The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-03 00:00:00

LONDON, 'TUESDAY EVENING, APRIL 3, 1855.

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

DEPARTURE OF THE BALTIC FLEET.
(Fionz the Times of this day. )
This afternoon the shores of the Solent will witness
one of those spectacles in which England is once more
at home. A portion of the fleet, consisting of more
than thirty vessels of war, and including a dozen sail of
the line, will start to occupy the Baltic, to blockade
every inlet and port of the Czar, and if possible find
some vulnerable point of his triple granite and iron. At
any time the sight of so many huge machines, sent out
with the message to kill and destroy, may well subdue
the most frivolous. Even a naval review, with its mi-
mic thunders, and its programme of triumphs, becomes
a scene of horror exactly in proportion as we realise its
true import. What we may see to-day, however, is
ambitiously and industriously grander, sterner, grimmer,
more real, and more deadly, than any like spectacle on
on these or any seas. The Baltic fleet of this year is in
all respects much stronger than the last ; it has more
steam power, more guns, a new class of gun-boats and
floating batteries, adapted for creeks and shoals, and,
what more than anything marks a resolution to do
something—a now commander. Sir Charles Napier
has ceased to command the Baltic fleet, not from any
deficiency in skill, in courage, or temper, but simply
because he did less than the British people expected to
see done. We have ourselves been ever ready to do
justice to his actual achievements, which are not to ,be
denied or depreciated ; but, when we send out the finest
fleet in the world, we naturally expect it to do more
than shut in a third-rate naval power, and assist an
army to destroy an unfinished fort. The new com-
mander, Admiral Dundas, has before him the services
of Admiral Napier, and, whatever his instructions, if
anye_use
- pdgrAtoratinka
Admirat Napier. irhe does not accomplish more,
he will certainly find himself next November under
orders to lower his flag, with small prospect of ever
hoisting it again. Such is the mission of the fleet the
Queen sends thisAay on its fatal errand. It is to at-
I tempt more, to run more risk, to follow further and
closer, to care rather less for losing ships and men, and
rather more for inflicting losses and disgraces on the
enemy. In a word, the force is stronger and the duty
more terrible than last year; and if the scene to-day
should attract a smaller crowd of gazers than last year,
they will doubtless see it less as a holiday spectacle, and
more as an operation of war.
We certainly had wished that after last year's experi-
ence we should have less of such floating castles as the
Duke of Wellington and the Royal George, and rather
more of the gun-boats and other small craft, on which we
must mainly rely in our offensive operations. For forty
years we have been introducing a new power into naval
warfare, and by its aid, together with continual improve-
ments in gunnery, we have brought the old man-of-war
to a perfection that Nelson never imagined. We have
given it twice the size, twice the weight of metal, and
infinitely more manageableness and security, Could we
suppose one of Nelson's fleets developed by a law of its
oss n, to grow, 'to become more active, powerful, and
docile ; to arrive at a sort of intelligence, volition, and
harmonious action, till it could defy the storm and hie ast
the current, bent and resolved on its way, faithful to its
mission, and not to be denied by any vulgar element,
there we have the fleet that this day leaves our
shores. Yet in this pride and might seems to
consist the very weakness of our naval under-
takings. The British man-of-war has been developed
rather by an internal law than by any law of adap-
tation, It is, indeed, the grandest work of human
hands. but it does not answer its purpose, if it has
not actually outgrown it. Without inquiry, and as a
matter of course, we have been making our ships larger
and larger, when inquiry might have suggested that they
should bo smaller and smaller. Were it, indeed, the
waves alone we had to deal with, could we fight out
every quarrel on the wide ocean, had we always to chase
huge fleets from one hemisphere
.to another, and fight
over again for ever, as in the old mythology, every bat-
tle ever fought with American frigate or Spanish three-
decker, there is no doubt as to the excellence of the type
we seem to have adopted. But the actual state of things
is far otherwise. Like some strong impetuous animal,
we seem to miss our object by running ahead of it. We
have to deal with shallovi waters and granite walls, and
find ourselves too gigantic fur the petty warfare, and,
giants though we are, we are so far baffled. No doubt
we have improved on last year ; but, unless there is a
large supply of the smaller craft, adapted for the shallow
waters of the Baltic, we shall only reiterate an inglorious
campaign with even less glory than before.
For anything we know, the departure of the Baltic
fleet may be an annual ceremony for many a year to
come. -Up to this time everything indicates a very pro-
tracted war. At the chief point of collision there is on
both sides an indefinite power of reinforcements and sup-
plies, and we go on pouring in men and material for ever
without decisive issue. But, if our army is thwarted by
earthworks, our navy is not less at fault with granite,
and, whether by sea or by land, the same endless warfare
is before us„till genius or accident shall suggest some so-
lution. Therefore it is that we still urge the necessity of
adapting onr means of warfare to the nature of the war.
Great men have always been remarkable for adapting
the means to the end. To do so politically argues a
singleness and straightness of aim, a disregard of
minor objects, and a contempt of mere material, never
found in the common order of minds, however accom-
plished. No doubt, it does cost a painful effort to con-
demn a majestic structure to vulgar uses, to break to
pieces the work of one's own industry and skill, to ac
knowledge a life half wasted, and a thousand oppor-
tunities thrown away ; but, if experience should estab-
lish that our magnificent ships are little better than use-
less lumber, or, at best, huge storeships, floating bar-
racks, and naval depots, we hope and trust that no false
thrift or professional pride will interfere to save them
from their proper fate. Let them be kept in their place,
but let us not multiply them, or attempt to use them,
simply because we have them, where they do not answer
the purpose. Die First Lord of the Admiralty has not
given us any very recent account of the peculiar prepa-
rations made f the Baltic warfare. If they are on a
scale for the occasion, and if from under the shadow of
our huge three-deckers tleete of gun-boats and batteries
are ready to start and penetrate every frith and fiord of
the Baltic, well and good—we stand corrected. But, as
a dozen boats here, and half-a-dozen there, are all the
public have heard of, it is not amiss to urge preparations
that may still be in time for this season, and may pro
bably be wanted the next.

LORD RAGLAN'S DESPATCHES.
(From the Daily News of this day.)

The nonchalance of Lord Raglan's despatches is, we
will be bound to say, unprecedented in the annals of
war. He not long ago began one of them by telling the
Minister of War he had "really nothing to report."
And in that of the 20th of March, which we publish to-
day, he says of the affair of the 17th, between the Rus-
sians and French—" Considerable loss must have been
sustained by our Allies, I fear, as well as by the enemy."
Tlitee days after the action took place, Lord Raglan
can only fear that our Allies had suff,red considerable
loss : it would have been too much trouble to ascertain
whether they had or not. Ministers complain that the
newspapers publish letters calculated to ,produce mis-
chievous impressions on the public mind. Can anything
produce a more mischievous impression than the
lackadaisical communications of the Commander-in-
Chief. Good-natured souls, who are reluctant to
find fault with any one, especially with any one
in place, try to extenuate the faults of Lord
Raglan's correspondence by alleging that, along with
the slip-shod epistles which appear in the Gazette,

he mu--t transmit others which enter more into
detail, but which Ministers deem it inexpedient to pub-
lish. If Ministers deem it. inexpedient to publish the
whole of Lord Raglan's correspondence—if they select
for publication certain portions that may safely be in-
trusted to the profane vulgar—then sure:y, were it only
to save Lord Raglan's character, they ought to select
portions which can better bear the tight. It is not the
curtness of the letters, or their awkward phraseology,
that is complained of. A man may be a good general
and a desperately bad writer. If Lord Raglan would
do, the public would forgive his being unable to tell what
he bad done. It is the heartlessness which his poco-
curante epistles appear to indicate that excites indigna-
nation. There is scarcely a family circle in England—
from the peer's to the pauper's—but has to bewail a
member reft from it by the scandalous mismangement in
the Crimea ; and yet Lord Raglan writes as if he had,
not one compunctious visiting—as if ;:his soul were as
serene and untroubled as it might be bad he no more
serious oversight to reproach himself with than a revoke
at whist.

True, he has plenty to keep him in countenance. All
the directors of the war—himself included—act as he
writes. Dr. Andrew Smith confesses, with edifying im-
perturbability, that his signature is affixed to dbcuments
of the contents of which he had no knowledge. Dr.
Menzies cannot tell whether he was under Dr. Cumming
or Dr. Cumming under him. Mr. Ward, purveyor, is
found to be inefficient from age ; hut the old dotard
grumbled at being sent back to England, and Lord
Raglan, "good-naturedly," allowed him to remain.,
How that word " good-nature" is misused l It might
be " go9d-natured" in so far as Mr. Ward was concerned,
but wag it good-natured to our gallant soldiers, who
were dying of inanition in the trenches, or tossing
in feverish agony on their pallets in the hospital!
And without condescending to notice the crowd of
minor pococuranti, is there not our Premier himself ?
Lord Palmerston is astonished that there should be ex-
citement and indignation in the country. " Have we,"
he asks, " been worsted in battle ?" No ; but, far worse
than that, our army for months was dying off piecemeal,
in face of an enemy who only assailed it to be repulsed
with disgrace. Our resources ar3 infinitely greater than
those of the foe—our men are braver than his ; and yet
•
at one time our army was visibly wasting away through
the mismanagement tof our rulers and commanders.
This is a deeper disgrace than losing many battles but
Lord Palmerston feels it not--he jokes at the expense of
those who feel it.

It is this frivolity of our rulers, and of those ,whom
they employ, that is the most galling part of what we
have at present to endure. The nation is high of heart
and earnest of purpose; its mean, are great, and it is
willing to exhaust them all for the attainment of the
great object it has in view; our soldiers are the bravest

of the brave—ardent in assault, dogged in sustaining
attacks, patient and unmurmuring under privations.
But the levity, the want of earnest purpose, in high
places spoils all. We might address our rulers in the
words of Cowper :

There is a public mischief in your mirth,
• It plagues your country ; folly, such as yours,
Graced with a sword, but worthier of a fan,
Has made what enemies could ne'er have done,
Our arch of Empire, steadfast but for you,
A mutilated structure, soon to fall.
From beginning to end the war in which we are en-
gaged has been conducted in a manner disgraceful to the
English Government, and to the country which has tole-
rated such a Government. It was undertaken under the
pretext of upholding the independence and integrity of
the Ottoman Empire. First a few troops was sent to
'Malta, with many sighs and prayers that they might not
need to proceed further. Then they were sent out to
Gallipoli, Scutari, &c., to protect Constantinople, as if
the Russians, in possession of the Principalities, were
irresistible, and nothing more could be looked for than
to keep the capital o-it of their clutches. When the
Turks had beaten the Russians on the Danube, our rulers
took heart of grace and advanced to Varna, where our
soldiers were kept dying of the rot like sheep in ill-drained
pastures. Then came the start to the Crimea, in the
vain hope to take Sebastopol by surprise, and wind up
the campaign with a dashing affair. And now they are
at their wits'-ends : afraid to carry on the war—afraid
to back out of it. They are coaxing Austria and Russia
to agree to a settlement which will enable them to face
the matter out with bold words in Parliament. From
first to last they have not been in earnest about any
thing but keeping their places, and providing for as many
of their kith and kin as possible. England may become
a laughing7stoek -ill the . eyes of ske:worbi ; th 4,
4,0-► cj ustrter.day -find t Nem' still' en titled to
dratv their salaries ? This comfortable prospect makes
them endure with heroic imperturbability all the suffer-
ing and all the shame that has befallen the nation. And
if the nation tolerates them and their frivolity much
longer, it will deserve the worst consequences that can
come from having such a Government inflicted on it.

DROUYN DE L'HUYS'S MISSION TO
VIENNA.
( From the Morning Chronicle of this day.)
The British public, with that shrewd instinct which
seldom errs, have come to the conclusion that M.
Drouyn de l'Huys is gone to Vienna to act as a kind of
prompter or fly-flapper to Lord J. Russell. Whether
our excellent and sententious Plenipotentiary went away
in haste with imperfect instructions, and only a general
impression that his presence would " set things to
rights"— or whether the Viennese atmosphere and the
adulation of Emperors and Princes have enervated that
" pluck" which is the noble lord's boasted characteristic
—the result appears to be that his proceedings hitherto
have not given satisfaction either to his own compatriots
or to our Allies.
When Lord John Russell was nominated to this
important mission, his political character and an-
tecedents weighed in fixing the choice. Our na-
tional honour, it was said, would be safe in the
keeping of a statesman whose speeches and political
acts breathed even an exaggerated patriotism, and who
had so courageously dtfen led his present chief when
assailed by a continental coalition. How ruthlessly he
sacrificed him, some yearand a-half afterwards, was, it
is true, forgotten ! it was stoutly maintained that
Lord John Russell would prove neither "an -Austrian
'Minister" nor "a Russian Minieter," but a single-
minded plenipotentiary, going to Vienna rather as a
representative of the feeling of his countrymen, and
as a kind of demonstration, than as a mere nego-
tiator ! Somehow or other these hopes hitherto have
been singularly disappointed. The noble lord is
famous for his fits and starts of patriotism and libe-
ralism ; for his extreme public spirit while in Opposi-
tion, or when in need of political capital, and his
sudden collapses when the immediate necessity is over.
Something of this kind seems to have happened to him
on the present occasion ; and the people are beginning
to grumble. It is bad enough, they say, that our gi-
gantic Colonial Empire should be left without a Minis-
ter to guide its policy or to attend to its affairs ; but to
be douly deprived—to have this great department of
State neglected, and, at the same time, to find our Ple-
nipotentiary contravening the Public Will and neglect-
ing the National Interests—is a little too bad.
Men ask—What are the motives that might influence
Lord John Russell at the present moment to lean to-
wards the accomplishment of a dishonourable, or at least
an inadequate, peace ? It is certainly very remarkable
that the noble lord, who had so flourished the warlike
trump before his departure, should have subsided so sig-
nally almost immediately on his arrival at Vienna ! He
certainly was not sent there to effect a compromise.
Mischief enough had been done by the proclamation of
our pretended military weakness, without our being
committed to undignified concessions on some maudlin
cry for "peace." The suicidal exposures—exaggera-
tions, though founded on fact—of the state of our army
in the Crimea might have been neutralised by contradic-
tions, but how get over such a confirmatory confession
as the abandonment of the siege of Sebastopol ? Pleni-
potentiary ho was, but not to misinterpret the national
will or tarnish the national honour. Therefore, and
deeply revolving these things, the public naturally ask,
why it is that England is so badly represented at Vienna,
as that the exact reverse of the wishes of all classes has
found its way into diplomatic propositions made in her
name ?

It is , singular ' that the public discontent at the
attitude assumed by the British representatives at
Vienna should have followed so closely on the detec-
tion of certain political and Parliamentary intrigues
here in London. A man who has passed his life in the
House of Commons always lives there in the spirit, even
if he be away in the body. Lord John Russell, too has
for some time past seen the Leadership of the Whig
party slipping from his grasp—nay, the very party itself
was not long since in danger of dwindling away—of
being absorbed. Lord Palmerston was assuredly
quizzed by the late Sir Robert Peel when he twitted
him with being a "pure Oil Whig ! " We strongly
suspect that Lord John Russell looks upon his newly-
reconciled colleague as little better than an interloper
and usurper. What, then, can be more natural than
that the noble lord, while " walking arm in arm with
Prince Gortschakoff on the glacis," or assisting with
becoming gravity at that solemnly farcical Conference
Board at Vienna, should have one eye on Down-
ing-street, or St. James's-square, or Grosvenor-gate,
or the t Speaker's chair? Now, he might think to
himself, is the chance of restoration for the " great
Whig party," or never. A menaced Coalition, on a
cry for " peace," might destroy so tempting au
opportunity I Heavy taxes, stagnation of trade, a more
than Panic war, are strong arguments for peace, in the
long run, with a commercial people, who had been
taught to believe in a political millennium and universal
free trade. What more natural than that Lord John
Russell—who, of course, gets the English papers, and
is keenly alive to what is going on at home—should
detect the growing conspiracy against resuscitated
etase of provoke Co-
mmons, m a.
Whiggism ? It- is net difficult to suppose him cursing
in his heart that war policy
which
mcooanliet,ion,
which wouldwithan apduvsetirseasviodteeoinnee ore thinm the revived
House
Whig party, and bar himself from the renewed leader-
ship of the Hour of Commons, the expected reward of
his magnanimous consent to serve under Lord Pal-
merston ! .
If, however, Lord John Russell be disposed to huddle
up a peace as quickly as possible—whether for such
reasons as these, or for others less personal and more
patriotic—all men concerned are not of his mind. It is
not very flattering to the pride of this country the posi-
tion in which England stands towards France. In an
ill-starred moment, Lord Palmerston babbled of "judi-
cious bottle-holding !" He little anticipated the day
when he would—whether he liked it or no—have a
"bottle-holder" himself! We can imagine the Emperor
shrink
snen
.
n d
East-
ern Napoleon mingling a little malice with his public spirit
lv geniusa ssthoo settle °
du in performing this function. It is bad enough that the
military renown of England should pale beside that of
France, and that the governmental
coun-
try Chief e oaf, theile iFrenchprosperity
isthyo raisedualuddhgalvoery.
B u
this o
tcboiuenk-
-1 i the
the
Chosen
h Eoa
that our " Palmerston, our man of "vigour",par excel-
lence—he,
too,
er whose
question—to
become dwarfed in the proportions of his fame by ,and
,this
monopolising Monarch —this inscrutable . man of glowing
words and stersterlingdeeds, who not only
excels the talk-
ing statesman in eloquence, but ca
very
think name
that
alonehe
caps s eloquence by
action ! Three years ago, who would have dared to
prophesy that the reputation of Lord Palmerston would
so soon have yielded place to the superior energy
rectitude of the personage, to whom, then t and
ex-
tended his patronage was deemed almost o have
magnani-
mous condescension ? Yet such is unhappily a
at the present day. The people of England the case
so much more confidence in- Napoleon
have now
the Third than
they have in the statesman whom they
dicta-
tor, that when the Tories wish to chose as a
create confusion for factious pus embroil matters and
it worth their while to throw out insinuations
they only -think
the former, passing over the latter insinuations against
insig-
nificant l as if he were
Monsieur Drouyn de l'Buys did
amuse himself, or to talk d' not come here to
diplomaticplatitudes
Ministerial trio who were with the
Cabinet to treat with him. speciallyTheE selected from the
Emperor of the French
never wastes time or opportunity'
Minister here, before despatching h'Sending his Foreign
the flagging energy of the British him Vienna to spur
a strong measure, but, if all reports be Plenipotentiary, was
strong than necessary. This much is iear—that since
true, not more
e
the French Statesman's visit a more decided
per-
ceptible in high quarters. It has oven tone is
his mission has so far been successful, transpired that
that the peaceful
aspirations of Lord John Russell
have been .officially
frustrated, and that our " man of •
vigour" has assented
to an ultimatum which Russia, in her arrogance, is likely
to reject with disdain.

THE CONDUCT OF THII WAR.
From the Morning Herald of yesterday. )
Everything which is now Passing serves to convince
us, that Lord Palmerston is faithfully carrying out his
pledge to Sir James Graham, that lie would continue to
persevere in the policy of Lord Aberdeen. Notwith-
standing the failure of that policy, and the disastroua

consequences which it has entailed upon the country,
the present Ministry refuse to learn the lesson which it
teaches ; they are walking in the same footsteps, and
we have a confident opinion that they will lead to the
same end.
The grand principle respecting the war by which Lord
Aberdeen and his colleagues were guided was this : To
trust to the success of negotiations, and in that trust to
neglect adequate preparations for the war. With pitiable
imbecility Lord Aberdeen boasted of having " clung to
the hope of peace with desperate tenacity ;" he suc-
ceeded in inspiring his colleagues with the same base-
less expectations, so that Lord Palmerston, at Perth,
did not hesitate to proclaim his strong conviction that
peace would be maintained ; and Mr. Gladstone brought
forward a peace budget, and absolutely contracted for
the return of the few troops which the Duke of New-
castle ventured to send as far as Malta. The British
Cabinet actually fancied that this, paltry demonstration
would be amply sufficient to 'deter the Czar from the
pursuit of objects on the attainment of which his own
heart and the hearts of his predecessors had been set for
upwards of a century ! The consequences of all this
management are too deeply engraved on the minds of
our readers to require here any description from us ;
and could we bring ourselves to believe that our present
rulers had learnt wisdom from dear-bought experience,
fearful and calamitous as that experience has been, at
any rate the nation would have gained something, and
would not be exposed to the like again.
But, as we have more than once observed, wise men
profit by past errors, but fools live only to repeat them.
So are we much mistaken if the event does not bear us
out in our opinion that Lord Palmerston's Administra-
tion is only repeating the very same error which has
made Lord Aberdeen's Ministry a byword and a scorn
amongst the nations. The Ministers- are 'now trusting
exclusively to the success of their negotiations at Vienna,
whilst they are neglecting the necessary preparations
for an adequate and successful prosecution of the war.
The fall of Sebastopol by bombardment and assault is
an event of which no one knowing anything of the
actual state of affairs in the Crimea has the slightest ex-
pectation. It is well ascertained, that, however much
the physical condition of the allied armies may have
improved, however much their position may have been
strengthend, however much their numbers may have been
increased, and their means of offensive attack multiplied,
in all these matters the Russians have made as great
progress as the allies; but in the two most important.
the two last, they have very greatly surpassed us. If
our means of attack have been doubled, their means of
resistance have been made at least five times more effec-
tive than they were at the commencement. The rela-
tive strength of the beligerent parties at Sebastopol has
been changed greatly to the advantage of its defenders.
In this state of things all hope of speedily taking the
place by assault is abandoned by every reasonable man.
Moreover, it is well known that if even such an attempt
were to prove successful, no real step would be gained,
but a fearful sacrifice of human life would be incurred,
and the allies would only seize an untenable position.
The south side of Sebastopol cannot be held while
the north, which commands it, and which bristles
with its hundreds of cannon, is in the possession
of the enemy. There remains, therefore, but ono
course, if Sebastopol is to be subdued—it can only be
done by investment, and by blockading the fortress ley
sea and land, and so starving out the garrison. Now,
inve-tment can only he accomplished by means of a
campaign in the Crimea ; beating the Russian armies in
the field ; fighting over again such battles as the Alma,
and storming the other heights which interpose between
Sebastopol and the level country about Eupatoria.
For this sort of campaign we are well convinced this
country is not making any adequate preparation. We,
moreover, believe we should not be very far from the
truth if we said that it is not making any adequate pre-
parations for any kind of campaign. The old system of
"starving the war" prevails. Go where we will we hear
nothing but well-authenticated stories of neglect orconfu-
sion. Converse with any military man, or the relations or
friends of any officer, and you hear the same story—" My
friend," one acquaintance tells you, " who is in such and
such a regiment, was to have sailed some six weeks ago ;
the regiment had received its orders for embarkation ;
they do not know for what cause, but they are not
gone." Another tells you, "My brother received orders
to start for the Crimea two months ago ; he sailed yes-
terday, but in the interval between his first orders and
his actual departure he received counter orders ; then
fresh orders and counter orders again, and now he is
gone at last ; but what can all these changes mean ?"
All this must, we are confident, be familiar to our
readers ; but we ask can any reasonable man think that
all this infirmity of purpose in our military arrangements
will enable this nation successfully to cope with the
might of Russia ? Look at the militia—owing to Lord
Palmerston's bungling, maybe to his design—little more
than one-third of the force voted is embodied ; and of
that force, owing to an attempt on the part of the
Government to break faith, more than one-third
have laid down their arms, and refused to serve any
longer.

Then, again, look at the Ordnance. A ball of pecu-
liar construction, calculated to be to the Artillery what
the Mini 6 rifle is to the soldiers, is discovered, and
proved, by experiments on their own ground, to be what
it pretends to be. How does that board, which num-
' bers amongst its members the Papist Mr. Monsell—
how, we ask, does that board deal with this invaluable
invention ? Why; instead of appropriating it with
eagerness it discourages the inventor, and rejects his
offers. Then again we would ask—when were the ten-
ders for the ambulance conveyances sent in ? Was it not
at least seven months ago ? When was the contract signed
—was it not little more than seven days ago ? The
Times politely invites Lord Raglan and General Canro-
bert to commence active operations in the field, and
urges them not to delay them till the Russian reinforce-
ments arrive. We do not pretend to affirm what means
the French general may have fer conducting such opera-
tions, but this we know, that if he attempt them he must
attempt, them alone ; for as was the case at Varna, so is
now the case at Sebastopol--oar army has not the means
of moving ! It is indeed worse off now in those matters
than it was then. "It was not," as Lord Panmure told
the House of Lords on the 23d of February, "till it was
a-certained, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the
army would have to winter in the Crimea," that any steps
were taken by Lord Aberdeen's Government to pro-
vide for that contingency. And now we suppose that
no will be taken to reduce Sebastopol, in the only
way it can now be, reduced, until " it is ascertained, be-
yond the possibility of doubt," that the Russians will
aot have peace on any, terms. Thus, ample time will be
afforded to the Russians to make every elevated spot
ofground a fortress, and every height an entrenched
camp, within 50 miles of Sebastopol. The truth, we
believe to be, that at this very moment, the Ministry
have asked the welfare of the country on the success of
the negotiations at Vienna. All their actions indicate
it but too plainly, Their preparations are not such
as if they really contemplated the continuance of the
war. The budget is postponed •till after Easter. The
holidays are nearly double their usual length. It seems
evident that the!, hope by the time of their ending that
the main difficalties at Vienna will be got over, and that
they will be able to meet Parliament with a positive
assurance of peace ; meanwhile, should rumours of their
probable concessions creep out, they are saved from
inconvenient questions as well as from inconvenient
motions. We expect at their hands an insecure and
inglorious pea Ce. No ;we are wrong ;we honestly
confess we do not expect peace ; but we shall be
agreeable surprised if it turn out that they have not
sought "to obtain it by offering unsafe and dishonourable
terms ; and whatever reliance we may have on the
loyaute of the French Emperor, still he can hardly be
,expected to stand out singly against the urgent pressing of his ally to concede. His intended visit to this coun-
try is curiously timed. Is it not meant to occupy the
public mind, and to withdraw its attention from too
close an analysis of the accepted terms of peace, which
the Ministers dread will not Satisfy the reasonable ex-
pectations of the nation.
We shrewdly suspect that we have here penetrated
the secret views of our readers. Will they be able to
carry them out ? 'We much doubt it—we incline to
think that the more they concede to Russia at Vienna,
the more evidently they expose their own want of confi-
dence in their strength, the less likely will the Russian
plenipotentiaries be to accept their terms. We do not
believe that the spirit of Nicholas is extinguished in
Muscovite councils. The more humble, therefore, we
are in our conduct and language at Vienna, the more
inclined 'will Russia be to fulfil her designs, and carry
out successfully that policy which the Sovereigns of the
House of Romanoff have never ceased to pursue, and
have accumulated the most gigantic preparations to
realise.
If Russia be resolved at all events to carry on the
war, then no terms, however degrading, which can be
Offered to her, will be of any avail. But if, on the other
hand, she be really desirous of peace, then will she
accept such terms as can be conceded with honour and
safety, provided they are firmly maintained. But if the
Allies betray any undue desire to terminate the contest
by unexpected and unworthy concessions, then will such
timid policy only serve as a temptation to Russia to
persevere, to shuffle eut of what she may have already
conceded, and at last to insist on such terms as even
our Ministers will not dare to concede.
If, unhappily, these views should turn out to be too
correct, then will these Ministers repeat the very same
blunder whereby they first involved us in war. Want
of firmness in the original negotiations drifted us into
war, and it is much to be feared that want of firmness_us
may now be equally the cause of its prolongatih
will the truth.of the proverb have a freasthfeds live but
exemplifica-
tion, " wise men profit by their errors, b.
to repeat them."

THE CIVIL SERVANTS OF VIE PUBLIC.
(From the _Derbyshire Courier.)
Mr. Lindsay, the member for Tynemouth, is well
known as an enterprising and successful man of busi-
ness. As any man is worth listening to when he speaks
of what he understands, so even were Lindsay a less
authority than be undoubtedly is on the subject of ships
and shipping, his opinion on the administrative system
of the Transport Service would be deserving of the best
attention of Parliament and the country. He calculates
that the aggregate tonnage of steamers engaged by 'Go-
vernment for the transport service amounts to .150,000
tone, and that of sailing vessels to 100,00 tons, amount,