The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-24 00:00:00

THE WAR DEPARTMENT .IND THE

ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

Lord Grey gave notice last night of his intention to
move an address to the Crown on Tuesday next upon a
subject which is at this time of the very highest conse-
quence, for it lies at the root of all the failures of our mi-
tary administration. Our readers will probably remem-
*er that very early in the last session of Parliament, and
when the war was still undeclared, we urged most I
strongly on the Government and the country the
;mperative necessity of a. complete reform in the civil de-
partments of the army, introducing unity instead of di-
vision, and direct responsibility instead of endless con-
tusion. We showed that success in war depended far
more on skill in military administrrtion than on any
other quality, for the bravest troops in the world cannot
triumph unless they have ample means of locomotion
and of transport, with continual supplies of clothing,
stores, and food. We added that in this country it was,
as matters now stood, extremely difficult to accom-
plish these essential objects, because the division of the
civil and military departments of the army under six or
seven distinct heads rendered it impossible to work the
machine ; and we predicted that, if the attempt was
male to carry on extensive military operations in
the field without a radical change at home, the re-
sult would be a failure. That result has ceme in a
form evert more rapid and disastrous than we had
anticipated ; but, though we readily acquit men of not
having accomplished impossibilities, we retain the con-
viction that the Government committed a fatal error last
spring in not proceeding at once to an entire reorgan-
isation and union of the civil departments of the army.
These views were energetically presented to the House
of Lords by Lord Grey ; they were known to be enter-
tained by Lord Panmure, by Mr. Ellice, and by all
those persons who had any practical knowledge of the
.subject ; and at length Parliament was called upon to
vote the necessary estimate for an additional Secretary
of State to take charge of the War Department.
There appears to have been in this transaction either
a great misunderstanding or great insincerity. It was,
indeed, obvious that when the Secretary of State for
War found himself charged with the mast laborious
• department in the Government he could not continue to
administer the Colonial dependencies of the British
Crown in both hemispheres. That point was conceded
and on that alone the separation of the offices was car-
ried into effect. The Duke •f Newcastle was allowed
to take his choice between the two departments ;
unfortunately for himself and for the country, he took
that of War ; and his colleagues unwisely con-
sented to give it him, instead of placing the seals
of that department [in the hands of the Minister
who was recommended to them by the unanimous voice
of the nation. But this was a very small part of the
change we had contended for, and which the state of the
army required. Instead of simplifying the administra-
tive machine, it added another wheel to it. The sepa-
ration of the Secretary at War from the Secretary of State
for War was retained ; the Ordnance, the Treasury, the
Horse Guards, the Home-office, all continued to con-
duct their fraction of military affairs ; and when Parlia-
ment calls for an account of the administratioa of the
army, it will be found impossible to unravel the truth
out of this labyrinth of offices, boards, and irresponsible
public servants. The evil is the more unpardonable
because it had been foreseen. Numerous instances had
been produced of the scandalous delays and absurd
mistakes arising out •f the perpetual references to dif-
ferent branches of the same service even in time of peace.
What must these evils become when a large force was
suddenly sent out to take the field at a great distance
from home, in a barbarous country, and with little
experience of administration cr of wart To take,
for instance, the most striking example. It is said

that the Secretary at War is the Flnance Minister
of the army. He is responsible to Parliament for
the employment of the public money, and every
measure or order which involves expense must
have his assent. But what can be done without expense!
How is it possible for the Secretary of State to exercise
any real authority at all, if the means of payment are in
the hands of one office and the means of execution in two
or three others !
The first condition of a good administration of the
civil departments of the army is to reduce them to one
bead, placing the power and the responsibility in the
hands of one Minister. What is now termed "the War-
office" should at once be expanded into the office of the
Secretary of State and identified with it, the Secretary
at War receiving the seals of what is now the higher de-
partment. This was the plan fully discussed and agreed
to by Lord Howick's commission, and it is a reproach to
the Ministers who set their names t,) that document that
they never carried its recommendations into effect. War
has at last come upon us. It has found us ill prepared
and prone to miscalculate our real strength ; for, while
the external condition of the Queen's troops presented, as
it ever will, the aspect of one of the finest armies in
Europe, our statesmen had neither the knowledge northe
power to provide for the rapid evolutions and enormous
wants of suchen army in active warfare. The next stepafter
the establishment of an effective Ministry of War, com-
prising under one head alltbe political duties of that office,
is to combine the administrative departments, which ought
to derive their authority from one responsible Minister,
being all subject to his immediate control. The de-
partment of stores and that of fortifications should be
separated from the Ordnance ; the Commissariat, the
Baggage Department, the Medical Staff, with the whole
system of military hospitals at home and abroad, and
the Militia, ought all to be brought within the control of
the War Secretary, leaving the Horse Guards and the
General Commanding-in-Chief to carry on that strictly
military portion of the administration of the army which
is a part of the Royal Prerogative. It is scarcely
credible to what extent the army has suffered by these
absurd divisions of duty and responsibility. Even the
Ministers of the Crown cannot obtain the commonest
information as to the condition of the forces without
applying to several distinct funetioneries ; and every
order they give has to pass through the same ordeal.
In some cases men holding high official stations at home
have been allowed to go out to the Crimea without re-
signing their home appointments ; thus Lord Raglan
himself is at this very moment blaster-General of the
Ordnance, and continues to transmit orders in that ca-
pacity to his deputy in England as if lie had time to
spare, in presence of the enemy, for, the business of a
semi-civil department at home.
The last 25 years have witnessed great and successful
reforms in almost all the institutions of this country.
We have reformed the House of Commons, we have
ameliorated the law, we have improved the Church, we
have reconstructed our whole colonial and commercial
system ; but that which up to this time has resisted all
reform is the administration of the army, partly because
the great man who retained the command of it till the
close of his life was an enemy to innovation, and partly
because the state of the army during peace did not ren-
der its defects apparent to the nation. The greatest and
most essential service that can be rendered at this time
to the country by any statesman is to accomplish this
great task. It requires a bold and comprehensive mind,
united to an indefatigable power of mastering details,
without which no man ought to touch military affairs.
It demands an absolute superiority to all personal con-
siderations, and a determination to withstand unmoved
all the resistance of party and family influence, of pro-
fessional pretensions, and of official prejudices. It must
have the head and the hand of a master, armed for a time
with almost di.ctatorial power. With less than this it
will be vain to undertake the reorganisation of the Bri-
tish army, for would be impossible to accomplish it.
Yet the securit y and the honour of the country depend
on its accomplishment. We do not presume to assert
that we have n statesman among us at this time fully
qualified by cb erecter and by previous attainments to
perform this duly, though Lord Grey and Lord Ellen-
borough are th e two men in whom we should be disposed
to place the laigest amount if confidence for such a pur-
pose. But, be the statesman chosen who he may, we
are satisfied that if he enters vigorously on the discharge
of such a duty lee will deserve, and he will receive, the
cordial and strenuous support of Parliament, of the press,
and of the people of England ; and that, without' such
a statesman, al ile to grasp the whole functions of a War
Minister, no 0 abinet can or ought to stand in the present
circumste noel of Europe. These are our opinions—not
formed h est' tly, or under the influence of the late dis-
asters in tl s.e Crimea, but deliberately expressed long
before the of ierations if war had begun. We urge them
now with :em ,fold force, because they are armed with all
the terrors of experience ; for the predictions of those
who diets. tted tibe organization of the civil departments
of the army'sult have: been more than justified by the re-
-5 (complaint we receive from the Crimea is a
pro.
test ar cant the system against which no Minister,
however l' eborious, and no General, however able, could
!mere:Nair ,fly contend ; and we trust that the first act of
she pr sent session of Parliament will be to enforce a I
radios' I. reform of these abuses.—Times.

SPORTING INTELLIGENCE.

BETTING AT .lANCHESTER-TunDAT.

T he rooms were well attended to-day, and things in a
gen eral way bore an animated appearance. It soon be-
care .e evident that there was a commission in the market
to back Rotherham for the Chester Cup, which roon
brought him to 25 to 1 (taken). The same odds were
taken about The Reiver, but 20 to 1 was in most in-
stances the highest offer against him. 50 to 1 each was
frequently asked for about Little Harry, Brown Brandy,
and Early Bird ; 40 to 1 was, however, the highest
offer, 12 to 1 would have been taken about Grwculus
Esuriens for the Derby, and De Clar© was occasionally
but we did not see him backed. 'We think 12
i( put up,"
to 1 could have been obtained. emo to 200 was offered
against Scott's Lot. 300 to 8 was offered on the field
for the Liverpool Steeplechase, for which event the
not yet appeared. Nothing was done
weights have
upon the Great Nor thern, Metropolitan, City and Su-
burban, or the Nort.;:arnpton Handicaps. The following
are Vic latest quotations :
LiVERPOOL STEXPLECHASE.
100 to Bon The Field (offered)
CIUSTEIt Qt/r.
25 to 1 agst The Reiver (taken freely)
25 to 1 agst Rotherham (taken)
•`-'5" to 1 agst Arthur We'lesley (offered)
40 to 1 agst Bracken (offered)
40 to 1 agst Little Hairy (take 50 to 1)
40 to 1 agst Brown Brandy (take 50 to 1)
40 to 1 agst Early Bird (take 50 to 1)
66 to 1 agst Virago (taken)
66 to 1 agst 'Muscovite (taken)
66 to 1 agst Kaffir (taken)
DERBY. •
15 to 2 agst St. Hubert (nominal)
11 to 1 agst Gra3culus (take 12 to 1)
13 to 1 agst De Clare (nominal)
30 to 1 agst Polydore (offered)
500 to 200 agst Scott'e Lot (offered)

THE AUSTRIAN DESPATOII OF DECEMBER 24.

The following is a translation of the Austrian despatch
of the 24th of December calling upon Prussia to arm.
It completes the series of documents. It is addressed
by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, the Austrian Am-
bassador at Berlin :

" VIENNA, DEC, 24.

"M. le Comte,—The Imperial Government is induced,
by the additional article of November 26 and the resolu-
tion of the Diet founded upon it, taken on the 9th inst.,
not only to come to an understanding anew with the
Prussian Court, respecting the military arrangements re-
quired by the position of the two German great Powers,
but also to give the Imperial Ambassador, who is President
of the Diet, the necessary instructions to co-operate in
carrying into effect the said resolution of the august as-
sembly.
" In order, however, to raise the discussion of this sub-
ject at Berlin the Imperial Government has waited for the
answer of the Prussian Cabinet to the official communica-
tion of the alliance contracted on the 2d of December ; for
it is clear that Prussia's adherence or non-adherence to that
treaty will cause her to modify the military measures she
will have to take. It was oar earnest wish to be enabled
to resume with Prussia our deliberations for the joint mili-
tary preparations of Austria, Prussia, and the entire Ger-
manic Confederation, on a line of exact political equality.
But since the declaration of the Berlin Cabinet, now lying
before us, postpones a decision on this subject, we are
limited for the present in our negotiations for the equip-
ment of the German Powers to retain merely that basis
that was already founded by the alliance of April 20 and
the resolutions of the Diet on the 9th inst.
" According to the 3d article of the treaty, and the
second paragraph of the military convention annexed to it,
Prussia eventually engaged to mobilise 100,00 J men
within 36 days, and again to place another 100,000 men on
its eastern frontier within three weeks after placing in
readiness the former body of troops. This engagement is to
come into operation as soon as the necessity for it arises, by
virtue of the stipulations in the treaty, and consequently
all that has now to be done is to come to a proper under-
standing on this point between the contracting parties.
" There can hardly be a doubt now, however, that the
necessity for this mobilisation is actually at hand, in case
there should be no certain prospect of re-establishing the
general peace by the end of a term now very near, and in-
deed before the expiration of the present month.
" Russia is ready to take the field on her eastern fron-
tier, and can concentrate, in a very short time, her forces,
now ready for action, so as to strike a vigorous blew at the
empire. For making its appearance at the Upper Vistula,
the Russian army requires far less time than is requisite
for the equipment and concentration of a Prussian army,
100,000 strong. If the fulfilment of Prussia's engagement
to assist in defending Austria from all attacks is to be
realised, it becomes, under such circumstances, more
urgent every day that Prussia should have in readineks
the military forces required for the purpose of common
defence. Baron Hess is decidedly of opinion that the
moment vas arrived when Prussia should commence the
mobilisation of apart of her army, according to the treaty.
He declares that our forces stationed on the Eastern fron-
tier will not suffice, until joined by the 100,000 Prussian
troops, for enabling him to commence the contest with the
prospective certainty of success.
" A more detailed discussion of the arrangements to bo
made on this head ought therefore to be commenced with-
out delay. We are also ready to send again and at once
for this purpose a military commissioner to Berlin.
"In the opinion of the Ordnance Master, Baron Hess,
in case these negotiations should be conducted not merely
on the basis of the April Treaty, but also en that of Prus-
sia's accession to the treaty of alliance of December 2, the
collective force of Prussia's contingent, as stipulated in
the military convention of April 20, would suffice for the
present, and nothing further would be imperative save the
immediate and simultaneous mobilisation of this aggregate
fore] of 200,000 men, which can be concentrated at Posen
and Breslau.

" With respect, further, to any military measures on
the part of the Bund, we indulge in the hope that Prussia
will be willing to co-operate with us at the Diet for
promptly and vigorously calling out what was agreed on
the 20th of April should form the minimum of the Diet's
contingent. Assuredly, all the Governments composing
the Diet will evince the greatest readiness in taking this
step, when they see the two great Powers setting them the
example by placing their own armies on a war footing
commensurate with the occasion.
" Together with the armies of Austria and Prussia, by
virtue of the stipulations mentioned, the remaining States
shall hold the half of their contingents ready for action.
In so far as it is applicable in the present instance, either
four separate half army corps could be formed, each with
its own commander, to be nominated according to the pro-
visions of the military federal statute, while each half con-
tingent could be joined later by its remaining half, so as,
if required, to bring the four army corps to their full
normal strength; or two combined and complete corps—a
South German and a North German could be formed. In
either case these federal corps would have to effect a junc-
tion simultaneously with that of the Austrian and Prus-
sian armies. The forms to be used in calling out and con-
centrating the federal troops may be left to the option of
the Governments concerned and the deliberations of the
military committee. All that in this respect need be
attended to would be to take care that no delay ensued
through the difficulties, perhaps, that might attend the
mobilisation of the half-contingents, respecting the forma-
tion of the smaller bodies of troops in particular, since the
chief object of the measure is to have the federal troops
ready for action, and in the strength prescribed. The in-
dividual Governments should not be fettered while pro-
moting this object, and, after the precedent of partial
levies on former occasions, the troops soonest ready would
have to receive the route. The federal adjustment of the
burdens by subsequent services, or by the payment of
their equivalent to the Diet, could be settled afterwards.
"Sh.uld Prussia's accession. to the alliance of December
2 take place later. the two Powers would doubtless be in-
duced at the same time to extend their joint motion in the
Diet to the calling out of the whole grand contingent of
the federal army, in order to give to the military position
of the entire Germanic Confederation a greater force,
stringently necessary for the offensive.
" Your Excellency will easily conceive that it is of imme-
diate and practical import ince for Austria to be speedily,
and fully made acquainted with Prussia's intentions rola-
tive to the points I have been dwelling upon. Our further
measures, in a military sense, and especially with respect
to our sending a military commissioner to Berlin and in-
structions to Frankfort, are connected with the reply of
the Prussian Government to the present note. In cmv mu-
nicating this note therefore to the President of the Minis-
try, your Excellency will express to him the very groat
value we set on receiving information as speedily as possi-
ble. and it is to be hoped in the sense desired, with regard
to Prussia's views and resolutions concerning the mobilisa-
tion on the part of the German Powers.—Receive, &c., •
" Count BUOL."