The Express.
London, England, 1847-01-18 00:00:00

valuation, either by a separate rate, Or by a charge on the
poor-rates, as they may see fit." It the words, "they may
an fit," applied to the poor-law commissioners only, then the
return must bo upheld. If thee applied to the guardians
telly, the demurrer must prevail. 'The Attorney.Gener.sl was
hoard in support of the demurrer; and Mr. Watson. Q.C.,
lithe raturn.—The court took time to consider the judgment.

BAIL COURT.
Nat Panat—Before Mr. Justice Erie.
PARRA?? ff. FRIKIL—LIADILITY OP PROVISIONAL COX-
wirresmax.—The plaintiff in this case was an adver-
tising *gent, and the defendant was the Honourable
Percy Evans Freke, son of Lord Carberry. The action
was brought to recover the sum of 1,5001„ for inserting in
newspapers theadvertisements of the London,Birminghamand
Buckinghamshire Railway Company. Mr. Hundrey and
Mr. Wordsworth appeared fur the plaintiff, and Mr. D. D.
Keane for the defendant. It appeared from the plaintiff's
case, that the defendant was present at the first meeting of
the promoters of the company in September, 1845, and De-
mme a member of the provisional committee, and was also
present at a meeting on Oct. 10. Previous to this date a
resolution had been passed to advertise the company, but the
defendant was not present. On September 24 he was pre-
sent, when the solicitors were directed to obtain the names
elf gentlemen, and publish them if necessary. Due notice
was given to him of all the meetings. On Octo-
ber 3, the name of the company was altered
from the London and Buckinghamshire to the London
Birmingham and Buekinghamshire Railway Company. At
this meeting the defendant was not present. Mr. Keane,
therefore. objectedto any evidence of what took place during
his absence.
The learned judge thought, although the defendant was
not present when the resolutions were passed, he was when
they were act 4 on, and therefore he hal adopted them, and
the order for advertisements was admissible, to show that he
consented to the advertising of the company. It was then
proved that no objection was made to the plaintiff's account
when it was sent in, and also that defendant's name
was registered in the prospectuses of the company
On the 23rd of September,dind the 29th of October, and
his written consent to act as a committeeman was also proved.
Mr. Keane objected to the reception of any evidence pre
winos to the 29th October, the day on which the defendant
gave his written consent, and contended that he could not be
liable (or anything before that time. Oo the production of
the newspapers containing the advertisements. Mr. Keane
objected to film unless the original advertisements were
produced.—lt was then shown that antaneging committee was
appointed on the Bth November, of which the defendant was
not a member.—Mr. Runtirey, on the part of the plaintiff,
agreed to strike out all the charges subsequent to that date.
—Proof having been given of the payment of money
for the advertisements, by the plaintiff, his case
was cloned, and Mr. Keane proceeded to contend that there
was nothing to show the liability of the defendant. There had
been no proof that the prospectus originally registered had
been advertised, nor had the original prospectuses sent to the
newspapers, or authorised copies from the Stamp-office, been
produced. There was no proof that the advertisements
were in conformity with the registered proapeetus--Evi-
deuce was then called to prove that such conformity existed.
—Mr. Keane said that that conformity existed only between
the prospectuses and papers which purported to be news
papers, hut were not legally proved to be so; and he contended
that the prospectus registered and so published was not
authorised by the committee. There was no evidence
from the Stamp-office of the authenticity of the newspapers,
but a witness was called who produced a copy of the tforn-
frig llerald from the office of that paper, and of the Sou
from the Stamp-office, and moved that the papers produced,
and called the Times, were published and circulated under
that name on the several dates attached to them. Another
witness proved that he gave the prospectuses, which he saw
given by the secretary to the plaintiff, to another person for
insertion in the papers.
The learned judge being of opinion that was a case for the
jury, subject to the objections taken for the defendant,
Mr. Keane proceeded to contend that there was
no evidence of the defendants being present at any
meeting which authorised the insertion of advertisements.
That the resolution of the 24th of September only autho-
rised the procuring the publication of the names of gentle-
men "and their co-operation with the company, and not the
expenditure of money; the whole of the debt due to the
plaintiff had. therefore, been incurred without the authority
or assent of the defendant.
Mr. Justice Erle said the main question for the jury waa,
whether the defendant had given sufficient authority to the
committee to act in his absence. According to the re-
cently decided cases, his name being on the list
of the committee was not enough to render hint liable,
but here it appeared that a resolution was passed
on the nth of September, at a meeting at which
the defendant was present, which included the expense of
advertising and solicitor's costs. The defendant had acted
with the rest of the committeemen, and having united with
them to act for one purpose, be was to a certain extent
liable. The questions kr the jury were—firstly, whether the
defendant had so acted as to give to the restof the committee
authority to pledge his credit for all purposes directly con-
nected with the carrying on of the company, and, secondly,
if the advertisements inserted by the plaintiff were necessary
for carrying out the undertaking successfully.—Verdict for
the plaintiff for 1,1001.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
Sittings in Banco.
PATER r. BAILSR.—SLANWIR OP TITLE—AUTHORITY
01 DISTRICT SURVEYORS YNDSR THE METROPOLITAN
BUILDINGS ACT.—This Cale was tried before Mr. Justice
Erie at the sittings after Trinity term, when a verdict was
mitered for the plaintiff. It was an action to recover com-
pensation in damages for slander of title. The plaintiff, it
appeared, was the owner of several unfinished houses in
Agar Town, which he had advertised for sale; and the de-
fendant being a district surveyor under the Metropolitan
Buildings Act, attended the sale, and without any reason-
able or probable cause, uttered certain words to the effect
that be was authorised to stop the completion of the houses
until the roads were made good. The defendant pleaded the
general issue. Several witnesses were called to prove that
the houses in question were put up for sale, and that the de-
fendant had previously called upon certain persons who he
bad reason to think would be present on the occsaion, and
stated that it was his intention, as district surveyor, to
warn purchasers against buying any of the houses until the
roads were properly finished. It was also proved
that the defendant did attend the sale, and that
be made use of certain expressions which the plain-
tiff alleged had prevented persons from becoming pur-
chasers. An application was made to the learned judge
to noneuit the plaintiff, on the ground that there was •
variance between the evidence given and the words set out
in the declaration, and also upon the ground that there was
an proof of the defendants having acted from malicious
motives. The learned judge overruled the objections, but
reserved to the defendant leave to move ; and the jury hay-
ing found for the plaintiff, a rule was obtained, in the course
of last term, to show cause why there should not be a non-
suit entered, or • new trial had, on the grounds mentioned.
Mr. Keating and Mr. Dowdeswell now argued against the
rule; Mr. Serjeant Channel, Mr. Serjeant Bytes, and Mr.
Baddeley in support of it.
The Lord Chief Justice, in giving judgment, said it could
not be disputed that the jury must find actual malice en the
part of the defendant, before they could return their verdict
against him. There were numerous authorities, showing
that in such an action it was necessary to prove malice.
Upon the other point, as to the variance between the evi-
dence and the declaration, the court was of opinion that such
a variance was amendable. In an action of this sort en
amendment might he made in the words contained in the
declaration, if that amendment did not affect the subetantial
question to be tried. In the present case the substantial
question wag, Did the defendant use words asserting that the
'aintirs title to the property was subject to his (de'end-
it's) right to interfere with the building of the houses until
sue roads were completed ? It appeared that the " variance "
complained of arose from the fact that the defendant was
charged in the declaration with having stated that he
would not allow " purchagea " (which word was ex-
plained by an inuendo) to be completed until
the roads were made good , whereas the evidence
went to prove that he had made use of the word houses, and
not purchases. The court was of opinion that this variance
was not material to the merits. It was sufficient for the
plaintiff to set forth that the defendant had used certain
words impugning his title to the property. Upon the other
point submitted to the court, es to whether malice had been
shown, regard must he had to the situation of the defendant
at the time he uttered the words complained of. lie did
sot appear at the auction as a stranger, nor did he act as a
HIM volunteer, ready to exercise an impertinent interference
with the affairs of others. He was a district surveyor,
under an act of parliament, end his duties, in general terms,
were to see that parties conducted certain affairs in con-
formity with that act, in the district under his controul.
It was objected in the present case, that the defendant had
shown malice towards the plaintiff, by giving notice of his
intention to warn purchasers against buying the houses, and
also by stating, on a subsequent occasion, that he
bad pursued Pater as the agent to the ground
landlord, because he could not find the ground landlord him-
self. The question was, whether there was anything .in
such conduct as this from which malice could be inferred ?
Did the evidence prove that the defendant had acted from
bad motives, with a view to injure the plaintiff? It was
not for the court to consider whether the defendant had
formed an erroneous judgment from the act of parliament,
or whether he had acted without any reasonable or probable
cause. The statute was a recent one, and it was difficult to
my whether the defendant had construed it properly in re-
ference to the roadways, and the conditions upon which
houses were required to be completed. According to the
defendant's interpretation of the act, there was reasonable
and probable cause for his interference ; but, considering the
great difficulty there was in construing acts of parliament cor-
rectly, the court did not,think that even, in the absence of rea-
sonable or probable cause, the defendant could be accused of
malicious conduct under the present circumstances. There
Was nothing to prove that he had done any more than dis-
charge his duty in conformity with the provisions of the
act. The verdict for the plaintiff must be set aside, and the
rule for a lawsuit be made absolute.—Rule absolute.
VARNST e. HicimAN.—THE GAMING ACT.—ltiont oP
a P•RTT TO RSCoVER MONET DEPOnITED TO Anton THE
EVIINT OP • WAOSS.• —This was an action against • stake-
holder to recover 'M. which the plaintiff had deposited with
him in respect of a certain wager upon a race, but which he
had demanded back prior to the race, stating that he wished
to withdraw horn the affair altogether. The stakeholder re-
fused to return him his money, alleging that he had paid it
over to the other depositor, who had, or pretended that lie
bad, won the race in question. Hence the present action ;
and the trial took place before the Lord Chief Justice, at
' • in Middlesex, when a verdict was
plaintiff. Mr. Parry now moved
t verdict, on the ground that the
c. 100, see 18, prohibited courts of law
v Jurisdiction either directly or oollaterally

in cases which arose out of transactions relating to wagers.
The act provided that" AU contracts or agreements, whether
by parole or in writing, by way of gaining or wagering, shall
be null and void ; and that no suit shall be brought or main-
tained in any court of law or equity, for rccovenng any sum
of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any
wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of
any person to abide the event on which any wager shall
have been made." This clause was manifestly passed with
the view to discourage the continuance of wagers under any
circumstances ; and it was quite clear that the plaintiff in
the present action ought, upon the authority of such an
enactment, to have been left to the mercy of the party with
whom he had deposited his money.
The Chief Justice said, as he was not aware that the Act
in question had ever yet received any construction from a
court of law; the learned counsel might take a rule. Rule
nisi accordingly.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
BERNARD O. COLIIIBI.II:IEinprAINROW TAVERN.—This
was an action brought to recover the price of a large quan-
tity of port wine, delivered by the plaintiff to one Argent,
who had been a waiter in the Rainbow Tavern, and who,
by articles of agreement entered into between him and the
defendant, became the manager of that establishment, and
subsequently became a bankrupt. A verdict having passed
for the plaintiff during the last sittings at Guildhall, Mr.
Bramwell now applied for a new trial, on the ground of
misdirection, and also that the verdict was against evi-
dence. It appeared that Argent had undertaken not to
purchase more than five pounds worth of wine on credit, and
not to accept bills, without the consent and cognizance of the
defendant, whose name was retained in the licenses and over
the door of the tavern, after he had ceased to be the osten-
sible proprietor. The court granted a rule to show cause
why there should not be a new trial.
Banta r. GRIMIYOOD.—SEDECTION.— IR this action,
which was bc.ught by the plaintiff, a market gardener
at
Greenwich, to recover compensation for the loss of his
daughter's services, by reason of her seduction by the de-
endant, who is a potato vender in that vicinity, a verdict
for the latter, at the last sittings at Guild.
taaTdby the Lord Chief Baron's directions. A material
discrepancy between the evidence of the plaintiffs daughter
and a surgeon who examined a child of which she had been
delivered, induced his lordship to tell the jury that the de-
fendant was entitled to their verdict, if they believed he was
not the parent.—Mr. Prentice now moveil for a new trial
upon the grounds of misdirection and surprise which were
set forth in affidavits. Ho contended that an action of this
sort could be maintained even though the plaintiffs daughter
had never become enceinte, and that intercourse coupled
with the slightest loss of service was sufficient to entitle a
parent to damagee.
Mr. Baron Alderson What damage did the plaintiff' sus-
tain by the act of the defendant if the woman was pregnant
before he knew her. If the principle contended for was cor-
rect, the parent of every street-walker might maintain an
action for seduction.—Mr. Prentice submitted that the jury
should have been asked whether the plaintiff had sustained
any damages.
Mr. Baton Parke intimated his opinion that it was unne-
cessary to prove the actual loss of service, as be conceived
the action might be maintained wherever the attentions of
the daughter were rendered less grateful and acceptable to
the parent.—Their lordships took time to consider.

the Last satins to
entered for the
Ihithiiii to set aside that
Bth and 9tk Viet., c.
from exercising any i