The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-24 00:00:00

juice that.the assault was not renewed upon a larger
scale, since such an action. would inevitably have greatly
increased the losses' we have to deplore ; aod the evacua-
tion of the Redau by the Ru,sians before 11 o'clock on
the night Of the battle shows that they were not able to
renew the defence of it against the -Highland Brigade on
the. morrow. But this is a circumstance which. can
hardly have entered into the calCulations of the British
commanders, who appear to have been unprepared for
the abrupt retreat of an euemy.who had hitherto offered
so pertinacious a resistance.
It is scarcely worth while .to advert to the official
Phraseology in which the services of the different
branches of the army and navy are acktio ele.dged in
this despatch, which is of the usual loose and undiscii-
minating kind ; but it is a little remarkable that in a
despatch purporting to give an account of a particular
action the name of no officer actually engaged in the
assault or iu conducting the arrangements is mentioned
with any mark of approbation except that of colonel
Windham, who was not the senior officer of the day,
though he headed his column with distinguished gallantry.
The action of the Bth of September is not, after all, the
brightest page in the history of the British army in the
Crimean campaign ; and General Simpson, with a mo-
dest veracity which does him honour, has not attempted
to colour the events of the day in our favour. .We must
take these things as they are, but no one doubts that
those portions of the British forces which were.engaged
fought with their wonted valour ; and that, although
wo were less successful than our knave allies on this
occasion, both armies have contributed in a just propor-
tion to their strength to the succes4ol termination of
the siege ; nor can we forbear to aeld that the French'
have dune full justice to. the exertions of the British
army on all occasions.

RESOURCES OF RUSSIA.
(Front the Times of this day.)
In such a contest as that between Russia and the
allies, it is, of course, natural to exercise some specula-
tion upoe. the resources of our antagonist, and to at-
tempt an estimate of the effects which exhaustion may
be producing upon the power of the enemy. In these
calculations, however, peculiar difficult;es are occasioned
by the secrecy which, in a country like Russia, envelopes
all public affairs. At home we know exactly what
amount of force we are exerting, and the charge which
that exertion entails. The numbers of men voted for
land and sea service form ma of public record ; and-
we are all very well aware film., whereas the Army,
Navy, and Ordnance used to cos' as some 16.000,000/.,
they are this year expected to cost come 50,000,0001.—
the difference of 34,000,0001. being due to the war.
More curious or careful inquirers can ascertain with
little trouble the actual or relative magnitude of particu-
lar items in the accmints—the charge for this' or that
force, or the cost of this or that description of stores.
Our own readers have been familiarised with the dissec-

tion of the various estimates, and have had repeated op-
' portunitios of observing and comprehending the distri-
bution and proportions of the details from which the
aggregate is made up. Everything is publicly axed ac-
curately stated and open to plain calculation. But in
Russia no such facilities of information exist, and in ap-
plying to the statements occasionally set fsrth by the
agents or partisans of that country the corrections which
they obviously dsmand, we can argue only from such
facts as have come under our observation, or from the
probabilities of the case itself. In these, however, we
find the materials for tolerably decisive conclusions.
At the outbreak of the war Russia had certainly the
reputetion of possessing a large military force already pre-
pere,l. We, it must be remembered, were upon a
peke establishment, whereas the Russian armies had
long been maintained at an enormous numerical strength
and in a state calculated for action. War, though not,
perhaps, expected quite so soon, was the very contin-
gency for which preparations had been so assiduously
made. We had to arm ourselves, whereas Russia was
already armed. Against this consideration, however.
we may set the fact that the drain of war fell upon
Russia earlier than upon ourselves. To the contests upon
the Danube the Russians had lost a vast number of
troops before the French and English expeditions sailed
for the East, and we here seen that notwithstanding the
prodigious array of legions represented as constituting
the permanent force of the Czars, levies of men have
succeeded each ether with ominous rapidity. These
levies are, no doubt, very different things from the Eng-
li.h recruiting system. When serfs are captured by
thousands and driven into the ranks of the army without
any expenditure in the shapes of bounty, and when they
are maintained at the lowest possible rate, the cost of
military augmentations would, of course, be lighter than
it is with ourselves. But, on the other hand, these
troops are expended as rudely as they are raised. They
are brought into action in immense masses, and have
been sacrificed in prodigious numbers. In the same
manner, although we may presume that the Russians
bad accumulated large warlike stores, in Sebastopol and
other arsenals, so as to support for a time, perhaps, the
demands of war without much immediate necessity for
new supplies, yet we have seen that the consumption of
this material was prodigial in the extreme. It should
be observed, too, tbat great pains bad evidently been ex-
pended.upon those departments of their army which, as
they evince excellence in military art, involve also in-
creased military charges. Even if men are cheap in
Russia, guns and gunners must be dear, especially when
the artillery is maintained on a scale unknown before.
When, therefore, we are told, as we have recently been,
that whereas the public revenue of Russia was some
35,000,0001., or, by the highest estimates, 45,000,000/.
sterling. the expenses of her army absorbed only some
14,000,0001. or 15,000,0001. of this amount, the utter
improbability of such a statement is discernible at a
glance. On our own army and ordnance we are expend-
ing this year between 27,000,0001. and 28,000,0001. ; and
to suppose that an army of 800,000 or 900,000 men,
comprising an extraordinary force of artillery, could be
supported for about half the sum required for our esta-
blishments is a presumption so palpably absurd as to
require no comment. It is, indeed, by no means im-
probable that the charges of the Russian army and of the
war itself in that country may be defrayed, to some ex-
tent, by means less direct and visible than simple pay-
ments from the Exchequer, but this hypothesis only
serves to augment the presumptive weight of the bur-
dens imposed upon the population. If the funds of the
wealthier classes are drained by exactions under the
name of voluntary contributions—if the operations of
the agriculturist are deranged by demands for his horses
and his waggons—and if the stocks even of the peasants
are exhausted for the supply of troops, it is evident that
the energies and resources of the country must suffer
even more than they would if the necessary funds were
raised by the ordinary system of taxation.
We think, therefore, there must be good reason for
believing in the exhaustion of the enemy under the pres-
sure of the war ; nor do we see, indeed, how such a con-
clusion could be easily contested after an impartial con-
sideration of facts. It has been said that the strength of
Russia for defensive war is immense, but this presump-
tion referred not merely to the numbers of her popula-
tion, but to the enormous extent of her territory and
the rigours of her climate, in reliance upon which she
could, even in the last extremities, retire before an in-
vader, and leave him with only the alternatives of pene-
trating a boundless desert or retreating under conditions
of almost equal difficulty. If the allied troops bad
plunged into the heart of the Russian empire these
difficulties would, no doubt, have made themselves
felt, but by directing our attack upon the Crimea
and Sebastopol we have put the Russians in such
respects upon a level with ourselves, or, as we
may more correctly say, we have even secured
the advantage. Instead of permitting the enemy to take
post upon his own ground, and to allure our armies to
whatever spot he pleased, we have ourselves opened the
lists on a spot to which he has been forced to repair by a
line of operations more difficult than our own. We
have landed our troops fresh from their depots within a
mile or two of the scene of action, whereas the Russians
have been compelled to toil over leagues upon leagues of
savage and desolate territory. They have not been re-
sisting an invading army in the centre of their empire,
but have been compelled to march to a remote corner of
their country to encounter an enemy established in
strength at that point. Their difficulties, therefore,
must have been great, and, as their financial resources
were far less considerable than our own, while the pres-
sure of a rigorous blockade has crippled their commerce,
we think there is good reason for assuming that they
cannot have maintained without exhaustion so tremen-
dous and desperate a struggle.

THE RUSSIAN PRISONERS AT LEWES —The whole of
the war prisoners stationed here—both officers and men
—are in a state of great delight, as they have been in-
lormed that an exchange of prisoners is to take place,
and that in the course of a fortnight or three weeks they
will all be sent to Libau on their way to Russia ; and
the Russian priest, who visits them weekly and adminis-
ters to them the sacrament and other rites of the Greek
Church, has authorised all the officers on ; arole, 20 in
number, to purchase any little necessaries they may re-
quire to the amount of one sovereign each, the accounts
to be sent to the Governor of the War Prison, to whom
the priest has undertaken to pay the money for their
liquidation. Some of the officers have already commenced
packing up their luggage in anticipation of their speedy
departure, and others are making preparations. Six of
the Finnish officers who were taken at Bomarsund last
year have obtained leave to spend a week in London, and
are now in the metropolis. The autumn appears as preju-
dicial to the health of the Finns as the spring, for there
is a large number in the prison hospital, and it bas
been found necessary to obtain the services of an assist-
ant-surgeon to relieve Dr. Burton of a portion of b es-
duties. Two of the men confined within the prison
died within the last fortnight, making altogether 15 since
their arrival in Lewes. The disease from which they
suffered was pthisis pulmonaris, which is a very preva-
lent complaint among them, and is attributable to their
weak constitutions, and in some measure to the nature
of their diet, which is very different to what they were
previously accustomed to. Large numbers of persons
continue to visit the prison and purchase the toys made
by the men ; indeed, on fine days the streets of the town
are quite thronged with people with toys in their hands.
According to the register of visitors, no less than 9;000
persons have been admitted within the prison walls dur-
ing the pest month, and the men have devoted the pro-
°eels of their industry to the purchase of various com-
forts and they have nearly all provided themselves with
watches since they have been here.