The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-23 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVEN

LITERATURE.

institutes which shall be both true and reasoned,
and he does not regard success as impossible.
Having exhibited thus far the general views
of the writer, we may Row state that in the
scheme or institute submitted in this volume to
the public these views are endeavoured to be car-
ried into effect, and while far from disclaiming its
pretensions to being both true and reasoned, the
author rests its claims to consideration rather on
its being a system of demonstration than a system
of truth. He then proceeds to state that his sys-
tem will be found of a very polemical character,
the reason of which is a philosophy only exists to
correct the inailvertencies of man's ordinary think-
ing. This system, antagonistic to natural think-
ing, is also, he alleges, antagonistic to psycholo-
gical doctrine, which he broadly affirms does all in
her power to ratify rather than correct the inad-
Tertencies of ordinary thought. What philosophy
has to do is negatively to correct these inadver-
tencies and to refute psychology, and positively to
establish truth in their place. This being the
work of the philosopher, how does the author of
the " Institute set about it ? He lays down ne-
cessary truths and laws in distinct propositions,
facing each iu a counter proposition the contra-
dictory inadvertency of ordinary opinion, and
plays them off against each other in order to elicit
and establish truths. The propositions and their
demonstrations constitute the text or staple of the
book, and are the " Institute of Metaphysics."
Each proposition is followed by a series of obser-
vations and explanations, in many of which we are
shown the points where the lesser controversies of
philosophy deviate from the main stem. The
" Institute" is divided into three main sections :
—the epistomology, or theory of knowing ; the
agniocology, or theory of ignorance ; and the
ontology,
.or theory of being. On the matter of
these sections we have, neither time nor space to
comment. We can only submit the following
statement and notice of the doctrine of "innate
ideas." " Rightly understood the doctrine of
innate ideas is merely another form of expression
for the initial principle of these Institutes. From
an accurate observation of the fact in regard to
knowledge, we learn that every cognition, or per-
ception, or idea, consists, and must consist, of two
heterogeneous parts, elements, or factors, one of
which is contributed from within, belongs to the
mind itself, and hence is said to be innate; the
other of which is contributed from without, and
hence may be said to be extranate, if such a word
may be coined, or of foreign extraction. . .
above all others to be
attended The circumstance,
to
n comingth e
tno,
a right comprehension of
the theory is, that the word innate is never to
be understood in reference to ideas, but only is
reference to a part of every idea, and that neither
is the word foreign, or acquired, or extraneous,
ever to be understood iu reference to ideas, but
only in reference to a part of every idea. There
are thus no innate ideas and no extranate ideas,
but every idea of cognition has an element which
is innate and an element which is not so ; every
cognition, in short, is both innate and extranate—
an d priori and an
consideration, of course,
fixes
extranate—
is
sossytthne
retishoeersii s
p elementsac
rotn. s ti
This
de
cno bynsi
considered
apart from
each other) as necessarily unknowable and contra-
dictory." Mr. Ferrier, who, by the way, is severe
on Reid, is Professor of Moral Philosophy and
Political Economy, St. Andrews.