The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-11 00:00:00

NG, MAY 11, 1855.

nied to them." And, a little later, he said :—" He had had
great opportunities of trying them (the Indian army) un-
der great difficulties and privations, at a distance from
their homes and families, and yet their zeal and energy
never abated. In the wars of Mysore and Egypt, the
native troops did not hesitate to embark in ships, al-
though that was contrary to their usages and preju-
dices ; and the reason that they so cordially consented to
embark was from seeing that there was no compulsion.
He would now cite the opinion of that gallant officer to
whom he had already referred—the late Sir C. Napier. He
ought to observe that that gallant officer went out to India
with the strongest prejudice against the East India Com-
pany and everything connected with it, and unfortunately
he committed himself to print; but, after having served in
several campaigns with the Indian army, and gained for
himself immortal honours by the victories obtained while
he was at their head, this was the opinion which he gave:
—" My opinion of the army generally is, that it is a very
fine army. The Indian artillery I really think is tho most
effective artillery in the world. Its practice is admirable.
I have seen a good deal of it. The Royal Artillery may be
superior as a scientific corps; but as a practical corps in the
field, in creasing mountains, jingles, rivers, and in every-
thing that artillery can be called upon to do in the field.
I never saw anything better than the Indian Artillery."
Lord Gough said on the same subject:—" I think the In-
dian army is nearly perfect. . . There cannot bo an army
more loyal, better disposed, or more ready to do their duty.
It is quite impossible to have a more brilliant set of offi-
cers, or a finer body of men than the Artillery of Bengal.
. . . I must say of the natives, as well as the Euro-
peans, that a more devoted set of men cannot be found."
Then with regard to the Bombay army, his gallant friend
Sir Willoughby Cotton had often said to him substantially
in private what he thus expressed before a committee :
"I do not conceive that there is a more effective army,
certainly not in India, and I think I may say not any-
where, than the Bombay army; they will go anywhere ;
they never make an objection to embark to any place ;
wherever you may require a contingent to-morrow, you can
send whatever number of them you please. If they are
alone they fight well, but if they are mixed with European
troops I think they are fully equal to any in the world."
Again, his gallant colleague (Sir G. Berkeley), on being
questioned as to what he thought of the Madras army, said
he thought it very good indeed. What was the opinion of
Lord Gough with regard to the medical stag of the Indian
army ? His lordship said—" It was my fortune to serve
during the whole almost of the Peninsular war, and I have
served through several campaigns in India, but in the
Puujaub campaign I do not think that at any one period
there was a wounded man without his dooley (litter), nor
wanting any comfort it was possible to give him." Then,
again, in reference to the commissariat, Lord Gough bore
this important testimony. He said that " during the
Mahratta campaign and the Sutlej campaign, the army
under my command was never one day without its regular
provisions." He was quite ready to admit that at length an
effort in the right direction had been made by the organisa-
tion of a land transport corps, under the command of a most
gallant soldier—one who would, no doubt, justify the high
reputation which he had heretofore obtained. There was
also an attempt about to be made—he trusted that it
would be a successful one—to raise a Turkish contingent,
and to officer it with Indian soldiers. Certainly, if due
discrimination had been displayed in this matter, the ser•
vices of men who had distinguished themselves in every field
in India for the last twenty years might have been secured.
But, by the infelicity of the steps which her Majesty's
Government had taken, they had failed to avail themselves
of the services of the men whom all India would have
pointed out as the most efficient. He stated this without
the intention of casting any disparagement upon the officers
who had been induced to enter upon the service of organ-
ising and commanding that contingent. But truth and
the great interests at stake demanded that he should state
that none of them were of that eminence which the occa-
sion demanded—none bore names known in Indian story.
What was the case when he referred to men whose names
were not amongst those officers ? When he mentioned
the name of General Patrick Grant, he mentioned
the name of one who —if parliamentary precedent and
the rules of party did not prevent it—would be the
man to fill at the present time the post of Minister
of War ' • one who was versed in the conduct of mili-
tary matters, and who was capable of taking the
conduct of the affairs of our armies at the present
juncture. Yet this gentleman was unemployed. There
was also Captain Hodgson, of whom Sir C. Napier had
spoken in, the highest terms. There was also Brigadier-
General Mayne, whom, as the house well knew, Govern-
ment had not been able to persuade to take a subordinate
command. Now, non-employment of men of that kind
was a national calamity. In complaining that no use had
been made of the Indian army, it was essential that he
should point out what use might have been made of it.
After much attention to the subject, and many communi-
cations with military men upon the subject, he had not
the slightest doubt that under proper arrangement a Euro-
pean force of from 20,000 to 25,000 men, forming a com-
plete corps d'arntee, might be despatched from India to the
Crimea. He was also informed by many of the highest
authorities that it was possible that a large army might be
despatched through the valley of the Euphrates, so as to
form a junction with troops in Georgia. No one could have
studied Indiani history without knowing that a body of
25,000 cavalry would be of the most essential service in such

a campaign a; that in which we were now engaged. The
warfare in the Crimea was in some of its phases not unlike
an Indian war. There were the same difficulties of trans-

port—the same difficultie;of—PrO;l;iOniTg:---ke(girE.
Perry) had known cases in India in which men had carried

with them sufficient for ten-Clays: Hence an army from
India would be most useful in the present state of things
in the Crimea. It was too latd to think of such a thing
for the present campaign, as the rainy season had set in.
But, in time for the next campaign, men might be de-
spatched from the different ports of India to a convenient
place of rendezvous, whence they might proceed to the
seat of war. That such a plan was perfectly feasible was
proved by the fact of two regiments having already found
their way from India. He (Sir E. Perry) had a doubt
that it would be said by those who entertsinei a different
view from himself, that it was very easy for him to get up
in his place and state vague generalities, and he could
not but admit that the very nature of the subject
obliged him to be somewhat general. It would also, he
doubted not, he said that it would not be safe to denude

India of English troops. It was well known that objection
had been made by Lord Dalhousie to the withdrawal of a
single man excepting cavalry regiments. The opinion which
Lord Dalhousie had upon this question might or might not
ho correct—he (Sir E. Perry) had no means of ascertaining
the fact. But supposing it to be a correct view of the matter,
the plan which he would suggest was this, that the freshly
raised regiments should be sent out to India to replace those
withdrawn for service is the Crimea. This, as it seemed to
him, would be farbetter than the systcrn which now prevailed
of sending out raw recruits, most of whom were inere•boys,
to almost certain death from unaccustomed hardships.

There was another objection which might be urged, viz.,
the difficulty of settling in a mixed corps d'armee the rel t-
tions of the officers amongst themselves. It had been thought
by some hon. members and out of doors, that a late order
had put an end to all difficulty on this question. He
thought, however, that such was not the effect of that me-
morandum. It would be in the recollection of some hon.

members that he had a few evenings since taken the oppor-
tunity of putting a question to the President of the Board
of Control upon this matter. From the answer of the right
hon. gentleman he had inferred that the memorandum in
question, emanating from her Majesty, meant nothing more
than upon its face it purported to mean, and that its only
effect, therefore, was to give to Indian officers an honorary
distinction all over that rank which they bore in India.
This was the whole and sole effect of that memorandum.
It was plain, therefore, that no liberty to command, except
in India, was conferred upon Indian officers, and hence,
if those 'officers were employed with Queen's troops, they
might be told, as in the time of- Abercromby, that they
had no right to give orders. Even if the reading which
he put upon this memorandum were incorrect, still it fell
far short of what the exigencies of the times and of the
service demanded. The British army at this moment
consisted of about 460,000 men, with upwards of 10,01:10
officers. The State required that this large army should be
made as efficient as any army in the world. Our officers,
whether Queen's or Compa,ny's, were, as a body and upon
the whole, superior to those of any other nation. But in
some things these officers were not to be compared with
those of foreign nations. He required in thisbranch of the
service, as an administrative reformer required in other
branches, that the best men should be found to fill the
highest pests. At the present moment there were several
important military questions waiting for settlement. There
were the questions of promotion, of recruiting, of military
education, of training, and of pay. All of these re-
quired the greatest consideration from military and
professional persons. Any measures which might be
taken with reference to these matters could only be satis-
factory if the whole army were dealt with ; and in fact,
according to the opinion of the best military authorities
upon the matter, no satisfactory reformation could be
effected in these matters, unless a complete amalgamation
took place of the Queen's and Company's services. It was
not only in a British point of view that this change was
important—it was no less required for the benefit of India.
He had no hesitation in affirming that in India the military
and civil forces did not—to use 'a French expression—
" function" well ; in order to this it was necessary that
the army in India should be a royal army, under the con-
trol, as at present, of the supreme government of India.
There was also another important question upon which he
felt it his duty to touch, although it was a delicate one, for
he had known much good arise from the mention of such
things in Parliament. He affirmed that there was some-
thing unsafe in the mode in which our military force in
India was constituted. A large number of officers were at
out-stations, far from the control of public opinion. Nor
was this all ; we had had mutinies in the army itself—a
spirit of disaffection had prevailed for years. It was the
part of a wise statesman not to shrink from grave facts like
these, but to look them fairly in the face, and, if possible
devise a remedy by which they might be met. He believed
that if the Indian army were a royal army much of this
disaffection would disappear in the allegiance and loyalty
which were inatural. .to..the pottition of royal troops.
Hon. members would see that he had no desire to exalt
the Company's army at the expense of the Queen's. In-
deed he believed that, as a whole, the latter would be en-
titled to rank higher than the former. He needed only
name Lawrence, Clive, Wellesley, Lord Lake, and last,
but not least, Naples., to prove this position. There
were no names in the Indian artily to vie with those which
he had just mentioned. Indeed, to make the Indian what
the
_royal force was, it should be bound as closely as pos-
sible to the mother country. He would say, bind the
Indian army as closely to us as might be, and, following
the example which the French in Algeria had set us with
regard to their army, make it gradually as national in
its character as possible. So far he had traced the bene-
fits of the proposed change as regarded the State ; he
would now consider it in relation to the soldier himself.
Viewing the matter in this light, he thought that the
proposed change would be advantageous both to the
Queen and th Company's men. The Queen's forces
would have opened to them not only those staff ap-
pointments which were so numerous in India, but also
several civil and political poets, which were now, from the
exigencies of.lndian service, often filled by military men.
The officers of the Company would also be benefited. They
would have the advantage of an increased field of military
exertion, as well as the prospect of higher military reward
than they could at present attain. In addition to
honourtliey
would have the honour of serving the Queen—an
with
which, as every one knew, had great influence
mili-
tary men. He could not help thinking that it was perfectly
ridiculous that the great advantage which would arise from
this fact alone should be lost to the State.srGe:Tpshreal may
hon.ue gen-
tleman here read a letter
Brigadier-General
Who Mid- iieled.as
and another from a native gentleman__d Sir Charles Napier,
interpreter td Sir W. Go:l:n:3.ms
There was a question,
in confirmation
of
fwiltiliis this subject to which he wtodsd,
closely
It
was
Indian
content
of the, royal and
oonnected
imself with briefly adverting.
whether the amalgamation
armies should be. complete,. orwthhethfoerrsetsheoflnthdieaenmaprimrey,
should be a distinct portion of o
_The latter was the view of Lord Grenvill!.. ,Of course this
spas orstshola for the consideration of military, ; bitt- '
Illare-was objeCtioatO totals of Lord
tit'‘lwould tendloanate the n Fink a mere
4044 body, eadtimpadult• mew' s of Such •