The Sun.
London, England, 1855-02-19 00:00:00

been made by some of his colleagues, with an unstained per-
sonal and political honour. (Applause.) I trust, therefore,
that the negotiations conducted by him may not be unsuc-
cessful. If that is so, he will have earned the highest and the
most ennobling "of :Al 'human triumphs—that of restoring
European peace. (Hear, hear.) But there are some
persons who tell you (and this is an opinion; very popular
in this country) that if a peace could be made now, upon
whatever terms, it could be nothing more than a mere
truce. Well, there is something very plausible in that
saying. But I happen to have looked back to the debates,
to the discussions and to the opinions of men who lived
when the peaco of 1615 was concluded ; and the language of
the Whig party at that time, the language of the Liberals of
that day, was, that France would never submit to the humili-

tion of that peace, that that peace was a mere truce, that war
must break out again after a few years, and that the French
nation would never rest until its losses had been made good
and its military misfortunes repaired by another and more
successful contest. I have no doubt the gentlemen who held
that language in 1815 got great credit for their sagacity—pro-
phets of evil generally do. But the peace of 1815 has been
more than a mere truce.; it has lasted for eight-and-thirty
years ; it has jested until the two nations have come to
understand one another better; it has lasted until, when
again called forth to battle, they are found fighting side by
side, not as enemies, but as allies. (Loud applause.) Well,
then, I say I for one will never quarrel with an honourable
peace merely because not battles enough have been fought,
because not enough of blood has been shed, or because it
comes too soon. I say emphatically an honourable peace,
because I do not believe the people or the Government of
France or of England would accept any other. (Applause).
As to the terms which ought to be made, it is idle to mention
them now. We cannot decide what they shall be until
the progress of the war is seen ; until we know what
powers of resistance or of vitality Turkey herself can put
forth ; until we know whether we are to have Austria for
an ally, for a friend, as neutral or as hostile ; and, lastly—
for we are not fighting in this cause alone—we cannot tell
what terms of peace ought to be made until we know what
terms aro approved by our ally the Emperor of the French.
Thteohr
eet
hf
gooruseee,s
greattailotnh oot If geprhioilltaomar a ht
gth
ueh
easvtei
questiono bnes ewn hmoi
feuhcFhl
nai nlvace I: I 1.
ed to enter
ques-
tion of the Principalititu, ancl the queetinn of the ammeooea—tedi
think it is idle to discuss such topics now, whun we must
discuss them in a merely speculative manner. (Hear.) In a
word, what I say is this—l am for a vigorous and energetic
prosecution of the war, as leading to a speedy peace. (Cheers.)
I am for moderate terms of peace, as tending to put a speedier_
end to war. And I am the more inclined to hold both these
opinions because (we must look at it fairly, and we ought to
state it frankly) the resources of this country are inexhaustible.
There is scarcely any expense which we cannot afford to
incur ; there is scarcely any amount of military strength
which we cannot afford to put forth ; but, after all, we have
a debt which exceeds the debts of all other European Govern-
ments put ;together ; we have a debt which is felt at this
moment, and which, perhaps, will be felt still more, as a very
serious incumbrance upon our industry. We are daily forced
more and more into commercial competition with America
and with the continent ; and, though it is perfectly true that
the same weight of debt was borne 30 years ago, when our
population was smaller, and when our resources were much
less than at present, still there is one difference between the
circumstances of that time and the circumstances of our own
which ought not to be forgotten. Thirty years ago emigra-
tion was unknown—that is to say, it had not become the
habit or the custom of the people. Whatever, therefore,
might be the sufferings, and whatever the discontent
caused by the load of taxes then pressing upon the people,
no alternative was open to them except to remain. At
present it is different. Every day you see men who have
fair prospects before them at home emigrating on the
slightest possible inducement to America or to Australia. I
believe, that if you were to double—if you were very largely
and materially to increase your debt, so as to add perma-
nently some ten or twelve millions a year to the national
taxation, you would give an impulse to that movement of
emigration which would, to say the least of it, be highly dan-
gerous, and which might ultimately end in a depopulation of
the country. (Hear.) That is a question which we must look
at fairly, and which we cannot overlook in considering this
subject of the war. So, therefore, I am for a vigorous, for
an energetic, and, if it can be, for an irresistible display: of
military power ; and I am for such a display of power for this
reason, among others, that we cannot afford a long war.
(Applause,)i Now, gentlemen although I feel that I am oc-
cupying more of your time than I have any right to do —(No;
no, and cheers)—l should like to say a word upon the man-
ner in which the operations of this war have been conducted.
(Hear.) It is of no use to deny that which everybody knows.
Great errors have been committed, and great disasters have
ensued. The question is, what is the cause of those errors
and, of those disasters ? Who is in fault, and who is the party
responsible for them ? Three answers arc 'generally given to
that question. There are many who say— and I observe that
the newspapers aro taking up that cry—that there is some-
thing in our parliamentary gystem, something in our internal
administration, which is in fault. Others say that it is the
organisation of the army which is defective. And a third
class again, reply that it is not the fault of any system, but
simply of an individual minister. Now, I will, with your
permission, consider those various points; and I hope-you
will do me the justice to believe, that though they may be
somewhat delicate, I will attempt to discuss them without
any prejudice of party or class. (Applause.) The complaint
commonly made against our system of parliamentary g.vern-
ment is this that under it all power and authority are
monopolised in a few hands, and that talent, without
connection, dose not find proper scope. Now, the question
to ask ourselves is, whether that is true or no ? I, it the
fact, that in the present day and durinir the present cen-
tury high administrative offices have been usually filled by
incapable soon, having no merit except that of connection ?
Of course that is a very popular theory ; and it is easy to
understand why it should be a popular theory. In the first
place, it is taken up by those and by tho friends of those
who, having been, as I believe, in a great degree responsible
for the present disaster, are naturally anxious to screen them-
selves and their friends by throwing the blame upon that ab-
straction— a system. In the next place it is a popular theory
because it flatters every man who, having entered public life,
having somewhat overrated his own abilities, and having
failed accordingly, is very glad to lay the blame upon his
want of influence rather than upon his want of energy or
talent. (Applause.) But I am very much mistaken in those
whom I address here if you are likely to be led away by any
vague or unmeaning cry. (Hear, hear.) Take the facts as
they stand. Take - the House of Commons as it is actually
constituted ; take each party in the House of Commons, and
Consider who, in those parties, aro the leading men. I begin
with what is called the ultra-liberal party. I do not suppose
it will be said that Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright have made
their way by means of-connection, or from any cause except
that of their own ability ; and yet Mr. Cobden and Mr.
Bright, unpopular as their views are upon this question of
the war, have filled as large a place in the public eye as any
public men now living. Well, take next the party of the
present and the late Government. Of that Government, next
to its chief, no one would hesitate to say that iu the House of
Commons Mr. Gladstone is the leading member ; and you are
all aware of Mr. Gladstone's career ; you aro all aware that
his parliamentary success is due solely and entirely to his
own personal ability. I might go through a long list of
names—Mr. Cardwell, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Disraeli—it is in-
vidious to mention names; but I will undertake to say that
if any one takes the lists of the House of Commons as they are
at present constituted, he will find that a clear majority of
those who are or who have been in the highest offices, or who
have filled a large place in the public eye, are men who have
made their way, not through connection, not through family
influence, but simply by the exercise of their own faculties and
powers. (Hear.) Nay, I go further. I am not defending our
L Parliamentary system as by any means perfect. It has great
faults ; but its faults lie, I think, in the contrary direction to
that now urged. The fault of our Parliamentary system is
that it does injustice to men who, with considerable power of
labour and with considerable administrative talent, do not
in the Houseosirtetalent x oc
lfusCommons,
more
es
te m
possess the faculty of debate. If there is any class to which
it does injustice it is that class. It certainly,is the case that
valuedas;
ti
hntaheveryis itntends
mere power of public speaking, the mere facility of reply in
which oughtembl
(Hear, hear.) But that is not a fault on the side of an aris-
pop troopapu lef
araluryl tas
s
edrdwate
uhhspei hgo anhd
evpfa,
eancarytnl dda
mon syf
ta:
h;ayi
snnyyospffitnr ee
agte thyotm: eaoqryfeut
epa lbrnee,s
aeitt.t tahnedtoecbia•attei,c
to throw a monopoly of power into the hands of a few per-
sons and families. That is a fault which, if it is inherent in
propor-
tions, with the republican government of America. (Hear,
hocHaue
He may
la. government,m.e) atyyNci Whatever te
hea
cer-
tainly has this merit : no man absolutely without talent or
important department. Consider the work that he has to do.
shortest notice, to answer for and to defend his own measures
and that of his colleagues. No clerk, no colleague, no subor-
dinate can assist him in doing that work. The measure of
his ability is taken ; his capacity or incapacity, as the case
may be, is fairly tested; and if he be incapable, if he be unfit
for the office which he holds, his unfitness is no' secret either
to himself or to others, and the pain, the ridicule, and the re-
proach of such a situation are in themselves a sufficient guar-
antee that it will not often be coveted. I say, then, what-
ever the fault of our Parliamentary government, it certainly
has not the tendency of throwing office into the hands of in-
capable men of high connection; and if time allowed, and if
I were not unwilling to weary you, I think that I might
prove that that has been the case by a reference net only
to our own but to many former generations. But if the
Parliamentary system be not in fault, the neat question is
whether the defect lies in the organisation of the army;
and on that point I say at once I do not undertake an entire
or a confident defence. I think that in the faults which are
commonly ascribed to our military organisation there is also
some considerable admixture of truth. Ono explanation of
those defects is obvious; and I think it tends to exculpate
from blame all parties concerned. That cause is, that an
army can only be properly tested in time of war. (Hear,
hear.) No reviews, no Chobham camps, no parade in Hyde
Park, will ever teach officers and men their duty, or show
the country whether the army is fit for its work or not. Now,
we have had a 40 years' peace. That is a groat blessing ;
and we must not complain if we have some price to pay for
it. We have had a 40 years' peace in Europe, and the result
of that peace necessarily is that almost every military officer
whom we can employ is either inexperienced from not having
seen a battle, or superannuated because his experience dates
from the time of the Peninsular war. (Hear.) But there
is something more than that. Our army, though it makes
a large figure in the estimates, is small compared to that 0f
the great military monarchies, and it has been scattered
abro td over a great variety of colonies. Hence, althotig
and the discipline cf the regiment is perfect in itself,, yet
when is called the regimental organisation—
when you come to place several regiments together, wired
come to deal with a larger force—with brigades or -
sions—neither officers nor men have any practice of united.
want of such organisation great confusion
action, and tar the organisationt
arises. Now I do not think it is fair, admitting, as I do, the
faults of the system, to blame men either at home or in the
field for not doing well on the first trial that which they have
never don& before, that which they have never been taught
to do, and that which they have never oven seen done by others.
Well, that is my explanation of the principal defects of the
military organisation. It is commonly said now that an injus-
tice is done to the private soldier by the infrequency of pro-
motions from the ranks. In that statement, I do not hesi-
tate to say,.l think there is some truth. (Hear, hear.) But I
think also there is:some error, some exaggeration. I do jus-
tice, as every one does, to the admirable conduct of the pri-
vate soldiers of our army. (Cbeeri.) But I would say, in
the first place, that promotions from the ranks are not quite
as rare as they have been represented to be; and, in the next
place, that which is more important, that the opportunities
for distinction, the opportunities for such actions as enable a
man to rise from the ranks, do not occur very often hi time of
• peace, it not in barrack life, it is not on parades or in

reviews that a private soldier has the means of so distin
guishing himself as to earn his promotion to the rank of an
officer. Therefore, without imputing blame to any one, I
think it is a natural and necessary state of things that pro-
motions from the ranks will be rare in time of peace, and be-
come more frequent, necessarily more frequent, in time of
war. I think that is extremely desirable. Ido not say that
prejudice in some quarters may not have had something to do
with the fault complained of ; but I think prejudice has had
comparatively little to do with it, and I think the principal
ienafurseeq
uh aensebye eenf
et hatppe
tw.tuh hti e
sI
forha v
de
smt
iehnettiioenhe d
afforded m l
tye,
tt
hh
ee
iirivato soldier. [A Voice--n " Feed them better. No • raw
coffee."] There are, no doubt many respects in which we
shall find that the military organisation requires reform.. All
I can say is that I believe there is not the slightest desire
among any party in Parliament to throw obstacles in the way
of such reform. I believe that all reforms that can be proposed
will meet with a fair and impartial consideration ; and I my-
self shall be heartily glad if they can be found practicable.
But, after all, it is not the military system, it is not the
the
eorganisationlTei,swhoifehthe
have'ail
fault of the military system,
months.of the that after we had twelve
months' notice of a war impending, the English army was
marry chores nslibt lewafsor
nmetostthoef
sent out from this country destitute of the means of moving.
ybeewnhiccohmismiresttepdo.
(Hear, hear.) It was not the fault of the military system
that when that army had been sent out it was despatched
to the most pestilential quarter that could be found on the
BlltackwasSeah,etantdhethefraeuldtetaeifnetdhein inaction
system that that army, scantily provided with materials for
a siege, and decimated by disease, was sent to undertake the
siege of Sebastopol, Government not having apparently taken
the trouble to inquire what was the strength of the place or
whether it had a garrison of 20,000 or 100,000 men, and that
that army was sent out at a season when t)ie operations of a
protracted siege bad become impossible. (Hear, hear.) Again,
it was not the fault either of the military or of the naval orga-
nisation that our largest and heaviest line-of-battle ships were
sent to the Baltic to attack fortsmithin reach of whose guns
they could not possibly come. All these errors are distinctly
chargeable upon individuals—upon the late Cabinet--upon
those who had the conduct of the war in the late Cabinet.
They are indisputably the faults of Ministers, and not the
faults of any system. (Hear.) Ido not say that by way of
oaii.B- to the humiliation or to the punishment of those who
have been sufficiently punished already ; but I do say it, be-
cause I think those who are anxious to defend those Ministers
are endeavouring unduly and unfairly to exculpate them by
throwing the blame upon a system of government at home
which is not at fault, and upon a military system which,
though undoubtedly defectiye, owes its defects principally to
the prevalence of a long period of peace. (Hear, hear.) And
now, gentlemen, I think you will be glad to hear that I have
pretty nearly gone through all the subjects which I undertook
to discuss with you. As to the future, -of course it is idle
either to speculate or to suggest. The conduci of a war, the
conduct of military operations, must always be very much in
the hands of the Government. One point, and one only I
would mention—l mean the question of finance. Ido not
blame the Chancellor of the Exchequer for having tried as
long as he possibly could to avoid any permanent increase in
the debt of the country. It was a fault on the side of pru-
dence, it was a fault on the unpopular side; and on both of
these accounts it is deserving of forbearance and of respect.
Bat I say that whether that policy were wise or no at
the commencement of the war (I mean the policy of pay-
ing for the war out of the taxes of the year), it has now
become, and will shortly become even more, simply and abso-
lutely impracticable. (Hear.) At the same time it is not fair
that a remote posterity should be charged with the expenses
of our wars. The only remedy, the only resource which I see
is to raise that portion of the funds required which cannot
be defrayed out of the taxes of the year, by means of what
are called terminable annuities—that is to say, spreading the
period of payment over •a certain limited term of years—
neither, on the one hand, raising it entirely from the taxes of
the year ; nor, on the other hand, leaving it as a permanent
addition to the national debt. By that means the expense of
this war will be borne, as it ought to be borne, by the gene-
ration which makes the war ; the debt will not be perma-
nently increased, and, at, the same time, the taxes need not be
increased to any excess. I think, on the whole, that is the
fairest, that is the safest, and that will be ultimately the most
Popular policy, There is one subject on which I have said,
and on which I shall say nothing, I mean that which relates
to the personal part of polities, the position of parties and the
change of governments. Those are subjects with which I
never very willingly deal, and at this moment they sink into
infinite insignificance. For myself, I can only say lam ready
to support any ministry which will carry out a vigorous and
a prudent policy to a successful issue. (Cheers.) I believe
that is the general feeling of Parliament; I am certain that it
is the universal feeling of the nation. God forbid that it
should be said of us in this age and country—above all, God
forbid that it should bo said of the Parliament of the country,
that in the heat and excitement of faction, patriotism has
grown cold. (Applause.) My sincere hope is, that ministers
may deserve that support which Parliament desires to give
taem. Lord Palmerston has taken office in a time of great
difficulty. Ho has been a great popular statesman ; and,
though his years are net few, and though his government is
mainly that which the House of Commonshas lately censured,
I still hope that he will prove himself strong enough to secure
unanimity for his Cabinet and -vigour for his councils. But,
in any case, and under whatever ministry, we shall continue
to rely with a sure hope upon the unimpaired resources and
the unaltered spirit of England—a spirit somewhat too care-
less and boastful in time of prosperity, but a spirit persever-
ing in difficulty and indomitable brclisaster. (Cheers.) For
myself, I desire nothing—l aim at nothing—l shall labour
for nothing, except to See the national honour maintained
untarnished, the blood and treasure of Englishmen no longer
recklessly squandered as they have,been, war effectively and
prudently carried on, and peace early restored. (Loud and
continued applause.)
Mr. Aftmes said ho was sure he should speak the sentiments
of the mayor, the sentiments of the present em bl the
sentiments of the town, and, he would say, thasessnrage,
their common country, when he said that theye omuelndt enot
f
allow Lord Stanley to leave the meeting without thanking
him most heartily for having conic down at tho present crisis
to address them upon the national affairs. He (Mr. Armes)
could not believe, and ho was sure his lordship would not
believe, that every atom of his expression had been equally
agreeable to so large and mixed a community ; but there
could scarcely be anything, he (Mr. Armes) conceived, more
grand in itself, and more comprehensible in its idea, than
that all of them'should agree to recognise the pure patriot-
ism of the sentiments which his lordship had announced.
(Hear, hoar.) He thought that the town of Lynn might well
bo proud of its representatives. (Loud applause.) He had
great pleasure in proposing the thanks of the meeting and of
the town to his lordship for coming down to address them
upon the present occasion. (Applause.)
Mr. BAGOE proposed a vote of thanks to the Mayor for his
kindness in presiding on this interesting occasion.
Lord STANLEY seconded the motion.

After which " three cheers for Lord Stanley" were called
for, and the call was responded to by round upon round of
the most enthusiastic hurrahs.
The meeting then separated.

PAPER MONEY IN RUSSIA.

(From the Derbyshire:Courier.)

The Czar, it appears, is availing himself of the advan-
tages to be obtained by the use of paper money. A
recent ukase makes this proclamation :
" Wherefore we have thought fit, for enabling the Trea-
sury to meet all its present engagements without imposing
new taxes, or increasing those already in existence, and in
approval of the Finance Minister's proposal accepted by
the Council of State, to grant permission to the Treasury
to cover the ensuing extraordinary expenses by the tempo-
rary emission of national promissory notes."
These notes are, it is said, to be paid of ethree years
after the proclamation of peace. One-sixth of the amount
issued is to be made over, in the meanwhile, to the ex-
change fund in silver roubles. The amount now issued
is not large, viz., twelve millions of roubles, or less than
2,000,000/. sterling. There can be little doubt that the
Czar is acting wisely by abstaining from the imposi-
tion of new taxes. Russia has comparatively little
commerce, and the amount of circulating medium
which she requires is not great ; this small amount
of paper money issued by the Czar will, nevertheless,
not be without its beneficial efect. It will tend to en-
courage commercial enterprise • and to assist trade just
at the time when the War renders such assistance
valuaille. If the Czar manages his paper money judi-
cionely, it will retain its
,value, promote the 'prosperity
of the nation, and be a powerfl auxiliary in enabling
him to eery on thcwar with England and France.
Representative paper money is nip* aided and ascer-
tained system. It was tried in England from 1797 to
1817. The result is clearly pointed out by Mr. James
Taylor in his recent " Essay on Political Economy,"
which abounds with wise and useful suggestions on the
subject of money

" It is a fact worthy of special notice, that when means
were in this way (viz., by the suspension of cash payments
by the Bank) provided for superseding any absolute ne-
cessity for gold, the Bank had no difficulty in procuring as
muck of that scarce metal as the necessities of the Govern-
tmheenßet rsetariuidrteiod
sustained through the unexampled difficulties of our con-
flict; By
thisto
valour,
and and, aided by the loyalty,
with Napoleon; .
I united the
and industry if a progiereue 'en
Government was enabled to bring that fearful contest to a
honourable to the British nation, tho
termination most
powers of the nation being greater
at and productive
use of paper money under
f gal7l97Bt,aryour national industry was
thebeginning,although a
our male population had
very large portion of . been em-
ployed for more than 20 years in the work of destroying
rather than of producing the necessaries of life."
In the first French Revolution we witnessed the wild,
ignorant, and mischievous abuse of paper money. In the
Revolution of 1848 we beheld the sober, • cl* • and
ju miens,
salutary use of paper money. Wherever power exists
at the end of the, war than at .
there is clanger. In the material world the most power-
ful agent we are at present acquainted with, steam, is,
if not properly controlled, a demon of destruction. Un-
der proper management how beneficial and valuable is
the service it renders to man. Such is necessarily the
case with paper money. Peel saw half the currency
question. his cultivated, shallow, common-place un-
derstanding,
took in the evil which lay exposed on the
surface of the subject ; he had not scope and depth of
intellect to penetrate below and extract the good.
at tThehe French,means of
u fortunately
in
g paper
for
moneythemselves,
with
it have
advantage. ACcordingly we find that, by the returns of
the Bank of France, for 1854, just published, that they
have iucreased their discounts by forty millions sterling
during the past year, while their stock of bullion is
larger by more than two and a half millions at the pre-
sent time than it was in January, 1854. It is a most
encouraging feature in the French return that the opera-
tions of the French banks in the provinces have increased
in amount, and are greater in the aggregate than those
of the main establishment in Paris.
In the meanwhile the stock of bullion in our bank is
,
less by about two millions than it was a year sines, and
the active circulation is also diminished by about the
same amount, Money is scarce, the rate of discoun
high, and trade depressed. "I could pc!iat out towns,