The National Register.
London, England, 1813-09-19 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER:__,

.46*7-

507

ifitl
and the prospect of attaining many beneficial results ley a Nki
employment of the established friendly relations, by colKientiall
representations, and by conciliatory 'councils, had not yet been
abandoned as hopeless. And with regard to the immediate interest
of the State, such a revolution would inevitably have been attended
with this consequence—that the Austrian territory would base
become the first and principal seat of war, which with its n ell-
known deficiency of means of defence could, in a short time, have
overthrown the monarchy.
In this painful situation Ids Majesty bad no other resonrce than
to take the field on the side of France. To take up arms ter
h ranee, in the real sense of the word, would have been a measure
not only in contradiction with the duties and principles of the
Emperor, but even with the repeated declarations of his Cabinet,
which had, without any reserve, disapproved of the war. On the
signature of the Treaty of the 12th March, 191'1, his Majesty pro-
cceded upon two distinct principles : The first, as is proved by the
.vords of the Treaty, was to leave no means untried which might
sooner or later obtain a peace ; the other, was to place bimseff in-
ternally and externally in a position, which, if it should prove im-
possible to effect a peace, or in case the turn of the war should
tier decisive measures in this part necessary, would enable Austria
to act with independence, and in either of these cases to adopt the
measures, which a just and wise policy should prescribe. Upon
this principle it was that only a fixed and comparatively small pail
of the army was destined to cooperate in the war ; the other mili-
tary resenrces, at that time in a state of readiness, or that still
remained to be prepared, were not called forth for the prosecution
of this war. By a kind of tacit agreement betwecii the Bellige-
rents, the Austrian territory was even treated as ventral. Tee
real end and views of the system adopted by his Majesty ti old not
escape the notice of France, Hus.ia, or any intelligent observer.
The campaign of 1812 furnished a memorable example of the
failure of an undertaking supported by gigantic powers, conducted
by a Captain of the first rank, when, in the confidence of great
military talents, he despises the rides of prudence, and waster; the
bounds of nature. ,The illusion of glory carried the Emperor Na-
poleon into the heart of the Russian -Empire ; and a false political
view of things induced him to imagine that be stiould dictate a peace
in Moscow, should cripple the Bufsian Power for half a ea:tinny,
and then return victorious. When this magnanimous constancy of
the Emperor of Russia, the glorious deeds of his warriors, and the
unshaken fidelity of his people, put an end to this dream, it was
too late to repent it with impunity. The whole French army was
scattered and destroyed : in less than fir months we have seen the
theatre of war transferred from the Dnieper and the Dwina to the
Oder and the Elbe.
This rapid and extraordinary change of fortune was the fore-
ninner of an important revolution in all the political relations of
Europe. The confederacy of Russia, Great Britain, and Sweden,
presented -a. point of union to all eeighbonring States. Prussia,
whom report had long declared 'determined to risk all, to piefer
even the danger of immediate political destruction to the lingering
sufferings of continued oppression, seized the favourable moment,
and threw hers( If into the arms of the Allies. Alai)? greater and
smaller Princes of Germany inert.. ready to do the same. Every
where the ardent desires of the. people anticipated the regular pi o-
ceedings of their Governments. Their impatience to live in inde-
prudence, and under their own laws, the sentiments of IA owe ed na-
tional honour, and the hatred of a foreign dominion, broke out in
Inieht flames on all sides.
His Majesty the Emperor, too intelligent not to censidcr this
change of affairs, as the natural and necessary consequence of a •
previous violent- political convulsion, and too just to view it in
anger, was solely bent upon securing, by digested and wt.ll-com-
bleed measure l, the real and permanent interest of the European
Commonwealth. Already, in the beginning of December, consi-
derable steps had been taken on the part of the Austrian Cabinet,
in order to dispose the Emperor Napoleon to quiet and peaceful co-
hey, on grounds which equally interested the world mei his own wee
rare. These steps were from time to time renewed and enforced.
ilopes been entertained that the impression of last year's cam-
paign, the recollection of the fruitless sacrifice of an immense army,
the severe measures of every description that would be necessary to
replace that Loss, the decided disinclination of France, anti of all
those nations conneeted with her, to a war. which, withme any
prospect of tutnre indemnification, exhausted and Fumed her interni.l
strength; that lastly, even a calm reflection on the doubtful Issue
of this new and highly imminent crisis, would ne.VC the Emperor to
listen to the wresentations of Austria. The tone of these repre-
i stetations was carefitlly adapted to the circumstances of the time,.
serious as the greatness of the object, 'underage as the desire of a
favourahle issue, and as the existing friendly relations required.