The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-19 00:00:00

" THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

" Your committee deem it unnecessary to state the
various duties of the Ordnance Department, nor need they
enter into details with the view of proving that upon the
efficiency of this department the naval and military ser-
vices depend.
" In April, 1854, Lord Raglan, the Master-General of
the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the forces
in the East; and shortly afterwards Sir Hew Ross was
named lieutenant-general of the Ordnance—an office which
had beers for many years abolished, but which was now re-
vived.
" Lord Aberdeen, in making this appointment, had to
some extent in view the abolition of the office of Master-
General. This subject had not, however, been considered
by the Cabinet, and in the meantime the Ministers believed
that the Lieutenant-General would have all the authority
of Master-General.
" The Lieutenant-General does not possess this power.
He is only a board officer ; and while in reference to mili-
tary duties ho exercises the Puthority of Master-General,
yet as regards the civil functions of the Ordnance he acts
only as a member of the board.
" The Board of Ordnance, moreover, differs from other,
boards in this respect—namely, that according to the prac.
tics or to the regulations of the department, the presence
of one board officer constitutes a board. During the sum-
mer and autumn of 1854, a board officer, the Surveyor-
General, was also employed abroad ; so that during v. period
when the pressure of business was heavier, and when the
expenditure of this department was larger than in any
previous year, two officers were wanting whose functions
the most economical administrations had been unable to
dispense with in times of peace.
" The Ordnance, even with its peculiar constitution,
may work efficiently while under the superintendence of a
vigilant Master-General, who has supreme authority, and
who is, therefore, justly held responsible for all its pro-
ceedings ; but the substitution of a lieutenant-general
changes the whole system of the office ; its duties are then
divided among the members of the board without any su-
pervising authority, and the business commenced by one
member maybe taken up or interrupted by another with-
out unity of purpose, and without due responsibility.
" The evils arising from the absence of the Master-Gene-
ral are abundantly exhibited in the evidence. The state-
ments of Sir T. Hastings, the Comptroller of Stores, and
of Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, amply prove
the unsatisfactory state of this department, while it would
seem, from the language of Sir Hew Ross, that he was im-
perfectly acquainted with the constitution of the board of
which he was a member.
" From the evidence it will be seen that a conflict of au-
thority arose between the members of this board. At a
time when urgent business required their attention they
were engaged in disputes, in preparing statements, and in
making appeals to tba Secretary of State for War. Sir
Thomas Hastings says, that although he made more than
one application informing the Secretary of State that he
had important communications to make to him, he received
no answer to his letters. Mr. Monsell, when he differed
from the other members of his board, applied to the Sec-
retary of State, who, by lending his sanction to the Clerk
of the Ordnance, enabled him to overrule both his col-
leagues, and thus interfered in a matter involving ques-
tions of military discipline, as well as of departmental sub-
ordination. In noticing the unseemly conduct of this board,
and the differences which were brought prominently for-
ward in the evidence, your committee observe with regret
that the public service has suffered from the want of judg-
ment and temper on the part of officers who were en-
trusted aiming a critical period with important public
duties.
" Your committee consider that it was detrimental to
the public service that the office of Surveyor-General
should have remained so long vacant, and that the duties
attached to that office should have been consequently im-
posed upon officers of the department who had already as
much upon their hands as they were able to perform effici-
ently:. . _

"Your committee believe that Lord Aberdeen would
have acted more beneficially for the public eervise if he had
appointed another Master-General when Lord Raglan could
no longer discharge the duties of the office, and they aro of
opinion that a vague intention of remodelling the Ordnance
Office affords no justification for the course pursued. If
this office were deemed to be imperfect, and ill-adapted for
its functions, there was the more need during its continued
existence of an able man to superintend its proceedings.
The Ordnance•office strikingly exemplifies the disordered
state into which a department may fall when there is no
able baud to guide it.
" After perusing the evidence, it will excite no surprise
to find that the arrangements attempted by this office in
reference to warm clothing, huts, and Minie rifles were
imperfect and dilatory. Huts were ordered at Constanti-
nople and Trieste, as well as in this country. The brat
order hero was issued on the 17th of November. When
the huts at length arrived at Belaklava, the exhausted
trensport service was unable to convey them to the camp.
It appears from the evidence of air J. Burgoyne and Sir
F. Smith that if canvas had been sent fur doubling the
tents, and planks for flooriug, effectual shelter for the
troops would have been provided at a much earlier period,
and at a smaller cost. It is impossible not to believe by
these means the sickness and suffering of the troops would
' have been diminished.
" Your committee must express their dissatisfaction
with the administration of the contract system under this
department, and they consider that no change will be
effective which dues not lead to a revisal and amendment
of this branch of the office.
"The tools supplied to the army are stated to be of bad
quality. Under a recent order the Ordnance furnish all
tools. The pioneers' tools were heretofore supplied by the
colonels of regiments. For this last supply the Ordnance is
not responsible. The officers examined almost uniformly
describe the tools supplied to the army as unserviceable. Sir
T. Hastings, on the other hand, states that ' he believes the
great mass of tools were good, but thinks that many have
been ill-treated, and that good tools in the hands of men
who do not understand them may be readily destroyed.'
There is, however, no doubt, that upon previous occasions
as well as in the present campaign, these articles of field
equipment have been condemned. In this country under a
proper system of contract and inspection there can be no
difficulty in obtaining tools of the best quality. The supply
of interior tools must be ascribed to carelessness or disho-
misty on the part of the persons responsible for the supply.
Your committee cannot ton forcibly express their opinion
of the importance of placingin the handsel the soldiers the
very best articles that can be provided.
" While the committee have felt it their duty to make
thesoobservations on the inadequate and disordered state of
this department., and its failure in some important func-
tions, they feel bound, at the same time, to mention the
admirable equipment of the corps of artillery attached to
the army, and the testimony generally given to the effi-
cient armament provided for the navy.

TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT AT 1101111.
"The sea transport between this country and the seat
of war has been conducted by the Board of Admiralty,
under the immediate superintendence of Captain Milne,
one of the Lords of the Admiralty. This business was
formerly transacted by a Transport Board, which was
abolished many years since. During the Inv, year requi-
sitions for transport were sent to the Admiralty from
several different quarters; the inceuvenience of this
system was so great, that Sir James Graham says he
deemed it indispensable, with the view to regularity
and promptitude, to bring these requisitions to one
common centre, from which the Admiralty might receive
order s. This change had not, however, been con-
pleted before he left office. The Duke of Newcastle
says, that no system will work well until the sea transl.;ort
is placed under the management of the Minister for War.
Such a course Sir J. Graham and Capt. Milne consicLr ob-
jectionable; it wou:d, they say, divide authority, increase
correspondence, and lead to confusion ; whereas now the
whole service afloat is united together in one link of re-
sponsibility.
" Sir J. Graham was, however, induced to re-constitute
the Transport Board, for the reasons which will be found
in his evidence.
" The mode in which ships wore taken up is stated by
Capt. Milne, and considering the urgent pressure of the pub
lie service, this buainess appears to Lave been ably conducted.
In pronouncing this opinion, your committee advert to the
magnitude of the operations executed. Within a year
somewhere abont 150,000 men and above 7C09 horses wore
conveyed, principally by steam, a large portion of them
to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country; besides
which ves.els had to be provided for stores to an enormous
amount, fur the purposes of war, for the sustenance
of both army and navy, and for the effective mainte-
nance of a steam fleet. .-iudden requisitions fur huts, and
other urgent necessaries, had also to be met.

"There is, it is said, an obvious error in comparing the
transport service between England and the Crimea to a
inereanthe arrang arrangement for the conveyance and delivery of
a given amount of tonnage. The transports, when sent to
the Crimea, could not deliver their stores and return. A
large number were permanently detained, from military
considerations, and many others were kept at Balaklava,
because there ware no warehouses on shore to receive their
cargo.

. - .
" Many complaints were made to your committee of the
mode in which stores were sent to the East. The mods in
[ which stores were sent depended on the nature of the re-
, quisitioe. Naval stores were apparently, sent under a
, satisfactory system. When the Ordnance Board apply, a
vessel is placed at their disposal provided they require it •
and, latterly, a similar system has been adopted with'
the medical department. The chief complaints have
arisen in reference to mixed cargoes. The captains of the
vessels, according to the Admiralty instructions, have
charge of the cnrgo ; but it is admitted that when large
passenger steamers were employed in this service the cap-
tains ware often unaccustomed to these duties, and iu such
cases the appointment of a supercargo would have been
beneficial. Until December it appears that a cargo-book
was not regularly kept. A Treasury minute, dated 11. th
December, 1854, states that some articles sent out to the
Crimea have been taken back to England in the same ves-
sels, and brought out again to the Crimea before they
have been delivered ; and that in other cases, where the
• vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or
four months before they had been received by the commis.
sariat. Ships were also so loaded that on arriving at the
port to which part of the cargo was unknown, and the
ship had to proceed on her voyage, carrying with her
things that ought to have been delivered at the interme-
diate port. Much suffering was the consequence of this
faulty mode of proceeding, the sick at Scutari being in
need of stores, which, in consequence of bad arrangements,
were carried to Balaklava.
" The unnecessary sufferings of the soldiers directly re-
ferable
to this neglect form one of the most painful por-
tions of the evidence; but on what department the blame
should rest, whether on the office of the Commander-in-
Chief, or of the Secretary-at-War, or of the Secretary of
State for War, your commiteee are unable to decide.
" Dr. Menzies had also, in a report to Major Sillery, the
commandant, dated tho 7th of August, directed attention
to this subject. "
No steps having apparently been taken in pursuance of
this suggestion, or of that of Dr. A. Smith to the military
secretary, on the 25th May, 1854, Sir J. Graham, on the 25th
of October, at the instigation of the Duke of Newcastle,
wrote a private letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, request-
ing him, after conferring with Lord Raglan, to have two
large steamers fitted for this service. On the receipt of
btheoisanlseetteervy one,arAdmiralexDpusontdead to
Dundas did
be not, as
Sebastopolashestate states,
ina act,
few
be underwdays,a his superintendence.udmoreoverhetlidit consider the transports
to
"Thus it appears that the preparation of ships for the
acounv:nyasnsegenoofntthiye
neglected.sick d
When it is remembered
wounded w as at first forgotten,
that
db
out of the limited number of the British army, 13,800 wore
removed,3l(ltchonosef
andthe 7stihckoofr wFoeburnud3erdy,,btehtwo•e(ehnsathdeftl
'
this neglect may be imagined. No foresight, qBiutepeintescems3abitoelr,could have provided for this large number. Some shipsf
should, however, have been specially tilted for a service
A. . .
••
•

"THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BOSPHORLTS.
" All transports, upon their arrival in the Bosphorus,
were placed under the orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer. This
officer had been specially selected for this duty by Sir James
Graham on account of his professional character and expe-
rience in matters connected with the embarkation and dis-
emb trkation of troops. He was placed, in the first instance,
under the orders of Vice-Admiral Dandas ; but a separate
power was afterwards given to him within the limits of
the Bosphorus, subject always to his reporting to the naval
commander-in-chief.

" As early as the Bth of September Rear-Admiral Boxer
applied for a ship to be attached to hirni,elf, with an expe-
rienced master, three good warrant officers, and a small
gang of artificers and mechanics. A compliance with this
requ,st would, he said, obviate delay and unnecessary ex-
pense in works which could otherwise only be executed by
hired artificers. To this application the Board of Adrui-
ray replied, that ' the service being temporary they were
not prepared to send out a receiving-ship, with its esta-
blishment.' On the 20th Nov. he repeated his application,
but before it had been received the board had reconsidered
its decision, andfhad ordered a vessel, the Melampus, to be
got ready for this service. The Melarnpusaccordingly sailed
in December. Sir J. Graham says he regrets that the first
application was not acceded to; and when the hurricane
of the 14th Nov., with all its disastrous consequences, is
remembered, it is obvious that this unfortunate decision
may have increased the difficulties of that deplorable crisis,
and may have subjected ReAr-Admiral Boxer to some of
the charges brought against him.
"Itmust be observed, however, thatßear-Admiral Boxer
had permitted Commander Barlase, on accouet of his know-
ledge in gunnery, to join theforces in the Crimea, although
this officer—having been for' three years in the Turkish
service—had been specially chosen to assist him. The rear-
admiral thus lost the person best fitted to communicate
with the Turkish authorities at a time when his assistance
would have been most useful.

" Under such disadvantages he was required to repair the
damages of the hurricane, and to forward to the Crimea
supplies of every kind in lieu of those which had been lost.
Deputy Commissary-General Smith, anxious toifulfil the
duties of his office, thought that vessels wore delayed for
coaling and watering, and that they were left iu positions
where the loading was rendered unnecessarily difficult.
This mismanagement he ascribed to Ad idral Boxer.
Hence differences arose between them, and both Lord
Raglan and Mr. Commissary-General gilder were even-
tually applied to on the matter.
"Your committee are of opinion that there was some
unnecessary detection of transports at Constantinople, and!
that the arrangements for coaling were very deficient ; bat
as they have not been able to examine A tiniral Boxer
they cannot pronounce an opinion as to his share of respon-
sibility. His letters in the appendix show that he exerted
hill:lsta' strenuously to discharge duties for which it is ad-
mitted that his means were inadequate, and, if he failed
under these difficulties, his subseq cent endeavours in the
harbour of Balaklava appeared to have been successful.

" THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT AT HOME.
" The coximisaiiat has been during many years a sub-
ordinate department of the Treasury; and although nomi-
nally transferred to the Secretary fur War in the summer
of 1854, it was not placed under his immediate control un-
til the 22d of last December, when a Treasury minute was
issued authorising this arrangement.
"Up to that period Sir C. Trevelyan, the Assistant-
Secretary of the Treasury, was practically the head of this
department. He stated that the forms of the commissariat
had been improved and simplified some years ago, and that
although persons might inisunlerstand any regulations, yet
he did not believe these forms were to be blamed. He
would willinely submit them to any practised accountant
for his opinion. Deputy Commissary-General Smith says
that, as long as regulations are required, none could be
made of a more simple furies than those applicable to the
commissariat and he hail never heard any complaints
arisiug out of observances of these forms.
" THE COMMISSARIAT IN THE EAST.
" It is the duty of the commissariat to furnish the army,
when in the.field, with plovisione for the Well, forage for
the animals, and land transport.
"Commissary-General Filder was app,intecl by the
Treasury to superintend the establishment of the commis-
sariat in the East. He was selected, it is said, on account
of his experience and special fitness for the charge ; and
authority was given him to provide such persons as might
be required fur the service; ample funds were also placed
at his disposal, and ships were ordered and provided to
act under his exclusive directions.
" With these large powers, heavy duties were imposed
upon him according to an arrangement which appears to
have been injudiciously adopted at the commencement of
the campaign, It was determined that there should be
only one store department with the army, and that this
should be under the care of the cuininiesariat. From this
decision it followed as a consequence that the commissa-
riat Was expected to make good the deficiencies of many
distinct departments. All the miscellaneous articles of
equipineut which cause undo,- the name of quartermaster-
general's stores were given in charge to the commissariat,
and, in addition to these extraneous duties, this depart-
ment was required not only to keep a large amount id Ord-
,nance stores, but also to purchase mates Ms and tools iu
the East for the purpose of the siege.
"The military system in this country affords the com-
missariat no opportunity of becoaring acquainted with.the
army, or of ministoing to its wants • so that in a campaign
the officers of this department find dremseivai called upea
to furnish supplies in regard to which they may have had
no experience; while the officers and men, being often
ignorant of the proper duties of the commissariat, consider
this department responsible for everything they may
require.

" LAND TRANSPORT.

" From the first the system of the laud transport was
found to he imperfect. No adequate measures were adopted
for its improvement, so that the army, when enc ►roped
before Sebastopol, depended for all its supplies upon a
service defective in its organisation and in its superinten-
dence.
" The army landed in the Crimea without the animals
necessary for the conveyance of the baggage, or for the
removal of the sick and wounded ; mucii inconvenience
and suffering resulted from thisdeliciency ; but if, as stated
to your committee, every available vessel was employed for
other purposes, the commissariat cannot he held responsi-
ble.

" When the army had encamped before Sebastopol mules
and baggage animals were brought over from Varna. On
the sth o October Commissary-General Filder asserted that
he had transport sufficient for all the purposes of the army,
and submitted to Lord Raglan a Belie uo for disposing of
aoeve 2000 animals, which were at Varna, and which he
said were not waited, and would only be an incumbrance
iu the Crimea. During this same period Sir Edmund
Lyons writes, that the transport animals, though in fair
condition, were not sufficient in number.
"On the Bth of November the commissary-general was
informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Cri-
mea. At this period he still possessed a large number of
baggage animals, and a considerable ainonut of hay and
forage, on board ships, in or near the harbour of Salaklava.
" About this period the Commissary-General became
alarmed, foreseeing that the conveyance of guns and ammu-
nition for the siege and for the defence of our position, the
removal of the sick and wounded, the distribution of ra-
tions, of forage, of clothing, of fuel, of medicines, and of
medical comforts, besides numerous other supplies, which,
iu the position of the army, were scarcely less important,
would all be imperilled by a failure in the land transport;
while the service was itself seriously endangered from the
want of shelter and forage for the animals during the ap-
proaching winter, and from the bad condition of the roads
between Balaklava and the camp.
"Your committee are not aware that any measures were
adopted for the protection of the animals from the incle-
mency of the season ; Sir John Burgoyne thinks there was
a great want of care, and that in a few instanced whore
the animals were attended to they wero preserved. The
drivers were inefficient, and, being without proper super-
intendence, lost, or indolently neglected, the animals en-
trusted to their charge. •

" THE ROAD.
"So mtioh of the suffering of the troops has been ascribed
to the wretched, or, as some witnesses state, the almost
impassable condition of the seven miles between BAlaklava
and the camp, that your committee endeavoured to ascer-
tain who was responsible for the maintenance of the roads,
and what insuperable objects impeded their repair.
" When the army reached the heights above Sebastopol
they found two principal roads from Balaklava to Sebas-
topol, one the fine Government road, the other, further to
the left, a useful farm road. The army held the Woronzoff
road up to the time of the battle of Balaklava, in October.
Immediately after that action it became uecesary to draw
in the outposts, which lost to the army the use of that
road; the other road, however, remained, and was avail-
able for all purposes until the rains commenced.
"On the 13th of November Commissary-General Filcher
wrote to the quartermaster-general, expressing his appre-
hension, and calling attention to this important subject.
"The duty of staking and maintaining roads for the
army falls upon the department of the quartermaster-
general. This officer was !about this time disabled by
severe illness. Sir J. Burgoyne, the chief engineer officer
on the staff, and other military authorities, state that the
soldiers could not be withdrawn from the trenahes for the
repair of the road. The alien were already overtasked by
military duties; they were growing weaker from day to
day, while their difficulties were increasing. An attempt
was made to employ Turkish troops on this work, but it
was noon abandoned.
" From the 14th of November, the date of the hurri-
cane, the land transport was gradually reduced in strength,
until it almost ceased to exist. The Commissary-General
writes:—' The men and beasts perished, owing to the fatigue
they underwent in struggling through the deep mud with
supplies, and from exposure to wet and cold.' To repair
these losses recourse was had to the depot at Constauti-

Mr. Sidney Herbert in January last. His views upon the which it mud have been known the casualties of war Would
best mode of constituting the War Department, and giving render indispensable.
to it an effective control over the subordinate:departments, " THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BLACK SEA.
and here explained, as far at least as he deems it advisable " The evidence exhibits a marked contrariety of opinion
to introduce a change during the pressure of war, which as to the responsibility for the transport service in the Black
leaves little leisure for re-constituting the military depart- Sea. Sir Jaines Graham said that the naval commander-
ments. in-chief, Vice-Admiral Dundas, had, under the Queen's
regulations, authority over the whole of the transports,
and he cited, in confirmation of this statement, sundry
minutes of the Board of Admiralty; and he added that
Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority over this service.
" Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the contrary, alleged that he
had nothing to do with the transports. According to his
statement, they were entirely under the management of
Lord Raglan, Rear-Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie.
" Captain Milne, the member of the Board of Admiralty
who had the superintendence of the transport department,
stated that the admiral commanding in the Black Sea was
responsible for the transport service in that sea. A supreme
power was, however, given to Lord Raglan, who had a
veto over the movement of all the transports, and a con-
current authority with the naval commander-in-chief.
" The difficulties of performing various services connected
with the army are ascribed to the want of sea transport ;
while the evidence of Captain Milne shows that no applica-
tion was made to the Admiralty for additional transports in
the Black Sea. Numerous witnesses testify to the want of
arrangements in the harbour of Balaklava, and to the dis-
order of the shore from the want of any sufficient landing-
places and wharves.
"In Balaklava there was a division of authority ; the
transports were under the immediate direction of Captain
Christie; the harbour was under the management of another
naval officer, and the shore was subject to military autho-
rity. Absence of regularity and arrangement on the shore
or in harbour necessarily delayed the service of the trans-
ports ; in such cases it was not easy to ascertain on which
of these three authorities the blame should rest.
"The narrow limits of the harbour, which is described
by Admiral Dundas as a mere ditch, rendered it, under the
best system of arrangement, an inconvenient place forland-
ing the vast quantities of stores required for the army, in-
cluding gum, ammunition, engineer stores, &seines, ga-
biting, camp equipage, quartermaster-general's stores, and
con in isiaria t supplies.
" The want of system which prevailed on the shore is
generally admitted ;the harbour was not governed with the
authority necessary for the maintenance of order, and the
transports were compelled to anchor outside the harbour—
an anchorage which naval men justly considered to be un-
safe.

nople ; but the waste and consumption of animals exceeded
the supply, and the service of the land transport could no
longer be performed by the commissariat.
"The horses of the cavalry were then employed, and
thus valuable animals, trained for the duties of the cavalry
and artillery, were used and worked to death in services
which should have been performed by animals purchased
for about 51. or 71. each.
" The broken road, and the want of land transport, in-
creased the confusion of the harbour. Sir E. Lyons ascribes
the crowded state of the harbour, and its attendant incon-
veniences, to the delay in removing cargoes from the ships
to the camp.
" As far as the information obtr ined enables your com-
mittee to form an opinion, it appears to them that in this
matter there was a want of due foresight and decision.
Early in November, when the probable necessity of
wintering in the Crimea was contemplated, energetic
means should have been taken to provide and maintain
an effective communication between the camp and Bila-
klava. The road bad then already been injured by the
traffic, and its condition had excited the apprehensions of
the commissary-general, who had called attention to the
subject; if a military force could not be spared, measures
should have been taken to obtain other labour in the E:ist,
or application should have been made to the Home Go-
vernment, who slight have sent labourers from England.
Such precaution would have saved much loss of time, and
many valuable lives, and would have contributed to main-
tain the land transport service in an effective condition.
The probable failure of the communication was not, how-
ever, brought to the notice of the Duke of Newcastle until
too late to enable him to take measures in England to pre-
vent the serious calamities which subsequently arose.

" DEPOTS IN THE EAST.
" The consequence resulting from the failure of the
transport service would have been in some degree obviated
by the formation of depots in the neighbourhood of the
camp, or between the camp and Balaklava.
" The establishment of depots is a duty specially noticed
in the commissariat regulations. Sir C. Trevelyan states,
that in October, Commissary General Filler was engaged
in the formation of a depot near the camp, in order that
he might be secure against the contingencies of the weather;
but after the action of Balaklava, the commissariat chest
was ordered on board ship, and the transports were sent
out of the harbour. At this time the abandonment of
Balaklava was contemplated. After this followed the
battle of Inkerman, when the transport service was occu-
pied in bringing up, ammunition, and a few days later
came the hurricane and catastrophe.' From this time for-
ward all the available animals were employed for the daily
requirements of the army, and the establishment of depots
was relinquished.
"At Constantinople Deputy Commissary General Smith
established extensive magazines; he states that the sup-
plies under his charge were sufficient, and the arrange-
ments for the custody and delivery of stores unobjection-
able. In August, or early in September, he entered into con-
tracts for a supply of fuel, and could have procured
enough for the army throughout the winter, but he was
not able to obtain transports for its conveyance; at the
same time the quantity that did reach Balaklava was
more than could be carried to the camp.
"He tried to hire native vessels for the service ; but
after the hurricane the masters of these vessels could not
be induced to attempt the voyage. According to his
evidence, it would appear that sat Constantinople ,he had
in store all the supplies which the army would require. No
blame can justly be attached to Deputy Commissary-
General Smith, nor can ho he held responsible for the
difficulties and distress which occurred in the Crimea.
"COMMISSARIAT SUPPLIES.
"FOOD FOR Tri E MEN.
"The Commissariat Department obtained an abundant
supply of salt meat, biscuit, and rum from England. This
was furnished by the victualling department of the Admi-
ralty, on requisition from the Treasury ; and the duty of
the commissariat as to these supplies consisted merely
in keeping the account and in arranging the distribution.
Fresh meat was chiefly procured from Eupatoria, from
Constantinople, and from Smyrna. Deputy Commissary
General Smith stated that he had at Constantinople 4,000
head of cattle during the winter ready for the consumption
of the army, beside: 2,000 at Smyrna ; and that if he could
have obtained sea transport, he thinks he could have sent
a regular supply to the army.
"The witnesses are not agreed as to the quantity of fresh
meat supplied to the army ; the regularity of the distribu-
tion depended partly-on the zeal and energy of the several
commissariat officers, and also on the position occupied by
the troops. Until the end of October the rations, it is said,
were furnished with regularity, and consisted of fresh
meat twice or thrice in the week. Mr. Parker, chaplain to
the fist division from the 28th of November till the 23d
of January, states that during that period the hospitals
were supplied with fresh meat almost every day, but the
troops did not receive it, he thinks, above once a-week ;
he never knew them, however, to be without rations.
Other witnesses say that the soldiers during the winter
months suffered occasionally from want of their rations,
and more frequently from the irregularity of their issue.
In the appendix a statement by a board of officers will be
found, iu which it is affirmed that the men for days and
weeks together went to the trenches with an insufficient
meal, and oftentimes with none at all, save a little biscuit
and rum. Any result derived from an average of rations
issued is delusive, because privation one day is not com-
pensated by superfluity on another. Even when the men
received a !sufficient meal, the proportion of salt meat with-
out an accompanying supply of vegetables was greater than
was consistent with the health of the troops. This deficie
eney of fresh meat, the most wholesome, as well as the
cheapest food, is ascribed to the failure of the sea trans-
port, the ships having been disabled by storms, and then
delayed by repairs ; in one instance all the cattle on board
perished from the inclemency of the weather, or from the
violence of the waves.
" Vegetables, which, according to the intentions of the
government, eliould have been issued gratuitously, were
very scantily supplied; indeed several witnesses assert that
none were ever seen in the camp. One ship loae of vege-
tables was detained in the harbour until the cargo was de-
cayed • and at Eupatoria, it is said, there was an immense
store of onions lying on the wharf, while disease, from
want of vegetables, was spreading through the camp. The
deputy commissary general states that he had an abundant
stock of rice at Constantinople during the time when it
was wanted even for the hospitals in tho Crimea. Pre-
served potatoes were, it is said, early in the autumn offer-
ed to the soldiers, but rejected ; later in the winter, when
the supply of vegetables was essential, it does not appear
that the offer was repeated. Coffee, which had been
ordered as an extra ration, was distributed to the troops
in a green state, and (there being no means of roasting
it) wits of little use. The explanation offered to your
committee on this point is not satisfactory. The more
immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been
overlooked, while ingenious arguments on the volatile
aroma of the berry, and on the Turkish mode of packing
coffee, were passing backwards and forwards between Com-
missary General Flitter and the Treasury. •
" FORAGE.
" 'W
hen the army first encamped before Sebastopol stacks
of forage were found in the neighbourhood; these were
soon consumed, and henceforward there appears to have
been much difficulty in obtaining fodder fix the horses.
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who left the
heights on the 7th of November, said that hie baggage ani-
mals were frequently without food ; and that on one occa-
sion he was obliged to kill 21 ammunition ponies, which
he had not the means of feeding. The Earl of Lucite, com-
manding the cavalry division, complained repeatedly, from
the 29th of September to the date of his departure, of the
condition to which the horses were reduced from want of
food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but
did not find the pressure so severe lentil after the sth of
November, when his brigade was posted on the heights.
After the hurricane the supply of forage failed, and under
the combined effects of work, exposure, and insufficient
food, the cavalry gradually ceased to exist as an effective
force.
" To what extent the commissariat is responsible for the
deficiency in all these supplies is a question to which it is
not easy to give a definite answer.
" Sir C. Trevelyan, speaking as the head of the commissa-
riat, and desirous of relieving the department from raven•
sibility, affirms their conduct throughout to have been ir-
reproa,:hable, and ascribes blame to other persons. Accord-
iug to his opinion, the quartermaster-general, for whose
good intentions he made full allowance, ought to bear the
chief responsibility. This officer,'he says, 'is responsible
for the road to the camp and for the reed along the border
of the harbour at Belaklava. By him also buildings should
have been appropriated for magazines, and stables for the
baggage animals should have been provided.'
"Sir C. Trevelyan also states that the endeavours of the
commissariat were frustrated by the mismanagement of
the ti•ansports, that there was a want of proper arrange-
ments in the harbour of Balaklava, and still worse dis-
order at Constantinople. Rear-Admiral Boxer did not,'
he says, possess the altitinietrative qualifications requi-
site fur that important station, and he delayed the trans-
ports in the Bosphorus or appropriated them to other ser-
vices:' In confirmation of this statement he :mentioned
the Rockliffe transport awl the Jason, which last, he said,
had been detained three weeks at Constantinople. Some
letters from Rear-Admiral Boxer will be found in the ap-
pendix, denying this assertion. Rear-Admiral Boxer also,
it appears, in December remonstrated against the irregu-
lar system pursued by the commissariat in the Crimea,
and requested the interference of the commander of the
forces. He suggested that some of the largest transports
should be strongly moored in Balaklava Harbour as float-
ing depots, and that the smaller steamers should be told
off for the special duty of conveying supplies.
" Your committee have not been able to examine Corn-
'flies ery General Milder or Rear-Admiral Boxer, and
they cannot therefore, decide upon whom this blame
should rest.

" Both these officers were, apparently, convinced that
the transport system in the Black Sea had been ill-con-
ducted. Whether, however, the Vessels had been injudi-
ciously detained as store depots by the commissariat, or
improperly employed in other services by the admiral at
ConstAntinople, are questions which your committee cAu-
not satisfactorily answer. These arrangements might with
propriety, have been reviewed by the high naval and mi-
litary authorities. They alone had the means of deciding
these differences, and of enforcing such a system as might
best secure tlfe conveyance of supplies with regularity and
dispatch.

"Before closing their observations on the commissariat
department in the East, your committee notice with plea-
sure the willing testimony which many witnesses have
borne to the zeal &nt energy which some subordinateofficers
of the commissariat displayed in procuring supplies, and in
relieving, as far as they were able, the distress of the troops
during a period of trying exigencies,
it-

THE AfEpICAL DEIAIITMENT AT HOME.
The medical dePartinent of the army and Ordnance is
under a director-general, who has an aesistant to aid him
in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the director-general,
states that he was under the immediate authority of five
different superiors—the Commander-in-Chief, the Secre-
tary of State for War, the Secretary at War, the Master-
General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He
further states, that upon the separation of the two depart.
ments of War and Colonies, he received no communication
ordering him to correspond directly with the Secretary for
War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that in August last
he himself told Dr. Smith that the Secretary of State for
War was his real and only master. Had such an arrange.
ment been earlier adopted, Dr. Smith says it would have
saved labour, while the service would have been more effi-
ciently conducted. The director-general states that when
he first heard of the probability that a force could be sent
to Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should
be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the
troops. This suggestion was adopted. Ho also selected
surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them direc-
tions for their guidance. He recommended that ambul-
ances should be prepared, and an ambulance corps ap-
pointed. For this purpose ho advised that able-bodied
soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Har-
dinge objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting
men, and pensioners wore employed instead. Dr. Smith
remonstrated in vain.

11;entire failure of this corps, and the subsequent
sufferings of the army, are abundantly proved.
"In 314 y, 1831, Dr. Smith addressed a letter to the mi
litary secretary of the Curatuauder-in-Qbief, reconmendin.;
that, `in the event, of the hosPitals boipg eatablished at V!