The National Register.
London, England, 1808-11-27 00:00:00

NUMBER FORTY-SEVEN•

MR ARMY AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.
Transitory ciremnstancts some times fix the conduct of
communities; and what was useful only for a season ,becomes
time permanent rule of their policfeltya kiAn. d
of prepossess iofter having fromx
custom, or unexpected success,
in favour of some particnlar arrane;ement; self-love, to
Ohm. with the suggestions of present convenience and es-
tablished habits exercise all their influence to persuade
them that as undeviating adherence to what was adopted
from temporary expediency, or momentary advantages,
is the sure foundation of their safety, and the acme of po-
litical Avisdotn. This obstinate perseverance, in ordinary
times, is unattended with danger ; it is productive, on the
contrary, of considerable advantages, as it concentrates
the energies, talents and resources of the state ; and this
accumulation of powers gives this unity Of object increased
vigour and effect. liet as soon as extraordinary events in-
tervene, arrangements, which were before advantageous,
might be ineffectual to meet the new occurrences ; and, if
pertinaciously adhered to, occasion disasters too urgent
and unexpected, to be opposed with promptitude and suc-
cess. This want of versatility, or this incapacity to ac-
commodate itself to the fluctuation of incidents, has been,
almost invariably, the cause of the disappearance of once
powerful and enterprising empires. They fell, as soon as
they had extraordinary difficulties to encounter, because
their means of resistance were calculated only on the scale
of ordinary chances.
Almost every page in history, ancient and modern, im-
presses this conviction ; and the eventful occurrences of
our time dissipate every doubt of the reality of the obser-
vations. However one state becomes a victim, and then
another, to this blindaes, :anti obstinacy; and those who
have the good fortune or the chance to escape, are *limn.
silk to the warning, or if ron,:ed for a moment to the ne-
cessity of a change of condue:-, !hi-4' are frightened, or dis-
heartened, by the exertions and iaeritices it seems to re-
quire, or fluctuate so long between resolving and perform-
ing, that they are seized in the very act of deliberatilig ; and
overwhelmed before they had come to a deteriuination bow
they shall act. ,
That this is .no mere speculative opinion, unsupported by
the evidence of facts, or formed only from remote deduc-
tions, we have too "many proofs from what has occarred
within the shu,rt, but instructive, space of the last 19 years;
and there is not a state, that itaii yielded to the renovated
energy and youthful policy of a neighbouring people, 'out
aght to attribute its disasters to the infatnatiou of attemp-
i.:., to i.es,it new rigorous institutior.s, seconded by
.1c force of opinion and the attraction of novelty, with
censtitutions weakened by age, and enervated by invete-
r.te aler,cs. E./cry thing about them pointed out the in-
l;ll.,:ncy of their usual arrangements, and the necessity of
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some constitutional. weakness, or restrained by the bias
of long-established customs, they still persevered, with the
pertinacity of dotage, or the presumption of folly in their
fatal delusion.
States have not only suffered from an improper, or ina-
deqnate use of their strength ; but likewise from the mode
of displaying it : jest as particular occurrences may induce
a people to direct their attention to an augmentation of the
navy, in preference to that of the army ; as was the case
with the Athenians, in the time of Themistocies. When
the exigency of the service became less imperious, they
-
still continued to cultivate it almost exclusively ; because
the brilliant success that attended the first experiment, to-
gether with the advantages flowing from an extensive corn-
inerce4 the tributes of the adjacent islands, and the va-
nity of extending their intluence' from the shores of the
Euxine,to those of Sicily, convinced these republicans
that an adherence to navkl operations was the secret of
their preponderance and security. These considerations
powerfsal :enough to seduce a less arrogant people,
united with the superiority they acquired from expe-
rience over their rivals, prevented them from chan-
ging their policy, when subsquent . occurrences ren-
dered a change indispensably nece4ary. This is the irre-
trievable error of States, that they never see the necessity,
or the fit season of innovation, till disasters have %hewn
its expediency ; and they seldom grow wise, till wisdom is
useless. 'elms the delusion continues ; and the Athenians
were not sensible of the impolicy of their conduct; till the
enemy were masters of their territory, had overturned their
Government, and proscribed their principal citizens. This
calamity solely originated in the mistaken idea they enter-
, tained, that from the land side their situation was impreg-
nable; they therefore considered the army i'secondary oh-
Jed, or it was wasted in remote expeditions. For 427 years
that they contended with their rivals for the supremacy,
fortune, it is true, seconded utmost invariably their efl'orts ;
but the loss of a single RNA al engag,ement at Aergos Potanios,
overturned for ever the dominion of Athens. The errors
and fate a Carthage were similar ; and both states serve
to show, that what sync, at one time, expedient, and
highly politic. may become, in consequence of new occur-
rences, ineflectual and dangerous.
The brilliant success of the Portuguese in the East, and
the discoveries of the Spaniards in the New World, together
with the immense riches accumulated by the Dutch, in-
spired the English and French s itl.l an ardent desire of par-
ticipating in the advantages and reputation of these expe-
ditions; and commerce and colonies engrossed, for more
than a century, the attention of the most powerful nations
in Europe. Our decided superiority In these pursuits,
together with.the splendour of our naval victories, and the
petailiarity of our situation, induced us, as it did the Athe-
nians and Carthaginians, to direct our attention, almost
exclusively, to maritime affairs; and as long as our neigh-
bours acted on the same principles, and bad the same ob-
ject in view, age acted in strict conformity to policy, as
well as to interest. But the Revelation has eleile an alte-
-1 ration in tills. as in 11,:tatt!, otter rice-..iirliia:iu:ei, ..ad the
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THE NATIONAL REGISTER.

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genius and activity of our neighbours have taken s different
direction. We remained for a long time bnatfected by this
change, till one of the greatest of our Statesmen, and one
of the stroneed advocates for maritime pursuits, grew sen-
sible at last that the navy alone was quite inadequate to our
security, and the preiservation of what we already possess-
ed. But this conviction was felt too late, and operated too
slowly; for whilst we were deliberating as to the necessity
of deviating from our usual• line of conduct; the enemy
had already advanced us, with gi4autic strides, in a career
we arc now reduced to the necessity of treading after him.
but this is not the only inconvenience, and disadvantage we
have to labour again:it in the new pursuit : Whilst our ad-
versary 11%4, in the very beginning of his course, flung away
evry trammel and ineuml•rance, which might encumber
him in the, prosecution of his undertaking, we fondly retain
a number of uselesi and embarrassing ornaments, which ex-
pose us, at every step, to the danger of tripping; and though
we have a more. considerable distance to run than the ene-
my, .re still keep on the useless and cumbersome frippery ;
whilst he, divested of every impediment of the kind, has the
advantage of ground, as well as convenience.
Ids this stihjtrt i+ particularly interesting in Me preqent mo-
ment, ve intend to dilute it heyond the lanai extant of our disqui-
ritiunr, (17,d to ..unclesde it in ova nest.]

FOREICiN IN'FELLIGENCE.

d•IMM•111110.....•
SPAIN.
toad;; A Nov. 115.—The retreat effected by the army
under General Blake from Valniaseda, after a confirmed
engagement, from eight in the ;morning until nine at night,
was as brilliant as a victory could have been. It is posi-
tively stated, that the euemihad upwards of five thousand
killed.—Among the prisoners was a General. We must
also necessarily have sustained some loss. It -would be ab-
surd to think otherwise. According to report, the 4th di-
vision were the principal sufferers.
They write from Catalonia, that the reinforcements sent
from Portugal, Arragon. and Valentin. had already arrived
is that principality, and that the troops under Signor
eilin;; were on the point of catering it : that the alacrity
and entlinsinsm of the inhabitants were daily increasing,
whilst it was evidontiy perceived that the confidence of the
French troops, aod even Leal himself, was very consider-
ably
.lowered ; and that no doubt was entertained, that,
within a very few days, Duhesme would solicit terms of
capitulation.
.-.llrAeosss, Nov. 5.-111 the Murcians have this day
marched off for Navarre. The General set Of last night
for Tuleda, where General Castanos is. It is supposed
4that they AIM concert measures for an attack upon the
enemy, and we are confident of success.
Mariam, Nov..--Last night the posts from Castile,
Galicia, Ind Burgos, came in a very late hour ; for it
nopears that in the latter city there was some bustle among
the inhabitants, in consequence of the French having scut
to demand of them a great number of rations. It is cer-
tain that they will not come to fetch them, as the troops of
Pistremadura have already( arrived in that city with their
cavalry and an excellent train of artillery.
The Central Junta is expected to remove to this capital
by the iisth instant.
Every preparation is making to attack the French
at Logrouo, before they have time to fortify themselves
there,
EXTRA CT OF A LETTER FROM VIEJO! OCT. 30.
" I informed you in my former letters, that our ad-
vanced guards were every day engaged with those of the
enemy, in which the advantage was always on our side.
But still nothing was done on our part to take pos.segsion
el. the positions war the city (Logrous) such RS 1711.111,

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Oyon, Montecorvo, Cerro, Cantabria.. &c. and conteut-
ing ourselves only with placing some posts of 40 or 60 men
at the utmost. At the same time 1 told you, that PintL-
'►•
had come as Provisional General of the Army, ha
taken the command from Equia, the hrother.in',4:l:
Godoy.. It has since been apprehended that
this has
givena'red
rise to sonic infamous conduct, and that a* treaty ans
Cr..
tered into with the French for the delivery of Logroua, and
also of our army into their hands. This, however, ads
happily prevented by the arrival, last Tuesday evening, of
General Castanos. la the meanwhile our small ady
posts were furiously attacked by the whole French army,
and driven into the town. .Whiie we were at our several
posts, the enemy's troops took possession of the pusitiw.4
near the city, which we ought to have occupied, notoeh•
standing our artillery did some execution at the 1,64,
and at Ilalbuena, against the enemy's cavalry. it was l;
evening, and the enemy's large tires being seen near the
city, me received orders to retire within the city Muhl, the
night. As soon as day broke, we covered our posts be-
fore the city t and as soon as the artillery percetwt the
approach of some detached bodies, after four dischays,
they retired. It was now noon, and we had not hied a
gun, nor eaten any thing, when, from a battery which way
raised between some olive trees very near the tom u,
heavy discharge of,balls, bombs, and grenades, were mad,:
upon the cis y, but the artillery being pointed too high my
damage was done. to it. We answered this diseha
ur ntell are fm
the batteries, rind with more effect, for we dismo
cannon, and killed all who were near it. At two in the
afternoon, the firing having ceased for a time, weri:
ordered to fall back in good order. When we returned tc
the town, we found the gates shut, and a great uninhcr
of
persons wanting. General Castanos had also left the phtfe,
for.vvhea he discovt red the treachery, and saw there,-
tions which had been loqt. he was in a great mg..
learned, that the night before, the French had el:oche:I
torch-light to attack Lodosa, where his troops were. 'fix
General, therefere, ordered a retreat towards Calahorri,
in order to unite the two armies, and commanded that the
traitor should be transported to Soria. At three in the
afternoon we effected our junction, and at midnight set
out for Nalda, three leagues to the right of Logroaa,
through a horrid way. The principal inhabitmts of 1;:e
city, who were dispersed, joined us, leaving their h9r.••
abandoned. The bridge was destroyed, which had beer.
undene several das bef.
" Itn is nod w three days since we have been iwirchca i!:!y
and night, without food, and through roads mbich secioed
impassable. Yesterday we arrived at this place, which
1.0.11.01"
three leagues from Calaborra, and five horn
We are waiting the innetion of the armies, rion
wlu'mt
to strike a blow at the enemy ; hoping for good success is
God, the Virgin, and the intrepidity and
:..00(1 n".h4
of Castanos. "Within a week something, decisive is to
done; Is
for it. is thought the enemy is to be attacked bctof3
he has fortified himself in the city.
V/I.I..AFTe VVC A, OCT. 31.-~011 the `2.lth in t. arrWerl at d'e!
head-quarters, D. Juan Miguel de Viv es, Captaa,r,j!
of this army, and the principality of Catalonia. Be tand:,(l
the day before at Tarragona, and there and here reel
the warmest reception. Two days before, there ikctl;
barked at the same port, besides the remaining part ot
Spanish hussars, and other detachments from )1
for 11,1(1,,!
the Spanish troops that have come from Portug:ll
of I It 111
principality. The latter are under the commato•
Marshal D. Gregory Laguna,
scows of provisional grenadiers of the two castiles,
troops of Valencia and Torragona, and the
.Santi.... v
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giment of cavalry, and two conames o
They have also bronght with them eO,OOO musk:
1
araitug the Catalonian troops.and consist of vario:lsc.y.
the; and :id
I,rtehsehhaleitnl-ovabreterssn
torenll
should cause the enemy to retire er
it urnediatelisY
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cin-
this
walls of Barcekma. wr
zbeed rir al
it,.o.

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