The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-29 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 29, 1855.

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

( From the Times of this day.)
The honour of England must be preserved at
any cost to personal feelings. The safety of the
brave men she has sent out must be a consideration
superior to all notions of delicacy. Why should
we not speak plainly what has been passing in the
minds of men of all classes during the last few
days ? When the telegraph sent the first news of
the fall of Sebastopol, the words " Our attack on
the Redan did not succeed" prepared the public
for some misfortune, and mingled a gloom with its
rejoicing. A few hours more made known a loss
of officers as great as at Inkerman, and many a
household had to mourn a member struck down in
a conflict which it knew was not a victory. Then,
for a long fortnight the nation awaited with deep
anxiety the arrival of details. The official despatch
came at last, brought by an officer of the Staff, as
if such a narrative as it contained must insure
the bearer's reward. It will be seen by last night's
Gazette that Major Curzon has received the re-
ward for his Job's tidings. General Simpson's is
yet to come, and, if we are correctly informed, the
Government are in some perplexity as to its nature.
We can tell them. He deservesrecall. How meagre,
how obscure that despatch was, will be testified by
all who read it. But what it contained and what
it omitted led to the same conclusion. The Bri-
tish army had been beaten, and beaten, it was rea-
sonable to suppose, through the incapacity of the
General who could send home such a despatch
on such an occasion. Two days more elapsed,
and the full truth was told. The calamity was
deeper, darker, more humiliating, than even the
most desponding had feared. The story of that
terrible day, related at such length, and with such
power, in these columns, has been read in every
corner of the British islands, and, translated into
many languages, is now before our friends and foes
all over Europe.. What has been the feeling of
the public during the last two days let each man
judge for himself. Let him also consider whether
it is a time to keep silence. A comparison of Ge-
neral Simpson's
,account of the attack with that
given by our correspondent will show how far the
Commander-in-Chief was informed of what actually
took place. It may be that British military cus-
tom requires a beld, unadorned style, and that a
General's despatch is to be considered analogous to
a Royal speech. , The full and interesting narra-
tives of Marshal-Pelissier and General Niel show,
however, that our allies have not arrived at this
rigidity of etiquette ; and even the Horse Guards
must admit that a General's brevity ought not to
excuse important omissions, and that a despatch
may be dignified without being unintelligible.
The British General led every one to believe that
only 1,500 men were engaged at first at the Redan,
and states positively that these were "supported
to the utmost." Of Colonel Windham's repeated
messages for help, of his personal return and in-
terview with Sir Edward Codrington, of his per-
mission to take ,The Royals, and of the unhappy
rout which made this meagre assistance too late
to be of any use, the Commander-in-Chief does
not breathe a word. The assertion that the
assaulting party was supported to the utmost we
know to be at vf,riance with the fact. The num
ber of men engaged is not stated clearly, nor
is an approximate calculation of the loss given.
Even of the duration of the contest the General is
ignorant. He says it was maintained for " nearly
an hour." Welearn from our correspondent and
from general testimony that it lasted for nearly two
hours. It is strange that a Commander-in-Chief,
with all his advantages, should be in error as to
facts which strangers and civilians could easily as-
certain. The Hon.. Leicester Curzon, the bearer of
this obscure and, inaccurate despatch, is recom-
mended to Lord Panmure as capable of giving more
minute details than the General's self-imposed
limits would allow. But, if the assistant military
secretary had any opportunity of learning the true
history of that fatal fight, we doubt not that his
narrative will convince the Secretary of War of the
valueless nature of the document he brought.
Why is General Simpson thus brief and erro-
neous in his communications? There is but one
answer,—he was ignorant of what passed, or desi-
rous to conceal it. We believe the former. How
should he he aware of the scenes enacted in the
Redan ? "He sat in a trench, with his nose and
eyes just facing the cold and dust, and his cloak
drawn up over his head 'to protect him against
both." He makes arrangenients which cause every
one to exclaim, "This is another I.Sth of-June.'
[To chooses the assaulting column from the Second
and Light Divisions, for the preposterous reason
that they had been so often and so desperately en-
gaged ; and when the moment is come that these
regiments consisting
of raw lads, and with
hardly one man in twenty who had fought
at the Alma—are to advance to the deadly
contest, he is content to go and sit motion-
less in a ditch. An unsupported Colonel
fights the battle. We have a glimpse of a General
of Division, but it is only as bewildered and irreso-
lute, and telling his subordinate that, "if they
were of any use, he might take the Royals." But
we will enter no further into this shameful history.
Examples of heroism were not wanting, and that
they may have their reward we earnestly hope.
But to General Simpson's opinions of individual
merit the public will attach little importance. He
will, of course, be unable sufficiently to express his
approbation of all Generals of Division, while his
warmest thanks will be due to every member of his
own Staff. But the men who died on that fatal
day, or will bring home wounds and mutilations as
a sore remembrance of it, must be honoured by their
country through information from other sources.
There can be no doubt of the discontent and
anger which reign among the troops. Officers and
men have lost all confidence in their chief, and the
only difference is that the private proclaims his
opinion with more open vehemence. The inca-
pable commander who has brought on England
this last disaster cannot force his soldiers to look
with envy on those gallant deeds of their ally to
which their own defeat serves as a foil, but ho can
oppress them with feelings of deep humiliation, of
resentment, of hopeless despondency. As
long as he shall lead them there will be the con-
viction that the day of battle is likely to be any-
thing but the day of victory. Now, too, are ap-
proaching those operations in the field which are
the test of aeneralship. Will the man who
could not attack with common skill a position with
which he had been for months acquainted be
capable of combinations and manoeuvres on new
and ever-changing ground ? The conclusion is not
difficult. It is the duty of the Government to
make arrangements for relieving General Simpson
of the post he holds. It is generally understood
that the present Commander-in-Chiet accepted his
appointment with reluctance. This does not, in-
deed, excuse him from all responsibility for subse-
quent failure, for no solicitations of a Minister
ought to overcome the resistance which is honestly
founded on a sense of incapacity. But the know-
ledge that his was only the minor fault of an irre-
solute refusal must soften the judgment of the
country. Any honour or reward which his ser-
vices may claim, or the position in which he has
been placed renders seemly, will be grudged by no
one, but let him no longer command our troops in
chief. A French Commander-in-Chief, under
somewhat similar circumstances, has been in this
very campaign superseded, and he returned with
true devotion and an admirable spirit to the com-
mand of his division. We will not suggest any
course to General Simpson or his advisers, but the
nation must immediately look to the Government
to provide the army in the East with a General
who commands its confidence and is likely to re-
tain it.
It cannot be too often repeated that our army
requires a younger man. A statesman in either
house, a lawyer on the bench, oven an admiral in
his comfortable first-rate, may preserve his effi-
ciency until au advanced age, for he is not under
the necessity of bodily fatigue. But the com-
mander of an army in the field must have phy-
sical strength not only for sedentary toil, but
for riding, walking, bearing wind, rain, and cold,
together with, all the personal discomforts of the
camp and the march. These qualities are not pos-
sessed by men of the age of the British Commander-
in-Chief, who sits in a ditch muffled up in a cloak
when a whole army rushes to the assault. Mar-
shal Pelissier wants, we believe, one or two years
cf 60, and yet his activity is looked upon as extra-
ordinary by his countrymen. Ho brought up the
reserves in person when General Bosquet was
wounded. The great body of the French Generals
are far below this age. Canrobert is 46, Bosquet
is 42 years old, about the age of Eyre and Mark-
ham. What is there to prevent the adoption of a
similar system in England ? Nothing but the ti-
midity of the Government, the sympathy of certain
military authorities at home for old acquaintances,
and the superstitious reverence for those who have
served during youth in the campaigns of a past
generation. If the nation is to preserve its rank
in Europe there must be no delay in giving greater
efficiency to the army by placing over it men of
adequate capacity. Englishmen hardly appreciate
how much their military reputation hafs ouifered

in the eyes of the world even in this triumphant
campaign. Their fame for personal courage
is as high as ever, but how their Government
should select such men for high commands, and
how the free British people should acquiesce in
the choice, are the wonder of foreigners. The Rus-
sians say we are an army of liens led on by
asses. If the country is to end this war with the
reputation of 40 years since it must not be content
with the chivalry of captains and lieutenants, or
the stubborn courage of the Highlands and Con-
naught. We have no wish to rival our allies in the
number of their troops ; we are content to admit
that in all joint operations their share in the toils
and glories of the war must be the greater. But
what the British army has to do it should be
enabled to do well. Little is gained by placing an
aged officer of high standing over our troops, and
keeping up an affectation of perfect equality, if the
French from superior numbers do nearly all the
work of the siege, while the small part allotted to
the English is marred by the incapacity of their
commander. We know not whether, after appeal-
ing to the public by their duty to their country, it
may not be a descent to ask them to consider the
private ties which unite individual families to -the
brave men whose lives depend on a general's judg-
ment. But it is an appeal to which human nature
will give perhaps even a readier answer. By all that
they owe to the army, which has fought so long
and so well, by their sympathy for those left be-
reaved and destitute through the recent slaughter,
as well as by their love of country and honour, we
conjure Englishmen to brook no delay in placing
at the head of their small, but chivalrous army, a
man who can make its valour productive of some-
thing more than an honourably disaster.

( Front the Morning Serer" of this clay. )
It is not veryoften that we are able to agree with
our weekly contemporary the Economist. In eco-
nomical and political questions we have alike dis-
sented from its views. Its avowed connection with
one gentleman holding office under the Goverment
has given to some of the opinions expressed in it an
influence that has been, even on the wtr question,
too often exerted against the national cause. It is,
therefore, we confess, with very great satisfaction
that we are able to point in its oolumns of last Sa-
turday to a very remarkable article, in the main
purport of which we cordially agree—perhaps, in-
deed, we ought to say, which follows up views and
sentiments which have been already earnestly ad-
vocated in this journal. We print it in another
column.

A few days after the fall of Sebastopol we endea-
voured to point out that the only practical use to
be made of that victory was to follow it up by
wresting the whole of the Crimea from Russia and
by insisting, as an indispensable condition of peace,
that itnever again should beannexed to the Russian
territory. When wearethreatened with the renewal
of those treacherous negotiations which must be
based upon the principle of leaving Russian terri-
tory intact, it is of the utmost importance to direct
the public mind to a clear anddistinct object. Such
is the retrieving of the Crimea from the iron grasp
of Russian rule. Until this is done the fall of Se-
bastopol is a mere idle triumph. If we are not re-
solved to do it the blood shed before that fortress
has been a wicked waste of human life. It is essen-
tial that this should be pressed upon the attention
of our rulers. It must be made plain, by an expres-
sion of public opinion, that England will not tole-
rate any Minister who will dare the treason of sur-
rendering to Russia the acquisition which has been
purchased by the blood of the brave men who
rest under a soil that must never again be dese-
crated by submission to Muscovite sway.
Entirely do we agree with the writer in the
Economist, that, in addition to wresting the Crimea
from Russia, it is absolutely indispensable that
Circassian independence should be acknowledged,
and that Georgia should be rescued from Russian
tyranny. In part of this territory the usurpations
of Russia are but of recent date. Little more than
twenty-five years have passed since the last of them
extended her territory to the foot of Mount Ararat.
At the commencement of the present century all
Georgia was free from the Russian yoke. The
ukase that finally annexed the first province to the
dominions of Paul bears date in February, 1801.

The subjection of Georgia to the government of a
despot at St. Petersburg is a mockery, upon every
principle of political or geographical distribution.
Inhabited by tribes differing totally from their
rulers in manners, in language, and in religion.
The Christianity of Georgia is very different from
the grovelling Czar-worship wiliich at Moscow and
Petersburg blasphemes the name of the Christian
faith. Remote, by a distance of 2,000 miles, from
the Russian capital, Tiflis is still more separated
from it by the mountains, and seas, and deserts,
which intervene. Such a province it is no object
to Russia to retain, unless as it may serve two
purposes. One is to form one of those sinuous
folds by which, serpent-like, she is stretching her-
self round the Ottoman empire to crush and de-
vour it—the other is an outpost on the road to
India. Were these two projects abandoned Rus-
sian diplomacy itself could devise no plausible rea-
son why Russian rule should exist in a country so
remote, so insulated from the Russian empire as
Georgia. But Europe is determined that neither
of these projects ever shall be accomplished. Let
us force Russia to recognise materially this as a
portion of European law by an abandonment of
provinces which she only holds to accomplish these
designs.
Let us earnestly hope thlat " the very scantiest
terms of peace" that will be thought of by the
Western Cabinets are those which are indicated in
the article of the Economist—the cession of the
Crimea, the withdrawal from Georgia, the acknow-
ledgment of Circassian independence, and the re-
nunciation of all right or pretence to meddle in
the affairs of Turkey under the pretence of a pro-
tectorate, whether joint or separate, of the Chris-
tian subjects of the Porte.
These terms would, after all, be scanty—they
would fall short of those which Europe would have
They
ythe march of a Russian
would still leave Vienna
aanrdigßhtertloindeemxpaondsed.
to
army ; they would leave Russia still powerful in
the Baltic ; and they would leave Poland—un-
happy Poland—still crushed beneath Muscovite
oppression. But it must be remembered that we
have gone into this war not to redress the wrongs
of Europe, but to secure the independence and
integrity of the Turkish empire ; in other words,
to prevent Russia being mistress of the East. This
object would be attained by the cessions on the
part of Russia we have pointed out—it could be
attained by nothing less.
If the Russian Cabinet has really renounced its
ambitious projects it will accede to terms such as
these. If they still retain them, then the war
must be continued until terms at least as favour-
able are extorted.
Let not, however, Russia imagine that if the pre-
sent opportunity be passed by, another will ever
offer of making peace upon such terms. In the
cant of Aberdeen phraseology, we may say that the
war has been hitherto circumscribed. We have
struck no blow in central Europe ; the guns of the
allies have not been heard upon the banks of the
Danube. Our fleet in the Baltic has been but a
demonstration. Let Russia force us to extend in-
stead of circumscribing the war, and the whole
account of Russian conquest must be opened. From
Lapland to China, we will ask by what law she
holds her frontier, and wrest from her one by one,
as we see occasion, her ill-gotten acquisitions, from
Finland to the plains that lie between her proper
boundary and the banks of the Amor.
We have candidly and freely expressed our ap-
proval of the manifesto of the Economist. We do
not care to speculate why or wherefore such an
article has appeared in the columns of that journal.
It is enough for us that it adopts our own views,
and indicates a bold, a manly, and an English po-
licy. To such a policy, no matter by whom advo-
cated, or by whom put forward, it is the first duty
of every lover of his country to give his support.
But then, let us ask—ls this the policy of the
Government, or are such declarations put forward
under demi-offlcial!sanction, to delude and to deceive
the public mind? Will the language of this manifesto
be held in reply to those proposals of Austrian medi-
ation which its writer truly anticipates ? Will the
Austrian diplomatist be plainly told that the
Western Powers will listen to no terms of peace
that will not include the cession of the Crimea, the
independence of Georgia and Circassia, and the
utter renunciation by Russia of all claim to a protec-
torate or right of interference in the internal affairs
of Turkey The time is come when we must look
for the intentions of Cabinets in solemn and official
documents in which the faith of Governments is
pledged to Europe. We cannot accept as indica-
tions of ministerial intentions the irresponsible de-
clarations of anonymous writers in newpapers. If
Ministers are ready to act upon such a policy let
them freely and officially avow it. The nation will
endure no paltering with questions upon which the
best and highest feelings of our nature have become
engaged.
Of one thing we warn statesmen of every party.
The Crimea never can be restored to Russia. By
the people of Eirtgland_ and France' the return, to

Russia of that which we have won at such terrible
cost would be regarded as treason to the cause of
both nations. In England the Minister who would
dare to propose it would meet with the execration, if
not the fate, of a traitor. Men may differ as they
please as to the ultimate objects for which the war
should be carried on ; they may perplex themseves
by disquisitions as to the disposal of the Crimea
when it is taken from Russia ; but, we repeat, the
people of this country never will consent that the
Crimea should be Russian again. Let our states-
men at once prepare their political and their stra-
tegical combinations for this. The Russian armies
must be dsiven from the Crimea, or they must be
forced to surrender in it, and the Crimea itself,
whatever be its future destiny, must be made once
and for ever free from Russian rule. For the tom-
foolery of four points—for the treachery of Austrian
mediation—for the vainglorious imbecility of special
plenipotentiaries deluded into betraying the honour
of the country—for all the quirks and quibbles of
diplomatic sophistry—the plain and manly common
sense of England substitutes the demand that the
Russians leave tt•.e Crimea never to return.

(From the Times of yesterday. )

On one or two occasions we have availed ourselves of
the illustrations afforded by the memorable operations
before Sebastopol to argue that this siege did not in
reality establish any new principles of fortification, or
place the defence of fortresses on any different footing
from that which it occupied before. The opinions we
thus expressed have now been confirmed by actual re-
sults. It is quite clear that the means of defence have
not been rendered superior to the means of attack either
by the use of earthworks, instead of masonry, or by
the employment of abundance of guns ; for guns in
vast numbers, with stores of ammunition to boot, were
found in Sebattopel after it
_had been evacuated,__and,.
if earthworks cotild have kept out .the allies, there they'
stood to perform the service. The truth is, as we have
more than once explained, that the term " siege "
cannot be applied with anything like precision to
those operations by which Sebastopol was so long as-
sailed. There never was any siege of the place in the
proper acceptation of the term. The idea of a siege
implies that an inferior force is defending itself against
a superior force by the aid of artificial protections, and
that the defenders are shut up and surrounded in the
place. The first condition of such operations is.that the
garrison or force defending the town should be limited
in its resources by the investment of the place, and, as
the resources of the besiegers are not thus circumscribed,
the result yields so great an advantage in favour of the
attack that the capture of the place usually resolves it-
self into a mere question of time. The besiegers can
draw supplies or reinforcements from their base of ope-
rations, whereas, since the force of the besieged is fixed
once and for. all, every casualty and every day's con-
sumption diminishes their strength, and brings the pe-
riod of their exhaustion nearer. Now, in the Crimea
these conditions, as our readers are aware, were not ful-
filled. Sebastopol was not invested—that is to say, was
not cut off from communication with the rest of the
country—and its garrison, therefore, independently of
the enormous stores which its arsenals contained, was
left at liberty to renew its strength by succours from
without. -The consequence was that the besiegers lost
the advantage usually attaching to their position, and
the calculations adopted in such cases no longer applied.
Another condition of a siege conducted by ordinary
rules is, that the attacking force should always outnum-
ber that at the disposal of the besieged, and certain
proportions, indeed, have been laid down as pro-
per to be observed in these respects ; but, at Se-
bastopol, this condition was wanting also. There
was, in short, no siege at all, in so far as that
expression implies the investment of a certain li-
mited force within the walls of a fortified place, on the
strength of which it relies for protection. In other
respects, too, the operations were extraordinary. Things
were executed on a scale perfectly prodigious, and so as
to put reasoning by precedent almost out of the question.
Nevertheless, it cannot fail of being instructive to exa-
mine the facts before us, and to consider the' general
bearings of the results which so tremendous a contest
has disclosed.

If we turn. in the first place to the employment of
earthworks, so signally exemplified in the Russian ope.
rations, it is impossible to overlook the immense advan.
Cages which were derived from this system of _defence
It is obvious, indeed, that on no other plan and in no
other material could fortifications have been either so
rapidly extemporised br so readily .kept up. To have
constructed works in masonry would have cost far more
time, and such works, moreover, when damaged, as they
must have been, by the fire of the besiegers, would not
have admitted of repairs so easily as redoubts and bas-
tions of earth. . It was undoubtedly the employment of
this material which enabled the Russians to surround
Sebastopol with fortifications on so enormous a scale.
So far, therefore, we have certainly seen what earth-
works can effect, but, as a qualification of these advan-
tages, it shouttl'he. observed that the demands Apon'thi
garriand became commensurate with the. extent 'and
magnitude of the works. The rapid construction of
bastion after bastion and battery after battery permitted
a wonderful multiplication of guns ; but with this
multiplication came that of casualties and consump-
tion also. Guns without stint require gunners without
stint, and gunners require not only munitions for
their cannon, but provisions for themselves. It is easy
to speak of abundance of guns as constituting the best
defence of a place, but such abundance requires a plen-
teousness of all other supplies and succours in proportion.
Let us suppose, for instance, that the essential condition
of a siege bad been satisfied in the case of Sebastopol by
an investment of the place so complete as to intercept all
chances of succour, and that the garrison bad been left
to resist the attack of the allies without any resources
but such as the town actually contained at the com-
mencement of the siege. How long, we may ask, would
the Russians in such a case have supported the drains
created by such tactics as they adopted, the constant
casualties over such an extent of fortifications, or the
enormous consumption of stores going on ? A. scheme
of defence like that pursued at Sebastopol presumes such
supplies of men and munitions as would very rarely be
found at command.
In the next place, it is plain that tactics of this kind
are as much the property of one party as of the other.
The allies also threw up earthworks, and mounted them
with guns, and, what is more, they showed that they
could maintain an ascendancy of fire. Neither did works
of this character prevent the adoption of the old system
of approaches, for the French sapped up to the Alalak-
hoff Tower with admirable skill, and took it not only by
a most brilliant assault, but in a most scientific manner.
After all, the results of the siege, as portrayed so
vividly in the description of our correspondent,
accord pretty nearly with natural presumptions.
The Russians evacuated Sebastopol apparently be-
cause the Malakhoff, the key of their defences, was
taken, and because the town had been searched
and shattered by the artillery of the allies. The Mala-
khoff was taken by thb regular system of attack—by
trench, and sap, and assault ; and the town was dams-
tg,ed by artillery which had acquired a superiority of
firs. The batteries of the allies proved more powerful
thsn those of the Russians. Of late they replied but
elocly to our guns, while our vertical fire spread havoc
and destruction all around. In fact, it was a gigantic
trial of strength, in which the allies proved the stronger;
but 't cannot be said that any new principles of attack
or defence have been established in the struggle.