The Express.
London, England, 1866-11-15 00:00:00

THE- 'EXPRggS,

Into intelligence.

EQUITY COURTS.—Nov. 14.
(Before the Right Hon. the Master of the Bolls.)
0111CLAL LIQUIDATORS.
At the sitting of the court this morning Lord Homily
said he wisW to observe, with respect to the report of
what he stated yesterday as to official liquidation, he was
represented assnyim that in oases of wandinp up under
the superviaion of the court, he always called upon the
official liquidators to give ample security. His lordship
never did anything of the kind. He had not the power to
de so. What he really did say was that he always would
call upon them to do so if he could ; but that, unfortu-
nately in those cases the court had no jurisdiction to do
anything of the sort, unless the parties applied to it for
the purpose. He was also represented to have said that
he thought the observations in the Standard newspaper
did sot apply to official liquidators. That was incorrect,
because all liquidators were official liquidators. The ob-
servations, no doubt, did not apply to official liquidators
acting under a compulsory winding up order.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.—Nov. 14.
Sittings in Banco.—Before the Lord Chief Justice and
Justices Mellor, Shee, and Lush.)
This was crown paper day.
WOOD ANDANOTHEH(APEILLLANTS) C. roams (agaroworarr).
This is the case which was partly argued on Saturday
before two judges, but, in consequence of its great impor-
tance, it was arranged that it should be re-argued to-day
before the full court. It wag an appeal against a conviction
under the Masters and Servants .Aet.
Mr. Manisty, Q.C. with whom was Mr. Pinder, ap-
ein support of conviction. The object of the
Masten ra and Servants Act was to prevent unlawful cm
binations of men to intimidate their employers, and the
conviction in this case was for unlawfully, by using certain
threats, forcing or endeavouring to force the respondent to
limit the number of his apprentices. The case stated
that upon the hearing of the information it was proved
by the respondent, and found as facts, that he was
a master builder, carrying on business in Stockton, and
the appellants are the president and secretary of a society
known as the United Order of Bricklayers. In October
last the respondent was erecting certain buildings, when
he sent one of his men to a certain place for • ladder.
Barron, one of the appellants, was seen to speak to the
men, but what he said to them was not known, upon
which the men went beck to the building, collected their
tools, and said they had been stopped from working.
Respondent asked why, when he was told he must know
that it was on account of his having four apprentices.
The men by their agreement Pere at liberty to leave and
the respondent to discharge them at any time.
Respondent afterwards wiote to the secretary of the
society, and asked the reason why his men had
been taken away from him, saying he had had
no notice, and that he wished to know what
the society required. Barron, in reply, wrote that
at • meeting of the society it was proposed,
seconded, and carried unanimously, that he should
only be allowed to have two apprentices, and not to have
• third until the eldest of the two was in the last year of
his time. There was also a demand for 181., expenses
which the society bad incurred in consequence, which
must he paid before the men would be allowed to return
to their work. The master builders afterwards came to •
resolution to discharge the men employed by them until
the respondent's men resumed work. The justices, being
of opinion that an offence had been committed, convicted
the appellants. The learned counsel contended that the
appellants had, by threats or intimidation, formed or en-
deavoured to force the respondent to limit the number
of his apprentices. The question was, what was the mean-
ing of threats or intimidation as used in the clause of the
act.
Mr. Justice Lush said it was not shown that the appel-
lants induced the men by persuasion or by threats to leave
their work.
Mr. Manisty argued at considerable length that this
was • threat or an intimidation of the master within the
meaning of the act, for which the men were liable to
punishment.
Mr. Coleridge, Q.C., with whom was Mr. Mecums's,
appeared for the appellants. He submitted there were no
grounds for the conviction. There were three distinct
periods in the case, and they could not mingle up what
took place at one time with what took place at another,
so as to make a charge against the appellants as having
jointly acted. To convict the two there must have been
some joint act. The first period was in October, when
Barron only was present and spoke to the men, and what
passed between him and the men was not known or even
EU
r. Justice Lush—From all that was known the men
might have acted voluntarily.
Mr. Coleridge—All the men did was to leave without
notice? which they had a perfect right to do by the terms
of their engagement by the master. Therefore what hap-
pened at first was no threat or an attempt to threaten.
After the men had left the respondent wrote to the society
for information, mid what was communicated to him was
no threat or an attempt to threaten.
Mr. Justice Lush—That letter was written at a meeting
where Wood and Barron were both present.
Mr. Coleridge said yes, but there was no proof that
they were present when the resolution was agreed to. If
there was anything illegal—which he denied—it was
passing the resolution. There was nothing approaching
a threat in the appellants communicating the reeolutio'a
in answer to the respondent's inquiry. It was not shown
that the appellants were present when the resolution was
passed, or that Wood had anything to do with the letter
that was sent to the respondent. Then with regard to the
payment of the 181., although it might be an illegal act to
demand it, it was no threat within the meaning of the
statute.
Mr. Manisty having been heard in reply,
The Lord Chief Justice, in delivering judgment, Heid—
iam of opinion that this conviction must be quashed. It
is quite unnecessary to determine in the present case
whether the combination of the workmen funning this
association, and the resolution they adopted not to work
for the respondent unless be reduced the number of his
apprentices, would be lawful or not at common law. I
quite agree that eases of this kind ought not to be pressed
further than they have gone ; and we ought, so long as
there is nothing in them contrary to the law, to leave it
open to labour on the one hand, and capital on the other,
to make the beat terms they can for themselves ; and in-
asmuch as men have not the advantage of wealth, they
cannot very often protect themselves except by means of
combination in associations of this kind, there-
fore we ought not to strain the law against
those who have no other means to waist each
other. There may, however, be cases contrary
to the common or statute law, but it is not now necessary
that we should determine whether this combination is an
unlawful one or not. To obtain a conviction under this par-
ticular act there must be a threat or intimidation to the
master, and factsbecome moat important in considering that
question. It appears that the appellants are the chairman
and secretary of a certain association, and on a given day
the appellant, Barron, was seen in conversation with the
respondent's workmen, after which the latter suddenly
left their work. No threat was at that time made to the
master, but the men having left, he inquired of Barron
why they had left, and he replied simply, on account of
your apprentices. In that I can find no threat—certainly
uo joint threat on the part of the appellants. The master
then again moves in the matter. There was no spon-
taneous communication made to him when the resolution
was agreed to ; it was not communicated to him to intimi-
date him, by means of a threat to reduce the number of
his apprentices, and the respondent, when his men left,
with the view of ascertaining why the men had been with-
drawn from his employment, put himself in communi-
cation with the society, evidently for the purpose, if pos.
sible, of entering into negotiations so as to arrive at a
settlement with the society. lie caked the reason why
his men were withdrawn, and be received a letter written
by Barron at a meeting over which Wood presided, con-
taining a copy of the resolution, for which letter, if it had
really amounted to a threat, Wood would have been
responsible with Barron as a joint act. It was
not for that resolution, or for what was done under it, that
the information was laid and the conviction obtained. We
must see whether the letter written under such circum-
stances amounted to a threat. We have nothing to show
that, although the letter purported to afford explanation
by way of answer to the question put by the employer,
it was intended to convey a threat. I do not think there
is enough to warrant the inference, under the circum-
stances, that it amounted to a threat under the terms of the
act of parliament, and on that ground the conviction can-
not be sustained.
Mr. Justice Mellor concurred.
Mr. Justice Shee was also in favour of the appellants.
The resolution not being communicated to the respondent
clearly took it out of the deli nation of a threat. Its not
being addressed to anyone destroyed its character of a
threat.
Mr. Justice Lush said it was an important point in the
consideration of the case that the resolution was com-
municated to the respondent, by way of explanation, in
answer to his letter. He considered the conviction could
not be sustained.
Conviction quashed.
THE QUEEN' T. KIDD.
Mr. Mellish, Q.C. (with whom was Mr. Kay), showed
cause against a rule to show cause why an order to pay
fijd. Easter dues to the vicar of Preston should not be
quashed. The argument relied on to show there was no
jurisdiction was, that the claim not being in respect of an
Easter offering payable as a common right, but was of
a larger amount,' founded on an old special custom, the
existence of which was denied, was not within the sta-
tute, and two questions arose—first, whether an Easter
offering payable by custom was within the 7 and 8 Wm.
c. 6 ; and secondly, if so, whether the jurisdiction
was taken away from the justices in this case upon the
ground that the custom was bona fide disputed.
Mr. Serjeant Hayes appeared in support of the rule.
He denied the fact of there being such a custom as that
claimed by the vicar.
The arguments had not concluded when the court rose.

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