The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-04 00:00:00

LONDON, THURSDAY EVENING, JANUARY 4, 1855.

R. ALBERT SMITH'S MONT BLANC
TO-NIGIIT it 8 o'clock, and Every Night (but Saturday).
:quits, 3s. ; Area, 28.; Gallery, Is. The INlernin't Representation:-
take place e:ery Tuesday, Thursday,•and SatUrday, at 3 o'clock. -
•
Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly.

CONTRACTS FOIL MATERIALS FOR SEAMEN'6 CLOTHING
Department of the Comptroller for Victuallimr Transper,
Services, Somerset House, 24th December, 1851.
PHE Commissioners for executing the Office of
A_ Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britaii
aid Ireland, DO HEREBY GIVE NOTICE, that on 110,ND 117,

15th ,lirlitary, 1855, at Olio o'clock, they ill be ready
uch persous as may be willing io contract for supplylirr
into her Nrs.iest‘'s Victuailtng Stares at Deptf..rd a:11
a. der-mmtionvel Artielcs, viz.:

ITEss-e.x .. •
WHITE CALICO .• •• ••••
OSNADURCH • • ••
PADDING CLOTH..
IHATE BAIZE
BLACX LINEN ..•

BLACK SILK • • .

BLACK &IA T WIST • .

SEWrNO COTTON (Fine) .. ....

BtAcx znAmoor .....

. ROLM. CANVAS
I White
TAPS
I.:leknateh . (White)
• •"

Black Bone
BUTTONS White Afetal
Large Horn..'
Pearl ....

WousTED (Blue)
Black.. • . ......
rsazAD Whited Brown
CC White (in lb. pakgs)

'I•o dcl

ro.

Yards.
47,010
10,000
2,000

5,500
Skeins.
100,000
Yards.
90.0C:0
Lbs.

300
Yanls.
15,000
10.500
60,030
300,000
Pieces.
90,010

Gross,

N,~BD

500
4,030
Lbs.
3,0 0
1,40
8,000
3,500

iKera.t at

Gu.por

Yards,
21,003
2S 000
5,000
1,500

2,500
skeias.
60,030
Yards.
50,00)
Lbs.

200
Yards.
10.',00
7,000
28,000
200,000
Pieces.
60,000
Yards.
21,0C0
Gross.
3,000
10,000

2,50)
Lbs.
2,500
1,0r.0
4,000
3.501

to troat will
and deliverim
1 Go.=port, the

hie-fourth
o`eachquan
tty to b
delivered b 3
the 31s,
March. an-
other four th
by the. 31st
Nay, snd
the remain-
der by the
30th Jun.
next,or ear
lier if pre-
ferred b}•
the party
tEndering,

Their Lordships reserve to them.elves the power, when the Ten
tiers are opened, of contracting either for the whole, or for such part
hereof only as they may deem lit, or for a greater quantity, or o
~otcontracting f,rany.•

No Tender will be received unless made on the Printed Form pro
sided for the purpose, and which may be obtained on application a:
he said Office, at the Victualling Yards at Go:port and Plymouth.
or to Commander Bevis, co►sducting the Packet Service at Liver-
pool, or to the Collector of Customs at Bristol.

Tenders will be admitted for any portion of the above quantities.
but separate tenders must be made for each place, and no attention
will be paid to any offer not so made.
Samples of the articles may be seen at the said offize, between the
hours of eleven and two only, and also at the Victualling Yards, at
Gosport and Plymouth. '
The conditions of the revised contracts, to which particular atten-
lon is called, may be seen at the said Office; at the said Victualling
Yards at Gosport and Plymouth. and also at. Liverpool and Bristol.
Yo tender will be received after One o'clock on the day of treaty, and
it will not be required that the party tendering or an agent on hI
behalf should attend at the office on the day of contract, as tht
result of the offer received from each person will be communicated to
him and proposed sureties in writing. _

. .
Every tender must be addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty,
and bear in the left-hand corner the words " Tender for
nd must also be delivered at Somerset Rouse.

THE 'STAFF SYSTEM AND THE MILI-
TARY OPERATIONS IN THE CRIMEA.

(From the Augsburg Gazette.)

If we subject the progress and results of the ope-
rations carried on by the Western Powers in their
contest with Russia to the test of scrutiny, we are
astonished at the defective knowledge of all that is
requisite for the proper preparation for such a war
which they disclose. The operations in the Baltic
we will not criticise, although it is strikingly evi-
dent that no one seems to have known at all what
kind of armed vessels nor how many of them would
be reqUired there for attacking the sea fortresses
with any prospect of success, or to have been aware
that a strong body of land troops would also be re-
quired to give their co-operation and support. Tho
whole naval campaign in that sea has been a failure
through this ignorance of the coast and waters.
The contest intended in the Danubian provinces
and in the Crimea lies under. a similar disadvantage.
WhoeVer arms for a war, the professed object of
which is declared to be nothing less than the hu-
miliation of a great power like Russia, must before
everything else be intimately and most accurately
acquainted with the theatre of war, which he either
intends or may be induced to occupy. Theclimate,
with the temporary or periodical changes of the
weather, the nature of the ground and its roads,
the means of conveyance and 'sustenance to be
found there, the assistance to be hoped for from
the inhabitants, and so on, have all to be duly con-
siderediwhen preparing to trace out the plan of a
war. Nor until these subjects have been fully dis-
cussed can a judgment be formed of the force that
will be required, or of its composition and suitable
equipment. Still more indispensable is an intimate
knowledge of the peculiar organisation of the ene-
my's army and the means it may have for increasing
its power of resistance on this or that theatre of war,
whether thr...se mcani exist through local obqta-
cies, natural and artiCcial, or the want of room
for carrying on field operations—a want that may
possibly be produced by treaties of neutrality with
the states adjoining those of the effemy.• The pre-
liminary and varied information above specified
forms in its aggregate the so-called " Staff Know-
ledge" (or Stall Statistics) ; and an admirable work,
lately published in a compendious form, from the
pen of
.Colonel Hardegg, by Koehler, in Stuttgart,
contains nearly everything a staff officer ought
either to know already, or make it his duty to learn
in detail. It is incumbent on the Minister of War
and the staff to provide methodically whatever is
essential to be known through instruction or other-
wise for the due preparation of the war, the trading
out of the general plan for waging the war, and the
Special plans of campaign.
How little all this has been heeded by the West-
ern Powers is evident from the operations they
have hitherto been carrying on against Russia.
Their troops landed in the Bosphorus without be-
ing able, after a brief rest, to proceed on their
march to the Lower Danube. Months rolled away
before single divisions even could obtain the most
necessary means of conveyance—which it must be
confessed were wanted on a very large scale—be-
cause those brought by the troops themselves to
that theatre of war could not be made available.
The equipmentof the men for taking the field proved
to be equally unadapted to the climate of the dis-
trict. The English Government was even com-
pelled to order a change in the uniforms. At last
the greater part of these auxiliary troops were con-
centrated near Varna, having been conveyed to
this place by shipping. But although this force,
welled to 30,000 men, might have been able'to act
most efficaciously from that spot in checking the pro-
gress of the Russian offensive operations, the auxili-
ary army in question of the Ottoman Porte remained
motionless near Varna, because in fact it was incapa-
ble of operating; that isio say, was not yet provided
with all those resources that such a body of troops
absolutely requires, for the full freedom of its
offensive movements, in semi-civilised countries
like Bulgaria and Wallachia. But for
.Austria's
menacing attitude in Transylvania and the .Buko-
wina Omer Pacha would probably have been de-
feated, notwithstanding the proximity of his pro-
tecting patrons. When the Russian forces finally
quitted the Principalities from strategical motives,
the allies of the Porte still felt themselves not in a
condition to assume the offensive, but advanced—
for the sake of doing something at all events—lnto
the Dobrudscha, where they soon came to perceive
their utter incapacity of offence.
In the meantime the rupture between the belli-
gerent powers became wider than ever. Nothing
more was to be done by threatening Russia ; steps
were necessary for making an attack in real earnest.
But where ? The answering of this question seems
to have been dispensed with when the general plan
of the war was sketched out, although it must have
been thoroughly clear what was to be done in case
this or that menace should prove inefficacious. Or
perhaps they depended with entire confidence on
the eflbctive aid of Austria—and Schamyl—and
fancied that standing behind the scenes they could
get the drama of war played out for them. If they
did they made a great mistake, and the would-be
prompter has been obliged to turn actor himself,
sorely against his will.
In selecting the point of attack the Western
Powers, who continued pouring in successive 're-
' inforcemeuts, had nothing whatever in the way of
limitation. The free disposal of a mighty fleet,
partly men-of-war and partly transports, gave
them the means of lauding their forces in Bessa-
rabia, near Odessa, or in the Crimea, or in Ana-
tolia. It appeared to be the most dangerous to do
so in Bessarabia because the Russians were in
greater strength there. On the contrary, in Ana-
tolia they could land on a friendly soil, anclawithout
lot or hindrance from the
.enemy could make their
preparations for a dampitign against Erivan and
Tiflis. • This would have given a mighty iinpulse to the
Turkish troops, and have roused u p Scharnyl to bring
every man he had into the field. If successful
there against the Russians this would hate been in
every case a most sensible blow, that would at the
same time have decided the future attitude of
Persia. An enterprise of this nature is certainly
not to be looked upon as an easy task. Campaigns
in thinly inhabited and ill-cultivated districts are
always attended with great difficulties acrd require
special preparations. But whoever has made up
his mind to enter upon a decisive contest,. must
also make himself acquainted with the impediments
of the ground he will have to. surmount. Thus,
for instance, if Asia Minor were selected, he would
be obliged, to do without h large "Ark of Attillery,

but could take. instead a large force of light ca-
valry, which is very important in a war of con-
quest, and which facilitates the procuring, of ali-
mentary supplies. Demonstrations against other
coast districts might be made in ,conjunction with
this enterprise, so as to keep the Russian troops at
several stations where they were.
After long vacillation the whole force of the
Allies was at last put on shore in the Crimea.
ebastopel was the object of the coutest and the
prize of. victory. If this place fell, the harbour
tad the Russian fleet would, fall with it into the
ands of the Allies. The great importance of this
ibjectof their Operations requires no comment. By
;o much the more was it to be expected that
iothing would have been neglected at all likely to
insure victory. -The winter season was, it is true,
coming on a apace. Experience, however, shows
that every fortress (a few rock fortresses excepted)
An be taken within a given time, provided the
works. of attack are not disturbed themselves from
.vithout in their rear. The carrying on of this at-
ack resembles, nevertheless, a charge of Hussars
more than it does a well-digested enterprise. The
landing at so remote a point as Eupatoria may be
ixcused by reason of the nature of the coast, and the
point would in other respects have been pefectly
well chosen if theyliad, above all things, desired to
cut off Mensehikoff s disposable force from Sebas-
topol and drive it away towards Perekop. 'The
weak garrison. of Sebastopol thus abandoned and
left to itself, would under such circumstances have
been unable to prevent the landing of the working
siege troops with their protectors, and • the subse-
quent early siege works, while the completing and
perfecting of the Sebastopol defences would also
have not made such rapid progress for want
_of
hatids. Perhaps the artillery attack alio might in
le sooner. Instead of
completely laid tt hh aa
tt
tl) caseoy have
dreamedbeen
they
e t
Icaadb
Men-
;chikoff prostrate at the Alma, marched forthwith
on Sebastopol, and behaved as if it was quite im-
possible that anybody else could seriously disturb
the progress of the siege except the garrison, whose
communications with the country behind them re-
mained perfectly open. At a later period they did
indeed arrive at the conviction that they had gOne
to work far too blindly, and strove to remedy the
disastrous consequences- of so many sins of omis-
sion. But they soon relapsed into the old fault,
and plied all their strength to reduce the fortress,
although the resistance of the garrison grew more
energetic every day, and a relieving, army of consi-
derable strength stood by their side. It is hard to
understand by what series of-erroneous representa-
tions and suppOsitions the leaders of this great
transmarine undertaking have arrived at the con-
clusion, that, in spite of all this and that, Sebas-
topol must fall. The Allies had left their own
shores, and were prepared for a siege. Now they
must go through a winter's campaign, and end it
successfully, before they can recommence the siege
with effect. But for this they are not prepared ;
and what fails 'to make such preparation complete
is not to be made up by bravery and mere fighting
excellence—it must be supplied in some way or
other. Before, however, the wooden winter bar-
racks can be erected, and the troops housed,
the severity of the weather and. the privation
of rest by night through :the alarms and
alertes of the enemy, may have so swelled the
numbers of the sick that the reinforcements com-
ing in'will hardly suffice to fill up the gaps. On
commencing offensive operations against the re-
lieving army, whose left wing does not seem. as
yet to have at all quitted the threatening position
over against Balaklava, very different necessities
spring up. , Commissariat columns must be orga-
nised,. for without their regular service in the rear
no operations can be carried on in the Crimea.
For this thousands of horses and beasts of
burden are required, who in their turn require
fodder., Even now, when the. English cavalry and
artillery horses are dwindled away to an insignifi-
cant figure, the hay, part of it at least, is sent from
England. The difficulties of feeding and shelter-
ing an army in a country where there are not even
the most common necessaries for an. encampment,
namely, water, wood, and straw, increase as the
men and horses increase, and the further they ad-
vance from the coast, on which account a consider-
able increase of numerical force must augment the
embarrassments of the allies, without perhaps renr
dering any counterbalancing advantages. The
superior strength of the besieging army protects it
in reality only against the attacks of the Russians,
therefore merely against—a catastrophe. It is the
contemplation of those adverse circumstances, only
too palpable, that has probably led to the
diversion to be ma, le by Omer Paella at tile
'head of 35,000 men. Their disembarkation at
Eupatoria will not be attended with any difficulty,
provided they are not surprised by one of those
sudden tempests. But what then? Before this
corps can be fit for commencing operations, a week
will have passed by at the least. In the mean
time a Russian corps, advancing from Perekop iu
sufficient strength will 'have been arrayed in the
rear of the Osmanli and make mincemeat of them.
People surely won't overlook the fact, that in a
country like the Crimea strategic holes and corners
can never produce the same resulti as in Germany
or France. The native can get over all difficulties
much more easily than a fore gn invader.'
If the war is undoubtedly the execution of fo-
reign policy, the duty of th© Government is to see
supplied, that a war de-
othidetd everythingn not begin without the
a-obyitsewlfantdeod es is
most careful preparation. One of the most im-
portanttre stated at the begin-
ning'of t
rhei
qs
uairrteimoleen—tsi—s
tahsoknowledge, as accurate
as possible, of all local causes of a nature to impede
the operations of war in an enemy's country. For
this purpose every great nation has organised a
special branch of service for its military system, a
branch which has for its duties the collecting,
sifting, arranging, and safe keeping of all the tech-
nical information required. This information is
partly derived, from literary sources, partly from
the mission of officers into foreign countries. Many
a piece of intelligence even in newspapers is regis-
tered. In RusSia thii duty falls upon the " Sci-
entific Committee of 'War" and the " Chancery of
Operations ;" in Austria on the office of Corn-
mander-in-tehief, especially on the second section
of it. In Prussia they have appointed special
chiefs or headS for these foreign topical and mili-
tary statistics ; and they are for the most part
staff officers, highly educated, and with great ac-
quirements, with several clerks under them. In
France the depot of war collects this information.
In England, where the high military authorities
are not centralised, and where a very meagre ex-
change of views, ideas, and the like appears to take
place, the organic requirements for such a branch
a
of the service appear to be nearly-utterly defective,
by the relatively
a continental war by land.
ally, should have
supplied this defect. Her war depot has rich stores
of this.military literature, for N
of
a.po-ann the First
Fdsplilarslrapatnlollyes ean; to
. forl
ebe :cer Qfa xor troops
nrgEoe °Jn'
s perhaps,
tli p
ognland's t ngland has at -her
organised admirably this branch of the service.
His ambassadors at Constantinople were invariably
distinguished generals, and had in their suite seve-
ral officers whose duty it doubtless was to study the
naystateaodw. .
e ofa t SouthernA
ur celebrated
a a
later periodßussiarene in a, military point of
coun-
tries,t
and published some very instructive memoirs
about them. The last French ambaSsador but one
in Constantinople, the present Marshal Baraguay
d'llilliers, under whose eyes the drama of the war
F l
through these
marshal (Marmont)
i
germinated as it were, may have in a like manner
furnished important intelligence, or have rectified
what already. existed. Nevertheless, the war
hitherto waged ,by the Western. Powers against
Russia does not evidence, in the course of its pro-
gresS, the fact of any attempt having been made
to complete their scientific resources, or derive
much advantage from those they already
possess.
A number of theories, good, bad, and indiffer-
ent, have been written en the art.of waging war,
but no commander could use such as a standard in
any real warfare. No intelligent theorist will ever
be guilty of such ridiculous presumption as to pre-
scribe to future generals what their mode of con-
ducting operations is to be. Still the careful and
cautious working out of details in various branches
of the land-service will always be of high practical
value, provided the practical and working military
authority makes itelf acquainted with them. Such
an authority is the staire Its military activity is
called into play before the:declaration of war, and
before the troops take the field the different plans
of operation must eventually be already discussed
to such an extent that a satisfactory account of the
local obSfaeleS to the field duties can at all events
be given, in order that preparations can be made
forovereorning them. Even should the prepara-
tions be of long-standing, they are always better
than those made on the spur of -the moment froth
dire necessity. In spite of all the prospects of
peace,. ibis not improbaele that a portion of the
German federal army will also enter, next spring,
the eastern theatreof war. The troops will indeed
there be enabled to do service in the same manner
as they have been taught during peace. But far
greater things will be expected of the staff on that
I thou OA many wior tiatmroi 9# wax,

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

The Royal George screw line-of-battle ship was warped.
into. the fitting basin, Sheerness, yesterday's tide. net
shipwrights are busily engaged taking her poop deck off.
The St. Jean'd'Acre, 101 guns, Capt. Hon. H. Kop-
pel, was paid wages at Devonport on Monday, and sailed
yesterday for Qucenstown.
The Monarch, 81, Captain Patey, is to embark at De-
vonport a detachment of Sappers and Miners, and wilt
sail on Saturday for Ireland to fill 'up her complement.
The foremast of the Monarch has had new cheeks, and
otherwise repaired, and will be put on board to day.
The Majestic's cre a' have completed all defects r,,:(1
de-
ficiencie.s aloft in the running rigging, and yesterday top-
gallant masts were sent on end, lower and topsail-yards
were also crossed, and she will be all a taunt tc-day.
Her crew are to be paid to morrow, and are then to pro-
ceed on leave of absence.

Tao Cressy, 80, screw, Captain Warren, is in No. 1
dry dock. Sheerness, with her topmasts housed and yards
do .vn. Her crew return from their leave on the 15th
instant. Her repairs are proceeding with, and she CB
being coppered two sheets higher than she formerly was.
Her guns aro all out, but we hear, immediately the crew
return, sho is to be got all atanto, like the Majestic, and
ready for immediate service.
Toe Imperieuse, 61, screw, Captain R. B. Watson,
C. 8., hauled into the steam basin dock at Portsmouth
yesterday, and Myrmidon and Oberon hauled into the
fitting basin.
We learn by electric telegraph from Plymouth that
the AI elusa, 5., which arrived in Plymouth Sound yes-
terday morning, had a Tong passage of 29 days from
Malta, having experiences contrary winds and calms.
She brings invalided troops, seamen, and mar►nes, under'
command of Lieut. Pringle, 71st Regt., and in medical
charge of Assistant-Surgeon Atkinson, 31st. At Malta
she embarked Lieut. Butler, R.N., !agent for the Pyre-
nees, and Lieut. Raymond, of the Tyrone, both of which
transports were lost on Nov. 14, off the Katcha. No
deaths have occurred on beard the Arethusa since she left
Malta. Lord Rokeby and Major-General Barnard em-
barked yesterday afternoon-on beard the St. Jean d'Acre,
101, Captain Keppel, and at 4 o'clock she steamed out
of Plymouth Sound for Queenstown on her voyage to
the Black Sea. _ _

The Arrogant, 46, screw, Captain Hastings Yelverton,
has discharged powder and shell, and will go into Ports-
mouth Harbour. _ _

The Amphion, 34, her Majesty's screw•frigate, Capt.
Key, hauled into Sheerness basin on Tuesday morning,
when she went alongside the sheers and got her lower
masts out, which are rotten and defective. The crew
are expecting soon to get leave ; Saturday is the day
named.

The Cossack, 21, screw, Captain Fansbawe, was taken
out on a cruise on Monday at Devonport, when her
engines answered well, and the leak is stopped.
The Pylades, 21, ,crew-corvette, is in the basin at
Sheerness. Only one of her boilers is got below. Penn and
Sons' mechanics are working at her machinery, which
progresses fast.
The Esk, 21, screw, captain Birch, had her trial yes-
terday at Portsmouth at the measured mile, and averaged
nine knots.

The Bonetta, 3, brigantine, Lieutenant Wake, R.N.,
commanding, arrived at Spithead yesterday from the
south-east coast of America station, which she left on
f)th of November ; consequently her news has been anti-
cipated by the steam mail packet. She reports the slave
trade on the Brazil coast as at a standstill. Mr. John
Harriman, passed clerk, R.N., came home in the
Bonetta, which has been in commission since February,
1.851, and will now be paid off.
Nearly all the seamen who were granted leave of ab-
sence from the Cumberland have arrived at Sheerness
and reported themselves on board the flag-ship
Waterloo.