The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-14 00:00:00

i3ONININ, MONDAY EVENING, MAY 14, 1855.

TIM NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA.

path successfully trodden hitherto. Far from having a hos-
tile character Against any one, its effect would lie to accele-
rate and facilitate the negotiations.

The papers relating to the negotiations at Vienna on
the Eastern question have been presented to both
Houses of Parliament. They', consist of 14 papers.

- . .
A discussion arose between the Plenipotentiaries of •Russia
on the one hand, and those of Austria and France on the
other, on the question of ascertaining whether the preliminary
consultation between the four allies would or would not be
repugnant to the principle established, according to Prince
Gortschakoff in the preliminary Conferences, that the Pleni-
potentiaries, after having ascertained the identity of their
views respecting the basis of peace, should retain complete
liberty of interpretation on the subject of the development of
those bases.

No. 1 is the text °Ether' tnemoranduni communicated
by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Great
Britain to Prince Gortschakoff on the 28th of December,
1854. It contains the four points or guarantees :

No. 1.

(Translation.)

•
M. Drouyn de l'Huys having proved, by the treaty of
December: 2, that the allies had contracted a mutual engage-
ment to enter into no arrangement with Russia before a pre-
vious deliberation in common with respect to it, and that
conseqUently nothing was more natural than to find in the
negotiation the allies, as a collective body on the one hand,
and •Russia on the other, Prince Gort-chakoff stated that,
without wishing to dissimulate the fact of the alliance, he
rested his case on the difference which existed between a belli-
gerent poilrer and a power which, though allied to belligerents,
was not herself at war. Ho asserted, that when the treaty
of the 2d of December was-concluded, the object of which.
was to lay down the bases of peace, no .check was placed on
their interpretation ; just as Austria remained free to judge,
in case peace. should not be re-established, which Power
should not have impeded it.
_

MEMORANDI73I COMMUNICATED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF
AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND GREAT BRITAIN TO ' PRINCE GORTS-

CHATEOFF ON THE 98TH OF DECEMBER, 1854.
In order to determine the sense which their Govern-
ments attach to each of the principles contained in the four
articles, and reserving to themselves, moreover, as they have
always done, the power to put forward such special con-
ditions as may appear to them required, beyond the
four guarantees, by the general interests of Europe, to pre-
vent the recurrence of the late complications, the representa-
tives of Austria, France, and Great Britain declare :-•-r
1. That their Governments, concurring in the opinion that
it was necessary to abolish the exclusive protectorate exer-
cised by Russia over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, and
henceforward to place under. the collective • guarantee of the
Five Powers the privileges accorded by the Sultans to the
Principalities, dependencies of their empire, have considered,
and do consider, that none of the stipulations of the ancient
treaties of Russia with the Porte relative to the said pro-
vinces should be revived at the peace, and that the arrange-
ments to be concluded on the subject of them should be ulti-
mately combined so as to give full and entire effect to the
rights of the Suzerain power, to those of the three Principa-
lities, and to the general interests of Europe ; •
2. To give to the freedom of navigation of the Danube all
the development of which it is susceptible, it would be de-
sirable that., the course of. the . Lower Danube, beginning
from the point where it beeomes common to the two river-
' bordering States, should be withdrawn from the territorial
jurisdiction existing in virtue of the third article of the
treaty of Adrianople. In every, case the free -navigation of
the Danube could not be secured if it be not placed under the
control of a syndicate authority, invested with powers neces-
sary to destroy the obstructions existing at the mouths of
that river, or which may hereafter be formed there :
3. The revision of the treaty of July 11, 1841, must have
for its object to connect the existence of the Ottoman empire
more completely with the European equilibrium, and to put
an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. As
to the arrangements to be taken in this respect, they depend
too directly on the events of the war for it to be possible at
present to determine the bases ; it is sufficient to point. out
the principle :
4. Russia, in renouncing the pretensions to take under an
official protectorate the Christian subjects of the Sultan of
the Oriental ritual; equally renounces, as a natural conse-
quence, the revival of any of the articles of her former trea-
ties, ,Ind especially of the treaty of Koutcbouk-Kaivardji, the
erroneous interpretation of which has been the 'principal
cause of the present war. In affording their mutual co-ope-
ration to obtain from the initiative of the Ottoman Govern-
ment the confirmation and the observance of the religious
privileges of the different Christian communities, without dis-
tinction of sect, and conjointly turning to account, in the
interest of the said communities, the generous intentions ma-
nifested in respect to them by his Majesty the Sultan, they''
will take the greatest care to preserve from all attack the
dignity of his Highness and the independence of his Crown, 1

Baron Bourqueney did not wish to deny that.each Plenipo-
tentiary retained his freedom of opinion whilst taking part in
the deliberations of the Conference ; but it was au indisputable
consequence of the treaty of December 2 that the allies should
attempt to establish a community of opinion with regard to
the common adversary.

M. de Titoff protested that Russia was not the adversary of
Austria, and 'maintained that the proposed course would not
only institute a Conference in addition to the general Confe-
rence; but in a practical point of view would entail deplorable
delays.

- Drouyn de l'Huys replied, that the preliminary con-
sultation which he had proposed was--.ntither a new ttia- an-
illegitimate fact—that France demanded this consultation
of her allies as a right—that, for his own part, it Iva-0,4 in
the opposite system that lie could see causes of dera—y ; final y,
that as the allies, having expeeted proposals from Russia, had
not drawn up any on their side, it was necessary that they
should give their attention to them with common consent,
and with the least possible delay.
Count Buol agreed to the proposal of M. Drouyn do l'Huys,
both on the ground of principal and in consideration of the
practical advantage which its application would entail, which
advantage had been already proved by the course followed in
the discussion of the two fernier points, without prejudice to
the freedom of opinion of either party.
Upon M. de Titoff remarking, that the taking of the initia-
tive by the Sublime Porte would appear at bottom to suit the
nature of the case and the exigencies of the situation better
that any other course, M. Drouyn de l'Huys said that the allies
would be anxious to give every weight to this initiative in the
pi:elhninary consultation which was about to take place be-
tween them.

The Plenipotentiaries reserved to themselves the right of
agreeing hereafter on the day on wiich they should again
meet in conference.

RUOL-SCUAUENSTEIN.
PROKESCH-OSTEN. GORTSCHAEOPT.
Dion-I; AE L'HuYs. TITOFF.
BOURQUENET.
J. RUSSELL.
WESTMORELAYD.
AALI.

The documents np to No. 11 relate to the first and
second points. We come at once to the third point, the
discussion of which led to the rupture of the Conference.

No. 12.

PROTOCOL (No. 11) OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT VIENNA AX.RIL 19,

On April 9 Count Buol opened the Conference by in-
troducing their Excellencies the Mini.ters of Foreign
Affairs of France and of the Porte, M. Drouyn de l'Huys
and Aali Pasha. By common consent the next Confer-
ence was adjourned until the arrival of fresh instructions,
which the Russian Plenipotentiaries, by a messenger
sent off on the 28th of March, had requested from their
Court after the Conference of the 26th.

1855.
(Translation.)
Present : For Austria, Count de Bnol-Schauenstein and
Baron do Prokeseh-Osten ; for France, M. Drouyn de l'Huys
and Baron do Bourqueney ; for Great Britain, Lord John
Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland ; for Russia, Prince
Gortschakoff and M. de Titoff; for Turkey, Aali Pasha and
Aarif Effendi.
The prctocol of the last meeting having been read and ap-
proved, the discussion was resumed on the third guarantee.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys recapitulated the double object of that
guarantee. Tho Sublime Porte being the principal party in-
terested that its existence should be more completely con-
nected with the European equilibrium, the Minister for Fo-
reign Affairs of France invited the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries
to explain themselves first on this portion of the question.
Aali Pasha is of opinion that it would be settled in a satis-
factory manner by a stipulation conceived in the following
terms : _ .

No. 11.
PROTOCOL (No. 10) OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT VIENNA,
APRIL 17, 1855.
(Translation.)
Present :—For Austria, Count de Buol-Schauenstein and
Baron de Prokesch-Osten ; for France, M. Dronyn de I'Huys
and Baron de Bourqueney ; for Great Britain, Lord John
Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland ; for Russia, Prince
Gortschakoff and M. do Titoff; for Turkey, Aali Pasha, and
Aariff Effendi.

After the protocol of the 9th instant had been read and
signed, Count Buol announced that Prince Gortschakoff had
informed him of the arrival of the answer returned by the
Imperial Court of Russia to the report forwarded by its Pleni-
potentiaries.

" The contracting Powers wishing to manifest the impor-
tance which they attach to the participation of the Ottoman
emp re in the advantages of the system established by public
law between the different European States, declare that they
consider that empire as forming, henceforward, an integral
part of that system; and mutually undertake to respect its
territorial integrity and independence as an essential condi-
tion of the general equilibrium."
The Plenipotentiaries of France and Great Britain give
their entire adhesion to the principle established by the Mi-
nister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte.
The Plenipotentiaries e Russia also concur in it. In ex-
plaining their idft they add, that they do not intend thereby
to pledge their Court to a territorial guarantee.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys, with the view of recording with
more precision the principle universally admitted proposes
the wording of an article which is adopted.

Prince Gortschakoff said that his Court, though fully
appreciating the reasons which had prompted the members
of the Conference to surrender to the Cabinet of St. Peters-
burg the initiative of the proposals respecting the develop-
ment of the third point, did not feel it incumbent on itself to
take advantage of the initiative which had been offered to ii ;
that, at the same time, it had authorised its Plenipotentia-
ries, in conformity 'with the declaration made at the meeting
of the 17th of January last, to enter most gravely, and with
the sincere desire of arriving at an agreement, on the exami-
nation of the measures which should be proposed, provided
they were not of a nature to infringe on the rights of sove-
reignty of the Emperor of Russia in his own territoxy ;..that,
for his part, he agreed with the form iri whin 'Lord John
Russell had stated the question when he said, in the Confer-
ence of the 2tith of March, that the best and only admissible
conditions of peace would be those whin, while consistent
with the honour of Russia, should at the same time suffice for
the security of Europe, and for preventing the recurrence of
the existing complications.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his deep regret at seeing,
after a delay of 18 days, the initiative which had been sur-
rendered to Russia at a conference at which he had not as.
sisted, again thrown upon the originators of the proposal.
His regrets were the more sincere as the Allies, having ex-
pected a precisely opposite result, were not prepared to tiraW
up their proposals immediately. He thoug'ht, therefore, that
the Allies shoul I at once meet to consult together on the sub-
ject. He felt bound, considering the importance of the reser•
vation made by Prince Gortschakoff, .o demand further bit-
planations respecting the meaning which that leiluitter at-
tached to it. He put the question, whether Russia would
consider her rights of sovereignty infringed if she deprived
herself of the liberty of building an unlimited number of ships
of war in the Black Sea. •

On an observation of Count Buol that it was also neces-
sary to anticipate the possibility of a misunderstagding be-
tween the Sublime Porte and one of the contracting Powers,
it was agreed to draw up a second article (hereto annexed,
together with the first, under letter A.)
One of the objects of the third guarantee being thus ar-
ranged, the other portion of the question is introduoed--
namely, the cessation of the Russian preponderance in the
-Black ttett.
M. Drouyn de 111huys explains his views On this matter.
He declares that the most natural and most eilleacions Means
of putting an end to the preponderanee of Russia iii thd Black
Sea eollsletS In the limitation of the Mafitinie ftitees eihich she
nittliltains there. Russia having accepted the principle atlas
cessation of her preponderance in the Black Sea, the French
Government did not expect to see the principal means of car-
rying it into effect excluded by the declaration of the Pleni-
potdiltiaries of Russia, that they would consider all limitation
as encroaching on the sovereign rights of the Emperor their
master. 'He enters lint) the question at large, with the view
to prove that every treaty implies a certain restriction of the
rights of sovereignty, which, nevertheless, being freely ac-
cepted, is in no wise derogatory to sovereign dignity.
Considering the question as the fads now stand, he states
that the Black Sea is at this moment occupied by the forces
of- the three Powers only, to the exclusion of Russia.
Those Powers, in possession of the Black Sea, will remain
in that position so long as the war shall last. It is therefore
hot for them to demand concessions from Russia. Wishing
to lay down the question correctly, it would be more exact to
say that it is for Russia to ask of the three Powers on what
conditions they will consent to put an end to the exclusion in
which her war flag is at present placed. To impose on her-
self a moderate limitation, in order to re-enter into possession
of a portion of her sovereignty which, in fact, is no longer in
the hands of Russia, would therefore be to make a sacrifice
altogether reasonable and justified by the circumstances.
That sacrifice would be all the more justified and honourable,
as it would contribute essentially to give to Europe a pledge
for the duration and solidity of the peace which it is endea-
voured to re-establish. After having added that it was his
earnest.desire to establish that the propositions to be made to
Russia were perfectly honourable, and that by refusing them
she would place herself completely in the wrong, he read the
articles 3 to 10 (copy of which is herewith annexed, marked
B). In entering upon the preliminaries of peace, with the
exception of the changes to be made in the wording, those
articles would be, according to him, sufficient to calm
Europe, aid to secure the integrity and independence of
the Ottoman empire.
r Baron do Bonrqueney has nothing to add either to the
clearness of the explanation or the force of the argumenti
which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France has made
use of.
Lord John Russell maintained that, under ordinary circum-
stances, a Power which regards as excessive the force of a
neighbouring Power can have recourse to its own resources far
the re-establishment of the balance. It was thus, for instance,
that Great Britain, on being informed, about 20 years ago,
that Russia had increased her Baltic fleet, limited herself to
the strengthening of her own navy. Nevertheless, the Black
Sea is placed in an exceptional position. The principle of closing
this sea having been in all times a rule of the Ottoman empire,
came by the treaty of 1841 under the public law of Europe. Of
the two powers which alone command the shores of the Black
Sea, the one, already very strong, continually augments her
forces, while the other is weakened by the wars she has had
successively to carry on against Russia. In this state of things
England regards the excessive increase of the Russlin fleet in
the Black Sea as a yerpetual menace hanging over the Bos-
phorus and Constantinople, whether that fleet could iu a very
short time transport considerable land forces. Turkey not
finding in her own forces the guarantees for security which
she herself and, with her, Europe, have the right to demand,
it is just to look for them in the diminution of the maritime
forces of the other sea-bordering Powers in a proportion that
would put an end to the menacing character of these forces.
This sacrifice being necessary for the repose of Europe, the
Emperor of Russia could not, in his opinion, qualify it as de-
rogatory to his dignity, To admit that the Ottoman empire is
an essential element of the European equilibrium, and to wish
to maintain at the same Cm?, a perpetual menace directed
against that empire, would appear to Mtn an Obvious contra-
diction. In the point of ,tiew of military honour there would
be, in his opinion, in an adhesion to the ideas developed by
the Minister for Foreigii Affairs of France, nothing that could
disturb the susceptibility of tiny one. The armies which are
attacking Sebastopol, and that which is defending that
fortress, have equally covered themselves with glory, and
te i
military honour is safe on both sides.
the Earl of Nestmareland, in concurring in the Opinion of
his colleague, brim forward in support of the proposed mode
pretends en tbhee
of solution, considerations founded on the reciprocal under-
standing of riverain states.
Count Buol sees in the project under discussion an efficacious
method for terminating the elision of blood, and for securing
tßEurope t
Seashe against a i
Hn seterespectives
ttheb
li excessiveestablishes
of h
forcesas
a disproportiont
general
e two
theory,
ht States whichhthat
borderingerss
to exists
t
to limit the Ned or the sea forces of a foreign Power would be
to encroach on her sovereign rights. On the otherhand the un-
limited increase of the military establishment of one Power an-
therises others to make it a subj ect for representations. Apply-
ing this rule to the exceptional position of the Euxine, a closed
sea, where an aggression can alone be attributed to au indefi-
nite development of the maritime forces of one of the border.
ing Powers, he considers that, in this special case, and in these
inland seas, the limitation is just, and nowise of a nature to
compromise the sovereign dignity-.

. -
Prince Gortschakoff replied, that Russia would bbt consent
to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed num-
ber, either by treaty or in any other manner. He shared iu
the regret expressed by M. Droilyn do l'Huys at the delay
that had taken place in the negotiations, which ho attributed
to the distance, and added that the Russian Plenipotentiaries
had been ready to enter on the discussion since the 213th of
March, and had only undertaken, in the first instance, to
make the reference to their Court in deference to the unani-
mous wish expressed to them on the subject.. With reference
to the necessity which M. Drouyn de Lhuys said would exist
of establishing a preliminary agreement among the allies be-
fore the proposals could be made, he considered this repug-
nant to the principle laid down at the preliminary meetings in
the months of December and January, th it each individually
should retain complete liberty of Interpretation on the sub-
ject of the development of the four bases of negotiation.
Baron de Bourqueney expressed his concurrence in the re-
gret expressed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and in answer to Prince Gortschakoff's last observation re-
marked, that,the members of the Conference had the right of
del,berating among themselves as they signed the protocols.
Lord John Russell could not disguise the surprise which
Prince Gortschakoff's statement had caused him. The sole
object of the surrender of the initiative to Russia w4S to
give her the opportunity of making prOpotale consistent
with her honour. History recorded rnoto than one instance
of great and glorious sovereigns having consented to a limita-
tion of their rights of edVeroignty in their own territory,
being animated with the desire of putting an end to the effu-
sion of blood by 4 treaty of peace, or of preventing a rupture
and the consequent evils of war. He instanced the consent
of Louis XIV. to the demolition of Dunkirk, and several
other cases drawn from treaties concluded between Great
Britain and France, and Great Britain end the United States,
with the view of avoiding war. Lie had hoped that Russia
would have voluntarily, and With the view of re-establishing
peace, made proposals tending to this end. Since the Court
of St. Petersburg hAa. declined to take the initiative on this
subject, the chalices of success attending the negotiations for
peace appeared in his eyes much diminished.
Prince Gortschakoff replied that a Power of the first order
could hardly accept the limitations of the nature to which
Lord John Russell had alluded, except after having sus-
tained a long series of disasters, and that the case of Dun-
kirk could in no way be applied to the present position of
Russia. As to the diminution of the chances of peace spoken
of by licra Russell, ha begged him to consider that Russia
had only excluded one point from discussion, and was ready to
examine all the modes of solution which should be proposed,
exclusive of this point.
M. DrOuyn de l'Huys expressed his wish to waiVe, if possi-
ble, questions of dignity. As soon as a stipalation was sanc-
tioned by mutual consent no one could pretend that sovereignty
was injured, and consequently, honour infringed. Russia her-
self, in consenting, in the Mrs° of the negotiations, to the
restrictions of certain rights—for example, in the islands of
the Danube--subderibed only
to perfedtly honourable condi-
tions.

Prince Gortschekoff admitted that honour was safe where
there was nr:tinal consent. It was on this ground that Russia
hadju,lged it fit frankly to agree to the stipulations respecting
thP, :Danube. It Would be different as reg trded the limitation
of her forces in the Black Sea. At the tench tithe he did not
pretend to eteltide peremptorily the consideration of every
proposal tending to the point of limitation, but reserved to
himself the right'Of refuting his adhesion.
The Earl of Wettmorelaud expressed a hope that the prin-
ciple of reciprocal accommodation between river-bordering
Stately would not be excluded by the Russian Plenipotentia-
rice. He added, that he shared in the painful impression pro•
duced on the other Plenipotentiaries by the reception given
by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the proposal to take the
initiative.
Aali Pasha agreed with the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs that, in the new phase in which the question was
placed by the statement of the Russian Plenipotentiaries,
it would be necessary to concert beforehand the proposals to
be made. He could not conceive how they could ever de-
finitively agree if each Plenipotentiary were to bring to the
Conference a plan of settlement drawn up without previous
consultation. This mode of proceeding appeared to him,
besides, repugnant to the reciproc 11 engagements existing
between the Allied Powers. He added, however, that in his

opinion the limitation of the naval forces in the Black Sea
was the only mode of solution at once practicable and honour.
able to all parties.
Baron de Prokesch asserted that, as the allied Powers had
consulted on the four bases of negotiation, nothing could be
more logical than that they should also consult on the appli-
cation of them.
Count Buol shared in the regret expressed by the Plenipo-
tentiaries of France and Great Britain that the answer of the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg was not of a nature to serve as a
point of departure for further deliberations. He could have
wished that the Imperial Court, of Russia had not only appre-
ciated the feelings which had prcmpted the offer of the ini-
tiative, but had been equally struck with the facilities which
the acceptance of this offer would Lava opened for the success
of the negotiations. With respect to the course proposed by
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, it appeared to him to
be but a natural consequence of their pcpsition, and of the

Baron Prokesch said, that Austria must strongly desire to
see Russia accept the proposition in question, which, in his
eyes, is calculated to calm Europe, and to place facts in har-
mony with the assurances of the Cabinet "of St. Petersburg.
Prince Gortschakoff asks the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Austria if the limitation of the Russian forces in the Black
Sea, which Count Buol had admitted to be an exception to a
general principle recognised by himself, were, in his opinion,
to be accomplished by means of coercion, in case Russia were
to refuse to concur in it spontaneously.
In answering this question, Count Buol declares that Aug.
tria, for the present, supports the project under discussion,
by recommending it to the adoption of Russia, but that in
other respects he must reserve fur the Emperor his master hill
liberty as to the choice of means by which he may consider it
give his support to his proposition.
reserved to himself the right of
expitinediecnetGeovletnsto ualyphakii to
having

explaining himself at the next Conference as to the proposed
mode of solution, M. .Drouyn de Piluys brings forward all the
urgent motives which tell in favour of an immediate decision,
insisting particularly .on being informed, at least, at once, if
the Plenipotentiaries of Russia accept or not the broad princi-
ples •f the project, subject to an ulterior arrangement of de-
tails. • .

•
Iu the discussion which followed on this subject the Pleni-
potentiaries of Russia maintained that it is not to them that
the delays and tardiness of the negotiation can with justice
be attributed. Prince Gortschakoff said that he was a party
to, the principle that each should propose, individually his own
mode of execution, but that, seeing before him on this occa-
sion a plan combined amongst four, on a basis which he had
always indicated as a rock to be avoided, he thought he had
a good right to ask, for the purpose of maturely weighingthis
plan, which he had only heard rapidly read, as much time as
had been necessary for preparing it—viz., twice 24 hours.
M. Drouyu de Lhuys observed that if, in the system pro-
posed, Russia had anything to object to in the fixing of a cer-
tain number, and the direct and immediate intimation of that
number by the Conference to the Russian Plenipotentiaries, a
plan might be devised which would remove this double diffi-
culty. The Plenipotentiaries of Russia and the Porte should
come to some understanding with each other in the presence
of the Conference, on a basis of counterpoise of their respec-
tive forces, which basis should be recorded in an arrangement
which they should mutually sign, and which, annexed to the
treaty, should have the same value and the same force.
On a general observation made by Lord John Russell,
that-he did not understand the' scruples of Russia when the
Porte showed itself disposed on its part to espouse the prin-
ciple of limitation, M. de Titoff states that, to resolve the
difficulties in an equitable manner, and in conformity with
the wants ans position of the two bordering Powers, the
most efficacious method would doubtless consist in facili-
tating direct explanations between the Plenipotentiaries of
Turkey and those of Russia. Fully sensible of the salutary
effects of a good understanding between the two States, he is
persuaded that nothing would offer to the Russian Plenipo-
tentinii.a bcttor opportunity of proVing the conciliatory
_disposition of their Court than if they were in a-position to
discuss their mutual interests with a Power free in its resolu-
tions and its movements.

This opinion having raised from several quFters the objec-
tion that the treaties signed by the Porte on the occasion of
the war prevented it from coming to an arrangement, with
Russia without the concurrence of the allies of the Sultan, M.
de Titoff maintains that to discuss was not the same thing as
to pledge. He therefore thinks that, without derogating from
the obligations which the the Porte has undertaken, the
.friends of peace ought not to discourage that Power from
adopting a method which the nature of things points out to
two countries which the war does not prevent from having a
large number of neighbouring interests, susceptible of being
better appreciated from the moment when they should be sub-
mitted to the competent examination of either-into its own
affairs.

Prince Gortschakoff declares his concurrence in the senti-
ments expressed by, his colleague, and regrets, to see the Su-
blime Porte, the security of whose independence was in ques-
tion, in a position which seemed so adverse to it.
Pasha protests against this manner of explaining the
question. He expresses his regrets at being obliged, notwith-
standing his desire not to embitter the discussion, to answer
the observations of Prince Gortschakoff by maintaining that
the Sublime Porte has been forced by circumstances which
are within the knowledge of all the world to have recourse
to arms to defend its rights; that the two great Western
Powers, having recognised the justice of its cause, have signed
with it a treaty of alliance, which stands on bases of perfect
reciprocity ; that the clause which binds the Ottoman empire
to the Western Powers not to arrive at a conclusion without
coming to a previous understanding with them binds them in
return in a similar degree to the Sublime Porte ; that, in fact,
his full powers do not authorise him to enter into a separate
negotiation with Russia irrespective of the Conference.
RUOL-SCIIALTENSTEIN.
GrORTSCHAKOFF. PROKESCH-OSTEN.
TITOFF. DROUYN DE DIRTY&
ROURQUENEY.
J. RUSSELL.
WESTMORELAND.
AALI.
AARIF.

(Enclosure 1 in No. 12.)
ANNEX A TO PROTOCOL No. 11.

Art. I. The high contracting parties wishing that the Sub-
lime Porte should participate in the advantages of the system
established by public law between the different States of
Europe, engage themselves severally to respect the indepen-
dence anti territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, gua-
rantee together the strict observance of this engagement, and
will, in consequence, consider every act or event which should
be of a nature to infringe on it as a question of European
interest.

Art 2. If a misunderstanding should arise between the
Porte and one of the contracting parties, these two States,
before having recourse to the employment of force, should
place the other Powers in a position to anticipate this extreme
course by pacific means.

(Enclosure 2 in No. 12.)

AMEX B TO PROTOCOL No. 11.
Art. 3. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and his
Highness the Sultan, wishing recriprocally to give a proof of
their confidence, and to anticipate the misgivings which
might arise from the excessive development of their naval
forces in the Euxiue, engage respectively not to have in that
sea more than fottr ships, four frigates, with a proportionate
number of light vessels and of unarmed vessels exclusively
adapted to the transport Of troops.
At't 4. The rule of the closing of the Straits of the Bospho-
rus and of the Dardanelles laid down by the treaty of July
13, 1841, shall fetaftin in force with the exceptions specified In
the following articles
Art. 5. Each of the contractitig Powers who havo not an es-
tablishment in the Black Sea shall be authorised by a firman
of hisHighoess, on notifying it five days beforehand, to bring
into that sea a nitfober of vessels equal to half the naval
forces which each of the two Powers bordering on the sea shall
Maintain there in conformity with Art. 2. '
Art. 6. At no time shall ships of 1712 r of foreign nations,
with the efeeption of light vessels belonging to the Embassies
admitted heretofore, be able to anchor at the Golden Horn,
and in time of peace the number of vessels of the line of the
contracting Powers who have no establishment in the Black
Sea shall not be allowed to be more than four at the same
time before Constantinople, in their passage from the Dar-
danelles to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the
Dardanelles.
Art. 7. In case
(which God forbid !) the Sultan should be
menaced by an aggression, be reserves to himself the right
to open the passage to all the maritime forces of his allies.
Art. 8. The two Powers borderihg on the Black Sea, in
order to testify to the other high contracting parties their
desire to maintain with them the most friendly relations, en-
gage to admit in all the ports situate in the BlaCk Sea the
consuls whom the latter may consider it useful to establish
there.
Art. 9. His Majesty the Emperer of All the Russias and
his Highness the Sultan, wishing to give a proof cf the
generous sentiments with which they are animated, promise a
fall and entire amnesty to all inhabitants and officers of the
provinces which have been the theatre of war. None of them
shall be molested or prosecuted for his opinions, for his acts,
or for the conduct he may have held during the war, or dur-
ing the temporary occupation of the provinces by the respec-
tive troops % the belligerent parties. The inhabitants of the
IslindS of Aland are admitted to the benefit of this provision.

Art. 10. His Majesty the King of Sardinia is comprised in
the present peace. Commercial and other relations are re-
estalkished between that kingdom and the Empire of All the
Russias, on the same rooting as they were before the declara-
tion of war.

No. 13.

PROTOCOL (NO. 1) OP A CONYRRIrNCE HELD AT VIENNA APRIL. 21,

1855

Present :—For Austria, Count tie Buol-Schauenstein and
Baron do Prokesch-Osten ; for Franee, Drouyn de
Lhuys and Baron de Bourqueney ; for Croat Britain, Lord
John Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland; for 'Russia,
Prince Gortschakoff and H. de Titoff; for Turkey, Anil Pasha
and Aarif Effendi.

RICE SD•

to the Ottoman empire, but would also multiply the occasions
for a misunderstanding between the European Powers.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys says he was not authorised to dis-
cuss the details of the Russian plan, the fundamental idea of
which is diametrically opposed to the system which France
would have wished to see maintained. That system tended to
obviate the danger of leaving two unequal forces in the pre-
sence of one another, by causing the disappearance from the
Black Sea, excepting as regards the police of the two border-
ing States, of all appurtenances of war, 'whereas the Russian
project would permit their indefinite augmentation. France,
adopting the idea from the Empress Catherine of Russia, de-
sired to make of the Euxine a sea entirely commercial, from
which should be excluded the flags of war of all nations; the
plan proposed by Prince Gortschakoff leads, on the contrary,
to invite them all there ; France maintains the principle of
closing— Russia wishes to abolish it.
M. de Titoff having observed that Article 5 of the project
of treaty presented by M. Drouyn de Lhuys also infringes
on thb principle of closing, even, in his opinion, to an extent
very dangerous to the indepepdence of the Porte ; and Prince
Gortschakoff havin,, equally declared that nothing would be
menacing to that independence, and to the European equili-
brium in general, except combinations which would admit on
the other side of the straits the existence of the most fornii-
dable fleets in the world, while within the counterpoise of the
Russian marine would be annihilated, M. Drouyn de Lhuys
replied that the Ottoman Government is the best judge of the
question whether the exceptions stipulated by Article 5 atre
or are not conformable to its interest—that, moreover, the
exception only confirmed the rule—and that, in any case,
there is no possible comparison between the exceptional cases
provided for in the article in question and the total abolition
of the principle of closing, as proposed by Russia.
Lord John Russell calls to mind that he has already
proved, at the last Conference, that the dangers which
menaced the empire of the Sultan come only from Russia—'
that neither France nor Great Britain is suspected of look-
ing for the breaking up of the Ottoman power—that nothing
can prove better than this war what different sentiments
animate those Governments. The Sublime Porte has called
ape. bkc w.etern Powers as well for their assistance against
the aggression of Russia as to obtain guarantees of security
for the future. England would have seen an efficacious =de
of obtaining these by the adoption of the system of the neu-
trality of the Black Sea, of which the Frenah Minister for,
Foreign Affairs has made mention. Russia .could have adopted
it without danger, because the Black Seawould have remained
closed to all flags of war. Russia having rejected this system,
as also that of reciprocal limitation of river bordering States,
with the admission of a restricte I number of ships of war of
the contracting Powers, and having on her side only proposed
a plan based on a totally opposite principle, and not offering,
in his opinion, any guarantee against the dangers which it is
proposed to remove, be can only express his deep regret that
it has not been possible for the Conference to come to an
agreement on measures for a pacific solution, and that Eng-
land and France are reduced to the necessity of seeking those
indispensable guarantees in the continued occupation of the
Black Sea and Baltic.

The Earl of Westmoreland concurs in the opinion of his
colleague.
-—•— •

M. de Titoff regrets that the Plenipotentiaries of Great Bri-
tain are not authorised to discuss the project proposed by
Russia, while such latitude would have offered a real pledge
of the sincerity of their desire for peace.
M. de Baurqueney having observed that the whole plan
developed by the Russian Plenipotentiaries had the character
of showing that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea,
to which the Conference has to seek the means of putting an
end, is an absolute necessity for the European equilibrium,
Prince Gortschakoff replies that the document presented by
him had the double object of proving-Ist, that the aggressive
force of Russia in the Euxino is not nearly so redoubtable as
it appears to be considered ; and, moreover, that in the inte-
rest of the European equilibrium, as well as the independence
of the Porte, the existence of a Russian naval forco in the
Black Sea is necessary.
Count Buol said, that Austria having nothing more at
heart than to contribute to the re-establishment of peace, he
regretted sincerely to see Russia proposing a principle of
opening the Black Sea, while the other Powers are unani-
mous in proclaiming the contrary principle as necessary to
the tranquillity of Europe. Austria can understand that Rus-
sia holds to having a respectable‘ force in the Black Sea, but
She sees in the unlimited extension of that force a danger, not
only for Turkey, but for Russia herself. The Russian Pleni-
potentiaries have themselves shown that their fleet in the
Black Sea was too weak to contribute in this war to the de-
fence of the coasts. It is not the less true that it is, nevertheless,
too strong for the Ottoman navy, as the results of the war have
already proved. It is therefore with the obj set of providing
against new complications that AuStria wishes to see a certain
limitation to the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys shows that Russia will not give any
species of guarantee to the Ottoman empire. In regard to
that prOvided by the Ist Article, and adopted at the last Con-
ference, Russia reduces it to a chimera, because, even in the
case of a Turkish province being invaded by one of the con-
tracting Powers, Russia, according to Prince Gortschakoff's
interpretation, will confine herself to the employment of its
good offices. On the other hand, she admits of no limitation
to a fleet which, in the judgment of all the Powers, is dispro-
portioned to the forces of the other river-bordering Power to
such an extent as to form a permanent menace against her.
Russia herself points to the danger to the Porte of the assem-
bling of European forces round Constantinople, and neverthe-
less she proposes a plan according to which they could freely
come there, and which would even permit the Russian Baltic
fleet to go and join that of the Black Sea.
Prince Gortschakoff does not pretend that his plan has no
objections. It would be better in general to abandon the
Sublime. Porte to its own - inspirations, and to give it greater
freedom of action. In any case, his project has feiver incon-
veniences than that of M. Drouyn de Pliny*, to which he At-
tributes the design of wishing to humiliate Russia, because
the principle of limitation touches upon sovereign rights. -
M. Drouyn de l'Huys protests against the tendency im-
puted to his project. If Russia has no intention of giving to
its Black Sea fleet an indefinite development, why does she
not corne to an understanding with the adjoining Power,
upon a basis of reciprocal limitation; why should not the two
Powers then make known to the Conference what they had
agreed upon between themselves 7 Where would there be in
such a proceeding humiliation or dishonour ?
Baron Prokesch observes, that when four Powersare unani-
mous iu seeing the existence of an unlimited fleet in the Black
Sea a danger for the Ottoman empire, the contrary opinion of
Russia cannot prevent them from devising means of precau-
tion against that danger. The Russian plenipotentiaries have
themselves admitted that an unlimited development of the
Russian naval forces in the Black Sea was neither for the in-
terest nor according to the intentions of Russia. Why, then,
not impose upon.herself a limitation in so convenient a form
as that of a reciprocal agreement between adjoining Powers ?
Prince Gortschakoff replied to Baron Prokesch that ho
could not but participate in the respect which the Austrian
Plenipotentiary manifested for a right of sovereignty of the
Sublime Porte ; that he recognises it as incontestable, and
bows to the principle ; but in return he asks the Austrian
Plenipotentiary why the same value is not placed by him
on a right of sovereignty equally iscontestible on the part of
the Emperor of Russia—that of deciding upon the number of
vessels which it may suit him to have in his own ports I It
seems to him that, in this case, reciprocity should be in strict
equity.

Baron Prokesch said that the answer lay in the difference,
between the respective positions, Austria being at the actnar
crisis the ally of the Powers at war with. Russia. Besides,
whatever confidence many be merited by the wisdom and mode-
ration of Sovereigns, that does not suffice to render superfluous
the positive stipulations of treaties, which will be necessary
as long as there are Governments.

M. Dronyn de' l'Huks repeated that the project produced
by him had been originated in a sincerely conciliatory spirit,
and that it contained absolutely nothing offensive or provo-
catory to Russia. The problem to be solved consisted in the
means of connecting the existence of the Ottoman empire
with the European equilibrium, and of putting an end to
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. But, when it is
a question of placing the territorial integrity of Turkey
beyond danger, Russia says she will maintain, but not gua-
rantee, it ; and when it is a question of guarding against the
dangers which menace Russia on the sea coast, Russia peremp:
torily rejects every species of limitation to her fleet, even
under the form of a direct arrangement with the Sublime
Porte.

_
The discussion having been brought back to the ques-
tion of the guarantee spoken of at the opening of the
meeting, and to the different opinions expressed on its bear-
ings by the Russian Plenipotentiaries to that of the other
members of the Conference, Baron Bourqueney stated that, as
having signed the treaty of 1841, he had already seen a
similar disagreement to that of which he was this day witness.
If his efforts did not then succeed to pass the principle of the
preparatory preamble, he should at least have the satis-
faction of twice maintaining the same doctrine, though in
the face, it was true, of the same adversaries. Who would
venture to contest that the international obligation asked
to-day from Russia by the Four Powers, then written
in the articles of a treaty, had not imposed on all the con-
tracting parties duties the prompt accomplishment of which
would have nipped in the bud the existing complications I
Count Buol said, that if one of the contracting Powers
attaches to the common guarantee a meaning different to that
given to it by the four others, she would do so at her own
risk and peril, as the others would maintain their interpreta-
tion.

Protocol No. 11 having been read, Prince Gortschakoff
took the opportunity of requesting that express mention
should therein be made of the explanations Which he gave to
the preceding Conference, in order to prove that he does not
attach to the guarantee mentioned in Article 1, which was
unanimously adopted, the sense of an active guarantee of the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire..
Aff. Drouyn de l'Huys states that the engagement to be con-
tracted by the Powers, as recorded in the last Conference, im-
poses qui' them the obligation themselves to respect, and to
force the other etintractAng parties to respect, the indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, so that
any contracting Power which abould make an attempt upon
that territorial integrity should be respfinattibie to the others,
who then, in order to cause respect to be paid to the common
engagement, should employ all the means in tlieif po'wer,
force not excepted.
Prince Gortschakoff recognises that Russia would be ob•
liged to consider any act hostile to the territorial integrity as
a question of European interest, but he refuses the engage-
ment to make it a case of war. He insists on the insertion
in the preceding protocol of his explanatory observation.
The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Austria,, ad-
hering to the opinion expreSkid ty M. Drouyn de l'Huys,
require on their part at the same time tbat the Plenipoten-
tiaries of France will record in the protocel of to-day, the
expression of the regret with which they learn the' restrictive
interpretation of Prince Gortschakoff.
'Count Buol adds that his impression had been that the
explanations Oren on all sides at the last Conference had
entirely dispelled the difference of opinion manifested in
the first instance by Prins® Go'rtscltakoff. The reading
of Protocol No. 11 having ended, Prince Gortschakoff
said that the Plenipotentiaries of Russia have (his day a
double duty to fulfil—that of giving their opinion upon
the propositions made at the last Conference, and that
of explaining their own views on the means of developing the
third principle. The propositions which have been made to
them being in their eyes derogatory to the sovereign rights
of the Emperor their master, contrary to the European equi-
librium, and dangerous to the independence of the Ottoman
empire, they cannot but decline them. Before making known
to the Conference the views of the Russian Plenipotentiaries
on the manner in which the treaty of July the 13th, 1841,
could be revised, Prince Gortschakoff repeated his regrets at
not seeing a representative here of one of the European
Powers, whose double right to participate in these delibera-
tions arises, in his view, from her quality as a state of the
first order, and from the fact of her having been a party to
the signature of that treaty. After having read the memo-
randum annexed (marked A), Prince Gortschakoff inquires
whether the Conference desires to know the ideas of the Rus-
sian Plenipotentiaries on the mode of carrying into effect the
general views which he had just made known.
Lord John Russell declares that the plan*developed by
Prince Gortschakoff rests on a basis on which he is not autho-
thorised to treat • that he is therefore precluded from enter-
ingo: into a discussion of the details of this plan, which,
making
known ever, he cannot prevent Prince Gortschakoff from
known to them.
Prince Gortschakoff, after having road
nthage
eadnnteosepp
dr.opspoeser
(marked B), holds that Russia, havTgrieumg
of forces in the
the means of re-establishing the equi
Black Sea, has redeemed her word,
Aali Pasha declares that i nosft
closing ion
ther
Straits,es b e
the maintenance of the princet‘ovltienih
that the Sublime Porte
the Russian plan tends t abolish
ple as a guarantee of
having at all times consideredtoos tbheisinpgri
rneesipeeted, excepting in
its independence holds it
certain cases which might be stipulated ; that the opening of
the wok am would in hor oyeri coditUte Act way A danger

Aali Pasha proposes for Article 1 a modified version, of
which a copy is annexed (marked C), adding that the engage-
ment made by each of the contracting powers in virtue of
that article consists, in his opinion, in respecting and causing
to be respected the independence and territorial integrity of
the Ottoman empire ; and the common guarantee applies,
therefore, to the strict observance of that engagement on the
kart of each of the contracting parties.
Baron Prokesch thinks that it would bo more logical to
unite Articles 1 and 2 into one. '

The Conference will consider these propositions at the time
of the final settlement.
Count Buol does not consider the different' modes of so-
lution as exhausted, and considers it especially the task of
Austria to look for means of accommodation. He hopes,
therefore, that the Conferences will meet again as soon as auy
of its members shall have any new propositions to make.
Lord John Russell, in doing full justice to the conciliatory
spirit of the Austrian Minister for foreign Affairs, declares,
as regards himself, that his instructions are exhausted.
Drouyn de I'Huys made the same declaration, adding
that he is under the necessity of taking the orders of the Em-
peror, his master, and he reserves to himself to natty: aonf
eventual communication thereon to the represents
France at Vienna.

pitoiLLIHO.LO-7aCgivITA.U, ENSTEINO.ORTSCIIAROFF.
DROUYN ME L'IIUIS. TITOFF.
ROURQUENET.'
J. RUSSELL.
WESTMORELAND.
AALI.
AARIF.

provided that they really led to the object proposed; .Au six
frankly and sincerely accepted the new scheme.
The Plenipotentiaries of Russia have no need of roc:tang
the ample manner in which the Imperial Cabinet has recently
adopted it. The circular of Count Nesselrode has been read
even here; it is doubtless present to the minds of all. -
During the whole course of the Conferences the attitude of
the Plenipotentiaries of Russia has conscientiously responded
to the scheme. They have united all their efforts to put it in
operation with frankness and sincerity.
The discussions which have taken place on the future posi-
tion of the Principalities of the Danube, as well as on the free
navigation of that river, furnish proof of it.
Limiting themselves to removing from the stipulations all
that could raise apprehensions and mistrust, which they re-
ject as unjust and uncalled for, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia,
entered, in other respects, without restriction or ambiguity,
into all views tending to realise the new political system
which would have henceforth to regulate the East.
They have not receded in this view before any sacrifice
compatible with the honour and dignity of their Sovereign,
and calculated to conduce'te the end which it is proposed to
attain.
The members of the Conference will render to them, it may
be hoped, the justice to acknowledge that all their proceed-
ings have had for their object the realisation of the common
solu-
tion view, which is to consolidate the position of the East in a
manner to put an end to the rivalries of the Great Powers,
tioTnhoefytbhrie ntghitrhdispiodineat.wiTthhetyly desireheoameself
that,
-den i
ial to
therden o
the balance of power
and place themselves on that of
arrive at it, all should consent to abandon the ground of pre-
judices,in Europe, which embraces the Eastern question.
In looking from this elevated point of view on the engage..
"meats which flow from the third point a solution will easily
be arrived at, honourable for all, and offering real guarantees
to all the contracting parties.
Before all, it is necessary to mention, that that which
it has been thought proper to call " the preponderance of
Russia in the Black Sea " has been the result of the nature
and the whole system of the political relations of the two
empires bordering tiler, on. It was a superiority of autho-
rity which Russia exercised rather by the ascendancy which
thhearn sbpyeheiearl
nit:r
ieattimiese
Swlliptrheintahcey.Ottonmreansul resulted frroemgave the her
iso-
latioa of the Porto much
more than from its inferiority on
the sea.

Developed by the influence of circumstances unconnected
with Russia, such as the regeneration of Greece, the battle of
Navarino, the conquest of Algeria by France, the indepen-
dent tendencies-of the Pasha of Egypt, of the Beys of Tunis
and Tripoli, which deprived the Porte of sufficiently impor-
tant maritime assistance, that inferiority was not brought on.
by Russia. It had formed the object of no stipulation. It
could have ceased at the will of the Porte.
The topographical configuration of the Bosphorus,so favour-
able to the organisation of an impregnable system of defence ;
the possession of fortresses and ports such as Varna, Sisepo-
lis, Bourgas, Trebizonde, &c. ; the advantacre of being able to
-group all her forces round three contiguous basina---these
were and they still are striking advantages which the Porte
possessed and still posseSses o'er Russia, who, obliged to
maintain naval forces in four seas separated by immense die-
tances,.could only give its navy in the Black Sea a restricted
development.
If, notwithstanding the mistrust which for twenty years
past has been excited against Russia, the Porte should not
make use of its advantages, would it not be because, instead
of seeing a danger for herself in the maritime development of
,d the menace
forces
elsewhere,
rshe , h a
uda d a
gasuspicioninst
which,of those
in timweh i cohf
nweoenld

Russia might serve as a means of defence?
Morally, as well as materially, facts seemed to justify that
view.

People have strangely deceived themselves in regard to the
dangers to which the Ottoman empire might be exposed from
the Russian fleet.

In affirming, in his work on Southern Russia, that with
her fleet, rated, it is true, at 30 vessels, Russia could at will
occupy Constantinople, Marshal Marmont has committed a
double error ; on the one hand, because the Russian naval
forces in the Black Sea can never reach that number without
uniting with those of the Baltic—a junction which is impos-
sible ; on the other, because, if even so gigantic a maritime
development could be effected, it would be very far tfrom
leading to the dangers which appear to be apprehended.
That which is now passing in the Crimea would be sufficient
to prove this.

The real facts are, indeed, otherwise opposed to these hy-
potheses. Let us take, for instance, what passed in 1833.
At that epoch the Russian fleet appears in the Bosphorus and
effects a descent, but under what conditions ? It is with the
consent of the Sultan, and to come to his aid. Moreover,
availing itself of all its shipping, the Russian fleet could only
transport on that occasion from 10,000 to 12,000 men. And
it will be admitted that this force, important as an anyiliary,
would have been entirely insufficient if it had presented itself
as au enemy.

Since that time much has been said of the development of
the Russian navy. Notwithstanding all that has been said,
.what do we see 2l) yeari after, that is to say, in 15531
The Russian fleet takes about 15 days for the embarka-
tion, the trauspoit, and the disembarkation of a division of
infantry, that is to say, from 15,900 to 16,000 men, from
Sebastopol to Redont Kaleh.

On taking into consideration the proximity of the maritime
establishments/of Russia, 20,000 men at most can be reckoned
as the number of troops for descent which the Russian navy
of the Black Sea, in its greatest development, would be in a
position to transport, on any given point of the Ottoman ter-
ritory, in the space of about three weeks.
Is that a very great danger? Does it justify the apprehen-
sions which have been conceived ? Is not a risk incurred in
endeavouring to avoid it, of sacrificing to a chimerical danger
the true conditions of the security' of the East and of the.
European equilibrium ? _ _ _

Dangers have many times menaced the Ottoman empire.
from other quarters than the north. An Admiral of the Sul-
tan has even teen seen to lead his fleet to his rebellious vassal.
Who answers that facts of this nature shall not again occur ?
Moreover, the English and French fleets, taken not collec-
tively, but singly, are neither less powerful nor less dangerous
than those of Russia. Because the maritime establishments
of Francs and England are further off, they are not on that
account more inoffensive. Europe is less able to watch the
, evolutions of the fleets that leave them.

By means of the rapidity of electric communications, they
could, by setting sail from Toulon and Malta at the same time
that the Russian fleet should leave Sebastopol, arrive in time
sufficient to ward off danger from the Porte. But who en-
, gagealhat.they may Not one day present themselves with the
same celerity, whether singly or collectively, before the Serag-
lio as enemies of the Porte

The rapidity with which the French fleet sailed towards

Salamis in 1853 shows the material possibility of this on the
part of France. The threats of which M. de Lavalette made
use prove its moral possibility. As regards England, we will
limit ourselves to mentioning the violation of the Straits in
1849, under pretext of tempests.
Where, if the Black Sea were disarmed, would be the secu-
rity against such attempts? Where the counterpoise to prevent
their being lightly undertaken

These simple ivflections are sufficient to show that what-
ever system may be adopted in revising the treaty of 1841,
with the view of connecting the Ottoman empire with the ba-
lance of power in Europe, tho maintenance in the Black Sea
of a respectable Russian naval force would not only not be of a
nature to raise serious apprehensions, but would even be one
of the conditions necessary to secure, by way of counterpoise
to naval forces that may happen to be in the waters of the
Levant, the intact observance of the stipulations concluded in
the interest of the European equilibrium. And let it not be
objected that this would be the maintenance of the status quo,
and that, in consequence, the preponderance which Russia.has
exercised in the Black Sea would not come to an end.
It has before been demonstrated that that preponderance
arises from the isolation of Turkey ; it will therefore cease with.
the entry of the latter under the public law of Europe.
The Porte would preserve not only the faculty which shehas
always had of giving at will to her navy the development
which appeared to it needful, but would acquire another moral
guarantee against all'attack on the part of Russia, who, of a
surety would not risk, for the sake of a most hazardous un-
dArtlking, to draw on herself, by a violation of the public law
of Europe, a general coalition.

More Crier, Russia would net refuse on her part to offernew
guarantees by a revision of the treaty of 1841, if this were
desired by the Sultan.

The transactions of Russia concluded directly with the Porte
hive never made of the Black Sea a closed sea. • On the con-
trary, the Treaty of Adrianople has had the merit of having
opened that sea to mercantile shipping of all nations without
distinction.

The closing of the Straits to war flags has not been the
result of agreements of Russia with the Porte. It has arisen
solely from the ancient legislation of the Ottoman empire.
The treaty of 1841 has only served to recognise and to con-
firm this principle, established by the Sultans in their quality
of sovereigns of the territory adjoining the'two Straits.
They are free to open the passage, as they were to keep it
closed.

So long as the Straits remained closed, it followed naturally
that the navigation of the Black Sea became accessible solely
to the ships of war of the two bordering Powers—the one
Russia, the other Turkey.
The Russian Plenipotentiaries are the first to admit the
facility which the Sultan possesses, in right and in fact, to
open the passage of the Straits to the war-flag of the Powers
with whom the Porte is at peace; but reciprocally, in open
ing the Straits on like terms, to authorise the passage from
one sea to the other, and that in favour of all nations.

Adopted by common consent in the interest of the general
equilibrium, a like provision may serve to put an end to the
inferiority in which the Porte is placed in the Black Sea. It
could be completed by other measures, which would be its
corollaries. Convinced that stipulations taken from this order
of ideas must draw forth the solution so much desired, and
give to the peace of Europe new pledges of security, the
Plenipotentiaries of Russia believe it their duty to appeal t°
the sentiments which animate the members of the Conference,
to engage them to enter into this salutary path, and to
dis-
cuss propositions drawn up in this sense.

(Enclosure 2 in No. 13.)
AiINEX B TO PROTOCOL NO. 12.
Art. . The high contracting Courts being desirous of
putting an end to the anxieties which may arise from the
inequality of the naval forces of the two borring Powers
border
in the basin of the Black Sea, his Highness he Sultan, by
a spontaneous act of his sovereign will, consents to modify
its secu,
the rule of the closing of the Straits of thesDhaaurdiaonrmelletsici
the Bosphorus, as provided for by the treaty of the lst (13th)
July, 1841, and to grant henceforth, without distinction, to
the flags of war of all nations, the free passage through these
Straits to proceed from the Archipelago
and vice versa•
e seen lafiotrs: regulating the tdhoewn
Passage or
the
ships w. ail:hthroarghngthem
sub-
promulgate, according as it may think necessary for
posi-
tionsiectofan:tbed specialurarteigoulan otfioth,e
~a_thicilichoratghoes
shau
anchorages, Bpluortke Sea'

city. • lation mentioned in the preceding article
Art. The
isdevtic feougurbtimpeeflapgztoef, wwahro,of
calledEna tuizinthasentajteu of
t
peace • f perfect equality, shall engage !scrupulously to
observe it.
Art. . His Highness the Sultan, however, reserves to
himself, with a view to particular circumstances, to introduce.
Into the provisions of that regulation, in favour of any flag he
exceptional and tezporary modifications, destined to
shall bwie it
pllnetasite:thgpolivilegts for a limited time.
Art. . In case (which God forbid !) the Sublime Porte
should herself be in a state of war, or should see her security
compromised by hostilities which might break out between
e
other Powers, his Highness the Sultan reserves to himself th
power to suspend the free passage through the Straits, either
entirely or partially, until the cessation of the circumstances
which may have required such a measure.

Cabinet .of Russia, in accepting the " four (Enclosure 3 in No. 13•)
The Imperial . fcAlosTu:epaloiTnocoNot.Nlo3..)l2
h negotiation,as I th
easy
eur otthcoounachTloefd
alteringfrom i itself f.
AN(NRE:
with the imPu•l'
theirerea
The High Contracting Parties, impressed
equilibrium of seeing
fundamental idea which presides over the deliberation
neither
generalher advantages of the
ANNEX C TO PROTOCOL No. 12. _ ___,_
points"lsmaebaansiinsgo,
of the Conference is to put an end to the isolated position of ance to the maintenance of the
\ the Sublime Porte partielPating the Ottoman empire, to connect it with the balance of power union established in Europe, to bring it within tho public law of the civilised pean States, declare that they will
Beach on its own part to
world; in short, to assure to it conditions of existence calm- 'an integral part of this union; ga
the territorial integrity of the
lated to afford pledges of security to itself, and to give to
ire . by public
i law bienntsetcune n henceforthtchcolon:is s
iirdedenertr herEue v 1 e r
I.‘ca);
Common the strict observance
Europe guarantees against fresh complications.
The realisation of this idea necessarily called for essential Ottoman emp , , will In co
of this engagement, anti maces in 4 the Put of RU5Sia, I)ooidtd 0111314ilig thew, act, &c.
respect the independence and