The National Register.
London, England, 1808-12-18 00:00:00

DEC• 18.

fatigue in advancing to the attack, and during the action ?
A. Certainly there was reason to suppose so. • •
Sir A. Wellesley then rose, and put a variety of questions to
Sir H. Burrard.
Q.. Has Sir H. Burrard heard of the standing order, that the
army should cook one day's provisions previous to a march;
and would not the troops have had such provisions in their
kaversacks?—A. Certainly, if they received orders to march.
Q. Did I not inform Sir H Burrard, on the 20th, that I
had given orders for the army to march on the following morn-
ing ?—A. Yes.
Q. Does Sir H. Burrard recollect, that I twice proposed 11
to him, on the field of battle, that the army should advance
in pursuit of the enemy ?—A. Yes.
Q. Do you ,recollect, that I proposed to pursue the enemy
with five of the brigades; leaving, General nine's and General
Austruther's brigades in the positions which they occupied?—
A. t do remember the proposal ; but 1 understand that the
advance was to be made on the left, where the ground was very
advant4eous to the enemy, who were much superior in cavalry.
also thought that General Ferguson's brigade wa:. advanced so
far, as to be inconsiderable danger.
The Deputy Advocate General then put a variety of questions
to Sir A. Wellesley.
Q. Was there any probability, in your opinion, that had our
army immediately followed up the success obtained on the 21st,
the defeat would have been rendered complete ?—A. The elle-
im's left, which was engaged with our right, retired by a road
which leads along the heights towards the vineyards. Their
troops were thrown into confusion by the attack of our cavalry,
and had we advanced at that moment, there was a great Aruba.
bility of their being completely routed.
Q. Was there any opportunity, in your opinion, of intercept-
ing and cutting oft' a part of the French army ?—A. Certainly, 1
think there was ; if the left wing had followed up the plan
which 1 suggested to Sir 11. Burrard, I believe that many pri-
soners would have been taken both no the enemy's right and left.
Q. When did you first propose to Sir 11. Burrard, that the
army should advance ?—A. When the enemy were beaten on
the left, I went to Sir H. Burrard, and proposed to him that our
troops should advance. Soon after my first proposal to Sir
Uurrard, General Ferguson sent his Aid-de-Gainp, Captain
Mellish, to inform me of the great advantages which he conceived
would arise from the advance of his brigade, in order to follow
lip the success which they had obtained. I immediately took
Capt3in Nlellish with me to General Iturrard, to endeavour to
prevail upon him to permit us to continue our advantages, but
he would not comply.
Sir 11. Burrard then asked Sir A.. Wellesley, what reason he
had for supposing that the French reserve had been euo-aged
in
the battle of the 21st ?—A. I myself saw them engaged ; I col
lected from the 411'0m:flint) of several wounded prisonors that
they had beenengaged ; and General Kellerman, who commanded
the French reserve, told it me, and that junta attributed the
in,. of the battle to the impetuosity of the reserve.
General Spencer was then called and examined.
Sir A. Wellesley.—Q. Did General Spencer, as my second in
eimmaand, consider the defeat of the enemy so decided as to w ar-
rant our pursuing them ?—A. I considered the enemy to be com-
pletely beaten in the centre, and I could, with my division, have
supported Sir A. Wellesley in the pursuit.
General Fergusson was next examined by Sir Arthur Welles-
ley.
Sir Arthur W.—Does Gen. Fergusson recollect that after he
received an order to halt, he sent Cwt. Mellish with a message
inform are that if 1 would permit him to advance, he could
gain all important advantage ?---A. 1 did send such a message.
sir Arthur W,—llescribe to the Court your reasons for send-
ing it ?
General Ferguson.—:s column of the enemy's infantry, con-
`islin; in my opinion of from li.'o to 2000 men, was completely
broken, and in confusion had got into a hollow, and thereby
placed in a situation of being completely cut oil from the main
body by an advance movement of the corps rimier my eontinand.
Q. Did General Fergussou consider the enemy so beaten on the
2141, a, to render a pursuit of them advantageous?-- A. I did.
Q. Did General Fel-03'400 perceive any part of the enemy's
tromps at the end of the engagement to consist a cavalry ?—A.
I did not.

Q. When and a here did you see the enemy's cavalry'-.-A.
Their cavalry were the flirt troop.; that showed themselves to
inur line. in answer to a queA inn put by Lunt Moira, he stated,
that the enemy made their last stood at &tie village of tir4gau.ta,

whence they were dislodged by the lst regiment. who were the
battalion inost advanced of the British troops. They then went
olf in the utmost confusion.
Lord Burghersh was next examined by Sir A. Wellesley.
Q. Was his Lordship present on the evening of the t2lst, when
I recommended to Sir Harry Burrard to pursue the enemy, and.
follow up the advantages we had gained that day?--A. I was.
Q. Does your Lordship recollect my ha% ou toe_ ~tst
Sir Harry Burrard nu the field to centime the onrsoit, and my
referring to our discussion of the preceding evening?—A.. I re'.
collect that he urged him to advance our right nearer to Torn a
V..dras that evening, and that if his opinion was taken, a pact
of the enemy who bad been enraged would nut he owe to rt..c..•
Lisbon.
Sic Arthur Wellesley then said, that he would call other wit-
nesses to prove further, that he recommended to Sir Harry Bur-
rard to pursue the enemy after the battle; but after a short con-.
versation amongst the Members of the Board, it was adjourned
to Wednesday.

TEN fa DAY.
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14.

Examinatit.n of Sir 4. WELLEstEr by Sir If. Br lIRIRD.
Q. Do you Oita( it was possible for the British army, consist-
ing of 16 or 17,000 men, to have commenced their march, when
the French cavalry so fur out•trumbered the English, without the
erwmy's knowing immediately of the movement ?•—.l. 1 think
under the circumstances of the country, and of pn,ition, it wt .&
possible for the army to march without the Itutr.vleder of the
enemy, at nine miles distance, for at least two or t hive hours.
Q. If the French at Torres Vedrus had know of the march
of the British army , could not they have reached \lnfra first, and
have pined reinforcements from St. Julien and Casra;e,

I c-nceive not.
Q. If you meant to attack Cascayes and Fort St. Julien, bow
did you propose to get heavy cannon ?—A. It had hero settled
before I left England, that I fimuld have the use or o hat heavy
cannon I wanted from the ships of the sleet, awl ammunition
for 24-pounders; and mortars, with ammunition, were sent
from Lnii,land in a store-ship, which joined the fleet before we
were in a situation to undertake any siege.
Q. How many Jays did you think it would have taken to
reduce. Caccayes and St. Julien by siege ?-..--.J.. I never made up
Imy mind. Neither of them is strong.
Lord .Moira then, in the name of the Court, put the following
queAtions to Sir 1-1. Lturrard :
Q. If tiencral Junot thanght that time Convention was more
advatnageotts than protracting the rain paign, w hat are the motive.*
that you suppose to have induced him to Nod) a decision I—A.
!10::ni n
i,nutsi 6por; prepared to
„u tamper say
thatvv hati: II lite they :et .b 0 lraerterekesido::::::le
that the Convention would have liven signed, if the French Offi-
cers had not laid their hands upon (itch- heart-, and nectared ea
This was a thing which could nut appear in p riat, as it might
1 cost the French Generals their heai, 0 hen the. t:stme to Paris.

Sir .4, fVellealey e.ramined by the Cuurt.
The same question was put to :Sir A. Wellesles.—A. 'When I
conceived it expedient to allow the French to evacuate Por-
tugal by sett, my opinion WaS formed from a cerwideration of
British interests and British objects, and also of the inhere, is
and objects of those allies acting in cont ert with (,rear Brit in.!
I thought that the French arms, having the military 'posses,
of tae constr.,, had a fair military right to withdraw their
army from Portugal by sea, and to carry with them their arms
and bo4:sge. Ido not think myself at all accountable fur the
reasons w hhc h de. ermined General Junot.
Nis. lino Margin},le examined by the Cuurt.

The Paine question was put to Sir flew.
Aliswer.--It must also be recollected that I had particular
instructions to take care in expelling the Frritch from Lipton),
that thev thonloi be prevented from retreating through Spain.--
11 it hoot pretending to say tom far it 'right hat) been the in-
tentioo of the ()nem) to attempt their retreat through Spain, I
nova tigoin slaw, that according In my opinion. and tli:ot of all
my Oiticerp, I had no other means of executing that part of toy
ingtructions, or preventing their irtieat through Spain (if such
had been their intention e, except by bigniug the Convention. I
cannot be anawerable for the nooti c «nich induced General.
J unat to agree to itieh a Convention.
Sir Arthur Welle•Ie) then read or the Court a written mane
ment of reason,. On the itoi it, w hen he prolonged to .reit ger
forward. he had :to army of front WAX) to 1- '•110 Mist.