The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-30 00:00:00

somewhere; and these faults should hereafter be inquired into ;
but the inquiry should not be made at a time when it would
have the effect of paralysing the exertions now being made,
nor while it would interfere with the efforts which ought to
be made without the delay of even 24 hours' more than can
be avoided, to improve the condition of our
army. My t
lords,
I think that there is no man who will not concur with me n
thinking that the necessity for some important change in the
administration of the army is of the most pressing descrip-
tion, and, if not effected instantly and without delay, the
consequences may be such as I shudder to contemplate. My
lords, it ie this feeling which induces me to ask your lord-
ships, as the first step towards effecting the improvements
which are necessary, to express your opinion of the necessity
of a change being made in the constitution of the military de-
partment. (Cheers.) The noble earl concluded by moving—
.. That it is the opinion of this house that great evils have
arisen from the present division of authority and responsi-
bility in the administration of the army, and that the whole
of the business connected with this impgrtant branch of the
public service, which is now distributed among different
offices, ought, therefore, to be brought under the direct con-
trol of a single and well-organised department."
The Duke of NEWCASTLE—My lords, as I do not intend
to oppose the motion of my noble friend—and there is a great
deal in what he has said in which I entirely concur—it is not
necessary for me to trespass upon your attention at any
length, for I feel bound to reserve myself on two points, be-
lieving that this is not the proper occasion to touch upon
either of them. My noble and learned friend (Lord Lynd-
hurst) has given notice of his intention to call your lordships'
attention to the conduct of the war, and to move a resolution
oonderanatory of the Government upon it, and it will be de-
sirable that I should reserve for that occasion my vindication
of their course. There is another point, my lords, which I
postpone with great regret—it is that which relates to my
own personal position and conduct. Under any other cir-
cumstances I should gladly have postponed anything relating
to myself, but the circumstances which have occurred so re-
cently as Friday last, in another place, would render me most
anxious to address your lordships on the topics connected
with my own position and conduct, were I not prevented by
two considerations—one of which at this moment I do not
think it necessary to explain, and the other is this, that on
a motion of such importance as the present, of such para-
mount importance to the welfare of the army and the
country, I should be most reluctant to mix up any matters
relating to myself. But if on this occasion I avoid touch-
ing on these topics, I trust I may he permitted to say
that at your lordships' very next meeting I shall venture to
addreas to you soma observations upon them. • The noble
duke the' proceeded to advert to the speech of the noble
earl ((rey), who, he said, had misunderstood what he had
stated last year on this subject. He had never maintained
that existing arrangements were entirely satisfactory, but
he had expressed an opinion that the noble earl carried his
views to an extreme length, and that it would be perilous
at any:period to effect sudden and sweeping changes in the
administration of the army, more especially at a period like
the present, The noble earl had failed to prove the connec-
tion between disasters in the Crimea and the depart-
mental system of our military administration ; and the
instances he had mentioned were not to be ascribed to
that system, and might have equally occurred under any
other. For example. In the matter of Mr. Nasmyth's proposi-
tion as to the guns, the delay had arisen through a misunder-
standing between the Admiralty and the Ordnance ; and
as to Prico's candles, they had been submitted to a medical
board, whose report bad been delayed through the illness of
its, head. Then, as to the loss of the Prince, the mo-
ment be had heard of it by telegraph, he had or-
dered the supplies contained in it to be replaced. He
wanted to prove, not that neglect and delay had not
taken place, but that, under the existing system, it was
possible to make the service work, and ho hoped occasion-
ally to make it work well. He admitted, with his noble
friend, that great alterations were necessary. Ho had
found by experience—he thought he was not even in antici-
pation taking a different tone from that he held last year
that in the Ordnance Department great alterations were
required, for the system certainly did not work well.
What alterations should be introduced his noble friend
avoided referring to, and he (the Duke of Newcastle) would
follow his example. He believed in that and other depart-
ments great alterations might be effected. Again, in the
medical department a very faulty system prevailed. He be-
lieved attempts might be made in times of peace, but it was
impossible in time of war to maintain a medical system exclu-
sively for the army. He thought it had broken down. lie
was ready to do all justice to the eminent men serving in that
capacity in the army ; but he believed, in the present state
of the army, and in tho present state of the hospitals, it was
absolutely necessary, in spite of all opposition, and in spite
of all personal feeling, to try and introduce the civil system
into the army. He believed the organisation of the medical
board was also defective, and there he agreed with his noble
friend that alterations should be introduced. But when his
noble friend spoke of a system of consolidation being abso-
lately necessary, he did not think he had quite explained
what he meant by consolidation. If he meant that the duties
performed now by the Ordnance Board, commissariat, com-
mander-in-chief, and all the other departments which were at
present separate, should be included under one roof and
superintended by one head, he believed it would be absolutely
impossible to carry that into effect. He had already found
that, under the existing system, during the short time that
the Secretary of State for War had been separated from the
control of the colonies, that he had been overburdened and
crushed by details to an extent that had left him too little
time to devote to greater and more important matters. If his
noble friend pursued consolidation in that sense to a greater ex-
tent, he was confident that, instead of greater efficiency, he
would render the office still more inefficient ; but if he merely
wished to produce greater unanimity of action and better
supervision and control over the different branches of the ser-
vice, then he agreed with his noble friend, and he believed
it might be extended further, although he hoped the first
step had been already taken. He begged to assure him, that
so far from its being possible in tine of war to carry consoli-
dation farther, it was found that it had been carried too far
already, and in two important branches he had found it neces-
sary to etnet a separation. we eeste lvul minted to
the advantages gained by the consolidation of the Admiralty.
He agreed with him, so far as regarded a time of peace. He
believed that the measure of his right hou. friend at the head
of the Admiralty had rightly consolidated the navy transport
with the Board of Admiralty in 1832, and up to the breaking
out of the war that consolidation had worked harmoniously
and well. But if he were to point out that which had more
eminently failed and broken down as a system, notwithstand-
ing the eminent abilities of Captain Mills, be should point to
the transport system as having failed more than any other
during the time they had been at war. And, although his
right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had
introduced the system, and who was naturally proud of what
he had done, admitted that it worked successfully in time of
peace, so satisfied was he that the system wasinefficientduring
the time of war, that he had himself proposed to the Government
that it should be departed from so long as the warlasted, and that
the transport board should be again established. There was
another point upon which he had himself found, that, so far
from consolidation, separation was absolutely necesary,
particularly while an army was in the field. He found that
the commissariat had been overworked, that step by step more
had been placed on it than it was able to bear. The result had
been that the army was deficient in the means of transport ;
and he believed if they continued their present system, and
left to the commissariat the means of transport for the army,
they would never have it effective. So satisfied was he of this
that he had transferred from the commissariat the land
transport of provisions, and had appointed an eminent mili-
tary man to superintend it ; and although there was not yet
time to ascertain the result, ho felt very confident that it
would be the means of placing the army in the field on a bettor
and more satisfactory footing when the new system came
into operation. He was aware that the more they multi-

plied the heads of departments at home, or in the field, the

more they would increase jealousies and misunderstanding ;
but he hoped to and mutual co-operation and assistance.
This land transport system, which he preferred to call it,
rather than the " waggon transport," had bees left in the
nands of the commissariat, from the advantages that depart-
ment was supposed to have, inasmuch as feeding the army,
that first and most vital point, its supply could not be
effected unless it had the means of transport at its com-
mand. He believed that was an entire fallacy, and that it
was far better the transport corps should be separated from
the commissariat, of course subject to the control of the
Commander-in-Chief ; and the commissariat would thin re-
main with enough to do in providing food, fuel, and forage
for the army. Having explained the views he took of con-
solidation, he came now to the observations that had been
made with reference to the state of the officers and men, as
regarded a want of instruction, from which serious evils had
arisen. He attributed a great deal of what the army was at
present suffering to a want of that education which ever
since the last war they had not the opportunity of obtaining.
He did not speak of the instruction of the officers, but of
the men, and co-operating as they now had been for some
months with the French army, these errors and defects
were still more perceptible, because while the French sol-
diers—more particularly those who had bad the advantage
of an African campaign—were willing and able to help them-
selves in any place, and under any circumstances, their
soldiers were unable to do so; not because they were less
intelligent or active, but because they lacked those means
of instruction which their Allies had possessed for many
years past. He hoped the want of instruction in the use of
arms had been to a great extent rectified, if not removed;
but as to the more important matters connected with the
camp, whatever information they possessed had been picked
up by bitter experience during the present campaign. When
his noble friend referred to the want of instruction in arms
he might have added also, that at the breaking out of the
war they laboured under the serious deficiency of a want
of these arms themselves. He referred, not merely to im-
proved arms, but to all descriptions, and he rejoiced to say
that these were being now rapidly replenished. He might point
out that that was one of the errors committed during the long
peace. He did not mean that they should have a great collec-
tion of arms which might be superseded by improvements, but
he contended that the armeries of the kingdom should never
have been allowed to be reduced to the condition they were in
at the breaking out of the war. Ho was speaking, not of
Minies, but of carbines and swords also ; and he would ob-
serve, further, that they had no efficient means of providing
shells, rockets, or other armaments. So deficient were they,
that they were indebted to private individuals, on the spur of
the moment, to supply these wants. He frankly confessed that
when he looked back at their condition, he locked back with
horror at the absence of all provision of that description. He
blamed nobody in particular ; every succeeding Government
must take its share • but he trusted, if it pleased Heaven that
they should arrive shortly at a peace, that one of the first steps
they would take would be to place their arsenals, not only at
home, but abroad, in a state of efficiency—not -overcrowding
them with arms, but enabling them to take the field without
the disadvantage they laboured under on the present occa-
sion. When his noble friend said that during © last 30
great delays had taken place in adopting
or 40 years
scientific improvements, then he entirely agreed with him,
but he hoped he had been instrumental in correcting that
evil. Ho had turned his attention to. the organization of
Lenin tgionthheadzubtelenanocni
i
.the scientific committee, whose v
the whole unsatisfactory, notwithstanding
good intentions of the officers composing_d be i
found more efficient t. He had entirely
re-organised it, and he trusted it wow
r sons were turning
at the present moment, when so many p,-.
their attention to scientific discoveries.
' to introduce oa-
ths ruble friend h. ad
said that he found it slow and dreary won,
provements when he was Secretary at War ; lie
Idid not hesi-
tate to say that his experience corroborated that of his noble
friend. If in times of greater leasure it had been slow, it was
not surprising that during the last nine or ten months the
machinery which every Government for the last :25 years had
found fault with had not worked satisfactorily. His noble
friend had said that was a mistake to have appointed four
Secretaries of State. Well, with regard to the appointment
of boards there were some advantages to bederived from them,
and that was to a great extent the way, in which he had been
endeavouring to conduct his department. lie had been Chief, the Secretaey at
prac-
tically meeting the Commander-in-
War, and the head of the Board of Ordnance. They had ar-
ranged their minutes, letters, and instructions, forming a
board._ as it were, practically ; but he frankly confessed he
wag not so much enamoured of the working of a board as his
noble friend. It did away to considerable extent with indi-
vidual responsibility. It divided the responsibility among
many, and moreover its satisfactory working depended on the
character of the individuals composingit. If the head or chief
had determination and self-will, they might work ha.rmo-