| ---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 53 July 8, 1998, article 01 of 15 | |
| -------------------------[ P H R A C K 5 3 I N D E X | |
| --------[ Rumble in the Mumble | |
| More than 6 months have passed since our last offering. My most humble, | |
| sincere and heartfelt apologies. At long last, here we are. Better late then | |
| never, that's what I always say. Unless of course, the late version sucks, | |
| then I just like to disavow it entirely. Well, here we go again. Another | |
| Phrack issue to glorify behavior which would otherwise be classified as | |
| sociopathic or frankly psychotic (according to Mich Kabay). More of what you | |
| want, more of what you need. Technical articles on fanatically enticing | |
| topics, lines and lines of glorious source, another gut-busting installment of | |
| Loopback, and of course, the News. Mammas, don't let your babies grow up to | |
| be hackers. Or hookers for that matter. | |
| Alright. Let's get down to business. Let's talk remote attack paradigms. | |
| Remote attack paradigms can fall into one of two types, based off of the | |
| standard client/server communication paradigm (we are glossing over any | |
| extensions to the model like client to client or server to server stuff). The | |
| two attack types are client to server (server-centric) and server to client | |
| (client-centric). Server-centric attacks are well known, understand and | |
| documented. Client-centric attacks are an area that is often overlooked, but | |
| is definitely fertile ground for exploitation. Below we look at both. | |
| ----[ Server-Centricity | |
| Historically, the vast majority of remote attacks have been server-centric. | |
| Server-centric, in this scope, refers to attacks that target server (or daemon) | |
| programs. A common (and frequently reoccurring) example is sendmail. The | |
| attack targets a server (the sendmail daemon) and approximates a client (the | |
| exploit program). There are several reasons why this has been the trend: | |
| - Server programs typically run with elevated privileges. Server | |
| programs usually require certain system resources or access to special | |
| files that necessitate privilege elevation (of course we know this | |
| doesn't have to be the case; have a look at POSIX 6). A successful | |
| compromise could very well mean access to the target system at that | |
| (higher) privilege level. | |
| - Discretion is the attacker's whim. The client/server message paradigm | |
| specifies that a server provides a service that a client may request. | |
| Servers exist to process clientele requests. As per this model, the | |
| attacker (client) makes a request (attack) to any server offering | |
| the service and may do so at any point. | |
| - Client codebase is usually simple. Dumb client, smart server. The | |
| impact of this is two-fold. The fact that server code tends to be | |
| more complex means that it is tougher to audit from a security | |
| stand-point. The fact that client code is typically smaller and less | |
| complex means that exploitation code development time is reduced. | |
| - Code reuse in exploitation programs. Client-based exploitation code | |
| bases are often quite similar. Code such as packet generators and | |
| buffer overflow eggs are often reused. This further cuts down on | |
| development time and also reduces required sophistication on the part | |
| of the exploit writer. | |
| All of these make server-centric attacks enticing. The ability to | |
| selectively choose a program to attack running with elevated privileges and | |
| quickly write up exploit code for it is a powerful combination. It is easy to | |
| see why this paradigm has perpetuated itself so successfully. However, up | |
| until recently it seems another potentially lucrative area of exploitation has | |
| gone all but overlooked. | |
| ----[ Client-Centricity | |
| An often neglected area of exploitation is the exact reverse of the above: | |
| client-centricity. Client-centric attacks target client programs (duh). The | |
| types of programs in this category include: web browsers (which have seen more | |
| then their share of vulnerabilities) remote access programs, DNS resolvers and | |
| IRC clients (to name a few). The benefits of this attack model are as follows: | |
| - Automated (non-discretionary) attacks. We know that, under the | |
| previous paradigm, the attacker has complete autonomy over who s/he | |
| attacks. The benefit there is obvious. However, non-discretionary | |
| attacking implies that the attacker doesn't even have to be around | |
| when the attack takes place. The attacker can set up the server | |
| containing the exploit and actually go do something useful (tm). | |
| - Wide dispersement. With client-centric attacks you can gain a wider | |
| audience. If a server contains a popular service, people from all over | |
| will seek it out. Popular websites are constantly bombarded with | |
| clientele. Another consideration: server programs often run in | |
| filtered environments. It may not be possible for an attacker to | |
| connect to a server. This is rarely the case in client-centric | |
| attacks. | |
| - Client codebase not developed with security in mind. If you think | |
| server code is bad, you should see some client code. Memory leaks and | |
| stack overruns are all too common. | |
| - Largely an untapped resource. There are so many wonderful holes | |
| waiting to be discovered. Judging at how successful people have been | |
| in finding and exploiting holes in server code, it goes to figure that | |
| the same success can be had in client code. In fact, if you take into | |
| account the fact that the codebase is largely unaudited from a | |
| security perspective, the yields should be high. | |
| For all the above reasons, people wanting to find security holes should | |
| be definitely be looking at client programs. Now go break telnet. | |
| Enjoy the magazine. It is by and for the hacking community. Period. | |
| -- Editor in Chief ----------------[ route | |
| -- Phrack World News --------------[ disorder | |
| -- Phrack Publicity ---------------[ dangergirl | |
| -- Phrack Librarian ---------------[ loadammo | |
| -- Soother of Typographical Chaos -[ snocrash | |
| -- Hi! I'm an idiot! -------------[ Carolyn P. Meinel | |
| -- The Justice-less Files ---------[ Kevin D. Mitnick (www.kevinmitnick.com) | |
| -------- Elite --------------------> Solar Designer | |
| -- More money than God ------------[ The former SNI | |
| -- Tom P. and Tim N. -------------[ Cool as ice, hot as lava. | |
| -- Official Phrack Song -----------[ KMFDM/Megalomaniac | |
| -- Official Phrack Tattoo artist --[ C. Nalla Smith | |
| -- Shout Outs and Thank Yous ------[ haskell, mudge, loadammo, nihilis, daveg, | |
| -----------------------------------| halflife, snocrash, apk, solar designer, | |
| -----------------------------------| kore, alhambra, nihil, sluggo, Datastorm, | |
| -----------------------------------| aleph1, drwho, silitek | |
| Phrack Magazine V. 8, #53, xx xx, 1998. ISSN 1068-1035 | |
| Contents Copyright (c) 1998 Phrack Magazine. All Rights Reserved. Nothing | |
| may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission from the | |
| editor in chief. Phrack Magazine is made available quarterly to the public, | |
| free of charge. Go nuts people. | |
| Contact Phrack Magazine | |
| ----------------------- | |
| Submissions: phrackedit@phrack.com | |
| Commentary: loopback@phrack.com | |
| Editor in Chief: route@phrack.com | |
| Publicist: dangergrl@phrack.com | |
| Phrack World News: disorder@phrack.com | |
| Submissions to the above email address may be encrypted with the following key: | |
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| phrack:~# head -20 /usr/include/std-disclaimer.h | |
| /* | |
| * All information in Phrack Magazine is, to the best of the ability of the | |
| * editors and contributors, truthful and accurate. When possible, all facts | |
| * are checked, all code is compiled. However, we are not omniscient (hell, | |
| * we don't even get paid). It is entirely possible something contained | |
| * within this publication is incorrect in some way. If this is the case, | |
| * please drop us some email so that we can correct it in a future issue. | |
| * | |
| * | |
| * Also, keep in mind that Phrack Magazine accepts no responsibility for the | |
| * entirely stupid (or illegal) things people may do with the information | |
| * contained here-in. Phrack is a compendium of knowledge, wisdom, wit, and | |
| * sass. We neither advocate, condone nor participate in any sort of illicit | |
| * behavior. But we will sit back and watch. | |
| * | |
| * | |
| * Lastly, it bears mentioning that the opinions that may be expressed in the | |
| * articles of Phrack Magazine are intellectual property of their authors. | |
| * These opinions do not necessarily represent those of the Phrack Staff. | |
| */ | |
| -------------------------[ T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S | |
| 1 Introduction Phrack Staff 11K | |
| 2 Phrack Loopback Phrack Staff 33K | |
| 3 Line Noise various 51K | |
| 4 Phrack Prophile on Glyph Phrack Staff 18K | |
| 5 An Overview of Internet Routing krnl 50K | |
| 6 T/TCP Vulnerabilities route 17K | |
| 7 A Stealthy Windows Keylogger markj8 25K | |
| 8 Linux Trusted Path Execution redux K. Baranowski 23K | |
| 9 Hacking in Forth mudge 15K | |
| 10 Interface Promiscuity Obscurity apk 24K | |
| 11 Watcher, NIDS for the masses hacklab 32K | |
| 12 The Crumbling Tunnel Aleph1 52K | |
| 13 Port Scan Detection Tools Solar Designer 25K | |
| 14 Phrack World News Disorder 95K | |
| 15 extract.c Phrack Staff 11K | |
| 482K | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| " The advent of information availability and a rise in the number people | |
| for whom the net has always been 'the norm' is producing a class of users | |
| who cannot think for themselves. As reliance upon scripted attacks | |
| increases, the number of people who personally possess technical knowledge | |
| decreases. " | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| ----[ EOF | |