1917-02-02

[Stage Direction]
Mr. W. E. KNOWLES (Moosejaw) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 21, to amend the Criminal Code.
/
Mr. HAZEN:: Explain.


Mr. KNOWLES:: The purpose of this Bill is to make it an offence for a manufacturer, selling goods to a wholesaler, to enhance or dictate in any way, by agreement or contract, the price at which the goods shall be sold. If the Bill is favourably considered by the House, the result in my opinion will be an immediate reduction of from 5 per cent to 10 per cent in the cost of many of the foodstuffs we consume. I have in my hand quite a number of these price-maintenance agreements, commencing with the E. B. Eddy Company, which the wholesale men are compelled to sign. These agreements dictate and bind in the most ridiculous and heartless way the wholesaler as to the price and conditions under which he shall sell the goods he has purchased. The object of this Bill is to prevent the continuance of that condition, and to leave the wholesaler or retailer, when he has purchased the goods, free to call them his own, and sell them for what he pleases.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, and Bill read the first time.


[Stage Direction]
Mr. W. E. KNOWLES (Moosejaw) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 22, to amend the Grain Act.
Some hon. MEMBERS:: Explain.


William Erskine Knowles: The Dominion Government has now gone intp the elevator business, having elevators at Moosejaw, Saskatoon, Calgary and Vancouver. The business is carried on between the Government and the farmers; the Government is also an employer of labour. I am seeking legislation to the effect that any claims against the Government shall be adjusted in the ordinary courts of the province, and also that the Workmen's Compensation Act shall apply to these Dominion Government employees just as it applies to the employees ,of any ordinary elevator company. The present system of having the claims brought before the Exchequer Court is very inconvenient and expensive, and the object of this Bill is to bring His Majesty into the same relation to his employees as is the ordinary subject who is engaged in this business.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, and Bill read the first time.

[Stage Direction]
On motion of Hon. Sir Thomas White (Minister of Finance), the resolutions adopted by Committee of Supply were read the second time and concurred in.

[Stage Direction]
House again in Committee to consider the following proposed resolutions.-Mr. Rain-ville in the Chair.
1.	That it Is expedient to provide that a sum not exceeding five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000) be granted to His Majesty towards defraying any expenses that may be incurred by or under the authority of the Governor in Council during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1918, for:-
(a)	The defence and security of Canada;
(b)	The conduct of naval or military operations in and beyond Canada ;
(c)	Promoting the continuance of trade, industry and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against war risk or otherwise;
(d)	The carrying out of any measures
deemed necessary or advisable by the Governor in Council in consequence of the existence of a state of war; and	'
(e)	Payments made for the said purposes during the fiscal year ending the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and seventeen, in excess of the amounts authorized by The War Appropriation Act, 1916.
2.	That the Governor in Council be empowered to raise by way of loan, temporary or otherwise, such sums of money as are required for the purpose of making any payment authorized by any Act founded on these Resolutions.
Hon. CHARLES MARCIL (Bonaventure) :: I have just received a letter from the parish priest of Port Daniel East, the Rev. J. Philippe Oyr, in which he calls attention to the fact that one of his parishioners, a young man named Joseph Doiron, has enlisted, leaving at home a wife and six young children, the eldest of whom is ten years, and the youngest nine months. His wife receives only $20 a month separation allowance. The parish priest wants to know if anything can be done to relieve this woman, either under the law as it stands,, or from the Patriotic Fund.


Sir ROBERT BORDEN:: Has the soldier assigned say part of his pay to his wife?


Charles Marcil: According to this letter, all she gets is the separation allowance of $20 a month.


Robert Laird Borden: Perhaps it would be worth while finding out whether she receives any assigned pay.


Charles Marcil: In the meantime, if she
is not receiving it, will this woman have

to be content with $20 a month? The right hon. gentleman will understand that if he wants to stimulate recruiting he will have to be a little more generous than that.


Robert Laird Borden: I am not quite clear at the moment whether there is any power to insist on a soldier assigning part of his pay to his family. I understand, however, that the Patriotic Fund makes provision in cases such as my hon. friend has mentioned.


Mr. GAUVREAU:: I would ask the hon. member for Bonaventure if that woman has applied to the Patriotic Fund at Riviere du Loup. If she belongs to the district from Montmagny down to Gaspe, and would apply to the branch of the Patriotic Fund at Rivdere du Loup, of which I am president, she would receive $50 a month from the Patriotic Fund.


Charles Marcil: I understand that those
along the coast of my constituency would come under the Restigouche branch of the Patriotic Fund, with headquarters at Camp-bellton. This soldier is named Joseph Doiron. His number is 889720. He enrolled on February 23, 1916, with the 189th Battalion at New Carlisle. He has since been transferred to the 22nd Battalion, which is now at the front. His wife's name is Elizabeth Langlois, and she has six children. These particulars are given in a letter I have received from the parish priest at Port Daniel East.


Robert Laird Borden: It would appear that if pay were assigned and if the ordinary allowance were made from the Patriotic Fund, this woman would be receiving something over $50 a month, as my hon. friend says she is already receiving $20 a month separation allowance.
I have some recollection that an order in council was passed, empowering us to deal with cases where a soldier at the front refuses to assign his pay.
I am informed by the deputy minister that there is an order in council which provides that if a man is married and has a family, one-half of his pay will, on application, be retained and paid over to his family while the man is serving at the front. Perhaps the reason that has not been done in this case is that the woman has not brought the matter to the attention of the department. Will my hon. friend' say whether that has been done or not?


Charles Marcil: On reading the letter
a second time, I see that it says the only
25i
amounts she has received is the separation allowance. I will hand the letter to the right hon. gentleman or to the Minister of Militia so that the case may be investigated.


Robert Laird Borden: If the matter
were brought to the attention of the proper officers of the department, and if the matter were also brought to the attention . of the Patriotic Fund, it is perfectly obvious that the family in question would be receiving something over fifty dollars per month, instead of twenty dollars per month. That really would be a more effective way of dealing with the matter than bringing it to my attention in the House of Commons, because I never heard of it until my hon. friend mentioned it.


Mr. TURRIFF:: Would the Prime Minister say as a matter of information if a soldier's wife who has six children dependent upon her receives the same separation allowance as the soldier's wife who has no children?


Robert Laird Borden: I understand
that, so far as the separation allowance is concerned, no distinction is drawn, but. so far as the Patriotic Fund is concerned, there is a distinction.


Mr. MACDONALD:: I would suggest the desirability of having printed in short form for distribution amongst the member's the rules regarding separation allowance. I put a question on the Order Paper to which I yesterday received a lengthy answer intimating that certain orders in council had been passed at different times; but it was impossible to gather any information from that answer without looking up the orders in council. It would facilitate matters if the department would have printed for members of this House a sucoinct statement of conditions in regard to separation allowances.


Robert Laird Borden: The hon. gentleman's suggestion is a very good one. I understand he does not want the printing of the orders in council, but the printing of their purport. The deputy minister informs me that the orders in council are being printed now, but it might be more convenient if the purport of them in simpler form were printed and distributed. The deputy minister informs me now that what I have just mentioned is also being done.


Mr. OLIVER:: I wish to bring to the attention of the Minister of Militia another

matter similar to the one which I brought up last night. I received this morning a letter in regard to a case affected by the order in council that I mentioned. A civil engineer, who sacrificed a valuable business to enlist, entered an Edmonton battalion as a lieutenant on July 3, 1915. He was promoted to be a captain in December, 1915. He was wounded at Pozieres on September 13, 1916. He had a dependent and invalid mother and a young child; he had no wife. His sister kept the child and took care of the mother, receiving a captain's separation allowance of $40 per month up to the passing of this order in council, and since that time she has been receiving $12 per month only on account of the child. The writer says:
"My brother, Captain 

, has offered
without hesitation his life and poss ..ssions and no doubt the country will deal generously with him in return."
I think it is hardly generosity to cut down the captain's separation allowance to an allowance of $12 per month under those circumstances.


Mr. KEMP:: The large number of combinations that can occur in respect to separation allowance and similar matters is surprising. We are trying to consolidate them and the regulations are being printed , not only in respect to separation allowance but in respect to other things. I am to-day having certain other regulations printed which I purpose! having distributed amongst the members, in respect to requests for leave, which come under different headings and are being continually changed. Improvements are being made from time to time, and I hope that in time all these cases will be covered. That is all I can say today about the matter.


THE ROSS RIFLE-DISCUSSION IN COMMITTEE.
Mr. CARVELL:: London, June 5th, 1916.
Prime Minister,
Ottawa.
Your cable 24th ultimo. Have communication from War Office covering letters recently-received from Commander in Chief Armies in France, who reports efficiency Ross rifle thoroughly tested by actual fighting in field, that he has again consulted General Officer Commanding Second Army in case fresh points have come to light during recent heavy fighting by Canadians near Ypres. Latter states his experience working Ross rifle during lr*st fight has only confirmed his opinilon that Canadians in Third Division have lost confidence in their rifle, and he recommends that rifles this Division be exchanged. Sir Douglas Haig remarks that although reports from Second Division not to same effect he is of opinion Lee-Enfleld rifle should be issued to all three divisions Canadian Corps. At my Council agree with this opinion and have approved his proposal to exchange rifles second and third divisions for Lee-Enfield pattern and steps will be taken forthwith effect exchange. Army Council hope be able utilize Ross rifles released from France, also those in possess'on Canadian troops England, for other purposes connected with war. They would be glad if steps could be taken stop any more R" ss rifles being brought to England, it being understood they thereby make themselves responsible (for supplying necessary rifles to Canadian troops on arrival here, and they see no reason to doubt being able do this. Army Council add should Canadian Govern-mentj be desirous undertaking manufacture! rifle of different patterns suitable for use during present war, in their opinion rifle made same pattern as now produced in United States for British army, which is on lines Lee-Enfleld, Mark III, embodying improvements, probably best one to adopt. Mailing copies correspondence. War Office wishes this matter regarded as secret until July 15th.
Perley.
Between 8th June and 5th July, the general commanding the forces in France, Sir Douglas Haig, had been asked by the authorities in England to make a report upon this rifle. The object was to put them in a position to give a satisfactory answer to the Canadian Government. I think that any hon. gentleman who reads the correspondence will come to the conclusion that this was the object. A report was made by Sir Douglas Haig, and evidently this must have been in the hands of the High Commissioner before he sent his communication to the Prime Minister.
This report is not very lengthy, and I purpose reading it. It is addressed to the Secretary of the War Office, London, and is as follows:
General Headquarters
British Army in the Field,
28th May, 1916.
Sir.-I have the honour to inform you that I have satisfied myself, after extensive inquiries carried out throughout the Canadian corps, that,

as a service rifle, the Ross is less trustworthy than the Lee-Enfleld. and that the majority of the men armed with the Ross rifle have not the confidence in it that is so essential they should possess. The inquiry on which these conclusions are based, was the outcome of an urgent application from a battalion of the third Canadian Division for re-armament with the short Lee-Enfleld rifle, in consequence of a high percentage of jams experienced with their Ross rifles during a hostile atack on the 1st May, 1916.
2.	I am accordingly of opinion that the second and third Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfleld rifle. It will be remembered that the first Canadian Division was so re-armed on the 12th June, 1915.
3.	I am not in a position to effect this with the means at my disposal in France. I have the honour to inquire, therefore, whether the necessary number of rifles can be supplied from home sources, without interfering, or delaying, the arrival and arming of the divisions due from England and Egypt on which I am relying.
I have the honour to be,
Sir.
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. Haig, General,
Commanding.in-Chief. British Armies in France,
Sir Douglas Haig, evidently on account of communications which- had passed between the Canadian Prime Minister and the Acting High Corrimissioner for Canada, was called upon for a second report. This report, dated June 21, 1916, is as follows:
Sir,-In reply to your No. 77/15/5307 (M.G.O.) of 10th June 1916, forwarding a copy of a telegram dated 7th June, from the Governor General of Canada, I have the honour to inform you that the efficiency of the Ross rifle has been thoroughly tested by actual fighting in the field, and the application conveyed in my O. B. /174 of 28th May 1916, was made after very careful consideration of all the evidence available.
2.	I have again consulted the General Officer Commanding Second Army in case any fresh points had come to light during the recent heavy fighting by the Canadians near Ypres. He tells me that his experience of the working of the Ross rifle during the last fight has only confirmed him in his/ opinion that the Canadians in the third Division, at all events, have lost confidence in their rifle and he recommends that the rifles in this division be exchanged.
3.	Although the reports from the Second Division are not to the same effect, I am of opinion that the Lee-Enfleld rifle should be issued to all three divisions of the Canadian Corps.
I must therefore adhere to my recommendation that the second and third Canadian divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfleld rifle, and I would urge the necessary steps to give effect thereto be taken without delay.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. Haig, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

I wish to read also the following communication from Mr. Bonar Law to the Governor General of Canada, dated at London, July 11, 1916:
With reference to my telegram June 10th. Report from General Officer Commanding in Chief in France has now been received by Army Council recommending that second and third Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with short Dee-Enfleld rifles and Army Council have approved this. They hope to be able to utilize Ross rifles released and also those now in possession of Canadian troops in England for other purposes connected with the war_ but ask that no more Ross rifles should be brought to England. Army Council will be responsible for supplying necessary rifles to Canadian troops on arrival in England. If your Government desire to undertake manufacture of different rifles suitable for use during war, Army Council think that rifles now being produced in America for British Army on lines of Dee.Enfield Mark 111 but with improvements would be best.
(Sgd.) Bonar Daw.
This correspondence from the official file shows that on July 11, 1916, the British Government had decided, that no more Ross rifles should be used in the field, that they had all the Ross rifles in England that they required and that they specifically requested the Canadian Government to send no more of these rifles to England. There does not seem to be any intimation in the correspondence that the Ross rifle could be improved or changed so that it would meet the requirements of the War Office. I shall not go into the question of whether the chamber was too large or too small, or whether there was something wrong with the bolt, because probably every member has received or seen letters from so'diers at the front in which the defects were pointed out. In view of these facts, I think we have a right to ask the Government what course they intend to pursue. We have an army which, we are told, numbers about
400,000	men, and it is up to the Prime Minister and to every man in Canada to see that within the next six months that army shall number 500,000 men. These men will have to be armed. It is evident from the correspondence that since July 11, 1916, the British army has been looking after the arming of our troops in the field. The question arises: are we to continue to manuiac-ture rifles in Canada, or not? In the month of July last a statement appeared in the press to the effect that the Government had made arrangements with, the Ross Rifle Company for the manufacture of Lee-En-field rifles, and up to the last three or four weeks I believed that the Ross Rifle factory had been employed in that work. I have no official information on the subject,
but I am told that the Ross Rifle factory is not manufacturing Lee-Enfield rifles. Indeed, I am informed that no move has been made towards remodelling the Ross plant for the purpose of manufacturing Lee-Enfield rifles. According to the cablegram sent to the Prime Minister by the Acting High Commissioner, the remodelling of that plant for the manufacture of Lee-Enfields would involve an expenditure of only half a million dollars. In the United States they have been able to remodel a plant within, a very few months, get all the necessary tools, and turn out Lee-Enfield rifles in large quantities. The Government were advised eight months ago that if they wanted to continue the manufacture of rifles they should manufacture Lee-Enfields such as are turned out in the United States. Unless my information is very much at fault-I do not think it is, but if it is my right hon. friend will correct me-no attempt has been made to manufacture anything but Ross rifles. We have +lhe statement from the Prime Minister that the Government intend to continue manufacturing Ross rifles and an amount has been placed in the Estimates for the next year to provide for the. manufacture of 80,000 of them. The time has arrived when the Government should take the members of the House, the people of the country and, above all, the Canadian soldiers, into their confidence respecting their intentions as to the arming of our army. This is a question much bigger than a matter of dollars and cents. It goes to the very root of recruiting and of national confidence in our ability to play properly our part in winning this war. It is the most important thing which is before the Canadian public to-day, and until the matter is cleaned up recruiting will not be as it should be. I shall not dwell upon what Canadian soldiers have said in letters from the front; I do not think it would be patriotic to do so. Besides, these letters would not look good in print. While it is true that the soldier may grumble over a very small matter and that the Ross rifle may have been a very good arm in many ways, yet a prejudice has sprung up against the further continuance of the Ross rifle as the national arm of. Canada. If the Government are going to continue the manufacture of rifles, as I presume they are, they ought to tell us what they are going to do about it. Personally, I was not in Parliament when the contract with the Ross Rifle Company was made, but the matter

came up on very many occasions in 1905, 1906, and 1907, when I was in Parliament. I was always in favour of manufacturing rifles in Canada, and I am just as strongly in favour of manufacturing rifles in Canada to-day as I was in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908. The very fact that we have a factory in Canada that has turned out the finest target and sporting rifles in the world is evidence that we can manufacture rifles in Canada. The fact that we have in the city of Quebec a factory that has turned out 1,000 rifles a day is all the evidence we want that we can manufacture rifles, and on a very large scale. The whole difficulty with regard to the Ross rifle seem to be in the breech mechanism, something regarding the bolt and the chamber. While that is a very important part of the rifle, when it comes to the question of manufacture, to the cost of manufacture and to the complications of manufacture I Cannot see that it is at all an insurmountable difficulty. It seems to me that we have only to change over that portion of the chamber, and make a Lee-Enfield chamber, bolt and magazine, instead of a Ross bolt, chamber and magazine; and if we have the plant in which we can manufacture a rifle of any kind, surely we have a plant which, with a small additional expenditure, and with some application of brains and ability could manufacture the rifle which the British Government tell us they would like us to manufacture. They put it as plainly as the English language can make it. They would like this Government to enter into the manufacture of the improved Lee-Enfield rifle, the same as in the United States. We know that in twenty-four hours the British Government wouid furnish this Government with the sealed pattern, and with the standard rifle. I do not know how long it would take-I suppose it would take some months, but not very many months to convert our Ross factory into a Lee-Enfield factory.
I ask, and I do not think I am asking anything that is confidential, have the Government taken any steps to manufacture any other rifle than the Ross rifle in Canada ; have they taken any steps to convert the Ross rifle factory into a Lee-Enfield factory; have they done anything to get us out of the unfortunate position in which we find ourselves; or are they simply going to manufacture 80.000 more rifles in Canada and turn out an arm which, according to ithe official representations, does not inspire our troops with confidence, and _which is not taken to England at the re-
quest of the British Government.
I hope the Prime Minister will appreciate that I approach this question in no controversial spirit. I have not tried to go into any of the difficulties that have existed heretofore. I ajm simply asking him, in the interests of Canada, and in the interests of the ttoops of Canada, whether he will take the country and the House into his confidence and tell us what the Government have done. I think I might go so far as to ask him to tell us what they propose to do, and whether they intend, in the first place, to carry on the manufacture of rifles an Canada, and if so, whether it is to be the Ross or the Lee-Enfield rifle


Robert Laird Borden: I think the request of the hon. gentleman is a very reasonable one, and I entirely appreciate the spirit in which he has approached the subject, and the general tone of his remarks in regard to this very important matter. The merits of the Ross rifle have been a matter of discussion in this House on various occasions during the past ten years. I recollect very well when I was on the other side of the House-I think my hon. friend was rot then in. Parliament.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: I was. I was not a
member when the contract was signed, but I was here during all the discussions.


Robert Laird Borden: My hon. friend will recollect then the various reports that were placed before the country and their general character. I do not think there was any doubt in the minds of members that, as a marksman's rifle, there was no better rifle in the world than the Ross rifle. I recollect that the consideration which impressed me at the time was whether or not the rifle as then ordered was of a sufficiently strong type to endure successfully the wear and tear of active service. I believe that certain portions of the rifle, which were thought to be weak, were afterwards strengthened, and the contract was acted upon Rifles were ordered from time to time, and thus the situation presented itself to the present Administration at the outbreak of war.
It might be proper for a moment to advert to the contract which was made by the former Government and which had to ,be taken into account by the present Government when it came to deal with, the .question. I am not referring to this by way

of reproach, but merely in order that the House may be possessed of the character of the contract that was made, and thus be enabled to understand what the contractual position was as between the Government, on the one hand, and the Ross Rifle Company on the other. The contract reads as follows:
Memorandum of Agreement made in duplicate this 27th day of March 1902.
Between
Sir Charles Ross, Bart., of Balnagowan, hereinafter called the Contractor, of the first part, and
His Majesty the King, represented by Honourable F. W. Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence for the Dominion of Canada, hereinafter called the minister, which expression as herein used includes also the successors in office of the said Minister of Militia and Defence, His Majesty so represented being hereinafter referred to as the Government, of the second part.
Whereas it is considered in the general interests of Canada that the rifles required by the Government for the purposes of Militia and Defence should be manufactured in Canada and whereas the contractor has proposed by himself or his assigns to undertake the establishment and operation of a suitable factory in Canada for the manufacture of such rifles, and to supply the Government with the rifles so required manufactured at said factory and delivered at a cost to the Government, not exceeding that which the Government would have to pay for similar rifles purchased by or for the Government as heretofore in the English market.
This agreement therefore witnesseth, and it is agreed by and between the Contractor and the Government, as follows:-
1.	The contractor is to establish at or near the city of Quebec in Canada a factory for the manufacture of rifles, with the necessary plant.
2.	The contractor undertakes to deliver to the Government between the first day of January. 1903, and tlje first day of January 1904, 12,000 rifles manufactured at the said factory corresponding and equal in every respect to a standard sample rifle which is to be approved by the minister, such rifles to be delivered by monthly even quantities, as nearly as may be of 1,000.
3.	The Government shall be bound and entitled to purchase from the contractor all rifles required for the use of the Government during the continuance of this contract. The contractor agrees that if the Government so desires and signifies its desire in writing on or before the 30th day of September in any year after the year now current, the contractor will deliver to the Government within the year following the next succeeding first day of January a number of rifles not less than 10,000 manufactured at the said factory, such rifles to be delivered by monthly even quantities, as nearly as may be, of not less than 800. If during the year the Government shall require any number of rifles in excess of the number hereinbefore specified for that year, the Government shall immediately notify the contractor of the additional number required, and the contractor shall do his utmost to manufacture at the said factory and to deliver to the Government all such rifles as may be reasonably required, and if need be he shall operate the factory at any time twenty four
hours per day, and he shall if required, furnish the total output of the said factory to the gov-vernment; provided however, that in case of war, actual or threatened, or any national emergency, requiring in the opinion of the Government, the immediate supply of additional arms, the contractor upon receiving any notice or demand from the Government for any number of rifles specified to be urgently required in view of this proviso shall, within thirty days after receiving such notice or demand notify the Government in writing of the number of rifles which he will undertake to furnish in accordance with such notice or demand, and the Government shall not under any circumstances be bound to purchase from the contractor in respect of any such notice or demand, any number of rifles in excess of the number which the contractor so notifies the Government that he will be able to supply.
4.	All the said rifles hereby contracted for are previous to delivery to be inspected by the Inspector of Small Arms of the Government of Canada, and upon such inspection the same rifles being found up to sample as aforesaid, delivery shall be taken as complete at the factory.
5.	If at any time or from time to time, the Government should desire to have any changes in or modification of the rifle to be manufactured and supplied by the contractor, the Government may give to the contractor at least twelve months notice in writing, specifying such changes or modification, and requiring the contractor at the expiration of the period of such notice to manufacture and deliver rifles so changed or modified, and the contractor shall therupon be bound upon and after the expiration of the said period, to manufacture and deliver the rifles subject to such changes and modifications, and the said standard sample rifle so furnished as aforesaid shall in respect of all rifles to be delivered after the expiration of the said period be deemed to have been altered or modified in accordance with the changes or modification specified by the said notice.
C. If a new rifle shall be invented which the Government shall desire to adopt or use the Government may furnish to the contractor a standard sample of such new rifle, and give the contractor twelve months notice in writing, requiring that the rifles to be delivered by the contractor upon and after the expiration of the period of such last mentioned notice shall correspond to the standard sample of such new rifle so furnished, the Government to protect the contractor against any actions for infringements of patents so far as such new rifles supplied to the Government are concerned, and upon and after the expiration of the said period all rifles to be delivered by the contractor shall accordingly correspond to such substituted standard sample, and the contractor agrees to originally lay out and adapt his plant, machinery etc., so as to provide the best facilities winch can reasonably be foreseen to enable him to apply the same to the manufacture of any such new rifle which may be desired.
7.	The Government shall furnish to the contractor. a standard sample rifle mentioned in the second clause of this contract, on or before the 10th day of April, 1902. If for any reason such standard rifle should not be furnished until after the said date, the said contractor shall, if he so desires, be entitled to equivalent extension of the time herein provided for manufacture and delivery.
8.	The Government shall pay for the said 12,000 rifles mentioned in the second clause of

this contract at the rate of $25 for each such rifle. The Government shall pay out of the moneys to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose for all rifles subsequently ordered as herein stipulated the same price of $25 for each of such rifles, unless one of the parties hereto shall upon the occasion of any such demand for further rifles notify the other of such parties that the price of such rifles in similar quantities in the markets of Great Britain has relatively to the present time increased or diminished, in which case the aforesaid price of $25 shall no longer govern, but the price for the rifles so ordered and to be thereafter ordered shall depend upon a further agreement of the parties, and in default of agreement the price to be fixed as provided in the 9th clause hereof. The price of all rifles herein contracted for or to be supplied pursuant to the provisions of this agreement shall be payable upon delivery; provided however, that after the establishment of the said factory and supplying of the plant for the running of the same, the contractor shall be entitled to payment in advance of delivery of moneys actually expended upon the rifles or parts thereof or fixtures therefor, to be delivered in that year upon a statement certified by him of the amount so spent upon establishing the fact of such expenditures to the satisfaction, testified by his signature of such statement, of the Government Inspector of Small Arms, such payments in no case to exceed 75 per cent, of the price of such rifles, the contractor undertaking whenever such advances are made, to insure and keep insured said rifles, parts and fixtures against loss or damage by fire for the benefit of the Government to the extent of such advances.
9.	Provided, however, that in case of any
changes in or modification of the rifle to be manufactured by the contractor, hereunder, pursuant to any such notice as aforesaid, or in case of the adoption by the Government of a new rifle to be invented as aforesaid, the price to be paid shall be the price above named, or such price increased or diminished by a sum to be agreed upon between the Government and the contractor, having regard to the question as to whether such changes or modification increase or diminish the cost of production, or in the case of the adoption of a new rifle, a price to be agreed upon between the Government and the contractor; provided, further, that in default of agreement, the amount of such increase or diminution of the price, as the case may be, shall be settled by two experts, one of whom shall be chosen by the Government, and the other by the contractor, whose decision, if unanimous, shall be final, while in the event of a difference between them the two experts so named shall name a third, and the decision of any two of the three shall be binding; it being the intention of this agreement that the price of the rifles furnished hereunder shall so far as is possible be the same as that of similar rifles in like quantities purchased by or for the Government from the British manufacturers in the open market in England and delivered in Ottawa.	.
10.	The contractor shall be permitted to import into Canada all tools and machinery not manufactured in Canada up to the required standard necessary for the said factory, and also all material, or parts in the rough, unfinished, to be used in rifles to be manufae-

tured by him for the Government free of duty, or in the case of payment by the contractor of any duty on any such tools, machinery or material or parts aforesaid, the contractor shall be entitled to a drawback or remission of the amount so paid; provided, also, that the contractor shall be entitled to import free of duty or shall be entitled to drawback or remission of duty paid in respect of the finished parts to be used in any such rifles, consisting of screws, nuts, bands and springs; and provided, further, that	if at any
time during the continuance of this contract the demand of the Government for rifles shall be such as to make it necessary for the contractor to enlarge the capacity of his factory then the machinery plant and material imported by him for that purpose, not manufactured in Canada up to the required standard, shall similarly be entitled to free entry, drawback or remission of duty.
11.	The contractor shall not be bound to deliver at the time specified in the case of strike or in the event of unforeseen occurrences beyond his control preventing manufacture, but in such cases the contractor shall have an equivalent extension of time, he hereby undertaking to resume work as soon as possible.
12.	The standard sample rifle to be approved by the minister, as provided in paragraph 2 of this agreement, and all standard samples substituted therefor pursuant to this agreement shall remain in the custody of the minister.
13.	Any notice to the contractor, hereunder, shall be deemed to be well and sufficiently given if the same be left at the contractor's office or mailed in any post office to the contractor at the said factory.
14.	This contract is hereby, pursuant to the provisions of the 16th section of chapter 11 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, made subject to the express condition that no member of the House of Commons of Canada shall be admitted to any share or part of such contract or to any benefit to be derived therefrom.
15.	This contract shall enure to the benefit of and shall be binding on the executors, administrators and assigns of the contractor, and where the context admits any reference, therein to the contractor shall be taken to extend equally to his executors, administrators and! assigns.
16.	The wages to be paid in the execution of this contract shall be those generally accepted as current in each trade for competent working men and working women in the district where the work is carried out.
In witness whereof the contractor and the minister have hereunder set their hands and seals at Ottawa aforesaid the day and year first above written.
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of (Sgd.) Charles D. Ross (seal) (Sgd.) R. F. Pinault.
(Sgd.) F. W. Borden (seal) Minister of Militia and Defence.
The contract, after it was made, was assigned with the sanction of the Government to the Ross Rifle Company, and at the present time it is therefore a contract between the Ross Rifle ' Company, the assignee of Sir Charles Ross, and the Government of Canada. I have read the contract in order that it might be known from ite terms that

no period was fixed for its termination. The Government is advised that the contract therefore continues indefinitely, the Government having no power to bring it to a conclusion.
I appreciate the fact, and I do not want to minimize it, that the contractor, Sir Charles Ross, and the company which he afterwards organized, were required to incur a very considerable expenditure in establishing a rifle plant in Canada, and it was therefore necessary to give them a contract of long duration, as otherwise no person could be expected to invest his capital in this country for such a purpose, considering that the company would have to depend, outside of its contract with the Government, upon such orders as they might be able to obtain for sporting and other rifles not designed for military purposes. The rifle has gone through various stages of development. First of all there was the Mark 1, as to which some criticism was made, and there were suggestions as to its improvement by expert officers of the Government. The defects, whatever they may have been, pointed out in that way, were supposed to be remedied by the adoption of the rifle known as Mark II. Criticism having also arisen of that rifle, and certain defects having been found, an endeavour was made to eliminate them by the adoption of the Mark III, which is the rifle mentioned in the correspondence that my hon. friend the member from Carleton (Mr. Car-vell) has read.
Now, the Ross rifle factory was the only factory in Canada capable of producing rifles for military purposes when the war began. As a matter of fact this should be said, and it is to the credit of Sir Charles Ross and of the Ross Rifle Company that it can be said, that, after the outbreak of war, I understand that factory was more successful in greatly increasing its output than any other factory on this continent. I believe that the increased output which that factory developed in at least the first year and a half of the war was very much greater than the increase in output which was shown by .any of the great rifle factories in the United States.
With regard to the extent of orders given by the Government, I might as well clear that point up at once, and the House is certainly entitled to the information. The Government of Canada have ordered since the outbreak of the war 290,000 rifles, and the Ross Rifle Company has delivered to the Government of Canada since the outbreak of the war 218,547 Tifles. There remains to be delivered 97,590 rifles, upon orders already .given.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: There seems some discrepancy there.


Robert Laird Borden: Yes, there is
an explanation here. The discrepancy in the figures is due to an order for 30,000 rifles which was placed before the war, and of these 26,137 were delivered after the outbreak of the war.
Let me refer for a moment to the .situation as it presented itself to the Government in the summer of 1915. My h.on. friend and other hon. gentlemen have referred to the criticism which Sir John French made of the rifle, and I think it is just as well at this stage that I should allude specifically to Sir John French's report, because in the light of that report the House and the country must judge of the steps which the Government took when that report had been communicated to them, and when, in consequence of it, the first Canadian division was armed with the Lee-Enfield instead of the Ross rifle.
1 want to emphasise that point right here; I do not want hon. members in this House or any one in the country to forget it. Whenever we were told by the competent authorities at the front that it was in the interest of the Canadian soldiers that the Lee-Enfield rifle should be substituted for the Ross rifle on any occasion, the Government of Canada have always assented and placed themselves within the judgment of the military authorities at the front who ought to know better in respect of such matters than we, sitting around a council board at Ottawa, could possibly know. So, when it was proposed in the summer of 1915 that the First Division should be re-armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle, for the reasons stated in Sir John French's report, we, of course, interposed no objection, and the First Division was re-armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle. Let us see what Sir John French said about the rifle. His report which has been brought down and laid on the table of the House is as follows:
Confidential.
From the Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, British Army in the Field, to the Secretary, War Office, London, S.W., General Headquarters, June 19, 1915.
Sir,-I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of War Office letter No. 77-15-5209 (A.5), dated 16-6-1915, regarding the action taken by

me in the matter of the Ross rifles of the Canadian Division.
2.	The circumstances are as follows:-
I had heard rumours that there was a growing want of confidence in this rifle, as evidenced by the fact that the infantry of the Canadian Division were taking every opportunity of exchanging their rifles with those of the Lee-En-field pattern from casualties on the battlefield.
3.	To satisfy myself whether there was any real justification for this state of affairs, without at the same time lending encouragement to the idea that the Ross rifle was unsatisfactory, such as might have resulted from an investigation by the divisional authorities, I gave instructions for the assembly of a small committee at my general headquarters to test the rifle with the various natures of ammunition in use, including ammunition of Canadian manufacture, of which a small supply was obtained from England for the purpose, none having been sent out to this country for use with rifle.
4.	The proceedings of this committee were
laid before me on the eve of a serious offensive operation in which the Canadian Division was to take part, and I was at the same time informed that over 3,000, or more than one-third of the infantry, of this division had already succeeded in re-arming themselves with the Dee-Enfield rifle without any authority having been given for them to do so.	.
Looking:
(1)	To the unanimous opinion of my committee that the Ross rifle could not be relied upon to work smoothly and efficiently in rapid fire with any ammunition other than that of Canadian manufacture;
(2)	to the fact that no ammunition of this nature was available in this country, and that sufficient supplies could not be obtained from England, and,
(3)	to the want of confidence in the rifle which a large number of the infantry evidently felt, as evidenced by the fact that over 3,000 had, without authority, exchanged their rifles for those used by their British comrades, and taken from casualties on the battlefield.
I did not feel justified in sending this Division into battle with the Ross rifle, and ordered the re-arming of the infantry of the Division with the Lee-Enfield rifle, which was carried out before they went into action on the 15th instant;
5.	As regards the suggestion made by the Army Council that the opinion of one or two selected Canadian officers should be obtained, I submit that this is a difficult and complicated question which can only be satisfactorily settled by the best expert opinion, and that the views of a few selected Canadian officers, who may or may not be prejudiced in the matter, will not be of any material assistance.
6.	I wrould, therefore, suggest that the Army Council should send to this country one or more of the most highly qualified experts obtainable to make the necessary tests under service conditions and report whether ammunition of British manufacture is or is not suitable for use with the Ross rifle. For this purpose a supply of ammunition of Canadian manufacture should be brought out for comparison.
The Army Council can then decide whether, looking to all the circumstances, it is advisable to restore the Ross rifle to the Canadian Divisions.
7.	In conclusion, I would observe that in my reports I have never condemned the Ross rifle, nor have I any sufficient data to justify me in doing so.
fSir Robert Borden. 1
I have expressed and acted on my opinion, that, so far as I can judge, the ammunition of British manufacture is not suitable for use with Ross rifles, and that there is a large and growing feeling of want of confidence in their rifle on the part of the men in the Canadian Division, which is amply justified by the report of the committee.
8.	Owing to the difficulty at present experienced in turning out rifles in sufficient numbers for our requirements, I shall most heartily welcome an authoritative statement which will carry conviction to the men that their apprehensions are unfounded, or what may possibly be found more easy of attainment, viz.: a slight alteration to the chamber of the rifle which will better adapt it for use with our British ammunition.
I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. French.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Before the right hon. gentleman goes any further on that point, I would like to ask if the Government was ever furnished with the report of the experts whom General French stated he intended to bring over from Great Britain?


Robert Laird Borden: I am under the impression-I shall obtain accurate information on that-that we did not receive the report to which my hon. friend has alluded.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The article that appeared in the newspaper in the month of May last has, I think, been referred to as the Alderson report. Was that report in the hands of the Government, and would that possibly be the experts' report to which General French referred to?


Robert Laird Borden: As I understand it, the communication to which my hon. friend alludes was a private letter from General Alderson to General Gwatkin; it was not an official document at all. In some mysterious way, which has never been explained, and without the authority or knowledge of General Gwatkin, a copy was taken and was given or solid to some person outside of the department altogether, and was made public. I did not know anything about it, so far as my recollection goes, until I saw it in the newspapers. No copy was ever furnished to me, and I do not know whether a copy was ever furnished to the ex-Minister of Militia.


Frank Oliver: My memory is that at a certain time during last session when a discussion in regard to the Ross rifle was going on, I asked the Prime Minister if he would lay on the table an official report by a board of inquiry made in England which was mentioned at the time. He declined to do so on the ground of military disadvantage if it were done.


Robert Laird Borden: In so far as my hon. friend's questions do not have immediate reference to the subject we are discussing, if he will kindly make a note of them and permit me to continue the thread of my remarks, I shall be grateful. It is difficult to deal with interruptions that are not precisely relevant.
The situation which confronted the Government in the summer of 1915 was this: We knew that Sir John French had concluded that the First Canadian Division ought to be re-armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle. He based that conclusion very largely upon the consideration that the men of the First Division, or a considerable number of them, had lost confidence in the Ross rifle. He took the view, in which I am sure we all concur, that no rifle, however effective, would be useful to the men if they had lost confidence in it. He said, in that same report, that he did not condemn the Ross rifle-that he had no data upon which he could condemn it; and he said further that the difficulty had arisen by reason of the fact that the ammunition supplied in this country, which might have made the rifle useful, could not be supplied in sufficient quantities. We algo knew that the chief difficulty at the front was from the jamming of the cartridges, and that is alluded to by Sir John French' in the concluding paragraph of his report when he himself makes the suggestion that if other rifles cannot be provided a remedy might be found by altering the chamber of the rifle, enlarging it so that the cartridge would not stick. We were also confronted with the fact that we did not then know of any other source from which we could procure rifles for the arming of our troops. It may be_ suggested that we should have given notice to manufacture the Lee-Enfield rifle. Well, it took something more than three months, according to my recollection, to get a sealed sample of the rifle that, as I shall point out later on, was suggested by the War Office as the new standard rifle for this country. I first asked in September, 1916, that a sample rifle for the purpose of making the cnange snouict De lurnished. We did not receive it until January. Wie were confronted with the further consideration that under the terms of the contract the contractors were permitted the full period of one year before they could be called upon to produce rifles of a different type. We also had information from the British
Government, whom we consulted on the subject, that a period of considerably more than a year would undoubtedly elapse, in their opinion, before the Ross rifle factory could be changed and the new plant acquired to enable them to produce a rifle of another type. In connection with that we had to take into account, of course, the extreme demands which were being made upon all the resources of this continent for plant and machinery of every kind, the lack of suitable steel, the great delay attending the filling of orders for machinery of any kind, and the fact that the machinery for turning out rifles is of a highly varied and complex character. So that, even if a contract were undertaken to deliver at a certain time, no one could be absolutely sure that it would be delivered within the period mentioned. And the war would not wait for these people, whoever they might be, to perfect their arrangements and secure their plant and machinery.
We must bear in mind, further, that in June and July, 1915, people in this country were not as thoroughly impressed with the possible duration of this war as they are to-day. I have already stated publicly that when I came back from Great Britain and communicated to some of my colleagues and to my right hon. friend the leader of the Opposition (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) my belief that the British Empire would not be able to throw its full strength into this struggle before June, 1916, every one of them was greatly surprised, and some could hardly credit the accuracy of the impression I had thus formed. We were looking forward then to a conclusion of the war some time in 1916; and as matters lay before us then, it did not seem possible that we could produce rifles of the Lee-Enfield type before the probable date of the conclusion of the war.
But then, further, the jamming difficulty was not confined to the Ross rifle, it affected the Lee-Enfield rifle as well. I do not know whether it affected the Lee-iinfield to the same degree as it affected the Ross, but of this I am perfectly confident, on information communicated to me by my late colleague the ex-Minister of Militia and Defence (Sir Sam Hughes) and others, that there was serious difficulty with the Lee-Enfield rifle itself in using the ammunition that was furnished. We came to the conclusion that the only course for us to pursue was to enlarge the chamber of the Ross rifle with a view to preventing the

cartridge from jamming. The size of the chamber, as I am informed, had been fixed originally at 463. If I am not mistaken,
. that was done in 1908. Afterwards, in 1910, it was reduced to '457, and about Januaiy, 1911, it was fixed at .460. Now, the British ammunition is precisely the same-.460. so, you had a cartridge which fitted tightly in the chamber of the rifle, and if the least bit of dirt should adhere to the cartridge before it went into the chamber, the jamming of the cartridge was inevitable.
What did we do? In view of what Sir John French had said, and in view of the experience of the men at the front, we decided that our only course was to enlarge the chamber of the Boss rifle. In July, 1915, it was decided to enlarge the chamber to *462, which is the diameter of the chamber of the Lee-Enfield rifle. But the then Minister of Militia and Defence, on looking into the matter more carefully, came to the conclusion that, for the purpose of absolutely preventing if possible, any danger of jamming, he had better go a little further: and so, in August, 1915, he directed that the chamber should be enlarged to [DOT] 464. That was done, and, as I understand it, the Second Division, when it went to the front, was armed with the Ross rifle with the enlarged chamber.


Edward Mortimer Macdonald: Did the Small Arms Commission recommend the last change to * 462?


Robert Laird Borden: I am informed by the deputy minister that the Small Arms Commission did recommend that change.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Did the Small Arms Commission recommend the change from -462 to -457?


Robert Laird Borden: I really could not tell my hon. friend that. I obtained the information not from the department, but from what I regarded as a reliable source. I had not time to verify it, but I will do so and see whether I am correct.


Sir WILFRID LAURIER:: Where was the last enlargement made-''


Robert Laird Borden: The enlargement was carried on in Great Britain. I have fairly full reports as to all that took place with regard to that, but I will not deal with that phase of the matter just at the moment. I shall be prepared, however, to do so later if my right hon. friend desires it.


Edward Mortimer Macdonald: Was the question
considered of making ammunition in Canada which would fit the chamber?


Robert Laird Borden: My hon. friend will realize that at the beginning of the war the only ammunition production that we could rely upon was that of the Dominion Arsenal, which, of course, was trivial as compared with the need. Afterwards we made contracts. The ammunition that was produced in this country was, as I am informed by the Deputy Minister of Militia, sent forward and pooled with the British ammunition, this country being given credit for it. Then the troops at the front were supplied by the general ordnance organization, as there could not be a separate ordnance arrangement for the Canadian troops in France. Unless, therefore, we attempted to carry out an apparently impracticable project, that of having a separate Canadian ordnance department for the Canadian troops at the front, we could not rely upon Canadian ammunition being served out to the Canadian troops. It seemed impossible to make that arrangement.


Mr. PUGSLEY:: Will the Prime Minister state what was the result of enlarging the bore of the rifle in England?


Robert Laird Borden: The result was supposed to be satisfactory, so far as the jamming was concerned. My hon. friend has before him the report of Sir Douglas Haig, to which I will refer in a moment. The Second Division went to the front on September 13, 1915, and as the enlargement of the chambers of the Ross rifle had not proceeded to a sufficient extent to enable the men of that Division to be armed with the Ross, they went to the front, as I am informed, armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle. The Third Division began to go to the front in January, 1916. By the end of February, 1916, nearly the whole division was at the front; the Engineer and Artillery units, however, went later. The whole division was in France at the end of June.
In February, 1916, the question arose as to whether further orders should be given for the Ross rifle and, if so, to what extent. The Government had before them a recommendation from the Master-General of the Ordnance for 200,000 Roes rifles, if I remember correctly. We did not accede to that in the whole; we gave an order for
100,000	Ross rifles with the enlarged chambers. In March, 1916, when the question came up as to the remaining portion of

the order, I sent a despatch to Sir George Perley, dated March 30, which has already been brought down, and which was as follows:
We have ordered *	* Ross rifles of
which
have been delivered and delivery of balance will not be completed before
We are considering giving an order
for an additional
but before deciding
we desire to obtain any available information and advice from British Government. It is said that they have an order for
rifles
placed with an organization controlled by *	[DOT]
at
visited these works and was greatly impressed with progress made. Possibly these rifles would cover our requirements if war should continue for more than a year.
To which on April 26, nearly a month afterwards, we received the following reply:
Your cable 30th ultimo. Minister Munitions presumes firm referred to is
with
whom Imperial Government have contract for
rifles. Deliveries not yet commenced
and probability is contract will not be completed by
Minister adds there
will be no surplus from British orders other than that already allotted *	[DOT]	* Regrets
therefore not in position to allocate from British orders any rifles to Canadian Government:	Desirable not place contract with
in
view work for Imperial Government.
We were looking around at that time, in view of an earlier termination of the war than now seems probable, to see whether or not provision could be made by which further very large orders for the Ross rifle should not be necessary. We realized that with the orders already outstanding :a very large supply of rifles would be in the hands of the Government at the end of the war. Having regard to the fact that during the previous summer the question of jamming had arisen, and also to some further rumours that came to our [DOT]attention, we considered that it might be better, if it were possible, to make provision that the Canadian troops be supplied with standard British rifles to which no objection had been taken. We were, however, informed at that time, April 26, that no such provision could be made; therefore we had to consider the situation from that standpoint.
These rumours, to which I have alluded, began to assume more definite shape, and I saw a telegram on the 12th May, 1916, from Sir Max Aitken to General Hughes, a portion o'f which has been brought down, and which was as follows:
Serious situation has arisen regarding Ross rifle *	*	[DOT] I request that you will show this
telegram to Prime Minister.
To this I replied on the 15th of May, two days, I think, before the Alderson report,
so-called, had made its appearance in the press. That report appeared on the 17th of May, but on the 15th of May I had sent to Sir Max Aitken the following telegram:
Have consulted with General Hughes and we are prepared to leave matter to judgment of Commander in Chief after he has had all necessary tests of both rifles under such conditions as are experienced at front. Men making tests should be of like experience.
It is only arm we are equipped to produce in Canada at present and we believe it effective if properly used. Minister Informs me that reports just received of recent official tests in England thoroughly demonstrate efficiency of our rifle.
I had discussed the subject with General Hughes, and he had given me that assurance and expressed very great confidence in the efficiency of the rifle, if properly used. I may say here that the test to which the Ross rifle was subjected was one of very great severity. It was a longer rifle than the Lee-Enfield, and that interfered, perhaps, to some extent with its use in the trenches. No one before the outbreak of the war, or in the early months of the war, could have foreseen that trench warfare would dominate the situation to the extent which it did. Further than that, the use of rifles, in trench warfare, with the mud a foot, or two or three feet deep, with rifles falling into the mud and becoming dirty-all that was a particularly severe test of the Ross rifle which was of higher quality in many respects than the Lee-Enfield rifle. It was put to a further severe test in this way:	It was placed in the
hands of men who were not trained soldiers, men as gallant and splendid as the world ever produced, but men who were not trained soldiers, who naturally were not trained as efficiently as the men of a regular army would be in the care of their weapons. Therefore, the conditions of the test to which the Ross rifle was subjected were of an unusually severe character. I am not at all sure that with an enlarged chamber, and under ordinary conditions of warfare, the Ross rifle would not be found a thoroughly efficient weapon. But the question with which we were always confronted was whether the men had confidence in it. Once we were convinced that they had not confidence in it, we agreed immediately that they must be armed with a rifle in which they had confidence, or they could not be effective.
In pursuance of these communications, I sent on the 5th day of June, 1916, a telegram to Sir William Robertson, Chief of the General Staff. It was sent through the

Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. That telegram read:
Secret. Following from the Prime Minister for Sir William Robertson. By reason of rumoured dissatisfaction with Ross rifle I held consultation with General Hughes on May 15 and sent unofficial message to Commander in Chief that we were prepared to leave matter to his judgment after making all necessary tests of both rifles under such conditions as are experienced at the front. We suggested that men making tests should be of equal experience. Ross rifle is only arm we are equipped to produce in Canada at present and we believe it efficient if properly used but are content to abide by judgment of Commander in Chief after thorough investigation and adequate tests. We realize absolute necessity of two conditions: first, that men shall be armed with thoroughly efficient rifle; second, that their confidence in such rifle shall be unshaken Please let me have your judgment as to proper course to pursue
On the same day I sent to Sir George Perley, who had taken a very keen and active interest in the matter, this telegram:
Confidential. Please ask Colonial Secretary to show you my secret cable to-day for Chief General Staff respecting Ross rifle and confer with Aitken to whom you may disclose terms of that message.
On the 5th day of June, I also sent to Sir George Perley the following telegram:
Secret. Please ascertain whether British Government have finally and definitely decided on new rifle, or whether they propose before final action to study lessons obtained in present war. If new type of rifle has been finally adopted we are prepared after suitable investigation to adopt it if found satisfactory, so that our rifle in future will be of same type as British. In that case British order for Ross rifles might be cancelled and new order for one hundred thousand rifles new type given Instead. Cost of machines and gauges for new type of rifle would approximate five hundred thousand dollars and this cost might be equally divided between two governments. Am making this suggestion because of continued criticism of Ross rifle which undoubtedly creates lack of confidence. No rifle however efficient is useful unless it commands thorough confidence of men.


Edward Mortimer Macdonald: I notice that in the communication which my right hon. friend has just Tead, he referred to the fact that the British Government had given an order for Ross rifles.


Robert Laird Borden: I am coming to that now.


Edward Mortimer Macdonald: Perhaps my right hon. friend could tell us whether that order is still in existence.


Robert Laird Borden: I shall go into that fully. In the early months of this war we had a good deal of communication with

the British Government as to the supply of rifles. The question was surrounded with much difficulty, and some of the calculations made at that time were not justified by subsequent events. The British Government took up the question of obtaining Titles in Canada, and in the autumn of 1914 they ordered 100,000 Ross rifles. I have asked for and obtained a memorandum as to what has been accomplished by the Ross Rifle Company in supplying rifles under that order. The memorandum which has been given to me by the Department of Militia and Defence is as follows:
Number ordered for the War Office, 100,000 ; number delivered to 20th January, 1917, 48,8C0 ; number still to be delivered, 51,200.
The Ross Rifle Company is still engaged in the production of those rifles for the British Government. It will be observed from the telegram which I have just read that I made a certain suggestion to the British Government in that regard. I suggested to them in effect this: There has been criticism of the Ross rifle; we are told that the men have lost confidence in it; you have an outstanding contract for the Ross rifle; we have outstanding contracts fpr the Ross rifle; the cost of the new machinery to make the necessary changes will be $500,000 (as a matter of fact, I think it would have been a great deal more than that); would it not be better for the two Governments to arrange with the Ross Rifle Company to cease the production of Ross rifles, and to change the orders, in so far as they have not been fulfilled, to the Lee-Enfield rifle, or the type of new rifle which is now being produced for you in the United States? That was the suggestion, which, however, the British Government did not accept.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: What was the date of
that?


Robert Laird Borden: The 5th day of
June, 1916.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Did the Government, or any of its officials, ever receive from the British Government an offer of machinery and the different tools necessary to re-equip the Ross Rifle factory for the purpose of manufacturing Lee-Enfields?


Robert Laird Borden: We asked them about experts. They said that in so far as some dies, machinery and plant were concerned, they would be procured and placed at our service for use in the production of a new rifle.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: When?


Robert Laird Borden: I cannot recall that but I will find out. Sir George Perley advised us on the 8th of June:
London, June 8th, 1916.
***War Office considers except trajectory the new Lee-Enfield now being made in United States is as good as any weapon that could be made with present experience and in present war; apparently high trajectory no particular disadvantage. Lessons obtained in present war have evidently not brought any new experience so far as rifles are concerned. Not considered possible say definitely what rifle will be finally adopted by British Government after war. Hardly to be expected that War Office would under present circumstances definitely commit themselves regarding their future service rifle. Master General Ordnance considers rifle now being made for them in United States exceedingly good weapon and would be glad see you use same pattern. Question of money arrangements would have to be taken up officially*but personally should consider that of minor importance.
Then, in reply to a previous telegram as to the test of the Ross rifle, I had from Sir George Perley, on the 8th June, 1916, this telegram already laid on the table of the House:
London, June 8th, 1916.
Confidential. Have shown and discussed with Aitken your secret cable to Chief General Staff.
-that is the telegram to Sir William Robertson which I have already read-
Question will now doubtless be settled by him. Have seen him personally to-day and impressed strongly as possible upon him your views regarding necessity thorough test and also that Canadian Government would need official documents giving full facts and statements which could be made public if thought desirable. Also impressed upon him that Ross rifle is only one which Canada can produce at present and that if our troops are re-armed at front it naturally would raise question whether Canada should continue manufacturing Ross rifle an'd if not some alternative feasible plan would have to be suggested. Showed him copy your cable 5th regarding new type rifle which I answered this morning. Whole question will doubtless be thoroughly considered within next few days.
Then, on the 10th of June, in reply to my telegram to Sir William Robertson, I had this communication through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is a telegram addressed to the Governor General:
The following, from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Begins :
I am much obliged for your telegram 6th June. It has been referred to Sir Douglas Haig and his reply is awaited before ahy opinion can be given.
On the 24th June I sent this telegram to Sir George Perley:
26 _
Most confidential, Secret. We have had under consideration since January last an order for one hundred thousand additional Ross rifles, none of which can be delivered before April, 1917. If we decide to order the additional one hundred thousand company requires nearly a year's notice before commencement of delivery in order to secure necessary material of various kinds for which there is great demand at present. Several months ago the Master General of Ordnance strongly recommended immediate action, but we have delayed by reason of doubts raised as to efficiency of rifle. Time has now arrived when immediate decision should be made. To this end it is important that we should have a definite, reliable and thorough report upon the merits of rifle. If it is so defective as to forbid its use at the front, or if confidence in its efficiency has been undermined in our troops, it would be a waste of public money to give further orders. Please consult Aitken, with whom I have had much correspondence on this subject and advise me whether any such report as above mentioned exists. If not, it should be made immediately for our guidance.
On the 5th of July I received from Sir George Perley a telegram as follows:
London, July 5th, 1916.
Your cable 24th ultimo. Have communication from War Office covering letters recently received from commander in chief armies in Prance who reports efficiency Ross rifle thoroughly tested by actual fighting in field, that he has again consulted general officer commanding second army in case fresh points have come to light during recent heavy fighting by Canadians near Ypres. Latter states his experience working Ross rifle during last fight has only confirmed his opinion that Canadians in Third Division have lost confidence in their rifle and he reccommends that rifles this Division be exchanged. Sir Douglas Haig remarks that although reports from Second Division not to same effect he is of opinion Lee-Enfleld rifle should be issued to all three Divisions Canadian corps. Army Council agree with this opinion and have approved his proposal to exchange rifles Second and Third Divisions for Lee-Enfleld pattern and steps will be taken forthwith effect exchange. Army Cduncil hope be hble utilize Ross rifles released from France, also those in possession Canadian troops England, for other purposes connected with war. They would be glad if steps could be taken stop any more Ross rifles being brought to England, it being understood they thereby make themselves responsible for supplying necessary rifles to Canadian troops on arrival here and they see no reason to doubt being able do this. Army Council add should Canadian Government be desirous undertaking manufacture rifle of different pattern suitable for use during present war, in their opinion rifle made same pattern as now produced in United States for British Army, which is on lines Lee-Enfield Mark III embodying improvements, probably best one to adopt. Mailing copies correspondence. War Office wishes this matter regarded as secret until July 15th.
It will be observed that the improved British rifle, what is known as the Enfield 1914 rifle, was not being produced in Great Britain; it was only being produced in the United States. The standard Lee-Enfield rifle was being produced in Great Britain.



but in the United States a new plant and a new organization had to he created. The improved type of rifle could be produced as quickly as the old type. The Enfield 19T4 rifle had a -276 bore instead of -303 bore; it was impossible to adhere to the -276 bore, for the reason that the ammunition 'being produced in England would not be suitable for that rifle; therefore, they took the new improved type, the 1914 Enfield rifle, and adapted the barrel to a -303 calibre and that is the rifle for which they have made contracts in the United States.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Would that not require a new chamber?


Robert Laird Borden: The chamber, as I understand, is included in the barrel. At all events, that is what I am informed by the technical officer. The improvements effected in the new type, called the Enfield 1914, which was practically, but not formally, adopted before war broke out, were utilized and adopted in the orders given in the United States, but the barrel was of a [DOT] 303 calibre and not a -276 calibre.
Then follow in order certain documents which my hon. friend has referred to, and which I khould like again to place before the House. I need not read Mr. Cubitt's letter. I will read Sir Douglas Haig's report, dated May 28, 1916:
May 28, 1916.
Sir,-I have the honour to inform you that 1 have satisfied myself, after extensive inquiries carried out throughout the Canadian Corps, that, as a service rifle, the Ross is less trustworthy than the Lee-Enfield, and that the majority of the men armed with the Ross rifle have not the confidence in it that it is so essential [DOT] that they should possess. The inquiry on which these conclusions are based, was the outcome of an urgent application from a battalion of the 3rd Canadian Division for rearmament with the short Lee-Enfield rifle, in consequence of a high percentage of jams experienced with their Ross rifles during a hostile attack on May 1, 1916.
2.	I am accordingly of opinion that the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfleld rifle. It will be remembered that the 1st Canadian Division was so re-armed on June 12, 1915.
3.	I am not in a position to effect this with the means at my disposal in France. I have' the honour to inquire therefore, whether the necessary number of rifles can be supplied from home sources, without interfering with, or delaying the arrival and arming of the divisions due from England and Egypt on which I am relying.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Sgd.) D. Haig, General,
Commanding in Chief, British Armies in France.
[Sir Robert Borden. J
There is a further report from Sir Douglas Haig, dated June 21, 1916, which is also significant. It is addressed to the Secretary of the War Office in London, and reads as follows:
June 21, 1916.
Sir,-In reply to your No. 77/15/5307 (M.G.O.) of June 10, 1916, forwarding a copy of a telegram dated June 7, from the Governor General of Canada, I have the honour to inform you that the efficiency of the Ross rifle has been thoroughly tested by actual fighting in the field, and the application conveyed in my O.B./174 of May 28, 1916, was made after very cardful consideration of all the evidences available.
2.	I have again consulted the General Officer Commanding Second Army in case any fresh points have come to light during the recent heavy fighting by the Canadians near Ypres. He tells me that his experience of the working of the Ross rifle during the last fight has only confirmed him in his opinion that the Canadians, in the 3rd division at all events, have lost confidence in their rifle and he recommends that the rifles in this division be exchanged.
3.	Although the reports from the 2nd division are not to the same effect, I am of opinion that the Lee-Enfleld rifle should be issued to all three divisions of the Canadian Corps.
I must therefore adhere to my recommendation that the 2nd and 3rd Canadian divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfield rifle, and I would urge that the necessary steps to give effect thereto be taken without delay.
I have the honour to be.
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
D Haig, General,
Commanding in Chief, British Armies in France.
It is well to remember, in justice to the Ross Rifle Company, that Sir Douglas Haig states in his report that the opinion which seems to have been pretty general in the Third Division was not shared by the men of the Second Division; but he thought it desirable and wise to arm all three divisions with the Lee-Enfield, in order that all the British forces at the front should be equipped with the same rifle. On the 11th day of July the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in consequence of these reports, sent us the following telegram, addressed to the Governor General:
July 11. 1916
With reference to my telegram, June 10, report from General Offlcer Commanding in Chief in France has now been received by Army Council recommending that second and third Canadian divisions should be re-armed with short Lee-Enfleld rifles and Army Council have approved this. They hope to be able to utilize Ross rifles released and also those now in possession of Canadian troops in England for other purposes connected with the war, but ask that no more Ross rifles should be brought to England. Army Council will be responsible for supplying necessary rifles to Canadian troops on

arrival in England. If your Government desire to undertake manufacture of different rifles Suitable for use during war, Army Council think that rifles now being produced in America for British Army on lines of Lee-Enfield Mark III, but with improvements would be best.
Hon. members will observe that on the 26th of April, 1916, we had been informed that the British Government had no supply of rifles which would be available for rearming the Canadian troops. But conditions as regards supply and production evidently improved, because on the 11th day of July they entered into a clear and distinct engagement with us that they would hold themselves responsible for arming all the Canadian troops with the Lee-Enfield rifle, and they have carried out that engagement up to the present, and I have no doubt they will carry it out in the future. So that from the 11th day of July up to the present all the Canadian troops at the front have been armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle, and the British Government have undertaken on their part to see to it that all the Canadian troops sent to the front shall be armed with that rifle.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Might I ask why, after that date, the Fourth Division went over armed with the Ross rifle?


Robert Laird Borden: To which, on the 7th day of September, 1916, the following reply was received from Mr. Bonar Law in a cable message to the Governor General:
Tour telegram of the 31st Fourth Division were sent to France armed with Ross rifles, but I .ee-Lin fields have since been sent to France for purpose of re-arming. Re-arming should be completely performed by now.
From this I understand that although the Fourth Division went to France armed with the Ross rifle, the British Government, in pursuance of their engagement with us, ret-armed them with Lee-Enfield rifles before they were actually at the front.
That is the situation up to that time, the net result of it being this:	In the
summer of 1911, when the Canadian Government were made acquainted with the view of Sir John French that, for the reasons expressed in his report, it was advisable to re-arm the First Canadian Division with the Lee-Enfield rifle, we assented at once that this should be done, because it appeared that there had been jamming of the Ross rifle; that the ammunition was unsuitable; that the men had lost confidence in the rifle, and that a change was absolutely necessary. Then, having regard to the suggestion of Sir John French that the rifle might be made right by enlargement of the chamber; having regard to the fact that there was no other source from which rifles could be obtained; having regard also to the fact that, according to the best judgment we could procure, it would occupy at least a year before rifles of any other type could be turned out by the Ross company, we concluded, following the lines of Sir John French's suggestion, that the only course was to enlarge the chamber of the Ross rifle. Accordingly the Minister of Militia in, July, 1915, determined to enlarge it from .460 to .462, and in August, 1915, he determined still further to enlarge it to .464, with the expectation that the enlarged chamber would prevent jamming. When the question of further provision of rifles came rather urgently before us in the winter of 1916, after giving an order for
100,000	rifles with the enlarged chamber, we made inquiry of the British Government on the 30th day o'f May, 1916, whether out of the supply of rifles which they had ordered, it would ibe possible to supply Lee-Enfield rifles to us, and what number; and on the 26th of April, 1916, we received a reply that no rifles out of those ordered by them would be available for our use.
Later on, when further difficulty arose with regard to-the rifles, we sent a communication first to Sir Max Aitken and

afterwards to Sir William Robertson, suggesting that tests should be made, pointing out that according to our view the rifle was efficient if properly used, and desiring, after those tests had been made, that the result should be communicated to us. In June, 1916, we left the whole question of the re-arming of the Canadian troops at the front to the absolute judgment of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander in Chief of ithe British army in the field; and when they determined, having regard to all consideration, that although some of the Canadian units were perfectly, satisfied with the Ross rifle, it would be advisable that all the forces should be re-armed we assented to that conclusion at once, accompanied as it was by the condition and undertaking that the British Government in the future would make themselves responsible for the arming of all the Canadian troops at the front with the Lee-Enfield rifle to which no exception seemed to have been taken, end in which at all events the troops seemed to have confidence, iso far as we could learn from the reports available.
Now, that is the situation as it presents itself to my mind. I have endeavoured to give the whole facts to the House so far as they can be disclosed with the consent of the War Office. My hon. friend, however, goes on and puts before us another question: What do we propose to do about the production of rifles in Canada? I want to point out in the first place that, so far as the arming of Canadian troops is concerned, we have the definite engagement of 'the British Government that our troops shall be armed, when, they go to the front, with the Lee-Enfield rifle. That engagement has been lived up to, as I understand it. For, although the Fourth. Division went to France armed with the Ross rifle, they were immediately afterwards armed with the Lee-Enfield, and are so armed today. The question of the production of rifles in Canada ceased to have the immediate urgency that it would have had if that engagement had not been given to us by the British Government. With this in mind, we come back to the question of what the Government has done with respect to the production of rifles in. this country in the future.
Certain negotiations are going on as to the disposition in Great Britain of our supply of Ross rifles, the most of which have been in use either by the British Government or ,by ourselves. We Tequire a considerable number in Canada of course for the

training of our own tro-ope-though I entirely agree that would be better, if it were possible, that out troops should be trained with the rifles they are to use at the front. In considering the question of what should be done, there are a couple of telegrams which have not yet been brought down 'and which it might be well that I should communicate to the House. In the telegram from which I am about to read there are some portions that, from considerations of public interest, I cannot disclose to the House:
Ottawa, September 5, 1916.
My advisers consider it important for purposes of common defence that adequate facilities for production of rifles should be maintained in Canada. They are impressed with the view that a standard rifle to be called Imperial Service Rifle should be adopted by Mother Country and all Dominions of Empire, if British Government can give them assurance that rifle known as Enfield .276 pattern adapted for .303 ammunition will be definitely adopted by British Government as standard service rifle my advisers would proceed to necessary examination for its adoption and preparation for adequate production here.' If on the other hand British Government have reached no definite conclusion as to type of rifle to be ultimately adopted my advisers would naturally desire to limit as far as possible expenditure for this purpose as it would have to be repeated in case another type should be adopted in early future. They would be grateful for full and prompt expression of views of His Majesty's Government as to situation which must be considered with regard to needs of whole Empire.
I havie stated that the date of that telegram is 5th September. In order to prevent ' misapprehension as to dates of telegrams, I may explain that when we send a telegram dated, for instance, 5th September, that telegram is received by the British Government on the 6th September. There i9 a difference of five hours in the time. Telegrams are thus referred to by the British authorities as of the following day- in the case I speak of this telegram is referred to as of 6th September. The reply is as follows:
Paraphrase of cypher telegram from Mr. Bonar Law to the Governor General.
London, September 19, 1916.
With reference to your telegram September 6th it is regretted by Army Council that it is impossible for them at present to give definite assurance as to the pattern of service rifle to be adopted after the war. Further experience may modify views now held, while the large stock of rifles which will have accumulated by the end of the war may render the adoption of any new pattern unlikely for some years to come. As regards the present manufacture of rifles suitable for use during the war the Army Council adhere to their opinion conveyed to you in the penultimate sentence of my telegram of July 11th.
Bonar Law.
As the telegram of July 11 may not be
clearly recalled by hon members, because of th.e mass of this correspondence,
I will refer to it again in order that the allusion in the document just quoted may be understood. The penultimate sentence of the telegram of July 11th is as follows:
If your Government undertake the manufacture of different rifles suitable for use during war. Army Council think that rifles now being produced in America for British Army on lines of Lee-Enfield Mark III, but with improvements would be best.
That is the same rifle described in a somewhat different way in my telegram of 5th Septembei In that telegram I referred to it as " the rifle known as Enfield, .276-pattem, adapted for .303 ammunition." I used that expression because I was informed by the Master General of the Ordnance that it would be understood by the Wiar Office, being the technical description of that rifle. I think it was in September, 1916, that we asked the Government to furnish us with a sealed pattern of that particular rifle in order that we might take steps, under the contract with the Ross Rifle Company, for its production in this country. On November 14 I made a recommendation to Council with regard to. it, and that recommendation was approved by His Excellency on November 15. It is proper that I should read that order in council, as it adopts for the purpose of future production in Canada the approved Lee-Enfield rifle which is being produced for the British Government in the United States, but which, as I understand, is not yet being produced in Great Britain, for the reason which I have already mentioned. The order in council is as follows:
November 15, 1916.
The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 14th November, 1916, from the Right Hon. the Prime Minister, stating that on the 27th day of March, 1902, His Majesty the King, represented by the Hon. F. W. Borden, then Minister of Militia and Defence, entered into an agreement with Sir Charles Ross, Bart., of Balnagowan, copy of which is appended, whereby the Government of Canada agreed with the said Sir Charles Ross to purchase from the said Charles Ross or his assigns all rifles required for the use of the Government. The said contract fixes no limit as to the time for which it shall remain in force.
That the said contract provided for the manufacture and delivery by the contractor in each year of such number of rifles not less than 10,000, as might be desired and signified by the Government in writing on or before the 30th day of September- of the year preceding the year in which delivery was to be made, each to correspond to a standard sample rifle to be provided by the said minister.
That the said contract further provided that should a new rifle be invented which the Gov-

ernment should desire to adopt or use the Government might furnish the contractor with a standard sample of such new rifle and give the contractor twelve months' notice in writing requiring that the rifles to be delivered by the contractor upon and after the expiration of the period of such last-mentioned notice should, correspond to the standard sample of such new rifle so furnished, the Government to protect the contractor against any actions for infringements of patents so far as such new rifles supplied to the Government were concerned, and upon and after the expiration of the said period all rifles to be delivered by the contractor should accordingly correspond to such substituted standard sample, and the contractor agreed to originally lay out and adapt his plant, machinery, etc., so as to provide the best facilities which could be reasonably foreseen to enable him to apply the same to the manufacture of any such new rifle which might so be desired.
That the said contract further provided for the fixing of the price to be paid for the rifles to be manufactured and delivered thereunder from time to time.
That from the date of the said contract all rifles required and used by the Government were, in accordance with the terms of the said contract, purchased from the contractor named therein, or from his assigns, the Ross Rifle Company, and the standard sample rifle furnished by the Minister of Militia and Defence as provided for in the said contract in 1902 with certain improvements and modifications made from time to time has been the rifle produced by the contractor up to the present time.
That much difference of opinion and much controversy has arisen as to the merits of the rifle so purchased and its usefulness as an active service weapon compared with other standard rifles adopted by the British Government. As a consequence repeated inquiries have been made and varying opinions given as to the desirability of substituting a new standard rifle for the rifle so manufactured. Concurrently with these inquiries, information was sought as to the possibility of procuring other standard rifles for the use of the Canadian forces. The readjustment of the contractor's factory for the production of a new standard rifle would involve great delay, and adequate provision for arming the Canadian forces in the meantime is necessary. Since the outbreak of war, however, the Government was not able, until very recently, to procure any other rifle in Great Britain or elsewhere for that purpose. On April 26, 1916, in response to an inquiry made on March 30, 1916, the Imperial Government stated that even up to June, 1917, there would be no surplus from British orders other than that already allotted to the Allied Governments, and that it was impossible to allocate from such orders any rifles to this Government. Early in July, however, the British Army Council, to whose decision the matter had been left by the Canadian Government, concluded that the Canadian Expeditionary Force should be armed with the Lee-Enfleld rifles, and the Army Council undertook to make themselves responsible for supplying the necessary rifles to the troops from Canada c n arrival in England. This arrangement was accepted, and it has been carried out. On the 5th September, 1916, the Imperial Government informed this Government that the condition indicated in their communication of the 26th April had changed, and

that it would be possible to arrange fer the transfer of a certain number of standard rifles to Canada from existing British orders.
Further correspondence took place with regard to the type of rifle which should be adopted in Canada. The Imperial Government, since the beginning of the war, has commenced, and is now carrying on the production of an improved rifle known as the Enfield 1914, or .276, adapted for .303 ammunition. The minister is informed that this rifle, as it is produced from time to time, will be issued by the Imperial Government to the British army, and the Army Council have advised that if this Government desire to undertake the manufacture of a new standard rifle the said improved rifle is considered the best.
In view, therefore, of the fact that other standard rifles are now available, the minister recommends that no further orders be given for the manufacture of the standard Ross rifle heretofore supplied to the Government under the said contract.
In view of the information obtained from the Army Council and of the very great desirability that the rifle to be issued to the Canadian forces should be the same in every respect as that to be supplied to the other forces of the British Empire, the minister further recommends that a new standard sample rifle be provided by the Minister of Militia and Defence, the same to be in every respect the rifle so to be supplied by the Imperial Government, namely, the Enfield, 1914, or .276, adapted for .303 ammunition, and be furnished to the contractor and his assignee, The Ross Rifle Company, in accordance with clause 6 of the said contract, and that the contractor and the said company be required, on and after the first day of December, 1917, to make all rifles supplied under the said contract to correspond to such last mentioned substituted standard sample rifle the Government undertaking to protect the contractor and his assignee against any actions for infringement of patents as stipulated by the contract, and, moreover, that the Minister of Militia and Defence be authorized to give a notice in the form hereto annexed to the said Sir Charles Ross and his assignee, The Ross Rifle Company.
The committee concur in the foregoing recommendations and submit the same for approval.
(Signed) Rodolphe Boudreau,
Clerk of the Privy Council.
It is necessary, for the purpose of giving the notice, referred to in the order in council, that it should be accompanied by the standard rifle itself. We were not able to procure a standard rifle in the time limited; therefore the order in council had to be amended as to the date at which t'he contractor should be called upon to undertake the production of the new standard rifle. As the new standard rifle was not supplied to us by the British Government until the 15th or 20th of January last, an amending order in council was passed by which the notice given to the contractor requires him to produce the new rifle on and after the 1st day of February, 1918, it being necessary under the terms .of the contract that he should have a year's notice.
The matter stands in that way at pre-

sent, and the question for the Government to determine is as to the extent of the order which should be given to the Ross Rifle Company for the improved rifle, or as to what other course, if any, the Government ought to take in the premises. On the one hand, we are confronted with the fact that after the conclusion of the war, we shall have, unless we dispose of them in the meantime, a very considerable number of Ross rifles, Mark III. I have spoken of some negotiations still pending with regard to disposing of some of these rifles. For the purpose of training under ordinary conditions of peace they would be useful to our troops, and it is quite possible that, under conditions of warfare different from those which have been encountered during the past two years, the Ross rifle might give perfect satisfaction. I am not prepared to pronounce an opinion upon* that, because there has been so much difference of opinion, so much controversy amongst experts, that it would be idle for me to venture on a subject which depends upon technical considerations as well as upon actual experience in the field.
The question, therefore, is under the consideration qf the Government at the present time, and we shall give our best attention to it. I should be very glad indeed if hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House, who have taken an interest in this subject, and who are now fully seized of the situation as it presents itself to the Government, would be good enough to give us the benefit of their views, which, of course, will be most carefully and attentively considered. The situation is as I have described it. We have made provision, by arrangement .with the British Government, that our troops shall be armed at the front during the continuance of the war with a rifle to which no exception has been taken. We have the question as to whether anything can be done with the supply of Ross rifles which are not in use at the front; and, lastly, there is the question as to the extent upon which we shall enter upon the production of rifles of a new type. Hon. gentlemen who heard me read the telegram of the British Government dated 19th September will remember that they expressed a great doubt as to whether or not any rifle other than the improved Lee-Enfield rifle would be adopted as the standard service rifle in the immediate future, putting forward, as the reason for that view, the reasonable consideration that they would be in possession
of so enormous a supply of rifles after the war that they, would not care to embark upon the production of a new rifle upon the scale that would be necessary. The condition which confronts them confronts us in a smaller degree, because we shall have on hand, unless we dispose of them in the meantime, a very large number of Ross rifles, Mark III, at the conclusion of the war, more than will be ordinarily required by this country for several years to come under conditions of peace. In the meantime, the order which was given in February last to the Ross Rifle Company is being carried out, and the order which the British Government gave to^the Ross Rifle Company in the autumn of 1914 is also being carried out. Altogether the company has still to produce and deliver about
150,000	rifles, about 97,000 for us, I think, and about 57,000 for the British Government.
At six o'clock the House took recess.
After Recess.
-[DOT]The House resumed at 8 o'clock. PRIVATE BILLS.


SECOND READINGS.
[Stage Direction]
Bill Nso. 5, respecting the Guardian Accident and Guarantee Company and to change its name to the Guardian Insurance Company of Canada.-Mr. Achim.
Bill No. 6, respecting the Athabaska
Northern Railway Company.-Mr. Bennett (Calgary.)
Bill No. 7, respecting the Continental Heat and Light Company.-Sir Herbert Ames.
Bill No. 8, to incorporate the Bishop of Mackenzie River.-Mr. Bennett (Calgary).
Bill No. 9, respecting the Lachine, Jacques Cartier and Maisonneuve Railway,Company. -Mr. Bickerdike.
Bill No. 10, to incorporate the Grand Lodge of the Canadian Association of Stationary Engineers of the Dominion of Canada.-Mr. Fripp.
Bill No. 11, respecting the Canadian Order of the Woodmen of the World.-Mr. Glass.
Bill No. 14, respecting the Grain Growers Grain Company, Limited, and to authorize it to change its name to " United Grain Growers, Limited."-Mr. Bradbury.
[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 15, respecting the Saint John Board of Trade.-Mr. Pugsley.
Bill No. 16, to confirm certain agreements made between the Vancouver, Victoria and Eastern Railway and Navigation Company and the Canadian Northern Pacific Railway Company.-Mr. Stevens.
Bill No. 17, respecting the Western Dominion Railway Company.-Mr. Smyth.

[Stage Direction]
House again in Committee, Mr. Blain in the Chair.
Robert Laird Borden: 
OPINION OF COMMITTEE.
[Stage Direction]
A unanimous opinion was expressed that the Canadian manufactured D.A.C. 1914 Mk. VII ammunition only, of those tried, was suitable for rapid fire with the Ross rifle, that provided a sufficient supply of Canadian manufactured ammunition of this type could be supplied, the other defects apparent were not sufficient to condemn the Ross rifle in view of the present shortage of rifles generally, and that those types of British made ammunition which were tried should not be issued to troops armed with the Ross rifle.
The committee were practically unanimous in advising that the Ross rifle should be employed on the lines of communication, and that if possible, the Canadian troops should be armed with the British rifle.
[Stage Direction]
With regard to the following specific points which the committee were asked to answer, the questions and answers as st&ted below:
1.	There are frequent reports that the bolt action jambs after about 5 rounds.
2.	Full value of rapid fire cannot be developed unless:
(a)	Ammunition of Canadian manufacture is used.
(b)	Rifle is perfectly clean.
3.	That English made ammunition is slightly larger than Canadian eo that immediately the cartridge exploded the cartridge case fills the chamber so tightly as to cause a jamb.
4.	(a) That orders exist that on no account are troops to take out their magazine as it necessitates stripping the rifle.
(b) Unless the magazine is unloaded every 24 hours and the spring action eased, the magazine fails to respond.
5.	That dirt accumulates easily in the bolt head and also in the receptive thread in the breech of the rifle. Owing to difficulty of cleaning jambs are caused.
6.	The screw of the bolt head expands under heat and renders it difficult to open the breech (presumably due to the number of bearing surfaces affected).
7.	The Ross rifle sight is defective because of its delicacy and the smallness of the figures which make it difficult ta adjust the sight easily.
8.	The magazine case is too thin and is dented easily. This causes a jamb as the spring cannot work.
9.	The foresight is not good for service work. The circular cover easily gets filled with mud and is difficult to clean.
10.	A hole has recently been bored in the base of the magazine to enable the cleaning of the magazine to be carried out with stripping the rifle.
11.	It is far easier to load the Lee-Enfield rifle than the Ross rifle with a clip of ammunition. A Lee-Enfield rifle takes 10 rounds a Ross 5 rounds.
12.	That the shape of the fore part of the chamber of the Ross rifle is different to that of the Lee-Enfield. That this does not allow of the same expansion' and is the cause of the jamb.
1.	Yes, but with British B. 1915 Mk. VII ammunition only.
2.	(a) Full value of rapid fire can be developed with ammunition of Canadian manufacture only.
(b) This point was not tested.
3.	The British made cartridge case appears to be of a slightly thicker gauge than that of Canadian manufacture and the diameter of the cartridge immediately under the rim appears to be slightly greater than that of Canadian manufactured ammunition. This may be the cause of jamming.
4.	(a) Yes.
(b) This possibly is the case but the committee were unable to test this point.
5.	This may be so, but the rifles were not tried under dirty condition.
[DOT] ~ -*%
6.	The expansion of the bolthead was not apparent when firing 100 rounds of Canadian manufactured ammunition.
7.	Admittedly the figuring of the sighting is small and difficult to read as compared to the British Lee-Enfleld rifle.
8.	The magazine case is flat and any dent therein would seriously affect the spring therein.
9.	The committee did not consider that any great amount of difference existed in this respect in comparison with the British rifle.
10.	This hole should be covered by a small revolving plate, adjusted by a screw.
11.	Undoubtedly the loading of the Lee-Enfield can be carried out in half the time, mainly owing to the fact that the guide for the clip on the British rifle is directly over the magazine chamber.
12.	Undoubtedly there is a difference of the shape of the fore part of the chamber, but the committee was jiot able to decide that this was the cause of the jamb.
(Signed)
C. M. Mathew, Colonel, D.D.O.S., G.H.Q.
C. R. Woodroffe, Lieut.-General A.Q.M.G.
H. Guest, Major, G.S.
C. D. Baker- Carr, Major, Commandant Machine Gun School.
T. Burchall Wood, Colonel, AA and Q.M.G., 1st Canadian Division. J. A Murray, Lieut.-Colonel, D.O.O., 1st Canadian Division.
W. H. McNeil Campbell, Captain, R.A.
[Stage Direction]
I't should be noted that twenty-six Ross rifles per battalion are used in the Canadian forces at the front at present for sniping purposes, there being no question at all that for that purpose the Ross is superior to any other rifle known.
I do not know that I have emphasised sufficiently one point that ought to be borne in mind by every hon. member of the House, and by every one in this country who is disposed to consider in a reasonable way the situation that confronted this Government in the summer of 1915, after Sir John French's report had been received. I know, in a very intimate and confidential way, what the situation in regard to rifles was both for the British Government and certain others of the Allied Governments. The situation with regard to rifles, machine guns, 18-pounder field guns, howitzers and guns of larger calibre, such, as were being increasingly used in the field-the situation with regard to all these matters was detailed to me in a very frank way by the present Prime Minister of Great Britain two days before I left England in 1915. I cannot even at this date go into the particulars of the information Which he then afforded to me. But I do desire to emphasize to hon. gentlemen in this House that there was the most desperate and urgent need of rifles of any description in 1915. I could give the House, if it were permissible, information with regard to certain negotiations that were carried on in that year, in which our co-operation was asked for securing rifles of a somewhat antiquated type. The situation was not such as would justify the Government in considering a selection of rifles. The situation was one which demanded every possible effort that could be made in every direction to procure rifles of almost any description. Men were undergoing training'not only in this country but also in Great Britain, some without rifles at all and others with dummy rifles. The need was most intense, insistent and urgent. The Government could have the chamber of the Ross rifle enlarged, as the chamber of the Lee-Enfield had been enlarged, so that jamming would be prevented. What else could it do? I again point out that under the contract the Ross Rifle Company was entitled to one year before it could be called upon to produce rifles of a different type and that the British Government thought it could not be done in less than two years.
On the 21st of July, 1916, we requested the British Government to furnish the Boss

Rifle Company as soon as possible with all technical infornfation including drawings, specifications and samples of the new standard rifle to which I have alluded. We also inquired on that occasion as to whether or not the British Government proposed to continue their contract with the Ross Rifle Company for the Ross rifle, Mark III,-or whether they would require Ross to produce the new pattern of Lee-Enfield rifle under that contract. Various reminders were sent requesting a reply to that telegram, but none was received until the 28th of August, 1916, when the following reply was made:
With reference to your telegram of July 21, Army Council state that 'the improved pattern of Lee-Enfield rifle is not at present manufactured at Enfield, as considerable time would have been taken up in turning arms to new pattern. At present the new pattern is only made in America, and under the circumstances, the Army Council consider that there is no necessity for the Ross Company to communicate with Enfield.
There had been a suggestion in the previous telegram that the Ross Rifle Company should be put into direct communication with Enfield for this purpose. The telegram continues:
It is not considered possible by the Minister of Munitions to obtain delivery from the Ross rifle factory of the new pattern rifle in quantities under two years, but I am asking him to advise as to the best manner for the company to obtain the necessary specifications and drawings. I will telegraph as soon as possible as to the company's contract with His Majesty's Government
They supplemented that telegram on the 5th day of September, 1916, with this message:
With reference to my telegram August 28, position as regards contract for supply of 100,000 Ross rifles to His Majesty's Government is as follows: Ross rifles now being delivered though not authorized for service in the field are still of value for many purposes, training, arming home defence units, and arming marines. Therefore, immediate supply of these rifles of service. On the other hand it is not considered possible to obtain deliveries in large quantities of new pattern rifle from Ross factory in less than two years. At a certain date the supply of Enfield rifles will be more than sufficient for needs of British troops and all requirements of Allies will have been met. Minister of Munitions in these circumstances does not propose to modify contracts and so far as this contract is concerned could not agree to change of pattern. Minister of Munitions further suggests that if it is decided to change over factory to new pattern for manufacture for Canadian Government it will be very desirable from company's point of view, both as regards finance and shop organization to carry out contract with His Majesty's Government while plant is being changed over. On learning that it has been decided that company should take up

manufacture of new pattern rifle for Canadian Government, Minister of Munitions will render every assistance in his power; he will .give instructions that specifications and drawings be prepared in United States and will place representative of Ross company into communication with British experts who are watching manufacture in United States; further there is a certain amount of equipment (jigs and tools) accumulated rifle plant here and not now required ; if this can be adapted to Ross company's plant, Minister of Munitions will be glad to supply it to Canada. Suggested that representative of Ross company should examine this equipment with view of transfer.
Then there is a passage which I shall omit.
Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Will the Prime Minister state the date when the British Government will be able to take care of all their requirements?	.


Robert Laird Borden: That is precisely what I think it is not desirable to state.
Further on there is a telegram of the 11th of September which relates to the efforts of this Government to obtain a standard rifle of the type which the British Government advised us to manufacture. The members of the committee will bear in mind that we had already been informed that this rifle was not being manufactured in Great Britain and that it was being manufactured in the United States. Therefore, being desirous of obtaining it as soon as possible, if we-were going to adopt it as a standard, we started out on our own account to get necessary specimens of the rifle in order that we might take proceedings under the contract. But on the 11th day of September, 1916, we received this telegram:-
Stated by Minister of Munitions that Master General of Ordnance, Canada, has applied to Ministry Organizations of New York for a few serviceable rifles of new pattern. It is considered undesirable by minister to send any rifles not critically examined by Chief Inspector of Small Arms in this country, and he will therefore select five rifles jof pattern mentioned and despatch from here.
We did not receive those rifles until about the 20th day of January, 1917. I suppose they had to be sent from the United States to Great Britain, where they had to be critically examined by the Chibf Inspector of Small Arms, and thereafter they were despatched to this country, sealed and in the form which was necessary under the contract.
It was necessary for us, if we proposed to give an order for rifles of that type, not only to have tfie rifle itself, but to have the specifications and drawings; so we proceeded to take steps for the purpose of acquiring them. On the 19th day of November, 1916, not having received the drawings and specifications, this Government despatched to the Colonial Secretary a telegram in these terms:
Ottawa, November 19, 1916.
Your telegram September 5. Rifles. Specifications and drawings of Enfield rifle, 1914 pattern, urgently required before 1st December. Please telegraph probable date of arrival and also of shipment.
Devonshire.
And on the 19th November we sent this despatch:
Ottawa, November 19, 1916.
Your cypher telegram of 11th September last. Rifles. Urgently required for use as sealed patterns five Enfield rifles 1914 pattern. Hope this can be arranged and should be grateful to know by telegram date of shipment.
Devonshire.
On 12th December we received 'from the Colonial Secretary the following telegram addressed to the Governor General:
London, December 12, 1916.
With reference to your cypher telegram November 19, it is regretted by Minister of Munitions that he is not at present in a position to supply specifications and drawings of 1914 pattern Enfield rifle. No standard pattern of this, rifle has yet been definitely settled upon, as it has been found necessary for manufacturers to alter certain points in original design. With reference to the taking up of the manufacture of rifle Minister of Munitions wishes to give every assistance to your Government, and will give instructions that specifications and drawings should be prepared in America or this country as soon as all details of pattern are definitely settled, and as promised in my telegram of September 5, will place representatives of Ross Company in communication with British experts who are in United States watching manufacture of rifle.
Up to the present time the necessary specifications and drawings alluded t.o in these several telegrams have not been received. As I stated, we have received the pattern ,of the rifle itself, and, having that pattern, we have given notice to the Boss Bifle Company in accordance with the contract as already mentioned. But, as i am advised by the Department of Justice-by the Solicitor General who looked into the matter-that for an older under the contract it is necessary not only that we should have the rifle itself but that we should have the specifications and drawings which, as I have said, although asked for some months ago, have been delayed owing to the fact that the exact nature of these specifications and drawings had not been fully settled.

It may be that in these remarks, which have been somewhat extended owing to the necessity of Teading so many documents, I have overlooked some point suggested by hon. members on the other side, or it may be that some new point may be raised on which it would be proper to give information. I can only say in concluding my remarks, that if any further information is desired in any respect I shall be veTy happy to give it to the best of my ability. The Government ha3 absolutely nothing which it desires to conceal in connection with this matter, except so far as considerations of the public interest may make it undesirable to place certain communications or portions of communications before the House in such a way that the information will reach the enemy.
I submit to the House and to the country this correspondence, and this account of the conditions with which we have to deal, with a good deal of confidence that our course will be appreciated, as it must be if it is understood. Throughout we have been animated by one purpose alone, namely, that the gallant men overseas fighting in the Canadian forces should be equipped with an efficient rifle, and, more than that, a rifle in which they could have absolute , confidence. That has been the purpose, the desire, and the intention of the Government, and I think it is manifest from the correspondence I have read and the incidents I have described that the intention has been well carried out.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: I think the House accepts the statement made by the right hon. the Prime Minister in the spirit in which it is offered. We all realize that in a subject of such a confidential nature as this there is some correspondence which the right hon. gentleman could not produce to the House. It is very evident from the manner in which his statement has been made that some correspondence is withheld. For that reason it is not as easy to discuss the subject as if it were an ordinary business affair. Personally, I feel very grateful to the Prime Minister for the information he has given. If I can get just a few more questions answered along the same lines I shall be perfectly satisfied, or, at any rate, I shall not have much further to say. I should like to know whether, at any time after July 15, when it became evident that there was something wrong with the Ross rifle, any person in authority went to Sir Charles Ross, officially or unofficially, and asked him if he would manufacture a different type of rifle from the Ross rifle, and

if so whether he demanded a year's notice provided for in the contract, or whether he agreed to manufacture whatever kind of rifle the Government wanted. My reason for asking is found in the newspaper correspondence which took place last month. I have not it before me, but I read it as, I presume, the right hon. the Prime Minister did. We all know what that correspondence was. I think it began because of a statement made by the Solicitor General (Mr. Meighen) in Montreal. Sir Charles Ross, in his letter, stated in very plain language that he had always been willing to do whatever the Government wished him to do, that he had not stood on the letter of the contract but wished to carry it out in spirit, and had always been ready to make whatever changes and modifications the Government wanted to have made.


Robert Laird Borden: I have no knowledge of any person having called upon Sir Charles Ross to make such a proposal. I understand that he is under the impression that he spoke to me in 1915 with regard to approaching the British Government with a view to having all the contracts changed into a contract for the Lee-Enfield rifle, possibly to procure a larger contract from the British Government.
I have a good deal of confidential correspondence about some negotiations that he had concerning a proposed large contract with the Russian Government, in which he requested the assistance of the Canadian Government. I have no recollection of his having made that suggestion to me in 1915. If he made any such suggestion to- me as he thinks he did, it must have been of a casual character, because I 'have no recollection whatever of it. Further than that, I have had the correspondence examined and I find no reference in it to any such proposals. I am perfectly satisfied that the proposal is one which would not have been entertained by the British Government, for the reason that they have always adhered to the theory that it would be impossible for him to change his factory so as to produce a new rifle in quantities inside of about two years. I have read two telegrams which indicate that. Sir Charles Ross himself thinks that he would do it in a year, possibly in less than a year. We have to take into account, of course, the views of those whose experience in such matters would make their opinions valuable.	-


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Prime Minister
says that he will take the opinion of some

official in England in preference to the opinion of Sir Charles Ross. [DOT]


Robert Laird Borden: I did not say
that. I said that in dealing with such a question we would have to take into account the view of experts, whether in .Great Britain or in our own department at home. We could not be absolutely sure that the view of the experts of the Ross Rifle Company woold be borne out in the end.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Prime Minister has a great advantage in discussing this matter, because he has had an opportunity of taking it up, not only with the experts in Great Britain and in the department here, but also with Sir Charles Ross; whereas we on this side of the House have had no opportunity of discussing it with anybody. But it would seem to the ordinary observer that the man who has the most up-to-date rifle factory in America, and who has been able to turn out rifles at the rate of 1,000 a day, ought to have some idea as to how long it would take him to equip his factory. However, I have no knowledge of the matter; I simply accept the statement made by the Prime Minister. Has the Ross rifle factory during the last two years and a half been asked to make any changes in the rifle which they are manufacturing? If so, how many; and have they required a year's time within which to make the change, or have they done it in a much shorter time? If they have done it in a shorter time, how long has it taken to effect the changes?


Robert Laird Borden: I do not want my hon. friend, or the members of the committee, or any one else to misunderstand me. I was not disparaging the ability or experience of Sir Charles Ross, for, as far as the mechanical details of the rifle are concerned, it is universally acknowledged that he is an exceedingly capable man. I only intended to suggest that a government, in the midst of a war, when the question of time is vital, must, in considering such a change, take into consideration the view which is entertained not only by the contractor, but also by their own experts and by the experts of Great Britain, whose experience and knowledge in such matters certainly should command respect. When the question of time is vital, one could not make a plunge into a proposal of that kind without taking the opinion of both sides into pretty careful account. My hon. friend asks me what changes have
been made. I have spent a good deal of time in endeavouring to get at the bottom of all these matters from first to last, and to see that the direction of events was in accordance with the best interests of our men at the front, but I certainly am not in a position to-night to give my hon. friend the information he asks, I should imagine that any changes, if any have been made, are of a very minor and trivial character, but I do not desire to commit myself to any statement on the subject unless I am absolutely sure that it is correct. I will get the information in written form from the Master-General of the Ordnance and give it to the committee to-morrow, or whenever the question is next taken up.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: That is entirely satisfactory. I quite understand that the Prime Minister has had many things to take up his attention besides the matter of following up the changes that may 1 ave -taken place in the Ross rifle. Still, as he seems to have a very complete brief or the case, I thought he might possibly be able to tell us what changes, if any, have been made. There has been an enormous amount of talk throughout Canada during the last year in regard to the Ross rifle. We hear it stated in one place that the company must be allowed a year in which to make any change. I have been told by a member of the House since coming here that changes have been made inside of one or two months. I suppose they would be minor changes, but they would be changes just the same, and some alteration of the machinery would be necessary. I do not forget the fact that this country is at war, nor do I forget that up to a comparatively recent period the question of getting rifles of any kind was a very serious problem for Great Britain and her Allies-. But in the light of the report, which the right hon. gentleman has read to-night, of a committee appointed by General French away back in June, 1915, positively recommending that the Canadian troops at the front be not armed with the Ross rifle, it is most remarkable that the matter was allowed to drift along as it did. It could he justified only by the reason given by the Prime Minister to-night: that a rifle of almost any kind was better than no rifle at all. I do not think that the same charitable construction could be placed upon the actions of the Government after -the lamentable affairs of May, 1916, as could be placed upon their actions after the occurrences of 1915, because in 1916 the rifle

situation must have been, very materially improved. I quite appreciate the fact that the Prime Minister does not wish to state the date when the British Government expect to be entirely independent in the matter of the supply of rifles. He quite properly refused to give that information to-night, and I would suggest that he go over the remarks which he made this afternoon, because it is my impression that he gave that information, perhaps without realizing what he was doing. That was my reason for asking the question. However, in the months of June and July, 1916, the Government must have had some idea that the British Government were not in the straits that they had been in the matter of rifles. The best evidence of that is that on July 11, 1916, this Government was notified by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to send no more Boss rifles to England; that in future the British authorities would proviide the Canadian army with Lee-Enfields.
That is a fact which is plainly stated in the correspondence; therefore, there is no reason why we should not discuss it. We start out from the 11th day of July, 1916, with the fact that the British Government were able to furnish the Canadian Army with Lee-Enfield rifles and that they did not want any more Roes rifles brought to Great Britain. The question that occurs to the average business man is, why, if that condition of affairs existed, the Government have gone on manufacturing Boss rifles from the 11th of July to the present time, are asking this Parliament to vote $2,660,000 for the purpose of purchasing more Ross rifles, and are producing 80,000 more rifles which the British Government will not allow upon the firing line and do not want in England at all. I appreciate the fact that these Ross rifles would be useful for instructional purposes, and for drilling purposes; and, as the Prime Minister stated they might be used on the lines of communication, although I think not in France, for I cannot conceive that under present conditions they would be allowed there. But we must remember that at the lowest calculation there must be 100,000 more Ross rifles owned or controlled by the Government of Great Britain than possibly can be required for the troops now in Great Britain for instructional purposes, and it would seem to me that these 100,000 rifles could be brought to Canada. They would more than supply any troops that are in Canada or that are likely to be, for instruc-

tional purposes. Therefore, it would seem that if the British Government are furnishing and have been furnishing since July last, all the rifles that are used at the front, the supply of nearly 300,000 Ross rifles-it must be pretty near that number since we started, as 218,000 have been purchased- a supply of that kind, one would think, would be quite sufficient.
The first question I asked this afternoon I repeat now. Why, in view of this state of affairs, have the Government continued manufacturing the Ross rifle and why are they -spending so much money for an article which, according to all the evidence, is of no great practical use to Canada in winning this war. I know that the Prime Minister takes the ground that the Ross rifle factory could not be converted into a Lee-Enfield factory within two years. We have not any evidence upon that.


Robert Laird Borden: I did n.ot give any opinion of my own upon it.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Prime Minister
gave the opinion of some one else, and I have no opinion upon it at all; therefore my opinion would not be as good as the Prime Minister's. But we must remember that we would not have to close down the Ross factory entirely in order to convert it into a factory for making another kind of rifle, for there is an enormous amount of machinery in a rifle factory that would apply to any kind of rifle. After all, about the only difference between the Ross rifle and the Lee-Enfield rifle is in the bolt chamber. All the machinery which would make the stocks, barrels, and bands, and the dozen odd parts of the rifle, would be applicable to another type. We have the evidence given by the Prime Minister himself that it would take only about $500,000 to build over the Ross rifle -factory into a Lee-Enfield factory, and that the British Government would agree to furnish the_ machinery, or a large part of it. That is stated in the communication which the Prime Minister has just read. With these facts in our minds, the thing which I cannot understand, and which, I think, will bother the people of this country, is why the Government have gone on since July, 1916, manufacturing this rifle, -and why they are still making it and purchasing 80,000 more when the Prime Minister himself stated this afternoon that after the month of July, 1916, the production of rifles was not a very serious matter. I think I am using almost the ex-act words which the Prime Minister

used. I think ihis first idea was that it was hardly worth while bothering their heads about a rifle until the war had ended, or at least until the Empire had decided upon the make of a rifle that would be Empirewide. There was a communication addressed to the War Office, I think in the month of September, 1916-I have forgotten the exact date, but I think it was in September-asking them if, in their opinion, it was worth while for the Canadian Government to enter into the manufacture of any kind of rifle until the matter had been decided by the Empire at large. The same answer came back that had been coming for four or five months; if you want to manufacture a rifle, take the American [DOT] 276. That seemed to be the answer every time. I appreciate the fact that my hon. friend has had some difficulty in getting the specifications and drawings, and, to some extent, in getting a' pattern rifle.


Sir SAM HUGHES:: When my hon.
friend refers to the American -276 rifle, I suppose he means the British -276 made in the United States?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Prime Minister has been speaking about that this afternoon, and I am only quoting his words. I mean the 1914 Enfield rifle manufactured in the United States. The same answer always came back, and it came back in this case: if you want to make a rifle, make the -276 according to the American pattern, It seems most remarkable that this thing was .allowed to dangle along for months, and that nothing had been done. Now we are down to the point that after the 1st day of February, 1918, the rifles supplied shall be according to this -276 or American Enfield. I do not know, but I would feel pretty badly to-night if I could bring myself to believe that we would require rifles in any quantity after February, 1918. It may be possible that we will require them, but I sincerely hope not. , It seems to me that, in that view of the case, it would be almost a useless expenditure of time and energy, let alone money.
I wish to call my right hon. friend's attention to just one other matter, and it is one which I cannot view in the same light as I have viewed the remainder of the statements which he made this afternoon and evening. It seemed to me that the principal reason given by the Prime Minister for continuing to manufacture the Ross rifle, and for the expenditure of $2,500,000 in the future on a weapon which
he himself must admit can be of no very great practical use as a military weapon, is that we are bound by the contract, and that we must carry out that contract. Why, Mr. Chairman, has the right hon. gentleman forgotten that this country is at war? Has he forgotten that you can break a contract, if it is necessary, under the War Measures Act? I do not care if there was no War Measures Act; surely if this nation has agreed with some one to purchase a rifle which is not of any good, we are not going to carry out the contract. I do not believe that we have reached that point. I do not believe that Sir Charles Ross would try to hold the Government for a moment to a contract of that kind. I believe that if the Government asked Sir Charles Ross tomorrow, or put him in the box before a committee of this House, he would tell them that not only is he willing now, but that he has been willing from the beginning to change that rifle to any pattern that the Government wanted. I believe that the Government could cancel that contract if they want to cancel it. I cannot for a moment conceive that any hon. man, with the nation at war, would try to hold the Government to the mere letter of a contract and say: because you have given me a contract to manufacture a certain article, therefore, I am going to have my pound of flesh, and I am going to demand that you carry out that contract to the letter. I would want some further evidence than that which has been produced to make me believe that. There is another thing which I cannot accept; nor do I believe that the Prime Minister himself can accept it or believe it possible, and that is that the Ross rifle factory would demand a full year's time in which to make a change in the class of a rifle.
As far as Sir Charles Ross is personally concerned, I have never seen him more than once or twice in my life, and I do not know anything about him at all, but I cannot conceive of any loyal, British subject standing on a condition of that kind, when the nation is at war, and saying: although I own the only rifle factory which we have in Canada, and notwithstanding the fact that you want these rifles changed in order that they may be of some benefit to this country in the prosecution of the war, I stand on my legal rights and I will not make that change within twelve months. If I were the Prime Minister and a contractor should take that ground, it would not take me very long to put another

man into that factory who would carry out any changes that the nation wanted.


Robert Laird Borden: What does my hon. friend mean by that? How could we put another man in charge?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Do you mean to say
that if there is a rifle factory in charge of a man who says that he will not make such a change within a year simply because the contract says he does not have to, that you could not take that factory rover and put somebody else in charge?


Robert Laird Borden: Do you mean to expropriate it?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Take it; I do not care what you call it. I would take it and so quickly that he w.ould never know what had happened to him. I do not think that I have to argue that before the Prime Minister. I do not believe that condition of affairs exists at all, and I think the Prime Minister would be much happier arguing that possibly it could not be done than that as he says because of the contract he could not do as he wished to do. However we have the explanation from the Prime Minister. I am very glad that the country has it and I think it would have been more fitting if we had had the facts laid before the public long ago. I realize that much of what has come put to-day has transpired since Parliament adjourned in May last, but there was a good deal which could have been given to the country a year ago. However, the country now has the information. I, for one, still hope that the Government will reconsider the matter and attempt to bring about the manufacture of rifles in Canada. As I said this afternoon, I agreed with that principle in 1904 and I agree with that principle to-day. I do not see any reason why rifles cannot be manufactured in Canada as well as in any other place in the world. I know they can be manufactured because they are being . manufactured. A rifle which for sniping purposes, as the Prime Minister admits, is the best rifle in the world, is being made to-day. As he says, this is the best equipped factory on the continent and therefore there is no reason why this factory could not be kept in existence and why they cannot accept the offer of the British Government and convert it into a Lee-Enfield factory. Notwithstanding the opinion of the Prime Minister, I do not think there is any reason why this factory could not, within a reasonably short time, be turning out Lee-Enfield rifles, which we know would be of
fMr. Carvell.l
some benefit in winning this war, instead of spending a year's time and $2,500,000 in turning out a rifle which, I am afraid, will not be of very much value to the Empire and which, the British Government do not want at all. I place this view before the Prime Minister, but I do not do so in a controversial spirit. I have tried to discuss the facts, and I do think that even at this late date there is time for the Government to do better than they have done and get much better results for the country than this proposal which they put forward would give.	,
Just another word and that is to the contractual part of the matter. The Prime Minister tries to make it appear that because this contract was in a sense perpetual they were compelled to go on and manufacture Ross rifles or rifles of some kind. The argument I used a few moments ago applies to this as well. If this country is at war and wants rifles or munitions or materials of any kind, all it has to do is to say so. It may be a question of adjustment later on, there may be some damages to pay, but that is a pretty lame excuse for manufacturing something that this country does not require, that is of no benefit to the country and which does not make for munitions necessary to the winning of the war. There is not much use in notifying the Ross Rifle Company that all rifles to be furnished by them after the first of February, 1918, must be of a certain pattern. Unless the Government makes with the company a contract sufficiently large to make it of some value, there is no object in going on and manufacturing. If you take, say, 12,000 rifles for this year, which, as I understand, is the minimum amount which the Government must take, at $30 apiece, and I believe that is the price for the rifle and the bayonet, that is only $360,000. That is th^ total cost of the 12,000 rifles. According to the information received this afternoon, it will cost $500,000 to equip the factory so that unless the Government go into this-


Samuel Hughes: How much did the hon. gentleman say it would cost to equip the factory?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: About half a million.


Samuel Hughes: For what?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: For re-equipping the
factory.


Samuel Hughes: That is only for the change in the gauges.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: That is all. The major
portion of the factory - would be equally suited to the manufacturing of the Lee-En-fields a-s the Ross. But there was the statement made this afternoon by the Prime Minister that the factory could be converted into a Lee-Enfield' factory for about half a million dollars. If you stand by the letter of the old contract, which means that the company must manufacture, say, 12,000 rifles, which the .Government take at $30 apiece, that amounts only to $360,000 while it whuld cost half a million dollars to change the factory over. That means that the contractor will not carry out the work and you will be doing nothing. If you follow out that contract to its logical conclusion, it means that the factory is closed down. I do not believe that it is in the best interests of Canada, of the militia of Canada, or of the British Empire, that the Ross rifle factory, or any other factory, that can manufacture rifles or anything else that is required for the conduct of the war should be closed down. I can only conclude by expressing the hope that the Government will reconsider this matter and put all the energy which they can into it, accept the offer of the British Government for these jigs and tools, equip the Ross rifle factory and manufacture something which will be of assistance to Canada and the Empire in the winning of the war.


Robert Laird Borden: That is exactly what we have asked them to do in this order in council whidh I have read. The hon. gentleman seems to regard the Ross rifle as a particularly fragile article. I do not so regard it at -all. The Ross rifle has a more delicate mechanism, it is admittedly a better target rifle, tout when it was subjected to the test under conditions of war which prevailed during the past year or two


Samuel Hughes: Did my right hon,
friend say it bad -a more delicate mechanism?


Robert Laird Borden: I thought so.


Samuel Hughes: Not at all.


Robert Laird Borden: I bow to the
superior knowledge of my hon. friend but I have so understood it from certain authorities which may not be so convincing on the subject as my hon. friend's opinion. But, I think I could give him some testimony to that effect. The despatch from the British Government to which I have alluded states that for certain purposes,
although not for service in the field, the Ross rifle is valuable, such as the training of the army, and so on. After grave consideration of the matter we gave this order in February last just as the British Government had given their order in the autumn of 1914. They are continuing their order. They are bound by the contract to have it fulfilled and pay for the rifles on delivery. We gave an order in February 1916, and we are bound by the terms of the contract. We must fulfil the contract and we must pay for the rifles. Sir Charles Ross has accomplished very great things in equipping bis rifle factory for war purposes. I would not be disposed to treat him in any harsh or unfair way, and I think when my hon. friend suggests that we should take him by the coat collar and put him out of the factory if he did not do this, that, or the other thing which he was not obliged to do under the contract, he is asking us to adopt a course which would hardly be consistent with fair play. I think it would be unfair not to have regard to the very large expenditure which Sir Charles Ross has made for the purpose of turning out rifles which were of a type approved by the late Administration, and approved also by the present Administration. My hon. friend might realize also that the 1914 Enfield rifle, according to the view of the British Government expressed in the telegrams which I have read, is a better rifle than that which is at present being manufactured in Great Britain. Nevertheless "they have not attempted to manufacture that model in Great Britain up to the present time, and that obviously for the reason I have already suggested.


Samuel Hughes: Have they accepted any from the United States?


Robert Laird Borden: I do not know.


Samuel Hughes: None whatever.


Robert Laird Borden: I do not know that they have accepted any; I do not know that they have not. I would suppose that the reasox they have carried on the manufacture in the United States, and not in Great Britain, is that in the United States it was necessary to build up a new organization, and therefore that new organization could be built up for the purpose of producing a new rifle, whereas in Great Britain they had their plants and factories all ready for the manufacture of the previous type of Lee-Enfield, and they carried on with that, because to have



attempted to make a change in Great Britain would have involved an unfortunate and unjustifiable delay.
My hon. friend (Mr. Carvell) says that rifles produced after the 1st of February, 1918, may be of no use in this war. That is perfectly true. The war may have ended by that time, and in the way we all hope it will end. But it might also have been in my hon. friend's mind, or in the mind of any reasonable person, in July or August of 1916, that rifles produced after the 1st of September, 1917, would not be of any use in this war; and the outcome of the war may still be such as would justify that anticipation. So it is perfectly idle to suggest that the Government could have taken any other course than that which they did take under the oircumstarmes. My hon. friend has referred to the condition of the Ross rifle in Great Britain, and suggested that the rifles might be brought back, and the present contract cancelled. As I have already explained, there are some negotiations on foot in regard to the Ross rifle in Great Britain, and possibly some announcement may be made to the House later in the session as to the outcome of these negotiations.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Would' the right hon.
gentleman let me know whether he found out during the dinner hour who it was that ordered or was responsible for the reduction of the chamber of the Ross rifle from .462 to .457 in 1910? v


Robert Laird Borden: I stated at the time that my information did not come from the Department of Militia and Defence, but that it waS reliable. I have asked the deputy minister to procure absolutely accurate information on that point, which I shall give to the committee.


Samuel Hughes: I understand that
it was on the recommendation of Colonel Harkom, the expert adviser ito the Militia Department under;. Sir Frederick Borden. The Standing Committee on Small Arms was never consulted. A mistake arose in this way. The Lee-Enfield rifle for the proof charge had exactly the same chamber as the Ross rifle for the finished charge. I forget the figures, but they are all on Hansard. The proof charge of the Lee-Enfield was, I think, about twenty some odd tons. Then the rifle was fired in proof, the expansion being greater than the tensile strength of the steel, the [DOT]chamber of the Lee-Enfield rifle was expanded about two-thousandths of an inch. The tensile strength was from forty-eight to fifty-two

thousand-fifty-two thousand being the proof charge. The steel after expanding did not contract back to the primary size of the chamber. With the Ross rifle, the proof charge was the same: fifty-two thousand or thereabouts, but the tensile strength of the Ross was from eighty to one hundred thousand pounds to the square inch., and accordingly there was no expansion in the chamber of the Ross; it remained exactly as it was. The chamber of the, Ross rifle was therefore the size of the proof charge, two thousandths of an inch less than the chamber of the Lee-Enfield. That was remedied in England and France. I do not want to take any part in this discussion, as I understand it is all about the contract.
The chamber of the Ross rifle was, of course, changed a couple of years ago, but let us take the Ross rifle with the small chamber. I did not h,ear the reports that were read this afternoon, nor have I seen them, but I challenge the world to produce a report showing a test between the Ross rifle with the small chamber, and the Lee-Enfield, with good ammunition for both rifles, where the Ross has not beaten the Lee Enfield. I go further and take dirt mud, and sand tests, of which we have had scores officially and otherwise, and I challenge any man to produce a report of what we call these official tests, even with the small chamber in the Ross, where the Ross rifle has not beaten the Lee-Enfield. I go further and say that even with defective ammunition, which has been the cause of all this trouble-it was not the rifles at all but the defective ammunition with the soft cartridge case-I will not say that the Lee-Enfield has not stood the fire as well as the small chambered Ross, but I say they are about even. But since we enlarged the chamber of the Ross rifle, I challenge any one to show a report of any tests here or in the British Army, where the Ross rifle, even firing bad ammunition, has not done infinitely better than the Lee-Enfield.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Was the hon. gentleman present after eight o'clock when the Premier read a report of the committee appointed by Sir John French in the month of June, 1915?


Samuel Hughes: The Ross chamber was not enlarged then. I care not what the report is. There is no such, test report in existence that has been made as between the two rifles where the Rose did not beat the Lee-Enfield. I know what has been done. '


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Premier read it.


Samuel Hughes: He did not read a comparative test between the two rifles.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Yes, he did.


Samuel Hughes: I should like to see it. I say that such a test was never made -by Sir John French. A hearsay report was ,made by one of his officers, but no comparative test.


Mr. A. K. MACLEAN:: If the report is produced, what will the hon. gentleman say?


Samuel Hughes: It cannot be produced for no comparative tests were made there by any authority whatsoever. I saw one report in a Canadian paper of a test between the two rifles that never occurred. One day they were illustrating to General Carson and Sir Max Aitken the defective cartridges. They took a boy, who was an engine driver and who had never fired more than twenty shots out of a Ross rifle in his life, to handle the Ross rifle, putting him in competition with an expert artillery man who was using the other rifle. As soon as a competent man was put on to handle the Ross rifle, with the defective cartridges it was found that the Lee-Enficld jammed more quickly than the Ross.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: That is not the comparative test referred to' by the Prime Minister this evening.


Samuel Hughes: I do'not know to what the right hon. gentleman referred.


Robert Laird Borden: It was some test referred to in Sir John French's report made on the 5th of June, 1915.


Samuel Hughes: There was no
such test for mud and dirt and all that sort of thing.


Robert Laird Borden: I did not say it was for mud or dirt; it was for defect in jamming.


Samuel Hughes: That is the point I am making. The. jamming was due to defective ammunition. I had the reports and I presume they should be in the department. I do not know whether they have been read here tonight or not. There was a report of the 28th Regiment of Regina having a mine exploded in front of them and in their attempt to take the trench, twelve of the rifles jammed. The cry immediately went up "Ross rifles jamming." Col. Embury knew from experience that it
27*
was the ammunition that was bad because they had been trained in England not to use certain brands-of ammunition; but in spite of all the orders that this ammunition was not to be served out to the Canadian troops, it was found bad mixed with good in every regiment that had the Ross rifle and it was not found in a solitary regiment that had the Lee-Enfield rifle. Five thousand rounds of defective ammunition were found in the pouches of one particular regiment after the fighting was over,


Mr. CAR YELL:: Was it a German conspiracy ?


Samuel Hughes: I do not know; I was not there. The men were disgusted with the rifle, the consequence being that Colonel Embury took the twelve men with the Lee-Enfield rifle and twelve men with the Ross rifle and made them test their rifles with the defective ammunition, and every man was convinced that defective ammunition jammed in the Lee-Enfield rifle after fifteen or twenty rounds had been fired, and in the Ross rifle only after fifty or sixty rounds had been fired. The Lee-Enfield rifle was put out of action after seventy-five or ninety rounds had been fired, and the Ross rifle only after a hundred to a hundred and twenty-five rounds had been fired. In every instance the Ross rifle proved better than the Lee-Enfield with defective ammunition, but with good ammunition neither rifle jammed, and they could not possibly jam. I could produce officers who are in the city to-night who fought with the Princess Patricias, with the Munster Fusiliers, with the Guards, with practically every British regiment- there are none in the city who fought with the Gordons-and they know that it was the defective ammunition that caused the jamming. There were three brands of it. Soft shells or soft cartridge cases would glue to the sides of the chamber and could not readily be extracted; but the tests are in the department and can be produced, if that has not already been done, showing where in England, France and Belgium these tests were made, and in every solitary instance with good ammunition there was no trouble with either rifle. With the defective ammunition, the Ross rifle would sometimes jam, but always later than the Lee-Enfield, the fault being entirely due to the ammunition. Although the British forces did not seem to be aware of it early in the war, they are aware of it now. The Canadian forces were not aware of it. At

the battle of St. Julien and the second battle of Ypres, a great deal of the ammunition the boys carried was Canadian ammunition that was absolutely perfect, and there was not one case*of jamming except where defective ammunition was .served opt to one of the brigades.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: The Third Brigade?


Samuel Hughes: No, I think it was the brigade under General Currie. The only thing the Canadians had to defend themselves with, with the exception of a few machine guns, was the Ross rifle, whereas the Germans had rifles, machine guns by the hundred and also their artillery and aeroplanes flying over our troops, and yet the Ross rifle firing the good Canadian ammunition carried our soldiers right through. The next day or two after the first three days of the fighting the Durhams and the Yorks were brought up to fill up the gaps on the right of the Third Brigade. When they began to fire with the defective ammunition, they found they could not Ato their rifles and many of them were shot down. They threw away their rifles and did the only thing they could do- fell back; they had no other recourse than to retire. Some of our rifles firing the bad English ammunition also jammed and there was considerable trouble, all due to the ammunition. Neither the Lee-Enfield nor the Ross rifle has jammed with good ammunition. Those who are familiar with rifles know the sand and mud test, of getting the rifles - and ammunition all dirty and testing them out. Where such tests have been made, with good ammunition or bad ammunition, the Ross rifle with the large chamber has beaten the Lee-Enfield.


Mr. J. J. HUGHES:: Then why was the Ross rifle condemned?


Samuel Hughes: I did not condemn it. You had better ask those who did. It has been pointed out that the Ross rifle is longer than the Lee-Enfield. The Ross r.fle is practically the same length as the Mauser rifle and it is the standard length. For trench warfare, of course, it is handier to have a short rifle. The only objection General Turner told me he could find to the Ross rifle was its length. When I pointed out that it was the same length as the Mauser rifle, he said that the soldiers had got the idea that the Lee-Enfield rifle was handier for running through a trench at night. That may have been true, but all that is done away with. Those who

make raids on the trenches use bombs and revolvers; only the men who stand out on top of the trenches use rifles. General Turner told me last summer and also previously that the Ross rifle was a little long for work in the trenches. When the decision came this year to change the rifle,' I spoke to General Byng about it. The Prime Minister offered to have a competitive test, if I remember aright. I presume it has been produced to-day.


Robert Laird Borden: No.


Samuel Hughes: Why was that test not held, may I ask? It was because everyone on either side knew that there would be bnly one result. We had scores of tests in England and. in France, and they knew that if a comparative test was made with good ammunition, the Ross 'rifle would come out on top for mud tests, and they knew that if there was a comparative test for bad ammunition-and we have had them again and again for each rifle in such a way that no favouritism was shown -the Ross rifle would always stand up a little better than the Lee-Enfield.
I have made no fuss about it, because the rifle was gone, and I felt that many of the boys were honestly uncertain about the rifle from the attacks made upon it, and many others were made uncertain. I would say: Don't carry a rifle that you have not confidence fn, but if you feel that way about it, change it. It was on that ground that General Byng advocated the change. He said he did not know the merits or demerits of the rifle, but the story was abroad that the Ross rifle jammed. A number of the English soldiers got the idea that our rifles were not what they ought to be, and a lot of Canadians got the idea that maybe our rifle was not as good as the English rifle. Another point. I have reports here, but I do not wish to bother the House with them-for the thing is past-showing the action of some of the regiments when they were ordered to give up the Ross rifle and take the Lee-Enfield. I might mention one case. Colonel Rose, of the Welland regiment, as well as others, entered a most determined protest. He said that he had tried again and again to make scores with the Lee-Enfield without success, but with the Ross rifle the score was 75 per cent for the entire regiment at 600 yards down to 100 yards rapid fire. And that is the sort of shooting that made the Germans hesitate at St. Julien, and caused them to believe that the Canadians were armed with

machine guns. With the Lee-Enfield tried over and over again, Col. Rose's regiment had only been able to make a score of 29 per cent for the whole regiment. He declared that it meant murder to change the rifles; one man with a Ross rifle was equal to two men with the Lee-Enfield, the shooting was so rapid and so accurate, and the sighting so easy. I say I have reports to this effect, but I have not bothered to give them, for the thing has gone by, so let it go.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: While we are cleaning up things and getting information, would the hon. gentleman (Sir Sam Hughes) tell us what took place about the bolt of the Ross rifle? I have seen reference to the fact that enormous sums of money were spent


Samuel Hughes: Not much money. Well, there was a good deal of it, too. The cam action of the bolt depends upon the lugs, as they are called. These lugs were made soft so that they would stand the recoil without breaking. They were tempered to just the proper consistency. Somebody conceived the idea that these should be hardened, and this was done in the case of a number of the rifles. By whose authority this was done, I do- not know, but I believe it was that of some officers at the camp in Kent. We sent over three thousand bolts properly tempered. But these people hardened them again, as we found out afterwards.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: What was the result?


Samuel Hughes: They were made as brittle as a piece of glass, almost; the bolts were practically ruined. It was a piece of meddling on the part of somebody-on whose part I never found out.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Was this hardening process carried out under instructions of the Canadian Government?


Samuel Hughes: No, we gave no instructions on the subject. I asked half a dozen times, but did not find out definitely on whose authority the thing was done. I heard a variety of stories about it, but I do not wish to mention any names when I am not sure of the facts. It was not done by authority of General Carson. He heard of it and was informed that it was necessary.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Is it true that over 100,000 rifles were so treated?


Samuel Hughes: I never heard it said that there were that manv.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: 1 have heard all sorts of stories about it-that there were from 75,000 to 150,000 rifles so treated.


Samuel Hughes: I never heard that there were as many as that. The number, as I was informed, was several thousands.


Mr. MURPHY:: If the committee and the people of this country could reconcile, in the first place, the opposing positions taken with reference to making a change in the Ross rifle by two members of the Government, and, in the second place, the opposing positions taken by Sir Charles Ross, the contractor, as against both of these gentlemen, the explanation which was given here as to the change would be the more readily accepted. As I understand the right hon. Prime Minister-and his explanation seemed reasonable-the chief objection to making the change was the time that would be consumed in carrying it out. But, speaking in Montreal in December last, the hon. the Solicitor General explained tnat the difficulty which confronted the Government in this regard was that the Government was bound by the contract made with the former Administration, and being so bound couid not make a change. Here are two different positions taken by these two distinguished gentlemen. As against both of them, Sir Charles Ross, in his letter to the Ottawa Citizen of 12th January, 1917, takes an entirely different position. In the first place, he does not seem to regard time as an element containing any difficulty whatever in making the change, and in the second place he makes it quite plain that if at any time the Government desired to make a change his company would not seek to hold them to the terms of the original contract. So that there may be no doubt on this point, let me refer the committee to that letter:-
You ask whether I made it clear to the Government at any time after the outbreak of war that the Ross Rifle Company would be willing not to stand on the letter of the contract or if Mr. Meighen was right in affirming at Montreal that the Government was "bound" by the contract made by the late Administration.
I am quite willing to reply to your question but to enable me to select the most appropriate extracts from official documents to back up my statement, I should like to know authoritatively, first, just what Mr. Meighen means by the word "bound."
Does he mean to repeat the historical platitude that Governments of Canada keep faith and are as a result bound by agreements made by themselves or their predecessors? Or does he allege that the Government because it was "bound" -was, as a result, hampered and prevented from taking the best course in the gen-


Robert Laird Borden: I have placed the contract in the pages of Hansard to speak for itself. It is obvious that the terms of the contract cannot be modified by a letter written to a newspaper. Sir Charles Ross since the outbreak of the war has used every effort to turn out in the greatest possible numbers and with the least possible delay the rifles which have been ordered by the Government. I have already given him credit for the enterprise, promptness and vigour with which he undertook to discharge that very important task. I am not aware that the terms of the contract have otherwise been modified in any way. However, II will make inquiry and see whether there is any document on record indicating that it was the intention to depart from the terms of the contract as I have placed it before the committee and as it is now in Hansard.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: A few minutes ago the ex-Minister of Militia made a somewhat re-^ markable statement. He said that the bolts' of thousands of rifles had been hardened, so that the lug holding the bolt in position became as brittle as a piece of glass, broke off and in many cases flew put in the men's faces. Certainly there is something about the treatment of these bolts which the country does not know. I know the ex-Minister fairly well; when he skates over a thing like he did over this matter to-night, I always get suspicious. I wish that the Prime Minister, who does not skate, wpuld investigate this matter and give the commit-

tee some information when the subject comes up again for discussion.


Robert Laird Borden: Probably some information can be obtained on the subject. As I have already said, we have nothing to conceal about this matter; if a mistake has been made in dealing with the bolts it is proper that the committee should be informed of it. I shall be very glad when this matter is taken up in committee again, to give any information that may be available on the subject.


Charles Marcil: ' On the 9th of December the new Minister of Inland Revenue, on his arrival at Quebec the day after he had been sworn in, declared in the presence of a large number of the workmen employed by the Ross rifle factory that he was authorized by his colleagues to state that the removal of the factory from Quebec had never been contemplated and that the factory would remain where it was. Probably the rumour to that effect had been started" by the announcement that the construction of a- new Dominion arsenal in Lindsay, Ontario, had been commenced. What is the policy of the Government regarding the manufacture of munitions and the manufacture of rifles in Canada?


Robert Laird Borden: The Minister of Inland Revenue asked me before he went to Quebec whether it was the intention of the Government to remove the Dominion Arsenal from Quebec. I told him that that had not been contemplated, and that it was not the intention of the Government to remove the Dominion Arsenal from Quebec.


Charles Marcil: What about the Ross rifle factory?


Robert Laird Borden: He asked me
whether there was any intention of doing away with the Ross rifle factory or of removing it from Quebec. I told him that that had not been in contemplation, and that it was not the intention of the Government to remove it. I understand that the declaration which the Minister of Inland Revenue made is in accordance with that.


Charles Marcil: What is in contemplation with respect to the arsenal at Lindsay? If my memory serves me correctly, the late. Minister of Militia said that Quebec was not a very safe place in which to manufacture munitions-that it was deemed advisable to manufacture munitions on a larger scale at a point more inland.
Sir ROBERT BORDEN. I do not understand how my hon. friend can find anything

inconsistent in the two statements. An arsenal has been established at Lindsay, from which ammunition is now being turned out. It is quite consistent with that that the Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, which has produced ammunition in small quantities in the past, should be continued.


Frank Oliver: Is there any provision in this contract with the Ross Rifle Company which gives the company the exclusive right to manufacture rifles for or supply rifles to the Government of Canada9


Robert Laird Borden: Ye3, the Government are bound to purchase from that company all the rifles that they require, and they are bound also to purchase from them not less than 10,000 rifles every year. I have not the contract before me-it has been sent to Hansard-but, as I recall it, the only qualification is that if the Government, in case of war or emergency, calls upon the company to produce rifles in very large numbers and the company in reply notify the Government that they can produce only a certain smaller number, then the Government would be at liberty to obtain the additional number wherever they might be available.


Frank Oliver: Has the Prime Minister any information as to what the cost of the Ross rifle establishment was at the outbreak of war?


Robert Laird Borden: No, I could not tell my hon. friend just what it was at that time, or, indeed, what it is at present. I know that the factory has been very considerably enlarged by the addition of units, as they call them, since the outbreak of war. It is only in that way that the company has been enabled to produce a greatly increased quantity of rifles during the past two and a half years.


Frank Oliver: There is, then, a provision that in case of war, such as did take place, if the company was not able to meet any demand made by the Government, the Government could take other means to meet that demand?


Robert Laird Borden: Yes, if it could get the rifles anywhere else. The situation that presented itself to the Government was that we could not get them anywhere else; therefore, we simply had to ask the Ross Rifle Company to do the best that they could. Their best was really beyond the anticipation of any person who knew what their resources were when war broke out.


Frank Oliver: What was the eapacity of their factory in 1914?


Robert Laird Borden: The Deputy Minister of Militia informs me that at the outbreak of war their maximum output was
20,000	a year.


Alexander Kenneth Maclean: I understand the Prime Minister to say that under the contract the Ross Company would be obliged to manufacture any pattern of rifle which the Government would require, the Government being bound to purchase at least 10,000 per year. If the Ross Company were required by the Government to make the necessary changes in plant in order to manufacture the Lee-Enfield instead of the Ross, which would entail a large initial capital expenditure, is the Government supposed to repay to the company part of that capital investment? Would it be fair to expect the Ross Rifle Company to make the necessary changes upon a small order of say 10,000 per year? It seems to me that that would hardly be a fair way of dealing with the company.


Robert Laird Borden: I appreciate what my hon. friend says. Of course, we do not intend to take any course which might be regarded as unfair to the company, especially having regard to the great vigour and resourcefulness which the company displayed in increasing its output. I agree entirely with my hon. friend that, possibly, if the contract was strictly enforced in that respect, a result that would not be regarded as quite fair to the company might follow. That is one of the difficulties of the situation which confronts the Government at the present time. We must take into account, on the one hand, the fact that we may have a very large number of Ross rifles, already manufactured, which would be sufficient and well adapted for the training of our troops in time of peace, a larger number probably than would be required in time of peace for that purpose. On the other hand, we have to take into account the fact that it is not advisable, as has been urged by the hon. member for Carleton, to continue the production of the Ross rifle Mark III. Therefore, we have directed the company, by notice under the terms of the contract, to manufacture the Enfield rifle of 1914, adapted for .303 ammunition. So that on the one hand, there is the fact, which faces the Government of the United Kingdom as well, that there will be this large surplus of rifles. On

the other hand, there is the consideration pointed out by my colleague from Halifax (Xvlr. Maclean) Inal if we followed out the strict terms of the contract, and simply ordered 10,000 rifles of the new type, the company might be put to an expense for the change of gauges, and for different plant and machinery, which would be greatly in excess of the order for the first year, and might probably equal the price to be paid for two years' orders if they should be restricted to the minimum fixed in the contract. I can only say- that we must take all these considerations into account, and that we have no disposition to act in a manner that might be regarded as unfair or harsh towards the Ross Rifle Company. I say that for the -reason that I think they have done remarkably well in increasing the output as they -have done since the war. began.


Alexander Kenneth Maclean: If the contractors are obliged to make the change in August, 1918, any arrangements to be made between the Government and the contractors should not be left until too -late a period. Of course that is quite obvious.


Robert Laird Borden: I appreciate that.
- Mr. CARVELL: I cannot understand the pessimism of my right lion, friend over the possibilities of making rifles in Canada. It seems to me that we have had an object lesson in Canada during the last two and a half years that ought to lessen all the pessimism-


Robert Laird Borden: What is the
pessimism alluded to?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: About the possibility of converting the Ross factory inside of two years in order to make rifles of a new type. He has given us a statement by some official in England who 'has some doubts about our ability to convert this factory in two years. I would like to carry him back to -the time, a little over two years ago, when the same authorities in England cabled over here to know if it would be possible to get 200,000 rounds of shrapnel in America, not in Canada, but in America, -and when the ex-Minister of Militia cabled back that he thought they could fill the order in Canada, and they went to work upon it. The ex-Minister of Militia himself stated the qther day that $700,000,000 had been expended in Canada by the British Government in the manufacture of munitions during the past two years. The same people who did not

believe that shrapnel shells could be made in America two years ago, who wondered if 200,000 rounds could be made in America, possibly honestly believe that you cannot change this rifle factory to enable it to manufacture Lee-Enfields within two years; but if our experience of munition work in the past two years is any criterion as to our abilities, I think that that man, whoever he may be, is incompetent, and that my right hon. friend is deserving of the severest castigation for listening to his opinion. I think he ought to have more faith and more optimism in this country than he has. If he had one-quarter or one-half of the optimism he ought to have, he would not see any lions in his path; he would go on and ask the manufacturers to make these rifles in the way they ought to be made to enable us to do our duty.


Robert Laird Borden: I am glad to find that my hon. friend is converted to an entirely new view as to the possibilities of manufacturing in Canada.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Oh, no, I have not changed.


Robert Laird Borden: He is now paying a remarkable tribute to the work of the ex-Minister of Militia and Defence, and to the work of the committee which he organized. It shows a comprehension long delayed on the part of my hon. friend which, I am sure, is an earnest of still better things to come. I should like to point out, however, that the manufacturers of Canada themselves were not very sure about their ability to do anything like what they have done when the proposal was first put before them. We have the testimony of the ex-Minister of Militia and Defence that he found a great deal of difficulty in inducing manufacturers in Canada to undertake the work at first, and that it was only some of them who were willing to undertake it. I am not at -all disposed to minimize the resourcefulness and ability of the Canadian people. I do know, however, that there has been, and still is, under present conditions, a good deal of difficulty about getting the plant and machinery of the type alluded to. At least, I have been told that by those who ought to know. But. when my hon. friend suggests that he is a better authority as to the time requisite for this purpose than the men who have been devoting their lives to work of this kind-


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: I did not say that I knew; I said, I would take the opinion of the man who was doing the manufacturing.


Robert Laird Borden: That is where I would differ from my hon. friend. I would not necessarily take the opinion of either of two persons where opinions were conflicting, and who possessed anything like the same skill and experience. If there was an opinion, on the one hand, that two years were requisite, and an opinion on the other hand that one year would be sufficient, I would be rather inclined to think that perhaps the truth might be found to lie between; but I would not think there was any reason why I should absolutely accept the one as against the other when presumably each party had sufficient knowledge and experience to form a judgment.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Just one word as to my right hon. friend's reference to my conversion in regard to the possibilities of Canadian manufacture. There has been no conversion on my part; I stated in this House on a great many occasions during last session that I had absolute faith in the manufacturers of Canada to turn out munitions, and I am sure that my right hon. friend, if he will con over the pages of Hansard, will have great difficulty in finding any other opinion expressed by me.


Robert Laird Borden: I do not think that I should take the trouble.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: No, I think you had better not try. As to the tribute which he says I paid to the ex-Minister of Militia and to the work of the committee which he formed, I have heard the ex-Minister of Militia make the same statement in this House as to the wonderful difficulties he experienced in getting manufacturers to go into the manufacture of munitions. I had an opportunity of hearing all those gentlemen in the box under oath within the last eight or nine months.
You can read every statement made by them and you will find no word to show that any man of them had any doubts whatever but, to. use an expression which has been used in this House before-and I do not wish to descend to slang-all I could find was that they fought like blazes *among themselves to see who would get the most contracts. There was no difference between them as to their ability to manufacture and to such an extent did they carry out that idea that- and I am -not now going into, that controversy-it will come up later-when the Shell Committee was put out of office and a new, I believe, better order of things was put in its stead, one or tnese manufacturers whom the ex-minister calls pessimists not only had manufactured some millions of dollars worth of shells for the Shell Committee but he had contracts in his pockets for 100,000 shells which he knew he could not manufacture for a year to come. The first act of the new powers which were placed in control was to cancel that contract.


Robert Laird Borden: Who had the
contract?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: I did not say. I said
one firm. You will find it in the evidence taken by the Royal Commission. I will not go into a discussion of that now, but I want to point out that there has been no change of heart on my part. The fact is that instead of each manufacturer being obliged to go into it, every one of them wias simply rushing to get in from the beginning and if there was any difference amongst them it was only to see who would get the biggest contract.


Mr. SINCLAIR:: I have listened with
a great deal of interest and I have admired the good nature of the Prime Minister and the way he has endeavoured to answer the questions which have , come from this side. But, there is one phase of the matter that I have not been able to understand thoroughly. We all understand that the Ross rifle has been condemned and that the Lee-Enfield has been adopted. The vital question is to. get the Lee-Enfield and I have not been able to understand why the matter has not been brought to a head by the Government offering Sir Charles Ross an order to make the Lee-Enfield for quick delivery. There should be no mystery about it. He has indicated in his letter that he is able to do it. We want the rifle and instead of speculating and asking people across the water whether it can be done, why not bring it to a head at once by giving an order if he will accept it. Then, we will find out how long it will take him to equip his factory and furnish the Lee-Enfield rifle.


Robert Laird Borden: We are obliged under the terms of the contract, to give a year's notice. Of course, if Sir Charles Ross should be prepared to execute an order within a year it might be done. But my hon. friend (Mr. Sinclair) will remember that we have to get the actual rifle itself. We were- instructed by the British Government that it would not do to go to the

United States and take five or six of the rifles in process of being manufactured there. They advised, and, indeed, instructed us, that if we proposed to adopt the new British rifle as a standard, the rifles must first be inspected and passed by the chief inspector of small arms in Great Britain. When we attempted, in September last, to expedite the matter by procuring half a dozen of these rifles in the United States	at one
of the factories where they are being produced, we received the telegram which I read this afternoon directing us that these rifles must be first inspected and passed by their chief inspector of small arms, or they could not be recognized as being of the necessary type. The rifles so inspected arrived towards the end of January. That was sufficient for the purpose of directing the Ross Rifle Company to produce a rifle of that type, but it was not sufficient for the purpose of giving an order to the Ross Rifle Company. For that purpose we required the drawings and specifications as well. We asked for these drawings and specifications in September last. We asked for them repeatedly, I think last on the 12th December, but up to the present we have not received them. We cannot give any order in the terms of the contract to the Ross Rifle Company until we do obtain those drawings and specifications; at least I am so advised by my hon. friend the Solicitor General (Mr. Meighen), who has examined the contract with care.


Alexander Kenneth Maclean: After hearing the opinion of the late Minister of Militia and Defence (Sir Sam Hughes) this evening as to the great merits of the Ross rifle over the Lee-Enfield, or any other rifle that the world ever heard of, I would think that it would be only frankness on the part of the Prime Minister to say that the ex-Minister of Militia did not encourage haste on the part of the Government in making a change from the Ross rifle to the Lee-Enfield. Apparently it was very difficult for the Government to give a contract foT the Lee-Enfield in Canada while the ex-minister was a member of my right hon. friend's Government.


Robert Laird Borden: My hon. friend is entirely mistaken about that and this ought to be said in justice to the late Minister of Militia. There is absolutely no doubt about it.
[Sir Robert Borden.3


Alexander Kenneth Maclean: I am not saying that it was wrong.


Robert Laird Borden: I would like to make this clear:	There is absolutely no
douibt about it that he was very confident about the superiority of the Ross rifle over the Lee-Enfield, and I believe he is to-day.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Nobody doubts that;
that is the trouble.
, Sir ROBERT BORDEN: While that may * be, I desire to- say that when he and I discussed the matter in the spring and early summer of 1915 and when we discussed the matter again-because naturally it was a [DOT]subject in which I took the greatest possible interest-in the spring and early summer of 1916, the ex-Minister of Militia interposed no objection to the course we took. That course was to refer the question to the military authorities at the front. He assumed an entirely reasonable attitude on the matter from first to last, although he was profoundly convinced all the time that the Ross rifle was all right if properly handled and properly used. He based his course, as I understand it, upon the consideration that-if the troops, or any large number of them, had lost confidence in the rifle, from the various attacks which had been made upon it, or for any other reason, it would not be proper for him to interpose any opposition to the objection which was raised by the authorities on the other side.


Charles Murphy: I understood the right hon. gentleman, earlier in the discussion, before dinner, to have mentioned that the notice terminating the contract had been given and the time limited by the notice would expire a year hence?


Robert Laird Borden: On the first of February, 1918.


Charles Murphy: Might I inquire whether between now and that time the Ross Company will manufacture solely for the Canadian Government or partly for the Canadian Government and partly for the British Government and if the rifle manufactured will be the Ross rifle?


Robert Laird Borden: Yes, they are
manufacturing for both Governments; something over 90,000 for the Canadian Government and nearly 60,000 for the British Government are still undelivered. As I pointed out before recess, we suggested to the British Government-I think in July, 1916, I cannot be sure but the documents

will show-that it might be a wise thing for the two Governments to get into negotiation with the Ross Rifle Company, stop the manufacture of Ross rifles altogether, let the factory be equipped as speedily as possible with the plant necessary to turn out the new type of Lee-Enfield and convert the orders still unfilled of both Governments into orders for the new type of Lee-Enfields.
The British Government made reply, in two different telegrams which I have read to the committee, pointing out that from their standpoint they did not think this advisable; that the Ross rifle was of considerable use to them for certain purposes, and that there would be no difficulty if we saw fit to try to make the change, for the Ross Rifle Company to continue during the process of reorganization to supply the Ross rifle Mark III to the British Government under the contract which had been made in December, 1914.


Frank Oliver: If I gathered what the
Prime Minister said in answer to a question a few minutes ago, the terms of the contract between the Government and the Ross Rifle 'Company, drawn with a view to the contingency of war arising, did as a matter of fact place the control of the contract in the hands of the Government, and not in the hands of the contractor.


Robert Laird Borden: I am not sure
that I caught my hon. friend's point.


Frank Oliver: The Rose rifle contract,
drawn up with a view to the contingency of war arising, which actually did arise, contained such terms as placed control of the situation in regard to the manufacture of Ross rifles in the hands of the Government.


Robert Laird Borden: I would not
quite agree in that view. I have not the contract before me, and I am speaking subject to correction upon an examination of its terms, but my recollection is that the contract contains the provision that if the Government by reason of war or emergency require a- very largely increased output of rifles in any year, then it shall be the duty of the Government to give notice to the Ross Rifle Company of the number of rifles required, and it shall be the right of the Ross Rifle Company to give notice to the Government that it can not produce more than a certain number of rifles within that period, and then, as to the excess of rifles required, the Government would be at
liberty to obtain them elsewhere. Whether that gives control of the situation or not, that is the fact.


Frank Oliver: I would certainly say that in effect, if not in letter, it did give the Government control of the situation. In fact, I would say absolute control. In any case it gave the Government absolute control as regards the number of rifles over and above the amount that the Ross Rifle Company could turn out within that period.


Robert Laird Borden: If they gave us notice.


Frank Oliver: They, would have to give notice, if the Government gave them notice.


Robert Laird Borden: They would
have to give us notice if they were unable to do what we required.


Frank Oliver: Therefore the Government was absolutely free of this contract so far as the number of rifles required by the Government was concerned over and above what the Ross Rifle Company could turn out. Now I do not assume for a moment that it was likely that there need be any friction in the matter at all. I assume that the Ross Rifle Company, being a business organization, would be willing t* meet the Government, just as the Government would be willing to meet them, with a view to making arrangements for meeting the requirements of the country, if the pressure had been exerted in that way. But the evidence we have from the attitude of the ex-Minister of Militia is that so far from pressure being exerted by the Government upon the Ross Rifle Company, the pressure was from the Ross Rifle Company upon the Government.


Robert Laird Borden: In what way?


Frank Oliver: In the way that it was the company that dictated the situation, and not the Government.


Robert Laird Borden: 
Frank Oliver: The Government accepted the limitations of the Ross Rifle Company, instead of dictating the limitations. Therefore, my contention is that the plea set up in the first place by the Solicitor General (Mr. Meighen) and later, though not in such definite terms, by the Prime Minister, as the reason why more energetic and effective action was not taken to equip our troops with an efficient rifle, does not hold good; leaving out of consideration altogether the suggestion of the hon. member

for Carleton (Mr. Car veil), that the Government should have exercised dominant rights, which, after all, 13 not such an extra- [DOT] ordinary exercise of power on the part of the Government in case of war. On several occasions, indeed, notably in the commandeering of wheat a year ago, this right has been exercised by the Canadian Government, and also by the British Government, which went to the extent in one case of taking control of the railway transportation of the United. Kingdom. So that there is in fact, as well as in law, no ground for the Government's contention that they were under the dictation of the Ross Rifle Company, instead of the Ross Rifle Company being under their dictation.
I am going to assume that I am one of the plain people, not interested in the Ross Rifle Company, or in the administration of the Government, except in so far as it affects the people of Canada and the win* ning of the war. It is from that standpoint that I do view, and wish to view this question, and with that view I am not able to begin the criticism that I desire to make, at the point where my hon. friend from Carleton started, namely, the summer of 1916, after it had been demonstrated by all the means that could be brought to bear that the Ross rifle was inefficient for the purpose for which it was required. I begin with August 4, 1914. This Government of Canada is equipped, as other governments are for carrying on the responsibilities of government, and among this equipment there is a Department of Militia and Defence, with a minister at its head. It was not a secret that has now developed after two or three years of war, that the rifle is the chief weapon of modern warfare, and that upon its efficiency and the efficiency in its use of the man who uses it rests success or failure. It was the business of the Govt-ernment of Canada, and it was the first business that should have concerned them once war broke out, to see that the rifle in the hands of our troops was efficient. They knew that our men were going up against the most thoroughly trained soldiers in the world, possessing the most efficient equipment that the most scientific nation could provide for the men upon whom it depended in its campaign for world-domination. Under these circumstances, even if there had never been any doubts about the rifle, it was the business of the Government of Canada to take stock of the rifle, at any rate from August 4, and not depend upon
[Mr. Oliver.!
Sir John French or Sir Douglas Haig or any one else across the water to see that our - men had an efficient weapon in their hands. It was the responsibility of Canada to see that that weapon was efficient. As a matter of fact, there had been suspicions in former years against the efficiency of the Ross rifle by the very men who sit on the Government side of the House, so that it cannot be suggested that there was any surprise at the findings of Sir John French or Sir Douglas Haig when those findings at last were made.
If there was one duty that rested upon this Government and upon its Department of Militia more than another it was to follow the troops in the training camp and in the field and be sure that the rifle in their hands was an efficient one. The misfortune of the case appears to be that we had a Minister of Militia who would not and will not believe anything from anybody except that this Ross rifle is the most efficient rifle in the world. The ex-Minister of Militia held that belief and holds it yet, as we have heard here to-night, and the right hon. Premier and his colleagues retained the minister in that responsible position from the beginning until a short time ago. Therefore, the responsibility for the consequences of the failure of the Ross rifle to stand up to the requirements of field service rests absolutely on the heads of the men who lead the Government of to-day. We had no right to wait until Sir John French, on his own responsibility, without the knowledge or consent of this Government, found it necessary, as the result of the terrible experience of the battle of St. Julien, to disarm tine Canadian Division taking part in that battle of Ross rifles and place Lee-Enfield rifles in their hands; and, as he says in words that are graphic, he did so, because he was about to send them into action again. The logic is that his conscience did not permit him to send them again into actipn armed with the Titles that they had when they wrent through the battle of St. Julien.
The ex-Minister of Militia spoke to-night of fain tests or of unfair tests of the Ross rifle. Could there be any test more definite or more final than the fact stated by General French that when he gave the order to rearm the First Division he found three thousand men of that division who had, as he says, without any authority, armed themselves with Lee-Enfield in the place of the Ross rifles. Surely the man on the firing line, the man in the trench, the man whose

life depends upon the efficiency of the weapon in his hands, is a safe judge as to the respective merits of the rifle that his Government has placed in his hands. His natural loyalty to his country would tend to make him keep it if he could have faith in it. Surely, when he (throws that rifle away and picks up the rifle of a dead man lying on the field of battle, there is no further argument or comparison necessary. We do n.ot need to hear from Sir John French or Sir Douglas Haig or any one else: the actions of our own men under stress of circumstance are enough, or should be enough, to settle the question of field efficiency of the Ross rifle. I am at a loss to understand how any set of men charged with the terrible responsibility resting upon the shoulders of the Government of Canada since the 4th. August, 1914, could submit to a continuance of such a condition in regard to the armament of our soldiers until the Army Council of Great Britain issued notice to them not to send over any more Ross rifles, and announced to them that they would arm our troops with Lee-Enfield rifles. A more humiliating position Canada could not be placed in, and how desperate the condition must have been when the Government of Great Britain would insist on doing for our men what our Government would not do for them.
I do not know, and no man can tell how *many Canadian homes have been rendered desolate as the result of the inefficiency of this weapon placed in the hands of our .soldiers by our Government. That was not the immediate concern of (the Imperial Government in insisting upon a change of armament. Their interest in the matter was the success or failure of the military *endeavours being put forward on the battle front; their interest was in the success or failure of the Allied arms. That was the cause that impelled them to insist upon the re-armament Of the Canadian forces with a rifle which our men considered efficient and which they considered efficient.
I cannot agree that even the very lucid and courteous statement made here to-night by the Prime Minister is in any degree an excuse, much less a justification, for the terrible sequence of events of which I have spoken. There must have been some means whereby the application of sufficient directive energy backed by the tremendous capital available from the treasury of Canada, could have put into the hands of our men an efficient weapon from the hands of their -own Government, from their own people.
It w'as possible, so the Prime Minister informed the House last session, to increase , the output of rifles twenty fold in the year and a half that had elapsed since the outbreak of the war. It was possible to create an Enfield rifle factory in the United States; it has been possible to create ammunition factories in many parts of the United States and Canada handling such enormous quantities of munitions of war that the human mind cannot calculate nor grasp the quantity.
It was not possible for the Government of Canada to manufacture, or to secure the manufacture of, sufficient Lee-Enfield rifles to arm the troops of Canada. But it was possible for the Government of Great Britain to do that-for they have done it. To-day, after two and a half years of war, though we had a rifle factory running in good shape in Canada at the beginning of the war, which factory has increased its output twenty times since then-I use the figure given by the Prime Minister-there is not to-day, of all the Canadian forces at the front, one man armed with a Ross rifle, we are informed, and every rifle with which our troops at the front are armed is made and furnished by the British Government. Such a condition is beyond description, it is beyond justification, it is beyond excuse. It can only be ascribed to the fact that we have had a Minister of Militia who, in the case of the Ross rifle, as in case of other militia equipment, has insisted on his own views as against the views of those who are in control of the army of Great Britain.
Now, I should be the last to admit superiority in ability on the part of any other people over the people of Canada. I should be glad to back the Minister of Militia or any other member of the Government-perhaps I might except the exMinister of Militia-but I would be willing to back the members of the Government generally-against an equal number of men of equal rank in any other country. But it is not a question of the respective abilities of the men in control of our affairs and those in control of affairs in Great Britain. The men in control of affairs in Great Britain are the people who are running the thing; it is their say; and if we are going to_ help to win the war, we must do it by helping them and not by going counter to their ideas. When it pleases them to require a rifle of a certain style, or equipment of a certain style, it is for us to provide that which will conform with their idea, so that we may work with

them harmoniously. We may think that we have as good as they have or better; but so long as they are carrying the big end of the burden, if we are going to be successful in helping them we must co-operate with them and not antagonize them by the equipment, munitions, or armament we bring forward.
This matter is very much more than a question of a contract between our Government and the Ross Rifle Company. It is a matter which, in the eyes of the British Government, was of such a character and of such importance that the winning of the war depended upon that Government taking the matter into their own hands. But if it was important to the British Government in the winning of the war, it was just as important to the people of Canada in the winning of the war. And it was a thousand times more important to the people of Canada in the preservation of the lives and limbs of the men whom they sent to fight the battles of Canada, the Empire and the world. These men came forward and gave themselves freely for the cause, leaving home, and friends, and property, and business, and prospects, to fight for an ideal, to fight for their country, for its honour and its safety; and we place in their hands a weapon upon which they cannot depend, in which they have lost confidence, which means that they have been slaughtered by our enemies because we did not do our duty by them by giving to them the weapon that they should have had to put them on equal terms with our enemies.


Robert Laird Borden: I regret that
my hon. friend (Mr. Oliver) should have made the extraordinary and extravagant statements which have just fallen from his lips. He apparently put out of sight and consideration the fact that those responsible for the administration of public affairs have been as anxious as he or any one else in this country could be to see to it that the men whom Canada has sent to the front were supplied with as good a weapon as possible. Does he realize that he is making this attack upon a weapon for which he himself is responsible? Does he realize that he sat on the Treasury benches, a _ member of the late Administration in 1908, when serious question arose about this rifle and that his colleague in the Government, speaking words for which he, as a member of the .Government, was responsible, took the ground that this was the best rifle that

.Canada could secure? I wonder if he realizes this, when he makes the most extraordinary statements that have fallen from ibis lips this evening. The words which I .have under my hand are his words, because they were uttered by one of his colleagues in the Government. Why, he even took the ground, through one of his colleagues, that-
The Ross rifle, in common with all other rifles, military or sporting, may he said to have certain defects, structural weaknesses, or deficiencies. It is not the custom of any government to publish to the world what it considers the weak points of the arms with which its troops are equipped.
This was an absolute denial that the Commons of Canada, the representatives of the people, should be given any knowledge of what the alleged deficiencies of this rifle were. He is responsible also for the statement that this rifle had been bent to the War Office and had been tested, and had been carefully reported upon, and was a good rifle. He is responsible for many other statements which I have under my hand but which I will not take time to quote to-night. I should like to have him understand that when this war broke out in 1914 the military forces of Canada were equipped with a rifle which had been deliberately selected by the hon. gentleman himself. He says that some further test should then have been made. I should like to ask any member of this House, or any other honourable and reasonable man in this country, how, with these statements and many more from hon. gentlemen on.the other side of the House, it would be possible to test that rifle further except by active service in the field. Will my hon. friend tell me how? Does he know of any means by which, it could foe tested other than by actual practical experience in the field? 1 do not know of any


Frank Oliver: My complaint is that when it- was tested by actual service in the field -which did not happen when the Liberal Government was responsible-my hon. friends did not take notice of the results of those tests.


Robert Laird Borden: I deny absolutely the assertion which the hon. gentleman has made. We did take notice of it, and we acquiesced at once in the determination of the military authorities at the front that the first division should be armed with Lee-Enfields, and that the Ross rifle should be put aside for the time being. It then became the duty of the Government to do

what best could he done; we had to consider. what was the best course that lay before us. I have already pointed out that the urgent question then was whether any rifle whatever could be obtained for arming the British and Allied troops about to go to the front. That question was so "urgent that the British Government were willing to accept, if they could obtain them, rifles of a very antiquated type, and they asked us to co-operate with them for the purpose of obtaining them. The apparent difficulty with the rifle then was the jamming caused by ammunition which was not fitted for the rifle, being somewhat larger than that produced in Canada. The only remedy to be applied, so far as we understood-, was to enlarge the chamber of the rifle. My hon. friend himself had taken the responsibility, which rests on him heavily to-day if he has a conscience, of fixing a chamber of .460 for a cartridge of precisely the same calibre. As I pointed out, a little bit of dirt or anything that would adhere to the cartridge would inevitably cause jamming. That was the condition which my hon. friend had created, with the advice of hi-s experts, with regard to the rifle which he put in the hands of the Canadian troops. We were told some time ago that the boots provided by the late Government were never intended for war, but only for peace. Are we to understand that the rifle which my hon. friend put into the hands of the Canadian troops was intended only for peace, not for war? Is that the position which he takes before this committee and before the people? If our troops were not to go without rifles, there was only one thing to do, and that was to enlarge. the chamber of the rifle so that the cartridges would be less liable to jam than if the chamber were left as it was. In that regard we took exactly the same course that the British Government took with regard to the Lee-Enfield rifle. They enlarged the chamber; we enlarged our chamber. We proposed- at first to enlarge it from .460 to .462; we eventually enlarged it to .464. After the chamber had been enlarged, tests were made, and it was thought that the rifle would- be serviceable under these new conditions. The course which we took had been suggested in the report of Sir John Frehch himself, and we carried it out with reasonable belief that it would make the rifle a serviceable one. We had as good reason to come to that conclusion as the British Government had to reach the conclusion that the enlargement of the chamber of the Lee-Enfield rifle would be
attended with a like result. When my hon. friend casts these sneers at us and makes these absurd reproaches against the Government, he does not do himself credit. Hon. gentlemen on this side of the House are as conscientious and inspired with as full a sense of duty towards the people of this country as he ever was or ever will be. It comes ill from my hon. friend, having regard to some of his own administrative experiences, to cast reproaches of this character upon men who are inspired by no desire in this war except that of doing their full duty to the people of Canada and to the men at the front. He has made absurd suggestions-well, I will withdraw that word, it is -unparliamentary

he has made suggestions which seem to me very unreasonable. He has suggested that the Ross Rifle Company was dictating to the Government. I take issue with him absolutely. The Ross Rifle Company never attempted to dictate to the Government; if they had attempted to do so, the Government would not have submitted to their dictation. The hon. gentleman misinterpreted my remarks with regard to expropriation. I did not suggest that the Government might not in a proper case expropriate or that they would have consideration for the wishes of the Ross Rifle Company if they thought that expropriation were proper and in the best interests'of the people. If the Government expropriated the property, compensation would be made to the Ross Rifle Company, who would have no cause of complaint nor do I believe that they would have made any complaint. The question- was whether the Government, if they took over the Ross Rifle factory, could operate it more efficiently than it was being operated by the company itself. I am bound to tell my hon. friend that I am absolutely -unable to follow his reasoning or to understand what he means when he arrives at the curious argumentative conclusion that upon the terms of the contract as they have been placed upon Hansard we -had control of the situation in case war should break out or emergency arise. I do-ufot very much whether he himself understands what he mean-s. How could we have control of the situation? If the Ross Rifle Company were called upon to produce a number of rifles which they were unable to turn out in a given period, they could give us notice and we could go elsewhere. * How did that give us any control of the situation, when- the (British" Government

were raking the four corners of the earth trying to get rifles and failing to get them? What advantage would it be to ns if the company should give u3 notice that they could not turn out rifles when we could not get them anywhere else? My hon. friend finds fault with us because we retained the Minister of Militia, who had confidence in the Ross rifle. Surely my hon. friend does not suggest that before the Ross rifle has been pronounced unsuitable toy the military authorities at the front, we should have discarded it? What reason would we have for discarding it before actual experience at the front had shown, in the estimation of the military authorities, that it was unsuitable? And when they did pronounce it to toe unsuitable, the Minister of Militia and Defence, as I have already declared to the committee, interposed no objection to the course which was taken; he assented at once to the proposed action of the military authorities, both in 1915 and in 1916. When my hon. friend, for some reason unknown to me, suggests this rifle should have been discarded on the outbreak of the war, does he realize that the British Government in the month of December, 1914, ordered
100,000	of these same Ross rifles? That seemed to me to afford fairly reasonable evidence fhat the rifle was a service-, able rifle; otherwise, for what reason would the British Government have given a large order of that kind, costing $2,500,000 or $3,000,000? We can hardly suppose that they felt themselves to be endowed with such astonishing resources that they could throw to the winds $2,500,000 or $3,000,000 for a rifle which they did not believe to be serviceable. As I said before, the rifle had been approved by the late Government in the form in which we found it when war broke out. The Minister of Militia believed it to be a good rifle. We had no evidence before us that it was not a good rifle until experience in actual warfare, under conditions of the utmost severity, demonstrated, in the opinion of the military authorities at the front, that it ought to be put aside and the Lee-Enfield substituted for it. They made that suggestion to us, and we acquiesced in it. When later on, in the summer of 1916, they made the further suggestion that all Canadian troops at the front should be armed with the Lee-Enfield, instead of the Ross rifle, we again acquiesced. Tnat is the whole situation, and I repeat once more that, in my opinion, it affords no ground whatever for the violent reproaches which 	-
my hon. friend (Mr. Oliver) has seen fit to
level against the Government in this connection.
Mr. OLIVER; I will not delay the House at any great length, and I do not intend to follow the Prime Minister in everything he has said. But his suggestion as to my responsibility for the Ross rifle is really hardly to the point. I was a member of the Government which instituted the making of the Ross rifle, and I have nothing to apologize for in regard to that matter. The contract has been read here to-night. It was a good contract, and the rifle was a good rifle for target and sporting purposes, or for any purpose for which it was used up to the outbreak of war. The Prrme Minister adopts the very cheap suggestion that it was a rifle for peace, and not for war; it was a rifle which had been used in peace until the outbreak of war. That was the only use there was for it, and it was found to be absolutely satisfactory, to be not only as good as others, but better than others. There is, therefore, no apology necessary from any member of the Liberal Government which made this contract for the Ross rifle as it was when war broke out. But once wax broke out, this Government, and not the late Government, became responsible, and when under war conditions the Ross rifle was found to be not satisfactory, when it was found that the troops using it could not depend upon it, when
3,000	of them threw it away and took Lee-Enfields because they believed that their lives depended on making the change, the responsibility for retaining that rifle was the responsibility of this Government and not of the late Liberal Government. I do not share the responsibility for the retention of the Ross rifles by our troops. My hon. friend spoke of my conscience. I am . trying to rid my soul of the blood of the men who died in France because we, the people of Canada, armed them with an inferior weapon. As to the provsion in the contract, which my right hon. friend says he does not understand, and that I do not understand-


Robert Laird Borden: I did not say that I did not understand.


Frank Oliver: Then that I did not understand.


Robert Laird Borden: I did not say that.


Frank Oliver: Then I beg the Prime
Minister's pardon; I accept his correction.

I would ask him for what purpose can it be imagined that that provision was placed in the contract except to exactly meet such a condition as arose on the outbreak of war, so as to place the Government of the country in a position to provide such rifles as they wished, and as many as they needed for the arming of their troops. There could be no other reason for placing that provision in the contract. That is why I believe the provision was well framed to achieve the purpose that I mention.
To repeat, on this point, the Prime Minister seemed to think that I found fault with the Government because they had taken the rifle to the battlefield. I did not find fauilt with the Government'for that. I do not expect this Government, or any other Government, to be omniscient, to see or know things that have not yet occurred. I absolutely relieve the Government from any responsibility for taking the rifle to the battlefield, and placing it in the hands of the troops for service in France. They had every reason, or at all events, some reason to believe that the rifle was a good rifle; but, as I have already stated, the rifle was under suspicion by the very men who sat around the Prime Minister, and whether it was under suspicion or not, the exigencies of the case were such that it was the business of the Government of Canada to follow events on the battlefield so that on their responsibility, and not on that of British officers, they would be sure that our men had, or had not, in their hands a rifle that was absolutely efficient. I absolutely protest against the responsibility being placed on any other shoulders than those of our own military department, who are charged on our behalf with seeing that our troops are efficient, and that their armament is efficient. It is not the responsibility of the British Government; it is the responsibility of our Government. After experience had shown that the rifle was inefficient, not on the authority of Sir John French, but on the experience of our own men who threw it away, there was no escape from the responsibility of the Government to see that that rifle was replaced as soon as it could be. The Prime Minister has suggested that the Government did everything they could to meet the situation. I recall that on the 17th May last, when the question of the efficiency of the Ross rifle was under consideration in this House, his colleague, the Minister of Public Works (Hon. Mr. Rogers) suggested, if he did not absolutely make the threat, that he would
imprison any man who questioned the efficiency of the Ross rifle. He stated from his place in the House that on the information which he had, he had no reason to believe other than that the Ross rifle was an absolutely efficient rifle; and yet in the hands of the Prime Minister at that time, on that very day, and for five days previously, there had been a cablegram from the accredited agent of the Militia Department in London saying, "Serious condition has arisen regarding Ross rifle. Show this to the Prime Minister." I do not wish to make this the occasion of an exchange of compliments, but as the Prime Minister has been handing a few bouquets to me, I take the opportunity of handing this to him for his consideration.


Robert Laird Borden: I am very much obliged to my hon. friend. His bouquets are so frequent and so fragrant that they are always welcome. I do not desire to repeat what I have already said about ten times since three okdock this afternoon, but which does not yet seem to have reached the inner consciousness of my hon. friend: that when the military authorities at the front, whom we considered the 'best judges, directed arming of the Canadian troops with the Lee-Enfield rifle, we acquiesced in it. I leave the situation there, but with this further statement: that we then made the best arrangement we found -possible, and which we conceived to be a reasonable arrangement, for improving the Ross rifle so that the jamming, the only defect which had' been seriously urged against it up to that time, would be remedied. Again in 1916, we took a like course and in taking it we had the engagement of the British Government that all our troops at the front would be armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle If that does not satisfy my hon. friend as to our desire and intention to do our duty in the matter, if it does not satisfy him that we did our reasonable duty in the matter to the best of our ability, or to the best of the ability of any Government that might have been called upon to deal with the situation, why, he and I shall have to be content to differ about the matter. I should say to him with all courtesy and all respect that all that he has urged in so strong, and even so violent, a manner has not in the least disturbed my opinion as to the wisdom of the course which we took. I do not see that we could have taken any other course, nor do I see that any other course would have been open to any government. It is impossible to complete the discussion this



evening; indeed, I made an engagement with the hon. member for Pictou (Mr. Macdonald) that the committee should sit on a subsequent day, and I therefore beg to move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind the request which I made to look up in the department-


Robert Laird Borden: In regard to
bolts?


Frank Broadstreet Carvell: Yes, and also the applications made to the company for changes, when they were made, and when they were complied with, if any were complied with.
Progress reported.
On motion of Sir Robert Borden the House adjourned at 11.10 p.m.
Saturday, February 3, 1917.