The National Register.
London, England, 1809-08-27 00:00:00

542

THE NATIONAL REGISTER.

soliciay of i c.. I.vlien an ancient oph►st was arguing to
prove tile impossibility of motion, a Philosopher who at-
tended his lectures made no other reply than by gravely
walkinz up and down the room. The friends of the King
and of the Constitution might treat the Reformers with
the same sort of indiWerence; but to do evil is more with-
in the power of every man in public, as well as private life,
than to do good, and one enthusiast is capable of effecting
more mischief than a hundred sober minded men can re-
medy ; neither is it to he forgotten, that supineness and
mensibility may suddenly al% ake to terror and to danger.

Whilst the Crown has places of emolument to bestow,
there will of course be many Candidates, and it will not be
necessary to prove, that secret rivalry is more dangerous,
because more safe, than a generous and open competition,
vhich is restrained by some sense of shame. However
speciously and adroitly Statesmen may betray the interests
of the people, they receive their reward openly and from
the public, and the eye of that public is ever turned upon
them with jealousy and suspicion. Nor does public indi
nation want any incitement to hunt them down, when their
conduct is notoriously flagitious.

If placeinen .avere rendered ineligible to seats in the
House of Commons, the influence of office would not the
less exist, only its operation would be more circuitous.
Statesmen, as l mg as they had friends and relatives in the
House, would have the same attacks made upon their
feelings, and the effect would be precisely the same. . That
corruption which you say now circulates so widely in the
House of Commons, would be spread more diffusely among
the Constituent; this would be changing a lesser evil for a
greater, the plothora of redundant health for a consump-
tion; a little feverish anxiety, for madness; and habitual
error, for inexpiable remorse. The Senatorial Statesman
is essentially a mixed ch-iraeter. His dependence upon,
and attachment to, the Crown, is in a great measure con-
Voided by responsibility to his Constituents ; and we
all know there are situations in which the greatest fa-
vourites of the Monarch must do homage to public opi•
nion, upon whatever grounds that opinion may rest. But
from even this imperfect controul the Constituent is entire-
ly free; he is little disposed to think of the duties or the
reiporp4ibilities which he owes to the country at large, and
will readily dispose himself to elect those Representatives
who will be most likely to se-Are to him the wages of his
own corruption. It is imaginary and delusive to talk of
the lower orders being less c:,rrupt than those whom they
have chosen to represmit them, and to attempt to shut
out from your consideration the motives by which the
greater part of mankind are governed, would be like an
attempt to overtake the visible horisou, which for ever
°peas act you advance.

But what is to be the result. of this plan of excluding.
Statesmen from the House of Commons, if the House of
Lords be not included in the regulation. The elThrt must
necessarily be a monopoly of public employments and emo-
luments: it would convert the intermed►ate barrier be-
tween the Crown and the People, into an instrument de
pendent upon the Crown, obliged to the Crown, and dis-
posed to assert and increase its rights, in opposition to
those of the People. It would increase its strength in pro.
portion as it increased the means ;
.I had almost said the ne-
cessity of corrupting it. Besi,les, the Peers are not a fluc-
tuating but a fixed body, and from that union which would
of course pervade them, they would in time become as
;formidable to the Crown as to the People.

In little republics, and in small communities, of what-
ever materials the government may. be fortmnl, a sense of
public duty may prove a sufficiently powerful motive of
action, and ;lye an impulse to the honest ambition of
those who, wish well to their country, but in the ordinary
state of human affairs, in the present condition of human
society, the determinations of any legislative body, how-
ever constituted it may be, will certainly be actuated by
'considerations less pure in their nature, and less efficient

AUG. 27.

11l opcimion that is the hest government which al-
fords the opportunity, and elicits the means of controuling
the greatest portion of our virtuous propensities, and
thereby ultimately concentrating them for the gaud of the
public. That degree of mental controul which shall restrain
the worse propensities of our nature, and prevent, thew
from affecting -our conduct, is no less a desideratum in
morals than in politics, and however good men many hope,
wise men will despair of finding it. Much has been said
and written upon the independence of the component
parts of our government, and nothing is more beautiful in
theory than the entire separation of each from the other.
But we all know that in practice this independence is corn-
' pletely amalgamated; there is in point of fact an intimate and
mutual connection between them, which is highly advan-
tageous, and almost necessary to the happiness of the
public. That in many respects they really are independent
of each other, cannot be denied, and as little wilt it be de-
nied that they ought to be so ; on the other hand, to use
the expression of Mr. HVAIE (Essay 5 and 6.) the Crown
has so many offices at its dsposal, that when assisted by the
honest and disinterested part of the House, it wit, always
command the resolution of the whole, so far at /east as
to preserve the ancient Constitution from danger : we may
therefore give to this influence what name we please, we
may call it, and sometimes we may justly call it, by the
invidious appellation of—corruption and dependence ; but
some degree, and some kind of it, arc i !separable
from the very nature of our Constitution, and necessary
to the p:eservation of owr mixed Government. Nobody will
deny that talents of great. magnitude are necessary, in
those to whom the business of governing nmukind.is direct-
ed : without these, Government itself would be neither
respectable or safe. It could not long direct the public
opinion. It could neither employ the public strength to
purposes of public utility, nor even wield its energies for
the purposes of general security. In the pressaut state of
the world, is it to be expected that we should meet with
such a degree of virtue in public men of talent and abi-
lity, as to he wholly devoid of every particle,,of personal
interest. No institutions of man, however brilliant in
theory, can be fenced against the incursions of this prin-
ciple ; not that we would he supposed to insinuate that
public men of grent minds press to the brink of corruption
with a more rapid career, .or with greater avidity, than
men of inferior abilities, or of more humble situatious.
The contrary is most indisputably the fact. The natural
tendency of great intellectual endowments is to elevate the
mind, and rescue the heart from the dominion of selfish
and baser passions, and even to render it indifferent to the
love of that wealth which may he amassed without excel-
leuce, and possessed without dignity. 'The philosopher
who has been accustomed to peruse man in the abstract.
and the enlightened Statesman who has been employed in
examing him more in detail, will be satisfied to derive
from his ir.!:,gled vi:tues and frailties, those erects which
have in vain been eApected from the influence of principle
alone. Such men will consider Parliament as the avenue
which leads to public confidence,—a confidence whisk
concurs, with other causes of a less honourable nature,
perhaps, to stimulate those exertions which lead to the
highest employments of the State.
Without the profit which attaches to these political
situations, and which enables men of ability to erect
their fortunes upon the bases of their lime, those ta-
lents which now occupy the foremost ranks of the State,
would probably languish amid the details of inferior
offices, be yoked to the desk in order to procure a preca.,
rions existence, or be devoted, perhaps, to the views of the
Sovereign alone, uncontrouled by the opinion and with-
out any feelings of regard for the interests of the people.—
But called forth as they now are by collision of powers and
intellect, they are rendered inure inaccessible by corrup-
tion ; the love of wealth is purified by the sense of tumour
and the fear of shame. A sense of delicacy, and elevation of
sentiment are excited ; habits of self respect and self-denial