The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-01 00:00:00

MANCHESTER RACES.

(THIS DAY.)
(BY ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.)

STEEPLECHASE.

Garland
Rosa
Columbine

Eight ran:
RAILWAY PLATE.

Royal Blue
STRETFORD STEEPLECHASE.—Off

PRUSSIA.

BERLIN, Dec. 29.—1 t is no secret that the Prus
sian Cabinet addressed a note, on or about the
19th, to its envoy at London and Paris, for the
purpose of being communicated to the British and
French Government, wherein it explains with
characteristic circumlocution and tortuousness its
motives for declining to adhere to the December
treaty. The note has not yet been made pub-
lic, nor has any analysis appeared in the jour-
nals. Its contents, however, if
.rumour be
correct, may be summed up in a few sen-
tences. Prussia founds one of her main objections
upon the treaty having been concluded before
it was submitted to her consideration, and this in
part upon the stipulations of the Bth of August, to
which she was not a party. She is not averse, how-
ever, to deliberate upon and enter into another
treaty, provided its requirements in regard to
Russia be moderate, and consistent with the Czar's
honour and dignity. In other words, Prussia has
no objection to join conferences which shall have
for object her own reparticipation in negotiations,
but upon bases and for objects, in so far as re-
gards Russia, palpably opposed to eventualities
connected with the triple treaty.
The document in amplification of the note of
the 7th of December dwells, it is said, with unction
upon the Emperor's " unreserved " assent to nego-
tiate on the four points, and deems this assent to
be a sufficient guarantee for sincerity on one side,
and for security on the other. The document like-
wise professes an earnest desire for reunion with
the three allies, for the purpose of establishing a
durable and secure peace; but the path to this
desirable object must be strewed with snowdrops
culled ix the gardens of Glatschina, and Prussia
must be relieved from all risk of compromise.
Nevertheless,she announces her steadfast intention
of adhering to her engagements with Austria, and
of not swerving from those imposed upon her by
the protocol of the gat of April, which latter, as
clearly demonstrated by recent Prussian despatches,
are regarded by her to be lax and general, and nc-
wise specific as to practical application.
It may be asked, what will be the result if the
policy, if such it can be called, pursued by Prussia ?
Why, the first result will be an armed neutrality,
which the dominant party trusts will be the fore-
runner of overt union with Russia ; and the next
must be submission on the part of the Cabinet to
the will of this party, or emancipation from its
trammels, and co-operation with the West. There
can be no medium. The day must come ere long
when the British and French Cabinets must re-
quest Prussia to declare herself unequivocally, or,
at all events, to accord demands which will be tan-
tamount to such a declaration. Under every cir-
cumstance, the next two or three months will teem
with complications, which may prove that the only
fruit of the cravings of Prussia for peace, upon
terms agreeable to Russia, will be the involving of
the country and of Germany in external war and
internal dissensions.

SPAIN.

Our accounts from Madrid are of the 25th ult.

The Ministry intend to make the maintenance
of the Consumes and Puertas a Cabinet question.
General Espartero will, in all probability, come
forward in the Cortes with a frank and explicit
declaration on the subject, which will greatly
simplify the question, and decide a strong majority
to vote "in favour of the maintenance of those im-
portant branches of the public revenue.
It is not true that M. Collado, the Minister of
Finance, had tendered his resignation.
The committee appointed to report the re-elec-
tion of M. Pacheco, lately appointed Ambassador
at Rome, decided the question in the negative.
It being Christmas-day, the Bourse was closed.

POLAND INVADED FROM THE BALTIC.

(From Count Valerian Kraiinski's Russia, Poland, and

Europe.)

The most vulnerable point of Russia on the Polish
side, and where she may be attacked in the most
effective manner, is, however, Samogitia, or the north-
western part of Lithuania, bordering on Prussia, the
Baltic Sea, and Courland. The inhabitants of that pro-
vince, known for their bold character and stubleern reso-
lution, are animated with a more intense hostility to the
Russian dominion than perhaps any other population
under its rule ; and this on account of the following
circumstance. The peasantry of Samogitia enjoyed,
under the Polish dominion, a certain degree of liberty,
—at least, their obligations towards the landowners de-
pended on the will of the latter, but were regulated by
custom, which, having acquired the force of law, was
religiously obeerved. This circumstance, united with a
fertile soil, the proximity of the sea, and an entirely free
trade, which was the case in Poland, rendered the
Samogitian peasantry one of the richest of their class in
Europa ; and their welfare naturally gave theni a feeling
of independence, unknown to the peasantry of the adja-
cent provinces. This happy state of things has been
entirely reversed since the establishment of the Russian
Government, because, as it did not recognise the
liberties enjoyed by the above-mentioned peasantry,
they were gradually reduced to a condition of absolute
serfage, and their welfare declined in the same ratio as
their liberty. This has been particularly the ease with
the steiro,sties, cr crown lands, which had been grated
by the Russian Government to several of its military
officers and civil eatployc's as a reward for their
cervices, and who nut only oppose the pea-
santry of those lands, but have even reduced many
small freeholders, by their influence with the public au-
thorities, to a state of serfage. This natural cause of
hatred against the Russian government is still more in-
creased by the circumstance that the Samogitians, who
do not belong to the Slavonic race, speak a language so
different from that of the Russians that they cannot under-
stand each other, as is the case with all the Slavonic na-
tions. The Samogitians proved their capabilities for an
insurrectionary war in 1831, when, having risen, without
any resistance from a regular army, they kept their
ground for about five months against the Russian forces,
and this in an entirely flat country. Now, a descent in
that quarter, for instance at Liebau, about thirty Eng-
lish miles front the Samogitian frontier, effected in the
early spring of the next year by the allied forces, and a
Polish legion, composed chiefly of officers and veteran
soldiers, now exiles in France and England, who may
be employed as instructors of the new levies, and whose
number may be considerably increased by the Poles who
have been brought as Russian prisoners to the above•
mentioned two countries, with a sufficient store of arms,
munitions, aad all the necessaries of war, will produce
an immediate insurrection, which, supported by a regu-
' lar force] of the allies, nsay be soon organised into an
effective army.*
An attack on this side of Russia will be much mere
effective than in any other part of the Baltic coast,
because, although there may be a considerable discon-
tent in the Russian Baltic provinces (Livonia, Esthonia,
and Courland), on account of the proselytism of the
Greek Church amongst the Protestant peasantry of these
provinces, it is by no means such as to produce an in-
surrection ; whilst the gentry of the same provinces
occupy the most important places in the civil and mili-
tary service of Russia, and are, therefore, notwithstand-
ing their German nationality, generally more attached
to the present order of things than many real Russians.
Neither .an great things, in this respect, be expected
from Finland, because this province, united with Russia
in 1809, has been since that time treated with particular
favour. It has a kindof constitution, an entirely sepa-
rate administration, its own army, all its ancient pri-
vileges and franchises, and even a much less restricted
tariff than the rest of the Russian empire. The Fin-
landers, enjoying all these peculiar privileges, have,
moreover, an open field for their talents and ambition in
the military and civil service of Russia, where many of
them occupy important situations. In short, Russia has
done everything in order to reconcile the inhabitants of
Finland to her rule ; and, consequently, it is no wonder
that she has succeeded in creating amongst them a con-
siderable party. These circumstances render an insnreec-
tion in that quarter against Russia not very probable,
except after a signal defeat of that power, and
consequently when it will be the least needed. But
supposing that the inhabitants of Finland should rise to
a man at a landing of the Allied troops, including the
Swedes (because it is impossible to admit that the
Swedish Government should be allowed to preserve its
neutrality next spring, when the Allied fleets employed
now in the Black Sea will be able to join those in the
Baltic), and that this province should be wrested from the
Russians, what strategic advantages may be derived
front ithe occupation of this extremity of Russia,
except the facility of taking St. Petersburg ? But the loss
of that capital will not injure in any way the real strength
of Russia, because the capture of her fleet will not make
much difference in this respect, considering that it may
be made useless by a blockade, as it was this summer
and it will have no more effect upon her commerce than
that which had been produced by the above-mentioned
means. It will only serve to rouse the national spirit of
the Russians, as was the case after the destruction o f
Moscow in 1812, and make the war more popular
amongst them.
The effects of a landing in Samogitia will be, how-
ever, very different. I have explained above, p. 14, et
seq., the causes which render a general and immediate
insurrection in that quarter certain, in case of such a
landing ; and a single glance on the map of that country
will slimy the ilnin.eec strategic advantages which Hill
be obtained by this combination. The insurrection, sup
ported by the Allied forces, and orguni ad in the manner
described in that place, may r eon reach Vilna, and even
extend beyond that town. This movement, operating
in the rear of the Russian armies engaged in Poland,
will at once cut off their communication with St. Peters-
burg, and thus compel them hastily to retreat beyond
the Dnieper. Such a retreat, accomplished through a
country in a state of insurrection, will be necessarily ex-
posed to great losses, particularly by the desertion of the
Polish soldiers who have been forced into the Russian
army, and which in this case will become general.TJP
came movement will deliver the webterit part of the Baltic;
coasts of Russia into the hands of the Allies, because the
Russian army, forced to evacuate Poland in an eastern
direction, must fall back on the old Russian provinces ;
for it is only there that it will be able to attempt making
a stand against the advance of the enemy.