The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

(No. 18.).

TIIE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND.
Foreign-office, June 2, 1855.

My Lord,—l herewith transmit the copy of a despatch
(No. 17) from Count Buol to Count Colloredo, with its en-
closures, which have been placed in my hands by Count
Colloredo.

I have told the Austrian Minister that, after an attentive
perusal of these documents, I could only again express my
regret that proposals to which it.was impossible for her Ma-
jesty's Government to agree should have been renewed by the
Austrian Government ; but that the sincerity of our regret
could not be doubted by Count Buol after the many proofs
that her Majesty's Government bad given of the importance
they attach to the co-operation of Austria in a cause which
concerns her more directly even than it does the Western
Powers, and from which her Majesty's Government could not
believe that her support would now be withdrawn.
I told Count Colloredo that I had already discussed with
him one of the propositions transmitted by Count Buol, and
that the opinion of her Majesty's Government upon it had
been conveyed to your lordship in my despatch of the Bth of
May, and communicated to Count Buol ; and that the other
proposition having been forwarded by your lordship, I would
read to him the answer which was about to be sent to you.
After reading to Count Colloredo my despatch of May 29
(No. 16) to your lordship, I said I wished to avoid all discus-
sion that might be irritating, and which, from the tone of
Count Buol's despatches, I was led to think would be useless,
but that there were some statements in those despatches to
Count Colloredo and M. de Hubner upon which I should take
the liberty of offering a few remarks.
In the despatch to M. de Hubner, Count Buol stated that
Austria provides a progressive report of much weight and
value to Turkey, by stipulating that for each new ship that
Russia may construct the allies shall be permitted to make
a proportionate addition to their naval stations in the Black
Sea ; and that, in the event of the Porte thinking itself
menaced, it may call the allied fleets to its aid.
Upon this I begged to observe that the real object of the
third basis appeared to be lost sight of, and that, so far from
causing the preponderance of Russia, to cease, the proposed
conditions would go to establish a competition for prepon-
derance between the allies and Russia. Such a state of things
would not be peace, but a constant preparation for war, and
a constant source of uneasiness to Europe.

The Porte, I said, required no permission from any other
Power to call upo❑ its allies for assistance when threatened
with danger. The Sultan might at any time do so of his own
free will and pleasure ; and if the proposal of Austria wero
adopted, and no effectual limitation were placed on the Rus-
sian fleet, that fleet would be a standing menace to Turkey,
and the Sultan would be continally justified in asking
for the aid of his allies, who would be in honour bound
to afford it. If the danger was imminent, the allied fleets
ini;lit arrive too late to save Turkey.; but, whether the
danger was imminent or prospective, the naval forces
of England and France could only be summoned to the
Black Sea for the purpose of repelling Russian aggression, and
on every such occasion Europe would have to fears and Eng-
land and France would have to be prepared. for, the renewal
of hontilitic...._ .

Count Buol in the same despatch says that the common
efforts of the allies should be directed to limiting the political
power of Russia, so as to render it, if not impossible, at least
eminently difficult, for her to abuse her material resources ;
but that the cessation of Ru.ssian preponderance in the Black
Sea would only be one of the means towards that end, as the
diminution, or even the total destruction of that fleet, would
not alone be sufficient to deprive Russia of the advantages
over Turkey which she derives from her geographical position.
I expressed my entire concurrence with Count Buol as to
the desirableness of limiting the political power of Russia ;
but, instead of entering upon a new problem, the practical
solution of which was not even alluded to by Count Buol, I
thought it would be more prudent for the allies to confine
themselves to the question at issue, which was how to give
effect to the third basis, and to put an end to the preponder-
ance of Russia in the Black Sea, and as yet no way so simple
or so effectual had been discovered as such a limitation of her
naval forces in that sea as should render their amount con-
sistent with the safety of Turkey.
In his despatch to Count Colloredo, Count Buol expresses
his firm conviction that the proposal of Austria for giving
effect to the third basis would be effectual, complete, and in
conformity with the interest of Europe ; and his Excellency
adds that its rejection by the Western Powers does 1.1,,)t per-
mit Austria to cast exclusively upon Russia the responsibility
of the failure of the negotiations.

Upon this I remarked that England and France, being at
war with Russia, and having made vast sacrifices, must be
allowed to judge for themselves on what
,terms they could
make peace consistently with their honour and with the
objects for which such sacrifices had been made, and that
the necessity under which they felt themselves of declining
the proposals of Austria proved that, in their judgment,
those proposals were neither effectual nor complete, nor
likely to be for the advantage of Europe. But Russia, I said,
had rejected terms that Austria thought reasonable in them-
selves and necessary tor the peace of Europe, and that were
not inconsistent with the dignity of Russia ; and because she
had so rejected them, and because the Western Powers could
not agree to conditions that Austria has since proposed, and
which are altogether different arekkineffectual for their object,
it is surely unjust to say that Riigland and France oppose
obstacles to peace, and that Russia is no longer exclusively
to blame for the failure of the negotiations.
I must also, I said, express my regret that Count Buol
should now be of opinion that the proposal to limit the naval
forces of Russia could only be considered as one of the condi-
tions which the belligerents had expressly reserved to them-
selves the right of imposingbeyond the four points, and which
the continuation of hostilities might render necessary, for his
Excellency, to the best of my belief, had not regarded the pro-
posal in that light, even when discussing it with the Plenipo-
tentiaries of England and France, and he had supported it in
the Conference, and had recommended it to the acceptance of
the Russian Plenipotentiaries, as the best means for giving
effect to the third basis.

The object of the third basis is to put an end to the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea; the limitation of the Rus-
sian fleet in that sea comes then strictly within that object,
and is not a distinct and separate proposal apart from the four
bases, and such as the allies reserved to themselves the right
to bring forward, according as the events of the war might
make it necessary.
I requested Count Colloredo to assure Count Buol that we
did not, as he supposed, exclude by anticipation any other
project that would be equally efficacious; but that we declined
and must continue to decline all such means as are manifestly
ineffectual for the objects we have in view.
Count Colloredo observed that some sacrifice should be
made to secure the alliance of Austria.
I said, I entirely agreed with him, and that we had shown
all possible deference to Austria. It was solely out of defer-
ence to her that England and France had agreed to the four
bases, and bad consented to enter upon negotiations for peace ;
it was to meet the views, and to secure the co-operation of
Austria in a cause which might be considered essentially her
own, that England and France adopted a course which they
would not otherwise have pursued until the events of war had
more distinctly defined the relative position of the belligerent
Powers.
Count Colloredo then adverted to the great interests which
Austria had at stake, and the risk she would incur by going
to war with Russia without being able •to reckon upon the
material support of the Western Powers, while she would have
to fear the if not the hostility, of Prussia, and of some
of the German States.
I said that, so far from questioning these considerations,
her Majesty's Government gave great weight to them, and
never failed to make allowance for the disadvantages under
which Austria thought herself labouring. It was for Austria
to decide between the considerations alluded to by Count
Colloredo' and the engagements she had entered into with the
Western Powers; but whatever her decision might be, and
whatever view Austria might take of her own interest and
obligation, no effort on the part of her Majesty's Government
would be wanting to maintain unimpaired the friendly rela-
tions that now existed between the two countries.
On the other hand, however, we must claim to be the beat
guardians of our own honour and the best judges of our own
interests, and Austria would have no just cause for complaint
if we declined to accept conditions which wemight regard as
inconsistent with our honour, and ineffectual for the objects
that England and France had pledged themetAelvuesEtNopseoeN.ure.
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No. 19.

The Earl of Westmorland acknowledges the receipt of
Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 29th of April, which was
communicated to Count Buol, who promises a speedy reply.

No•
20.
Foreign-office, un h
TDB EARL OF CLARENDON TO. TUB EARL OF WESTMORLAND.J2.
My Lord,---With reference to your Lordship's despatc
of the sth inst., in which you report that Count Buol had
stated that his object was not to make a proposition in any
way on behalf of the Governments of England and France,
but entirely independent of them, I have to observe that, as
the propositions were formally submitted to the Govern-
ments of Englilha 'and France,
those Governments, if they
had agreed to them, would il3 honour have been bound to
'

abide by then, and to seek no other or better terms ; and
Austria then, in bringing them beforo the Conference, would
fairly have been entitled to say that she did so in behalf of
the English and French Governments.

I must further observe that, although Count Buol may
consider that the nomination of consuls was sufficiently
alluded to in the second article of his project, yet England
and France could not consent to delegate to the Russian and
Turkish Plenipotentiaries the settlement of a question of so
much importance as that of the right to appoint consuls in
Russian harbours for the purpose of superintending the ob-
servance of the treaty.
And, lastly, with respect to the fulfilment of the obits-
_ _ . . .

, -
tions contracted by Austria by the treaty of the 2d of De-
cember, which Count Buol said was a subject more imme-
diately connected with the ultimatum which Austria had
proposed to address to the Russian Government, in which
was involved the question of an immediate declaration of
war, I can only repeat that it is the wish of her Majesty's
Government to avoid an irritating discussion upon a question
with respect to which the Cabinet of Vienna appears long
since to have formed its opinion and taken its decision.
I shall, therefore, confine myself to remarking that Austria
has bound herself to concert measures with England and
France for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d of December,
if peace was not made on certain bases before a specified time.
That time has long since elapsed, and the bases have been re-
jected by Russia ; but the project of Austria would not have
given effect to the bases, and would not have put an end to
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. England and
France were therefore compelled t• decline adhering to a pro-
position which, although it may be called an ultimatum,
cannot be said to have involved an immediate declaration of
war, as there can be no doubt that the proposal would have
been gladly accepted by Russia.— I am, d:e.,

CLARENDON.

No. 21.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND.
Foreign-office, June 13, 1855.
My Lord,—Count Colloredo yesterday read to me a despatch
from Count Buol, stating that he considered that the reserve
made in the protocol of December 28, with respect to the
principle of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia
in the Black Sea, is at present in full force ; that the events
of war must bring about the solution of the point ; and
Count Buol hopes that the efforts of the allies will obtain
the end in view as completely as Austria would probably
have obtained it, either by peaceful methods or by joining
in the war, if her allies had not rejected the last Austrian
proposal. However much Count Buol regrets the rejection
of that plan, the continuation of the war in no way changes
the position of Austria and her allies towards each other.
Austria will maintain her rights and perform her duties as
regards the Eastern question, on the bases agreed upon, and,
until she learns to the contrary, will conclude that her allies
will do the same. Austria will more especially endeavour to
maintain the concession obtained from Russia on the first and
second points, and also as regards the material guarantee (of
the Ottoman empire) ; Austrian troops will remain in the Prin-
cipalities to defend Turkey from attack on the side of the
Danube, until the chances of war may dispose the belligerents
to resume the work of peace on the bases already admitted and
partially developed.
Without giving any opinion on the probabilities of the
war, the Austrian Government cannot conceal its apprehen-
sion that the greatest successes in the Crimea may not be suf-
ficient to induce Russia to make peace, and that the reverses
of Russia may so excite the Russian people as to render peace
more difficult of attainment, so that the war may be indefi-
nitely prolonged.
The consequences will be that the Ottoman empire will be
exhausted, and the original object of the war lost sight of.
Count Buol fears that amidst these new complications the
grand political end of the alliance will disappear. Austria
will assuredly do nothing to hasten a result so much to be
lamented ; on the contrary, the Austrian Cabinet is deter-
mined to maintain its intimate relations with its allies, and
Count Buol hopes to find on their part similar intentions.
I told Count Colloredo that, without consulting my col-
leagues and learning the opinion of the French Government,
I could give no answer to the despatch he had just read,
and which I had listened to with much regret, as it was un-
favourable to the prospects of an alliance from which we had
expected so much towards bringing the war to a successful
end, and from which, when peace was concluded, we had
looked for important advantages to Europe.
Austria, I said, might confidently rely that England and
France would maintain their engagement, and perform
their duties with scrupulous good faith, and that it would
be their object to maintain the most friendly relations with
Austria, but I would not conceal from Count Colloredo my
own opinion that the continuation of the war must, to a
certain extent, change the position of Austria and her allies
towards each other unless she took part in the war, in ful-
filment of her engagements ; if she did not do so the cause
must be either that it would be inconvenient to her to give
effect to the treaty of December 2, or else that her Allies
were to blame for the rupture of the negotiations, Upon
the first cause, which was too improbable for belief, it
would be unnecessary to make any remark ; but against the
second I must beg in the strongest manner to protest, and
for the reasons which I had given in answer to another
despatch of Count Buol's, which Count Colloredo had just
read.

If England and France had been extravagant in their
demands, or had sought to gain any advantage over Russia
beyond the terms that had been agreed upon between the
three Powers, Austria would have been fully justified in
considering herself rel eased from her engagements, and in
throwing upon her allies the responsibility of the consequences ;
but no condition was pressed which had not previously been
assented to by Austria, and which was not subsequently sup-
ported by her in the Conference ; and, because these propo-
sals were rejected by Russia, it was difficult to understand by
what process of reasoning Austria arrived at the conclusion
that she was thereby emancipated from her obligations, and
that her only duty was to wish success to her allies in the
war which they were still determined to carry on.
The questions involved in the four points would, I said as
a matter of 3ourse, come under consideration whenever nego-
tiations were resumed ; but England and France must consi.
der themselves entirely free to act according to circumstances,
and that. they must in the meanwhile regard as non avenus
the partial arrangements made at the Conferences of Vienna.l
Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and
give his Excellency a copy of it, if ho should desire to have
one. I am, &c.,