The Sun.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

THE MISMANAGEMENT OF THE WAIL.
(From the Times of this day.)

The last official accounts from the Crimea happily confirm
the previous statements, that the rigour of the winter is
already past, that the health and condition of the allied armies
are improving, that supplies of all kinds are abundant, and
that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert have under their
command an effective army of at least 100,000 men, inured
to the perils of war by the hardships they have surmounted,
aid ready to execute with the utmost gallantry any operations
in which they may be engaged. Thus far, our confidence in
the strength of the allied forces and in their ability to enter
upon a fresh campaign is revived ; but, on the other hand, we
are led to consider with increasing solicitude the nature of the
enterprise they are carrying on, and the apparent absence of
that vigour and promptitude of command which is indispen-
sable to success. What are the strategical plans of the gene-
rals commanding these armies ? What are the prospects of
bringing to a prosperous result the operations of the siege ?
What means are they prepared to adopt in order to encoun-
ter and defeat the vast and varied resources which the enemy,
vith indefatigable eaergy and treat skill, is ready to turn
igainst us I To these questions we may be told that no
answer can be given until we learn the results of the
resolutions taken by the last council of war. But
we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that no indication has
yet been given of any connected system of action, that
the invention and originality of resource displayed in this
Siege have hitherto been altogether on the side of the Rus-
sians, and that some considerable portion of an interval of
time which is absolutely irretrievable and invaluable to the
Allied armies has already escaped without a single blow being
struck.

Let us first consider this state of things with reference to
the siege, properly so called, of Sebastopol. It is known,
from the attack made by the French on the night of the 23d
of February, and from the despatch of General Canrobert of
the 17th of March, that the Russians have succeeded in estab-
lishing themselves in positions between our own lines and the
original outworks of the town. The General speaks of "an
attack directed on the 14th of March against a first line of
Russian ambuscades at the parallel opened before the hillock
.on which the Russians have established their new work in
front of the Malakhoff Tower." This hillock or mamelon,
.which is, we 'believe, the same known by our men as Gor-
don's-hill, has now become one of the principal objects of the
French attack, but no impression has yet been made upon it,
although it effectually protects the Malakhoff Tower behind
it. In fact, in this extraordinary siege the common order
of things is inverted, for, instead of the besieging army
working up to the walls of the tows by roguiar
preaches, in this case we find the besieged garrison throw-
ing out fresh works which bring them closer to our lines, and,
the space between the two antagonists is progressively nar-
rowed, not by our drawing nearer to the works of the enemy,
but by the enemy advancing his works to meet ours. Hence
the frequent postponements and difiappointments of the hope
that our fire would shortly open on some important front of
the place. On the other hand, it appears that one battery,
built by the French, but armed and manned by British troops,
has been,pushed forward so as to command a portion of the
great harbour, and one of the Russian steamers of war, the
Gromonossetz, has been sunk by our fire. From the extreme
proximity of the outposts, which are in some places within
200 yards, a constant fire is kept up by riflemen stationed in
pits for shelter, and the hand-to-hand combats of the French
with the garrison are frequent and murderous. This
is a state of things which cannot continue much
longer ; and, whether the plan of the assault be
persevered in or abandoned, nothing is to be gained
by a more protracted delay of that fire for which
such vast and laborious preparations have been made. The
next step in the operations must depend on the result of the
general bombardment ; but until that point is decided no-
thing else will be attempted. Let that be tried, since every-
thing is in readiness for it ; but, should the result prove less
complete than was at one time anticipated by the engineers
of the army, a totally different plan of operations must be
resorted to.

As the season is now returned at which an army in the
Crimea can take the field, we look with far greater confidence
to a judicious and enterprising plan of strategical movements
than to a persistence in the siege. The whole coast of the
Crimea is open to the conveyance of troops to any point by
the steam fleet. The distances from one place to another are
inconsiderable. The Turks, under Omer Pacha, already hold
one strong position on the flank of the Russians at Eupatoria.
Another corps d'arnyee might operate with the utmost
facility on their rear from Kaffa. to Kara-su ; and we are
wholly . unable to conceive the grounds on which an army
capable of conquering any force that can be brought to
meet in the field should remain penned up in au
intrenched camp which is literally beleaguered by the
enemy. That of all positions the least advantage-
eus and the most insecure. For, even if we suppose
that Sebastopol itself fell under our bombardment,
-until we have beaten the Russian army in the field we should
be unable to hold our conquest, and might be exposed to at-
tack from the 'hole force of the enemy outside the walls..
There is reason to believe that the 2d division of the Russian
army, under General Paniutin, is already on its march south
of Perekop, and it is impossible to doubt that large reinforce-
ments are on their way. The vital question for us is whether
the allied Generals can anticipate their arrival, and employ
with effect those short but decisive moments which mark the
opening of this campaign.
Public opinion and the energy of this nation were net un-
duly excited last autumn to urge upon the Government the
' necessity of reinforcing the army after the battle of Inkorman,
and of supplying those numerous deficiencies which had mani-
fested themselves in every branch of the service. The subse-
quent debates in Parliament, and the disclosures before the
Committee of Inquiry, have most fully ratified that appeal.
We do not flatter ourselves that public opinion can either dis-
cern or direct with unerring sagacity the complicated move-
ments of an army, depending, as they do, on a thousand
causes which are only known to the officers command-
ing on the spot. But this consideration reduces the
whole question to one of confidence in those officers.
The soldiers have, by common consent, done their
work nobly. They held the unarmed redoubt at Inkerman
against a myriad foes, they laboured through the winter in
the trenches. and the xettkrning_enrine..fipisthe..EUXivoZil,
for the generals of the Allied armies to direct this energy to
victory. They cannot expect to remain where they are.
"They cannot expect to succeed in' any operation of import-
ance by confining themselves within an intrenched camp.
'Nay, the very soil around the camp and the ports, infected
;by the continued presence of so large a body of men and the
sad remains below its surface, will drive us off as summer
advances with its pestilential exhalations. A stationary in-
vasion, and a siege in which the besiegers are more completely
invested than the garrison, are contradictions' in terms, and
every day we lose at this crisis will increase our difficulties
-hereafter. The situation in which the generals now find
themselves is precisely that which they had to anticipate
throughout the winter, and they ought therefore to be pre-
pared to meet it. Their aforesight, their vigour, and their
:resources are now upon their trial, and we cannot entirely
conceal our apprehensions that the same apathy or irresolu-
tion which left the army throughout the winter to struggle
against incalculable evils may defer till it be too late those
movements in the field which alone hold out a fair prospect of
ultimate success.

STATE OP PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
( From the Morning Herald of this day. )
Lord Ellenborough's review last night of the war policy of
the last and present Government, and of our position with
reference to the great question of the age, was marked by
that originality and power, and that command of the subject,
which he commonly brings to every discussion. "We had
at the commencement of this war," observed the noble lord,
with striking force, "an indulgent Parliament and an enthu-
siastic peeple ; we have now a discontented people and an in-
quiring Parliament ;" and with consummate ability he indi-
cated the causes which have induced this unhappy change,
and indicated with merciless distinctaess the authors of our
national calamities and embarrassments.

We shall not follow Lord Ellenborough in his bill of indict-
xnent—it is drawn up with a completeness which renders
comment superfluous—and if there be ono fact more generally
understood and recognised than another, it is, that under
existing management things must go from bad to worse, if
the state of affairs at home and abroad admits of degrees
England has never been engaged in a war in which the
people took from the first so great an interest as this ; from
the first it has been popular, and notwithstanding the sacri-
fices, the losses, and the management, popular it contines to
be. No Ministry ever undertook the conduct of a war under
auspices more favourable than the first Coalition. They had
the hearty support of Parliament and of the country; they
lad no factious difficulties to surmout—their course was
clear before them—at least as clear as any course can be to
clouded or warped intellects; they had ample time to obtain
the fullest information of the nature of the undertaking they
were about to engage in, and of the enemy they were about
to encounter; they slighted their opportunities—they have
made shipwreck of a splendid expedition, and have bequeathed
its remains to be the sport of their presumptuous successors.
The Parliament that was indulgent has naturally become in-
quiring—the popular enthusiasm has naturally changed to
moody discontent,
Lord Ellenborough complained of the length of the adjourn-
ment, and contrasted its duration with the trifling amount of
public business transacted since the commencement of the
session. His lordship seems to forget, however, that Lord
li Palmerston's Government is essentially a Government on suf-
ferance ; that every species of shift and manoeuvre is resorted
to, in order to prolong its precarious and shambling exist-
ence. Anything to gain time. The chapter of accidents is
the chapter of their -existence ; and, in the present aspect of
Europe a zreat many events may be pressed into sixteen
days. They have taken seven or eight clvo of grace, and
few will be found to deny that they stood in frightful need of
them.
There is one portion of Lord Ellenborongles speech which
we confess disagreeably surprises us. It is that which treats
of the purpose of the expedition to the Crimea, and its pro-
bable results. Our space does not permit us on this occasion
to traverse fully his lordship's opinions on this subject, but
we shall take an early opportunity of referring to them at
length. Lord Ellenborough is of opinion that the invasion
of the Crimea was from first to last a mistake ; that the allies
will never take Sebastopol ; that, even if they did, its posses-
sion would be impossible, and the razing of it absurd, with-
out an army of 100,000 men to occupy the isthmus and keep
the passes to the eastward. We answer, if Sebastopol be
not razed, the Russian supremacy in the Black Sea is undis-
turbed, and if undisturbed, we have gone to war and lost an
army literally for nothing. The maintenance of Sebastopol
as a great naval arsenal is essential to the extension of Rus-
sian power in the south—once reduced and dismantled, a
small force would easily prevent its reconstruction. Russia
knows this well, and therefore she makes a deadly stand
against the besieging armies. No man of Lord Ellenborough's
abilities can take up any view of a subject without investing
it with interest, if not with importance ; but we are quite
satisfied that Isis reasoning in this matter is fallacious, or that
it can only be maintained by denying ab initio the acknow-
edg ed object of our enterprise.

THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.
(Freon the Daily News of this day.)
According to our most recent communications from Vienna,
Lord John Russell is understood to see little or no prospect of
and to expect to be in England by the 14th
peace
We may add that some of the most sincere
of April. at present,
and in-
timate allies of Ministers express no regret at this state of
affairs, but, on the contrary, freely express their conviction
that any peace made now would be precarious and uncertain.
Respecting the course that will be puroied by Russia little
doubt seems to be felt in any quarter. How Austria will act
is a mere puzzling inquiry. M. Dronyn do l'Huys—at least
so says the .Ifoniteur—is to proceed immediately to Vienna.
On the other hand, we learnkom a reliable source that Count
Nesselrode is already on 1,1, way to that capital. When it is
deemed indispensable that the diplomatic champions of
France and Russia sbould have a personal rencontre iu the
lists at Vienna, matters may be said to look serious. Russia
must entertain a strong conviction that the wavering faith of
Austria is assailable ; France that its precious ally requires to
be narrowly watched. The ready concession by Russia of
those points which most affect the personal interests of Aus-
tria, and the confidence with whieh Russia leaves the garri-
sons of Poland to be occupied principally by its Asiatic troops,
had already pointed to the same conclusion.
nut, whatever COUTOO Austria may see fit to adopt, the war