The National Register.
London, England, 1809-10-15 00:00:00

TH4 piATIONAL REGISTER.

con.:,,ostiote ; leave us the dreadful alternative, to
conquer or perict t 'This iitheconVictiOn we ought to im-
press upon our minds, whenever we take the utility of our
isures, or the application of our resourees, into con-
sieeratton.

This impression, we believe, is general ; but reiterated
Itsappoiutments have prevented its• full operation, and di-
Terted,its tendency. Hence originated the belief, that the
'very principle of our policy must have been fundamentally
'wrong, when merely its application was defective. That
the system itself was erroneous, because the partial and
impeded operation did not answer the proposed effect.
It is iuconceivable with what levity and precipitation men
of sense imbibed this error, and bow they could propose,
contrary to.the experience of every age and country, the
adoption of defensive, in preference to offensive measures.
The policy of. FA BlUil the cunetator, suited the panic
which the first victories of HANNIBAL had diffused ; but
the bold resolution of the elder SCIPIO was better adapted
to the genius al.d institutions of Rome. We strongly de-
precate the idea of preserving our military force, for the
event of a possible struggle upon our own shores : a simi-
lar
occurrence supposes the loss of our naval consideration,
and the inefficitey of the remedy to obviate the evil I We
NV. Oilltlask, of w;iat, avail would our regular army be to us,
sn such au evelit, scaite..ed as it is over our immense pof.
iiessluns ; every citizen must then be a soldier ; and if the
i;eople are aniniate.d with such feelings, and defensive pu-
iicy he thought expdient, we should instantly disband one
Half of our military force ; litriband our resources for
a similar contin,cesicy, and thus decrease our enormous six-
lienditure. It is drivelling in the extreme to keep up a
vast and expensive establishment for a dubious advantage,
and remote objects. When the great question of our in-
dependence is about to be decided, it is not the regular
aiiny, but. the collected force, moral and physical, of the
leountry, which can disconcert. the boldnes, and rep! the
Teiteratca attacks of the invaders. There may be an ap-
parent, prudence in keeping- a ready organized force, to
-meet the first impression of the enemy, in case of an in-
vasion ; hut nothing can be more deceitful than to trust
solely to its cflicacy ; for the enemy is too wary to hazard
the descent, until the subjugation of the Continent, and I

the immensity of his preparations, give hint a decided su-
-leriority in that kind of force. When things are arrived
at such a cris'is, it is only the intense ardour and united
senti;nent of an armed population, which call repel and
confound a repetitioa of desperate and formidable assaults.
But our army may, in the interval, be usefully employed
in obstructing the developement and consolidation of the
enerN's des'gns upon the Continent : and thus defer, or
cornpretely baffle the possibility of employing his undivided
strength and attention against ourselves. In order to com-
prehend what might be done to that 'effect, had we acted
upon a larger scale, we will point out the consequences of
our partial diversions, and shall prove, that our contracted
and partial interference has rendered the most material,
tiervice to the Allies, and prevented the Tyrant front being,
it this motrient, master of Europe.—ln order to show the
truth of this observation, we will take a retrospective
;Tie* of 'our three last. expeditious; and of the state of
Europe duriag that interval.
Our first Exrditiov!, nottvi;hvtanil;ng the infamy of the
trieqmoa sipc#3 Cintra, and the calamities which at-

.. ~..,

15.

Leaded bir o Moose's retreat, was of vital athaniage
_
to the Spaniards, as it compelled the enemy to detach the.
greater part of his army in pursuit of ours. Bad this
powerful diversion not been effected, the concentrated
force of the Usurper, after the capture of Madrid, might
have borne down every obstacle, forced the passes of the
Sierra Morena, and appeared, in less than two months,
before the gates of Seville, Cirthageni, and Cadiz. The
movement of Sir Jona' Moone's Wee disconcerted the
execution of that• project, and placed literally hors de
combat one third of the whole force of the enemy. Soo LT'S
and Nzios corps, which, at the commencement of the por•
snit, amounted to about 56,000 men, were, by disease
and hunger, reduced to absolute. skeletons. Our diversion
certainly saved Spain for that season. ft is the height of
absurdity to deny. that we made no painful sacrifscesupon.
the occasion. But is the operations of war, it is not so
much the loss, as the attainment of the object, which
to be considered. With our diminutive force and tardy
co-operation, we, nevertheless, prevented the French front
becoming, at that time, masters Of the Peninsula.
Our second Mxperlition preserved Portugal; drove Scutt

from that kinplom ; raised the character of our army at

the battle of Talavera ; ►rrevcnted 13136WAPARTE from
drawing a single detachment from the Peninsula ; liberat-
ed Gallicia, the Asturias, Leon, and the -greater part of
Catalonia ; and had no inconsiderable influence upon the
Vaud making in this moment by Austria. Had we made no
efforts in Spain ; had -We rejected co.operatiun as impoli-
tic;—detrimental to us, and useless to our allies, it is pro-
bable that E tIONAPA 11TE would 'have assailed Austria with

his collect)_.?! force, leaving only a small corps to act on the
defensive in Spain. For that purpose 50,000 men mould
have sufficed to cover Madrid, occupy Barcelona and
Pampeluna, and preserve a communication with France.
But by our interference, feeble as it has been, we have
forced him to reverse his usual line of couduct and pol:cy.

it is the interest, and has been the invariz.;ble custom of
that dangerous and active man, never to make extraordi-
nary eflbrts at the same time, in two different places.
He suspended his attack against one power, until he had
completed the destruction of the other. We have
corn-
s paled him to abandon, or deviate considerably from this
policy. His collected force would have annihilated Aus.
tria ; and, haviug finished there the work of destructiOni
might have returned, aml borne down, with .the violence
of a mountain inundation, every obstacle. which the Spa-
niards could oppose to his progress. Before the end of
this year he naig-ht realise his vaunted Menace of planting
his eagles on thettowers of Lisbon and. Cadiz. The evecu-
tion of that promise is, at least, deferred; and who knovfe
what events may occur to•protract it siiH longer.
Our expedition to the Scheldt bore the same feature of
misconduct in the projecting and management : acid pro-
duced, however, a great sad henificiai result, it forced
the enemy to collect a large force, which he would -other.
wise have detached to Vac Danube, or Tagus; and thus
given the French army, in-either gearter, a preponderat-
ing accession of force. Our Expeditions, comparatively
trifliog. as they have been, and defective in a variety of re=
spects, have forced the tyrant to abandon his favourite
policy, and to divide his armies and attention between the
Danube, the Tagus, and the Scheldt. We have thus gives
Austria au opportunity of continuing the war with a greater