The Sun.
London, England, 1855-05-15 00:00:00

vantages and its dangers. (Hear, hear.) Its advantages
are all for the public, and its dangers are for the indivi-
dual who adopts that as his principle of government.
(Hear.) I have myself seen diiaster converted into victory,
and discouragement into enthusiasm. I have seen public
confidence re-established • I have seen public prosperity
carried to an unexampled of increase, beyond what,
at any previous period, it has been known to attain to ; and '
I have been able, in a very great measure, to trace all these
advantages in the condition of the State to the adoption of
the principle of regarding solely the fitness of individuals
in their selection for public employments. (Hear.) lam
enabled, at the same time, to inform your lordships that
there is this danger to the individual who acts on that prin-
ciple—that he is surrounded by persons, by disappointed
jobbers, and by little-minded men, depending for their
promotion on patronage and favour, who will, animated
by the most unscrupulous animosity, join together for the
purpose of overwhelming his Government. (Hear, hear.)
And if, in consequence of the
present feeling of the people,
any Government should be established in this country de-
termined to act on the principle I have mentioned, I feel
assured that it would be in danger from the same hostility,
unless it received the constant, uniform, and vigilant sup-
port of the people, on whom it alone could depend for sup-
port. (Hear.)
I have been not unobservant of the events
which have taken place in this country during a very con-
siderable period of time ; and I have conversed with many
who have equally regarded those events with vigilant ob-
servation ; and it is certainly in accordance with my obser-
vation, and with that of others, that a very great, and, as
I think, very dangerous change has come over the practice
of the constitution. The time was when speeches in Par-
liament directed public opinion —(hear)--when, whatever
might have been the feeling during the recess, whatever
might have been the snccess of agitators during the period
while Parliament was not sitting, the meeting of Parlia-
ment, and the announcement of the opinions of those who
were in the habit of leading parties in Parliament, at
once gave a direction to public opinion and brought it into
a right and safe course. I fear there has bren growing up
a very material change in this respe t. Public opinion
now is, I fear, more generally formed out of doors, and,
being there formed, acts on the conduct of Parliament. I
look with great apprehension to a state of things in which
persons, however unable, yet wholly irresponsible, possess
power treater perhaps than that of Parliament. I look
with apprehension to a state of things in which those whom
I may call " the gentlemen of the platform" have more
influence by their speeches than " the gentlemen of the
House of Commons." That state of things has been grow-
ing up in this country. It fills me with considerable
alarm. I know the importance of watching public opinion.
I know the importance of endeavouring to direct it. It
appears to me that public opinion, if I may so express
myself, in a manner resembles a great river between
two dikes. The waters rise gradually, slowly, imper-
ceptibly, and without danger, apparently, in the eyes of
those unaccustomed to their progress ' but at last they in-
crease to such a height that they overtop and destroy the
dike, and, pouring down on the plain, desolate everything
before them. The same waters, however, if distributed by
prudent and judicious management into streawlets run-
ning the fields, would fertilise and beautify the
land. (Hear.) It is with the conviction, then, that it is
essential to the good working of the constitution that Par-
liament should direct, as far as possible, public opinion
that I make this motion. (Hear.) I make it for the pur-
pose of enabling your lordships to place this house in the

front of the people. (Cheers.) I make it for the purpose of
inducing you to go to the foot of the Throne as the faith-
ful interpreters of public opinion, to state respectfully to
her Majesty the extent of public dissatisfaction and the ex-
tent of public complaint ; to state your determination and
that of the people to assist her Majesty with all the re-
sources of the country in the prosecution cf a just and ne-
cessary war ; but at the same time to state your opinion
that the Government must be conducted on the true public
principle of selecting men for employment in consideration
of their means of serving the State. (Hear, hear.) Before
I enter upon the conduct of the war, to which it will be
necessary for me to direct your lordships' attention, allow
me to draw distinctly the line which appears to me to se-
parate the functions of the Government from the functions
of the general. It is the duty of the Government to form
a plan for the campaign, and it is the duty of the Govern-
ment to place in the hands of the general to whom they
confide the conduct of the campaign the most perfect in-
strument they can prepare for the purpose of obtaining
success—a perfectly well equipped army. It is for the
general to carry into execution the plans of the Govern-
ment ' • and we, as Parliament, it appears to me, haveonly
t deal with the conduct of the Government. (Hear, bear.)
Your lordships will probably ,recollect that at the very
commencement of this war I, in the most earnest manner,

cautioned the house and the public against looking
too closely into the conduct of the officers in the cora-
_

mand of. the fleets and armies. I reminded your
lordships of the extreme sensitiveness of military men, and
of the necessity of leaving their minds on all occasions per-
fectly free to exert all their energies for the public service.
I alsured your lordships that the hope of public approba-
tion and the apprehension of public displeasure would al-
ways be sufficient to animate those officers to the utmost
extent of their exertions for their public service. I pro-
pose to adhere to the reserve I recommended to others, and
I wish it to be understood in all I say I deal only with the
Government by whom this war has been conducted.
(Hear.) For the purpose of conducting the war I appre-
hend it will ba admitted that is necessary we should have
men and animals—that is, men aided by animals. Unfor-
tunately the war has not been conducted in that way ; and
very little exertion appears to have been made for the pur-
pose of providing the army with sufficient strength, and
with the means of moving. It was not in the first in-
stance that the standard was reduced, nor was it at

an early period that the bounty was increased, but
it was by lowering the standard and by increasing the
bounty that the army must be augmented. On a recent
occasion the Minister of War very properly issued a circu-
lar respecting the militia, which relieved from service those
men who had not entered thatforce with the understanding
that they were to be embodied ; but he accompanied that
measure by the offer of a bounty so extremely small as not
only to endanger the success of the measure, but almost to
secure its failure—(hear, hear)—and I believe that we have
lost the services of from 16,000 to 20,000 men for the pur-
pose of saving some 50,0001. or 60,0001. (Hear, hear.)
There has been no real economy except in that in which
parsimony was most to be rejected, and in which liberality
was most to be invited—namely, in the obtaining of men
for the army and navy, and in providing the army with the
means of moving. I ventured at a very early period to
represent to this house the absolute necessity of taking the
most extensive measures for the purpose of providing the
army with the means of moving, but it is only within
the last three months that any effectual measures
have been taken for that purpose—(hear, hear)—and
at this moment the army cannot move, and never has
been able to move. This immoveability, in consequence of
the want of animals, has been the cause of many of the
errors which have pervaded the campaign. My lords, early
in the last year it was decided, I think most properly, to
separate the Colonial Department from the Department of
War; but, when that division took place, no measures were
adopted—as should have been the case—for the purpose of
strengthening the hands of the Minister of War. I en-
tirely object to the principle of pulling to pieces great de-
partments in the midst of a war. Imu sure that such a
measure was totally unnecessary. The only thing abso-
lutely necessary waste give the Minister of War full powers
over all the subordinate departments, to make his orders
run through them, and to give him the power of compel-
ling the execution of any measures he might direct. Hail
that power been distinctly given to my noble friend (the
Duke of Newcastle), had he surroun led himself, as I think
he should have clone, with a military staff, instead of de-
pending upon civil clerks—had it been thoroughly under-
stood in the Government that the noble duke's orders were
at once to be executed in all departments, I firmly believe
that many of the disasters which have occurred would
nave been prevented. But I fear the noble duke has had
to fight a battle here as well as in the Crimea—l fear that
he has had to wrest the Commissariat from Sir C. Trevel-
yan—that he has had to wrest the Laud Transport Corps
from the Commissariat —that there have been difficulties
here as well as in the Crimea—and that those difficulties
eave to a very great extent led to the failures we have
experienced. My lords, at the commencement of the war
he manner in which our forces should act was a matter of
the most careful and anxious consideration on the part er her
.lajesty's Government—whether the army should act as a
separate body, or whether it should unite in operation
with the army of France. The objection to the union of
the armies was obvious —the existence of divided commands,
an inconvenience which no extent of cordiality and good
sense on the part of the generals could by possibility alto-
gether obviate. (Hear.) It is almost impossible for any
two men, however able they may be, to conduct difficult
military operations with success under the principle of a
divided command. (Hear.) Napoleon said, with perfect
truth, that it was better to appoint one general of ordinary
abilities to the command of an army than two men of supe-
rior abilities having a divided command ; and, depend
upon it, unity of command is that which most contributes
to success. We had the opportunity of employing our
troops to a certain extent, perhaps, in the Black Sea, on a
separate expedition ; but we had before us the Baltic, the
true sphere of our operations. Joan, however, quite under-
stand that her Majesty's Government might have been desir-
ous that the armies and navies of the two countries should ap-
pear together wherever operations were carried on, and I do
not deny that there wasconsiderable advantage in that unity
of operations, but it was an advantage deeply purchased
by the want of unity of command. It was decided that the
war should be carried on in the Baltic, and also in the
Black Sea. Now, my lords, any one who takes the trouble
of looking carefully through the charts of the Baltic will
have seen that, while the Russians had taken every precau-
tion, by the erection of defences, to prevent ships of large
draught of water from entering their porta and from coming
near their dockyards, the same precautions had not been
taken against the attacks of vessels of a smaller class, and
that both at Sweaborg and at Cronstadt there were oppor-
tunities of turning the dockyards and of attacking them by
vessels of small draught of water. It was obvious that, in
the case of such an operation, it would be most advi, able
to have at hand a body of troops, because if the marines
were landed from the ships for employment on shore the
strength of the fleet would of course be materially dimi-
nished, and its efficiency foraction would be considerably ine.
paired. Neither of these considerations appear, however, to
have occurred to her Majesty's Government. They sent a fleet
to the Baltic without gun-boats and witnout troops. They
rendered it impossible to obtain success with the means
which they placed in the hands of the admiral. The admiral
did as much as he could do with the means which were in-
trusted to him. I deeply regret that the public expecta-
tions were so highly raised at the commencement of the
war; that the people were led to suppose that some extra-
ordinary service would at once be performed by the fleet.
For those exaggerated expectations two members of the
Government were particuarly responsible. (Hear, hear.)
in nl
thing expec-
tation
t my lords, a
mattersoerfitohuiss tkhiinndg, to disappoint
isa n publicrn
a
to-
wards the officer in command. I Rill venture to say
that, while I do not question the right of a First Lord of
the Admiralty—whether he thinks tit to state the grounds
of the proceeding or not—to direct an officer to haul down
his flag I do think it is proper that the feelings of an offi-
cer so directed to give up his command should be to the
last extent carefully considered and consulted --(hear,
hear)—and Ido deeply regret that Sir C. Napier is not
the only officer employed in the fleet who has had
reason to complain of the manner in which he has
been treated by the Admiralty. (Hear, hear.) I con-
sider it to be a public duty, my lords, to consult the
either to the: officer
feelings of ever
Well, so muwho is employed under the Crown.
to Gallipoli
:h for, the Baltic. But it was determined to
send an
to the Mediterranean—first to Malta, then to
the last two ind then to Constantinople. I do not object
oar
from
of the army to Malta, or from Malta
trench
at Gr°a7ll jaGr.allipoli to Constantinople. I think
cunistances then exi;
cumstancee of thre
it; were correct under the then cir-
. I think the formation of the in-
at 'Constantinople irava g was requisite under the circum-
when these troops arrived
emaernritt4tootnakea
uponthe war which was then
general
orali:ov7
ea:let ofrlif her Majesty's Govern.
well as upon the banks a the the Black Sea, in Asia, as
moment the war in Asia, -which it,tibe- At the present
that upon the banks of' the Daim-ara°st as important as
been altogether