The National Register.
London, England, 1821-10-15 00:00:00

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•

THE TIONANAT. REGISTER

" VOYAGE D.INS LA GRAND'S DRETAGNE."
Under the above title, M. Dupin has published
the observations lie made on a recent Tour through
this kingdom—they bespeak a degree of candour and
impartiality, perhaps, as rarely met with in the
English historian of France, as in the French his-
torian of England. The following extract we hope
will prevent the future idiom of any of the OLD
WOMEN Of England on the score of invasion ; an
alarm which for ages past it has buen the trick Of
government to create whenever more than usual
pressure was intended to be placed on the back of
poor JOHNNY BULL.
" At this epoch Great Britain had, besides the regular army,
COO,OOO militia, infantry, and cavalry, in arms, all the seamen
of the merchant service enrolled for the gun-butts, and the in.
habitants of the coasts embodied in corps, called sea fencibles.
It remained to be seen whether this force was capable of with.
sho
ck of the alloy of Boulogne, Pad that army
crossed the Channel.
" When the First Consul threatened England with an invasion,
he did not appear inclined to attempt it with ships of the line ;
he caused gun bents to be built in all the ports and in all the
rivers on the Atlantic coast, and collected them to the number of
1,300 in the port of Boulogne. Troops to the amount of 100,000
r: ere to be embarked on board of these gun boats and transports.
In the case of a successful descent, immense reinforcements were
to follow. They were to force a landing on the opposite coast,
cud proceed direct to London, not, as was supposed might be
done in the time of Lloyd by advancing only two miles a day in
consequence of the difficulties of the ground and the embarrass-
mentof baggage, but by forced marches, carrying every position
by the bayonet or field artillery. After their landing, nothing
would in the first instance have arrested the progress of the con-
querors of Lodi, of Zurich, of Heliopolis, of Hohenlinden, and
of Marengo.
" But was the descent possible ? It was not possible to enter
Dover by force. That port is situated between twn high moun-
tains, in a position in which its lofty batteries and works, safe
from any coup do main, would easily destroy the most formidable
fleet. There was besides on the heights of Dover an entrenched
camp, occupied by a considerable force, which would have de-
fended the coast under the protection of the forts and batteries.
" On the other hand, how were 1,300 vessels to get out of Bou-
logne in one tide, and to stand over in any thing like order to the
English coast ? This could never be done under the fire of the
English squadron cruising in the Channel.
" But that squadron might be driven or its station by& gale
of wind; and before it could have time to return, the French
flotilla might CMS& Be it sin But let us see what would follow.
" The English had lined their mast with strong batteries on
every point where a landing could be attempted Strong towers
were built at short distances along the snore, which was com-
pletely within the range of their guns ; thftielnirteue towers
could not be taken by a coup de main, Brigades.' light ar-
tillery, corps of cavalry, flying camps of infimnrp, resented a
force moveable along the whole of the ses cairn by a reed ex-
' pressly made for that purpose. The English Ire beside** great
number of gun boats in all the ports opposite Boolope. All
small craft, all pilot and f,shing boats, Abe. weir leepted for
warfare if necessary. They were numbered end elegised in divi.
stone, with officers ready to direct, and troops to man them.—
The guns and ammunition were so disposed in the magazines that
these vessels could be armed in a moment. Finally, besides the
squadron stationed off Boulogne, there was a fleet of observation
in the Downs, another at Spithead, and a third at the Nore. In
a few minutes the telegrarhic signals could communicate between
all these points and the Admiralty in London,
" Titus, whichever way the wind might blow, it was probable
that the English would arrive at the point of descent, if not in
time to prevent a landing, at least soon enough to burn our flo-
tilla. ' In that case our army
.would have been left without a re •
trait, without support, and without provisions.
" That it would have performed prodigies lam sensible. It
would not have been less magnanimous than the army of the
eist, after the naval battle of Aboukir. But those opposed to it
were not Turks and Arabs. It would have to contend against a
people of pindlgious obstinacy—against a million of men in
arms, animated by the enthusiasm of patriotism, and incited by
the most implacable hatred of the French name.
" 1 have impartially stated our means of attack, and the
English means of defence.
" I ant aid of opinion that it was impossible to effect a descent
without the protection of a fleet equal to that which we then pos-
sessed, and which was defeated in the battle of Trafalgar : hut it
was necessary that this fleet should lint have possession of the
Channel, and the Captains who commanded it. in consequence of
the inexperience of many. ann the indecision of others (though
there were honourable exceptions), were such as to render a vic-
tory impossible. As to success after the landing, I leave it to
eminent military commandera to determine by their skill and
experience the chances of victory and defeat. I confine myself
to a statistical view of the military said naval force of Great
Britain.
" Instead of attacking the British empire in its centre, it
would have been mote advantageous to land in Ireland. But it
would have been necessary to have made this attempt with a great
expedition. Had Gen. Buona lute, instead of conquering Egypt,
proceeded with his army of Italy to Ireland, that country would
certainly have been lost to England, and Blida!' power would
have sustained an irreparable blow. By landing in the Bay of
Galway, to proceed afterwards along the banks of the Sharman,
a fine position would have been occupied. Ireland must have
been thrown into insurrection, the natives armed and organized
in.corps, and the English driven out of that island. We fomented
the revolt of the Isiah by sending them trifling succours. They
were the victims of their confidence, mid frightful massacres fol-
l Owed the insurrection.
" At the time when our continental army had completed its
glory by the campaign and victory of Austerlitz, England, by
destroying the combined naval trace of France and Spain, off
Cape Tratalgar, secured a long duration to her menu= pre-
ponderance. Being relieved from all fear of invasion, she aban-
doned the defensive system, and gradually adventured an
offensive war. She failed in her first attempt against Spain,
under General Moore; and against Belgium, under Chatham.
Instructed by these reverses, Idle learned to connect more perfectly
her military and naval opetations; to employ more abundance
and fitness in her meant, more prudence in her plans, and more
vigour in the execution. The army which the naval force at
Corunna saved front destruction was 11000 after brought back by
that same force to the Peninsula, where, supplied and supported
by the navy, it balanced during five years the success of the
French troops in Portugal and Spain, which countries became the
tomb of the armies of Austerlitz and dens."