The Sun.
London, England, 1855-08-23 00:00:00

straightforward conduct. She may regret the,
stringent punishment she must receive, but does
not and cannot repent the sins that rendered that
punishment necessary.

As we recently stated, the Emperor NAPOLEON
has a heavy debt of vengeance to exact from the
betrayers of the mighty founder of his dynasty.
He may postpone his demand, but he cannot
"forgive or forget" the deep-dyed treachery. He
has wrongs of his own to avenge —wrongs that
have been inflicted alike on France and England,
and which both Governments should speedily
notice. His language at the opening of the
Chambers proved that he felt it deeply. It will
not be the least valuable result of the Riyal visit
to France that an opportunity will be afforded of
discussing and deciding on the course to be adopted
with respect to Austria. Whateverthat course may
be, whether the Western Powers insist on the
performance of the Austrian engagements, or suf-
fer her to remain in undignified isolation until she
falls from internal commotions, and the natural
antipathies of the conflicting elements of which
she is composed, it is quite certain that they
will not enter into fresh negotiations, or permit
Austria to intsrmeddle in matters wherein her
previous interference was the cause of so many seri-
ous evils, and which prevented the Allies while
waiting for her promised co-operation, from put-
ting forth their strength in such a manner as
would speedily have brought Russia tc her senses,
and produced an honourable, a secure, and a per-
manent peace.

It cannot for a moment be supposed that the
bombardment of Sweaborg is to be the only, or
even the chief operation in the Baltic this season,
although the public have been greatly disappointed
as to the amount of the success achieved on that
occasion, although " the sea defences in general
were but little injured," as Admiral DIINDAS him-
self informs us ; yet what has occurred has
taught a valuable lesson both to friend and foe,
to Englishmen and to Russians. We have learned
that with comparatively trivial loss to ourselves
we may inflict immense damage on Russia, that
must materially cripple her power and abridge her
resources. We can with practical impunity destroy
her dockyards, and arsenals, and her accumulated
stores and munitions of war, can prove that we are
really in etrnest, and, what is of no less importance,
can humiliate the War party in the eyes of their
countrymen. It is not merely the total suspeo-
sion of their maritime commerce that they are
compelled to submit to, but they have seen that
their strongest forts are unable to shelter the stores
placed under their immediate protection—that the
vessels engaged in the bombardment can demolish
the strongest buildings, and consume the property
remaining therein, while placed beyond the range
of their fire. That which, if not " death," is
certainly " ruin" to them, is nothing but fun to
the jolly tars engaged in the transaction !

_ .
I But while they learn all this—they may also,
lif time be afforded, devise means of preventing
similar proceedings. The stores supplied in place
of those already lost may be deposited in
bomb-proof buildings. Cannon of longer range and
1 greater capability may be substituted for those
i whose deficiency has been so clearly ascertained.
Every hour procrastinated may materially enhance
the difficulty of achievements now comparatively
easy, and by next spring they may become almost,
if not altogether, impossible. We have seen what
Russians can do in the way of defence, and very
serious consequences may ensue if we defer
taking what at present we have only to reach
out our hands to secure.
Cronstadt ought to be, and very probably will
be, the next object of attack. We have already
, indicated the mode in which the mortar-vessels
and gun-boats might securely destroy the dock-
yards and arsenals ; and, in fact, all the Govern-
ment buildings and works, and materially damage
the fleet itself. What has been done at Sweaborg
may be repeated at •ronstadt, with equal if not
greater results. If the long range could be
effectual in the one quarter, it may certainly be
equally so in the other—and we, can scarcely
conceive that Helsingfors would have been'
spared—that the fleet would have weighed
anchor, leaving the greater part of their work
undone, if it were not intended to try their
strength against the great stronghold of the
enemy, where the labour, if more arduous, would
likewise be more honourable, and the results of
the most vital importance to the enemy.
We hope and believe, then, Chat something
will be attempted against Croncatadt ; and, if so,
we cannot doubt but that mile!' may be accom-
plished. The policy that spared Odessa is non
universally condemned, As we have repeatedly
stated, the Russians are incapable of appreciating
any degree of leniency, or attributing it to any cau4e
but a dread of too greatly exciting the indignation
of the AUTOCRAT. Mercy to Russia, to her trade
or her towns, is cruelty to England. If we spare
them, we do it at the expense of our over-burdened
taxpayers, wad of our gallant brethren now
risking their lives for the honour and welfare of
their country in the Crimea and elsewhere. The
sanguir Ary miscreants who butchered an in-
offcw.;tve crew defended by a flag of truce,
wk.) murdered their own countrymen, in order
4.0 destroy with them some of the hated foe, are
deserving of no leniency. They are savages, who
have no consideration for others, and who should,
therefore, receive none themselves. We must
convince them that they themselves will be the
greatest sufferers by such proceedings as the
Hango massacre. It is the only mode by which
they can be taught, and the lesson should be
made sufficiently stringent, in order to suit their
dull comprehensions. •

is—The great question •f the day
at is War?
We are said to be at war with Russia, and what
is wantel is a proper understanding as to what is
meant by this brace of manosy';iables, for it is
quite clear that the Government and the people
do not attach the same signAcation to them.
'peak, of war, leaving out
The elements, so to s
of account those over which human will has no
control, may be dr,scribed as intellectual, physical,
and moral. Tile first embraces the origination
and general direction of the other two, and the
responsibility of its use rests chiefly with the
Mitaistry at home, and our commanders military
and naval abroad, and more especially with the
former. Tine duty of the general or the admiral
is to see to the welfare and efficiency of his men,
and to deal the heaviest blows at the pride and
strength of the enemy the skill, discretion, and
force at his command will enable him to inflict—
his only restrictions being orders from the Admi-
ralty, and the observance of those rules of huma-
nity with respect to which all civilised nations
are agreed. The duty of the Government is to
have armies and navies so far equal to the occa-
sion as the means at their disposal will permit,
and having them to put the best men they can
get at their head, and send thorn to the beat pos-
sible fields for dealing destruction and humilia-
tion on the enemy. So far, we dare say, all are
agreed. But the public think, and the Govern-
ment apparently do not altogether, that the duties
of the latter,
irrespective of civil matters, is far
frari bring dinhf:gcl when the aboTe particulars