The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-26 00:00:00

we were wrong in inducing him, step by step, to adhere
to his demands until it was impossible to withdraw them
without a loss of honour. My lords, I thought it my
duty to state my views of the character of the late Em
psi or Nicholas, and of the origin of the war, hoping
that by doing so I might assist in mitigating that bitter
spirit which has been imported into this great question. I
consider that to wage an unnecessary war, or to continue
a war which is even just and necessary, for a single
hour, after the objects for which it was commenced are
obtained, is the greatest sin which any nation can com-
mit, and a sin for which every man, be his influence what
it may, has a share, if he neglects to check the commis-
sion of that sin, so contrary to the laws of God and
humanity. (Hear.) It is for these reasons that I am in-
duced earnestly to recommend to your lordships the mo-
tion which I have now the honour to submit, "That an
humble address be presented to her Majesty, to thank
her Majesty for having ordered the protocols of the re-
cent negotiations at Vienna to be laid before us ; to in-
torm her Majesty that this house deaply deplores the
failure of the attempt to put an end by these negotiations
to the calamities of the war in which the country is now
engaged, and, to express our opinion that the pro-
posals of Russia were such as to afford a fair pros-
pect of concluding a peace by which all the original ob-
jects of the war might have been gained, and by which
her nijesty and her allies might have obtained all the
advantages which can reasonably be demanded from
Russia."

ties, those two States, before employing force, should put
the other powers in a position toanticipate their resort to
this extreme remedy. On these two articles, which were
intended to carry into effect the first part of the third
point, no difficulty whatever arose, excepting an observa-
tion made by Russia, that she was not to be considered
as bound by the articles she had concurred in,
to take up arms in all cases on behalf of the Turkish
empire. The other powers recorded their regret at this
result, but I must say, in my opinion, without any just
foundation. On the contrary, I think the reserve of
Russia on this point was only wise and just, and I wish
it had been imitated by our own plenipotentiaries.
Russia said, and I think with unanswerable force, that
the blood of Russia belongs to Russia, and is to be shed
only for Russian interests, and therefore she would not
bind herself in all possible cases to take up arms in de-
fence of Turkey. These unlimited engagements to go
to war in defence of other countries are, in my opinion,
always imprudent and dangerous, but singularly so in
the case of Turkey—an empire composed of such
heterogeneous materials, and of which the ultimate dis-
solution is absolutely certain, and a mere question
of time. The course of Russia on this point, there-
fore, appears to me to have been infinitely wiser
and more prudent than our own. Next, as to the
second part of the third point, relative to the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea. England and France
on the one side, said they would be content with
nothing short of the limitation of her naval force in that
sea ; whilst to this, on the other hand, Russia would
not consent, maintaining that her preponderance would
be sufficiently diminished by the two articles already
agreed to, as well as by an important alteration of the
treaty of 1841, in respect to the right of Turkey to bring
foreion ships of war into the straits of the Dardanelles
and Bosphorus. By that treaty this right was withheld
except in times of actual war. Russia proposed that,
maintaining the general principle of the closure of the
straits, Turkey should have a right to open them to the
fleets of any of her allies, whenever she considered herself
to be menaced, a conjuncture of which she herself was to
be the sole judge. Austria was of opinion that the propo-
sals of Russia offered fairgrounds for discussion, and might
have led to some settlement of the question. In order to
form a judgment whether her Majesty's Government
were right in closing the door on further negotiation, we
must compare the effect of the two proposals, and also
consider whether that right admitted by Russia was not
capable of further modification, and of being rendered
still more advantageous to this country. What is really
meant byl the phrase of limiting the preponderance of
Russia in the Black Sea is, that her great naval power
should be rendered no longer a source of just apprehen-
sion to Turkey. To me, there appears great force in the
remark of Prince Gortschakoff, that this object would
be attained by the articles already concluded. It is sug-
gested that an attack may be made on Turkey with a
large maratime force from Sebastopol, carrying a consi-
derable body of treops. Of course it must be supposed
that this is not a very easy affair, nor capable of being ac-
complished in a moment. You must have very little faith
in the assertions constantly heard as to the improvements
going on in the Turkish empire—you must think even
still more meanly than I do of the strength of Turkey, if,
with all the facilities that exist for fortifying the entrance
to the Bosphorus and the approach to Constantinople, If,
with the great population and resources of the country,
you believe that Russia could venture upon an enterprise
of this kind without vessels capable of conveying
40,000 or 50,000 troops, with a respectable artillery.
Now, we know from our own recent experience that,
even with all our vast mercantile marine and magnificent
steamers, to collect the means of moving an army of
that force is not a work which can be performed in a
moment, but is one of great difficulty and expense, and
not to be accomplished in secret. The agents of her
Majesty's Government in Turkey could not fail to know
what was in agitation long before it was completed, so
that, under the other provision by which Turkey was to
be enabled to call in the aid of her allies, there would
be ample time to come to her assistance. Knowing the
risks with which an operation of this sort would be at-
tended, I cannot help feeling very confident that it would
not be attempted by Russia, and that if it were, it
would be defeated by the intervention of the allies of
Turkey. (Hear, hear.) I grant that, if the time should
ever arrive when, from differences between the nations
of Europe, the western powers should not be prepared
to assist Turkey against the attacks of Russia, or if
one of them should be prepared to join in a plan of
iniquitous spoliation, in a case of that kind the Russian
fleet in the Black Sea would be a source of immediate
apprehension to Turkey. But in the case supposed,
would the limitation of the Russian fleet be sufficient to
preserve Turkey from the sudden destruction which
would menace her. One must be sanguine, indeed to
suppose so. It is obvious that, if you believe Russia
really intends to fulfil the solemn engagements into
which she has entered, the two articles concluded really
accomplish all your objects • it is only on the assump-
tion that she is faithless, and does not mean to observe
those engagements, that any further security is required.
But oa that assumption I ask what is the value of
this limitation of the Russian force in the Black Sea ?
Would that provision be worth the paper on which
it is written ? It is evident that no stipulation would
be more easily open to evasion. (Hear, hear.) A
faithless power would have no difficulty whatever in
augmenting her naval force to a much greater extent
than the treaty permitted. As long as Russia maintains
naval establishments and dockyards, she must be allowed
to repair her old ships, to build others to take their
places when worn out, to turn them over to be used as
convict hulks, and for other such purposes. It would be
easy for her to have ships completely fitted and pre-
pared, ready for launching at a moment's notice, to keep
two or three crews attached to each of the chips kept
afloat, and practised in succession in the Black Sea, or
sailors might be brought across from the Baltic during
winter. You cannot offer any obstacle to the extension
by Russia of her commercial marine ; and I ask toy
noble friend if there is any force she could keep up half
so dangerous to Turkey as a vast fleet of steam gun-
boats, each capable of carrying one or two heavy guns,
and a force of 200 or 300 soldiers, for a voyage of a few
days? But the treaty, in the very words as drawn up
by yourselves, opposes no difficulty whatever to Russia
providing a force of this kind to the full extent of her
pecuniary resources. The gun-boats might he kept at
Taganrog, Odessa, and other ports of the Black Sea,
really the property of the Government, but nominally
of the merchants, so that on the shortest notice they
could be assembled at Sebastopol. It appears to me
that my noble friend, in urging the precedent of the de-
molition of Dunkirk under the treaty of Utrecht in 1713,
selected a very unfortunate instance. This provision of
the treaty has always been considered as a very great
humiliation for Louis XIV., and was imposed only after
the fortune of that sovereign had been reduced to the
lowest ebb by a series of military disasters. Besides, so
little effective was that provision, that in 1744 France
fitted out a great army against England from this very
port, and in tha debates of 1783 Lord Shelburne, when
charged with having abandoned the provisions of former
treaties relative to the port of Dunkirk, exclaimed, " If
I was wrong in departing from those provisions, all
former Ministers were wrong in not enforcing them."
While this stipulation was worthless to the allies, was
it not open to the just objections of Russia ? She said it
was an insult to an independent nation to call upon her
to limit her fleet. I think this view a reasonable and
sound one, and can call your lordships' attention to
high authority in support of it. In 1813, when the
Emperor Napoleon was driven almost to extremity by
the defeat of Leipsic, and was treating for peace, it was
proposed that his dominions should be reduced to the
ancient limits of France, and a noble friend of mine,
whose absence to-night, as well as the indisposition that
causes it, I much regret (the Earl of Aberdeen), was
charged with the conduct of the negotiations on the
part of this country. He was instructed by Lord Castle-
reagh that on no account should Antwerp be left in the
possession of France, which the British Secretary of
State said would be little short of imposing on Great
Britain the charge of a perpetual war with France,
adding, "We do not wish to impose any dishonourable
conditions on France, which limiting the number of her
ships would be, but she must not be left in possession
of this point." So that the depriving France of Ant-
werp, after all the vast sums expended on its dockyards
and arsenals; was considered less humiliating to her
pride than would have been a proposal for limiting the
number of her ships of -war,_ .. I think an opinion of
this kind, without any—vefeaotioe—to the question
now pending, is a pretty clear proof that to ask an
independent nation to limit the force she keeps us, is an
insult and a degradation to her. In the case of Russia
it is a very great insult and degradation, for the only
conceivable value you can attach to the provision is, that
it will be the means of preventing a breach of faith on
her part. Therefore, in asking Russia to consent to this
provision, you ask her to direct her ambassador to put
his hand to a treaty declaring and acknowledging their
own want of faith. That is a great objection on the part
of Russia to this limitation ; but there are of course
others. For example, it is not impossible that, some
time or other, Russia may be the ally of Turkey against
one or both of the Western Powers, and in fact the first
commencement of the armament of Russia previous to
the present contest was to support Turkey against the
menaces of the French minister. There has been great
exaggeration, I repeat, with regard to the acts and con-
duct of Russia. It was an exaggeration to say
that she had been guilty of an unprovoked aggres-
sion ; there is no ground for saying so, while there
is still less ground for saying that she was guilty of
francrin keeping her claim out of sight, for the demand
of Russia to protect the Greek Church has been avowed
in the plainest and strongest language from the very
outset. I find that as long ago as December 1852, Col.
Rose reported that Russia claimed the right under the
treaty of Kainardji ; then again, after that Sir Hamilton
Seymour reports from St. Petersburg that the Emperor
claimed to exercise this protection over millions of
Christians who were subjects of the Sultan ; and Lord
John Russell, in a despatch subsequently written, admits
in terms that this claim of the Emperor was "prescribed
by duty, and sanctioned by treaty." How, then, can
you contend that Russia was guilty of a fraudulent con-
cealtnent of her claim ? I think the occupation of the
principalities was a wrongful act. But if Russia wag
in the wrong, was there no allowance to be made
for her ? We had made many and grievous blun-
ders, and we should not be too severe in criticising
Russia for this. The late emperor was a man in whom,
I timed Itothtienkthheewwe
must say, notwithstanding that I know it is unpopu-
lar, that I saw, in spite of many faults, many good quali-
alfsarseinocfehreislypdeeotp-olet.ed to what he be-
selfish grati.ficiation or mean motive actiliabteedliehvi
be-
lieved
hours of the believe
na tunno_
dergenig
calm and Chri
empire. %Thuennwearied labour of governing his great
Emperor Nicholas—when I contemplate the
I read the touching account of the last
.2!11_ spirit in whichdie met his mortal end
ery were faults will:hecticat
-e-aurl Then
that man fraud and trench-
sce„,, oannot7a? his conduct throughout that awful
departure of Prince blexischir violent conduct after the
he was greatly Wrong foru could be justly imputed.
*ff, but I also think that

The Earl of CLARENDON next addressed their lord
ships, and said—l have listened to my noble friend with
all the respect and attention which he never fails to coin
mand in this house, and I think that his very long and able
speech has been characterised by his usual ability. If,
however, the noble earl has failed to convince your lord-
ships, it will certainly not be from any want of a strong
conviction on his part of the justice of the cause which he
has undertaken. I have no doubt whatever that the noble
earl conceived that in bringing forward this motion he had
a public duty to perform ; but, on the other hand, I
may be permitted to say that it was with deep regret
that I heard him propose his resolution, not less on
account of the terms in which it is couched, than my
conviction that if agreed to by your lordships it would
be productive of most serious mischief. (Loud cheers.)
The noble earl has laboured to prove that the war
in which we are engaged is neither a just nor a neces-
sary war. He has condemned the manner in which the
war has been carried on, and in which the negotiations
have been conducted, and has applauded the moderation
of the terms of the Russian plenipotentiaries, which he eon.
eiders should have been accepted. During the three and a
half hours in which he has proceeded in an uninterrupted
strain of applause as to the admirable course pursued by
Russia, every word which he has said in censure of her
Majesty's Government applies with equal force to the Go-
vernment of the Emperor of the French. The speech of
my noble friend, with all the authority of his name and
the great weight of his character and position, will be
widely published by the partizans of Russia without giving
any reply to the statements which he has made. (Hear.)
And my noble friend has, so far as in him lies, rendered
essential service to the Emperor of Russia in the course
he has taken. So far as depends upon my noble friend he
will have done his utmost to encourage the Emperor of
Russia to resist compliance with those demands which
England, France, and Austria, consider just, and which
it would have been honourable in Russia to have accepted,
and as far as in him lies the noble lord would represent
us to the world as in a state of division and weakness
In this latter point, however, I think the noble lord will
be disappointed, and thus will possibly end the mischief
which his speech was calculated to produce, because I
trust your lordships will this evening, by your majority,
agree with me in that negative with which I propose to
meet the motion of the noble lord, and prove to Russia
that the opinions that have been so often expressed in this
house have undergone no change, and are not now waver-
ing. I regret the time at which this motion has been
brought forward, not that I think that any great advantage
may arise from these proposals which are now under con-
sideration, and which I did not consider of sufficient im-
portance to induce me to ask the noble earl to postpone his
motion ; but it is for the interest of peace itself, the attain-
ment of which the Government has as much at heart as
the noble lord himself. If we are to be called upon to enter
into all the details of the negotiations of the day, to
defend all the proceedings of our plenipotentiaries, to
state what are the grounds upon which we think
alone peace should be made, I say that is a course
which will render negotiation more difficult, and, as nego-
tiation must precede peace, may consequently cause peace
itself to suffer by premature discussions. (Cheers.) I shall
not follow the noble earl in his remarks upon the contents
of the blue-books laid before your lordships last year, but
—and this I think will be of more interest and importance
to your lordships—l will refer to the deductions which he
has made from these despatches, and the attempts which
he has made to prove that we are engaged in an unjust and
unnecessary war. The solitary expression of blame which
he employed against Russia was its occupation of the
Principalities, although even for that the noble lord found
something in the nature of an apology. Now, I contend
that the war in which we are engaged is in strict confor-
mity with the law of nations, and is supported by the
ablest writers on the subject. Vattel says :—" By the law
of nations it is laid down as a principle that war is just
and lawful which is to avenge or prevent injury. When
once a state has given proof of injustice, rapacity, pride,
ambition, or any imperious thirst of rule, she becomes
an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is
to'stand on their guard against her. They may come upon
her when she is at the moment of acquiring a formidable
accession of power—may demand securities, and if she hesi-
tates to give them, may prevent her designs by force of
arms. Must we delay to avert our ruin until it becomes
inevitable? If the appearances are so easily credited, it is
the fault of that neighbour who has betrayed his ambition
by several indications. Should that formidable power betray
an unjust and ambitious disposition by doing the least in_
justice to another, all nation. may avail themselves of the
occasion, and by joining the injured party thus form a coali-
tion of strength, in order to humble that ambitious poten-
tate, and disable him from so easily oppressing his neigh-
bours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear—for an
injury gives us a right to provide for our future safety, by
depriving the unjust oppressor of the means of injuring
us ; and it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to assist those
who are oppressed or unjustly attacked. When a neigh-
bour in midst of a profound peace erects fortresses on our
frontiers, equips a fleet, augments his troops, assembles a
powerful army, fills his magazines—in a word, when he
makes preparations for war, are we allowed to attack him
with a view to prevent the danger with which we think
ourselves threatened? The answer greatly depends on the
manners and character of that neighbour. We must in-
quire into the reasons of those preparations, and bring him
to an explanation. Such is the mode of proceeding in
Europe; and if his sincerity be justly suspected, securities
may be demanded of him. His refusal in that case would
furnish ample indication of sinister designs, and a sufficient
reason to justify us in anticipating theta." My noble
friend in his eulogies upon Russia dwelt upon the forbear-
ance which it had shown towards Turkey, but he omitted
to state what had been the constant and uniform policy
of Russia towards Turkey. I will inform the house
of the extent and nature of the territory wrung from
Turkey by Russia during the past century. "In 1774
the fortresses of Kertch and Yenicale with their dis-
tricts in the Crimea, Kinburn and its district, the desert
between the Bug and the Dnieper, the town and district
of Azoff, and the two Kabadins in Circassia, were ceded
hy Turkey to Russia by treaty.' In 1783 the Crimea, the
island of Taman, and Cuban Tartary were annexed to the
Russian empire by a manifesto of the Empress Catherine.
In 1774 Turkey acknowledged, by treaty, the River Cuban
as the boundary of Russia. In 1792 the fortress of Oczakow
and the country between the Bug and the Dniester were
ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1812 a part of
Moldavia ; the fortresses of Chotchim and Bender, Bessa-
rabia, with Ismail and Kilia • and the left bank of the
Pruth, from its entrance into Moldavia, were ceded by
Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1829 a part of the pacha-
lie of Akhaltzick, and all the littoral of the Black Sea,
from the mouth of the Cuban to port St. Nicholas, and
the islands at the mouth of the Danube, were ceded by
Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1834 the Russian terri-
tories, from the port of St. Nicholas to the province
of Georgia, were extended by treaty with Turkey." This
then is the power which, according to my noble friend,
has acted with so much candour and forbearance towards
Turkey. We all knew what was the opinion of the late
Emperor Nicholas with respect to the state of that nation.
We know that he said " nothing could save the sick man,"
and the mission of Prince Menschikoff was intended to give
the coup de grace to the siek man, not by resorting to vio-
lent means, but by slow poison. By the misinterpretation
of the treaty of Kainardji the Emperor sought to secure
another treaty or instgument by which the right of inter-
ference between the Sultan and his subjects should be se-
cured to Russia, who would thus obtain a virtual sove-
reignty over ten or twelve millions of the most enterpris-
ing, the most active, and most intelligent subjects of the
Sultan. Since the time of the occupation of the principal-
ities we have heard a great deal more of the intentions of
Russia, and the mode in which she seeks to carry them
into effect. We know now the vast resources of Russia, and
how stealthily she has been at work for years accumulat-
ing those resources. The fortresses at Sebastopol and Bo-
marsund were a standing menace to Europe. The whole
of Europe was in reality standing over a mine, while the
vast power of Russia had either paralysed the states of
Europe, or blinded them to their real danger. Every Go-
vernment of Europe has been in part to blame for permit-
ting this state of things. For the last 25 years there has
been an amount of deference paid to Russia to which she
had no right or claim, and she has been allowed to pry into
and meddle with the affairs of every country. Her con-
duct has at times been denounced, but nobody considered
it his business to interfere effectually, and Europe gene-
rally was unaware of the danger which menaced it until
the mine was suddenly exploded by Prince Menschikoff.
The entire possession of the Sound was one of the great
objects of Russia. and her Government had ordered a very
large increase of her steam fleet, and the whole of her
sailing ships of the line were about to be converted into
screws, and she was actively engaged beforo the breaking
out of the war in the completion of a system of railway
communication which would have had the effect of doub-
ling the effective power of her military forces. With
Constantinople and the Bosphorus in the hands of Russia,
what, I would ask, would be the fate of all the nations
bordering on the Black Sea ? AU the commerce of the
West with those countries would soon be brought to an end
(Cheers.) What would have been the fate of Europe itself
if the Russian fleet were no longer looked up in the Black
Sea ? With the full possession of the Sound, and her
fleets no longer ice-bound for six months in the year, all
Europe would be in the hands of this Colossus. And it is
no small thing that we were upon the eve of seeing this
bold design of universal empire all but universally ac-
knowledged. The first act of the present Emperor was to
declare that he was determined to place the Russian em-
pire upon the highest pinnacle of glory and power, and
fully to carry out all the plans of his predecessorr, the Em-
press Catherine and the Emperor Nicholas. The policy
of Russia has undergone no change. It is the same now
wt
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createdto the greatfergiving
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ale Nicholas, characterised
,
unavoidable, it is that into which England and Franco
have ever there was a war which was just, necessary, and
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which
hthwe I)ereeac saide a s
t ,have now deliberately entered ; and it as all the more just
-
tiation to preserve peace without having and necessary because every effort had been made bye hnegeos.
g recourse9t t
wee
tili•ies. The unbending pride of Russia it was liat
repent
having real cause of the war, and made it unavoidable,
believe that the people of this country do not ansleelt
having entered intd the present conflict. If there is one
thing gore. than another, which. oharacterises the people
hioll
of this country, it is a keen sense of national honour, and
a-strong determination nob to pubmit to anYtiliofi W
_

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, MAY 26 1855.

the resolution which he had called upon them to adopt.
It was not for them to take into consideration the rumours
to which his noble friend had referred as to Russia being
_ _

they deem a national disgrace. (Cheers.) It was with
these objects the war was undertaken, and to those
objects we still adhere, viz., that of maintaining the in-
tegrity and independence of Turkey, and not alone to
protect Turkey, but to guard Europe against the ambi-
tions designs of Russia, These objects, we think, can be
secured by annulling all the treaties between Russia and
Turkey ; by causing the protectorate of Russia over the
principalities to cease ; by removing all the obstacles in
the way of the free navigation of the Danube ; by connect-
ing Turkey more closely with the family of European na-
tions ; by causing the preponderance of Russia to cease in
the Black Sea ; and by preventing Russia from having
any exclusive rights of interference between the Sultan
and his subjects. (Cheers.) If these bases of negotiations
had been honestly accepted and acted upon, they would
have secured the objects which we had in view on entering
upon this great struggle. The manner in which the defence
of Sebastopol has been carried on without having the op-
portunity of sending a single gun by sea, by relying solely
on the resources accumulated in that port, are proofs of the
dangers to which Turkey was exposed from Russia. From
Archangel to Sebastopol, from Bomarsund to Petropaulov-
ski—everywhere in fact there is the same accumulation of
military stores, the same protection and defence, and the
same proof that Russia must havebeen aware that the policy
which she was pursuing would at some time excite the alarm
and unite the efforts of all Europe against her. (Cheers.) All
shat we wished to obtain was such a diminution of the
forces of Russia as should secure the safety of Turkey, and
kfford no danger to the liberties of Europe. In reply to our
demands, Russia said, " We will not submit to this, nor
,)ermit any interference with what we consider our own
sovereignty in our own territory, and we claim the right
to accumulate and even to develope all those means of ag-
Ssession which in principle are quite untenable." It is not,
contend, derogatory to the dignity of such a country to
reduce her armaments if she really intends to restore con-
fidence, and not to justify the suspicions which are enter-
tained of her motives. The noble lord has referred to the
statement made at the conference of Vienna, by Prince
Gortschakoff, to the effect that it would be impossible to
land 16,000 men in Turkey from the Crimea with any seri-
ous consequences to the integrity of that country. I believe,
on the contrary, that such a force suddenly brought before
Constantinople would be the greatest blow which that coun-
try has ever yet received ; it would be accompanied by ap-
peals to the passions and feelings of a large portion of the
most excited and discontented subjects of the Porte, and
there would very soon be an end to the Mussulman dy-
nasty in Europe. But Russia also proposed that the straits
should be opened indiscriminately to all the powers, and
that the Russian fleet should have free access to the Medi-
terranean, and thus acquire the means of disturbing the
Greek inhabitants of the Levant islands ; and she pro-
posed also that the Porte should be able to call the Allied
fleets into the Black Sea whenever it was threatened. But
the safety of Turkey would always be in danger from such a
fleet, as Russia and the allies would never be able to say
that the apprehensions of the Porte, whenever they were
called upon, were groundless, or that the call for assistance
should be listened to. The result of this would be, as the
reward and return of all the cost and sacrifice which we have
made in this war, that England and France would indirectly
bind themselves by treaty to have a large force always in
the Mediterranean ready atthecallof the Sultan, and would
thus enter into securities to make Russia keep the peace,
while Russia would give no corresponding security to
keep the peace. England and France would, in fact, con-
stitute themselves the watchmen Jof Europe, and be re-
quired perpetually to keep their fleets upon a war footing.
But whether the fleets of the allies were in the Mediterra-
nean or at home, they would never be able to arrive .in
time to protect Constantinople from tie effects of a well-
organised and well-arranged attack on the part of Russia.
The Government of Russia still claims her right to be a
standing menace to Europe, and has refused to join with
the other powers in guaranteeing the independence of Tur-
key, and she has no right to say that by the concessions
which she has made, merely for the purpose of conceding
something to German interests, she has fulfilled those duties
with respect to European interests which have led to the
just and necessary war in which we are now engaged.
The Russian fleet is powerless to Russia, except in the
Black Sea, as a menace to Turkey, and as an engine to
carry out her designs against that country. (Cheers.) I
can only add that if it is our good fortune to restore to the
country the blessings of peace, I trust it will be only such a
peace as will meet the approbation of your lordships and
that of the country at large. (Hear.)
The Earl of MALMESBURY said that he consilered
the question then before the house as one so far removed
from party politics that, although he could not be expected
to be an energetic supporter of the Government, he would
have come almost any distance, and at almost any incon-
venience, to record his vote against the motion of the noble
earl. In the address which the noble earl proposed, he
stated that the original objects of the war might have been
gained by the recent negotiations, but had not b.en attained.
Now, he did not agree with the noble earl in that, because he
did not think that the original objects of the war were suffi-
ciently touched by the negotiations recently carried on at
Vienna. Mischievous as was the speech in which the noble
earl had introduced his motion, the only danger to which
the country was now exposed did not arise from that speech.
The same opinions were expressed on the previous evening
in the other house by a man equally looked up to for
his talents—he world not say for his consistency or
the sincerity of his convictions—and, perhaps, even sur-
passing the noble earl in the gifts of oratory and eloquence.
He did not know how far he might be permitted to refer
to what took place in another place, but he would say that
no later since than the previous evening he dreamt that he
heard a man he had always admired as almost the greatest
orator of the day address an august assembly in a tone,
with words, ;and with a colour: and distortion of the
facts of the case worthy of a Russian minister, and which
if he had been a Russian minister would have obtained for
him every cross in the gift of the Emperor but that of St.
Andrew. He felt so husailiated, pained, and distressed as
an Englishman, at what he heard, that he could hardly
believe his hearing until he read this morning's journal,
and found his dream realised word for word. (A laugh.)
He trusted that the sentiments of the Government
were such as might be deduced from the speech of the
noble earl (the Earl of Clarendon), and that the Govern-
ment were fully, determined to accede to no terms of
peace not fully as strong or even stronger than those
rejected by Russia at Vienna. The country had entered
iuGu the pieseut war with es full belief in the justice of our
cause. The spirit of our officers and the bravery of our sol-
diers had never been surpassed since England was a king-
dom, and we only wanted vigour, determination, andunity
on the part of her Majesty's Government. (Hear, hear.)
He hoped, if the noble earl divided the house, that the di-
vision would show unequivocally the opinion of that house,
for such a division would be most important before the
public opinion of Europe.
The Duke of ARGYLL said that the arguments of his
noble friend who had brought forward this motion tended
to show that, since the beginning of this struggle, wo had
been continually increasing our demands, and that while
Russia had shown a conciliatory we had displayed an ar-
rogant, spirit. Now, no argument could be more unjust.
He really -did not know whether it was the intention of
his noble friend to convey that impression—
Earl GREY—Certainly not.
The Duke of ARGYLL said that the speech of his noble
friend was, however, calculated to convey it. With regard
to the disposition Russia had shown to accept reasonable
terms from the allies, he exceedingly regretted the tone of
his noble friend's speech, which was an out-and-out defence
of Russian moderation, and as such would heves an exceed-
ingly bad effect, and must produce a re-action. He could
assure his noble friend that though he was an earnest sup-
, porter of the cause of peace when the great objects for
which we had undertaken the war were attained,
yet he could not consider that the concessions of Russia
were sufficient to place those objects within our reach, or
to satisfy our national interests and honour.
Lord LYTTELTON agreed in the terms of the motion,
but not in all the views which had been stated by the noble
earl who brought it forward.
The Bishop of OXFORD felt that the appeal addressed by
the noble earl to the right reverend bench ought to meet
with some answer in words before they proceeded to a divi-
sion on his resolution. He could not vote for the proposed
address, because he did not think it would tend to advance
the object which the noble earl had so much at heart.
The speech made by the noble earl went even further than
his motion, in throwing the blame of the war upon Eng-
land and her respected ally. It was our bounden duty to
examine whether the war now proceeding was of such a
character that it could properly be described as an appeal
to the tribunal of God for justice, which there was no
earthly tribunal to enforce. Every war, to be justifiable,
ought, in his view, to be resolvable into one of self-defence.
He (the Bishop of Oxford) did not wish that the English
people should be ready to quit any war in a dishonourable
manner, or without the success which their arms merited;
and he, therefore, must deplore the disparaging language
that had been used respecting this campaign, because it
would make peace more difficult of attainment, consistently
with the honour of England.
The Duke of NEWCASTLE had listened to mach that
had passed with very sincere pain. When he first saw the
notice of the noble earl, he apprehended that little but
mischief could arise from the discussion of the question
which he raised, but those anticipations of evil were greatly
aggravated by the speech that was delivered by his noble
friend that evening; for throughout the whole of that
speech he had so greatly extenuated, he might say defended,
every act of the's enemy, and dwelt so heavily upon every
act they had themselves committed, that he was afraid the
result could not be otherwise than to a great extent to ir-
ritate the people of this country. (Hear, hear.) He (the
Duke of Newcastle) thought that was a serious evil, and
that it was likely to lower them in the eyes both of the
Allies and of their enemies. (Hear, hear.) He used these
observations most sincerely in the interests of peace, be-
cause he conscientiously believed that the speech which his
noble friend had addressed that evening was far more cal-
culated to postpone that peace which they most heartily,
desired to see than any of the declarations of the most vio-
lent friends of war that could bo delivered in any assembly.
That speech must have the effect of encouraging Russia in
the efforts she was making and the demands sh was put-
ting forth. It might, perhaps, even induce her to with-
draw from the concessions she had already expressed her
entire willingness to make. (Hear.) If that was to be its
effect upon their enemy, what was likely to be its effect on
their friends? (Hear, hear.) What was the condition of
Germany ? Germany was divided on the question, but
nevertheless they had many friends to their cause amongst
the states of Germany; but when such sentiments were ex-
pressed, not by an insignificant individual, but by one oc-
cupying a high position in the house and in the country—
one bearing also a great and historic name—was it not eat-
ciliated to paralyse Germany, turn thoseiwho were their
friends against them, and encourage those who were already
against them to persevere in their hostility ? (Hear.) Then
again, what was likely to be the effect in France? (Hear.)
Must not a great number of the people of France look with
alarm at the discussion that had taken place ? Was it not
likely that the people of France would say, " What security
have we that the English will not desert us in a very short
period of time ?" And were not the people of France likely
to be deterred by that consideration from a continuance in
that firm and fixed alliance which they had hitherto dis-
played ? (Hear.) He (the Duke of Newcastle) was sure,
from the spirit of the people of this country, that an at-
tempt to defend the actions and conduct of their enemy
was more likely to instigate them to express a desire for
war than any other course they could possibly take. That
feeling would prevent any Government, however desirous
it might be for peace, from effecting that object, even
though it should be a Government as anxious for peace as
the present Government must be, unless it had departed
from the opinions which it entertained when he had the
honour to be a member of it. (Hear.) The speech of his
noble friend was in fact calculated to throw difficulties in
the way of that important object which he was sure his
noble friend had warmly at heart. He (the Duke of New-
castle) felt there was no vain love of military glory enter-
tained by the people of this country ; they had no desire for
sanguinary conflicts for the mere purpose of hearing the
guns in the park when fired to celebrate the victory of their
arms—their wishes generally, he believed, rather tendesi to
peace, but they did not think that they had yet obtained
the great _object fOr which they hid entered into this war.
(Hear, hear.) If he had listened to the speech of his noble
friend with pain, he had also heard with considerable pain

disposed to conced3 something more. He (the Duke of
Newcastle) must confess he could not agree that the coun-
ter-proposition made by Russia was one which was in
any degree calculated to obtain the objects of the war.
(Hear.) He could not see how the limitation of the ships

of Russia in the Black Sea was such an indignity to Russia
that it was inconsistent with her honour to accept it.

(Hear.)But they were not obliged to look upon the question
in that point of view, because it was one of the four bases
which Russia had accepted, and it was only the mode of

Carrying it out which she refused to adopt. 'He could not
see in the counter-proposition of Russia any equivalent for
this proposition respecting the limitation of her preponder-
ance in the Black Sea. He could not see in the counter-

proposition any security at all. (Hear.) The counter-
proposition of Russia was really one for her own advan-
tage. (Hear.) Putting aside the question of limitation,
what did she offer ? She proposed that they should regard
the Black Sea as a mare clausum, and adopt the status quo
ante bellunt, with this exception, that the Turkish Govern-
ment should not wait for a declaration of war, but should
when it liked call for the assistance of any other power.
But Turkey might some day " call those spirits front the
vasty deep" when there would be no one to answer her. If
that proposition was accepted, they should, as his noble
friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said,
keep a large fleet in the immediate neighbourhood. It was
the way to create a perpetual element of discord. There
would be a perpetua. state of semi-war, and if this state of
semi-war were departed from, there would be a call in the
House of Commons for a diminution of their fleet. There
would be a return to the state in which they had been
before, when they had only three or four vessels of war in
the Mediterranean, which were locked up for a month in
the harbour of Valetta•. What, he asked, would be the
condition of Turkey if that should again be their position
at a period when she demanded their assistance ?
The Earl of DER 3Y said—My lords, I had little wish to
intrude upon your lordships when the noble duke rose, and
I have still less a desire to do so now, because, since I have
heard the speech of the noble duke I may say there is not

one syllable in it to which I can dissent, or which does not
entirely express the views and opinions which I entertain
with regard to the war. (Hear.) I think, my lords, that
a proposition like that which is now before us, involving
as it does matter of so much importance, should not have
been brought forward at this moment, but the opinions by
which it has been accompanied are peculiarly unfortunate,

because, while they are at variance with the opinions of
the country, they are calculated to encourage the preten-
sions of Russia, and therefore I should be sorry that such

a speech went forth to Europe without some expression
of your lordships' feeling. (Hear.) But, my lords, al-
though I am disposed to think that the noble earl has ex-

ercised a sound discretion in abstaining from going to a

division on this question, I yet think that if,he had only
desired to place his own opinions fairly before the peers of
England, and fairly before the country and the world, he
either ought not to have brought forward such a motion as
this, and this time, or he ought to have made his motion
nugatory by going to a division upon it. Because where we
have the poison of the argument, we ought, at all events,
to have the antidote of the division. It is desirable that
there should be no mistake on this subject, and if the noble
earl doubts my opinion on the matter, let him go to a divi-
sion, and I am sure there are not a dozen, nay, I may say
a half-dozen members out of the five hundred and fifty
members of your lordships' house, who would not give a
negative to the motion. (Hear, hear.) I regret very
much the manner in which this motion has been brought
forward. I could have desired that Ministers should
have taken the course dictated by practice, and the
n gotiations having closed for all substantial purposes, your
lordships' opinion ought to have been taken, on the ques-
tion when the papers were laid on the table. I cannot
regret that in laying these papers on the table, Ministers
did not express, as they might have done if they had been
so dispose.l, their regret that these negotiations had not led
to a substantial issue ; for then they might have received—
as I am confident they would have done—the assurance
that this and the other house of Parliament would give
them their combined support in the vigorous prosecution
of the war. (Cheers.) The terms of the resolution go to
express an opinion that the house still entertains a lively
hope that the conference of Vienna would lead to peace ;
but I confess I have no such hope or desire. I believe,
with the noble duke, that the people of this country are
anxious for peace, but at the same time they are deter-
mined that the war shall be carried on until peace shall be
obtained upon honourable terms, and I think the terms pro-
posed by Russia, if they had been assented to, would not
have givenus all the security that wehave a right to demand.
(Hear.) If I look back to what might have been done be-
fore the war was actually commenced, I cannot help feel-
ing that if a more determined front had been shown to
Russia in the first instance, she would have beet reluctant
to enter upon the war. (Hear.) I agree with the noble
earl that Russia did not desire war in the first instance ;
she was rather bent upon obtaining her object at all cost,
and, if possible, without a recourse to the force of arms,
but the more you delayed offering a determined opposition
the better she became prepared for war when the time
came for declaring it. (Hear.) The feeling of Russia for
continuing at peace was sincere, no doubt ; but we ought
to have addressed to her an uncompromising declaration
that we understood her projects, and if she persevered in
those projects, she would only be exciting the determined
hostility of the two great western powers. lam perfectly
persuaded that if such a tone had been adopted towards
Russia we should be placed in a much more favourable
position than we are in now. The Government were
quite aware what the ulterior objects of Russia were, and
from that moment it became their duty to convey to Russia,
in unequivocal terms, that those objects could not be tole-
rated. But the question you have now to consider is, what
course England ought to take in order to bring this war to
a speedy antlhonourable termination. Now, my lords, upon
thA question I do not undervalue the concessions which
Russia has been compelled to make by the valour of our
men and the progress of our arms. I do not undervalue
her withdrawing from the principalities. Ido not under-
value her renclineas to concede independent Governments
to Moldavia and Wallachia, in her desire to secure the
free navigation of the Danube, though the latter project is
not new; because, although it has been the practice of
Russia to obstructthat stream, it was yet the bounden duty
of Russia, under treaties, to take care that its navigation
was open and free to the whole world. (Hear.) I say, my
lords, I neither undervalue those objects' nor do I pre-
tend to say that they are incomplete in themselves, but
the main object for which we entered on the war was to
secure the integrity of Turkey ; and my complaint with re-
gard to the third point is not'that we asked too much, but
that we asked too little. (Hear.) Fer in the progress of
the war changes have taken place in our demands, and we
are justified in increasing those demands by the altered
circumstances in which we are now placed. What we ori-
ginally demanded might have been reasonable enough
before we went to war, bet hating drawn the sword and
lavished fifty millions of treasure, besides sacrificing the lives
of twenty thousand of our valuable subjects, we have a right
to demand more ; but I must say, also, that there has been
a material alteration in the character of the war since the
original demands were made. At first we were told that
the war was to be thoroughly defensive, the simple object
being the protection of Turkey and securing the free navi-
gation of the Danube, and up to that period we might
have been satisfied with less demands than could be
now accepted with honour or security to ourselves;
but, from the moment that you commenced an aggressive
war—from the moment you gave effect to the decla-
rations of the Government that a stop must be put to
the preponderance and ambition of Russia—it was needless
to talk about our propositions being humiliating to Russia.
The noble lord opposite holds the opinion that anything
which reduced her power or strength must be humiliating
to Russia • but you were pl3dgecl to accomplish that humi-
liation when you entered the Crimea. When you sat down
before the fortress of Sebastopol, where you have remained
through the heroic exertions and noble patriotism of your
troops, you took up a position which was humiliating to
Russia, but it would be more humiliating still to England
if you were to abandon it without receiving the amplest
terms you could demand. The country is sincerely anxi-
ous to see peace re-established, and I am unwilling to say
a single wordwhich might stand in the way of obtaining that
peace ; but, at the same time, I do not believe that any
engagement you could have entered into at the conference
of Vienna could have been consistent with the honour of
the country in the position in which she is now placed by
your having made an aggressive attack on Russia. We are
not responsible for this aggressive war in the manner in
which it has been conducted, but we are responsible to the
Sovereign and the country that the great efforts we have
made to humiliate Russia shall not be disgraced by an un-
worthy peace, no matter whether we approve or disapprove
of the conduct of the war. The noble earl says we ought
to have been satisfied with the security offered by Russia.
Now, what was the proposal of Russia ? Why, it was
nothing more nor less than that there should be a limit
placed upon the maritime power of herself and the Porte,
but that in case of imminent danger the Porte should have
power to summon the fleets of her allies to the straits of
the Dardanelles. Now observe, in the first place, that the
straits are the absolute property of the Porte ; they are
pact of the Turkish dominions, and, according to the law
of nations, Turkey has a perfect right to open or close
them just as she may think proper, so that, coy lords, in
point of fact, Russia proposed to grant to Turkey nothing
more than she was already entitled to, without the sanc-
tion or permission of her enemy. (Hear, hear, hear.)
T-f there could be a proposition more calculated than another
to embroil Russia and Turkey, to keep up a constant fear
of insecurity, to impose on the guaranteeing powers the
necessity of keeping up forces without the hope of effecting
the object for which the forces were maintained—if there
could be a proposition having for its objects these results,
that was the proposition made by Russia, and which the
noble earl calls on your lordships to affirm. It is of no
use now to moralise on the horrors of war. We are en-
tered into war, and the question now is how we could
withdraw from the war without discredit to our arms—
without dissatisfaction to our allies—without encouraging
those who aro hesitating, and discouraging those that are
friendly to us—and also with the security of having some
reasonable prospect that we should not be plunged, in
six months' time, into another war more aggressive in
character and more intense in its nature, from the fact
of our showing too great a desire to conclude a peace.
(Hear, hear.) Therefore, in the interests of peace itself,
this is not a time for inquiring what was the origin,
and what was the conduct of the war. The only ques-
tion we have now to decide is, what is to be done to
extinguish the war with honour and credit? (Cheers.) In
this instance I cannot say I regret that the negotiations at
Vienna have failed. I believe that if we would have a se-
cure and honourable peace we must conquer that peace—
(loud cheers)—and that by showing, in the teeth of such
resolutions as those proposed by the noble earl, that there
is a fixed determination in this country of going through
that war into which we have entered, and that we will
not depart from it until we have brought it to an honour-
able conclusion. (Loud cheers.)
Earl GRANVILLE rose to state a matter of tact, and
not to prolong the debate after the discussion which had
exhibited so remarkable a unanimity. The matter of fact
which he rose to state was this. He understood that the
noble earl had supposed that the conferences were closed.
Bnt that was not the fact. At this moment proposals
had been received from Austria, together with subse-
quent modifications, which were at present under the
consideration of the two Governments of France
and England. There was very little chance—indeed
he might say there was no chance—of a favourable conclu-
sion.

Lord GREY said he was afraid there would be very
little use i❑ dividing, as more than one of those who
would have supported him were unavoidably absent.
The motion was withdrawn amidst much laughter,
caused by several noble lords declaring that it was nega-
tived nemine contradicente.
ROYAL COMMISSION.
A royal commission, consisting of the Lord Chancellor,
the Earl of Harrowby, and the Duke of Argyll, was then
formed for the purpose of giving the 'assent of her Ma-
jesty to several bills, Lord Pannatire being the only peer