The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-20 00:00:00

offered at Silistria, that the Russians had retired from the
principalities. I own it surprised me very much that the
feeble eutrenchuleuts of Arab Tibia should have held the
whole Russian army on the Danube in check for nearly a
year, and defeated their utt mpt at invasion. But such
being the case, it b 'came a great question what should be
done with the allied armies ? Every one will agree with
we that if they had been withdrawn from Bulgaria, whi-
ther they had been sent, and recalled to Constantinople, it
would give rise to general disappointment, would cer-
taitey induce a belief that the war was not pressed a ith
vigour, and 'night even encourage Russia to think that
she could defend herself for ye re. (Hear, hear.) The
question then to be decide t was, was the army to be sent
beyoud the priucip dities ? We knew that Austria was
then quite willing to drive Russia out of the princi-
palities, but, that she would not cross the Pruth. We had,
therefore, to .consider what would be the position of the
allied armies if they had advanced—the position of 60,000
or 70,00 J men on thta• large anti wasted plains, opposed to
the whole force of Russia, without adequate resources—for
the army could not march without the means of transport ;
it would take two or three months to reach the Russian
army, therefore, and no one doubted that the Russian
army was superior in numbers to our army, not very strong
numerically iu the first instance, and weakened by disease
in the ether. Therefore that course could not b 3 taken. It
was therefore decided to send the army to the Crimea.
Hon. gentlemen sail that we had no sufficient information
on the subject. We had all the information that could be
obtained. (Hear, bear.) Different results, no doubt, were
to be derived from that information, but it is always the
case in war. I observe, indeed, that a great commander
in Spain, timing the late war, did not know the number
of the English army opposed to him. We had inforrna-
thin ; it was not to be relied on implicitly ; and Lord
Regian -so stated in, in reply to the Duke of Newcastle.
We had information that the Russian army in the field
was about 45,000 men, and in the garrison of Sebastopol
about 15,000 men, making about 60,000 in all in the
Crimea. The question then arose, was it possible to take
Sebastopol with the forces of the allied army ? I believe
it was. (Hear.) If we had effected that object before the
long defence of that fortress had increased the Russian
obstinacy, I believe that it would have shortened the war,
by inducing the Emperor of Russia to listen to reasonable
terms of peace. (Hear, hear.) It is now the fashion to
say that stsbastopol could not re taken ; but Ido not hold
with that fashion. There are now artificial defences of
great strength where on that occasion last year the town
iu great part was defended by a single wall. (Hear, hear.)
Was it impossible that the allied army, landing in the
Crimea, should gain a great victory, and that the gates
of Sebastopol should be thereupon thrown open to them ?
(Hear, hear.) I believe it was possible. I remember
very well that that brave soldier the late Marquis
of Anelesea said, when the French anti English ar mien
were united together in emulation, nothing could resist
thew. We Lowe it su at the Alias. (Cheers.) Wes it
not possible after this great victory to press ou to Sebas-
topol and take it white the Russian army was in confueiou ?
But if that was not done, was it impossible to the allied
armies to attack the weak oefences which then existed on
the south side of Sebastopol, and make themselves masters
of the town ? It has not so happened certainly ; such is the
fortune of war that we cannot make anything sure But
I say that it was well worth while to incur the risk for the
chance of striking so great a blow • and that those who
made the expedition, therefore, sought a great prize which
not only triumph but peace would follow. (Cheers.) That is
one part of the case. Tue other part of the case regards
th .so whose duty it was to supply the expedition ; and as
the hon. and learned gentleman who spoke last, as yell as
the hoe. baronet the member for Hertfordshire, applied
observations to me as the depreciator and accuser of the
Duke of Newcastle, I shall take the liberty of referring to
those aguments. I beg leave, therefore, to say that the
comparison iuetituted by the bun. and learned gentleman
in the brat instance is inapplicable to me, and, therefore,
altogether out of place. There was no secret made of the
accusation of the Duke of Newcastle; on the contrary,
the Duke of Newcastle was fully informed of the whole
nature and contents of the correspondence in question.
Not that the Duke of Newcastle was deficieut in the con-
scientious discharge of his duties. He was both a con-
scientieus and a la,oorioue Minister ; but then he had not
setricient authority in his office to carry on with eneigyand
effect a great war, such as that in which we were engaged.
That wits my opinion. It might be wrong, and it was not
shared by wy colleagues, who hail the fullest confidence in
the administrative ability of their colleague. Then, with
respect to the number of British troops and the supplies
sent out. No one can deny who looks at the evidence, that
in spite of defective organisation—we having been left too
lung in peace, and without adoptingsuffiadent remedies and
reforms—that in spite, I say, of defective organisation,
there was great activity shown in dispatching to the Crimea
all that the army required. No doubt, many defects could,
and have been pointed out—some by the hon. member for
Totues--owing to the defective organisation and the evils
that have flowed from such defective organisation; but the
useful labours of the committee will not have been thrown
away, if with that knowledge which we have acquired,
the noble lord (Lord Pantnure)will be enabled to give more
concentrated power to the War Department, and thus
prevent those delays which have occurred owing to want of
due correspondence between the seveeal departments of
,;overnment. That, I think, will be a great advantage,
but it does not form a sufficient case on which to ask the
horse to pass a vote of censure on the administration, or
a case on which to cast blame on the whole of the
administration employed in conducting public affairs.
Could they say, that, considering the obstacles which
the Minister of War found with respect to sending,
out huts and clothing, this furnished a good ground for
such a censure as the motion of the hon. and learned gentle-
man proposed ; nay, the hon. and learned gentleman felt
this view so strongly that he goes to another ground en-
tirely, though he does not positively refer to it. If this is
the case, that at the commencement of LI great war, we,
having sent an expedition composed of as fine an army as
could be conceived ; that army, however, not being success-
ful, though most successful ie battle, in the imme hate ob-
ject for which it was dispatched, the capture of Sebastopol
—is it, or is it not, desirable that this house should inflict
its censure on those who projected that expedition. I own
is, appears to me, if the house come to that conclusion, the
house will commit a great injustice—will commit a great
injustice agaiust men who, when they engages' in the war,
endeavoured to the best of their power—anal they were
men of no ordinary capacity wise formed the members of
Lord. Aberneen's administration—who endeavoured to the
a blow agthut RuggiN
ben of *fix power to aired.