The Express.
London, England, 1847-05-11 00:00:00

way is would be affected by the repeal of the
Bank °LaMar Ad and the ease of imeeskner kffis. Lately,
the Lab of Frazier, when the trade et Mit curry was
mace in he same predicament es oar own was at Ods ma.
seen, stureeded in obtaining a loan of KAM et Wee
from this Jesuitry, and as secs se it was known the the
loan w:s Intend into, eoaddeace was in • greet memare
re cored ; so much so, indeed, that the Bank of France was
able to forego the demand foe the lest instalment of 200,000,
which ups this time he believed had never left this country.
(Hear) This proved low everything turned on credit. bet
the Book of England free now, and confidence would be at
once teetered, and the urgent demands they now had for dis-
counts would at en. mane. Having tried the bank charter
now for three yews, and found it either altogether inope-
rative, or 9nly *primly* for evil, let the house follow the
example et a certain man who, having a fig-tree which bore
no fruit, said, "Cut it down • why cumbereth it the
ground ?"C' Hear," and a laugli.)
Mr. CAR WELL contended that the premises of the
noble lord (in which he agreed) did not bear out his conchs-
siun. Ills premises had been addressed to the state of things
as they existed, but when he charged the pressure on the
money market, high prices, and low stocks of foreign pro-
duce [tithe neglect of the currency, he altogether differed
with lam. Manage the arrangements of the currency as
they would, they never could estract any artificial advantage
from nem; but if in periods of pressure they dealt with the
currency without great caution, they would only increase the
disarrangements, and add to the difficulties they would
Teruel,. The currency, according to Adam Smith, wasa
whi el. creatieg nothing of hash, but carrying round that
which was cleated. They had a certain quantity of articles
that could be carried round, and currency was the wheel
that carried them round. That wheel, if it went round in-
acturetely, though it might appear to give abundance when
there oas really pressure, would, by the absence of economy
in the first instance diminish the supplies for the later and
more severe period of the difficulty end aggrai ate the evil.
The country was now beginning to feel the gigantic works
which she had undertaken in a period of prosperity, but
which were beyond her strength, at the same time ehe had
to mound against one of the greatest calamities that bad
befallen in modern times, and the pressures these occasioned
war not to be removed by any change in the currency. It
would have been fortunate had the alarm been taken earlier
by the Beak and it had contracted its issues. He thought
alo it would have been fortunate if the Chancellor of the
Exchequer had cot called upon them for assistance when
they were already suffering from pressure in other quarters.
There were two duties, and only two, which attached to a
properly regulated system of currency—the first was truth of
the standard, and the second economy of application. The
measure of 1844 was merely to give full effect to that of 1819
for ensuring the first of these duties, by giving effect to
the right established by that act of converting bank paper
Tutu pdtl. The tint effect of the act of 1844 was to cause a
considerable drain of gold from the Bank of England. That
gold was not, however, exported, but found its way into the
coffers of private bankers sad other parties. It was said!
that the act of 1844 had been inoperative ; so far from that,
it hal introduced a circulation of gold instead of one of
country notes. No doubt this change had been effected with
some -acrifice of economy ; and, while it was going on, trade
might languish, but they knew since the passing of that act,
that trade had never before been so prosperous, and they had
had s command over all the grain is the world. Then it
was mid the hill wax mischievous, because it contracted the
circulation; and yet those who held that argument
in the next breath told them that the circuit'•
tion was Low 20,000,0001.' whereas the maximum
wee 21,500,0001. He denied that the remedy pro-
posed would create confidence or dissipate the alarm which
existed. It was argued that bank notes might be circulated
at home, while the gold was sent abroad. This, in effect,
was • propoeiticn for increasing the total amount of money
circuiation, by raising the price of all articles in the home
market. (Cheers.) He could not understand the argument
of the hon. member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), that the
same amount of note circulation would not do when corn
wee at one hundred shillings as when it was at fifty shillings.
We must pay for our imports, if not with our manufactures,
with gold; and if we desire to retain the gold, we must lower
our prices for other articles, so as to ensure foreigners to take
them instead. In what way, then, did the currency bill
apply to the present state of things. It we send gold abroad,
we restrict the circulating medium of this country, and
raise the price of every article of our produce. (Hear.)
When the measure of 1844 was passed, )hey wore told that in
the time of prosperity it would saturate the country with
gold, and the hoe. member for South Lancashire attributed
to Mr. Huskirson the opinion that by saturating the coun-
try with gold in the time of prosperity, it would be in the
country when the time of adversity came. But surely Mr.
Hu,kisson never meant to say that when the necessity for
importing corn arrived he would provide gold in pay-
ment for every quarter. The sum of his argument
was this, that the misfortune or prosperity of the
country depended not on the currency but on the amount
of capital; that the currency represented the amount
of capital accurately or inaccurately, according as it
was a good or bad currency. if it represented it accurately,
then they would always have to suffer such misfortunes lathe
pressure on the capital might create; if it represented it
inaccurately, then they would have to suffer that and such
calamities besides as the aggravation of circumstances might
cause. Truthfulness was the first object of a currency,
economy was only a secondary one. Ise the time of pros-
perity with experience before them, they considered what
was wise and determined on the scale of the currency and
the amount of issue they would permit to the Bank. The
effect of that hill had been to saturate the country with gold
without pressing on the energies of trade. They were now
called on to tamper with the currency under a pressure
which they were told would be only temporary. But if they
once departed from principle, they would pay for it
hereafter, and they had no reason for believing that
the time when the country would have to pay double
would be more ealsfactory ; en the contrary, they had
reason to believe that the mischief would be greater then.
On the other hand they said they were asked to say to the
people " We call on you to accommodate yourselves to the
necessities of the position in which providence has placed
you ; you have been affected with • scarcity ; you must
practise economy ; corn you want, and corn you must have
at any price ; you must Lao), fur it in gold, till you lower the
, price of other commodities to such an extent as will induce
foreigners to take them in place of your gold ; you must,
therefore, submit to this temporary inconvenience, but you
must not dare, great as the danger is, to face that greater
danger which a departure from sound principles must
bring upon you." (Cheery.)
After a few words from Mr. BROWN, in explanation,
Mr. T. BARING said he did not intend to take any wt
in the present debate, but he could not remain silent when
he heard the pressure throughout the country attributed to
the effects of a want of corn, to the extent of railway opera-
tions, and to mismanagement of its concerns on the part of
the Bank of England. He could not agree with the hon.
gentleman that no novel principle had been introduced in
the Bank Charter Act of 1844, and that it was in consequence
of its action that they had seen an influx of gold into the
country. It could not be attributed to the want of corn,
because in former periods, as in 1639 and 1840, there had
been a great want of corn in the country, and large im-
portations of that article hod taken place, without
being accompanied by that total want of credit, means
and power on the part of the commercial com-
munity to meet their engagements, such aa had been ex-
hibited during the last three weeks. (Hear, hear.) In other
1 countries a want of corn was felt, and importations into them
had taken place; is France the want was equal to their own,
and yet there was not in France that state of commercial
difficulty which was experienced here. (Hear, hear.) It
might be said that this was owing to the larger metallic cur-
rency of France. The metallic currency of that country was
80,000,000, with 15,000,000 of paper. la this country it was '
30,000,000 of paper against 60,000,000 of gold. But that
was not the question ; the question was, did the Bark of
France refuse to commerce those facilities which the Bank of ,
England refused, and was obliged to refuse? He thought that
railways had been carried to too great an extent, and it was
impossible to deep that they had diverted • great deal of
capital from other modes of employing it, but it was in con-
sequence of diminution of money facilities that railway
securities became unavailable to their holders. (Hear.) At
other periods there bad been as great speculation in the
country without the same pressure being felt. Neither was
it the want of discretion on the part of the Bank that pro-
duced :a pressure on commerce and trade which was totally
unexampled since 1825. (Hear, hear.) The real cause, in
his opinion, was the limitation imposed on the power of the
Bank. (Hear, bear.) He believed that without that limita-
tion they might have done with a much smaller amount
of notes, but the very fact of there being a limi-
tation at all produced this effect, that every
person took means up to that limit, and when he saw the
limitation approach he felt the greatest alarm lest he should
fail in his futpreengsgemeota (Hear.) He did not oppose 1
the act of 1644, because he considered it an experiment, and
seeing it brought forward and supported by men of great
power and ability, he was diapered to give it a fair trial.
Brides, he did not feel competent to give an answer to the
habitual question of the right hon. baronet, " What is a
pound ?" (Laughter.) But being eggaged in commercial
pursuits, and having rather actively engaged in them, he
could state what the facts were and what the effects were.
(Hear, hear.) And when be stated this, that for ten days
it was impossible for the most solvent houses to obtain
money on the most undoubted securities, for the smallest
sums, from any plain whatever, because the Bank of England
by this act could not afford facilities, he thought
he stated a fact that must raise seine doubt& in the minds of
those who supported the measure of 1844 ; and that, what-
ever the degree of human wisdom might be which was
brought to the preparation of it, emergencies and circum-
stances might arum in this country which would baffle all
their calculations. (Hear.) The fact that there were
60,0001. worth of silver, which was a legal tender, on which
not one penny could be raised, the Bank refusing it (not on
a question of price, but looking to its own safety, as it could
not have more than one-fifth of the bullion in its coffers in
silver on which notes could be issued) was another circum-
stance that must produce its effect on the minds of all with
respect to this act. He admitted that this act worked well,
so far as it prevented an undue issue on the part of the
country banks, but when they came to • real test of is
value it totally failed. At the very time when it should not
be done, the screw was put on, and the whole trade
and commerce of tie country was dislocated. (Hear.)
It was intended to give security to trade and commerce, but
with money at 3 per cent. in August, and 10 or 13 per cent.
in April, it was making trade and commerce the greatest
lottery in the world. (Hear, hear.) And who were the suf-
ferers ? not those who they said were the cause of the press-
ure, but the merchants and commercial men of England,
against whom not a word could be said, who could not be
seemed of overepeculatioe, and to whom not the slightest
suspicion could attack. (Hear, hear.) They had to export
7,000,0001. of money for corn, but the value of the
property of the country was depreciated 100,000,0001.
(Hear, hear.) Wty should that result follow
If the Bank of England were to advance half a million, and

Tardy, as if he bad bun tonimi by mom teldbhearted re-
miniscence. But hem, the id" they howl' the honour-
able member for Bimini smiths Itemaniable somber for
Clitheroe repeat those isniaaationo—oang*g the order of
battle, and giving as the war-cry MA, mine OM the Bank
of England was not pradom, and had set watched the signs
of the times. Why, let him ask, what nail ham happened
if the Bank of England had acted odisnriso than it had
done? Why, the very set which spoke loudest for the
prescience, the eirudence, the segacity, end the fore-
sight of the directorate, was the very act so much
questioned, of reducing the interest in Hugest! To that
set was the nation indebted for rescue from entire ruin. The
oanfidence of the public was raised by it ; and to that sir- ,
montane& England owed it that her merchants had scoured
the world for torn, and that the exchanges of the continent
were almost everywhere is oar favour ! (Cheers.) It
was not right that the Banked which had thus con-
tributed to teed time es y, go without any expres-
sion of approbation eir eimilknos from that great act—
but what they hod W &opium was, that so great an autho-
rity on this question as the right hon. gentleman, the last
person from whom they might have expected a rebuke,
should, amid • mass of incoherent assertions, have used
language which might be construed as coodemsatory of their
conduct, so that all the creatures of panical ignorance might
agree that the Bank of England was the author of the evil,
and that they had the authority of the right hon. baronet
the member for Tamworth fur the fact ! (Loud and
repeated cheers.) Now, he (Mr. Disraeli) was not
one of those who, on such a subject as the present,
could appeal to the passions of the house. He wished to
come to it es a matter repairing the calmest consideration
and he believed if this act of 1844 were calmly considered—
if facts were investigated and windy opinions avoided—they
might be led to a result highly beneficial to the country.
What mainly appeared to him imputable to the act of 1844
was, that whilst it was an eat which could not pre-
vent any mischief that under the former system might
have occurred, it was an act which prevented much of the
benefit which might have been expected had that system
been adhered to. It appeared to him that it would be found
upon examination that this act failed in every object it was
held out to the public as designed to fulfil. First, they
were told that this act would prevent any of those disorders
which they were accustomed to associate with the name
of panic. they
the act was under discussion he recollected
that there always was brought before them the instances of
1836.37 and of 1839. It was by a picturesque representa-
tion of those osseous of depression and public discom-
fort that this house was ailed upon, on the authority
of one supposed to he deeply read in the subject,
to pass the bill now under their consideration. Now, it was
a fen, which he was able to prove, that if this bill had been
enacted previous to 1836-7, the disorder which happened at
that time would have equally oocurred. He could prove that
to them by the records of their own house. In the drain of
1838-7, from the end of March to the end of December, the
bullion in the Bank fell from 8 millions to 3,900,0001., yet
the circulation was never aagreat as it would have been under
the act of 1844. If that act had been in existence in 1836-7
all the disar era which had occurred might still have occurred
—none of them would necessarily have been presented. The
official returns upon the table proved this fact. He took the
return from March to December, and he Lund that the cir-
culation in the month of March, 1836, was 17,600,0001.,
whilst the bullion wee 8,000,000!. According to the act of
1944, the circulation might have been 22,000,0004 If he
took the other months he found the same result. In April,
1836, the circulation was 18,500,0001, the bullion 7,600,0001.
Thus, whilst the circulation was 181 millions, it might, under
the acts of 1844, have been raised to 211 millions. Let them
look at the return for the 6th of December. At that time
the circulation was 17,000,0001.: the bullion only 3,900,000!.;
but, according to the act of 1844, the circulation might have
been 17,900,0001. But then it was said, that the act was
intended to control the discretion of the Bank. Now, how
would it have controlled the discretion of the Bank, or pre-
vented the evil in 1839 ? During the drain of 1839 the Bank
securities were 26,600,0001., the bullion, which in April in
that year was 9,500,0001., fell to 3,2.50,0001. On the 16th of
May the Bank raised the rate of diacoant to 5 per cent. on
the 20th of June to 64 per cent. On the 13th of July the dead
weightwas offered for sale, and on the Ist of August the rate of
interest was raised to 6 per cent. That was indeed a period of
ruin. Then was the time when the Bank weat to France
for assistance. Now let them see what, under such circum-
stances, would have been the effect of the act of 1844. This
was the way to test the virtue of that boasted law. On the
27th of November, 1838, the circulation of the Bank was
17,800,0001., the bullion 9,500,0001. Adding to the
9,500,0001. the 14,000,0001. which might be circulated under
the act of 1844, the total circulation might have been
23,500,0001., instead of 17,800,0004 Through the first four
months of 1839, the amnia state of things existed. On the
16th of May—the day the Bank of England raised their rate
of interest—the circulation was 18,300,0001. ; the bullion,
4,100,0001. Therefore, had the act of 1844 been iu operation,
the circulation would have been within 200,0001. of what
the circulation really was. Take the 13th of July. The cir-
culation on that day was 18,600,000/. ; the bullion, 3,400,000/.
The circulation under the bill of 1844 would have been hardly
one million leas. It was, therefore, perfectly clear, that as
to a " control of the power of the bill, ' which they were told
was one of the great virtues of the act of 1844, had that act
been in operstion in 1836 and 1839, it would have made no
tensible difference in the state of the circulation or the con-
duct of the Bank, and in any months of disaster and disorder
it would even have permitted a larger circulation than that
which really ruled. (Loud and repeated cheering.) But now
he came to another point, namely, the fluctuation of notes,
in correspondence with the amount of bullion in the Bank.
It was avowedly one of the objects of the act of 1844 that,
under its operehoo, notes should fluctuate in correspondence
with the amount of bullion which the Bank might hold.
Now how had that been fulfilled ? It appeared from the
return of the 21st of September, 1844, that the bullion at
that time in the Bank was 15,100,0001., whilst the cir-
culation was 20,600,0001. (Hear, hear.) But by the
eighth weekly return, after the act came into operation,
it appeared that the circulation had risen to 22,300,000!.,
whilst the bullion had decreased to 14,000,000/. Thus
whilst the bullion had decreased more than 1,000,0001. the
note circulation had increased 1,700,0001. If they came to
the clese of the year 1844 they would find that the bullion
return was 14,800,0001., whilst the circulation was 20,100,0001.
In the early part of 1845 the bullion was 14,500,0001., the
circulation 20.600,0001., but three moatha after the bullion
was 16,200,0001. whilst the circulation was precisely the same.
so that during three eventful months during which the
bullion increased 2 millions, the circulation was not altered.
(Hear, hear.) Yet it was on the faith of its causing a cone-
pondeece between the fluctuations of bullion and the fluctu-
ations of the circulation that this act was passed! (Cheers.)
If, then, this act had no power to control the discretion of
the Bank of England —if it failed in regulating
the fluctuation of the circulation—what advantage.
he would like to know, was gained by it to
counterbalance the great inconveniences of which they had
heard that night from the hon. member for
Huntingdon ?
(Hear, hear.) They were told that the state of affairs in the
city was unprecedented—that if there was not an actual state of
bankruptcy, that never was the condition of things equalled.
They were told that the Bank of England could not
mist the commerce of the country, because they were
obliged by law to keep a certain amount of treasure in a
particular department. He had shown that the act failed in
every object tor which it was designed. Why, then, run all
this risk—why encounter this certain peril sad danger for
the sake of retaining such • law upon the statute book ?
( Hear, hear.) It was thought at the time that the pro-
mised advantages would be dearly paid for—it was
now felt that they paid dearly without reaping
the advantages. It might he some case for the
bill if it attained the advantages it sought, but
not attaining those advantages were they to be ruined,
in order that it might not he repealed ? (Cheers.) If they
found that they had given their assent to such a bill upon
false pretences—if they found that it proved a failure in its
operation—let them not br satisfied by the right hon, baronet
tuning round to exclaim " You forget the injury it has
prevented." (Renewed cheers) When that right hon.
baronet tuba them of 1836 and 1839, let them remember the
facts he (Mr. Disraeli) had presented to their notice that
night, and judge for themselves how the prognostications of
the promoters of that measure had been rallied. (Chien).
The latitude of discretion in the Bank directors had not been
altered by the act, but remained just the same aa before.
During the progress of the measure through parliament,
well nigh the whole body of London bankers addressed to
the right hon. baronet a paper—a protest, in fact, in which
they expressed their conviction that unless, in periods of
crisis, the Bank had power to extend their issue'. beyond the
fourteen millions, the result of the limitation imposed would
be most injurious to industry. That prediction bad
been amply fulfilled. The bill of the right honourable
baronet had turned out a clear failure. Why,
then, was the country which had so suffered from
it to be longer afflicted with it ? There might be
looses resulting from the discretionary expansion of circula-
tion required by the London bankers in the protest he had
read, but the point was, that loss was better than ruin.
(Hear, hear.) He would now leave the question in the
hands of the Route.

Sir H. PEEL said the hon. gentleman was wrong in
stating that he left the question in the hantls of the house;
for the house was not in a position to pronounce any opinion
upon it at all. This great subject, in point of fact,
was before them in the most inconvenient form
possible. The right hon. gentleman, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer had made a proposition, of which be (Sir K.
Peel), tor one, cordially approved, and which he felt would
meet with the general sanction of the house. His hon.
friend the member for the City of London then attempted an
amendment on the proposition, but that amendment having
been with,!rawn, it was impossible for the house to come to
any satisfactory decision on the question submitted to it in the
course of the debate. Before the house formed any opinion
—it could come to no decision—on the propriety of some new
course with referenoe to the currency, he hoped it would take
warning by the course of the present debate ; if the act
in question was as defective as it was alleged to be, it seemed
extraordinary that there should be no approach to unanimity
with reference to the new measure to be substituted for it.
First, his hon. friend the memberpor the City of London re-
quired an assurance from the right hon. gentleman opposite
that, if be required any additional assistance to meet the de-
ficiency bills in July, he should draw money, not from the
banking department, but from the issue department, and he
said that if this assurance were given, he was content to allow
the act of 1844 to remain. This was a simple propo-
sition, involving no change in the principle of the
measure, but it appeared to him (Sir Robert Peel)
that his right hon. friend was taking that course likely to
enable him to dispense with the aid of the Bank next July.
Then came the hon. member for Montrose with a proposition
that there should be an unlimited competition and free trade
in banking, and that the country banks should be allowed to
issue 81. notes, and larger amounts, convertible, on demand,
into gold. This proposition, if adopted, would have no ten-
dency to diminish the gold circulation in this coun-
try, or to prevent the pressure that had arisen. Then
cams the hon. member for South Lancashire, with a

to go through the operation of liquidating accounts, the
same half million would soon return to its coffer!. Hie right
hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the
government had not in any way caused, or alai e d in pro.
ducing, the present pressure. What he blamed the gee( ne.
meat for, was the aupport given by them to measures which,
if they had not caused, had certainly increased, the pressure.
The system adopted was bawd on the assumption that there
would always be prosperity. It did not make any provides
for times of adversity, and at such periods it must place the
government under the necessity of resorting either to a loan
or to indirect taxation, and possibly even to both. The rule
that "two and two make four" was, of course, very correct;
but they had all along been proceeding on the principle that if
you take two from two there would remain tour. to
hear," from Lord O. Bentinck). He could not but wear;
that, by his statement in January, the right hoe. gentlemen
had not led the house to suppose there would be any defi-
ciency. (Hear, hear). The effect of what he said was, that
the loan of 8,000,000/. was to be paid in monthly instaluseets,
and that he would not allow any discount; and the public
were naturally led to bel.eve that he would esquire ony
the ordinary amount of deficiency bills. (Hear, hear). ea
for the loan contractors, he was quite aware that they had
no right to expect any sympathy in that house, tied MS*
admit that, under the circumstances which were believed as
exist, a fair price was given for the advance. It was very
discreditable to this nation, in a monetary point 01 view
that there was now less difference between the Eng.
lish 3 per cents, and the French 3 per cents., than there
kad been at any previous period. (Hear, hear.) His right
hon. friend said that his proposal would benefit the public.
So long as the Bank were enabled to give futilities, it might
have that effect ; but it must not be forgotten that if there
were a demand for gold from America, that demand mint
be met by • contraction of the notes. The wisest course,
under present circumstance; would have bee 0 to take, not
the narrow view of a needy Chancellor of the Exchequer,
with an empty treasury, but a wide and compreheissive view
of all the interests of the country, and not, becaire they had
eight or ten millions to pay for foreign corn, to act in such a
way as to make the most stable and prudent parties tremble
for the result of their legislation. (Hear, hear.)
Sir O. CLERK said the bon. member who had just sat
down had not brought forward any arguments which satin.
tied him that the present pressure was in any degree to be
attributed to the act of 1844 ; and he had so far paid a com-
pliment to that act as to admit that it had prevented an
undue circulation of paper. Now, what were tee circum-
stances which had preceded and accompanied this presser.?
Owing to the want of agricultural produce there was pro.
bably a deficiency in toe available capital of the country
amounting to between 20,000,0001. and 30,000,000 f. ; and
there had been applied to the construction et railway works
a much larger proportion of capital thiu at any previous
period. The necessary consequi nee of these two
causes was to diminish the capital available for the
assistance of the commercial world. Under all the cir-
cumstances of the case, it was not at all amohishing
that the rate of discount was so high. Had the present
system been relaxed there would, no doubt, have lees an
appearance of prosperity, followed by greater depression.
To issue It. notes, as suggested by the hon. member for
South Lancashire, would be the most etlectuel mode of
driving all the coin out of the country ; and they would
have a return of the money crises of 1816 and 183 e. If the
mearare of restriction had not prevented the prt eau. e seising
from the operation of extraordinary cause*, it had saved the
country probably from the still greater calamity of • run on
the banks. lie was dread it would be nerethry to trust to
time to remedy the pressure ; any attempt to tamper with
the currency would only afford a any
&dewier, which, as in
every other case where a stimulus was app.wil, would be
attended with are action. He trusted, therefore, that what-
ever means the right hon. gentleman might adopt to relieve
himself from a temporary pr. twee, he would at all events
abide by his determination not to interfere la itlethe act 0f1844.
With regard to the particular proper-al of toe right his.
gentleman be doubted whether it would produce the good
results which he anticipated. When the preseat pressure
was over, it might be easy to make terms, but so long as
parties were obliged to borrow money at 8 per cent. he did
not think they would be induced to make advances to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer by the offer of .1 per cent.
Mr. DISRAELI said the hon. member for Clithero (Mr.
Cardwell), though he had criticised the noble lord the mem-
ber for King's Lynn for introducing int., the discussion
a wider subject than that brought before the house by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, had himself travelled very
extensively on that ferbiddea ground. The hon. gentleman
had laid down certain principles for the csteleisnment of
a sound system of currency principles, the utemacy of
which it was very difficult to caallenge, but which had no
immediate relation to present circumstances. The hon.
gentleman told them that they were, above all things, to
beware of artificial arrangements. He (Mr. D.-rdeli ) would
like to know if the whole banking system a sre not (as was
understood) artificial in its character. (liar, bear ) It
was very easy to lay down abstract principle s, which would
apply to Utopia much better than en thiscoun ity. (Laughter).
The hon. member delivered a panegyric on tee act of 1844.
lie said that the object of that measure was to saturate
England with gold. We might now, he said, be subject to
some financial pressure and monetary difficulty, but by the
' providential arrangement of 1844, the coentry was prepared
for the crisis; and severe as was the depression, we had ne-
vertheless been prepared adequately to meet the exigency.
Now, what was the state of England with respect to the
precious metals in the year 1814 ? On the 7th of September
in that Tear—only three months after the bill passed—the
bullion in the Bank amount( dto 15,109,060/. Surely, then,
it was not the bill of 1844 that saturated the country with.
gold? (Hear, hear.) But then the hon. member for
Clitheros found it necessary to account lee the depression
occurring in the face of this superb enactment, an he did
so, by the ready expedient of ascribing our monetary
condition to the circumstance that alarm had not been taken
sufficiently early by the Bank of Englund. (Hear, hear.) The
Bank, said he, did not contract its issues in time —it took
no care of its money when the panic commenced ! New, he
(Mr. Disraeli) apprehended that, despite what might be
vaguely insinuated by the hon. member for Tatuworth, that
house had no right, under the act of 1444, to criticise the
conduct of the Bank in its banking e.epartinent. (Hew,
hear.) They had invented a•• porters machinery"—a ma.
chinery almost as perfect as the sliding-scale—(loud cries of
"Hear, hear," from the aitt ieulturists)—a machinery which
was perfectly to regulate the issue department of the Bank.
That machinery was announced by the mianary, it was
sanctioned by the house, it was received by the public. If
the Bank mismanaged their affairs, that, after the bill of
1844, was their affair, and not the affair of the HOW, et
Commons. If the parliament placed in the transaction of
public affairs a public body, not only over whoa they
had no control, but over whom they had ostentatiously
announced that they would have no control, greet ss might
be the inconvenience—dicotrous as might be the esso
sequences to their constituents and to all the prime*
Inter, sts of the country—yet he did say that they, by their
own act, had 'stopped themselves of criticism. Self mpg,
common decency must prevent weir uttering a word;
for what could be so condemnatory of their own sagacity—
what could present them in so ridiculous a point of dwell
society—as to turn round, like a common weld, and slim
the Bank for that very thing which they thieved= had
forced the Bank to do? (Renewed cries of " Hear, beer.")
Remembering the speeches of the right hon. heroine in 1844
—remembering words which must be even now rigging ia
the ears of many members nothing, sun ly, bat the
perplexity of finding himself in so confused a position meld
have induced so eminent a statesman to criticise the Bank Si
the author of the evil. But was the Bank the author of the
evil? Could it be justly arraigned as guilty of what had
occurred? He (Mr. Disruli) was prepared to contend that
the Bank, so fur from being open to critecrin, was entitled to
the highest praise. The Batik lowered its rate of interest ia
August. What was there in the state of the country in
August which should have made the Belie look with any
alarm to the future ? The Bank had at that time in ha
coffers an almost unprecedented amount of treasure. She
thatlsesi sheedhaatdthhaeltdtifmoreathyeearlaZdesat hamal;uoirittwoof years. If Is rtlitl
Bank looked to her command of the precious metals—to the
state of trade and manufactures—to the general feeling in
the City—her directors had a right to suppose that theff
were justified at that time in assisting Wendy every
well-founded commercial movement. But no doubt it
would be said the directers of the Bank ought sot to be in-
fluenced by the mere superficial opiuion of the commercial
men around them. Some of them, who were members of
that house, might have heard complaints of the scarcity of
corn, and might have heard some hon. member urge that
the ports of the country ought to be opened to the fres is-
dP°irreeitoti°llre, °sof focreireirmsgrtanaiced,. Weroelulidwnhoatdthouebnt.? nThclesheaJ
circumstances, watch attentively the conduct of the ro
statesmen of the day. Would they have found the right
honourable baronet the member for Tentworth—woalii they
have found the noble lord at the head of the government—
prepared to open the ports? Not at all there was so
apprehension in political circles. The members tor Taw
worth
oanpitlifinodfonthgameeewnhoosignwere.
betterßut euiappose..tdhemy lookell
totrade,
points than others. Suppose they looked to the corn
Now here were some remarkable facts showing the opinias
of the corn trade. On the 6th of August, 1843, the as
struck for the six preceding weeks gave the price of wiled
, 61s. 11d. per quarter. On the same day in 1846 the average
was only 495. 2d. per quarter. (Hear, hear.) When, thine
fore, they found fault with the Bauk, it was clear that the
Bank, in August last, was acting in conformity with ths
opinions of the dealers as to any fear of scarcity. Bat whet
were the prices in September ? In 181.5 tee average for the
six weeks ending September marked the price at 665. 7d- •
at the same period in 1846 the price was 475. 3d. (Hel!!
hear.) Did not that exonerate the Bank? Was it W
he
tolerated that the Bank, under such circumstances, skald
be made the scapegoat in the eyes of a public forgetfill •,
I the significant =cane of those who were, an i are, the nm-
test:nuts' anhde hoabdliviquoci'Lltetod ?Ille(Hspearea,khinearg .irgußust4eheurwilouleddwigive.
;ears the averages:_ for each of the succeeding months of the two
le October, 1845, the average was .. .535. 2d.
1846 51s. ltd.
11
In Nov., 1846 68s. 61.
1846 •• 695. 7d.
In Dee., 1845 •• 58s. 9d.
„ 1846 600. Id.
So that, taking the average of the six months, from Jaly to
December, the average was—
In 1845
In 1846
(Loud cries of " Hear, hear.") He asked them, with that
fidence, if that document, which no one could falsify, and la
I could appeal to, was not alone a sufficient vindication
of the Bank of England from those imputations
cast upon her ? Those imputativas proceeded from •
foregone conclusion. Hence was the great bill—the great
monetary charter of 1844—in distrea—acel o icseer
must be found, and that scape-goat was the Bank of 4'
land ! He would do the right honourable baronet the justice
to say that his charges against the Bank had been espremed