The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-18 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF TIIE POBLIC JOURNALS.

( From the Times of this day.)

It is stated from Berlin, with an appearance of
pwbability, if not of authority, that the Emperor
of Russia, in communicating the intelligence of
the fall of Sebastopol to his uncle, the King of
Prussia, in a telegraphic message, added emphati-
cally that " Russia would never make peace upon
such a defeat." This declaration, if it be authen-
tic, is more consistent with the tone hitherto as-
sumed by the Russian Government than the ridi-
culous attempt of the principal Russian organ at
Brussels to represent the evacuation of Sebastopol
as a consummate stroke of military genius, highly
favourable to the interests of the Russian army
and creditable to the strategical judgment of
Prince Gortschakoff. The evacuation of Sebasto-
pol and the manner in which it was accomplished,
without considerable loss, were undoubtedly cre-
ditable to Prince Gortschakoff if he had no alter-
native left but the abandonment of the place or
the total loss of his army. He chose, as it is the
duty of every general to do, the least of two evils,
and though he might have prolonged the resis-
tance of the garrison, every hour's delay would
have rendered his position more perilous. We
rejoice for the sake of humanity, and for the suc-
cess of our arms, that the Russians did not exe-
cute their frightful threat of not leaving one
stone of Sebastopol upon another, and that from
the moment the French flag floated on the Malak-
hoff Tower the contest for the possession of the
town was at an end. But we utterly deny the
extravagant conclusion of the partisans of Russia,
that such a retreat can be held to strengthen the
position of the enemy in any other part of the
Crimea, or that any amount of sophistry can cause
the evacuation to be regarded as anything but a
signal defeat of Prince Gortschakoff's army. The
moral blow of the loss of that fortress, which the
army had undertaken to defend, must be felt even
by Russian troops ; in losing Sebastopol they aban-
don the works of defence they had raised on so
huge a scale, the resources still supplied by the
town and arsenal, and all the advantages of that
position. It is highly improbable, and we might
say impossible, that any other position in the Cri-
mea can afford equal advantages to an army. On
the contrary, the peculiar danger of the Russians
in the Crimea arises from the fact that, instead of
falling back on fresh resources and lines of defence,
the further they are compelled to retire the worse
their position must become. Admitting the lines
still occupied by the Russian army from the
northern forts along the Mackenzie ridge to be
strong, how long can they remain there ? How
long can they retain those heights, with the know-
ledge that winter is approaching, that the autumnal
rains will soon destroy their communications, that
their supplies are falling off, and that a few weeks
more may place them between an impassable tract
of steppes and a victorious enemy? The evacuation
of Sebastopol, great and memorable as that event
is in itself, is the least of the embarrassments and
calamities of the Russian army, for it leaves that
large body of men exposed to every kind of peril
and privation, in a peninsula affording them nei-
ther the means of subsistence nor the possibility of
escape.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising
that a rumour should have got abroad that Prince
Gortschakoff has offered to evacuate the northern
forts and the whole of the Crimea, provided he be
allowed to retire with arms and baggage. We
have not ascertained whether there be any truth
in this report, and we are inclined to doubt the
accuracy of it. If Prince Gortschakoff made
such a proposition, he would at once disclose
to his antagonists the hopeless nature of his
position ; and they, on the other hand, would
be the more bound to take advantage of the
embarrassment of the enemy. Our own military
history affords one conspicuous example as a
warning to successful commanders not to throw
away the results of their operations in the field by
an imprudent concession to a defeated opponent.
The Convention of Cintra, which set Junot's army
free after the defeat it had sustained at Vimiera,
called forth a stronger blast of popular indignation
than the disasters of Walcheren ; and if there be
anything more trying than to fail in the prosecu-
tion of a war, it is the disgrace and folly of t hrowing
away the opportunities which success has placed
within our reach. To allow the Russian army to
withdraw from the Crimea with the honours of
war at this crisis would literally be to repeat the
Covention of Cintra, for we may be certain that no
such proposition will ever be made unless the
enemy is satisfied that he can command no other
means of retreat. We do not for a moment sup-
pose that either Marshal Pelissier or the Com-
mander of the British forces, or the allied Cabi-
nets, which may be consulted in a few hours
by the telegraph, would lend themselves to
such an arrangement • and, indeed, it is not
in the (loved character of the Russian army
to seek such an indulgence. On one occasion
only, when Peter the Great was surrounded by
the Turkish army on the Pruth, has a Russian
Czar purchased the safety of his army by submis-
sion, and even then Catharine succeeded in obtain-
ing, by negotiation, terms which the position of
the two parties by no means justified. Our position
at the present moment is widely different. The
Russian army in the Crimea has not been beaten in
a decisive engagement, nor is it at present sur-
rounded by the superior forces of the Allies. Its
line of retreat is still open, though it may not
long remain so. But the circumstance which is
most unfavourable to its existence, and which, in-
deed, constitutes a peril of the highest order, is
that this army has no proper base of operations,
and that, if compelled to retreat, it must cross a
vast extent of barren country, uninhabited, without
water, and barely affording a scanty sustenance to
the Tartar herdsmen of the Crimea. When Marshal
Soult was executing his retreat after the battle of
Orthez, in 1814, he chose the road to Toulouse,
because, if he had attempted to cover Bordeaux,
he ran the risk of being driven by the Duke
of Wellington into the department of the Landes,
where his army would have been unable to
exist. What the Landes are to ono district
of the south of France the Crimean steppes
are to the whole northern part of that peninsula,
and an army driven to retreat upon the Russian
territory has no possibility of escaping from the
necessity of crossing this desert. To fight a battle
with a considerable river or the sea in the rear of a
position is justly considered to be one of the most
dangerous contingencies of war, and is by all means
to be avoided. But to run the risk of being de-
feated in action with no lime of retreat but one
which crosses near 1(X) miles of dry and unculti-
vated desert is a, danger to which European armies
have seldom been exposed in modern warfare,
though there are examples of the destruction of the
Roman legions by similar calamities in the Parthian
wars. The probability is that but a very small
portion of an army defeated under such circum-
stances could escape, and if the Russian army under
Prince Gortschakoff meets with that fate the re-
treat of Moscow will be avenged.
From the moment that the Russians cease to
hold Sebastopol and a commanding position in the
Crimea they are exposed to two adverse contin-
ereecies ; they may be cut off altogether by a flank
march of the enemy from some point on the coast,
or, if driven back by a direct attack in front of
their position, they may be compelled to retire on
a country which offers no resources for the main-
tenance of an army. If the former of these opera-
tions be attempted by the Allied generals, Simphe-
ropol is evidently the strategical point on which
the fate of the campaign would turn. Simpheropol
is about equidistant from Alouchta, on the south
coast of the Crimea, and from the mouth of the
Alma, the distance in either case being within 30
miles. Alouchta has the advantage of being acces-
sible to the Allied forces by laud and by sea, and
the passage of the hills into the valley of the
Salghir is not likely to offer any serious obstacles to
the light infantry of our armies. These speculations
may be idle, for they can in no degree affect
the result, and the plan of operations of the Allied
Commanders is doubtless already formed and in
operation ' • but in a crisis of so much importance
every practicable movement invites consideration,
and it is satisfactory to think that there are seve-
ral modes of accomplishing the same object. Yet
the Emperor of Russia hardens his heart against
the stern lessons of war, and, pursuing the fatal
policy which led him to reject the too liberal terms
offered him at Vienna, he threatens to resist until
he will have to pay a larger penalty from dimi-
nished resources. Yet who but his own subjects
are now the dupes of these pretensions ? We have
seen the utmost Russia can do in defence of Sebas-
topol when her whole military and naval establish-
ments were in the highest state of perfection, and
now that these establishments are annihilated we
have no reason to entertain any apprehension of
her future efforts.

THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE AT LISMORE.—His Grace
arrived at .Lismore on Wednesday afternoon, and met
an enthusiastic reception from all classes of the inhabi.
tauts. A correspondent of the Frthntan says—" Large
cavalcades Of, the resident gentry, &c., with numerous
pedestrians and others occupying land, either under his
grace or adjacent.to his extensive states, heartily joined
in the warmest demonstrations of welcome. There were
several triumphal arches erected, and flans flying. The
' town was illuminated, bonfires were blr.zing, and by a
judicious arrangement made by the inhabitants (wbo
liberally subscribed for the purpose) a brilliant display of
fireworks. The novelty and beauty of the designs were
particularly remarkable, more especially the last one, a
very handsome temple, displaying Cead Mille Failthe
—Devonchire, sun oundad by coloured stare, rockets,
&Q., in they reateat profusion."