The Express.
London, England, 1865-12-29 00:00:00

THE "EXPRESS, FRIDAY EVENING, DECEMBER '29, 1865.

Tan Daily News is taking advantage of this
holiday season to publish in full • document of the
highest military and historical importance, viz.,
General GRANT'S Report, in which is summed up
the history of the American civil war from May,
1864, when Garter assumed the chief command,
until the close of the contest. It is too much the
fashion in this country to undervalue a scientific mili-
tary education. At the commencement of the civil
war in America the same heresy prevailed to aconsi-
derable extent in that country. From the very first,
indeed, the Confederates acted upon the opposite
principle. The officers placed in command of the
Southern armies were all graduates of West Point
—probably the best military college in the world
—and some of them, like STONEWALL JACKSON,
were not only graduates, but had themselves been
professors of military science. Experience soon
convinced the North that if they expected success
they must adopt the same plan. The volunteer
General were gradually superseded. M'CLELLarr,
MEADZ, GRANT, and SHERMAN were all graduates
of West Point ; and SHERMAN, like STONEWALL
JACKSON, had been • military professor in Loui-
siana. The last volunteer officers who held im-
portant commands were BANKS and BUTLER, and
both were doomed to furnish conclusive proof (if
any were needed) thatthere is &science and artof war
which must be learnt before it can be practised.
Practically speaking, therefore, it is abundantly
clear that none but educated soldiers have suc-
ceeded in the American war which has just closed.
It may be thought, however, that although Lee,
GRANT, and SHERMAN did display great ability,
they neglected to follow those principles of war
which are to be found in the authorised books on
the subject. But the most cursory perusal of
General GRANT'S Report will at once dissipate any
such opinion. Let any one read the maxims of
NAPOLEON, or the principles of JoMINI, or the
" Theory of War," by Colonel M`Dounem., and be
will perceive that GeneralGasNr, in considering the
great military problem which he was called upon to
solve when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief
—in stating that problem in his Report—in devising
the best plan of solution, and in carrying that plan
into effect, adhered with the most scrupulous
accuracy to the general principles which have been
sanctioned in theory and in practice by all the
great masters of war. Now, what was the pro-
blem ! "The military power of the South was to
"be broken." On the one hand, he says, " the
" resources of the South and their numbers were
"far inferior to those of the North." On the
other hand, " the North had a vast territory, with
" • population hostile to the Government, to
" garrison, and long lines of river and
" railroad communication to protect, to
" enable the North to supply the ops-
" rating armies." Moreover, as the Northern
armies were on the circumference of the circle, and
the Southern armies in the centre, the South were
able to concentrate more rapidly. Thus, when
GRANT assumed the command of the American
armies, the North had only one advantage over
the South—they had more mamma and larger
numbers. The only effect of this would have beer
to have enabled the North to crush any one army
of the South by bringing against it superior num-
bers. But hitherto this had been found to to
impracticable. The long lines of communication
through a hostile country enabled the South to
act upon these lines without endangering their
own, and the fact that "the armies of the East andl
" West acted independently and without concert,
" like a baulky team, no two ever pulling together,
" enabled the Southern generals to use to great
" advantage their interior lines of communication
" for transporting troops from east to west, rein-
" forcing the army most vigorously pressed, and
" to furlough large numbers during seasons of in-
" activity." GRANT at once saw the necessity of
changing this system. The team must be made
to pull together. He determined, he says, first
" to use the greatest number of troops practicable
" against the armed force of the enemy ; pre-
" venting him from using the same force at diffe-
" rent seasons against first one and then another
" of our armies, and the possibility of repose for
" refitting and producing necessary supplies for car-
" rying on resistance. Second, to hammer away
"continuously against the enemy and his resources,
" until by mere attrition, if in no other way,
" there should be nothing left to him but sub nis-
" goo." In war it is obvious enough that the
policy of concentration is the best policy. GRANT
saw not only the importance of this principle, but
the mode of carrying it into effect. Having col-
lected together two armies tinder himself and
SHERMAN, much more powerful than the armies
under LEE and JOHNSTON opposed to them, the
directed them both to advance and "hammer away"
continuously, giving the enemy no rest. Thus he
fulfilled the first maxim of war, to bring a larger
body of troops against a smaller body ; and
he fulfilled another maxim of war, because

he prevented his enemy from -*king advantage
of his interior or shorter limes et oommtudeation.
In other words, he not only coscentratad his
,own
troops, but he prevented hie adversary from con-
centrating his. He took advantage of his own
superiority in numbers, and prevented his adver-
sary from repairing his deficiency in numbers.
But he did more. From the west and from the
mat, from the Mississippi and from the James, he
organized expeditions to destroy the railroads in
the rear of the Confederate armies, and thus ful-
filled the remaining maxim, to destroy the enemy's
lines of communication without endangering
his own. It was to cut off Les's army
from the South that 'lumen was directed
to advance along the south aide of the James River
and to seize Petersburg, and, if possible, Rich-
mond ; and it was owing to BUTLER'S ignorance
and obstinacy that this part of GRANT'S plan
turned out so unsuccessful ; for if such an officer
RS SHERIDAN had commanded there is no reason to
doubt but that Richmond would have fallen before
it did.
But able as the plan sketched out by General
GRANT was, and based as it was upon established
military principles, its execution would have been
impossible if those who acted under the Com-
mander-in-Chief had been different men. In a field
of war so extensive as that of the United States,
it is simply impossible for the Commander-in-
Chief to give detailed instructions to each of his
subordinates. And so it was with General GRANT.
When he is explaining his views to such men as
BUTLER and BANKS he certainly descends into de-
tails, because it is obvious that be had no confi-
dence in their military capacity. But in dealing
with SHERMAN, MEADE, or &ISFAHAN, he contents
himself with the most general instructions• He
sees them, talks to them, satisfies himself that
they comprehend the principles upon which he is
acting, and then leaves them in the confident ex-
pectation that " they will execute them
"to the fullest extent possible." But observe,
two conditions are needed before this plan can be
followed. The first is, that the Commander-in-
Chief and his lieutenants shall act on the same
general theory. The same principles of war must
be assumed to be true by the chief and by his
subordinates, and this condition cannot be secured
unless both parties have received a military educa-
tion, and have given in their adhesion to the same
military principles. The time lost in explaining
to a subordinate the principles and the mode of
carrying them into effect would have made it im-
possible for GRANT to have begun or to have com-
pleted the necessary movements within the time at
his disposals
-

- .
Fortunately, however, the officers under GaL.Nr
had been educated in the same school as himself,
and thoroughly understood the theory of war
which they were called upon to put into practice.
But something more than a knowledge of principles
is required in an effective General. Ile must be
able to put his theory into practice. This result
can only be secured by the Commander-in-Chief
exercising sound judgment. With him rests the
selection of those who are toexecute his commands.
If he fails in selecting the fittest men he must
himself fail, however admirable may be his plans.
The power of selecting the right man is essential
to military success. Accordingly this is a power
which has been possessed by every great com-
mander—by none more than by NAPOLEON, WEL-
LINGTON, and Ids3.xsoaonou. And it is a
power which was surely possessed by the man who
selected SHERMAN, MEAD, and SHERIDAN.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

(THIS DAY.)

which monarchy In Spain seemed to rest as on • rock, and
bar Inter absecoe from the capita daring the 'helm has
further alienated the people from the Quaid* Siordtl, if
not ss • principle, en a person, as • visible intOrsonetion
di the Stete—has last the respect a the nalisa, and all
who wish well to constitutions' monarchy in Spain would
rejoice to be persuaded that at the eleventh hour Qaeen
Isabella bed looked out with bee own eyes from the inner
chambers of her paler@ upon the disaffection end disgust that
ars rising round her royal hones like a flood. The speech
she has just delivered is not perhaps inferior to other similar
documents in vagueness. There is ■ saving clause in the
sentence about Chili in which the Spanish government
promises to give an account, not only of the program of the
war, " but also of any negotiations that may take place
in connexion therewith." The independence of another
Centrel American Republic has been recognised, and the
recognition of the kingdom of Italy is referred to m a way
which cannot fail to gratify Spanish piety without alarm-
tag Italian patriotism. The financial paragraph of the
speech is a medal of safe generality, and will not set
the teeth of bondholders on edge. Her Majesty farther
states that she will rely upon public opinion as represented
in the chambers, but as only ministerialists have been re-
import and all the opposition have abstained from voting,
it is to be feared Queen Isabella is Innocently begging •
very large question.
to the view of the Poet the framers of the speech have
been less studious than, under the circumstances, was to
be expected, in guarding against criticism in the paragraph
which refers to the relations of their government with
Chili. This is perhaps the more to be regretted, because
there are other portions of the speech which are far from
unsatisfactory. A paragraph oonteining an intimation
that the claims of the creditors of Spain were about to be
liquidated, is, as might be supposed—for we have only the
elperienee of the past to guide us in our anticipations of
. . .

the future—conspicuously absent.
The TefegrapA can see little ground from the speech to
hope that Spit will desist from her purpoee of coercing
Chili into submission, unless a 'imager memo be put
upon she government of Madrid than it ham yet sustained.
The occasion of the delivery of the speech was undoubtedly
important Spain le a sort of, political volcano, which is
always on the verge of an eruption, and of l►te the /PEW
totall of an approaching outburst have been more plentiful
than usual.

LATEST INTELLIGENCE. 1

THE ITALIAN MINISTRY.
The reconstitution of the Italian cabinet, says
the indipesdance Beige, is making scarcely any
progress. That is understood. In order to escape 1
the embarrassment it is necessary to take a
ministry from the left and completely change the
political course. The crown hesitates to decide
the natter. Hence the powers entrusted to
General de ls Marmora in order that
he may try and form a coalition ad-
ministration comprising the hostile elements
which compose the right and left centre. Up to
this time the steps taken for that purpose have
not come to an end. It is doubtful whether they
will succeed, especially if, as rumour states, nego-
tiations have taken place between the left centre
and the left, in which these two parties have
sought to come to an understanding for the
division of power on conditions which would give
, the crown all desirable guarantees for order and
prudence.

(ulnas mimics.)
AUSTRIA.

—____.
COLOGNE, Dsc. 29.
The Cologne Gazette of to-day publishes a telegram
from Vienna according to which the Minister of
Finance has forbidden the payment of the
January dividend of the Austrian Creditanatalt.
The Council of Administration of the Creditan-
stalt have, therefore, tendered their resignation.

THE BRAZILS.
(By Telegraph from Limbos.)
BUENOS AYRES, Nov. 27.

Rumours are current that peace is about to be
concluded between Paraguay and the allies through
European mediation.
Lopez, President of Paraguay, has sent a despatch
to President Mitre, the contents of which are not
known.
There is much political agitation on the subject
of a new capital for the Argentine Confederation,
where the representatives of the different states
should assemble.

RIO DE JANEIRO, Dec. 9.
The allied army continues to advance without
interruption.
COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE.
Exchange on London, 25k, 25k. Coffee, good
first, 6.800 to 7.000 refs ; shipments since the de-
parture of the last mail, 93,838 bags, of which
31,590 were for the Channel. Sales 160,000 bags ;
stock, 130,000. Freights for the Channel, 47k, 50.

BAHIA, DEc. 13.

-- .
Exchange on London, 261, 27. Cotton, 17,000
to 17,200 eels. Sugar, browns, 2000 to 2.300 rein.
PERNAMBUCO, Dsc. 16.

Exchange on London, 28 to 28k. Sugar, whites,
4.600 to 4.700 rein ; brown, 2.000 rein, to 2.400
refs. Cotton, 16,200 to 16,300.
The Estramadura arrived at Pernambuco on
the 13th.

LISBON, DEC. 28.

The Royal Mail Steampacket Company's ship
Douro has arrived from the Brazils, and will sail
at noon to-day for Southampton, with 60 paasen-
gers, 285 bags of coffee, 1,981 hales of cotton, 230
rolls of tobacco, and 251 packages of sundries
specie, 39,9501. The Oneida, with the outward
mails of the 9th December, sailed from St. Vincent
on the evening of the 21st instant.