The National Register.
London, England, 1811-06-30 00:00:00

SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 1811.

01,ITIC4L DISC,

No. 169.

,
SPAIN.

It is impossible to look at the present tittiation of
rmies in the South of the Peninsula, without
feeling a deep conviction, that the fate of ;he war
will speedily be decided in the neighbotzrhood of
Badajos. Indeed this fortress is become the key of
Estremadura, without which we cannot attempt to
penetrate into that. province, and deprived of which,
the enemy, in the reduced .state of their troops in
Spain, cannot resist our progress. As long as the
attention of our whole army was occupied, either on
the, not them frontiers of Portugal, or in its ;wrench-
mc nts before Lisbon, by the force under IIIAS.SEN3
before it had experienced any considerable reduc-
tion, the possession of Badajos was not of s•) much
importance to the French as it bas now become.

They wanted, then, no fortress to protect the
freintierS. of the South of Spain, which were threat-
el*bi tr vnemnr.,"luld'ltlie.caliettre -rsf-Dtteijiis only
became advantageous or necessary when, in order to
effect a diversion in favour of MASSE` A, SOUIIT in-
vaded:the Alentejo. The late events •of the war
have. produied a total change. The flight of the
grand French- army out of Portugal, and its defeat
at -Duas Casas, compelled &MA' to retrace his
steps; at the same time it enabled Lord WELLING.-
TON to divide his troops, and to form in the South a
force sufficient to act on the offensive. Threatened
in his .turn, SOULT retreated into Estremadura,
and Badajos became the shield of that Province.
Conscious of its increased importance, the French
Commander provided it With a strong garrison,
in order that it might check our advance, ivhilst he
should collect reinforcements and form an army nu.
therous enough to meet airs on the field, and to give
the French arms= opportunity ofrecovring the glory
and fame they had lost. Albuera witnessed the migh-
tsf conflict, and the completo defeat of his best troops
and his intentions. Yet he knew the object was too
important to be abandoned without a second struggle.
He knew that if l3adajos was suffered to fall, our
army, reinforced from the main body in the ncrth,
would rapidly advance towards Seville. He fore-
saw that in that case the siege of Cadiz must be
raised, and the kingdom of Grenada
Pol. IV. CL241:X,117

perceived that these

lutely nececessary, would only serve to create new
difficulties and dangers ; for the raising" of the siege,
of Cadiz must be attended by the invision of An:
dalusia by our troops and the Spaniards in that
quarter ; and the evacuation of the kingdom of
Grenada by an immediate insurrection of the people.
At the same time it was evident that if Vicron re:.
mained before Cadiz and our army proceeded to-
Seville, Sotwr would be too weak to defend that
city, and would be compelled to fall back upon the
capital, thus leaving VicTott and the troops in Gre-
nada cut off from any communication with Madrid*
or with France, and reduced either to force back
their way through superior numbers, at the same.
time maintaining an incessant contest in the rear
or like General DUPONT to surrender prisoners of
war. In order, if possible, to avert these threaten-
ing perils, SOULT, it now appeal-s, has collected
reinforcements from every quat ter whence troops
could be detnched, without so far' %veal:ening WO
garrisons, to which they tikOnged, as; to encourage
the people to take up arms. He has also beerr
joined by some battalions horn MiteSENA'S army,
and at the head of a force, fully equal, if not su-
perior, to that • under Lord WELLINC-rox's co:v.
mand, is now advancing a second time to attempt
the relief of Badajos, and by our overthrow, to
secure the possession of the South of Spahr, which
now entirely depends On the issue of the next battle.
For should he meet with a fresh defeat,
,it woula
be impossible for him to delay any longer the sur-
render of Badajos; and all the dangers which we
have already enumerated 'kvould cease to be pro
spective. They would to upon him, and th 6
other French divisions in the South of the ?enin.-
sula with even greater effect than before as theit
weight would be encreased by his new disasterso
and his ability to resist them proportionably 414114
niched. Once driven froth the Smith of Spain, the
French would invainattempt to Maintain themselves
in the capital. Their losses, which mtist then t onsist.
not Only of the men killed, Wounded, or taken pri-
soners on the field, but of the whole of Arivrtnt's
divisions; would be too great to be speedily repaired*
whilst the impulse given to the hatiottal mind would
create fresh armies in those provinces still occupied
by the enfeebled enemy,- and ere the artiVals
if they could be frintiml?

.

.
evacuate 1111 W, litlireelli.satio
9". •
4.- -. :,- • : . --' --.
za • ..irl . . • . •:-.
...:.v •
. , • .
' 11-:, •t - -.4:-1-• _
... h
.....„ ,
1/442,_•,.7