The Express.
London, England, 1850-03-09 00:00:00

detailing the different and enoseesive increases that had
*been mode to our military and naval establishments. I I
allowed that from 1836 down to 1869, yen had
bad • eontinualeuccession of inotwasss areal military and I
naval establishments, to meet mean special exigessiss, such
es
the Oregon dispette—the Maine Boundary dispute—
M'Leod dispute--the Tahiti affair—the Syrian
bushier; and that when the exigencies which had
given nee to the hicresee of your establishments
had posited away, the expenditure, which bed been in-
creased to meet those exigencies, had never been reduced
again. (Hear, hear.) But we some to the discussion of this
subject now with the additional advantage of another yea's
experieace. We are another year further removed from
that great aisle in the affairs or Europe, which everybody
had expected was to lead to certain calamitous consequences
in the form of international war. Now, if there be one con-
soling feature in the picture, one drop to sweeten the cup
of gall that hes overspread Europe during the last two or
three years, it is this—that we have elicited from all that tur-
moil and convulsion the tact that there is not a disposition on
**part ef the great balk of the people of any nation to pass
their frontiers to make war upon • neighbouring testicle.
Alluding to the government colonial measure, Mr.
Cobden asked : Does the noble lord intend to stop
there? Are we to give to the colonies as complete an inde-
pendence, nay, more independence, than the states of the
American union possess, stereo they cannot dispose of an
acre of waste land, and have not the power to touch their
tariff—shall we give to our colonies that full measure of self-
government, and shall the pi opts of this country be called
upon, by the same prime minister who does all this for the
colonies, to pay the whale expense of the military police that
occupies those colonies? (Hear, hear.) I come before you
on this occasion, with reference to the maintenance of our
army, under totally different circumstances. I maintain that
it is utterly impossible for any minister—any minister
with • head upon his shoulders—aner declaring what
we have heard declared with reference to Australia, to the
Cape, to New Zeeland, and to Canada—to oontemplaui the
permanent charge upon the tax-payers of this country of
maintaining a military police in those colonies. (Hese,
hear.) For it is but a military police. In assuming
that you may make a considerable reduction in the
expenditure for your armaments, I fume assumed a
gradual withdrawing of your armies from those colonies to
which I have referred. (Hear.) DJ not let me be answered
by pointing to our enemas at Malta and Gibraltar, or by a
reference to Ceylon or Jamaica, or any of those colonies
where the aboriginal or the African race predominates. But
confining myself for the present to those touts, ries where
the English ram can become indigenous end where it pre-
ponderates—and I make no exception of New Zealand—
where the population are being civilised.-1 my you cannot
maintain toe charge you now place upon this country of pay-
ing for the military establishments in those places. Fee
what is the ob)jects Is it that the ade connection between
England and the colonies should be the expense of maintain-
ing those establishments? I know no other motive, except
it be to preserve the patronage ; and it will be for this house
if it fairly represents the people of thin country, to say that
the only reams for persisting in this anomaly, being that of
maintaining patronage in Downing-street, is not a good rea-
son for taxing the people of this country. In addi-
tion to the forces kept In toe colonies, there are the reliefs ne-
cessary at home, in order that those forces may have tneir
appointed times at home, and the number always ea the
ocean going srd coming for relief,—l believe not much
short of 20.000 men. That gives the means for a conside-
rable future reduction in the army. But I maintain that,
since 1833, you are in a different position with rospect to the
army that you require at home. First, with reference to the
means of transport. Why, you forget that since the opening
of railroads has linked the extremities of the kingdom
together, the same amount of troops gives you a vastly in-
creased power. (Hear, hear.) I have here a very interest-
ing evidence on that subject. General Gorden, Quarter.
master-General, stated in his evidence before the committee
on railways in 1814, " I ehou'd say that this mode of railway
conveyance has enabled the army (comparatively to tee de-
man-is made upon it a very small one) to do the woe kof a very
large one ; you send • battalion of 1,000 men from London
to hlanchester in nine hours ; that same battalion marching
would t.ke seventeen day.; and they arrive at the end of
nine hours just as fresh, or nearly so, as when they started."
What have individuals cone in consequence of redraw:et
They have adapted their circumstances so as to profit by
this quick communication. Men of business, for austanee,
habitually keep smaller necks of goods, because Vey can
sooner renew their impolite. (Hear, hear.) Last year, in
the committee on the ordnance estimates, we applied the
same principle. We found that enormous sti res were kept
in London, and also scattered over several parts of the
wintery ; and we recommended the goverment to avail
itself of the facilities of the railways, as private individuals
do, and keep smaller stocks is store and fewer eetabliso-
, meets. Since 1835 you have very largely increased your
forces in other ways. For instance, you have 14,800
out-p.usioners enrolled; you have 9,200 dock-yard men
enrolled in battalions, and drilled to use both lino and

small arms ; you have 2,500 or 3,010 of the county noun"-
tulery. Here is en increase of 26,000 annul men, to which
may ne added 6.000 tor the increase of the constabularybulary in
behind once 183.5. That was an inctease of 33,000 since
1835, and it formed an additional ground why there
should h.; a gradual reduction in oar armed force.
(Hear, hear.) Now take the cue of Ireland.
Ireland had been always the unhappy excuse for keeping up
a loge army at home. (Item% boar.) Ireland is now :yen-
ta, and by pacing moon measures fur her, and giving her a
representative system and teethe' ions like our own, ynn
would do morn than 12 regiments to :ems the peace there.
(11,m, hear.) Ireland wee never before Kt free irsm pulitbal
excitement and organisation es she was at present. bite
is now brought within a day's journey of L union, and I
trust that she will not be treated in future in any respect
like a cor quered province. (Hear, hear.) You have 2.5,000
troops in inland—that was the am:unt last year, according
to the statement of the Secretarrat•War ; you had an in-
crease of 5,000, or 7,000, in the constabulary ; ,you had an
increase of 6,000 pensioners. (Hear, hew.) You bad
therefore in Ireland an armed force of 35,000 or
37,000 men at the present time; but in 1833 you
had not more than 17,000 or 18,600 of all ranks. (Hear.)
You propene to reduce 1,800 rank and file, but I can see
no correspooding redaction in the number of officers.
(Hear, hear.) I hoped to see the withdrawal of
a major or one or two captains, but I find their number is
just as greet now as it was before. (Hear.) Independently
of the reduction in the number of men, you might effect
considerable economy by a different organisation of the
army. Is did not require a military man to know that. Is
your cavalry regiments, in particular, a change is required,
because they are the lauthingttock of Europe. I
asked a distinguished military man, et present in London,
who occupied a high grade in the service of Austria, and
acquired some celebrity in the war in Hungary, to kok over
the army estimates with me and to see Low differently
they manage these things with us and in Austria. I
believe the Austrian system does not differ much from
that of France and Prussia. Well, when I chewed
him the estimates end told him how we manag,d,
he laughed outright at the force of our cavalry reed
meats and the number of officers. (Hoer, hear.) The
organisation of the Austrian regiments is t this:—
, The light cavalry of Austria, comp .g lancers, humane,
land light horse, have in time of peace bsquadrons of 180
, men each, or 1,440 men ; end in war, of about 200 men.
Each regiment has 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors,
8 captains of first rank, 8 captains of second rank, 16 lieute-
nants of first rank, 16 lieuteniutte of second rank ; total, 62.
The dragoons ants mummers are organised in the same man-
ner as the light cavalry, with the exception that them are
only 6 squadrons and hut 1 colcnel end 1 major. This gave
one efflcer for every 28 men. (hear.) Now in the Begtish
guards there are 32 officers to 3,51 men, or one cfficer to
every 11 men. (Hear, hear.) In the cavalry regiments of
the line there am 27 officers in a regiment of 328 men, or
one officer to every 12 men. (Hear.) The result to
which we came was this, that it you put two English regiments
into one with only half the present Lumber of officen, you
would have still 20 per cent. more officers in an
English regiment than in an Austrian one. Now,
with regard to the navy, it has increased to a very
large extent sines 1835. It has inweased from 4,000,0001.
to 6,942,0001. (Hear, hear) Now, I say there is no
thing in the state of affairs in Europe which should deter us
from contemplating a gradual reduction in our marine
forces. And here, again, I have to complain that the
organisation of our navy is formed, not with regard to the
*tenets of the commerce of the country, but has
been made subservient to high patronage—(bear, hear)—
because, if you compare it with the navy of the United
States—and no person will say that we would do wrong in
comparing ourselves with the United States in marine
matters—you will find that the United States have only one
hue-of battle ship on sea ; but wherever their commerce is
extended—and it extends over many oceans end seas—oar
will find small vessels of war. (Hear, bear.) Thus they
make their navy answer that purpose which a navy shoed
answer is time of peace—that of a police force for their
mercantile marine. (Hear.) Bat we keep an enormous
number of line-of-battle ships at sea which ere not of the
least nee es a police or safeguard of commerce. (Hear, hear.)
As to the idea of their looking after pirates, for instance, yen
might as well think of getting field batteries to run after
pickpockets in the courts and alleysof London. (" Hear," and
laughter.) Last year I sat upon a committee which inquired
iota the practicability of using all our steam mewls—all one
merchant steam vessels—as a means of national defence. We
stated in our report that it was practicable to call into use an
immense amount of steam power which may be made avail-
able in cam of necessity. We stated that 108 skewers of
400 tons burden and upwards, of which there were 36 of
more than 1,000 tons, could be made available for national
defence at a few Weeks' notice, and that there were 700 or
800 vessels altogether, on every one of which some kind of
'ornament could be placed in cue of necessity. (Hear.) In six
weeks time the larger vessels could he fitted as war stamen,
and a large weight of guns could be placed on bond of them,
in case of any sudden emergency or hostility. (Hear, hear.)
In the present state of the navy as of the army I Dee reasons
why you may diminish your expenditure. Ido not think
your tied in the blettiteeranean is of say use or credit to you
at the present mom nt. (Hear, hear.) I think those great
line of battle ships now in the port of the Pirceus, would be
much better employed if laid op in ordinary or in the Meeks
—(ben, hear)—because as long as yen keep In mm4llllooB,
in time of peace, these enormous armaments, you will fled
*disposition, either on the part of the government, or f the
Ferema fleeretery, or of the Admiralty, to employ them in
Mime way or other, in order to have an excuse for renewing
IYe estimates at the year's end. (Hear.) How differently
Ow government of the United States acted. They acted in
a manner which ought to be a lesson to us. They never
anted themselves to the teeth in time of pesos in order to
frighten foreign governments, for they knew that foreign
governments wou:d give them credit fur the latent strength
which they possessed, and that they would never be es.
crotched upon whilst they had such power in mem.
(Hear) Our policy, on the contrary, has been founded at
the euppoeiUon that foreign governments would not give se
credit for strength unless we kept a great number of Hag Of