The National Register.
London, England, 1814-11-06 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER._

What, however, with all our clinging to the Powers that
be, is the actual state of, our cmnmerce with those coun-
tries, and even with Russia? The merchants must answer

Ibis question.
But we instil by this system an idea that we are grasp-
ing and ambitious. Every body is aware of this disposition
-but ourselves; and in no one instance is combined so striking
an example of it, than in the treaty of Pa! is. The prgjet
was evidently British; and the idea of yoking Flanders to
Holland sprung, in the first instance, most probably from
that of the pi oposed matrimonial connection with the House
of Orange. The fertile fields of Flanders, appeared too ne-
cessary to the dull and.monotonous morasses of 'Holland, to
be overlooked. The disposition of the people was forgotten,
the perpetual state of confusion in which they bad been kcpl
for ages•—their fields moistened with the blood of their fel-
low creatures--the state of peace which they bad enjoyed
since they were under the sway of France—their rapid im-
provement under her system of Government—their conse-
quent attachment to that country—all were forgotten ; and it
should seem that attempts are about to be made to create, by
force, an union between two countries, as little likely to
coincide in opinions or unite in habits as oil and water arc

capable of amalgamation.
But to us, the object appears, in addition to that before
alluded to, to have been a great one ; for, it should seem the
Cape of Good Hope was another of the causes which led to
our endeavouring to obtain Flanders for Holland. What-
ever might be the disposition of • the Sovereign of Holland,
the people of that country had no claim whatever upon us to
justify our involving ourselves on their account. In any
transaction that might make our right to the possession of
the Cape in the least doubtful, Holland might have alledged
. that an equivalent was necessary. It was very possible,
might a British minister have said, but Great Britain is not
to .furnish it. But France had artfully contended at that
snoment, or rather conceded the Status ante Belize): : shedid
this in a moment of distress, merely to establish the Princi-
ple ; avid out of this erinciple thus established, has grown
the cession of Belgium to Holland, though the fact flies in
the very face of the principle.
The result of this miserable diplomacy, we shall discover
in that of the Congress at Vienna. It will then be found
that France has made her usually admirable use of this prin-
ciple, which existed uo where, bat the eh...elle ideas of
some London Editors.
But there is another mason why it weld _have been bet-
ter to have left France the Rhine for her boundary,; this rea-
son is simply, that in the actual state of that empire she will
always be able, at the commencement of a continental war, to
give hie to- er ilrsteampaign by advancing to the ithiste.'
This has been most clearly proved in the events of the past qet
years. W ith Spain, either allied or neutral (the former by
far the most probablel,with the influence she has planted in
Italy, there is nothtng to prewnt her bringing her 250,000
men to Dear on the Flemish frontier.
Tiie policy of thus holding .ont ati inducement to a great
fiery injurious. In this
as previous posseisioa

NOV. e.

will be recollected, and the loss, in a moment of distres,, will
excite an ardent desire to regain the prize.
But, if aggrandizement was, a.; it is, the object of the Allies,
the principle would have been 'much more easily established,
if France .had been permitted to retain the Netherlands.
Prussia, it appears, seeks for Saxony—Russia longs for the re-
establishment of Poland—Sweden, Austria, &c. all look for
aggrodizement, but France is to be in Stain quo ante natant.
It certainly would have been desirable could such a principle
have been established, but not being possible, it never ought

to have been attempted.
As things are, how do we stand ? France endeavours to
protect Saxony, aided by her natural connection with
Bavaria, and a strong attachment in Sitxony to the Sovereign :
to this, is super-added her influence in W irtemburgh and
Italy ; she will be able to bole the House of Lorraine in check,
or compel it to an alliance with her. Thus, we think we have
rendered the iwpolicy of this measure self-evident, and
simply because the project is impracticable.
But there is another reason why the allies, and particularly
Great Britain, should not have sanctioned this system.
There is a rage fur arrondizing as well as (for so it would ap-
pear) for being arrondiled. This disposition has grown out
of the French revolution ; and in our paper of to day, we
furnish a curious proof of it, in tho proje i for the reorganiza•
tion of Germany, in the Congress assembled at Rastadt.
subsequent to the treaty of Campo Formio. It will be seen
that one of the objects was to take Hanover off our hands.
It now, it seems, is to be made a Kiagdovi. '
Such are the few ideas to which a reflection on the subject
of the Congress at Vienna, has given rise in our minds.-
Talleyrand, it appears, has pretty distinctly inti»hitei, that
unless France is admitted to her share of plunder, there
must be a trial of strength, or in a word, an appeal. to arms.
Should this unfortunately be the case, all the melancholy
results will be charged to (teat Britain, and may he iustly
ascribed to the incautiousness of her diplomatic nepresenta-
tivc, in allowing, fora moment, that her reteriCon of the Care
required a recompense to Rolland. Comquest had given her
every right to it, her commercial and eastern policy peremup'
tinily demanded of her to retain it, and vhv permit for a
`moment the propriety of an equivalent to Holland-0 UPI.
iland, whose Sovereign was not warm in his seat, and who,
i long before he could get himself re-recognized by the F. esi-
' -dent of the United States, dispatched an Ambassador to him,
I although in a stwe of open war with uA, and that war sprinZ3i to,
11.
out of the mostltnprincipled, flagitious, and atrocious mo-
-1 lives ; and, the sole object of r.l;icti was, to support the Man
. who had deprived this very Prince Sovereign of his posses-
lions ? This was a grateful return for the united iterest of
-i
:, Me Regetit, of his Ministers, and of Lord Grenville.
To conclude, we feel ou:selves compelled to eNpre.,s our
foam *at Esuope is again likely to be harassed by war ; and,
from our course of 'seasoning, theme will be little difficulty'
for our enemies to ascribe the melancholy events to the in.
ordinate ambition of Great Britain. Tile laq war was sail. to
/),7 for the Fake of :tiaita. The next will be said to /I. for the
rape of rood Hope. Hence, we bear all the odium of war,
*A- well as aft its es pence. .

0F this grosi truth, we this day ..ttirriish our readers with tlic
contents of a letter from Milan. The iitterest attached to it, pre-
cludes the necessity of any tnieriatiarrt. It wat tecgivecl after this Fr
per bad been farmers

mat:on to go to war will bi found s
instance t
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bed, but not being possible, it never ought
npted.
how do we stand ? France endeavours to
aided by her natural connection with
mg attachment in Sitxony to the Sovereign :
.added her influence in Wirtemburgh and
Able .to bole the House of Lorraine in check,
i alliance with her. Thus, we think we have
policy of this measure self-evident, and
to project is impracticable.
!other reason why the allies, and particularly
hould not have sanctioned this system.
✓ arrondizing as well as (for so it would ap-
Irrondiled. This disposition has grown out
; and in our paper of to day, we
proof of it, in the projei for the reorganiza•
in the Congress assembled at Rastadt.
e treaty of Campo Formio. It will be seen
)bjects was to take Hanover off our hands.
is to be made a Kiagdovi.
7ew ideas to which a reflection on the subject
at Vienna, Las given rise in our minds.
appears, has pi etty distinctly inti»hitei, that
k admitted to her share of plunder, there
f strength, or in a word, au appeal• to arms.
afortunately be the caw, all the melancholy
barged to Gt eat Britain, and may he
incautiousness of her diplomatic Representa-
for a moment, that her reteriCon of the Care
npense to Holland. Camquest had given her
, her commercial and eastern policy perenip'
lof her to retain it, and vhv permit for a
opricty of an equivalent to Holland —t,)
Ikl-
vcreign was not warm in his seat, :,nd who,
7ould get himself re-recognized by the F. esi-
ted States, dispatched an Ambassador to him,
Ye of open war with t:A, and that war springing
iritnprincipled, flagitious, and atrocious mu-
sole object of v. I was, to support the Ma
ved this very Prince Sovereign of his posses-
vas a grateful return for the united i"Aerest of
his Ministers, and of Lord Grenville.
, we feel ou:selves compelled to cNpreg our
pe is again likely to be harassed by war ; and,
e of 'seasoning, Oleic will be little difficulty'
to accribe the melancholy evemts to the in.
ion of Great Britain. Tile la-st war was sail. to
of :tialta. The next will be said to for tli(s •
Hope. Hence, we bear all the odium of war,
F ex pence.
•
LI truth, we this day ..tarnish our readers with tlic
Art. from Milan. The interest attached to it, pre-
ity of any oberyatiorn. It Wilt leCgivid *Ref this V'
HUM