The National Register.
London, England, 1812-11-15 00:00:00

SUNDAY, NOVEMI3EIt 15. 1812.

Nn. ().55.

~

POLIFVAL

\IMO F Tti E P P ESENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN CA M

A few weeks only have elapsed since we followed with
anviety and apprehension the march of the French legions
toloscow. NVe dreaded, not so much the capture of that
ci!y, as C,e effects which it was likely to produce, jaging
ft-ii the infl.tencc of former disasters, on the mind of the
Irssiao Emr rto R. We did not think it could prove other-
lea. fatal to the successful issue of the war, than by leading
to an imn,diate pea e, and provided ALEXANDER should •
retail irtnness enough to resist the offers which we stated
we nail no doubt BUONA P ART E would make (and the event
r.ved our surmise right), we were disposed to consider
struction of the antient capital of Russia as beneficial
the cause cif the Empire. This opinion was confirmed by
Or sea: cell" hoped for resolution of AL r.X AND R. When
nd th tt a'ivc at last to his true interests, he rejected
pusillanimous counsels of fear, and disregarded the pro--
••, of the enetny to the heart of his dominions—when
•aw that, instead of suing for peace, he prepared with in-
‘Ased energy for war—when we beheld the spirit of the
(.'yple rising with superior strength from the midst of dis-
;slers, and with augmented affectionjor a. Government en-
deared by mutual dangers—wheu we perceived the Russian
Cenerals, umbsinaved by the audacity and successful ma-
axiivres of the enemy, resuming the offensive at the time he
he had reduced them to the helpless state of frigi-
l'" and the Russian Armies, powerfully reinforced, closing
irotaal hint, and threatening at seve.al points his communi-
cilioits with Poland, our hopes revived, and we began to
In ik with renewed confidence for a more successful issue to
f.t campaign These hopes, as they were not founded on
clime:lea! anticipations, authorised by the wishes of the
heirt :done, not by the evidence of reaslu, have not been dis-
a;:puinted. In the short peliod of a month, the whole face cf
1.1:: war has changed. Relying on his former fortunes, and
-Ilging from the timidity of other nations that shrunk be-
!,:e his rashness, NA rot, eotsr cut his way to 'Moscow, through
iaughter and desolation, to dictate terms of peace from the
Losom of that capital. Anticipating rest from their labours,
and abundance for the winter, his soldiers fouud.thenrelves
on their arrival in that city, obliged to contend with an
armed population, and an ocean of flames." They over-
powered the former, and severely chastised them for their
lan iotism ; but the latter, though ultimately checked, had
deprived them of their expected shelter and provisions.—
In vain did Vey rake the ruins of consumed palaces; in
vain did they proclaim to the world, that the resources they
had •;.ved were sufficient for their support. A little month after,
an l before their boasts hzd been forgotten, they have been
VOl. V. No .'CC.XLV.

compelled, either by the want of magazines, or the harassing
ae;ivity of the ltussiari divisions, •to rebnquish their prey
and for the first time 'has a capital been relieved from the
g: asp of BUON AP ART E, otherwise than by a treaty, disad—
var,tt;cous and dishonourable to the invaded. It is true,
that the circumstances under which this. deliverance has.
been cfl'ected, are not yet perfectly known; but it is clear,
that should it even prove temporary, it would he attended
with consequences of the most benefical natuie, for it must
inspire every Russian peasant and warrior, with a degree of
confidence &put' to their patriotism, and which cannot fail
to render their exertions still more spirited, and consequently
more likely to be crowned whit ultimate success.
!n the ab,ence of official details the causes that have led
to the abandonthent of Moscow by the Trench, have been
variously stated. We shall consider the different opinion%
that have prevailed on this subject, and point out their
plausibility or improbability.

By some it has been supposed, that BUONAPARTE, con.-
vinced of his inability to maintain himself at such a dis-
tance from his other armies during the winter, had pre.
tended in his Bulletins
.tlias it was his intention not to
relinquish Moscow, only in.ordet to deceive his antagonists.
and to secure an unino:ested retreat from that city. For that
purpose he is said to have made demonstrations indicative of
a prolonged stay, whilst be was secretly preparing for hie
departure. Thus„ his ordering VICTOR to meet him with
his army from Smolensk° was only intended, it is asserted,
to alarm the Russians and prevent-their advance whilst he
fell back, and, by his junction with that commander, ob-
tained a superimity of force too decided not to make it.
impossible for his opponents to act on the offensive. In
support of this supposition it is urged that, embarrassed by
the fear of discouraging his subjects and -allies by his sudden
retreat from the capital of Russia, and aware of the necessity
of keeping his intention concealed, he however contrived in
his last Bulletins to prepare the public mind in France
.to
expect such an event. In these be contradicted his former
statements Aspecting the extent of the city rescued from
the flames, and reduced it from •a third to• one-tenth, evi-
dently too- snuff. a portion to contain an army 'of nearly
100,000. men, who could not, safely encamp in the fields.,
under the unwonted severity of a Russian winter, and must
therefore be expected to seek other quarters. These, be
added, could not be entered in less than twenty, days,. from
which it was inferred that he would lead back his army to
Smolensko or Witesnk,a march, which at that reriod of the
year, could not be effected in a shorter - The mention
made of the standards, Madonas and other curiosities found
in the Kremlin, having been sent to Par i,, also eller
a belief that . he had hastened to ncurelbe feU..rc:

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