The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-17 00:00:00

TVHY HAS SEBASTOPOL NOT BEEN

TAKEN ?

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CALEDONIAN MERCURY.
Sir,—The Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, in
his speech a short time ago to the Legislative Assembly
stated that France has atthis momentan army of 581,000
soldiers. A question here naturally suggests itself to
every one who reads this speech—" 581,000 soldiers be-
longing to our ally ! How does it happen that Sebas-
topol has not been taken long ago, and what occasion
has England to engage twenty or thirty thousand Ger-
mans to enable the allies to make head against the Rus-
sians ?"
When we were about to engage in the present war,
one of the great arguments continually advanced by the
warlike party in the country against the peace party wets
this :—" France is the first military power of Europe,
England is the greatest naval power, and, in addition to
that, the richest—disposing of an almost unlimited
amount of capital. England and France united, nothing
can resist them. Russia will soon be obliged to sue for
mercy," _ _

Without the alliance of France we should never have
dreamed of attacking Russia. But with such all alhanee
—always supposing that France would put Mali her
whole strength, in the same manner as we should—we
had every right to believe, as Sir James Graham said,
that the war would be sharp and short ; would in effect
be ended in a single campaign by the capture of Sebas-
topol, and the destruction of the whole of the Russian
fleet in the Black Sea. This might easily have been ac-
complished last summer, as I shall now proceed to show.
France, as I have already stated, is the first military
power in Europe. She has at present, and had during
the whole of last year, 581,000 men under arms,
perhaps—taking all their qualities together—the first
soldiers in the world, far superior to the Russians,
and equalled only by the English. But this is not
all. France can at any time double the number of her
standing army, and that without a new conscription—
simply by a decree of the Emperor. I shall point out
how this is done. The young men, when they are se-
lected by ballot for the conscription, are engaged for 8
years. But before they have run out their term of eight
years, a number of them, though not the whole, are al-
ways sent home at the end of 3 or 4 years, under the
obligation, however, to return to their colours at any
time during the period of their engagement, when re-
quired to do so by the Government.
Thus, there is always in France a number of soldiers
perfectly disciplined, independent of the standing army,
ready to be called into activity at a moment's warning
whenever the Government thinks fit. The army which
the Emperor of the French could dispose of during the
whole of last year, and which he can command at the
present time, is above a million of men. In the speech
of Louis Napoleon already referred to, it is stated that
the conscription of this year is to consist of 140,000 re-
cruits, the same as last year. But this new levy is not
to increase the existing army—that is positively declared
in the Emperor's speech—but only to keep up the army
to its old staidard, by supplying the place of those who
have completed their time, or are allowed to return to
their homes, previous to their legal service being finished.
The real army of France, then, is above a million of
men, perfectly disciplined and warlike, and which it only
requires a sufficient command of money and the will of
one man to bring into active employment. Bonaparte,
the first Emperor, never had an army equal to it, even
when he marched 700,000 men across Germany and Po-
land into the very heart of Russia. I ask once more
then, how it happens that with the complete command
of the sea, an unlimited command of capital, and a million
of soldiers at the disposal of one of the allies, '3ebastopol
is not taken—how it happens that at the Battle of the
Alma the English army of 27,000 was supported only by
22,000 French—how at Inkerman the English army had
to contend against the most terrible odds—one against 7
—and that the only assistance afforded them was by
6000 French 3 and how, in fine, at the present moment
our poor soldiers are so overtasked in defending their
batteries, 'that they aro dying by hundreds a-day, by
disease brought on principally by over fatigue and ex-
posure in the trenches, arising from the smallness of their
number in proportion to the task assigned to them
As this must appear strange to those who place im-
plicit reliance on the French alliance, and who believe
that the French Emperor is as anxious to bring the war
to a rapid conclusion as is the Government of this coun-
try, and that he is as willing to make as great sacrifices
for that end, we have sent from Britain every soldier,
sailor, and ship, which we could possibly command. We
have called out our militia, and we have even passed a
bill for the enlistment of foreign soldiers. France, on
the other hand, has an army of 450,000 men under arms
at home, of which 100,000 are absolutely idle in camp
at Boulogne, and she has only about 60,000 in the
Crimeaand 60,000 in Algeria. 100,000, or even 50,000
of these home troops would have secured the conquest of
Sebastopol almost without a battle. At the battle of
Alma, 50,000 additional French troops would have
enabled the Allies, after the victory, to have marched
directly upon Sebastopol, to have completely invested
it, to have cut off the supplies, and to have forced it to
surrender at discretion. And even after the battle of
the Alma, bad a new French army been sent to the
Crimea, for instance half the troops at the camp of Bou-
logne, during the time that the Emperor of Russia was
sending his reinforcements for the defencd of Sebastopol,
the place would have been taken by this time. And at
present, if the French Emperor would only send
50,000 men to co-operate with the Turks at
Eupatoria, and to march against Sebastopol from
the north, the place would not hold out for a month.
Sebastopol, I repeat, would have been taken lung ago
had the French Emperor determined to take it, and will
be taken only when Louis Napoleon has made up his
mind to take it ; that is to say, has made np his mind
to send sufficient forces to take it. Without this
determination on the part of the French Emperor, all
our exertions with our regulars, our militia, and our
foreign legion will be absolutely useless. And as soon
as this determination is come to by Louis Napoleon, a
sufficiency of French soldiers will ho sent without our
requiring the slightest aid from Germany or Switzer-
land. The foreign enlistment bill has thus been utterly
useless in every point of view.
Sir Archibald Alison in a speech, and Sir Howard
Douglas in a pamphlet, have pointed out, as I have
done, that the attack on Sebastopol has failed altoge-
ther from the want of a sufficient number of men on the
part of the assailants. Indeed this is evident to every
one. But those gentlemen—ultra-Tories both of them—
have thrown the whole blkine of this upon the Govern-
ment of Lord Aberdeen. The Government should have
sent out more troops—the Whigs have allowed the mi-
litary establishments of the country to fall too low, &c.
Such are the reasons assigned by those two opponents
of the Government for the failure of the expedition.
But not the slightest censure is hinted against Louis
Napoleon, who, even since his coup d'etat, by which
all liberty has been put down in France, has been taken
under the special patronage of the Tories.
Now, though I consider that the chief blame must be
attributed to the French Emperor, who had plenty of
troops at his command, and who did not send them, yet
our Administration must be regarded as in some degree
in fault in not having forced the French Emperor to
send to the Crimea the necessary forces. For instance,
last summer Ministers should have decidedly said to the
French Emperor, " Send off, from your camp at Bou-
logne, at least 50,000 additional men, which are neces-
sary to insure the success of the expedition, or we shall
withdraw altogether from the alliance and give up the
war, and we shall inform Europe, and especially France,
of our reasons for so doing. England is quite willing to
pay her full share of the expense of those additional men
and will furnish the ships necessary for the transport.
But we cannot consent to exhaust all our means, and our
ally lie by and not do the same." Such should have
been the tone adopted by the Government of this coun-
try, and had Ministers acted in this way Louis Napo.
leon would not have dared to refuse to send the neces-
sary reinforcements ; for he knows well that public opi-
nion in France, especially the opinion of the army, would
have accused him of compromising the national honour ;
and this the French Emperor—despot as he is —could
not brave with impunity.

Put Ministers have conducted themselves in a most
weak and vacillating manner towards Louis Napoleon.
They have allowed him to do just as he pleased. He has
completely outwitted them, and even the press of Eng-
land has played into his hands. While the most virulent
Attacks have been made by the press against our Cabinet
—principally for not sending out more troops, when they
had no more to send, not the slightest comment by any
paper whatever has ever been advanced against the Em-
peror of the French. So that Louis Napoleon actually
imagines he may do just as he pleases with the English,
and that whatever he does the whole nation is ready to
appplaud.

About the period that the battle of the Alma was
fought', the French Emperor was amusing himself at
Boulogne commanding at sham-fights, delivered by the
great army assembled there. Every one recollects how
on one occasion 50,000 men marched up the hill to
attack the town, where there they were encountered by
50,000 other troops, commanded by the Emperor in
person. Of course the assailants were defeated and
is called. Well,
as it
obliged to retreat, and Louis Napoleon covered himself
with glory in this petite guerre,
this took place at the very time when our expedition to
the Crimea was failing from the want of sufficient forces.
I was then at Paris myself, and I can vouch for this,
that in almost every French society where people could
converse without being overheard by the spies of the
police, the utmost ridicule was thrown upon the Em-
peror. Every one said, why are these men not sent out
to the Crimea to terminate at once the war by a decisive
victory I Are our soldiers, at a crisis like the present,
to be kept at home to serve as toys and amusement to
Louis Napoleon ?

Such was the feeling in France at this time, and with
such a feeling existing in that country our Government
only required to make a sufficiently firm representation
to compel, in a manner, the Emperor to send to the
Crimea forces sufficient to have insured, before the com-
mencement of winter, the capture of Sebastopol. The
press of France, ever since the coup d'aut, has been
muzzled, and, of course, no French paper dared to
speak out. The press of England, however, might have
done something. But instead of pointing out the im-
policy of retaining so large a force in France at such a
jucture, the limes, the Herald, the Citron &c.—the
London journals are read very generally in Paris—could
hardly find words to express their admiration of Louis
Napoleon, and their columns were filled up with gor-
geous descriptions of the magnificent reviews and sham-
fights presided over by the Emperor.
The conduct and motives of Louis Napoleon,
in not having pushed, as he ought to have
done, the war in the Crimea, will -require some
explanation, in order to be fully understood. Having
passed the last eight months in France--during the
whole time of the campaign in the Crimea—and having
, conversed during this period with a number of lute'''.