The Express.
London, England, 1847-08-31 00:00:00

MONEY MARKET.

MONDAT BMWS.
With very limited business to-day in the foods, the
upward movement of prism Ina eaatimied ia an
bee
of commercial disasters, and the general dolgessian
trade. This is, however, by no means an ansommics
condition of stock values in the like circumstance";
the usually accepted solution of which is, that the
smaller order of capitalists, who in ordinary times are
accustomed to employ their money in loans aod ,
counts, on unexceptionable paper, as then ,
so as to realise an average rate of interest beyond
what the funds or other readily converting
securities would yield—become infected with
the distrust naturally and generally generated by
the course of commercial insolvency, in which,
more or less, some of them may chance to be
involved. Scarcely knowing where to repose confi-
dence in the commercial world, or in the mass of in-
dustrial interests which directly now, or indirtctly
hereafter, may be prejudiced by the unfortunate wear-
rences of the day ; not caring to invest in railway or
other share values, which may not be returnable in cash
with intereet and profit when required ; and fatigued
therefore with funds in hand idle and =productive,
they turn to funded or unfunded inveetmeats, in which

interest is at least running on, and the capital so em-
ployed is alway s readily realisehle at call, it maybe with
a profit in price beyond interest, but at all events with
a short loss, for which the nature of the security, and
the facility of re-entering into capital, are deemed a
sufficient compensation. Thus it happens that the
higher prices of stocks, commonly reckoned the
barometer by which a prosperous condition of affairs
generally should be indicated, are, on the contrary,
not =frequently the result of industrial depression,
and the want of confidence which is the consequence.
Other causes, rather principal than collateral, operate in
the same direction to produce thesame effects. The go-
vernnient, of whatever political complexion that govern-
ment may chance to be, have a horror of Consols de-
scending day by day to a low figure. It is the
valgarly inherited conception that national credit is to
be measured by the per tentage rise or fall of stocks,
whereas, excepting in the case which has not yet
oecurrid, or been suspected, of national incapacity for
discharging duly the interest of the debt, the fluctua-
tions in the values of national securities are the re-
flection only of the mutations of the market
rates of money or interest, comparatively with
the rates of other values, apart such excep-
tional cases, arising out of peculiar circum-
stances affecting general credit, such as those now
ruling, and which have been adverted to. The Bank
of Eugland, eympathisiug with, or influenced by, the
government, have only been too ready to lend aid on
all occasions of the depreciation of public securities,
by lending money upon them to speculators operating
for the rise, and thus enabling them, by creating
short 'applies of stock at market, to uphold prices,
and punish parties who have speculated upon a falL
The less that bank or government concern themselves
with the course of stock values or speculations the
better. They only in the end miss their aim, because
all credit, however artificially supported, just as water,
however dammed up, mast find its level. And
the damage from officious interference to stay the
natural tendencies of credit, is just the same as would
result from damming up a stream which eventually
accumulates so as to overflow, and then force down
its banks by the pressure of an irresistible mass of
waters. The tree and practical theory is to leave
values alone; they are sure to adjust themselves.
This governmental and bank anxiety about public
securities, acts all to the injury of commerce and
commercial values. Because, as the Bank lays out its
capital in supporting the prices of stocks, by loans upon
stocks, it has so much the less means for waiting upon'
the legitimate requirements of commerce and industry.
Consols had improved at the close of business to
87: to # for money, and 88 to for account, and those
quotations prevailed for the greater part of the day.
The rate of continuation between money and account
was therefore somewhat reduced, a sign that money
was easier. The transactions, as before said, were of
a limited character, and the feature of the day was
calmness in business with prices advancing. Reduced,
' Threes were 87,1 to I. Three-and-a-Quarter per
Cents., 89; to 1. Long Annuities, 9 to 1-16. Ex-
chequer Bills, 3s. to 6s. prem. Bank Stock 1931 to 7e.
The dealings in foreign securities were of the usual
unimportant nature. Some improvement may be
noted in Dutch stocks, although coming lower from
Amsterdam. These are among the legitimate securi-1
ties most popularly dealt in. 'l'hey were quoted, with
scarcely any business to-day, at better prices, the
Two and-a-Half per Ceuta. at 56 to ; the Fours, at
89 to 5. Belgian Four-and-a-Half per Cents. at 92
to 4. Spanish Fives at 19.1 to 20} ; the Threes, at
291 to 30. Portuguese, 24 to 6. Mexican, 181
to 19t.
Two failures in the corn trade were reported to-
day, one at Oahe', on the Danube, the other at
Genoa, but the names did not transpire. It is pro-
bable they may have arisen out of the similar and
previous casualties here.
ENGLISH PONDS.
Bank Stock, 194 6 T Long Am.., 33 Yrg, Rep. 9th Jea.
3 per CL Red. Anna., 871 1 1860, 84
3 per Ct. Consols Ana.., 871111 Consuls for Amt., 831 71 81
tz2i pa
Cliartillato, 1860, PZi.lobglL, pm.
1-16 Ditto, Hump, 10 o pm.
70E510 FUNDS.
S par Ct. Hallam Bds., 1846, 168 4 per Ct. Portuguese Acct. 131
191 181 6 vcr4(lt. Kumla, Bonds, 1823, E et.
Ditto. Acct. Sept. 13, 191
6 per Ct. Portuguese Ma., 80 I 3 per Ct. Span 291
lie 3 per CL. Ditto Acct.. Sept. 16 2/1
4 per Por”.elt 834 4i Pm Ct. zste. 93