The Express.
London, England, 1847-08-25 00:00:00

loally 'Oust any dibrioration of the land by the
tenant, Auld with soh It cisme the restristion on as-
signment of the le on aid& Ile well di weed with.
On the taunt bessmiag et hinelvent, the
landlord is to be at liberly to reforms the land,
paying to the tones estate " resemble oompensa-
tion for seek hapeassaents effected by the tenant as
have hicawasi the dal renting value of the land,"
the anent lointadjutred by •
The Imaiked eowasants for the tenant's quiet
enjoyment of the boa during the loess; also, that he
wffi insure the buildings against fire; and that he
will, at his own cost, drain " every part of the land
which requires drainage," the tenant covenanting to
an additional rest, equal to 5b per cent. upon the
outlay. There is then a general covenant by the
tenant for " good and husband-like" management of
the land, and not to break up specific pastures with-
out the landlord's consent. The lease ends with a
mutual covenant for the appointment of arbitrators,
in the usual way, and with all necessary powers to
bind both parties by their award, to whom all dis-
putes are is be referred.
Such is the concise and practical form of lease
framed by a body of intelligent farmers and land-
owners, after much consideration, and with an anxious
desire to do justice to both parties to the contract
At present our limits do not permit us to say more than
that, subject to the criticisms we have offered, it attains
the object sought, and that it deserves the attentive
consideration of landowners.

WE do not profess to give legal opinions to corre-
spondents. It really would not pay to do so. If, for
example, we made a practice of answering all the
questions laid before us on the New County Courts
Act only, we must " keep a barrister," as WARREN
used " to keep a poet."
While, however, we decline the office of general
exegetes of this act, there is one point about
which so mach doubt has been expressed by c
jorre-
spondenta, and which so materially affects the uris-
diction of the new courts, that we cannot fairly
decline to throw such light upon it as a well-weighed
opinion may have. This point is, how far there is a
concurrent jurisdiction of the county and the superior
courts, and especially the law of costs in cases which
may be brought before either class of tribunals.
The 128th section of the act enacts that "all actions
which before the passing of the act might have been
brought in any of the superior courts, where the plain-
tiff dwells more than twenty miles from the defendant,
' or where the cause of action did not arise wholly, cc
in some material point, within the jurisdiction of the
court, within which the defendant dwells or carries on
his business, at the time of the action brought, or
where any officer of the county. court shall be a party
(except in respect of any claims for goods taken in
execution of the process of the court, or their proceeds)
may be brought in any of the superior courts, at the
election of the party proceeding." This seems clear
enough. But a difficulty arises in combining this clause
with the 129th, which enacts" That if any
.action shall
be commenced after the passing of this act, in any of the
superior courts of record, for any cause other than
thaw lastly kreinbefore spec d, for which a plaint
might have been entered in any court holden ander
this act, and verdict shall be found for the plain-
tiff for a sum less than 201., if the said action is
founded on contract, or less than 51. if it be
founded on tort, the said plaintiff shall hare
judgment to recover such sum only and NO costa; and
if a verdict shall not be found for the plaintiff, the
defendant shall be entitled to his costs as between
attorney and client, unless in either case the jtulge who
shall try the case shall certify on the back of the record
that the action wasp to be brought in such a superior
court."
Great doubts exist, it appears, as to whether the
129th section puts any limitation on the 128th, in
reference to coots ; and if any, what they are. Some
of our correspondents insist that if a plaintiff, residing
more than 20 miles from his debtor, elect to sue in a
superior court, the judge has no discretion as to certi-
fying or not. Others contend that he has such a dis-
cretion, but doubt how far it extends.
On considering the matter, it appears, that by the
necessary construction of the 129th section, no limit-
ation whatever is put by it on the 128th, but, on the
contrary, that suits brought in the superior courts-
-Ist, by a plaintiff residing more than 20 miles from
his debtor; 2nd, where the cause of action did not arias
wholly or in some material point within the juris-
diction of the court belonging to the defendant's
place of abode or business; and 3rdly, when a county
court officer is a party in his private capacity—are
excluded from the whole operation of the act, if the
plaintiff so elect by section 128, and particularly from
the operation of section 129, by the exception in the
beginning of that section. This seems plain, also,
from the " purview " of the act, which was to
give a cheap and expeditious mode of settling mad
local differences, but not to preclude any one from
taking the opinion of the superior court as to his
claim. But to deter the plaintiff from putting the
defendant to needless expense by suing him before a
superior court, when there is nothing to render the
local jurisdiction inapplicable, this right to sue in the
superior courts is saddled with a liability to pay costs,
if it appear to the judge that the county court was the
proper place for the action. When the county court is
an improper tribunal, it would be unfair to saddle the
plaintiff with the costa when he gets a verdict, and
the act in two places expressly absolves him from this
penalty. It first lays down (in the 128th section)
three cases in which the plaintiff is released from the
operation of the act, without any discretion as to
costs on the part of the judge of the superior wart
And these reasons are most fair. A trades-
man at Southampton orders goods, by letter,
of a manufacturer at Manchester. The goods
are selected by the manufacturer's clerks, packed by
his packers, conveyed to the station and booked by
his waggoner, and the letter of advice posted from his
counting-house. If the money is not paid, though
under 201., it would be the height of injustice to
compel the manufacturer to send all these people to
the county court at Southampton to prove their
several acts; and it would also be unfair to summon
the defendant and his men to Manchester to
prove that the goods never reached Southampton. In
such cases the plaintiff may sue the defendant at
Southampton, but cannot be forced to do so. If he
de not choose so to sue, the parties are left to their
old remedies under the existing judicature, and ex-
pressly. excluded from the whole operation of the act,
as parties dwelling more than 20 miles apart. Nearly
the same observations apply to the second e
when, though plaintiff and defendant might Titir!!
in Southampton, everything from which the demand
arose, and which, therefore, would have to be proved,
had passed at Manchester. It is obvious that difficult
questions may arise as to what may be " a material"
portion of a cause of action, so as to bring it under
the 128th section. The third exception (as to actions
to which an officer of the court is a party) rests on
deratlons the soundness of which is apparent.
These three exceptions were clearly considered by
the legislature as plainly definable in themselves, and
as at once entitling the plaintiff, if he so elect, to try
his cause in the superior court. But, in addition to
these, there are numerous questions, of great 1
intricacy, arising often in cases when the sum in tlls-
pate is trifling, in say of which, perhaps, there
may be conflicting decisions of the superior courts, or
different opinions of learned judges. In such eases it
would be indecent to make the inferior judge an
arbiter between his superiors. Accordingly, the
legislature leaves to every suitor the right of apply-
ing to the superior courts in all cases, but subjects
him to a penalty for the defendant's benefit, unless it
appears that his application to the superior court was
prompted by a higher motive than a desire to put his
antagoniet to expense. S Lich being the well known inten-
tion of the act, we cannot find in the words of it,
careless as they are, anything necessarily .inconsistent
with these intentions. The expression in the 129th
section, " for an mete other than those lastli
before specified," is loose, if not unintelligible. The
exceptions in the 128th section are not causes for
which actions can be brought. A plaintiff dwelling
more than 20 miles from a defendant can hardly, we
should imagine, be " a cause of action." The mean-
ing of the exception in the 129th ambits is no
doubt " other than those actions or pidings
specified in the 128th section." This interpretation
at once clears up the difficulty, caused by the obscure
and vague phraseology of the 129th section. In cer-
tain cases specified in the 128th section, actions for
201. or less may be brought in the superior court.
In these actions the judge has no discretion as to casts
under the act. In all but these cases he has • new
discretion vested in him by the act, and to be exer-
cised, no doubt, on considerations which, before the
parsing of the act, would not have entered into the
question of certifying for costs.