The Express.
London, England, 1847-01-14 00:00:00

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resulting from the renunciations were a rontagious fact, that
might be thus communicated from one hennas to the other,
these descendants of Philip V. hid forfeited their rights to
the crown of Spain. There is no more foundation for main-
taining it at present, for the situation arising out of the
marriage of the Infanta with the Duke of Montpensier
does not make the least alteration in that which the
treaty of Utrecht has founded, and which has received, in
fact and in right, the adhesion of all Europe. After twelve
years war between Europe and England, the first among the
European powers thought that a grandson of Louis XIV.
and his descendants might, without danger to the equili-
brium of Europe, sit on the throne of Spain while the de-
scendants of Lou's XIV. were seated on the throne of
France. This degree of kindred between the two Crowns,and
the bonds that might result from it between the two states,
were fully accepted, in the commencement of the last cen-
tury, by all the power.; and the guarantees, inserted in the
treatyof Utrecht to prevent the union of the crownsof France
and Spain on the same head, appeared to them fully to
satisfy their legitimate interests. That is the public
law of Europe—the situation accepted and settled in the
name of the equilibrium of Europe. The marriages just
concluded alter in no wi-e, I repeat, this situation.
They had naught to the degree of kindred between the
crowns of France and Spain. They tske away none of the
guarantees stipulated by the treaties agiinst the union of
these two crowns. They cannot then legitimately give rise
to any protestation founded on these treaties and on the
public law of Europe. You will please, Monsieur le Comte,
to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston.—l am, &c.

Y. OUIZOT TO TEE DEIE OF OLUCK' HERO.

(Private extract )
PARIS, NOV. 11, 1813.—Doubtless the Neapolitan com-
bination suits us admirably, and we shah neglect nothing
that may contribute to its success ; but to promote its suc-
cess, you, better than any one, know that it must
seem to be entirely the product of the Spanish soil,
and not a foreien importation. We have done much
to obtain the King of Naples's consent to an acknow-
ledgment, because we wished that combination also to
be possible, with dignity for the queen and the
Spanish nation: and a greater latitude to be thus allowed
to their choice. We are delighted to have succeeded. But
Spain alone must decide which of the descendants of Philip
V. is most ;agreeable to her; and we shall not leave the
ground on which we took our stand from the beginning.
Let then your language be in conformity with our determin-
ation on this point. We do not, however, intend to show
ourselves averse to the marriage of the queen with
the Duke of Cadiz or the Duke of Seville, nor will we
assume with regard to that combination an atti-
tude that may render its success a failure for us. It is
agreeable to our principles. It has many chances in its favour
and the interests of France hare nothing to apprehend from,
it. It is necessary, likewise, insetting forth the advantages,
far Spain herself, of the Neapolitan combination, and in
assisting its ratural means of success, to state that the com-
bination of the s•ns of Don Francisco de Pula will not en'y
meet with no objection on our part, but obtain our cordial
support.

Y. OVIZOT TO COUNT BILESSON.
(Private extract.)
PA FRY, Szrr. 2, 1845.-1 find, on arriving here, your
letter of the 28th of November. You have perfectly under-
stood the shades of distinction between the marriages. We
by no means intend to renounce the Neapolitan. You must
support it throughout, provided, however, it is not a con-
straint on the Spanish public, such as must probably
result from disturbances in • country already so dis
turbed from differences in a government so much
rent by faction. We likewise wish it to be well
known, and averred that we, France and Bourbons, on
our own account, make no objection to, we place no obstacle
in the way of, the Duke of Seville's candidature. That com-
bination satisfies and suits us ; and if, notwithstanding our
continued support of the combination Trapani meet with
grave obstacles in and from Spain, we shall snpport the
Duke of Seville both vita Queen Christina and the Spanish
cabinet. Such is our whole and undisguised thought on
both hypotheses, Act in consequence.

6. N. ()MOT TO COUNT JiRNAC.
(Private extract.)
PARTR, AUG. 19, 1816 —The infant Don Enrique is com-
prised in our principle. We admit him entirely. We have
no objection whatever to him, but it being always under-
stood that Queen Isabella, and the queen, her mother, and
her government., are alone ealled on to choose between the
two brothers, and are perfectly free in their choice, and if
their preference should on the Duke of Cadiz, that no ob-
jection to him shall come from London.

M. OCIZOT TO cooler BRESSON.
(Private.)
PARIS, Dic. 10, 1845.—The basis of our policy towards
Spain in general, and especially in the question of the mar-
riages of the Queen and of the Infanta, is the firm desire of
preventing between the two principal allies of Spain, France
and England, a return of that active rivalry, of those despe-
rate struggles, which have done, and would still do, so
much evil to Spain first, and then to Europe. This policy
is in the interests of Spain as well as of France. Spain has
at present two interests of a superior order dominating,
to which all others must be subordinate.
An interest of internal policy, which is to Five a foundation
to its government and to its administration, to insure its
tranquillity, its prosperity, and its internal strength. An
interest of external policy, which is. I do not hesitate to say
so, to unite itself intimately with France, and to regain, by
so doing, its rank in Europe, by conserving its independence
and its repose. For the suttees of these two interests, the
cessation of all active and lively struggle between France
and England, on account of Spain, is very desirable.
Our policy is therefore, in its general principle, Spanish as ,
well as French, and conformable to the superior and COM-
mon interests of the two countries. When, therefore, in the
special question of the marriage, either of the Queen or of
the Infant, we :pat aside 'all combinations which might
create a struggle between France and England, on Spanish
ground, far from Spain having to complain, or be shacked
at it, she ought to approve of us, and second us with all her
power; for in that we have to make, and we really
do make, es well as her, to the high and common
interests of the two countries, the sacrifice of in-
terests
and inclinstinns which are most dear to us,
and which we would follow most willingly, if great
and wholesome reasons of state did not dissuade us from it.
But that this policy may be practicable and attain its end, it
must be mutually accepted, and practised upon by England
as by France. with the same moderation and the same
sincerity. If, then, whilst we labour to avoid, by the mar-
riage either of the Queen or of the Infanta, all combinations
which would rekindle the Anglo-French struggle in Spain,
as much was not done on the other hand; if, on the con-
trary, the prepared is allowed to be proposed, a combine-
don contrary to the principles proclaimed by us (the throne
of Spain must not depart from the descendants of
Philip V.), a combination which would compel ns
to renew ourselves the struggle which we wish
to destroy, it is evident that we could not,
and decidedly we should not accept of such a position. The
more I examine, the more convinced I am, that in Spain
and around Spain there is an active and incessant labour
going on to bring about the marriage of a Prince of Coburg
either with the Queen or with the Infants. The British
government does not positively work at this marriage, but
it does not endeavonr efficaciously either to prevent it. Jt
does not express a peremptory no to a combination
that would place a Prince of Coburg on the throne, as we
have as regards a French prince. And on their side, Queen
Christina and the Spanish government endeavour to
turn to account the fear we have of a Coburg
marriage, to insure the Montpensier marriage, always
leaving mom for the possibility of a Coburg marriage,
in case the Montpensier marriage should not succeed.
We cannot act the part of dupes in this. We shall continue
to follow sincerely our policy, that is to say, to avoid every
combination likely to rekindle the conflict between France
and England on the account of Spain. But if we perceive
that on the other side they are not so precise and
decided as we are . if, for example, either from want
of energy of the English government, or by the doings
of its partisans in Spain and around Spain, a marriage
was preparing for the Queen or for the Infante, which en-
dangered our principle—the descendants of Philip V.—and
if that combination had chances of success with the Spanish
government, then we should come forward immediately,
without reserve, and should demand simply and openly the
preference for the Duke of Montpensier. Such is our line of
conduct—it is perfectly consistent and loyal ; and, at the
same time it is adapted to disconcert, either before-hand, or
at the the critical moment, the Coburg combination, or any
other. I confidently entrust you with its execution. You
are thus armed for the present and for the future. You will,
I Ism sure, only make use of your different weapons in a case
of necessity, or at an opportunate moment. Follow up our
policy to its end, as long as it is not rendered impossible to us
by a oombinatipn against us in opposition to our principle ;
and if you find yourself reduced to this extremity, stop the
combination by the means I place in your hands.