The Express.
London, England, 1859-09-10 00:00:00

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND ITALY.

(From the Mem4sur)

When hots spook foe themselves; it seems at first
sight that there is little to be gained by explaining
them. Nevertheless, when passion or intrigue die-
tort the simplest thing', it becomes necessary to set
their character in a true light, in order that every
one may form an intelligent judgment of the mum
of events.

In the month of July last, when the Frew:o-
f:Sardinian end Austrian armies were face to face be-
tween the Adige aid the Nlincio, the chances were
nearly equal on both aides, for if the I'w:co-Sar-
dinian army had on its side the moral influence of
acquired mass, the Austrian army was numerically
stronger, and rested not only on formidable fortresses
but also on all Germany, which was ready at the
Brat eigoal to make common cause with her. Had
this eventuality been realised, the Emperor Napoleon
would have been obliged to withdraw hie troops from
the Minato and transfer them to the Rhine, and
then the Italian erase for which the war was under-
taken would have been, if not loot, at lead placed

in great danger. In these grave circumstances the
Emperor thought it would be for the good, Ent of
Pianos and then of Italy, to conclude peace, provided
its aonditions could be conformed to the programme
he had adopted and useful to the cause he desired to

—.
The first thing to asoartain was if Austria would
cede by treaty the territory which had been con.
quwed ; the second, if she would frankly abandon
the supremacy she had acquired in the Peninsula;
if she would acknowledge the principle of an Italian
nationality by admitting a federative system;
finally, if she would consent to endow Venetia with
institutions which would make it a truly Italian
province.
As to the first point, the Emperor of Austria
ceded the conquered territory without contest; as to
the second, he promised the most ample concessions
to Venetia, admitting for the example of its future
organisation the position of Luxembourg towards
the Germanic Confederation, but he made these con.
cessions strictly conditional upon the return of the
Areltdukes to their states.
Thus the question was laid down very clearly at
Villafranca; either the Emperor must ask nothing
foe Venetia, and :content himself with the advan-
tages acquired by arms, or, in order to obtain im-
portant concessions and he acknowledgment of
the principle of nationality, he must give his
consent to the return of the Anthdukes. It was good
sense then which traced the line he was to follow; for
it wee not • question of bringing back the Arch-
dukes by the aid of foreign troops, but, on the con-
trary, to restore them with real guarantees by the
free will of the people, who would be made to under-
stand how completely their return would be for the
good of the great Italian country.
The foregoing is in a few words the real explana-
tion of the negotiation at Villafranca, and to every
impartial mind it is evident, that the Emperor Na-
poleon obtained by the treaty of peace as much as,
and perhaps more, than he had acquired by arms.
We must even distinctly acknowledge that it was
not without a feeling of profound smypathy, that the
Emperor Napoleon saw with what frankness and re-
solution the Emperor Francis Joseph renounced, for
the sake of European peace, and in the desire of
re-establishing good relations with France, not only
one of his fairest provinces but even the policy—
dangerous, perhaps, it may have been, but in any case
not devoid of glory—which had secured to Austria
the dominion of Italy.
In fact, if the treaty were sincerely carried out,
Austria was no longer for the Peninsula that hatile
and formidable enemy that bsffied all the national
aspirations, from Puma to Rome and from Florence
to Naples ; but, on the contrary, she became a
friendly power, sine* she freely consented to be no
longer a German power on this side of the Alpe, and
to develop Italian nationality as far as the shores
of the A.driatie.

From the preceding it is easy to comprehend that
if, after the peace, the destinies of Italy had been
confided to men more intent on the future welfare of
their common country than on petty partial sucoeeaes,
the object of their effort. should have been to develop
and not restrict the consequences of the treaty of
Villafranca. What dare simple and patriotic, in
feet, than to say to Austria: " You desire the re-
tain of the Archdukes? Well, be it so; but then
fulfil loyally your promisee concerning Venetia ; let
her receive a life proper for herself ; let her have
an Italian administration and army ; in one word,
let the Emperor of Austria be on this side of the Alps
nothing more than the Grand Duke of Venetia, just
as the King of the Netherlands is for Germany
merely the Grand Duke of Luxembourg."
It is even possible that, as the result of trunk and
friendly negotiations, one might have induced the
Emperor of Austria to adopt combinations more in
harmony with the wishes manifested by the Duchies
of Modena and Parma.

----- -
The Emperor Napoleon, after what had passed,
was justified in relying on the good sense and the
patriotism of Italy, and in believing that it would
understand the motive of his policy, which may be
briefly stated u follows :—" Instead of risking a
European war, and consequently the independence
of his emu by; instead of expending three hundred
millions (of francs) more, and shedding the blood of
fifty thousand of his soldiers, the Emperor Napoleon
accepted a peace which sanctions, for the first time
foe ages, the nationality ofthe Peninsula. Piedmont,
which represents more particularly the Italian
cause, finds her power considerably augmented; and
if the confederation be established she will play the
principal part therein; but one only condition is an-
nexed to all these advantages—it is the return of the
old sovereign houses to their Sutra." This
language, we still believe, will be understood by the
sound-minded portion of the netion ; for otherwise,
what will happen? The French Government has
already declared the Archdukes will not be restored
to their States by a foreign force, but a part of
the conditions of the peace of Villafranca
not having been executed, the Emperor of Austria
will find himself released from all the engagements
made in favour of Venetia. Harassed by hostile
demonstrations on the right bank of the Po, he will
maintain a war footing on the left bank; and in-
stead of a policy of conciliation and pesos we shall
see a policy of distrust and of hatred revive, which
will entail new troubles and new misfortune..

Great hopes seem to be entertained of a European
congress, and we heartily desire it; but we much
doubt if a Congress will offer better conditions for
Italy. A Congress will only demand what is. jest;
and would it be just to demand of a great power
important concessions without offering in return
suitable compensations? The only issue would be
war ; but let not Italy be mistaken. There is but
one power in Europe which makes war for an idea ;
that is France, and France has accomplished her
task.