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Concentrating power over social protection in designated ministries and departments can be a way for governments that have been dependent on donors to finance specific programmes, to begin to take control of the development of the sector.
Such changes can occur gradually and in small steps, even in contexts where state capacity is relatively lacking, and the social protection sector is highly fragmented. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
This has occurred, for example, in Kenya, where the Government’s clear steps to clarify and consolidate programme governance and administration has arguably enabled the Government to take the lead – from a financing and policymaking perspective — allowing it to chart a new course within an emerging rights-based, lifecycle approach, as exemplified by the universal old age pension.100 However, it should also be noted that increased concentration in administrative structures may not be a necessary condition for expansion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
There are some examples of countries that have achieved successful social protection expansion where authority appears to be dispersed across different 98 ISSA/SSA, (multiple years) 99 See Chapter 2, case study on Argentina.
100 See Chapter 3, case study on Kenya.
2 High-level governance 32 ministries and administering bodies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 82 |
For example, in Nepal, which invests more in social protection than almost all low- and middle-income countries, the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration oversees the core lifecycle programmes including the universal pension and child protection grant, but the Ministry of Labour oversees all employment-related benefits, while the Employees’ Provident Fund is autonomous and located under the Ministry of Finance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 84 |
Equally, in Cabo Verde, multiple ministries have oversight functions, with the national social security institution, the INPS, administering contributory benefits and the National Centre of Social Pensions administering social pensions and social health insurance (community-based social insurance).101 Future research would be required to demonstrate a definitive relationship between specific institutional structures and social protection expansion outcomes; nevertheless, the broad experience is suggestive of greater concentration of authority and/or administration as an important enabling condition. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 105 |
Þ Therefore, while there is no one solution for overcoming fragmentation, the experience of high-income countries and successful low- and middle-income countries suggests that a higher degree of concentration of authority and administrative responsibility, especially for administering core lifecycle social protection programmes, is often associated with broad- based coverage expansion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 69 |
Þ Countries with low state and institutional capacity are less able to cope with institutional complexity and would be better served to simplify institutional arrangements as early (or as soon) as possible.
Þ Even in low-capacity contexts with high degrees of fragmentation, increased concentration can occur gradually, and small steps can open the door for potentially meaningful expansion.
2.4.2 Policy design and governance Institutional structures are often a reflection of the policies behind them. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 98 |
This is true regardless of a country’s income level but is especially pertinent to countries at earlier stages of social protection sector development.
Social protection systems are characterised by a high degree of dualism in low- and middle-income countries, where often, most of the population — many of whom are employed in the informal economy — are unable to access benefits through the contributory system but are not deemed poor enough to qualify for limited poverty-targeted transfers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 99 |
Calls for “increased integration” are too often de-linked from discussions around the policy objectives of different types of programmes, which may be inherently in conflict. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 36 |
Greater integration of the sector, ultimately, requires shifting from a model wherein ‘social assistance’ is provided only to those in extreme poverty or those deemed particularly vulnerable, to one in which lifecycle social security – financed through a combination of taxes and contributions — is regarded as an entitlement for everyone during their lives, as depicted in Box 2-9. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 74 |
In such a social security system, a loose collection of other benefits (other ‘social assistance’) plays a much more limited, supplementary role for those who need additional support. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 36 |
101 ISSA/SSA, (multiple years) 2 High-level governance 33 Box 2-9: Fragmentation in social protection sectors in low- and middle-income countries The ad hoc and piecemeal establishment of new programmes has left messy institutional configurations in the social protection ‘sector’ (where it can be called such) in the large majority of low- and middle-income countries.102 The predominant model in many countries consists of a bifurcated system with, on the one end of the spectrum, multiple (sometimes hundreds) of programmes, many of which are small, programmes targeting narrowly defined ‘vulnerable groups’, often in specific geographic areas, with overlapping eligibility conditions, small and unequal transfer values and large coverage gaps. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 181 |
At the other end, contributory schemes cover workers in the formal economy, leaving out the vast majority in the ‘missing middle’ who may not be classified as poor but are nonetheless vulnerable.
This ‘poor relief’ model focused narrowly on poverty reduction, risks undermining the right of most citizens to social security. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 67 |
Integration in social protection requires shifts in the policy design of the key components the system so that everyone is increasingly included in core lifecycle benefits under a ‘social security model’, which, in low- and middle-income countries with high levels of informality, calls for a much larger role for tax-financed lifecycle guarantees, and a more limited role for other types of ‘supplementary’ social assistance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
Figure 2-9: Mixed, fragmented social protection systems in low- and middle-income countries Source: Development Pathways. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 29 |
The global commitment to social protection floors responds, in part, to a growing recognition of the complexities and slow progress of extending coverage through contributory schemes in a context of stubbornly high informality and a changing world of work.103 Attention has turned to tax-financed (or ‘non-contributory’104) social protection schemes as better suited, in the immediate term, to guaranteeing coverage for groups that have been difficult to incorporate into formal contributory schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
Furthermore, R202 calls for basic social protection income and health guarantees in childhood, during working age, and in old age and echoes the nine risks underlined in C102.105 Article 102 It is no exaggeration to suggest that the proliferation of small new schemes is a direct legacy of the neoliberal policy framework of the 1990s and early 2000s. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 94 |
The “rediscovery of the ‘social’” went hand-in-hand with the recognition that poverty persists, even in good times, and must be specifically addressed (Mkandawire, (2004)) and ushered in a period of “projectization” and “micro-ization” of social policy that relegated it to a “residualist category of safety nets” (Tendler, (2004)).
Therefore, what sometimes looks like progress at first glance – a new programme here, a pilot there – has in many cases complicated the path to universal social protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 134 |
103 This included a perceived inflexibility or “ill-suitedness” of traditional employment-based social protection systems to adapt to the persistent challenges of poverty, social exclusion and labour market informality.
World Bank, (2019).
104 The term ‘non-contributory’ risks discounting the contributions made by all people throughout their lives, through their work, the payment of indirect taxes, social reproduction and care, etc. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 101 |
See McClanahan (2020) 105 ILO (2012) 2 High-level governance 34 9 of the Recommendation calls on countries to “implement[] the most effective and efficient combination of benefits and schemes in the national context” provided these are designed in a coherent way and do not leave gaps.106 In other words, R202 calls for policies to establish universalism by design, through coordinated policies that cover everyone for a given contingency, rather than as an uncertain future result of an eventual blurring together of a collection of unarticulated benefits for different groups. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 139 |
For pensions, a few countries achieve this through a single tax-financed design, as in Botswana, Georgia, New Zealand, among others.107 More commonly, however, successful countries combine tax-financed and mandatory contributory (social insurance) schemes to provide universal coverage for those who are unable to contribute, while also offering higher-level coverage to those enrolled in the contributory system.108 And, technical consist of social insurance only, albeit generally with minimum guarantees.109 How countries design their tax-financed programmes will help determine how well they can be integrated with the existing contributory architecture that exists in most countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 139 |
For these systems to be inclusive, it is important that the tax-financed schemes (Tier 1) undergirding these ‘multi- tiered’ systems (Box 2-10) be either universal or pension tested, but not poverty targeted, to ensure that there are no gaps in coverage. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 65 |
Several low- and middle-income countries have taken steps to put in place inclusive multi-tiered systems, including Thailand, Nepal, and Timor Leste in Asia; Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, and Mexico in Latin America; and Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Seychelles in Africa, among others.
These inclusive pension systems are not only administratively simpler, but they are more likely to be administered by the same authority, increasing the chances of smooth integration between the two types of schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 112 |
Many countries, however, including most countries in South and Southeast Asia,110 many in Latin America111 and most African countries outside of Southern Africa, when they provide social pensions, opt for smaller, means-tested transfers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 52 |
Not only do these poverty targeted programmes tend to leave out most workers in the informal economy, but they can contribute to institutional fragmentation as they are administratively more complex, are frequently administered by separate institutions (often the Ministry of Social Development or the Ministry of Finance) and therefore are less likely to be integrated with the contributory schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 71 |
Indeed, the creation of the institution often follows the policy rather than the other way around, which can be problematic if programmes emerge haphazardly or in response to a narrowly defined problem. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 42 |
For example, in many Latin American countries, the Ministries of Social Development were established in tandem or only after the launch of targeted and conditional cash transfer programmes, bypassing the labour or social security ministries.112 While this may represent progress from the perspective of anchoring the programmes in a national institutional framework, it also artificially separates the poverty reduction function of social security from its broader objectives (to the extent that these dedicated ministries are seen as ‘responsible’ for reducing poverty and inequality) and obscures the poverty reduction 106 For example, among the core principles specified in Article 3 is “coherence across institutions responsible for delivery of social protection.” 107 For example, Aruba, Botswana, Cook Islands, Georgia, Kosovo, New Zealand, Suriname, and Timor-Leste. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 182 |
108 Around 64 countries organize their pension systems this way.
Based on analysis of ILO (2017c).
Original source ISSA/SSA, (multiple years) 109 For example, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Jersey, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, and Slovakia.
However, many of these schemes also contain non-contributory or semi-contributory components within them. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 127 |
110 For example, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
See HelpAge International (latest year); ILO (2017c) 111 For example, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paragray, Peru, Uruguay. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
See HelpAge International (latest year); ILO (2017c) 112 ECLAC (2016) 2 High-level governance 35 role that core lifecycle schemes (including social insurance) play in this process, where they typically have a bigger impact than poverty-specific programmes (see also Annex 3).113 Box 2-10: Multi-tiered systems for universal coverage Although all benefits across different ‘branches’ of social security can be multi-tiered, pension systems are most commonly associated with multi-tiered designs, as has long been promoted by the ILO (see e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 146 |
Duran, 2017).
An ideal multi-tiered pension system, depicted in Figure 2-10, consists of: • Tier 1: an adequate, guaranteed pension (social pension) financed from general taxation, which can be either universal or ‘pension-tested’.
• Tier 2: mandatory social insurance paying higher-rate pensions for those who pay social insurance contributions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
• Tier 3: voluntary private (supplemental) pensions for those who wish to make additional contributions.114 The guaranteed tier 1 benefit can be universal or ‘pension-tested’, meaning the social pension is only paid to those who are not enrolled in a mandatory social insurance system.
Furthermore, the tier 2 benefit must be higher than the tax- financed guarantee to preserve the incentive to join social insurance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 98 |
Figure 2-10: Depiction of ideal pension systems with universal (left) or pension-tested (right) tier 1.
This multi-tiered design is consistent with the ILO’s “staircase social security” policy paradigm, where countries first aim to provide basic coverage at a minimum guaranteed level (horizontal extension), while striving to gradually provide higher levels coverage, including consumption smoothing, through risk pooling arrangements (vertical extension ) (ILO, 2010). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 111 |
Often referred to as a multi-pillar” approach, it has rarely been applied to other branches (see e.g.
Kidd, 2015; Duran, 2017; and World Bank, 1994).
However, there is a clear need for more careful thinking about how the multi- tiered design ought to be applied to lifecycle benefits for all contingencies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 91 |
Figure 2-11 outlines an ideal disability benefits system consisting of a combination of tax-financed and contributory benefits that could be accessed at different phases in the lifecycle and for slightly different purposes.
(See also McClanahan and Gelders (2019) for a discussion of multi-tiered child benefits.) | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 74 |
113 For example, in the US, research has shown Social Security reduces overall poverty by a third, twice as much as 5 means-tested programmes combined, and reduces poverty among the elderly by 75%, 20 times the combined effect of means-tested transfers (Meyer and Wu, (2018)).
In Brazil, the pension system (including Previdencia Rural) was found to reduce inequality by 11%, while Bolsa Familia only reduced it by 0.6% (ISSA, (2013)). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 126 |
114 See Kidd (2015) 2 High-level governance 36 Figure 2-11: Multi-tiered disability benefits system Source: Development Pathways’ depictions.
Despite conventional wisdom, poverty targeting is far from the only option available to governments facing budget constraints.
In fact, the principle of universalism can still be respected in policy design, to leave no (legal) gaps, by using other, easily identifiable characteristics, such as age or social insurance affiliation, to select beneficiaries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 120 |
For example, universal policies can begin with narrow eligibility for limited age groups (e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 21 |
only the youngest children, prioritizing early years, or only the very oldest) and then gradually expand the age criteria according to a standard schedule.115 This approach has been used in South Africa with the Child Support Grant, where the programme initially covered only those children aged 0-6 years but then continued to extend the upper age threshold each year until it reached 18, ensuring that all children who first enrolled were never off rolled from the programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 95 |
Vietnam is also following this model with the social pension, for which the age eligibility began at 80 years and is to be gradually reduced as part of the reform process.
This method is much simpler to administer and ensures that everyone in the age category is covered. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 57 |
Alternatively, pension testing, or benefit testing, is a fairer and administratively simpler mechanism than poverty targeting that also permits smoother integration with contributory systems: all that is required is to maintain data on who is registered in the social insurance system; everyone else receives the social pension. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 61 |
While far from fool proof, pension/benefit testing ensures that legal coverage is guaranteed, even if effective coverage may not be fully achieved due to administrative shortcomings.116 This model is most effective when the two types of benefits are administered by the same institutions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 57 |
However, when the two tiers are administered separately, the coordination challenges as well as the risks of errors and institutional ‘turf disputes’ are far greater.117 A further potential advantage of pension-tested systems is that, as social insurance membership grows 115 With this approach, it is important that the government have a transparent and agreed plan for gradually adjusting the age eligibility so that expectations are clear for the public as well as to allow for clear planning based on budgetary projections. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 109 |
116 For example, Kidd and Athias (2019) found that pension testing was superior to poverty targeting but nevertheless resulted in higher than expected exclusion rates in countries they examined.
117 See e.g.
Chirchir and Barca (2020) for a discussion of the challenges of information sharing across institutions, particularly with respect to semi-autonomous social security institutions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
2 High-level governance 37 (provided this is a priority for the government and it is taking concrete steps to improve this), the size of the population receiving tax-financed benefits, and the corresponding budget required to finance it, should decline over time.118 Many countries are working very hard to extend social insurance, but the establishment of non- contributory schemes can complicate these efforts if not carefully designed. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 89 |
Governments must balance the immediate goal of coverage extension (at all costs) against the longer term but equally valid goal of building increasingly adequate coverage that supports decent employment.119 Key to this balance is ensuring that the correct incentive structures are in place, including providing higher benefits for those who pay contributions to avoid disincentives to formal employment. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 71 |
For example, in Argentina, the Government prioritized extending coverage of child benefits through the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) above all else (a laudable objective) and achieved broad and rapid extension.120 However, that extension came at the cost of a not insignificant number of working women deciding to stay informal or leave formal employment since the benefit provided in the non-contributory schemes was equivalent or higher than the ones provided through the contributory system.121 Situations like these can be avoided if the multiple components of the system are considered as part of a whole — which is a core high-level governance imperative — with the goal of everyone (or as many as possible) enjoying higher levels of coverage (adequacy) provided through risk pooling. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 168 |
Þ Therefore, it is a common misconception that good governance is independent from policy design, but in fact, the two are intricately linked.
Þ Simpler policy designs — the quintessential example being universal tax-financed benefits but also pension-tested or benefit-tested lifecycle schemes — have more straightforward implications for governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
Þ Complex policy designs — such as means-tested or conditional policies122 — have more complex administrative requirements, are less compatible with contributory programmes, and create more opportunities for error and violations of rights.
118 See McClanahan and Gelders (2019) for actuarial projections of the declining cost of a benefit-tested tax-financed child benefit based on assumptions of continued growth of the social insurance system.
119 ILO (2019b) 120 ILO and UNDP (2011) 121 Garganta et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 142 |
(2017); Garganta and Gasparini (2015) 122 Conditional cash transfers or multi-sectoral policies also involve complexities that complicate governance, as discussed in the next section.
3 Mid-level governance 38 3 Mid-level governance Good governance of social protection systems requires technical capacity — including appropriate administrative, systems and management processes (Box 3-1) — to implement the policies and programmes that make up the system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 110 |
Wherever possible, these functions should be carried out in an integrated way, and in a digital age, social protection systems increasingly rely on robust information management systems (MIS) to support coordination and interoperability. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 44 |
Not so long ago, even some high-income countries still relied heavily on paper-based processes to perform the basic functions of social protection.123 Today, however, ICT-based integration permeates every facet of social protection governance – including policymaking, oversight, scheme management and delivery of benefits and services. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 71 |
It is therefore both the ‘backbone’ of a well governed social protection system, as well as the ‘gateway’ through which the social protection system interacts with other areas of government, or indeed with other social protection systems in other countries (through the facilitation of portability of benefits in line with international social security agreements). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 67 |
An absence of functioning back-office information system, or any of its components, is a major impediment to the establishment of social protection floors.124 123 Indeed, the pace of digitisation has been similar in countries of very different income levels, and sometimes, digital solutions have been slow to arrive in even the most ICT infrastructure-friendly environments. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 76 |
124 According to the latest General Survey concerning the Social Protection Floors, the Governments of Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Honduras, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, Peru, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, and Trinidad and Tobago cited challenges related to data collection and information systems as key obstacles to implementing Recommendation No.
202.
Chirchir and Hu, (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 118 |
202.
Chirchir and Hu, (2019).
3 Mid-level governance 39 Box 3-1: Core administrative, systems and management processes in social protection implementation Regardless of the high-level policy design, delivery of a new social protection programme125 requires a set of core administrative processes, including.
• a communication strategy to introduce and continually raise awareness about the programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 94 |
• a registration mechanism that enables collection and validation of personal data of applicants and stakeholders (e.g., employers), • an enrolment process that enables those selected for the scheme to officially join it, including the issuance of membership cards or other tokens of inclusion.
• especially in low-income countries where many are un-banked, on-boarding and account opening by the payment service provider (PSP) often involves separate processes and compliance requirements. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 99 |
• the cash-out or withdrawal process by which recipients can retrieve their benefits.
• a change management process to dynamically respond to changes in beneficiaries’ eligibility status; and • a grievance and redress mechanism built into the scheme design, that enables citizens to appeal decisions, file complaints or otherwise provide feedback. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 70 |
Alongside the core administrative processes, a social protection programme contains a number of critical systems and management processes that operate to ensure the smooth functioning of the scheme, including: adequate institutional and human resource arrangements; a set of operational documents detailing the rules of operation for the scheme to guide administrators; social accountability mechanisms to ensure that government, PSPs and administrators can be held to account; payment systems; computerised management information systems; monitoring and evaluation systems; and financial management of the scheme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 101 |
The systems and management functions are required along the continuum of core administrative processes for successful scheme implementation, as depicted in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: Key operations processes and systems for social protection scheme implementation Source: Development Pathways’ depiction. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 56 |
Based on a review of good practices in MIS in social protection, this section identifies elements or components of mid-level social protection system structures that are associated with effective 125 These operations apply to the delivery of income transfers.
While many of the processes are also core components of delivering in-kind benefits, including health care, appropriate modifications would need to be made. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 79 |
3 Mid-level governance 40 governance at the scheme-, institution- and system-level, recognising that countries are at different stages of digitisation of their social protection systems.
An emphasis is placed on the role of MIS for improving coordination and integration within the sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
3.1 Programme-level MIS – Simpler designs for low-capacity contexts An MIS system is the backbone of an effective social protection delivery system and, in a digital age, computerised MISs are increasingly important for the fulfilment of rights. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 58 |
Programme-level MISs (especially digital ones) can support every phase of the social protection delivery process for both contributory and non-contributory programmes, including identification of applicants and beneficiaries through targeting and registration; compliance with conditions (where required); management of appeals and grievances; exit and graduation; production of payment lists and reconciliation of payments. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 81 |
Digital programme level MISs support social protection delivery by enhancing accuracy and integrity of data through appropriate data quality controls and verification, improving efficiency and effectiveness of programme operations, and enhancing accountability and citizen empowerment through public portals, self-registration portals, dashboard and programme reporting mechanisms.126 There are many examples of MIS systems that support these end-to-end delivery processes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 84 |
For example, the MIS for Uzbekistan’s Pension Fund supports nearly all aspects of programme management, from computation of pension amounts, production of payrolls, and reconciliation of payments to automated SMS messaging to alert beneficiaries that payment has been executed, as well as complaints and grievances through a module that allows for direct linkages with the Office of the Prosecutor General.127 At the programme level, many of the information management requirements are different for contributory schemes compared with their non-contributory counterparts. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 116 |
For this reason, the two instruments are considered separately in this section.
3.1.1 Contributory schemes By their nature, contributory schemes involve complex data collection and management processes.
Much of the complexity is driven by the imperative to collect contributions, as well as to monitor compliance by employers and workers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 67 |
These core functions are necessary for the financial sustainability of the schemes as well as to ensure that benefits can be paid in a timely way, and governance of these systems require a specific set of mechanisms and processes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 44 |
Box 3-2 summarises the key components of a contribution and collection system, based on the ISSA’s Guidelines on Contribution Collection and Compliance.128 126 Chirchir and Barca (2020) 127 Chirchir (2017) cited in Chirchir and Barca (2020) 128 International Social Security Association (ISSA), (2019b) 3 Mid-level governance 41 Box 3-2: Contribution collection and compliance system requirements In contributory schemes, the contribution and collection process alone are highly complex and sits within the broader governance system of the social security scheme or institution, which typically comprises an Executive Board. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 166 |
However, specific governance mechanisms may be required for the different components of the contribution collection and compliance process.
According to the ISSA, a contribution collection and compliance system involves nine components: • “A registration processes.
This should be comprehensive and include all contributors who are liable to pay contributions, and other parties, such as employers, who are involved in the collection process, along with banks and non-bank financial institutions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 91 |
• A process for determining the liability of insured persons and their employers, and what contributions are due.
• A validation process to ensure the correctness of the contributions paid.
• A process to collect these contributions.
• A process for recording contributions paid by a contributor over their lifetime, which can then be used by the benefit-paying authority to determine the amount of social security benefit due. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
If this process is not robust, and contributions are not accurately reflected on contributors’ individual records, confidence in the overall social security system will be undermined.
• A risk-based approach for monitoring compliance and controlling fraud within these processes.
This should include units to detect fraud and inspect records to ensure contributors and employers are meeting their obligations.
• A debt management process for pursuing contributions where liabilities have not been met. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 91 |
• An enforcement process including law courts for collecting contributions due where the contributor or employer refuses to pay.
• A set of operational processes which connects all these key elements and specifies the information flows between the different parts of the organization(s) involved.” Each of these components is associated with a related set of information management needs and meeting them requires a high degree of institutional capacity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 79 |
The ISSA provides guidance for institutions seeking to strengthen their contribution collection and compliance systems, including detailed resources and support available to social security agencies.
The guidelines cover the following themes: Governance and Management; Strategy; Operational Processes; Fraud Control; Coordination with External Organizations; Fostering Awareness and a Culture of Compliance; and Maturity Programme and Permanent Evaluation and Adjustment. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 94 |
In addition to contribution collection, the calculation of earnings-related benefits in contributory systems relies on maintaining accurate data on past earnings as well as the application of what are often complex accrual formulas.
Moreover, contributory schemes generally operate within a strong legislative framework which lends a certain degree of stability to the functional requirements of their information systems. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 75 |
That said, ongoing reforms to contributory systems around the world — which range from parametric reforms, such as changes to benefit formulas or the pensionable age, to structural reforms with serious, even existential, implications for the ways the schemes operate — have placed new information management demands on social security agencies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 65 |
At the same time, these entities are increasingly tasked with devising administrative and technical solutions to facilitate the extension of coverage to workers in the informal economy and adapting to new forms of work, which brings a range of highly complex challenges related to data collection, management, and monitoring.129 All of these challenges require innovative solutions and a high degree of adaptability. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
As noted in earlier sections on sector-wide institutional coordination, the degree of ‘tolerance’ for handling complexity often depends on the degree of institutional or administrative capacity in the wider environment.
The same principle can be applied at the level of the implementing agency, where complex schemes require a high degree of institutional capacity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 66 |
For several reasons, the agencies that administer contributory schemes are often semi-autonomous and well-resourced, 129 International Social Security Association (ISSA), (2019c) 3 Mid-level governance 42 including in low- and middle-income countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 66 |
This grants them access to technological solutions and human resources — for example, better software and ‘brain ware’ (see Section 3.2) — that are not typically available to line ministries and other implementing entities and enables them to cope with the higher degree of complexity involved in administering their schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
Largely because the information management requirements for contributory schemes are necessarily more complex, many of the national social security institutions, even in low-income countries, have moved toward increased digitisation of contribution collection and compliance monitoring.
Advances in these processes are taken up further in Section 4.1. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
Finally, a key factor in determining the design and effectiveness of an MIS, is the amount of information managed.130 In this regard, contributory schemes generally tend to collect core information needed to operate the schemes such as applicant/recipient, application process, grievance process, payment process and exit process. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 67 |
This focus on essential information as opposed to large monitoring data (which is common with targeted schemes, as discussed below) coupled with standardised operational processes ensures that contributory schemes can benefit from several top Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software platforms to support their operations. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 53 |
3.1.2 Tax-financed (non-contributory) schemes At the programme level, the implications of policy design choices for MIS development and implementation are often overlooked, which is particularly true for tax-financed (non-contributory) schemes.
However, the design of non-contributory schemes is critically important for determining the amount and type of information that will be collected and the degree of stress on the administrative structures, including MISs. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
The more complex a scheme design is, the more information must be collected, and each additional type and piece of information that must be collected adds cost and raises the potential for errors.
131 Generally speaking, for non-contributory schemes, core lifecycle benefits have lower information management requirements than other types of benefits,132 particularly those paid to households. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
For example, a universal old-age pension or a child benefit place a much lower information burden on an MIS at the point of eligibility determination, since the core information required is captured at the individual rather than household level and includes basic demographic and personal identification information.
Furthermore, changes in eligibility for lifecycle benefits, especially when they are based on age, are predictable and therefore conducive to forward planning. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
In contrast, non-contributory schemes that base eligibility on poverty targeting or require compliance with conditions are inherently more administratively taxing than universal or unconditional programmes.133 For example, Georgia’s PMT formula used to determine eligibility for the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) programme consists of three separate indices (household welfare index, household needs index, and household consumption index), each with a long list of predictor variables, with different coefficients for four geographic areas.134 Georgia has relatively high state capacity, but similarly complex models are being widely used in low-capacity contexts such as Zambia or Malawi, and typically fall under the responsibility of relatively weaker line ministries, which have very low technical, financial and human resource capacity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 168 |
Besides the additional variables needed for poverty targeting, these monitoring data variables need to be updated frequently presenting additional administrative strains on the information systems.
As discussed, programmes that then condition payment on fulfilment of conditions add a whole 130 Chirchir and Kidd (2011) 131 Ibid.
132 See Box 2-1.
133 Kidd et al.
(2017) 134Baum et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 112 |
133 Kidd et al.
(2017) 134Baum et al.
(2016) 3 Mid-level governance 43 separate set of data collection (sometimes involving other sectors such as education and health), data transmission, data processing and linkages beyond one sector, and data management requirements including data protocols and scalable data hosting platforms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 89 |
This is arguably one of the reasons why conditional cash transfers are declining in popularity among governments in low- and middle-income countries, since they require large amounts of secondary information capture from complementary programmes.
In addition, Kidd and Chirchir (2011) have argued that, because poverty targeting mechanisms are inherently inaccurate, the likelihood of complaints and appeals is higher for these types of schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 96 |
Increases in appeals, in turn, put additional stress on MIS systems.
And, because the information requirements from poverty targeting are so great — involving information about the whole household — re-censusing is usually only done every four or five years, at best. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 58 |
However, since people’s incomes, employment situation, household composition and living arrangements are changing constantly, the systems will struggle to keep up with ever-changing dynamics, especially in low-capacity contexts.135 While the management of individual types of schemes presents specific sets of challenges, when considering the potential for increasing integration of contributory and non-contributory schemes, policymakers must consider a number of additional issues. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
First, policy design again matters.
For example, pension/benefit-tested schemes — which are common in core lifecycle programmes such as old-age or disability pensions, but are also used for other contingencies, such as unemployment, sickness, maternity/paternity, and family support —have lower information requirements at the point of registration than poverty-targeted schemes and are hence more conducive to an integrated design. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 96 |
This is because, beyond the core qualifying conditions (such as age, disability status, employment status, etc.
), the only additional information required relates to whether the individual is eligible for a contributory benefit, which is much simpler to obtain than information on individual or household means. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 59 |
Regardless of the overall scheme design, however, clarifying the data security and privacy protocols between different scheme administrators is crucial as contributory schemes have an interest in avoiding exposing sensitive personal data of their members.
Finally, the objective for integrating information needs to be considered. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 60 |
Where integrating information across contributory and non-contributory schemes is required to monitor the operations of the social protection sector, this could be achieved by bringing together summary statistics on contributions for reporting and analytics instead of linking personal data. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 48 |
However, if the objective is to check for duplication or to facilitate transitions between contributory and non- contributory schemes, then there is a need to link the information based on some unique ID or a combination of IDs. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 46 |
For instance, Brazil’s Cadastro Unico uses ‘match keys’ (name, mother’s name, birthdate, and codes from key documents).136 And, these unique IDs are often linked to the National Identification Database or Civil Registration Systems which are very important authentication and verification systems for both contributory and non-contributory schemes in many countries.
Notably, the availability of high-tech solutions depends on the quality of the broader ICT infrastructure in a country. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 104 |
Leveraging technology for the expansion of social protection requires basic data capture technology, servers for hosting databases and software, as well as cloud-based technology.
For example, the success of the ISAS Information system in Turkey is largely owed to a very effective wider e-Government environment.137 In places where basic hardware or telecommunications infrastructure is lacking, the range of solutions available will be more limited. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 89 |
Beyond a very basic level, ICT infrastructure is enabling rather than determinant: that is, progress is 135 Knox-Vydmanov (2014) 136 https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/integrating-data-information-management-social-protection-a1-brazil.pdf 137 Chirchir and Hu (2019) 3 Mid-level governance 44 possible even in contexts with very limited ICT infrastructure, and even in contexts with advanced ICT infrastructure, governments may be slow to adopt digital solutions for a variety of reasons (e.g., bureaucratic obstacles, low levels of ‘brain ware’ in government relative to private sector, etc.). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 172 |