The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-11 00:00:00

as requisite under existing circumstances.
That armament he assembled together, and
marshalled under his Imperial banners. It
has recently been stated in the House of Commons
—this wonderful army of NAPOLEON-at some-
where about half-a-million of men in the aggre-

gate. Erroneously so stated : for it was consi-
derably more. It was a legion such as had never
before been gathered together by one man, such
as probably may never be assembled again by any
other—out-numbering the boasted followers of
XERXES, and over-shadowing the barbaric hordes
of ATARI° and ODOACER. It included, in French
troops alone, a grand army of 850,000 men ! and
with these 50,000 Italians,
..under the Viceroy
Prince EUGENE ! 60,000 Poles, under PONIA-
TOWSKI ! 40,000 Bavarians ! 30,000 Saxons

30,000 Westphalians ! 15,000 men from Wur-
temberg ! 9,000 from the Archduchy of Baden !
23,000 from the Rhenic Confederation I 20,000
as a Prussian contingent ! 30,000 Austrian auxi-
liaries and 30,000 Neapolitans, led by their
hero of romance, the most gorgeous of the tributary

Kings of the new SESOSTRIS, the most chivalrous
of the PALADINS of the mightier than CHARLE-
MAGNE ! Altogether, scarcely credible though it
sounds, not half-a-million of men, but as
many as 1,187,000 ! If we subtract from that
grand total, however, some 387,000 for soldiers
in the hospitals, for those absent upon furlough,
and for the deficiencies caused here and there by
incomplete regiments, we shall approximate more
nearly to the actual force collected together in
1811 for the invasion of Russia by NAPOLEON
the Great. Yet with even this enormous reduc-
tion, there is left the appaling balance of 800,000
men with which the Conqueror of Europe crossed
the boundaries of the Russian Empire and ad-
vanced upon its capital. We speak not here at
random. The calculation we have made is that
authoritatively put forth by BOUTOURLIN. With
that mighty mass of warriors NAPOLEON entered
upon his Russian campaign. And what is the
estimate formed of that campaign by no less im-
partial an observer than Lord BROUGHAM ? Why
Lord BROUGHAM has declared, in his " Statesmen
of the Time of George III.," that according to
his view, among all the wonderful campaigns ever
made by NAPOLEON (and when he closed his
career at the age of 47 on the field of Waterloo
they had amounted, these campaigns, altogether,
to no less than fourteen), this one, the campaign
of 1811 in Russia, was the most triumphant, the
most completely successful ! And so assuredly it
was. The conqueror had advanced at the pas de
charge by victory after victory until he had seized
the capital of the invaded empire, until he had
established his head-quarters in the Kremlin,
until he was issuing his Imperial decrees from the
Palace of PETER the Great. NAPOLEON only
failed after that because of a fatality beyond the
grasp of human forethought. Hi 3 defeat has
pissed into a proverb. He was vanquished not
by man, but by the permission of Divine Paovi-
DENCE. His victors were the elements. The
wind blew, and the snow fell, and the frost came,
and his mighty host was all but annihilated. Be-
cause they were so far within the recesses of that
inclement land, and because, with this, the winter
began two months earlier than ordinary. It can-
not be so with us. We are on the margin instead
of at the centre of the Russian E_npire. Besides
which, our fleets in the Black Sea are ever close
at hand, while our transports are continually
arriving with supplies awl reinforcements. The
situations are altogether different. And if Russia
is less at our mercy now than she was at one time
at NAPOLEON'S, we are all the while less at hers,
or rather at that of the cold and barrenness which
are her chief internal auxiliaries. Wherefor so
let us trust confidently, under the aid of GOD, in
the justice of our cause, and in the strength of out•
arms, while the chief part of our 200,000 men
are still beleaguering the fortifications of Sebas-
topol.

If anything was established by the Peace-at-
any-price party during the late Parliamentary dis-
cussions, it was that the demands made on Rus-
sia for the limitation of her fleet could easily have
been evaded, and would, therefore, if accepted,
have been of comparatively little value. That
view of the subject was particularly dwelt on by
Earl GREY, in the House of Lords, and his line
of argument was also adopted by several of the
speakers in the Commons. But it did not, there-
fore, byany moans follow that the Western Powers
should have in any degree abandoned the demand,
or been satisfied without even the verbal securities
reqaired. Had they done so, it would vir-
tually have been a connivance at the well-

We could

known schemes of Russia.
scarcely have remonstrated at any accession to
her fleet or ominous signs until the inviolable
attack had taken place. It was not because we
were contented with the merely personal promises
of Russia, though we were at the very time when
receiving the most conclusive evidence of her
duplicity and insincerity willing to waive every
description of real security, that we should also
give up the shadowy hope founded on the word of
a Government whose mendacity had become pro-
verbial I The peace party proved too much for
their own propositions. They showed, beyond the
possibility of doubt, that in place of pressing too
hardly on Russia our Plenipotentiary fell far
short of what he ought to have required—
that he should have insisted on " material
guarantees," or, at least, on the disarmament of
every Russian fortification in the Euxine or its
vicinity. If the views of Russia were so moderate
and inoffensive as she professed—if she were only
seeking the " commercial" development so vividly
depicted by Mr. BRIGHT-what could she want of
these threatening fortresses ? The Hon. Member
for Manchester does not arm him Self with revolvers
and bowie knives when going on 'Change—though
by no means "mealy mouthed" in his language
to others he does not keep weapons either of offence
or defence. He would regard it as a particularly
bad investment of the capital which might be so
much better applied in the improvement of his
machinery or the extension of his works.
His friend the CZAR is also aware that
the warlike toys on which so much money
has been expended by his predecessor are
not, and cannot be, required for defence. It is
only for aggression that he can want either forti-
fications or ships of war. It suits his purpose,
however, to pretend that it is his anxious solici-
tude for the sick man's health that induces him
to keep up these expensive establishments. He
wishes to protect Turkey from the nefarious de-
si ;ns of France and England, and, through his
representative at the Vienna Conferences, practi-
cally asks, " Quis custodiet, ipsos custodes ?”—who
shall guard the • poor helpless Turk against his
treacherous Western guardians ? And this view
of the case is adopted by his broad-brimmed friend
in the British Parliament, who, notwithstanding
his scruples against all offensive weapons, thinks
Russia quite right in indulging her amiable
weakness, and keeping a large assortment on h
ready to accommodate any pugnacious customer
at a moment's notice !
•

vV
We believe, however, that the public will not
be satisfied with this rechauffee of the arguments
of Prince GORTSCHAKOFF in AIIDELL A to Protocol