Relational frame theory: a post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition.

temporal relations tend to emerge later in development than simple comparatives. 2.4.7. Spatial Relations A large number of relations deal with the arrangement of objects or aspects of objects in space, relative to each other, such as in-out, front-back, over-under and so on. These spatial relations are like comparative relations, but often they imply or specify frames of reference that make them quite specific. For example, if you are told that house A faces the back of house B, you could order the front and back doors of both houses into a linear sequence (back door of A, front door of A, back door of B, front door of B). This is because front and back doors are relative to each individual house, and knowing the orientation of the two houses implies the more detailed information. 2.4.8. Conditionality and Causality Conditionality and causality share features with both hierarchical relations and comparative relations. Forexample, if a listener is told, “A causes B and B causes C,” s/he may simply derive, via a frame of comparison, that “A caused C and C was caused by A.” Hierarchical class membership is involved, however, if the listener derives “B was caused by A alone, but C was caused by both A and B.” That is, the listener constructs a precise hierarchy of causeeffect relations, and therefore such relational responding extends beyond the basic frame of comparison. The same type of analysis may be applied to conditional relations such as “ifthen.” The constructed nature of this relation is more obvious than with temporal relations, particularly as one begins to attribute cause to conditional properties. Events are said to cause events based on many features: sequences, contiguity, manipulability, practical exigencies, cultural beliefs, and so on. Causality itself is not a physical dimension of any event. 2.4.9. Deictic Relations By deictic relations we mean those that specify a relation in terms of the perspective of the speaker such as left-right; I-you (and all of its correlates, such as “mine”); here-there; and now-then (see Barnes and Roche, 1997a; Hayes, 1984). Some relations may or may not be deictic, such as front-back or above-below, depending on the perspective applied. For example, the sentence “the back door of my house is in front of me” contains both spatial and deictic forms of “front-back.” Deictic relations seem to be a particularly important family of relational frames that may be critical for perspective-taking. Consider, for example, the three frames of I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN (when it seems contextually useful, we will capitalize relational terms if they refer to specific relational frames). These frames are unlike DERIVED RELATIONAL RESPONDING AS LEARNED BEHAVIOR 39 the others mentioned previously in that they do not appear to have any formal or nonarbitrary counterparts. Coordination, for instance, is based on formal identity or sameness, while “bigger than” is based on relative size. Temporal frames are more inherently verbal in that they are based on the nonarbitrary experience of change, but the dimensional nature of that experience must be verbally constructed. Frames that depend on perspective, however, cannot be traced to formal dimensions in the environment at all. Instead, the relationship between the individual and other events serves as the constant variable upon which these frames are based. Learning to respond appropriately to (and ask) the following kinds of questions appears to be critical in establishing these kinds of relational frames: “What are you doing now?” “What did you do then?” “What are you doing here?” “What are you doing there?” “What am I doing now?” “What did I do then?” “What am I doing here?” “What will I do there?” Each time one or more of these questions is asked or answered, the physical environment will likely be different. The only constant across all of the questions are the relational properties of I versus You, Here versus There, and Now versus Then. These properties appear to be abstracted through learning to talk about one’s own perspective in relation to other perspectives. For example, I is always from this perspective here, not from someone else’s perspective there. Clearly, a speaker must learn to respond in accordance with these relational frames. For example, if Peter is asked, “What did you do when you got there?” he should not simply describe what someone else is doing now (unless he wishes to hide what he actually did, or annoy and confuse the questioner). We shall consider the relational frames of perspective in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 2.4.10. Interactions Among Relational Frames At the present time very little is known about the effects of learning to respond in accordance with one type of frame on other framing activities. We have seen evidence in our research of such effects. For example, training in SAME may make OPPOSITION easier; training in deictic relations may make appreciation of contingencies easier and so on. One fairly clear prediction from RFT is that there should be some generalization of relational responding, particularly within families of relational frames. For example, an individual who learns to respond in accordance with sameness, may learn to respond in accordance with similarity (or opposition, since sameness is a combinatorially entailed aspect of opposition) more rapidly than, say, comparison. Similarly, learning across more closely associated families of relations may be more expected than learning across more distinct families. For example, to frame in accordance with comparison may facilitate hierarchical framing more readily than a frame of coordination. For the time being, however, such issues will have to await systematic empirical investigation. 40 RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY 2.4.11. Relational Frames: A Caveat In listing the foregoing families of relational frames, we are not suggesting that they are somehow final or absolute. If RFT is correct, the number of relational frames is limited only by the creativity of the social/verbal community that trains them. Some frames, such as coordination, have been the subject of many empirical analyses. Others such as opposition and more-than/less-than have also been studied experimentally, but the relevant database is much smaller than for coordination. Many of the frames listed, however, have not been analyzed empirically, or have only been subjected to the most preliminary of experimental analyses. Thus the list we have presented is to some degree tentative in that some of the relational frames we have identified are based on our preliminary, non-experimental analyses of human language. For example, TIME and CAUSALITY can be thought of as one or two types of relations. It is not yet clear if thinking of them as separate or related may be the most useful. Thus, while the generic concept of a relational frame is foundational to RFT, the concept of any particular relational frame is not. Our aim in presenting this list is to provide a set of conceptual tools, some more firmly grounded in data than others, that may be modified and refined as subsequent empirical analyses are conducted. 2.5. COMPLEX RELATIONAL NETWORKS It is possible to create relational networks from mixtures of various relational frames and to relate entire relational classes with other relational classes. Forexample, if one equivalence class is the opposite of another equivalence class, then normally each member of the first class is the opposite of all members of the second and vice versa. This can continue to virtually any level of complexity. For example, consider the relations that surround a given word, such as “car.” It is part of many hierarchical classes, such as the class “noun,” or the class “vehicles.” Other terms are in a hierarchical relation with it, such as “windshield” or “wheel.” It enters into many comparisons: it is faster then a snail, bigger than a breadbox, heavier than a book. It is the same as “automobile,” but different than a house, and so on. The participation of the word “car” in these relations is part of the training required for the verbal community to use the stimulus “car” in the way that it does. Even the simplest verbal concept quickly becomes the focus of a complex network of stimulus relations in natural language use. We will deal with this in detail in the next three chapters because this is a crucial form of relational responding in such activities as problem-solving, reasoning, and thinking. The generative implications of this process are spectacular. A single specified relation between two sets of relata might give rise to myriad derived relations in an instant. Entire sets of relations can change in an instant. This kind of phenomenon seems to be part of what is being described with terms like “insight.” 2.6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL FRAMES AS OPERANTS Operant behavior can be originated, maintained, modified, or eliminated in the laboratory and it is relatively easy to identify operants in that context. Many naturally occurring DERIVED RELATIONAL RESPONDING AS LEARNED BEHAVIOR 41 behaviors, however, are difficult to bring into the laboratory in such a highly controlled fashion. Nevertheless, we can examine the characteristics of these naturalistic behaviors to see if they have some of the properties characteristic of operants. Four such properties seem most relevant: first, they should develop over time rather than emerging in whole cloth; second, they should have flexible form; third, they should be under antecedent stimulus control; and fourth, they should be under consequential control. If derived stimulus relations are based upon operant behavior, they should show these four characteristics. Although much work remains to be done, there is some supporting evidence for each of them.