The National Register.
London, England, 1812-12-06 00:00:00

DEC. 6.

eeenseensis.
France the causes of the loss of Badajos, that Lord Wellington had
taken Badajos in the face of two arelies, each of which, instreneth,
was equal to his own. I t was stated by Soult, that the army miler
terd Wellington was not superior to that uniler his command, nor to
that commanded by Marmont ; but he stated the (lacunae of ae.ern.
bling troops to he so great, and the rapidity of Lord Welliiigt, 11-s
iyements to be so extraordinary (an admission most honourable to the
pliant Marquis, more particularly as it came froth the enemy), his
oetretions carried on with such celehrity, the si,ge incased yy it h set h
vigour, awl the assault in ide with such rallantry, as to exceed all his
ca, : so that he had only reached Album with his'arinv.
his wry to relieve the fortrese, when be received -intelligence that it had
fallen. After this; it was for him to direct his force so as to OF et
as hat he might he capable of doing tier the interest of Spain, with a view
to repel the Invadieg army. The French armies were so strong that the
gallant Marquis did not expect to be enables to Mitre them out of
Spain; and he stated in his communications with his Government,
" If I can reduce the two fortresses (Ciudad Rodrigo and B
an P
d place ortuga' under their protection, my next operation shall be
directed to the South of Spain, to deprive the enemy of the resource s
they possess in Seville ; or if It hlige them to collect an army to de-
nial them, I shall then co:npel them to raise the siege of Cadiz. I I
fram Bialajoa I can aa!yance into Andalusia, this will be myeiteject."
When Lord WelEngton Badajos, in consequence, cer-
tai ly, of the tietey to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, Ire nett nbliged to
march to protect that fortress, to secure that interestinz frontier of
Portugal. The Noble Lord afterwards stated, that he did not alto-
gether regret, that c'it comstances had caused him to direct an opera-
tion in the Nort instead of the South, as he had intended ; and he
loped, as he nemil himself at the head of an army to which he could.
lock with confidence for success in an action with. Marmots, he might •
in that quarter, more particularly it Castile were thrown open, be able
to do that which would deliver Andalusia more completely, than if,
ra he had first intended after the capture of Badajos, he had advanced
against the French in Avdalusia. He (I.Ord C.) begged the House to
bear this in mind. Lord Wellington did make an irruption into Cas-
tile. He drove the French from Salamanca, and advanced upon the
line of the Douro. Though at the commencement of these opera-
tions, his army was such, that he could court a general action with
Marmont, when he arrived upon the line of the Douro, tins was no
longer the case. The French, as was their practice, there snrifieed
all the hold they had of the country, by withdrawing their troops from
stv:ial fortresses they had pr. viously occupied, to make head
:gains, Lord Wellington. Banc the battle of Salamanca, Marmont
was reinforced from Leon and Est remadura, from the army of CAM-
nib, and from the army of Madrid. From that moment, Lord Wel-
lington ,aid, " I am not prepared to risk a general battle, sinless I
fiat, that upon military grounds 11 can engage you with a prospect of
success." The battle of Salamanca was fought in consequence of this
dinereoieatioe.— Wit bout going into the derail, which he thouvht un-
necessary, as ev-ry Englishman. was familiar with it, he would say
this was a victory gained after manceuvres the most complicated,
where two armies were long in sight of each other, each observing what
the other did, and trying, by every ell ort of militara skill, to take ad-
yentage of any errors that might occur. The loss of the French
'rn' in the fieht, and through the consequences which naturally re-
sulte4 from it, could not be estimated at less than 20,000 men.•
What was the situation of Spain at present? Lord Wellington lied
taid, that but for one unfortunate circumstance the success oft he cam-
mien would have been certain. Success would have been certain,
bad not the French collected the whole of their disposable force,
amountieg to not less than 70 or 80,000 men, upon the Tonnes, and
compelled Lord Wellington prudentially to make a retreat, a retreat
which was more lilw the prelude to a victory than a proof of disaster.
The enemy had only been enabled to compel him to retreat by an ab-
dication of every military principle which had regulated their conduct
before. It Madrid hied neen a position of military importance,. which
it was not, the case would have been materially different from what it
at present appeared. Lord W. 11;41 not taken possession of it as a mi.
ori position. nor had he adiranced upon it for tae vain glory of
hiking the enein)'s capital—he went there on this principle ; he
knew, that unless advancing he threw-a large force on the flank of
he con Id not make that General do what was really the object
ol Lord Wairgton's operations—raise the :lege of Cadiz, while An-
dalusia and the southern provinces of Spain.were delivered from the
ee"emy. It was now seen that the French Could not retain Madrid.
They were obliged to evacuate it in their tune; as well as sic, and
acre now euly in possession oldie ground on which elegy toed, and
sa far as ever from effecting the military or moral subjonition of the
country. But if they were to measure the influeoce of the victory
of 13lamatica only by what it had produced in Spain, he would say,
their estimate ant: value would be most unfair, most unwise, most
untrue, in the circumstances in whicfi Ettrope was at present placed.
Did the. House know, that -the character of the battle of Borodino,
le'as partly caused by Lord Wellington ? In that great Kittle, in which
80XXX) men laid down their lives, it was consoling to know that.
Prince Kutusoff had it in his power, on the morning of that day,
to animate his troops, by telling them of the glory gained by the Eng.
I:sit at Salamanca.—(hear, hear !) Did not the Howe feel that it
trent be most animating to the Russian army to know that the Mar-
St 4 of Wellington- had at Salamanca completely r. utcd the French