Distinguishing Ernst von Glasersfeld ’ s “ Radical Constructivism ” from Humberto Maturana ’ s “ Radical Realism

It is not my intention to compare their entire works in this short paper. It would be like comparing apples and pears – they have produced very different models and for very different purposes. While Ernst von Glasersfeld has always limited himself to a sharp focus on epistemology, Humberto Maturana has developed several different models relating to the different areas of cellular biology, experimental epistemology, neurophysiology, language, visual perception, and the “definition of the living,” among others. Indeed, in recent years Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995) has written that he now tries to avoid even using the term “epistemology” and writes about human “knowing.” “...(this book) is an attempt to explain a way of thinking and makes no claim to describe an independent reality. That is why I prefer to call it an approach to or a theory of knowing. Though I have used them in the past, I now try to avoid the terms ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowledge’ for constructivism, because they tend to imply the traditional scenario according to which novice subjects are born into a ready-made world, which they must try to discover and ‘represent’ to themselves. From the constructivist point of view, the subject cannot transcend the limits of individual experience.” (Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 1–2) In his early studies Ernst von Glasersfeld noted a problem in Wittgenstein’s (1933) assertions about comparing our picture of reality with the reality in question in order to determine whether or not our own picture was true or false. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1987) comments: “How could one possibly carry out that comparison? With that question, although I did not know it at the time, I found myself in the company of Sextus Empiricus, of Montaigne, Berkeley, and Vico ... the company of all the courageous sceptics who ... have maintained that it is impossible to compare our image of reality with a reality outside. It is impossible, because in order to check whether our representation is a ‘true’ picture of reality we should have to have access not only to our representation but also to that outside reality before we get to know it. And because the only way in which we are supposed to get at reality is precisely the way we would like to check and verify, there is no possible escape from the dilemma.” (Glasersfeld 1987, pp. 137–138). So here is a very clear condemnation of “epistemological cheating” – the impossible feat of trying to peep around our perceptual “goggles” to see if our “picture” is approximating to the “real reality” or not. Over the past 20 years Ernst von Glasersfeld has put a lot of effort into understanding just where his work and the work of Humberto Maturana differ, especially in the fundamental matters of epistemology. Apart from his grave reservations about key concepts of Maturana’s work such as the “observer” (and how he comes about), “consciousness,” “awareness,” and “language” (its genesis, and that it precedes cognition, etc.), Ernst von Glasersfeld shares the perplexity of other authors regarding the ways in which Maturana can be seen to be “smuggling realism” back into his opus in one form or another (Mingers 1995, Johnson 1991, Held & Pols 1987). In Maturana’s writings there are many passages where one gets the impression that he edges over into the terrain of “realism” in his discussions and phraseologies. In attempting to understand this Ernst von Glasersfeld (1991) tries to explain that Maturana Vincent Kenny A Accademia Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica (Italy) <kenny@acts-psicologia.it>