The National Register.
London, England, 1808-02-28 00:00:00

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disecrnin
for us and for the Swedes, at this unhappy moment, that
we should determine, with sound judgment, what can really
he done for them, and that we should nut attempt what
there is no likelihood we can perform.

The real statesmen, who should be called to deliberate
on this momentous subject, would first endeavour to re-
solve the question, Whether Great Britain can afford to
Sweden the means of waging an effectual war of defence
against the enemies who now assail her ? Were this ques-
tion, on probable and satisfactory evide►►ce, determined in
the affirmative, they would then put forth every effort to
accomplish the object. Rut were it on equally good evi-
dence determined i►► the negative, they would entirely
abandon this project, and immediately consider what next
could l►e done for this unhappy country. As soon as ever
they had, by patient inquiry, satisfied themselves what was
the greatest good they could procure for her, abandoning
rII other hopeless objects, they would bend their whole
powers to accomplish this attainable advantage. To leave,
however, this clear and manly course, and to make some
feeble and drawling attempts towards the highest °hied,
without any satisfictory evidence that they can accomplish
any good, ►s the part of common empiric.; of office, and
according to the stile in which the affairs of all nations
are too commonly managed.

France is again about to menace this country with in-
vasion, and it will be altogether inconsistent with what we
owe to our OtVII safety to permit any considerable portion
of our forces to leave our own shores. Our East India
possessions are already threatened with a formidable arma-
ment ; and it would be to risk the existence of those splen-
did dominions to place ourselves out of a condition to send
an important reinforcement there on the shortest notice,
ichen the marsh eastward of a Russian or French army
begins. That we can, in these circumstances, afford an
aid to the warlike, but feeble and disunited Swedes, to
enable them to resist the force of the Russian Empire, is
surely maintained with signal inconsistency by those who
only a twelvemonth ago expected from that Empire an
etTectual resistance to the gigantic power of France 3 who
even now insist that the Emperor Alexander concluded the
Peace of Tilsit without necessity, and that he might still
have maintained the contest. The mountains and narrow
defiles of Finland arc reckoned a powerful barrier. With
sty great a superiority of force, however, they might soon
be penetrated, But, it unfortunately happens that there
is a track along the shores of the Finland (I ulph I of consider-
able extant, which opposes little resistance to the march of
au army, but a number of insignificant rivers.

The dangers, however, which threaten Sweden are not
all on the side of Russia. That there is a perfect possi-
bilitt of an invasion by a French and Danish Army from
Zealand, can never he denied by those who have main-
tained that a trench Army mi►;ht have passed from 1101-
s'ein to Zealand, a much wider passage, in ►spite of the
utmost eflorts of the British Navy I and who on that ground
base vindicated the attack on Copenhagen. But indepen-
dent of this circumstance, a formidable invasion may un-

sioestionabl be made from Norway, which supplies 3(1,000
men for the Danish army. It cannot be forgotten that


rrp.

ago a Norwegian army did mvado..,
prevented from 01611;4 porsr•xitm of
Gottenbiirg-h by the intervention of Air. Elliott, the British
Minister.

If it stlemsimpossible to conclude that any effort which
this country can safely make, can enable S‘vedeli to wage
a successful War of Defence against the united attacks of
Ithssia, Denmark and France, should these powers be sti-
mulated to engage obstinately in the contest, the question
which nest remains for the considerate statesman to re•
solve, is, what is the greatest benefit offer this which Great
Britain can procure for her. If the question were about
Peace absointels, there non's] he no difficulty in the deli-
bera.fion; as there is no doubt that l':•rice s, ould be granted
to Sweden, upon her own application, probably within t
any dirninntion of her ten tory. lint then a conditioa
would he annexed to it, that she take part in the Wrr
against. Britain ; arid this it is our interest, if possille, to
prevent., Now, this it fortunately does not seem altogether
impossible, by the prompt evercis,! of wisdom and discre-
tion, to prevent. Thongh we cannot put Sweden in a
condition to defend herself throagh nil leopatds against her
nnited and most powerful enennes t we an enaide her 10
assume such an attitude of resistance, as NI ill niA9 tileM
we it will not he very easy to overcome her. l'hk ac-
cordingly it is our duty to do. We stiould, with 1.;
most. promptitude and energy Rend to the relief of Sweden
such titt assistance as we ran rensonhldy spare ; sr" 5!1,,p1,1
employ all our wisdom and noisily in stimnlatiar and
directing the Swedish Government to call forth in th:7' !rest
effectual way the resources of. the country ; and when
have placed her in the most complete posture of defence
possible, and *hrn her enemies see before them the dif-
ficulties which they must overcome, then we should open
for her a negociation, and then, in all probability, Pi ace
for her might be prcienred, and her neutrality mit-net,
inviolate. Even with the ltnowledge that they would yid
timately subdue her, the sight of real and serious obstacles
would weigh deeply with her enemies, and lead them to
balance the possible gains with the obvious losses. It may
be taken for granted that not one of the hostile parties
would wish to see Sweden absolutely subdued, rteept Rus.
sia alone. To her the dominion of Sweden, or at least the
more important part of it, mould necessarily fall. France,
I however, has no inclination to see the power of Russia
1 ag-
grandised by so very important an acquisition, And as to ,
Denmark, there are few things of which she has more read
son to stand in dread. If Russia were in possession of
Sweden, Norway 'Would heroine a very precarious posses•
sion, and the command of the Sound must he instantly
abandoned. In the state of delence, therefore, which sae
have described, there IN every reason to suppose, from the-
known interests of the hostile patties, that reasonable
terms of Peace might be proettred for Sweden. But if we
shall foolishly hold out vaponriag pretences of a complwe
and absolute defence, and shall encnnraze rweden tee
hold the language of defiance and irritation, the eorithined
enemy may be urged from the dictates of offended pride,
and from the motive of baffling, mortifsine, and cv'
posing Britain, to engage in a determined and ext-r-
-!nitrating warfare. In that ease Ow eonrn of Sweden is
sealed, No efforts in the power of th;s..ruuntry, can pr,-
I it.

1 . °
750 THE NATIONAL REGISTER.
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cruelest enemies, instead of performing the service of wise only twenty years ago
and discerning friends. It. is of infinite consequence, both Sweden, and was only pri
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