Interactive Effects of Mood and Task Framing on Creative Generation

This study introduced a motivational compatibility account for the influence of mood on creative generation. Building upon the feelingsas-information framework, it was proposed that positive moods signal to individuals that they are safe, motivating them to take advantage of this presumed safety by seeking stimulation and incentives (i.e., having fun), whereas negative moods signal to individuals that there are problems at hand, motivating them to solve these problems. Based on these assumptions, it was predicted that positive and negative moods should enhance effort on creative generation tasks construed as compatible with the motivational orientations they respectively elicit. Specifically, positive, relative to negative, moods were predicted to enhance effort on tasks construed as fun and silly, whereas negative, relative to positive, moods were predicted to bolster effort on tasks construed as serious and important. Evidence for this model, and several of its underlying assumptions, was adduced in 3 experiments in which mood was manipulated and participants completed creative generation tasks that were framed as either fun or serious. Results are discussed with an eye toward addressing alternative theoretical explanations. Over the past 2 decades, social psychologists have been at the forefront of what may be seen as a second stage of the cognitive revolution (Baars, 1986), a movement to establish and elucidate the role of affect in information processing and task performance. The fruits of their labor have been substantial, with innumerable studies now demonstrating that affective experiences profoundly shape the course of judgment, decision making, and problem solving (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Martin & Clore, 2001; for reviews). This research has drawn inspiration from a number of innovative theories meant to organize and explain how moods and emotional states impact cognition and action (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Isen, 1987; Wegener & Petty, 1994); however, perhaps no theoretical framework in this area of inquiry has been as far-reaching in its influence as the feelings-as-information model developed by Schwarz and his colleagues (see e.g., Schwarz, 1990, 2001; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Essentially, Schwarz and his associates propose that affective states serve to inform individuals about the nature of their current situation. Positive affective states signal that the current situation is safe, suggesting to the individual that cognitive effort is unnecessary unless specifically required by other ongoing goals or directives. In addition to spurring a reduction or withholding of effort, the safety signal conveyed by positive states is also posited Correspondence should be sent to Ronald S. Friedman, Department of Psychology, University at Albany, State University of New York, 100 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222. E-mail: rfriedman@albany.edu Creativity Research Journal 2007, Vol. 19, Nos. 2–3, 141–162 Copyright # 2007 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Creativity Research Journal 141 to engender a proclivity toward risk taking and the use of novel or creative alternatives. In corresponding fashion, feelings-as-information theorists propose that negative affective states signal that the current situation is problematic, suggesting to the individual that cognitive effort is required to assess and remedy this undesirable or threatening state of affairs. Beyond intensifying effort, the problem signal conveyed by negative states is also posited to enhance risk-aversion and inhibit the use of novel alternatives. In recent years, a prodigious amount of empirical evidence has been adduced in support of this model. For instance, in the domain of persuasion, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that individuals in bad moods exhibit more attitude change in response to strong, rather than weak, arguments, whereas those in good moods exhibit moderate and equal attitude change irrespective of argument quality (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack; 1990; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994). Consistent with the feelings-as-information approach, these findings suggest that negative affective states, such as bad moods, relative to positive affective states, such as good moods, increase the motivation to engage in effortful information processing, in this case leading to greater elaboration of the content of persuasive messages. Correspondingly, in the domain of impression formation, it has been found that individuals in bad moods are less likely to rely on stereotypes in making interpersonal judgments than those in good moods (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). To the extent that stereotypes constitute ‘‘rules of thumb’’ meant to save the time and energy required to process individuating information (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994), these findings are also consistent with the notion that negative, relative to positive affective states, promote expenditure of cognitive effort, in this case inhibiting the use of heuristics involving category membership. Parallel findings have also emerged from the domain of problem solving, where it has been shown that individuals in negative affective states exhibit superior performance on a range of tasks that demand careful, effortful processing (e.g., correlation estimation, Sinclair & Mark, 1995; logical reasoning, Fiedler, 1988), whereas those in positive affective states exhibit impaired performance on such tasks (e.g., Fiedler, 1988; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982; Melton, 1995; Sinclair & Mark, 1995). Together, these findings, and others, offer strong converging support for the core predictions of the feelings-as-information framework. Of course, even casual perusal of this veritable sea of findings inevitably brings to mind the question: Do individuals in negative affective states always outwork, outthink, and outperform those in positive states? As alluded to earlier, according to Schwarz and his colleagues (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991), affective states are not only posited to influence the quantity of processing, but to also influence the quality or style of processing. Specifically, whereas negative affective states are generally posited to increase the effort invested in a given task, they are also predicted to increase risk-aversion and to diminish the use of novel alternatives. Therefore, on measures of creativity and cognitive flexibility, which presumably demand increased risk-taking and novelty-seeking rather than sheer effort, positive relative to negative affective states should enhance rather than undermine performance. In line with this prediction, a number of studies have suggested that positive, relative to neutral and=or negative affect promotes more flexible categorization (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990), facilitates insight problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), and leads to the generation of more original ideas (e.g., more unusual word associations; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; see also, Hirt, McDonald, & Melton, 1996). Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, the aforementioned findings may be seen as offering only tentative support for the predictions of the feelings-as-information model. For instance, a number of the most prominent studies within this line of inquiry merely demonstrate that positive mood facilitates creativity or cognitive flexibility relative to a control group (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984; Study 1; Isen et al., 1985, Study 2), and as such, fail to additionally establish whether negative mood leads to the predicted decrease in performance on tasks of this ilk. Moreover, when negative affect conditions have been included, the R. S. Friedman, J. Förster, & M. Denzler 142 Creativity Research Journal results have often failed to support the feelings-asinformation approach. For instance, in one set of well-known studies (Isen & Daubman, 1984, Studies 2 & 3), cognitive flexibility was marginally increased relative to a control group amongst participants in a negative mood. Likewise, in a more recent study, Kaufmann and Vosburg (1997) adduced evidence that negative, relative to positive affective states enhance, rather than diminish insight problem solving performance. Other studies have indeed demonstrated increments in creativity under positive, relative to negative, mood, yet defied interpretation in terms of feelings-as-information. For instance, in one noteworthy experiment, Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, and Martin (1997) manipulated not only positive versus negative affect, but also whether participants were cued as to the original source of their moods. A critical corollary of the feelingsas-information model is that affective experiences will only influence performance when they are considered informative regarding the task situation itself (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Restated, to the extent that feelings are attributed to a source that is irrelevant to the current task, the individual should discount them, preventing the feelings from influencing task performance. In their experiment, Hirt and his colleagues (1997) found that positive, relative to negative, mood bolstered creativity even when participants were cued that their feelings were irrelevant to the task. As such, their findings suggest that even if positive moods do reliably enhance creativity, the feelings-as-information model may not suffice to account for the phenomenon. In sum, the feelings-as-information model parsimoniously accounts for the empirically well-established tendency of negative, relative to positive, affective states to bolster the effort invested in cognitive processing across multiple domains of judgment and problem solving. On the other hand, its complementary predictions regarding facilitative effects of positive, relative to negative, affect on creativity and cognitive flexibility have not b