The Express.
London, England, 1868-10-31 00:00:00

THE DECLARATION OF BARON VON
BEUST.

The New Free Press of Vienna, which first pub-
lished the remarkable declaration made by Baron
Benet to the commission on military affairs, again
reverts to the subject and says :
The principal point in the statement of Baron Beust is
that be does not regard a conflict between Prussia and
Prance as doubtful, or as an event that can be avoided,
and that it is in prospect of that event that he re-
quires Austria to be fully armed. According to the
language of the minister Austria must be armed
in order to make her neutrality respected, and also
to be able to repel other powers which may be disposed to
interfere. Baron von Beust haa not stated who these powers
are, but he seems to hint at Russia, and the Danubian
Principalities, and perhaps also Italy and the South
German States. It is probable that he anticipates the first
movement will take place in the East, for he said that the
Hungarian landwehr might be first called into action.

-1868.

OUR PARIS LETTER.

WPM OUR OWN

PARIS, FIUDLY EVENING.

Although the Bourse, supported by the Bank of
France and the great companies which operate
upon the strength of M. Magne's " counsels," re-
fusc to be frightened by the Bt. Petersburg de-
spatch, the semi-official prints take issue upon it
with much smartness. The I'airic confines itself
to asking what can be the meaning of this apple
of discord thrown down in the midst of a pacific
situation ; it will, however, wait for the full text
before saying more. But the war journal, the
Pap—the journal of the much-breakfasting and
much-decorated Camagnaoe—speaks as follows:

In the few lines of the St. Petersburg journal there is
an opinion sad an hypothcaia. The general opinion com-
mon, it would appear, to ail Europe is that a collision
between Prussia and France is inevitable. The proba-
bility must be very great to assume, as it does in the
political world of Oennany and Russia, the form of oar-
tainty. Our opinion on this subject is well known [viz.
that there must be war). As to the hypothesis which
SIMMS that if France were victorious she would
cross the Rhine, we repudiate it emphatically.
France requires but two things, which, lightly
considered, are one—her security and her dignity.
France has nothing to envy, nothing to seek, nothing to
desire kronor the Rhine. Consequently we hold the hypo-
thesis gratuitous, and altogether absurd that France
dreams of conquests on the other side of the river.

This testimony of the Cassagnaos to the mode-
rate designs of France—this certificate that she
wants nothing more than to take from Prussia and
other neighbouring powers the Rhine frontier, and
will afterwards keep contentedly on her own aide
of the river will be appreciated as it deserves.
Apropos, however, even these moderate aspira-
tions travel a long way out of the map.
M. Gueroult, deputy for Paris, writes in the
Opinion Nationale that ho agrees with most of
the reasoning in the commentary on the now map.
It is true, " although the government says so,"
that France bus greater scope for alliantics than
before Sadowa
There are freer governments at Berlin, VlOllll4 and
Florence, and in that fact would consist our true
strtngth and the most certain guaranLe of European
peace, if we only had a policy; if our government knew
what it wants and what it believe+ ; if it did not pass
from one idea to another between sunrise and sun-
set ; if it did not talk about patnoti, anguish
when it was about to publish a map proving
that our situation was never better, and if it
did not one day ask for compensation from Prussia,
and the next argue that we had no need of any. The
government, after haring often appeared to think dif-
ferently, now speaks as we do. But we are not sure that
it yet thinks what it says, because its acts are incwisistent
with its wonls—it professes to be re-assured, but arms as
if it were not.

The Bourse was extremely firm. Rento closed
at 70fr. 70c. for cash, and 70fr. 621 c. for account
(the highest prices of the month) with a 1-18,t of 20c.
andlian rose 4.7ic.

THE REVOLUTION IN SPAIN.

MADRID, O. 28.

The 'NV14411.011, the journal which yesterday
pronounced in favour of a democratic republic,
this morning resumes its strictures upon the mani-
festo of the Provisional Government, which it main-
tains has entirely exceeded its functions in endea-
vouring to influence the people of Spain in favour
of a constitutional monarchy. The government,
according to the writer of this article, did not in-
herit, and could not inherit, anything from Queen
Isabella. It was the creature of the revolution,
which was itself an entirely democratic and re-
publican movement ; and therefore—at least this
appears to me to be his conclusion—it has no right
to act in any but a democratic and republican
sense. Ido not pretend to form a very decided
opinion upon the effect which these arguments
may have upon the minds of the Spanish people.
Probably to those who have already adopted
republican sentiments, and to them only, will they
appear entirely convincing. But I must say that
the writer seems to me not to have stated quite
fairly or accurately the position of the Provisional
Government. It is by uo means necessary to con-
tend Out it is in any degree the heir of the govern-
ment of the late Queen. The less it inherits from
that corrupt and tyrannical administration, the
more completely it breaks with all its old tradi-
tions and practices, the better it will be for Spain.
It would, indeed, be impossible to dispute, even if
it were desirable to do so, that the Provisional
Government is, in fact, the offspring of the revo-
lution, and that its duty is to complete and secure
the results of that movement. But when the
writer in the Discussion attributes to the revo-
lution an entirely democratic and republican cha-
racter, he assumes that which, according to my un-
derstanding of the movement which ended in the
dethronement of Queen Isabella, it would be im-
possible for him to prove. So far was the revolu-
tion from being exclusively the work of the demo-
cratic or republican parties, that had those sec-
tions been alone engaged in it they would have
bad no chance of succeeding, and Spain would have
still groaned under the degrading yoke of Marfori,
Father Claret, and Co. The revolution was
accomplished by the union of all sections of the
liberal party, the most numerous and, I
believe, the most influential being the Progres-
istaa and the members of the Liberal Union,
neither of which sections have as far as I ant
aware ever given their approval to or espsissi: eased
any desire for a republican form of government.
Certainly the men who were most native is brine-
ing about the revolution, the men who led its
armies in the field, or commanded the ships
which rendered such valuable assistance at
sea, are none of them republicans, and
never professed that they were fighting for a re-
. public. Serrano, Prim, and Topete always con-
fined their hostility to the dynasty of the Bour-
bons, and never extended it to the institution of
royalty itself. Their sentiments upon this point
were well known when the Central Junta c
-
witted to Serrano the task of forming a Pro-
visional Government, and when that body and
almost all the Juntas throughout the country
afterwards expressed their eontidenee in the men
whom he had associated with him in the perform-
arcs of this task. If the Provisional Government
is the creature of the revolution it is the creature
of the revolution us represented by the Junta, and
as that body was well acquainted with the mo-
narchical opinions of its members when they were
appointed, the entertainment of those opinions
cannot now well be alleged as an offence
against the revolution. The government may
have done wrong in indicating tee the
people the course which they consider best for the
interests of Spain, but if they have erred the proof
of their error must rest upon other grounds than
those urged by the writer in the Piseassieo. For
my own part, 1 can hardly see that it was unwise
or impertinent for a ministry—even a provisional
ministry—in times so critical as these to intimate
to the uutiou its opinion as to the best form of
government for it to adopt. To attempt to en-
force these opinions by the exercise of administra-
tive influence or of military authority, would
indeed be a direct breach of the condition upon
which the ministers assumed that the
future institutions of the country should be left
to the free ',Lehr° of the people; but the same ob-
jection dues not apply to their euforeement by
plain and candid urgiu t. lf, as seems
to be the general opinion of those who
are best acquainted with the conditiou of
Spain and the capacity of her people
fur the nduuuislyetieem of their own affairs, a con-
stitutional monarchy is the form of goy's• sot
whieli is best applicable to the presentetuaditiuu
of affairs, it would be a pity that the attention of
the nation should be dietructed by the pursuit of
impossible republics. There le work enough still