The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-28 00:00:00

A GERMAN VIEW OF THE FALL OF foreign policy. He must again repeat that, had Prowls
SEBASTOPOL. declared herself, Au,tria roust have acted with deciFion,
and Russia could not have resisted a European coalition.
The King and Government of Fru,sia were responsible
for the rnanifo!d suffering entailed by a state of war.
Several other toasts were proposed, and the evening
concluded with feeli3gf of general satisfaction.

The Augsbut g Gazttte, which is more or less open
to Austrian impressions, and which, at all eTen
expresses the opinions of a large class in Germany,
makes the following comments on the fall of Sebas-
topol :
" Sebastopol has fallen—fallen after a struggle which
has not its equal in the history of wars—but yet fallen,
and we have to consider the importance of this event, its
certain and probable consequences, for is might happen
that a more earnest and pressing warning than ever might
be given to Germany to exchange its present neutrality
for a position which, if it dies not place the decision in
its hands, would at least make it participate therein.
" The Russians have—and the Russians themselves
put emphasis upon the announcement—voluntarily eva-
cuated the south side of Sebastopol. As if they had any
other choice than to withdraw or to bury themselves
under the ruins ! Since Prince Gortschakeff's despatch,
concluding with the words `our fortifications suffer,' the
catastrophe was simply a question of time, and the attack
at Traktir-bridge was the last desperate attempt to avert
it. The attempt failed. Sebastopol fell as it was doomed
to fall, and when the Nord endeavours to demonstrate
that it is only now, that the army is concentrated iii
the northern forts, that there is unity in its action and
movements, it is comically absurd.
" We do not wish to overrate the event of the Bth of
September, but we must not underrate it. The northern
fortress may be a stronger, a much stronger fortress, but
the south part contained everything which Sebastopol
bad to defend—the whole of Russia's Black Sea fleet,
I.nd all the resources of that fleet. All this is annilii-
lated ; and for at least half a century to come, even with-
out the stipulations of a peace, through the simple
force of circumstances, the limitation of the naval power
of Russia is an accomplished fact. The third guarantee
point no longer exists. But there is a point of still
greater importance. The prestige of Russia's invio-
lability is gone—gone in the East as in the West ; her
whole power is shaken to its centre, and this especially
because Sebastopal did not fall at once, and because it
has only fallen now.
" It would be superfluous now to investigate whether

it was possible or impossible to have taken the fortress
by a coup de main immediately after the landing in the
Crimea ; but then Sebastopol only would have been
taken, and Sebastopol is not the Crimea, still less Rus-
sia. But since then every nerve has been strained to
keep the place. A. large army, always as numerous,
often more numerous than the forces of the allies, has
fought with bravery throughout, all the means of art
and nature have been employed, and yet the Rus-
sians have fought in vain, and an incongruous host,
with no other retreat than the sea, has beaten their
army on its own ground, with an immense empire be-
hind it, and when the highest stake was played for the
position of Russia in the Bast. Russia's military honour
is safe ; for in her retreat she has left nothing but ruins
and corpses, but her power has not the less received a
mortal wound.

•` Will the new phases of the war, will the fall of Se-
bastopol lead to a successful renewal of the peace nego-
tiations ? Russia will never make peace after a dis-
aster' is the haughty sentence attributed to Alexander
11. We will not touch upon it. If the Western Powers
entertain the same idea, peace would never be possible.
Russia will still be willing to negotiate. But there are
reasons ti induce the Western Powers to be reasonable

in their demands. They cannot sieze upon the heart of
Rmsia, as long as Central Europe remains inactive, and
perhaps they may now obtain an indemnification for war
expenses ; afterwards, when Russia's finances shall have
sunk to exhaustion, they will not. Are they to seek
for an indemnification in Russian territory ! But where
is the Russian territory that can have an equivalent
value in their eyes I The Crimea may be a valuable
pledge, but neither France nor England can wish
to place it among the jewels of their Crown.
And Germany ? Whoever has calmly studied the posi-
tion of Germany throughout the struggle must inevi-
tably be convinced that in the leading circles there has
existed a secret sympathy for Russia, a secret hatred for
the Napoleon dynasty. Frani reasons caused by the un-
mistakeable feeling of th© whole people the cause of
Russia was not openly espoused, but a tacit support was
given to it by inaction, and no idea was entertained of
a-ting against Russia. The invulnerability of the Rus-
sian army was believed in Germany as long as the Wes-
tern Powers were alone in the field, and the quiet hope
was entertained that Napoleon 111., like Napoleon 1.,
would knock his head to pieces against his powerful ad-
versary, and Germany reap where she bad not sown ;
but the fall of Sebastopol has destroyed that belief and
deceived that hope. Germany, it is true, has spared
seine millions because she resolved to look on as a pas-
sive spectator of the struggle, but let us beware lest a e
have ultimately to pay the piper with far more than
those millions. More than once Russia and France
have met on bloody battle-fields as enemies, and yet one
year afterwards Napoleon and Alexander were discuss-
' ing the partition of Europe ; and on the throne of
France there is now another Napoleon, and on the
throne of Russia a second Alexander."