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As such, the examples featured in this overview and in the in-depth case studies that accompany it serve as practical examples of relative success in selected areas of governance.
Countries faces additional, often significant, challenges that are unique to their specific political, socio-economic, and institutional context.
18 See, for example, Chirchir and Barca (2020) for a framework and proposals for building integrated social protection information systems. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 98 |
2 High-level governance 8 2 High level governance High-level governance refers to the mechanisms and structures — including national strategies and definitions of social protection, legislative and regulatory frameworks, institutional structures and policy designs, and high-level coordination mechanisms —needed to build sustainable systems. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
It gives particular emphasis to the need for policy coherence across sectors, and for coordination mechanisms (both within social protection and across sectors) to be defined at the highest levels and formally embedded within all levels of the national social protection system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 49 |
Drawing on existing accounts of successful social protection expansion as well as general challenges facing all social protection systems, the chapter identifies several elements or components of high- level social protection system structures that have been associated with more effective governance.
Each of these is taken up in turn in the following paragraphs. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 63 |
2.1 A common definition of social protection at the national level At the global level, different understandings abound across international organizations and in academic scholarship, and reviewing that debate is beyond the scope of this report.
Many national governments, meanwhile, must contend with their own unique historical social protection legacies, which often reflect highly diverse understandings of what counts (or should count) as social protection, and what does (or should) not. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 95 |
In contexts where the social protection landscape is just beginning to take shape, defining what social protection will come to comprise is particularly important for building coherent governance structures and for setting a baseline context against which future expansion can be assessed. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 49 |
Countries that take deliberate steps to clarify the boundaries of the sector, including through national social protection policies or strategies, are better able to institute the system-wide governance mechanisms — including sector-wide monitoring and evaluation — that make expansion possible.
Among the biggest dividing lines in social protection definitions, both globally and at national levels, is the relative emphasis placed on different types of benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
Countries in the Global South diverge the extent to which they invest in, or rely heavily on, what might be called “core” lifecycle benefits, which trace their history to – and draw legitimacy from — international norms and standards, versus placing a greater emphasis on smaller, more targeted benefits that aim primarily at poverty reduction and are not, or are only loosely, connected to defined lifecycle contingencies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 87 |
To some extent, all systems exhibit both broad types of benefits, as explained in Box 2-1.
Core lifecycle benefits are the essential building blocks of a social security system.
Moreover, meaningful extension of social protection occurs through strengthening these core benefits, which not only draw legitimacy from an established international framework but are highly self-sustaining in domestic political contexts. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 83 |
While other benefits may complement or supplement these central programmes, they cannot replace them and are frequently much more difficult to govern for a variety of reasons.
Adding to the confusion, the terms social protection and social security continue to be used differently in different contexts. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 55 |
In particular, ‘social security’ is often conflated with employment-related contributory systems or social insurance, even though international norms, including ILO Convention 102, are agnostic about the specific instruments through which social security may be provided. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 54 |
Drawing on examples from around the world, this paper will underline some of the features of core lifecycle benefits that lend themselves to stronger governance frameworks both by relying more heavily on, and reinforcing, key principles of good governance like participation, transparency, predictability, and accountability. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 65 |
2 High-level governance 9 Box 2-1: The lifecycle framework for social protection and potential implications for governance Social protection entails the guarantee of at least basic income and health security across the lifecycle.19 While it is among the most powerful tools available to government to address poverty and inequality, one of its core functions is to build resilience to shocks. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 81 |
The most common stocks are linked to the human lifecycle and/or the labour market — including costs associated with childhood and its inherent vulnerabilities; income loss due to sickness or disability (both short-term and long-term), pregnancy or maternity/paternity, work-related accidents or diseases, unemployment, or old age; or ill health, which can occur at any stage in the lifecycle. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
Corresponding to these nine common lifecycle contingencies, ILO Convention 102 of 1952 set minimum standards for the establishment of what might be called “core” lifecycle benefits: old age pensions, disability benefits, survivor benefits, cash sickness and maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, employment injury benefits, family benefits and medical benefits, all of which may be contributory or tax-financed (non-contributory), means-tested or universal. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
These core contingencies are re-affirmed, and the same corresponding benefits suggested, in ILO Recommendation 202 of 2012, which reinforced calls for basic income and health security during childhood, active (or working) age, and in old age.
20 But, alongside core lifecycle benefits, national social protection systems often include certain programmes to address risks that are not directly associated with the lifecycle. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 94 |
These additional benefits aim to supplement or complement — not replace — what is offered through core programmes and may include benefits aimed at covariate risks and shocks21 like natural disasters, conflict, public health crises or drought; categorical (but not-age-related) benefits to support specifically defined groups such as ethnic minorities or persons in remote geographic regions; benefits to provide a minimum income guarantee to protect against poverty (akin to so-called ‘safety nets’); or instruments to promote complementary goals like livelihood support or employment (e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 122 |
through public works or ‘workfare’).
Importantly, if the core lifecycle system is functioning as it should — that is, providing a comprehensive scope of coverage with adequate benefit levels — the need for these other supplementary benefits is reduced.
This is true even in the face of covariate shocks.
Figure 2-1 depicts an ideal model of a national social protection system combining core lifecycle benefits with other supplementary programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 97 |
Figure 2-1: Core lifecycle benefits specified under ILO Convention 102 and Recommendation 202 Source: Development Pathways’ depiction based on C102 and R202. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 48 |
2 High-level governance 10 National social protection strategies (NSPS) or national social protection policies (NSPP) are one important way in which countries at earlier stages of social protection expansion can raise the importance of social protection in the national agenda and assert control over the process of social protection sector development in a meaningful way. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 70 |
Recommendation 202 calls for all countries to “formulate and implement national social security extension strategies, based on national consultations through effective social dialogue and social participation” (Article 13(1)).
Box 2-2 summarises the essential elements of a national social security strategy as outlined in R202. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 72 |
According to a recent compilation by ILO and UN Women, at least 49 countries around the world have a national social protection/security strategies or policies in place.22 A separate study of NSPS/NSPPs in Africa found that more than half of African countries (29 countries) have either an NSPP or an NSPS, all but four of them adopted since 2010.23 Social protection national strategy documents offer an opportunity to assert the legitimate role of the state in providing for basic income and health security of the population; to define social protection in the national context (including a specific list of schemes programmes and/or types of programmes) that fall within the sector; and to set strategic priorities — all the better when they are costed — for expansion.24 Moreover, they provide governments with assurance that their immediate decisions align with long- term plans for the sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 190 |
For example, the Government of Lesotho was able to scale up child grants for vulnerable families in response to a drought secure in the knowledge that the move aligned with the long-term vision for the sector.25 19 Social protection and social security are frequently used interchangeably, though there are some notable distinctions.
See “Glossary” in (ILO, 2017a) for a discussion of the usage of the two terms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 100 |
20 ILO Recommendation 202 re-affirms these contingencies in Article 5 and suggests the same corresponding benefits in Article 9(2).
21 See e.g.
Dercon (2005) 22 https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/RessourceSearch.action?id=3&ressource.type.ressTypeId=414&order=2 23 UNDP and African Union (2019) 24 See Pino and Confalonieri (2014) for a review of national social protection policies and strategies in West Africa.
25 Davey (2016) cited in UNDP and African Union (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 173 |
Davey (2016) cited in UNDP and African Union (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 22 |
2 High-level governance 11 Box 2-2: Recommendation 202 provisions on national social security strategies ILO Recommendation 202 on National Social Protection Floors establishes that all countries should develop and implement strategies for the implementation of social protection floors where countries do not already have minimum guarantees, and to progressively seek higher levels of protection to “as many people as possible” in accordance with economic and fiscal capacities of Members. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
Furthermore, it states that social security systems ought to be “coherent with national policy objectives” and coordinated with other public policies.
Article 14 specifies the components of national social security extension strategy.
“Members should: a) set objectives reflecting national priorities.
b) identify gaps in, and barriers to, protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 74 |
b) identify gaps in, and barriers to, protection.
c) seek to close gaps in protection through appropriate and effectively coordinated schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, or both, including through the extension of existing contributory schemes to all concerned persons with contributory capacity.
d) complement social security with active labour market policies, including vocational training or other measures, as appropriate. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
e) specify financial requirements and resources as well as the time frame and sequencing for the progressive achievement of the objectives; and f) raise awareness about their social protection floors and their extension strategies, and undertake information programmes, including through social dialogue.” Furthermore, according to the Recommendation, national strategies should always apply to workers in the formal and informal economy and seek to reduce informality and complement social, economic, and environmental development plans, while also ensuring support for disadvantaged groups and people with special needs. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 107 |
Finally, R202 comes full circle to link with Convention 102, specifically encouraging members to “aim to achieve the range and levels of benefits set out in [the Convention and those that followed]” (Article 17) and to work toward ratifying the Convention, underscoring its continued relevance today. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 69 |
Ideally, the process by which a national social protection system is delineated, as distilled through its national strategy or policy, should be a safe political space in which diverse national stakeholders can exercise political voice, in line with Recommendation 202’s call for social dialogue.
However, in many low- and middle-income contexts, donors still exercise an outsized role, certainly in early rounds. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 92 |
Even if early versions of the strategy or policy may not fully capture the Government’s vision or priorities, once an initial policy or strategy is agreed and it becomes apparent that these are nationally endorsed frameworks, the frameworks can serve as a catalyst for further refining and, ideally, expanding the sector as well as for crystallising national stakeholders’ interests, views, and preferences. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 83 |
Moreover, because of the pace at which expansion and experimentation is occurring, new programmes may precede or develop in tandem with the articulation of policy, complicating the planning process. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 39 |
For example, this process of real-time contestation played out in both Uganda and Rwanda, where the definition of social protection in national social protection policies excluded certain high-profile or emerging programmes (the VUP in Rwanda only emerged after the first NSPP, and livelihoods programmes were not included in Uganda’s NSPP). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 79 |
The NSPP offers a bounded space in which scrutiny and debate of the definition can occur —in Rwanda, this led the Government to revise the definition in the subsequent policy to include the VUP,26 while in Uganda, there is a recognition that the policy is not aligned with practice, but the definition has so far served to prevent livelihoods programmes from occupying a more central place in national social protection priorities.27 Whether the national social protection policy or strategy is an effective tool for overall system governance largely depends on the agreed scope of the national definition. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 122 |
Those that understand social protection to include primarily core lifecycle schemes (contributory or tax-financed) as well as 26 Lavers (2016) 27 Government of Uganda, (2019), (2015) 2 High-level governance 12 other, more limited programmes aimed primarily at poverty reduction, are more likely to be able to offer a common framework for a coordinated approach to the development of the sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 102 |
Examples of strategies and policies that apply this broader lifecycle lens (usually in reference to the social protection/security as a right) can be found, for example, in countries as diverse as Lesotho,28 Cambodia, Uganda, Myanmar, and Ethiopia.29 A number of factors affect the degree to which these definitions align with conventional understandings (see Box 2-3). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
Paradoxically, a definition that is too broad risks including programmes that would not be considered social protection by many international definitions, resulting in even greater challenges.
In Bangladesh, for example, 95 programmes implicating 35 ministries are mentioned in the National Social Security Strategy, which poses immense challenges coordination and dilutes the political focus away from improving core schemes.30 Box 2-3: Aligning the definition of social protection with international practice. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
While there is broad agreement on the core instruments that comprise social protection — including social insurance, tax-financed universal and means-tested benefits, and (to some extent) labour market interventions31 — there is significant leeway for interpreting the specific boundaries in each context (in particular, the appropriate balance between lifecycle and other, supplementary programmes within a national system). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 82 |
In general, countries at earlier stages of developing their social protection systems are more prone to adopting a restricted definition that is at odds with historical understandings.
In countries with longer formal social welfare traditions, such as in Europe and other high-income countries, and to some degree in Latin America and parts of Southern Africa, national definitions are more likely to reflect international norms and a lifecycle approach. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 85 |
This for a variety of reasons, including a longer history of establishing cross-national legal and practical frameworks for ensuring comparability and portability of rights, as well as to influences in certain countries which then spread via regional policy diffusion.
For example, Niño-Zarazúa et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 64 |
(2012) attribute the adoption of lifecycle frameworks (non-contributory income transfers for older people and children) in Southern African countries to the application of a European model in South Africa and subsequent policy diffusion across the region.32 Similarly, in Latin America, countries like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay were in many ways pioneers in adopting early welfare state structures, which later developed relatively in tandem — though in more stratified labour markets — with European states during the post-war period.33 However, many countries in the Global South find themselves at earlier stages of social protection expansion, where the boundaries have pushed beyond the original formal social security institutions set up in the immediate post-colonial period. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 152 |
Here, the proliferation of schemes and approaches with often very different logics, objectives and financing arrangements complicate the challenge of deciding what is included and what is not, especially countries that rely heavily on external financing.
For instance, Niño-Zarazúa et al.
(2012) contrast the Southern Africa model with the experience of Middle Africa (e.g., Liberia, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Zambia, Sierra Leone), where donors and external influences are much more salient. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 116 |
This model “lacks the degree of coherence of the Southern Africa, especially as it involves programmes with many different orientations and designs” but share a common focus on extreme poverty, among other features.
In these contexts, the process of defining social protection is more prone to be ‘captured’ by actors who support a narrower, residualist understanding of social protection, including some donors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 88 |
Too often, however, the policy or strategy that results reflects more limited definitions of social protection, as only comprising a residual sub-set of programmes aimed at the poorest or most vulnerable.
This idea of reducing poverty (and vulnerability understood narrowly) as the core 28 Freeland and Khondker (2015) 29 ILO, (2017b); ILO and UNDP (2011); Government of Uganda (2015); Government of Myanmar (2014). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 121 |
Ethiopia’s NSPP is surprisingly broad given the relatively narrow focus on the PSNP as the largest supplementary social assistance benefit in the national context.
For example, the policy includes the new social insurance scheme, recently implemented in 2011, and refers to social protection as not only for poor households and vulnerable individuals, but for “all people” (see Government of Ethiopia (2012) and UNDP and African Union (2019)). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
30 Bangladesh Planning Commission (2019) and national stakeholder consultations.
31 There is still considerable debate about which labour market regulation and interventions might be considered social protection and which are not.
32 Niño-Zarazúa et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
(2012) 33 Mesa-Lago (2009, 1978) 2 High-level governance 13 function is present, for example, in 26 of 29 African NSPS or NSPPs, while some limit it even further to “ensuring food security” (Burundi), reducing malnutrition (Comoros, Niger), and social exclusion (Lesotho, Gabon).34 The definition tends to reflect this restricted conceptualization in contexts where the most visible programmes are poverty targeted and where certain donors and external actors, notably the World Bank, are more influential.35 Pino and Confalonieri (2014b) also highlight the very narrow definition of social protection in Ghana’s NSPP which targets “only the most vulnerable” in its Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) Programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 204 |
The narrow definition downplays or ignores the ‘core businesses of social protection, which is to provide income and health security across the lifecycle for defined contingencies and sets countries on a residualist path that will be difficult to reverse.36 Moreover, the more restrictive view of social protection that has taken hold across many low- and middle-income countries is at odds with the way core social protection is defined and practised in high-income countries,37 where investment is overwhelmingly concentrated in lifecycle schemes (old age and survivors; disability; family; unemployment), with only marginal resources going to other types of support, often poverty targeted ‘poor relief’ programmes, as shown in Figure 2-2. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 151 |
Indeed, even the budgets of many low- and middle-income countries similarly show a greater investment in core programmes than in non-core, supplementary benefits, when a broader definition of social protection is applied. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 45 |
Figure 2-2: Levels of investment in different core lifecycle and other programmes across OECD countries, 2014 - 2016 Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm Þ Therefore, it is vital that countries at earlier stages of planning and development of their social protection systems set out a nationally agreed definition of social protection through a consultative process. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 108 |
Þ When defining social protection, it is imperative that countries include core lifecycle benefits in their delineation of the sector, its objectives, and its intended covered population.
Þ Narrower definitions that only consider — or emphasise too heavily — smaller, supplementary (‘safety net’) programmes are not only at odds with the broader international 34 UNDP and African Union (2019) 35 See, for example, Niño-Zarazúa et al., (2012) 36 See e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 124 |
Mkandawire (2005); Pierson (2001) 37 For definitions, see e.g. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 30 |
ILO, (2017a); ISSA/SSA, (multiple years); Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), (latest years) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Italy Greece Austria Belgium Finland France Portugal Poland Spain Slovenia Luxembourg Denmark Germany Hungary Norway Czech Republic Netherlands Estonia Sweden Japan Slovak republic Latvia Switzerland United Kingdom Lithuania Canada United States New Zealand Turkey Australia Ireland Israel Iceland Chile Korea, Dem. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 114 |
Rep. Mexico Percentage of GDP Old Age and survivors Disability Family Unemployment Poor relief Other 2 High-level governance 14 experience, but often preclude possibilities for greater integration and more effective system- wide governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 51 |
2.2 A strong legislative and regulatory framework Globally, more and more countries are embedding the right to social security in their constitutions, providing a fundamental enabling environment for the expansion of social protection.38 These provisions can range from establishing social security as an object of state policy, imposing a duty on the state to provide social security (without necessarily affirming an individual right), or directly affirming the individual right to social security, providing a firm foundation in national law for social security.39 Ultimately, however, the realization of the right to social security often depends on the specific articulation of rights and entitlements in national legislation as the explicit expression of the state’s commitment to honour them.40 For example, out of 16 countries that have implemented cash transfers in Latin America examined in Cecchini and Martínez, (2012), all but five had constitutional recognition of social rights, but in only four of them did these rights translate into explicit (non- contributory) guarantees.41 Once firmly embedded in a legal and regulatory framework, rights linked to specific programmes cease to be discretionary and become judicable and therefore enforceable in a national court system.42 Almost without exception, national contributory schemes tend to be grounded in legislation because they require social partners to agree to mandatory deductions in the form of social contributions and therefore generally require a legal framework to enforce compliance from the onset. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 306 |
Moreover, legislation covering contributory schemes tends to be highly specific, laying out the covered population; the size of the contribution for workers, employers, and government; the level of benefit or replacement rate; the conditions for compliance and enforcement; and the governance (in the narrow sense) and administrative structures behind the scheme.
For historical reasons, most schemes that have a statutory basis are contributory schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 84 |
Figure 2-3 depicts the global evolution in the adoption of statutory social security programmes, by branch, based on the first year when a statutory provision was introduced. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 39 |
It shows that countries tend to follow similar paths in introducing new contingencies, starting with employment injury, then adding old-age pension systems (which were generally linked to disability and survivors’ pensions) and then gradually adding benefits focused on people of working age and families, including cash sickness and maternity benefits, family benefits and unemployment.43 38 ILO (2011), Chapter 3. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
39 The latter two – individual rights or state responsibility – are most likely to result in enforceable provisions.
40 ILO (2019a), paragraphs 163-165.
41 See Table II.2.
42 Indeed, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations noted that “safety nets, initiatives and other projects that are not established by law do not therefore offer sufficient guarantees to be considered as forming part of national social protection floors within the meaning of the Recommendation”. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 126 |
ILO, (2019), paragraph 172).
43 ILO (2017a).
Many high-income countries also have legislation supporting schemes providing minimum income guarantees.
See ILO, (2019a); ISSA/SSA, (multiple years); Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), (latest years).
2 High-level governance 15 Figure 2-3: Evolution of social security legislation around the world, by branch Source: Reproduced from ILO (2017), Figure 1.2.
Original source: ISSA/SSA (multiple years). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 151 |
Original source: ISSA/SSA (multiple years).
While most programmes tracked in the trends above are contributory, many non-contributory schemes are also grounded in legislation and are included in Figure 2-3.
Here, the distinction between core lifecycle and other supplementary benefits become salient, since virtually all countries ground their core national lifecycle schemes covering the risks of old age, disability, and survivorship — regardless of how they are financed — in legislation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 106 |
A large number of the newer, non- contributory programmes that have proliferated in recent decades in low- and middle-income countries still lack a formal legislative framework.44 Many of these programmes began as extra- budgetary, sub-national (often pilot) initiatives which have tended to expand and contract, and even disappear, with subsequent changes in government.45 However, it is also true that the number of schemes that have gained statutory status has begun to increase in the last decade, particularly in Latin America. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 115 |
However, the likelihood of these schemes having a legal framework is considerably higher for schemes covering core lifecycle contingencies than otherwise. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 25 |
For example, analysis of the Social Assistance, Politics and Institutions (SAPI) database46 suggests that, whereas around 57 per cent of social assistance “cash transfers” (conditional and unconditional) in developing countries were grounded in “ordinary legislation” in 2015, nearly 80 per cent of non-contributory programmes covering the risks of old age and disability were.47 While it is beyond the scope of this review to determine the reasons behind this, it is very likely related to the broad appeal of these programmes and their higher potential to gain and sustain national political interest. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 134 |
Importantly, core lifecycle benefits are individual entitlements, which tend to be easier to enforce. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 22 |
This is in keeping with a rights-based approach, which recognises the inherent human right of all individuals to social security, rights that can be readily claimed and adjudicated when specified in 44 ILO, (2019a, 2017a) 45 Indeed, partly because non-statutory programmes are difficult to track over time but also because they do not constitute entitlements, key comparative resources on social security programmes often exclude programmes with no grounding in legislation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 112 |
See International Social Security Association (ISSA) and Social Security Administration (SSA) of the United States, (multiple years).
46 The SAPI database provides a synthesis of longitudinal and harmonized comparable information on social assistance programmes in developing countries, covering the period 2000-2015.
UNU-WIDER, (2015).
47 The database also tracks other types of statutory instruments, such as Constitutional law, Decrees, and agency regulations. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 113 |
These other forms of statute are considerably weaker than ordinary legislation; however, similar patterns emerge though the gap narrows somewhat.
For example, 90% of old-age and disability programmes are anchored in either ordinary legislation or decree, this drops to 79% for UCTs and CCTs.
2 High-level governance 16 law.48 With individual benefits, a claim is made based on relatively easily demonstrable risks (e.g., age, labour market status, maternity, incapacity). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 118 |
On the other hand, many of the smaller, often poverty targeted benefits are paid to households.
While individuals may and typically do benefit indirectly from household transfers, the mechanism is not guaranteed, particularly in situations where intra-household dynamics are imbalanced resulting in an unequal sharing of resources.
With household benefits, enforcing a claim is more complicated. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 79 |
Household benefits pool eligibility requirements across multiple individuals within a household, and household means, and composition (two primary requirements for eligibility) are both subject to constant fluctuation.
These features make proving an unclaimed right, where it exists, extremely challenging.49 Þ Therefore, anchoring social protection programmes in legislation is a minimum requirement for ensuring that rights are enforceable. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 83 |
Þ Because they require consensus from social partners, contributory programmes tend to have a strong and specific statutory basis governing the obligations and rights of contributors and beneficiaries.
Þ Non-contributory benefits are more likely to be grounded in legislation when they are tied to core lifecycle contingencies, such as old age, disability, or survivorship. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 77 |
Þ Individual entitlements such as those specified in a lifecycle framework lend themselves more readily to being enforceable under a rights-based approach to social protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 35 |
2.3 Mechanisms for national coordination in social protection (vertical and horizontal) Close coordination among the varied and disparate actors implicated in the social protection system is fundamental and, according to some scholars, a precondition for the establishment of comprehensive social protection systems.50 So-called ‘horizontal’ coordination — which involves coordinating across sectors, actors, and institutions — is growing in importance as policy innovations increasingly require stronger linkages between income transfers, services, and benefits in kind. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 104 |
Governments must also grapple with the very complex challenges related to ‘vertical’ coordination between central and local levels, both regarding different levels of government and along the different components of the social protection within an established hierarchy of responsibility. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 46 |
Figure 2-4 depicts the main types of horizontal and vertical coordination that are required for the effective implementation of national social protection floors, as suggested by the UNDG Social Protection Coordination Toolkit (2016).
Horizontal coordination is required both at the policy level and the operational level, while vertical coordination is required across all administrative and organizational layers, from the highest levels down to frontline operations. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 89 |
48 Social security is a human right, as outlined in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which states: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” 49 See also Section 0. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 103 |
50 According to Cunhill Grau et al.
(2015b): “It is therefore no exaggeration to say that one of the basic conditions that must be in place before a comprehensive social protection system can be crafted is the presence of closer coordination and management of different sectors of government and of the different levels of government.” (p. 376) 2 High-level governance 17 Figure 2-4: Coordination required to implement national social protection floors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 108 |
Source: Adapted from (United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization, 2016), Figure 3. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 31 |
2.3.1 Horizontal coordination Because social protection interacts closely with other policy areas, steady and significant expansion of social protection requires both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policy coherence.51 The social protection system or ‘sector’ operates within the broader economic and fiscal context, but direct coordination is often required with specific policy areas, such as employment and tax policy, for example regarding formalization and contribution and collection; education, health and nutrition policies; water and sanitation; housing; legal aid; financial services; etc.52 The policies that are closely implicated with social protection policies are often referred to as ‘complementary’ policies or interventions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 141 |
Figure 2-5 depicts a basic model that situates a simplified social protection sector, which may consist of social security with close links to social care and social work, within this broader policy context of complementary interventions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 47 |
Coherence is required between social security (including between tax-financed and contributory schemes, and about in-kind benefits) and social care services; but there must also be coherence with other ‘external’ policies that impact on the governance and administration of social protection.
51 ILO (2019a).
See also Recommendation No.
202, paragraph 10 ILO, (2012).
ILO (2019a).
See also Recommendation No.
202, paragraph 10 ILO, (2012) 52 Gillion et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 148 |
202, paragraph 10 ILO, (2012) 52 Gillion et al.
(2000) for the ILO defined governance in pensions as being concerned with scheme management, but “also concerned with the interrelationship between national policy, national management and scheme management.” (p. 217) 2 High-level governance 18 Figure 2-5: Internal and external policy coherence in social protection Source: Development Pathways. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 110 |
In practice, achieving internal and external policy coherence is anything but straightforward and depends only partly on the governance structures within the social protection system itself.
Ultimately, improvements to governance within social protection may be constrained by impediments to governance in the broader economic, political, and institutional system in which it is embedded. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 70 |
Nevertheless, there are several concrete measures within the social protection system that can make both internal and external coherence more likely.
According to the UNDG Social Protection Toolkit, “Ideally, the shared vision of social protection would be embodied in one entity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 58 |
This entity should be responsible for facilitating the coordination process, have the legitimacy to settle conflicts, and be accountable for the successful and efficient implementation of the SPF.”53 National coordinating bodies articulate formal lines of responsibility and clear division of roles between different actors and stakeholders, including across wider government, the private sector and civil society, and are therefore central to achieving horizontal coordination of the sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
54 They frequently take the form of permanent, inter-governmental councils or bodies in which the key actors in the social protection system are represented: ministries of labour, social development, health and education, as well as leaders of the respective departments with responsibility for implementation; (semi-autonomous) social security agencies and pension funds, if separate; as well as an advisory role for donors, if relevant, representatives of stakeholders (social partners) and beneficiaries (civil society organizations). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 109 |
Usually, they are headed by the lead ministry responsible for delivery of social protection.
However, they can also be convened on an ad hoc basis in response to a particular need or policy, and they may be more limited in scope involving a few, specifically relevant institutions, departments, or units. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 62 |
Whether “high-intensity” or “low-intensity”,55 all these spaces, if well managed, can provide a vital formal 53 United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016) 54 These national coordinating bodies are becoming commonplace across low- and middle-income countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 72 |
If sub-Saharan Africa has been the locus of the proliferation of national social protection policy and strategy documents, Latin America has been at the forefront of the establishment of national coordinating bodies (or ‘social cabinets’) for social protection and/or social development, a process that began in the 1980s and has continued to the present (ECLAC, (2016)).
See also Pino and Confalonieri (2014) on West Africa.
55 Repetto and Pottenza Dal Masetto (2012). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 129 |
55 Repetto and Pottenza Dal Masetto (2012).
2 High-level governance 19 space for coordinating the sector and can service to enhance buy-in for national expansion strategies and indeed are a fundamental tool for implementing national social protection floors.56 Successful coordination under a national coordinating body is far more likely when the entity has the legal authority to carry out its officially mandated duties. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
Such authority may be established, for example, by an Act of Parliament or other statute,57 which should also specify terms and conditions that are reviewed and agreed by all relevant parties and authorities, including by the agencies and actors that fall under its remit. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 53 |
Moreover, overall accountability is strengthened when the coordinating body, sometimes referred to as a National Social Protection Board (NSPB), is also required to report to a higher authority, such as relevant oversight committees within the executive or legislative branch.58 While the coordinating body should comprise representatives from the key actors and institutions involved in delivering social protection, the number of representatives should be “as limited as possible” to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the Board.59 Figure 2-6 depicts a typical institutional set up for an NSPB, based on a review of international experiences conducted for the UNDG Social Protection Coordination Toolkit (2016),60 although in practice, partial successes may be achieved even without all of the formal components in place, as explained in Box 2-4. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 174 |
56 See ILO (2012), Article 20.
57 Ibid.
58 That said, one of the achievements of coordination bodies in many Latin American countries has been to counter-balance authority and decision making in the sector away from the executive branch, where social protection was often housed in the office of the Vice President or even the First Lady.
59 United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016), p. 26. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 110 |
60 The report notes that the setup depicted in the diagram is based on the experiences of the Philippines, Cambodia, and others.
Box 2-4: Advances in coordination in Kenya through the Social Protection Secretariat While the NSPB is a core governance unit for the sector, the Social Protection Secretariat can sometimes play an outsized role in sector-wide coordination. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 86 |
This occurred, for example, in Kenya, where plans for the formal establishment of a National Social Protection Council laid out in the National Social Protection Policy of 2011 never took shape, pushing de facto responsibility onto the National Social Protection Secretariat (SPS).
Even though it lacked formal backing from Parliament, the SPS became the catalyst body for the eventual institutional consolidation in the sector and introduction of the universal pension. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 93 |
That said, the lack of formal backing for the Secretariat’s powers has occasionally been noted as a limitation to carrying out certain functions.
Source: Kenya case study in this report series.
2 High-level governance 20 Figure 2-6: Example of the organizational set-up for coordination at policy level Source: Reproduced from Figure 4 in United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and International Labour Organization (2016). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 100 |
Notably, the NSPB or equivalent sits atop the lead implementing authority, generally the Lead Ministry, which is responsible for coordinating technical working groups on specific policy areas, programmes, or thematic areas (such as children or older people).
These issue-based technical working groups can become vital spaces for dialogue and provide needed momentum behind social protection expansion.
This can occur even where no high-level national coordinating body exists for social protection writ large. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 97 |
For example, in Fiji, the national consultative process that preceded the National Policy on Ageing 2011-2015, led directly to effective policy change, and specifically to the expansion of the Social Pension Scheme, which today reaches nearly 90 per cent of older Fijians.61 The SPS was forged out of a collaborative national process, that included government agencies,62 NGOs, faith-based and civil society organizations, with technical assistance from international organizations.63 The process both reflected and precipitated good governance decisions, but it was carried out within a relatively narrow policy space on a specific issue area (ageing) and without a central authority charged with policymaking and planning for the ‘sector’. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 161 |
The Fiji experience demonstrates the potential for smaller issue-based consultative processes to drive larger changes in countries that have a weak history of sector-wide coordination efforts.
Lessons from targeted consultative processes can also be applied to future coordination efforts in other issue areas or as a template for initiating larger, sector-wide planning processes.
61 See the Fiji case study in this report series.
62 We have no information on which agencies were involved. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf | 101 |