The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-24 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC lOURN.ALS.

( From .the Times of this day.)
The eagerly-anticipated despatch of General Simpson,
which was forwarded from the seat of war with so much
haste that the steamer which brought it did not wait for
Marshal Peliss!er's report, presents us with a very mo-
dest, and, we must add, a very meagre narrative of the
crowning operation of this eventful siege. We have no
doubt that on this, as on most other occasions, both the
Government and the nation will be mainly indebted to
the correspondents of the British press and to private
communications for a more complete and accurate pic-
ture of that extraordinary and awful struggle which
finally placed the stronghold-of the Russians in the hand=
of the allied armies. On the present occasion therefore
we shag confine ours-lves strictly, like General Simpson,
to the military details of that part of the attack in which
the British forces were engaged.
After the progress which had been made early in the
present month in alvancing the works of the besiegers
to the furthest limit against the princ:pal defences of the
enemy, and in arming these batteries with the guns and
projectiles required for another general bombardment,
the engineer and artillery officers of both armies re-
ported that the assault of the place ought to be made on
the Bth, having been preceded by a heavy fire for three
previous days. The opening of that fire on the morning
of the sth has already been described with his usual feli-
city of expression by the correspondent of this journal,
who witnessed the scene from Cathcart's-hill. The sun
wse that day clear and ruddy over the forts of Sebas-
topol. It was the last gleam of light and hope which
shone over th,e doomed but untaken city. -Upon a
signal from the. French lines the entire circuit of the
works of the besiegers poured forth' an intolerable and
incessant storm of fire. The armament of the batteries
had become so ponderous and so extensive that
even Sebastopol, with the 4,000 cannons remaining
in its arsenals, responded to the fire in vain. No stop, no
breathing time, allowed the enemy to repair the damage
inflicted upon their batteries, or to remount fresh guns,
and at last the superiority of the fire of the attack was
decisively established. _ _

The preparations of the allied armies were completed
for the assault in the night of the 7th and the morning
of the Bth, the cannonade not having ceased until just
before the French storming columns commenced their
attack. The operations of the whole army, both in,.the
British attack on the Redan and in the French attacks
on the Little Redan and the Central Battery, were made
to depend on the success of the French assault on the
tnain position of the Malakhoff, and the tricolour planted
on the parapet of that w was to be the signal for the
general advance. General Simpson appears not to have
thought that it elevolvedzpon nim to report on the whole
of the arrangements of this combined operation ; but it
is evident that Marshal Pelissier had long made up his
mind that the capture of the Malakhoff was the decisive
event of the siege, and that he had resolved not to fail
in attack;ng that position a second time. The event has
fully justified that opinion, which was held from the first,
by Sir John Burgoyne and many other officers ; but, as
the main strength of the attack was justly and succe-s-
-fully directed against the Malakhoff, it is not equally
clear for what reason, after that work was in the posse--
sion.of the French, other secondary assaults were made
by both armies against points of inferior importance.
Such, however, was the case, and the Russians were
more successful in their defence of the Redan and of the
Central Battery than of the Malakhoff. It seems to
have been determined, however, that the whole army
should share in the glorious perils of the day, and the
Fr6nch assaults on the extreme left extended even to the
Quarantine Battery.
In pursuance of the arrangements made by Lieuten-
ant-General Sir W. Codrington, now commanding the
Light Division of the British army, and of Lieutenant-
General Markham, commanding the Second Division,
the assaulting column to be directed against the Redan
was selected from these two corps, which have borne so
very large a portion of the sufferings and losses of the
campaign, and have covered the regiments belonging to
them with incomparahle distinction. The whole column
consisted of but 1,000 men, preceded by a covering party
of 200 men and a ladder party of 320, so that, as far as
this succinct statement of the Commander-in-Chief gives
us any clue to the events of the day, only about 1,520
men of the British army were engaged ! The column
penetrated into the salient angle of the Redan, where a
sanguinary fight was maintained for nearly an hour with
the enemy ; but it was found impossible to maintain the
position. General iiirnpson states that the greatest
bravery was displayed, a fact of which we have no
doubt, and that this determined and bloody contest
was "supported to the utmost ;" but he does not inform
as whether the troops were checked by a cross-fire of
artillery from the second line of Russian defences or by
the infantry of the garrison, and, above all, he omits to
state what were the reserves brought up under these
critical circumstances to the support of a column engaged
no doubt within the Redan with very superior numbers
of the enemy. We have no wish to prejudge unfavour-
ably the conduct of the officers who commanded on this
occasion, or to diminish the public satisfaction at the
general result by cavilling at the means employed ; but,
on the other hand, we have now before us the official
report of the British Commander-in-Chief, relating his
own arrangements ' • and, as we certainly can claim
no share in the brilliant achievement of the
French columns against the Malakhoff, which was vic-
toriously terminated before the British attack began, we
are bound to inquire with some anxiety into the causes
of our subsequent failure. As the matter stands upon
General Simpson's report, it appears iecredible that a
party of only some 1,200 or 1,500 men should be sent
to storm a work in which the Russians had probably
entered
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an hour we should not be told what reserves were sent
to its support. Indeed, we are expressly told that the
reserve, consisting of the Highland Brigade, was not
engaged ; it is probable, however, though by no means
clearly expressed, that some further detabhments of the
Second and Light Divisions did join in the assault to
support the storming columns. • The assault on the
Malakhoff '
division, with the Zouaves of the
Guard as a reserve ; and in his spirited address to the
Generalm wasmah lede by General Bosquet, at the head of
e s
soldiers before the battle he told them " It is a general
assault, army against army." What, then, was the
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ledehvieohteditbwanads
conquer, but too weak to hold'? Gen.
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forced
hei
nt armysoeulfgfhndtto doing
Simpson omits to tell us ; but the next sentence of his
report is, if possible, more extraordinary than the pre-
en t
unable
a
ceding one, for he adds that- " the trenches were subse-
quently to this attack so crowded with troops that I was
r to
General
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organiseEllo
Eyre."
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establishes hitherto
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the reserve, to be supported by the Third Division
under ,
several facts which are not creditable to the Com-
mander-in-Chief
understand why the crowded state of the
trenches prevented the advance of the reserves,
for, if they were too crowded, the most natural
operation would seem to be to move a brigade to the
front'. But; however this may be, who but the Gene-
ral-in-Chief is responsible for the over-crowding of his
men to such an extent, as he himself informs us, that
he could not use them, or execute his own plan of
attack So that on the one hand we had a body of
troops in the Redan too weak to maintain itself there
d
o makee
against the enemy, and on the other the trenches so
crowded with men that the second assault could not be
organised by the reserve ! This state of things seems to
be so inconsistent with the most ordinary rules of war
that we cannot but suspect that General Simpson has
omitted some essential circumstances in this hasty and
unsatisfactory narrative. AN it turned out, wo may re: