The National Register.
London, England, 1808-02-15 00:00:00

LITICAL DISQUISITION.

NI:31BIER SEVEN

lIINSON'S CONFLUENCES WITII
IiMI'7S.ROR. OF RUSSIA.

:he public attention has been am:tete:l to the im-
.ments made by Lord Ilr':•hinson in the House of
lay last, respecting certain conferences which he
age personally to hold with the Emperor of
after the Treaty of Tilsit, that they are ren-
of paramount interest among the topics which

1r discussion.
inces in which these conferences were held were
mentous, and pregnant with consequences. An
-ry• of Europe had just then beet fixed. The

the French Revolution, the most remarkable

tal of the Roman empire, had just been termi-
ontinent. The great Continental 'Monarch, who
it to resign the contest, and the delegated organ
ter Government who remained as.ociated in the
explain their mutual sentiments on the mo-
►n. Hardly can the ilanOtlation picture a situ-
trkable. The mission itself of Lord Hutchinson,
most extroonlinary on record. lie was sent,

intend, at least to witness the final act of the

ich had been acting- on the stage of Europe for
'ears. He was sent to aid with hi; counsels; to
f communication between the two performing.

tnd to give to his own Government the advice of

pun the inconceivably important transactions in
sent to bear so unusual a part. No document
are acquainted, in all the voluminous records of
, in point of importance, hear to be compared
umstances with the narrative of the conferences
tchinson delivered in his place as a Peer of the
onday night. As it is our object, iu the pre-
1, to point out carefully the bearings of these
Yrencess upon the great political questions which
the British public, it is absolutely necessary that
the narrative before us ; but, independent of this
we should deem it injustice to our readers not
t of such high importance, as far as to us be-
d before them. We copy the report from the
isle; we have every reason to believe it. is
!meat of the Noble Lord himself. When his
.o that part of his speech in which his narrative
vs was introduced, he thus ex pret-ed himself:
td of A ugu-t, my Lords, 1 had a conversation
.or of Rus',ia at hantiocostroff. His Imperial
me whether I :tad not admitted to Count
days :titer the battle of Friedland, that it was
In to make Peace ? I told him that I had done
of that opinion then, which subsequent events
that I thous ht myself bound in justice to him,
publicly to avow it, which I should continue to
ve His Imperial Majesty :aid, we arc then
the necessity there is to make Peace. I an-
.ffirmative.
ial Majesty proceeded to state, that be bad
iation to England; that he attached no fake va-
-as the French Ns ur..l) to the acceptance or
tnediatioo: Lot that it was Lis most 3 interc sad
I.

•

anxious wish that England should make Peace, as he was sure
that it was his interest, and also that of Europe, and ours, that
we should restore tranquillity to the world.
" I said to his Imperial Majesty, that he had nit given surs
ficient time for England to accept or reject his mediation, be'
came a much longer period than a mantis must elapse before any
answer could be received ; and though the disposition of my
mind inclined towards Peace, I, nor no other mao in England
would ;:ecept it, but on conditions the most reasonable and lions
towable; that as far as we were CoUcerned, the events of the
War hull heen y favourable.
" Ta which his Imperial 'Majesty replied, that the time al-
'awed was of oe impartruce, bemuse we might take three or
four months, if we pleased, to accept or reject his mediation
but his anxious wish and desire was, that we should make
Peace. That he had a perfect knowledge of the feelings and
character of the peopl.. of Etriaarl that he had been ma'e neA
quainted hyßora pa rte with tbe condiliOns of Peace proposed to
be offered, and that he had no doubt shat even I Mystlf would
consider them to be highly reasonable and honourable.
" Some confidential conversation followed, NV hich I do not,
think mrelf at liherty to sitscloses" •
Such is the account which Lord Butchinsou rendered of the
first conference held between the Emperor Of Russia aud him elf,
after the Treaty of Tilsit, and before the. intelligence of the
attack on Copenhagen had yet reached them. Let us en-
deavour, with as much precision as possible, to ascertain its
circumstances. It is a point to be received as demonstratively
certain, that in this conference there ss:o no artifice on the part
of the young Emperor. It bears the most striking internal evi-
dence of profound sincerity. The external proofs too of this sin-
cerity are irresistible. No conceivable object Was to la gained
by deceit. But above all, never would a ouug and inex'
perienced Monarch, have been selected as the iustrument of a
train of deceit. Had Bonaparte been the instigator, he would
never have trusted the direct, and impetuous passions of a
youthful Emperor in so delicate a business; and Alexander
himself would surely have had some servants faithful enough to
have prevented this direct prostitution of the royal dignity. Had
a scene of artifice been planned, some hackneyed courtier would
have sustained the ignominious task ; his Imperial Majesty
would have been withdrawn from the disgrace, and from the
difficulty.
Depras its, not only the most deep, but the most experienced
would be implied in every imputation of insincerity on the part
of the young Monarch. It is, therefore, to be rejected with
confidence and certainty. To have accepted, and to have pert
petrated the office of deception on this occasion would prove.
him not only a but a practiced villain. But We know
that the character of Alexander is directly the reverse of all
this. lie is simple and artless to a fault, Tills is well known
to be one of the defects of his character. Though he is far
from weak in unlerstanding, from the privacy of his educa-
tion, he is little acquainted with the PhlifiCes of other men, and
not always sufficiently nmster even of disguise.
Such being the irresistible proofs of the sincerity or the Em-
peror of Russia in this conference, it is eompletely decisive of
the question, whether any secret articles ins lie Treaty of Tilsit
were printed ag'ainst thil tountsy. We may confidently pro,
nominee that in the opinion of the Emperor of Russia no tittle of
that Treaty was injurious to us. If an article respecting
Corfu wal admitted, surely it will not be contended that his
opinion was far wront, ; surely it will not be rontetobst! that our
interests were deer!), erected by the dispasal of Corfu either
ono way or !n another. If a st.zr‘t article was aituitted for

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