1942-01-26

REPEAL OF PETROLEUM AND NAPHTHA INSPECTION ACT

[Stage Direction]
Hon. C. W. G. GIBSON (Minister of National Revenue) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 2, to repeal the Petroleum and Naphtha Inspection Act.
He said: The Petroleum and Naphtha Inspection Act was originally passed in 1877, at a time when gasoline was a by-product. The main purpose of the act was to safeguard users of coal oil from the adulteration of coal oil with gasoline. Owing to the greatly increased demand for and use of gasoline, the provisions of this act are no longer necessary and are a needless expense.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.


[Stage Direction]
Mr. WILFRID LaCROIX (Quebec-Mont-morency) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 3, to provide for the flags of Canada.
Some. hon. MEMBERS. Explain.
Mr. LaCROIX (Quebec-Montmorency): The purpose of this bill is to empower the governor in council to create a national flag for Canada, the only nation in the world which does not possess or fly a distinctive national flag. Our country is voluntarily doing its full share in this war, and doing so as an independent and sovereign nation; therefore the time has come for a flag that will express the sovereignty of the Canadian people and the Canadian parliament, just as the union jack represents the sovereignty of the United Kingdom-in other words, of the parliament at Westminster.
A Canadian flag will stand for national freedom, commonwealth fellowship and national unity, and be a rallying force in the defence of the nation. Furthermore, it is a natural consequence of the adoption of the statute of Westminster ten years ago, by which Canada was designated a sovereign nation.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first
time.

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. H. BLACKMORE (Lethbridge):: I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister. Why has the sugar ration in Canada been set at three-quarters of a pound per person while in the United States it is fixed at one pound? Again, have any steps been taken or has any plan been made to increase Canada's beet sugar productive capacity by the building of factories? If not, why not?


Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):: The question is one which the Minister of Finance (Mr. Usley) would wish to answer. It is also a question that might best stand on the order paper to be answered at a subsequent sitting of the house.



JAPANESE NATIONALS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. THOMAS REID (New Westminster):: May I ask the Prime Minister a question? In view of the many statements appearing in

The Address-Mr. Hanson (Fork-Sunbury)
the press in British Columbia in connection with the removal of Japanese from the coast, I was wondering if, some day soon, the Prime Minister would make an official statement regarding the matter, as many of us, many of the people of British Columbia, are in doubt as to what is going to happen.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I will try to meet the
wishes of the people of British Columbia by giving the fullest possible information with respect to the working out of the government's policy in relation to the Japanese in the province. What may be the best moment to make the statement I am unable to say offhand. Perhaps, meanwhile I shall have a chance to confer with my hon. friend. I will see that the statement is made in due course.



LABOUR CONDITIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. CLARENCE GILLIS (Cape Breton South):: On Friday the hon. member for
Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) made inquiry with reference to the situation at Kirkland Lake. The acting minister said that he would have some information on the question on Monday. I wonder if he is prepared to give the house that information.


Hon. N. A. McLARTY (Secretary of State):: Yes. As suggested by the hon. member for Cape Breton South, I did make inquiries, and the Minister of Labour did furnish me with the information desired by the hon. member for Vancouver East. I am advised that the minister has received various communications from union officials which at first he regarded as accepting the proposals, but more recent advices indicate that certain qualifications of the procedure are requested. No formal reply has been received from the mine operators.



GOVERNOR GENERAL'S SPEECH


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed from Friday, January 23, consideration of the motion of Mr. Alphonse Fournier for an address to His Excellency the Governor General in reply to his speech at the opening of the session.
Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, we are met here again, at the beginning of the third session of this parliament, under conditions which stagger and appal our thoughts and imagination. Literally the whole world is at war, and we as Canadians are, by free choice and inclination, belligerents in the most momentous conflict in the world's history.
Since we parted in November last, the world has moved on from one tragic event to another in such quick succession as to well-nigh appal the most stout-hearted, and to cause all of us to search our minds and our hearts in an effort to comprehend the meaning and the implications of total war, which now has involved not only the western world but the eastern as well, and threatens to engulf us all.
On a quiet Sunday in December, while most of us were endeavouring to enjoy a day of rest after a week of anxiety over the situation in Russia and Libya, came the treacherous and shattering attack on Pearl Harbour. What an hour of crisis in the world's history! What an hour of crisis for the people of the United States, their government still dealing in good faith with the government of Japan, in an earnest effort to avoid the extension of hostilities to the far eastl And what an hour of crisis for this Canada of ours! Living side by side with the United States, we are conscious that every step taken on the part of the axis powers brings the war that much nearer to this nation.
The government acted promptly in the formal matter of declaring war. It did not wait to call parliament. It pursued the correct constitutional practice and assumed the responsibility for its action. That is responsible government under our system and practice.
Did the government have a mandate to declare war on Japan? It did not. It did not require a mandate. Knowing the situation, it assumed the responsibility which, by every principle of responsible government, belongs to representative government, and went through the formality of declaring war on Japan, trusting that parliament and public opinion would sustain its action.
Now that the whole world is at war, now that Canada is at war with all the axis powers, now that we are endangered along with our neighbour on the west coast, this country must face the whole position realistically, and begin for the first time to wage total war with total effort. We have professed to be waging total war. We have accomplished much since September, 1939. But we have never even up to this minute really waged total war. The Prime Minister has on many occasions preached the doctrine of total war, but, he, more than any other man in Canada, has found himself cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, by his own commitments.
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) not so many months ago, uttered a stirring challenge in these eloquent words:
I believe we shall win, not simply because we say so, but because Canada, along with the other democracies, will stop at nothing which
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The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
can be effectively done to ensure that the forces of evil shall be stamped out, that the menace of slavery shall be banished, and that free men and their families may enjoy the liberty which, until this struggle began, we in this dominion had somehow taken for granted. We cannot take it for granted any longer. The menace is against Canada, as well as against the rest of the world.
Noble words those, my countrymen! But the minister is fettered by the commitments of the ministry, which prevent the fulfilment of the aims so eloquently portrayed by him in the quotation I have just read. And because everyone in this house and every thinking citizen in this country knows that in this hour of grave national crisis we must, each for himself, determine that we shall have total war, come what may, I call upon parliament to deal, and deal at once, with that crisis.
What happened at Pearl Harbour may happen at Esquimalt. What happened 160 miles off Halifax may happen at Halifax. What happened 60 miles off Long island may happen at Sydney, Saint John or Quebec. To-day the fate of Canada, of Australia, of the British empire, of all the democracies and of democratic civilization is being determined in Malaya, in the Philippines, in Libya and in the snows of Russia, and shortly it may be in Britain itself, if invasion is attempted in the spring.
And what must our contribution be? I give the answer in the words of Mr. Churchill, spoken in this very chamber less than a month ago in the hearing of most of us:
The enemy ranged against us . . . have asked for total war. Let us make sure they get it.
And speaking in Washington to the congress of that great democracy Mr. Churchill said:
Provided that every effort is made, that nothing is kept back, that the whole man-power, brain-power, virility, valour and virtue of the English-speaking world, with all its galaxy of loyal friends, are associated in a common community or state, we can be reunited by the simple but supreme good.
Again, in this chamber, Mr. Churchill summed up in these eloquent words the duty of each and all of us:
There is no room now for the dilettante, for the weakling, for the shirker or the sluggard; the mine, the factory, the dockyard, the salt sea waves, the fields to till, the home, the hospital, the chair of the scientist, the pulpit of the preacher-from the highest to the humblest, the tasks all are of equal honour. All have their part to play.
The enemy, Mr. Churchill said, have asked for total war: let us make sure they get it. And what is Canada doing to make sure they get it? The Prime Minister has stated, not once but a dozen times, that total war must be waged by total effort. But have we

total effort? Are we not shackled by dangerous and paralyzing restrictions, restrictions which are of the government's own making, restrictions which were imposed by the government without any mandate from the people, restrictions which would not be imposed to-day in the light of present-day conditions, restrictions which are impeding the fulfilment of the government's own pledges, made after we had concluded the first comfortable period of our war effort, which was to be a moderate contribution, a moderate participation?
During the past few months I have travelled from Halifax to Victoria, and have to the best of my ability sounded public opinion. I listened as intelligently and as intently as it was possible for me to do. During this period events have happened with tragic rapidity. There has been Hong Kong; there has been Pearl Harbour. These tragic events have brought about a tremendous change in public opinion in every part of Canada. Months ago, when the Prime Minister first preached total effort for total war, it was not interpreted by each of us as having a personal application; the total effort was to be for the other fellow, not for us as individuals. But I am convinced that to-day, without a full mobilization, a full marshalling, a full pooling of the complete resources, both of man-power and of materials, of this nation and of all the democracies, we cannot wage total war, and victory may elude us.
I desire to ask this house and the country two questions: Has Canada fully mobilized her material resources? Has Canada fully mobilized her man and woman power to wage total war? These are, I repeat, two vital questions which face parliament to-day. We as the elected representatives of the people must face these two questions man-fashion. It will not do to leave them to the government. If we do so we abdicate our functions as the elected representatives of the people, and we may as well declare that we are no longer a democracy. No. Parliament must face these two questions. We must no longer tolerate the making of government policy by order in council. I appeal to every hon. member in this house to join with me in urging that parliament, that this House of Commons, assume the responsibility of seeing that the supreme objective of waging total war by total effort is attained.
These two questions face us, and what is the answer? We all know in our hearts that the answer is in the negative. If we are honest with ourselves we can give no other answer. That being so, we must then determine what further steps must and shall be taken.

The Address-Mr. Hanson (Fork-Sunbury)
Now, what are the requisites of total war as applied to Canada at this critical juncture of our history? I have given considerable thought to this problem, and here is my blueprint of the principles underlying a total war effort for Canada to-day. It may not be complete, but such as it is I offer it to the house and to the country.
1.	To muster, equip and train as many and as strong forces as possible to meet and defeat the enemy in whatever threatre of war he may be found.
2.	To defend Canada and to prevent the invasion of Canada. And I point out, without arguing the question, that there is a distinction between the two.
3.	To mobilize by any and every necessary means the wealth and material resources of the nation in order to provide the implements of war for our armed forces and to provide for the other services which are necessary for the carrying out of total war.
4.	To mobilize and organize Canadian agriculture to produce and supply to our armed forces and to our allies as much food as it is possible to transport to them, as well as to supply our civilian population.
5.	To mobilize and organize Canadian industry to produce as great quantities of armament and munitions as our facilities and available materials will permit.
6.	To build and man transport ships and more ships to carry our products of food, munitions and armament to the scene of conflict.
7.	Finally, and perhaps not so important, to mobilize and organize the material wealth and resources of the nation, and such of the personnel of its civilian population as are not immediately required for the armed forces and other war services, to ensure the continuance, under restricted conditions, of such peace-time activities and supplies as are reasonably necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of our own people.
Nothing less than these seven propositions will fulfil that theory and practice, if we are serious and mean what we say when we pledge ourselves to total war. In order to accomplish this the man and woman power and the total material resources of the nation, without any limitation, must be marshalled-pooled, if necessary-and put to work. It must be done on a selective basis if the best results are to flow from the effort. It may be that someone else will put these requisites in a different order. That does not matter.
In June, 1940, under great pressure, this government caused to be introduced and enacted the National Resources Mobilization Act. I
accept full responsibility and the onus, if any there be, for the position which I took on that occasion when, in company with my colleague the hon. member for Yale (Mr. Stirling), I went to the Prime Minister that June morning after the fall of France and demanded that action be taken. Under that authority, patterned after the British act of May, 1940, the government is empowered, with one limitation, to do anything and everything required for the "efficient prosecution of the war." Let me repeat those words-to do anything and everything for the "efficient prosecution of the war." That is the underlying principle 'of the National Resources Mobilization Act.
With the exception of one limitation the government has full and complete power and authority to mobilize and utilize every resource of the nation, except man-power, for use in a theatre of war "outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof." Therefore, with respect to man-power, the power of mobilization is strictly confined to use within the territorial limitation of the nation.
At the time I accepted that limitation on the theory that half a loaf was better than no bread. And it was a distinct step forward, having regard to the theory of moderate participation which had been government policy up to that time. It imported the principle of compulsion; let there be no mistake about that. This government thus committed itself to the principle of compulsion. It was accepted without reserve by the great mass of the Canadian people.
Did the government have any direct mandate from the people of Canada to introduce and pass the mobilization act? Most assuredly it did not. But it did have a mandate from the people of Canada to efficiently prosecute the war, and it also had the responsibility of defending the nation. At that time, and right up to this present moment, where has been the defence of the nation? The defence of the nation lies in Britain, in the English channel, in the North sea, in Russia, in the near east, in the far east; wherever the enemy may be found. There, overseas, lies Canada's defence, her first line of defence. I think we are all agreed on that principle; at least I hope we are.
May I pause here, sir, to offer a constructive concrete suggestion arising out of the rapidly changing events in the far east. Those of us who have been listening to the news have heard with quickening hearts the urgent appeals of our kinsmen in Australia, the appeals to the United States and Britain for assistance and more assistance. I am sure each of us must have been impressed by the serious situation which has developed there. Every able-bodied man in Australia has been called to the
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The Address

Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
colours. I pray to God that it is not too late. I am afraid that it may be; for how can these men be trained in time for the defence of their shores, men who have never had previous training?
Now I come to my proposal. Why should not this dominion send a division of trained men to Australia? It would be more than a gesture of good will. It would be a demonstration of support and help and solidarity which would grip the imagination of the whole world, and especially of our own people, who have been thrilled by the exploits of the gallant Australians in Libya, in Greece, in Malaya and in every theatre of war. If we have not a division of trained men in Canada- and apparently we have not, I do not know; the minister can answer that-then send one of our trained divisions now in England, and replace it with men from Canada. Those men over there would welcome the opportunity for active service. I earnestly commend this proposal to my right hon. friend and his cabinet.
If we are to defeat the common enemy we must seek him out and defeat him in every theatre of war and wherever he may be found. That is one of the first principles of military strategy, the soundness of which has never been questioned. On no other hypothesis shall we win this war. To me that is fundamental. And if we are to seek out and defeat the enemy; if we are, in the words of the Minister of National Defence, to "stop at nothing which can be effectively done to ensure that the forces of evil shall be stamped out"; in a word, if we are to wage total war, how can we do so when we continue to impose a strangling restriction on our ability to mobilize our man-power for active service in any theatre of war?
That is the problem to which I implore the close attention of hon. gentlemen. Up to date the answer is the voluntary system, and it alone is relied upon. I do not intend to decry out of hand the voluntary system. The loyalty and patriotism of our young men was beyond question, although we were told in September, 1940, that some of them had to be taught their national obligations. Up to a certain point of time the voluntary system produced results. But because of the extended character of the struggle; because of its gigantic nature; because of all the factors which have developed in the course of more than two years of war; because man-power is so vital to any total war effort, I am quite sure that the time has now arrived when the voluntary system is no longer adequate to the necessities of the occasion.
By a reference to recruiting statistics I am quite certain that I can prove this premise.

Further, the figures on recruiting prove beyond a shadow of doubt that some communities are doing far more than others, that there is no equality of sacrifice as between the component parts of the nation. That the voluntary system has failed may be proved not only by statistics but also by the evidence of credible witnesses, those charged with the responsibility of making the system work.
The first witness I call is the Minister of National Defence himself. Speaking in this house on November 5 last as appears at page 4115 of Hansard, he admitted that the army was deficient by 13,000 in the number of recruits sought for the preceding four-months period. That surely is some evidence; to me it is very convincing evidence. Is it not striking and convincing evidence that in the mind of the minister at least the system is not yielding the results desired?
I pause here to say that, so far as my information goes, the defects in the voluntary system are not, up to date, reflected in the enlistments for the air and naval services. I am referring only to the active army. Our men, especially our younger men, are air-minded.
To cover the situation, the department has set up special recruiting committees. One such was established in New Brunswick-a province which, in my view, has done wonderfully well in voluntary recruiting-due, in part at least, to economic conditions; we have no war industry there. I now warn the government and the minister that the consensus among those most active in promoting voluntary enlistment in that area is that the limit has been reached. I offer that in the utmost good faith, believing it to be true. At a recruiting meeting held in my own city within the last few days, addressed* by the premier of the province and by the president of the university, there was hardly a man of military age present, and that fact called for some pointed remarks from at least one of the speakers, himself a veteran of the last war.
In the city of Montreal, as long ago as August 27, W. B. Scott, K.C., co-chairman of the special recruiting committee of that city, stated:
It is time for the public to know and realize that we are not getting the recruits we need for the active army.
On October 16, Brigadier Georges Vanier, the D.O.C. for military district No. 5, Quebec City, who is charged with responsibility for making the voluntary system in his district produce results, is reported to have stated:
We are not getting enough men; we must have more.

The Address

Mr. Hanson (Fork-Sunbury)
And, according to a news report, he stated, on or about November 20, in a public address, that Canada's present system of recruiting for the armed forces "does not meet our needs".
On August 21, Brigadier Panet stated:
Acceptable recruits have not been coming forward in sufficient numbers to meet the quota.
On November 25, Brigadier Panet stated at a press conference that recruiting was lagging badly throughout most of the country. This is what he is reported to have said:
The recruiting campaign which drew many men into the armed forces during the summer has slowed down to a walk and there is now nothing like the required number of men signing up for service.
Surely the evidence which I have submitted is the best evidence anyone can have that the voluntary system has not provided and is not providing the number of men required.
But if anything more is desired, may I call the attention of the government and the house to a speech made by the premier of New Brunswick, at the. city of Saint John, as recently as the 12th of January. Speaking at a meeting of the Engineering Institute of Canada, he went out of his way to make several declarations on this question of manpower; and there is no uncertainty about what he said. Among other things, he said this:
In the United Kingdom, in other portions of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and in the United States unrestricted military service is provided for. Can we afford, as a nation, to apply a lesser measure to our contribution?
At the close of his remarks, speaking on the duty of Canada and the question of national unity, he made use of this language, which I commend to the Prime Minister and the membership of the house:
If national unity means anything it should mean that we are united in our determination to stand wholeheartedly behind our Canadian boys who are committed to bear the brunt and heat of battle. They it is who are making, or will make, the real sacrifices in this war. And as Canadians they are entitled to adequate support in every theatre of war where they may be engaged. They are entitled to our assurance that, come what may, they will receive the fullest measure of assistance that it is within the power of this country to provide. Anything less than that is not enough.
On December 16, the legislature of Manitoba adopted a resolution calling for five specific things:
1.	Immediate mobilization and utilization of all resources;
2.	Employment of all men and women in the most useful way, according to age, training, physical capacity and ability;
3.	Elimination of provisions restricting conscription of man-power for service in Canada only;
4.	Equitable division of the burden of service; and
5.	Dedication of total effort to the single purpose of destroying the enemy.
This is an important declaration by an important representative body. It follows in substance the stand of the Canadian Legion, as presented to this government in November last. Surely this is evidence of a change in public opinion.
And now I put this question to the government and to the house and to the country. Are men needed for the army? There may be some who will still say, as many believed at the outbreak of war, that a large armed force is unnecessary. Let me call some further witnesses and see what they have to say on this point.
The first witness I shall call is again the Minister of National Defence. Speaking over the radio on April 8, 1941, he said:
Man-power and morale are the paramount factors in this war. ... If anyone has had an idea that men are not needed, I want to say very emphatically that that idea is wrong. Men are needed now, and will be needed in large numbers from month to month.
Again, speaking in this house on November 5, as reported at page 4114 of Hansard, the minister stated:
There has been an idea that the army will play some sort of minor role, that this is really a navy and air force war. Let me say to you that from the views which were given to me-
I assume he is referring to his recent visit to England-
-it was made quite clear that the role of the army in this war is and will be no minor one. . . . But there is no illusion that this war can be finished without an army to meet and, with the cooperation of ships and planes, eventually beat Hitler's land forces. . . . The army supported by the other services must eventually strike the decisive blow.
This is the considered opinion of the Minister of National Defence. Who is there to challenge it?
A further witness is the former adjutant general. Speaking over the radio on September 7, 1941, he said:
There is only one power on earth that will beat Hitler-man-power. Never let it be said that our men were of the best but our numbers too few.
Surely this is sufficient evidence from high authority to demonstrate the need for manpower and more man-power. And where is that man-power needed? Is it needed within Canada, or is it needed outside Canada? Where should the enemy be faced? Should
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The Address-Mr. Hanson (Fork-Sunbury)
we wait until he bombs Halifax, until he scales the plains of Abraham, until Esquimalt has been converted into another Pearl Harbour? Or should we go forward to meet him in theatres of war outside our own domain? In other words, where does the defence of Canada lie?
Let us see what the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power) has to say on this subject. Speaking, appropriately enough, at the Laurier Centennial at McGill university on November 20, 1941, the minister stated:
The spirit of Canada could not survive in a world dominated by racial tyranny and given over to racial slavery. That is why every young Canadian, whether he watches the shores of Labrador, patrols the waters of the Pacific, guards the cliffs of Dover or the fortress of Hong Kong, or fights above the sands of Libya or the steppes of Russia, is defending Canada. He is not merely helping to keep the invader from our shores; he is helping, too, to preserve the kind of world-a free world-which is the only kind of world in which the Canada of Laurier or, indeed, any nation worth preserving, could survive.
Speaking, again, at the annual dinner of the Dominion commercial travellers' association in the city of Montreal, the minister is reported to have used the following words:
The source of the most insidious, most destructive evil which the world has ever known is wherever the hordes of Hitler, the slaves of Mussolini, the murderers of Japan, are to be found. We can only exterminate, we can only destroy it at its source.
Perhaps the best witness one can call in proof of the point is Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, present chief of the general staff, who stated on December 19, as reported in the press, as follows;
One of the objectives of the enemy is to create confusion in Canada and bring about a diversion to home defence of troops that would otherwise be sent overseas. We must not forget that this war will be won outside Canada and we must send our main forces to the place where they will be needed most.
That is the testimony of a professional soldier charged with the responsibility of running this war under the government. But I go even higher than that; I go to the words of the Prime Minister himself. I quote from a speech which he delivered at the Lord Mayor's luncheon at the Mansion House in London on September 4 last. These are solemn words, and he made a solemn pledge when he said:
I cannot make too clear that the policy of the Canadian government is to have our troops serve in those theatres where, viewing the war as a whole, it is believed their services will count most.
If, then, it is the clear policy of the Canadian government to have our troops serve in those

theatres of war where their services will count most, why have we the restriction contained in the mobilization act? Why do we continue the subterfuge of two armies? Why do we not face the issue frankly, squarely and courageously, recognizing that the defence of Canada best lies beyond our shores and that our armed forces should be sent to meet the challenge?
Now, what are the reasons why we in Canada are circumscribed and unable to implement the pledge of the Prime Minister to meet total war with total effort? The reason in my view is political. It is political because the Prime Minister and his party attained office in 1921, and retained it for nine years, by capitalizing the situation which arose out of the last great conflict. The people of Canada in 1940 were made promises which, it has developed, cannot, in the light of present-day facts, be kept if we are to do our full duty.
The one most potent implement in war is man and woman power. Let no one argue otherwise. It can never be disregarded or eliminated. It is the one vital factor which must be present, no matter how highly developed our war mechanism may be. If you grant me that, and I think you all will, then I come to examine the principle of compulsion. I hope to do so objectively; I hope to do so judicially; I hope to do so without rancour.
In a democratic, self-governing country, the theory of compulsion is, in ordinary peacetimes, anathema to all our instincts. Most of us are individualists. But in war time the situation is entirely reversed. Then, not the individual rights and material comforts of the individual citizen are predominant, but the safety of the state is paramount.
Let me put this question to hon. members of this house and to the people of Canada: Is it consistent with the principles of democracy that the state, when its life is in peril, when its very existence is at stake, should have the right to demand the services and help of all its nationals? All history cries out in the affirmative. In the words of Lloyd George in 1916, on the second reading of the military service 'bill in England when they were putting compulsion into effect:
There never yet has been a country faced with a great military peril that has ever saved itself without resort to compulsion. Never! It is true of autocracy; it is even more true of democracy. Every healthy body has demanded the help of its members to defend itself. Thank God Britain is not a paralytic that cannot command the services of every citizen. . . . Every great democracy which has been challenged, which has had its liberties menaced, has defended itself by resort to compulsion, from

The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
Greece downwards. Washington won independence for America by compulsory measures; they defended it in 1812 by compulsory measures. Lincoln was not merely a great democrat, but his career was in itself the greatest triumph that democracy has ever achieved in the sphere of government. He proclaimed the principle of, "government of the people, by the people, for the people," and he kept it alive by conscription. In the French revolution the French people defended their newly-obtained liberties against every effort of the monarchists by compulsion and by conscriptionary levies.
A further important statement is that which is attributed to Abraham Lincoln in an article in the Vancouver Province which just came to my attention this morning. When the Union army of volunteers was in desperate condition, President Lincoln is reported to have said:
Voluntarism is the unprincipled dodge of cowardly politicians. It has ground up the choicest seed of the nation. It has consumed the young, the generous, the patriotic, the intelligent, and the brave, and it has wTasted the best moral, social, and political elements of the republic, and left the cowards, the shirkers, and the money makers to stay at home and procreate their kind.
But if we are to survive this gigantic struggle, the disciplinary and plenary powers which the government must exercise should not be limited to man-power. Man-power is of great importance. Equally important is the complete mobilization of the wealth and material resources of the nation. Some people argue that this should come first. That is a matter of opinion. My own view is that the one is complementary to the other.
Let me say at once that since July, 1940, the government has taken steps to mobilize the industry of the country and turn it in the direction of production suited to our war needs. Industry and labour alike have cooperated, and to-day I feel sure that we need not hang our heads at the record of production of Canadian labour and industiy. Since July, 1940, we have been in the organization stage. To-day we have reached the production stage. Whatever part the government has played in that endeavour, certainly at the outset much was left undone. My own view is that the major credit is due to industry and labour. But it is a gigantic task to convert the peace-time activity of a peaceful agricultural and semi-industrial country like Canada into a war-time economy. It takes time and effort and leadership and good will on the part of all to accomplish this; and, while much has been accomplished, much remains to be done. To that end I advocate the principle of complete mobilization of industry, so that this country shall supply to our armed forces the necessary equipment 60 essential in a total war.
In the speech from the throne, the advisers of his excellency have asked his excellency to say that this parliament will be invited as an integral part of Canada's direct war effort, to approve a contribution to Britain of vast quantities of munitions, foodstuffs and supplies. We are now part of a gigantic struggle. Production of munitions and foodstuffs is an important element in this effort. Our contribution in mechanical transport has been important and impressive. Our munitions industry had to start from scratch, and, while we had a slow take-off, we have now, owing to the cooperation of industry and labour, backed by the financial resources of the nation as contributed to the government, advanced to a stage of production which is creditable to those who have been entrusted with this important task.
To make a contribution to Britain of our production of food, munitions and supplies is in line and in keeping with the policies which we have advocated since the outbreak of the war. I am glad to see that the government has now recognized the desirability of such a policy. We shall support it.
Our agricultural population has always stood ready to do its part. All it needed was to be told what to do, to be given leadership. More than a year ago I pleaded with the government to give, out of our abundance, a substantial gift of wheat. It will be recalled that this proposal did not even meet with the courtesy of any comment or reply. But I would impress upon the ministry that agriculture in Canada was, for the first two years of the war, producing in many instances below the cost of production; and so much of that situation as still obtains should be remedied.
You cannot expect agriculture to produce for less than the cost of production. For ten years they have been doing it, and agriculture is bankrupt-in my part of the country at all events. And what has happened since the war began? Owing to the fact that our agriculturists are hardly getting a new dollar for an old, men are leaving the farms for the munitions factories. There is no doubt about that. Wherever there is war industry, men, particularly young men, are leaving the farms for the munitions factories. The growth of the munitions industry has drained from many of our agricultural communities a large amount of agricultural man-power which it is absolutely essential should be maintained on the farms if we are to have not only a prosperous and contented agricultural population, but, over and above all that, the quantity and quality of production which is essential to victory.
I propose now, Mr. Speaker, to deal with the government's proposals as revealed in the speech from the throne.
26	COMMONS
The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
The speech from the throne states that we will be advised of the -
. . . means the government proposes to adopt, to effect as complete as possible a mobilization of the material resources and man-power of the country in direct furtherance of a total national effort.
Presumably this is in fulfilment of the statement made by the Minister of National Defence for Air on December 13, when he said:
These powers-
That is, those under the National Resources Mobilization Act-
-we propose to use in this emergency which confronts us, and in an endeavour to see to it that every man and woman in this country carries on the work which will be of the greatest possible benefit to the state as a whole.
If these announcements are carried out in their literal interpretation, the results will be welcomed by the country. Unfortunately there is too much ground1 for believing that there is in these statements little more than a pious expression of opinion. The statements do not differ from statements which were made by the Minister of National Defence for Air at the time the mobilization act was passed. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 18, 1940, as reported at page 862 of Hansard, with reference to the mobilization act, the Minister of National Defence for Air said:
It should be said that anyone who is physically fit and is below the age of 45 years may, and in fact will, have not only the opportunity hut the obligation to join the militia service of Canada.
In a national broadcast on July 10, 1940, in which he was explaining the principles of the mobilization act, the Minister of National Defence for Air spoke as follows:
Every able-bodied man must be and will be trained in the use of arms to defend his home, his loved ones, his liberty, his life.
From these latter two statements of policy came the farce of the thirty-day training plan. Instead of every able-bodied man being trained in the use of arms, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three and twenty-four-year-olds were given elementary training and then posted to the reserve units where many of them probably have been lost sight of. Only 15,000 have been retained in the army, to be used in accordance with the limitation of the mobilization act, solely for the defence of Canada, within Canada.
The only criterion we have of the government's sincerity with regard to its proposals for the future is the means by which it has carried out similar pledges in the past. Must we assume that the policy enunciated in the speech from the throne will be fulfilled only to the same extent as the policy announced by the Minister of National Defence for Air in connection with the mobilization act?

I turn now to the question of a plebiscite.
Let me say at the outset that the loyal people of Canada will and do feel deeply humiliated by the declaration that we are to hold a plebiscite to ascertain if the people will relieve the ministry and, in particular, the Prime Minister, from the position in which he finds himself and which he took prior to the last election, by his own volition and initiative.
We are, in the words of Premier Bracken, to have "this crowning indignity". We are to be asked to take money needed for the war and spend it in order to relieve our elected representatives from a responsibility that goes with responsible government.
I wish to mention in passing the words of Premier Hepburn of Ontario. They speak for themselves:
One of the most dastardly, contemptible and cowardly things ever perpetrated on a dignified and respected country by any government.
Those are not my words. They are the words of a man who helped put the right hon. gentleman opposite into power.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


An hon. MEMBER:: When?


Richard Burpee Hanson: In 1935; and let me add that a good many hon. members also are here by reason of that fact.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No, no.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I am
sorry; it is true just the same. My own view is that, "at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history"-to use the words of the speech from the throne-the course suggested by the government is the greatest exhibition of lack of national leadership this country has ever witnessed. It is a masterstroke of bad publicity for Canada among the allied nations. As one newspaper has said, "never were so many people humiliated by so few."
It is a deliberate attempt to evade responsibility and save the face of the ministry, and particularly the face of the Prime Minister. It is the negation of responsible government as we know it and practise it.
We cannot win this war by a plebiscite. Germany does not carry on war by plebiscites. The first function of government is to secure the safety of the state, and the government that fails in that duty commits the cardinal, the unpardonable sin. Let this government rise to the level of its duty; let it not be afraid to lead. A plebiscite is not a policy; it. is the negation, it is the avoidance of a policy. It is merely an unworthy expedient to avoid facing a vital issue. Its purpose is to avoid rather than to face responsibility; it is

The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
to avoid rather than to enforce the performance of a duty. It is not a declaration of faith; it is a declaration of impotence.
What is the position? The government knows better than anyone else the position in relation to man-power. It knows better than we can know that the maximum must be done and done quickly. This government knows the responsibility which we assumed when we declared for total war, when we sent men overseas, when we undertook to stand by them with adequate reserves and reinforcements. Now we propose to abandon these undertakings to the shadow of a plebiscite.
This government, by this lack of action, has failed these men and it knows it has failed them. History will hold it responsible if disaster comes. In effect, the government admits that we are not a united nation, and we are not a united nation because of commitments made by this government previous to March, 1940, based on the situation then existing, which has little no relation to the known facts of to-day-facts better known to the government than to any of us. And yet it will not move along the only honourable path open to it.
What are these commitments? Briefly, that we shall not have compulsory military service for overseas, in those theatres of war where the conflict is to be fought and won, or, God forbid, lost. The Prime Minister doubtless will argue that because he, unasked, made that commitment, he has a mandate from the people not to use compulsion for overseas service. That will, I assume, be his position. In fact, I believe he has so stated.
Let us examine this question of mandate. Did the Prime Minister, elected to power in 1935, have a mandate to declare war in 1939? Most assuredly he did not. Did the Prime Minister have a mandate from the people of Canada to adopt the principle of compulsion for military service in Canada in June 1940? Most assuredly he did not. Did the ministry have a mandate from the people to put a ceiling on prices at a time when the price level of agricultural products, for instance, was low and uneven? Most assuredly it did not. Did the ministry have a mandate-and I want hon. gentlemen to direct their attention to this, because we are going to meet with it sooner or later-to take from the war appropriation bill millions of dollars, perhaps hundreds of millions, voted by this parliament, taxed from the people of the country of all classes, poor and rich alike, to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, and switch those hundreds of millions of dollars to the purposes of the new Commodity Prices Stabilization corporation to help maintain the price ceiling on imports from abroad? Assuredly it did not.
I deny that the ministry had a mandate from the people against compulsory military service for overseas. It was not an issue. The Prime Minister himself made a pledge, which was accepted. He now seeks to be relieved from that pledge, but that is a very different thing from a mandate. If I interpret aright the vote of the last election, it was a mandate to prosecute the war-interpreted as moderate in some quarters, middle-of-the-road in others, but undoubtedly a mandate to prosecute the war.
We entered upon a leisurely prosecution of the war for the first nine months. There is no doubt about that. Then came the tragedy of Dunkirk, and things began to happen. The government under pressure stepped up the tempo of the war. We had the mobilization act, a long step forward, but with a limitation self-imposed by the ministry. It contained the very principle of compulsion which the Prime Minister has proclaimed against. The country accepted it without protest. It was the first real sign of leadership the country had been given. Now we have reached a time properly described in the speech from the throne as "the gravest crisis in the world's history", a time which demands the utmost effort, and instead of the situation being met mam-fashion we are offered a plebiscite.
Could anything be more fantastic? Could anything be more futile? Let us examine this question of mandate a little further.
In 1916 Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States on a cry that he kept the nation out of war. I remember it, and so do you. Yet within twelve months he sent a strong, stirring message to congress, and the United States declared war on Germany. That is history. Did he have a mandate? Most assuredly he did not. He had a mandate to keep the nation out of war.
In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain, valiantly striving to preserve the peace of Europe, brought down in the British House of Commons, long before war came, but in anticipation of war, a measure designed to conscript the man-power of Britain. Previously he had vigorously opposed the idea. Did he have a mandate for that decision? Most assuredly he did not. His action in doing so was an outstanding illustration, however, of the application of the principles of responsible representative government.
In 1914 Sir Robert Borden gave an assurance to the British government that if war came his government was prepared to stand by Britain, and he immediately called parliament together to sanction his undertaking. He
28	COMMONS
The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
staked the life and existence of his ministry on that undertaking. That was responsible government under the British system, and under the British practice which we follow here; that is the principle which this government should invoke.
Did Mr. Roosevelt have a mandate to put into operation the compulsory principle when he started his training plan before the United States went into war? Most assuredly he did not.
This government should have a policy either for or against complete national service in an all-out effort for total war, and by that policy it should stand. That is the leadership which the nation is looking for. And what are we getting? A plebiscite. A plebiscite on what? Not on a concrete proposal for total war- nothing of the sort; a plebiscite seeking a release from an obligation arising out of a commitment made by the Prime Minister, unasked for, and long anterior to the happening of the tragic events with which this nation and the world are at present confronted.
Again, could anything be more fantastic, more humiliating to a self-respecting people? The Prime Minister asks to be relieved from a pledge, made voluntarily, without any mandate. And yet his government has placed on the statute books, in the Dominion Elections Act, a prohibition against any candidate for parliament signing any pledge to his constituents. Why is that prohibition there? Because the government of the day, the government and parliament, decided as a matter of principle that such a thing was improper and should not be done. Yet we have this spectacle before us to-day.
I have a proposal to make to the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister feels bound by his self-imposed vow; if his conscience bothers him and he now wishes to be relieved of that vow; if he desires, in the light of reason and world events, to change his position and pursue a total war effort by all means open to him as the leader of the state; if he wishes, in the light of the situation now confronting him and this nation and this war-torn world, to give a new lead to the nation, there is a well-defined and well-established constitutional position and practice open to him. That is to say, he may come to this house and say to us that, "notwithstanding my self-imposed vow, for which I had no mandate, I now find that, in the circumstances which confront this nation as a result of this gravest moment of world crisis, another course must be followed, another and more vigorous policy must be pursued." It is his duty and his privilege to come to parliament in this way, to state his new policy, and to ask for the endorsation of
tMr. R. R. Hanson.l
the people's elected representatives. That is the British way of responsible government. That is the Canadian system of responsible government. That is the course the Prime Minister should pursue under the pressure of to-day's situation.
Is there anyone so bold as to say that is not the right and proper course? Who is there in this house who will say that that course should not be pursued or cannot be pursued? I venture to say that he would get the consent of the house almost unanimously.
Why have the people delegated to us, their elected representatives, the power to speak for them, and what are our obligations? Surely we have some obligations in the premises. Let those who seek to answer peruse once more the classic declaration of Edmund Burke to the electors of Bristol in 1774. The words he uttered then are in principle as true to-day as they were 170 years ago. In order to refresh the memory of all of us I.propose to read a major portion of that address:
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
My worthy colleague says his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If, government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and, what sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion, in which one set of men deliberate and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?
To deliver an opinion is the right of all men; that Of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear, and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience, these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and

The Address-Mr. Hanson {York-Sunbury)
advocate against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.
I beseech the Prime Minister to alter his purpose while yet it is not too late, to adopt a manly course, to give to the country that measure of national leadership for which it is so earnestly looking and seeking at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history. This house will support him. The nation will support him.
What is to be the form of this plebiscite? What question or questions will it carry? Will it merely ask approval of a release of the government from a past commitment restricting the method of raising men for military service, as indicated in the speech from the throne, or what? Who is to vote? When will the vote be taken? What machinery will be used? Will our soldiers, sailors and airmen, at home and overseas, have the opportunity of voting-that privilege which at present is denied them in by-elections? What list will be used? Will there be a new registration? There should be.
What is the estimated cost of the plebiscite? When will it be held? Time is an all-important factor under conditions as they are to-day. And I ask this question seriously; What effect will the announcement of this plebiscite have upon the pending war loan? I venture to think, disastrous. Has the government considered the risk to our war effort involved by the delay in having to hold this plebiscite before any major change in policy can be effected? Will it take two months, or three months, or how long? The enemy may have won a decisive victory before then, while we indulge in a plebiscite. What a tragedy! Mr. Roosevelt, that master of epigram, recently said: "Lost ground can always be regained; lost time never." All these and kindred questions the Prime Minister should make plain when he speaks, and I invite him to do so.
What will the government do if the plebiscite is indecisive, if the majority is small? That is a possibility. Will the government then claim that it has a mandate to pursue its present policies? Or will it say that, that expedient having failed, we shall try another course? Meantime, while Nero fiddles, Rome burns! The whole thing is fantastic.
If the plebiscite carries, what then? We have no commitment from the ministry as to what they will do. The speech from the
throne indicates that the administration will then take the position that, subject only to its responsibility to parliament-and I am glad to learn that the administration admits that it has responsibility to parliament-the administration shall, irrespective of any previous commitment, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise. They do not ask for a mandate under this plebiscite; they ask for a blank cheque. We do not know what will be done. What is to be done under that blank cheque? Will it be, as it has been in the past, a matter of political expediency and not of vital reality? I fear so. That, Mr. Speaker, is altogether too narrow an undertaking. Rather, it is no undertaking at all. It will not satisfy the public demand. It will not constitute a policy which will meet the gravest crisis in the world's history. It is no policy at all. It is merely a palliative.
And what if this plebiscite is rejected by the people of Canada? What then is to be the position? Will the government resign? Or will the Prime Minister endeavour to carry on, cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, by a self-imposed vow which renders it impossible to carry out his other pledge to the people of Canada that he will meet total war with total effort, that he will prosecute total war with total effort? What of the pledge of the Minister of National Defence that Canada, along with the other democracies, will stop at nothing-these are the minister's words; do they mean anything? -which can be effectively done to ensure that the forces of evil shall be stamped out? Will the minister resign if this plebiscite does not carry? Knowing him as I do, I believe he will.
But what of the Prime Minister? Surely if this proposal fails, his position will be impossible. Will he resign, or will he, no matter what the cost in lack of total war, continue to see his duty, as he stated in Winnipeg on July 10 last, "to seek above all else to preserve national unity?" That was his supreme objective then. That was why lie did not propose to go to Britain; he must remain here to preserve national unity! Well, he went to Britain, and I think he did right. Did we have national unity in Canada? Have we had it all along? The answer comes back in a thousand tongues, that we have not national unity. We have something quite different; we only have unity of the Liberal party, and we shall never have national unity under a party government in war time. The two are incompatible.
Does the Prime Minister think that this subterfuge of a plebiscite to relieve his personal position and save his face makes for national
30	COMMONS
The Address-Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury)
unity? I leave to public opinion the answer to that query. I know what the answer is among the loyal people of this country, who feel nothing but humiliation and disgust at this lack of leadership. For, mark you well, you cannot have national unity without leadership, leadership of a type which only a Churchill and a Roosevelt are giving to the democracies. National unity will come to Canada only when we have in this country a truly national government representative of all the people and backed by all the people. Then you will have national unity; then you will achieve a total war effort. You will never achieve it under a party government.
I am done, Mr. Speaker. I and those who think as I do cannot accept the government's proposal of a plebiscite as a solution of the problems confronting this nation at a time of gravest crisis in the world's history. It is not even a palliative. It is a subterfuge to help the Prime Minister out of an impossible position, created by himself, and with the sole desire to perpetuate his political power.
The people have asked this government, this parliament, for real leadership. In this proposal they have been given nothing. They have asked for bread; they have been given a stone. Frankly, it leaves the country with a feeling of frustration. Verily, never were so many people humiliated by so few!
I move, Mr. Speaker, seconded by the hon. member for Yale (Mr. Stirling), the following amendment to the motion now before the house:
That the following words be added to the address'.
"This house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers, instead of giving to the country the leadership so essential at a time properly described in the speech from the throne as the greatest crisis in the world's history, on the contrary, have sought to evade their responsibility by holding a plebiscite, which, in the view of this house, is the negation of responsible government.
And this house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers have not seen fit to recommend to parliament without delay additional measures designed to
(a)	completely mobilize the wealth and material resources and, on a selective basis, the full man and woman power of the nation, to the end that the nation may wage total war in any theatre of war;
(b)	supply the imperative needs of agriculture, industry, and the fighting forces of the nation; and
(c)	prepare for the post-war period."
IMr. R. B. Hanson.]


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker, when my hon. friend the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) rose on Friday last to begin his remarks in this debate on the address, he very properly and very courteously extended his congratulations to the mover and the seconder of the address. I should like to join with him in those congratulations. I noticed that my hon. friend was somewhat careful to stress the manner of the presentation and said very little about the substance of what was said. I should like to extend congratulations not only upon the excellence of the delivery of both hon. gentlemen but also upon the excellence of the remarks themselves. The hon. member for Hull (Mr. Fournier) and the hon. member for Brantford City (Mr. Macdonald) have made a most important contribution to this debate, which, I think I am right in assuming, may prove to be one of the most important in the history of this parliament.
It was of interest and of significance, I am sure, to all present that both hon. members, one coming from the province of Quebec and the other from the province of Ontario, held identical views in regard to Canada's war effort and the policies which should govern in the prosecution of that effort. Both were equally concerned that all the policies of the government should seek first and foremost to preserve national unity in this country. It was fortunate, as well as a matter of interest, that both hon. members had had the privilege last year of visiting Great Britain and of giving to this house during the course of their remarks their impressions of the effects of war on the British isles, and particularly their impressions of the courage and endurance of the brave people of Britain.
It is not without interest that the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), who is the leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation party, and the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore), the leader of the Social Credit party, who I understand are to follow me in this debate, were at the same time afforded the same opportunity. And perhaps I may be pardoned if I remind the house that the leader of the opposition and myself each had an opportunity last year of visiting Great Britain, of conferring there with members of the administration and others, and of seeing conditions first hand for ourselves. It is, I believe, a matter of satisfaction and pleasure to all six of us that we had the opportunity of making the trip to Britain by air, and returning to Canada in the same way. I hope the experience gained as a result of those visits will, as I believe they will, be

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
reflected increasingly in the views we may express in the house in respect of the prosecution of the war.
Mr. Speaker, I should like also to congratulate my hon. friend the leader of the opposition on the presentation of his address to the house. I thought his remarks presented the position of his party very fairly. I am sure I shall not be expected to agree with some of the things he has said, but with much of what he said I can agree with him most cordially. I believe it would have been better for this country if some of the controversy which has taken place with such acrimony and violence in a section of the press of the country had awaited the more reasonable and reasoned form of discussion, which I hope will be followed in this parliament.
With regard to what my hon. friend has said concerning the necessity of a total war effort, I believe it will be found that he and I hold similar views. What I take exception to in his remarks, and with respect to the controversy which has taken place outside the house, is that most of what has been said has related exclusively to only one aspect of the war effort. That aspect, I believe I shall be able to show, is a much narrower aspect than is generally assumed. All that Canada has done in addition has been more or less completely ignored.
I must say that I am surprised to find that, after having spent so large a portion of his time telling myself and the house that the government should have brought forward a policy of conscription for service in the military forces overseas, my hon. friend has not had a single word to say about conscription for military service overseas in the amendment he has just moved to the address in reply to the speech from the throne-no, Mr. Speaker, not a single word. My hon. friend is now so concerned about it that he is looking at his amendment to see if that is really so-to see if there is anything in the amendment which will give him sufficient ground to stand on in any reply to what I have just said.
The amendment is in the nature of a want of confidence motion in this administration. I had not expected my hon. friend to extend congratulations to the administration on all of its effort, but I had expected him to stand up for the policy which he led us at all events to assume is the policy of his party at the present time.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It is right there, in paragraph (a). Read it.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon. friend will have every chance to read his own policy later. But on a matter of so great importance
as the one we are now discussing I do not think one should be obliged to search with the aid of a microscope to discover the purport of an amendment which has been moved at a time like the present.
As I have already said, there has been a little too much controversy in the press concerning this matter, prior to the discussion in parliament itself. That controversy has gone very far to confuse in the public mind the real significance of many matters which should receive more careful consideration and discussion in this House of Commons. I believe, as I proceed with what I intend to say this afternoon, it will be seen that with respect to some of the matters on which there is an impression throughout the country that the government and the opposition differ, that not only are we closer together than the public has been led to assume, but that on many matters our views with respect to policies which should prevail are very, very much the same. I believe that is true with respect to the views of all parties in the house. I am speaking now of views concerning an effort for total war, with respect to selective service, and with respect to compulsion where it is necessary, in the application of selective service, and in connection with other points to which I shall make reference later.
But what I do wish at once emphatically to suggest is that hon. members seek to get the true picture of Canada's war effort as a whole, and not be misled into misjudging that effort or misjudging the ministry by singling out one particular aspect and seeking by controversy to obscure the larger and really magnificent effort of the country as a whole.
I cannot agree with my hon. friend, either, in his views with respect to what in the truest .sense of the word constitutes responsible representative government. To my mind responsible representative government is related very closely to the will of the people, and particularly to the will of the people as expressed at the time of a general election. If I were to accept what my hon. friend has said, and what some of his followers have applauded him in saying, then I should be obliged to ignore altogether the will of the people as expressed at the last general election. And not only that; but after its having been given also the interpretation whicti my hon. friend time and again has placed upon it, namely that this government was returned to power with the vast majority it has, in virtue of the fact that it was so often stated that if this government were returned to power,, conscription for overseas would not be applied. Notwithstanding that he has said such was a

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
fact, he now wishes me to turn round and ignore the expressed will of the people altogether.
Well, Mr. Speaker, there may to-day be reasons-and I hope this afternoon to make it clear that there are strong reasons-why the people of this country should be told that any commitments made in the past which in any way restrict the government in the exercise of its best judgment with respect to all phases of the war should be removed. That being the case, the people should be told that the government is of opinion that not only the government but all hon. members should be released from any past obligations which may bind their freedom of discussion in any particular at the present time.
When my hon. friend goes on to ask me what I am going to do with respect to any expression of view which may be made by the people in connection with any reference which will be made to them, may I say to him that in seeking to get relief from past commitments I am not going to begin by making new and fresh commitments. In seeking freedom on the part of the ministry I am not going to start in by seeking to tie my own hands. I know the kind of lecture I might have to expect from my hon. friend were I to do anything of the kind.
In the political controversy which, unfortunately, has become so acute of late; which is obscuring the magnitude and balanced nature of Canada's war effort, and which, moreover, threatens to impair its efficiency, attempts are being made to confuse in the public mind three things which should be kept separate and distinct. With respect to each of these the government's position is being misrepresented:
The first relates to total effort to meet total war.
The second relates to national selective service as a means to this end.
The third relates to the application of compulsion without restriction of any kind; in other words, to conscription for service in the armed forces overseas.
As respects total effort to meet total war, that is and has been right along the policy of the present administration. As regards national selective service as a method of achieving a total effort, that, too, is and has been the policy of the government. As respects the use of compulsion in applying the principle of national selective service, that, also, is a part of government policy. In the case of compulsion only one definite limitation has been recognized, and that is the limitation of the use of compulsion as a method of raising men for military service overseas.

Whether or not the government, all circumstances considered, has gone as far in achieving a total effort as it might have gone or should have gone, is a fair subject for debate. Whether the government, all circumstances considered, has applied the principle of national selective service as rapidly and as extensively as it should have been applied, is also a fair subject for debate. Whether, with the single limitation referred to, the government has, all circumstances considered, made sufficient use of compulsion in applying the selective principle is also a fair subject for debate. So far, however, as policy itself is concerned, whether it relates to total effort, to national selective service, or to the use of compulsion, with the single limitation mentioned, there exists no difference, so far as I am aware, between the government and its opponents. I propose to substantiate these statements by reference to the government's record.
What, then, is the difference with respect to policy between those who to-day support the administration, and those who, by every means in their power, are seeking to create opposition to the government in its war effort?
Freed from the emotions and passions aroused by the storm of controversy, it will be seen that the only difference that does exist is a difference with respect to the application of compulsion in raising men for military service overseas.
An examination of the facts will show that the difference of which the government's opponents are seeking to make a national issue is a much smaller difference than even the existing limitation on the use of compulsion would seem to imply.
The limitation, as I have stated, relates solely to the application of conscription to the raising of military forces for service overseas. These forces, as hon. members are well aware, are, in the present war, not confined to one single service, as in the last war was almost entirely the case. They include the men enlisted in the Canadian navy and in the Canadian air force, as well as those enlisted in the Canadian active army. I shall later on have something to say about the total numbers already enlisted for services anywhere, in the three branches of the armed forces. So far as the navy and the air force are concerned, it is well known that the numbers who have volunteered have considerably exceeded the number it has been possible to accept 'for immediate . service. Moreover, it is worth noting that in Britain

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as in Canada compulsion is not used as a method of raising fighting men for the navy and the air force.
The issue, therefore, between the government and its opponents narrows down solely to the question of the application of compulsion in raising men for the army. The issue is narrower even than that, since compulsion is already being employed, to raise men for service in the army in Canada. It should be added that the issue thus narrowed to conscription for overseas service in the army relates only to a possible future contingency, since up to the present the active army has secured the necessary recruits on a voluntary basis.
Notwithstanding all that has been done and is being done by the armed forces, and in war production of all kinds, and in finance, the government's opponents are seeking to make of conscription for the single purpose mentioned, a symbol of Canada's total war effort.
As I have said already, the policy of the government is, and from the outset has been, the achievement of a total national effort for total war. I propose, now, to explain exactly what I understand by the total effort of a nation. It involves two fundamentals.
The first of these is the devotion to the prosecution of the war of all the available energies and resources of the nation in excess of those required to maintain the health and efficiency of the people.
The second-and it is of equal importance- is a proper balance in the use of these energies and resources for the manifold needs of war. A total effort, for example, would not be achieved if so many men were enlisted in the armed forces, at sea, on land, and in the air, that there were not enough men left on the farms to feed them. In the same way, a total effort would not be achieved if so many men were enlisted that not enough were left in the factories to provide them with the necessary ships, planes, tanks, guns and ammunition. Moreover, modern war has shown that an army, and equally a navy, is dependent upon adequate air support. A total effort, therefore, cannot be made unless the right balance is achieved between all branches of the armed forces. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Indeed, the most difficult task in total war is the decision of the correct balance between different aspects of the war effort.
Moreover, the appropriate balance of one country would seldom, if ever, be appropriate for another. Germany, for example, is able to raise an exceptionally large army because she can draw on the enslaved populations for war production and food'. Britain, likewise, is in
a position proportionately to increase her armed forces to a greater degree than Canada, because Canada requires men to help feed and arm Britain, as well as to feed and arm our own country.
The foundation of the total effort of any country is a correct decision as to the minimum requirements of the civilian population. Once that is determined, production and consumption except for war, must be steadily and progressively cut down to the minimum. Waste must be eliminated; the manufacture of all luxuries and many comforts must cease. The surplus of man-power and resources thus secured must be used to make war.
In using this surplus, it is vital that it be developed in the right way. It is not enough to create a navy, an army, and an air force; the sailors, soldiers and airmen must be fed, clothed and armed; they must be moved to the area of combat, and communications must be maintained; reinforcements of men and supplies must be kept flowing. All this requires the most careful planning and detailed organization.
In reviewing the organization of a total effort for Canada, I shall begin by outlining the nature of Canada's war-time responsibilities; in other words, the various aspects of our total effort.
At the very outset of the war, the Canadian government considered with the British government the broad lines of development and of our war effort. We tried to envisage all the possibilities of a conflict, which we realized might last for years, and which might spread throughout the world. From time to time, since 1939, there have been shifts of emphasis, but anyone who cares to refer to the broadcast I made on October 31, 1939, will find in it the outlines of every aspect of our effort as it has developed since the outbreak of war.
For convenience, Canada's war effort may be divided into six main aspects. All of them are vital to a total effort. The achievement of a total effort depends upon keeping them in proper balance.
A necessary foundation of our whole effort is the maintenance of the security of our own Canadian territory and territories like Newfoundland and Labrador immediately adjacent to our shores. I know some of our citizens were impatient with the government for insisting, from the outbreak of war, upon our responsibilities for the coastal and territorial defence of Canada. We did not find similar impatience in London, where potential dangers, from all quarters of the world, were clearly perceived. Recent events in the Pacific, and the sinking of ships off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, should serve to dispel any lingering belief that

34	COMMONS
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Canada is immune from attack. What we must guard against now is the opposite tendency. Happily, Canadian territory is geographically more secure than the territory of most of the belligerents. We all know, too, that the best defence of our territory is the defeat of the enemy before he arrives. But we must not neglect necessary defences. We must be prepared to meet sudden raids from sea or air in certain strategic areas. The most elementary rule of warfare is the maintenance of the security of the base of operations. This aspect of our effort necessarily includes Canada's share of our joint responsibility with the United States for the defence of North America.
The Canadian navy has a share in this primary responsibility for our territorial defence. Our navy has also a great and growing responsibility in the North Atlantic. Its part in the battle of the Atlantic is already important. We are all aware of the great strain which has been thrown on the British navy, and, more recently, on the United States navy, by the existence of warfare in every ocean. We know, too, that the possibility of finally crushing Hitler depends upon keeping open the sea lanes from North America to Britain1 and Europe. From the outset, the government has placed no limit on the expansion of Canada's navy. We have manned ships as fast as the navy has been able to acquire them. Not only is the greatest possible Canadian naval strength needed in the North Atlantic, but so are merchant ships to carry men and supplies to Britain. Canada is providing and will continue to provide and to man both, to the very limit of our capacity.
All this is very different from Canada's task at sea in the last war. Then, we relied, in the early stages of the war, not upon ourselves, but on the British navy for the protection of our coasts on the Atlantic, and the Japanese navy for our protection on the Pacific, and, in the later stages of the war, upon ships of the United States navy.
The army shares with the navy the responsibility for our territorial defence. It shares also with the navy in the defence of Newfoundland and other islands in the Atlantic. Its main task, however, has been its contribution to the defence of Britain. Every Canadian will remember with pride what Mr. Churchill has said on more than one occasion, of the sense of security which the presence of our troops has given to the government and people of Britain.
It is natural for Canadians, remembering the last war, to judge our war effort in terms of the size of our army. In the last war, Canada's war effort was essentially and almost entirely an army effort. This, however, is a

very different kind of war, and its successful prosecution demands very different methods. This war has been well described as a war of machines, of science and of psychology. I think those are Mr. Churchill's own words.
While prepared to send overseas as large an army as Canada can support, without failing iru other directions, the government is even more anxious to see that every man, every unit, and the army as a whole, will have the greatest possible striking power. More important to-day than the size of an army is its striking power.
The Royal Canadian Air Force, like the navy and the army, has its part in our territorial defence and the defence of Newfoundland. Its responsibilities on ihe Pacific coast have been increased by the outbreak of war with Japan. But its main task is the administration of the British commonwealth air training plan. The battle of Britain in 1940 completely justified the emphasis which, from the opening days of the war, Britain and Canada alike placed upon the achievement of air superiority.
Every campaign in the present war has equally shown that, without adequate strength in the air, an offensive action and even prolonged resistance on land or at sea is foredoomed to failure.
The safety of Britain, and Britain's capacity to strike back at the enemy, depend alike upon the air strength concentrated in Britain. That strength is being developed largely on Canadian soil, both in the British commonwealth air training plan, and in the schools of the Royal Air Force. The air training plan is the greatest and the most vital of all Canada's military commitments' in this war. No effort has been spared and no effort will be spared to assure its continuing success.
Canada's concentration on air training has inevitably reduced the number of Canadian squadrons in operations overseas. Unlike the army which serves overseas as a unit, a large and growing proportion of- the trained personnel of the Canadian air force serves with the Royal Air Force. The claims of national pride have been subordinated to a [DOT]total effort.
In nothing could the difference between the present war and the last, and the nature and extent of Canada's effort be more marked than in the country's contribution to aerial warfare.
A vital aspect of Canada's war effort is our contribution to the food supply of Great Britain. This contribution has grown steadily in importance. Britain cannot feed herself, and her own great and growing armed forces. Still less can she feed the ever-increasing

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numbers of men we are sending from Canada to add to her armed strength. In the present war, unlike the last, her sources of food on the continent of Europe have all been closed off by enemy occupation. Canada is the nearest source of food left open. Without our food, the people of Britain might starve. Without our food, the Canadian army in Britain would be a handicap instead of a help. In a literal sense the very lives of the British people and our own armed forces overseas depend upon the exertions of Canadian farmers and fishermen. In prosecuting the war, theirs is no secondary role. As time goes on, the demands upon Canada for supplies of food for the allied forces and, later, for the peoples of the now subjugated countries are certain to increase.
I have mentioned food production separately because I doubt whether the country is fully aware of the vital importance of food regarded as a munition of war. Otherwise, it might well have been included as a phase of the productive aspect of our total effort. It is not in food alone that Canada's war production extends far beyond our own needs. Canada's production of the machines and munitions of war is already developed on a scale which would have been considered impossible two years ago. The other day, the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) stated that Canadian munitions were being used against the axis on every battlefront and on every ocean. That, surely, is cause for pride, though not for self-satisfaction. It is well to remember that every battle which has been lost in this war has been lost because of the lack of machines; of planes, or tanks, or guns, or ships. The cry we continue to hear from every front is not so much for numbers of men as it is for tanks, for planes and for ships.
In making the machines of war, Canada's productive task has only begun when our own armed forces have been supplied. Except for planes, Canada has been a main source of British supplies, outside Britain herself. Only recently has the United States begun to overtake us. And now the United States has many other urgent demands to meet. Canadian weapons and munitions must help fill the gap made larger than ever by Japan's entry into the war.
Our mines and forests, our foundries and factories, are also helping to supply the other nations of the British commonwealth, Russia, the forces of the other allies, and even the United States. In September of 1939, the government assured parliament that every effort would be made to avoid the useless sacrifice of men because of the lack of modern weapons. Every campaign has gone to prove
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how highly mechanized and how heavily armoured an army must become before it can hold its own in present day combat.
While it cannot be said too often that total war demands total effort, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that total effort means using men and resources, where each will count for most, not where their employment will fit in with individual wishes or the wishes of those who have failed to see the needs of our effort as a whole. Too many of those who are talking of total war are measuring Canada's effort, as I have said, in terms of one aspect only.
Both in the short run and in the long run, Canada would weaken the cause of the United Nations by failure to give adequate protection to vulnerable areas in our own territoiy; or by failure to contribute adequately to the naval protection of the Atlantic passage; or by failure to maintain a formidable striking force in Britain or in whatever theatre of war Canadian troops may serve; or by failure to keep up the air training on which the air strength of the British commonwealth so largely depends; or by failure to provide adequate food supplies and to produce weapons and munitions in adequate volume. All are essential to Canada's war effort. What is equally essential is that our effort shall be in the truest sense a balanced effort. We roust not fail in any of these directions. It is only by keeping all these demands upon our man-power and resources in proper balance that our utmost effort will be achieved. It might be added that all this depends upon the satisfactory financing of the entire effort.
In the light of what I have just set forth, I desire briefly to review Canada's record of achievement in the present war. It will be seen that we have developed our effort in all its aspects simultaneously. Equally, we have sought to maintain the proper balance between production and the armed forces and, among the armed forces themselves, between the needs of the navy, the army and the air force. The foundations of Canada's war effort along these lines were laid in the closing months of 1939. At that time, I stressed the importance of preparing for a long and terrible struggle in which staying power, the power to hold out to the end, might well be decisive.
Knowing the importance that, in the minds of many, would be given to an expeditionary force, I pointed out the vital importance as well of an adequate naval and air contribution by Canada. I said that our effort would be concerned in equal measure with the fighting forces at sea, on land, and in the air; that our economic contribution might well prove to be the most important of all; that,

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
in addition to being the granary of the British commonwealth, Canada might also become its arsenal. From the very outset, we took a broacj view of Canada's tasks in this war and organized our national effort on all fronts. I turn now to what has been achieved.
First, as respects the navy: At the outbreak of war, there were some 20 ships and less than
2.000	men in the Royal Canadian Navy.
At the beginning of 1940 the navy had grown to 80 ships, and over 5,000 men; at the beginning of 1941 the numbers had risen to 175 ships, and 14,800 men. At the beginning of this year the navy comprised over 350 ships and 27,600 men.
From the beginning of the war, the navy has assumed a steadily growing share of convoy work in the North Atlantic. Canadian ships of war have shared in the protection of Britain from the threat of invasion. Sailors of the Canadian navy have served and are serving in all the seven seas, either in Canadian or in British ships. Canada's pride in the navy is reflected in the long waiting list of young men seeking to join the service.
As respects the army: At the outbreak of war the permanent active militia, as Canada's regular army was then called, included about 4,500 men. By the end of 1939, the Canadian Active Service Force, to give the army its name at that date, had increased to 64,000 men. The first Canadian division had just arrived in Britain.
At the close of 1940, the active army included almost 170,000 men. A Canadian corps of two divisions had already been formed in Britain. Canadian troops were also on active service in Newfoundland, the British West Indies and Iceland.
At the close of 1941, there were more than
260.000	men in the Canadian active army, enlisted for service in any part of the world. About half this number were on active service outside Canada. A third infantry division, an armoured division, an army tank brigade, forestry troops, and other specialized units, and thousands of reinforcements were in Britain, in addition to the original corps of two divisions.
Canadian troops continued to serve in Newfoundland and the West Indies. Two Canadian regiments recently added a new chapter of valour in the heroic defence of Hong Kong.
In addition to the active army, several thousand young men had, during 1941, been called up for military training and service in Canada under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Of this number, a considerable proportion had enlisted in the active army, the navy, and the air force. Some
[Mr. Mackenzie Kinff.l
thousands more had been assigned to duties in Canada, thus relieving enlisted men for service elsewhere.
Mention should also be made of the reserve army, in which at the end of 1941, some 140,000 men were enrolled.
As respects the air force: At the outbreak of war the active strength of the Royal Canadian Air Force was some 4,000, all ranks. By the close of 1939, the strength had risen to over 8,000; by the close of 1940, it had reached 43,000; by the close of 1941, it exceeded
100,000	men.
In addition to the home defence duties which began with the outbreak of war, the air force was engaged, in the closing months of 1939, in planning and arranging the organizational details of the gigantic British commonwealth air training plan.
The year 1940 was a year of construction development for the plan. But, in spite of the strain which was then placed upon the force, Canada's three squadrons which were sent overseas did valiant service in the Battle of Britain.
In 1941, responsibilities of the home war establishment for patrol work in the Atlantic area and Newfoundland steadily increased. The outbreak of war with Japan added seriously to its tasks on the Pacific coast.
The duty of providing a trained air crew for the active theatres of war through the air training plan continued throughout 1941 to be the heaviest responsibility of Canada's air force. The magnitude of the air training plan was still further enlarged during the year, and the output of trained men accelerated.
The growing part of the Royal Canadian Air Force in air operations over Britain and the continent of Europe has found sombre reflection in the casualty lists. At the close of the year, from the original three, Canada's own force in the field was expanded to twenty-eight squadrons which had already been formed or were in the final stages of formation in Britain. Thousands more of the Canadian pilots and aif crew, trained in the commonwealth air training plan, were serving as individuals with the Royal Air Force, not only in Britain but also in the western desert and other theatres of war.
Over and above any commitment under the commonwealth training plan, the call for highly qualified and scientifically trained personnel for very special duties, such as radio location, has been responded to by the dispatch overseas of thousands to fill this immediate and important need. Canada's share in the war in the air has reached a stage where Canadian airmen have become a major factor in the armed strength of the British commonwealth.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
At the outbreak of war, the production of war materials in Canada was on an exceedingly small scale and was confined to a very limited range of equipment.
Throughout the closing months of 1939 and the early months of 1940 Canada passed through the stage of organization. Plants were established; tools and raw materials and labour mobilized; and the ground work of production laid. But apart from a few lines, such as personal equipment for our fighting men, there was little to show for our manufacturing efforts, except a steadily rising total of orders placed, and contracts let. We did, however, achieve a vast expansion- of the output of essential raw materials both for our own and for British production.
Throughout 1940, there was constant criticism of the inadequacy of Canada's war production. No allowance was made for the length of time required to organize the production of complicated machines, most of which had never been made in Canada before. Today, however, the self-same critics are obliged to admit that Canada's production has reached immense proportions. They now are giving exaggerated and disproportionate emphasis to another single aspect of our war effort. Indeed, not a few of the government's critics have become altogether too indifferent to war production. They do not seem to realize, as the government realizes, that, if Canadian production is to be pushed to the limit, many of the most difficult problems are still ahead of us.
It should be remembered that Canada has undertaken,' in addition to equipping her own divisions, to help equip British divisions, Australian divisions, New Zealand divisions, yes, and Russian divisions. If there is to be a united allied effort, Canadian weapons and munitions, as well as those of other countries, must be sent where they will be of the greatest service to the common cause.
In two years of war, Canada has experienced an industrial revolution. Our country is now producing almost every type of machine and equipment called for in our munitions programme. In some directions, this production has reached staggering proportions. In others it is mounting steadily.
Let me cite a few details: Our present shipbuilding programme involves a total expenditure of over 8500,000,000. We have built and are building large numbers of corvettes, minesweepers, patrol boats and motor torpedo boats. We are engaged in a merchant ship building programme of considerable proportions, so great in fact as nearly to equal Britain's own programme. Canada is also engaged upon the construction of destroyers.
We are making guns of all kinds: anti-aircraft guns, field guns, naval guns, tank and anti-tank guns, several types of machine guns, anti-tank rifles, sub-machine guns, rifles, trench mortars, bomb throwers, and smoke projectors.
In the production of aircraft, Canada's experience has not differed from that of other countries. We have had our full share of problems, delays and disappointments. At one time or another, since the war began, fifteen types of aircraft have been produced in Canada. Production is now going to be concentrated on seven modern types: an elementary trainer, two advanced trainers, two bombing and^ gunnery trainers, a flying boat, a twin-engine fighter and a long-range bomber. In addition to the production of new planes, some thirty plants distributed across Canada from Halifax to Vancouver are engaged in the overhaul and repair of planes. In order to meet the growing need, these facilities will require to be doubled during the next twelve months.
One of the most spectacular achievements has been the production of army vehicles. Nearly 200,000 of all types have already been delivered. Army vehicles made in Canada are in use on every battlefield of this worldwide war. A large number of tanks and universal carriers have also been delivered. Canadian tanks have already been in action in Russia.
I shall not attempt to catalogue the whole range of Canadian war production, but special mention should be made of the hundreds of thousands of bombs; the millions of shells; the hundreds of millions of rounds of small arms ammunition; and the hundreds of millions of pounds of explosives and chemicals already made in Canada. Not only are we making these munitions for our own forces and for Britain, but vast quantities have been made available to the United States.
The United States, as well as Britain, look to Canada for a part of their supply of essential base metals. Canadian production of aluminum, copper, nickel, lead and zinc has grown steadily in volume. Our steel production-the foundation of our industrial war effort-is still expanding. Since the invasion of Norway cut off all European supply, Canadian timber has been vital to Britain's war effort.
A most striking fact about our war production is that the value of the supplies we have provided for Britain since the war began has been at least as great aS the cost of; raising, equipping and maintaining Canada's own armed forces. In the first two years of war their value exceeded $1,000,000,000. Britain's need for these supplies has been so urgent

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
that, in some cases, our own forces have gone short in order to fill more pressing requirements for the armed forces of Britain.
In the whole field of war production Canada has become a major factor. Among the United Nations; we share with the United States alone the capacity to produce substantially more than the requirements of our own armed forces. It is true that, in order to supply Russia, Britain has valiantly suffered a shortage in recent months. It is to North America that Britain looks to meet the deficiency, and in North America to Canada no less than to the United States.
The record would not be complete without a reference to foodstuffs for Britain. In times of war, wheat, bacon and milk products are munitions of war quite as much as planes or tanks or guns or ships or shells or explosives or chemicals.
Canada has sent to Britain vast quantities of wheat and flour; bacon and other pork products; cheese and eggs and honey. The range and1 quantity of Canadian food required by Britain is steadily increasing as the hazards of war make access to other sources of supply difficult or impossible.
For Britain, for many of the othef nations fighting for freedom, Canada is an arsenal, a shipyard and a storehouse of food, as well as a full partner on the fighting front.
One measure of Canada's approach toward a total war effort will be found in the record of our financial achievements. The financial burden the war effort has imposed upon the Canadian people is enormous. The cost of raising, equipping and maintaining our own armed forces and1 of building up the country's defences has reached almost incredible heights.
From the outbreak of war in September, 1939, until March 31, 1940, during the planning and organizational phase, these direct war expenditures amounted to some $118,000,000.
In the fiscal year April 1, 1940, to March 31, 1941, these expenditures totalled approximately $752,000,000.
The estimate of direct war expenditures for the present fiscal year (April 1, 1941-March 31, 1942) was SI,450,000,000. Of this huge sum $851,000,000 had been expended by the end of 1941.
'Our direct war expenditure from the beginning of the war until December 31, 1941, had accordingly reached a total of $1,721,000,000. The magnitude of our direct war effort may be illustrated by a comparison of this figure with the cost of Canada's effort in the last war. War expenditures, from August, 1914, to March 31, 1920, including demobilization after the war, totalled $1,670,000,000. In other words, by the end of 1941, a period of two

years and four months, our direct war expenditures in this present war already exceeded the whole expenditure on the last war over a period of six years less four months. Even more striking is the fact that Canada's direct war expenditures in the present fiscal year will not fall far short of the total cost to Canada of the last war.
In addition to providing for our direct war expenditure, the government also undertook to provide whatever Canadian dollars were necessary to pay the Canadian producers of war supplies for Britain. For this purpose, it has been necessary, since the outbreak of war, for the Minister of Finance (Mr. Usley) to provide an additional $1,219,000,000.
Every effort has been made to distribute the huge financial burden as fairly as possible. By December 31, 1941, some $2,000,000,000 had, since the outbreak of war, been raised from taxes alone. To achieve this what amounts practically to a peaceful revolution in our national tax structure has been necessary. The government has relied mainly on direct and steeply progressive taxes on the incomes of individuals; and drastic taxation of corporation income and excess profits. Succession duties have been included among the permanent features of the national taxing system. Agreements are being negotiated with the provinces to facilitate the orderly and equitable mobilization of the financial resources of the country to the utmost limit of its capacity.
Taxation, war savings, and war loans, while necessary to provide the vast sums required to meet huge war expenditures, also serve a further essential war-time objective. They act as an automatic check on civilian consumption and thus free material resources and man-power for war purposes.
The curtailment of civilian consumption, as I have already pointed out, is absolutely vital to a total war effort. Financial measures such as increased taxation and greater saving contribute to this end; but all the curtailment required cannot be accomplished by financial means. I shall say a word later about other methods used by the government to make additional resources available for the war effort.
One method the government has not been willing to use as a means of reducing consumption. That is the easy method of allowing prices to rise unchecked. That would, of course, have reduced consumption drastically. But it is a method which would be unfair and unjust in the present, and perilous for the future. That is why, in October last, the government decided to halt the rise "when prices began to rise rapidly. It was in order


The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
to spread the burdens of war as fairly as possible that the government undertook to control all prices, and, where necessary, to take other steps to control civilian consumption in fair and equitable ways.
In undertaking to control the cost of living, the government was following, on the economic side, the policy, adopted at the outset of the war, of a progressive and orderly advance towards the goal of a full-out effort. It was realized that the stage would ultimately be reached when the problem of a general rise in prices would have to be faced. We felt it was advisable to postpone action to control all prices until such action was really necessary. Complete control of prices, as all are coming to understand, involves many complications, and restrictions. Moreover, like all compulsory measures, it requires a large staff to administer the machinery of enforcement. It was clearly undesirable to take men's services from other tasks one moment before they were needed. Price control became necessary, late in 1941, if our people were to be spared the fears, the sense of insecurity, the suffering and the profiteering which the inflation of prices inevitably produces. The successful operation of price control and the ancillary measures to control wages and salaries will help in the winning of the war. After the war, they will aid our country on the road to recovery and reconstruction.
From this brief review, it will be seen that Canada's war programme has been a balanced programme. The record of achievement is a balanced' record. What is more, this effort has been achieved by methods which have kept our country united. Indeed, without unity of purpose and effort as a nation, it could never have been achieved.
Let me come now to the programme for the present year, which has been prepared in reference to the fiscal year ending March 31, 1943.
The navy already has 350 ships and over
27,000	men in the service. The programme of expansion for 1942 can be expressed very simply. Our shipbuilding capacity is being used to build ships for Britain and for Canada. Apart from the naval craft built for Britain, the navy will take all the ships Canada can build, and it will enlist and train the men required to man the ships. No limitation has been placed upon the number either of ships or of men, save in so far as the number of available ships necessarily sets a limit to the numbers of men who can be enlisted for training.
The Canadian active army now consists of the corps of three infantry divisions, divisional and corps troops, an armoured division, and an army tank brigade in Britain. In addition,
there are, in Britain, in reinforcement units, thousands of reinforcements. A fourth infantry division, and the brigade groups of a sixth division, have been mobilized in Canada. In addition, there are the troops on home defence duties on our coasts and in vulnerable areas, and troops in training as reinforcements.
During 1942, that is this year, up to March 31 next, it is proposed- to create overseas a Canadian army of two army -corps: one army corps to comprise three infantry divisions and two army tank brigades; the other to consist of two armoured divisions. In addition, all necessary ancillary units to serve these two corps will be provided. To reach this objective it will be necessary: first, to convert the present fourth division into an armoured division and train and equip it for this special role and dispatch it overseas in due course; second, to raise, equip, train and dispatch overseas another army tank brigade for use with the infantry divisions of the Canadian corps; third, to raise, equip, train and dispatch additional ancillary troops for both the infantry corps and the new armoured corps; fourth, to maintain and reinforce these two corps; fifth, to provide headquarters staff organizations for an army and an armoured corps.
It will, however, be recognized that the ultimate disposition of all troops necessarily depends upon circumstances which determine the course of the war.
As for the territorial defence of Canada, special dispositions have been made where that seemed to be required, as a result of the outbreak of -war with Japan. The garrisons of coast defences have been strengthened. Reserves have been allotted to deal with any likely emergency.
A special reorganization and regrouping of reserve formations is under way right across Canada, and an emergency organization of active service personnel in training centres or elsewhere is being established.
Whether it will be necessary to mobilize another division for Canadian defence when the fourth armoured division is dispatched overseas will, of course, depend on developments in the intervening period.
The situation in Canada in respect to antiaircraft defence is improving each month as more equipment becomes available. New units are being mobilized in accordance with anticipated deliveries of equipment.
The 1942 army programme will create a thoroughly modem, well balanced and hardhitting Canadian overseas army. This army will be complete and self-contained. It will be capable of operating in any theatre, and can be effectively maintained in respect to both man-power and equipment.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
It should be noted that the outstanding feature of the army programme for 1942 is the proposed increase in the armoured strength of the army overseas. This development is in line with military experience in the present war and with the policy of the British army.
I have already pointed out that the Royal Canadian Air Force at the end of the year mustered well over 100,000 men, without counting civilians. The air training plan is in full operation; the responsibilities and duties for coastal defence particularly on the Pacific have greatly increased; and the complete establishment of twenty-eight Canadian operational squadrons overseas is to be fully achieved, not only with a full complement of flying personnel, but also with all necessary ground and maintenance crews.
Until such time as arrangements may have been concluded with the government of the United Kingdom to increase the number of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons beyond twenty-eight, the Canadian pilots and other air crew sent overseas, in excess of the numbers needed to maintain these Canadian squadrons at full strength, will serve with the Royal Air Force where thousands of their comrades are already in active service.
Some increase in the home war establishment must be anticipated. Of this, for obvious reasons, I cannot be expected to give details.
Thousands of young Canadians are now engaged in active operations, and the augmentation of these numbers by air training will continue to be the heaviest work of the Royal Canadian Air Force in Canada. In the long run, as the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power) has repeatedly warned, no more acute man-power problem faces the government than that of assuring the supply of recruits for training as air crew, not in the immediate future but some months or a year hence. There is no question of reluctance to serve; on the contrary, young men are eager for the opportunity; but the numbers available with the necessary high qualifications are limited by our small population. Looking ahead, this question looms larger than the needs of the navy or the army, or of industry.
To the solution of this problem by means of the development of air cadets, pre-entry education, physical training and conditioning and other means, the government is directing intensive study.
The effectiveness of Canada's own armed forces depends upon the effort put forth on the farms, in the mines, in the forests, in the workshops and factories, on the railways and the merchant ships of Canada. Canadian production since the war began has been

essential as well to the effort of Britain and, indeed, of every nation fighting the axis powers. The dependence on Canadian productive efforts of what are now called the United Nations will be greater than ever in 1942; that is, this year.
I have already pointed, out that the government has set no limits to war production. The only limits are those imposed by the growing scarcity of management, tools, raw materials, and skilled labour. Although the Minister of Munitions and Supply told parliament in November that practically all available establishments in Canada were already engaged in war production, he recently stated that he was "raising the sights again". More production can be achieved only by the conversion of existing establishments from unessential production, and by the transfer of labour. There is no slack left in our industrial economy. But I shall be surprised indeed if we do not find, when the year ends, that Canadian industry and Canadian labour have once again amazed us all.
The productive increases already achieved by Canadian agriculture have been little short of miraculous. Cheese production has increased by one-fifth, concentrated milk output by two-thirds, hog production has doubled, and egg production will soon be at an all-time high. For this third year of the war dairy farmers, hog producers and poultry men have been asked to produce the maximum quantities possible.
Canada has contracts with Great Britain for bacon, hams and other pork products amounting to 618,000,000 pounds. The forthcoming agreement for cheese is expected to be for at least 125,000,000 pounds. Then, 675,000 cases of evaporated milk will probably, again this year, be required by Britain. The present contract for eggs is for 30,000,000 dozen. Further large contracts for summer and fall delivery are anticipated. Canada has also undertaken to supply Britain with 4,500,000 pounds of honey; 510,000 barrels of fresh apples; 425,000 cases of processed apples;
300.000	cases of canned tomatoes; and other fruit and vegetable products in substantial quantities. Altogether, the value of the exports of the above commodities will be at least $180,000,000. Exports of the same products in the year before the war were valued at about $50,000,000.
If we do all in our power to help them meet their labour problems, we can, I know, count on Canadian farmers to do the rest. But the goal which is set for them for 1942 will demand their utmost effort.
In his speech at the Mansion House during my visit to Britain, and again in this chamber on December 31, the Prime Minister of Great

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
Britain made particular reference to the financial assistance which Canada had extended to Britain in the present war.
The extent to which Canada has been furnishing supplies to Britain is, I am sure, not fully realized by our own people. Canada has supplied weapons and munitions to Britain for the use of Britain's armed forces, and for other allied forces for which Britain has undertaken to provide equipment. Canada has also supplied to Britain raw materials required in British war production, and foodstuffs required to feed the armed forces and the people of Britain. In other words, Canada is, at one and the same time, a full partner in the war in her own right, and one of the principal arsenals, granaries and shipyards for Britain, other parts of the commonwealth and other of the allied nations. The total volume of Canadian shipments to Britain since the commencement of the war compares favourably with the volume which, thus far, has moved from the United States.
Canadian financial assistance to Britain has been necessary in connection with the provision of these vast quantities of war supplies. The financial assistance which Canada has extended to Britain is, of course, not what is ordinarily understood by the use of that term. Canada does not ship money across the Atlantic; the money itself never, in fact, leaves Canada. Canadian financial assistance has been extended to Britain in the following manner. The British government has purchased war supplies from Canadian producers. Britain, however, has not had1 enough Canadian dollars with which to make payment for the greater part of these supplies. Payment has accordingly been made in pounds sterling. This English money has remained on deposit in London, because it cannot, of course, be used in Canada. Most of the Canadian money required to pay the producers of guns and copper and bacon and other commodities has been supplied by the Canadian government. This Canadian money has had to be raised from the Canadian people in taxes, war savings or war loans.
Canada's financial aid to Britain has, in other words, amounted to this: the Minister of Finance has raised money in taxes and loans from the Canadian people to pay Canadian producers for ships and tanks and guns and planes and other munitions shipped overseas for the British army, navy, and air force; also, to pay Canadian producers for aluminum, copper, steel, timber and other raw materials needed for British war industry; and, as well, to pay Canadian farmers and fishermen for the food Canada has sent overseas to feed the British people.
The British government has been able to acquire some Canadian money as a result of ordinary business transactions, such as the sale of British exports to Canada, and receipts from interest and dividends on Canadian securities. This money has been used to pay for a part of the British purchases. But British exports to Canada are necessarily on a diminishing scale.
In the early months of the war, the British government had a considerable accumulation of gold and was able to use some gold to pay for war supplies received from Canada. The British government acquired some additional Canadian money by an arrangement to have Canada buy back from Britain certain Canadian government and government guaranteed securities held in Britain. For the most part, however, payment for Canadian supplies has, of necessity, been made in pounds sterling.
For the past year, Britain has urgently required from Canada vast quantities of munitions and supplies. These Canada has created the capacity to produce. The Canadian producers have been paid in Canadian money by the Canadian government. Canada, in turn, has been credited on the books of Britain with English money, which, however, cannot be spent in Canada. In this way, Canada's surplus store of English money has been assuming larger and larger proportions. What, in effect, all this really means, is that Britain has a steadily growing war debt to Canada.
We all remember the international problems and difficulties caused, after the last war, by the existence of huge war debts owed by one government to another. We recall how reluctant nations were to accept payment from other nations in the only way in which a huge external debt can really be settled, that is by removing tariffs and accepting payment in goods. We know that huge external debts created suspicion and bitterness between nations. The government is anxious to avoid the creation of similar difficulties in the postwar relations between Britain and Canada. We believe that difficulties would be avoided and, at the same time, the real extent of Canada's war-time contribution would be more fully comprehended, if Canada's financial arrangements with the United Kingdom, both for the past and for the reasonably foreseeable future, were duly clarified. We believe that the time has come for this clarification.
The government, accordingly, is proposing to the British government that the financial arrangements between Canada and Britain should be placed on a new footing. The offer
revised EDnrrax

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
which is being made is one which we have reason to believe will be warmly welcomed by the British government.
In so far as past transactions are concerned, the proposal is to convert the major portion . of the pounds sterling which have accumulated to Canada's credit in London into a loan to the United Kingdom of seven hundred million dollars, in Canadian money. It is proposed that, during the war, the loan will be reduced by the proceeds of any sales made to persons outside the United Kingdom, of Canadian dollar securities now held by residents of the United Kingdom, and also by the proceeds of the redemption or repayment of any Canadian securities held in the United Kingdom. The new loan would not bear interest during the war. As soon as practicable after the war, it is proposed, however, that the governments of the two countries should arrange an appropriate rate of interest to apply from that time forward, and make appropriate provisions for retiring the loan.
Since the beginning of the war, approximately $400,000,000 in Canadian money has been made available to Britain through the purchase by our government of Canadian government securities held in Britain. In other words, our government, during the war, has been paying off a part of the dominion's external debt. Under the arrangement now proposed, the Canadian government will purchase outright the remaining dominion government and Canadian National Railway securities owned by residents of Britain, estimated in amount at some $295,000,000. This means that the Canadian government will, before it becomes due, pay off its own remaining debt in Britain. The British government will pay the present owners of these securities in pounds sterling. The Canadian government, in turn, 'will pay the British government for the securities in Canadian dollars.
For the future, in addition to the financial provision for raising and maintaining Canada's own armed forces, the government will, as a part of Canada's direct contribution to the defeat of the axis, ask parliament to make provision for meeting Britain's shortage of Canadian dollars by supplying, free of charge and without obligation, to Britain, munitions of war, raw materials, and foodstuffs up to an amount of one billion dollars. Such provision would mean that thereafter Canada's direct war effort would include, in addition to her armed forces, an outright contribution of war supplies on a vast scale.
The proposals I have outlined will, it is anticipated, suffice to meet the requirements of the United Kingdom for Canadian war supplies until early in 1943.

In announcing this offer, I wish to draw particular attention to the fact that the financial burden of war now being borne by the Canadian people will not be increased by the proposed financial arrangements with the United Kingdom. Canada has already undertaken to supply the Canadian money required by Britain to pay for Canadian war supplies. Whether this money is provided in the form of a loan to Britain, or of a direct contribution to the defeat of Hitler, will not change the number of dollars which the Canadian people are already committed to raise for the prosecution of the war.
The advantages of the proposed financial plan are that it will avoid the growth to huge and unmanageable proportions of a war debt which might breed serious misunderstandings and bitterness in the future; that it will definitely relieve Britain of any financial anxiety which might arise in connection with its Canadian sources of supply; and, finally, that it will bring our working arrangements into accord with the realities of the war situation.
The adoption of the new plan will mean that Canada, at this time of intensified crisis, is giving unmistakable evidence of the determination of our people to put forth their utmost effort in the preservation of our own liberties and in the common cause of freedom.
At six o'clock the house took recess.
After Recess
The house resumed at eight o'clock.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker,
before I resume my remarks at the place at which I left off just before recess,, I might say a word in reference to the request which my hon. friend the leader of the opposition made, that the government should consider the advisability of sending a division from Canada to Australia. As my hon. friend is aware, whatever assistance it may be possible for any one country of the United Nations to give to any other country of the United Nations, or any one part of the empire to give to any other part, must necessarily be a matter of consideration with all the countries and parts of the commonwealth concerned. The government is anxious, as the government of every other part of the British commonwealth would be, and as the United States and other of th.e United Nations would be, I am sure, to cooperate in every possible way in affording such assistance as can be effectively given to our friends and brothers ini Australia. But what form that assistance will take, what it may be best to

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do, can only be determined after there has been an opportunity of complete and careful conference with all the parts concerned. My hon. friend will have noticed that the particular request which our friends in Australia are making, is at the present time, for planes and tanks; and I am not without grounds for believing that they may be receiving some assistance of the kind from Canada at present, and that 5ve shall be able to add considerable assistance to them in those particulars, and possibly in other ways, as time goes on.
I had been outlining, Mr. Speaker, our programme for the coming year. In that outline I showed, I think, that in every aspect of Canada's war effort we planned to move forward to the limit of the country's capacity. It remains for me to give some indication of the total financial burden which the programme will involve.
Little more than a rough estimate of the cost can be given at this stage. The Minister of Finance will be somewhat more precise when he introduces the war appropriations. But the provisional estimate at this stage is $3,000,000,000.
The financial advisers of the government believe that this huge sum and the additional sums required for civil government can be raised by taxation, war loans, and war savings, but they equally regard this as a full-out financial effort.
In preparing its war programme for 1942, the government has had but one objective. It is the objective we have had from the outset, namely, the achievement of a total national war effort. It is not, however, an effort exaggerated in any one aspect at the expense of other aspects. It is, as it has been from the beginning, a balanced effort. It seeks to take account of all demands and all eventualities, as far as it is humanly possible to foresee them. Moreover, it is so planned as to fall into its appropriate place in the united effort of all the nations arrayed against the axis.
The most searching and careful study has been given to the extent to which it is possible to expand each aspect of the national effort without weakening some other aspect just as important to the whole.
Equally careful consideration has been given to the methods by which the desired ends can best be attained. A balanced total national war effort requires the mobilization through taxation, loans and savings of the necessary financial resources, and the most careful decisions with respect to the means by w'hich this is to be accomplished. It also requires the mobilization of material resources, and the mobilization of man-power, and like care with respect to the best means by which both of
44561-ii
these can be accomplished. I shall leave to the Minister of Finance the question of the means to be employed in mobilizing the financial resources. That matter will have to await the presentation of the budget.
In the case alike of the mobilization of material resources and of man-power, some measure of compulsion is necessary, just as it is in the case of the mobilization of financial resources. The use of compulsion, or if you prefer the word "conscription", for the mobilization of material resources and manpower is, as I have said, not new. It has been approved by this parliament. The principle of compulsion is embodied in the National Resources Mobilization Act, which was enacted on June 20, 1940. This act gives the government very wide powers to mobilize, for war purposes, both the material resources and the man-power of the country. Since of the two the mobilization of material resources is much less a subject of controversy, I shall speak of it first.
In the early stages of the war, the mobilization of material resources presented few problems. Production was in the stage of organization. The demand for raw materials was small. Shortages of Canadian supplies could readily be met by purchase in the United States. In other words, all our other shortages boiled down to a shortage of United States dollars. The government lost no time in facing this problem. Foreign exchange control was established on September 15, 1939, and increasingly stringent measures were taken through the prohibition of pleasure travel in the United States, and the restriction of unessential imports to ensure the supply of American dollars needed to buy war materials in the United States. Fortunately, at the very moment when these drastic measures threatened to prove insufficient, the whole problem was vastly simplified by the reciprocal arrangements embodied in the Hyde Park declaration. The problem has been further simplified by the establishment of joint committees on war production, and by recent agreement between the United States and Canada to remove all obstructions to the free flow of war materials between the two countries.
Means have also been taken to stimulate the production in Canada of strategic raw materials and to prevent the export of raw materials of which a shortage might be anticipated. Stock-piles of imported raw materials have been accumulated.
Steps have been taken to discourage waste, and to salvage waste products. By severe taxation and the encouragement of war savings, civilian consumption has been curtailed.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
In recent months, the manufacture of nonessential goods has been curtailed or eliminated entirely. The compulsory mobilization of material resources has been progressively and selectively effected by a highly efficient though exceedingly complex system of economic controls. I might cite the curtailment in the production of motor vehicles and a great variety of other articles in which metals are used, as for example' stoves, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, refrigerators and radios. I might also mention the drastic limitations placed upon the use of silk and rubber.
These and many other measures have been taken progressively, in order to make materials available to our war industries as they have been expanded. Already, the rationing of some commodities for civilian use has begun. If we are to achieve a total effort, far more drastic curtailments will follow.
The whole business of mobilizing material resources is not spectacular; it is far from pleasant; but it is the real foundation of a total war effort. The government has never hesitated to take any of the necessary steps at the moment it was believed they were essential.
I turn now to the question of the mobilizing of "man-power", which term, by the way, when it is used without definite restriction, is intended to comprehend "woman-power" as well. I wish to speak more particularly of the means of mobilizing the additional manpower and woman-power required to maintain the existing effort, and to develop the enlarged programme.
National selective service is the method by which the government proposes to accomplish the mobilization of man-power on an extended scale. Let me define national service as it is understood by the government. By national service is meant any form of service, either voluntary or compulsory, which contributes directly to Canada's war effort. By national selective service is meant the selection of men and women for the various forms of national service according to the method or methods calculated to produce the most satisfactory results. In order to be selective, national service does not necessarily need to be compulsory. Voluntary service is also selective. The army, for example, does not accept every man who offers to enlist. In finding the right place for a man, no quality is likely to count for more than willingness to serve. Compulsion is only of value where it serves to ensure a greater total effort. Wherever necessary and of value in increasing Canada's war effort, the government is prepared to employ compulsion. It would, however, be a waste of effort to

engage a small army of officials to compel people to do what they are perfectly ready and willing to do without compulsion.
In announcing that national selective service is the method by which the government proposes to accomplish the mobilization of manpower on an extended scale, the government is not announcing a new policy. What we propose to do is to extend what, in fact, we have been doing right along, that is, to apply the principle progressively. In other words, we intend to continue to extend the application of national selective service to meet new needs as they arise.
As I have already said, this policy, too, is not new, nor is it being advanced to-day for the first time, or as a consequence of high-pressure methods employed to influence the independence of members of parliament. The principle itself, as I have already explained, was approved by this parliament in June, 1940. It has already been applied to some extent. On November 12 last, I made it very plain to parliament that, with respect to the mobilization of man-power, the government's policy was one of national selective service; and, also, that an extension of the application of compulsory selective service-conscription, if you will-was a part of that policy. Let me repeat my exact words as reported in Hansard of 1941, page 4321:
So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied, and how far it should be extended, is a matter which the government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.
I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the principle of compulsory selective national service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle. I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training, and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the house will learn as the government takes its decisions on that matter.
I did not, at that time, announce any decisions as to its further application. Such announcement would hardly have been appropriate at the close of a session tvhich had already completed all its major business. I felt that, in fairness to parliament, announcements on such an important matter should be reserved for a new session, when members would have adequate' opportunity for the fullest consideration and debate.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
The extended application of compulsion to national selective service is a highly complicated matter. It is, in itself, a selective process. The use of compulsion selectively is no less complicated in the mobilization of man-power than in the mobilization of material resources. However, the fact that further decisions were not announced in November has not delayed the further application of the principle. Indeed, it has rather facilitated the very careful planning and organization which is so essential before the extended application of selective service, whether on a voluntary or a compulsory basis, can be brought into effective operation.
Everyone will recognize that the effective use of the man-power-and the woman-power -of a nation is essential to the achievement of a total war effort. But it is not the total. It is, as I have already stated, only one factor in the total. In considering any extension of the application of selectivfe service as a means of promoting a total war effort, it is important to remember that national selective service is not an end in itself, but is only a means to an end, that end being a total war effort.
The problems of mobilizing resources, and mobilizing man-power, are inseparable from one another and like all other aspects of our war effort must be kept in proper balance. Material resources cannot be mobilized without man-power to mobilize them, and no good purpose is served by mobilizing men unless they are provided with the necessary materials and tools to work with, and the necessary equipment and arms to fight with.
Under the authority of the National Resources Mobilization Act, a limited measure of national selective service on a compulsory basis has been applied since October, 1940, in the selection of young men for military training. The principles of selection have been age and marital status, with adequate safeguards, through postponements, for other essential forms of national service.
The government now proposes to apply the compulsory powers of national selective service to other aspects of the war effort as well as to military service. These powers will be applied selectively and1 progressively to those activities where it is considered by the government that their application will contribute to the goal of a total effort. It has not been necessary, nor would it, indeed, have been helpful at an earlier stage to make demands upon the nation such as the government has in contemplation, and as will be set forth as the session proceeds. In this connection I invite your attention particularly to what I am now about to say.
These demands will intimately affect the lives of many men and women. They will
also effect the life of the nation in the following way: there will be a further very definite curtailment of the amenities we have hitherto been able to preserve. These demands will not affect physical health or that contentment of spirit'that comes from serving great causes, but they will make further inroads upon the comfort and convenience of very large numbers, and upon the character and aspect of our daily life.
It must not be supposed that there are large reserves of idle people leading a leisurely existence who can now be called to the national ranks. The entire adult Canadian population, with very few exceptions, gets up in the morning, works all day, and goes to bed tired out at night. In our form of society people have been accustomed to find their own jobs to a very large extent, thus saving vast government machinery.
If all the efforts of everyone were really devoted solely to making war, there would be no food, or fuel, no transport, or clothes. We have to recognize the fact that a very large proportion of the population, particularly women, is occupied in ministering to the needs of the more actively engaged population, and that that number has increased1 since the last war with the increase of population who have to be ministered to.
The process which is now to be applied*-and. has, indeed', been continuously applied-much more vigorously, is not the calling of idle people to work, but the sharpening and shifting forward of a proportion of their effort into work which is more directly related to the war.
Here I end the portion of the remarks to which I invited special attention.
It may surprise hon. members to learn that the words I have just used, are not my own words. With the exception of the two words "Canadian population", which I have substituted for the words "British race", the statement is not mine. It is a statement by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. After all that has been said in Canada in recent months about all-out conscription in Britain, and its application to women as well as to men, it may occasion still more surprise that this statement was made, not at the beginning of 'the war, nor at the end of the first year of war, nor even of the second year of war, but as recently as December 2 last.
The explanation of the timing is simple, in war, correct timing is vital. Some steps must be completed, before others can be taken. The time of application of measures is quite as important as the extent of their application. No mechanical rule or order can -be followed. The appropriate measures for one country will
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never exactly suit another country. In the case of each, local conditions must be considered ; the nature of the tasks undertaken by each country, and their relative importance in the total effort of all, must be the decisive factor.
To achieve a total national effort everyone must contribute to the effort either directly or indirectly. All cannot do the same work. As far as possible, each must be fitted into the appropriate task. Many, perhaps the majority, can find the appropriate place for themselves, and, as Mr. Churchill said, save "vast government machinery". Certainly no government is wise enough to decide the appropriate task for every individual in the nation. And, even if governments were allknowing, the war would not wait while this stupendous job was being performed. What the government can do, and what we propose to undertake to do, is to meet the urgent needs by the best means we can devise.
I shall not attempt at this time to outline the measures which are contemplated in order to extend the scope of national selective service. I shall confine myself to saying that the extended policy of selective service will comprehend measures to increase the supply of man-power available for war industry and for the armed forces; also measures to safeguard and, where necessary, to assist in providing agricultural labour required to expand war production on the farm. These objects it is proposed to achieve by positive action to increase the mobility of available man-power, to add to the number of women available for employment, and to facilitate the transfer of labour from non-essential occupations to direct employment in the furtherance of the war effort. The policy also envisages improvements in the method of selecting men for compulsory military training and service.
The administrative machinery required to carry out the proposed measures equitably and efficiently will necessarily be intricate and complicated. The capacities of men and women cannot be weighed and measured and graded with the same certainty as the qualities of wheat or cement or steel can be determined. To perform the complicated, task of selection with success will demand both time and skill.
The government, moreover, has no desire to add unduly-which means wastefully-to governmental machinery. It is imperative that we avoid using men and women for "unnecessary tasks. In those aspects of our war effort in which voluntary methods are working satisfactorily, voluntary selection, including a measure of choice by the individual of the appropriate field of service, will be

continued. The use of the more expensive and complicated methods of compulsion will be confined to those branches of our war effort where it is felt that compulsory selection will increase its efficiency.
While the government, in its policies, has sought a total effort, it has never ceased to believe that only by a united effort could total effort be achieved. In every step the government has taken from the moment the threat of war appeared on the European horizon, we have sought so to direct aur policies and the course of public affairs that the country would remain united' in its support of the national effort.
Every hon. member of this house knows that, except for the assurance that, in the event of a European war, there would be no conscription for service overseas, this parliament would never have decided, in the immediate and unanimous manner in which it did, to stand at the side of Britain in the resistance of aggression, and the defence of freedom.
Hon. members are also aware that if, at the time when Canada's participation in the war was challenged in an election in t'he province of Quebec by a government professing a different political faith, a like assurance with respect to service overseas had not been given in the name of the present government by the late Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe, by the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Cardin), and other Liberal leaders and members of this House of Commons from the province of Quebec, the verdict of the people of that province might have been wholly different.
At that time, the people of the province of Quebec turned out of office the government that had sought to thwart Canada's war effort, and placed in office under the leadership of Hon. Mr. Godbout, a government which was prepared to cooperate with the federal administration in furthering the national effort. I doubt if any service at the time meant more to the allied cause than that rendered by the people of the province of Quebec in thus demonstrating the unity of Canada in its war effort.
When, three months later, the direction of the war effort of Canada by the present administration was challenged-though from an opposite extreme-by a resolution of the legislature of the province of Ontario, and the administration appealed to the people of Canada in a general election, the government gave the assurance that, if returned to power, it would continue to maintain the policy of no conscription for service overseas. Not only the government, but the then leader of the Conservative party- a party disguised it is true, for the time being, as the National Government party-took an equally strong stand in opposition to conscription for overseas service. The candidates, not

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
of one political party only, but the vast majority of candidates in the general election gave their constituents to understand that they were opposed to a policy of conscription for overseas service. In so doing, reference was continually made to the effect of the adoption of conscription in the last war, and) the serious wound which, at the time, its application had inflicted in the side of our country.
As I look at the membership of this house which represents the will of the nation as expressed in the general elections, held during this very war, I say there are not a dozen members,-if, indeed, there are that many- regardless of party, who could rise in their places and truthfully say that, in the last general election, they had advocated a policy of conscription for military service overseas.
Time and again it has been said by hon. members opposite-and I think my hon. friend the leader of the opposition has said it oftener than anyone else-that the present government would not have had the enormous majority it has in this present parliament if it had not given the explicit assurance that, if returned to power, it would not adopt conscription for military service overseas. Others have held that it is unfair to say that any one issue should be singled out as the decisive issue in a general election. They maintain that many factors were in the minds of the people. It is said, for example, and I believe it to be true, that the present administration owes its vast majority to the 'belief so generally held that at this time of war no better administration could be found to administer Canada's war effort and to conduct the country's affairs. Not the least of the reasons for this belief was the view that the present administration might be expected to harmonize differences more effectively and thereby to avoid disunity at a time of war when, above all else, unity is vital.
In accordance with the general consensus of view as respects the mandate given by the people themselves, the government, throughout 1940 and 1941, proceeded to develop an all-out war effort. Might I pause here to say a word in reference to what my hon. friend the leader of the opposition said this afternoon with respect to mandates. If I recall aright, he said that this government took immediate action when Japan declared war, though we had no mandate from the people. He referred to a number of other acts performed by the government for which he said1 the government had no special mandate. He referred to Abraham Lincoln and some of his actions at the time of the civil war, for which my hon. friend said Lincoln had no mandate. That is all perfectly true; but of all the instances mentioned by my hon. friend there was not
one in which, when the possibility of action of the kind mentioned had been placed before the people themselves, any subsequent action on the part of the government was restricted by a specific pledge or commitment with respect thereto. Of all the instances he mentioned there was not one in which the people themselves had been given the assurance, before the event itself took place, that if it did take place the government, while it would do all in its power to meet the situation, would not in one particular go counter to what it believed at the time to be the will of the people, and had expressly set forth the limitation that was to be respected. Therefore there is a great difference between what my hon. friend has put forward with respect to actions where there were no commitments in advance and the action of this government respecting a commitment that was definitely made with regard to a definite situation.
In this connection might I commend to my hon. friend, as I continue with what I have to say, the words by Abraham Lincoln which he quoted, that government was or ought to be "of the people, by the people and for the people." I hope my hon. friend will keep that thought in mind in reference to the criticism he has been offering with respect to myself, that I have been paying too much attention to the people and not enough attention to some of the things that at the present time are being said by a vociferous press.
As I was saying, in accord with the general consensus of view as respects the mandate given by the people themselves, the government, throughout 1940 and 1941, proceeded to develop an all-out war effort. Until parliament was in session in November last, the government continued to carry on that effort, not without criticism, but certainly without the issue of conscription for overseas service being raised, in any authoritative manner, by any party or party leader in this house.
At the time of my tour of western Canada, prior to my visit to Britain, an attempt was made to raise the issue of conscription. A cloud no larger than a man's hand appeared in the political sky at Calgary and in some other of the western cities. I at once recognized that this was not due to a spontaneous movement on the part of the people themselves, but was rather the manifestation of a political movement carefully organized by opponents of the government, to force conscription to the fore as a political issue. I accordingly sought to meet this threat to our national unity in the only way in which I believed it could and should be met, if unity throughout Canada was to be maintained.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
Speaking in the city of Vancouver before a very large audience, I said:
The policy of the government regarding conscription has been made abundantly clear. We have taken the position that every young man who is physically fit should be liable for military training and service in Canada for the defence of Canada. This policy is designed to prdvide our country with a second line of defence should the country be subject to direct attack. In the same way, parliament has put at the disposal of the nation, all the material resources of the country.
My colleagues and I, expressing, as we believe, the will of the Canadian people as expressed by themselves in a war-time election, have made it equally clear, that service outside Canada in the armed forces of Canada at sea, on land and in the air-service undertaken in the cause of freedom-shall be freely undertaken.
Before war came, the government gave a solemn pledge that in the event of war, we would follow that policy. When war came the pledge was solemnly reaffirmed. At the general elections during the war itself, that policy received the overwhelming approval of the people of Canada. Indeed, no political party can be said to have advocated conscription for overseas service. The leader of the official opposition could scarcely have been more emphatic than he was in declaring that conscription was not an issue; that, having regard to the memories of the past, and experiences in the last war, anyone who might raise that issue was not true to the highest interest of his country.
The present unhappy state of the world is in large part the result of broken pledges. Nazi Germany has erected bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. Bad faith, broken pledges, and disregard of the popular will are the very forces against which Canada is fighting to-day. That being so, I wish the more emphatically to affirm the government's intention to keep the pledge repeatedly given to the people of Canada.
This statement is representative of the views I everywhere expressed in the course of my western tour, and which everywhere met, if not with unanimous, certainly with general approval. With the people of Canada thus reassured, there was little, if any, agitation on the matter during my absence in Britain and immediately after my return. In parliament there was little or no question or discussion raised concerning conscription until, while parliament was in session in November, it was announced that the leader of the Conservative party in the senate was to replace the present leader of the opposition in the leadership of his party, and would also replace him in the leadership of the official opposition in this House of Commons.
Prior to this announcement, I had restated in this House of Commons the government's position with respect to national selective service, as I have already quoted it to the house. At the same time, as leader of the

government, I made clear by own position with respect to the application of conscription to service in the armed forces overseas, in the following words:
But so far as conscription for service overseas is concerned in the armed forces of Canada, that question was submitted to the people of Canada at the last general election, an election which was held in war time, and in which the leaders of all political parties made their statements to the electorate, and the people of Canada decided against conscription for overseas service. So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas.
These words are to be found in Hansard for November 12, 1941, at page 4321. This statement was made during the afternoon of November 12. On the evening of that day, the new leader of the Conservative party, without any previous attempt at consultation or conference with myself, or any member of the government, and before he himself had become a member of this House of Commons, issued a statement announcing his acceptance of the leadership of the Conservative party, in which he set forth as his policy "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war". In view of the position of the government with respect to national selective service, this statement narrows down simply to a demand for conscription for overseas service. It thereby made the single question of the application of conscription for military service overseas into a political issue of the first magnitude.
Outside parliament altogether, the political skies have now become so overcast with controversy, promoted by high-pressure methods and highly financed publicity, that the nature and extent of Canada's war effort is not only being obscured, but is in danger of being seriously impaired,
If the issue of conscription for service overseas is to be fought out, the place for it to be fought out is on the floor of this parliament. If, however, members of the government and, indeed, members of this House of Commons generally, are to be free to express their views irrespective of any previous commitments, it is necessary that all members be released from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.
Quite apart from the controversy which has arisen, there are the strongest of reasons why the government should, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation, as they may arise, subject only to its responsibility to parliament.

When, prior to its outbreak, the possibility of war in Europe was discussed in Canada, it was thought of in terms of another European war, the scene of which would be confined for the most part to Europe. The last war was still much in mind. The incidents connected with conscription and the results which flowed from its application remained vivid memories. The mere thought of the repetition of anything of the kind was abhorrent to the minds of most people in Canada. Few, if any, even dreamed at the time that war might so spread as to bring into the orbit of actual hostilities, any part of the western hemisphere. When people on this side of the Atlantic thought of war during the autumn and winter months of 1938 and the early spring of 1939, they thought first of the protecting power of the British fleet. The war between Japan and China, though it had) been in existence for some years, seemed so remote as to have little or no bearing upon the security of the Pacific coast of this continent.
When the general elections were held during the month of March in 1940, the recollections of 1917 were still vividly in mind. Also in the mind of the people were commitments made in and' out of parliament respecting no conscription for service in the armed forces overseas. The relatively greater part which the air and naval forces would play in the present war, in comparison with the last; the obligation which Canada had assumed with respect to the commonwealth air training plan; the need for the immediate development of the navy, the importance of developing the manufacture of munitions on a large scale, all pointed to the unwisdom of raising any issue with respect to conscription.
It was not until the intent and might of nazi aggression had become apparent by the subjugation of Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France, that its danger to all free countries began to be appreciated. When Italy entered the war, concern was still mostly with what might happen around the shores of the Mediterranean and in Africa. It -was difficult for many to believe that the enemy might, some day, be battering our own shores on the Atlantic, and even on the Pacific.
During the past year, however, the bombardment of Britain from the air, the varying fortunes of her armies in a continuously increasing number of areas; the vast additions in resources and man-power gained by Germany through the countries she had overrun ; the unrest in the far east; all this, and much else, helped, during the past year, to change the picture vastly as viewed from this side.
The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
On the other hand, Russia's entry into the war on the side of the allies served to lessen anxiety with respect to the need for men needed for the army.
Japan's declaration of war against the United States and the British commonwealth, the consequences flowing from her treacherous attack upon United States' possessions in the Pacific, and upon British and Dutch possessions in Asia and .the Indies; the present menace of her armed forces to the island dominions of Australia and New Zealand; all these have given rise to fresh anxiety throughout Canada.
The declaration of war by Germany and Italy, as well as' Japan, against the United States has brought the United States into the conflict against the combined axis powers. This, in turn, has given rise to problems which the government is facing in meeting its obligations with respect to the joint defence of the two countries. The declaration signed at Washington on January 1 by 26 nations to combine their efforts against the axis powers, has still further emphasized Canada's responsibilities.
In a world situation so involved, with enemies on every front, with no one able to say what the outcome of battle in other parts of the world may bring of immediate and increased danger to our own land, the government feels strongly that it should be perfectly free to recommend to parliament whatever course of action it deems essential to the security of our own country, and to the preservation of freedom in our own and other lands.
Such freedom the government does not possess at the present time, not because of any limitations upon the powers of parliament -parliament is at all times supreme-but because of past commitments made by the government and, regardless of party, by most members of this house.
If, then, it is desirable that the government subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment, irrespective of any previous commitments, it is clear that means must be found of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.
There are, as I see it, three means by which this release could be obtained:
The first would be by means of a general election. In a general election at this time the issue of conscription for service overseas would become one of the issues and, in existing circumstances, would almost certainly be the main issue.

The Address-Mr. Mackenzie King
The second would be by means of a referendum solely with reference to the question of conscription for service overseas.
The third would be by means of a plebiscite, not to obtain a decision with respect to conscription, but solely with the object of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.
These three -means have been considered by the government with relation particularly to which of the three would occasion the least interference with the war effort of the country.
The government is of the opinion that neither a general election nor a referendum on the question of conscription is either advisable or necessary.
As for a general election, apart from the fact that the government has every reason to believe it continues to possess the confidence of the country, it would not, we believe, be in the interest of the people themselves, in the existing crisis, to leave the country without a parliament for the time which it would take to hold a general election. Moreover, other issues entering in, it would not be possible to say that the verdict of the people, whatever it might be, had related solely to the issue of the application of conscription for overseas service.
The objection to a referendum on conscription is that far from freeing the hands of the government it would be a specific request to the people to make a decision with respect to conscription. As I have already said, the proper place to debate the question as to the extent to which conscription should be applied is on the floor of parliament.
The strongest of reasons why the government should be given a free hand to take, subject to its responsibility to parliament, any course of action which it may believe to be necessary at a time of war is that the government itself alone can know all the circumstances and reasons which necessitate a particular course of action. These reasons cannot all be made public, linked as they are with the combined plans of other countries, with questions of military strategy, and the necessity of such matters being carefully concealed from the enemy.
A plebiscite differs from a referendum in that a plebiscite is taken to ascertain the views of the people, whereas a referendum is a request for a decision by the people on a specific plan or project. The government does not believe that it would be fair to the people to ask them to make military decisions. 
It is, as I already have said, not possible, in war time, to make public adequate information on which wise judgments can be made.
In consulting the people by plebiscite, the government is not throwing on the people the responsibility of making a military decision. It is asking the people to give the government full power and full responsibility to take whatever military decisions the government, in the light of all its knowledge, believes to be necessary. In consulting the people, therefore, we are not shirking responsibility, we are asking for full responsibility.
A course completely different from any one of the three I have mentioned has been suggested. It is that the government should ignore commitments altogether, refrain from any consultation with or reference to the people, and here and now immediately put in force conscription for service overseas.
I am perfectly sure that were any government to proceed in any such arbitrary manner, completely disregarding the will of the people as expressed in the past, or as it might be expressed in the present, it would find any such attempt effectively thwarted by the people's representatives in parliament.
Personally, I reject as unworthy of consideration, any course of action by this or any parliament which ignores the authority from which parliament and the government alike derive their power. I reject as still more unworthy the suggestion that the government should break the solemn pledges given and repeated time and again to the electorate. Let me repeat what I said at Vancouver:
The present unhappy state of the world is, in large part, the result of broken pledges. Nazi Germany has erected bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. Bad faith, broken pledges, and disregard of the popular will, are the forces against which Canada is fighting to-day.
I do not propose to erect bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. I propose at all times to do all in my power to see that the will of the people, not that of any particular section or group or interest, however powerful or vociferous, shall prevail in the government of this country.
Perhaps I should add that yet another course of action has been suggested. It is that I should resign and advise His Excellency the Governor General-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Hear, hear.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, I hear some of them opposite; I hope they listen to what I am -going to say. It is that I should resign and advise His Excellency the Governor General to call on some other person to form a government which would ignore all past

The Address

Mr. Coldwell
commitments and- undertake to enforce conscription without any prior consultation with the people. In other words, I am being asked to sell my birthright for their mess of pottage, and to destroy whatever confidence the people of Canada may possess in my honour as a public man, and, in doing so, also to destroy the confidence the people possess in the honour and integrity of the government.
Those who speak and write in that way might be prepared so to act, but I am not.
If we wish to destroy, not at this time of war alone, but for all time, the last vestige of confidence which the people of Canada have in their free political institutions and in their public men, that would be the most effective way to go about it.
The government, having, for the reasons I have mentioned, decided to seek from the oeople, by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments, proposes, without delay,-to introduce legislation to set up the required machinery for conducting the plebiscite at the earliest possible date. The plebiscite will be taken with the minimum of expense consistent with equitable and efficient provision for a full and honest expression of the views of the people.
I need scarcely say that in the machinery which may be necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite, special provision will be made for ascertaining the views of the men on active service in the armed forces.
I shall not go into detail regarding the procedure to be followed in holding the proposed plebiscite. The question which the government proposes to submit to the people is the simple and straightforward question: Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?
It will be seen that in seeking freedom for itself to act on all matters pertaining to war in accordance with its judgment, the government is taking a course Which will remove all legitimate excuse for controversy, and the course best calculated to maintain the unity of the country in this time of war.


Mr. HOMUTH:: Then what will they do?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That will
depend in part upon what my hon. friend and those who are round him will do.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Do not worry about us.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am quite prepared to trust the people; my -hon. friend certainly is not. Just here may I pause to say that if my hon. friend is afraid that the people will pronounce against conscription,
for that is what he has in his mind, and he is still prepared1 to have conscription put into force without any reference to the people, then I should like to know how he expects that- the unity of this country is going to be maintained.
In the presentation of the plebiscite to the electorate the desire of the administration to possess complete freedom of action will, of course, receive the vigorous and whole-hearted support of all members of the government It will, I hope, receive the support of every member of parliament, and will, I believe, receive the support of the Canadian people.


Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar):: Mr. Speaker, I could not begin my remarks this evening without first congratulating the mover and the seconder of the address in reply to the speech from the throne, who were our good companions on a recent trip to Great Britain. They acquitted themselves in a manner which, I believe, won the congratulations of hon. members on all sides of the house.
I thought that perhaps at times their praise of the government was a bit extravagant; shorn of these superlatives, their speeches were admirable.
I want to take this opportunity of expressing my own appreciation for the extensive tour of Great Britain so generously provided by the British branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association, and to express particularly my thanks to Sir Howard d'Egville, who supervised the arrangements on this side, to Sir Drummond Shiels, to Mr. Spencer-Hess, and to the British Ministry of Information, who combined to pilot us around Great Britain. Nor must we forget to thank, too, the Hon. Vincent Massey and Mrs. Massey and our splendid staff in the city of London. Every one of them did everything possible so that we might see all those things which visiting parliamentarians ought to see, and to make our stay in Great Britain as pleasant as it could possibly be under the grim circumstances of war. And Britain was grim. I knew from past experiences the British seashore and countryside. I would scarcely have recognized some of the places that I had known in my boyhood days. But in spite of the grimness we found a cool, courageous people engaged in a people's war and determined that when this conflict ended, there would be a people's peace and that the British people would build a new Britain in which the people might find security and peace.
But I should like to say more about those things at another time. To-day we are at the beginning of a new session of parliament. We
The Address-Mr. Coldwell

meet within the shadows of dark and threatening skies. This is no time for discussions of relatively inconsequential matters. We are faced with more widespread threats to human freedom than, perhaps, the world has ever known and let us not blind ourselves with undue optimism. All is not well with the war or with our efforts to win it. Except in Russia, north Africa, and China, the axis powers have retained the initiative and have forced the allied powers to retreat from one position to another. This is not because our armed forces are inferior to those arrayed against them, but because we have failed, I believe, so far to realize that this is a war of machines as well as of men. Our steel, copper, nickel and other resources which should have been going into tanks, planes and guns have been going, instead, into automobiles, refrigerators and the luxuries of modem life, and some, indeed, in the early stages of this war found their way to Japan. Our industrialists insisted on business as usual, and until quite recently the government did little to turn those major factories into plants for the production of war material. Indeed, propaganda throughout the country has been directed towards the more glamorous and the more spectacular course of placing men in uniform, when events have proven that the provision of modem equipment should not only have kept pace with enlistments but have outrun them.
Then, too, there has been no real challenge to all our people to put forth every effort. In Britain the people believe most fervently that they are fighting, not to safeguard their present way of life, but to build a finer, nobler Britain, in which there will be larger measures of social security and economic justice. No such dynamic yet touches the lives of our people. They see business as usual, profits much as usual, and the representatives of monopolistic trusts in key positions in the Department of Munitions and Supply and controlling many phases of our war effort. The wheat producers of the west try to make ends meet at prices that were far too low before the war began, while workers in industry see barriers erected against their right to organize in associations of their own choice. Thus our national effort falls short of what it should be, because it lacks the proper dynamic.
I said that the bright spots in the present situation were north Africa, Russia and China; in north Africa because, so Mr. Churchill told us, we have concentrated most of our new equipment there, and so at last a British army meets an axis force on nearly equal terms. The reason for the stubborn resistance of the Chinese is that they fight 
for a China that had begun to make progress towards a greater measure of economic security, more than old imperial China ever knew. This, too, is. the secret of Russian courage and Russian success. Whatever criticism we might have of their methods of government, the Russian people believe firmly that they are fighting to prevent the destruction of those economic and social advances which they themselves have made during the last twenty years. That these advances have been real and marvellously efficient, the effectiveness of the Russian army, the quantity and quality of their equipment, and the magnitude of their industrial reserves, amply demonstrate. Surely we can learn some lessons from these facts. Laboriously, for over two years, we have been mobilizing our war effort, and in spite of our boasted industrial strength we have failed to provide the tools to get on with the job. It is true that Russia had built great war industries before the war. But she was also able to build new cities, new homes, new universities, new standards of life, while we did neither the one nor the other. When -the test came, there were no private monopolies, no trusts, no vested interests, no contractors who refused to accept war contracts except on their own terms, no business men who needed the incentive of gain or the acquisition of wealth, to slow up her war effort and bring her to the brink of defeat. In a few weeks she was geared for total war, with the full support of a people with a future to defend. Give our people assurances of a brighter future, remove the hand of selfish gain from our war effort, and in our own way and under our own social institutions Canada can do at least as well.
Thus we can build the hope of a future upon which alone sacrifice for victory will depend. But this hope must be based on something more than fine speeches and attractive promises. As long as people see our aged folk trying to make their meagre pensions meet the increased cost of living, or pensioners, or dependents of those who perished in the last great war, or who are fighting in this one, coping with increasing poverty while industry is prosperous and its total dividends increase, social discontent will act like a canker at the very core of our war effort; for the morale of the nation is the core of resistance, the foundation of victory.
To-day our people see the owners and directors of prosperous industries in charge of our war effort. I know that among them are conscientious and patriotic citizens who are giving of their very best. But even these are human, and sometimes some confuse the welfare of the organizations they have served with

The Address-Mr. Coldwell
the welfare of the nation, while others identify the welfare of their enterprises with the welfare of the nation itself.
No parliamentary committee has yet delved into the activities of the Department of Munitions and Supply, with which most of the dollar-a-year-men have been associated; but that should be done at this session of parliament. In the United States the office of production management corresponds fairly closely to our Department of Munitions and Supply. There, a committee under the chairmanship of Senator Truman investigated its activities. Its report, submitted to congress on January 15, 1942, was most interesting. It recommended that the office should be drastically reorganized. The report stated that there were 255 dollar-a-year-men and 631 who received no government pay, but many of whom retained remunerative connections with the companies which lent them to the government. These men, the report said, had a tendency to favour big business, whether they were conscious of the fact or not. The committee declared that it was opposed to the government taking free services-and I quote -"from persons with axes to grind"-and recommended that if they were needed by the department they should be given salaries and required to relinquish their private business connections, and salaries.
In parts, the Truman report reads like criticisms that have been made in this house. For example, I quote:
Apparently there never has been any real and coordinated procurement of aircraft.
Again:
There is a tendency throughout to place everything on order wherever possible and put the sole responsibility for delivery on a few large producers.
Again:
"Big business" has had its lobbyists in the form of dollar-a-year-men and men without compensation. Small and intermediate business men have sought to obtain the same benefits by hiring those who they think have influence. In some eases the persons are hired to render legitimate services and are paid so handsomely as to lead many to think their employers must have expected to receive added benefits. In others no legitimate services are rendered and payments that are made can be treated only as compensation for influence. In most instances the "Washington connections" are non-existent and the pedlars of influence are relying on the chance that the business man can obtain a contract without help if he made a serious and determined effort.
Are we free from these abuses, with much [DOT]the same type of establishment? Well, prosecutions now going on in the Ottawa courts should make us suspect that we may not be. There is unrest in Great Britain, too,
on another phase of the same problem. The Labour Discussion Notes for December, a publication of some of the members of the British Labour party, contained a careful survey of the matter. It said:
The feeling that excess profits are being made must lead to cynicism and lack of a feeling of personal responsibility among the workers in factories from whom a more intensive effort is demanded; while at the same time many employers are putting forth the argument that the inability to make high profits owing to the action of the excess profits tax is itself a brake on production.
The publication goes on to express alarm at the growing economic power of the big monopolies and states a fact of which we should take the most careful warning when it says:
There is one other important factor which requires careful watching-that is the future of the vast capital equipment provided by the government to increase output. ... It could form the basis of, for instance, a sizeable national munitions industry or it could become a gift handed over at a nominal charge to the present owners. In the latter ease, all the effects of the excess profits tax would disappear overnight.
With these warnings before us we should go into the whole problem of munitions and supply, or some day we may find that a few trusts and corporations have so increased their power over the economic life of Canada that the individual, unorganized consumer is entirely at their mercy. Indeed, I would go as far as to say that unless the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) himself is alert to this situation, he will find that the present trends in Canada will shatter every economic and social policy which he has preached and professed throughout his whole career in public life.
To achieve an enthusiastic response from the people of Canada there must be a greater approach to economic justice and equality of sacrifice. In spite of the excess profits tax, total dividends last year were greater than in the previous year. The Globe and Mail reported J. R. Timmins and Company as saying that 1941 dividends exceeded $2S5,000,000 as against $280,000,000 for 1940. These are not my figures, but the figures published by the Globe and Mail of t'he city of Toronto on December 22, 1941.
Our people are not satisfied with our war effort. They look at the personnel of our various war boards and they see representatives of big business in control almost exclusively. To regain the confidence of the people, representatives of farmers and of labour, in the widest sense of these terms, must be given adequate control. By adequate control I do not mean the appointment of the odd farmer
The Address-Mr. Coldwell

or labour representative chosen by the government on the recommendation of some member of .this house, but representatives, according to their importance in the country, chosen by their own representative -organizations.
Everywhere we went in industrial Britain we found labour representatives sharing public responsibility with the owners of industry and wealth. I was told that in the rural districts farmers and their labourers shared similar responsibilities. Such, of course, are essential links in an all-out war effort. Canada has been called in this house the arsenal of the British commonwealth; yet we have not equipped our own soldiers adequately. The story told by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) of the gallant defenders of Hong Kong reflects little credit on those responsible for the sending of that expeditionary force.
I hope that the committee which the Prime Minister has promised will investigate all the circumstances with great thoroughness. In Montreal on January 6, addressing the Women's Canadian club there, I made a brief and passing reference of concern regarding the equipment and training of our troops at Hong Kong. Newspapers immediately designated those who expressed such sentiments as undermining our war effort. I wonder what those newspapers think now about that, or what they think of the harsh epithets applied by British speakers and British papers, including Lord Beaverbrook's own Daily Exjness, to those responsible for the lack of preparation in the far east. In my opinion the military and naval authorities who allowed our men to proceed to Hong Kong without anti-tank guns and adequate equipment and training, with the situation in the far east as tense as it was in late October, were guilty of negligence or ignorance. Had they read Lord Gort's report, the official dispatches on the battle of France? That report was published in Canada two weeks before the ill-fated Hong Kong expeditionary force sailed. Of that'battle of France Lord Gort wrote:
So ended a campaign of twenty-two days which has proved that the offensive once more gained ascendancy in modern war when undertaken with an army equipped with greatly superior material power in the shape of air force and fighting vehicles.
After giving some examples of lack of equipment, Lord Gort continued:
These instances among many others serve to indicate the vital necessity for an expeditionary force, if it is to be used in a first class war, being equipped on a scale commensurate with the task it is called upon to fulfil. The day is past when armies can be hurriedly raised, equipped and placed in the field, for modern war demands the ever-increasing use of complicated material.

But it is equally important to inquire under what circumstances a Hong Kong force was asked for, and under what considerations and agreements it was sent. Who took the responsibility for neglecting Brigadier Lawson's expressions of uneasiness on leaving without complete equipment? Did those who decided that the force was to be sent satisfy themselves that in the event of war the island of Hong Kong could be defended? Did they inquire as to its air defences, its artillery equipment, its water and other vital supplies? Or are we to infer that Canadian troops are being placed at the disposal of the imperial general staff without adequate control or inquiry on the part of our own Department of National Defence? If so, then the government has reversed the policy so vehemently maintained in the last war by Sir Robert Borden, and have relegated Canada to the position of colonial days.
It is clear that Canada, Australia and the dominions should be properly and of themselves represented on an allied council dealing with all matters of war stategy. This is most essential. The Minister of National Defence excuses the failure to send adequate equipment with the Hong Kong force on several grounds, one of which was that Japan suddenly and without warning struck in the Pacific. On Saturday last-and the report can be found in full in yesterday's New York Times-the Roberts commission in Washington reported the facts in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbour. The report shows that as early as January 24, 1941, the secretaries of the United States navy and of the United States army were discussing the gravity of the Pacific situation; that on October 16, 1941, twelve days before our men left Canada:
The commanding general, Hawaiian department, and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the war and navy departments ... of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia and the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States.
No doubt this view was also held in London, and I assume it was transmitted to Canada.
Then why, in the face of this information, and in view of Lord Gort's report, our experiences in Greece and in Crete and our difficulties in north Africa a year ago, were our troops, even such as were trained, allowed to proceed without equipment to an island which the public now knows could not possibly have been defended successfully?
The leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) said last Wednesday that there would be other Hong Kongs-

The Address-Mr. Caldwell


Richard Burpee Hanson: I did not say that. I said there may be.


Major James William Coldwell: Yes; I stand corrected. The duty of this house is clearly to see that there are no repetitions of the Hong Kong episode. It is our duty to see that our men are given at least a chance to defend themselves properly.
The government proposes to ask the people of Canada for, to use its own words, "by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service." That being so, the people of Canada have a right to ask that those responsible for the sending of partly trained, improperly equipped men to Hong Kong, and who failed to satisfy themselves that the island was in a condition which made its defence a possibility, should be relieved of any further' responsibilities in the dispatch of our men to any war zone. This is no time to condone carelessness or inefficiency. These delinquencies have brought Britain, the United States and our allies to the brinks of several disasters. Britain, and recently the United States, appear to have acted promptly to deal with such situations. The people have a right to know that no more ill-equipped partly trained men will be sent to places impossible to defend.
As to the plebiscite itself, we are always prepared to support a proper and democratic reference to the people of a clearly defined policy. All that the government intends to ask in the present instance is release from its promise not to conscript for overseas service. That is not enough. The government should tell the people exactly what the war situation really needs. Does it or does it not require conscription of men for overseas service? I hope that in this debate the discussion will not centre round the minor matter of taking a plebiscite. The government has decided to take it; then let it be taken with the least possible delay, and in the meantime let the government take the country into its confidence and tell us why release from its commitments is necessary. This is no time for political strategists to wrangle for party advantage. Obviously the need for equipment and supplies is as great, indeed, judging by the lack of equipment for men already in training, the need is greater. The Canadian people, I believe, demand that industry and finance shall be subjected to national selective service to the same extent as man-power, at the same time and on the same terms. Of course that is not what the
new leader of the Conservative party wants. Mr. Meighen said1 quite explicitly at Weston town hall last Thursday:
I have offered to support the government without stint or reserve in a policy of compulsory selective service for all our forces, our farms and our factories.
No mention here of compulsory service of finance and industry. In commenting, the Montreal Gazette said:
This policy is broad enough and comprehensive enough to cover the whole man-power issue.
Quite so, but it reveals the real aim of the people who engineered the new leadership; the newspapers who support him and the so-called committee of two hundred, who failed to secure control of Canada several years ago through their defunct Leadership League and who now, in the midst of war, are trying a war stunt of confusion and division. These people are not advocating the policy urged by the Canadian Legion, which asked for an allround mobilization of man-power, industry and wealth, though they have pretended to do so; or the policies urged by farmer and labour groups calling for the conscription of industry and wealth before further measures for the conscription of man-power are proceeded with. Neither are these policies involved in the amendment that was moved this afternoon. Beginning with the War Measures Act, right through to the National Resources Mobilization Act, the government has had full power to place this country on a total war footing, with one exception, which government spokesmen have claimed to be of minor importance. Yet, as I have pointed out, our industrial and war effort has been carried forward on the business-as-usual basis, with profits and big business control the governing considerations. Let us know, then, what the government proposes to do, and the needs which make these proposals necessary. None will give more support to an all-out war effort than we will give, but we demand that it be based on equality of sacrifice and not be made merely an opportunity for the regimentation of the Canadian people in the interests of a few monopolistic trusts and their beneficiaries.
In order to place our point of view clearly before the house, I am going to move an amendment to the amendment, seconded by' the hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) in these words:
That all the words after the words "this house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers" be struck out and the following substituted therefor:
"have used the sweeping powers conferred by the National Resources Mobilization Act mainly for the conscription of men for home defence, and in the opinion of this house no total effort
The Address

Mr. Coldwell

adequate to meet the present needs of the war, domestic problems and the preparation for postwar conditions is possible without total mobili-. zation of wealth, industry and finance, as well as human resources.
"Therefore this house respectfully requests that the forthcoming plebiscite should seek the support of the people of Canada for the complete and effective conscription of war industries, accumulated wealth and financial institutions, at the same time and on the same basis of sacrifice as the suggested extension of the conscription of man-power."
Such a plebiscite would give our people an opportunity to give proper expression to their views and guide this house regarding what is in effect a new policy to which a large majority in this house gave no support, or, in whole or part, as the Prime Minister said, opposed in the general elections of 1940. In this way the vote would be an expression of the people's approval of a policy and not merely a plebiscite caused by the government's resort to political expediency. For some time attempts have been made to divide the people of Canada artificially on a question which should be decided not on the basis of partisan controversy but on the basis of the nation's need in a great crisis. This need, I repeat, involves more, much more, than a discussion of the use of man-power, though man-power is necessarily involved in it.
I repeat that the present critical war situation at home demands a complete mobilization of the total resources of our country. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation group will support such total mobilization, but demands that accumulated wealth and war industries be conscripted at the same time, in the same manner and upon the same terms as man-power. If we are to have this all-out war effort, it must be on the basis of national unity. Every discussion of these matters in this house and in the country ought to be undertaken with due regard to the unity of our people of all races, creeds, and tongues. Had the nature and objective of our war effort been clearly placed before the people, our unity would not be endangered. This house has failed to realize that the greatest danger to our unity in war is exactly the same danger we face in peace, the danger from inequality of sacrifice and opportunity. In any . part of Canada where profitable industry is found side by side with low standards of living on our farms, and low wage levels with high prices in the cities, there in peace and war disunity arises. If those who live well on the proceeds of profitable industry are of a different race or tongue, the situation is aggravated because the depressed people can find no basis of unity or understanding with those whom they regard as their exploiters.

Thus an all-out united war effort requires much more than provision for our armed forces, important as that certainly is.
At least some sources of disagreement have been removed since December 7. There were some people who before that date thought of the struggle as one not touching directly the vital interests of this country. But the attack on Pearl Harbour, the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, as well as the declarations of war upon the United States by Germany and Italy, have brought the war to our shores. The danger of attack has been real in Victoria and Vancouver, while we know that submarines have been operating near our own Atlantic shores. The whole American continent is now in the war zone and our Latin-American friends have, therefore, recognized the need for hemispheric solidarity. There can now be no doubt in any part of this country as to the need for Canada's all-out and united support of the allied effort to defeat the aggressor powers. It is clear now that we are not in this war merely to help Great Britain, or to help Russia, or to assist the United States; we are in it, in a very real sense, to defend ourselves and our future paths to progress. That being so, we dare not do less than organize our country for an allout, supreme effort. This we have not had, nor can we have it as long as we operate our economic life on the basis of business as usual. In other words, we must accompany any mobilization of our human resources with a thorough mobilization of industry and finance.
There are some who claim that Canadian industry and finance have already been adequately mobilized. That this is not true is shown by our output, by the lack of planning and by the huge profits and dividends which still continue to be made. Real conscription of our material and financial resources must include the following, and I want to place these points before the house in order that we may understand exactly what we mean when we speak of total mobilization and the conscription of wealth and industry:
1.	The national ownership or, at least, control of all our war industries to produce everything we require to maintain civilian health and morale and to provide our fighting forces with adequate equipment.
2.	An integrated production plan which utilizes every available plant and facility in its proper place without regard to the demands of big corporations and trusts.
3.	A complete reversal of the present dollar-a-year-men control policy and the substitution of proportionate representatives of organized farmer and labour bodies on all control

The Address-Mr. Coldwell
agencies, so that the pressure of big business could be effectively curbed and democratic direction of the war effort achieved.
4.	Direct national control of all our financial institutions so that without inflation and without unnecessary future burdens of debt, we can finance our national effort.
5.	There must be, at least, a one hundred per cent excess profits tax, and, indeed, on all profits a low maximum rate should be set and the excess taken by the government for our war effort.
6.	The present loan policy should be replaced by one of compulsory, interest-free loans imposed on the accumulated wealth of rich individuals and corporations, and based on ability to contribute. Indeed, the fairest method would be to establish a fair maximum income for all and to tax back to the countiy every dollar above that maximum.
In view of the outline of the financial aid the government proposes-and quite properly -to give at this time to those who are fighting our battles across the sea, I should like to see a policy of that kind adopted. It may, indeed, become quite necessary. If we did all this, we would still be doing less to industry, to wealth and to those of us who are not called upon to surrender our futures and our lives to Canada than we propose to do to those who are being called upon to surrender themselves to fight in this terrific war.
I know that as yet we in Canada have scarcely been touched by war. When I flew from Canada to Great Britain last autumn, and when I returned again in the same quick manner, it seemed as if I had stepped from one world into another. Apart altogether from the black-outs, apart altogether from the evidences of destruction and devastation we saw round us in the great cities; apart altogether from the scarring of the countryside we noticed as we passed through; apart from the fact that to-day the people of Britain are living on rations which, despite efforts to make them healthy and adequate, are nevertheless monotonous, and insufficient to maintain that amount of energy required to carry on under the circumstances under which the people in Great Britain are living-I say that despite all these things we noticed the will of the people to carry through to victory.
I might at this point make one reference which will be familiar to those who were with me. One day we saw an aged woman outside a little corner store. I asked her if she did not wish that the government might do something to end the war to-morrow. In spite of her poverty and in spite of the fact she with many others had been bombed out of her home, she said, "No, sir, not until we have licked him."
We saw the courage of the people over there, and we realized the grimness of the struggle. We in this country have not yet begun to understand the grimness of the situation across the seas.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to leave this thought, that in addition to the provision of men to take part in the battles raging throughout the world to-day, there is something which we in Canada must be prepared to do to a greater extent than we have done before, and that is to provide the people of Great Britain with those concentrated foods which they lack and which are so greatly needed to maintain the health of their working force and their morale. Surely out of our bounty we can deny ourselves pork, bacon, ham, cheese, butter and other foods of the concentrated type so that we may send more and more across the seas to maintain the health of the women, children, workers and soldiers on that beleaguered island. When we left Great Britain that was one of the things they said: "Tell your people in Canada to send us more things-more food, more supplies. Those are the things we need."
I had not intended to say that to-night; I had intended to reserve that suggestion for some other occasion. But, Mr. Speaker, I could not let this occasion go by without saying that if it is necessary for our government to restrict the consumption of those things needed across the seas-for, out of our bounty we could substitute many other things -then I say to the government: "Restrict those supplies, and ration the country." I know the people will respond to the greatest extent to such an appeal.
On motion of Mr. Blackmore the debate was adjourned.
On motion of Mr. Mackenzie King the house adjourned at 9.50 p.m.
Tuesday, January 27, 1942