The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-27 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, JANUARY 27, 185 5,

seas, we are apt to is rebuked, by Him at whose breath
the stormy tempest rages, and found that serious losses
might be sustained on that element. We have this further
disadvantage as regards transport by sea, that we have al-
most exhausted our resources for conveying by steam the
articles necessary for tle sustenance of our army. I should
like to state to the house, because it is, perhaps, scarcely
aware of it, what amount of transport has been necessary to
convoy, not only our non, not only our horses, not only our
ammunition, but the food, the provender, and military
stores requisite for ths maintenance of an army such as i
ours. And when it is said that these departments of the
Government have bees slack and remiss in their mode of
executing their duty, Mink lowe it to the Admiralty to read
this paper to show whet an immense power has been put
into exercise in order te convey this army and its stores.
I find that from the 7th of February, 1851, to the 10th of
December, 1854, and from the 11th of December, 1854, to
the 22d of January, 10, that the Admiralty in their own
ships or hired transports have conveyed to the East—British
troops from England, officers, 2,141 ; men, 54,231; horses,
5,408; provisions from England, 29,261 tons, navy service ;
18,897 tons, army service; 19,135 Ordnance stores; 110,8G7
tons of coals ; 3,320 lava' stores, and from Malta 7,180
tons. French troops from Marseilles and Toulon—officers,
556 ; men, 14,055 ; horses, 193 ; stores, 8,037. From Calais
to the Baltic—French troops—officers, 437 ; men, 12,888 ; ,
horses, 21; British stores, navy provision, 9,346 tons ;
Ordnance stores, 266 tons ; naval stores, 247 tons ; coals,
47,907 tons ; making a grand total of 3,134 officers, 81,167
men, 5,622 horses, and 251,133 tons of provisions and
stores. I have read this statement, for I deem it of im-
portance that the house should know the description of
duties exacted from this department, and to show the
extent to which the Admiralty has been able to co-operate
with the military department in furnishing these necessary
supplies for the sustenance and strengthening of the army.
I shall hereafter have occasion to show the charges snarls
with respect to these departments, but I will uow go back
to the point from which I started, which was that if the
Government be asked who is to blame that the stores have
not been removed from Balaklava to the camp—if we are
expected to make a guess as to this in order to put on
other men's shoulders and to shift the blame from our-
selves, the burden of which we have no right to bear, you
will be disappointed in your expectations ; for the Go-
vernment are determined to take no such course. We have
written to the Commander-in-Chief, pointing out the
failures which appear to have taken place, drawing his
attention to circumstances which have been reported to
us, and desiring him to use the supreme powers intrusted
to him to displace those men who have shown themselves
incompetent, and to replace them by those acting under
his eye, who have qualified themselves in the stern school
of experience and who have given proofs of their adminis-
trative ability. It is not iu the power of the Government,
at this distance and without information, and it would be
cowardly and discreditable without certainty, to attempt
to throw the blame on men who are absent—who may be
accused unjustly, and who, at any rate, are now gallantly
penning their lives in the service of their country. (Hear.)
Tim hon. --a iee„,,ls ,k,s_eee re. :31....C9,1 ' Ims not rimer-
relied with the Govtafileent on a subject which last session
was the great object of debate. Then we had not sent out
men enough, then eat hart neglected to form a reserve ;
but I think those discussions showed at least that the
Government had sent out a considerable force, and had
formed a considerable reserve, which, however, I ad-
mitted had ceased to be a reserve, as it was sent to
reinforce the main body of the army. The difficulty
now arises to create a reserve, am. the Government will
ask for powers to form one, end I have no doubt but that
they will receive from this house every vote necessary for
that purpose. I wish to slate that the Government have
no wish to conceal any portion of their conduct, but they
may have, and they have, strong reasons for refusing to
submit to this vote ; but anything that the Government
eau produce in the way of information, which will show
what has or has not been done, the Government are ready
to produce. My hon. friend has given notice of what he
desires shall be produced, but some part of that informa-
tion cannot be obtained because it does not exist; but
everything without prejudice to individuals that can be
got shall he produced. I will add to those of which notice
has been givers the accounts of ammunition, of which
there is said not to have been a sufficiency, and also those
of food and clothing—l will add all these, for I think there
exists in the country a great delusion on these matters,
and that it is imagined, because the army is not in posses-
sion of what it ought to be, that these stores have not left
the shores of England. There aro some of the statements
which have been made so absurd that I should hope they
almost carried their refutation with them. I read in a
newspaper the other day a paragraph headed "How the
Government provides ammunition," giving an account of
the Lancaster guns, the shells of which, it was said, were
so small that they would not fit the bore, and there was
so much " wind" that it was impossible to fire with accu-
racy. I, by a great chance, met with another paragraph
in a different paper, headed "The Ordnance again," which
stated that the shells sent were much too large, and that
the men were engaged in filing them down. Now, if
these statements were read by gentlemen who could not
read both, they, seeing them in print, might deem them
conclusive. I was told the other day that the huts
were sent out without nails. I thought this a most ex-
traordinary statement, and, before I could receive infor-
mation on this from official quarters, a gentleman hap-
pened to come into my room to whom I mentioned this,
and ho said that, as he was very curious to see the huts
stowed, ho saw them embarked, and ho was particu-
larly struck, not only with the frames into which they
fitted, but also with the yap in whichevery nail and screw
appeared almost to be in its proper place. Yesterday I read
a statement with respect to the clothing sent out in which
it was stated that it was the custom to send out the coats
without the buttons, which were sent with them and sewn
on by the soldiers, and that the coats lately despatched to
the army were without isuttoas. In answer to this 1 may
4 state, in the first place, that it is not the custom to send
out coats without buttons, and that the coats sent to the
army were completed before they left England. I will not
detain the house with a budget of these statements I have
collected, but I mention these as specimens of the levity
with which such charges . are made, and which .have not
the slightest foundation in fact. I have statedthe intention
of the Government to lay on the table of the house the re-
' turns, for were I now to go into details as to how many
thousand blankets and coats had been supplied such a
course would be unsatisfactory, as I would much sooner
, pass over these things and lay the necessary documents
before the house, and they will then be able to judge of
the truth of the statement of the insufficiency of the pro-
, visions made by the Government. The noble lord' who sits
I am sorry to say, behind me mentionea that one cause of
the determination at which he arrived to leave this Go-
te ee
ta
el
df ootarreute tscittheohoil
telfbapeohtecuretur(chipmi
oneomabsttaylehhenooveei
thought
eddegtdwihhtsi
oes-t.
vernmeat was this—that the War Departments were not
swoamr.oTdihfieendObre lt°orhde, Irealthilnyk,ffoebj
indi-
vidual who is now addressing you being charged with the
themet
hu moving vs
officelion Secretaryngs o
wfetfhhtiche
hoeaftrsosmoet
Secretary
rtpeee
its.
aat
cir
Temy
hia
aaet
set t
sls
Waroe i
louse
iet
oh isit
oughtwill
as to the manner in which these departments ought to be
reorganised and consolidated, and at the same time
I stated the opinion I entertained as to tho position
held by the Secretary at Win I stated that the office
ought not to be held by one who was a Cabinet Minister,
but that his duties ought to becoufined simply to the finan-
cial details of the army. I stated also that at the moment
the Government should be enabled to make arrangements
by which these departments could be put on a better and
I sounder footing I was not the man to stand in the way,
and that I would readily and gladly give up the office I
I now hold. (Hear.) When I pressed this matter on the
attention of the Earl of Aberdeen I stated that I was per-
fectly willing to resign the office which I held, for I felt—
an opinion which I had expressed, andwhich I still adhere
to that some change was necessary, and I felt that I ought
to lose no time in redeeming the pledge which I had made.
I consulted some of my colleagues on this matter, and
among others the noble lord the member for Tiverton, and
I told him my feeling as to quitting the office I now hold
in the Government in the event of any change—if it should
be merged or so altered in its character that I could not
hold it. The noble lord gave me his opinion with great
friendliness, and with sincerity, I hope, and said that were
ho Secretary of War he should think its combination with
that of Secretary at War would impose so large an amount
of business that it would be impossible that a single man
could perform it, and urged that I would not take the
course contemplated—that of placing my resignation in the
hands of Lord Aberdeen. I cannot say that I have seen
any reason to change the opinion I stated as to the neces-
sity of a complete remodelling of the War Department.
You want some person to conduct the finance of the army,
another for the provisioning of the army, another for the
arming of the army, and again, the commander-in-chief
to maintain and conduct the business of the army ; these
are the persons who should form a board, over which the
Secretary of State, the chief Minister for the War Depart-
ment, should preside, and from whom the others should
receive instructions, and to whom they should make
reports of the progress made in carrying out his will.
I understand, speaking generally, that this was a
view shared in by all the members of the Govern-
ment, and answers, with the difference of the Financial
Minister, to that mentioned by the Duke of Richmond.
What you want in these departments is a division of
labour, and to secure among the subordinates the complete
subordination of all to one common head. It was with this
view that the noble duke the Secretary of State has for
some time past been having meetings of all different heads 1
of the departments—sitting together to receive instructions
and to make suggestions—bringing any business which they
had not the power singly to perform, and to receive instruc-
tion in the presence of each other, so that each might know
exactly what the other was doing. Tho object of this was
to combine all the means in their power to attain one com-
mon object. Minutes were taken at these meetings, copies
of which were sent to the principal members of the Go-
vernment. At every fresh meeting the minutes of the last
were read, and reports were made as to the progress of the
works in hand. The noble lord behind me said he differed
from me as to the constitution of this board ; but I did
not know at the time, neither do I at this moment, the
amount of the difference of opinion between us. I have
mentioned this, because it is alleged that the Government
did not intend, and have not taken any steps to make
alterations in these departments. I may also add that in
the autumn the Commissariat Department was removed
from the control of the Treasury, and placed under that of
the chief Minister of War. It is said, however, that you
have not been able to make changes necessary for the carry-
ing on of the war—that you have not been able to make
graneyaptracticalc difficultieshanargeesse.. AtTtahkee
which found that they could not supply a st iffinent num-
ec)tinhemecnasceemorttheof euprderneatniecne,s
num-
ber of shells fitted with fusees for the workin hand. An
officer of engineers received instructions from the Secre-
tary of State, and organised a factory out of his own re-
sources, in which any quantity of this delicate work can
be executed at considerable saving to the country. With
regard to the waggon corps, of which it has been stated
there was a great want, I do not think it was organised
till the later years of the war under the Duke
it of
Wellington, who formed it himself. It gradually dwin-
dled down, year after year, till 1832 or 1838 was
totally abolished. A waggon corps cannot be kept in
a state of great efficiency during a time of peace. You
cannot have your regiments marching from place to place ,
followed by their train of horses with baggage on pack-
saddles
while you have your railways to convey them in a
s the necessityherttimotothe of p
their destination. The Government, however,
felt
com-
menced buying animals not onlythewalaegeggonthcoerps,a coastild oftho
south of France, but in Spain, Tunis, Egypt, and wherever
they were likely to find horses or mules adapted for their
purpose. The Duke of Newcastle has organised a corps,
and I see from accounts in the newspapers that fresh sup-
plies of baggage animals are arriving at Balaklava, and I
have every reason to hope that when this establishment is
put on a thorough good footing by an experienced officer
who discharged the same duty for Sir Charles Napier we
shall find that it will not be possible for our army to fall
into the same state in which it has been. I believe the
commissariat in the Crimea has been overburdened with
work, and that their duties ought to bo confined to the pro-
viding of provisions, and not as hitherto, to its transport
likewise. The Duke of Newcastle
staff has also established a
corps for the purpose of providing a police for the
Army, This was seat out some time ago, and is working

tinted, or even attempted to be substantiated, which I !
might apply myself to answer. Now, the statement which
the hon. and learned gentleman made ho put upon a very
simple issue. He says that there left the shores of this
country one of the largest and best appointed armies that
England ever sent forth. He recites their numbers, and he
asks what has become of those forces. And here I must say
my hon. and learned friend fell into one inaccuracy, be-
cause he asks what has become of the whole numberof
men, as if they all went out with the original expedition,
sentand overlookingoutsince
then, and
fact
thatthat maothersn y
hefaathnemot have been
circumstance which must be taken into account in estimat-
ing arithmetically the proportions which have fallen in
battle or died from disease. Sir, I confess that I approach
this subject with unaffected feelings of pain. I am not
about to attempt or pretend to bolster up a case by read-
'
in.. letters or extracts from letters, seeking to convey to
the house impressions other than those that in my con-
science I know to be correct. I believe that exposure to
suffering, exposure to an inclement season, and to priva-
tions of all descriptions, has reduced the army under the
command of Lord Raglan to a state that does excite deep
anxiety in the mind of every Englishman. But, sir, so far
as it depends upon us, I might quote the very observation
which fell from my hon. and learned friend when he said,
"You have transported to the shores of Balaklava stores
enough to feed and shelter twice the body of men that you
have sent out." (Hear, hear.) Now, you:may ask—as I
have no doubt you will do—what is the reason why an
army such as the hon. and learned gentleman described it
—so fully equipped, should have fallen in so short a period
into a state arguing a great want or defect in the in-
ternal organization, either of that army itself en the spot,
or in the departments charged with the administration at
home ? The lengthened remarks I made the other day
when I had to disuse this subject will, I trust, enable
me to abridge, and even justify me in abridging, as
11 much as possible, the statement I have to offer to-night;
but I stated then, and I state now, my belief that the
first cause to which you must trace the disorganisation
in that army is to be found in the system we have pursued
during a long period of peace. (Hear, hear.) I am not
now speaking merely of reductions effected in men er in
votes of money, but of the destruction of the very sources
of our military power during the 40 years' peace which
followed 1815; and I think I can satisfy you in a very few
words that we have had virtually no army during that
time—that we have kept our forces for purposes of police
at home and in our colonies rather than for purposes of
defence abroad. We have, indeed, maintained our forces
in a state of high discipline up to a certain extent of or-
ganisation, but not beyond it. What I mean—if the house
will pardon me for noticing it—is simply this :—English-
men are people who can do as well, and, perhaps, one's na-
tural national vanity leads one to think that they can do
even better than any other persons, anything whatever
that they choose to attempt. But, I ask, what is your
English army? It is only a collection of regiments. The
internal discipline of those regiments is certainly oompleto
—you have in every company and in ov,ry regiment a
most perfect regimental system ; and, if you observe, sun
will find that in the actions that have lately taken place,
and in the whole of the campaign during which they have
occurred, there has not been the slightest sign of regi-
mental disorganisation. On the contrary, it is admitted
on all hands that the relations between the officers and the
men—the affection between them, and the confidence the
men have shown in the courage and capacity of their
officers, have been most admirable, and could not be ex-
ceeded. All this has been witnessed, although there has
been wanting that control over the whole army which you
can get only by practice—and you have had no such prac-
tice. I say, then, iu fact, that what you term,tho English
army, has not been an army, but a collection of regiments.
Why, I venture to say that there have been field-officers
iu command of regiments in the Crimea who, until they
went there, unless they had been in India or been quartered
in Dublin, never in their lives saw a brigade. What, then,
I ask, can you expect from such an army? You look for a
perfect regimentalorganisation, and you succsed i find! ng t,
bat can you expect men who have never seen an army in the
field, and are utterly unacquainted with the movements of
such a force and with the regulations required for its sup-
plies and its security—can you expect such persons to bo
Heaven-born adruinistratoi s, who can do not only what
they have never practised, but what they never even saw
done? This is a very important element in the considera-
tion of the causes of the misfortunes which have occurred
to our army abroad. Again, look at the composition of
your army as regards the individual men. Iu England you
have the highest degree of civilisation to be found in the
world. As a matter of course, therefore, you have the
minutest subdivision of labour; and, from the smallness
of the country and the close proximity of different places
you have the most rapid communication botvveen your
cities and towns. Well, what is the result ? Why, that the
English peasant never does anything for himself, as in the
case in less advanced states of society. His house is built
for him, and so is his dress and everything ho requires;
except in the case of the most remote districts of your em-
pire, where a few of the peasantry may be found who built
their own cabins and make their own clothes, shoes, and
(Aber articles in a primitive manner. The great subdivision
of labour consequent on high civilisation offers such faci-
lities for every man getting everything done for him that a
man does not know how to turn if he is thrown upon his
own resources and left to shift for himself. I recollect an
hon. friend of mine opposite handing me last autumn a
letter, with suggestions relating to the clothing of the army
to be sent to the Crimea, which I adopted without loss of
time ; and that letter concluded, I remember, with a re-
markable sentence of warning, to the effect that when I had
doae;allthe things that herecommendedthey would be aimed
valueless, for the men must suffer through not knowing how
to help themselves. An army is a vast and complex machine,
and I might refer you to the failures that occurred at the
commencement of former wars in which England has been
engaged. I might also ask you to look at the successive re-
ductions you have made in the strength of your force, and '
especially to the disembodiment of the militia after 1815—
measure which continued until this body was reconstituted
for the first time in 1852. I might further point to the de-
struction of your waggon-train—to the entire destruction
of your staff abroad. All these things have been clone
year by year under the pressure of economy, without there
being a single attempt made (indeed that was thought to,
be almost foreigtito a country such as ours) to organise an
army for any purpose in the field. Well, a few years ago
the nation was startled by the appearance of a letter from
a great authority—the greatest military authority this
country ever saw. Tho Duke of Wellington addressed his
celebrated letter to Sir John Burgoyne, protesting against
the defenceless state in which England was placed. Sub-
sequently to this, and even prior to it, great efforts were
made to increase the steam navy which we now possess,
the creation of which began some 10 years ago, and an
augmentation was likewise made to our army. But the
Government of Lord Derby restored that great source of
military power—the militia—which had been lying dor-
mant for se long a period. While all this was taking place,
our commerce and our wealth, and consequently our means
of supporting our national establishments, were simulta-
neously increasing. We had, at the same time, a growing
demand for the services of these establishments. Our
colonies were rising into empires, Australia was fast be-
coming one of the most important possessions, and our
dominion had extended in other parts of the globe scarcely
less important. Now, that being so, I want to know if it
is the opinion of hon. gentlemen that war is a thing so
simple that its practice can be acquired without the least
difficulty and at a moment's notice? Just look at the
different occasions on which we have commenced war. I
don't know of any instance in which England has been
plunged into war in which she has not met with reverses.
But former cases differ from the present in this, that we
have to set against misfortunes of this description
great military successes. If I were to read to the
house the accounts Rhich the Duke of Wellington gave
of the state of his army after the retreat from Burgos
you would recognize complaints very similar in terms to
those we now see in the public press ; but complaints,
not arising as soon after the beginning of the war, but at
a period subsequent to that, and even after the army was
guided by the greatest military genius of his day. Take a
later case. When our expedition was sent into Affghanis-
tan the mortality in the army was frightful. Again, the
expedition that went under General Godwin into Burmah
suffered from a rate of mortality amounting to 48 per cent.
I sincerely wish I could draw up a more favourable state-
ment than I can do regarding our army now in the East,
because, I grieve to say that, since I was asked at the com-
mencement of the session what number of our men had
fallen by disease or the sword, the mortality has nearly
doubled, and the drain now going on in the army under
Lord Raglan, amounts, unfortunately, to nearly 14 per
cent. I said I would net quote letters that I have re-
ceived, stating that in some portions of the army there is
a very degree of efficiency, because there is a very different
degree of comfort; for I apprehend that every one in this
house knows perfectly well that the sufferings of the men
have been proportionate to the distance of their encamp-
ment from that port, which was described by the hon. and
learned gentleman as choked with stores, food, clothes, and
the means of shelter, sufficient for a body of troops twice
their number ; and that it has not been the want of those
provisions or stores, but the impossibility of moving them
from Balaklava up to the camp which has constituted the
difficulty. I Lave received a letter from a gentleman who
has been engaged on a commission which we sent out
some time back to inquire into the state of the medical
department and hospitals, both at Constantinople and in
the Crimea, and he puts the case in this way. After de.
scribing the condition of affairs there, he says, "Your
Government has sent out plenty of everything ; they have
sent it 3,000 miles, but the distance is 3,006 ; and the
last six miles are more difficult than the first 3,000." I
believe that this is a true representation of the state of
things. You will ask me what is the cause of that defi-
ciency? (Hear, hear.) Well, in discussing that point the
house must make allowances for the great dithealty that
had to be encountered there, as also for the circum-
stance that at this distance from the scene we cannot be
fully informed of the real state of the case. We know that
before the army left -Varna there was a collection of ani-
mals amounting to about 5,0C0 with the expedition. Since
then the cavalry horses and many of the artillery horses
have died from exposure to the cold and want of food, and
this at a time when it was said that there was forage to
great amounts in the harbour of Balaklava. Now, I have
an extract here pretty well describing what happened in
the Crimea before a certain date. It states :
‘‘ Before the middle of August there were in the six regi-
ments of English cavalry 1,000 men dismounted, and the
horses of 700 others were unserviceable. The baggage ani-
mals died, the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the
guns, and one-third of the reserve ammunition was given over
to the Spaniards because the ammunition carts were required
for the conveyance of the sick, the number of which daily in-
creased."

satisfactorily. He is engaged in forming an hospital staff,
which will, I believe, be the means of redressing one of the
most crying grievances of the army, by supplying the want
of a permanent staff attached to the hospitals, instead of
trusting to those men passing through the hospitals. It is
impossible for anything to be worse than the system that
has hitherto been pursued in this respect. I trust that by
adopting a sounder one, copied from that of our allies, our
hospitals will be placed in a more efficient state than they
have ever yet been. The naval transports are said to have
been numerically insufficient for the transaction of the
business required of them, without being subjected to a
strain which ought not to be put upon that service. My right
hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will explain
the alterations intended to be made, in order to produce an
efficient transport service and to enable them to grasp a busi-
ness as comprehensive as that which has of late been
thrust upon them. The moment that it came to the
knowledge of the Government that errors arose from the
way of stowing the ships—by the overcrowding of one ship
aid then shifting the cargo to another—a committee was
appointed to examine into the cause, to trace out the de-
linquents, and to lay down a clear and simple system by
which the recurrence of these errors would be prevented.
[n last autumn, when the 'Government read accounts
showing the incompetency of the medical staff, they sent
out a commission to inquire into the cause, but they did
net intrust this to medical men only. They desired to
have a searching investigation, and they connected with
the commission gentlemen independent of the medical pro-
fession, and who had no interest in screening its errors;
unconnected also with this department of the Government,
and having no interest in screening its shortcomings. They
received instructions to probe the investigation to the ut-
most, to obtain the truth and to expOse it without mercy.
At the same time they received instructions, in order that
no precious time might be lost, to report as they went on
—to make every practical suggestion they deemed it desir-
able to adopt; and instructions were given also to the
heads of the hospitals at Scutari, and to Lotd Raglan, to
'adopt such suggestions on hearing the reasons for them.
I hope shortly to lay the results of these inquiries before
the house, and, what is of more importance, the steps
taken in consequence of them. I have stated, I fear at
some length, details which must be wearisome to the house,
but, having done that, I wish to ask the house what is its
intention with regard to the motion before it? Do you
propose to a committee upstairs of 15 gentlemen no less a
subject of consideration than the condition of the army
before Sebastopol, and the conduct of the departments at
home who have the management of that army? I will
take the last case first, and I ask, supposing you carried
this motion—supposing there was to be found a Govern-
ment
which would submit to such an inquiry—what would
be the effect of the appointment of the committee
upon those departments, and what would be its ulti-
mate effect upon that army whose safety, of course, is
our principal object ? I apprehend that if you refer to the
committee the inquiry of how those departments are to be
re-modelled and consolidated, how their authority is to be
made subservient to one supreme authority, the Govern-
ment must, until the committee have decided what they
will recommend, abstain from carrying into effect their
own measures, and wait until some blue-book comes out
in August, to the recommendations of which they can give
practical effect. How would the committee get at their
information ? Would they examine the men charged with
the execution of the measures into which they are in-
quiring, or get the opinions of those men at second-hand ?
The members of the Government are, at this moment, more
conlersant;than- a committee can be with the deficiencies of
the machinery they have been called on to work ; they know
its weak places, they, know what are the remedies that
should be applied, they have a clear object in view, and
they are ready to carry it out; but a committee must hear
evidence and counter-evidence, must sift that evidence
backwards and forwards, and, after a long delay, must
come probably to the same conclusion, having interposed
the delay of a whole session for the purpose of doing by
their authority what ought to be done by the authority of
the Government. But what will be the' effect of the in-.
quiry upon the departments themselves ? We know what
it is to subject the conduct of any department to a com-
mittee. The head of that department, with ether members
of the Government in this house, must attend to conduct
his defence. What time would be left to the members of
the Government to adminie,er to the army, to carry on the
measures necessary for the prosecution of the war, if their
time were to be taken up in a committee-room of the
House of Commons, answering questions, producing
returns, and endeavouring to defend themselves from
the attacks made against them in the committee. For
all purposes of action, the Government would be pa-
ralysed during the time the inquiry lasted. What would
be its effect upon the army? How do you intend to
examine into the condition of the army ? Do you intend
to send commissioners to. Sebastopol to inquire into the
conduct of the Commander-in-Chief like those which the •
Directory sent to General Dumouriez, or to send out mem-
bers such as were sent by the Dutch Senate to control the
Duke of Marlborough ? You. will not do that. Then, do
you intend to bring home officers from Sebastopol to give
accounts to the committee of the condition of the army ?
Those are the duties of the Commander-in-Chief and of tho
executive Government. If the Commander-in-Chief is in-
capable of performing them he ought to be recalled ; and
if the Government are convinced of his incapacity they are
guilty all crime in not recalling him; but they would also
be guilty of a crime if they jumped at that conclusion
without evidence and without proof, and disgust the army
by committing a gross injustice and sacrificing a man for
the unworthy purpose of placing on his shoulders the blame
that the House of Commons wished to place on the shoul-
ders of the Government. There may be Governments who
have shielded themselves under proceedings like that, but
this Government is not capable of such conduct, and, if it
were, I for one would not remain a member of it for one
hour. If you intend to carry this motion you intend to
paralyse the action of the Government at home and of the
army abroad. for it is impossible for a commander-in-chief
and his officers to act freely when they know that there is
a jury sitting on their every action, and that there are wit-
nesses misrepresenting their conduct whom they have not
the means of answering. You will also inspire the army
with disgust at their commander, so that, in whatever way
you put it, the inquiry is objectionable, because either you
fail in getting your information, or if you get it, you do so
at the expense of the efficiency of the army. I cannot con-
ceive by what arguments you can justify this motion. You
may say,—hero is a case of isaster, of great sickness and
mortality in the army, and we think the Government are
to blame for it; but, if that is what you think, the Go-
vernment ought to bcar the punishment. You cannot mean
to inquire into the mode of conducting the business of a de-
partment, or to enter into a pedantic disquisition as to the
duties of this or that office ; for, depend upon it, you must
look not so much to the form of the office as to the energy
and will of the man who holds it. It is your duty, if you
entertain that opinion of the Government, not to institute
inquiries which may be prolonged to the dog days, but
fearlessly to say, " You, the men conducting this war, are
unfit for your posts—(Opposition cheers)—you are con-
ducting it in a manner discreditable to yourselves, and,
what is much more important, destructive to the best in-
terests of the country ; we will, therefore, put you out of
the Government, and we will substitute for you those in
whose capacity and integrity we have more confidence."
(Hear, hear.) I am perfectly willing to abide by that
test; but I ask the house, if they have made up their minds
to take that course, to avow it manfully, and at once.
There is no disguising the fact that this Government has
existed for a long period without what may be termed
genuine party support ; it has, consequently, been sub-
jected to defeats upon cross motions of every description,
and, no doubt, its strength and efficiency have been greatly
impaired. The Government has also been exposed to
much obloquy and calumny. Some people have said it
should despise obloquy and calumny, but, however the
calumniator may be despised, no Government in a country
like this can afford to despise the calumny. With con-
stant repetition it has its effect upon the character of pub-
lic men, as this Government has found by that course
being recklessly and unscrupulously pursued. But the
Government now stands in a situation much more preca-
rious than it did. We cannot deny that a Government
already weak has received a heavy blow by the secession
from its ranks of a man whose talents, character, and ante-
cedents make him in every way the first man in this house,
and give him a personal influence over it that no one else
possesses. I lament that secession for the sake of the Go-
vernment, for the sake of the public service ; and I hope
the noble lord, who has treated me since I have been his
colleague with a confidence and kindness I shall ever grate-
fully recollect, will pardon me for saying, for his own sake,
I do not think that this is a moment when any servant of
the Crown ought to leave the public service, the emergency
being so serious; but I feel the full weight of the loss
of the noble lord, and on account of that loss, I ask
the house, above all things, for a plain, rapid, and intelli-
gent decision as to our ourselves. You have negotiations
of the greatest importance pending, the state of things in
the Crimea requires constant and daily action, you require
both for the negotiations and for the purpose of carrying
ou the war measures to be at once directed and carried into
effect, and the suspension of all the functions of the Go-
vernment which necessarily takes place when its existence
is staked on a vote of the House of Commons, of whioh no
one can say what will be the remit, is most fatal to the
public service. What I ask is a decision at once and in
plain language upon this point. It is indifferent to me in
what shape it comes, bet I should regret to see such a mo-
tion as this carried, for I do not want a precedent to be
set for transferring to committees upstairs the fanctiona
and prerogatives of the Crown, and I wish the Executive
to be respected by this house, as well as to see it respect
the decisions of the house. Each has its own peculiar
functions, which cannot trench upon one another without
injury to the public service. I hope the house will con-
sider well the course it is about to pursue. There are great
perils surrounding this country, it is a moment of breath-
less anxiety, and it does become the Senate of the nation
clearly to express its intention as to what-men it will in-
trust with the management of the difficult and delicate
affairs that are now in progress. With these feelings, I
express my intention of voting against the motion of the
hon. and learned gentleman. I have endeavoured as
shortly as I could to vindicate the Government from the
charge of having knowingly and with their eyes open
suffered our gallant army to perish. I have even, by the
last mail, received accounts of a re-distribution of ground,
by which the work and labour to be borne by our soldiers
will be much decreased, and of the arrival of baggage
animals, which, I trust, may facilitate the carrying up to
our army of the clothes and provisions necessary for its very
existence. It is necessary for that army and for the oountry
that a speedy and distinct decision should be taken as to
th stability or the termination of the Government which
now holds the reins of power, but which ought not to hold
them if it cannot use them effectually. It is time that the
Ilona° of Commons should decide upon this point. We
are ready to abide by their decision ; but, I say again, let
that decision be plain and intelligible, and, above all
things, let it be speedy. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. H. DRUMMOND—The right hon. gentleman shall
understand, at least from me, plainly and intelligibly,
t hat I do impute it to the gross incompetence of same
man or men that an event has occurred without a parallel
in history; that an army, three times victorious, has
been left to perish, to be utterly destroyed, by the incom-
petence of those who ought to have supported it. The
whole !country is in wrath with somebody, but no one
seems to know who that somebodY, should be. (Hear.)
That is the plain question we want to have answered. Is
this wrath confined to one party, or is there not a burst of
indignation from one end of the kingdom to the other? Is it
not re-echoed from Germany and from France ? Is it not
asked in all their papers, what can the English Govern-
ment be composed of? And was over such cruelty exhi-
bited towards men as that with which they have treated
their army? I should have thought the right hon. gen-
tlemen themselves would be the very first to thank us for
coming forward and asking for information. I am not
content to throw the blame on a Government. I can un-
derstand that it is very decent and proper and right for
all the gentlemen sitting there to put themselves forward
in order to screen their subordinates ; but it is not satis-
factory to us, Does any one mean to say that it is the
fault of the right hon. gentleman that the army is
ettgring ? No ; but it is the fault of the Government.

The sentence applies strongly, I appreheni to Balaklava
and Sebastopol, as it describes the destruction of horses,
the impossibility of obtaining ammunition. It then goes
on further to describe the state to which the Light Bri-
gade had been reduced :
" These troops (the Light Brigade), which only three weeks
before had traversed 60 miles in a single march, were now
with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the heights,
although only four miles from the camp, and the sides of the
mountain were covered with the carcases of many hundred
animals who died in the effort."
The extract proceeds :
. .

" The loss of the British army in September was consider-
able. Above 3,500 men had died of sickness or fallen into
the enemy's hands. 1,5110 horses had perished from want,
exclusive or those lost in battle. To fill the cup of disaster,
fever and diarrhoea, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad
fnnolurriasvhamgeesn. t hpady
saelnrotarydy,
treesdcisponorgseedotfoarindisieeass,e
r,
amgeat
afnridghitn-
a short time many thousand men died in the hospitals."
Now, all this was not written by Lord Raglan detailing
how his army was situated—it was written in the year 1809,
to describe the state of the British army after the battle of
Talavera ; and I quote it because it tallies with singular
exactness with the precise amount of our losses in each par-
ticular arm of the service now. It is, as I said before,
difficult to see where the fault originated. It is sometimes
stated that we have " the command of the seas"—that was
the popular expression; and it was said—" You might as
easily supply your men before Sebastopol as you could sup-
ply t em at home," But when we talk of commanding the

Does any one say that it is the fault of the noble lord ?
No ; but it is that of the Government. Why did the
noble lord retire ? Because he has not yet been able satis-
factorily to ascertain upon whom the fault rests. My
right hon. friend has completely evaded the question. I
thought his speech the other night most conclusive for
his own defence ; the only fault I find with it is, that
it was too clever. It showed him to bo a very eloquent
man. Eloquence is a flue art, the sister of poetry and
painting, and there is a strong family likeness. The
consequence was, that when we got the speech in plain
black and white before us, many things appeared very dif-
ferent to what they were before they bad been translated.
There was no doubt as to the propriety of sending troo
to Varna, for the assistance, as was said, of "the, Turks
and civilization," although how the troops got together I
know not. (A. laugh.) Varna lies on the road from Rus-
sia to Constantinople, and it was very natural to plant an
army there; but, to my infinite astonishment, I found,
after the army had arrived there, that one of the essentials
of an army—namely, a waggon train, had been wholly for-
gotten, and it now turns out that the Duke of Newcastle,
having sent the army there in September—having always
intended to send it there—just discovered—three weeks
ago—that a waggon train was necessary, and accordingly
telegraphed to Col. Macmurdoc to come over, who, I be-
lieve, remained here for three weeks.
Mr. S. HERBERT said, a waggon train did exist, but
it was under the commissariat until the alteration to which
the kon. gentleman referred had been made.
Mr. H. DRUMMOND—The army remained for a con-
siderable time in that unheelthy place Varna, no one
knows why. Sending an army without a waggon train is
like send*.eg a ship to sea without masts or steam. But I
am not going to enter into the military question. I shall
teke the vulgarest-looking view of the whole subject, for I
think that if there had been sense enough in the Govern-
ment to manage a private commercial cencern, they would
have got over this wonderful seven miles. There is no
doubt that my right hon. friend has fully discharged his
duty, that ho has sent out articles liberally and lavishly,
and we shall have to pay a lavish bill for them ; but the
persons for whom we bought, and to whom we sent them,
never got them—that is the point. The Duke of Newcastle
refused to allow officers of cavalry regiments to take their
four horses, because "Colonel Kinloch was gone to buy
mules in Spain." Well, Col. Kinloch did buy mules in
Spain. I believe that, for three months after they were
bought, they remained in Spain, and I do not know whether
they have ever been sent out at all. The inquiry we wish
to make is as to how these things came about. How was
it, again, that the Commander-in-Chief did not give the
Duke of Newcastle a hint that he had forgotten the waggon
trains ? Does the Duke of Newcastle ever go to a friend's
to dinner by railway ? If so, does he not ascertain before
he arrives at the station whether his friend will send his
carriage to carry him the odd two miles to his house ? If
not, that two miles may lose him his dinner in the same
way that the odd seven miles in the Crimea have lost the
army their dinner. But this is still more remarkable.
Only last spring Lord Hardinge issued an order directing
each man to carry in his kit Vb. less • than before, pro-
mising that that 3ilb. should be carried at the public ex-
pense. Could not Lord Hardinge have asked the Duke of
Newcastle whether he had any means'of carrying these
baggages ? We may remember, too, the debates in the
House of Lords, iu which Lord Ellenborough distinctly
alluded to the question of waggon trains, and pointed out
either their distance from the scene of action or their in-
efficiency. But I now pass on to the most extraordinary
thing. I lost sight of the army for a time, when on a
sudden I found that it had left Varna and gone to the
Crimea. What appeared so extraordinary to me was, the
war being understood for the defence of Turkey, that her
Majesty's Ministers, this house, and the whole country,
should think that, the defence of Turkey and the invasion
of the territory of Russia was one and the same thing. At
the end of the last war the Government desired the Duke
of Wellington to draw up a statement upon the mili-
tary power of hassle, its power of aggression upon
Europe, and its means of defence. The duke did so,
and we never he ird or thought more of it until he came
into office many years afterwards, when ho found that the
Governments of Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia had ob-
tained the same kind of information, and the three re-
ports were lying in some office in this country. They all
agreed upon this point, that however Russia might bluster
she could do nothing in the way of attacking the rest
of Europe ; but that all the other powers of Europe
would perish in an attempt to attack Russia. This ap-
peared to me a very strong reason against our proceeding
as we did. But it was more extraordinary that the army
should have been sent to the Crimea without any of the
necessary information. The right hon. geutlemen said the
other night that Lord Raglan had been directed to procure
the best information. They had written to Lord Raglan to
procure information ! Why, it reminds me of the Chinese
proclamation—" Sound the gongs, and drive the barbarians
into the sea." (A. laugh.) Writing to Lord Raglan did
not give him the information he wanted. Why did you
not make our ambassador at Constantinople procure that
information for you before you went to the Crimea ?
(Cheers.) My right hon. friend has alluded.to a letter that
I troubled him with, but I also forwarded him a letter re-
lative to a person who was thoroughly master of the lan-
guage, and who offered his services to the Government to
procure information for them. The right hon. gentleman
gave me a civil answer, and the person was not employed.
(A laugh.) I know that Lord Stratford was asked for this
information in 1853, and that a relation of mine was sent
to Lord Stratford, and recommended to him a person who
spoke the whole of the languages of the country. Lord
Stratford was implored to send this person to the Crimea
to obtain information. Instead of which, the army was
sent with no knowledge either of the fortifications or the
country, the force in the town of Sebastopol itself, or the
Russian force in the Crimea. I say thin was a most rash
and ill-considered proceeding, and that the thing wanted
was the information which the Government had refused to
take measures to obtain. It is all very fine now to talk
about despising calumny. The only doubt I have is, whe-
ther there has not been too much leaning on the part of the
Government in the direction of the newspapers—(hear)--
and whether, if it had not been for the newspapers, that
expedition to Sebastopol would ever have been sent.
You did not know, as I have said, the nature of the soil,
the extent of the fortifications, the number of men in the
place, or the' disposition of the inhabitants ; and so ill-in-
formed have you been, and so ill-informed has Lord Raglan
been, that while the German newspapers—no doubt
instructed by the Russian Ministers in those States—have
from time to time published statements detailing the num-
ber of reinforcements sent by the Emperor of Russia into
the Crimea, Lord Raglan had no knowledge whatever of
the arrival of those reinforcements. The diplomatic de-
partment ought to have supplied this kind of information,
and the Ministers at Berlin and other places ought to be
asked what they have been about to neglect this informa-
tion. I should like also, to know the truth about the
opinions of officers highly placed relative to the amount of
force necessary for this expedition. It has been stated by
the friends of Marshal St. Arnaud that it was his opinion
that it was impossible to expect success unless the fortress
of Sebastopol was invested by an army of 50,000 men,
with another army of 50,000 besides to protect the be-
siegers. I should like to know whether other commanders
did not share that opinion. I remember hearing that a
strong opinion was expressed by an officer high in our ser-
vice, who was engaged in the expedition, that the force
which invested Sebastopol was not sufficient. In the last
edition of a work by Sir H. Douglas, I find Sir H. Douglas
is of opinion that to invade the Crimea and lay siege to
Sebastopol with the force at our command was a desperate
and daring operation, and that it was undertaken contrary
to the judgment of an eminent engineer officer, whose opi-
nion ought to have been taken. But while it would not be
difficult to prove that several persons of high authority
thought the force sent to the Crimea was insufficient, the
course I shall pursue is to give the Government everything
they ask in order to carry on the war, strongly objecting
to your whole proceedings from beginning to end. The
landing of the troops in the Crimea was, I admit, a well-
effected and creditable operation. (Hear, hear.) It was,
indeed, considering the extent of the force to be landed, a
most wonderful thing, and people who think that the
lauding of such an army upon a hostile shore is as easy a
thing as going down to a whitebait dinner at Greenwich
know very little of the difficulties of such an undertaking-
(Hear, hear, and cheers.) I then come to the case of the
artillery. Now, did you intend to invade Russia or not ?
If you did why was there no proper siege artillery ready ?
(Hear.) Only this morning I received a letter from an
officer in the army, who says :—" There was not one
single 13-inch mortar for the first two mouths of the siege."
Then, again, why was no provision made for hospital
accommodation ? There were neither hospitals at Bala-
klava nor at Scutari. And here, again, I wish to attribute
no blame to my right hon. friend. He has done admirably
in sending 10,000 beds, but I do not believe they are put up
yet at Scutari. Part are at one place and part at another ;
like the Minis rifles, which were sent to one place,while the
ammunition was sent to another. Why was there not a
supercargo on board the Government vessels, who had com-
mand of the things on board, and who knew what ought to
be left at each place at which the vessel stopped ? There
were provisions without end at Balaklava, but the army
could not got them because na one had the order to give
them out. (Hear, hear.) The commissariat has been, as
they say, in the hands of the Treasury. Lord Aberdeen
was the head of the Treasury, and was it possible that the
whole feeding of the army was intrusted to Lord
Aberdeen and the clerks of the Treasury ? No wonder, if
so, that the troops could not get anything to eat. I
have received a letter from an officer in the Guards.
The hon. member proceeded to read the letter, which
stated that the writer met the colonel of his regiment
with a pair of saddlebags upon his, horse, with which
he was going to Balaklava to draw tallow candles for
his men, which, it was stated in a general order, would be
issued for their use. They went together to the stores,
where they were told that there was not a tallowcandle in
all Balaklava. Another general order was issued that any
regiment might have potatoes on application. Down the
writer went to Balaklava, but none could he get for his men,
although tons of potatoes at Balaklava were beginning to
decay. Sooner than throw them overboard, the French
soldiers got them for nothing. Why, then, the writer
asked, were these general orders given to issue potatoes and
candles, except to humbug the people of England ? The
men, too, ho added, were one year in arrears of clothing.
It had been at Scutari for months, and it had been pro-
mised to be brought up, but it was there still, and the
men were in rags. The writer of this letter says this sort
of thing has been caused by the country's neglect. I say
it has been caused solely by Ministerial incompetence.
(Cheers.) So, again, the militia clothing has been delayed,
until the tailors have lost 10,0e0/., because Lord Har-
dingo could not settle the cut of those ridiculous German
postboye' coats. (A laugh.) Ah order was sent to Gibral-
tar for the men there to practise with the Minis rifle, But
from the-day on which the order was given, until a few
weeks ago, I understand there was not a Minie rifle to be
got there. With regard to this Mini. rifle, I believe that
Mr. Westley Richards went to an enormous expense, and
incurred a great deal of trouble; to perfect it. After a
wearisome delay, one of the specimens was selected, and
what did the Government do? They sent it to If no to be
manufactured, and there they also manufacture Minia
rifles for the Emperor of Russia. Upon inquiry, I find
that Mr. Filder is still at the head of the commissariat at
Sebastopol, who was the man that Sir Thomas Picton
wanted to hang. (Laughter.) When the wooden buts
were first talked about the Duke of Newcastle was asked
how they were to be got up front Balaklava to the camp ?
" Oh," says he, "the men can draw them up." They are
already overworked by other duty, and it has been calcu-
lated that it would take the labour of 2,500 men for three
weeks to draw them to the camp. By the last accounts it
was stated that some of them had arrived, but that they
were being carried up by two planks at a time upon mules,
the planks being burnt up for firewood as they arrived,
from the unlikelihood of the rest ever following them.
The want of :shoes and other clothing has been disgraceful,
and these details we can only get at by a, committee of this
house, which I therefore think ought to be granted.
(Hear, hear.) The original fault, from the beginning, I
take not to be so much single fault as an aggregation of'
faults, misin.g from your having despised your enemy
too much. (Hear, hear, hear.) Whatever the honour-
able member for the West Riding may say,' his talk
about crumpling up Russialiko a sheet of paper ran through
the country, and people thought that Russia was a little,
foolish, second-rata rower, which you, 44 the mews of