The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-04 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1855.

While earnestly deprecating the abandonment
of the lines and works before Sebastopol, we are
by no means disposed -to undervalue the benefitr
that would necessarily arise from a well-organised
movement having for its object the closing of the
various channels of supply to the Russian army.
We have repeatedly and emphatically directed
attention to the paramount importance of such a
course, which would not only make Sebastopol,
but the whole of the Crimea, our own. The ope-
rations
against Kertch, Anapa, and the Sea of
Azoff were so many steps in the right direction, ,
but they were only instalments of what was re-
quired. The Isthmus of Perekop should be her-
metically sealed, and also the passage of the
Sivash, so as to prevent the transit of large bodies
of men or stores for the relief of the Russian army
or garrison. This duty, it energetically under-
taken, would, although arduous, not be beyond
the power of the troops that could be detached
from the lines, who might be materially assisted
from seaward. We do not, of course, mean that
the larger class of vessels, requiring a considerable
draught of water, could be made available, but

flat-bottomed boats, each carrying a single gun,
could, by judicious management, be enabled to
penetrate from Genitchi almost to Perekop itself,
so as to prevent the possibility of men or stores
being transported over the Putrid Sea, and even
to greatly impede the communications across the
Isthmus. The storehouses at Odessa and Nico-
laieff might also easily be destroyed, so that no
supplies could be spared from the districts that
have hitherto proved such fertile sources ; and if
sent, the channel of communication could also be
blocked up by an army having the base of its
operations on Eupatoria, and placing the Rus
sians in the field betweeu two fires.

It is more than probable that some operation
of the latter description was contemplated when
03IAR PASHA and the Turkish army of the Danube
were sent to Eupatoria. It was clearly not in-
tended that the experienced General and his
veteran soldiers should remain inactive under
cover of the Allied fleets. Sufficient reinforce-
ments were not, however, despatched to enable
them to take the field, and meet any attack that
might be hazarded by the Russian generals. The
whole of the army now quartered on the Mackenzie
heights might be brought against them, and they
should, before abandoning the shelter of Eupa-
toria, be satisfied that they were in sufficient
force to risk the chances of a pitched battle.
That they have never hitherto been, but it by no
means follows that the original plan may not still
be fully and fairly carried out.
According to the best information that can be
obtained, the Allies have nearly, if not quite,
200,000 fighting men in the Ciimea ! Less than
half that number would amply suffice to maintain
the lines and works constructed against Se-
bastopol—against all sorties from within, or
attacks from without. We have seen that a
comparatively small number have always been
sufficient to repel the fiercest onslaughts of the
Russians, and Inkerman and the Tchernaya attest
the great results that can be accomplished by a
small but efficient body in defending an intrenched
position. An army of one hundred thousand men
might, therefore, take the field to the rear of the
Russians ; and, judging from the experience of the
past, from what has already occurred ii every
hand-to-hand encounter, such a force might un-
hesitatingly meet any that the Russians could
bring against them. ; z

Their army may be estimated at 150,000 men
at the utmost, one-third of whom are cooped up
within the walls of the beleaguered fortress. One
hundred thousand is, therefore, the greatest
number they could bring into the field on any
emergency. Even that is probably far beyond the
mark ; but supposing for the sake of argument
that they could be made available, would the
Allies shrink from anything approaching to an
equal contest, or hesitate to risk the fortunes of
the campaign on such a contest ? We believe
not. We are convinced that there is nothing
Which they would more ardently desire than such
a chance, and we should fearlessly abide the
result.

Besides, if one hundred thousand men be not
sufficient for such a duty, why not send additional
reinforcements. If England cannot spare the
men, France has them, and we now know that we
can implicitly depend on the most zealous co-
operation on the part of our faithful Ally.
She possesses the power, and we may rest
asiured that the will is not wanting t It .will ho
true econotoY to spare no exertions in the earlier