The National Register.
London, England, 1809-10-15 00:00:00

651

it, without methodically opening the trenches, without w orking
on through the inundations and marshes, in short, without hav-
ing invested the town; and if they must invest it on both sides,
they would require to have two armies; Ist. One between the
411ead of Flawlers and the town of St. Nicholas, opposite to
Brussels and to the rand or France; indeed, we know no
General bold enough to take this position with less than 80,000
Infantry and between 8 anti 10,000 cavalry, since he must ha‘,"
to withstand the army which should arrive from Fra:..-e, am!
the troops should stretch out from the Head of Flanders, that
is to say, the whole garrison of Antwerp, which in a coral
attack, would sally out on that siee ; `2d, On the side of t:44.
town, the investment could not reasonably take place with au
army of less than 40,000 men, having in front a corps of obser-
vation, to keep in check the army of the Duke Vnlniy,
aisembled at Maestricht, which could draw near Antwerp, and
having another corps tcbords. Bergen•op-Zoom agatiA the.
Dote!). It would, therefore, have been easier f44r Lord Chat-
ham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance
as fur as Flanders, leaving Antwerp aunt the French army
behind him, than to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiege
it. This much with re.rard to the land side.

On the side of the river, the following are the obstacles which
must have stopped the English :
lst, Fort Frederic and Fort Doel, each mounting fifteen 36,
pounders; after these, Fort Lillo, and the Fort of liefkens
shock, each mouwinw si xi y 36-pounders, and ten mortars; and
behind, a line of eighty von-boats and pinnaces, mounting two
hundred 24-pounders. Now, every aensihle man who knows
that there is only a distance of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo
and the' Fort of Liefkeeshoek, which is oppositelo it, per-
ceives that this passage caunto he forced. With regard to fir-- ,
'hips, it is well known that fire-ships and infernal nualfines
ace ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St.
Maio had no effect ; these sorts of explosions were never able
to shake a rampart. An estacado had been estahlisited, which
had secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In tine, we had also
fire-ships; sixteen were already in readiness, an we were
going to asail ourselves of the first favourable occasion to send
them against the English. Besides, to make me of fire-ships,
it waist& have been necessary to approach within 300 fathoms
of 'he town, since from Lillo to Antwerp the Scheldt makes
four elbows, which would have prevented fire-ships from being
directed from any greater distance.
Oa the sea side in like manner no success could he hoped far;
but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land •
and seat, Lillo and Liefketishoek had been carried, which sup-
poses two regular sieges, the enemy would directly after have
met with three other barriers to be forced; the Pearl Fort,
Fort St. Philip, and Fort St. Mary. All these fortS are tower-
ed by inundations, and each of theM would have required a
separate siege. These different operations could not have taken
place without loosing 40 days more, and supposing that by the
20:h of October•the land and sea forces had been able to ap-
proach within 2000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required
three months more to take the town. With regard to the
squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, upend down
the river, protecting Antwerp, and protected by it. The tak-
ing of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing iinpoisible for Lord
Chatham, an operation touch more difficult to be effected than
the occupation of a quarter of France.
However, the following was the system of the French army ;
from the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince
of Polite Corvo was at Autwerp with 30.000 men, national
guards, regulars and Dutch troops. The Duke of Conegliann
was at Ghent with the corps of the. Head of Flanders, consisting
of 25,000 men; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 20,000
men.

We should have let the English, had they seriously presented
themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-pp-Zoom, stretch out
beyound the inundation of Lillo and march against Ant‘x ;
the Duke of Coneglieno would have proceeded towards the
Head of i landers, and whilst the English would have been mak,
lax their dispositions to invest Antwerp from Fort 141110 to the
citadel, the Prince of Ponte Corso, and the Duke Of Coneg-
iano, protected by the inundations and by the immense work-
of the town, would have.waited for them, u!ltt on the day
agreed upon, would have stretched out upon the right; and
then the English army would have terminated hi destinies;
the Duke of !Aria would during that time have proceeded to
the island of Cadsand. On the lst of September there were
between Flanders and the Scheldt and Maestricht, twenty thou-
bawl men under aruth They were not all regulars, but they

C.CT. 15,

•.‘ ere all commanded by men who had served ; re all
volunteers, and consistod, for the must, Wirt, offtirme, t• ler-
ottice.rs, and fdrtner soldiers who had obtained theirdtschi- • t•es,
mid who had run to arms on the firstsignal. •
Lord Chathain, • therefore, charged himself with a ,f••.%.`_: ii
operation, and those, therefore, wha projected it -he:: -u.l.•.*A-
selvec to be as ignorant of the climate as of the Inc:tides. •• rd
Chatham saved the EugliA army by determining to re-e mi.' k
it ; hut every day float he delays to execnte this determtuai--.14
heightens the misfyrtunes of his ex pedition, and if he is col :site
it it not in having oFdered the retrelt, it is in having s, 1(114, dO.:
layeil to re-embark ; for during this delay, the Eii4l.lslt tr.:ops
contract fresh diseases and become infected with Ire: h seeds tif
deoructioa,

Let it suffice to say that the Emperor when he learned thafao
huglish army had bc,.n landed upon that point, recommended
that it should not he attacked, and that we should leave the de-
struction of it to the disease,:, which, in that dangerous climate,
must da the i.nemy more ijury than the cannno, w ithont tie
costing any thing to France.
The English, in i.tnling in Flander,. did, therefore, a !!;ing
contrary all the rules of war :I. Because they took for the
theatre of their operation's a country so unwholesome, utat tln‘y
to pr.`Stllne that ro.tattii's stay in it would destroy their
army ; 0,74 t the r‘-untry is c,-)ti-Fred with strong pluceS, such at
Flushing, Bergen:-up-'Loots, Bathz, and Linn ; and on the side
of the 1,-i,ted of Cads:old, the new fort Napolean, &c.
idio. Because their principal object appeared to be to cap!it•e
. _

the squadron, t'oey ought to h.tvr: imagmed that t:it, squaLl:e.it
depended w)on Antwerp, and that Ani-Aerp 'a3 ..qpregnahle,
for its coinmunicatinn6 with France •tould n,,t be ! ui )ff, e xxept
by immense armies. against which the wtiule population of
France vvou!d have time to march. . .

The result of all which is, that the English liave been for so
many years shut out of the Colviucut., ttr..t they arc u.l :Inger
acquainted with it. Every thing has ex! eist their
hatred against France.
With regard to the Island of Walcheren, it is taid, that they
menn'to keep it. We should have only cause to applaud this:
resolution for many reasons ; Ist, The English, altiintig!i
had 20,000 men in the Island of Walcheren, could not rev cilt it
from being attacked and retaken; 2d, 20,000 English, ekpused
to the influence of the climate, would experience so much loss,
that it would be necessary to he continually reitiforcing t nein :
that in the course of the year, 80,000 men would as necessarily
become victims to the climate, and it would cost them more to
guard this marsh, then to preserve the East Indies; 'hut it 'is
probable that time would not be left for them to suffer such losses.
The channel between the two islands is so narrow, that bombs
can reach from one to the other. The 20 ships of the line and
the flotilla which we have in the Scheidt, would soon make us
masters of that river. It would not be forgotten, that four
years ago, and with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all
the r'iasts; can it be doubted, that we should be soon masters

of a _Used sea? and can it. at the same time, be supposed that.
the Ens,lish would attempt to keep Flushing without being mas-
ters of the Scheldt ? Besides, a flotilla i, too dangerous a war
for them. Such a war is not carried on with boats alone, it is
conducted with excellent troops, that is to say, with means which
do not allow the English any advantago over us.
We well know that men exist who, although completely ig-
norant of the art of war, have, notwithstanding, the silly habit
of taking and endeavouring to give counsel to those who are
masters in it ; those people, yet more skilful than the public
speaker who introduced the subject of war before Hai:Mb:ll, tell
von, that the English, by preserving the !slated of Wakheren,
vi ill make it a second GibrAtar, or another Alalta ; in hue, a
commanding point which svill render them masters of Flanders,
or Holland, &c. Poor neuimen! they cannot perceive that if
the English persist in keeping the Island id Waleitern, that
circumstaoce would be as advantageous for us as if they Hers
einbarrased in the heart of Spain.
In general, wherever an English army lands on the Continect,
every real French Man ought to rejoice.—Such a contest is com-
pletely, lo our favour : a natiwu of three mtillions of men cattuot
meet man for man a nation of forty millions. A oew array, all
the elements of which are in the ilavy, cane it keep the held
agaiust the veteran forces which have conquered two-thirds of
k;urope; in line, an army Iv Well can only arrive by sea, has
neitherartillery, cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a very
great inferiority in all these mear:s, and Lord Chatham re .11y
could not mount more tbau 200$) cavalry; well ! before 15 data