The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-05 00:00:00

THE BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA.

(Front the Morning Post of tMs day.)
Prince Gortschakoff'e detailed account of the Teller-
naya battle attributes the defeat of the Russians to the
precipitate manner in which aide-de-camp General Read
attacked the left of the French position, without wait-
ing. for General Lipraudi's advance to make itself felt
on the centre and right. It is distinctly to this error of
his lieutenant, slain during the action, that the Russian
commander ascribes his defeat. He admits great losses,
for which he accounts in a different manner ; and his
opinion is, that though the losses must, in any case, have •
been heavy, yet, in spite of them, he would have won the
battle only far the cane we have m. ntioned. If we com-
pare General Della Marmera's and General Pelissier's re-
port with this Russian despatch, we find all tallying and
agreeing in such a manner about the main facts, that a
very perfect picture of the action is obtained. The
Sardinian commander felt, with a sort of quick mili-
tary instinct which dots him credit, that the Rus-
sian attack would be pretty much what it preyed to
he, rather than what Prince Ge rtschakoff intended
to make it, and that the main stress and weight of
it were destined to bear upon the French. This hap-
pened ; and it is quite coneifeent with the truth of the
Russian general's complaint that there was a want of
simultanietrin the movements of his subordinates—that
General Read went on too soon, and Genrral Liprandi
too late. But, the facts being such, we entirely believe
the Prince's inference from them to be an error. Had
those two generals been more mindful of their superior's
orders, the whole onset would have been a far more
military affair, but not, we are cons inced, more success-
ful ; and as to the losses, it seems to us they would only
have been the larger. Nap( Leon long eine° ehowel the
world that a great combined attack is a bossiness of stop-
watches ; but then he had trr6pe on whom he could
rely when they were sober—nay, even when they were
famished ; and, once more, we say that no amount of
generalship will rrevent the Russian troops from being
very roughly handled on the field by such men as Gene-
ral Pelissier and General Della Marmora command.
There is something curious about the comm; 'cement
of Prince Gortschakoff's report it you compare it with
the sequel. Some one in France predicted that the Rus-
sian despatches would pronounce this great battle a
" reconnaissance en force." and truly the Russian Prince
begineeby saying that understan ling tee Allies had re-
ceived reinforcements, he felt coeipelled to go out "to
reconnoitre." Bu*, presently. as if seized and absorbed
by the serious realities a hich he is relating, he forgets
this vain glozirg, and speaks of the battle as it deserved
to be spoken of.
General Della Marmora see • s to have at once under-
stood both what the Russians irrended, and what they
would be able to accomplish. In his own front there
would be only a demonstration of artillery, but the real
attack was against the French. He accordingly, with
the comp isure and the assured band of a player who
knows his game, a'tered the 4;irection of his batteries, and
sent down his riflemen, or Bersaglieri, to be in readiness
fora fresh start across the canal and the river. Almost
immediately the events were seen to correspond with
his anticipation—his guns raking and enfilading the
dense masses who advanced against the Frercb, and, at
the sane time, hindering the Russian batteries from
forming. It was the most judicious and paralysing
employment of artillery we have yet had in the battles
of the Crimea. Whole gaps were seen to open in the
thick mobs of soldiery w,th which the Russians always
make their attack : and the Zottaves—the nimblest,
most intelligent, and meet attentive of troops—imprve d
the moment by gallant bayonet charges. We must
)2/y
of the Zeuaves they never do allow opportunity to e 0
And now we will return, for a moment, to Prince
It. is
G wtschakoff's remark about his heavy
quite clear that when a lefty po-ition,
war of effecting
artil-
lery, is to be assailed, there is only one
it is the attack without such a murderous loss that
thousands of miles
pain-
ful and terrible even to read of it thou,
order.
from the scene. That way is in loose
crowned by batteries
When men come up a slopae
fank fire—when they
defendsl'sslwi;,r
or raked by the grapeshot of
try to get up such
they swarm suddenly across
r sixty deep, every bal
has many victims. But g perplexing multiplieity of
the range in a light,
flaring, perplexing
are astonished and
separate forms, first,
when they do fire, they inflict
; and, secondly,
puzzled
injury; and meantime, the interval is
cemparatively no
htgained b y a multitude, who,
cleared, and the here
elope, fifty
thye
are stopped, are united and re-assembled,
ju-e beeausetheY
work -
ready for the of the bayonet.
It was took thus the Zeuavee m
...Amon on the
famous 7th of June. Nothing (cell well be conceived
more eingular than the appearance of their advance, or
the manner in which
lthey clambered up the deadly slope.
Artillery was poweress against them. A gun, which
would have swept a whole bettalien off the earth, wasted
its power on a single assailant, or perhaps on his turban.
We should be at a Ices, Only for one fact explanatery of
all the rest, to account for those dense forneati, as which
mult
It needs good troop., really ood troops, thorough-
bred troops, to confid • g
e th ern, in presence of the enemy,
to this loose order, in which every man has but his own
individual spirit, alertness, and mettle to sustain him.
A faint-hearted people must have a bottle of brandy and
a great crowd behind. Of course, there is an immense
sparing of bloodshed where the loose order can be
adopted ; and you almost neutralise artillery into the
bargain. " A battery can defend itself," said Frederick
the Second ; " it needs not a guard," he continues
(in the instructions which he published for the officers
of the Prussian army), " and it is generally taken, if
at all, only because the guard have rushed out to charge
the assailants, and then return pele-incle with these, ob-
structing its fire."
This may be all very true as against Austrian and
Russian troops, but give the nocestary instruction and
practice to a body of our Hieelanders, or Connaught
Rangers, or Rifles, or to the French Zo.uaves, and then
we should be curious to examine, on an ordinary field of
battle, the position of that battery which such soldiers
would not contrive to approacle—of whi,ch such soldiers
would not bring down the gunmen:, and which euch.esol-
diers would not silence and capture. The Russian
formations explain the greae,ness of their
losses' while
exhibiting the essentially u pmilitary character of the
nation.

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