The Express.
London, England, 1847-11-03 00:00:00

number of peraons of respectability who had had dealings
with Mr. Macey now deposed to his integrity.
Lord Deuman said that without then making any obser•
vationa, though many suggested themselves to his mind, the
curt wished to age the affidavits before pronouncing any
decision.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
tett3ogs 10 Beim
Th;s court during the term will consist of the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Coltman, Mr. Justice Mauls, and Mr.
Justice Williams. Mr. Justice Cresswell will preside at
chambers. !

....--
RODDEBE AND °THERE O. NOWILL AND OTHERS.—THE
SHEFFIELD CUTLERY.—INFRINOEMENT or THAD' NAHA.
ID this case Mr. Muntague Chambers moved far a rule to
show cause why there should not be a new trial, on the
ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against
evidence; and also in arrest of judgment, on the ground that
the damage complained of was not proper:y laid in the de-
claration. The plaintiffs and defendants, it appeared, wire
severally engaged in the cutlery trade at Sheffield, and the
action was brought fir the alleged infringement of the trade
name by which the goods sold by the plaintiffs were distin-
guished. The case was tried before Mr. Justice Williams at
the last sittings at Westminster, when a verdict was entered
for the plaintiffs—damages 40s. The evidence disclosed the
fact that the defendants had received from a person named
Lord an order for a certain number of knives, marked " J.
Rodgers and Sons, Sheffield," and that the attendants had
accordingly sold him articles bearing the name adopted
by the plaintiffs. This f tct becoming known to the
plaintiffs they brought their action to recover (nominally)
the sum of '271., the value of the knives in question, but in
reality to try the question as to whether the law would
authorise a person engaged in trade to sell his own goods
ender a false representation that they were goods manufac-
tured by another party. A mass of evidence was advanced
to prove that the plaintiffs knives were diatinguiehed by a
particular mark, used that the plaintiffs alone had a right to
use that mark. It was then proved that defendants had sold
the knives in question marked with the names of the plain-
tiffs, though' in point of fact, the goods did not come from
their manufactory. On the part of the defendants it was
contended that the action had originated in an attempt on
the part of the plaintiffs to establish a monopoly to a particu-
lar article, or to a particular name. The learned judge,
however (said the learned counsel in moving on the moult
occasion), Mid the jury that the case in no way involved any
question as to monopoly, or as to whether a man might
gain a title to a particular trade-mark by the use
of that mark. His lordship then laid it down as
a principle of low, that no man had a right to sell his
own goods under a false representation that they were the
goods of another person. It' he did so, that other person
bad, by the law of our country, a right of action against him.
The question then was, whether the mark used by the de-
fendants was the mark claimed by the pliintiffs, and whe-
ther the defendants had used it in such a way as to induce the
public to believe that the goods were manufactured by the
plaintiffs.—Mr. Chambers now submitted that the mere act
of false representation on the sale of goods did not present a
ground of action ; but there must be coupled with the mis-
representation an intention to defraud, and it must also be
proved that some damage bad resulted from the fraud. The
learned counsel cited various authorities to show that, in all
cases where actions had been brought to recover damages
for fraud and deceit, it had been held that the consequences
of the fraudulent affirmation must be the damage to the
plaintiff. lie therefore contended that the learned judge, in
the present case, had not submitted the proper question to
the jury, inasmuch as there had been no proof that the plaintiffs
had sustained any damage, or that they had established an
exclusive right to the mark alluded to. Upon the point as
to " arratiug the judgment," Mr. Chambers contended that
the declaration was bail, on the ground that the allegations
as to the damage complained of were not sufficiently com-
prehensive. The declaration stated that the defendants had
manufactured, or ciused to be manufactured, certain knives
bearing a particular mark, and that they had sold the same,
whereby the plaintiffs Mel lost divers gains and profits ; but
there was no allegation of any specific damage, nor was it
stated that the defendants had any intention to injure the
custom of the p.asotiffs.
The court, in giving judgment, said they could cot see in
this case any ground for granting a new trial. The real ques-
tion was, whether the law would protect a man from having
goads sold as manufactured by him, when, in truth, they
were made by another person, The declaration stated that
the plaintiffs Lad made certain knives, and that they adopted
a particular mark for the purpose of denoting that the goods
were their manufacture. It then proceeded to say that the
defendants, in order to injure the plaintiffs in their business,
and to deceive the public, had made certain knives, and bad
sold them with the plaintiffs' mark upon them, whereby
the plaintiffs had lost the sale of a quantity of knives, &e.
The question, therefore, was whether the defendants had
committed a wrongful act, and with a wrongful intention.—
The court was of opinion that there was sufficient evidence
as to this point, and they could n t discover any misdirection
on the part of the learned judge. As to the argument which
had been raised in arrest of jud rwent, the declaration was
framed in a manner to be supporte I at Nisi Prius, and as there
had been sufficient evidence to support it at that trial, the
court held that the judgment ought to be in favour of the
plaintiff.—Rule refused.