The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-15 00:00:00

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(Pion Galignani's AfeSSAAW;.7.77:7Nr-.,,
The Paris journals contain few leadthc;o6trntion4...
..„..
and these aro not of sufficient interest to cbNirn extract saw
or analysis, with the exception of the Pays,'*hicli con.
talus some lengthened remarks on the German situa-
tion, with some special allusions to the policy which
Prussia still continues to pursue. These, coming from
a semi-official source are worthy of consideration ; and,
as the moment approaches when the Court of Berlin.
must declare itself intelligibly, they may be considered
of importance. Our contemporary, having pointed
iet
out in the late decision of the Frankfort D
the serious step which, although characterised
by their traditional caution, the minor States of Germ
many have taken towards the policy of the Western
alliance, argues from it that the system of neutrality as
regards Central Europe, looked upon as their last hope
by the partisans of the Czar, is now and for ever at an.
end. When Germany prepares for a contest, the con-
test must indeed be considered at hand. Admitting
even the probability of a war with Thus ia, and placing
themselves in a condition to take part in it, the minor
German States place themselves at once on the side of
European right, wh'cli Austria has openly declared
herself ready to defend with France and Eng-
land. According to Count Duel's despatch of the
14th January the Imperial Envoy at the Diet was
instructed to obtain its consent to the mobilisation•
of one half of the Federal army, unless it should be of
opinion that it was more advisable to place the whole cf
it in a state of " dispenibility" or immediate readiness
for active service. It was to the latter condition that
the Diet addressed itself; it was the precise measure
which it took of the necessity of the situation ; it has,
in point of fact, complied with the extreme view taken.
cf German requirements by Austria, although only put
forward as a suggestion. The whole of the Federal army,
instead of the half of it, is placed to all intents and pur-
poses on such a war footing as may be justly called
" disponibility," when in fifteen days it can answer the
demand of the Diet for active operations. The Austrian
policy is therefore virtually the policy of Germany as
represented by the Diet of Frankfort ; and Prussia, in.
not accepting it, at length frankly and openly deviates
from her German patriotism and duty, as well as from.
that course which Europe expects from her as one of the
leading defenders of her public right. A recapitulation
of these facts connected with the recent resolution of
the Diet, and a glance at the only practical view which
can be taken of their import may be necessary to enable
our readers to appreciate to their full value the following
remarks addressed to the Court of Berlin by the Pays:—
" It is quite evident that this first measure is but the
prelude of resolutions more decisive. The preparation
f''''' war implies the recognition that there exists a pub.
lie danger, while there exists also a neoessity to oppose.
Reason and the course of events mutt determine the
moment when this defensive attitude of Germany shall
proceed to action. Austria has not renounced her claim.
to call for the complete mobilisatioa of the Federal
army ; and we have no doubt that Germany will take
the next necessary step to prove the earnestness of the
decided course which she has in her collective capa-
city commenced. This ought to be for Prussia a matter
for deep consideration. We have said so for a long
time. In not rallying to the policy of European.
right, she comprises not only her highest interests
and her legitimate influence, but she runs the risk
of losing her traditional preponderance in the bosom of
the Confederation. There are at length symptoms and
, facts which cannot deceive the attention of the states.
man. These symptoms bunt forth in all directions.
The direction of the Germanic movement is now passing
away from Prussia, which, still refusing to enter frankly
into the councils of Europe, anal still resisting the cur-
rent of European opinion which has carried all the
other German States along with it, will find herself
exposed on the diplomatic ground to checks quite as
formidable as any which she could experience on the
field of battle. With the good faith which animates the
Western Powers, with the spirit of wisp conciliation
which distinguishes them, they have offered to the ex.
ceedingly fine-drawn susceptibilities of Prussia a means
of escaping from the difficulty in which she is placed.
The important despatch of M. Drouyn de l'Huys consents
to the negotiation of a separate treaty between the
Court of Berlin and those of England and France.
This, doubtless, is a great concession of form made to the
antoitr-piolve of Prussia. It is a bridge thrown across
her path to enable her to re-enter the conferences of
Vienna, in which her position as a great European Power
could not alone entitle her to take a part. But it is
quite evident that this concession could not pos-
sibly have for its result the sanction of France on
England for the neutrality or isolation of Prussia.
The treaty which they would consent to sign with
her could only be a second edition of the treaty of
the 2d of December ; and who knows if the events
which take place during the negotiations may not de-
mand that they at once pass over even the conditions of
this latter treaty ? Whatever be the case, Prussia can.
not enter directly or indirectly into actual alliance with
the three great Powers, without bringing with her some•
thing more to their aid than her vain declarations ; in.
other words, the aid which she brings must be an effica-
cious one for determined eventualities. We know that
Prussia abandons only with regret the mild and easy but
perilous system of neutrality, to which she gives the more
generous title o finediation. Mediation is an honourable
mission, but at its proper time, and within its proper
limits. Has that time been announced It is very doubtful.
Have thoselimits been defined? Without doubt, and by the
interpretation given on the 28th December to the four
points of guarantee. Can Prussia cause this interpre.
ta.tion, with all its practical consequences, to be ad-
mitted by Russia 1 If so, all discussion is at an end',
and we must have peace in a very short time re.
established. But it is necessary to lose no time, in
-. ...........a., _...ast. a.a.-7- "a a ~,,a, la 0..........1—. +harm
is the danger of being obliged to modify- essentially
even the bases of this interpretatioh. If, on the
:w iina than
hu.f
use t
other hand, and this unfortunately seems evident to
Prussian state:m;,cexerntd in makingheinselves the ea
themselves, there is little
agreetl ehop
.v ,
.. requirements of Europe, what tetho tehn at
Prussia the
letnis
the
etle about mediation It is well.
known
:
?
the 2d December *will not, on.
.i
lepart _........e the principles set forth in
ti • fie Bth of A ugust, in the protocol
iiny
notes acco account
of
their tr...... 7 e _ alliance, in the memorandum of the 2tz
December. These acts contain the minimum of theBi
rights and interests of Europe. The future may extend
their proportions, but to curtail them is by no means'
probable. The course of true mediation henceforth con-
sists in adhering without reserve, without arricre pensie,
to the protective principles of the modern equilibrium.
Each division, in enlarging the European collection of
forces makes a great step towards the re-establishment
of peace. It is this which all the minor states feel that
they do when they ally themselves, one after the other.
to the Western Powers. Is Prussia to be the last to
follow the great movement to which she might have
given an early impulse ? Will she court the fate of
being forced into the wake of the general policy of
Europe, even into that of the German Confederation of
which she might have remained the soul and the head V'