Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication

Modeling Modeling is not merely a process of behavioral mimicry, as commonly misconstrued. The proven skills and established customs of a culture may be adopted in essentially the same form as they are exemplified because of their high functional value. However, in most activities, subskills must be improvised to suit varying circumstances. Modeling influences convey rules for generative and innovative behavior as well. This higher level learning is achieved through abstract modeling. Rule-governed judgments and actions differ in specific content and other details while embodying the same underlying rule. For example, a model may confront moral conflicts that differ widely in content but apply the same moral standard to them. In this higher form of abstract modeling, observers extract the rule governing the specific judgments or actions exhibited by others. Once they learn the rule, they can use it to judge or generate new instances of behavior that go beyond what they have seen or heard. Much human learning is aimed at developing cognitive skills on how to gain and use knowledge for future use. Observational learning of thinking skills is greatly facilitated by having models verbalize their thoughts aloud as they engage in problem-solving activities (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Meichenbaum, 1984). The thoughts guiding their decisions and action strategies are thus made observable for adoption. Acquiring generative rules from modeled information involves at least three processes: extracting the generic features from various social exemplars, integrating the extracted information into composite rules, and using the rules to produce new instances of behavior. Through abstract modeling, people acquire, among other things, standards for categorizing and judging events, linguistic rules of communication, thinking skills on how to gain and use knowledge, and personal standards for regulating one’s motivation and conduct (Bandura, 1986; Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). Evidence that generative rules of thought and S O C I A L COGNITIVE T H E O RYOF MASS COMMUNICAT I O N 2 7 5 D ow nl oa de d by [ G az ia nt ep U ni ve rs ite si ] at 0 1: 15 3 0 D ec em be r 20 11 conduct can be created through abstract modeling attests to the broad scope of observational learning. Modeling also plays a prominent role in creativity. Creativeness rarely springs entirely from individual inventiveness. By refining preexisting innovations, synthesizing them into new procedures and adding novel elements, something new is created (Bandura, 1986; Bolton, 1993; Fimrite, 1977). When exposed to models of differing styles of thinking and behaving, observers vary in what they adopt and thereby create new blends of personal characteristics that differ from the individual models. Modeling new perspectives and innovative styles of thinking also fosters creativity by weakening conventional mind sets (Harris & Evans, 1973). Motivational Effects The discussion thus far has centered on the acquisition of knowledge, cognitive skills, and new styles of behavior through observational learning. Social cognitive theory distinguishes among several modeling functions, each governed by different determinants and underlying mechanisms. In addition to cultivating new competencies, modeling influences have strong motivational eff e c t s . Vicarious motivators are rooted in outcome expectations formed from information conveyed by the rewarding and punishing outcomes of modeled courses of action. Seeing others gain desired outcomes by their actions can create outcome expectancies that function as positive incentives; observed punishing outcomes can create negative outcome expectancies that function as disincentives. These motivational effects are governed by observers’ judgments of their ability to accomplish the modeled behavior, their perception of the modeled actions as producing favorable or adverse consequences, and their inferences that similar or unlike consequences would result if they themselves were to engage in similar activities. Vicarious incentives take on added significance by their power to alter the valence and force of external incentives (Bandura, 1986). The value of a given outcome is largely determined by its relation to other outcomes rather than inheres in their absolute qualities. The same outcome can function as a reward or punisher depending on social comparison between observed and personally experienced outcomes. For example, the same pay raise has negative valence for persons who have seen similar performances by others compensated more generously, but positive valence when others have been compensated less generously. Equitable rewards foster a sense of well-being; inequitable ones breed discontent and resentment. 2 7 6 BANDURA D ow nl oa de d by [ G az ia nt ep U ni ve rs ite si ] at 0 1: 15 3 0 D ec em be r 20 11 Vicariously created motivators have been studied most extensively in terms of the inhibitory and disinhibitory effects of modeled transgressive, aggressive, and sexual behavior, with accompanying outcomes (Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1984; Malamuth & Donnerstein, 1984; Paik & Comstock, 1994; Zillmann & Bryant, 1984). Transgressive behavior is regulated by two major sources of sanctions: social sanctions and internalized self-sanctions. Both control mechanisms operate anticipatorily. In motivators arising from social sanctions, people refrain from transgressing because they anticipate that such conduct will bring them social censure and other adverse consequences. In motivators rooted in self-reactive control, people refrain from transgressing because such conduct will give rise to self-reproach. Media portrayals can alter perceived social sanctions by the way in which the consequences of different styles of conduct are portrayed. For example, televised aggression is often exemplified in ways that tend to weaken restraints over aggressive conduct (Goranson, 1970; Halloran & Croll, 1972; Larsen, 1968). In televised representations of human discord, physical aggression is a preferred solution to interpersonal conflicts; it is acceptable and relatively successful; and it is socially sanctioned by superheroes triumphing over evil by violent means. Such portrayals legitimize, glamorize, and trivialize human violence. Inhibitory and disinhibitory effects stemming from self-sanctions are mediated largely through self-regulatory mechanisms. After standards have been internalized, they serve as guides and deterrents to conduct by the self-approving and self-reprimanding consequences people produce for themselves. However, moral standards do not function as fixed internal regulators of conduct. Selfregulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and there are many processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct (Bandura, 1991b, 1999b). Selective activation and disengagement of internal control permits different types of conduct with the same moral standards. Figure 3 shows the points in the self-regulatory process at which moral control can be disengaged from censurable conduct. One set of disengagement practices operates on the construal of the behavior itself by moral justification. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is culpable is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of moral purposes. Moral justification is widely used to support selfserving and otherwise culpable conduct. Moral judgments of conduct are also partly influenced by what it is compared against. Self-deplored acts can be made benign or honorable by contrasting them with more flagrant transgressions. S O C I A L COGNITIVE T H E O RYOF MASS COMMUNICAT I O N 2 7 7 D ow nl oa de d by [ G az ia nt ep U ni ve rs ite si ] at 0 1: 15 3 0 D ec em be r 20 11 Because examples of human culpability abound, they lend themselves readily to cognitive restructuring of transgressive conduct by such advantageous comparison. Activities can take on a very different appearance depending on what they are called. Sanitizing euphemistic labeling provides another convenient device for masking reprehensible activities or even conferring a respectable status upon them. Through convoluted verbiage, reprehensible conduct is made benign, and those who engage in it are relieved of a sense of personal agency. Figure 3. Mechanisms through which self-sanctions are selectively activated and disengaged from detrimental conduct at critical points in the self-regulatory process. Cognitive restructuring of behavior through moral justifications and palliative characterizations is the most effective psychological mechanism for promoting transgressive conduct. This is because moral restructuring not only eliminates self-deterrents but engages self-approval in the service of transgressive exploits. What was once morally condemnable becomes a source of self-valuation. Ball-Rokeach (1972) attached special significance to evaluative reactions and social justifications presented in the media, particularly in conflicts of power. This is because relatively few viewers experience sufficient inducement to use the aggressive strategies they have seen, but the transmitted justifications and evaluations can help to mobilize public support for policy actions favoring either social control or social change. The justificatory changes can have widespread social and political ramifications. 2 7 8 BANDURA D ow nl oa de d by [ G az ia nt ep U ni ve rs ite si ] at 0 1: 15 3 0 D ec em be r 20 11 The mass media, especially television, provide the best access to the public through their strong drawing power. For this reason, television is increasingly used as the principle vehicle of justification. Struggles to legitimize and gain support for one’s values and causes and to discredit those of one’s opponents are now waged more and more through the electronic media (Ball-Rok