The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-06 00:00:00

ADMIRALTY, RINE 6.

With reference to the above despatch, Lieutenant
Henry Frederick M‘Killop will be promoted to the rank
of Commander, as soon as he shall have completed the
sea time required to qualify him for that rank.

Miranda, Vesuvius, Curlew, Swallow, Stromboli, Ardent,
Nfedina, Wrangler, Viper, Lynx, Recruit, Arrow, Snake,
Bea;le, and five French steam-vessels.

NIPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF COMMONS-YESTERDAY.

THE WAR.—ADJOURNED DEBATE.
( Continued from our third edition of lag evening.)

Mr. COBDEN vsurned the debate. ' I should like to sea
my right hon. friend now stand upon that' table, and be
forced to read that speech from beginning to end, and let
the house contrast it with the speech he made last night.
(Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman says the question now
is whether we (that is the Government) are right in refus-
ing to make peace on the terms proposed by Russia. That
is not the whole question. The question in debate—and
which is to be decided by the division to-night—is whe-
ther the plan proposed by the Government was the best
and the only plan that could, under the circumstances, be
devised—(hear, hear)- or whether the difference between
the plan and the plan proposed by Russia was such as to
warrant the recommencement of the war. These are the
questions we have before us to-night. What is the dif-
ference between the two proposals ? Remember, it is the
Government of this country with whom we have now to
deal. They are the parties who are now responsible for the
war ; they will have the glory if it succeed, and upon them
must rest the responsibility if it fail. Well, what is the
difference between .the proposal of the Government of Eng-
land and the propoa4 of the Government of Russia? The
question between thew was—whether Russia should have
four sail of the line, fonr frigates, and a proportionate nuni-
ber of smaller vessels in the Black Sea ; or whether all the
navies of the world should have free access to that sea, and
Russia be permitted to have as many ships there as she
pleased ? Now, I have been told by a nautical man that if
Russia, had accepted your proposal and destroyed sll her
worthless ships and her green-timber vessels, and sent an
order to the United States for four first-class line-of-
battle steam-ships, of 130 guns each, fitted with screws,
four frigateri of that elastic character we know the
Americans build, carrying perhaps 70 or 80 heavy guns,
and also fitted with screws, and a proportionate force of
smaller screw vessels—she would have had a far more for-
midable navy in the Black Sea than she has ever yet had
—a force that would be able to compete successfully with
double the naval power she has ever yet maintained in that
sea. (Hear.) If that be the case, what great diminution
of power were we, after all, going to impose upon Russia
for the protection of Turkey ? But Russia resisted this
proposal for limiting the number of her ships as a point of
honour, not on the ground of diminishing her force ; she
resisted it on principle. (Hear.) Now, however, the right
hon. gentleman says, if we allow Russia to havefree access
to the Black Sea, and we have also free access to those
waters, we shall be put to an enormous expenditure iu
keeping up a large peace establishment for the purpose of
watching Russia in the Black Sea. The right hon. gentle-
man had talked of the probability of a six years' war. Now
let me ask how long would the interest of the money you
will have to pay for that six years' war keep up your fleet
to the establishment necessary for watching Russia in
the Black Sea? It has been said that though
Russia may promise that no aggressive movement shall be
made upon Turkey, yet as we cannot believe anything that
Russia promises we must insist upon her reducing the num-
ber of her ships. But it appears to me that you must go
further than this, for if you undertake to maintain the in-
dependence of Turkey you take a task in hand that cannot
be accomplished without great and permanent expense to
the country—a task which will compel you to maintain a
large armament continually on the watch in Turkey or in
its immediate vicinity. (Hear, hear.) You say you can-
not believe Russia, and you call upon her for securities.
I would ask the noble lord, the member for London, what
that great model of whiggery, when the Whigs were in
opposition (Fox), said upon the subject of securities.
When it was said we must have securities against the
aggression of France, and the Tories of that day were
urging precisely what the noble lord is now urging, Mr.
Fox said, " We have securities—the only securities we can
ever depend upon, namely, the interest of France to make
peace, and if it be her interest she will keep it ; such
is the state of all nations, and it will be so as long as the
world lasts—your only security is your own vigilance." If
you recognise it as the policy of this nation that you will
send armies to fight the battles of the continent iu the
midst of their great standing armies and their system of
conscription, I should be a hypocrite to say that such a
policy was consistent with that moderate peace establish-
ment which it has been the maxim of this countryfcr years
past to maintain. If you acknowledge that policy you
must be prepared to keep up a large standing army to place
yourselves ifi a military point of view on a par with France,
with Austria, with Prussia, with Russia, and the rest, for
if you attempt to follow out such a policy without such
preparation to uphold it, depend upon it the country is
bat preparing the way for a most ridiculous and ignomi-
nious exposure of weakness. (Hear, hear.) I would ask
the right hon. gentleman when he last night indulged in
vituperation against Russia, when he told us that Russia
was not to be trusted, whether he was aware that as a
cabinet minister he had himself been a party to au engage-
ment with Russia to interfere conjointly in the affairs of
Moldavia and Wallachia. The right hon. baronet told us
last night that Russia was altogether without shame, and
ho attributed to her every sentiment and act that was vile
and dishonourable. Did he not know at the time tnat he,
as a member of the Cabinet was himself a party to the
treaty by which we were to join ourselves with France,
Austria, Prussia, Turkey, and Russia, to be the guardians
of Wallachia and Moldavia, to interfere by force of arms
in h-cr internal affairs, and to form a tribunal that would,
in fact, constitute the government of those Principalities ?
By the-treaty contained in the fourth protocol, you have
bound yourselves in terms to become, conjointly with
Russia and the other powers, the government of Wal-
lachia and Moldavia. I will read the protocol to the
house, in order to show what engagements you have
entered into with that power, which, because you have
had some newspaper statements of successes and altered
circumstances, it now suits you to vituperate, but
which at other times you can slaver over with your
praises. Here is the seventh article of the protocol, but I
will read also the sixth. It provides, " That there shall be
no interference without the consent of the high contracting
parties—England, France, Russia, and Austria--and the
courts will not afford protection in the Principalities to
foreigners whose proceedings may be prejudicial to the
tranquillity of those countries or the neighbouring states;
and disapproving such proceedings, they engage respectively
to take into c onsideration the representations made by
either of the powers, or even by the local a uteitmtonhthi
ceteooi
hot:p eifat
ljwi
ietoisi
h'
Thus you are bound, together with Russia, if the governor
of Bucharest should make a report of some local difficulty,
RussiaisAsnounhmbdalebi mith:
ietscsonar
inhabitants
sou esrtm e t
signed
gr
niumee
et
engages
deo
g,
dbadayygul oeed:uwßararrioutrthsaesutemogblleaotlotuitltn:e.Hdrras,Aetadeuirand.in:wgcTtehohrhnuoejetuurnisns:
conclu-
siones
o
? I blush when Ibe
country
foet
oaau odnnttti
rot
consideredy.
fo ftHo
hr
teedhtrs
aheeonesipget
ernirocesoto—i
uogues
ihni`bttl Oosro
iuntearhssii
entfasrg6ps
states."
party
yet
mede
-
dling foreigners such as are just described ; nor to allow the local
hn
pporovi tran-
quillityßussellveerost
•Isouttfga:hnthdoheusel
l.raditoubwhte hna
with their own local matters, if in the opinion of the
tranquil-
lity of their own country. (Hear.) Mark, how changed is
the child and champion of revolution when' he breathes the
air of Vienna! (Loud cheers.) My hon. friend the member
for Aylesbury cheers these sentiments, and my denuncia-
tion of this arrangement. (Hear, hear, from Mr. Layard.)
But has my hon. friend himself in this matter pursued that
bold, consistent, and manly course which, with his de-
clared opinions, I think he should. It is well known that
the sympathies of my hon. friend were in favour of the
war, because he believed it augured some advantages to
nationalities, that it would tend to the independent-, or
at least the good government, of certain states in Wal-
lachia, Moldavia, S crvia, and the rest. (Hear, hear, from
Mr. Layard.) But has my honourable friend so little
sagacity as not to see that all this waste of blood
ought t
and treasure had very different objects in view from those
he contemplates? And seeing the course the war has
taken, and the terms and arrangements upon which the
oGovernmentdenounce
oaruneoreeaidt
altogether,theytoconcludseinoo i
ll
to do with those objects for which alone he has declared it
was defensible. (Hear, hear.) Before the war actually
nothing
broke out I was appealed to, by illustrious names, not to
oppose it, because it was looked forward to by them as
likely to promote the independence of certain down:troddsn
communities on the continent. I gave my opinicm in
answer to that request eighteen month! ago in writing,
wt
ahr,
a ny
n .
a friend a
and I am not now disposed to recall a single word I then
stated. I warned those persons who came to me, that
if they expected that a war, originating in diplomacy, as
this has done, and carried ou by means of enormous
armies, as this has been, and with such then as those
I who are at the head of our own Government, and of
I the Governments of the continen to give direction and

purpose to it—l warned them that they would deceive
themselves if they supposed such a war would tend to
their advantage, or satisfy their aspirations—and I added,
bat my fear was that the effect of such a war would he
just the opposite of what they wished—and would
strengthen those despotisms they hoped to weaken and
lepress still more those oppressed communities they hoped
ro serve. (Hoar.) Stich was my opinion then. and such I
still believe to be the tendency of this war. (Hear.) But
to revert to illy right hon. friend's allusions to Russia—l
believe there are few whose public views are more opposed
to Russian despotism than mine; but it is unjust—l had
almost said it was scandalous for a Cabinet Minister, who,
within these few weeks, was himself a party to these con-
fidential and, as I think, unworthy arrangements with
Russia, to get up and speak of the government of that
country as might right friend did in his speech of last
night. This conduct, however, is not confined to soy
right hon. friend ; the same game of see-saw has cha-
racterised the members of the Government throughout.
From time to time they change their tone and their
arguments to suit the press and the feeling of the people
out of doors. And so obvious is the alteration which a
few leading articles produce, that it might be supposed if
the same thing happened in some other country, amongst
a people of less discernment than ourselves, that cabinet
secrets ooaed out and were communicated to the newspaper s
perhaps by some lady friend—that the wife possibly of
some cabinet minister drew from her husband and divulged
to the wife of the editor of some leading journal the fact
that there were two parties in the cabinet—a war party
and a peace party, and that the peace party, which was the
weaker, required to be whipped into submission. (Hear,
hear.) So completely have we seen the change in the tone
of the Government accord with the altered tone of the
leading articles of the newspapers from day to day that the
case I have imagined to have taken place in another c
un-
try might almost be supposed to have happened here.
(Hear, hear, and laughter.) What had been the con-
duct of the noble lord the member for London, for in-
stance ? We find at the conference's at Vienna the noble
lord assumed the most polite and agreeable demeanour.
There was no hard language used there, but when he re-
turns to the House of Commons we find him falling back
upon the old strain, and talking about Russia establishing
large fortifications on the German frontier and in the
Baltic, and of her intrigues in the German courts. Bat
did it never occur to the noble lord that the obvious reply
to these statements was, " Pray. which of the four points
was intended to rectify this evil—(cheers)—which of them
would have met the difficulty of these great fortifications
in the Baltic, and prevented Russia from interfering and
encroaching on Germany?" There is no guarantee in these
four points against the rebuilding of Bomarsuud—there is
no protection for the Circassians. The independence of
the world is forgotten when the noble lord is at Vienna, but
is recalled to his mind the moment he returns to the House
of Commons. Then, if we go into the House of Lords,
what do we find the conduct of the members of the Go-
vernment there ? I confess I read with astonishment the
speech of the noble-lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
the other night. I presume it was intended to attain an
object for the moment, and in that it probably succeeded,
but I very much doubt if it will attain any permanent
end that will satisfy either the noble lord or the country.
The noble lord, in that speech, attacked Russia with
vituperation, and adopted a tone of defiance towards her,
as if he had never been a party to those arrangements as
to the Government of Wallachia and Moldavia to which
1 have alluded. He said look at the strength of Sebasto-
pol—what were all the fortifications our armies have there
met with erected for, and what were all those war ma-
terials collected there for which have enabled the garrison
so long to withstand the siege, if it were not for the pur-
poses of aggression. But surely that noble lord cannot
be ignorant of the fact, that the great strength of Se-
bastopol has been erected since our army has been
before it, and that ammunition and provisions, some-
times in convoys of 500 and sometimes of 1,000 carts at a
time, have entered.the tortress. (Hear, hear.) Then the
noble lord the member for London had alluded to Ger-
many in a manner that would hardly be taken as indicative
of our good sense or our wisdom. He talked of the corrup-
Lieu of the German Courts and of the interference of the
Russian government and of Russian agents in those coun-
tries. But from what he(Mr. Cobden) had heard, he fancied
we were much unistakenas tothe tendency of pnblicopinion
in Germany, and as to the supposed difference betweenthe
people and their governments in reference to this war. He
was told that in Germany there was no party that wanted
to join in the present war, and that though there might be
well-wishers to our cause there was no party ready tobreak
the peace and enter into hostilities with Russia ; and if it
was recollected what was the past history of Germany in
relation to France and gussia it would be seen what was
the reason why there was not any great dread of Russia
there. In Prussia all the traditions of the people were
favourable to Russia and hostile to France—and on this
question they ought to speak in that house without
reserve, and as if their debates were not reported ;
and he would say that they had in Prussia and the north
of Germany a dread of France, owing to the suffering
which the people underwent during the revolution, ands
also partly because France lay contiguous to the Rhenish
provinces of Prussia, and was supposed to have cast an
envious eye upon them. But whatever the cause, it was
the fact that in every cottage in Germany the feeling was
rather favourable to Russia and in opposition to France.
In the cottages of Germany would be found memorials of
calamities caused by Franco, and the only recollections of
Russia were, that she had come and helped them to escape
from the rule of Napoleon. All this might account for
Germany's not being so anxious to enter into a war in

alliance with France. Another reason was to be found in

the fact that there never was any principle laid down by
which any safeguard against Russia would be secured to
Austria and Germany if they entered into a war with their
next neighbour for our purposes—no security was given
against Russia's retaliating on Germany. And now what
would be said, after the result of the conferences at Vieuua
was made known, but that we, after talking about fighting
for the liberties of Europe, had dropped our pretensions,
and had not said a word which could give auy confidence or
auy security to any part of Europe. There could, there-
fore, be no alliance with Prussia, or with any nation
lying contiguous to Russia. He (Mr. Cobden) was lately
Balking to a Prussian gentleman, who sail that we English
were a most unreasonable and net a little arrogant people,
for we expected the Prussians to enter into the war with
Russia—that is, sixteen millions of men of a country lying
contiguous to a country with sixty millions; and they were
not like the English, who, when the war was over, could
withdraw to an impregnable position ; whi a in the
ease of Prussia it was always in the power of
Russia to assault her; and that really the way in
which the newspapers bullied Prussia could only
bo compared to the conduct of a man who drove
a doo, on to attach a wolf. (Hear, hear.) If we looked
back at the tone taken by the newspapers, was there not
something that bore out those remarks? And it should be
remembered, 'when you were 'dealing with Germany you
were dealing with an educated people, who had their news-
papers too, and in a country where education was so diffused
that you might go to buY your bread and meat in Latin if
you did not know German. Having such a people, then,
to deal with, were not they in that house somewhat too ar-
rogant in their treatment of them, and was it not
somewhat arrogant in the noble lord to say that all Ger-
many was corrupted by Russia? If the English people had
to undergo the conscription, as was the case in Russia,
where every man and horse and cart could be taken for
military purposes, they would be a little more chary about
going to war, and our pot-house politicians would not call
out so loudly for war, and the Government would look at
the question of war with more consideration, because it
would be known how severe were the sufferings caused by
war, when they were brought home to a people. He had
said long bolero we sent a man from these shores that if we
were going to war with Russia to vindicate our rights, or to
avenge our wrongs, we should do so with our strong arm,
with our navy, but that we should not send a man to the
eontineut of Europe or to Turkey; the exp-ession he used
was, that we should not take our land forces over the backs I
of whole populations of continental Europe, where there
were a million of men in arms between us and the power
we affected to dread. He held the same opinion now, and
he believed that we ought to have stood on the same ground
with regard to Russia as Austria and Prussia did ; and if
we had not rushed so hastily into war, it would have hap-
pened, as was proved, that Austria and Germany would
have averted all the evils which were dreaded, for it now
appeared that Austria and Prussia had by treaty declared
it to be a cases belli if Russia crossed the Balkan, and they
would have been equally ready to have declared the cross-
ing of the Pruth by Russia a caves belli. Why, then,
sheuld not we hove been contented to stay in our island
home and send our fleet into the Black Sea, telling
Austria and Prussia, here is a great danger to Europe,
and if you will share with us the resistance to
it we are ready to help you, but if not we will protect Tur-
key by sea, but not a man of our army shall move till you
set yourselves in motion towards a common object in this
defence. (Hear.) Any one would now say that would
have been a wise policy. He heard some hen. gentlemen
say the Russians would have been in Constantinople ; but
he said no, they would not, for Austria and Northern
Germany had a far greater interest in keeping Russia out
of Constantinople than we had. He then came to consider
the inconsistent arguments which had been used by our
leading statesmen. .They had declared during the last 18
months that Germany and Austria were more interested in
resisting Russia than we were. It was so stated by the noble
lord at the head of the Government, by Lord J. Russell, by
Lord Clarendon, and by Lord Lyndhurst; there was not a
leading mind among them but laid it down that Austria
and Germany had a greater interest in this question than
we had. Then why did not we, who had less interest in
the matter than they, wait until those great powers were
ready to move? But we said that we were going to fight
the battle of the civilisation of the world, and we set about
that with 40,000 or 30,000 men, for we never had more
than 30,000 in the Crimea ; and the correspondent of the
Tinto had lately repeated what he said before, that we
lost half our army because we had not men enough to do
the duty required of them. Was it the function of Eng-
lishmen to fight because Germany was corrupt? He (Mr.
Cobden) said, as was said by Prince Gortschakoff at
Vienna, that the best blood of England should be shed
for Englishmen and England. He did not say this dis-
paragingly of Germany and Austria, who had shown
themselves wore enlightened on the subject of this
war than we were. The English people had been sti-
mulated, and especially by the noble lord (John
Russell), (for he held that noble lord to be the
greatest offender in that respect), had been clamoured
into the war, and had not taken time for combinations
with Austria and Germany to avert the threatened
danger. But now, when it was known that Ger-
many and Austria would not act with us, we were going
on in the same course. It would be a Parliamentary
curiosity of literature to go to Hansard and extract the
declarations of Minister's that Austria and Germany would
join us. (Hear, hear.) They put it into the month of
her Majesty in her speech from the throne, and they re-
peated it in every speech they themselves made. He could
not even except the right hon. gentleman the member for
the University of Oxford—(hear)—for even he, in his great
speech on the budget, expressed his opinion that there was
little doubt but that Austria had actually joined us. (Hear,
hear.) It was impossible to read extracts from all the
speeches. and he would give but a few. Here was one from
a speech of the noble lord (J. Russell) on the 22d of Dec. " If
Russia should not consent to such very moderate terms as
it will be our duty to propose, after the Minister of the
Emperor of Russia has declared he is directed to enter into
negotiations, but should still continue of opinion that
that great scheme which was begun in the reign of the
Empress Catherine, if not before, and which is to end in
adding Turkey to the Russian dominions, must be prose- 1
cnted—if he is still of that opinion, I feel convinced that
we shall, before the opening of the next campaign, hate
alliance of Austria both in offensive and defensive opera.-
teem." Were we going now, and at this time, to carry
on
the war on land? That was the question, and he (Mi Cob.
g
den) would say, as he said before, are you going to co.
yourselves to the taking of Sebastopol ? That
was t'lelllqlll3leist-
tion. Was that to be done now, although it had been given
up, notwithstanding that the noble lord and other gentle.
1
men on the Treasury bench came down day after day with
different stories on that point for the purpose of beguiling
the house. Although they might allow that sort of thing
to go on, Austria would not allow such double dealing.
The proceedings of the Conferences were published, and

it was now seen how the Government were prepared to
make peace, and that a proposal to withdraw front before
Sebastopol had come from them; and. the only question
being the infinitesimal
question of the reduction of
the number of the Russian ships in the Black See.
He agreed with his 'Ott hon. friend (Mr. Gibson), and
thought that the Russian proposal was better .than ours.
However, it was rejected. We were then now carrying on
the war with a determination to take Sebastopol ; at least
so he gathered from the statement of the noble lord. He
did not know whether it was too late to speak of it ; but be
would ask if it was worth while to spend our treasure and
shed our blood like water to take Sebastopol, if we took it
at all, if we accompanied its capture with the carrying out
of the policy of the Government, as laid clown in their de-
claration, that under no circumstances were we to take any
territory from Russia. It scented then that we were
fighting for no purpose but to knock about the ears of
our brave men a certain quantity of stone and mortar,
and to destroy certain mounds of earth and fortifica-
tions to which we could point as having been destroyed
by us. But how long would they remain so. Why, Russia
would come to some banking house in London, and in
three years they would be all built up more strongly thau
ever. What was the plan and object of the recommence-
ment of the war—what was it for ? Was it a war against
the preponderance of Russia? Let them discard passion,
and talk of this question es if they were talking of the
'United States of America. Suppose that they were talking
of the reduction of the preponderance of the United States
in the Gulf of F:ori la or the Gulf of Mexico. What would
be the rational ground of a discussion which would follow
a proposal made with the absence of all passion, and in
which they would have the benefit of their unclouded in-
tellects to guide them? What, would they not ask, we
the source of the power of the United St des in those seas?
Would they not rioint to New Orleans, which commanded
and was the outlet for all the cote merCe which sprang
from the fertile territories existing on the Mississippi, the
Missouri, and the Ohio inhabited as they were by million
of men, the producers'of vast wealth to their empire ?
(Hear, hear.) Would not the result arrived at be that
that preponderance was natural to and inherent in the
coantry, and arising from this state of things? Let them
hadsam eßctol
Russia
consequences ne e s
preponderanceflowing fr) thethe sameß ;k causes.. Sea?
turn their eyes to the Black Sea and the would see the
in
she possessed on its shores fertile
. provinces, rich and pros-
perous harbours, and a large and there • commerce. He
(Mr.Cobden) was speaking lately to a
those countries well, and who were increasing
he
engagee in the largest
Because Why
said gentlemandth. t .wa hnookn partTf
commercial transactions there, and
of the United States of America bad there been Irapid
progress in wealth and interior production since stuhceh
repeal
of our corn laws as had taken place in those Russian pro-
vinces. It was estimated that in the year before lastßusel
had exported five millions of quarters of grain of all kinds,
and if things went en in the same proportion in the next five
years it was estimated that she would export 20 millions of
grain of all kinds. He admitted that it was onl3 a youthful
barbarian' which was developing itself into something bet-
ter, but so long as such vast produce was going into the
Black Sea, and Russia had no other neighbour but Turkey,
a decayed and uuimproving empire, -all the powers of the
earth could not take away the preponderance in the Black
Sea from her, because it was inherent in the nature of
things. She had there 1,000 miles of frontier, and was
Russia to be asked to cut herself down to the level of de-
erepid Turkey? It was an impossibility. What were se
fighting for? Tuere was no mystery in what he was going
to say. It was whispered that we were fighting more at
the wish of France this our own. But were we sure that
the war was not going on against the wish of the French
people? He would ask gentlemen who were acquainted
with and had connexions in France, whether they had not
private information on this point, for of course there was
not much information to be gob from the press in that
country. He heard from private sources that the war,
which was never very enthusiastically liked in France,
was now more than disliked. Then what were the
wishes of the French Government ? He was now
entering on delicate ground, bat he was about to
allude to a subject which he told the noble lord
(Palmerston) that he should treat of publicly, be-
lieviug as ho did that it was his duty to speak
out ou a question which involved great events, and might
be fraught with calamities to the country. He came to
this point—was it the wish of the French Government to
go on with the war ? or was it the wish of oar Govern-
ment ? It had been industriously spread abroad that the
French dynasty had so much at stake in the war that the
Government dared not withdraw their army from before
Sebastopol on account of the effect which such a step would
have on the French people. Now, his hon. friend (Mr.
Bright) and himself had had it communicated to them on
good authority that the French Government had stated to
ours that they were willing to accept of either alternative
of the terms published in the last protocols. He was not
talking of the proceedings of a secret conclave. They all
know of what was calleca meeting of the supporters of the
noble lord in Downing-street. On that occasion, when the
noble lord said they were about to enter on a confidential
conversation, and that no representatives of the papers were
present, Es hon. frien t asked if it was true that an inti-
mation had been made by the French Government
to ours that they were willing to accept trins different
from those offered by M. Drouyn de l'Huys, and that there
had been a refusal to accede to them on the part of our Go-
vernment. The noble lord refused to answer the question,
although he was much pressed. He (Mr. Cobden) pressed
him to give an answer, and he told the noble lord dis-
tinctly that if ho would give an answer, and say no, that
he could treat all that took place there as confidential, but
that if the noble lord allowed him to go out of the room
without an answer, looking to the sources of the informa-
tion he had received, he would not make any secret of
what passed on that occasion. The state of things was very
serious. We had contrived to detach Germany and Austria
from us ' • there was no hope of their joining us; that was de-
cided—there was no one now to help us. What would our
fate be if, by and bye, it was proved that England was the
cause of the recommencement of the war, and that she had
acted contrary to the inclination of the French Government
and the Ftenchp topic? T hat might lead to the very opposite of
all we hoped from the union of the two peoples—it might
lead to their estrangement. If we were to carry on the
war in conjunctior with France alone, did not that in-
volve the responsibility of doing more than we are doing ?
Would it not some day be a subject of recrimination that
our force in the Crimea was so small, and that of the
French so great ? This was not, perhaps, the proper time
to bring up this question, but he would refer to observa-
tions which had been made by the hon. member for In-
vernees-seire, who stated that we were 40,000 short of the
number of men voted by Parliament. It was stated by tt
noble lord a member of the Government in December,
that we were 20,0,0 short; and the hon. member for In-
verness-shire said that the militia regiments in England
were mere skeletons, while in Ireland and Scotland they
were, practically, disbanded. If that were true, and we
still wanted forty thousand men, might we not be urging
on the war with that blind heedlessness with which every-
thing had been done by the Government, without look-
ing three months beforehand ; and by and bye again
see the consequences of this want of foresight of the Go-
vernment ? He was speaking at a moment when the
country was excited by the recent intelligence from the
seat of war. Now, if any one studied the maps of the
scene of the operations, it would be seen how much was
made out of very little, although it had done much to
increase the confidence of the people. Ile placed uo
limits to the power of England and France if they put
out their strength, but he was not so sure that our po-
sition in the Crimea was as supposed. He had been in
communication with a gentleman with regard to the
supply of food to the Russians in the Crimea, and he did
not learn from him that Sebastopol depended on Kertcir
for food. He was told by this gentleman (and it ought
to damp this unwarranted exultation), who was a holder
of corn at Kertch, that the Russian Government had
stated to him five months ago that theyconld not be respon-
sible for the safety of his corn. Five months ago, Russia
gave notice that it was intended to abandon Kertch, and
no doubt it was the same with Beriansk and other places
iu the Sea of AzoiL From what he gathered there was
great exaggeration with regard to this expedition to the
Sea of AzotL If there was really anything in it, what must
now be the reflection of those who had the ships to under-
take it long ago? (Loud cheers.) Were we sure that the
expedition was not occasioned by the same cause which
took our troops from Gallipoli to 'Warns, and from Yarns
to the Crimea—the cry of " Do something." (Hear, hear.)
If ever a government or a commander did something be-
cause they were told to do something, and for no other
reason, the chances were a hundred to one that they would
do something wrong. (Rear, hear.) He was not sure that
the expedition was caused by anything but because the
Government was called on to do something, and he would
now record his deliberate opinion that, while the proceed-
ings in the Sea of Azoff were destroying private property.
and would not add to the lustre of our arms, he believed
that they could have no better effect upon the war
than the marauding expeditions last year in the Gulf
of Finland had on Cronstadt. (Hear, hear.) He believed
that the supplies of Sebastopol came entirely from
Perekop, and that that place and Simpheropol were
strongly fortified like Sebastopol, and that both must be
taken before you could intercept the food of the Russian
army, and take Sebastopol. As to the interception of sup-
plies into the Crimea across the steppes beyond Perekop,
he was told by a gentleman that every spring 1,000 carts
were obtained to go from Odessa and other places on the
coast, over the steppes, with produce to the Crimea, and
that all that commerce was now suspended. The conse-
quence was that the Russian Government would avail itself
of all that means of conveyance, while so far from the
steppes being an obstacle, journeys were made over steppes
five or six times greater inextent than those. Was it not
better that we should look at all these things in this light,
and calmly consider them, without giving way be an effer-
vescence of feeling which prevented our judging of the con-
sequences of what we were about to do ? We had recom-
menced the war with a determination to take Sebastopol.
When he said that the united strength of England and
France could not be resisted by any human power, he made
one exception in favour of a greater power than either.
He alluded to pestilence and disease. He had read lately
some extracts from Spencer's work with reference to the
climate of the Crimea, which had reference to the summer,
He never dreamt of applying those observations to the
winter, for if • well housed and fed, and not overworked is
the trenches, there was nothing in the constitution of an
Englishman to prevent his living and being in health in
the winter in the Crimea. But in the summer, according
to the best autlorities, it was hardly possible for an Eng-
lishman in the Crimea, unless the most careful precaution
was observed, to escape the intermittent fever which re-
velled in July, August, and half of September. Those
• Those
were the fatal months. If any one sinned against th
careful rules of diet—if a man went out in the the most
sun, or was exposed to the night dews •f mid-daywater when heated, or ate new corn he took cold
things brought on the intermittent f or fruit—all these
precautions soldiers, of all other ever; and all these
dreaded the fate of the army in .July, men, disregarded. He
ber. Had that been thought of August, and Septem-
they turned away from peace? by the Government when
shoulders ould rest the whole On them and. on their
not for their emoluments responsibility. He would
and all t • self the responsibility they heir power, take on him-
If no pestilence destroyed incurred in the next 6 months.
the Crimea, all the our army, and we triumphed in
army was destroyed honour would be theirs ; but if our
and there by pestilence, if it failed in the field,
was a repetition of the disasters of last winter,
they must be prepared for retribution—nothing short of
physical violence, which would come upon them in thenext
6 months. There had been a great want of frankness in the
conduct of the war. The public had gone heedlesslytint. ITadt
and entertained very erroneous opinions respecting 'F
of the greatest
not the tone held at recent meetings beeneforeenemy _
? He
arrogance, and ignorance of the power h
rested his case upon the infatuation of invading Russia
with a land force.
Had weconfined ourselves to naval
no disasters and no dis-
Operations, we should have hadto
invade Russia,
we
pre-
content. By sending
"erThat expedition was under -
pared for inevitable disasters.
out of doors, in regard to whit
the statesmen of the country
taken in obedience to a cry
ought to have exercieed a coit-
e sent a land force three thousand
trolling judgment.
an colonists, and it
miles to carry on war with our American
failed. The expedition of Napoleon L, supported by half
a million of bayonets, and
aimed at the very heart of Rus-
sia, failed. -Wm Ulm any Mann to believe that, with tire

tradition of the spirit which she then exhibited to animate,
her patriotism, Russia would make a less stubborn resist-
ance to us than she did to Napoleon I. ? It was hi. belief
that we had entered upon a task the greatest, the most ar-
duous and the most difficult that ever a nation undertook,
and that we ahauld have to more than double our energies,
the number of men engaged, and the money we had spent in
a single year, before we should succeed in accomplishing our
objecc. Ought not we to tell this to the people, amito subdue
rather than excite their feelings ? Suppose we should snfler
reverses, and have to contend not only with-intermittent
fever, but with plague and cholera in addition? Ought not
the House of Commons, instead of cheering the Minister
when he told them that the conferences were closed, not to
subdue the spirit of the country in a righteous cause, but to
let it know fully and fairly what was before it ? What he
blamed the Government for was, that they bad played
falsely and treacherously with the people, and there would
be a reckoning with them in the country. The noble lord
at the head of the Government said in one of his harangues;
that the people of England were his reserve force—what had
he done to make that reserve available? The noble lord
the member for the city of London said in December that
we would have ISO,OOO or 200,000 Englishmen under arms,
with foreign levies to aid them. Where were they? There
had been the same child's play all through, from the be-
ginning up to the present moment. (Opposition cheers.)
All he asked was, that they would deal candidly with
the public. He had noticed that, whenever the mass of a
people became cruel, revengeful, and unreasonable towards
Governments, or towards their leaders, it was because they
thought they had been betrayed ; and there was nothing
by which the Government would so surely risk the loss of
public favour, and reap public calamity, as by attempting
to conceal from the people of this country the whole
amount of the difficulties and dangers which were now
hanging over them. It was on this account, and because
he would not be responsible in the slightest degree for what
might happen in this country, that he wished to speak out
on this occasion ; and he warned hon. gentlemen that there
were no institutions which might not be in danger from
from the reaction that might take place from over-san-
guine confidence in the war we had now undertaken. He
had seen public opinion Out of doors take sudden and
strange freaks. He had seen the men who clamoured
the loudest for war, after the first disasters meeting toge-
ther, not to denounce themselves, or to take to them-
selves the slightest demerit, but to denounce those who
weee.jzighest in the land and most responsible. And when
he saw what had been the course of proceeding in the
face of what he must believe to be superior informa-
tion—when he saw the way in which in high places the
passions of the people had been pandered to, and a mere
momentary triumph sought at the risk of great future die-
aster—hemnst say that he thought many of these persons
had deserved the retribution with which they had met.
He would never so far truckle to the popular spirit as .to
join in any cry which should divezt the mass of the peo-
ple from what he believed to be their first duty, viz., to
consider how far they were responsible for what had fallen
on the land and how far reform ought to begin at home.
He had spoken as he had done, because •he believed that
we were engaging in a war, the difficulties and dangers of
which were understood by neither the Government nor
the people. Were the Russians at Portsmouth he should
have taken a different tone ; but it was to counsels mode-
ration and caution that he had made this long, and per-
hapssomewhat tedious, appeal to the house. (Cheers.)
Mr. COLLIER said the great value of the present de-
bate was that it had explained the causes of the misma-
nagement of the war. Those causes were now clearly
seen to be the presence in the Cabinet of right hon.
gentlemen who were determined that this country should
not humble the enemy, and who seemed to consider them-
selves equally charged with the interests of Russia as of
England. He inferred from the remarks of the right hon.
baronet the member for Carlisle on Friday week, that that
right hon. baronet meant to transfer his allegiance to the
right hon, gentleman the member for Bucks, because that
right hon. gentleman was more pacific than the present
Government. He was thankful that the Russianising ele-
ment had now left the Cabinet, and in the improved con-
dition of the army they traced the effects of a firmer
policy; and if the Prime Minister would continue the course
he had adopted, he would carry With him the unanimous
opinion of the country. He characterised the arguments
of the hon. member for the West Riding as fallacious,
and severely commented on the bad taste shown in the
way he spoke of our recent successes in the Sea of
Azoff, and the exultation with which ho anticipated
the progress of fever in the Crimea. He condemn° i, also,
the manner in which the hon. gentleman violated the con-
fidence imposed with respect to the private meeting of the
Liberals in Downing-street, and concluded by expressing
his opinion that the people of England would be glad to
know that the conferences were terminated, and that peace
must now be sought through the vigorous prosecution of
the war.
Lord H. VANE intimated his intention to support the
amendment of Sir W. Heathcote. He admitted that the
limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea was difficult,
and he thought the Russian propositions were as well cal-
culated to secure that end as that proposed by the Govern.
meat, and he believed that a peace concluded upon those
terms would have been beneficial to Europe.

Sir SINORTHCOTE opposed, and Major PEED supported,
Mr. Lowe's amend atent. _

Mr. EWART, though a firm friend of peace, would sup-
port the vigorous prosecution of the war, believing that
was the shortest road to peace. At the same time he was
not for a war of nationalities, and he had no idea of crush-
ing Russia, but he would leave the terms of peace in the
hands of Government, and could not therefore support Mr.
Lowe's amendment.
Mr. VANSITTART condemned the Government fer
standing upon such a nice point of honour as their inter-
pretation of the third proposition, and lie was therefore in-
clined to support Sir Wm. Heathcote's amendment. He
would not, however, press that, hut ho called upon the
Government to lay down some definite course of policy, on
attaining which they would conclude the war.
Mr. F. SCULLY defended the conduct of Lord John
Russell in the Vienna negotiations.
Mr. CROSSLEY had been opposed to the war altogether
at its commencement, but being once engaged in it he was
for a vigorous prosecution of the war.
Mr, J. G. PHILLINIORE severely censured the conduct
of Mr. Gladstone, and urged a strenuous prosecution of
the war.
Sir J. GRA.HAM—I can assure you, sir, that I never
rose in this house with feelings of greater embarrassment
or of greater pain than those which I experience on the
present occasion, and like my hon. friend the member for
the West Riding. I shall appeal to the generosity of this
house, inasmuch as I am well aware that the opinions
which I am about to express are not in accordance with
those entertained by a majority of the members of the
house, and I shall make this appeal with confidence because,
being in the minority in which I feel myself, I ant sure of
a disposition on the part of the house to deal faicly with
me. (Hear.) It is painful to un lorgo taunts such is those
which last night and this evening have fallen from hon.
gentlemen on the opposite side of the house, who accuse
those who are anxious, even under present circumstances,
to obtain a peace, which appears to them an honourable
one, of being Russian ausi:iaries, or, or as other hon.
members say, of being friends to Russia. Now, Sir, it is
necessary to submit to taunts of that description, and
the only consolation which is left to me is that wiser
and better men than myself have had to undergo ebserva-
tions of a similar description. (Hear.) But I feel that in
the present circumstances of this country I cannot fairly
be called a friend to Russia because I take a course which,
if I neglected to take, I should consider myself an enemy
to my own country and a traitor to those whom I repsesent,
and I should feel myself guilty of baseness if I hesitated
manfully and fairly to express to this house and to the
country what aro ray opinions with reference to the policy of
the present war. My position with regard to this question is
different from that hold by other hug. gentlemen who are of
opinion that the late negotiations should have led to peace,
and who have constantly and consistently objected to the
war from its very commencement. I, on the contrary,
have entertained the opinion, and I still entertain it, that
the war declared against Russia was a just and necessary
war. That opinion, I say, I have entertained, and I still
adhere to it, but the real question now at issue, according
to my humble judgment, is, have the real objects been ob-
tained for which the war was undertaken, or did the con-
ferences which had been held at Vienna establish a fair
ground for believing that an opportunity was afforded, if
improved, of bringing the war to a satisfactory termina-
tion ? Besides having entertained and expressed the opi-
nions to which I still adhere, that the war originally was
a just and necessary war, it was my duty in the Govern-
ment of Lord Aberdeen to fill an important post connected
with the conduct of the war ; and when the hon. members
for Leominster and Plymouth have asserted that it is now
quite plain what were the causes which led to failure, while
I and those whe act with me, and who with me left the
Government of the noble lord the member for Tiverton,
occupied a position in the administration of affairs, I tell
them, in reply, that, although it would ill become' me to
speak of my own efforts or my own conduct, still this much
I can say, that from the first moment when I went to the
Admiralty I used my best exertions to prepare the naval
forces of this country for any emergency which might
arise. (Hear.) My efforts were sincerely and constantly
directed to that end long before the commencement of the
war, anchluring its progress I endeavoured to the best of
my abilliry to provide ample means to meet the wants of
the public service, and when I left office I hope, and I may
say I think. that those means were not found deficient by
my successor. (Hear.) Having made these observations, I
shall now pass on to the observations which I conceive it
to be my duty to submit for the consideration of the house.
On a former evening, before the commencement of the re-
cess, I urged upon the Government the propriety of ad-
journing this debate, because I was of opinion that a sub-
ject of such magnitude and importance ought not to be hur-
riedly discussed, and it appeared to me impossible that in
the short remains of one evening it could meet with suffi-
cient consideration, and I therefore pressed the adjourn-
ment of the debate. During the interval a very im-
portant change has taken place in the state of af-
fairs. The conferences at Vienna were then open ; they
are now closed. It anpears that, since the conference
of the 26th of Aeril, a proposition has been made by
the Austrian Government to the Governments of England
and_ France which, in the opinion of Austria ought to have
been submitted to the Russian envoys, and which afforded
a hope at least of an adjustment of the difference not being
head of the iil we now hear from the noble lord at the
that Governmentproposition,
that England and Francehave re-
jected and that the conferences are closed.
As matters nov
fore the recess that time stand, I think that, if it was important be-
should be given for discussing this
great question, the circumstance to which I have adverted
has greatly increased the
theln first place, I shouldgrwaiTsVt of
the present occasion.
y stria and
know what was the pre-
cise proposition made b
pi,coanideject,d by England
and Franco ti and in the next
should wish to be in-
formed whether it is tho opinion of her Majesty's Govern-
ment that the four points, which we have
of
so much
about, ought to be maintained as the bases future nego-
tiation, or whether fresh terms have been fixed, upon
which alone England will consent to deal with upon
I cannot conceive any question of greater importance,
or one which deserves on the part of the Government s's
more frank and immediate explanation, because I have
observed in the progress of this debate in this popular as_
sembly with what rapidity an inclination has shown itself
to raise the terms to be determined upon as a sic qua
nom before concluding a peace. I do not see the bun.
and learned member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) in
hie place, bet before the recess he made a speech which
the house will remember—a speech remarkable for its elo-
quence, its energy, and its ferce—a speech worthy of the
occasion and eeetny of the high position held by the hon.
and learned gentleman ;it the bar of Ireland ; but, re-
markable as that speech was for its eloquence, it lv:suas
no
less so for the opinions expressed in it—opinions
acted upon, would lead to interminable hostilities. (Hear.)

It was, said the hon. and learned gentleman, no longer
a question of terms ; Russia was a perfidious Power,
who never observed the treaties into which she en-
tered ; and the argument of the hon. and learned
gentleman went to show that we are now fighting, not
for terms, but for the honour, glory, and supremacy of
England throughout the world. Well, sir, that opened
out an alarming prospect. Tnen, again, in the progress of
the debate, the hon. member for the Mon ose barglie has
declared his opinion that the time has now arrived when
it is not safe to conclude a peace with R while that
country holds a single ship, port, or fortress in the Black
Sea. Then, again, I am at a loss to understand what is the
precise and definite object for which this war is to be =gel
It is a trite observation, yet it is one which on this particu-
lar occasion is not altogether inappropriate; that one point
of a good minister is to avoid involving his country in a
war, for experience shows us, and history teaches us by ex-
ample, that though it is always easy to involve a country
in a war, it is very difficult to carry on that war with the
full and cordial support of the people for any very great
length of time. I will illustrate this position by reference
to history, and since the great rebellion there have been
wars that afford instances in support of what lhave
stated. In 1739 Sir Robert Walpole was at the head of the
Administration of this country. He was a popular and a
most successful minister, but he most reluctantly declared
war against Spain, in which the people of England entered
most heartily at that time. Nothing, indeed, ever femme led
the popularity of that war at its commencement. Every
class of society rivalled each other in their efforts to carry
on the operations of the war. The leading members of the
Opposition took a most active part in it, and even a prince
of the blood formed one of a procession when the war was
declared, Sir R. Walpole was against the declaring that
war, but he did so in deference to the will of the people ;
but, within two years, he, from being the most popular Mi-
nister who over held power, was abandoned and left with-
out support from any quarter, anti, after his overthrow, the
country became discontented with the whole operations of
the war, which was suffered to drag its slow length along for
some seven or eight years amid the execrations of the peo-
ple, and, to use the expression of a right hon. gentleman,
an ignominious peace was the result. The conferences
at Aix-la-Chapelle were kept open with the desire of
delaying the progress of negotiations in the hope that for-
tune might turn in our favour. But fortune did not smile
upon our arms; adversity followed instead of success, and
after the negotiations had been protracted the war was at
last terminated by a peace, in which, I believe, the only
instance in history occurred of our actually sending two
hostages to Paris—the Earl of Sussex and Lord Calthorpe.
The Pretender, who was then in Paris, and had witnessed
the arrival of those noble lords as hostages, exclaimed,
" If ever the day should come when I shall haverecovered
the throne of my ancestors, my first desire will be that
hostages shall come from Paris to London, andnot gofrem
London to Paris." Well, sir, this was the result of the
war of Sir R. Walpole. Allusion has been made to the Ame-
rican war, and to the last and longest war, namely, that
with France, but it should be remembered that in the case
of both those wars there were palpable and direct British
objects involved. The war with America was a struggle
for empire. There were no less than 13 British colonies
at stake, which the Sovereign of this country be-
lieved to be the glory and tne brightest jewel of his crown,
and which he never would consent to have severed from
this country. During that war we suffered many disas-
ters ; we had thousands of miles to traverse, and we strug-
gled in vain. The war finally ended in disaster, the effects
of which are still regretted, and by many believed to be
almost irreparable. But it was believed, notwithstanding,
that terms might at the commencement have been possi-
ble. That, however, was a war in which England was
fighting for an empire. Then, what was the case in regard
to the war of the French revolution ? That was a struggle
of another kind ; but still its object was direct and imme-
diate as touching the safety of our native land. I hear an
expression of dissent from an hon. member below me, but
I must beg to state what the cause of that war appears to
me to have been. In this world of ours the pride of em-
pire has proved to be be the source of great commotion and
productive of mighty effects ; but there is another passion
of the human mind which has produced equally important
consequences, I mean the inglorious passion of fear—" Pri-
mus in orbo dens est Timor.' Fear has subdued empires,
fear has made wars, and it was the fear entertained of the
dangerous principles that existed at the period of the
French revolution which involved this country in war.
What was the fear ? Was it a groundless fear ? I think
that fear was rightly entertained, and the danger boldly
met. There was a regicide, there was a blood-stained
guillotine, there was the declaration of Jacquerie, there
was the declaration of the Social Propaganda, there were
all the horrors of the French revolution. Those appre-
hensions were not ill founded which led to the com-
mencement of the French war. In its progress it became an
internecine war, and afterwards a struggle between the
first Napoleon and the rest of the powers of Europe, the
question, so far es this country is concerned, being whether
England should be a free and independent nation or should
become an appanage and mere domain of France ? Reference
has been made to thevast cost of the war, and an earnest
appeal has been addressed to the house on that subject—
"o ! miaeras hominum mentos, 0 ! pectora cmca."
It has been stated that no less a debt than 500,000,0001 has
been incur] ed to maintain the Bourbons on the throne of
France, which was rescued from the great conqueror Na-
poleon I. by the glorious successes of our arms, led on by (me
of the greatest generals that the world has known for these
1800 years—a general equal at least to Ceeiar, and only in-
ferior, if inferior, to Napoleon himself. (Cheers.) But hav-
ing succeeded in establishing the royal throne of France,
and having incurred

at the grandsire's sore regret,
From age to age an everlasting debt,"

it so happens that the very next heir of that great con-
qneror is now ou the throne of France; and not only on the
throne of France, but is our powerful, cur cordial, and, I
must add, our faithful ally. This surely deserves some
pains why we should reflect, first of all, upon the facility
with which war is waged in this conotry, and then •pro-
coed to consider what yon have for its object. You per-
ceive that the wars to which I have alluded have been
national and direct wars in their object, but the was
which we are now waging with Russia is one in
which our interest is remote and contingent—aistant and
not immediate. I have already said thst lam one of those
who are responsible for the declaration of this war. I do not
ragret it, but I think it ought to be always borne in mind
what was the precise object of the war. Now, sir, I must
take exception to some doctrines which I have heard al-
vanced. lam not one of those who believe that during
the progress of a war it is perfectly legitimate to vary your
terms according to the degree of success attending your
operations. But, while I say I think your terms may
vary, I am strongly of opinion that the object for which
you embarked in a war should be kept steadily is view,
and that that object should not vary', whatever may be the
success of your arms. Now, the object for which we em-
barked iu this war was the maintenance of the indepen-
dence and the integrity of Turkey. That was the avowed
object, and, I contend, the sole object, of the war. I con-
sider that the war was necessary and just, and that the rea-
sons for it were twofold. Fist, there wore the covert
in-
tentions of Russia, which were concealed from the English
Government, and which were followed why the overt act
of the invasion of the Principalities. Now, sir, it'will be-
en= my duty shortly to refer to the negotiations which
have taken place. I will not enter into details as to the
settlement of the first point in reference to the principali-
ties—the immediate object of the war ; for, though excep-
tioas could be taken to it with reference to certain par-
ticulars on which the hon. member for. the West Riding
commented, yet in the main the settlement proposed did
secure the perfect independence of the principalities, and,
instead of placing them under the protectorate of Russia,
placed them under that of the four contracting European
Powers, and they stipulated that no negotiations should
take place with reference to the principalities without the
whole question being . laid before the four contracting
Powers. The second point, with reference to the naviga-
tion of the Danube, I will not discuss at any length, but
merely state that in the main the propositions of the noble
lord were acceded to. It was agreed that the navigation
should be placed under a European commission, in which
England was to have a voice, and precautions were taken
with respect to keeping cpen, not only the course of the
river, but also its mouth, where impediments had arisen.
The management of this was to be plactd under a local
committee, to he created bya European commission, which
could not be diss)lved except by the consent of the four
contracting Powers. 'lt was erroneously stated on a
former evening that the question of a naval force to be
kept at, the mouth of the river constantly to watch tie
faithful performance of these stipulations was negatived
by Russia; it was not so, tee question was only reserved
till after the settlement of the third point. I think I
am authorized to state to the house the spirit in which
the Russian envoy accepted the four points. On the
3d of December, immediately after the signature of
the treaty by Austria, France, and England, the Rus-
sian envoy, in accepting the terms of negotiation as
contained in the four points, distinctly announced that
he accepted them, renouncing, on the part of his Go-
vernment, the spirit of the religious protectorate of
Russia over the Christian subjects of Turkey, renoun-
cing the political protectorate of the principalities, con-
senting to the free navigation of the Danube, and
also consenting to the revision of thestreaty of 1841. These
were the declaration made by the Russian envoy who ac-
cepted these bases, and I consider it important that they
should be borne in mind during thisdiscussion, because I
think that it will be found, after a careful investigation of
the negotiations. that the Russian envoy did agree in the
main throughout these discussions to the concessions which
he made at their commencement. He consented to that
which was the most important of all the questions—viz.,
the religious protectorate claimed by Russilloyer the Chris-
tian subjects of the Turks, which, in point of fact, was the
immediate origin of the war. I will not go back to the dis-
pnted question as to what took place with respect to the
discussions as to the holy places—for it was stated by the
noble lord the member for the city of Loudon' who then
held the seals of the Foreign Department, that, in the
opinion of England, at the commencement of the quarrel the
first threat of force did not proceed from Russia, but that
Russia was in the right and France was in the wrong. The
Emperor of the French, with.great magn am i nity, having the
spirit of peace, which cannot be too highly commended, on
consideration of the whole question and the conduct of his
ambissador at Constantinople, receded from the claims of
his ambassador, whose acts he disavowed, and he placed
France in the right, which had originally beenin the wrong.
)Hear.) Russia had a distinct and just cause of complaint
against Turkey with reference to the transaction to which 1
have alluded, but I think the tone adopted by Prince Mens-
chikoff on his mission to the Porte was wholly iuconsis-
tent with the respect duo to an independent Power. This
insolence—for I can call it by no other term—coupled
with the invasion of the Principalities, rendered it a para-
mount duty on the part of the allies of Turkey—England
and France—to come forward in its defence, and to secure
its independence, which had been so violated. (Hear.)
Will the house permit me now to state what in my opinion
is the strongest part of the present case, and which deserves
careful cowl !oration ? I agreed with the hon. member for
Hertfordshire when he said it was not politic by force of
arms, when engaged in war, to humble an a iversary ; but
I think that discretion should be used in cases of the kind
where insolence was followed by aggression, and that hu-
miliation by force of arms was a necessary part of the
conduct of the war. But look at the result of the last
war with Russia and contrast her claims at the
commencement of the war with the terms on which she
was willing to conclude peace at Vienna, and I think you
will not find that the history of any war shows any
greater alterations in tone and terms than those which
have been obtained in the late conferences of Vienna from
Russia, and obtained, as I contend, by force of arms.
Before proceeding to investigate in detail tue demands
and concessions of Russia, I must state that in my opi-
nion the test Ly which you ought to try negotiations
of this kind was wisely and well laid down by the noble
lord the British Plenipotentiary 'on that occasion,
wmhenence mh. eent"ofianree
sound in which theohtlo.
dg that, in his opinion, at the com-
suited and duly ant! ounr so
fnothtereaadtyv e
man f
adversary
peace cnooittl doobne.
considered. (Hear,) The noble lord then
wentte
nt 0 onn, taonmd %nether obsrvation, to which I call atten-
6'kt:which I cordially and entirely subscribe.
He said, with reference to this q'tiestion of honour, that