The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-25 00:00:00

I

THE SIEGES OF 1812 AND 1855.

BADAJOZ AND SEBASTOPOL.

According to the ordinary rules of siege operations the
approaches would have been driven to the edge of the
ditch surrounding the Malakhoff Tower, and the coun-
tersearp blown in before such an assault would be made,
but the accounts which have just reached us do not lead
us to suppose that these precautions had been employed.
Indeed the extraordinary configuration of Sebastopol
has compelled the Generals on more than one occasion
to pursue a course entirely at variance with the pre-
scribed rules of the art of reducing regular fortifications.
On more than one memorable occasion in his career in
the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington not only em-
ployed similar means, but staked the fate of his army on
their success, and especially on the third siege of
Badaj,,z, in 1812. Contrary to all calculation, the
Picurna, an outbreak of the town somewhat resembling
by its position the Mamelon or Kamtschatka Redoubt
before Sebastopol, was forced without being battered,
and Badajoz itself was carried by storm before the coun-
terscarp was blown in or the fire of the place silenced.
No one who has ever read it can have forgotten the lan-
guage in which the historian of that great contest relates
the most terrible action of the war. The ramparts,
crowded with dark figures and glittering arms, just
illuminated by the glare of flames from below ; the red
columns of the British, deep and broad, coming on like
streams of burning lava, ; the sudden arrival of the Light
Division and the Fourth Division on the brink of the
yawning chasm, into which they dashed with incredible
fury, some to be smothered in the wet ditch beneath, some
to be dashed by the shot against the strong palisade, some
to be torn upon the jagged range of sword-blades fixed
in ponderous beams which defended the top of the
breach. For two hours did our men persevere with in-
domitable courage in the attempt to force their way
through this scene of slaughter, and it was not until hun-
dreds of the boldest and bravest had perished that they
were compelled to acknowledge that the breach of the
Trinidad was impregnable. It was past midnight, and
2,000 men had already fallen, when the Duke of Wel-
lington ordered the remainder to retire and to re-form
for a second assault. Even that order was executed with
difficulty, and the fate of Badajoz might have been un-
decided that night if other portions of the troops had
not found means to scale the
.Castle and to carry a bas-
tion, and enter the town at a different point. Out of the
An to Portuguese army of 2.2,000 men no less than
5,000 fell at the siege of Badajoz, and 3,750 at the assault
alone. We trust that we shall not now have to lament
as great a loss, but we are dealing with far more nume-
rous armies and a place of infinitely greater extent.
We refer to this example, not only because in some of
its circumstances it will probably be found to present an
. Redan, but
in 1819 - also as a
imperfect analogy with the attack on the Malakhoff and
the proof that the Duke of Wel
l-
at the pinnacle of glory and at the head
of an invincible army, was stopped in one portion of his
attack upon Badajoz by causes not very dissimilar from
those which the allied
the same night by other itinkeaen.ssc:
although in the poops' town was carried
have encountered at Sebas-
topol,material difference in the
The fate of the position of the_t
aseTheere is,
whoowaermveire,,;tb_is
the 'ca. •
turn of Badajoz campaignwithin aof 1812 turned upofnd
forp
both Soult and Marmont Weertain number. o
with auy"erior
forces in the rear of the Britishre hangingbs superior
forces
on the contrary, the superiority
army, At. Sebastopol,
on the
side of the besiegers, and, far from force is
"cv
'n toe
apprehend from the Russians in the having anything
field, nothing would
more conduce to the triumph of our enterprise than to
find an opportunity of meeting thou there,—.Tinte3.