The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-18 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING; SEPTEAIBER, 18, 1855.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER-SIR JAMES

GRAHAMLTIIE DMI MALTY.

The following is the close of the lengthened and
singular correspondence between Sir Charles Napier

and Sir James Graham and the Admiralty :

No. XXXI.
[Copy.]
13, Albemarle-street, 12th Jan., 1855.
Sir,—l have received your letter of the Bth January,
and I beg respectfully to observe that their lordabips
have evaded, but not replied to my letter. I did not

complain that my officers had not been promoted, and I
knew very well that the French army and navy bore a
omspicuous part in the capture of Bomarsund.
I knew also that their chiefs were promoted, and the
army and navy thanked by the Chambers, while the
only chief on our side promoted has been Brigadier Jones,
who proposed a plan of attack on Sweaborg, which was

condemned and rejected by the French Marshal, the
French General of Engineers, the French Admiral, and

myself, as impracticable and dangerous, whereas I have
been deprived of my command, and her Majesty has not

been advised to express her approbation.
I did not complain of any neglect of Captain Watson
or his officers and men, and I am glad their lordships

have at last promoted his First Lieutenant, and no re-
ward is too great for his bold and successful blockade of

the Gulf of Finland after I retired with the Fleet to

Kiel, and it is most providential that some of his ships
were not lust ; it is probable that such would have been

the fate of my fleet had I ramained at Nargen, as
ordered by their lordships, until the ice came, and at all
hazards ; and it is singular also, the dates of my letter,

announcing my intended retirement, and the date of

their lordahips' letter withdrawing the order to remain

at all hazards, were the same.
Their lordships conclude their letter by saying they
had already expressed their sense of my exertions during
my command of the Baltic fleet, but they forgot to do

so when they ordered me to haul down my flag ; and
they also forgot to promote my Flag Lieutenant, agree-

ably to the custom cf the service.*
I was not desired to thank the junior admirals, the
officers and men, without whose exertions and willing
obedience, under the most trying circumstances, the

wretchedly-manned and inefficient fleet could not have
been brought into the state of discipline it was in when

I brought it home, after having for nine months con-
ducted them through all the dangers of the Baltic and
Gulf of Finland—conducted them safely into anchorages
that no fleet had visited before, without pilots, without

ights, and without buoys or beacons, except those

placed to mislead us,—and all this with a fleet of such a

size and magnitude as had never been before seen•; and
after having repeatedly offered battle, with only one-

third of the Russian force, and blockaded Bomarsund

amidst a labyrinth of sunken rocks and islands, and,
finally, in conjunction with a French army and fleet,

took it.

Their lordships say no censure has been conveyed on
any point requiring further investigation. I beg to differ
from their lordships : I will not enter on the fact of Sir

James Graham having, In his capacity of First Lord,
written to me to begin to withdraw the fleet, and then,

in his capacity of ono of the Board, reproving me for so
doing. The points on which an investigation of my con-
duct is necessary are, whether I was right or wrong in
agreeing:with a Marshal of France, a General of Engi-
neers, and a French Admiral in rejecting the impracti-
cable plan of an English Brigadier-General of Engineers
for attacking Sweaborg, with which decision the Admi-
ralty have expressed their discontent ; whether the
report of my second reconnaissance of Sweaborg deserves
the construction their lordships thought fit to give it

and, indeed, changed the sense and meaning of it al-
together, to make out a case against me, at the same
time using language to goad me to attack Sw eaborg,
contrary to my judgment, contrary to the judgment of
the French Admiral, and contrary to the judgment of
my own Admirals, whom I was ordered to consult ; this
was to the imminent risk of her Majesty's fleet, either
from the fire of a fortress of the first order, or from tem-
pestuous weather, or from both ; unless, indeed, I could
hit on a fine day in the latter end of October, when the
Crosistadt fleet should be frozen, and that of Sveaborg
open. These were their lordships' instructions, and they
showed that they were totally ignorant of the state of
the Baltic.

Had their lordships consulted Sir Byam Martin, who
was then alive, or, indeed, any captain of a Baltic trader,
they would have told them whether a fine day was
likely to be found at that season of the year, and
whether any sane man would push a fleet amongst
sunken rocks, without beacons or buoys, to attack one
of the strongest fortresses in Europe, when he could not
depend on the weather for two hour&
Notwithstanding all the explanations I gave to their
lordships in public letters, and to Sir J. Graham in pri-
vate letters, they persisted in writing to me in a style
that might have done for a man who either did not know
his duty, or was afraid to do it ; but not to a man of my
character and services.

If enough was not done in the Baltic to satisfy the
public, and if blame was to attach to any one, it should
attach to the Government, for not sending out a suffi-
cient number of troops at a proper season of the year,
and if that was not practicable, for not sending
out the appliances pointed out in my report of
the 12th of June, and which differed little from
my report of the 25th of September. Their lord-
ships thought proper to interpret the last as an as-
surance that I could attack Sweaborg with ships
alone, and that I meant to do so, though I most dis-
tinctly said, after giving a detailed account of how it
should be attacked, if by ships alone—" Whether this
attack would succeed or not it is impossible to say ; but
we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hot
shot and shells, of which they would have abundance ;
and, whether successful or not, it is evident the ships

would be in no state to meet the Russian fleet after-
wards ; and if the attack was made at this season of the
year, when you cannot depend on the weather for two
hours, I do not know how many would be lost."
I then proceeded to say, " I beg their Lordships will
not suppose for a moment that Sweaborg cannot be at-
tacked ; I think it can, but it must be done with caution
and judgment." Then followed a complete detail of the
manner it should be attacked to insure success, and I
should have thought that their Lordships really mis-
understood my letters had they not persisted in address-
ing me in the same style after my explanations.
During the whole of the summer Sir James Graham
was cautioning me against risking the fleet against stone
walls, and complimenting me for having proved myself
a consummate Commander-in-Chief —praised me for all
my arrangements—for the capture of Bomarsund, with
which he was more than pleased ; but then, because two
engineers proposed plans diametrically opposite to each
other, he forgot his former cautions and all his former
praises—forgot his consummate Commander-in-Chief—
and urged me to attack Sweaborg, contrary to my own
judgment and that of my colleagues, and risk her Ma-
jesty's fleet amongst sunken rocks, against heavy bat-
teries, and at a season of the year which any man who
knew his business would have positively forbid, instead
of goading to attempt.
In Sir James Graham's letter to me, of the 17th of
October, he makes use of the following expression—it is
the French General who writes :—" We partake of the
opinion of General Jones. Sweaborg may be attacked
and taken by the fleets, if they think fit to make on that
fortress a serious attack."
Now, there is no such thing in ;General Jones's re-
port—the French General meant General Niel's report,
and Sir James Graham either never read General Jones's
report, or thought proper to forget it. General Niel,
after stating that he thought the fleets could lay Swea-
borg in ruins, added, "Mail les vaisseaux sant des ma-
chines bien bien compliqudes bien faciles incendier'
une tells operation est hardie—elle n'a jamais ete fait
que je sache et ce n'est pas A moi qu'il appartient de la
conseiller."± This, Sir James thinks proper to inter-
pret, in his letter to me, " General Niel intimated very
distinctly an opinion that the attack ought to be made;"
and then goes on to say, alluding, I suppose, to General
Jones's report, " that report made a great impression
here, and raised a strong presumption that, with the aid
of the military force then present with the fleet, in
seven or eight days the works at Sweaborg might be
destroyed, and that the month of September was the
proper time for the operation." Whatever impression
it Made on Sir James Graham (who I do not think a
good judge) that report made none on the French mar-
shal—none on the French admiral, the French engineer,
or myself. We all considered it impracticable, and as
the weather turned out, had it been put in course of exe-
cution, the communication with the fleet would have

He was afterwards promoted.
+ General Niel acted like a man of sense and honour, in
qualifying hill opinion.

been cut off, and the troops and stores in poss,ls sioni of
the enemy before sunset ; a portion of the would
most probablytalso have been lost—it would hai 'e been
worse than Sebastopol ! Sir James then otlnies
thus :—" Then came your scowl reconnai' ;ss ace 'of
Scveaborg and plan of naval attack, which you consi-
dered pricticable."

I gave tavo plans, one with the fleet alone, th(e success
of which I doubted, and though; dangerous ; th,e second
I thought certain of success. Their lordships • thought
proper to deliberate on one and to ignore Vie • other,
which differed, however, little from the one I 'igave on
the 12th of June ; and then Sir James Graham. tells the
an opportunity xvo,s lost ; adding words about ii sks and
dangers, and telling me that prudence consists I weigh-
ing them, and firmness in encountering the. r. Had
their LorOlships weighed these things they vs rcluld not.
have writt sn me such letters:

Sir Jamos, in another letter, tells me he is • tt.nwilling
to be involved in a written controversy with me ; but
that I had brought it on myself by my report of: the 25th
of September—that report appeared to him to b e entirely
at variance with the opinions previously exp sessed by
me ; and he certainly understood me to say, that if I
had mortars, rockets, and Lancaster's guns, I c moidered
Sweaborg vsilailable by sea.
Now, in .May, I declared it to be unassailabl a by sea
or land, and. the Admiralty did not send to m e the ap-
pliances which, in September, I declared to be wanting,
because they believed, from nay account, they ,P; ould be
useless against a place, which, in the first insi-,ance, I
pronounced to be impregnable.

Sir James; then coatinues thus—" I could not bring
myself to believe that the want of Lancaster's guns, or
even of mor tars, rencler4a sea attack, on your plan of
the 25th of September impossible, if you had 25 sail of
the line reausembled before the place, with all their
means of vertical fire."' But Sir James forgot that my
report in M J.), was made before I had seen Svveaborg ;
but the rep( ,rt of the 12th of June was after I had seen
it ; and it defers little from that of the 25th September!
I wonder whether Sir James Graham, when hie wrote
thii, had for,gotten his great respect for stone mills, and
his warnings: to avoid them ; and had he forgot his con-
summate Commander-in-Chief?

I have now again well weighed and considered this
painful subject. I have consulted friends, and lam
of opinion, and so are they, that my character has
been attacks id by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and
by the Boari. ; and coupling that with my dismissal from
command, I have nothing left but to demand that my
conduct be i nvestigated before a court-martial.
I can qui to understand that their lordships wish to
avoid an investigation ; for they are quite aware that
my conduct will be proved creditable to me, and very
different to their lordships.—l have the honour to re-
main, your ,Dbedient humble servant,
(Signed) CHAS. NAPIER.
To the above masterly letter the Admiralty reply as
follows, uneier the signature of their Secretary :

No. XXXII.
(Copy.)
Admiralty, Jan. 13, 1855.
Having 1 yid before my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your letter of yesterday's date, lam com-
manded by their Lordships to acquaint you that although
my Lords upon some occasions have not been enabled
to express the same satisfaction at receiving your re-
ports, which they have directed to be conveyed to you
upon others, they have only to rapeat that no censure
has been pa sued upon your conduct in reference to the
operations of the Fleet under your orders, and their
Lordships :have already expressed their sense of your
exertions in, a manner customary upon intimation that
the flag of a re officer of your rank has been struck in pur-
suance of t heir Lordships' orders. They had also, in
accordance with your recommendation, promoted the
Flag Lieut( 'pant who was the bearer of your despatches
announcing: the fall of Bomarsund, and since your flag
has been s truck the name of no other officer has been
submitted by you.
[I submit tied a name, and he was promoted.]
My Lordis do not feel themselves icaEed upon now to
enter a seco,nd time into discussion of reports on which
they have < 'heady stated their opinions, and still less to
take cogni lance of other informal documents which have
never been laid before them, and which they decline to
recognise.

[These, I. Auppose, are Sir J. Graham's that are called in-
formal ; a pi •etty way of carrying on business.]
They consider that no inquiry into your conduct is
necessary, and they entirely decline to submit a contro.
versy raisedi by an officer under their orders, to the de-
cision of a 'Court-martial.

My Loris further direct me to inform you, that while
bhey have been unwilling to pass censure upon any part
of your con.duct they have not failed to observe, from
the moment; of your first quitting Wingo Sound without
orders, an, I. down to the present time, you have re-
peatedly th ought fit to adopt a tone, in your correspond-
ence with t heir Lordships, which is not respectful to their
authority. Such a course, if generally adopted by other
officers, would be destructive to the discipline and inju-
rious to the ;best interests of the servioe, and is not cal-
culated to ir u3pire confidence in an officer entrusted with
an important command.

[Why did 1-they not produce them? I defy the Admi-
ralty to pro duce one instanco in the British Navy where
an officer's l otters were falsified.]
I am fur Cher directed to add that this decision is to be
considered by you as final.

I am, Sh?, your most obedient humble servant,
W. A. B. HAMILTON.
Vice•Ad m iral Sir Charles Napier, S.C.B.
The next ;letter is the rejoinder of Sir Charles to the
above letter, .of the Admiralty :

No. XXXIII.
Merchistoun Hall, Horndean,
Jan. 20, 1855.

Sir,—l ;save received your letter of the 13th inst., in
which you state, that " although my Lords upon some
occasions have not been enabled to express the same
satisfaction on receiving my reports which they have
done on others, that they never passed censure on me,
in reference to the operation of the fleet under my com-
mand." This communication leaves me at a loss to
understand why their Lordships' letter of the 4th Oct.,
No. 744, was written ; and I shall, therefore, take that
letter paragraph by paragraph, and reply to it.
1. Your renewed reconnaissance of Sweaborg gives rise
to more pressing and serious considerations.
[My opinion since I first saw Sweaborg has never
changed.]

2. You desire us not for a minute to suppose that Swea-
borg cannot be attacked, and you proceed to point out in
detail the precise mode in which the operation ought to be
conducted..

[Certainly. I pointed out the precise mode of attack.
One witrn ships alone, but saying success would be doubt-
ful, an'A many ships would be lost. Another with ships,
guns. gun-boats, Lancaster guns, rockets, 13-inch mortars
on The islands, and a vast supply of shot, shells, and
rockets, in addition to the ships. This mode I thought
certain, and do still think so, notwithstanding the disaster
at Sebastopol.]
3. You express your opinion that if your plan of at-
tack by the ships werec adopted, you are quite certain
the fortress would be laid in ruins, and most probably
an entrance opened to the ships.
[I never said anything of the sort. I said, if attacked
by the ships alone success would be very doubtful. The
ships would be set on fire by red-hot shot and shells, and
be left in no condition to meet the Russian fleet after-
wards ; and if attempted at that season of the year I did
not know how many would be lost.]
Fs 4 . What, then, are the obstacles to the immediate
attempt ? Admiral Plamridge and the French Admiral
are ordered to rejoin you.
[The want of the means I pointed out to insure success.
Had Admiral l'iumridge and the French squadron re-
joined with the month's provisions he was ordered to take
in, it would have been nearly expended before he got back,
and could have done us no good without the appliances
I asked for. Neither could he have come until the end of
October, the period their lordships thought most favour-
able for attack, but which I knew to be most unfavour-
able.] _

5. Recent events in the Black Sea will not encourage
the Russians to attempt any enterprise of more than
usual hazard and daring at this precise moment.
[Recent events in the Black Sea were a miserable de-
ception; more recent events showed that the British fleet
was nearly destroyed. And had that been known at the
Admiralty, Sir J. Graham's cautions to me would have
been repeated instead of his gaadings.]
6. Your second reconnaissance of Sweaborg opens a
new view, and the presence or absence of a few guns of
an improved construction, or even of mortar-vessels,
cannot make the whole difference between a possible
and an impossible attack.
[My second reconnaissanco opened no new view to me;
and the presence or absence of a " few guns," as their
lordships are pleased to call what I asked for, just makes
all the difference between the possible and the impos-
sible.]
Any man reading the foregoing letter would say that
no,thiag more goading could have been written to one
in my position ; nothing short of a positive order more

* Where was the vertical fire to come from ? We had
no mortars. Did he mean the ships to be heeled over, guild
eat with the porta eaulked OYU

urgent or imperative ; it was to say, "If you don't act
it will 'be a disgraceful backwardness ! It is a letter
which will remain at the Admiralty on record ; and if
hereafter my life should be written, posterity will per-
haps take it as a proof that Sir Chatles Napier was a
cowardly commander !

This injurious letter was followed up by another from

their lordships, October 17, No. 779, which I will now
digsect, as I have done the first.

1. Their lordships might also have been satisfied with
the decision adopted by you, on the joint report of the
tfag officers referred to, if the reports of the French and
English military officers had not contained adverse
opinions, and if your own letter of wept. 25th had not
afterwards expressly informed their lordships that they
were not to suppose for a moment that Sweaborg could
not be attached.

[lf this is not censure, what is it ? It might be thought
the opinions of the naval flag officers were of more worth
than those of the French and English military officers on
❑aval affairs. It is probably the first time that soldiers
were considered better judges of naval warfare than
seilors ! And those soldiers announced opinions directly,
at valiance with each other. But how was it to be at-
tacked? Not by chips alone ! And that was well known
to their lordships, though they thought fit to ignore it.]
In their next letter, October 31, No. 796, their Lord-
ships told me plainly they could not express satisfaction
with the decision come to, not to attack Sweaborg after
the fall of Bomarsund. That was not only a censure on
rue, but on a Marshal of France, a French Admiral, and
on my own Admirals. The French Chamber, however,
did not agree with their Lordships; they gave thanks to
their officers, and the Emperor promoted them ; but I
have been removed from my command by the English
Admiralty !
Their Lordships speak of informal documents, which
they will not recognise. Are, then, the letters of the
First Lord of the Admiralty, official and momentous of
meaning, informal ? Were they to be of force for stimu-
:ating, goading an Admiral, against his judgment, to
risk the destruction of a noble fleet, amidst fogs, sunken
rocks, stone fortresses, and ice and fire ; and yet to be
of no authenticity or weight in justification of an injured
and insulter? man ?

Their Lordships say no inquiry into my conduct is
necessary, and decline submitting a controversy, raised
by an officer under their orders, to the decision of a
court-martial. But it was not I who raised the contro-
versy. It was their Lordships, by misinterpreting my
letters.

But they further direct you to inform me that, while
they are unwilling to pass censure on any part of my
conduct, they have not failed to observe that, from the
moment " I first quitted Wingoe Sound without orders,"
down to the present time, I have repeatedly thought fit
to adopt a tone in my correspondence which is not re-
,peetful to their authority.
This passage is to me surprising. For, first, I did
not quit Wingoe Sound without orders. Their Lordships,
by letter of the Bth of March, ordered me to proceed to
Wingoe Sound. On the 10th of March they sent me
Lord Clarendon's instructions to dispose my fleet so as
to prevent the Russian ships passing out of the Baltic.
Acting on those instructions, I left Wingoe Sound,
proceeding to Kioge Bay as a better station for effect-
ing the object of Lord Clarendon's communication. I
arrived there on the Ist of April, and was immediately
reproved by the Admiralty for obeying Lord Claren-
don's orders, transmitted to me by the Admiralty !
On the 2d of April I received orders from tke Duke
Hof Newcastle, also forwarded by the Admiralty, to pro-
ceed to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, from Kiel,
65 soon as possible.
On the 3d of May I received a letter from their lord-
ships, dated Bth April, approving of my proceedings in
raving \Vingoe Sound ! Also came a letter from Sir
J. Graham, dated 10th of April, from which the follow-
ing is an extract :
" I am entirely satisfied with your proceedings. Nei-
ther Lord Clarendon nor I anticipated your movement
inside the Belt, and believed that you would watch in
the Cattegat the entrance to the Sound, and of the
Belt, until you received orders to enter the Baltic. You
judged, however, very wisely, and. the time which you
have gained has been very precious ; and the passage of
' the Belt in fine weather, and in safety, has been a most
successful exploit.
" You will also have been enabled to exercise your
officers and men to great advantage, with the certainty
that the enemy is in front of you, locked up in ice for
some time to come ; and that your reinforcements will
arrive, and that your discipline will be improved before
lie can move, even if he were so disposed."

On the sth of April Sir J. Graham wrote thus, also
" lam highly satisfied with your movements, with
the position which you have taken up for the present.
Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Grey can readily communicate
with you where you are now, and most useful informa-
tion from Stockholm reaches you without loss of time.
" Considering the state of the ice in front of you I
rejoice in the belief that you are on the ground in time,
and that you will be strong and well prepared before
the critical moment arrives."

Now, on the 14th Jan., 1855, I received a letter
from their lordships again accusing me of leaving
Wingoc Sound without orders, and also remarking that
down to the present time, from that period, I have re-
peatedly thought fit to adopt a tone in my correspon-
dence which is not respectful to their Lordships' authority.
I believe in one instance only, up to the 4th of Octo-
ber, I did write hastily to their Lordships, and I after-
wards expressed my regret to Admiral Berkeley for
having done so. Up to that date, also, I received
nothing but praise from their Lordships. Since then, I
admit the use of strong language, but I was goaded to
it by their Lordships' public letters, and by Sir J. Gra-
ham's private letters, which were almost past endurance.
Their Lordships have directed you to add, that this,

their decision, is to be considered by me as final. It may
be final for their Lordships, but certainly will not be final
for me, until I receive complete satisfaction for the in-
jurious imputations on my character and conduct.
Her Majesty was certainly not displeased with my
conduct in the Baltic, for she invited me to Windsor on
'lay return, The invitation reached me too late to obey
her Majesty's command ; and as it has not been repeated,
my hope is, that Sir J. Graham's misrepresentations to
myself of my opinions and conduct have not been ex-
tended so as to affect her Majesty's sentiments. But I
have been deprived of my command—an unusual act,
save where an officer has misconducted himself.—l have
the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

CHAS. NAPIER.

The Secretary of the Admiralty, &c., &c.
XXXIV.

Admiralty, Jan. 22, 1855.

I have received and laid before my Lords Commis.
sioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 20th instant,
in reply to their Lordships' letter of the 13th instant.—l
am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
W. A. B. HAMILTON.
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.

THE CASE OP PAUL, STRAHAN, AND BATES.—It is not
generally known that the bail in the ease of Paul, Stra-
han, and Bates (which will not he tried, it is understood
during the present sessions of the Central Criminal
Court) am•unts to no less a MITI than 60,000/. On the
last examination at Bow-street the six sureties for the
defendants increased their recognisances from 3,0001. to
5,0001. each, making 30,000/., and each defendant in-
creased his recognisance from 5,000/. to 10,000/.,
making the three 30,000/., and with the bail 60,000/.
for their appearance to take their trial. Her Majesty's
judges on the rota will take their seats at the Central
Criminal Court on Wednesday, when an application will
be made on the part of the defendants to postpone the
trial to the October sessions, and it is understood there
is every probability of the same being granted. At pre-
sent the leading counsel for the defence has not been
fixed upon. Mr. E. James has been retained for the de-
endant Bates.

MEXICAN BONDHOLDERS.—The following is from the
Committee of Mexican Bondholders :—" The committee
have received ad vices from Mr. Whitehead, dated Mexico,
the 19th ult. The garrison of Mexico had, on the 13th
ult., pronounced for the plan of Ay utla,' which pro-
nunciamento all the leaders of the late President's party
signed. In accordance with this plan General Carrera,
late Commander-in-Chief, was elected provisional Presi-
dent. General Carrara is described as a man of great
moderation, who was likely to do all in his power to
maintain order while i❑ power, and to relinquish it with-
out reluctance when the public interest should require it.
No Ministers had been appointed, and the public busi-
ness was for the present carried on by the chief clerks
of the several Ministerial departments. Senor Don P.
F. del Castello was thus at the head of the department
of finance, and had, by a circular order of August 16,
called for information respecting all assignments on the
public revenue, suspending all of them until they should
I have been duly examined, with the exception of the as-
signments in favour of the bondholders and of the mili-
tary on actual duty. This is a very satisfactory indica-
tion of the intention of the new authorities, and Senor
Del Castello assured Mr. Whitehead that such were also
the sentiments of General Carrera. The Wye, which
arrived at St. Thomas too late for the Atrato, had taken
nothing from Vera Cruz for the dividends, but 412,500
from Tarapico,".

LETTERS FROM THE CRIMEA.

(From the Allorniv Post of this day.)
CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
SEPTEMBER 1.

The weather we are enjoying
on these heights,
at the present time, is precisely the same as we
experienced when embarked and lying at anchor in
Varna Bay at this time last year. The appearance
of rain that I noticed yesterday has vanished, and
September sets in very fine—much cooler than the
weather we were a short time ago complaining of.
The new sap, which was intended to lead into a
sixth parallel, I understand is now not to be
made, and the sap only continued as an ap-
proach to some rifle pits the Russians have esta-
blished in front of the Redan, is costing us a great
number of lives—no less than 9 officers and 63 men
during the last two nights. I have already named
the officers who fell on the night of the' 29th.
Last night Captain Foster, of the 95th, who had
been only one week in the Crimea, was shot ; Cap-
tain Ross, of the Buffs, taken prisoner ; and the
adjutant of the 30th, Lieut. Forbes, had his right
arm carried away at the shoulder joint, and, from
the effects of injury at the same time caused to the
chest, he has since died.
Orders were some time since issued for a constant
fire of musketry to be kept up on the embrasures
of the Redan, which, for a time, had the desired
effect of keeping the fire somewhat under, but the
Russians have now taken our example, and also
keep up a continuous fire of musketry, which, toge-
ther with the sap that is iu hand being enfiladed by
the batteries of the Redan, cause the great increase
in our casualties. Previous to this work being com-
menced, the whole of our casualties in both attacks
averaged 35 during the 24 hours, but the greater
proportion in the Right Attack. The Andes has
arrived outside Balaklava, with drafts for various
regiments, from England, and the Bayana has come
into harbour also with drafts. Both officers and men
appear all boys ; indeed, it would be a rarity to
see any other at the 'present time, and it is only
astonishing that they go through the work and
hardship that they do. There is little talk of an-
other bombardment or a regular opening of fire,
but the noise during the greater part of each night
appears as if it would take very much to increase
it. What the Russians are about seems equally a
mystery. They have given up throwing round
shot into our camps during the last day or two,
having doubtless been informed of the small amount
of damage they caused.

SEPT. 2.

After a remarkably cool morning, the weather
this afternoon suddenly became very warm. The
nights are now all chilly,,but occasionally the middle
of the day approaches to something like the old
heat. The dust everywhere is abominable ; but
we have an agreeable reduction in the number of
flies, and I wish I could say as much of fleas and
other vermin, which infest the camps to a great ex-
tent. Little has occurred of general interest to-day.
There was much firing last night, but I have not
heard of any officers having been among the casual-
ties.

The Indiana has come into harbour with the 82d
Regiment, from Cephalonia, which will disembark
the day after to-morrow, and take the place of tho
13th Light Infantry at Balaklava, when the latter
regiment will go to the front.

SEPT. 3.

After an exceedingly dusty ride to Balaklava this
morning, I found the hills resounding with the
music of the band of the 82d on board ship, and
the drafts of various regiments that were disem-
barking might have imagined they had reached a
lively place, and were about to enjoy themselves.
Poor fellows, I thought as I looked at them—boys
fresh and clean from England—they are about
enough to supply the expenditure of two or three
nights.

last night, about eleven o'clock, orders were sent
round for all hands to be prepared for a turn-
out at a- moment's warning ; but as no attack
has ever vet come when expected and prepared for,
so on this occasion we were not disturbed, except
by the preparation. An attack is now expected
to-morrow morning. Deserters have reported an
army of 90,000 in our rear ; but the Sardinian ca-
valry, who have been on reconnaissance during
the day, report the immediate country to be clear.
A Russian artilleryman who has also come in
speaks of every preparation having been made to
abandon the south side—that the ships in harbour
are filled with stones and plugged, ready to bo sunk
at the shortest notice. General Pelissicr has this
day, I understand, been most anxious for an
opening of the bombardment to-morrow morning,
but whether to enable them to proceed more ad-
vantageously with their works, or as preparatory
to another assault, I know not. It appears evident
from all accounts that the Russians have little idea
of holding the south side during the winter; and the
question arises, whether they will not abandon it
even if we do not assault. A few days seem likely
to produce some change. The large force they have
now assembled must be maintained with great diffi-
culty, owing to the immense distance they have to
convey their supplies ; and the general belief is that
they will make a desperate effort both in front and
rear at the same time. It may come to-morrow
morning, or on any other; but toujottrs /gets must
be our motto. There is an assault of some kind at
this very moment, 9 p.m. ; the musketry, which ap-
pears to be in the direction of the Mamelon or Re-
dan, is very heavy, and shells are passing through
the air like peas—a dozen may be counted at the
same instant. All hands are only waiting the word
to turn out, and are fully equipped.
The following General Orders have just been
issued :

Head-Quarters before Sebastopol, Sept. 1.
A court of inquiry will assemble at the head-quarters of
the Second Division, on Monday, the 3d inst., at 10 a.m.,
to inquire into such matterF as may be brought before it.
President, Lieut.-General Markham, C.B. ; members,
two field officers (not under the rank of lieut.-colonel)
from the First and Third Divisions.—By order.
(Signed) if. W. BARNARD, Chief of the Staff.

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