The Sun.
London, England, 1855-04-12 00:00:00

LONDoN, THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 12, .1855.

OFFICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
EASTERN EXPEDI TION.

The following is the article of the Moniteur, re-
ferred to in our telegraphic despatch :--
To know the truth, when it concerns the honour, se-
curity, and power of the State, is the incontestible right
of a great country like France., To speak it, when silence
is not imposed by patriotism for the public weal, is the
sacred duty of a strong Government like that of the E-
mperor. The Eastern expedition, its causes, its object,
the military operAtions prepared for sustaining it, the
diplomatic negotiations entered upon for obviating or
terminating it, are now facts that are matters of discus-
sion pending their transition to the page of history. In
order that these facts may be usefully discuised and seri-
ously judged, we are now about to
,state them in their
a most scrupulous exactitude. Such course appears to
us to be both frank and useful. Public opinion is
prompt to take alarm and prone to error in the midst of
emotions and events such as those of which it now feels
every day the reaction. The best mode of reassuring it
is by enlightening it.
In what manner was the Eastern expedition con-
ceived! What are the expectations and the data that
dictated its plan ! What are the causes that modified
it ? Why was the Anglo-French army landed in tkie
Crimea instead of acting on the Danube and making a
campaign in Bessarabia ? How must we explain the
long resistance of the besieged in presence of the ardour.
and heroism of the besiegers! Such are the points we
wish to examine in the first part of this work. We
shall bring to this examination only some certain facts,
authentic documents, and truth of military science and
military history.
The imperious and decisive circumstances that Com-
manded' France to draw the sword after 'a peace ..of
forty years aye present to the minds of all persons.
'unable to obtain the admission cif her supre-
macy over Turkey by the terror of her protocols, had
endeavoured to impose it by force. She had 'violated trea-
ties, invaded a territory, disdained. Lt•-id Ihreatened
Europe. Her armies were occupying the Principalities,
were advancing, on the-Danube, and bad even marked
out the halting places of a victorious march on the

Balkans. The admirable spirit of the Turkish nation
was not sufficient to thwart this plan. Russia found an
unexpected obstacle, it is true, in the heroic devotion of
a people which she thought had fallen, and whose resist-
, aim; made her remember that it had conquered Peter
the Great. But the struggle was an unequal one. The
whole world, breathless and excited, awaited the issue
with anxiety. Germany, uncertain between her habits
engendered by the Holy Alliance and the counsels ten-
dered by her own dignity, did nut know yet whether she
ought to submit any longer to the arrogance of that do-
mination which weighed upon her, or finally reject it.
It was frein the West that the signal of resistance
went forth. France and England, loyally united,
did not hesitate to send their fleets and armies to the
East to defend there the integrity of the Ottoman Em-
pire, the respect due to treaties, the equilibrium of Eu-
rope, and the cause of civilisation.

The exalted will which presides over the government
of our country, and which bad resolved on 'this war as
essential to its honour, after having vainly endeavoured
to prevent it by honourable conciliation, then traced out
instructions for the illustrious marshal, in whose hands
the swcrd of France was about to be placed. In those
instructions, bearing the date of April 12, 1854, we read
the following passages :
"In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French
army, about to fight at more than 600 leagues from its
native land, my first recommendation to you is to be-
stow the greatest care on the health of the troops, to
spare them as much as possible, and not to come to an
engagement unless you have made sure of two-thirds at
least of the favourable chances.

"The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the
chief place of debarkation, because it is intended to be, as
a strategical point, the basis of our operations— that 'is
to say, the 'place d'armes,' where we can place our de-
pots, ambulances, and provisions, and whence we can
easily advance'br re-embark. That will not prevent you
on your arrival from stationing, if you deem it advisable,
one or two divisions in the barracks either to the west of
Constantinople or else at Scutari.

" So long as you are not in the presence of the enemy
the dislocation of your forces will be cf small moment,
and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may
produce a good moral effect ; but if, by chance, after ad-
vancing on the Balkans, you should be constrained to
beat a retreat, it would be far more advantageouS to re-
gain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople,
for the Russians would never venture from Adrianople
to Constantinople, leaving as they would on their right a
choice army of 60,000 men. If nevertheless there should
be a wish to fortify the line of Karassu in front of Con-
stantinople, it should only be done with the intention of
allowing it to be defended by the Turks alone, since, I
repeat ip, our position will be more independent, more
formidable, by being on the flanks of the Russian army,
than by being blocked up in the peninsula of Thrace.
"This first point established and the Anglo-French
army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora,
you will have to come' to an understanding with Omer
Pacha and Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one
of the three following plans : 1. Either to march and
taso.l. kiln Russian . 2. Or to
spize the Crimea._ 1 Or
to land, say at Odessa, or at any other spot on the Rus-
sian coast of the Black Sea.
"Ir, the first case, Varna seems to me the important
point for occupation. The infantry might, go to it by
sea, and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land. In
no case ought the army ever to remove too far from the
Black Sea, in order that it may have its communications
constantly open with the fleet.
ti

In the second case, the one concerning the occupa-
tion of the Crimea, it is necessary above all things to be
sure of the landing place, in order that the disembarka-
tion may be effected at a•distance from the enemy, and
that this place may be capable of being fortified quickly,
so that it may serve as a support in case of a retreat.
" The capture of Sebastopolought not to be attempted
unless you are provided with at least half a battering
train and a great many sacks of earth. When you ap-
proach that place, do not neglect to seize Balaklava, a
small port situate four leagues to the south of Sebastopol,
and by means of which communication may be easily
kept up with the fleet during the continuance of the
siege.
" In the third case, that in which an enterprise should
ba resolved on in conceit with the admirals against
Odessa. *

" In every case my principal advice is, never to
divide your army, but always to march with all your
troops united ; for a compact mass of 40,000 men is
always an imposing force ; broken, it is worth nothing..
"If, however, you are obliged to divide your army,
make arrangements for reuniting it on some spot in 24
hours.

" If on the march it forms several columns, fix upon
a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy.to
prevent any column being attacked singly.
" If you repulse the Russian-, pi oceedloo farther than
the Danube, unless the Austrians join in the movement.
"As a general rule every movement ought to be con-
certed with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army.
It is only on certain exceptional, occasions, as when the
safety of the army is concerned, that you should act on
your own sole decision.
Marshal, I have full confidence in you ; I am con-
vinced that you will remain faithful to these instructions,
and that you will bring fresh glory to our eagles."
Thus, as we see by this extract from the Emperor's
instructions to Marshal St. Arnaud, Gallipoli had been
chosen as the place of debarkation of the Anglo-French
army. We must urge the important considerations
which led to this choice.

The first principle in a maritime war is to fix upon a
point of assembling which is protected from the attacks
of the enemy, easily defended, easy of access for disem-
barking and provisioning the troops, which will allow
the army to move in advance or fall back: upon its base
of operations, if forced to do so, and which, in case of
defeat, shall afford shelter and a refuge to the fleets. '
The peninsula of Gallipoli satisfied admirably these
conditions for a well-conducted naval war. Situated at
Cie entrance of the Daidanelles, it was easily provisioned
through the sea of Marmora and the Thracian Gulf. A
weighty reason, drawn from the respective situations of
the Russian and Turkish armies, made it necessary to
possess this place.
The Russians, by crossing the Danube at Routs-
chouk, by advancing on Adrianopole, and by leaving
the Turkish forts, and even Constantinople on their left,
would be able to precede us there, and to close the re-
treat of our ships engaged in the Black Sea. There was
in that a great danger which the foresight of the Allied
Governments provided against and prevented. Another
consideration prescribed the previous occupation of
Gallipoli. At the period the expedition was about to
leave, that is to say in April, 1854, inquiries were
anxiously made whether our military forces would arrive
in time to cover Constantinople. A defensive war then
appeared much more likely than an offensive one.
What was endangered—and indeed already violated
—was the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and
that was what we were about to defend and
reconquer. Had the Turks lost a single battle on
the Danube the Russians would have been able to
reach the Balkan in three days' march, and would
have had the road to Constantinople open to them.
The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that
capital. The two Allied Governments were fully
alive to the fact that even had a Russian army entered
Adrianople, it would not have been able to advance upon
Constantinople, leaving an army of sixty thousand Eng-
lish and French on its right flank ; and this foresight is
to be found in the instructions of the Emperor.
Thus, in every respect, and in anticipation of nearly
all casualties, the peninsula of Gallipoli was admirably
selected as the place of debarkation and the base of ope)
rations,. From this point we were able to protect the
Turkish capital and to control the movements of our
fleet ; we advanced without exposing our flanks, and we
kept up our communication with Toulon and Marseilles.
But the Anglo-French army had hardly arrived at
Gallipoli when the scene began to be changed. Although
the Russian scone., had been seen in sight el Verne, tilt
heroic deft ace of Siiistria had broken the onward im-
pulse of Prince Gortschakoff. The struggle, instead o!
being removed into the centre of the Turkish empire,
was kept up on the Danube, with various changes of
fortune, The generals in chief of the expedition were

and
withdraw
rtyapionttaniatuoi
omoemTnr tflhtnt:i
farl
then under the impression that they should be able to
r
arrive in time at the scene of action, perhaps in time to
save Silistria, but in any case in timoto loin the TUrkish
army, and hold the Balkan against tie iluesians, having,
as it were, the two wings of their arny protected by the
fortresses of Shumla and Varna. This plan was as bold
as it was prudent.
The wisdom of it was, moreover, pointed out by
existing circumstances, and by the imminence of the
danger. In fact, the Russians had taken Silistria, the
fall of which was announced as inevitable in the reports
of Omer Peelle, the fate of the Ottonan Empire might
have depended upon the issue of ore general engage-
ment,may
e
The French and English armies wen bound to foresee
rind prepare for this. There was their post, because
there perhaps would he the denoucincittof the strife, and
the'final decision of fete.
These apprehensions were falsified ly events._ The
thetie:oh tveda:
reirreao.msoti
eifyhs n
get
What
nvlbmoeosiry:
ri
yaodl:
rtesreagcheot
oitwof(ruu,
rwhet
lyhadodhtemeisnt:ii
vlepahebeuneaArurrr
setnbl
courage of the Turkish army, and the presence of the
allies, sufficed to force the Russians tortoise the siege,
t
s
advancing.
daihnevnEsi ragettpevhneet,em
t
h
army havecwinigsd. done by entangling itself it a country laid
with its communications cut df, furrowed by
large water-courses, and infested by petilent disorders ?
It is net victory that it would have sought, but deazu-
tion without contest, and death withoutcompensation.
It has been said that after the retreat of the Russians
we ought to have acted upon the Danube and entered
into Bessarabia. Let us put the mater in the most
straightforward manner possible. Wi6ont the co-ope-
ration (contours) of Austria, our army could not advance
upon the Dareebe without incurring the risk of a most
fatal catastrophe. We must not forget that our base
of operations was the sea, Losing this we risked every-
thing and compromised everything. .Military £thence
and common sense both entered' their protei%Against un-
derakieg operations with 60,000 Anglo• French and
60,000 Turks in en unhealthy hudimpricticabto coun-
try, having no means of transport, wit:mut any reserves
of artillery or organised parks—no depots Of eatables or
munitions at Shumla, Varna,' or Silistria. All these re=.
sources, indispensable atethe commencement of a cam-
paign, cannot be improvised in a few days,' when those
who have the management of affairs are 800 leagues dis-
tant from their country. These resources might have
failed us completely. We should have found ourselves
in front of an army of 200,000 men waiting for us on
th:ir own ground ; or else retreating before us, trying' to
entrap us into a still more dangerous position, giving us
no other alternative than that of a most disadvantage-
ous battle or an impossible retreat. A simple re-
connaissance of two days in the Dobrudscha which cost
us more than a most murderous combat, is a proof of
what we have advanced. Generals-rn-chief, who, igno-
rant of the dangers attending such an undertaking,
should have allowed themselves to be drawn- irate the
commission of such an irreparable fault would, we have
no hesitation in saying, have endangered the responsi-
bility of their command. ,
Again we repeat it, a campaign beyond the Danube
and on the Pruth is not possible without the co-opera-
tion of Austria. Now, a Government does not make
war when it desires it, unless forced to do so by incon-
trovertible circumstances. It takes care to Hake war
tohnel y when
ti t. isßarbelaektiongdowsioth.
RAusussiAtriashwe a swnaontierdea'toly
beet
sure of Germany with its 500,000. men in arts. Her
dignity, her interest, the example of the Western Powers
excited her to action—her prudence warned her to wait
and arrange the composition of her military forces and
herpolitical alliances before committing herself to the
struggle.
But what could the associated generals do at Varna
after the retreat of the Russian army ? Could they re-
main in a state of inactivity vehicle would have brought
on discouragement, and by which the prestige of our flag
would have inevitably suffered Such an attitude was
forbidden to our generals, both by military honour and
political interest. Having once taken a position on the
great theatre, there was no retreat ; something must be
done ; our soldiers must have a goal to strive to reach ;
our enemies must have something to fear, Europe must
feel the ambitious desire of following us, while it would
he our duty to give her the opportunity of honouring us
and admiring us. Thus then we come to the question
of operating upon the Crimea.

-An expedition rgainst Sebastopol might probably
hasten the catastrophe of the war. Such an expedition
had a determinate end. It might possibly put into the
hands of tho Allies a province and a fortress, which
could be used as a guarantee and a means of exeaange
in the event of negotiation for peace. Deeply influenced
by these considerations, the generals in command of the
forces deliberated upon the plan, but delayed for a time
to put it into execution (arretereat l'execution).
However, the expedition having been made the subject
of deliberation at Paris and London, and treated at last
as a fact, Marshal St. Arnaud received--not instructions
which could not be transmitted through such long dis-
tances of space, but hints or advice of the following
nature :

" Ho will make himself thoroughly acquainted with
the nature and amount of the Russian reeves in the Cri-
mea ; awl net wisetapar _those forces are tpo forieidable ;_
and land in a spot which may serve as a.basiis for future.
operations. The best place seems to be Theodosia,
called Kaffa now. This spot, however,
is objection-
able, as being forty leagues from Sebastopcl ; but it offers
great advantages. In the first place, the bey is large and
safe. The Alps of the squadron are there in perfect safety,
and the same remark applies to the barques which bring
supplies to the army. In the next
place, our army, once
established on the spot, may use it as a proper base of
operations. If we occupy the extreme east of the
Crimea, we can repel all the reinforcements coining by
the way of the Sea of Azoff and the Caucasus. We make
our way onward towards the centre of the country, at
the same time that we have its resources at our command.
We take possession of Simpheropol, the strategical centre
of the peninsula, and have the road open to Sebastopol,
on which probably there will be a great battle. In the
event of this being against us, we may retwat upon
Kaffe, and nothing is compromised. If it is in our
favour, we can besiege Sebastopol, and by infesting, it
completely
we shall compel it to surrender in atolesebly
Unluckily this advice was not taken.
short interval."
Whether
the generals-in-chief had not sufficient troops to un-
ileatake this long journey in the Crimea, or whether
they expected a speedier result from a bold and iloex-
pected coup de main, they resolved, as if know well
known, to land at some few leagues distant from Sebas-
topol. The glorious battle of the Alma seemed to prove
that they were right. Bat in the -moment of victory
coud
they saw clearly enough that without a port they
have no base of operations. Influenced by Viet irresis-
tible inetinet of preservation which never deceives those
who listen to it, they directed their course to Balaklava,
on the south of Sebastopol. It was clear, too, that the
army con!d not live in the enemy's country without
being in direct communication with the fleet.
south
But the consequence of retreating towards the_
was to give up the northern heights—in other words,
to abandon the idea of investing the fortification. The
Anglo-French army, in fact, was not suffici3rltlY
nume-
rous to invest the place completely h
. It was necessary
to limit our operations to the southern potion of
town. To accomplish this the English toot possession
of the harbour of Balaklava ; the French, looking fora
point d'appui for the purpose of disembarking their stores
and ammunition, found very providentially the port of
liamiescb. The soldiers, who are generally right, called
this " Providence Port."
Sebastopol, it is well known, is not surrounded with
walls and earthworks. It is rather s great fortifiedto 20
camp, containing generally an army d 15 from
by the Russian siege-works by numerous batteries, and more especially.
the
an fleet, which, skilfully stationed in
every thousand men, protected at the commencement of the
inner harbour, had its batteries directed upon l
e.
ave-
nue by which the Allies could approach thel pp
it was practi-
cab;e to attempt an assault, but still such
s
an enterprise
the
somewhat adventurous, inasmuch as
would have been
At this period—that is to say, when the Anglo-French
Allied forces had not sufficient artillery to silence that
impossible to An
of the enemy. Doubtless, nothingf
d wenaesralsand soldiers
'3
g months have manirested
such as those who for the last six
.mon
fatieues, and sufferings of
their character in the perils, e
Anglo-French army,
of success could !lave
this long siege, but nothing abort Tile responsibility of cons-
justifiecra coup so audacious,
all and prudence
wand imposes prudence before.
compose.
things,deliver-
of 50 000 men at most, placed on a
saislt with an army ,
' ' tillsry ammunition, reserves—not having
rock, wantingiar . ,
prescribed to the generals-in-chief not to the as-
its rear secured by entrenchmeuts in care of a check, and
having no refuge but its ships. That would have been
to risk the fortune and the fate of the expedition, and
nothing should be hazarded at a distaece of $OO leagues
from one's own country.
The coup de main, which the generals thought possible
after the battle of the Alma, escaped them, and it only
remained to proceed with the siege after the rules of the
military art. At the very commencement of this diffi-
cult enterprise the Russians took two measures, very effi-
cacious for themselves and very regrettable for us. The
first was the stragetie movement of Prince Menschilester,
who, instead of shutting himself up in Sebastopol,
marched towards Simpheropol, afterwards took the field,
and kept up his communication with the fortress ; the I
second was the bold resolution to sink most of the ships'
of war, a measure which enabled the enemy to render
the port inaccessible to our fleets, and to acquire for the
defence of the place from five to six hundred guns thus
set at liberty, together with their ammunition, and to
employ their seamen as gunners at the batteries. Thus,
although the guns of the town at the Arf,t presented a
fortaidahle aspect, new batteries were raised, as if by en-
chantment, and our feeble siege artillery could not ex-
tinguish the fire of the. besieged.
From this moment it became apparent to all that Se-
bastopol would not be taken until after a long struggle,
that the aid of powerful rainforcetnente would be re-
ouired, alai that poseibly murderous battles might have
have to be fouglit. This situation was a serious one.
The generals in-chief contemplated it with that calmness
which exalts a character to the level of the most difficult
. responsibilities. This is a proper occasion for speaking
RaglADI tui kifiltOrY
of General Caurobort and Lord Will
- -
_..-......,

speak of them. Their part in this great, scene has been
worthy of the two countries of which they wield !the
swords. Placed face to face with immense obstacles,
they have estimated them only to triumph over them by
their courage, perseverance, and devotedness. The army,
sustained by their example, has borne all without com-
plaining ; exposed to all the rigours of a terrible winter,
having to preserve therm from the cold, the snow, the
torrents of rain, nothing but pits, and small UAW abri ;
it has refused no sacrifice fir the honour of the flag and
the country, or to gain the confidence of the chiefs whom
it had learned on the field of battle to loVe and honour.
In order duly to appreciate the immense difficulty of
the enterprise which the generals-in-chief had conceived
and executed, it will not perhaps be useless to explain to
those who are ignorant of it, in what consists a siege
properly so called, and how the siege of Sebastopol is
placed .beyond the application of those principles of
which the science immortalised by Vauban is the ad-
mirable summary. Let us first say that Sebastopol, a
tams strongly.fortified towards the see, is not regularly
fortified on the side, Its enclosure is defended by a sisal:
low fosse, the earth from which has been thrown up to-
wards the place to forin a parapet. On the first plan
are found abbatises and trans-deoup, and the batteries,
the fire of which crosses-in front of those defences, rise
gradually one above another, receding towards the
centre of the town. More, the port is traversed by war
steamers, which, forming so many moveable batteries,
may be employed to flank and protect all the defensive
works.

The operations of a siege before the as,anit May be
divided into four principal phases—first; the investment;
second, the operiine•:of the trenches; third, the construc-
tion of parallels and batteries, and the-opening of fire ;
and fcurtb, the crowning of the covered way, and the
establishment of breaching and counter batteries.
First, the investment—that is to .say,,the surrounding
of the place on all sides:--so that, during the siege,.it
can receive no reinforeernents of men nor supplies of
ammueition and provisions. According to the ordinary
geneial rides, it is calculate] that the besieging /army
ought to number five or six times as many more as the
besieged: Sebastepol, as has before teen said, could not
be invested at all, and the number of the besiegers was
at most only double that of the besieged. We do not
reckon the army 'of observation which is employed in
holding the (Russian) army of succour in check.
Second, opening of the trenches. —This is ordinarily per-
formed at a distance of from 300 to GOO metres from the
place ; the trench is, as is generally known, a ditch dug
in the ground, the earth Irmo which is thrown towards
the fortress. In this way a parapet is formed to shelter
the soldiers from the fire of the enemy. At Sebastopol,
the Russians having employed large guns
.taken from
their ships, and having enormous range, the trench could
not be opened nearer than 900 metres. Instead of find;
ing a soil easily excavated, pur soldiers found almost
everywhere rock, so that they were obliged to use
-petards to blast it morsel by morsel, and to employ bags
of earth, which, piled one on another, formed parapets.
It will be seen that this was a slow, painful, and perilous
process. • . •

_
Third, opening of fire.—Generally, engineers work to-
wards the most salient points, because these are the
weakest ; and the trenches enveloping the attacked
fortress in front take the form of several semicircular
lines, connected with one another by zigzags. These
semicircular linos are called parallels. The batteries are
raised in front of these lines, which, embracing the *tit-
tacked front in the form of a semicircle, give the fire a
converging direction. The besieged have not this ad-
vantage, as may be easily conceived, for a besieged
'town may be regarded as forming the centre of a circle,
of which the besiegers occupy the circumference. At
Sebastopol, on one side, the nature of the ground,
broken up by ru‘ged ravines, and on the other de-
velopment of the enclosure, which presents but few
salient points, have prevented, in great part, those
favourable arrangements just explained.
Fourth, crowning the covered way.—When the be-
sieger has reached the salient point of the covered way,
which is carried round the fosse, he encloses this work
by extending the trench along the crest on each side of
the angle. This is called crowning the covered way.
Breaching batteries are constructed there, by means of
which the wall has to be knocked into the ditch, and
heaps thus made OR which the besiegers are to mount to
the assault. Generally by the time this critical moment
is attained almost all the enemy's guns have been dis-
mounted, the carriages broken, and the ammunition ex-
hausted. Nevertheless, as sometimes there remain some
guns on the flanks of the bastions of the attacked front,
a counter battery is established either in the crown
of the covered way or on the counterscarp of the ditch, 4
to extinguish the last fire of the enemy. Thus we may
assume that when the assault is attempted, the entire
artillery of the place has been destroyed, and that the
garrison, decimated by the enemy's fire, exhausted by
excessive work, enfeebled by want of nourishment, and
discouraged. by the absence of news from without, will
not longer oppose a serious resistancP.
At Sebastopol nothing like this has taken place. As
fast as one gun has been dismounted another has been
set up in its stead ; when one man has fallen his place
has been supplied by another ; as soon as one garrison
has been exhausted another has succeeded it. -Provisions
have been abundant, and battering in breach could have
no result, as the obstacle ordinarily opposed by the wall
is replaced by palisades, trous-de-lout' and abbatises, and
because the epaulernents being of earth the balls have
tone them little harm. -in the ease. of a regular attack
directed against a fortress of the 'first order, and this
attack directed against two demi-huies and a bastion, the
front of the fortification would embrace not more than
an extent of about 300 metres ; and the attack in front
would have a development of about 8,000 metres.
At Sebastopol the extent of the attacked front is more
than 3,000 metres, and that of the attack has a develop-
ment of 41 kilometres. It musttie added that for the
guard of this immense extent of trenches the army has
had to furnish nearly 10,00
through a period of six months,omen,
and day and night,
that during a rigor-
ous winter, in the midst of snow and rain. This will
give some slight idea of tea fatigues of our soldiers and
the difficulties of the siege.
The history of modern states does not present an ex-
ample of a more difficult, more glorious enterprise, or
one which by the very grandeur of the obstacles it pre-
seats, agrees more nearly with the importance of its
object, and that of the states engaged therein. The siege
of Sebastopol has scarcely any analogy with any other
in our military annals. To attack. a place which is not
invested, when the enemy, superior in numbers, Tay
recruit himself with more provisions and ammunition,
and when be keeps the field, is an act of audacity which
could be attempted only by England and France united
for an object necessary for Europe.
The siege of Dantzic has been much admired as one of
those in which heroism united with science triumphed
over the greatest difficulties of an obstinate and formid-
able defence. Dantzic, prot:mted by the Vistula, the
embonchere of which in the Baltic is closed by the fort
of Verihselmunde, was in a situation equally unfavour-
able to a complete investment ; still it was possible to
take a position on the river between the fort which
closed its mouth and the town, and so to intercept its
communication with the sea and invest the place. This
is what was done under the orders of General Lefebvre.
But yet although the place was enclosed within our lines
of attack, notwithstanding the presence in the neighbour-
hood of the Emperor Napoleon, who covered the siege at
the head of a numerous army, and paralysed the succour
of Prussia and Russia, Dantzio resisted 51 days from the
opening of the trenches.. At a later period, after the '
retreat of Moscow, the town, occupied then by the
French, did not capitulate until after a defence, which
lasted a year, against a combined.attack by sea and land.
We might multiply examples, but the foregoing will
suffice to show that the Anglo-French army in the
Crimea has performed there all that was to be expected
from its courage and the ability of its chiefs. It has
not Only exhibited constancy and firmness in the midst
of sufferings and perils • by adding the glory of Inker-
man to that of Alma it raised still higher the honour
of our arms. We ought to hope that the end of its
noble efforts will be attained ; but unanimous opinion
already acknowledges, and history will one day repeat,
that it has merited the admiration and the gratitude of
the world.

We have explained the military conduct of the allied
governments since the commencement of the Eastern
expedition. With the same precision and impartiality
we shall treat of the negotiations, their various phases,
their reasons, and their aims.