The Express.
London, England, 1860-07-24 00:00:00

(Stamped, id. Additional.)

to swum by fortifications tbs dockyards of Dover and Port-
land, sad also to create a oentral point et Cannock Chase.
to lIRWS as • substitute for or assistance to Woolwich.
The house will remember that after the conclusMn
of the great war, which laded in ISIS, this country
had established its supremasp—l may say so—in re,
gard to warlike operations on Ibis issa. by the good for-
tune, the gallantry, and the bravery co! our sailors, who bad
swept the ocean of all hostile fleet. ;pod as far as man-
time power went we were flee from say alarm of
attack from any quarter whatsoever. (Haar, hear.)
The nations of Europe, moreover, bad been ea-
banded In resource., sod had been entirely satiated
in mind and spirit with t►e events of the war. There was
hardly • eountry from the Trona to Moscow which bad not
in turn been submerged by the tide of warlike contest, ex-
cepting this fortunate country, and I think I may add,
Sweden. Well, it was natural that the people of Europe,
having been @absented by the bog maitiniumme of war, and

having suffered its 'miseries and oalienitiee—and let is. add
that than miseries and calamities fall far more heavily upon
the country which is the 100116 of warlike operations, than
on the contending armies--in that temper of naiad should
fix their thoughts and desires upea • long metlensiase at,
Fieis KwasiM.eßllrerdeee,Sattor many yelreafenVia
conclusion of the peace those who were responsible.for the
affairs of this country should have been content to rest on
the glories we had gained, is the memory of the strength
we had displayed, of the victories we had achieved, and
should not have thought it necessary to call upon the people
of the country for coy great exertion with a view to pros-
pective dangers which there was no reasonable ground for
anticipating. The consequence wee that fora great number
of years we acted with regard to our dockyards, and other
vulnerable points, very much as we had done during the
war. And so long am the movement of ships depended upon
wind sad the chances of weather, that calculation was right,
bewails we had then • very large fieet. Not longer
ago than 1848 we had 84 sail of the line. We were there-
fore still in a condition, as long as war was carried on by
sea in mailing ships, by our superior skill, by our superior
aptitude for naval combs; to rest on the strength which we
had. The same difilcultiee which interposed in 1804 and
1806 to prevent • large army drawn up on the opposite side
of the Channel from crossing over to this aide continued to
exist. And therefore the successive governments of the
day were justified in abstaining from any great measures
for the purpose of artificial protection to our dockyards and
coasts. But pregrimively steam began to he intro-
duced. Every man at once saw that the intro-
duction of steam as a moving power for naval
armaments had totally altered the character of
naval warfare, and entirely changed the condition of our
insular position. These events which, if not impomible,
were at least extremely difficult, while ships were only
'ailing vessels, became comparatively easy when steam was
introduced. In fact, I remember Sir IL Peel saying "that
steam had bridged the Channel," and for the purpome of
war had almost made this Wand maim to bean in country.
Well, sir, I will not state now—beeauae these things are
better made in general terms—l will not state the
degree to which the absence of artificial defences has
rendered us in particular and critical periods very
liable to any hostile attack which any person may
be disposed to make upon us. In 1847, I thing it was, in
consequence of an able memorandum drawn up by Sir John
Burgoyne, and sent to the Duke of Wellington, the duke
wrote and published—or at least it was published—the
famous and well-known letter, in which he described, with
all the knowledge which belonged to a great captain, and
with all the anticipations of evil" which his experience in
war had led him to expect, in the event of the country
being the some of warlike operations, the want of artificial
defence, and implored those who were charged with the
conduct of this country to provide better for its security
against foreign aggrounon. Well, air, that appeal fell on
diet oars, as far as this country was concerned. (Hear,
hear.) We were indeed in a condition of the country
which might be described by the words " Magni stet mind-
en umbra"; but the people of England could not be brought
to realise the altered condition of things. Little, but not
much, was done in consequence of that appeal from one of
the greatest masters of the art of war, and the most learned
in the opportunities of attack and the means of resisting it.
Soon atter that the government of Lord Derby came into
power, and I will do them the justice to say they took
a great and very important step towards placing
this country in • condition to defend itself by
reorganiaing and re-establishing the militia. It is
due to them, and especially to the right hon. gen•
tleman the member for Cambridge University, who was
then Home Secretary, and who took great pains a
arranging this measure, that the country ought to be Fate-
ful to them. I bad myself before that time, and have
since, when I was in office, taken steps with a view of
placing the artificial defences of the country upon some
general system. 1 found that one department acted with-
out the knowledge of the other ; that each acted inde-
pendently, and without combining the measures which
were necemary. I asked the commander-in-chief for the
time being, the Master-General of the Ordnance,

the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Inspector-General of
Fortifications, and the Secretary for War, to meet at my
office, and weeeterblished asystemof mute alconsultation and
combination, which led the way to great improvements in
our defences, both at home and at some of our foreign
stations. Since th►t time that system has gone on ; and
whereas Gosport bad at one time no defences whatever, ex-
cept a salute battery of comparatively small guns—whereas
Plymouth wee imperfectly defended—whereas Sheerness
had at one time only one gun that would go off. (A leuz,b.)
I remember hearing that, soon after the war, two
French steamers once came in there under the
pretence of coaling, and that baying sent on shore
to know whether a salute would be returned, they
were told that there wee only one gun available for firing,
and the officer must excuse the authorities if there was a
little interval between the salutes— (laughter)— whereas at
the period to which I allude all these important establish.
ments'were very imperfectly end inadequately defended.
Since that time very considerable progress has been made
in every one of them. lam bound to my for my right bon.
friend the Secretary for War, and the illustrious duke the
Commander-in-Chief, that those two public officers have
co-operated with the utmost cordiality, and without the
slightest official jealousy, for the interests of the army and
the protection of the country, in • manner which entitles
them both to the gratitude of the nation. It
is owing to their exertions • far greater advance
in our artificial defenoes has been made than ever took
place in the same period of time. My right lion. friend
has moved for a commission to inquire into the present
state of this most important point. The report of that
oommisaion is now upon the table. The recommendations
of those commissioners, which have been confirmed by the
revision of another committee of military officers, called
the defence committee, amount to a totel outlay of about
11,000,001 X., including 1,600,000 f. for armaments of float-
ing defences. Well, sir, I hold it absolutely necessary for
the safety of the country that these recommendations
should substantially be adopted. (Hear, hear.) Now
there are two ways of doing this. You might either vote
annually such a portion of annual income as •lone
the country would like to spend upon a matter of that
kind, and by so doing defer, perhaps for 18 or 20 years,
the accomplishment of those defences. Or you might take
the coulee which it will be my duty to recommend to you,
and endeavour to complete them at the earliest possible
timo—(hear, hear)—without at the same time laying upon
the country for a considerable period of years, a larger
►nnual burden than would be incurred if you prosecuted those
works more slowly—l mean that you may, by raising termin-
able annuities, running for 30 years, obtain • sum which
will be sufficient in the comes of three or four years to com-
plete these works. You may get within • short period
the security you want, and no► lay upon the
country a much heavier burden than would be incurred if
you were to wait till the slow proms of mutual votes
brought the money that was necessary. But if theee works
are necessary, and I think common sense will show you that
they are, they are necessary as soon as you am get them.
They are seeemary for the time present. It would be
folly to postpone for eighteen or twenty year. the comple-
tion of a security against dangers which may not, indeed,
arise, but which nosy be contemplated as possible, and V
they be possible, they may be so within • comparatively
short period of time. This is • course which I know
is in some degree a departure from usual practice.
It is contrary to principle to raise money by ism

[TWOPENCE.

for the annual expanse of the country. To do so for
the purpose of defraying the ordinary expenses of the
country would be as spendthrift a proceeding se it would
be for an individual to borrow money every year to pay
household expenoec. We know very well what would be
the fate of • man who did au—(l. tap) ; and • minim
which did so would be brought to grad and early mahatma-
meet. But in private life parliament has empowered and
encouraged individual'. to raise rnocey by loan from the
Exchequer Loss Commissioner., or Irvin private oompaaies.
for the purpose of accomplishing at once peen's eat
ins-
provements upon their landed properties, spreading the re-
payment over • very considerable length of time. That
which ma regarded by parliament as nomad police with
regard to private individuals cannot be means with regard
to the patter and more important interests. of the nation.
By raising this memy by terminable marmite* we shall pm-
vest it from becoming a minimums% addition to the perma-
nent debt of the country, which' think orqrht be avoided
in every case whertelltie.milala On the present women
I am eonviaced it is With regard to the Intemite
of these waive' it is lammed& say man to neat
his eyes over the We ef Serape, end eas and hear what is
peeing, said not be ceavineed that the future
not free from deader. - It is dillarb to my when
the storm may bunt, but the harlots ie Merged with
clouds, Which betoken the possibility el a tempest, (Rear,
110,11fikj erre that the house lamb lam new=
of our immediate neighbours acmes the
Thew re no use in disguising the matter. It is in no un-
friendly spirit I am ,speaking. Nobody has any right to
take offence at the ocinchunona and reflections which are
purely founded upon the principle of eelfoleferice. It
true we have recently concluded a treaty of cornmeal m-
istime with Frame. (Ironical cheers and laughter from
the opposition. ) Sir, these are not matters to
be treated with lenty—(hear, hear) ; they are not
arrangement, without great value. It is perfectly
well known, and, I am sure, proved by experience, that
nations which have with each other great commercial is-
teroourse, nations in which large interests are involved in
the maintenance of peace, are less likely to fall out and
become antegooista than nations between whom these ties
are not cemented. But at the Mina time these thioge are
not brought about all at oar. A great nation, whose
energies have nut hitherto been directed to commerce—a
great nation, whose achievements and glories have induced
them to turn to warlike operations, cannot he ex-
pected, on • sudden, to be entirely free from
all her former habits, and at once to understand
all the benefit, and advantages which arise from
peaceful and commercial relations. I hope much from that
treaty. But that treaty alone would bee frail security for
a peat nation with mighty and extensive interests, with
great wealth, with shores more open to attack than the lard
frostier of any country. Because when two nations touch
each other with • frontier by laud, you know pretty well
where and how en attack can be made, and you can guard
against it then and there. But an island whose fron-
tier is the ma is open to attack at any point
where an enemy who is able to command the sea may direct
his opposing forces. Therefore I my it would be folly on
oar part to rely on the future effecta of a commercial treaty
when we know we have vulnerable points which need
artificial defences, and which we have artificial means of
supplying. Now, is there nothing in the state of Europe
that leads us to rink that we might, in the course of
events, be called upon to defend ourselves from a hostile
attack ? Why, we see in Franco an army of 600,000 and
odd men, consisting of men of whom 40%000 odd are ac-
tually in arms, and of whom the remainder are merely on
furlough, and could be celled into service in a fortnight.
Well, that army is far greater then nonce can
require for the purposes of defence. (Hear, hear.)
No nation in the world would think, unprovoked.
of attacking France. Nothing could be gained by it. No-
body could expect to dismember France—nobody could fare
otherwise then ill by au unprovoked attack upon France.
Therefore, fur the purposes of defence, that army may be
deemed to be un . Well, I don't mean to say that
that army is raised for tdie deliberate purpose of aggression.
I trust it is not ; but the possession of the power to
frequently gives the desire to do ear—(hear, hearl—sod
Cannot, you are not entitled to, rely apes the forbearance
of • stronger neighbour—you are bound to make your means
of defence proportionate to his means of aggression. (Rear.)
Bat, air, is it only on land that the arrangements of

Fraisoethe meanie, Frames—are disproportionate to our
means of defence Why we ksow that the utmost exer-
tions have been made and are making to create a sexy very
nearly equal to our own. That is • navy which aunt be
required for any pommies of defence to Fnnee, and which,
therefore, we are justified in looking upon as
an antagonist whom we may have to encounter.
, It wee a navy too which, under present arrangements, war
' not onlyadeptedforpurpieesof attack, but had the means of
transporting within • very few hours • large and formid-
able number of troops to our shores. While, on the one
hand, the Freuch navy has increased beyond any amount
which it has retched since the end of the Let war,
our navy has, through the change from sailing ship:
to steam, necesiarily, diminished in number. We had
at one time, as I have stated, upwards of 100 line of
tattle ships, at another 84 ; but they were all sailing ships.
Sir John Yakington, when First Lonl of the Admiralty,
did very good service by proceeding to substitute steam line
of battle ships for sailing ships. I trust that we are
going on in the same course, and that in
time we shall re-establish our navy upon the
same footing of superiority to that of any foreign power
which I hold to be absolutely necessary to our existence se
a nation. (Cheers.) 1 say then that in the present state of
things we have no right to rely for our security upon the
mere forbearance of the ruler of France. (Hear, hear.)
Interests of the moat extended and diversifies' character
exist all over the world in which both countries are con-
cerned ; said in every quarter there is a liability on the part
of the representatives of those countries, often on both
sides, by an excess of real or a mistaken sense of duty, to
lead the nations which they represent into conflict. Nobody
can answer for a day hardly that something may not Lapp=
in some quarter of the world that may lead to disegreeible
communications between the two powers. With tha
utmost desire on the part of the two governments
that those things may be amicably adjusted, where
one country is stronger than the other it is
very difficult for such an arrangement to be
made. The stronger power naturally expects a sub-
mission which the weaker power may not be disposed to
give. And if that weaker power were an absolute or des-
potic monarchy the thing might be arranged ; but where
the weaker power is a constitutional monarchy, consisting
of three institutions, with • free press, whose opinion is
manifested on every public event, you may be r(uite sure
that such • country would revolt against concessions made
by the government if they were told that they wear ren-
dered necessary by the absence of means of defence, owing
to the neglect of former government+ to provide sufficient
security ; and, though they might be disposed to submit,
their indignation would recoil against those who hail power
in their hands, and this would sow the seeds for

dissension. (Hear, bear.) Then I say that for the
sake of peace it is desirable to make those preparations.
(Cheers.) It is desirable that we should nut live upon
forbearance ; it is desirable that we should be able effec-
tively to defend ourselves against any foe ; and then it id
known that no country will, without ample rowan and pro-
vocation, disturb the state of peaoeful relations that exist.
(Hear, hear.) But what email' be the dangers to which we
are exposed? They are of two kinds. The dangers to which
we are exposed would —1 my nothing of our colonies on
foreign posmssions—be those of invasion, fur two purposes.
(hoes that et greed, or the hope of conquest—that 1 think
no country would imagine to be possible. (Cheery.) Much
has been said about getting possession of the metropolis—of
ler.ying heavy contributions ; sod, by overbearing the spirit
and hopes of the country, dictating in the capital terms of
pesos that would be ignominious to the country and advan-
tageous to the invaders. A third, and I think • much
more probable attempt would be, by a sudden attack by
sea and by land ; or by land, if our sea defences were too
strong, to get possession of our naval arsenals—the
cradles of our naval strength—the cradles of the navy,
which is our national strength ; and by striking at the root
of our naval power, to lay us open afterwards to other
measures which they might be inclined or ibis to effect.
(Hear, bear.) I say that 1 dismiss the notion that any
foreign power could have an idea of conquering this country
with • view to its ultimate or permauent retention, because
that could never enter into the mind of any man. (Oheers.)
No doubt London might be occupied. ( ear, hear.) Well,
London is too vast • space to be surrounded by artificial de-
tenon. (Hear, hear.) You cannot fortify so vast • cir-
cumference ; Loudon must be defended in the field.
(Cheers.) There are strong natural positions close to Lou-
don, which skilfully taken advantage of, might enable •
smaller force to re,ist a larger force, and successfully to
repel invasion. Aud there is this to be said, that whatever
amount of force an enemy might land upon
our shore; so long as we retain our naval
power, that force would ultimately be lost
—(hear, hear)—becattee its connexion would be cut off,
its supplies would be impossible ; and sooner or later, that
force would be compelled to surrender as prisoners of
war. It might do great mischief—it might cause erten.
rive destruction of life and property, and indict the utmost
misery upon the country ; but, as regarda ultimate success,
ao military man would look to such an operation as likely
to be of permanent advantage to his country, except in so
far es inflicting injury upon this country. The operation
which I think most likely to be attempted is the lauding
of considerable forces for the purposes of destroying our
dockyards. If the dockyards were destroyed. On, navy is
oat up by the roots ; because then, if a naval action were
to tabs place, whatever the result might he, while the
emy woald have his dockyards, his arsenals, and his
stores, to refit, replenish, and reconstruct his navy
—your basis is gone, your dockyards are burnt,
your stores have disappeared, and you have no
mar of refitting • fleet to sail again to meet the
enemy. If once you loss the caroused of the sea, what
Only let. gentle-
Twee' ha:r.f)or everything that
hecostima
=wastes of thishocwouanetpory.den?