The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-12 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.
( From the Times of this day. )
The first question which presents itself to our
consideration, after we have given utterance to
those feelings of exultation and of gratitude which
the glorious termination of the siege of Sebastopol
excites at this moment throughout the empire, re-
lates to the military consequences of this victory,
and to the strategical measures best calculated to
bring the campaign and the war to a speedy and
triumphant termination: A tremendous blow has
been struck at the military power and fame of Rus-
sia, and her naval forces in the Black Sea have been
annihilated. The courage, the perseverance, and
the incessant labours of the allied armies have al-
ready disposed of the arguments of those who con-
tended that Sebastopol was impregnable until it
should be invested, and that the Russian soldiers
were invincible within itsredoubts. Itnow appears
from Admiral Bruat's despatch that the mortar-
boats of both squadrons took part in the attack,
and threw shells against the marine batteries, so
that from the heights of Inkerman to Streletzka
Bay the whole fortress was encompassed with a
storm of fire, and an enormous number of men
must have been engaged in the works. Neverthe-
less, upon the final establishment of General
Bosquet's division of the French army in the
Malakhoff Tower, Prince Gortschakoff instantly
proceeded to execute a pre-arranged plan for the
destruction and evacuation of the town. All that
night the harbour was illuminated by the lurid
glare of burning ships, and from time to time
the explosion of vast magazines rent asunder
enormous piles of masonry, while an all-devour-
ing conflagration swept like the scourge of Heaven
over the devastated city. Sebastopol has pe-
rished, like Moscow, by the hands of her de-
fenders, while her successful assailants witnessed
the awful spectacle unscathed. Means of retreat
had been secured by a long bridge of rafts across
the great harbour, and for many hours large masses
of troops were removed by this passage to the
northern side ; but at 8 o'clock in the morning of
the 9th this communication was stopped, the whole
of the works and town being then evacuated. If,
as is probable, any of the Russians remained on the
south bank after that hour, they must either have
perished in the fire or fallen into the hands of the
besiegers. About 500 of the wounded, we know,
remained,in the Fort St. Paul, and for them an
armistice was asked ; but, with their accustomed
indifference to the preservation of life and property,
the Russians were determined to destroy the city
rather than capitulate, and they executed their
design."
The position of Prince Gortschakoff's army, after
the main body had effected its retreat across the
harbour, was, therefore, as follows :—His extreme
right, consisting of the corps most actively engaged
in the defence of the place, rests upon the Sever-
naia work, or Star Fort, and holds the strongly in-
trenched positions on the north shore, where, no
doubt, considerable preparations have been made
for this emergency. His centre covers the Belbek,
and is protected in front by the fieldworks thrown
up along the ridge of Inkerman. His 'left wing
consists of Liprandi's corps, occupying the ground
from Mackenzie's Farm to the heights of Aitoder
on the Bakshi-Serai road. No attempt was made by
the relieving army under Liprandi to effect a di-
version during the assault of the Bth, and the severe
defeat of the 16th of August appears to have
satisfied the enemy that the lines of the Tcher-
naya were not to be carried. But the result of
the general assault and the occupation of the
southern side by the Allies entirely changes the
strategical positions of the combatants, and else
the objects of the campaign. The struggle for the
possession of Sebastopol is at an end. That prize
is in our hands, and, as the defence of the fortress
and the harbour was the grand object of the
Russians, they have nothing left on that spot to
contend for. The mere occupation of the north side
of the port is a barren advantage, for, though it
might hold a garrison, it cannot shelter a defeated
army ; and it is obvious that, after the failure of
the main object, all the ability and generalship of
the Russians will be required to save the whole
body of their forces in the Crimea from destruction.
We therefore infer that the northern forts will
either be held for a time by a limited garrison, or,
more probably, altogether abandoned, in the hope
of saving the army. Never was an army in a more
critical position. They are confined within a penin-
sula which affords them no other fortified position,
no sustenance for the troops, and no water beyond
a certain line. The sea, covered with hostile ves-
sels, surrounds three sides of this theatre of war,
and the fourth is separated from the Russian base
of operations by steppes and marshes. The allied
armies already oc'iupy strong positions at Eupatoria
and Yenikale, which can be reinforced in a few
hours by sea, so as to threaten the Russians in
their flank and rear ; and while it is impossible for
the enemy to hold his ground in the south of the
Crimea—for which, indeed, there is now no further
object—to retreat in this season across the country
is a formidable undertaking, while the loss of a
battle in the open field would be absolute destruc-
tion. The Russians are in a trap, from which the
Tchongar road and the Isthmus of Perekop are the
only means of escape, and even there their com-
munications may possibly be intercepted.
No doubt all these contingencies have been fore-
seen ; Prince Gortschakoff's plan of campaign has
long since been made ; judging, therefore, from
the accustomed tactics of the Russian army, as
well as from the extreme difficulty of his present
position, we incline to the opinion that he will
adopt the course of a general and immediate
retreat. To hold the Crimea without Sebastopol,
and even after the harbour of Sebastopol itself
has been transformed by conquest into the base of
operations of the invading armies, would be a boot-
less and unprofitable task, and the danger is
greatly aggravated by the fact that the whole body
of the Allies, with unlimited means of naval tran-
sport at their command, will shortly be at libertj
to advance upon any part of the peninsula which
is accessible from the coast. These immedi-
ate consequences of their own success in the siege
operations must have been considered by the Al-
lied Generals, and the moment is now arrived
when they may proceed to open the campaign of
which the reduction of Sebastopol was the first
preliminary. That field operations of this nature
have long been contemplated by the Allied Govern-
ments is obvious from the large cavalry force they
have continued to send to the Crimea. The British
army alone can bring upwards of 3,000 sabres and
lances into the field, and the French cavalry is still
more numerous and impatient of the inaction to
which it has hitherto been condemned. Hitherto
the contest in the Crimea has been confined to one
single object, and, with the exception of the action
of the 20th of September on the Alma, and the
flank march to Balaklava, it has been a war with-
out a single tactical movement. General Pelissier
has shown, in our humble opinion, very admirable
military qualities since he assumed the command,
and he has been ably supported by General Simp-
son ; but the present state of our affairs deserves to
call forth abilities of a still higher and more bril-
liant order. The Russian army in the Crimea is
probably not superior to the forces of the Allies in
numbers, and it is immeasurably inferior to them
in resources and supplies, as well as in those moral
qualities which at once constitute and enhance the
prestige of victory. On every occasion on which
they have encountered an enemy in this war—
whether Tarks, French, English, or Sardinians
—the fortune of war has deserted the Russian
eagles. For them to advance is impossible, for
the whole coast is guarded by the enemy, and no
Russian vessel floats on those waters. The strong-
hold in which the Czars had accumulated during
the last two reigns an incalculable amount of war-
like stores for the subjugation of the East has been
reduced to a blood-stained ruin by the troops who
were glad to escape with life from its burning walls;
and the question on which the attention of Europe
is now fixed is no longer the fate of Sebastopol, but
how is the Russian army to escape from the Crimea,
or to maintain itself there ? We trust that no
considerations whatever will prevent the Allied
Generals from giving the most vigorous and imme-
diate effect to the great advantage they have won.
Beyond the time absolutely required for the re-
moval of the wounded no armistice should be con-
ceded. To give the campaign its full effect its
success must now be rendered absolute and com-
plete. The Russians are a people who will deny to
the last that any advantage has been gained over,
them, and Prince Gortschakoff boasts in his ac-
count even in this sanguinary defeat that he was
extremely successful in carrying off his army.
Fighting, as they are, in closed lists, without the
means of escape, the defeated Russian army should
be compelled to lay down its arms, or to fight a
general action, which would crown the series of
our successes by a still more decisive victory. The
peninsula itself is besieged and well-nigh invested
by our fleets and armies, and if the command of a
single road be lost, the whole line of retreat, and
the only line by which supplies and communica-
tions can reach the Russians, is gone. Such we
take to be the relative position of the belligerents
in the Crimea, and, with the means of action at the
disposal of the French and English Generals, we
have confident hopes of a glorious result.

(From the Daily News of titis day.)
There is a cool, self-complacent effrontery in the
bulletins and deFpatches of Prince Gortschakoff
that has never been surpassed. He can make a
defeat a theme of congratulation ; and, when he
has nothing else to brag of, will boast of the alac-
rity and prudence he has displayed in running
away. lie appears to think that his Imperial mas-

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