Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism

Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition. In a far away kingdom, a prince rides through a thick forest. Unlike neighboring countries, with their long list of laws, this kingdom has only one rule, and subjects are free to do what they wish as long as they do not break it. The same rule also applies to the prince, but being royalty has its advantages, and few would dare to challenge him if he were caught violating it. Nevertheless, when he breaks the rule—as he often does—he does so as discreetly as possible. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2012) 3:405–423 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0112-5 K. Gray (*) : C. Schein Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill, CB #3270 Davie Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA e-mail: kurtgray@unc.edu Dusk is slowly falling in the forest, when a flash of color catches his eye. He slows his horse and sees a young girl with blue eyes and a ragged yellow dress hiding amongst the trees. He orders her to come out and asks her name. “Viola. I’m walking to find work in the next town.” “But the next town is miles away,” the prince replies. “Where are your parents?” “They passed away. I’m an orphan.” The prince smiles slyly, “So you’re alone.” After looking around to make sure they are truly alone, the prince decides that tonight, he will again be breaking the kingdom’s one rule. One thing is clear in this story—the prince violated an important norm—and it seems likely that the girl is somehow involved. As for the exact nature of this norm violation, the possibilities are limitless: the kingdom may prohibit horseback hitchhiking, camping in the woods or mingling outside your social class. For all the facts of the story tell us, the prince could be clandestinely adopting this orphan, rescuing her from a life of drudgery so she may grow up joyously in his castle. Nevertheless, we cannot help feeling that Viola will be harmed instead of helped, that she will suffer physically and emotionally at the hands of the rule-breaking prince. The question is: Why do we tie this norm violation to suffering? In this paper, we suggest that judgments of immorality are generally—and inextricably—tied to perceived suffering. This psychological link between blame and pain grows out of the fundamental cognitive template unifying moral judgment—the moral dyad (Gray et al. 2012b, c). The moral dyad consists of two perceived minds—an intentional moral agent and a suffering moral patient—and it explains not only a host of phenomena in moral psychology, but also dissolves the psychological tension between deontology and utilitarianism. At its heart, dyadic morality is a formalization of the general link between mind perception and moral judgment, which we explore first in this paper. We then explore dyadic morality, explaining how it grows naturally out of the structure of psychological concepts. Next, we explore the implications of dyadic morality, including dyadic completion, which is the tendency to see harm in immorality, and immorality in harm. Finally, we argue that dyadic morality psychologically unites the theories of utilitarianism and deontology. People do not separate acts from consequences (as deontology advocates), nor do they separate consequences from the agents who perform them (as utilitarianism advocates). This link between deontology and utilitarianism suggests that research in moral cognition goes off track when focusing primarily on moral dilemmas that pit the two theories against each other. 1 Minds and Moral Judgments Philosophers have long wrestled with two basic questions of morality: who can be held morally accountable and who deserves moral rights. In answering these questions, philosophers often appeal to mental capacities. Moral responsibility is argued to 406 K. Gray, C. Schein