The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-17 00:00:00

TIM EXPEDITION TO TILE EJST:

"(he Mo2:iteur of yesterday contains the pro-
mised second article on the expedition to the East.
It is as follows :

-- -- -- ----- - - -
" IL
" POLITICAL PART.
" After having told the country the whole truth on
the plan of the campaign and on the expedition to the
East, it remains for us to state bow policy understood
its task, its duty, the honour of France, and the inte-
rests of Eurepei. What were"the general causes of the
war ? For what interests were France and England to
carry their miiitary and naval forces en far from their
'wn shores ? On what point do the different States of
Europe touch upon this question of, European order?
What is the object which ought to be kept in view for
the interests of all ? How are the four guarantees to be
understood and' accepted on either side as a basis fur
neeotiatiOn ? Is it just, is' it useful, to limit the power
of Russia in the Black Sea ? What will be the results
of the Vienna Conferences, for peace or for war? That
is what we wish to examine in the second part of this
task, that, on the eve of the decisive solution now under
achievement public opinion, completely enlightened, may
accept with equal confidence peace, if it is possible—
ever, if it is necessary.
"The commencement of this great struggle is known;
it originated in a small claim brought against Turkey on
the ground of concessions she had granted in favour of
the Latins in the Holy Land. Russia only wanted a
.pietext. For her the tomb of Christ was only a stepping
stone to power. But that sacred stone could not become
a stumbling-block for the peace of the world. The Go-
vernment of the Emperor of the ,French,
sby regulating
that ,question in the most equitable manner, forced the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg to unmask its real thoughts.
Every one at once discovered that Russia had only
originated the discussion to open the Bosphorus to her
sovereignty. Tlie forced interpretation which she drew
froth the treaty of Baiiiasrdji was, in fact, nothing else
than the moral fall of the: Sultan. The questien then
ceased to be a religious one—it became a political one.
The whole of Europe found itself engaged in it. It be-
came necessary to make it understand its interests, de-
fend its rights, and show its strength.
" All the efforts of the French Government were
direct to that result. England, deceived at first by the
ous characr of the question, very soon
pretendedunsto withedrig,lin
her clear aed etraighttoreard common
sense, its real bearing. She felt, like us, the threat and
at rogance ot that dominetiou, and her band was stretched
forth to meet ours, already extended to seal the alliance
Ibetween the two great countries who represent the civi-
lisation of the West.
''.For France, as for England, the Eastern question
represented an interest superior to that of their own
ambition. Russia wished to dominate at Cemstantinople.
It was' neces•ary to prevent it. Russia, mistress of the
Black Sea, having only to extend her hand to touch the
Bosphorus. platted the Meditekranean under the
menace of the fleets of Sebastopol. In advancing to-
wards the Dardanelles she brought her frontiers to the
shores of the Mediterranean. Wherever her vessels
could reach her preponderance was assured. From her in-
accessible ports she touched all empire iaed all kingdoms.
Not only had France and England a jive!, not only
did Germany bend beneath the weight of the Colossus
that leant upon her, but Greece, Italy, Spain, Egypt,
and all the secondary States, found themselves struck
be the same blew in their security and independence.
Strange circumstance ! Europe had shut its eyes to this
invasion ot the north. In 1828 France and England,
burning the Turkish •flcet at Navarino, destroyed the
force which protected the west. At that period we
sought an ally at St. Petersburg, instead of beholding
there an adversary of our influence and of our civilise
Lion. In 1840 England, Prussia, and Austria, leaving
aside the Cabinet of the. Tuileries, Again united them-
selves without suspicion. Sehastopol, closed to every
investigation, hiding in its inaccessible port the activity
of its dockyards arid arsenals, did not appear to any
one as a menace. It was forgotten that as far back as
1805 a fleet left that point with 12,000 men on board,
landed them in Italy, and brought the Russians and
French in contact in the Mediterranean. Yet that was
a warning worthy of record, fer it proved that Russia
from the creeks of the Euxine, by the domination of
the Straits, could reach to the entrance of the Adriatic.
" Some years later Russia, having to struggle against
France united to Austria, difieed her invading policy
much more precisely by the object she pursued and by
the means which she employed. The plan of that policy
is a revelation in itself. We borrow it from an authen-
tic document recently published in the memoirs of a
statesman, Admiral Tichakoff, to Whom the Emperor
Alexander gave the following instructions under date of
April 19, 1812 :
" ' The astute conduct of Austria, which has just allied
itself with France, obliges Russia to employ every weans
in its power to ,;iscovcert the hostile intentions of those
two Powers. The most important is to turn to our account
the military genius ot the Slavonic•people ae Servia, Bos-
nia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Illyria, who,
once armed and under military organisation, would co
operate powerfully with our operations. The Hungarians,
dissatisfied with the proceedings of their actual Govern-
ment, offer to us also an excellent means for alarming Aus-
tria, for making a diversion to her hostile ideas, and, don-
sequently,,for weakening her resources. ' All these tribes
united to our regular troupe would form a very imposing
militia, not only to provi.ie against the hostile intentions
of Austria, but. to effect a mcrked diversion upon the right
wing of the French possessions, and to give us a sure means
of striking It-blow in the direction of Nissa or Sophia. The
'object of the diversion against France must be to occupy
1 Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and to direct their militia upon
Ithe meet important points of the Adriatic, more especially
ou Trieste, Fiume, Boccarli Cattare, so as to est dalish.
there, aceordiug to opportunity, relations with the English
fleet, and to wake every effort to fan into a if me the dis-
content in the Tyrol and SiVitzerland, and to act in com-
mon with those brave eopulatiuns, dissatisfied with their
actual Government. You • must' employ every possible
means to exalt the Slave ,populations, to bring them to
serve our 'object. For examp'e, you can promise them in-
dependence, the erection of a Slave kingdom, pecuniary
rewards for the most influential men among them, decora-
tions and suitable titles for the chiefs and troops. Finally,
you may add to those means ally other you may deem ex-
pedient to gain them over most conformable to actual cir-
cumstances.'
" Such were the views of Russia as far back as 1812,
not only against France, but against Austria. This in-
cendiary plait could not iral,e left the archives of St.
Petersburg at a mot.) fitting moment to show to Europe,
and especially to the Cabinet of Vienna, the immense
interest that every one must have to put finally a bar-
rier to a policy which completely jastille43, by its meatis
and objects, the. foresight of the Emperor Napoleon I.
li the heirs of Peter the Great should ever dominate at
Conetantinople by the Black Sea, Aintria, surrounded,
embraced on 'all sides by the powerful arm of Russia,
would be at the 'mercy of an enterprise such as the
daring mind of the Enip.ror Alexander bad conceived.
Hungary, open to its action by the Danube, would be
given up to all the excitements of its remembrances.
Tire Adriatic exposed to 'the brusque attace of a Slave
coa'itein, would cease to be the ilialt amid bulwark of
tie Austrlete empire, and the key of the Gulf et Trieste
would pass by a surprise from Vienna to St. Petersburg.
"There i', therefore, nothing more legitimate, more
neceeeaey, aid int re just before God and universal con-
science than this resistance, of wbich the two naval
Governments of the West gave the signal in the month
of April, 1854. England and France crew the ewer.' in
the cause of every other State. Their armies and fleets
wi re•the avant-gardes of Europe. Having the honour
of arriving first, on the theatre of war they had the right
to expect they would be followed there, and they confi-
dently awaited Austria and Prussia at this r,ndezvous
of the equilibrium and of the independence of European
order,

"Austria and Prussia did not hesitate to place them-
selves in the solidarity of the interests for the defence of
which France and England were about to fight. • In the
protocols signed at Vienua they recognised the rights of
Turkey ; they rejected the advances of the Cz:ir, who, not
daring to ask their support, cur fined ilimeell t i prapose to
them resignation and neutrality ; they'united tht:inmelees
by a trety fir the guar..aitee of Gernan interests ;
they placed ther arrnis me a war I,otiiiv, ;JO they
inv it..sd ,the • German Confederation to foli..w t heir e:-
ample ; lint, while preparitg themselves for action, t`:e
two great German Powers hesitateif ta act. It was lea
courage 'Aid) they wanted—for Goveretnentaaat have
the respeesihility of the honour and welfare et tin it
country at tiesit are rever deficient in that ; what they.
,v anted ,ra.t cotitiderice. oe-iiiterested in the can=es of
the war, they w etc uncertain of its ajoci. It was that
object which it was nee essar,.- to do tine, so as t J lave
thee„ no cause f',r lie-at ttioe or distrust.
"The Enip.rer, in opening the legislative session of
1?54, ,aid in his sue-ch :
•" Ettiope is aware beyond a doubt that if France draws
the sword it is because she is compelled to do so. It
knows that France has no idea of teg.ranelisement. She
only wishes to tesi-t dor "erous outbursts ; and I am proud
openly to declare that the tio.e vf eonqueas is irrevocably
past, for it is not by extending the limits of its ter, itmy,
that a nation can henceforth become honoured and power-
ful; it is by placing itself at the head of generous ideas,
• by uniking everywhere to prevail the empire of right and
justice.'
"That solemn declaration left no doubt upon the cha-
racter of the war ; it allowed no distrust of the inten-
tions of the Gwiernments of France and England. Thus,
.when Germany had the question put to us how far we
intended to go, it Was easy fir M. Lrouyn de Lhuysi, if
concert with Lord Ulu endon, to reply in the name of
the Emperor in his memorable note to M. de BituI"::
itey,•in fintrimatitig the general conditions o"o".est'oral
the allied Puwets would consent to treat for the t ,
i.
tiun of peace. • Those conditions comprisaeraltts) "'
vehtionally understood by the ' Four
exchanged be 7
and, while notes and counterrm
" Germany, however.
P tcee.rst.urg, waicentinoo
tween Viebri,Berin, arid S'._rtimea ; France and Erg-
and deve:oped itself in the U
fbr the cotrantil cau,•e,
won I J no:
,:,.g.r.van 0 to a decision,
laud low.ht before' Sebaste.po;
and they lavished t ,
Finally 9ustria asked us if we
tood or the independence and
the bases of the four
would mill consent to. . ,
was long in the councils of
' The hesitation
equilibrium el Eureh;ei
guarantees. 11,
,s,,as It appeared to them that, alter
the two Alik" fforts' ant''
such sad sacrifices, after h ,'
ierbeat up
as
eitlch .'l°l.lP"'e. t Alma and r t Tpi 11.‘ lng
:d two victories, a _ . ,
ierman,
when
grained .
were i„„iaene.t. Sebastopol, and
guile armies % when their
Black Aea they had
fleets occupied the . ,the right to exact
But the interest. of an alliance with Austria f Word.
as for war overruled the inspirationof fur
F, face tho-ze levit -
ra Ate exactions. The treaty of the aof - 1
December was
the result of that policy.
"It was, therefore, from - • •
consideration to u n A q •
a,
from the desire of au offensive
with her, and to dive to Germany and defensive alaance
of moderation, that we a an unequivocal proof.
accepted the overture of negotia-
tions on the basis of the . four guarantees, reserving to
right of introducing therein any
other condition that
night result from the chances of war.
`a Oil the •
part of tbe Allied Governments, this act of
moderation cost nothing t,) their dignity, nor to the in-

terests which they defend ; for, had it been se, they never
would have given their consent, In fact, there was but
one of two things possible ; those negotiations would
succeed or would fail. If successful, Europe, by the
four guarantees, obtained conditions which, four months
previously, Count Nesselrode declared he could only ac-
cept after ten years of disastrous warfare ; if a failure,
Austria, whose alliance become an offensive one, en-
tered into armed action, and the weight of her sword
would soon obtain by war what her influence could not
effect in the Cobferences.— . .

"Thus, in either case, it was well to negotiate at
Vienna, while continuing all the same to fight in the
Crimea. '
"As regards the conditions of peace, nothing can be
more just, more moderate, more conformable to the
rights and interests of Europe. It will be easy for us to
establish this by characterising clearly the thought which
dictated them arid the object which they were to achieve.
The first of the four conditions, in putting an end to the
protectorate of Russia in the principalities of Moldavia,
Wallachia, and Servia, and in placing their privileges
under the collective guarantee of the Great Powers,
takes away from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the rights
which it pretended to hold from ancient treaties, and
which were the only mewls for subjugating those popu-
lations, for dominating Turkey, for approaching Austria
on. her most vulnerable side, and for troubling the whole
of 'Europe ; the second by stipulating the free navigation
of the Danube, liberates the commerce of all nations—
especially of Austria—frotn the !floral -and material ob-
stacles which impede it, and throws operi the mouths of
.that great river to the States of which it is the fortune
and the defence.
" The fourth, in delivering Turkey from the preten-
ginoeuerptte
roht:ecsts assorateuorevs more thanerthe
Greek
ssiu°l7jecoifs 71ofutslisieStoula eltarn,i ve
ever freedom 'of conscience at the same time that it des
stroys the supremacy which the Czars arrogated to them-
selves,
wasthe c
,;ne politicaleillconcealed under
of jest a
of :eahligiieobu,s
mask.
thensk.better to im-
pose,
"As regards the third of those conditions—that which
hasthe
B
fur its object to
havelimit esthretvrreped it expresslyonderaiceo s
fßus: the
most h
most important and most contests I, so as to explain it
here, categorically. First of all, how must it be under.
stood ? Evidently anything' equivocal on. so grave a
point cannot suit any vne. The allied Governuients,
who have a consciousness of the justice of their, preten-
sions, have not feared defining them. Russia has turned
the Black !Sea into a Russian lake ; she has gradually
founded maritime establishments there of the first ;
she has accumulated there, with as much perseverance
as mystery, considerable naval forces, and it may be
said that by that exclusive domination of the Black Sea
she has placed Constantinople in a permanent state of
siege.

This state of things is not possible, because it is in-
compatible not only with the integrity of the Ottoman
•
empire but with the security of the Europe.wholeof
" Franceooirbee
teat nihndeedEEn i
completelybga
yel e npdesi,aneci
Sea, or
demanding Russia to lnii t
hooerr
bt
right.oy wn eaur
,t, neutralise sech
thatthata
rpeseseauaol,et
ephemeral and such a war I
hawbwreeaoersuwtplhdenoelwolrbteeoefrb served, this demand for the usl
limitation t; i and,oo o let
u ist-
ei an pea Cr, or for the neutralisation of thenßials,cgnkisSecesnet
does not respond only to Anglc-French interests, it re-
sp,.nds also to the interests of Austria, for which the
Daiiube, a commercial and military river, is a
highway, open to her activity towards the-Enxine and
Asia. An argumentis brought against this pretension
which we do not think serious ; it is said to the Allied
Powers, ' You ask a concession from Russia, which at
most slight be the price of the surrender of Sebastopol,
and that place is still held by the Russian army.' Our
reply is this :—' The law of nations gramtsi that a por-
tion of what is obtained by war may be kept by peace.
We have not yet taken Sebastopol, that is t rue ; but
what is Sebastopol at the present moment to Russia ? It
is no longer a naval port, as her fleet, sunk at the mouth
of the harbour, or shut up behind that insurpassable
baserra tiesrt,
hies wiilid
battle-field
rawn from
which
hthe "struggle.
wehayewu e_oTrh,eifßlack
they
like it, which has been abandoned to us by the enemy.
The Russian flag could not show itself there. Our ships
and those of England and Turkey navigate it in every
sense. Its domination has changed hands. It hasgons
from Sebastopol to Constantinople.
" Who compels us to give up this pledge 1 Is not such
a situation the very best we could have ? And not only
do we occupy the Black Sea, but we besiege Sebastopol,
we are fortified at Kamiesch and at Balaklava, Ower
Pasha is entrenched at Eupatoria, Odessa is menaced by
our fleets ? What can Russia do ? Could she suffer for
any length of time without detriment to her moral
streneth and without ruin to her commerce the blockade
which Kill shut her up iii every 'part of the Bieck Sea
and in the Baltic ? Could she Jive in that paralysis which
in her strikes the vital principle of nations—that is to
say, movement, action, the right of 'expiating and ex-
changing her produce, and which would condemn her
to isdlation sterility, impotency, in the immensity of her
empire ? To ask Russia to limit her naval forces, cr to
neutralise the Black Sea—that is to say, to exchiele
therefrom all vessels of, war of any nation whatsover, is
therefore to exact from her much less than what we have-
acquired by war, and which we could maintain without
an effort. In fact, what does it reqnire to prevent Rus-
sia from ever entering the B'aok Sea again ! Four men-
or-war of each of the maritime Powers, France, England
and Turkey. Such a cruising squadron would suffice to
occupy the Biack Sea and to transplant its domination
from the shores of the Ciiintia, to the entrance of the
Bosphorus. . .. . #
" What, Russia has lost, what she cannot recover by
war, no matter how long, is her preponderance over the
East. What she may legitimately psk is a share of in-
.flaelice iu the affairs ef the world. She would
fie;el' if
needs be, a coalition of all States to restrain her hilibi-
tion ; but no one wishes to-humiliate her. What i-i asked
from her Europe has the right, and i is its duty to
I exact. If be grants it, the peace of thetiearld is assured,
the ohject of the allied Powers attainea: If she refuses,
war will continue and decide it.
" At the moment we write these grave solutions are
being prepared and discussed at the Vienna Conferences,
where M. Drouyn do l'Huys and Lord John Russell
have taken, with the authority of their character
and position, the expression of the Common thought
of their Governments. The country must confidently
await the result of that decisive trial. It may say
that peace will be concluded, it it is possible w:th honour
to the fl4gs of. France and England and security for
their influence, and that war, if it should continue, will
be necessary for the object proposed by the Allied Go-
vernments, and from which nothing can turn them aside.
" But a great result is acquired already from the very
fact of these nee' otiations. Fiance and England bare
loyally negotiated with Austria to allow her policy to ex-
haust the last resources of conciliation. Those confer-
ences of which Vienna is the centre are the loyal and
honest act of the Emperor, Francis Joseph. But the I
Allied Powers know that if Austria does not succeed in
this noble effort of her European patriotism, she will
tiOit resolutely with them. In limiting their demand
to the very conditions accep'ed by theYienna,Cabinet in
the treaty of the 2d of Dec. they have gained to the com-
mon cause an important .and devoted ally. The possibility
Of peace, like the necessity 'of war, must henceforth he
only a fact, in common to the three Powers who signed
that treaty. The ?solidarity of their interests and of
their eneaeements would unite times in the struggle as it
has united them in the Conferences, and that grand Eu-
ropean confederation will soon have triumphed ova
every resistance. . •
- "France aed England may therefore congratulate
themselves in having consented to negotiate while con-
tinuing to fight. It. acting thus :hi y have not only
given a proof of moderation—they have ii,creased their
strength. Their ailhesion to an honourable and possible
peace, having PS consequence the rpport of Austria in
a necessary and legiLbnate war, is an act counselled by
wisdom, and which will be approved by public opinion.
" One word more, in c,,,,1-i,;( n, ,Tt is, perhaps, a
novel and bold tidies to speak of ti.e,nlll:t ay and d;p10-
matic conduct of a war wh,le the. army is fighting and
u,..gotiati,ins are pending. .:17e thought that it was pre-
cis-le the moineat to spiel: the truth to tire. country.
True, ae is only danger tar the werik. With ihzlit arid
6tr-regth 5,11 their side, it Ininiur.l thlise, who speak it —it
reassures those who hear it2'

:at nawei,).:
r'lleillcs,:iees°lsrluiit:i. a :sesiti::::
sattempt
took
imwl)::,:ntot
In c,"'nf,(llfence of the inteittieA ViAit cf the Etup-r:r
of t::r. l'r,beli to Onildhail on'Thersd,,v, the 19;1 lust.,
and t',e obstrile;itus to, business that will prise trom the
(Tow (1,1 state of the ther.to4fires; the committee of
lookers have iS,'lled a recoron,'endaCMre that al! bil!s due
tt. , thrit •3\, ant not aldressol
should ho presented en •Wetiriesdav; air,' .1 &h.
SiIOCkING SAcarf.tt:E.-13.RisTrtr., A:•ril 14.—A- Pill!'
eir.,;,:tetubfltobliby the snert-
pay,il,le at city batiker_4l,
ful St 'M a, ion has been caused in Ois city
Varies I,ave reposed the reposins oftlie
.S_niyist.ormf- 1,
, Errs,
Ashton-nowt, situated about three o, ,
rznaiienmi;
'l.;;liisn'ill'o: :at t-i` vi'):l-:::::::::Th:rsi I w"----:nci:b f:l'Srlint'7l:ritv-'l.:lt'ait'vd,re:lsm:'l,aveonaule-sfe
ISl2tlijgt.rieilitirebe.e;
:lit:: nteedd
lof "Tom
Tar Glloicrens't.iePr'; :fir
than the recovery.
of any
1 motiered,
mwionngg
to
terhaee
citizenstes du *evere
ss f r;,:tltl,
h,
ri :
t.O
I and Clifton. It is be-
:lel: ;ins concealed. tram in-
ectunary in tie
. .
wee on the Vet and a view of the chancel of
I,ioneov(telyt,l;9o
fob:arc.bee: p
_,
h in which th
laalicii.-ofpreonn:
it the
is art
q tii:tio7
be,. it aPr",ars that there must '
P •-•- have been at last seven
1 -sibt t.-1"-''''s '`ng,wed in it • '
„,,,„oer in which tlt- vault vita ~r ei_
A.,di ousiebruti
en,
:ne
!net:2
,i,
r, .
,u. p, p : • _
late
otio that some stonemasons w .
by herself.
and it was cotrent'fy
the operations. Tile i
ji,. ete engaged to conduct
Sir
3610 some
.family differences, the
well known.
chat 0.,,,1iv0, t ject of the plunderers is pretty
reilinoratn,,ddaStirthl:itigiinheSoifnyhtehr resided
by
She -was of somewhat eccentric habits,
aunt of the
atbeclutamlidt;?Yhoaviniz been embalm'', the heart was
jewels were interred with ber, and
placed within
the coffin, enclosed in a silver box, and
that Om brea,t-plate, 1 landles, &c., upon the coffin
were of pure silver. The sacrile2l)uB villains cut open
the lead coffin of the lAke Sir John Swyth, and also
that of the late Lady Smyth. The former they
must have had some difficulty in removing from
its position, as it took four men to-day to replace
it. . They were disappointed, however, in their
anticipations of plunder, he leaden ceffin in which
are contained the remains of the Dowager lady
Smyth remaining intsw,. It is supposed, also, that they
iv'ere disturbed, as they left a ail lantern behind them
and some massive silver ornaments, which had been
I appended to the exterior of one of the coffins. A. large
reward has been offered for the discovery of the offen.
der?, but at present the police have, no clue to them,
I although it is more than suspected they belong to a gang
who have long infested the parishes of Bedminster and
Long Asbton,inear this city, and some of whose members
have recently received the sentence of penal servitude at
the late Sornersetsbire sessions at-A assizes.