The Express.
London, England, 1846-11-18 00:00:00

--,-------
eo---------me to as was alleged, for allowing sentence to be pro-
nounced against the marriage. Such change of mind might
have been the result of her being advised that she Ind no
good defence to the suit. Neither was the alleged agree-
ment with the promoter of the Pa or his agent, but
with her husband. And there was no proof of it beyond her
own testimony, on which, without corroborotion, he could
not rely. lie did not attach much importance to what was
said et the negligent conduct of her proctors in the manage-
ment of the suit. It amounted at most, if true, to evidence of
ignorance, or want of zeal on their part, and nett* evidence of
fraud and collusion. Evidence of fraud and collusion ought in
the main to be extrinsic of the proccedinr in this F u it, though
they might be of such a nature as to evidence bad faith. But
there was nothing of that sort in this ease. Having cons
he
i-
dered well all the circumstances, he was of opinion that
could not conclude, from the evidence before him, that the
sentence declaring the marriage void was obtained by fraud
and collusion, and he must tberefcre overrule the exceptions.
_. __....... lin4 cht Brace. ....

Before Vice-Chancellor limp; nrove.
Avt.on v. SOUTH DEVON RAILWAY COH
eircumPANT.—
li PA
ances
=HT or or CALLS.—This Cabe, of which the et
were stated in this paper of yesterday, was men-
tioned again this morning. His Honour mild that he was
prevented by the practice of the court from giving the plain-f
tiff a case for the opinion of a court of law, at this stage c
the proceedings, unlepe the defendants would consent. As
the defendants were not disposed to consent, he would Ow
the plaintiff liberty to pay the interest on the unpaid calls
under protest (provided he made the payment within a week)
and without prejudice to any question in the cause. The
motion to stand over until the hearing of the cause.
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
IN THE MATTER OP MARTHA ELIZABETH RHODES SUE
rola-
T-
TLEWORTH, A LAYNATIC.—This case, of the proceedinsra
tile to which in the Bail Court an account was published court in
this paper Yesterday, was now brought before the at
the suggestion of Mr. Justice Patteson. After Mr. Parry
had been again heard at great length in opposition to the
sufficiency of the order and the certificate on which the
lunatic was deteineel, Lord Denman said that the court
would not have felt any difficulty in the case had it nut been
that Mr. Justice Patteson had entertained doubts which,
becan'e they emanated from him,
were entitled to
highest respect, and could not but induce the court to view
its own opinion with some distrust. That opieion the court
was, however, bound to pronounce. The case court
as
one of great importance, and in this peculiar, th
everything which related to the unfortunate persons
who were in the situation of the object of this application,
was, like their condition itself, entirely exceptional. In
recent years several acts of parliament had been passed for
the purpose of protecting such persons, and provision,
framed with extreme care and tenderness, had been made for
preventing fraud, and for investing lunatics with safeguards
against the devices of those who might have an interest in
confining them without cause. To found the proceeding
for committing any one to an asylum, an " order" to the
keeper of the asylum must be issued, not necessarily, how-
ever, by some one hearing a particular character 4 because it
was intended that the right to issue it should arise in the
opportunity for making observations on the conduct of the
lunatic. In the present case the order had been issued by
the clergyman of the parish, and the court thought
that he was under the circumstances a very fit
person to issue it. The act of parliament required
that certain particulars of information should be appended to
the order, or that the special circumstances which prevented
the disclosing them in the order should be dated. Unless
that should be done the lunatic was not to be confined in an
asylum. In this case many of those particulars had been
disclosed, and with respect to those omitted, which involved
the previous history of the lunatic, the excuse
shoe
feu oat
the lunatic was watched by a party whom
appeared sufficient to the court, and to have been made
with Lena fides, With regard to the certificate, the
language of the 46th section of the 8 and 9 Victoria,
c. 100, differed from the section immediately pre.
ceding it which treated of the order, apd accuse to ha
directory rather than imperative, aud the court cculd not
but feel that provisions which related to persons known to
the law, and presumedly skilful, as were medical men, might
without' impropriety be construed as directory only. The
first certificate objected to stated that the opinion of the
gentleman who gave it was caused by his finding that the
lunatic laboured under delusions of various kinds, and was
dirty and indecent in the extreme. It was contended that
this was only a conclusion from facts which ought to have been
set out; but, as the statement of the particulars on which
the conclusion was founded would not enable any tribunal to
determine whether the alleged delusions were in fact delu-
sions; and, as the result to be deduced from any enumeration
of specific facts must necessarily bo referred to men of science
to determine, it could not have been intended that the certi-
ficate should contain a minute detail of the circumstances
on which the opinion was based. But, further, this
certificate did contain the statement that the luna-
tic was dirty and indecent in the extreme, and that
phrase "in the extreme " would certainly justify the conclu-
sion. The second certificate did not strictly follow the form
given by the set of parliament. It was to he lamented that
it did not, and medical men should understand that the form
ought to be strictly purpled ; but if the court found a certi-
ficate equivalent to one in the form prescribed, it could not
say that it was bad, especially when the character in which
it was given was taken into consideration. He, therefore,
was of opinion that the statement therein of the grounds of
the conclusion—a conversation that day had with the
lunatic—war a statement of a fact within the meaning of the
act which required the medical man, who granted the cer-
tificate, to set out " facts," as the ground of his belief. It
must not be forgotten that these certificates were net final, and
that their function was the pointing out source% of information
that directed and facilitated ulterior inquiry. It wete,however,
his duty to go beyond the mere decision on the sufficiency of
these documents, and to say that if the court had thought
them bad, it nevertheless could not have discharged a lunatic
admittedly dangerous, without betraying its duty to the pub-
lic. The court had no power to set aside the certificate, it
could only discharge the lunatic from custody. Would the
court be entitled, either as judges or as individuals, to do
that It had been suggested that the lunatic, if dis-
charged, might be again committed to an asylum ;
but it would be much better to leave the luna-
tic in custody, assured, as the court was, that she would
be discharged, if safely that might be, by those who were
specially appointed to watch over lunatics and protect them
from wrong. He thought that it would be an abuse of the
very name of liberty to restore to liberty a person who then
would become a curse to herself and others ; and that they
who had an interest in her welfare ought to rejoice that
there was thrown around her the protection of this moot
considerate act of parliament. The application, therefore,
in his opinion, ought to be refused.
Mr. Justice Coleridge and Mr. Justice Wightman con-
curred.
Mr. Justice Erle said that he fully concurred in what had
been said by the Lord Chief Justice, and was further of
opinion that the prohibition in the act was confined to the
keepers of licensed lunatic asylums, leaving the restraint of
lunatics to be regulated at common law.
BAIL COURT.
ALEXANDER v. COONS.—PERJURT.—Mr. Locke moved
fora new trial in this case, which was an action to recover
171., and was tried before the Under-Sheriff. The case for
the plaintiff was supported by two witnesses only of the
names of Willbeam and Robley, the latter a female. The
affidavits stated that Willbeam was a witness for Alexander
the plaintiff, on every occasion, and that Alexander was in
the habit of getting up fictitious cases, and proved them by
means of Willbeam. In this case Willbeam swore that he
was in Alexander's shop when Cooke purchased certain furs
for a third party, and that he (Willbeam)
delivered them to
him. The other witneas swore she was present in Alex-
ander's shop at Islington in April, when Cooke called with a
lady and said the furs were for her, and offered 51. 10s. in
part payment and a bill for the remainder, which was re-
flood. This was the whole evidence. Cooke in his affi-
davit denied that there was ever any such sale, and that
every word sworn by Willbeam and the other witness
was false. At the trial Willbeam was asked how many
times he had been a witness for Alexander, and be said three
limes only, but it was sworn that he had been a witness five
times. Evidence could be produced to show that Alexander
had been Lied for stealing a watch, and imprisoned for six
months; that he had been in the pillory, at Guernsey for
forgery, and had been in Newgate several times. A bin had
been lately found against him for perjury, which had been
removed into this court by certiorari, and was now pending,
Willbeam being also prosecuted with him. It was sworn
that Cooke had not been to Islington for three years. The
defendant was willing to pay the debt and costs into court to
abide the event.—A rule nun was granted, the money to be
paid into court, if it was made absolute.
Re Jousr DowLixo.—Balt.—Mr. Prideaux moved, on'
behalf of this person, a prisoner in Winchester gaol, that he
might be admitted to bail. The warrant was not verified by
affidavit, and it was stated therein that the prisoner waa com-
mitted for cutting and wounding one George White, a police-
man, in the execution of his duty, in the town of Andover.
As it did not state that he had feloniously cut and wounded,
it did not show that it was a felony ; and the prisoner was
entitled to bail as of right.
Mr. Justice Pattown.—ls there any authority to show
that we must construe a warrant so strictly. You had better
have a writ of certiorari to bring up the depositions, and take
a rule nisi that he may be admitted to bail in the country.
I don't think I should be justified in treating this merely as
a misdeameanor.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
Sittings in Banco.
POTT AND ANOTHER V. CLEOO, ERECUTOR.—III-
- TO DEPoerrolia IN BANES.—The plaintiffs are
assignees of a bankrupt banking firm, and the defendants
executor of the late Mr. Turner (father of the lady who
acquired so much celebrity by having been carried off, some
years ago, by Mr. Gibbon Wakefield). Mr. Turner died
tuisolveat, and leaving a large Name against him due
to his banker, now represented by the plaintiffs. This
action was brought to recover that balance. The defendant
pleaded a set-off of various sums paid into the bank to the
credit of the late Mr. Turner. To those pleas of set-off the
plaintiffs replied that the payments alleged to have been made
to the credit of Mr. Turner Were barred by the statute of
limitations, and the question was, whether they were 90 or
not. At the trial, before the late Mr. Justice 'Williams, at
the last spring assizes of Chester, a verdict passed for the
plaintiffs upon certain counts, one of which was upon the
statute of limitations. A rule to set aside that verdict
and enter one for the defendant having been subsequently
obtained, pursuant to leave reserved,
The Attorney-General and Mr. Welaby were now beard,
at great length, in showing canoe against it.—Mr. Chilton,
(Lc., Mr. Townsend, and Mr. Egerton, supported it.—The
only question of public interest raised during the
of the arguments was, whether there existed gra=
bankers and their customers the relation of debtor and cre-
ditor, so as to make payments made to the credit of the ens-
tomer a debt from the day upon which they were made,
upon which On statute of limitations operated; or; whether