The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-15 00:00:00

THE CRIMEA.

Thursday's Debats contains the following notes
on the present occupation of the allied army, from
the pen of Colonel St. Ange
" The allied army, in possession of Sebastopol
and released from the stern and perilous labours of
the trenches, already sees before it, in the more or
less distant future, new vistas of glory ou the plains
of the Crimea. But before taking the field it will
have to adapt itself to the new situation cleated
by its success, and to take in hand the work of
organisation, supposing that it is intended to keep
Sebastopol, as appears probable. The following,
then, is a slight sketch of what has now to be done,
and of what is doubtless being done at this mo-
ment.

" To explore the interior of Sebastopol, to ascer-
tain the state of the various localities, to purify and
clear the town, examine the buildings with an eye
to the lodgment of the troops, to bring in for the
moment a few battalions which
.will place sentries
where required and preserve good order, and to
collect what inhabitants may be left for the pur-
pose of employing them in removing the rubbish,
the remainder of the army meanwhile remaining
encamped in its positions.
" To disarm all our siege batteries, and transport
the guns, mortars, and projectiles on board ship ;
to remove also all the sapping and mining tools, as
likewise the gabions and earthsack-s that may still
be made serviceable ; and, lastly, to fill up all the
trenches. _ _ _

" To restore the place to a state of defence by
repairing its chief fortified area, demolishing at the
same time the superabundant works, that would
compel us to leave in it too numerous a garrison.
" Finally, to inspect the guns, arms, and other
objects of war left by the enemy in the town, to
make out a list of their condition, divide them
among the allied powers, and carry them off, ex-
cept such as may be deemed useful for arming the
place, the requisite changes being kept in view.
The military stores abandoned by the enemy in his
precipitate flight must be immense, as General
Pelissier has already announced.
" Such, then, is at least the enumeration, though
a very abridged one, of what has to be done when
taking possession of a captured fortress ; and we
think there will be occupation of this nature for a
month. _ _

"It has been asked if Sebastopol is tenable so
long as the Russians remain masters of all the forts
on the north side which line the sea in front of the
town. Undoubtedly it may be held in spite of this.
We received balls and bombs in our roofless
trenches, sheltered merely by parapets thrown up
in haste, under the fire even of grape and mus-
ketry, and we did not ou tat account abandon
the trenches. In Sebastopol we shall be sheltered
from the balls by the walls of the houses—in-
deed, of several houses at once ; no fire of grape
or musketry need be feared at the distance the
enemy is now at (from 1,200 to 1,400 yards). As
for the bombs, we may screen ourselves from them
as the Russians themselves did against ours,
by constructing strong hurdles with earth upon
heni. We cannot want the materials, since the
Russians had not time to burn and destroy every.
thing in this great city. It is true that the occu-
pation of the north by the Russians prevents our
entering the roadstead and the port. But what.
need we of them, when we already possess the ex-
cellent harbours of Cape Chersonesus ? Have not
our fleets already passed the winter without incur-
ring any danger in those waters ?
" It has also been asked if the Allies will have
to undertake, now or latter, the siege of the forts
on the north side. There appears no absolute ne-
cessity for so doing. That would be binding our-
selves down again to labours slow and painful as
those which have occupied us so long, and cost us
so many efforts, so many men, and so much money.
The key to those forts is in fact a victory over the
Russian army in the Crimea ; then they would fall
of themselves, seeing that they must be instantly
abandoned. Or, if the Russians choose to retain
them still, a blockade and famine will compel thew
to surrender; and this is a humiliation that Rus-
sia's pride dreads more than al] the rest. The forts
of the north side can consequently neither prevent
our occupation of Sebastopol, nor can they thwart
our operations in the interior of the Crimea, on
account of their eccentric situation. We should
not be surprised at their being blown up so soon
as the Russian army is compelled to retreat from
the neighbourhood of Sebastopol.
" The respective position of the two armies re-
mains the same, and will do so until one of the
two shall take the initiative of a movement that
will force the other to manoeuvre in its turn. For
the present, the allied army holds its strong posi-
tions on the Tchernaya, on the Fedukhine moun-
tains, on Mount Sapoune, and the table-land of
Sebastopol, until the occupation of the town shall
have been properly arranged, and its chief defences
thoroughly repaired. It does not appear to have
anything else to do at present.
" The Russian army, for its part, occupies the
excellent positions of Mackenzie, strongly en•
trenched and lined with redoubts like our own.
On both sides the capability exists of receiving the
attack with chances tolerably equal of serious resist-
ance and success, and with the equal risk of losing
a great many men. The Russians will probably
continue in observation before us within their
strong positions until the allied army gives signs of
some movement. But what will that movement
be ? Shall we venture to attack in front the Mac-
kenzie heights, where the road from Simpheropol
winds along ? Shall we penetrate into the heart
of the Crimea by another route ? If so, by what
route, and when ? All these are premature ques-
tions. Let us avoid tracing our imaginary plans of
campaign. Rather let us permit time to develope
the events, or if our imagination must needs out-
strip facts, the field of conjecture is open."