The Express.
London, England, 1865-04-19 00:00:00

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HIGH WAVED AT LONDON-M=o2.
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LONDON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19.

As New Orleans, Charleston, and Wilmington
have ancctesively served for useful examples of mo-
dern war in the attack and defence of fortifications
_. .

by RM. we may draw for our own benefit a lesson
from the fall of Richmond and Petersburg appli-
cable to modem fortifications by land. These
cities, which resisted for a period only shorter
than the siege of Sebastopol, were, like it, de.
fended by earthworks, forming an enceinte of
very great extent. It would appear that there
was a oontinuous line at ditch rampart; but how-

_
ever this may be, it is certain that the main de-
fence consisted in very powerful forts, placed at
such intervals as to command every inch of the

intervening ground, and to sweep it with the cross-
ing fire of tke most powerful artillery at short
range. It was, then, in fact an entrenched camp,
defended by all that modern ingenuity and skill
can suggest to make such a place impregnable.
And as we possess, thanks to Lord PALMKBSTON,
examples of similar modes of defence at the vital
points of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the
Thames, it is worth one's while to inquire what
it was that made the Confederate position

so strong, and what at length caused its
capture. For there is a certain theory in favour
with the abettors of our new system of defence,

which, though never very distinctly enunciated,
yet always is so put as to suggest the infe-
rence that an entrenched camp is an invention so
wonderful that it makes guns do the work of men,
and that there is no need at all to consider either
the number or the quality of the troops by which
it is to be held.

Yet, if we only oonsider for a moment, we shall
see that it was, after all, Lee's army, and not his
defensive works, that so long held the Federals at
bay. That army had proved itself able to hold its
own in the open field. In the series of combats com-
mencing with the Wilderness and ending with the
assault on the lined of Richmond north of the James,
the Confederates had repulsed every attack without
more help than that of mere field works. They
were indeed inferior in numbers, and therefore
could neither drive back their opponents, nor
even permanently hold their positions, without

farther aid. But though they successively aban•
cloned their positions, they were so nearly equal in
strength that they were never driven out of them
in rout by one day's fighting. Therefore, when at
length they fell back upon the much more powerful
and long-prepared works which enclosed Richmond
and Petersburg, they were in fact an unbroken
army, almost equal to their opponents, and conse-
quently quite able to repel his attacks on the
Strong defences which they now occupied. And
though these were very extensive, yet, as we have
pointed out, this disadvantage was counterba-
lanced by the possession of an internal railway, and
by the difficulties of the ground which GRANT
oompiecl. The consequence was that against what-
ever point in the circuit the Union general might
direct his assault, he was sure to be received by a
force nearly as large, fighting behind fortification;
and covered by heavy guns.
At length, however, GRANT overcame the diffi-
culties of the ground, and the impediments of the
season and weather passed sway. Then he was
able to use his superiority of numbers in com-
pelling LEE to extend his lines to a degree which
made it impossible for his smaller force to man
them sufficiently. And when they were insuffi-
ciently manned GRANT made his assault, broke
through the lines in spite of the guns of the forts,
with their powerful and concentrated fire, and,
turning them, captured the forts themselves at the
point of the bayonet.
Thusthen it is provedthat now, as always,itis not
toearthworksor any skilful applications of engineer-
ing, but to superiority in hard fighting, that an army
must owe its success ; and that, though a modern
fortification, with fort supporting fort, will, like the
ancient one, with bastion supporting bastion, for a
certain time enable the weaker party to hold the
stronger off, yet the time will surely come when
the stronger will be able to use its strength, and
using it, to win by it. And most important of all
is it for us to recognise that, if at any time a for-
tified place is held by a number of men dispropor-
tioned to its extent, it must fall at the first blow,
whether it is defended by earthworks, by con-
tinuous line, by forts with ditch and scarp and
osponnieres, or by any other system. For if LEE,
instead of retiring on Richmond with from 60,000
to 100,000 veterans, had retired to it with but
20,000 or 30,000, or with 50,000 newly-railed
militia, then Gs•sr would not have needed to
force him to extend his lines, be would have broken
through these insufficiently garrisoned works at
once, with precisely the same ease as he broke
through them at last, when by his strategy he had
reduced the defenders actually in Petersburg to
that number.
un evident Application of this experience in
our case is this. These fortified camps of ours at
Portsmouth and elsewhere are mere toys to
look at, unless they can be garrisoned by an
adequate force. For be it remembered that they
also are of immense extent. The two land feats
of Portsmouth alone are ten or twelve miles in
length ; and the Commissioners wbo devised them
accordingly estimated the necessary garrison