The National Register.
London, England, 1808-06-13 00:00:00

JUNE 13.

riled interest, we are sure that our Readers will rejoice in re-
ceiving an account of it; and we therefore subjoin an anal)sii
of the principal reasonings, together with inch observations as
it may seem necessary for us to add, in our capacity of Re-
viewers.
There are in this kingdom a great number of persona, who
deem our naval superiority to he so infallible a safeguard, as to
Mace us beyond the necessity of any military provision at home.
Lord Selkirk argues most forcibly against such a bvpothesis
and he cites the authorities of Lord Nelson and Sir Sydney
Smith. It is indeed perfectly true that invasion has often been
threatened, and never seriously attempted, and we are :tinting
the number of those who think invasion an event by no means
probable; but we do not go the length of declaring that we
think it by any means impossible. A successful invasion of
England would not be at all more extraordinary than many other
of the great political events which the last few years have set
before our eyes. Four years ago, invasion was less probable
than it is now : for at that time Bonaparte must have risked
both his power and his personal safety on the success of the en-
terprize : now his situation is such. that neither of these two
great objects will be staked, and neither, of course, will surer
by a failure. We are opposed against an enemy, who not only
bears to us a hatred the most rancorous and implacable, but
pthsesses a genius the most magnificent, a force the most formi-
dable, every advantage, in short, and every motive, that can
render hostility tremendous, and teach Great Britain the neces-
sity of exerting every muscle to its highest tension. No sacrifices
ill be deemed too great, if they can purchase our destruc-
tion : the lives of an hundred thousand men will he estimated as
an inconsiderable price : and to an enemy thus desperately de-•
termined, it is hut too probable that some opportunity must occur.
We are certainly inclined to place a strong reliance on the
maritime force of Great Britain : but we see the difficulties that
may fall in the way of our naval exertions. Not only may our
fleets, by contingencies of weather, be disabled from intercept-
ing the passage of the enemy, but it may by some unfortunate
accident occur, that bad judgment may prevent the proper ope-
rations of those fleets. English Admirals are not apt to neglect
or mistake their duty ; but instances of error have been known,
and when the misconduct of one man, the mismanagement of a
single day, may open our country to that foe who has already
overrun the Continent, we cannot think it unnecessary to pro-
vide ourselves against the consequences of invasion.
" Since then," says Lord Selkirk, " the obstacles to the pas-
" sage of the enemy are not physically insuperable, it is at least
" a possible supposition that they may succeed in landing an
" army of 100,000 men on the coast of Kent or Essex. It be-
t: comes us to consider coolly whether our means of defence are
" now sufficient to allurd a certainty or even a fair probability,
" that we may overcome such an invading force. No one I
" presume, will venture to assert, that our regular forces are
" adequate to the contest, even with the addition of the militia.
" (if the numerous army maintained by this kingdom a great
" part is detached into distant colonial stations, while those at
" home have so extensive a tract to guard, that there is much
"difficulty in collecting any considerable number in one place."
It would therefore, (as Lord Selkirk :votes at greater length
thin we can afford to do in our narrow limits) it would therefore
he probably the wish of our commanders to avoid a decisive ac-
tioa. But in a small country highly cultivated like England,
protracted warfare could not he as successful as it sometimes has
proved itself to he in an extensive territory thinly inhabited,
mid full of forests, morasses, or mountains: so that our army
would most likely be unable to avoid an engagement for any very
lonx while. The regular force being thus insufficient, we must
rest uur hopes on the support that our army may obtain, from
the vo!untary zeal of the nation at large. We are willing to
lime that the nation at large are not yet convinced by tbeirde-
magogues, that they have nothing to fight for. He then argues
• thus:—
" In the history of the most courageous nations in the world,
" instances are recorded of the erects of panic; and what is
" su likely to produce a sensation of this nature, as a state of
so unusual; one which the people are not prepared
to meet, one which of late years they have even been sedulous-
"ly taught to believe remote from all prohabilitv ? if the
" Struggle were to be of long duration, the inherent spirit of the
" nation might overcome every disadvantage; Britain has had
" her Allred and her Wallace. : and such would yet again ap-
:: pear, if the circumstances of our times were similar; but we
Dave not now to expect a protracted struggle. We have an
antagonist rapid and decisive in his movements, vigilant to pre'
Serve every advantage yy Web he gains; mad Wore the nation