The National Register.
London, England, 1815-01-29 00:00:00

JAN. 29._

gIEM
%k II Id been brought forward respecting his conduct.'"
aper.ttions of the British ai my on the East coast of Spain,
1813 He should not attempt here to dispute the principal
of Admire! Milkmen, that the enemy never had more
than 5000 men at Villafranca, as the refutation of this point would
properly tome under the consideration of the third charge, - but he
c nail not forbear making some slight allusion to it. it was true
the Admiral had not rested it entirely on his own opinion, but hail
ctrl .aviniretl to support it by the information derived by Captain
S Aiwa, fiom a C talonian peasant ; and the same information was
relied on by Captain Bowyer, with the addition that the enemy had
way five gime Thee came the letter from Colonel Lotter, which
letter, however, Admiral Hollowell had suit received when he dis.
peteliecl we kiyaaiulli. Under any other circumstances, his pro-
,centor's good sense would prebafily have cautioned him aga test
credence to such stories, and making himself time medium of
french. febrieetione. The garrison of 'Tarragona had been repre-
sented as at the 1111111Mit 1/ or leoa, but most probably !moo men.
lie knew that there were two regiments of 700 each, lilt) artillery
men. 4100 Spanish troop, besides the crews cf two privateer% rut
ployrd in working the gnus. He ktievv, too, that Marshal Stickel
had theinglit the garrison strong enough to resist any attack. The
Admiral hail said, our gnus were taken by the enemy in'o his fort,
and that lie hail counted the number of men employed in this work,
as if the whole of the garrison was oertainly to occupied, mutt! the ene-
my tt tailed to exhibit to hint whatetreetitrength they hail at their dis.
pesal. le %lion rd not. ii!,..voker, ito into till thee'. einem- tam ial tietai
as io the number and even the calibre tht guns 'so abandoned, the
oject of which t videatly was to disguise in false colours the trite
history of those transaciiiins, but confine hitn.ell to the main :laser.
time that sit the period when the siege of Tarragmet was rinsed. the
appreachi of the column of 5,000 was still diStant. Not a word was
Haiti of 'he advance from the other side of the farce under
31arahal Sachet ; and when it was at length introdimed, it was in
suet, away, as completely to produce tioetleairtel effect in misleading
We pith is mind, prone to receive impressions without intuit exact
erteury into cirenneitanees or dates.: The Admiral knew, and lie
atitrineil it in hie prestetere that he knew it was the probable junction
of S teleo and the rolitmit at Villtfritima, that alone behaved him not
to attack the latter force. Wa. this proceeding, then. just ; or
ought not his prosecutor, Rile thought proper to repast at ad, have
reported faithfully? If on the 11th lie had forgotten a conversation
Olt die lithe ite which the advance of Sachet, with V 5,000 mete was
positively communicated to him, of what value was his opinion?
But was his memory so extremely feeble as sot to recollect, that.
even on the 13th a part of the British troops had to en eugaged
nearly the whole day with the lwadmost division of Marshall
Sorbet's army? Admiral Hallowell stood, therefore, convicted either
an nufaitlifid or an iguarant reporter. He had. however, succeeded,
both at misenidieg public opinion, and in injuring him in the esti-
mation of Government. There were oilier misrepresentations as to
the disembarkation of the whole army at lialaener. which belonged
rather to the second charge. He might by riling a general action
Lave mitloabtedly gained a little temporary popularity. but he
trussed he should be able to convince the Court, that he had acted
touch more advantageously for the interests of the British army
committed to his charie'e by adopting the judgment of those officers
in whom he conceived he could repeat• the greatest conlidenee.
—ln the letter which he received the day previone to the retreat.
he retied discover no such undertakitig on the past of Admiral Hal
}men as he had stated, that he could get us if the g 11114; and it
such an otter had been made, be certainly should not have attended
to it, knowing, as lie did. its physical impossibility. [Here Sit
joint Murray read the letter. dated Nlalta, June 14.11 ' Anti now he
would ask the Court, whether the letter to Lord IVellitetton was
j',"ni3ble On any pretext, or whether it was no: one of the most ins
trecorens meaSilrego ever taken ltv an naivete:mil that could usiativatte
,(1111Y in the most violent pert anal animosity ? 11'1:ether it could
hate for its object auy other via w than by eifectitig his removal from
colon:mil, to tomove the ereat obstacle to the Admiral's requiring
that, unbounded authority over military measures, and counsels
,
it was well known. he was ambitions to exercise? Every
etenmer of the Court knew the importance of the Quarter-Master-
General's office, and how accessary it was that he should receive an
Toteible assi• tenet. from the naval branch of the service. instead of
)avilitating hi• pueposea, however, he should prole that the Admiral
bad ordered the Bristul to anchor near Balageer, with no other view
thim that Of preventing Genet al Doukin from repairing to head-
quarters. As to time charge of surrentleritig Ilia own judgment to
the adviee of that officer, active and intelligent as he was, he utterly
denied it; it had no foundation; be had never consulted him till
Aftcrly, lie itoreaehed no luau's judgment; he accuted uo mates

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