The National Register.
London, England, 1811-11-24 00:00:00

NATIONAI2 REGISTER.

statement,in whichhe acknowledges the death of 120
men, a number which, under all the circumstances of
the case, may be quadrupled without any disregard
of truth. The argument he employs to explain and
justify this failure, are too singular to be suffered to
pass unnoticed. Had not the report been trans-
mitted by him el the War Minister of NAroLEoN,
one might be induced to suppose that the following
passage had been penned on purpose to form a
charge of ignorance, neglect, or a wanton waste of
lives, against the new-fangled Marshal. 4, The
assault had failed," it says, 46 because the breach
vas in:a recess covered hy the fire of the enemy ; be-
cause it was too narrow ; because the troops de-
bouched from too great a distance ; and finally, be-
cause the battering train of three pieces of cannon
has inszSicient to level 14 parapets and drive the
enemy from the breach." We will ask whether these
excuses of the failure could not have been anti-
cipated ; especially by a Commander who has had
so much experience in sieges as SUCH ET ; and
whether, under such circumstances, an Officer, who
bad the least regard for humanity, would have sent
his troops to a certain death ? 46 After this tinfor-
twiet affair," continues the report, is a resolution
was adopted to erect a new battery nearer, to in-
crease the number of guns, and to push the covert
way to the foot of the breach." When these works,
svhieh ought to have been accomplished before any
attack was made, were beginning to play, General
ELANy, having previously collected the corps of
MAni, Commander-in-Chief in Murcia, and the
divisions of A LtILYERA nc VILLA CAMPO and Ostsro,
with the neighbouring guerillas, advanced at the
Lead of 20,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry, to raise
the siege of Saguntum.
There is no operation in war, of which the con-
sequences ought more serionsly and attentively to
be weighed and calculated, than an attempt at re-
lieving a besieged fortress or town, by a general
engagement in its vicinity. If it be done in the
expectation of effective co-operation on the part of
the besieged, or wier a view of compelling the
enemy to divide his force, it ought at the same
tune to be considered, that the very catastrophe
which the battle is intended to prevent, will, should
it be lost, be hastened ; whilst the army which, after
the reduction of the place, would otherwise have
been able to check the further advance of the con-
queror, is broken and dispirited, and obliged either
to give up the defence of the province, or to shut
itself up in the remaining strong places, where it
may be invested and taken in detail. Neither are
the advantages of attacking a besieging army in its
lines, as great as they are generally imagined.

SvcHET, is to leave a division to blockade the for-
tress, and to march with the rest against the re.
lieving force. Then, indeed, may the General who
makes this disposition expect a sortie on the part of
the garrison, which he seems to invite, as it is
impossible, if he wishes to contend with effect
against the advancing enemy, that he should leave
a sufficient number of troops behind to awe the be-
sieged. Then also may his opponent entertain req.
sonable hopes of success, especially if he be able to
draw him into action at a considerable distance from
the blockading division, so that the divided corps
can lend each other no assistance. But, for that
purpose, he ought only to alarm the besiegers Itv
his approach, to hover some days in their. vicinity,
threatening :t variety of points, and consequently
checking their operations, without coming so near
as to be compelled to fight a decisive battle in
sight of the place he wishes to relieve, unless every
effort to entice them away h .5 failed: for there
he will find his enemy strcee, and should
he be defeated, his disaster wit:. .-Ised by the
garrison, will, as in the preseet case, pro.
duce their immediate surrender. Here, toe,
should the besieging General adopt the tac,
tics of ancient times, and await the attack in his
lines, the chance of discomfiture runs strong against
the assailant. We will Must! ate this assertion hr
an instance from history. Alcsia being besieged by
the R omans, the Gauls, who had a great superimity
of numbers, resolved to attack them in their lines.
C-7.tiAlt gave orders to suffer them to advance, ami
when they were rushing into his purposely weakly
defended entrenchments gave orders to one of his
Li9ntenents to sally out and fall on them on one
side, whilst lie should attack them on the other.
The capture of twenty thousand of the Gauls with
their General, and the destruction of almost their
whole army proved the excellence of that plan,
which might, no doubt, be carried into effect in mo-
dern times with equal success.
Circumstances having induced General &Axe to
think the preservation of the fortress of Saguntum
an object, both within his ability to obtain, and
equal to the dangers of the undertaking, on the
2.5 th of October last he offered battle to the be-
sieging army on ground, which even from the re-
port of the enemy, the only document hitherto in
our possession, seems to have been most judiciously
chosen. During the first, and indeed, the greatest
part of the action, the advantage both in ma.
nceuvring and in fighting was evidently on the side
of the Spaniards. Marshal SUCUET was even com-
pelled, for once, to do justice to their valour. He
begins by acknowledging that their first onset
" convinced him" that he had to contend with

the, advantages of attacking a besieging army in it; ! pellea, tor once, to uv juaut‘..a. ...... ......... . --- ___
lines, as great as they are generally imagined. 1 begins by acknowledging that their first onset
The modern practice followed in this instance by l 44 convinced him" that he had to contend with
. ~,,, . ip. ..... _ ........00.- . . .