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Section 7 of the Act provides for disqualification for membership of Parliament or of State Legislatures.

Section 7(d), as it stood at the material time and with which we are concerned in the present appeal provides,, inter alia, that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State, if whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account, he has any share or interest in a contract for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by, the appropriate Government.

On the concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Tribunal it cannot now be disputed that the appellant has interest in the contract in question; so that the first part of section 7(d) is satisfied.

The High Court has found that the contract attracts the last part of section 7(d) inasmuch as according to the High Court the Government of Bihar had undertaken to discharge the service of supplying grain to the residents of Bihar and the firm of the appellant 's family had entered into a contract for the performance of the said services.

The last part of section 7(d) postulates that the appropriate Government has undertaken to perform certain specific services, and it is for the performance of such services that the contract had been entered into by a citi zen.

In other words, if a citizen has entered into a contract with the appropriate Government for the 60 474 performance of the services undertaken by the said Government he attracts the application of section 7(d).

This provision inevitably raises two questions: what are the services undertaken by the appropriate Government? Has the contract been entered into for the performance of the said services? At this stage it is necessary to consider the material terms of the contract.

This contract was made on February 8, 1956, between the Governor of Bihar who is described as the first party and the firm which is described as the second party.

The preamble to the contract shows that the first party had to stock and store foodgrains in Darbhanga District for sale in pursuance of the Grain Supply Scheme of the Government for which a proper custodian and bailee for reward was necessary.

It also recites that the second party had applied to become such custodian and bailee of such stock of foodgrains as the first party shall deliver to the second party in one lump or from time to time on terms and in the manner expressly specified under the contract, or as may be necessarily implied.

Clause 1 of the contract provides that the second party shall, at the direction of the first party, take over foodgrains from the railway wagons or from any place as directed by the first party; thereafter the second party had to cause the grains to be stored in his godown at Dalsinghsarai and had to redeliver the same to the first party after weighing either at the second party 's godown approved by the first party or at any other place as directed by the first party.

The movement of the grain had to be done by the second party himself or by a transport contractor appointed by the first party.

Clause 2 imposed on the second party the liability to maintain a register and keep accounts as prescribed thereunder.

Under cl. 3 the second party undertook to keep such stocks and establishments as may be necessary at his own expense.

Clause 4 imposed upon the second party the obligation to protect the stock of foodgrains or to make good the losses except as thereinafter provided: Clauses 5 to 8 are not material for our purpose.

Clause 9 provides that the second party shall deposit the sum of 475 Rs. 5,000 in a Savings Bank account which has been pledged to the District Magistrate, Darbhanga, and comply with the other conditions specified in the clause.

Clause 10 deals with the remuneration of the second party.

It provides that the first party shall be liable to pay to the second party remuneration for the undertaking in this agreement at the rate of Re. 1 per( cent on the value of the stocks moved or taken over from his custody under the orders or directions of the first party or his agent calculated at the rate fixed by the Government from time to time for wholesale sales of grain.

The clause adds that no remuneration shall be payable to the second party if the first party takes over the whole of the balance stock lying with the second party for reasons of the termination of the agreement.

The rest of the clauses need not be recited.

It would thus be seen that the agreement in terms is one of bailment.

The State Government wanted to entrust the work of stocking and storing foodgrains to a custodian or bailee.

In that behalf the appellant 's firm made an application and ultimately was appointed a bailee.

There is no doubt that by this contract the firm has undertaken to do the work of stocking and storing foodgrains belonging to the State Government; and if it can be reasonably held that the service undertaken by the State Government in the present case was that of stocking the foodgrains the contract in question would obviously attract the provisions of section 7(d).

Mr. Varma, however, contends that the service undertaken by the State Government is the sale of foodgrains under its Grain Supply Scheme; and he argues that unless the contract shows that it was for sale of the said goods it cannot attract the provisions of section 7(d).

Unfortunately the scheme adopted by the State Government for the supply of grain has not been produced before the Election Tribunal, and so the precise nature and extent of the services undertaken by the State Government fall to be determined solely by reference to the contract in question.

It is true that the contract relates to the stocking and storing of foodgrains which the State Government wanted to sell to the residents of Bihar; but can it be said 476 that stocking and storing of foodgrains was such an integral or essential part of the selling of goods that a contract for stocking and storing foodgrains should necessarily be regarded as a contract for their sale? In our opinion, it is difficult to accept the argument that stocking and storing of foodgrains is shown to be such an essential and integral part of the supply scheme adopted by the State Government.

Theoretically speaking stocking and storing foodgrains cannot be said to be essential for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of sale of foodgrains, because it would conceivably be possible for the State Government to adopt a scheme whereby goods may be supplied without the State Government having to store them; and so the work of stocking and storing of foodgrains may in some cases be conceivably incidental to the scheme and not its essential part.

It is significant that sale of goods under the contract was never to take place at the godown of the firm.

It had always to take place at other selling, centers or shops; and thus, between the stocking and storing of goods and their sale there is an element of time lag.

The only obligation that was imposed on the firm by this contract was to be a custodian or bailee of the goods, keep them in good order and deliver them after weighment as directed by the first party.

It cannot be denied that the remuneration for the bailee has been fixed at the rate, of Re. 1 per cent on the value of the stocks moved or taken over from his custody; but that only shows the mode or method adopted by the con tract for determining the remuneration including rent of the godowns; it cannot possibly show the relationship of the contract with the sale of goods even indirectly.

Can it be said that the contract entered into by the State Government for purchasing foodgrains from agriculturists who grow them or for transporting them after purchase to the godowns are contracts for the sale or supply of goods? Purchase of goods and their transport are no doubt preparatory to the carrying out of the scheme of selling them or supplying them, and yet it would be difficult to hold that contracts entered into by the State Government with the agriculturists or the transport agency is a contract for the 477 sale of goods.

We have carefully considered the material terms of this contract, and on the record as it stands we are unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court that a contract of bailment which imposed on the bailee the obligation to stock and store the foodgrains in his godown can be said to be a contract for the purpose of the service of sale of grain which the State Government had undertaken within the meaning of section 7(d).

It appears that before the High Court it was not disputed by the appellant that the service whose performance had been undertaken by the State Government consisted in the supply of grain to the people of the State of Bihar; and the High Court thought that from this concession it inevitably followed that the firm had a share and was interested in the contract for the performance of the service undertaken by the Government of Bihar.

It seems to us that the concession made by the appellant does not inevitably or necessarily lead to the inference drawn by the High Court.

If the service undertaken by the State Government is one of supplying grain how does it necessarily follow that a contract by which the bailee undertook to store the grain was a contract for the supply of grain? It may sound technical, but in dealing with a statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen it would be unreasonable to take merely a broad and general view and ignore the essential points of distinction on the ground that they are technical.

The narrow question is: if the State Government undertook the work of supplying the grain, is the contract one for the supply of grain?; in our opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative; that is why we think the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the contract when it held that the said contract brought the appellant 's case within the mischief of section 7(d).

In coming to its conclusion the High Court thought that its view was supported by a decision of this Court in N. Satyanathan vs K. Subramanyan (1).

In that case the appellant who was a contractor had entered into an agreement with the Central Government (1) ; 478 whereby he had offered to contract with the Governor General for the provision of a motor vehicle service for the transit and conveyance of all postal articles for the period specified in the contract, and the Governor General had accepted the offer.

As a consideration for the same the Government had agreed to pay to the contractor Rs. 200 per month during the subsistence of the agreement "as his remuneration for the service to be rendered by him".

It appears that on this contract two questions were raised before this Court.

First it was urged that it could not be said that the Central Government had undertaken any service within the meaning of section 7(d) of the Act when it made arrangements for the carriage of mailbags and postal articles through the contractor.

This contention was rejected on the ground that though the Government was not bound in the discharge of its duties as a sovereign State to make provision for postal mail service, it had in fact undertaken to do so under the Indian Post Offices Act for the convenience of the public. "It cannot be gainsaid", observed Sinha, J., as he then was, "that the postal department is rendering a very useful service, and that the appellant has by his contract with the Government undertaken to render that kind of service on a specified route"; and he added, "the present case is a straightforward illustration of the kind of contract contemplated under section 7(d) of the Act".

This straightforward illustration, in our opinion, clearly brings out the class and type of contracts which fall within section 7(d) of the Act.

Government must undertake to render a specified service or specified services and the contract must be for the rendering of the said service or services.

That was precisely what the contract in the case of N. Satyanathan (1) purported to do.

It is difficult to see how this case can be said to support the conclusion of the High Court that the contract for stocking and storing of goods is a contract for rendering the service of supplying and selling the same to the residents of the place.

In this connection Mr. Jha, for the respondents, has drawn our attention to a decision of the Madras High (1) ; 479 Court in V. V. Ramaswamy vs Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli (1).

In that case the Court was concerned with four contracts by which the contracting party agreed "to hold the reserve grain stock belonging to the Government of Madras, safely store it, and dispose of it according to the directions of the Government".

In other words, it was a contract not only for the stocking and storing of foodgrains but also of disposing of it, and that naturally meant that the contract was for service which the State Government had undertaken to perform.

This decision cannot assist the respondents in the present appeal.

In the result we hold that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of the Tribunal that the contract in question did not attract the provisions of section 7(d) of the Act.

The appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside.

We cannot finally dispose of the matter, because one question still remains to be considered, and that is whether the conclusion that the appellant 's nomination paper had been improperly rejected would lead to the decision that the election of not only respondent 1 but also respondent 2 should be declared to be void.

The Election Tribunal has declared the whole election to be void, and in their respective appeals filed before the High Court both the respondents have challenged the correctness of that finding.

The High Court, however, thought that since in its opinion the nomination paper of the appellant had been properly rejected it was unnecessary to deal with the other point.

The point will now have to be considered by the High Court.

We would, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the pro ceedings to it in order that it may deal with the other question and dispose of the appeals expeditiously in accordance with law.

In the circumstances of this case we direct that the parties should bear their own costs in this Court.

Costs in the High Court will be costs in the appeal before it.

Appeal allowed.

Appeal No. 198 of 1954.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 16, 1952, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petn.; No. 1231 of 1951.

M. section K. Sastri, for the appellant.

H. L. Khaskalam, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.

64 502 1960.

November 18.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appellants petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

The High Court certified under article 132(1) of the Constitution that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

Hence the present appeal.

The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster.

After the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the appellant executed an Instrument of Accession to the Dominion of India on August 14, 1947.

Thereafter, he entered into an agreement with the Dominion of India popularly known as "The Stand Still Agreement".

On December 15, 1947, he entered into an agreement with the Government of India whereby he ceded the State of Baster to the Government of India to be integrated with the Central Provinces and Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh) in such manner as the Government of India thought fit.

Con sequently the Governments in India came to have exclusive and plenary authority, jurisdiction and powers over the Baster State with effect from January 1, 1948.

The Legislature of the State of Madhya Pradesh passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh Act 1 of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which received the assent of the President of India on January 22, 1951.

The preamble of the Act stated that it was one to provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith.

Under section 3 of the Act, vesting of proprietary rights in the State Government takes place on certain conditions,, mentioned in that section, being complied with.

The definition of 'proprietor ' is stated in section 2 cl.

(m) and it is "in relation to 503 (i) the Central Provinces, includes an inferior proprietor, a protected thekadar or other thekadar, or protected headman; (ii) the merged territories, means a maufidar including an ex Ruler of an Indian State merged with Madhya Pradesh, a Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar or Jagirdar within the meaning of wajib ul arz, or any sanad, deed or other instrument, and a gaontia or a thekadar of a village in respect of which by or under the provisions contained in the wajib ul arz applicable to such village the maufidar, the gaontia, or the thekadar, as the case may be, has a right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such village;".

The definition of 'mahal ' is stated in section 2(j) and it is "mahal", in relation to merged territories, means any area other than land in possession of a raiyat which has been separately assessed to land revenue, whether such land revenue be payable or has been released, compounded for or redeemed in whole or in part;".

Before the High Court the appellant contended that he was still a Sovereign Ruler and absolute owner of the villages specified in Schedules A and B of his petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

He urged that his rights had been recognized and guaranteed under the agreements entered into by him with the Government of India.

The provisions of the Act, therefore, did not apply to him.

It was further contended that the provisions of the Act did not apply to a Ruler or to the private property of a Ruler which was not assessed to land revenue.

He relied on article 6 of the Instrument of Accession and the first paragraph of article 3 of the Merger Agreement.

The High Court held that if the petitioner 's rights under article 6 of the Instrument of Accession and article 3 of the Merger Agreement had been infringed it was clear from the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution that interference by the courts was barred in disputes arising out of these two instruments.

The High Court was also of the opinion that article 362 of the Constitu tion was of no assistance to the appellant.

504 After referring to the definition of the word 'proprietor ' in the Act, the High Court was of the opinion that the word 'maufidar ' in section 2(m) of the Act had not been used in any narrow or technical sense.

A 'maufidar ' was not only a person to whom a grant of maufi lands had been made but was also one who held land which was exempt from the payment of "rent or tax".

It accordingly rejected the contention on behalf of the appellant that the word 'maufidar ' is necessarily confined to a grantee from the State or Ruler and therefore a Ruler could not conceivably be a maufidar.

The High Court also rejected the contention on behalf of the appellant that as he was a "Ruler" within the meaning of that expression in article 366(22) of the Constitution he did not come within the expression 'ex Ruler ' as contained in the definition of the word 'proprietor ' in the Act.

The expression 'Ruler ' as defined in article 366(22) of the Constitution applied only for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.

The expression 'ex Ruler ' given in the Act must therefore be given the ordinary dictionary meaning.

According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 'Ruler ' means "one who, or that which, exercises rule, especially of a supreme or sovereign kind.

One who has control, management, or head ship within some limited sphere".

The High Court accordingly took the view that although the appellant did exercise such a rule in the past he ceased to exercise it in his former Domain after the agreements of accession and merger had come into operation.

Accordingly the appellant must be regarded as an ex Ruler and as he was also a maufidar he fell within the definition of the word 'proprietor ' in the Act.