The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-12 00:00:00

SPIRIT Or THk PUBLIC JOURNALS.

THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.
( Prom the Times of this day. )
The first question which presents itself to our
consideration, after we have given utterance to
those feelings of exultation and of gratitude which
the glorious termination of the siege of Sebastopol
excites at this moment throughout the empire, re-
lates to the military consequences of this victory,
and to the strategical measures best calculated to
bring the campaign and the war to a speedy and
triumphant termination: A tremendous blow has
been struck at the military power and fame of Rus-
sia, and her naval forces in the Black Sea have been
annihilated. The courage, the perseverance, and
the incessant labours of the allied armies have al-
ready disposed of the arguments of those who con-
tended that Sebastopol was impregnable until it
should be invested, and that the Russian soldiers
were invincible within itsredoubts. It now appears
from Admiral Bruat's despatch that the mortar-
boats of both squadrons took part in the attack,
and threw shells against the marine batteries, so
that from the heights of Inkerman to Streletzka
Bay the whole fortress was encompassed with a
storm of fire, and an enormous number of men
must have been engaged in the works. Neverthe-
less, upon the final establishment of General
Bosquet's division of the French army in the
Malakhoff Tower, Prince Gortschakoff instantly
proceeded to execute a pre-arranged plan for the
destruction and evacuation of the town. All that
night the harbour was illuminated by the lurid
glare of burning ships, and from time to time
the explosion of vast magazines rent asunder
enormous piles of masonry; while an all-devour-
ing conflagration swept like the scourge of Heaven
over the devastated city. Sebastopol has pe-
rished, like Moscow, by the hands of her de-
fenders, while her successful assailants witnessed
the awful spectacle unscathed. Means of retreat
bad been secured by a long bridge of rafts across
the great harbour, and for many hours large masses
of troops were removed by this passage to the
northern side ; but at 8 o'clock in the morning of
the..9th this communication was stopped, the whole
of the works and town being then evacuated. If,
as is probable, any of the Russians remained on the
south bank after that hour, they must either have
perished in the fire or fallen into the hands of the
besiegers.. About 500 of the wounded, we know,
remained in the Fort St. Paul, and for them an
armistice was asked ; but, with their accustomed
indifference to the preservation of life and property,
the Russians were determined to destroy the city
rather than capitulate, and they executed their
design. _ _

The position of Prince Gortschakoff's army, after
the main body had effected its retreat across the
harbour, was, therefore, as follows :—His extreme
right, consisting of the corps most actively engaged
in the defence of the place, rests upon the Sever-
naia work, or Star Fort, and holds the strongly in-
trenched positions on the north shore, where, no
doubt, considerable preparations have been made
for this emergency. His centre covers the Belbek,
and is protected iu front by the fieldworks thrown
up along the ridge of Inkerman. His left wing
consists of Liprandi's corps, occupying the ground
from Mackenzie's Farm to the heights of Aitoder
on the Bakshi-Serai road. No attempt was made by
the relieving army under Liprandi to effect a di-
version during the assault of the Bth, and the severe
defeat of the 16th of August appears to have
satisfied the enemy that the lines of the Tcher-
naya were not to be carried. But the result of
the general assault and the occupation of the
southern side by the Allies entirely change; the
strategical positions of the cinnhatants, and alse
the objects of the campaign. The struggle for the
possession of Sebastopol is at an end. That prize
is in our hands, and, as the defence of the fortress
and -the harbour was the grand object of the
Pussians, they have nothing left on that spot to
contend for. The nu re occupation of the north side
of the port is a barren advantage, for, though it
might hold a garrison, it cannot shelter a defeated
army ; and it is obvious that, after the failure of
the main object, all the ability and. generalship (,f
the Russians will be required to save the whole
body of their forces in the Crimea from destruction.
We therefore infer that the northern forts will
either be held for a time by a limited garrison, or,
more probably, al togeti er abandoned, in the hope
of saving the army. Neva- was an army in a more
critical position. They are confined wii hin a penin-
sula which affords them no other fortified position,
no sustenance for troops, and no water beyond
a certain line. The sea, covered with hostile ves-
sels, surrounds three sides of this theatre of war,
and the fourth i- separated from the Russian base
of operations by steppes and marshes. The allied
armies already occupy strong positions at Eupatoria
and Yenikale, which can be reinforced in a few
hours by sea, so as to threaten the Russians in
their flank and rear ; and while it is impossible for
the enemy to hold his ground in the south of the
Crimea—for which, indeed, there is now no further
object—to retreat in this season across the country
is a formidable undertaking, while the loss of a
battle in the open held would be absolute destruc-
tion. The Russians are in a trap, from which the
Tchongar road and the Isthmus of Perekop are thu
only means of escape, and even there their com-
munieations may possibly be intercepted.
No doubt all these contingencies have been fore-
seen ; Prince Gortschakoff's plan of campaign has
long since been made ; judging, therefore, from
the accustomed tactics of the Russian army, as
well as from the extreme difficulty of his present
position, we incline to the opinion that he will
adopt the course of a general and • immediate
retreat. To hold the Crimea without Sebastopol,
and even after the harbour of Sebastopol itself
has been transformed by conquest into the base of
operations of the invading armies, would be a boot-
less and unprofitable task, and the danger is
greatly aggravated by the fact that the whole body
of the Allies, with unlimited means of naval tran-
sport at their command, will shortly be at libert3
to advance upon any part of the peninsula, which
is accessible from the coast. • These immedi-
ate consequences of their own success in the siege
operations must have been considered by the Al-
lied Generals, and the moment is- now arrived
when they may proceed to open the campaign of
which the reduction of Sebastopol was the first
preliminary. That field operations of this nature
have long been contemplated by the Allied Govern-
ments is obvious from the large cavalry force they
have continued to send to the Crimea. The British
army alone can bring upwards of 3,000 sabres and
lances into the field, and the French cavalry is still
more numerous and impatient of the inaction to
which it has hitherto been condemned. Hitherto
the contest in the Crimea has been confined to one
single object, and, with the exception of the action
of the 20th of 'September on the Alma, and the
flank march to Balaklaya, it has been a war with-
out a single tactical movement. General Pelissier
has shown, in our humble opinion, very admirable
military qualities since he assumed the command.„
and he has been ably supported by General Simp-
son ; but the present state of our affairs deserves to
call forth abilities of a still higher and more bril-
liant order. The Russian army in the Crimea is
probably not superior to the forces of the Allies in
numbers, and it is immeasurably inferior to them
in resources and supplies, as well as in those moral
qualities which at once constitute and enhance the
prestige of victory. On every occasion on which
they have encountered an enemy in this war—
whether Turks, French, English, or Sardinians
—the fortune of war has deserted the Russian
eagles. For them to advance is impossible, for
the whole coast is guarded by -the enemy, and no
Russian vessel floats on those waters. The strong-
hold in which the Czars had accumulated during
the last two reigns an incalculable amount of war-
like stores for the subjugation of the East has been
reduced to a blood-stained ruin by the troops who
were glad to escape with life from its burning walls;
and the question on which the attention of Europe
is now fixed is no longer the fate of Sebastopol, but
how is the Russian army to escape from the Crimea,
or to maintain itself there ? We trust that no
considerations whatever will prevent the Allied
Generals from giving the most vigorous and imme-
diate effect to the great advantage they have won.
Beyond the time absolutely required for the re-
moval of the wounded no armistice should be con-
ceded. To give the campaign its full effect its
success must now be rendered, absolute and com-
plete. The Russians are a people who will deny to
the last that any advantage has been gained over
them, and Prince Gortschakoff boasts in his ac-
count even in this sanguinary defeat that ho was
extremely successful in carrying off his army.
Fighting, as they are, in closed lists, without the
means of escape, the defeated Russian army should
be compelled to lay down its arms, or to fight a
general action, which would crown the series of
our successes by a still more decisive victory. The
peninsula itself is besieged and well-nigh invested
by our fleets and armies, and if the command of a
single road be lost, the whole line of retreat, and
the only line by which supplies and communica-
tions can reach the Russians, is gone. Suoh we
take to be the relative position of the belligerents
in the Crimea, and, with the means of action at the
disposal of the French and English Generals, we
have confident hopes of a glorious result.

( From the Daily News of this day.)

- -
There is a cool, self-complacent effrontery in the
bulletins and despatches of Prince Gortschakoff
that has never been surpassed. He can make a
defeat a theme of congratulation ; and, when he
has nothing else to brag of, will boast of the alac-
rity and prudence he has displayed in running
away. Ho appooxo to think that his InaPo44l Was.

ter will be reconciled to his recent loss, by being
told that " the enemy found nothing on the south-
! ern side but blood-stained ruins." He announces
that " the passage of the garrison from the southeru
to the northern part was accomplished with extra-
ordinary success," with as jaunty an air as if he
were talking of an advance, and' not of a retreat_
A man of this character—who is equally proud of
drubbing and being drubbed—does not take muea
pains to conceal his losses. It is true Prince Gertr
chakoff—or the officials at St. Petersburg whop_w"
lish as much of his reports as is deemed expedient-- •
does not go the length of telling explicitly liof
many of his men have been put hors de combat,
but he gives a tolerable inkling of it. He aekncsw.
ledges to the loss of a hundred men while crossing
the bridge ; and adds that he was obliged to leave •
cc five hundred men grievously wounded on the
southern side." If the wounded, whom it was
found impossible to carry along with the retreating
army, amounted to so many, those who were able
to accompany it, or who were sent away before the
retreat commenced, must have been much more
numerous ; and if 100 men were killed in crossing
the bridge, the number of those who fell during
the bombardment and in the assault must have
been much greater. The epithet,
too, which t
Prince applies to the fire of the allies (feud'enfer_
—infernal fire) would seem to indicate that his
nerves had been a little shaken by it. It is equi-
valent to what decorous Englishmen would call an
admission that the Allies had made the place t°°
hot to hold him ; or, as more plain-spoken
Pe i~l
ple might say, that they had played the dev
with him. Prince Gortschakoff's despatch in;
plies that the whole of the southern-side has be,
abandoned by the Russians. This is a point as
which some—to us unaccountable—doubts we_f:
expressed in certain quarters during the earl,' PaLi,
of yesterday. The croakers would have it Wail
only the town and the Kai abelnaia suburb has Is
evacuated. But, even before Prince Gortschake
report was received, all doubts were cleared 1113:11/
the explicit statement of Admiral Bruat _
approached, this morning, the Quarantine batteriel
on board the Brandon, and ascertained mysel,fith:
they are now evacuated. They have just uf,i'riie
up. Our soldiers have left their trenches, and
spreading themselves in groups over the fortide
tions of the town, which seem to be totally
de-
serted."
allied
The blow which has just been struck by the • b,
armies is sufficient to insure our ultimate trig This
if it is promptly and vigorously followed
is what the English public must now look to ~11
insist upon. There is a natural indolence iodif.,
men that prompts them to withdraw from an With
ficult undertaking provided they can do g 0 eta'
eclat ; and our Ministers—no disrespect tu
is meant—are, after all, mere men. Besides', t
an
will immediately be besieged by all who have.bie, .
interest in letting Russia down as softly as Peeeltrota
There will be renewed offers of mediation.,, of
Austria ; and the Aberdeenites, and the whe,`e
the Peace-at-any-Price party, will be brea73i.
out into choral chaunts in honour of autoDiagil
mous forbearance in the hour of victory, an' to
demonstrations that we can now "put an en co
the war with honour." It is not enough that vvefit ;
do so with honour ; we must do so with Pret.ve
we must gain something by the efforts we eats
made. When the French and English Goverton." of
recognised the four points *as a possible bag
pea
negotiation, they expressly reserved to them° Do
a right to modify their demands in accorda
with the progress of warlike events--that is, ttell'oit
crease their demands if success should put it ia_anoli
power to exact more. Russia is now in a "'tn
worse condition to stand out for easy tering irit
she was then. We say this in no vindictive tiT,cot
towards Russia, but with a view to the perina.uno
peace and security of Europe. It is our husl..o,
to render the Government at St. Petersibt7oer•
innocuous as possible. We must not all" that
selves to be deluded by sunh vague tall► as ad.
" the war was commenced to diminish the aac, o 0
ancy of Russia in the Black Sea." That raakimo ja
anything, or nothing. The war was undertzwe or
the first place to compel Russia to abstain from the
propriating territory that of right belonged_fotO
Porte, and from usurp)ig a de facto suzu'mitsb•
over the Sultan ; and, in the second place, to —rs of
lish the general princip'e. that the Great VII tor
Europe will no longer tol -rate the wresting' e`e of
ritory from the weak 1 y the strong by f°l%
arml. The war will I): va been waged in sTili it
Russia is not compelled, in the treaty by whic,
is terminated, to renounce in express ter111;00.
attempt= in future to extend its territories ;go-
quest at the expense of any member of theftaio
pean system of states ; and to promise to 3e'cor
in future from all int( /Terence in the domeou.3be ,
earns of the Ottoman Empire. Nay more, .""„cof,
good faith of ussia cannot safely be relied aria
material guarantees must be exacted from lief, of
the fulfilment of these promises. The nab,ll.o" '
ode
these material guarantees is a consideration „s.' to
delicacy and difficulty. They must be sue° Tobt
impress Russia with the danger of breakingod
and at the same time such as areleast likely to lee
the national pride of the Russian people. I so
any portion of the Russian territory—properlout-
called—severed from the Empire, the sense 'art'
raged nationality would expose Europe to the cilarge
of a speedy renewal of hostilities. But there are f
tracts of territory subject to the Government,°rDea,
Petersburg, which the Russians have not yeti "`"erea
to consider as their own; these might safely be se.forto
from the Empire. Again, it has been the 11,a10 the
practice of Russia, when victorious, to mazes of
conquered bear in a great measure the ex.P''',aio it!
the war ; she could not reasonably conill'3so,
having "her own measure meted to her
were France, England and Turkey to exareglossio,
damnify at the close of the present war. be wit
`
is amerced in one or other of these war s.th the
be chary of again provoking a collision IV 01011
Western Powers ; if she is let off more easilYe'suo)e
comparative impunity will encourage her to is
her tortuous courses without delay. One trbt t°
certain, that no overtures to negotiation one,,in to
be made by the Allies until Russia sues 0 I ui'dious
rant her peace on their own terms. Any itsnts
to be
applications on the part of Austria ought so Pr
peremptorily rejected. We confess that in o more
as our own Government is concerned,. CO?
,mention of " negotiation" throws us lot°,
sweat. We never hear of English dipleolivb Wi ie".
to
out having the words recalled to our mindless
Helen MacGregor is made by Scott to ad s bee
her sons 'after learning that her husband J'ad your
entrapped by his enemies. " You may yea to her
father," said Helen MacGregor, turning WI
sons, " in what this young Saxon tellsite sfe,ho
only when the bonnet is on his head " for
in his hand, he never exchanges the tartaaisertibly
broadcloth, but he runs himself into the 10 again'
intrigues of the Lowlanders, and heeranoir tool
after all he has suffered, their agent,..—th 0011 1
their slave." And even so it is with .I°lll2 a /it;
his foreign policy. He never desists frn, '''s4f toad
rious war to negotiate, but he allows be:n.,„ ia 11,;(1
outwitted. This was the case with 111; gain 'so
and 1815 ; and was very nearly heirleg,peas. tie
case with him at the late Vienna Corei-diploto.,,e' r..
the battle-field be is irresistible ;in t,he Alf the ho
salons he has uniformly earned for "
castic description of Byron—" the le%
bleeds for all, and ever bleeds in vain'

(Prom Galignani'a ger of tlis
„natigli. at 0:1
mann
WtsbhuaabsTettjhoseturechtbosejipo,ouflieninnso,ideroxiinad!,rntatramohiitueismgrAfheprm
atsohsme
Univers, merely give
tetieexnhipe_
esi allied
vetahcwart iei :o izt
er4s,ba
tii e—se
ap:rifoin igooii
do
:n: s
1,11
iiii
oiiii::-ti,...
.1
of congratulation, or, indeed, at*. ;7s v. ''''
ever. We commence with the Jourottv ~... a,
which makes the following observatiol39o'f unhoPeof
•• A. great, an immense success, and 'Wad Ca ,I°„uiroce
for rapidity, crowns the heroic con sf3"V the firt„r6ro°
the allied armies in the East. Let us ze -t in wi the
speak of the great feat of arms pointed 0' Sense 04 eie
despatch, and afterwards examine the that -oi
second. It was in open day, at high lingt:baslo;.
gained footing on the formidable ratnParts rub- nth°. .„t1- the
and on one of its strongest and moat nor° as well been
In fact, the tower ruined by the assault',' it,, flo° cow
Korniloff Bastion, which serves to sorra 000° the
constructed on a mount commanding
baorsuerngal,(tthhee Kcaareraenbienlngadiao,ckws,hearnedtahlei oltilitali Ptirt9:ler
the_grsest:keibtt:
tablishments are situated). This first gloat exPl_s 01
less considerable, and the assault a
but if the bearing of it was great for tlilleafgunrtboenir theleec°'6joliot
the siege no one could have supposed thst!reoospoEsega by
the Malakhoff was taken. it would have giv„ouiPlishe:ll re'
of the vast faubourg. Our brave men 7,,__1„ to sti.lily
a single blow a task which appeared likely ratut'tbe
quire long and perilous labours. it „jou., tb,..„%ted
thought, and it is even known with cer..,itd coota,na tho
Russians, in the rear of the Malakboff•
eh ~sots °, . and
numerous works and batteries ; that th Zochea h tae
great buildings of the faubourg were 013'1,e defo_, as
that the Russian generals had orders i'see tl3(],",,eir
around inch by inch ; and nevertheless
leasis sociorto
if struck by panic, set fire to the IC-ar Le„ to on history
vessels of war. This assarli in broad OW
ornfowstarafdatnrei:
just
t 3
atsintithecraencbaennfootubned
fiontrtabe,el7l,:rarege t_eo,ll.o
to °nig-
compared to that of Sebastopol. It loidiers hav;peri,
- o°9 esooff
all the bold intrepidity which our
played, if we call to mind the check whichsa_o mai
~ ~,,,
enced on the 18th of Juniorbefore this
cr. But if the
T temptedower—avengs this tit°. aPt•
assault on the Malakhoff by the French asked
1,4
ceeded, fortune refused success to the t,_LI. lid geds
...iojc
a check now so giously
consider 311
thetßa acykEsa enwgdel iartsethb
the Central hxcee andeeat aer sameagdl,a time
i aßn ssatsl
atishogneabi
enbbesaynt- tt co:11070e
nnt ho
abe
ti, C
jar
nTI 1
nie,°:
01:4;
auk? be On vil
front against four bastions, which ,
~4i6os •, A.
the strongest of the whole line of 0,-,,r,, 4 r.,
the excertion vf the Flagstaff Pattol '''--

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