| ==Phrack Inc.== |
|
|
| Volume Two, Issue 22, File 9 of 12 |
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| PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN |
| PWN PWN |
| PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN |
| PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN |
| PWN Issue XXII/Part 1 PWN |
| PWN PWN |
| PWN Created by Knight Lightning PWN |
| PWN PWN |
| PWN Written and Edited by PWN |
| PWN Knight Lightning and Taran King PWN |
| PWN PWN |
| PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN |
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| What Is Wrong With This Issue? Introduction |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| There is a distinct difference in this issue of Phrack World News, which may be |
| attributed to the unfortunate final outcome of my self-enforced exile from the |
| mainstream modem community. In the "prime" days of PWN, many of you may have |
| enjoyed the numerous "bust" stories or the ever suspenseful undercover |
| exposures of security trying to end the hacking community. Those days are over |
| and have been for quite some time. |
|
|
| To put it simply, I do not have the economic resources to legally run around on |
| the nation's bulletin boards or to go and gather information on suspected |
| security agents. Perhaps this is for the better. However, I have a feeling |
| that most people disagree and rather enjoyed those types of stories. Its no |
| longer in my hands. Its obvious that I need help with such a task and that |
| help can only come from you, the community itself. |
|
|
| I am easily reached... I am on Bitnet. Even people who own MCI Mail, GTE |
| Telemail, or Compuserve accounts can send me mail thanks to experimental |
| gateways. People on ARPAnet, Bitnet, or UUCP should have no problems |
| whatsoever. So please go ahead and drop me a line, I would be interested in |
| what you have to say. |
|
|
| :Knight Lightning (C483307@UMCVMB.BITNET) |
|
|
| Much of this issue of Phrack World News comes from Internet news sources such |
| as the Risks, Virus-L, and Telecom Digests. Some news stories come from other |
| magazines and newspapers, and a few come from Chamas, the online Bitnet |
| bulletin board run by Terra of the Chaos Computer Club (CCC). A very special |
| thanks goes to The Noid of 314 for all his help in putting this issue together. |
|
|
| A couple last things to mention... the upcoming files on hackers abroad have |
| taken a slightly different direction. There will be news on foreign hacker |
| activities presented in PWN (starting this issue), but actual files on the |
| subject will be presented by the hackers themselves so watch for them. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| Who Is Clifford Stoll? Pre-Issue Information |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| This issue of Phrack World News features many stories about the Internet Worm |
| and other hacking incidents on the Internet. One person who plays a prominent |
| role in all of these stories is Clifford Stoll, a virtual unknown prior to |
| these incidents. However, some checking into other related incidents turned up |
| some very interesting information about Cliff Stoll. |
|
|
| Clifford Stoll, age 37 (as of May 2, 1988) was a system's manager at |
| California's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. He might still retain this |
| position. Stoll is the master sleuth who tracked down the West German hacker, |
| Mathias Speer, who infiltrated the Internet via the Space Physics Analysis |
| Network (SPAN). The game of "cat and mouse" lasted for 10 months until |
| Clifford Stoll eventually set up an elaborate sting operation using files |
| marked "SDI Network Project" (Star Wars) to get Mathias to stay online long |
| enough to trace him back to Hannover, FRG. |
|
|
| I was able to contact Clifford Stoll at LBL (which maintains a node on Bitnet). |
| However, outside of a confirmation of his presence, I was never able to really |
| converse with him. Recently he has been seen on DOCKMASTER, a node on ARPAnet |
| that is operated by the National Security Agency (NSA). He has also been seen |
| as having accounts on many other nodes all across Internet. Either he has come |
| a long way or was just not as well known prior to the Internet Worm incident. |
|
|
| For more information see; |
|
|
| Time Magazine, May 2, 1988 and/or New Scientist, April 28, 1988 |
| ------------- ------------- |
| Thought you might be interested to know about it. |
|
|
| :Knight Lightning |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| Dangerous Hacker Is Captured PWN Special Report |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| Last issue, I re-presented some memos from Pacific Bell Security. The first |
| of which featured "Kevin Hacker," who I now reveal as Kevin Mitnick. The |
| original intent was to protect the anonyimity of the said hacker, but now that |
| he has come upon public fame there is no longer a reason to keep his identity a |
| secret. |
|
|
| The following memo from Pacific Bell Security was originally seen in Phrack |
| World News Issue XXI/1. This version leaves the legitimate information intact. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| On May 14, 1987, Electronic Operations received a court order directing Pacific |
| Bell to place traps on the telephone numbers assigned to a company known as |
| "Santa Cruz Operations." The court order was issued in order to identify the |
| telephone number being used by an individual who was illegally entering Santa |
| Cruz Operations' computer and stealing information. |
|
|
| On May 28, 1987, a telephone number was identified five separate times making |
| illegal entry into Santa Cruz Operations' computer. The originating telephone |
| number was 805-495-6191, which is listed to Bonnie Vitello, 1378 E. Hillcrest |
| Drive, Apt. 404, Thousand Oaks, California. |
|
|
| On June 3, 1987, a search warrant was served at 1378 E. Hillcrest Drive, Apt |
| 404, Thousand Oaks, California. The residents of the apartment, who were not |
| at home, were identified as Bonnie Vitello, a programmer for General Telephone, |
| and Kevin Mitnick, a known computer hacker. Found inside the apartment were |
| three computers, numerous floppy disks and a number of General Telephone |
| computer manuals. |
|
|
| Kevin Mitnick was arrested several years ago for hacking Pacific Bell, UCLA and |
| Hughes Aircraft Company computers. Mitnick was a minor at the time of his |
| arrest. Kevin Mitnick was recently arrested for compromising the data base of |
| Santa Cruz Operations. |
|
|
| The floppy disks that were seized pursuant to the search warrant revealed |
| Mitnick's involvment in compromising the Pacific Bell UNIX operation systems |
| and other data bases. The disks documented the following: |
|
|
| o Mitnick's compromise of all Southern California SCC/ESAC computers. On |
| file were the names, log-ins, passwords, and home telephone numbers for |
| Northern and Southern ESAC employees. |
|
|
| o The dial-up numbers and circuit identification documents for SCC computers |
| and Data Kits. |
|
|
| o The commands for testing and seizing trunk testing lines and channels. |
|
|
| o The commands and log-ins for COSMOS wire centers for Northern and Southern |
| California. |
|
|
| o The commands for line monitoring and the seizure of dial tone. |
|
|
| o References to the impersonation of Southern California Security Agents and |
| ESAC employees to obtain information. |
|
|
| o The commands for placing terminating and originating traps. |
|
|
| o The addresses of Pacific Bell locations and the Electronic Door Lock |
| access codes for the following Southern California central offices ELSG12, |
| LSAN06, LSAN12, LSAN15, LSAN23, LSAN56, AVLN11, HLWD01, HWTH01, IGWD01, |
| LOMT11, AND SNPD01. |
|
|
| o Inter-company Electronic Mail detailing new login/password procedures and |
| safeguards. |
|
|
| o The work sheet of an UNIX encryption reader hacker file. If successful, |
| this program could break into any UNIX system at will. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| Ex-Computer Whiz Kid Held On New Fraud Counts December 16, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| By Kim Murphy (Los Angeles Times)(Edited For This Presentation) |
|
|
| Kevin Mitnick was 17 when he first cracked Pacific Bell's computer system, |
| secretly channeling his computer through a pay phone to alter telephone bills, |
| penetrate other computers and steal $200,000 worth of data from a San Francisco |
| corporation. A Juvenile Court judge at the time sentenced Mitnick to six |
| months in a youth facility. |
|
|
| After his release, his probation officer found that her phone had been |
| disconnected and the phone company had no record of it. A judge's credit |
| record at TRW Inc. was inexplicably altered. Police computer files on the case |
| were accessed from outside... Mitnick fled to Israel. Upon his return, there |
| were new charges filed in Santa Cruz, accusing Mitnick of stealing software |
| under development by Microport Systems, and federal prosecutors have a judgment |
| showing Mitnick was convicted on the charge. There is, however, no record of |
| the conviction in Sant Cruz's computer files. |
|
|
| On Thursday, Mitnick, now 25, was charged in two new criminal complaints |
| accusing him of causing $4 million damage to a DEC computer, stealing a highly |
| secret computer security system and gaining access to unauthorized MCI |
| long-distance codes through university computers in Los Angeles, California, |
| and England. |
|
|
| A United States Magistrate took the unusual step of ordering "Mitnic k] held |
| without bail, ruling that when armed with a keyboard he posed a danger to the |
| community.' "This thing is so massive, we're just running around trying to |
| figure out what he did," said the prosecutor, an Assistant United States |
| Attorney. "This person, we believe, is very, very dangerous, and he needs to |
| be detained and kept away from a computer." |
|
|
| Los Angeles Police Department and FBI Investigators say they are only now |
| beginning to put together a picture of Mitnick and his alleged high-tech |
| escapades. "He's several levels above what you would characterize as a |
| computer hacker," said Detective James K. Black, head of the Los Angeles Police |
| Department's computer crime unit. "He started out with a real driving |
| curiosity for computers that went beyond personal computers... He grew with the |
| technology." |
|
|
| Mitnick is to be arraigned on two counts of computer fraud. The case is |
| believed to be the first in the nation under a federal law that makes it a |
| crime to gain access to an interstate computer network for criminal purposes. |
| Federal prosecutors also obtained a court order restricting Mitnick's telephone |
| calls from jail, fearing he might gain access to a computer over the phone |
| lines. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| Dangerous Keyboard Artist December 20, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| LOS ANGELES (UPI) - In a rare ruling, a convicted computer hacker was ordered |
| held without bail Thursday on new charges that he gained illegal access to |
| secret computer information of Leeds University in England and Digital |
| Equipment Corportation. |
|
|
| Kevin David Mitnick, age 25, of Panorama City, is named in two separate |
| criminal complaints charging him with computer fraud. Assistant United States |
| Attorney, Leon Weidman said it is unusual to seek detention in such cases, but |
| he considers Mitnick 'very very dangerous' and someone who 'needs to be kept |
| away from computers.' |
|
|
| United States Magistrate Venetta Tasnuopulos granted the no-bail order after |
| Weidman told her that since 1982, Mitnick had also accessed the internal |
| records of the Los Angeles Police Department, TRW Corporation, and Pacific |
| Telephone. |
|
|
| "He could call up and get access to the whole world," Weidman said. |
|
|
| Weidman said Mitnick had served six months in juvenile hall for stealing |
| computer manuals from a Pacific Telephone office in the San Fernando Valley |
| and using a pay phone to destroy $200,000 worth of data in the files of a |
| northern California company. |
|
|
| Mitnick later pentrated the files of TRW Corporation and altered the credit |
| information of several people, including his probation officer, Weidman said. |
|
|
| He said Mitnick also used a ruse to obtain the name of the police detective |
| investigating him for hacking when he was a student at Pierce College. He |
| telephoned the dean at 3 a.m., identified himself as a campus security guard, |
| reported a computer burglary in progress and asked for the name of the |
| detective investigating past episodes, Weidman said. |
|
|
| The prosecutor said Mitnick also gained access to the police department's |
| computer data and has impersonated police officers and judges to gain |
| information. |
|
|
| A complaint issued charges Mitnick with using a computer in suburban Calabases |
| to gain access to Leeds University computer data in England. He also allegedly |
| altered long-distance phone costs incurred by that activity in order to cover |
| his mischief. |
|
|
| A second complaint charges Mitnick with stealing proprietary Digital Equipment |
| Corporation software valued at more than $1 million and designed to protect the |
| security of its computer data. Mitnick alledgedly stored the stolen data in a |
| University of Southern California computer. |
|
|
| An affidavit filed to support the complaints said unauthorized intrusions into |
| the Digital computer have cost the company more than $4 million in computer |
| downtime, file rebuilding, and lost employee worktime. |
|
|
| A computer operator at Voluntary Plan Assistance in Calabasas, which handles |
| disability claims for private firms, told investigators he allowed his friend |
| unauthorized access to the firm's computer. From that terminal, Mitnick gained |
| access to Digital's facilities in the United States and abroad, the affidavit |
| said. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| Kevin Mitnick's fate is in the hand's of the court now, but only time will tell |
| what is to happen to this dangerously awesome computer hacker. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| Trojan Horse Threat Succeeds February 10, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| During the week prior to February 10, 1988, the Chaos Computer Club of West |
| Berlin announced that they were going to trigger trojan horses they'd |
| previously planted on various computers in the Space Physics Analysis Network |
| (SPAN). Presumably, the reason for triggering the trojan horses was to throw |
| the network into disarray; if so, the threat did, unfortunately, with the help |
| of numerous fifth-columnists within SPAN, succeeded. Before anybody within |
| SPAN replies by saying something to the effect of "Nonsense, they didn't |
| succeed in triggering any trojan horses." However the THREAT succeeded. |
|
|
| That's right, for the last week SPAN hasn't been functioning very well as a |
| network. All too many of the machines in it have cut off network |
| communications (or at least lost much of their connectivity), specifically in |
| order to avoid the possibility that the trojan horses would be triggered (the |
| fifth-columnists who were referred above are those system and network managers |
| who were thrown into panic by the threat). This is rather amazing (not to |
| mention appalling) for a number of reasons: |
|
|
| 1) By reducing networking activities, SPAN demonstrated that the CCC DOES |
| have the power to disrupt the network (even if there aren't really any |
| trojan horses out there); |
| 2) Since the break-ins that would have permitted the installation of |
| trojan horses, there have been a VMS release (v4.6) that entails |
| replacement of ALL DEC-supplied images. Installation of the new |
| version of VMS provided a perfect opportunity to purge one's system of |
| any trojan horses. |
| 3) In addition to giving CCC's claims credibility, SPAN's response to the |
| threat seems a bit foolish since it leaves open the question "What |
| happens if the CCC activates trojan horses without first holding a |
| press conference?" |
|
|
| Hiding from the problem doesn't help in any way, it merely makes SPAN (and |
| NASA) look foolish. |
|
|
| Information Provided By |
| Carl J. Ludick and Frederick M. Korz |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| This is a perfect example of a self-fulfilling phrophecy. The Chaos Computer |
| Club's announcement that they were going to trigger their Trojan horses in the |
| Space Physics Analysis Network (SPAN) illustrates the potent power of rumor -- |
| backed by plausibility. They didn't have to do anything. The sky didn't have |
| to fall. Nervous managers did the damage for the CCC because they felt the |
| announcement/threat plausible. The prophecy was fulfilled. |
|
|
| "And the more the power to them!" |
|
|
| :Knight Lightning |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| TCA Pushes For Privacy On Corporate Networks October 19, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| By Kathy Chin Leong (Computerworld Magazine) |
|
|
| SAN DIEGO -- As more and more confidential data winds its way across computer |
| networks, users are expressing alarm over how much of that information is safe |
| from subsidiaries of the Bell operating companies (BOCs) and long-distance |
| firms providing transmission services. |
|
|
| This fear has prompted the Tele-Communications Association (TCA) and large |
| network users to appeal to the Federal Communications Commission to clarify |
| exactly what network data is available to these vendors. |
|
|
| Users with large networks, such as banks and insurance companies, are concerned |
| that published details even of where a circuit is routed can be misused. "We |
| don't what someone like AT&T to use our information and then turn around and |
| compete against us," said Leland Fong, a network planner at Visa International |
| in San Francisco. Users are demanding that the FCC establish a set of rules |
| and regulations so that information is not abused. |
|
|
| At issue is the term "customer proprietary network information" (CPNI), which |
| encompasses packet data, address and circuit information and traffic statistics |
| on networks. Under the FCC's Computer Inquiry III rules, long-distance |
| carriers and Bell operating companies --- specifically, marketing personnel --- |
| can get access to their own customers' CPNI unless users request |
| confidentiality. What his group wants, TCA President Jerry Appleby said, is |
| the FCC to clarify exactly what falls under the category of CPNI. |
|
|
| Fong added that users can be at the mercy of the Bell operating companies and |
| long-distance vendors if there are no safeguards established. Customer |
| information such as calling patterns can be used by the operating companies for |
| thier own competitive advantage. "At this time, there are no controls over |
| CPNI, and the users need to see some action on this," Fong said. |
|
|
| Spread The Concern |
|
|
| At a meeting here during the TCA show, TCA officials and the association's |
| government liason committee met with AT&T to discuss the issue; the group will |
| also voice its concerns to other vendors. |
|
|
| Appleby said the issue should not be of concern just to network managers but to |
| the entire company. Earlier this month, several banks, including Chase |
| Manhattan Bank and Security Pacific National Bank, and credit card companies |
| met with the FCC to urge it to come up with a standard definition for CPNI, |
| Appleby said. |
|
|
| While the customer information is generally confidential, it is available to |
| the transmission carrier that is supplying the line. The data is also |
| available to marketing departments of that vendor unless a company asks for |
| confidentiality. Fong said that there is no regulation that prevents a company |
| from passing the data along to its subsidiaries. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| Belgian Leader's Mail Reportedly Read By Hacker October 22, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| Taken from the Los Angeles Times |
|
|
| Brussels (AP) -- Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens on Friday ordered an |
| investigation into reports that a computer hacker rummaged through his |
| electronic files and those of other Cabinet members. |
|
|
| The newspaper De Standaard reported that a man, using a personal computer, for |
| three months viewed Martens' electronic mail and other items, including |
| classified information about the killing of a British soldier by the Irish |
| Republican Army in Ostend in August. |
|
|
| The newspaper said the man showed one of its reporters this week how he broke |
| into the computer, using Martens' password code of nine letters, ciphers and |
| punctuation marks. "What is more, during the demonstration, he ran into |
| another 'burglar' ... with whom he briefly conversed" via computer, the |
| newspaper said. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| Police Find Hacker Who Broke Into 200 Computers October 24, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| London (New York Times) - Police said yesterday that they had found and |
| questioned a 23-year-old man who used computer networks to break into more than |
| 200 military, corporate, and university systems in Europe and the United States |
| during the past five years. |
|
|
| The man was asked about an alleged attempt to blackmail a computer |
| manufacturer, but an official for Scotland Yard said that there was not enough |
| evidence to pursue the matter. He was released. |
|
|
| The man, Edward Austin Singh, who is unemployed, reportedly told the police he |
| had been in contact with other computer "hackers" in the United States and West |
| Germany who use communications networks to penetrate the security protecting |
| computers at military installations. |
|
|
| Singh's motive was simply to prove that it was possible to break into the |
| military systems, police said, and apparently he did not attempt espionage. |
|
|
| London police began an investigation after the man approached a computer |
| manufacturer. He allegedly asked the company for $5250 in exchange for telling |
| it how he had entered its computer network. |
|
|
| The company paid nothing, and London police tracked the suspect by monitoring |
| his phone calls after the firm had told Scotland Yard about the incident. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| University of Surrey Hacker November 10, 1988 |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| There has been a lot of recent publicity in the U.K. about the arrest of a |
| hacker at the University of Surrey. There were stories about his investigation |
| by Scotland Yard's Serious Crimes Squad and by the U.S. Secret Service, and |
| much dicussion about the inadequacy of the law relating to network hacking. At |
| this date, he has only been charged with offences relating his unathorised |
| (physical) entry to the University buildings. |
|
|
| An interview with the individual, Edward Austin Singh, reveals that his |
| techniques were simply ased on a program which tricked users into |
| unsuspectingly revealing their passwords. "I wrote a program that utilized a |
| flaw that allowed me to call into the dial-up node. I always did it by |
| phoning, never by the network. The dial-up node has to have an address as |
| well, so I was calling the address itself. I called the dial-up node via the |
| network and did it repeatedly until it connected. That happened every 30 |
| seconds. It allowed me to connect the dial-up node at the same time as a |
| legitimate user at random. I would then emulate the system." |
|
|
| He used to run this program at night, and specialized in breaking into Prime |
| computer systems. "I picked up about 40 passwords and IDs an hour. We were |
| picking up military stuff like that, as well as commercial and academic," he |
| claims. This enabled him to get information from more than 250 systems |
| world-wide, and (he claims) in touich with an underground hackers network to |
| "access virtually every single computer system which was networked in the US - |
| thousands and thousands of them, many of them US Arms manufacturers." |
|
|
| The article states that "Prime Computers have so far declined to comment on his |
| approach to them or his alleged penetration of their computer systems, until |
| the American Secret Service completes its inquiries." |
|
|
| Information Provided By Brian Randell |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|