# /etc/default/nss | |
# This file can theoretically contain a bunch of customization variables | |
# for Name Service Switch in the GNU C library. For now there are only | |
# four variables: | |
# | |
# NETID_AUTHORITATIVE | |
# If set to TRUE, the initgroups() function will accept the information | |
# from the netid.byname NIS map as authoritative. This can speed up the | |
# function significantly if the group.byname map is large. The content | |
# of the netid.byname map is used AS IS. The system administrator has | |
# to make sure it is correctly generated. | |
#NETID_AUTHORITATIVE=TRUE | |
# | |
# SERVICES_AUTHORITATIVE | |
# If set to TRUE, the getservbyname{,_r}() function will assume | |
# services.byservicename NIS map exists and is authoritative, particularly | |
# that it contains both keys with /proto and without /proto for both | |
# primary service names and service aliases. The system administrator | |
# has to make sure it is correctly generated. | |
#SERVICES_AUTHORITATIVE=TRUE | |
# | |
# SETENT_BATCH_READ | |
# If set to TRUE, various setXXent() functions will read the entire | |
# database at once and then hand out the requests one by one from | |
# memory with every getXXent() call. Otherwise each getXXent() call | |
# might result into a network communication with the server to get | |
# the next entry. | |
#SETENT_BATCH_READ=TRUE | |
# | |
# ADJUNCT_AS_SHADOW | |
# If set to TRUE, the passwd routines in the NIS NSS module will not | |
# use the passwd.adjunct.byname tables to fill in the password data | |
# in the passwd structure. This is a security problem if the NIS | |
# server cannot be trusted to send the passwd.adjuct table only to | |
# privileged clients. Instead the passwd.adjunct.byname table is | |
# used to synthesize the shadow.byname table if it does not exist. | |
ADJUNCT_AS_SHADOW=TRUE | |