The National Register.
London, England, 1821-10-14 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL. REGISTER

VOYAGE DANS LA GRANDE IIIiETAGNE."
Under the above title, M. I)upin has published
the observations he made on a recent Tour through
this kingdom—they bespeak a degree of candour and
impartiality, perhaps, as rarely met with in the
English historian of France, as in the French his-
torian of England. The following extract we hope
will prevent the future alarm of any of the 04.1)
WOMEN of England on the score of invasion ; an
alarm which for ages past it has been the trick of
government to create whenever more than usual
pressure was intended to be placed on the back of
poor JOHNNY BOLL
" At this epoch Great Britain had, besides the regular army,
600,000 militia, infantry, and cavalry, in arms, all the seamen
of the merchant service enrolled for the gun-boats, and the in•
habitants of the coasts embodied in corps, called sea fencibles.
It remained to be seer. whether this force was capable of with•
standing the shock of the army of Boulogne, bad that army
crossed the Channel.
" When the First Consul threatened England with an invasion,
he did not appear inclined to attempt it with ships of the line ;
he caused gun boons to be built in all the ports and in all the
rivers on the Atlantic coast, and collected them to the number of
1,300 in the port of Boulogne. Troops to the amount of 100,b00
were to be embarked on board of these gun boats and transports.
In the case of a successful descent, immense reinforcements were
to follow. They were to foice a landing on the opposite coast,
and proceed direct to London, not, as was supposed might be
done in the time of Lloyd. by advancing only two miles a day in
consequence of the difficulties of the ground and the embarrass-
mentof baggage, but by forced marches, carrying eve!), position
by the bayonet or field artillery. After their landing, nothing
would in the that instance have arrested the progress of the con-
querors of Lodi, of Zurich, of Hehopohis, of Holienlinden, and
of Marengo.
" But was the descent possible? It was net possible to enter
Dover by force. That port is situated between two high moun-
tains, in a position in which its lofty batteries and works, site
front any comp de main, would easily destroy the most formidable
fleet. There was besides on the heights of Dover an entrenched
camp, occupied by a considerable torce, which would have de•
fended the coast under the protection of the forts and batteries.
" On the other hand, how were 1,300 vessels to get out of Bou-
logne in one tide, and to stand over in any thing like order to the
English (04/it ? This could never be done under the tire of the
English squadron cruising in the Channel.
" But that squadron might be driven off its station by a gale
of wind ; and before it could have time to return, the French
flotilla miht cross. Be it so. But let us see what would follow.
•• The English had lined their coast with strong batteries on
every point where a landing could be attempted. Strong towers
were built at short distances along the shore, which was com-
pletely within the range of their guns ; these nurtello towers
could not be taken by a coup de ',win, Brigades of light ar-
tillery, corps of cavalry, flying camps of infuiitry, presented a
force moveable along the whore of the sea coast by a road ex-
pressly made for that purpose. The English had besides a great
number of gun boats in all the ports opposite Boulogne. All
small craft, all pilot and fishing boats, arc. were prepared for
warfare it' necessary. They were numbered and classed in divi.
sions, with officers ready to direct, and troops to man them.—
The guns and ammunition were so disposed in the magazines that
these vessels could be armed in a moment. Finally, besides the
squadron stationed off Boulogne, there was a fleet of observation
in the Downs, another at Spithmd, and a third at the Nore. In
a tea minutes the telegraphic signals could communicate between
all these points and the Admiralty in London,
" Thus, whichever way the wind might brow, it was probable
that the English would arrive at the point of descent, if not in
time to prevent a landing, at least soon enough to burn our flo-
tilla. In that case our army would have been left without are •
treat, without support, and without provisions.
" That it would have performed prodigies lam sensible. It
would not have been less magnanimous titan the army of the
east, after the naval battle of Aboukir. But those opposed to it
were not Turks and Arabs. It would have to contend against a
people of' prodigious obstinacy—against a million of men in
arms, animated by the enthusiasm of patriotism, and incited by
the most implacable hatred of the French name.
" I have impartially stated our means of attack, and the
English means of defence.
** 1 am still of opinion that it was impossible to effect a descent
without the protection of a fleet equal to that which we then pos-
seased, and which was defeatial in the battle of Trufalgar : but it
was necessary that this fleet should first have possession of the
Channel, and the Captains who commanded it. in consequence of
the inexperience of many, anti the indecision of others (though
there were honourable exceptions), were such as to render a vic-
tory impossible. As to success after the landing, I leave it to
eminent military commanders to determine by their skill and
experience the chances of' victory and defeat. I confine myself
to a statistical view of the military and naval force of Great
Britain.
" Instead of attacking the British empire in its centre, it
would have been more auvantageous to land in Ireland. But it
would have been necessary to have made this attempt with a great
expedition. Had Gen. Buena. aite, instead of conquering Egypt,
proceeded with his army of Italy to Ireland, that country would
certainly have been lost to England, and British power would
have sustained an irreparable blow. By landing in the Bay of
Galway, to proceed afterwards along the bank- of the Sharman,
a tine position would have been occupied. Ireland must have
been thrown into insurrection, the natives aimed and organized
in corps, and the English driven out of that island. We fomented
the revolt of the Irish by sending them trifling succours. They
were the victims of their confidence, and frightful massacres fol-
lowed the insurrection.
" At the time when our continental army had completed its
glory by the campaign and victory of Austerlitz, England, by
destroying the combined naval force of France and Spain, oar
Cape Trafalgar, secured a long duration to her maritime pre-
' poniterante. Being relieved trust all tear of invasion, she aban-
doned the defensive system, and gradually adventured an
offensive war. She failed in her first attempt against Spain,
wider General Moore; and against Behgiunt, under Chatham.
Instructed by these reverses, she learned to connect more perfectly
her military slid naval opeiations; to employ more abundance
and fitness in her means, inure prudence in her plans, and more
vigour in the execution. The arniy which the naval force at
Corunna saved from destruction was soon after brought back by
that same force to We Penimula, where, supplied and supported
q the navy, it balanced during five years the success of the
tench troops in Portugal and Spain, which countries became the
, tomb of the armies of Austerlitz and Jena."