The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-06 00:00:00

THE ATTACK OP THE 18th.

General Pelissier's despatch of the 22d of June, giving
a full report of the action of the 18th, or at least of that
part of it in which the French army was most promi-
neatly engaged, is a candid, perspicuous, and highly
creditable narrative of the proceedings of that unfortu-
nate day. Some additional circumstances might have
been mentioned which possibly contributed to the failure
of the attack, but upon the whole this report is a fair and
correct account of the chief causes of this untoward oc-
currence. It makes no attempt to conceal the magnitude
of the losses sustained by the allied armies or the keen-
ness of the disappointment which rapidly succeeded the
immoderate confidence of the troops, and it leaves us to
award the responsibility of this disaster to those upon
whom the chief burden falls. We shall not assume that
ungracious and invidious office. There were errors of
judgment, there was a want of accuracy and combination
in the movements, there was an incorrect estimate of the
resources of the fortress in this plan of attack ; all this
is fully acknowledged by the Generals themselves, but
the consummate intrepidity shown by the troops and by
the gallant leaders who fell at the head of their men bids
us abstain from saying a single word which may aggra-
vate the pain of our loss or of their untimely fate. These
daily remarks of ours are read by a large portion of the
civilised world, but more especially they are read, and
read with avidity, by those whom they most concern—
by our countrymen in the camp before Sebastopol ; and
however indifferent we may be in general to the praise
or blame of interested parties, we should be sorry to
write a single word which could be thought inaccurate,
unjust, or discouraging by the army.
We therefore confine ourselves to the general
considerations which the problem of this siege still
suggests, and which must eventually decide the fate
of Sebastopol. It is now universally admitted by all
the engineers, English and French, before the place
that the Malakhoff Tower and the works about it are
the key of the whole position, and that against this
point the main operations of the attack must be directed.
The chief importance of the Mainelon, which was cap-
tured by the French on the 7th of June, and is now
called by them the Brancion Redoubt, is, that it at
once enabled the besiegers to advance their lines and
works about 700 yards nearer to the Malakhoff than
they were before, and consequently to drive on their
approaches with greater energy against the main posi-
tion. The surprise we have already expressed on pre-
vious occasions that measures were not instantaneously
taken on the 7th to secure this advantage was equally
felt by the army and by the Russians themselves ; for
in the course of the armistice which was so strangely
granted, as if to enable the enemy to repair his works,
some of the Russians asked whether the Generals were
drunk when they acceded to such a request. General
Pelissier says that after the capture of the outer works
they had been rapidly converted into the basis of an
attack against the Karabelnaia suburb itself. But no
works by sap or otherwise had been driven beyond
them, and the artillery placed in them was still 650
yards from the Malakhoff Tower. Nevertheless, an
assault under these extraordinary conditions was deters
mined upon after the bombardment of the 17th, and it
Was to be directed almost at the same time by the
French against the Malakhoff works, and by the Eng-
lish against the Redan. Upon this arrangement another
remark of great importance presents itself. It should
be borne in mind that the Redan is a work which pro-
jects or advances considerably in front of the Malak-
hoff, and that the fire even from the Mamelon takes
the Redan in flank. The Roden is, moreover, lower
than these works, and is commanded by them. The
double operation of the 18th of June is, therefore,
reduced to this dilemma :—lf the French attack
on the Malakhoff works proved unsuccessful, it
was totally impossible for the English or any
other troops to occupy the Redan, or to hold it
even if they had crossed the abattis and the ditch ' • but
if the French attack on the Malakhoff works had suc-
ceeded, then neither could the Russians have continued
to hold the Redan ; they must inevitably have been
driven out of it in a few hours by the fire of the Malak-
hoff and the Mamelon directed against themselves, and
this result would have been obtained with certainty, and
without any assault of the Redan at all. Or, to express
the same proposition in fewer words, if the Malakhoff
works were not taken, the Redan could not be held by
us ; and if they were taken, the Redan could not be held
by the Russians. In no case could the capture of the
Redan have contributed to the fall of the Malakhoff
works, because the latter are is the rear of the former,
and completely enfilade it. If this argument be sound,
as we believe it to be, the result is that no attack on the
Redan ought to have been made at all, or, at most, a
false attack to divert the attention of the enemy from
the main point. The real English attack would have
produced a far more serious effect if it had been directed
against the Barrack Battery, the point assailed by
General Eyre ; and if a powerful body of troops had
penetrated there they might have caught the Russians
in the Redan on their flank and rear. A redan is a re-
doubt not closed behind ; but to attack it by assault in
front is to attack it precisely where it is strongest. The
Cross fire of such a work from the faces of the bastion
and the flanking batteries is perfectly irresistible, and
the consequence was that no man got within 50 yards
of the ditch alive. Nothing, in short, could justify such
an attempt, except the moral obligation Lord Raglan
might feel to share the peril of our allies. But there
was this difference in our position—if the French bad
carried the Malakhoff, they would have decided the
fate of the siege ; if the English had carried the Redan
only, they would have decided nothing.
This being the unfortunate, but inevitable result
of a premature attempt to carry by assault works
still retaining the superiority of their fire, the course now
to be pursued by the engineers is clear. They have it
in their power to push forward by regular approaches
from the position of the Mamelon against the Malakhoff
Tower, and eventually to establish in these advanced
works batteries of sufficient weight to subdue the fire of
the enemy, and we have reason to believe that this regu-
lar operation has now been commenced. Indeed, Gene-
ral Petissier states in his telegraphic despatch of the 3d
inst. that our works are progressing satisfactorily, and it
is probably to this operation that he refers. Hitherto,
in spite 'of the prodigious resources which have been
brought to bear against Sebastopol, the fire of the be-
siegers has been too distant and too diffuse to produce a
deci,ive effect on any one point. The siege has now as-
sumed a more precise direction, and with an adequate
amount of time, of labour, and of artillery, the approaches
against the Malakhoff Tower will acquire more of that
certainty which has hitherto been the boast of the science
of military engineering.
But, while the allied armies are obviously endeavour-
ing to concentrate their attacks upon the place, we per-
severe in the opinion that there are many points in the
adjacent districts of the Crimea against which the large
bodies of effective troops not employed in the siege work
might with advantage he directed. The recent excur-
sions conducted with judgment and success by Omcr
Pasha and by General Marinora, at the head of the
Turkish and Sardinian corps d'arince, have penetrated to
a considerable distance into the lateral valleys of the
Tchernaya. Nearly the whole country on the left bank
of tho Belbek has been visited by these troops as far as
the pass of Aitodor, and without encountering any serious
resistance reconnaissances have been made half way from
Balaklava to Bakshi-Serai. It is extremely uncertain what
amount of forces the Russians have in reserve in the in-
terior, and there are strong reasons for believing that
the main body of the Russian army has been withdrawn
to reinforce the garrison of Sebastopol. All appearances
of an aggressive movement on the part of the enemy
from the north have, for the present, ceased ; and,
though the country beyond the Belbek is exceedingly un-
favourable to field operations, General Bosquet's army
of observation, assisted by the means of transport at our
command, may in a few hours menace any part of the
coast. It is, of course, impossible for ns to enter with
more detail on the possibility of such operations ; but
while the allied forces, amounting to 200,000 men, re-
main confined within the plateau 'which extends from the
Tchernaya to the sea, as if they were blockaded by a
superior force, it is more than doubtful whether any
such force exists. We discovered by experience the
weakness of the Russians at K.ertch, at Yenikale, at
Anapa, and on every point we have attacked, except
Sebastopol, and we cordially hope that advantage will
be taken of the delay in the siege operations to make at
least another diversion against the enemy on some other
point of the theatre of war.