The National Register.
London, England, 1812-04-26 00:00:00

A PRII, 26.

We have been long accustomed to record British
triumphs. In all ages, since the establishment of this em-
pire, valour has formed the grand characteristic of its
children, and victory their prize. Yet, notwithstanding
the splendour of our military annals, for a time at least,
those of our navy shed a still brighter lustre on the British
name. Brilliant atchievements, like the ocean foam,
sprung on every wave. Whatever enemy opposed us at
sea, and whatever force he brought into action, his dis-
comfiture served to encrease our power and the terrors of
our fame, until we had reached a height of earthly gran-
deur, which, it was thought, humanity could never sur-
pass. What, however, is now the situation of the coun-
try ? Is she not almost daily crowned with additional glo-
ries, reaped by our land armies in the Peninsula ? Does
not her sword smite the foes of human kind with as much
force as her trident ? The late decisive and surpassing
triumphs that have marked the career of the brave army
commanded by Lord WELLINGTON, will yield a satisfac-
tory reply. It is impossible, however, to consider the last
display of British heroism, which has reduced the strong
fortress of Badajoz into our possession, without feeling
the tide of exultation mixed with regret and grief. The
pride and power of the enemy in Estrsmadura, are now
laid prostrate, but the numbers that have fallen on our
side sadden e% en the face of victory itself. Had it been
slightly incurred, with the view of acquiring fame at the
expellee of human lives, we should not bestow on a bril-
liant atchievement the praise to which a useful one is alone
entitled. But the capture of Badajoz was an object of
vital importance to the interest both of Portugal and Spain,
and the only method of insuring success, was that of act-
ing with energy and promptitude. There is no doubt but
the enemy had no intention of suffering that place to fall
without an attempt at raising the siege. They relied on
its making a protracted resistance, and were collecting all
their force to rush upon our army, and wrench from its
grasp the reward of its toils, had not the indefatigable
activity and profound skill of our Commander interposed,
anticipated, and defeated their plans. A bombardment
might have been attended with less danger and a smaller
loss on our side ; but it would have consumed more time,
and the whole end of the campaign might have failed.—A
general action would then have probably taken place, in
which our army, compelled to leave a powerful division
before the fortress, would have fought with diminished
numbers, and although we are convinced v: ith equal cou-
rage, perhaps with results less advantageous., and certainly
as sanguinary.
The advantages likely to accrue from this capture are
sn great, as completely to overbalance the consideration
of the loss which we have sustained. The communication
between MARMONT and Sour.T may now be considered as
nearly interrupted and cut off ; and there is reason to think
that operations are already commenced with a view to
drive F;OL'LT from Seville, and raise the siege of Cadiz,
rind Licar the province of Andalusia altogether of the
r:rench. Sucilve will probably, in that event, form a
junction with SOULT ; but, in doing this, he must aban-
don his views upon Alicant ; leave Valencia unprotected ;
and Arragon, as well as Catalonia, entirely open to the
Guerrillas, and to-the regular Spanish armies under Baron
IYERous, General LACEY, and General O'DONNELL.
, We subjoin some fer accounts from Lisbon though
.hey are not of a later date than those brought by Captain