The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-01 00:00:00

POLAND INVADED FROM THE BALTIC.

(Front Count Valerian Krasinslci's Russia, Poland, and
Europe.)
The most vulnerable point of Russia on the Polish
side, and where she may be attacked in the most
effective manner, is, however, Samogitia, or the north-
western part of Lithuania, bordering on Prussia, the
Baltic Sea, and Courland. The inhabitants of that pro-
vince, known for their bold character and stubborn reso-
lution, are animated with a snore intense hostility to the
Russian dominion than perhaps any other population
under its rule ; and this on account of the following
circumstance. The peasantry of Samogitia enjoyed,
under the Polish dominion, a certain degree of liberty,
—at least, their obligations towards the landowners de-
pended on the will of the latter, but were regulated by
custom, which, having acquired the force of law, was
religiously observed. This circumstance, united with a
fertile soil, the proximity of the sea, and an entirely ft ee
trade, which was the case in Poland, rendered the
Samogitian peasantry one of the richest of their class in
Europe ; and their v: obese naturally gave them a feeling
of independence, unknown to the peasantry of the adja-
cent provinces. Tide happy state of risings has been
entirely reversed since the establishment of the Russian
Government, because, as it did not recognise the
liberties enjoyed by the above•mentionFd peasantry,
they were gradually reduced to a condition of absolute
serfage, and tlier welfare declined in the same ratio as
their liberty. This has been particularly the case ‘Ni fi
the starosties, er crown lards, which lied been granted
by the Rus<ian Government to several of its military
officers and civil employe's as a reward for their
services, and who not only oppose the pea-
can try of those lands, but have even reduced ninny
small freeholders, by their influence with the pubic au-
thoritieg, to a state of serfage. This natural cause of
hatred against the Russian government is still more in-
creased by the circumstance that the Samogitians, who
do not belong to the Slavonic race, speak a language so '
different from that of the Russians that they cannot under-
stand each other, as is the case with all the Slavonic na-
tions. The Samogiti:sns proved their capabilities for an
insurrectionary war in 1831, when, having risen, without
any resistance from a regular army, they kept their
ground for about five months against the Russian forces,
and this in an entirely flat country. Now, a descent in
that quarter, for instance at Liebau, about thirty Eng-
lish miles from the Samogitian frontier, effected in the
early spring of the next year by the allied forces, and a
Polish legion, composed chiefly of officers and veteran
soldiers, now exiles in France aid England, who may
be employed as instructors of the new levies, and whose
number may be considerably increased by the Poles who
have been brought as Russian prisoners to the above-
mentioned two countries, with It MlffiCient store of arms,
munitions, aid all the necessaries of war, will produce
an immediate insurrection, which, supported by a regu-
lar force] of the allies, may be soon organised into an
effective array."
An attack on this side of Russia will be much mere
effective than in any other part of the Baltic coast,
because, although there may be a considerable discon-
tent in the Russian Baltic provinces (Livonia, Esthonia,
and Courland), on account of the proselytism of the
Greek Church amongst the Protestant peasantry of these
provinces, it is by no means such as to produce an in-
surrection ; whilst the gentry of the same provinces
occupy the most important places in the civil and mili-
tary service of Russia, and are, therefore, notwithstand-
ing their German nationality, generally more attached
to the present order of things than many real Russians.
Neither can great things, in this respect, be expected
from Finland, because this province, united with Russia
in 1309, has been since that time treated with particular
favour. It has a kind of constitution, an entirely sepa-
rate administration, its own army, all its ancient pri-
vileges and franchises, and even a much less restricted
tariff than the rest of the Russian empire. The Fin-
landers, enjoying all these peculiar privileges, have,
moreover, an open field for their talents and ambition in
the military and civil service of Russia, where many of
them occupy important situations. In short, Russia has
done everything in order to reconcile the inhabitants of
Finland to her rule ; and, consequently, it is no wonder
that she has succeeded in creating amongst them a con-
siderable party. These circumstances render au insurrec-
tion in that quarter against Russia not very probable,
except after a signal defeat of that power, and
consequently when it will be the least needed. But
supposing that the inhabitants of Finland should rise to
a man at a landing of the Allied troops, including the
Swedes (because it is impossible to admit that the
Swedish Government should be allowed to preserve its
neutrality next spring, when the Allied fleets employed
now in the Black Sea will be able to join those in the
Baltic), and that this province should be wrested from the
Russians, what strategic advantages may be derived
from ithe occupation of this extremity of Russia,
except the facility of taking St. Petersburg ? But the loss
of that capital will not injure in any way the real strength
of Russia, because the capture of her fleet will not make
much difference in this respect, considering that it may
be made useless by a blockade, as it was this summer !
and it will have no more effect upon her commerce that
that which had been produced by the above-mentioned
means. It will only serve to rouse the national spirit of
the Russians, as was the case after the destruction o f
Moscow in 1812, and make the war more popular
amongst them.
The effects of a landing in Samogitia will be, how-
ever, very different. I have explained above, p. 14, et
A 71., the causes which render a general and immediate
insurrection in that quarter certain, in case of such a
landing ; and a single glance on the map of that country
will show the immense strategic advantages which will
he obtained by this combination. The insurrection, sup
Fur Lutl by the Allicd fuices, loud org..ni,cd ill the siiam.er
described in that place, Dray soon reach Vilna, and even
extend beyond that town. This movement, operating
in the rear of the Russian armies engaged in Poland,
will at once cut off their communication with St. Peters-
burg, and thus compel them hastily to retreat beyond
the Dni,-Tier. Such a retreat, accomplished throw-'di a
country in a state of insurrection, will be necessarily ex-
posed to great losses, particularly by the desertion of the
Polish soldiers who have been forced into the Russian
army, and which in this case will become general. Trio
same movement will deliver the western part of the Baltic
coasts of Russia into the hands of the Allies, because the
Russian army, forced to evacuate Poland in an eastern
direction, must fall back on the old Russian provinces ;
for it is only there that it will be able to attempt making
a stand against the advance of the enemy.

The expediency of an invasion of the Russian borders
from that quarter was forcibly pointed out in one of the
letters on the chances of the present war, which appeared
immediately after its declaration, in the Al[genuine Zeitung
of Augsburg, and are ascribed to a high military authority
of Germany. It is, however, almost superfluous to re-
mark, that the success of such a plan must chiefly depend
upon the proper execution of its details, which cannot be
furnished except by some reliable persons, possessing a
thorough knowledge of men and things in the above-men-
tioned quarters. The same letters discuss the probabilities
of the capture of Seleastepol, and say that it would be
tearing out an eye to the Russian giant.

THE PRUSSIAN GUN-BOATS NiX AND

SA LA 1.11-41 V DER.

_ - *O.

The Prussian steam gun-boat Nix was on Friday
placed in the Queen's dock at Keyham, and the Sala-
mander in No. 1 dock, preparatory to their being sur-
veyed next week by the Admiralty officials prior to their
exchange for her Majesty's frigate Thetis, 3S, now in
Hamoaze. These paddle gun-boats were built some
four years since by Mr. Scott Russell on the banks of
the Thames for the Prussian Government. They are
about 170 feet long, the decks being 42 feet broad at the
paddles, aid 25 feet at the close of the sponsons.
They are lightly rigged, schooner fashion, the masts
very wide apart, and are fitted with oscillating engines,
by Russell and Co., of 140-horse power. The hulls
are very fine and sharp, and have submerged rudders
at each end, forming the lower parts of the stem and
stern respectively. The stem rudder is furnished with
screw which will fix it securely when not required for
use. This rudder is worked below the deck, and the one
aft by a wheel on deck, in the ordinary way. The paddle-
wheels are about 16 feet diameter. Each boat is provided
with four large guns, 63-pounders, and two 32-pounders.
When not in use the four large guns are stowed amid-
ships, two with their mouths pointed forward and two
aft. In ordinary steam-vessels there is no increased
width of deck near the paddles, but in. the gun-boats
under consideration there is a sufficient addition to
the Neck lengthwise, in the front and rear of each paddle-
box, to admit one of the large guns. This increase is
sustained by framework in connexion with the sponsons,
which are beans running across the upper part of the
hull, and overhanging th ship's side. Upon this over-
hanging portion the large guns will have to work
when in action. The two 32-pounders point over each
quarter, but there are ports forward for these, near the
bows, to be used when necessary. Public attention
having been much directed towards the boats, their ap-
pearance at Plymouth has created great interest, and a
general opinion prevails that they will be found of little
service to the nation; while their light and elegant con-
struction may render their speed most useful in rivers
and harbours, it will prevent their attempting an over-
sea voyage. It is considered that, should it be pos-
sible to bring them in a position to use their heavy
metal, the working of the 68-pounders would soon tear
to pieces the stanchions in which the ringbolts are fixed,
and the bulwarks which form the ports, because the
deck, which overhangs eight feet, affords no sufficient
support for either stanchions or bulwarks. As only two
of these guns are likely to be worked at one time, it might
have been better to have but two, and to have placed
there amidships. The decks of the Nix and Salamander
arc perfectly open and unprotected ; there is no shelter
whatever for the artillerymen, who could be easily swept
off by a few well-directed shots from the enemy. The
greatest defect, however, of these boats consists in their
being built of iron, apparently half- inch plates, a thick-
ness which would stand no chance of resisting a can-
non ball, even of moderate dimensions, for, should one
strike the hull near the water, the vessel must inevit-
ably be disabled. The Prussians are most polite and
attentive to visitors. Port-Admiral Sir Wiliam Parker,
accompanied by Captain Robb, of the Czesar, 91, made
a cursory inspection of the gun-boats on Saturday after-
noon. Captain Sunda all and the other Prussian (Armors
have, during their visit to Plymouth, been entertained
by the Port-Admiral, by Admiral-Superintendent
Michael Seymour, and other official personages con-
nected with the port.

FESTIVITIES AT BROUGHAM HALL.—Lord Brougham
is spending the Christmas at Brougham Hall, in this
neighbourhood, and it affords us much pleasure to state
that his lordship is in the enjoyment of good health, and
as full of repartee and joke, although he has crossed
man's allotted span, as he was in his younger days,—
Ireohliorattna aecz;ttc.