The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-08 00:00:00

of the Admiralty, as to Odessa, I will read a despatch
which I think will satisfy the house on that subject.
Lord SEYMOUR —I wish to ask whether this despatch
has been laid uppn the table—(cheers)—because I think
that if we aro to have a discussion on the despatches, and
if they are to be read on one side, we ought to have the
answers to them on the other. (Hear.) I shall therefore
move for those despatches, and for any answer which may
have been received in reply to them. (Hear, hear) I hope
the noble ford at the head of the Government will not ob-
ject to lay them before the house. (Hear.)
Mr. S. EIERBERT—The objection is a fair one. It is a
rule of the house that no despatches shall be read which
have not been laid upon the table, but there are moments
and occasions when the generosity of the house will allow
that rule to be departed from, when a man's character is
attacked, and when he can vindicate himself by the
reading of a despatch to the publication of which the noble
lord at the head of her Majesty's Government makes no
objection on the ground of public convenience. The house
will therefore bear with me while I read it :
" Admiralty, Dec. 8, 1854.
" Sir,. I am commanded by my Lot ds Commissioners of
the Admiralty to call your attention to their letter of the
13th of October Last, No. 622, respecting an attack on the
port of Odessa at any proper opportunity.
" Although this question has been postponed, at the re-
quest of the generals commanding the allied forces on shore,
my Lords are of opinion it should be again taken into con-
sideration, with a view to an effectual opera ion whenever
circumstances will permit " I am, he.,
" Vice-Admiral Dundas." " R. OsBoRNE.
Now, the noble lord (Seymour) says I ought not to read
these despatches unless the house has also the answers to
them. But I have given a reason why Admiral Dundas
bad not executed the attack upon Odessa, and why he
should be acquitted of all blame. I have made no imputa-
tion upon the commanders on shore. I have no doubt they
had sound and good military reasons for doing what they
did. But these despatches are necessary to the defence of a
public man, whose character is public property. And now
let me say a few words with regardto the Straits of Ket tch.
It may be said, " Why did not Sir E. Lyons attack Kertch
and open the passage before?" My right hon. friend stated
on a previous occasion, and stated with truth, that the
Russians had blocked up the passage with ships sunk for
that purpose. But the other day it was said, " Where are
the ships ?" It was stated that there were no ships sunk,
that the statement of my right hon. friend was a mere ex-
cuse, and that the thing ought to have been done long ago.
But what does Admiral Lyons say in his letter published
in the Times of to-day, and addressed to the Secretary of
the Admiralty ? He says :--
" Had this expedition been deferred but a short time
longer there would have been many and great difficulties to
overcome, for the enemy was actively employed in strength-
ening the sea defences, and in replacing the sunken vessels
which had been carried away by the current during the
winter months."

And this is a current from a frozen sea, which brings down
with it many obstacles to navigation. The letter proceeds:—
" Of the 40 vessels sunk last year• some still remain, and a
French steamer touched upon one of them yesterday. It
appears that the enemy did not succeed in destroying the
coals, either at Kertch or Yenikale, so that about 17,000 tons
remain, which will be available for our steamers."

Well, that is my answer, and I think it is conclusive and
satin; actory against those discreditable attacks which were
made on Tuesday by the hon. and learned member for Ply-
mouth (Mr. Collier). I have said that the objects of the
war have been successfully attained, and that this gives us
a golden opportunity of bringing the war to a termination
whenever the country shall be so pleased. My right hon.
friend (Sir J. Graham), in that lucid and masterly speech
which he addressed to the house on Tuesday night, went
seriatim through the proposals made at the conferences. I
will not enter upon the question of the protectorate of the
principalities. I will not enter upon the question of the free-
dom of the navigation of the Danube, or the question of the
right of interference with regard to the protection of the
Christians in general in Turkey, except in passing to say
that I was struck by a statement matte by the noble lord
(J. Russell), who stated as a reason for not having entered
upon the fourth point that he found in a conversation with
the Turkish ambassador that he objected to a stipulation
which would infringe on the rights of the suzerain of T urkey
by giving a vested right in interference, not to one nation,
but to several, in the internal concerns of Turkey. Well,
that was not an unnatural observation for the ambassador
of Turkey to make, but there was this singularity in it,
that, after the enemy had agreed, not to the particular sti-
pulations, but to the four bases upon which police should
be concluded, there was one party who had not
given in a similar agreement, and that party was our ally.
Now, that complicated the negotiations considerably. With
regard to the third point, we should recollect that it di-
vided itself into severs,l,portions. You have the question
touched upon by the hon. gentleman (Sir B. Lytton), that
that which was merely the preamble of the treaty of 184 L
is now to be converted into a condition. There was a state-
ment with regard to the independence of Turkey which was
recited iu the treaty, but it was not made a condition in
the treaty. But now, by a concession, as the hon. gentle-
man says, extorted by the sword of Alma and of Taker-
man, it becomes converted into a condition. Well, now,
look at the question of the Straits. The noble lord was
offered by Russia the mare apertum. He gave his rea-
son for not accepting it, and I thought it unanswer-
able. For some time I have held that opinion my-
self. But let me recall the attention of the house to
a circumstance which should show how cautious we ought
to be in pledging ourselves to opinions upon matters
with which we are but little acquainted. (Hear, hear.)
When the question of peace was discussed 12 months
ago in the press, every one said that no peace wouldbe good
for anything which did not open the Straits. [Mr. DAYARD
—" I protested against it."] The hon. member for Ayles-
bury, having a great knowledge of the country, protested
against that opinion, bat scarcely any one discussed the
question in the press who did not say—" He must open
the Dardanelles." The noble lord, however, said that to
open the Dardanelles would be to infringe the rights of
Turkey, and would be a great advantage to Russia. It would
introduce the Russian fleet into the Medi erranean, where we
have great interests, and it would allow Russia or any other
power to menace the existence of Turkey, which is a weak
power. (Hear.) I thought that was a conclusive answer.
But what was the second proposition of Russia with regard
to the Straits? The limitation of the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea seams to be failing into general disrepute. I was
originally, like my right hon. friend, a party to limitation ;
but it was not one of the original objects of the war. It
was not, I think, heard of till December last. lam not
sure by which of the confed rates it was suggested. I
am not disposed to blame the Government for making it
a sine qua non, to which, however, we were no party. We
should be careful how we blame the Government for small

matters, in which they may be sometimes erroneous.
They may have several courses which they may pursue,
and the difference between those courses may be very
small. The Government can but adopt one, and iu this
particular case an Opposition has great advantages. They
have got as the ground of opposition the errors, not
of one Government, but of four ; and any Government
may have to take the course which it may not itself prefer.
We should, therefore, look with indulgence on the conduct
of the Government in questions of this kind. Hon. mem-
bers may wish only to attack the Government, but the
shaft goes further, and they may be striking an ally instead
of hitting the Government. (Hear.) Well, but the limi-
tation is now pretty generally said to be illusive. Thenoble
lord said the Russians were only to have four ships in the
Black Sea, but some one said seven or eight. The hon.
member for the West Riding argued that it was impossible
to go to war upon one ship more or less. The noble lord
replied that they could not, but that when Russia bad
seven or eight instead of four ships, the suspicions of Eu-
rope would be aroused, and then some steps would bs
taken to prevent the threatened evil. The hon. member
for the West Riding further stated that Russia could get
ships built, not of rotten timber, at home, but could get
screw vessels of the'greatest size built in the Thames or the
Mersey. But to that the noble lord said, "No; for no ves-
sels unarmed could pass the Straits." There, I think, the
nobl noble lord
passindulwas the Straits. errorfaoirts. I believe
rthat any ships not
armed
Here, then, was
another argument in favour of limitation destroyed. I
do not know with whom the question of limitation origi-
nated. Ido not make tlfat limitation a charge against the
Government—l cannot afford to do so—but I was not a
party, and I do not know who is, to making this a sine
qua non. It will not be found, from the papers pre-
sented to Parliament, that the French or Austrian Go-
vernment made it an ultimatum. It was not an ultima-
tum or a sine qua non. My impressi ,n is that it was a
fresh importation into the differences between us and Rus-
sia, but I believe that, at all events, this particular basis
is now defunct. We should now consider what was the

merit of the counter-offer made by Russia. Ido not thiuk
that question has yet been fairly stated. Constantinople is
a capital situated upon a narrow strait. Turkey exercises,
and has exercised, from time immemorial the right—some
say the natural right—of closing these Straits, upwards or
downwards, to ships of war. Other capitals are placed in a
position
somewhat similar. In the Bay of Naples, 1 believe,
ships above a certain number of tans are not allowed to
enter. At Copenhagen no ships of war are permitted to
come within, three miles of a certain battery. But by the
treaty of 1841 this restriction was put on Turkey,—that,
although her right to close the !Straits was recognised,
she could not open them at all except in case of war, and
then not in favour of one particular nation, but in favour
of all. (Hear, hear.) Was that the proposal made by
Russia ? No ! The proposal made by Russia was this—
that Turkey, at her discretion, shall either open the Darda-
nelles upwards, or the Bosphorus downwards, to any one
power she chooses at any time she thinks herself menaced,
and although she may nut be at war. The only restriction
in the Russian document is when Turkey considers herself
menaced. There may be objections to that. I can fancy
arguments against it. But Russia has not told us to what
extent she will concede; she has not produced this propo-
sal as an ultimatum, but as something for negotiation, re-
serving to herself the right to concede it if she o nnot es-
cape from it. Now, if we recognise Turkey as an indepen-
dent pewer she has that natural right, and if so, it may be
said it is no concession on the part of Russia ; but is Rus-
sia snaking no concession when she deprives herself of the
natural right of issuing trout the Black Sea into the Medi-
terranean? In case Turkey should be menaced by Russia
after such an arrangement, what does she do ? Declare war.
That is always a fatal course for Turkey, unless she has
friends to back her. No ; but she can call to her aid a
fleet which shall preponderate, and from that moment
you have the cessesion of Russian preponderance which you
want, and that safety for Turkey which she requires.
(Hear.) Now, I frankly confess that, if it had been sub-
mitted to me, when a member of the Government, to make
this proposal to Russia, I should have said, "You may ask
it, as in negotiation you may ask anything." No one knows
better than the noble hard (Lord Palmerston), after the
NorthlAmerican treaty of the late Lord Ashburton, that
you do not go into negotiation with an ultimatum, and I
should have said, " You may ask it if you like, but it is
childish to think that Russia will ever make such a conces-
sion." By the treaty of 1841 great restrictions were placed
upon Turkey. That treaty was drawn by the hand of
Baron Brunow. By that treaty, and those restrictions on
nowyouhave an opportunity of ?
which have been with-
held Turkey, Russia secured important advantages to herself.
By refusing this proposal you go back to the status quo and
those restrictions which Baron Brunow imposed; and you
ethrowh ,
since
regaining. (Cheers.) Is this my opinion only '
Here is an
extract from a private letter written in 1829 by Sir Robert
Gordon, our ambassador at Constantinople, at the time of
awalyB immense 4 l, but which advantages,ih
the treaty of Adrianople. He had seen a victorious Rus-
sian army—or, at any rate, what was supposed to be a vic-
torious army—at Adrianople, dictating terms by which
Turkey lost immensely in territory and strength, and
here is his opinion what should be the policy of England
in the Black Sea :
" I beg to record my opinion that, should England at any
time go to war with Russia, and the seat of war be Turkey,
you ought to take carp to have a British fleet on this side the
Dardanelles. This alone can save (and it will effectually save)
the Porte from utter destruction, while Russia will be at-
tacked in the only quarter in which she is directly vulnerable
to Great Britain."

(Hear.) That is the opinion of a nun who know tho-
roughly the merits of the case to Which his attention had

been turned, under very important and peculiar circum-
stances, and he at that distance of time foresaw the neces-
sity of some arrangement by which to have an English fleet
in the Bleck Sea. If you can have an English or a Western
Power fleet (I do not care which for the purpose of my ar-
gument) in the Black Sea, not after war is declared, but
without any one having a right to declare war on that ac•
count, or to take offence, or even to ask explanations, you
may depend up n it that it is the most effectual way of
protecting Turkey. I said I would not touch upon the other
points. I have mentioned this point because I do not think
sufficient attention has been directed to it, and as far as
tay judgment can lead me, my belief isthat if in the autumn
of 1853, instead of the then treaty preventing Turkey al-
lowing any ships of war to enter into the Black Sea, we
had had this proposal which we have now extorted from
Russia by our success in war, the presence then of two
powerful fleets in the Black Sea might have prevented any
war whatever. (Cheers.) It was not open to us. We had a
treaty to break, but I do believe, looking back to the cir-
cumstances, that if this proposal bad formed the treaty
then, we should have escaped the war. (Hear.) The house
has heard me with great indulgence, and I wish to be very
brief as the only return I can make. The hon. baronet op.
pcsite (Sir B. Lytton)—he must pardon me for again re-
ferring to him, as it is but the penalty of making a speech
so argumentative and able as his -the hon. baronet says to
my right hon. ftiend the member for the University of
Oxford (Mr. Gladstone)—" You cannot have had your
heart warm, because at the outset of the war you describe
the objects of it in such low terms," and the hon. baronet
quoted a passage from the speech of the right hon. member
for the University, in which he said the Turkish Govern-
inent was full of anomalies, " Think," says the hon. hart.,
" of your chilling the people by saying you were going to
war for a Government full of anomalies." Well, is it
full of anomalies ? (Hear, hear.) But I apprehend we
are not making war for the purpose of supporting the in-
stitutions of Turkey, but regretting that her institutions,
her religion, and everything about her, should have ex-
posed her to attack. We think it desirable that some
other Power than Russia should hold the key of the Dar-
danelles • we cannot, help it, but Turkey happens to be
there, and so we support her by our arms. The hon. hart.
says, in order to excite the people, you shoald not tell the
truth—you should not tell these chilling facts to the people,
but paint the objects of the war in brighter colours. I
must say if those ingredients to excitement were wanting
to be supplied, so great have been the contributions of
other parties that if the Government had had no scruple
on the subject it would have been a work of supererogation
to throw in any additional number. (Hear, hear.) I re-
joice to think my right hon. friend has not been guilty of
exaggerating the objects of the war, or the advantages of
the nation whom we defend, not because we are bound by
treaty to defend leer, but to retain a great Power in the_
Mediteri anean, and to prevent Russia marching on in her
policy of aggression. (Hear, hear.) I have spoken of
the advantages of the proposal of Russia with respect
to the Black Sea. The immense advantages from the
abrogation of treaties, which were as a net-work upon
Turkey, no one ought to knew better than England.
What has Russia done ? Russia has been in the hanit of
treating Turkey as an Asiatic Power. How do we treatan
Asiatic Power? How does France treat an African Power?
We know that whenever a civilised nation comes in contact
with a barbarous nation, seemingly by a law of Providence,
the one absorbs the other. But what do we do in Asia ?
We make a treaty, and the moment the Sovereign puts his
hand to a treaty, be he Sultan, Nabob, Rajah, or Ameer,
his power has departed from him. We take an early oppor-
tunity of declaring that the conditions have been broken, it
is a casus belli, we pounce upon him; and there is an end.
(Cheers.) That is the way France treats, in Africa, with the
uncivilised nations next to her. That is the way Russia treats
with the uncivilised nations next to her. The mistake
Russia committed was, that she applied this system of treaty
to a European Power ; for, though by nature Asiatic, Tur-
key, by her geographical situation is European. Europe
cannot afford to have these loose Asiatic principles obtain-
ing in the case of Turkey, and, therefore, England, France,
and Austria—Austria chiefly—are interested in preventing
this aggression. Now comes the question, what are we to
do ? I have said the peace party is very much divided.
They start from different points ; but they have the same
end in view, thinking there is an opportunity now of effect-
ing an honourable termination of this war. (Hear.) Are
the war party perfectly agreed ? (Hear.) What says my
hon. and learned friend who opened the debate this even-
ing? " Whisper but three words"—that is, whisper three
words to Austria; and I must say here, in reference to
what has fallen from the hon. and learned gentleman, I
beg leave to give my hearty dissent from the opinion that
the noble lord (J. Russell), in the late conferences, played
a part unworthy of the British nation—(cheers)—because,
loooking through those papers, I am bound to say I think
the conduct of the noble lord was dictated by a high sense
of the honour and interest of his country, and that he was
in no way an unfit representative of England either in his
conduct or character on that occasion. (Cheers.) But
what says my hon. and learned friend. Whisper but
three words into the ear of Austria—" Poland, Hungary,
Italy." I have heard complaints that Austria will not fight;
I have heard complaints that Prussia will not go heartily
with us. Whisper, says my hon. and learned friend, to
Austria and to Prussia the word Poland. But I ask you,
do you want to drive those two Powers into strict alliance
with your enemy ?If so, that whisper will do it. (Hear.)
I was glad to hear the noble lord at the head of the Govern-
ment say that the balance of power in Europe could only be
preserved by maintaining the strength of Austria. We must
not be led away by our sympathies nor by any abstract re-
gard for nationalities. Whisper " Poland," whisper
" Hungary," and what will be the consequence to Europe.
Then, again, the hon. and learned gentleman says, whisper
" Italy.' but to whom are we to whisper it ? To Austria?
Is all Italy Austria? Is it the Austrian bayonet alone
that keeps Italy down ? If you whisper " Italy," you
must whisper it in a much gentler tone to another Power
—to a Power more closely allied to England herself.
(Hear.) The moment you interfere with nationalities,
away with the doctrine that you are not to meddle with
politict‘l and religions sympathies, and are not to seek to
propagate certain opinions and princip!* e (Hear.) If ever
it should come to a war of nationalities, England, Protes-
tent England, free England, must never forget that there
is one country which has ten thousand times greater claims
than Poland or Hungary on her regard. By a great crime
Poland may have been divided; by a political injustice
Hungary may have been subjugated; but in those countries
it is the absence of individual liberty that is suffered, it is
the oppression of the body, as it were, that is to be endured;
but there is a country in which not only the body, but the
mind, tho intellect, and the soul are enslaved—and by
whom ? By the Government of the Pope. which seems to
be perpetuated by Providence in order to give us a warning
never to trust the management of temporal affairs to the
guidance of ecclesiastics. (Cheers.) If such a State is in
existence, what can be tho affections of the people for their
Government ? What did I road two days ago in the foreign
c Treipondence of a newspaper? I read an account of the
Pope having effected his return todtoine from Castel Gon-
dolfo ; but how did he effect it ? It was done by station-
ing at intervals small pickets of mounted gendarmerie along
the line of his route. But, if you are going to whisper na-
tionalities—if you are going to name Poland, Hungary,
and Italy as words of menace—you must whisper them to
one whose sympathies are Roman Catholic, and who gives
great support to the Roman Catholic faith in his own do-
minions ; you must whisper them to an ally who is, in this
particular, diametrically opposed to you in his sympathies,
and whose alliance is too valuable to be trifled with for the
sake of any, such Utopian topics as these. (Hear.) You
must whisper them to one who has been fighting by your
side with a bravery, a fidelity, a courage, and good-fellow-
ship that has never been surpassed. (Cheers.) Speaking
of the time when I was a member of the Government, I
can bear testimony that the Emperor of the French be-
haved towards the English Government with a frankness,
cordiality, and good faith to which I attach the greatest
importance. But do I attach to it that importance merely
because we are engaged in a mighty enterprise together ?
No; but Ido so because I believe that the conduct of the
Emperor of the French is the conduct of the French people.
I believe that he represents the French nation, that he un-
derstands their feelings, and.thoroughly appreciates their
character ' • and I trust in God that when this war shall be
happily at an end the alliance we have now formed may lay
the foundation of a lasting friendship between this country
and that gallant and chivalrous people. (Cheers.) But the
question with us now is, what are we to do ? The four
points aro, or are not, at an end—l don't know which. It
has been lately stated by Lord Clarendon that the four
points may still be considered to contain the main objects
of the war. The noble lord the member for the city of
London, in the course of this debate, has used expressions
with regard to Russia which have given great alarm to
hon. gentlemen occupying the benches below the gangway.
He said that the Russian family had entered into marriage
alliances with the German Courts; and I observed also
that Lord Clarendon adopted a similar line of argument
in a speech delivered by him in the House of Lords, when
he at the same time observed that Russia had been con-
verting her line-of-battle ships into screw-steamers and
was covering her territory with railways. The reflection
I made on reading this was, that I hoped to God we were
not going to establish as a precedent, that the fact of an
Emperor forming family alliances with Gorman princes
and of covering his territory with railways was a suffi-
cient reason why we should go to war with him. (Cheers
and laughter.) lam bound, however, to say that the
noble lord satisfied me on Tuesday night that he had no
intention of establishing such a precedent. He said that
he had used thos 3 statements merely as facts the truth of
which was well known. Having had the honour of being
Lord Clarendon's colleague, I can bear my humble tes-
timony to the great ability, patience, and tact with which
he has carried on the most difficult negotiations and
which required immediate action. (Hear, hear.) Well,
sir, in regard to the course which is now to be taken by
this country, before airy decisive step is determined upon,
it is necessary that we should carefully look both at
the state of our alliances and at the existing state
of Europe in general. I have already spoken
of the interest which France and of the interest which
Austria has in this war. There is no doubt that with
respect to the people of France the war is not so popular
with them as it is with the people of England. Any man
coming from France will tell you this. The alliance
with
England is popular in France, but the war is rot. And
why is this ? It cannot be because it has impoied any
additional burden of taxation on the people, for the war
has hitherto been carried on by France wholly' up ,n credit.
There has not been one sixpence additional taxation im-
posed upon them on account of the war. The reason why
the war is not popular in France I believe to be that its
objects are too remote to be tangible to the imaginations
of the French people. It is a war which commenced with
self-denying ordinances in respect to commerce ; but, I
ask, has the Emperor of the French himself the same zeal
in the cause of war as is felt by England ? We know that
the Emperor Napoleon is his own Minister, but that the
Foreign Minister of France is virtually Prime Minister.
Now, we also know that M. Drouyn do Lhuys, the late
colleague of the noble lord at Vienna, made a proposal to
us. I assume that that proposal was made with the ap-
proval of the Emperor; and what is it that I saw two or
three days after this proposal was said to have been made ?
I read in the Moniteur au extract from the Independance
Beige—a publication under the immediate surveo'ance of
the Government—to the effect that the French Govern.
ment had made certain proposals for renewing negotia-
tions for peace, and which proposals were believed to be in
consonance withl the interests and honour of France, but
that the Emperor had consented to withdraw those pro-
posals out of respect to England. Now, I infer from that
that France is nearer making peace than we are. I believe
she will stand by you in this struggle as long as she can,
but her interests are different. I believe in the cordiality
of her friendship, but there is no friendship so cordial that
fan admit of being taxed too highly. Take also the case of
Austria ; why, even Austria may get alarm when men like
the hon. and learned member for Sheffield whisper Poland
in her ear. (Hear.) But there is another nation of whom
we seem of late almost to have lost sight in this quarrel,
and that is Turkey. What is the case of Turkey ? Just let
me read a despatch of Lord Stratford, in the autumn of
1852, when Lord Clarendon sent it, proposal for making
peace, which he thought might be settled on safe and
honourable grounds, with every moral and political advan-
tage on the Sultan's side. He observed that :

" Au unnecesssary continuance of hostilities would involve
the most perilous hazards, the most exhausting sacrifices, a

i avastg e neeffrau sl iwo na
ro. f bAlno
do dh, 0 andw was mot rhei s tproposalis
rbelcee tel h? o r rlots r
w,aosf
1 Peremptorily rejected by the Ministers, the Council, and the
i Sultan, to all of whom it was successively submitted, ' for
they are now bent,' says Lord Stratford, ' upon ex • uding
every kind of note, however carefully expressed. Unfortu-
nately,' he adds, ' the motives to forbearance are thrown into
the shade by the dazzling illusions of hope, and passion is in
league with occasion to merge all fears of dangers and all con-
siderations of prudence in a wild, though attractive
speculation, difficult at least to realise, and of which the ac-
complishment would not be unattended with formidable
drawbacks.' Our Government seams to have been perfecter
aware of the danger, nay, the almost certain destruction for
Turkey herself, involved in a war. Lord Clarendon says that
' it would entail the destruction of the Ottoman empire.'
And again, Russia would be effectually repelled, but
Turkey in the meanwhile might be irretrievably ruined,
and we might find it then impossible to restore her integrity,
or to maintain her independence."'
I saw a statement in the Times the other day showing the
difference that exists in Turkey in the diearts of recruiting
the army now and when the war first broke out. The en-
listment at the commencement Of the war soon raised an
army of 150,000 strong. But what was the case now
9 It
should be recollected that there is in Tutkey astan.eitig
clement in society—a R,assian par ty. They are beei noir, to have their prejudices aroused. The Ottomans begin to
° think that they are suffering more from the presence of the
allies than from that of the Russians. They are begineias,
to be apprehensive as to what may be the real intentions'
of the allies, and if you continue this state of things long
you will strengthen that Russian party-which, after peace
shall be concluded, will raise its head and become more
powarfnl than ever. (Hear, hear.) Recollect that in
those provinces, which are half Russian, the greatest
jealousy and hatred are directed against the occupying
army, to whatever nation it may belong. They had great
hatred and jealousy of Russia, which I believe was in-
creased by the behaviour of the Russian army while
occupying the country. Austria now occupies it; and a
state of things, in which a foreign army remains the master
of thoseproviuces, is one which it would be prudent to put
an end to as soon as possible. I have asked you to look at
these matters, because I think the country should consider
them. The country wishes for successes ; so do I —and I
believe that successes will bring us,nearer to peace, but
you must not overstrain thisdesire for successes, nor so far
be led away by it as to incur the risk of reverses. I think,
undoubtedly, that successfacilitates immensely the acquire-
ment of an honourable peace, but it must be borne in mind
that there are great dangers imminent—the want or water
in the Crimea, and a climate which Europeans seldom en-
counter without loss of health or life. Therefore I entirely
concur in that part of the motion which assures her Majesty
that we are willing to support her in a war which may and
in a just and honourable peace. For the rest I care little
for the words of my hon. and learned friend (Mr. Lowe),
which he says are truisms, but which I say would be tru-
isms if true. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) A portion of the
hon. ant learned gentleman's amendment implied that
Prince Gortschakoff refused to entertain the question of
the limitation of Russian naval power in the,Black Sea,
but he made a qualification which prevents that as-
sertion from being strictly accurate. (Hear, hear.) I,
however, as a party to the limitation, though not as a sine
qua non, cannot censure the Government for adopting
that'Part of the amendment, and I am not, now going tob
discuss it, nor do I mean to give a vote on it. Thanking
the house for the indulgence, with which they have heard
me, I bag to say, in conclusion, that all I meant to do was
to defend my right hon, friend and myself against imputa-
tions which have been cast upon us, to show that we, who
are thought to be the originators off the war, have a right
to express an opinion as to its termination, and to explain
thatfor the reason we thought war justifiable we now think
peace justifiable, because we have met with the successes
we desired. I have stated what are the dangers and diffi-
culties by which the future continuance of this war is be-
set, and, having so done, I leave it to the house to consider
them. (Hear.)
Mr. DRUMMOND condemned the system which both
Sir J. Graham and Mr. Herbert had adopted, of appealing
to character in debate. He also condemned the practice
of quoting despatches not on the table of the house. He
traced the origin of the war to a dislike of Russia en-
tertained for many years, and which had, in fact,
led to the Affghan war. As to the integrity of Tur-
key, which was put forth as the main cause of the war,
he contended that the integrity of Turkey and the protec
Lion of the Christians were incompatiule with each other.
Nor was the pretence of protecting civilisation more sin-
cere, for there never was such an abomination as the moral
condition of the Turkish empire. But the fact was, this
was a people's war, who had been roused by demagogues to
hate Russia, and the Ministers had not the manliness to
say we were not prepared to go to war. He condemned
the speech of Mr. Cobden as threatening the pet sonal vio-
lence of the populace against the Government, and re-
minded him that he had formerly done the same to Sir R.
Peel. There were two good things which would now come
out of the War—first, the destruction of the Mahommedan
power ' • and next, that, whatever else might happen, the
French would assuredly be the masters of Constantinople.
Mr. Sergeant GHEE argued 'in favour of accepting 'the
Russian offer as a basis of negotiation. The bon. member
was proceeding at great length, when
Mr. WILKINSON, interruping the hon. member, said,
amid cries of " order," he. begged to move the house be
counted. He had been listening for the last thirty-five
minutes to the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman,
and it was disgraceful to see the small number of members
in the house.
Mr. COBDEN—If the house is to be counted, I move
that the bell be rung before that is done. .
The division bell was therefore rung in the ordinary way;
the sand.glass was turned up, and before it had ran down,.
there was a great rush of members into the house. The
doors having been closed,- Mr. Fitzroy proceeded to count
the house, and there being considerably more than forty
members present, the debate proceed.ed.
Among the members present we observed Mr. Disraeli,
Mr. Walpole, Sir W. Jolliffe, Mr. Baillie, Sir H. Wil-
loughby, and other distinguished Conservatives; except
I Lord Palmerston, no Minister was present.
Mr. Sergeant SHEE then proceeded to inveigh against
the Government for rejecting the Russian propositions
without so much as a discussion.
Mr. ALCOCK condemned the conduct of the war, but
would support the present Government in preference to
having Lord Ellenborough for a War Minister.
Sir H. WILLOUGHB ir thought there were elements
for negotiation in the last of the propositions made by
Russia, and he expressed his preference for Sir F. Baring's
resolution instead of Mr. Lowe's amendment.
Sir W. CLAY supported the Government.
Lord R. CECIL contended that the issue now before
the house was the conduct of Lord John Russell in bleak-
ing off the conferences at Vienna without discussing the
Russian propositions. He argued that the allied ultima-
tum was utterly useless for its purpose. He asked, sup-
posing the Allies got the Crimea, what they intended to
do with it, as it was impossible that either France or Eng-
land could hold it ; and he insisted that a satisfactory
peace might have been framed out of a development of
Prince Gortsehakoff's proposal.
Mr. BRIGHT said—l feel very much in the position
which I felt last year when the declaration of war was
brought down to the house, and I made a speech in oppo-
sition to the Government policy. I was then told that I
was too late, and it has been said in the course of these
debates, more than once,• that those who take the view I
take are too late on this occasion. We are not now dis-
cussing the question of the origin of this war. If we were
I should claim confirmation in the result of the views I
ventured to express in the first instance—for there seems
to boa general feeling that the sacrifices which have already
been made are greater than the results which have been ob-
tained. (Rear.) Now, in my observations I am not
about to carry on the discussion with the hon. gentlemen
below me, who are themselves interested in a question
which is by no means that before the house. Those
honourable gentlemen are interested in some vast and
gigantic scheme of supposed advantage to Europe,
to be obtained only by means of long and widely ex-
tended hostilities; but, so far as the house is concerned in
discussing the question with the Governmentel think those
hon. gentlemen are out of court. The noble lord the Se-
cretary for the colonies has stated over and over again—
and, amidst the confusion of statements which he and his
colleagues have made, I think he will scarcely find fault
with .me if I assume what he wishes, I presume, that we
should understand him to mean is—that the object of this
war is simply to secure the Turkish territory from the grasp
of Russia, and I suppose from the grasp of any other power—
for he apprehends that if Russia were to extend her power
by the acquisition of Turkey, it would give her such an
accession of strength as to endanger the safety of the other
European powers. And when he speaks in the vague—and
I must call it absurd—language aboutthelibertiesof Europe
and the civilisation of the world, I should say the noble
lord means those great objects so far as they can be con-
served by the conservation of the Turkish territory. The
noble lord tells us, and so far we are getting at length
out of some of that mystification which has hitherto cha-
racterised the Government—that he has no kind of sym-
pathy sucle as would lead him into war for the sake of
what aro called the nationalities of Europe. The noble
lord turned the cold shoulder to the people of Hungary
when he said that ho thought no greater calamity could
happen to Europe than the separation of Hungary from the
Austrian empire. Then we have got rid of Hungary. The
noble lord said also the other night that it was a mistake
to suppose that he ever intended to go to war for the resto-
ration of Poland; and he stated further, what must be dis-
heartening to those who supposed the Government would
ever go to war for such a Quixotic object, that the cause
of Poland was hopeless, and that it would be utter madness
for England or France—not merely indiscretion, but mad-
ness—to take any part in promoting resistance on the part
of the people of that country to their rulers. Well, having
got rid of Hungary and Poland, it requires only to assume,
what no doubt will be the case, that some other member
of the Government will get up later in the evening and say
that it is impossible we should enter into hostilities with a
view to the regeneration of any part of Italy. The noble
lord then tells us that we are not going to war for conquest,
and that should be borne in mind by those who would
urge on the Government to a prolonged war. On Tuesday
the noble lord said, " Be it always remembered that we aro
seeking no object of our own." It seems odd, to me that
we should go to war for objects of somebody else's, and
that when peace is concluded we shall not have acquired
an ell of new territory, or secured any advantages what-
ever for ourselves. It is for Turkey and the general sys-
tem of Europe that we are struggling. In this war the
whole thing always resolves itself into some general mys-
tification, and we are now all of us almost in the dark as
to what the ultimate objects of the war are. (Hear.) As
to the question of crippling and humbling Russia, I am
ready to admit that when people go to war they are not
expected to be nice in dealing with the enemy, nor is
it to be expected that the allies will in this case be over
nice in their treatment of Russia ; and if the taking of
Sebastopol be humbling Russia, there can be no question
that those who wish for war are justified in taking it, and
of proposing any terms of peace which they think they can
persuade Russia to accept. But the noble lord told us last
year that he still intends to leave Russia a great empire.
(Hear.) I think that was very considerate of the noble
lord—(hear, and a laugh)—and I believe it was considered
in St. Petersburg that that declaration of the noble lord
did show great considetation on his part. (Hear, and
laughter.) But if we are not going ;to war for nationali-
ties—if we are not going to war for Conquest, and if we are not going to war for such a crippling of Russia
as
pwiorue,ldwbee
ceoffmecetetdo byth aisdqiusmesetmiobne:rmwehnetthoefrthtehe conditions-
which
her iefhutTu re security egiuiasrt:dntaeffe7danmde
iannsc obny-
unte r Nvhurkehaa so
maloynbge
sidering this, it must not be forgotten that that security is
not absolute, but always partial and conditional.
Ga
rfeew nights hear.) I have here au extract from a speech (madeHe a ,bry,
nLi oe rt di 0 Cti l
ba rr
ee ne dg oh nt
fienr
waenroat hbeyr place ago on the
Mefyanllobthleiefur.ieeunlddseays,y. That noble lord
tthbeenatsttaaitnemd—ent‘
, spirit in which it is agreed.
key. The value of a twat
' which it is entered into.f No troe'atayn
like Turkey perfectly sa eand says truly, that
mustt always depend upon the
fier no security to Tur-
edan thema
kgeo good dwfeaai
weak
h powerwith
I
immediately in •
• termined against a powerful neighbour
contact wlth her, if that neighbour is de-
to act on the aggressive towards her." Lord Cla-