The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

No 17
'7/ OL. • •

I let:

,',
--(COMMHVICATED TO THE
rjorgYr Btroa ; 'To Coutrit Comoasno.
' EiattoF CIanENDON nrCotirrs.o.. esa.o.uxao.)
1- .orYleDs2% MaY 28,,1855...
• .
M. 1.6 Comte--Lord Westmoreland has obeyed the orders
of his Court in reading to" me a despateh which Lord Claren.
don addressed to him' ort:theAtb. distant, and in which was
enclosed another despatch that his lordship had-mitten to
Lord' powlei;dated the gthonst.
It i§ with a feeling of sliderOtegret ihit we have observed
from: these deounients, of the contents of 'which your Excel+
kmcy's report of the Bth instant had already made us cogni.
sent, that the Government
,of, her Britannic Majesty has not
thought it possible to agree to our final propositions, whose
aim was to obtain the development of the third gnarantee.
Lord Clarendon having made the remark that the details of
these propositions, as fully explained in my despatch of the
13th of April, and which your Excellency read to his lord-
ship, had never reached him in, a formal shape, we hold to
proving that M. Deouyn de l'Huys, who, on his arrival here,
after having had an interview with the Ministers of her
Britannic Majesty, was the interpreter to us of the opi-
nion )ramon to both Cabinets, undertook also when he
left us to explain both to his own Government and to that
of Great Britain our project of an ultimatum, the result,
moreover, of confidential deliberations, in which that states-
man, as well as Lord J. Russell, had constantlytaken,part.
With the view of not anticipating the report of this
Minister, of her Britannic Majesty, nor the overtures which
we knew were to reach London from. Paris, we refrained
from communicating directly to the Cabinet of St. James's
the definitive summary of our propositions, copies of which
I transmit herewith. These propositions, of which the first
comprises five Articles, and the second six, would have been
presented under the form of an ultimatum for the choice
of Russia. You will also find herewith enclosed a copy of a
project of treaty between Austria, France, and Great
Britain, which was intended to serve as a complement to
our plan, and which fixed as a casus belli every aggresion on
the part of Russia of such a nature as to endanger the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
as well as the excessive increase of the naval forces of Russia
in the Euxine.
Lord Clarendon does not attach much practical value to
this latter stipulation, since he says Austria has already de-
clared that she could not admit that the question of peace
or war should turn upon eight or ten ships. But we
may be permitted to remind his lordship of the immense
difference that exists between our attitude in the actual
state of affaairs, while we are still free to determine as to
the question of war, and the contrary position in which
we should be placed were the case of war once clearly defined
and stipulated by treaty. In this contingency no one can
doubt that Austria would scrupulously act up to the engage.
ments she contracted.
Lord Clarendon eis of opinion that the time has arrived for
Great Britain and France to invite Austria to concert with
them, in pursuance of her engagements, upon the measures
for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d December.
Here, however, and first in order, the question presents
itself, what is the object of the alliance ? It is none other
• than the re-establishment of peace upon the basis of the four
common principles. The first two of these principles have
already obtained a complete development in the Peace Con-
ferences. As to the third, we have proposed to our allies, at
the same time binding ourselves, in case of need, to support
it by force of arms, a solution which it is our firm conviction
would be effectual, complete, and agreeable to European in.
terests.
I cannot do better, M. le Comte, in order to make you ac-
quainted with all the reasons that we have to bring forward
to strengthen this view of the question, than to transmit to
you herewith copies of the communications which I have
made to Baron Hubner upon this matter, and which you will
have the goodness also to place before Lord Clarendon.
If Russia, being placed in a position to agree to one or
other of these propositions of the ultimatum, had rejected
both of them, we should then have had proof that sho
will decidedly not give her assistance to the complete
realisation of the third guarantee, in so far as its object
is to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea.
It being impossible, therefore, to do else than consider as ex-
hausted the means of conciliation for bringing about such a
peace as the interests of. Europe, and our own in particular,
require, the Emperor, our august master, decided to have re-
course to arms as a means of obtaining this peace, the want
'of which is 'so generally Telt, and which would miscarry
under the resistance of one Power alone. On the other hand,
so long as an absence of assistance on the part of our allies
puts obstacle's in the way of this last and decisive proof, oar
impartial estimation does not allow us to make the responsi-
bility of the failure of the negotiations fall exclusively upon
Russia.

We are most anxious that the remarks made in this and
the annexed despatch should be of a nature to modify the
impression that our plan in the first instance has produced
upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty.
If, however, despite our wishes, such were not the case, we,
' could only earnestly desire that the chances of war, to which
our allies have determined to leave the task of effecting the
cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, may
soon take such a turn as to attain thieend in a manner that
would appear to them more on a par with their sacrifices than
the solution that we have proposed to them. •
T' To insist upon an international engagement, imposing
upon Russia terms for the permanent limitation of her
naval forces in the Black Sea, is—and we are far from not
i recognizing. it—a right that belongs to the belligerents, since
.they have especially reserved to themselves the power of Ina-
posing, over and above the four guarantees, such particular
conditions as the continuance of hostilities might render ne-
cessary. But we maintain that this mode of solution,
-brought forward absolutely and to the exclusion of every
other method, were it equally efficacious, cannot authorise
out allies to appeal, as regards us, to the stipulations of
treaty of the 2KI of December, and can only be included among such conditions of peace as are alluded to above,
and which the protocol of the 28th of December, when
defining the third guarantee, makes expressly to depend on
the events of the war.
Faithful to our engagements, and attaching, moreover,
the greatest value to the ties that unite us to England, we
shall firmly maintain our present policy, and await the turn
that events may take, and the propitious moment for re-
newing negotiations for peace, in which we will not, under
any circumstances, take Part, except with an unchangeable
determination that they shall lead to a
positive and efficacious
development of the four guarantees.
The language which we propose to hold to Russia, and
which, when held, we will faithfully make known to the
Government of her Britannic Majesty, will be conceived in
the same spirit.

.
Your Excellency
Its annexes to Lord isClarendoruct insted to read this despatch and
them. n, and to give him a copy of

Receive, &c.,

BUOL.

PROPOSITIONS.
FIRST PROPOSITION.
Article I. Tho High Contracting Partiesb,aeianvg_adnetasigreosuos thatf
the
the Sublime Porte should participate in the
good Anderstanding established by the Law
trfti Nationst re-
among 'the various States of Europe, severally engage
spea the Independence and territorial integ,2
Otto-
man Ennpire, gnirantee in common the strict observanceeo thi
engagement, and will in consequence consider every act and
every event which would be of a nature to endanger it as a
question of European interest. If a difference should arise
between the Porte and one of the Contracting Powers, those
two States, before resorting to arms, should place the other
Powers in a position to obviate this continency by pacific

means.
Art. 2. The Russian Plenipotentiaries and those of the
Sublime Porte will propose in common to the Conference
the equal effective force of the naval armaments which the
two sea-bordering Powers will maintain in the Black Sea, and
which must not exceed the amount of Russian, vessels at pre-
sent afloat in that sea.
The arrangement which they shall have made in this re-
spect shall form an integral part of the General Treaty.
There shall also be inserted in the Treaty the measures
which the said Plenipotentiaries shall have agreed to, with a
'flew to enforce the precise and constant observance of the
Stipulations of the present Article.
the 3. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of
ofejrsPhorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty
specified 13.1841, shall remain in force, with the exceptions
his
the following Articles. •
tablishment Ib. of the Contracting Powers which has no es-
to send
from h. .11 the Black Sea will be authorised by a firman
frigAartte.s
5. In
18 Highness
into and station in that sea two
fnesriseOf mailer force.
pertinwith
being menaced ,vent, (which God forbid I) of the Sultan
right of o
allies.straits
he reserves to himself the
g the ,
to all the naval forces of his

SECOND Paorosrriox.
. Article 1. The High Contract' g Powers • g desirous
that the Sublime Porte should participate inthbeelnadvantages
of the good understanditteesetablished by the Law of Na-
tions among the various
Na-
to respect the independence andor t:ur°Pe, severally engage
Empire, guarantee in com rieitorial integrity oithe
Ottoman
in
cozen the strict observance
of this engagement, and will,
qeufence, consider every
act and every event which would be to ger it as a question of European natureinteresatuf a difference
Contracting
endau-
should arise between the Porte and one of
Powers, those two States, before resorting toeams, should
place the other Powers in a position to obviate this centin-
gency by pac,fic means.
Art. 2. The rule respecting the closing of the Strait a
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty
eas t-v-
-of July 13, 1841, shall continue in force, with the exceptions
specified in the following Articles :
Art. 3. Each of the Contracting Powers which has no
establishment in the Black Sea, will be authorized by a fir-
man from his his Highness to send into the station in it two
frigates or vessels of smaller force, in order to protect their
commerce, and to exercise the necessary inspection,
Art. 4. If Russia should increase the amount of her naval
forces at present afloat, as duly defined, the contracting
Powers who do not possess an establishment in the Black Sea
would be authorised by a firrnan of his Highness, by giving a
previous warning of five days, to send respectively into that
sea an additional number of vessels of the same class, equal
to one-half of the naval forces of Russia.
Art. 5. At no time will ships of war of foreign nations be
allowed to anchor in the Golden Horn, with the exception
of the small vessels hitherto admitted belonging to the
Embassies ; and in time of peace the number of ships of the
line of the Contracting Powers which have no establishments
in the Black Sea, must never exceed four at a time before
Constantinople, on their way from the Dardanelles to the
Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles.
Art, 6. In. the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan
being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the

right okpii the. Straits to all the naval forces of the
Allies. 3. kz' -
After the reading .of the six Articles the Russian
Plenipotentiaries would be confidentially informed that, con-
sidering the reservation glade by them in the interpretation
of the first article which il6clines the engagement to enforce
theVeserrvaneo afltte-independence and territorial-integrity
of.tavesthiffataa ,Empii7s4-considering, moreover, their re-
fuaijipAgree to anyJimitation of the Russian forces in the
81aalr..-See.;.-Austria, France, and Great Britain, whilst re-
specting the sovereign rights of Russia, will availlhemsdves
of the same rights by agreeing among themselves by a formal
document-
-Ist. To enforce the-ebservance of the principle established
in the Ist article, in the event of the violation of the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by
1 Russia.

2dly. To consider as a casus belli the increase of the
amount or strength of the Russian naval force in the Black
Sea as regards its effeetive forts at the beginning of the war.
If Russia should herself engage not to exceed that number,
the three Powers would consent not to give publicity to the
Convention.

• PROJEOr OF, TREATY..
Their sties tho-Ereperor of Austria, the Emperor of
the French, and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, desirous of securing the independence
and territotig integrity_ f the Ottoman Empire, and being
respectively desirous of carrying into effect the engagement
stipulated in the - article of the treaty concluded on
the between have named; as
their Plenipotentiaries,- &e., who having examined
their full powers - - have agreed upon the following
articles :
Art. 1. The High Contracting Parties engaged, in case of
need, to empley their armies and fleets in order to attain the
object above specified.
Artitt 4L therefore, one of the Powers which signed the
said treaty of the ' were to commit an aggression
on the Ottoman Empire of a nature to endanger one or other
of the two principles established in the preamble of the pre-
sent treaty, the high -contracting parties, on the appeal of
the Sultawmoink/ proportionally join in defending that Em-
pire in a manner to-be mutually determined and agreed
upon. Y.

Art. 3. An e4ssive increase of the naval forces in Russia
in the Euzine would be considered as an act of aggression,
calling for the application of Articles 1 and 2.
Art. 4. Ratifications.

SECRET ARTICLIS,
Article 1. In the event of Russia augmenting the amount
or the strength of her naval forces ha the Black Sea so as
to reach its effective amount at the commencement of the
war, according to the statement hereto annexed, and if the
remonstrances addressed in common to Russia, as well as the
presence of the allied fleets in the Black Sea, were to prove
fruitless, the High Contracting Powers agree to consider this
fact as giving rise to the application of the third Article
of the Treaty of this day. Consequently they would consider
the existence of such effective force as a casus belli, and
would immediately employ their land and naval forces in
ordent, empof that Power to conform again to those condi-
tioned' equilibrium which are necessary to the interest of
Europe. - w ,
Art. 2, Ratifications. Iroboall NA • •

(4,141.1.4",,t V 11.
(No. 18.) ,
Ties EARL OF. CLA.RRNDON TO THE EARL, OF WRSTSIORRLAXD,
Foreign-office, Juno 2, 1855.
My Lord;--I herewith transmit the copy of a despatch
(No. 17grem. Count Buol to Count Colloredo, with its en-
closures, which have been placed in my hands by Count
Colloredo.
I have told the Austrian Minister that, after an attentive
perusal of these. documents, I could only again express my
regret that proposals to which it,was impossible for her Ma-
jesty's Governraent to agree should have been renewed by the
Austrian Government ; but that the sincerity of our regret
eaultAllot hp-doubted bytount Buol after the many proofs
tliaCher Slajeaty's Government had given of the importance
they attach to the co-operation of Austria in a cause which
concerns her more directly even than it does the Western
Powers, and from which her Majesty's Government could net
believe that her support would now be withdrawn.
I told Count Colloredo that I had already discussed with
him one of the propositions transmitted by Count Baol, and
that the opinion of her Majesty's Government upon it had
been conveered to.your lordship in my despatch of the Bth of
May, and 'eommunicated to Count Buol ; and that the other
proposition beep f9rWarded by your lordship, I
would
read to hi file aeswerwhich was, about to be sent to you.
After reading to Count Colloredo my despatch of May 29
(No. 16) to your lordship, I said I wished to avoid all discus-
sion that might be irritating, and which, from the tone of
Count Vuph's despatches, I was led to think would be useless,
but that there ,were
tChoen nl
itb
eC or
tllyoeref d,eorrin,
some statements in those despatches to
dewe Titre
kreu.pon
In the desp which I should take
Ach to M. de:Hubner, Count Buol stated that
Austria provides a progressive report of much weight and
value to Turkey, by stipulating that for each new ship that
Russia may coustrUct the allies shall be permitted to: make
a proportionate addition to their naval stations in the Black
Sea ; and gat, in the event of the Porte thinking itself
menaced, IF inlay callthe allied fleets to- its aid.
Upon this I begged, to observe that the real object of the
third basis appeared to be lost sight of, and that, so far from
causing the preponderance of Russia to cease, the proposed
conditions would"go to establish a competition for prepon-
derance between the allies and Russia. Such a state of things
would not be peace, butte, constant preparation for war, and
a constant sourcoof uneasiness to Europe.
The Porte, I said, required no permission from any other
Power to call npen its, allies for assistance when threatened
with danger. The Sultan, might at auy time do so of his own
free will • and if the proposal of Austria were
adopted, .1 c ne effectual limitation were placed on the Rus-
sian fleet, that; fleet would be a standing menace to Turkey,
and the Sultan: would be continally- justified in asking
for the aid 4rhisallies, who would be in honour bound
to afford it. if • the danger was imminent, the allied fleets
might arrive 'too late to save Turkey ; but, whether the
danger was inarninegt or prospective, the naval forces
of England ROA Franco ...Ad only 1.3 summoned to the
Black Sea for the purpose of repelling Russian aggression, and
on every such occasion Europe would ha' re to fear, and Eng-
land and FaAnde would have to be prep red for, the renewal
of hostilities" *
Count Buol,in the same despatch says that the common
efforts of.tWallies should be directed to Jimiting the political
power of Ataksia, so as -render it, if not impossible, at least
eminently diffieult, for her to abuse her material resources ;
but that the ceSsation of Russian preponderance in the Black
Sea would only be one of the means towards that end, as the
diminution, or even the total destruction of that fleet, would
no lone be sufficient to deprive Roast tof the advantages
whiclagbe-derives from her geographical position.
Texpressed my entire.coneurnence with Count Buol as to
the desirableness of limiting- the political power of Bessie, ;
"fiiit;lfiete4,4-6f entering upon, a new problem, the practical,
solution of. 44 was,not, even alluded- to by Count Buol, I
thought itivtool•be „more prudent for the allies to confine
themselves to 'the question at issue, which was how to give
effect to the third basis, and to put an end to the preponder-
ance of Ru.ssia;i'n the Black Sea, and as yut no way so simple
or so effectual* been discovered as such a limitation of her ;
naval forces ita that sea as should render their amount con-
sistent with the safety. otTurkey.
In his despatch to Count Colloredo, Co unt Bual expresses
his firm conviction that the proposal of Austria for giving
effect to the third basis would be effect ua 1, complete,. and in
conformity with the jeterest of Europe; • and his Excellency
adds that its rejection by the Western Powers does not per-
mit Austriitito'caSt exclusively upon Russ is the responsibility
of the faileire Of the negotiations.
Upon this I remarked .that England aid France, being at
war with Russia,- and hating made vast sacrifices, must be
allowed to judge for themselves on what, terms they could
make peace consistently with their honour and with the
objects for ovhich such sacrifices had been made, and that
the necessity under which they felt then iselves of declining
the proposals of Austria, proved that, in. their judgment,
those proposals were neither effectual nor complete, nor
likely to be for, the advantage of Europe. But Russia, I said,
had rejected terms that Austria thought reasonable in them-
selves and necessary tor the peace of Eur ope, and that were
not inconsiskent with .the dignity of Russi: a ; and because she
had so rejeeted them, and because the W extern Powers could
not agree to conditions that Austria has ;since proposed, and
/ow, are Altogether different audineffeci mal for their object,
itisitureliiffijUst to say that England . and France oppose
obstacles to peace, and that Russia is no longer exclusively
to blame for' the failure ofthe negotiations.
I muiVaLeYS, said,,,express my rogrer t that Count Buol
should now be of opinion that the proposal to limit the naval
forces of Russia) could only be considered as one of the condi-
tions which the belligerents had expressl; v reserved to them-
selves the right of impetsingbeyond the foe erpoints, and which
the continuation of hostilities might rend 4 :r necessary, for his
Excellency, to the best of My belief, had as )t regarded the pro-
posal in that light, even when discussing it with the Plenipo-
tentiaries of England and France, and he had supported it in
the Conference, and had recommended it 'to the acceptance of
the Russ:an Plenipotentiaries, as the best means for giving
effect to the third basis.
The object of,the.third basis is to put an end to the prepon-
derance of Rusiia in the Black Sea; the lin citation of the Rus-
sian fleet in that sea comes then strictly • within that object,
and is not a distinct and separate proposal apart from the four
tboa"brsi and such as the antes reserved to tl cemselves the right
bring forward, according as the events of the war might
make it necessary4,l
requested Count Colloredo to assure (;cunt Buol that we
did not, as he
project that wouldBuP bpe
esed, exclude by antis lipation any other
and must continue to de,
efficacious; b ut that we declined
cline all such mean s as are manifestly
ineffectual for the objects we have in
Count Colloredo observed that some sacrifice should be
made to secure the alliance of A
I said, I entirely agreed with Austria.
him, and that we had shown
all possible deference to Austria It was solely out of defer-
ence to her that England and Franco
had bases, and had consented to enter agreed to the four
it was to meet the views, and tonpon nega )tiations for peace ;
Austria in a cauie which might be securee the co-operation of
own, that England
and
France
adeptoeurdie red essentially her
would not otherwise have pursued until the events course which they
more distiiiictly defined the relative
po 't' 'vents of war had
Powers.
n of the belligerent
' -
Count Colloredo then adverted to the great interests Austria had at stake, and the risk she we.tda incur by
which
to war with Russia without' being able to reckon u going p
material supportof the Western Powers, "while she wouldonhathve
to fear the ill-will, if not the hostility, of Prussia
and of c
of the German Stat es
some

nsi
to ;hem, and
,lei!
msaaijdeetthya,e,
Gsoevfaerrainfroemat
gqauveestigornei
never failed to make allowance for the &
which Austria thought'berself labouring. it
wantages under
to deci.o#__b_etween the considerations alludedtfo" Austria
Colloredo and the engagements she had entered into by Count
Western 'Powers; but vThitever her decision miotht with the
wEatiSfei-V—iiustria might tale of her own be, _and
interest and
obligation, no effort on the part of her Majesty's Government
e
would be wanting to maintain unimpaired the friendly r la"
tions that now existed between the two countries. -
On the other hand, however, we must claim to be the best
guardians of our own honour and the best judges of our own
interests, and :Austria would have no just cause for complaint
if we decline& io accept conditions which we:might regard as
inconsistent with our honour, and ineffectual for the objects
that England and France had pledged themselves to secure.
—I have dto CLARENDON.
P ' ~
C •s .—Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to
mint t ,
acH., and to give him a copy of it, should his Excel-
lency deal/. C.
e tealave one.

Lord Claia.rl No. 19.
The E
of Westmorland acknowledg
en-erea
communicated to Count Buol, whopromises a speedy reply.
despatch of the 29th of eAsintilh,e wrehiecehiptwaosf

Tux No EARL OF CLARRIbox TO. 20.
TIIE EARL OF WESTXORLAND.
Foreign-office, June 12.
My Lord,—,With reference to your Lordship's despatch
of the sth inst., in which You report that. Count Buol had
stated that his object was not to make a proposition in any
way on behalf of the Governments of England and France,
but entirely independent of them, I have to observe that, as
the propositions were formally submitted to the Govern-
ments of England and France, those Governments, if they
Iliad agreed to them, would in honour have been bound to

abide by them, and to seek no other or better terms ; and
Austria then, in bringing them before the Conference, would
fairly- have been entitled to say that she did so in behalf of
the English and Fi:ench Governments.
I rnuot finper observe that, although Count Buol may
consider that the nomination .of _ consuls was sufficiently
alluded to in the second article of his project, yet England
and France could not consent to delegate to the Russian and
Turkish Plenipotentiaries the settlement of a question of so
much importance as that of the right to appoint consuls in
Russian. harbours for the purpose of superintending the ob-
servance of the treaty.
And, lastly, with respect to the fulfilment of the obliga-
tions contracted by Austria, by the treaty of the 2d of De-
cember, which Count Buol said was a subject more imme-
diately connected with the ultimatum which Austria had
proposed to.address to the Russian Government, in which
Was involved the question of an immediate declaration of
war, I can only repeat that it is the wish of her Majesty's
Governinent to avoid an irritating discussion upon a question
with respect t 3 which tho Cabinet of Vienna appears long
since to have formed its opinion and taken its decision.
I shall, therefore, confine myself to remarking that Austria
has bound herself to concert measures with England ani
France for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d of December,
if peace was not made on certain bases before a specified time.
That time has long since elapsed, and the bases have been re-
jected by Russia ; but the project of Austria would not have
given effect to the bases, and would not have put an end to
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. England and
France were therefore compelled to decline adhering to a pro-
position which, although it may be called an ultimatum,
cannot be said to have involved an immediate declaration of
war, as there can be no doubt that the proposal would have
been gladly accepted by Russia.- I am, &e.,

CLARENDON.

... No. 21.
THE EARL OF CLAR.ENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELLED.
Foreign-office, June 13, 1855.
MyLord,—Count Colloredo y ter esday read to me a, despatch
from Count Buol, stating that he considered that the reserve
made in the protocol of December 28, with respect to the
principle of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia
in the Black Sea, is at present in full force; that the events
of war must bring about the solution of the point ; and
Count Buol hopes that the efforts of the allies will obtain
the end in view as completely as Austria would probably
have obtained it, either by peaceful methods or by joining
in the war, if her allies had not rejected the last Austrian
proposal. However much Count Buol regrets the rejection
of that plan; the continuation of the war in no way changes
the position of Austria and her allies towards each other.
Austria will maintain her rights and perform her duties as
regards the Eastern question, on the bases agreed upon, and,
until she learns to the contrary, will conclude that her allies-
will do the same. Austria will more especially endeavour to
maintain the concession obtained from Russia on the first and
second points, and also as regards the material guarantee (of
the Ottoman empire) ; Austrian troops will remain in the Prin-
cipalities to defend Turkey from attack on the side of the
Danube, until the chances of war may dispose the belligerents
to resume the work of peace on the bases already admitted and
partially developed.
Without giving any opinion on the probabilities of the
war, the Austrian Government cannot conceal its apprehen-
sion that the greatest successes in the Crimea may not be suf-
ficient to induce Russia to make peace„ and that the reverses
of Russia may so excite the Russian people as to render peace
more difficult of attainment, so that the war may be indefi-
nitely prolonged.
The consequences will be that the Ottoman empire will be
exhausted, and the original object of the war lost sight of.
Count Buol fears that amidst these new complications the
grand political cud of the aflame will disappear. Austria
will assuredly do nothing to hasten a result so much to be
lamented ; on the contrary, the Austrian Cabinet is deter-
mined to maintain its intimate relations with its allies, and
Count Buol hopes to find on theiipart similar intentions.
I told Count Colloredo that, without consulting my col-
leagues and learning the opinion of the French Government,
I could give no answer to the despatch he had just read,
and which I bad listened to with much regret, as it was un-
favourable to the prospects of an alliance from which we had
expected so much towards bringing the war to a successful
end, and from which, when peace was concluded, we had
looked for important advantages to Europe.
Austria, I said, might confidently rely that England and
France would maintain their engagement, and perform
their duties with scrupulous good faith, and that it would
be their object to maintain the most friendly relations with
Austria, but I would not conceal from Count Colloredo my
own opinion that the continuation of the war must, to a
certain extent, change the position of Austria and her allies
towards each other unless she took part in the war, in ful-
filment of her engagements ; if she did not do so the cause
must be either that it would be inconvenient to her to give
effect to the treaty of December 2, or else that her Allies
Were to blame for the rupture of the fieg,otiations. Upon
the first cause, which was too improbable for belief, it
would be unnecessary to make any remark f but against the
second I must beg in the strongest manner to protest, and
for 'the reasons which I had given in answer to another
despatch of Count Buol's, which Count Colloredo had just
read.

If England and France had been extravagant in their
demands, or had sought to gain any advantage over Russia
beyond the terms that had been agreed upon between the
three Powers, Austria would have been fully justified in
considering herself rel eased from her engagements, and in
throwing upon her allies the responsibility of the consequences;
but no, condition was pressed which had not previously been
assented to by Austria, and which was not subsequently sup-
ported by her in the. Conference ; and, because these propo-
sals were rejected by Ruisia' it was difficult to understand by
what process of reasoning Austria arrived at the conclusion
that she was thereby emancipated from her obligations, and
that her only duty was to wish success to her allies in the
war which they were still determined to carry on.
The questions involved in the four points would, I said as
a matter of 2ourse, come under consideration whenever nego-
tiations were resumed ; but England and France must consi-
der themselves entirely free to act according to circumstances,
and that they must in the meanwhile regard as non avenus
the partial arrangements made at the Conerences of Vienna-4
Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and
give his Excellency a copy of it, if he should desire to have
oue. I am, ctc.,

CLARENDON.

No. 22. - •
Lord Clarendon informs the Earl of Westmoreland that
Count Colloredo had read to him a despatch from Count Buol
expressing his regret at the termination of the Conferences,
and his surprise at the objections made by the Cabinets of
London and Paris to the proposition which he had brought
forward at the Conference on the 4th inst., which proposition,
bp said, had originated with M. Dronyn de Lhuys, who, hav-
ing been in direct communication with her Majesty's Govern-
Mente, was considered at Vienna to be the special representa-
tive of the policy and views of England and France.
Lord Clarendon declares his total dissent from the state-
ment mul opinions of Count Buol.

(No. 23.)

CIRCULAR DESPATCH ADDRESSED TO TIER MAJESTY'S REPRE

SRNTATIVES AT FOREIGN' COURTS.
Foreign-ofilee, June 19.
Sir,--0a the 4th instant a Conference was summoned at
Vienna by Count Buol, the proceedings at which are recorded
in the protocol of which I enclose a copy.* ,
This protocol, together with the protocols of the Confer-
ences held at Vienna between the 15th "of March and the 26th
of April, of which copies have been transmitted to you, will
place you in possession of the details of the negotiation in
which her Majesty, in conjunction with her allies, has recently
bean engaged, and which, to her Majesty's great regret, have
not resulted in the conclusion of a peace with the Emperor of
Russia.

I consider that the present will be a fitting opportunity to
state for your information and guidancesthe views of her Ma-
jesty's Government upon the negotiations which have thus
been brought to a close.

The stipulations for which, whillt reserving to themselves
the right of insisting npon'otlier special and additional con-
ditions, her Maje;ty and he fillies,' considered it more parti-
cularly incumbent on them to provide, were as follows :--
1. That the exclusive right to interfere to a certain extent
in the internal affairs of provinceS "belonging to the Turkish
Empire, which Russia had in`forther times wrung from the
necessities of the Porte, should no longer be exercised by that
Power.

2. That the channel of the Lower Danube, and more espe-
cially the outlets of that river into the Black Sea, should no
longer be subject to the exclusive control of Russia, but
should, on the contrary, be confided to the superintendence
of delegates appointed by other Powers as well as by Russia,
and who should take measures for freeing and keeping free
from obstructions the great water communication of Central
Germany with the rest of the world.
3. That the Turkish Empire should become part of the
system of European equilibrium, and that means should be
taken to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the
Black Sea.

4. That the pretensions of Russia officially to protect the
Christian subjects of the Porte should be renounced, and that
the Powers should use their influence to obtain from the Sul-
tan, by an act of his own Sovereign authority, the confirma-
tion and observance of the religious privileges of his Christian
subjects.

A communication to this effect was made to the Court of
Russia at the close of last year, and was accepted by that
Power as the basis on which negotiations might be entered
into.

Negotiations were accordingly commenced at Vienna, but,
unfortunately, it is only on the first and second points that
anything approaching to an agreement was arrived at ; for,
the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to accede to the
reasonable proposals made to them by the Plenipotentiaries of
the allies on the third point stopped the progress of the nego-
tiations upon that point, and the fourth point was, in conse-
quence, not brought under discussion. •
It satisfactory, however, to her Majesty's Government to be
able to appeal to the protocols on the first and second points
as an evidence of the anxiety shown by the allies to devise
terms of settlement advantageous to the general interests of i
Europe, and more immediately conducive to the development
of the prosperity of Germany ; and her Majesty's Government,
therefore, regret the more that the refusal of Russia to accept
the proposals of the allies on the third point should have stood
in the way of the advantages which would have resulted from
the arrangements which might have been made in regard to
the matters to which the two first points related.
Her Majesty's Government are aware that Count Nessel.
rode, in a despatch which he has recently addressed to the
Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts, has sought to place in
a favourable light the course pursued by Russia in the dis-
cus.sions on the two first points, and to persuade foreign Go-
vernments, and more particularly those of Germany, that the
continued preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea bas no
direct bearing on the questions which relate to the Principa-
lities and to the navigation of the Danube, nor on the inter-
ests of Germany, and that Germany, therefore, ought not to
co-operate with the allies in their efforts to reduce that pre-
ponderance.
Her
Majesty's Government are, however, persuaded that
an impartial consideration of the real facts of the case will
serve_ to. the illusion which it was the object of Count
Aesseli ode s despatch to create. Her Majesty's Government
have no desire to undervalue the importance of the matters
arrangement
to which the
sketched out in the rotooocstoilns
her Majesty's Govenrnanmn
under
p regard to tcoonteren fiorset relatetw o ;
pointshut
that, as regards the Principalities, must be permitted to observe
any rights which Russia
mightoe
her former treaties were at
Once
the abrogation of those treaties on
oextinguished possess or
by :
the breaking out of the war, and that, Ceottslequently, the
made by
protec-
Rtiuonssiaoftßo uthsseiainitsein.eosttstohfe roesourmltaoofy,
exemption of the Principalities from the
anyb
ueto
is the
esoi
direct con-
sequence of the violent act of aggression committed
Russia theia on the Turkish empire - and, as regards the ntted gbYa Danube, ito '
be observed that although the
arrangements proposed in the fifth protocol would be, to a
certain extent, satisfactory, yet it was mainly owing to the
refusal of Russia to accede to the reasonable suggestions put
forward by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria in the fourth Con-
ference, that those proposed arrangements were not made
more complete, and more in conformity with the general in.
terests of Eprope.
But the arrangements proposed in regard to the first two

* See Eastern Papers, park XIV.