The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-11 00:00:00

9:11g

LONDON, MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1855.

The Allied Powers seem to have at length
shaken off the apathy by which they were so long
oppressed, and to have now resolved to carry on
the War with vigour and energy. The result has
been the most brilliant, and in one quarter almost
bloodless, triumphs. In our impression of Sa-
turday we announced the attack and capture of
the White Works and the Mamelon Tower. We
are now enabled to state in addition that they
took on the occasion no less than 62 guns, in-
cluding 8 cohorns, and 400 prisoners. The
contest, although exceedingly fierce, was but of
brief duration. At 6.30 p.m. on Thursday the
signals for assault were given, and within a single
hour the national standard of France floated over
the Mamelon and the two redoubts in Careening
Bay. These important positions remained in
their hands, and, should they be enabled to retain
them and to turn the captured artillery against
their former possessors, it requires but slight pre-
tensions to extraordinary prescience to declare
that the Malakhoff Tower must shortly share a
similar fate, and that the desperate resistance of
the garrison of Sebastopol itself cannot be much
longer protracted. General PELISSIER has thus
more than vindicated the high military reputation
he had previously enjoyed, and proved that our
gallant allies are so fortunate as at last to have
got " the right man in the right place." Since
he succeeded the brace but less energetic CAN-
ROBERT in the supreme command of the French
army not a moment has been lost in pushing on
the operations Of the siege, nor has there been
a single failure to damp the ardour of his
noble followers. Everything attempted has been
accomplished iu the most complete and satisfactory
manner. It only enhances the glories of the army
of France to state that the Russians have displayed
great gallantry, and offered the most obstinate
resistance at every point, but all in vain. Despite
their proved valour they were unable to withstand
the terrific onslaughts of the assailants, and hence
the decisive victories which it is our pleasing duty
to record—victories which must at no distant
period terminate in the capture or destruction of
the south side of Sebastopol, and the scanty rem-
nant of the Russian fleet which now finds shelter
beneath its walls.
From the French despatches we learn, although
our own do not allude to the subject, that the
English troops were not idle on this important
occasion. General PELISSIER declares that
" our Allies"—i.e. the English—" with their
usual resolution, carried the works in the quarries,
and established themselves there." Our accounts
state that " We have lost 400 men in killed and
Wounded," and that is probably only the English
loss on the eventful occasion. It was but the
preceding day that the bombardment of the town
and outworks was reopened, and no time was
allowed to repair the damages, which the Rus-
sian' had on previous occasions succeeded in
effecting during the nights. This the vigorous
activity of PELISSIER prevented. Not a moment
was allowed for restoration ; no breathing-time
was granted. The defenders were
as-
tounded at the apparently desperate character
of the attack, which, however, proved irre-
sistible, and the Mamelon
remained in
the hands of our Allies. Nor were they contented
with this glorious achievement. General PELIS-
SIER is manifestly one of that energetic school
who consider that " nothing Ibis done while any-
thing remains to be accomplished"—who will
not be contented with any triumph, if all
that is practicable has not been attained. He
therefore followed up his first success, and also
took Possession of the two redoubts of Careening
Bay. The spotia opima in the shape of 62 pieces
of heavy ordnance, together with 400 prisoners,
remained in his hands.
The triumphs in the Sea of Azoff, although

less brilliant, are no less important. Taganrog
Marionpol, and Gheisk were attacked on the 3d,
sth, and 6th instant. The public buildings and
numerous Government magazines of provisions
have been burnt, and an immense loss of supplies
has thus been inflicted on the enemy. In all
these transactions the Allies had bu; one man
wounded, and that notwithstanding the presence
of a garrison of 3,500 men at Taganrog. In
these important depots were stored the provisions
collected from the districts watered by the Don
and a large portion of the Dnieper. From thence
the Russian troops in the Crimea, and even in
Sebastopol itself, were chiefly supplied with pro-
visions, and now that these important sources
have been cut off, it is by no means improbable
that the Russians may be compelled to risk all on
the chances of a decisive battle, of the result
whereof we cannot for a moment doubt.

There may now be something less of arrogance
on the part of their diplomatists. They may now
be quite willing to accept the terms so contume-
liously rejected at Vienna, but the hour for re-
pentance has passed by. Nothing less than the
disarmament of all the Russian strongholds in
the Euxine and the Sea of Azoff, the destruction
of all her ships of war, and an ample pecuniary
indemnity for the expenses of the War, will now
suffice. Nor will these be all. We must not
limit our securities to the vicinity of the Black
Sea but must look to the "West as well as
to the East, and obtain satisfactory guarantees
against the restoration of Bomarsund, or
the pursuit of an aggressive policy in the neigh-
bourhood of the Baltic. We may, ere many
days' time have elapsed, receive intelligence from
that quarter that will paralyse the friends of Rus-
sia, and teach the Autocrat a salutary lesson as to
the dangers incidental to such a career as that
which he had marked out for himself, and the
signal punishment that awaits a detected and colt-
victed plunderer of his neighbours.

According to the latest accounts from the
Crimea, the force directed against the Russian
army in that peninsula may be estimated at some
200,000 men altogether ! We are not, we
believe, in any way exaggerating the amount of
the aggregate strength of the Allies when we
speak of it, in round numbers, as somewhere about
200,000. Let us explain the matter in two
minutes by analysing that rather ample sum-
total. There are, in the first instance, not less
than 130,000 French soldiers under the orders of
General PELISSIER, according to the statement put
forth by the new Commander-in-Chief himself in
the address to his troops, announcing the volun-
tary resignation of the supreme authority by his
gallant predecessor. There are under the direc-
tion of the Field-Marshal, the Lord RAGLAN, as
nearly as can be well calculated, under the cir-
cumstances, 30,000 of our brave countrymen.
There arOhe 10,000 picked veterans from Pied-
mont recently despatched to the seat of war as the
Sardinian Contingent, under• the direction of
General DE LA MARMORA. There are, besides all
these, about 30,000 Turks, under OYER PACECA,
either at Kamiesh or at Eupatoria. And a very
simple sum of addition demonstrates with arith-
metical precision the rather indubitable fact that
130,000 French, and 30,000 English, and 10,000
Sardinians, and 30,000 Turks, make up a com-
prehensive total of just 200,000 at present in the
Crimea at the disposal of the Allied Commanders-
in-Chief.

Now, the task entrusted to this somewhat im-
posing force we cannot for an instant regard as at
all disproportioned to its capacities. We cannot
for one moment regard it as a labour beyond the
reach of its powers of accomplishment. We can-
not for a minute imagine that what is required to
be effected by those 200,000 men—the flower of
the French, English, Turkish, and Sardinian
armies—is in any respect more than can be readily
effected by so considerable a body of heroic and
well-disciplined troops, directed by the united
abilities of PELISSIER, RAGLAN, OMER, and MAR-
MORA. What is the precise nature of that task ?
What is this new labour of HERCULES ? It may
be readily enough explained. The Allies are
striving all this while to inflict a blow, a mortal
blow if possible, upon the Northern CoLossus by
whose vast bulk, and mighty energies, and gigan-
tic ambition the liberties of Europe are threatened,
and through those liberties the fabric of modern
civilisation. And at what chink in the armour
of that Northern CoLossus is the blow directed ?
Not at its heart—Moscow. Not at its head—
St. Petersburg. But at what was finely called
by Cardinal WISEMAN, during the course of last
March, in his eloquent and patriotic lecture upon
the War, in St. Martin's Hall, Long-acre—" the
only vulnerable point it presented, like ACHILLES
—that Crimean heel with which it pressed upon
the neck of Turkey!" It is to bring the COLOSSUS
of Russia, clad in all its panoply of steel, clashing
down upon the dust, wounded and humbled --
that the Allies are, with the aid of 200,000 men,
aiming such deadly blows at that "Crimean heel,"
striking chiefly all the while at what may be
called the veritable tendon-Achilles Sebastopol,
and yet pressing hard at the same time to the
right upon Kertch and to the left upon Eupatoria.
No doubt at all the task is difficult, restricted
even to these narrow limits, concentrated upon
this one paramount object—nevertheless, while
acknowledging its difficulty, we believe that it
may reasonably be regarded as capable of accom-
plishment. We believe that it cannot possibly
baffle the powers of England and France united,
aided as the armies of those two chief nations of
the earth are by noble contingents from Turkey
and Sardinia. Sixty thousand men were more
than sufficient to carry the banners of England
and France in triumph up the almost impreg-
nable heights of the Alma. A mere handfull of
the Guards and the Zouaves was enough to
scatter the legions of Russia among the ruins of
Inkerman. A grand army of 200,000 men, such
as that of the Allies now in the Crimea, will be
ample, we cannot but believe, with all the fullness
of implicit credence, to inflict the desired wound
upon the Northern CoLossus at Sebastopol.
It may be interesting to compare at this mo-
ment the relative positions of the two great Euro-
pean armies directed against Russia within tho
last half century. Contrasting for a moment the
objects aimed at by the Allied army in 1854-55,
and by the army of NAPOLEON in 1811-12, it
must be remembered, in the first instance, that
while we strike the blow at the heel, NAPOLEON
aimed his, and with deadly effect, at the very
heart of the common enemy of civilised Europe.
We haVe our fleets to fall back upon for supplies,
and for retreat, too, in case of any extraordinary
emergency, and continually also for reinforce-
ments. He had no naval armaments to aid him
in his operations—he bad to trust only to his
land forces, and to that incomparable genius for
war which has given him a name among the con-
querors of the earth beyond those even of the
demi-gods of antiquity—beyond the accomplished
Roman and
the
daring Macedonian. By reason
of which, because
he had no Euxine for his base
of operations—because he had to attack Russia,
not on the margin, but far in the interior
—NAPOLEON required a mightier land arma-
ment than can be well regarded by the Allies

as requisite under existng circumstances.
That armament he assembled together, and
marshalled under his Imperial banners. It

has recently been stated in the House of Commons
—this wonderful army of NAPOLEON—at some-
where about half-a-million of men in the aggre-
gate. Erroneously so stated : for it was consi-
derably more. It was a legion such as had never
before been gathered together by one man, such
as probably may never be assembled again by any
other—out-numbering the boasted followers of
XERXES, and over-shadowing the barbaric hordes
of ALARIC and ODOACER. It included, in French

troops alone, a grand army of 850,000 men ! and
with these 50,000 Italians, under the Viceroy
Prince EUGENE ! 60,000 Poles, under PONIA-
TOWSKI ! 40,000 Bavarians ! 30,000 Saxons !
30,000 Westphalians ! 15,000 men from Wur-
temberg ! 9,000 from the Archduchy of Baden
23,000 from the Rhenic Confederation ! 20,000
as a Prussian contingent ! 30,000 Austrian auxi-
liaries ! and 30,000 Neapolitans, led by their
hero of romance, the most gorgeous of the tributary
Kings of the new SESOSTRIS, the most chivalrous
of the PALADINS of the mightier than CHARLE-
MAGNE ! Altogether, scarcely credible though it
sounds, not half-a-million of men, but as
many as 1,187,000 ! If we subtract from that
grand total, however, some 387,000 for soldiers
in the hospitals, for those absent upon furlough,
and for the deficiencies caused here and there by
incomplete regiments, we shall approximate more
nearly to the actual force collected together in
1811 for the invasion of Russia by NAPOLEON
the Great. Yet with even this enormous reduc-
tion, there is left the appaling balance of 800,000
men with which the Conqueror of Europe crossed
the boundaries of the Russian Empire and ad-
vanced upon its capital. We speak not here at 1
random. The calculation we have made is that
authoritatively put forth by BOUTOURLIN. With
that mighty mass of warriors NAPOLEON entered
upon his Russian campaign. And what is the
estimate formed of that campaign by no less im-
partial an observer than Lord BROUGHAM ? Why
Lord BROUGHAM has declared, in his " Statesmen
of the Time of George III.," that according to
his view, among all the wonderful campaigns ever
made by NAPOLEON (and when he closed his
career at the age of 47 on the field of Waterloo
they had amounted, these campaigns, altogether,
to no less than fourteen), this one, the campaign
of 1811 in Russia, was the most triumphant, the
most completely successful ! And so assuredly it
was. The conqueror had advanced at the pas de
charge by victory after victory until he had seized
the capital of the invaded empire, until he had
established his head-quarters in the Kremlin,
until he was issuing his Imperial decrees from the
Palace of PETER the Great. NAPOLEON only
failed after that because of a fatality beyond the
grasp of human forethought. His defeat has
passed into a proverb. He was vanquished not
by man, but by the permission of Divine PROVI-
DENCE. His victors were the elements. The
wind blew, and the snow fell, and the frost came,
and his mighty host was all but annihilated. Be-
cause they were so far within the recesses of that
inclement land, and because, with this, the winter
began two months earlier than ordinary. It can-
not be so with us. We are on the margin instead
of at the centre of the Russian Empire. Besides
which, our fleets in the Black Sea are ever close
at hand, while our transports are continually
arriving with supplies and reinforcements. The
situations are altogether different. And if Russia
is less at our mercy now than she was at one time
at NAPOLEON'S, we are all the while less at hers,
or rather at that of the cold and. barrenness which
are her chief internal auxiliaries. Wherefor so
let us trust confidently, under the aid of GOD, in
the justice of our cause, and in the strength of our
arms, while the chief part of our 200,000 men
are still beleaguering the fortifications of Sebas-
topol.

If anything was established by the Peace-at-
any-price party during the late Parliamentary dis-
cussions, it was that the demands made on Rus-
sia for the limitation of her fleet could easily have
been evaded, and would, therefore, if accepted,
have been of comparatively little value. That
view of the subject was particularly dwelt on by
Earl GREY, in the House of Lords, and his line
of argument was also adopted by several of the
speakers in the Commons. But it did not, there-
fore, by any means follow that the Western Powers
should have in any degree abandoned the demand,
or been satisfied without even the verbal securities
required. Had they done so, it would vir-
tually have been a connivance at the wel--
known schemes of Russia. We could
scarcely have remonstrated at any accession to
her fleet or ominous signs until the inviolable
attack had taken place. It was not because we
were contented with the merely personal promises
of Russia, though we were at the very time when
receiving the most conclusive evidence of her
duplicity and insincerity willing to waive every
description of real security, that we should also
give up the shadowy hope founde 1 on the word of
a Government whose mendacity had become pro-
verbial ! The peace party proved too much for
their own propositions. They showed, beyond the
possibility of doubt, that in place of pressing too
hardly on Russia our Plenipotentiary fell far
short of what he ought to have required—
that he should have insisted on " material
guarantees," or, at least, on the disarmament of
every Russian fortification in the Euxine or its
vicinity. If the views of Russia were so moderate-
and inoffensive as she professed—if she were only
seeking the " commercial" development so vividly
depicted by Mr. BRIGHT-what could she want of
these threatening fortresses ? The Hon. Member
for Manchester does not arm himself with revolvers
and bowie knives when going on 'Change—though
by no means "mealy mouthed" in his language
to others he does not keep weapons either of offence
or defence. He would regard it as a particularly
bad investment of the capital which might be so
much better applied in the improvement of his
machinery or the extension of his works.
His friend the CZA.R is also aware that
the warlike toys on which so much money
hispredecessor
has been expended by are
not, and cannot be, required for defence. It is
only for aggression that he can want either forti-
fications or ships of war. It suits his purpose,
however, to pretend that it is his anxious solici-
tude for the sick man's health that induces him
to keep up these expensive establishments. He
wishes to protect Turkey from the nefarious de-
signs of France and England, and, through his
representative at the Vienna Conferences, practi-
cally asks, " Otis custodiet, ipsos custodes ?"—who
shall guard the poor helpless Turk against his
treacherous Western guardians ? And this view
of the case is adopted by his broad-brimmed friend
in the British Parliament, who, notwithstanding
his scruples against all offensive weapons, thinks
Russia quite right in indulging her amiable
weakness, and keeping a large assortment on hand
ready to accommodate any pugnacious customer
at a moment's notice !
We believe, however, that the public will not
be satisfied with this rechavffee of the arguments
of Prince GORTSCHAKOFF in Annex A to Protocol