The Express.
London, England, 1861-02-15 00:00:00

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LONDON, FRIDAY, FEB. 15.

THE capture of Gaeta is an honour to the Sar-
dinian ants. To the very last the Bouasost re-
mained true to treachery. Even the noble chivalry
of CI tI.DINI and the solemn promise made upon a
King's word could not for • moment seduce the
wretched Fa vs( I. into the path of honour. Whilst
the Italian General suspended his fire to succour
his wounded enemies, the favourite son of the
Church, in violation of every pledge, directed the
breach to be repaired and a new attack to be ,
organized. But the task was far from easy. The
soldiers of King FRANCu were no doubt inferior
in spirit to those of CIALDINI. But the French
EMPEROR probably hoped that by his unjustifiable
interference to prolong the siege he had managed
to exhaust the best troops of the Italian army,
and had thus made success still more difficult.
Gaeta was the favourite fortress of the Bocasoics
of Naples, and its defences were constructed on
the moat approved principles. And it is clear
that unless the plan of attack had been
skilfully made and skilfully carried into effect the
place might have held out for some time longer.
Our contemporary, the Times, whilst confessing its
ignorance of the details of the siege, seems to think
that tho principles of war have been altered by
modern discovery. It is gravely said that the
days of assaulting a fortress are gone by, and that ,
a mere bombardment must lead to a surrender.
The taking of Delhi, forsooth, was a mere matter
of brute courage. And military skill, we presume,
had as little to do with that achievement as it had
with taking the Malakoff. ['this ignorance, or mere
perversity t Those who ever read the despatch of
General BAI•U SMITH relating the siege operations
before Delhi, will not soon forget the skill dis-
played by that officer and the engineers under his
command. Nor is there • military man in either
hemisphere who would not bear with surprise the
proposition that the days of " forlorn hopes" are
past. The stern command of the Great Samisen
to his generals, that they must never surrender
until they had stood an assault, would pro-
bably be considered as reasonable now as it was
half a century ago. Had old Eiaor of Gibraltar
held Gaeta instead of a perjured BorasoN Prince
with his horde of mercenaries, the world would
without question have heard of an assault de-
livered and possibly repulsed. But after all, the
defence of Gaeta was fruitless, and it is well that
it was not more prolonged.
At the same time it is of the utmost importance
to point out that so far from the siege of Gaeta
proving any exception to the ordinary principles
of war, it is only another instance of the truth of
military science. It seems to be almost impossible
to persuade people that an enemy will never be
dislodged from a place by a mere bombardment.
The houses behind the ditch and rampart may be
knocked to pieces—guns may be disabled,
men may be killed and wounded, but
so long ea the damage can be repaired,
and fresh supplies can be procured, the place may
continue to hold out. The Crimean campaign
showed the enormous difficultidof taking a fortress
which was not invested, and the siege of Gaeta,
which has just closed, proves tho same thing.
So long as the French fleet remained to prevent the
Sardinian fleet from completing the investment,
the progress of the Sardinians was almost nominal.
Besides the encouragement which the presence of
the French navy gave the besieged, the garrison
had ample means of relieving themselves from
their wounded, and providing themselves with
fresh provisions and renewing their warlike stores.
But the moment the two sea front' of the fortress
were covered by the Sardinian ships all was
changed. Whilst on the one hand the limited
number of men and the limited quantity of sup-
plies were rapidly diminished, and the confusion
and demoralization of the garrison rapidly in-
creased ; on the other hand, the besieging forces
increased in numbers and in the vigour of their
attack. Such a state of things, however, must
have an end. The inevitable result must follow.
And so Gaeta fell. It fell after the manner of
every place which has been besieged and invested
for a sufficient length of time. No doubt the dis-
coveries in gunnery render the effect of an artil-
lery fire more fatal than in former times, and
shorten to a considerable degree the operations of
a siege. But the principles upon which such
operations proceed remain unaltered, and we may
rely upon it that it was only by the skilful applica-
tion of such principles that the Sardinians have
attained so rapid a success, and at a loss com-
paratively so trifling.

According to the telegram, the Royal Family is
to embark in a French ship, and the garrison are
to remain prisoners of war until the surrender of
Messina and Civitella del Tronto. What is to bo-
come of the Kura does not distinctly appear,
but it is tolerably certain that he
will not be permitted to enter either
of the two places mentioned, or to disembark
on any part of the dominions which ho has
lost. It certainly is of the utmost importance
that this deposed monarch should be ex-
cluded, if possible, from Italy, and that all the
fortified posts should be in the hands of the Sar-
dinians. Some politicians are disposed to under-
rate the value of a fortress, but the history of
Italian revolution proves how mistaken is this
opinion. So long as either Messina or Gaeta
remain ed in the hands of the BOURBON there was
still some hope of recovering the lost kingdom.
Though all Sicily except Messina was entirely
lost tenyesrs ago, that one city furnished a base of
operations for FILANOIERI, and enabled him to dis-
embark his army in safety and subdue the island.
If Gaeta had remained in the hands of Fatiecm 11.,
it would have been always possible to organize an
army for the purpose of invading Vie Neapolitan
territory. The consequence must have been that