The Sun.
London, England, 1855-01-24 00:00:00

VIE WAR DEPARTMENT AND THE
ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

Lord Grey gave notice last night of his intention to
en eve an address to the Crown on Tuesday next upon a
sai:ject which is at this time of the very highest conse-
queoce, for it lies at the root of all the failures of our mi-
tary administration. Our readers will probably remem-
zer th.at very early in the last session of Parliament, and
when the war was,stillundeclared, we urged most
strongly on the Government and the country the
lieeperativt: necessity of a complete reform in the civil de-
of the army, introducing unity instead of di-
TlP,:tiogienn,and direct responsibility instead of endless con-
tusion. 'We showed that success in war depended far
more on skill in military administrrtion than on any
other quality, for the bravest troops in the world cannot
triumph unless they have ample means of locomotion
and of transport, with continual supplies of clothing,
stores, and food. We added that in this country it was,
jig 'natters now stood, extremely difficult to accom-
plish these essential objects, because the division of the
civil and military departments of the army under six or
seven distinct heads rendered it impossible to work the
machine ; and we predicted that, if the attempt was
made to carry on extensive military operations in
the field without a radical change at home, the re-
sult would be a failure, That result has come in a
form even more rapid and disastrous than we bad
anticipated ; but, though we readily acquit men of not
baying accomplished impossibilities, we retain the con-
viction that the Government committed a fatal error last
spring in not proceeding at once to as entire reorgan-
iaation and union of the civil departments of the army.
These views were energetically presented to the House
of Lords by Lord Grey ; they were known to be enter-
tained by Lord Panmure, by Mr. Ellice, and by all
those persons who had any practical knowledge of the
subject ; and at length Parliament was called upon to
vote the necessary estimate for an additional Secretary
of State to take charge of the War Department.
There appears to have been in this transaction either
a great misunderstanding or great insincerity. It was,
indeed, obvious that when the Secretary of State for
War found himself charged with the moist laborious
department in the Government he could not continue to
administer the Colonial dependencies of the British
Crown in both hemispheres. That point was conceded
and on that alone the separation of the offices was car-
ried into effect. The Duke of Newcastle was allowed
to take his choice between the two departments ;
unfortunately for himself and for the country, he took
that of War ; and his colleagues unwisely con-
sented to giie it him, instead of placing the seals
of that department in the hands of the Minister
who was recommended to them by the unanimous voice
of the nation. But this was a very small part of the
change we had contended for, and which the state of the
army required. Instead of simplifying the administra-
tive machine, it added another wheel to it. The sepa-
ration of the Secretary at War from the Secretary of State
for War was retained ; the Ordnance, the Treasury, the
Horse Guards, the Home-office, all continued to con-
duct their fraction of military affairs ; and when Parlia-
ment calls for an account of the administration of the
army, it will be found impossible to unravel the truth
Out of this labyrinth of offices, boards, and irresponsible
public servants. The evil is the more unpardonable
because it bad been foreseen. Numerous instances had
been produced of the scandalous delays aad absurd
mistakes arising out of the perpetual references to dif-
ferent branches of the same service even in time of peace.
What must these evils become when a large force was
suddenly sent out to take the field at a great distance
from home, in a barbarous country, and with little
experience of administration or of war! To take,
for instance, the most striking example. It is said
that the Secretary at War is the Finance Minister
of the army. He is responsible to Parliament ior
the employment of the public money, and every
measure or order which involves expense mutt
have his assent. But what can be done without expense!
How is it possible for the Secretary of State to exercise
any real authority at all, if the means of payment are in
the hands of one office and the means of execution in two
or three others
The first condition of a good administration of the
civil departments of the army is to reduce them to one
bead, placing the power and tho responsibility in the
bands of one Minister. What is now termed "the War-
office" should at once be expanded into the office of the
Secretary of State and identified with it, the Secretary
at War receiving the seals of what is now the higher de-
partment. This was the plan fully discussed and agreed
to by Lord Howick's commission, and it is a reproach to
the Ministers who set their names to that document that
they never carried its recommendations into effect. War
has at last come upon ue. It has found us ill prepared
and prone to miscalculate onr real strength ; for, while
the external condition of the Queen's troops presented, as
it ever will, the aspect of one cf the finest armies in
Europe, our statesmen had neither the knowledge nor the
power to provide for the rapid evolutions and enormous
wants of such an army in active warfare. The next stepafter
the establishment of an effective Ministry of War, com-
prising under one head all the political duties of that office,
is to combine the administrative departments, which ought
to derive their authority from one responsible Minister,
being all subject to his immediate control. The de-
partment of stores and that of fortifications should he
separated from the Ordnance ; the Commissariat, the
Baggage Department, the Medical Staff, with the whole
system of military hospitals at home and abroad, and
the Militia, ought all to be brought within the control of
the War Secretary, leaving the Horse Guards and the
General Commanding-in-Chief to carry on that strictly
military portion of the administration of the army which
is a part of the Royal Prerogative. It is scarcely
credible to what extent the army has suffered by these
absurd divisions of duty and respnsibiiity. Eren the
Ministers of the Crown cannot obtain the commonest
information as to the condition of the forces without
applying to several distinct functionaries ; and every
order they give has to pass through the same ordeal.
In some cases men holding high official stations at home
have been allowed to go out to the Crimea without re-
signing their home appointments ; thus Lord Raglan
himself is at this vary moment Master-General of the
Ordnance, and continues to transmit orders in that ca-
pacity to his deputy in England as if he had time to
spare, in presence of the enemy, for the business of, a
semi-civil department at home.
The last 25 years have witnessed great and successful
reforms in almost all the institutions of this country.
We have reformed the House of Commons, we have
ameliorated the law, we have improved the Church, we
have reconstructed our whole colonial and commercial
system ; but that which up to this time has resisted all
reform is the administration of the army, partly because
the great man who retained the command of it till the
close of his life was an enemy to innovation, and partly
because the state of the army during peace did not ren-
der its defects apparent to the nation. The greatest and
most essential service that can be rendered at this time
to the country by any statesman is to accomplish this
great task. It requires a bold and comprehensive mind,
united to an indefatigable power of mastering details,
without which no man ought to touch military affairs.
It demands an absolute superiority to ell personal con-
siderations, and a determination to withstand unmoved
all the resistance of party and family influence, of pro-
fessional pretensions, and of official prejudices. It must
have the head awl the hand of a master, armed for a time
with almost dictatorial power. With less than this it
will be vain to undertake the reorganisation of the Bri-
tish army, for it would be impossible to accomplish it.
Yet the security and the honour of the country depend
on its accomplishment. We do not presume to assert
that we have a statesman among us at this time fully
qualified by character and by previous attainments to
perform this duty, though Lord Grey and Lord Ellen-
borough are the two men in whom we should be disposed
t place the largest amount of confidence for each a pur-
pose. But, be the state man chosen who ho may, we
are satisfied that if ho enters vigorously on the discharge
of such a duty he will deserve, and he will receive, the
cordial and atreuous support of Parliament, of the press,
and cf the people of England ; and that, without such
a statesman, able to grasp the whole functions of a War
Minister, no Cabinet can or ought to stand in the present
circumstances of Europe. These are our opinions—aot
formed hastily, or under the influence of the late dis-
asters in the Crimea, but deliberately expressed long
before the operations of war had begun. We urge them
now with tenfold force, because they are armed with all
the terrors of experience ; for the predictions of those
who distrusted the organization of the civil departments
of the army have been more than justified by the re-
sult. Every complaint we receive from the Crimea is a
protest against the system against which no Minister,
however laborious, and no General, however able, could
successfully contend ; and we trust that the first act of
the present session of Parliament will be to enforce a
radical reform of these abuses. —Times.

SPORTING INTELLIGENCE.

BETTING AT MANCHESTER-TU(IIIMAX.

The rooms were well attended to-day, and things in a
general way bore an animated appearance. It soon be-
came evident that there was a commission in the market
to back Rotherham for the Chester Cup, which soon
brought him to 25 to 1 (taken). The same odds were
taken about The Reiver, but 20 to 1 was in most in-
stances the highest offer against him. 50 to 1 each was
frequently asked for about Little Harry, Brown Brandy,
and Early Bird ; 40 to 1 was, however, the highest
offer. 12 to 1 would have been taken about GI-welling
Esuriens for the Derby, and De Clare was occasionally
put up," but we did not see him backed. We think 12
to 1 could have been obtained. 500 to 200 was offered
against Scott's Lot. 100 to 8 was offered on the field
for
the Liverpool Steeplechase, for which event the
weights have not yet appeared. Nothing was done
upon the Great Northern, Metropolitan, City and Su-
burban, or the Northampton Handicaps. The following
are the latest quotations :
LIVERPOOL STEBPLECHASE.
100 to Bon The Field (offered)
CHEST2R CUP.
25 to 1 agst The Eel ver (taken freely)
25 to 1 agst Rotherham (taken)
25 to 1 agst Arthur IVellesloy (offered)
40 to 1 agst Bracken (offered)
40 to 1 apt Little Hairy (take 50 to 1)
46) to 1 agst Brown Brandy (take 50 to 1)
40 to 1 agst Early Bird (take 50 to 1)
66 to 1 agst Virago (taken)
66 to 1 agst Muscovite (taken)
66 to 1 agst Kaffir (taken)
DEIBT.
15 to 2 aget St. Hubert (nominal)
11 to 1 agst Grmeulus (take 12 to 1)
13 to 1 agst De Clare (nominal)
30 to 1 agst Polydore (offered)
500 to 200 agst Scott's Lot (offered)