The National Register.
London, England, 1812-05-31 00:00:00

THE POLICY

ABROAD CONSIDERED.

• TO THE EDIT OR OF 'I HE NATIONAL REGISTER'

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EXTENDING OUR SYSTEM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Slat,—A recent correspondence has brought this im-
taht subject in a tangible shape before the public. It
is unnecessary to advert to the momentous nature of the
question ; and it wou?d be almost presumptuous to offer
a peremptory opinion, when persons of the highest politi-
cal authority express sentiments diametrically opposite.
However, neither side has offered more than simple asser-
tion, and until they favour the public with the grounds.
upon winch they re..t their conviction, I should not con-
sider myselfinstified in assenting implicitly to an authority
unsupported by filet or argument.
it implies, Sir, the most correct knowledge of our re-
sources, to maintain or deny the practicability of extend.
ing the scale of our militias- operations on the Continent.
That knowledge, but few have an opportunity of acquir-
ing ; and those who possess the greatest facilities in that
respect, who are presumed to be masters of the subject,
hive increased the difficulties attending the discussion by
th mai ked differences contained in their corres-
pondence.
Without presuming to determine whether Lord WEL-
LESLEY) or Lord LivEltPooh, has the advantage of truth
r.r. his side, I must acknowledge that the present state of
tlu Continent appears to offer a strong argument in favour
of a vigorous application of our energies. At the came
time the relaxation visibly apparent in the efforts of the
eriemy in the Peninsula, strongly recommends any measure
wnich mi Olt enable Lord WELLINGTON to take advantage
of their present embarrassments.
This is certainly a most critical juncture in the affairs of
Spain and Portugal. The vast force which IluoNAhmorE
is collecting in Poland ; the .magnitude of the object he
has there in view ; the resistance he has to apprehend, and
the necessity he is under of covering his rear, and keeping
open his communications with France,—these complicated
c,nses will compel him to consider every other object as one
of a secondary policy and alarm. The negociations pend•
ri between our Government and that of Sweden, must
also excite his most serious apprehensions. Whatever may
be the extent of his activity or of his resources, the 'Jos-
tle attitude of the Northern States, will require their ful-
lest employment. No man is better acqu-Jintel than he is
h.ith the difficulties and dangers of a Russian war. The
Pze of his preparations attests his anxiety ; and the French
Ruler is too shrewd not to perceive, that no victories or
acquisitions made beyond the Niemen, will compensate
f r the risks and loss he will incur in the contest. The
battle of Austerlitz, or of Eylau, oh any other engage-
ment he fought with the Russians, will offer him no en-
couraging recollections on the opening of a campaign, or
0.0 the eve of a conflict. 'Fhe battle of Evlau Alone caused
lum a loss of 30.000 men in killed and Nv ounded. Three
or four such victories, would leave him alone to prosecute
his plan of conquests in Russia.
174.17. No. t.

Involved in a contest of that description, BUON APAIITL
will have no means of detaching reinforcements to his az-.
mies in the Peninsula. We see him, on the contrary,
withdrawing a considerable part of his torces from ilmt
quarter. Would it not, therefore, be of the utmost im-
portance to take advantage of his weakness there, and
compd, him to disgorge in Spain, what he may de•
vour in Poland ?

Lord WELLINGTON has opened the campaign under the
most brilliant and auspicious circumstances. The Spa-
niards themselves begin to display renewed energies ; and
their Government seems to be animated by an honest det r-
mination to co-operate vigorously with the Ailies for the
liberation of the Peninsula. These are hopes whi;:h the
most ardent amongst us did not dare encourage ; ana, I
trust, they will not be disappointed horn ill-timed and er-
roneous motives of. economy. I call them, Sir, erro.
neoni, because by making great expence and exertions for
a short time, we might soon be able to curtail both to half
their present enormous standard. Do we mean. to leave
this war a fatal inheritance to our children ? A contest,
which by a generous exertion might be terminated in the
course of twelve months, is likely to last as many years..
Sikh a protracied.state of wai faie none can contemplate
without horror, or look to i:s conclusion wid.out dismay.
The best interests of humanity have already suffered too
much tinder its duration c 1 pressure.
I therefore anxiously wish to see the practicabilitvof ex-
tending..our military operations on the Continent, proved
in this most favourable juncture. If the present be neglect-
ed, fortune, I am afraid, will not offer another. Should rho
Allies re-occupy Made id, and expel the invaders from
the South, BUO:4APARTE would not retrieve the loss and
disgrace—by even planting ins eagles on the towers of
Petersburgh and Moscow. The event would terrify
in the midst of his triumphs ; and all his conquests in
the North would he ephemeral acquisitions, if Lord
WELLINGTON, at the head of a British, Spanish, and
Portuguese force, threatened to p:lss the barrier of t.;,e
Pyrenees. His Lordship already presses upon the enemy
every direction. They fly at his approach. They suffer
the most important fortresses to be taken, without darhig
to hazard a battle for their relief. This is a strong con-
fes%ion of their weakness. With such palpable pro'.fs
of a great change in the character of the war, the public
would not shriiiik from an experiment, however euen-
sive, which should be likely to expel the enemy frt in
Spain. Could any sacrifice be too great, -t,v!;i,.11 would
secure the attainment of such an object ? Were BtroNA-
PA RTE absolute and undisputed master of the rest of ITA-
rope, this reverse in the Peninsula would outweigh all his
other advantages, and ultimately subvert his authori•v.
I wish, to know, Sir, the amount of our disposeakle
regular force. If it were possible to send ittimediatelr
R reinforcement of 20,000 to Spain, I should in that case
feel the strongest confidence that the French, in less than
three months, would he obliged to abandon the whole
of the South of Spain, together with the capital, and
probably retreat as far as the Ebro. All the resources and
population of Spain would be thus placed at the disposal

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