The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-19 00:00:00

HOUSE OF COMMONS-(YESTERDAY.)

The SPEIKER took the chair at 4 o'clock.
The following bills were read a third time and passed :
—Capetown Railway and Dock ; Derbyshire, Stafford-
shire, and Worcestershire Railway (No. 2) ; Glasgow,
Kirkintilloch, and Baldernock Roads ; Hoffe's Estate ;
Royal Medical Benevolent College ; Dagenham Docks ;
Great Northern London Cemetery.
The further consideration of the Torquay District
Churches Bill, after some discussion, was postponed.
The following bills were considered and ordered to be
read a third time :—Dundalk ffarhonr and Port, Lon-
don and Brassington Road, Wad hurst and We-t Far-
leigh Roads, West Bromwich Improvement, Westmin-
ster Improvements, Westminster Land Company.
PETITIONS.

Petitions were presented by Mr. Ellice, from Ros-
common, in favour of the Lord Advocate's Education
Bill ; by Mr. Henley, from Oxford, against the sale of
intoxicating liquors on the Lord's-day.

THE REPORT OF THE SEBASTOPOL COMIIITTEE.

Mr. ROEBUCK brought up, amidst some cheering, the
report of the select committee on the army before Sebas-
topol, which was then laid on the table.
On the motion, of Mr. DISRAELI, it was ordered that
the report should be read by the clerk of the house.

Sir D. LE MARCHANT, the chief clerk, accordingly read
the report as follows :

" Tho complicated nature of this inquiry, the variety of
subjects investigated, the number of witnesses examined,
and the frequent inconsistency and contrariety of the evi-
dence, render it no easy task to present a clear, definite,
and just exposition of the matters submitted to your com-
mittee.-

"The difficulty of this task has been enhanced by the
impossibility of summoning some persons as witnesses who
might have furnished important infoimatien. From the
same cause some persons are left under imputations, in re-
gard to which your committee regret thi.t they can pro-
nounce no conclusive opinion. The fulness of the investi-
gation has, moreover, been restricted by considerations of
state policy, so that in the outset of this report your com-
mittee must admit that they have been compelled to end
an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to
complete. _ _

" liavingoffered this preliminary explanation, your com-
mittee will endeavour to state, as shortly as the subject
will allow, the opinions which they have formed in regard
to the following heads of this inquiry, viz. :
"1. The condition of our army before Sebastopol.
" 2. The conduct of the departments, both at home and
abroad, whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of
that army.

"THE CONDITION OF OUR ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.
" An army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance
of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe
winter in besieging a fortress which, from want of num-
bers, it could not invest, was necessarily placed iu a situa-
tion where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be en-
dured. Your committee are, however, of opinion that this
amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by
causes hereafter enumerated, and which aro mainly to be
attributed to dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the
supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its
healthy and effective condition. Iu arriving at this opinion
they have made allowarce for the unexpected severity of
the storm on the 14th of November, and they have not
bee❑ unmindful of the difficelties which a long period of
peace must inevitably produce at the commencement of a
campaign.
" In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful
condition of the army the evidence must be perused ; and
your committee will only refer to such details as may be
requieito to sustain their opinions.
"From the Itch September, when the army landed in
the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as witnesses state,
until about the middle of November, the troops suffered
from overwork and from dysentery, but were not, upon
the whole, ill-provided with food. Even at this period
there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and a
painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treat-
ment of the sick and wounded. As the season advanced
the causes of sickness increased, and the army, with its
number of effective men daily diminishing, became more
and more disproportionod to the amount of duty which it
had to perform. .
" From the middle of November this army was, during
a period of many weeks, reduced to a condition which it
is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured both
by officers and men with a fortitude and heroism unsur-
passed in the annals of war. They were exposed under
single canvas to all the sufferings and inconveniences of
cold, rain, mud, and snow, on the high ground and in the
depth of winter. They suffered from overwork, exposure,
want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and
imperfect accommodation for the sick.
" The fatigue necessarily. resulted from the inadequacy
of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army
was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of
the siege, the extent of front to be defended, the positions
to he maintained, and the works to be undertaken, depended
on military considerations, and were decided upon in con-
junction with our allies. Your committee regard these
matters as beyond the limits of their inquiry.
"The other causes of suffering will be reviewed under
the following heads :

THE CONDUCT OF THE DEPiCTMENTS BOTH AT HOME
AND ABROAD WHOSE DUTY IT HAS BEEN TO ADMINIS-
TER TO THE WANTS OF THE ARMY.
"THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT AT HOME,

"The responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea
rests upon the home government. The Duke of Newcastle,
in his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan, on the 10th of
April, 1854, directs careful, but secret "inquiry" to be
made into the present amount and condition of the Russian
force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of
Sebastopol.' And his ("race further observes, that before
the siege of a fortress so strong can be attempted, it is
necessary that information which can be relied on shall be
obtained upon many points on which little or nothing is at
pre=ent known.' A second despatch, dated the 29th of
June, directs that the safety of Couttantinoplo having
bteaesnsiasen _cured, whatever might be the movement of the
be undertaken,
no campaign in the Principalities should
ken but that measures should be at once con-
certed for the si •
ege of Sebastopol. There is,' it is added,
no prospect of a safe andthe fleet
peace until the for-
tress is reduced, and fleet taken
despatch leaves to Lord Raglan or destroyed.' The
scrotion only ' in case
of some insuperable impediment, such as a want of ample
preparation by either army, or of the possession by Russia
of a force in the Crimea greatly out-numbering that which
can be brought against it:
"The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success
Lord Aberdeen states it to have been their impression that.
Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a coup d,
main. The Duke of Newcastle says, that he expected
the
army, after capturing Sebastopol would winter there or
else, after destroying the fortress, would return to .!
nter
on the shores of the Bosphorus. Sir James Grahamwi
has
the strongest opinion that the order for the expedition
was given at the right time, and was executed at the right
time.
" This report shows the results which ensued upon the
frustration of these expectations. Your committee have
inquired what information the Government had obtained
which induced them to order this expedition. In regard to
this matter it may be observed that the Duke of Newcastle
had, in his despatch of the 10th of April, estimated the Rua-
SiAla forces in the Crimea at ;7'0,000 men, and he believes
that when the
eapreition was ordered no more reliable ea-

counts had been received. Sir James Graham, however,
says that at a later period, viz., the last week in July, ho
had obtained from a Crimean authority a complete ac-
count of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads,
its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most
important of all, a statement of the force, which was esti-
mated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which were
cavalry, 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebasto-
pol, and the remaining 30,003 were dispersed through the
Crimea.' Vice-Admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May,.
1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying
upon information which ho had obtained, he estimated the
Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. The embas•
sies at St. Petersburg and Constantinople were unable to
furnish any information upon these important subjects.
" Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the 19th of July,
states that `the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more
in deference to the views of the British Government than
to any information in the possession of the naval and mili-
tary authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's
forces or to their state of preparation.'
" The terms of reference do not call upon your commit.
tee to pronounce any opinion in regard to the policy of the
Government in ordering the expedition to the Crimea: but
it is their duty to report how far the preparations made
were adequate to the preparations which had been ordered.
"The general direction of the war was in the hands of
the Duke of Newcastle, who, in the spring of 1854, hell
the office of Secretary for War and Colonies. In July these
departments were divided, and the duke being relieved
from colonial duties, undertookthe immediate conduct of
the war.
" When this important change was effected it does not
appear that any order in council, minute, or other docu-
ment was prepared defining the special duties of the War
Department. The duke, as Secretary of State, had un-
doubtedly, before as well as after the change, ample powers;
he considered himself officially responsible for all the de-
partments under his control, and he could issue such orders
as he thought fit for their guidance. He states, however,
that he felt his means to be insufficient for the due per-
formance of his separate duties as Secretary of State for
War; he considered the organisation of all the war depart.
ments and their relation to each other to be in an unsatis-
factory state, but he felt it to be impossible, consistently
with attention to pressing businees, to attempt their re-or-
ganimation.
"In making the separation between the Secretaryship. of
War and the Colonies, together with the transference of
the commissariat from the Treasury to the Secretary for
War, the Cabinet considered that they had adopted mea-
sures initiatory to other changes which would necessarily
follow. The members of the Cabinet did not, however,
hold any consultations upon the changes to be made, or
the best mode of effecting them ; they separated, as usual,
at the close of the Parliamentary session in August, and
as they were not summoned to a meeting, they did not re-
assemble in council until the second week of October. At
'a later period of the year Lord John Russell expressed his
dissatisfaction with the state of the War Department, and
suggested Lord Palmerston as the fittest person for the
office of Secretary of War. He adduced some cases
where he said there had been a want of vigour in the
exercise of authority, although the Cabinet, he added,
' had done much in its recent meetings to repair omis-
siens.' Your committee notice with regret that the
Cabinet did not meet in August or September, when
these omissions might have been sooner remedied.
Lord John Russell also observes, that ' the House
of Commons would expect, after six or seven months'
deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department.
Your committee can find no trace of these deliberations ;
and any evils that may have resulted from delay in such
arrangements are, therefore, properly laid to the charge of
the Cabinet.
" At the date of the expedition to the East no reserve
was provided at home adequate to the undertaking. Mr.
Sidney Herbert states, in his memorandum of the 27th of
November, ' The army in the East has been created by
discounting the future. Every regiment at home, or
within reach, and not forming part of that army, has been
robbed to complete it. The depots of battalions under
Lord Raglan have been similarly treated.
" The men sent out to reiuforce the army were recruits
who had not yet become fit fur foreign service, and the
depots at home were too weak to feed the companies
abroad.
" The order to attack Sebastopol was sent to Lord Raglan
on the 20th of June; the formation of a reserve at Malta
was not determined upon until early in November.
"It will be seen from the correspondence between Lord
J. Russell and Lord Aberdeen, that Lord Reglad had re-
ported that 'he wished he had been able to place in the
position of Balaklava, on the 26th of October, a more con-
siderable force,' and also, ' that on the sth of November
the heights of Inkerman were defended by no more than
8,000 British infantry." When the Duke of Newcastle in-
formed Lord Raglan that ho had 2,000 recruits to send to
him, he replied that ' those last sent were so young and
unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept
away like flies. He preferred to wait.'
" In December the power of reinforcing the army with
efficient soldiers was so reduced that the Government
thought it necessary to introduce a Foreign Enlistment
Bill for the purpose of raising a foreign legion.
" Your committee must express their regret that the
formation of a large reserve at home, and also in tke proxi-
mity of the seat of war, was not considered at a much
earlier period, and that the Government, well knowing the
limited numbers of the British army, the nature of the
climate in the East, as well as the power we were about to
encounter, did not at the commencement of the war take
means to augment the ranks of the at nay beyond the ordi-
nary recruiting, and also that earlier steps were not taken
to render the militia avail .ble both for the purpose of ob-
taining supplies of men, and also, in ease of necessity, for
the relief of regiments of the line stationed in garrisons in
the Mediterranean—measures which they found themselves
compelled to adopt at a later period.
" THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.
" On accepting the Secretaryship for War, the Duke of
Newcastle found himself in this disadvantageous position
—he had no separate office for his departments, he had no
document prescribing his new duties, no precedents for his
guidance, and his under seeretariea were new to the work.
In this situation he undertook the superintendence of nu-
merous departments, with whose internal organisation he
was dissatisfied, and the management of a war urgently
re();lii.negdizem,xatiaiiinid
pveitTercotiilys operations.
ft.auano
t d with the best
mode of exercising his authority over the subordinate de-
partments, and those departments were not officially in-
formed of their relative position, or of their new duties to-
wards the Minister for War, His interference was sought
for in matters of detail, wherein his time should not have
f been occupied, and he was left unacquainted with trans-
! actions of which he should have received official cognisance.
Feeling his large responsibilities, ho took upon himself to
remedy innumerable deficiencies which were brought to
his notice, and, in the, meantime, matters of paramount
necessity were postponed.
"The evidence, moreover, shows that the duke was long
left in ignorance, or was misinformed, respecting the pro-
gress of affairs in the East. He was not, until a late period,
made acquainted with the state of the hospitals at Scutari,
and the horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were
conveyed from Balaklava to the Bosphorus. Lord Aberdeen
has significantly observed that the Government were left in
ignorance longer than they ought to have been of the reel
state of matters in the l met. The Ministers, he says, were
informed of the condition of the army from the public
papers and private sources long before they heard it offi-
cially, and not hearing it officially they discredited the
rumours around them. Thus, while the whole country
was dismayed by reports, and was eagerly looking for some
gleam of official intelligence, the Cabinet, according to the
statement of Ministers, was in darkness.
" Harassed by these rumours, and perplexed by the in-
discreet silence of those who should have enlightened him,
the duke sent a commission to inquire into the state of the
hospitals at Scutari and in the Crimea. The commission
was issued in October ; it did not report until April. A
form of proceeding suited to redress grievances at home, or
to become a basis for legislative measures, was ill adapted
to relieve the pressing wants of 5,000 men suffering under
usieinanagernent and neglect.
" With the same benevolent intention, the duke, through
the channel of the Foreign-office, requested Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe to take upon himself, in addition to his many
onerous duties, a certain amount of supervision and assist-
ance of those hospitals.
" The clothing of the troops was not within the province
of the Secretary of State; awl the Duke of Newcastle says
it was extremely doubtful whether he had any right to in-
terfere. The soldiers hail received the ordinary supply for
the year ; yet the peculiar circumstances in svkich the
army had been placed induced the duke to recommend to
the Commander-in-Chief that an extra supply should be
furnished, and, in addition to this, warm clothing should
be prepared to meet the inclemency of the weather. The
system of clothing the army was then, and still is, in a
state of transitiou. Whenever the existing contracts cease,
the clothing will be supplied by the Ordnance, or by a
clothing department.
" The warm clothing was considered so important that,
upon hearing of the loss of the Prince cleanser, all the mili-
tary departments were occupied with this supply. The
Secretary for War issued orders; the Secretary at War was
constantly at the Ordnance, urging and hastening these
proceedings; clothiug was bought also in Austria and in
Switzerland. Ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and agents
were applied to for assistance ; money was profusely ex-
pended, and at a later period in the winter the troops must
have received a supply far larger than was required for
their reduced numbers.
"THE SECRETARY AT WAR.
" The duties of the Secretary at War are shortly stated
by Mr. Sidney Herbert ; they still be found more fully
enumerated in a memorandum, which was given in evidence
before the committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure
in 1850.

" The division of the Secretaryship of War and Colonies,
though technically it did not alter the position of the Secre-
tary at War, yet practically diminished the exercise of his
power, and tended to limit his functions to the original
duties of his office, namely, the financial business of the
arwv. Even in these matters the authority of a Secretary
of State, when exerted, must necessarily over-ride the
control of a Secretary at War. Mr. Sidney Herbert, as
Secretary at War, had no power to originate anything ;
but from praiseworthy motives, and with a view to relieve
the Duke of Newcastle, he undertook to do a duty which
was not the business of his office. Thus, in _ December,

having learnt from private sources the deplorable condition
of the hospitals, he wrote to the commandant, to the chief
medical officer, and to the purveyor, urging and authoris-
ing them to procure whatever might be wanted, assistants,
supplies, or additional buildings, promising them his ap-
probation for such outlay, and placing unlimited funds at
their disposal.
" While expenditure was thus encouraged, some finan-
cial regulations were still enforced, suited to a time of
peace, inapplicable to a period of war, and operating un-
justly on the soldiers who had been wounded or afflicted
with sickness in the Crimea. According to these regula-
floes every soldier coming into an hospital is obliged to
bring with him his kit; but although the troops, upon
landing in the Crimea, had been deprived of their knap-
sacks, which in many cases were never restored, yet no or,
der had been issued to furnish another set in lieu of those

articles which the soldier had been compelled to relinquish,
awl which are essential to his cleanliness and comfort.

Again, upon leaving the hospital, men were exposed to a
recurrence of sickness from insufficient clothing, and no
proper arrangement had been made to furnish this supply.
"An improvement, involving seine outlay, has been
suggested to your committee, which deserves the attention
of the Executive Government. The general hospital at
Chatham is said to be inconveniently situated, and ill
suited for the reception of invalids from the seat of war.
Vessels of large size cannot go there, and consequently the
siel: and wounded have either to be removed to a smaller
ship, or sent,by other means to the place of their destina-
tion. At the same time your committee may remark that
while hospitals are provided for the reception of officers
in the navy returning sick or wounded, no such accommo-
dation exists for officers of the army.
8 " Your committee may here also express a hope that the
vile which have arisen from allowing soldiers' wives to
accompany an army in the field will prevent a repetition
of this error.
".A memorandum will be found in the appendix, pur-
port lug to be by the Duke of Newcastle,' but written by