The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-13 00:00:00

THE CONFERENCES _AT VIENNA.

The Journal deiDabats of Thursday, in an article
bearing the signature of "S. de Lacy" (a gentleman
supposed to have peculiar facilities for information),
gives the following details of the late important con-
ferences at Vienna : _

"It is known that Prince Gortschakoff declared, in
a note addressed to Count Boo! on the 28th November,
that the Emperor his master accepted the four propo-
sitions of the Cabinet of Vienna as a point of departure
for peaceful negotiation, and that Count Buol replied
on the 30th that the Emperor Francis Joseph had re-
ceived the communication with much satisfaction, and
that„ appreciating to the fullest extent the intentions
that inspired that important resolution, the Emperor
thoughts he could not respond to it on bis part better
than by hastening to communicate it to his Allies, the
Courts of Paris and London, in order to obtain a frank
and fair solution of the four points, thus recognised as
an indispensable preliminary to the re-establishment of

general peace.
" These communications resulted in the conference
held at Vienna on the 28th of December, between M.
Buol and the representatives of France and Great Bri-
tain and Prince Gortschakoff. The business of that
conference was to make known to the Russian Minister
the interpretation given by the three Courts of Paris,
London, and Vienna to the four conditions laid down
in the note of the Bth of August, and to place in his
hands a copy of the protocol or memorandum contain-
ing this interpretation. In reality, it was more espe-
cially to determine the sense and bearing of the second
and third conditions that explanations were necessary.
The second condition declared that be navigation of
the Danube should be free from all hindrance and sub-
jected to the application of principles established by the
acts of the Congress of Vienna. The third declared that
in concert by the contracting parties i view to the
the treaty of the 18th of July, 1841;:. houla be revised
pik
maintenance of the balance of Euro,, _
..„...r.m... treat, of
the 14th of July, known as the ts. s Treaty,'
re-
news the old closing of the Black Sea; By its stipula-
tions, entrance into the Black Sea is forbidden to vessels
of war of all nations. The effect was that the naval

forces of Turkey and Russia could alone navigate that
sea, whilst the navy of Russia was nee allowed to pass
from thence into the Mediterranean.]
" As far as regarded the free navigation of the mouths
of the Danube, the protocol of the 2Sth December pro-
posed the formation of a mixed commission appointed by
the five Courts, the powers and duties of which could be
arranged in the course of the negotiations. As regarded
the revision of the treaty of 1841, with a view to the
maintenance of the balance of Europe, the protocol
stated that balance to have been disturbed by the pre-
ponderance obtained by Russia, not only by the treaty
of 1841, but also by many former treaties ; all these
treaties would be atenullei. The Black Sea would be
free ; but the naval strength to be maintained or pro-
vided for there by each Power would be determined on
a principle of equality that would form a basis for future
stipulations. The protocol of the 28th December stated,
also, that there was no intention of assailing the in-
tegrity of the Russian empire, or of depriving it of any
province whatever. But the three Powers signing it
reserved to themselves the right of profiting from what-
ever advantages might result from the existing war,
whenever it was necessary to settle definitively the
strength and extent of the naval and military establish-
ments hereafter to be allowed to Russia on the coasts
of the Black Sea.
" The first of the four conditions of the note of the
Bth of August relates to the protectorate exercised by
Russia over the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia,
and Servia. This protectorate was to cease. The lan-
guage of the note of the Bth August was so precise that
the protocol of the 28th December added nothing on
that point. But the protocol was explicit on the fourth
point.
This had for its object the final abolition of the
special right of protectorate unceasingly claimed by
Russia in favour of those subjects of the Sultan profes-
sing the Greek religion. All the treaties appealed to by
Russia in support of this claim were to be annulled. For
the exclusive protection of Russia, there was to be sub-
stituted the joint protection of the Five Powers, who
would engage to respect the rights of the Ottoman Porte,
and to use their protectorate with the utmost delicacy,
so as neither to alarm its susceptibility nor weaken
its &independence. The protocol then recited the re-
cent decrees of the Sultan, whose sincerity was be-
yond doubt. The signing Powers guaranteed the main-
tenance of these decrees, so favourable to the whole of
the Christian communities, and their impartial applica-
tion.
" The reading of the protocol was followed by a
warm discussion, which produced a clearer explanation
of the advantages reserved as possibly to be derived
from the actual results of the war prior to the signing
of preliminaries. It would-not, therefore, be impossible
that the demolition of the fortress of Ismail, on the
Danube, might be required, and the construction in its
place of a neutral fortress, the property of the five
Powers, and under the guardianship of a mixed garri-
son. Possibly, also, there might be required the de-
struction of Sebastopol, with the demolition of its forts
and arsenals ; and their rebuilding might be for ever
forbidden, as would also the establishment of any naval
or military station that could threaten the independence
of Turkey. This proviso was energetically opposed by
Prince Gortechakoff, who declared that he had no power
to accept such conditions. He added that he would im-
mediately transmit the protocol or memorandum to the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and request the orders of his
Sovereign.
"The next day Prince Gortschakoff again had an in-
terview with Count Buol, and showed himself disposed
to accept a new version of the third condition, as to the
possible consequences of the war, not essentially differ-
ing
stood firm to the old rendering,
announcing that the reply would hove to be plainly and
simply in the negative or affirmative.
ou furtomßuoi, thathowever, proposed to him on the previous evening.
o
"But on the evening of the 6th inst., Prince Gorts-
cbakoff received from the Emperor Nicholas an order to
accept the protocol of the 28th without reserve, as a
basis for peaceful negotiations. On the morning of the
7th, M. Buol was informed of this resolve of the Court
of St. Petersburg, which was immediately communi-
cated to the representatives of France and Great Britain,
who met together in the evening. The Russian Minis-
ter was present at this meeting. Other conferences have
taken place since the 7th inst., and, if we are to rely on
later telegraphic despatches from Vienna, the Turkish
Ambassador has been invited to take part in them.
"We confine ourselves here to a simple narrative of
facts. Tho field
.is open to wide conjecture, but at the
present critical conjuncture of the negotiations it is
doubtless wisest to wait the course of events."

(Front the Constitutionnei.)
Has peace come to surprise Europe at the moment
when everything seemed to intimate that the war was
about to become general, and to assume vaster propor-
tions, or has the telegraph once more thrown men's
minds into a deceptive and ephemerical delusion ? In
France and in England peace ought to be easily be-
lieved in, because all are anxious for it. The Western
Powers do not, in fact, combat for any material in-
terest, or for any satisfaction of self love ; they have
taken up arms to defend the rights of an ally, and
to preserve the balance of power in Europe. They

communicated to them the answer of the Russian Minis-
ter, have given a simple refusal- to accept- it, as tlsey had
a right to treat as a refusal on the part of Russia an ac-
ceptance, which was not without reserve or limit. We
believe that Austria requested of them not to make use
of that right immediately. On one hand'it could have
been observed that the interpretation given by Russia
to the four guarantees did not differ sensibly from the
interpretation decided on amongst the three allied
powers ; and, on the other, the delay accorded to Russia
to reply had still a week to run. There consequently
did not appear to be any inconvenience for the ambas-
sadors, in place of replying by au immediate and irre-
vocable refusal to take, on the offer of Russia, the in-
structions of their courts. It is that course which was
adopted. Our letters state that the English and French
ambassadors have written to their Governments for in-
structions, and, should it bs necessary, for the necessary
powers to treat. Such are the facts, if we are well-in-
formed, and they have not the proportions which the
imagination of news-makers at once attributed to
them. They constitute merely for the policy of France
and of her allies, a great moral success. It is already
an enormous step to have brought Russia to accept
in their substance these four guarantees, in which
M. de Nesselrode had beheld the destruction of her
power and the ruin of her honour. But the question
which occupies every mind at present is to know if we
are nearer to peace. To that question only one man can
reply, and he is the Emperor Nicholas. It he be sincere,
if the declarations of his ambassador do not conceal any
duplicity, if the negotiations be asked for sincerely, and
will be carried on in' the same spirit, peace may issue
from the conferences to be perhaps opened at Vienna.
But is there not sonic snare in the offers of Prince Gort•
schakoff ? Three things authorise us to call in doubt
the sincerity of Russia ; the unexplained rapidity of a
complete change in the opinions, language, and declara•
tions of the Czar ; the evident interest of Russia to pro-
long the discord which exists at present between the
two great German Powers, and which every pacific step
on the part of Russia aggravates by furnishing to Prus-
sia the arguments which she wants ; and lastly, a deci-
sive strategical reason. The Russian Government con-
ceals as much as it can from publicity the movements of
its troops, and few persons take the trouble of following
in the map even those which come to the knowledge of
the public journals. The persons who are acquainted
with the measures taken by Russia since the signature of
the treaty of December 2, and the prospect of a
contest with Austria, will understand of what im-
portance would be the delay of a month at present
to the Czar. It may be remembered that the con-
centration of the Austrian forces in Transylvania placed
the Russian troops in so false a position that the Em-
peror Nicholas wag obliged to make up his mind to eva-
cuate the principalities. Russia now seeks to render to
Austria what she has done to her. In order not to be
taken in the rear by the large forces which Russia has
assembled in Poland, on the Pilica, and the Upper
Vistula, the Austrian army has extended its left beyond
measure, and it was found necessary to create in the
greatest haste the entrenched camps of Cracow and
Lemberg, in order to protect Gallioia. With the im-
perial guard concentrated at Warsaw, the corps of
§'iewers and Paniutine, and the reserves which are in
Livonia and Courland, Russia can in fact in a few days
throw 150,000 men into Gallicia on the road to Vienna.
The great point now is to prevent the Austrian army
which occupies the principalities, and the centre of which
is in Transylvania, from giving assistance to Gallicia,
whilst leaving some divisions to hold firm against the
Russian corps which guard Bessarabia and the banks of
the Preth. Since December 2, Russia has been snaking
every exertion to form, without stripping the Danube,
a new army to menace the Upper Dniester, and the
headquarters of which are at Kiew. These two armies,
the army of Poland, intended to be marched from the
north to the south, and the army of Podolia, intended
to be marched from the east to the west, and which
would so place between two fires the Austrian army,
are to be placed under the command of Prince Paskie-
witsch. General Hess would be obliged to provide
against both at the same time, and a battle gained or a
march concealed would open to one of the two Russian
armies the road to Vienna. What Russia wants in order
to be able to strike this grand blow is to have assembled
in Podolia sufficient forces ; she has so completely
stripped her army of the Danube to defend Sebastopol
and Odessa, that she has as yet been able to collect
around Kiew not more than 80,000 men. She requires
from 120,000 to 150,000 to act efficiently. Did she
hope, by pretending to negotiate, to gain time for the
troops which are on their march from all sides to arrive
in Podolia ? It is for better-informed persons to say."

Another article on the same subject from the
Constitutionnel says :
" The four guarantees were accompanied with reserves
which are set forth in article 1 of the treaty of Vienna
war continues in the East ; Russia has not supported a
long conflict ; she is not exhausted ; and yet, her am-
bassador, accepting the four guarantees with reserves,
,demands to take them for the bases of a treaty of
peace I What is to be thought of this war? Would
it be very solid and very durable ? If anything can
instruct us exactly as to the real intentions of Russia,
it is assuredly the despatch of M. de Nesselrode, dated
26th August, addressed to Prince Gortschalsoff: ' We
regret not to be able to act on these communications.
We believe that we have exhausted the measure of con-
cessions compatible with our honour ; and our inten-
tions seriously pacific, not having been favourably re
ceived, it only reniains to us to abandon to the even-
tualities of war the task of fixing the definitive bases
of negotiations. We will wait until equitable conditions
shall permit us to conciliate our wishes for peace with our
dignity and political interests.' It seems to us that the
veil is rent asunder by such language as this. The
Emperor Nicholas snakes known that he is not seriously
inclined for peace, unless his situation in the East be main-
tained ; and he adds that the four guarantees being con-
trary to his dignity and his policy, war alone can fix the
definitive bases of the negotiation. In good French,
does not nil that mean that the four guarantees accepted
by Prince Gortschakoff as the basis of a pacification, are,
in the eyes of Russian diplomacy, only a provisional
basis, and that the peaceable intentions at present mani-
fested by the Czar are not serious ? The least that such
declarations authorise us to say is, that every man of
sense has reasonably the right to ask himself if the offer
to negotiate peace, made by Russia, be a trick or an act
of sincerity ? Is it a trick to gain time ? Time will
not be gained ; everything marches with the same step
at Paris, London, and Vienna ; and the Czar will find
himself after as before, in presence of the same calm
and the same resolution. Is it a trick to deceive
Europe ? It will deceive no one. European loyalty
which might be surprised in 1153 by the acceptance with
the double understanding of the Vienna note, will only
receive the Muscovite propositions supported by gua-
rantees of real value. Is it an act of sincerity ? God
grant it may be ! Everybody has need of peace, and
greater need of security ; and the Czar would deserve
praise for baying resolved on justice. But oven in that
case we should be less moved by peace as a result
than as the glorification of French policy. Peace we
are sure to have in any case. We cannot understand
those who would beg for it as a concession from the
magnanimity of the Czar. Peace is the right of Europe
and the world ; accepted or imposed we shall have it ;
and when three powers like France, England, and
Austria unite to conquer it, it would require a strange
failure of mind or heart to doubt of its certain and solid
establishment. What would especially strike us, if the
offer of Russia should be sincere, would be homage ren-
dered in the face of the world to the prudence, modera-
tion, and firmness of France. When the Emperor sent
the fleet to Salamis, he was alone—alone with good
sense, equity, and courage. Three months after he had
the support of England ; four months after that of Aus-
tria ; six months after that of Prussia ; and at present
he has that of Russia. After ali the kings and all the
peoples, the Emperor Nicholas would say to Napoleon
111. :—' Sire—You are right ; your policy was from
the first moment true, moderato, loyal, in conformity
with the principles of justice, civilisation, and Christi-
anity ; founded not on personal views r private mbi-
tion, but on the interest, exactly, equitably appreci aated,
of Europe ; and the proof is that I, who am en-
lightened and subjugated by so much wisdom—l, w hoI
have my forts full of flats, my provinces of soldiers—
accept this policy in the face of God and men as the
basis of a treaty of peace.' Such is what the de-
claration of Prince Gortschakoff signifies, if the Czar be

(From the Pays.)
We assuredly ask for nothing better than to believe
in the sincerity of the pacific declarations made in the
name of the Emperor of Russia by Prince Gortschakoff.
We should salute the re-establishment of peace as one
of the most fortunate and most desirable results. We
recall to mind, with pride for the cause which the
Western Powers defend, that the existing war is only a
war of general equilibrium, and that the day on which
its political object shall be attained, and the equilibrium
of Europe be consolidated and guaranteed, none of the
Governments engaged in the conflict would wish to
prolong it. The treaty of alliance between France and
England solemnly sets forth that those two empires do
not wish to derive from the war any peculiar advan-
tage, any increase of territory, and that they only seek
for the means of assuring in future the peace of
Europe and the world by rescuing our manufacturing
nations from the eventuality of new disorders. If
peace be possible under conditions loyally accepted,
obstacles will come neither from the west, nor from
the powers which now support European interest. Are
we in such conditions I Is the question which during
the last two years has agitated modern States, and which
only yesterday was so grave and menacing, about to be
settled all at once in an unhoped.for arrangement ? Dees
the Czar, who was so proud and reluctant to treat only
two days ago, henceforth resign himself to the conces-
sions demanded by Europe, and does he accept without
reserve the law which the interest of the future obliges
the Great Powers to impose on him ? If we can believe
the numerous despatches which have reached us during
the last few days, and which we consider as exact on
the whole of not in the details, we must reply in the
affirmative to these questions. Prince Gortschakoff,
even before the expiration of the time accorded to him
by the Allied Powers, has made known to the represen-
tatives of Austria, France, and England, that 4is sove-
reign adheres in principle, with the exception of some
slight modifications of detail, to the four guarantees, and
to the interpretation given to them in the Conference of
the 2Sth December. He added that he demanded the
opening of negotiations to treat and conclude on all
points. Thus then in appearance at least Russia unex-
pectedly accepts what she declared unacceptable not a
month ago ! The four guarantees, which on the 6th Nov.
last a circular of M. de Nesselrode considered as incom-
patible with the dignity of the Czar, which Prince
Gortschakoff affirmed on the 28th December to be dia-
metrically contrary to the views of his Government, the
Czar and Cabinet of St. Petersburg new submit to in
the most sudden and most unexpected manner ! It will
be admitted that in this sudden change of Russian policy
there is something strange which explains tie general
astonishment with which the news has been received.
To this [astonishment is added involuntary but very
natural distrust. In spite of oneself the mind recall
the souvenir of what took place with respect to the
famous note of Vienna. At that epoch the most serious
men believed in the re-establishment of peace. When
the Czar adhered to the propositions of the conference
of Vienna, faith in his uprightness was general, and there
was a disposition to treat as chimeras the far-seeing ob-
jections of Turkey. The memorable circular of Vii. de
Nesselrode, by displaying the real views of Russia, tore
from all eyes the bandage which hid the truth ; Europe
was saved from a fictitious peace, from which soon
would have arisen the greatest danger and the most
redoubtable complications. Does Russian diplomacy
keep in reserve a second edition of this note in order
to bring it forward at the moment which may be con-
sidered °ppm tune. We do not know what secret
projects may be in concoction on this subject at
the Court of St. Petersburg ; but it will be admit-
ted that the past authorises the most impartial men
to be on their guard against the future. Unfortu-
nately, there are numerous reasons for distrust.
Russia, in addition to the evident interest she has to gain
time, is obliged to male all her efforts, on the one hand,
to prevent Prussia from adhering to the alliance of the
2d December, and, on the other, to prevent that alliance,
which is now simply defensive, from becoming offensive,
between Austria and the Western Powers. Negotiations
are evidently the readiest and most natural means of sus-
pending, in this respect, definitive resolutions, and per-
haps of causing them to fail ? But nevertheless, as re-
gards this case also, the past contains precious lessons.
Prussia, with her admitted sympathy for the cause of the
Czar, may allow herself to be dominated by this falla-
cious pretext. But the intelligent loyalty of Austria
will not fall into such a manifest snare, and as to the
Western Powers, if they frankly accept the negotiations
proposed to them, if they wish to prove that they do not
reject any occasion of reestablishing peace, if they offer
to Russia the possibility of proving in a striking way the
sincerity of her pacific declarations, they will not lay
aside their arms, which protect theindependence and the
interests of Europe. The heroic conflict of which the
Crimea is the theatre will not be imprudently interrupted,
at the risk of giving to Russia the time of accumulating
on this point new forces and new elements of resistance.
It is not the first time that great military operations and

_ .
pacific nezetiations have been carried on at the same
time. We are of th oafs who think that the events of the
field •f battle are the most decisive arguments for the
deliberations of Plenipotentiaries and the drawing up of
protocols !"