The Express.
London, England, 1857-11-02 00:00:00

dominions stn's' general quite u

prosperous ea thoseemader oar ioinselpatiffeeff-- The
two principal exceptions have been Oxide and the
Niz tu's territory; and in these the cease of misgo-
vernment is obvious. The Princes relied confidently

on the support of a soldiery in British pay against
any insurrectionary movements provoked by their
own epprtesion. The influence of the superior
European civilisation is neared to the subjects of
native States by the emulation of their Princes;
and the existence of an actually reigning clams among
the natives prevents Europeans from regarding them
as an inferior clan, and dealing with them accord-
ingly—themaelvss Gem feeling that they are
an inferior clam, and submitting to be treated
se such. Nor do the natives alone bene-
fit by the maintenance of the native States.
Bad Bengal, Behar, and the North-Western
Previa' ego been more thickly studded with native
soverelgoties, the military elan among the natives
would not have learned so easily to regard them-
"elves as a nation—aa the nation. Our Prtetorians
would not have been so unanimous in their Mutiny.
Nay more, in our effort, to suppress the Mutiny we
should not have been exposed to the same difficul-
ties in respect to our commissariat and transport
arrangements es it is likely we shall be. English
officers have borne witness that between the Pun-
janb and Delhi it would have been impos-
sible to obtain supplies, or bring up our
siege trains, but for the saaistance of the
Jheend and Putealah Rajahs. Their treasuries
had not been looted by mutineers, and they lent
their money freely to help us in our need. Their com•
mand of the local means of conveyance is permanently
superior to ours, and they helped us to drag our
heavy guns and their appurtenances through the
deep Asada al the region they occupy.

The moral to be drawn from these considerations
is, that after the suppression of the mutiny, or re-
volt—call it which you will—there must be no " an-
" mastless." Even though a few great landholders,
or even Princes, should be found to have been im-
plicated, it will be wise to abstain from confiscation
and appropriation of their territories. If any such
persons have acted hostilely to us, let their territories
be given to some member of their family who has not
been compromised; or, if none such as be found, to
some neighbouring P rince ; but let us carefully eschew
taking possession of them ourselves. Nay, it might
be well to go further in our renunciation of the fatal
annexation policy, and even restore some territories
which we have already annexed. We have no desire
to see so large a State as Oude re-established in
the centre of our dominions, more especially on such
conditions an those which encouraged the ex-dynasty
to misgovern it; but keeping in view the aversion
of the inhabitants to direct English rale, we think
claimants to portions of it, with feasible titles, might
be found who could administer it more beneficially
far all parties than we can do. The annexation
policy has in some cases, no doubt, lad its origin in
no undue hut of aggrandisement, or territorial ex-
tendon, but simply in a narrow-minded bureaucratic
love of centralisation. It has, however, shaken the

confidence of the natives of India in our good faith,
and like all centralisation it has weakened, instead
of strengthening, the hands of Government for good.
It ought to be renounced at once and for ever.

In these [smirks we have confined ourselves to
the policy of annexation. We have &raided, for
the present, the question of its morality, because we
wish to avoid angry discussions with the advocates
of the practice. If, however, say of them are de-
sirous of entering upon this branch of the question,
we are ready to meet them. We have no hesitation
in avowing oar conviction, that some recent cases of
annexation have been most disgraceful to the Anglo-
Indian 001 ernmen t.

Lit it bat be whispered, as a piece of exclusive
informstion, amongst • knot of Parisian speculators,
that the French Government are about to issue a
Report OW the State of the National Finances, and
the entire audience will rush in frantic haste to the
Bourse to " operate for the rise," as the phrase runs.
The curious part of the matter is that no one will
think of stopping to sok what the Report of the
lattelsien of FII4ANCZ will say. To ask such a
question. indeed, would merely provoke • smile at
the simplicity of the interrogator, it being always
sastuned, as • matter of course, that the Mt-
myna, in his financial picture, will confine him-
self exclusively to tints of the most roseate
hue. But this state of things has really
its inconveniences. When the public know
that the Financial Report will betray a constant en-
deavour to put the best possible face upon every
point referred to, and that it will studiously evade
all but the most meagre reference to adverse features,
the power of such a document to instil confidence is
greatly diminished ; for no one cares about • review
which is notoriously one-aided. Of course, nobody
doubts for a moment the skill of the financial essay-
ist; every one feels perfectly convinced that the
accounts of the nation will be—we will not say
" cooked," but, presented in the form most grati-
fying to all persons of an optimist turn of mind,
as well as to all who can admire and relish
really clever manipulation. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the reflecting public want something more thou
this ; and hence the melancholy flatness into which
the effects of these periodical Financial Reports imme-
diately subside. The momentary applause which is
got op amongst the official elogissura in the press and
in financial circles counts for nothing, in the absence
of any genuine response from the public, for whose
ediflcatioo the labours of the ernployi's in the Finance
Department are especially intended.
The French Government an the more open to the
eharge of bad taste and want of perspicacity in this
matter Dwane. the French Finances are really not in so
bad a condition as to need such desperate and constant
attempts to writs them up in public estimation.
After makingallowance for a variety of cent ingeucies
which M. MAONE either ignore& altogether or touches
upon with the utmost delicacy of pen, the results of
the Budget of 1839, which is about to be submitted for
examination to the Council of State, are really not
an bad. Of course it is impossible to rely with I
any confidence upon Estimates referring to two
years hence, and put forward by the Government of
a mammy where there is, virtually, neither press,
Parliament, nor freedom of discus&ion ; but there is
still something cheering in the announcement that
the Budget of 1839 is calculated to present a surplus
d tarty -eight millions of francs, or 1,920,0001. ster-
ling. This result is arrived at, too, although, as we
UM aftestly ensured, the expenses "are taken on
• fis largest basis," whilst the produce of taxation
" valued with great moderation." W MAGNE is
seasequently enabled to triumphantly recommend
that the large sum of 1,800,000 i. be applied in 1839
le the &inking fund. Now, if this result be really
attained, and the money applied as proposed, we
declare that we shall be the first to congratulate the
Government upon the fact, and to render the due
mend of praise ; for such a result would indicate a
vast improvement in the financial re sources sad
policy of a Government which has never yet got
through a year without a large deficit. But there
is an old sportiog paying, which teaches that it is
best not to holloa before you are out of the wood.
and a flourish of trumpets may be most gracetlil)