The National Register.
London, England, 1809-01-08 00:00:00

. -
JAN, .S• THE NATIONAL REGISTER:
_ ............ ~...
That it relieved a great extent of Sp visit frontier frans al, i very considerable reinforcement from England, under Lieutenant-
apprehensions of an eoemy, awl the whole of Spain from th '! ;eneral Sir John Moore, which, 'worse'', mu affl%C aiii.saiu.
of having an enemy behind them, and alio.; ed all parts of Simi. ,he army, from the 45th to the 30th of . Aueust
o •
to take more effective measures for its general defence; as weli
It appears a point on which no evidence adduced casisenahla
as perinitted Portugal iounediately to contribute for their mutual the Board to pronounce, with confidence, whether or not a itr.!
support. • s
suit after the battle of the tlst, could have been egicaeious; nor,
That it enabled the'British army immediately to enter Spain, can the &aid feel confident to determine on the t`YM' .(once of a.
if required, by central routes, while it transported the French
force to a very distant part of their own coast, far removed from forward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir liarry Burottst
has stated weighty considerations against such a measase. Fur-'
the Spanish frontier. tiisr, it is to be observed, that so inally collateral circumstances.
That it immediately released 4000 Spanish soldiers, and sew.
he defence of Catal ania; it also released from the ould not be known in the moment of the eneins s repulse, as of--
them to t•
;er wards became clear to the arm, and have been represented
Portuguese frontier another body of 2000 Spanish troops. The 10 the Board. And considering the extraordinary sireum•Oances
Portuguese army also became disposable for the common cause• tinder o hick two new Commanding Genera!, al-lived from the
To the men of worand transports, which at this season of the 4:Fean, and joined the artny (the one ditriug,aad the other imme-
year, with great difficulty could keep their station near the iately after, a battle, and those sucsess•vely superseding each
coast, and on whose presence the supplies and operations of the
other, and both the original Commander within the space of 24,
army depended, the opening of the Tagus afforded immediate hour:), it is nut surprising that the army was not carried forward,
shelter. :iota the second day after the action, from the necessity of the
It is further urged by the Generals, as much more than pro- .;eiterals being acquainted oith the actual State of things, and of
liable, that if the enemy had been required to lay doo n their ;heir army, and proceeding accordingly.
arms, and snrrender prisoners of oar, they would not have coin- •
It appears
plied; but if driven to extreinit v, that they would have retired that the Convention of Cintra, in all its proisress and
conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not
upon Lisbon, reinforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been
thus compelled to share their fate r sod— in the temporars attack objected to by the five distinguished Lieutenant Geuerals of that .
army ; and other General Officers who were mi that service.,
of this city, much ttlatnity :tad destruction must have ensued. whom we have had no opportunity to examine, have also con-
Also, that masters of the Russian fleet, and of the boats and
curved in the great advantages that %sere immediately gained, to
shipping in the Tagns,• the passage of the river was ensured to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general'
them : that they could have defended for a considerable time its
service, by the conclusion of the Convention at that time.
East Bank, and prevented the occupation of the Tagus by our
fleet : that, NY ith the strong fortresses of Alentejo in their posses- Oa a consideration of all circumstances, as, set forth in Alibi:
sion, they could haVe protracted a destructive war, to the great Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further
detriment of Portugal and the Spanish cause, by finding employs military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howso- 1
mein for the greater part of the British army,. for the remainder ever, some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness
of the year, and whose difficulties and losses in such operation o: the Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, is
must have been very considerable. is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and lions-
I t appears, that the forts on the Tagus were taken possession items appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Oen.
of on the 2d• of September by the British troops, and the port Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Bi't• Arthur Wel- s
was then opened to our shipping : That on the sth the army bad lesley, as well as that the ardour end gallantry ofthe rest of the
i s its right at St. Juliens, and its left on the heights of Hellas: Officers and soldiers, ors every occasion during this expedition,
•,,,• That on the•tilth or 9th, a British corps marched into Lisbon, to have done honour to the troops, and renected.listre on your
1 Majesty's arms. All which is most,dutifullyaatisaitted. I
ensure the tranquillity of that city, during the embarkation of ,
the eneroys, who were all sent off (except the last division, par- (Signed) D. Du NDAS, General ' PEMBROICIktIeUt.-Gen: ,
posely.dctaineS9' before the cud of the month, and part of the Mersa, General. G. NUGENT,'LIeut.-Gen., t
:British army Was then actually on its route towards the Spanish PETER CRAIG, Gen. and .
frontier. , .
II ISATHFISLO, Gen. 0. Ntcuolas4leieitt.-r.ita ..
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Major-' eueral Spencer, that in Egypt, in 1801 (after the vie- of bia lajesty'c forces in Portugal, as connected with'the
tors of t!te 21 st of lurch, the French having thrown their w hole Armistice and subsequent Convention of Cintra, 1 think it in-
force into Alexandria and Grsad Cairo, about 10,0t1U aura in eumbent to state to you, that although the report is fully detailed,
each place), that at the siege of Alexandria, in August, the and perfectly explanatory of all the transaction; ns they ap-
cottntry was in the full possession of the Briti"h and Turks. geared in evidence before you ; yet, upon a due consideration of
The garrison, cut off from every possibility of relief, and could the w hot- matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon
only have held out some days, when a capitulation was granted the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, which the word- It has been urged by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and allowed by your re ort and +►pinion upon the whole of the late operations
to it, September• the 2d, as favourable as the Convention of of his Majesty's wart:+nt expressly enjoin shoulat bt: strictly
Cintra to the army of Junot (of 24,000 French, and 6000 Rus- examined, enquired into, and reported upon, has been altos
siztas), and perfectly 'similar in all the chief articles of men, other omitted. ~
baggage, artillery, conveyance, &c.; also, that the same terms I feel it my duty, therefore, to call your attention to these '
- •-
had been previously granted to the garrison of Cairo, under two principal features of this important case, the Armistice and
much the same eircumstances. By these two Conventions, or Convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the 1 •••
Capitulations, above 20,000 French evacuated Egypt, and the same again into your most serious consideration, and subjoin to • - •
British army was left disposable for other purposes. the opinion which you have already given upon the other points
On the whole, it appears, that the operations of the army un- submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether, under all
•...
tier Sir Arthur Wellesley,
,from his. landing in Mondegu Bay the the
it
which app ear in evidence before you, on the .
Ist of. August, until the conclusion of the action at Vitneira, the relative situation of the two armies on the i'ld of August, 1808,
• S/1 st of August, were highly honourable and successful, and such it is your opinion that an Armistice was udyisable, and, if so, •
oughtbe :to have
llsideration o, :
«f a British army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th ardor 21st .been agreed upon; and whether, upon a like co
to I'l,ooo, deriving only some small aid from a Portuuee s be relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the Ass
(1600 men), and against whom an enemy, not exceeding 14,000 ' mistices and when all the British forces w ere landed, itis yowl
awn iu the field, was opposed; and this before the arrival of a .on piion that a Convention was advisable, and, if so w I