The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-26 00:00:00

SPIRiT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

(From, the Times of this chty.)
1 If p-,aeo load been concluded at Vienna upon the
terms which were proffered to the acceptance of
Russia by the representatives of the allied Powers,
no doubt great differences of opinion would have
been expressed in this country as to the value of a
peace so obtained. The political adversaries of the
present Administration and the more excited par-
tisans and promoters of the present war would
have denounced any such compromise as that which
was recently proposed as a base surrender of the
honour of this nation and a shortsighted bargain for
a hollow peace. Men of more moderate opinions
might have thought that the results of the war, if
it had been thus terminated, bore no adequate pro-
portion to the spirit in which it was begun, and to
the sacrifices it has already cost us ; while the
power and influence of Russia, would have been
rather augmented than diminished by the energetic
resistance she has hitherto opposed to the formid-
able combination arrayed against her. Nor could
much reliance have been placed upon the terms
themselves which the Vienna Conference was in-
duced to offer, for, as Lord Malmesbury observed
on Tuesday evening, we could have no material
guarantee for the limitation of the naval force of
Russia, and if, as would probably have been the
case, she violated or evaded her engagement in that
respect, the rest of Europe could obtain no redress
without a fresh appeal to arms. On the other hand,
the partisans of peace would have gained strength
by the recovery of that inestimable blessing, and
a considerable portion of the community would not
have looked very closely at the nature of the con-
cessions which procured for them a cessation of the
burdens thrown by war upon the country.
But, although these differences of opinion would
have instantly manifested themselves upon the
conclusion of peace, we apprehend that the extent
to which the allied Powers were disposed to carry
their concessions can now be viewed in only one

tight. They have shown their desire for the ter-
mination of this contest to have been so sincere that

they would even have signed a treaty of peace
Which threw upon Russia none of the burdens or
humiliations of defeat. They asked for no cession
of territory ; they left even the forts of Sebastopol
untouched by negotiation ; did not raise the ques-
tion of an indemnity either to Turkey or themselves
for the expenses of the war, and were conten t to
restore matters to very nearly the state they were
in before these hostilities began. Greater forbear-
ance and moderation were never shown to an enemy
and an assailant, especially when it is remembered
that the whole strength of that enemy is defensive,
and that we have absolutely nothing to apprehend
from the forces of Russia against ourselves. These
proposals have, however, been made in vain, and
the Russian Plenipotentiaries rejected them as per-
emptorily as if they had involved any serious sacri-
fice of the dignity or the interests of their sovereign.
Can anything demonstrate with more irresistible
evidence that the sole cause of the duration of the
war lies in the obstinate and inveterate resistance
of Russia to the fairest terms of peace, that the re-
sponsibility of prolonging the war rests altogether
with the enemy, and that we have no alternative
left but to employ force to compel the Russian Go-
vernment to make peace on such terms as justice
and the public security may demand ?
The task is a difficult one, and it may be long
before we bring it to a successful termination; but
this country is not wont to relax in its efforts to
obtain a great political object, and our stubborn
endurance and resolution have before this accom-
plished far greater labours than time. The hope
of terminating the war by a compromise is at an
end ; henceforth it becomes a trial of strength
between Russia and the Allied Powers, which can
only be terminated by the exhaustion of one or
other of the belligerents. It is needless to add
that, having carried our offers of concession to the
utmost limits of forbearance, we cannot for an in-
stant recede from the position we have henceforth
to defend, and that to make peace on any other
terms would be to surrender to the universal
ascendancy of Russia all those interests which it is
our object to protect from her rapacity and her
ambition. We may have underrated the strength
of our opponent in the earlier stages of this con-
flict, for the failure of the Russian armies in their
first operations on the Danube gave the world too
low an opinion of their skill and courage. But, if
the power of Russia be greater than was at first
supposed, the more urgent is the necessity to re-
duce it within limits which shall cease to threaten

the independence of other countries.
As the rejection by Russia of the moderate
terms offered by the Allied Powers is a decisive
justification of the war in which France and
England are engaged, so also this event ought, on
every principle of logic and good faith, to exercise
a decisive influence on the policy of the German
Courts. They have testified from the commence-
ment of these disputes the strongest desire to bring
them to an amicable termination—Prussia by keep-
ing altogether aloof from the quarrel, and Austria
by agreeing to take a more active part in this
struggle, if peace could not be obtained by other
means which have now been tried and exhausted.
Next to Russia herself, who is the prime mover
and sole original cause of these calamities, it is
impossible to doubt that the principal author of
the present distressing state of Europe is the
King of 'Prussia. Had he firmly adhered to the
principles which he formally adopted in the
Protocols of Vienna ; had he laboured, in
conjunction with ,Austria, to maintain the
union and the dignity of the Germanic Confedera-
tion ; had he called out the military forces of his
kingdom • and had he made the Russian Govern-
ment feel that the continuance of this war would
place it in direct opposition to the whole of Europe,
it is impossible to doubt that peace would before
this have been restored, if, indeed, the war had ever
begun. But the secession of Prussia and the divi-
sion of Germany have enabled Russia, as yet, to
paralyse Austria and to resist the Western Powers,
even when their demands were reduced to the most

limited conditions on which a negotiation could be
conducted. If there were either honesty or judg-
ment in the councils of Prussia, these facts could
not be without weight even upon her ; but, in the
condition to which that Court is now reduced, fear
alone will regulate its conduct.

The position of Austria is altogether different.
She has participated in and has presided over the
Conference, which was opened at her solicitation.
She has agreed to the last in those terms which
Russia has rejected. She has proclaimed her in-
tention to the world by her Notes, and bound her-
self by treaty to prosecute the alliance with the
belligerent Powers to the complete attainment of
their common object. She has assembled for this
purpose one of the finest armies in Europe; amount-
ing certainly to 500,000 effective men ; and she
has now acquired the certainty that Russia will not
submit to any terms of peace affording valid secu-
rities to Europe, except upon compulsion. The case
to which all her policy and all her preparations
have been tending for the last 18 months is now
complete. One bold stroke may place her at the
head of public opinion in Germany, may rivet the
alliance with France by indissoluble ties, and may
transfer to the young Emperor of Austria an influ-
ence in Europe hardly inferior to that enjoyed by the
late Emperor Nicholas in the best part of his
life. To hold such cards, and not to play them—
to have such a prize within reach, and not to
clutch it—to feel the power 'of rendering such a
service to mankind, and not to do it—are errors
which overshadow the remainder of an existence,
and render the most conspicuous positions in the
world the least honourable and the least to be
desired. It is here, most especially, that the
remarkable moderation of the terms proposed by
the Plenipotentiaries of the Western Court tells
with irresistible effect. The more moderate they
were the stronger is the obligation of Austria to
support them, for the more cordial and sincere was
her own assent to them ; and, as the French and
English Governments will now forthwith proceed
to call 'upon the Cabinet of Vienna to 'enter upon
the fulfilment of the stipulations of the treaty of
the 2d of December, it is impossible for that Court
to recede with honour from the engagement to take
effectualmeasures for the attainment of the object
of the alliance, which all pacific means have failed
to accomplish.

(Prom. t4e Times of this day.)
It is now seriously propounded in various quare
-
ters that England is incapable of making war. W
have seen it argued with much philosophy and
practical illustration that in proportion as we have
become more free, more constitutio‘nal, and more
commercial, we have lost that unity of purpose,
that warmth of sentiment, and that keenness of
pull
powerfullys
sofagainst
power.
owoeanrse. 1
action necessary to military success. Every man
or by th
now does that which is right in his own
but
eyes, and a very delightful state it is,
oupbgelrirecaaottpepuiiiiion, it is not the political organisation thatatpwroorsk-
influence of parties and classes, of schools and
Pinedirsvidinualsw,aor; byWfoerceinoafyp
societies, but while these several forces are
real
in their own directions, they
another, and the result is a
The man to carry on war with 'effect
meaning
bsocuolt:tinilcCei
who can say, "L'etat! c'est mo• , must be he
under 111 absouteoisvehris‘thalehlutmhe_
pire," where the word has a 1. ' In an ct ern_
So-
vereigndhleepasretrmvaisenntat,bs
wishesii for an
the war. Now, nobody
lap
War
countryministe
Minister
0 will act
War Minister . )
Emperor we
very much sz the
oWuarrmion Emperor, but without
shall but waste
y and our myriads of men.
The War
, Ministermust be able to command at
Ministerso 0 f
m aonn -De
as freely as the Commander-in-Chief at the