The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-12 00:00:00

LONDON, WED ESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER, 12. 1855.

SI/C eHARLES NAPIER -REPORT OF
GEN. JONES.-THE ADMIRALTY.

The following letters are a continuation of the
correspondence between the Gallant Admiral and
Sir James Graham. The observations of Sir Uhas.
Napier on the report of General Jones are printed
in a smaller type within brackets. On the 31st of
October the Admiralty wrote to Sir Charles as
follows:

No. XXII.
(Copy.)
Admiralty, Oct. 31, 1854.
You observe that " the opinion of General Jones did
not differ from that of the flag officers" with respect to
the attack on Sweaborg ; and you proceed to state what
that opinion was, namely, " that the resources were not
sufficient for such an enterprise, nor was the season of
the year propitious."
You then quote a passage from the report of General
Jones, which you say, is not at variance with this opinion.
Yet General Jones distinctly stated, on the 27th of
August, when 10,000 French troops, in additicn to the
Marines, were still present with the fleet, that if 5,000
men were landed on the Island of Bak Holmen, and if
heavy batteries were constructed there, a simultaneous
bombardment by land and sea would soon lay in ruins
the dockyards, the storehouses, and the principal works
of the enemy.
[Had their lordships chosen to examine the plans, they
must have seen that it would have been madness to have
landed troops, but that they would not see. Sebastopol
was supposed to be taken, and they wanted a case against
me.]

You objeeted to tktirlandineproptimed by General
Jones ; but you now contend that there was no differ-
ence with respect to the " mode" of the attack between
the Flag Officers and the English General.
With respect to " the time," both necessary and best
suited to the attack, you admit that a difference did
exist; but you omit to notice the passage with which
General Jones concludes his report, wherein he says,
"that the close of the summer may probably be con-
sidered the best for bombarding Sweaborg ; as, the win-
ter following close on the destruction of the public esta-
blishments and buildings, would preclude the possibility
of repairing or re-building them during a northern
winter."

[A very pretty reason indeed to attack a fortress,
amongst sunken rocks, and in gales of wind. ]
General Jones, therefore, differing from the flag offi-
cers, thought, at the end of August, that there was time
enough for the attack, and that tho moment was most
propitious.

[ln this General Jones was proved, by the subsequent
weather, to be mistaken.]

Writing on the 13th of September, you make the fol-

lowing remark on the entire plan of General Jones :
"General Jones propased landing 5,000 men at Swea-
borg, and planting batteries against it., and he thought
this a good season to do so."
[lt would have been more than unwise— it would have
been madness.]

" Had the French General been unwise enough to
follow this advice, and had the Admirals been indiscreet
enough to have countenanced an operation that, by his
account, required seven or eight days to have brought it
to a successful termination, the troops would have been
made prisoners, and probably half a dozen of the ships
lost ; this would have made rather a bad finish to the
first campaign in the Baltic." This, surely, is a differ-
ence of opinion not confined to the " time," but extend-
ing to the " mode" of the proposed attack, and con-
firms the declarations of their lordships, that " adverse
opinions " had been presented to them.

[lt is quite true that adverse opinions had been presented
to them by the two engineers, but not by the admirals ;
they were unanimous.]
Yon further remark, in your last letter of the 26th of
October, that if their lordships were led to believe by
your report of the reconnaissance of Sweaberg, in your
despatch of the 25th of September, that you contem-
plated an attack by the fleet alone, such an impression
was erroneous, and that there is not one word in that
letter which conveys the least idea that such was your
intention."

[This is perfectly true ; but their lordships thought pro-
per to put one paragraph of my letter before another, and
changed the sense of the letter altogether.]
Paragraph 13 of that despatch commences with the
words, "if Sweaborg were attacked by a fleet alone ;"
and then follows a detailed plan of attack by naval
means only, set forth at length in paragraphs 13, 14,
and 15, and no mention whatever is made of the neces-
sity of military co-operation, until at the close of the

despatch these words are added :--"I have said nothing
about troops ; but I have no doubt they could be most
usefully employed."
[Which was doubtful success, and not to be undertaken
Ott that season. True, but there is mention of gun-boats,
mortar-vessols, rockets, &c.]

Their lordships were under the impression, when they
read this despatch, and when they deliberated on it, that
the result of your second reconnaissance of Sweaborg
was a conviction on your (:;.n mind that "the place
might be attacked with caution and judgment by the
Fleet," and that the aid of troops was not indispensable.
[Yes, it could be attacked with caution and judgment,
and the cautious and judicious way was stated. Then
followed the detail ; their lordships thought proper to
apply that to an attack by ships alone, which is not true.]

The words read by you in paragraph 16 (No. 516) are
these :—" I beg that their lordships win not suppose for
a moment that Sweaborg cannot be attacked. I think it
can ; but it rnust he with caution and judgment."
[Quite true, but to be done with caution and judgment,
and not with ships alone ; their lordships knew well my
meaning.]

On the 30th of May, writing from Hango Head (No.
108) you say :—" I send the plan of Sweaborg and
Helsingfors, which appear to me unattackable either by
sea or land ;" and again on the 24th of July (paragraph
2 in No. 296) you assume that " an attack on Sweaborg
is entirely out of the question."

[That opinion was formed by plans, sent by tho Admi-
ralty before I bad seen Sweaborg. That alluded to the
few troops sent out, which their lordships know well, if
they choose.]

Surely the second reconnaissance of Sweaborg, and
your despatch of September 25tb, founded on it, did
open a new view of the question, and did demonstrate
a change in your opinion, as expressed on the 30th of
May, that "the place was unattackable by sea or
land."

[lt demonstrated no such thing ; because, in my de-
spatch to Sir James Graham, forwarding Chads' report,
after seeing Sweaborg, the plan of attack was the same as
after the second reconnaissance. I have already said the
report of the 30th of May was made before I saw Swea-
borg ; their lordships endeavour to keep out of view my
report after seeing Sweaborg.]

Their lordships are now told that their last impression
was erroneous, with respect to the possibility of a sea
attack ; for you declare an attack by the fleet alone to
be a "desperate undertaking ;" and, although you add,
" at this season of the year," writing on the 26th of
October, yet at the Council of War held at Ledsund,
on the 12th of September, the season even then was
considered too far advanced for an attack " on any for-
tified part of the coast of Russia with a chance of suc-
cess."

[The impression was erroneous ; but it was erroneous
on purpose, if they understand English. Most certainly
if the 12th of September was unfavourable, the 26th of
October was more so, when their lordships, in their wis.
dom, or rather i
ortunn their ignorance, desired me to choose a
day.and opp
The weather which you report to have experienced in
the Baltic since the departure of the French troops and
ity.]
ships may be adduced in corroboration of the correctness
of this view ; and my Lords have already declared them-
selves satisfied with the reasons assigned by you for not
attacking Sweaborg after th 4 withdrawal of the French
fleet and army.
But, considering the conflict of authority contained
in the different reports recently brought before them,
their Lordships cannot, with equal confidence, express
satisfaction with the decision taken at Ledsund, not to
attack Sweaborg immediately after the fall of Bomar-
sund.

[The opinions of the engineers were diametrically oppo-
site to each other ; the Admirals were unanimous ' • yet
their Lordships are dissatisfied with the decision talcell-bv
the Admiral I and enerals not to land troops. If that is
not censure, do nGot know what is.]
Some stress is laid on the want of Lancaster guns, and
of rocket boats and mortars. But lam directed to ob
serve, that the Lancaster guns are not yet brought into
general use, nor are they yet perfected ; and it was not
considered necessary to expedite the construction or the
departure to the Baltic of gun-boats or mortar-vessels,
when, at the end of May, their Lordships were assured
by you that Sweaborg was " unattacliable either by sea
or land."

LI Drat repest,:the opiacoa ofSvreaborg, at the elici of

May, was formed from plans; but the opinion in June was
from both plans and inspection, which their Lordships
keep in the back ground.)
I am, Sir, your prat obedient servant,
CHAS. NAPIER.

To the above communication from "My Lords of the
Admiralty," Sir Charles Napier made ths,,,folfowing
triumphant reply :—__

_
No. XXIII.
[Copy.]
Duke of Wellington, Kiel, Nov. 6, 1854.
Sir,—ln reference to your letter, No. 796, of the 31st
October, I beg to observe that it h quite true, when
General Jones stated on the 27th August—when 10,000
French troops, in addition to the Marines, were still
present with the fleet— that if 5,000 men were landed at
Bak Holmen, and if heavy batteries were constructed
there, a simultaneous bombardment by land and sea
would soon lay in ruins the dockya7d, the storehouses,
and the principal works of the enemy.
Long before General Jones made that report it was
notoriously known that the Frenct General had deter-
mined to take home his army* as soon as the works of
Bomarsund (which surrendered an the 16th August)
were destroyed, and he stated in his letter to me that
a debarkation at that dangerous sesson of the year (Sept.
2) appeared to him and to Admira. Parseval impossible,
in which I agreed with him, but proposed that he should
attack Abo, which he declined, as cholera was raging in
the French army. They sailed on the 4th September, and
I have no hesitation in saying, lad the whole French
army gone to Sweaborg instead of to France, and been
backed by the seamen and marites and the fleet, they
would not have effected a landirg, and if they had, ac-
companied by their materiel, guts, mortars, stores, &c.,
necessary to throw up the works General Jones pro-
posed, they would not have re-enbarked one man or one
gun, and most probably ships you'd have been lost, and
the English and FrenelvAdslirale, .and,the General,
would have; been lnaecttpon 'by iintti nations as totally
unfit for their command, and most probably impeached,
and a triumph would have been given to the Russian
cause that would have convulsed all Europe.
Their Lordships seem to forget that when I received
their letter of the 4th of September, to call a council of
war, the whole French army had sailed, and the ques-
tion was, " Whether anything more could be done with
the fleet alone ?" And the Admirals agreed unanimously
that we had not resources to do more, nor was it a
fitting time.
General Jones reported that the only mode of at-
tacking Sweaborg with any prospect of success was by a
combined operation by land and sea. What, then, could
the Admirals mean but,the same thing ?
Their Lordships say that I omit to notice the passage
with which General Jones concludes his report, where
he says, " that the close of summer may probably be
considered as the best for botnbar.ling Sweaborg, as the
winter, following close on the destruction of the public
establishments and buildings, would preclude the pos-
sibility of repairing or rebuilding them during a northern
winter."

The only observation I have to make to that is,
that in the Gulf of Finland it was not the end of sum-
mer, but the beginning of winter, and time has shown
that General Jones was wrong—that there was not
time for an attack, and that the moment was not pro-
pitious. I must finish this part of my letter by remark-
ing, that I think their lordships, instead of throwing
blame on me, should have given both the French Ad-
miral and General and myself credit for not undertak-
ing an operation which must have led to inevitable dis-
aster, and which their lordships frequently cautioned me
against. I think it is hard the opinion of the admirals
is to be so lightly treated.
I now come to my last reconnaissance of Sweaborg,
reported on the 25th of September, and as their lordships
seem to be under an erroneous impression, in justice to
myself I must state it at length, and comment upon it :
" On the following day I proceeded to reconnoitre Swea-
borg in the Driver, piloted by Captain Sullivan, through
an intricate passage of sunken rocks, little more than a
quarter of a mile wide, and stopped abreast of Grnbara
Island, about two miles south of Gustavus Sward."
The sunken rocks are shown in the small Russian
chart only ; from this position the fortress appears like
batteries heaped one on the other, pointing towards the
sea.

On the southern face of Gustavus Sward and Vargon
77 guns cover the approach of a fleet from the south-
ward, besides 29 guns on three batteries at Bak Holmen.
The three-decker lies in the entrance of the passage be-
tween Bak Holmen and Gustavus Sward, and her broad-
side also covers the approach from the south.
The best reconnaissance was made by Capt. Sullivan,
being at anchor for seven hours, and having leisure to
well examine the whole of the southern part of the
fortress.

Their lordships will observe that we could not get a
view of the western defences, and, I think, General
Niel having only seen the western part of the fortiaca-
tions for a short time, is rather hasty in giving an opi-
nion that eight or ten sail of the line would lay it in
ruins in two hours.

There was not time to find a passage through the
rocks to enable us to see the western face, at the north
end of which a line-of-battle-ship was placed to cover
the entrance by Langhorn, and another at hanc to sup-
port her.

- In my former report, I agreed with Captain Washing-
ton that the feet could lay in Miele Roads in the sum-
mer ; that is now more difficult, as batteries have been
built on the south points of Landharn Island, but they
could be destroyed.
If Sweaborg were to he attacked by a fleet alone, they
would approach from the south in one line, raked by
160 guns—one or two of the leading ships would anchor,
and occupy the batteries at Bak liolmen ; the next would
pass on, fire a broadside into the three-decker, and
anchor—clear of her broadside—against the south-west
angle of Gustavus Sward. She would be followed by
the next, pouring a broadside into the three-decker,
and anchor a-head of her leader, and en on in succes-
sion, as close as the ships could lay'. By this time the
three-decker would probably be sunk, and the whole
western face of Sweaborg engaged. A. small squadron
would be required to anchor south of Langhorn ; they
would have to contend against it, and two or more line-
of-batt!e-ships and what guns were in Helsiugfors.

All the passages shou'd be buoyed, and small steamers
stationed in the narrowest and most dangerous channels.
The large steamers should be under weigh in various
directions to assist ships in difficulties, and a reserve
squadron ready to take the place of disabled ships.
Whether this attack would succeed or not it is impos-
sible to say, but we must calculate on ships being set on
lire by red-hot shot and shells, of which they would have
abundance, and, whether successful or not, it is evident
the ships would be in no condition to meet the Russian
fleet afterwards, and if the attack was made at this sea-
son of the year, when you cannot depend upon the wea-
ther for two hours, I do not know how many would be
lost.

The above was my opinion of how Sweaborg could be
attacked, if by ships alone ; but I ask their lordships to
do me justice, and say whether one word in that de-
spatch can be construed into an intention of attacking
Sweaborg with the fleet alone, and particularly at this
season of the year?
Then follows the paragraph of which their lordships
make so much use, but which they put in the wrong
place :
" I beg their lordships will not suppose for-a moment
that Sweaborg cannot be attacked. I think it can, but
it must be with caution and judgment."
And then follows the cautious and judicious plan :
" I have little to add to the report I made to Sir
James Graham, a copy of which I sent to the Admi-
ralty, and which I again enclose. Since that report it
has become easier; we have now Lancaster's guns ;
every ship in the fleet should be furnished with them.
Thirteen-inch mortars should be placed on Laghara
Island and Lango Rocks, and gun-boats carrying Lan-
caster guns should be added to the fleet. Those ships
should be placed at different points, at a proper dis-
tance from the fortifications, well furnished with shot,
shells, and rockets, and a bombardment commenced and
continued until the wooden buildings, of which there are
many, were on fire, and an evident impression made on
the fortress. The ships should then close in and finish
the work. How long this would take I cannot say, but
I am quite certain the fortress would be laid in ruins,
and most probably an entrance opened to the ships.
" I have said nothing about troops, but there is no
doubt they could be most usefully employed."
Their lordships do not appear to me to be at all aware
of the position of Sweaborg or the dangers of the naviga-
tion. If they will consult Captain Sullivan, he will tell
them that it would require days to prepare for such an
attack ; the fleet could not go in off hand and attack it ;
they must lie in Miolo Roads. They must buoy all the
shoals, and they must defend them when buoyed ; all
the vessels must take up their position beforehand
amongst the rocks. All this requires time and fine wea-
ther, not to be had at this season of the year.
If their lordships will read over this carefully, I think
it perfectly impossible they can sustain the construction
they put on my despatch of the 25th Sept. But if they
are determined to deliberate on the first part of my
letter alone, and ignore the last, I have nothing left but
to protest most respectfully against it.
Their lordships have raised a new question. They
say, that on the 30th May, No. 10 8, I sent the plans
of Sweaborg and Helsingfors, which appeared to me
unattackable. Quite true. My judgment was then
formed on plans, many of which came from the Admi-
ralty ; but their lordships have forgotten Admiral Chads'
report, sent to Sir James Graham on the 14th June,
and my report on the 18th July, after seeing
Sweaborg.
Their lordships allude also to what I said on the 24th
July, but that was in reference to the intended attack on
Boinarsund, the force not being considered large enough
for Sweaborg.
In the concluding part of their lordships' letter they
say—" But, considering the conflict of authority con-
tained in the different reports recently brought before
them, their lordships cannot, with equal confidence, ex-
press satisfaction with the decision taken at Ledsund not
to attack Sweaborg, immediately after the fall of Bo-
marsund." Their lordships forget that when the council
of war was held the French army was gone, and I think

o The cholera was aging amouget the 11, and bad
Troet)aez ha 4 Pet iat

I have given their lordships sufficient reason for its de
parture.
-

Relative to their observation about the Lancaster
guns, I am aware that it was quite impossible they could
be prepared this year, and all my observations on the
subject were intended for the following year ; and with-
out them, and a great number of mortars and a vast
supply of shot and shells, such a fortress as Sweaborg
could not be reduced.

I hope and trust their lordships will be satisfied, and
that this correspondence, which has caused me much
pain, may now be terminated,—l have, &c.,
(Signed) CEAS. NAPIEIt, Vice• Admiral.