The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-29 00:00:00

layed, I will take the opportunity of answering your letter
of the 21st inst., which treceived on the 23d.
You begin by saying that my proposal is mainly founded
on the assun,ption that Herbert ought not to move the Es-
timates next session in the House of Commons. This is a
mistake : my proposal was founded on a combined consi-
deration of the official arrangements for the new depart.
ment, with a view to the general efficiency of the public
service, and the immediate requirements of the great war
in which we are engaged.
It is obvious that the last of these two objects is the
greatest, and that the adjustment of official arrangements
may anti should be made subordinate to the immediate re-
qui at' the war.
In respect to the first head,l am happy to see there is
no irreconcilable difference between us. You agree with
me that the office of Secretary at War, as at, present con-
stituted, cannot be maintained together with a Secretary
of State for the War Department. You also agree with
me, that an Under-Secretary of State could not, with any
propriety, move the estimates.
You only differ with me in the opinion I expressed that
the change ought to he made in the estimates of next year.
I had thought that Herbert might hold the office of pay-
master, such as I held it from 1830 to 1831, and such as
• Macaulay held it from 1816 to 1847, and thus be connected
with the War Department without moving the estimates.
Had you asked my opinion concerning the distribution
of offices, this is the suggestion I should have made.
You, looking upon the present state of things as tempo-
rary, think that Herbert might continue to move the esti-
mates, as Secretary at War, and that he would do so with
the acceptance of the House, in which he is deservedly
popular.

Although I am of opinion that the House of Commons
would expect, after six or seven months of deliberation, a
final arrangement of the War Department, yet the differ-
ence between us is not so great that I could not yield to
your wiQh and the decision of the Cabinet upon this part
of the subject.

I will Only say, therefore, that I see no objection, in
principlJ or in practice, to a rule that the Secretary of
State for the War Department should, like the Chancellor
of the Exchequer and the Secretary at War, be always a
member of the House of Commons.
I come to the second part of the question.
Here you meet me in liinine by saying that the transac-
tion would be considered only as a mode of substituting
one man for another, and that, in justice to the Duke of
Newcastle, you do not think that his colleagues, without
very strong grounds, would wish to place him in such a
position._

Now I had understood that your Administration was
founded on the principle of doing what was best for the
public service, without regard to the self-love, or even the
acquired position of individuals. The Duke of Newcastle
would, I think, be the last man to wish for an exception
to this rule in his favour.
Your next objection is to Lord Palmerston's age, but
when I see the vigour of his mind and body I cannot attach
much weight to this argument.
You say next, that it was your strong impression, from
various conversa ions, that at the time of the separation of
the War Department I greatly preferred the nomination
of the Duke of Newcastle to that of Palmerston. You are
mistaken in this respect. But it is true my opinion gut-
tuated very much, and it was only determined bPthe
Qtrong wish which I understood had been' elprdssed by the
Duke of Newcastle to complete in the War Department
the preparations he had so well begun. I thought it due
to him to presume in favour of his efficiency.
I come, therefore—having cleared the ground of all these
obstructions—to the real question—" What are the require-
ments of the great war in which we are engaged ?"
Setting aside all historical references, both on your part
and mine, I think it is cle .r either that the Prime Minis-
ter must be himself the active and moving spirit of the
whole machine, or the Minister of War must have dele-
gated authority to control other departments.
Neither is the case under the present arrangement. I
will give you an instance but too pregnant with warning.
Early in October I wrote to the Doke of Newcastle on
the subject of transferring the 97th Reziment, then at the
Piraeus, to the Crimea. He informed me, in answer, that
he had wished to do so, and that he had also wished to send
between 00 and 3,000 men, the draughts of various re

giments, to the Crimea.
Now, why was ho not able to carry his intentions into
effect? Becan'e he could not remove the obstacles put in
his way by oth.r departments, and because the Prime Mi
. .

niAter (-li.l -not at once overcome those obstacles.

At a much later time the 97th was moved, and it is only
to-d•iy that I see, by a telegraphic despatch from Lord
Stratford, dated on the 18th inst., that the Orinoco
(which conveys that regiment) had left Constantinople for
the Crimea.

But in the meantime Lord Raglan had reported that be
wished he bad been able to place in the position of Bala-
klava, on the 26th of October, a more considerable force,
and also that on the sth of November the Heights of In-
kerman were def.nded by no more than 8,000 British
infantry. What can be done by a single British regiment
was seen on the 25th of October, when the 93d alone saved
the position of Balaklava by their firmness and gallantry.
Had 5,000 more men been at Lord Raglan's disposal on
the 25th of October and the sth of November, how much
more fruitful, though not more glorious, might have been
those niPmr,rable days.

The CAinet has, it is true, in its recent meetings, (lime
much to to rermir omissions ; but a Cabinet is a cumbrous
Ind unwieldy instrument for carrying on war ; it can fur-
nish suggt•siions or make a decision upon a measure sub-
mitted to it, but it cannot a lminister.
What you want, therefore, I must repeat, is a Minister
of War of vigour and authority. As the welfare of the
empire and the success of our present conflict are concerned,
I have no scruple in sayiug so.
Keep up, if you think right., as a temporary arrangement,
a Secretary at War ; mak- it clear that it is temporary ;
that is to say, only to last till more complete consolidation
can taco place ; hut let PArli,:ment and ,the country be
assured that you have placed the conduct of the war in the
hands of the fittest man who can be fou❑d for that duty.

retnaiu, ruy dear Lord Aberdeen, yours vsry truly,
J. RUSSELL.

(Letter from Lord Aberdeen t) Lorl J. ituus3ll.)

Downing-street, Nov. 30, 1851.
My dear Lord John,—There are two or three points in
your lettar, received yesterday, to which I think it as well
to advert without further delay, in order that before you
see Palmerston th s whole subject may be placed in a con-
•lition to be fully understoo I.
I am glad that it is no lon,zer necessary to enter into anv
COllsi.l4,rat ion at presen ti f H Theft's position. I agree with
you in thinking, that in consequence of the creation of a
Secretory of State for the War Department, the office of
Secretary at War must be modified ; but I am still of
opinion that a Privy Councillor's office may be constituted,
by the occupant of which the estimates should be moved,
and who should control th.- whole expenditure and financial
concerns of the army. R-garding Herbert's present situa-
tion as temporary, I need say nothing further respecting it;
but I must altogether demur to your declaration that you
see no objection, in principle or in practice, to a rule, that
the Secretary of State for the War Department should,
like the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary
at War, be always a member of the House of Commons.
Such an opinion, if adopted, I think would manifestly be
at variance with the public interest. It is probable that
it might very often be desirable to appoint a military man
to the office of Secretary of State for the War Department,
:trid it is equally probable that such a man might be found
in the House of Lords. Officers who by long service and
merit have received the honour of a peerage, might be the
persons of all others whom it would be most important to
select for this office, and it is difficult to conceive why a
seat in the Hou e of Lords should operate as a disqualifi-
cation, _

I think that the office ought to stand upon tho same
footing as that of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who
may be eit' er a peer or a commoner, as the public interest
may require.
You complain that the Duke of Newcastle has not a suf-
ficient control over the departments with which he is in
contact, and that he does not p .ssess a delegated authority
sufficient to enable him to perform his duties satisfactorily.
I do not exactly know what is meant by a delegated
authority, but I apprehend that he possesses all the autho-
rity with which he, or any other person, could properly be
invested.
The instance you adduce of this want of control are
wholly i 'applicable, and fail to establish the fact. You say
that you wrote to the Duke in 0 t,ober, and recommended
him to send the 97th Regiment tothe Crimea, and that he
replied, it was his wish to have done so, as wallas to send
2,003 troops then ready for embarkation. You conclude,
therefore, th he did not do it because he could notretneve
the obstacles put in his wty by other dep srtments, and be-
cause the Prime Minister did not at once overcome those
obstacles. Now, allow me to say, that before a Prime Mi-
nister can remove obstacles, he must be informed of their
existence, and if it was imagined that he possessed any
such power, it might easily have been put to the test by
calling upon him to exercise it.
In this case, however, it is not easy to say what the
Prime Minister or any one else could have done. The Duke
of Newcastle wished to send the 97th Regiment from the
Piraeus to the Crimea, and proposed to Clarendon to do so.
Clarendon protested against it, and said that the tranquil-
lity of Greece depended upon the regiment remaining at
Athens. The Duke, I think, very properly, at the time
acquiesced, and subsequently sent a weak regiment to re-
place the 97th in Greece.
The obstacle to sending the 2,00) men arose from Lord
Raglan himself. When the Duke informed Lord Raglan
that he bad this number of recruits to send him, Lord
dthoneeDinukseu.ch
Raglan replied that those last sent were so young and un
thewe rqeu
away "like flies." He preferred therefore to wait. Ido
formed, that they fell victims to disease,red tiacneil se
ws
question
op
a case ; but I rnu,t submit that in all this there is no evi-
dence know what a Priam Minister couldpahratvoef
to the simple issue of a personal preference, and the enb3ti
Afterof
all,a Iyl woittinntkoyf
oauurth letterty
plainly
thenly
tution of one man for another.
In answer to my suggestion that some consideration we;
due to the Duke on the part of his colleagues, you say that
you understood the administration was founded on the
p•inciple of doing what was the best for the public service,
without regard to the self-love, or even the acquired lmai-
Hon of individuals. Undoubtedly this was the case ; and
I fully :Tree in thinking that the Duke of Newcastle would
be the last man to wish fur any exception to this rule in
his favour.

But I nut observe that at the formation of the Govern-
ment no such office as the War Department was contem-
plated ; and when, subsequently, the
was Colonial-office
divided, no objection whatever was made to the choice of
the War Dmaittneat by the Duke ; nor, as far as I am
aware up to this moment, to his management of the office.
Now, I think you will admit, that although another
spterliu of m
on
°lll might
offil e
tperi perhaps
iLaveis l
a)e evt❑ preferred on the first con-
iveryl y
different thing to dis-
place a man who hasdischarged its duties ably and honour-
?f,obulyn,dmerelygillre efficient. Undoubtedly m ointhe belief tha,tatiother might possibly be
the public service
must be the first object ; but, in the absence of any proved
defect, or alleget incapacity, I can see no sufficient reason
for rsense of j such a custice andhange, which, infaithdeed, I think is forbidden by
ej
a ./ood.
You say that I madedbe an objection to Palmerston's age ;
but this is not quite correct. As my acquaintance with
Palmerston commenced very man
oice as
y years ago, I r
[ouch as any one to see the vigour of his mind and body;
but when I mentioned his age, it had reference to the no-
tion of intrustiug him with the duties now discharged by
• the Duke of Newcastle and by Herbert, It would be a de.