The National Register.
London, England, 1813-07-25 00:00:00

4M3

Allies continue to retreat before him How different would
his situation have been had he waited for the Allies in his
imposing position on the -Akin, in the most fertile and most
pupulous part of Germany, totally devoted to him, in the
neighbourhood of France, in. a position where all his re-
sources where at hand, fi om whence he could contain Italy,
Switzerland, and France itself, and overawe Austria; instead

of putting himself at the mercy of that power, by which the
light flank and rear of his army can be completely turned.
He would then have put the Allies precisely in the same
situation in which he stands himself; he would have com-
pelled them to remove from the'- :%sourcs, ft'om which
-they would have been in danger I,:.ing cut; he would
.have compelled them to titarch in older to attack him
through exhausted countries, whence their supplies could be
brought only from enormous .distances, and he might have
seized the opportunity of striking a decisive blow which
would have put an end to the contest, a fate which now
awaits hit:. But the natural rashness of the man and the

peculiarity of his situation rendered this wise plan impracti-
clhle. Accustomed hitherto to easy triemphs, he does not
calculate, he dares ; acknowledging no tight but force, his
strength must not be doubted, or its power is shaken to its
ha-i,; temporizing prudence encourages reflexion, and he
must dazzle because he cannot convince.
A sense of impending danger, and the recollection of his
Russian campaign, induces him, however, after fruitless at-
tempts to intit»idate, to depart from his constant and funda-
n,rntal system; he I.:cs for an At mistice, and propo::es a Con-
gress for Peace ; but his apprehensions must not he known or
even suspected. and the same veil of hypocritical sensibility,
13 ;Ayr which &I the massacres of the French Revolutionists

ivele committed. covers the insidious proposal.
An article which has appea;-ed in the lionigsbc7 and St. '
Pritr.sburo Gn:ettes, and which we give in another part of
this Varce, rely be considered as a demi-official declaration
of the sentiments which the AMA Powers entertain of his
sincerity, and of the conditions on which•alone they are wil-
ling to conseat to a Peace. To this paper we refer our Read-
els, as want of room prevents us from commenting at .any
length upon it. It is supposed to have been drawn by
the fimons loT Ea:UE,and although we do not approve
clan the sentiments it contains, no Continental diplomatic
60:•tunent has given us More satisfaction since the beginning
ef the Fiend) lien-'lotion. We rejoice to sec that the
li.)(e-tv of the Continent cf. Europe, and the withdrawin:,
of the French armies beyond the Rhine, arc at last insisted
upon as the preliminaries to a general pacification. Yet,
However desirable these objects certainly are, we should
think them purchased too dear by the implied acknowledg-
ment of Buo NAPA RT E's pretended dynasty, with which the
peace and permanent security of Europe are totally itico
ratdde. But piobah!y 'the Allies were fully aware, that
Be ON AP A ItT E • could not accede to these conditions. llis
rower in France has been solely upheld by the terror
he inspired on the Continent, and by the opportunity his
constant wars gave .him of diverting the attention of
his subjects, formerly his equals. A peace such as
the Alhes propose, wauid be no less (although not so
immediately fatal to hint,) than another complete over-
throw ; and urged by despair and remorse, he will
(we tear now nc,twitlistandinly; our former opinion) again rush
into battle, and perish t• with the harness on.his hack;" even
_ should the Armistice be continued for a few days.longer.

ess tlf temporrsy matter has prevented us
tiriteack,ittrilatter part of this attich:, the extent we
iallititin(l.o44L-We shall probably have another oppor-
-_,
‘-liffiteiitirttolne same subject.
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N. B.

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