The Sun.
London, England, 1855-08-24 00:00:00

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.

Sir,—Last year the Admiralty thaught proper to cast
reflections on me because I did not attack Sweaborg in
the .latter end of last October. I felt, indignant at such
reflections, and replied as a British admiral ought to do.
This led to an angry correspondence, and subsequently
to my being deprived of the command of the Baltic Fleet.
I demanded inquiry on my conduct, which was refused.
I annealed to the Cabinet, and received no reply; and,
finally, to the House of Commons. The papers were re-
fused, under the plea that it would be injurious to her
Majesty's service.
As Sweabhrg has now been bombarded that plea is at
an end, and the time is come to tell the' "reason why" it
was not attacked last year.
After the capture of Bomarsunal; Sweaborg was again
examined, and it was the opinion of the French marshal,
the 'admirals,' and myself, that we had not the proper
means to attack so formidable a fortress—we had neither
gun -or mortar' vessels—aud that the season of the year was
much teo advanced.
General Jones was of opinion that by landing 5,000 men
on the island of Bak-Holmen, thro.virig up works, and
then nicking a simultaneous attack with the fleet, it might
be realaced in seven or eight days. This plan was unani-
tllol.l9ly rejected. General Niel Was of opinion that it
mighr. be knocked down in a couple of hours by seven or
eight sail of the line. but he added that it would be an
operation tree hardi, that such an operation had never
been attempted, and it was not his province to recom-
mend it.
These opinions were sent home ' • the people of England
were not satisfied, and I was instructed by the Admiralty
to bold a council of war, to inquire whether any further
operations could be attempted.
The French marshal and his army were gone; the
council was therefore limited to the Allied admirals, who
replied that no further operations' could be attempted at
that season of the year,• and withtheaneanf at our dis-
posal.
Before this rcport was received, another order was sent
out to exam G examine General Jones's p au ; the French marshal
being gone, the council was not held.
Alew days afr er came a third order to assemble a coun-
cil of war to examine General Niel's plan. •
The French adaniralswas justly indignant at being again
called upon, even before the first report had arrived, and
declined attending. The council was in consequence
limited to the British almira,,, and they reported that
they saw no reason to change their opinions.
Shortly after this, the French admiral received orders
to withdraw the French fleet from the Gulf of Finland,
which order was communicated to the English Govern-
ment on the Ist of September. On the ISth the French
fleet sailed, anal I proceeded to Nargen, that I might again
examine Sweaborg, and see if there was the smallest pro-
babi ity of making a successful attack on it without corn-
prorni4ing the safety of the fleet.
Up to this time things had gone on smoothly anon gh
with the Admiralty. I received nothing but praise and
approval of any conduct., except in one instance, that I was
checked for leaving Wing° Sound, their lordships having
forgot that they had directed me to follow Lord Claren-
don's orders, which I had done.
. Sir James Graham's praises were also fulsome to a de-
gre, but when he saw the people were becoming dissatis-
fied, he began to cast about and see who he could blame,
and his "My dear Sir Charles" was turned into "My
dear Admiral." I guessed what was coming, but, I cer-
tainly did not expect the treachery I experienced, and
though he returned to " My dear Sir Charles," I saw he
was no longer to be trusted. _

On the 26th of September I went off Sweaborg in the
Lightning, piloted by Captain Sulivan,,thrJugh an intri-
cate passage of sunken rocks, little more than a quarter of
a mile wire, and stopped abreast of Golearn Island, about
two miles south of Gustavus' fe'worcl.
The sunken rocks are shown in the small Russian charts
only. From this position the fortress appears like bat-
teries perched one on the other, pointing towards the sea,
On the southern face of Gustavus' Sword and Vargen 77
guns cover the approach of J. fleet from the southward, be-
sides, 29 guns on three battetieSntßA-Holinen. The three-
decker lies on the entrance of the passage' between Bak-
Holinen and Gustavus' Sword, and her broadside also
covers the approach from the south.
We could not. get a view of the western defences, and I
think General Niel, having only seen the western part of
the fortifications for a short time, and at a greater dis-
tance, was rather hasty in giving an opinion that eight or
ten sail of the line would lay it in ruins in two hours.
There was not time to find a passage through the rocks,
to enable us to see she western face, at the northern end of
which a'.ins-of-battle ship was placed to cover, the entrance
by Laugholin, and another at bend to support her. In my
former report. I agreed with Captain Washington that the
fleet could lay in Aliolo Roads in the summer. It is now
more difficult, as
.batteries have been built on the south
point of Sundhainu, but they could be destroyed.
I wrote to the Admiralty to say, if Sweaborg was at-
tacked by a fleet alone, they would approach from the
south in one line, raked by 160 guns ; one or two of the
leading ships would anchor and occupy the batteries at
Bak Hohnen the next would pass on, fire a broadside into
the three-decker, and anchor clear of her broadside against
the south-nest angle of Gustavus' Sword ; she would be
followed by the next, pouring a broadside into the three-
decker, and anchor ahead of her leader, and so on in suc-
cession as glose as the ships could lay. By this time the
three decker would probably be sunk, and the whole west-
ern face of Sweaborg engaged.
A small squadron would be required to anchor south of
Langhobn. They would have to contend against it, and
two or three line-of-battle ships, and what guns were in
Helsingfors.
All the passages should be buoyed, and small steamers
stationed in the narrowest and most dangerous channels.
The large steamers should be under weigh in various direc-
tions, to assist ships in difficulties; and a reserved squad-
ron ready to Wee the place of disabled ships.
Whether. this attack would succeed or not it is impos-
sible to say, for we must calculate on ships being set on
fire by red-hot shot and shells, of which there would be
abundagice; and whether successful or not, it is evident
the ships would be in no eonditicn to meet the Russian
fleet afterwards ; and if the attack.was..maKle at this season
of the year, when you cannot depend ou the weather for
two hours, I do not know how many would be lost. I
begged their lordships not to suppose for a moment that
Sweaborg could not be attacked, for I thought it could,
but it must be with caution and judgment.
I went on to say that I had little to add to the report I
sent to Sir James Graham, a copy of which I sent to the
Admiralty, and a copy of which I send to you, sir.*
Since that report an attack has become easier ; we have
now Lancaster guns—every ship in the fleet should be fur-
nished with them ; 13-inch mortars should be placed on
Laugholin Island and Vargo Rocks. The French occupied
one of these positions ; five mortars wore damaged, two
burst: Why the English did not occupy another island is
not stated. Again, gun-boats carrying Laucaster guns
should be added to the fleet ; they should be placed at
different paints, at proper distances from the fortifications,
well furnished with shot, shells, and rockets, and a bom-
bardment commenced, and continued till the wooden
buildings, of which there are many were set on fire, and
an 'evident impression made on thei fortress—the ships
should then cleme up and finish the work.
How long this would take I could not say, but I was
quite certain the fortress would be laid iu ruins, and most
probably an entrance opened to the ships.
I have sti 1 nothing about.troops, but there is no doubt
they could be usefully employed.
It will be seen by what I have written and by Admiral
Dancing's despatch, had my plan been followed up to the
letter, Sweaborg would have been annihilated.
It appears the Allies had only 43 gun and mortar
boats, and many mortars have been disabled. They ought
at least to have had 100. Sir James Graham, in a letter
to me, said 200.

Had that number been there the bombardment would
have been confirmed by means of reliefs, as men are re-
liever] iu the trenches. The mortars would have had time
to cool, and the bombardment continued till not one stone
was left on another, and an opining made for the ships to
go in and finish the work.
Instead of that the. Admiralty do not seem to have
foreseen that mortars could not stand for ever, though
they must have had reports from Sebastopol, and thus an
operation, which appears to have, been managed with great
judgment, has only met with partial success, for Admiral
Duudas in his report admits the sea defences were little
injured.
We appear to have suffered little or nothing either in
men or ships, and bad Admiral Dundas's means been
greater, he might have continued the bombardment as
long as the weather remained fine, and the fleets, instead
of returning to Nargen, might have been at anchor in
Sweaborg.
The first year there might have been some excuse for
the Admiralty not having means, but none the second.
They received my report early enough, and if there was
not time to build gun and mortar boats, there were plenty
of vessels in the river fit to be converted, and plenty of
money in the Exchequer—they had only to ask, and the
whole country would have given it y acclamation. In-
stead of building gun and mortar boats, they built a par-
cel of iron floating batteries, which could hardly swim,and
if they could they would have been useless, for had they
been placed within 400 yards of Sweaborg they would have
been annihilated, and at 800 yards they would have done
no harm.
The first experiment on iron cost the country a million ;
and where are they? The second experiment not much
less than half a million ; and they have not left our ports,
and probably never will. When will the country be tired
of giving money to incapable men?
The Ministers have been driven to reform the War De-
partment—
when will they think of reforming the Admi-

* To SIR JAMES GRAIlAM.—Report, June 12, 1854.—Th0
only successful manner of attacking Sweaborg that I can see,
after the most mature consideration, assisted by Admiral
Chads, who is a practical man and knows more about gunnery
than any man iu the service, is by fitting out a great number
of gun-bJats, orrying one gun with a long range, and placing
them west of Sweaborg and south of Helsingfors. Every shell
and perhaps not five per
effect. Back them by the
fromoeot. themfrom
the
eu
el do e tme
yl
would
w takehere
fleet to relieve the men, and in the course of the summer
Sweaborg would be reduced to ashes, and Helsingfors also, if
it was thought proper. And I don't see why we are to be
mealy-mouthed about it in time .of war. The ships you"
will see could not be destroyed, because they could move out
of the way.
I was at the siege of Martinique many years ago. We could
not batter Fort Bourbon, as it lay higher than the ground
around it ; but 50 mortars in three weeks plunging their shells
into it made it surrender ; and whether mortars aro placed on
shore or in gun-boats is quite immaterial ; indeed the latter
have the advanta4e, for when the shops begin to tell, and
one's blood begins to warm, the ships w.'uld move up to the
batteries, and close quarters would finish what the mortar
boats began. I sent you home, I think, copies of all the
plans, and if you will lay them before the engineer and artil-
lery officers, .1 will be bound for it they will agree with me,
that it is the only way to destroy Sweaborg without an army
superior to the Emperor of Russia's, which we are not likely
to bring into the field. It is too late this year, but be all pre-
pared next, now we know the anchorage, and begin early,
I forgot to say that the islands within range may all be put
in requisition for 13-inch mortars. The expenses would be
very great, no doubt; but if we are to bring the war to a
conclusion espouses must not be thought about,