The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-01 00:00:00

CONDITION OF TDB ARMY IN THE
CRIMEA.

(From the Times.)
Could it be proved to everybody's satisfaction,
or rather to everybody's grief, that matters are as
bad as they are represented in the Crimea, or even
very much worse, there nevertheless exists a cer-
tain fatal prepossession adverse to any active re-
medial measures. That prepossession is only a form
of our incurable national self-complacency. Are
we not the two most civilised Powers of Europe,
ourselves the wisest and best, if not also the
bravez.t of the two, fighting against the most
barbarous Power ? Is not Russia a nation go-
verned by a despot, assisted by tools,- by means
of ukases, tl e' knout, conscriptions, Siberia, forced
contributions, martial law, and a system of per-
sonal brutalities from which oven the highest
nobility is not secure? How is it possible but that
the free genius of our own favoured country
should prevail,tunder all circumstances whatever,
against a form of society so low that it may be
called abhorrent to liuMan nature itself? May
we not be sure that, even if things are
bad enough with us— worse-looking possibly
from our comparative, innocence of war —they I
are,- in reality, stilt Worse with the Russian
army, and that even in this fatal struggle
with,elimate, with wintsr,- with -storm, and with
famine, we are beating the Russian; or must
eventually beat him? Now, in this great depre-
ciation of the foe, and in the particular reason for
this depreciation, lies our principal danger. We
despise Russia for the very reason that we ought to
fear her. We hold ourselves vastly her superior for
a point on which we ought rather to take a lesson
from her. She is a barbarous Power. Grant it ;
and a purely military Power. Her system is
worked with a rod of iron. The Czar treats her
nobles as they do their serfs. Generals are sent to
Siberia sr reduced to the ranks ; governors of cities
' are sentenced to work on the roads ; nobody
knows whose turn may come next, or how terrible
it may be. It is a crime to be incompetent. For
a moment's vacillation the services of a long life
are forgotten, and it is rebellion not to understand
rightly an order that admits of two construc-
tions. The Imperial family itself is not exempt from
this iron law. The incompetent heir is put aside,
and his partisans disappear. In such a system the
hardest metal is a necessity of State. When the
instrument •nce yields, or permits its edge to be
turned by the soft compunctions of humanity or
personal kindness it is thrown away. It may be good
enough in its place, but will not do the work of
tke Czar. Such is the quality of the Russian system
that we may perhaps hate or despise it, and that
we may afford to do so in time of peace, but we
cannot afford to do so in time of war, or in any
affair that relates to war. We cannot afford to
fight with soft iron against hard iron, with foils
against naked swords, with holyday pageants
against the grim reality, with courtiers against
warriors—in a word, with peace against war. Yet
that is very much what we are vainly attempting
to do.

It will not be diniod that if the Czar, by a per-
sonal inspection or otherwise of an army, ascer-
tained it to be in the condition of our army be-
fore Sebastopol, h• would instantly put it into
entirely new hands. Even were the case not ■o
bad, it will not be doubted that rebukes, peremp-
tory orders, and other measures of rigour would
soon be heard of, and that every man in the ser-
vice would be put on his mettle. But if we want

to know how Emperors and great generals manage
these affairs, we have an example in the corres-
pondence of Napoleon, particularly that with his
brother Joseph. It was not with good nature
that this man conquered half Europe. He in-
structed, commanded, reproved, rebuked, and
abused everybody, without any exception. He
would have everybody about him at his post and
up to the mark. He required his viceroys and
marshals to do as he did, and transmit downwards
the vigour of their chief. If our system be not
one of aggression, if we are actually denying our-
selves the prizes of conquest, and seeking only the
barren honours of justice and humanity, never-
theless the work itself is not in any respect short
of that undertaken by Napoleon Bonaparte. In
attacking Russia we aro simply attempting to do
what he could not do, to cap his greatest triumphs,
and to redress hie worst failure. This we attempt
to do with about one-fifth of his force, and with
the still greater disadvantage of a dividel. com-
mand. To succeed after his disappointment would
be almost miraculous. If he, then, ever required
an iron will, an iron head, iron instruments, and a
whole system of iron, as, indeed, he always did,
much more do we. Yet everybody knows that the
whole conduct of this expedition, from first to last,
has been rather that of an encampment at Chob-
ham than an invasion of the soil of Russia, and
an attempt to destroy the strongest place of the
strongest man in the world. Ministerial favour,
nepotism, routine, official punctilios of a hundred
kinds, have all been observed in a battle of giants.
We are hampered, not by the inexoraqle condi-
tions of the war, bad as they may be, but by the
silken bonds of class, clique, and kin. The real
administrators of the army are much too kind-
hearted to peach against one another, or to give
one another unnecessary pain. They are all good
fellows, and though one, if report speaks true,
who should be the very eye of the chief, is almost
blind, another never had much capacity, and has
had no experience, a third is too infirm to appear,
except in a carriage, and the staff is otherwise
crowded with beardless youths, gone to the Crimea
to learn their profession, we are no more likely to
hear of any complaints than the vulgar public is
to hear the quarrels at a ball at Alinack's, or the
mishaps of a dinner at Windsor Castle. The Czar
is not to be tied within his own dreary continent
with such gossamer webs as these. We smile at

the Chinese, who defend their empiro with paper
ramparts, mock steamers, the clashing of swords,
and the sounding of gongs ; but what will the world
say of us should it be found that our army had
invaded Russia under a staff as showy and thea-
trical ?

Then we are told it is the duty of every true
Englishman to enter the official conspiracy, and
help to conceal the true state of things from those
twin horrors—the British public and the Empe-
ror of Russia. We are always to report "an im-
provement for the better"—roiafercements ar-

riving, supplies getting up, the roads under
repair, the winter clothing coming at last, the
weather improving, and something decisive about
to be done. What can be tke use of attempting to
conceal from the Russian Generals what scores of

spies and deserters report to them every day ?
Whatever we happen to know they have known
a fortnight before ; but at all events the
people of this country ought to know that such is
the mortality and sickness in our army, that though
reinforcements are poured in with a profusion
utterly unparalleled in history, the army refuses to
increase, or to become equal to its position. We
shall not now reiterate the reasons which prove
that the fault is mainly in the commanders, though,
if the excuses made be admitted, and if Lord Rag-
lan has really undertaken the same amount of work
as the French with half their force, and half their
facilities of landing and conveyance, he has com-
mitted the capital error of being outwitted by his
ally. Never could there be a more fatal defence
than one which admits everything we have said, and
adds thereto another charge greater than all the
rest put together. For our part, we will not press
the indictment so far; we will content ourselves
with indicating the great disorganisation of the
army, and demanding that the most vigorous steps
shall be taken to reclaim it, if possible. Let every
officer be sent hone who is not thoroughly up to
his work, and who will not put his whole strength
into it. Let reprimands, orders, admonitions, and
supercessions be sent out. Since Lord Raglan 1
sends home no information as to the state of his

army and the condition of his camp, Government
has no choice but to act upon the information con-
veyed in thousands of private letters, and open to
the whole world. With that mass of evidence be-

fore him, the Duke of Newcastle iiictis-I;;;ifear-
ful responsibility if lie allows a good-natured regard
for this man's feelings or that man's connections to
prevent the discharge of his plain duty to the
army and his country.

NARROW ESCAPE OF Loan CARDIGAN. —Corpora
John Robinson, of the 13th Light Dragoons, in a letter
addre-sed to a friend in Doncaster, dated Noy. 2, thus
describes the narrow escape of Lord Cardigan in the ca-
valry charge at Balaklava, 4nd the part he took in his
lordship's rescue :—" Just as I was unpriming one of
the enemy's guns, and passing another, there were three
pairs of horses in it, and there was one man mounted on
the centre pair : he was in th• act of dismounting when
I galloped past Lim and gave him a cut and a draw
across the throat, which I thought was the quickest way
of getting rid of him. I did not ride many yards further
before I saw our commander, Lord Cardigan, very nearly
thrust off his horse, and if it had not been for me, the
old boy's life would not have been worth a row of pins.
I saved him, for I directly saw a Russian had marked
him, for he drew his lance and made at hie lordship, but
I was too expert for the rascal. I parried the well-
meant stroke, and then he bolted as if Old Nick was after
him."—Leas Mercury.

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[PRICE SD.

"DYNASTIC CONSIDERATIONS."

----
Tho Press of Saturday contains an enigmatical
announcement, in which it speaks of—
"An event now in progress, which will excite the
greatest interest in Europe."
"It is not to be expected that dynastic considera-
tions can wholly be excluded from the policy of courts ;
and such considerations will soon assume a shape
to demand the gravest deliberation."
We do not profess to understand what our ora-
cular but generally well-informed contemporary
means ; but we wish to impress upon our readers
the following facts, which in connection with cer-
tain rumours which have been afloat for some (lays,
we consider may give them something upon which
they may " chew the cud of bitter fancies" during
the recess.
The enrolment of the militia lias been delayed
for More than twelve months after its absolute
necessity had become apparent, and is now em-
bodied for foreign service.
Our home recruiting has been " burked "—we
can use no other word. Our Government has—to
all appearance wilfully—destroyed our army. We
use the word advisedly, because, although igno-
rance and incapacity may be alleged in defence of
-the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Sidney Herbert,
no such excuse can be plausibly advanced in favour
of Lord Palmerston and some others of the Coali-
tion. They must have known the inevitable con-
sequences of their colleagues' blunders. Mr. Sidney
Herbert states that he has sent 54,000 Melt to the
Crimea. Now, no one will venture to estimate
Lord Raglan's army at more than 24,000 men, in-
cluding all reinforcements. Where are the 30,000?
Our Government has systematically set its face
against all voluntary associations fer defence, thus
absolutely refusing the people the use of arms even
for the protection of their own homes and families.
Be it observed that this is the act of a " Liberal
Government." The Tories were not afraid to arm
the people. In 1813 the number of volunteer
cavalry alone amounted to 68,000; the local militia,
exclusive of the regular force of that description,
amounted to 304,000—three ha:ired and four
thousand armed men. Our "Liberal Government"
have now got permission from a servile Parliament
to enlist, pay, aye, and bring into England by
degrees, an indefinitely large force of Belgian and
German mercenaries.

Surely there can be no connection between these
startling facts and the dark inuendos of the Press.
If there be any scheme on foot to the fulfilment
of which such preparations as we have indicated
above can be mad• ancillary, there must be persons
somewhere far more foolish and wicked than we ever
conceived to be possible. We do not mean the
Ministry, for we are quite aware that they are
foolish and wicked enough for anything.
The utter falsehood of the alleged necessity for
the employment of foreign troops may be gathered
from the following statement of the number of
armed Englishmen on foot in 1813. We quote from
Sir A. Alison :

Land forces, including the British troops in lies.
India
Embodied regular militia 93,000
Volunteer cavalry 65,000
Local militia and volunteers
Sailors employed on board 102 ships of the
line, 219 frigates, and smaller ♦essels,
amounting in all to 613 sail of different
sizes

Marinas ...

118,000
18,000

Total 897,000
Nearly 900,000 men. Me population of the islands
has since increased one-third, and Ministers, for
some purpose or another, have th• audacity to assert
that we must fall back on the employment of Bel-
gian and Germais mercenaries.

We ask with what end and object ? for we think
it is obvious that the alleged necessity is neither
more nor less than a downright falsehood.—Morn-
illy Herald.

THE TERMS OF PEACE.

(Feont the Examiner.)

It is understood that the indirect negotiations which
have been pending at Vienna. If 1; 1 lallies
nnr. tao
exptect the eriaiß whizth may, lead to more active help
from Austria, have definitely failed. What the Czar
offers, as might have been anticipated, is not satis-
factory.

We do not profess to be acquainted with the details
of these negotiations, but as to the main question which
they hare broken down we have no reason to doubt the
information communicated to us. Agreement even as
to the construction of the four points waq thought not
unattainable, but it was on the condition required by the
allies for the liberation of the Black Sea from the naval
and military incubus of Sebastopol that every hope of
neentninodation vanished.
The Czir will listen to no stipulations his
power over the fleet and the fortifications of Sebastopol.
Maintaining that each Sovereign must be left to do what
he likes within his own territories, and that none can
have the right to question his preparations at Sebasto-
pol, he argues that the Sultan, in like manner, is at
full liberty to convert Sinop° into a fortress and arsenal,
which he may make, if it so please him, as extensive and
as formidable as Sebastopol.
Such is said to be the reasoning and resolve of Russia;
and manifestly, if assented to or acted upon, the change
would be merely from open war to a state of antagonism
as fatal to the general interests of Europe. Each coun-
try would he unceasingly engaged in constructing for-
tresses, training and paying armies, building fleets—
always preparing, in short, for no remote hostilities. It
would be that most undesirable and most insecure of all
things—an armed peace ; for with Russia and Turkey
in such attitudes, how could Europe disarm ?
Rus'sia would characterise it as not less outrageous to
demand of a great power, than humiliating to suck a
power
to consent that she should limit her number of
ships, and cease to make her batteries formidable in any
sea. The first maritime countries, however, have not
shrunk from entering into stipulations of this kind.
England and France made mutual concessions not many
years since that each would keep only a certain number
of vessels in the waters east of Malta ; and what would
seem to have been demanded of Russia was something
tantamount. It Bemire maintain her great fleet at Se-
bastopol, England and France must keep a correspond-
ing fleet in the Black Sea or the Bosphorus ; and suck a
state of things would be as expensive and disquieting as
war, without any hope of ultimate satisfaction from such
resuls as are produoed by war.
It is idle to set up the point of honour in answer to
the demand for a guarantee against aggression. What
now must be forced from Russia is the satisfactory secu-
rity that her future intenticns are those of peace. If
her fortresses in the Black Sea are to be kept armed to
the teeth, Russia still meditates war. Her very de-
mands prove it, and necessitate a continuance of the
existing struggle till material guarantees shall be ob-
tained for the effective re-establishment of peace.
They lie before us in the Crimea, and the first condi-
tion now, to whatever we may hope hereafter to
achieve, must be the completion of that enterprise. It is
no longer upon the Danube, but in the Crimea, that tran-
quillity must be conquered. The line of the Danube is com-
paratively safe, but after all that has passed an honourable
peace is not possible which would leave Russia possessed
of the Tartar province. To do this woeld be to leave
Turkey in a far worse strait than we found her. To de-
prive Russia finally, decidedly, and by force of arms of
the Crimea, is the work we have now, therefore, impera-
tively to do. We have half accomplished it ;it may
take the summer to complete ; the Sea of Azoff may
have to be entered by vessels fitted for the purpose, and
the amount of reinforcements required for the reduction
of the fortresses of the mountains, as well as of the
batteries of Sebastopol, may be larger than we have
even yet taken into calculation. But there the great
obstacle to peace now lies, and it can b. removed only
by the sword. As long as the Czar retains the Crimea
he will persevere in his projects against Turkey ; and it
is not till we are finally masters of that province that
the possibility of peace to Europe can ever be restored.

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