The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-20 00:00:00

THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

(From the Morning Herald's late Special Corres-

pondent in the Crimea.)
In my last letter I pointed out to your readers
some of the difficulties which existed in the way of
the allies marching round to the north side of Se-
bastopol by Traktir Bridge and the heights of Mac-
kenzie's Farm. These difficulties are considered
so great that I doubt if ever a serious attempt will
be made in that direction ; but there is another
route by which the north side is assailable—a de-
scent on the coast at either Eupatoria or Kalamita.
By landing at the former place the allies would pos-
sess great advantages ; such, for instance, as not
being obliged to disembark the whole force at once.
Divisions or even regiments might be landed sepa-
rately, and remain under cover of the earthworks
of Eupatoria until a sufficient force was accumu-
lated to take the open field. From this point two
routes would be open to the allies—across the in-
terior of the Crimea upon Simpheropol, or that by
which, this very day twelvemonths, they advanced
upon the heights of Alma. The first and most for-
midable obstacle to the landing at Eupatoria would
ho the almost total want of water. From my
knowledge of that part of the Crimea, I much doubt
if there would be sufficient water found even for
half the troops necessary. For any force of cavalry,
or for the baggage animals which would be im-
peratively necessary to an army marching against
7iimpheropol, there would be absolutely none for
the first 30 miles of the route—a very little after
that. Marching on Alma from Eupatoria, the
fleet, as on the last occasion keeping along shore,
could supply the whole army with water until their
arrival at the river Bulganak, or Alma, where in
the hottest summer months they would be sure to
find some. The only great danger by which this
movement would be attended would be the fear-
fully long flank which the allies must necessarily
leave exposed to the enemy in their march along the
narrow road over the salt marshes ; old and expe-
rienced officers consider this risk so great as to
entirely counterbalance all the advantages th©
allies might at first appear to possess by disembark-
ing at Eupatoria. Landing at Kalamita Bay, south
of the marshes, would avoid this danger ; but then
it would be absolutely necessary not only that the
whole force should be disembarked at once, but
that it should be an army of such strength as to
enable it at its first lauding to defy the utmost
efforts of the Russians to compete with it. This
army, therefore, ought at the very least to comprise
60,000 picked troops, and all the world must know
now that to embark and disembark an army of
60,000 on an enemy's coast would require such an
amount of preparation as to make it almost impos-
sible that the expedition could be undertaken this
year. Even if the whole plan could be arranged
and carried out within the month, it would be
madness to attempt it with the winter coming on,
as the fleet, to be of any service at all, must lie
On the open coast, with bad anchorage, and within
a mile of a lee shore.

By lauding at Kalamita the allies would have to
fight once more the battle of the Alma, though it
would not then be such a contest as was gained
this day twelvemonths. Since the Turks have oc-
cupied Eupatoria, the Russians have been engaged
in turning the heights of Alma into a series of
earth fortifications ; but the extreme left of their
position on the sea is still vulnerable to the assaults
of the allied fleet ; and under cover of their fire
the English and French could again succeed in
breaking through the line of defence at this point.
Once any portion of the heights was carried the
whole position would be turned, and the inves-
ture of the north forts a routine affair.
But, as I have before said, I consider it out of
the power of the allies to make any movements such
as those I have described before next spring. Before
60,000 of their best troops could be spared from
camp it would be necessary to alter most consider-
ably the present position of the allies. To defend
the immense extent of ground they now occupy
they have not a man too many, and if the effective
strength of the army was reduced by 60,000 it
would be necessary to reduce the lines also. The
whole of the extended position along the Tchernaya
and Traktir Bridge must then be abandoned, and
the troops defending it retire to the actual heights
of Balaklava, where a garrison of 10,000 'men might
defy the world. Of course, the cause and reason
of such a movement would be divined in an instant
by the enemy, and they in turn would be able to
concentrate all their available men on the Alma.
When the siege of the north side commenced nei-
ther Balaklava nor Kamiesh would have any im-
portance, or be of any use but as store depots. A
new base of operations, and some new port from
which to draw our supplies, would be necessary ;
and the only one that could possibly be used is the
Katcha. Do auy of your readers recommend that
our transport fleet should anchor for the winter off
such a spot as that ? Or do any of your readers
suppose that during the rainy season supply could
be got over such a country as that which lies be-
tween the Katcha and the Belbec _

Expecting any advance against S impheropol until
the allies have ample means of land transport is out
of the question, and a movement against Perekop
about as likely and as feasible as a movement
against the moon. Your readers may depend upon
it that they will never hear of any fighting in the
open field north of the Alma, and for the best of all
reasons—viz., north of that part of the Crimea
there are not sufficient roads, sufficient wood, or
sufficient water for the wants of an army, tither
English, French, or Russian.

The following letter by a " Hertfordshire In-
cumbent" has been addressed to a contemporary:—
Sir,—The signal success with which the arms of
the allies have recently been crowned ha's naturally
set the public, civilians as well as military men,
speculating on the next step likely to be taken by
the enemy ; and it seems to be the general opinion
that Prince Gortschakoff is likely to evacuate his
position on the north side of the harbour of Sebas-
topol, and endeavour to withdraw his whole army
from the Crimea.

It appears to me that there are some strong rea-
sons against too confidently expecting this agree-
able result. Events have proved that in the battle
of the Tchernaya, on the 16th ult., there were pre-
sent a large portion of the second corps d' armee,
the arrival of which was by competent judges con-
sidered impossible before tho second week of the
present month; and it is believed, on good grounds,
that the extraordinary rapidity of their march was
achieved at the cost of 25 per cent. of their num.-
hers. It also appears that at the date of the battle
of the Tchernaya a portion of two divisions of Gre-
nadiers—the detachment of which from the army
of Poland was announced by the Allgemeine
Zeitung in the middle of July—was at Bakshi-Serai,
and the remainder of them on the point of enter-
ing the Crimea.

These movements, it is plain, cannot have been
effected without the most excessive pressure upon
all the means of transport extending over an enor-
mous radius, and this very circumstance prevents
the reversal of the operation. The vacuum created
by the destruction of the baggage animals which
have been used up in concentrating the troops
must be filled up before those troops can be again
dispersed. In such a matter the resources of a
country under an absolute Sovereign are like a
man's balance at his banker's ; his checks to any
amount will be honoured without difficulty while
any effects remain, but no longer. The Czar may
easily seize every horse and ox within the Govern-
ments of Ekaterinoslav and Cherson ; but not even
the Czar can flay Midas twice. The army of Prince
Gortschakoff, therefore, however much it may de-
sire to retreat homewards, must, I suspect, wait,
and wait some time, before it obtains the means of
stirring. And, if it must wait, most assuredly it
has every motive to attack the Allies if the least
prospect of success should appear.
But, however, if we are still to endure some
time before we can hope to be gratified by the
pleasing spectacle of the enemy in full retn at, per-
haps the delay may be well compensated by the
completeness of the result, should it at last arrive.