The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-25 00:00:00

THE SIEGES OF 1812 AND 1855.

BADAJOZ AND SEBASTOPOL.

According to the ordinary rules of siege operations the
approaches would have been driven to the edge of the
ditch surrounding the Malakhoff Tower, and the coun-
terscarp blown in before such an assault would be made,
but the accounts which have just reached us do not lead
us to suppose that these precautions had been employed.
Indeed the extraordinary configuration of Sebastopol
has compelled the Generals on more than one occasion
to pursue a course entirely at variance with the pre-
scribed rules of the art of reducing regular fortifications.
On more than one memorable occasion in his career in
the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington not only em-
ployed similar means, but staked the fate of his army on
their success, and especially on the third siege of
Badaji,z, in 1812. Contrary to all calculation, the
Picurina, an outbreak of the town somewhat resembling
by its position the Mamelon or Kamtschatka Redoubt
before Sebastopol, was forced without being battered,
and Badajoz itself was carried by storm before the coun-
terscarp was blown in er the fire of the place silenced.
No one who has ever read it can have forgotten the lan-
guage in which the historian of that great contest relates
the most terrible action of the war. The ramparts,
crowded with dark figures and glittering arms, just
illuminated by the glare of flames from below ; the red
columns of the British, deep and broad, coming on like
streams of burning lava ; the sudden arrival of the Light
Division, and the Fourth Division' on the brink of the
yawning chasm, into which they dashed with incredible
fury, some to be smothered in the wet ditch beneath, some
to be dashed by the shot against the strong palisade, some
to be torn upon the jagged range of sword-blades fixed
in ponderous beams which defended the top of the
breach. For two hours did our men persevere with in-
domitable courage in the attempt to force their way
through this scene of slaughter, and it was not until hun-
dreds of the boldest and bravest had perished that they
were compelled to acknowledge that the breach of the
Trinidad was impregnable. It was past midnight, and
2,000 men had already fallen, when the Duke of Wel-
lington ordered the remainder to retire and to re-form
for a second assault. Even that order was executed with
difficulty, and the fate of Badajoz might have been un-
decided that night if other portions of the troops had
not found means to scale the Castle and to carry a bas-
tion, and enter the town at a different point. Out of the
Anglo-Portuguese army of 22,000 men no less than
5,000 fell at the siege of Badajoz, and 3,750 at the assault
alone. We trust that we shall not now have to lament
as great a loss, but we are dealing with far more nume-
rouslv armies and a place of infinitely greater extent.
.e refer to this example, not only because in some of
itsimperfect
pceirrfceucmt circumstances it will probably be found to present an
lington in 1812, at the pinnacle of
the Redan analogy with the attack on the a
, but also as a proof that the Duke of Wel-
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turnedthe two armies topol, although in the Duke'sps
upon
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Etopped in one portion off hisi
the same night by other m
material difference in the hcaaysee encounteredwas
st Scarried
There is, however, this
The fate of the campaign of 1812
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