The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-24 00:00:00

SPIRIT OP THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

(From the Times of this day.)
The eagerly-anticipated despatch of General Simpson,
which was forwarded from the seat of war with so much
haste that the steamer which brought it did not wait for
Marshal Pelissier's report, presents us with a very mo-
dest, and, we must add, a very meagre narrative of the
crowning operation of this eventful siege. We have no
doubt that on this, as on most other occasions, both the
Government and the nation will be mainly indebted to
the correspondent; of the British press and to private
communic:ttions for a more complete and accurate pic-
ture of that extraordinary and awful struggle which
finally plaited the stronghold of the Russians in the hands
of the Mlle arm'ei. On the present occasion therefore
we shall confine ourselves strictly, like General Simpson,
to the military details of that part of the attack in which
the British. forces were engaged.
After this progress which had been made early in the
present month in advancing the works of the besiegers
to the furl hest limit against the principal defences of the
enemy, and in arming these batteries with the guns and
projectiles required for another general bombardment,
the engineer and artillery officers of both armies re-
ported that the assault of the place ought to be made on
the Bth, having been preceded by a heavy fire for three
previous d ays. The opening of that fire on the morning
of the sth has already been described with his usual feli-
city of expression by the correspondent of this journal,
who witnessed the scene from Cathcart's-hill. The sun
rose that day clear and ruddy over the forts of Sebas-
topol. It was the last gleam of light and hope which
shone over the doomed but untaken city. Upon a
signal from, the French lines the entire circuit of the
works of the, besiegers poured forth an intolerable and
incessant storm of fire. The armament of the batteries
had become -so ponderous and so extensive that
even Sebastopol, with the 4,000 cannons remaining
in its arsemals, responded to the fire in vain. No stop, no
breathing time, allowed the enemy to repair the damage
inflicted upon their batteries, or to remount fresh guns,
and at last the superiority of the fire of the attack was
decisively €alitablished.

The preparations of the allied armies were completed
for the assault in the night of the 7th and the morning
of the Bth, the cannonade not having ceased until just
before the French storming coltunns:coranwapsi4heir
attack. Thee operations of the whole army, both in the
British attack on the Redan and in the French attacks
ou the Little Redan.and the Central Battery, were made
to depend on the success of the French assault on the
main position of the Malakhoff, and the tricolour planted
on the parapet of that work was to be the signal for the
general ad ranee. General Simpson appears not to have
thought th at it devolved upon him to report on the whole
of the arrangements of this combined'operation ; but it
is evident that Marshal Pelissier had long made up his
mind that the capture of the Malakhoff was the decisive
event of the siege, and that he had resolved not to fail
in attackin g that position a second time. The event has
fully justified that opinion, which was held from the first
by Sir John Burgoyne and many other officers ; but, as
the main strength of the attack was justly and success-
fully directied against the Malakhoff, it is not equally
clear for wl'ant reason, after that work was in the posses-
sion of the _Trench, other secondary assaults were made
by both armies against points of inferior importance.
Such, however, was the case, and the Russians were
more succeissfulin their defence of the Redan and of the
Central Battery than of the Malakhoff. It seems to

have been determined, however, that the whole army
should share in the glorious perils of the day, and the
French assarlts on the extreme left extended even to the
Quarantine Battery.

In pursu trice of the arrangements made by Lieuten-
ant-General Sir W. Codrington, now commanding the
Light Division of the British army, and of Lieutenant-
General Markham, commanding the Second Division,
the assaulti.ug column to be directed against the Redan
was selectech from these two corps, which have borne so
very large a portion of the sufferings and losses of the
campaign, ar,,cl have covered the regiments belonging to
them with inconiparahle distinction. The whole column
consisted of but 1,000 men, preceded by a covering party
of 200 men and a ladder party of 320, so that, as far as
this succinct statement of the Commander-in-Chief gives
us any clue to the events of the day, only about 1,520
men of the British army were engaged ! The column
penetrated into the salient angle of the Redan, where a
sanguinary fight was maintained for nearly an hour with
the enemy ; but it was found impossible to maintain the
position. General Simpson states that the greatest
bravery was displayed, a fact of which we have no
doubt, and that this determined and bloody contest
was "supported to the utmost ;" but he does not inform
is whether the troops Were checked by a cross-fire of
artillery from the second line of Russian defences or by
the infantry of the garrison, and, above all, he omits to
state what were the reserves brought up under these
critical circumstances to the support of a column engaged
no doubt within the Redan with very superior numbers
of the enemy. We have no wish to prejudge unfavour-
ably the conduct of the officers who commanded on this
occasion, or to diminish the public satisfaction at the
general result by cavilling at the means employed ; but,
on the other hand, we have now before us the official
report of the British Commander-in-Chief, relating his
own arrangements ; and, as we certainly can claim
no share in the brilliant achievement of the
French columns against the Malakhoff, which was vic-
toriously terminated before the British attack began, we
are bound to inquire with some anxiety into the causes
of our subsequent failure. As the matter stands upon
General Simpson's report, it appears incredible that a
party of only some 1,200 or 1,500 men should be sent
to storm a work in which the Russians had probably
3,000 or 4,000 • and that when this small party bad
entered the work and maintained itself there for nearly
an hour we should not be told what reserves were sent
to its support. Indeed, we are expressly told that the
reserve, consisting of the Highland Brigade, was not
engaged ; it is probable, however, though by no means
clearly expressed, that some further detachments of the
Second and Light Divisions did join in the assault to
pt
r, at the head of
assault on the
mu
aa
General M‘Mabon's divi4ion with the Zouaves of the
support 0
ffthe
was stormingledb y Generalcolumns.
B q The
Guard as a reserve ; and in his spirited address to the
osue
'
soldiers before the battle he told them "It is a general
assault, army against army." What, then, was the
British army doing while that gallant and devoted band
forced itself into the angle of the Redan, which it was
brave enough to conquer, but too weak to hold ? Gen.
Simpson omits to tell us ; but the next sentence of his
report is, if possible, more extraordinary than the pre-
ceding one, for he adds that " the trenches were subse-
quently to this attack so crowded with troops that I was
unable to organise a second assault, which I intended ,
to make with the Highlanders, who had hitherto formed
the reserve, to be supported by the Third Division,
under General Eyre." This statement establishes
several facts which are not creditable to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the army. We do not clearly ,
understand why the crowded state of the
trenches prevented the advance of the reserves,
for, if they were too crowded, the most natural
operation would seem to be to move a brigade to the
front. But, however this may be, who but the Gene-
ral-in-Chief is responsible for the over-crowding of his
men to such an extent, as he himself informs us, that
he could not use them, or execute his own plan of
attack ? So that on the one hand we had a body of
troops in the Redan toe weak to maintain itself there
against the enemy, and on the other the trenches so
crowded with men that the second assault could not be
organised by the reserve ! This state of things seems to
b- so inconsistent with the most ordinary rules of war
that we cannot but suspect that General Simpson has
omitted some essential circumstances in this hasty and
unsatisfactory narratiTe. As it turned out, we may re.