The Sun.
London, England, 1855-08-09 00:00:00

y //-
e

. .
. . .
/17.%
7i -
--- , C-.--
, .
. .
. .
—,..,
- .
..-.:.:... .
N 1:-;;;"4"))1'; ~ ,
/ , &
- i
- •
~,,_ „ uhn+•
. ~,,
~,,,,„.„, av •br - ::-.-', ,ilik
et ' —lit -,,,,i xr• e
‘...::. ..,:.
.. P
I .y.,,
i.,:: ~
,
~..,
-..„.„...... •.f. 'r, -
' '.e,...z.;',..0,t-/ • ,'' '
--4004,"t1i
. ~... . . n.„0., .
• t.„.. ....._.:.;,/e*. ~,lAN
,- ..-:-..." ~,':/iY.,,044-44,
. _
..:,--,_._ ~411' cg'.. ': ..4,04,74.;
:. '''- .....,:,/
~ ~ 6?-_, \1.414/4kr.,...
;''''' - 20, -4*CAl.i's* 011 '.if '-'- Ail f'‘
-5.. -_
cit,--<•§) Ar : .11.. ..,..-ig,,-
_
. .

[PRICE 4D- STAMPED SD•

PROGRESS OF TIIE WAR. ,

The session is about to close this year, as it did last
year, at a crisis of expectation. Then it was the land-
ing in the Crimea—now it is the assault of Sebastopol,
which every member of Parliament will hope to read in
the papers at every hotel he comes to in his tour. Thus
a twelvemonth bas pamed, and only one step in the
,ffair7- the mere landing—been achieved. Certainly
his makes great demands on the faith of the distant
spectator, for it must be said the spectacle is one that
could never have been believed did we not see it, and
what we see is wholly unaccountable. Here is the
largest, the grandest, the most perfect, the most costly
instrument of war that was ever made by mortal man—
more than 200,000 men, the very best soldiers in the
world, with the finest navies, the quickest maritime
transport, the most inexhaustible treasuries, the greatest
skill, energy, and enterprise ; the most copious variety
of mechanical means—even thing, in fact, that con-
' tributes to success either in peace or in war. We occupy
an impregnable position, excellent ports, ready commu-
nications, abundant markets, and all only a fortnight
from our arsenals, and only a second of time from our
head-quarters at home. What more is wanting ? What
is there that the two nations will not give to overflowing
on the mere hint that it may be required ? Let the
Minister of War say what he wants—nay, let him only
order it from the proper departments, and he can have
it—larger arms or smaller arms, 18-inch mortars or
Colt's revolvers, diving-bells or balloons, " navvies"
or horses, marching tents or winter houses, infernal ma-
chines or summer clothes—anything whatever that he
nay require. If his own powers are insufficient, if his
department is not quite comprehensive enough, if the
various branches of the public service are not yet suffi-
ciently in accord, we believe that Lord Panmure has only
to breathe his wishes, and they will be complied with.
Lieut.-General Simpson is now Commander-in-Chief.
Has he all the powers necessary to a vigorous prosecu-
tion of the wart Can he employ as he pleases every
man and every material sent to the war? If he has not
this power, does he perceive the want of it ! Such is
the feeling of the British people on this point, and so
thoroughly are they aware that this is a race with Rus-
sia, and that the quickest will win, that there is no sacri-
fice they will not freely undergo to push on the war. It
is not unreasonable to expect some early sign of success
when such means ate employed. The armies with which
Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and even Napoleon con-
quered wherever they came fell short in all respects of
the aggregate force of the Allies in the Crimea. Take
it all in all there never was such an army, and never did
army enjoy such facilities and resources.
What, then, is wanting ? One thing, it must be con-
fessed, is wanting—that is, the one head that animates
the foe. We are four different nations, and, though two
of them are content to be subordinate in the plan of opera-
tions, and the two chief actors are on the best possible
terms, yet the simple fact of their having different points
of attack is itself a source of weakness. We should feel
much more comfortable if any distinguished engineer or
authority, in either the British or the French army,
soul I assure us that the present plan of combined opera-
tions is just such as would be adopted by one army
under one head. There was a want of co-operation on
the unfortunate 18th, and even now it is said by
some on the spot that the conventional idea of two
-eparate attacks interferes with the success of either.
The French have pushed their trenches so much nearer
than the British, and have exposed themselves to so
mach more loss th .rehy, that it is impossible to speak of
them without the greatest respect ; but is it true, as we
hear from the spot, that they have only to turn the
,guns of the Mame! ,n on the Redao and they can make
it untenable! If this be so, it is difficult to see the pur-
pose of our works in front of the Redan ; or, if they be
necessary, it is difficult to see how they cannot be vastly
expedited at this moment by a constant fire from the
Nlamelon. What stands in the way but the military
fiction of two attacks ? Again, it is said that we are
short of men. Is it possible that there can be a want of
men for the siege of a suburb, ashen the besiegers amount
to 200,000 I We have the Turks and the Sardinians at
our disposal. If the men are not fairly distributed
according to the need at each point of the operations,
this only betrays the fatal defect,—the want of one
head—that is, of one army. Surely this can be rectified.
It is only a matter of arrangement. What makes the
case more flagrant is, that while portions of the allied
army have been always overtasked, other portions base
had nothing to do. There is no want of energy and
talent, but it is not employed. While we write we are
rejoiced to hear that Omer Pasha is at length released
from inactivity, and leaves the Crimea for Asia, where
he is certainly wanted. The Turkish Contingent, it is
said, goes to Eupatoria, but what to do there we know
not.

But there is another want of co-operation still more
fatal to success than the etiquettes and imaginary lines
that divide allied armies. We are still several armies in
our own selves. There is still the Horse Guards, still
the Ordnance, still the Admiralty, which pull together
even less than armies of different tongues. We want
men in our approaches ; we get on slowly with our sap
and our batteries, and expose ourselves to the censure
of the French engineers by being, as they say, behind-
hand. To meet the want we have employed sailors and
marines, a thousand or two ; but we are assured that
the fleet could easily all this time have lent us 6,000 with-
out interfering with any naval operation. If this aid has
been required and refused, then it cannot be said that
we are one army even among our ouselves. Up to the
very last we have been assured that the ordnance has been
utterly deficient, and that the Russians dominate over us
from mere superiority of metal. We have to encounter
OS-pounders, and, to all appearance, an inexhaustible
supply of them. All our own guns, it is said, are worn
nut, while the Russian guns seem ever new, and at every
point larger than ours. I-, is in vain that we construct
batteries of small guns in face of such pieces, well served,
as they have always been. Frequently we have been
obliged to give up our batteries almost as soon as we
have put them to the proof ; or we have lost many days
ie the attempt to strengthen them, or change them from
gun to mortar batteries, when they would answer one
purpose as little as the other. Yet surely there can be
no lack of the largest guns in the fleet, which could soon
recruit its metal from our stores at home. Any how, by
this time there ought to be no lack of material of all
kinds at the camp. If we have not as ninny British
soldiers as we could desire, we have iron, and we have
machinery, and we have men enough ready to work hard
at home. One great maxim in war, as in other affair-,,
is to make up with what we have for what we have not.
It is not, indeed, to be expected that all nations should
have everything, and all they can do is to apply their
peculiar resources so as t command all they want.
Rave we everything we want for the siege ? If we have
it, and it is withheld by the jealousy of departments or
the forms of office—if our Artillery is too proud to com-
p':ai❑ and ask assistance, and if the other services will
not come forward till they are invited, and scarcely
then, then, in fact, there is a war of departments as
well as of nations, and we are our own worst
enemies. There is nothing unreasonable, certainly
nothing factious or traitorous, in these inquiries. But
a few days remain for legislative action, if it be neces-
sary, or for official explanations, if they are to be vouch-
safed us ; and we are anxious once more to rouse the
vigilance of Ministers before the curtain falls on the
session.—Times.