The Express.
London, England, 1867-11-09 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 9. 1867.

THE BATTLE OF MENTANA.

(rao Oh OWN coassarorrnor.)
FLORENCE, Nov, 5.
_

The reason of the scanty news that reached this
city for thirty-six hours after an event of absorbing
interest which had occurred within 200 miles of it,
and on a line of railway and of telegraph, is re-
vealed to-night. General Garibaldi had, after
withdrawing his men and formally disbanding
them, and while on his way to Capron., been seizA.l.l
in the train by order of government. He WAS
carried a prisoner to Spezzia, his friends were for-
bidden to accompany him, and a telegram in which
Crispi, the leader of the extreme liberals in the
chamber, but who now was playing the most con-
stitutional part, informed his friends in Florence
that Garibaldi had retired and was actually on his
way home, was not allowed to be delivered till ten
last night, eleven hours after it had been des-
patched, and by the time the offices of the liberal
papers, which appear only in the evening, were
closed. These are not very noble weapons for a
national government to fight with.
Florence has been full to-day of returning Gari-
baldini, from whom, as well as from some who were
employed on the staff, I had obtained a gond deal
of the details. But the Riforma of this evening
publishes an interim official report, signed by
General Fabrizi (chief of the staff), by Colonels
Missori, Menotti Garibaldi, and Guerzoni, and
by Alberto Mario ; and as this will be the his-
torical narrative I cannot do better than give it
textually. There needs only to be premised, on the
authority of Signor Crispi, that the movement of
concentration on Tivoli was made with the design,
not of attacking, but of withdrawing the volunteer
force, preparatory to its dissolution, in view of the
complications caused by the intervention of the
national troops and to avoid the possibility of any
collision with them.

" On the 3rd of November, at half-put twelve
noon, the body of volunteers which occupied
Monte Rotondo was put in motion by the Men-
tana road in the direction of Tivoli, where all the
other corps occupying the Pontifical territory were
directed to concentrate. General Garibaldi had
provided for the possibility of encountering the
enemy on the march, and had directed, in an order
of the day, all the arrangements suggested by
military art to guard against an unexpected attack.
The advanced guard was composed of the lst
battalion of Bersaglieri, which was ordered to throw
out strong flanking parties on our right, which was
the side exposed to the enemy. We were in all
about 5,000 men, with the two pieces of artillery
taken at Monte Rotondo. The advanced guard
had passed Mentana (this seems about two miles
from Monte Rotondo) when word was passed back
that the Pontifical troops had already attacked the
head of the column at the extreme point of tho
advanced guard. On seeing the enemy the general
made the following dispositions :

"The 2nd battalion of volunteers and the 2nd and
3rd Betsaglieri, together with the Carabiniers of
Leghorn, were extended along the heights which
rise about half a mile from Mentana, and were
received with avery sharp fire of foreign Chasseurs
and Zouaves.

But the positions in front of Mentana not
being found suitable for defence, and a move-
ment in force towards the left being developed by
the enemy with the evident intention of cutting off
our line of retreat, our line was withdrawn into
Montana, occupying the houses and the castle,
while the rest of the Garibaldian troops were eche-
loned on the left and behind the village. Then
two columns of Chasseurs and Zouaves attacked in
front and on the left, as had been foreseen, and
succeeded for a few minutes in penetrating as far
as the first houses. The position was critical,
Montana and the retreat were threatened. General
Garibaldi ordered the whole line to charge with
the bayonet ; it was brilliantly executed, and Men-
tans was recovered. The general himself directed
from a height the fire of our guns. The day seemed
won, and the enemy was at every instant losing'
ground, when a new and dense hostile line ap-
peared on the field. They were the fresh batta-
lions of the Antibes legion who, reinforcing the
wavering battalions of the first line, attacked our
left with new vigour. Their arms of precision
and artillery caused heavy loss to our men, who
disputed the ground foot by foot. But victory
seemed now hopeless. We were crushed with
numbers, and paralysed by the want of ammunition
for our guns, which had exhausted their seventy
rounds. It was necessary to save the line of re-
treat, and to hold the enemy in check, preventing
him from descending on the road that leads from
Montana to Monte Rotondo. This object was
successfully attained, and the retreat on Monte
Rotondo was effected.
"General Garibaldi concentrated there all his dis-
posable forces for the defence of the position and
the castle. The enemy approached within gun-
shot of the village, but did not advance nor
attack. Towards five o'clock he drew up his forces
on the heights fronting Monte Rotondo, and left
the whole evening and night at our disposal.
General Garibaldi might have employed this time
in reorganizing and opposing an extreme resistance
in the elevated position of Monte Rotondo. But
after the French and Italian intervention, the
political situation preponderated over the military,
and further bloodshed became useless. General
Garibaldi perceived it, and ordered a retreat on
Passe Corese. It was executed in the course of the
evening, in presence of the enemy, and in excellent
order.

"The combat lasted four hours. The whole Pon-
tifical army, with three batteries of artillery, of
which, however, they could only place a few guns
in position, were in our front. The behaviour of
the volunteers during the fight was praiseworthy,
and almost all the general and superior officers
suffered in person during the critical moments of
the fight. But the seeds of dissolution scattered
through the body by the infamous arts of the hired
agents of the authorities, the failure of ammu-
nition, the miserable arms, the evident want of an
object, had rendered victory impossible. The
individual actions of gallantry were numerous, and
on receiving the reports we shall make them known.
Our losses may amount to 250 dead and wounded,
and some hundreds of prisoners ; but the enemy
paid still more dearly for his victory."

Official Italian reports raise the number of pri-
soners to 1,100, all of whom have been given up by
the French. It seems evident from this fact, as well
as from some expressions in the report, con-
firmed by private statements, that a portion
of the volunteers had not behaved very well.
But for this the reasons suggested seem to be as

ample explanation. It must have been felt in the
ranks that victory could not give Rome, and
though it is reasonable to suppose that by the date
of the fight none were in the ranks, after the ter-
rible trials they had passed through, save those who
were ready to give their lives for that object, it is
as reasonable to allow that they might well think
of safety when there was no longer a remote pos-
sibility even of success. On the other hand, the
heavy losses in killed and wounded, and the fact
that the enemy did not venture to molest the
retreat, showed that at many points the fighting
must have been desperate. It is said that a portion
of the Papal troops were armed with the Cluuisepat
rifles, which did terrible execution. P true, the
fact shows that the reports of Chasseurs de Vin-
cennes having for some weeks past been privately
sent to fill up the Papal ranks have not been with-
out foundation.

General Garibaldi, on arriving at Coreae on the
evening of the 3rd, issued a manifesto stating that
as the mixed intervention had now taken out of
his bands the object of his enterprise—the libera-
tion of Rome—he withdrew from it. General
Fabrizi: was charged with the necessary details of
the dissolution of the force, and Garibaldi tele-
graphed to Leghorn for a vessel to take him to
Caprera, and next morning, attended by many of
his late staff, he set off by special train for Florence,
on his way to that port. But at Vigline the train
was stopped by Colonel of Carabineers Carnozzi,
who required the general to descend, and told him
he was under arrest. Garibaldi demanded the
warrant, but was told there was no warrant but an
order from government. He denied its authority
over one guilty of no crime against the Italian
government, and claimed his right in the character
of a deputy, a Roman general appointed
by a regular government, and an American
citizen, and declared that he would only submit
to force. His friends prepared to defend,
but he forbade them, and opposed only a passive
resistance. Crispi telegraphed to Florence to the
government for leave to Garibaldi to proceed
quietly to Caprera, pledging himself that there
should be no demonstration; but, after an hour
had elapsed, no reply arrived, and Colonel Carnozzi
ordered Garibaldi's removal. Four carabineers
I took him up in their arms and placed him in the
train, in which only his family were allowed to
accompany him. He is now at Spezzia. You will
have by this time the official exposition in the
Gazette of this evening of the reasons for this action
by government. It is proper to add that the cora-
-1 mitting any act leading to a possibility of war with
a neighbouring power is a crime under the Italian
code.

Florence is full of regular troops, which are
poured into it still by every train. The news of
the withdrawal of the national forces from the papal
territory has been received with sullen acquiescence.
The only difference is that the liberal journals de-
sire it should inaugurate a position towards France
resembling that held towards Austria in regard to
Venice. The ministerial papers desire, on the
contrary, to make it the basis of new negotia-
tions. ,