The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-18 00:00:00

Sir,-1 have received your letter of the Sth January,
and I beg respectfully to observe that their lordships
have evaded, but not replied to my letter. I did not
complain that my officers had not been promoted, and I
knew very well that the French army and navy bore a
conspicuous part in the capture of Bomarsund.
I knew also that their chiefs were promoted, and the
army and navy thanked by the Chambers, while the
only chief on our side promoted has been Brigadier Jones,
who proposed a plan of attack on Sweaborg, which was
condemned and rejected by the French Marshal, the
French General of Engineers, the French Admiral, and
myself, as impracticable and ,la.ngerou., whereas I have
been deprived of my command, and her Majesty has not
been advised to expresS her approbation.
I did not complain of any neglect of Captain Watson
or his officers and men, and I am glad their lordships
have at last promoted his First Lieutenant, and no re-
ward is too great for Ma bold and successful blockade of
the Gulf of Finland after I retired with the Fleet to
Kiel, and it is most providential that some of his ships
were not lost ; it. is probable that such would have been
the fate of my fl:et had I remained at Nargen, as
ordered by their lordships, until the ice came, and at all
hazards ; and it is singular also, the dates of my letter,
Announcing my intended retirement, and the date of
heir lord-hips'ltitter withdrawing the order to remain
at all hazards, were the same.

Their lordships conclude their letter by saying they
had already expressed their sense of my exertians (luring,
comrnand'of the Baltic fleet, but they forgot to do
so when they or.lered me to haul down my Wig ; and
they also forgot t., promote my Flag Lieutenant, agree-
ably to the custom of the service:"

I was not desired to thank the junior admirals, the
officers and men, without whose exertions and willing
obedience, under the most trying circumstances, tar
wretchedly-manned and inefficient fleet could not have
been brought into the state of discipline it was in when
I brought it home, atter having for nine months con.
ducted them through all the dangers of the Baltic and
Gulf of Finland—conducted them safely into anchorage,
that no fleet had vi,ited before, without pilots, withou,
lights, and without buoys or beacons, except those
placed to mislead us,—and all this with a fleet of such a
size and magnitude as had never been before seen ; and
after having repeatedly offered battle, with only one-
third of the Rus,sia.n force, and blockaded Bomarsund
amidst a labyrinth of sunken rocks and islands, and,
finally, in conjunction with a French army and fleet,
took it.

Their lordship say no censure has been conveyed on
any point requiring further investigation. I beg to differ
from their lordships : I will not enter on the fact of Sir
James Graham having, in his capacity of First Lord,
written to me to begin to withdraw the fleet, and then,
in his capacity of one of the Board, reproving me for so
doing. The points on which an investigation of my con-
duct is necessary are, whether I was right or wrong in
agreeing:with a Marshal of France, a General of Engi-
neers, and a French Admiral in rejecting the impracti-
cable plan of an English Brigadier-General of Engineers
for attacking Sweaborg, with which decision the Admi-
ralty have expressed their discontent ; whether the
report of my second reconnaissance of Sweaborg deserves
the construction their lordships thought fit to give it ;
and, indeed, changed the sense and meaning of it al-
together, to make out a case against me, at the same
time using language to goad me to attack Sweaborg,
contrary to my judgment, contrary to the judgment of
the French Admiral, and contrary to the judgment of
my own Admirals, whom I was ordered to consult ; this
was to the imminent risk of her Majesty's fleet, either
from the fire of a fortress of the first order, or from tem-
pestuous weather, or from both ; unless, indeed, I could
hit on a fine day in the latter end of October, when the
Croastadt fleet should be :rrozen, and that of Sveaborg
open. These were their lordships' instructions, and they
showed that they were totally ignorant of the state of
the
Had their lordships consulted Sir Byam Martin, who
was then alive, or, indeed, any captain of a la,itie trader,
they would have told them whether a fine day was
likely to be found at that season of the year, and
whether any sane man would push a fleet amongst
sunken rocks, without beacons or buoys, to attack one
of the strongest fortresses in Europe, when he could not

depend on the weather for two hours.
Notwithstanding all the explanations I gave to their
lordships in public letters, and to Sir J. Graham in pri-
vate letters, they persisted in writing to me in a style
that might have done for a man who either did nut know
his duty, or was afraid to do it ; but not to a man of my
character and services.

If enough was not done in the Baltic to satisfy the
public, and if blame was to attach to any one, it should
attach to the Government, for not sending out a sufii•
cient number of troops at a proper season of the year,
and if that was not practicable, for not sending
out the appliances pointed out in my report of
the 12th of June, and which differed little from
my report of the 25th of September. Their lord-
ships thought proper to interpret the last as an as-
surance that I could attack Sweaborg with ships
alone, and that I meant to do so, though I most dis-
tinctly said, after giving a detailed account of how it
should be attacked, if by ships alone—" Whether this
attack would succeed or not it is impossible to say ; but
we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hot
shot and shells, of which they would have abundance ;
and, whether successful or not, it is evident the ships
would be in no state to meet the Russian fleet after-
wards ; and if the attack was'made at this season of the
year, when you cannot depend on the weather for two
hours, I do not know how many would be lost."
I then proceeded to say, " I beg their Lordships will

not suppose for a moment that Srveaborg cannot be al
_ _ _

tacked ; I think it can, but it must be done with caution

and judgment." Then followed a complete detail of the
manner it should be attacked to insure success, and 1
should have thought that their Lordships really mis-
understood my letters had they not persisted in address-
ing me in the same style after my explanations.

During the whole of the summer Sir James Graham
was cautioning me against risking the fleet against stone
walls, and complimenting me for having proved myself
a consummate Commander-in-Chief —praised me for all
my arrangements—for the capture of Boinarsund, with
which he was more than pleased ; but then, because two
engineers proposed plans diametrically opposite to each
other, he forgot his former cautions and all his former
praises—forgot his consummate Commander-in-Chief—
and urged me to attack Sweaborg, contrary to my own
judgment and that of my colleagues, and risk her Ma-
jesty's fleet amongst sunken rocks, against heavy bat-
teries, and at a season of the year which any man who
knew his business would have positively forbid, instead
of goading to attempt.
In Sir James Graham's letter to me, of the 17th of
October, he makes use of the following expression—it is
the French General who writes :—" We partake of the
opinion of General Jones. Sweaborg may be attacked
and taken by the fleets, if they think fit to make on that
fortress a serious attack."
Now, there is no such thing in :General Jones's re-
port—the French General meant General Niel's report,
and Sir James Graham either never read General Jones's
report, or thought proper to forget it. General Niel,
after stating that he thought the fleets could lay Swea-
berg in ruins, added, "'Ma's les vaisseaux sant des ma-
chines bien 6ien eompliqudes bien faciles ii incendier'
uno telle operation est hardie--elle n'a jamais ete fait
que je Bache et ce n'est pas d moi qu'il appartient do la
conseiller."t This, Sir James thinks proper to inter-
pret, in his letter to me, " General Niel intimated very
distinctly an opinion that the attack ought to be made ;"
and then goes on to say, alluding, I suppose, to General
Jones's report, " that report made a great impression
here, and raised a strong presumption that, with the aid
of the military force then present with the fleet, in
seven or eight days the works at Sweaborg might be
destroyed, and that the month of September was the
proper time for the operation." Whatever impression
it Made on Sir James Graham (who I do not think a
good judge) that report made none on the French mar-
shal—none on the French admiral, the French engineer,
We all considered it impracticable, and as
or myself,
the weather turned out, had it been put in course of exe-
cution, the communication with the fleet would have

He was afterwards promoted.
t General Niel acted liko a matt of sense and lioneur, in
qualifying hia opinion.