The National Register.
London, England, 1809-10-15 00:00:00

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T; e Moniteur of Sept. 28, contains the following observation+
en the London Gazette of Saturday, September 2, containing
the dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosu. On the
paragraph
•6 When entered Spain, I had a communication with Gene-
ral Cuesta, &c."

The Moniteur remarks :—We wish Lord Wellesley to com-
mand the English armies With his character he will suffer
some great catastrophe. It appears, that be has neither spieS
nor any accurate information; which is astonishing iu a counts y
where England has so many partisans. .
" I preferred to go, thinking that the British troops were
mast likely to do the business effectually, &c."
Note.---We believe that his dispositions were made; for we
see in one of his dispatches, that he thought he had only to do
with IQ or 12,000 French, and it was possible that he might
march with 20,000 men againsta corps, which, in his opinion,
consisted only of 10 or 12,000; but he would have gained 'setter
information on his march ; and he would have learned that this
corps of 12,000 men amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat
cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in
der to be able to escape, into impracticable roads. Ceoeral
Wellesley is ineseuSable for not having known that the corps of
the Dukes of Dalmatia; Elchingen, and Treviso, amoutited to
10,000 men, and for having thought he could cover his left flank
against this formidable army, by leaving two battalions at Puerto
Banns. W hat ignorance!
" I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me suf.
tarot for giving up so important a post as Talavera."
Note. ;corral Cuesta did right to leave Talavera; if he had
delayed, he would have been lost. He did wrong to leave two
divisions and 40 pieces of artillery on the Tagus; he lost these;
and this-p:wst, which was the rear guard, was a post of honour ;
General W ellesley ought to have occupied it. 1t is acknowledge,'
in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear guard, according to
the operations, is the post most important to defend ; but
ral Welle3ley had taken the lead, and according to the laudable
practice of his maul), had left to his Mikes the post of danger.
" The enemy stated to he 30,000 strong, but at all events eon- •
sibling of the corps of Soult and Ney."
Nate.—We see, that, even at the time when he wrote, the
English General did not know the force of the French ; he speaks
only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Eleningen, and
appears to have no knowledge of the corps of the Duke of Tre-
viso, 25 battalions strong, and which, since their entrance intn
bpoin, have nut been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If
Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he
tray one day dearly pay for them.
16
.r 4" c had reason to expect the advance of ‘rictor's corps to

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L REGISTER.

653

TataV era, as 900 n. as General Cuerta's march should he known;
and that after leaving 1,2,000 ineo t►► watch Veoegas, and
from.lo to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late actiou, this
corps would have amounted to 25,000."

/i'utc—l'his is a singular calculation which Lord Wellesley
makes of the first and fourth corps, and the reberve. The hrst
Corp, is composed
.of 36 hatialioas, the fourth of 30, the reserve
of 20 battalions, and the cavalry of 40 t•quadrons. Loyd Wel-
lesley had •therefore around him 170 bait:slims and SO or 90

squailrous, an,l he expected to conquer Madrid with YO,OOO men,
We do not speak of the Spaniards; they may be reckoned as of
consequence for plundering single persons, or for defending them-
selves behind a wall, but very little aecnunt can he made Nf theta
in a regular battle, as the English may have been convinced.—
If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his W,OOO men, the w hole
army of Lord Chatham, which went to bury itself in the marshes
of the Isle of Waleherea, he could have derived nothtnz from
his expedition hut disgrace, confusion, and defeat. if the Eng-
lish mean to dispute Spain with France. they must land an army,
if not equal to the Fwnele army, at least two-thirds as stroni:,
that is to say, of at least 150,000 men; fur the Spaniards cannot
he reckoned fur more than one-third Su a regular battle.
Nothing can he more a,tvantageons to France than to have the
Engikh engage in land-w ars; for then,• instead hf conquering
England by sea, we aka Conquer her on the Continent. such is
cunielit shews•to admiration what those arc who direct the Cabi-
•net of London..

Themistocles advised the Athenians to abandon their citadels,
and_take refuge on hoard their ship. It is to be wished that .
the British Cabinet may persist, as it has lwgun, in the plan ►►f
deserting its ships, and throwing itselfupnn the Continent. We
have predicted the humiliation of England; and peace before a
year closes. Before a year shall have expired, the
whate.vec efforts they may make, will be driven out of the. Pe- •
iusnln, and the Imperial Eagle shall.wave on the ftirtre:4es of
Lkbon.

[At the end bf Ike. next paragraph, the Monit cur adds the fol-.
lowing note :]—We shill not continue these notes; it would be
an insult to our readers; the falsehood of the report of Lord
Wellesley
_must be evident to every one. Lord •Wellesley, •
without knowing the force ef the enemy with whom he had to • •
Contend, without being furnished with that which constitutes an
army, advanced to Talavera. The idea of entering Madrid
turned his brain. He took the French army for an army of •
Seapoys. He arrived at Talavera with 25 or 20,000 men.
lie was then joined by 30,000 Spaniards, and with these two
armies he intended to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of SA- •
!lino manceuvrea skillfully to draw him on, and formed a junc-
tion with the 4th corps and the reserve, and, with the King at
their head, marched against the enemy. The Duke of Daliva-
tin, with still more considerable forces'thao those of the King, •
marched upon their rear. Lord Wellingum could not extricate
himself hut h) heating separately the two winks. The Ist and •
4th eorps prescitteel him an opportunity, since they attacked,
without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Duke of •
Dalmatia. The English fought well; the battle of 'Talavera

was doubtful, though the loss of the English was much more '
considerable than our' ; for the French artillery was much •
More numerous. It appears, from a series of mitt plied faults,
the French could not take the positioe oa the 11444 but the
Loglish were beaten back every time they attempted tlf advaece
upon the French. When the 10,9 i.);) men commanded by the
Dake of Dalmatia were at l'iacentia, Lord' Wellesiey
there were not sure than 10,019 iii;•l%., wit' gave hiinieir to
the most riiliculens combinations. lie perceived, •ivisvcCei, the
fully of his calculatiotet, tits extreme imprudence, aud was suf. •
geienily fortunate to sase himself in Portisgal with hi. infantry.
What would have been the case, if, manieuvritig act.ortlits4 to
the principle, of war, the French Art ball only give', oatile
united! Lord IVellia.;ton vat's, " tie want of the trietins of
conveyance presented hint from marching In Madrid." What
would have been the consequence if be 1644mitrehed to Madrid,
and the Duke of Dalmatia had p;nred hinnielf ivetu eel; him ni4
the Trigt:s I He wonid have come with his army to Fr.gace.
lie would have sacriticed brave weft prmatiuption, anti
iguaranee of that of wille:t a General ought not to be
mot.

This-expedition greatly retionibles that of General Moor.. in
the mouth of Novemocr last; hat Moore %c o, moth
pruilcitt, hod Kaved hiioself 1,0041er, and i 11./101• be St/tit:rot cola-
mous losses, thoo half of his are,v reiunieti.itt lioghtlitt. Like
General Moore, Aileherallry aiwtolotird his hmititals, hit
baggage, kit 4 artiiler, and arrived in Portugal K itb ttie half of

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