The National Register.
London, England, 1808-10-09 00:00:00

642

THE NATIONAL REGISTER.

01 ending twenty thousand men to Calabria would pro-
duce such a result. The Neapolitans may be disposed to
insurrection in favour of their exiled Monarch ; but when
we reflect on the doshonourible compromise which the
greater part of the Nobility entered into with their op-
pressors, there is reason to apprehend that the former, so
far from contributiug to such an tryout, would make every
eft, A to counteract it. The French, however, will be
ob;ged to keep an army of forty to fifty thousand men in
Italy, the greater part of which they will employ in the
south, to maintain the tranquillity of that peninsula.
With such a formidable force in the country we doubt Very
much if the Satives will have the* courage to make any
exertions in favour of their independence. If that he the
case we should keep to no purpose 30,000 men in Sicily.
But should our whole army, on the• contrary, be collected
in Spain, amounting, we will suppose, to about 60,000,
the enemy would be either compelled to withdraw the
greatest part of his force from Italy, and thus endanger
the loss of that important possessions or he unable to op-
pose an effectual resistance to the united strength of Creat
Britain and Spain beyond the Pyrenees. This subject re-
quires the maturest reflection. The principal object of
this war should he to weaken on the Continent the opinion
of French invincibility ;—should we have the fortune to
triumph over the enemy, and, in conjunction with our
A ilies, expel them from Navarre, overwhelmed with shame
and disgrace, tais effect is immediately produced. it is
then we can reckon on insurrections in Italy and other
co.intries ; and then would be the time to fly to their
assistance. This plan of operations has manifest and deci-
sive advantages ; for whilst it distracts the attention of the
exiity, and compels them to withdraw a considerable part
of their force from Germany, it gives Austria a chance of
prosecuting the war with vigour and success, and affords
Italy some prospect of salvation.
But all these reflections arc as problematical, as they
are momentous, until it be dttcided who is to conduct the'
operations of our army. It is unnecessary to recur to his- •
tory to be convinced that the talents and the reputation of
the ( ommander decide the events of a campaign ; the ex-
perience ;if our own time confirm, but too painfully, the
justice of !he observation. Whilst the afthirs of Europe
arc approaraing esery day nearer and nearer to a crisis,
which decides oar fate in common with that of other Na-
tions. we dare not proceed beyond gentle innuendoes and
delicate insinuations, relative to the appointment to the
chief command. It there be any man in this country, who
does not discover in such conduct a well-founded for
alarm and anxiety, though we may be astonished a! reso-
lution, we cannot avoid entertaining a very suspicions opi-
nion of his heart and his understanding. Every thing that
is sacred to man, is in dauger, and, in the digress and Fs-
turhation of such a stale, we are as anxious about trifling
considerations, as if we existed in times of the profoundest
security. What has occasioned this futility and relaxation
in the national character ? Are we fully aware of the dan-
ger that menaces us ? Do we sufficiently appreciate the
g:at'us and the pertidy of the enemy ? Would to Heaven
that no fatal experience might teach us the extent of his
resource.:, and the destructive tendency of his projects.
Every day furnishes a new proof of his versatility, dissitnn-
leion aod insatiable ambition ; and we look to the conso-
;:dation of his power and his indefatigable pursuit of new
acquisitions, with as iuclifference, which does not du much

OCT. 9.

honour to our judgment and foresight. Englishmen the
modern Philip is more ambitious, more profligate, and a
more inveterate enemy of our freedom and country, than
is imagined. His resources are as various, as his designs
are flagitious. This moment to conciliate Russia, and
render her subservient to his will,.he orders hls agents to
circulate the report of an insurrection in Petersburg, and
the arrestation of Alexander. The gross fabrication is im-
mediately transmitted to this country, in order that the
unwarrantable observations of our journalists may con.
firm the infatuation and dependence of that ill-fated Mo-
narch. •

Against such .an individual more than ordinary precau.
tion necessary. lint all our energy and foresight be
our nfnirs he confided to ;neon!.
useless if the direction of
petcnt persons. If every particle of individual virtue and
public spirit he not.extinet ; if we set any value on the
privileges we have acquired by the glorious exertions of
our forefathers, we will jealously and conscientiousi; ex.!.
mine the merits of the man, to whom our fortunes at;(1
those of our Allies arc to be intrusted. We relied it ag:Ua
and again, who is to command the formidable army vie
have sent to the Continent ? We feel no antipath‘ 0r pre-
judice ag,ainst any of the candidates, vve will part 011:arise
no one ; but we have a right, in common with the rest of
our countrymen, to insist strenuously that the Mel its of
the officer, to whom this important command will be cm.-
. tided. be strictly investigated.
There is something peculiarly vile and repulsive in
base insinuations, which some hireling writers throw (q.t
arr,inst the men, who have the courage and the honesty
to expose themselves to calumny, and, perhaps, to c I anef,
to prevent the dishonour of the army and country. lint
what is the country, or its interests to men, who, in oppo-
sition to their conviction and conscience, have.the
to bestow the titles of factious and disaffected on thus,
who resist an appointment, which they secretly disfippreve
of themselves? no they reflect on the injury they do the
community by thus calumniating the zeal and courage of
a few honest men ? Arc they so callous, so dead to every
generous feeling, as not to know that their sycophancy
and want of principle may contribute to the destruction
or captivity of our whole regular army ? Is it possible
that they can be so profligate or so stupidly ignorant as to
term faction the united disapprobation of the people and
army, and even of the most enlightened members of the
Ministry ; whilst, according to the same jesuitical logic,
only a few infallible and truly disinterested retainers at the
Horse Guards, and one or two Morning Papers, afford ex-
clusive proofs of patriotism and loyalty. We know to
estimate the professions and civism of those arch-patriots;
and should they have the misfortune to triumph over tle•
feelings and good sense of their country, they
will, sooner
or later, have cause to bewail the mischief they contributed
to occasion.