The National Register.
London, England, 1808-07-17 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL ItEGISTER.

tremity of 'Spain to the other, he must leave in every pro-
`. ince Mt overruns from twenty to thirty .housand, if ht
wishes to secure his conquests. If he will expect an:.
favorable result, he must divide his army ; and of the
da ,ger of such an expedient, the fate of i/upont's corps
convince biro.

Another considerable disadvantage for the enemy is,
their not being able to employ a numerous cavalry, ton
a scarcizy of forage; for in- the middle of May all the
vegetation of the Champa gn country is burned up by the
excesNive heat. To what extremities this will reduce les
foraging parties may be easily conceived. From the same
plosical cause they w not even be able to employ tha-
tiemendous train of artillery, which has had so decisive a,.
influence in all their wars. In fact there is nut one coml•
try le Europe, where a numerous invading army has,
greater obstacles to surmount, and less probability 01
success, if the inhabitants are determined to tesist.
Let us now examine what assistance this couutey can ren-
der the Spaniards, under a military point of view. We will
not achert to the number it may he expedient to send II
their assistance; nor will attempt to discover the desiana-
tMn of the expeditions fitting out. But if we make a judi-
cious use of the military posit ,ons we have in the Mediter-
ranean, we can always make an important diversion, on
several sides, in their favour. c can render them, at the
same time, a pass.ve assistance, which may be as eflicaci:
°as as the nust a. tine co-operation on our part. We um.
only sotlect the greater part of our regular troops now in
Englann, anti encamp them opposite Holland or Brabant,
with a sumeient number of transports always in readiness,
mid the trench will be compelled to keep 50,000 men to
protect the menaced points ; whilst the uncertainty of our
attack increases the,r alarm and augments our aggrcssise
means. We should occasionally embark eight or ten thou-
sand, and annoy the i rench coasts, which will keep then.
in contin tat anxiety from the apprehension of our making
a deice nt. but we must not confine ourselves to idle de-
leretst rations. %%believer a favourable opportunity offers.
He; should eflect a lauding, ravage the country. carry ofl
the cattle, and lay the whole coast from Calais to Mar-
seillcs contribution. This proposal may be repug-
nant. to filo conscientious and humane ; but they do not re-
flect that false principles of humanity, in a crisis like the
present, arc attended with more fatal consequences, and
more destructive to mankind, than the most barbarous
mode of warfare. }or the French, during a great part of
Ma war, having suffered no direct losses, and having con-
sequently est aped Cie pressure of the calamities they have
bro..glit on other states, are more indifferent as to its con-
timetnce. They have at present no plausible pretext 01
in :inuring against, or resisting the pernicious ambition
of The tyrant who oppresses them. But were they to feel
in their own houses, or in their own fields, the distresAes
alluded to above; were they to be spectators of the de-
viiatation of their own country, they would raise such cries,
as u otA have more effect in restraining the ambition of
Eon :p..rte, than perhaps any other event which could
ocean It may be objected, that this vigorous retaliation
would only tend to increase the animitsity which subsists
bet!yeen the two countries. We will not 'answer this objec-
tion by asking if the French would act in the same manner
towards us, had they it in their power.--They certainly
woald. as the people of this country are not in the
habit of jn.:ifying their actions by the example of thi:t
! rod restless nation, we will rather defend it oa
the expediency of disgusting them, bs the misery they
mill sutler th-anselves, of their tame acquiescence in the
most i!ii2; .ions projects of their master. They are heartily
tired, there is no doubt, of the oppression they labor
under. The calamities they would suffer from this new
mode of warfare would probably increase their hatred of
us bat tti^y would convince them at the same time, more
forcibly than any other circumstance, of the ruinous con.'
sequences of their abject submission to an immoral tyrant.

JITTT

We should, however, make a d aereace be. lit,,, t n
aerself and the states the cotiyuei..d. Our uesc..nts sty
ac confined totally to the former; and by this jud
and humane discrimination, we s,ioulri impress on the u.
of the French, that me were their enemies from 1,0 0
inotiv e, but because they were the common entii,.
every other state.
All this time we have only adverted to the assistance
paniards have to expect from this county: Let us
• urn our attention to the continent. tit e there het
ustria awaking from bet lethargy. Evt ry account
.eriiiany and Holland inclines us to believe s:,c
egiect the favourable opportunity. Ghe has tie exiii
d fate of Prussia before her: in retivintili•• her ani
.ncrcases the anxiety .and difficulties of
ho will never pardon, should he succcud dgainf,t p
'.er troublesome and dangerous nectraiiiy. but ;lit!"
reason to believe that the Cabinet of Vienna is so hi
'o her true interests. The Archduke Charles, who is
uttered by every patriot in Germany, as the iast prop
Austrian, and even German, independence, is toe el,
I ghtened to overlook the present advantages. His nienr#
patriotism, and abilities as statesman and general, arc iie.-
:her sufficiently known, nor appreciated in this count
He possesses a decided influence over the minds nf
countrymen. He is equally loved by the Hungarian, the
';ohemian, the Austrian, and the Iviorav iani and the sol-
lier has always felt, and acknowledges the effects of his
humane solicitude.

The new arrangement of the Austrian army is admirable:
it is di' itted into ten corps in imitation of the French. The
command of the respective corps is given to generals ofdis-
• •nguished abilities and great experience. Prince Lichten-
stein, Counts Bellegarde, klenau, and General Zach, de-
serve the highest measure of confidence, and enjoy a high
reputation in the Austrian army. And as the Aerchiluite
harles's patriotic exertions, are no more impeded by
t ourt intrigue, or the personal aversion of the fate Lm-
i.ress, we may conclude that the organ zation of the rest
of the army corresponds with the choice of the generals.
From these and other circumstances we are coi.vinced,
hat Austria will declare war against France before ihe he.
;inning of September, and probably sooner. She spewed
P. disposition to resist before she could have received any
account of the Spanish insurrection: what influence this
sarcumstance will base on her resolution may be easily
surmised. And in case of an event of this kind occuring,
can Bonaparte expect' from the Princes of the Rhenish
cc nfederacy the assistance he received during the Prussian
war. If those degraded Princes are influenced by the
same feelings and impressions which actnate the generality
of men, we may boldly pronounce them to be heartily
tired of their state of vassalage. The capricious and ar-
rogant character of their Protector, with his treatment of
.he Pope and of the Royal Family of Spain, must con-
ince them that their security is precarious. They have
:ot forgotten, that, under the Germanic constitution, they
enjoyed as much independence as the most ponerful sove-
reigns in t urope. They cannot fail to contrast the dignity
of a Prince of the Roman Empire, with their present de-
gradation as vassals to an insolent soldier of fortune.
Therefore, if Austria knows how to make a proper use
of this dissatisfaction, and promises them forgetfulness
of th past, she may see them fighting her battles for her,
instead of ..o;nbatinp.; under the banners of Bonaparte.
Such is the revolution, which a few weeks has eft•cled
in the state of Europe. There are none of our reade;-s so
luke-warm, or so ignorant of our true interests, as to be
i..•.derent to tht security and advantages it holds out to
An enlightened policy, with a just indignation at the
Miquitous treatment of a brave and unsuspecting peop.e,
and the strong interest we feel as freemen, at scene g a
system of universal oppression likPly to he estra
• e all
these suggest the necessity of a decided concurrence? on
•in
the part of this country, in favour of the Spanish patriots.