The Sun.
London, England, 1855-10-09 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

(From the Daily News of this day.)
At length it seems clear, both from the reports
of Prince Gortschakoff and from the accounts which
have reached us from the allied armies, that neither
is the Russian army retiring, nor all the allied
commanders content with the fall of the town of
Sebastopol as the crowning exploit of the campaign
of 1855. As yet, therefore, neither the gratuitous
advice of the peremptory and prophetic Times, nor
the difficulty of provisioning the Russian army in
the Crimea, has had the effect of driving the Rus-
sians to Perekop. Neither has Prince Gortschakoff
shown any signs of retiring—nor, indeed, do we
believe that he will show any signs of retiring until,
by the operations of the Allies, he is compelled to
take that course. The truth is, as we pointed out
some time ago, the Russians have everything to
gain by delay. If they can only maintain their
present position for two months they will be in a
much better situation for the purpose of conducting
negotiations than if they were now to evacuate the
peninsula. Exasperated as the Russian army and
the Russian people must be by the fall of Sebas-
topol—and that such exasperation is dreaded the
Emperor's manifesto and Prince Gortschakoff's
order of the day are proofs too significant to bo
disregarded—it is obvious enough that the effect
of a voluntary retreat might be such as seriously
to endanger the life or even the dynasty of the
present Emperor. AssureJly it is for no slight
cause that an absolute monarch condescends to de-
fend himself before his subjects in a public mani-
festo.

But whilst the perils of Russia are great, and the
necessity of putting on a bold front is of vital im-
portance to the empire, the necessity under which
the Allied Governments are placed of pushing on
the war with relentless vigour becomes every day,
if possible, more imperative. And, indeed, it ap-
pears, if we may judge from the information which
has reached us, that energetic measures have al-
ready been taken to carry this policy into effect.
Although at first some doubt seems to have arisen
as to whether the military movements communi-
cated by telegraph were correctly represented, and
although some of the public journals seem at a loss
to understand their purport, still we think the gene-
ral scheme of operation is sufficiently obvious—
founded as it certainly is upon well-known strate-
gical principles.
The Russian army, amounting to probably not
less than 150,000 men, occupies the forts on
the northern side of Sebastopol, and a line to
the eastward of some twenty-five miles in length,
extending along the precipitous heights of Mac-
kenzie to Aitodor, and thence north-eastward to
Albat, on the Upper Belbek. Along this enor-
mously strong ridge, strengthened by field works
and a numerous artillery, the Russian main army is
posted ; but in front the Russian commander has
thrown forward strong outposts towards the Tcher-
naya and the Valley of Baidar, to give timely
warning of the movements of the enemy. Besides
this main army, and a division in the neighbour-
hood of Kertch of some 14,000 men, there is another
division watching the Allies, towards Eupatoria,
of probably 20,000 men. On the other hand, the
Allies have determined upon a plan which they are
now endeavouring to carry into effect, namely, to
threaten the Russian communications with Perekop
and the Tchongar road. These roads, which fall
into the great road to Simpheropol, are, it is well
known, the only roads by which the Russians are
supplied with provisions, or by which, in case of
necessity, the army can retreat. In furtherance of
their object, the Allies have already transported
some 30,000 men to Eupatoria, who will be rein-
forced from time to time until a corps d'armee is
collected there sufficiently strong to take the field.
Indeed, according to the latest accounts, a cavalry
affair has already taken place between the French
under General and the Russians,
under General Korif, in which the former appear
Ito have been victorious. The object in thus taking
the field must of course be to intercept the reinforce-
ments, to cut off the convoys of provisions, and in
short to starve the main Russian army. In this
way the Allied Generals hope, no doubt, to compel
the Russian Commander to assume the initiative,
and in fact to put him under the necessity of at-
tacking the Allied army in the position which its
Commander may select as most advantageous. But
whilst the Allies are concentrating their forces
about Eupatoria, in order to occupy the attention'
of the Russian Commander, it was requisite that
their army on the Tchernaya should advance its
outposts so as to threaten the Russians occupying
the Mackenzie plateau and the Upper Belbek. So
long as the main body of the Russian troops occu-
pies this line it is by no means probable that any
attempt will be made to force it, for whether we
estimate its strength from private letters, from
the best maps, or from the photographic repre-
sentations of Mr. Fenton, it seems a position little
less than impregnable. Unless, therefore, the
Russian line is greatly weakened, the Allies will
probably content themselves by merely threaten-
ing it by the display of such an imposing force as
will demand the presence of the Russian army in
their strong position along those heights. Ac-
cordingly, we learn from St. Petersburg that the
Allies have pushed forward a detachment of some
30,000 men as close as possible to the Rus-
sian outposts, that they are making daily recon-
naissances, and indeed that they have already had
a successful affair with the enemy at Urkusta ; and
it is even said that the pass through the mountains
has been forced. It thus appears that the Allied
armies are engaged in a double movement, one on
the north and the other on the south of Prince
Gortschakoff, each dependent on the other; and
the grounds upon which the schemes of operations
proceeds are obvious.
It is of course necessary for the Russian general
to keep his line of battle along the heights unbroken
—for once pierced, the Russian army is lost. At
the same time it is es4ential for him to keep his
communications open with Perekop, and therefore
it is impossible he can endure a corps d'armee
in
his rear. His position, therefore, is obviously full
of peril ; though at the same time that of the Allies
is not without peril also. The peril to the Allies is,
lest the Prince, detaching 80,000 or 100,000 men,
should suddenly fall on the Allied corps at Eupa-
toria, and annihilate it. In this way the Prince
may, from time to time, attack the divisions of the
Allied army separately, and thus succeed in repeat-
ing the exploit which has immortalised the great Na-
poleon, when, abandoning the siege of Mantua, he de-
stioyedtheAustriandivisionsinsuccession. To carry
such a scheme into effect requires certainly a con-
' summate general, of a genius to strike a blow with
an almost marvellous celerity and with overpower-
ing vigour ; nevertheless, as it seems to us, some
such scheme as this must be adopted if the Russian
army is to be saved. For since Eupatoria is dis-
tant from the great road but 25 miles, it is utterly
impossible that any rational commander should al-
low an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men to establish
itself in his rear, and in the line of his communica-
tions, without making some effort to dislodge or
destroy it. At the same time it may cost Prince
Gortschakoff dear should the allies learn that his
line along the heights had been materially weak-
ened ; for then, of course, the army from Baidar
would at once push on, seise the plateau, and so
fall on the rear of the Russians.
If, therefore, we have rightly interpreted the
plans of the allies, it seems that the contest is now
one of pure generalship ' • and a few weeks must
determine whether or not the Crimea is destined
to be in the hands of the allies before the close of
the present season.