The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-08 00:00:00

_/-

IPRICE SD.

of duty, are not admitted to these tents for want of room.
For this excessive sickliness of the troops the late Govern-
ment are clearly, in a great measure, responsible. Want of
sufficient shelter for the troops is a main cause of the sickness
and mortality iu the army. Now, as soon as the Crimean
expedition began to be talked of, Sir John Scott Lillie drew
the attention of Lord Hardinge and the Government to the
necessity of providing wooden huts in advance for tie winter
shelter of the soldiers ; but the first contract for such huts,
in this country, was net entered into until the Crimean win-
ter had fairly set in.
The sickness and mortality in the army of the Crimea may
be greatly diminished by accelerating the provision of shelter,
anti rendering more sure and regular, the distribution of
clothing and rations for the soldiers. A beginning has been
made towards the attainment of these ends ; but a large in-
fusion of fresh blood into the transport and commissariat ser-
vices, and sleepless superintendence and control on the part
of the head of the Government, will be required to make it
more than a mere beginning. The sickness and mortality
in the army having been diminished, the means of adding
to its effective force will have next to 'be considered.
A very remarkable letter from "An Old Trooper," which
we publish to-day, presents a striking view of the man-
ner in which the late disastrous news from the Crimea
is contributing to render more difficult the raising of re-
cruits. This evil consequence of mismanagement can only
be counteracted by improving the condition of our sol-
diers in the Crimea. As soon as it shall appear that they
have been rendered more comfortable, the military spirit of
our peasantry will revive. But it is not merely men—it is
an organised army that is wanted ; and to make an organised
army we must have competent officers. To this end one of
the first duties of the new Preinier and War Minister must
be to throw aside the muster-rolls of the Horse Guards—to
break through the conventional rules of promotion for mere
seniority, and to trample upon the preference hitherto con-
ceded to the aristocracy. The officers—even those of the
highest grade--for the army of the Crimea ought, as a rule,
to be between the ages of 30 and 46 ; and they ought, if
possible, to be men who have seen real service in the field.
The officers of the regiments which have served in Africa and
at the Cape ought to be preferred ; and it ought to be kept
in mind that the Queen has two armies, and that is the dut
of Ministers to make no distinction between them, but
select capable officers as readily from the Indian army as fr
thak-whicla is called par excellence "The Queen's." Th.
• will be muttering among our Peninsular veterans at the
posal to bring for.verd men • there be clir
among the scions of aristocracy at the proposa, t,o make
capacity the sole title to employment and promotion; there
will be dismay and indignation throughout " The Queen's "
army at the proposal to place the Indian army on a footing
with them. But all this discontent must be disregarded,
if the full military power of the nation is to be brought
into play ; and the contest in which we are engaged
demands out utmost efforts. At the head of an aug-
mented army, thus officered, ought to be placed an
able General in the prime of life, able and willing to
keep himself constantly in the eyes of his soldiers, to see
everything with his own eyes, and to lay hand to work when
any of the machinery of the army is " thrown out of gear-
ing." We have given more prominence to the improvements
required in the human material of our army than to improve-
ments in organisation—not because we do not feel the urgent
necessity of the latter, but because we are convinced that
competent men and officers can do more, even under an in-
different system, than weaklings and fools can under the
most plausible system that human ingenuity can devise.
It will be no bad test of the competency of the new Pre-
mier and War Minister for their task, the manner in which
they set about the indispensable innovations on the old sys-
tem of appointments and promotions in the army.

(From the Morning Advertiser of this day.)
Now that Lord Palmerston has succeeded in forming a new
Government, there can be no harm in detailing some of those
difficulties which the noble lord had to encounter in the exe-
cution of the task which her Majesty confided to him. On
receiving his Sovereigns commands on Sunday afternoon, to
construct a new Cabinet, Lord Palmerston applied—for rea-
sons with which we are acquainted, though it would not be
right to mention them—at once to Mr. Gladstone, Mr. S.
Herbert, and the other leading Peelites, to join the new Ad-
ministration. In anticipation of the occurrence of such a
contingency as that of their being asked to join a Palmer-
ston Government, the Peelites had met on Sunday morning
in the house of Sir James Graham, ho being confined to
his room, and consequently unable to take part in their
deliberations at any other place. The result of their meet-
ing was, that they determined on refusing office under Lord
Pahnerston unless ho would consent to appoint Lord Aber-
deen Lord President of the Council. This determination was
formally communicated to Lord Palmerston early on Monday,
and the noble lord intimated in reply, in the plainest terms,
that if the Peelites declined to join him, except on the con-
dition of giving the Presidency of the Council to Lord Aber-
deen, he could and would form a Cabinet without them. He
gave them, however, till the morning of the following day to
,re-consider.the resolution to which they had come. Another
meeting of their number took place in the interval—also in
Sir James Graham's house—at which the Peelites came to the
conclusion, that if Lord Palmerston would agree to give two
more of their number seats in the Cabinet, they would join
him in his Administration. . The two parties for whom they
stipulated were Lord Canning and Mr. Cards 311. The pro-
position was at once rejected by Lord Palmerston ; but he
went so far as to intimate his readiness to agree to such a
compromise as should consist in his giving a seat to Lord
Canning alone. The Peelites, acting chiefly under th, ad-
vice of the Duke of Newcastle, after some hesitation, though
even then with manifest reluctance, assented to the terms,
and thus terminated a most momentous Ministerial Crisis.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER. AND THE ADMIRALTY.
(From the Tits of this day.)
There is something quite uncanny about this awful war.
Nothing follows suit in it, and it goes wrong from first to
last. How it becr.-, non were was"peaue wneu were vow..
to nave neon fighting, and fighting when we chose to
call it peace, everybody knows. But its very festi-
vities turn sour, and in its givings of thanks there
is always a note out of tune. Sir De Lacy Evans
appeared, with all honours, to receive that rarest
and richest mcod of valour, the thanks of the Speaker
before the assembled house, but no sooner had he
opened his lips in reply than something possessed him to re-
proach his eulogists, and challenge to hot controversy all who
should do less than justice to the Second Division. Then
comes the Mansion-house dinner. The Lord Mayor is seized
with the commendable ambition of presenting himself before ,
the eyes of the nation between the most stately and the most
eccentric of our modern heroes. Garrick between Tragedy
and Comedy had sympathies for both, and it is hard to say
which he would follow. But no Lord Mayor of London that
over existed could have shown simultaneous affinities to Car-
dicein and Napier, or have harmonised two such utter dim-
el:Mos. There, however, they were, to make the best of
themselves. Cardigan did his part with perfect good taste.
• There is something indeed suggestive of Madame Tussaud in
the " identical uniform" which ho wore in the desperate
cavalry charge. But his speech was, with a slight exception,
the simplest possible narrative of facts, and is, indeed, a brief
history of the war throughout its earlier stages. His de-
Scription of that most gallant, though Quixotic enterprise,
in which there was " the greatest apparent certainty of death
that could possibly be conceived," without the slightest
advantage to be gained by the sacrifice, was at once digni-
fied, modest, and affecting. How it happened that a body
of men so brave and well-disciplined, so attached to their
officers; and so well cared for by them in return,
should have been led to certain destruction with
scarce a word of remonstrance against a stupid and '
suicidal order, Lord Cardigan forbore to explain. Perhaps
he may have good reasons for his silence ; but in the mean
time we must beg leave to retain our belief that, notwith-
standing the valour and discipline of that ill-fated corps, it
was recklessly offered up as a victim to that want of harmony
which is known to have existed, for some reason or other,
between itself and the other branches of the service.
And now for Sir Charles Napier. At all events, duty and
obedience arc not here overdone. The contrast is the greatest
that can be imagined. According to Sir Charles, the fleet
placed. under his command was " badly manned and worse
disciplined," and he never had fair play from the Admiralty.
The conclusion is, that he has brought home his fleet with
scarcely the loss of a man, an anchor, or a spar. In the army
we seem to have perfect organisation and entire destruction
—in the navy no discipline, and no loss ; there not being
much to choose between the respective results on the enemy.
But, disguise it as we may, the spectacle of a magnificent
fleet assembling in the Baltic, and coming back scathless,
with nothing to show but the destruction of some granite
works and the capture of 2,000 prisoners, done by soldiers,
not by sailors, does not command itself to the taste of the
British people, and has not found favour with the Admiralty.
So Sir Charles has been relieved of his command, and, as a
natural consequence, went off at the Mansion-house on Tues-
day like an unlucky gun that hangs fire and then explodes
at half-cock. In the strange mixture of exposures and re-
serves that run through his speech, it is impossible to
form any judgment on his case. Nor is ho always con-
sistent with himself. The principal exposure is, that the
Admiralty asked Sir Charles " why he did not take S area-
borg, and why he did not do this, that, and the other;" in
fact, why he did not do something ? The question is so natu-
ral, that one looks for the answer, and Sir Charles's answer is
a very mysterious one. Ho says he proposed a plan for taking
Sweaborg, which might be taken by a certain day, though he
does not tell us what the plan was, why ho proposed it in-
stead of executing it forthwith, and what the answer of Go-
vernment was to this apparently gratuitous proposition. As
we do not know the letter of Sir Charles's instructions, it may
be rash to pronounce on his conduct on his own showing;
but, that a =an should take a magnificent fleet to the Baltic,
and, instead of doing anything, send the Admiralty ablpalmane
en of French
shp,
Governmentor .
e o n mst
o t ot theatkp re o aplproposing
delaystihneg
for doing something, and then not do it, and throewino,
grotesque a proce d that it
on the Admiralty, is so utterly gro
expla neaftroionmaorsneunwdz:npneedgrrliotarhsnhaostt
capturedinemthaends
soldiers whichieenagabylsed,
credit, by conferring a baton on the General in command,
employ
Sir Charles is not more lucid than-on the matter of Sweaborg.
to the Ho wrote, as
to attack Bomarsund. Why he should write at all, or pro-
ose anything, we do not know, but let that pass. " I
wanted," he says, " no other troops to enable me to go there.
1 had troops enough ; but the French Admiral thought it
more proper to have some. The French Government sent
out 10,000 troops accordingly. I repeat, that I did
not want them they would much better have been
employed at Sebastopol. I only asked for one or
two thousand men to make the thing more sure, but I could
have done the work without them, and I wrote home to that
effect. However, they sent us out 10,000 mon." Can any-
body make out from this whether Sir Charles asked for more
men or not ? He first says that he did not, then that he did,
and lastly that he did not. If ho did, of course it is a very
great pity, as the French have reaped all the glory of the
achievement, and the British army has not even that to boast
of. We quite agree, too, with Sir Charles, that just at that
time 10,000 men would have been better in the Crimea. ,If,
as he seems to admit, he did ask for one or two thousand
soldiers just to make the thing snore sure, when he had an
ample force of Marines in his fleet for this very sort of occa-
sion, he must not complain if the British Government took
him at his word, and, having more regard to the success of
the joint muse than the private glory of England, sent him
the very effectual assistance of 10,000 French soldiers.
But what is the real imputation that Sir Charles-must ad-
dress himself to I It is not simply that he has done nothing,
except opposing a very imperfect obstruction to Russian com-
merce, as much to our loss as theirs. No sensible person
wished to force our wooden walls into collision with the
granite walls of the foe. People talked of Cronstadt, to be
sure, and they talk of it now, but they do not wish anything
to be done•rashly, and they are quite ready to hear what Sir
Charles has to say on the question of " Wood verful Granite,