The Sun.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT

HOUSE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.)

The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack
at five o'clock.
The Earl of SHAFTESBURY presented a petition
from Manchester, praying that in any arrangement
entered into for the cessation of hostilities the restora-
tion of Poland might be insisted upon.
The Duke of ARGYLL presented a petition from
Dumfries, praying for the prohibition of distillation
from grain.
In reply to Lord ST. LEONARDS,
The LORD CHANCELLOR said that the Solicitor-
General intended to move for leave to bring a bill into
the other house on the subject of testamentary jurisdic-
tion. It was also his intention to introduce a measure
to amend the law of divorce and to improve the system
of church discipline.
PRIVATE BILLS.

The Cambridge University and Town Water Bill and
the Taunton Gas Bill were read a second time.
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS BILL.
On the motion of Lord BROUGHAM, the house
went into committee on this bill.
After some discussion, in which the Lord Chancellor,
Lord St. Leonardo, Lord Brougham, and the Bishop of
Exeter took place,
The bill passed through oommtttee.
DEAN FOREST BILL;
On the motion of Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY
this bill was read a second time.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Lord BROUGHAM then rose to call the attention
of the house to the adjourned debate of the 23d and
26th on the subject of criminal procedure. The noble
and, learned lord said, when he looked back to the great
changes that had taken place in our criminal law
during the last 30 years the great bulk of them only
referred to the procedure of the law. In 1828, when he
made a statement to the other house of Parliament, which
gave rise to considerable discussion, he enumerated no
less than 95 great defects in our law.. It appeared that
of that number no less than 80 had been referred not to
the law itself, but to procedure. He trusted that the sub.
feet would be well considered by the Government during
the recess, and that they would, upon the re-assembling
of Parliament after the recess, assent to the issuing of a
commission to inquire into the whole subject. He had
already laid on the table 30 resolutions, which he in-
tended to press upon their lordships' consideration.
The LORD CHANCELLOR having passed a. 11-10
compliment upon the labours of the noble and. learned
lord for the services he had rendered to the adoinistra-
tion of justice, said he could assure hiss that the subject
should have the best consideration of the Government
with a view to carry out every amendment that was
possible.
After a few words from Lord LYTTLETON,
The subject dropped.
Lord MONTEAGLE moved for a copy of a letter
from the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank
of England to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the
14th of March.
The latter was then ordered to be printed and laid on
the table of the house.
ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE.
• Earl GRANVILLE then moved the adjournment of the
house until Monday next.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said that he proposed to sit
on Monday and Tuesday for the purpose of hearing appeals,
-but of course no other business would be proceeded with.
He would take care on Tuesday to move the adjournment to
the 16th. (Hear.)
THE STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said that her Majesty's
Government had proposed an adjournment of somewhat un-
usual length after a sitting during which a very small amount
of public business had been transacted, and he was afraid
that at the end of the session their lordships would be de-
tained for an additional week. He thought at the present
moment that it might not be inconvenient to look back a
little, to look at the present position of the country, and also
to look a little forward. (Hear.) It so happened that we
were now exactly at the termination of the first year of the
war, and he wished their lordships to consider the position in
which the country stood at the beginning of the war, and
what had been done. At the beginning of the war the coun-
try had a very strong Government, and a very fine army. At
present it had only half that army, and had lost half the Go-
vernment. He was not sure, however, that some persons did
not think that although the Government had been deprived of
half its members it might not have increased in strength. (A
laugh.) This, at least, was certain, that, whatever might have
been its increased strength in the Cabinet, in Parliament it was
materially diminished, and, instead of having a very strong
Government to carry on the war, the country had now a very
weak Government. At the commencement of the war there
was a confiding Parliament and an enthusiastic people. Now
there was an inquiring people and a discontented House of
• Commons. (Hear, hear.) What had been done ? We occu-
pied, by means of our Allies, the Turks, Eupatoria. In con-
junction with our Allies, the French, we had occupied for
six months 25 square miles of territory in front of Sebasto-
pol. From that position our troops could neither advance
nor retreat. Our officers and soldiers had maintained their
accustomed reputation; but, although they had done so, it
was impossible to conceal the fact that the reputation of this
country as a military power had been very seriously impaired.
(Hear, hear.) The last men in the country to believe in the
reality of war were her Majesty's Ministers. In consequence
of that due preparations were not made. Their eyes were at
last opened, and with the best possible intentions, but know-
ing nothing of the duty they had to perform, they did every-
thing too late, and nothing well. (Hear.) In order to perform
great services to the State an army should (be numerically
equal to the work imposed upon it—it should be well orga-
niadi well equipped, and well commanded. It was still
more essential to military operations that that army should
be Yvon 211,.../1. _
tion, it was impossible to obtain adequate success. Now the
condition of the expedition sent to Sebastopol was that it
was without an adequate force of cavalry, and without any
means of movement. From the inadequacy of cavalry the
victory at Alma could not be improved. From the absence
of cavalry when Prince Menschikoff's forces were divided, it
was impossible to take advantage of that separation. But
there was a yet more fatal want—the want of conveyance.
Within seven miles of the sea our army bad been exposed to
an extent of distress unknown since the retreat of the French
troops from Russia, and equally destructive perhaps of our force.
What had the Government attempted to do ? From a desire to
do everything as economically, and as delicately and conside-
rately as possible to carry on the war, they had attempted to
raise the militia without ballot and without any substitute
whatever of a coercive character for the ballot. They had
attempted to carry on the war, as regarded the navy, with-
out bounty and without impressment. They had endeavoured
to carry on the war without a reserve at home, and a cam-
paign without animals. (Hear, hear.) At the end of the
Peninsular war our army could go anywhere and do anything.
At present our army could go nowhere and do nothing but
defend its lines in any part where they might be attacked.
What had been the effect on the navy of the determination
to carry on the war with no other resources than such as
could be obtained by ordinary means, without resorting to
impressment or giving a bounty ? He rejoiced to see that
the number of seamen and marines voted last year had been
completed, and he believed that in the present year the num-
ber voted might be obtained by the ordinary means, and
that in all probability in successive years a force of 6,000 or
7,000 men would be obtained in the usual manner, and added
to our naval strength. Brit the amount of force which we
should have at the conclusion of the present year did not ex-
ceed one-half of the force which we obtained during the last
war. To those who were now sending a magnificent fleet to
the Baltic ho must be permitted to say that that fleet was
not of sufficient strength. He understood that 20 sail of the
line, all steam-ships, were to be employed on that service,
with a proportionate number of smaller vessels. If we had
any great reason to expect that that force would be increased
as it was during a portion of the last year, by a force of six or
seven sail of the line belonging to France, he should con-
sider it sufficient at an early period of the campaign ;
but last year two or three months elapsed before
the French ships joined our fleet, and they left the
Baltic six weeks or two months before our vessels.
Looking at the great demand for transports for the French
service, ho did not anticipate that more than one vessel be-
longing to France would join our fleet in the Baltic during
the present season.
Earl GRANVILLE—Not more than one ?
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH—Not more than one. It
was of such vital importance to maintain our superiority in
the Baltic that we ought not to run the smallest risk, and we
ought to have a force of our own on which we could entirely
depend under all circumstances. No doubt, the force about
to be sent out was a most powerful one, and it might do great
things against an enemy ; but the force of that enemy con-
sisted of 30 sail of the line, and there was every reason to
suppose that several *ow vessels had been added to that
force during the wint* However ho might rely upon the
strength of the British ships, the gallantry with which they
would be fought, and the ability of the officers in command,
he did not think we should be justified in fighting any doubt-
ful battle, or any battle iu which we might not expect to
achieve a decisive victory. He, therefore, did not think it
safe to trust the interests of the country to a fleet of the ex-
tent intended to be sent out. Many naval officers capable of
forming a correct judgment were of opinion that our fleet
should consist, not of 20 but of 25 sail of the line, and that
we ought to have a reserve of 5 sail of the line at Portsmouth,
and 5 sail of the line at Plymouth. He was unwilling to
allude more particularly to the point, but felt confident
that, if we desired to early on this war undisturbed by any
diversion, we must be strong everywhere, and prove that
it would not be safe to provoke our hostility. (Hear.) The
Government had no reserve at home. At the very end of
the. last war, wo had 60,000 regulars and 60,000 militia
in till; country. What was our force now? We had none.
If from Any accident of war or weather our fleet should be
destroyokin the Baltic, there was nothing sufficient in this
country to give protection to our coasts. Now could any
looking at the present strength of the army, at our
militia, at the progress of enlistment, expect the country in
the Prssveut or for several following to intain in
the field more than 20,000 effective m enylars nilf we could do no
could do just twice as much as the little
more than thas.,,e
state of Sarilinm, ahis ought to be a matter of serious reflec-
tion-to Parliament atii the Government, and the more so be-
cause it was imp ossi 0.?•7 discriminate the consideration of
our actual naval and nnlitar,w-vosition from the consideration
of those negociations which
_eerzonew in progress at Vienna,
and of which we should soon I to result. Let their lord-
ships consider what was the cause r
'That la Present war—the
occupation of the principalities. Turkey to declaretreaty
war, and this country The
principalities were evacuate
came fdorwinaredoitlosatnesteeT4rtkehey,
between Austria and Turkey. Theroeoturledabye
eTera‘ky
übt that
at this moment we could obtain by
which treaty could give against the occupation of
otibiet
palities. There was as little doubt that we could
ain the
security of treaties for the free navigation of the Danube.
We could likewise obtain all the security treaties could give
for the protection of the Greek subjects of the
Porte with
out .the intervention of Russia. Not only could these
securities be obtained now, but they could have been ob-
tained at an earlier period. We, therefore, could at once
obtain all for which we originally made war. We sent an
Y to; Varna to give the hand to Austria. As soon as
Austria Was prepared to rest upon our hand, we withdraw,
and sent our troops to Sebastopol. Could any one reason-
ably doubt what the consequences of such a proceeding
would be, and that Austria would act with extreme caution ?
Austria was in a position of the greatest danger when our
army was sent to Sebastopol. But the sending of that army
to Sebastopol created a new element of difficulty. It intro-
duced the question of military honour, which was infinitely
more difficult to deal with than any question of commerce.
If he were not mistaken the main practical difficulty was one
Imilitary honour. But our demands went further. We said
we would have some security against the preponderance of
Russia in the Black Sea. That was altogether a new de-
mand, and ono which did not arise out of the first circem-

stances of the war. And how did the Government propose
to carry that into effect ? They sent an expedition to Sebas-
topol as ancillary to the attainment of that object. He
trusted that they had not demanded from Russia any con-
c2ssion which might be represented by the Emperor to his
people and his army as inconsistent with their honour. It
was a most painful thing to touch the honour of a military

power. He did not hesitate to say that we were net in a mi-
litary position in front of Sebastopol which justified us in
asking Russia for such a sacrifice, for, although we were the
besiegers, we were also besieged. Now, if the Government
could obtain any fair concession and stipulation on the part
of Russia tending to diminish her preponderance in the Black
Sea, he would ask how the performance of that stipulation
was to be enforced ? Had former stipulations of the same kind
been enforced They had not. How could the Government
without a new war compel Russia to perform any stipulation
she might make for the purpose of diminishing her prepon-
derance iu the Black Sea ? He apprehended that it would be a
vain attempt; but whatever opinion might be entertained with
respect to the war, he should deeply lament that any reason-
able expectations of making peace should be taken away if a
proposition for terms which could be of no practical benefit
should not be agreed to. (Hear, hear.) As the whole atten-
tion of the Government and of a large portion of Europe was
directed to the single question of the reduction of Sebastopol,
it was desirable to look at the reality of the thing, and inquire
what was its real value. In time of war its value was known

exactly. (Hear, hear.) At present we had a superior force
in the Black Sea. We had blockaded Sebastopol, and de-
prived Russia altogether of that naval preponderance which

she would otherwise derive from the possession of the Black
Sea. No doubt, under peculiar circumstances, the whole of
the Russian fleet might sail from Sebastopol, and strike a
blow, as in the case of Sinope ; but that would have no very
material effect on the results of a war. Practically, Sebas-
topol and the Russian fleet were nullified by the superiority
of our own fleet. Supposing Sebastopol to be taken and
destroyed, in the course of a very few years it would be
restored. The destruction of that place would be only a
temporary advantage. If it was intended not only to take.
but to keep Sebastopol, that was a different thing. Bset
we intended to maintain Sebastopol we must go a great deal
further. It would be impossible to maintain 100,000 men
in the Crimea to prevent Russia from occupying Sebastopol.
To do that it would be necessary to raise tie* nations around
the Crimea from serfdom, and to attempt the reconstruction
of the kingdom of Mithridates. (laser, hear.) Supposing
treaties could be formed under the guarantee of all the great
powers of Europe for the effectual protection of the princi-
palities against the re-oecupetion of Russia, then would still
remain the danger of Sebastopol--a danger which no dimi-
nution of five or tat ships of the Russian fleet would
prevent. There Would be the danger of Russia embarking
40,000 or 50,000 men, not in vessels of war, using them
as a but in her mercantile navy at Odessa and
all the ports of the Black Sea, and throwing that force sud-
denly upon Bourgas, getting possession of the Bosphorus, and
so crashing Turkey. It was against that danger that we
ought to guard, and there was but one way of doing so. It
was impossible to nullify to Russia her own possessions. But
our ally had possession of the Bosphorus and Constantinople,
and the only real security would be to create a Sebastopol in
the Bosphorus, and giving Turkey an army with which, un-
der strong fortifications, she might fight her own battles, and
defend herself until her friends could come to her rescue. In
conclusion, he must express his earnest hope that no-demand
inconsistent with the honour of the Russian army and people
would be made—that no demand would be made which it
would be difficult or impossible to enforce, and which, if en-
forced, would not conduce to the security which was desired.
Earl GRANVILLE, in reply to the first objection of the
noble earl, said that he had consulted the noble earl the leader
of the party opposite este the period of adjournment, and had
received his approbation of the course proposed. Making full
allowance for the ability and temper of the speech of the noble
earl—giving him credit for many suggestions which he had
made to the Government and the house—balancing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the speeches which he had
made during the present year, his (Earl Granville's) belief
was that, although their lordships might be deprived of the
noble earl's speeches, the interests of the sountry would not
at all suffer on that account, even if the adjournment should
be for a month. (Laughter, and hear.) This was not a proper
period to go into a disquisition on foreign affairs. (Hear.)
There was hardly a member of their lordships' house who would
not admit that if there ever was a time when it would be
objectionable to drag the Government into a discussion on
such matter, it was the present—(hear)—and he could not
help thinking that those who had listened to the noble earl's
speech would consider it a great dereliction of public duty if
any member of the Government were to follow the noble earl
through the various topics in which he had indulged. (Hear.)
The noble lord had stated that we went to Sebastopol for our
own objects. Now he was unable to explain the meaning of
that phrase, but he most confidently denied that any singe
step we had taken in the course of this war had been taken
with reference to our own objects. The noble earl next re-
ferred to the insufficiency of our naval operations in the Baltic,
and he gave an account perfectly differing from the accounts
which the Government had received from the French Govern-
ment of the assistance they would be able to give us in that
sea. He had no wish to hazard any prophecy in opposition to
the prophecy of the noble earl, but when the noble earl said
our naval preparations were insufficient for the purpose to
which they were to be applied, he must be allowed to say,
with all due deference to the noble earl's superior knowledge,
that he believed such was not the case. The force now at the
disposal of Admiral Dundas consisted of seven ships of the
line, eight frigates, eight gun-boats, all the lessels having
either paddles or screws, while a large number of vessels of
different sorts could be added in a short time; and on the
whole he might say there was now a fleet ready for sea of not
less than 104 pendants. How could it be said then, with any
degree of truth, that such an overwhelming force would be
insufficient for the purpose to which it was to be applied ?
(Hear, hear.) With regard to the army, he was quite un-
able to go into details, but he entirely denied that we had
suffered loss to anything like the degree mentioned by the
noble earl, or that the military prestige of th's country had
fallen in the estimation of Europe. He thought it was a gross
exaggeration when the noble earl said the misfortunes and dis-
asters which had overtaken our army in the Crimea were ex-
actly like the defeat which Napoleon met with at Moscow.
That there had been great disasters—that there had been
great suffering—that there bad been great losses, he did not
pretend to deny ; but against that their lordships must place
the acknowledgment of the noble earl himself, that our °fa:
. .
any army in the world. Add to that the fact that the effici-
ency of our army was such as to enable them to meet the
enemy at any moment, and he thought there would be no
reason for the desponding tone adopted by the noble earl.
When he considered that after the most extraordinary land-
ing that ever took place, and after three battles gained by
the invincibility of our troops, we were now in an impreg-
nable position in the enemy's dominions, he did say that it was
giving an unjust notion to the people of this country, as well
as to our allies, of the power we possess, for the noble earl to
indulge in such language as that which their lordships had
heard to-night. (Hear, hear.) Why, it was notorious to
them all that our army at this moment was being strength-
ened every day in numbers and in health, and above all they
were in the highest possible spirits. He believed they were
equal now to any duty which they might be immediately called
upon to perform. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl next ad-
verted to the weakness of the Government, and he regretted
that instead of a strong Government the country was com-
pelled to put up with a weak Government. Now nobody
could regret more than ho did that the Government had
lost some of those eminent men whom the noble earl
and his colleagues failed to obtain when they were en-
deavouring to form a Government, but, at the same time,
Ministers had not lost all courage on that account; on the
contrary, relying on the honesty of their intentions, they felt
convinced they would be supported by the country, while
what had passed lately in the House of Commons showed that
the house was inclined to give them its support. More than
that, looking at the elections that had taken place—looking
at the fact that, in almost every instance where the members
Of the Government had to appeal to their constituents, they
had either been returned without opposition or with an over-
whelming majority—looking still more at the extraordinary
change of opinion which had taken place in the large com-
mercial town of Liverpool, he did believe there was sufficient
proof shown that the people of this country, as well as the
House of Commons, were strongly disposed to give the Go-
vernment their support. (Hear.) At all events, if Ministers
obtained that support without going into details, he could
assure their lordships, for himself and for his colleagues, that
they would show no want of zeal in endeavouring to obtain
Peace, while, on the other hand, they would, as far as it was
possible, strive to support the interest, tho dignity, and the
military reputation of the country. (Cheers.)
The Earl of MALMESBURY could not agree with the noble
earl that his noble friend had taken an unfortunate opportu-
nity for pressing his views upon their lordships, with regard
to the present position of affairs in the East, nor did he be.
lieve that his noble friend's speech on the subject would
be detrimental to the public interest. His noble friend had
repeatedly given his advice to their lordships touching the
conduct of the war and other matters, and where it was not
followed by the Government the neglect had proved to their
disadvantage. Two instances of this neglect immediately
occurred to him. On ono occasion, before the commence-
ment of the war, the late Government, and half the present
Government, proposed to reduce the taxes of the country
something like 1,200,000 e, and upon that occasion his noble
friend most solemnly warned them that they were commit-
ting an imprudent act. Subsequent events proved that his
noble friend was correct. What was the second instance in
which his noble friend tendered his advice to the Government?
Why, it was when he warned them that they had not calcu-
lated sufficiently upon the number of animals required for the
laud transport service. That advice, however, was not taken,
and yet almost every misfortune that had occurred to our
a: my was to bo traced to the want of a sufficient land trans-
port. So much, then, for the neglect of his noble friend's
advice. The noble earl opposite said he did not understand
the expression of his noble friend when ho geld we went to the
Crime, far our own objects. Now, what he supposed his
noble friend meant was, that Austria, France, and England,
with respect to the invasion of the Crimea, were anything but
of the same opinion. Then the noble earl objected to the com-
parison which his noble friends bad made between our disas-
ters and the disasters which befell the French army in 1812 ;
but for his part he could hardly conceive any analogy more
true or exact. The enemy was the same, the time was the
same, and the result was the same. Tho climate destroyed
the army before Moscow, while the climate was the principal
cause of the calamities which had befallen our army before
Sebastopol. But the noble lord opposite appeared to think
the present a most inopportune moment to offer advice about
the war, but if they were to be tongue-tied upon the subject
of the negotiations now going on, where was the use of their
attending the house 7 (Hoar.) Government had declared
their intention not to introduce matters of domestic policy
pending the war, and if they were now to remain silent upon
questions of foreign policy, what else was there for them to
touch upon ? But ho could not think that it was inconvenient
for the public service that independent members of Parlia-
ment should tender their advice to Government upon the
subject of the war, or draw attention to any important point
that may strike them. Well, then, at this moment the coun-
try was most anxious about what was passing at Vienna, and
their lordships would be mere dolts if they did not offer some
Opinion upon it, or call for some explanation from the Go-
vernment. No one could be more anxious than he was that
the honour of the country should be maintained ; but this
tea, care that the
was the most important moment this country had seen since
tibe.lrferefmoreadam.
1.1445, the period of the last
lordships would be unworthy of their position if they did not
congress at Vienna, and their
foundation es opportunitynetfotrhprelaweninegwtahye.pea(effeeoefr,Ehuereolp.e)
the eminent hi
who( who() speak slightingly or disrespectfully of
but at the sam.
time
haei4isoteddat the last congress of Vienna,
La a little niore eleenmepeiCte inthe jeriesent Government would
than were the statesmen of 1814-15. r treeaties and demands
committed was turning their
thetak
upoTnhtheerror which they
east, and look-
sequence tward to France as sours° of
ing wesalldanger. The con-
the security of Turke
sequence was, y aennd the pretensions of
were not
Russia in the Black Sea
bitter framil attended to, and
we were now reaping the ,
enstsi‘of that neglect. From
1815 down to the present time It
the knotid, step by step, in-
creased her territory; and with
_29 ledge of that circum-
stance and the treaties of 1828 and
that one it was
scarcely credible to the present generation of the prin-
ty
• sof Vienna was a ,verthrowin cipal acts of the congi es
s now Erin, g
der which Frauco wa
he very dynasty un
' hted view that weasarree
Ties not only showed the short-sighted
w•
necessity of our salt
events in 1815, but it also proved the .
al guarantec3 trom
t materi
not merely moral guarantees, bu