The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-23 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 23, 1855.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

(Front the Times.) •
I The session that virtually opens to-day will decide one
of the most important questions that can arise in the his-
tory of a people. That question is neither more nor less
than this, -Whether England is henceforth to be a mili-
tary Power ? While we ask the question we almost hoar
it objected on this side and on that, that such a question
can never be asked in any Parliamentary or noticeable
form ; that nobody will think worth asking what almost
everybody is prepared to answer one way ; that, supposing
the question to be decided substantially and in effect, it
will be by the gradual decision of the time, warping our
habits elowly and imperceptibly to peace or to war ; that,
in all probability, England will always remain what she is,
prepared eottally for peace and for war, though perhaps
somewhat hindered in the prosecution of war by her con-
stitutional ideas and mercantile habits. Indeed, it is always
probable that nothing decisive will be done, and that we
shall go on clothe what we have done before. Ia answer to
all these very netural objections, we must repeat our strong
persuasion that the question is virtually asked, and
to a very great extent, be decided this very session. What
if the qncetion be not asked at all in any manner what-
ever, literal or virtual, and everything relating to the war
ho permitted to go on as it has done before,—that will
itself be a decision,—perhaps a final decision,—that Eng-
land is henceforth not to be a military Power. It is quite
evident that on the present system we cannot wage war,
and it is sheer extravagance and downright murder to pre-
tend to do so. It is demonstrated beyond a shadow of
doubt that such is the dead lock of authorities and de-
partments, such the complication of forms, such the intru-
sion of foreign and injurious influences in every part and
step of our military administration, that we cannot
cope with the elements themselves, much less with
a respectable foe. It is quite evident that we can
no more wage war to any effect than the " Train
Bands" under a staff of John Gilpins, or any other
mock militia. The immense material and pompous or-
ganisation of war, which cost us some twenty millions a
year, aro a delusion and a snare, simply because we don't
possess the mode of working them to any effect. After
half a century of the most expensive and elaborate susten-
tation and improvement, our military system has at last
been set to work. It has been about a twelvemonth at
work, and during that twelvemonth has been urged, and
encouraged, and warned, and assisted, and corrected, and
chided, and resuscitated iu every possible way. Nor is
there any reason to suppose that it would have fared better
in other possible hands. Yet the result is failure, failure,
failure—a perpetually descending bathos of non-per-
formance, confusion, delay, perplexity, impotence, and
whatever ends in nothing. The system is found as im-
possible to work as a ship that will not obey its rudder, or
anengine that cannot be get into motion • or a figure of
bones ateriltteeersee MO which we cannot breathe the
breath of life. The dead lock is absolute, final, inevitable,
and desperate, from Whitehall to the camp before Sebas-
topol. The Minister of War, the Commander-in-Chief at
home, the Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea, down to
the purveyor of stores at Scutari, and the miserable lad,
dozing, hungry, naked, and frost-bitten in the trench, are
all equally dummies. They can do nothing. They are
mere blocks in the inanimate system that answers no other
purpose than to make us flatter ourselves we are prepared
to go to war, when wo certainly are not. They constitute
a scarecrow, which has long ceased to frighten our foes,
and only deceives those who maintain it. Nov, if this
session, in the face of the utter wreck of this fabric, the
thorough detection of this imposture, the absolute collapse
of this stage giant, suffers the thing to go on, and votes
supplies and all the rest of it as heretofore, then we say it
virtually, and perhaps finally, resolves that England
henceforth shall net be a military power.
We have been accused of personal feelings in
our remarks on the war, and of reflecting on this
or that officer maliciously or wantonly. The tenour
of our complaint, however, has been entirely against
the system, and, under that system, we really believe the
ablest Minister will be likely to find himself crushed and
disabled. The promised reform in the War Ministry, that
cost a break in the last session and 17,0001. a year, simply
relieved the Minister of War of the care of fifty colonies,
and so far was a great and positive advantage ; but it loft
all the complications, all the divided, co-ordinate, and con-
flicting authorities of the existing system. unchanged ; it
left the Duke of Newcastle incapable of giving an order
which he might, en the best grounds, believe to be abso-
lutely necessary for the salvation of an army ; it left him
recoiling not so much from the responsibility of decisions
as from the trouble and uncertainty that attended their
execution. When this is the case with the man most re-
sponsible for the administration of the war, and vulgarly
supposed to be really and entirely responsible, what must
be the case with a multitude of other officers industriously
subordinateanclpowerless ? It is the object of the system to
destroy freedom of action, and the spirit engendered by the
system is to do as little as possible, and even to know as
little as possible. That is the language alike of the officers
in the field and the functionaries at home. Wo are only
too fully persuaded that at the approaching day of trial,
when all who hare been so unfortunate as to share the re-
sponsibility of this enterprise will be called to a searching
and terrible account, they will all be well able to defend
themselves. They will all be able to point out that they
had not the authority that the occasion required, that
their delays wore necessary, that they could only indicate
wishes when commands were to be given, and might begin
a measure, but could net carry it out ; that they were
thus necessarily dependent on chance and caprice, and
the chances went against them. Could we think
the system possible, wo should have adopted a more
severe line as to the conduct of individuals. Nay,
men who have been present for months in the Crimes
have been under the belief that we were only too apt to
screen individuals for the sake of our correspondent. In
point of fact, we have not censured them as they seamed
to deserve, because we well knew that the system was one
under which they could not do their duty.
But the prepossession most fatal to the hope of a right
decision, and most conducive to the wrong decision of
leaving things as they are, is the idea that there is really
no such alternative as that of being a military power or
not ; and that a country like ours, mainly addicted to
peaceful pursuits, may without any violent change, or any
institutions very discordant from its general policy, con-
duct at least a defensive war with respectable success. Now
all experience, and especially that of the present ego, is
dead against this prepossession, which is simply a piece of
English narrow-mindedness. War is war, and cannot be
made anything else than war. It will not be reduced to
a system of ledgers, memoranda, desks, stores, uniforms,
and other dead or dormant affairs, such as may answer,
possibly, for a domestic institution. In our own times
every Power worth anything in war is an expressly mili-
tary Power, under an Emperor, who is, in fact, the head
of the army, as his very name denotes. Not one of the
Emperors now reigning in Europe is either a coastitutienal
Sovereign or the legitimate heir to his throne. One chief
of one military bureau out of a dozen is no snatch for the
man who can say, "Sic vo?o, sic jubeo, stet pro ration
ro!untas." Of course, we are not demanding the creation
of a military despotism, but we are demanding that with-
out which military success, and even the preservation of
an army in the field, is impossible—one undivided respon-
sibility. Do wo object to the creation of such an office ?
Well and good. The objection is reasonable enough. It
would be peculiarly reasonable in the 'sleuth of a Bright,
and perhaps of a Cobden. But let us be consistent. Let
us give up war altogether. Let us take rank as a commer-
cial nation. Let us settle as the Dutch, the Venetians,
and some other ancient military Powers have done, and
become the humble spectators of our neighbours' quarrels.
It is possible we may be the happier, nay, even the better
for it ; that is, if our neighbours will let us alone. If
they will not let us alone, then we must enjoy what hap-
piness they choose to leave us—what morality or religion
they choose to prescribe or encourage. If we are still too
proud for this, and wish to keep up with the first - rank,
then we must not mince the matter. We must have a
proper military
organisation, with sufficient unity and
power, and sufficient adaptation to its purpose in all other
respects, to make us a match for our imperial Allies and
antagonist.

tion of the department the execution of the law should de-
volve. The circumstances above alluded to would seem to
indicate that the Govoroment has been losing time, and
idly dallying with the very instruments which it insisted
upon having placed into its Land. Au inquiry- into the
truth of these allegations may appear to cover but a nar-
row corner of the groat field of the war management ; but
itwill be a test of the Fincerity and energy (er the want of
them) with which Ministers have been urging on military
operations since the Parliament met in December. At that
time much of their past indolence and inefficiency was
condoned, in the hope that the future would make monde.
if it shall appear that they have been going to work since
time, as languilly and unsystematically as ever—thatwill
prove their proiniFzs of amendment to have been hollow or
insincere; tisill demonstrate that, either from incapacity
or want of goodwill to the work in hand, the Ministry, Os
at present constituted, is incompetent to the great task of
carrying on the war.

The inquiry next in order is of wider scope. It embraces
the whole operations of the naval campaign in the Baltic.
It is generally understood that Ministers are seeking to
throw the whole blame of its comparative failure on Sir
Charles Napier; and that Sir Charles bitterly complains
of having been hampered by injudicious instructions, and
of having been inadequately provided and supported from
home. It is possible that a searching investigation may
show that both pasties are in fault. It will be difficult to
excuse an experienced commander for having accepted
command upon terms that might or must have rendered it
impossible for him to perform his duty. And it will be
difficult for Ministers to show that they are not respon-
sible for having employed, and kept in office, an ineffi-
cient agent.
Lastly, full explanations must be exacted of the causes
of the chaotic and anarchical state which appears, through.
out the campaign, to have pervaded every department of
the army and navy in the Black Sea. It will not be enough
for Ministers to show that they have issued orders for all
things to be done aright. Rave they taken the most ordi-
nary precautions to enforce obedience to their orders ? or
have they, satisfied with fantail than, looked apatheti-
cally on, while they were neglected or disobeyed? This
is too wide and complicated an inquiry to admit of our
details
our meaning. In a letterlsstrate
now; but two simple circum-
stancesfrom an able and respectable military officer of high rank,
entering
now before us, it is confidently affirmed that " it is well
wiinllt into
serveit s
tdoe
known that one of the Cabinet Ministers wrote to Scutari
to direct a pier to be erected at that place for the landing
of the sick, and that it was not done for three months
after." A similar negligence in enforcing obedience to
orders is said to have resulted in the non-erection of a tem-
porary pier or piers for the embarking of the sick and
wounded at Balaklava. And we are also informed that
the military authorities in our army before Sebastopol are
prepared to thwart and obstruct the civil engineers sent
out td construct a railroad from Balaklava to the camp.
The apathy with regard to the war, indicated by these
simple facts, appears to have pervaded all orferations, from
the greatest to the least. The truth of the allegations on
this head; so freely circulated, must be ascertained or dis-
proved ; and if it is established, the causer of the offence
must bo removed.

It cannot be too often insisted upon, that, to ensure suc-
cess, these investigations must be conducted with all the
sternness, but with all the calmness,of a judicial inquiry.
,a rrlar discharge of eguxiip, point de zcle, was never
T moreall e yarpa
puldi'esa
ble. favourite
A r m
a nd
cna i
ques-
tions—every member rushingforward singly, and without
concert, to show how zealous he IS—can only perplex and
bewilder, and prevent the attainment of any amelioration
in the management of the war.

(From, the Morning Herald.)
the truth must come
out. Misrepresentation has reached its limits. Confes-
sionsand public anxiety
has
-naeshseamnbilnetsentshiitsy
that the
of incompetency on the part of the Duke of New-
castle, and lady-like but false statistics on the part of Mr.
Sidney Herbert, have lost their novelty- Ignorance in the
War Minister will no longer serve the purpose of an ex-
cuse, but will be taken as an aggravation of the offence;
while the assertions of the Secretary at War are now so
much distrusted that proof of all he says must be unflinch-
ingly required.
The public are now aware that there are two things
which must be looked to with regard to the state of affairs
in the East, and they will demand pnnisnment for the
past as well as security for the future.
The destruction of our army, the betrayal and quasi
ruin of our ally, the utter waste of time, of lives, of money,
are all things which no effort of man can recall ' • but all
those things must llp sifted, examined, searched into, in
the first place, that the guilty and the guilty alone may be
punished; and, secondly, that by acquiring a knowledge
of the means by which such events became possible, we
may be enabled to make provision against their future re-
currence.

An effort has been made to shift responsibility from
those who are more obviously guilty to the seTeral subor-
dinate departments, and to assert that all things were duly
ordered, but that the orders were not obeyed. The ques-
tion, therefore, naturally suggests itself, " Why wet() they
not obeyed ?" and the immediate answer is, " That the
authority and power to enforce obedience did not exist."
If this bo so wo say, then, that the great event of the
session of 1854—the appointment of a War Minister—was
a delusion practised on the public, a falsehood and a fraud.
Surely no man can be so forgetful or so ignorant as not
to know that the reaava pat f—rward to justify the ap-
pointment was the strong necessity of procuring uniformity
of action in all the dop irtments, and that to obtain it a
supreme authority was indispensable. Certain are we
that the public so understood it, and that Parliament
voted 17,0001. a :roam for eh. ...penises sf the new office),
upon the distinct understanding that the War Miminter
should ha.vo the power of compelling obedience to hie
commands.

Either the power exists, or it does not. If it exists,
what must we think of the possessor of the authority who
did not compel obedience ? And if it do not, can we con-
ceive anything more criminal than the pretence of under-
taltiug duties which the Minister knew he had not the
moans of performing, even if ho had capacity to understand
the measures necessary to be taken ? We wish the duke a
safe doLveranco from the dilemma.

As far, however, ai the nation is concerned, it matters
little which may be the truth ; for even if the power did
exist, it was in hands totally incompetent to use it ; the
thunderbolts of Jupiter himself would become innocuous
in the feeble grasp of an infant.
We believe, however, that the Treasury will be found
upon examination to have been the real clog ; and an anec-
dote was yesterday current ia. the City, which might go
far to illustrate this position if investigated. A merchant
was stated to have taken to Balaklava a vessel loaded with
articles of the first
rnecessity for the troops, all much
',ranted at the time.
That seeing the deep distress of our
noble soldiery, this man, in the true spirit of patriotic
Henality, offered the whole to our commissariat without
reserving any profit; and that the offor, being by them
declined, was subsequently made to General Caurobert,
and at once accepted.

at ow, if this statement be true, and we have heard it
from more than one reliable quarter, the question at once
arises—why were those articles of the first necessity re-
fused by the commissariat of a starving army ? And we
think that any one at all acquainted with our system will
answer, that the commissariat were under the necessity
of applying in every instance to the Treasury, and well
knew that the myths of that department would answer,
through their oracle, "that my lords were not aware" of
the necessity of the purchase. Inquiry into these matters,
as we have said before, is to be made regarding " by-
gones," as warnings for the future. But we are threatened
with results not yet we hope concluded, and which,
although not so vital to the safety of our army, aro yet of
enormous importance to the honour of England ; we allude
to the impending negotiations for peace. Englishmen
will, perhaps, hardly believe that we are now at the
eleventh hour entreating and supplicating the Czar to ac-
cept the Vienna note—for such in substance and fact is
the meaning of the four points—and this we are doing
without the smallest consideration for the fact, that we
have since the period when that note was rejected sacri-
ficed the finest army that ever left England, and expended
enormous sums of tomalley in the vain.attempt to bring the
Czar to reason. The whole object, however, is to try by
any means to rescue the great offenders—the Aberdeenites
and Nicholas—from the punishment which the wickedness
of the one and the treason of 'the other have so justly
earned. Is that object to be attained 1 The English na-
tion must answer the question, and they should remember,
in making their reply, that the four points are the Vienna
note in a new shape—that no peace can be safe which does
not provide for the destruction of Sebastopol, nor honour-
able which does not secure an indemnity for the Sultan,
even if the Allies are simple-minded enough to pay the
enormous expenses which they have incurred, and must
yet meet, without exacting remuneration from the Czar.
These are the very lightest conditions which England
and her Allies should impose upenßus
eiar, and these are
conditions which never can be
proposed
decoded to as
long as the Coaliti, a remains in office.
The great object of putting out the wretched clique
which goes by that name is to prevent them, by means of
41 difficulties from
which their successors may find it impossible to extricate
the country, with due regard to its honour.
that
misused, goe
fromet
in
volving the nation have so scandalously
which they A
means by which it ap-
The ejection of Lord Aberdeen must be speedily, if we
wish to save our army, now attenuated to the last degree;
We can hardly believe that any 'Tian even the most
sanguine, expects that an assault will !
tts
be made upon pearsan d
here
possible sl iebtl eustO suggesteffeet t
batitopol at present. The lossh would be enormous ; and,
exposed to the fire of the nort ern forts, the Allies could
not retain the town a single hour.
the
object. only
We have, therefore, to suggest—humiliating, deeply
humiliating, as the course must
.bp—to entreat of our gal-
lant and high-minded Allies to anklai Off our hands such a
trenches portion of the duties of the es as may enable our
them at afuture
the
day. The must perceive necessity of this measure;
their
poor soldiers to survive,in order to assist
and so highly do we estimate chivalrous high feeling,
that we are convinced the Emperor and his generals would
at once accede to the demand.
hope has at last
This would allow our over-worked and half-starved
which surrounds the her-
troops to be sent dcwn by divisions. in 'succession to "Bala-
while the army con-
tinuesk arrived,l a a, toe
iareceivetohatvheeacifetwhiinlagyweh.rieef she tr we
we still
stgoilled
believefeedin food
geetdo
irh seost
eutroh,rees
ilftritehhuteonhi
urdegehti exhausted hotnah els
utterlyst ei.tl
chaotic
usptnraeal strength;
isnqui blahaob:
leo
period so gained, the
communications between the harbour and the lines might
be made practicable, perhaps the railway completed, and
on the return of our soldiers the French would find their
reward in the gratitude and affection which their noble
conduct would have excited in their Allies.
We protest we feel ashamed.and grieved to a degree we
can hardly express, when we find Ourselves compelled to
make such a suggestion ; but any humiliation is better
than the heartless sacrifice of the noble and gallant fellows
whom the Coalition have betrayed. The nation, how-
ever, will remember that for this, as for other degrade"-
Radical colleagues.
To return to the meeting of Parliament. We wish in
conclusion, to address a few words to the leaders of the op-
position upon the course which circumstances imperatively
require at their hands.
The nation is now thoroughly awake, and will expect
adieu from those in whom it may require to repose con-
' fidence, The days fa forbearam aro gowit by ; fwthor

condonance will be criminal. Wo well know how terrible
a sacrifice of self would be required to undertake the task
of rescuing the nation and army from the fearful plight in
which incompetency and treachery have involved them,
but it must be made. Moreover, if action is now post-
poned, it will come too late, and when the mists of official
mis-statements have been cleared away by the fearful ca-
tastrophe which any day may now produce, the wrath of
England will be terrible, and in the anger of an outraged
people we may find that unless the Conservatives adopt
some decisive course, and that soon, the charge •f conni-
vance may be extended fi om the Government side of the
house, so as to include iu its desolating sweep the benches
now occupied by an opposition, which v ill then be con-
sidered to have utterly failed in its duty to a betrayed
country and a sacrificed army. To the nation we say—
"Awake, arise, or be for ever fallen."