The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-16 00:00:00

We can acquaint our readers this morning with a fact
which will create no small astonishment, and which will
give the public a new insight into the policy of Russia
and the contingencies of the war. The Crimea, at pre-
sent the scene of hostilities, is a peninsula situated at
the extreme south of the Russian empire, and connected,
as our maps inform us, with the continental territory by
the Isthmus of Perekop. Across this isthmus, as we
have hitherto understood, all Russian troops must be
marched to the relief of dish comrades before Sebastopol,
and great stress has naturally been laid upon the expe-
diency of blockading or occupying this important pas-
sage. The isthmus itself is but a narrow strip of land,
and is traversed by a wall of masonry from sea to sea.
The only access to the peninsula is through an arched
gateway in this wall, and thus, as we are informed by a
note in one of the best and most recent maps of the coun-
try in question, the possession of this fortified line effectu-
ally closes the Crimea against an enemy. Now, at this
moment "the enemy" advancing from the north is no other
than Russia herself ; and if, therefore, the Isthmus of
Perekop could bo occupied, the Crimea and its fort-
resses would be at the mercy of the Allies on the single
condition of dealing satisfactorily with the Russians
actually in Sebastopol or the viciuity. No further re-
inforcements could be brought up. The Crimea would
be " invested " far more completely than Sebastopol it-
self, and the whole peninsula, rather than the principal
town, would be in a state of siege. Such has been
hitherto the prevailing belief, and various plans have
been accordingly suggested for bringing to pass a result
so desirable. Turks were to be landed at Perekop and
put in possession of the line ; gun-boats were to be sta-
tioned along the shore ; and, altogether, it was argued
that a pass so easy both to occupy and defend might be
made our own with great advantage to the allied cause.
Even if we could not absolutely keep out the Russians,
we should, at-any rate, be accurately informed of their
coming, and could certify the etrongth of each rainfaren-
ment, and the time of its approach, for the benefit of Lord
Raglan's army. Why these schemes were never carried out
it is unnecessary at present to inquire. What we now
wish to tell the public is, that they would, one and all,
have been perfectly useless, for that the Russian Go-
vernment had some time back constructed across the
shallows of the Putrid Sea another great military road
to the Crimea, so effectually that it is actually the better
road of the two, and so quietly that Western Europe
never heard a word about the matter.
if the reader Vl ill take any ordinary map of the Cri-
mea he will see that to the east of the isthmus of Pere-
kop there extends a species of narrow inland lake,
known as the Putrid Sea, which is separated from the
Sea of Asoff by a curious dike-like strip of land, running
up from the eastern corner of the Crimea, and almost,
but not quite, touching the Russian continent at a
point called the Straits of Genisch. It is possible
for troops advancing into the Crimea from the interior
of the empire to leave the isthmus of Perekop, in
their rear, to march along the coast of the Putrid
Sea, to cross the Straits of Genitsch, and then, by toil-
ing along the whole length of the dikelike strip above-
mentioned, called the Isthmus of Araba, to enter the
Crimea a few miles north of Kaffa. This route was
actually taken by a Russian General in the last cen-
tury, and it still forms a commercial road between the
eastern parts of the Crimea and the continent. Some
nine or ten years ago, however, a road was commenced,
upon bridges and viaducts, across the Putrid Sea it-
self, and was completed, we believe, a considerable
time before the outbreak of the present war. At what
points the communication between the two shores
has been effected we cannot precisely say ; but they
approach each other so closely in many places, and
the whole sea, besides being narrow, is so full of
shoals and shallows, that many facilities for the
undertaking were no doubt discovered. According
to the information we have acquired, foundations
were probably laid at favourable points of the
shoals, and bridges then carried from one point to an-
other, till the communication was complete. The road
itself, now that it is inished, is said to be the best road
available for the passage of troops and stores from Rus-
sia to the Crimea. For troops moving; from Odessa we
imagine that the Perekop route would be preferable,
but for reinforcements arriving from the south-east of the
empire and the country of the Cossacks the route across
the shallows would be more convenient. In this case the
distance between Simpheropol and the interior would be
much shortened, and it is mot improbable that both
routes may have beau recently employed when it was de-
sired to surprise the allies with an overwhelming superi-
ority of force suddenly brought up. Altogether, the
fact thus tardily disclosed, in the filth month of our oc-
cupation, bears signal and striking testimony both to
the preparations of the Russian Government for the con-
tingency of war in the Crimea, and to the amount of
knowledge we may yet have to acquire upon this and
similar subjects.--1 loses.