The National Register.
London, England, 1808-03-27 00:00:00

The King has now au absolute power over the rank,

over the professional income, and, virtually, over the elm-
peter of every (Aker in the British Army. This power
OW3A originally acksiowledged in the Crown, at a time when
the numberi of the A rmv were so small as to be scarcely
,14 artily of notice : but the exception to the great princi-'
liles of the constitution, which forbid the arbitrary disposal
'of any man's fortune and character, has now been so vastly
,extended, that it has risen to bear no insignificant propor-
tion to the rule itself. Still it retains its inherent nature,
nd is, properly, only au exception ; for, even what is
'ailed martial law (which, though emanating from the
row, and depending upon it, is much more favourable i
Ito liii,rty, than the immediate power of the individual I
I
s°vereigu) is, as Upd grant lawyer Sir Matthew flak has
Av. AIL 1.0!. 1.

declared, in truth and in reality no kw, but something
indulged, rather than allowed as a law.
Let it not be said, then, that in seconding a limitation of
the King's Military Power, we are trenching on the Prero-
gative of the Crown; for nothing foieign to the Constitu-
tion can he a branch of th.: Prerogative, since the Peer. o-
gative itself exists but as a branch of the Constitution. •
Charier the !second kept up, in this kingdom, a petty
force of about five thousand men. In the reign of George
the Third, the support of a great Army, (which has in-
creased, and, it the plans of Ministers cucceed, is likely to
increase st;:l further), has been deemed necessary for the
defence of the State. But it is not necessary, that a force
created to defend the State in general, be thrown into the
hands of one single Member of the State : for that which
was intended to protect its from our enemies abroad, may
otherwise be, at some period, directed to the destruction
of n'ur liberties at home. His present Majesty, it is true,
is not likely to take any such wicked measure : but if
every King were to be wise and moderate, there would be
no use for any Constitution at all, and the reason why our
Coustitutio* is so transcendently admirable, is because it
• has, in most instances, guarded so effectually against the
encroachment af tiny branch of the Legislature. It', then,
it be necessary (anti we fear it is necessary) to keep up a
large standing Andy in the Country, it is surely expedient
to dispose of the individuals, constituting that army, so as
nut to add too great a force to any power in the State.
It is urged that the Crown, which has constitutionally the
prerogative of making wars, mast have constitutionally the
prerogative of appointing the Ofli:•ers who shall be employed
in those wars. Hut it ought not to follow, that the Crown
shall, therefore, have the power of displacing its Officers
without their tria! or even crime : for these Officers ha% ing
once been appointed by the Kin, become the servants ()I' the
countiv, anti no cause but an offeaec against the country,
and that too an offence fairly proved, ought to avail in
depriving any man of his. profession, his sebsisttnee, and
his honour. The twelve Judges are appointed by the
King ; hut the twelve Judges are not removeable at the
King's pleasure. The power of the King should he rather
the power of reward than of punishment ; in our consi i-
tuition his actual authority is, as it ought to be, very
small : but his intlitence is, as it ought to he, extensive.
The power of granting Commissions is a power of influ-
ence: gratitude for the past may create an attachment,
and hope for the future may perrtnate a devotion to the
crown : hut the power of dismissal and deprivation is a
power of authority ; uncongenial with the gentle attributes
of Majesty, discordant front the principles of the Brtish
Constitution, and invidious to men of so liberal a profes-
sion, who always act or should always be supposed to ail,
f; um the inspiring motives of honour and hope, rather
than from the mean operation of servility and fear.
Under the present regulations of the army, no °frees
can be safe : his honour, which is his whole support, may
be whispered iu a dark corner : eavy, treachery, and

-

Ir 4

gilo6.4wove•-•

F. NA VONA

fa'S'locr4 may 14up.plaaj him with the mill±are advisers of
his King : and his King, 'who ran view hi:n only with the
eyes of thew advisers, may sentence him, on itch migrepre-

agitation, to beggary and disgrarei The best monarch
_ cannot help misusing such a power sometimes y what must
that power be, if it fill into the. hands of a bad King ? It
IS said by Ministers, that no misapplication has in fact oc-
curred as yet 3 that is to say, the rhlic in general knows
no striking instances of such a misapplication. We firmly
believe that his present Majesty would never knowingly
Misapply such a power' hut, unknob:.ingly, it is almost
18possible for fallible humanity to avoid an occasional
misapplication of it—and why should we leave a possibility
for such an event ?

But while we are desirous of restraining the arbitrary
power of the Crown, because we conceive that it is not
eonstitetional i we are eager to confirm to the Crown the
prerogative of distributing justice, because to that preroga-
tive the constitution has entitled it. Let the K ing he the foun-
tain of military as well as of civil laws but let the law be
• .1 all eases open and Certain ; let the immediate cogni-
zance of offences be in all cases delegated by the Crown
4o a competent tribunal. The civil law of this country k
lodged by the Legislature in the King : from him it emanates,
1i id is distributed by his Judges, according to the decisions
Cr fact that are given by juries of his people..Thelllilitary
Law does not so constitutionally come Into the hands of
the King, because the Lords and Commons have nothing:
to do in its ordinations but the defects in its origin would
be greatly remedied by a regular course iu its distribution.
If the King is still to frame the articles* of war, to create
the crime and to create the punishment, at least let these
articles be applied by a Court-Martial. Then the Office:
tried will be tried according to a public code, and not ac-
e irding to a private caprice : then hit country will know
his conduct, and if injustice should deprive him of his COM-
mission, public opinion will never deprive him of his cha-
racter. Courts-Martial are Courts of Honour : in their
nature they wi.l not require tbe same proofs that are de-
manded in the Old Baileys their members will still have e
great discretionary powers 61.4 the Judges of an Officei
Mill then be his Peers, as the emeititution direct,. These arc
the Courts in which points of too delicate, subtle, and eva-
nescent a nature for the grosser perception of the common
law may be advantageously, tried s and the exception te
the principles of the constitution may be tolerated in con-
sideration of its advantages. And when it is remenibered
that the members of a Court-Martial are not bound, like
a Jury, to be unanimous in their sentence, and how many.
(Sines may be comprized in the sweeping diarge of un-
gentlemanlike conduct, no latitude of impunity can be
apprehended from the universality of such a mode of trial.
At present, the just and the unjust, all equally suffer. The
c ruses of dismissal are not made public, and he who lose,
his commission for the most scandalous fault, is in ro
worse condition than h^ who may hate becu degraded hs
caprice or mista:-.e, :slid who, if he had been tried by
Court-Martial, miLlht perhaps have procured himself at
honourable acquittal. In all cases, Where it becomes ne-
cessary to dismiss an Offseer, and where it would never-
theless be hard to eepuee him by a Court-Martial, a resig
nation may be properly accepted.

There is one answer which we foreve will be mado to al
!►e have 9;141, namely, " that unicere arc nut unfair!.