The Express.
London, England, 1866-09-17 00:00:00

Etc erpreoo.

TO CORRESPONDENTS
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BRITANNIA.
Tins EMU S°, GUN POWDER TOM OR, THI GIPSY
YOTGER A sON.—Mr. W. G. Rose; The
Brother+ Vlctorelli And THE CASTAWAY; OR, THR
HUI ki-DORN t;nBAN D.

MOH WATIOt AT LONDON BRIDGI.
Tan DAT —Mornht, 6K 47m Afternoon. 7b. 12414.
ID-340AROW—Itominff, 7h. 42m Afternooa. NA 17m.

LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER VT.

IT was not to be expected that the half-yearly
general meeting of the Bank of England would
pass by without prominent allusion to the late
crisis, but little, if any, additional light was thrown
upon the sub;:cct. The principal reason was,
doubtless, that the whole facts of the case are so
thoroughly known that nothing more remains to be
said. We arc all aware that the panic was in the
strictest terms a panic—au universal withdrawal
of credit because two or three large companies had

from sheer mismanagement or worse been obliged
to stop payment. In times like the past the public
never stop to discriminate, but condemn good and
bad alike. Bence, as the Governor of the Bank
observed, there Ivas a general drain upon the
banking housus of London the day after the sus-
pension of OvKi:END, GURNEY, and Co. The
manner in ichi i this sudden pressure was met

with ono exception reflected the highest credit
upon the 'rinks, both private and joint stock,
and furnishes the most complete answer

to the charge that they had locked up
their funds in speculative and hazardous
business. The Governor takes some credit for the
assistance the Lank of England afforded at this

crisis, a duty, ho said, which the Directors could
not shrink from, and, it may be added, the only

policy which ensure the safety of the Bank
• ro,
complex machinery of credit
fact, been elaborated to that degree that no esta-
blishment in England can escape injury from the

misfortunes of its neighbours.
It is difficult to gather from the speeches of the
Governor whether the Directors were in favour of
the issue of the Government letter or not. At one
period he almost intimates that the Bank had acted
in anticipation of the letter, and we suppose there-
fore that it had their approval. Against this, how-
ever, may be set the letter of the Governor and
Deputy, Governor of the 11th May, in which, after
detailing the enormous amount of advances made
that day, and the consequent reduction of the
reserve to 3,000,0(00/., they state that "unless
" the money taken from the Bank is withdrawn
" from cireuhtion, there is no reason to suppose
" that the reierve is insuflicient." If the Govern-
ment letter had not been issued, the Directors
would have quickly found out that this reserve
was inanffieieht. There appears no doubt that
in the event of the Goveniment doing nothing
there would have been such a drain on the other
deposits that the Bank would have been reduced
to the necessity of stopping all loans and discounts
to prevent stoppiiiv pa) inent altogether. Even
in Cie early part of " Black Friday" evening Mr.
GLADSTONE stated in the House of Commons, with
reference to the suspension of the Bank Charter
Act, " I have not the least reason to suppose
" that any request from that quarter (the Bank
" Court) is likely to reach the Government." It
may be assumed, therefore, that the Directors of
the Bank, either from motives of delicacy, or from
a want of sufficient appreciation of the difficulties
of the time, were rather against the suspension
than otherwise, although in the latter case they
doubtless soon modified their opinions.
With reference to the management of the Bank
since the issue of the Government letter, a rather
awkward question was put, viz., " What means
" were taken to allay the suspicion which during
" the panic had prevailed on the Continent
" that the Bank of England was about to
" suspend specie payments I" If the ques-
tion had been, " What means were taken
"to keep alive the suspicion 1 " the answer
is easy. "We maintained the rate of discount at
" 10 per cent. long after it was shown to be unne-
" emery." Those who know well the immense
damage to English credit by the Bank rate being
kept at 10 per cent. for more than three months
will understand the significance of this suppositious
reply. Looking at the subject in a national point
of view there is, unfortunately, no room for doubt
that the management of the Bank since the crisis
has been disastrously timid. We have a right to
expect from the Directors of the greatest monetary
establishment in the world something better than
a blind adherence to more routine—that quality,
at all events, can be found in the smallest of traders
or government clerks. It must seem incompre-
hensible that a body of men, selected from the
most successful, and therefore by implication the
ablest, merchants of the day, should prove in-
capable of taking a broader view of financial affairs
than a petty shopkeeper. The most extraordinary
part is, that they failed to see the injury inflicted
not only on the national credit by the unnecessary
maintenance of 10 per cent., but also the bar that
it effectually opposed to the increase in the re-
sources of the Bank.
If 10 per cent., however, has damaged the
nation, it has at any rate benefited the proprietors
of Bank stock. It was long ago surmised that the
Bank was making an uncommonly good thing out
of the crisis, and the opinion is now shown to be
perfectly right. It is sixty years since so high a
dividend as 6i per cent. was proposed, and by far
the greater part of the profit was made in the
period since the failure of Orzaann, GMAT; and
Co. On tho 28th February, after providing for
the dividend declared for the half-year then end-
ing, the Rest stood at 3,011,7611. On the
9th May it had increased to 3,237,6871., and