The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-23 00:00:00

TO TH! EDITOR OF THE StilV.

London, Feb. 23, 1855.
SIR,—At a moment when we are seriously threat-
ened with present disturbance, if not with pros-
pective revolution, it is well to consider who, and
what, is to blame for the actual state of military
affairs. Some people say "the aristocracy ;" others
" Lord Raglan ;" a third party make the late Mi-
nistry, and especially the Duke of Newcastle, alone
responsible • a fourth exculpate all, and observe
that England has never begun a war, after a long
period of peace, without losing an army. Now
in each of these various replies there is some de-
gree of truth. It is certain that no military esta-
blishment, however theoretically perfect, can be in
working order where no officer under 50 years of
age has seen a battle ; and a large proportion of
the disasters which have occurred are therefore
justly imputable to the peace. It is not less
certain that the tactical blunders of the
late Cabinet the unprepared state of the
army in regard of materiel after a year's
novice of impending war—the choice of Varna
for an encampment, and the long detention there
—the sudden embarkation for th:Crimea, in which
so many hardships were caused by the leaving be-
hind of teats and equipages of every description
—the utter ignorance in which all concerned appear
to have been as regarded the strength of Sebasto-
pol and of its garrison—lastly, if we are to take
the word of Sir Howard Douglas, the bad manage-
ment of the campaign and siege operations—are
individual faults, distinctly ascribable to particular
men, and not in fairness chargeable upon any
system, how ever defective. Eager partisans,
anxious only to cover Lord Aberdeen and his col-
'eagues with censure, may exaggerate the amount
and importance of the errors which I have enume-
rated ; ardent Liberals, having in view the double
object of screening their own political leaders, and
of exciting popular feeling against a class, may, on
the other hand, overlook or pass lightly over them—
but a calm looker-on will perceive and acknowledge
—first, that even with a competent Administration
and a well-organised army, many blunders'must have
been expected in the first campaign of the only
European war which this generation has witnessed;
next, that neither the Government at home, nor
the generals in the field, have made the best of the
system which they found in existence, and had to
administer. But, this being premised, and large
allowance made accordingly for past errors, it must
in justice be admitted that a great deal remains to
do in the way of army reform ; and the reason is
obvious. An army in time of peace is compara-
tively in a state of abeyance. No Minister is likely
at such a time to propose an organic change in its
constitution ; nor, were he to do so, is it probable
that he would receive from Parliament or the pub-
lic the requisite amount of support. We find,
therefore, that though many departmental reforms
have been carried out, the principle of English mili-
tary organisation, as a whole, remains substantially
the same as it was after Waterloo. Thatcircumstance
alone irdicates the necessity of careful revision and
large alterations. Society has in the course of the
last 40 years made great advances. The position
of the labouring man is no longer what it was.
Individuals of a higher and better educated class
enter the ranks even now, and will do so to a much
greater extent when induced by the prospect of
more rapid advancement. No one who reads the
letters of soldiers serving in the Crimea can affirm
that among the writers there are not many com-
petent to fill a higher position than that in which
they find themselves. And on the other hand,
though the charges of neglecting their men,
brought against regimental and divisional officers,
are for the most part unfounded, and iu every case
greatly exaggerated, yet it cannot be denied that
want of practice in campaigning—ignorance of the
mode of life of the private soldier—and the habit
of having everything done for them in time of
peace—do prevent our lieutenants, captains, and
colonels from being as efficient as they might be in
securing the comforts of the troops. They do not
want for' the will, but they are deficient in the re-
quisite practical knowledge.
The question is—What remedy ? I say, take a
certain fixed number of commissions and give them
to non-commissioned officers—not less than one-
fourth of the whole. Perhaps it would be well to
begin with a lesser number just at first, leaving the
increase of it optional with the Commander-in-
Chief. Ultimately, when, as would be the case, a
higher class of men are drawn into the ranks by the
hope of rising to be officers, you might increase the
number to one-third. Beyond this last proportion
I think you ought not to go, with reference to the
fair claims of the more educated classes, and to
the interests of the scientific branches of the
service. It is often said that a promoted private,
when first appointed to an ensigncy-, feels himself
out of place, a man among boys, and his pay not
equal to meet necessary expenses. This is true,
but it need not be so in future. Such men
should pass over that merely probationary grade,
and begin their new career as lieutenants. Many
good soldiers doubt whether the rank of
ensign ought not to be abolished, and whe-
ther a young man who has passed through the
military schools might not join as lieutenant, of
course at a more advarced age than at which he
now joins. I should approve this change. What
can be worse than sending out raw lads fresh from
school to face a Crimean climate ? They have
pluck enough, but pluck alone, without constitu-
I
tion, is not sufficient. But this is a minor point
of detail.
As regards the remaining two-thirds, I should
suggest the foltowing division :—One-third to be
left, as now, in the hands of the Commander-in-
Chief, on whom it might be a useful check, if he
were compelled to give in to Parliament a yearly
return of commissions granted, stating the parent-
age of the recipients, and the reason of the choice,
sons of officers who had served to be preferred, but
this to be left to his discretion. The publicity
given to his selection would put a stop to the abuses
which we now witness, and which it is alike im-
possible to deny and to palliate.
Tho remaining one-third I should think it pos-
sible to put up to public competition, or in any
case, failing that, to offer as the reward of a severe
and protracted training in military schools, which
would afford security to the public that incom-
petent men should not pass. It is to this section
that one should look for the most able scientific
officers ; and if the examinations are strict
enough, it matters little is whose hands you
vest the original presentation, which would only
carry the grant of a commission on condition of the
student showing himself worthy of it. Care must
be taken that the training should be one not of
books exclusively, but testing bodily as well as
mental fitness. Macaulay and Wood argued, in
the Indian debate of '53, that where examinations
are probationary only, and not Competitive, there j
ensues anVinevitable tendency on the part of exa-
miners to relax the rule, rather than disappoint
an incapable, but well-intentioned aspirant. Such
may be the case at Haileybury or Addisconbe, and no
doubt the argument is plausible. Still it need not
be ; and in proof that it need not, I appeal to
Westpoint, the American military academy. It is
well known that whatever the merits of Ame-
ricans, a complete education, and a thorough-going
as opposed to a superficial knowledge of things, are
not their strong points ; but I never met a West-
point officer—and I have met a good' many—who
was not both a gentleman and a thoroughly edu-
cated man. Yet the Westpoint system is not one
of competition ; the cadets are nominated by mem-
bers of Congress, and get their appointments as
officers on no other condition than that of passing,
which, so severe is the training, only about one in
three does.
By the tripartite division which I suggest, I
think you would combine the three elements most
needed in organising an army—reward for service

performed in the field—iaw-ard for service not
military, or for military services rendered in former

is
wars, of which there ro more appropriate ac-
knowledgment than a commission granted to the
son or nearest relative of the person concerned ;
and, thirdly, the highest scientific education given
to a part of the officers.

It may be objected that the scheme I propose
tends to throw the army wholly or nearly into the
hands of the lower or middle class. I don't an-
swer this objection, as the Radicals do, by saying,
" That is exactly what we want." On the con-
trary, I should think it au evil. At the same
time, I must observe that, as matters now stand,
there is an undue pressure upon the Horse Guards
by Peers and leading landed gentry, which it is
well to put a stop to. The reason I take to be,
that among many persons there prevails a notion,
one abundantly foolish, that the Army and the
Church have some superiority in point of gentility
over other professions—always excepting the noble
profession of doing nothing. Consequently, if a
lad is bookishly inclined, he is set to teach
the theology of the Church of England : if he
shows a turn for hunting and mischief, the
county member is importuned to get his name put
down on Lord Hardinge's list. The navy, the
bar, medicine, literature, even the civil service, are
rarely thought of, unless, from the character or
circumstances of the applicant, the two favoured.
-occupations are out of the question. I do not ap-
prehend that the younger sons of our territorial
aristocracy, titled and untitled, will be any the
worse for being scattered over a greater variety of
professions, instead of being almost exclusively
confined, by custom, to two. And so strong in
many aristocratic families is the love of sol-
diering, that I firmly believe many youths
`who, being destined for the army, under the

present system, learn nothing, because
,tbe,
not required to learn anything, would 0.°74
go through a searching and long discipline,l.k_',
even the necessity of a good deal of prevn
paration, with the prospect of ultimately read
military distinction. If lam right in "
I think I am, the benefit to them
families will be incalculable ; for
stand, the habits of indolence and or
which such an age as ours almost ne(
duces in the wealthy, and in the chi,
wealthy, are far more democratic in;
the growth of the manufacturing pi
spread, of education, such as it is,
peasantry. Anything that induces
work, and to make their children work,
a class benefit, but, considering the it
which the upper classes retain over
the community-, a national blessing al!
As to the purchase system, there are
of dealing with it. The cne, to buy ,
terests and prohibit purchase in all cases,
more easily said than done. If an office
to retire, and the next in succession be
him for retiring, one does not see how
can interfere to prevent a bargain, of wl
know nothing. I set aside the exile)
process, though that would be very f
next, and, I think, the sounder plan;
the transaction altogether. The real 3
abuse of the purchase system is, that
buys his promotion over the head of
This is disgraceful, and should be stoPl
It is stopped in the Indian army, and
process. Government, lam told, doe.,
fere, but promotes the next in senior'
reference to purchase. Consequently,
wishes to sell out, the money is found,
immediate junior, or, failing him, by t
can afford it, but by the officers of thk
collectively, each of whom gains a steP
tirement. A fund is formed for the . „,,y,
which each officer contributes out of bleols
contribution is not more than he 011 Wo. lit
and he receives it back again on rell".reprgoret
forms a kind of savings bank, an, :in it, ,al,
economically beneficial to all who sue'ignoresio
which does injustice to none. I am n 040:4,0
regimental minutiae, but I see no be Ql'7-01
same plan should not' be adopted ''''„bjeotiemg. 0
army. There may, however, b°,l it nij,4tiro
which I am unaware, and I suss ' The, ~,A to
being prima facie fair and effective' suit
subject of purchase, however, is 11,,oitWei OP
consideration by a Parliamentary CO onick-
We want also a decoration for all era. to
given as a reward for special indiridilsl Invite °f i
seems to be the modern system to de sortitee
armies, but I do not think well of Le" rfes ;01
man, whether private or officer, ",rni et of
credit for merely standing his ground a toilweci
and, as to seeing service, that is ra°l goetijdoo
good fortune and favour than 0` to "g 0
duct. There should be at least
...a of !,01.
of such a decoration, for the mere 03'10701
lorn hope or a Balaklava charge, tlllsne,,jo
lent thing in its way, cannot be placed cnoi
with that union of firmness and skill, -borei,
well as physical superiority, which ulaY,, 21-0
in the direction of a complicated inch o'oo
tion. But I should value the decor test
a means of rewarding those who, cons.drole
the interests of the public service, ea".o bit
g;
warded by promotion—as, for install ,00•
who may have performed a special act iiiitir.,4.
but who can neither read nor write, asvir
to learn. A medal and a money preral Ai!
proper remuneration in such cases Ai
As regards the Staff I believe all yofrifo
agreed. It ought to be a special bralic'oooi,
vice, with certain assigned duties, wineternigii
cannot perform should not think of en 1001,
The present examinations for young eot of
into the army are a farce. The 01:9.0sof ,
#
framers seems to have been the exelnhsli, be,
branch of knowledge which can P°ssw,dho rii
to the officer hereafter. For thosej„hl,l7,
pass through the scientific training i"1";• ositire
mend, there should be a separate exall:i 010
too strict (for many a man can fig',,, no
show others how to fight, who has "4,
book learning), but practical and pro • 01
far as it goes.
00 4°
The only remaining topic—one alin;;, 04
to touch—is that of a closer connect p,
the Queen's and the E. I. Company's ,70,70,
idea of an amalgamation between t,°.,,f0e7 D'°ol9,
tamed by some. I should think it a'toiseo9
were possible, but the difficulties seesi 1100oec
as to put it out of the question. A ° 110;
requisite for an efficient Complalile4o
is that he should speak the icinaev4sli
guages (two at least) fluently, and fr00,7,,te,
something of native habits. lam far u'ol,
that this is insisted on as it ought geet„ersco,,,,
theory, at any rate, is good, and thentog to des
to correspond. Now it is clearly W,r",,lear that'
with this requirement ; and equall "45, vii, of,
cannot reasonably expect all owewths" lino
~I'
serving, to study Eastern tongues on„riedlifoiri
culation of being at some future r-viol f.,
serve in Hindostan. But if you Ie",
officers iu Europe, Queen's officers i'll rrese if
justly, that they have an equal and i.ce.cb, for 10,
right to be employed in the East, will csoe,e, ►
of the necessary qualification, they tioctril
The armies must therefore remain die,„ no :10
—that is, the Sepoy force, for there "1,004
why the Company's European troops in 4,
be merged in the Imperial army. 131tootigr
that this separation is inevitable, I dof A 1 i,4. P
the case of commanders-in-chief, or °f gene/'
pointments in the highest grade..ib th°o,
I powth• of holding personal converse With if to.F,;
though always desirable in a generra'oecl,,'"
vital consequence, and may be saerh'isstVeci
supreme necessity of putting the ii"loser hic)
bear the heaviest responsibility. A %fit 1" ;
1 tion between the two armies than bit.ol,'
have indicated does not appear practical 0e „of,
There are other matters which iys-t P'') Ft
but in so rough a sketch as this I anno, rolp
beyond laying down a few broad 0°,4)04
all, none of these reforms, deell 004
as they are, press so much in point c)t 01,4 U
make it worth while to carry them ens prere.Pil
by carrying them out in haste. 1114.41:, OA
war, the system is everything ; in a crap tewito,s
thing wanted is to put the right nslanfogiVo
place. This I believe Lord Ellenbf fatii'Ar
do ; and, therefore, not overlooking tiriosefieiep
Indian administration, but regarding too ce
comparatively immaterial at a Moine° blO . ill
,
sent, I most earnestly desire to see 1.0
of the war.
4.he relAtlir ri
The changes which I suggest in 1"--s jaleolp
ganisation are large, no doubt—perhaPtA,'' 0
can yet be carried through Parliara,elintrielii;Ab
such a pedant as to standout for " abce Ar t
have many adverse influences to ~cerenowololl
must take what we can get, and ,I;tilf fri
doing the best in our power, even ":t, itoseief
which theoretically we think the be'oori 0 vd.
hope is, that the Conservative part12010;(111roo,
they are on this question, and adran.„vieuito: 1
may well ba by the attitude of the P7tsporroiirref
ceive that their true wisdom lies sn'' ofeite
but reform. If they neglect the c.fi, joe'rne.
know not what may follow—notlloolaii cleront
that moderate and practical referine 0011,,tellitle
see, and probably much that Wm° 1: ii,l,l' ail
cate. The nation, at least v.-tart rtbo
part of it, is willing to real°,•sh noilain ;
antes. They know that we EnP/opt °do 07,40
the habit of makin changes, leuallanrill,6l° 01
practical necessity of the moment •ed Orr Ili
they know that the army has relris4llsin f,eAsoaleof
years of peace, unaltered in their t, ftforill.oo-
- organisation ; and they know ,Of•PL roily
least of its shortcomings, the econolndot, o'',/belia,
and the curtailed votes of Parliarae that first vthe
sible. It is not likely, therefor°,9_, cocas oro
feeling of disappointment, excited v•ilito Pi tlibir
ure has cooled down (and as aceciery deciffetilat
Crimea improve, it will lessen 6°10350 olv of
will be shown much inclination tot` its C01)2.00 d
tion for the past. In truth, the ft the to to
I do' not now speak of blundero,7o•angb'i 17ters.
the campaign, but of the generaLarties,Aonrisogb
the army—are shared by an I;:,.ery A' Po.
branches of the Legislature, bY 'itself. Oa or
tion, and by the general public
stot he, will b
will be accomplished if a new- ervatiVers' tilief
rated for the future ; and if ecnleine e othe,,,iiil!'
derstand, in this case as in sn„,istent "ot 7
reforming policy is neither ineor
their true a., ''
principles, nor incompatible with
izl3oj"
rests.—l remain, &c.,
A LIBERAL,c DE.--
A,"
a'
PIJVC Pr°
LIVERPOOL STEE—
dI, for
-4.-------
until it .d,
The Steeplechases are postponed u.n.,:l 000°114"
2d, and, in the event of the frost Et"'
tiler postponed until the 7th. „e 4
gicleJ
eif Ilispoi
THE CAMP ROAD FROM BALA5,lllVv•iee ''
if ybefrod•
to understand that although the "
the
oth Wool coy
at Balaklava on the 29th ult., by the teelP to be
made no less than three miles ei
expected _p•
The entire railway to the camp was
pleted in six weeks.
The demand for money is
change at from 3 to 3i per cent' one
103,,,c1,
reties. Out of doors there is less in i ;a soii3,dei bis
a pere "_ei; so 1.0 Ater 0150
have been expected during
from Australia and elsewhere haavie:the itliPviapf
By an edict of M. de Westph
after loeist
Interior, the London Punch, ~._,. rt?iw•
model:anted:yet
rho°
tilS
oat:: ;t;
iireglii
confiscated, is forbidden to oisrllab! r

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