The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-12 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

INCAPACITY OF LORD RAGLAN.
(Prom the Times of this day.)

By this time Lord Raglan has been put in possession
of the opinions prevailing in this country respecting the
conduct of the Crimean expedition, and we have reason
to believe that ho protests with some strenuousness
against the coaelusions which would attach culpability t 4
hinaselfer hisstaff. Toe que,tion itself is one of the gravest
importance on public is i less than private grounds. That
maxim of our institutions that every man is innocent
until he has been proved otherwise is assuredly not with-
out its force when the pee-son concerned is a General in
command of an army, previously enjoying a good profes-
sional reputation, and as yet unheard in his own defence.
In such a ems we are even more than usually bound by
the laws c,f justice to the observance of.moderaqon and
forbearance, but we must needs express our opinion that
those laws have not been hitherto transgressed. Lord
Raglan has been charged with "incapacity," and it has
been asked, more or less plainly, that he should be re-
called from his command. In this dernaml is there ail-
thine' unreasonable or unfair h--anything of which hie
lordship or his friends are entitled to complain ! We
think not, and we request the reader to follow us impar-
tially through a few observations.
Lord ..A.berdeen observed, with great candour,
on the occasion of his resignation, that the discon-
tent of the country with the, Government was a
natural consequenee of_ the '4,11-si4ess which had
attended its measures ; am}- argument was
tood- in -di! .case of t4o,Aiiit raesshow Muchh_
more forcible must be its-applicat oil'to the Commander-
in-Chief abroad—to the general actually on the spot in
charge of the army, and with the power of control over
all its operations I Mr. Gladstone reminded the House
of Commons, in an elaborate speech, that even the offi-
cers of the various military departments were reason.
sible to Lord Raglan alone, and that no step could be
properly taken by the Government in the way of dis-
placing or superseding them without his knowledge and
consent. We need not, however, pursue this argument
further, or enter into any explanation of the authority
with which a Commander-in-Chief is invested over all
branches of the army. He is, unquestionably, the per-
son responsible at first sight for the conduct and results
of the war ; he shares most largely in the honours and
profits of success, and it is he from whom account is ftrst
due in the case of disaster. No doubt he may clear
himself from blame, but that a responsibility does attach
to his office proportioned to its authority is what we
think no reasoning man would deny.
More especially is this the case when the misfortunes
of an expedition have been, to all appearance, avoidable,
when they have been traceable much more to our own
weakness than to the enemy's strength, and when the
superiority acquired by the personal intrepidity of our
troops has been lost for want of the talents which should
have turned their valour to amount. If we had been
overmatched in the field, defeated in fair fight, op-
pressed by irresistible rigours of climate, or otherwise
overborne by invincible calamities, there would be little
to be said. No general can be held absolutely or un-
conditionally responsible for success ; and even a van-
quished commander may deserve reward. But when,
as in the Crimea, all that could be reasonably asked of
Fortune has been granted, and more than could
land-
ing,ex-
pecteddbe
soldiers oaldehi ei
er sv
andetn
heroicallyentths,e ann
march
aewrr
cfhoher
when
a wereethd
e failure has been
-
whall so manyet h
obviously confined to the administrative departments of
the army—it is surely nothing bat reasonable that the
triumphant theof battle,
officer to whom the chief administration of the army was
committed should be thought accountable prima facie
for the consequences ensuing. The same rule of pro-
ceeding by which Lord Raglan was honoured with a
Field Marshal's rank brings him also a Field Marshal's
, responsibility • • • • nor will the public, we think, be very
able to comprehend the principle on which Lord John
Russell, after declaring that the army had been brought
to a " horrible and heartrending" condition by means
"inexplicable" even to himself, could stand up a few days
afterwards and stigmatise as " ribaldry" the comments
of a press which • had questioned the capacity of that
army's commander for the situation he filled.
Premising this much on the general question, we can
review the events of the expedition without prejudice or
partiality. In so far as the delays permitted were de-
trimental to the enterprise, the result is probably not
imputable to the decision of the commander on the spot.
We can understand also by what succession of events
the army found itself on the heights between Balaklava
and Sebastopol without the supplies necessary for its
own well-doing or the munitions required for the siege.
Probably the principle adopted was that of sacrificing
every other consideration for the chanee of getting into
Sebastopol as quickly as possible. if this could be p.c-
. _

spots, , .or 'cipmr, titidatfilai;,, 146[4 OW ' ps would lan
their 'etargoeiron the regular keys of the great harbour,
and our troops, if it was deokird to winter in the Cri-
mea, would be comfortably hedged in the town. There
was something, therefore, to be said for the plan of con-
centrating every effort on the construction of batteries
and the accumulation of siege material, even to the ne-
glect of all precautions against the continge. cy of
failure. Possibly, if Lord Raglan had set about making
a road from Balitkava at the end of September, iv.-
stead of getting up his guns and ammunition to the
heights, it might have been said that a more decisive
policy would have saved him all this trouble by putting
him in possession of Sebastopol itself. Up to the
17th of October—indeed, the day on which the can-
nonade fitst opened, the tactics employed admit of ex-
planation, if not of defence, bet that morning should
have terminated all doubt as to the tree state of affair,.
We know, from Lord Raglan's own despatches, that the
prospect of " ulterior rneasures”—theit is to say, of the
assault and capture of the town—began then to appear
indefinitely remote, and that the great feature of the
operations—the advantage of the besieged over the
besiegers in all the conditions required for a successful
siege—was completely established. But why, under
such circumstances, were not tke tactics changed ? Why
when it was clear that we must be dependent for some
i roads,
and
dom to
r
time on the resources of our own position, were not
those resources collected and assured ? There was still
time to open and secure communication with Balaklava,
dptwoorh7pvinrlisioaol it cfulilcret d,teoapol allreinforcements, that
to
late. iiThisget
clothingconstructinstore,
is one of the leading points
fore inquirs y.
Assuming, as we may certainly do, that all, or nearly
all, the consequences which actually ensued was to be
foreseen on the spot after the failure of the 17th of
October, it becomes a point of inquiry how soon
facts and impressed with acainted with these
due sense of the
altered position of the array,
the Ministry at home werez,
Judging from their
proceedings, it appears as if they only adopted,
after the news of the battle of Inkertnan those measures
which should have been executed without the loss of an
hour after the news of the ineffectual cannonade. Up
to a certain period—viz., the 17th of October, the tac-
tics of the campaign were, as we have said, intelligible,
but the situation became immediately altered by the
events of that day, and the chief disasters of the expedi-
tion seem to have arisen from the fact that the course of
proceedings was not altered accordingly. Whether the
result was due to failure of perception, and, if so, whe-
ther the failure was abroad or at home—whether appli-
cations for succour were not made or not heeded—is
more than can be yet certified. On one point—that of
the unroasted coffee—we have already seen it stated that
Lord Raglan bad made strong and early representations,
but without effect, and the same method of exculpation
may, undoubtedly, be open to hire —on other points.
What the public cannot understand is how the only two
arties to whom responsibility can
ultimately attach
of incapacity
should both be blameless together after disasters which
have plainly occurred from incompetence of administra-
tion alone. Government may have left Lord Raglan
with insufficient means of action, or Lord itagian *may
have failed in turning those steatns to account
; but that
BiX miles from
port, have perished by thousands for want of common
necessaries, is more than the country can believe.
bwohtehn aorue
rt
tree bepesx,
eamt thee diet fromn
c e 10l ef
co
nal ryg e

"Hwe.ads.estirheed be.ond all
one thing
LOUD CLARINDOIT. —Lord
.Clarend. on has bad maxi
compliments conferred upon him. during the late discus-
sions. *dons. Everybody entrusted with the formation of a
Government subscribed to the general opinion that hie
ncoenedtifnuutancLeoridn
things to have him for Foreign Minister. He saw,
with his well-known shrewdness,
. that this was no time
to interfere with the negotiations that. have been carried
DtheerhyFodrideigmn-ooriffi.
on so successfully, and that are at this moment
in such
a happy train. Lord Clarendon holds the complicated
threads of those negotiations, spread over Europe, in his
hand. Every one in turn saw how delicately, bow
firmly, they are held in his grasp.. All desired to pre-
serve the continuity of these negotiations. Lord Derby
saw the necessity. But he despaired of Lord Clarendon's
co-operation with himself until he should first secure
Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Her-
bert ; and then, and not till then, did he consider him-
self in a position—a position which he n!vEr reached
to approach Lord Clarendon, with or without, as the
case might be, the influential mediation of Lord Lans-
downe, who bas throughout the whole of these negotia-
tions " won golden opinions from all men."_lllorning
Chronicle.

ANOT/IRR PROFESSIONAL VISIT OP tTENNT LIND TO
ENGLA.ND.—The lovers of music will be gratified to learn
that Jenny Lind has entered into an engagement to re-
visit England, in her professional capacity. Those, how-
ever,ithe r whoop emr
aa. y
house expect
will to b seebe
hc.r againdisappointed,
on the boards of
e
From religi-
UeufsorsecrthPelesundershehas determined
publicwhich could
be clnstrued into givino, her sanction to theatrical or
operatic performances. °She has further resolved that
anycircumstances never
all her future exhibitions before the public shall partake,
more or less, of the character of sacred music ; and,
4ith this view, she bas, we are informed, stipulated that
she shall sing only in Exeter-ball. She is expected here
some time in the month of April. Our readers are aware
that Jenny Lind is now the mothec of two childrea,