The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-30 00:00:00

LONDON, MONDAY EVENING, JULY 30, 165.

ARUSSIAN INFERNAL MACHINE,
picked up off Cronsta It, by H. NT.S. Wellingt,n, is on view
and its nse expla.nea daily, at the ROYAL PSNOPTICON, Leicester-
square. Doors open, morning, 12 to 5 ; evening, 7to 10. .A dmission,
Is.

OYAL POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTION.
Y...A.) For one night only, WEDNESDAY, the 18th Instant, at
Eight o'clock. A GRAND MUSICAI. ENTERTAINMENT will be
given by Mr. GEORGE BUCKLAND, assisted by the following
eminent Artists:—Miss Clarl Fraser, Mr. T. Young, Mr. Henry
Buekland, Mr. Govelbein, and Mr. Montem Smith. The Selection
will consist of Glees, Duets, and Songs from the most eminent com-
posers.

tenant-Commander Wm., T. F. Jackson, left Sheerness
on Saturday for her cruising ground off the coast of
Scotland, having completed her refitment for the season.-
During the thunderstorm on Thursday last the electric
fluid descended' over the Thunder floating battery, at
moorings on the west shore abreast of the
_dockyard,
Sheerness, struck the mizonmast of that ship, and
shivered her masthead to,pieces.
Her Majesty's steam-transport Rhadamanthus, John
Mara, Master-Commander,- has arrived at 'Woolwich
with stores from Portsmouth.

The hired transport Reaper, Ponald Crnikshaik,
Commander, has sailed from Woolwich for the Crimea,
with waggons, shot, &c.
• The Adelaide steam-transport has also sailed -from
Woolwich for the Black Sea,heavily laden with powder,
shot, shell, ambulance waggons, hospital carts, and other
stores.

The building capabilities of Pembrokedockyard are to
he enlarged by the construction of two new building slips,
which, when completed, will raise the number to 14.
Several of these are of very large dimensions, capable of
taking the largest men of war. These works, with a new
boat basin, are now being carried out, and the dry-dock
is also being lengthened and widened so as to admit a
heavier ship than hitherto. The sum of 26;000/. will
this year be expended in these improvements. The erec-
tion of gasworks for the dockyard is immediately to be
proceeded with, and the whole is to be ready by October,
when the arsenal will he lighted by gas. The strength
.of this establishment has of late, been much increased,
and the utmost activity prevails. _
Several detachments of regiments serving in India ar-
rived on Friday evening at the General Hospital, Fort
Pitt; Chathain, being invalids sent hoine for discharge:
There are a few able • men among them ; these will join
their depot's provisional battalion, Chatham garrison, to
complete their time of Ser% ice. ThN'ciritsist of the fol-
lowing corps :-Bth King's Own, lEtth Foot, 22d, 35th;
52d, 53d, let Battalion 60th Rides, 70th, 75th, 9Gth,
Royal Artillery, and St. Helena Regiment, in charge of
Lieutenant William Henry Herrick, Bth Fo.t. The
nndermentioned officers also came home in the ship :
Lieutenant Peter Edward Quin; 98th ; Surgeon Charles
Hamilton Fasson, 14th Light Dragoons ; Assistant-
Surgeon Bassana, 70th ; Major Whitelock and Dr. Fer-
son, of the East India Company's service. These troops
embarked on board the ship Marlborough, Capt. Smith,
on the 30th of March last, at Calcutta, and sailed the
following day, and arrived at St. Helena on the 16th of
June and received on board a detachment of invalids,
consisting of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 4 privates,
one woman, and two children of the St. Helena Regi-
ment ; on Thursday they arrived in the Thames, and
disembarked at Gravesend the following day. They
brought home five military prisoners under various sen-
tences by General Court-Martials. During The voyage
there were eight deaths, viz., Privates Mitchel and Kelly,
Bth Foot ; Charles Puree], 35th ; Corporal John Ryan,
Patrick Allen, Henry Sarrance, 52d ; John Porcer, 96th;
C. Hangar, 70th; they died from phthisis and dysentery.
The Royal Artillery has proceeded to Woolwich.
Information has been received at Chatham garrison, of
the arrival in the Channel of the 22d Regiment from
India ; they are expected at Chatham daily.
Another party of Russian prisoners has just arrived at
Lewes from Portsmouth, consisting of four officers and
four privates. They are all from the Crimea, and during
the past week eight officers and as many men have thence
arrived in Lewes. The officers are fine, powerful men,
above the ordinary stature. They are all in lodgings in
the town, and the privates are in the war prison.
Large quantities of shell of every description, from
13-inch to the smallest sizes used, with mortars to match,
are being made at two of the principal foundries in
Liverpool.
We regret to announce that telegraph intelligence has
been received of the death of Lieutenant the Hon. E.
Fitzclarence. Lieutenant Fitzclarence died on 'Wed-
nesday last, from the effects of his wounds, at the Eng-
lish hospital at Constantinople, to which place be bad
been conveyed from Balaklava. The gallant deceased
was serving as aide-de camp to his colonel, the late Co-
lonel Yea, and with him took part in the unsuccessful
attack on'the Redan, on the 18th ult., where be was
very dangerously wounded. He suffered amputation of
the left leg and the right hand, which operations be bore
with great fortitude, and at the date of the last' letters
he was considered to be progressing most favourably,
so that the receipt of the news of his death has occa-
sioned much grief to his relatives. The deceased was
the fourth and youngest son of the late Earl of Mun-
ster, and was born on the Bth of July, 1837. He entered
the 7th Regiment, as Ensign, in November, 1854, and
in January last obtained his lientenantcy. In the spring
he accompanied the depot of his regiment to the seat of
war, and he had only been a few weeks before Sebasto-
pol when he was called upon to assist in the attempt on
the Redan,

MAZZINI ON THE WAR.

July, 1855.

My dear Friend,—You a* me why I do not express
my opinions on the war. I feel disheartened. You seem

to. in; to be fighting, like Ajar, in the dark ; only he
Was praying for light—you have it shining on you from
every side, and shut your eyes resolutely against it. You
have been repeatedly warned. Men who do not claim
any superior insight or power of genius, but who from
their position, from the studies and events of a whole
life, are entitled to know something of continental poli-
tical matters, told you from the beginning of the contest
that Austria would never fight your battles ; that her
only aim was to take possession of the Principalities; that
by your obstinately pursuing the flying phantom of an
alliance with her you were not only degrading your
cause and losing all the sympathies of thegood and brave
throughout Europe, but fettering your intellect, cramp-
ing your schemes, and turning the policy of your war
from the only ground upon which you could rationally
hope for victory, to a wild chase of impossibilities.
All this has been subsequently christened into facts.

Still, you remain inert, impassive, unshaken, bent on

the same identical track—plunging deeper and deeper
into a dark, hopeless region of dreams and deceptions ;
whilst a single act of will would lead you back to the
wide, easy, bright path, on which honour and victory
must bless each step of yours. I see brave deeds,
sufficient to redeem a whole fallen nation ; noble
powers of action and endurance, displayed by your
unknown demi-gods, your soldiers, and officers, in the
Crimea ; but for what purpose and with what hope ?
I bow before the quiet silent devotedness with which
your nation accepts all the sacriiices inseparable from
a war, and I• feel proud of loving and being loved in
your own country but such devotion ought not to be
in vain ; and as far as I can see, it is so. Owing to the
policy %-; hien leads the War, you are fighting 'for an
impossibility.
The thought, unless indeed all practical sense has
forsaken your nation, must be by this time, after nine
months of efforts and deceptions, living and rastless
within many souls ; still, none dams to give utterance
to it. You are in your Parliament floating between one
party aware of the difficulty-of your position, but draw-
ing from that knowledge a policy of cowardice, and
another, fully alive to the supreme necessity of not with-
drawing from the contest before a decisive victory, but
neither understanding, nor wanting to understand, how
victory can be reached ; peace at any cost, even of
honour, and war for war's sake ; the three words uttered
by Mr. Roebuck remaining unsupported, echoless, a
threatening prophecy to be remembered when it will be

too late. Your adriiicistrative reform societies are sys-
tematically shunning the vital question, apparently aim-
ing at nothing else but at teaching people how to do
cleverly the wrong thing. Your press, active, far-
sighted, bold, sometimes fierce, and, when combined,
all-powerful concerning details and all second-rate
matter, is silent about the problem—" Can Russia
be conquered through the Crimea ?" Still that
is the question. It is good and brave to die for one's
own flag ; but it is, sad, unutterably sad and culpable
to bid the best die a fruitless death, when more
could be achieved. Martyrdom is in certain times and
circumstances the sacred duty of the weak ; the strong
are bound to conquer.

Can you conquer, without a radical change in your
actual policy? It is my deep conviction that you cannot.
To believe that the succgss of a war rests on a ground
of mere organisation and military-detail skill—that the
directing policy has nothing to do with it—that, when
you have comparative perfection of mechanical arrange-
ments and valour, you have conquered the most of fa-
vourable chances, is an immense mistake. I have wit-
nessed in 1848, in Lombardy, the rapid, progressive, un-
avoidable destruction of a certain triumph through a
single fatal stroke of policy.
There, on a land where a national movement bad sud-
denly taken place and swept the territory, the fortresses
excepted, of all foes, from the Alps to the sea, a King
stepped forward, with regular battalions, artillery, and
resources twice equal to a conquered, disheartened, de-
moralised enemy, but with a different aim, the aggrandise-
ment of the House of Savoy, and with a monarchical
tradition entirely antagonistic to the spirit and tendency
of the movement. There was valour in the army, de-
votedness in the officers ; and a whole population glow-
ing with enthusiasm was backing the Piedmontese regi-
ments. The plan was obvious. The 30,000 Austrian
soldiers who had fled to Verona and Mantua could never
reconquer alone the lost ground. To prevent their being
reinforced was the problem to be solved ; and the solu-
tion was easy. To arm the population and tell them—
protect your houses ; to leave behind the fortresses ; to
march to the Alps and establish there, on the points
where the military roads link Italy with the Austrian
empire, two camps of some 25,000 soldiers each ; to
bombard Trieste, from whence the Austrians were draw-
ing all their supplies ; to rouse with an appeal to the
Slavo-Illyrian nationalities all the eastern Dalmatian coast
of the Adriatic—was undoubtful, cheap victory. But
Trieste vas forbidden by diplomacy ; the Tyrol, I do
not know by what old absurd rights of the German
Confederacy ; to arm the population was out of the
question ; for a people who fights its own battles is a
very dangerous element to rising monarchies ; to protect
the Venetian military roads was to strengthen the repub-
lican Government which had been proclaimed at Venice.
And how could a Government, bent not on the creation
of an Italian nation, but on the formation of a Pied-
montese kingdom of the North, raise a war of nationali-
ties ? Thus, all the truly strategic operations being ex-
cluded, the emancipating. war found itself forcedly nar-
rowed down to the regular siege of the fortresses. The
Piedmontese army lingered before Mantua and Verona
until a scorching sun, disease, irregularity of commis-
sariat supplies, and the demoralising discouragement
always attending troops kept in comparative immobility,
pointed out to a freely reinforced enemy an opportunity
for overpowering it. A. wrong policy had destroyed all
the chances of the war. Such must be the case in every
war. Its method rests mainly on the policy which rules
the councils of the nation—such is, and most strikingly,
in your own.

Had the policy of your Government been a liberal one,
you would be now firmly established in the heart of your
enemy's land, backed by the insurrection of a whole
brave nation, and with a powerful germ of disorganisa-
tion, through desertion and revolt, at work in the ad-
verse army. A stroke of energy at the service of a
principle would have given you allies on every point of
Europe; and no despotic power would dare or be able to
support Russia against you. We could pledge our word
for that.

By your declaring yourselves hostile to any national
movement—by your courting during sixteen months the
vilest of the despotic powers, Austria—by your re-
nouncing every moral aim, every noble aspiration, for a
paltry and hateful programme of expediency, and status
quo, you have deprived yourselves of the sympathies of
all the good and brave throughout Europe—you have
prevented a Polish rising—you have lost the alliance of
Sweden—you have allowed free space and security to
all German intrigues against you ; and renouncing all
freedom of action, all free choice of places, means, and
military plans, you have, like Charles Albert, in 1848,
narrowed the war to a siege, on a spot which will
be, I fear, henceforward named " the grave
of England's honour and England's sons," The grave
of England's honour and England's sons—the Crimea,
at this period, can be but this.

I confess I cannot understand the silent, obstinate'
apathy with which your press, your meetings, your Par-
liamentari. men, are witnessing the sacrifice of thousands,
without ever dreaming of asking themselves—Can vic-
tory—a decisive and permanent one, be obtained there ?
I shudder when 1 read such words as those with which
Lord Palmerston coolly assures the House of Commons
that all losses will be met by new supplies of men. You
had better decree at once that the youth of England
shall be periodically decimated, for no other purpose than
that of gratifying the military ignorance of Louis Na-
poleon, and withdrawing every source of alarm from the
Austrian Government.
A. Crimean expedition could in no case, I believe, lead
by itself to a decisive success or to honourable terms of
peace. Odessa, if you wanted to act from the Black Sea,
was the point for you. Still, had you chosen the favour-
able moment and worked with adequate means—had you
landed at once 100,000 men somewhere above Sebasto-
pol, and marched to Perekop, whilst your fleet would
have got possession of the Straits of Kertch, Cape of
Kezantip, and other points on the Sea of Azoff,
the Crimea might have been yours, and you would have
then fallen back on Sebastopol—thus deprived of all its
communications with the continent. It was no doubt

an important deed. But now, what is your hope ? What
is your aim in systematically sacrificing your best men
under the walls of a town which, in all probability, you
will not take, and which, if taken, cannot give you what
you want ?
It is high time for you, I think, to look earnestly into
the matter, and to see that England's forces, which Eng-
land may need at a not very distant period for her own
protection against allies, are not lost in a hopeless contest.
Cast a glance back on the war. You thought in the
beginning—and it was the first fatal mistake—that you
would frighten the Czar out of the contest with some
50,000 or 60,000 men placed at Constantinople, Galli-
poli, or Adrianople. When you began to perceive that
a real earnest war was unavoidable, you turned to the
Danube; there was your natural basis for offensive ope-
rations. Austria—it is now an established fact—forbade
your acting there. You bowed to Austria, dismissed
the thought at once, and gave up to Austria—the second
fatal mistake—the Principalities.
Forbidden the Danube, and not wanting to arouse,
through Poland, the dreaded question of the nationalities,
you decided upon adopting the Bonapartist scheme of a
Crimean expedition. You landed with troops, material,
and knowledge of the localities and of the enemy's forces
utterly unequal to the object, near Sebastopol. You
wanted to try the north, but found unforeseen and al-
most insurmountable obstacles, and through the most
dangerous flank march possible, you turn to the south.
You could not, for want of troops, invest the place ;
you did not dream of preventing the accumulation of
military stores and victuals which were coming from
the interior of Russia and Siberia, down the Volga and
the Don, through Rostof and Kertch, to Sebastopoti-
But you simply established yourselves there, trust
ing to chance, and despising the enemy---andin.ni
en.
you still are. Since then you have been dune ra
.ni t_
danger--aYerted only through want of bolso
_ _

Russian leaders, and heroic valour in your soldiers at
Inkerman and Balaklava—of being driven back to the
sea. Since then, you have lost the hope of an active
alliance with Austria, lost the confidence of Europe,
lost a considerable amount 4 money, lost (I speak of
England alone) some 40,000 men, and won—some
counter-approaching outposts erected since your arrival.
This is the summary of the past ; now for the future.
Sebastopol—the besieged southern part is as strong as
ever--the Russian army in the Crimea more strong than
ever ; and, owing to the conduct of Austria, numerous
fresh reinforcements are coming from the interior of
Russia. You cannot dream of starving the enemy ;
your expedition to the Sea of Azoff has come five or six
months too late ; military stores and provisions equal
to the wants of many months were already accumulated
in Sebastopol. And the military road of the Shivagh,
the road across the isthmus, the read leading from
Simpheropol to Sebastopol through Baktchiserai, the
road from the same town to the northern part of the be-
sieged place, are all in the hands of the Russians. You
must then take the town by force. How many men will
you have to lose in getting possession of the Malakhoff,
of the Redan, and of the first line of defence ? How many
in conquering the second line ?
Suppose you do gain possession of the whole town how
are you to keep it under the fire of the northern forts ?
The ground there is much higher than on the southern
site. The octagon fortress, called the Sievarna, the key
of Sebastopol, according to Sir Howard Douglas, com-
mands town, bay, and docks. Its height protects it from
the tire of your ships, its shores are precipitous. You
most therefore attack it by land, thus finding yourself
after nine months of exertions and sacrifices just before
the obstacle from which you shrank at the beginning.
Flow much time, how much English blood, will be re-
quirA to overcome it ? Can ,you feel sanguine after the
experiments on the south ?
And, then, the Russian farces. outside Sebastopol ?
Tl. inner in number ; exhausted by victories which
would undoubtedly prove like those of .Pyribus, you will
then have to begin the true war, the Crimean campaign.
There are Russi,:n forces, strong enough now, and which
will he stronger still in a short while, on the right, at
the two extremities of the Tchernaya ; Russian forces on
the B.,lbelr, Russian forces in the proximity of Euratoria ;
Russian forces under Wrangel, Montresor, Beliegarde,
in the interior. Between those and through the steppes
which from Simpheropol up to the isthmus spread over
all the Crimea you will have to fight your way to Pere-
hop. On the steppes, no trees, no shrubs ; against the
intense heat and intense cold an invading army is de-
fenceless : no resting shelter—the Crimea is more than
thinly inhabited ; 10,000 English square miles and te-
nanted by some 200,000 inhabitants, and a few scattered
villages of the interior will be burnt by the Russians.
Water is there very scarce and saturated with salt. The
winter sweeps the desolate land with overwhelming
snow-storms : the warm season softens through the
melting of the snows the ground to such an extent that
the artillery will sink through it. No road tracks—the
bridges on the ravines not strong, and easily destroyed.
These difficulties you will say must work against the
Russians, too ; yes, only the Russians are at home, they
are used to them ; you are not ; you must conquer, they
have only to defend ; every step in advance will leave
you further from your basis of operations, from your
supplies ; every step backwards brings them nearer to
their own.

A t the end of the Crimean steppes lies your objective
point, Perekop. The Russians have been all this while
fortifying it. Then should you conquer it and Russia
not yield, three hundred miles of new steppes . . .
Oae would say that the man who first planned the
Crimean expedition wanted to solve this problem : how to
sink in an apparently plausible enterprise the best blood
of England, and make her defenceless for a time of need.
Such are your prospects. How many thousands of
men, how many millions of pounds are you disposed to
engulph in their possible, not probable realisation !
People who are wanting deliberately to blind them-
selves and England, will talk to you of a probable ope-
ration through the Liman of the Dnieper against Kber-
son, and the naval arsenal of the Crimea, Nicolaieff.
They forget Otchakow and Kilboroun, placed opposite
each other at two and a half miles distance, and forbid-
ding the entrance of the Lagoon ; they forget that every
place on the shores must have been by this time fortified
by the Russians ; they forget that Nicolaieff is now the
point where a reserve army of some thirty thousand
Russians is formed. They will suggest an attack upon
A.kerman ; and Ovidioplis on the Dniester ; they forget
that there you would be faced by the Russians, and
threatened on your flank by the Austrian army. Can
you trust the Austrian army ? They will hint at a
bold attempt against Perkope. How—by sea ? On
the Azoff Sea it is protected by the Shivagh ? on the
Black Sea your men-of-war cannot east anchor except
at the distance of 20 miles. By land ? You must first
fight, and conquer the campaign I spoke of some lines
back. Unless you want to find yourselves prisoners,
between the forces coming from the interior of Rus-
sia and those manoeuvring in the interior of the Crimea,
you must destroy Wrangel and Bellegarde. With what,
forces ? You have now, after all usual deductions made
—and Turks and Piedmontese included-150,000 active
men in the Crimea : probably less, certainly not more.
Some 40,000, almost without cavalry, are at Eupatoria.
Ilow many of the rest will you leave to push on the
siege ? How many to guard Kamiesch and Balaklava ?
No ! Unless you raise the siege ; unless you apply
your energies to the only vulnerable point of Russia—
Poland ; unless you radically change the policy ruling
the war, you can do nothing but systematically and
periodically perish in fruitless attempts before Sebasto-
pol. Russia is there now too strong for you.
Will your Government ever spontaneously adopt a
charga of policy ? Never. The men who had not one
word to say in the name of England's honour when the
Czar in 1848-9 invaded the Principalities and crushed
Hungary, because his object was then to check liberty and
national moverrents—the men who plotted with Louis
Napoleon for restoring the Pope "under an improved
form of government" at Rome—the men who can,
during sixteen months, exhaust every form of servile
complacency towards such a power as Austria, and,
scorned, do not dare a threatening word—can ally them-
selves with despotic usurpers—they will never say to a
nation, Rise ! Their policy lies between the despatch of
the 23d of March, 1853, in which Lord Clarendon de-
clares that her Majesty's Government is anxious to avert
the risks of any advantage being given to the European
revolutionists, and the speeches of Lord Palmerston,
branding the liberty of Poland as a dream, the future
rising of Hungary as an untoward lamentable event.
They may break their pledge with Sicily ; they will
never break that which binds them to continental abso-
lutism. But that you, English citizens, who worship
freedom and revere morality—you who have no pledge
except to England's honour and safety—you who all to a
man waved your hats at Poland's glorious rising and pro-
claimed its overthrow a crime, you whose brothers and sons
are dying, the victims of a wrong policy, in the Crimea:
whilst in Podolia and Lithuania they could conquer—
you, the free and able, by a single resolute act of will,
by a sudden energetic collective manifestation to compel,
can sit quietly witnessing the slow, useless work of de-
struction, and trust your fates to men who, thanks to
their policy and to Austria, are besieging, after nine
months of operations, an outer work, is more than I can
explain to myself or others. Every man who has a son,
a brother, or a friend in the East ought to walk with a
map of the Crimea on his breast and a flag with the
name of Poland inscribed, from place to place, from
park to park, from cottage to cottage, and preach and
explain, until hundreds of thousands should peacefully
but sternly signify their will. Change of policy. Down
with Austria. Let Poland's rising be helped. And
then you ought to kneel and thank God most humbly
for having placed the easy accomplishment of a great
act of justice on the very path which leads to English
safety and success.
But Austria! Prussia ! Leave Prussia to her own
people; Austria to Hungary and to ourselves. As sure
as Austria will never fire a single gun for you against
you while we live. The question of the nationalities is
amounting to a general war. What of that ? Will not
the nationalities fight their own battles ? Only those
battles will be yours too. With Poland, Hungary, and
Italy up, the Czar cannot dream of marching to Con-
stantinople.
Out of the road I point depend upon it there is no de-
cisive victory nor honourable peace possible for you. In
a letter which I addressed to the chairman of the Society
of the Friends of Italy, on the 2d of March, I said,
" Your policy is absolutely wrong and immoral, there-
fore you cannot and will not conquer." I maintain
my ground. War is for me the greatest of crimes,
whenever it is not waged for the benefit of mankind,
for the sake of a great truth to enthrone, or of a great
lie to entomb. Yours is not such a war. It shrinks from
the proclaiming of a principle. It equally aims at cur-
tailing despotic encroachments from the north, and
strengthening despotism in the centre of Europe. It de-
clares that Turkey has a right to independence, whilst its
policy and tactics are calculated so as to prevent any
other country from asserting itself independent. I be-
lieve in God, and in a providential scheme ; and conse-
quently I do not believe in triumph crowning a war
grounded on expediency, temporary self-interest, and
antagonism to European rights and liberty.
Czarism is a principle—the principle of unbounded
authority ; it is only a principle—that of naivea
liberty—that can conquer it.—Yours faithfully, _
JOSEPH DIAZZINI.

APOTHECARIES' BALL.—Names of gentlemen who
passed their examination in the science and practice of
medicine, and received certificates to practise, on Thurs.
day, July 26, 1855 :—Ge o rg e Nelson
eCsveoerlrvlayilemeses,l
classes, of
ton ; James Thorpe Chatterton, Hastings, Sussex ; and
Albert Iles, Cirencester, Gloucestershire.
.ESTIMATES FOR CIVIL SERVICES.--A general abstract
6;556,9631., against 6,6441,8.71/. in 1854,
exhibitso f the
a grand to be
total,
tdeemrf cart
hacivil
:,711369005/Is.. h;;
occwll aaissnssg
23a,,
decrease of 87,9081. The i
as full
viz.:—
Class 1. Public works and buildings, 746 ("vs,
salaries,aan,d
andar
t justice,B4c6.
~
6o
7f
op2l
.o,
2l i;
4c :51 departments,,ca2lsasssBstil
~,
:c
41 , 31 5
) education, science,
mal, consular, and other
foreign services, 328,3441. ;class 6, superannuations and
temporarycharities, 218, miscellaneous, special, and
1003001. objects,342l. ;756,1691' ; and civil contingencies,

. \
( Front the Tinges of this day.)
The last Russian reports of the naval hostilities in tlifs
Sea of Azoff are rather more complete than the aceoants
which have been published officially . . this cOuntry.•--
Despatches had, indeed, reached the 'Ada iralbr from
Sir E. Lyons and Lieutenant Hewett, cotinnaticang Fier
Majesty's ship Beagle, from which it appears that on
the 31 of July the large flats and hawsers of the flyless
bridge connecting the Arabat Spit with the mainla d
across the Strait of Genitchi were destroyed. This
operation was performed with great spirit, for the Rus-
sians had lined ths beach with riflemen, and onr boas
were riddled with balls at, a distance of from GO to 80
yards. The principal part in the achievement was per-
formed by Stephen Trewavas, an able-bodied seaman of
the Agamemnon, and, by his name, a stout Cornishman,
who cut the hawsers and sot the Go sting bridge adrift.
The road across the ferry from Genitchi to Arabat is,
therefore. interrupted, and we are not without hopes
that the launches ef the ships may still be able to force
the strait and enter the Putrid Sea. The Russians
themselves appear to contemplate this contingency, for
Prince Latasoff, who commands on that part of the
coast, reports that the Tchongar-bridge has been pro-
tected by new fortifications—a precaution the enemy
would hardly have takedif they had not been aware
that the bridge can be approached by water. The
Tchongar-bridge and the military road passing over it,
to which we first called public attention some mouths
ago, are accurately laid down in the map annexed to
Mr. Darby Seymour's book on the Crimea and the Sea
of Azoff ; and the point at which the road is carried for
about 400 yards on piles across the lagune does not ap-
pear to be mere than 20 miles off the Strait of Genitchi
From their first invasion of the Crimea the Russians have
used these lines of communication. In 1737 General
Lasci halted his army at Genitchi, threw a bridge over
the strait, and marched along the Tongue or Spit of Ara-
bat. In this critical pcsition he learned that the Tartars
mere prepared to dispute his passage at the southern ex-
tremity, where a small body of men might successfully
oppose an artny. With great presence of mind he out
through the tongue of land, on the one hand to cover
himself from attack, and on the other he caused a sort of
raft or floating br dge to be constructed between this
Tongue of Arabat and the mainland, across which the
troops passed, while the horses of the army swam ( r
fire I the lagune. The Khan of Crim Tartary continued
to await the approach of the Russian army at the lines of
Or-Kapi or Perekop ; but Lasci again deceived his anta-
gonist, for having entered the Peninsula in this singular
manner from the Spit of Arabal, he evacuated the coun-
try again by the- promoktory of Tehorgonn, showing
th at even 120 years itAo military operations in the Crimea
could be conducted by two lines of march independent
of the isthmus of Perekop. The history of these early
campaigns is by no means uninstructive, for it is certain
that with means of transport far inferior to those now
possessed by the allied armies the Russian generals suc-
ceeded in enterin the Crimea on several different points,
and confounded the enemy by the rapidity of their un-
foreseen attacks.

We now revert, however, to the recent operations,
which have been imperfeciv described in the published
despatches of the British 'Government. It is stated in
the Russian accounts that on the 27th of Jane nine
steamers of war appeared before Genitchi, and opened
fire partly on the town and partly on the roads along
the coast, where a convoy of salt was stopped and de-
stroyed. The fire was continued for some days, but it is
stated, oddly enougb, that on the 29th of June vessels de-
tached from the squadron set fire to all the farms within
30 versts. We are at a loss to conceive how these ves-
sels could interfere with the agricultural pursuits of the
inhabitants except in the immediate vicinity of the shore,
and the report appears to be a loose and unmeaning
one. On the 3d of July it is correctly stated that two
boats came within about 60 yards of the shore ; but the
Russian commander has omitted to add that they suc-
ceeded in performing the daring exploit of cutting the
floating bridge adrift under fire, and that, instead of
losing " three rowers and the man at the helm," this
feat fortunately cost our brave fellows only two slight
contusions.

The immediate effect of these operations seems to have
been to draw the attention of the Russians to this point
on the coast, and we are informed that, " from arrange.
ments made by Prince Gortschakoff, the detachment of
Genitchi was reinforced by fresh troops, and the number
of Cossacks of the Sea of Azoff placed with their boats
at the disposal of Prince Labanoff was increased." We
remark this passage, because it is the first time, as far as
we know, that any allusion has been made in the Rus-
sian despatches to these Cossacks of the Sea of Azoff.
These Cossacks are a branch of one of the clans of Za-
porogue Cossacks, who maintained their independence
against the Czars of Russia until the last century, and
were eventually destroyed by Catherine 11., who trans-
ported a portion of them to the frontiers of Circassia and
the Sea of Azoff. They are organised under their Het-
man, not as irregular cavalry, but as a portion of the
naval forces of Southern Russia. They pass for the best
mariners of those seas, and they furnish about 30 well-
armed gunboats to the Imperial fleet, which were em-
ployed until last year in maintaining the blockade of the
Circassian coast. When the allied squadrons forced the
Straits of Yenikale and swept across the Sea of Azoff,
we heard nothing of the maritime Cossacks to whom the
navigation and defence of those waters is specially en-
trusted. It seems, however, that this flotilla was
in some place where it escaped the observation of
our cruisers, and where its services remain at the
disposal of Prince Labanoff at Genitchi. We there-
fore are led to conclude, that if these facts are at all
correct, these gun-boats of the Cossacke of the Sea
of Azoff must have retreated to the Si wash or Putrid
sea, where it was known that a considerable quantity
of shipping took refuge when pursued by Captaia Lyons.
If this be the fact, it serves to show that there must at
least be water within the Strait of Genitchi to float
some of our launches and gun-boats, and the prepara-
tions for the defence of the Tcbongar-bridge prove that
the enemy anticipated an attack in that quarter. This
hostile demonstration was, however, not persevered is
at the time it was made, which is now fully four weeks
ago, and more recent accounts from the fleet lead us to
believe that the Admirals had collected the whole body
of vessels of light draught in Kamiesh Bay, where it
was thought that a coup de main would speedily be at-
tempted in another direction.
Whatever may be the causes that retard the progress
of the siege of Sebastopol by land, and cause the allied
Commanders to postpone those field operations which
are considered by all those military authorities who
have investigated the subject, both abroad and at home,
to be indispensable preliminaries to the reduction of the
place, none of these reasons can affect the movements of
the navy. It is obvious that the Admirals possess all
the advantages which the undisputed possession of Se-
bastopol itself has heretofore secured to the naval power
of Russia. They have a fleet, an army, and an arsenal
at their disposal in so central a position that they can
strike the enemy within a few hours on any point of the
vast semicircle which extends from the mouth of
the Danube to the mouth of the Don, and the
terror inspire, by these sudden incursions would
be greatly increased by the rapidity with which
they might be made to succeed each other in different
places. Indeed, large armies would be required to gar-
rison and defend so vast an extent of coast. The expe-
riment tried in the Sea of Azoff was completely success-
ful, but it has scarcely been followed up, and, with
forces capable of achieving any exploits at sea, it is in-
credible how little has as yet been undertaken. We sin-
cerely hope that the time of these intermittent operations
is nearly at an end.
One scheme of a novel and peculiar character is men-
tioned in some of the last letters from the camp, which
partakes of the character of a naval operation. The
French have now carried forward the White Works on
the extreme right until they reach the shore of the inner
harbour of Sebastopol at Careening Bay. It has been
suggested that, under cover of the French batteries, it
may be practicable to construct and launch rafts carry-
ing heavy guns, after the fashion of the Lady Nancy,
which did good service in the bombardment of Tagan-
rog, and that a small flotilla of this descriptidn may act
with effect against the Russian steamers and some part
of the defences. The expedient reminds one of the cele-
brated, but almost incredible, operation of Mahomet 11.,
when he brought his fireships and galleys at the siege of
Constantinople into the rear of the Golden Horn ; but
in the present instance, since the allies are in possession
of part of the coast of the harbour, and will probably ere
long completely occupy the Careening Bay, it is by no
means impossible that some portion of our naval re•
sources may be employed above the town.