The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-10 00:00:00

THE EASTERN PAPERS.

The papers relating to the Conference at Vienna
on the Eastern question have been presented to
Parliament. From their great length we cannot
find room for the whole. The following is a trans-
lation of the final Protocol (No. 14). It relates
to the proceedings at Vienna on the 26th ult. :

(Translation.)
Present :
For Austria.—Count Buol-Schauenstein and Baron
Prokesch-Osten.
For France.—M. Drouyn de l'Huys and Baron de
Bourquency.
For Great Britain.—The Earl of Westmoreland.
For Russia.—Prince Gortschakoff and M. de Titoff.
For Turkey.—Aali Pacha and Ariff Effendi.
Count Buol opens' the meeting by saying that he in-
vited the members of the Conference to assemble at the
request of the Russian plenipotentiaries, who declared
that they have communications to make.
Prince Gortschakoff wishes to establish the fact that it
was the Russian plenipotentiaries who, in the twelfth
Conference, recorded in the proctocol the last proposi-
tion tending to the solution of the third principle, and
that it is again they who now submit new plans with
the same object.
Before developing them, he thinks it his duty to recur
to an assertion of the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, recorded in the twelfth proctocol, stating " that
Russia is unwilling to give the Ottoman empire any sort
of guarantee, and that as for the one contained in Art. 1,
and adopted in the eleventh Conference, Russia reduces
it to a mere chimera, since even in case a Turkish pro-
vince were invaded by one of the contracting powers
Russia, according to the interpretation of Prince Gorts-
chakoff, will confine herself to the exercise of her good
offices."
He remarked that the Russian plenipotentiaries have,
in common with the other members of the Conference,
sanctioned the principle of making the Sublime Porte
participate in the advantages of the European concert,
and of placing her under the safeguard of the public law
of Europe. And, lastly, they have engaged, in the
name of their court, to respect the independence and
territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire: Can these
engagements be characterised as chimeras ? One of the
reasons for which he declined an active territorial gua-
rantee of the Ottoman Empire arises from the difficulty
of precisely defining its limits. The territorial guarantee
once stipulated would it not be necessary to extend it to
the most distant points, as, for instance, Tunis and
Aden, and to make any attack directed against either
of those territories by one of the contracting powers a
cases belli? He declines giving so extended a mean-
ing to the engagement he takes, on the plea that
the blood of Russia belongs to Russia alone. This
does not mean, however, that Russia will confine
herself exclusively to good offices. The independ-
ence of the Sublime Porte is not only the interest of
Europe, but also that of Russia. If it were menaced
Russia would not be the last to defend it, but she re-
serves to herself the right of judging when the case oc-
curs, whether or not it be necessary to employ her ma-
terial resources.
Adverting to the special object of to-day's conference,
he states that the plan proposed by the Russian plenipo-
tentiary had for its object not only to resolve the diffi-
culties of the present, but also to surround the indepen-
dence of the Porte with guarantees for the future ; how-
ever, that as this plan had been declined, especially on
account of its resting on a principle contrary to a sove-
reign right of the Porte, the maintenance of which she
deems necessary fur her independence, he sought the so-
lution on a different plan. He reeds the articles 1 and
2, of which copy is hereto annexed, the one giving a new
confirmation to the principle of closing the Straits ; the
other, leaving the Sublime Porte herself supreme judge
of the cases in which the interest of her security would
require exceptions to that principle, and in which she
should deem it requisite to summon, according to cir-
cumstances, either the fleets of the Western Powers, oil
that of Russia.
In answer to Prince Gortschakoff, M. Drouyn de
l'Huys maintains the words quoted by the former. He
again states, that France engages to respect not only
the independence and territorial integrity of the Otto-
man empire, but also to enforce their observance ;
whereas Russia declines contracting this second engage-
ment. As for the Regency of Tunis, to which Prince
Gortschakoff has alluded, he, for his own part, finds no
difficulty in extending to that country the engagement
to which he is ready to subscribe.
With reference to the new propositions of the Russian
plenipotentiaries, he has already declared in the last
Conference that his instructions were exhausted, since
Russia had rejected the limitation in every form what-
soever. He applies the same declaration to the present
propositions. With this reserve, he observed that these
propositions tend so little to the cessation of Russian
preponderance in the Black Sea, that they even provide
for the contingency of the preponderating fleet becom-
ing hostile.
Baron Bourqueney entirely concurred, in every point,
in the opinion of M. Drouyn de l'Fluys.
Lord Westmoreland recurs to the declaration made
by Lord J. Russell in the last Conference, to the effect
that the instructions of the plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain were exhausted.
With regard to the establishment of Aden, of which
mention had been made, he states that his Government
has in no way violated their treaties with the Sublime
Porte concerning it.
Prince Gortschakoff answered, that in speaking of
Aden, be bad no intention of making recrimination with
regard to the past, but only to instance a hypothetical
case, calculated to show the extreme consequences to
which the territorial guarantee of the Ottoman Empire
would, in certain cases, lead.
M. de Titoff adds to the statement of his colleague the
expression of his hope that the Conference will acknow-
ledge that the obstacles to an understanding do not ema-
nate from the plenipotentiaries of Russia, who, far from
confining themselves to any exclusive system, now pro-
pose a plan on a new basis, while the plenipotentiaries of
France and Great Britain declare that their instructions
are exhausted.
Aali Pacha and Aariff Effendi state that their instruc-
tions neither admit of their giving their adhesion to the
propositions of the Russian plenipotentiaries, nor of
their giving an opinion in this matter, and that they find
themselves in precisely the same situation as the pleni-
potentiaries of the allied powers.
Count Buol addresses hinself to the new Russian pro-
posal. He sees with satisfaction that in Article 1 the
principle of closing had been substituted for that of
opening, which had previously been proposed. He thinks
Article 2, which reserves for the Sultan the power of
eventually calling to his assistance foreign fleets, and of
opening the Straits as an exception, is susceptible of a
practical application. The proposition appears to him
to admit of discussion ; it contains elements of which
teustria will endeavour to avail herself for an under-
standing ; but in the rough state in which it still is he
cannot consider it as a solution, nor even as a basis for
solution.
Baron Prokesch says that since there is a disparity
in the respective positions of the powers, it will be
difficult to carry out the principle of reciprocity on
which Article 2 is based. Nobody will suspect
Austria of wishing to impair the independence or
the territorial integrity of Turkey. When the ma-
ritime powers, in concert with Russia, agreed. to
the emancipation of Greece, they derived no territorial
aggrandisement from it. On the other hand, Russia, in
a series of wars with the Ottoman empire during a cen-
tury, deprived her of province after province. The course
pursued by her in 1853 was judged by the powers who
signed the protocols as pregnant with imminent danger
to the Sublime Porte and to Europe. Against these
dangers they are at present endeavouring to provide.
Their respective positions not being equal, it is not for
Russia to seek guarantees ; she is not in want of them,
either for herself, for she finds them in her own power,
or for the Sublime Porte, who does not require any on
her side ; but it is right that the allied powers should
ask Russia for guarantees in the interest of the Porte,
and against the recurrence of the dangers which have
been the cause of such serious disturbance and of such
enormous sacrifice to Europe.
In a practical point of view, be thinks that the Rus-
siae fleet, in order eventually to give effectual assistance
to the Sublime Porte, must possess considerable strength.
Article 2 would, therefore, tend to perpetuate a danger
which it is our object to put an end to.
Prince Gortschakoff, in answer to the Austrian pleni-
potentiaries, states that the project now proposed is more
than a mere sketch, that it is equivalent to a real basis;
that this project does not merely tend to the solution of
the present complication, but it also contains provisions
for the future, and that its execution will put an end to
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, while surround-
ing the existence of Turkey with new guarantees. Art. 2
does not absolutely require reciprocity ; it acknowledges
the independence of the Sublime Porte in constituting
her sole judge of the dangers which could threaten her,
and in leaving to her the most entire liberty of choice re-
garding those whom she would wish to call upon in order
to remove these dangers. The power reserved for the
Sultan of calling in the help of Russia, if he should think
proper, does not necessitate a priori her keeping a pre-
ponderating naval force in the Black Sea. Moreover,
the plenipotentiaries of Russia, in proposing, in the first
instance, the " mare apertum," and afterwards the
" mare clausurn," think that they have furnished irre-
fragable proof of their sincere desire to facilitate a gene-
ral understanding.
Count Buol observes, that when he attached to the
Russian project no other value than that of a sketch, he
was actuated by the consideration that this project pro-
poses only the means of putting an end to the naval pre-
ponderance of Russia when it should already have
reached the proportions of an intolerable danger, but
tends in no way to make it cease in a permanent man-
ner and in the ordinary state of things.
Prince Gortschakoff answers, that combined as it was
with the principles to which he subscribed, and which
tend to place the Sublime Porte under the protection of
the public law of Europe, and to respect its indepen-
dence and its territorial integrity, his project seems to
him to possess the value of a complete work.
Drouyn de l'Huys states that the solution which
France would wish to see effected would have been cal-
culated to obviate the danger, from whatever side it
might arise. At present the only question is, to seek

guarantees against the dangers which menace Turkey on
the side of Russia. It is not enough to devise means
eventually to put an end to the' conflict when it has
already broken out ; it is necessary to remove the possi-
bility of a conflict, since every conflict disturbs Europe.
The new Russian project, allowing the inequality of
forces in the Black Sea to remain, only assures Europe
with respect to the issue of the misunderstandings which
may arise. With the object of obviating the possibility
of this, France has proposed an engagement to ensure
respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey. This en-
gagement, to which Russia refuses its assent, was a gua-
rantee for the Sublime Porte more important than the
help which is prospectively offered to her ; for if the
Russian fleet is powerful, the forces to be opposed to it
will be even more considerable, and if it be weak, the
help it will be able to bring will not be effective.
Prince Gortschakoff states that .he counterpoise to the
Russian preponderance would be contained in the power
of the Sultan to call to his assistance foreign fleets,
and that the most solid guarantee for the territorial in-
tegrity and independence of Turkey is contained in its
admission into the European system ' • that, on the other
hand, the existence of a formidable Russian fleet in the
Black Sea is, in his eyes, a condition essential both to
the balance of power in Europe, and to the indepen
dence of the Porte. However, he takes cognisance of
the opinion expressed by the Austrian: Minister for Fo-
reign Affairs on the new Russian proposition, expressing
the hope that the plenipotentiaries of France and Great
Britain, whose instructions he much regretted to find did
not permit of their taking part in the discussion, will
submit it to their courts, and he.dOlos not doubt that the
Ottoman plenipotentiaries would , too well appreciate
its importance and its advantaiesl not immediately to
ask the Sublime Porte for instructions on this subject.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys agrees with Count Buol that the
Russian project is not a basis, and that it contains at
most an element, inasmuch as the principle of closing is
preferable to that of opening. Such as it is his instruc-
tions do not allow him to take part in the discussions,
neither will he consent to take it to Paris.

,Baron Bourqueney states that the position is not modi-
fied by the new propositions, and wishes it to be under-
stood that the silence which they voluntarily impose
upon themselves should not be taken for adhesion.
M. de Titoff remarks that it appeared to be forgotten
that the third guarantee had for its object to put an end
to the maritime preponderance of Russia in the Black
Sria, strengthening at once the independence and the
.power of self-government of the Porte. This double ob-
wet seems to him better secured by the Russian project
than by the principle of limitation maintained by the
opposite party, so that Russia, if she had the ambitious
pli,r.ns which are imputed to her, would even have reason
to'prefer a certain limitation, resulting practically from
the state of things, to a combination which opens the
Black Sea to foreign fleets as soon as the Sublime Porte
should consider herself menaced.
lThe plenipotentiaries of Austria having said that it
was for that reason that they would have wished to see
adopted the plan of a direct understanding to be arrived
atin the conferences between the sea-bordering powers;
on the reciprocal limitation of their naval forces. Prince
Gortschakoff declares that it is one thing to appreciate
the practical value of a direct understanding respecting
a reciprocal limitation, as M. de Titoff was the first to
do; but another to furce upon Russia this limitation by
means of a negotiation in the conference—a course which
appears to him impracticable, and which the Ottoman
plenipotentiaries have moreover declined.
Drouyn de l'Huys lays claim to having originated
the plan of a direct understanding, adding, that Aali
Pacha had not objected to the form in which he himself
had proposed it, but that he was only opposed to an un-
derstanding being come to out of the conference, as con-
trary to the reciprocal engagements contracted by the
allies.
Prince Gortschakoff recalls to mind that M. de Titoff
had, on his part, adverted to the difference existing be-
tween discussing and definitively concluding.
Aali Pacha states his opinion that the third point
having been adopted in common, the basis of the ar-
rangement which is to bring about its solution could in
the:same manner not be settled except in common and
in the conference; that direct negotiations with the Rus-
sian plenipotentiaries on the subject of this point would
be contrary to the reciprocal engagements contracted
between the allied powers ; and that it is only with re-
ference to the details that recourse might be had to the
mode here proposed.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys states that his plan embraces
the three essential points of view : Ist, to embody the
guarantee of the allies in the general treaty ; 11, to give
to this guarantee the form of a distinct understanding
between the sea-bordering powers ; and lastly, to pre-
vent any of the allies from entering into a separate ar-
rangement.

Count Buol having in conclusion taken cognisance of
the two principles contained in the proposed articles,
Prince Gortschakoff remarks that it must not be for-
gotten that these two principles were intimately con-
nected with the adoption of the whole plan which he
proposed.
Baron Prokesch having recurred to the question as to
the sense to be attached to the guarantee granted by the
contracting powers to the Sublime Porte, M. Drouyn
de l'lluys states that he has already pointed out the
want of solidity in the guarantees offered by Russia on
her part to the Ottoman empire. If its integrity be vio-
lated on land, Russia does not engage to defend it, but
only to interpose her good offices ; if it be attacked by
sea, Russia holds out the eventual assistance of her
fleet by requesting that it be allowed to enter the Medi-

terranean.
Prince Gortschakoff having answered that since it is ,
the interest of Russia to defend the independence of the
Porte, the explicit engagement is unnecessary, M.
Drouyn de l'Huys remarks that it was not a question of
interests emanating from geographical position, but of
positive stipulations.
Aali Pacha maintains that in the terms of the engage-
ment to be taken, all misunderstanding between the
Sublime Porte and one of the contracting powers should
be considered as a question of European interest ; that,
consequently, the circumstances under which the com-
mon guarantee might entail war, could not be imminent.
Prince Gortschakoff having expressed the hope that
the ideas set forth by the plenipotentiaries of Russia
would be taken into serious consideration, the plenipo-
tentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Turkey declare
that they can only persist in their original declaration.
Count Buol resumes by reiterating the opinions pro-
nounced by him ; adds that the project developed by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs ofFrance and declined by the
plenipotentiaries of Russia, contained a complete and effi-
cacious system ; that he could not say as much of the pro-
positions put forward this day • that Russia iu attaching
to the mutual guarantee the value: only of an engagement
not to encroach on the independence and territorial in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire, reduces it, in fact, to an
obligation which may be said to be self-evident ; that the
arrangement proposed to act as an application of the
principle of the cessation of Russian preponderance of
the Black Sea, limits itself to the power reserved to the
Sultan of calling foreign fleets to his aid whenever the
preponderance of the Russian fleet should become
threatening to him, which, in fact, would only tend to
augment the chances of a misunderstanding ; that, to
sum up, the Russian propositions could only be con-
sidered as including principles of a nature to be intro-
duced into a general and complete system.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys concurs in every respect with
the language of Count Buol.
The Ottoman plenipotentiaries concur on their part.
At the moment of closing the meeting, Prince Gort-
schakoff declares that the plenipotentiaries of Russia have
amply redeemed their word by proposing several plans
of solution.
(Signed)
BIJOL-SCIIAUENSTEIN.
G ORTSCHAKOFF.
DRP ROKESC 1-1-OSTEN.
TITOFF. OUYN DE L'HUYS.
URQU EN EY.
IV ES I'AIORLA.ND.
AALT.
AA RIF.

Inolosure in No. 14.
Annex to Protocol No. 13.
(Translation.)
Article 1. The principle of the closing of the Straits
of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in time of peace,
fmoraroy Bosphorus, to the
sanctioned by the ancient legislation of the Sublime
Porte, and by the treaty of July 1-13, 1841, remains in
full force.
exception, the
Article 2. His Highness the S
teultan reserves to himself
fleets of foreign powers which the Sublime Porte should
think it necessary to summon whenever she should think
tshtera poweriStraits
of
theto open,uani
Dardanelles
ITe asyo and of thep Bph
her security menaced.

h
eswcaap se movedfrom theby mharn.d
Josiah
fan
assassin.
emCuotuonoT
moronLdlaEyinzrNAth7Yp. —urThee Loforodoog Mayor held
thelda
Emperor
Wilson, seconded by Sir G. Carroll, carried unani-
mously, and ordered to be presented to the French am-
NapoleonT The
am-
bassador by the Lold Mayor and a deputation. Colonel
Wilson stated that reports were coming in very fast that
many of those who bad refused Lord Panmure's offer
resolution o on
his
in the first instance had altered their opinion, and were
rejoining the regiment, which he expected would soon
complete its full complement of men ; and that, with a
few exceptions, they were conducting themselves in [a
very orderly and attentive manner. Several applications
for commissions were referred to the head-quarters' com-
rnEtee. In answer to Mr. Kennard, Colonel Wilson said
that, as sion as the recruits were perfect in their drill,
applicaton would be made for more officers.
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SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

(Front the Times of this day.)
There seems more and more reason to apprehend that
the support of Austria, for which we have suffered so
much and made so many concessions, will, after all,
fail us. Must we, then, forgetful of all that we have
demanded, all that we have done, make peace because
Austria, after so many months of futile negotiation,
such vast preparations, and such imposing military dis-
play, refuses to support in the field the cause to which
she has repeatedly given her moral support and diplo-
matic assistance ? For her own conduct she will one

day have to answer, and sooner or later will doubtless
receive her reward. Let us leave her aside for the pre-
sent, and consider how far her apparent intention to

staid aloof from actual conflict justifies us in withdraw-
ing from our pretensions and negotiating an ignominious
peace. The first thing that strikes us is, that we com-
menced this struggle without securing the co-operation
of Austria, confident in the might of the allied Powers,
and deeming it better to interpose an effectual barrier to
the threatened aggressions of Russia than to wait till
we had spurred into activity the slow movements of a
Power beset with every species of financial difficulty,
and supporting herself with infinite labour by balancing
against each other the jarring claims and conflicting in-
terests of so many discordant and disaffected nationali-
ties. Had we known what we now know of the dispo-
sition of Austria, should we in any way have altered
our proceedings ? It is certainly possible that we might
have objected to the occupation of the Danubian Prin-
cipalities by a Power so little disposed to aid in the
only measures by which those Principalities could be
placed in a state of permanent security. We might also
have paused in the expedition to the Crimea, had we
known that Austria would have contented herself
with interposing her forces between the Turks and
the Russians, and so left the latter free to pour
the whole remaining strength of the army of occupa-
tion upon the flank and rear of the besiegers. But,
having taken these steps, and having now for sixteen
months stood the whole brunt of the war without the
aid of Austria, and, indeed, with that diversion in fa-
vour of Russia which the occupation of the Danubian
Principalities undoubtedly occasioned, we ask, with
much confidence, is there any reason why we should dis-
continue a war begun and continued without Austrian
co-operation, because that co-operation seems more dis-
tant and more unlikely than it did at first ? Are we
prepared to admit that we were so rash and so fool-
hardy—that we so entirely miscalcuated our own force
and that of our enemy, that the aid without which we
did not scruple to draw the sword has now become in-
dispensable, and that therefore there is nothing left for
us but to beg permission ignominiously to sheathe it ?
What is this astonishing change which the 16 months
have brought about, that we should exchange our former
attitude of menace for one of crouching subserviency,
- _

and, casting aside all self-confidence and self-respect,
abjure that noble part which in a moment of genuine,
but, as we are
_told, transitory magnanimity, we had

undertaken to play?
We have lost, it is true, by the disastrous effects of a
winter campaign, aided by the most murderous negli-
gence, some 20,000 excellent soldiers. The inhospitab!e
coast of the Crimea has shattered to pieces a consider-
able number of transports, which our commanders had
exposed to the storms of the Euxine ; we have found

the climate of the East more pernicious than we were
disposed to expect to human life, and the Turks even
more helpless, and less able to provide for the wants of
civilised man, than we could have expected. We find,
in fact, that the greater part of our supplies must con-
tinue to be drawn from England, and that, if we wish to
derive any help from the country we come to defend, we
must provide roads, communications, markets, and con-
veyances entirely for ourselves. We have found moreover,
that the seceond- rate States of Europe, in which class Prus-
sia must since the commencement of the present negotia-
tions and operations in the East undoubtedly be placed,
are far more overawed by the power and terrified by
the predominance of Russia than we had any reason to
imagine. It would really seem as if the frontiers of that
mighty despotism had advanced from the Niemen to the
Rhine, and that literary, refined, artistic, scholastic,
metaphysical Germany was content to smoke its pipe
and drink its beer on sufferance under the shadow of the

~_
aegis of Slavonic power. Europe has tried to be Repub-
lican, and, true to the prophecy of Napoleon, is going to
be Cossack.
.. ..

We have not understated the circumstances of the
present crisis. Nay, we would, if we could, put them
more forcibly, in order to rouse the attention of the
nation and its rulers to the gravity of the position under
which those who involved us in this war are now said
to be dreaming of a dishonourable peace. Any peace,
under existing circumstances, which should not com-
pletely establish the ability of the Western Powers to
set a positive limit to the onward progress of Russia,
would be absolute treason and perdition to the cause of
liberty, juaice, and enlightenment throughout the world.
If the Western Powers are not able now to arrest the
onward course of Russian ambition and rapacity it is
vain indeed to expect aid from any other quarter, or to
hope that what they give up in despair to-day they will
be enabled by any fortunate change of circumstances to
achieve to-morrow. The favourite maxim of modern
politicians,—"Rtculer pour mieux sauter," has no appli-
cation now. We cannot hope for a more favourable
time than the present. Many circumstances might occur
which would render our position less imposing than
now, but none can be suggested with any plausibility
which would be likely to improve it. In the Emperor
of the French we have a faithful and an honourable ally,
but we have recently been reminded by a lamentable in-
cident on how frail a thread an alliance rests which de-
ipeesisfys
coanr
etlhe es
s lifeof
ho fi
sap singerso lneaml
saanee
tayno da tnhda
sot manen e
os
mo
pd
aa
sus ne td-
by unscrupulous and inveterate enemies. From Germany
ton years ago we might have hoped something ; now
she has not the heart to stand forth in her own cause
against her oppressor, and is quite as likely to resist as
to support those who have really drawn the sword in her
own quarrel. We need not mention Spain, which, habi-
tually without money, and deservedly without credit, is
an object of pity to every one, but of terror only to her-
self. Neither can we look to the American Republic
for aid in vindicating the rights of nations and asserting
the supremacy of justice. Let any one read the letter
of the " States'-man," and say whether, under the nume-
rous and not rigidly consistent causes which he alleges
for a fact hitherto stoutly denied—the fact of the hos-
tility of the United States to the cause of the Allies—he
cannot trace a feeling only seeking for excuse, and ready
to find any pretext for believing England in the
wrong. Under such circumstances we appear to have
no choice. That which was at first merely a struggle
to prevent the Russians from occupying Turkey
and seizing on Constantinople has really become no-
thing less than a struggle for life and death, which
is to decide the question between the advance of
modern civilisation and its retrogression to a state
below that of the greater part of Europe in the darkest
period of the middle ages. It is vain to consider now
whether it would have been wiser to precipitate this con-
test, or to trust to the chapter of accidents to dispel the
dark cloud that is already spreading over our heads.
The lists are prepared, and there is no escape for us ex-
cept by descending into them gallantly and fighting out
this battle as we fought out so many others with our
own good sword. Nor, if we can only prevail on our
statesmen and generals to look danger boldly in the face,
and act as men who hope for no success except in vic-
tory, have we any reason to tremble for the result.
Now that we thorougly appreciate and understand the
nature of the contest in which we are involved, we
have no reason to fear a repetition of the miseries of
the past year. Tents, and food, and clothing were
wanting, and can be supplied ; in the spirit and courage
of our men and officers there is, happily, nothing to de-
site. An abundant commerce fills our harbours with
ships and our mercantile towns with prosperity, and the
savings of the country double, according to ordinary
calculation, the extra expenses of the war. While our
enemy is driven to such straits that he is obliged to tax
at an enormous amount those very exports already bear-
ing so heavy a burden in the shape of a land transport of
hundreds of miles, we find that our progress, though
checked, is not arrested, and that in the very midst of
war we are able to enjoy not a few of the advantages of
peace. History would present no parallel to the conduct
of a ration which under such circumstances should re-
nounce the glorious career upon which she has entered,
and prefer the certainty of defeat by treaty to the almost
equal certainty of victory by persevering in war.