The Sun.
London, England, 1855-10-08 00:00:00

THE FRENCH AND mama IN THE

CRIMEA.

THE OPINION OF THE PEOPL E IN PARIS WITH
RESPECT TO THE CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH
TROOPS ON THE BTH SEPTEMBER.

TO THE EDITOR OP THE SUN.

SlB,—When I returned to Paris from a visit to Lon-
' don about a week ago I hardly felt the courage to face
my French friends. Sebastopol bad been taken ; the
English had failed in their assault upon the Redan, while
the French had captured and retained the Malakhoff,
the possession of which by the Allies had forced the
Russians to abandon the town.
Such being the state of things I, of course, expected
that my French acquaintances, with the good-humoured
raillery of their character, would chuckle over our failure
and their success. Bat, to my agreeable surprise, I
found that everywhere in Paris the highest praise was
not only given to the determination and bravery of our
soldiers, hut that the French public attributed to the
heroic resistance of our sodiers the success of the day
as much as to those employed directly in the taking of
the Malakhoff.
In France, such are the number cf old officers and
soldiers spread everywhere over the soil, and such is
the military turn given to the military mind; by the
constant perusal of the Campaigns of the Empire, that
strategic operations are better understood in Paris by
all classes, even to the lowest, than by the generality of
well-informed people in London. And when the Times
and the other ournals, and their correspondents, go
blundering on, blaming this person and that, and throw-
ing chill upon our poor soldiers, the French people,
with a justness of view, and a frank generosity, allow to
our troops as much merit as to their own.
I have the advantage of a pretty numerous acquaint.
ance in Paris, amongst whom are a number of military
men. As a matter of course, the converation since the
capture of Sebastopol has been almost exclusively
upon that subject. I have heard the question discussed
over and over again, and I will now give you the al-
most universal opinion of Frenchmen as to that action.
This will be certainly more interesting to your readers
than any opinion of my own.
The Malakhoff was the key of Sebastopol. When
that was taken the town was ours. It was, therefore,
necessary that every effort should be directed to this
end, and that everything else should be subordinate to
the capture of that fort. But, in order to reduce the
Malakhoff, it was absolutely necessary to make diver-
sions in other places ; because, if the Malakhoff was at-
tacked alone, the whole Russian army would be concen-
trated for its defence, and all the men the allies could
bring against it would not be sufficient to secure its cap-
ture.

Hence the besieging of the Redan and the other forts,
all important it is true, but of which the capture could
not take place until the Malakhoff was in possession of
the allies,• the attack of which, however, forced the
Russians to withdraw a considerable part of their force
from the defence of the Malakhoff.

• On the Bth of September the approaches to the Mala-
khoff were quite' sufficiently close to warrant the as-
sault. The French were at less than twenty-five yards
from the fortification, nearly every gun was silenced,
the walls around the fort had been nearly levelled by
the play of the artillery, and the French had nothing to
do but to walk into the fortification, fighting their way,
of course, but without the necessity of an escalade.
But the Great Redan was not in any way prepared for
an assault. The English trenches were at more than
two hundred yards' distance from the walls. The bat-
teries of the fort, both in front and in flank, were in full
activity ; and the taking and retention, of the Redan
under these circumstances was physically impossible,
supposing the Russians comported themselves with their
usual obstinacy and courage.
Such was the state of things on the Bth September.
The allied Generals thought that the propitious moment
was arrived for taking Sebastopol. General Pelissier
said to General Simpson, "I can easily, from the posi-
tion I occupy, take the Malakhoff ; but the difficulty is
to hold it, before I can bring my reserves and artillery
into action, and prepare it for defence. If I surprise the
Russians, which I hope to do, and take the fort by a
coup de; main, they will return in such force that the
small number of men who mount to the assault will be
overwhelmed and driven back as on the 18th of June.
I do not expect that the Redan can be taken by you.
You are not in a condition to do so ; but it is absolutely
necessary that a diversion should be made in our favour
after our first success, to give us time to breathe, and to
bring up our artillery and reserves. All I ask for this
is one hour, and I will undertake to keep possession of
the Malakhoff. Make your assault, and give us, if pos-
sible, that length of respite. Throw away as few men
as possible, but engage the Russians for at least au hour,
and Sebastopol is ours." Such is the conversation sup-
posed to have taken place betwixt Pelissier and Simpson;
and I am informed upon good authority that private let-
ters from French officers in the Crimea fully confirm
that the purport of what I have stated was really said by
General Pelissier.

Such was the plan adopted. It was exactly in accord-
ance with the tactics of the great Napoleon, who was in
the habit of sacrificing a certain number of men, in order
to secure the object in view. Napoleon was in the habit
of saying to a colonel of a regiment, without mincing
the matter, "dllez vous faire tuer, vous et votre regi-
ment," when be sent a devoted corps to the attack of a
redcubt or a position which there were not the slightest
chance of taking, and that in order to facilitate the suc-
cess of another part of the army. And the corps of
General de Salles, who attacked the Central Bastion,
and was repulsed, was placed in the same position as the
English, except that the work it had to do was not quite
so desperate. This is the real state of the case fully
admitted at Paris, but which, of course, could not be
openly declared in the despatches, although it is hinted
at sufficiently clear to military men in the report of
General Niel. The devoted band which attacked
the Redan, as well as the French under de Salle, were
in a manner sacrificed to the success of the great object
in view, the retention of the Malakhoff. They were.the
forlorn hope—les enfans perdus—of the allied armies.
This the blundering correspondent of the Times has not
bad the sagacity to discover, and he has expressed him-
self as if the sole object of the English had been to take
the Redan. Nor has the Times itself, with all its thun-
dering articles against General Simpson, seen clearer.
The explanation which I have just given, and which
is recognised by everybody in Paris, is the real one, and
clears up the apparently inexplicable conduct of General
Simpson. Why, it is said, did not he send reinforce-
ments? Because he knew that no reinforcement which
the English army could have sent could have secured
the capture of the fort, and would have been an addi-
tional and useless loss of life. His object was merely
to occupy a great portion of the Russian army for a cer-
tain time, and to give Pelissier time to fortify himself in
the Malakhoff, in order to be able to resist the tremen-

dons attack of the Russian army to retake the fort,-to
which he was sure to be exposed in the afterpart of the
day. Another question is also put by the Times' corre-
spondents—" Why did not General Simpson send his
best troops to the assault ?" Because (the answer is
evident) he wished to preserve his best soldiers for an
attack which really would succeed, and thought the
young recruits fit enough food for powder. Such is war!
Let us return to the narrative. The Malakoff is taken
by the French almost without the loss of a man; their

great loss was in the defence some hours afterwards.

Instantly the flag is hoisted for the English to commence.
About 2,000 poor soldiers, who of course believe that
the attack is a serious and not a false attack, are sent

across a space of 200 yards, exposed both in front and
in flank to batteries of 68-pounders. They arrive at
the foot of the wall out of breath, after losing by the
discharges of grape about a third of their number.
The rampart is scaled, notwithstanding the Russians
on the other side, who are driven back, and the British
obtain a footing in the salient angle of the Redan. Put,
as a natural and inevitable consequence after going
through such tremendous risks, there is a certain degree
of confusion among the survivors. One regiment is
mixed up with another, and there is not the same order,
arrangement, and discipline as there would have been

had there been nothing but fair open fighting. Not-
withstanding this our poor fellows occupied the place,
and held the Russians in cheek—not for an hour, as
stated by Pelissier, but for nearly double that time—
and that against immense masses of the enemy • for we
are informed that, after the surprise of the Malakhoff,
the greater part of the Russians engaged there rushed
to the Redan, to share in the repulse of this handful of
English. Atter a desperate and heroic defence against
such immense odds, the devoted band of British were
pushed almost by physical pressure out of the Redan,
and the greater part annihilated.

Such was the behaviour of the English column of at-
tack, as detailed in the despatches of Pelissier. Neil
and Marmora, and the French, one and all agree in say-
ing that no troops could have behaved with more

courage. A vicille moustache said to me the other day,
" what soldiers but the English would have marched
200 yards against such a tremendous enfilading fire of
artillery, would have mounted the breach after being
decimated by grape, and that, when opposed by a much
superior force on the other side ; and, finally, who would
have retained their position in the fort for two hours

against overwhelming odds ?"
The Times' special correspondent (like an ill bird that
files its own nest) attacks the poor soldiers, because, he
. _

says, they were in confusion and did not obey the order
of their officers to jump into the traverses into certain
destruction. But how does he know that the soldiers
refused to obey this order, or that such a foolish order
was ever given by the officers ? The correspondent was
not there himself to see. He must, therefore, have
taken his report from some one of the officers who had
wished to exalt himself and his class at the expense of
the poor soldiers. And yet this. writer, in order that
he may send to his paper a long pompous letter, does not
hesitate to calumniate and vility our poor soldiers in the
face of Europe, and that upon hearsay evidence, the very
day after the action, without leaving: himself the time of
verifying his strictures. His letters, as well as the
articles of the Times upon the same subject, have been
translated into the French papers, and there is but one
opinion in Paris as to the conduct of the Tin/cs and his
correspondent—that of disgust and indignation. The
general saying here is, that the correspondent is a preten-
tious blockhead, who dues not in the slightest degree
understand military affairs, and who has not hesitated,
in order to send a long,letailed account to his employers,
to attack not only the General-in-Chief, but to calum-
niate the poor soldiers.
While the English troops were devoting themselves
in the manner I have described, the French hi the
Malakhoff were comparatively free from attack, for the
great assaults of the Russians to retake the fortifications
only commenced about half-past two. Pelissier had
then double. the time of respite he asked from General
Simpson, and during this time the French had nk.de the
most of their time. The approaches on the French side
were levelled so as to allow the entrance of artillery and
' the rapid advance of the reserves. A nuruber of field