The Express.
London, England, 1848-06-27 00:00:00

EQUITY COURTS.

Before I, ioe-Chancellor knight Bruce.
EX PARTE SOUTHALL, no HILL.—LIEN OF' ACCOUNTANT
ON Boors.—The petitioner had been employed by the bank.
rupt es an accountant to make up the bankrupt's books
before the bankruptcy. After the hat issued the messenger
required the petitioner to give up the books, which he de-
clined doing unless he was paid fur his services, for which he
demanded 81. ss. The messenger nevertheless took pos-
session of the hey Its, and the petitioner now sought to have
them returned to him, or to hove his dem►nd satisfled.—Mr.
Bacon and Mr. Youngs supported the petition, and Mr.
Bwanuton and Mr. Ileathfield appeared for the assigner,.
—The Vice.Chencell,r thought it clear that the petitioner
hail a lien an the books, and gave the assignees the option of
hosing an order made upon thom for payment of the de-
mand and the costs of the petition, or of having the petition
stand over [or an action to be brought, with admissions.
The essignees asked and obtained time to consider which
course should be adopted.

EX PARTE THOMAS. IMPEACHING TRANSACTIONS
rNDEH EANKRupes OWN FlAT.—This was the bankrupt's
own fiat, and Mr. K F. Smith now moved, an behalf of
the bankrupt and a creditor, to annul the fiat, the creditor
undertaking to issue a new one; the reason of the ap.
plication being, that it was desirable to impeach, under the
hat, certain transactions to which the bankrupt was a party.
The Vice-Chancellor made the order subject to the filing
of an affidavit, showing that the creditor's debt was suffi-
ciently old to enable the transactions in question to be over-
reached.

Before Vlce-Chancellor Wiirram.
REOENT'A CANAL COMPANY V. GRAND JUNCTION CANAL
COMPANY.—INJUNCTION.—This was an application to dis-
solve an injunction which had been obtained ex parte by the
plaintiffs on Friday last. and by which the defendants were
restrained from permitting or causing to flow through Nor-
wood Upper Lock on the Grand Junction Canal any part of
the water now is Paddington Long Level, until additiosal
water should have been introduced into the Long Level
through Cowley Lock, and then and thenceforth frem allow-
ing any greater amount of water to flow through the
Norwood Upper Lock out of the Long Level than
the amount so introduced into the Long Level
through Cowley-lock. 'The injuncton had been ob-
! mined on the ground of an alleged breach on the part of the
defendants of an agreement entered into between the two
companies in 1819, and afterwards confirmed by act of par-
' liament, by which the quantity of water to he drawn
through the eeveral locks by each company was prescribed,
with a view to the regulation of the levels of the canals.—
' Mr. Itolt and Mr. Busk appeared in support of the motion
to dissolve; and the Solicitor. General and Mr. Wickens con-
tra for the injunction—llM Honour made an order, giving
liberty to the defendants to pass through Norwood.lock dai'y
any quantity of water, not exceeding 30 lucks, of 9,000 cubic
feet each ; and also such further quantity, if any, as should
be let into the level at Cowley-lock, until by such means
there should have patted 120 of such locks of water through
Norwood-lock. if more should be found necessary the
patties were to have liberty to apply, but they were thence-
fo-th to be restrained from drawing off more than came into
the Long-level through Cowley-lock, in the words of the
2nd branch of the injunction.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
Nisi Pears.—idefore Mr. Justice Wagtail= and a Special Jury.
licLen ♦NU WHIMS V. ESDAILE AND OTHPUN.-1 ate
WOOD PAVEMENT.—Sir F. Thesiger, with whom was Me.
Hogging, appeared for the plaintiff in this case; and Mr.
Q.C., and Mr. Peacock for the defendauts.—This
was an action of covenant upon a deed entered into in 1844
between the plaintiffs anal defendants. The plaintiffs, it
appeared, were the licensees of a patent for the wood pave-
ment which had been granted to a party of the name of
Parkyns in April, 1339, and the defendants were the
licensees of a patent which had been taken out in 1841 by a
person of the name of Rankin for a similar invention. The
defendants entered into a covenant with the plaintiffs, by
whisk they agreed to pay the latter a certain royalty, ff they
infringed the principle of Parkyns' patent ; the principle of
that patent being the inclination of the fibre of the blocks
of wood to the horisla from 40 to 70 degrees. The
defendants laid down pavement in Cornhill, sod
also at a bridge at Chalk Farm, where the blocks
were at an inclination of 73 degrees. On the part of the
plaintiffs it was contended that, although the inclination of
the blocks of wood laid down by the defendants was not
within the precise words usi d in the deed, still, practically,
there wan no difference between 73 degrees and 70 degrees.
For the defence, Mr. Martin submitted that the whole mat-
ter was a question of law ; but at all events no breach of co-
venant whatever bad been committed by the defendants ;
for it was merely intended that they should be limited to the
precise inclination epecified,which was from 40 to 70 degrees,
and his clients had a right to adopt, as they had done, any
other inclination that they might chums—Mr. Justice
Wightman, in summing up, said that the question turned
upon the real construction of a written document, and that
was a matter of law. It appeared that there were ten pa-
, tents, one of Rankin's and another of Perkyruis, and their
I principle was the same. If persons chose to make agree.
menu in specific terms, they must abide by
them ; and although In practice there was no
distinction between these two patents, still the language of
the covenant was express ; therefore, unless the inclination
adopted by the defendants was within that li nit specified in
the covenant, the plaintiffs could not recover. The jury
would consequently return a verdict for the defendants, the
plaintiffs having liberty to move to enter a verdict for
101.12.
Tate DUKE or BRUNSWICK V. BAKER.—SLANDER.—
In this case, when the jury had been sworn, the foreman
handed in a pamphlet which he said had been sent to him by
post. (The pamphlet was understood to contain a speech of
the Duke of Brunswick.) Mr. Justice Wightman observed
such a proceeding was highly improper.—Mr. C. ekburn ap-
plied to be allowed to see the pamphlet, and then asked
teat it might he impounded. It wiu accordingly handed
to the officer of the court.—Mr. S,rjeant Allen and Mr.
Charnock conducted the case OR behalf of the plaintiff, and
Mr. Cockburn and Mr. Bramwell were counsel Per the de-
fendant. Thia was an action to recover compensation in
damages for cereal' slanderous word.: used by the defendant.
From the opening addles! of the learned sergeant, and from
the subsequent evidence, it appeared that the defendant was
a sheriff's officer, who had a writ of fi. fa. to levy upon
the plaintiff's goods, and that he went to Brunswick-house
for that puipme. On his arrival there lie found the gates
closed, and persons outside to prevent any one from entering
the premium. On the 15th of May, 1847, the defendant suc-
ceeded in effecting an entrance, upon which some violence
ensued, when he said to the servants. " You are a set of
—. You are a nest of —." Upon being remon-
strated with for using such language, he said that
the Duke of Brunswick was a d—d —. In con-
sequence of the forcible opposition offered to the
defendants getting into Brunswick-house, several po-
licemen got over the wall and came to his assistance.
For the defendant it was contended that he was completely
at the mercy of the duke's seavant when he endeavoured to
enter the plaintiff's house, and had been greatly provoked.
The words, moreover, which the defendant had wad a ere
unhappily of common occurrence amongit people in a low
station of life, and had no particular meaning. The action
had not been brought to vindicate the plaintiff's character,
but merely because it annoyed him to find that a vulgar
sheriffs officer had " got between the wind and his nobility,"
—and nothing but an action could satisfy the Duke of Bruns-
wick. The learned judge havng summed up, the jury
found for the plaintiff—damages 40s.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
Sittings in Banco after Term.
EDWARDS V. LAWLE.sa.—DELIVERY OP BIONED BILL
BY ATTORNEY, BEYOIIE ACTION BROVOIIT.—This was an
action upon an attorney's bill against the Hon. Cecil Law-
less, as a member of the managing committee of the Great
Manchester, Rugby, and Southampton Railway, tried be-
fore Baron Rolfe at the last Warwick summer assizes, when
a verdict passed ter the plaintiff for 492/. It was objected at
the trial upon the issue, that no signed bill was
delivered by plaintiff a month before action brought, pur-
suant to 7 & 8 Vic., c 73 (there being a plea to that effect
upon the record) and that the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited.
It appeared a signed bill had been delivered to a Mr. Moore, a
co-managing committeeman, at his residence in Wood-street,
Cheapside, and that the bill was headed, " To the provi-
s.onal committee of," &c. ; but that no bill had been de-
livered to the defendant himself, or left at the office of the
company. The objection that, twee these circumstances,
the statute had not been complied wi'h was overruled at
the trial leave being reserved to move the court upon the
point.—Mr. Humfrey, Q.C., with whom was Mr. Phipson,
now showed cause against a rule for a nonsuit in consequence
obtained, and con ended that as Mr. Moore prOWd
to be an active managing committeeman, and was jointly
liable to the debt sued for, a delivery by plaintiff
of his bill to him was equivalent to a delivery
to defendant himself, on the principle that Mr. Moore stood
in the position of en indebtor; and it had been decided that
an attorney who bad duly delivered his bill to one of two
joint contractors was enabled to sue the other.—Mr. White-
hurst was heard in 'import of the rule.—The court were of
opinion that the rule for a nonsuit should be made absolute.
The present case was not to be looked at in the light of an
ordinary case of co-contractors. The question was, bad
there been a delivery of the bill to the provisional committee
which comprised the managing committee ? There had
been no delivery at the office of the company, nor to any one
who could fairly be said to represent the company. Every
member of the provisional committee did not represent the
whole body. The courts had already frequently distin-