The Express.
London, England, 1861-08-14 00:00:00

TO OUR RILU)ERS.

SPORTING INTELLIG F-NC

A !Ate edition of the Express published every
evening during the racing season, containing the
results of the lay's races.

H 'grows has been defined as philosophy teaching
by example, and the contemporary narrative of
events in another country is sometimes of advan•
tage to us not inferior to what history yields.
With minds sufficiently removed from the scene,
and sufficiently unbiassed by the interests in dis-
pute, we may cull wisdom from the errors of our
brethren, as well as from those of our fathers. So
there are probably few on whose ears the news of
the Northern disaster at Bull's Run did not fall
as a warning not inapplicable to ourselves in regard
to the reliance due to a Volunteer Army, such as
for the last two years we have been so busily en-
gaged in organising. As the later accounts have
given shape and colour to the first hasty outlines,
we have seen more distinctly the precise points on
which such warning is useful. It has, indeed,
been given in the gentlest form. A pitched
battle, lasting for a whole day, resulting in
the utter rout, not of the vanquished, but
of the victors, it has yet not been
a decisive battle. The loss has been trifling, and
there has been ample time allowed to make it
good, to strengthen the defence, and to renew the
preparations for attack. Such results must not
be usually hoped filer such defeats. They have
followed in this instance because both armies were
in the main made up of Volunteers. Had General
BEA UREA:ASIA forces been the trained veterans
of a great military power, it is beyond doubt that
the capital would have been in his hands within
twelve hours after the first Northern Volunteer
turned his back. Had his camp been supplied, as
the camp of such a power would be, with the due
proportion of each arm of the service ; had he
possessed the means of rapid and safe advance which
every regular army possesses, it is all but certain
that scarce a regiment opposed to him would
have escaped. We are, therefore, to take this
first great Volunteer battle as no type of the power
of Volunteers to withstand the shock of a tho-
roughly equipped invading army. But while the
consequences of Volunteer failings have been in this
case infinitely less momentous than in otheir cir-
cumstances they would be, we may usefully exa-
mine their nature with a view to discover to what
extent our own Volunteers might be liable to fall
into like misfortunes.

Now, in the first place, we must dismiss en-
tirely any notion that the flight from Manassas
to Washington was • proof of inferiority to our-
selves in mere courage. The troops which fled
had fought as gallantly as any could do under the
burning sun of a long summer's day. They were
in truth of our own blood, and we cannot afford
the confession that beneath another sky we lose
our British valour. Nor with the knowledge how
French and Irish and Highland regiments fight,
can we admit that the infusion of the Celtic ele-
ment in the American race, while it may contri-
bute something of braggadocio to their language,
takes away aught of reckless daring from their
deeds. Behind the Eton of the quick-beating Celtic
blood there lies enough of Teutonic stubbornness
to make American soldiers equal to those of any
land. Nor in the second place must we lay too
much stress upon their rawness under arms. The
rifle is far more of a national weapon in the States
than it has yet become in England. If from
the towns came some to whom its use
was unfamiliar, they were mixed up with
those in whose hands it had been since infancy.
So, too, in regard to drill we must remember that
the bulk of the forces engaged had been throe
months enrolled, and wu must consider whether
a steady military life for three months is not more
than equal to a couple of years during which one
or two hours per week are devoted to instruction.
Eliminating then these considerations, let us look
what were the real circumstances which led to the
defeat of the Northern army.

They seem to have been twofold. Firstly,
there was the independence of judgment which is
characteristic of Volunteer troops. This was
notably exemplified in the way in which they dis-
banded themselves when their three months' enrol-
ment had expired. We cannot doubt that, had
they believed there was a real and pressing
need for their services, they would have remained
under arms with the same alacrity with
which they sprang to arms at the l'itraturres
1113(111110111. But in their judgment there was no
reason why they should be under arms at that
particular moment, and accordingly they took a
furlough. They knew that Washington was safe
—they saw no particular danger to be feared
from the opposing army—and the event has
proved that they wen right. It seemed to them
that autumn would be time enough to drive the
enemy out of Virginia, and in that opinion it
appears th►t the Commander-in-Chief coincided
with them. In the meantime they had their homes
and their families to see, their harvests to gather,
their hasty domestic arrangements to complete.
So they departed, severing that in a few weeks
they meant to return, and thus it happened
that at a critical moment a general found himself
without an army. They did exactly what the
Highland forces of the Paerstrunt did before
Slwriffinuir and Culloden ; exactly what the Gan-
baldian forces did after the Volturno and before
Gaeta. Eking under no obligation to stay, and
seeing no mama why they should stay sulkiest
to satisfy their judgment that their stay was
necessary, they exercised their right to take lean
of absence. This and no more is the explanation
of their disbanding in presence of the enemy, and
it can only be met by the same means which the
King of ITALY found it necessary to apply to the
gallant :arilmildiana, whose courage and whose
patriotism had been put to thorough proof. It is