The Northern Daily Times.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1856-06-21 00:00:00

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In the Court of Common Pleas, at Westminster, two
important
questions affecting railway companies,and their
obligations to the public, came before the judges sitting
in banco. These were the 'cases of Simon v. the Great
Western Railway Company, and the case .cif Dunham v. the
London and North Western' Railway
.Company. The first of
these caused was an action against the Great Western
Railway Co., for damage done to a quantity of furniture
conveyed by them to Taunton, whicn they so negligently
carried that it was damaged and broken. The defendants
pleaded a number of pleas, among others that the furni-
ture was insufficiently packed; and the third plea was,
that a special agreement had been entered into, by which
the defendants were not to be answerable for loss or
damage, however caused. The question came before the
court on demurrer. For the pla.intiiff it was contended
t hat such a special contract as that insisted on, by notice,
was void under the Railtvay and Canals Traffic Act (17
and 18 Victoria, c. 31, s. 7), unless in writing signed by
the parties.
The second case was an appeal from the decision of the
County Court Judge of Liverpool. An action was brought
by the plaintiff for damage done to three crates of meat,
sent from Liverpool to London, which was spoiled from
not being forwarded within a reasonable time. The plain-
tiff had signed a note, which purported that the carriage
should be at the owner's risk. The company relied upon
the special contract as being signed and within the pro-
vision of the Railway and Canals Traffic Act, and exone-
rating them from responsibility. The County Court
Judge decided against them, and gave damages to the
plaintiff under one of the provisoes of the 7th section,—
that nothing in the statute should be construed to prevent
railway companies from making such conditions with re-
spect to the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of goods,
&e., " as shall be adjudged by th court or judge, before
whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be
just and reasonable.''
The Chief-justice, in delivering judgment, said it seemed
to him that in this case the intention of the Legislature
was to place the whole railway syStem under the control
of the courts. The previous section, of the statute referred
to gave large powers to the Court of Common Pleas, but
there were various questions which might arise with
reference to what was at the time of the passing of the
statute greatly complained of—namely, special contracts
resulting -from notices, which prevented parties from
recovering for loss or damage of goods, when, in truth,
they were boned by the monopoly of railway companies
to carry by no other way. The fair meaning of the sec-
tion was this :sln the first place it declares that all notices
shall be null and, void, in so far as they go to relieve the
company from responsibility, but that shall not prevent
conditions being made between the company and the party,
but which conditions shall_be adjudged to be reasonable
by the court; and then, in order to make such conditions
binding, they must be signed by the party. The section,
therefore, would run thus : General notices limiting lia-
bility shall be null andvoid ; but parties may make special
contracts provided they be adjudged just and reasonable
and where on the one nand you complain that you are
compelled to make special contracts, on the other the
Legislature will give them the security of the courts that
the contract made is just and reasonable. Apply that
rule as to the first case brought before the court, and the
court thought the fourth plea, as to the mileage, just and
reasonable; and that the third plea was bad, because it
sought to relieve the company from responsibility for the
loss of goods by reason of insufficient package, which was
an insufficient answer if the whole package was lost.
With respect to the second case the same construction
would apply. But, in order to ascertain whether the
contract was just and reasonable, the court must have
better materials to judge of the facts. As to the first
case, the judgment would be for the plaintiff on the third
plea and for the defendant on the fourth plea. As to the
second case, it must be sent down again for better infor-
mation. Judgment accordingly.

PORTING INTELLIGENCE