The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-23 00:00:00

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.

London, Feb. 23, 1855.
SIR,—At a moment when we are seriously threat-
ened with present disturbance, if not with pros-
pective revolution, it is well to consider who, and
what, is to blame for the actual state of military
affairs. Some people say " the aristocracy ;" others
" Lord Raglan ;" a third party make the late Mi-
nistry, and especially the Duke of Newcastle, alone
responsible ; a fourth exculpate all, and observe
that England has never begun a war, after a long
period of peace, without losing an army. Now
in each of these various replies there is some de-
gree of truth. It is certain that no military esta-
blishment, however theoretically perfect, can he in
working order where no officer under 50 years of
age has seen a battle ; and a large proportion of
the disasters which have occurred are therefore
justly imputable to the peace. It is not less
certain that the tactical blunders of the
late Cabinet the unprepared state of the
army in regard of materiel after a year's
notice of impending war—the choice of Varna
for an encampment, and the long detention there
,—the sudden embarkation for the Crimea, in which
so many hardships were caused by the leaving be-
ihind of tents and equipages of every description
—the utter ignorance in wich all concerned appear
to have been as regarded the strength of Sebasto-
pol and of its garrison--lastly, if we are to take
the word of Sir Howard Douglas, the bad manage-
ment of the campaign and siege operations—are
individual faults, distinctly ascribable to particular
men, and not in fairness chargeable upon any
system, however defective. Eager partisans,
anxious only to cover Lord Aberdeen and his col-
leagues with censure, may exaggerate the amount
land importance of the errors which I have enume-
rated • ardent Liberals, having in view the double
object screening their own political leaders, and
of exciting popular feeling against a class, may, on
the other hand, overlook or pass lightly over them—
but a calm looker-on will perceive and acknowledge
—first, that even with a competent Administration
and a well-organised army, many blunders must have
been expected in the first campaign of the only
European war which this generation has witnessed;
next, that neither the Government at home, nor
the generals in the field, have made the best of the
system which they found in existence, and had to
administer. But, this being premised, and large
allowance made accordingly for past errors, it must
in justice be admitted that a great deal remains to
do in the way of army reform ; and the reason is
obvious. An army in time of peace is compara-
tively in a state of abeyance. No Minister is likely
at such a time to propose an organic change in its
constitution ; nor, were he to do so, is it probable
that he would receive from Parliament or the pub-
lic the requisite amount of support. We find,
therefore, that though many departmental reforms
have been carried out, the principle of English mili-
tary organisation, as a whole, remains substantially
the same as it was after Waterloo. That circumstance
alone indicates the necessity of careful revision and
large alterations. Society has in the course of the
last 40 years made great advances. The position
of the labouring man is no longer what it was.
Individuals of a higher and better educated class
enter the ranks,even now, and will do so to a much
greater extent when induced by the prospect of
mere rapid advancement. No one who reads the
letters of soldiers serving in the Crimea can affirm
that among the writer there are not many com-
petent to fill a higher position than that in which
they find themselves. And on the other hand,
though the charges of neglecting their men,
brought against regimental and divisional officers,
are for the most part unfounded, and in every case
greatly exaggerated, yet it cannot be denied that
want of practice in campaigning—ignorance of the
mode of life of the private soldier—and the habit
of having everything done for them in time of
peace—do prevent our lieutenants, captains, and
colonels from being as efficient as they might be in
securing the comforts of the troops. They do not
want for the will, but they are deficient in the re-
quisite practical knowledge.
The question is—What remedy Y I say, take a
certain fixed number of commissions and give them
to non-commissioned officers—not less than one-
fourth of the whole. Perhaps it would be well to
begin with a lesser number just at first, leaving the
increase of it optional with the Commander-in-
Chief. Ultimately, when, as would be the case, a
higher class of men are drawn into the ranks by the
hepo of rising to be officers, you might increase the
number to one-third. Beyond this last proportion
think you ought not to go, with reference to the
fair claims of the more educated classes, and to
the interests of the scientific branches of the
service. It is often said that a promoted private,
when first appointed to an ensigucy, feels himself
out of place, a man among boys, and his pay net
equal to meet necessary expenses. This is true,
nub s% future- Such men
should pa..s over that merely probationary grade,
and begin their new career as lieutenants. Many
good soldiers doubt whether the rank of
ensign ought not to be abolished, and whe-
ther a young matt who has passed through the
military schools might not join as lieutenant, of
course at a more advanced age than at which he
now joins. I should approve this change. What
can be worse than sending out raw lads fresh from
school to face a Crimean climate ? They have
pluck enough, but pluck alone, without constitu-
tion, is not sufficient. But this is a minor point
of detail.
As regards the remaining two-thirds, I should
suggest the following division :—One-third to be
left, as now, in the hands of the Commander-in-
Chief, on whom it might be a useful check, if ho
were compelled to give in to Parliament a yearly
return of commissions granted, stating the parent-
age of the recipients, and the reason of the choice,
sons of officers who had served to be preferred, but
this to be left to his discretion. The publicity
given to his selection would put a stop to the abuses
which we now witness, and which it is alike im-
possible to deny and to palliate.
Tho remaining one-third I should think it pos-
sible to put up to public competition, or in any
case, failing that, to offer as the reward of a severe
and protracted training in military schools, which
would afford security to the publio that incom-
petent men should not pass. It is to this section
that one should look for the most able scientific
officers ; and if the examinations are strict
enough, it matters little in whose hands you
vest the original presentation, which would only
carry the grant of a commission on condition of the
student showing himself worthy of it. Care must
be taken that the training should be one not of
books exclusively, but testing bodily as well as
mental fitness. Macaulay and Wood argued, in
the Indian debate of '53, that where examinations
are probationary only, and not competitive, there
ensues an!inevitable tendency on the part of exa-
miners to relax the rule, rather than disappoint
an incapable, but well-intentioned asiiirant. Sueh
maybe the case at Haileybury or Addisconbe, and no
doubt the argument is plausible. Still it need not
be; and in proof that it need not, I appeal to
Westpoint, the American Lailitary academy. It is
well known that whatever the merits of Ame-
ricans, a complete education, and a thorough-going
as opposed to a superficial knowledge of things, are
not their strong points ; but I never met a West-
point officer—and I have met a good many—who
was not both a gentleman and a thoroughly edu-
cated man. Yet the Westpoint system is not one
of competition ; the cadets are nominated by mem-
bers of Congress, and "get their appointments as
01'I100YA on ago °floor condition than that of passing,
which, so severe is the training, only about one in
three does.

By the tripartite division which I suggest, I
think you would combine the three elements most
needed in organising an army—reward for service
performed in the field—reward for service not
military, or for military services rendered in former
wars, of which there is no more appropriate ac-
knowledgment than a commission granted to the
son or nearest relative of the person concerned ;
and, thirdly, the highest scientific education given
to a part of the officers.
It may be objected that the scheme I propose
tends to throw the army wholly or nearly into the
hands of the lower or middle class. I don't an-
swer this objection, as the Radicals do, by saying,
" That is exactly what we want." Ott the con-
trary, I should thinkit an evil. At the same
time, I must observe that, as matters now stand,
there is an undue pressure upon the Horse Guards
by Peers and leading landed gentry, which it is
well to put a stop to. The reason I take to be,
that among many persons there prevails a notion,
one abundantly foolish, that the Army and the
Church have some superiority in point of gentility
over other professions—always excepting the noble
profession of doing nothing. Consequently, if a
lad is bookishly inclined, he is set to teach
the theology of the Church of England : if he
shows a turn for hunting and mischief, the
county member is importuned to get his name put
down on Lord Hardinge's list. The navy, the
bar, medicine, literature, even the civil service, are
rarely thought of, unless, from the character or
circumstances of the applicant, the two favoured
occupations are out of the question. I do not ap-
prehend that the younger sons of our territorial
aristocracy, titled and untitled, will be any tho
worse for being scattered over a greater variety of
professions, instead of being almost exclusively
confined, by custom, to two. And so strong in
many aristocratic families is the love of sol-
diering, that I firmly believe many youths
who, being destined for the army, under the

/
' l'f
present system, learn nothing, because the,
t., dip,
not required to learn anything, would eleslfik
go throughasearching and long discipline, unnii
even the necessity of a good deal of prep
paration, with the prospect of ultimately l'Tro
military distinction. If I am right in tbmiki
I think I am, the benefit to them and tlgo
families will be incalculable ; for as 1,740
stand, the habits of indolence and over-inurrdo
which such an age as ours almost necessaril/M
duces in the wealthy, and in the children latii
wealthy, are far more democratic influences
oto
the growth of the manufacturing PevrerontiO,
sprea of education, such as it is, aut
00
peasantry. Anything that induces such
otiot
work, and to make their children work, is 'Lie/
a class benefit, but, considering the itarainn„o,4
which the upper classes retain over the DP- j.
the community, a national blessing also. isetllA
As to the purchase system, there are two tea it
of dealing with it. The cm., to buy up re 5,600
terests and prohibit purchase in all cases..
.'4lOl
more easily said than done. If an officer be ";011
to retire, and the next in succession be willingruseo,
him for retiring, one does not see how Gnveit 00
can interfere to prevent a bargain, of which
of 00
know nothing. I set aside the expinget. TO
process, though that would be very glover°,
next, and, I think, the sounder plan, is nett
the transaction altogether. The real iniuleboll
abuse of the purchase system is, that a L,, 00
buys his promotion over the head of a P7i, 000
This is disgraceful, and should be stopped • tlt
It is stopped in the Indian army, and by der
process. Government, lam told, does n°0•111
fere, but promotes the next in senioritii
i
reference to purchase. Consequently, nos bt
wishes to sell out, the money is found,
1001 A
• immediate junior, or, failing him, by the iiite
can afford it, but by the officers of
.110 by bi tfo
collectively, each of whom gains a st4posata
tirement. A fund is formed for the Y.-- y.
which each officer contributes out of ailehilsicl
contribution is not more than he can W laid
and he receives it back again on retirirlgi;oris..l
forms a kind of savings bank, an 81'404 ,171
economically beneficial to all who shirs.‘„;00:000
which does injustice to none. I alp iglu '/
regimental minutiae, but I see no reas°,:, gar-sf
same plan should not be adopted ill W;gt.lo 0
army. There may, however, be obi 3 olio
which I am unaware, and I suggest Toned
el 0
being prima facie fair and effective• oito
subject of purchase, however, is well,to to
consideration by a Parliamentary conton...not4 p
We want also a decoration for all Thsat'ool
given as a reward for special individual oteeS,,,b
seems to be the modern system to decersot•
armies, but I do not think well of it tool
man, whether private or officer, dies!. scrdof
credit for merely standing his ground
'-vpiror
and, as to seeing service, that is more* 04
good fortune and favour than of g 0
oir
duct. There should be at least t ds4
of such a decoration, for the mere course:oo;
born hope or a Balaklava charge, 0°4;0,10
lent thing in its way, cannot be placeuiej
with that union of firmness and skill, °be retie
well as physical superiority, which raalory 50
in the direction of a complicated ini" 01
tion. But I should value the decoratiotein tif f
a means of rewarding those who, °oasis "00
the interests of the public service, eau • ef
,
warded by promotion--as, for instance(' 0
who may have performed a special act .40°,0
but wit() can neither read nor write, anvil or
to learn. A medal and a money pren2l JO
proper remuneration in such cases , bems?
As regards the Staff I believe all "eti/
agreed. It ought to be a special bra y% tbsic.
vice, with certain assigned duties, whi°,arity,
cannot perform should not think Of en:011,00,
The present examinations for yeunte cl„il
into the army are a farce. The obJ7O evil
framers seems to have been the excltisr beyso
branch of knowledge which can nessitibe dy,
to the officer hereafter. For those Thlgarri
pass through the scientific training whisrdr,
mend, there should be a separate e$ b$ AP
too strict (for many a man can fir', 0;10
show others how to fight, who has
I',
book learning), but practical and 11---- 10'
far as it goes.
00,6,,ited
The only remaining topic—one allnoo,-•Y„
to touch—is that of a closer conne°;4lolo3
the Queen's and the E. I. Companf's,,,,ooo,lll
idea of an amalgamation between Te00.,,c1" CI
tamed by some. I should think it urs-te,," Pl.
were possible, but the difficulties see'- 7rstP"
as to put it out of the question' 0 • lani
requisite for an efficient CorePVo,
is that he should speak the i en° sie
guages (two at least) fluently, and fteinord
something of native habits. lam far be; hoof
that this is insisted on as it ought Wootics,
theory, at any rate, is good, and th..„"ng to
to correspond. Now it is clearly rur—,;,47,tel A
witu CU Ils .1. cti tail. omit,. b - axial cci"- r
cannot reasonably expeot • all
serving, to study Eastern ton„aties°nt„hroqj
culation of being at some future P',.,101
serve in Hindostan. But if you en34r,
officers in Europe, Queen's officers will
justly, that they have an equal an which' if
050
right to be emplOyed in the East,oorit,
officer/ ototto
of the necessary qualification, they tioetii
The armies must therefore remain dis, ei, f
—that is, the Sepoy force, for there 4'oo
why the Company's European trooPstiA oil
be merged in the Imperial army. ft 014
that this separation is inevitable, I u",,f $ 7.,,, ,
the case of commanders-in-chief, or -- 0.-r,
pointments in the- highest grade*,•Oit
power of holding personal converse 1/,11" la 4 d
though always desirable in a genslieediSoP
vital consequence, and may be 0141,00$ Ai
supreme necessity of putting the, tinset,
bear the heaviest responsibility. A 'tot':
tion between the two armies than,Lbiottile
have indicated does not appear priotn 001
There are other matters which °lilt... stn etfi
but in so rough a sketch as this I ands. .
beyond laying down a few broad princiP •
_iv
all, none of these reforms, deePlif tialr, '
as they are, press so much in point °t •,, c
,A 1
make it worth while to carry thera ,r's tiolooosl
by carrying them out in haste. °o". Ili
war, the system is everything ; in 6 it) P., ITS
thing wanted is to put the right Wall Oa 09
place. This I believe Lord Ellenl.oo'..lo
fhe ri
do •, and, therefore, not overlooking --,bselv
Indian administration, but regarding 't/igev
comparatively immaterial at a m 0131610 ill ci• ,
sent, I most earnestly desire to see ' ai
of the war. t 0 OLs0Ls
The changes which I suggest in i s 0010
ganisation are large, no doubt—path Pt, .1 „0 0
can yet be carried through Parliataen_seen; 4
such a pedant as to standout for it all, u efni 015
have many adverse influences to acetitstsir
be °Li r' A
must take what we can get, and ait he& °Si!'
doing the best in our power, even," "t,,0l
which theoretically we think the '7"00_,00"d•
poi
hope is, that the Conservative partl'iliseili rot
they are on this question, and at:Wavle/ J
may well be by the attitude of the Pe;;;04000,
ceive that their true wisdom lies 0.°11,,, AO '
but reform. If they neglect the t?r, 00:46.
thine'
know not what may follo're—mo-rseets (17 I
that moderate and practical ratan° oiler it
i
see, and probably much that 10,10 1.,,1i
_i itt
cate. The nation, at least l' jog: pc' ty
part of it, is willing to reak°,o a' ",belt, i l
antes. They know that we Eng`‘ Ft "as P-4
the habit of making changes, e/Tsesand .-
Pa
0
practical necessity of the moment Lied ,0 P
they know that the army has reoP:,,,is,; 'SO
years of peace, ufialtered'in the,.„‘•";t, rdefrier
its organisation ; and they knoW the el.,er
~f 64 01!
least of its shortcomings, the ecostn'it, P",elr'on'
and the curtailed votes of Parliealie tot foot ibe
amble. It is not likely, therefort,olool,4o
feeling of disappointment, excited v•itotai'l), If
ure has cooled down (and as acctiof tsdiet/10039,
Crimea improve, it will lessen evdoseu-000.00,
will be shown much inclination t, 00 c°ooP,sta
tion. for the past. In truth, the lgt. the or 0
in b°
I do not now speak of blundersi oreaaebi .-iss•
the campaign, but of the gene° rtiestaielooo
the army—are shared by all Pesry A p°,
branches of the Legislature, bf.etritself• ,„„ int or
tion, and by the general public
sore be At to 0
will be accomplished if a new el atil' tb.t.er
serf useitt ts
rated for the future ; and if Can
..,,,,, otn ifith.dir
derstand, in this case as ill S"': terlt OPP
0
reforming policy is neither ineOrigt'i: sir o'l
principles, nor incompatible with fro.
rests.—l remain, &c., " ri° a'
A LIBERAL
_....„
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Pt—
LIVERPOOL STEJ,- 1 11' r
----4.-------- 0 friFisti'ii3g,
The Steeplechases are postponed till coo
01
2d, and, in the event of the frost 0
ther postponed until the 7th. ifea
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THE CAMP ROAD FROM BAT"'''.ll,(vieo • no .
to understand that although the al; 6th to rand co'
at Baiaklava on the 29th ult., bY , the tend to be
made no less than three miles 0' ,pecte sl'
tr
PI e 0
The entire railway to the caatn vras e- the t 0 ht
pleted in six weeks.
.4 p r to in %901.13 All
is 0.0,. A ii, ye_
~,,s ,1..
The demand for money
leas dent Wl° col Its
change at from 3 to 3i per cent' °II vial'd W•
b tril:l'
cities. Out of deorS there is been
is , ~g 0 t
have been expected during a Per_ been eoister 4000
from Australia and elsewhere ban, the 21°-' 01101 '
By an edict of M. de West 1
Pbafeter beteCa.
Interior, the 'London Punch, a ,r,?..
confiscated, is forbidden to elroulati Pa

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buy up T
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lividual inifil
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