The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-15 00:00:00

MAYNOOTH.

The Earl of HARROWBY, in reply to the Earl of
Winchelsea, stated that he had received a complaint
from the professors of Maynooth, stating that their evi-
dence had been privately used by Dr. Cullen to show
the propaganda at Rome that their opinions differed
from the high Roman authorities. He (Lord Harrowby ),
in reply, bad told them, that the evidence having ulti-
mately become a public document, and known to the
world, its early communication to Rome by Dr. Cullen
merely anticipated its knowledge there ; so that it waq
erroneous to impute the private connection to the effect
that had been imputed.

CONDI7CT OF THE WAR.
The Earl of ELLEN-BOROUGH, who had the following
resolutions on the paper,—
"That a humble address be presented to her Majesty,
"To assure her Majesty of our continued support in the
Prosecution of the just and necessary war in which her Ma-
jesty is engaged ;
" To declare the sincere gratification with which we have
regarded the perfect community of counsels between her Ma-
jesty and the Emperor of the French, and have seen friendli-
ness established and increasing between the French people
and'our own—events full of hope for the future to other na-
tions as well as to ourselves ; _ _

“To express our adthiration of the many deeds of valou”
by which the allied forces in the East have illustrated their
brotherhood in arms, and our satisfaction that the brave
army of Piedmont is now called to participate in their actions
and in their fame ;

"To declare our persuasion that, amid all their disap-
pointments, the people of this country still retain the gem-
Tons feelings which led them at the commencement of the war
willingly to place all the. means required from them at her
Majesty's disposal—that they will still protect the weal:
against the aggression of the strong—and that they are not
prepared to consent that Russia shall, by her increasing pre-
ponderance, so control the Turkish Government as actually
to hold Constantinople within her grasp ;
" To acquaint her Majesty that, while we admit and lament
the privations to which war necessarily subjects all classes of
the people, we yet venture to assure her Majesty that they
would in so just a cause bear those privations without com-
plaint if they could feel that the war had been well conducted
—that the troops had not been exposed to any hardships
which could have been avoided by forethought—and that
everything had been done to enuble them to achieve decisive
success ;

" Humbly to represent to her Majesty that her people,
suffering privations on account of this war, have as yep
had uo such consolation ; that, on the contrary, we can iot
withhold from her Majesty the avowal of our conviction
that the conduct of the war has occasioned general dissatis-
faction and given rise to just complaints ; and that we mu t
humbly lay before her Majesty our deliberate opinion that,
it is only through the selection of men for public employme t
without regard to anything. but the public service that the
country can hope to prosecute the war successfully, and t)
obtain its only legitimate object—a secure and honourabl.'
peace ;"

rose and said,—My lords, it is now more than a year that
we have been at war,—a period somewhat longer, I be-
lieve, than the war itself was expected to last by the Mi-
istry that entered into it,—and during that period we have
brought forward the whole military force of the country,
such as it is, and also the whole of its naval force. We
have had no reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of
our soldiers and seamen (hear, hear); but, on the contrary,
they have rivalled the great actions of those who have pre-
ceded them in former wars, and have been led on all occa-
sions by English gentlemen with their accustomed spirit
and devotion. (Hear, hear.) We have been allied with
the greatest military Power in Europe—a Power, too,
almost our own equal in naval strength. Therehas existed
the most cordial union between the forces of the two
Powers; and yet, my lords, obtaining, as we have oh-
tained, so much glory, by the aide of that glory we have
seen unusual suffering, and, notwithstanding all our
strength, united to that of France, notwithstanding all the
devotion of our troops, we have not as yet obtained any
decisive success, nor can any man say that, at the present
moment, there is any expectation of so doing. This alone,
my lords, would justify me in calling your lordships' at-
tention to the subject, and in asking you to consider what
may be the causes from which this failure has originated,
and what are the remedies which it may be expedient to
apply. Very recently, too, another event has taken place
which gives a still graver character to the war. The ne-
gotiations at Vienna have failed, and they have failed in
such a manner—that is, by the production on the part of
Russia of proposals which were perfectly inadmissible—
(hear, hear)—as to afford the apprehension of a protracted
war as well as of a great contest. My lords, under
these circumstances I feel that if any apology be necessary
for now calling yourlordships' attention to the subject, it
is an apology for not having brought forward this question
at an earlier period. But, my lords, since the accession of
Lord Palmerston to office there has been a sort of torpor in
public affairs, and there has been nothing to induce any
man tobring forward a great public question. If it had
rested with that noble lord the torpor which has existed in
parliament would have been extended to the public mind,
for the very first measure which he attempted to carry was
a measure for the purpose of stifling the Committee of In-
quiry into the state of the army before Sebastopol, a com-
mittee voted by the great majority of the House of Com-
mons, and supported almost unanimously by the people of
this country. (Hear.) Strange and singular was the course
adopted by the noble lord for the purpose of inducing the
House of Commons to rescind the .resolution at which it had
arrived. He desired to bepermitted to appear in the world',
masquerade in the historical character of Richard 11., whr
fell, as history points out, because he exercised undue
private partiality, instead of a desire for the public good,
in the appointments of persons to office, and because he
utterly disregarded the opinions of the public. But, my
lords, it was represented that Lord Palmerston was the
fittest person to conduct the affairs of the country in time
of war on account of his military experience. Now, cer-
tainly, that noble lord has during his political life, now
extended over a considerable period, for a long time held
the office of Secretary at War. Now, that office is not by
any means connected with the direction of war, but ha,
only to deal with the financial affairs of the army, but.
nevertheless, he has been represented, because he so loin
held that office, as possessing great military experienee
We have recently found that Mr. Sidney Herbert, whc
lately occupied the position of Secretary at War, very
properly, as I think, in the discharge of duties of a pub-
lic nature, assisted the noble duke who was then at the
head of the War Department, but that was by
no means done by him in the character oi
Secretary at War, nor had the Secretary at War, as
such, anything to do with the direction of a war
If Lord Palmerston, holding that °film, acquired great
military experience and established a great military repu-
tation, that circumstance must have been known to the
late Duke of Wellington, and would have certainly tended
to make him desire to retain him in the Administration of
which he was the head. I do not mean to say that tb,
Duke of Wellington did not entertain a high opinion of
Lord Palmerston's military capacity, but I recollect one
circumstance which leads me rather to doubt that he did
so. I recollect sitting by the side of the Doke of Welling-
ton in this house during the unfortunate difficulty between
himself and Mr. Huskisson, which led to the resignatior
of a portion of the gentlemen who then formed the Coali-
tion Government. The Duke of Wellington was called
out of the house on the occasion to which I refer, and on
his return he said to me, " That was Lord Palmerston who
wanted to see me, in order to tell me that if Huskisson
went out he would go to. I made no reply, for it is not
for me to fire great guns at small birds." (Loud laughter.)
Snob, at the time, was the opinion of the Duke of Welling-
ton.
I will not pretend to sa that the small bird
dossotio subsequent times have attained to the dimen-
--etill,at tperhaps,
the character of the eagle----(laughter)
peered eeretteriod referred to such as I have stated ap-
a short t a e opinion of the Duke of Wellington. But
formed theeper,the public instructors of the country ir-
necessary to pile': that the man of all others whom it was
Palmerston. He
„1:: the position of Minister was Lord
man of the situation.' t° use the phrase in vogue, " the
that unfortunate vre,,,kn ITations will sometimes indulge in
dividuals they will gee°Z.Which occasionally afflicts in-
country, and that han-
indulged in by the people (TraflneY• This weakness was
pened to the people which occ-151
Y happens to indi-
viduals who indulge in like weaknesses
namely, repent-
er the weakness.
ance seen followed oa the ind4eames—
Pe.eple so ready
I believe that there is hardly -ix;
tl3odividual
as the people of this country
e Vet.
up to the admiration of an -5" o thems 1
short period. For a short period—but for for a e
short
period—nothing can r
exceed the warmathver:v
affection and admiration which they maintain for some
individual. but a change soon co mesover them, and that
warmth of affection is soon followed byaigid indiffer-
ence, more than equal to the intensity of the admiration
before entertained. I fear that at the
present moment th,
feeling of the people is in that. cold state, and that they
op ion of the
h.we become gradually disappointed at their adoption
the
man whom they shortly ago desired to
.see head of
the Government (Hear.)
a state thinking, and the pub-
While Parliament has been le
P the public has been
: of ter or .
I.c has come toappear to be just
SA to the *and certain conclusions,which
adopted in
futureuct of the war,
avoiding similar die-.
appointments and as to the means to b(
t for the purpose of
have arrived at tati
selection of the
those they have experienced. The peopl(
lirconclusion—tha.t it is necessary, in
regard their individualsfitness, employments, t(
for public emploY
not a convert to ,thnat not to act by favour. I am
all times the
whenever for shortprinciple on which I have' acted,
time I have been in posses-
sion of power; and I can speak from experience of its ad-

vantages and its dangers. (Hear, hear.) Its advantages
are all for the public, and its dangers are for the indivi-
dual
who adopts that as his principle of government.
(Hear.) I have myself seen disaster converted into victory,
and discouragement into enthusiasm. I have seen public
confidence re-established • I have seen public prosperity
carried to an unexampled of increase, beyond what,
at any previous period, it has been known to attain to ; and
I have been able, in a very great measure, to trace all these
advantages in the condition of the State to the adoption of
the principle of regarding solely the fitness of individuals
in their selection for public employments. (Hear.) lam
enabled, at the same time, to inform your lordships that
there is this danger to the individual who acts on that prin-
ciple—that he is surrounded by persons, by disappointed
jobbers, and by little-minded men, depending for their
promotion on patronage and favour, who will, animated
by the most unscrupulous animosity, join together for the
purpose of overwhelming his Government. (Hear, hear.)
And if, in consequence of the present feeling of the people,
any Government should be established in this country de-
termined to act on the principle I have mentioned, I feel
assured that it would be in danger from the same hostility,
unless it received the constant, uniform, and vigilant sup-
port of the people, on whom it alone could depend for sup-
port. (Hear.) I have been not unobservant of the events
which have taken place in this country during a very con-
siderable period of time ; and I have conversed with many
who have equally regarded those events with vigilant ob-
servation ; and it is certainly in accordance with my obser-
vation, and with that of others, that a very great, and, as
I think, very dangerous change has come over the practice
of the constitution. The time was when speeches in Par-
liament directed public opinion —(hear)—when, whatever
might have been the feeling during the recess, whatever
might have been the success of agitators during the period
while Parliament was not sitting, the meeting of Parlia-
ment, and the announcement of the opinions of those who
were in the habit of leading parties in Parliament, at
once gave a direction to public opinion and brought it into
a right and safe course. I fear there has bren growing up
a very material change in this respect. Public opinion
now is, I fear, more generally formed out of doors, and,
being there formed, acts on the conduct of Parliament. I
look with great apprehension to a state of things in which
persons, however unable, yet wholly irresponsible, possess
power greater perhaps than that of Parliament. I look
with apprehension to a state of things in which those whom
I may call " the gentlemen of the platform" have more
influence by their speeches than " the gentlemen of the
House of Commons." That state of things has been grow-
ing up in this country. It fills me with considerable
alarm. I know the importance of watching public opinion.
I know the importance of endeavouring to direct it. It
appears to me that public opinion, if I may so express
myself, in a manner resembles a great river between
two dikes. The waters rise gradually, ?lowly, imper-
ceptibly, and without danger, apparently, in the eyes of
those unaccustomed to their progress ; but at last they in-
crease to such a height that they overtop and destroy the
dike, and, pouring down on the plain, desolate everything
before them. The same waters, however, if distributed by
' prudent and judicious management into streawlets run-
ning through the fields, would fertilise and beautify the
land. (Hear.) It is with the conviction, then, that it is
essential to the good working of the constitution that Par-
liament should direct, as far as possible, public opinion
that I make this motion. (Hear.) I make it for the pur-
pose of enabling your lordships to place this house in the
f •ont of the people. (Cheers.) I make it for the purpose of
inducing you to go to the foot of the Throne as the faith-
ful interpreters of public opinion, to state respectfully to
her Majesty the extent of public dissatisfaction and the ex-
tent of public complaint ; to state your determination and
that of the people to assist her Majesty with all the re-
sources of the country in the prosecution of a just and ne-
cessary war ; but at the same time to state your opinion
that the Government must be conducted on the true public
principle of selecting men for employment in consideration
of their means of serving the State. (Hear, hear.) Before
I enter upon the conduct of the war, to which it will be
necessary for me to direct your lordships' attention, allow
me to thaw distinctly the line which appears to me to se-
parate the functions of the Government from the functions
of the general. It is the duty of the Government to form
a plan for the campaign, and it is the duty of the Govern-
ment to place in the hands of the general to whom they
confide the conduct of the campaign the most perfect in-
strument they can prepare for the purpose of obtaining
success—a perfectly well equipped army. It is for the
general to carry into execution the plans of the Govern-
ment • and we, as Parliament, it appears to me, haveonly
t deal with the conduct of the Government. (Hear, hear.)
Your lordships will probably recollect that at the very
commencement of this war I, in the most earnest manner,
c.l.utioned the house and the public against looking
too closely into the conduct of the officers in tho
ccm-
u:aud of the fleets and armies. I reminded your
lordships of the extreme sensitiveness of military men, and
of the necessity of leaving their minds on all occasions per-
fectly free to exert all their energies for the public service.
I assured your lordships that the hope of public approba-
tion and the apprehension of public displeasure would al-
ways be sufficient to animate those officers to the utmost
extent of their exertions for their public service. I pro-
pose to adhere to the reserve I recommended to others, and
I wish it to be understood in all I say I deal only with the
Government by whom this war has been conducted.
(Hear.) For the purpose of conducting the war I appre-
hend it will be admitted that is necessary we should have
men and animals—that is, men aided by animals. Unfor-
tunately the war has not been conducted in that way; and
very little exertion appears to have been made for the pur-
pose of providing the army with sufficient strength, and
with the means of moving. It was not in the first in-
stance that the standard was reduced, nor was it at
an early period that the bounty was increased, but
it was by, lowering the standard and by increasing the
bounty that the army must be augmented. On a recent
occasion the Minister of War very properly issued a circu-
lar respecting the militia., which relieved from service those
men who had not entered thatforce with the understanding
that they were to be embodied ; but he accompanied that
measure by the offer of a bounty so extremely small as not
only to endanger the success of the measure, but almost to
secure its failure—(hear, hear)—and I believe that we have
lost the services of from 16,000 to 20,000 men for the pur-
pose of saving some 50,000/. or 60,000/. (Hear, hear.)
There has been no real economy except in that in which
parsimony was most to be rejected, and in which liberality
was most to be invited—namely, in the obtaining of men
for the army and navy, and in providing the army with the
means of moving. I ventured at a very early period to
represent to this house the absolute necessity of taking the
most extensive measures for the purpose of providing the
army with the means of moving, but it is only within
the last three months that any effectual measures
have been taken for that purpose—(hear, hear)—and
at this moment the army cannot move, and never has
been able to move. This immoveability, in consequence of
the want of animals, has been the cause of many of the
errors which have pervaded the campaign. My lords, early
in the last year it was decided, I think most properly, to
separate the Colonial Department from the Department of
War; but, when that division took place, no measures were
adopted—as should have been the case—for the purpose of
strengthening the hands of the Minister of War. I en-
tirely object to the principle of pulling to pieces great de-
partments in the midst of a war. lam sure that such a
measure was totally unnecessary. The only thing abso-
lutely necessary wasto give the Minister of War full powers
over all the subordinate departments, to make his orders
run through them, and to give him the power of compel-
ling the execution of any measures he might direct. Had
that power been distinctly given to my noble friend (the
Duke of Newcastle), had he surrounied himself, as I think
he should have done, with a military staff, instead of de-
pending upon civil clerks—had it been thoroughly under-
stood in the Government that the noble duke's orders were
at once to be executed in all departments, I firmly believe
that many of the disasters which have occurred would
have been prevented. But I fear the noble duke has had
to fight a battle here as well as in the Crimea—l fear that
he has had to wrest the Commissariat from Sir C. Trevel-
yan—that he has had to wrest the Land Transport Corps
from the Commissariat—that there have been difficulties
here as well as in the Crimea—and that those difficulties
have to a very great extent led to the failures we have
experienced. My lords, at the commencement of the war
the manner in which our forces should act was a matter of
the most careful and anxious consideration on the part of her
Majesty's Government—whether the army should act as a
separate body, or whether it should unite in operation
with the army of France. The objection to the union of
the armies was obvious the existence of divided commands,
an inconvenience which no extent of cordiality and good
sense on the part of the generals could by possibility alto-
gether obviate. (Hear.) It is almost impossible for any
two men, however able they may be, to conduct difficult
-unitary operations with success under the principle of a
divided command. (Hear.) Napoleon said, with perfect
truth, that it was better to appoint one general of ordinary
abilities to the comma,:d of an army than two men of supe-
rior
abilities having a divided command; and, depend
upon it, unity of command is that which most contributes
to success. We had th 3 opportunity of employing our
troops to a certain extent, perhaps, in the Black Sea, on a
separate expedition ; but we had before us the Baltic, the
true sphere of our operations. I can, however, quite under-
stand that her Majesty's Government might have been desir-
ous that the armies and navies of the two countries should ap-
pe a together wherever operations were carried on, and I do
not deny that there wasconsiderable advantage in that unity
of operations, but it was an advantage deeply purchased
ny the want of unity of command. It was decided that the
war should be carried on i-a the Baltic, and also in the
Black Sea. Now, my lords, any one who takes the trouble
of looking carefully through the charts of the Baltic will
have seen that, while the Russians had taken every precau-
ti on, by the erection of defences, to prevent ships of large
draught of water from entering their ports and from coming
near their dockyards, the same precautions had not been
taken againet the attacks of vessels of a smaller class, and
'chat both at S weaborr and at Croustadt there were oppor-
tunities of turning the dockyards and of attacking them by
vessels of small draught of water. It was obvious that, in
the case of such an operation, it would be most advit able
to have at hand a body of troops, because if the marines
were landed from the ships for employment on shore the
strength of the fleet would of course be materially dimi-
nished, anti its efficiency for action would be considerably ina
pai red. Neither of these considerations appear, however, to
have occurred to her Majesty's Government. They sent a fleet
to the Bal:ic without gun-boats and without troops. They
rendered it impossible to obtain success with the means
which they placed in the bands of the admiral. The admiral
dial as much as he could do with the means which were in-
trusted to him. I deeply regret that the public expecta-
tions were so highly raised at the commencement of the
war; that the people were led to suppose that some extra-
ordinary service would at once be performed by the fleet.
For those exaggerated expectations two members of the
Government were particu arty responsible. (Hear, hear.)
Et is, my lords, a serious thing to disappoint public expec-
tation in a matter of this kind, and it is a cruel thing to-
wards the officer in command. I a ill venture to say
that, while I do not question the right of a First Lord of
the Admiralty—whether he thinks fit to state the grounds
of the proceeding or not—to direct an officer to haul down
his flag, I do think it is proper that the feelings of an offi-
cer so oirected to give up his command should be to tho
tact extent carefully considered and consulted (hear,
hear)—and I do deeply regret that Sir C. Napier is not
the only officer employed in the fleet who has had
so
reason to complain of the manner in which he has
been treated by the Admiralty. (Hear, hear.) I con-
, my to the
si.,ler it to b feeling
ofm7leoryaoffipueberliewhdoutil,my lords, to consult the
7.43we1l
either to the advancetlien to
employed under the Crown.
~,liapnoir.mch for the Baltic. But it was determiued to
to Gallipoli,Mediterranean—first to Malta, then to
the last two nae
of the army to Malta, or from Malta
Constantinople. I do not object
=instances of the riv:Xa
from Gallipoli to Constantinople. I tLink
trenchments at Gallipoli were correct under the then cir-
I think the formation of the in-
cunistances then existing
. (1114 of her Majesty'
was requisite under the circum-
at Constantinople it was but when these troops arrived
merit to take a general view
war which was then
Govern-
carried on upon the shores 4fblttahe:Black
a been
e ai
n A sia,
a s
as
At the present
well as upon the banks of the
moment the war in Asia, which is alnabe.s
altogether
that upon the banks of the Danube, h t irnixwtalit as a

THE SUN, LONDON; TUESDAY EVENING, MAY 15 1855.

neglected. I can recollect the apprehensions which were
entertained in 1829 at the advance of Prince Peskiewikch
from Erzeroum to Constantinople. The danger to Con-
stantinople was almost as great on the Asiatic as on the
European shore. Any blow struck against Turkey in Asia
paralyses the Turkish empire. More than that—the whole
commerce between Turkey and Persia is carried on by
Trebizond and Erzeroum, and the occupation of those places
by Russia puts an end to that trade, insulates Persia, and
most materially affects her policy. But, notwithstanding
these circumstanes, we did not carry on war in Asia
as we did in Europe, with army against army. We had
in Asia nations at our disposal. We had nations con-
quered, but yet disposed to throw off the yoke. We had
still more—a gallant nation which has been for years in
arms, successfully defending its independence. We should
make war with theirarmy as well as by the troops we could
detach for any operation of this kind ; but this mode of
action has been altogether neglected, and, as far as I can
collect, the appointment of Colonel Williams, who was sent
out as a commissioner, appeared about the same time that
news was received of the defeat of the Turks at Kars, which
appeared to threaten Erzeroum. TheTurke were only saved
by the advance of Schamyl. But for that advance the
Russians would have been in Erzeroum. I say then, it
being the duty of the Government to look to the.whele war,
it is a most material and serious defect in the conduct of
the war that nothing should have been done for the pur-
pose of acting in Asia. But it was determined to send the
troops to Varna. I entirely approve that movement, and
I thank my noble friend the noble earl late at the head of
her Majesty's Government for having pressed that course
upon his colleagues. I think he did rightly, and for the
reasons which he assigned. Not only was it an excellent
military position—the best which could be selected at the
time—but it " gave the hand" to Austria. That was the
expression of the noble earl, and the view which he enter-
tained was perfectly just and correct. That army, placed
at Varna and at Shumla, threatened Odessa, threatened
Sebastopol, threatened Anapa, threatened every Russian
station upon the Black Sea. It was an excellent po-
sition in itself ; but no sooner was the army placed
there, and about to give the hand to Austria—no
sooner was Austria about to rest upon that hand—
than we withdrew it, and sent the army to the Cri-
mea. I think that sending the expedition to the Crimea,
after Austria had invited our co operation in the Princi-
palities was as great an error in diplomacy asit was in war-
fare. I ventured to caution the Government at the time as
to the effect which it must have uponthepolicy of Austria.
We have never to this clay been in the same position with
respect to Austria in which we were when that offer of co-
operation was made. What did Austria say when she was
informed of the intention of sending the expedition to the
Crimea? "That alters my position. I cannot venture to
fight Russia by myself, and you have withdrawn the force
which might have assisted me." And, my lords, what is it
that we have done very recently? Almost at the moment
when we were entering upon negotiations, and it wasof the
utmost importance that we should have the cordial assist-
ance of A ustria, yon withdrew the Turkish army and sent
it from the Principalities to Eupatoria. The best possible
assistance which the Austrian army could have you with-
drew at the very moment when it was most necessary that it
should have something to rely upon. You denuded her alto-
gether of any extraneous assistance, and you left the Aus-
trian army with its line extended from the Pruth to the
north of Galicia—you exposed her whole line to the attack
of the Russian army, with Germany uncertain behind her.
How, then, can you complain of the conduct of Austria? If
you say that Austria has acted with undue timidity, im-
pute it rather to your own mistakes—the mistake of the ex-
pedition to Sebastopol, and the mistake of the expedition to
Eupatoria. Those two mistakes have paralysed Austria,
and until your army is in a position in which it can assist
the Austrian army you may depend upon it that Austria
never can venture to give you the assistance which you re-
quire. (Hear, hear.) The treaty between Austria and Tur-
key is dated the 14th of June. That treaty was the real
cause of the raising of the siege of Silistria. Had your army
at Varna had the means of movement, can it be doubted
that you would have attempted, before raising the siege of
Silistria, to march to support the Turks? Was it consis-
tent with your honour to allow a place which was the
great safeguard of your army to be taken under your very
eyes ? But the negligence of the Government had left the
army motionless. You could not advance to the relief of
Silistria; and when the Russians, compelled by the advance
of Austria, retired from the Principalities—when any gene-
ral in command of an army that could move would have
pressed upon their rear and have prevented them taking
away the plunder of the Principalities, and retiring by easy
marches into Bessarabia—your army was unable to move.
Why was it unable to move ? Because ti.e Government had
cot provided it with the means. (Hear.) It was no fault of
the general; it was the fault of the Government. No-
thing sufficient was done for the purpose of making those
troops really an army; for troops are not an army unless
they can move into the field. Consider only for a moment
what would have been our position had the proper means
been taken to make that army moveable, and had it ad-
vance I. You would have bad united more than 120,000
men of allies and Turks, in conjunction with, and supported
by, an Austrian army. You would have had Bessarabia,
and would have commenced the campaign from the Dniester;
and the first victory would have placed Odessa, Nicolai, and
the Crimea itself at your feet. It was determined, how-
ever, to send the expedition to Sebastopol. That expedition
involved two conditions, both fatal to the efficiency of an
army. It was quite impossible to send a sufficient force of
cavalry, and it was impossible to send a sufficient number
of animals to move the army. It could, therefore, never
gain a decisive victory, or move in the field so as to destroy
the enemy.. Had it had cavalry, the victory of the Alma
would have destroyed the Russian army ; had it had the
means of movement when Prince Menachikoff passed the
Belbek, he never would have been allowed to retreat. That
army has since been placed between Sebastopol and the
sea. It is now beleagured, and it cannot move in any di-
rection. It has the sea open to it, but it cannot advs.nz.e.
It is placed in a position in which it cannot obtain de-
cisive success, and it is placed there by the act of the Go-
vernment. It is the Government, therefore, that I accuse
of the position in which that army is placed. (Hear,
hear.) I say nothing of the discretion of sending an army
across the sea at the time of the equinox, in 400 vessels,
without having sufficiently reconnoitred the place, or hav-
ing ascertained by information from any quarter what the
amount of the defences might be, or what force the enemy
might be able to bring into the town. If any general had
ventured to do, of his own authority on the geld, that
which you compelled our general to do—that is, had he
ventured to attack a place, and had he failed in the attack
in consequence of his not having had information, and not
having reconnoitred the place, he would have been taken
before a court-martial, and would have been dismissed the
service. You, the Government, are answerable for having
effected an operation under these circumstances. I will not
go into the military impolicy of it. If you had taken the
place, anti had come away, and had destroyed it, you would
have had no security in peace, because it might have again
been placed in the same condition of defence as before; but,
if you remained during the war to occupy it, you would be
throwing away a great army, and would be detaining it in
a most inconvenient position for the purpose of protecting
the town, whereas a blockade would have effected all your
purpose. Upon these grounds I say that the Government
has not conducted the war well, and that it has placed the
army in a position in which it cannot obtain decisive suc-
cesses. And now, my lords, as regards the third point—
the exposure of the troops to sufferings which forethought
might have avoided. Is there one man in this house or in
the country who does not believe that that was the case ?
Hear Dr. Andrew Smith, the gentleman who very pro-
perly advised the Government at a very early period of the
war. He tells you that the lives of hundreds and the
miseries of thousands have been the consequence of not
doing that which might have been done by forethought for
the purpose of preventing the disasters which have occurred.
Ask your admiral, and he will tell you that he received no
instructions for the preparation of transports. That is a
new mode of carrying on a great expedition. I recollect,
when I was engaged with the Duke of Wellington and Sir
G. Cockburn on a small expedition to China, that we did not
forget the sick and wounded. A 74-gun ship was sent from
this country fitted for the reception of the wounded, al-
though wo wero making war at a distance of 25,000 miles,
instead of 3,000 miles, as is the case in the present inikance.
my lords, I will.not go into the melancholy details of all
the confusion which we have heard of in the transport
service, the Ordnance department, the despatch of stores,
and the lateness of their arrival—three months being the
usual period before they were supplied after the requisi-
tion was sent in. I will not attempt to harrow your lord-
ships' minds by tracing the passage of the wounded and
sick from the camp at Balaklava, carried by the humanity,
of our Allies, nor will I dwell upon the state of destitu-
tion cn the shore, or the horrors of the middle passage, or
the abominations of Scutari. All these things will be
chronicled by the faithful pen of history. They are now in
the minds of every one, and it is unnecessary for me, fortu-
nately, further to allude to them; but, my lords, we have
reed that which has been stated with respect to those
calamities with which the army has been afflicted, and I
think that the opinion of all men is this, that however de-
fective may have been the system, it is not the system
alone which is to he impugned, but the conduct of the men
by whom the system has been carried on. (Hear.) My lords,
to attribute anything to the defects of system is the subter-
fuge of convicted mediocrity.' (Hear, and a laugh.) Medio-
crity succumbs to system ; ability dominates over it, and
forces men to a better course. Public zeal, seconded by
public ability, will drive almost any system into the right
course. But that has not been the case here ; and one of
the most distressing circumstances, in contemplation of all
thet has been produced before the committee, is not so much
the defect of the system, which may be remedied, but the
extent of mediocrity which pervades the departments.
(dear.) It is that feeling, I apprehend, which has led very
generally the people of this country to the belief that it is
absolutely necessary, for the future, to adopt a new prin-
ciple in the selection of officers for the public employment.
My lords, I entirely agree in that view. It is my
belief that the best of all Governments is the Govern-
ment which affords the greatest facilities for obtain-
ing the assistance of the ablest men in the public service.
( Hear.) It was upon that principle that I opposed the
Reform Bill. I said it was not calculated to produce in
the House of Commons the ablest men. Was I right?
(Cheers.) Is the House of Commons more distinguished
by ability than it was in former times? Have we not
been c. :spelled to use up all the old men in the House of
Commons because the regenerated House of Commons has
not been able to produce young men of equal ability?
(Laughter.) I am in favour of administrative reforms
precisely on the same principle. I desire to see the ablest
men in the public service. (Cheers.) I can recollect well,
many years ago. being much struck by the observation of
a great philosophical historian who treated of the success
and grandeur of the Roman Republic. He compared the
whole circumstances of that republic with the circum-
stances of other States which appeared to have greater
chances of progress, and he said, " The cause of the suc-
cess of the Rowan Republic has 'been this :—the great vir-
tue anti the great ability of a few great men." (Cheers.)
It is, therefore, as far as I can further the object of bring-
ing able men into the public service, that I altogether
adopt the principle which is generally received at the pre-
sent time. My lords, I recollect having heard that Mr.
Pitt once said that in the whole course of his life he had
hardly been able to give more titan three or four situations
to
vaermy opsrto powerfulmintl.
tMinlirsetepre,rasomn
as
nhoef wa ivsehreyd
bold,. eat
manhe
owasof
a
One of the best securities for the proper discharge of pub-
lic duties is to have a man of very proud mind ; yet so
encompassed was Mr. Pitt by the trammels of Parliamen
tary Government that, with all his strength, such was the
result of his experience. Anti what was the result of his
policy.
Failure in war was the result of all his ability.
(Hear.) Notwithstanding all the sacrifices of the country
ens all the courage of the troops, the general character of
the military operations of Mr. Pitt was failure, and that
failure very greatly to be attributed to the action of that
necessity which did not permit him to look abroad for the
ablest wen. (Hear, hear.) How different were the cha-
racter and conduct of his great father? He disdained those
trammels; he acted independently of them; he selected the
fittest man wherever he was to be found; be restored con-
fidence to the people ; he restored victory to our arms ;
and are eve, who eulogise his character, who admire his
genius, who glory in his success—are we to shrink from
applying to our own times his principles, as involving too
great a sacrifice to the weakness of modern government ?

(Loud cheers.) How much more powerful would be the
position of a Minister -.131e to select men best fitted for the
public service? How much more agreeable would be the
possession of office if he had the boldness so to act. ? He
would then feel, whatever might happen, whatever might
be the success of his Government, he had at least performed
the moral obligation he incurred. (Hear, hear.) But,
my lords, how can we, sitting here by the hereditary right
conferred, for the most part, upon our ancestors, for
their services to the State, for their fitness for public
employment, how can we refuse to adopt that prin-
ciple? It is the princple of our own origin. (Cheers.) It
was because my father was a great lawyer, not because he
was a party man, that he was selected on account of fitness
for a great office, that ,of Chief Justice of the Peas. He
had no family, no connections; he rose altogether by his
fitness. (Cheers.) It was not favour; it was fitness that
made Mr. Yorke chancellor and earl. (Cheers.) It was
not favour, it was fitness, that made Sir James Harris, the
great diplomatist, Earl of Malmesbury. (Cheers.) It was
not favour which raised the father of the noble lord oppo-
site (Viscount Canning) to that office the reward for which
was the peerage which the noble viscount now holds.
(Cheers.) It was not favour which raised the brothers
Cecil to he Ministers of Elizabeth and of James, and the
founders of two great families. We are here for the services
of our ancestors. Is it for us, then, who sit here by that
great right, and enjoy dignity and honour by reason of their
services and their fitness for public employment—is it for
us to turn round and say, "It is tree our ancestors rose by
fitness, but our relatives shall enjoy advantages from con-
nection with us, and from favour ?" (Cheers.) No ! I trust
your lordships will adopt a different view of the interest
and honour of this house. I trust you will agree on this
occasion to place yourselves in the front of the people and
at the foot of the throne to state their complaints and their
dissatisfaction. (Hear, hear.) I trust you are fully im-
pressed with the greatness of the crisis in which we stand,
and that you feel all the dangers of the contest in which
we are engaged. I feel myself that during this contest,
protracted as it will be, we shall often have need of the
support of the people. I desire to secure that support
by identifying this house with public opinion. I desire to
,place the country on our side. I desire that we should
present to the enemy we have to encounter the aspect of a
united people, and that we should obtain a secure and
honourable peace by acting together—Parliament supported
by the general affection and co-operation of the country.
(The noble earl, having moved the address, resumed his
seat amid general applause.)

Lord PANMURE said,—My lords, after the very consis
derable notice which has been given of the address which is
now in your lordships' hands, I certainly did expect that
we should have heard that address recommended to us in
a speech of much more power and ability than that just
delivered by the noble earl. I have studied this address,
and I must confess that seldom has it fallen to my lot to
read such a concoction of assurances as those which are
proposed for your lordships' adoption. They commence
with truisms which no man can contradict ; they continue
with congratulations in which every man must unite ; they
proceed to accusations of misconducti in which those who
are accused are most indistinctly portrayed ; and they con.
elude with representations which, I think, the noble earl,
according to his own admission, has gathered from public
meetings lately held—that until the proper men are placed
in the proper places the hopes of the country for an ho-
nourable peace will never be effectually realised. Or, my
lords, to use the quaint expression of my friend, Mr.
Drummond, until the square men shall be put into the
square holes and the round men into the round holes ;
or, as may be still further gathered from the tenour of this
address, until that party' with which the noble earl has
now permanently associated himself shall turn out this
Government and occupy their places, that nothing will be
right in the conduct of the war and that no honourable
peace can be obtained. It is quite impossible for me to
meet the noble earl's motion with a direct negative. To a
great many parts of the noble earl's motion I can give my
cordial assent. (Cheers.) But the noble earl must know
that from the whole design and object of that address the
Government must dissent, and they cannot butrecognise in
it a censure to which they cannot submit. It will therefore
be my duty, my lords, to move that this question be not put
—not to give a direct negative to it, but to prove to your
lordships that her Majesty's Government appreciate the
character it is intended to bear, and to give it their most
strenuous opposition. Now, I beg to draw sour lordships'
attention to the character of this address. Who will ven-
ture to deny the justice of the phrases used by the noble
earl with regard to the gallant heroes belonging to our
naval and painters, services who have distinguished them-
selves in their country's cause during this war? (Cheers.)
Who will undervalue the patience with which our army
have undergone the sufferings to which they have been ex-
posed? Who will venture to underrate the gallantry with
which both officers and men have performed every duty to
which they have been called ? There is no one who regrets
more deeply than I the sufferings that have attended the
army of the East. But, my lords, I cannot admit that all
these sufferings have arisen from the misconduct of the
Government at home—l cannot admit that these sufferings
have pressed upon the army from the neglect of proper
means having been taken by the Government' at home.
We must all recollect that when our army took the field
England bad been at peace for 40 years. We may remem-
ber that during that 40 years Government alter Govern-
ment have vied with each other, not in extending the
military education of the army, but in economising the
finances devoted to that purpose. We may remember that
it was only yesterday that the Commander-in-Chief of this
array stated in evidence before the House of Commons that
during the Government of the noble earl opposite (the Earl
of Derby) the artillery had been reduced by that false
economy—(" No, no !" from the Earl of HARDWICKE and
other peers.) If the noble earl will be pleased to listen he
will probably find that to what I am saying he ought to say
"Yes, yes," rather thah "No, no." I was not proceeding to
fix a charge against the Government of the noble earl oppo-
site. I said, what was stated by the noble viscount (Lord
Hardinge), that during the noble earl's Government, from
the false economy previously practised, the artillery had
been reduced to a state from which the Commander-in-
Chief and the Master-General of the Ordnance, during the
period of the noble earl's Government, erected it into the
condition in which it was found upon the opening of the
war. (Cheers) And so it was with all our military esta-
blishments. What little we had was regimentally perfect
in its way, but it was not calculated to undertake great
operations, and I am sure that the people of this
country will make the allowanceenecessary for an army in
the field under the circumstances in which they were placed.
The noble earl has attached great blame to the Govern-
ment because our force was sent into the field incapable of
movement. Now, it igiNquite true that there was no land
transport attached s "that time to the army. The old
waggon train had been abandoned—nothing had been set
up in its place by the Government, and when the army
was called upon to take the field it was natural to suppose
that the means of transport would be sufficient. But, my
lords, I am bound to say' that every means were taken to
make that transport as complete as possible, and I cannot
believe that it was from the want of the means of moving
our army from Varna that they did not advance to the re-
lief of Silistria. I must say that in these resolutions I re-
cognise not, as the noble earl would have us to suppose, the
mere desire that the Government should be carried on
by the best men without any reference to their con-
dition or party connexions, but I recognise in them a
general censure of the Government for the conduct
I recognise the ofresells-
tnnoble(ilener' arlharaes, puttinghaer.)
upon the Government a
° the s
ofwar.
the
full and entire responsibility for the whole sufferings of the
army, for the position in whichour army has been placed, and
for the state in which, according to the noble earl, it lies at
present. Now, my lords, there has been much said as to the
state and condition of our army. I have already stated that
it is quite true that that army during the winter season
suffered extremely in its position before Sebastopol. I have
already stated that, from circumstances over which the Go-
vernment of that time had little or no control, there was a
deficiency of housing and of supplies of clothing and food,
which, however, during the last four months has been en-
tirely remedied, and at this moment I am entitled to say
that our army is in as good a condition as when it left this
country, and that it is as prepared to take the field and carry
on any operations which may be assigned to it as it has ever
been from the commencement of the war. I see the noble earl
doubts that statement. He knows the strength of his position
and the weakness of mine. He knows that he may with
safety make statements about the strength and power of our
army ; but he also knows, on the other hand, that I am
unable, by document, to give that detailed contradiction
which I say, on my character as a Minister and a gentle-
man, I am quite prepared to give to it. (Hear.) Bift, my
lords, with reference to that army, from the beginning of
February, in a great measure owing to the precautions
previously taken by my noble friend (the Duke of New-
castle), and owing to the steps taken by the Government
who were in power previously to the present, that army
began gradually to resume its condition, and to gain in-
creased efficiency. From the early part of February that
army began to shake itself clear from the effects of sickness,
and the supplier to the army were impro-ed, both in the
time of delivery and the quantity supplied. And, my
lords, it will hardly be believed, when the noble earl talks
of the state and condition of our army, that it has cot
only been increasing in efficiency, but that regularly,
since the beginning of March that army has been deriv-
ing reinforcements from this country and the Mediter-
ranean, which have put it in as vigorous a condition
as it has ever been. But, my lords, the noble earl has given
us a speech on the question of the selection for the proper
places of the fittest men who can be found in the public
service, but during the whole of that speech, and at its
conclusion, I have not gathered that the noble earl has put
hand upon a single instance —(cheers)—either in which fit
men are found in unfit places, or that he has convicted the
Government of making any selection of unfit men, which
k the noble earl has thought it worth his while to adduce.
(Hear.) Whether the noble earl at first intended to charge
the Government with having selected unfit men for their
places in tire military direction of this war, and has since
changed his mind, I am unable to say. (Cheers.) But I do
most heartily congratulate the noble earl, and I do most
heartily congratulate your lordships' house, that you are
not called upon to look at this question in this light—
(hear)—for I know that no more unpatriotic course could
be taken, or one more dangerous to a successful issue of
the war, than that your lordships should by any vote and
act of yours lead the commanders of our armies, or
even its lowest heads, to suppose that Parliament is dis-
posed in any way to do them an injustice, or to reflect
upon their acts, while they were devoting their best ener-
gies and mind to the service of the country. (Hear. hear.)
Well, my lords, is it in civil employment that the noble
earl finds that improper men have been selected. I think
that if he advanced such a chargoas that, it was his duty at
least to point out some instances in support of it, that we
might know the direction in which the noble earl's com-
plaint tends. But, however, he his chosen to lay hishand
upon no particular instance. It is sufficient for him to dis-
parage all public men—(hear, hear)—by a vague and uni-
versal assertion, leaving everybody to select for himself the
instances which the noble earl might have pointed out to us,
but which ho has to-night utterly failed to do. But the
noble earl went on to express some opinions in connexion
with this subject to which I, at least, cannot give my as-
sent. He says that he opposed the Reform Bill be-
cause he thought it limited the choice of the best men
for the public service. (" No, no !" from the
Earl of Ellenborough.) He said that, under the old con-
stitution of this country, you had men in Parliament who
were fit to carry on the business of the State, but that as
soon as the reformed Parliament was established those men
of ability were succeeded by men who were not equal to
thosetion
3 had been disappointed,
who
nd i ft n the public expec-
tthat that reform, which
in its origin was a measure that was obnoxious to him, had,
when tried by experience, proved a failure in its results.
Now, my lords, I cannot adroit that the Reform Bill has
proved
I any such failure. I think that there have been
many men returned to Parliament since the passing of that
measure who have taken a part in the conduct of public
affairs which has done them great credit. (Hear, hear.)

I believe that the Reform Bill is still capable of furnish-
ing the country with men well qualified to ainsiniiter
its Government, and I am afraid that, so far at least
as this argument goes, the noble earl will find but 1
little sympathy from those who aro otherwise asso- 1
ciated with him upon those questions. But, if I mis-
take not, the noble earl went even further, and talked of
the contrast which now exists between public men in Par-
liament and public men on the platform in this country.
The noble earl seems to think that Parliament formerly
led public opinion in this' country, and that now public
opinion too much leads Parliament. My lords, I am one of
those who think that public opinion is right in leading
both Parliaments and Governments. To a certain extent,
no doubt, Governments and Parliaments ought so far to
understand public opinion as in some cases to forerun it,
but, according to the constitution of this country, I hold
that wholesome public opinion, which is formed neither
too rapidly nor too precipitately, ought to lead both Go-
vernments and Parliaments, and I for one should be sorry
to see public opinion in this country taking its cue from the
Government of the day, or even from the dictation of Par-
liament itself. (Hear.) And now I come to consider another
point--damely, that the resolutions of the noble earl seem
intended to cast censure on her Majesty's Government.
The effect of that censure upon the Government, if your
lordships should think fit to pass it, cannot be but too appa-
rent. My lords, I think it is worthy of your serious consi-
deration that three months have scarcely elapsed since we
had a political crisis of perhaps the most extraordinary de-
scription which ever occurred in this country. During that
crisis the opportunity of forming a Government was offered,
I think, to no less than four distinct individuals. It was
offered, among others, to the noble earl opposite, (Lord
Derby) of whose party the noble earl who moves this address
then formed a distinguished member. Three months ago the
policy of the preceding Government with regard to the
whole management and conduct of the war stood exactly as
it does now. Their neglect to follow out the views of the
noble earl in the Baltic, and in the expedition to Gallipoli,
to Constantinople, to Varna, and subsequently to Sebasto-
pol itself, then occupied precisely the same position as it does
at this moment; and so, too, the same remark holds good
with regard to their omission to carry the war into Asia.
Yet at that time, when the Government was offered to the
noble earl opposite, and when the noble earl who brings
forward this resolution was to have filled a post in the
Ministry which would have enabled him to correct those
errors, or, at all events, to try and remedy them, the task
of forming an Administration was, nevertheless, delibe-
rately declined by the noble earl's leader; and, therefore,
I hardly think it is fair now for the noble earl to pass a
censure upon the present Ministry for that position of
affairs which he himself had the opportunity to grapple
with and to rectify, by being called upon to assist the
noble earl near him, who received authority from the
Crown to form a Government. But, my lords, is it, I ask,
for the good of this country is it for the advantage of the
conduct of the war—is it safe, even in a constitutional point
of view, to be recurring within the space of three short
months to fresh changes in the Government, and to agitate
the country from the one end of it to the other? This, my
lords, is a serious question, on which, I say, you will do
well to deliberate before you determine to adopt the address
of the noble earl. I may here just observe that, so far as
this is a matter of mere personal consideration for my
self and my colleagues, we would be ready to put it en-
tirely out of sight. The public must, I think, by this time
know that it is no bed of roses to undertake the adminis-
tration of the affairs' of this country at any period, but
more especially during the present most responsible and
eventful crisis. So far, therefore, as personal consider-
a,tions are concerned in our retention of office, they are
entirely of a secondary nature. But I must take leave to
warn your lordships against these frequent changes of the
Government. (Hear.) I must warn you that it is not upon
any slight or mere party grounds that these changes ought
at such a time to take place ; it is not because one party
would wish to turn out another; otherwise the public may
speedily be led to say, " A plague on all your parties !" and
put an end to constitutional government altogether. (Hear.)
I warn your lordships seriously against consequences of this
kind, and I think it is a sufficient argument to point to
the recent changes which have taken place, and to indicate
the dangers of your repeating jhose changes, with,
perhaps, worse results. I therefore bag your lordships to'
pause before you commit yourselves to the adoption of this
address; and I entreat you rather to seek by rejecting it,
to calm down the minds of the people on the subjeot of
change; to enable the executive Government to carry out
the plans which it has in view with reference to the con-
duct of the war ; to show the commanders of your armies
that they may trust with confidence in the instructions
which they may receive from a Government which has had
time to mature those plans ; and, above all, I implore you
upon no trivial grounds, especially at such a juncture as this,
to give effect to a vote the result of which can only be to
settle nothing, for the noble earl proposes no settlement of
anything—but to disturb the existing state of things, to e-un-
settle public affairs, and to jeopardise the result of the great
war iu which we are now engaged. (Hear.) The noble lord
concluded by moving the previous question.
The Earl of HARDWICKE said that, in rising at that
early stage of the debate, he felt his own incompetence to
deal with the question before their lordships in a manner
befitting its gravity and importance, but at the same time
having from the beginning been impressed with strong
opinions, which he had never concealed, as to the manner
in which the war had been conducted, he was desirous of
availing himself of that opportunity of laying before the
house his views somewhat more',in succession and detail
than he hed yet been able to do. Omitting from the reso-
lutions now under discussion that portion which touched
upon out-door agitation, or any topic of that description,
he was disposed distinctly to agree with the noble earl who
had just sat down that the latter part of the motion ex-
pressed disapproval of the conduct of the war. With that
expression of disapproval heentirely concurred. Everything
he thought had not been done to enable the country to
achieve success in the war in which it was now engaged.
In the first place,
_he felt convinced that if a different
,course of policy had been adopted by the Government be-
fore Russia had crossed, the Pruth, if they had announced
to the Emperor of Russia that a cordial understanding
existed betwen France and this country, and that
we were determined to form an alliance offensive and defen-
sive with France for the purpose of preventing the over-
throw of the-Ottoman Porte, and if our fleets had then en-
tered the sea which the Emperor bf RussiZ considered his
own, the war might altogether have been avoided. If, too,
after the war had begun a more vigorous line of action had
been taken, and if, instead of indulging in-bravado and
braggadocio, and unduly exciting public expectation, the
Government had shown greater judgment in the handling
of our fleets, a greater measure of success might-have been
obtained. If the Government had conducted the war, upon
the principles upon which they professed to enter into it—
for the defence of the integrity of the Turkish empire—if,
remembering that we were a great maritime and not a
great military Power, they had determined to exhibit
tin; might of England in that manner in which it could
be exhibited with the greatest effect, if they had de-
spatched a combined force of 10,000 British and 20,000
French soidiers to assist the Turkish army on the Danube,'
and had completely blockaded the Baltic and Black
seas, equipping our fleets in such a way as would enable
them to carry on a flotilla warfare on the coasts, the Con-
gress of Vienna would have had a better chance of arriv-
ing at a successful termination, and our army would not
have been placed in the position in which it now was. Our
fleets would have been really more useful, and there would
have been a better prospect of bringing-the waeto a success-
ful conclusion than could possibly be the case from running
our heads, as we had done, against one of the strongest
fortresses in the world. To institute a blockade of the
enemy's ports was one. or the most successful modes of
waging warfare which a maritime country like this could
adopt, and yet, with great naval resources at their com-
mand, the Government had failed to do this in a com-
plete and efficient manner. In the case of the White
Sea the Government certainly had a very good answer
in the manner in which the trade was carried on be-
tween this country and that part of the Russian do-
minions. It appeared that remittances were sent
out from this country ono year, and the cargoes
sent thence in return in the following year, and
there was every reason therefore why no blockade should
be instituted until those cargoes had been 'lespatched for
which the money had been paid. In the Baltic a thorough
blockade had certainly been established, though the result
of it had been to throw the whole commerce of Russia in
that quarter into the hands of Prussia, just as the manage-
ment of our armies in the seat of war had resulted in throw-
ing two of the finest provinces of the Turkish Empire into
the hands of Austria. These two German Powers therefore,
instead of assisting us to bring the war to a successsul ter-
mination, were far more likely to desire the continuance of
a state of things from which they were so great gainers.
But the maritime policy of the Government in the Black
Sea was calculated to excite the' greatest dissatisfaction.
The Government, indeed, rover seemed to have made up
their minds what they should do in reference to the blockade
in that quarter, for on the let of June, 18 54, the First Lord
of the Admiralty stated in the other house, in answer to
Mr. Horsfall, that orders had been given to the admirals,
both in the Baltic and the Black Sea, to institute and en-
force strict blockades, and that there was every reason to
believe that those blockades had been instituted ; and yet
nearly a year after in that house his noble friend opposite
(Earl Granville), in answer to a question from the Earl of
Airlie, gave their lordships to understand that a blockade
had not been enforced in the Black Sea, but that the atten-
tion of the admiral had been directed to the subject, and
there was every reason to believe that his measures for that
purpose would be successful. Such conflicting statements
as these were calculated to mislead the mercantile commu-
nity, to induce them to take steps which the actual circum-
stances of the case did not warrant, and finally to throw
them into a state of doubt and uncertainty which
entirely put an end to all commercial operations. The
consequence was, that the trade of the foreigner had been
conducted with facility; while it was impossible for' our
own countrymen to carry on their mercantile transactions.
Now, the trade of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff
together was of very considerable Magnitude, oonsieting,
as it did, of articles which peculiarly belonged to the
trade of this country—of wool, linseed, and corn. In 1854
there arrived at Constantinople, from Russian ports in the
Black Sea, 453 vessels with linseed, containing 770,000
qua-tern, exclusive of ships containing other cargoes. It
was a singular fact that this trade was continually increas-
ing, for in 1352 only 415,000 quarters arrived at Constan-
tinople, and in 1853 640,000, while in 1854, as he had
stated, there arrived 770,000. Out of the 453 vessels which
convoyed these cargoes no less than 333 passed the Straits
of Kertch, coming from the Sea of Azoff. Now, ho was
sure that if the navy of England in the Black Sea had not
been made subservient to the use of the *army, it would
have been enabled to perform the great and important
duty not only of carrying out an effective blockade, but of
conducting upon the shores of the Euxine'and of the Sea
of Azoff a system of guerilla warfare which would have
tended to harass the enemy and to create an important
diversion. There was, however, one important point
connected with the transport service to which he
hoped he might be permitted to refer. It was found
essential, from the progress of science, to conduct operations
with steam power, and a large expenditure was incurred in
that respect. It was of the utmost importance that the ar-
rangements for coaling ships should be as complete as pos-
sible, but at Constantinople, Malta, and Gibraltar, he be-
lieved that the arrangements were very defective. He
would ask their lordships toconsider how defective arrange-
ments in that respect entailed a heavy expenditure on the
country. He would take the case of a ship of 2,500 tons,
engaged at a rate of 50s. a month per ton ; that was about
2001. a-day. When the ship arrived at Constantinople
and required to be coaled, the arraegements,were so bad
that only 30 tons of coals could be put on board in a
day, whereas, in a good coaling yard, the same quantity
could be shipped in an hour; and taking the price
of coal at Constantinople at 31. a-ton, the ship would
be coating the country 290/. aelay, while she was unne-
cessarily detained doing nothing. It was of the utmost
importance, not only that the arrangements for putting

coals on board the ships should be as efficient as possible,
but that there should always be a sufficient supply of coals,
and that that supply should not be dependent upon the
direction of the wind. There was at Plymouth and in the
Medway a number of hulks, which might very easily be
fitted up with steam power and employed in carrying coals
from this country, and then there would be no necessity to
rely upon sailing vessels for a supply of coals from Malta
or Gibraltar. He would also endeavour to facilitate the
means of coaling in those districts. He trusted that he
should be excused for entering into those details, for they
formed part of the subject under consideration, and, if not
attended to, the cost of the war would be enhanced to an
enormous extent. Vessels were now in a great measure
dependent on, for their motive power, a most expensive
fuel, which, if rendered scarce in those districts, might
rise to 101. a ton. Though the noble lord opposite
(Lord Panmure) was not responsible for all that had
taken place, still some blunders had occurred since
he had accepted office. A noble !tarsi had already pointed
out that a vessel which received a body of troops on
board was obliged to unship them, owing to some misun-
derstanding, and be (Lord Hardwicke) was informed that
some curious blunders had lately been made, showing that
these departments were still in a state of " higgledy-
piggledy," and required watching with the greatest care,
or the country would be put to the greatest expense, and
the army involved in the• greatest difficulty. The other
day it was desired to erect, at the seat of war before Sebas-
topol, some hospital huts for convalescents, and the engi-
neer whose duty it was to erect them found that the Go-
vernment had sent over the huts in three ships, of which
only one had arrived in the harbour at Balaklava. That
ship, however, had only brought the roofs and floors ; the
ship that was next coming had the walls on board, and the
ship behind carried the windows and doors. Under these
circumstances the engineer was completely paralaysed, for
be could not put up the huts until the second and third
ships arrived. (Hear.) He would repeat another anec-
dote he had heard. A quantity of harness was sent to the
Crimea, and, when the cases were opened, it was found
that they contained no back traces, so that the harness
was of no use at all. A noble lord had described the army
as an army with a head and a body, but no legs, so that it
could not move. However, to facilitate that operation, a
number of American lumber waggons were sent to the
Crimea. Those waggons were fitted with poles, but not
shafts • and, though there was harness ready, it appeared
that it made for shafts, and poles ; and there was no
harness for leaders. These blunders, when elf put to-
gether, were fatal to the prOgress of the war and to the
success of our arms, and, as he intended to give his vote
for the resolutions, only performed his duty in showing
that everything had not been done to enable our forces to
achieve success. (Hear, hear.)
The Earl of ELGIN said it was with very great reluctance
that he was about to trespass for a few moments upon the
attention of their lordships, more especially as the noble
earl who had given way to him had much greater
claims on their notice ; but as he (the Earl of Elgin) had
been absent from this country for some time, he feared that
a silent vote on the subject before their lorcHhips' house
might be liable to misconstruction. He had intimated to
the noble viscount at the head of the Government his desire
to give him an independent support; but it had also ap-
peared to him that, in the critical circumstances of the
country, it was the bounden duty of every public man to
tender a hearty and generous support to the Government
of the Queen ; and he had now to determine whether cir-
cumstances had occurred which should induce him to join
in a vote condemnatory of the Government. Nothing had
occurred in the interval to make him regret that the'pledge
of support he had tendered was not unqualified. Neither
in the Crimea nor at Vienna had any successes which had
attended the exertions of the Government been so complete
as to cause the germ of hope he had reposed in the admi-
nistrative ability of the noble viscount (Palmerston) to
ripen into perfect confidence. (Hear, hear.) But when
asked to unite in a vote of condemnation on the Govern-
ment, he had to ask first, was the condemnation just;
and rext, would it contribute towards the redress of
the evils the existence of which all deplored ? Now, it
was notorious that the condition of the army in the Crimea
had of late very much improved, and that the Government
were prepared with a scheme for the reorganisation of the
military departments ; and to condemn the Government
in the face of these things would be a violation of justice.
The noble earl who proposed it kept Out, of sight the
changes which had lately occurred in the Government, and
charged all the blame supposed to attach to the conduct of
the war upon the present Administration. The first part
of the resolutions referred to the general conduct of the
war, and was conceived in terms of exuberant exultation.
Not a word of national friendships of long standing broken ;
desolation carried into many happy homes ; Europe in
arms ; Asia agitated to its centre ; America sullenly ex-
pectant. The latter part of them was couched in terms of
exuberant denunciation. Bat the departments impugned
by the latter part of the resolutions had been changed,
and the departments alluded to in the former part re-
' mained in the same hands. And the doctrine of govern-
mental responsibility could not be carried so far as to
make the present Administration responsible for the blame
attached to the military departments of the former Govern-
ment. Even, however, if he could concur in the censure
proposed to be cast upon the Government, he should be un-
willing to do so in favour of the noble earl opposite, and
thus to bring about a change of Government at a time when
it was most objectionable to have frequent changes of Admi-
nistration. He happened to be on the Contine: tat the
time when the last change of Government took place, and
the most painful impressions were created in foreign coun-
tries as to the instability .A our administrative system in
consequence of these frequent changes of administration.
And not the least of the calamities which the war had
brought upon us was the tendency which it had in many
quarters to throw discredit on our constitutional govern-
ment. (Hear.) The only loss which was really irrepar-
able was the loss of character. (Hear,) Still there was 4,
large measure of consolation. As to the military depart.
ment, the character of the British soldier for moral quali-
ties and physical endurance had been raised to an extent
it never had attained before. In spite of the unfavour-
able tone of a portion of the American press, he had seen
in influential journals of the United States commentaries
on the conduct of our army at Alma and Balaklava which
no true-herrted Englishman could read without emotion.
And he had heard tribute not less generous borne
to them by our French allies. He had heard,
also, from bigotted votaries of that branch of the
Christian Church which prided itself on having re-
tained within italimits room for the exercise of the heroic
virtues of Christiania y, a frank admission that the hospi-
Itals at Scutari had shown that the fairest and choicest
flowers of Christian charity would bloom even in that
which they were accustomed to call the arid soil of Pro-
testantism. (Hear.) He doubted if the character of states-
men, and public men, and of Parliamentary institutions,
had proportionably risen: (Hear.) It was notorious that
doubt had been created, in quarters where it never had
existed before, as to the practical efficiency of our much-
' vaunted constitution, and its fitness to carry us unscathed
through periods of peril. (Hear.) There was only one way
in which these doubts could be removed. Let public men
evince the same indifference to personal motives, and the
same generous patriotism, and the same disinterested de-
votion, to duty, which had characterised our soldiers in this
field and the women of England at the sick bed. (Cheers.)
If—which God forbid--it should be otherwise, and if, un-
Ihappily, in those whom fortune and rank or royal favour
I placed in the van these qualities were wanting, whO
.should dare to blame the press and the people of Eng-
land if they looked for those qualities elsewhere ? (Cheers.)
The Earl of WINCHILSEI said he was compelled
solemnly to declare his conviction that this was an unjust
war, which ought never to have been entered into ; and,
therefore, he founded his support of the resolutions on this:
that the Government had shown 'a want of judgment in
placing the army in a situation in which, humanly speak-
ing, success was impossible, and sacrifice inevitable, with-
out the special intervention of Almighty Providence. He
did not attribute to the Government all the disasters that
had occurred, which ,were partly owing to the impolitic
course pursued, by the other house—in obedience to the re-
publican faction in reducing our military establUments.
The Victualling Office, the Commissariat Board, the Trans-
port• Board, the, Medical Board, all had been affected or
destroyed by these reductions, and the result had been to
render us, upon the outbreak of the war, unready for any
great effort.. The Baltic fleet had left -England in a most
disgraceful state as to its manning ; and it was well for us
that the Russians had not met it. The 'object of the Se-
bastopol committee was to blind the public as to the real
causes of our disasters. He should vote for the resolu-
tions, although not perhaps approving of every part of_
them, because the substance of them was this, that the
Government had shown a want of the judgment and ca-
pacity essential for the conduct .of such a war.
Earl GRANVILLE said he wondered that the noble
lord could support resolutions, the first of which approved
the justice and necessity of the war in which we were
engaged. He disagreed with the noble earl in the opinion
ho had expressed, that if the Russian fleet had come out we
should have suffered. (Earl Hardwicke—Hear, hear.) 'On
the contrary, I regret that the opportunity was wanting to
our gallant sailors of gaining a great victory. (Cheers.)
Tho noble earls who had snoken in this debate had not
agreed in their tactics, and the noble earl who had brought
forward these resolutions had appeared to countenanos, in
supporting the last of them, the line taken by a leading
opposition paper, in representing the families of the
Glowers, the Howards, and the Cavendishes Sitting in con-
clave, and dictating to the Premier the , colleagues he
should choose. (A laugh.) Now, my lords (said the noble
earl), lam a Gower—(a laugh)--but lam the only Gower
who has any official employment. I am related to a Ca-
vendish, and the noble duke at the bead of that house has
not shown himself slow to discover and encourige,konius,
even when found among the very lowest classes of society.
(Hear, hear.) I see near me the heir presutnptive to that
house, who did not shrink at the university from success-
ful competition with the ablest and best-educated men of
his day; nor did he shrink in his private capacity from
aiding the country in any undertaking. And, as far as I
remember, his only relation bearing the name of Caveu-
dish is a gentleman who is fattening on the enormous emofu-
meats attached to the Foreign Office service. My lords,
lam also, I am sorry to say, related to some of the
Howards. (Loud laughter.) Not to " all the Howards ;"
for since the time of Pope they have so wonderfully
multiplied and ...increased— (laughter)—that I believe
Mr. Horace Mann would find them as numerous as the
Smiths. (Laughter.) But the member of the Howard
family selected by the Queen to represent her in Ireland
is certainly not, in the west riding of Yorkshire, or any-
where in-the United Kingdom, considered inimical to the
middle classes. My lords, I may as well make a clean
breast of it—(laughter)—and I must admit that some of
those who have gone before me had such quiversfull of
daughters who did not die 01a maids—(laughter)—that I
have relations on this side of the house ; I have relations
on the cross benches---(hear, and laughter)—and I have re-
htions on the opposition. (Hear, hear, and laughter.),
Nay, I have had-the unparalleled misfortune of having no
less than three cousins in the Protectionist Administration
of the noble earl opposite. (Laughter, and hear, hear.)
Not withs tandingall thesehereditary infirmities--(laughter)
—I have had -occasion, in a career not so brilliant as that
of the noble earl, to mix much with the middle classes, and
to acquire greater sympathy, perhaps, with them than he
possesses—and notwithstanding his adulation. of them, I
doubt if his admiration for their peculiar characteristics
came quite as freely and frankly from his lips as the sneers
in the former part of his speech. There has been on this
subject great misapprehension in the public mind as to the
appreciation by official men of mien distinguished intprivate
business, and the facility of obtaining such men to fill offi-
cial posts. I remember one of the departments abolished
by the House of Commons because it was " too expensive ;"
before that happened it lost its secretary because a com-
mercial company offered him double the salary he was re-
ceiving from the Government. And a friend of mine, at
the head of one of the departments, the expense of which
was found fault with last year, was offered 2,000/, a year
(double that which he receives from the Government) by
a great commercial company—an offer he declined to ac-