of the third point, and Austria had only adopted it
it in deference to the urgent representations of the :Western
Powers. But Austria would not make war for ten ships more
or less. She could not justify such a course to Germany or to
Europe. She had never pledged herself to war against Russia
for such a cause, and never would. She would look to the
whole of the peace to be made, and not to a single part.
On the other hand, the French and British Plenipoten-
tiaries maintained that a limitation to be good for anything
must be an effectual limitation ; that it would be a limita-
tion to say that Russia should not have more than 6,000
ships of war, bait such a limitation would be absurd. Look-
ing at the particular proposal before us, it was evident that
the state of the Russian naval force before the war was the
very state of danger against which wo were anxious to guard.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys referred to the attacks on the Turkish
ships at Sinope, and the declarations of Admirals Hamelin and
Dundas that they could not with prudence divide their forces.
I said that the British Government had always pointed to
the Russian fleet in Sebastopol as a standing menace to Tur-
key, and to provide by treaty that this very forco might again
be constructed and assembled would be a course they could
_ _

not justify to Parliament or the nation ; that Russia, if she
consented to limitation, would hardly refuse to agree to one
that would be efficient. The closing of the Dardanelles and
an efficient limitation were consistent propositions ; but, if
the limitation was not to be efficient, the closing of the Straits
would be inconsistent. He bad himself argued that the dan-

ger consisted not in the magnitude of the Russian force, but
in the tcte-a-tete of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. Yet
this very danger he now proposed to restore.
Count Buol was ready to propose consuls at Sebastopol
and elsewhere in the Black Sea ; stations for small vessels at
the mouth of the Danube ; the faculty for the Sultan of call-
ing the fleets of his allies to his assistance in case of menace ;
and other subsidiary provisions. He laid it down as a prin-
ciple that the existence of an aggressive fleet in the Black
Sea is a flagrant contradiction with the assurance so often
given by Russia that she does not wish to disturb the integrity
of the Ottoman empire. But he did not consider that a fleet
of 15 sail of the line was excessive, or could be dangerous to
Turkey. He spoke of 10 sail of line-of-battle-ships, not yet
built, as not forming any real object of alarm to Europe.
The Ottoman Minister, who was unfortunately not sum-
moned to meet us, is of a totally different opinion. Ho thinks
it would be injurious to the Porte to require that we should
devote her revenues to the fortifications on the Bosphorus,
when internal improvements so urgently require her attention.
He doubts whether any forts on the Bosphorus would save
Constantinople from attack.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys, in the conversation I am reporting,
said that he was ready to increase the number of Russian
ships of war to be maintained to the number now above water
in the Black Sea.
I added, that although I had no authority to do so I would
undertake the same engagement.
Count Buol, however, 'persisted in his proposal, and asked
us to refer it to our Governments.

It is not necessary to state the measures which Austria
would be prepared to take to convey an ultimatum to Russia
upon this basis. They are well conceived, and would be
doubtless acted upon with good faith.
But I cannot suppose that Russia would prefer war with
Austria to a peace which would give her leisure and means to
prepare a new attack on the Ottoman empire.
In the case of such an attack renewed five years hence,
could we rely on the Austrian guarantee of the integrity of
Turkey? I apprehend that the same financial embarrass-
ment, the same doubt of Prussia and the German States, and
an army reduced to the establishment of 1852, would para-
lyse her then, as they did in 1853.
The occupation of the Principalities by Russia she felt to
be dangerous to her existence as a great Power, and she
risked war to put an end to it. But, that point accomplished,
I fear we must not count upon her aid to save Constantinople
from the encroaching ambition of Russia.

No. 9.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.-(RECEIVED
APRIL 21.)

(Extract.) Vienna, April 18,1855.
Yesterday, after the Conference, the Plenipotentiaries of
France, Great Britain, and Turkey, met in Count Buol's apart-
ment. There had been an anxious feeling at the result of our
former meeting. The position on both sides appeared to be
uneasy, though much more on the side of Austria than on
ours. The war would, indeed, in all probability continue to be
a struggle glorious to England and to France, and calculated
to maintain the reputation of those two great Powers. But
the waste of life and money would be enormous. On the other
hand, the fact of Austria's declining to join in the war would
have roused a very angry feeling in France and in Great
Britain. With the Westera Powers alienated, Prussia
triumphing over her in Germany, and Russia bent
on her humiliation, her situation would have been almost in-
tolerable. These considerations on both sides led to the pre-
valence of a conciliatory spirit in the meeting of yesterday.
After much discussion, which was conducted with great tern-
i per on all sides, mul in which the ,j4dgmeAt And tact of Aa