The National Register.
London, England, 1811-10-06 00:00:00

SIT Isn) A V, OC rOBER 6. IQ-11.

N° 197.

POLITICAL DISQUISITION.

No. 183.

SICILY.

The present state of our relations with the
Sicilian Court, nr rather the probability of th it
being soon brought to a close, has caused a most
impor rant quostion to be started ; what line of con-
duct should Great Britain adopt towards a trea-
cherous Government (supposing its wish to deceive
should he completely proved), and a peop!e dissa-
tisfied with their fate, and desirous of improving
their condition by changing their masters ? Some
of our political writer's have strenuously contended
that we ought to settle the differences that exist
tetween the Sicilian Rulers and their subjects, and
which are lik ly to terminate, either by a civil war,
or the easy subjugation of the island by the French,
in a manner at once decisive and effective. They

advise that we should immediately take military
possession of the country, and after removing the
prcsent Sovereign, should, with the consent of the
people, establish a form of Government on tl,e
model of our own, which would call their energies
into action by reviving all their rights, and would
secure to us a most important point either for
attack or defence in the Mediterranean. These
hints thrown out before the public, through the
medium of the press, have probably given rise to
the rumour, that Lord Wm. BENTINCK was ordered
to repair instantly to Sicily, as Commander in Chief
of the British army, and to take military possession
of the island. That Lord WILLIAM has been di-
rected to return, we believe there is no doubt ; but

that he has been empowered to carry a measure so
important, and perhaps fatal in its consequences,
into effect, we think is at least premature. It may
have been contemplated as a last step, should all
others fail to recall the Court of Palermo to a sense
of its true interests, as well as of justice and duty,

but would not be resorted to, unless it had been
ascertained that our forbearance would cause the

island to be treacherously surrendered to the enemy.
Engaged, as we are, on a variety of points, with
an antagonist ready to avail himself of every feel.
ing, and every prejudice which circumstances may
awaken
,in the mind of the people of every country,
-'and•co turn therh into weapons more powerful than
Vol. /17. CICVIL

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the sword, we ought not to forget the influ.
ence which the .conduct we shall adopt t wards

Sicily will have over our Spanish and Portu-
guese Allies, and the fate of the war in the
Peninsula; nay, over our future relations with
the other Powers of Europe. It is well known,
that ever since our troops landed, bl"d, and con-
quered on the Lusitanian or Iberian fields, the at.
tention of the nemy has been directed to the means
of -checking their progress, not only by force of
arms or superiority of numbers, but by creating a
violent distrust in the minds of thos we came to
assist, of the sincerity of our motives. W.. were
artfully represented as the real invaders of Spain,
who, in the garb of Allies, and under the mask of
friendsh►p, fed the struggle that destroyed the popu-
lation and internal resources of the country, to pro-
fit afterwards by its weakness, the confidence we
had acquired, and the advantages we had gained ;
and should we succeed, wi,h the aid of the mis-
taken inhabitants, to overpower the opposition of
the French armies, to reduce the two kingdoms
into provinces of the British empire. These mis-
representations scattered wide amongst the people,
by the numerous agents of the enemy, have, it
is also well known, taken root, and notwithstanding
the proved sincerity of our disinterestat co-opera.
tion in the common cause, the SpaEi.irds have in
many occasions displayed a spirit of jealousy and
mistrust which has prevented them from reaping by
our exertions all the benefit they migl‘t have done.
Although taught by the experience of every cam-
paign, and the example of the Portuguese ; that
their armies will never be able to resist the enemy
efficiently, until they be commanded by British
Officers, impenetrable to bribery, and deeply skilled
in the art of war, they have preferred the certainty
of experiencing ruinous defeats, to entrusting more
than a temporary command in only one province
or two, to men who have achieved the most glo-
rious triumphs. Our generous disregard of this
senseless jealousy as far as it affects only our feel.
ings and pride, which %se sacrifice to the welfare of
the common cause, ought to have taught them

that their suspicions were unjust : but, since we
cannot deny their existence, it is for us to consider,
how far it would be plitic in us to stieng-hert
them, by adopting towards Sicily the very
line of conduct which the enemy has so often

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