The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-11 00:00:00

after a committee had been sitting month after month, ree
porting to the house, and discussing the conduct of the
war, another committee ought to be appointed to inquire
how far the Indian army might be rendered, not effectual
for
general purposes, but actually available for thetpre-
aTn'real question was,
sent war. He would, however, tell his hon.. friend that
was
ts
not f a ,
question n l d
fora sare_d
committee m I no.d if
thatue was not the question which ought to be considered.
whether the Indian army, or
tloyf
with the safety of our IndianThyatpw possessions (Hear hear.)
Commons to determine. Nay, it •
y, 1 was not a question to be
determined by the Government the i'ostuesne
of this country. It was a
question to be decided by the Governor-General
alone. The Governor-General, if
of India
were
the man he ought
to be, and if he were a man of such were
experience and talent
as he ever bad been, was alone competentto my whether a
soldier could leave India with due regard to the safety and
security of that mighty empire. This .question, with regard
to the Indian army being available, was not one of specula.
tion ;it was a question of fact. The experience of half a,
century showed that the Indian army had always been
available. Had there been any al ifficulty. in rendering that
army available for the expeditions to Egypt, Ceylon, Java,
the Mauritius, the Eastern Archipelago, China, and
Afghanistan? He must, in passing, express his opinion
that the Affghan war, though fought by the Indian army,
rut] paid for by the Indian treasury, was essentially a
European war. His hon. and learned friend might say that
he referred rather to the Indian officers than to the Indian
army; and that was not so much a -matter of ,speculation
as of fact. Her 31.:jesty's Government had stated that
they wanted the services of Indian officers, and.what was
the result ? Within a few days, almost within a few hours,
hundreds of Indian, officers volunteered, and at this mo-
!dent there were many Indian officers serving this
c iiintry under Generals Williams and Ca'nnon. His hon.
and learned friend had thought fit to constitute himself a
j udge as to whether the prober officers had or had not
been selected. His bon. friend had named men whose
distinction was recognised throughout India,-and he (Sir
J. 1-I°p"g) would be glad to see those gallant, officers em-
ployed in the service ; but he must say that the officers
who had already been selected were men of high distinc-
tloa, and he was satisfied they would show. themselves
deserving of the confidence t had been reposed in
them. His he
13, friend proposed, by his motion, to in-
quire into the
steps which it might be necessary to take
if it should be deemed advisable to constitute the In-
dian army a Royal army, He thought his hon. friend
would have been a little more logical if he had established
the condition precedent
d
an inquiry which was
instead of proposing to enter into
consequent upon a condition that id not exist. His hon. frihad nothing definite to e
n
d
had told the house that he
J. Hogg) that the hon. gentleman suggest.
It appeared to him (sir
on. gentleman was enamoured of some
change, and that if he could only obtain some change he
did not care what it was. The hon.
gentleman first put
upon the paper a notice of motion for "kindof roving
commission •
a ng
commission to inquire and see
.what
Heaven would send
them. The hon. gentleman, however, now asked for
committee. He (Sir J. Hogg) was sure that if the hon.
and learned gentleman was sitting on the bench where he
had so long presided with honour to himself and advan-
tage to his country, and if any one were to make hies
such a proposal as he had now submitted to the house,
he would regard it as a kind of political bill of discovery„
to see if anything could be discovered upon which some-
thing could be founded. (A laugh.) His honourable
friend had directed attention to three prominent points
—the amalgamation of the two armies ; whether there
should or should not be a distinct, teparate, local army for
India ; and, if there were to be a separate, distinct, local
army for India, whether or not that army should be a.
Royal army. The hon. gentleman said he felt a little diffi-
culty with respect to the subject of amalgamation, and he
(Sir J. Hogg) was not surprised that he did so. Indeed
his only surprise was that his hon. friend had not been
more sensible of the difficulty, for he (Sir J. Hogg) re-
garded such an amalgamation as not merely a 'matter of
of difficulty,but of impracticability. The two armies were,
indeed, absolutely antagonistic the one to the other. In
the Queen's army they had the system of purchase and
exchange, and they had continual reliefs to different parts
of the British empire, but in the Company's army there
was no purchase. In that army officers were gratuitously
nominated to commissions ; they did not rise by purchase,
but solely by seniority ; and so rigid. was that rule of
seniority that exchange was precluded. In the Indian
army, the junior lieutenant not only had a right to have
the stipulated number of lieutenants above him, but
by the rules of the service he was entitled to have thesame,
identical individual officers above him, and the rules of the
service did not permit of any exchange under any circum-
stances. Then, with regard to the system of reliefs, the
Indian army was a local army, and not only were its ser-
vices confined to India' except under circumstances of pe-
culiar emergency, but, as a general rule, the army of each
presidency was confined to that presidency. He thought,
then, he was justified in saying that the constitutions and
arrangement of the two armies were not only different, but
that they were actually opposed the one to the other There
were, however, some other matters which his :hon. friend
had slurred over, but to which he (Sir J. Irogg) would.
ask the attention of the house. In the Indian.army every
officer, after a certain number of years' service, wasentitled
to retire upon the pay of his rank. There were also dif-
ferent funds—as, for instance, funds for widows and
orphans, the contribution to which was compulsory—pe.
culiar to the Indian army. How, then,' was an amalgama-
tion to be effected? Would they assimilate the Queen's
army to the Company's army, and give the former these
boons, or would theya,assimilate the Company's army to
the Queen's and deprive them of their vested rights and
interests? He asserted most confidently that amalgama-
tion was absolutely impracticable. What he had said so
far applied to the English officers and men ; but how
would the suggested change affect the sepoys ? He would
ask the house to listen to what Mr. Macaulay said of the
sepoy:. lie said :
" A hostile monarch may promise mountains of gold to
our sepoys, on condition that they will desert the standard
of the Company. The Company promises only a moderate
pen-ion after a lon z service. But every sepoy knows that
the promise of the Company will be kept, he knows that if
he lives 100 years his rice and salt are as secure as the
salary of the Governor-General, and he knows that there
is not another State in India which would not, in spite of
the most solemn vows, leave him to die of hunger in a
ditch as soon as he ceased to be useful."
That was a true descrip,inu of the sepoy at the present
time. Now, the sepoy had failings, and his prominent fail-
in o• was suspicion, dislike, and fear of innovation. He (Sir
J. Hogg) did not exceed the bounds of fact when he said
thatany innovation excited and alarmed the distrust of the
sepoy, oven though it were for his own benefit. He would
rend co the house the opinion of an officer of the Indian
army, the historian of the Affghan war, with respect to the
danger of tampering with the Sepoys, in consequence of
their dread of innovation. Mr. Kaye said—

"The people of India will bear a great deal, so long as
they are used to it. They are very intolerant of change.
They do not understand it. They are timid and suspicious.
Benevolence and wisdom may go hand in hand in our mea-
sures, but the people are not easily persuaded that what
we are doing is for their good."
This apprehension of change was peculiar to the people of
India, and every man who had ruled that country had
acted upon the principle of altering as little as possible the
condition of the sepoys for fear of 'exciting some mini).
prehension. He (Sir J. Hogg) thought he had shown that
the amalgamation of the two armies was impracticable,
and he contended that, as they could not have such amal-
gamation, the army of India must be a separate, local,
distinct army. At this moment 9-10ths of the army were
natives. It must not only be a separate and distinct local
army, but it must be a native army. We could not hold
India by an exclusively European force. This country
could not stand the drain of money and treasure ; the two
treasuries of England and India could not stand the drain
that would be necessary to hold India exclusively by a
European force. If they could do so it would be perilous
in the extreme, fatal to India, and fatal to our hold on
that country, from the disaffection and jealousies which it
would excite in the native mind. The army, then, mug,
be local and native, but it must be officered by British
officers in order to be effective. These officers must be
familiar with the language, the religion,' the usages, and
the prejudices of the sepoys; and, if such were their quali-
fications, they could not fail to conciliate them and
command their affections. (Hear, hear.) 'Without such
qualifications, instead of conciliation, we, would have
alienation ; and this brought him to a remark of his hon.
friend, who spoke of Indian officers as if it were an advan-
tage to be always looking to his native country. Nov he
(Sir J. W. Hogg) contended for exactly the reverse. The
Indian officer, to be effective and useful in the capacities
he had indicated, must go out young—he must go out not
too old to be transplanted. He must take root in India,
and feel and look at India as his home; and not only must
he remain in India, but remain in the same regiment, that
he might know the peculiarities of the natives at large, as
well as every man individually in the regiment. Tate result
interests.
b y theh a
ti
showed that this was the fact. At the present moment there
were 1,100 officers in the Indian army who, if they pleased,
might retire on pensions, but who were so much attached to
the country and so devoted to their profession and their
men that they did not avail themselves of the privilege.
(Hear, hear.) A European force could not be in itself a
local force in any sense similar to that of the native army.
It ought to be identified with the native army. If it wr
so, it would be a source of strength and confidence ; if t
was not it would fail to be either. (Hear, hear.) Then
to, the
the Indian empire ; but these were only auxiliariessnmaned
there were about 30,000 Queen's troops for the defence
. of
native army. They went out as auxiliaries, d
f‘ The
Wellington said with reference to thise vreryae Aped
su,
auzi.
Queen's army are and must always
the Indiangarmy." Now,
such, their stay being usually short. In 1827 the of
liaries, and auxiliaries only, to
t.
it _ wasthijs
army in
was this the effect of mere speculation dieory? No; like the
its present condition the work f
-,i, lured. It commenced
as the
mall of circu2nsta
dually increased,' and slight
from small beginnings,is constitution till at last it arrived
best institutions of the counnray,
changes were made in e
_c.ency. irtogre:y w up and was altered
(Hear.) It was a fabrics
at its, present state of th I
of a hundred years. With it was
associated mighty names
of hour. (Hear, hear.) In the early periods
of folly an • ewe had no army—there were
reared by the wisdom
of thelndian empu:
n the way. The first `soldiers
and apprehensions
however, we
b in
anhe E ers 'we had.
got into align:ails
y were uropeans., W had
were few in num 6s
andan d destroyedin i gh ty
the • I
then no adt: Into how e Jealousy
that the first we employed.
might b
ne pat
iti
vl 1
ne
sil
might state were the deacenda ta
„; 'a the
of Portuguese, who were called " topassece .oft the
middle of the last century,
with the native princes, and then Commenced imprudence
might
tion of a native army. At first there enced the
Bri-
tishorgn
officers to a regiment, and were only three
officer holding the 1113..., . the Indian army- bad no
g a commission till
regiment was formed, he believed l7BO. The first
Battle of Plassy, -under Lord in 1750; and was at the
and constitution of the Clive. - Siich *CA thW origin
army as it
a separate and distinct local now existed in India—
Majesty's troops, which army, 'having the aid of her
* were changed -,,after.pailicular,
periods of service. It
might. be said., .why could we not
have a local Indian army which would at the Barite'- time
be a royal 9 army . This raised the question,, ought the
army to be transferred to' the Crewn ? His honourable .
:friend said-he would change-it from.heing a,leeal erzeiy,Fid
thereby add-to its honour, dignity, and consequence.. H.
contended that the effect would be exactly the reverse; As
an Inditin army it had acquired glory and distinction, such
as no other army could exceed. Instead of baying thedis-
Unction of being a separate army, if We transfened: it to
the Crown it would become a kind of local army—it might
I - era Wrest India-r 4,- e-4
become a eort.of Ceylon "regimen ~. _
mint, but we would do-away-with all its prestige ?ind its
-
glory. (Hear, hear.) In 1 832 Mountatewart Elphinstons,
in reply Co questions put to him on this subject b 1i... yt 6 Pre.
sident of the Board of Control, first
spoke of the separation
of the two governments, ts the civil from the military, Dag
follows :—'
" The separation of the civil go,frorn the mills
tart' would probably not answer in vernrueilt
any country, but least
of all in India:
The great problem there-has alwaryi•bsen
to_maintain the ,subordination of the mary ilit woofer to the
tivif,and-to prevent clash-11TE belw3en tho .g.v'efilart and
oconaligdeer ai-Gaid• la t We have ant always boa