The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-25 00:00:00

haltlewlic objected to war in the abstract, he confessed he
keret; ll:apathy for those who denounced thei war for
buil_ oannercial purposes. (Ch.eers.) He ha, n
.f
1,-- Y for those who would suffer insult to the country, i
bYti resistance they diminished the
. sales of their cotton
;31' Re did not believe in a calico millenium. (Cheers
:°and Laughter.) It *weakn a Chr:stian prin.ciapuledthhaetdhide
,1:1101 defend the aeainst the drone,
41'111?esitate to record his vote in favour f the resolutions
ht
right hon. friend the member for Buckinghamshire.
.g ri 'WILKINSON was of opinion that the present war
vllliel elliiittri a great extent, be ascribed to the impression
d c trived to convey to the late
Emote the
Peer I?artyahtathisenconntry would not resist his
laigereit'ie °23°.• Ruestshlanutghht the motion of the right hon..me
us
he1:e,,14 Xanchester (Mr. Gibson) the most. mischievous
i.`,..nae_ rted on the journals. The resolutions of the right
ophiifeober for Bucks were calculated fairly to elicit the
thee,"? of the house ; but as they unfortunately bad. for
vie; °°Ject to damage the Government, who, in his view,
tle:thot amenable to blame, he should vote for the amend-
The 1 r
nti;,._
welarquis of GRA..NBY thought they ought tofisnu-
lsiether the intentions of Russia
treaty
aadyi eally been o .
t of Adrianople,
„„,%. ive character. Ever since the t
aeuelerOdiwas signed 26 years ago, Russia had had the power,
Plemeang to Lord Aberdeen, to march at any time she.
topic," Pon Teheran on the one side, or upon Constant'
she , 1:1,1 the other. Had she done so?, It was said thtt.
tat been biding her time, and that it•was not till l•o.3
t• on to take the decisive.
steh." bad found herself in a
the ERut the Times newspaper year declared that if
reNeeroe Nicholas had sent 20,090 men to Constanti-
eat_O, day. after Prince /1 hikoff returned fromdb. his
the city. Why, then, di he not 4° he might have taken • Hamilton Seymour, h .aril so? From the report of Sir Hamilton
expedition. Prince.
Alen
4,903 troops disposable for
Ivrt.l.,,lllkoff left on the 21st of May, and Count Nesselrode,
the L;ig ten days later to Reschid Paeba, assured him that
tee,'nPeror had no intention of making war on the Sul-
ant to him. That
IN !lid that such war would be re u
Sul-
this reason why he did not takePCgonnstantinople. The
the ni)einta aimed at two objects. The first was to attach
by re'1(.111 o.Empire more closely. to the balance of power,
that irucations of the existing treaties ; and it appeared
had assented to that pro-
Poeti,`,Le Russian Government
sep,ou_n, only it had refused to enter into a guarantee to
the,-thit tliat arrangement by arms. The second part of
ittNi• irid Point was the limitationof the preponderance of
had la -a the Black Sea. Now, he did not hick that we
itioi:V• more right to say Russiathat should not build
the ha in a. certain number of shipsin her own ports than
at porn e limit the number we mightit choose to construct
allow reolith or Sheerness. But sia had offered to
patio the Dardanelles to be opened toships of war of all
he ,t1118,,,,9ae Sultan having power to
we se them whenever
1)t0,',°4?1-,t there was
.danger.. And ?It) objected to that
qoi" '1 • The Turkish ministerh. self. The Russian
thateParuent also made a second proposition, to the effect
,shoAleh Black Sea should be closed, butth:aut
giving
uSgnlfitavne
mays, re Power to open the Dardanelles
st,e notice of his intention; and Austria had declared that
Atesta, in that offer elements for renewed negotiations. If
lho_sryt thought ',there were elements for negotiations, why
ho:1801,1 totthis country consider Austria's propositions? The
Tx:)siti had been Veld that Austria had actually made a pro-
the h°4 ; he trusted that before the closeofwtshsa. tHdeebwaates
aitz;,°ose would know what thatproposition
14e 17:18., he Peace, provided it were bent st an.d honourable,
deal " near(' with regret upon, that. occasion men who
theireeci Peace stigmatised as not caring for the honour of
itiaiieee entry, He however believed that there was no
lee,_ that house who desired
the'M'able terms. (Hear.) At the same time, het hought
peace on any otr t a
see_ -teoglan.d should not remain at war an hour after
DowLY essential end had been game , she was too great a
tial Jens be influenced by aught else than what was essen-
be right that
lee 1, and right. What we believe
to b„rl,l maintain but we ought not to al ow ourselves
bet t'a.,_ePt in a state of war by it being_ said that we had
the orkela Sebastopol, or we had not obtained possession of
'lf Coken
What was desirable was this, that the Houseupou
thetlueions should declare what was right and just ;
th,c:elaration it was for the executive to act. It was
11114bl'h
the eto
'neh considerations as these that.he felt himself
agree with the motion of h.is right hon. friend
His right hon,
fri",„t;lernher for Bucks (Mr. Disraeli).
ap,,:(l said that he was desiroust of shutting the door
ith that pro-
'ea'll:tfoileotiatioil.
be pet
inr
i-,}?, so doing Hhee thought d ilo
a great difficulty would
11'4 tbat e Way of a safe and honourable peace. Nor,-
riling all—hy voting for the motion, he would be weak-
toilif'B,',ne hands of her Majesty's G nment, and so di-
thie,ulng their influence throughouttoEcuirsopeoe.untSryuc,hhya
pi.,,1;;,w9.1d, he feared, be disastrous b
cm ed, and he felt
4t 4, "'ging the contest in which it w
tight b 0 therefore, to vote againasetetnliegmotion of his
4 4 i'4n• friend.
Le vi'L"'• PRILLrmoRE said that it was his intention
the err" for the motion of his hon. friendththeoetemerber for
) and be-
he of Oxford (Sir W.
1, an unpopular course,
Le Ntg, !'ll.a in so doing hewas tatiise his reasons for so
doe,„ It his duty to state to the
this °,*
,The hon. member .for Lamb_oerththbeadvigoobrjoeucstepdroto_
kotii,()Lien because he said he was f
Petit,'ll of the war; but those whhoatwethreat awnaxriosus
houfoldr
es pr-owB Were not the less desirous. t
qtrt• ectited with vigour if that peace couldHneo(tmbre.
Ail. 41ed u
1, 'lli% Pon safe an with the
tt „`pre) could not a„.4:il.eehonourable tnobleermlos'rd who had
ht that
41. e ,81:,°t'en, when he said thathßuTssuirakienyt.enHdeedthionutahe eorn-
ilieniZteent to act honourably
Illit-e'Prtant details furnished by SirHSheyaniveouexrisbtaedd
lie,„ eisposed of any doubt which
might
/Pseg that mint. Indeed, he believed that there never
at thae War so just and necessary as that in which w ewetroe
Ho was not a friend
tkiej Present moment engaged.
!let ",., but a friend to the
glilboerryt
d d on
of
of
un England,e
3e4tit'ua.t liberty and that yshaonudldglbnerY
0114 ghat
said, that although he agreed with
the
le , sentiments which had fallen from his hon. and
It4rat:e4 friend in his able speech, yet, considering. the
°,o:tte4,_ti'ke which remained to discuss a question of such
" toli7A, it might be for the convenience of the. house if
111S1%itra in the. debate, rather than wait until a
kostl44lsee:te evening. 'Whatever might be thought
ho
0,11, they must all admit that they had a
intele .4teilti
right
4° 14 of fare. There was first the motiodnisotfintchte,
i Iglbl ernan the member for Bucks—a • •
e'lledtlstisetezt:_,ote
of want of
.confidence, with a somewhat
th °O of th '4 feeble declaration with regard to the prose-
ho
to
rigeitillthoti,iool:3..war.. Then came the
faomrernodr.mtsemnotumtha.His,
the riht hon. member in a speech °I
4titgehatt tb.9n:itcti.oll,l the member for Oxford,
„,er errainste
r I,_ on.
,n., ro,ovetlanamendment to the motion. of the
4f,°- 4aied -eit oer for Portsmouth, •by amp'
'll5l, tttend—_ . r completed. theqat
ueasntdiothehon
movingmember
4e nistem'ere4nt, which arrived 6
aspect
he policy-
0,041124
no taiaindeicidef.l ao suing a decided mar-
A 0
y i P delteLining wriicthhthelerc,
°l' thfi' right
was imepnostsiblen for him to vote for the motion
ell4llcl't-rb hon. member forßucks, because theiuhntcehrtoarkin.
tentlen,:n4 anbigtloll,4 language of which the
tie ens —.4
"uplained were chiefly the result orfg
a violation
of delilet being Partn end. It would have been
had
given
negotia-
I'll 3- " the of the Government if they
ekeee,lPlanations before the time for such explanations
the tlle time 'Rd not agr with the right hon. gentleman
OD the
coet,'.e for further eeetiation had passed away, on
ail enarr, he felt thatnaebe dinto their latest information,_
acer.
atilliae,rtPnitY hada'riseeenerof a probability, if not of
go " ' `-''. Putting
I *eve, , an end to the horrors of war._ He had,
t , ',eau
• gel:item:tanting as he
i gratified with the declaration of the right
e_,l. no in
8..---eraa declarationt
o_
o. jerk_
which, representing
me to
might
future
:44 ean I:2_°° Id b e amoun . f colNe wportant and beneficial influence on th
sue °f °f this great empire. The motion of the right hon.
4,,ttibiZ f° 'Portsmouth was open to the samericharge of
v;eni,"a tY that had been made against the Government.
ntleman's
che,_-•`tering the frankness of the right hen.
had framed
hill ''vter, he could not impute to him that he 1,041210ti on
the right
tar, ," ',O unite persons holding opinions diametrically
kill, ''-' ‘° each other. He liked the speech of
hid ttentleruan very well, for the right gentleman
hie'
Wished the hquus ht
nna had not yet led to peace. If
intothtepg
4et
he
W.
h - to declare itshreng.ret thatthe
ke' gentleman would only introduce the word ‘'
differenceet"
of
i?pieZblendrnent there would be no reat
dhimself.
Wliare between the right hon. gentleman and
teUtle"
ID
Vations or com-
e°lllplained of in the motion f the right hon.
Zeohijelnailoo Jas, that it spoke of the
was
~..e„,_ as having passed away. Hneegtheolught the aspect
te0re1,...-'‘'4 hen. friend's (Sir F. Baring) amendmentdment
er Klee than pacific. As regarded. the amen
kiese o. friend the member for Kidderminster (Mr.
st,ne, that was clear and intelligible; and he (Mr. Glad-
Nti:,), thought that nothing but a clear and explicit dada-
Itwas well to
ought to be made on this subject.
ituieVene to the latest moment any interference with the
froni I.°os of the Government, but the housewould detract
ti_ its a
un
~„-ignity if it consented to a doubtful mode of ac-
tiO4' eee was,
to his
therefore lad that his hon. friend's me-
% Vae clear and intelligible; but he also objected ~,, em,,
"1 the -"ellt, because, first, it contained
It stated
that fact which it purported to maintain.
an untrue recital
%lee Conference at Vienna
the C • had failed, in cense
Itt thee of the refusal by Russia to limit her power
brought be-
Jet 0 illack Sea. When any motion was
e the h •• ught to be str.ic y
. ism is °use, its terms o .
tion
e flee „‘"? thought the terms of his hon. friend's mo
• tl correct ;
that 1, •that con
"" fulfil condition because, though it was true
ie.,. hoe Gortschakoff said
be restric ed
he had no instructions.tto_
le-,t:uhte thiaaetktte naval power of Russia should .
d for
tlithfetftee, it eevaa;syeevtidaent that the point wasretse e
subsequent meeting of the
,Was-e consideration With that record before the house,
to te i!ot
too. dry and bre ma
in the Black
°l4l-Zi4 maintain that Russia had declined to entertain
Ne.
rn,d, in fact, refused to limit her power
41klcA i'll, e amendment of his hon. friend would would be to
eke ;,,,"ne terms more warlike. He maintained that the
Prea;e'llient of his hon. colleague (Sir W. Ileathcote) ex-
qfei.e,', in the mildest terms, that the opportunity now
they ' °Y the present nec,otiations, or communications, be
be ' what they might, should not be lost, but they should
Of means to bring about terms for the settlement
roe, JR unha Buckinghamshire, hri
- fitaner for byghatsthreannggeeonblivion had
tie:' that the first and second points were totally
'wig-
tare ,li,t, ; they were matters about which Russia did not
kiki,,' .'oeY were therefore concessions of no moment, and
['rll-,14 Order to secure the neutrality of Austria.andus
0f,,,,54,_a but about a month ago Russia was not desiro
she
kb -,,''.ing these concessions Indeed, at that time e
Vi°,4telY refused these concessions ; and what was the
thel of the right hon. gentleman then ? Why, he pointudg
limitation of the mouth of the Danube as one amo
eareat, yet unforeseen, results of the contest.
N, ISII-AELI explained that he thought this was not a
.., of ..1,,..
atr. ,ulmeulty,
Ilea. kxLA.DSTONE accepted the explanation, and. he quite
this °d from the right hon. gentleman that he did not deem
Dofiuttint to be on gunimportance. Well, then, of the four
•vvh -,.. the t
we firs t° we ei•ecompletely settled, and the reason
Qait,.,..the fourth point bad not been decided was simply be--
%La," it had not been discussed. It was proposed for.di.scus
14,1'4, but the Western Powers objected to enter upon it , but
Wa ,e„sireci, 'without fear of contradiction, to state that there
Da °thing in the fourth Point to prolong the watro.
two third
tl,,t" ereated the difficulty. It might be divided inparts,
ttlia, whlcli related to a territorial guarantee of Turkey,
Russia
o tthwhieli referred to the preponderance of powerßi
t tobve, Illack Seli. With regard to the former, be would.by
wilOats
t' ~,"ie the house Then, the only question rem
e - c'ne •
, vt.respecting the preponderance power lit The
ha
of inaltahe 'Black
Allies 'proposed a plan for putting an enddtot
an °ill
ederance. Russia proposed a first and seeen method,
,vta 3 „u ghestion of difference between these various proposals
th, •4°Ny before the house. He would remind the house that
th 'l' bad g„,
ti, it the princi far
to
lai pledge
the country in the face of Europe
tl ,:t, or tftins izvi, .
handoniiilnd these negotiations was a qufeesit-
roceed to examine.
He
the
1 • 't the last 'prvo'epirueosmiteioeuntweof Russia would be to leave
t. u
' 443 cf the Go
more free to deal with th_eequases
notio
„,-In3llth spirit as they might think prudent. n w:
the' of those who were prepared to disavow or to shrink from
but LeaPonsibilities connected with the origin of this war ;
his Opinion it was difficult to overstate the weight of
tesNuabilities and. the amount of physical and moral

evils brought about by the war, and the amount of physical
and moral good which it had intercepted. We had- not only
a just but a sufficient cause for going to war. Let them
inquire then, what was the controversy upon which they
entered. The objects of the war, as they were originally
contemplated, were not so wide as the evils he bad described.
They did not attempt, and thsy thought it too much to at-
tempt, the total abolition of the evil ; and, for a long time,
the four great Powers confined themselves merely to narrow-
ing it within certain limits, and hemming it in. It was all
very well for gentlemen to say, at this time of day, " You
ought to have sent your fleet into the Black Sea when Russia
occupied the Principalities." These were delusions which
arose from forgetfulness of the circumstances, and from the
excitement of the state of things which existed at a former
period. Not only the Government to which he belonged,
but no Government, could by possibility, in June, 1853,
have ventured to take so rash a step, even with reference
to the state of English opinion. The first conclusion to which
they must have come would have been, that they would at
once have abandoned, if they had interfered in any such
proceeding, the co operation of Austria, Prussia, and France.
What were the objects which were then contemplated ?
What were the questions which were then under die-
dussion ? The questions under discussion were these :--The
Emperor asked a certain amount of ratification and extension
of the treaty of Kaivardji ; the Porte was ready to give a cer-
tain amount of ratification and extension to that treaty. The
questions raised were, whether the temporal, as well as the
spiritual, privileges of the Greek Christians were to be pro-
tected by Russia—whether the Greek Christians should have
privileges granted to them which would place them on a par
with the other non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte ; and
whether it should be by a separate engagement with Turkey,
or by a general engagement with the other Powers, that these
rights and privileges should be guaranteed. In 1853, these
were the only questions in dispute between Russia and the
Allied Powers ; and he was sere he should be confirmed and
not contradicted by her Majesty's Government when he said
that every one of these objects had completely vanished.
([Tear.) There was now no question about a separate treaty
between Russia and the Porte ; there was now no question as
to the temporal privileges of the Greek Christians ; there was
now no question as to whether the Greek' Christians should
enjoy the same privileges as the other non-Mussulmen subjects
of the Porte. Nothing could be more simple—and really the
matter was so important, and the words so few, that he hoped
the house would allow him to put them in possession of them
—nothing could be more simple than the issue to which this
matter was brought after the tangled negotiations of 1853.
Lord Derby, in fact, had confessed, in another place, that he
had read through the Blue Book as far as the month of July,
but that he found it impossible to proceed any further in
threading the labyrinth. The negotiations gathered into a
central point in December. That was the time they must
look into if they would get a clear view of the grounds upon
which this war was undertaken. The proposal made at that
period was summed up in these terms :—lt was done at,Con-
stantinople by a meeting of the representatives of the Four
Powers, under the presiding influence of the active Lord Strat-
ford de Redcliffe; and the plan adopted. there obtained a pre-
ference over the plan simultaneously adopted at Vienna, and be-
came actually the basis of the proposal finally made to the Em-
peror of Russia. Now, what was the plan on which, in Decem-
ber, 1853, the Four Powers were agreed, and which they pre-
sented to Russia as the full amount of the concessions which
she had a right to demand. The first point related to the
evacuation of the Principalities, which was to take place as
rapidly as possible. The second point was, that all the
treaties which were dissolved by the actual war, including the
treaty of Kainardji, were to be removed. (Derisive cheers
from the Opposition.) He knew not from what gentleman
that opposition came, but it showed the blinding influence of
the exciting circumstances of the times, and of the strong feel-
ings of a magnanimous people, as opposed to that judicial
understanding which, after all, ought to guide us in these
transactions. The second term, in December, 1853, was,
after all, that the old treaties between Russia and Turkey
should be renewed ; and the third term was, that the Sultan
of Turkey should communicate, not to the Emperor of Russia
alone, but to each of the five Powers, and that a firman should
be issued, guaranteeing to the Greek Christians of Turkey all
those religious privileges which might be enjoyed by the other
non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte. These were the objects
of the great Powers in 1853. There were many who were
then listening to him to whom this statement would come as
a revelation. (Hear, hear.) Nevertheless, such was the turn
which affairs had taken. He was sure that her Majesty's
Government would confirm and not contradict him when he
said that these were the terms so proffered to Europe and
published to the world. He might, if it were prudent, carry
still further his statements, which would be corroborated by
the documents which had passed between the Powers engaged
in this great struggle, and especially between England and
France. But what was the manner in which their proposals
were received by Russia ? He had stated the terms of the
protocol of Jan, 13, 1854, to which St. Petersburg gave no
written answer. The answer was the mission of Count Orloff.
When that noblemanarrivedat Viennahe submitted the coun-
ter demand of Russia ; and now, having enabled them to as-
certain the fixed point from which they ought to measure
their distance, he would proceed to makesome remarks upon
the demands then made. The tone they held, and the terms
then required by Russia, when explained, would give
them another fixed point from which they would be able
to judge whether it was true, as some had said, that the ob-
jects of this war were not attained, and that if we retired we
should retire as a humiliated and degraded nation. These
were the terms of Russia on the 2d of February, 1854. This
was the answer of Russia, upon the reception of which the
resolution was taken, upon the recommendation of Austria
and Prussia, by the Governments of France and England, to
send that summons to the Emperor of Russia, which was
immediately followed by the declaration of war. The de-
mands were—first, that it was to be an irrevocable condition
that the negotiations should take place on the subject mat-
ter at issue not at Vienna or any neutral -place ; the choice
was given to Turkey that they should take place either at St.
Petersburg, under the person of the Emperor, or at the
head-quarters of the Russian army. This was the first con-
dition, essential and irrevocable. The second condition was
the confirmation full and entire of the old treaties from Kain-
ardj onwards. The third condition was the protection of
the Greek Churches ; the fourth was, of course, the evacua-
tion of the Principalities ; the fifth was the restoration of the
status in quo in the Principalities ; the sixth was, that Tur-
key should have a new set of stipulations with respect to the
reception of refugees and strangers. Such were the absolute
demands which constituted the ultimatum of Russia before
the war. Was there here a cause of war or not ? When first
Austria had permission to refer to St. Petersburg, the pro-
position which was made was in the shape of Four Points. He
did not shrink from his share of the responsibility of the de-
cision at which the then Government arrived in consequence
of the mode in which those propositions were received.
(Conservative cheers.) Ho did not shrink from his personal
responsibility in regard to the Crimean expedition. (Hear.)
But he called upon those, who said that that expedition had
entirely failed, to mark the difference iu the language of
Rqssia before and after that expedition. (Hear, hear.)
He held that military expeditions in time of war were only
to be regarded as means, and not as
ends. (Hear,
hear.) On the 26th of August, 1854, Russia replied to
the communication of Count Buol, who had forwarded
the Four Points. He would not quote the reply in extenso
but the effect of it was this—that the Four P Ants
were terms to which Russia could not consent except at the
end of a desperate struggle, and a long series of disasters.
He quite agreed with his noble friend the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, that the naval and military forces of Rus-
sia had long been the standing menace of Turkey. The ques-
tion of theßlack Sea was one of great, he might say of insu-
perable difficulty. It was not in the wit of man to institute
a perfectly satisfactory arrangement with regard to the Black
Sea. If it were an open sea, like the Meditemneati, they
might know what to do. If it were like the American lakes,
close water, they would know what to do.
If they were
dealing with powers that shared the coast of the Black Sea—
if it were shut in and not accessible to vesselsof great draught,
of water, then, too, they would know what to do ;
but unless
they converted the straits of the Black
fficulty, Sea into a canal, as it:
were, they could not get over the di On the other
hand, if they treated the Black Sea in any of those modes,
they should not overlook the fact of the weakness of the
Turkish Government, and the importance to Europe of pre-
venting an aggression on the Ottoman empire. The question
was surrounded with difficulties. There was no suggestion
not open to objection. Nothing with regard to this limita-
tion of the Russian power in the Black Sea could be otherwise
but an imperfect remedy for the present, and an imperfect
guarantee for the future. Well, then, what wans as to be done
which
?
They had to take their choice of several pl, all of
were imperfect. So far as Parliament was aware, he (Mr.
Gladstone) and his colleagues left office pledged to nothing
but the destruction of the preponderance of Russia. They
were aware of that responsibility. They were responsible,
with the noble viscount at the head of the Government, for
having proposed the Russian limitation of the naval forces in
the Black Sea. He always considered the plan defective, but
ho became an assenting party because he knew of no other.
In doing so, they did not exclude themselves from profiting by
any experience arising from discussions on the question into
which they should enter, and they left themselves open to per-
severe with that plan, or to adopt any other plan equally good,
or it might be preferable, so as not to warrant a continuance of
the war. What had been the reception of the plan for that
limitation from the first night it was discussed in the House
of Commons ? He considered its reception had been most
unfavourable. He had heard au hon. and chivalrous friend
say that he was ready to go all lengths in defence of the war,
but he had not heard any member of the house rise and say
that he was prepared to sanction the continuance of the war
if the limitation were refused ; while, on the other hand, he
would be prepared to accede to peace if the limitation welemenre
granted. He did not believe there were twenty gent
in that crowded assembly ready to hold that line.
of There
were some who thought this was not a question con-
test as to terms. The ground on which they stood before
Europe was, that they were ready to make every concession
- •to refuse everything that should not be offered—and the
dividing line was between the limitation of the naval force in
the Black Sea and the discretionary power of the Turkish
Government. They were cognisant of the fact, that the con-
ferences had been held. As regards then uestion of limitation
alone, the conferences had • been adjrned ; and, on that
issue, they were called to vote by the motion of the right
hon. gentleman, the member for Buckinghamshire—a vote
which, if it were affinitively recorded, would not represent the
feelings of the house or of the country. If the vote of the
house went to declare that-this was not a question of terms,
after what had taken place at Vienna, it would go far to in-
volve them in a breach of faith in the eyes of Europe. If it
were not a question of terms, What course were they to
adopt ? This was not the first occasion on which they ha
war.
d to
express a solemn judgment on the rights of peace or
Were they to resort, or to think of a system of dismember-
ment ? The objection to that was, that it was impossible. If
we intend to make this question a war of nationalities, it
would be well to consider whether we can makethat war alone.
He apprehended that we would be alone, and that Austria
would not be ikely to enter into a war of nationalities. From
the comp sitil on of Austria, he would ask, was shelikely to enter
into a war of nationalities Will France do so ? He could tell
them that France, as well as Austria, would not and could not
enter into this war of nationalities in this she entertained a
different opinion, he would ask how that war could be enter-
sainedby her when she looked at the present state of the city of
Rome. (Hews) He would not say, can France enter into
such a war, but could she en' er into a war of nationalities
under such circumstances,? He had read a few days ago
some portion of the debates in the Sardinian Chamber rela-
tive to the Sardinian contingent for the war, and some of the
members objected to its joining the English army, because
they thought it would be in bad compa.ny. (Laughter.) They
said the English had managed to lose 2,000 men out of an
army of only 120100. He argued that, with many gentlemen,
this was not a question of terms, for these have been acceded;
but both gentlemen in that house and the public journals
called out for military successes. Such an idea washdeouns,
it was immoral and inhuman, and he would Klyno a-
tion had a right to make war for military successes alone.
(Hear, hear.) If they obtained SUCCC6S, they would want to
continue the war to make it a mere war of military glory ; if
they did so he would warn them that they tempted the wrath
of Him in whose hands was the fate o f all armies, as much as
that of the infant in tpahreceeveire.adle. He s vould ask what was the
tnatinthteartmposwteor
htehviesspsaqrioyupestion ? The Gover ntnents of France and
sEdtitgmel aendodfn
otose
g
peace of Europe, and these terms had entuall constituted
the military occupation of the ev'
col wasti
the
con-
ceded what she at first refused, except a ',mere trifle. But vo
Crimea. Russia,f
rttosnisia,l:i a dewahknii now
said that we must gow have sue - 4ia We do not

consider that we have subjugated Russia, and therefore we !
will continue the war until we make these successes. He
could not avoid saying, that he thought neither peace nor
the honour of Russia seemed to be the primary object in
these arrangements, but that military glory was the primary
object. He warned them that the eyes of Europe were upon
them, and that their words uttered in that house would be
quoted against them in the face of Europe, and by them they
must rise or fall. The right hon. gentleman the member for
Manchester, three or four months ago, made a solemn appeal
to the house, and charged them with an earnestness that did
him the highest honour, with a guiltiness of blood if they per-
sisted in maintaining the war. He (Mr. Gladstone) did not
wince under that challenge, because he believed that it was a
war of a class which we carried on at a distance that we might
not carry it on nearer home—because it was a war which we
carried on in the Crimea that we might not have to carry it
on in the heart of Europe—just as in ancient times the greatest
orators of Greece called on their countrymen to carry on war
in Thessaly that they might not have to carry it on in Attica.
They had recently had among them some of the most distin-
guished of their gallant troops, who received at the hands of
her Majesty an acknowledgment at least of their valorous
deeds. Many of those forms, he rejoiced to say, were again
erect, and had regained the Mastic step of youth and health,
but what were they to say to the thousands who slept on the
waters of the Bosphorus, or under the rock Balaklava ?
And what were they to say to their gallant allies,s of
who, ranged
side by side with them in the hour of privation and danger,
had suffered, he feared, in a much greater degree. (Hear.)
But it was no consolation to him that the fatal progression,
the French should have suffered double our loss, though that
was more than 15,010, and that more than four times that
number of Turks slept beneath the ground. It was no conso-
lation to him to know that the Turks had lost 120,000, and
the Russians 250,000 men—amounting altogether to nearly
half a million of human beings, or at the rate of a thousand a
day. With him the consideration was, that if the war were
a war for smaller, secondary, and trivial objects—a war for
objects which they dared not in public papers t 3 declare to
the world, then ho said, in God's name, while there was yet
time, let them do something to put an end to that awful
scourge, and let them, by the adoption of firm, moderate, and
cautious terms re-open to Christendom the hope of a return
to happiness and peace.
Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, although I do not concur in many
parts of the speech of my right hon. friend, yet I willingly
yield to him the acknowledgment that he has discussed the
question in a manner worthy of himself and of this house—
(hear)—that he has considered that which was of most im-
portance to the continuance or the cessation of this war—that
he has fairly brought before us the arguments which weigh
upon his mind as to the conclusion to which he had come—a
conclusion to which, if convinced by his argument, any mem-
bers of this house might subscribe. (Hear, hear.) So far
the spirit of my right hon. friend's speech has been totally
different from that of the right hon. gentleman opposite—
(cheers)—who gave us no clear and intelligible account why
he would continue the war—who used, to follow a phrase of
his own, the most ambiguous language on the subject, and
who detained us for two hours and a half with party attacks
and ingenious sarcasms. (Cheers and laughter.) But, sir,
before I speak of the right hon. gentleman's speech, and at-
tempt to defend myself from the attacks which he has made
upon my conduct as a member of the Government, I must
revert while they are fresh in my memory to some of the argu-
ments and topics urged by my right hon. friend who has just
sat down. My right hon. friend says most truly that the
terms already assented to by Russia go far beyond those which
were originally asked by the allies, but surely he ought to have
laid greater weight upon the very obvious consideration that,
if such be the blessed state of peace that princes and sovereigns
are most unwilling to exchange it for a state of war, that
which will give an immediate remedy for an immediate danger
suffices them to maintain that state 'of peace. But when once
the rubicon is passed—when you have got into war—when once
powers are engaged in conflict, then it becomes you to think,
not what would have been sufficient before the contest com-
menced, but to consider how you can obtain peace which has
in it the elements of safety and of duration. (Cheers.) I
cannot, therefore, attach the value which my right hon.
friend attaches to the change which has taken place. in con-
sequence of Russia having felt the power of the allied belli-
gerents—the pressure of Austria concentrating her forces and
threatening hostilities until Russia gave way—and the in-
fluence of the expedition to the Crimea. But the question is
not whether the immediate danger is warded off, but whether
you are to seek security for the future, and if so in what that
security shall consist. There is one danger with regard to
the principalities—that was the first point. The second point
has not reference to any immediate danger from Russia, or
any immediate protection to Turkey. But the third point
did not contain a declaration that it was necessary to revise
the treaty of 1841, in the first place, with a view to attach
Turkey to the balance of power, and, in the next place, to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea ;
and my right hon. friend thinks he sees in the propositions of
Russia a fulfilment of that condition. Now, the danger is
that Russia having a preponderance in the Black Sea—having
twenty sail-of-the-line in her harbour at Sebastopol—may, as
has been shown, take advantage of the powession of that
fleet and get possession of the Bosphorous, or land an army
in its immediate vicinity. Now, what does Russia say to
that ? Russia says that she will consent that the fleets of
other powers may come into the Black Sea, provided
always that the fleets of Russia may at any time pass
through the Bosphorous. What would be the conse-
quence of accepting such a condition ? The fleets of Eng-
land and France would seldom go into the Bosphorus,
and not in any force in time of peace ; but these twenty
sail-of-the-line might at any time present themselves at
Constantinople, before the gates of the Sultan's -palace,
and impose upon him what terms they please. (Hear, hear.)
What was forbidden by the treaty of 1841 would have been
possible and easy to Russia, and this is what the Russian ple-
nipotentiaries call a compliance with the terms proposed.
(Hear, hear.) Then after I left Vienna another proposal was
made, in which my right hon. friend seems to see a security;
and it was this; to leave the treaty of 1841 as it now stands,
the Sultan declaring, as he has a right to declare, that he
wishes to maintain the principle of closing the Straits, but
that if Turkey was menaced she might call the fleets of her
allies to her assistance. I can see but very little, very scanty
security in that. Leaving the treaty of 1841 as it was before
the commencement of the year in case of a menace of invasion,
of violence on the part of Russia, Turkey would have the
right of every independent power of calling her allies to her
assistance, and to that point where they could most easily
assist her. I think in this case everything consists in priority,
and the fleets of the allies being at the distance, and a large
fleet of the Russians in the near neighbourhood, it is probable
that that menace would have been carried into execution be-
fore the Sultan could have called for assistance from his allies.
(Hear, hear, hear.) If we had consented to such terms,
think it would have been right to say we did not pro-
pose the fulfilment of that part of the third point.
(Hear, hear.) It is said that the third point is fulfilled.
Why, the acceptance of a proposal so nugatory and meagre as
either the first or second of Russia's alternatives would have
been an attempt to deceive Europe in a manner quite unwor-
thy of two such nations as England and Turkey. It would
have been far better to have said at once, " We are unable to
put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea—
iemust be built up again as soon as Russia can launch fresh
ships, and therefore that part of the scheme must be aban-
doned." But consider that that scheme against the prepon-
derance of Russia in the Black Sea is one of the many securi-
ties which, having gone to war for, we have attempted to ob-
tain. That Russian preponderance in the Black Sea is next to
the danger of Russia occupying the principalities ; and to
finish the war without any security against that danger would
indeed show that we had been defeated. My right hon. friend
has dwelt much upon the doctrine that you must have suc-
cesses independently of all terms of peace. I agree generally
in what my right hon. friend has stated upon that, and I
doubt whether any will say that independently of all terms
of peace, and independently of the security of Turkey, it was
necessary to gain military successes. I quite agree with my
right hon. friend that never has the valour of the English sol-
dier been brighter. (Cheers.) Never has the power of endur-
ance, the hardihood, and the fortitude of the British soldier
stood so high as it has done during the present war. (Hear.)
But if the objects are not effected by which we can be cer-
tain of having securities for peace, Turkey would be greatly
endangered. Hear.) If it should be said that not only had
England and France relinquished the terms they had advanced
—and terms which Austria had said were just and fair, but 1
which Russia had not complied with—but in addition to that
had withdrawn 150,000 or 200,000 men from the Crimea,
without success, that would be a great addition, not only to
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, but to the pre-
ponderance of Russia all over the world. (Hear.) If you had
that which all men would acknowledge to be a security for
peace and a safeguard for Turkey, you might then with all
honour withdraw from the Crimea, but if, in addition to a
failure in your terms of peace, you admitted a failure of suc-
cess, and withdrew your army, then Russia would immensely
increase aer power over the eivilised world. And now sir, having
said this much with regard to the later topics in the speech
of my right hon. friend, I come to the question of the nego-
tiations with which I was charged at Vienna. (Hear.) But
let me state, in the first place, that although I thought suc-
cess in that negotiation came within the range of possibility,
that at no time was I sanguine that success was probable.
(Hear.) I can assure the right hon. gentleman that I felt I
had no habits of diplomacy, and that, being more accustomed
to parliamentary life than to intercourse with those who carry
on negotiations, I was not the fittest person to undertake the
duty. But when Lord Clarendon told me that he wished me
to undertake that mission—and my noble friend likewise con-
curred in that wish and when I found that her Majesty had
been pleased to express her approbation of such an appoint-
ment, I felt I could not honourably decline, it. (Hear.) The
right hon. gentleman says I ought to have begun with the
third point. That was-not a question for me ; I was only
acting as one of the servants of the two Governments of
France and Great Britain. France, Great Britain, and Aus-
tria had duly considered the question, and when I was in
Paris I was informed by a despatch from my noble friend the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government
had resolved that the third point should be.taken in the order
in which it stood. (Hear.) It was, therefore, my first duty
to consider of the first point and the question of the Princi-
palities. I believe that the concessions that have been made
by Russia with regard to these Principalities are of the
greatest importance, (Hear.) The right hon. gentleman
confounded two things which are essentially distinct. He
speaks of the protection of the Christians to which I had
referred in a despatch when I was Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and in which it was stated that it was
presented to the Emperor of Russia as a duty, and that it
had been sanctioned as such. Now there can be no doubt
whatever that, with regard to Wallachia and Moldavia, not
only by the treaty of Kainardji, but by other treaties—by
the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople—the Emperor of
Russia had an engagement from the Sultan to protect the
Christian subjects in the Principalities ; and if a congregation
were subject to outrage, murder, and pillage, I conceive it
was the duty of the Emperor of Russia to ask for some re-
dress for such grievances. I know that, without any such
treaty, our ambassador at Constantinople, on receiving an ac-
count from a consul that a Christian church was destroyed,
or a Christian was murdered, thinks it his duty to bring the
fact under the notice of the Sultan, and generally obtains re-
dress. (Hear.) But the treaties to which I allude are ex-
press upon that point, and it is impossible for me, or for any
man, to deny that Russia had those rights by treaties.
But the right hon. gentleman confounded these treaties with
the proposal that was made by Prince Menschikoff, and asked
how .I could snake such a dangerous admission as that there
was a right of protection, and at the same time protest against
it in the case of Prince Menschikoff. Why, the right of pro-
tecting those churches was sanctioned over and over again by
treaties, but what Prince Menschikoff demanded was a claim
of protection going beyond those treaties, and which arose,
as stated in one of Lord Clarendon's despatches and in one
of the four points, from an erroneous interpretation of the
treaty of Kainardji. Of that erroneous interpretation lam
the more convinced when I recollect a fact that occurred
during the negotiations between Sir Hamilton Seymour and
the late Emperor Nicholas. Sir H. Seymour said to the
Emperor, " Have the goodness to point out on what part of
the treaty of Kainardji your claim is founded ; " and his
Imperial Majesty said—as an Imperial Majesty is likely to
say—(a laugh)—" I will not point out to you the particular
article of the treaty ; go to Count Nesselrode, and he will
point out the article of the treaty." Sir Hamilton Seymour
as he was bid, went to Count Nesselrode, and said, " Will
your excellency have the goodness to point out to me the par-

ticular part of the treaty of Kainardji on which your master's
claim is founded." Count Nesselrode said, " I am not con-
versant with those treaties, but Baron Brunow is conversant
with them ; tell your Government to apply to him, and he
will point out the part of the treaty on which the claim is
founded." But as Baron Brunow never attempted the task,
I conclude that it was not any part of the treaty of Kainardji
that gave such a claim. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gen-
tleman therefore creates confusion when he confounds that
claim with the undoubted rights claimed by the,Emperor of
Russia for the protection of the Christians in Moldavia and
Wallachia. (Hear, hear.) I will not at this late hour enter
into auy kind of disquisition about the navigation of the
Danube, but I may say, that on that point likewise we have
gained pretty considerable advantage. But we have to con-
sider the whole question, and a most important question it is,
which has occupied us for those two years past, and which I
think may occupy the Parliament of this country even for
future generations—namely, whether it is not necessary to
put some bounds to the progress of Russia, and in what man-
ner that object is to be effected. (Hear.) Far be it from me
to say that I could pretend, from any reflections or lights of
mine, to solve that great problem. (Hear, hear.) I consulted
others not only in England and France—not only the mem-
bers of my own Government an I the members of the French
Government—and I may venture to say, since he did me the
henour to admit me to an audience, the Emperor of the
French—(cheers)—but likewise several statesmen of the
continent of Europe, not eugagel with either power,
but whose well known wisdom -and authority, and whose
long experience in political matters entitled tbeir opinions to
the utmost attention. (Hoar, hear.) Now what is the posi-
tion of Russia ? It might not be such as would have justified
us in making war, or have excited us to make it ; but,
being at war, it behoves us all, and my right hon. friend the
member for the University of Oxford as much as any man,
most seriously to consider it. (Hear, hear.) Russia has,
since the commencement of the century, increased her power
more than any other power of Europe. (Hear, hear.) She
has upwards of sixty millions of inhabitants, and has an
army of 800,000 men in time of peace. After a considerable
struggle, and much resistance by Lord Castlereagh, the re-
presentative of this country, and by Prince Talleyrand, the
representative of France, she acquired and retains Poland.
The only limit was, that Poland was united to Russia by her
constitution ; but that link, which gave to Poland a separate
representation—a separate army, and as it were a separate
existence—was totally broken, and a new and hard fetter of
iron was employed to bind her to Russia after the insurrec-
tion of 1831. (Hear, hear.) In Poland she has erected six
or seven fortresses, of at least equal strength with Sebastopol.
She has conciliated the peasantry to a very great extent by a
policy artfully adapted for that purpose. (Hear, hear.) At
the same time the young men of Poland of rank and intelli-
gence, who might be filled with historic recollections and
patriotic ardour, and would some day rise up against the
policy of Russia, are carefully marked and selected and sent
to a distance in the interior provinces, there to meet with
no sympathy, where their names are unknown, and their 'ate
is forgotten by all except the relatives they have left, behind.
(Hear, hear.) In the Baltic we find from the discoveries
made last year—since the commencement of the war—that
a great plan of fortifications had been undertaken, which Sir
C. Napier sent home, and which he said would have given
Russia a complete predominance over the Baltic, because when
those fortifications were completed, neither Denmark nor
Sweden, nor any other power could have held up their fingers
against Russia in the Baltic. In Germany she has connected
herself with many of the smaller princes by marriage. Many
of the princes of Germany, I am sorry to say, live in great
fear of what they think is the revolutionary disposition of
their subjects, and they rely upon their armed forces to pro-
tect them ; but what are those armed forces 7 The officers of
those forces are seduced and corrupted by the Russian Court.
Rewards, orders, and distinctions are distributed amongst
them—evensthe receipt of money to pay debts will be accepted
by them, and that money is liberally given by the Russian
Court, so that Germany, which ought to be the seat of inde-
pendence—Germany, which should stand forward for the pro-
tection of Europe against Russia—has been for years under-
mined in its vital strength and independence by Russian arts
and Russian means. I have hitherto not spoken of the im-
mediate danger with, which we have had to deal. The imme-
diate danger with which we have had to deal was this—that,
after a long course of violence and aggression, Russia had
signed a treaty at Adrianople which gave her new powers, and
confirmed many of the old. The dangers arising from that treaty
to Turkey are admirably pointed out in a despatch of Lord
Aberdeen ; but neither Lord Aberdeen nor the Duke of
Wellington, who was at the head of the ministry at the
time, thought it right to go to war on account of those
dangers. I believe they acted wisely ; but now that we
are at war we are not to forget the lesson Lord Aber-
deen gave, or keep out of sight the dangers that were
pointed
out in that despatch.. (Hear, hear.) She had there-
fore great means of influence in Turkey, such means of in-
fluence that I believe, if she had been wise and prudent, it
was quite sufficient to enable her to gain a permanent con-
trol over the councils of Constantinople. But in an hour of
imprudence—the Sovereign is dead, and the time for severe
comments is passed by—she insisted upon what Turkey
thought a degradation, and which she resolved to resist by
force of arms. Lord Stratford had some time before said,
" I think the time is come when Turkey's position must be
entirely changed. Either she will fall into a state of total
dependence upon Russia, or she must get rid of those ma-
nacles and shackles with which for years past she has been
fettered." We had to choose between leaving her completely
under the sway of Russia, or raising her to something higher.
We chose the latter part of the alternative. The immediate
danger was warded off. The siege of Silistria failed ; but had
it not been for the presence of the allied forces, it would have
been renewed in the summer or autumn, and the Russian
forces would have been at the Balkan. ussia retired across
the Danube. Austria then said that unless the Principalities
were evacuated she should declare war with Russia, and upon
her forces being assembled Russia evacuated them. Now, it
was because these Principalities were placed under the safe-
guard of Austria, because any attempt to invade Turkey or
to cross the Balkan and reach Constantinople was thus pre-
vented, that we felt ourselves enabled to send to the Crimea
the expedition which, like my right honourable friend
(Mr. Gladstone), I still think we were right in sending, but
the discussion of which I will, like him, reserve for some fu.
ture occasion. There is, however, this fact, that from the
pressure at Sebastopol, the Russian fleet is no longer one
of 18 or 19 sail of the line, but a great part of it has been de-
stroyed by the Russians themselves. The question then came,
how we could diminish her power and put an end to her pre-
ponderance in the Black Sea. lam not at all ashamed of the
manner in which I agreed with Count Buol to invite the Rus-
sian plenipotentiaries to take the initiative upon the question.
Count Buol represented to us that it might be hurtful to the
dignity of Russia to have terms imposed upon her for the
limitation of her power in the Black Sea, but that in consi-
deration of the security of Europe she might make a propo-
sition to that effect to Turkey, and he asked us, the plenipo-
tentiaries of Franco and England, not to bring forward our
propositions until he had made the proposal. He made the
proposal, and I followed it up—answering for England, and
not for Russia, as the right hon.-gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) sup-
poses--with these words, "In the eyes of England and of
her allies, the best and only admissible conditions of peace
would bo those which, being most in harmony with the
honour of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for
the security of Europe, and for preventing the return of
complications such as that the settlement of which is now in
attaine
Eprnorgoipvessw. 'as'n, pofrowvihadetdisthnealsleedeu
arityof
com-
plication, what is in fact dreadful war, was prevented, was
(Hear.)l
andlwi tslhiethretanskr
it not desirable that the terms should be compatible with the
honour of Russia, and should be such as to make her satisfied
with the arrangement ? (Hear.) Therefore lam quite willing to
abide, and I believe my colleagues are ready to abide, by that
declaration which I then made. The answer,which was delayed
fora considerable time, was that the Russian plenipotentiaries
were desired not to make any propositions ; and we are told in
this circular that was in conformity with orders which had been
given by the Emperor Nicholas. I think that was a very
unwise decision. I have always understood that Russians of
great sagacity always considered that the Emperor Nicholas
paid too much attention to his marine, and that his fleets at
Sebastopol and Cronstadt, though they might make a show
on parade, would not be able to compete with those of the
maritime Powers. I believe that to be a very sound opinion,
and therefore I thought it possible that they would have
made this concession, thus giving up something the cession of
which would not really diminish the power of Russia as a
great Power, but would diminish her power in the Black
Sea. I bear it said that if the force was limited, the fleets of
England and France might come in at any time and insult
the coasts of Russia in the Black Sea. How would she be
worse than she has been in the present war, when we have
seen that her fleet has been no security at all ? No sooner
have the fleets of England and France appeared in the Black
Sea than her ships have skulked into Sebastopol, and several
of them have been destroyed. I told one of those persons
to whom I have alluded, whose name I must not mention,
that we intended to propose the limitation of the Russian
fleet, but that I was told Russia would object to it. He
said, " If that is so, it is a proof that she means aggression."
I thought that observation perfectly just. I cannot conceive
why Russia should hesitate to make peace in order that she
may have eighteen or twenty sail of the line at Sebastopol,
unless she meditates some future aggression upon Turkey.
And that I now believe, still more than I did last year,
still more than I did before I went to Vienna, to be in
the contemplation of Russia. Russia thinks that Turkey
cannot endure long, and thinking that when Turkey breaks
up England or France will hasten to sieze Constantinople,
and thuu menace her empire, she feels it necessary to
be beforehand with these Powers, and make herself mis-
tress of the city. Put it, however, which way you
will—Gs an act either of aggression or of self-defence—it
comes to the same thing, that it is the intention of Russia, at
some future time—it may be, in no remote future—to possess
herselfiof Constantinople. (Cheers.) Believing that to be the
case, are the Governments of France and England to close
with the proposition of Russia, that they should have no se-
curity except that, in case of menace, Turkey might call up
the fleets of her allies? I admit all the imperfections of the
security we have proposal, but let the right hon. gentleman
(Mr. Gladstone) and the house recollect that we are by a sti-
pulation with Austria and our position in the war precluded
from asking for any territorial concession. No doubt, the
return of some of the provinces which Russia has wrested
from Turkey would be a better security than the limitation of
the fleet ; but if we bad proposed such a course, Austria would
have opposed it, and Rwisia would have left the conferences.
We were, therefore, obliged to resort to the other security,
and I confess I have seen no better plan than that which we
proposed, except the other plan, to which Russia was still
more opposed, of making the Black Sea altogether a commer-
cial sea, and forbidding the entaance of ships of war into it.
Such, therefore, is my defence with reference to this point.
The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli)—and his language
seemed to me to be extremely ambiguous—said, " What does
it signify whether Russia has four or eight ships more or
less I" and then he went on to say, " You ought, in fact,
to carry on the war defensively ; you ought to defend
Turkey when Russia is prepared to attack her." Now
this comes to one of two conclusions the right honour-
ushsseiaw liilalvriensgpenctonthseentiendtegrtoitsya of
Y,
honour-
able gentleman has not told us which .—either to be
there perpetually to defend Turkey" and thus to make
au eternal war, or, having defended Turkey against the
na,ritdhallt
Turkey, that we should withdraw our forces and make peace,
• having no security beyond those to which Russia has already
• , consented—that is the plan of my right hon. friend the
immediatefo the h u hundredth time,
member for the University of Oxford. But my right hon.
friend fairly and manfully avowed that plan. He brought it
before the House of Commons of England, and declared that
these were terms upon which he thought that we should be
secure. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disr ieli), however,
said —" Put an cud" (not to war—but) " to the negotiations*'"
therefore, at once proposing that we should have no success,
no security for peace, and at the same time proposing the
continuance of the war. Can anything be more inconsistent,
more extravagant than such a proposal ? Now it hag been
said that Austria has not given us all the support which she
might do. As far as the support to be given in conferences
is concerned she has fully given us that support, and with re
gard to this last proposition of calling up the forces of the
allies when Turkey was in danger, she said that is no security
—that is leaving the preponderance of Russia unlimited till
the moment when the danger becomes intolerable. (Bean)
I must say, sir, I do not expect, however, that Austria is
prepared in the present state of the question to take au im-
mediate part in the war against Russia. I believe that she
would have consulted her own interest and dignity better if
she had some time ago joined us in that war, but at the same
time there are considerable motives, there are powerful mo-
tives, to influence her in maintaluing peace with Russia.

In the first place, she has not her capital in the situation of
either London or Paris, which are free from any danger of
incursion by the Russian army. She has no fortresses in
Gallicia to prevent the Russian army marching at once to
Vienna, while she has no secure alliance on this subject
with Prussia. (Hear, hear.) These are some of the
motives which have deterred her from taking an active
part in the war, and the Austrian Government feel that, un-
less they can show that there is some predominant and ne-
cessary motive to induce her to go to war, she would not be
justified in calling upon the population of Germany to support
her iu it. I tell this openly to the house, because I think
that not only ought justice to be done to Austria, but like-
wise because I do not wish to hold out any hope that she
will take an immediate part in the war. I do think, however,
that her position is such—that her treaties and engagements
with us are such, that, if the war continues, she will find it
necessary to take part in the war. But of this I feel sure,
that the part Austria has played in not taking a share of the
spoils of Turkey, which Russia had confidently expected, and
in joining us, will never be forgiven by Russia, and, there-
fore, her only safety is in building up such allies as may secure
her against Russia. (Hear, hear.) Sir, for that reason I shall
be ready to vote against the motion of the right hon. gentle-
man the member for Buckinghamshire. This, sir, is a great
national question— perhaps the greatest national question
that ever enga2ecl the counsels of the house or called forth
the resources of the country—and yet the right hon. gentle-
man seeks to degrade it to a mere party struggle. Sir, the
right hon. gentleman alluded to the distrust which is felt in
the Government. I do not deny the existence of that dis-
trust, but I do not believe the cure for it would be found in
the substitution of the right hon. gentleman for my noble
friend who sits on this side of the house. I do not believe such
a change would create that general satisfaction which the
right hon. gentleman seems to expect. (Hear, hear.) I hear
much said about administrative reform. I think that is a
natural desire, and I entirely agree in the object required ;
but I want to know why it should be presumed that there
arc other men, either sitting on the opposite side of the
house or elsewhere, who could carry out administrative
reform better than those who are at present iu the possession
of office. I believe you could not have a better measure than
that which has been proposed by my noble friend Lord Pan-
muro on the subject of reform in the department of the army.
My noble friend proposes to place the civil branches of the
army under the superintendence of one Secretary of State,
thereby having the eye of one man to watch and the hand of
one man to guide the machinery connected with the army.
So far as the departments of the army are concerned the evils
eomplained of are remedied ; while, with regard to the other
departments of the Government, I do not find that there is
any special accusation as to them. Ido not find with regard
to the Financial Department, the Home Department, or the
Colonial Department that there has been any complaint made
of inefficiency in those departments. I believe, therefore,
that the right hon. gentleman, while he has not founded his
propos it ou any particular accusation, has no better founda-
tion for the remedy which he says will do away with the gene-
ral distrust. lam convinced that the party opposite would
not gain any credit by the carrying of this motion, because
it would be said that in a great crisis the great Con-
servative party, for upWards of a year, came forward with
the greatest patriotism to support the Crown and sustain
the honour of the country ; but, after little more than
a year, they abandoned that patriotic course when they
thought there was an opportunity of slipping into
office. (Hear.) I believe the right hon. gentleman and those
who vote with him would gain no credit by such a course,
and whatever may be the division in this house I think, in
point of reputation, this has been a false move of the right
hon. gentleman. (Hear.) If he can censure any act of ours,
if he can put his finger upon any act of the Government and
censure that act, ofjourse we are open to any censure, to any
observation, to any criticism which this house may choose to
make ; but to bring forward vague words, to merely catch up
what seems to be the feeling of the moment, and which may
not last but a day or two, to be so impatient as not to wait
until after the Whitsuntide holidays to know if the negotia-
tions are concluded, betrays, I must say, such a falling off in
the patriotism which has hitherto been displayed in the votes
of hon. gentlemen opposite, that I think they will add nothing
to their fame or reputation by the,equrse they are now taking.
(Cheers.)
On the motion of Mr. WHITESIDE, the debate was then
adjourned until to-morrow (this day).
Sir WM. SOMERVILLE obtained leave to bring in a bill
to encourage the providing of improved dwellings for the
labouring classes in Ireland. ,
Lord PALMERSTON intimated that the committee on the
bill for the better local government of the metropolis would
not be resumed until the Tuesday after the recess, and there-
fore the house would meet to-morrow (this day) at the usual
hour, instead of at 12 o'clock, as had been previously ar-
ranged.
The other orders of the day were then disposed of, and the
house adjourned at half-past one.