The Sun.
London, England, 1855-07-10 00:00:00

all this, the personal side of the question, that we
are afraid the proposition itself, which converted
Lord John at once from the most ravenous of the

dogs of war into the very tamest partisan of peace,
should pass without sufficient observation. Let
us take the proposition in the words of Count
Buol, as quoted by Lord John Russell :—" -Un-
doubtedly the best security you can have is the
!imitation of the Russian fleet. But there is ano-
ther solution, and that would be, instead of weak-
ening Russia, to strengthen Turkey. It is the
opinion of the Austrian Government and of the
English Secretary. of State for the Colonies, that
the Third Point may be carried into effect either
in the one way or in the other. The proposal you
make is, undoubtedly, the best ; we should be
very glad to see it assented to by Russia ; in the
Conference we shall give it every support ; but we
will not say that we do not reserve to ourselves
the power of proposing the other mode—namely,
instead of a limitation of Russian force, to have a
counterpoise on the part of the Allies." To this
proposition Lord John Russell is candid enough to
see some objections. In the first place, it might
entail considerable expense upon us ; in the second
place, it would put Turkey under our immediate
protection ; and, in the third place, the appear-
ance of these rival fleets in this narrow sea would
look extremely like a competition for predomi-
nance. Nobody can say these are not good reasons,
but Lord John argues against the proposition as a
friend. He smiles it amicably and reproves it,
but takes especial care that the precious balm of
his wisdom should not break the head of his con-
sistency. We are not obliged to be so delicate,
and shall therefore take the liberty of urging some
reasons against the proposition, which Lord John
either overlooked or did not find it convenient to
state.
In the first place, it is very doubtful whether
such a proposition comes within the words of the
third point at all. The third point stipulated
that an end should he put to the preponderance of
Russia in the Black Sea, clearly meaning the exist-
ing preponderance over Turkey ; while the propo-
sition which received the assent of Lord Jobe Rus-
sell, so far from putting an end to the preponder-
ence of Russia over Turkey, recognises its existence,
and seeks to counteract it by calling in . aid the
allies, instead of putting an end to it. Thus, had
England and France acted on the suggestions of
their metamorphosed Plenipotentiary, they would
have set the example to Russia of wandering from
those very bases of negotiation which it had cost
them so much trouble to establish, and a strict
adherence to which contained at that moment the
only guarantee for peace. Dismissing this view,
we will next observe that Lord John Russell would
have had the allies concede to Russia a right and
control over their proceedings never, so far as we
are aware, claimed over France and England by
Russia or any other Power. Independently of
treaties, the Black Sea would naturally be free to
all Powers to navigate with whatever force they
please, the only limitation to that right being the
rights of the country whose consent was necessary
for the passage of those fleets into those waters.
The Hqllespont and Bosphorus are the very heart
of the Turkish empire they form part of its
internal navigation, and could not be passed with-
out its consent. Thus Turkey had a right to
forbid the entrance of the Black Sea to all nations,
and to defend that entrance by arms if it were
attempted to be forced. With this right Russia had
nothing to do, and those vessels which the Porte
allowed to pass the Dardanelles might occupy the
waters of the Black Sea without giving Russia any
cause of just offence. Then came the treaty of
1841, by which Russia, unwarrantably encroach-
ing on the natural rights of Turkey, obliged her to
consent that it. should be a casus belli if she ad-
mitted foreign vessels of war within the Strait].
But this casus belli was only against Turkey, and,
though Russia extorted by this treaty the right to
go to war with Turkey if she admitted foreign ships,
it was as against Turkey alone that she gained it.
She might'quairel with Turkey for lotting us in,
but had no right to quarrel with us for entering.
This state of things Lord John Russell proposes to
abolish, and, instead, to give Russia a power to ob-
ject—a power which, till now, she has never en-
joyed—to the number of ships which we shall
choose to send thither. The increase of Russia's
navy is to be unlimited ; ours is to be limited by
her. The initiative is to be with her, and we are
only to follow her lead. Instead of limiting her
force, we should by such a treaty limit our own.
It is a new thing for this country to be thus placed
at the disposition of another, and more especially
when that other is a Power which dares not face
us on the open sea. What a conclusion to be gained
for all our blood and all our treasure !
When we took up arms the treaties between Rus-
sia and Turkey were abrogated, and we might,
without incurring the penalty of war, navigate the
Euxine with armed ships. Now, Lord John Rus-
sell proposes that, by way of curbing the power of
Russia, we should renounce the right we had when
we began hostilities, and, while we leave her an
absolute discretion as to the number of her ships,
should undertake to guide ourselves by that dis-
cretion. If we are really sincere in the objects of
the war, to what end should we make a peace
leaving the Russian naval power in the Black
Sea unlimited 1 The only use that Russia
has for ships in the Black Sea must be
to overawe, and, ultimately, to conquer Turkey
—the very thing we took up arms to prevent.
Russia we may weaken, but Turkey for years to
come we cannot strengthen. gehastopol, Lord
John has told us, is a " standing menace," and
none the less a menace when wo shall haste assented
to its being filled with any number of ships the
Emperor of Russia pleases. Lord John Russell,
one of the principal authors of the war, may be
prepared to make peace on terms so abject and hu-
miliating, and at the same time so onerous, giving
us not the sligthest semblance of advantage and
saddling us with burdens never before undertaken
by this country—the maintenance of a permanent
fleet to wath an enemy whom we have not been
strong enough to humble; we know not with what
disasters we may be visited, we know not by what
Ministers we may be governed, but we firmly be-
lieve that there is no disaster within the range of
probability which could drive us to such concessions
and no Minister except Lord John Russell who is
likely to prcpose them for our adoption.

(Front the Morning Herald of this dap)
The revelations and confessions of Friday night
last have cleared up the mystery connected with the
rejected Austrian proposal, and have disclosed a
state of things in the Cabinet that fully accounts
for the ruinous indecision which has marked the
policy of Lord Palmerston's Administration.
Lord John Russell's disclosure is not more fatal
to the Government of which he is yet a member,
than it is fortunate for the country. We now un-
derstand, upon authority not likely to be called in
question, that upon the great question. of peace or
war—call it rather the great question of England's
existence as a first-rate power—the responsible
advisers of the Crown are at issue ; that they hate
all along been a divided Cabinet ; and that we
have very narrowly escaped for
.the present the
conclusion of an ignominious peace. The conse-
quences of these divisions—the half-hearted mea-
sures, and insecure policy resulting from them—in
the late and present Administrations, have cost
the country 100,000,0001. and a noble army.
These are losses, great though they be, which the
nation can yet repair, and will yet repair, under a
vigorous and honest Government ; but the peace
contemplated and all but concluded, the settlement
of the Eastern question on the terms proposed by
the Austrian Minister, would have added to our
losses the additional bitterness that they had been
incurred in vain, and that the interests of England
had been betrayed by those to whom in an evil
hour they had been confided.
Lord John Russell has made a clean breast of it;
he had accepted Count Buol's proposal, " and I
gave an assurance," he adds, " which I authorised
Count Buol to communicate to the Emperor, that
I would lay the propositions before the Cabinet of
this country, and would use my best endeavours
to put them in such a light that I might hope for
their aceeptanee." It is but just to say that in
adopting this course Lord John Russell was at
least consistent. To the proposal of M. Drouyn
de LlitiyA of the 10th April our plenipotentiary had
consented. `the late proposition of the Austrian
Minister went as far, perhaps, of tbo two, farther
—With the principle of limitation ; but neither
containedwe say it advisedly—the provisions of
a safe and honourable peace. They might have
been—they would have been, as we pointed out at
the time—readily evaded by Russia ; they were
thoroughly worthless as a basis for the settlement
of the great question to which we are committed.
The proposition of the 19th of April emanated
from the French Envoy, and Count Buol had suf-
ficient address to make it appear in the last Confe-
rence that the latest proposition rested upon cer-
tain suggestions thrown out by M. Drouyn do
Lhuys. But now comes the gist of the whole mat-
ter. M. Drouyn do Lhuys returns to his Govern-
ment, and finds that his views have been so little
in accord with those of the Emperor, that he
instantly tenders his resignation. Lord John
Russell also returns home ; in due time the Aus-
trian proposition is presented to the British Go-
vernment and rejected. Lord John kept his word
with Count Buol, we can well believe, and no
doubt pressed his proposals, but he tailed to carry
the Cabinet with him. Does be resign ? By no
means ; the " circumstances of the time" forbade
such a course, and no man understands better than
Lord John Russell the time for an exhibition o,f,
that virtue ; but the " unsuccessful negotiator
voucheafes a further explanation of his conduct.