The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-06 00:00:00

THE Sun, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVEN 1:“3 JUNE 6 1855

the defence of Sebastopol, on the one hand, and the attack
on the other, had covered the contending armies with
equal glory, and that' the military honour of Russia,
France; and England, was safe as affected by those opera-
tions. I will now recall in detail to the recollection of the
house what were the demands and language of Russia at
the commencement 'of the war, and what, after a year's
fighting, were her submissions--for I can give them no
other name—on which she was willing to conclude peace
at Vienna. Her first pretension was, that no other Power
shoild be permitted tointerfere in anynegotiation between
Russia and the Sublime Porte. That pretension was as-
serted repeatedly in the most arrogant and offensive terms.
Let, us contrast with it the result. All the negotiations
for the last two years, by the forced consent of Russia,
have been conducted by England, France, and Austria on
behalf and in aid of the Sultan. (Hear.) Her next pre-
tension was, that the Turkish ambassador must sue for
peape either at St. Petersburg or at the head-quarters of
the, Russian army. A more arrogant pretension than
this was never put forward ; but now, let us see,
has it been abandoned ? Why, through the medium
of Austria. If Russia did not ask, she, at all
events, suggested the holding of the conferences at
Vienna. Prince Menschikoff's head-quarters were no longer
the only place where Turkey could sue for peace, for her
plenipotentiaries met the Russian ambassador at the con-
ferences held in the capital of Austria. What was the
next pretension ? Russia refused to meat the Turkish envoy
at any conference upon equal terms, alleging that Turkey
had not been admitted into the family of European States.
Ask the noble lord who has just returned from Vienna, and
who sat at the table where the conferences were held, whe-
ther the Russian ambassadors sitting at the same table did
not discus; upon equal terms proposition after proposition
with the Turkish envoy. That envoy met the ambassador
of Russia, met the noble lord acting on the part of England,
met M .Drouyn de l'Huys and the other plenipotentiaries
at the same table on terms of perfect equality, and the mon-
strous pretensions of Russia were not only recalled but ne-
gatived in the most decisive manner. What was the next
pretension? The principalities were occupied by Rus-
sia as a material guarantee. The conferences were opened
at Vienna, the Russians are expelled the principalities,
and those principalities are occupied by the Ally of
England. Russia, not satisfied with occupying the princi-
palities, had passed the Danube and advanced into Bul-
garia. How was that met ? By a treaty of offensive and
defensive alliance, that if Russia advanced to the Balkan
a cases belli must arise, involving the necessity of other
grtfat European Powers taking part in the war as well as
France and England. But has there been no military
success ? Has there been for the last nine months a single
Russian on the right bank of the Danube? By the valour
of the Turks themselves; by thegallant defence of Silistrir
the Russians were expelled, not from the principalities by
Austria, but from the Turkish territory by Turkish arms.
Then the fleets congregate in the Black Sea. It has been
the boast of Russia that the Black Sea was virtually
her possession, that she had at her command a naval
force which gave her complete dominion over it.
Her boast also was that in the Baltic she had a fleet
at all times, when the weather permitted the free naviga-
tion of the waters, amounting to 30 sail of the line. What
hats become of her ships? By the suicidal hand of
Russia herself, in fear of an attack, a large portion of them
hai been destroyed. Talk of prestige ! The naval pres-
tige of Russia, whether in the East or in the Baltic, has
vapished before the superiority of the allied Powers of
France and England, and I do not think that we shall hear
much more of Russia's naval supremacy either in the Baltic
or•the Black Sea. Then, again, I ask what was the cha-
racter of the► works at Bomarsund ? They were works of
the most alarming description, and erected in defiance of
a treaty. Nothing could prove more clearly the justice of
the war at its commencement than the very fact of the
existence of that fortress. But where is it now? Razed
to the ground by the attack of France and England ; and
Russia has been taught a lesson not speedily to be for-
gotten even by such a. Power as she is. Now, let us pro-
ceed to the Danube. Under various
,pretences Russia has
proctically, for the last three or fohr years, had the cam-
mend of the mouths of that river, and the lower portion of
it; the most important in regard to the trade of the prin-
cipalities, was in her hands. That power she shamefully
abused by various artifices; first, by the establishment of a
line of quarantine, next, by the erection of powerful bat-
te'ries at the Salina mouth, by which both sidesof the river
were commanded by Russia. What are the terms which
the noble lord successfully negotiated with respect to the
Danube? Russia consents to remove the line of quarantine,
tal have no fortifications at the Salina month, and to place
the navigation of the river under a European commission,
in which England should have a voice. The fourth point
to which I have already adverted is with respect to the
rights privileges, and immunities of members of theortho-
dox Rinse-Greek faith within the dominions of the Turk,
claimed as being placed under the peculiar protection of
Russia ab antiquoin force of treaty engagements, and espe-
cially that of Kainardji, with Count Nesselrode's enforce-
ment of his demand, on rejection of the Turkish amendments
of the Vienna note. It will be remembered, with respect
to this particular claim, it was alluded to in the terms in
which I have read it to the house, when made by
the Emperor Nicholas himself at an audience which Sir
Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador, had with the
Emperor, and reported by Colonel Rose to Lord Malmes-
hury as made at Constantinople so far back as 185'. I very
much regret that the British and French Governments did
not consent at the conference, pending the reference of the
third point, to proceed to exhaust the fourth. I think if
they had proceeded to discuss that point there is every
reason to believe that no practical difficulty would have
arisen in its adjustment. All doubt would have been
removed with respect to the remaining points of difference
between the contending parties, the ground would have
been cleared, and a near approximation to peace would
have been obtained. The Austrian Government was
anxious that the point should be discussed. Russia
was willing to discuss it. It was France and Eeglaud
that interposed. Prince Gortschakoff then, on the part
of Russia' made an important declaration with refer-
ence to the fourth point. Ho-regretted the delay in
discussing it, and said that he was ready to discuss it
at once, and that ho attached no practical importance
to it. Having ut the commencement of the negotiations
declared that he accepted the bases, foreseeing the necessity
of renouncing the exclusive protectorate of Russia, ho sad
that nothing could give greater facility to the Sultan in
governing his empire. Not only, then, ware the first and
second points fully settled, but in this fourth point I con-
fidently believe there was no insuperable difficulty. On
the third point the pretension of Russia was that the in-
dependence and integrity of Turkey was not guaranteed by
any stipulation of the treaty of 1810; that it was assumed
in tue preamble, but not ratified by any specific engage-
ment. On that part of the question a complete explanation
took place in the presence of the noble lord. What was the
result of that explanation? So far from holding that the de-
'claret ion with respect to the independence and integrity of
Turkey was not a subject of stipulation iu the treaty,
Prince Gortschakoff consented that the independence and
integrity of Turkey should be guaranteed by treaty. What
was most remarkable was, that the terms of guarantee pro-
,posed by Russia were varied by the Turkish envoy, and his
suggestions were adopted by the conference. I have vise
through seriatim the pretensions of Russia at the c ,m-
-imencement of the war, and the conclusions arrived at after
the conference. There remains only that portion of the
third point which relates to the means by which the naval
preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be dimi-
nished. When I was a member of Lord Aberdeen's Govern-
ment, I was a party to a proposition made to France with
reference to the mode of giving effect to this third article,
by a limitation of the Russian fleet. As being a party to
that proposition, I am bound to state that it was never re-
garded by me as an ultimatum, that it was submitted to
France, and was not accepted by her as au ultimatum, and
that it was not proposed at Vienna either by France cr
England as an ultimatum. It would be monstrous to begin
a conference with an ultimatum. It would be utterly
inconsistent with the whole proceedings of a negotiation
to do so. If ever there was a negotiation clear froni
such an absurdity it was the conferences at
Vienna, because in good faith and in the very face of the
stipulation with respect to the third point, it was stated
that the parties proposing these terms should have the
right to vary them in accordance with the events of the
war. Clearly, therefore, the proposition was not an ulti-
matum, and not being an ultimatum, I come to consider
whether, on the whole, this being the only ground of dif-
ference, it is prudent to insist en it. If I had had any
doubt at all, I am bound to state that the result of the
discussion in this house has convinced me that as an ulti-
matum it is not tunable. On this point the observations
of the hon. member for the West Riding are so strong and
so well founded that it would be impossible to overlook
them. Steam has made an immense difference in this
matter. If you allow Russia in the Black Sea four of the
largest ships of the line, with all the advantages of the
screw and with a proportionate number of smaller •veseels,
I believe that even with the limitation you propose the
whole object of Russia will be effected. You would mark
your distrust of her without taking adequate means to
check her. If Russia proves faithful—and for 40 years she
has been your ally without any complaint on your part—
no such stipulations are required. But if she proves per-
fidious, then no limitation such as you propose would be
of any avail. Another observation to which I attach great
importance, because it is well founded, is this—lf you ob-
tain that stipulation, are you prepared to go to war if Rus-
sia should have one ship or two ships more than the stipu;
lated number? (Hear.) It is admitted on all hands that
the interest of England in this matter is remote and indi-
rect, and that the interest of Austria is direct and imme-
diate. Austria has a far deeper interest in this matter than
either France or England. Let me observe that the position
of Austria at the abrupt conclusion of the negotiations was
not at all that which it was at tho commencement of them.
The observations of the hon. baronet the member for Herts
last night with respect to Austria wore wise and judi-
cious. I think she has, under very trying circumstances,
been the faithful friend of England. Her position is very
peculiar. She stands, as it wore, on a narrow isthmus
between the two great seas—the barbarism of Russia on
the one hand, and the military ambition of the Western
powers on the other. She is in a position of enormous
difficulty, and is entitled to our utmost forbearance. I
hold that peace—a great blessing to all nations—is in a
paramount degree the policy of England. (Hear, hear.)
Peace also is the policy of Austria. She, therefore, is the
natural ally and friend of England. We ought, seeing her
position, to bear with her infirmities, but, above all, we
ought not to quarrel or come to a hasty rupture with her.
I think we are entitled to know the proposition which
Austria made to England and France at the close of the
conferences. I regret that the noble lord was not present
at the conference when the Russian envoy made his last
proposition. I quite agree with the noble lord that Eng-
land and France were justified in rejecting the proposal
with regard to a ntlre apertunt. But I entertain quite
another opinion of the proposition of the 26th of April,
and regret that the noble lord was not nresent'when it was
made. I think that that proposition was not to be re-
garded as an ultimatum, because Russia was not justified
any more than England and France in beginning with an
ultimatum. I think that that proposition, though not
perfect in itself, did afford, as Count Buol and M. Drouyn
de l'Huys said, the elements of an adjustment. M. Drouyn
de l'Huys having heard the proposition, and having de-
clared that it afforded the elements of a settlement, pro-
ceeded to Paris, and the noble lord proceeded to London,
but he had the advantage of discussing this question with
the Russian envoy, and the still greater advantage of hear-
ing the opinion of Austria upon it. Rumour says that M.
Drouyn de l'Huys way well satisfied with the last proposition
as moulded by Austria; that he submitted it to his govern-
ment; that the Emperor of France was not unwilling to
accept it; that he proposed to the English Government that
they should accept it; and that its rejection took place in
consequence of the influence of the English Government
exercised through the noble lord. I speak from rumour
merely, having no information on the point. I think we
aptro propositionpos
ion fr was.om
Vienna—having
M . Drouyn de
finding it rejected,
we are all bound to speak out on this occasion. I have
retiredl3llrklnol)liss et
hfodeakoistmn brought
auttnhtc that
Government—andcouncils o f the French Emperor. Surely
stated without reserve my own position and feeling with
respect to this question. I am not a slavish admirer of
Russia. I am not the auxiliary of Russia. I am not the
friend of Rtissia, but I am the sincere friend and advocate
of peace on honourable term. • I hope the golden opportn.

nity will not be lost of obtaining the greatest of all bless-
ings without the sacrifice of national honour. I have
heard it said that we are fighting for prestige. It is a
most dangerous doctrine. Yon must adhere to a definite
object in the war, though I admit your terms may vary
with the view of giving effect to your object. There is
something, I think, in the present balanced state of the
sontest in the Crimea which makes the conjuncture favour
able to a settlement. The honour of England is safe by
the victories gained wherever we have come in contact
with the enemy, and the advantages of those victories is
perceptible in the lowered tone of the enemy, orig.nally so
arrogant and insulting. Though not the friend of Russia,
I think the honourof Russia should be considered ; but if
you wish to push her to the wall in driving your terms,
there is something passive in her resistance, and though
vanquished she will not yield, and not yielding she will
not make peace. I am by no means satisfied that if this
opportunity be lost—even if our arms be victorious—that
it will soon recur. (Hear, hear.) I wish to throw all
taunts and party feelings aside. It is a great crisis—setr-
sum, cords. Let us elevate our minds and feelings to the
interests of a great nation. The claims of humanity are
at stake, and I am confident we will best serve Our coun-
try if we consider those interests, and those interests only.
The greatest blessing 'we can confer on her, either as
regards 'her internal prosperity or her foreign rela-
tions, is peace. The opportunity is favourable, and to
the latest hour of my life I should regret if the opportu-
nity is lost. I do not think all the money spent or the
losses sustained will be thrown away if peace be obtained.
I think both England and France have been taught some
useful lessons. I think Russia also has been taught that
arrogance must be abated, and that herpretensions cannot
be sustained. I do hope if peace is'restored that we shall
not hastily reduce our establishments—certainly not our
naval establishment—and our military force only in a small
degree. I think it only consistent with our position
among the great nations of the World that we should main-
tain both large naval and military establishments. If the
object of this country in the prosecution of the war were
the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, then we must
cast aside the hope that we should be able soon to return
to a small naval or military force. It must be recollected
that when once a weak state called into her aid the assist-
ance of a powerful., auxiliary, just in proportion is the
length of time which the former depended upon the latter,
i n the same proportion did she require its future support.:
(Hear, hear.) Whether the principle of limitation or any
ether expedient was adopted, he was still decidedly of
opinion that to maintain the integrity of Turkey would be
an object, the accomplishment of which would, day after
day, be found to be more d.cult. The great test of
statesmanship, he felt assured, 'would be found to be to
make the necessary provisions for the fall of the Ottoman
empire, and to take care that Constantinople did not be-
come the property of Russia, upon the one hand, or of the
Western powers upon the other, and the policy which
such a state of things rendered requisite could not be sus-
tained unless.the English Government were backed by an
adequate force both by sea and land. (Hear, hear.) He
had endeavoured to express his opinions upon the question
before the house openly and dispassionately ; he had en-
deavoured to refrain,in giving expression to those opinions,
from using a single word that could give offence to any
awn. member, and he had only, in conclusion, to thank
the house for the attention with which they had lis-
tened to the remarks which he had felt it to be his duty
to make. (Hear, hear.)
Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, the observations which have
been made in the courts of the debate on the negotiations
at Vienna, and especially the observations made by the
hon. gentleman the member for the West Riding (Mr.
Cohen), render it incumbent upon me to make some expla-
nations and offer some remarks. In so doing I shall endea-
vour to imitate the calm spirit in which my right hon.
friend the member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) has dis-
cussed this matter. As he has observed, we are not now
considering any question of party triumph or party inte-
rests, we ere looking to the great question of the condi-
tions on which peace 'may be obtained, or the objects of
the war which we have entered upon may be accomplished.
It seems to me that these are the two great questions—if
you are determined to have peace, on what conditions can
you obtain it?—lf you mean to'carry]on the war, for what
objects are you to wage that war? (Hear.) Now, sir,
with respect to the first of these questions, let it be re-
membered, as my right hon. friend truly observed, that we
have already in the very short period of hostilities gained
very great objects from Russia, mho, beginning with say-
ing that she would, not negotiate except with Turkey
alone, and with Turkey at no other place than St. Peters-
burg, or the head-quarters of the Russian army, after-
wards consented to sit down as an equal at the conferences
with Turkey; that although Russia at the first maintained
her ancient treaties, with Turkey must not be disturbed,
was quite willing to consent to renounce that protecto-
rate which she had hitherto—whether rightly or wrongly
I will not dispute—exercised over the principalities, and
that she was ready in making a new treaty to renounce
all the articles of those treaties which in the course of cen-
turies she had been able to effect by means of victories in
the field and skill in the Cabinet. These concessions, and
some othersofgreatimportance,Russia madeincensequence
of the league formed against her and the successes we have
gained in the war that we have carried on. Still I could not
help feeling that we were iu this position, and. I stated it
very soon after my arrival at Vienna to Count Buol as a rea-
son why I did not entertain any very sanguine hopes from
the conferences—l said that the Western had met
with successes sufficient to justify them in not making
peace except on terms which should guarantee a full se-
curity to Tnrkey against future aggression; but, at the
same time, Russia had not had such reverses that we could
expect her to make all those concessions which would give
the securities which we were bound to demand. This was
the position in which the negotiations began. It may he
said, why begin negotiations at such a time ? That was a
necessity imposed on us by the treaty with Austria. Our
treaty with Austria on the 2d of December provided that
in certain cases Austria should join with us to obtain the
four points even by force of arms ; but Austria said natu-
rally, as I think, for her own interests, with full consider-
ation of the importance of enteiing into a war, that she
must first ascertain that Russia was unwilling to make
peace on terms which Ahstria should think sufficient. It
was necessary to ascertain that course, and for that pur-
pose the conferences at Vienna took pl Ice. My right hon.
friend who spoke last said truly that, with regard to the
first point, we place the principalities of Wallachia and
Moldavia under the protectorate of the Fire Power', in-
stead of their being placed under the solo protectorat6 of
Russia according to former treaties. We provided—al-
though die hon. member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden)
is very ill-satisfied with those terms (hear, hear)—we pro-
Tided for free legislation, for liberty of worship, and for
the freedom of trade in the principalities. Every mem•
bar of the conferences—the Russian Minister amongst
;the rest—was perfectly willing that the administration
and legislation in these provinces should be entirely na-
tional, and not be interfered with by any other power.
The honourable gentleman criticised some of the provisions
of the protocol respecting these provinces, much in the
same way that they were criticised on a former occasion.
Let me say, in the first place, that I am entirely respon-
sible for having agreed to those terms. They do 'net fir-
plicate the Government to which I belong, and I am
ready to take the whole of that responsibility, but I must
say that those terms do not bear the sense which the
hon. member for the West Riding has placed upon them.
He says that the natives of those principalities are not to
engage in matters dangerous to the tranquillity of their
country, bat the real 'engagement is, they are not to enter
into intrigues which shall be dangerous to the tranquillity
of their country. These are the terms,' and I owe that I.
consider the position of the principalities is a very critical
one. They are in close proximity to Russia, and to Am-
•tria, and to Turkey, and it will be very difficult to main-
tain the independence of legislation and government is
those principalities. rn the first place, neither Russia nor
Austria will allow intrigues to be carried on in these prin-
cipalities against the security and tranquillity of theirown
provinces. By the articles of this treaty. no Illussulman
was to enter into the principalities, and if the Turkish
armies (lid enter into them, it would be an interference
with the power of self-government.• I hold it to be a diffi-
cult thing to-make a satisfactory arrangement on these
points. The Turkish Minister at Vienna had no authority
to make an arrangement on this subject, and it was agreed
tthst, with - the consent of the ministers of Russia and
Austria, that the future arrangements should be made at
Constantinople, with the concurrence of all the Christian
powers there. Some persons imagine that it would he
better to make the principalities entirely independent. I
believe that in that case they would fall immediately
under the power of either Austria or Russia ; and that
perhaps there would be a contention between those two
powers as to which they should belong to, and that they
certainly could not maintain their independence; . But in
providing for the freedom of religion, of trade, and of legis-
lation, I thought we did much for the happiness and secu-
rity of those provinces. With respect to the Danube, it
was said the other day that Russia only gave up the power
of having a qrtarintine ; but it will be seen from the treaty,
of Adrianople that Russia was also to have a number of for-
tifications on the banks of that river. sit should likewise be
remembered that English and French commissioners were
to exercise a general supervision there ; and by a proposal of
mine that commission was only to be dissolved by the con-
sent of all the powers, so that the freedom of the navigatiQu
of the Danube might be thoroughly secured. We come next
to that great point which is called the third point ; and
before I touch upon it I must allude to the regret expressed
by my right hon. friend that the Governments of England
and France did not permit and sanction the conference
going into the question of the fourth point, and endeavour-
ing to settle it before discussing the third. Now, upon
that I must remark that that point was far from being so
easy of settlement as my right hon. friend supposes. (Hear.)
I had several conversations on the subject with the very
intelligent ambassador of the Porte, who spoke to me very
earnestly, and protested against any article being inserted
in the treaty by which the Porte should renounce in any
way its independence, and be made to depend upon the
Christian powers with' regard to its own internal affairs.
(Hear.) I thought that objection, or rather suggestion,
with respect to the fourth point a very reasonable one; but
at the same time I saw that the plenipotentiaries of Russia,
and probably of Austria, would be very anxious to obtain
such a settlement of the fourth point as would have enabled
them in some way to control the legislation of the P orto as
regards the Christians. In discussing the fourth point,
therefore, we should have found ourselves in very consi-
derable difficulty, and I certainly could not have consented
to any arrangement of that point which, on the one hand,
did not provide for equal privileges to the Christians and
Mahomedans, and which, on the other hand, would have
enabled any of the powers to interfere with the internal
affairs of Turkey. (Hear.) I come, therefore, to the third
point, upon which there has been so much discussion, and
upon which we bad the misfortune not to arrive at any
conclusion. And here I think my right hon. friend rather
takes advantage, as some others have done, of the mode-
ration displayed by the Western Powers in order to
say, "As you were willing to concede so much—as
your terms were so moderate—why did you not make
them still more moderato and so secure their acceptance
by Russia 1" (Hear, hear.) The proposal which was sug-
gested by the French Government, which does not appear
as a proposition in the protocols, but which was more
than once stated with great eloquence and ability by the
French Minister, M. Drouyn do l'Huys, was that there
',should be what he called a neutralisation of the Black Sea,
estalblishments
anlisnfuteadriNanyttp,btsaoi
lbietrisol
esesfnshihshneamoogoueufsl
nlodttrba
dtbehei
eaan.
destroyed,
eseaWtsahtl
rlafeoolayl rrß,
esttlaehhan,
caeaktelpsnwusdaar
Sea
adtoahsefeal
except
forts
ttgeosphef commerceetfarofnero drs:
thhieemu
Ipues
ati
3ocense
afl
purposesno
mentioned the
gonoudsspiarnopmosiintiiosnte,rbs
att the moment
they never could agree to any measure-which declaredpu t iat thatwn
enads
entirely to their military forces in the Black Sea, and pre-
vented them having any force with which they could re-
sent the insults even of a small power on that sea. Now,
it was in order to meet that objection, and to offer
nothing that was not extremely moderate, that we pro-
posed that, with the view of putting an end to Russian
preponderance in the Black Sea—the very terms to which
all the powers, including Russia herself, had consented—
her naval forces should be limited, I ask, how else were

you to obtain a cessation of Russian preponderance in the
Black Sea? (Hear, hear.) I have heard manygentlemen
say that this plan would be inefficient. Ido not believe
that it would have been in practice inefficient, because I
believe that immediately Russia offered —I will not say by
one ship, but by two or three ships, or even by "a large
force—to continue her course of aggression, the suspicions
of Europe would have been roused, and that what doesnut
seem at first sight a perfect security, would have turned
out in practice to have been a security for Turkey, and
consequently a security for the peace of Europe. Bat, sup-
posing that plan was not to be insisted upon, in what man-
ner was this term to be carried out ? I presume no person
will maintain that it was my business, as representing the
Government of her Majesty, to give up that which we
thought perhaps the most essential of all the propositions
in the four points, with a, view to put an end to the pre-
ponderance and to the aggressive ambition of Russia. Well
how was this to be done ? My right hon. friend says with
great truth that it would not have done to have accepted the
first proposition of Russia and to have allowed Russian fleets
to pass from the Bosphorus to tha Dardanelles, and from the
Dardanelles; to the Bosphorus at their pleasure. It is ob-
vious that if we had consented to those terms that not only
the fleets of Russia would have passed through the Dar da-
nelles, and thus have increased to a very large amount the
Black Sea fleet, but the latter would have come out from
time to time, and, passing close by the Sultan's palace,
would have paraded the waters of Greece with a view to
raise discontent and dijaffection among the subjects of the
Porte. Add to this the facility of means, whenever the
Czar of Russia might think proper to send his fleet to Con-
stantinople in order to enforce some unjust demand. I
think, therefore, that the first Russian proposition would
not have been sufficient. Let me here observe, that the
notion which the hon. member for the West Riding has,
that these great ships could be built in America and sent
into the Black Sea, has no foundation to rest upon, because
that plan could not be carried into effect so long as we closed
the Dardanelles against Russia ; and unless we admit the
opening of the Dardanelles it is impossible that ships-of-
war built in America could pass into the Back Sea, or
could furnish the great fleet to which the hon. member has
alluded. We now come to the second proposition of Rus-
sia, made on the 26th of April. My right hon. friend and
others think that was a good proposition to accept ; but it
is impossible to see in that proposition any real difference
between the preponderance of Russia as it stood before the
war, and the preponderance of Russia as it would have re-
mained if the proposition had been accepted. The only dif-
ference is, that in case of men acethe Sultan might call up the
fleets of his allies from the Mediterranean ; but in ordinary
circumstances there would have b een no difference whatever ;
the same preponderance would have existed; and how, was
I to say, or how was Lord Westmoreland to say after I
left Vienna, that we insisted upon the cessation of the
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, and at the same
time we consented to replace Russia in exactly the same
position in which she stood before the war? (Hear.) But
my right hon. friend thinks that Count Buol was satisfied
with this proposition ; but I beg, though it is a rather
long passage, to read to the house what Count Buol act-
ually did say. He said that—

" The project developed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of France and declined by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia,
contained a complete and efficacious system ; that he could
not say as much of the propositions put forward this day :
that Russia, in attaching to the mutual guarantee the value
only of an engagement not to encroach on the independence
and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, reduces it,
in fact, to an obligation which may be said to be self-evident;
that the arrangement proposed to act as an application of the
principle of the cessation of Russian preponderance in the
Black Sea, limits itself to the power reserved to the Sultan
of calling foreign fleets to his aid whenever the preponderance
of the Russian fleet should become threatening to him, which,
in fact, would only tend to augmesit the chances of a mis-
understanding; that, to sum up, the Russian propositions
eould only be considered as including principles of a nature
to be introduced into a general and complete system."
That was the opinion which the Austrian Plenipotentiary
gave of this Russian proposal. How then, if we meant to
insist upon the cessation of the Russian preponderance in
the Black Sea, could we agree to the Russian proposal ?
(Hear.) I have now stated why I think we could not accept
the conditions of peace as proposed by Russia. Of.course,
if Russia chose to consider that she was not sufficiently de-
feated in the war to agree to our terms, she had a right to
refuse them. I have been much criticised for having alluded
to the somewhat analogous case of the treaty of Utrecht,
when the fortifications of Dunkirk were destroyed; but I
have gained thereby what was a virtual admission on the part
of Prince Gortschakoff, that it is not a question of honour,
but a question more or less of defeat and of inferiority in
the war. Because no man maintains that Louis XIV., in
making the treaty of Utrecht, signed a peace inconsistent
with his honour on the contrary, it was a peace very cre-
ditable, almost glorious, to that monarch; but in agreeing
to the terms of that treaty he agreed to that which was the
consequence of his defeats ; and therefore the Russian
plenipotentiaries admitted that a similar treaty might be
accepted now, provided only that Russia were more de-
' feated, and received more checks in the course of the war.
I believe that it is not at all a question of the honour of
Russia. I believe, on the contrary, it is that Russia sees
that she has no reason as the war at present stands to re-
nounce in any 'way those aggressive projects which she
sedulously entertains which she intermits, which she lays
by for a time, but which Catherine entertained, which the
Emperor Nicholas, at the latter end of his life entertained,
and which the present Emperor has almost openlyavowed,
and is now endeavouring to carry into effect. (Hear.) That
I believe is the reason, and not a question of insulted dig-
nity and offended honour, which induced Russia to refuse,
the propositions of the Western Powers. I now come to a
very serious question, upon which I must decline to give
that definite answer which an hon. gentleman opposite
asked for, namely, "If you are forced to continue the Tsar,
and if you find that the only terms which you can propose
for giving real security to Turkey are refused, what will be
your object in the war?" My answer must be a very general
one. It is, that our object will continue to be, as it has hi-
therto been, the security of Turkey against Russia, and
therefore a security for the peace of Europe. I cannot believe
that if Russia were allowed, uncontrolled, to work her own
way towards the capital of the Turkish empire, making per-
haps small progress in 1855, the greater progress ten years
hence, and still further advance twenty years hence, that
the independence of Europe would be secure. (Hear, hear.)
Every ono has ssen—the incident has appeared lately iu
one of the public journals—in a history written by an au-
thor of great genius, that when Napoleon was engaged
with the Emperor Alexander in considering this great
question he asked for a map, put his finger on Constanti-
nople, and, after some moments of meditation, exclaimed,
"Constantinople—no, it is the empire of the world." I
cannot remember upon what occasion it happened, but
I recollect hearing the Duke of Wellington saying that an
addition to the forces of Russia in the Baltic and the pos-
Session of Constantinople, and consequently an entrance
into the Mediterranean, would make her too strong for the
rest of the world. (Hear, hear.) I believe it is not only
the recognised opinion oigreat men, but the general per-
vading sense of this country, that we should not allow
Russia to effect, either b 7 a simulated peace or by open
war, the conquest of Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) You
may say that the terms we proposed were not effectual for
that object; but if you say so you will blame us, not for
oar ambition certainly, because we asked nothing of Rus-
sia—not for our harshness towards Russia, but for our
rnoderati in, because we did hot ask for stronger terms and
more powerful Guarantees. There are no doubt other
guarantees besides this of the limitation of her fleet, and
it has been said that the practical mode of carrying out the
basis of the third point must depend on the events of the
war, and could not bo determined beforehand ; but we
wore compelled, when we agreed to negotiate at all, to
specify the practical security which we meant to have.
That negotiation is over, and we must consider, according
to the events of the war, what security is necessary foe the
protection of Turkey. (Cheers.) My right hon. friend
said the other day to my surprise, though I ssm glad he
has not repeated it after my denial, that I meant to make
this a war of nationalities. I never uttered a word which
could bear any such interpretation. (Hear.) That I men-
tioned the name of Poland in my description of the power
of Russia is quite true, but my object-in doing so was to
show how necessary it was to obtain some security against
thefurther aggression of that great empire; and if any infe-
rence were to bo drawn from my observations, it would be
that the case of Poland was now so utterly hopeless, that
it would be madness in England and France,to take any
part in promoting resistance in that country. (Hear.)
But be that as it may, never intending any war of na-
tionalities, and never having said anything of the kind, I
still do think it will be necessary to obtain some material
guarantee against the aggression of Russia. So fares these
four points provided a security for Europe, I think we should
make them our object. It is an advantage that Russia
should be compelled not to renew again those treaties with
Turkey which bind Turkey in chains from which it is de-
. sirable she should be freed. It is of importance that the
navigation of the Danube should be free--it is of "inport-
ance that the Sultan should give privileges to his subjects,
so that his Christian subjects may be attached to him and
may be ready to defend the Turkish empire against an
enemy. My right hon. friend has said that it was the care
of statesmen to provide for the security of Turkey. Now
it has been the view of English and French statesmen, and
it was certainly the view of the Austrian statesmen who
presided at the councils of the Emperor of Austria and
who have presided at them, that there is no reason why
Turkey should not be maintained, and why her independ-
ence and integrity should not contine to exist. That is
the language I heard from Prince Metternich and from
Count Bee). They both repudiated the doctrine of the
Emperor Nicholas that Turkey must fall, and that some
provision should be made for the succession. Austria, -in
these negotiations, has been sincerely endeavouring to pro-
vide with us security against the aggressive designs of
Russia. Everything I saw at Vienna induced me to be-
lieve that, averse as Austria was to war, she was at the
same time most sincerely desirous with us to obtain the
objects which we desired, (Cheers.) The position of
Austria, having so many enemies in Germany, is very cri-
tical, and much as I wish the present war to be brought
to a speedy conclusion—much as I desire Austria to take
part with the Allies—l should sincerely lament anything
being done to weaken the power of Austria in the great
European system. Belonging to the centre of Europe, hav-
ing frequently taken part in great wars with the view of
maintaining the balance of power in Europe, I believe that
her existence is of the greatest value to Europe, and that
other powers, ourselves among the rest, are hampered by
the policy of Austria, who wishes to maintain peace and
assist in the balance of power in Europe. Our object, there-
fore, in continuing this war will be to maintain the same
views. The means mustvary according to the events of the
war, and I think it would be idle, and ridiculous, and pre-
sumptuous, to point out now what are the terms of peace
which the English Government, in conjunction with her ally,
would think it necessary to demand.. But this point, I think,
has been secured, even by these abortive negotiations—that
from this time forward Turkey will be considered one of the
powers of Europe, forming part of the system of the balance
of power ; that her internal regulations will be allowed to her;
that her independence uud integrity will be recognised ; and
that thereby, partly from events of the war, and partly by
negotiations,i• we have really at the present moment already
attained very great and material advantages. That we have
not obtained those advantages which should make Turkey se-
cure I am forced to admit, 'and I do not thick we are likely
to make peace until we have obtained terms of peace that will
be safe to Turkey. Be it remembered always that we are seek-
ing for no object of our own—that when this peace is con-
cluded we shall not have obtained an acre of territory the
more, or any advantage whatever for ourselves. It is for Tur-
key and for the general system of Europe that we are endea-
vouring to obtain security. And now a few words with respect
to the particular state of this question. We seem tome, having
begun the debate on the motion of the right hon. gentleman
opposite, because the Whitsuntide holidays were coming and
the confe' ences were not• closed, to have arrived at a period
when, theWhitsuntide holidays being over and the conferences
being closed, these motions and amendments are not befitting
the present state of affairs. I think it would be far more regu-
lar if, when the Ministers of the Crown are able to bring down
the final closs of the conferences—those proposals which my
right hon. friend is so anxious to see, together with the de-
clarations made by her. Majesty's plenipotentiary—l think we
should be proceeding in a far more regular course if, having
her Majesty's communication on the table, we were to addreo

her Majesty on the subject of the vigorous prosecution of the
war. (Hear, hear.) If other gentlemeA, taking a different
view should like to move an amendment to that motion, with
the view of forcing the Government to an immediate re-
renewal of negotiations, of course it will rest with them to
do so. But, having spoken to my noble friend on the subject,
I know he is of opinion that such a course would be far more
regular, and more befitting the proceedings of the house, than
the discussion of such motions as are now before it. Of course,
should the house choose to go on with with the discussion, it
is out of our power to prevent the house from taking that .
course ; but it seems to us that the course I have suggested'
would be more regular, and would lead the house to decide
aye or no whether it will continue to support the Government
in the course they are pursuing. (Cheers.)
11Ir. RO EBUCK then moved the adjournment of the debate
until Thursday.
Lord PALMERSTON—Sir, I agree with my noble friend,
that, under the altered circumstances in which we at present
stand—that, seeing that the conferences have been finally
closed, and that negotiations are at an end—that the course
which was suggested by the right hon. gentleman under diffe:
rent circumstances, when the negotiations had not terminated,
and when the conferences were not concluded, would now be
the simplest and plainest course. We are at present discuss-
ing a series of amendments, and many hon. gentlemen have
great difficulty in coming to a conclusion upon them. The
question which the house has a right to consider is, how the
Government has conducted these negotiations, and whether
the house, under the circumstances in which the country is
placed, is willing to give to her Majesty that assurance of sup-
port in the prosecution of the war which I think the house
will be disposed, by a great majority, to affirm. The course,
therefore, I propose would be to agree to the adjournment
proposed by the hon. and learned gentleman. We shall, in
the course of a day or two, receive the protocol of that Con-
ference which took place yesterday. We shall then be in a
condition to advise her Majesty to submit to Parliament those
papers which will show the course of negotiation up to the
last moment, and then Parliament will be in a condition to
judge of the course which ought to be pursued. (Cheers)
Mr. DISRAELI—Sir, the suggestion of the noble lord
appears to me to be very unsatisfactory. Moro than three
weeks ago I made a suggestion to the noble lord, he having,
by command of. her Majesty, placed papers upon the table,
that he should follow the usual coarse of Minis, ers in his po-
sition, and move an address to the Crown on the subject, so
that the house might have the opportunity of expressing an
opinion on the manner in which the affairs of the country had
been transacted, and also of expressing their determination
to support her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, if she
should think it necessary to carry it on. But hOw did the
noble lord receive the suggestion ? First, in silence, and then,
when he broke through his taciturnity, in a spirit of jocula-
rity and in a tone of levity. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord
has given no reason why the debate should not proceed. If
the noble lord had placed these papers on the table—which he
ought not to have done if the negotiations had not been con-
cluded—if he had said, while placing the papers on the table,
negotiations are going on, and it will probably be my duty
to place other papers on the table—nobody would have urged
the noble lord to take the step which I suggested, and I
should not have made the motion which I thought it my
duty to submit to the house. But the noble lord placed
the papers on the table, and it was legitimate and necessary
for the house to express its opinion on the conduct of the ne-
gotiations, and all that has occurred has occurred in conse-
quence of the conduct of the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) There
has been an attempt made to distinguish between the Mini-
sterial question and what has been called the other question.
I do not understand how the distinction is established. If we
discuss the policy of ti e Government, that is as much a Mi-
nisterial question as the one in which we proposed to visit
the conduct of the Administration with censure. Now, what
is the position in which the house is placed ? We have be-
fore us an amendment of an honourable member which the
noble lord has publicly said he shall support. That motion
introduces the main• question of the negotiations that have
proved abortive at the conference, and whether we adopt the
first or second amendment, or both, the sense is the same. If
you only accept the first amendment, to which the noble lord has
pledged himself, and oppose the second, which I gather it is the
intention of the Government to do, the only deduction that can
be drawn is that, in consequence of Russia rejecting the prin-
ciple of the diminution of her naval force in the Black Sea,
we feel it our duty to announce to her Majesty that we are
ready to support her in the vigorous prosecution of the war,
the only inference being that all means of negotiation are
exhausted ; or whether we accept the second amendment,
the deduction is the same and the inference is inevitable. The
question having been discussed for two nights, whether the
House of Commons will sanction as a sine qua non the propo-
sitions made by the noble lord in his character of plenipo-
tentiary, it is trifling with the house to say that the debate
is not to be brought td its legitimate conclusion, and that
the opinion of the house is not to be taken on this legitimate
question. No papers which the noble lord can place upon
the table can affect the importance, or touch the paramount
interest of the question raised-by the amendment of the hon.
'member for Kidderminster, and I trust the house would not
stultify itself after the debate which had been carried on for
two nights, and after some of the most eminent members of
the house had given their opinion on the subject, and after
the minister had accepted the amendment of the hon. mem-
ber for Kidderminster, upon which the whole question of the
conduct of the negotiations could be raised, by making the
debate a tabula rasa, merely because in a few days the noble
lord could lay on the tab'e one more paper to complete the
history of negotiations admitted to have been abortive. I
trust the house will feel it due to its character to express a
distinct opinion whether the limitation with respect to the
naval force of Russia in the B ack Sea shall be a sine qua non
in a peace between the two countries.
Mr. BRIGHT quite agreed in the observations of the right
hon. gentleman. The proposal made by the noble lord cer-
tainly seemed to him the most extraordinary he ever heard
even from the Ministerial bench, and that was saying a great
deal. (Laughter.) They had for the last two nights been
discussing, in overflowing houses, the question whether the
Government had acted for the true interests of the coun-
try in laying it down at Vienna, as a sine qua non of peace,
that there should be a limitation of the naval force of Russia
in the Black ea. That question was of ten thousand times
more importance than the convenience of a Ministry or the
existence of a Cabinet, and it was certainly a most extraordi-
nary proposition that now, because the Government had get
into a sort of hocus pocus, into which it invited the house to
plunge itself—(laughter)—theyl were to give up its further
discussion merely because the noble lord at the head of the
Government always fertile in expedients, he might say eva-
sions—told them that at some futur,; time he might lay on
the table some farther papers, and move an address. The
opinion of the house must be pronounced upon the proposi-
tion of the hon. member for Kidderminster. He hoped that
whatever might be the opinion of members with respect to
that proposition—whether they were for ruining the country
by prolonged hostilities—(" Oh, oh")—or for saving it by
peace—each would stand by his own opinions, and face out
his own convictions. The question was one which should
have the fullest and freest discussion of which a question was
capable.
Mr. LABOUCHERE supported ;,he motion for the adjourn-
ment of the debate, believing after what had fallen from the
noble lord with respect to the production of papers, that on
Thursday next the house would have the whole circumstances
of the case more fully before them, and would thus be better
able to give to the country that clear expression of their
opinion which it w,s desirable should emanate froin them.
Mr. LOWE said that if the hon. member for Manchester
was in danger of being bullied, as he seemed to apprehend, he
(Mr. Lowe) feared that' e was in some danger of being cir-
cumvented. The noble lord having expressed an opinion in
favoul of the first part of his proposition, he certainly felt so
much encouraged thereby that he felt disposed to persevere in
pressing it upon the attention of the house. He was advised
by the noble lord to withdraw his amendment that he might
move an address in favour of the vigorous prosecution of the
war; in other words, that the noble lord might get rid of it.
(Hear.) He could not consent to do so as the matter then
stood. He believed that the proceedings of the conference at
Vienna were a fitting subject fur discussion, in the house, and
unless he had an assurance from the Government, that in the
address they intended to move that que'stion should be raised
so that it might be debated, he should press -his amendment.
(Question, question.)
It w,as then agreed that the debate should be adjourned to
Thursday nest.
JURISDICTION OF THE STANNARY COURT
AMENDMENT BILL.
This bill passed through committee.
REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS,. &c. (SCOTLAND) BILL.
The Lords' amendments to this bill were considered, and
agreed to.