The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

No. 17.

•
COUNT BUOL TO. COUNT COLLOREDO.—(COMMUNICATED TO THE
EARL OF CLARENDON BY COUNT COLLOREDO .
Vienna,) May 20, 1855.
Comte—Lord Westmoreland' has obeyed the orders
Court in reading to me a despateh which Lord Claren-
odfonhis addressed to him on the Bth instant, and in which was
enclosed another 'despatch that his lordship had written to
Lord Cowley, dated the sth inst.
It is wit documents, of sincere regret that we have observed
from these of the contents of • which your Excel-
lency's report of the Bth instant had already made us cogni-
sant, that the Government of her Britannic Majesty has not
thought it possible to agree to our final propositions, whose
aim was to obtain the development of the third guarantee.
Lord Clarendon having made the remark that the details of
these propositions, as fully explained in my despatch of the
13th of April, and which your Excellency read to his lord-
ship, had never reached him in a formal shape, we hold to
proving that M. Drouyn de ?Buys, who, on his arrival, here,
after having had an interview with the Ministers of her
Britannia Majesty, was the interpreter to us of the opi-
nion common to both Cabinets, undertook also when he
left us to explain both to his own Government and -to that
of Great Britain ow project of an ultimatum' the result,
moreover, of confidential deliberations, in which that states-
man, as well as Lord J. Russell, bad constantly taken part.
With the view of not anticipating the report of this
Minister of her Britannic Majesty, nor the overtures which
we knew were to reach London from Paris, we refrained
from communicating directly to the Cabinet of St. James's
the definitive summary of our propositions, copies of which
I transmit herewith. These propositions, of which the first
comprises five Articles, and the second six, would have been
presented under the form of an ultimatum for the choice
of Russia. You will also find herewith enclosed a copy of a
project of treaty between Austria, France, and Great
Britain, which was intended to serve as a complement to
our plan, and which fixed as a cams belli every aggresion on
the part of Russia of such a nature as to endanger the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
as well as the excessive increase of the naval forces of Russia
in the Euxine.
Lord Clarendon does not attach much practical value to
this latter stipulation, since he says Austria has already de-
clared that she could net admit that the question of peace
or war should turn upon eight or ten ships. But we
may be permitted to remind his lordship of the immense
difference that exists between our attitude in the actual
state of affaairs, while we are still free to determine as to
the question of war, and the contrary position in which
we should be placed were the case of war once clearly defined
and stipulated by treaty. In this contingency no one can
doubt that Austria would scrupulously act up to the engage-
ments she contracted.
Lord Clarendon is of opinion that the time has arrived for
Great Britain and France to invite Austria to concert with
them, in pursuance of her engagements, upon the measures
for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d December.
Here, however, and first in order, the question presents
itself, what is the object of the alliance'. It is none other
than the re-establishment of peace upon the basis of the four
common principles. The first two of these principles have
already obtained a complete development in the Peace Con-
ferences. As to the third, we have proposed to our allies, at
the same time binding ourselves, in case of need, to support
it by force of arms, a solution which it is our firm conviction
would be effectual, complete, and agreeable to European in-
terests.
I cannot do better, M. le Comte, in order to make you ac-
quainted with all the reasons that we have to bring forward
to strengthen this view of the question, than to transmit to
you herewith copies of the communications which I have
made to Baron Hubner upon this matter, and which you will
have the goodness also- to place before Lord Clarendon.
If Russia, being placed in a position to agree to one or
other of these propositions of the ultimatum, had rejected
both of them, we should then have had proof that she
will decidedly not give her assistance to the complete
realisation of the third guarantee, in so far as its object
is to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea.
It being impossible, therefore, to do else than consider as ex-
hausted the means of conciliation for bringing about such a
peace as the interests of Europe, and our own in particular,
require, the Emperor, our august master, decided to have re-
course to arms as a means of obtaining this pease, the want
of which is so generally felt, and which would miscarry
under the resistance of one Power alone. On the other hand,
so long as an absence of assistance on the part of our allies
puts obstacles in the way of this last and decisive proof, our
impartial estimation does not allow us to make the responsi-
bility of the failure of the negotiations fall exclusively upon
Russia.
We are most antious that the remarks made in this and
the annexed despatch should be of a nature to modify the
impression that our plan in the first instance has produced
upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty.
If, however, despite our wishes, such were not the case, we
could only earnestly desire that the chances of war, to which
our allies have determined to leave the task of effecting the
cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, may
soon take such a turn as to attain this end in a manner that
would appear to them more on a par with their sacrifices than
the solution that we have proposed to them.
To insist upon an international engagement, imposing
upon Russia terms for the permanent limitation of her
naval forces in the Black Sea, is—and we are far from not
recognizing it—a right that belongs to the belligerents, since
they have especially reserved to themselves the power of im-
posing, over and above the four guarantees, such particular
conditions as the continuance of hostilities might render ne-
cessary. But we maintain that this mode of solution,
brought forward absolutely and to the exclusion of every
other method, were it equally efficacious, cannot authorise
out allies to appeal, as regards us, to the stipulations of
treaty of the 2d of December, and can only be included
among such conditions of peace as are alluded to above,
and which the protocol of the 28th of December, when
defining the third guarantee, makes expressly to depend ou
the events of the war.
Faithful to our engagements, and attaching, moreover,
the greatest value to the ties that unite us to England, we
shall firmly maintain our present policy, and await the turn
that events may take, and the propitious moment for re-
newing negotiations for peace, in which we will not, under
any circumstances, take part, except with an unchangeable
determination that they shall lead to a positive and efficacious
development of the four guarantees.
The language which we propose to hold to Russia, and
which, when held, we will faithfully make known to the
Government of her Britannic Majesty, will be conceived in
the same spirit.
Your Excellency is instructed to read this despatch and
its
annexes to Lord Clarendon, and to give him a copy of
them.

PROPOSITIONS.

FIRST PROPOSITION.

Receive, &c.,
BUOL,

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties being desirous that
the Sublime Porte shouldesta established
in the advantages of the
good understanding
engage
fagNe attoions
among the various States of Europe, h
stehveerLaallwy
re-
spect the independence andterritorial integrity of the Otto-
man Empire, guarantee in common
the strict observance of this
engagement, and will in consequencevery event which would be ofanatur consider every act and
e
question of European interest. If aeto endanger it as a
difference should arise
between the Porte and one of the Cent
two States, before resorting to arms, should
Powers, those
Powers in a position to obviate this contingencyaplace the other
by pacific
means.
Art. 2. The Russian Plenipotentiaries and those
Sublime Porte will propose in common to the Conference ofthe
the equal effective force of the naval armaments which the
two sea-bordering Powers will maintain in the Black Sea, and
which must not exceed the amount of Russian vessels at pre-
sent afloat in that sea.
The arrangement which they shall have made in this re-
spect shall form an integral part of the General Treaty.
There shall also be inserted in the Treaty the measures
which the said Plenipotentiaries shall have agreed to, with a
view to enforce the precise and constant observance of the
stipulations of the present Article.
Art. 3. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty
of July 13, 1841, shall remain in force, with the exceptions
specified in the following Articles.
Art. 4. Each of the Contracting Powers which has no es-
tablishment in the Black Sea will be authorised by a firman
from his Highness to send into and station in that sea two
frigates or vessels of smaller force.
Art. 5. In the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan
being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the
right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of his
allies.

SECOND PROPOSITION.
Article 1. The Hih Contracting Powers being desirous
that the Sublime Porte should participate in the advantages
of the good understanding established by the Law of Na-
tions among the various States of Europe, severally engage
to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, guarantee in common the strict observance
of this engagement, and will, in consequence, consider every
act and every event which would be of a nature to endan-
ger it as a question of European interest. If a difference
should arise between the Porte and one of the Contracting
Powers, those two States, before resorting to arms, should
Place the other Powers in a position to obviate this contin-
gency by pacific means.
Art. 2. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty
of
spec ifie July d
in the 13, 184 following Articles 1, snail ntii?ue in force, with the exceptions
:
Art. 3. Each of the Contracting Powers which has no
establishment in the Black Sea, will be authorized by a fir-
man from his his Highness to send into the station in it two
frigates or vessels of smaller force, in order to protect their
commerce, and to exercise the necessary inspection. •
Art. 4. If Russia should increase the amount of her naval
forces at present afloat, as duly defined, the contracting
Powers who do not possess an establishment in the Black Sea
would be authorised by a firman of his Highness, by giving a
previous warning of five days, to send respectively into that
sea an additional number of vessels of the same class, equal
to one-half of the naval forces of Russia.
Art. 5. At no time will ships of war of foreign nations be
allowed to anchor in the Golden Horn, with the exception
of the small vessels hitherto admitted belonging to the
Embassies ; and in time of peace the number of ships of the
line of the Contracting Powers which have no establishments
in the Black Sea, must never exceed four at a time before
Constantinople, on their way from the Dardanelles to the
Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles.
Art. 6. In the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan
being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the

right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of the
Allies.
After the reading of the six Articles the Russian
Plenipotentiaries would be confidentially informed that, con-
sidering the reservation made by them in the interpretation
of the first article, which declines the engagement to enforce
the observance of the independence and territorial integrity
of the Ottoman Empire ; considering, moreover, their re-
fusal to agree to any limitation of the Russian forces in the
Black Sea ; Austria, France, and Great Britain, whilst re-
specting the sovereign rights of Russia, will avail themselves
of the same rights by agreeing among themselves by a formal
document-
-1 st. To enforce the• observance of the principle established
in the Ist article, in the event of the violation of the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by
Russia.
2clly. To consider as a cases belli the increase of the
amount or strength of the Russian naval force in the Black
Sea as regards its effective force at the beginning of the war.
If Russia should herself engage not to exceed that number,
the three Powers would consent not to give publicity to the
Convention.