The National Register.
London, England, 1811-06-02 00:00:00

SITNDAY, JUNE 2, lfil 1.

POLITICAL DISQUISITION.

No. 165.
WAR IN IN THE PFNINSUI.A.

The war in the Peninsula flames forth with addi-
tional vigrur. The important movements per-
formed in the month of March, Which terminated in
the evacuation of Portugal
,by the French, seemed
to have brought the campaign to a close. Expelled
from the northern, they were fast retiring from the
southern provinces of that kingdom, and strong
hopes were entertained, that the renewal of hostilities
would take place in the heart of Spain, where the
enemy once opposed by a regular and victorious
army, and harrassed on every side by the Guerillas,
vbuld find it impossible to maintain an extended
footing. MASSFNAIS retreat, however, has only
proved the prelude to a mcra active kind of ope-

rations, and the most sanguinary battles. Con-

scious that if he did not prevent the entrance of
Lord WttLtsarint's army ii to Spain, but suffered
the seat of war to be transferred into that cou-ncry,
the spirit of patriotism would bdrst forth with

renewed energy in the provinces which now bear
,the yoke but impatiently, and supported by the .
presence and courage of our warriors, as well as
the skill of their Commander, would rise too high
to be once more subdued, BUONAPARTE ordered
retreating Generals to bring the fate of the
war to an issue, and by a series of desperate actions
either to ruin our army, or perish in the attempt.
In consequence of these commands, the existence
of which cannot be doubted when we compare the
late supineness of the French Mar.hals, when the
advantages of numbers was on their side, with
their sudden activity when they had been reduced
to little more than half their former strength,
MASSENA and SoULT traced back their steps. They
. had both left the two most important fortresses in
the present state of the war, surrounded by our
troops. Almeida and Badajoz, although strongly
garrisoned, could not long defend themselves, as,
cut off from the possibility of receiving any sup-
plies, the very strength and numbers of their garri-
kons formed their weakness. Aware of its.situation
in this respect, and never forgetting that one of the
Di-a duties of a General is to spare a u
his soldier's blood, Lord WELLINGT
V. C 1.2 "..X.141C.

to employ against Almeida no other weapon than
hunger, whilst lie spread the greatest part of his
army, as a shield on the hills that "‘:e the frontiers
of Portugal. Had hi intended to enter Spain from
that quarter, he would have adopted oler means
to reduce that fortress more speedily. But as he
conceived it improper to invade a province where
he should immediately fall in with another fortified
place, and where the enemy was posted in the midst
of his strength, being able to collect reinforcements
from. every neighbouring town, and even, without
much loss of time, from France, he contented
himself with preparing to repel every attempt
which might be made for the relief of Almeidt
and directed offensive operations to be carried on
in a quarter where they were likely to meet with
the greater success. We have already seen how
effectually arid gloriously his Lordship defeated
the reinforced I`,lAsm:NA in his desperate endea-
vours to open a communication w ith, and to throw
fresh supplies into Almeida. The subsequent escape
of its gairison through the darkness of n;ght, and
with the assistance of skilful guides by whom it was
enabled to avoid our pests, wiiiist 1-14
fortress in our possession, is an additional proof oa
the complete disappointment of MASSENAIS inten-
tions, since what he could not effect by the force of
arms, he was compelled to resort to secret wiles,
to execute, and even then, but partially accom-
plished. Let us now consider the different charac-
ter of the campaign on the southern frontiers of

Portugal.

The French force in the South of Spain is
divided into numerous corps of moderate strength,
stationed at a considerable distance from each
othqr, and scarcely able to repress the incessantly
threatened rising of the extensive and populous
provinces which they are intended to overawe. It
is therefore evident, that if menaced by a British
army, they must abandon a large portion of the
country which they occupy, to be able, by the
junction of their scattered forces, to oppose our
progress. But in so doing they necessarily remove
from the minds of the natives the dread which alone
keeps them in subjection, and open a wide field for
patriotic enterprise, as well as for any operations
which our troops at Cadiz may perform, by being
on the undefended coasts, and attacking
tr. At the same time their distance frow

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