The National Register.
London, England, 1813-07-25 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER.

JULY 25.

'kande:Al a battery manned by seamen, kept up a well-directed and
heavy fire. The importance of this acqui,ttion, and toe I.,pini:y with
which the fort has beet taken, make it quite untiecelisary fur me to say
how much I approve the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, and of
Cayain Adam.
[Here lo!lows a dispatch froa, Lieut.-C(4. Prevost, detailing the par-
ticulars of his attack I:11 Fort Si. Philippe, to tile Cul de r, and
i:!th is to the •ame cilcct as Ihe account given by Capt. Adam', of the
ii.vinciblel inserted in 1a t week's piper.)

Alajeat3's Ship Malta, June 1.1, 1813.
My Lord,--Admiral Hallowell has jti,t decided on sending a stiip
to Aticant, and I have mutely time to state to your Lordship. and I
du so w ith great regret, that I have been under. the necessity of
raising the siege of Tarragona, and embarking the army under my
command. In my private letter of the 7th instant I mentioned to
_cone Lolalship, the reports of the as-semblage of tat: French foret s
at Bat Mona, and tle:t Marshal Sachet was likewise iu march from
'Valeecia ; and stated it as my opinion, that should these reports be
configured, the ohject your Lordship had in view raatid not be
areomptslted. Uafortunately tla•ae rumeurs proved tree, and re-
luctantly I resolved upon raising the sit:4;e anti emaarking the army,
us the only ItiCani of avoiding a general action. which MIISt have
hd 4,11 10tIV,111 eve:), disadvantage. I cannot as this tnonwat
refer to dates, but it is sufficient for she present to atate, that the
teach force at Baree!ona was TIVYPi rated to meat less than awl°, ,:ald
that preyions to their march it would amount to 10,000, with 14
P..ces of artidery. 1 have however no account that it ever exceeded
eight; and that is the ntenber on which my calculation tc.ita formed.
thi!, trace, upon the evenina• of the 9th, or morning of the 10th,
etarchtal out from Barcelona, and entered the Vil!a Franca, at tour
o'clock in the evening of the 1 i th, from whence it was reparied to
we to march at twelve o'clock at night from Vendrells, distant only lb
nr 0 miles from Tarragona by the great road, and a tew neles
farther by another road, by which eamant can easily pass. On the
9th of loth the arrival of Sachet at Valencia was made known to
rite ; his exact force was never pet fectly ascertained, bet from the
jutelligenee received fem Valencia, he maiched front thence with
0000 men, and certainly in the rear of that place had the pottier of
thawing grout reinfereentents to his army.
To these corps mint be added' a body of 1009 men, which had
pre vioualy .arrived *at Tortosa, and another corps, milt pendent of the
garrisoe, of 2,a00 men, who had arrived at Lerida. 'these corps,
which lam sure I do-not exaggerate, amount to 20.500 men, with •
which in four or five days, Marshal Sachet could attack the allied
army, if he thought proper ; or avoid an action, Wile wished still
11W0!C to reinforce his army. Yonr Lordship, en rite other !,suet,
will observe, that I could 'scarcely bring into tile field 142,000 men,
and that the army of Cataleriia war stated to me at e,500, making
twenty thousand five hundred of which two British and two.„tipaiiisi:
divisions were at tlu Col de Balaguer, and could not be witildraw tt ;
and I coeld not leave less than two thousand tivelonetred to cover
the artillery and stores, and to contaia the garrison of Tarrioanai,.
The two corps, at the least, would amount to upwards Of 4,31.)
men, leaving me 15,000 men to meet the best Fretted troops
Spain, amounting to upwards of 20,(4)0.
lam sure there is nobrOly more willirg to give foil credit to
Vie gallantry of the Spanish troops titan I am, but your Lordship
well knows that they are unable to move, and I could not therefare -
depend upon the excention of any order widen eetessardy oniiatal
them to make a movement ; and troops of this &set ir Km 1 Small
about 13,000 men*: unless, therefore, I could pl.:ee them in positio.,
which, as the French had the option of fightstal when atici vAtere
tiro y pleased, it was impossible I could place a,ry rt•;ia ice 11:1011
them. My British and German troops anuainied to 450 d. Peril ;Ts
3-our Lordship ma be of opinion, that under thew ClrellinqU!iec:•,
(eight to have risked an action, bad no other unfavottralhe objectians
existed ; but when
.your Lordship is informed, that I had no
possibility of retreat, it unsueressful,---:that theta wtit,td hAvel:ee‘t
lee hopes of embarkation, iffoilhwed,;---ited that the tatey neva
have been unavoidably lost, if beat,--I venture to Italy Witt N-I)ia
Lardship will think however it is to be regretted, that I itavt
adopted the only means of maintaininz entire,. or indeed of savhig,
an army on which so much depends. Lfeel the greater contideace
in this hope; on reverting to the I:3th paragraph ef your Lordship's
general instructions for the conduct of the cantpaiioa
I am fully aware there are many eiremustancea Winch may retire
farther information, and upon all parts I shall uc lrappy to give'every
explanatton in my rower. Your Lordship perhapa may nrut opinion
that the place should have been taLen; but as it was far too sta.:nil:o
titorm, I believe it not only to have been impossible, but that ave should
not have taken it in eight or ten days : my only regret is, that I

47'

continued the siege so long. Induced by the hopes of the reinforce-
ments-I expected, I continued it to the last moment, and fort*.
natt ly the weather proving favoniable, the troops %vete unbal'i,ed
.ith,.nt molestation. On this favourable
.cireninstaiice I could not
depenil for another, day, and therefore, having taken my part; I ini-
inediately•put in execution, and 1 regret to say, that I was, in con-
sequence,. obliged to leave the guns in the most advanced hatteries.
Had I remained another day, they might have been brought off
Out this risk I would not ruir, when the existence ot the- army was at
stake, not only from unfavourable weather, but from the appearance
or an enemy, in whose presence l could not have embarked perhaps
at ;11, (*viand)/ not without stitioing a great 10544 and without tho
possibility of deriving. any alvantage.
I have only further at this time to add, should blame be attached to
the failure of the expedition, no share can fall on Admiral Hallowell,
who conducted the naval branch of it. From that distingnHied
officer I have met with every assistance and co-operation in his
power; and I think it only justice to him to state, that It was t.is
opinion tln. cannon in the batteries might have been saved by
remaining till the night, and that they then could have been brought:
on. however, was a risk t did not wish to rim for so trifling
an object, and preferred losing them to the chance ofthe eiulturk atiou.
ioiag opposed, and of an eventual much more serious loss.
I have the honour to lie, tke..
(Signed) J. iNILTURAY Lieut.-Gen.•
To the Marques ot Wellington, K. G. Sc.
•

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