The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-12 00:00:00

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arapesd,,Md Blackwell or Woolwich 180dd: ... Os.. 1:213..
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erangements,
WELL ON NERVOUSNESS, DEBILITY, AND
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4,,,,, puittr
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ari IZ, &n.,
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the above harassing and distressing
li'm44 eg-la'll
In the get rid 3'. intelligible and popular exposition of how we should
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'. &e. "Qt of the twenty•fonr. Illustrated by numerous

Ltti
2.
.. leaTS AND SLOES OF MARRIED LIFE.
0 Z_eihlch that bath no wif, I hold him lost,
itPIC3I, and all desolat. He that hath nochild,
cf-4114ect : '!'ul and winde."--Chancer.
It tee impelled, and retarded
1„,._ na-....karitai Itove Matches—Precipai a .
,:siitt,olo,ll-
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" "bat A Lecture to Young Men.
passions hurt the bocly—what Improves
gee
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Tilt
typis. 6 and 7. companions to the preceding.
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To know the truth, when it concerns the honour, se-
curity, and power of the State, is the incontestible right
of a great country like France. To speak it, when silence
is not imposed by patriotism for the public weal, is the
sacred duty of a strong Government like that of the Em-
peror. The Eastern expedition, its causes, its object,
the military operations prepared for sustaining it, the
diplomatic negotiations entered upon for obviating or
terminating it, are now facts that are matters of discus-
sion pending their transition to the page of history. In
order that these facts may be usefully discussed and seri-
ously judged, we are now about to state them in their
most scrupulous exactitude. Such a course appears to
us to be both frank and useful. Public opinion is
prompt to take alarm and prone to error in the midst of
emotions and events such as those of which it now feels
every day the reaction. The best mode of reassuring it
is by enlightening it.
In what manner was the Eastern expedition con-
ceived ? What are the expectations and the data that
dictated its plan ? What are the causes that modified
it ? Why was the Anglo-French army landed. in the
Crimea instead of acting on the Danube and making a
campaign in Bessarabia ? How must we explain the
long resistance of the besieged in presence of the ardour
and heroism of the besiegers ? Such are the points we
wish to examine in the first part of this work. We
shall bring to this examination only some certain facts,
authentic documents, and truth of military science and
military history.
The imperious and decisive circumstances that com-
manded France to draw the sword after a peace of
forty years are present to the minds of all persons.
Russia, unable to obtain the admission of her supre-
macy over Turkey by the terror of her protocols, had
" endeavoured to impose it by force. She had violated trea-
ties, invaded a territory, disdained and threatened
Europe. Her armies were occupying the Principalities,
were advancing on the Danube, and had even marked
out the halting places of a victorious march on the
Balkans. The admirable spirit of the Turkish nation
was not sufficient to thwart this plan. Russia found an
unexpected obstacle, it is true, in the heroic devotion of
a people which she thought had fallen, and whose resist-
ance made her remember that it had conquered Peter
the Great. But the struggle was an unequal one. The
whole world, breathless and excited, awaited the issue
with anxiety. Germany, uncertain between her habits
engendered by the Holy Alliance and the counsels ten-
dered by her own dignity, did not know yet whether she
ought to submit any longer to the arrogance of that do-
mination which weighed upon her, or finally reject it.
It was fr mn the West that the signal of resistance
went forth. France and England, loyally united,
did not he,itate to send their fleets and armies to the
East to defend there the integrity of the Ottoman Em-
pire, the respect due to treaties, the equilibrium of Eu-
rope, and the cause of civilisation. .
The exalted will which presides over the government
of our country, and which had resolved on this war as
essential to its honour, after having vainly endeavoured
to prevent it by honourable conciliation, then traced out
instructions for the illustrious marshal, in whose hands
the sword of France was about to be placed. In those
instructions, bearing the date of April 12, 1854, we read
the following passages :
"In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French
army, about to fight at more than 600 leagues from its
native land, my first recommendation to you is to be-
stow the greatest care on, the health of the troops, to
spare them as much as possible, and not to come to an
engagement unless you have made sure of two-thirds at
least of the favourable chances.

" The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the
chief place of debarkation, because it is intended to be, as
a strategical point, the basis of our operations— that is
to say, the 'place d'arines,' where we can place our de-
pots, ambulances, and provisions, and whence we can
easily advance or re-embark. That will not prevent you
on your arrival from stationing, if you deem it advisable,
one or two divisions in the barracks either t) the west of
Constantinople or else at Scutari.

" So long as you are not in the presence of the enemy
the dislocation of your forces will be of small moment,
and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may
produce a good moral effect ; but if, by chance, after ad-
vancing on the Balkans, you should be constrained to
heat a retreat, it would be far more advantageous to re-
gain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople,
for the Russians would never venture from Adrianople
to Constantinople, leaving as they Would on their right a
choice army of 60,000 men. If nevertheless there should
be a wish to fortify the line of Karassu in front of Con-
stantinople, it should only be done with the intention of
allowing it to be defended by the Turks alone, since, I
repeat it, our position be more independent, more
formidable, by being on the flanks of the Russian army,
than by being blocked up in the peninsula of Thrace.
"This first point established and the Anglo-French
army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora,
you will have to come to an understanding with Omer
Pacha and Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one
of the three following plans : 1. Either to march and
meet the Russians. 2. Or to seize the Crimea. 3. Or
to land, say at Odessa, or at any other spot on the Rus-
sian const of the Black Sea.

" In the first case, Varna seems to me the imporbant
point for occupation. The infantry might go to it by
sea, and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land. In
no case ought the army ever to remove too far frein the
Black Sea, in order that it may have its communications
constantly open with the fleet.
" In the second case, the one concerning the occupa-
tion of the Crimea, it is necessary above all things to be
sure of the landing place, in order that the disembarka-
tion may be effected at a distance from the enemy, and
that this place may be capable of being fortified quickly,
so that it may serve as a support in case of a retreat.
" The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be attempted
unless you are provided with at least half a battering
train and a great many sacks of earth. When you ap-
proach that place, do not neglect to seize Balaklava, a
small port citrate four leagues to the south of Sebastopol,
and by means of which communication may be easily
kept up with the fleet during the continuance of the
siege.
"In the third case, that in which an enterprise should
be resolved on in concert with the admirals against
Odessa.
" In every case my principal advice is, never to
divide your army, but always to march with all your
troops united ; for a compact mass of 40,000 men is
al ways an imposing force ; broken, it is worth nothing.
"If, however, you are obliged to divide your army,
make arrangements for reuniting it on swims spot in 24
hours.
" If on the march it forms several columns, fix upon
a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy.to
prevent any column being attacked singly.
" If you repulse the Russians, proceedino farther than
the Danube, unless the Austrians join in the movement.
"As a general rule every movement ought to be con-
certed with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army.
It is only on certain exceptional occasions, as when the
safety of the army is concerned, that you should act on
your own sole decision.
" Marshal, I have full confidence in you ; lam con-
vinced that you will remain faithful to these instructions,
and that you will bring fresh glory to our eagles."
Thus, as we see by this extract from the Emperor's
instructions to Marshal St. Arnaud, Gallipoli had been
chosen as the place of debarkation of the Anglo-French
army. We must urge the important considerations
which led to this choice. _

The first principle in a maritime war is to fix upon a
point of assembling which is protected from the attacks
of the enemy, easily defended, easy of access for disem-
barking and provisioning the troops, which will allow
the army to move in advance or fall back upon its base
of operations, if forced to do so, and which, in case of
defeat, shall afford shelter and a refuge to the fleets.
The peninsula of Gallipoli satisfied admirably these
conditions for a well-conducted naval war. Situated at
Vie entrance of the Dardanelles, it was easily provisioned
through the sea of Marmora and the Thracian Gulf. A
weighty reason, drawn from, the respective situations of
the Russian and Turkish armies, made it necessary to
possess -this place.
The Russians, by crossing the Danube at Routs-
chouk, by advancing on Adrianopole, and by leaving
the Turkish forts, and even Constantinople on their left,
would be able to precede us there, and to close the re-
treat of our ships engaged in the Black Sea. There was
in that a great danger which the foresight of the Allied
Governments provided against and prevented. Another
consideration prescribed the previous occupation of
Gallipoli. At the period the expedition was about to
leave, that is to say in April, 1854, inquiries were
anxiously made whether our military forces would arrive
in time to cover Constantinople. A defensive war then
appeared natich more likely than an offensive one.
What- was endangered—and indeed already violated
—was the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and
that :was what we were about to defend and
- reconquer. Had the Turks lost a single battle on
the Danube the Russians would have been able to
reach the Balkan in three days' march, and would
have had the road to Constantinople open to them.
The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that
capital. The two Allied Governments were fully
alive to the fact that even had a Russian army entered
Adrianople, it would not have been able to advance upon
Constantinople, leaving an army of sixty thousand Eng-
lish and French on its right flank ; and this foresight is
to be found in the instructions of the Emperor.

Thus, in every respect, and in anticipation of nearly
all casualties, the peninsula of Gallipoli was admirably
selected as the place of debarkation and the base of ope-
rations. From this point we were able to protect the
Turkish capital and to control the movements of our
fleet ; we advanced without exposing our flanks, and we
kept up our communication with Toulon and Marseilles.
But the Anglo-French army had hardly arrived at
Gallipoli when the scene began to be changed. Although
the Russian scouts had been seen in sight of Varna, the
alereio defence- of Silistria • had broken the onward im-
pulse of Prince G-ortschakoff. The struggle, instead of
being removed into the centre of the Turkish empire.
I was kept up on the Danube, with various changes of
fortuue, The generals in chief of the expedition were

The French and English armies were bound to foresee
and prepare for this. There was their post, because
there perhaps would be the denouement of the strife, and
the final decision of fate.
These apprehensions were falsified by events. The
courage of the Turkish army, and the presence of the
allies, sufficed to force the Russians to raise the siege,
and withdraw to the other side of the Danube.
Every time that the enemy retreats there is a great
temptation for the -army before whom he retires ; it is
the temptation of pursuit. Bat when pursuit may en-
danger an army, there is more glory id halting than in
advancing. The love of glory should never lead to that
which wisdom forbids. What could the Anglo-French
army have done by entangling itself in a country laid
waste, with its communications cut off, furrowed by
large water-courses, and infested by pestilent disorders ?
It is not victory that it would have sought, but des'zu-
tion without contest, and death sisitti'Mkt-bompensation.
It has been said that after the retreat of the Russians
we ought to have acted upon the Danube and entered
into Bessarabia. Let us put the matter in the most
straightforward manner possible. Withont the co-ope-
ration (contours) of Austria, our army could not advance
upon the Danube without incurring the risk of a most
fatal catastrophe. -We must not forget that our base
of operations was the sea. Losing this we risked every-
thing and compromised everything. Military science
and common sense both entered their protest against un-
dertaking operations with 60,000 Anglo-French and
60,000 Turks in an unhealthy and impracticable coun-
try, having no means of transport, without any reserves
of artillery or organised parks—no depots of eatables or
munitions at Shumla, Varna, or Silistria. All these re-
sources, indispensable at the commencement of a cam-
paign, cannot be improvised in a few days, when those
who have the management of affairs are 800 leagues dis-
tant from their country. These resources might have
failed us completely. We should have found ourselves
in front of •an army of 200,000 men waiting for us on
their own ground ; or else retreating befcre us, trying to
entrap us into a still more dangerous position, giving us
no other alternative than that of a most disadvantage.
ous battle or an impossible retreat. A simple re-
connaissance of two days in the Dobrudscba which cost
us more than a most murderous combat, is a proof of
what we have advanced. Generals-in-chief, who, igno-
rant of the dangers attending such an undertaking,
should have allowed themselves to be drawn into the
commission of such an irreparable fault would, we have
no hesitation in saying, have endangered the responsi-
bility of their command.
and Again w
on the
we rpreupteha
is it, acampaign
not
possible
withoutb ey o n d
tthhee
co-opera-
tion
. oapnerae.
tion of Austria. Now, a Government does not make
var when it desires it, unless forced to do so by incon-
trovertible circumstances. It takes care to make war
only when it is able to do so. Austria was not rea'ly at
the moment. Breaking with Russia she wanted t ) be
sure of Germany with its 500,000 men in arms. Her
dignity, her interest, the example of the Western Powers
excited her to action—her prudence warned her to wait
and arrange the composition of her military forces and
her political alliances before committing herself to the
struggle.
But what could the associated generals do at Varna
after the retreat of the Russian army ? Could they r,?.-
main in a state of inactivity which would have brought
on discouragement, and by which the prestige of our flag
would have inevitably suffered ? Such an attitude was
forbidden to ou-r generals, both by military honour and
political interest. Having once taken a position on the
great theatre, there was no retreat • something must be
done ; our soldiers must have a goal to strive to reach ;
our enemies must have something to fear. Europe must
feel the ambitious desire of following us, while it would
be our duty to give her the opportunity of honouring us
and admiring us. Thus then we come to the question
of operating upon the Crimea.

An expedition against Sebastopol might probably
hasten the catastrophe of the war. Such an expedition
had a determinate end. It might possibly put into the
bands of tha Allies a provineelnd a fortress, which
could be used as a guarantee and a means of exchange
in the event of negotiation for peace. Deeply influenced
by these considerations, the generals in command of the
forces deliberated upon the plan, but delayed for a time
to put it into execution (arreterent rexecution).
However, the expedition having been made the subject
of deliberation at Paris and London, and treated at last
as a fart, Marshal St. Arnaud received—not instructions
which could not be transmitted through such long dis-
tances of space, but hints or advice of the following
nature :

"He will make himself thoroughly
acquainted with
the nature and amount of the Russian forces in the Cri-
mea ; find out whether those forces are too formidable ;
and land in a spot which may serve as a basis for future
*rations. The best place seems to be Theodosia,
called Kaffa now. This spot, however, is objection-
able, as being forty leagues from Sebastopol; but it offers
great advantages. In the first place, the bay is large and
safe. The ships of the squadron are there in perfect safety,
and the same remark applies to the barques-which bring
supplies to the army. In the next place, our army, once
established on the spot, may use it as a proper base of
operations. If we occupy the -extreme east of the
Crimea, we can repel all the reinforcements coming by
the way of the Sea of Azoff and the Caucasus. We make
our way onward towards the centre of tie country, at
the same time that we have its resources atiour command.
We take possession of Simpheropol, the strtegical centre
of this peninsula, ad have the road opento Sebastopol,
on which probably there will be a great battle. In the
event of this being against us,
we nisiy retreat upon
Kaffa, and nothing is compromised. If it is in our
favour, we can besiege Sebastopol, and by investing it
completely we shall compel it to surrender in a tole*bl y
short interval."
Unluckily this advice was not taken. Whether
the generals-in•chief had not sufficient- troops to un-
dertake this long journey in the Crieiea, or whether
they expected a speedier result from a bold and unex-
pected coup de main, they resolved, as it is now well
known, to land at some few leagues distant from Sebas-
topol. The glorious battle of the Alma seemed to prove
they could
that they were right. But in the moment of victory
they saw clearly enough that without port
have no base of operations. Influenced by that irresis-
tible instinct of preservation which never deceives those
who listen to it, they directed their course to Balaklava,
on the south of gebastopol. It was clear, too, that the
arty could not live in the enemy's country without
being in direct communication with the fleet.
Bet the consequence of retreating towards the south
was to give up the northern heights—in other words,
to abandon the idea of-investing the fortification. The
Anglo-French army, in fact, was not sufficiently nume-
rous to invest the place completely. It was necessary
to limit our operations to the southern portion of the
town. To accomplish this the English took possession
of the harbour of Balaklava ; the French, looking for a
point d'appui for the pnrpose of disembarking their stores
and ammunition, found very providentially the port of
Kamiescb. The sold.ors, who are generally right, called
this " Providence Port."

Sebastopol, it is well known, is not surrounded with
walls and earthworks. It is rather a great fortified
generally ly
at anthe aorommymoefhforeoromehlts
of
fo
the2o
liebnnyi:ingpermogteeerncous batteries, and more especially
irliciltassasian fleet, which, skilfully stationed in the
by which the Allies could approach the place.
tcbinillayetnignuetepirs-:aehwncaoßorbour, bad its batteries directed upon every ave-
nueAt this period—that is to say, when the Anglo-French
army arrived before Sebastopol, perhaps it was practi-
cable to attempt an assault, but still such an enterprise
would have been somewhat adventurous, inasmuch as the
Allied forces had not sufficient artillery to silence that
of the enemy. Doubtless, nothing was impossible to an
Anglo-French army, composed of generals and soldiers
sych as those who for the last six months have manirested
their character in the perils, fatigues, and sufferings of
this long siege, but nothing short of success could have
justified a coup so audacious. The responsibility of com-
mand imposes prudence before all things, and prudence
prescribed to the generals-in-chief not to deliver the as-
sault with an army of 50,000 men at most, placed on a
rock, wantiaglartillery, ammunition, reserves—not having
its rear secured by entrenchments in
.case of a check, and
having no refuge but its ships. That would have been
to risk the fortune and the fate of the expedition, and
nothing should be hazarded at a distaece of 800 leagues
from one's own country.
The coup de main, which the generals thought possible
after the battle of the Alma, escaped them, and it only
remained to proceed with the siege after the rules of the
military art. At the very commencement of this diffi-
cult enterprise the Russians took two measures, very effi-
cacious for themselves and very regrettable for us. The
first was the stragetic movement of Prince Menschikoff,
who, instead of shutting himself up in Sebastopol,
marched towards Simpheropol, afterwards took the field,
and kept up his communication with the fortress ; the
second was the bold resolution to sink most of the ships
of war, a measure which enabled the enemy to render
the port inaccessible to our fleets, and to acquire for the
defence of the place from five to Six hundred guns thus
set at liberty, together with their ammunition, and to
employ their seamen as gunners at the batter's i. Thus,
although the guns of the town at the first presented a
formidable aspect, new batteries were raised, as if by en-
chantment, and our feeble siege artillery could not ex-
tinguish the fire of the besieged.

From this moment it became apparent to all that Se-
bastopol would not be taken until after a long struggle:
that the aid of powerful rainforcements would b? rfe
quired, and that possibly-murderous battles migb:
have to be fought. This sifuation.,was &.0!:1csO u
',flogs
The generals in-chief contemplated it with 0_0'1:4 difficult
which exalts a character to the level of the for
for speaking
responsibilities. This is a proper ocemilis history will

speak of them. Their part in this great scene has been
worthy of the two countries of which they wield lithe
swords. Placed face to face with immense obstacles,
they have estimated them only to triumph over them by
their courage, perseverance, and devotedness. The army,
sustained by their example, has borne all without com-
plaining ; exposed to all the rigours of a terrible winter,
having to preserve them from the cold, the snow, the
torrents of rain, nothing but pits, and small tenter-abri ' •
it has refused no sacrifice for the honour of the flag and
the country, or to gain the confidence of the chiefs whom
it had learned on the field of battle to love and honour.
In order duly to appreciate the immense difficulty of
the enterprise which the generals-in-chief had conceived
and executed, it will not perhaps be useless to explain to
those who are ignorant of it, in what consists a siege
placedproperly
beyondso h
called,
toapplication
and how theof h
siege oftos
o principles Sebastopolnoiloo o
is
f
which the science immortalised by Vauban is the ad-
mirable summary. Let us first say that Sebastopol, a
town strongly fortified towards the sea, is not regularly
fortified on the side. Its enclosure is defended by a shal-
low fosse, the earth from which has been thrown up to-
wards the place to form a parapet. On the first plan
are found abbatises and trauz-de-loup, and the batteries,
the fire of -which crosses in front of -those defences, rise
gradually one above another, receding towards the
centre of the town. More, the port is traversed by war
steamers, which, forming so many moveable batteries,
may be employed to flank and protect all the defensive
works.
The operations of a siege before the assault may be
divided into four principal phases—first the investment;
second, the opening of the trenches; third, the construe-

tion of parallels and batteries, and the opening of fire ;
and fourth, the crowning of the covered way, and the
establishment of breaching and counter batteries.
First, the investment—that is to say, the surrounding
of the place on all sides—so that, during the siege, it
can receive no reinforcements of men nor supplies of
ammunition and provisions. According to the ordinary
general rules, it is calculated that the besieging army
ought to number five or six times as many more as the
besieged. Sebastopol, as has before been said, could not
be invested at all, and the number of the besiegers was
at most only double that of the besieged. We do not
reckon the army of observation which is employed in
holding the (Russian) army of succour in check.
Second, opening of the trenches. —This is ordinarily per-

formed at a.distaiice of from 300 to 600 metres froln.the
place ; the trench is, as is generally known, a ditch dug
in the ground, the earth from which is thrown towards
the fortress. In this way a parapet is formed to shelter
the soldiers from the fire of the enemy. At Sebastopol,
the Russians having employed large guns taken from
their ships, and baying enormous range, the trench could
not be opened nearer than 900 metres. Instead of find-
ing a soil easily excavated, our soldiers found almost
everywhere rock, so that they were obliged to use
petards to blast it morsel by morsel, and to employ bags
of earth, which, piled one on another, formed parapets.
It will be seen that this was a slow, painful, and perilous
process.

Third, opening of fire.—Generally, engineers work to-
wards the most salient points, because these are the
weakest ; and the trenches enveloping the attacked
fortress in front take the form of several semicircular

lines, connected with one another by zigzags. These
semicircular lines are call:A parallels. The batteries are
raised in front of these lines, which, embracing the at-
tacked front in the form of a semicircle, give the fire a
converging direction. The besieged have not this ad-
vantage, as may be easily conceived, for a besieged
town may be regarded as forming the centre of a circle,
of which the besiegers occupy the circumference. At
Seba-topol, on one side, the nature of the ground,
broken up by ringed ravines, and on the other de-
velopment. of the eec'osure, which presents but few
salient points, have prevented, in great part, those
favourable arrangement, just explained.
Fourth, crowning the covered way.—When the be-
sieger has reached the ,alient point of the covered way,
which is carried round the fnsse, he encloses this work
by extending the trench along the crest on each side of
the angle. This is called crowning the covered way.
Breaching batteries are constructed there, by means of
which the wall has to be knocked into the ditoh, and
heaps thus made on which the besiegers are to mount to
the assault. Generally by the time this critical moment
is attained almost all the enemy's guns have been dis-
mounted, the carriages broken, and the ammunition ex-
hausted. Nevertheless, as sometimes there remain some
guns on the flanks of the bastions of the attacked front,
a counter battery is established either in the crown
of the covered way or on the counterscarp of the ditch,
to extinguish the la.t fire of the enemy. Thus we may
assume that when the assault is attempted, the entire
artillery of the place has been destroyed, and that the
garrison, decimated by the enemy's fire, exhausted by
excessive work, enfeebled by want of nourishment, and
discouraged by the absence of news from without, will
not longer oppose a serious resistance.
At Sebastopol nothing like this has taken place. As
fast as one gnn has been dismounted another has been
set up in its stead ; when one man has fallen his place
has been supplied by another ; as soon as one garrison
has been exhausted another has succeeded it. Provisions
have been abundant, and battering in breach could have
no result, as the obstacle ordinarily opposed by the wall
is replaced by palisades, trous-de-loop and abbatises, and
because the epaulements being of earth the balls have
done them little harm. In the case of a regular attack
directed against a fortress of the first order, and this
attack directed against two demi-lunes and a bastion, the
front of the fortification would embrace not more than
an extent of about 300 metres ; and the attack in front
would have a development of about 8,000 metres.
At Sebastopol the extent of the attacked front is more
than 3,000 metres, and that of the attack has a develop-
ment of 41 kilometres. It must be added that for the
guard of this immense extent of trenches the army has
had to furnish nearly 10,000 men, day and night,
through a period of six months, and that during a rigor-
ous winter, in the midst of snow and rain. This will
give some slight idea of the fatigues of our soldiers and
the ditticulties of the siege.

The history of modern states does not present an ex-
ample of a more difficult, more glorious enterprise, or
one which by the very grandeur of the obstacles it pre-
sents, agrees more nearly with the importance of its
object, and that of the states engaged therein. The siege
of Sebastopol has scarcely any analogy with any other
in our military annals. To attack a place which is not
invested, when the enemy, superior in numbers, may
recruit himself with more provisions and ammunition,
and when he keeps the field, is an act of audacity which
could be attempted only by England and France united
for an object necessary for Europe.
The siege of Dantzic has been much admired as one of
those in which heroism united with science triumphed
over the greatest difficulties of an obstinate and formid-
able defence. Dantzie, protected by the Vistula, the
embouchere of which in the Baltic is closed by the fort
of Verihaelmunde, was in a situation equally unfavour-
able to a complete investment ; still it was possible to
take a position on the river between the fort which
closed its mouth and the town, and so to intercept its
communication with the Pea and invest the place. This
is what was done under the orders of General Lefebvre.
But yet although the pla,:a was eiclosed within our lines
of attack, notwithsta ,ding the presence in the neighbour-
hood of the Emperor Napoleon, who covered the siege at
the head of a numerous army, and paralysed the succour
of Prussia and Russia, Dantzic resisted 51 days iron the
opening of the trenches. At a later period, after the
retreat of Moscow, the town, occupied then by the
French, did not capitulate until after a defence, which
lasted a year, against a combined attack by sea and land.
We might multiply examples, but the foregoing will
suffice to show that the Anglo-French army in the
Crimea has performed there all that was to be expected
from its courage and the ability of its chiefs. It has
not only exhibited constancy and firmness in the midst
of sufferings and perils ; by adding the glory of Liken
man to that of Alma it has rased still higher the honour
of our arms. I,Ve ought to hope that the end of its
noble efforts will be attained ; but unanimous opinion
a!ready acknowledges, and history will one day repeat,
that it has merited the admiration and the gratitude of
the world.

We have explained the military conduct of the allied
governments since the commencement of the Eastern
expedition. With the same precision and impartiality
we shall treat of the negotiations, their various phases,
their reasons, and their aims.