The Sun.
London, England, 1855-08-09 00:00:00

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PROGRESS OF TIE WAR.

The session is about to close this year, as it did last
year,, at a crisis of expectation. Then it was the land-
ing in the Crimea—now it is the assault of Sebastopol,
which every member of Parliament will hope to read in
the papers at every hotel he comes to in his tour. Thus
a twelvemonth has passed, and only one step in the
affair—the mere landing—been achieved. Certainly
this makes great demands on the faith of the distant
spectator, for it must be said the spectacle is one that
would never have been believed did we not see it, and
what we see is wholly unaccountable. Hero is the
largest, the grandest, the most perfect, the most costly
instrument of war that was ever made by mortal man—
more than 200,000 men, the very beat soldiers in the
world, with the finest navies, the quickest maritime
transport, the most inexhaustible treasuries, the greatest
skill, energy, and enterprise ; the most copious variety
of mechanical means—everything, in fact, that con-
tributes to success either in peace or in war. We occupy
an impregnable position, excellent ports, ready commu-
nications, abundant markets, and all only a fortnight
from our arsenals, and only a second of time from our
head-quarters at home. What more is wanting ? What
is there that the two nations will not give to overflowing
on the mere hint that it may be required ? Let the
Minister of War say what he wants—nay, let him only
order it from the proper departments, and he can have
it—larger arms or smaller arms, 18-ineh mortars or
Colt's revolvers, diving-bells or balloons, " navvies "
or horses, marching tents or winter houses, infernal ma-
chines or summer clothes—anything whatever that he
may require. If his own powers are insufficient, if his
department is not quite comprehensive enough, if the
various branches of the public service are not yet suffi-
ciently in accord, we believe that Lord PanmureAlas only
to breathe his wishes, and they will be complied with.
Lieut.-General Simpson is now Commander•in-Chief.
lias he all the powers necessary to a vigorous prosecu-
tion of the wart Can he employ as he pleases every
man and every material sent to the wart If he has not
this power, does he perceive the want of it ? Such is
the feelinc, of the British people on this point, and so
thoroughly are they aware that this is a race with Rus-
sia, and that the quickest will win, that there is no sacri-
fice they will not freely undergo to push on the war. It
is not unreasonable to expect some early sign of success
when such means are employed. The armies with which
Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and even Napoleon con-
quered wherever they came fell short in all respects of
the aggregate force of the Allies in the Crimea. Take
it all in all there never was such an army, and never did
army enjoy such facilities and resources.
What, then, is wanting ? One thing, it must be con-

fessed, is wanting—that is, the one head that animates
the foe. We are four different nations, and, though two
of them are content to be subordinate in the plan of opera.
tions, and the two chief actors are on the best possible
terms, yet the simple fact of their having different points
of attack is itself a source of weakness. We should feel
much more comfortable if any distinguished engineer or
authority, in either the British or the French army,
could assure us that the present plan of combined opera-
tions is just such as would be adopted by one army
under one head. There was a want of co-operation on
the unfortunate 18th, and even now it is said by
some on the spot that the conventional idea of two
separate attacks interferes with the success of either.
.The French have pushed their trenches so much nearer
than the British, and have exposed themselves to so
much more loss thereby, that it is impossible to speali of
them without the greatest respect ; but is it true, as ivve
hear from the spot, that they have only to turn the
guns of the Mamelon on the Redan and they can make
it untenable If this be so, it is difficult to see the pur-
pose of our works in front of the Redan ; or, if they; be
necessary, it is difficult to see how they cannot be vastly
expedited at this moment by a constant fire from he
Mamelon. What stands in the way but the milit4ry
fiction of two attacks ? Again, it is said that we *-e,
short of men. Is it possible that there can be a want lof
men for the siege of a suburb, %hen the besiegers amount
to 200,000 ? We have the Turks and the Sardinians at
our disposal. If the men are not fairly distributed
according to the need at each point of the operatio4s,
this only betrays the fatal defect,---the want of ope

head—that is, of one army- Surely this can be rectifitd.
It is only a matter of arrangement. What makes t e
.

case more flagrant is, that while portions of the all

army have been always overtasked;other portions have
bad nothing to do. There is no want of energy anc
talent, but it is not employed. While we write we ar(
rejoiced to hear that Omer Pasha is at length release(
from inactivity, and leaves the Crimea for Asia, wher

he is certainly wanted. The Turkish Contingent, it ii
said, goes to Eupatoria, but what to do there we know

not.

But there is another want of co-operation still more
Fatal to success than the etiquettes and imaginary lines
that divide allied armies. We are still several armies ii

our own selves. There is still the Horse Guards, st
the Ordnance, still the Admiralty, which pull tNetb,
_ .

even less than armies of different tongues. We wai
men in our approaches ; we get on slowly with our sr

and our batteries, and expose ourselves to the censur.e
of the French engineers by being, as they say, behind-
hand. To meet the want we have employed sailors and
marines, a thousand or two ; but we are assured that
the fleet could easily all this time have lent us 6,000 witlx-
out interfering with any naval operation. If this aid had
been required and refused, then it cannot be said that
we are one army even among our ouselves. Up to the
very last we have been assured that the ordnance has been
utterly deficient, and that the Russians dominate over ui
from mere superiority of metal. We have to encounter
68-pounders, and, to all appearance, an inexhaustible
supply of them. All our own guns, it is said, are worn
out, while the Russian guns seem ever new, and at every
point larger than ours. I; is in vain that we construct
batteries of small guns in face of such pieces, well served,
as they have always been. Frequently we have beeri
obliged to give up our batteries almost as soon as we,
have put them to the proof ; or we have lost many dayri
in the attempt to strengthen them, or change them from
gun to mortar batteries, when they would answer and
purpose as little as the other. Yet surely there can be'
no lack of the largest guns in the fleet, which could BOOM
recruit its metal from our stores at home. Any how, by
this time there ought to be no lack of material of all'
kinds at the camp. If we have not as many British.
soldiers as we could desire, we have iron, and we have'
machinery, and we have men enough ready to work hard
at home. One great maxim in war, as in other affairs,'
is to make up with what we have for what we have not.
It is not, indeed, to be expected that all nations should'
have everything, and all they can do is to apply their!
peculiar resources so as to command all they want.!
Have we everything we want for the siege ? If we have
it, and it is withheld by the jealousy of departments or;
the forms of office—if our Artillery is too proud to corn-.
plain and ask assistance, and if the other services will;
not come forward till they are invited, and scarcely

then, then, in fact, there is a war of departments as
well as of nations, and we are our own worst
enemies. There is nothing unreasonable, certainly
nothing factious or traitorous, in these inquiries. But
a few days remain for legislative action, if it be neces-
sary, or for official explanations, if they are to be vouch-
safed us ; and we are anxious once more to rouse the
vigilance of Ministers before the curtain falls on the
session.—Times.