The Express.
London, England, 1848-07-17 00:00:00

LATEST FROM PARIS.

Since the receipt of intelligence which will be found
in another page, the following has come to hand :
PARTS, SUNDAY, 6 30 r.w.
The annexed is a full report of the speech of M.
Lamartine, delivered in the Committee of Foreign
Affairs, which I alluded to this morning. The II port
is understood to be supplied by M. Lamartine
Gentlemen,—There is nothing more agreeable and at the
same time more difficult than to reply toe speech of M. Man.
guin on foreign affairs. He possesses the 'tenancies of con-
troversy ; he elevates and extends his discussion to the height
of his intelligence and the limits of the globe, but at the same
time he has some points of view so eccentric and so personal,
and a imetimes hazards such assertions, that one fears, in
rejecting an error, at the same time to oppose a truth. He
borrows (to use his own expression) a little of my
poetry for his policy. I would borrow of him a little of his
good sense, science, and eloquence to refute it. He accuses
frankly the position taken by French diplomacy, and my
manifest of February. It is (said he) a contradictory policy,
assuring and menacing at the same time for foreign powers.
If M. Manguin will again read this political declaration of
February, he will perhaps acknowledge his error. Does
not this manifest (said he) pledge France to blow
the fire of republicanism, and support all the de-
mocratic insurrections in the world? Quite other.
wise,—it adopts directly contrary views. It says that
liberty, to bs durable, should be indigenous toithe soil that
before it is proclaimed in the institutions which are only the
emanations of the principles of the people, it should exist
in their character ; that France would not adopt any
propaganda incendiary, agitation, much lees perfidious;
that she acknowledged the compatibility of all the go-
vernments, progressive or retarded ; that she would not
impa any one before its due time. It added only, that
when democratic or poonlar institutions should be created,
reconquered, or organized round France, and within reach
of her aid, if these democratic or popular parties called on
her for support, in virtue of a conlotmity of principles, she
would feel obliged to lend her ass stance. Thu is what was
said of the manifest, and this is what the minister has done
for four months past. I contend that the manifest could not
say, and the government could not do otherwise for the re-
public. In brief, was the republic a republic of disnrganiz ition
or conquest ? No, but of order, pews and fraternity with the
nations. What did it require? Time to allow Europe to
understand its character, for the purpose of avoiding, in its
weakness and in its cradle, the divlay of those irritations and
iiundersomdings by all the cabinets, who would immediately
have coalesced against it from an apprehension of the terror
th►t the fugue of 1813 inspired. Is it true, as M. Manguin
pretends, faithful in that to his souvenirs of 1831, that this
policy could have been as deceptive for France, that an
armed "propaganda" could have been more sure, and
that we are now more menaced with coalition, than im-
mediately after the 24th of February? I will run with
him from kingdom to kingdom, over the map of the
ocean and the Continent, and will prove to him by evidence
that this policy his borne its fruits, prevented universal war,
and placed the Republic in one of the freest and finest di-
plomatic positions that France has ever held. I do not in
this render honour to any one intelligence but where it in
due to events; and I repeat, what I stated yesterday, that
it is Providence who for four months has conducted

the, foreign affairs— of the republic. Let us begin
with England, the powerful motive source of
all the wars, the bond of all the coalitions of the'
Continent. What ah .uhl be desired by a republic governed
by weld informed and enlightened men? A good understand-
ing with England, since on this depends, in a great measure;
the peace of the Continent. France and England, being
divided, draw the whole world in. vitably into their quarrels.
New, allow me, stentlemen, to observe by what means an'
intelligent and honest French diptbmacy may maintain, spite
of national prejudices, conceit d between England Red France.
Thus, when it is necessary t i make a treaty with England,
or to conduct any transactions in common with her, it is not
only, it is not principally, the government which must be
negotiated with ; there is something in England more power-
than governments and ministers—it is public opinion. Now
there are in England two organic and traditional parties,
the whips and the Wriest, the latter including all hotting
aristocratic opinions, the latter democratic, at least as for as
the ir 'tenuous and character of England admit of their de-
velopment. Each of these parties is a counterpoise to
the other. and as one rises end the other descends
in public influence, the reins of government are
held by the whips or teries respectively. Now one great,
advantage of the revolution of February wad to find a whip'
or liberal administration in England ; fir the party in public
opinion that this ministry represents would not have allowed
it, without abandoning its principles, to declare itself hostile,
ipso facto, to the French republic, no more than in 1792 when
England did not oppose our first ti public. The excesses of
the republic Fitter '92 drove England to a coalition against
France; but I hope, and am confident, that the mod, ration,
wisdom, and loyalty of the republic of 1849 will not bring
shout a similar dissension he ween the two treat nations.
This innffens've and even amicable attitude of England
towards the republic of 21ffi February, prevented at once all
possibility of a coalition of the Coto inent against us. This
gave time fur reflection to Europe—time for reflection to
France herself Let us see hoe this time has been employed.
Let us see if it be true, as M. Manguin and M. Napoleon
Bonaparte base said, Mat we are surrounded by a coalition,
that we hems no ameciable policy, and that time only aug
ments our dangers. 1 will say nothing of Russia : our new
relations h ner ere not yet sufficiently defined, but nothing
indicates the necessity of a collision with that power.
What WWI the power which could alarm us the moat
immediately after the 24th February, and serve as an ad-
vanced guard to Russia, and an expeditionary body from
Germany ? It was Pripet& With her immense military farce
always ready, she might have invaded us, and attacked . ur
let: flank. whilst Austria would have ievade d cur right.
Iler 400,000 men, augmented by auxiliary It.issian troops,
would have been a terrible load to support in the eventu-
alities; of a war. The generosity of the King of Prussia
did not allow us long to dread this; our relations with him,
through the intervention of M. de Circourt, reassured us at
once. The events 01 Berlin, the first connected with the
policy of the 24th February, added to our confidence in this
quarter. 'What could a Prussian intervention now do against
us ? Let M. Manguin himself, if he can, extricate himself
from the dilemma in which I shall place him. The kime of
Prussia, almost obliged to exile himself from his capital at
Potsdam in the midst of his troops, is in truth but the king of
the army. Well then, of two courses, either the king of
Prussia must throw himself into the arms of his people and
make an alliance with the most liberal, the mostdemomatie,
and the most enlightened people of Germany, or he must se-
parate himself from his people, remain surrounded by his
faithful army, and ally himself will Rusah. If the King of
Prussia unites with his people, their democratic sympathies
will lead them forcibly towards us, and our natural alliance
is consummated. Or the King of Freesia will remain In
the midst of his arms-, and will make an alliance with
Russia to reconquer his own country, end then what could
a sovereign do, obliged to take Russia so auxi:iary, and
reconquer his throne and nation by the aid of foreigners. ? We
have, then, inleither case, nothing to fear from Prussia. The
twelve or fifteen democratic revolutions which have taken
place in the centre and north of Germany, after that of Berlin,
have always produced the same result. Everywhere, by natu-
ral attraction, and of which the pacific attitude of ranee has
oeen the signal, the people have detached themselves from
the absolutist principles of their governments, to approach
with all :he influence of this attraction the French people,
and by that the necessary alliance with France. M. Gu set
adopted as a maxim, " Peace at any price." I have
adnpted and would give my country another maxim,
"The union of France and Germany at any price."
Bat this is not all. Look into that citadel of old absolutism
at Vienna as to what we have to hope or fear relative to the
Rhine, Italy, and the court of Austria; what can a court
do at this moment whose sovereign has been obliged to fly
his capital and seek an asylum at Inepruck in the passes of
the Tyrol ? Whet can a coo-t do from which Rely is now
separating itself, and driting from Milan, frem Venice, and
all the Italian territory the Austrian army ? What can a
court do whose nominal sovereignty is barely recog-
ni,ed by Hungary, which has lesied for itself a separate
army and appointed its own Minister of Foreign Affiirs,
to protect its own interests apart from those of Austria,
which at this moment has ordered a fresh levy of 200,000
men, not to place them at the m. rcy of Austria, but to create
a bulwark fur its oen independence, which, as I have this
morning learned, has declared that not one Hungarian
soldier shall cross the frontier to fight against the Italians?
What, in fine, can this court do when Bohemia dividss
itself into the Sclave and Teutonic races, and a general
of the empire is obliged to bombard Prastue, one of
the capitals of the empire? But I will go still further,
and ask what can a court do fr,tm the brow of whose
emperor the diet of Frankfort has torn the Imperial
crown of Germany to place it on the head of the Arch-
duke John ? Is it a court thus circumstanced that can menace
France, eitner in a coalition on the Rhine or a resistance,
very prolonged and very triumphant, to the independence of
Italy? No, evidently not! This naturally brings me to the
quemi mot Italy itself, particularly dwelt upon by M. Napoleon
Buoneparte. Before, however, I enter on this, I would notice
two observations of M. Manguin, for I should not leave any
point obscure or unanswered. M. Manguin has said, " Be-
fore you occupy yourself with Italy, have you thm.ght of two
menacing powers at your flanks, and which you must first
arrange with or defeat, to leave you at liberty in case of inter-
vention in Italy ? They are, according to M. Manguin, Bel.
Fiala and Spain. I will say in two:words, for everyone knows
it, and I would not conceal it even from Belgium, that if at the
revolution of February we had marched our army of the north
of 30,000 men into Belgium,in one month Belgium would have
been in our hands or effaced for the time from the map.
We would not de it; I would not do it ; and I congratulate
myfelf that I would not, and it is on that account that
the government would have nothing to do with it. Let me im-
press this on you, although it has been charged with
it in the attempt, doubly culpable towards Belgium and
towards France, which the Belgian and French democrats
endeavoured to carry into effect, in spite of us, in that
unfortunate expedition which was just now spoken of on the
Belgian frontier. We would not that Belgium should
be revolutionised at the same moment as France was in
revolution and peace problematical; and we did well. We
reasoned as men of prudence and foresight : If Belgium
be revolutionised, two parties will immediately be in pre-
sence ; one whocould remain independent,theother who would
desire a junction with France. What shall France do? If
she oppose her own party in Belgium, and refuse to incorpo-
rate herself with s country who would give itself to
her, she will incur the reproach amongst French Re-
publicans of cowardice or treason to the democratic
principle in Belgium; if she incorporate herself with
Belgium, she will do an act of ambition and conquest,
and will immediately entail a war with England and Hol-
land, and through these with Russia, Prussia, and the
whole continent. This is why we could not do this—we ere
it frankly to friends and foes—we need not boast, nor need
we blush for our prudence. As to Spain, I differ com-
pletely both in let and in principle with the policy pro-
Clby M. Manguin as to that country. From the time of
XIV. toNspolson, ana_ down to Until Philippe, all ths