The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-30 00:00:00

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Appoint a general to command the troops in
under the direction of the Minister, to undert
taut duty of watching over the discipline and
the troops at home and of preparing them for
when they were called upon. Let him be an .
train the troops in arms—not a Minister of War
his hands at the Horse Guards ; and as to duties of a different
description, which now belong to the Commander-in-Chief,
give them to a Minister of War—no matter what You call him
—transfer to him the duties belonging properly to a Minister
of War, and which now are performed by the Commander-hi-
Chief. Among those duties Ido not hesitate to say ruralist
include the patronage of the army. I know how strong lathe
prejudice which exists upon this subject ; I know how Many
persons believe that you cannot, without danger, place the
patronage of the army under the control of a member of the
civil Government. But let me just point out how the present
system works. Can any Minister be justly made responsible
for the conduct of a department if he is not allowed to choose
the instruments he employs—if he is not intrusted with the
means of rewarding those who do good and faithful service I
I would ask the noble earl the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether he would consent to be responsible for con-
ducting the foreign relations of this country if he had no voice
in the appointment of any member of the diplomatic body,
from the Attache up to the highest Minister acting under him
—if be had no means of advancing those who did well, or of
recalling those who did ill? (Hear) Would he consent to un-
dertake the management of oisr foreign relations upon these
terms ? I think I cannot be at a loss for his answer. But with
regard to the army, it is more particularly necessary that this
ffiUe
pthonin
power should be exercised by the person responsible for its
If therecien iseY one thing
morehat d
thanoes thatanother
u efficiencypon mainlywhich
i t
depend
depends
it is upon the manner in which the patronage is exercised
(hear)—upon the care taken to advance deserving officers,
and sternly refuse promotion to the incompetent. It is upon
the care and seal with which this is, done that it mainly
depends whether your army is efficient or the reverse. Let
me also observe that in every other department of the public
service you do trust the Minister of the Crown with patron-
age. I have already referred to the diplomatic service. The
naval service is the same, and throughout the whole of the
civil service the different branches are subject to the control
of her Majesty's Government. I don't deny that abuses
may be committed in this way. I should be the last to
deny that under every Government, and in every time,
Parliamentary interest and other improper motives have
influenced the appointments and promotions in the public
service. Such abuses, lam afraid, have existed, and while
human nature is what it is lam afraid they will exist. I
know no country, no form of Government in which they
have been avoided, and the greatest and most difficult problem
for the solution of a Government,_ is to secure the appoint-
ment of the right men to situations in the public service.
Upon the whole, however, admitting the abuses which have
taken place in the administration of patronage, I believe that
placing it under the control of the responsible Ministei of
the Crown is the best security you can obtain for the duo
discharge of this most important duty. I know that a com-
parison has sometimes been-drawn between the distribution
of patronage in idle navy and in the army. (Haar, hear.)
I should be prepared for answer to take issue upon that,as a
matter of fact. I deny that for the last 60'years the distribu-
tion of the patronage of the army under the existing system
has, upon the whole, been more pure than that of the navy.
The abuses may have been of a different character. I admit
that they have in some respects been of a different character.
But if you will go into detail and scrutinise appointments, I
will undertake to show you, that the public service hasiuf-
fered more in the army than it has In the navy during the last
60 years from injudicious appointments, -made from improper
motives. My lords, I cannot help stating that, even now,
at this moment, in the Crimea, judging by results; I cannot
believe that the patronage of the army has been exercised
with so much greater judgment and discretion than that of
the navy. (Hear, hear.) This I know—and I see a noble
lord here present who can confirm the truth of what I am
saying—that I know that there is in the army at this mo-
moment groat dissatisfaction at the recent promotions for ser-
vices—(cheers)—and lam told that it is the opinion of the
army—whether correctly or not I have not the means of
judging--that men who were not really under fire—(hear)—
at Inkerman, or Alma, or at Balaklava, and who have never
undergone all the perils and the hardships of the trenches—
that men of this kind have received the promotion which has
been denied to most meritorious regimental officers. (Hear.)
I know not whether that allegation be true, but I think it is
a pregnant example of the inconvenience of the existing sys-
tem that such an allegation and such complaints can be
made, and that no man in this house can distinctly say,
if the mistake has been made, who is responsible for it. Is
it the Secretary of State for War, or is it the Commander-
in-Chief ? I think it would be one of the great advan-
tages of the change I propose that in these matters any
future responsibility would be brought distinctly home to
one individual, and thus this great power of promotion,
upon the judicious use of which the whole efficiency of an
army depends, would be exercised under that check and
under that feeling of responsibility which would then be
created. (Hear, boar.) When touching upon promotion, I
cannot avoid mentioning one other subject. Look at the
medical staff and at the medical service. I believe there has
bean no branch of the service which has been so completely
withdrawn from the control of the civil Government of the
country as the army medical service ; and, I ask, do the pre-
sent state of that service, and the manner in which the duties
have been performed, justify you in believing that that pa-
tronage has been so much more judiciously exercised than
patronage in other branches of the service ? I say, then,
that you have failed in preventing those evils against which
the measure was directed, by withdrawing the patronage of
the army from the regular control of the country. But let
us see, in avoiding one class of evils, what others you have
encountered. In the first place, the management of the
army, the general responsibility for its efficiency, have neces-
sarily been thrown with the patronage, and the Commander-
in-Chief therefore has this power over 'the army. But you
have given it to him, as I have already shown, with a crippled
and. divided authority, an authority powerful for destroying but
powerless in action—strong to prevent the civil servants of the
Crown from acting'upon their own views in the management
of the army, but weak in enabling them to act on their own.
I have now touched upon the weakneis and uncertainty of
action which have distinguished our military arrangements,
but, my lords, surely every one will agree with me that even
in times of mace the manaveies-4 " —7`" ^"c"i'"'"
thost, ...portant of the functions discharged by the
executive Government of, the country ; and in time of war
the management of the army and navy are clearly the two
most important of the duties attached to the Government.
If this be true, and no one will, I think, deny thlt it is so, is
it either more or less than a palpable absurdity to say that,
while we have a Government responsible to the country and
to
gi trona ntwltihafotol re
branchthoe
tr control over generalothv eelri
public
beol
ifca
rpsmocl,yi yiechewhich e
ytgblioevyrednms may
military authorities, who shall enjoy a quasi independence in
say that at this moment you arc suffering from the effects
Which have been produced by that kind of independence
carrying
adopt,ya Parliament
given to the military authorities, and I make that statement
without hesitation, because I have pointed out the errors
which have prevented-the War Department from adequately
answering the expectations of the country. I have pointed
out the errors of administration which have rendered that
department less equal than it ought to be to discharge the
duties attached to it ; but I assert that those errors have
arisen from the want of sufficient power on the part of the
civil Government to introduce occasionally those improve-
ments which have been known to be necessary. I believe
that most of the Governments which have existed in this
country for many years havb been aware of the great,
the paramount importance of introducing various im-
provements into our system of military administration. I
can assert that such has been the case with all those Govern-
ments with which I have had the honour of being con-
nected, and I believe it to have been the case with most
other Governments which have of late years conducted the
ailitirs of this country. It is now nearly 20 years ago-since
I had the honour of accepting the office of Secretary at War,
and I can confidently state that I had discharged the duties
of that office for a very short period before I perceived a
necessity for the introduction of many great improvements,
but under the complicated system of the present administra-
tion so slow and weary was the work of effecting the changes
which I perceived to be necessary that, although I applied
my best energies to the task, and although I hope I was not
altogether unsuccessful in introducing home improvements,
still I retired from that office with a painful consciousness
that what had been done was a small part indeed of what re-
mained, to do. I believe that other Secretaries at War have
experienced the same feelings ; because I have perceived that
gentlemen who have successively held that office have endea-
voured to follow out a career of improvement, and. that yet all
that has been done falls far short of what is necessary. I am
persuaded that there never will nor can be any effectual cor-
rection of the evils which I have pointed out until you place
the management of the army, as all other branches of the
public service are placed, under the direct and immediate
control of some one office presided over by one of the respon-
sible advisers of the Crown. It is a great advantage of our
constitutional system that, in carrying on the public service
of the country, you secure the advantage of great experience
in the management of public affairs, and at the same time you
check a too great adherence to routine. You secure the ad-
vantage of experience, because there exists a vast body of
able and experienced men ; and those who hold office do so,
it may be said, upon good behaviour, and at the same time
you correct the tendency to routine which among such a body
of -men would be sure to arise by placing every branch of
the Government under some ono Minister of the. Crown,
who is responsible to Parliament and to the country for the
manner in which the duties of his department are per-
formed. Practically speaking, Ministers retain office for a
few years only, and by that means fresh minds are intro-
duced into the various departments of the State, and thus
there is great facility for the introduction of improvements
when they may be necessary. This is our system in the ad-
ministration of -all branches of the•public service, with the
exception of the army, and what is the consequence ? The
army has been under purely professional management, and
the administration of it has for a series of years been in-
trwtel to officers who have risen to high rank in their pro-
fes.ion, and who are, therefore, generally men advanced in
life, and on whom it is passing no reflection to say—what, in-
deed, may be said of all other professional men—that they
are indisposed to consent to any alteration in that system
under which they themselves have risen to distinction, and
which was in existence at the time when they entered the ser-
vice. But you place the administration of the army not only
under professional men and professional management, but
you add to that arrangement the difficulty that the. chiefs
of the profession have not their hands free to adopt
any measure which they may think necessary, but they
are checked at every turn by requiring the concurrence
of other departments; and, from the manner in which
the different offices are constituted, they have to
contend against the natural jealousy of the civil departments.
You see now, my lords, in the events in the Crimea the re-
sults of such a system. It is to mistakes committed before
the war began that it is to bo attributed that the army is
not in that state of efficiency and usefulness in which it ought
to be. But let me not be misunderstood when I say that the
army has not shown itself as efficient as it ought to be. Ido
not mean to deny its valour or its many great exeollene,
for lam as sensible of them as any of your lordships. No
man admires more than I do the heroic valour they have dis-
played in battle, and the still more heroic fortitude they have
displayed under privations almost incredible. I (Cheers.)No
the
man, I say, admires these excellences more than do, but
more I admire them so much the more do I desire to see the
administration of the army placed under a system of manage-
ment which will relieve it from those faults which I have long
foreseen would load to those unhappy consequences in which,
unfortunately, I bay" seldom found any officer_ of high
rank prepared to believe. (Hear, hear.)
My lords, I
say that I admire the valour and fortitude displayed by our
army, nor do I doubt that their efforts, in spite of those faults
to which I have adverted, might have been- attended with
success, had they been seconded by better arrangenients. The
errors which have been made are precisely in kind what I an-
ticipated when, in the debate on the Address last year, I ven-
tured to predict to your lordships that, unless some great
changes were made, we should not be many months engaged
in a groat war without meeting with calamitous results. I
made those observations a year ago, and, although I felt in
doing so that I was guided by reason, still I little believed that
the prediction would be so soon and so fearfully fulfilled. Er-
rors of the kind whichhave been committed I did expect; but
I must admit th it in degree those which have been committed
exceed anything that I could have believed possible. I think
that what has occurred must form the subject of a strict in-
quiry. There must have been some great faults committed

r PRICE SD.

Practical officers. Now, my lords, look at the advantage of
instruction of this kind, for your staff particularly. •In this
present campaign, is it net the general cry of every man, that
the want of the thorough instruction of your staff officers has
been one of the greatest difficulties which you have had to en-
counter. I think that that is true. In the French army we
know that no officer can serve on the staff until he had passed
a most severe examination as to his knowledge of every prac-
tical detail. In our army, unfortunately, that is not the
case. But there is another circumstance which has increased
the deficiency of your staff officers. It is this—more than
20 years ago a committee of the House of Commons pointed
out that it was very desirable that the same officers should
not be engaged for too long a continuance upon the staff; and
they recommended that staff officers should not be employed
for more than five years at a time ;
assigning as a reason, not
only that it would be more fair to all the army, but that it
would create a Class of educated staff officers who would be
very useful in the time of war. That was the recommenda-
tionoHow hfasa ciotmbmeetteeof
treated?
the Hlotusheaosf yearsrCemotamaineodnsfr2oom
to this a dead letter, and the recommendation has only lately
been repeated by that commission to which I before referred,
of which I had the honour to be a member last spring. I
might point out other instances; I might refer to the want
that ago.daY
of improvement in the clothing, in the arms, in the artillery
—to delays in adopting the latest scientific discoveries for
adding to the powers of these arms. But I abstain from
doing so. I think I have said enough to show your lord-
ships that, during a very long peace, our army was not
managed in such a manner as to fit it for the emergency of
war. I know it has been said, and upon high authority,
that this state of things has been produced by the niggardli-
ness of Parliament—(cheers)—that it is because we have not
kept up our establishments upon a sufficiently large scale
that these evils have arisen ; and I perceive, from the cheers
which have followed my mention of this, that some noble
lords are of that opinion. For my own part, 'I utterly deny
the correctness of such a statement. (Hear, hear.) In the
first place, the improvements I have pointed out would not'
have cost one single farthing—l mean to say, that every one
of those improvements to which I have alluded might have
been introduced with the most perfect facility without one
single shilling of expense. But more than that—l deny that
the House of Commons has shown that niggardliness which
has been imputed to it. (Hear.) For 19 years I had the
honour of being a member of that house, and I do not believe
that in the course of those 19 years I was ever absent when
military estimates were discussed. During four of those
years it was my duty to submit them to the House of Com-
mons,
and I will assert that in that time I never yet. saw a
single instance in which the House of Commons refused a
vote of money which was necessary for the real efficiency of
the service. (Hear, hear.) lamby no means sure that I
could say the reverse with equal confidence—that they had
never made giants with injudicious liberality. Well, I say,
then, there has not been this niggardliness which is so often
dwelt upon. Ido not, indeed, pretend to say that you have
kept up establishments during peace sufficient to enable you,
without large augmentations and without some time spent in
preparation, to enter upon an offensive war. Certainly not;
and I hope and trust that this country never will consent to
keep, up its peace establishments upon any such scale. (Hear.)
To do so would be to commit the greatest blunder which
could be imagined ; because, independently of the expense,
of the great drain upon the resources of the country, and of
preventing the real increase of power which the accumulation
of wealth in a kingdom creates,—independently of all this,
independently also of the great evils arising from the
jealousy which would be excited by such armaments in
foreign countries—the just and natural jealousy which
would exist in those countries upon finding that our arma-
ments were kept up on a scale sufficient at any time for offen-
sive preparations, which would drive them into a similar
course, and would leave both parties pretty much where they
were before—independently, I say, of all this, I assert that,
if you do keep up these establishments upon such a scate,
you will be in a worse situation at the b ginning of a war than
you actually dr2 now —you would be in a worse position for
this reason. You would have your army still more full than

it is of officers advanced in age and without ex,-.erience in
war ; and you. would have your arsenals and harbours filled
with arms, ships, and stores of obsolete pattern, and not em-
b )(lying all the improvements which modern science had sug-
ges',ed. I firmly believe already that it would have been
better far us if, on the'brealiing out of this war, we had been
thrown to a greater extent upon the resources whichwe could
create at the time, and if we had trusted less to thoso relics
of a former war which were then in existence. I say, there-
fore, that over economy does not account for these evils. They
arise from a very different source. Let me remind you how
very large have been the grants which Parliament has made
for the support of our military and naval establishments
during peace. By a return which was laid upon the table of
the house last session, it appears that the total money spent
upon our army, ordnance, and navy during the 17 years end-
ing in 1853 was no less than 217,000,0001. 15,500,0001. an-
nually have been applied to this object, and will any man
tell me that so vast a sum as 15,500,0001. a-year, if judiciously
applied, is Rot ample to keep up an armament quite sufficient
for all peace purposes, and sufficient as a nucleus for more
extended preparations when war takes place? (Hear.) When
-war breaks out you never want to commence offensive opera-
rations immediately ; there-is always some time 'for prepara-
tion. For instance, in the present war, it was not until six
months after the declaration of war that the expedition sailed
to the Crimea, which we must call the beginning of offensive
operations. Your expedition sailed,-I believe, from Varna
in September, While war was declared in March. Even be-
fore these six months expired there was still more time for
preparation. [Lord HARDINGE suggested, that our troops had
been sent to Gallipoli some time before the end of the six
oneration I
say, that offensive operations did not commence until
months after the declaration of war, and until nearly twelve
months after war must have appeared so probable that prepa-
rations might have been commenced. That time, if well used,
and if your establishments bad been previously upon a proper
footing, was ample for you to have made every effort which
could reasonably be expected from this couhtry. I repeat,
then, it is not to over economy that we must attribute tho ex-
isting evil, which has quite a different origin. The fault is
that to which I have already adverted—the division of au-
thority and responsibility. There is a very homely saying that
" too many cooks spoil the broth ;" and you have had too
many cooks. (Hear.) . What you want is something like the
administration at the Admiralty. The Admiralty does per-
form every function with regard to the navy which one would
expect to devolve upon it. It builds the ships ; it appoints
the officers ; it gives all the requisite directions- with regard
to manning, discipline, and provisions ; and everything is
complete within itself. What is the consequence ? No doubt
there have been some errors of judgment committed, even by
the Admiralty, during the present war. It would not be diffi-
cult to point out some of those errors ; but still, upon the
whole, the Admiralty has furnished to the country a most
splendid fleet, and the efficiency of that fleet has not been
impaired by such mistakes as have occurred with regard
to the army, for you have had a fleet not only splendid
in itself, but exceedingly useful. My lords, I say.
therefore, that if you wish to apply a remedy to this stat 3
of things, you must consolidate the many independent de-
partments which have now concurrent power and authority
with respect to the administration of the army. Unless
you do that, you will effect no real good, and I must say that
that consolidation cannot, in my opinion, be effected by the
mere appointment of a Secretary for War. The Secretary
of War has to direct not only the army, but the navy. Ho
is supposed to be the organ of the Government for directing
all your warlike operations. Now; it seems to me to be quite
inconsistent with this function that he should have under his
charge all the details connected with the management of the
army. Complaints would probably arise from the navy that
they were put under the authority of a department which had
authority over the army, and in this way jealousy might arise
between the two services, as well as a conflict of authority
between Secretaries of State. What is really wanted is, as I
have stated before, the consolidation of the offices of the Se-
cretary for War, the Commander-in-Chief, the Board of Ord-
nance, and the Commissariat. You ought, in my opinion, to
have one single and well-constituted department, which should
do for the army that which is done for the navy—that is
provide an efficient instrument to execute the orders of the
Government, whatever thosb orders may be.' If you do this,
I cannot believe that a fourth Secretary would be necessary ;
for I concur with the noble earl who spoke upon this subject
some time ago, that the real direction of the war ought to
rest with t'ae Prime Minister. There is no other authority iu
the Government who can direct every measure of every-sub-
ordinate department for the conduct of the war in the same
manner as the Prime Minister, because when the country is
engaged in'war it naturally absorbs everything else. The
business of the Treasury, of the Foreign-office, of the army
department, and. of the navy, are of equal importance in for-
warding the one common object, and, except the Prime Mi-
nister, I know no one who can direct all those departments
efficiently. But I know it is said that such a consolidation
Would. be objectionable, because it would place the command
of the army and the patronage of the army too immediately
in the hands of the Government of the day. (Cheers.) My
lords, I know how much stress has been laid by many per-
sons upon this objection, but I am prepared to meet it.
With regard to the prerogative of the Crown, which has been
sometimes dwelt on, I will not repeat the arguments I ad-
dressed to your lordships upon a former occasion with re-
gard to this point, because, if I am not mistaken, the noble
duke (of Newcastle) gave up every ground of objection of
thatkind to the change I proposed, and said, the prerogative
of the Crown was not affected by the question one way or the
other—that all executive duties belong equally to the Crown,
but that they are all equally exercised by means of responsi-
ble advisers, and subject to the criticism of Parliament. When
you say there is an objection to putting the command of our
-iCon hi. ,
Untilsueh
army too directly-under the Government of the. day, let me
remind you that the existaenvceeryofmaodern Commanderintroduction. lcut ef
after the tihsenowknown'is
revolutionary war, I believe you can find no in-
stance of a Commander-in-Chief during peace. You never
had such an office during peace, and even during war the
Commander-in-Chief was generally what his name implies,
the commander of a certain portion of the army directly under
his orders, and of which he acted as general. The pleasure of
the Sovereign upon any point was then taken by the Secre-
tary of State or the Secretary of War and not by the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Cnief recommended,
but it was a member of the civil Government who took the
pleasure of the Sovereign. It was not Until 1812 that the
Commander-in-Chief's office was placed upon the footing of a
public department ; until then he was only an officer com-
manding a certain portion of the army. At the same time, I
am ready to allow that, although actually this change took
place not before 1812, yet substantially it took place at a
considerably earlier period, and probably for 50 or .60 years
the department has leen what it now is. But, further than
this, I hold that, according to the duties now performed by a
Commander-in-Chief, his title is a misnomer. He is not Com-
mander-in-Chief. To my notion, the name implies an officer
who is in military command of,troops, who is constantly at
their head and acting as their general. Now I need not
tell your lordships that the Commander-in-Chief in- this
country is never seen at the head of troops—unless,
indeed, it be at a birthday parade or a review in Hyde
NPark. Except at some state pageant of that kind, I say,
the Commander-in-Chief never appears in command of
troops, and his duties might be perfectly well per-
formed without his ever putting a red coat on his back. He
With in his office at the Horse Guards, and upon him there de-
volves the duty of organising and superintending the British
army all over the world. It is a duty which, in every other
Country, is performed, not by a general commanding, but by
Si Minister of War. In this country the Commander-in-Cinef,
is a Minister of War shorn of a great part of his proper power
.
and authority. He is Minister of War, with very little power
over the,artillery, with no authority in matters of expense,
and with scarcely any as regards the provisioning, clothing,
armingand of the troops. He is Minister of War deprived of
all the essential parts of his functions. I say, then, that the
obvious remedy for the evil is to get rid of this department.