The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-30 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 30, 1855.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF LORDS--(YESTERDAY.)
The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack
at five o'clock. •

PETTY LARCENIES.
Lord BROUGHAM presented a petition from the
magistrates and chairman of quarter sessions, cotnplain-
ing of the expenses incurred in prosecuting petty larcenies,
and praying for a reform in the criminal law of the
country. The noble lord entered at some length into
the prayer of the petition, and said he was exceedingly
glad to see his noble friend, the Lord Chief Justice, in
his place, and hoped that the attention of that noble lord
and the Government would be directed to the subject.
He therefore begged to lay on the table a bill to alter
the present law.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said be was exceedingly
glad to inform the noble lord that a bill of a precisely
similar object had been prepared, and was about to be
introduced in the other house. He entirely concurred
with the noble and learned lord that it was time a- mea.-
sure was passed to meet the evil. He did not state this
much with the object of stopping the noble lord ; indeed
he thought it was desirable to have both bills printed.
Lord CAMPBELL hoped that the present session
would not pass away without the law being altered.
LORD LYNDHURST AND THE MINISTRY.
Lord LYNDHURST postponed his motion from
Friday till the Monday following.
THE CHARGE AT BALAKLAVA.—NEW MILI-
TARY DECORATION.
Lord VIVIAN asked.the noble lord the Minister of
War whether he had any objection to lay on the table
of the house the exact words of the order to charge, in-
asmuch as there were two versions of the order given,
the one being imperative and the other was of a dieure-
tionary character. He asked, therefore, whether thby
would have any objection to lay the order on the table,
or a copy of the original order issued by Lord Raglan.
He ale() wished to know whether he . understood the
noble duke rightly that it was the intention of the Go-
vernment to give to the army in the Crimea a clasp
for Balaklava ?
The Duke of NEWCASTLE said he was not dis-
posed to lay on the table the exact words of
the order to which his noble friend referred, for the
reason that the circumstance attending it had led
to a correspondence which had only recently been
brought to a, close. (Hear.) He did not think,
therefore, that it would be fair to the parties con-
cerned to lay that order before their lordships
until the whole of the correspondence which had taken
place was ready to be produced at the same time. With
regard to the second question with respect to the Crimea
medal, it was intended to give that medal to all those
who had taken part in that campaign from its commence-
ment to the present time. With regard to the clasps
for Balaklava, it would only be given to those engaged
there. He would take that opportunity of stating that
it was the intention of her Majesty to institute a
cross of military merit, which should be applicable to all
ranks of the army, from the general in command to the
youngest private in the ranks. The principle to be
adopted in deciding how this order shall be conferred
shall be by adjudication of a jury of persons occupying
a similar rank to that of the persons whose names shall be
given as deserving the order.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE BILL.
This bill was read a second time.
THE WAR DEPARTMENT.
Earl GREY then rose and said—My lords, the subject to
which I propose this evening to call your attention is one
which, in the present circumstances of the country, is of such
extreme importance that I assure you I feel very painfully
bow unequal I am to the task I have undertaken; but I en-
tertain so strong a sense of the urgency—of the absolute ne-
cessity—of some such change as that which it is my purpose
to recommend, that however unequal I may be to the proper
performance of this task, I have not thought myselt at liberty
to avoid it. Before Igo further, I oughtiprobably to offer
some apology for having taken the somewhat unusual course,
after giving notice of my motion for Thursday next, of bring-
ing it under your lordships' consideration to-night. My rea-
son for doing so was this :—I had learnt, in common with the
public, that certain circumstances which have recently oc-
curred rendered it not improbable that some changes might
take place with reference to the administration of the affairs
of the army, and it appeared to me—and I found also, from
communications with noble lords on both aides of the house,
that it appeared to them—that before any such changes were
carried into effect it was desirable that this house should have
an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the principle
on which such changes should be made. I intend to move
that your lordships should agree to a resolution declaring
your opinion that serious evils have arisen from the present
division of authority and responsibility in the administration
of the affairs of the army, and that therefore the business re-
lating to this most imp3rtant branch of.the public service,
which is now distributed among various different offices,
should be placed under the immediate control of a single
aml well organised department. I must remind your
lordships that twice in the course of the last session
of Parliament I called your attention to this very im-
portant subject. During the debate on the address in reply
to her Majesty's graciam speech from the Throne, I called
the attention of the Government and of your lordships to
the great inconvenience which was certain to arise from
the present constitution of the military departments, in
the event of that war taking place with which wo were then
threatened. About two months before the war broke out I
urged as strongly as I could do that preparations should be
made for it in this respect ' • and subsequently, after the war
had commenced—on the 7th of April—l more distinctly
called your lordships' attention to the subject. I then moved
for certain papers, but, as I wished to leave the matter in the
hands of her Majesty's Government, I carefully abstained
from making any motion which would lead to a difference of
opinion, and I only moved for papers about granting which
there could be no difficulty. The production of those papers
was acceded to by her Majesty's Government; and, as I have
to refer to them, perhaps I may be permitted to pause for one
moment to say that I think my noble friend, the noble mar-
quis below me, was quite right in calling the attention of
your lordships to the irregular nature of the return which
was in the first instance laid upon the table. I consider that,
in order to enforce the respect due to this house, it was quite
proper on the part of my noble friend to call attention to a
return in which the very unusual course had been taken of
including in the correspondence laid upon the table an elabo-
rate answer to the speech of the peer who moved for that
correspondence. So far as I was individually concerned, I
has not theleast objection to that answer having been placed
upon your lordship's table. On the contrary, lam rather
glad that your lordships should see what are the arguments
which can be advanced in this manner in reply to those
which I have uSed` With regard to that part of the letter
which controverts certain statements made by me, I will say
that the most important of these statements—those relating
to the arrangements of the troops in the West Indies—were
founded upon official correspondence which was laid upon
the table of the other house in consequence of a motion
which I made in 1840, and if any of your lordships will
take the trouble to refer to that return, which is in the
library of this house, you will find that it bears out to the
very letter every word I uttered. The remaining part of
my statements, which was contradicted, and which does not
rest upon that paper, was founded upon reports made to me
officially when I was Secretary at War, by a gentleman whose
accuracy I never in any one instance found at fault, and upon
whom I have the most perfect and entire reliance. But, re-
turning from this digression, I beg to say, that the object of
the motion which I made last year was not to call for any ex-
pression of opinion on the part of this house, but to direct
the attention of your lordships, of the Government, and I will
also say of the public, to a subject which it appeared to mo
required very serious consideration. Nor do I think that I
was altogether unsuccessful, or that I failed in making some
impression upon the Government, because, although the
noble duke, now at the head of the War Department, argued
at great length, in reply to my speech, that the existing
arrangements were perfectly satisfactory, and were working
admirably, and stated that he bad no doubt they would con-
tinue to do so, and that he anticipated no difficulty in carry-
ing on the war under those arrangements, within about two
months from that time it was announced that it had been
found necessary to divide the Colonial and the War Depart-
ments, and to appoint a fourth Secretary of State to take the
exclusive charge of the Department of War. I hold in my
hands a paper which had been laid upon the table of this
house—in consequence of an address to her Majesty which I
moved before Christmas—explaining, so far as it does explain,
that division of offices. I cannot help expressing my great
disappointment that that explanation should bo so imperfect.
(Hear, hear.) I confess I did expect, when a measure of such
importance was adopted, that there would have been some
regular and official record of the manner in which it was to be
carried into execution (hear), that there would have been some
minute by her Majesty in Council, such as has been made on
former occasions, or some other equivalent official document,
accurately defining the limits of the duties of the new office
which had been created, and pointing out how business was
in future to be conducted. I cannot help thinking that
the absence of any such formal document proves in it-
self that the measure was a crude and ill-digested
one. I must add, my lords, that from what we know of
the measure from this very short account of it, and from
what we learn from the public newspapers, it is, in my
opinion, anything but satisfactory. I would remind your
lordships that in bringing this subject under your notice last
year I pointed out two great objections to the existing
arrangements. The first was that the business relating to
the administration of the army was divided among far too
large a number of independent departments ; and the second
was that the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies,
whose authority was supposed to keep all these independent
departments in one line of action, had far too much to do to
enable him to execute that task. Now, it is quite true that,
by the arrangements which have been made, the second of
these objections has been removed. A Secretary of State has
been appointed whose special and exclusive business it is to
take charge of all that relates to the conduct of the war ; but
the first, and by far the most important, of those objections
remains altogether untouched. You have as many indepen-
dent departments as before concerned in the administration
of business relating to the army. Nay, I should rather say
that the objection has been aggravated, because, instead of
simplifying a machine which was already too complicated,
what you have done has been to introduce a new and un-
necessary department, and the only step in the nature of a
consolidation which has taken place was the transfer, on the
22d of December, of the Commissariat to the War Depart-
ment. I cannot, however, call that a consolidation at all. I
cannot, for my own part, understand how a description of
business involving so much detail and so many matters of
finance can be conveniently dealt within an office constituted
like that of a Secretary of State. I certainly think it is a
description of business thatwould be more properly united
to departments which are more conversant with pecuniary
transactions and with matters of detail. The other depart-
ments continue precisely as they were. You have still the
same number of entirely indeffendent departments, and your
only security for their working harmoniously together is that
they may be made to do so by the common and superin-
tending authority of the tiely Secretary of State, I. CODA

help thinking that the experience of the Admiralty might
have taught us that the expectation that these independent
departments would be made to work well together by one
superintending authority of this description could not be
realised. I may remind your lordships that when the Navy
Beard and the Victualling Boards were distinct departments
under the Admiralty, although they were entirely subordi-
nate to the Admiralty, it was found that difficulties and de-
lays were constantly occurring, and the inconveniences at
length so great that Parliament—in my opinion very wisely
—abolished the independent boards, merged them in the Ad-
miralty, and brought the whole business relating to the navy
under one single authority. But the Navy Board and the
Victualling Board were far more completely subordinate to
the Admiralty than the various departments of the army are
to the -new Secretary of State. One of the army depart-
ments is presided over by a Cabinet Minister. You klave, a
Secretary at War and a Secretary for War, both in the
same Cabinet. Again, you have a Commander-in-Chief—a
Minister of very considerable authority—who takes the
ov
yeroeuigehladvier, too,eet l
on business relating to his
ownle asduerepa ftm theei S
the Master-General of the
Board of Ordnance possessing a very large independent au-
thority, and the same is the case with the Commissariat. It
pleasure
seems to me, therefore, that it was vain to expect that so
cumbrous a machine would work with the necessary promp-
titude and vigour. I think it was easy to predict, from the
commencement of the war, that a machine so constituted
would not be found to answer. Unhappily, the anticipations
to that effect which I entertained the moment I heard of the
measure which was contemplated have been far more than
fulfilled. I have only to point your attention to the calami-
tous events of the last few weeks and to the present position
of our army in the Crimea in order to convince your lord-
ships how far this system has failed to provide for the
satisfactory management of military
affairs. I will not
attempt to harrow your lordships' feelings by describing the
present lesetion of our army in the Crimea. I will not
attempt to go through any details Of 'the various ads of the
mismanagement to which that unhappy condition is attri-
butable. I wave any advantage I Might obtain for my argu-
ment by doing so. in order that I may
spare your lordships
and myself the pain of dwelling uPen- such topics, and also
that I may avoid the risk of making those observations which
I mean to direct against the system appear as if they were
intended as personal censures upon individuals. It is suffi-
cient that I should assume that your lordships are well ac-
quainted —indeed, who is there who is not well acquainted
—with the present state of the army in the Crimea ; and,
knowing what that condition is, I would point out to you
that the statements which have been made by her Majesty's
Government in their own defence afford the strongest and the
most conclusive arguments in favour of that view of this
subject which it is ray object to press upon you. My lords,
you will remember we have been told that ample stores of
every description have been sent to the Crimea--that food
and clothing and medicine, and everything required for the
comfort and convenience of the soldiers, have been despatched
in quantities ample, if not profuse—that mules and horses
have been bought for transport, and have been sent or have
been ordered, with provender for their support, to the East.
You have been told all this, and I have not the slightest doubt
that you have been correctly informed ; but, though all this
has been done, it is unfortunately but too certain that, owing
to the defects of organisation—these defects the existence of
which the noble duke very frankly acknowledged in the
short session before Christmas—these supplies have not been
available at the time and place where they were wanted, and
because these supplies were not Ise available when and whero
they were required, our gallant army has been reduced to its
present condition, its losses by sickness and death, brought
on by fatigue and by want, infinitely out-numbering the
losses occasioned by battle or by preventible diseases.
We know this. It is acknowledged on all sides that
from the want of organisation these unhappy conse-
quences have resulted. Then, let me ask, how is it that
errors having such fatal consequences have occurred i To
that question, my lords, I am quite unable to return a
complete answer, but I think we can form a very safe judg-
ment as to how these errors are, is part, at least, to be ac-
counted for. These mistakes---thcse errors, are, I think, the
natural, if not the inevitable result of that complicated and
cumbersome mode of administertg business which has so
long prevailed in this country. They are, indeed, the na-
tural and necessary consequences of that cumbersome and
complicated system of transacting business. It is because
you have had a Secretary at War, a Commander-in-Chief, a
Board of Ordnance, and a Commissariat Department, carry-
ing on a yoluminous correspondence with each other, with the
other departments of the Government, and with the officers
serving abroad, that, in such correspondence, the essentials
of what was to be done have very often been lost sight if,
and mistakes and errors have taken place, and, when mis-
takes have not occurred, the mod ordinary arragements haye
only been effected with a loss of time which, in war, is too
often a loss of everything. I will not trouble your lordships
with more than one or two instances of the mistakes to which
I refer ; but although I am elisions, as far as possible, to
avoid touching upon particular errors and blunders, still, as
an example of the working of the system, I think it is neces-
sary that I should mention one'or two cases. One of those
cases we have heard of for the first time this evening, and I
certainly regard it as a very remarkable one. We have
, learnt, from the question of my noble friend on the cross
1 benches, that an offer having been made to her Majesty's Go-
vernment by a most eminent engineer —Mr. Nasmyth—a man
of European reputation, and the Government having deter-
mined to employ his great talents in manufacturing artillery
of a certain description, while he was in full work, meeting
the requisition of the Government, the work was suddenly
interrupted and suspended for, I belieyo, as long a period as
a fortnight, owing to some misapprehension between the dif-
ferent departments. (Hear.) I read, too, the other day, in
the newspapers a correspondence with regard to the cowry
of the army with candle stereo: firm in this country—
Price's Patent Candle Compaay=a,,Xlrm known, not merely
commercially, bat for its success in wliati .luty call ono of the
greatest philanthropic 011'1,3% ever inado—(hear, hear)—sco-
ing how grievously the army was suffering for want of fuelo
from mere patriotic motives suggested to the Secretary at
War that it was very desirable that a contrivance cklled
" candle stoves," which was extrbmely portable, should be
supplied for the use of the troops, and that thereby the great
difficulty of carrying up heavier stoves from Balaklava might
be surmounted. It seems that-this suggestion or offer was
made to the Secretary at War before Christmas; it was at
once entertained by him, and was referred to the Board of
Ordnance. Mr. Price, or the conepauy, was for a long time
without hearing from the board; they complained through
the public papers ; and the result was the publication of two
letters which I cannot help reading, illustrating, as they do,
the mode in which the present System works. The first is
from the War-office, and is as follows

" War-office Jan. 3.
" Sir,—l am directed by Mr.'Sidney Herbert to'thank you
for the anxiety and zeal you have shown for the welfare of
the public service, but ho regrets to say that he has no au-
thority to accept any tender—that must be done through the
Ordnance Department; and Mr. Herbert has requested that
no delay should lake place in coming to a decision on the
matter.
I am, Sir, yours most obediently,
" GEORGE D. RAMSAY."
Well, I don't wonder that the Messrs. Price, having received
that letter from the Secretary at War, thought they were
quite safe in applying to the Ordnance, and thatthe neees-
sary authority was, at all events, to be obtained there. But
it appears that these arrangements aro so complicated that
very often the heads of departments do not know what is the
prodpre4
for the following is the answer received from the
Board of Ordnance
Ordnance, Jan. 18, 1855. W— 4,431.
Gentlemen,—With reference to your letter of the 13th
deqdu ; quarter to which particular applications should be
ri
inst., addressed to the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance,
requesting to know whether the Government is likely to
require any, and what quantity, of your candle stoves /or
the use of the army in the Crimea I have the board's com-
mands to acquaint you that they havei no cognisance what-
ever of this subject, not any communication having been
made to them respecting Messrs. Price's stoves. They are,
th„efore, unable to give you the information you desire as to
the inteation of the Government with regard to these stoves.
I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant,
" J. WOOD."
I really think that it is very remarkable that the Messrs.
Price, being referred from one office to another in this man-
ner, did not give up the business altogether. They did not
do so, however, but they went next to the War Department,
and this is an account of what occurred when they went
there
On receiving the Ordnance letter we went to a third
office—that of the Secretary of State for the War Department
—to try if we could there get an answer to the tender. We
found that it was under consideration, but that two difficul-
ties existed in the way of its acceptance_ first, that a num-
ber of ordinary stoves, with orclina—
LT fuel for them, had
already been sent out, so that Government was doubtful
about sending any a these new ones except for some special
purposes—such as warming camp hospitals ; and, secondly,
that in all hospital matters it was necessary to consult the
proper medical authority, and he had been ill, so that his re-
port had not yet been received, but was daily being looked
for, and on it being received our company's tender would be
answered."
•• - -

by
yn
the
ee shortestk quickest
possible time.
d vl ee
y stovesa
ea
conveyance. onnn
Now, my lords, that was a matter which, if it were to be use-
ful
shouldaall,t
havew beenas to be
sentuseful
o
As fast as they could b 4 got ready they should have been
started to the Crimea, if they were to be of any use at all. But
the suggestion was made before Christmas ; and here I find,
upon the 22d of January, Messrs. Price still waiting for a de-
cision, and the subject still under consideration, and hung
u
up, while they are driven about like shuttlecocks from one
office to another, and, ;at last, waiting until the director
of the medical department is well enough to give
an opinion upon it. Really, this is an instance which is in
itself an epitome of the result of the whole system. (Hear.)
I am sorry to go into these details, but those who have not
themselves been concerned with the working of those depart-
ments cannot understand the question without having one or
two of these particular instances brought before them. Take
one more case —that with reference to which I asked a ques-
tion an evening or two of the noble duke. I asked whether
it was true that the 91st Regiment had been sent to the Cape
and that the ship which ought to have brought it back had
come home empty, because orders had not been sent to the
general commanding on that station. The noble duke said
that it was true, and he stated certain circumstances explain-
ing how it happened. Those circumstances were, that the
noble duke had written to the noble 'viscount the Com-
mander-in-Chief, informing him that the regiment was to
come home, and that he had also informed the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Cape that it was to come home ; but no de-
spatch had been written to the military authority at the Cape.
The Lieutenant-Governor being a civilian, and having no
authority over the troops, undoubtedly the general in com.
mand had a right to expect that a despatch would be ad-
dressed to him. (wean) I do not express any opinion whether
in the circumstances of the case he ought to have been satis-
fied with the information received through the Lieutenant-
Governor or not. That is a question which it is quite unne-
cessary for me to enter on ; but this is particularly clear that
it ought not to have been left to that chance. Ho ought to
have had direct orders from.his superiors in this country to
forward the regiment. I see exactly how this arose—it was
precisely from that division of authority of which I am com-
plaining. The noble duke thought the noble viscount had
written to order the regiment home, and the noble viscount,
upon his side, believed that the noble duke had given orders.,
Viscount HARDINGE—Orders were given.
Earl GREY continued—
The noble viscount says, that
orders had been given ; but in all official correspondence I
have always found it most strongly insisted that orders to
military authorities were not to go through civil authorities,
and that when there is a civil governor of a colony orders for
the removal of a regiment should be addressed not only to
•WM but also to the °Alcor iLt caungladi (Hear, 1100 That

is a rule which I, in my experience, never knew departed
from, and, when I had the honour of holding the office of
Secretary of State for the Colonies, certainly if I had departed
from-it I should have had a remonstrance of a kind which f
should by no means have liked to receive from the then Com-
mander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington(hear, hear)—and
a very just remonstrance it would have been.
Viscount HARDINGE—Perhaps it will save time if I state
what the facts were. Precise orders did go out from my
noble friend the Secretary of State for the War Department.
These orders were precisely that the 91st Regiment was to re-
turn to England. The lieutenant-governor and the general
commanding conferred together upon the pi opriety of that
order. It appeared that there were 300 men under the estab-
lishment of 5,000 which it was thought prudent to maintain
in the colony; and, in con=equence of the concurrent opinion
of the lieutenant-governor, who received the order from the
Secretary of State, and of the general commanding, it was
decided that the 91st Regiment ought not to return. These
are the real facts of the case,

Earl GREY—I can only say, that if I made a mistake I
was led into it 'by the answer of the noble duke the other
day ; because I appeal to your lordships whether he did not
distinctly state that I was correctly informed, and that the
reason why the regiment was not sent home was because
the military authority at the Cape bad received no direct
orders himself (Hear, hear.) Therefore, if I have made a
mistake I can only say that I am not r sponsible for • it.
Now, see how this has worked upon the public service. You
have not only incurred the unnecessary expense of the ship
coming home empty, but you wanted that regiment urgently
for the war in the East. A very fine regiment, which had
gone through the Caffre war, and Consisted of trained and
disciplined soldiers, was worth—l need not inform yonr
lordships—two or three times the number of freshly raised
men from this country, whom alone you could otherwise have
sent. But you have by this mistake between the departments
—a mistake, I say, directly arising from the multiplication of
unnecessary authorities—been deprived of the services of that
regiment which were so much required.
Viscount HARDINGE was understood to say that his order
bad not gone to the Cape, but that the order of the Secretary
of abate qinte sufficient tv have warranted th.ce sanding
home of the regiment. In consequence of the state of the
colony, however, at that moment, and the arrangement be-
fore entered into that there should not be less than 5,000 men
in that colony, the lieutenant-governor and the officer com-
manding both determined that the regiment ought not to be
sent home.
Earl GREY continued-,That is my case. The military
authority at the Cape did not receive direct orders from the
Commander-in-Chief because the order of the Secretary of
State was sufficient,
Viscount HARDINGE again rose, but being met by cries of
" Order" he resumed his seat.
Earl GREY—The noble viscount will excuse me, but I
think that he had better comment upon this afterwards, in-
stead of interrupting me in the progress of my address. • My
lords, I say that mistakes of this kind have had a most mate-
rial and most unfortunate influence upon the progress of our
arms in the East; but it is an act of justice which I am glad
to pay to her Majesty's Government—even if it were not ne-
cessary to my argument, of which, however, it is a most
essential part—it is, I say, an act of common justice to her
Majesty's Government to observe that the want of success
which we have experienced in the East is to be accounted'
for not merely by errors which have been committed
since the commencement of the war, but by errors of
much longer standing—errors in the management of the
army which no Government for many years past has been
able to avoid—errors of at least as long standing as from
the commencement of the general peace in 1815. (Hear,
hear.) My lords, I say that it is to errors in the
administration of the army of that long standing that a
great part of our misfortunes are to be attributed ; and I
think I shall be easily able to convince your lordships that
that is a correct statement. In the first place, let me ask
you, is there any man who does not feel that the want of
success in the East has been in no slight degree attributable
to the deficiency which has existed of officers of rank and
experience who are at the same time of such an age as to
make them efficient iu the field ? Has not the want of a
sufficiently wide field -of selection for general officers to be
employed in the Crimea been one great difficulty with whisk
her Majesty's Government have had to contend Does any
man doubt that ? If not, let me ask how that deficiency is
to be accounted for ? It is to be accounted for by the cir-
cumstance that during a long peace, in spite of many remon-
strances, you have adhered obstinately to- that system of
promotion to the rank of general officer by seniority—and
not by seniority alone, 4for, although I think that it would
be absurd to expect by mere seniority to get general officers,
even if confined to afters who were actually serving, our
system is infinitely more absurd than that. A man rises to
be a general officer not by serving, but by simply living
upon half-pay. After he has once attained to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, under certain circumstances, he then,
without doing another day's duty, and fit or unfit, rises by
seniority alone to the rank of a general officer, and it is the
only way in which he can obtain that rank. Let me show
you the consequence. I had the honour of serving last
spring upon a commission of inquiry, and it was proved by
the papers placed before that commission, and it is stated in
our report, that of the general officers employed during the
last 29 years more than half had been above ten years out of
active employment in their profession previous to being ap-
pointed to the staff as general officers—that many had been
for periods exceeding 20 years unemployed—and that in one
case an officer actually had done no military duty of any
description for very nearly 37 years before he was so em-
ployed. Now, my lords, I wish to ask you whether you can
expect, with such a system of appointing general officers, to
have them efficient ? Can you expect that during peace, even
all the important functions which general officers have pei-
form in maintaining the efficiency of the army, by inspecting
regiments, and seeing that on distant stations, and at the
various garrisons, discipline is properly maintained—do you
think it possible, I ask, howover excellent an officer a man
may have been in early life, that ono who has been 37 years
out of the exercise of his profession, and who is appointed
because he has outlived all his contemporaries, can perform
efficiently, even in peace, the duties of a general officer? You
will find also, my lords, from the report of the commission,
that the actual average age of the major-generals appointed
at the last brevet under that system was no less than 60.
My lords, I say that the consequenee is that it is actually
impossible under this system that you should have any num-
ber of officers who have seen service in the rank in which
you want to employ them, and upon whom, being at the same
time of a suitable age, you could depend for service in the
Crimea. The measures of the Government have, I am sure,
been restricted by this system in a manner which must be
most painful to them, and at the same time it has had no slight
effect in producing those consequences which we so deeply
deplore. Then, let me ask you whether the instructions of
our army during peace is what it ought to have been in order
to prepare it for war ? Let me remind you that it is only
about two years since that you formed your first establish-
ment for teaching, with anything like a system, the use of
improved fire-arms to the troops. The French had had esta-
blishments of that kind, in which the use of the Minie rifle
was taught upon a most admirable plan and with the utmost
care, for years. The deficiency was over and over again
pointed out; but it is only two years or two years and a-half
since such an establishment was farmed for our own army.
But, more than that—l have it upon the authority of the
noble viscount himself—that he has ascertained that one bat-
talion of our Guards, which ought to be one of our best, and
almost a model regiment, had actually never had any ball
practice for a space of three years. My lords, that was the
manner in which the use of arms was taught to your
troops. But, is it merely the use of their arms on drill
—is it the mere knowledge of these things which makes
a good soldier or a good officer ? Ought he not to know
something more than that ? Ought he not to know bow to
perform outpost duty, how to take advantage of all the acci-
dents of the ground for offence and defence, how to construct
small works for similar purposes, how to build huts for his
own shelter of such rude materials as are to be found wher-
ever warlike operations aro to be carried on ? Ought he not
to know all the best modern contrivances for facilitating
labour and for employing the joint efforts of large bodies of
men with most effect in the prosecution of any work to be
carried out? Ought not all these things to be taught to both
officers and men ? It is quite clear that instructions of this
kind would have been of the very highest value to our men in
the East. I think it was Napoleon who said that, in all the
armies of Europe there was a great deficiency in this respect,
even in his day, and that they had much to learn in compa-
rison to the Romans, where in every legion the men were
taught the use of trenching tools as well as of their weapons
before they were considered to be available soldiers; and
Napoleon, I think, said that, with an army of that sort, a
good general would fight as much with the spade as with the
musket. How deeply has the,want of this kind of instruc-
tion been felt in our army, and how much is its inferiority in
some respects to the French army to be attributed to a defi-
ciency of knowledge of this part of the business of a soldier ?
Why have they not known it? Simply because no attempt
has ever been made to teach them. There has never been
anything like a systematic attempt to teach your °Mem% and
men that most necessary and most important part of their
duty as soldiers. Would there have been any difficulty in
teaching them ? Far from it. There is no reason why every
soldier in the British army should not be as well instructed as
the Sappers and Miners. I answer for it that, in a long peace,
with proper arrangements, there would not be the slightest
difficulty in devising means by which every single soldier in
the British army, before ho took his place in the ranks,
should have gone through a perfect system of instruc-
tion of this kind. Look at the indirect advantages
which would have arisen from it. In the first place,
we know now that the soldier, if he gets tired of a military
life and buys his discharge, has often great difficulty in main-
taining himself, owing to his understanding no useful de-
scription of labour. The Sappers and Miners, on the con-
trary, are so useful in civil life that it is actually difficult for
the Government to keep them—there are such constant at-
tempts to bribe them out of the service by persons who know
how valuable they would be in any employment to which they
might bo turned. That instruction, therefore, costing
nothing, would have led to a vast improvement in the soldier
after his discharge. Nor is that all. There is another indi-
rect advantage which would have arisen of not less import-
ance. I believe that nothing would have so much contri-
buted to improve the British army as to have occupied some
of their spare time by some useful employment of this kind.
My lords, forced idleness and tedium have been the curses of
the army. It is those which have driven your soldiers into
those acts of drinking which have been the opprobrium of our
service—which I am happy to say are now greatly diminished,
although they still continue to a great extent. It- is those
which have driven your young officers into those irregula-
rities, of which some painful exposures have lately
taken place. My lords, I don't blame those young officers.
Young men cannot be expected to submit to what are often
very dry, and apparently uninteresting studies, with no im-
mediate result. If they have not some stimulus to it, and
if they know that it will not have the smallest influence
upon their promotion, how can you expect young men to
devote themselves to studies of that description There
would have been no difficulty in requiring that a competent
knowledge of the scientific as well as of the practical part of
their profession should be a necessary qualification for officers
to obtain promotion. There would have been no difficulty
in making them feel that those who took great pains and
.acquired all this sort of knowledge would advance their
chances of promotion ; but I know that the opinion in the
army has been that such was not the effect of such studies.
I have myself heard the remark made by officers—" Why
should we take the trouble to instruct ourselves and get
the highest place at Sandhurst, when we know that
distinguishing ourselves in that way will not advance us at
all if it does not rather create a prejudice against us I" I
firmly believe that they were wrong in that impression ; but
I cannot deny that I have heard men say, that it would even
create a prejudice against them, and would make them be
regarded rather as what aro called !!*?..°"947 Plan as

rPRICE SD.

practical officers. Now, my lords, look at the advantage of
instruction of this kind, for your staff particularly. In this
present campaign, is it net tho general cry of every man, that
the want of the thorough instruction of your staff officers has
been one of the greatest difficulties which you have had to en-
counter. I think that that is true. In the French army we
know that no officer can serve on the staff until he had passed
a most severe examination as to his knowledge of-every prac-
ticardetail. In our army,' unfortunately, that is not the
case. But there is another circumstance which has increased
the deficiency of your staff officers. It is this—more than
20 years ago a committee of the House of Commons pointed
out that it' was very desirable that the same officers should
not be engaged 'for too long a centinuauce upon the staff, and
they recommended that staff officers should not be employed
for more than five years at a time ; assigning as a reason, not
only that it would be more fair to all the army, but that it
would create a class of educated staff officers who wpuld be
very useful in the time of war. That was the recommenda-
tion 'of a committee of the House of Commeus 20 years ago.
How has it been treated? It 'has remained ,from that day
to this a dead letter, and the recommendation has only lately
been repeated by that commission to which I before referred,
of which I had the honour to be a member last spring. I
might point out other instances; I might refer to the want
of improvement in the clothing, in the arms, in the artillery
—to delays in adopting the latest scientific discoveries for
adding to the powers of these arms. But I abstain from
doing so. I think I have said enough to show your lord-
ships that, during a very long peace, our army was not
managed in such a manner as to fit it for the emergency of
war. I know it has been said, and upon high authority,
that this state of things has been produced by the niggardli-
ness of Parliamont—(cheers)—that it is because we have not
kept up our establishments upon a sufficiently large scale
that these evils have arisen ; and I perceive, from the cheers
which have followed my mention of this, that some noble
lords are of that opinion. For my own part, I utterly deny
the correctness of such a statement. (Hear, hear.) In the
first place, the improvements I have pointed out would not
have cost one single farthing—l mean to say, that every one
of those improvements to which I have alluded might have
, been introduced with the most perfect facility- without one
!. single shilling of expense. But more than that—l deny that
the House of Commons has shown that niggardliness which
has been imputed to it. (Hear.) For 19 years I had the
honour of being a member of that house, and I do not believe
that in the course of those 19 years I was ever absent when
military estimates were discussed. During four of those
' years it was my duty to submit them to the House of Com-
mons, and I will assert that in that time I never yet saw a
single instance in which the House of Commons refused a
vote of money which was necessary for the real efficiency of
the service. (Hear, hear.) lamby no means sure that I
could say the reverse with equal confidence—that they had
never made giants with injudicious liberality. Well, I say,
then, there has not been this niggardliness which is so often
dwelt upon. Ido not, indeed, pretend to say that you have
kept up establishments during peace sufficient to enable you,
without large augmentations and without some time spent in
Preparation, to enter upon-an offensive war. Certainly not ;
and I hope and trust that this country never will consent to
keep up its peace establishments upon any such scale. (Hear.)
To do so would be to commit the greatest blunder which
could be imagined ; because, independently of the expense,
of the great drain upon the resources of the country, and of
preventing the real increase of power which the accumulation
of wealth in a kingdom creates,—independently of all this,
independently also of the great evils arising from the
jealousy which would be excited by such armaments in
foreign countries—the just and natural jealousy which
would exist in those countries upon finding that our arma-
ments were kept up on a scale sufficient at any time for offen-
sive preparations, which would drive them into a similar
course, and would leave both parties pretty much where they
were before—independently, I say, of all this, I assert that,
if you do keep up these establishments upon such a scale,
you will be in a worse situation at the b ginning of a war than
you actually are now —you would be in a worse position for
this reason. You would have your army still more full than
it is of officers advanced in age and without experience in
war ; and you would have your arsenals and harbours filled
with arms, ships, and stores of obsolete pattern, and not em-
bodying all the improvements which modern science had sug-
gested. I firmly believe already that it would have been
better for us if, on the breaking out of this war, we had been
thrown to a greater extent upon the resources which we could
create at the time, and if we had trusted less to those relics
of a former war which were then in existence. I say, there-
fore, that over economy does not account for these evils. They
arise from a very different source. Let me remind you how
very large have been the grants which Parliament has made
for the support of our military and naval establishments
during peace. By a return which was laid upon the table of
the house last session, it appears that the total money spent
upon our army, ordnance, and navy during the 17 years end-
ing in 1853 was no less than 217,000,0001. 15,500,0001. an-
nually have been applied to this object, and will any man
tell me that so vast a suns as 15,500,000/. a-year, if judiciously
applied, is sot ample to keep up an armament quite sufficient
for all peace purposes, and sufficient as a nucleus for more
extended preparations when war takes place ? (Hoar.) When
war breaks out you never want to commence offensive opera-
rations immediately ; there is always some time for prepara-
tion. For instance, in the present war, it was not until six
months after the declaration of war that the expedition sailed
to the Ciiniea, which we must call the beginning of offensive
operations. Your expedition sailed, I believe, from Yarna
in September, sshile war was declared in IParch. Even be-
fore these six months expired there was still more time for
preparation. [Lord lIARDINGE suggested, that our troops bad
been sent to Gallipoli some time before the end of the six
months.] Yes, but Gallipoli was not an offensive operation. I
...Y. that emeeive operations did not commence until six
months after the declaration of war, and UttiAl nearly twelve-
- months after war must have appeared so probable that vrepa-
rations might have boon commenced. That time, if well used,
and if your establishments had been previously upon a proper
footing, was ample for you to have made every effort which
could reasonably be expected from this country. I repeat,
thou, it is not to over economy that wo must attribute the ex-
isting evil, which has quite a different origin. The fault 'is
that to which I have already adverted—the division of au-
thority and responsibility. There i I a very homely saying that
" too many cooks spoil the broth ;" and you have had too-
many cooks. (Hear.) What you want is something like the
administration at the Admiralty. The Admiralty does per-
form every function with regard to the navy which one would
expect to devolve upon it. It builds the ships ; it appoints
the officers ; it gives ill the requisite directions with regard
to manning, discipline, and provisions ; and everything is
complete within itself. What is the consequence I No doubt
there have been some errors of judgment committed, even by
the Admiralty, during the present war. It would not be diffi-
cult to point out some of those errors ; but still, upon the
whole, the Admiralty has furnished to the country a most
splendid fleet, and the efficiency of that fleet has not been
impaired by such mistakes as have occurred with regard
to the army, for you have had a fleet not only splendid
in itself, but exceedingly useful. My lords, I say.
therefore, that if you wish to apply a remedy to this state
of things, you must consolidate the many independent de-
partments which have now concurrent power and authority
with respect to the administration of the army. Unless
you do that, you will effect no real good, and I must say that
that consolidation cannot, in my opinion, be effected by the
mere appointment of a Secretary for War. The Secretary
of War has to direct not only tho army, but the navy. He
is supposed to be the organ of the Government for directing
all your warlike operations. Now, it seems to me to be quite
inconsistent with this function that he should have under his
charge all the details connected with the management of the
army. Complaints would probably arise from the navy that
they were put under the authority of a department which had
authority over the army, and in this way jealousy might arise
between the two services, as well as'a conflict of authority
between Secretaries of State. What is really wanted is, as I
have stated before, the consolidation of the offices of the Se-
cretary for War, the Commander-in-Chief, the Board of Ord-
nance, and the Commissariat. You ought, in my opinion, to
have one single and well-constituted department, which should
do for the army that which is done for the navy—that is
provide an efficient instrument to execute the orders of the
Government, whatever those orders may be. If you do this,
I cannot believe that a fourth Secretary would be necessary ;
for I concur with the noble earl who spoke upon this subject
some time agt, that the real direction of the war ought to
rest with the Prime Minister. - There is no other authority in
the Government who can direct every measure of every sub-
ordinate department for the conduct of the war in the same
manner as the Prime Minister, because when the country is
engaged in war it naturally absorbs everything else. The
business of the Treasury, of the Foreign-office, of the army
department, and of the navy, are of equal importance in for-
warding the one common object, and, except the Prime Mi-
nister, I know no one who can direct all those departments
efficiently. But I know it is said that such a consolidation
would be objectionable, because it would place the command
of the army and the patronage of the army too immediately
in the hands of the Government of the day. (Cheers.) My
lords, I know how much stress has been laid by many per-
sons upon this objection, but I am prepared to meet it.
With regard to the prerogative of the Crown, which has been
sometimes dwelt on; I will not repeat the arguments I ad-
dressed to your lordships upon a former occasion with re-
gard to this point, because, if I am not mistaken, the noble
duke (of Newcastle) gave up every ground of objection of
that kind to the change I proposed, and. said, the prerogative
of the Crown was not affected by the question one way or the
other—that all executive duties belong equally to the Crown,
but that they are all equally exercised by means of responsi-
ble advisers, and subject to the criticism of Parliament. When
you say there is an objection to putting the command of our
army too directly under the Goverment of the day, let me
remind you that the existence of a Commander-in-Chief, such
as he is now known, is a very modern introduction. • Until
after the revolutionary war, I believe you can find no in-
stance of a Commander-in-Chief during peace. You never
had such an office during peace, and even during war the
Commander-in-Chief was generally what his name implies,
the commander of a certain portion of the army directly under
his orders, and of which he acted as general. The pleasure of
the Sovereign upon any point was then taken by the Secre-
tary of State or the Secretary of War, and not by the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief recommended,
but it was a member of the civil Government who took the
pleasure of the Sovereign. It was not until 1812 that the
Commander-in-Chief's office was placed upon the footing of a
public department ; until then he was only an officer com-
manding a certain portion of the army. At the same time, I
am ready to allow that, although actually this change took
place not before 1812, yet substantially it took place at a
considerably earlier period, and probably for 50 or 60 years
the department has been what it now is. But, further than
this, I hold that, according to the duties now performed by a
Commander-in-Chief, his title is a misnomer. He is not Com-
mander-in-Chief. To my notion, the name implies an officer
who is in military command of troops, who is constantly at
their head and acting as their general. Now I need not
tell your lordships that the Commander-in-Chief in this
country is never seen at the head of troops—unless,
indeed, it be at a birthday parade or a review in Hyde
Park. Except at some state pageant of that kind, I say,
the Commander-in-Chief never appears in command of
troops, and his duties might be perfectly well per-
formed without his ever putting a red coat on his back. Ho
sits in his office at the Horse Guards, and upon him there de-
volves the duty of organising and superintending the British
army all over the world. It is a duty which, in every other
country, is performed, not by a general commanding, but by
a Minister ofaWar. In this country the Commander-in-Chief
is a Minister of War shorn of a great part of his proper power
and authority. He is Minister of War, with very little power
over the artillery, with no authority in matters of expense,
and with scarcely any as regards the provisioning, clothing,
and arming of the troops. He is Minister of War deprhilv the
te f
all the essential parts of his functions. 1 say,
then, t ,
Obvious remedy for the evil is to get rid of this department,

Appoint a general to command the troops in England, and
under the direction of the Minister, to undertake the impor-
tant duty of watching over the discipline and the training o'
the troops at home and of preparing them for service abroad
when they were called upon. Let him be an officer who will
train the troops in arms—not a Minister of War with a pen in
his hands at the Horse Guards ; and as to duties of a different
description, which now belong to the Commander-in-Chief, _
give them to a Minister of War—no matter what you call him
—transfer to him the duties belonging properly to a Minister
of War, and which now ale performed by the Commander-in-
Chief. Among those duties I do not hesitate to say youmnst
include the patronage of the army. I know how strong is the
prejudice which exists upon this subject ; I know how many
persons believe that you cannot, without danger, place the
patronage of the army under the control of a member of the
civil Government. But let me just point out how the present
system works. Can any Minister be justly made responsible
for the conduct of a department if he is not allowed to choose
the instruments he employs—if he is not intrusted with the
means of rewarding those who do good and faithful service
I would ask the noble earl the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether he would consent to be responsible for con-
ducting the foreign relations of this country if lie had no voice
in the appointment of any member of the diplomatic body,
froM the Attache up to the highest Minister acting under him
—if he had no means of advaucing those who did well, or of ,
recalling thoSe who did ill? (Hear.) Would he consent to un-
dertake the management of our foreign relations upon these
terms ? I think I cannot be at a loss for his answer. But with
regard to the army, it is more particularly necessary that this
power should be exercised by the person responsible for its
efficicucy. Upon what does that efficiency mainly depend
If there is one thing more than another upon which it depends
it is upon the manner in which the patronage is exercised
(hear)—upon the care taken to advance deserving officers,
awl sternly refuse promoti3n to the incompetent. It is upon
the care and zeal with which this is done that it mat ily
depends whether your army is efficient or the reverse. Let
m service also
yoobistedrso'et tann hi
stt iee v3eiriyn
ios tt
chi? d
of etphaer tcmr
oe nwt of the p
n with
th•bli
patron-
age. I have already referred to the diplomatic service. The
naval service is the same, and throughout the whole of the
civil service the different branches arc subject to the control
of her Majesty's Government. I don't deny that abuses
may be committed in this way. I should be the last to
deny that under every Government, and in every time,
Parliamentary interest and other improper motives have
influenced the appointments and promotions in the public
service. Such abuses, I am afraid, have existed, and while
human nature is what it is I am afraid they will exist. I
know no country, no form of Government in which they
have been avoided, and the greatest and most difficult problem
for the solution of a Government, is to secure the appoint-
ment of the right men to situations in the public service.
Upon the whole, however, admitting the abuses which have
taken place in the administration of patronage, I believe that
placing it under the control of the responsible Minister of '
the Crown is the best security you can obtain for the due
discharge of this most important duty. I know that a com-
parison has sometimes been drawn between the distribution
of patronage in the navy and in the army. (Hear, hear.)
I should be prepared for answer to take issue upon that as a
matter of fact. I deny that for the last 60 years the distribu-
tion of the patronage of the army under the existing system
has, upon the whole, been more pure than that of the navy.
The abuses may have been of a different character. I admit
that they have in some respects been of a different character.
But if you will go into detail and scrutinise appointments, I
will undertake to show you that the public service has suf-,:
fared more in the army than it has in the navy during the last
60 years from injudicious appointments, made from improper
motives. My lords, I cannot help stating that, even now,
at this moment, in the Crimea, judging by results, I cannot
believe that the patronage of the army has been exercised
with so much greater judgment and discretion than that of
the navy. (Hear, hear.) This I know—and I see a noble
lord here present who can confirm the truth of what I am ,
saying—that I know that there is in the army at this mo-
moment groat dissatisfaction at the recent promotions for ser-
vices—(cheers)—and I am told that it is the opinion of the
army—whether correctly or aot I have not the means of
judging—that men who were not really under fire—(hear)--
at Inkerman, or Alma, or at Balaklava, and who have never
undergone all the perils and the hardships of the trended-- '
that men of this kind have received the promotion which has
been denied to most meritorious regimental officers. (Hear.)
I know not whether that allegation be true, but I thiak it is
a pregnant example of the inconvenience of the existing sys-
tem that such an allegation and such complaints can be
made, and that no man in this house can distinctly say,
if the mistake has been made, who is responsible for it. Is
it the Secretary of State for War, or is it the Commander-
in-Chief ? I think it would be one of the great adean- '
tages of the change I propose that in these matters any
future responsibility would be brought distinctly home to
one individual, and thus this great power of promotion,
upon the judicious use of which the whole efficiency of an
army depends, would be exercised under that check and
under that feeling of responsibility which would then be
created. (Hear, hear.) When touching upon promotion, I
cannot avoid mentioning one other subject. Look at the
medical staff and at the medical service. I believe there has
been no branch of the service which has been so completely
withdrawn from the control of the civil Government of the
country as the army medical service ; and, I ask, do the pre-
sent state of that service, and the manner in which the duties
have been performed, justify you in believing that that pa-
tronage has been so much more judiciously exercised than
patronage in other branches of the service? I say, then,
that you have failed in preventing those evils against which
the measure was directed, by withdrawing the patronage of
y oßut
haveiet
usesaczy. fromavoiding the regulara
scso notfr tevils, he
tatcorthtreyrs.
encountered. Iu the first place, the management of the
army, the general responsibility for its efficiency, have neces-
sarily been thrown with the patronage, and the Commander-
in-Chief therefore has this power over the army. But you
have given Me him, as I have already shown, with a crippled
and divided authority, an authority powerful for destroying but
powerlessinaction--strong to prevent the civil servants of the
Crown from acting upon their own views in the management
of the army, but weak in enabling them to act on their own.
I have now touched upon the weakness and uncertainty of
action which have distinguished our military arrangements,
but, my lords, surely every one will agree with me that even
in times of peace the management of the army ought to be
one of the most important of the functions discharged by the
executive Government of the country ; and in time of war
...q.nagement of the army and navy are clearly the two
most importaiit of the duties attached to the Government.
If this be true, and no one will, I think, deny that it is so, IS
it either more or less than a palpable absurdity to say that,
while we have a Government responsible to the country and
to Parliament for the general line of policy which they may
say that ao t n
adopt, the whole control over the army shall be given to
military authorities, who shall enjoy a quasi independence in
carryingt
this
moment t branch,i,e.
to y then arepu b
if
BringserviceLm M
the lords,l
effects
which have been produced by that kind of independence
given to the military authorities, and I make that statement
without hesitation, because I have pointed out tho errors
which have prevented the War Department from adequately
answering the expectations of the country. I have pointed
out the errors of administration which have rendered that
department less equal than it ought to be to discharge the
duties attached to it ; but I assert that those errors have
arisen from the want of sufficient power on the part of the
civil Government to introduce occasionally those improve-
ments which have been known to be necessary. I believe
that most of the Governments which have existed in this
country for many years have been aware of the great,
the paramount importance of introducing various im-
provements into our system of military administration. I
can assert that such has been the case with all those Govern-
ments with which I have had the honour of being con-
nected, and I believe it to have been the case with most
other Governments which have of late years conducted the
affairs of this country. It is now nearly 20 years ago since
I had the honour of accepting the office of Secretary at War,
and I can confidently state that I had discharged the duties
of that office for a very short period before I perceived a
necessity for the introduction of many great improvements,
but under the complicated system of the present administra-
tion so slow and weary was the work of effecting the changes
which I perceived to be necessary that, although I applied
my best energies to the task, and although I hope I was not
altogether unsuccessful in introducing some improvements,
still I retired from that office with a painful' consciousness
that what had been done was a small part indeed of what re-
mained to do. I believe that other Secretaries at War have
experienced the same feelings ; because I have perceived that
gentlemen who have successively held,that office have endea-
voured to follow out a career of improvement, and that yet all
that has been done falls far short of what is necessary. I am.
persuaded that there never will nor can be any effectual cor-
rection of the evils which I have pointed out until you place
the management of the army, as all other branches of the
Public service are placed, under the direct and immediate
control of some one office presided over by one of the respon-
sible advisers of the Crown. It is a great advantage of our
constitutional system that, in carrying on the public service
of the country, you secure the advantage of great experience
in the management of public affairs, and at the same time you
check a too great adherence to routine. You secure the ad-
vantage of experience, because there exists a vast body of
able and experienced men ; and those who hold office do so,
it may be said, upon good behaviour, and at the same time
you correct the tendency to routine which among such a body
of, men would be sure to arise by placing every branch of
the Government under some ono Minister of the Crown,
who is responsible to Parliament and to the country for the
manner in which the duties of his department are per-
formed. Practically speaking, Ministers retain office for a
few years only, and by that means fresh minds are intro-
duced into the various departments of the State, and thus
there is great facility for the introduction of improvements
when they may be necessary. This is our system in the ad-
ministration of all branches of the public service, with the
exception of the army, and what is the consequence ! The
army has been under purely professional management, and
the administration of it has for a series of years been in.
trusted to officers who have risen to high rank in their pro.
fession, and who are, therefore, generally men advanced in
life, and on whom it is passing no reflection tosay —what, in-
deed, may be said of all other professional men—that they
are indisposed to consent to any alteration in that system
under which they themselves have risen to distinction, and
which was in existence at the time when they entered the ser-
vice. But you place the administration of the army not only
under professional men and professional management, but
you add to that arrangement the difficulty that the chiefs
of the profession have not their hands free to adopt
any measure which they may think necessary, but they
are checked at every turn by requiring the concurrence
of other departments; and, from the manner 'in which
the different offices are constituted, • -they have to
contend against the natural jealousy of the -civil departments.
You see now, my lords, in the events in the Crimea the re-
sults of such a system. It is to mistakes committed before
the war began that it is to be attributed that the army is
not in that state of efficiency and usefulness in which it ought
to be. But let me not be misunderstood when I say that the
army has not shown itself as efficient as it ought to be. I do
not mean to deny its valour or its many great excellences,
for I am as sensible of them as any of your lordships. No
man admires more than I do the heroic valour they have dis-
played iu battle, and the still more heroic fortitude they have
displayed under privations almost incredible. (Cheers.) No
man, I say, admires these excellences more than I do, but the
more I admire them so much the more do I desire
of to
m time
stem e.
administration of the army placed under a av
ment which will relieve it from those fmilts which I have
which,
long
consequences in
foreseen would lead to those unhapPY
unfortunately, I have seldom found any officer of high
rank prepared to believe. (hear, hear.) My lords, I
say that I admire the valour and fortitude displayed by our
army, nor do I doubt that their efforts, in spite of those faults
to which I have adverted, might have been attended with
success, had they been seconded by better arrangements. The
errors which have been made are precisely in kind. what I an-
ticipated when, in the debate on the Address last year, I ven-
tured to
predict to your lordships that, unless some great
changes were made, we should not be many monalis'engaired
in a great war without meeting with calamitous results. I
made those observations a year ago, and, although I felt in
doing so that I was guided by reason, still I little believed that
the prediction would be so soon and so fearftdly fulfilled. Er-
rors of the kind whichlfave been committed I did expect; but
I must admit that in degree those which have been committed
exceed anything that I could havebelieved possible. I think
that what has occurred must form the subject of a strict in.
quirY. There must have neon oomo great faultfi committed

eemewhere ; and these faults should hereafter be inquiretd inotuol
but the inquiry should not be made at a time when w
have the effect of paralysing the exertions nowhibcheinogamghatd
teo,
nor while it would interfere with the efforts w
be made without the delay of even 24 hoursr
army
-e
be avoided, to improve the ofconditionnnAtthyanloredasn,
I think that there is uo man who will
hunoootaretaoirguarhawnigteh
imnethine
thinking that the necessity for some
administration of the army i o ratltheaamPdoswt
itphroeasstindgeladeys7tihpe-
tion, and, if not effected instantly
consequences may be suchh. itynsrshuydder to contemplate. My
ow induces me to ask your
lords, it it is this feeling
ships, as the first stepwtoltWards effecting the improvements
to express your opinion of the necessity
which are necessary,
of a change being made in the constitution of the military de-
partment (Cheers. )The noble earl concluded by moving—
That it is the opinion of this house that great evils have
arisen from the present division of authority and responsi-
bility in the administration of the army, and that the whole
of the business connected with this important branch of the
public service, which is now distributed among different
offices, ought, therefore, to be brought under the direct con-
trol of a single and well-organised department."
ThODuke of NEWCASTLE—My lords, as Ido not intend
to oppose the motion of my noble friend—and there is a great
deal in what he has said in which I entirely concur—it is not
necessary for me to trespass upon your attention at any
length, for I feel bound to reserve myself on two points, be-
lieving that this is not the proper occasion to touch upon
either of them. My noble and learned friend (Lord Lynd-
hurst) has given notice of his intention to call your lordships'
attention to the conduct orthe war, and to move a resolution
condemnatory of the Government upon it, and it will be de-
eirable that I should reserve for that occasion my vindication
of their course. There is another point, my lords, which I
postpone with great regret—it is that which relates to my
own personal position and conduct. Under any other cir-
cumstances I should gladly have postponed anything relating
to myself, but the circumstances which have occurred so re-
cently as Friday last, in another place, would render me most
anxious to address your lordships on the topics connected
with ray own position and conduct, were I not prevented by
two considerations—one of which at this moment I do not
think it necessary to explain, and the other is this, that on
a motion of such importance as the present, of such para-
mount importance to the welfare of the army and the
country, I should be most reluctant to mix up any matters
relating to myself. But if on this occasion I avoid touch-
ing on these topics, I trust I may be permitted to say
that at your lordships' very next meeting I shall venture
hto
address to you some observations upon them. T no e
duke then proceeded to advert to the speech of the noble
earl (Grey), who, he said, had misunderstood what he had
stated last year on this subject. He had never maintained
that existing arrangements were entirely satisfactory, but
he had expressed an opinion that the noble earl carried his
views to an extreme length, and that it would be perilous
at any period to effect sudden and sweeping changes in the
administration of the army, more especially at a period like
the preeent, The noble earl had failed to prove the connec-
tion between disasters in the Crimea and the depart-
mental system of our military administration ; and the
instances he had mentioned were not to be ascribed to
that system, and might have equally occurred under any
other. For example. In the matter of Mr. Nasmyth's proposi-
tion as to the guns, the delay had arisen through a misunder-
standing between the Admiralty and the Ordnance ; and
as to Price's candles, they had been submitted to a medical
board, whose report bad been delayed through the illness of
its head. Then, as to the loss of the Prince, the mo-
ment he had heard of it by telegraph, he had or-
dered the supplies contained in it to be replaced. He
wanted to prove, not that neglect and delay had not
taken place, but that, under the existing system, it was
possible to make the service work, and he hoped occasion-
ally to make it work well. He admitted, with his noble
friend, that great alterations were necessary. He had
found by experience—he thought he was not even in antici-
pation taking a different tone from that he held last year
that in the Ordnance Department great alterations were
required, for the system certainly did not work well.
What alterations should be introduced his noble friend
avoided referring to, and he (the Duke df Newcastle) would
follow his example. He believed in that and other depart-.
ments great alterations might be effected. Again, in the
medical department a very faulty system prevailed. He be-
lieved attempts might be made in times of peace, but it was
impossible in time of war to maintain a medical system exclu-
sively for the army. He thought it had broken down. He
was ready to do all justice to the eminent men serving in that
capacity in the army ; but he believed, in the present state
of the army, and in the present state of the hospitals, it was
absolutely necessary, in spite of all opposition, and in spite
of all personal feeling, to try and introduce the civil system
into the army. He believed the organisation of the medical
board was also defective, and there he agreed with his noble
friend that alterations should be introduced. But when his
noble friend spoke of a system of consolidation being abso-
lately necessary, he did not think he had quite explained
what he meant by consolidation. If he meant that the duties
performed now by the Ordnance Board, commissariat, com-
mander-in-chief, and all the other departments which were at
present separate, should bo included under one roof and
superintended by one head, he believed it would bo absolutely
impossible to carry that into effect. He had already found
that, under the existing system, during the short time that
the Secretary of State for War had been separated from the
control of the colonies, that he had been overburdened and
crushed by details to au extent that had left him too little
time to devote to greater and more important matters. If his
noble friend pursued consolidation in that sense to a greater ex-
tent, he was confident that, instead of greater efficiency, lie
would render the office still more inefficient ; but if he merely
wished to produce greater unanimity of action and better
supervision and control over the different branches of the ser-
vice, then he agreed with his noble friend, and he believed
it might be extended further, although he hoped the first
step had been already taken. He begged to assure him, that
so far from its being possible in time of war to carry consoli-
dation further, it was found that it had been carried too far
already, and in two important branches he had found it neces-
sary to effect a separation. His noble friend had pointed to
the advantages gained by the consolidation of the Admiralty.
He agreed with him, so far as regarded a time of peace. He
believed that the measure of his right hon. friend at the head
of the Admiralty had rightly consolidated the navy transport
with the Board of Admiralty in 1832, and up to the breaking
out of the war that consolidation had worked harmoniously
and well. But if he were to point out that which had more
eminently failed and broken down as a system, notwithstand-
ing the eminent abilities of Captain Mills, he should point to
the transport system as having failed more than any other
during the time they had been at war. And, although his
right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had
introduced the system, and who was naturally proud of what
he had done, admitted that it worked successfully in time of
peace, so satisfied was he that the system wasinefficient during
the time of war, that he had le imself proposed to the Government
that it should be departed from so longsts the war lasted, and that
the transport board should be again established. There was
another point upon which he had himself found, that, so far
from consolidation, separation was absolutely necesary,
particularly while an army was in the field. He found that
the commissariat hadbcen overworked, that step by step more
had been placed on it than it was able to bear. The result had
been that the army was deficient in the means of transport ;
and he believed if they continued their present system, and
left to the commissariat the means of transport for the army,
they would never have it effective. So satisfied was he of this
that ho had transferred from the commissariat the land
transport of provisions, and had appointed an eminent mili-
tary man to superintend it ; and although there was not yet
time to ascertain the result, he felt very confident that it
would be the means of placing the army in the field on a better
and more satisfactory footing when the new system came
into operation. He was aware that the mere they multi-
plied the heads of departments at home, or in the field, the
more they would increase jealousies and misunderstanding;
but he hoped to and mutual co-operation and assistance.
This land transport system, which he preferred to call it,
rather than the " waggon transport," had beet left in the
nands of the commissariat, from the advantages that depart-
ment was supposed to have, inasmuch as feeding the army,
that first and most vital point, its supply could not be
effected unless it had the means of transport at its com-
mand. He believed that was an entire fallacy, and that it
was far better the transport corps should be separated from
the commissariat, of course subject to the control of the
Commander-in-Chief ; and the commissariat would then re-
main with enough to do in providing food, fuel, and forage
for the army. Having explained the views he took of con-
solidation, he came now to the observations that had been
made with reference to the state of the officers and men, as
regarded a want of instruction, from which serious evils had
arisen. Ile attributed a great deal of what the army was at
present suffering to a want of that education which ever
since the last war they had not the opportunity of obtaining.
lie did not speak of the instruction of the officers, but of
the men, and co-operating as they now had been for some
months with the French army, these errors and defects
were still more perceptible, because while the French sol-
diers —more particularly those who had had the advantage
of an African campaign—were willing and able to help them-
selves in any place, and under any circumstances, their
soldiers were unable to do so ; not because they were less
intelligent or active, but because they lacked those means
of instruction which their Allies had possessed for many
years past. He hoped the want of instruction in the use of
arms had been to a great extent rectified, if not removed;
but as to the more important matters connected with the
camp, whatever information they possessed had been picked
np by bitter experience during the present campaign. When
his noble friend referred to the want of instruction in arms
he might have added also, that at the breaking out of the
war they laboured under the serious deficiency of a want
He f
of these arms themselves.erred, not merely to im-
proved arms, but to all descriptions, and he rejoiced to say
that these were being now rapidly replenished,He might point
out that that was one of the errors committed during the long
Peace. He did not mean that they should have a great collec-
tion of arms which might be superseded by improvements, but
he contended that the armeries of the kingdom should never
lukrebeen allowed to be reduced to the condition theywere •
at the breaking out of the war. He was speaking, in
Mititoo, but of carbines and swords also ; and he wontelltob-
sseh"eues', lumber, that they had no efficient means of providing
that they le rockets, or armaments. So deficient were they,
indebted to private individuals, ou the spur of
the moment, to
when he looked imelVathese wants. He frankly confessed that
:their condition, he locked back with
horror at the alesenee
blamed nobody in Pertitetrprovision eithat description. He
must take its share ; but he t;, every succeeding Government
rusted, if it pleased Heaven that
they should arrive shortly at
a
they would take would lee to placefaffi teieh'ethrearst oneneaolfst,hneofitriotnlsytepats
home, but abroad, in a state
a efficiency
takecT—net overcrowding
them with arms, but enabling them
the disadvantage they laboured under on
t:be field withoute present oeca-
siou. When his noble friend said that during
the last 30
or 40 years great delays had taken place
scientific improvements, then he entirely agreed with him,
but he hoped he had been instrumental in correcting thet,
evil. He had turned hie attention to the organisation of
the scientific committee, whose investigation had been on
the whole unsatisfactory, notwithstanding the zeal and
good intentions of the officers composing it. He had entirely
re-organised it, and he trusted it would be found more efficient
at the present moment, when so many persons were turning
their attention to scientific discoveries. His noble friend had
said that he found it slow and dreary work to introduce im-
provements when he was Secretary at War ; he did not hesi-
tat° t° say that his experience corroborated that of his noble
friend. If in times of greater leasure it had been slow, it was
not surprising that during the last nine or ten months the
machinery which eve Government for the last 25 years had
found fault with had not worked satisfactorily. His noble
friend had said that wNa,vselai
Secretaries of State. mistake to have appointed.. four
with regard to . the appointment
of boards there were some advantages te be derived from them,
and that was to a great extent the way in which he had been
endeavouring to conduct his department. He had been prac-
tically meeting the Commander_iiTa
War, and the head of the Board of Ordnance.Commander-in-Chief, the Secretes), at
ina They had ar-
ranged their minutes, letters, and r
confessed heuctions, forming a
loard, as it were, practically ; but hefrankly
was not so much enamoured of the working board as his
extent :nt with iudi-
noblatrtend. It did away to considerable
responsibility among
depended on the
Larintdusa reenotim
_nsoibility. It divided the
~,lluriool,er its satisfactory working
itael+corrtuturinae individuals composingit. If the head or chief
UM and self-will, they might work harmo-

nionsly, but if not, each would pursue his own opinions, and I
try to carry out his own views. A board would only work 1
well, where there was a prominent supremacy in the head.
With regard to another point, following the example of the
French, who, in 1820, believed that the English military
system was superior, not having then had the immense
advantage of twenty-five years campaigning for one-fourth
of their army in Africa, he (the Duke of Newcastle) had
appointed a commission of three officers to investigate in
Paris the whole Fr rich military system, with the view to
their making a reOrt and suggesting such improvements
as might satisfactorily be introduced into their system ;
and concurrently with that, Lord Raglan had appointed a
commission of officers in the Crimea, with the view of
ascertaining the practical working of the same system, and
acting, of course, under instructidns sent out by himself.
From these investigations he hoped tp derive great advan-
tages. They would obtain the theory of the French system
in Paris, while, from the officers in the Crimea, they would
have the practice as exemplified in the field. There was an-
other department in which the French were extremely effi-
cient, and which was represented by " L'Ecolo de la guerre."
They had been obliged to go over the town in order to secure
maps of an authentic character upon the breaking out of the
war. The defect was an obvious one in the British army, and
he had taken the first steps to establish such an institution in
London. He had had communications with foreign Govern-
ments and with Lord Dalhousie in India, in order to obtain a
collection of maps with this important object. His noble
friend had omitted any reference to the financial system of the
army, but it appeared to him that it might be advisable to
transfer the auditing of these accounts to the Audit Office.
It was not his intention to oppose the motion of his noble
friend. If it was thought desirable to place this abstract re-
solution on the books of the house, he, on the part of the
Government, was not disposed to dissent from it. At the
same time, he frankly admitted that there were inconveni-
ences in placing an abstract resolution on the books, and he
would submit to his noble friend whether he would think it
worth while, after the declarations ho had made, to press it,
especially as the notice had been altered from that which was
originally given. He agreed with his noble friend that mate-
rial alterations were essentially necessary, and, whatever Go-
vernment was to carry them out, he hoped they would be
able to do so as circumstances permitted them, and without
doing mischief instead of good. Under these circumstances
he hoped that the noble earl would not press his motion.
- -

Lord HARDINGE said, that being supposed to be divested
of all political feeling by reason of the office which he had the
honour to hold, he should not offer any opposition to tho mo-
tion of the noble lord. However, ho should beg to set the
noble earl right in reference to the statement attributed
to him (Lord Hardinge), to the effect that, a few years since,
certain battalions of the Guards knew nothing of ball prac-
tice, in consequence of never having been supplied with
ball cartridge. He believed he might state that within
the last two years, not only had the Miuie rifle been in-
troduced, but the practice with that arm had been car-
ried on with very great effect. Indeed, ho might say
that no recruit had gone out to the Crimea since last
spring who was not well practised with that arm—(hear,
hear.) Since he (Lord Hardinge) had the honour to occupy
the position of Commander-in-Chief, a school of musketry
had been established, and he believed the result was
superior to anything that previously existed. At the
battle of Inkerman the rifle was of immense service ; not
only was it effective in thinning the Russian battalions, but
it also kept down the fire of their batteries at very long
range, (Hear, hear.) With regard to the observations of
the noble earl as to the superiority of the French civil depart-
ment of the army over ours, the cause was altogether
owing to their being engaged for the last quarter of a century
in Algeria, where from 80,000 to 100,000 of the French
army were constantly acquiring a knowledge of the art and
business of war. Such had not been the case with our troops.
(Hear, hear.) But he could not agree with the noble earl as
to the inferiority of our military education, inasmuch as the
warmest testimony had been borne to the system at Sand-
hurst by Sir Charles Napier aid other distinguished officers.
He should say of the army in general, that no continental na-
tion had so excellent or perfect a state of military affairs as
that produced by our regimental system in point of drill and
discipline, to say nothing of the spirit and[affection it infused
into the men for each other. That was well known of the
infantry ; and Balaklava gave proof of it in the case of the
cavalry. (Hear, hear) Our artillery officers were promoted
at too advanced a period of life—that he should admit ; but
otherwise no artillery in Europe excelled ours. The corn-
missariat might be more perfect, but the consolidation advo-
cated by the noble earl would not, in his (Lord Hardingo's)
opinion, remedy the evils complained of, and which they all
' sincerely deplored.
Lord CAMPBELL said he rose to give his humble but sin-
cere advice to his noble friend (Earl Grey) not to withdraw
the motion. He believed it expressed the unanimous opinion
of their lordships. Why then should it not be recorded on
the proceedings of the house ? The system, not individuals,
was most to blame
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH concurred with the noble
duke opposite (the Duke of Newcastle) in thinking that this
motion should not be pressed, because, whilst the Govern-
ment was in its present position, it would not be altogether
fair. None of their lordships could tell who might be Mini-
ster of War to-morrow—perhaps it might be the noble earl
(Earl Grey) himself. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) The Go-
vernment was at present in the position of a prisoner at the
bar whilst the jury was out considering its verdict—(a laugh)
—and, perhaps, to-morrow's sun would shine on them no
longer as a body of gentlemen forming the Government of the
country, but as pronounced " guilty," and, consequently,
holding a different position in the Legislature from that
which they now occupied. (Hear, hear.) It was contrary
to his opinion of public policy that this motion should be made
when there was practically no Government to speak upon it.
He (the Earl of Ellenborough) had frankly and frequently
expressed his opinion of the conduct of her Majesty's Govern-
ment since the commencement of this war. He had accused
them of want of knowledge, want of promptitude, and want
of forethought. At the same time he should admit himself
guilty of gross injustice if lie did not admit, on the fullest
consideration, that by far the greatest portion of our calami-
ties originated in /.ho orh-n0,,, end not hare. (cries of ,‘ Ilear,
hear.") /rad we a Wellington or a Sir George Murray in
command the public u6ver would have heard of the slightest
portion of these sufferings. He (the Earl of Ellonborough)
deeply deplored the position of the Minister of War,
answerable as he was for the commissariat department,
under the management of Sir Charles Trevelyan, whose
elaborate paper he (the noble earl) had endeavoured
to understand. (A laugh.) He (the Earl of Ellenborough)
had conducted the war department, the financial department,
and the whole diplomatic concerns of a great empire. No
person ever disobeyed one of his laws—he never had to send
in an estimate, or look at the details of accounts. (A laugh.)
In this country we were a small military power ; in India we
were a great military power, owing to our system, and wars
were carried on well. He placed no faith in this amalgama-
tion system ; and, therefore—but particularly seeing the
position in which Ministers were at present placed—he should
regret if the noble earl (Earl Grey) peristed in moving his
1 resolution.
After a brief pause,
Earl GREY rose to reply, and repeated his censure of the
divided responsibility which at present existed, the result of
which was that the affairs of the army were improperly
managed.
The motion was then withdrawn, and their lordships
adjourned,

HOUSE OF COMMONS-YESTERDAY.

The SPEAKER took the chair shortly before 4 o'clock,