The Sun.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

THE STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. -
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said that her Majesty's
Government had proposed an adjournment of somewhat un-
usual length after a sitting during which a very small amount
of public business had been transacted, and be was afraid
that at the end of the session their lordships would be de-
tained for an additional week. He thought at the present
moment that it might not be- inconvenient to look back a
little, to look at the present position of the country, and also
to loolea little forward. (Hear.) It so happened that we
were now exactly at the termination of the first year of the
war, and he wished their lordships to consider the position in
which the country stood at the beginning of the war, and
what had been done. At the beginning of the war the coun-
try had a very strong Government, and a very fine army. At
present it had only half that-army, and had lost half the Go-
vernment. He was not sure, however, that some persons did
not think that although the Government had been deprived of
half its members it might not have increased in strength. (A
laugh.) This, at least, was certain, that, whatever might have
been its increased strength in the Cabinet, in Parliament it was
materially diminished, and, instead of having a very strong
Government to carry on the war, the country had now a very
weak Government. At the commencement of the war there
was a confiding Parliament and an enthusiastic people. "Now
there was an inquiring people and a discontented House of
Commons. (Hear, hear.) What had been done ? We occu-
pied, by means of our Allies, the Turks, Enpatoria. In con-
junction with our Allies, the French, we had occupied for
six months 25 square miles of territory in front of Sebasto-
pol. From that position our troops could neither advance
nor retreat. Our officers and 'soldiers had maintained their
accustomed reputation ; but, although they had done so, it
was impossible to conceal the fact that the reputation of this
country as a military power had been very seriously impaired.
(Hear, hear.) The last men in the country to believe in the
reality of war were her Majesty's Ministers. In consequence
of that due preparations were not made.- Their eyes were at
last opened, and with the best possible intentions, but know-
ing nothing of the duty they had to perform, they did every-
thing too late, and nothing well. (Hear.) In order to perform
great services to the State an army should Ibe numerically
equal to the work imposed upon it—it should be well orga-
nised, well equipped, and well commanded. It was still
more essential to Military operations that that army should
be well placed. If the army were thrown into a false posi-
tion, it was impossible to obtain adequate success. Now the
condition of the expedition sent to Sebastopol was that it
was without an adequate force of cavalry, and without any
moans of movement, From the inadequaey of cavalry the
victory at Alma could not be improved. From the absence
of cavalry when Prince Menschikaff's forces Were divided; it
was impossible to take advantage of that separation. But
Mere was a yet more fatal want—the want of conveyance.
Within sevee miles of the sea our army had been exposed to
an extent of distress unknown since the retreat of the French
troops from Russia, and equally destructive perhaps of our force.
What had the GovernMent'attempted to do ? From a desire to
do everything as economically, and as delicately and conside-
rately as possible to carry on the war, they had attempted to
raise the militia without ballot and without any substitute
whatever of a coercive character for the ballot. They hid
attempted to carry on the war, as regarded the navy, with-
out bounty and without impressment. They had endeavoured
to carry on the war without a reserve at home, and a cam-
paign without animals. (Hear, hear.) At the end of the
Peninsular war our army could go anywhere and do anything.
At present our army could g 6 nowhere and do nothing but
defend its lines in any part where they might be attacked.
What had been the effect on the navy of the determination
to carry on the war with no other resources than such as
could be obtained by ordinary means, without resorting to
impressment-or giving a bounty ? He rejoiced to see that
the number of seamen and marines voted last year had been
completed, and he believed that in the present year the num-
ber voted might be obtained by the ordinary means, and
that in all probability in successive years a force of 6,000 or
7,000 men would be obtained in the usual manner, and added
to our naval strength. But the - amount of force which we
should have at the conclusion of the present year did not ex-
ceed one-half of the force which we obtained during the last
war. To those who were now sending a magnificent fleet to
the Baltic he must be permitted to say that that fleet was
not of sufficient strength. He understood that 20 sail of the
Pule, all steam-ships, were to be employed on that service;
with a proportionate number of smaller vessels. If we had
any great reason to expect that that force would be increased
as it was during a portion,of the last year, by a force of six or
seven sail of the lino belonging to France, he should con-
sider it sufficient at an early period of the campaign ;
but last year twa or three mouths elapsed before
the French ships joined our fleet, and they left the
Baltic six weeks or two months before our vessels.
Lo king at the great demand for transports for the French
service, he did not anticipate that more than one vessel be-
longing to France would join our fleet in the Baltic during
the present season.
Earl GRAN VILLE—Not more than one ?
_ _ _

The Earl of ELLENl3olloU6l—Tioit;re than one. It
was of such vital importance to maintain our superiority in
the Baltic that we ought not to run the smallest risk, and we
ought to have a force of oar own on which we could entirely
depend under all circumstances. No doubt, the force about
to be sent out was a most powerful one, and it might do great
things against an enemy ; but the force of that enemy con-
sisted of 30 sail of the line, and there was every reason to
• suppose that several screw vessels had been added to that
force during the winter. However he might rely upon the
strength of the British ships, the gallantry with which they
would be fought, and the ability of the officers in command,
_ he did not think wo should be justified in fighting any doubt-
ful battle, or any battle in which we might not expect to
achieve a decisive victory. He, therefore, did -not think. it
safe to trust the interests of the country to a fleet of the ex-
tent intended to be sent out. Many naval officers capable of
forming a correct judgment were of 'opinion that our fleet
should consist, not of 20 but of 25 sail of the line, and that
we ought to have a reserve of 5 sail of the line at Portsmouth,
and 5 sail of the line at Plymouth. He was unwilling to
allude more particularly to the point, but felt confident
that, if we desired to carry on this war undisturbed by any
diversion, we must be strong everywhere, and prove that
,it would not be safe to provoke our hostility. (Hear.) The
Government had no reserve at home. At the very end of
the last war, we had 60,000 regulars and 60,000 militia
in this country. What was our force now / Wo had none:,
If from any accident of war or weather our fleet should be '
• destroyed in the Baltic, there was nothing sufficient in this
eeenuntry to give protection to our coasts. Now could any
e, looking at the present strength of the army, at
our
militia, at the progress of enlistment expect the country in
the prtseznnto,„o,iihtbr
3srgoaleffrollowing, years to maintain in
the field
ective men ? If we could do no
more than that, we could do just twice as much as the little
state of Sardinia. This ought to be a matter of serious reflec-
-tion to Parliament and the Government, and the more so be-
cause it wasaizioassnaiblme..to. dryisperoijinao discriminate the consideration of
sae'rlo That to thelpeid t
n--
lac cc te
noor Turkey,
doubt tlesteruet Theihai ttay3.t,
. our actual ii
were 110::inr0111. the. consideration
of those ne,ociatio.4 whichliita
we shckad. soon learn the result.Pl°g progress
attheNiTii•eliolnrda,-
' and of which
pii
ciapineZtifeoc.:
. ships consider what was tia,,c
Turksprenyt to wadre—cltailree
occupation
thoisf countrythe
he?llB..„eM
' principalities were evacuated
Tin eie
between Austria and Turkey.
could. obtain bY treaty every :at this Moment we
which treaty. could g
palities. • There was aivseliagalalenst doubtthe
tteactliwPaetuel'enolaf ?rliobetalinri Litt
b
security of treaties for the free navigation of the Daim e. . . •es
of the Porte with_
out could likewise obtain all the security treaties could give
'for the protection of the Greek subjects
only
out the intervention of Russia. Not .
ould have been ob-
tained be .obtained now, but they c y could thess
tained at an period. We,
We sent an
. earlier therefore, could at once
obtain all for which we originally made war..
As soon as
' army to Varna to givo tho hand to Austria.
Austria was prepare% to rest uron our hand, we withdrew,
and sent our troops to -.Sebastopol. Could any one reason-
ably doubt what. the consequences of such a proceeding_ .
would be, and that Austria would act with extreme caution 1
Austria was in a position of • the 'greatest danger when our
army was sent to SAastopol. But the sending of that army
'to Sebastopol created a new element of difficulty. It intro-
duced the question of Military honour, which was infinitely
more difficult to deal with than any question of commerce. 1
If ho were not mistaken the main practical difficulty was one
of military honour. But our demands went further. We said
-wei, Would :hare some security against the preponderance of
Ans Ola inille Black Sea. That was altogether a new de-,
Aland and ono "which did not, ariso out of the first cimmn-1