1941-02-28

[Stage Direction]
Hon. CYRUS MACMILLAN (Queens) presented the first report of the select committee on the Pension Act and the War Veterans' Allowance Act, and moved that the report be concurred in.
Motion agreed to.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to draw to the attention of the government the following remarks of Senator Gerald Nye, of North Dakota, made in the debate yesterday afternoon in the United States senate on the so-called lease-lend bill. Senator Nye is reported to have said:
As we have done until now, Canada has required of England cash on the barrel head.
That is for war supplies.
Canada hasn't made a move to indicate other than that she would anticipate cash on the barrel head in the future.
Enact this bill, and you will find England using our United States dollars which we will give her to pay Canadians for the war supplies they send to their mother country.
I would ask the government what steps, if any, are being taken to correct such damaging statements in the United States. Has any statement been issued by the Canadian legation in Washington in refutation of such unfounded charges?

Canada's War Effort


Hon. H. A. BRUCE (Parkdale):: I was
about to ask a somewhat similar question, and I also notified the Prime Minister of the fact. My question is:	The newspapers report a
statement made by Senator Gerald Nye accusing this dominion of doing nothing for Britain except what is paid for in "cash on the barrel head!."
As this might have some effect on the lease-lend bill before the senate, will the Prime Minister inform the house what steps he has taken to refute this slander?


Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):: My hon. friend who has
just spoken did give me notice of the question he was about to ask. My hon. friend the leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation group (Mr. Coldwell) also gave me notice of the question he was going to ask, and I prepared a reply to be given to whichever one of the two spoke first. I have reserved in brackets a place for one name or the other, so that each might get full credit for having asked the question.
The government is of course aware not only of the specific statement to which the hon. member has referred, but also the similar allegation concerning Canada made in the course of the discussion in the United States on the lease-lend bill. After careful consideration the government decided that it would not be wise for us to make a public statement in regard to a subject of domestic debate in the United States, even for the purpose of correcting misrepresentations of Canada's action.
We have felt that Canada's position as a belligerent and a co-partner with Britain in the present war was well known in the United States. It has been a considered view of the government that the facts are so easily available and so widely known that it is much wiser to rely on Americans themselves, who are aware of the facts, to correct in public damaging statements, than to undertake Canadian intervention in a debate between Americans on United States policy. We have the best of reasons for believing that those in positions of chief responsibility in the United States are under no misapprehension as to the extent and form of Canada's contribution. They are not likely to be misled by such statements as that referred to by the hon. member-I should say now the hon. members.
The misrepresentation of any public intervention by Canada might easily prove much more damaging than the original statements it was sought to correct. The fact that we can rely with confidence on the more serious newspapers in the United States to correct
misrepresentations can be illustrated by an editorial which appeared in the New York Times on February 21, and which I should like to read into the record. This editorial appears in the New York Times of February 21 this year. It 'is entitled "Misrepresenting Canada," and is as follows:
Our good neighbour Canada is fortunately not unduly sensitive to misrepresentation of her status, her actions and her motives in our congressional debates, or she would have cause for resentment over a recent speech by Senator Wheeler of Montana. "Canada, which is a colony of Great Britain" said Senator Wheeler, has a law "for the drafting of men for three months' time and in that law expressly provides that no draftee may be sent abroad without his consent."
Canada is not a British colony but a free and independent nation, voluntarily linked with other free nations of British origin in a commonwealth of nations in which all are on an equal footing, and from which any of the partners has the right to secede at any time. The senator should know this, for it is part of the information shared by everyone at all conversant with international affairs. Moreover, the reason for Canada's restriction of her drafts for national service is notoriously that she has already, and can continuously command, so many volunteers for service abroad that to draft more men would only be an embarrassment.
Australia and New Zealand, also characterized by Senator Wheeler as "British Colonies", have the same status as Canada. When he goes on to say that "they are not even loaning, to say nothing of giving," war supplies to Britain, but are "insisting that the cash be put on the barrel top," he echoes a statement wholly contrary to the facts and frequently exposed. Canada, Australia and New Zealand all entered this war by the side of Britain of their own free will. Their participation in it is not restricted by monetary consideration other than their capacity to contribute. They pay their own bills, even reimbursing Great Britain for any supplies they cannot themselves furnish, and from their own resources they give to her freely, without measure and without price. Assertions to any other effect by responsible statesmen in Washington do not tend to help our relations with a spiritual ally and staunch friend.
I have thought it desirable to place this editorial on record to illustrate how the best informed citizens of the United States really view statements of the character referred to. I am sure hon. members will, on reflection, agree that nothing could be more unfortunate with respect to furthering the interests of Canada or the interests of the British empire at Washington than for either this country or any other nation of the British commonwealth to take any step at Washington which would give the administration, or the opponents of the administration there, reason to say that we in Canada-particularly the government-were trying to interfere in matters of
Income Tax

their own domestic concern, and were going out of our way to influence the free and independent judgment of the American people.


Mr. T. L. CHURCH (Broadview):: Might I ask the Prime Minister if that is the Senator Nye who was the co-author of the Neutrality Act, and who objected in the senate to Canada and England sending "missionaries" as he called them to the United States, professors and lecturers, to "drag America into the war"?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think my hon. friend will have to look up his own "Who's Who" in the United States.


Thomas Langton Church: Should not the government regulate, through passports or in some way, those who go to the states and lecture, because it does Canada harm? People go there and do the empire and Canada a great deal of harm, making speeches about Canada's war effort which are unauthorized by the government.



INCOME TAX


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day.
Mr. VICTOR QUELCH (Acadia):: I wish to address a question to the Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson), or in his absence, to the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley).
In the March 1 issue of the Financial Post, on page 1, the following heading appears:
Hear Pool Asked to file tax returns.
Ottawa takes first steps to levy income tax on cooperative organizations.
My question is: Has the Department of National Revenue requested that cooperative organizations throughout the dominion file income tax returns?


Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance):: The attention of the Minister of National Revenue will be called to that question on his return.



INQUIRY AS TO POLICY FOR 1941-42 CROP YEAR

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. A. ROSS (Souris):: I wish to ask a question of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Speaking on November 22 he intimated that a wheat policy covering the 1941-42 crop year would be announced some time in February.
As many farmers throughout Canada are now anxious to plan their spring operations, will the minister say when we may expect that announcement?


Hon. JAMES MacKINNON (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: I well remember
making the statement that I would-I think I went that far-some time in the month of February, make a statement as to the wheat policy for the coming year. At the time I said that I had no idea that there would be any trouble in bringing finality to plans for a wheat policy for the coming season. The wheat committee of the cabinet, the cabinet generally, the wheat board, the advisory committee advising the wheat board, and practically everyone interested in wheat in western and eastern Canada, individuals and organizations, have been giving this matter of wheat the very closest study. Any delay that there has been is caused by the tremendous number of different viewpoints on the question and the great divergence of opinion as to what should be the programme for next year. During last week and the early part of this week the wheat board and the advisory committee to the wheat board has been meeting in Winnipeg attempting to bring some finality to their advice to the cabinet in this matter. The wheat board arrived in Ottawa yesterday morning to consult with the wheat committee of the cabinet and I am hopeful that we shall have at least a partial announcement on the matter of policy within the next three or four days.


Mr. DOUGLAS (Weyburn):: In view of the fact that the government apparently has not a wheat policy, may I ask whether the possibility has been considered of offering a prize of war savings stamps to those suggesting the best policy?



WAR MUNITIONS AND MATERIALS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. CLARENCE GILLIS (Cape Breton South):: Has the Minister of Munitions and Supply any answer to the question I asked yesterday with regard to the plate mill at Sydney, Nova Scotia?


Hon. C. D. HOWE (Minister of Munitions and Supply):: The plate mill at Sydney has received very careful study in the Department of Munitions and Supply. The mill was bought in the last great war but was installed too late to be used at that time and it has not since been operated. To put the mill into operating condition to-day-because I am sorry to say that a good many of the parts are gone, having been used for other purposes-would involve an expenditure of
S4,500,000.	The difficulty is that even though

Trans-Canada Air Lines
Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation have the mill, they have no raw material to make plate. The raw material is all sold to Britain on long-term contract. Britain has been consulted by the department and has advised us that it cannot release any of that tonnage, preferring to get the ingots rather than plate, so far as that particular source of supply is concerned. The government has ample plate capacity in Canada to supply all the needs that can be foreseen at this time both for armour plate and for steel plate for shipbuilding and other requirements, although there is a temporary shortage of tin plate at the moment. We have decided that under the circumstances we are not warranted in financing the rehabilitation of the plate mill, but we are studying the question of installing additional primary steel capacity at Dosco-that is, more open hearth capacity-and I hope a decision on that question will be made early next week.



SOLDIER SETTLERS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. M. NICHOLSON (Mackenzie):: I had intended putting a question to the Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar), but owing to the urgency of the matter perhaps I may be allowed to ask it of the ministry. I have here a letter from one of my constituents who enlisted for active service on January 7 of this year. He has sent me a letter from the superintendent of the soldier settlement board in Saskatoon-


Mr. SPEAKER:: Order.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: This soldier has been notified that unless he makes payment, which he cannot make, he will lose possession of his land within thirty days. Can the minister give any assurance that men in this position will have protection while the war is on?


Georges Parent: Perhaps the hon. member would put his question on the order paper.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I might ask my hon. friend a question. Has he himself spoken to the minister about the matter with regard to which he wishes to have information?


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: I understand the minister is out of the city.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Has he spoken to the deputy minister?


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: No, I have not.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I would suggest, in regard to these departmental matters, that information which is desired could perhaps be expedited if such questions were brought to the attention of the minister himself or of one of the officials instead of having the time of the House of Commons taken up with such less urgent matters at this particular time. I feel it is necessary to direct attention to the fact that questions on the orders of the day should be questions arising out of some immediate necessity and should be put in the form of questions. It is very pleasant to have one's constituents know that one has received their letters and read them in the House of Commons, but that is not the purpose of questions on the orders of the day. Such questions should relate to matters that are imperative and of general interest to the house.



TRANS-CANADA AIR LINES CONTRACT FOR CARRIAGE OF MAILS-REVISION OF PRICES

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. H. HARRIS (Danforth):: In 6pite of what the Prime Minister has said, may I ask a question of the Postmaster General or perhaps of the Minister of Transport. I should like to know whether a contract has been entered into between the Department of Transport, who are operating the affairs of Trans-Canada Air Lines, for the carriage of mails; if so, when does it expire, and will the minister responsible for it lay it on the table?


Clarence Decatur Howe: No contraot has been made for the year 1941. The act as at present drawn requires that a new contract be made each year on the basis of the performance of the old year. It has been found that in actual operation this is hardly possible, because figures for the old year are not available when the new year begins. We are asking for legislation, as my hon. friend will note from the order paper, for a revision of the act.


Joseph Henry Harris: No revision of price?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes, there will be a revision of price as well. It is the intention to cut the price on the carriage of air mail from sixty cents to forty cents a mile beginning the first day of April, 1941.
1118	COMMONS
House of Commons-Friday Adjournments



ADJOURNMENT AT SIX O'CLOCK ON FRIDAYS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
William Lyon Mackenzie King: The order of the day to-day is No. 4, for the house to go into committee of the whole on the resolution respecting the war appropriation bill. Before the house proceeds to that order, I should like to say a word about evening sittings on Friday. On one or two occasions before, I have mentioned to hon. members that as the time of the house is taken up during the week with the discussion, for the most part, of urgent war matters, and all of us are obliged to concentrate very closely on these particular questions, which are most important, that for the present at least, unless there is some special reason to the contrary it would probably meet the wishes of hon. members generally if it were understood that we would adjourn on Friday at six o'clock instead of continuing sitting during the evening. I have discussed the matter with the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson), and he and I hold the view that the house has much to gain and nothing to lose by having it understood that at least for this part of the session unless the government deem it important to have hon. members do otherwise, the house will not sit on either Wednesday or Friday nights. Unless there is some view to the contrary on the part of hon. members, I should like to announce now that we will not sit this Friday evening, and that for the present we will not be sitting on other Friday evenings unless there is some special reason why we should do so.
I would draw attention to the fact that intensity of effort is a factor that has to be taken into account in considering the significance of duration of effort. I imagine that in our discussions at this very critical time we are expending more energy in a few days than at other times we would expend in several days. That is a factor which has been recognized in the British House of Commons, and I think we might equally recognize it here.


Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition) :: May I say that I concur entirely
in what the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) has said. Speaking for myself I can say honestly that at the end of the week I feel very tired. It is a tremendous effort to come here in the morning and work continuously from nine o'clock until eleven o'clock at night. I do not think the public will expect men, especially members of the government and others charged with responsibility, including myself, to put in a day as

long as that. I must have some relaxation, and I welcome this release from attendance here on Friday night. I hope other hon. gentlemen will concur in the suggestion that has been made by the Prime Minister.


Major James William Coldwell: Speaking for the small group with
which I am associated, Mr. Speaker, I should say we welcome this suggestion. I agree with the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) that members of the government are working under a very heavy strain which to some extent will be relieved if this suggestion is adopted. I have often thought that the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) might have some hon. members deputize for the members of the government on occasion, because I realize the heavy strain they are under. We in this little group, with our committee work and so on, welcome this change. Though we are a small group in opposition nevertheless we devote a very considerable amount of time to the work of this house. So I say that not only have we no objection to this proposal; we welcome it, and we hope all other hon. members will welcome it also.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I should like
to express my appreciation of the cooperation given in this matter, but there is one thing I should like to say to the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell). I hope he will not imagine that members of the government are being relieved of any duties because the house rises at six o'clock. We have in the past reserved Wednesday and Friday evenings, when they were free, for additional meetings of the war committee of the cabinet, so that we will be just as busy with the work of the administration at that time as we would be if we were in the house.



WAR APPROPRIATION BILL


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed from Wednesday, February 26, consideration in committee of a resolution to provide sums not exceeding $1,300,000,000, for the year ending March 31, 1942, for the carrying out of measures consequent upon the existence of a state of war-[DOT] Mr. Ilsley-Mr. Bradette in the chair.
Richard Burpee Hanson: Mr. Chairman, when the house adjourned on Wednesday afternoon I had partly completed the statement which I wished to make at that time. I desire now to continue with that statement, and I promise the committee that I shall not take any great length of time. May I express the hope that the heat dis-

War Appropriation Bill
played from time to time on that occasion has been dissipated, and that we may pursue the discussion of this subject in a calm and philosophical manner.
At the time of adjournment on Wednesday I had partly placed on Hansard a statement which I had handed to the press on Thursday, February 20, the opportunity of reading which was denied to me at that time. I had carried the matter down to the point of the various recommendations made by the manufacturers to the acting Minister of Munitions and Supply in January last. I then adverted to the fact that the matter had been given attention by the chairman of the war-time requirements board, who had brought in from the United States a capable executive who was an authority on aircraft production. Apparently there is some little difference of opinion between myself and the Minister of Munitions and Supply with regard to the views of this gentleman. I am informed that his views with respect to Federal Aircraft were in accord with the views of the manufacturers; it has been so stated to me.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I think it is only fair to
give the source of that information, because the three gentlemen associated with him have told me the exact opposite.


Richard Burpee Hanson: If the
minister had waited until I concluded I think I could have saved him the necessity of interrupting. I will repeat that statement. I was informed-and I will now say that I was informed by a member of one of the manufacturing concerns

that this gentleman's views as expressed to them were in accord with those of the manufacturers. The minister stated the other day that the gentleman in question had not so expressed himself to the minister, and I accept that statement. There is no printed record of what the gentleman in question said, so I think the matter will just have to be left at that point. Even if he had said one thing or the other it would not settle anything, but in any case, as far as I am concerned I have to leave there the discussion of what his views were.
I was also informed from the same source that as a result of the expression of that gentleman's views the chairman of the board was in accord with and recommended the dissolution of Federal Aircraft. I am bound to say that according to the chairman's report as it appears in the Votes and Proceedings, and from what the minister has said, that information was not well founded. I hasten to say so, and I am sure that is a correct position for me to take. I want to say, however, that with that single exception, everything I said in my statement with regard
to this matter of the production of Anson aircraft is in accord with what the minister has said, and in accord with the facts. So far as I know there is just that one item of misinformation that was given to me.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I just want to call my hon. friend's attention to the fact that according to my recollection of his statement it said quite definitely that the programme was very much behind schedule. I do not think that is indicated by the record.


Richard Burpee Hanson: We will just see about that. I think I can demonstrate that myself.
I now wish to place on the record the more important of the concluding portions of the statement, in order that the matter may be fairly complete in Hansard. The statement proceeds:
The matter was delayed to await the return of the minister, but as yet the public is unaware of any steps taken to change the existing Federal set-up. On the 31st of January the minister is reported as having said:
'T can see nothing at the moment to indicate that we would get more planes by upsetting the Federal apple-cart." He went on to make a forecast of production, which is considered by aircraft manufacturers to be little short of fantastic.
I am further advised that after his return from England the minister communicated by letter with the aircraft manufacturers who had signed the original memorandum.
That is, to the acting minister.
He promised that a thorough study of the situation would be made at once, and upbraided some of the firms for being behind in their deliveries. All the firms were requested to answer as quickly as possible three questions:
1.	Will the taking of steps you recommend accelerate production of Ansons in Canada, and if so to what extent?
2.	On what facts do you base your opinions?
3.	What guarantee can you and your group give as to a date when substantial deliveries of Anson planes will be made, provided your recommendations are accepted?
I am advised that a joint reply was made to this request, but I am unaware as to its nature, except that the manufacturers have reiterated the basic theme of the complaint against Federal Aircraft, which is that there can be no guarantee of performance under present or proposed reorganization so long as no schedule can be obtained from Federal Aircraft as to when engineering data, raw materials, parts, proprietary articles, castings, forgings, and finished parts, which are to be supplied by Federal Aircraft, will be available.
I believe that paragraph contains the gist of the defects of Federal Aircraft production. I am not going to allocate the blame to anyone. The minister stated that this was a mushroom industry, something that had never before been attempted on a large scale in Canada, the magnitude of which I
War Appropriation Bill

cannot at all events encompass in my own mind, and which I doubt if many hon. members can encompass.
But to me, the amazing part of it is that while the minister knew of the representations, asked the questions which he did with regard to recommendations for accelerating production of Ansons in Canada, and received the joint reply in which the manufacturers reiterated the basic theme of the complaint against Federal Aircraft, which was that there could be no guarantee of performance under present or proposed reorganization, so long as no schedule could be obtained from Federal Aircraft as to when engineering data, raw materials, parts, proprietary articles, castings, forgings and finished products, which were to be supplied by Federal Aircraft, would be available, he ignored these recommendations-


Clarence Decatur Howe: I do not like to interrupt my hon. friend, but I think he is reading into the last letter the trade wrote something that is not there. I asked the trade to say when they could guarantee delivery, and they said they could not guarantee delivery until they had that information.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is
about the same thing.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I suggest that if my hon.
friend wishes to be fair, he should read the last letter from the manufacturers, and take a vote on how many would switch anything to them on that letter.


Richard Burpee Hanson: As a
matter of fact the minister did not table the letters.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes, I did.
Mr.	HANSON	(York-Sunbury):	I	have
not been able to find them.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I tabled them.
Mr.	HANSON	(York-Sunbury):	I	have
not found them.


Clarence Decatur Howe: They are there.
Mr.	HANSON	(York-Sunbury):	I	have
not been able to get access to them; I understood they were not tabled.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I tabled them before.


Richard Burpee Hanson: If the
minister says they were tabled, then I accept his word.
It was on the basis of all these facts that I was endeavouring in the statement I made, without wishing in any degree to embarrass the government, to ask the minister for a
I Mr. R. B. Hanson.]
full, complete and true statement of the position, and to tell the house and the country what the government intended to do to end the apparently impossible position then existing with regard to aircraft production in Canada, referring particularly, of course, to the production of Avro-Ansons, one of the most urgent necessities in our war effort. My statement was directed almost entirely, if not altogether, to the production of Avro-Ansons.
I should like now to give the committee and the country a little resume of the history of aircraft production in Canada, in connection with this war effort. I am not speaking of the production of planes for civil aviation, which was carried on to a very limited degree before the war. I am speaking with regard to Canada's war effort, and the action of the government.
That history I set out as follows:
1.	No contracts for aircraft in connection with the war effort were placed in Canada by the Canadian government from the time the war broke out until February, 1940.
2.	Primary trainers, Fleet and Tiger Moths and intermediate trainers-Harvard-were then ordered from Canadian manufacturers.
3.	Avro-Ansons at that time were to be supplied complete from England, less wings and tail surfaces, which were to be ordered in Canada.
4.	When France fell, this government decided to make Avro-Ansons completely in Canada, with American Jacobs engines and instruments imported from the United States.
In July, 1940, the Canadian Avro-Anson programme was in a disorganized state, and at that time Federal Aircraft Limited was formed to coordinate the plans and to speed up production. I believe the minister will admit that this is a fair statement of the object of setting up Federal Aircraft.


Clarence Decatur Howe: It was set up to organize it. There was no disorganization, because nothing had been done about it.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That may be a matter of opinion. It is the opinion of some people, and it is my opinion. That, however, may not be worth much.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Not very much, on that
subject.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Then we can agree on that, at least, that my opinion is not worth much.
I now call attention to a press release covering the week of June 28, 1940, given out by the bureau of information, in which the following information was supplied under

War Appropriation Bill
t/he heading "aircraft expansion". This is one of those press releases. I do not say the minister is responsible for it, but somebody is. Certainly the minister is partly responsible for it. It is one of those things fed to the Canadian people about that time which tended to soothe them to sleep with regard to the government's war effort. This is the part to which I call attention:
Duties in Canada previously allocated to the British supply board have been vested in the Department of Munitions and Supply. The department will now place orders direct for the British government. This arrangement is expected to expedite the placement of orders for British requirements and generally speed up the production of munitions of war in the dominion. Canadian industry is being geared up to meet Great Britain's needs.
I have no objection at all to that paragraph. I believe it contains a fair statement of the objective at that time. Then the statement goes on to say:
In announcing the appointment of Mr. R. P. Bell, prominent business executive, to the executive committee of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Hon. C. D. Howe intimated that many difficulties in the supply of aircraft had been overcome. Mr. Bell's responsibility will be that of coordinating the entire aircraft production throughout the dominion, and accelerating the output of the aviation industry. Mr. Bell is serving without remuneration. He commences at a time when the Canadian Aircraft Industry has responded splendidly to the emergency created by the inability of Great Britain to ship components under the terms of the joint air training plan.
That is quite a tribute paid to the industry by t)he minister at that time. It continues:
This response has been such that the larger part of the programme, which covered two years, has been compressed into a one-year plan.
Mark this sentence:
Elementary trainer planes are already being produced on a mass production basis.
I wonder whether that was a correct statement of the position-"a mass production basis." Of course I quite realize


Clarence Decatur Howe: What does the hon. member mean by a mass production basis?


Richard Burpee Hanson: I am asking the minister what he means by a mass production basis. It is a quotation from his statement.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes, but the -hon. member
says it is not on that basis. We shall have to have an agreement on that.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I wonder whether that was a correct statement for the minister to make, having regard to the facts as they existed at that time, and especially
as they existed with respect to some of the planes, the elementary planes-trainer planes -the minister had in mind.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Elementary training planes have never been behind schedule.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I never said they had. This does not say anything about schedule; it says they were being produced on a mass production basis. That means to the people of Canada a large production basis.


Clarence Decatur Howe: How large?


Richard Burpee Hanson: I do not know. The minister stated that, but he did not enlarge on his statement. His remarks continue:
Engines for other planes have been ordered from the United States to replace those to have come from Great Britain, and Canadian plants are now turning out training and service planes, bombers and fighters, as fast as modern industrial practice permits.
That may be true with regard to training and service planes, but I am just wondering, and I ask the minister, whether it is true that they are turning out bombers and fighters as fast as modern industrial practice permits. If he means modern industrial practice in Canada, then of course that does not mean much. But it was intended, I think, to lull the Canadian people into the thought that we were getting bombers and- fighters in substantial numbers every week and every month. I suggest that that was not a true factual statement, that it was intended only to keep the people quiet and to prevent them from asking questions.
As the minister stated on Wednesday last, the general manager of Federal Aircraft was Mr. Moffett, chief aeronautical engineer of Canadian Vickers Limited. I do not know this gentleman and I would not wish to say one word to injure his reputation in the slightest degree. I would have no reason for saying this, and I would not have referred to him had not the minister done so. But this is clear: After public criticism and press criticism became apparent following the minister's return from England earlier this year, Mr. Moffett was replaced by Mr. Newman, of the Canadian Pacific Railway company.
In August, 1940, the minister gave Mr. Bell the choice of remaining as president of Federal Aircraft Limited or continuing as director of aircraft production. Since the retention of the former post would probably have meant his transfer to Montreal, Mr. Bell elected, as I understood the minister, to re-
War Appropriation Bill

main as director of aircraft production. Mr. Lawson was appointed president of Federal Aircraft.
This is the point I want to make. There was continued disorganization of the Anson programme during the latter part of 1940, after Mr. Lawson came in. I am informed that this disorganization was made even worse by bad management or bad judgment, or perhaps both, in Federal Aircraft itself. During the balance of 1940 there were many meetings held between the minister and members of the industry under contract to supply portions of the Anson programme in an effort to show him the situation.


Clarence Decatur Howe: That is not true.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is the statement as made to me.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I never in my life discussed Federal Aircraft with the industry.


Richard Burpee Hanson: All right; I shall have to leave it at that. I am informed that, as a result, many promises were made by the minister, but that no action was taken by him in spite of the fact that many individuals in his own department, in the Department of National Defence for Air, in the industry, and even in Federal Aircraft itself, wanted a change. That is the statement which was made to me by a responsible member of the industry.


Clarence Decatur Howe: My hon. friend is reporting what I did and I must say-


Richard Burpee Hanson: It is what the minister did not do.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I never discussed Federal
Aircraft with the industry. I have discussed it casually with individual members of the industry, but Federal Aircraft were handling their own affairs. I have discussed Federal Aircraft with the president and directors of Federal Aircraft, but that is the only serious discussion I had with anybody.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I am informed the minister did have a discussion. If the minister says he did not, by the rules of the house I am bound to accept his statement.
I come now to January of this year when the industry, through the Air Transport association, wrote asking for a meeting with the government to discuss the problems of aircraft production. As has already been stated, the acting minister invited six of the main contractors in the Anson programme to describe the situation to him individually and later to produce collective recommendations. This was done on January 7, and among other

things they called for the dissolution of Federal Aircraft. The acting minister himself left the impression with the representatives of the industry that he was fully persuaded that they were advocating the proper policy and, it is stated, cabled the minister, who was then in England, asking permission to act, but this was refused.
Then the chairman of the war-time requirements board arranged, through Mr. Carmichael, for a report by Mr. Breech. I shall not go over this again. This is what the industry thinks ought to be done. The industry has represented that the war-time requirement is for an aircraft production head *with complete authority, with its own finances, and particularly encompassing the engineering division of the Royal Canadian Air Force.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Does my hon. friend recommend that?


Richard Burpee Hanson: I am saying what the industry recommends.


Clarence Decatur Howe: What about parliamentary
control?


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is another point. There was a falling off of production of aircraft in England, but Lord Beaverbrook was taken into the ministry for the purpose of getting results in production. He broke through every tradition with regard to parliamentary control; he is now a dictator in effect with respect to aircraft production, but he got results.


Mr. RALSTON:: I think my hon. friend has made entirely too wide a statement when he says that Lord Beaverbrook broke through every tradition with regard to parliamentary control. That is exactly the point my colleague was making, that you could not break through parliamentary control.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I realize the difficulty and I pointed it out. I realize there is the matter of parliamentary responsibility, and at the moment I am not advocating that Mr. Bell, or whoever may be appointed, should be made a dictator.


James Layton Ralston: Or Lord Beaverbrook.


Richard Burpee Hanson: He has
pretty wide powers.


James Layton Ralston: But he has not the power to supersede parliamentary control.


Richard Burpee Hanson: What he says goes with the British government. Someone should be put on the job. He could be made responsible to the minister-I agree that that ought to be done-but he should

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get results. I do not think we can go as far as the industry has suggested we could, and I have told them so. To sum up, the industry still recommends that Federal Aircraft should be dealt with as indicated in the aircraft manufacturers' joint memorandum of January 7, 1941.
It is hoped, and in order to attain economical and rapid large-scale production it is fundamentally necessary, that orders be placed with the industry for at least a year ahead. This has not been done and most of the aircraft manufacturers have not yet been fully occupied. It will be apparent, I think, that on all orders for 200 aircraft or more the manufacturers have made good deliveries-I think the minister himself demonstrated that the other day-in some instances being a year ahead of schedule.
In his anxiety to throw up a smoke screen to hide or obscure certain established facts, the minister used harsh and bitter words, especially toward certain of the press of this country. But I want to say to him and to the committee that those harsh and bitter words will not prevent us from analysing the situation objectively, or from searching out every fact that may bear upon the situation. I was pained to hear the minister use language which created the impression that everyone who differed from him or who criticized him was a saboteur. That was the impression created in my mind. Too easily has he concluded that Canada's war effort and this government are coterminous. May I suggest to him that he should understand that criticism of the government may help, not hinder, the government's war effort. One of our objectives is to demonstrate any weaknesses that may exist so that inefficiency shall not honeycomb our war effort, in order that we may have the planes and more planes so urgently requested.
There seems to be an inconsistency between some of the minister's declarations. May I point out that possibly he has a short memory? In a speech on Wednesday last, he said this, as reported at page 1053 of Hansard:
In our most optimistic moments we never expected that we would get any substantial production of Avro-Anson planes until March.
That is what the minister said two days ago. On February 21, in reply to the hon. member for Cumberland, who suggested that production of Ansons was months behind' schedule, the minister said, as reported in Hansard, page 922:
No. There was never the slightest thought in anyone's mind that we would get the first Avro-Anson plane before the end of February,
1941. . . . All I will say now is that we never anticipated having Avro-Anson planes of Canadian manufacture delivered at this date.
But what did the minister say on the 30th July last? He may check me if he wants to; I have Hansard here, page 2116 of last session :
It is anticipated that Canadian production of Ansons will commence before the end of this year.
This was after Federal Aircraft was set up. No doubt the minister had some reason for making that statement. Why does he not have his secretary or somebody check up on his previous statements?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Well, Mr. Chairman,-


Richard Burpee Hanson: All right,
now.


Clarence Decatur Howe: On the 30th July, Federal
Aircraft had been set up for ten days, and we were not aware at that time that we had to make a complete re-design of the plane. We thought we had a straight manufacturing proposition.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I tried to say that, to be fair, that there were reasons upon which the minister based his anticipation.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I gave the house my best
statement at the time.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I am not
questioning the minister's good faith. Again I make that statement, and make it quite clearly. I am questioning whether the minister's judgment and the minister's efforts have always been exercised to the best advantage in this matter. I never yet questioned his good faith.
I should like to go a little further. The minister, I believe, is the hardest-working member of the administration. I say that; that is evidence of fairness, is it not? I certainly believe that, but I honestly believe also that the minister undertakes too much and therefore has not accomplished all that he might have accomplished. I know it is commonly true of the man who is endeavouring to do a big job, that he thinks he can do it better than anybody else, and very often he is right, but it clogs up his effort with regard to other matters. I know that in the practice of the law, in the drafting of contracts and that sort of thing, I have often felt that I might save a good deal of time if I could delegate these matters to other people, but in the actual practice of working the thing out, it was my belief that I could do it much better than the other fellow in my office, and I did not give it to him, and sometimes got waterlogged with work. That,
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I believe, has happened to all of us. The Minister of National Defence will agree with the principle I am trying to enunciate. I think, if I may be allowed to say so, that has been one of the minister's weaknesses.


James Layton Ralston: I do not plead guilty
to being "waterlogged."


Richard Burpee Hanson: Perhaps
that was not a happy term. I do not mean to suggest that it is literally true. But that is one of the defects of people of the minister's quality. In endeavouring to do a job, he has endeavoured to do too much. I beseech him to take this suggestion from me in the spirit in which it is offered, that he try to impose on somebody else the burden of aircraft production and not keep every rein in his own hands. That advice is offered in the best of good faith.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I offer the problem of aircraft production to anyone who cares to take it.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Do not
offer it to me.
I believe, having said what I have, that I have given some evidence of good faith and shown no desire to clog the government's war effort. Believe me, I do not want to do anything of that sort, and I do not want anybody to say that I am making criticism just for the sake of criticism or to impede the minister or anybody else at this period. We think certain things are wrong. We think it is our duty to point them out. When we have done that, I believe we have concluded our duty. I may say that for one thing which we think is wrong and which I have pointed out on the floor of this house, I have pointed out to ministers, to deputy ministers and to their executives a dozen other things which will never see the light of day; and they thanked me for doing it. I regard it as my duty to do it in that way and I shall continue along that line. If I were seeking to throw mud and scandal in the faces of ministers and the administration, I would not adopt the course I have adopted.
, But that is the course I intend to pursue. If anybody is sending me material just for the purpose of discrediting the war effort and not for a constructive purpose, I give him public notice here and now that I do not intend to use it in that way, and that I shall not do so until the whole thing bogs down, and then we shall have a real showdown.
My mail is flooded daily with suggestions as to this, that and the other thing. Ninety per cent of it is chaff and it goes in the waste-paper basket. But ten per cent may be wheat;

I try to examine it, and when a question arises, and the opportunity offers and I have time, I send for some man whose department is concerned; I tell 'him about it; I ask him to investigate it, and I am prepared to take his decision. I conclude that my duty is then done.
That is my practice with regard to individual matters which have arisen. Possibly I am doing a better service to the war effort of the country by adopting that line of policy than some people would give me credit for.
Coming back to this question of the minister's, shall I say optimism, I wonder whether he will take exception to this observation, that the statement made by him in this house on July 30 created the impression that this particular class of planes would be in production before the end of 1940? That was the inference which I myself took from his language. I am bound to tell the minister that I was greatly buoyed up by it, because I had known of the situation in Amherst. So far as I am concerned, this Anson business goes back to the unemployment situation in Amherst. Later on, I was there and saw the situation. Can the minister honestly complain if we rather hesitate to accept his assertions after comparing those statements and exposing their inconsistency.
I wish to refer to one other passage in his speech of July 30 last, and then I shall not quote anything more. On that same page of Hansard, page 2116, the minister said this- and I want the committee to mark these words:
Early in 1941, we expect to have a production of 360 planes per month, or about 12 planes per day. Sundays and holidays included, on the basis of production now arranged for. A further production programme is now being discussed between Great Britain and ourselves which promises to materially increase this output.
I am bound to say that this was a heartening statement and I applauded it at the time. If Canada, early in 1941, could have this production of planes, 12 a day, it would be splendid. I have no doubt the minister made the statement in good faith, but unfortunately production has not measured up to that estimate. I do not blame the minister for that. I know that there have been numberless changes in the designs of these planes. None of them, I would say, are standardized so that they can be turned out by mass production like motor cars. But the Canadian people are apt to be lulled to sleep by a promise like that, and when they find that the fulfilment is not up to the promise and the expectation, then of course there is criticism. The minister must not be unmindful of that and he must not be resentful. All the criticism I make at the moment is that probably the minister was too optimistic at that stage, but

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I am hopeful that aircraft production in Canada will reach the point suggested, and higher too. Like every other new industry, it has to grope its way through all difficulties; it has to go through the morass of lack of engineering data, lack of designing data, lack of many of the things we cannot make in Canada and have never made. It could not be expected that we would have a greater effort, and yet the minister promised such an effort. I think he was too optimistic. That is a charitable view to take and I will leave it at that.
We have not come very close to fulfilling expectations, and I suggest to the minister that this is the sort of thing to which the Canadian people have been objecting. Our expectations are raised and disillusionment is painful. I do not know what the facts are about production, but one newspaper states that actual deliveries in January were 60 per cent of the estimate, and most of the production is that of small primary trainers. Apparently they have been able to produce these with considerable facility. I should like the minister to tell us exactly, if he did not tell us the other day in plain terms, just what the facts are, and I suggest that vituperation and bitterness will not produce planes, but that a plain unvarnished statement of facts, without vituperation and bitterness, will help the house and the country to reach conclusions on policy and will redound to the credit of the minister.
The minister has admitted that the manufacturers were requested by the acting minister to submit recommendations as to what should be done with the Avro-Anson programme. He has read the letter submitted by the manufacturers, in which they made five recommendations, and the fact is that five important recommendations were made by the manufacturers themselves and, it is said, ignored by the minister. The minister agrees with me. He ignored their recommendations. Why did he ignore those recommendations? Were they ineffective? Were they irresponsible recommendations? Were they such that they should be ignored?
Then, the minister admitted that he personally requested the manufacturing firms to answer three questions. He admits that the questions as I stated them were exactly as asked, but he did not tell us-and I suggest that this is a significant omission-what the joint reply of the firms was. I invite him to add their reply to the record. I have already stated-I stated it in the statement I gave the press and I will not repeat it-what I believed their reply was, namely, their reiteration of the basic theme of complaint against
Federal Aircraft, that there can be no guarantee of performance, and the several matters to which I have referred.
The minister has neither confirmed nor denied the statement. To my amazement, he has not given any reasons or explanations why he has refused to follow the unanimous recommendations of the manufacturers. In my view-and I say this in all charity-he failed to take the Canadian public into his confidence, and I invite him to do so while there is still time.
In conclusion, I just desire to say that we on this side have a duty to perform to the Canadian people, and we shall not be intimidated from making criticism of the government's effort. I repudiate entirely the suggestion of sabotage, and that such criticism is designed to impair production. I repudiate these suggestions on the part of the minister. The minister said that the department was being disorganized by such criticisms. We have made no criticism of the department as such, or of the executives. In fact, I have always defended the executives. I did so the other day. What we have criticized is the set-up which the minister launched in July, 1940, and which, by the unanimous consent of those who know best, namely, the aircraft industry itself, has failed to perform the functions for which it was intended.
Before I take my seat I should like to ask the Minister of Munitions and Supply if he will table at the earliest possible moment:
(a)	A copy of all contracts between the government and Federal Aircraft Limited;
(b)	A copy of all contracts between the government and/or Federal Aircraft Limited and the manufacturers of Avro-Anson planes;
(c)	A copy of all letters, telegrams, memoranda, or other documents exchanged between the government and Federal Aircraft Limited and/or any official thereof, with reference to the speeding up of production, the personnel of Federal Aircraft Limited, the status of Federal Aircraft Limited, and associated matters;
(d)	A copy of all letters, telegrams, memoranda, or other documents exchanged between the government and/or Federal Aircraft Limited and/or any official thereof and any manufacturer or manufacturers of Avro-Anson planes or parts thereof relating to the speeding up of production, the status of Federal Aircraft Limited, and associated matters.
I have finished with what I had to say on this matter. I am sorry the debate took the turn it did. I do not think it was necessary or desirable. A newspaper or a public citizen of this country, making statements based upon
War Appropriation Bill

information received bona fide, information which would in legal parlance constitute reasonable and probable cause, a term which my legal friends know-any public man or any public newspaper, I say, making statements based upon information of that kind, free from malice-I put that in because I think it is important-has no right to be termed a saboteur.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Perhaps I should make a
few remarks at this time in reply to my hon. friend the leader of the opposition. My remarks as to the nature of the sabotage, which were general in their character, were hardly intended to reflect on the hon. gentleman himself or any member of the opposition. I was talking rather fast that day-


Richard Burpee Hanson: I think
you were a little heated.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I doubt if I directed them in that way. I was endeavouring to show the harm that is done by criticism of the type I call sabotage. As far as my references to one particular newspaper are concerned I have nothing to retract. I made them after careful consideration, I believed sincerely what I said and I do not wish to be regarded as softening at all those remarks.


Richard Burpee Hanson: You are going to have the battle out.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Oh, yes. So far as Federal Aircraft is concerned, and the reason that the trade took it upon themselves to come to Ottawa, I believe there was a little organization in that outside the trade itself. I got a letter-


Richard Burpee Hanson: Not from me.


Clarence Decatur Howe: No.


Mr. MacNICOL:: Were they not invited?


Clarence Decatur Howe: They asked for the appointment, they were permitted to come; we will put it that way. I did not think the acting minister indicated the other day that he asked them. I have not looked into that matter.


Richard Burpee Hanson: He was
not sure.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I think it came the other way-they asked to come and he permitted them to come. I think the position they took was more or less outlined to them after they came. I got a private letter from one of them, written the same evening, which I received on my return, which indicates that that was the case. However, be that as it

may, we have six firms who were subcontractors of Federal telling us how to operate Federal. I have never permitted my subcontractors to tell me how to operate my business, and I have had many of them "gang up" and try to tell me. Remember this: these are people holding contracts with Federal Aircraft, whose profits depended on their relation with Federal. I doubt if because six of these subcontractors "gang up" and come to Ottawa the government is bound to accept their recommendations.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I suggest that the minister do not use that expression "gang up."


Clarence Decatur Howe: Well, say join together. I am using the language of the contracting business, and we are talking about contracts here.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It sounded to me like the language of thugs.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Oh, no-perfectly good usage. However, so much for the prima facie case. I do not agree with the leader of the opposition that because six of them come and put in a report, the government is bound to accept the report. But the government is bound to give it consideration, and consideration was given.


Mr. BLACK (Cumberland):: Does the minister not think it proper that those heads of industries who were made responsible for this production and who were suffering because the blame was placed on them should present their views?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Is the hon. member asking a question or stating his own interpretation?


Percy Chapman Black: Well, does the minister not think it perfectly proper for them to come and make these representations, when the blame for failure to get production was put on them?


Clarence Decatur Howe: I do not question the right of the manufacturers to come. They came, they were well received, and they submitted a written statement. I am not questioning their right to do so, but I am questioning the position that when they do so we are bound to follow their views. When we received representations of that kind from six responsible firms we were bound to give them consideration and study, which we did. I wrote back to the firms-I do not remember the questions; they were tabled. Perhaps my hon. friend would lend me the letters.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Yes. We sought in the proper office of this house for those letters, and they said they had never heard of them. We did not get them.

War Appropriation Bill


Clarence Decatur Howe: I had them on my desk when I was making my address.


Richard Burpee Hanson: According to the clerk's notation they were tabled on the twenty-sixth.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I gave them to a page boy; I cannot trace them after that.
On January 31 I wrote to the firms saying that on my return from the United Kingdom my attention had been called to recommendations signed by six firms with some experience in the manufacture of aircraft or components, which must of course receive careful consideration. I said that a thorough study of the situation was being made at once; that I was confident they would not make recommendations without being exceedingly sure of their ground, and that I would like their prompt written reply to the following questions. Now, I think these are reasonable questions:
1.	Will the taking of the steps recommended, in your opinion, accelerate the production of Ansons in Canada, and, if so, to what extent?
In other words, would we get the planes quicker by following the procedure they asked, or would we not? I had to know that. I want planes as quickly as I can get them.
2.	On what facts do you base your opinion in this regard?
3.	As one of the contractors holding a subcontract for this production, what guarantee can you and your group give as to a date when substantial deliveries of Anson planes will be made, provided your recommendations are adopted?
It is no trivial matter to disband a company with commitments as large as Federal had. amounting I suppose to many millions of dollars, perhaps fifteen or twenty millions. To wipe that company out with a stroke of the pen and say, "The company is gone; now someone else pick this up," I felt would not further the matter much. It would take a manufacturer six weeks to pick it up; we had a drafting staff of about fifty and a total staff of double that number.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Why were plans not
brought from England after the fall of France, instead of taking time to draft them here?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Plans were brought from England, but as I tried to explain they involved Whitworth threads, English standards, and for large-scale production here it is not easy to get English threads and standards. For that reason we had to redesign to adapt them to Canadian standards. At the same time the air force said that to make the Avro-Anson their ideal twin-engine trainer they wanted extensive changes in design-a roomier cockpit in order that proper instruments could be put in, and several other changes.
We were not starting to design the plane from the beginning; we were taking the English plans and trying to make the necessary modifications for production here.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I will help the minister further: Did they not go a long way further than that and make continuous changes in the design?


Mr. STIRLING:: And a different engine?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes, we had a new engine mounting to put in, which meant new piping all through the plane and involved a complete redesign.
I think those are fair questions. Here is the reply, and I would ask hon. members if, having these replies, they would have done anything other than what I did.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Would it not facilitate matters if it was understood that the whole of the three letters should go on Hansard ?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Very well; I will ask that all three letters go on Hansard. I am now referring to the letter dated February 5, signed by five of the six contractors; apparently one dropped out. I have read the first question in my letter of January 31; this is the answer:
Our opinion is as expressed in our recommendations of January 7, that the Anson project can be expedited in the manner outlined. As to the degree of acceleration which could take place, we nave not sufficient information before us to answer this question with a proper degree of accuracy. A further complete study of the present production plans of the Federal Aircraft, Limited, and the de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Limited, wouild be necessary before the tempo of this acceleration could be ascertained.
That is vague, to say the least. Then to the next question,-"On what facts do you base your opinion in this regard?"-this is the answer:
The fact that the principal contractors of the Anson programme believe a change would be beneficial.
I think a fair question would be, beneficial to whom? Then this was the answer to question 3:
No guarantee of delivery dates can be given by the contractors, as no schedule has been supplied by Federal Aircraft Limited showing when the raw materials, A.G.S. parts, proprietary articles, castings, forgings, finished parts which are to be supplied by Federal will be available.
On the strength of those answers I ask the committee if anyone would be justified
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in taking away that contract from Federal and giving it to the industry. The industry say, "Yes, we think we can do better." We ask, "On what do you base your opinion?" They reply, "Well, we just think it would be better, that is all." They give no basis whatever for their belief. Then we ask, "When can you give us a plane?" Their reply is, "Well, we don't know, but it depends on a lot of things." Well, so it does, but at least in connection with Federal we know on what it depends; we know the situation; we know what we can do. We have had an expert look at it, and certainly he did not recommend upsetting Federal. Nor did our own men, who were charged with the duty of investigating the matter, recommend that the contract be taken away from Federal. Certainly I would have acted on very slender information if at that time I had proceeded, on the opinion of five firms, all subcontractors of Federal, to suspend Federal and put ourselves in the hands of these subcontractors. In conclusion they say:
In closing we would like to say that we have no interest or preference in this matter other than to see the work in which we are engaged progressing as satisfactorily and as rapidly as possible, and that whatever your decision may be you will find our companies ready as always to cooperate to the maximum of our ability.
That is a very fair statement.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Did they not recommend that de Havilland alone prepare the designs, arrange the necessary set-up and everything else that had to be arranged in regard to production, at the de Havilland plant; and that after an investigation by a real manufacturer, by de Havilland, the work should be distributed among all the firms in order that they might manufacture by mass production?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes, the suggestion was that
de Havilland replace Federal as the main contractor, for whom the others are subcontractors. Then de Havilland would become its own subcontractor; that is, it would occupy a dual position. It would be the general contractor, because the proposal was that Federal, which was the main contractor, should be wiped out, and that de Havilland should take over that work and distribute the subcontracts among the industry.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Is that not the very
same method followed at Fort William, where apparently very fine work is being done? I understand that all the investigations are made at this plant, and that the other plants -they may be branches of the same company scattered across Canada-send their master mechanics to Fort William to see just what

has been developed there, and to obtain the jigs, the plans and whatever else is required, and then return to their own plants. Is that not why production is going so very satisfactorily in connection with the Hurricanes being turned out by the company?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Of course every plant making finished aeroplanes contracts out certain of its business. I think in Fort William they contract out the wings and probably many other parts. I should say, however, that at Fort William they manufacture seventy-five per cent of the plane in their own plant.


John Ritchie MacNicol: And the set-up in that
plant is followed in all others?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes. That is the case also
with Fleet and de Havilland, to a small degree; they contract out parts of their planes. Every contractor does. I suppose there must be easily two or three hundred plants in Canada making aeroplane parts.


John Ritchie MacNicol: I believe there are some twenty thousand parts to each plane.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Yes. I do not consider it
any reflection on the contractors if we do not accept their views. Why should we? I have had contractors come to me before this and say they think something should be done differently. I look into it, but I am not bound to take their opinion. If I am the man in charge of the job I have to make my own decision, and I made it in this case. We decided to carry on Federal. After exhaustive investigation and a very thorough study of the possibilities of Federal we decided what could be done there by way of revamping the organization, and we decided that we could get better results with Federal than we could by dropping Federal at that stage of the proceedings and turning over the whole matter to de Havilland. That was a decision I had to make, and for better or worse I made it. I do not think any argument in this house is going to decide whether it was for better or worse. Perhaps we will know before the end of this calendar year.


Mr. ADAMSON:: That was the view taken by the minister and the experts in his department?


Clarence Decatur Howe: It was the view taken by
me. I have to decide. Let us not analyse the department to see who voted this way and who voted that way. I hope my hon. friend is not suggesting that.


Agar Rodney Adamson: No.


Clarence Decatur Howe: War Appropriation Bill

Following the request of the Acting Minister of Munitions and Supply for the opinion of the undersigned as to how the Anson project can be expedited, the following unanimous recommendations are submitted:
1.	Federal Aircraft Ltd., to be dissolved.
2.	de Havilland to be asked to manage (or administer) for the department, the Anson project, taking over the personnel, material, records, etc., of Federal Aircraft Limited forthwith.
3.	de Havilland to assume responsibility for engineering and procurement of material.
4.	These functions of de Havilland not to include the taking over of Federal Aircraft Limited's financial obligations (other than for material) or financial functions or contractual obligations; all of which the department can handle best.
5.	Contracts for components, etc., made henceforward to be with the department (upon the recommendation of de Havilland, if desired).
DATED 7th January, 1941.
Massey Harris Ltd.,
M. F. Verity,
Superintendent.
Boeing Aircraft of Canada Ltd.,
S. Burke,
President.
National Steel Car Ltd.,
R. J. Magor,
President.
Canadian Car & Foundry, Ltd.,
V. M. Drury,
President.
de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.,
P. C. Garratt,
Managing Director.
Ottawa Car & Aircraft Ltd.,
Redmond Quain,
President and Managing Director.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I want first to remind the committee that the members of the Cooperative Commonwealth group in this house, at the outbreak of war envisaged just such a debate as has taken place during the last few days in reference to these war appropriations. With that in mind we made two suggestions to deal with such a situation. First we suggested that from time to time the government ought to have closed sessions of this house at which hon. members could be given confidential information-not necessarily units of production-as to the actual progress being made in the supplying of war material. Failing that we suggested that a committee should be set up representing all parties in the house, to which information could be given as to the exact progress we were making in the production of war materials. We should not confuse that committee with the committee the Prime Minister is suggesting to go over the accounts. That is a different matter altogether; accounts are one thing and actual production of the article is another.

The government did not see fit to accept either of these suggestions, for various reasons into which we need not go at this time. But I want to remind the Minister of Munitions and Supply that if he feels there has been undue criticism of him the blame can be laid nowhere else than at the door of the government itself, which failed to place any machinery in our parliamentary system at this time by which members could get the actual facts with reference to our war effort.
The other day sitting in his seat in the house the Minister of Justice said, across the floor of the house, that it was the opposition that needed strengthening. That may or may not be true. The fact of the matter remains that the opposition cannot do the job which under our parliamentary system it is supposed to do if it has not access to the facts. Until the minister gave his statement the other day it is doubtful whether out of the 244 men and one lady in the house there were more than twenty who knew anything about the exact state of aircraft production in Canada. In fact I doubt whether there are many who know a great deal more about it even now, after the statement.
When I listened to the minister's speech the other day my mind went back to some of the debates which took place two years ago in the British House of Commons. I recalled some of the speeches made by Sir Kingsley Wood, who was then in charge of aircraft production, by Mr. Churchill, by Mr. Amery, by Sir Roger Keyes and by Mr. Greenwood. Some of the statements made the other day by the minister were reminiscent of statements made on those occasions. People who questioned, people who queried, people who criticized two years ago in England were being accused	of undermining public
confidence.
I submit to the minister that abuse does not dispel criticism.	Accusing one member of
"groping in the sewer", another member of "getting his information by devious methods", and calling, "sabotage, sabotage!" will not answer the things hon. members want to know. I suggest further that to end every discussion of a contract by saying that it is "up to , schedule" is not sufficient. That was what happened all through 1939 in Great Britain. What does "up to schedule" mean? It may mean nothing. It may refer to a pre-war schedule. It may be a schedule drawn up prior to the collapse of France. Unless we know what the schedule is, unless we have some information concerning it, to say that it is up to schedule has no meaning at all. It means nothing until we know who set the schedule, when it was set and what it

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calls for. I suggest that first of all the minister ought to admit at least to himself that there is widespread misgiving in Canada with respect to the effective production of aircraft. Whether or not it is justified, let us first of all realize that that widespread misgiving does exist. Let us admit that it is true.
We cannot expect anything else, because we must remember that there are men working in those factories who have contact with people outside. People engaged in those industries are people who know at least something about the matter. The minister may refer to street rumours, or anything he likes, but the fact remains that that feeling persists. It could not help persisting when we consider that the Minister of National Defence for Air is quoted as having said in Montreal:
"Unfortunately I do not know why it has not been possible to produce these planes on schedule, and I am not in a position to judge the delay" he said. But one exasperated officer had told him the other day, "There are some manufacturers who are either damn fools or damn liars."
When statements like that, and others one might quote, come out, it is understandable that the man on the street may have misgivings. I want to suggest to the minister, too, that the people who are concerned about this matter are not people who are seeking to destroy Canada; they are people who are seeking to save Canada. I wish the minister would give close attention to that fact.
The other day the minister spoke about his duty. I believe he has as conscientious a sense of duty as any hon. member in the house. But we, too, as members of the House of Commons, have a duty to perform. We have a duty to the taxpayers, the people who before this war is over will have to shoulder the tremendous burden of taxation to finance the war. We as their representatives have a responsibility to them.
This morning I received a letter from a returned soldier who is in receipt of a pension of $15.20 a month. He tells me he proposes to put $5 a month of it into the purchase of war savings stamps. Am I to write and suggest to that man that that is a good idea, unless at the same time I can assure him that I know every dollar he is sacrificing is being used to the best possible advantage? I cannot do that. May I remind the minister, too, that we have a responsibility to the men in the fighting services.
Most hon. members will recall the shell shortage of 1915 in Great Britain. They will remember that Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe, who began the campaign to reveal that shell shortage, were maligned from one end of Great Britain to the other. But we know now that they were right, that there was
in fact a shell shortage and that thousands of British soldiers lost their lives because of the lack of ammunition in the last war. The fact that a member, newspaper or some other organization seeks to ascertain the facts or to criticize the government is not an indication that they are lacking in patriotism. It is an indication that they are seeking to serve their country in the best way they can.
I do not think anyone in the house would for one moment argue that the production of aircraft is an easy matter. The task of production must be tremendous. Any person who over-simplifies or under-estimates the task with which the minister is faced is not being fair to the minister, to the govermnent or to himself. What we want, first of all, is that the minister be frank with us and place before us an outline of the vast department he heads, to see if together there is not some way, through suggestions, proposals or amendments to proposals, by which the set-up can be made more efficient than it is at the present time.
Last fall I came in contact with some of the people working at the Malton plant, owned by the National Steel Car Corporation of Hamilton. They drew to my attention certain disconcerting facts, some of which I placed before the house last fall. I pointed out at that time I had been informed by men working in the plant that there had been a labour turnover of some seventy-five per cent to ninety per cent, and that in six months 900 men had quit their jobs in the plant. I pointed out that there had been some serious accidents in the plant-and there have been accidents since that time. I placed those facts before the house, but to the best of my knowledge nothing has been done.
Because of my interest in the matter scores of letters have come to me from people who have worked in the plant or are working there now. I made it my business to go to Toronto and talk to some of them. We have no other way of getting information. The minister may have it, but we have not. We can only place the facts before him, as we have done; that is what I want to do. For instance I am informed that the contract for Hampden bombers was given early in 1940, and my information is that up to the present only some twenty wing assemblies have been completed; that at Montreal up to two weeks before Christmas only 21 wing assemblies had been completed, and that at that time the work had to be shut down because of the lack of certain articles. Then there is the information I have with reference to the production of Avro-Anson planes. The other day the minister said the first one had been flown, but not delivered. The minister's information
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may come from a most reliable source, but I am told by those who should be in a position to know that the plane to which the minister referred was an English Anson with an American engine and with Canadian engine mountings, assembled in Canada.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is correct.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I said that.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I do not think you did.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I stated that there were other components on it, and there were.


Richard Burpee Hanson: The inference was that it was a Canadian plane, and it is not.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I said it was a mock-up; I did not say it was a plane at all.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I think the impression given was altogether wrong. I read the minister's statement very carefully and the impression I got was that the first Canadian-made Anson had been flown, whereas my information is that no such thing as a Canadian-made Anson exists.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Wholly Canadian-made, no.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: In September, 1940, National Steel Car received a contract to manufacture certain parts of the Avro-Anson. I am told that one of their best men was asked to set up a jig, which he did in three weeks-a record time. But it has been waiting six weeks on the floor to be proved, which cannot be done because it needs certain parts which have not yet been ordered, nor has the manufacture of the tools needed for their production even been started. The information I have from some of the men who work there, or who have worked there, is that twenty-five per cent of the tools necessary for making the fuselages for the Avro-Anson were ordered three months ago and are completed; that 10 per cent are partly completed, but that tools for the greater proportion of the smaller parts are not yet even ordered.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Who is responsible? Federal Aircraft.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: The question naturally arises, who is responsible? Who ordered these parts? Who is responsible for seeing that different parts are ordered concurrently in order that they may be delivered more or less at the same time? There has been a lack of synchronization. As a matter of fact one man makes the statement that an order had gone out through the plant that

there was no hurry on Avro-Ansons, that this machine had been pushed back on the priority list. I wonder if that is correct? If so, why? Is the Avro-Anson further back on the priority list than it was before? The contention has been made-I think the minister hinted at this the other day-that the reason for the delay in the production of Avro-Anson trainer bombers was a delay in the receipt of drawings from England.


Clarence Decatur Howe: No.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: That contention has certainly been made.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Blueprints from the Department of National Defence.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: My information is that drawings came from England to Federal Aircraft Limited last autumn, but that a complete set of Avro-Anson drawings have not been issued by Federal Aircraft. The result is that the Malton plant is still short some of the prints which it requires.
I should like to say a word about the Lysander, which is still considered one of the best army cooperation planes built. When I spoke before in the house I reminded hon. members that educational contracts had been given, the last of which were to be completed in November, 1939. But they were not completed until March, 1940. Posteducational contracts were given for 190 Lysander planes. On October 1, 1940, of the first group of 21 aircraft, twelve had been standing on the assembly floor of the manufacturer waiting for parts with which to complete them. Between October 1 and the end of the year those 12 and possibly eight others had been completed and accepted for delivery. But on January 1, 1941, that first group had not all been completed, accepted, and marked off. They were still on the shop books. The parts for the succeeding planes up to the 112th of the whole order of 190 Lysanders were either stalled or in some stage of production in the departments of the plant. During the last of January, 1941, twelve Lysanders were completed and assembled.
As evidence of the inefficiency which has marked this project I cite a group part given to me as No. 1470-1-2. This is a single part of which two are required for each Lysander plane. It is made from a standard section requiring virtually no machining. Early in October, 1940, the erection department notified the planning department that 52 of these parts would be needed to complete a group of Lysanders then fairly well advanced in the assembly line. The erection department has been waiting for these parts ever since and

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the planes have been waiting for this part before they can be completed and assembled. I am told that one man could complete the whole order of 52 parts in an hour, but this whole group of Lysanders has been held up waiting for this particular part. The 12 planes which had been completed in January waited weeks for this part before they could be finally completed.
I should like to refer for a moment to the Boeing aircraft factory in Vancouver. Early in the year the Vancouver newspapers carried a story to the effect that between 150 and 200 men had been laid off. Trade union officials have told me that the parts which they had manufactured were stored in the Canadian Pacific shops and had not been shipped east because the firms in the east were not ready for them. At a time when young men were coming out of the technical schools hoping to go into the Boeing aircraft plant, between 150 and 200 men were laid off because of lack of material. This has had a serious effect upon the labour market.
Our newspapers carried an advertisement showing a picture of a young aviator, under which appeared this message, "Only you can give him wings. Buy war certificates." The Canadian people have made it possible to buy these wings; it is now the task of the Department of Munitions and Supply to give him the wings. When between 150 and 200 men are laid off in an aircraft plant at a time when we are supposed to be accelerating our war effort, it is quite apparent that there should be a serious investigation.
A word about the Fairchild aircraft plant in Montreal. In this case the trade union became so discouraged at the lack of efficient production methods that they submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Labour on February 6. This memorandum dealt with hours and wages and concluded with a paragraph which I should like to read. This trade union represents about 1,900 men of those who work in the Fairchild plant. The submission is:
Besides all of the above, men have been known to quit because of the fact that they *were forced to hang around killing time, there being no jobs for them. This condition is chronic in some departments, especially on the night shift where days are spent on jobs which would ordinarily take only hours. Men wishing to do their best in the war effort, are actually ashamed to take their wages, and the nights seem ten years long.
Supervision is such that dozens of pieces are scrapping before an error is discovered. This is often blamed on the men unjustly.
Such is the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust created in the minds of the employees, that production schedules must be seriously affected.
The feeling of insecurity in employment consequent on the mass lay-offs which have taken place from time to time, is most demoralizing.
The men are being goaded into rash actions which are becoming increasingly difficult to control.
We feel that, in the interests of the country and the war effort, a thorough inquiry into the running of this plant is in order. We will be willing to cooperate in any such inquiry.
I suggest that the labouring men of this country are interested in this war effort-as much as any other group-and when they find reason to complain and to submit a memorandum such as this to the Minister of Labour, there is need for action.
I will pass on to the minister the main criticism which I hear. He is a technical man; the rest of us are not, and all we can do is report what we hear as to complaints in the industry. After all, the minister knows this industry; he is an engineer of high standing in this country. To most hon. members long lists of figures and schedules mean little, but results mean something, and all we can measure by is whether or not the figures which he reads in this chamber are followed by actual results in planes which take the air.
The main criticism I hear is that 'throughout the entire aircraft industry there is a lack of direct communication; that information goes, for instance, from the Department of Munitions and Supply to Federal Aircraft Limited, Montreal; from there to National Steel Car Corporation at their headquarters in Hamilton; from there to the plant at Malton; and when inquiries have to be made they go right round the circle again. It may be that we have created so many intermediary steps, so much red tape, so many cogs in the machine, that the machine is slowing down or at least it is not doing the job which it was intended to do.
I want, therefore, on behalf of the group with which I am associated, to make one or two suggestions, not only with reference to the minister's department but with regard to this whole war appropriation.
The first is that the government ought to enunciate a clear statement of war policy. It has been suggested in some places that we should have a war cabinet of a few ministers who would not be charged with administrative responsibility and who could give time to laying out a clear-cut war policy. I was hoping that during the discussion on this appropriation the Minister of National Defence would make a statement with reference to the government's whole war policy. All of us know that the Canadian people can produce only a certain amount of goods and services; somewhere there is a limit to our
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productive capacity with reference to this war, and the government have to make a decision as to how that can be best divided. Is it being divided in the best way at the present time? The other day the Minister of Finance broke down this tremendous appropriation of $1,300,000,000: some $660,000,000 for the army, over $400,000,000 for the air force, and $175,000,000 or $180,000,000 for the navy. Well, is that the -best division? In some quarters we are told that actually the appropriation for the army may go up to $800,000,000; for the air force, to close to $500,000,000, and for the navy, to nearly $200,000,000.. Why is the division made on that particular basis? We should know. We believe, for instance, that our contribution- I am talking now not about our contribution with reference to foodstuffs but to the actual prosecution of the fighting services part in the war-should follow three lines.
First, our main contribution, as has been outlined by the Prime Minister, should be the supplying of planes and trained air personnel to Great Britain. We have understood that that was the cornerstone of the government's war policy. Yet from all we can gather, almost twice as much will be spent on the army as on the air force. Has -there been a change of policy? If so, there should be some statement of the government's war policy. If our main contribution is to be aeroplanes and trained air personnel, why is not the vote for that particular department larger than it is, rather than the increase shown in some of the other departments?
In the second place, we believe that the army's contribution should be divided two ways: the training of a highly mechanized and highly skilled expeditionary force, and the training of militia for the defence of Canada. Personally I should like to know from the Minister of National Defence, at some stage in the discussion of these appropriations, whether he believes that the tremendous amount of money now being spent in the training of men who are not attested, who will not be sent overseas, who in many cases could not be sent overseas, would not be better expended either in training the expeditionary force, in building planes, or in training air personnel. We have a right to know why the government has divided this appropriation in the way it has done. What is the policy back of it?
The third aspect of war policy relates to the navy. I mention it as such because what we require in Canada is a navy capable of patrolling the coasts of Canada and protecting us against occasional raiders.
That is a summary of the war policy which we believe should be followed.
fMr. T. C. Douglas.]
The second suggestion that we want to make is that the Department of Munitions and Supply might with advantage be divided into two parts, as I suggested in this house last year; that a department of aircraft production should be set up; that the department now has become large and unwieldy; that if, as has been said repeatedly in this chamber by members of the cabinet, our primary contribution is to be the production of planes and the training of air personnel, it merits the setting up of a separate department to take care of that particular activity.
The third thing we suggest is that industry be mobilized so as to increase the efficiency of our production of war materials. Under the National Resources Mobilization Act the government has the power to mobilize industry. I do not know whether they consider they have done so; certainly we do not. We maintain that, for instance, each industry should be developed on a unit basis; that the aircraft industry ought to be a unit directed by a minister of aircraft production and his officials, every firm to be merely a part of that unit; and that where it is necessary to take over a plant, or where the government has spent the money to build a plant, it should call upon the required personnel to produce the planes in that plant either on a management fee or some other basis; but that the entire production of war material in Canada should be organized on a unit basis, with industry conscripted or mobilized around the particular article which they are producing.
A while ago the minister was speaking here of the subcontractors of Federal Aircraft. There is no reason why the minister or his department for the production of aircraft, taking Federal Aircraft and the work it is doing immediately under his department, could not deal direct with each one of these subcontractors and organize them into a unit. The principle applies not only to that industry; other industrialists and technicians should be mobilized into industry. I confess that I have been troubled to read in the press from time to time in the last few months of so-called dollar-a-year men who had left the departments because of the pressure of their own business. It has happened in a number of cases. There was Mr. Duncan, the former master-general of the ordnance, and Mr. Campbell. At least half a dozen have left Ottawa in the past six to eight months. There may have been other reasons, but the reason given was pressure of their own business. Personally I do not like that. If there were other reasons they should have been stated. If these gentlemen were not efficient and were not doing their job as they should have been, that is all right. But if the reason given

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is pressure of their own business, demanding that they leave the government's service and go back to their own business, that is not good enough.


James Layton Ralston: I do not know what my hon. friend means. He referred to the master-general of the ordnance, and I wish to take issue with him if he reflects upon Mr. Chester. I do not know what he means by "not being good enough."


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I mean that the explanation is not good enough. It does not satisfactorily inform us why a man should leave the service of the country at this critical time. I am not casting reflections on any one. Just a few weeks ago a young man, a sergeant in one of the units, was given an opportunity to go to England with a draft that was going to reinforce one of the regiments now in the old country. That young man had a business. I went with him on the day that he went down and turned the key in his door and said that business would have to wait for the duration. If he can afford to do that, so can others.


Mr. GOLDING:: What was his business?


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: He runs a
store, which is as important to him as the business of an executive is to that executive.


William Henry Golding: It may not be as important as Mr. Duncan's business.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: At the present time nothing can be more important to Canada and Canada's war effort than the production of necessary supplies whereby men in the fighting forces are enabled to carry on the war successfully, and if there is sufficient need for these men to be here, and if they were doing a good job, there is no reason why they should leave.


James Layton Ralston: What my hon. friend has said rather confirms the impression I received that he was making a reflection upon these gentlemen. Mr. Chester came at my earnest request in order that he might give his organizing ability to the reorganization of the department of the master-general of the ordnance. He came, as announced in the newspapers at the time, for a limited period, with the consent of the directors of Hudson's Bay company, who could not spare him indefinitely owing to the fact that their president in London, Mr. Ashley Cooper, is himself engaged in connection with war work there, and Mr. Chester had to take on an added load in the business. He came on that understanding, and I gave him my undertaking that I would make provision for him to return. He stayed a month longer than was expected.
He is engaged in work in connection with war activities, besides running his business and providing employment and supplies. I say to my hon. friend that it does not lie in the mouth of anyone to suggest that this gentleman is not doing his duty or that he should stay here indefinitely w'hen, as a matter of conscience, and having regard to his duty elsewhere, he feels it incumbent upon him to return to his work after having done a fine job for us. He fulfilled more than the contract he made with the country and he and his company have more than done their share in connection with our war effort.
The Minister of National Defence for Air is not here, but I was present when the arrangement was made with Mr. Duncan, and if I remember rightly, Mr. Duncan was to come for three months. I believe he stayed for eight or nine months, and everyone knows that he stayed at a time when the president of his company, Mr. T. A. Russell, was very ill. But Mr. Russell, with his well known tenacity and indomitable spirit, endeavoured to carry on until death overtook him and Mr. Duncan had to go back. That company is engaged in the extensive production of war materials for the country. Tribute has been paid to the magnificent contribution of Mr. Duncan and the company to the war effort, and my hon. friend therefore is not justified in anything that carries the slightest reflection upon him because he is not staying for the duration of the war.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Perhaps I should speak with regard to Mr. Campbell's position. Mr. Campbell came to Ottawa as chairman of the war purchasing board and he remained throughout the duration of that board. The government had made preparations for eventually turning the war purchasing board into a department of government and Mr. Campbell was invited to take a position in the Department of Munitions and Supply. He stated at the time that his work at the Ford plant had expanded so rapidly and that company had taken on such heavy commitments that he felt he could render a better service to the country by going back to Windsor in order to look after the organization of his own company than he could by remaining with the department of munitions. I do not see in that anything that reflects upon him, nor is there any reflection upon the department.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: There is no intention on my part to reflect upon anyone, but I do say that it is a question not where a man's personal inclination lies but where he can render the greatest service to the country.
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If, as the minister has stated, this gentleman's own firm is engaged in war industry which is more essential than the work he was doing here, then of course it is the minister's duty to see that he goes back to the work that he can do best. But if a man is valuable enough to be brought here and his services are worth while, he ought to be retained, if possible, irrespective of his own convenience. If his departure is due to public reasons, if he can render better service elsewhere, that is a different matter. But I would point out that men do not go into the army and then decide after a while that they will go back home because the store is losing money. That is not allowed in the army and we cannot allow it to happen with any other class. The technical and executive brains of the country ought to be mobilized the same as industry and man-power.


John Ritchie MacNicol: The hon. member has used the word "mobilize" frequently. May I ask him how he would mobilize all industries that have contracts to make component parts for planes? I know many industries that are making a hundred different things while they are engaged at the same time in the manufacture of parts for aeroplanes. I have no doubt that the vast majority of small parts entering into the manufacture of planes are made by companies that are engaged in the manufacture of different lines. How would the hon. gentleman mobilize each company? Firms are making large quantities of tubing, and their production in plane tubing is but a fraction of their total output, so that if they were to be mobilized for the production of this particular article they would be closed down five days out of six.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I am not
suggesting that the idea be carried to an absurdity. I do not say that you should mobilize every firm that has anything to do with the production of a single article, but a single industry should become a unit. Every factory that could make any contribution to that unit would be part of the unit. Some factories would be giving their entire productive capacity. Others, such as those my hon. friend has mentioned, would probably devote only a small part of their time to particular work, and in that event you would let out contracts or require a part of their space and of their personnel. But the difficulty has not lain with the man producing some small amount or relatively unimportant part of aircraft production. Apparently the difficulty has lain with the organization of those producing the major things that go into aircraft production.


James Lorimer Ilsley: In the sense in which the hon. member has used the word "mobilization," is there not mobilization of industry now, for example, the motor vehicle industry? Is that not completely mobilized in the sense in which the hon. gentleman has used the term?


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: No, I would not say so. Certainly the aircraft industry has shown that it is anything but mobilized:
different plants in different parts of Canada manufacturing various parts, some waiting for others, some held up because a certain part has not been ordered, or tools for the production have not been begun. There was evidently a lack of mobilization of all organizations.
All I want to say to the minister is that I hope the discussion which has taken place and the criticism carried on in the press for the past few months will not be taken as any personal attack upon him, that it will not be a matter for resentment, but rather that it will cause the government to pause and consider again the setting up of some machinery whereby hon. members may be made acquainted with the actual facts. We are not getting the facts; the minister is not in a position to give us the facts in a public session like this. It is only two years ago that the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, now Prime Minister of Great Britain, was threatened with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act because in the British House of Commons he dared to present data which showed that the aircraft industry in Britain was not as it was being represented to be by the Minister for Aircraft Production at that time, Sir Kingsley Wood. We do not want a situation like that in this countiy, but we may have it; hon. members will not be still forever, the public will not, the press will not. We wish to be able to go back to our constituents and tell them the actual situation. For example, we are asked by the Minister of Finance to go out and appeal to people to buy war savings certificates. Most of us have done this, but we can do it only if we can do it with a clear conscience and are able to say that from information given us confidentially we can assure them that every possible effort is being mobilized for the efficient prosecution of this war.
To the Minister of Munitions and Supply all I want to say is that the saboteurs in this country are not the people who are inquiring for facts and data of aircraft production. The saboteurs here as in any other country are the people who are saying that all is well when all is not well. The real saboteurs are the people who try to lull the

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country into a false sense of security. All I am asking the minister and the government to do is to set their house in order before it is too late.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I have listened with a great deal of interest to the speech of the hon. member for Weyburn. I think he again misinterpreted my remarks of yesterday. I was not bitter against the people who want to know; I was bitter against the people who without knowledge make statements that undermine public confidence; all the difference in the world. There is no statement about aircraft production that I am not prepared to make to this committee. I told the committee that; I said I had a confidential report and would lay it on the table, and I do not know any question that can be asked about the aircraft industry in Canada to-day that I am not prepared to answer.
The criticism to-day arises largely from the fact that in the past I have been giving data on aircraft production, perhaps looking further ahead than I should have looked if I had had a more realistic view of what Canadian industry could produce. My hon. friend the leader of the opposition rather chided me for saying on July 10 or 12 that we would be producing a certain number of aircraft a month early this year. On what did I base that statement? I based it on what at that time we planned to produce. We had made a very careful study of the industry; we had gone to see all the plants and said, "What do you need to carry out this programme?" They said, "We need so much floor space." We said, "Very well, we shall have that checked up, and if that appears to be necessary for that production, we will arrange for financial assistance to provide it." We were working then on a campaign which we thought would produce planes at the rate mentioned by the leader of the opposition, I think 360 planes a month. That was all arranged. As I have repeatedly said, the difficulty has been that our plants have not been standing up to their estimated production. For example, we estimated that Fairchild would be producing 30 Bolingbroke bombers a month early this year. I had in mind perhaps March. They are not producing anything like that.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: What is the reason, lack of material?


Clarence Decatur Howe: It is just lack of ability to produce, as far as I can see. We have had experts there, the best we can get, and they all say they should do better, and they will do better next month. If it were an industry
that had been producing for years-but this is a mushroom industry, we have no background on this industry.


Mr. CASTLEDEN:: How about Malton?


Clarence Decatur Howe: They have had all the orders they can fill since this war started. We have had experts there to find out why they are not turning out more planes. They are making a great number of components and some day the planes will come out fast.


Major James William Coldwell: Does the minister not think that the big labour turnover in Malton is a factor?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Certainly it is. It is a reflection on something.


Major James William Coldwell: Can the minister tell us why there is such a large turnover?


Clarence Decatur Howe: I cannot. We have been trying without success to find out the reason. In 1936, there was practically no aeroplane industry in Canada; I suppose it was employing less than one thousand men; to-day it is employing twenty thousand.


Mr. MacINNIS:: Did the minister approach the employees at Malton to try to get their point of view?


Clarence Decatur Howe: No, I have enough trouble approaching the management.	,


Angus MacInnis: They are an important factor in the industry.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Is Federal Aircraft a small plant or a large plant? How many are engaged in it, and where is the plant?


Clarence Decatur Howe: It is a very small operation on Delorimier avenue in Montreal; I suppose they have at the most 250 employees. It is largely a pilot plant; as they design anything they go and build it. It is a check plant for the design, and it has been represented to me that as such it is well worth while. It is carrying out a small manufacturing operation which will be useful in the entire programme; it is a small shop for fuselages and certain parts.
My hon. friend mentioned certain things that I can explain at once. He mentioned that the Boeing plant in Vancouver had to stop manufacturing wings. The reason was, in the original arrangement for the air training plan, Britain was to supply Anson planes less wings, the wings to be built and installed in Canada. We arranged accordingly with the Boeing plant in Vancouver to build the wings. When Britain stopped shipping Anson planes to Canada, there was no place to use the

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wings and they piled up to such an extent that Boeing had to lay off men and stop the manufacture of wings.


Richard Burpee Hanson: They are there yet.


Clarence Decatur Howe: They are there yet. That is a war situation that one cannot control. Here is an arrangement that was perfectly clear at the time; circumstances made it impossible for Britain to ship Ansons, with or without wings, therefore Ansons did not come, therefore the wings were not used. I mention that just because my hon. friend mentioned it. That was a circumstance beyond the control of anyone.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Is not the bottle-neck completely connected with the design of the engine, and the fact that up to the present an engine satisfactory in all particulars to all the engineers who have to pass upon it has not been developed? Should the engine not be completed first?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Is my hon. friend referring to the engine for the Anson?


John Ritchie MacNicol: Everything pertaining to the engine.


Clarence Decatur Howe: We developed an American type engine to fit a British type plane. Of course everything about the engine is different from the British engine; all the engine fittings are different. I think that is only one of a number of things that had to be redesigned in adapting the British Anson for construction in Canada. I doubt if there is a single part of the plane exactly the same in the Canadian version as in the British version, unless possibly it is the wing.


Richard Burpee Hanson: The minister was, I think, going to tell about the experience with Canadian Car when somebody interrupted.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I was using that just as an illustration, because that is perhaps the most successful show in Canada to-day; certainly it is the largest. We expected and the company expected a production of thirty planes a week there by this time. Actually they have a production of fifteen. We consider that very good, and it is very good, but it is only half what they expected to have. I think this is about the best operation we have, with about five thousand men employed there, but this shows what can happen even in a well managed plant.


Herbert Alexander Bruce: Is that at Malton?


Clarence Decatur Howe: No; at Fort William.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Is the pilot plant for the plane not made by that company at Fort William?


Clarence Decatur Howe: No, I do not think so. There is one plant there, a very good plant. The success at Fort William, of course, has been brought about because of the high type of people they have had to deal with in that locality and the great ability the workmen in that district have shown. Even with that advantage, however, they have been able to get up to only half their schedule.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I heard there were German saboteurs in that plant, but I did not pay any attention to that.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Oh, no; not at the head of the lakes. I make this statement simply in order to indicate some of the difficulties that have arisen. If I were asked the number of planes we hope to get by next July, I would attempt to give a forecast, but I would assume that any such forecast would be taken by hon. members as my best view of the subject at the present time. I would not expect that they would come along a year later and say, "You told us in July, 1936, that in March, 1937, we were going to have so many planes and we got only half that number." That is the difficulty in working with an industry that has no background. I could predict very closely in connection with the motor car industry, because I know and the operators of the plants know what they can do. The same is true in connection with the steel industry or any other industry that has been going a long time and has a background. We know from what they have done in the past that, given certain facilities, they can do certain things in the future and by a certain time, but that is not possible in connection with the aircraft industry.
I do not want to hold back anything with regard to the aircraft industry. If my hon. friend is worrying about facts, I will give them to him as best I can; or if I cannot do that offhand, I will get the information. I am not holding back anything, nor do I desire to hold back anything. There is nothing I could give in a secret session that I am not prepared to give in open session, so far as the aircraft industry goes. That does not apply, however, to other types of production, in connection with which the British government has placed us under the seal of secrecy.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is in connection with guns. Nobody is asking for that information, nor do I think we should ask for it.

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Clarence Decatur Howe: That is quite right. I do not, however, wish to be represented as holding back information that may be helpful to the committee or to hon. members.


Percy Chapman Black: What number constitutes the present programme for the re-engineered Anson machine?


Clarence Decatur Howe: I gave Mr. MacMillan's view on that in the report which he made following a very recent study, in which he had the benefit of the best technical advice he could find in Canada and the United States. I would prefer to leave it at that. I do not remember the figures, but the report is in Votes and Proceedings.


Percy Chapman Black: But I presume the department would set an objective, that they would want a thousand or five thousand Anson machines. The other day I understood the minister to say that six thousand of these Jacobs engines had been ordered for Anson machines.


Clarence Decatur Howe: No; I said that something over five thousand Jacobs engines had been ordered, and we are using them not only in the Anson but also in the Fleet 60 and the Cessena.


Percy Chapman Black: Then the
minister does not care to say just what the Anson expectations are at the present time?


Clarence Decatur Howe: It is all on page 7 of Votes and Proceedings.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Before the minister goes on to another point, may I say to him that we are not asking him to make
a forecast. I do not think such forecasts have a great deal of value. We wish to know what steps are being taken to deal with a situation which the minister admits is bad; what is being done to deal with the inefficiency, the lack of coordination, the. poor management in certain instances. Are any steps being taken at all? Have we any reason to believe the condition will be better six months from now than it is to-day? Forecasts are not worth a great deal, but is any investigation being carried on to find the reason for the present situation, to remedy it and to accelerate production? That is what we had in mind.


Clarence Decatur Howe: We are carrying on intensive investigations, and we have succeeded in bringing in some men with wide manufacturing experience. It is very difficult to get them, because the aeroplane industry everywhere in the world is expanding as quickly as it is in Canada, if not more quickly. It is difficult to get these men, but we have succeeded in getting two or three who already have been
14873-73}
able to make quite a contribution and will continue to do so. Similarly, the manufacturers themselves are gaining experience from day to day. Gradually, the situation is getting less chaotic and more systematized. In the beginning it was difficult to give orders for months ahead. Now we have practically the entire industry on the basis of twelve months ahead. The industry knows exactly what it will be called upon to do for the next year, and it is getting in shape. I think three months from now, we shall have a different looking industry from the one we have to-day, but I can only say that it is improving steadily. The other day I told the press that I thought the industry was about three months behind its expectations, and I still think that is a fair statement. In other words, what we expected to have to-day we shall probably have about three months from now. As I say, everything possible is being done to get the industry on a better organized and more efficient basis, and I think every contractor is working as hard as we are to that end.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: May I suggest one thing which I do not think is being done and which I believe ought to be done. In Great Britain, production speeded up the moment it was possible to get labour behind the war effort on an organized basis. Some similar attempt has been made in this country by the setting up of a labour supply committee, but not on anything like the same scale. Some of these firms that are working on government orders actually have refused to allow the men to organize. I have here a copy of a notice which was posted in one plant, stating that they did not want these men organizing, and that they would consider any man who tried to organize them or connect them up with any trade union as being subversive.


Clarence Decatur Howe: May I ask my hon. friend
if that is not illegal? He knows the law better than I do.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: It may be
illegal, but I suggest that it is being done.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Then why not prosecute?


Richard Burpee Hanson: I would
suggest to the minister that there is something in this suggestion, and further I give him the name of a plant: Canadian Vickers. If he will send his public relations men, or whoever may be the proper people, to get in touch with the men in that plant, they will find that there is among the workers in Canadian Vickers a lack of morale which ought not to exist. This is due to the fact that the
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men believe the pay is too low, and the company will not cooperate with the men. That is the information I have from inside that plant. I do not vouch for it, but I offer it in good faith and suggest that it be the basis of an investigation.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I would be very glad to
have that situation looked into, and I will do so to-morrow. The suggestion has been made-and it is a fair one-that the work of the Department of Munitions and Supply should be divided. There are two sides to that question. In England there are three departments purchasing supplies. The navy department purchases its requirements. The Department of Supplies purchases the requirements of the army, and the Department of Aircraft Production purchases for the air force. I have yet to find-and my colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) may have a view in the matter- any great enthusiasm for dividing purchasing in that way.
As a matter of fact, I saw a cartoon by Low which appeared in Lord Beaverbrook's own paper. It showed Lord Beaverbrook and his three busy bees. They were crouched in an alley, while three very respectable gentlemen, Mr. Alexander of the navy, Sir Alexander Duncan of the supply board, and Mr. Bevin were approaching along the main street. Lord Beaverbrook has a blackjack in one hand and a revolver in the other, and a fiendish light in his eye. Apparently Beaverbrook and his gang were to take what supplies the respectable ministers had with them. This cartoon was obviously intended to illustrate the subject of common gossip in England.
The trouble is that with three departments in the same market there is bound to be competition among the three. The navy may place an order in one plant. Then the supply department may come along and think that it requires the capacity of that plant to produce for the army, and as a result may give it too large an order. Then the aircraft branch comes along and gives orders for aircraft parts, on top of all this. There you have a company that is overloaded, and will disappoint someone-and probably all three. That is the difficulty.
In the United States there are two purchasing departments. The army buys for the army. In connection with the army there is an aircraft section which buys aircraft for the army. The navy does its own buying, and buys aircraft for the navy. Then, the president has set up a coordinating committee, and that coordinating committee is attempting to set up an overriding organization which will

coordinate the purchases of both. I was told in England, however, and I have been told repeatedly in the United States, that we are fortunate in Canada to have a single buying authority for all military needs.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I think the principle is sound, and I am bound to say that to the minister.


Clarence Decatur Howe: That, I think, is obvious.
It is better to have a single buying agency.
Whether or not the work is too heavy, I do not know. I always regard it as a challenge, not to my industry but to my organizing ability. I do very little work round the department, I may say. If anyone comes to me and wants an order for something I simply say, "I do not place orders. I am not the man who places orders. Go to see So-and-so, who is handling the matter." If it is a general purchasing matter I would send him to Mr. Malkin's department; if it were a matter of purchasing munitions I would send him to Mr. Drysdale's department; or if it were an inquiry respecting the purchase of guns I would send him to Mr. Carmichael. The work is departmentalized, and as a department grows top-heavy we subdivide, and may subdivide it again. That is a process of organization.
Whether two ministers could organize better than one, or whether three ministers might do better than one, I do not know. That, too, I believe is a question which has two sides to it. I am not taking either side. I took the department as it was organized by parliament. If parliament, the Prime Minister, or anyone else wishes to subdivide it and give me part of it, then that will be all right with me. Or, much better, so far as I am concerned, if it were divided into three parts, and those parts were given to three other men, and I were permitted to go back to the Department of Transport, I would be the most delighted man in Canada.
However, we have that problem. But because it is a large problem, I scarcely believe it is worth while to describe myself as overloaded, overworked and so on-I believe those are the adjectives which are usually used. I doubt if that is so. I think it is possible for one man to create a big organization. There are many big organizations in the world which function efficiently. I may not be the man to do it; however I am trying to do it, and I suggest that we must be given credit for the fact that while we are a mushroom industry we have expanded very rapidly and up to this time have been able to carry on without a major scandal and without any serious break-down in the supplies which have been expected by the army, the navy and the

War Appropriation Bill
air force in Canada, and by those departments in Great Britain that have entrusted their business to us.
I am the last man in the world who should answer the argument my hon. friend has made with regard to dividing the work. I do not think it is a good thing to do; but if others believe it is, I certainly will not stand in their way.


Mr. DIEFENBAKER:: I believe the discussion we have heard during the past couple of days with regard to aircraft has been most interesting and illuminating. After recovering from some of the annoyances of a few days ago, the discussion to-day has been carried on in a manner that must have been helpful to the minister, and has been revealing to us.
The minister has frankly admitted that the promises made in July last, and the anticipated deliveries then expected, as well as the promises made in November and December, have not resulted in the fulfilment of his expectations. Various suggestions have been made, and one of them is that, realizing as we all do the tremendous responsibilities on the minister, and without any suggestion or any inference against him, the department should be divided, with a view to securing the fulfilment of expectations with regard to the numbers of planes to be delivered.
We have endeavoured to secure information and, speaking on behalf of the official opposition, we should like to have tabled before parliament the entire report made by Mr. H. R. MacMillan, except such matters as would in any way be of assistance to the enemy.
Mr, HOWE:	It is in to-day's Votes and
Proceedings.


John George Diefenbaker: While a portion of it is in to-day's Votes and Proceedings, there remains another portion which does not appear. I realize it is difficult to decide what parts would or would not be beneficial to the enemy. The minister has told us that in so far as the production of aeroplanes is concerned, industry has fallen down. He has said that it is a mushroom industry and that apparently it lacks coordination. He mentioned in particular the situation in so far as the Boeing aircraft company is concerned.
I have a suggestion to make at this time, arising out of the statement with regard to the division of responsibility in the United Kingdom. I suggest that, with a view to preventing the possibility of failures such as have occurred in the last six months in the matter of aircraft production, we have set up at this time a committee composed of representatives of the aircraft industry in
Canada, and that we get in touch with the Right Hon. R. B. Bennett, acquainted as he is with requirements in Great Britain, and experienced as he must be in consequence of the assistance he has given Lord Beaverbrook, and have him come to Canada and head a committee or, if you like, a commission, to investigate the whole situation with regard to the failure of our aircraft production, to the end that further failures will not have to be admitted in this chamber.
So far as the official opposition is concerned, our attitude is not one of offering unfair criticism. We believe that as an opposition we have the right and the duty to place before parliament and Canada the facts in connection with what we believe is not being done in the interests of this country. Apathetic acceptance of conditions will not win this war. The minister has said that we have not been able to live up to our expectations, that things have not turned out as we expected they would. That is not good enough. To-day we must have planes, not promises. We must have planes, not plans for the future. We must have action from this department and not just adjectives describing the perfection of the performance.
Our position is similar to that adopted in Great Britain in 1915 and 1916. The other day the minister spoke in critical terms of the Financial Post and referred to that paper as a saboteur. Twenty-five years ago I heard from the gallery of the British House of Commons the same criticism levelled against the London Times. At that time it was taking an attitude similar to that taken by the financial and other papers of Canada to-day. Our newspapers are asking for action instead of promises and excuses. As the hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) stated a little while ago, Lord Northcliffe was maligned, condemned and pointed out as a traitor because he condemned what he believed was wrong, because he insisted upon action.
We, as the official opposition, represent a large portion of public opinion in this dominion. We represent the majority of the men who are in the armed forces of this country. We owe a duty to those whom we represent to place before parliament the viewpoints that we wish to express. I do not believe in criticism just for the sake of criticism, especially at this time of national need. I am not, nor are the members of this group, concerned with political platforms. The attitude of the Conservative party is to endeavour to assist and cooperate with the government. We will criticize where we believe criticism is due, but we will approbate when we believe credit is due. We realize the
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responsibility which rests upon the ministers of the crown. I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we have a sincere desire to cooperate.
On the other hand, if we banish partisanship for the remainder of the war, we are asking that the government do the same, that there be no suggestion of partisanship in the administration of affairs connected with the war. Our attitude is not as the Minister of Munitions and Supply would have had the people of this country believe the other day. We are not criticizing or attacking him unfairly; our only desire is to see if we can be of assistance at this time. I have a number of suggestions which I should like to make in connection with certain matters and which might well be considered by the government at this time.
I realize that the minister has taken the attitude that Federal Aircraft shall not be dissolved. If Federal Aircraft is falling down, as the minister admits, if I understand him correctly; if it has failed to secure the cooperation and assistance of the other industries from which it secures its supplies, then there is something wrong, and there is some justification for the criticism which has been general throughout Canada. The minister singled out one paper, but I have before me an editorial which appeared in a paper which has consistently supported the government of the day. In reference to the failure of this government effectually to assure a proper flow of aeroplanes, the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix had this to say on January 29, 1941:
It calls for complete and public enquiry into all circumstances and a direct placing of responsibility. And when responsibility has been placed it calls for penalties and assurances there will be no repetition for this affair gives a strong impression of something rather worse than incompetence and mismanagement.
That is the attitude expressed by the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix and many other papers throughout Canada.


Clarence Decatur Howe: It is what one would call the long view, from Saskatoon to Montreal.


John George Diefenbaker: All across the
dominion.


Percy Chapman Black: Both Halifax
papers, the Chronicle and the Herald, took the same stand. That is why the minister should have given this explanation earlier.
Progress reported.
On motion of Mr. Ralston the house adjourned at 6 pan.

Monday, March 3, 1941.