The Sun.
London, England, 1855-09-17 00:00:00

but feel that, in the consideration of my conduct,
more than naval questions are involved.
As long as we have a superior fleet in the Baltic,
we protect the shores of England from insult and.
desolation, our commerce from ruin ; we retain
Sweden and Denmark in their neutrality.
Behind that fleet there is nothing ; no naval, no
military reserve at home to defend our coasts ; no
fortifications, adequate to protect our ports, if at
any time, through any disaster arising out of a
most dangerous and little known navigation, or out
of the accidents of treacherous end tempestuous
weather, or out of an attack on forts, which, with
whatever caution and judgment it might be con-
ducted, and whatever more or less of success might
attend it, must be expected to result in the crip-
pling of many of the ships engaged, our Baltic fleet
should, under circumstances of great temporary
disadvantage, be brought into action with the very
powerful fleet of -the enemy, and in that action
should sustain defeat, in three weeks from that
time a Russian fleet, full of troops, might be on
our coasts, and even as the Dutch once were on
the Thames.

I did not think, and I do not think, that for any
chances of success which were ever within my reach
I should have been justified in incurring that risk.
I afforded the enemy frequent opportunities of en-
gaging the fleet in open sea. There I knew that
the chances of war were equal, and that even if
not fully successful (but I justly expected full suc-
cess), I must so cripple the enemy's fleet as to
make it incapable of further enterprise. These
opportunities of equal battle the enemy declined,
and many I gave them of unequal battle they de-
clined also. I did not think myself justified in
engaging,
with such means as I had at my disposal,
forts first, and a fleet afterwards ; and it was .not
so easy, as their lordships seemed to think, to
choose a fine day at the end of October, when the
Cronstadt fleet would be frozen up, and Sweaborg
open. And I say deliberately, that Ido not think
that anything short of a reasonable expectation of
complete success, not against the forts only, but
against the fleet within them, would justify an at-
tack by ships, upon such forts as those at Swea-
borg ; and so thought the French admiral, whom
their lordships have necessarily included in their
censure. And had the marshal of France not sailed
with his army, he also must have been included in
their dissatisfaction, that Sweaborg was not at-
tacked before he sailed. I never would, under
pressure from without, and against my own better
judgment, advise an attack upon forts like that
which lately failed at Sebastopol.
If their lordships should be of opinion that with
the means at our disposal we ought to have made
an attack on Sweaborg, it is for them to test the
correctness of their opinion by submitting my
conduct, for not advising it, to the judgment of a
court-martial. I repeat, that it would be most
gratifying to me there to explain and justify all
my proceedings ; and I can truly say that, on re-
flection, I am more satisfied with myself for having
resisted the instigations I received, to do what I
felt to be wrong, than for the various measures in
which I succeeded, and for which I had their lord-
ships' approbation.—l have the honour to be, Sir,
your obedient, humble servant,
CHAS. NAPIER5 Vice-Admiral.
-

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.
The letter which follows is from the Admiralty,
and is an answer to the above. It will be seen
that it takes no notice of the demand of the gallant
Admiral for a court-martial ou his conduct.