The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-23 00:00:00

T 11.3 BAS r ERN QUESTION.

We have already published an analysis of the
despatch of the sth January, addressed by M. do
Mauteuffel, the Prussian Minister, to Count
d'Arnim, the Prussian Envoy at Vienna, explaining
tho reasons why Prussia refused to fulfil the mili-
tary engagements she had entered into with Austria
in virtue of the treaty of the 20th April and of the
additional article annexed thereto. We are now
enabled to give the text of that despatch in ex-
tense, as also the text of a despatch addressed by
Count Buol, the Austrian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, under date of the 14th of January, to the
Austrian Envoys at the different Courts of Ger-
many, and the important despatch of M. Drouyn
de L'Huys on the same subject.
Translation of Instructions forwarded by Baron
Manteuffel to Count Arnim on the sth of January,
1855 :

" Your Excellency will find enclosed a copy of a note
addressed on the 24th Dec., 1354, to Count Esterhazy,
in which the Imperial Austrian Cabinet more closely de-
fines the military measures which, in its opinion, Prussia
and the other German Governments ought to take in
virtue of the treaty of April 20th, and of the additional
article of the 26th Nov. Count Buol very justly re-
marks that it is necessary the contending parties should
come to an understanding in respect to the exigency
which presents itself, and on which the efficacy of the
conditional military obligations into which Prussia has
entered depends. As your Excellency will readily con-
ceive, his Majesty has from the same point of viewlunin-
terruptedly directed his attention to the course of events,
and long before this matter was brought forward, in the
way done in the despatch of December 24, his Majesty
had conscientiously taken into consideration the obli-
gations which he had taken on himself. It does
not appear to be my duty now to enter more fully
into the dispositions made by his Majesty the King,
dispositions arising as well from a regard to the
interests of his country and people, as from the un-
deviating"attention which he has paid to the gravity
of the circumstances, in order with noiseless progress to
effect an increased preparation for war and a more speedy
development of force. By the measures taken, larger
bodies of troops can be ready for action within a much
shorter period than that conditionally appointed in the
Military Convention of April 20, and we might there-
fore suppose that we should in some degree be able to
tranquilise Count Buol in regard to the heavy blow of
the Russian military force on the Austrian Empire, could
we share his opinion that Russia entertained the idea of
proceeding aggressively.
" However, after having dispassionately examined the
general state of affairs, we should be obliged to do violence
to our own conviction before we could arrive at the con-
clusion that Russia will assume the offensive if she is not
attacked. I have more than once had occasion to direct
your Excellency to make such confidential communica-
tions to the Imperial Austrian Cabinet as in our opinion
would most positively refute any such supposition. Besides;
our intelligence respecting the movements of the Russian
troops is by no means of a nature to justify the apprehen-
sions alluded to. I attach the greater importance to
what has above been said, as it appears to be the object
of a part of the press to lead public opinion astray in this
matter. Indeed, the recent conduct of Russia, in respect
to the endeavours made to bring about negotiations for
peace, is of such a nature, that it would bo difficult for a
dispassionate observer not to remark her sincere wish to
come to an understanding. Russia has unreservedly
accepted the four points as they were proposed to her.
After tke conclusion of the Treaty of December 2, she
not only did not retract her acceptation, but she gave a
fresh instance of her readiness to conclude a peace by
granting fuller powers to Prince G-ortschakeff. His
Majesty the King Lae the satisfactory conscious-
ness of having always so employed his personal and
diplomatic influence at St. Petersburg, that tho im-
perial Russian Cabinet should declare itself ready
to treat on the basis of the four points, a'though
this of peace gncs that which ;Ale Lev.,
contracting Powers (Russia. and Austria) had con-
sidered the object of their alliance, when the treaty of
April 20th was concluded. A confidential conference
has already been held, in order more nearly to specify
the four points. We do not know the result of
that cralfa runes, and because we do not know it,
And as long as we do not know it, we shall con-
sidqr it an imperative duty to take the simple
and unmistakeable conditions of the treaty, as our
inviolalle rule of action, and keep the circle of our
obligations free front any extension which we cannot
clearly overlook. In respect to the military matters,
which aro pointed out to us as duties, we shall hold
fast to the leading and fundamental principles of the
April treaty, which also find their expression at the
clone of the Military Convention, inasmuch as the ob-
ject of mutual assistance is stated to be the warding
off of an attack. Even the obligations which Prussia
took on herself in the additional Article of November
20, 1854, bear this defensive character, although they
confessedly go beyond the fundamental principles of the
treaty of April. They (the obligations) are besides in-
separably connected with the pre-supposition of a mu-
tual endeavour to procure the acceptance of the four
poi/as. It is selfevident that there cannot be any mu-
tual common action as long as Prussia has no share in
the interpretation of those points, and exercises no influ-
ence on the same. Tie right to such participation, in as far
as it regards definitive artrangements which, though made
with the declared intention of maintaining the balance of
power in Europe, change the whole of the international re-
lations of Europe, and seem to modify treaties which Prus-
sia has also signed—this privilege Prussia does not found
on her being a sharer in any stipulation connected with
the present Eastern complication, but on her quality of
a great European power, which, by its own well won
right, has participated in the treaties that regulate the
legal state of things in Europe. The assurance need
hardly be given that his Majesty the King will, with the
utmost tenacity, cling to this view of things, and in order
to maintain it, should it be in danger of being disputed,
he will not shrink from sacrifices and dangers which his
faithful subjects will share iu with their well-tested re-
signation, and with the whole force and perseverance
which arise from true patriotism. It is least of all ne-
cessary to give such an assurance to his Majesty the
Emperor Francis Joseph, the illustrious relative and ally
of the King. Neither need it be given to the Sovereigns
and the leading statesmen of the other States, as, in
spite of divergent views and interests, Prussia reckons
with confidence on their just appreciation of her claims,
and is willing to procure their recognition (gnerkennung)
of the same by means of explanation and mutual agree-
ment (vcreinberung).

" From the foregoing remarks on the principles which
actuate the King in respect to his own military attitude,
your Excellency will readily perceive that his most gra-
cious Majesty does not consider himself called on to
take the initiative in the German Confederation in re-
spect to an immediate arrangement for the preparation
of war of each separate contingent. The draft which
PM specially recommended by us and Austria to the
Bond as a fitting basis is positively established, both
by the proposition of the committee and by the
resolution which was taken by the Bund on the
9th, but Prussia, from consideration for her other
German allies, believes herself bound not formally
to return to the same, as by so doing she would an-
ticipate the duties of the Military Commission. On the
other hand, it is self-understood that the Royal Mili-
tary Plenipotentiary will always be furnished with the
necessary instructions for demanding the activity of the
Military Commission on the basis of that part of the
Federal Constitution which makes provision for war, and
also for bringing the matter to a conclusion in a proper
way. By thus acting according to the Federal Consti-
tution, those objections will be best removed which, as
we confess, present themselves to the proposals of the
Austrian Cabinet, as intimated in its despatch of the
24th of the last month.

" Your Excellency will be pleased to make to Count
Buol a written communication of the present instruc•

Lions.

"Accept, &c."
DESPATCH OP COUNT BUOL.

"VIENNA, Jan. 14.
"After the resolution taken by the German Confede-
ration on the 9th of December, we considered it our
bounden duty directly confidentially to confer with the
Royal Court of Prussia on the subject of the practical
result to be derived from the decision of the Band.
" The instructions which were given to our Minister
at Berlin to this effect, your -- has learned by my
communication of the 2Gth of December. It iw evident
from the reply now received, of which I have the
honour to enclose a copy, that tho views of the Cabinets
of Vienna and Berlin do not coincide iu Come essential
points.
" The whole Confederation acknowledged the threat-
ening state of affairs ; but Prussia questions the cor-
rectness of the decision of the Bund, on the ground of
the reiterated assurance of Russia, for which there is no
guarantee, that she will confine lirself to the defence of
her own territory. We neither undervalue such a pro-
mise given by a Power involved in the war, nor the
effect which it may possibly have on its limitation ; but
no binding, no securing quality which could exercise any
positive influence on the execution of the resolution
taken by the German Confederation can be attributed
either by the German Governments or by Austria to a
promise which has been accepted by no one. If proof
were necessary that Russia herself does not believe that
it (the promise) can be made subservient to the necessi-
ties 94 her pOili4OPtit Mild At this Yerl moment

r PRICE SD.

be found in the conduct of Russia towards Turkey on
the right bank of the Danube.
" Even if we do not refuse to share in the hopes which
Europe attaches to the concessions recently made by
Russia at the conference held on the 7th, the object to
be attained is still too distant—the opinions ns to the
practical accomplishment and the application of the four
preliminary points may differ in such manifold ways,
and the chances of war may exercise so much influence
—for the Imperial Court to yield to the hope that in the
preliminary results which havb already been obtained,
it has in hand a sure guarantee that peace will really be
restored.
" We appeal to the good sense of the German Go-
vernment,, and demand whether they can deceive them-
selves by fancying that the situation of affairs has mail
now lost anything of that threatening ch;-racter which
the Bond itself recognised. His Majesty the Emperor,
our illustrious inaAcr, considers it necessary to remain
in a state ctf complete preparation for all contingencies,
arid the apprtaching negotiations for peace will there-
fore, as long as the certainty of a favourable result is
wanting, neither exercise any. influence on the military
measures of Austria, nor can they, in the opinion of the

Emperor, he allowed to interfere with the engagements
entered into with his Majesty's German Allies for the
attlinment of common (mutual) objects. Such an atti-
tude can but serve the interests of peace, and increase
the chances of a favourable issue to the negotiations.
" It is our most firm conviction that our German
Allies ought also now to place the whole of Germany in
a position calculated to command respect. It appears
to us that the interests of the German nation and its
Princes urgently require that Germany should, as well
as ourselves, be sufficiently prepared for all possible con-
tingencies. Whatever expression may in future be given
to the resolutions of the Bund in its quality of a politi-
cal power, we must again propose that whatever is re-
quisite for the development of the military force may
be cared fer without delay. . _

"You will readily conceive that, entertaining such
opinions, we could not otherwise reply to the communi-
cation of the Prussian Cabinet respecting the armaments
of Russia and the German Bund than by these instruc-
tions to Count Esterbazy, of which a copy is annexed.
" The Imperial Presidia' Minister to the Bund will
accordingly propose to the respective Committees that a
motion be made in the Piet that at least one-half of the
several contingents shall be made mobile, unless the
opinion should prevail that it would be more advisable
to place the whole of the Federal Array in readiness for
operations. The question whether, in the first case,
two combined army corps or one complete corps should
be formed, which the second half of the contingent
would have to follow in case of need, as well as other
matters of a like nature, ought to be made the subject of
consultations which should be held as speedily as pos-
sible, and of resolutions on the part of the authorities of
the Bund.

" The election of a Federal Commander-in-Chief will
also be necessary, in order that the union of the different
parts of the Federal army may, agreeably to the Act of
Confederation, be united under one command. We are
therefore of opinion that the Diet should immediately
occupy itself with this matter, and take the necessary steps
for electing a Commander.in-Chief of the Military Forces
of the Build, while in the several States the necessary
measures should be taken for placing the Federal Corps
prepared for war at the disposal of the Commander who
is to be elected.

"Your will communicate these instructions, as
well as the documents which accompany there, to the
Courts of, &c., and request them to have the kindness to
make known to us the resolutions to which this commu-
nication may give rise, as also the instructions which
they may be pleased to give to their representatives at
Frankfort, in order that they may co-operate in the ac-
complishment of the important duty which the organ
(the Bund) of the will of the whole of Germany has to
fulfil.—Accept the assurance of my perfect esteem,

"COUNT BUOL."

Baron Manteufiel's despatch of the sth January
was communicated by the Berlin Cabinet to the
Governments of London and Paris. A letter from
Frankfort, dated the 19th instant, states, that
although the Diet has not yet been called upon to
pronounce itself upon the demand of Austria and
the refusal of Prussia, the question has nevertheless
led to some animated discussions between the lead-
ing members of the Diet. An incident has occurred
which has added considerably to the excitement
which already existed. M. Drouyn do Lhuys,
namely, sent a reply to the Russian communica-
tion. This reply is not so much addressed to the
notification of refusal by Prussia to call out its con-
tingent, as to the pretension formally expressed
by that Power to maintain its place in the con-
ferences that aro to bo held at Vienna on the bases
accepted by Prince Crortschakoff. The reply of the
Fr-elm-1 Government, in a p‘lrenaptnry t•n(1. explicit
manner, and ix terms which admit of no doubt
that it is the expression of opinion of En;,;land and
Austria also, denies the right of Prussia to take
part in the Conferences, unless she joins the treaty
of the 2d of December.

The following is a correct analysis, almost a 're)•-
batittb copy, of the despatch of the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs :
" The Cabinet of Paris estab/ial,ff that Prussia ex-
plains her refusal to mobolise her army:-Ist, Because
she does not believe in the imminence of en attack upon
Austria by Russia ; 2dk', Because the support which she
would have to give ought to be preceded by au entente
between the contracting parties upon the feasibility
of carr3ing out the eventual conventions. Prussia
adds, moreover, that there can be the less objection
to suspend the execution thereof, because if it was really
necessary to place the Prussian army upon a war foot-
ing, it could be done within the period fixed upon. The
Prussian Government, therefore, is resolved not to
change the character of its obligations. The additional
article may have extended them ; but it has not modified
their nature, and Prussia only engaged herself towards
Austria to & defensive alliance. The two great German
Powers, moreover, ought to unite their efforts to obtain
the adhesion of Russia to the four points specified in the
notes of the Bth August, and it would be necessary for
the realisation of that community of action that Prussia
herself should participate in the definition of those first
bases of a future peace.
" As regards the acts, the object of which would le
either to consolidate the balance of power in Europe, or
to modify existing treaties, and which Prussia had
signed, her right to participate therein does not depend
upon this or that accidental stipulation ; it is due to
the rank she holds in the world. King Frederick
William, to maintain it, will not be deterred by dangers
and sacrifices, which the nation would share with as
much devotion and energy as patriotism.
" Another despatch from. M. do Manteuffel (the above
is the analysis of that of the sth of January) brings out
in more prominent relief the principal points where
Prussia establishes that, the more she entrenches herself
behind the strict interpretation of her engagements by
the resistance to the pretension made to extend them
against her will, the more, on the contrary, will she be
disposed to enlarge them by means of negotiation, pro-
vided her position and her dignity as a great Power are
respected.

`` The Cabinet of Paris beholds in the expose given in
M. do Manteuffel's despatches two distinct orders of
ideas ; the one special to the relations of the Prussian
Government with the Court of Vienna, the other con-
cerning the ensemble of its position in Europe.
"On the first point, France is resolved not to inter-
fere in questions which exclusively concern the German
Confederation ; on the second, the Cabinet of Paris is
willing to explain itself.
" The Cabinet of Paris does not pretend to contest to
Prussia the rank she holds. Nay more, during the last
two years it has often reminded her of the obligations
of that high rank of which she is so justly proud. But
it feels it a duty to observe that the quality of great
power is permanent—it cannot be cast off when it im-
plies onerods duties, and be resumed when it only offers
advantages. Privileges and duties of this importance
are absolutely correlative. The one is inseparable
from the other. It is not to be supposed that Eng-
land and Austria take a different view of the case
from France. But so much is certain, that France
will never allow that a power which, from its own
free will, took no part in the great events which are
taking place in the world shall afterwards maintain a
claim to regulate the consequences thereof. The advan-
tagespee. arising from the war are only for thpebtep
eilliigaetrineotit,
in
powers. And the advantages of the present (essentially
of e
malar
aotrhe
al advantages)interestsof consist
Europe ini
n the
threigrhegt o
Prussia has not done anything as yet for that object.
She has refused to proclaim her neutrality. That reso-
lution does her honour. But, in reality, on what side is
she ! If hostilities continue, will she be with or against
the Allied Powers ? This is what no one can tell.
Can Prussia reproach Francs for her confidence
in Austria I The lines of conduct have been so different.
By a movement which she declares purely a strategio
one, Russia evacuates the Principalities ; Prussia imme-
diately declares herself satisfied, whilst Austria, on the
very morrow of the day upon which that evacuation is
communicated to her, exchanges the notes of the Bth of
August with France and England. On the 23111 of No-
vember Prince Gortschakoff announces the adhesion of
his Court to the four points ; Prussia congratulates
herself in having obtained the object of her efforts ;
while Austria signs the treaty of alliance of the 2d De-
cember with the Western Powers. On the 7th January
Russia accepts the interpretation of the four guarantees ;
Prussia, fancying the success of her policy complete, re-
jects the appreciation made by Austria of the treaty of
the 20th of April, and refuses to call out her contingent;
whilst Austria spontaneously hastens to recognise that
the case provided for Art. 5 of the treaty of the 24l of
December is realised; that the re-establi liment of peace
is not assured, and offers to combine her plans of mili-
tary operations with the Allied Powers.
" Is there a wish of maintaining that Austria finds in
the alliance of the 2d of December advantages not shared
by Prussia ? What are they ? This observation of
Prussia doubtless does not imply an assent ; but yet, as
a proposition is made to conclude a Prussian treaty, he-
side the Austrian treaty, it would be well to explanithe
exact meaning of the proposition. Was that the object
of M. d'Usedom's mission to Lout:: That missionrii
wars viruped up in so pinch Y
4

"z_

f " ~--s

object is not yet known in Paris. But the more
endeavours were made to conceal it, the more were
made to discover it. All that has been discovered
is that Prussia exerted all her efforts to prevent the
Allies from waging the war upon the vulnerable point
of the enemy, and to prevent the passage of their
troops through Germany. What did she offer as a
compensation ? To place a corps d'armee on the Polish
frontier; that is to say, that Prussia with one hand
would turn aside the sword of the Allied Powers, and
with the other cover Russia as with a shield. Might
one not be authorised to suppose that M. d'Usedom had
different treaties in his portfolio, and took out by mis-
take the wrosg one at London—that which was to have
been produced at St. Petersburg ?
"The French Government has not the intention, you
may be assured, of hurting the feelings of Prussia. It
expresses itself thus in a loyal and sincere expression
(cpanchement) ; rind if it desires its language to be beard
at Berli❑ it is in the hope to see Prussia at least give up
a pcsitiou in which, if it had been happy enough to see
its efforts crowned with success, she would not have
been to-day."

PRUSSIAN TACTICS DESCRIBED BY M.
DJWULV DE LIWYS.

( From the Daily News.)

We had recently the satisfaction of giving the earliest
intelligence of the claim lately put forward by Prussia
to share in the settlement of the great European quarrel
from the dangers of which she has kept carefully aloof.
To these pretensions Dl. Drouyn de Lhuys has just re-
plied in a despatch to the Marquis de Moustier, French
dance Beige an analysis of this deTatch, which in some
ambassador at Berlin. We borrow from the Indepen-
important points is more accurate than one published
last evening by some of our contemporaries :
M. de Lbuys commences by recapitulating the arguments
employed by M. Manteuffel. Prussia, he says, refuses to
mobilise her army—firstly, because the attack of Russia
upon Austria is by no means imminent; and secondly, be-
cause the assistance of Prussia ought, in the first place, to
be preceded by a previous understanding as to the timeli-
ness of putting the eventual conditions of the convention
in execution at the present moment. If this assistance
became really necessary, Prussia would be ready to give it
before the delay fixed. Prussia, besides, does not wish to
change the character of her Obligations. She has not
bound herself to Austria excepting by a treaty purely de-
fensive. Besides this, the two great German Powers
ought, in the first place, to make efforts in common to ob-
tain the adhesion of Russia to the four points of guarantee,
and in order to do that it would be necessary that Prussia
should participate in the definitive regulation of the basis
of the peace. Prussia adds, that whether the question be
to consolidate the equilibrium of Europe, or to modify the
treaties which she has signed, her right to participate in
the conferences on the subjects of these matters is derived
and belongs to her, not from her adhesion to such or such
a particular convention, but from her rank as a great
Power. The King of Prussia is consequently determined
to maintain that right. He will not recoil, in order to
have it recognised, before any danger or sacrifices, and the
sacrifices in which ho knows that his people will support
him with all the energy of patriotism.
Having thus sketched the Prussian case, as exhibited by
M. Mantuffel, Drouyn de Lhuys thus proceeds to ex•
press the sentiments of his Government :
"The French Government has to observe that there are
in this statement two kinds of ideas—one concerning the
relations of Prussia and Austria, and the other relating to
the situations of Prussia in Europe. France will not make
any reference to the former, which belongs only to the Ger-
manic Confederation ; but as to the second, she is disposed
to speak distinctly. France does not deny the rank of
Prussia as a grand Power—the French Cabinet itself has
often, during the last two years' reminded Prussia of
the obligations involved in that rank which she puts
forward with so just a pride. But the quality of a great
power is a permanent matter, and cannot be abandoned
one day, because of its burdens, to bo resumed the day
after, for the sake of its conveniences. Its rights and its
duties are correlative, and cannot be separated.
" There are no reasons for supposing that England and
Prussia take a view of these things different from that of
Austria ; but be that as it may, it is very certain that
France will not admit that a power may of its own will
hold itself aloof from great events while they are taking
place, and not maintain its pretension to regulate their
consequences. Tho gains of a war are only for those who
have carried on that war, and the advantages derivable
from the present war—advantages essentially moral—will
be the right to participate in the deliberations which are
undertaken in the interest of Europe for the restoration of
peace. What has Prussia done to have a right to such
participation ? She has refused to proclaim her neutra-
lity—a very honourable course no doubt—but on what
side is she, and on what side will she act, if the war con-
tinues ? No one can say.
Can Prussia complain of the great confidence which
France accords to Austria ? Thos conduct of the latter
power and that of Prussia are widely different.
" Russia evacuates the Principalities by a movement
which sho declares to be purely strategical. Prussia at
once declares herself satisfied, whilst Austria immediately
thereupon exchanges the notes of the Bth of August. Prince
Gortschakoff adheres on Nov. 28 to the four points, Prussia
flatters herself that she has obtained the object of her
efforts; whilst Austria, on the contary, signs the treaty of
Dec. 2 with the Western Powers. On Jan. 7 the ambas-
sador of Russia accepts the interpretation of the Allied
Powers. Prussia, completely satisfied, sends a refusal to
Austria to fulfil her military engagements resulting from
the treaty of April 20 ; Austria, on the contrary, writes
the next day to her allies that the re-establishment of
peace not having been assured, she has to propose to com-
bine with them her military plans; in execution of Art. 5
of the treaty of Dec. 2.
" Will Prussia pretend that Austria finds in the alliance
advantages which she could not enjoy? If so, what are
they : ;3inee 5110 proposes to make a Prussian trenty by
the side of the Austrian one, she ought certainly to signify
the precise signification of that proposition. Is that the
object of M. Usoclom's visit to London ? Tho mission of
that diplomatist has been carefully invested with so much
secrecy ands() many confidential forms that, to the present
time, the secret has not come to the knowledge of the
French Cabinet.

" But the more pains arc taken for concealment the more
will be used for discovery. All, however, that the French
Cabinet knows of that mission is that Prussia has been ens
dearouring to psovent the Allies from carrying the war to
the most vulnerable point of Russia, and to interdict the
passage of their troops across Germany. What did she
offer in compensation ? She offered to
pines a corps
p arntec on the frontier of Poland—that is to say, that
Pruss4a with one hand should turn aside the sword of the
Allied Powers, and with the other cover the Russians
with a buckler. Ono would, in truth, imagine that M.
d'Usedoia had several treaties in his portfolio, and that ho
produced at London by mistake that which ho ought to
have brought forward at St. Petersburg.
" The French Government is very far from wishing to
wound the feelings of Prussia. It is in a loyal effusion of
feeling that it expresses itself thus. It wishes that its
words should ho listened to at Berlin, in order to make
Prussia escape from a situation in which it should have
been happy not to see her if its previous efforts had suc-
ceeded."