The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-18 00:00:00

committee on this point? The House will excuse me for
what lam about to read, as Idoit in self-defence. It is
said that I proposed a resolution at the end of the pro-
ceedings of that committee which had only in its support
my own casting vote ; now, I will ask the house when I
read the resolutions which were agreed to unanimously by
that committee, which were penned by the noble lord the
member for Totnes, what is the difference between my
resolution and that of the noble lord ? In page 4, under
the head of " The conduct of the departments both athome
and abroad whose duty it is best to minister to the wants
of the army," there appeared these words
" The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success.
Lord Aberdeen states it to have been their impression that
Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a coup de
main. The Duke of Newcastle says that he expected the
army, after capturing Sebastopol, would winter there, or
else, after destroying the fortress, would return to winter
on the shores of the Bosphorus. Sir James Graham has the
strongest opinion that the order for the expedition was
given at the right time, and was executed at the right time.
This report shows the results which ensued upon the frustra-
tion of these expectations. Your committee have inquired
what information the Government had obtained which induced
them to order this expedition. In regard to this matter, it
may be observed that the Duke of Newcastle had, in his de-
spatch of the 10th of April, estimated the Russian forces in
the Crimea at 30,000 men, and he believes that when the ex-
pedition was ordered no more reliable accounts had been re-
ceived, Sir J. Graham sas, however, that at a later period—
namely, the last week in July—he had obtained from a Cri-
mean authority a complete account of the Crimea, its localities,
its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water,
and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force,
which was estimated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8,000 of
which were cavalry, 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebas-
topol, and the remaining 30,000 were dispersed through the
Crimea.' Vice-Admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May,
1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon
information which he had obtained, he estimated the Russian
force in the Crimea at 120,000 men. • The embassies at St.
Petersburg and Constantinople were unable to furnish any
information upon these important subjects."
It is due to the gallant lord to have this statement made to
show that he was opposed to the policy, and that the only
. persons really responsible for the expedition are the Ad-
ministration who had the management of it
Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the 19th of July, states
that the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in
deference to the views of the British Government than to any
information in the possession of the naval and military autho-
rities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their
state of preparation.' "
Now, sir, I simply repeat what has been told to me, and I
hardly think that I should be violating any confidence if I
mentioned my authority, but I will not state it, although I
dare say that it is known to the right hon. gentleman. I
• am informed that the authorityon which he relied wrote to
him a letter, stating that he had been in the Crimea only
once, that he spoke upon information gained upon the most
cursory travelling through the country, and that what the
right hon. gentleman called "a Crimean authority" was a
person who bad only been there a few days. Observe, I
speak upon authority, and I see a right hon. gentleman
opposite who, I think, knows the authority upon which I
speak, because he stated to him exactly what he stated to
me. (Hoar, hear.) Now, sir, I come to a part of the mat-
ter which affects the noble lord at the head of the present
Administration. He was at that time Home Secretary.
Under his command was the militia of this country (hear);
and I state that, after war was declared, and before the
expedition to the Crimea was undertaken, the Adminis-
tration took no steps to provide a reserve of force for
the army which they were about to employ on that ex-
pedition, that army being originally in numbers inade-
quate to the task which was imposed on it. Now, I
charge that against the noble lord, and I charge it as a
great error, and no mot e ; but an error may lead to great
mischief, and I think that it has done so in the case of the
noble lord. He took no provision in respect to the militia.
The army was sent out totally inadequate, as the right
hon. gintleman himself admits. He believes that the army
of Russia amounted to 70,000 men, and we sent to the
Crimea at the utmost 25,000 men.
Mr. GLADSTONE--You forgot the allies.
Mr. ROEBUCK—I was speaking of the British army ;
but the allies and we together sent a force of 50,000 men.
At that time the right hon. gentleman believed that 70,000
men were in the Crimea. Vice-Admiral Dryades believed
that there were 150,000 men there, yet we despatched an
army of 25,000 men, aided by a smaller army of French to
invade the Crimea, and at that time the noble lord who
was at the head of the militia took no steps to provide a
reserve by means of the militia of this country. Again I
appeal to the report of the Sebastopol Committee :
" From the 16th of September, when the army landed in
the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as some witnesses
state, until about themiddle of November, the troops suffered
from overwork and from dysentery."
Now, the statement that the troops suffered from over-
work means that their numbers were insufficient—(hear)-
and every witness who came before us, generals, captains,
privates, all concurred in stating that the men were over-
worked. They went to the trenches for 24 hours at a time
—I am understating it. If there had been more troops their
work would have been less; and, what was more than all,
had an adequate provision been made of labour in the Cri-
mea, that seven miles at the end of the 3,000 would not
have stood in the way like a great chasm to prevent the ar-
rival of all support and sustenance from this country. I
heard the right hon. gentleman the member for South
Wiltshire, when upon the Treasury bench, say that the
whole distance between us and the army was 3,006 miles,
but that the last six was the insuperable difficulty. (Hear.)
Why, at that time there was there, upon that six miles,
the means of making a road tho most complete that na-
ture offered ; there were faggots in abundance as well as
"metalling"—in the phraseology of road-making, lime-
stone. (Hear.) All that was required was stout yeomen
arms. Those arms were not provided ; and at whose door
shall we lay the fault ? Clearly at the door of the Ad-
ministration which sent an army to do a deed which no
army could do thus hampered, thus ill-provided, thus
" cabined, cribbed, confined." (Cheers.) Why, sir, if
they had had 20,000 labourers, could they not have made
that road in a fortnight, and should we have heard the
harrowing descriptions which we have heard of the misery
suffered by our gallant troops upon that occasion? Not
at all. Well, then, I say that upon the Administration,
and upon them alone, rests the responsibility that our
army was totally unprovided, that they went inadequate
to the occasion, that we sent a force to perform a deed
which was totally unequal to the office, and that, instead
of sitting in anxious conference endeavouring to supply
the want which their own carelessness created, Parliament
separated in August, and there was no Cabinet Council
till the middle of October. The noble lord the memberfor
the city of London was instructing the population of Glo-
• cestershire, I believe, by certain lectures • the right
bon. gentleman the head of the Board of 'Works was
shining somewhere in Scotland—(a laugh)—and, in fact,
with the exception of the Duke of Newcastle and the right
hon. gentleman the member for South Wiltshire, and, I
believe, the Earl of Aberdeen—(An hon. MEMBER.—
" The Earl of ClarendOn.] lam not quite so sure about
• the Earl of Clarendon; but, with those exceptions, all
were taking their pleasure from the end of August till the
middle of October.
Mr. GLADSTONE.—Quite untrue.
Mr. ROEBUCK continued.—There was no Cabinet
Council daring the whole of that period. The Duke of
Newcastle stated before the committee that he was in Lon-
don all that time; and I believe that the then First Lord
of the Admiralty was also at his post ; but they are now out
of office—they have received their punishment. (Cheers,
and a laugh.) The persons whom I wish to visit are now
in office, because they were at that time indulging them-
selves, and were not looking after their duty. The noble
lord at the head of the present Administration, where was
he ? The noble lord the member for the city of London,
where was be ? The right hon. gentleman the Home Se-
cretary, where was he ? The right hon. gentleman the
President of the Board of Works, where was he ? Why, I
could go through the list ; and I ask, why was there no
Cabinet Council during all that time? (Hear, hear.) In
that interval the Battle of the Alma was fought—the
expedition to the Crimea was determined on and exe-
ceted. You may tell me that the expedition was deter-
mined on before ; then, why were you not in London
to receive intelligence as to the mode in which it was
executed? (Hear, hear.) Why were you not at your
posts ? The army dwindled away ; cold, hunger, tempest
came upon them. You were not at your posts to minister
to their wants, and I ask the house to visit with severe
reprehension the men who so forgot their duties. (Hear.)
Now, sir, it is in evidence that the sufferings of the army
were not attributable to the army itself ; that they were
not attributable even to the governors or generals of
that army; but they must have had a cause, and it is
for us to inquire what was that cause. It was that the
army was not adequately provided for the operations
which they had to perform. They were thrown upon the
shores of the Crimea without the means of transport, and
although we bad command of the sea, and could convey to j
the shores of the Crimea everything that England or the
world could offer, yet our troops died six miles from the
shore because there was not au adequate road provided by
this great country for its army. Can any one believe, Sir,
if we hat had a man at the head of the Cabinet, or in the
Cabinet, who had the spirit in him vhich this country
furnishes, I would say, to the humblest of her sons, with
the means which this country affords of performing every.
thing which human art or science can accomplish—can any
one believe, I ask, that seven miles off mud should stand
between us and as gallant an army as ever left the shores
of England ? (Hear.) We let them die like sheep.
They suffered undor single canvas—there was no oppor-
tunity of taking them huts to cover them—cold,
rain, snow, tempest beat upon their heads ; and
the Government of her Majesty were indulging their ease
'while those gallant men were enduring such extremes of
suffering. And are the representatives of the people of
England to stand idly by and witness such a dereliction of
duty? The thought is monstrous—it makes my blood boil.
The Government sent forth a body of men to fight the bat-
tles of their country, and they sent them armed as troops
Were armed 30 years ago, notwithstanding all that art has
accomplished during the interval. [SiiD. L. Evans—"Some
—not all."] I am glad that the gallant general, who knows
so Well the sufferings of the army to which he was attached,
should correct me if I exaggerate; but evidence was given
before the committee that the weapon which is popularly
known as "Brown Bess" was in tho hands of man y regl-
meats before Sebastopol, and assuming one-fourth of the
army to have been thus armed—[Sir D. L. Evans—" Only
one-fifth."l—Well, one-fifth; but I saythat even if one man
was improperly armed it is the fault of the Administra-
tion, and the man so armed was a sacrifice to the want of
care, diligence, and foresight on the part of those to whom the
conduct of the war was intrusted. I say that it is only
proper that this house should visit with severe reprehen-
sion persons who so carelessly dischared their duties. With
regard to medical stores, that army should never have been
sent to the Crimea unprepared with them, even if the
troops were in health to perform their duty; but before
the army left Varna plague in the shape of cholera attacked
it, and then, surely, it was the duty of the Government to
provide for it everything which the medical science of this
country could afford. What was the description given to
the committee of tho wretchedness endured by the troops
before Sebastopol ? They were described as broken down by
disease--disease more potent than the enemy; they slept
under single canvas, their legs up to the knees in mud, they
were rained upon when suffering all the horrors of diarrhcea:.
and all the other miseries to which poor human nature is
subject were experienced by that army. Was the arm
th
Weremeans? not. And upon whose head must be charged the
mischief which lam now describing? I say, upon the
Administration. But it is said—and I now come to a
part of the subject upon which I can hardly touch without
in the committee hes already performed
that for which it was appointed. It is said that it has got
rid of all the enemies in the Administration, of those who
were the cause of the mischief. Now, sir, for my own
part, I am far from believing that
suc is the case. (Hear,
bear.) It he said you have turned out Lord Aberdeen, the
Duke of Newcastle, and the right bon. members for Car-
lisle, the University of Oxford, and Wilts and what more
do you expect ?Do you want to see everybody punished?
I, sir, say yes; I want to see everybody punished who de-
serves it. (Hear, hear.) I think that that argument is

unfair to those who were more immediately connected
with the conduct of the war. Perhaps, I may be permitted
to say—and I say it in no spirit of presumption—that I
think the Duke of Newcastle has been made a scapegoat—
(hear, hear)—that he has been sent into the wilderness
Iwith
ntkh e sin
that
foefve the
r t
herthere
was
aAdministrationm son his had
n whoreal
really
s cha
te (Hear.)
d
his duty conscientiously, that man was the Duke of New-
castle. (Hear, hear.) Ile acted according to the best of
he was always at his post; and he was ever
his
intentability;
upon
the honour of England and the welfare of the
army which was submitted to his care. (Hear, hear.) I
say, therefore, sir, that to throw all the blame upon the
Duke of Newcastle and to make his retirement from office a
sufficient holocaust to the anger of England, is an act of in-
justice to which I will not consent to be a party. I say
the same with regard to the right hon. member for Wilts.
(Hear, hear.) No man could have been more intent than
that right hon. gentleman had always been upon the hon-
our of his country, and on performing the duties of his
office. I do not mean to say that he did not often do
wrong. I think he did; but then I draw the distinction
between him and other members of the Administration,
that he was conscientiously endeavouring to perform his
duty and was always at his post--(hear, hear)—and his
kindliness of spirit was always pervading the office to
which he belonged. (Hear, hear.) I say that that right
hon. gentleman and the Dula, of Newcastle acted to the
best of their abilities for the welfare of England ; and that
they should be offered up as a sacrifice for the sins of the
rest of the Administration is an act of injustice which I
think that this house cannot but disapprove—(hear)—when
there are those who have done the injury still holding the
seals of
_power, while the least guilty have gone out of
office. With regard to the right hon. gentleman the late
First Lord of the Admiralty, I hope he willexcuse me say-
ing that I think he made some serious mistakes. I think
he made a grave mistake in building large ships of war,
when, in my opinion, he ought to have built marine batte-
ries of small vessels, but at the same time there was about
him a desire to do his duty, which does not appear to me
to have been evinced by the other members of the Govern-
ment. I say, therefore, that it is no satisfaction to me to
have got rid of those individuals. I am glad that any man
who has done wrong is out of office, but what I want is,
that all who have done wrong should go out—(hear)—and
I hope that the house will support me in that desire. I feel,
Sir, that to adequately bring forward this resolution re-
quires a strength beyond that which I possess, for myfeeble
body is only now borne up by the indignant spirit within.
I have seen a brave army of Englishmen pining and melt-
ing away in destitution. I have seen them thus in conse-
quence of the errors and the supineness of the Administra-
tion, and I have seen the persons who formed that Adminis-
tration come back to office unstricken by any expression of
opinion on the part of this house. It is now manifest that
the Administration which I wish to censure have been guilty
of wrong, and whether the result of carrying my resolution
be to transfer power from those who sit on this side of the
house is to me a matter of total indifference. All that I wish
for is justice, all that I desire is to see that we shall never
again be in the position of calling on a body of our brave
fellow-countrymen, and at the same time sit here night
after night faced by a body of men by whose supineness
and errors they are being consigned to an untimely grave.
(Hear.) In this spirit I have moved the resolution which
I now, sir, place in your hands. lam aware that I have
inadequately performed the duty which I have undertaken,
but I have done so to the best of my ability, and I now
leave the question to the decision of the house. (Cheers.)
,General PEEL, in moving the previous question, said—The
resolution, sir, which the hon. member for Sheffield has placed
in your hands, in the first place, calls upon this house to ex-
press a deep feeling of regret at the sufferings of our army
during the winter campaign in the Crimea. To that portion of
the resolution I am sure that every member of this house will
cordially assent, and I think would also be willing to add some
expression of admiration for the fortitude which that army
displayed during all its privations. The resolution, however,
goes on to say that the house, coinciding with the resolution of
their committee, that the conduct of the Administration was
the first and chief cause of the calamities which befel that
army, do hereby visit with severe reprehension every mem-
ber of that Cabinet whose counsels led to such disastrous re-
sults. Before the house consents to agree to that resolution,
it ought to consider what are the principal considerations
which it embodies. Now, sir, I think that, if the words of
the resolution convey any meaning at all, that meaning is an
expression condemnatory of the policy of the expedition to the
Crimea. Now, I am not prepared to come to that conclusion,
or to condemn the policy of that expedition. I voted against
that resolution in the committee, and I am not prepared to
adopt it now. It is perfectly true that little was known of the
state of the Russian army, or of the Russian fortresses in the
Crimea, but if no expedition was to be undertaken without
full and accurate information of the facts I venture to say that
the allied armies would have attempted nothing at all against
a country so situated as Russia. (Hear.) No great object can
be gained without running some risk in its attainment. (Hear.)
The best test, however, of the expedition to the Crimea
is, that there was a:better chance of success on the
first landing of the army than there has ever been since ; that
there was a better chance of taking Sebastopol by a coup de
main—a sudden assault—than by a protracted siege or cam-
paign in the field. Another point to be considered is the
state of the allied armies at that time. They had been de-
pressed by sickness and inaction, and it was absolutely ne-
cessary that some means should be resorted to in order to
restore their spirits. Above all, however, the state of public
feeling at home must be looked to. Throughout this coun-
try there was a general opinion that some blow ought to be
struck, and I will venture to say that if nothing had been
attempted we should have been called upon to condemn the
Government for not doing that which we are now asked
to pass a vote of censure upon them for doing. (Hear,
hear.) But, independently of the policy of going to the
Crimea, the hon. and learned gentleman has made great
complaints that the army upon its arrival there was not
provided with sufficient land transport. Now, I speak
with great deference in the presence of the hon. and gallant
gentleman (Sir D. L. Evans), but I do not concur in the
blame cast upon the authorities in this respect. I believe
the great object of the expedition to the Crimea was to land,
in the first instance, the greatest possible number of combs-
batants ; and, even if we could have had greater naval trans-
port at our command, it would have been far better to em-
ploy it in conveying more troops and more cavalry than in
supplying the means of land transport. It has always ap-
peared to me that the reason the army did not advance im-
mediately after the Battle of the Alma was not from the
want of land transport, but from the necessity of protecting
the wounded ; and I have little doubt that if the forces of
the allies had at once advanced the result of that glorious
battle would have been the immediate fall of Sebastopol.
(Hear, hear.) That, however, is a point on which I think
neither the hon. and learned member nor myself is the best
judge. Well, although Ido not blame the policy of the ex-
pedition to the Crimea, I must say that I cannot observe
in it any of that sagacity which the hon. and gallant mem-
ber for Cambridge (Colonel Adair) refers to in his resolu-
tion. (Hear, hear.) It is quite evident that the Govern-
ment looked forward to only one result of the expedition,
and that a successful one. It was not until after the 18th of
October that the failure of the Allied armies to produce the
anticipated result first opened the eyes of the commanders to
the fact that a long and protracted 'siege would be necessary,
and not only to that fact, but to the still more lamentable one
that if they could not succeed in their enterprise, neither
could they withdraw. The Allied armies were forced to en-
counter a winter in the Crimea, and that they were subjected
to the misfortunes which consequently befel them was not a
matter of policy, but a matter of necessity. Then, again,
the great cause of these calamities— the cause to which I have
ever attributed all the sufferings to which our troops were ex-
posed—was from our having commenced great military pre-
parations with inadequate means. (Hear.) Did not the Go-
vernment in the first instance send out a greater army than
the reduced state of our establishment permitted of ? It is per-
fectly true that the Duke of Wellington advised this country
never to enter into a little war; but even a greater misfor-
tune than entering upon a litle war is to enter upon a great
war with little means. (Hear, hear.) In the first place, you
sent out every available man you could lay your hands upon,
having no reserves to fall back on for the supply of those
casualties which sickness and engagements with the enemy
are sure to entail. lam fully borne out in that description
of the state of the army by a paragraph in a memorandum of
my right hon. friend the then Secretary at War. That me-
morandum, which is dated Nov. 17, 1854, has reference to the
increase of the army, and this is the description which the
right hon. gentleman gives :
" England has not usually been very successful at the
commencement of her wars, for the reason that she does
not in time of peace maintain an army large enough to be
capable of lasting as well as sudden extension. (Hear.) It
is possible, as this year has shown, to create, at very short
notice, a very efficient and, for us, considerable army ; but
it is quite another thing to maintain those numbers and that
efficiency. The army of the East has been created by dis-
counting .the future. (Hear.) Every regiment at home or
within reach, and not forming part of that army, has been
robbed to complete it ; the depots of the regiments under
Lord Raglan have been similarly treated."
I think that fully bears me out in saying that there is no very
great proof of sagacity in the policy which sent out so much
larger a force than you had reserves to keep up. (Hear, hear.)
But, although I think the Government were ill-advised in
giving way to the cry raised in this house, throughout the
country, and by the press—for it was in this way that the
Government were urged on to this undertaking—l will not
condemn them on that ground, for I believe their mistakes
originated in their desire vigorously to carry on the war, and
I infinitely prefer such a determination to the more peaceful
spirit which was evinced by some members of the Cabinet, but
you have no doubt placed yourselves in a position from which
there is now no retreat, and I believe there is not a man in this
house who does not wish that every exertion should bo made
in order to carry out the objects for which our gallant army
and that of our brave ally have so nobly fought. I can
assure the hon. and learned gentleman 15 is from no party mo-
tive that I will not agree to his proposition. I have recorded
my party predilection by the vote I gave on the resolution of
the right hon. gentleman the member for Buckiughamshire,
the professed object of which resolution was to turn out the
Government; and I did so, sir, because I believe the time has
arrived when a better, because a stronger, Government should
be formed from this (the Opposition) side of the house.
(Hear.) But, although entertaining this party feeling, I
never will be a party to casting a censure upon honourable
men, who, in my belief, have exerted themselves to the ut-
most of their power in performing the duties of their office.
(Hear.) I believe that far too much of this sort of blame has
been cast upon individuals in the course of our proceedings
in the committee--(hear)—and I am certain that some of our
best public servants are deeply hurt by the insinuations
thrown upon them in the course of that inquiry. I have in
my hands a letter from the late Lieutenant-General of the
Ordnance, an officer whose character is far too high and
whose services are too well known to render it necessary for
me to dwell upon them. (Hear.) He writes to me to request
that I will take any opportunity which the forms of the house
admit of to vindicate his character from what appears to him
to be an unfair attack. "It has," he says,—
" Caused me considerable annoyance to be exposed to such
a charge from so high an authority, after a prolonged service
in which I have endeavoured faithfully to discharge my
duty, and (as I had hoped, until now, it was allowed)
with credit to myself. After the perusal of the report I only
find one point upon whirl} any ground of censure is directly
applied to me, and that is the charge that, ' from the lan-
guage of Sir Hew Ross, it would seem that he was imper-
fectly acquainted with tt e constitution of the board of which
h e was a member.' This I emphatically deny, for I had
made myself perfectly acquainted with my duties, both as
Lieutenant-General and as a board officer. The difficulties
of uy position early called my attention to these poirits, and
had the examination been carried further to give me an
opportunity of explanation, I should only have illustrated
the evidence of Colonel Anson in 1849, which went to prove
that, -though one board officer may constitute a board, yet
that A r all important questions the signature of a second
officer is desirable, and in some cases indispensable."
Asa n 'ember of the Board of Ordnance for five years, I can
state n iy cordial agreement with the evidence given by the
gallant , officer. Sir Hew Ross then goes on to say
VI ith regard to the general censure 011 the members of
the be .ard, whatever may have been the differences that ex-
isted, L'iy conscience acquits me of any want of judgment
an ten iper,' and I can with confidence appeal to my col- I