The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-13 00:00:00

The clear, though elaborate statement of the military
operations of the allied armies in the East, which has been
published by the French Government in the Moniteur,
will be read in all parts of the world with intense interest,
' for the Emperor of the French pap a not undeserved
homage to the force and justice of public opinion, by sub-
, ranting the whole course of a campaign and an expedition
not yet concluded to the criticism of France, to the know-
ledge of our adversary, and to the judgment of foreign na-
tions. We confess that we ourselves have perdsed this re-
markable document with a degree of satisfaction, which is
increased by the unexpected discovery that the strategical
opinions expressed in this journal from the commencement
of these operations are identical in every point, save one,
with the views entertained by the French Government
and its military advisers. In attempting to defend those
opinions be such arguments as our own knowledge of the
theatre of operations and of the art of war enabled us to
suggest, we certainly were quite unconscious that the very
same points were those on which the Cabinet of the Tuile-
ries relied for the successof the expedition'; but., although,
as is apt to be the case in the conduct of military affairs,
many unforeseen difficulties have arisen, and the result has
not yet been equal to• our sacrifices and our expectations,
we remain unshaken in our conviction that the main
strategical movements of the last campaign were perfectly
sound, and that, in fact, no others could reasonably have
been attempted.
Our readers niay remember that considerably before the
declaration of war, and when our fleets had gone up to
Beycos Bay, in the winter of 1853-4, we continually dwelt
upon the importance of the Thracian Chersonesus as the
base of our position for the defence of Constantinople and
of Roueeelia, which was then the primary object of our
intervention. The instructions of the Emperor of the
French to Marshal SL Arnaud, bearing date the 12th April,
1854, exactly one year ago, are directed in the first in-
stance to this point. Gallipoli was the base of operations,
because, in the event of the defeat of the Turks on . the
Danube, and the passage of the Balkan by a Russian army,
that force would have been outflanked by the allied troops
in Thrace, and its march on the capital become impossible.
At the same time, tNe possession of the Dardanelles secured
our maritime comm unications, which might otherwise
have been threatened 2.1 y the enemy. These preparations
were purely defensive, but our position in the war was still
of a defensive character. The force originally sent out
consisted of about 40,000Frenseh and 20,000 British troops,
and the operations contemplated at that time were regu-
lated by the necessity of the ease) and by the strength of
that army. We therefore hold, es the French statement
very ably maintains, that the occupation of Gallipoli was
a wise and correct determination on the part of the allies
under what were the known and anticipated circum-
stances against which they had to provide. •
But beore the month of May was past these circum-
stances had materially changed. The Russian army had
crossed the Danube, occupied the Dobrudscha, and threa-
tened the line of the Balkan. The success of this move-
ment, however, depended on the capture of Silistria ; and
the gallant defence of that place, followed by the defensive
treaty of the 13th of June between Austria and the Porte,
turned the fortune of war. The allied forces had mean-
while advanced to Varna, where they were ready to assist
in the defence of the Balkan, had the Russians taken Si-
listria and continued their advance. But the Emperor of
the French had expressed inthe strongest terms his resolu-
tion to avoid a march upon the Danube, and to abstain
from an expedition into the Danubian provinces, which
could only have produced the most fatal results. If
oar memory berves us, rather less than ten months
have elapsed since the British Ministers And those
who shared their opinions were exposed to a storm of oblo-
quy because they steadily resisted the appeals made to
them to throw our forces into this perilous and desperate
situation.
It was felt, however, that the Allied Governments,
having entered upon this war, oould not allow their arma-
ments to remain inactive, or neglect any means likely to
bring the contest to a glorious termination. The expedi-
tion to the Crimea had been regarded from the first as one
of the objects to be kept in view by the Allied Generals,
and when the whole Russian line had retreated across the
Danube, and even beyond the Pruth, the Tauric Peninsula
wail obviously the fittest field for the operations of the
maritime Powers. The French Government, however,
appears to have expressed at an early period its preference
for Kaffa as the base of operations on the Crimean coast,
and something like a reproach is cast upon the Allied
Generals for having selected their place of landing and
attack elsewhere. It is on this point that we differ from
the conclusions at which the author of the article in the
Moniteur has arrived. The project of a landing at Kaffa
had frequently attracted our attention, and was more than
once adverted to in these columns; but, after full con-
Jideration, in which we had the advantage of some of the,
highest military authorities in Europe, who were not con-
sulted by the French Government, we were led to the
conviction that, although Kaffa offered the greatest ad-
vantages of any point in the Crimea for the landing and
first establishment of the army and for the fleet, yet that
the position of this port present almost insuper-
able obstacles to our advance against Sebastopol. The
great deficiency of the army was, that it landed in the
middle of September, without adequate means of trans-
port and with a feeble division of cavalry, while it remained
dependent for many necessaries on the fleet. A march
from Kaffa upon Simpheropol would have compelled the
army to enter upon a line of country separated from the
sea by a chain of high mountains, and exposed to
flank attacks from the light troops of the enemy. To un-
dertake such a march of 100' miles in the condition the
army was in last autumn would have been an enterprise
of the most perilous kind. , had the expedition landed at
Kaffa, as some of the officers in high command were dis-
posed to recommend, it would probably have been com-
pelled to pass the winter there in inaction, and the allied
Governments would have been roundly accused of treachery
to the cause they professed to defend;. in fact, they might
with far greater advantage have paned the winter in the
Bosphorus. But it appears to us to be at the present time
ungeaerous and incorrect to lay the blame of our difficul-
ties upon men who took a decision which was ratified at
the time by public opinion and military judgment through-
out Europe. Moreover, one of the very first directions
given to Marshal St. Amami, in the event of his invading
the Crimea, was to seize the harbour of Balaklava,'and to
maintain the commuhications between the army and the
Ships.
It is not therefore to the strategical plan of this cam-
paign, as adopted by the allied Generals, that we think
adverse criticisms can be fairly addressed. The errors
committed have occurred much more in the execution of
the plan than in the conception of it. We regret that at ,
heohr
ea!
certain times and opportunities a vigorous attempt was
not made to defeat the relieving army of the enemy ;
whereas this French statement adNuyiietsshth t the u:ty e
no army of observation at all.
astonishment at the manner in which the siege has been
arae
conducted—the attempt to cover upwards of 26 miles of
works and approaches—the delay which occurred iu the first
instance, when an attack was possible--the neglect of all
means to anticipate and destrOy the works of the enemy,
rising as if by magic before our eyes, and the astonishing
blindness which suffered the Russians to occupy and fortify
the Manselon, which is the key of their position, although
it is situated 100 yards nearer to the French lines than
to their own. These are some of the causes. which have
frustrated the siege, all of which may be summed up in
one sentence—that the Russians have shown more science,
strength, and invention in their mode of defence than the
allied forces in their mode of attack. No donbt, the diffi-
culties of the besiegers were great and extraordinary, but
BO were those of the besieged; and the highest achieve-
ment of the art of war is to take advantage of those diffi-
culties for oneself and to turn them to the disadvantage of
the enemy. Agreeing therofore in the main with this
French statement as to the strategical operations of the
campaign, we cannot assent to its defence of the technical
operations of the siege. It seems, on the contrary, to have
turned out that the allied armies are weakest precisely in
those scientific departments on, which we relied with the
greatest confidence; and, having exhausted the skill of
our engineers, it is now intimated that the armies have
the resource of taking the field. We sincerely hope that
this decision, which we have now strenuously advocated
for more than a month, has at last been taken ; but with-
out more energy of command and vigour of invention than
have hitherto been shown by the Generals it is impossible
to carry on successful warfare.

(From the Times of this day.)
We were prevented last night, by press of matter, from
offering any comment upon the case of Mrs. Ramsbothava.
The report of the proceedings appeared in our impression
of yesterday. Upon the facts of the case it would be
needless for us to offer any comment, so painful a notoriety
have they obtained. Suffice it to say, that it appears to
have been proved beyond all doubt that this lady did ac-
tually abstract from the shop of a draper named Moule,
in Baker-street, certain small articles—a pair of sleeves and
four pocket-hankerchiefe. The only question was, was
she at the time of the commission of the act in her right
mind ? She had stolen, or rather was supposed to have
stolen, the sleeves, and when she presented herself again
measures were taken to have lier carefully watched. Of
course, when the question of motive came to be considered
the case absolutely broke down. Motive there could be
none in Mrs. Ramsbotham's case. She might, had she so
pleased, have had all the sleeves and handkerchiefs in Mr.
Monle's shop, and ber husband would have paid the bill
without much inurnizir. The fact is, that in commenting
upon this case we find ourselves in a certain difficulty.
The medical reasons alleged by Mr. Ballantine in his de-
fence of the prisoner were in all probability founded upon
truth, but they are not of a character to bear much dis-
cussion. She had arrived at a time of life when the whole
nervous system of women is altered, and, when the change
is a morbid one, they are scarcely, if at all responsible fer
their actions. There are among them persons who, " during
that change, are in constant nervous excitement—under
continual hallucitss.tions—resulting from a morbid affecti n
o
of the brain, superinduced by the change alluded to."
Such was Mr. Ballantine's defence, and it appears to be
founded on reasonable grounds.
For, let us forget fo-r a moment that Mrs. Ramsbotham
was in a social position something above the common, and
treat the case simply as that of a person who might with-
out violence to preconceived notions have been placed at
the bar of criminal justice. Evidence would naturally be
given to show that she had been guilty of pilfering articles
of slight value. That being admitted, it would be shown
on the other side that the articles she had stolen—let us
choose the hardest word—could be of no possible value to
her ; that she had spent a long life with an unblemished
character, and in the exemplary discharge of every duty
of life ; an I that at the time of the commission of the sup-
posed theft she was in a state of health of which mental hal-
lucination is the ordinary concomitant. Under these cir-
cumstances would any ordinary jury have brought in a ver-
dict of "Guilty" against the poorest applewoman ? If
this be so, certainly the fact that Mrs. Ramsbotham was
in a somewhat higher social position ought not in reason
to have affected the verdict. In her case, happily, verdict
there was none. The jury could not be brought to agree
on any conclusion. Six of them believed Mrs. Ramsbotham
to have been insane at the time of the commission of the
act—that is, to have been under mental hallucination. Six
of the number took the opposite view. Against this result
we have nothing to say. We can conceive minds which
could admit of doubt in such a case ; and then it must not
be forgotten that the social position of the accused told
against her, A juryman who would have instantly ac-