The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-04 00:00:00

upon the anniversaries of Alma, of Balaklava, of Inker-
man, and of the confused calamities which made up the
history of the past winter. In short, though but a year
ago this season was judged suitable for the commence-
ment of a great enterprise, experience has shown that
titiomnsu.st bsriixngmweirteh iwtetehkes sapreeedyallclothsestofeamnilibtearyeooupeetread-
upon with certainty by the besiegers of Sebastopol ;
rain may perhaps be delayed till November, and thus
they will have two months for the execution of their
plans. But, on the other hand, even September may
interrupt the labour of both troops and workmen by the
heavy gales and the storms of rain which sometimes ac-
company the autumnal equinox.
Divided command now begins to be felt inconvenient.
The line from Baidar to Inkerman, a distance of twelve
miles, is occupied by French, Sardinians, and Turks,
with, we believe, a part of the English cavalry. The
troops of each nation have their own commander, totally
independent of all the others. Report speaks of a plan
for uniting the commands of the troops on the Tchernaya
in one hand. A Russian attack may be repeated which
it will be necessary to repel, or a demonstration made
which the allies may have the power to change into a
hurried retreat. In any case, the will of a single com-
mander is necessary for rapid combinations along such
an extended line. For offensive movements, particularly
for pursuit after a victory, such an unity of authority
seems almost indispensable. The rumours which pre-
vail on the subject may be founded in error, but they
show that an evil is felt which it requires no military
knowledge to appreciate. The departure of Omer Pasha
seems to have deprived the Turks of all efficient corn-
wand whatever. Probably believing that his absence
would be of short duration, he left Osman Pasha with,
apparently, very detailed instructions, so as almost en-
tirely to control his liberty of action. As no successor
to the late Commander-in-Chief has been appointed,
Osman Pasha must remain as a lieutenant, and continue
bound by instructions which hamper his movements,
and render impossible the co-operation of the Turks in
any plans of their allies. But up to the present time
the allies have acted strictly on the defensive, and no
movement has been contemplated but such as might
more efficiently protect their extended lines both on the
side of the Tchernaya and Sebastopol. On the great pre-
parations of the last ten weeks the hopes of the French
and British Generals are fixed, and indeed the fire that
will open, when they shall judge that the fitting time is
come, will be unexampled in the history of warfare.
The cannonade of October last was trifling to that of
April ; April was surpassed by the two days which pre-
ceded the capture of the Mamelon ; but all will sink
into insignificance compared with the iron tempest which
will shortly be poured on the besieged city. The weight
and range of the guns, the number and size of the mor-
tars, the new positions of the batteries won by the steady
progress which has marked the summer, will try the
endurance of the Russians to the utmost. The great
scale on which such a bombardment is carried on, and
the preparations necessary for its execution, render the
delays which precede it a matter of little surprise. In
April the allies threw against Sebastopol, within nine
days, 550,000 shot and shell ; the cost of the British
ammunition alone was 300,0001. Yet April is now
looked back upon as a time when we undervalued the
enemy and did not know what Sebastopol was. Even
on ordinary flays the Ru-sians will often fire some 4,000
shot in the 24 h mr--, and throw 600 shell into one part
of the British position. Yet their general fire is cor-
rectly described as slack in comparison with ours. What
may be their resources, and the strength of the. work at
which they labour day and night, we cannot judge ; but
there can be no doubt that a struggle is approaching
which will determine the fate of Sebastopol for this win-
ter at least. No one can pretend to foretell the issue ;
all that is spoken of with certainty is, that the line-of-
battle ships will be destroyed, or at least driven from
their position, so as to be made powerless against the
assaulting tr, ops. Whether we shall take the Malakhoff,
whether we c'n keep it, whether it will lead to the im-
mediate capture of the town, or only to ulterior success,
are all matters of doubt. The chances are in favour of
the allie., who are superior in the character of their men,
in the science they can command, and even in numbers ;
but, should victory not favour their arms, they will pro-
bably be forced to wait in inactivity till another spring
and another system of tactics assure the success which
they probably might have commanded earlier. Our
generals have set all on the hazard of a doubtful struggle
at a single point, and we must wait the result.

(Prom the Daily News of this day.)
Our Generals in the Crimea have been sorely annoyed
by the surveillance which the newspaper press bas exer-
cised over all their operations. They forget that they
owe to this publicity a comparative exemption from acts
of injustice to which the Russian Generals are frequently
subjected. The authorities in St. Petersburg, after
twisting and turning the news of the battle of the Tcher-
naya into every possible shape, and after finding that by
no legerdemain anything could be made of it, but a de-
feat, have set themselves to invent excuses for the dis-
agreeable fact. Prince Gortschakoff, it would appear, is
1P) be made the scape-goat. The St. Petersburg corres-
pondent of Le Nord has been instructed to write to that
journal, that " an impatient desire of measuring his
strength with the enemy hurried Prince Gortschakoff on
beyond the limits of prudence." In Russia this false ac-
cusation is certain to be believed, for there no one dare
publish the fact that Prince Gottchakoff, instead of
being hurried away by an impatient desire of battle,
merely carried into effect instructions received from St.
Petersburg, in a letter from the Emperor, which was
read to the troops before going into action. It is true
that a somewhat similar trick was tried by Sir James
Graham, when he attempted to throw upon Sir Charles
Napier the whole blame of the resultless campaign of
1854, while Sir Charles had been merely acting in con-
formity to the instructions of the Admiralty. But the
disingenuous finesse of Sir James having been exposed,
no other minister will attempt to repeat it. Our Admi-
rals and Generals are henceforth safe from such unwortby

treatment, Not so with the Admirals and Generals of
Russia. Others of them have experienced the same
treAtment as PrinceGortschakoff before now ; and others
will experience it hereafter as often a 3 obedience to the
commands of their government !eads to di,•aster and de-
feat. The much-decried publicity, for which England
is indebted to its newspaper press, secures to our com-
manders by sea and land fair ► play at the bands of
Government, and secures to the public that efficient
service which can only be rendered by men who are
sore of having justice done them provided they do their
duty.:

It is as well, however, to note that in the present case
any sympathy for Prince Gortschakoff would he entirely
thrown away. "Even-handed justice has commended
the contents of his poisoned chalice to his own lips."
He. has merely b en treated by his Government as he
has himself treated a braver and a better officer. Among
the Russian officer 4 who fell at the battle of the Tcher-
nay; was Gereral Read. "Dead men tell no tales ;"
and accordingly Prince Gortschakoff has resolved that
General Read shall bear the blame of his failure. " I
then proceeded," says the Prince, in his report pub-
lished in the Invalide Russe, "to that redoubt (the re-
doubt on the Telegraph Hill), to examine the ground in
person, to give my final instructions for the operations
of the troops, when I was startled by a violent platoon
firing on our right wing. General Read, with his two
divis:one, had attacked the Fedukhine heights. It is
impossible for me to explain the motive which deter-
mined that General to make the attack contrary to the
adopted plan, without having received my orders to do
so, for very soon afterwards be himself and the chief of
hie staff were killed." Now, singularly enough, no no-
tice is taken of this grave charge against Gen. Read in
the abstract of Princs Gertschakoff'e report, which origi-
nally appeared in the Invalide Russe. General Read, it
recoilected, was not killed outright, but was con-
veyed to the French camp, and lingered some time be-
fore he expired. The full report of Prince Gortschakcff,
published ih the Invalide Russe, has, therefore, all the
appearance of a second and amended edition, prepared
after the Prince had ascertained that death had incapa-
citated the man on whom he now seeks to throw the blame
of his repulse from contradicting him. What a picture
of courtly baseness and falsehood does this shifting of the
blame from shoulder to shoulder present ! The parasites
of the Court first accuse Prince Gortschakoff of rashness,
whereas it appears that he simplycarried into effect the posi-
tive commands of the Emperor ; and the only way the
Prince can devise of warding off a misrepresentation
Which he knew awaited him, is, not to tell the real
truth, but in his turn to invent a lie against a dead
officer. And it is pretty clear that such falsehood and
dishonesty is not confined to the soil of Russia, but that
it would flourish-as luxuriantly in this our own land,
were there not a public opinion to keep it in check.
Selfish cruelty and falsehood are the vices of slaves.
They prompt the Russians to slander the absent and the
dead, and to turn their guns on their own wounded,
abandoned on the field of battle, rather than that the
enemy should have the credit of relieving them.
There is another important lesson to be drawn from
the report of Prince Gortschakoff. The allusion made
by General Pelissier, in his order of the day issued after
the battle of the Tchernaya, to his desire to econotnise
the blood of his soldiers, betrayed a lurking uneasiness
lest be should be accused of not having followed up his
victory with sufficient promptitude. The elaborate report
of Admiral Druid, published a short time afterwards, has
much the appearance of having been got up to meet
such a charge by anticipation. And now the report of
Prince Gortschakoff shows how the Russians have been
able to turn to account the failure to pursue them. In
a tone of braggadocio the Prince declares that he made
a stand upon the Mackenzie heights, but that the enemy
" eared not attempt" to assail him. Whenever the
Allies have grappled with the Russians in earnest, the
latter have shrunk from the contest ' • but whenever the
Allies have failed to follow up their advantage, the Rus-
sians have had the audacity to claim a semi-victory. The
Muscovites must be dealt with as the old doggrel ad
vises dealing with a nettle :
If von gently touch a nettle,
It will burn and sting you still ;
Grasp it, like a man of mettle,
And the rogue obeys your will.

(Front the Morning Herald of this day.)
With the latest intelligence from Odessa appears the
following statement :—" The Russians are busy fortify-
ing and intercepting the passes communicating with the
Putrid Sea." It would seem that not until we were
masters of the towns and fortifications in the Straits of
Kerteh did the thought strike the commanders of the
expedition that the possession of the Putrid Sea is a
matter of even greater consequence than the occupation
of the Azoff. By the Spit of Arabat, and across the
wooden causeway, constructed of late years, the Rus-
sians have been able to move their supplies and rein-
forcements into the Crimea at pleasure, and may do so
still for that matter, for all we know to the contrary. '
Tho Sivash flows up to the very rampart of Perekrp,
spreading into marshy lagunes along the northern coast.
The successful navigation of such waters could only be
attempted by means of a fleet of flat-bottomed boats ;
and tcr E=l-1 craft,- there is 'work to do, and plenty of i!,

At last the necessity for their construction seems to ho
felt, and we perceive that a few boats specially fitted for
this service are being built at Kertch or Yenikale.
The Russians, we may be quite sure, well knew the value
of the highway by which they have heretofore drawn,
uninterruptedly, large supplies of men and provisions,
and they are determined to defend it and its approaches
to the last.

Now surely it must strike any intelligent person who
watches the progress of events in the Black Sea and
exercises his judgment upon the conduct of this war,
that the high ways to the Crimea should not have been
left all this time in the hands of the enemy. Surely the
nature of the navigation, both in the Azoff and the
Sivash, ought to have been duly taken into account,
with a view to providing the only effective means of
occupation. It is now nearly four months since the
attack upon Kertch and Yenikale. Why was not the
blow then struck followed up at once ? Simply because
the means were not provided—boats of the proper de-
scription were not ready. In a very few weeks the win-
ter will set in, and render operations impossible, either
in the Putrid Sea or the Sea of Azoff. Yet we find
the boats are not ready even now, they are only in pre-
paraioe, while the Russians are industriously strengthen-
ing all the approaches, and prepared no doubt to defend
them vigorously for the short interval during which they
can now be exposed to our attacks this season. It is
clear that a most important opportunity for crippling
the enemy has been lost --a consideration for the em-
barrassed condition of the Russian army that will no
doubt be appreciated and turned to excellent account.
We lately directed attention to the report that a line-of-
battle ship of 131 guns had been actually laid down in
the dockyard of Nicolaieff, almost before the eyes of our
cruisers. This report was disbelieved, but it now re-
ceives confirmation in a letter from Odessa ; and not only
sn, but we learn that this projected liner is but one of a
fleet to be built forthwith. A large supply of timber
from the Imperial forests of Minsk and Volhynia has
been ordered for delivery, not only at Nicolaieff, but at
Sebastopol—" by preference," so the letter states, " at
Sebastopol ; but if that should be impossible, at Nico.
laieff." So much for the dread inspired by our fleet, its
activity, and its vigilance. So much, also, for the san-
guine anticipations of the immediate surrender of the
stronghold of the Crimea.
An evening contemporary is innocently sarcastic upon
the "sympathy with the arduous exertions of respon-
sible statesmanship" manifested by certain journalists
who "volunteer advice as to the manner in which the
war ought to be conducted "—the misfortune being that
the advice is tendered after the necessity for it has
ceased to exist. It is to be regretted that the Adminis-
tration to which our contemporary is so humbly de-
voted did not avail itself of advice from a quarter so
solicitous for its honour, and, so influential an in-
terpreter of its views. Lord Palmerston's Govern-
ment needs an adviser, and is less embarrassed, we
apprehend, by the sympathy of journalists—except per-
haps by that of our contemporary—than the Globe thinks
it necessary to assume. For our own part, we have
never hesitated as to the course we should adopt.
Such advice as we have thought it our duty to give has
been intended, not for a Cabinet in which it was impos-
sible to place reliance, but for the country at large, in
order that loss and disaster might, if possible, be averted.
We have the melancholy satisfaction of finding all our
anticipations realised. If our solemn and repeated
warnings have been slighted we are avenged. We
pointed out, from the commencement of the campaign,
the certain consequences of a defective commissariat, of
the absence of proper means of transport, of the want
of an efficient service. Months ago we drew attention
to the state of the Ottoman army in Asia, and suggested
the imperative necessity of proper reinforcements and
an experienced command : we pointed out the use to
which the Government of St. Petersburg turned the
Asiatic successes of the Russian arms. All this and
much more we have done, in the honest belief that we
could not do otherwise, and with the sincerest desire to
see the successful progress of the war—the right we have
called upon the God of battles 'to defend, vindicated,
and the honour and glory of the Western alliance stea-
dily advancing. These were—these are our sentiments
and opinions—advocated irrespective of any Govern-
ment, and superior to the influences of any party. We
recognise in the conduct of this eventful war the same
vices, ignorance, apathy, or treachery, by which it has
been from the first distinguished. With magnificent
resources we have done almost nothing, and our Go-
vernment at this moment are without a defined object
in the prosecution of the war.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND SIR JAMES
GRAHAM'.

The following is the correspondence in continua
tion of what appeared in The Sun of yesterday

NO. I.
SIR TAMES GRAHAM TO SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Admiralty, Feb. 24, 1854.

My dear Sir Charles—The conversation which I had
with you yesterday has left on my mind the painful im-
pression that the means which the Admiralty has pro-
vided for fitting out and manning the North Sea fleet
are, in your opinion, insufficient for the occasion, and
unequal to an encounter with the Russians on fair terms.
I have done my best to provide a force which I con-
sider adequate to the duty to be performed ; and any
exertion which this Board considers necessary, will be
made without intermission.

You urge on me the propriety of offering bounty. If
you are dissatisfied with the preparations that have been
made and are in progress—if you have not entire confi-
dence in the strength of the combined forces of France
and England, you had better say so to me at once, and
decline to accept a command which, in your opinion, will
not redound to your honour, or to the safety of your
country. It will be far better that you should refuse
the offer of this command than undertake it with any
such misgivings.
I have married my confidence in you by offering it. If
you decline it on account of the insufficiency of the
means which will be placed at your disposal, I must
endeavour to make some other arrangements as soon as
possible.
Without a good will and hearty concurrence, this
Board and the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic flea
cannot work well together.—l am, my dear Sir Charles,
yours very faithfully,

J. G. GRAHAM.
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.

No. 11.
SIR CHARLES NAPIER TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

18, Albemarle-street, Feb. 24, 1854.

My dear Sir James—l thought it my duty to point
out to you what I thought the best way of manning the
fleet, to insure a great, glorious, and speedy victory over
the Russians.

I never made difficulties when service was required,
and, after a long lib spent in honour, I am not going to
make them now.

I should consider myself a coward, and unworthy of
holding her Majeity's commission, were I to decline any
service, he it ever so desperate. Lord Nelson never de-
clined any service, no more shall I, particularly after the
confidence you placed in me; but, with the means at my
disposal, will do all I can for the honour and glory of
my Queen and country, which shall not he tarnished in
my hands ; and I certainly have no apprehension of fail-
ing, either in good will or hearty concurrence with the
Board of Admiralty.

I am, my dear Sir James, yours very faithfully,
CHARLES NAPIER.
The Right Hon. Sir James Graham, Bart,,
Admiralty.

[Note.—The above letter is the best answer to the
Times for not throwing up my command. The last
paragraph of my letter will show that I reckoned with-
out my host.—C. N.]

No. 111.
SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

House of Commons, February 24, 1854.
My dear Sir Charles—l do not anticipate that I shall
ask you to undertake any "desperate" service. When
I offered you the command, I felt certain that the honour
of the country and of the flag might be safely confided
to you. Your apparent distrust of the means which I
could place at your disposal was the sole cause of some
uneasiness on my part.

Your note of this evening has dissipated all doubt and
apprehension. I shall be most happy to see you at the
Admiralty to-morrow, at II o'clock, when we will discuss
the arrangements which it will be necessary to make.
I am, my dear Sir Charles, yours very faithfully,
J. G. GRAHAM.
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.

No. IV.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO
SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Admiralty, MarClTlT,lBii:—Tßeceived 13th.]
My dear Sir Charles,—ln the first place let me con-
gratulate you on the perfect success of your proceedings
of yesterday. Never did a fleet sail in more regular
order, or under higher auspices. I am, yours sincerely,
J. G. GRAIIAM.
Vice-Admiral Sir C. Napier, K.C.B.

No. V.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO SIR

CHARLES NAPIER.

Admiralty, April 5, 1851. [Received Bth.]
My dear Sir Charles—l am highly satisfied with your
movements, and with the position which you have taken
up for the present. Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Grey can
readily communicate with you where you now are ; and
most useful information from Stockholm reaches you
without loss of time.—l am, yours very truly,
J. G. GRAHAM.

Nu. VI.
EXTRACT Or A LETTER FROM SIR JAMES GI:MUM TO SIR

CHARLES NAPIER.
Admiralty, April 10, 1854. [Received 19th.]
My dear Sir Charles—l am entirely satisfied with
your proceedings. Neither Lord Clarendon nor myself
anticipated your movement inside the Belt, and be-
lieved that you would watch in the Cattegat the entrance
of the Sound, and of the Belts, until you received orders
to enter the Baltic. You judged, however, wisely,' and
the time which you have gainci has been very precious,
and the passage of the Belt in fine weather, and in safety,
has been a most successful exploit.—l am, my dear Ad-
miral, yours very truly, J. G. GRAHAM.
His Excellency Vice-Admiral Sir C. Napier, K.C.B.
[Note.—On the 24th March the Admiralty called my
attention to their order of the Bth March, directing me
to remain in Wing° SAund until further orders, and say.
ins that I appear 'o have left it without assigning my
reasons, and to have acted therein without the c'tneur-
rence of the Board, although I took out sealed orders,
dated I.oth March, directing me, with refer-uce to my
first orders, to follow Lord Clareudon's instructions by
taking a pcEiti::n near the entrance to the Baltic,