The National Register.
London, England, 1815-06-11 00:00:00

POLITICAL DISQUISITION.

OPENING AND PLAN or VW CAMPAIG'N.

The grand political juggle is now accomplished. The
ale ruiral CiAleges of France, the Representatives of the
peo..le. the Dtputations frOm the Army and Navv, and all the
au:ho, ities of the empire, have accepted the Ness Ciinstitu
tiolia. Act, received Napoleon's oath of fidelity, and pledged
their own The Atismiq of the Field of May has been
more splendid than its programme announced; and if the
loyalty of the French nation was previously betrayed by
fear and treachery, its senses have now been dazzled and its
enthusiasm i,omentarily awalcenod, by a display of pomp and
rnagnificente csle;siated to seduce Hie imagination and to re-
call the most brilliant fictions of ancient romance. The
eCeci of such exhibitions on the French character, is greater
than it is generally imagined. Had Louii XVIII. given his
people the spectacle of a coronation, his tights would have
been considered as established, and he would have found
hands to def nd them. and not merely hearts to pity his
nisfortunes. The prevalence of perfidious councils alone
can have induced him indefinitely to postpone that cere-
mony, in order to leave the crown more accessible to his
artful rival at his intended return.
Armed with revived influence, but conscious that unless
supported by fresh incentives, the public fervour may
quickly cool, Buonaparte seems resolved to seize this mo-
ment ti trust the capital to his Ministers and place himself
at the head of his armies. He has probably already reached
his head quarters, and the firing said to have been heard be-
tween Dunkirk and Ostend may have taken place to announce
his arrival. At such a crisis,when we stand, as it were, on the
rid4e of battle, what can be more interesting than to mark
the approach of two mighty hosts and calculate their opera-
tiops

That Buonaparte will be the assailant, we entertain but
little doubt His interest is to anticipate the union of all
the Allied faces, and by some brilliant enterprise, to

give at its very co,iiinencement a complexion to Cie war,
which %ill animate his adhclents at home and discourage the
Royalists. A success over the Allies would produce more
effec• the insorgents in the Knuth and West, than an army
of Sn non met) eml,at.led against them ? Will he then rush
at once itlto Belgium, and endeavour to increase

Vol. 7714 No. C‘;CLIX.X V.ll.

rity by the destruction of our army ? No ; he will respect
our troops; not only because their valour has been tried, but
because he is well acquainted with the tactics of their com-
mander. Were Buonaparte to invade the Low Countries.
the Duke of Wellington would avoid a battle and fall back.
All the strongplaces are well garrisoned, and were the engine
fo pursue his advance, he vrouid be compelled to weaken
his artny in order to invest them. The farther be should
proceed, the more he would be enfeebled ; whilst •ur cotn-
mander, retiring by his right toward the Rhine, would join
successively the Prussian, the Germatt, the Austrian and
Russian troops, in a word the whole mAs.s of the Attie:,
whose march to the line of action would be consirierahly
shortened, and who would easily overpower in opponent
thus placed with reduced strength-at their mercy. Bat :t
will he said, the people of Belgibm Might Hs* in favour
of Auonaparte; Would not this give sufficient Lplendcur
to his first operations to answer the purpose of a dash,
and a sufficient increase of force to compensate for
the corps detached from his army ? We reply no.—
To advance after a battle would prove him victorio,“s
to advance before one, rash. Besides, certain of beinK
compelled to retreat as soon as he should have reached
the concentrated power of the Allies, disgrace would follow
too soon on momentary advantage, not to reduce his credit
and the hopes of his friends to a far lower scale than at the
opening of the campaign. The support of the pt of it of
Belgium would he nothing without the possession of the for-
tresses of that country, all of which would require a long and
uninterrupted siege. lie would even forfeit that support for
ever, when it would be found that he was forced to desert
those who had ta'..en up arms in his cause. Instead of eY•
ecuting, therefore, he would only have counteracted all h's
own designs, and greatly decreased, if not annihilated, every
possibility of success. Where then will his f‘,Ft attack b
made? Will it be directed against the Prmi..lans who oc-
cupy the countries between Belgium and the Rhine, and in
that case, might not their commander adopt the *a:ire plan
as the Duke of Wellington, and retire before the invaders ?
It is not impossible that Buottaparte should nlake his
effort in that quarter ; and three reasons support that suppo•
sition. First, Marshal Blucher, who conmatiOs the 141134_
sians, possesses more courage th.lo discretion. Repeatedly,
during the last campaign, he es posed his who:e army to &-
kr., and was cnly extricated by the und.touted valuer

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