The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-12 00:00:00

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

With reference to the negotiations at Vienna,
the Inclependance, Beige, a journal notorious for its
Russian leanings, remarks :—" It would seem that
the negotiations about to open are not to interrupt
the progress of hostilitieS in the Crimea. On the
contrary, the Western Powers appear determined to
push them with increased vigour ; and this, in our
opinion, constitutes the danger of the situation; this
is the circumstance most likely to compromise the
result of these negotiations." It scarcely required
this acknowledgment from a Russian organ to con-
vince the public of the wisdom of the resolution
adopted by the Western Powers not to intermit for
a moment their warlike operations in the Crimea.
The charge of squadrons and thunder of artillery in
front of Sebastopol will not be heard at Vienna; the
delicate nerves of the diplomatists assembled in
that capital will not be disturbed by the din of war,
or their deliberations interrupted. But the Russian
Minister will have a powerful motive for cutting
short his rigmarole speeches and protocols, when he
knows that every minute he spins outby them
enables the Allies to work additional havoc in the
Muscovite ranks. The Russian Government and
its partisans flattered themselves that they had
gained an important point when they once more
entangled France and England in negotiations ;
but their hopes begin to abate since they have seen
that these powers can fight and negotiate at the
same time. Undoubtedly their resolution so to do
" constitutes the danger of the situation ;" but the
danger is all for Russia, not for the cause of na-
tional independence and European tranquillity.
The groan wrung from the Russian organ in the
Belgian press, by the bellicose propensities of the
Western Powers, betrays the arriere-pensie with
which Russia has consented to entertain proposals
for peace on the basis of the Four Points. Russia
still hopes to gain back by diplomacy what it has
lost by arms. There is only one way of meeting
and foiling its finesse ; and that is to propose, in
brief and explicit terms, such conditions of peace
as will give lasting security to Europe against Mus-
covite aggression, and to call upon the Russian
Government to accept or decline them without
Niggling or chaffering. The Czar ought to be told
in plain unequivocal language—" Remonstrance is
in vain ; you must do so and so, or the war goes
on." On this head the weighty words with which
an article on " The Conduct of the War," in the
new number of the Quarterly Review, is wound up,
will be endorsed by the great body of the nation :
" Just as these sheets were being printed off, we received
the intelligence that Russia had accepted the Four Points.
If our article had been written with a knowledge of this
circumstance, we should have endeavoured to enforce the
same views wo have already expressed, and should not the
less have urged the propriety of some change in the Cabi-
net. We believe indeed that there will be greater need
than ever for vigilance and firmness. Wo dread the diplo-
macy of Russia mere than her arms. We are apprehensive
that her submission is a device for detaching Austria from
the alliance, and for paralysing our preparations for the
next campaign. Hostilities, it is affirmed, are not to be
interrupted ; but we are alarmed lest the Government
should repeat their former errors, and, lulled into false
security by the negotiations, should relax in their efforts
to provide armaments against the spring. Any such sus-
pension in our efforts would be the height of folly and false
economy. The mere pecuniary cost of preparing for war
is vastly less than that of war itself, and should Russia
really yield to our demands, it will only be because wo
hold ourselves in readiness to exact what she refuses. In
igaorau,:e of the guarantees that will be asked of her, and
the amount of the indemnity which will be required for
the expenditure we have incurred, we can give no opinion
upon the conditions of peace proposed by our ministers.
We trusted them to provide for the contingencies of war,
and found ourselves deceived. If, taking advantage of the
secresy with which the negotiations must be conducted,
they should again disappoint the reasonable expectations
of the public, and assent to inadequate terms, they will
not, we venture to predict, be able to withstand the storm
of reprobation which is justly due to men who, through
weakness and incapacity, have betrayed their country."
In this warning one important condition to be
exacted from the Czar is touched upon—" the
amount of the indemnity which will be required for
the expenditure we have incurred." It is not to be
endured that the people of France and England
should ultimately pay the expenses of a war forced
upon them by the arrogant injustice of the Russian
Autocrat. Compelling him to refund our outlay out
of his own exchequer will be an act of simple jus-
tice, and at the same time our best guarantee
against a repetition of the offence. To allow him
to escape without this mulct would be, on the part
of our Government, false generosity. It would be
to affect being generous at the expense of their
own people. It would bo to fine the innocent
and let the criminal escape scot-free. Russia
ought, by every principle of law and equity, ulti-
timately to bear the whole expenses of the war.
The cession of the Crimea is as much a sine qua non
as the payment of an indemnity by Russia ; and
the cession of the Aland Isles as the cession of the
Crimea. It is taking too narrow a view of the
causes and objects of the war to confine our at-
tention exclusively to the diminution of the
power of Russia in the Black Sea. England, at
least, has a more direct and immediate interest
in the diminution of the power of Russia in the
Baltic. We have a trade to make in the Euxine,
but we have a trade to lose in the Baltic. Had
not the breaking out of the war cut short the
operations required to effect that purpose, Bomar-
sund would have been made as formidable a fortress
as Sebastopol ; and assuredly it will be made so,
if Russia is allowed to retain possession of it. Were
Bomarsund made the Sebastopol of the Baltic, it
would constantly threaten Stockholm in exactly
the same way that the latter does Constantinople.
Sebastopol, with a strong Russian fleet, made for a
time a Russian lake of the Black Sea ; Bomarsund,
with a strong Russian fleet, would in like manner
make a Russian lake of the Baltic. These pen
feathers—the Aland Isles and the Crimea—must
be plucked from the northern and southern wings
of the Russian eagle, or that insatiate bird of prey
will soon be flying about again, as mischievous and
as great a nuisance as ever. We do not say that
the three conditions we have enumerated above
are all that can or ought to be extracted from
Russia, but our Government should be satisfied
with nothing short of them.—Daily News.