The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-30 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 30, 1855.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

110 USE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.)

The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack
at five o'clock.

PETTY LARCENIES.

Lord BROUGHAM presented a petition from the
magistrates and chairman of quarter sessions, complain-
ißof expenses incurred in prosecuting pettylarcenies,
and praying for a reform in the criminal law of the
country. The noble lord entered at some length into
the prayer of the petition, and said he was exceedingly
glad to see his noble friend, the Lord Chief Justice, in
his place, and hoped that the attention of that noble lord
and the Government would be directed to the subject.
He therefore begged to lay on the table a bill to alter
the present law.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said he was exceedingly
glad to inform the noble lord that a bill of a precisely
similar object had been prepared, and was about to be
introduced in the other house. He entirely concurred
with the noble and learned lord that it was time a mea-
sure was passed to meet the evil. He did not state this
much with the object of stopping the oloble lord ; indeed
he thought it was desirable to have both bills printed.
Lord CAMPBELL hoped that the present session
would not pass away without the law being altered.
LORD LYNDHURST AND THE MINISTRY.
Lord LYNDHURST postponed his motion from
Friday till the Monday following.

THE CHARGE AT BALABLANA-NEW

TA RY DECORATION.

Lord VIVIAN asked the noble lord the Minister of
War whether he had any objection to lay on the table
of the house the exact words of the order to charge, in-
asmuch as there were two versions of the order given,
the one being imperative and the other was of a discre-
tionary character. He asked, therefore, whether they
would have any objection to lay the order on the table,
or a copy of the original order issued by Lord Raglan.
He also wished to know whether he understood the
noble duke rightly that it was the intention of the Go-
vernment to give to the army in. the Crimea a clasp
for Balakiava
The Duke of NEWCASTLE said he was not dis-
posed to lay on the table the exact words of
the order to which his noble friend referred, for the
reason that the circumstance attending it had led
to a correspondence which had only recently been
brought to a close. (Hear.) He did not think,
therefore, that it would be lair to the parties con-
cerned to lay that order before their lordships
until the whole of the correspondence which had taken
place was ready to be produced at the same time. With
regard to the second question with respect to the Crimea
medal, it was intended to give that medal to all those
who had taken part in that campaign from its commence-
ment to the prasent time. With regard to the clasps
for Balak'ava, it would only be given to those engaged
there. He would take that opportunity of Stating that
it was the intention of her Majesty to institute a
cross of military merit, which should be applicable to all
ranks of the army, from the general in command to the
youngest private in the ranks. The principle to be
adopted in deciding how this order shall be conferred
shall be by adjudication of 3.jury of persons occupying
a similar rank to that of the persons whose names shall be
given as deserving the order.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE BILL.
This bill was read a second time.

- THE WAR DEPARTMENT.
Earl GREY then rose and said—My lords, the subject to
which I propose this evening to call your attention is one

which, in the present circumstances of the country, is of such
extreme importance' that I assure you I feel very painfully

how unequal I am to the task I have undertaken ; but I en-
tertain so strong a sense of the urge,ney—of the absolute ne-

cessity—of some such change as that which it is my purpose
to recommend, that, however unequal I may be to the proper

performance of this task, I haVe not thought myselt at liberty
to avoid it. Before Igo further, I ought.orobably to offer
some apology for having taken the somewhat unusual course,

after giving notice of my motion for Thursday next, of bring-
ing it under your lordships' consideration to-night. My rea-
son for doing so was this :—I had learnt, in common with the
public, that certain circumstances which have recently oc-

curred rendered it not improbable that some changes might
take place with reference to the administration of the affairs
of the army, and it appeared to me—and I found also, from

communications with noble lords on both sides of the house,

ghat it appeared to them—that before any such changes were

carried into effect it was desirable that this house should have

an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the principle
on which such changes should be made. I intend to move
that your lordships should agree to a resolution declaring
your opinion that serious evils have arisen from the present
division of authority and responsibility in the administration
_ .

of tho affairs of the army, ei:elthat ticero fora the bueineee re

Sating to this most important brancliof, the public service,
which is now; distributed among various different offices,
shopld bo placed under the immediate control of a single
and well organised department. I must remind your
lordships that twice in the course of the last session
of Parliament I called yciur attention to this very im-

portant subject. During the debate on the address in reply
to her Majesty's gracious speech from the Throne, I called
the attention of the Government and of your lordships to

the great inconvenience which was certain to arise from
the present constitution of the military departments, in
the event of that war taking place with which wo were then
threatened. About two months before the war broke out I
urged as strongly as I could do that preparations should be
made for it in this respect ; and subsequently, after the war
had commenced—on the 7th of April—l more distinctly
called your lordships' attention to the subject. I then moved
for certain papers, but, as I wished to leave the matter in the
hands of her Majesty's Government, I carefully abstained
from making any motion Which would lead to a difference of
opinion, and I only moved for papers about granting which
there could be no difficulty. The production of those papers
was acceded to by her Majesty's Government; and, as I have
to refer to them, perhaps I may be permitted to pause for one
moment to say that I think my noble friend, the noble mar-
quis below me, was quite right in calling the attention of
your lordships to the irregular nature of the return which
was in the first instance laid upon the table. I consider that,
in order to enforce the respect due to this house, it was quite

pr;Pe;oxr tha part of my noble friend to call ateniien-to a
return in which the very unusual course had been taken of

including in the correspondence laid upon the table an elabo
rate answer to the speech of the peer who moved for tha
correspondence. So far as I was individually concerned, I
had not the least objection to that answer having been placed
upon your lordship's table. On the contrary, lam rather
glad that your lordships should see what are the arguments
which can be advanced in this manner in reply to those
which I have used. With regard to that part of the letter
which controverts certain statements made by me, I will say
that the most important of these statements—those relating
to the arrangements of the troops in the West Indies—were
founded upon official correspondence which was laid upon
the table of the other house in consequence of a motion
which I made in 1840, and if any of your lordships will
take the trouble to refer to that return, which is in the
library of this house, you will find that it bears out to the
very letter every word I uttered. The remaining part of
my statements, which was contradicted, and which does not
rest upon that paper, was founded upon reports made to me
officially when I was Secretary at War, by a gentleman whose
accuracy I never in any one instance found at fault, and upon
whom I have the most perfect and entire reliance. But, re-
turning from this digression, I beg to say, that the object of
the motion which I made last year was not to call for any ex-
pression'of opinion on the part of this house, but to direct
the attention of your lordships, of the Government, and I will
also say of the public, to a subject which it appeared to me
required very serious consideration. Nor do I think that I
was altogether unsuccessful, or that I failed in making some
impression, upon the Government, because, although the
noble duke, now at tho head of the War Department, argued
at great length, in reply to my speech, that the existing
arrangements were perfectly satisfactory, and were working
admirably, and stated that he had no doubt they would con-
tinue to do so, and that he anticipated no difficulty in carry-
ing on the war under those arrangements, within about two
menthe from that time it was announced_ that it had been
found necessary to divide the Colonial and the War Depart-
ments, and to appeint a fourth Secretary of State to take the
exclusie charge of the Department of War. I hold in my
hands a paper which had been laid upon the table of this
house—in consequence of an address to her Majesty which I
moved before Christmas—explaining, so far as it does explain,
that division of offices. I cannot help expressing my great
disappointment that that explanation should be so imperfect.
(Hear, hear.) I confess I did expect, when a measure of such
importance was adopted, that there would have been some
regular and official record of:the manner in which it was to be'
carried into execution (hear), that there would have been some
minute by her Majesty in Council, such as has been made on
former occasions, or scene other equivalent official document,
accurately defining the limits of the duties of the new office
which had been created, and pointing out how bUsiness was
iu future to be conducted. I cannot help thinking that
the absence of any such formal document proves in it-
self that the measure was a *Crude and ill-digested
one. I must add, my lords, that from what we know of
the measure from this very short account of it, and from
what we learn from the public newspapers, it is, in my
opinion, anything
•but satisfactory. I would remind your
lordships that in bringing this subject under your notice last
year I pointed out two great objections to the existing
arrangements. The first was that the business relating to
the administration of the army was divided among far too
large a number of independent departments ; and the second
was that the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies,
whose authority was supposed to keep all these independent
departments in one line of action, had far too much to do to
enable him to execute that task. Now, it is quite true that,
by the arrangements which hair() been made, the second of
these objections has been removed. A Secretary of State has
been appointed whose special and exclusive business it is to
Lake charge of all that relates to the conduct of the war ; but
the first, and by far.the most important, of those objections
remains altogether untouched. You have as many indepen-
dent departments as before concerned in the administration
of business relating to the army. Nay, I should rather say
that the objection has been aggravated, because, instead of
simplifying a machine which was already too complicated,
what you have done has been to introduce a new and un-
necessary department, and the only step in the nature of a
consolidation which has taken place was the transfer, on the
22d of December, of the Commissariat to the War Depart-
ment. I cannot, however, call that a consolidation at all. I
cannot, fer my own part, understand how a description of
business involving so much detail and so many matters of
finance can be conveniently dealt within an office constituted
like that of a Secretary'of State. I certainly think it is a
description of business that would be more properly united
to departments which are more conversant with' pecuniary
transactions and with matters of detail. The other depart-
ments continue precisely as they were. You have still the
same number of entirely independent departments, and your
only security for their working harmoniously together ithat
they may be made to do so by the common and superin-
tending authority of the new Secretary of State. I cannot

help thinking that the experience of the Admiralty might
have taught us that the expectation that these independent
departments would be made to work well together by one
superintending authority of this description could • not be
realised. I may remind your lordships that when the Navy
Board and the Victualling Boards were distinct departments
under the Admiralty, although they were entirely subordi-
nate to the Admiralty, it was found that difficulties and'de-
lays were constantly occurring, and the inconveniences at
length so great that Parliament—in my opinion very wisely
—abolished the independent boards, merged them in the Ad-
miralty, and brought the whole business relating to the navy
under one single authority. But the Navy Board and the
Victualling Board were far more completely subordinate to
the Admiralty than the various departments of the army are
to the new Secretary of State. One of the army depart-
ments is presided over by a Cabinet Minister. You have a
Secretary at War and a Secretary for War, both in the
same Cabinet. Again, you have a Commander-in-Chief—a
Minister of very considerable authority—who takes the
pleasure of the Sovereign directly on business relating to his
own department. You have, too, the Master-General of the
Board of Ordnance possessing a very large independent au-
thority, and the same is the case with the Commissariat. It
seems to me, therefore, that it was vain to expect that so
cumbrous a machine would work with the necessary promp-
titude and vigour. I think it was easy to predict, from the
commencement of the war, that a machine so constituted
would not be found to answer. Unhappily, the anticipations
to that effect which I entertained the moment I heard of the
measure which was contemplated have been far more than
fulfilled. I have only to point your attention to the calami-
tous events of the last few weeks and to the present position
of our army in the Crimea in order to convince your lord-
ships how far this system has failed to provide for the
satisfactory management of military affairs. I will not
attempt feelings by describing the
present
posharrowitiyouronour
ef lordships'
the Crimea. I will not
armyin
attempt to go through any details of the various acts of the
mismanagement to which that unhappy condition is attri-.
butable. I wave any advantage I might obtain for my argu-
mentmh e
by doing so, in order that I may spare your lordships
andt
I myself
thev e
imay pain d
I Mean to diratlagatrist Me' system car
obse rations w,hich
.4
as if they Wert"
intended as personal censures upon incl ,
athe o
risk
i sdkw
ee
fl ling
akninpgont much topics, and also
iduals. It is suffi-
cient that I should assume that your lordthips are well ac-
quainted —indeed, who is there who is not well acquainted I
—with the present state if the army in the Crimea ; and,
knowing what that condition is, I would point out to you
that the statements which have been made by'her Majesty's
Government in their own defence afford the strongest and the
most conclusiie- arguments in favour of that view of this
subject which it is my object to press upon you. My lords,
you will remember we have been told that ample stores of
every description have been sent to the Crimea—that food
and clothing and medicine, and everything required for the
comfort and convenience of the soldiers, have been despatched
in quantities ample, if not profuse—that mules and horses
-have been bought for transport, and have been sent or have
been ordered, with provender for their support, to the East.
You have been told all this, and I have not the slightest doubt
that you have been correctly informed ; but, though all this
has been done, it is unfortunately but too certain that, owing
to the defects of organisation—those defects the existence of
which the noble duke very frankly acknowledged in the
short session before Christmas—these supplies have not been
available at the time and place where they were wanted, and
because these supplies were not po available when and where
they were required, our gallant army has been reduced to its
present condition, its losses by sickness and death, brought
on by fatigue and by want, infinitely out-numbering the
losses occasioned by battle or by preventible diseases.
We know this. It is acknowledged on all sides that
from the want of organisation these unhappy conse-
quences have resulted. Then, let me ask, hew is it that
errors having such fatal consequences have occurred I To
that question, my lords, I am quite unable to return a
oomplete answer, but I While we can form a very safe judo- ,
ment as to how these errors are, in part, at least, to be ac-
counted for. These mistakes—these errors, are, I think, the
natural, if not the inevitable result of that complicated and
cumbersome mode of administering business which has so
long prevailed in this country. They are, indeed, the na-
tural and necessary- consequences of that cumbersome and
Complicated system of transacting business. It is because
you have had a Seeretaiy at War, a Commander-in-Chief, a
Board of Ordnance, and a Commissariat Department, carry-
ing on a yolnminous correspondence with each other, with the
other departments of the Government, and with the officers
serving abroad, that, in such correspondence, the essentials
of what was to be done have very 'often been lost sight if,
and mistakes and errors hive taken place, and, when mis-
takes have not occurred, the most ordinary arragements haye
only been effected with a 100 of time which, in war, is too
often a loss of everything. I will not trouble your lordships
with more than one or two instances of the mistakes to which
I refer ; but although I am, anxious, as far as possible, to
avoid torching upon particUlar errors and blunders, still, as
an example of the working of the system, I think it is neces-
sary that I should mention one or two cases. One of those
cases we have heard of for the first time this evening, and I
certainly regard it as a very remarkable one. We have
learnt, from the question of my
,noble friend on the cross
benches, that an offer having been made to her Majesty's Go-
vernment by a most eminent engineer —Mr. Nasmyth—a man
of European reputation, and the Government having deter-
mined to employ his great talents in manufacturing artillery
of a certain description, while he MS in full work, meeting
the requisition of the Government, the work was suddenly
interrupted and suspended for, 1 belieye, as long a period as
a fortnight, owing to memo misapprsia,...-a, har.,-...... +1,.., ALP
forent departments. (Hear.) I ,04d. too, the other day, in,
the newspapers a correspondence With regard. to the supply
of the army with candle stoves. A firm in this country—
Price's Patent Candle Company—a firm known, not merely
commercially, but for its success in what I may call one of the
greatest philanthropic efforts ever made—(hear, hear)—see-
ing how grievously the army wt.s suffering for want of fuel,
from mere patriotic motives sukgested to the Secretary at.
War that it was very desirabli that a contrivance called
" candle stoves," which was exfsemely portable, should be
supplied for the use of the troops, and that thereby the great
difficulty of carrying up heavier stoves from Balaklava might
be surmounted. It seems that this suggestion or offer was
Made to the Secretary at War'before Christmas ; it was at
once entertained by him, and S#M referred to the Board of
Ordnance. Mr. Price, or the company, was for a long time
Without hearing from the board ; they complained through
the public papers ; and the result was the publication of two
etters which I cannot help reading, illustrating, as they do,
the mode in which the present system works. The first is
From the War-office, and is as follows :

_
"War-office' Jan. 3.
" Sir,—l am directed by Mr. Sidney Herbert to thank you
for the anxiety and zeal you have shown for the welfare of
the pnblic service, but he regrets to say that he has no au-
thority to accept any tender—that must be done through the
Ordna,ncq,Department ; and Mr. Herbert has requested that
matter
no delay should take place in coming to a decision on the

" I am, Six, yours most obediently,
" GEORGE D. RAMSAY."
Well, I don't wonder that the Messrs. Price, having received
that letter from the Secretary at War, thought they were
quite safe in applying to the Ordnance, and that the neces-
sary authority was, at all events, to be obtained there. But
it appears that these arrangements are so complicated that
very often the heads of departments do not know wkat is the
proper quarter to which' particular applications should be
addressed ; for the following is the answer received from the
Board of Ordnance
" Ordnance, Jan. 18, 1855. W— 4,431.
" Gentlemen,—With reference to your letter of the 13th
inst., addressed to the Lioutenant-General of the Ordnance,
requesting to know whether the Government is likely to
require any, and what quantity, of your candle stoves for
the use of the army in the Crimea, I have the board's com-
mands to acquaint you that they have no cognisance what-
ever of this subject, not any communication having been
made to them respecting Messrs. Price's stoves. They are,
therefore, unable to give yoit the information you desire as ti
the intention of the Government with regard to these stoves.
" I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant,
" 3: Wooe."
I really think that it is very remarkable that the Messrs.
Price, being referred from one office to another in this man-
ner, did not give up the business altogether. They did not
do so, however, but they wentnext to the War Department,
and this is an account of what occurred when they went
there :—. -
" On receiving the Ordnance • letter we went to a third
office—that of the Secretary of State for the War Department
—to try if we could there get an answer to the tender. We
found that it was under consideration, but that two difficul-
ties existed in the way of its acceptance first, that a num-
ber of ordinary stoves, with ordinary- fuel for them, had
already been sent" out, so that Government was doubtful
about sending any of these new ones except for some special
purposes—such as warming camp hospitals ; and, secondly,
Company's tender would be
that in all hospital matters it Was necessary to consult the
proper medical authority, and he had been ill, so that his re-
port had not yet been received, but was daily being looked
reeadto be of any use at all. But
Now, my lords, that was a matter which, if it were to be use-
ful at all, was to be useful in the shortest time. Candle stoves
Messrse still evaiting.for a faonrs,waenrdedon” it being received our
they should have been
should have been sent out hythe quickest possible conveyance.
the suggestion was made before Christmas; and here I find,
sAtseeflasedt taOsththe
de-
cision, and the subject still under consideration, and hung
upon the 224 of January,
up, while they are driven about like shuttledocks from one
, if
office to another, and, at last, waiting
ecyricmoeual
egyo tw
were
until the director
of the medical department is well enough to give
an opinion upon it. Really, this is an instance which is in
itself an epitome of the 'result of the whole system. (Hear.)
I am sorry to go into these details, but those who have not
themselves been concerned with the working of those depart-
ments cannot understand the question without having one or
two of these particular instances brought before them. Take
one more case —that with reference to which I asked a ques-
tion an evening or two of the noble duke. I asked whether
it was true that the 9lst Regiment had been sent to the Cape
and that the ship which ought to have brought it back had
come home empty, because orders had not been sent to the
general commanding on that statioe.
The noble duke said
that it was true, and he stated certain circumstances explain-
ing how it happened. Those circumstances were, that the
noble duke had written to the nob!c viscount the Com-
mander-in-Chief, informing him that the regiment was to
come home, and that he had also informed the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Cape that it was to come home ; belt no de-
spatch had been written to the military authority at the Cape.
The Lieutenant-Governor being a civilian, and having no
authority over the troops, undoubtedly the general in com-
mand had a right to expect that a despatch would be ad-
dressed to him. (Hear.) Ido not express any opinion whether
in the circumstances of the case he ought to have been satis-
fied with the information received through the Lieutenant-
Governor or not. That is a question which it is quite unne-
cessary for me to enter on ; but this is particularly clear that
it ought not to have been left to that chance. He ought to
have had direct orders from his superiors in this country to
forward the regiment. I see• exactly' how this arose—it was
• precisely from that division of authority of which lam corn-
' Plaining. The' noble duke thought the noble viscount had
written to order the regiment home, and the noble viscount,
, upon his side, believed that the noble duke had given orders.
Viscount HARDINGE---Orders were given.
- Earl GREY continued—The noble viscount says, that
orders had been given ; but in 'all official correspondence l
have always found it most strongly insisted that orders to
military -authorities were not to go through civil authorities,
and that when there is a civil governor of a colony orders for
the removal of a regiment should be addressed not only to
him but also to the officer in command. (Hear, hear.) That

is a rule which I, in my experience, never knew departed
from, and, when I bad the honour of holding the office of
Secretary of State for the polonies, certainly if I had departed
from it I should have had a remonstrance of a kind which I
should by no means have liked to receive from the then Com-
mander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington—(hear, hear)—and
a very just remonstrance it would have been.
Viscount HARDINGE—Perhaps it will save time if I state
what the facts were. Precise orders did go out from my
noble friend the Secretary of State for the War Department.
lapse orders were precisely that the 91st Regiment was to re-
turn to England. The lientenant-governor and the general
commanding conferred together upon the propriety of that
order. It appeared that there were 300 men ander the estab-
lishment of 5,000 which it was thought prudent to maintain
in the eolony; and, in consequence of the concurrent opinion-
of the lieutenant-governor, who received the order from the
Secretary of State, and of the general commanding, it was
decided that the 91st Regiment ought not to return. These
are the real facts of the case.
Earl GREY—I can only say, that if I made a mistake I
was led into it by the answer of the noble duke the other
day ; because I appeal to your lordships whether he did not
distinctly state that I was correctly informed, and that the
reason why the regiment was not sent home was because
the military authority at the Cape had received no direct
orders himself ? (Hear, hear.) Therefore, if I have made a
mistake I can only say that I am not r sponsible for it.
Now, see how this has worked upon the public service. You
have not only incurred the unnecessary expense of the ship
coming home empty, but you wanted that regiment urgently
for the war in the East. A very fine regiment, which had
gone through the Caffre war, and consisted of trained and
disciplined soldiers, was worth—l need not inform your
lordships—two or three times the number of freshly raised
Men from this country, whom alone you could otherwise have
sent. But you have by this mistake between the departments
—a mistake, I say, directly arising from the multiplication of
unnecessary authorities—been deprived of the services of that
regiment which were so much required.
Viscount HARDINGE was understood to say that his order
had not gone to the Cape, but that the order of the Secretary
of State was quite sufficient to have warranted the sending
home of the regiment. In consequence of the state of the
colony, however, at that 'ouorwt, and the arrangement be-
fore entered into that there shoUld not be less than 5,G06 men
in that colony, the lieutenant-governor and the officer com-
manding both determined that the regiment ought not to be
sent home.
Earl GREY continued—That is my case. The military
authority at the Cape did not receive direct orders from the
Commander-in-Chief because the order of the Secretary of
State was sufficient,
Viscount HARDLNGE again rose, but being met by cries of
" Order" he resumed his seat.
Earl GREY—The noble viscount will excuse me, but I
think that he had better comment upon this afterwards, in-
stead of interrupting me in the progress of my address. My
lords, I say that mistakes of this kind have had a most mate-
rial and most unfortunate influence upon the progress of our
arms in the Fist; but it is an act of justice which I am glad
to pay to her Majesty's Government—even if it were not ne-
cessary to my argument, of which, however, it is a most
essential part—it is, I say, an act of common justice to her
Majesty's Government to observe that the want of success
which we have experienced in the East is to be accounted
for not merely by errors which have been committed
since the commencement of the war, but by errors of
much longer standing--errors in the management of the
army which no Government for many years past has been
able to avoid—errors of at least as long standing as from
the commencement of the general peace in 1815. (Hear,
hear.) My lords, I say that it is to errors in the
administration of the army of that long standing that a
great part of our misfortunes are to be attributed ; and I
think I shall be easily able to convince your lordships that
that is a correct statement. In the first place, let me ask
you, is there any man who does not feel that the want of
success in the East has been in no slight degree attributable
to the deficiency which has existed of officers of rank and
experience who are at the same time of such an age as to
make them efficient iu the field ? Has not the want of a
sufficiently wide field of selection for general officers to be
employed in the Crimea been one great difficulty with which
her Majesty's Government have had to contend ? Does any
man doubt that ? If not, let me ask how that deficiency is
to be accounted for It is to be accounted for by the cir-
cumstance that during a long peace, in spite of many remon-
strances, you have adhered obstinately to that system of
promotion to the rank of general officer by seniority—and
not by seniority alone, for, although I think that it would
be absurd to expect by mere seniority to get general officers,
even if confined to officers who were actually serving, our
system is infinitely more absurd than that. A man rises to
be a general officer not by serving, but by simply living
upon half-pay. After ho has once attained to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, under certain circumstances, he then,
without doing another day's duty, and fit or unfit, rises by
seniority alone to the rank of a general officer, and is the
only way in which he can obtain that rank. Let me show
you the consequence. I had the honour, of serving last
spring upon a commission of inquiry, and it was proved by
the papers placed before that commission, and it is stated in
our report, that of the general officers employed during the
last 2a years more than half had been aboveen years out of
active employment ill their profession previous to being op-
pointed to the staff as general officers—that many had been
for periods exceeding 20 years unemployed—and that in one
case an officer actually had done no military duty of any
description for very' nearly 27 years before he was so em-
ployed. Now, my lords, I wish to ask you whether you can
.....0--eseefene of general officers, to
have them efficient ? Can you expect that during peace, even
an the important functions which general officers have to per-
form in maintaining the efficiency of the army, by inspecting
regiments, and seeing that on distant stations, and at the
various garrisons, discipline is properly maintained—do you
think it posiible, I ask, however excellent an officer a man
may have been in early lifeb that one who has been 37 years
out of the exercise of his profession, and who is appointed
because he has outlived all his contemporaries, can perform
efficiently, even in peace, the duties of a general officer? You
will find also, my lords, from the report of the commission,
that the actual average age of the major-generals appointed
at the last brevet under that system was no less, than 60.
My lords, I say that the consequenee is that it is actually
impossible under this system that you should have any num-
ber of officers who have seen service in the rank in which
you want to employ them, and upon whom, being at.the same
time of a suitable age, you could depend for service in the
Crimea. The measures of the Government have, I am sure,
been restricted by this system in a manner which must be
most painful to them, and at the same time it has had no slight
effect in producing those consequences which we so deeply
deplore. Then, let me ask you whether the instructions of
our army during peace is what it ought to have been in order
to prepare it for war ? Let me remind you that it is only
about two years since that you formed your first establish-
ment for teaching, with anything like a system, the use of
improved fire-arms to the troops. The French had had esta-
blishments of that kind, in which the use of tho Minie rifle
was taught upon a most admirable plan and with the utmost
care, for years. The deficiency was over and over again
pointed out; but it is only two years or two years and a-hale
since such an establishment was firmed for our own army.
But, more than that—l have it upon the authority of the
noble viscount himself—that he has ascertained-that one bat-
talion of our Guards, which ought to be one of our bust, and
almost a model regiment, had actually never had any ball
practice for a space of three years. My lords, that was the
manner in which the use of arms was taught to your
troops. But, is it merely the use of their arms on drill
—is it the mere knowledge of these things which makes
a good soldier or a good officer? Ought he not to know
something more than that ? Ought he not to know how to
perform outpost duty, hew to take advantage of all the acci-
dents of the ground for offence and defence, how to construct
small works for similar purposes, how to build hats for his
own shelter of such rude materials as are to be found wher-
ever warlike operations are to be carried on ? Ought he not
to know all the best modern contrivances for _facilitating
labour and for employing the joint efforts of largo bodies of
men with most effect in the prosecution of any work to be
carried out? Ought Rot all these things to bo taught to both
officers and men? It is quite clear that instructions of this
kind would have been of the very highest value to our men in
the East. I think it was Napoleon who said that, in all the
armies of Europe there was a great deficiency in this respect,
even in his day, and that they had much to learn in compa-
rison to the Romans, where in every legion the men were
taught the use of trenching tools as well as of their weapons
before they were considered to be available soldiers; and
Napoleon, I think, said that, with au army of that sort, a
good general would fight as much with the spade as with the,
musket. How deeply has the want of this kind of instruc-
tion been felt in our army, and how much is it's inferiority in
some respects to the French army to be attributed to a defi-
ciency of knowledge of this part of the business of a soldier ?
Why have they not known it? Simply because no attempt
has ever been made to teach them. There has never been
anything like a systematic attempt to teach tour officers and
men that .most necessary and most important part of their
duty as soldiers. Would there have been any difficulty in
teaching them? Far from it. There is no reason why every
soldier in the British army should not be as wall instructed as
the Sappers and Miners. I answer for-it that, in a long peace,
with proper arrangements, there would not be the slightest
difficulty in devising means by which every single soldier in
the British army, before he took his place in the ranks,
should have gone through a perfect system of instrue-
I tion of this kind. Look at the indirect advantages
which would have arisen from it. In the first place,
wo know now that the soldier, if he gets tired of a military
life and buys his discharge, has often great difficulty in main-
taining himself, owing to his understanding., no useful de-
scription of labour. The Sappers and Miners, on the con-
trary, are so useful iu civil life that it is actually difficult for
the Government to keep them—there are sucli constant at-
tempts to bribe them out of the service by persons who know
how valuable they would be in any employmerit to which they
might be turned. That instruction, thetefore, costing
nothing, would have led to a vast improvement in the soldier
after his discharge. Nor is that all. There is another indi-
rect advantage which would have arisen of not less import-
ance. I believe that nothing would have so much contri-
buted to improve the British army as to have occupied some
of their spare time by some useful employment of this kind.
My lords, forced idleness and tedium have been the curses of
the army. It is those which have driven your soldiers into
those acts of drinking which have been the opprobrium of our
service—which I am happy to say are now greatly diminished,
although they still continue to a great extent. It is those
which have driven your young officers into those irregula-
rities, of which some painful exposures have lately
taken place. My lords, I don't blame those young officers.
Young men cannot be-expected to cubmit to what are often
very dry, and apparently uninteresting studies, with no im-
mediate result. If they have not some stimulus to it, and
if they know that it will not have the smallest influence
upon their promotion, how can you expect young men to
devote themselves to studies of that description ? There
'would have been no difficulty in requiring that a competent
knowledge of the scientific as well as of the practical part of
their profession should be a necessary qualification for officers
to obtain promotion. There would have been no difficulty'
in making them feel that those who took great pains and
acquired all this sort of knowledge would advance their
chances of promotion ; but I know that the opinion in the
army has been that such was not the effect of such studies,
I have myself heard the remark made by officers—" Why.
should we take the trouble to instruct ourselves and get
the highest place at Sandhurst, when we know that
distinguishing ourselves in that way will not advance us at
all, if it does not rather create a prejudice against us ?" I
firmly believe that they were wrong in that impression; but
I cannot deny that I have heard men say, that it would even
create a prejudice against them, and would make them be
regarded rather as what are called " book-men" than as