The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-12 00:00:00

Ou L 1 CRIMIA

The following letter from a Prussian Engineer hai
been addressed to a contemporary
Sir,—For five months the Allied Armies have carried
on their attacks on Sebastopol by means of artillery.
According to all reports, when they first sat down before
the place, its southern side was nearly open and defence.
less, aid the Russians gained time for the construction of
some earthworks, chiefly through the delays of their ene-
mies. On the 17th of October, the English and French
having erected a number of batteries, and armed them
partly with heavy ordnance, opened fire, and succeeded
in making some impression on the badly devised and
worse executed atone towers, but at the end of tfie
day their guns were nearly silenced. The blame was
cast upon the French ; their breastworks were said to
be weak, their magazines not sufficiently protected, and
their gulls unable to cope with the heavier metal of the
Ru-siaiis. After the failure of the bombardment regular
parallels were opened against the place, and trenches
were carried forward considerably, and some new bat-
teries constructed and armed • but to all appearance the
fortress is still as far as ever from being taken.
A result so contrary to every expectation would natue
rally lead military men to inquire whether the resources
of modern artillery were duly made use of by the be-
siegers in this memorable contest ; or whether there
were natural and insurmountable obstacles which pre-
vented these resources from being effectively employed.
Nor can dare be any harm, in this particular case, by
openly se rutinking the scientific merits of proceedings
which, hoe ever recent of occurrence, are historical facts
already; for Lever were siege operations conducted with
greater publicity than those for redue;ng Sebastopol.
Teat the work undertaken was, from natural causes,
a very difficult one nobody will deny ; but to consider
it impossible would involve a severe stricture on the con-
duct of the connnandcrs who still persevere in their eedea-
yours. On the other side, not a few unavoidable causes,
which prevented the artillery of the allies from making
a more sen,ible, as well as speedy, impression on the
fortress, may be pointed oute Amongst them the great
extent given to the siege works appears t) occupy a most
conspicu ins pos'ion. The Freech undertook to attack
the western part of the town, whilst the English directed
their separate efforts against the eastern ['ation, In
bon cases the whole line of the Russian •fortifications
was embraced. To inquire ,whether this multiplicity cf
points of attack originated from a contempt for the
earthworks hastily thrown up by *the enemy, or from
other causes, is irrelevant for the present purpose ; evi-
dently it must have been possible to contract the lines,
and to concentrate the efforts for reducing the place.
After the experience gained on the 17th of October,
every artillery officer in the allied camps must have been
aware that the Russians were superior in the number
and calibre of their guns, and that they wanted neither
men nor ammunition to serve them properly. In
consequence of the affair of Balaklava the English,
moreover, were excluded from the use of the most
convenient road for carrying stores to the camp, and'
the difficulties of bringing up in front of the town more
numerous and heavier pieces of ordnance were immensely-
'in creased. How therm eonld the Allies hope speedily to
obtain a superiority in artillery fire all over such extended
lines as they still persevered in occupying ? It may be
said that as siege works advance their wilt : ihemseivie;
contract laterally, that the second parallel will of ne-
cessity be shorter than the first, and the third still
shorter than the second. But a second parallel cannot
be opened with areasonableared o maintaining
neh oapi et
gioonfotdgacadti
deal
nnl gaining
the
of
f tmuchfhaece wboayofnrsdkao
numerous and active enemy, before the ricochet and en-
fidloaidnigngnboartteery even
of
s h
allotted to them, that is, destroying the traverses
dismounting the guns of the fortress. Besides, it is not
enough to open a second parallel; it must also be armed •
with guns of large calibre, part of them very heavy, in
order to be capable of withstanding the shock of acharge
,f powder even heavier than one-third of the weight
of the solid ball which must be projected with great
foice. In the face of the immense difficulties
in bringing up the grZat guns for properly arming
the second and third parallels, would it not have been
better for the allies to have given up one of their lines
ef attack, and to have directed their combined forces
and energies upon one or two points of either the east-
ern or the western parts of the town ? By such a con-
tent; ation the besiegers might not only have reasonably
expected to be able to silence the Russian artillery at
those points by means of such guns as they could bring
into position, but the ruinous labour of making, watch-
ing, and defending uselessly extensive lines of trenches,
would have been lessened by at least one half. The
British army would have escaped being decimated by
incessant watching, exposure, and fatigue ; Russian
sorties might far more easily have been guarded
against or repulsed, and the necessity of interrupting
the progress of the siege for want of guns and am-
munition either totally obviated or greatly di-
minished in duration. It need scarcely be men-
tioned that in erder to blockade that part of the town
where the direct attack was abandoned—which had
better never hove been undertaken—a chain of closed
redoubts shoull have been established. But which
part of the town—the eastern or the western—should
have been attacked directly and which one .
blockaded ? On this question there could exist but little
doubt, if any, after the battle of Inkerman. It is but
natural for a strong garrison to try to proceed from de-
fensive to offensive operations at that spot where de-
fence is weakest and most difficult, and the Russians
attacked the heights of Inkerman under great disadvan-
tages, with a view to prevent the English from approach-
ing nearer in the direction of Mount Sapone, on the
eastern side of the Careening Bay, and from thereby out-
flanking Fort Malachow. This part of their lines of de-
fence was so weak and insufficient originally that they
never ceased in their efforts to strengthen it until they ac-
tually succeeded in establishing new and advanced fortifi-
cations for its protection. By permitting them so to do,
the French now appear to have lost the very spot forh
placing t the best advantage an enfilading battery, wbic
would have been of the greatest service, not only
be-
cause its well-directed fire would have spread o
0.80
annoy-
ance over a great extent of the enemy's works,ha b
&juice cf
because it was not liable to be masked bytcoense___en,i_
play
Frentach artillery
the direct attack upon Fort Malachow , and
to the very end
the -
of comparatively
s:o,w,e,floe:tllntlrthtelsecilastswloil
eaahgyeev.aebt
se:el
d.keptonpi constantiannpdonsel.e
a strong
d
powder. The. placed at such distances
pearpecaibsie.
have large
e consisted -
sappearsmSal ° lidt
calibre, and incapable _nib guns were more power-
aabi ol nu
ta tnhde
a
land
andpialretvi ce r
from the Russian wweks quite unattainable. This error
fel, but they weelui:°rdi.'
Droved a bane th
and effective firinugvg oreon,
charge of
mistaken general notions about
originally
gceo:
and
t
l
alhnekogaeui rtt
mt
aoe The
ssei
noise.
siege, e ooasnfngt
populi;.raficaster gun in
lities of the I.
"idea be'
was powder and
range
.33 9t to less real ur
object prreelTryvohiuomegu s y singled out, not
on
ball °Pelle hit
innte itisaot 11:j e old two grooved regulation
r:ihflue:L:aurtiascuaTsteeetirilalagains'ignetodl scale, with the additional disadvan-
races of an excessively short barrel, a windage, a weak
cstaaryge , e
wan
theee fauallis w
ting
oulad
powder, and a bullet of very questionable
cboer raeicntp
lcyensturffie
coi
ef
ngt rtanv
di teys.
tr o yAanlyl ac of
of practice in shooting at very distant objects ;
i,ut the; is not the first instance in military matters that
the very best results have been expected om the greatest
aceutnu lation of defects.
In siege of orations, carried on against a fortress so
slroeg,ly garrisoned and so open to receive reinforce-
ments, a 1 possible precautions ought to be taken again::
"orties. But we •do not find that field artillery was
kept t eady, charged with grape-shot, to scour the ground
.e con-
in advance of the tre,nclits, nor that redov order to pre-
u
ts we
atm ucteil at the wings of the parallels,t
i
vent tie enemy from getting in them, and
t iog the more advanced one in the rear,
It would he invidious to follow uP every shortcoming
of minor impertance, but it must be mentioned that the
b t silent about the existence of
reports are ominously si*le
blinds or screens for the rnb
e razures to keep off the rifle
and about
bullets of the enemy,
Ishells fl •
about in
against the pieces 0. burst flying
battei ies. The most unaccountable thing, however, is
that although the far greater part of hand-to-hand fight-
ing is goii,g
on in the dark, not a word has been said
during the whole siege about any means employed on
either side tot making di,tiectly visible the 'opposite
works and operations in the night time.
I hope, sir, you will judge these lines to be 'written
in.a spirit of candour, of the greatest-good•will towards
the British nation, and of due respect for the consum-
mate bravery of the troops engaged in this extraordinary
military spectacle by, sir, your obedient servant,