The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

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after the sacrifices they have made and arc making, it is duo
to them that their armaments should not retire from the
Black Sea without obtaining in the conditions of peace some
special security against Russian preponderance in that sea.
The interests of Austria may be fairly supposed to outweigh
in the Austrian'. Cabinet the general interests of Europe.
There is, however, some chance that at the last moment Aus-
tria may prove firm. It seems to me that Russia must either
refuse to limit her naval force in the Black Sea on the ground.
of her dignity and her greatness, or she must consent to make
her limitation effectual for its object. In either case our po-
sition is a good one. Our present business is to concert with
the French and Turkish Plenipotentiaries the exact mode in
which we shall act in the Conference, and leave it to Prince
Gortschakoff to declare the purport of the instructions which
ho may receive from St. Petersburg.
Should these be of a nature to meet our proposals half way,
M. Drouyn de l'Huys and I intend to declare at once what
we would accept, without any further discussion. If this is
refused, we break off; if a fresh reference to St. Petersburg
is asked. we intend to say that we can only consent to such
reference on condition that the answer must be a decided yes
or n0...F0r such an answer M. Drouyn de Flluys and I should
not wait. - -

In relating what passed a the meeting I have omitted to
say that Count }ldol, in the paper which he'read to us,
de-
cl:+red that if Russia were to refuse to guarantee the integrity
of Turkey it would be a eaBus belli with Austria.

No. 5.
Lord Clarendon approves Lord John Russell's language in
reply to Count Buol, as reported in No. 3.

No. 6.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON—(RECEIVED

Aram 17.)
Vienna, April 16, 1855.
My Lord—The Russian messenger will arrive to-day ; con-
ference will probably take place to morrow. The Austrian
Minister wishes it to adjourn for further deliberation till next
day.
If other hope is lost I wish to propose to the Conference
the following plan. The French Minister is favourable to it.
Austria will not support any demand for cession of territory.
1. As the existence of an aggressive Russian fleet in the
Black Sea would be in flagrant contradiction with the as-
surance so often given by Russia that she does not wish to
impair the integrity of the Ottoman empire, it is agreed :
(1.) That with the exceptions stated in the following arti-
cles, the rule of closing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, re-
cognised by the treaty of 1841, shall be in force so long as
the Russian naval long) in the Black Sea shall not exceed four
sail of the line, four frigates, and six smaller -vessels.
(2.) That while the said rule subsists two sail of the line,
two frigates, and three smaller vessels of any Power which
has no establishment in the Black Sea, and which is in amity
with the Sultan, may enter the Black Sea upon giving four
days' notice to the Ottoman Government. _ _

(3.) Upon any increase of the Russian naval forces beyond
the number specified in Article 1, or on the existence of a
larger Russian force being ascertained, a larger number of
ships of war of the allies of the Sultan may pass through the
Straits into the Black Sea, in conformity with the desires of
the Sultan, and in the proportions to be regulated from time
to tithe by agreement with the Ottoman Porte ; such increase
not to form, at any time, a legitimate subject of remonstrance
on the part of Russia.
(4.) At no time shall any ships of foreign nations, beyond
the small ships belonging to the Embassies admitted hitherto,
anchor in the Golden Horn, nor shall any number of lino of-
battle ships belonging to foreign Powers not having establish-
ments in the Black Sea excee ling four, pass at one time before
the capital in their passage from the Dardanelles to the Black
Sea, or from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles, while the Sul-
tan is at peace.
2. The cession to Turkey of the islands at the mouth of the
Danube surrendered by the treaty of Adrianople.
3. The Asiatic frontier, on the side of Russia, to be newly
laid down and defined.

4. An European guarantee of the territorial circumscription
of the Ottoman empire in Europe as defined in the trea•y.
5. The forts on the Asiatic coast, now abandoned by Rus-
sia, not to be re-occupied.--I have, dtc.,
J. RUSSELL.

No. 7.
TUE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD Jon RUSSELL.
(Extract.) Foreign-office, AprillB, 1855.
We think that the limitation of the Russian fleet should
be absolute, and that it would be made too conditional by
the plan you wish to propose. We must avoid as much as
possible the system of counterpoise, the objections to which
you have explained fully to the Austrian Government.

No. 8.
LORD JOUR RUSSELL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.—
(RECRIVBD APRIL 21.)

(Extract) Vienna, April 16, 1855.
We had yesterday a meeting of four hours' duration at
Count Buol's. M. Dronyn de I'Huys, Baron/ Bourquenoy,
Lord Westmoreland and I were present.

[ PRICE 4D. STAMPED SD•

Pasha were of material assistance, Count Buol proposed to the
belligerent Powers a general understanding to the following
effect :

1. That the plan of limitation of numbers agreed to in Lon-
don should be first proposed and be supported by Count Buol.
2. That it should be proposed that Russia and Turkey, by
mutual agreement, should maintain reciprocally a force no
larger than that which shall remain to Russia at the end of the
war. A list to be drawn up, and the convention referred to in
the treaty to have the same force as if it formed part of the
treaty. Ships of war- of the 'allies to be admitted into the
Black Sea in limited numbers, not exceeding for each half the
Russian force.

3. In case of the failure of both these propositions, he
thought that bases of peace might be found in the following
conditions :—A general engagement to respect the integrity
of the Turkish empire on• behalf of each, of-the Powers, and
against any one of them which should violate this engage-
ment ; a provision that the closing of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus should continuo to be the rule, with the excep-
tion that Powers which have not establishments in the Black
Sea may be admitted by the Sultan to the extent of half the
number maintained by Russia for each Power ; 'consuls in the
Russian ports ; a treaty with Austria that if Russia shall in-
crease her naval force in the Black Sea beyond the number
maintained by her in 1853 it shall be a cams kW for the con-
tracting Powers. It was agreed that the guarantee of the in-
tegrity of Turkey should be proposed before any of these
plans, the questions being taken in the order of-1, guaran-
tee ; 2, closing of straits, and limitation. I reserved my opi-
nion for further consideration. Such -was the general result
of this important meeting. M. Dronyn de l'lluys called upon
me in the evening, and we drew up together a rough outline
of the proposals to be made. It will be seen that, supposing
the second proposition to be rejected as well as the first, the
value of the third depends ou three things :-
1. Guarantee by all the contracting Powers of the territory
of Turkey.
2. A system of counterpoise in the Bhck.-Sea.
3. The limitkti m of the Itussian force in the Black Sea to
the number of ships maintained before the war, under pain
of war with the Allies.
The value of this last article consists in the maintenance of
the alliance directed against Russia. I confess it appears to
me that if this third system can be made an ultimatum by
Austria, it ought to be accepted by the Western Powers. In
saying this, I may appear to contradict my former opinions.
But, in fact, Ido not retract those opinions. The system of
limitation I believe to be far better than that of counter-
poise ; but the question is between an imperfect security for
Turkey and for Europe. and the continuance of the war
should the Government of her Majesty, • in concert with that
of France, be of opinion that such a peace can be accepted,
they will instruct Lord Westmoreland accordingly. If uot, I
hope to be allowed to be heard personally before a 'final de-
cision is made.

Count Buol, having been earnestly called upon by M. Drouyn
do Flluys to join the Western Powers in case of rupture, had
prepared an ultimatum of the Austrian Cabinet. It was, ob-
vious that great care had been taken in preparing the ground
upon which Austria means to take up her position. Count
Buol dwelt especially on the importance of closing the Dar-
danelles, and the value of an European guarantee of the
Turkish empire. But the real point of his discourse lay in
the declaration that Austria would not assent to press Bas-
sin on the question of limitation further than the restoratiin
of the status quo of the Russian fleet before the war.
The question was put in this way : In order to carry into
effect the third point, Count •Buol proposed the following
measures to be submitted to the Conference :-Ist. The clos-
ing of the Straits. 2d. The guarantee of Europe for the terri-
torial circumscription of the Ottoman empire, 3d. The prin-
ciple of a limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black
Sea. In presenting this third measure as a cases belli to
Russia, it was to be thus stated :—Limitation fixed at the
number of the fleet before the war, to be completed according
to the system of a balance of power. By this last phrase I
understood was meant that as fast as the Russians should
build ships, Turkey should be allowed to introduce ships
into the Black Sea ; so that in some years, if Russia should
have 15 ships of the line at Sebastopol, Turkey might have
15 sail of the line cruising in the Black Sea.
It would be difficult and wearisome to give the details of a
conversation which lasted for four hours. I will endeavour,
therefore, to give an abstract of the arguments employed.
Count Buol set before us the insignificance of the danger
to be feared from the presence in the Black Sea of ten ships
of the line not yet in existence, nor likely to be so for some
time, compared with the advantages to be derived from a peace
attended with such important concessions by Russia. He ex-
tolled the security which Turkey would obtain by the Euro-
pean guarantee. He spoke of the means which Turkey pos-
sessed for her defence. He again declared that the limitation
of the naval forces of Russia had not entered into the original
definition of the third point, and Austria had only adopted it
it in deference to the urgent representations of the Western
Powers. But Austria would not make war for ten ships more
or less. She could not justify such a count() to Germany or to
Europe. She had never pledged herself to war against Russia
for such a cause, and never would. She would look to the
whole of the peace to be made, and not to a single part.
On the other hand, the French and British Plenipoten-
tiaries maintained that a limitation to be good for anything
must be an effectual limitation ; that it would be a limita-
tion to say that Russia should not have more than 6,000
ships of war, but such a limitation would be absurd. Look-
ing at the particular proposal before us, it was evident that
the state of the Russian naval force before the war was the
very state of danger against which we were anxious to guard.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys referred to the attacks on the Turkish
ships at Sinope, and the declarations of Admirals Hamelin and
Dundas that they could not with prudence divide their forces.
I said that the British Government had always pointed to
the Russian fleet in Sebastopol as a standing menace to Tur-
key, and to provide by treaty that this very force might again
be constructed and assembled would be a course they could
not justify to Parliament or the nation; that Russia, if she
consented to limitation, would hardly refuse to agree to one
that would be efficient. The closing of the Dardanelles and
an efficient limitation were consistent propositions ; but, if
the limitation was not to be efficient, the closing of the Straits
would be inconsistent. He had himself argued that the dan-
ger consisted not in the magnitude of the Russian force, but
in the tete-a-tete of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. Yet
this very danger he now proposed to restore.
Count Buol was ready to propose consuls at Sebastopol
and elsewhere in the Black Sea; stations for small vessels at
the mouth of the Danube ; the faculty for the Sultan of call-
ing the fleets of his allies to his assistance in case of menace ;
and other subsidiary provisions. He laid it down as a prin-
ciple that the existence of an aggressive fleet in the Black
Sea is a flagrant contradiction with the assurance so often
given by Russia that she does not wish to disturb the integrity
of the Ottoman empire. But he did not consider that a fleet
of 15 sail of the line was excessive, or could be dangerous to
Turkey. He spoke of 10 sail of line-of-battle-ships, not yet
built, as not forming any real object of alarm to Europe.
The Ottoman Minister, who was unfortunately not sum-
moned to meet us, is of a totally different opinion. He thinks
it would be injurious to the Porte to require that we should
devote her revenues to the fortifications on the Bosphorus,
when internal improvements so urgently require her attention.
He doubts whether any forts on the Bosphorus would save
Constantinople from attack.
M. Drouyn de l'Huys, in the conversation I am reporting,
said that he was ready to increase the number of Russian
ships of war to be maintained to the number now above water
in the Black Sea.
I added, that although I had no authority to do so I would
undertake the same engagement.
Count Buol, however, 'persisted in his proposal, and asked
us to refer it to our Governments.
It Is not necessary to state the measures which Austria
would be prepared to take to convey an ultimatum to Russia
upon this basis. They are well conceived, and would be
doubtless acted upon with good faith.
But I cannot suppose that Russia would prefer war with
Austria to a peace which would give her leisure and means to
prepare a new attack on the Ottoman empire.
In the case of such an attack renewed five years hence,
could we rely on the Austrian guarantee of the integrity of
Turkey ? I apprehend that the same financial embarrass-
ment, the same doubt of Prussia and the German States, and
an army reduced to the establishment of 1852, would para-
lyse her then, as they did in 1853.
The occupation of the Principalities by Russia she felt to
be dangerous to her existence as a great Power, and she
risked war to put an end to it. But, that point accomplished,
I fear we must not count upon ber aid to save Constantinople
from the encroaching ambition of Russia.

* No. lb.

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----`, ; I*:' , ''.l vo Count Buol, I said, taust. be well aware that kilh ia S
scheme is impracticable ; zthe proposals he has :rip-
, )// f: .• *4.; .l,s,
'
ported, and the language ho has used in the Conferen sea,
•
prove that, in his opinion,
she t Si Ss
bi
sincere
ntm:
eoi gln.eh tit,nhcotohnoestipisirteeortflet:l
her honour and her dignity as a first-rate Power, consent to
satisfactory arrangements if
her wish to maintain the Ott om an empire and to give nejut.t
cause of uneasiness to Europe •;
Russia, while endeavouring to4,elude the real question at issue
by concessions respecting the., Principalities and the naviga-
tion of the Danube, refuses t) enter into engagements :a!
persists in her right to retain and to augment her ine•lns of
aggression, it is clear that I ter professions aro not sincere,
that her designs are dangerm is, and that the active co-opera,
tion of Austria with her allies will be essential to her own In--
terests, and will be justified. in the eyes of the world for the
purpose, not of humiliating uor of injuring Russia, but of_
arresting the progress of her am bitious policy, and of obtain-
ing securities for the future pea .:,e of Europe. '
Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count
Buol. siYaiii::::.l:

No. 15..
THE EARL OF WESTMORELANP TO TUE EARL OF CLAMINDO7
(RECEIVED NAY 19.)
(Extract.) Vienna, May 16, 1855.
The proposition of Count Buol, a sketch of which was sent
to your lordship in the telegraphic. despatch of this day, is
annexed to this despatch.
Count Buol has felt that since the publication of the pro.
tocols of tho Conferences py her M.jesty's Government the
position of Austria in the eyes of .the public would be ren-
dered extraordinary if she dicl:not take any measure to fulfil
the words which he bad himself used. at theta
—namely, that Austria would still seek the means of bring..
ing about an understanding between the great Nwers of
Europe. Having in view, therefore,_ the fulfilment. of .this
engagement on the part of 'Austria' • which had 'IOW been ,
made public, and having, as a second object, to give to 'the
final closing of the Conferences (if, indeed, they were to to
closed) the dignity of an cfficial form, Connt Buol bad
drawn up the propositions now submitted to your lvd-
ship, which he thought had the great advantage of not
betraying that that perfect unity of ideas between Austria
and the Western Powers which had been so manifest during
the whole course of the negotiations had in any manner been
disturbed.

Count Buol, therefore, making use of the right to convoke
the Conference, which appertains to each of its members so
long as it is not formally dissolved, proposes to state to the
assembled Plenipotentiaries that, in accordance wits the lan-
guage he had held a:. the 12th and 13th Conferences, ho had
invited them to assemble, in order to submit to them the pro-
position which accompanies this despatchlall the stipulations
of which had originally been suggested by the British and
French Plenipotentiaries.

Count Buol believes that the proposition will be sup-
ported by the representatives of England and France, and
that it will be rejected by the Russian representatives, as it
has already in part been rejected by them. Count Buol
would then declare, on the refusal of the Russian Plenipo-
tentiaries to entertain this project, that it appeared to him
that there was no further object for the meeting of the
Conference, which he would then formally close.
In communicating this plan to Baron Bourqueney and my-
self, Count Buol begged that our Governments should be so-
licited to consider its communication as of the most confiden-
tial character. With regard to the proposition itself, he pointed
out to us that it was entirely based upon ideaswhich had ema-
nated from the British and French Plenipotentiaries, to which
he added some modifications of his own. He stated distinctly
that the proposition, such as it was, was one which must be
either accepted or rejected by Russia, and that be would not
bring it forward as one capable of bearing discussion and mo-
dification.

Count Buol then stated that, as he still considered that
the project which had recently been submitted (as Austria's
ultimatum to Russia) to the British and French Govern-
ments, and rejected by them, fulfilled the engagements which
Austria had taken with regard to the third basis, he would
not consider that the rejection of the present proposition by
the Russian Plenipotentiaries in conference would entail
upon Austria the giving effect to the extreme obligations of
the treaty of the 2d of December.
Count Buol then said that while he recognised the right
of the British and French Governments to abstain from the
Conference which he intended to convoke, he must remark to
us that such abstention would constitute the rupture of the
negotiations by our Governments, and would thus render pa-
tent the dissidence of opinion which prevailed between them
and the Government of Austria.

fEnclosure.)
PROPOSITION TO BE SUBMITTED BY COUNT BUOL TO THE
CONFERENCE.

1. The high contracting parties being desirous that the
Sublime Porte should participate, in the advantages of the
good understanding established by the law of nations
among the various States of Europe, severally engage to
respect the independence and territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, guarantee in common the strict observ-
ance of this engagement, and will in consequence consider
every act and every event which would be of a nature to
endanger it as a question of European interest.

r If adifference should arise bet;reen the Porte and one of
the contracting Powers, those two States, before resorting to
arms, should place the other Powers in a position to obviate
this contingency by pacific means.
2. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of the
Bosphorus ant the Dardanelles, established by the treaty of
July 13, 1841, shall remain in force, with the exceptions
specified in the following articles :-
3. Each of the contracting Powers which has no establish-
ment in the Black Sea will be authorised by a firmau from
his Highness to send into any station in that sea two frigates
or vessels of smaller force, in order to protect their commerce
and to exercise the necessary inspection.
4. The Russian Plenipotentiaries and those of the Sublime
Porte will propose in common to the Conference the equal
effective force of the naval armaments which the two sea-
bordering Powers will maintain in the Black Sea, and which
must not exceed the amount of Russian vessels at present
afloat in that sea. The arrangement which they shall have
made in this respect shall form an integral part of the general
treaty.
There shall also be inserted in the treaty the measures
which the said Plenipotentiaries shall have agreed to, with a
view to enforce the precise and constant observance of the
stipulations of the present article.
5. In the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan being me-
naced with aggression, he reserves to himself the right of open-
ing the Straits to all the naval forces of his allies.

No. 16.
TIIE EARL OF CLARENDON TO TILE EARL Or WESTMORELAND.
Foreign-office, May 29.
My Lord,—Your despatch of the 16th* has been received
and laid before the Queen.

Your Lordship states in that despatch that Count Buol
has felt that since the publication of the protocols by her
Majesty's Government the position of Austria in the eyes
of the public would be rendered extraordinary if she did not
take any measures to fulfil the words used at the last Con-
ference—viz., that Austria would still seek the means of
bringing about an understanding between the great Powers
of Europe ; and that having in view the fulfilment of this
engagement, together with the object of giving to the final
closing of the Conference the dignity of an official form,
Count Buol desires to convoke the Conference, and to sub-
mit to it the proposition which is inclosed in your Lord-
ship's despatch.
Count Buol expects that this proposition will be supported
by the representatives of England and France, and that it
will be rejected by the representatives of Russia; and Count
Buol would then declare, on the refusal of the Russian Pleni-
potentiaries to entertain the project, that there was no fur-
ther object for the meeting of the Conference, which he would
then formally close.
Your Lordship will convey to Count Buol the best thanks
of her Majesty's Government for this communication, which
they regard as a fresh proof of the good-will of Austria and of
her earnest desire to promote the restoration of peace; and
you will state to his Excellency that her Majesty's Govern-
ment consider that they would be wanting to the frankness
and good faith which have hitherto characterised the pro-
ceedings between Austria and the Western Powers if they
hesitated to make known the objections they entertain to the
course which Count Buol proposes to adopt, and the grounds
on which they think that the engagement taken by his Excel-
lency at the last Conferences will not be effectually carried
out by a project which he says he expects that Russia will re-
ject, and which cannot be acceptable to England and France.
Either we are prepared to give up the conditions which,
with the concurrence of. Austria we have hitherto demanded
as the means of carrying out that object of the third point
which consists in making the preponderance of Ruda
in the Black Sea cease, or we are not prepared to do so.
If we had brought our minds to despair of SUMO in
war, and were ready therefore to make peace on any terms
which would at once put an end to hostilities, then the pro-
posal which Austria offers to make on our behalf to Russia
would be inexpedient, because it contains the principle of
limitation to which Russia has already objected, and her,ob-
jections to which she has now publicly announced in her cir-
cular of May 10th; and, if such were the hopeless state If
our affairs, it would be necessary to make some proposal that
Russia would be likely to accept, instead of one which, in the •
opinion of Count Buol, Russia is almost certain to reject.
But if, on the other hand, we still think the future pro-
spects of the war sufficiently favourable to entitle ns to
persevere in demanding the conditions which
secantvetrien
forward as affording a foundation for future
objections
be-
the proposal of Austria is open to serious
limitatiOn of
cause, though it contains the principle of
ath rinciple is
the naval forces of Russia in the Black paupr:
not applied in a manner that would be eSeaff.ecale. f_Po_rnsotarit's
pose ; and it does not contain the principal 0)
bgeenexeraceledaemd:
best security that
pointments and supervision,
and his Allies.
without the knowledge of the Sultan
provide, and who.,
I must also observe that the stipul ti
the limit which may be agreedwuh which
5..0 tf
onro ta
who is now in active co.
and no allusion is made ton'dS •id.ance,
and for whose dignity
' operation with England a
nesty is altogether omitted inaithineiap,roposition of Count Buol ;
• the war, is entitled to become a
by her active co-opera
treaty of peace,
' contracting party to any
d eraents held out
and interests they are
tesopegallY
• But what are the in in,
make such us ria to per-
_r to offers on our behalf to
• suede us to empower bound to

Russia 7
indeed, two inducements which might be held
outThWeruesaars% temptation make renewed proposals of peace

proposals intended to be
as would be '
to Russia.
gwinoulttibren,attuhraetsutchhe
made' • all probability,satasfactory to
us would, m be accepted by Russia, and that
' e might be obLai
thus Pox. . ned on terms alike honourable to
both parties, and affording security against the renewal of wait
The second inducement would be, that the proposal being.
always ill its nature such as would be satisfactoryus,Aus-
tria would engage that, in the event of its beinr rejected by
Russia, she would forthwith • - ej
take part with the Western
Powers in the war,
and would assistthem in compelling Bus-
sia to accept the conditions so proposed.
But in the present case no such inducements are held
out ; the conditions are not in themselves such as would be
satisfactory to us. We are told that Russia would, in all
probability, refuse them ; and Count Buol informed your
Lordship that this rejection by Russia would not lead
Austria to give full effect to the obligations of the treaty of
December 2 by uniting her arms to ours. The only con-
sequence, then, of the course of proceeding which Count Buol
propcses that we should adopt would be a formal declaration
by Austria that the Conferences were at an end, and, it is to
be presumed, a subsequent announcement that she had de-
termined to maintain her neutral position, and to take no
part with England and France in the war.
Undoubtedly, in the present state of things, her Majesty's
Government see no advantage in the continuance of the Con-
ferences, and are prepared to concur in their being closed ;
but an announcement by Austria that she meant to take no
part in the war would be most inkuious to the cause which
Austria has, morally and politically, espoused, and would, on
that account, be deeply regretted by her Majesty's Govern-
' ment.
The value which her Majesty's Government attach to the
, Austrian alliance is too well known to Count Buol to need