The Sun.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

stances of the war. And how did the Government propose
to carry that into effect ? They sent an expedition to Sebas-
topol as ancillary to -the attainment of that of jest. He
trusted that they had not demanded from Russia any con-
cession which might be represented by the Emperor to his
people and hie army as inconsistent with thole honour. It
was a most painful thing to touch the honour of a military
power. He did not hesitate to say that we were not in a mi-
litary position in front of Sebastopol which justified us in
asking Russia for such a sacrifice, for, although we were the
besiegers, we were also besieged. Now, if the Government
could obtain any fair concession and stipulation on the part
of Russia tending to diminish her preponderance in the Black
Sea, he would ask how the performance of that stipulation
was to be enforced ? Had former stipulations of the same kind
been enforced ? They had not. How could the Government
without a new war compel Russia to perform any stipulation
she might make for the purpose of diminishing her prepon- 1
derance in the Black Sea ? He apprehended that it would be a
vain attempt; but whatever opinion might be entertained with
respect to the war, he should deeply lament that any reason-
able expectations of making peace should be taken away if a
proposition for terms which could be of no practical benefit
should not be agreed to. (Hear, hear.) As the whole attsn- ,
time of the Government and of a large portion of Europe was
directed to the single question of the reduction of Sebastopol,
it was desirable to look at the reality of the thing, and inquire
what was its rear value. In time of war its value was known
exactly. (Hear, hear.) At present we had a superior force
in the Black Sea. We had blockaded Sebastopol, and de-
prived Russia altogether of that 'moat preponderance which
she would otherwise derive from the possession of the Black
See. No doubt, under peculiar circumstances, the whole of
the Russian fleet might sail from Sebastopol, and strike a
blow, as in the case of Sinope ; but that would have no very
material effect on the results of a war. Practically, Sebas-
topol and the Russian fleet were nullified by the superiority
of our own fleet. Supposing Sebastopol to be taken and
destroyed, in the course of a very few years it would be
restored. The destruction of that place would be only a
temporary advantage. If it was intended not only to take
but to keep Sebastopol, that was a different thing. But if
we intended to maintain Sebastopol we must go a great deal
further. , It would be impossible to maintain 100,000 men
in the Crimea to prevent Russia from occupying Sebastopol.
To do that it would be
.necessary to raise the nations around
the Crimea from serfdom, and to attempt the reconstruction
of the kingdom of Mithridates. (Hear, hear.) Supposing
treaties could be formed under the guarantee of all the greet
powers of Europe for the effectual protection of the princi-
palities against the re-occupation of Russia, then would still
remain the danger of Sebastopol—a danger which no dimi-
nution of five or ten . ships of the Russian fleet would
prevent. There- would be the danger of Russia embarking
40,001:1,or 50,00 men, net( in vessels of war, using them
as a convoy, but in her mercantile navy at Odessa and
all the ports of the Black Sea, and throwing that force sud-
denly noon BoUrgas, getting possession of the Bosphorus, and
so crushing Turkey. It was against that danger that we
ought to guard, and there was but one way of doing so. It
was impossible to nullify to Russia her own possessions. Bat
our ally bad possession of the Bosphorus and Constantinople,
and the only real security would be to create a Sebaetopol in
the Bosphorus, and giving Turkey au army with which, un-
,ter strong fortifications, she might fight her own battles, and
defend herself until her friends could come to her rescue. In
conclusion, he must express his earnest hope that no demand
inconsistent with the honour of the Russian army and people
would lie made—that no demand- would be made which it
would be difficult or impossible to enforce, and which, if en-
femede would not conduce to the security which was desired.
Earl GRANVILLE, in reply to the first objection of the
nohle earl, said that he had consulted the noble earl the leader
oi• the Party opposite es to the period of adjournment, and had
reeeived his approbation of the course proposed. Making full
alaewauce for the ability. and tempe.r of the speech of the nob•e
owl— giving him credit for many suggestions which he had
made to the Government and the house—balancing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the speeches which he had
re ale during the present year, his (Earl Granville's) belie
%vas that, altheugh their lordships might be deprived of the
liable earl's sp'ecches, the iutcrests of the sountry would not
at all suffer on that -accoaut, even if the adjournment should
be for a month. (Laughter, and hear.,) This was not a proper
period to go into a disquisition on foreign affairs. (Heat )
There was hardly amember of their lordships' house who would
not admit that if there ever was a time when it would be
objectionable to drag the Government into a discussion on
sach matter, it was the present—(hear)—and he could cot
help thinking that those who had listened to the noble earl's
speech would ceasider it a great dereliction of public ditty if
any member of the Government were to follow the noble earl
through the various topicsin which he had indulged. (Hear.)
The noble lord had stated that we went to Sebastopol foe 011!'
own objects. Now he was unable to explain the meening, of
that phrase, but he most confidently denied that any singe
step wo had taken in the course of this war bad been taken
with reference -to our own objects. The noble earl next re-
ferred to the insufficiency of our naval operations in the Baltic,
and he gave an-account perfectly differing from the accounts
which the Government had received from the French Govern-
ment of the assistance they would be able to give us in that
sea. He had no wish to hazard any prophecy in oppositien to
the prophecy of the noble earl, but when the noble earl said
our naval preparations were insufficient for the purpose to
which they were to to applied, ho must be allowed to say,
with all due deference to the noble earl's superior knowledge,
that he believed such was not the ease. The force now at the
dispose]. of Admiral Dundas consisted of seven ships of the
line, eight frigates, eight gun-boats, all the vessels having
either paddles or screws, while a large number of vessels of
different sorts could be added in a short time; and on the
whole he might say there was now`a fleet ready for sea of not
less than 101 pendants. How could it be said then, with any
degree of truth, that such an overwhelming force would be
insufficient for the purpose to which it was to be applied ?
(Hear, hear.) - With regard to the army, he was quite un-
able to go into details,' but ho entirely denied -that we bad
suffered loss to anything like the degree mentioned by the
noble
_earl, or that the military prestige of ths country had
fallen in the estimation of Europe. He thought it was a gross
exaggeration when the noble earl said the misfortunes and dis-
asters which had overtaken our army in the Crimea were ex-
aetly like the defeat which Napoleeu met with at Moscow.
'That there had been great disasters:--that there had
great euffering=that there bad been great losses, he did hot
pretend to deny 3 loot eeeenst that their lordships must place
the acknowledgment of the noble earl himself, that our offi-
cers and'men had shown themselves equal, if not superior, to
any army in the world. Add to that the fact that the effici-
ency of our army was such as to enable them to meet the
enemy at any moment, and he thought there would be no
reason for the desponding tone adopted by the noble earl.
When he considered that after the most extraordinary land-
ing that ever took place, and after ,three battles gained by
the invincibility of our troops, we were now in an impreg-
nable position in the enemy's dominions, he did say that it was
giving an unjust notion to the people of this country, as well
as to our allies, of the power we possess, for the noble earl to
indulge in such language as that which their lordships. had
heard to-night. (Hear, hear.) Why, it was notorious to
them all that our army at this moment was being strength-
ened every day in numbers and in health, and above all they
were in the highest
_possible spirits. He believed they were
equal now to any duty which they might be immediately called
upon to perform. (Hoar, hear.) The noble earl next ad-
verted to the weakness of the Government, and he regretted
that instead of a strong Government the cotuttry was nom-
polled to put up with a weak Government. Now nobody
eould regret more than ho did that the Government had
lost some of those eminent men whom the noble earl
and his colleagues failed to obtain when they were en-
deavouring to form a Government; but, at the seine time,
Ministers had not lost all courage on that account; on the
contrary, relying on the honesty of their intentions, they felt
convince) they would be supported by the country, while
. what had passed lately in the House of Commons showed that
the house was inclined to giie them its support. More than
that, looking at the elections that had taken place—looking
at the fact that, in almost every instance where the members
of the Government had to appeal to their constituents, they
had either been returned without opposition or with an over-
whebuing majority—looking still more at the extraordinary
change of opinion which had taken place in the large com-
mercial town of Liverpool, he did believe there was sufficient
proof shown that the people of this country, as well as the
House of Commons, were strongly disposed to give the Go-
vernment their support. (Hear.) At all events, if Ministers
obtained that support without going into details, he could
assure their lordships, for himself and for his colleagues, that
they would show.no want of zeal in endeavouring to obtain
peace, while, on. the other band, they would, as far as it was
possible, shire to support the interest, tho dignity, and the
military reputation of the country. (Cheers.) .
The Earl of MALAIESBURY could not agree with the noble
earl that his noble friend had taken an unfortunate opportu-
nity for pressing his views upon their lordships, with regard
to the present position of affairs in the East, nor did he be-
lieve that his noble friend's speech on the subject would
be detrimental to the public interest. His noble friend bad
repeatedly given his advice to their lordships touching the
conduct of the war and other matters, and where it was not
followed by the Government the neglect had proved to their
disadvantage. Two instances of this neglect immediately
occurred to him. On one occasion, before the commence-
ment of the war, the late Government, and half the present
Government, proposed to ranee the taxes of the country
something like 1,200,000/., and upon that occasion his noble
friend most solemnly warned them that they were commit-
ting an imPrudent act. Subsequent events proved that his
noble friend was correct. What was the second instance in
which his noble friend tendered his advice to' the Government?
Why, it was when he warned them that they had not calcu-
lated sufficiently upon the number of animals required for the
land transport service. That advice, however, was not taken,
and yet almost every misfortune that had occurred to our
army was to be traced to the want of a sufficient land trans-
port. So much, then, for the neglect of his noble friend's
advice. The noble earl opposite said he did not understand
the expression of his noble friend when he said we went to the
Crimea for our own objects. Now, what he supposed his
noble friend meant was, that Austria, France, and England,
with respect to the invasion of theiCrimea, were anything but
of the same opinion. Then the noble earl objected to the com-
parison which his noble friends had made between oar disas-
ters and the disasters which befell the French army in 1812 ;
but for his part he could hardly conceive any analogy more
tree or exact. . The enemy was the same, the time was the
same, and the result was the same. The climate destroyed
the 'army before Moscow, while the climate was the principal
cause of the calamities which had befallen our army before
Sebastopol. But- the noble lord opposite appeared to think
the present a most inopportune moment to offer advice about
the warebut if they were to be tongue-tied upon the subject
of the negotiations now going on, whore was the use of their
attending the house ? (Hear.) Government had declared
their intention mot to introduce matters of domestic policy
pending the war, and if they were now to remain silent upon
questions of foreign policy, -what else was there for them to
touch upon ? But he could not think that it was inconvenient
for the public service that independent members of Portia-
meat should tehder their advice to Government upon the
subject of the war, or draw attention to any important point
that may strike them. Well, then, at this moment the coun-
try was most anxious about what was passing at Vienna, and
their lordships would be, mere dolts if they did not offer some
opinion upon it, or call for seine explanation from the Go-
vermnent. No one could be more anxious than he was that
the honour of :the- country should be maintained ; but this
was the most important moment this .country had seen since
1- te-15, the period of the last congress at Vienna; and their
ltaor.dships would be unworthy of their position if they did not
ovi i sole.
obeaca care
to
rfteih.
oafmot
othohidenatttiopportunityooosplscaask n otf
slightinglyot e
rplacingowo aowtrha
away,
disrespectfully
peace of Europe
Et r h hear. ro.
f)
tbii,;o.:.taeailtnltitnthiecont men who assisted at the last congress(il of Yienufa
th:tn 11,1171.(1:11:
committea,a,, t
ins
westward t,,, t
se au same he hoped the present Government would
ence was, the
security
Rugsla in the Black
we were now reaping the
~uimerz:lneinspoefcti.silui-tteir
Thetrea teiens.earnd
which
sica. were not sufficientlydemandsthey
attended to, and
of that neglect. From
18-z0 before them, it was
1815 down to the present ti,ale Ressia had, step b t • -
creased her territory; and_
.11i
athe knowledge of thyat BC
iorp:11 Iran-
stance and the treaties of is
scarcely credible to the present_. gent.tteiration that one of the prin.
y overthrowing
hich France we e ,
the very dynasty under w
cipal acts of tho congress of Vienna was a treat
. t _ . o thating. ear.)
was taken of
but it also proved the necessity of our taking
events in 1815,
Thin not only showed the short-sigh ed view
GI but material nu.--._ ra from
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• - - ' _ "•aar. t. . -