The National Register.
London, England, 1811-06-09 00:00:00

• .
The official accounts of the battle of Albtrera
are at last arrived. Rumour had wandered but lit-
tle from the truth. When immense armies crowd
the field, and the whole might of contending em-
pires is brought into action, the flood of human
blood seldom surpasses that which on the 16th ult.
dyed the plains of Estransadura. Although the
total of the allied and hostile force which fought on
that memorable day did not exceed fifty thousand
men, the collected loss of both parties amounted
to no less than 15,000, or nearly one-third of the
whole. The honour of many ‘nation's seemed at
stake. The Spaniards and Portuguese, who formed
the two-thirds of the Allied Army, had to emir-
late British valour, so often displayed in their
cause, and now a witness to, as.well-as a sharer irt.
ther exertions. The different corps of the Confe-
deration of the Rhine, which composed the largest
portion of SouLT's army, led on b some of the
most distinguished regiments of France, also felt
the powerful spell of emulation, and the numbers
that fell in the space of the few hours the battle
lasted, prove that on both sides the most determined
courage was displayed, and the most strenuous
efforts made to obtain the victory. But Marshal
/I,IRESFOItto had to contend, not only with hostile
bravery, but with veteran skill and experience—
qualities in which the Portuguese and Spanish di-
visions of his army were still necessarily deficient.
His courage, however, and
,his activity supplied the
place of experience, and ultimately wrenched from
the enemy the triumph which for, a short time they
fancied they had won. Led, perhaps, by the wish
of affording the Spaniards an opportunity of re-
deeming their military fame, obscured by the con-
duct of their Generals at the battle of Barrosa,
Marshal BERESFORD stationed them in the post of
honour; and entrusted them with the defence of
some heights which " raked and entirely command-
ed our whole position," and which thus formec!,the
most important point in our line. Strict prudence
might have required that he should have placed less
confidence in troops which, although
brave, were not equal to our Own either in
Vioki CLXXX.

might depend Alta. Ing
In his expectations he was, however, deceived ; not
by any cowo.rdice on their part, but because
none but British troops throughout Europe can
sustain the first impetuous onset of the French,
led on by skilful officers. After a courage-
ous, but flutless resistance, the Spaniards were
driven from the heights, and our whole posi- •
tion being raken and commanded by the enemy, it
became necesvry either to alter it, and fall back, or
to retake tel hills that had been lost, under even
greater disadvantages than those. under which the
enemy laboured in their attack 'upon them; for we
had to meet troops flushed with their momentary
success, and therefore more likely to defend what
they had acquired obstinately. But even here the
want of experience of the Spaniards encreased our
difficnkies, and in a great measure contributed to
occasion the heavy loss in British killed and
wounded which, we experienced. It appears, by the
fact of a body of Polish lancers being able to turn
our right, and to form, undiscovered, behind the
British columns destined to carry the heights, that
the Spanish Commanders, whose troops originally
composed our right wing, had forgotten to place
detached pickets of eavairy, in advance, and on their
flanks, to observe the Movements of the enemy.
For had the precaution, always used by expe-
rienced officers, been ern. plOyed, it would have been
impossible for the Polish lancers to penetrate so far
undiscovered, and our men aware of their approach
would have met and defeated their charge, as every
other 'made openly by the -French cavalry. Owing
to this unfortunate omission, the Polish lanceri
(who are strictly speaking Cossacks, armed with a
spear fastened with a thong of a convenient length
to their wrist, which they dart before they come
within reach of the bayonet, and draw back with
the thong after inflicting a wound), 'Were mistaken
for Spaniards, and only known as enemies, when
the point of \their spears was felt, and when the
brig!tde which they had attacked in the rear had
been broken, and therefore rendered almost totally.
incapable of resistance.
• ths increated disadvantages


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N° ISO 4 - SUNDAY JUNE 9 1811 • P,Aucz 9114
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LITICAL DISQLIIVTION. or discipline ; but' he thought the high feeling of
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national honour, nalliVal to Spaniards, would nerve
,
" No. 166. their arms, hid make them irresistible, when they
' should find that the very fate of the Allied Army
THE BATTLE Or ALBUERA. might depend on their maintaining their position.

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