Differential social organization, collective action, and crime

This article elaborates and extends Sutherland’s [Principles of criminology (4th ed.), Lippincott, Philadelphia, Sutherland (1947)] concept of differential social organization, the sociological counterpart to his social psychological theory of differential association. Differential social organization contains a static structural component, which explains crime rates across groups, as well as a dynamic collective action component, which explains changes in crime rates over time. I argue that by drawing on George Herbert Mead’s [Mind, self, and society. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Mead (1934)] theories of symbolic interaction and social control, we can conceptualize organization in favor of, and against, crime as collective behavior. We can then integrate theoretical mechanisms of models of collective behavior, including social network ties, collective action frames, and threshold models of collective action. I illustrate the integrated theory using examples of social movements against crime, neighborhood collective efficacy, and the code of the street. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime The theory of differential association, along with the concept of white collar crime, was probably Edwin Sutherland’s greatest legacy. It is well known that the theory explains individual criminality with a social psychological process of learning crime within interaction with social groups. Criminal behavior, according to Sutherland [71], is the result of learning an excess of definitions favorable to crime. This is the differential association process. Less well known is Sutherland’s attempt to explain aggregate crime rates across groups and societies. Here, he specified the theory of differential social Crime Law Soc Change DOI 10.1007/s10611-006-9045-1 DO9045; No of Pages A portion of this chapter was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Canada, November 16–19. The research upon which this paper was based was supported in part by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0004323) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01DA18148). The funding agencies bear no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations drawn here. James F. Short, Jr. and Joachim Savelsberg generously provided comments on an earlier draft. R. L. Matsueda (*) Department of Sociology, University of Washington, 202 Savery Hall, Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195, USA e-mail: matsueda@u.washington.edu organization to explain rates of crime with an organizational process of group dynamics. The crime rate of a group is determined by the extent to which the group is organized in favor of crime versus organized against crime. Moreover, the explanation of crime rates, differential social organization, is consistent with the explanation of individual acts of crime, differential association. Sutherland spent considerable time refining his individual-level mechanism of differential association, which subsequently received much attention from the criminological community, as researchers tested (e.g., [46]) and revised the theory (e.g., [1, 13]). He devoted less time to his more sociological theory of differential social organization, which consequently never progressed beyond its original rudimentary form. Although Sutherland never explicitly specified the concrete content of organization in favor of crime and organization against crime, he did imply two components: (1) a static component, in which social structure and group organization explained differences in crime rates across social groups; and (2) a dynamic component, in which group processes explained changes in crime rates over time. In this paper, I will focus on the second component, conceptualizing differential social organization as collective action both for and against crime, and integrate theoretical mechanisms from developmental psychology, social networks, and collective action. To integrate these diverse mechanisms, I will use George Herbert Mead’s [52, 53] theory of social control as a general framework for the study of joint behavior among two or more persons. I then draw on developmental psychologists’ stages of moral reasoning [43], which extends Mead’s [52] stages of play and the game, and which may vary by the density of network ties. I also draw upon sociologists’ theories of social networks and weak ties to impose a communication structure on group behavior, as well as threshold models and collective action frames to account for the direction of collective behavior. Finally, I illustrate the integrated model with examples from social movements against crime, neighborhood informal social control, and collective acts of street crime. Differential association theory Sutherland stated differential association theory as a set of nine propositions, which introduced three concepts – normative conflict, differential association, and differential group organization – that explain crime at the levels of the society, the individual, and the group [22]. Normative conflict: the root cause of crime in society At the level of the society, crime in society is rooted in normative conflict. For Sutherland, primitive, undifferentiated societies are characterized by harmony, solidarity, and consensus over basic values and beliefs. Such societies have little conflict over appropriate behaviors. They also have little crime. With the industrial revolution, however, modern industrial societies developed, with advanced divisions of labor, market economies, and increased conflict. Such societies become segmented into groups that conflict over interests, values, and behavior patterns. These societies are characterized by specialization rather than similarity, conflict rather than harmony, coercion rather than consensus. Moreover, they tend to have high rates of crime. From these observations, Sutherland hypothesized that high crime rates are rooted in normative conflict, which he defined as a condition in which society is segmented into groups that conflict over the definition of appropriate behavior. R.L. Matsueda