The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-18 00:00:00

been cut off, and the troops and stores in possw.sion of
the enemy before sunset ; a portion of the fleet would
most probablytalso have been lost—it would have been
worse than Sebastopol ! Sir James then continues
*fans :—" Then came your second reconnaissance of
S weaborg and plan of naval attack, which you consi-
dered practicable."
I gave two plans, one with the fleet alone, the success
of which I doubted, and thought dangerous ; the second
I thought certain of euccess. Their lordships thought
proper to deliberate on one and to ignore the other,
which differed, however, little from the one I gave on
the 12th of June ; and then Sir James Graham tells me
an opportunity was lost; adding words about risks and
dangers, and telling me that prudence consists in weigh-
ing them, and firmness in encountering them. Had
their Lordships weighed these things they would not
have written me such letters.

Sir James, in another letter, tells me he is unwilling
to be involved in a written controversy with me ; but
that I had brought it on myself by my report of the 25th
of September—that report appeared to him to be entirely
at variance with the opinions previously expressed by
me ; and he certainly understood me to say, that if I
had mortars, rockets, and Lancaster's guns, I considered
Sweaborg assailable by sea.
Now, in May, I declared it to be unassailable by sea
or land, and the Admiralty did not send to me the ap-
pliances which, in September, I declared to be wanting,
because they believed, from my account, they would be
useless against a place, which, in the first instance, I
pronounced to be impregnable.
Sir James then continues thus—" I could not bring
myself to believe that the want of Lancaster's guns, or
even of mortars, rendeied a sea attack, on your plan of
the 25th of September impossible, if you had 25 sail of
the line reassembled before the place, with all their
means of vertical fire."* But Sir James forgot that my
report in May was made before I had seen Sweaborg ;
but the report of the 12th of June was after I had seen
it ; and it differs little from that of the 25th September!
I wonder whether Sir James Graham, when he wrote
this, had forgotten his great respect for stone walls, and
his warnings to avoid them ; and had he forgot his con-
Aummate Commander-in-Chief ?

I have now again well weighed and considered this
painful subject. I have consulted friends, and lam
~f opinion, and so are they, that my character has
keen attacked by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and
by the Board ; and coupling that with my dismissal from
command, I have nothing left but to demand that my
conduct be investigated before a court-martial.

I can quite understand that their lordships wish to
avoid an investigation ; for they are quite aware that
any conduct will be proved creditable to me, and very
different to their lordships.—l have the honour to re-
main, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed) CHAS. NAPIER.
To the above masterly letter the Admiralty reply as
'ullows, under the signature of their Secretary

No. XXXII.
(Copy.)
Admiralty, Jan. 13, 1855.

Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your letter of yesterday's date, I am com-
manded by their Lordships to acquaint you that although
my Lords upon some occasions have not been enabled
to express the same satisfaction at receiving your re-
ports, which they have directed to be conveyed to you
opon others, they have only to repeat that no censure
has been passed upon your conduct in reference to the
operations of the Fleet under your orders, and their
Lordships have already expressed their sense of your
exertions i❑ a manner customary upon intimation that
the flag of an officer of your rank has been struck in pur-
suance of their Lordships' orders. They had also, in
accordance wits your recommendation, promoted the
Flag Lieutenant who was the bearer of your despatches
announcing the fall of Bomarsund, and since your flag
has been struck the name of no other officer has been
submitted by you.
[I submitted a name, and he was promoted.]

My Lords do not feel themselves 'caked upon now to
enter a second time into discussion of reports on which
they have already stated their opinions, and still less to
take cognisance of other informal documents which have
never been laid before them, and which they decline to

recognise.
[These, I suppose, aro Sir J. Graham's that ire called in-
formal ; a pretty way of carrying on business.]
They consider that no inquiry into your conduct is
necessary, me-d.4,lrey.rentirels..tieeline to submit
versy raied by an officer under their orders, to the de-
cision of a Court-martial.
My Lords further direct me to inform you, that while
they have been unwilling to pass censure upon any parr
of your conduct they have not failed to observe, from
the moment of your first quitting Wingo Sound without
orders, and down to the present time, you have r,-
peatedly thought fit to adopt a tone, in your correspond-
ence with their Lordships, which is not respectful to their
authority. Such a course, if generally adopted by other
officers, would be destructive to the discipline and inju-
rious to the best interests of the service, and is not cal-
culated to inspire confidence in an officer entrusted war,
an important command.
[Why did they not produce them? I defy the Admi-
ralty to produce one instance in the British Navy where
au officer's letters were falsified.]
I am further directed to add that this decision is to be
considered by you as final.
I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,
W. A. B. HAMILTON.
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.
The next letter is the rejoinder of Sir Charles to the
above letter of the Admiralty :
No. XXXIII.
Merchistoun Hall, llorndean,
Jan. 20, 1855.
Sir,—l have received your letter of the 13th inst., in
which you state, that " although my Lords upon some
occasions have not been enabled to express the same
satisfaction on receiving my reports which they have
done on others, that they never passed censure on me,
in reference to the operation of the fleet under my Cam-
wand." This communication leaves me at a loss to
understand why their Lordships' letter of the 4th Oct.,
No. 744, was written ; and I shall, therefore, take that
letter paragraph by paragraph, and reply to it.
1. Your renewed reconnaissance of Sweaborg gives rise
to more pressing and serious considerations.
[Hy opinion since I first saw Sweaborg has never
chaugod

2. You desire us not for a minute to suppose that Swea
borg cannot be attacked, and you proceed to point out in
detail the precise mode in which the operation ought to be
conducted.
[Certainly. I pointed out the precise mode of attack.
One with ships alone, but saying success would be doubt-
In!, and many ships would be lost. Another with ships,
guns, gun-boats, Lancaster guns, rockets, 13-inch mortars
on the islands, and a vast supply of shot, shells, and
rockets, in addition to the ships. This mode I thought
certain, and do still think so, notwithstanding the disaster
at Sebastopol.]
3. You express your opinion that if your plan of at-
tack by the ships were adopted, you are quite certain
the fortress would be laid in ruins, and most probably
an entrance opened to the ships.
[I never said anything of the sort. I said, if attacked
by the ships alone success would be very doubtful. The
ships would be set on fire by red-hot shot and shells, and
be left in no condition to meat the Russian fleet after-
wards ; and if attempted at that season of the year I did
not know how many would be lost.]
TA. What, then, are the obstacles to the immediate
attempt ? Admiral Pluairidge and the French Admiral
are ordered to rejoin you.
[The want of the means I pointed out to insure success.
jlleiandedAwdmitihratlbeFlmeemnrtibd,geean provisionsdthe bFen e
wasch ords
in, it would have been nearly expends, I before he got back
qe
raeadd oe n t
arbee-
and could have done us no good without, the appliances
French
I asked for. Neither could he have come until the end of
October, the periol their lordships thought most favour-
able for attack, but which I knew to be most unfavour-
able ]
5. Recent events in the Black Sea will not encourage
the Russians to attempt any enterprise of more than
usual hazard and daring at this precise moment.
[Recent events in the Black Sea were a miserable de-
ception; more recent events showed that the British fleet
was nearly dostroye I. And had that been known at the
Admiralty, Sir J. Graham's cautions to me would have
been repeated instead of his goadings.]
6. Your second reconnaissance of Sweaborg opens a
new view, and the presence or absence of a few guns of
an improved construction, or even of mortar-vessels,
cannot make the whole difference between a possible
and an impossible attack.
[My second reconnaissance opened no new view to me ;
and the presence or absence of a " few guns," as their
lordships aro pleased to call what I asked for, just makes
all the difference between the possible and the impos-
sible.]
Any man reading the foregoing letter would say that
nothing more goading could have been written to one
in my position ; nothing short of a positive order more

* Where was the vertical fire to come from ? We had
no mortars. Did he mean the ships to be heeled over, a►d
act with the ports caulked over?