The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-06 00:00:00

THE SUN, I,ONDONs WEDNESDAY EVENING, JUNE 6 1855,

tradition of the spirit which she then exhibited to animate
her patriotism, Russia would make a less stubborn resist-
ance to us than she did to Napoleon.l. ? It was his belief
that we had entered upon a task the greatest, the Mint a:-
ciao= and the most difficult that ever a nation undertook,
sad that we should have to more than double our energies,
the number of mon engaged, and the money we had spent in
a single year, before we should sueceed in accomplishing our
(Nem Ought not we to tell this to the people, and to subdue
rather than excite their feelings ? Suppose we should suflsr
reverses, and have to contend not only with-intermittent
fever, but with plague and cholera in addition ? Ought not
the House of Commons, instead of cheering the Minister
Nehen he told them that the conferences were closed, not to
'subdue the spirit of the country in a righteous cause, but to
let it know filly and fairly what was before it ? What he
blamed the Government for was, that they had played
falsely and treacherousty with the people, and there would
be a reckoning with them in the country. The noble lord
at the head of the Government said in one of his harangues,
that the people of England were his reserve force—what had
be done to make that reserve available? This noble lord
the member for the city of London said in December that
we would have 180,000 or 200,000 Englishmen under arms,
with foreign levies to aid them. Where ware they? There
Tad been the same child's play all through, from the be-
ginning up to the present moment. (Opposition cheers.)
All he asked was, that they would deal candidly' with
the public. He had noticed that, whenever the mass of a
people became cruel, revengeful, and unreasonable towards
Governments, or towards their leaders, it was because they
thought they had been betrayed ; and there was nothing
by which the Government would so surely risk the loss of
public favour, and reap public calamity, as by attempting
to conceal from the people of this country the whole
amount of the difficulties and dangers which were now
hanging over them. It was on this account., and because
he would not be responsible in the slightest degree for what
might happen in this country, that he wished to speak out
on this occasion ; and he warned hon. gentlemen that there
were no institutions which might not be in danger from
from the reaction that might take place from over-san-
guine confidence in the war we had now undertaken. He
had seen public opinion out of doors take sudden and
strange freaks. He had seen the men who clamoured
the loudest for war, after the first disasters meeting toge-
ther, not to denounce themselves, or to take to them-
selves the slightest demerit, but to denounce those who
were highest in the land and most responsible. And when
he saw what had been the course of proceeding in the
face of what he must believe to be superior informa-
tion—when he saw the way in which in high places the
passions of the people had been pandered to, and a mere
momentary triumph sought at the risk of great future die-
aster—hemust say that he thought many of these persons
had deserved the retribution with which they had met.
He would never so far truckle to the popular spirit as to
join in any cry which should divest the mass of the peo-
ple from what he believed to be their first duty, viz., to
consider how far they were responsible for what had fallen
on the land and how far reform ought to begin at home.
He had spoken as he had done, because he believed that
we were engaging in a war, the difficulties and dangers of
which were understood by neither the Government nor
the people. Were the Russians at Portsmouth he should
have taken a different toae ; but it was to counsel mode-
ration and caution that he had made this long, and per-
haps somewhat tedious, appeal'to the house. (Cheers.)
Mr. COLLIER said the great value of the present de-
bate was that it had explained the causes of the misma-
nagement of the war. Those causes were now clearly
seen to be the presence in the Cabinet of right hon.
gentlemen who were determined that this country should
not humble the enemy, and who seemed to consider them-
selves equally charged with the interests of Russia as of
England. He inferred from the remarks of the right hon.
baronet the member for Carlisle on Friday week, that that
right hon. baronet meant to transfer his allegiance to the
right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks, because that
right hon. gentleman was more pacific than the present
Government. He was thankful that the Russianising ele-
ment had now left the Cabinet, and in the improved con-
dition of the army they traced the effects of a firmer
policy; and if the Prime Minister would continue the course
he had adopted, he would carry with him the unanimous
opinion of the country. He characterised the arguments
of the hon. member for the West Riding as fallacious,
and severely commented on the bad taste shown in the
way he spoke of our recent successes in the Sea of
Azoff, and the exultation with which he anticipated
the progress of fever in the Crimea. He condemne3, also,
the manner in which the hon. gentleman violated the con-
fidence imposed with respect to the private meeting of the
Liberals in Downing-street, and concluded by expressing
his opinion that the people of England would be glad to
know that the conferences were terminated, and that peace
must now be sought through the vigorous prosecution of
the war.

Lord H. VANE intimated his intention to support the
amendment of Sir W. Heathcote. He admitted that the
limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea was difficult,
and he thought the Russian propositions were as well cal-
culated to secure that end as that proposed by the Govern.
ment, and he believed that a peace concluded upon those
terms would have been beneficial to Europe.
Sir S. NOnTHCOTE opposed, and Major REED supported,
Mr. Lowe's amendment.

Mr. EWART, though a firm friend of peace, would sup-
port the vigorous prosecution of the war, believing that
was the shortest road to peace. At the same time he was
not for a war of nationalities, and he had no idea of crush-
ing Russia, but he would leave the terms of peace in the
hands of Government, and could not therefore support Mr.
Lowe's amendment.
Mr. VANSITTART condemned the Government fur
standing upon such a nice point of honour as their inter-
pretation of the third proposition, and he was therefore in-
clined to support Sir Win. Heathcote's amendment. He
would not, however, press that, but he called upon the
Government to lay down some definite course of policy, on
attaining which they would conclude the war.
Mr. F. SCULLY defended the conduct of Lord John
Russell in the Vienna negotiations.
Mr. CROSSLEY had been opposed to the war altogether
at its commencement, but being once engaged in it he was
for a vigorous prosecution of the war.
Mr, J. G. PHILLIMORE severely censured the conduct
of Mr. Gladstone, and urged a strennen■ prosecution of
the war.

Sir J. GRAHAM—I can assure you, sir, that I never
rose in this house with feelings of greater embarrassment
or of greater pain than those which I experience on the
present occasion, and like li 7 hen. friend the member for
the West Riding. I shall ap, the generosity of this
house, inasmuch as I am Iv,' shvare that the opinions
which I am about to express are not in accordance with
those entertained by a majority of the members of the
house, and I shall make this appeal with confidence because,
being in the minority in which I feel myself, I am snro of
a disposition on the part of the house to deal fairly with
me. (Hear.) It is painful to undergo taunts such as those
which last night and this evening have fallen from hon.
gentlemen on the opposite side of the house, who accuse
those who are anxious, even under present circumstances,
to obtain a peace, which appears to them an honourable
one, of being Russian auxiliaries, or, or as other hon.
members say, of being friends to Russia. Now, Sir, i t is
necessary to submit to taunts of that description, and
the only consolation which is left to me is that wiser
and better men than myself have had to undergo observa-
tions of a similar description. (Hear.) But I feel that in
the present circumstances of this country I cannot fairly
be called a friend to Russia because I take a course which,
if I neglected to take, I should consider myself an enemy
to my own country and a traitor to those whom I represent,
and I should feel myself guilty of baseness if I hesitated
manfully and fairly to express to this house and to the
country what are my opinions with reference to the policy of
the present war. My position with regard to this question is
different from that held by other hon. gentlemen who are of
opinion that the late negotiations should have led to peace,
and who have constantly and consistently objected to the
war from its very commencement. I, on the contrary,
have entertained the opinion, and I still entertain it, that
the war declared against Russia was a just and necessary
war. That opinion, I say, I have entertained, and I still
adhere to it, but the real question now at issue, according
to my humble judgment, is, have the real objects been ob-
tained for which the war was undertaken, or did the um-
ferences which had been held at Vienna establish a fair
ground for believing that an opportunity was afforded, if
improved, of bringing the war to a satisfactory termina-
tion ? Besides having entertained and expressed the opi-
nions to which I still adhere, that the war originally was
a just and necessary war, it was my duty in the Govern-
ment of Lord Aberdeen to fill an important post connected
with the conduct of the war ; and when the hon. memb n's
for Leominster and Plymouth have asserted that it is now
quite plain what were the causes which led to failure, while
I and those whe act with me, and who with me left the
Government of the noble lord the member for Tiverton,
occupied a position in the administration of affairs, I tell
them, in reply, that, although it would ill become me to
speak of my own efforts or my own conduct, still this much
I can say, that from the first moment when I wont to the
Admiralty I used my best exertions to prepare the naval
forces of this country for any emergency which might
arise. (Hear.) My efforts wore sincerely and constantly
directed to that end long before the commencement of the
war, and during its progress I endeavoured to the best of
my ability to provide ample means to meet the wants of
the public service, and when I left office I hope, and I may
say I think. that those means were not found deficient by
my successor. (Hear.) Having made these observations, I
shall now pass on to the observations which I conceive it
to be my duty to submit for the consideration of the house.
On a former evening, before the commencement of the re-
cess, I urged upon the Government the propriety of ad-
journing this debate, because I was of opinion that a sub-
ject of such magnitude and importance ought not to be hur-
riedly discussed, and it appeared to 'no impossible that in
the short remains of one evening it could meet with sutli-
cient consideration, and I therefore pressed the adjourn-
ment of the debate. During the interval a very im-
portant change has taken place in the state of af-
fairs. The conferences at Vienna were then open ; they
are now closed. It appears that, since the conference
of the 26th of April, a proposition has been made by
the Austrian Government to the Governments of England
and France which, in the opinion of Austria ought to have
been submitted to the Russian envoys, and which afforded
1.'11013e at least of an adjustment of the difference not being
bead of and we now hear from the noble lord at the
jected that Government that England and Franco have se-
As matters novstproposition, and that the conferences are closs 1.
fore the recessat I think that, if it was important b
great question, the time should be given for discussing Ohs
has greatly increased the to which I have adverted
place, I should wishgravity of the present occash D.
In the first
to know what was the pre-
cise proposition made by Austria and rejected by England
and France ; and in the next place I, should wish to be in-
formed whether it is the opinion of ner Majesty's Govern-
ment that the four points, which we have heard so
much
about,
ought to be maintained as the base f
f
ationalone E, or whether fwilh res
cons terms ha o suture nego-
ti ve been fixed, noon
which ngdandl ent to deal with u„1, e
•
I cannot conceive any question of gseete
r he Government a
or one which deserves on
tthe pairt of. t InV"tanca,
of this
because
a t
isonn this
more frank and immediate
have
observed in the progre.ssupopular as
sembly with what rap( ley an in
upon has
shown
to raise the terms to he determined
las a
Rine
(vat
non before concluding a peace.. do not see. the h
and learned member 'for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) is
his place, but before the recess he made a speech which
the house will remember-3 speech remarkable for its e' o
-
quence, its energy, and its force—a speech
h heldYr worthy
borth Zr of.he hen.
the
()maxim and worthy of the high position
and learned gentleman at the bar of Ireland ; but, le-
ulamkable as that speech was for its eloquence, it was no
lima
sp
for the o
hop
inions exressed •t
in —oated so
lapon, Would to i 'Mons bieb, if
lead nterminable stilities.w(Hear.),

It was, said the hon. and learned gentleman, no longer
a question of terms ' • Russia was a perfidious Power,
who never observed the treaties into which she en-
tered ; and the argument of the hon. and learned
gentleman went to show that we are now fighting, not
for terms, but for the honour, glory, and supremacy of
England throughout the world. Well, sir, that opened
out an alarming prospect. Then, again, in the progress of
the debate, the hon. member for the Montros i burghs has
declared his opinion that the time has now arrived when
it is not safe to conclude a peace with Rassi while that
country holds a single ship, port, or fortress in the Black
Sea. Then, again, I am at a loss to understand what is the
precise and definite object for which this war is to be weged.
It is a trite observation, yet it is one which on this particu-
lar occasion is not altogether inappropriate, that one point
of a good minister is to avoid involving his country in a
war, for experience shows us, and history teaches us by ex-
ample, that though it is always easy to involve a country
in a war, it is very difficult to carry on that war with the
full and cordial support of the people for any very great
length of time. I will illustrate this position by reference
to history, and since the great rebellion there have been
wars that afford instances in support of what I have
stated. In 1739 Sir Robert Walpole was at the head of the
Administration of this country. He was a popular and a
most successful minister, but he most reluctantly declared
war against Spain, in which the people of England entered
most heartily at that time. Nothing, indeed, ever excee led
the popularity of that war at its commencement. Every
class of society rivalled each other in their efforts to carry
on the operations of the war. The leading members of the
Opposition took a most active part in it, and even a prince
of the blood formed one of a procession when the war was
declared, Sir R. Walpole was against the declaring that
war, but he did so in deference the will of the people ;
but, within two years, he, from being the most popular Mi-
nister who ever held power, was abandoned and left with-
out support from any quarter, and, after his overthrow, the
country became discontented with the whole operations of
the war, which was suffered to drag its slow length along for
some seven or eight years amid th execrations of the peo-
ple, and, to use the expression of a right hon. gentleman,
an ignominious peace was the result. The conferences
at Aix-la-Chapelle were kept open with the desire of
delaying the progress of negotiations in the hope that for-
tune might turn in our favour. But fortune did not smile
upon our arms; adversity followed instead of success, and
after the negotiations had been protracted the war was at
last terminated by a peace, in which, I believe, the only
instance in history occurred of our actually sending two
hostages to Paris—the Earl of Sussex and Lord Calthorpa.
The Pretender, who was then in Paris, and had witnessed
the arrival of those noble lords as hostages, exclaimed,
" If ever the day should come when I shall haverecovered
the throne of my ancestors, my first desire will be that
hostages shall come from Paris to London, and not gofrom
London to Paris." Well, sir, this was the result of the,
war of Sir R. Walpole. Allusion has been made to the Ame-
rican war, and to the last and longest war, namely, that
with France, but it should be remembered that in the case
of both those wars there were palpable and direct British
objects involved. The war with America was a struggle
for empire. There were no less than 13 British colonies
at stake, which the Sovereign of this country be-
lieved to be the glory and tne brightest jewel of his crown,
and which he never would consent to have severed from
this country. During that war we suffered many disas-
ters ; we had thousands of miles to traverse, and we strug-
gled in vain. The war finally ended in disaster, the effects
of which are still regretted, and by many believed to be
almost irreparable. But it was believed, notwithstanding,
that terms might at the commencement have been possi-
ble. That, however, was a war in which England was
fighting for an empire. Then, what was the case in regard
to the war of the French revolution ? That was a struggle
of another kind ; but still its object was direct and imme-
diate as touching the safety of our native land. I hear an
expression of dissent from an hon. member below me, but
I must beg to state what the cause of that war appears to
me to have been. In this world of ours the pride of em-
pire has proved to be be the source of great commotion and
productive of mighty effects ; but there is another passion
of the human mind which has produced equally important
consequences, I mean the inglorious passionof fear—" Pri-
mus in orbe dens eat Timor." Fear has subdued empires,
fear has made wars, and it was the fear entertained of the
dangerous principles that existed at the period of the
French revolution which involved this country in war.
What was the fear ? Was it a groundless fear ? I think
that fear was rightly entertained, and the danger boldly
met. There was a regicide, there was a blood-stained
guillotine, there was the declaration of Jacquerie, there
was the declaration of the Social Propaganda, there were
all the horrors of the French revolution. Those appre-
hensions were not ill founded which led to the com-
mencement of the French war. In its progress it became an
internecine war, and afterwards a struggle between the
first Napoleon and the rest of the powers of Europe, the
question, so far as this country is concerned, being whether
England should be a free and independent nation or should
become an appanage and mere domain of France ? Reference
has been made to the vast cost of the war, and an earnest
appeal has been addressed to the house on that subject—
"O ! miseras hominum mentes, 0 pectora caeca."
It has been stated that no less a debt than 500,000,0001 has
been incurred to maintain the Bourbons on the throne of
France, which was rescued from the great conqueror Na-
poleonl. by the glorious successes of our arms, led on by one
of the greatest generals that the world has known for these
1800 years—a general equal at least to Cmsar, and only in-
ferior, if inferior, to Napoleon himself. (Cheers.) But hav-
ing succeeded in establishing the royal throne of France,
and having incurred
at the grandsire's sore regret,
From age to age an everlasting debt,"
it so happens that the very next heir of that great con-
queror is now on the throne of France; and not only on the
throne of France, but is our powerful, our cordial, and, I
must add, our faithful ally. This surely deserves some
pains why we should reflect, first, of all, upon the facility
with which war is waged in this country, and then pro-
ceed to consider what you have for its object. You per-
ceive that the wars to which I have alluded have been
national and direct wars in their object, but the war
which we are now waging with Russia is one in
which our interest is remote and centingent—distant and
not immediate. I have already said that lam one of those
who are responsible for the declaration of this war. I do not
regret it, but I think it ought to be always borne in mind
what was the precise object of the war. Now, sir, I must
take exception to some doctrines which I have heard ad-
vanced. lam not one of those who believe that daring
the progress of a war it is perfectly legitimate to vary your
terms according to the degree of success attending your
operations. But, while I say I think your terms may
vary, I am strongly of opinion that the object for which
you embarked in a war should be kept steadily in view,
and that that object should not vary, whatever may be the
success of your arms. Now, the object for which we em-
barked in this war was the maintenance of the indepen-
dence and the integrity of Turkey. That was the avowed
object, and, I contend, the sole object, of the war. I con-
sider that the war was necessary and just, and that the rea-
sons for it were twofold. First, there were the covert in-
tentions of Russia, which were concealed from the English
Government, and which were followed up by the overt act
of the invasion of the Principalities. Now, sir, it will be-
come my duty shortly to refer to the negotiations which
have taken place. I will not eater into details as to the
settlement of the first point in reference to the principali-
ties—the immediate object of the war; for, thougk excep-
tions could be taken to it with reference to certain par-
ticulars on which the hon. member for the West Riding
commented, yet in the main the settlement proposed did
secure the perfect independence of the principalities, and,
instead of placing them under the protectorate of Russia,
placed them under that of the four contracting European
Powers, and they stipulated that no negotiations should
take place with reference to the principalities without the
whole question being laid before the four contracting
Powers. The second point, with reference to the naviga-
tion of the Danube, I will not discuss at any length, but
merely state that in the main the propositions of the noble
lord were acceded to. It was agreed that the navigation
should be placed under a European commission, in which
England was to have a voice, and precautions were taken
with respect to keeping open, not only the course of the
river, but also its mouth, where impediments had arisen.
The management of this was to be plactd under a local
committee, to be created bya European commission, which
could not be dissolved except by the consent of the four
contracting Powers. It was erroneously stated on a
former evening that the question of a naval force to be
kept at the month of the river constantly to watch the
faithful performance of these stipulations was negatived
by Russia; it was not so, the question was only reserved
till after the settlement of the third point. I think I
am authorized to state to the house the spirit in which
the Russian envoy accepted the four points. On the
3d of December, immediately after the signature of
the treaty by ustria, France, and England, the Rus-
sian envoy, in accepting the terms of negotiation as
contained in the four points, distinctly announced that,
he accepted them, renouncing, on the part of his Go-
vernment, the spirit of the religious protectorate of
Russia over the Christian subjects of Turkey, renoun-
cing the political protectorate of the principalities, con-
senting to the free navigation of the Danube, and
also consenting to the revision of the treaty of 1841. These
were the declaration made by the Russian envoy who ac-
cepted these bases, and I consider it important that they
should be borne in mind during thisdiscussion, because I
think that it will be found, after a careful investigation of
the negotiations. that the Russian envoy did agree in the
main throughout these discussions to the concessions which
he made at their commencement. He consented to that
which was the most important of all the questions—viz.,
the religious protectorate claimed by Rassiaover the Chris-
tian subjects of the Turks, which, in point of fact, was the
immediate origin of the war. I will not go back to the dis-
puted question as to what took place with respect to the
discussions as to the holy places—for it was stated by the
noble lord the member for the city of London, who then
held the seals of the Foreign Department, that, in the
opinion of England, at the commencement of the quarrel the
first threat of force did not proceed from Russia, but that
Russia was in the right and France was in the wrong. The
Emperorof the French, with great magnaminity, having the
spirit of peace, which cannot be too highly commended, on
consideration of the whole question and the conduct of his
ambassador at Constantinople, receded from the claims of
his ambassador, whose acts he disavowed, and he placed
France in the right, which had originally beenin the wrong.
)Hear.) Russia had a distinct and just cause of complaint
against Tarkey with reference to the transaction to which 1
have alluded, but I think the tone adopted by Prince Mens-
chikoff on his mission to the Porte was wholly inconsis-
tent with the respect due to an independent Power. This
insolence—for I can call it by no other term—coupled
with the invasion of the Principalities, rendered it a para-
mount duty on the part of the allies of Turkey—England
and France—to come forward in its defence, and to secure
its independence, which had been so violated. (Hear.)
Will the house psrinit me now to state what in my opinion
is the strongest part of the present case, and which deserves
careful consideration? I agreed with the hon. member for
Hertfordshire when he said it was not politic by force of
arms, when engaged in war, to humble an adversary; but
I think that discretion should bs used in cases of the kind
where insolence was followed by aggression, and that hu-
miliation by force of arms was a necessary part of the
conduct of the war. But look at the result of the last
war with Russia and contrast her claims at the
commencement of the war with the terms on which she
was willing to conclude peace at Vienna, and I think you
will not find that the history of any war shows any
greater alterations in tone and terms than those which
have been obtained in the late conferences of Vienna from
Russia, and obtained, as I contend, by force of arms.
Before proceeding to investigate in detail tne demands
and concessions of Russia, I must state that in my opi-
nion the test by which you ought to try negotiations
of this kind was wisely and well laid down by the noble
lord the British Plenipotentiary on that occasion,
when
ilhle declared that, in his opinion, at the corn-
ssiel tnnetddoi of negotiations no treaty of peace could be
nacwthich the honour of the adversary was not con-
d.
make another
(Hear.) The noble lord then
tention, and to se,nioctillieircoobrdiseravuaytioann,dtoewnthiircehlyl csaulblsactritbene.-
He said, with reference to this question of honour, that

the defence of Sebastopol, on the one hand, and the attack
on the other, had covered the contending armies with
equal glory, and that the military honour of Russia,
France, and England, was safe as affected by those opera-
tions. I will now recall in detail to the recollection of the
house what were the demands and language of Russia at
the commencement of the war, and what, after a year's
fightingi were her submissions—for I can give them no
other name—on which she was willing to conclude peace
at Vienna. Her first pretension was, that no Other Power
should be permitted tointerfere in anynegotiation between
Russia and the Sublime Porte. That pretension was as-
serted repeatedly in the most arrogant and offensive terms.
Let us contrast with it the result. All the negotiations
for the last two years, by the forced consent of Russia,
have been conducted by England, France, and Austria on
behalf and in aid of the Sultan. (Hear.) Her next pre-
tension was, that the Turkish ambassador must sue for
peace either at St. Petersburg or at the head-quarters of
the Russian army. A more arrogant pretension than
this was never put forward ; but now, let us see,
has it been abandoned ? Why, through the medium
of Austria. If Russia id not ask, she, at all
events, suggested the holding of the conferences at
Vienna. Prince Menschikoff's head-quarters were no longer
the only place where Turkey could sue for peace, for her
plenipotentiaries met the Russian ambassador at the con-
ferences held in the capital of Austria. What was the
next pretension ? Russia refused to meet the Turkish envoy
at any conference upon equal terms, alleging that Turkey
had not been admitted into the family of European States.
Ask the noble lord who has just returned from Vienna, and
who sat at the table where the conferences were held, whe-
ther the Russian ambassadors sitting at the same table did
not discuss upon equal terms proposition after proposition
with the Turkish envoy. That envoy met the ambassador
of Russia, met the noble lord acting on the part of England,
met M .Drouyn de l'Huys and the other plenipotentiaries
at the same table on terms of perfect equality, and the mon-
strous pretensions of Russia were not only recalled but ne-
gatived in the most decisive manner. What was the next
pretension? The principalities were occupied by Rus-
sia as a material guarantee. The conferences were opened
at Vienna, the. Russians are expelled the principalities,
and those principalities are occupied by the Ally of
England. Russia, not satisfied with occupying the princi-
palities, had passed the Danube and advanced into Bul-
garia. How was that met ? By a treaty of offensive and
defensive alliance, that if Russia advanced to the Balkan
a casus belli must arise, involving the necessity of other
great European Powers taking part in the war as well as
France and England. But has there been no military
success ? Has there been for the last nine months a single
Russian on the right bank of the Danube? By the valour
of the Turks themselves, by the gallant defence of Silistria,
the Russians were expelled, not from the principalities by
Austria, but from the Turkish territory by Turkish arms.
Then the fleets congregate in the Black Sea. It has been
the boast of Russia that the Black Sea was virtually
her- possession, that she had at her command a naval
force which gave her complete dominion over it.
Her boast also was that in the Baltic she had a fleet
at all times, when the weather permitted the free naviga-
tion of the waters, amounting to 30 sail of the line. What
has become of her ships? By the suicidal hand of
Russia herself, in fear of an attack, a large portion of them
has been destroyed. Talk of prestige ! The naval pres-
tige of Russia, whether in the East or in the Baltic, has
vanished before the superiority of the allied Powers of
France and England, and I do not think that we shall hear
much more of Russia's naval supremacy either in the Baltic
or the Black Sea. Then, again, I ask what was the cha-
acter of the works at Bomarsund ? They were works of
the most alarming description, and erected in defiance of
a treaty. Nothing could prove more clearly the justice of
the war at its commencement than the very fact of the
existence of that fortress. But where is it now? Razed
to the ground by the attack of France and England; and
Russia has been taught a lesson not speedily to be for-
gotten even by such a Power as she is. Now, let us pro-
ceed to the Danube. Under various pretences Russia has
practically, for the last three or four years, had the cam-
mand of the mouths of that river, and the lower portion of
it, the most important in regard to the trade of the prin-
cipalities, was in her hands. That power she shamefully
abused by various artifices; first, by the establishment of a
line of quarantine, next, by the erection of powerful bat-
teries at the Sulina mouth, by which both sides of the river
were commanded by Russia. What are the terms which
the noble lord successfully negotiated with respect to the
Danube? Russia consents to remove the line of quarantine,
to have no fortifications at the Sulina mouth, and to place
the navigation of the river under a European commission,
in which England should have a voice. The fourth point
to which I have already adverted is with respect to the
rights, privileges, and immunities of members of the ortho-
dox Russo-Greek faith within the dominions of the Turk,
claimed as being placed under the peculiar protection of
Russia ab antiquoin force of treaty engagements, and espe-
cially that of Kainardji, with Count Nesselrode's enforce-
ment of his demand, on rejection of the Turkish amendments
of the Vienna note. It will be remembered, with respect
to this particular claim, it was alluded to in the terms in
which I have read it to the house, when made by
the Emperor Nicholas himself at an audience which Sir
Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador, had with the
Emperor, and reported by Colonel Rose to Lord Malmes-
bury as made at Constantinople so far back as 1851 I very
much regret that the British and French Governments did
not consent at the conference, pending the reference of the
third point, to proceed to exhaust the fourth. I think if
they had proceeded to discuss that point there is every
reason to believe that no practical difficulty would have
arisen in its adjustment. All doubt would have been
removed with respect to the remaining points of difference
between the contending parties, the ground would have
been cleared, and a near approximation to peace would
have been obtained. The Austrian Government was
anxious that the point should be discussed. Russia
was willing to discuss it. It was France and England
that interposed. Prince Gortschakoff then, on the part
of Russia, made an important declaration with refer-
ence to the fourth point. He regretted the delay in
discussing it, and said that he was -ready to discuss it
at once, and that he attached no practical importance
to it. Having at the commencement of the negotiations
declared that he accepted the bases, foreseeing the necessity
of renouncing the exclusive protectorate of Russia, he said
that nothing could give greater facility to the Sultan in
governing his empire. Not only, then, were the first and
second points fully settled, but in this fourth point I con-
fidently believe there was no insuperable difficulty. On
the third point the pretension of Russia was that the in-
dependence and integrity of Turkey was not guaranteed by
any stipulation of the treaty of 1840; that it was assumed
in the preamble, but not ratified by any specific engage-
ment. On that part of the question a complete explanation
took place in the presence of the noble lord. What was the
result of that explanation? So far frarn holding that the de-
claration with respect to the independence and integrity of
Turkey was not a subject of stipulation in the treaty,
Prince Gortschakoff consented that the independence and
integrity of Turkey should be guaranteed by treaty. What
was most remarkable was, that the terms of guarantee pro-
posed by Russia were varied by the Turkish envoy, and his
suggestions were adopted by the conference. I have gone
through seriatim, the pretensions of Russia at the com-
mencement of the war, and the conclusions arrived at after
the conference. There remains only that portion of the
third point which relates to the means by which the naval
preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be dimi-
nished. When I was a member ofLord Aberdeen's Govern-
ment, I was a party to a proposition made to France with
reference to the mode of giving effect to this third article,
by a limitation of the Russian fleet. As being a party to
that proposition, I am bound to state that it was never re-
garded by me as an ultimatum, that it was submitted to
France, and was not accepted by her as an ultimatum, and
that it was not proposed at Vienna either by France or
England as an ultimatum. It would bs monstrous to begin
a conference with an ultimatum. It would be utterly
'inconsistent with the whole proceedings of a negotiation
to do so. If ever there was a negotiation clear from
such an absurdity it was the conferences at
Vienna, because in good faith and in the very face of the
stipulation with respect to the third point, it was stated
that the parties proposing these terms should have the
right to vary them in accordance with the events of the
war. Clearly, therefore, the proposition was not an ulti-
matum, and not being an ultimatum, I come to consider
whether, on the whole, this being the only ground of dif-
ference, it is prudent to insist on it. If I had had any
doubt at all, I am bound to state that the result of the
discussion iu this house has convinced me that as an ulti-
matum it is not tenable. On this point the observations
of the hon. member for the West Riding are so strong and
so well founded that it would be impossible to overlook
them. Steam has made an immense difference in this
matter. If you allow Russia in the Black Sea four of the
largest ships of the line, with all the advantages of the
screw and with a proportionate number of smallr vessels,
I believe that even with the limitatien you propose the
whole object of Russia will be effected. You would mark
your distrust of her without taking adequate means to
check her. If Russia proves faithful—and for 40 years she
has been your ally without any complaint on your part—
no such stipulations are required. Bat if she proves per-
fidious, then no limitation such as you propose would be
of any avail. Another observation to which I attach great
importance, because it is well founded, is this—lf you ob-
tain that stipulation, are you prepared to go to war if Rus-
sia should have one ship or two ships more than the stiena;
lated number? (Hear.) It is admitted on all hands that
the interest of England in this matter is remote and indi-
rect, and that the interest of Austria is direct and imme-
diate. Austria has a far deeper interest in this matter than
either France or England. Let me observe that the position
of Austria at the abrupt conclusion of the negotiations was
not at all that which it was at the commencement of them.
The observations of the hon. baronet the member for Herts
last night with respect to Austria were wise and judi-
cious. I think she has, under very trying circumstances,
been the faithful friend of England. Her position is very
peculiar. She stands, as it were, on a narrow isthmus
between the two great seas—the barbarism of Russia on
the one hand, and the military ambition of the Western
powers on the other. She is in a position of enormous
difficulty, and is entitled to our utmost forbearance. I
hold that peace—a great blessing to all nations--is in a
paramount degree the policy of England. (Hear, hear.)
natural Pea llylasois the policy of Austria. She, therefore, is the
and friend of England. We ought, seeing her
position, to bear with her infirmities, but, above all, we
ought not to quarrel or come to a hasty rupture with her.
I think we are entitled to know the proposition which
Austria made to England and France at the close of the
conferences. I regret that the noble lord was not present
at the conference when the Russian envoy made his last
proposition. I quite agree with the noble lord that Eag-
land and France were justified in rejecting the proposal
with regard to a mire apertum. But I entertain quite
another opinion of the proposition of the 26th of April,
and regret that the noble lord was not present when it was
made. I think that that proposition was not to be re-
garded as an ultimatum, because Russia was not justified
any more than England and France in beginning with an
ultimatum. I think that that proposition, though not
perfect in itself, did afford, as Count Buol and M. Drouyn
de l'Huys said, the elements of an adjustment. M. Dronyn
de l'Huys having heard the proposition, and having de-
clared that it afforded the elements of a settlement, pro-
ceeded. to Paris, and the noble lord proceeded to Loudon,
but ho had the advantage of discussing this question with
the Russian envoy, and the still greater advantage of hear-
ing the opinion of Austria upon it. Rumour says that M.
Drouyn de l'llays was well satisfied with the lastproposition
as moulded by Austria; that he submitted it to his govern-
ment; that the Emperor of France was not unwilling to
ro no
km epnl
at
eteh
in
o totsaendd
thtahte
iEt
sti
grel jisehctGioonvet
tabeecyrep:biotn; ldthaactcheptePirt";
exercised through
of the influence of the English Government
through the noble lord. I speak from rumour
merely, having no information on the point. I think we
ought to know what that proposition was. 111. Drouyn d
l'Huys has brought the proposition from Vienna—having
proposed it to his Government—and finding it rejected,
,
retired from the councils of the French Emperor. Surely
s
we are all bound to speak out on this occasion. I have
tated without reserve my own position and feeling with
respect to this question. I am not a slavish admirer of
Russia. lam not the auxiliary of Russia. I am not the
friend of Russia, but lam the sincere friend and advocate '
of peace on honourable terms. I hope the golden oppertxt•

nity will not be lost of obtaining the greatest of all bless-
ings without the sacrifice of national honour. I have
heard it said that we are fighting for prestige. It is a
most dangerous doctrine. You must adhere to a definite
object in the war, though I admit your terms may vary
with the view of giving effect to your object. There is
something, I think, in the present balanced state of the
*contest in the Crimea which makes the conjuncture favour
able to a settlement. The honour of England is safe by
the victories gained wherever we have cones in contact
with the enemy, and the advantages of those victories is
perceptible in the lowered .tone of the enemy, origorally so
arrogant and insulting. Though not the friend of Russia,
I think the honour of Russia should be Considered ; but if
you wish to push her to the wall in driving j'Orfr terms,
there is something passive in her resistance, and though
vanquished she will not yield, and not yielding she will
not make peace. lamby no means satisfied that if this
opportunity be lost—even if our arms be victorious—that
it will soon recur. (Hear, hear.) I wish to throw all
taunts and party feelings aside. It is a great crisis—sur-
ge/7i, cords. Let us elevate our minds and feelings to the
interests of a great nation. The claims of humanity are
at stake, and I am confident we will best serve our coun-
try if we consider those interests, and those interests only.
The greatest blessing we can confer on her, either as
regards her internal prosperity or her foreign rela-
tions, is peace. The opportunity is favourable, and to
the latest hour of my life I should regret if the opportu-
nity is lost. Ido not think all the money spent or the
losses sustained will be thrown away if peace.be obtained.
I think both Enelend and France have been taught some
useful lessons. I think Russia also has been taught that
arrogance must be abated, and that herpretensions cannot
be sustained. Ido hope if peace is restored that we shall
not hastily reduce our establishments—certainly not our
naval establishment—and our military force only in a small
degree. I think it only consistent with our position
among the great nations of the world that we should main•
tarn both large naval and military establishments. If the
object of this country in the prosecution of the war were
the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, then we must
cast aside the hope that we should leS able soon to return
to a small naval or military force. It must be recollected
that when once a weak state called into her aid the assist-
ance of a powerful auxiliary, just in proportion to the
length of time which the former depended upon the latter,
i n the same proportion did she require its future support..
(Hear, hear) Whether the principle of limitation or any
other expedient was adopted, he was still decidedly of
opinion that to maintain the integrity of Turkey would be
an object, the accomplishment of which would, day after
day, be found to be more difficult. The great test of
statesmanship, he felt assured, would be found to be to
make the necessary provisions for the fall of the Ottoman
empire, and to take care that Constantinople did not be-
come the property of Russia, upon the one hand, or of the
Western powers upon the other, and the policy which
inch a state of things rendered requisite could not be sus-
tained unless the English Government were backed by an
adequate force both by sea and land. (Hear, hear.) He
had endeavoured to express his opinions upon the question
before the house openly and dispassionately ; he had en-
deavoured to refrain,in giving expression to those opinions,
from using a single word that could give offence to any
hon. member, and he had only, in conclusion, to thank
the house for the attention with which they had lis-
tened to the remarks which he had felt it to be his duty
to make. (Hear, hear.)
Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, the observations which have
been made in thelcourse of the debate on the negotiations
at Vienna, and especially the observations made by the
hon. gentleman the member for the West Riding (Mr.
Cohen), render it incumbent upon me to make some expla-
nations and offer some remarks. In so doing I shall endea-
vour to imitate the calm spirit in which my right hon.
friend the member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) has dis-
cussed this matter. As he has observed, we are not now
considering any question of party triumph or party inte-
rests, we are looking to the great question of the condi-
tions on which peace may be obtained, or the objects of
the war which we have entered upon may be accomplished.
It seems to me that these are the two great questions—if
you are determined to have peace, on what conditions can
you obtain it ?—lf you mean to:carresion the war, for what
objects are you to wage that war? (Hear.) Now, sir,
with respect to the first of these questions, let it be re-
membered, as my right hon. friend truly observed, that we
have already in the very short period of hostilities gained
very great objects from Russia, who, beginning with say-
ing that she would not negotiate except with Turkey
alone, and with Turkey at no other place than St. Peters-
burg, or the head-quarters of the Russian army, after-
wards consented to sit down as an equal at the conferences
with Turkey; that although Russia at the first maintained
her ancient treaties with Turkey must not be disturbed,
was quite willing to consent to renounce that protecto-
rate which she had hitherto—whether rightly or wrongly
I will not dispute—exercised over the principalities, and
that she was ready in making a new treaty to renounce
all the articles of those treaties which in the course of cen-
turies she had been able to effect by means of victories in
the field and skill in the Cabinet. These concessions, and
some others ofgreatimportance, Russia made in consequence
of the league formed against her and the successes we have
gained in the war that we have carried on. Still I could not
help feeling that we were in this position, and I stated it
very soon after my arrival at Vienna to Count Buol as a rea-
son why I did not entertain any very sanguine hopes from
the conferences—l said that the Western Powers had met
with successes sufficient to justify them in not making
peace except on terms which should guarantee a full se-
curity to Turkey against future aggression ; but, at the
same time, Russia had not had such reverses that we could
expect her to make all those concessions which would give
the securities which we were bound to demand. This was
the position in which the negotiations began. It may be
said, why begin negotiations at such a time ? That was a
necessity imposed on us by the treaty with Austria. Our
treaty with Austria on the 2d. of December provided that
in certain cases Austria should join with us to obtain the
four points oven by force of arms ; but Austria said natu-
rally, as I think, for her own interests, with full consider-
ation of the importance of entering into a war, that she
must first ascertain that Russia was unwilling to make
peace on terms which Austria should think sufficient. It
was necessary to ascertain that course, and for that pur-
pose the conferences at Vienna took place. My right hon.
friend who spoke last said truly that, with regard to the
first point, we place the principalities of Wallachia and
Moldavia under the protectorate of the Five Powers, in-
stead of their being placed under the sole protectorate of
Russia according to former treaties. We provided—al-
though the hon. member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden)
is very ill-satisfied with those terms (hear, hear)—we pro-
vided for free legislation, for liberty of worship, and for
the freedom of trade in the principalities. Every Mem-
ber of the conferences—the Russian Minister amongst
the rest—was perfectly willing that the administration
and legislation in these provinces should be entirely na-
tional, and not be interfered with by any other power.
The honourable gentleman criticised some of the provisions
of the protocol respecting these provinces, much in the
same way that they were criticised on a former occasion.
Let me say, in the first place, that I am entirely respon-
sible for having agreed to those terms. They do not im-
plicate the Government to which I belong, and I am
ready to take the whole of that responsibility, but I must
say that those terms do not bear the sense which the
hon. member for the West Riding has placed upon them.
He says that the natives of those principalities are not to
engage in matters dangerous to the tranquillity of their
country, but the real engagement is, they are not to enter
into intrigues which shall be dangerous to the tranquillity
of their country. These are the terms, and I own that I
consider the position of the principalities is a very critical
one. They are in close proximity to Russia, and to Aus-
tria, and to Turkey, and it will be very difficult to main-
tain the independence of legislation and government in
those principalities. In the rst place, neither Russia nor
Austria will allow intrigues to be carried on in these prin-
cipalities against the security and tranquillity of their own
provinces. By the articles of this treaty no Mussulman
was to enter into the principalities, and if the Turkish
armies did enter into them, it would be an interference
with the power of self-government. I hold it to be a diffi-
cult thing to make a satisfactory arrangement on these
points. The Turkish Minister at Vienna had no authority
to make an arrangement on this subject, and it was agreed
that, with the consent of the ministers of Russia and
Austria, that the future arrangements should be made at
Constantinople, with the concurrence of all the Christian
powers there. Some persons imagine that it would be
better to make the principalities entirely independent. I
believe that in that case they would fall immediately
under the power of either Austria or Russia ; and that
perhaps there would be a contention between those two
powers as to which they should belong to, and that they
certainly could not maintain their independence. But in
providing for the freedom of religion, of trade, and of legis-
lation, I thought we did much for the happiness and sem,
rity of these provinces. With respect to the Danube, it
was said the other day that Russia only gave up the power
of having a quarintine ; but it will be seen from the treaty
of Adrianople that Russia was also to have a number of for-
tifications on the banks of that rivgr. It should likewise be
remembered that English and French commissioners were
to exercise a general supervision there ; and by a proposal of
mine that commission was only to be dissolved by the con-
sent of all the powers, so that the freedom of the navigation
of the Danube might be thoroughly secured. We come next
to that great point which is called the third point ; and
before I touch upon it I must allude to the regret expressed
by my right hon. friend that the Governments of England
and Francs did not permit and sanction the conference
going into the question of the fourth point, and endeavour-
ing to settle it before discussing thelthird. Now, upon
that I must remark that that point was far from being so
easy of settlement as my right hon. friend supposes. (Hear.)
I had several conversations on the subject with the very
intelligent ambassador of the Porte, who spoke to me very
earnestly, and protested against any article being inserted
in the treaty by which the Porte should renounce in any
way its independence, and be made to depend upon the
Christian powers with regard to its own internal affairr.
(Hear.) I thought that objection, or rather suggestion,
with respect to the fourth point a very reasonable one; but
at the same time I saw that the plenipotentiaries of Russia,
and probably of Austria, would be very anxious to obtain
such a settlement of the fourth point as would have enabled
them in some way to control the legislation of the P orte as
regards the Christians. In discussing the fourth point,
therefore, we should have found ourselves in very consi-
derable difficulty, and I certainly could not have consented
to any arrangement of that point which, on the one hand,
(lid not provide for equal privileges to the Christians and
Mahomedans, and which, on the other hand, would have
enabled any of the powers to interfere with the internal
affairs of Turkey. (Hear.) I come, therefore, to the third
point, upon which there has been so much discussion, and

iapon which we had the—misfortune not to arrive at any
conclusion. And here I think ray right hon. friend rather
takes advantage, as some others have done, of the mode-
ration disphyed by the Western Powers in order to
saY, "As you were willing to concede so much—as
your terms were so moderate—why did you not make
them still more moderate and so secure their acceptance
by Russia ?" (Hear, hear.) The proposal which was sug-
gested by the French Government, which does not appear
as a proposition in the protocols, but which was more
than once stated with great eloquence and ability by the
French Minister, M. Drouyn de was that there
should be what he called a neutralisation of the Black Sea,
that it should be a sea for the purposes of commerce only,
and, being so, that all arsenals and forts for the purnoses
of war should be destroyed, and that there should lie no
establishments in the Black Sea except for the peaceful
purposes of trade. Well, that was a large and, I must say,
in itself a very good proposition, but the moment it was
mentioned the Russian ministers at once declared that
they never could agree to any measure which put an end
entirely to their military forces in the Black Sea, and pre-
vented them having any force with which they could re-
sent the insults even of a small power on that sea. Now,
it was in order to meet that objection, and to offer
nothing that was not extremely moderate, that we pro-
posed that, with the view of putting an end to Russian
preponderance in the Black Sea—the very terms to which
all the powers, including Russia herself, had consented—
her naval forces should be limited. I ask, how else were

you to obtain a cessation of Russian preponderance in the
Black Sea? (Hear, hear.) I have heard manygentlemen
say that this plan would be inefficient. Ido not believe
that it would have been in practice inefficient, because I
believe that immediately Russia offered—l will not say by
one ship, but by two or three ships, or even by a large
force-=to continue her course of aggression, the suspicions
of Europa would have been roused, and that: what doesnot
seem at first sight a perfect security, would have turned
out in practice to have been a security for Turkey, and
consequently a security for the peace of Europe. But, sup-
poeiug that plan was not to be insisted upon, in what man-
ner was this term to be carried out ? I presume no person
will maintain that it was my business, as representing the
Government of her Majesty, to give up that which we
thought perhaps the most essential of all the propositions
in the four points, with a view to put an end to the pre-
ponderance and to the aggressive ambition of Russia. Well
how was this tO he done ? My right hon. friend says with
great truth that it would not have done to have accepted the
firs t proposition of Russia and to h aye allowed Rus3ian fleets
to pass from the Bosphorus to the Dardanelles, and from the
Dardanelles to the Bosphorus at their pleasure. It is ob-
vious that if we had consented to those terms that not only
the fleets of Russia would have passed through the Dal da-
nelles' and thus have increased to a very large amount the
Black Sea fleet, but the latter would have come out from
time to time, and, passing close by the Sultan's palace,
would have paraded the waters of Greece with a view to
raise discontent and disaffection among the subjects of the
Porte. Add to this the facility of means, whenever the
Czar of Russia might think proper to send his fleet to Con-
stantinople in order to enforce some unjust demand. I
think, therefore, that the first Russian proposition would
not have been sufficient. Let me here observe, that the
notion which the hon. member for the West'Riding has,
that these great ships could be built in America and sent
into the Black Sea, has no foundation to rest upon, because
that plan could not be carried into effect so long as we closed
the Dardanelles against Russia ; and unless we admit the
opening of the Dardanelles it is impossible that ships-of-
war built in America could pass into the Rack Sea, or
could furnish the great fleet to which the hon. member has
alluded. We now come to the second proposition of Rus-
sia, made on the 26th of April. My right hon. friend and
others think that was a good proposition to accept ; but it
is impossible to see in that proposition any real difference
between the preponderance of Russia as it stood before the
war, and the preponderance of Russia as it would have re-
mained if the proposition had been accepted. The only dif-
ference is, that in case of menacetheSultan might call up the
fleets of his allies from the Mediterranean ; but in ordinary
circumstances there would have been no difference whatever;
the same preponderance would have existed; and how, was
I to say, or how was Lord Westmoreland to say after I
left Vienna, that we insisted upoe the cessation of the
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, and at the same
time we consented to replace Russia in exactly the same
position in which she stood before the war? (Hear.) But
my right hon. friend thinks that Count Buol was satisfied
with this proposition ; but I beg, though it is a rather
long passage, to read to the house what Count Buol act-
ually did say. He said that—

" The project developed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of France and declined by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia,
contained a complete and efficacious system ; that he could
not say as much of the propositions put forward this day :
that Russia, in attaching to the mutual guarantee tho value
only of au engagement not to encroach on the indepewleuce
and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, reduces it,
in fact, to an obligation which may be said to be self-evideJit;
that the arrangement proposed to act as an application of tLle
principle of the cessation of Russian preponderance in tare'
Black Sea, limits itself to the power reserved to the Sultan
of calling foreign fleets to his aid whenever the preponderance
of the Russian fleet should become threatening to him, which,
in fact, would only tend to augment the chances of a mis-
understanding; that, to sum up, the Russian propositions
could only be considered as including principles of a nature
to be introdUced into a general and complete system."

That was the opinion which the Austrian Plenipotentiary
gave of this Russian proposal. How then, if we meant to
insist upon the cessation of the Russian preponderance in
the Black Sea, could we agree to the Russian proposal?
(Hear.) I have now stated why I think we could not accept
the conditions of peace as proposed by Russia. Of course,
if Russia chose to consider that she was not sufficiently de-
feated in the war to agree to our terms, she had a right to
refuse them. I have been much criticised for having alluded
to the somewhat analogous case of the treaty of Utrecht,
when the fortifications of Dunkirk were destroyed ; but I
have gained thereby what was a virtual admission on the part
of Prince Gortschakoff, that it is not a question of honour,
but a question more or less of defeat and of inferiority in
the war. Because no man maintains that Louis XIV., in
making the treaty of Utrecht, signed a peace inconsistent
with his honour • on the contrary, it was a peace very cre-
ditable, almost glorious, to that monarch; but in agreeing
to the terms of that treaty he agreed to that which was the
consequence of his defeats ; and therefore the Russian
plenipotentiaries admitted that a similar treaty might be
accepted now, provided only that Russia were more de-
feated, and received more checks in the course of the war.
I believe that it is not at all a question of the honour of
Russia. I believe, on the contrary, it is that Russia sees
that she has no reason as the war at present stands to re-
nounce in *any way those aggressive projects which, she
sedulously entertains, which she intermits, which she lays
by for a time, but which Catherine entertained, which the
Emperor Nicholas, at the latter end of his life entertained,
and which the present Emperor has almost openlyavowed,
and is now endeavouring to carry into effect. (Hear.) That
I believe is the reason, and not a question of insulted dig-
nity and offended honour, which induced Russia to refits))
the propositions of the Western Powers. I now come to a
very serious question, upon which I must decline to give
that definite answer which an hone gentleman opposite
asked for, namely, " If you are forced to continue the war,
and if you find that the only terms which you can propose
for giving real security to Turkey are refused, what will be
your object in the war?" My answer must be a very general
one. It is, that our object will continue to be, as it has hi-
therto been, the security of Turkey against Russia, and
therefore a securityfor the peace of Europe. I cannot believe
that if Russia were allowed, uncontrolled, to work her own
way towards the capital of the Turkish empire, making per-
haps small progress in 1855, the greater progress ten years
hence, and still further advance twenty years hence, that
the independence of Europe would be secure. (Hear, hear. )
Every one has seen—the incident has appeared lately in
one of the public journals—in a history written by an au-
thor of great genius, that when Napoleon was engaged
with the Emperor Alexander in considering this great
question he asked for a map, put his finger on Constanti-
nople, and, after some moments of meditation, exclaimed,
"Constantinople—no, it is the empire of the world." I
cannot remember upon what occasion it happened, but
I recollect hearing the Duke of Wellington saying that an
addition to the forces of Russia in the Baltic and the pos-
session of Constantinople, and consequently an entrance
into the Mediterranean, would make her too strong for the
rest of the world. (Hear, hear.) I believe it is not only
the recognised opinion of great men, but the general per-
vading sense of this country, that we should not allow
Russia to effect, either by a simulated peace or by open
war, the conquest of Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) You
may say that the terms we proposed were not effectual for
that object; but if'you say so you will blame us, not for
our ambition certainly, because we asked nothing of Rus-
sia—not for our harshness towards Russia, but for our
moderation, because we slid not ask for stronger terms and
more powerful guarantees. There are no doubt other
guarantees besides this of the limitation of her fleet, and
it has been said that the practical mode of carryingout the
basis of the third point must depend on the events of the
war, and could not be 'determined beforehand ; but we
were compelled, when we agreed to negotiate at all, to
specify the practical security which we meant to have.
That negotiation is over, and we must consider, according
to the events of the war, what security is necessary for the
protection of Turkey. (Cheers.) My right hon. friend
said the other day to my surprise, though, I am glad he
has not repeated it after my denial, that I meant to make
this a war of nationalities. I never uttered a word which
could bear any such interpretation. (Hear.) That I men-
tioned the name of Poland in my description of the power
of Russia is, quite true, but my object in doing so was to
show how necessary it was to obtain some security against
thefurther aggression of that gwt empire; and if any infe-
rence were to be drawn-from my observations, it would be
that the case of Poland was now so utterly hopeless that
it would be•madness in England and France to take any
part in promoting resistance) in that country. (Hear.)
But be that as it may, never intending any war of na-
tionalities, and never having said anything of the kind, I
still do think it-will be necessary to obtain some material
guarantee against the aggression of Russia. So far as these
four points provided a security for Europe, I think we should
make them our object. It is an advantage that Russia
should be compelled not to renew again those treaties with'
Turkey .which bind Turkey.in chains from which it is de-
sirable she should be freed. It is of importance that the
navigation of the Danube should be free—it is-of import-
ance that the Sultan should give privileges to his subjects,
so that his Christian subjects may be attached to him and
may bo ready to defend the Turkish empire against an
enemy. My right hon. friend has said that it was the care
of statesmen to provide for the security of Turkey. Now
it has been the view of English and French statesmen, and
it was certainly the view of the Austrian statesmen who
presided at the councils of the Emperor of Austria and
who have presided at them, that there is no reason why
Turkey should not be maintained, and why her independ-
ence and integrity should nut continue to exist. That is
the language I heard from Prince Metternich and from
Count Baol. They both repudiated the doctrine of the
Emperor Nicholas that Turkey must fall, and that some
provision should be made for the succession. Austria, in
these negotiations, has been sincerely endeavouring to pro-
vide with us security against the aggressive designs of
Russia. Everything I saw at Vienna induced me to be-
lieve that, averse as Austria was to war, she was at the
same time most sincerely desirous with us to obtain the
objems which we desired, (Cheers.) The position of
Austria, having so many enemies in Germany, is very cri-
tical, and much as I wish the present war to be brought
to a speedy conclusion—much as I desire Austria to take
part with the Allies—l should sincerely lament anything
being done to weaken the power of Austria in the great
European system. Belonging to the centre of Europe, hav-
ing frequently taken part in great wars with the view of
maintaining the balance of power in Europe, I believe that
her existence is of the greatest value to Europe, and that
other powers, ourselves among the rest, are hampered by
the policy of Austria, who wishes to maintain peace and
assist in the balance of power in Eiirope. Oar object, there-
fore, in continuing this war will be to maintain the same
views. The meansimustvary according to the events of the
war, and I think it would be idle, and ridiculous, and pre-
sumptuous, to point out now what are the terms of peace
which the English Government, in conjunction with her ally,
would think it necessary to demand. But this point, I think,
has been secured, even by these abortive negotiations—that
from this time forward Turkey will be considred one of the '
powers of Europe, forming part of the system of the balance
of power ; that her internal regulations will be allowed to her;
that her independence and integrity will be recognised ; and
that thereby, partly from events of the war, and partly by
negotiations, we have really at the present moment already
attained very great and material advantages. That we have
not obtained those advantages which should make Turkey se-
cure I am forced to admit, and I do not think we are likely
to make peace until we have obtained terms of peace that will
be safe to Turkey. Be it remembered always that we are seek-
ing for no object of our own—that when this peace is con-
cluded wo shall not have obtained an acre of territory the
more, or any advantage whatever for ourselves. It is for Tur-
key and for the general system of Europe that we are endea-
vouring to obtain security. And now a few words with respect
to the particular state of this question. We seem to me, having
begun the debate on the motion of the light hon. gentleman
opposite, because the Whitsuntide holidays were coming and
the conferences were not closed, to have arrived at a period
when, theWhitsuntide holidays being over and the conferences
being closed, these motions and amendments are not befitting
the present state of affairs. I think it would be far more regu-
lar if, when the Ministers of the Crown are able to bring down
the final Gloss of the conferences—those proposals which my
right hon. friend is so anxious to see, together with the de-
clarations made by her Majesty's plenipotentiary—l think we
should be proceeding in a far more regular course if, having
her Majesty's communication 913 the table, we were to address

her Majesty on the subject of the vigorous prosecution of the
war. (Hear, hear.) If other gentlemen, taking a different
view should like to move an amendment to that motion, with
the view of forcing the Government to an immediate re-
renewal of negotiations, of course it will rest with them to
do so. But, having spoken to my noble friend on the subject,
I know he is of opinion that such a course would be far more
regular, and more befitting the proceedings'of the house, than
th discussion of such motions as are now before it. Of course,
should the house choose to go on with with the discussion, it
is out of our power to prevent the house from taking that
course.; but it seems to us that the course I have suggested
would be more regular, and would lead the house to decide
aye or no whether it will continue to support the Government
in the course they are pursuing. (Cheers.)
Mr. ROEBUCK then moved the adjournment of the debate
until Thursday. _ _

Lord PALIIERSTON —Sir, I agree with my noble friend,
that, under the altered circumstances in which we at present
stand—that, seeing that the conferences have been "finally
closed, and that negotiations are at an end—that the course
which was suggested by the right hon. gentleman under diffe-
rent circumstances, when the negotiations had not terminated,
and when the conferences were not concluded, would now be
the simplest and plainest course. We are at present discuss-
ing a series of amendments, and many hon. gentlemen have
great difficulty in coming to a conclusion upon them. The
question which the house has a right to consider is, how the
Government has conducted these negotiations, and whether
the house, under the circumstances in which the country is
placed, is willing to give to her Majesty that assurance of sup-
port in the prosecution of the war which 'I think the house
will be disposed, by a great majority, to affirm. The course,
therefore, I propose would be to agree to the adjournment
proposed by the hon. and learned gentleman. We shall, in
the course of a day or two, receive the protocol of that con-
ference which took place yesterday. We shall then be in a
condition to advise her Majesty to submit to Parliament those
papers which will show the course of negotiation up to the
last moment, and then Parliament will be in a condition to
judge of the course which ought to be pursued. (Cheers.)
Mr. DISftAELI—Sir, the suggestion of the noble lord
appears to me to be very unsatisfactory. Moro than three
weeks ago I made a suggestion to the noble lord, he having,
by command of her Majesty, placed papers upon the table,
that he should follow the usual course of Minis ers in his po-
sition, and move an address to the Crown on the subject, so
that the house might have the opportunity of expressing an
opinion on the manner in which the affairs of the country had
been transacted, and also of expressing their determination
to support her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, if she
should think it necessary to carry it on. But how did the
noble lord receive the suggestion? First, in sileuce, and then,
when ho broke through his taciturnity, in a spirit of jocula-
rity and in a tone of levity. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord
has given no reason why the debate should not proceed. If
the noble lord had placed these papers on the table—which he
ought not to have done if the negotiations had not been con-
cluded—if he had said, while placing the papers on the table,
negotiations are going on, and it will probably be my duty
to place other papers on the table—nobody would have urged
the noble lord to take the step which I suggested, and I
should not have, made the motion which I thought it ray
duty to submit to the house. But the noble lord placed
the papers on the table, and it was legitimate and necessary
for the house to express its opinion on the conduct of the ne-
gotiations, and all that has occurred has occurred in conse-
quence of the conduct of the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) There
has been an attempt made to distinguish between the Mi -
sterial question and what has been called the other question.
I do not understand how the distinction is established. If we
discuss the policy of tl e Government, that is as much a Mi-
nisterial question as the one in which' we proposed to visit
the conduct of the. Administration with censure. Now, what
is the position in-which the house is placed ? We have be
us an amendment of an honourable member which the
noble lord has publicly said he shall support. That motion
i;1.1; reduces the main question of the negotiations that have
pra•.
• ved abortive at the conference, and whether we adopt the
first- .or second amendment, or both, the sense is the same. If
you o thivaccept the first amendment, to which the noble lord has
pledged himself, and oppose the second, which I gather it is the
intention of the Government to do, the only deduction that-can
be drawu is that, in consequence of Russia rejecting the prin-
ciple of thy' diminution of her naval force in the Black Sea,
we feel it our duty to announce to her Majesty that we are
ready to support her in the vigorous prosecution of the war,
the only infeTe nee being that all means of negotiation are
exhausted ; or whether we accept the second amendment,
the deduction is :the same and the inferepce is inevitable. The
question having been discussed for two nights, whether the
House of COMMO,IS will sanction as a sine qua non the propo-
sitions made by the noble lord in his character of plenipo-
tentiary, it is trifling with the house to say that the debate
is not to be brought .to its legitimate conclusion, and that
the opinion of the hons e is not to be taken on this legitimate
question. No papers which the noble lord can place upon
the table can affect the importance, or touch the paramount
interest of the question raised by the amendment of the hon.
member for Kidderminster, and I trust the house would not
stultify itself after the debate which had been carried on for
two nights, and after some of the most eminent members of
the house had given their opinion on the subject, and after
the minister had accepted the amendment .of the hon. mem-
ber for Kidderminster, upon which the whole question of the
conduct of the negotiations could be raised., by making the
debate a tabula rasa, merely because in a few days the noble
lord could lay on the table one more papor to complete the
history of negotiations admitted to have b eon abortive. I
trust the house will feel it due to its character to express a
distinct opinion whether the . limitation will:. respect to the
naval force of Russia in the Black Sea shall be a sine qua non
in a peace between the two countries.
Mr. BRIGHT quite agreed in the observations' of the right
hon. gentleman. The proposal made by the noble lord cer-
tainly seemed to him the most extraordinary he ever heard
even from the Ministerial bench, and that was saying a great
deal. (Laughter.) They had for the last two nights been
discussing, in overflowing houses, the question whether the
Government had acted for the true interests of tho coun-
try in laying it down at Vienna, as a sine qua non of peace,
that there should be a limitation of the naval force of itussia
in the Black Sea. That question was of ten thousand times
more importance than the convenience of a Ministry or the
existence of a Cabinet, and it was certainly a most extraordi-
nary proposition that now, because the Government had go t
into a sort of hocus pocus, into which it invited the house to
plunge itself—(laughter)—1 were to give up its further
discussion merely because the noble lord at the head of the
Government- always fertile in expedients, he might say eva-
sions—told them that at some future time he might lay on
the table semi further papers, and move an address. The
opinion of the house must be pronounced upon the proposi-
tion of the hon, member for Kidderminster. He hoped that
whatever might be the opinion of members with respect to
that proposition—whether they were for ruining the country
by prolonged hostilities—(" Oh, oh")—or for saving it by
peace—each would stand by his own opinions, and face out
his own convictions. The question was one which should
have the fullest and freest discussion of which a question was
capable.

Mr. LABOUCHERE supported ,the motion for the adjourn-
ment of the debate, believing after what had fallen from the
noble lord with respect to the production of papers, that on
Thursday next the house would have the whole circumstances
of the case more fully before them, and would thus be better
able to give to the country, that clear expression of their
opinion which it was desirable should emanate from them.

Mr. LOWE said that if the hou. member for Manchester
was in danger of being bullied, as he seemed to apprehend, he
(Mr. Lowe) feared that ho was in. some danger of being cir-
cumvented. The noble lord having expressed an opinion in
favour of the first part of his proposition, he certainly felt so
much encouraged thereby that be felt disposed to persevere in
pressing it upon the attention of the house. He was advised
by the noble lord to withdraw his amendment that he might
move an address in favour of the vigorous prosecution of the
war; in other words, that the noble lord might get rid of it.
(Hear.) He could not consent to do so as the matter then
stood. He believed that the proceedings of the conference at
Vienna were a fitting subject for discussion in the house, and
unless he had an assurance from the Government, that in the
address they intended to move that question should be raised
so that it might be debated, he should press his amendment.
(Question, question.)
.It was then agreed that the debate, should be adjourned to
Thursday next.

JURISDICTION OF THE STANNARY COURT
AMENDMENT BILL.
This bill passed through committee.
REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS, &c. (SCOTLAND) BILL.
The Lords' amendments to•this bill were considered, and
agreed to.