The Sun.
London, England, 1855-08-04 00:00:00

THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.

In rising to call the attention of the house to the subject
of the conferences„
Mr. LAING stated that he had only brought forward
this question under the strongest sense of duty. The de-
-cision come to by the Government in regard to the non-
acceptance of the Austrian propositions for peace was one
of the most important that had ever been come to, and
yet, although it had been taken against the unanimous
opinion of the five plenipotentiaries who represented the
Allied powers at those conferences, and although the war
had now entered upon quite a new phase, and had entirely
changed its relation to the public opinion of Europe, no dis-
cussion had taken place with respect to the policy pursued
by the Government since the papers which afforded the
necessary information had been laid before the house. The
only discussion that had taken place with respect to the
policy pursued by the Government was on the motion of
the right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks. But that
discussion was conducted, not only in a state of igno-
rance, but, what was worse, in a state of misinformation on
the part of the house as to what had really taken place at
the Vienna conferences. It was then supposed that the
conferences had been broken up, because Russia had re-
f used to entertain the proposition of the allies for a limita-
tion of her power, and had proposed entirely unacceptable
terms of peace, so that there was no hope of a satisfactory
conclusion. And when it was subsequently rumoured that
Austria had made propositions of peace, it was supposed
that these were only the Russian proposals for peace
slightly disguised ; while the rumour by which it was ac-
companied, that there were dissensions in the Cabinet on
the subject, was not credited. It was in this state of
things that the right bon. gentleman the member for
Bucks brought forward his motion, previous to which there
was that meeting of the supporters of the Government in
Downing-street which had been so frequentlo adverted to.
Now, it was generally supposed that meetings of that kind
were of a confidential character, where the communi-
cations of the Minister were more open than in that house;
but he would appeal to honourable members whether
either then or in the discussion which subsequently took
place the whole truth was told by the Government? He
considered that there was a suppressio yeti closely approach.
ing a suggestio falai. The motion of the right hon. gentle-
man was discussed on an entire misapprehension of the
real state of things. It never entered the head of any one
on,that side of the house to suppose that a proposition had
been male by Austria, which the noble lord the member
for the city of London considered perfectly satisfactory,
and that there was a division in the Cabinet on the subject.
The subsequent discussion which took place, on the motion
of the member for Sheffield turned entirely on the conduct
of the noble lord the member for London, and that on the
motion of the hon. member for Sheffield upon the comities
of the war, so that he was perfectly justified in saying
that there had as yet been no discussion on the question
whether the Austrian proposals afforded a basis for mak-
ing peace. He brought forward this question now on ac-
count of what he knew with respect to the public opinion
of Europe. Firmly connected with industrial undertak-
ings, he was able to ascertain the opinions not so much of
professed politicians as of merchants, bankers, financiers,
and manufacturers, who constituted the independent pub-
lic opinion of Europe to a great extent on this subject. At
first the public opinion of this class of persons was, with
few exceptions, in favour of the course adopted by the
Western Powers in resisting the aggressions of Russia, but
he believed their opinion was now opposed to the course
taken in not making peace on the terms suggested at
Vienna. They said that when men of the eminence of the
noble lord the member for the city of London and M.
Dronyn de PHuys were sent to Vienna, the proceedings as-
sumed more the character of a submission to arbitration than
of an ordinary diplomatic congress; that we were now fight-
ing against the award of our dwn arbitrators ; and that,
unless the Austrian proposals contained the basis of a satis-
factory solution, it was incredible that the noble lord the
member for the city of London and M. Drouyn de l'Huys,
going to Vienna with opposite propositions, should have ar-
rived at the opinions they did, and in which they were sup-
ported by the Turkish Plenipotentiary—the representative
of the Power most immediately concerned. An examina-
tion of the papers recently submitted to Parliament had
led him (Mr. Laing) to a similar conclusion. In expressing
the opinion, however, that we had committed a great error
in not making peace at Vienna on the terms of the Aus-
trian proposals, he must express his entire dissent from the
principles of what were known as the peace party. He
believed that this war was just, necessary, and inevitable,
and that peace ought not to be made until the rational ob-
jects of the war were attained. But he believed that the
rational objects of the war had been attained, and 'that in
now prosecuting the war further we had not only com-
mitted a mistake, but a crime. The objects of the war
were very simple, and could not be better described than
they were in the circular despatch of Count Buol, theAus
trian Minister. He said, " The object of the war is to
limit the political power of Russia to such a point is to
render the abase of its material resources if not impossible,
at least in the highest degree difficult." He believed in other
words that the general object of the war was to maintain
the general balance of power in Europe, an object not only
worthy of this ceuntry, but one which we could not givuup
without diehononr and disgrace. In the proper sense of the
term there was no more legitimate or necessary object than
the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. He
believed that our modern civilisationrested on the factthat
we had a community of nations, each pursuing its own de-
velopment independent of the others, without allowing any
one to gain undue preponderance or to draw others into
their own system. If that system were subverted we should
fall into a state of society more like that which prevailed
under the Roman empire than anything which existed
in, modern Europe. He thought it was quite clear that
Russia had acquired a position in Europe which did
threaten the balance of power. But how did the danger
originate ? In the circumstances by which the German
powers, which were the natural rampart of Europe
against Russia, became subservient to that w p e And
what was the cause of that ? He believed it waso r.
the absurd
foreign policy by which we had alienated the
mischievously iwntne;ine'ev'cr-
tive Governments of Europe by
dling in their internal affairs, and by patting
on the back
the revolutionists, whom we never had any intentionof
assisting ; and that it was particularly by the course which
we pursued in 1848 that we had alienated the German
powers, had driven them into the arms of Russia, and 111e1
thus created the danger with which we were now called
upon td deal. He believed that an alliance between Eng-
land and Austria to resist Russia was one dictated by na-
ture and common sense, for England and Austria were both
essentially conservative and non-aggressive powers as re-
garded foreign policy. We brought the war upon us by
alienating the German powers, and the keystone of any
effectual system for resisting the aggressions of Russia,
and restoring the European equilibrium, must be a
hearty and cordial alliance between England and the
German states. But the more immediate and specific
danger arose from the position of Russia with regard to
Turkey. It was caused, in the first place, from the inter-
nal and, he was afraid, incurable weakness of Turkey, and
the existence of certain old treaties so ambiguous and ill
defined that Russia could carry on her aggressions to a con-
siderable extent without consulting any particular castes
belli on which the other powers of Europe could interfere.
The remedy proposed for that state of things by the first
statesmen of Europe was embodied in the propositions
termed the four points, which, in his opinion, contained a
fair and rational definition of what might be reasonably
asked from Russia, both as security for the future and as
punishment for the past. He believed that the moderation
of our demands received all bat universal approbation
throughout Europe. Russia at first refused to consider
the four points, but hardily a year elapsed before she was
obliged to concede their principle. A conference was then
opened at Vienna, and when three and a half out of the
four points had been settled, the negotiations were broken
off 'upon the mode provided for, carrying into effect the
wand half of the third point. Two propositions were
made by Russia—the first for the absolute opening, and the
second for the absolute closing of the Black Sea ; but both
were rejected at once by the allied powers as failing to
afford any satisfactory guarantee.
e At the last moment
Austria
proposed the plan of counterpoise, relaxing the
rule for the closing of the Straits in favour of the allies
under certain contingencies ; and, in addition, she agreed
to enter into a triple alliance with England and France for
the specific purpose of guaranteeing Turkey against any
aggression on the part of Russia. He believed that a bet-
ter security for the peace of Europe could not be obtained;
long for 00 --
K ail there was a triple alliance between z
Prance, and Austria, the general peace would not be dis-
.
turbed. (Hear, hear.) In that triple alliance Austria
offered to insert a secret clause, that if Russia should re-
ject' the proposition to be made to her, or, having accepted
it, should endeavour to evade its stipulations by increasing
her fleet to an unreasonable extent, Austria would con-
sider it as a callus belli. Now Russia either would or
would not have accepted the Austrian proposal. He
believed, from what he had heard both in England and
in other parts of Europe, that she would have accepted it '
in the end, and that, consequently; peace would have been
made. Assuming such to be the case, what he had to ask
was. whether the difference between what we demanded
at Vienna and what Russia would have accepted and we
might' have got was such as to justify the continuance of
the war, and all the sacrifices in men and money which it
involved? Practically, the negotiations were broken off on
the difference between limitation and counterpoise. Let
them consider what that difference was. The arguments
against counterpoise, and in favour of limitation, were that
the former wonlcrinvelve the country in a large additional
annual expenditure for keepiug up a fleet in the Black Sea,