The Express.
London, England, 1848-05-03 00:00:00

BAIL COURT.
Kitting. in Ileiwo—nefore Ste. Justice ("tentage.
THE LLAN ELIA- RAILWAT COMPANY v. ..SUB SOUTH
WALES RAILWAY Comeavv.—MaKnamue.—Mr. Crowder,'
Q C., mated for a rule to show (atm why a mandamus
should fed issue to compel the South Wales Railway Com-
pany to UMue their warrant to the sherif requiring him to
summon a compensation jury to assess the value of a certain
quantity of land which they had taken from the other com-
pany. These two railway companies had been negotiating
for the last two y mire about the sale of the land in gun.
non, but the South Wales Railway Company now contended
that the land was public property, under an act of paella.
went h
and could not be dispcwed of. The Llanelly Company,
however, maintained that they had a right to tell the laud,
and the South Wales Company had already obtained a
mandamus to compel the priwent applicants to restore their
Due, which it appeared they had guttered to fall into a state
of dilapidation.—Rule nig: granted.
Sett rriNo ACTIONS —Mr. Archbold, in • ease in which
neither the plaintiffs nor defendant's names transpired, ap
plied for a rule to show cause why a writ of prohibition, to be
directed to the judge of the County Court of Cumberland,
should not issue to restrain the plabdiff from issuing execu-
tion on two judgments which he had obtained under the fol-
lowing circumstances:—The action was brought to recover
the sum of 271. for copies of the Times newspaper supplied
to the defendant from 1844 to 1816. The plaintif had di-
vided his claim, and brought, in fact, two actions—the lint
being for the sum of 131.105. 4d., the second for 131.10.. did.,
end he had recovered on both. The learned counsel now
contended that, under the new County Court Act, the plain-
tiff ouitht to have brought his action for • sum under twenty
pounds. and the the facer over altogether. That doc-
trine was laid down by the Court of Exchequer on Saturday
last in the caw of " parts Ackreyd," where it was held
that actions could not be split—Mr. Justice Coleridge: As
the Court of Exchequer have decided this point, at all event*
you must have • rule.
FOSTER T. TEMPLE.—TILE JUROR Or TRU WISTIIINSTIR
COUNTY COURT EXORRDING Mte I CRIS DICTION.—MT.
Bony moved fur • rule to show cause why a writ of prohi-
bition should not issue, directed to D. C. Moylan, Esq., the
judge of the Westminster County Court, to restrain any fur-
ther proceedings being taken on a summons which he had
improperly granted. The circumstances under which this
applization was made were shortly these. On the 30th of
March in this year • summons was served on the defendant
as the executor of one W. Thompson, at the instance of the
plaintiffs, E. Foster, senior, and E. Foster, junior, to whom
the said W. Thompson was alleged to have been indebted at
the ti i e of his death, fur spas supplied on the 9th of April,
4842. On the 14'h of April in the present year defendant
appeared at the Weetnnuater County Court in obedience to
the summons. Upon the hearing of the case, however, it
was stated that the defendant was summoned to appear, not
as the executor of Mr. Thompson, but as the executor of
Mr. F. W. Taylor. An objection to the summons was taken
On this ground, and the judge hell it to be good. The
plaintiffs' solicisor said that no fresh summons could be
issued. a., the statute of limitations would interfere, the
goods naviag been supplied on April 9, 1842 , but the
learned judge dismissed the ease, and determined on
fuming a flash summons, which was subsequently done, the
name of Thompson being substituted for that of Taylor.
The learned coui,el now contended that the judge could not
issue a new summons. Under circumstances similar to those
of the present case, the 12th rule of the County Court pro-
vided that where the first surnames had been properly
served, which was here the case, the judge might issue as
many others as he chose, but they must bear the date of the
original one ; whereas in the present case a new summons
altogether, beariug a different date, had been issued.—*f he
COMI% granted the application.

COURT OFmbe COrs
inMONm PLEAS.
eM Beis
PHILLIPS e. TEE MERCHANTS' AND TRADERS SHIr
LOAN AND INSVILINCE COMPANY.—LIABILITY OP SHARB•
HOLDEIIS IN A JOINT-STOCK COMPANY WHEN A JrlieneNT
RA, BEEN OBTAINED AGAINST THE COMPANY.—This case
was reported in yesterday's Express. It was en applica-
tion for a rote to show cause why execution should not issue
agsiast the shareholder of a company against which a judg-
ment had been recovered and execution could not be levied.
It WAR made under the 66th and GSth sections of ith and Silt
Vic. c. 110. The ease was postponed to produce the declara-
tion in the case.—Mr. Kennedy now produced the declara-
tion. which contained an averment that the policy was not
paid by the company, although they had funds.—The Court
had suggested teat the policy might have contained a con-
tract *hat the insurers should rely only on the fund', and it
did contain a stipulation that each shareholder should only
be Heide to the amount of his shares; hut this was only in-
tended to limit the liability of the individual sbarehol !ere,
but they were still liable on any judgment recovered to the
amount of these shares. In this (AM there was an affidavit
which stated that the shareholder in quest:on was possessed
of 1.000 shares, equal to 25,0001 , and tam% tore he was liable
to that amount.—Kule nisi grarved.
LLOYD T. JONES.—JUItISOICTION or CoUNTV COVISTS.
—Thus case cams before the court on a rule calling on the
judge of the county court of Merionethshire to show cause
why a prohibition should not issue to restrain the judgment
verdictoceedings in a case of " Lloyd e. Jones," in which a
had been found for the plaintiff—damages, it. it ap-
peared that a plaint was brought before the county court, in
tresp-as against the defendant, for fishing in • river on the
lends of the piebald near the town of Bala. The defendant
had purposely gone on the land to try • right maintained to
belong to the inhabitants of lisle to fish in the river in ItUtll-
- At the trial it was objected that as there was a question
of title involved the county court had no jurisdiction, ques-
tions of title being specially excluded by the act. The judge,
however, proceeded to try the case, and gave a verdict
against the defendant. On this a rule was obtained some
time since. The affidavits stated that it would have
been necessary to go into evidence to show the right of
way, • right of common, and a right of fishing, all which
were asserted to belong to the inhabitants of Bela.—Mr.
Serjeant Talfourd now showed cause, and contended that the
right of fishing and the right of way were not such incorporeal
hereditament* as to make the question of title arise in an I
action of trespass, and thus to bar the jurisdiction of the
county court —Mr. M. Lloyd was heard in support of the
rale, and cited • number of cases to show that the right was
such an hereditament, end contended that the mere claim
was sofficieut to tale the case out of the jurisdiction.—The
mutt took time to consider their judgment.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
•
Sittings in Banco.
CHILTON r. THE LONDON AND CROYDON RAILWAY
COMPANY.—FALSE IMPRISONMENT.—This was en seti•in of
trespaes for false imprisonment brought by Mr. Chilton,
Q C., who, while travelling from Sydenham to London by
the defendants' railway, lost his ticket, and on refusing to
pay 3d., the extra fare from Croydon, was arrested under a
bye-law of the company, and detained in custody for ten
minutes, when he was discharged on giving bail. He then
brought the present action, which, it may be remembered,
resulted in a verdict for .5001. damages. A rule for a new
trial, upon the ground that the damages were excessive, was
subsequently obtained ; and cause against that rule haring
been shown during the present term by Sir F. Thesiger and
Mr. Serjcant Channell, Mr. Kennedy was heard yester lay
in reply in support of the rule. lie contended that the
damages were excessive, and disproportioned to the injury
sustained by the plaintiff; that the jury were influenced by
the defendants having declined to apologise, a circumstance
which they should not have taken into their consideration
in measuring the damages. Mr. Chilton put himself for-
ward as the wetter of • public right; it turned out that
the defendants were wrong in their interpretation of
the law, and that they were not authorised to
make the bye-law under which the arrest complained of
had been made. But the plaintiff claimed no damages for I
any personal inconvenience he had sustained, although he
had a long correspondence with the defendants b. fore the
action was commenced. The learned barons having conferred
with each other for • few minutes,
The Lord Chief Baron said he was of opinion that the rule
ought to be discharged. lie regretted to be obliged t. differ
with two members of the court, for whose opinions he enter.
tained the most profound respect, hut he felt bound by the
numerous authorities cited by Sir F. Thesiger, and he
thought the court should he extremely cautious in meddling
with the verdict of a jury, when the only objection to that
verdict was the amount of damages awarded. lie entirely
concurred in the opinion that trial by jury would he ineffi-
cient for the public good, if verdicts given either from preju-
dice, or by mistake, or contrary to evidence, were not to be
subjected to the supervision of courts. But ques-
tions of fact were altogether for juries, and above
all the measuring of damages was a question purely and ex-
clusively (or their consideration. Unless in cases where ver-
dicts for " monstrous " or " outrageous " damages were
returned, he felt very much indisposed to interfere with the
decision of a jury. All the circumstances in the present case
were considered by the jury, and there being no objection to
the verdict execs it the amount of damages, he thought the !
reasons assigned in support of the rule were not sufficient, !
and that it should be discharged.
Mr. Baron Parke said he had the misfortune to differ with
the Lord Chief Baron and Mr. Baron Platt. The conclu-
sion to which he had come was that the damages were es-
cessive, and that the rule for a new trial ought to he mode
absolute. There was no doubt about the principles laid
down in the numerous cases cited by Sir F. Thesiger, that
kitties were censtitutionslly the judges of all questions of
fact; but, adhering to those principles, it
of the utmost benefit sometimes that verdicts even
upon questions of fact were subject to revision
and if it wee otherwise, "trial by jury" would
be no blessing to the country. Courts had therefore
always exercised a jurisdiction by reviewing trials
when it appeared that juries had acted wrongly either by
mistake or from prejudice. If courts were satisfied that
juries exercised a sound discretion, they would not of course
interfere ; but otherwise it was their duty to do so. Be
meant not to cast any imputation upon the jury in this case,
but they appeared to have been influenced by other motives
than those by which legally they should have been actuated,
and he therefore thought the verdict should be set aside.
The sum awarded was so extraordinarily large con-
sidering the injury Mr. Chilton sustained, that it was
quite clear she jury were influenced by opinions by
which they should not have been swayed. There was
no charge of misconduct or reflecting upon the cha-
racter or personal honour of Mr. Chilton. He merely
pattered the inconvenience of a few minutes' imprisonment
under an order which the defendants conceived the act of
parliament had authorised them to make. They were now
disabused of that impression by the decision of this court.
They afterwards refused to apologise, but that was • topic
which the jury should not have considered in awarding the
Under all the circumstances, his view of the case
vdiriamala Zt the sum of 6001. was so infinitely disproportioned
to the trespasses complained of, the jury had been, unwit-
tingly perhaps, influenced by a desire to punish the defen-
dants for their obstinacy in not apologising. or for exercising
their authority too strictly. Those were matters which they
should not have taken into their consideration in pronounc-
ing their verdict. He believed the jury had not exercised a
roper discretion, and therefore, acting on the principles