The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-12 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF TIIE PUBLIC TOURNALS.

INCAPACITY- OF LORD RAGLAN.
(Front the Times of this day.)
By this time Lora Raglan has been put in possession
of the opinions prevailing in tpis country respecting the,
conduct of the Crimean expedition, and we have reason
to believe that he protests with some strenuousness
against the coredusione which would attech culpability to
hituselfor Lis staff. Tee que.stion itself is one of the gravest
importance on public ne less than private grounds. That
maxim of our institutions that every man is innocent
until he has been peered otherwise is assuredly not with-
out its force when the person concerned is a General in
command ef an army, previously enjoying a geed profes-
sional reputation, and as yet unheard in his own defence.
In such a case we are even more than usually bound by
the laws ef justice to the observance of moderation and
forbearance, but we must needs express our opinion that
those laws have not been hitherto tran4gressed. Lard
Raglan has been charged with "incapacity," and it has
been asked, more or less plainly, that he should be re-
calliid Irons his command. In,this demand is there any-
thing unreasonable or unfair ?--anything of which his
lordsip or his friends are entitled to complain ? We
think not, and we request the reader to follow us impar-
tially through a few observations. -
Lord Aberdeen observed, with great candour,
on the occasion of his resignation, that the discon-
tent of the country with the Government was a
natural consequence of the . ill-suCcess which had
attended its measures; and, if this argument was
good in the case of the Ministry at home, how much
more forcible must be its applicatioirto the Commander-
in-Chief abroad—to the general
actually on the spot in
charge of the army, and with the power of control over
all its operations ! Mr. Gladstone reminded the House
of Commons, in an elaborate speech, that even the offi-
cers of the various military departments were respon-
sible to Lord Raglan alone, and that no step Could be
properly taken by the Government in the way of dis-
placing or superseding them without his knowledge and
consent. We need not, however, pursue this argument
further, or enter into any explanation of the authority
with which a Commander-in-Chief is invested over all
branches of the army. He is, unquestionably, the per-
son responsible at first sight fir the conduct and results
of the war ; he shares most largely in the honours and
profits of success, and it is he from whom account is first
due in the case of disaster. No doubt he may clear
himself from blame, but that a reeponsibility does attach
to his office proportioned to its authority is what we
think no reasoning man would deny,
More especially is this the case when the misfortunes
of an expedition have been, to all appearance, avoidable,
when they have been traceable much more to our own
weakness than to the enemy's strength, and when the
superiority acquired by the personal intrepidity of our
troops has been lost for want of the talents which should
have turned their valour to account. If we had been
overmatched in the field, defeated in fair fight, op-
pressed by irresistible rigours of climate, or otherwise
overborne by invincible calamities, there would be little
to be said. No general can be held absolutely or un-
conditionally responsible for success ; and even a van-
quished commander may deserve reward. But when,
as in the Crimea, all that could be reasonably asked of
Fortune has been granted, and more than could be ex-
pected of soldiers heroically performed—when the land-
ing, the battle, and the march were all so many
triumphant achievements, and when the failure has been
obviously confined to the
.administrative departments of
the army—it is surely nothing but reasonable that the
officer to whom the chief administration of the army was
committed should be thought accountable prima facie;
for the consequences ensuing. The same rule of pro-
ceeding by which Lord Raglan was honoured with a
Field Marshal's rank brings him also a Field Marshal's
able to comprehend the principlepublic, on which Lord John
Russell, after declaring that the army had been brought
to a " horrible and heartrending' condition by means
"inexplicable" even to himself, could stand up a few dayi
afterwards and stigmatise as ribaldry" the comments
hich had questioned the capacity of that
of a press w
army's commander for the situation he filled.
h on the general question, we can
review the events of the expedition without prejudice or
para. ti lity In BO far as the delays permitted were Premising this much
de-
trimental to the enterprise, the result is probably not
imputable to the decision of the commander on the spot.
\Ye can understand also by what succession of events
the army found itself on the heights between Balaklava,
and Sebastopol without the supplies necessary for its
own well-doing or the munitions required for the siege.
Probably the principle adopted was that of sacrificing
every other consideration for the ohanoe of getting into
Sebastopol as quickly as possible. if this could be ac-
complished, there would be no need for store*, huts,
depots, or communications, since our ships would 'land
their cargoes on the, regular keys of the great harbour,
and our troops, if it was decided to winter in the Cri-
mea, would be comfortably lodged In the town. There
was something, therefore, tube raid for the plan of con-
centrating every effort on the construction of batteries
and the accumulation of siege material, even to the ne-
glect of all precautions against the contingeecy of
failure. Possibly, if Lord Raglan bad set about making
a road from 13alak!ava at the end of September, in-
stead of getting up his guns and ammunition to the
heights, it might have been said that a more decisive
policy would have saved him all this trouble by putting
him in possession of Uebastopoi itself. Up to the
17th of October—indeed, the day on which the can-
nonade first opened, the tactics employed admit of ex-
planation, if not of defence, but that morning should
have terminated all doubt as to the true state of affairs.
We know, from Lord Raglan's own despatches, that the
prospect of " ulterior measures"—that is to say, 'of the
assault and capture of the town--began then to appear
indefinitely remote, and that the great feature of the
advantage of the besieged over the
ditions required for a successful
siege—wag
established. But why, under
operations—the
besiegers
all
te co
completely
conditions
such circumstances, were not the tactics changed ? Why
when it was clear that we must be dependent for some
time on the resources of our own position, were not
those resources collected and assured ? There was still
time to open and secure communication with Balaklaya,
to procure reinforcements, to construct roads, to form
provision depots, to get winter clothing in store, and to
do, in fact, all that has since been done or attempted
when
for nit
uir is too late. This is ono of the leading points
qy.
Assuming, as we may certainly do, that all, or nearly
all, the consequences which actually ensued was to be
foreseen on the spot after the failure of the 17th of
October, it becomes a point of inquiry how soon
the Ministry at home were acquainted with these
facts and impressed with a due sense of the
altered position of the army. Judging from their
s it
tf
theal appears
sas if they only adopted,
battle of Inkerman, those measures
afterwprhoicc eh: had ngonui news
have been executed without the loss of an
hour after the news of the ineffectual cannonade. Up
to a certain period— viz., the 17th of October, the tac-
tics of the campaign were, as we have said, intelligible,
but the situation became immediately altered: by the
events of that day, and the chief disasters of the expedi-
tion seem to have arisen from the fact that the course of
proceedings was not altered accordingly. Whether the
result was due to failure of perception, and, if so, whe-
ther the failure was abroad or at home— whether appli-
cations for succour were not made or not heeded—is
more than can be yet certified. On one point—that of
the unroasted coffee—we have already seen it stated that
Lord Raglan had made strong and early representations,
but without effect, and the Name method of exculpation
may, undoubtedly, be open to him on other points.
What the public cannot understand is how the only two
parties to whom responsibility
miliac:lnhave left Lord Raglan
can ultimately attach
should both be blameless together after disasters which
incompetence e nLcoer
do f
Raadgml
ainn ant:a;
thhwi have
ee
aili ni
failedsanffil plainly
occurredentut vr nmeanting ferthoseoorfrom
a action
s to account ; but that
both are to be exgmpted
.from the charge of incapacity
when our troops, at the distance of only six miles Prim
art have perished by thousands for want of common
necessaries, is more than the country can
believe.

LORD CLARNDON.—Lord Clarendon has bad manyupont hhe i
wm
general
during.with
h
ertai o
ethe late discus
formation of a
pinion that his
continuance in the Foreign-office was the one thing
needful. Lord-Derby did more. lie desired beyond all
son e. Everybody
Governmentcompliments conferredsubscribed entrusted
to
thincis to have him for Foreign
mister. He saw,
witlibis well-known shrewdness, that this was no time
to interfere with the negotiations that have been carried
on so successfully, and that are at this moment in such
Lord Clarendon holds th
a happy train. e complicated
threads of those negotiations, spread over Europe, in his
hand. Every one in turn saw how delicately, how
firmly, they are held in his grasp. All desired to pre-
serve the continuity of these negotiations. Lord Derby
saw the necessity. But be despaired of Lord Cl De
co-operation with himself until he should first secure
Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and Air. Sidney Her•
bert ; and then, and not till then, did he consider him-
self in a position—a position which he never reached
to approach Lord Clarendon, with or without,
as the
case might be, the influential mediation of Lord Lans-
downe, who has throughout the whole of these negotia-
tions " won golden opinions from all me4l;o2.inu
Chronicle.
ANOTHER PROFESSIONAL VISIT Op JENNY LIND TO
ENGLAND.—The lovers of music will be gratified to learn
that Jenny Lind has entered into an engagement to re-
visit England, in her professional capacity-. - Those, how-
ever, who may expect to see her again on the boards of
either Opera-house will be disappointed.
From religi-
ous scruples she has determined never more to appear
before the public under any circumstances which could
be construed into giving her sanction. to theatrical or
operatic performances. She has further resolved that
all her future exhibitions before the public shall partake,
more or less, of the character of sacred music ; and,
with this view, she has, we are informed, stipulated that
she shall sing only in Exeter•hall. She is expected here
some time in the month of April. Our readers are aware
that Jenny Lind iii now the mother of two childien.