The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-25 00:00:00

evils brought about by the war, and the amount of physical
and moral good which it had intercepted. We had not only
a just but a sufficient cause for going to war. Let them
inquire then, what was the controversy upon which they
entered. The objects of the war, as they were originally
contemplated, were not so wide as the evils he had described.
They did not attempt, and they thought it too much to at-
tempt, the total abolition of the evil ; and, for a long time,
the four great Powers confined themselves merely to narrow-
ing it within certain limits, and hemming it in. It was all
very well for gentlemen to say, at this time of day, " You
ought to have sent your fleet into the Black Sea when Russia
occupied the Principalities." These were delusions which
arose from forgetfulness of the circumstances, and from the
excitement of the state of things which existed at a former
period. Not only the Government to which he belonged,
but no Government, could by possibility, in June, 1853,
have ventured to take so rash a step, even with reference
to the state of English opinion. The first conclusion to which
they must have come would have been, that they would at
once have abandoned, if they had interfered in any such
proceeding, the co operation of Austria, Prussia, and France.
What were the objects which were then contemplated ?
What were the questions which were then under dis-
cussion ? The questions under discussion were these :—The
Emperor asked a certain amount of ratification and extension
of the treaty of Kainardji ; the Porte was ready to give a cer-
tain amount of ratification and extension to that treaty. The
questions raised were, whether the temporal, as well as the
spiritual, privileges of the Greek Christians were to be pro-
tected by Russia—whether the Greek Christians should have
privileges granted to them which would place them on a par
with the other non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte ; and
whether it should be by a separate engagement with Turkey,
or by a general engagement with the other Powers, that these
rights and privileges should be guaranteed. In 1853, these
were the only questions in dispute between Russia and the
Allied Powers ; and he was sure he should be confirmed and
not contradicted by her Majesty's Government when he said
that every one of these objects had completely • vanished.
(Bear.) There was now no question about a separate treaty
between Russia and the Porte ; there was now no question as
to the temporal privileges of the Greek Christians ; there was
now no question as to whether the Greek Christians should
enjoy the same privileges as the other non-Mussulmen subjects
of the Porte: Nothing could be more simple—and really the
matter was so important, and the words so few, that he hoped
the house would allow him to put them in possession of them
—nothing could be more simple than the issue to which this
matter was brought after the tangled negotiations of 1853.
Lord Derby, in fact, had confessed, in another place, that be
had read through the Blue Book as far as the month of July,
but that he found it impossible to proceed any further in
threading the labyrinth. The negotiations gathered into a
central point in December. That was the time they must
look into if they would get a clear view of the grounds upon
which this war was undertaken. The proposal made at that
period was summed up in these terms :—lt was done at Con-
stantinople by a meeting of the representatives of the Four
Powers, under the presiding influence of the active Lord Strat-
ford de Redcliffe; and the plan adopted there obtained a pre-
ference over the plan simultaneously adopted at Vienna, and be-
came actually the basis of the proposal finally made to the Em-
peror of Russia. Now, what was the plan on which, in Decem-
ber, 1853, the Four Powers were agreed, and which they pre-
sented to Russia as the full amount of the concessions which
she had a right to demand. The first point related to the
evacuation of the Principalities, which was to take place as
rapidly as possible. The second point was, that all the
treaties which were dissolved by the actual war, including the
treaty of Kainardji, were to be removed. (Derisive cheers
from the Opposition.) He knew not from what gentleman
that opposition came, but it showed the blinding influence of
the exciting circumstances of the times, and a the strong feel-
ings of a magnanimous people, as opposed to that judicial
understanding which, after all, ought to guide us in these
transactions. The second term, in December, 1853, was,
after all, that the old treaties between Russia and Turkey
should be renewed ; and the third term was, that the Sultan
of Turkey should communicate, not to the Emperor of Russia
alone, but to each of the five Powers, and that a firman should
be issued, guaranteeing to the Greek Christians of Turkey all
those religious privileges which might be enjoyed by the other
non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte. These were the objects
of the great Powers in 1853. There were many who were
then listening to him to whom this statement would come as
a revelation. (Hear, hear.) Nevertheless, such was the turn.
which affairs had taken. He was sure that her Majesty's
Government would confirm and not contradict him when he
said that these were the terms so proffered to Europe and
published to the world. He might, if it were prudent, carry
still further his statements, which would be corroborated by
the documents which had passed between the Powers engaged
in this great struggle, and especially between England and
France. But what was the manner in which their proposals
were received by Russia ? He had stated the terms of the
protocol of Jan. 13,1854, to which St. Petersburg gave no
written answer. The answer was the mission of Count Orloff.
When that nobleman arrived at Viennahe submitted the coun-
ter demand of Russia ; and now, having enabled them to as-
certain the fixed point from which they ought to measure
their distance, he would proceed to make some remarks upon
the demands then made. The tone they held, and the terms
then required by Russia, when explained, would give
them another fixed point from which they would be able
to judge whether it was true, as some had said, that the ob-
jects of this war were not attained, and that if we retired we
should retire as a humiliated and degraded nation. These
were the terms of Russia on the 2d of February, 1854. This ,
was the answer of Russia, upon the reception of which the
resolution was taken, upon the recommendation of Austria ;
and Prussia, by the Governments of France and England, to ,
send that summons to the Emperor of Russia, which was I
immediately followed by the declaration of war. The de-
mends were—first, that it was to be an irrevocable condition
that the negotiations should take place on the subject mat-
ter at issue not at Vienna or any neutral place ; the choice ,
was given to Turkey that they should take place either at St.
Petersburg, under the person of the Emperor, or at the
head-quarters of the Russian army. This was the first con-
dition, essential and irrevocable. The second condition was
the confirmation full and entire of the old treaties from Kain-
ardj onwards. The third condition was the protection of
the Greek Churches ; the fourth was, of course, the evacua-
tion of the Principalities ; the fifth was the restoration of the
status in quo in the Principalities ; the sixth was, that Tur-
key should have a new set of stipulations with respect to the
reception of refugees and strangers. Such were the absolute
demands which constituted the ultimatum of Russia before
the war. Was there here a, cause of war or not ? When first
Austria had permission to refer to St. Petersburg, the pro-
position which was made was in the shape of Four Points. He
did riot shrink from his share of the responsibility of the de-
cision at which the then Government arrived in consequence
of the mode in which those propositions were received.
(Conservative cheers.) He did not shrink from his personal
responsibility in regard to the Crimean expedition. (Hear.)
But ho called upon those, who said that that expedition had
entirely failed, to mark the difference iu the language of
Russia before and after that expedition. (Hear, hear.)
He held that military expeditions in time of war were only
to be regarded as meaus, and not as ends. (Hear,
hear.) On the 26th of August, 1854, Russia replied to
the communication of Count Buol, who had forwarded
the Four Points. He would not quote the reply in extenso
but the effect of it was this—that the Four Paints
were terms to which Russia could not consent except at the
end of a desperate struggle, and a long series of disasters.
He quite agreed with his noble friend the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, that the naval and military forces of Rus-
sia had long been the standing menace of Turkey. The ques-
tion of the Black Sea was one of great, he might sayinstitute of insu-
perable difficulty. It was not in the wit of man to
a perfectly satisfactory arrangement with regard to the Black
Sea. If it were an open sea, like the Mediterranean, they
might know what to do. If it were like the American lakes,
close water, they would know what to do. If they were
dealing with powers that shared the coast of the Black Sea—
if it were shut in and not accessible to vessels of great draught
of water, then, too, they would know what to do ; but unless
they converted the straits of the Black Sea into a canal, as it
were, they could not get over the difficulty. On the other
Cand, if they treated the Black Sea in any of those modes,
they should not overlook the fact of the weakness of the
Turkish Government, and the importance to Europe of pre-
venting an aggression on the Ottoman empire. The question
was surrounded with difficulties. There was no suggestion
not open to objection. Nothing with regard to this limita-
tion of the Russian power in the Black Sea could be otherwise
but an imperfect remedy for the present, and an imperfect
guarantee for the future. Well, then, what was to be done ?
They had to take their choice of several plans, all of which
were-imperfect. So far as Parliament was aware, he (Mr.
Gladstone) and his colleagues left office pledged to nothing
but the destruction of the preponderance of Russia. They
were aware of that responsibility. They were responsible,
With the noble viscount at the head of the Government, for
' having proposed the Russian limitation of the naval forces in
the Black Sea. He always considered the plan defective, but
he became an assenting party because he knew of no other.
In doing so, they did not exclude themselves from profiting by
any experience arising from discussions on the question into
which theyabould enter, and they left themselves open to per-
severe with that. plan, or to adopt any other plan equally good,
or it might be preferable, so as not to warrant a continuance of
the war. What had been the reception of the plan for that
limitation from the first night it was discussed in the House
of Commons He considered its reception had been most
unfavourable. He had heard au hon. and chivalrous friend
say that he was ready to go all lengths in defence of the war,
but he had not heard any member of the house rise and say
that he was prepared to sanction the continuance of the war
if the limitation were refused ' - while, on the other hand, he
would be prepared to accede to peace if the limitation were
granted. He did not believe there were twenty gentlemen
in that crowded assembly ready to hold that line. There
were some who thought this was not a question of con-
test as to terms. The ground on which they stood before
Europe was, that they were ready to make every concession
-to refuse everything that should not be offered—and the
dividing line was between the limitation of he t naval
Turkish
force in
the Black Sea and the discretionary power of the
Government. They were cognisant of the fact, that the con-
ferences had been held. As regards the question of limitation
alone, the conferences had been adjourned ; and, "on that
issueethey were called to vote by the motion of the right
hon. gentleman, the member for Buckinghamshire—a vote
which, if it were affinitively recorded, would not represent the
feelings of the house or of the country. If the vote of the
house went to declare that this was not a question of terms,
after what had taken place at Vienna, it would go far to in-
volve them in a breach of faith in the eyes of Europe. If it
were not a question of terms, what course were they o
adopt 7 This was not the first occasion on which they had t
to
express a solemn judgment on the rights of peace or war.
Were they to resort, or to think of a system of dismember-
ment? The objection to that was, that it was impossible. If
we intend to make this question a war of nationalities, it
would be well to consider whether we can make that war alone.
He apprehended that we would be alone, and that Austria
would not be likely to enter into a war of nationalities. From
the comp sition of Austria, he would ask, was she likely to enter
into a war of nationalities ? Will France do so ? He could tell
them tat France, as well as Austria, would not and could not
enter into this war of nationalities in this she entertained a
different opinion, he would ask how that war could be enter-
;mined by her when she looked at the present stance te of
enter the cit
into
of
Rome. (Hear.) He would not say, can Fra
such a war, but could she en or into a war of nationalities
under such' circumstances ? He had read a few days ago
some portion of the debates in the Sardinian Chamber rela-
tive to the Sardinian contingent for the -war, and some of the
members objected to its joining the English army, because
they thought it would be in bad company. (Laughter.) They
said the English had managed to lose :1,000 men out of au
army of only 12,00. He argued that, with many gentlemen,
this was not a question of terms, for these have been acceded;
but both gentlemen in that house and the public journals
called out for military successes. Such an idea was hideona-
us,
it was immoral and inhuman, and he would say that no
tion had a right to make war for military successes alone.
(Hear, hear.) If they obtained success, they would want to
continue the war to make it a mere w ar of military glory ; if
they did so he would warnthein that they tempted the wrath
of Him in whose hands was the fate ce! all armies, as much as
that of the infant in the cradle. He vrould ask what was the
state of this question The Governments of France and
England had proposed certain terms to Russia, which was
deemed necessary to prevent that power from breaking the
peace of Europe, and these terms had eventual y constituted
the military occupation of the Crimea .Russia had now con-
ceded what she at first refused, except a mere trifle. But we
said that we must pow have military MCC esses. e; We do not

consider that we have subjugated Russia, and therefore we
will continue the war until we make these successes. He
could not avoid saying, that he thought neither peace nor
the honour of Russia seemed to be the primary object in
these arrangements, but that military glory was the primary
object. He warned them that the eyes of Europe were upon
them, and that their words uttered in that house would be
quoted against them in the face of Europe, and by them they
must rise or fall. The right hon. g-ntleman the member for
Manchester, three or four mouths ago, made a solemn appeal
to the house, and charted them with an earnestness that did
him the highest honour, with a guiltiness of blood if they per-
sisted in maintaining the war. He (Mr. Gladstone) did not
wince under that challenge, because he believed that it was a
war of a class which we carried on at a distance that we might
not carry it on nearer home—because it was a war which we
carried on in the Crimea that we might not have to carry it
on in the heart of Europe—just as in ancient times the greatest
orators of Greece called on their countrymen to carry on war
in Thessaly that they might not have to carry it on in Attica.
They had recently had among them some of the most distin-
guished of their gallant troops, who received at the hands of
her Majesty an acknowledgment at least of their valorous
deeds. Many of those forms, he rejoiced to say, were again
erect, and had regained the elastic step of youth and health,
but what were they to say to the thousands who slept on the
waters of the Bosphorus, or under the rocks of Balaklava ?
And what were they to say to their gallant allies, who, ranged
side by side with them in the hOur of privation and danger,
had suffered, he feared, in a much greater degree. (Hear.)
But it was no consolation to him that in the fatal progression,
the French should have suffered double our loss, though that
was more than 15,000, and that more than four times that
number of Turks slept beneath the ground. It was no conso-
lation to him to know that the Turks had lost 120,000, and
the Russians 250,000 men—amounting altogether to nearly
half a million of human beings, or at the,rate of a thousand a
day. With him the consideration was, that if the war were
a war for smaller, secondary, and trivial objects—a war for
objects which they dared not in public papers t 3 declare to
the world, then he said, in God's name, while there was yet
time, let them do something to put an end to that awful
scourge, and let them, by the adoption of firm, moderate, and
cautious terms re-open to Christendom the hope of a return
to happiness and peace.
Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, although' I do not concur in many
parts of the speech of my right hon. friend, set I willingly
yield to him the acknowledgment that he has discussed the
question in a manner worthy of himself and of this house—
(hear)—that he has considered that which was of most im-
portance to the continuance or the cessation of this way—that
he has fairly brought before us the arguments which weigh
upon his mind as to the conclusion to which he had come—a
conclusion to which, if convinced by his argument, any mem-
bers of this house might subscribe. (Hear, hear.) So far
the spirit of my right hon. friend's speech has been totally
different from that of the right hon. gentleman opposite—
(cheers)—who gave us no clear and intelligible account why
he would continue the war—who used, to follow a phrase of
his own, the most ambiguous language on the subject, and
who detained us for two hours and a half with party attacks
and ingenious sarcasms. • (Cheers and laughter.) But, sir,
before I speak of the right hon. gentleman's speech, and at-
tempt to defend myself from the attacks which he has made
upon my conduct as a member of the Government, I must
revert while they are fresh in my memory to some of the argu-
ments and topics urged by my right hon. friend. who has just
sat down. My right hon. friend says most truly that the
terms already assented to by Russia go far beyond those which
were originally asked by the allies, but surely he ought to have
laid greater weight upon the very obvious consideration that,
if such be the blessed state of peace that princes and sovereigns
are most unwilling to exchange it for a state of war, that
which will give an immediate remedy for an immediate danger
suffices them to maintain that state of peace. But when once
the rubicon is passed—when you have got into war—when once
powers are engaged in conflict, then it becomes you to think,
not what would have been sufficient before the contest com-
menced, but to consider how you can obtain peace which has
in it the elements of safety and of duration. (Cheers.) I
cannot, therefore, attach the value which my right hon.
friend attaches to the change which has taken place in con-
sequence of Russia having felt the power of the allied belli-
gerents—the pressure of Austria concentrating her forces and
threatening hostilities until Russia gave way—and the in-
fluence of the expedition to the Crimea. But the question is
not whether the immediate danger is warded off, but whether
you are to seek security for the future, and if so in what that
security shall consist. There is one danger with regard to
the principalities—that was the first point. The second point
has not reference to any immediate danger from Russia, or
any immediate protection to Turkey. But the third point
did not contain a declaration that it was necessary to revise
the treaty of 1841, in the first place, with a view to attach
Turkey to the balance of power, and, in the next place, to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea ;
and my right hon. friend thinks he sees in the propositions of
Russia a fulfilment of that condition. Now, the danger is
that Russia having a preponderance in the Black Sea—having
twenty sail-of-the-line in her harbour at Sebastopol—may, as
has been shown, take advantage of the possession of that
fleet and get possession of the Bosphorous, or land an army
in its immediate vicinity. Now, what does Russia say to
that ? Russia says that she will consent that the fleets of
other powers may come into the Black Sea, provided
always that the fleets of Russia may at any time pass
through the Bosphorous. What would be the conse-
quence of accepting such a condition I The fleets of Eng-
land and France would seldom go into the Bosphorus,
and not in any force in time of peace ; but these twenty
sail-of-the-line might at any time present themselves at
Constantinople, before the gates of the Sultan's palace,
and impose upon him what terms they please. (Hear, hear.)
What was forbidden by the treaty of 1841 would have been
possible and easy to Russia, and this is what the Russian ple-
nipotentiaries call a compliance with the terms proposed.
(Hear, hear.) Then after I left Vienna another proposal was
made, in which my right hon. friend seems to see a security;
and it was this; to leave the treaty of 1841 as it now stands,
the Sultan declaring, as he has a right to declare, that he
wishes to maintain the principle of closing the Straits, but
that if Turkey was menaced she might call the fleets of her
allies to her assistance. I can see but very little, very scanty
security in that. Leaving the treaty of 1841 as it was before
the commencement of the war in case of a menace of invasion,
of violence on the part of Russia, ,Turkey would have the
right of every independent power of calling her allies to her
ass stance, and to that point where they could most easily
assist her. I think in this case everything consists in priority,
and the fleets of the allies being at the distance, and a large
fleet of the Russians in the near neighbourhood, it is probable
that that menace would have been carried into execution be-
fore the Sultan could have called for assistance from his allies.
(Hear, hear, hear.) If we had consented to such terms, I
think it would have been right to say we did not pro-
pose the fulfilment of that part of the third point.
(Hear, hear.) It is said that the third point is fulfilled.
Why, the acceptance of a proposal so nugatory and meagre as
either the first or second of Russia's alternatives would have
been an attempt to deceive Europe in a manner quite unwor-
thy of two such nations as England and Turkey. It would
have been far better to have said at once, " We are unable to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea—
it must be built up again as soon as Russia can launch fresh
ships, and therefore that part of the scheme must be aban-
doned." But consider that that scheme against the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea is one of the many securi-
ties which, having gone to war for, we have attempted to ob-
tain. That Russian preponderance in the Black Sea is next to
the danger of Russia occupying the principalities ; and to
finish the war without any security against that danger would
indeed show that we had been defeated. My right hon. friend
has dwelt much upon the doctrine that you must have suc-
cesses independently of all terms of peace. I agree generally
in what my right hon. friend has stated upon that, and. I
doubt whether any will say that independently of all terms
of peace, and independently of the security of Turkey, it was
necessary to gain military successes. I quite agree with my
right hon. friend that never has the valour of the English sol-
dier been brighter. (Cheers.) Never has the power of endur-
ance, the hardihood, and the fortitude of the British soldier
stood so high as it has done during the present war. (Hear.)
But if the objects are not effected by which we can be cer-
tain of having securities for peace, Turkey would be greatly
endangered. (Hear.) If it should be said that not only had
England and France relinquished the terms they had advanced
—and terms which Austria had said were just and fair, but
which Russia had not complied with—bUt in addition to that
had withdrawn 150,000 or 200,000 men from the Crimea,
without success, that would be a great addition, not only to
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, but to the pre-
ponderance of Russia all over the world. (Hear.) If you had
that which all men would acknowledge to be a security for
peace and a safeguard for Turkey, you might then with all
honour withdraw from the Crimea, but if, in addition to a
failure in your terms of peace, you admitted a failure of suc-
cess, and withdrew your army, then Russia would immensely
increase her power over the civilised world. And now sir, having
said this much with regard to the later topics in the speech
of my right hon. friend, I come to the question of the nego-
tiations with which I was charged at Vienna. (Hear.) But
let me state, in the first place, that although I thought suc-
cess in that negotiation came within the range of possibility,
that at no time was I sanguine that success was probable.
(Hear.) I can assure the right hon. gentleman that I felt I
had no habits of diplomacy, and that, being more accustomed
to parliamentary life than to intercourse with those who carry
on negotiations, I was not the fittest person to undertake the
duty. But when Lord Clarendon told me that he wished me
to undertake that mission—and my noble friend likewise con-
curred in that wish— and when I found that her Majesty had
been pleasedsto express her approbation of such an appoint-
ment, I felt I could not honourably decline it. (Hear.) The
right hon. gentleman says I ought to have begun with the
third point. That was not a question for me ; I was only
acting as one of the servants of the two Governments of
France and Great Britain. France; Great Britain, and Aus-
tria had duly considered the question, and when I was in
Paris I was informed by a despatch from my noble friend the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government
had resolved that the third point should be taken in the order
in which it stood. (Hear.) It was, therefore, my first duty
to consider of the first point and the question of the Princi-
palities. I believe that the concessions that have been made
by Russia with regard to these Principalities are of the
greatest importance. (Hear.) The right hon. gentleman
confounded two things which are essentially distinct. He
speaks of the protection of the Christians to which I had
referred in a despatch when I was Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and in which it was stated that it was
presented to the Emperor of Russia as a duty, and that it
had been sanctioned as such. Now there can be no doubt
whatever that, with regard to Wallachia and Moldavia, not
only by the treaty of Kainardji, but by other treaties—by
the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople—the Emperor of
Russia had an engagement from the Sultan to protect the
Christian
Principalities
and
pillage, I conceive it
; and if a congregation
were
b t to
inh
outrage,te murder,
was the duty of the Emperor of Russia to ask for some su subjectsee
re-
dress for such grievances. I know that, without any such
treaty, our ambassador at Constantinople, on receiving an ac-
count from a consul that a Christian church was destroyed,
or a Christian was murdered, thinks it his duty to bring the
fact under the notice of the Sultan, and generally obtains re-
dress. (Hear.) But the treaties to which I allude are ex-
press upon that point, and it is impossible for me, or for any
man, to deny that Russia had those rights by treaties.
Bat the right hon. gentleman confounded these treaties with
the proposal that was made by Prince Menschikoff, and asked
how I could snake such a dangerous admission as that there
was a right of protection, and at the same time protest against
it in the case of Prince Menschikoff. Why, the right of pro-
tecting those churches was sanctioned over and over again by
treaties, but what Prince Menschikoff demanded was a claim
of protection going beyond those treaties, and which arose,
as stated in one of Lord Clarendon's despatches and in one
of the four points, from an erroneous interpretation of the
treaty of Kainardji. Of that erroneous interpretation lam
the more convinced when I recollect a fact that occurred
during the negotiations between Sir Hamilton Seymour and
the late Emperor Nicholas. Sir H. Seymour said to the
Emperor, " Have the goodness to point out on what part of
the treaty of Kainardji your claim is founded ; " and his
Imperial Majesty said—as an Imperfal Majesty is likely to
say—(a laugh)—" I will not point out to you the particular
article of the treaty ; go to Count Nesselrode, and he will
point out the article of the treaty." Sir Hamilton Seymour
as he was bid, went to Count Nesselrode, and said, " Will
your excellency have the goodness to point out to me the par-