The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-21 00:00:00

How far diplomacy has affected them I know not,.but I really
envy the satisfaction which the noble earl must have enjoyed
,n the conv,ntion - signed with Pielmont. (Hear.) I

look upon that as contributing lava:lD:Lie force to tho compeer
exertions of the Western Powers. (Hear, hear.) I envy him
the satisfaction he must have enjoyed, because I must say
that of all the events which have occurred since 1848—events
which have generally been creditable to the smaller constitu-
tional Powers of Europe, whose conduct almost universally
has been far superior to that of the grew; Powers in the emer-
gency in which they were placed—l say of all the measures
adopted, that which most conduces to the credit of the Pied-
montese statesmen by whom it was adopted—that whichmost
conduces not only to their present credit, but to the future
interests of their country is that convention, by which Pied-
mont joins the Western Powers. (Hear.) That, of all other
measures is destined to find a place in history as one of the
most admirable transaotious and most remarkable acts of a
long.sighted Government. I congratulate the noble earl and
the statesman at the head of the Piedmontese Government—
the people and the army of Piedmont, on that event. (Hear,
hear.) They have taken by it a new position in Europe, and
have justified the expectations entertained of their virtue and
wisdom, and I most earnestly hope that they may get the re-
ward they so justly deserve in the advantage to be derived
from the measure in question to their country, and in the
honour which they deserve to have for themselves. (Cheers.)
I deplore the loss of the Duke of Genoa, as noble, a soldier
as ever met an enemy in the field, and who, if he had been
spared, would have shed another ray of honour—of that
honour which never deserts them—on the head of the illus-
trious military family of which he was so great an ornament.
(Hear.) There is another subject on which I have to congra-
tulate the noble earl, and that is the recent convention with
Turkey ; that also adds a very material force to the army
which is to be employed in this war. Undoubtedly, it would
have been a subject of very great satisfaction if that conven-
tion had been made ten months ago. Whether it was impos-
sible to overcome Turkish scruples sooner, I know not, or
whether the ordinary means were adopted for the purpose of
effecting that great object, I know not, but this I will say,
that it is an object fraught with advantages, not only to the
prosecution of military operations, but more especially to the
actual position of Turkey itself; because we must not think
that if we can save Turkey, in this war we have done all.
(Hear.) We have done little or nothing unless we place Tur-
key in a position in which she will be able to protect herself
until the other Powers of Europe may come to her assistance.
I know nothing that can tend so directly to the revival of the
Turkish empire as the revival of the Turkish army. (Hear.)
It has had at nu distant period an army more instructed,
more disciplined, and more scientific than any army known in
Europe at the time, though that was tho time of Charles V.
I know not why at this time she should not be capable of
producing an army of equal merit, but this I know, that in
States such as that is, the only possible chance of revival is
in the reconstruction of an army. (Hear.) When a State is ,
falling in virtue, the last place virtue leaves is the army in
the field. It was so in the fall of the Roman empire, when
the highest virtues still adorned the army, while everything
that is corrupt existed in the court. And, my lords, I feel
satisfied that if you can in any way reconstruct the Turkish
army, you will give to that country the chance of reconstruction
in other respects which it has never yet had, and which may
free the future Government of that country from many difficul-
ties and dangers to which it has been recently exposed. (Hear.)
But I must say that I think the extent to which the employ-
ment of Turkish troops in our service is to be made avail-
able is very insufficient ; and I think that it is not in
our own service only, but in the service of the French also,
that a very large body of Turks ought to Le employed. In-
stead of 15,000, we should at least have 30,000 Turkish sol-
diers in the service of this country ; and I should earnestly
desire to see the same number in the service of France, offi-
cered by French officers, to serve on the Pruth, as our Turk-
ish contingent should be by English officers to serve in Asia ;
for, my lords, I have no doubt whatever, that, so long as we ,
attempt to conduct this war against Russia without attempt-
ing any diversions whatever—allowing her to bring her whole
forces over the hardened snows, with all their means of tran-
sport and all their artillery, to attack our forces, at a most
inclement season, and at a distance of 3,000 miles, without
an adequate artillery perhaps, certainly without the adequate
equipment that an army in the position before Sebastopol
ought to have—l say we shall meet with difficulties which it
will be impossible to withstand, unless we take means to
make necessary diversions. (Hear.) My lords, has been
to me a deep subject of regret, from the commencement of
this war, that her Majesty,s Government should not have paid
that attention which I think they ought to have done to the
importance of the war in Asia. (Hear.) I entirely concur,
my lords, in all that has been said and written by that able
gentleman who, more than any other, is acquainted with the
affairs of Asia—l mean Mr. Layard. I entirely concur in all
that he has said. We are not only a European but an Asiatic
pbwer. (Hear, hear.) To us this war has a double interest
and importance. It affects us, not merely as regards the
coasts of the Mediterranean, or the manner in which Russia
may get possession of Constantinople and establish her fleet
iu the Black Sea, with a view to the destruction of our
commerce and our position there as a naval power ; it is of
importance to us, as it affects greatly our position in the
East. (Hear, hear.) Upon the result of this war depends
the communication with India through Egypt. Upon the
result of this war depends the question whether Turkey shall
possess any independent strength in Asia Minor. If Russia
conquers that strength will fall. All communication be-
tween Turkey and Persia is cut off. Persia becomes sub-
ject to Russia, and all the power of Persia, through Russia,
will be against us in India. (Hear.) I say, therefore, the im-
portance of the war in Asia is incalculable to us. It is quite
a different thing to us whether she succeeds in Asia than it is
to any of the other Powers engaged in this war ; and there-
fore I most earnestly desire that in addition to these Turkish
troops we should also have the aid of Persian soldiers. The
Persians form the very best soldiers, equally able with those
of other countries to bear heat and cold, bravo as their swords,
and obedient to their officers whenever they are paid. I most
earnestly desire to see that army officered as the irregular
forces are under the East India Company, by a commandant,
a second in command, and an adjutant ; rand I feel satisfied
that, so officered, those troops would be equal to any service
to which they might be called. But, my lords, there is
another Power whose assistance I think we have a right to
claim in this war—a Power most deeply interested, whose
existence as connected with India is, I willnot say, dependent
on the result of this war, but most materially connected with
it—l mean the Government of India. (Hear.) Is the Govern-
ment of India to stand aloof in this war, which affects Persia
and which affects the communication through Egypt ! Is
that Government to do nothing ! Is she to bo the Prussia of
the East ? Is she to let others fight her battles ? I think not.
I think not only that the available forces of India should be
brought into the fi'eld, but that the Government of India
should pay for them, as it is for their interest and for their
safety that they would have to fight. (Hear.) In addition to
30,000 Persian soldiers that could with great effect be opposed
to Russia in Asia, why should we not have the use of the noblest
artillery in the world —the native artillery of India. You can
have 48 guns without the smallest inconvenience to
the service in India—not served by men who will run
away when the enemy is advancing to their muzzles, but
who will die at their guns—(hear)—who may have their
guns taken from them, no doubt, but who will never desert
them, standing at their posts till left dead men. (Hear.)
Then there is the irregular cavalry, than which there is
no nobler body of men in the world. (Hear. hear.) ' The offi-
cers are selected from the whole army of India—men full of
daring, full of knowledge, genius, and zeal, to whom the sol-
diers are devoted, and who would follow them to the end of
the world. (Hear, hear.) Of those you can easily have 3 000
officered by the best men in the world, and the men, being
Mahomedans, might bring over with them volunteers from
the various regiments in the- service of the Government of
India, so that thus you might have 8 or 10 battalions officered
by men—some of whom we know by name,—equal to any you
possess in the army. (Hear.) Thus, then, including the
Turkish and Persian troops, you might have an army of
50,000 men, which would be strong enough to give you Tiflis
and Georgia. Observe that in this war before Sebastopol you
are' enclosed by the town and by the enemy, and you have no
means of contact with the people of the country. But in
Georgia you would have the feeling of the nationality of the
country in your favour. We would have allies by our side.
We would have Schamyl and the Circassians, and would have
an opportunity of attacking Russia with the arms she has
herself used for the purpose of subjugating a large portion of
Europe. (Hear.) You would attack her with her own arms,
and you may depend it that in this war you must fail unless
you determine to appeal to nations and not alone to armies
—(hear)—unless you will avail yourselves of the means which
the national feeling of the people more recently annexed to
Russia places at your disposal, (Hear.) This is a war, I re-
gret to say, ad internationem, and it is absolutely necessary
that you should avail yourselves of every means in your
power, for the purpose of bringing it to a conclusion honour-
able to this country, safe for us, and safe for the rest of the
world. (Loud cheers.)
The Earl of HARROWBY expressed his concurrence in
the observations which had fallen from the noble earl who
had just addreased the house with respect to the import-
ance of appealing to the feelings of nationality against Russia.
In Asia, the Georgians and Circassians had, by their own
unaided strength, almost obtained a victory over Russia, but
he believed that if we assisted them, nothing could resist
them. But it was Poland which was the one really weak
point of Russia. He was 'surprised to hear the noble lord
who had just gone to Vienna talk as if under no circumstance
were we to look for an alteration in the territorial distribu-
tion of the Russian empire. But in that case what were we
fighting for ? Whit substantial guarantee could we have
against Russia except in a substantial alteration of her terri-
torial constitution. (Hear.) That, however, could not be
done except we turned our attention both to Poland and the
Caucasus.• And yet, strange to say, in neither quarter had
anything been done by the allies. (Hear.) Let us raise the
standard of Poland and we should aaiso seventeen millions of
men the most warlike in Europe, and the most opposed to
Russia, both in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Nor, when he
considered what sacrifices Prince Metternich was willing to
make at the Congress of Vienna, and •when he looked to what
had occurred since, could be doubt that Austria would be
willing to make some sacrifices of territory in order to raise a
more effectual barrier against the power of Russia. Whether
our Government were or were not prepared to take steps for
appealing to the national feeling of the Poles, he did, now-
ever, hope that our minister would not go to Vienna prepared
to pledge this country that under no circumstances should
any alteration be effected in the territorial extent of Russia.
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Lord PANMURE said that the noble earl who had just ad..
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curtailing the period of enlistment in the army. And as he
(Lord Panmure) to some extent participated iu the opinions he
had expressed, he should be quite willing to limit the operation
of this measure to three years. And with this amendment and
limitation of the period for which it was to be in force, he trusted
that the house would have no difficulty in agreeing to a mea-
sure the object of which was to enaclo the Government to'en-
list in tho army men of sufficient age, with sufficient strength,
and with constitutions sufficiently formed, to enter at once
on the arduous duty of a campaign, instead of being com-
pelled, as at present, to take boys of eighteen, who had to be
fed and trained for two or three years hefore they are fit to
undertake the commonest warlike operations. (Hear, hear.)
Passing from the.bill before the house, the noble earl had
then adverted to a number of points connected with the army
in general, and had in particular adverted to the number of
recruits which would be required to fill up the army to the
effective strength voted by the House of Commons on the
previous evening. Those who were conversant with the de-
tails of the army knew that at no period was it possible to
maintain its effective strength at the number voted in the
estimates. And if that was tho case iu time of peace, much
more so must it be the case in time of war. In time of peace,
the casualties from sickness and otherwise reduced an army
of 100,000 men by 12,000. Of course, the casualties out of
an army of 190,000 in time of war must be much more nu-
merous, and a much larger number of recruits must be re-
quired to fill np the deficiency thus created. Ile was not,
however, afraid of getting the requisite supplies of men by
recruiting ; and for this purpose the Government relied, not
only on their own measure, but also upon the assistance of
every lord-lieutenant, every deputy-lieutenant, every man
interested in the welfare of the country by the ties either of
landed or commercial property, to induce men to enter ,the
service of their Queen and country. For the more speedily
we could employ an efficient force, the more speedily would
a conclusion be put to a state of things which disturbed all
the relations of the country, landed, commercial, and social,