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Their further contention that their right to retain the difference between full assessment and quit rent is not a right in an estate also fails.

The Act therefore when it extinguishes or modifies the rights of inamdars in the inam estates is clearly protected by article 31 A.

The next contention is that the Act does not provide for compensation and is therefore ultra vires in view of article 31.

We find, however, that the Act has provided for compensation under section 10 so far as that part of inam lands which are vested in the State by section 7 are concerned.

Further section 17 provides for compensation in a possible case where anything has been left out by section 7 and the inamdar is entitled to compensation for it.

It is true that by sub section (5) of section 17 no compensation is to be paid for the loss to the inamdar of what he used to get because of the difference between the quit rent and the full assessment.

It is how ever clear that article 31 A saves the Act from any attack under article 31 which is the only Article providing for compensation.

In this view of the matter the constitutionality of the Act cannot be assailed on the ground that it provides no compensation for extinction of certain rights.

There is no force in these appeals and they are hereby dismissed with costs.

One set only of hearing costs.

Appeals dismissed.

iminal Appeal No. 68 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 11, 1957, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), Lucknow, in Criminal Appeal No. 515 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated October 31, 1955, of the Special Judge, Anti corruption, Lucknow, in Criminal Case No. 2/3/32/45 of 1953 55.

Frank Anthony, Udai Pratap Singh and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant.

G. C. Mathur and O. P. Lal, for the respondent.

December 15.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.

This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar j. has been filed by C. 1.

Emden (hereinafter called the appellant) who has been convicted under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act).

The case against him was that he had accepted a bribe of Rs. 375 from Sarat Chandra Shukla on January 8, 1953.

The appellant was a Loco Foreman at Alambagh Loco Shed, and Shukla had secured a contract at the same place for the removal of cinders 76 594 from ash pits and for loading coal.

This contract had been given to Shukla in June 1952.

The prosecution case was that the appellant demanded from Shukla Rs. 400 per month in order that Shukla may be allowed to carry out his contract peacefully without any harassment.

Shukla was told by the appellant that he had been receiving a monthly payment from Ram Ratan who had held a similar contract before him and that it would be to his interest to agree to pay the bribe.

Shukla, however, refused to accede to this request and that led to many hostile acts on the part of the appellant.

On January 3, 1953, the appellant again asked Shukla to pay him the monthly bribe as already suggested; Shukla then requested him to reduce the demand on the ground that the contract given to him was for a much lesser amount than that which had been given to his predecessor Ram Ratan; the appellant thereupon agreed to accept Rs. 375.

Shukla had no money at the time and so he asked for time to make the necessary arrangement.

The agreement then was that Shukla would pay the money to the appellant on January 8, 1953.

Meanwhile Shukla approached the Deputy Superintendent, of Police, Corruption Branch, and gave him information about the illegal demand made by the appellant.

Shukla 's statement was then recorded before a magistrate and it was decided to lay a trap.

Accordingly, a party consisting of Shukla, the magistrate, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some other persons went to the Loco Yard.

Shukla and Sada Shiv proceeded inside the Yard while the rest of the party stood at the gate.

Shukla then met the appellant and informed him that he had brought the money; he was told that the appellant would go out to the Yard and accept the money.

At about 3 p.m. the appellant went out to the Yard and, after making a round, came to the place which was comparatively secluded.

He then asked Shukla to pay the money and Shukla gave him a bundle containing the marked currency notes of the value of Rs. 375.

A signal was then made by Shukla and the raiding party immediately arrived on the scene.

The magistrate disclosed his identity to the 595 appellant and asked him to produce the amount paid to him by Shukla.

The appellant then took out the currency notes from his pocket and handed them over to the magistrate.

It is on these facts that charges under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Act were framed against the appellant.

The appellant denied the charge.

He admitted that he had received Rs. 375 from Shukla but his case was that at his request Shukla had advanced the said amount to him by way of loan for meeting the expenses of the clothing of his children who were studying in school.

The appellant alleged that since he had been in need of money he had requested Kishan Chand to arrange for a loan of Rs. 500; but knowing about his need Shukla offered to advance him the loan, and it was as such loan that Shukla paid him Rs. 375 and the appellant accepted the said amount.

Both the prosecution and the defence led evidence to support their respective versions.

The learned special judge who tried the case believed the evidence given by Shukla, held that it was sufficiently corroborated, and found that the defence story was improbable and untrue.

The learned judge also held that on the evidence led before him the presumption under section 4 of the Act had to be raised and that the said presumption had not been rebutted by the evidence led by the defence.

Accordingly, the learned judge convicted the appellant of both the offences charged and sentenced him to suffer one year 's rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 under section 161 of the Code and two years ' rigorous imprisonment under section 5 of the Act.

Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The appellant challenged the correctness and propriety of this order by his appeal before the High Court of Allahabad.

The High Court saw no reason to interfere with the order under appeal because it held that, on the facts of the case, a statutory presumption under section 4 had to be raised and that the said presumption had not been rebutted by the appellant.

In other words the High Court did not consider the prosecution evidence apart from the presumption since 596 it placed its decision on the presumption and the failure of the defence to rebut it.

In the result the conviction of the appellant was confirmed, the sentence passed against him under section 161 was maintained but the sentence under section 5(2) of the Act was reduced to one year.

The sentences thus passed were ordered to run concurrently.

It is against this order that the present appeal by special leave has been preferred by the appellant.

This appeal has been placed before a Constitution Bench because one of the points which the appellant raises for our decision is that section 4(1) of the Act which requires a presumption to be raised against an accused person is unconstitutional and ultra vires as it violates the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.

We would, therefore, first examine the merits of this point.

The Act was passed in 1947 with the object of effectively preventing bribery and corruption.

Section 4(1) provides that where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161, or as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.

Mr. Anthony, for the appellant, contends that this section offends against the fundamental requirement of equality before law or the equal protection of laws.

It is difficult to appreciate this argument.

The scope and effect of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 has been considered by this Court on several occasions; as a result of the decisions of this Court it is well estab.

lished that article 14 does not forbid reasonable classific ation for the purposes of legislation; no doubt it forbids class legislation; but if it appears that the 597 impugned legislation is based on a reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia and that the said differentia have a rational relation to the object Sought to be achieved by it, its validity cannot be successfully challenged under article 14 (Vide: Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice section R. Tendolkar (1).

In the present case there can be no doubt that the basis adopted by the Legislature in classifying one class of public servants who are brought within the mischief of section 4(1) is a perfectly rational basis.

It is based on an intelligible differentia and there can be no difficulty in distinguishing the class of persons covered by the impugned section from other classes of persons who are accused of committing other offences.

Legislature presumably realised that experience in courts showed how difficult it is to bring home to the accused persons the charge of bribery; evidence which is and can be generally adduced in such cases in support of the charge is apt to be treated as tainted, and so it is not very easy to establish the charge of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt.

Legislature felt that the evil of corruption amongst public servants posed a serious problem and bad to be effectively rooted out in the interest of clean and efficient administration.

That is why the Legislature decided to enact section 4(1) with a view to require the raising of the statutory presumption as soon as the condition precedent prescribed by it in that behalf is satisfied.

The object which the Legislature thus wanted to achieve is the eradication of corruption from amongst public servants, and between the said object and the intelligible differentia on which the classification is based there is a rational and direct relation.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the challenge to the vires of section 4(1) on the ground that it violates article 14 of the Constitution must fail.

Incidentally, we may refer ' to the decision of this Court in A. section Krishna vs The State of Madras (2) in which a similar challenge to the vires of a statutory presumption required to be raised under section 4(2) of the Madras Prohibition Act, 10 of 1937, has been repelled.

(1) ; (2) ; 598 That takes us to the question of construing section 4(1).

When does the statutory presumption fall to be raised, and what is the content of the said presumption? Mr. Anthony contends that the statutory presumpion cannot be raised merely on proof of the fact that the appellant had received Rs. 375 from Shukla; in order to justify the raising of the statutory presumption it must also be shown by the prosecution that the amount was paid and accepted as by way of bribe.

This argument involves the construction of the words " any gratification other than, legal remuneration " used in section 4(1).

It is also urged by Mr. Anthony that even if the statutory presumption is raised against the appellant, in deciding the question as to whether the contrary is proved within the meaning of section 4(1) it must be borne in mind that the onus of proof on the appellant is not as heavy as it is on the prosecution in a criminal trial.

Let us first consider when the presumption can be raised under section 4(1).

In dealing with this question it may be relevant to remember that the presumption is drawn in the light of the provisions of section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

In substance the said section provides inter alia that if a public servant accepts any gratification whatever other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act, he is guilty of accepting illegal gratification.

Section 4(1) requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is proved that an accused person has accepted " any illegal gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing.

" This clause does not include the receipt of trivial gratification or thing which is covered by the exception prescribed by sub section

The argument is that in prescribing the condition precedent for raising a presumption the Legislature has advisedly used the word " gratification " and not money or gift or other consideration.

In this connection reliance has been placed on the corresponding provision contained in section 2 of the English Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 (6 Geo. 5, c. 64) which uses the words "any money, gift, or other consideration ".

The use of the 599 word gratification emphasises that it is not the receipt of any money which justifies the raising of the presumption; something more than the mere receipt of money has to be proved.

It must be proved that the money was received by way of bribe.

This contention no doubt is supported by the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in The State vs Abhey Singh (1) as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in the State vs Pandurang Laxman Parab (2).

On the other hand Mr. Mathur, for the State, argues that the word " gratification " should be construed in its literal dictionary meaning and as such it means satisfaction of appetite or desire; that is to say the presumption can be raised whenever it is shown that the accused has received satisfaction either of his desire or appetite.

No doubt it is conceded by now that in most of the cases it would be the payment of money which would cause gratification to the accused; but he contests the suggestion that the word " gratification " must be confined only to the payment of money coupled with the right that the money should have been paid by way of a bribe.

This view has been accepted by the Bombay High Court in a subsequent decision in State vs Pundlik Bhikaji Ahire (3) and by the Allahabad High Court in Promod Chander Shekhar vs Rex (4).

Paragraph 3 of section 161 of the Code provides that the word " gratification " is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money.

Therefore " gratification " mentioned in section 4(1) cannot be confined only to payment of money.

What the prosecution has to prove before asking the court to raise a presumption against an accused person is that the accused person has received a " gratification other than legal remuneration "; if it is shown, as in the present case it has been shown, that the accused received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration then the condition prescribed by the section is satisfied.

In the context of the remuneration legally payable to, and receivable by, a (1) A.I.R. (2) xi.

(3) (4) I.L.R. 1950 All.

600 public servant, there is no difficulty in holding that where money is shown to have been paid to, and accepted by, such public servant and that the said money does not constitute his legal remuneration, the presumption has to be raised as required by the section.

If the word " gratification " is construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe then it would be futile or superfluous to prescribe for the raising of the presumption.

Technically it may no doubt be suggested that the object which the statutory presumption serves on this construction is that the court may then presume that the money was paid by way of a bribe as a motive or reward as required by section 161 of the Code.

In our opinion this could not have been the intention of the Legislature in prescribing the statutory presumption under section 4(1).

In the context we see no justification for not giving the word " gratification " its literal dictionary meaning.

There is another consideration which supports this construction.

The presumption has also to be raised when it is shown that the accused person has received any valuable thing.

This clause has reference to the offence punishable under section 165 of the Code; and there.

is no doubt that one of the essential ingredients of the said offence is that the valuable thing should have been received by the accused without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.