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63 Sharma and Koroivueta (2019) 2 High-level governance 21 However, cross-sectoral coordination is not without risks and can in fact be an indication that authority is dispersed too broadly across the sector.
Coordinating bodies too often lack decision making power and serve as a space for exchanging information about respective ‘silos’ rather than joint decision making.
Sometimes, this can be because a coordinating body was promoted by external actors and never ‘owned’ by governments. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 117 |
For example, in Bangladesh, despite significant investment in a national coordinating structure by donors, investment in social protection has fallen, engagement by national policymakers has been low, and the organization of thematic working groups may inadvertently undermine the development of integrated contributory and non-contributory systems, as explained in Box 2-5.64 Moreover, cross-sectoral coordination is costly in terms of time and financial resources and is not always required. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
While some issues and challenges clearly require cross-sectoral coordination (for example, issues related to MIS strategy and development65), many issues are best solved by the appropriate delegated authorities and do not rise to the level of complexity that would require broad coordination efforts.66 Policymakers in the lead ministry responsible for directing coordination may need to limit the number of issues and problems that call for coordination or scale back expectations with regard to the degree of integration that is practicable (see Box 2-6). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 112 |
Furthermore, decisions about the degree of power sharing (i.e., whether coordination involves joint decision making and/or pooling of resources, or whether it is more about cooperation among relatively autonomous units) depends on the degree of integration sought, the design of the policy 64 Based on analysis of the World Bank Public Expenditure Review (2019) and Mid-term Review of the National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) (2019) and Kidd and Khondker (2013).
65 See Section Section 3.2. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 124 |
65 See Section Section 3.2.
66 Cunhill Grau et al.
(2015b) Box 2-5: Successful coordination in Bangladesh, but limited progress toward expansion Donors, particularly the UNDP, provided significant funding to the Government of Bangladesh in developing the National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) and in building support across government for its implementation through the Social Security Policy Support (SSPS) programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
The NSSS is recognised as a reference point for the social security sector and, as a result, there is an agreed set of objectives across government and development partners.
A key aspect of UNDP’s support has been to strengthen coordination across the 35 Ministries engaged in social security. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 65 |
With support of the SSPS to Cabinet Division, the Central Management Committee (CMC) has become recognised as the main management and coordination body for the social security sector while several clusters for the sector have been established.
A significant achievement has been to develop agreed Action Plans for each Ministry, focused on their implementation of the NSSS. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 73 |
While coordination mechanisms are functioning, leadership of the social security sector remains weak, and investment in tax-financed core lifecycle programmes has declined from around 0.45 per cent of GDP in 2013 (Kidd and Khondker, 2013) to 0.33 of GDP in 2019, according to analysis of the Mid-term Review of the SPSS.
While the CMC meets, often it is without the appropriate level of representation, which reduces its influence. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 115 |
Indeed, coordinating 35 ministries is a challenging task, and the broad scope of involvement may not be necessary given that most ministries have very small schemes, only some of which are delivering core lifecycle benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 45 |
Similarly, there is little evidence that the organisation of implementing ministries into five Thematic Clusters has been effective; for example, the clusters are supposed to meet four times a year for a total of twenty thematic meetings but have fallen short on this relatively modest target.
In fact, the separation of social allowances and social insurance into two separate clusters is likely to undermine the development of a coordinated and inter-linked multi-tiered social security system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 96 |
Source: Based on Bangladesh Planning Commission (2019) and national stakeholder consultations. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 21 |
2 High-level governance 22 (if around a specific policy) as well as the ability of different actors to overcome institutional resistance to increased integration.67 Box 2-6: Scaled back ambitions regarding cross-sectoral coordination in Chile Crece Contigo Sometimes, big plans for multi-sectoral governance are challenging to implement in practice, and policymakers may find themselves scaling back expectations regarding the level and nature of engagement of different actors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 100 |
Chile Crece Contigo is an example of an ambitious attempt at inter-sectoral coordination that stopped short of achieving the objective of full integration and comprehensive coordination envisaged.
Chile Crece Contigo was implemented in 2006 under the Bachelet administration as a holistic approach to early childhood development providing in-kind benefits and services. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
Qualifying families with children up to age 5 year receive free antenatal care, maternity care, child healthcare; a layette; psychosocial support for children and families; and free childcare and pre-school.
As such, it brings together a multitude of actors and institutions beyond the social protection sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 68 |
While many components of the programme are universal, free childcare and pre-school are affluence tested and only available to those who score in the lower 60 per cent of the household social registry.
In this sense, the programme extends well beyond the prevailing poverty targeting approach that characterised other flagship social protection programmes (e.g., Chile Barrio, Chile Solidario, and Chile Emprende). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 90 |
While in principle, the policy envisaged a high degree of cross-sectoral coordination and even full integration for Chile Crece Contigo, including shared policymaking, one study found that coordination was in fact limited to inter-sectoral financial transfers from the lead ministry (Ministry of Social Development) to other ministries involved.
Notably, the education sector was not included in key decisions, despite the implications for the sector of a new mandate for free preschool. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 105 |
Multi-agency plans and budgets were not prepared, followed, or assessed.
Rather, coordination in practice was limited to identifying performance indicators and sectoral contractual agreements.
Source: Cunill-Grau et al.
(2013), cited in Cunhill-Grau et al.
(2015b). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 84 |
(2013), cited in Cunhill-Grau et al.
(2015b).
A specific type of cross-sectoral coordination has emerged regarding conditional cash transfers (CCTs) as well as “cash plus” initiatives, the latter of which are increasingly finding favour with international organizational and governments.68 CCTs condition eligibility for cash benefits on the fulfilment of behavioural conditions, most often related to health (basic check-ups and preventive health) and education (school attendance and enrolment). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 125 |
CCTs are still the model of choice in many Latin American countries, with more than 30 programmes in operation in the region in 2015.69 Like many other supplementary social protection benefits, CCTs are increasingly administered by Ministries of Social Development, which some have noted as a sign progress in their institutionalization given that many started as ad hoc programmes under executive offices (e.g.
the vice president or prime minister) or in other ministries (Box 2-7). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 112 |
However, establishing specific ministries to address specific problems can create additional challenges, including fragmentation.
Moreover, from a governance perspective, verifying compliance with conditions can be extremely challenging, requiring complex cross-sectoral coordination. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 50 |
For example, in Brazil, some 36,000 professional are required to verify school attendance of 17.5 million students; rules have been interpreted differently by local officials; and the Ministry of Social Development70 struggled to get the Ministry of Education to prioritise the programme, despite relying on the participation of the education sector to successfully implement the programme.71 Given the fact that evidence for the effectiveness of conditions is weak (or highly qualified), and in light of the high administrative costs 67 Cunhill Grau et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 115 |
(2015b) note the following sources of institutional resistance to cross-sector action: centralism, predominance of a market rationale in the organization and management structure of the public sector (competition for resources), sectoral approach to budgetary matters and assessments, and vertical intergovernmental relations.
They also note resistance to information sharing (see also Section 3.3).
68 See, for example, Roelen et al.
(2017) 69 Cecchini and Atuesta (2017). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 122 |
(2017) 69 Cecchini and Atuesta (2017).
Among the most well-known of the ‘new’ social protection programmes were Oportunidades/Prospera in Mexico (though now defunct) and Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
Cecchini and Atuesta (2017).
Among the most well-known of the ‘new’ social protection programmes were Oportunidades/Prospera in Mexico (though now defunct) and Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
70 The names of the Ministries have changed numerous times since the programme’s inception.
71 Cunhill-Grau et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 161 |
71 Cunhill-Grau et al.
(2015b) 2 High-level governance 23 of enforcing conditions, the benefits of investing heavily in enforcing conditions is questionable.72 It is perhaps no surprise that unconditional cash transfers are gaining favour internationally and make up the vast majority of supplementary social assistance programmes in Africa.73 In many ways, cash plus interventions are an inevitable sequitur to CCTs. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 108 |
As CCTs matured, it became increasingly evident that the emphasis on the demand side (so-called “co-responsibilities” by citizens) must be matched by equal or greater supply-side improvements in service delivery as the state’s fundamental responsibility.74 Under an ideal cash-plus scenario, the non- fulfilment of conditions should trigger state checks and appropriate support from social workers to ensure that beneficiaries are aware of and able to access the relevant services. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 98 |
The most widely cited examples of relatively successful “cash plus” programmes include Chile Solidario and Colombia’s Familias en Acción in Latin America, and the Livelihoods and Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 57 |
Research has shown that cash plus interventions can enhance the impacts of cash only programmes, but their success depends in large part on good governance, including: clear, formal agreements among participating authorities as a necessary condition; a high degree of awareness and engagement by all stakeholders at all levels of programming; high levels of capacity among social workers, which it should be noted is lacking in the vast majority of low-income countries; case management and referral systems; and financial resources to match ambitions; among other factors.75 The coordination required to implement CCTs and cash plus initiatives is both broad and narrow. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 127 |
Broad in that it requires deliberate cross-sectoral coordination between income transfer functions (generally located within Ministries of Social Development where supplementary social protection benefits are typically administered), and the Ministries of Health and Education, as well as with 72 See e.g.
Hulme et al.
(2012).
Largely for these reasons, there are indications that CCTs are declining in popularity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 101 |
For example, after years of consistent expansion, the percentage of households participating in CCTs in Latin America stagnated at around 18.6 per cent from 2008 to 2012 and had declined to 16.9 per cent by 2016, and overall investment began to decline from a high 0.38 per cent in 2014 to 0.33 per cent in 2015 (Cecchini and Atuesta, (2017)), and in any case is much lower than what most governments spend on core lifecycle schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 133 |
These average figures mask a high degree of diversity in coverage in these programmes.
The programme with the highest coverage (62%), Bolivia’s Juancito Pinto programme, is in fact universal for all children attending school.
Most programmes have much lower coverage, ranging from 1.8% of households in Chile, to 18.4% in Honduras, while a few (6 countries) have higher-than average coverage.
See Cecchini and Atuesta (2017) figures 6 and 10.
73 UNDP and African Union (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 138 |
73 UNDP and African Union (2019).
Out of 45 cash transfer programmes in Southern and East Africa, only four are conditional.
In West Africa, 16 are unconditional and six are conditional.
74 There was also growing recognition that those most likely to fail to fulfill conditions and be hit by sanctions were often among the poorest and most vulnerable, creating a vicious cycle in which the programme ends up punishing those least able to comply, often through no fault of their own.
75 Roelen et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 127 |
75 Roelen et al.
(2017) Box 2-7: Institutionalization of cash transfers from a whole systems perspective The establishment of specific ministries to address specific policies – recall, for example, Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development and Combatting Hunger – may help to concentrate resources on a set of previously under-appreciated issues, but it can also create additional challenges, including fragmentation and coordination. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 95 |
For example, in Latin America, 18 countries have established dedicated Social Development Ministries, while six have formal authorities attached to the executive.
However, there is still a high degree of fragmentation regarding the management of cash transfers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 51 |
For example, only 43 per cent of active CCTs are housed in Social Development Ministries, while the rest are distributed across sectoral (health, education) ministries, social investment funds, or subnational institutions (Cecchini and Atuesta, 2017, and ECLAC, 2016).
Moreover, newly established lead ministries may have low levels of convening authority, especially if financial resources are not forthcoming (UNDP and African Union, 2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 116 |
In social protection, given the need for tight coordination across all types of income transfers to reduce duplication, overlap, and perverse incentives, there are strong justifications for placing the oversight of income transfers under a central ministry —such as labour and social affairs — although the specific political and institutional circumstances must be considered. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 68 |
2 High-level governance 24 social care and social work services, which are often housed in different departments within Social Development Ministries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 32 |
Among other positive outcomes, these policies have helped shine a light on the weak provision of social care and social work in low- and middle-income countries and the urgent need for investment in case management and referral systems.76 However, cash-plus coordination is also somewhat narrow in that it generally corresponds to a narrower definition of social protection —one that is synonymous with ‘cash transfers’ in the supplementary (non-core) sense — and therefore does little to address the fragmentation within the broader social protection sector or the under-supply of key social services to the broader population (including those not covered by cash-plus interventions). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 136 |
Þ Therefore, horizontal coordination is a basic requirement for both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policy coherence, as social protection increasingly interacts closely with other policy areas.
Þ Successful coordination depends heavily on clear, formal mandates for the central coordinating body in the sector as well as participating actors, agencies, and institutions, but can also occur in less formal, or targeted, smaller-scale spaces. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
Þ However, the gains from engaging in complex, cross-sectoral coordination, particularly when involving small, complementary, or supplementary social protection programmes, should be weighed carefully against the potential opportunity cost of not first investing more concertedly in within-sector coordination and integration through strong institutional frameworks for core inclusive social protection programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 74 |
2.3.2 Vertical coordination Ensuring streamlined delivery of social protection benefits and services requires clear, formal mechanisms for coordination between central and local levels, both regarding different levels of government and between the different components of the social protection within an established hierarchy of responsibility. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 58 |
Effective vertical coordination ensures that policy decisions are respected during implementation; improves efficiency by empowering local structures with administrative responsibilities; improves information flows at all levels; improves transparency; enables ownership at local levels; and facilitates sound and timely allocation of resources.77 Levels of decentralization and the rules governing the distribution of power vary considerably across countries, but everywhere, it is imperative that national rules for reporting are made clear to all appropriate authorities from an early stage to facilitate coordination. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 107 |
There is a wide variety of social protection delivery models around the world, with local authorities exercising varying degrees of control over administration, and processes vary even across individual programmes, agencies, and even sub-components of programmes.
Programme-specific vertical coordination rules often take centre stage where sector-wide coordination and monitoring structures are relatively weaker. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 74 |
For example, in Africa, decision-making authority is highly centralised, while local governments take on the lion’s share of core programme delivery for tax- financed schemes, but there are persistent challenges about establishing clear lines of reporting back to ministries and national governing structures. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 56 |
For example, in Mozambique, a lack of clear administrative hierarchy (where local structures do not correspond to national level structures) creates challenges for formal reporting and accountability, and in Malawi, District Councils are often unaware of social protection activities in their districts, and the local landscape is dominated by multiple ad hoc committees overseeing implementation of separate programmes, with little national coordination.78 In Ethiopia, despite the inter-ministerial policymaking challenges at national level, the PSNP benefits from relatively tight vertical management, with specifically defined and multi- 76 See e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 130 |
Roelen (2014) on Ghana’s LEAP.
See e.g.
Roelen (2014) on Ghana’s LEAP.
77 United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016) 78 UNDP and African Union (2019).
See also Chapter 3 on Kenya in this report.
UNDP and African Union (2019) 2 High-level governance 25 disciplinary task forces at different levels (kebele and woreda), which coordinate planning based on national guidelines. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 137 |
And, despite advances toward greater sector-wide coordination, Kenya’s Social Assistance Unit still lacks implementing structures at lower levels and relies on the Department of Social Development to implement programmes.79 Other regions show similar variability by programme or implementing agency, making broad-brushed generalizations difficult, particularly in contexts with multiple programmes spread widely across ministries and institutions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 80 |
The legal distribution of power between national and subnational units, and the degree of decentralization in the wider institutional context, matter for social protection as with other sectors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 35 |
According to the UNDG Social Protection Toolkit (2016), “Ultimately, the social protection system needs to be consistent with deconcentrating and decentralization policies, as well as with local administrative capacities.”80 Even unitary systems often have complex rules regarding the degree to which subnational units can deviate from the national policy. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 76 |
For example, in Vietnam and China, wealthier provinces can in some cases pay higher benefits (or contribution subsidies, in the case of China) than are established under national rules.81 Generally speaking, though, managing vertical coordination in unitary states is more straightforward than in federal systems, where complex issues around devolved authority (especially as regards fiscal federalism) can create challenges for governing social security. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
Many of these systems may have ‘hidden’ welfare states — subnational schemes and programmes that are difficult to coordinate with national schemes in terms of financing, eligibility across programmes, levels of benefits and incentive structures, besides posing significant challenges for national assessment and international comparisons.
Federalism can also influence the expansion and contraction of social protection over time, as explained in Box 2-8. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
Box 2-8: The complex role of federalism in social protection extension Federalism can have both positive and negative implications for the expansion of social security, but the relationship is complex.
The optimistic view is that relatively more progressive subnational units serve as “policy laboratories” finds some, albeit highly qualified, support in federalist scholarship (Greer and Elliott, 2019; Obinger et al., 2005). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 99 |
One might point to Kerala State in India, or to more ‘in the US, or to the recent devolution of authority over certain aspects of social security policy to the Scottish government as reflection, at least in part, of an expectation that improvements are more likely to occur at lower levels of government. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 61 |
However, a dominant thesis — supported by econometric analysis showing that federal states spend less on average than unitary states on social policies —has long held that federalism is inimical to the development of the welfare state.
Drawing on the experiences of federal democracies in high-income countries, research from political science has shown, however, that the conditions under which these holds are heavily context dependent. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 83 |
Where countries are in the development of their welfare states seems to matter a great deal.
Largely because federalism tends to slow the reform process, in the early, foundational stages of social policy development, federalism has worked against social policy expansion, while in latter stages (e.g.
retrenchment), federalism has served to slow efforts to retrench and can therefore help to preserve social policy institutions (Obinger et al., 2005). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 99 |
This suggests that low- and middle-income federal states that find themselves at the early stages of developing their social protection systems may find progress to be slower to come by and more difficult to manage than in their unitary counterparts, all else being equal, largely because it requires more resources to be spent on bargaining among relatively autonomous units. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 70 |
Effective national MIS systems that enable information sharing and cross-programme coordination are crucial for avoiding the informational bottlenecks that can pervade federal systems.
It is particularly important in federal states that vertical coordination structures in social protection are formally aligned with the distribution of national and subnational powers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 66 |
For example, in Germany, states have responsibility for law-making and regulation for certain areas of social policy and health, but the national government plays a key role in establishing uniformity and equality of 79 See also the case study on Kenya in this report series.
80 United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016), p. 12.
81 ISSA/SSA (multiple years); Kidd et al.
(2016).
ISSA/SSA (multiple years); Kidd et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 126 |
(2016) 2 High-level governance 26 (minimum) standards across the main components of the social protection system.82 Responsibility for delivery may also vary by the class of recipient, as with family benefits in Switzerland, where the federal government administers allowances for agricultural employees and self-employed farmers, and cantonal governments pay equivalent or higher child allowances for non-agricultural employees and self-employed workers.83 Sometimes, the level of devolution varies by programme even within the same federal system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 116 |
For example, in the United States, national government control is much tighter (even uniform) in large mandatory social insurance programmes like Social Security (old age cash benefits) and Medicare (old-age health insurance) but much more diffuse in poverty-targeted programmes like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid (means-tested health benefits), where states have a higher degree of discretion in determining eligibility and benefit levels, resulting in large variations in adequacy for beneficiaries in different states. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 119 |
Where these roles and powers are not explicit or are weakly enforced, coordination is undermined, as in Argentina, where formal rules governing fiscal federalism can matter less than political considerations in determining the distribution of resources to different provinces and within programmes.84 Regardless of the legal distribution of power in the wider context, improving vertical coordination within the social protection system requires understanding the importance of a two-directional flow of information and funds. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 95 |
Whereas top-down processes — for example, strategic leadership and guidance, monitoring, planning, and budgeting, etc. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 25 |
— are key to ensuring effective delivery of social protection policies and programmes, there is also a need for bottom-up mechanisms to ensure feedback and reporting from lower, operational levels to higher levels.85 To illustrate, the UNDG Social Protection Toolkit (2016) defines the main forms of vertical coordination as follows, citing specific concrete examples for each: 1) Delegate responsibilities to local authorities with clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities between the different layers of the subnational administration. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 109 |
For example, in South Africa, the South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) is subdivided into four administrative tiers flowing from a National Office to 9 regional offices, 44 district officer, and 331 local offices.
This structure allows nationally defined entitlements to be standardized and delivered equally across all nine provinces, while maximising the efficiencies provided through local offices with proximity to beneficiaries.
2) Install an incentive system for the local administration. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 110 |
This is particularly important in federal contexts.
For example, in Brazil, the federal system calls for creative solutions to incentivise active participation and alignment in social protection delivery.
The Bolsa Familia programme utilised performance-based financial incentives, measured through a Decentralized Management Index, to encourage municipalities to effectively implement the programme at local levels. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
A study of earlier iterations of the programme (Bolsa Escola) showed that local mayors who complied with programme monitoring and registry requirements, and received federal funds for it, were more likely to be re-elected, and those who did not experienced significant political costs.
3) Install an efficient chain of committees and set of procedures to organize flows of information and funds in two directions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
For example, in Kenya, the chain of command was streamlined significantly following the adoption of the National Social Protection Policy, 82 ILO (2019a) 83 See country profile or Switzerland in International Social Security Association (ISSA) and Social Security Administration (SSA) of the United States, (multiple years).
84 See case study on Argentina in this report series. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
85 United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016) 2 High-level governance 27 which clarified roles and lines of responsibility between the national level down to county level.86 4) Design and implement reporting mechanisms and tools.
Harmonization in reporting mechanisms requires creating common systems and platforms to channel information quickly and efficiently upwards from local levels to higher-level oversight and monitoring units. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 97 |
Systems can make use of flash reports and dashboards87 to ease communication between layers.
For example, in the Philippines, improvements to the reporting framework and mechanisms have helped the country move toward better harmonization in M&E and reporting.
The Community-based Employment Program (CBEP), which developed a common reporting mechanism for all public employment programmes, can serve as a model to extend to other areas of social protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 91 |
5) Develop an integrated management information system.
For example, Chile’s single registry, the Social Information Registry (RIS) allows for continual update of social protection programme information by municipalities, as well as data exchange through legal agreements with 43 state institutions and 345 municipalities.
Chapter 3 explores integrated MISs in greater detail.
Issues related to coordination in mid-level and ‘frontline’ governance processes are taken up in subsequent Chapters of this report. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 113 |
Þ Therefore, countries should clarify the formal rules of the game for vertical coordination within the social security system from the outset.
Þ In federal structures, formal structures may actually impede rapid development of the sector, and efficient mechanisms for information exchange are required to reduce the risk of bottlenecks. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
Þ Improving vertical coordination requires introducing mechanisms to facilitate the top-down and bottom-up flows of information and funds, which can take a variety of forms, from information management systems, to reporting mechanisms, to incentivising active participation by lower-level units. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 55 |
2.4 Institutional structures and policy designs for effective social protection expansion and delivery A government’s ability to pursue expansion in social protection largely depends on their ability to drive forward a sector-wide vision that can be implemented through the appropriate institutional channels. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 51 |
There is enormous variation in the way that social protection systems are organised from an institutional perspective, but in general, the simpler the organigram and corresponding policy designs, the easier the task of governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 42 |
2.4.1 Institutional frameworks for social protection delivery Section 2.1 suggested that the way social protection is defined in sector-wide documents reflects, and may help determine, the institutional arrangements governing the sector, presenting an opportunity for countries to give shape to disordered social protection landscapes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
Indeed, the institutional architecture for overseeing, organising and delivering social protection programmes is a fundamentally important enabling condition for achieving universal social protection.
Effective 86 See also the Kenya case study in this report series.
87 See also the Kenya case study in this report series. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
2 High-level governance 28 governance requires clear institutional structures, including designated lead Ministry(ies) and/or agency(ies) tasked with delivering the core components of the national social protection system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 45 |
Having a dedicated ministry or department overseeing social protection implementation ensures visibility for social protection, which can be particularly important in contexts where programmes are scattered across other sectors or ministries.88 Because oversight also involves sector-wide monitoring and evaluation, designating a lead ministry also ensures a degree of accountability for sector-wide planning, including setting strategic targets and priorities and achieving strategic outcomes through the effective delivery of different social protection programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 91 |
In an ideal arrangement, programme-level monitoring should feed up to the lead ministry and respond to these targets and objectives.
(In addition, legislative bodies may exercise oversight of the sector or individual programmes as they perform their core responsibility to enact and amend legislation governing the sector.) | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 61 |
To ensure that the lead ministry can effectively carry out its coordination and oversight responsibility, it should ideally have strong convening power, which typically links to budgetary responsibility for delivering the core (or the largest) social protection programmes in the sector.
Too often, however, oversight for different programmes is divided among multiple institutions without effective coordination mechanisms, and/or coordination is left to relatively weak institutions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
This institutional fragmentation is among the key challenges preventing broad- based coverage extension and the eventual achievement of universal social protection.
It is important to note that complexity in the dispersion of administrative responsibility for programmes is not problematic per se, provided there are effective coordination structures in place.
Indeed, many high-income countries have extremely complex programme delivery and administrative structures. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 81 |
However, the tolerance for complexity in institutional dispersion of administrative responsibility and even oversight functions is highly dependent on having strong state and institutional capacity.
Paradoxically, the contexts that most require effective coordination due to high degrees of fragmentation, are often those least able to provide it. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
For example, according to the ILO, there is a much “greater need for systemic integration and unity” in a country like Bangladesh, where the National Social Security Strategy references some 95 programmes, reflecting incredibly complex, disparate and often conflicting and contradictory reporting lines and ministerial responsibilities.89 Moreover, the initial placement of programmes is heavily path dependent: once a programmes is embedded within a given ministry or agency in the national institutional architecture, there are high transition costs to governance reforms that would streamline arrangements, although progress is certainly possible. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 124 |
Figure 2-7 shows the national social protection institutional arrangements in place for the main cash benefit programmes in Ethiopia, which is emblematic of countries that are in the nascent stages of sector development.
In line with the NSPS, the lead ministry ostensibly responsible for the coordination of social protection implementation (the “focal government Ministry”) is the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 90 |
However, the Ministry has weak convening power and delivery capacity, despite being required under the NSPS to establish and coordinate an inter-Ministerial stakeholder committee tasked with monitoring progress in the sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 43 |
As a legacy of the pre-NSPS period, core components of the flagship Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (and its urban counterpart, the UPSNP) are delivered by separate ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Urban Development.90 Meanwhile, the Ministries of Women and Children and Education also deliver a collection of small, targeted programmes, disconnected from the larger 88 UNDP and African Union (2019).
89 ILO (2019), paragraph 658. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 122 |
89 ILO (2019), paragraph 658.
90 The public works components of the PSNP/UPSNP are delivered by the Ministries of Agriculture and Urban Development, respectively, while the direct income support for those who are unable to work is delivered by MoLSA.
The process has given way to significant institutional power struggles between MoLSA and the other ministries.
2 High-level governance 29 social protection programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 106 |
In addition, the newly established contributory pension schemes for formal-sector workers consist of two separate agencies for public- and private-sector workers, respectively, reporting to both the Ministry of Finance (fund oversight) and MoLSA (policy oversight).
Finally, a new health insurance scheme that would create a separate institution was approved in 2010 but has not been implemented. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 84 |
Figure 2-7: Institutional arrangements in Ethiopia’s nascent social protection system91 Source: Development Pathways’ depiction based on ISSA/SSA (multiple years).
In Ethiopia, the national social protection policy clarified roles and responsibilities of uncoordinated institutional actors and units within the Government, but the resulting framework is still largely reactive to existing programme structures that pre-dated the conceptualisation of social protection as a ‘sector’. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
Nevertheless, as previously noted, the definition of the sector as such provides a clear space for further contestation and adjustment in future.
The complex institutional architecture that characterises many countries in the Global South stands in stark contrast to the relatively more concentrated structures governing social security systems in many high-income countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
It is important to note that these structures did not appear overnight but, in most cases, have been forged over decades.92 While there is a wide variety of institutional structures reflecting complex institutional legacies, some of which continue to rely on intricate coordinating mechanisms across multiple agencies and ministries, the overarching tendency over time has been toward consolidation of authority and resources within one or two core institutions or agencies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 87 |
This has occurred most recently, for example, in Norway, Portugal and Spain, which 91 Additional national social security organograms can be consulted in 0 and in the case studies in this report.
92 For example, in the “Continental” welfare states (Esping-Andersen, (1990)), social insurance systems initially consisted of entirely different schemes for different occupational groups, but the differentiation among them gradually gave way to more uniform national standards and policies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 104 |
2 High-level governance 30 merged the functions of the ministries of labour with the ministries of social affairs.93 A number of countries, including Belgium, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey, also centralised administration under unified social security agencies.94 And others, including countries of all income levels, moved to centralise collection of contributions and payment of benefits under one institutions (a full service social insurance institution).95 Notably, many European countries, especially those predicated on a social insurance model, place supplementary social assistance benefits under the management of municipalities, even if these are tightly regulated by national governments.96 Nordic countries, on the other hand, tend to deliver all types of benefits through central, national administrative structures. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 157 |
Therefore, paradoxically again, even in high-capacity contexts where the ability to cope with institutional complexity and fragmentation is higher, relatively concentrated institutional arrangements are often preferred.
Figure 2-8 shows the current institutional setup in the Netherlands and Norway.
While they reflect different approaches and historical legacies, in each case, oversight is concentrated in a single ministry and the core business of social protection is associated with one or two agencies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment provides policy oversight and management, while benefits administration is supervised by the Inspectorate for Social Affairs and Employment (SZM) and delivered through three structures roughly corresponding to employment- related benefits (UWV), core lifecycle benefits (SVB), and minimum income guarantees (municipalities). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
In Norway, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has primary oversight for social security through the Directorate of Labour and Welfare,97 while the national social security agency, NAV, delivers benefits through local offices.
Contributions are also collected through local tax offices in Norway. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 61 |
93 In Norway, the Ministry of Social Affairs merged with the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration; in Portugal, a new Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity took on labour and employment functions as well as the functions previously overseen by the Ministry of Social Security, Family and Children; in Spain, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was redesigned to integrate three secretariats – Social Security, Social Services Family and Disability, and Immigration and Emigration. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 97 |
ILO, (2019a).
94 Ibid.
95 Examples include: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
ILO, (2011), paragraph 382) 96 Based on analysis of Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), (latest years). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 136 |
97 The Ministry of Children and Equality, as well as the Ministry of Health and Care Services, also have an oversight role with respect to specific functions in their remit.
2 High-level governance 31 Figure 2-8: Social security institutional arrangements (excluding health care) in the Netherlands and Norway.
Source: Development Pathways’ depictions based on (Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), latest years). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 100 |
Several low- and middle-income countries have also avoided high degrees of institutional fragmentation, and it is perhaps no coincidence that these are also the many of the same countries that have achieved notable social expansion.
For example, Mauritius, South Africa, Mongolia, Georgia, China, and Vietnam, among others, all concentrate control of the sector under a central ministry, even if different departments manage different types of transfers or programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
In other social protection ‘leaders’ in the Global South, such as Seychelles and Uruguay, different ministries might be responsible for oversight of different key programmes, but a central administering agency (the Agency for Social Protection in Seychelles (APS), and the Social Insurance Bank (BPS) in Uruguay) is responsible for delivering all of the main benefits.98 Similarly, in Argentina, even as high-level ministerial configurations have shifted, administration of core social protection benefits has remained largely concentrated under the central national administering body, the ANSES.99 Furthermore, even in nascent and emerging systems, substantial progress is possible and enabled by good governance decisions around consolidation of benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 154 |