The Sun.
London, England, 1855-10-25 00:00:00

tions, as they certainly are.
" Passing over the lengthened delays, of which we
cannot receive a satisfactory account, his division of his
force on the Ist of July appears singularly injudicious.
While denying most strongly that he had sufficient evi-
dence to prove that the enemy had go.. beyond his reach
from his position in Jonquiere Bay, it may he admitted,
for the sake of illustration, that they had effected their
escape by passing to the southward of all the squadron
and going down the Gulf of Tartary. Such a case being
presupposed, the probabilities are to be calculated on.
We take them to be as follows :—The probable time of
the enemy's escape from Castries Bay was the 27th of
May. Strong southerly gales were experienced by the
Bittern in the Gulf of Tartary during this time and till
the 6th or 7th of June. The Russians could therefore
have barely had time to beat 400 miles south and pass
through the Straits of La Perouse before the arrival of
the Winchester and consort in thatnarrow passage. Is
it likely they would continue to beat to the southward
after getting out of the supposed cul•de-sac in which
they had placed themselves ? Or would they not at once
take advantage of a fair wind and run to the strongest
of their settlements to leeward—that is, somewhere in
the Sea of Okhotsk ? The latter must strike every one
as the most obvious and judicious course for them to
pursue ; and it must be epually evident that a force far
superior to their known strength was requisite to destroy
them when supported by land batteries, or to cut them
out when placed in a harbour protected by natural or
artificial bars and shallows. Nevertheless we find the
Admiral reducing his force by the withdrawal of the
Winchester, 50, and Bittern, 12, and despatching
a squadron, under his second in command, num-
bering only 160 guns and 1,400 men, while he
is (or should be) perfectly aware that the Russians
have efficient land defences for all their settlements, and
at Ayan are said to muster about 5,000 soldiers. Ad-
miral Stirling's reasons for proceeding to the southward
in person may, in like manner, be specu.atad. He may
have considered that where the Admiralty had thought
so young a.captain as Elliot of the Sybille worthy of a
commodore's rank it was his place to assign him the post
of honour and danger. But why, then, withdraw the
Winchester, the most powerful ship of the station ? If
all flag-ships are merely Admiral's floating houses, to
accompany them as the shell does the snail, then the
sooner these officers shift their flags into steam-yachts
the better, for surely it is a needless expense converting
the heaviest ship of the fleet into an Admiralty-house.
He may have thought his presence demanded in China,
but this is an idle supposition, for it may be safely as-
serted that he will not bestow much, if any, of his time
there till the hot season is over—that is, about October.
Lastly, he may have considered that the enemy had
really gone to the south, and that he was taking the post
of danger ; if so, he wilfully risked his two vessels in a
most unjustifiable manner. It is believed, however,
that the Admiral's kuighterrantry (supposing
that he
ever had so mercurial a spirit) has, at the age of 65 or
66, been so far expended as to deter him from seeking
so unequal a combat. All circumstantial evidence goes
to prove that he believed the enemy had got into the Sea
of Okhotsk ; and we have the facts vouched for that
what he thought the most probable scene of action was
committed to his second in command, and that with a
force much weaker than it might have been, and totally
inadequate to effect the destruction of even the squadron
seen, if the Russ placed himself in a sheltered position,
as he invariably has been found to do.