The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-25 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 25 1855.

evils brought bout by the war, and the amount of physical
and moral goof I which it had intercepted. We had not only
a just but a mfficient cause for going to war. Let them
inquire then, what was the controversy upon which they
entered. The
objects of the war, as they were originally
contemplated,
They did not . 'were not so wide as the evils he bad described.
4 attempt, and they thought it too much to at-
tempt, the total abolition of the evil; and, for a long time,
the four
r seat Powers, confined themselves merely to narrow-
ing it w' tb.in certaiu limits and hemming it in. It was all
ver r 1'7141 for gentlemen to say, at this time of day, " You
ow eat to have; sent your fleet into the Black Sea when Russia
ne copied thr: Principalities." These were delusions which
al rose from foergritfulness of the circumstances, and from the
e scitement,V,-: the state of things which existed at a former
- period. Nof only the Government to which he belonged,
but no Gr ivernment, could by possibility, in June, 1853,
have vent ared to take so rash a step, even with reference
to the sts .te of English opinion. The first conclusion to which
they mv
.st have come would have been, that they would at
once 1" Ave abandoned, if they had interfered in any such
Proe" ding, the co operation of Austria, Prussia, and France.
What . were the objects which were then contemplated ?
IVII- were the questions which were then under dis-
cus mien ? The questions under discussion were these :—The
E mperor asked a certain amount of ratification and extension
of the treaty of Kainardji ; the Porte was ready to give a cer-
tain amount of ratification and extension to that treaty. The
ques=tions raised were, whether the temporal, as well as the
spiritual, privileges of the Greek Christians were to be pro-
tect,ed by Russia—whether the Greek Christians should have
privileges gr gited to them which would place them on a par
with the other non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte ; and
wb,ether it should be by a separate engagement with Turkey,
or by a general engagement with the other Powers, that these
ghts and privileges should be guaranteed. In 1853, these
rere the only questions in dispute between Russia and the
Allied Powers ; and he was sure he should be confirmed and
not contradicted by her Majesty's Government when he said
that every one of these objects bad completely vanished.
( Hear.) There was now no question about a separate treaty
between Rua and the Porte ; there was now no question as
to the temporal privileges of the Greek Christians ; there was
now no question as to whether the Greek Christians should
enjoy the same privileges as the other non-Mussulmen subjects
of the Po' rte. Nothing could be more simple—and really the
matter w,as so important, and the words so few, that he hoped
the hourie would allow him to put them in possession of them
—nothing could be more simple than the issue to which this
matte-r was brought after the tangled negotiations of 1853.
Lord Derby, in fact, had confessed, in another place, that he
had read through the Blue Book as far as the month of July,
but that he found it impossible to proceed any further in
threading the labyrinth. The negotiations gathered into a
central point in December. That was the time they must
100 k into if they would get a clear view of the grounds upon
wh;Lch this war was undertaken. The proposal made at that
pet iod was summed up in these terms :—lt was done at Con-
ste .ntinca?le by a meeting of the representatives of the Four
PC rivers , under the presiding influence of the active T ord Strat-
f, Rd de Reda& ; and the plan adopted there obtained a pre•
f.eronce over the plan simultaneously adopted at Vienna, and be-
came actually the basis of the proposal finally made to the Ein-
poror of Russia. Now, what was the plan on which, in Dec,m-
-b Cr, 1853, the Four Powers were agreed, and which they pre-
sented to Russia as the full amount of the concessions which
she had a right to demand. The first point related to the
evacuation of the Principalities, which was to take place as
rapidly as possible. The second point was, that all the
treaties which were dissolved by the actual war, including the
trf!aty of Kainardji, were to be removed. (Derisive cheers
fr om the Opposition.) He knew not from what gentleman
hat opposition came, but it showed the blinding influence of
'the exciting circumstances of the times, and of the strong feel-
ings of a magnanimous people, as opposed to that judicial
understanding which, after all, ought to guide us in these
transactions. The second• term, in December, 1853, was,
after all, that the old treaties between Russia and Turkey
should be renewed ; and the third term was, that the Sultan
of Turkey should communicate, not to the Emperor of Russia
alone, but to each of the five Powers, and that a firman should
be issued, guaranteeing to the Greek Christians of Turkey all
those religious privileges which might be enjoyed by the other
non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte. These were the objects
of the great Powers in 1853. There were many who were
then listening to him to whom this statement would coma as
a revelation. (Hear, hear.) Nevertheless, such was the turn
which affairs had taken. He was sure that her Majesty's
Government would confirm and not contradict him when he
said that these were the terms so proffered to Europe and
published to the world. He might, if it were prudent, carry
still farther his statements, which would be corroborated by
the documents which had passed between the Powers engaged
in this great struggle, and especially between England and
France. But what was the manner in which their proposals
were received by Russia ? He had stated the terms of the
il,rotocol of Jan. 13, 1P54, to which St. Petersburg gave no
written answer. The answer was the mission of Count Orloff.
When that noblemanarrived at Viennahe submitted the coun-
ter demand of Russia ; and now, having enabled them to as-
certain the fixed point from which they ought to measure
their distance, he would proceed to make some remarks upon
the demands then made. The tone they held, and the terms
then required by Russia, when explained, would give
them another fixed point from which they would be able
to judge whether it was true, as some had said, that the ob-
jects of this war were not attained, and that if we retired we
should retire as a humiliated and degraded nation. These
wore the terms of Russia on the 2d. of February, 1854. This
was the answer of Russia, upon the reception of which the
'resolution was taken, upon the recommendation of Austria
and Prussia, by the Governments of France and England, to
send that summons to the Emperor of Russia, which was
immediately followed by the declaration of war. The de-
mands were—first, that it was to be an irrevocable condition
that the negotiations should take place on the subject mat-
ter at issue not at Vienna or any neutral place,; the choice
was given to Turkey that they should take place either at St.
Petersburg, under the person of the Emperor, or at the

head-quarters of the Russian army. This was the first con-
dition, essential and irrevocable. The second condition was
the confirmation full and entire of the old treaties from Kain-
ardj onwards. The third condition was the protection of
the Greek Churches ; the fourth was, of course, the evacua-

tion of the Principalities ; the fifth was the restoration of the
status in quo in the Principalities ; the sixth was, that Tur-
key should have a new set of stipulations with respect to the
reception of refugees and strangers Such were the absolute

demands which constituted the ultimatum of Russia before
the war. Was there here a cause of war or not ? When first
Austria had permission to refer to St. Petersburg, the pro-
position which was made was in the shape of Four Points. He
did not shrink from his share of the responsibility of the de-
cision at which the then Government arrived in consequence
of the male in which those propositions were received.
(Conservative cheers.) He did not shrink from his personal
responsibility in regard to the Crimean expedition. (Hear.)
But he called upon those, who said that that expedition had
entirely failed, to mark the difference in the language of
Russia before and after that expedition. (Hear, hear.)
He held that military expeditions in time of war were only
to be regarded as means, and not as ends. (Hear,
hear.) On the 26th of August, 1854, Russia replied to
the communication of Count Buol, who had forwarded
the Four Points. He would not quote the reply in extenso
but the effect of it was this—that the Four P Ants
were terms to which Russia could not consent except at the
end of a desperate struggle, and a long series of disasters.
He quite agreed with his noble friend the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, that the naval and military forces of Rus-
sia'had long been the standing menace of Turkey. The ques-
tion of the Black Sea was one of great, he might say of insu-
perable difficulty. It was not in the wit of man to institute
a perfectly satisfactory arrangeinent with regard to the Black
Sea. If it were an open sea, like the Mediterranean, they
might know what to do. If it were like the American lakes,
close water, they would know what to do. If they were
dealing with powers that shared the coast of the Black Sea—
if it were shut in and not accessible to vessels of great draught
of water, then, too, they would know what to do ; but unless
they converted the straits of the Black. Sea into a canal, as it
were, they could not get over the difficulty. On the other
hand, if they treated the Black Sea in any of those modes,
they should not overlook the fact of the weakness of the
Turkish Government, and the importance to Europe of pre-
WNW; an aggression on the Ottoman empire. The question
was surcavided with difficulties. There was no suggestion
not open to objection. Nothing with regard to this limita-
tion of the Russian power in the Black Sea could be otherwise
but an imperfect remedy for the present, and an imperfect
guarantee for the future. Well, then, what was to be done ?
They had to take their choice of several plans, all of which ]
were imperfect. So far as Parliament was aware, he (Mr.
Gladstone) and his colleagues left office pledged to nothing
but thi destruction of the preponderance of Russia. They
were Aware of that responsibility. They were responsible,
with Abe noble viscount at the head of the Government, for
having proposed the Russian limitation of the naval forces in
the Black Sea. He always considered the plan defective, but
he became an assenting party because he knew se no other.
In doing so, they did not exclude themselves from profiting by
any experience arising from discussions on the question into
which they should enter, and they left them-elves open to per-
severe with that plan, or to adopt any other plan equally good,
or it might be preferable, so as not to warrant. a contimiance of
the war. What had been the reception of the plan for that
limitation from the first night it was discussed in the House
of Commons ? He considered, its reception had been most
unfavourable. He had heard an hon. and chivalrous friend
say that he was ready to go all lengths in defence of the war,
but he had not heard any member of the house rise and say
that bp was prepared to sanction the continuance of the war
if the limitation were refused ; while, on the other hand, he
would be prepared to accede to peace if the limitation were
granted. He did not believe there were twenty gentlemen
iu that crowded assembly ready to hold that line. There
were some who thought this was not a question of con-
test as to terms. The ground on which they stood before
Europe was, that they were ready to make every concession
to refuse everything that should not be offered—and the
dividing line was between the limitation of the naval force in
the Black Sea and the discretionary power of the Turkish
Government. They were cognisant of the fact, that the con-
ferences had been held. As regards the question of limitation
alone, the conferences had been adjourned ; and, on that
issue, they were called to vote by the motion of the right
hon. gentleman, the member. for Buckinghamshire—a vote
which, if it were affinitively recorded, would not represent the
feelings of the house or of the country. If the vote of the
house went to declare that this was not a question of terms,
after what had taken place at Vienna, it would go far to in-
volve them in a breach of faith in thueyes of Europe. If it
were not a question of _terms, what course were they to
adopt ? This was not the first occasion on which they had to
express a solemn judgment on the rights of peace or war.
Were they to resort, or to think of a system of dismember-
ment? The objection to that was, that it was impos-ible. If
we intend to make this question a war of nationalities, it
would be well to consider whether we can make that waralone.
He apprehended that we would be alone, and that Austria
would not be likely to enter into a war of nationalities. From
the comp sition of Austria, he would ask, was she likely to enter
into a war of nationalities ? Will France do so ? He could tell
them that France, as well as Austria, would not and could not
enter into this war of nationalities ; in this she entertained a
different opinion, be would ask how that war could be ener-
zained byher when she looked at the present state of the city of
Rome. (Hely%) He would not say, can France enter into
such a war, but could she en er into a war of nationalities
under such circumstances He had read a few days ago
some portion of thi debates in ho Sardinian Chamber rela-
tive to the Sardinian contingent for the war, and some of the
members objected to its joining the English army, because
they thought it would be in bad company. (Laughter.) They
said the English had managed to lose 2,000 men out of an
army of only 12000. He armed that, with many gentlemen,
this was not a question of terms, for thesd have been acceded;
but both gentlemen in that house and the public journals
called out for military successes. Such an idea was hideous,
it was immoral and inhuman, and he would say that no na-
tion had a right to make war for military successes alone.
(Hear, hear.) loftouthldiney,avkoaberotaiitthneed success, they would want to
cthoneytinduide tshoehweawr
o
of Him in whose hands was th°
eatrtheea wto
fta hre orft militaryem
armies, p t e da
stghi
muchrY wrath;ieis
that of the infant in the cradle. He would ask what was the
state of this queatsnotdiopnre?
those v enTthet
termsb aGovernmentsof France and
England had proposed-certain terms
pdzernee
odfnEecuerssaoper,y
the military occupation of the Crimea. Ru:osusinsaishiaYh, breakingwdhniochw constitutedewtohanes.
ceded what she at M
first refused, except a mere trifle. Low, re
said that we U have military successes. .ti We do not

consider that we have subjugated Russia, and therefore we I
will continue the war until we make these succ,sses. He
could not avoid s lying, that he thought neither peace nor
the honour of Russia seemed to 'be the primary object in
these arrangements, but that military glory was the primary
object. Ho warned them that the eyes of Europe were upon
them, and that their words uttered in that house would be
quoted against them in the face of Europe, and by them they
must rise or fall. The right hon. gentleman the member for
Manchester, three or four months ago, made a solemn appeal
to the house, and charted them with an earnestness that did
him the highest honour, with a guiltiness of blood if they per-
sisted in maintaining the war. He (Mr. Gladstone) did not
wince under that challenge, because he believed that it was a
war of a class which we carried on at a distance that we might
not carry it on nearer home—because it was a war which we
carried on in the Crimea that we might not have to carry it
on in the heart of Europe —just as in ancient times the greatest
orators of Greece called on their countrymen to carry on war
in Thessaly that they might not have to carry it on in Attica.
They had recently had among them some of the most distin-
guished of their gallant troops, who received at the hands of
her Majesty an acknowledgment at least of their valorous
deeds. Many of those forms, he rejoiced to say, were again
'erect, and hail regained the elastic step of youth and health,
but what were they i o say to the thousands who slept on the
waters of the Bosphorus, or under the rocks of ,Palaklava ?
And what were they to say to their gallant allies, who, ranged
side by side with them in the hour of privation and danger,
had suffered, he feared, in a much greater degree. (Hear.)
But it was no consolation to him that in the fatal progression,
the French should have suffer,d double our loss, though that
was more than 15,030, and that more than four times that
number of Turks slept beneath the ground. It was no conso-
lation to him to know that the Turks had lost 120,000, and
the Russians 250,000 men—amounting altogether to nearly
half a million of human beings, or at the rate of a thousand a
day. With him the consideration was, that if the war were
a war for smaller, secondary, and trivial objects—a war for
objects which they dared not iu public papers to declare to
the world, then he said, in God's name, while there was yet
time, let them do something to put an end to that awful
scourge, and let them, by the adoption of firm, moderate, and
cautions terms re-open to Christendom the hope of a return
to happiness and peace.
Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, although I do not concur in many
parts of the speech of my right hon. friend, 3et I willingly
yield to him the acknowledgment that he has discussed the
question in a manner worthy of himself and of this house—
(hear)—that he has considered that which was of most im-
portance to the continuance or the cessation of this war—that
he has fairly brought before us the arguments which weigh
upon his mind as to the conclusion to which he had come—a
conclusion to which, if convinced by his argument, any mem-
bers of this house might subscribe. (Hear, hear.) So far
the spirit of my right hon. friend's speech has been totally
different from that of the sight hon. gentleman opposite—.
(cheers)—who gave us no clear and intelligible account why
he would continue the war— who used, to follow a phrase of
his own, the most ambiguous language on the subject, and
who detained us for two hours and a half with party attacks
and ingenious sarcasms. (Cheers and laughter.) But, sir,
before I speak of the right hon. gentleman's speech, and at-
tempt to defend myself from the attacks which he has made
upon my conduct as a member of the Government, I must
revert while they are fresh in my memory to some of the argu-
ments and topics urged by my right hon. friend who has just
sat down. My right hon. friend says most truly that the
terms already assented to by Russia go far beyond those which
were originally asked by the allies, but surely he ought to have
laid greater weight upon the very obvious consideration that,
if such be the blessed state of peace that princes and sovereigns
are most unwilling to exchange it for a state of war, that
which will give an immediate remedy for an immediate danger
suffices them to maintain that state of peace. But when once
the rubicon is passed—when you have got into war—when once
powers are engaged in conflict, then it becomes you to think,
not what would have been sufficient before the contest com-
menced, but to consider how you can obtain peace which has
in it the elements of safety and of duration. (Cheers.) I
cannot, therefore, attach the value which my right hon.
friend attaches to the change which has taken place in con-
sequence of Russia having felt the power of the allied belli-
gerents—the pressure of Austria concentrating her forces and
threatening hostilities until Russia gave way—and the in-
fluence of the expedition to the Crimea. But the question is
not whether the immediate danger is warded off, but whether
you are to seek security for the future, and if so in what that
security shall consist. There is one danger with regard to
the principalities—that was the first point. The second point
has not reference to any immediate danger from Russia, or
any immediate protection to Turkey. But the third point
did not contain a declaration that it sms necessary to revise
the treaty of 1841, in the first place, with a view to attach
Turkey to the balance of power, and, in the next place, to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea ;
and my right hon. friend thinks he sees in the propositions of
Russia a fulfilment of that condition. Now, the danger is
that Russia having a preponderance in the Black Sea—having
twenty sail-of-the-line in her harbour at Sebastopol—may, as
has been shown, take advantage of the possession of that
fleet and get possession of the Bosphorous, or land an army
in its immediate vicinity. Now, what does Russia say to
that ? Russia says that she will consent that the fleets of
other powers may come into the Black Sea, provided
always that the fleets of Russia may at any time pass
through the Bosphorous. What would be the conse-

queue; of accepting such a condition I The fleets of Eng-
land and France would seldom go into the Bosphorus,
and not in any force in time of peace; but these twenty
sail-of-the-Hue might at any time present themselves at

Constantinople, b:;fore the gates of the Sultan's palace,
and impose upon him what terms they please. (Hear, hear.)
What was forbidden by the treaty of 1841 would have been

possible and easy to Russia, and this is what the Russian ple-
nipotentiaries cal: a compliance with the terms proposed.
(Hear, hear.) Then after I left Vienna another proposal was

made, in which my right hon. friend seems to see a securAy;
and it was this; to leave the treaty of 1841 as it now stands,
the Sultan decl 'ring, as he has a right to declare, that he

wishes to maintain the principle of Closing, the Straits, but
that if Turkey was menaced she might call the fleets of her
allies to her assistance. I can see but very little, very scanty
. .

security in that. Leaving the treaty of 1841 as it was before
the commencement of the war in case of a menace of invasion,
of violence on the part of Russia,' Turkey would have the
right of every independent power of calling her allies to her
assistance, and to that point where they could most easily
assist her. I think in this case everything consists ha priority,
and the fleets of the allies being at the distance, and a large
fleet of the Russians in the near neighbourhood, it is probable
that that menace would have been carried into execution be-
fore the Sultan could have called for assistance from his allies.

(Hear, hear, hear.) If we had consented to such terms, I
think it would have been right to say we did not pro-
pose the fulfilment of that part of the third point.
(Hear, hear.) It is said that the third point is fulfilled.

- •
Why, the acceptance of a proposal so nugatory and meagre as
either the first or second of Russia's alternatives would have
been an attempt to deceive Europe in a manner quite unwor-
thy of two such nations as England and Turkey. It would
have been far better to have said at once, " We are unable to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea—
it must be built up again as soon as Russia can launch fresh

ships, and therefore that part of the scheme must be aban-
doned." But consider that that scheme against the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea is one of the many securi-
ties which, having gone to war for, we have attempted to ob-
tain. That Russian preponderance in the Black Sea is next to
the danger of Russia occupying the principalities ; and to
finish Cm war without any security against that danger would
indeed show that we had been defeated. My right hon. friend
has dwelt much upon the doctrine that you must have suc-
cesses independently of all terms of peace. I agree generally
in what my right hon. friend has stated upon that, and I
doubt whether any will say that independently of all terms
of peace, and independently of the security of Turkey, it was
necessary to gain military successes. I quite agree with my
right hon. friend that never has the valour of the English sol-
dier been brighter. (Cheers.) Never has the power of endur-
ance, the hardihood, and the fortitude of the British soldier
stood so high as it has done during the present war. (Hear.)
But if the objects are not effected by which we can be cer-
tain of having securities for peace, Turkey would be greatly
endangered. (Hear.) If it should be said that not only had
England and France relinquished the terms they had advanced
—and terms which Austria had said were just and fair, but
which Russia had not complied with—but in addition to that
had withdrawn 150,000 or 200,000 men from the Crimea,
without success, that would be a great addition, not only to
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, but to the pre-
ponderance of Russia all over the world. (Hear.) If you had
that, which all men would acknowledge to be a security for
peace and a safeguard for Turkey, you might then with all
honour withdraw from the Crimea, but if, in addition to a
failure in your terms of peace, you admitted a failure of suc-
cess, and withdrew your army, then Russia would immensely
increase Ler power over the oivilised world. And now sir, having
said this much with regard to the later topics in the speech
of my right hon. friend, I come to the question of the nego-
tiations with which I was charged at Vienna. (Hear.) But
. . _ _

let me state, in the first place, that although I thought suc-
cess in that negotiation came within the range of possibility,
that at no time was I sanguine that success was probable.
(Hear.) I can assure the right hon. gentleman that I felt I
had no habits of diplomacy, and that, being more accustomed
to parliamentary life than to intercourse with those who carry
on negotiations, I was not the fittest person to undertake the
duty. Tint when Lord Clarendon told me that he wished me
to undertake that missioa—and my noble friend likewise con-
curred in that wish - and when I found that her Majesty had
been pleased to express her approbation of such an appoint-
ment, I felt I could not honourably decline it. (Hear.) The
sight hon. gentleman says I ought to have begun with the
third point. That was not a question for me ; I was only
acting as one of the servants of the two Governments of
France and Great Britain. France, Great Britain, and Aus-
tria had duly considered the question, and when I was in
Paris I was informed by a despatch from my noble friend the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government
had resolved that the third point should be taken in the order
in which it stood. (Hear.) It was, therefore, my first duty
to consider of the first point and the question of the Princi-
palities. I believe that the concessions that have been made
by Russia with regard to these Principalities are of the
greatest importance. (Hear.) The right hon. gentleman
confounded two things which are essentially distinct. He
speaks of the protection of the Christians to which I had
referred in a despatch when I was Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and in which it was stated that it was
presented to the Emperor of Russia as a duty, and that it
had been sanctioned as such. Now there can be no doubt
whatever that, with regard to Wallachia and Moldavia, not
only by the treaty of Kainardji, but by other treaties—by
the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople—the Emperor of
Russia had an engagement from the Sultan to protect the
Christian subjects in the Principalities ; and if a congregation
were t-übject to outrage, murder, and • pillage, I conceive it
was the duty of the Emperor of Russia to ask for some re-
dress for such grievances. I know that, without any such
treaty, our ambassador at Constantinople, on receiving an ac-
count from a consul that a Christian church was destroyed,
or a Christian was murdered, thinks it his duty to bring the
fact under the notice of the Sultan, and generally obtains re-
dress. (Hear.) But the treaties to which I allude are ex-
press upon that point, and it is impossible for me, or for any
man, to deny that Russia had those rights by treaties.
But the right hon. gentleman confounded these treaties with
the proposal that was made by Prince Menschikoff, and asked
how I could make such a dangerous admission as that there
was a right of protection, and at the same time protest against
it in the case of Prince Menschikoff. Why, the right of pro-
tecting those churches was sanctioned over and over again by
treaties, but what Prince Menschikoff demanded was a claim
of protection going beyond those treaties, and which arose,
as stated in one of Lord Clarendon's despatches and in one
of the four points, from an erroneous interpretation of the
treaty of Kainardji. Of that erroneous interpretation I am
the more convinced when I recollect a fact that occurred
during the negotiations between Sir Hamilton Seymour and
the late Emperor Nicholas. Sir H. Seymour said to the
Emperor, " Have the goodness to point out on what part of
the treaty of Kainardji your claim is founded ; " and his
Imperial Majesty said—as an Imperial Majesty is likely to
say—(a laugh)—" I will not point out to you the particular
article of the treaty ; go to Count Nesselrode, an! he will
point out the article of the treaty." Sir Hamilton Seymour
as he was bid, 'went tO ' Count Nesselrode, and said, "Will
Tour excellency have the goodness to point out to rao the par.

titular part of the treaty of Kainardji on which your master's
claim is founded." Count Nesselrode said, " I am not con-
versant with those treaties, but Baron Brunow is conversant
with them ; tell your Government to apply to him, and he
will point out the part of the treaty on which the claim is
founded." But as Baron Brunow never attempted the task,
I conclude that it was not any part of the treaty of Kainardji
that gave such a claim. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gen-
tleman therefore creates confusion when he confounds that
claim with the undoubted rights claimed by the Emperor of
Russia for the protection of the Christians in Moldavia and
Wallachia. (Hear, hear.) I will not at this late houa enter
into any kind of disquisition about the navigation of the
Danube, but I may say, that on that point likewise we have
gained pretty considerable advantage. But we have to con-
sider the whole question, and a most important question it is,
which has occupied us for those two years past, and which I
think may occupy the Parliament of this country even for
future generations—namely, whether it is not necessary to
put some bounds to the progress of Russia, and in what man-
ner that object is to be effected. (Hear.) Far be it from me
to say that I could pretend, from any reflections or lights of
mine, to solve that great problem. (Hear, hear.) I consulted
others not only in England and France—not only the mem-
bers of my own Government an I the members of the French
Government —and I may venture to say, since he did me the
honour to admit me to an audience, the Emperor of the
French—(cheers)-.but likewise several statesmen of the
continent of Europe, not engaged with either power,
but whose well known wisdom and authority, and whose
long experience in political matters entitled their opinions to
the utmost attention. (Hear, hear.) Now what is the posi-
tion of Russia ? It might not be such as would have justified
us in making war, or have excited us to make it; but,
being at war, it behoves us all, and my right hon. friend the
member for the University of Oxford as much as any man,
most seriously to consider it. (Haar, hear.) Russia has,
since the' commencement of the century, increased her power
more than any other power of Europe. (Hear, hear.) She
has upwards of sixty millions of inhabitants, and has an
army of 800,000 men in time of peace. After a considerable
struggle, and much resistance by Lord Castlereagh, the re-
presentative of this country, and by Prince, Talleyrand, the
representative of France, she acquired and retains Poland.
The only limit was, that Poland was united to Rusiia by her
constitution ; but that link, which gave to Poland a separate
representation—a separate army, and as it were a separate
existence—was totally broken, and a new and bard fetter of
iron was employed to bind her to Russia after the insurrec-
tion of 1831. (Hear, hear,) In Poland she has erected six
or seven fortresses, of at least equal strength with Sebastopol.
She has conciliated the peasantry to a very great extent by a
policy artfully adapted for that purpose. (Hear, hear.) At
the same time the young men of Poland of rank and intelli-
gence, who might be filled with historic recollections and
patriotic ardour, and would some day rise up against the
policy of Russia, are carefully marked and selected and sent
to a distance in the interior provinces, there to meet with
no sympathy, where their names are unknown, and their "ate
is forgotten by all except the relatives they have left behind.
(Hear, hear.) In the Baltic we find from the discoveries
made last year—since the commencement of the war—that
a great plan of fortifications had been undertaken, which Sir
C. Napier sent home, and which he said would have given
Russia a complete predominance over the Baltic, because when
those fortifications were completed, neither Denmark nor
Sweden, nor any other power could have held up their fingers
against Russia in the Baltic. In Germany she has connected
herself with many of the smaller princes by marriage. Many
of the princes of Germany, I am sorry to say, live in great
fear of what they think is the revolutionary disposition of
their subjects, and they rely upon their armed forces to pro-
tect them ; but what are those armed forces ? The officers of
those forces are seduc,pd and corrupted by the Russian Court.
Rewards, orders, and distinctions are distributed amongst
them—even the receipt of money to pay debts will be accepted
by them, and that money is liberally giveu by the Russian
Court, so that Germany, which ought to be the seat of inde-
pendence—Germany, which should stand forward for the pro-
tection of Europe against Russia—has been for years under-
mined in its vital strength and independence by Russian arts
and Russian means. I have hitherto not spoken of the im-
mediate danger with which we have had to deal. Tho imme-
diate danger with which we have had to deal was this—that,
after a long course of violence and aggression, Russia had
signed a treaty at Adrianople which gave her new powers, and
confirmed many of the old., The dangers arising from that treaty
to Turkey are admirably pointed out in a despatch of Lord
Aberdeen ; but neither Lord Aberdeen nor the Duke of
Wellington, who was at the head of the ministry at the

time, thought it right to go to war on account of those
dangers. I believe they acted wisely ; but now that we
are at war we are not to forget the lesson Lord Aber-
deen gave, or keep out of sight the dangers that were
pointed out in that despatch. (Hear, hear.) She had there-
fore great means of influence in Turkey, such means of in-
fluence that I believe, if she had been wise and prudent, it
was quite sufficient to enable her to gain a permanent con-
_trol over the councils of Constantinople. But in an hour of
imprudence—the Sovereign is dead, and the time for severe
comments is passed by—she insisted upon what Turkey
thought a degradation, and which she resolved to resist by
force of arms. Lord Stratford bad some time before said,
" I think the time is come when Turkey's position must be
entirely changed. Either she will fall into a state of total
dependence upon Russia, or she must get rid of those ma-
nacles and shackles with which for years past she has been
fettered." We had to choose between leaving her completely
under the sway of Russia, or raising her to something higher.
We chose the latter part of the alternative. The immediate
danger was warded off. The siege of Silistria failed ; but had
it not been for the presence of the allied forces, it would have
been renewed in the summer or autumn, and the Russian

forces would have been at the Balkan. Russia retired across

he Danube. Austria then said that unless the Principalities

were evacuated she should declare war with Russia, and upon

her forces being assembled Russia evacuated them.

NoN,i, it

was because these Principalities were placed under the safe-
guard of Austria, because any attempt to invade Turkey or
to cross the Balkan and reach Coustautinople wasthuspre-
.

vented, that we felt ourselves enabled to send to the Crimea

,he expedition which, like my right 'honourable friend

(Mr. Gladstone), I still think we were right in sending, but
the discussion of which I will, like him, reserve for some fu.
ture occasion. There is, however, this fact, that from the
pressure at Sebastopol, the Russian fleet is no longer one
of 18 or 19 sail of the line, but a great part of it has been de-
stroyed by the Russians themselves. The question then came,
how we could diminish her power and put an end to her pre-
ponderance in the Black Sca. lam not at all ashamed of the
manner in which I agreed with Count Buol to invite the Rus-
sian plenipotentiaries to take the initiative upon the question.
Count Bnol represented to us that it might be hurtful to the
dignity of Russia to have terms imposed upon her for the
limitation of her power in the Black Sea, but that in cousi-

deation of the security of Europe She might make a propo-

sition to that effect to Turkey, and he asked us, the plenipo-
tentiaries of France and England, not to bring forward our
propositions until he had made the proposal. Ho made po
proposal, and I followed it up—answering for England, and
not for Russia, as the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) sup-
poses—with these words, " In the eyes of England and of
her allies, the best and only admissible conditions of peace
would be those which, being most in harmony with the
honour of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for
the security of Europe; and for preventing the return of
complications such as that the settlement of which is now in
progress." (Hear.) I wish to ask, provided the security of
Europe was attained and the return of what is called a com-
plication, what is in fact dreadful war, was prevented, was
it not desirable that the terms should be compatible with the
honour of Russia, and should be such as. to make her satisfied
wit 4 the arrangement? (Hear.) Therefore I am quite willing to
abide, and I believe my colleagues are ready to abide, by that
declaration which I then made. The answer,which was delayed
fora considerabl&time, was that the Russian plenipotentiaries
were desired not to make any propositions ; and we are told in
this circular that was in conformity with orders which had been
given by the Emperor Nicholas. I think that was a very
unwise decision. I have always understood that Russians of
great sagacity always considered that the Emperor Nicholas
paid too much attention to his marine, and that his fleets at
Sebastopol and Cronstadt, though \they might make a show
on parade, would not be able to compete with those of the
maritime Powers. I believe that to be a very sound opinion,
and therefore I thought it possible that they would have
made this concession, thus giving up something the cession of
which would not really diminish the power of Russia as a
great Power, but would diminish her power in the Black
Sea. I hear it said that if the force was limited, the fleets of
England and France might come in at any time and insult
the coasts of Russia in the Black Sea. How would she be
worse than she has been in the present war, when we have
seen that her fleet has been no seourity at all? No sooner
have the fleets of England and France appeared in the Black
Sea than her ships have skulked into Sebastopol, and several
of them have been destroyed. I told one of those persons
to whom I have alluded, whose name I must not mention,
that we intended to propose the limitation of the Russian
fleet, but that I was told Russia would object to it. He
said, " If that is so, it is a proof that she means aggression."
I thought that observation perfectly just. I cannot conceive
why Russia should hesitate to make peace in order that she
may have eighteen or twenty sail of the line at Sebastopol,
unless she meditates some future aggression upon Turkey.
And that I now believe, still more than I did last year,
still more than I did before I went to Vienna, to be in
the contemplation of Russia. Russia thinks that Turkey
cannot endure long, and thinking that when Turkey breaks
up England or France will hasten to sieze Constantinople,
and thud menace her empire, she feels it necessary to
be beforehand with these Powers, and make herself mis-
tress of the city. Put it, however, which way you
will—as an act either of aggression or of self-defence—it
comes to the same thing, that it is the intention of Russia, at
some future time—it may be, in no remote future—to possess
hersolflof Constantinople. (Cheers.) Believing that to be the
case, aro the Governments of France and England to close
with the proposition of Russia, that they should have no se-
curity exvept that, in case of menace, Turkey might call up
the fleets of her allies ? I admit all the imperfections of the
security we have propose 1, but let the right hon. gentleman
(Mr. Gladstone) and the house recollect that we are by a sti-
pulation with Austria and our position in the war precluded
from asking for any territorial concession. No doubt, the
return of some of the provinces which Russia has wrested
from Turkey would be a better security than the limitation of
the fleet ; but if we had proposed such a course, Austria would
have opposed it, and Russia would have left the conferences.
We were, therefore, obliged to resort to the other security,
and I confess I have seen no better plan than that which we
proposed, except the other plan, to which Russia was still
lgsahticif:hips more or " What does
less ?" and then he went on to say, " You ought, in fact,
more opposed, of making the Black Sea altogether a commer-
cial sea, and forbidding the entaance of ships of war into it.
Such, therefore, is my defence with reference to this point.
The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli)--and his language
seemedi t signify to
whether
ttho e be extremelyeßussa
has
ambiguous—said,
four or °us e
i•gu
to carry on the war defensively ; you ought to defend
Turkey when Russia is prepared to attack her." Now
this comes to one of two conclusions —_ the right honour-
able gentleman has not told us which either to be
there perpetually to defend Turkey, and thus to make
au eternal war, or, having defended Turkey against the
immediate aggression, and Russia having consented to say,
for the hundredth time, that she will respect the integrity of
Turkey, that we should withdraw our forces and make peace,
having no security beyond those to which Russia has already
consented—that is the plan of my right hon. friend the
member for the University of Oxford. But my right hon.
friend fairly and manfully avowed that plan. He brought it
before the House of Commons of England, and declared that
these were terms upon which he thought that we should be
secure. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli), however,
said —" Put an end" (not to war—but) " to the negotiations;"
° at once proposing that we shoulil have no success,
no security for peace, and at the same time proposing the
continuance of the war. Can anything be more inconsistent,
more extravagant than such a proposal ? Now it has been
said that Austria has not given us all the support which she
might do. As far as the support to be given in conferences i
is concerned she has fully given us that support, and with re-
gard to this last proposition of calling up the forces of the
allies when Turkey was in danger, she said that is no security
—that is leaving the preponderance of Russia unlimited till
the moment when the danger becomes intolerable. (H
I must say, sir, I do not expect, however, that Austria is
prepared in the present state of the question to take an im-
mediate part in the war against Russia, I believe that she
would have consulted her own interest and dignity better if
she had some time ago joined us in that war, but at the-sa
mo
time there are considerable motives, there are powerful'
mo-
twee, to iniNCOO liar iu uniutainiug poace /tit Russia,._

' In the first place, she has not her capital in the situation of
either London or Paris, which are free from any danger of
incursion by the Russian army. She has no fortresses in
Gallicia to prevent the Russian army marching at once to
Vienna, while she has no secure alliance on this subject
with Prussia. (Hear, hear.) These are some of the
motives which have deterred her from taking an active
part in the war and the Austrian Government feel that, un-
less they can show that there is some predooainant and ne-
' cessary motive to induce her to go to war, she would not be
justified in calling upon the population of German:7' to support
her in it. I tell this openly to the house, beca.'ise I think
that not only ought justice to be done to Austria, but like-
wise because I do not wish to hold out any
hope that she
will take an immediate part in the war, I do think, ho wever,
that her position is such—that her treaties and engagements
with us are such, that, if the war continues, she will find it
necessary to take part in the war. But of this I feel slue,
that the part Austria has played in not taking a share of tile
spoils of Turkey, which Russia had confidently expected, said
in joining us, will never be forgiven by passia,
and, there-
fore, her only safety is in building up such allies as may socur,e,
her against Russia. (Hear, hear,) Sir, for that reason ishau
be ready to vote against the motion of the right hon. get ,tle-
man the member for Buckinghamshire. This, sir, is a gn..at
national question— perhaps the greatest national questio. 'I
that ever enga .ed the counsels of the house or called forth
the resources of the country—and yet the right lion. gentle-
man seeks to degrade it to a mere party struggle. Sir, the
right hon. gentleman alluded to the distrust which is felt in
the Government. I do not deny the existence of that dis-
trust, but I do not believe the cure for it would be found in
the substitution of the right hon..gcntkman for my noble
friend who sits on this side of the house. I do not believe such
a change would create that general satisfaction which the
right hon. gentleman seems to expect. (Heir, hear.) I hear
much said about administrative reform. I think that is a
natural desire, and I entirely agree in the object required ;
but I want to know why it should be presumed that there
are other merr, either sitting on the opposite side of the
house or elsewhere; who could carry out administratiire
reform. better than those who arc at present in the possession
of office. I believe you could not have a better measure than
that which has been proposed by my noble friend Lord Pan-
mure on the subject of reform in the department of the army.
My noble friend proposes to place the civil branches of the ,
army under the superintendence of one Secretary of State,
thereby having the eye of one man to watch and the hand of
one man to guide the machinery connected with the army.
So far as the departments of the army are concerned the evils
eomplained of are remedied ; while, with regard to the other
departments of the Government, I do not find that there is
any special accusation as to them. Ido not find with regard
to the Financial Department, the Home Department, or the
Colonial Department that there has been any complaint made
of inefficiency in those departments. I believe, therefore,
that the right hon. gentleman, while he has not founded his
propos 41 on any particular accusation, has no better founda-
tion for the remedy which he says will do away with the gene-
ral distrust. lam convinced that the party opposite would
not gain any credit by the carrying of this motion, because
it would be said that in a great crisis the great Con-
servative party, for upwards of a year, came forward with
the greatest patriotism to support the Crown and sustain
the honour of the country ; but, after little more than
a year, they abandoned that patriotic cour...e when they
thought there was an opportunity of slipping into
office. (Hear.) I believe the right hon. gentleman and those
who vote with him would gain no credit by such a course,
and whatever may be the division in this house I think, in
point of reputation, this has been a false move of the right
hon. gentleman. (Hear.) If he can censure any act of ours,
if he can put his finger upon any act of the Government and
censure that act, of course we are open to any censure, to any
observation, to any criticism which this house may choose to
make ; butto bring forward vague words, to merely catch up
what seems to be the feeling of the moment, and which may
not last but a day or two, to be so impatient as not to wait
until after the Whitsuntide holidays to know if the negotia-
tions are concluded, betrays, I must say, such a falling off-in
the patriotism which has hitherto been displayed in the votes
of hon. gentlemen opposite, that I think they will add nothing
to their fame or reputation by the course they are now taking.
(Cheers.)
On the motion of Mr. WHITESIDE, the debate was then
adjourned until to-morrow (this day).
Sir WM. SOMERVILLE obtained leave to bring in a bill
to encourage the providing of improved dwellings for the
labouring classes in Ireland.
Lord PALMERSTON intimated that the committee on the
bill for the better local government of the metropolis would
not be resumed until the Tuesday after the recess, and there-
fore the house would meet to-morrow (this day) at the usual
hour, instead of at 12 o'clock, as had been previously ar-
ranged.
The other orders of the day were then disposed of, and the
house adjourned at half-past one.

THE MINISTRY AND ITS SUPPORTERS.

A meeting was held yesterday afternoon at the official
residence of the First Lord of the Treasury, in Down-
ing-street, which was numerously attended by all sec-
tions of the Liberal party in the House of Commons.
Being a private meeting, reporters were excluded, and
we are therefore unable to give a detailed account of the
speeches delivered on the occasion. Lord Palmerston,
in a speech of some length, vindicated the policy of his
Government, asserted the unanimity of his colleagues,
and stoutly maintained their resolution to prosecute the
war with vigour until terms should be obtained calcu-
lated to insure at safe and honourable peace. The pre-
cise nature of those terms his lordship claimed for the
Government the right of determining according to cir-
cumstances ; but those of his audience who expected to
hear any definite statement on this momentous question
weht away very little wiser than they came. The meet-
ing was afterwards addressed by Messrs. Lowe, Layard,
Bright, Cobden, Lord Robert Grosvenor, Sir James
Graham, Mr. Laing, and other gentlemen, who gene-
rally concurred in censuring Mr. D►sraeli's resolution,
though considerable difference of opinion was expressed
as to the amendment of Sir F. Baring. The tone of
the meeting, though by no means harmonious, was,
perhaps, as favourable t the Government as could be
expected nn ier circumstances so little calculated to
inspire confidence.

The following is a list of the members (numbering 203)
who attended the meeting :
Graham, Sir J. Molicreiff J. Shelburne, Earl
Ilerbert, S Thorn.son, G. Klmr, L.
Wool; Sir C. Gardner, lt. Perry, Sir E.
Diolesworth, Fit W. Wickham, ii. Rams len, Sir J.
Macaulay, T. B. Price W. Kinnaird, A.
Lewis, Sir G. C. Haidiey, C. Portman, W.
Ellice, B. Kershaw, J. Dcnismi, E.
Villiers, C. Crook, J. Howard, lion. C.
Bouverie, Hon. E. P. Ileadlam, T. Ebrlngton, Viscount
Hay ter, W. Acton, Josenh Ellice, E., Jun.
Mulgrave, F arl of Chambers, T. Marshall, %V.
Hall, Sir Benjamin Brocktehorst, J. Lowe, R.
Grey, Rt. lion. Sir G. Rich, B. Warner, E.
Russell, Lord J. Kirk, W. Traill, G.
Gib.on, M. Baxter, W. Baring, 11.
Cobden, R. Oliveira, B. Cdbbett, J. M.
Bright, J. Duke, Sir J. Milton, Viscount
Horsman, E. Stanley, W. Dundas, F.
Hervey, Lord A. lliangies. R. Lindsay, C.
Castlerosse. Vis. Bidduiph, Col. R. M. Mills, T.
Basile, Archel. Heywood, J. Cavendish. G. C.
Russell, H. Morris, D, Lemon, Sir C.
Laing, S. Cheetham, John Craufard, E. H. J.
Goodman, Sir G. Brotherton, J. Coffin, W.
Townshend, Capt. J. Ewart, J. Tynte, Col. C.
Pechell, Fir G. Phillimore, R. J. Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.
Ferguson, J. Fitzgerald, J. Monsell, W.
Scobell. Capt. Caulfield, Lt.-Col. J. Peel. F.
Hankey, T. Bonham-Carters J. De Vere, S. E.
M +the vm, A. Walmsley, Sir J. Wells, W.
Matheson, Fir J. Russell, F. C. Scrope, G.
Bland, L. H. Collier, R. P. ' Dmgarvan, Viscount
,ktiderson, it J. Ingham, R. Ricardo, S.
Beaumont, W. Forster, John Berkeley, Adm.
Hantner, Sir John Ewart, W. Sheridan, R.
O'Briem, P. Wyvili, M. North, F.
Harcourt, G. G. Ricardo, 0. Berkeley, Hon. H.
Langston, .1. 11. Seymour, Lord Jermyn, Rt. Hn. Earl
Glregson, Samuel Cowan, C. Esmond e, J.
Seymour, D. Phillimore, J. G. Brand, H B. W.
Luce T. Vane, Lord H. Bethell, Sir R.
Matikinnon, W. Atherton, W.' Robartes, T.
Biggs, W. Milne , W. M. E. Seymour, H.
Strickland, Sir G. Norreys, Sir D. Williams, W.
[ Tancred. H. Moritz, G. Price, Sir R.
Heard, J. Littleton, E. Peel, Sir R.
Forret , _ ~. , Lord A. Forster, Charles Davie. Sir H. R. F.

Herbert, P. Waterpark, Lord Grosvenor, Ld. R.
Duncan, George Clay, Sir W.. Bt. Wortley, J. S.
Aealr, H. Layard, A. H. Duff, G.
Grace, 0. O'Flaherty, A. 111arjoribanks, D.
Elliott, J. E. Itice, E. Cardwell, E.
Keogh, W. Bruce, H. A. Gordo.i, A.
3avendish, C. C. Walter, J. Smith, M.
Scully. V. Clifford, Lt.-Col. H. M. Osborne, R.
Lee, W. Alcock, T. Ball, J.
O'Brien, J. Scholetield, W. Johnstone, Sir J.
Foley, J. 11. Hogg, Sir J. W. Fitzroy, Henry
Bulkeley. Sir R. Dent, J. It eed, J.
Thornhill, W. Fitzwilliam, G. Ferguson, Sir It.
Shafto, R. Bell, J. Bruce, Lord E.
Grenfell, Charles Fortescue, C. S. Clinton, Lord It.
Dalrymple, Viscount Rumbold, C. Duncan, Viscount
Crossley, F. Goderich, Viscount Wilkinson, W.
Freestun, Colonel Smith, R. Berkeley. G.
Heneage, Geo. F. Baines, Rt. Hon. M. Wilson, J.
Chaplin, W. Stafford, A. Barnes, T.
Thornely, T.