The Express.
London, England, 1847-01-15 00:00:00

tied in the uueommuniuted and, at leant by her Majesty's
present goverament, unacquieweil in, memorandum ofthe
27th of k'ebruary, 1846. The imminent danger specified in
that memorandum was the likelihood that either the queen
or the infanta should be about immediately to maraca foreign
prince, not being a descendant of Philip V. But if that like-
lihood had ever existed, it had at all events ceased to
exist when M. Bressun demanded the hand of the infanta
for the Duke of Montpensier. Not only had it then ceased
to exist, but with respect to the queen, whose marriage was
at that time the immediate and only subj., et of diieeinion, it
had been succeeded by an impossibility. because, when
Count Bresson demanded the band of the infanta for the
Duke of Montpclisier, the marriage of the queen to the
Infante Dun Francisco had actualiy been resolved upon and
settled. Therefore the memorandum of February the 27th,
1846, cannot afford the slightest ground on which to build a
justification for breaking the engagement of Eu. M. Guizot
denies that the treaty and the renunciation. of Utrecht
afford to the British government any ground of right fur
protesting against the marriage of the Duko of Mont-
pensier, and against its possible a:mug:teems. Now the
British government have protested against that marriage u
at variance with the spirit of thu treaty of Utrecht, and
against ecrtain contingent consequences of that marriage, as
a violation of the letter of that treaty ; and her Majesty's
goventment are of opinion thnt their protest recta upon good
and sufficient grounds. M. Guitut says that the treaty of
Utrecht lied a double object : the first, to secure the crown
of Spain to Philp and his descendants ; the second, to pre.
vent the possibility of a union of the crowns of France and
Spain on one and the same head. Now, the first of theme
results seas undoubtedly the erect, but is nowhere
put firth as one of the objects of the treaty ;
and the second was a means and not an cad.
The main and real object of the treaty, besides
the restoration of peace between the contrite:Mg partici,
was that for which the pr ceding war had been under-
taken ' • and it is truly net forth in the second article of the
treaty between Great Britain an 1 Spain,'which recites that:

"fa guerre qu'on cunt de ter:taper heureirsesuent rur cette pax.
a (te entreprine au semnieneernent, et onetinuie pi hmg.tempi tree
tent d'anitnusitr• et dee depewes immeneea, mead Bien qu'aree uno
errUsiun do bang inesprimable, a oder du ddirter imminent dont la
liiterti, et I.s mint,• de tuute I EUTIlik a (It' meuscee par I'union trop
etroit des royaumes d'Espaigne et de France."
It was a too close and intimate union between the king-
doms of France and of Spain which constituted that danger
to the balance of power in Europe which it was the real
object of the war of succession and of the transactions of
Utrecht for ever afterwards to avert; and the means by which
that too close and intimate union was to be prevented were the
perpetual separation of the two crowns, ant perpetual exclu-
sion of any prince of the royal family of une of the two
countries, or of any of the descendants of such prince from
succeeding to the throne of the other. lier ajestj's govern-
ment, therefore, contend that the marriage of the Duke of
Nlontpensitr to the infanta is at variance with the main
object of the treaty, and that the letter and positive stipula-
tions of tte treaty would prevent any of the descatdants of
that prince from succeeding to the throne of Spain " what-
ever might be the manner iu which the succession might de-
volve upon their line." The French government do not
pretend to deny the validity of the renunciations of Utrecht.
Thos: renunciations were clear, positive, explicit, and corn.
prthensive. They were incorporated in the treaty, and were
made part of the law both of France and of Spain. And
the King of France engaged by the stipulations of the treaty
" solennellement et par parole de roi," that neither he nor
his heirs and successors "no (crone jarnais r➢on, nine per.
mettront quo jamais it suit mien fait, capable d'emptcher lea
renonciations et autres transactions susdites d'avoir leer
plein et entier etfet;" ,ut that, on the contrary, "they would
take sincere care and exert themselves, atilt que rica ne
donne atteinte a oe fondement du s.ilut public, nine puisse
Febranler." Her Majesty's government arc surprised that
iu the face of such renunciations and of such stipulations and

engagements, the French government should endeavour to
represent, as is implied, though not directly asserted, in M.
G uieot's despatch, that the descendants of the Duke of Mont-
pensier could relieve themselves from the positive and perpetual
excludust which attaches to them from the transactions of
Utrecht, by the plea that they would inherit rights from the
Infanta Luisa Fernsnda. It is manifest that no claim trans-
mitted to them by the infant' could counterbalance or set
aside the poritive disqualification which they will inherit
from the Duke of Montpensier. Nothing is more common
than that the disqualification inherited by children from one
of their parents overrides the quelification which they
inherit from the other. But it there were any value
in this implied assertion of the French gdvernment,
and if the marriage of the Duke of Montpellier
with the infanta would really free his descendants from the
disabling effects of the renunciations of Utrecht, how could
the cmclusion of that mune:tee be reconciled with the above
quoted engagement of the crown of France solemnly taken,
" et par parole de roi," never to do, nor to permit to be
done, anything which could be capable of preventing those
renunciations "from haring their full and entire effect"?
The French government, therefore, must either admit that
the descendants of the Duke of Montpensier are excluded by
virtue of the renunciations in the treaty of Utrecht, or they
must acknowledge that they have violated the en-
gagement in that treaty. M. Guizot, however, quotes
instances of marriages of two princes of Spain with
princesses of France, and of a prince of France with a prin-
ces. of Spain, and he says that the last instance is remark-
able, because it was the heir to the crown of France who
married one of the heiresses of the crown of Spain. To
them instances her Majesty's governm eit would reply that
even if they were cases in which the stipulations of Utrecht
had been overlooked, the fact of their Mime been so over-
looked by statesmen in the last century, would be no reason
why they should not be appealed to and observed by stater
men in the present century, if those stipulations see us them-
selves clear, positive, and indisputable. Doubtful stipulations
may receive an interpretation from precedents ; but a trea-
ty that is plain and precise, can only be invalidated by an
act as formal an itself. A law is not abrogated fir one man
because another man has abstained from appealing to its
enactmeuts ; and • treaty is not annulled for one generation
because another generation, under circumstances essentially
different, may lave allowed its stipulations to lie dormant.
But the cases quoted by M. Guizot are very different from
that of the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier. In all
thew cases the Salk law wee in force both in France and in
Spain ; and the princesses in question, instead of being imme-
diate heiresses to the crown of the country, to the royal family
of which they respectively belong id, were in the two first in-
stances by the law of France altogether excluded, and in the
third instance by the law of Spain excluded until all male ham
should be extinct. It is obvious that while the Salic law was
in force in both countries, the strict enforcement of the
stipulations of Utrecht in regard to females might well be
considered as less important than it has now become, sines
the &eve which bas of late years been mete in the law of
succession in Spain. But with respect to the cues quoted,
it may be observed, as to the first, that after that marriage,
the treaty between Spain and Austria in 172.5 still further
confirmed and recorded the exclusion of all French prison
and their descendants from the throne of Spain ; and with
reepect to the third, that no descendants of that marriage
have succeeded or have claimed a right to succeed to the
Spanish crown. M.Guisot, indeed, says that the stipulations
of Utrecht will suffice forthe future, as they have done for the
past, for the interests of peace and for the balance of power
in Europe. If her Majesty's government are to understand
by that sentence, that whereas no French prince or hie de-
scendants has since the treaty of Utrecht claimed to succeed
to the throne of Spain, no French prince or his descendants
will ever claim so to succeed in future, H.M.'s govern-
ment would admit that the question at issue between the two
governments was divested of much of its practical import-
ance. Her Majesty's government, however, cannot admit
that the experience of the past, as asserted by M. Guisot, has
demonstrated that foreign influence has no power of swaying
the international policy of Spain. On the contrary, the
history of the last century affords many examplesto show
how, in consequence of that intimate connexion which, not-
withstanding the treaty of Utrecht, continued to subsist be-
tween the crowns of France and Spain, Spain followed
France into war, and made peace only when France did
to,. It is time indeed, as M. Guizot reminds
her Majesty's government, that in the present eee-
tury, Spain made a great and successful effort to vindicate
her national independence ; and it may be remarked that the
unanimity of feelings which then crowned their exertesse
with success, was much strengthened by the deep imperial
produced throughout Spain by the seercay and eurpnee with
which those proceedings were conducted, which were la.
tended to lead to the ettablishment of a Franqh prince on the
Spanish throne. The British government has not, as M.
Guizot seems to suppose, forgot those ciente ; nor does it
fail to render justice to the patriotism then displayed by the
Spanish nation ; and her Majesty's government are caw
vaned, that on any analogous occasion, the same spirit
would animate the whole Spanish people. But he
Majesty's government would deeply lament that se7
such occasi .n should arise again to let lore on the pr-
insult • tempest of angry passions ; and again ts
pour fourth on the soil of Spain a deluge of human blood.
The calamities of such a conflict, however great they :Lb:
are not too dear a price far a people to pay for the
nsnce of their national independence ; and, though oda
states may be involved in the evils connected with seas
struggle, sound policy may lead them to cheer immediate
exertions and sacrifices, rather than encounter the tater
dangers which apathy and inactivity would render too few
tain. But great would be the responsibility which woe
weigh upon those who should wantonly have been the err
of such evils • and if those evils, besides being unaseeseadig
produced, had' their origin in breaches of treaties sad of
engagements, that responsibility we -ev
overwhelming. I have to instruc
to M. Guisot, and to send him e

(Signed;

The letter teem M. r; nista .
was accidentally printed yeaterday.

tended, yesterday,
remainder, ---

engagements, that responsibility would indeed be heavy ad
overwhelming. I have to instruct you to read this deepen*
to M. Guiaot, and to send him officially a copy of it.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALariurros.
The letter fns-n M. Gaiaat to M. Jarmse, .1 ded Nov. 21, IA
was amidentally printed yesterday. It Woad bar; followed the Or%
•
CRACOW.
Our extracts from this series of despatches at-
tended, yesterday, to the fourth. We now give the
remainder, commencing with No. 5 :
r.-11. REXENE TO M. OCIZOT.
(Extract.)
BERLIN, APRIL 3,1841—Commenting on the purport of
the despatch of your Excellency, M. de Canna has added:
" Assuredly, we never thought of prolonging beyond the
Axed period, by any real necessity the occupxtioa of the ter-
ritory and the town of Cracow. The Russian and Prumaiaa
troops, as you already know, evacuated the town almost
ia
metffitely ; but everything must bit re-establishedgalm
vernment no longer exists ; we cannot place
Schindler at the head of the senate ; it is a long and
plexing affair, and we feel the necessity of terminable ie.
After having re-established order, we must re-establish 10.
gularity ; re-compose a government which may act. nit&
tranquillity his been but too lone disturbed, and the fogs.
that this violent crisis has given birth to will unfortasetehi
be too long a time in disappearing."
EIMMMIIMErI..IIIIIIII