The National Register.
London, England, 1812-01-12 00:00:00

SUNDAY73ANIT ARV 12, 1812.

r . 211.

POLLI IC AL DI.- QUISI I lON.

No. 198.

- -
POLICY AND CONSEQUEN ES OF THE PRESENT WAR

EXAMINED.

(Continued from our Lest.)

Accustomed by painful experience to behold and to
lament the triumphs of France, the world considered the
fulfilment of her denunciations against us within the
range of her power. This opinion strengthened the ene-
my, by depriving us of all foreign assistance. To con-
firm it, was his most important object ; to prove it fal,;e,
curs. The former could only be attained by a speedy
and successful exertion, to realize his threats ; the latter
by preventing or defeating the attempt. But prevention
seemed impossit'le, and defeat doubtful. For who could
check such resolute enterprise ? who could repel such
m'ghty hostility ? Triumphant, the world lay at his feet,
and all earthly opposition mint cease. Stopped in his
career, after the anticipated successes which he had so
loudly and confidently proclaimed, he must be disarmed
of half his terrors, and the spirit of resistance, encou-
raged by the least sign of impotency on his part, must
revive in other quarters. It was universally known, that
the whole force that had subdued the bravest armies of
the Continent was directed against us ; and should we be
...able to survive the tremendous shock, our power must
be deemed a rock on which nations might lean for sup-
port, and freedom stand unconquerable, whilst that of
our adversary would be greatly reduced in the scale of
public estimation.—We did more than resist the storm ; '
we dissolved it. We did more than overthrow the phy-
sical strength collected against us : Without a battle we
conquered the moral energies of France. That vast con-
centration of means was rendered useless : those nu-
merous hosts that darkened the opposite shores, and be-
gan to invade the waves ; and still more that gigantic
ambition which, armed with so many engines hitherto
found irresistible, had planned, prepared, and proclaimed
our ruin, were paralised without a blow—by the apprehen-
sion of defeat. Though placed in a defensive attitude, and
single among the nations, we presented such a front of
calm intrepidity, and undaunted heroism ; such a mass
of native power, and such an unanimity of patriotic feel-
ing, as to melt the temerity of our assailant into fear,
his activity into inaction. Conscious, hut too late,
that an attempt at invasion would be attended with the
annihilation of his flotillas, and the ruin of his army ; he
also felt, that to abandon his enterprise would be a public
acknowledgment of weakness, which would not fail to
rouse the Continental Nations from their despondency,
79/. P. No. CCM.

PRICIP, 9d•

and to involve him in fresh hostilities. He reflected that
we were no longer the same Power with whom he had to
contend in former wars. Our Navy had hitherto been
our strongest arm ; but his threats and- demonstrations
had made us a Military State, and thus doubled our effi-
ciency not only for defensive but fur offensive (Tema ions.
Our weip;llt, in the scale of Continental warfale, would
henceforth be far more considerable, and might prove
sufficient to turn its fate. Thus, his hatred had cherished,
his passion to destroy had enlarged, our influence. To
repress its exertion, and to avoid the encreased perils which
it would occasion, it was necessary that he should rernairt
at peace with his Continental Neighbours. However
inconsistent this might be with his future plans, it was
a line of conduct requisite to ward off immediate evils ;
and he adopted it in the hope, that a continued state of
alarm would confine our thoughts and our troops to the
defence of our island, and that tired out by constant ap-
prehensions, we should at length agree to terms which
re..luce us beneath our former level, and remove all
his grounds of fear. To prev,:nt hostile commotions among
die Powers in his rear, he laboured to conceal his impo-
tence, and endeavoured to attract the attention of the world
by a renewal Of those demonstrations against us, which 'he
bud firmly resolved should not lead to a serious attempt.
Many months had been spent in teaching and exercising
his soldiers to.row and manage their boats. This delay
being so well accounted for, bad excited no surprise.
Naval evolutions, within port, had occupied a still longer
portion of time, without creating any suspicion of the
true cause that detained the invaders on their shores.
But when it was known that every preparation was com-
pleted, and yet nothing was undertaken ; when the oar
had grown as familiar to the French veterans as the mus-
ket, and yet they were not called into action ; when the
troops bad been several times embarked, and the vet
sels afzer proceeding.as far as the mouth of their har-
bours, had fled back in disorder at the appearance of
our distant cruizers, the world began to view the con-
test with deeper interest and less despondent feelings.
__When it was afterwards perceived, that instead of
wrenching the sceptre of the waves from our grasp, and
redeeming the « independence of the seas," the assembled
hosts of France had performed no other feat than that of
investing a tyrant with the Imperial Purple, his delay was
attributed to the wish of securing one of the chief objects.
of his ambition, before he ventured on the desperate en-
terprize which was to obtain the other. But when it was
found that the EMPEROR seemed as little disposed as the
FIRST CONSUL to carry his threats into execution, tl.e cause
was no longer looked for amongst his ambitious views, and
the supposed mysteries of his policy. A glance tlr;xsa

It r •
1 94,
. . THE NATIONAL ItEG.STER.

Imaimm
at our coasts sufficiently explained the true reason of. his
forbearance. They were seen lined with a naion in arms,
rot timidly awaiting the expected foe ; but breathing open
defiance, sending her cruisers to chasten his pride, and
appal his myriads, and her fleets and armies to reduce
Ins 'colonial possessions. We-had become the assailants
in a war originally defensive on our part. With an accu-
mulation of hostile lot ce before us, divisions of which had
singly subdued powerfnl states, we enjoyed undisturbed
tranquillity, catlied on the trade of the universe, and ex-
tended the sphere of our dominions. The effect which
th prospect of on security and of our might produced,
was such as the wisdom of our Statesmen, and the appre-
hensions of the en my, had anticipated. The conduct
and course of the war had displayed in their true light the
relativemeans and resources of the two countries. In the
plenitude of her power and tie exultation of her pride,
Fiance had not been able to inflict a ssraind on any limb
of British Empire. In vain had she impressed almost
the whole world into her service. The world that had
obeyed her through fear, served her with reluctance, and
now beheld our opposition with hope, our success with
joy. At the hour of unequalled danger, reduced to de-
fend her own territory with her single means, unsupported,
though fighting in the cause of mankind, England had
pi-rived the superior magnitude of her resources, and the
unconquerable heroism of her population. The offensive
operations which she had undertaken showed that instead
of wanting protection, she was able to yield it. This im-
portant point was no sooner ascertained, than Austria,
who had laid down the sword only because she saw no
Power capable of assisting her effectually, caught a spark
of our spirit, and rising in confidence, in proportion as
she had sunk in hope, wisely determined to renew the
contest whilst the whole force of France was assembled
on a distant spot, but rashly hurried to the field before
she could be properly supported. She had secured the
alliance of Russia, and relied on our co-operation. But
ere the Russian armies could have passed their frontiers,
and our supplies been shipped, she had sounded the trump
of war, untimely warned the FRENCH EMPEROR of his
danger, and rushed forward to meet his advancing le-
gions without considering that she thus encreased the dis-
tance which separated her troops from her. Allies, and the
perils of the campaign. This error occasioned her ruin.
France marchedber veterans from her channel coast to the
banks of the Danube, ere the Russians had entered the
territory they came to protect. Destroyed or captured
in the fields of Bavaria which it had invaded, the Austrian
army left Austria defenceless, whilst divisions of her Al-
lies only reached her capital a few days before it was
summoned by the conqueror, and sut rendered to his power.
After their junction with the weak remains of a numerous
army, these auxiliary corps found themselves unable to
keep the field, and fell back to the
.farthest bounds of Mo-
ravia, where the main force of the Russian army had but
just arrived. There the enemy followed them, and there
was fought a battle which seemed to close for ever the
destinies of the Austrian empire.- The Russian Autocrat
retreated within his dominions by marches regulated by
the will of the conqueror, and the descendant of the House
of Hapsburgh only obtained the restoration of his heredi-
tary states, by tke cession of the most valuable and ex-
tensive provinces. A few months witnessed the opening
and the close ofOthe contest.
This war, which has justly been termed unfortunate,
was so short in its duration, and so decisive in its nature
for two reasons. The first, to which we have already

J

alluded, was the want of systematic and conj-ined
tions. Neither time, distances, nor even numbers
been calculated. Had prudence
_guided the Au!
councils, no hostile demonstration should have been
until it could be rendered effective by the support
adequate auxiliat Tforee. The time which the ltr
Would spend in marching to a given point, should
been compared with that in which the French
reach it. The means which the latter possessed o:
veying their troops with increased rapidity on a st
emergency, should have been examined, and even
caution should have been adopted to prevent the fot
th.:! two empires from being assailed and beaten in
The second reason is, that this war was waged on th
of France by her choicest veteraas both soldiers and
manders. The peace of the Continent, and the nat
her hostilities towards us, had hitherto rendered the .
out of a large number of conscripts unnecessary. V
cies only had been filled. The suddenness of the A
attack demanded instant opposition, and the Frene
peror led all his disposable troops to the field, and 0:
new corps to be formed to join him afterwards if
nary. At the head of such warriors, and conn
against an army chiefly composed of new levies,
mutated the war before he had any occasion to c
new corps into action.

--------
He bad atchieved many triumphs, obtained a
cured most important advantages : but he had purl
them with the lives of his most valuable soldier
former campaigns, he had intermixed his new Levi'
a certain proportion of veterans, leaving enough
latter to instruct, encourage, and lead on the form!
keeping the rest in reserve for future emergencies.
arrangement, the loss of men, however great, was r'
in its consequences and importance, by falling
conscripts, who could always be replaced, whil:
who survived, had, by the constant example of the:
panions, learned to despise danger, and acquired di+
activity, and experience. The sudden burst of
strian war had rendered the usual adoption of th
sure impracticable, before he entered into the field
advantages which the blind rashness of the Austri
mander had placed within his reach, could only be
by rapidity of movement. He therefore hurried
efficient force into action, without waiting for tl:
poration of his raw levies with his experienced
An army so composed, commanded victory,
wasted by it. At the close of the contest, which
ed before his conscripts had overtaken his veteran
successful career, he found himself aggrandized
tory but weakened in effective strength. Every
blood, shed on his side, was precious. Every rn;
was a soldier hardened by the toils of successi
paigns, versed in all the stratagems of war, an,
able to assume the command of armies. The
such men was but ill supplied by youths, torn
from their homes, and prevented by the speedy
tion of the contest, from sharing in its operations,
coming inured to hardships and to dangers. Fn
period, France began to exchange her real strer
that fictitious power, created by the recollection
exploits, which overawes the minds of men of
tire, and when brought to the test by some dari:
shrinks into insignificance, or vanishes away
terrors with which superstition invests a corpse.
cipient decline of the French military force was
by the subsequent war with Prussia, assisted by
might of the Russian empire. The former haf