The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-04 00:00:00

LONDON, THURSDAY E‘rENING, JANUARY 4, 1855.

"R. ALBERT SMITH'S. MONT BL .NC
TO-NIGIIT at 8 o'clock; and Eyery Night (but Satu:llay).
Stalls, 3s. ; Area, 2a.; Gallery, la. The Mernhit Iteorcsentationr
take place ii*cry Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, at 3 o'clock. -
Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly.

CONTRACTS FOR MATERIALS FOR SEAMEN'S cLoTtn.ya
Ilepartmentef Vie COmptroller for Victualling and-Transpori
' Services, Somerset House, 24th December, 1851
THE Commissioners for exeouting the Office of
Lord High Adnitral of the United Kingdom of Great Britait
and Ireland,. DO HEREBY-GIVE NOTICE, that en MONDAY, t h
18th January, 1855, at One o'clock, they will be ready to treat witl;
ueh persons as may be willing to contract for ?upplying and delivering
into her Majesty's Vic►c:ailing Stores at Deptferd and Gosport, the
aides-mentioned Articles, viz. :--

• To he delivered at
Deptford. Gosport.)
--
•
Yards. Yards.
.. 29,000 20,000
WHITE CALICO •• —•••• •• •• 47,000 20,000
OS NA BURGH ••••..••.. • • .• • •• 10,000 ' 5,000
PADDING CLOTH.. .. 2,000 1,5:30
BLUE BAIZE l,OOO
BLACK LINEN .. •••• •• - fourth
Skeins. Skeins. oreach'lltian
BLACK SILL. ...
Yards. Yards. delivered by
BLAcK SILK Tivisr ••... • . •
Lhs. _Lbs, March, an-
SEWING COTTON (Fine) .. - • 200 other fourth
Yards Yards. by the 31st
BLACM i-11a.Loo:1 , 1'),000 10;00 May, and
ROYAL CANVAS . . 10.501 7,001 the retrain-
rstly ............, 60,0)0 28,000 der by the
Willie
TArx i
Pieces fixes. next,or car
. Dutch (White) .• •• • 9'0,020 60,000 1i...r if I pre-
Yards. (erred by
L. mad: .. — 21,000 the party
Gross. Gross. Icndcring.
Black Bone - , 3,000
Wbite fetal ' ' 8,,:80 10,000
BUTTONS Large Horn 501)
Pearl • • • •
Lbs. Lbs.
WoitsrED (Bide)" ' 3,0.0 . 2,510
1 Blank
TnEEAD Whited Brown .... 3,000 4.000
White (ln lb. pal;gs) 3,500 1z,500

Their Lordships reserve to them ,elves the power, when the 'Pen
ders are opened, of contracting either for the whoie, or fed• suet: par;
hereof only al they may- deem fit, or for a greater quantity, or o 1
not contraoting for a.ly.

No Tender will be received unless made on the Printed Form pro.
tided for the purpose, and which may, be obtained on application at
iho said Office, at the Victualling Y..rils at Gozport and Plymouth,
or to Commander Bevis, conducting the Packet Service at Liver-
pool, or to the Colizzlor of Customs at Bristol.

Tenders will be admitted for any portion of the above quantities,
but separate tenders must be made for each place, and no attention
will be paid t) any offer not so male.
Samples of Ills articles may be seen at the said ofthe, between the
hours of eleven and two (Illy, and also at the Victualling' Yards, at
Gosport and Plymouth.
The conditions of the revised coratracts,lo which particular atten•
don is called, may be seen at the-sail Odice, itt the said Victualling
Yards at Gosport"and Plymouth and a'so at Vverpool and ilristoi.
No tender will be received atter Ono o'clock on the day of treaty, and
it will not he required' that the party tendering or an agent on hit,
behalf should attend at the oftice_on the day of contract, as the
result of the offer received from each person will be communicated to
him and his proposed sureties in writing.

Every tender Must he addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty,
Ind bear in the !eft-hand corner the words " Tender for
must also be delivered at S3mersct House.

THE ST.AFF SYSTEM AND THE MILI-
TARY OPERATIONS TIIE -CRIMEA.

(From the Augsburg Gazette.)

If we subject the progress and results of the ope-
rations carried on by the Western Powers in their
contest with Russia to the test of scrutiny, we are
astonished at the defective knowledge of all that is
requisite for ,the groper preparation for such a war
which they disclose. The operations in the Baltic
we will not criticise, although it is strikingly evi-
dent that no one seems to have known at all what
kind of armed vessels nor how many of them would
be required there for attacking the sea fortresses
with any prospect of success, or to have been aware
that a strong body of laud troops would also be re-
quired to give their co-operation and support. The
whole naval campaign in that sea has been a failure
through this ignorance of the coast and waters.

Thecontest-intended in the Danubian provinces
and in the Crimea lies under a similar disadvantage.
Whoever arms for a war, the professed object of
which is declared to be nothing less than the hu-
miliation of a great power like Russia, must before
everything else be intimately and most accurately
acquainted with the theatre of war, which he eith©r
intends or may be induced to occupy. The climate,
with the temporary or periodical changes of the
weather, the nature of the ground and its roads,
the means of conveyance and sustenance to be
found there, the assistance to bo hoped for from
the inhabitants, and so on, have all to be duly con-
sidereelfwhen preparing to trace out the plan of a
war. Nor until these subjects have been fully dis-
cussed can a judgment be formed of the force that
will be required, or of its composition and suitable
equipment. Still more indispensable is an intimate
knowledge of the peculiar organisation of the ene-
my's army and the means it may have for increasing
its power of resistance on this or that tlaeatreof war,
whether these means exist through local obsta-
cles, natural and artificial, or the want of room
for carrying on field operations—a want that may
possibly be produced by treaties of neutrality with
the states adjoining those of the enemy. The pre-
liminary and varied information above specified
forms in its aggregate the so-called "Staff Know-
ledge" (or Staff Statistics) ; and an admirable work,
lately published in a compendious form, from the
pen of Colonel Hardegg, by Koehler, in Stuttgart,
contains nearly everything a staff officer ought
either to know already, or make it his duty to learn
in detail. It is incumbent on the Minister of War
and the staff to provide methodically whatever is
essential to be known through instruction or other-
wise for the due preparation of the war, the tracing
out of the general plan for waging the war, and the
special plans of campaign.
How little all this has been heeded by the West-
ern Powers is evident from the operations they
have hitherto been carrying on against Russia.
Their troops landed in the Bosphorus without be-
ing able, after a brief rest, to proceed on their
march to the Lower Danube. Months rolled away
before single divisions even could Obtain the most
necessary means of conveyance—which it must be
confessed were wanted on a very large scale—be-
cause those brought by the troops themselves to
that theatre of war could not be made available.
The equipmentof the men for taking the field proved
to be equally unadapted to the climate of the dis-
trict. The English Government was even com-
pelled to order a change in the uniforms. At last
the greater part of these auxiliary troops w.ei e con-
centrated near Varna, having been conveyed to
this place by shipping. But although this force,
swelled to 30,000 men, might have been able to act
most efficaciously from that spot in checking the pro-
gress of the Russian offensive operations, the auxili-
ary army in questionof the Ottoman Porte remained
motionless near Varna, because in fact it was incapa-
ble of operating; that is to say, was not yet provided
with all those resources that such a body of troops
absolutely requires, for the. fell freedom of its
offensive movements, in semi-civilised countries
like Bulgaria and Wallachia. But for Austria's
menacing attitude in Transylvania and the Buko-
wina Omer Pacha, would probably have been de-
feated, notwithstanding the proximity of his pro-
tecting patrons. When the Russian forces finally
quitted the Principalities from strategiCal motives,
the allies of the Porte still felt themselves not in a
condition to assume the offensive, but advanced—
for the sake of doing something at all events—into
the Dobrudscha, where they soon came to perceive
their utter incapacity of offence.._
In the meantime the rupture between the belli-
gerent ,powers became wider than ever. Nothing
more was to be done by threatening Russia ; steps
were necessary for making an attack in real earnest.
But where ? The answering of this question seems
to have been dispensed with when the general plan
of the war was sketched out, although it must have
been thoroughly clear what was to be done in case
this or that menace should prove inefficacious. Or
perhaps they depended with entire confidence on
the effective aid of Austria—and Schamyl—and
fancied that standing behind the scenes they could
get the drama of war played out for them. If they
did they made a great mistake, and the would-be
prompter has been obliged to turn actor himself,
sorely against his will.
In selecting the point of attack the Western
Powers, who continued pouring in successive re-
inforcements, had nothing whatever in the way of
limitation. The free disposal of a mighty fleet,
partly men-of-war and partly transports, gave
them the means of landing their forces in Bessa-
rabia, near Odessa, or in the Crimea, or in Ana-
tolia. It appeared to be the most dangerous to do
so in Bessarabia because the Russians were in
greater strength there. On the contrary, in Ana-
tolia they could land on a ft loudly soil, andjwithout
let or hindrance from the enemy could make their
preparations for a campaign against Erivan and
Tiflis. 'Phis would have given a mighty impulse to the
Turkish troops, and have roused up Schatuyl to bring
every man ho had into the field. If successful
there against the Russians this would have been in
every case a most sensible blow, that would at the
same time have decided the future attitude of
Persia. An enterprise of this nature is certainly
not to be looked upon as an easy task. Campaigns
in thinly inhabited and ill-cultivated districts are
always attended with great difficulties and require
special preparations. But whoever has made up
his mind to 'enter upon a decisive contest, must
also make himself acquainted with the impediments
of the ground he will have to surmount. Thus,
for instance, if Asia Minor were selected, he would
be obliged to do without a large ,ark of artillery,

but could take instead a large force of light ca-
valry, which is very important in a war of con-
quest, and which facilitates the procuring of ali-
mentary supplies. Demonstrations against other
coast districts might be made in conjunction with
this enterprise, so as to keep the Russian troops at
their several stations where they were.
After long vacillation the whole force of the
Allies was at last put on shore in the Crimea.
31bastopol was the object of the contest and the
prize of victory. If this place fell, the harbour
and the Russian fleet would fall with it into the

;lands of the Allies. The greTtiinP;t;neOOf this
ibject of their operations requires no comment. By
io much the more was it to be expected that
nothing would have been neglected at all likely to
:usurp victory. The winter season was, it is true,
coming on a apace. Experience, however, shows
that every fortress (a few rock fortresses excepted)
can be taken within a given time, provided the
works of attack are not disturbed themselves from
eithout in,their rear. The carrying on of this at-
ack resembles, nevertheless, a charge of Hussars
more than it does a well-digested enterprise. The
!ending at so remote a point as Eupatoria may be
occused by reason of the nature of the coast, and the
point would in other respects have been pefeetly
well chosen if they had, above all thine, desired to
jut off Monschikoffs disposable foie() from Sebas-
topol and drive it away towards Perekop. The
weak garrison of Sebastopol thus abandoned and
left to itself, would under such circumstances have
been unable to prevent the landing of the working
siege troops with their protectors, and the. subse-
quent early siege werles, while the completing and
perfecting of the Sebastopol defences wool I also
vprogress fo want of
1 re
artillery attack also might in
hands.
notrmedalleps eI
triel!ei rapid
that case have been practicable sooner. Instead of
that they dreamed they had completely laid Men-
echikoff prostrate. at the Alma, marched forthwith
en Sebastopol, arid behaved as if it was quite im-
possible that anybody else could seriously disturb
the progress of the siege except the garrieon, whose
communications with the country behind them re-
mained perfectly open. At a later period they did
indeed arrive at the conviction that they had gone
to work far too blindly, and strove to remedy the
lie:s
roliir eseii(ei
eg.
many sins of
Butemis-
ri
t
into the old fault,
t s consequencesieysoon relapsed of, sie
end plied all their strength to reduce the fortress,
although the resistance of the garrison grew more r
g
army of consi-
abl e t i seterevnegrythd stood
o and
bay a
their
It is hard to
understand by what series of erroneous representa-
esata
tions and suppositions the leaders of this great
tram:meal-hie undertaking have arrived at the con-
clusion, that, in spite of all this and that, Sebas-
topol must fall. The Allies had left their own
shores, and were prepared for a siege. Nov they
must go through a winter's campaign, and end it
successfully, before they can recommence the siege
with effect. But for this they are not prepared ;
and what fails to make such Preparation complete
is not to be made up by bravery and mere fighting
excelleAce—it must be supplied in some way or
other. Before, however, the wooden winter bar-
racks can be erected, and the troops housed,
the severity of the weather and the privation
of rest by night through the alarms and
alertes of the enemy, may have so swelled the
numbers of the sick that the reinforcements cent-
in; in will hardly suffice to fill up the gaps. On
commencing offeirsive operations against the re-
lieving army, whose left wing does not seem as
yet to have at all quitted the threatening position
over against Balaklava, very different necessities
spring up. Commissariat columns must be orga-
nised, for without their regular service in the rear
no operations can be carried on in the Crimea.
For this thousands of horses and beasts of
burden are required, who in their turn require
fodder. Even now, when the English cavalry and
artillery horses are dwindled away to an insignifi-
cant figure, the hay, part of it at least, is sent from
England. The difficulties of feeding and shelter-
ing an army in a country where there are not even
the most common necessaries for an encampment,
namely, water, wood, and straw, increase as the
men and horses increase, and the further they ad-
vance from the coast, on which account a consider-
able increase of numerical force must augment the
embarrassments of the allies, without perhaps ren-
dering any counterbalancing advantages. The
superior strength of the besieging army protects it
in reality only against the attacks of the Russians,
therefore merely against—a catastrophe. It is the
contemplation of these adverse circumstances, only
too ralpable, that has probably led to the
diversion to be made by Omer Facila at the
head of 35,000 men. Their disembarkation at
Eupatoria will not be attended with any difficulty,
provided they are not surprised by one of those
sudden tempests. But what then ? Before this
corps can be fit for commencing operations, a week
will have passed by at the least. In the mean
time a Russian corps, advancing front Perekop in
sufficient strength will have been arrayed in the
rear of the Osmanli and make mincemeat-of them..
People surely won't overlook the fact, that in a
country like the Crimea strategic holes and corners
can never produce the same results as in Germany
or France. The native can get over all difficulti6s
much more easily than a foreign invader.
If the war is undoubtedly the execution of fo-
reign policy, the duty of the Government is to see
that everything wanted is supplied, that a war de-
cided
-on by itself does not begin without the
most careful preparation. One of the most im-
portant requirementee--es we stated at the begin-
ning of this article—is the knowledge, as accurate
as possible, of all local causes of a nature to impede
the operations of war in au enemy's country. For
this purpose every great nation has organised a
special branch of service for its military system, a
branch which has for its duties the collecting,
sifting, arranging, and safe keeping of all the tech-
nical information required. This information is
partly derived from literary sources, partly from I
the mission of officers into foreign countries. Many-
a piece of intelligence even in newspapers is regis-
tered. In Russia this duty falls upon the " Sci-
entific Committee of War" and the " Chancery of
Operations ;" in Austria on the office of Com-
mander-in-hief, especially on the second section
of it. In Prussia they hare appointed special
chiefs or heads for these foreign topical and mili-
tary statistics and they are for the most part
staff officers, highly educated, and with great Ac-
quirements, with several clerks under them. In
Franco the depot of war collects this information.
In England, where the high military authorities
are not centralised, and where a very meagre ex-
change of views, ideas, and the like appears to take
place, the organic requirements for such a branch
of the service appear to be nearly utterly defective,
partly to be explained, perhaps, by the relatively
small number of troops that England has at her
disposal for carrying ona continental war by laud.
France, therefore, England's ally, should have
supplied this defect. Her war depot has rich stores
of this military literature, for Napoleon the First
organised admirably this branch of the service.
His ambassadors at Constantinople were in variably
distinguished generals, and had in their suite seve-
ral officers whose duty it doubtless was to study the
state of Southern Russia in a military point of
view. A celebrated French marshal (Marmont)
made a tour at a later period through these coun-
tries, and published some very instructive memoirs
about them. The last French ambassador but one
in Constantinople, the present Marshal Baraguay
d'Hilliers, under whose eyes the drama of the war
germinated as it were, may have in a like manner
furnished important intelligence, or have rectified
what already existed. Nevertheless, the 'war
hitherto waged by, the Western Powers against
Russia does not evidence, in the course of. ies.pro-
gress, the fact of any attempt having been made
to complete their scientific resources, or derive
much advantage from those they already possess.
A number of theories, good, bad, and indiffer-
ent, have been written en the art of waging war,
but no commander could use such as a standard in
any.real warfare. No intelligent theorist will ever
be guilty of such ridiculous presumption as to pre-
scribe to future generals what their mode of con-
ducting operations is to be. Still the careful 'and
cautious working out of details in various branches
of the land-service will always be of high practical
value, provided the practical and working military
authority makes itself acquainted with them. Such
an authority is the staff. Its military activity is
called into play before the declaration of war, and
before the troops take the field the different plans
of operation must eventually be already discussed
to such au extent that a satisfactory account of the
local obstacles to the field duties can at all events
be given, in order that preparations can be made
for overcoming them. Even should the prepara-
tions be of long-standing, they are always better
than those made on the spur of the moment from
dire necessity. In spite of all the prospects of
peace, it is not improbalie that a portion of the
German federal army will also enter, next spring,
the eastern theatre of war. The troops will indeed
there be enabled to do service in the same manner
as they have been taught during peace. But far
greater things will be expected of the staff on that
than On, ;aarty other theatres Qi W.

NAVAL AND JIILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

The Royal George screw line-of-battle ship was warped
into the fitting basin, Sheerness, yesterday's tide. The
shipwrights are busily engaged takin7 her poop deck off.
The St. Jean d'Acre,: 101 goes, Capt. Hon. H. Kop-
pel, was paid wages at Devonport on Monday, and sailed
yesterday for Queenstown.
The Monarch, 84, Captain Patey, is to embark at De-
vonport a detachment of
.Sappers and Miners, and will
sail on Saturday for Ireland to fill up her .complement.
The foremast of the Monarch has had new cheeks, and
otherivide repaired, and Will be put,on board to day.
' The Majestic's crew have completed all defects and-de-.
finiencies aloft in the running rigging, and yesterday top-
gallant masts were sent on end, lower and topsail-yards
were also crossed, and she will bo all a taunt to-day.
Her crew are to be paid to morrow, and arc then to pro-
ceed-on leave of absence.

Toe,Cressy, 80, screw, Captain Warren, is in No. 1
dry dock, SheerneSS, with her topmasts housed and yards
down. • Her crow return from their leave on the lfitli
instant. Her repairs are proceeding with, and she is
being coppered two sheets higher than she formerly was.
Her gaps arc all out, but we hear, immediately the crew
retura' .she is to be got all Masao, like the Majestic, and
ready for immediate service.
The ImperieuFe, di, screw, Captain It. B. Watson,
C. 8., hauled into the steam basin dock at Portsmouth
yesterday, and Myrmidon and Oberon hauled into the
fitting basin.
We learn by eectric telegraph from Plymouth that
the Arejiusa, fie, which arrived in Plymouth Sound yes-
terday morning, had n long passage-of 29 days from
Aliilt~t, having experiencee contrary winds and calms.
She brill o invalided troops, seamen, and marines, under
command of Lieut. Piingle, 71st Regt., -and in medical
charge of Assistant-Surgeon Atkinson, 31st. At Malta
s!ie embarked Loot. Butler, Ti N., agent for the Pyre-
nees, and Lient. Rayinond, of the Tyrone, both of which
transports were lost on Nov. 14, ea the K.atel.a. No
deaths have occurred on bearl the A rethnsa since she left
Malta. Lord Rokeby and Major-General Barnard em-
barked yesterday afternoon on board the St. Jean d'Acre,
101, Captain Keppel, and at 4 o'clock she steamed out
of Plymouth Sound for Queenstown on her voyage to
the Black Sea.

The Arrogant, 46, screw, Captain Hastings Yelverton,
has discharged powder and shell, and will go into Ports-
mouth Harbour.

Tire Amphion, 34, her Majesty's screw frigate, Capt.
Key, hauled into Sheerness basin on Tuo.iday morning,
when the went alongside the sheers and got her lower
masts out, which are rotten and defective. The crew
are expecting soon to get leave ; Saturday is the day
named.

The Cossack, 21, screw, Captain Fanshawe, was taken
out on a cruise on Monday at Devonport, when her
engines answered wen, and the leak is stopped.

Tae Pylades, 21, f crew-corvette, is in the basin at
Sheerness. Onlyone of her boilers is got below. Penn and
Sons' mechanics are working at her machinery, which
progresses fast.
Tile Esk, 21, screw, Captain Birch, had her trial yes-
terdayat Portsmouth at the measured mile, and averaged
aline knots.

The Bonetta, 3, brigantine, Lieutenant Wake, R.N.,
commanding, arrived at Spithead yesterday from the
south-east coast of America station, which she left on
9th of November ; consequently her news has been anti-
cipated by the steam mail packet. She reports the slave
trade on the Brazil coast as at a standstill. Mr. John
Harriman, passed clerk, RN., came home in the
Bonetts, which has been in commission since February,
1851, and will now be paid off.
Nearly all the seamen who were granted leave of ab-
sence from the Cumberland have arrived at Sheerness
and reported themselves on board the flag-ship
Waterloo.