The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-19 00:00:00

OPERATIONS IN THE C RIMEA.

The main test of ability and the best 1 sledge of success
in the art of war might be defined to be the power of
employing military resources to the best- aC.vantage. We
read the memorable story of General Tt io naparte's first
Italian campaigns, and of the still. more astonishing
struggle of the Emperor Napoleon in 1 814 against the
hosts of a European coalition, with a far deeper interest
than we find in the movements of the overgrown legions
of the Grande Arrae in its march to Mos,to w. The Duke
of Wellington in the Peninsula prolonging the resistance
of Spanish patriots at the head-of .40;00 British troops
nainst the enormously superior armies of the French
Marshals affords us one of the grandest in ilitary lessons
in history, for it terichesus that victory s le.es not always
follow the " big battalions," when genius. and resolution
are on the other side. In other words, r:on army of com-
paratively small numbers, commanded b y a general who
is thoroughly master of his Weapons, :in d prepared to
obtain from that army the best services fit can perform,
is far more formidable to an enem: r than a more
numerous array of combatants labor ring with the
difficulties of a divided command, and :not vigorously.
directed to a common object. It is. a d Moult thing to--
command 30,000 men with real judgme int, but it is far
inure difficult to command 109,000 meo, so as to bring
every part of that vast and mirriplicat sel machine into
uniform and simultaneous action,. to place every branch
of the service and every man of the for: in the most
suitable position, and to be the central a id motive power
of so great a tuultitude. Yet, without.: this power of
command, which gives the strength of 1.60,000 arms to
the will of a single man, it. is-impossible Ito carry on war
with success, and the greatest sacrifices will be made in
vain.
These reflections are naturally suggest ed to us by the
present position and past achievement s of the allied
armies in the Crimea. In engaging in t hat great expe-•
.dition the Governments of England and . France traced
out the political plan of the campaign, fc r which they
hold themselves, and. must ever rem:
.responsible.
They selected the officers whom they th ought best qua-
lified in their respective services to con duct the opera-
tions, and, although a very large proport ion of these gal-
lant veterans have broken down in heals ;h or froin other
causes, it cannot be affirmed that any of her choice was
possible at the outset of the war. The se commanders
were furnished with what were supposed to be ample re-
sources, and, although the first estimate of the duty to
be performed was far below thesmark, th e deficiencieiof
the armies have since been supplied wit ;h unparalleled
profusion. The immense numbers of efficient troops
which have been conveyed to the Crimes i, and are still
on their way thither—the enormous sieg: m trains of both
armies, 'which have been three or four times renewed
—the incalculable consumption and su ippiy of muni-
tions of war—the unceasing conveyancm 5 of all that is
necessary for the sustenance of such vast armies—
and, above all, the magnitude of the s team transport
service by which these prodigies have linen effected,
all concur to render the Crimean expe &Awn one of
the greatest undertakings in history, and the two most
powerful nations of the world have spa red nothing to
insure its success. Having provided then s extraordinary
resources, the allied Governments wisely I: ift them almost
absolutely and entirely at the disposal of: the Generals
on the Spot, and upon them the strategics I:responsibility
of the campaign devolves ; but, with the utmost desire
to put a favourable construction on the r otions and in-
tentions of men whose devotion to the i ;entice of their
respective Countries is beyond all doubt, we confess our
inability to discover indicationsof a well-c cnceived gene-
ral plan of operations on a scale commens az ate with the
amount of the forces under their orders.
General Pelissier has directed his whole energy since

he assumed the chief command of the French army to
the prosecution of the siege. He succeeded on the 7th of
June in the occupation of the Mamelon ; he then con-
ceiltrated all his force on the Malakhoff w nese, leaving
the Roden to the English, and desisting tuitirely from
the left attack. We have no doubt that, tie far as the
siege is concerned, this course of action is the most
rational, and the last telegraphic despatch shows that
the French have advanced their ambuscades to the glans
of the Malakhoff Tower. But these are open atsions which'
can be carried on by 50,000 or 60,000 men as rapidly
and effectually as by a far greater number. In fact, the
number of men who can be engaged in the siege of a
single point is limited by the extent of the works, and,
provided the reliefs are sufficiently frequent, -nothing is
gained by any amount of troops beyond those ac-
tually engaged. The advantage to be de rived' from
large additional forces or reserves consists in the pos-
sibility of extending the operations of the invading
army, by selecting fresh points of attack, by making
diversions, and by endeavouring to cut off the commu-
nications of the enemy. In the present case this power
is vastly increased by the naval resources at the com-
mand of the Generals, for, as the expedition to Kertch
proved, it is in their power at any moment to throw a
corps of from 15,000 to 30,000 men on any point where
the enemy may be least prepared to receive them, and
this while the Russians are wholly destitute of similar
facilities of locomtion. A very superficial acquaintance
with the subject suffices to point out an infinite number
of partial enterprises of this nature, but of these only
one has been attempted, and, although the attack on
Kertch and the Sea of Azoff was highly successful, we
know that it was not undertaken without infinite hesi-
tation and delay, and it has not been repeated. All this
time, it must be observed, that the Sardinian army,
which landed in the Crimea about two months ago in
the highest state of efficiency, has not once been seriously
engaged with the enemy, athough it has suffered
severely from cholera and inaction. The operationg of
the Turks have also been confined to a reconnaissance ,by
Omer Pasha in the mountains behind Balaklava and the'
occupation of Yenikale, and the main body have now
returned to their old quarters behind Balaklava. Eupa-
toria is admitted to be a strategical point of great impor-
tance ; it has defied the attempts of the Russians to re-
capture it, but it has not at present been used for any
offensive purpose. It is probably true that the hilly
region between Balaklavaand Baksbi-Serai presents con
siderable obstacles to the passage of troops, and that the
Russians have made the most of their superior know-
ledge of the country. Yet we must question whether
some twenty miles of a district resembling Derby-
shire or the Welsh hills can present an impassable
barrier to men who have ere this forced the
Hindoo ghauts and the gorges of the Atlas. At
any rate, the whole western coast of the Crimea
is quite open to attack, and an army advancing be-
tween the Alma and the Katcha, or between the
Katcha and the Belbek, would have a supply of water
and a wooded country to cover each of its flanks.
Or, if these enterprises appear too hazardous for the
army, it would znot be impossible to find more active
employment for the fleet. Nothing has been attempted
against. Odessa, or the forts of Kimbourn and Oezalsow,
which guard the entrance to the bay of Cherson, the
estuary into which the Dnieper and the Bug discharge
their waters. This spot is well known to be one of the
principal depots of military and naval stores of the Rus-
sian empire, and of provisions for the army ; and,
although we do not know how far it is possible to ap-
proach Cherson and Nicolaieff, we cannot but think
that the seamen who found their way within gunshot of
aatrieemnapltse.d;g,st•ehnoutghhe IreuAthdomfirtahles Danubehaven o
v a has not been
Taganrog would pilot a gunboat near enough
fltootitilhaosoef
passingfubtthat
gunvvbeoahtsavcaepnaobledoo
valid objections
hheerbeara.re .
against some of these operations, though we b..-slieve that
none is so desperate or hopeless that it might not be
tried. But we throw out these suggestions from the
conviction that the worst policy we can adopt is that
of inaction. Already we fear- -that the most favour-
able season for a campaign in the Crimea, when the
herbage still affords food to the animals of the army,
has passed away. August is probably the least available
month of the summer for such a purpose, and, although
the sanitary condition of the army is wonderfully
good, the fall of the year and the fruit season are
always dangerous in these climates. MOreover, it is
evident that the Russians, relieved in great measure
from the necessity of maintaining a large force on
the frontier of Germany, are collecting troops in
the Governments of Podolia and Cherson for an
autumnal campaign in the Crimea. The extraordinary
qmeicence of their forces in the interior for many
months past is an unexpected piece of good fortune, but
it was the interest of the allied armies to avail themselves
of it ; else why were the French reserves hurried off by
orders from Paris nearly two months ago, and why
were the Sardinians brought into the field ? We make
these remarks in no spirit of censure or animadversion
on any one. Indeed it is impossible to ascertain, if
there be any blame, where it ought to rest. But, we
repeat, success is not to be looked for without a plan of
operations proportioned to the magnitude of our military
and naval resources ; and such a plan must be executed
by a mind capable of embracing and directing the whole.
Nobody can make war piecemeal ; and, though we may
have that amount of success which we shall always owe
to the valour of English and French troops, yet higher
military qualities than even valour are required before
we can command victory or secure peace.—Times.

The twelvemonth's notice requisite in such cases was
issued yesterday from the India House, of a resolution
of the Court of Directors to lower the rate of interest on
India Bonds from 4 per cent., at which it has stood since
the 24th of May, 1854, to 31 per cent. The reduction
will consequently date from the 21st of July, 1556. The
measure has been expected for some weeks, and is cal-
culated to act favourably upon the money market and
the shares of the guaranteed Indian railway lines.
Holders of the bonds agreeing to accept the reduction
must signify the same by the 21st of January next, or
they will be liable to be paid off.
REMARKABLE CASE OV ROBBERY AND SUICIDE.—
The Sun of yesterday contained a brief announcement
to the effect that the postmaster of Amsterdam, who had
been apprehended on Tuesday afternoon in that town,
charged with absconding with 8001., had hanged him-
self in the Bridewell soon after being taken into custody.
Yesterday (Wednesday) en inquest was held before the
borough coroner, at which the facts of the case trans-
pired. A day or two ago Jan Hanjik, postmaster at
Amsterdam, absconded from that town with Dutch
securities to the value of 8001. It seems that he pro-
ceeded direct to Liverpool, and on Monday succeeded in
cashing the bills at the office of Mr.Caffre, moneybroker,
in Waterloo-road, who, however, before giving him the
money, had made some inquiries at the office of the
Dutch Consul. On Monday evening the police authori-
ties at Liverpool received information of the robbery
from Amsterdam, with a description cf the absconding
paymaster, which led to his apprelleusion on Tuesdayiby
Inspector Murphy. of the detective depaetinent. He was
taken to Bridewell, and in the evening he was found slle-
pended by the neck from one of the bars of his cell,.and,
eltgough immediately cut down, life was extinct. A ver-
dict of felo de se was returned. The whole of the money
Wks been recovered.

OFFICIAL DESPATCH FROM THE

CR,I At EA.

( From a supplement to Tuesday's Gazette.)
WAR DEPARTMENT, JULY 18.

Lord Panmure has this day receired a despatch and
its enclosures, of which the following are copies, ad-
dresse-d to his Lordship by Lieutenant-General Simpson,
Commanding her Majesty's Forces in the East.

Before Sebastopol, July 7, 180.

My Lord,—l have the honour to acquaint your Lord-
ship that the retrains of our late lamented Commander-
in-Chief, Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, were removed
from Head-quarters to Kazatch Bay, on Tuesday the 3d
inst., and placed on board her Majesty's ship Caradoe,
which departed for England that same evening.
Nothing could he more imposing than the whole line
of this melancholy prccession. The day was fine, and
the appearance of the allied troops splendid ; as many
as could be spared from duty in the trenches, and
with safety to their camp; were collected, and the
procession moved from 'the door of this house exactly
at four .o'clock p.m., in the following order :
In the court-yard of the house was stationed a guard
of honour of one hundred men of the Grenadier Guards,
with their drums and regimental colours ; fifty men,
with one field officer, one captain, and one subaltern,
from-the Royal Sappers and Miners and from each regi-
ment, lined the road from the British to the French
bead-quarters, a distance of about a mile ; a squadron
of cavalry was stationed on the right of the line, two
batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry on the
left of it ; the infantry were commanded by Major-
General Eyre, C.B.
The road from the French head-quarters to Kazatch
Bay was lined throughout the whole way by the infan-
try of the French Imperial Guard, and of the Ist corps ;
bands were stationed at intervals and played as the pro-
cession passed, and field batteries (French) at intervals,
on the high grounds right and left of the road, fired mi-
nute guns.
The procession to escort the body was as follows :
Two squadrons British Cavalry (12th Lancers.)
Two squadrons Piedmontese Light Cavalry.
Four squadrons French Chasseurs d'Afrique (Ist and
4th Regiments).
Four squadrons French Cuirassiers (2d and 9th Regi-
ments).
Two troops French Horse Artillery.
Major I;randling's troop Horse Artillery. •
The coffin, covered with a black pall, fringed with
white silk, and the Union Jack, and surmounted by the
late Field-Marshal's cocked hat and sword, and a gar-
land of " Immortels," placed there by General Pelissier,
was carried on a platform, fixed upon a 9-pounder gun,
drawn by horses of Captain Thomas's troop Royal Horse
Artillery.
At the wheels of the gun-carriage rode Gen. Pelissier,
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, His Highness
Omer Pacha, Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army,
Gen. de La Marmora, Commander-in-Chief of the Sar-
dinian Army, and Lieutenant-Gereral Simpson, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the English Army.
Charger of the late Field-Marshal, led by two mounted
orderlies.

Relations and Personal Staff of the late Field-Mar-
shal.

Generals and other officers of the French, Sardinian,
and Turkish armies—a large number of whom attended.
British Commissioners to Foreign armies.

British General officers and their Staffs.

Stiff of Head-quarters.
One officer of each regiment of Cavalry and Infantry,
Royal Sappers and Miners, and Land Transport
Corps ; two from the Naval Brigade, Royal Marines,
Medical and Commissariat Staff, and three from the
Royal Artillery.
Personal escorts of the Allied Commanders-in• Chief.
The personal escort of the late Field-Marshal (Captain
Chetwode's troop of the Bth Hussars).
A field battery of the Royal Artillery.
Two squadrons of British Cavalry (4th Dragoon
Guards);
Detachment of Mounted Staff Corps.
The escort was under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Dupuis, Royal Horse Artillery.
Two field batteries of the Royal Artillery, stationed
on the hill opposite the house, fired a salute of nineteen
guns, when the procession moved off.
The united bands of the 3d, 9th, and 62d Regiments,
stationed in the vineyard that surrounds the house,
played the Dead March.
The band of the Sardinian Grenadiers was stationed
half way to the French Head-quarters, and the band of
the 10th Hussars on the left of the line.

The approach to the wharf at Kazatch Bay was lined
by detachments of the Royal Marines and sailors.
The body was received on the wharf by Admiral Bruat
and Rear-Admiral Stewart, C. 8., and a large number of
officers of the combined fleets. The launch of the Bri-
tish flag-ship, towed by man-of-war boats, conveyed the
coffin to the Caradoc, the boats of the combined fleets
forming an escort ; and the troop and battery of the
Royal Artillery included in the escort, formed upon the
rising ground above the bay, and fired a salute of 19
guns as the coffin left the shore.
Everything was well conducted, and no accident oc-
curred.

Thus terminated the last honours that could be paid
by his troops to their'beloved commander. His loss to
us here is inexpressible ; and will, I am sure, be equally
felt by his country at home. The sympathy of our
Allies is universal and sincere. His name ,and memory
are all that remain to animate us in the difficulties and
dangers to which we may be called.
I have, &c.,
JAMES SIMPSON,
Lientenant-General Commanding.
_ _ _

The Lord Panmure, &c., &c.
P.S.—I enclose the lists of casualties to the sth inst.

Enclosure 1.

NOMINAL RETURN OF CASUALTIES FROM THE
2ND TO THE STO OF JULY, 1855, INCLUSIVE.
3d Battalion, Grenadier Guards-2 sergeants, 9 rank and
file wounded.
Ist Battalion, Scots Fusilier Guards-1 rank and file
killed; 3 rank and file wounded.
Ist Battalion, Ist Regiment of Foot-2 rank and file
wounded.
3d Foot-1 rink and file killed; 1 officer, 1 drummer, 4
rank and file wounded.
9th Foot-7 rank and file wounded.
34th Foot —1 rank and file wounded.
17th Foot-3 rank and file wounded.
18th Foot-1 rank and file wounded.
23d Foot-1 rank and file wounded.
30th Foot —1 rank and file wounded.
31st Foot-1 drummer, 2 rank and file wounded.
33d Foot-1 rank and file killed.
34th Foot-1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, wounded.
38th Foot-1 officer, 1 rank and file, wounded.
39th Foot-1 rank and file wounded.
41st Foot-4 rank and file wounded.
42d Foot-1 rank and file killed ; 3 rankand file wounded. i
44th Foot-2 rank and file wounded.
47th Foot-1 rank and file killed ; 2 rank and file wounded.
68th Foot-3 rank and filo wounded.
72d Foot-1 lank and file killed ; 4 rank and file wounded.
77th Foot-6 rank and file wounded.
79th Foot-3 rank and file wounded.
88th Foot-1 rank and file killed ; 6 rank and filo wounded.
. 89th Foot-4 rank and file wounded.
90th Foot-3 rank and file wounded.
93d Foot-1 rank and filo killed ; 1 piper, 4 rank and file,
wounded.
95th Foot-1 rank and file wounded.
let Battalion Rifle Brigade-1 rank and file wounded.
2d Battalion Rifle Brigade-3 rank and file killed; 13 rank
and file wounded.
Royal Artillery-1 officer killed.
Royal Sappers and Miners-2 rank and file wounded.
Total-1 officer, 11 rank and file, killed ; 2 officers, 3
sergeants, 2 drummers, 1 piper, 102 rank and file,
wounded. _ _

W. L. PAKENHAM, Lieut.-Colonel,
Acting-Adjutant-General.

Enclosure 2.

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICFRS WHO HAVE
BEEN KILLED FROM THE 2D TO THE sni
JULY, INCLUSIVE__

KILLED.
JULY 5.
Royal Artillery—Captain A. Gordon.
W. L. PAKENHA3I, Lieut.-Colonel,
Acting-Adjutant-General.

(Enclosure 3.)
NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE
BEEN WOUNDED FROM THE 2D TO THE 5TD..1
OF JULY, INCLUSIVE.
WOUNDED.
JULY 2.
38th Foot—Lieutenant C. A. S. Dickins, severely.

JULY 3.
3d Foot—Captain C. Hood, slightly.
W. L. PAKENHAM, Lieut.-Colonel,
Acting-Adjutant-General.

Enclosure 4.

NOMINAL RETURN OF NON-COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS AND PRIVATES KILLED FROM
THE 2D TO THE STH JULY, 1855, INCLUSIVE.

KILLED.
JULY 3.
3d Foot—Private John Neil.
47th Foot—Private William Bransfield.
2cl Battalion—Rifle Brigade—Privates John Bates, James
Martin, and William Mitchell.