The Sun.
London, England, 1855-06-19 00:00:00

" FORAGE.

" NV hen the army first encamped before Sebastopol stacks
of forage were found in the neighbourhood; these were
soon consumed, and henceforward there appears to have
been much difficulty in obtaining fodder ft.r the horses.
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who•left the
heights on the 7th of November, said that his baggage ani-
mals were frequently without food ; and,that on one occa-
sion he was obliged to kill 24 ammunition ponies which
he had not the. means of feeding. The E old of Lund, com-
manding the cavalry division, complained repeatedly, from
the 29th of September to the date of his departure,' of the
condition to which the horses were reduced from Wanes of
food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but
did not find the pressure se severe until after the sth of
November, when his brigade was posted on tha heights.
After the hurricane the supply of forage failed, and under
the combined effects of work, exposure, and insufficient
food, the cavalry gradually ceased to exist as an et.feJtive
force. _ '

"To what extent the commissariat is responsible for the
deficiency in all these sapplies is a question to which it is
not easy to give a definite answer.
" Sir C. Trevelyan, speaking as the head of the commissa-
riat, and desirous of relieving the department from respon-
sibility, affirms their conduct throughout to have been ir-
renroa,hablo, and ascribes blame to other persons. Accord-
ing to his opinion, the quartermaster-general, for whose
good intentions he made full allowance, ought to bear the
chief responsibility.• Thisofficer,' he says, is responsible
for the road to the camp and for the ro..d along the border
of the harbour at Balaklava. By him also buildings should
have been appropriated for magazines, and stables for the
baggage animals should have been provided. -
"Sir C. Trevelyan also states that the endeavours of the
commissariat were frustrated by the mismanagement of
the transports, that there way a want of proper arrange-
ments in the harbour of Balaklava, and still worse dis-
order at Constantinople. Rear-Admiral Boxer di.l not,'
lie says,.' possess the administrative qualifications requi-
site fur that important station, and he delayed the Y trans-
ports in the Bosphorus or appropriated them to other ser-
vices.' In confirmation of this statement he mentioned
the Rockliffe transport and the Jason, which last, he said,
had been detained three weeks at. C enstantinople. Seine
let,ters from sear-Admiral Boxer will be found in the ap-
pendix, denying this assertion. Rear-Admiral Boxix also,
it appears, in December remonstrated against the irregu-
lar system pursued by the commissariat in the Crimes;
and requested the interference of. the commander of the
forces. suggested that some of the largest transports
shoubt be strongly moored in Ba4lllava Harbour as float-
ing depots, and that the smaller steamers should be told
off for the special duty of conveying.supplies.
" Your committee have not been able to examine Corn-
miSsary General" leilder or Rear-Admiral Boxer, and
they cannot therefore, decide upon whom this blame
should rent. . .

" Both these officers were, apparently, convinced that
the transport system in the Bieck Sea had been ill-cen-
ducted. Whether, however, the vessels had been injudi-
cionsly detained as store depots by the commissariat, or
improperly employed in other services by the admiral at
Constantinople, are questions which your committee can-
not satisfactorily answer.- These arrangements might with
'propriety, have been reviewed by the high naval and mi-
litify authorities. They alone hadthe means of deciding
these differences, and of enforcing such a system as might
best secure the conveyance of supplies with regularity' and
dispatch..
" Before closing their observations on the commissariat
:department .in the East, your committee notice with plea-
sure the willing testimony which many n ituesses have
borne to the-zeal and energy which some subordinate officers
of the commissariat displayed in procuring supplies, and in
relieving, as far as they were able, the distress of the troepe
during a period of trying exigencies.
' THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT HOME.
"The Medical department of the army and Ordnance is
under a director-general, who has an assistant to aid him
in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the director-general,
states that he was under the immediate authority of five
different superiors—the Commander-in-Chief, the Secre-
tary of State for War, the Secretary at War, the Master-
'General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He
further states, that upon the separation of the two depart-
.ments of. War and Colonies, he received no communication
ordering hiatto correspond directly with the Secretary for
War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that in August last
he' himself told Dr. Smith that the. Secretary of State for
War was his real and only master. Had such an airange-
Mont been earlier adopted, Dr. Smith says it would have
saved labour, while the service .would have been more effi-
ciently conclucted.. The director-general states that when
first heard of the probability that a force could be sant
lo'Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should
'be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the
.troops. This suggestion was adopted. H also selected
surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them dire°,
tions for their guidance.' He recommended that ambul-
ances shOuld be prepared, and an ambulance corps ap-
pOinted. For this purpose he advised that able-bodied.
,soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Har-
ding° objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting
men, and pensioners were employed instead. Dr. Smith
remonstrated in vain.
"The entire failure of this corps., and the subsequent
suffering's of the army, 'are "ribuniiantli proVed.
"In May, 1831, Dr. S.nith addressed a letter to the mi-
litary secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, recommending
that, ' in the event of the hospitals being established at t_t

distance from the army, ships should be fitted for the tran-
`• sport of the sick and wounded.' This application was not
I attended ti).

" Before the army left England the most experienced pur-
veyors were assembled by order of the Secretary atWar, and
after consultation with the Director• General of the Medical
Depaitment, they drew up a report in regard to the stores
required for the medical treatment of the troops.
" Dr. Smith states that he issuel orders to the druggists
for the supply of medicines ; he made requisitions on the
Ordnance for the hospital stores, and through the Ordnance
to the Admiralty.for the supply of medical comforts. The
system pursued at to medical comforts was altered after
Sept., when Dr. Smith provided this supply. Respecting
the hospital
,stores. Dr. Smith says, that when he had made
his requisition on the Ordnance his duty ended. His office
had no further information on the subject; that he occasion-
ally applied or sent to ascertain what had been dome, but
that this was outstepping the functions of his department.
"The strict economy enforced during a long period of
peace, by means of a rigid system of audit and account, may
doubtless, at the first outbreak of war, have still fettered
Dr. Smith, Ls well as other public servants, who dreaded to
incur responsibility for any expedition, however urgent,
which was not guarded by all .the forms and documents
usually required. An excess•of caution, in the first in-
stance, led probably to some evils, which a lavish outlay
could not afterwards repair. The letters of the Secretary
at War, read by him ip his evidence, forcibly illustrate
this observation. In many cases instructions in this mat-
ter might have been useful to public servants, whose expe-
rience was wholly founded oath) methods rightly insisted
upon during peace.
"THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT IN THE EAST.

" The army, 'when sent to the east, had a greater num-
ber of.medical-wen in proportion to the number of the
troops than' ever before accompanied a British army, and
the witnesses generaily concur in testifying to their zeal
and efficiency ; many of these were, however, disabled by
sickness before-the descent on the Crimea, so that after
each of the actions, at Alma and Inkerman, some regi-
ments had net the requisite number of medical men. The
ambulances for the conveyance of the sick and wounded
were too heavy, and ill adapted for their purpose.
" The treatment of the sick and wounded in the camp at
Balakiava and Scutari has already formed the subject of a
lengthened report by commissioners specially appointed
for this purpose; further information upon this point will
be found in the evidence already presented to the house.
Tho condition of the tent-hospitals, as described by Mr.
Parker, chaplain to the First Dirision, was, from the 28th
of November to the 231 of January, the period of his stay
in the Crimea, so wretched and painful to heAr, that your
committee gladly avoid repeating those deplorable details.
The medical men, it is said, were indefatigable in their
attentions; but so great was the want of the commonest
necessaries, even of bedding, as well as of medicines and
medical comforts, that they sorrowfully admitted their
services to be of little avail.

" The hospital at Balaklava bad an advantage, inasmuch
as it was nearer to the limited supplies which were on
board ship but the uncertainty whether or not Balaklava
could be retained, disconcerted the arrangements of this
hospital, and upon one occasion t bepatients were removed.
TR regard to its subsequent condition, there is a difference
of opinion, depending probably upon the dates of the
several visits ; but the prevailing testimony is to the effect
that this hospital was for many weeks in a discreditable
state.

"Allowance must be made for the circumstances in
which the continued possession of Balaklava was held, and
for the difficulty of establishing a hospital in such build-
ings as were found there. The want of proper orderlies,
the insufficiency of Medicines, especially of opium ; of
medical comforts, some of which were essential to the
health of the men, and the great want of purveyor's stores,
have been so fully set forth in the report of the commis-
sioners, that your committee deem it superfluous to adduce
further evidence in corroboration of their statements. They
will, therefore, proceed to observe u2on