The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

VIENNA CONFERENCES.

The additional papers containing the communications
which passe,' between the English Ministers and the
Austrian Government haVe been laid before Parliament.

They consist of twenty-three documents, and date
from the 3d of April to the end of June, 1855 :

No 1.
TUE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD JOIIN RUSSELL.
Foreign-office, April 3' 1855.
My Lord,—Count Colloredo has read to me a despatch
from Count Buol on the subject of the third point, which
forms the greatest difficulty in the negotiations, and which is
about to be taken into consideration by the Conference.
Count Buol observes that, Russia having admitted the
principle that her preponderance in the Black Sea is to beput
an end to, there can be no doubt that apparently the simplest
and most direct mode of attaining the end which the allies
have in view would be by the limitation of the naval forces of
Russia in that sea. This result might be obtained by-Russia,
engaging either to reduce her fleet to a fixed cumber of ves-
sels, or not to increase their actual number; and the latter
alternative, while it would make the sacrifice more easy,
would'come to nearly the same result, as half the fleet at Se-
bastopol bas already been sunk by the Russians themselves.
But Count Buol thinks that there may be reason to ap-
prehend that Russia may oppose this solution of the ques-
tion, on the ground of its affecting her dignity and national
honour, which the Emperor Alexander will have to consult as
much, or perhaps even more, than his predecessor.
He argues, therefore, that it will be necessary to provide
for the case of Russia refusing categorically to enter into any
positive engagement to reduce her naval forces.. In such an
event, and supposing that a complete agreement had been
come to on the three other points, would the belligerent
Powers, Count Buol asks, consider it indispensable to con-
tinue the war on that account ? But he adds that, whatever
their decision might be, Austria, for her part, not being at
present engaged in hostilities, would have no sufficient mo-
tive to declare war against Russia, if the sole obstacle to
peace were the refusal of that Power to consent to the direct
limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.
In order, then, to arrive at a practical solution of the ques-

tion, Count Buol is of opinion that recourse must be had to
the system of counterpoise. For this purpose ho says that
several possible combinations present themselves.
Russia and Turkey might enter into reciprocal engagements
n't to maintain in the Black Sea more than an equal number
of ships of war.

In this case the only other point to be considered would be
the revision of the treaty of 1841, so far as to concede to the
other Powers the right of maintaining a limited number of
ships of war in the Black Sea, with the special object of watch.
ing over the due execution of the arrangements for keeping
clear the navigation of the Danube at its mouths.

If, however-, Count Buol adds, the naval forces of Turkey
and Russia in the Euxine could not be placed in this manner
on a footing of equality, the Porte might, while maintaining
the principle of the closing of the Straits as a general rule, re-
serve to herself the right of calling into the Black Sea, as an
exceptional measure, even in time of peace, as many ships of
war of friendly Powers as she might consider necessary when-
ever she found herself menaced.

If Russia persisted in maintaining in the Black Sea a fleet
larger than could be required for purposes of defence, and
refused to consent to any kind of limitation of them, it
would be impossible to contest the right of Europe to consi-
der the maintenance of such force as a permanent danger to
Turkey; in this case the exception would become the rule,
and the Porte would have continually reasons for giving fir-
mans to the ships of war of friendly Powers to pass the Straits.
Such a state ,of things would, Count Buol thinks, be little
agreeable to Russia ; and it is by strongly supporting this
argument that it may be possible to convince Russia that A
is more for her own interest to prefer either a direct or iudi-
sect system of limitation.
I told Count Collerodo that I had listened to Count Buol's
despatch with equal surpr!se as concern, as it was nothing short
of an announcement that Austria would not adhere to the
treaty of December 2, if the Western Powers persisted in car-
rying the third basis into effect, for Count Buol must be aware
that his proposed system of counterpoise was both inadequate
and impracticable. A reciprocal engagement between Russia
and Turkey to maintain an equal number of ships in the
Black Sea would secure the preponderance of Russia,
whose ships would always be better manned, better armed,
and in a better condition than those of Turkey ; but Count
Buol proposed that at the same time other Powers should
maintain a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea,
for the special object of keeping clear the navigation of the
Danube, and upon that I begged to observe that the special
object might or might not be the real one, and Count Buol
might be sure that England and France would not profess
one thing while they intended another. If Count Buol's
proposals were really to be adopted, I could only say that
ships of war would be utterly useless at the mouths of the
Danube to watch over the fulfilment of stipulations that a
commission was appointed to carry out; that if these ships
moved away from the mouths of the Danube Russia would
have just ground for complaint, and that if England and
France were suddenly to be at war with Russia this
limited force might at once be overpowered by the force
that Russia would be suffered to retain. But if England
and France, under pretext of watching the Danube, were
to send a force into the Black Sea to protect Turkey and
keep Russia in check, then we should simply be continuing
the present system; which effectually secures both these ob-
jects, but which system we are on every account desirous to
put an end to.

Count Bupl's next proposal, that Turkey should call in as
many foreign ships of war as she thought necessary, whenever
she found herself menaced, appeared to me, I said, even more
objectionable; for it would impose upon the Western Powers
the duties of perpetual police, while it would relieve Turkey
from the care of providing for her own protection, as she
would consider that she had acquired a right by treaty to
call upon England and France for aid whenever she thought
herself in danger, without reference to the cost and inconve-
nience to them or to the distance at which their fleets might
happen to be stationed. As Count Buol, however, abandoned
the notion of limiting the naval force of Russia, and conse-
quently of preventing its indefinite augmentation, Turkey
would always be in danger, and consequently would always
consider herself menoced.

But what was.the meaning, I asked, of this right .to call
upon foreign Powers ? Surely it could not be intended to
uphold the independence of the Ottoman empire by a stipu-
lation which made its existence dependent upon foreign as-
sistance ? And what were England and France to do in the
event of their obeying these calls, which might constantly be
repeated ? Why, they would have to send into the Black Sea,
on each occasion armaments as powerful as they now main-
tain there, in order to be on a footing of equality with Rus-
sia, and they must always be expecting and be prepared to
go to war with Russia.
But Russia will be mistress of her own policy and her own
actions, and will know how best to carry out her own de-
signs at the right moment.
So far from menacing Turkey, she might establish the most
friendly relations with her ; she might lull her into false se-
curity, and within three days after she had picked a quarrel
with Turkey a Russian army might be in possession of Con-
stantinople and occupied in fortifying the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles ; and while the navies of England and
France were upon a peace establishment a Russian
fleet of 27 or 30 sail of the line might suddenly issue from the
Baltic and sweep the British seas. _

The Porte would then learn, Europe would then learn, but
too late, the value of that delusive right which it is proposed
to confer on Turkey of calling in her allies at the approach of
danger. _ _ _

Yet such were the terms, I said, upon which Count Buol
seemed desirous to conclude a peace that was to be honourable
and just, that was to maintain the independence and integrity
of Turkey, and that was to furnish solid guarantees for the

future tranquillity of Europe, but I need hardly say that in
such arrangements her Majesty's Government could take no
part.
If the war went on it would be for Austria to consider her
own position, not only during its continuance after the pre-
parations she had made, the language she had held, and
the engagements she had entered into, but also at its con-
clusion when peace was made between the four belligerent
Powers. She may rest assured, however, that, even though
England and France were deprived of the immense advan-
tage of Austrian co-operation in a cause that is essentially
Austrian, they will not abandon that cause, but they will use
every means at their command, and will shrink from no sac-
rifice, to obtain their demands, which are founded on justice,
and which have the safety of Europe for their object.—l am,
c., CLARENDON.

(No. 2.)
THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
(Extract.) Foreign-office, April 3, 1855.
The Baron de Bourqueney's despatches having led the
French Government to doubt whether it was the intention of
Russia to accept the third basis in the sense in which it has
always been understood by England and France, it occurred
to M. Drouyn de l'Huys that the object in view might be
effectually attained, and that the dignity of Russia might be
better consulted, by excluding all ships of war from the
Black Sea.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys accordingly prepared a memorandum
upon the means of giving effect to the " neutralisation" of
the Black Sea, and he proposed that, with the concurrence
of her Majesty's Government, this project should be sub-
mitted to the Conference as a proof of the desire entertained
by England and France to meet any reasonable objections on
the part of Russia, and of the sincerity with which they la-
bour to bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion.
I acquainted your Lordship by telegraph on the 24th ult.
that her Majesty's Government acceded to the project of the
French Government.

The Baron de Bourqueney informed his Government that
the project had not been favourably received at Vienna, and
M. Drouyn de l'Huys, after taking the orders of the Emperor,
determined to proceen himself to Vienna for the purpose of
explaining and supporting his views, but to come in the first
instance to London in order to establish a complete under-
standing between the two Governments as to the course that
it would be expedient to pursue. M. Drouyn de l'Huys ac-
cordingly left Paris on the 29th ult., and on the following day
a meeting was held here, at which were present the French
Ambassador, M. Drouyn do l'Huys, Lord Palmerston, Lord
Lansdowne, and myself.
The questions of the neutralisation of the Black Sea
and that of the limitation of the Russian naval force in that
sea were fully discussed.
With respect to the first (neutralisation), it was agreed to
propose :-
1. That Russia and Turkey should have no ships of war in
the Black Sea, nor in the Sea of Azoff, excepting some few
small vessels, for the purpose of sea police, to prevent piracy;
and that, as regarded the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus,
an understanding should be come to with the Porte, with a
view to ascertain whether the Porte would not be willing to
include those waters in the arrangement if it should be neces-
sary to do so, in order to obtain the consent of Russia to the
application of the principle of neutrality to the Black Sea and
to the Sea of Azoff.
2. That the ports of the two Powers in the Black Sea and
the Sea of Azoff should be solely commercial ports.
3. That foreign Powers should be allowed to have consuls
in those ports. -

4. That there should be no menacing assemblage of troops
by either Power on the shores of the Black Sea.
5. That the allied Powers (England, France, and Austria)
should have the right to send their naval forces into the
Black Sea if the provisions of the treaty should be violated.
6. That the two Powers (Russia and Turkey) should have
the right to maintain a fixed number of light vessels for the
police of the Black Sea, and unarmed transports exclusively
adapted for the conveyance of troops.
With respect to the second question, viz., the limitation of
the naval force of Russia-, it was agreed to propose :
, 1. That Russia and Turkey ahould each of them maiztakt

'n the Black Sea, and ia the Sea of A.zoft,' no more than four
sail of the line and four frigates, with a proportionate number
of light vessels for the police of those seas, and of unarmed
transports exclusively adapted for the conveyance of troops,_
and that this same limitation should apply to the naval force
which Turkey should maintain in the Bosphorus and in the
Sea of Alarmdra. _ _ .

2. That Englaw], France, and Austria should each be
permitted to maintain half that number of ships in the
Black-Sea; that is to - say, two sail of the line, and two fri-
gates, and some smaller vessels for each of the three Powers
if they should think fit so to station them. Russian ships of
war not to be allowed to enter the .14s4orus, nor to pass
through the Straits into the MediterraMia4.
3. That, in case of danger to Turkey, and on tho demand of
the Porte, all the naval forces of England, France, and Aus-
tria, should be allowed to enter the Black Sea, to assist in de-
fending the Turkish empire.
4. That the contracting Powers should be allowed to have
consuls'at all the'Russian and Turkish ports in tha Black Sea
and in the Sea of .Azoff.--
It was then agreed
1. That the two systems, namely, that of the neutralisa-
tion of the Black Sea, and that of the limitation of the naval
forces of Russia and Turkey in the, Black Sea, should be
explained to Austria, and that she should be asked whether
she would adopt either the one or the other, so as to co-
operate with France and England in. proposing it to Russia,.
undertaking further to co-operate in war with France and
England if the plan so proposed should be rejected by Russia.
2d. That it should be understood tbat France and England
would prefer the system of [neutralisation if Austria should
leave the choice to England and France. .
3d. That if Austria should refuse ,to bind herself to co-
operate in war with France and England, in the event of
Russia rejecting that one of the tip' proposals which Austria.
might concur with France and England in proposing, then
France and England. should propose the plan of neutralisa-
tion, and. if it be rejected by Russ laait,..:- 4eggtiation must be
broken off. - '

I have only further to acid that her Majesty's Government
rely with confidence upon the best, efforts of your Lordship
and of Lord Westmoreland being used for carrying into ffect
the agreement which they have come to with the Government
of the Emperor of the French.

No. 3.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.—(RECEIVED
ARRIL 13.)
(Extract.) Vienna, April 10, 1855.
After the Conference yesterday M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmoreland, and I met Count
Buol and Baron Prokesch in Count Buol's official apartment.
Count Buol addressed us in a very formal manner, and told
us that he was about to explain to us fully (a fond) the policy
of the Austrian Government on the third point. Ho said that
the pan of neutralisation as developed by M. Drouyn de
Lhuys appeared to him on reflection to come within the third
point, and to attain its object very completely; that he
should have no difficulty in saying that Austria would be glad
to see it accepted. He had not, however, any hope that Rus-
sia would accept it, as she would thereby be disarmed in the
Black Sea, while Turkey would be armed in the Bosphorus,
or at all events in the Mediterranean.

He should, in like manner, be glad to see Russia consent
to limit her forces. But, looking at the concessions Russia
had made on the first and second point, and the probability
of her acquiescence in what might be settled on the fourth
point, Austria was not prepared to go to war on account of
the refusal of Russia to limit her naval force in the Black Sea.
That force had been already nearly destroyed ; what remained
was blocked up, and Russia would hereafter be afraid to give
offence to France and England, for fear of similar consequences.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered these observations very ably.
He laid it down as a principle that, the value of a treaty or
agreement of any kind is that each —irtiele, instead of being
the cause of the separate members, became the cause of the
whole ; that, without any treaty, Austria might have defended
the Principalities, and the maritime Powers have sought to
put an end to the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea ;
that the value of the treaty consisted in the union of objects
and of efforts. In this spirit France and England had defended
the free navigation of the Danube, and had Austria been
thwarted in her endeavours on that subj ect her allies would have
been prepared to continue the war in her support ; that he ex-
pected, in like manner, Austria would urge the adoption of the
third point, which was very clear and positive in its terms; that
unless she did so the alliance would lose all binding force, and
would soon crumble to pieces. He explained and defended the
plan of neutralisation, which he conceived to be beneficial to
the whole world. He, therefore, asked Count Buol very
pointedly what he would do in support of the third point,
which was essential to the conclusion of a durable peace.
Before Count Buol could answer, I requested his attention
to what I conceived to be the position of Austria. From the
first moment of Prince Menschikoffs leaving Constantinople
I had thought that, with the assistance of Austria, we might
easily defeat the designs of Russia in the East; that without
Austria we should have a long, though doubtless a victorious
contest. I remarked that there were three roads by which
Russia might reach her long-cherished object—the possession
of Constantinople ; one by Asia, the second by the Princi-
palities and Bessarabia, the third by the Black Sea ; that
the Asiatic route might be put out of consideration for the
present purpose ; that the route by the Principalities was
stopped by Austria and the Allies ; and the third route re-
mains to be considered.

Marshal Marmont had gone into this question as a military
man, and had shown how, by embarking 10,000 men with 25
sail of the line at Sebastopol, and a march of 60,000 men by
Bessarabia, Constantinople mig4be st4.ld lip Ruslist: He ar-
gued, however, that all depended on priority—this time we
had the priority, another time Russia might have it. I might
be told that Austria would intercept the invasion by land ; she
had, however, not interrupted the passage of the Danube or the
siege of Silistria, and she might be equally slow On another
occasion.

I showed that the project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as
we could not always have a large fleet at hand ; humiliating to
Turkey, if she were always to lean on France and England; un-
safe for Europe, which wouldbe kept in the perpetual ferment
of preparation for war. We had, however, examined this
plan carefully, in conformity with the desire of Austria, and
only gave it uli from being convinced of its inadequacy.
I said M. Drouyn de l'Huys had so ably explained the plan
of neutralisation that no more need be said. We were
however, ready to adopt the plan of limitation if Austria, on
its rejection, would join us in the war.
I alluded, lastly, to public opinion in England. I said we
considered this as an European cause ; and that, both as a
great European Power and from her position, Austria was
called upon to take a leading part in defence of Turkey ; that
we had made allowances for the difficulties of Austria, but we
had felt deeply that, when she was prepared for war in July
last, she had allowed division after division to be taken from
Bessarabia to the Crimea, without attempting any diversion
in our favour ; that we had still hoped, and the voices against
Austria were few. But, if new, after the treaty of the 2d of
December, Austria escaped its engagements by relying solely
on the letter of that treaty, the irritation against Austria in
England would be very great; that it would be impossible to
revive confidence, or to fasten again the parts of a cable which
had failed to hold. It was the decisive moment for an alli-
ance which, if kept together, would accomplish a great object.
After some time spent in discussion, Count Buol seemed
to me to depart from the course he had taken at first. He
no longer said that Austria was determined not to support us
in case of a rupture. He spoke of treating the third point
like the two former ; of coming to no previous resolution re-
specting war ; and of not engaging in hostilities for two ships
more or less.
. .

...,...- ..... ....,...
Another meeting for Wednesday, with the assistance of
Aali Pasha, was proposed and settled.
This has been, in my opinion, an attempt on the part of
Austria to induce the Western Powers to relinquish their pro.
posals on the third point. As such, it has entirely failed.

No. 4.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLAREND"'
(RECEIVED APRIL 15.)
12, 1855.
(Extract.)
Another meeting was held yesteVrideanynaa'tACPOlt Buol s, al
which Aali Pasha and Arif Pasha were present.
Count Buol read to us a paper which he had drawn up.
I afterwards asked him for a copy of this Paper, but he
declined to give it me, saying it had no official character, and
had not been seen by the Emperor.
The paper, however, contained the present resolution of
the Cabinet. This resolution is to hear the propositions of
the Court of St. Petersburg before committing themselves
further. It may be that the answer of the Russian. Emperor
may be so unfavourable and so peremptory that Austria will
at once concert with her allies on the mode of breaking off
the negotiations, and stating to Russia a cases bells. But it
may be that the Russian answer will admit o? further discus-
sion in Conference, with a hope of pacific settlement. The
Austrian Government declines, therefore, to give any further
pledge at the present moment.
This resolution, natural enough in itself, was based upon
very unsound reasoning. Count • Buol maintained, that in
the first draught of the four points it was stated that the
treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interest of the balance
of power, but that the plan of reducing' Russian power in
the Black Sea was an afterthought, and had been adopted
by the Austrian Government rather to please her allies than
from any conviction of its necessity ; that, while they were
ready to support the proposal in conference, they were not
prepared from personal regard to their allies to go to war
without a case of proved necessity.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys and I combated this reasoning. We
stated that the views of the French and English Governments
were no secret to Austria or to the world. Speeches in Par-
liament on the part of the English Government, official notes
published in the Moniteur on the part of the French, had
attested in the most public manner, six or eight months ago,
our apprehensions of the danger, and our estimate of the
means of providing against it. We appealed to Aali Pasha as
to the reality of the danger of an attack on the Bosphorus by
a Russian fleet and army, and he fully confirmed our views
by his own emphatic statements.
Count Buol argued that it was not necessary to make Tur-
key equal to Russia, as in the system of the balance of power
small States could preserve their independence in the neigh-
bourhood of States far superior to them in the number of
their armies und the extent of their resources.
But this was answered by pointing to the peculiar situa-
tion of the Black Sea, where Russia had kept up a great
naval force without any commerce to guard, in the presence
of no rival Power, and too evidently for purposes of aggres-
sion.
Count Buol told us he had not pressed the neutrality of
ships more or less.
could not propose war to the
the islands at the mouth of the Danube, as he was sure, if
tphiestCaotn fFe
rr
se nu
he bad done so, the Russian Minister would have broken up
ck
fe r trif oer saidtw o
I am answered that, bad Austria insisted pi the neutrality
of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, and a rupture of
the Conference had taken place, I should not have argued in
the British Parliament that this was a point which only con-
cerned Austria, but I should have represented it as the cause
of an ally; and I was sure that three-fourths of both houses
would have supported her Majesty's Government in such a
quarrel.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys observed that tour treaty of Dec. 2
was not with the Diet of Frankfort, but with Austria.
We both appealed to Austria to make the plan of neutrali-
sation or that of limitation a cases be2li, and expressed our
belief that if this was done Russia would at once give way.
Count Buol positively declined to accede to this proposal,
and maintained his former reserves.
While I consider this course as not unnatural on the part
of a Power which has hitherto kept out of the war, and is
very averse to plunge into it, I conceive the policy of such
reserve to be unwise in itself, and unjust to her allies,—
unwise, because Russia, after so many sacrifices of her pride
and military position in the Principalities to please Austria,
would nearly to a certainty give way, and thereby secure
the peace so much desired; unjust to her allies, because