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to the extent our statements in bullfrog marina, inc., eie, spears, and hall suggest that extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is admissible where the contract contains a clear integration clause, we disavow them.

this action is premised on smythe's activities driving for lyft, and has nothing to do with his ""identity"" as a driver for uber.

see id., at 134135, 75 s.ct. 623.

and, the persuasive impact of floyd's confessions must be scrutinized in the light of all the evidence, presented at trial and new.

limiting the assertion to the facts of this case, the respondent actually did propose that i rely on the unaffected market price.

to the extent that syllabus point 3 of state v. caudill, 170 w.va. 74, 289 s.e.2d 748 (1982) is inconsistent, it is hereby modified.

to the extent that our decision in united states v. albertini, 830 f.2d 985 (9th cir. 1987), conflicts with rodgers, we overrule albertini.

to the extent that plant economy, inc. v. mirror insulation co., supra, holds otherwise that case is overruled.

the plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to modify the dissolution judgment by terminating his alimony obligation because of the defendant's alleged cohabitation with her boyfriend.

on this record we are unable to conclude with any degree of certainty that finneman received a fair trial on the charge of possession with intent to deliver, and we exercise our discretion and notice the obvious error on the charge of possession of 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver.

we determine whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy on a ""case-by-case basis, considering the facts of each particular situation.""

accordingly, we overrule the portions of tamara r. that are inconsistent with this holding.

williams has not filed a response.

nevertheless, to the extent that any or all of these opinions conflict with our holding herein that violation of a federal regulatory scheme will support a claim of negligence per se, they are expressly overruled.

accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, disapprove deruyter, and approve the decision of the court below.

to the extent they are to the contrary, wright v. state ex rel. patchin, 994 s.w.2d 100 (mo.app. 1999), and state ex rel. mather v. carnes, 551 s.w.2d 272 (mo.app. 1977), are overruled.

those remaining charges proceeded to trial on march 28, 2008, in philadelphia municipal court.

suarez-quilty also clearly acknowledged her unauthorized use of the credit card in her stipulation, admitting she violated rule 32:8.4(c) by committing the acts alleged in count vii (unauthorized use of credit card) of the board's complaint.

neither pilothouse 60 itself nor the way in which it was discussed in conjunction with the motions in limine establishes that the trial court erred by excluding trimet's proffered evidence.

therefore, we quash the fifth district's decision in taylor and disapprove its decision in cervino v. state, 785 so.2d 631 (fla. 5th dca 2001), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.

see bell v. state, 108 so. 3d 639, 648 (fla. 2013) (rejecting burden-shifting argument: ""when considered in context, the prosecutor's comment is properly understood as a statement on the jury's duty to analyze the evidence presented at trial followed by the prosecutor's argument regarding what conclusion the jury should reach from the evidence."").

the accident report contains no reference to a low back injury.

. hacker

while the court of appeals' decision in brooks was very effective in advancing kentucky law on the issue of dissenters' appraisal rights, to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion it is overruled.

in my view, appellant adhered to the explicit requirements of our rules of civil procedure, and nothing more was required of her to preserve her claim.

to the extent that east montgomery water, sewer fire protection authority v. water works sanitary sewer bd. of city of montgomery, 474 so.2d 1088 (ala. 1985), conflicts with this holding, it should no longer be followed.

rush's remaining claim that the courtroom was closed during jury voir dire, in violation of her sixth amendment right to a public trial, is without merit and partially unpreserved.

wages are considered ""due"" within the meaning of section 206 either when the employer concedes they are due or, when following investigation and hearing, the labor commissioner rules they must be paid.

accordingly, we recede from this court's decision in donahue, and affirm appellant's conviction and sentence in all respects.

in accordance with the above principles, we overrule bates v. donnafield, supra, insofar as it denied a woman a cause of action for loss of consortium.

therefore, we reverse the decision of the commonwealth court and remand to that court for further proceedings in this matter not inconsistent with this opinion.

shannon v. commonwealth, supra, at 548-51 (shannon, part i) readdressed this reasonable/unreasonable belief analysis, overruled baker and gray, and reinstated blake v. commonwealth.

rompilla v. beard, 545 u.s. 374, 387, 125 s. ct. 2456, 162 l. ed. 2d 360 (2005).

##note: morehart v. county of santa barbara is reversed, not overruled (same line of cases).

in its haste to reduce the practically unmanageable volume of claims that presently may be brought by way of post-conviction habeas corpus under article 11.07, v.a.c.c.p., the majority has overruled yet another of its past decisions without adequate justification.

since the last time we considered the rule in trig electric, other jurisdictions, including the ninth circuit court of appeals, have consistently held that these types of state claims are not preempted by erisa.

although the majority did not address the continued viability of vogel, it has effectively been overruled.

to the extent doneff v. treasurer of state of missouri , 965 s.w.2d 255 (1998), and brown are contrary to this opinion, they are overruled.

in shapiro, the seventh circuit stated, 383 f.2d at 685, that it preferred the ali rule to other possible formulae on the ground that it resulted in a charge shorter, simpler, and more congruent to the expert testimony than the charge based on davis v. united states, 165 u.s. 373, 17 s.ct. 360, 41 l.ed. 750 (1897), which was a traditional test and itself based on m'naghten; it found the ali test more comprehensible than durham and more helpful to the jury.

we have held that a district court's failure to give a heat-of-passion manslaughter charge to the jury does not prejudice a defendant when the jury is presented with second-degree intentional murder and first-degree premeditated murder and finds the defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.

id. (quoting riyaz a. kanji, the proper scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction in the collateral order context, 100 yale l.j. 511, 530 (1990)).

2011) (quotation omitted).

see state v. santos, 770 so.2d at 321 (per curiam ) (citing godinez v. moran, 509 u.s. 389, 399, 113 s.ct. 2680, 2687, 125 l.ed.2d 321 (1993)).

mcl 450.1209(1)(c)(ii).

see id. 232.116(2)(b).

we therefore approve the second district's decision in j.s. u.b. and disapprove the fourth district's decision in lassiter.

they argue that the beard case was exceptional because it involved maximum security inmates and that the prison's regulations were motivated by its rehabilitative goals.

given the potential"" for certain records to qualify as trade secrets, the ""other statute"" provision of the pra ""operates as an independent limit on disclosure of portions of the records at issue here that have even potential economic value.""

therefore, joshua v. state should be overruled, and we expressly do so now.

7. child custody: appeal and error.

see id., at 1683-1685, and n. 44; bottomley, patent cases in the court of chancery, 1714-58, 35 j. legal hist. 27, 36-37, 41-43 (2014).

since mcburney was erroneously decided, that interpretation of the statute was also incorrect.

ordinarily, dismissal for failure to state a claim is without prejudice, and the court has discretion to permit a party to amend the pleading to allege additional facts in an effort to state a claim.

because hummel, the conflict case, involved a motion filed under rule 3.800(a), we disapproved the first district's decision only "to the extent it [wa]s inconsistent with" anderson.

id. at 1005 (baer, j., concurring).

we therefore recede from lewis.

the commonwealth is correct that the boulware panel opined that a defendant must prove his privacy interest before the commonwealth's burden of production is triggeredfor the reasons discussed infra, that holding is disapproved.

in people v. rudolph ( supra ), the court of appeals, overruling precedent, held that the statutory command in cpl 720.20(1) that the sentencing court address youthful offender status when a defendant is eligible for such status cannot be dispensed with, even where defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request

as the tenth circuit recognized, however, other courts of appeals have held that the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim does not begin to run until the employee resigns.

we think that his analysis of peerless roll leaf co. v. griffin sons, was altogether correct, and that he had no alternative but to follow that decision; on the other hand, we now think that we were then wrong and that the decision must be overruled for reasons we shall state.

the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of operating while under the influence of liquor did not ""preclude their consideration of the evidence of intoxication in considering the negligent operation charge.""

accordingly, we approve the decision below and disapprove saunders, ansel and employee benefit claims to the extent that they authorize relief pursuant to rule 1.540 when a judgment for damages is entered non-jury after a jury trial was demanded and not waived but the parties were given notice of the proceedings.

be that as it may, to the extent that our present opinion is inconsistent with ryles and heath, the latter are hereby overruled.

""'this result only follows, however, if the misrepresentation relates to the very nature of the proposed contract itself and not merely to one of its nonessential terms.'"" brumley, 945 n.e.2d at 779 (quoting restatement (second) of contracts 163 (1981)).

the prosecutor effectively withdrew the question.

our legislature has also expressly carved out appeals challenging search and seizure rulings.

to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion, state v. werner, 810 s.w.2d 621, 626 (mo.app. 1991) is overruled.

the time has come to reconcile and regularize our cases in this field.

because it needed only to ""briefly set forth"" the draft permit's factual and theoretical underpinnings, see 40 c.f.r. 124.8(a), the fact sheet's comparative brevity cannot alone be indicative of any illegitimate additions to the response to comments.

to the extent that cermeno-cerna v. farrell, 291 f. supp. 521 (c.d., cal., 1968), appeal dis'd as moot sub nom. giumarra vineyards corp. v. farrell, 431 f.2d 923 (9th cir., 1970), is contrary to this holding, it is expressly disapproved.

lobrano, judge david r.m. williams, judge joan bernard armstrong, judge steven r. plotkin, and judge rudolph f. becker iii) have voted to overrule donnelly.

the court improperly concluded that the viability of the presumption of [section 6381(d) ] is questionable and inherently self-rebutting, such that it would be arbitrary and capricious to apply the presumption in cases where the trial court finds that it cannot determine if the parent had responsibility for the child.

moreover, insofar as they suggest that a party seeking a modification of a custody order must prove an overwhelming necessity for the change in custody, we hereby overrule ex parte martin and ex parte peppers.

to the extent that payne v. state, supra,smith v. state, supra, 304 ga.app. 708, 699 s.e.2d 742, or any other case rejects the use of two standards of review as set forth above, they are hereby overruled.

the tribe sold the land for a fixed sum of $50,000.

if the quoted language means that a litigant may avoid the presumption merely by asking for findings on an issue without challenging the findings when actually made, we disapprove it, because such an interpretation is contrary to section 634

citing ""the inflexible policy of the yavapai county attorney . . . to automatically seek capital punishment in every case where evidence of at least one statutory aggravating factor was present,"" the dissent would have ""treat[ed] [the prosecutors'] failure to exercise . . . discretion as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance.""

we conclude that insurance code section 520 dictates a result different from that reached in henkel, and accordingly we overrule the decision in henkel to the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed in the present opinion.

because the issues in this case are legal in nature, our review is for legal error.

an ""advertising structure"" ""means a structure of any kind or character erected, used, or maintained for outdoor advertising purposes, upon which any poster, bill, printing, painting or other advertisement of any kind whatsoever may be placed . . . ."" ( 5203.)

brockett v. spokane arcades, inc., 472 u.s. 491, 501 (1985) (citations omitted).

to the extent they are inconsistent herewith, the cases of procunier v. superior court (losoya) (1973) 35 cal.app.3d 207 [ 110 cal.rptr. 529], and procunier v. superior court (herth) (1973) 35 cal.app.3d 211 [ 110 cal.rptr. 531], are disapproved.

our analysis of the merger issue requires us to disapprove one of our published opinions because it is irreconcilable with a subsequent opinion of our supreme court.

we agree with clements and the court of special appeals that cjp 12-302(c) does not authorize the state's appeal in this case.

a trial court must give an instruction sua sponte on an uncharged lesser offense that is necessarily included in a greater charged offense if the evidence warrants the instruction.

it is true, as the district court noted, r. 356 (dist.

this court has previously considered and rejected this exact claim in hall v. state, 820 so.2d 113 (ala.crim.app.1999), stating: use of the word you, without more, in relationship to a jury charge on mitigating evidence does not imply that the finding of a mitigating circumstance must be unanimous.

however, in smith v. state, 918 so.2d 141 (ala.crim.app. 2005), an opinion released today, we expressly overrule our previous holdings in kelley v. state, 911 so.2d 1125 (ala.crim.app. 2004); coleman v. state, 911 so.2d 1099 (ala.crim.app. 2004); and thornton v. state, 859 so.2d 458 (ala.crim.app. 2003), that a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a rule 32 petition that has not been properly verified, and we hold that the lack of verification of a rule 32 petition is not a defect of subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, it is a defect that is waived if not properly objected to the state did not object in this case to the lack of proper verification of presley's petition; therefore, that issue is deemed to be waived.

resolving this conflict in prior panel decisions of this court, we overrule both the holding and the reasoning in constant and its progeny (including pascarella and barron), and conclude that a homosexual parent bears no special evidentiary presumption in a child custody case.

indeed, in marsh, the prosecutor made the following statement during closing argument regarding the defendant's testimony: ""use your common sense, ladies and gentlemen.

to the extent that the decisions in general motors corp. v. ramsey, allis-chalmers mfg. co. v. coplin, ford motor co. v. lemieux lumber co., ford motor co. v. revert, and pierce v. ford motor co. hold or imply that an automobile dealership is the agent or representative of the manufacturer if the dealership performs warranty or recall work, they are disapproved.

second, there are material differences between the parole act and parole code. for example, as petitioner himself pointed out in his pro se petition, the parole code vests the board with discretion, in certain situations, to award a convicted parole violator with credit for time spent at liberty on parole.

however, because the stalking statute proscribes an entire course of conduct, ""a second or successive offense is not necessarily committed by acts that are factually distinct from each other but only by acts that are factually distinct from the entire course of conduct punished by the first conviction.""

we disapprove of those statements in brooks and green because deterrence is directed at persons who have committed wrongful acts.

to the extent that barnes v. blue haven pools (1969) 1 cal.app.3d 123, which was decided under summary judgment law as it stood prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments, is to the contrary, it is no longer vital inasmuch as such law as it stands now is materially different.

william hardy inc., v. commissioner, supra, 82 f.2d 249, is overruled, and the order will be affirmed.

jorgensen v. coppedge, 148 idaho 536, 538, 224 p.3d 1125, 1127 (2010); dillon v. montgomery, 138 idaho 614, 617, 67 p.3d 93, 96 (2003); bingham v. montane res. assocs., 133 idaho 420, 427, 987 p.2d 1035, 1042 (1999).

[appellant risner br. at 18-19].

we therefore recede from our opinion in clark v. muldrew, supra.

the court's discussion fails to adequately account for the origin of the specific intent element that both section 2(a) and 2(b) contain.