The National Register.
London, England, 1809-05-21 00:00:00

SUNDAY, MAY 21, 1809.

No. 73.

POLITICAL DISQUISITION.

NIOSIBER SEVENTY-ONE.

RELATIVE STATE STATE OF SWEDEN, RUSSIA, AND

ENGLAND.

The present state of Sweden is not understood in propor-
tion to its importance. The people have seldom any at-
tention for inure than one point or object. This political
negligence, however, is not sanctioned by reason. In po-
litics, as in domestic economy, the grand result almost a!-
ways depends upon what in itself appears unimportant.
But a few weeks are elapsed, since Sweden, and the Kiln:
of SWEDEN, were as much overrated as they are now un-
derrated. We remember the time, when the common cry,
both in Parliament and out, was, that it was equally in-
cumbent upon the prudence and the genc-osity of the pub-
lic to pour the whole resources of the kingdom into Swe-
den, to consider, the Swedish cause as ;he immediate cause
of this country, and to fight for Stralsund as for Dover.
This clamow, like every popular clamour, secs unreason-
able, and the Ministry of the day are entitled to lasting
praise, that, in giving way to it in appearance, they eluded
its absurd extremity in practise. Sir Joey Aloofly was
sent to the aid of the King of SWEDUN, but his instructions
were discretionary, and he exercised this dis,,retion so as to
return without doing any thing. He saw, in fact, that the
state of things was such as not to justify any extraordi-
nary interposition on the part of England. He saw that
nothing was to be done, and he exercised the sumer rudence
in Sweden. which he afterwards exercised in Spain, and
whiCh perhaps equally saved us in hoth—ta return without
making an attempt, where such an attempt could only be
fruitless.
Immediately upon the present Ministry coming into
power, they concluded a treaty offensive and dofensive,
with the King of SWEDON, and stipulated to give a monthly
trabsidy, in order to keep the Swedish armies in the' field.
We cannot but consider that this treaty was a most mate-
rial error in policy. There certainly are cases in which it
ii wise to subsidise, and it even may be .made a question,
whether in all possible cases of Continental alliance, it is not
better to assist by subsidy than by a proportion of our
troops. We can better spare our money than our men.
ind under proper application our money may he most ef-
fieient. But in all questions of subsidizing, the. first. point
to be determine:l is, what is the value of the zliipilce and
co-operntion.hroci ?Is it worth the price, which is de-
manded of us in subsidy ? If this question he determined
in the negative, it is surety an error in prudence to ptir-
chase any thing at inure thaa its worth. There will be no
end of subsidizing, if subsidies are to be given and mins.;
mired according to the wants and wishes of the: partiesto
be subsidized. There is a very considerable danger, more-
over, in the principle of subsidies, lest the too frerineat and
liberal practice of them should impair the, re;litary spirit
of the country, and deteriorate our reputation at home.and
lI.—No.

PRICE 9d,

abroad. A nation, like an individual, will not be much'
respected, who is considered as fighting by his purse ra,
ther than by his sword. In point of fact, such a nation
would not deserve esteem.
The treaty concluded with Sweden offended against both
these circumstances. It was an imprudent bargain, and it
was made under circumstances, in which it argued that we
were proceeding upon a system of purchasing war. Its
improvidence has been evinced by its unfortunate result,
and should have been anticipated by a due consideration of
the relations between France and Sweden. Who for ex-
ample, with any attention to the relative strength of
France and Sweden, would have indulged a moment's ex-
pectation—either that Sweden could act as any consider•
able diversion, or that she could support herself against
the concentrated strength of France. Sweden, as separated
from Russia, was most perfectly inefficient as to produciO4
any effect upon France. Under such circumstances, it' ja
really inconceivable what could :have. induced the present
Ministers to conclude such a treaty. It would have been
infinitely more wise, and more generous, to have employed
their influence on the KING to persuade bin, to consult the
interests of his kingdom, and give peace to Sweden, than b/
this pecuniary temptation to encourage him 'to contiLw.p,
the war.
The King of SWEDEN, in fact, appears to us to have
fallen into his present state under two causes i—in the firait
place, by his o*n intemperate nature—and secondly , by tb
direct impulses and seductions of his allies. nit Brit'i
Ministry, in their eagerness to procure co-opeiatipi), hOtt
overloOked the important peints,..how far such cu-operao
tion could be °limy values and whether it would not more
materially injure others, than benefit ourselves I

If the British Ministry, indeed, had duly considered. the
actual condition of the kingdom of Sweden, its narrow re=
sources, its weak Executive, and its seditious and turbulent
aristocracy, they would never have suffered the yeuag ging
to have persisted in a war, which could have no other tor.

mination than his ruin.
They would never hate. Ott otily suffered, but encriii-
raged him by a pecuniary subsidy, to persevere in a war as
hopeless of any favourable issue, as it *as pregnant witt}.
mischief. The Ministry on the other band, eager to pro-
cure an ally, and to keep hiri, seethed most totally to have
overlooked the necessary consequences, which must result
to that ally himself. We. feel same pain in imputing such
selfish and narrow policy to the Government of this coun-
try ; but under the evident circumstances of the ease, it is
very difficult to acquit them.of it. The King of Swains
seems to have been encatmtaged iu a course which could
have no other tertninatioatban his ruin*. ,
Nothing appears more•surpriviag than the perfect trig-
quillity with which MIS Atirolution' has been effected:--•
SWeden at present is as
ills if' ribping 11*(1,Opened.
Not a voice is heard 'in favour of the king. , 'l'ol-:c3ce is
this unanimity on a point which was surely calculated to
cr.!' forth the feelings and passions of a'Veliplec and par- _
ticularly of a people so charaqvistieally loyal as Lb.

522

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Swedes have been reputed. The answer to this questlon is
unfurtuuately too easy. The course of Administration
pursued by the King was in such evident contradiction to
the good of the kinndoin, that not one man can be found to
defend it—not one but allows the necessity of the permanent
deposition of the King. Every one, according to all the
Cottcnburgh accounts, acknowledges, that the eetistence of
the kingdom requires a new King-, and that GUSTAVUS
801, be restored. Such have been the fatal effects of con-
tradicting the public opinion.
' Such, therefore, is the present stale of Sweden consider-
ed in itself. With respect to Russia, the relations of Swe-
den arc very unfortunate, and merit an expianation in de-
tail. When the father of the deposed King came to the
Throne,• he found himself not onlycontrouled, but almost
enslaved, by a turbulent Senate, who were almost all to a
Man purchased by the Enemas of liussi.s, and who inter-
posed themselves as checks to the King whenever it suited
the interests, or the purposes of Russia. The Court of
Versailles was at that time the refuge of the minor Ger-
manic Bodies, and considered it as the main point of her
fundamental polies- to keep Denmark and Sweden in a
stale, which might at once be a counterpoise against the
growing ambition of Prussia, or united with Prussia, might
be interposed as a barrier against A ,stria. Crider these
circumstances the-Kiso (t SW EnEN derive himself into the
arms of France, and by the assistance of money borrowed
from that Court, erected a complete Revoltition in Sweden
•-r-suppressed for a time at least the Russian Faction, and
established liimself in the plenitude, if not in full despot-
bun of Royal Power.
It is.dnnecessary• to m, nti m that this accuinplished hut
precipitate Soivereign fell tin ler the blow of an assassin,
and that since that period pie Government of Sweden has
been most ,cruelly distracted by factions. The immense
power of Russia, her vicinity, and her inexhaustible means
of influence, have been temptations too powerful for the
Nirtuo•of the Stedish Nobles, and, in cbusequence, there
in-loudly is, and always has beeti„ an overwhelming- faction
in t he- Swedish nobility, which h3rs oowa 014' if AO governed,
the country according io Russian interests.
The Court of Petersburg-It has Always availe4 itself of
every opportunity to contison and strengthen tins influence.
When Poland was formerly in a similar situation, .I.l.Ussia
interfered, and was suffere;l• to-nominate- a king. The
tourt of Petersburg!) -have •Neit'inideavonring to play a
similar game in 'Sweden, •flut inPpliity flit 'opportunity is
not so favourable. -41 the mewl: resolution had been at-
tentkd.with any consequent an.archy,- if the.peopte.and
hai been divided iat9),,pnr,Oes, .a very strong- faction
would. ins antly have declared itself fur..ltussia..under
such circumstances lime farnify'imi VAYA- might • feet-el:wen
set,aside 'for ever. lint happ4V for the indepenoVnee of
'Sweden, the Swedes have separated the cause of the coun-
try from that of the King, arid have acknoiviedged the na-
tural pre-erninersce,of thp tUraner., la this state of.things,
they have submitted,to change their Kinn- when the public
• -
trood so Manifestlyrequirea
. . •

$.14