| Mishnah Bava Batra | |
| משנה בבא בתרא | |
| merged | |
| https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Batra | |
| This file contains merged sections from the following text versions: | |
| -William Davidson Edition - English | |
| -https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1 | |
| Mishnah Bava Batra | |
| Chapter 1 | |
| <b>Partners who wished to make a partition [<i>meḥitza</i>] in</b> a jointly owned <b>courtyard build the wall</b> for the partition <b>in the middle</b> of the courtyard. What is this wall fashioned from? In <b>a place where it is customary to build</b> such a wall with <b>non-chiseled stone [<i>gevil</i>],</b> or <b>chiseled stone [<i>gazit</i>],</b> or <b>small bricks [<i>kefisin</i>],</b> or <b>large bricks [<i>leveinim</i>], they must build</b> the wall with that material. <b>Everything is in accordance with the regional custom.</b> If they build the wall with <b>non-chiseled stone, this</b> partner <b>provides three handbreadths</b> of his portion of the courtyard <b>and that</b> partner <b>provides three handbreadths,</b> since the thickness of such a wall is six handbreadths. If they build the wall with <b>chiseled stone, this</b> partner <b>provides two and a half handbreadths and that</b> partner <b>provides two and a half handbreadths,</b> since such a wall is five handbreadths thick. If they build the wall <b>with small bricks, this</b> one <b>provides two handbreadths and that</b> one <b>provides two handbreadths,</b> since the thickness of such a wall is four handbreadths. If they build <b>with large bricks, this</b> one <b>provides one and a half handbreadths and that</b> one <b>provides one and a half handbreadths,</b> since the thickness of such a wall is three handbreadths. <b>Therefore, if the wall</b> later <b>falls,</b> the assumption is that <b>the space</b> where the wall stood <b>and the stones belong to both of them,</b> to be divided equally. | |
| <b>And similarly with regard to a garden,</b> in <b>a place where it is customary to build a partition</b> in the middle of a garden jointly owned by two people, and one of them wishes to build such a partition, the court <b>obligates</b> his neighbor to join in building the partition. <b>But with regard to</b> an expanse of <b>fields [<i>babbika</i>],</b> in <b>a place where it is customary not to build a partition</b> between two people’s fields, and one person wishes to build a partition between his field and that of his neighbor, the court <b>does not obligate</b> his neighbor to build such a partition. <b>Rather, if</b> one person <b>wishes</b> to erect a partition, <b>he must withdraw into his own</b> field <b>and build</b> the partition there. <b>And he makes</b> a border <b>mark on the outer side</b> of the barrier facing his neighbor’s property, indicating that he built the entire structure of his own materials and on his own land. <b>Therefore, if the wall</b> later <b>falls,</b> the assumption is that <b>the space</b> where the wall stood <b>and the stones</b> belong only <b>to him,</b> as is indicated by the mark on the wall. Nevertheless, in a place where it is not customary to build a partition between two people’s fields, <b>if they made</b> such a partition <b>with the agreement of the two of them, they build it in the middle,</b> i.e., on the property line, <b>and make</b> a border <b>mark on the one</b> side <b>and on the other</b> side. <b>Therefore, if the wall</b> later <b>falls,</b> the assumption is that <b>the space</b> where the wall stood <b>and the stones</b> belong <b>to both of them,</b> to be divided equally. | |
| With regard to <b>one who surrounds another on three sides,</b> that is, he owns parcels of land on three sides of the other person’s field, <b>and he built a partition</b> on <b>the first, the second, and the third</b> sides, the court <b>does not obligate</b> the neighbor who owns the inner field to contribute to the construction of the partition if he does not wish to do so. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: If he arose and built a partition</b> on <b>the fourth</b> side of the field, the court <b>imposes upon</b> the owner of the inner field the responsibility to pay his share for <b>all</b> of the partitions. | |
| In the case of a dividing <b>wall</b> in a jointly owned <b>courtyard that fell,</b> if one of the owners wishes to rebuild the wall, the court <b>obligates</b> the other owner <b>to build</b> the wall with him <b>up to</b> a height of <b>four cubits.</b> If after the wall was built one of the neighbors claims he alone constructed it and the other did not participate in its building, the latter is nevertheless <b>presumed to have given</b> his share of the money, <b>unless</b> the claimant <b>brings proof that</b> the other <b>did not give</b> his part. The court <b>does not obligate</b> the reluctant neighbor to contribute to the building of the wall <b>higher than four cubits.</b> But if the reluctant neighbor <b>built another wall close</b> to the wall that had been built higher than four cubits, in order to set a roof over the room that was thereby created, the court <b>imposes upon him</b> the responsibility to pay his share for <b>all</b> of the rebuilt wall, <b>even though he has not</b> yet <b>set a roof over it.</b> Since he has demonstrated his desire to make use of what his neighbor built, he must participate in the cost of its construction. If the builder of the first wall later claims that he did not receive payment from his neighbor, the neighbor <b>is presumed not to have given</b> his share of the money, <b>unless he brings proof that he did</b> in fact <b>give</b> money for the building of the wall. | |
| The residents of a courtyard <b>can compel</b> each inhabitant of that courtyard <b>to</b> financially participate in the <b>building of a gatehouse and a door to the</b> jointly owned <b>courtyard. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel</b> disagrees and <b>says: Not all courtyards require a gatehouse,</b> and each courtyard must be considered on its own in accordance with its specific needs. Similarly, the residents of a city <b>can compel</b> each inhabitant of that city <b>to</b> contribute to the <b>building of a wall, double doors, and a crossbar for the city. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel</b> disagrees and <b>says: Not all towns require a wall.</b> With regard to this latter obligation, the mishna asks: <b>How long</b> must one live <b>in the city to be</b> considered <b>like</b> one of <b>the people of the city</b> and therefore obligated to contribute to these expenses? <b>Twelve months.</b> But if he <b>bought</b> himself <b>a residence in</b> the city, <b>he is immediately</b> considered <b>like</b> one of <b>the people of the city.</b> | |
| The court <b>does not divide a courtyard</b> at the request of one of the joint owners <b>unless there will be</b> in it four by <b>four cubits for this one and</b> four by <b>four cubits for that one,</b> i.e., this minimum area for each of the joint owners. <b>And</b> the court does <b>not</b> divide <b>a</b> jointly owned <b>field unless there is</b> space <b>in it</b> to plant <b>nine <i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for this one and nine <i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for that one. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The court does not divide a field <b>unless there is</b> space <b>in it</b> to plant <b>nine half-<i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for this one and nine half-<i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for that one. And</b> the court does <b>not</b> divide a jointly owned <b>garden unless there is</b> space <b>in it</b> to plant <b>a half-<i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for this one and a half-<i>kav</i></b> of seed <b>for that one. Rabbi Akiva says</b> that half that amount is sufficient, i.e., the <b>area required for sowing a quarter-<i>kav</i> of seed [<i>beit rova</i>].</b> Similarly, the court does <b>not</b> divide <b>a hall [<i>hateraklin</i>], a drawing room, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, an olive press, and an irrigated field unless there is enough for this one</b> to use the property in the usual manner <b>and enough for that one</b> to use the property in the usual manner. <b>This is the principle: Anything</b> for <b>which</b> when it <b>is divided,</b> each of the parts is large enough to <b>retain the name</b> of the original item, the court <b>divides</b> it. <b>But if</b> the parts will <b>not</b> retain the original name, the court <b>does not divide</b> it. <b>When</b> does this rule apply? It applies <b>when</b> the joint owners <b>do not both wish</b> to divide the item; when only one of the owners wishes to divide the property, he cannot force the other to do so. <b>But when both of them wish</b> to divide the item, <b>they may divide</b> it, <b>even</b> if each of the owners will receive <b>less than</b> the amounts specified above. <b>But</b> in the case of <b>sacred writings,</b> i.e., a scroll of any of the twenty-four books of the Bible, that were inherited by two people, <b>they may not divide</b> them, <b>even if both of them wish</b> to do so, because it would be a show of disrespect to cut the scroll in half. | |
| Chapter 2 | |
| <b>A person may not dig a pit close to the pit of another,</b> in order to avoid damaging the latter’s pit. <b>And</b> similarly, one <b>may not</b> dig <b>a ditch, nor a cave,</b> i.e., a covered pit, <b>nor a water channel, nor a launderer’s pond,</b> which is a pit used for washing clothes, <b>unless he distanced</b> all of these <b>three handbreadths from the wall of another and he plasters lime</b> on the place where there is water. <b>And one must distance the solid residue</b> of produce that has been pressed free of its oil, e.g., the refuse of olives from which oil has been squeezed, <b>and</b> animal <b>manure, and salt, and lime, and rocks three handbreadths from the wall of another,</b> as all these items produce heat and can damage the wall. <b>Or, alternatively, he</b> may <b>plaster</b> the wall <b>with lime</b> to prevent damage. <b>One must</b> likewise <b>distance seeds,</b> i.e., one may not plant seeds, <b>and</b> one may not operate <b>the plow, and</b> one must eliminate <b>urine, three handbreadths from the wall</b> of another. The mishna continues: <b>And one must distance a mill</b> from a neighbor’s wall by <b>three</b> handbreadths <b>from the lower stone</b> of the mill, <b>which is four</b> handbreadths <b>from the</b> smaller <b>upper stone</b> of the mill. <b>And</b> there must be a distance of <b>three</b> handbreadths <b>from the</b> protruding <b>base [<i>hakalya</i>]</b> of <b>an oven</b> until the wall, <b>which is four</b> handbreadths <b>from the</b> narrow <b>upper rim [<i>hassafa</i>]</b> of the oven. | |
| <b>A person may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space four cubits high above it,</b> i.e., between the top of the oven and the ceiling, to avoid burning the ceiling, which serves as the floor of the residence above. If <b>one was setting up</b> an oven <b>in the upper story, there must be a plaster floor beneath it,</b> which serves as the ceiling of the lower story, at least <b>three handbreadths</b> thick, so that the ceiling below does not burn. <b>And</b> in the case <b>of a stove</b> the plaster floor must be at least one <b>handbreadth</b> thick. <b>And if</b> he <b>causes damage</b> in any case, <b>he pays</b> compensation for that <b>which he damaged. Rabbi Shimon says: They said all of these measurements</b> to teach <b>only that if he causes damage he is exempt from paying,</b> as he took all reasonable precautions. | |
| <b>A person may not open a bakery or a dye shop beneath the storeroom of another, and</b> he <b>may not</b> establish <b>a cattle barn</b> there, as these produce heat, smoke, and odors, which rise and damage the items in the storeroom. The mishna comments: <b>In truth,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that in the case <b>of</b> a storeroom of <b>wine</b> the Sages rendered it <b>permitted</b> to set up a bakery and a dye shop beneath, as the heat that rises does not damage the wine. <b>But</b> they did <b>not</b> render it permitted to establish <b>a cattle barn,</b> because its odor damages the wine. If a resident wants to open <b>a store in</b> his <b>courtyard,</b> his neighbor <b>can protest</b> to prevent <b>him</b> from doing so <b>and say to him: I am unable to sleep due to the sound of people entering</b> the store <b>and the sound of people exiting. But</b> one <b>may fashion utensils</b> in his house and <b>go out and sell</b> them <b>in the market,</b> despite the fact that he is not allowed to set up a store in the courtyard, <b>and</b> the neighbor <b>cannot protest</b> against <b>him</b> doing so <b>and say to him: I am unable to sleep due to the sound of the hammer</b> you use to fashion utensils, <b>nor</b> can he say: I cannot sleep <b>due to the sound of the mill</b> that you use to grind, <b>nor</b> can he say: I cannot sleep <b>due to the sound of the children.</b> It is permitted for one to make reasonable use of his own home. | |
| <b>One whose wall was close to the wall of another may not</b> build <b>another wall close</b> to the neighbor’s wall <b>unless he distances it four cubits from</b> the wall of the neighbor. And one who desires to build a wall opposite <b>the windows</b> of a neighbor’s house must distance the wall <b>four cubits</b> from the windows, <b>whether above, below, or opposite.</b> | |
| <b>One must distance</b> his <b>ladder four cubits from</b> a neighbor’s <b>dovecote so that a mongoose will not</b> be able to <b>jump</b> from the ladder to the dovecote and devour the birds. <b>And</b> one must distance his <b>wall four cubits from a roof gutter, so that</b> the neighbor <b>can lean a ladder</b> in the empty space to clean and repair the gutter. <b>One must distance a dovecote fifty cubits from the city</b> to prevent doves from eating seeds in the town. <b>And a person should not establish a dovecote within his own</b> property <b>unless he has fifty cubits in each direction</b> between the dovecote and the edge of his property. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that one must have surrounding the dovecote the <b>area required for sowing four <i>kor</i></b> of seed on each side, which generally extends <b>as far as a dove flies</b> in a single flight. <b>And if one bought</b> the dovecote with the land, <b>he has the acquired privilege</b> of its use <b>even if</b> it has surrounding it only the <b>area required for sowing a quarter-<i>kav</i> of seed [<i>beit rova</i>]</b> around it, and he need not remove it from there. | |
| With regard to a dove <b>chick [<i>nippul</i>] that was found within fifty cubits</b> of a dovecote, <b>it belongs to the owner of the dovecote.</b> If it was found <b>beyond fifty cubits</b> from a dovecote, <b>it belongs to its finder.</b> In a case where it <b>was found between two dovecotes,</b> if it was <b>close to this one,</b> it belongs <b>to</b> the owner of this dovecote; if it was <b>close to that one,</b> it belongs <b>to</b> the owner of that dovecote. If it was <b>half and half,</b> i.e., equidistant from the two dovecotes, <b>the two</b> owners <b>divide</b> the value of the chick. | |
| <b>One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from the city, and</b> in the cases <b>of a carob tree and of a sycamore tree,</b> which have a great many branches, they must be distanced <b>fifty cubits. Abba Shaul says: Every barren tree</b> must be distanced <b>fifty cubits. And if the city preceded</b> the tree, as one later planted the tree alongside the city, he <b>cuts down</b> the tree, <b>and</b> the city <b>does not give money</b> to the tree’s owner in compensation. <b>And if the tree preceded</b> the city, which expanded after one planted the tree until it reached the tree, he <b>cuts down</b> the tree <b>and</b> the city <b>gives money</b> to its owner. If it is <b>uncertain whether this one was first or that one was first,</b> he <b>cuts down</b> the tree <b>and</b> the city <b>does not give money.</b> | |
| <b>One must distance a permanent threshing floor fifty cubits from the city,</b> so that the chaff will not harm the city’s residents. Furthermore, <b>a person should not establish a permanent threshing floor</b> even <b>on his own</b> property <b>unless he has fifty cubits</b> of open space <b>in every direction. And one must distance</b> a threshing floor <b>from the plantings of another and from</b> another’s <b>plowed field</b> far <b>enough that it does not cause damage.</b> | |
| <b>One must distance</b> animal <b>carcasses, and graves, and a tannery [<i>haburseki</i>],</b> a place where hides are processed, <b>fifty cubits from the city. One may establish a tannery only on the east side of the city,</b> because winds usually blow from the west and the foul smells would therefore be blown away from the residential area. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: One may establish</b> a tannery <b>on any side</b> of a city <b>except for the west,</b> as the winds blowing from that direction will bring the odors into the city, <b>and one must distance</b> it <b>fifty cubits</b> from the city. | |
| <b>One must distance from vegetables water in which flax is steeped,</b> because this water ruins them; <b>and</b> likewise one must distance <b>leeks from onions, and mustard from bees. And Rabbi Yosei permits</b> one not to do so in the case <b>of mustard.</b> | |
| <b>One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from a cistern, and</b> in the case <b>of a carob and of a sycamore tree,</b> whose roots extend farther, one must distance the tree <b>fifty cubits.</b> This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>whether</b> the cistern or tree <b>is</b> located <b>above or to the side</b> of the other. <b>If</b> the digging of <b>the cistern preceded</b> the tree, the owner of the tree <b>cuts down</b> the tree <b>and</b> the owner of the cistern <b>pays</b> him <b>money. And if the tree preceded</b> the cistern the owner of the tree need <b>not cut down</b> the tree. If it is <b>uncertain whether this came first or that came first,</b> the owner of the tree need <b>not cut down</b> the tree. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the cistern preceded the tree,</b> the owner of the tree need <b>not cut down</b> the tree. This is due to the fact <b>that this one digs in his own</b> property, <b>and that one plants in his own</b> property. | |
| <b>A person may not plant a tree near the field of another unless he distances it four cubits from</b> the field. This is the case <b>whether</b> he is planting <b>grapevines or any</b> kind of <b>tree.</b> If there <b>was a fence between</b> them, <b>this</b> one <b>may place,</b> i.e., plant, his grapevines or trees <b>close to the fence from here, and that</b> one <b>may place,</b> i.e., plant, his produce <b>close to the fence from there.</b> If the <b>roots were spreading into</b> the field <b>of another,</b> the owner of the field <b>may dig to a depth</b> of <b>three handbreadths</b> even if he severs those roots, <b>so that</b> they do <b>not impede</b> his <b>plow.</b> If he <b>was digging a cistern</b> in that spot, or <b>a ditch, or a cave,</b> and he came upon the roots of his neighbor’s tree, <b>he may cut downward</b> normally, <b>and the wood</b> from the roots <b>is his.</b> | |
| With regard to <b>a tree that leans into the field of another,</b> the neighbor <b>may cut</b> the branches <b>to the height of an ox goad</b> raised <b>over the plow,</b> in places where the land is to be plowed, so that the branches do not impede the use of the plow. <b>And</b> in the case <b>of a carob tree and</b> the case <b>of a sycamore tree,</b> whose abundance of branches cast shade that is harmful to plants, all the branches overhanging one’s property may be removed <b>along the plumb line,</b> i.e., along a line perpendicular to the boundary separating the fields. And if the neighbor’s field is <b>an irrigated field, all</b> branches of <b>the tree</b> are removed <b>along the plumb line. Abba Shaul says: All barren trees</b> are cut <b>along the plumb line.</b> | |
| With regard to <b>a tree that extends into the public domain, one cuts</b> its branches <b>so that a camel can pass</b> beneath the tree <b>with its rider</b> sitting on it. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> One cuts enough branches that <b>a camel loaded with flax or bundles of branches</b> can pass beneath it. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> One cuts <b>all</b> branches of <b>the tree that</b> extend into the public domain <b>along the plumb line,</b> so that they do not hang over the public area at all, <b>due to ritual impurity.</b> | |
| Chapter 3 | |
| With regard to the <b>presumptive ownership of houses; and</b> of <b>pits; and</b> of <b>ditches; and</b> of <b>caves,</b> which are used to collect water; <b>and</b> of <b>dovecotes; and</b> of <b>bathhouses; and</b> of <b>olive presses; and</b> of <b>irrigated fields,</b> which must be watered by people; <b>and</b> of <b>slaves; and all</b> similar property <b>that constantly,</b> i.e., throughout the year, <b>generates profits, their presumptive ownership</b> is established by working and profiting from them for a duration of <b>three years from day to day.</b> If the one in possession of the property can prove that he worked and profited from it for the previous three full years, there is a presumption that it belongs to him, and would remain in his possession if another were to claim that the property belonged to him or to his ancestors. With regard to <b>a non-irrigated field,</b> i.e., one that is watered by rain, in which produce grows during certain seasons during the year, <b>its presumption</b> of ownership is established in <b>three years, but they are not from day to day,</b> since the fields are not worked and harvested continually throughout the three-year period. <b>Rabbi Yishmael says: Three months</b> of possession <b>in the first</b> year, <b>three</b> months of possession <b>in the last</b> year, <b>and twelve months</b> of possession <b>in the middle, which are eighteen months,</b> suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: A month</b> of possession <b>in the first</b> year, <b>and a month</b> of possession <b>in the last year, and twelve months</b> of possession <b>in the middle, which are fourteen months,</b> suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. <b>Rabbi Yishmael said: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that eighteen months are required for a non-irrigated field, <b>said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to a white field [<i>bisdeh lavan</i>],</b> i.e., a grain field. <b>But with regard to a field of trees,</b> once <b>he gathered his produce, and</b> then <b>harvested his olives,</b> and then <b>gathered his figs, these</b> three harvests <b>are</b> the equivalent of <b>three years.</b> Since he harvested three types of produce, this is equivalent to having possessed the field for three years. | |
| There are <b>three</b> independent <b>lands</b> in Eretz Yisrael <b>with regard to</b> establishing <b>presumptive ownership: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee.</b> If the prior owner of the field <b>was in Judea and</b> another <b>took possession</b> of his field <b>in the Galilee,</b> or if he was <b>in the Galilee and</b> another <b>took possession</b> of his field <b>in Judea,</b> the possessor does <b>not</b> establish <b>presumptive ownership until</b> the one possessing the field <b>will be with</b> the prior owner <b>in one province. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The Sages <b>said</b> that establishing presumptive ownership requires <b>three years only in order that</b> if the owner <b>will be in Spain [<i>Aspamya</i>], and</b> another <b>possesses</b> his field for <b>a year,</b> people <b>will go and inform</b> the owner by the end of the next <b>year, and</b> the owner will <b>come</b> back <b>in</b> the <b>following year</b> and take the possessor to court. | |
| <b>Any possession that is not accompanied by a claim</b> explaining how the possessor became the owner <b>is not</b> sufficient to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership. <b>How so?</b> If the prior owner <b>said to</b> the possessor: <b>What are you doing in my</b> land? <b>And</b> the possessor <b>said to him</b> in response: I am in possession of the land <b>because no person ever said anything to me</b> about my being here, i.e., he states no valid claim as to why he would be the owner of the land, his mere use <b>is not</b> sufficient to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership. But if the possessor claimed: I am in possession of the land <b>because you sold</b> it <b>to me,</b> or: <b>Because you gave</b> it <b>to me as a gift,</b> or: Because <b>your father sold it to me,</b> or: Because <b>your father gave it to me as a gift,</b> these are valid claims to ownership. In these cases, his possession <b>is</b> sufficient to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership. <b>And one who comes</b> to claim the land <b>based on inheritance does not need a claim</b> explaining why his ancestors had a right to the land. <b>Craftsmen</b> who are in possession of items that they are repairing, <b>and partners, and sharecroppers, and stewards [<i>veha’apotropin</i>] do not have</b> the ability to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership with regard to property in their possession, as their possession is not indicative of ownership. Similarly, <b>a man does not have</b> the ability to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership <b>with regard to his wife’s property, and a wife does not have</b> the ability to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership <b>with regard to her husband’s property. And a father</b> similarly <b>does not have</b> the ability to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership <b>with regard to a son’s property, and a son does not have</b> the ability to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership <b>with regard to a father’s property.</b> A husband and wife, or son and father, use each other’s property freely. Possession is therefore not indicative of ownership. The mishna continues: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that one establishes the presumption of ownership after profiting from the property for a certain duration, with the exception of the above people, <b>said?</b> It is said <b>in</b> a case of one who <b>has</b> mere <b>possession</b> of the property, which does, in some cases, serve as proof of ownership. <b>But in</b> a case where another person <b>gives</b> one <b>a gift, or</b> there are <b>brothers who divided</b> their inheritance, <b>or</b> there is one who <b>takes possession of</b> the <b>property of a convert</b> who died without heirs and his property is now ownerless, as soon as one <b>locked</b> the door of the property, <b>or fenced</b> it <b>or breached</b> its fence even <b>a bit, this is</b> considered <b>taking possession</b> of the property, and it effects acquisition. | |
| If <b>there were two</b> witnesses <b>testifying on his behalf that</b> he, the possessor of the land, worked and <b>profited</b> from a field for <b>three years,</b> and therefore has presumptive ownership, <b>and they were found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, as it was proven that they were not present to witness the matter about which they had testified, they must <b>pay</b> the true owner of the field <b>the full</b> value of the field that they attempted, through their testimony, to remove from his possession, as it is written in the Torah: “Then shall you do to him, as he had planned to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If <b>two</b> witnesses testify that he worked and profited from the field <b>during the first</b> year, another <b>two</b> testify that he worked and profited from it <b>during the second</b> year, <b>and</b> another <b>two</b> testify that he worked and profited from it <b>during the third,</b> and all were found to be conspiring witnesses, payment of the value of the field to the owner is <b>divided among them.</b> If the testimony was given by <b>three brothers,</b> each of whom testify about one year, <b>and another</b> unrelated individual <b>joined with</b> each of the brothers as the second witness, <b>these are three</b> distinct <b>testimonies</b> and they are accepted by the court. If they were to be considered one testimony, it would not be accepted, as brothers may not testify together. <b>But they are one testimony for</b> the purpose of rendering them as <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, and the payment is divided among them. | |
| <b>These are</b> uses of property <b>that have</b> the means to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership, <b>and these are</b> uses of property <b>that do not have</b> the means to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership: If one <b>would stand an animal in a courtyard;</b> or if one would place <b>an oven, a millstone, or a stove</b> there; <b>or</b> if one <b>raises chickens</b> in a courtyard, <b>or places his fertilizer in a courtyard,</b> these actions <b>are not</b> sufficient to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership. <b>But</b> if one <b>constructed a partition ten handbreadths high to</b> contain <b>his animal, and similarly</b> if he constructed a partition <b>for</b> his <b>oven, and similarly</b> if he constructed a partition <b>for</b> his <b>stove, and similarly</b> if he constructed a partition <b>for</b> his <b>millstone;</b> or if one <b>brought chickens into the house, or</b> if he <b>fashioned a place</b> in the ground <b>for his fertilizer</b> that is <b>three</b> handbreadths <b>deep or three</b> handbreadths <b>high,</b> these actions <b>are</b> sufficient to establish the <b>presumption</b> of ownership. | |
| With regard to <b>a spout</b> protruding from one’s roof gutter draining water into another’s property, its owner <b>has no</b> means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use, <b>but</b> he does <b>have</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege with regard to its place,</b> as the Gemara will explain. With regard to <b>a gutter pipe</b> that traverses the length of the roof, one does <b>have</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use. With regard to <b>an Egyptian ladder,</b> which is small and portable, one <b>has no</b> means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use. <b>But with regard to a Tyrian</b> ladder, which is large and fixed in place, one does <b>have</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use. With regard to <b>an Egyptian window,</b> one <b>has no</b> means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use; <b>but with regard to a Tyrian</b> window, one does <b>have</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use. <b>What is</b> the defining feature of <b>an Egyptian window?</b> It is <b>any</b> window that is so small <b>that a person’s head is not able to fit inside it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> a window <b>has a frame, even though a person’s head is not able to fit inside it,</b> one does <b>have</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use. With regard to <b>a projection</b> emerging from the wall of one’s house, overhanging a courtyard, one <b>has</b> the means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use if it protrudes at least <b>as far as a handbreadth,</b> <b>and</b> the owner of the courtyard <b>can protest</b> its construction. If it protrudes <b>less than a handbreadth,</b> the owner of the house <b>has no</b> means to establish <b>an acquired privilege for its</b> use, <b>and</b> the owner of the courtyard <b>cannot protest</b> its construction. | |
| <b>A person may not open his windows,</b> i.e., build an opening in a wall to use as a window, <b>into a courtyard belonging to partners,</b> i.e., a courtyard in which he is a partner. If he <b>purchased a house in another,</b> adjacent <b>courtyard,</b> he <b>may not open</b> the house <b>into a courtyard belonging to partners.</b> If he <b>built a loft on top of his house, he may not open it into a courtyard belonging to partners. Rather, if he desired</b> to build a loft, he may <b>build a room within his house, or</b> he may <b>build a loft on top of his house, and open it into his house,</b> not directly into the courtyard. <b>A person may not open an entrance opposite</b> another <b>entrance or a window opposite</b> another <b>window toward a courtyard belonging to partners,</b> so as to ensure that the residents will enjoy a measure of privacy. If there <b>was a small</b> entrance <b>he may not enlarge it.</b> If there was <b>one</b> entrance <b>he may not fashion it</b> into <b>two. But</b> one <b>may open an entrance opposite</b> another <b>entrance or a window opposite</b> another <b>window toward the public domain.</b> Similarly, if there <b>was a small</b> entrance <b>he may enlarge it,</b> and if there was <b>one</b> entrance <b>he may fashion it</b> into <b>two.</b> | |
| One <b>may not form an</b> empty <b>space be-neath the public domain</b> by digging <b>pits, ditches, or caves. Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> it <b>permitted</b> for one to do so, provided that he places a covering strong enough that <b>a wagon laden with stones would</b> be able to <b>tread</b> on it without breaking it, therefore ensuring that the empty space will not cause any damage to those in the public domain. One <b>may not extend projections or balconies [<i>ugzuztraot</i>] into the public domain. Rather, if he desired</b> to build one he may <b>draw back into his</b> property by moving his wall, <b>and extend</b> the projection to the end of his property line. If one <b>purchased a courtyard in which there are projections and balconies</b> extending into the public domain, this courtyard <b>retains its presumptive status,</b> i.e., the owner has the acquired privilege of their use, and the court does not demand their removal. | |
| Chapter 4 | |
| One <b>who sells a house</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has not sold the gallery,</b> an extension built above or alongside the main building, <b>and</b> this is so <b>even if</b> the gallery is attached to the house and <b>opens into it. Nor</b> has he sold <b>the room behind</b> the house, even if it is accessible only from inside the house. He has <b>also not</b> sold <b>the roof when it has a parapet ten handbreadths high,</b> as such a roof is considered a separate entity and is therefore not included in the sale of the house. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the parapet <b>has the form of a doorway,</b> that is, if it consists of two upright posts with a beam crossing over them, then <b>even if</b> the parapet <b>is not ten handbreadths high,</b> the roof <b>is not sold</b> together with the house, unless it is specifically included in the sale. | |
| One who sells a house without specification has sold <b>neither the pit nor the cistern [<i>dut</i>], even if he writes for</b> the buyer in the bill of sale that he is selling <b>him the depth and the height</b> of the house, as anything that is not part of the house, like pits and cisterns, must be explicitly mentioned in the contract or else they remain in the seller’s possession. <b>And</b> therefore the seller <b>must purchase for himself a path</b> through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his, because he has sold the area of the house along with the house itself, and he no longer has permission to walk there. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say:</b> The seller <b>need not purchase for himself a path</b> through the buyer’s domain, as this is certainly included in what he has withheld for himself from the sale. <b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer in the bill of sale: I am selling you this house <b>apart from</b> the pit and the cistern, <b>he need not purchase for himself a path</b> through the buyer’s domain. Since the seller unnecessarily emphasized that the pit and the cistern are not included in the sale, he presumably intended to reserve for himself the right of access to them. If the seller kept the house, but <b>sold</b> the pit and the cistern <b>to another, Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The buyer <b>need not purchase for himself a path</b> through the seller’s domain to reach what he has bought. <b>But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path</b> through the seller’s domain. | |
| One <b>who sells a house has,</b> as part of the sale, <b>sold</b> also <b>the door, but not the key. He has sold the mortar that is fixed</b> in the ground, <b>but not the portable</b> one. <b>He has sold the</b> immovable <b>lower millstone [<i>ha’itzterobil</i>], but not the</b> portable <b>upper stone [<i>hakelet</i>],</b> the funnel into which one pours the grain to be ground. <b>And</b> he has sold <b>neither the oven nor the double stove,</b> as they are deemed movable. <b>When</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it, and everything that is in it,</b> <b>all these</b> components <b>are sold</b> as part of the sale of the house. | |
| One <b>who sells a courtyard</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has sold</b> with it <b>the houses, pits, ditches, and caves</b> found in the courtyard, <b>but</b> he has <b>not</b> sold <b>the movable property. When</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it and everything that is in it, all these</b> components <b>are sold</b> along with the courtyard, even the movable property. <b>Both</b> in <b>this</b> case, where he executes the sale without specification, <b>and</b> in <b>that</b> case, where he adds the phrase that includes the movable property, <b>he has not sold the bathhouse, nor</b> has he sold <b>the olive press that is in</b> the courtyard, as each is an entity with a discrete purpose and not an integral part of the courtyard. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One <b>who sells a courtyard</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has sold only the airspace,</b> i.e., the open space, <b>of the courtyard,</b> but nothing found in the courtyard, not even the houses. | |
| One <b>who sells an olive press</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has sold</b> with it <b>the <i>yam</i> and the <i>memel</i> and the <i>betulot</i>,</b> the immovable elements of the olive press. <b>But he has not sold</b> with it <b>the <i>avirim</i> and the <i>galgal</i> and the <i>kora</i>,</b> the movable utensils of the olive press. <b>When</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it and everything that is in it, all these</b> components <b>are sold</b> along with the olive press, even the movable utensils. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One <b>who sells an olive press has sold the <i>kora</i></b> as well, as it is the most fundamental element of the olive press. | |
| One <b>who sells a bathhouse</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has not sold</b> with it <b>the boards</b> that are placed on the floor, <b>nor</b> has he sold <b>the basins or the curtains [<i>habilaniyot</i>]. When</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it and everything that is in it, all these</b> components <b>are sold</b> along with the bathhouse. <b>Both</b> in <b>this</b> case, where he executes the sale without specification, <b>and</b> in <b>that</b> case, where he adds the phrase that he is selling everything that is in the bathhouse, <b>he has not sold the tanks of water, nor</b> has he sold <b>the storerooms for wood,</b> as an explicit sales agreement is required for these matters. | |
| One <b>who sells a city</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has sold</b> with it <b>the houses, the pits,</b> the <b>ditches and caves, the bathhouses and the dovecotes,</b> and <b>the olive presses and <i>beit hashelaḥin</i>,</b> as will be explained in the Gemara, <b>but</b> he has <b>not</b> sold <b>the movable property</b> in the city. <b>But when</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it and everything that is in it, even if there were cattle and</b> Canaanite <b>slaves in</b> the city, <b>all these</b> entities <b>are sold. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> One <b>who sells a city has sold</b> with it <b>the <i>santar</i>,</b> the meaning of which will be explained in the Gemara. | |
| One <b>who sells a field</b> without specifying what is included in the sale <b>has sold the stones</b> in the field <b>that are for its use, and the reeds in the vineyard that are for its use, and the produce that is</b> still <b>attached to the ground, and the cluster of reeds that</b> occupy <b>less than the area required for sowing a quarter-kav of seed [<i>beit rova</i>], and the watch station that is not plastered with clay, and</b> the young <b>carob tree that has not</b> yet <b>been grafted, and the untrimmed sycamore</b> that is still young. | |
| <b>But he has not sold</b> along with the field <b>the stones that are not</b> designated <b>for use</b> in the field, <b>and not the reeds in the vineyard that are not</b> designated <b>for its use, and not the produce that is</b> already <b>detached from the ground. When</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer: I am selling you <b>it and everything that is in it, all these</b> components <b>are sold</b> along with the field. <b>Both</b> in <b>this</b> case, where he executes the sale without specification, <b>and</b> in <b>that</b> case, where he adds the phrase that he is selling everything that is in the field, <b>he has not sold the cluster of reeds that</b> occupy <b>a <i>beit rova</i></b> or more, as they are considered a separate field, <b>and</b> he has <b>not</b> sold <b>the watch station that is plastered with clay, and not the carob tree that has been grafted, and not the sycamore trunk.</b> All of these entities are significant in their own right and have a status independent from that of the fields, and they are therefore not included in the sale of the field. In continuation of the previous mishna (68b) discussing one who sells a field, the mishna teaches that even if he says that he is selling it and everything that is in it, has sold <b>neither the cistern, nor the winepress, nor the dovecote, whether</b> it is <b>abandoned or utilized,</b> as these items are not part of the field itself. <b>And</b> the seller <b>must purchase</b> for himself <b>a path</b> through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva,</b> who holds that one who sells, sells generously; therefore, whatever is not explicitly excluded from the sale is assumed to be sold, and it is presumed that the seller did not retain for himself the right to the path that he requires to access his property. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> The seller <b>need not</b> purchase a path through the buyer’s domain, as it is assumed that since the seller withholds these items for himself, he also reserves a path to reach them. <b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when</b> the seller <b>says to</b> the buyer in the bill of sale that he is selling the field <b>apart from these</b> things, i.e., the cistern and the winepress, <b>he need not purchase for himself a path</b> through the buyer’s domain. Since these items would have been excluded from the sale even if he had said nothing, it is assumed that he also meant to reserve for himself the right to access them. But if the seller kept the field but <b>sold</b> the cistern and winepress <b>to another</b> person, <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The buyer <b>need not purchase for himself a path</b> through the seller’s domain to reach what he has bought, since a seller sells generously. <b>But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path</b> through the seller’s domain. <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that these items are excluded, <b>said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to one who sells</b> a field, <b>but with regard to one who gives</b> it away as <b>a gift,</b> it is assumed that <b>he gives all of it,</b> including everything found in the field. Similarly, with regard to <b>brothers who divide</b> their father’s estate among themselves, when they each <b>acquire</b> a <b>field</b> as part of their inheritance, <b>they acquire all of it,</b> including the items that would be excluded from a sale. So too, with regard to <b>one who takes possession of the property of a convert,</b> when <b>he takes possession of a field, he takes possession of all of it.</b> <b>One who consecrates a field has consecrated all of it. Rabbi Shimon says: One who consecrates a field has not consecrated</b> any of the items that are ordinarily excluded from a sale <b>except for the grafted carob tree and the sycamore trunk.</b> | |
| Chapter 5 | |
| <b>One who sells a ship has sold</b> along with it <b>the <i>toren</i>, and the <i>nes</i>, and the <i>ogin</i>, and all</b> of the equipment that is used for <b>directing it. But he has not sold the slaves</b> who serve as oarsmen, <b>nor the packing bags</b> that are used for transporting goods, <b>nor the <i>antikei</i></b> on the ship. <b>And when one said to</b> the buyer: You are purchasing <b>it,</b> the ship, <b>and all that it contains, all of these</b> latter elements <b>are</b> also <b>sold.</b> One who <b>sold a wagon [<i>hakkaron</i>] has not sold the mules</b> that pull the wagon. Similarly, if one <b>sold the mules, he has not sold the wagon.</b> One who <b>sold a yoke [<i>hatzemed</i>] has not sold the oxen,</b> and one who <b>sold the oxen has not sold the yoke. Rabbi Yehuda says: The</b> sum of <b>money indicates</b> what one has sold. <b>How so?</b> If the buyer <b>said to</b> the seller: <b>Sell me your yoke for two hundred dinars,</b> since <b>it is a known matter that a yoke is not</b> sold <b>for two hundred dinars</b> he clearly intended to purchase the oxen as well. <b>And the Rabbis say: The</b> sum of <b>money is not proof.</b> | |
| <b>One who sells a donkey has not sold its vessels,</b> i.e., its equipment, with it. <b>Naḥum the Mede says:</b> He has <b>sold its vessels. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> There are <b>times</b> when the vessels <b>are sold,</b> and there are <b>times</b> when <b>they are not sold. How so? If the donkey was before him and its vessels</b> were <b>on it, and</b> the buyer <b>said to him: Sell me this donkey of yours, its vessels are sold.</b> If the buyer said to him: <b>Is the donkey yours;</b> I wish to purchase it, <b>its vessels are not sold.</b> | |
| <b>One who sells</b> a female <b>donkey has sold</b> its <b>foal</b> along with it. But one who <b>sold a cow has not sold its young.</b> One who <b>sold a dunghill has sold its manure.</b> One who <b>sold a cistern has sold its water.</b> One who <b>sold a beehive has sold the bees</b> in it, and likewise one who <b>sold a dovecote has sold</b> the <b>doves.</b> <b>One who buys the produce of a dovecote from another,</b> i.e., the doves that will hatch over the course of the year in a dovecote, <b>must leave [<i>mafriaḥ</i>]</b> the <b>first</b> pair of doves from the <b>brood</b> for the seller. If one buys <b>the produce of a beehive,</b> i.e., all the bees produced from a beehive over the course of the year, the buyer <b>takes three swarms and</b> then the seller <b>renders</b> the bees <b>impotent,</b> so that they will stop producing offspring and instead produce only honey. One who buys <b>honeycombs must leave two combs.</b> If one buys <b>olive</b> trees <b>for felling, he must leave two shoots</b> for the seller. | |
| With regard to <b>one who buys two trees in the field of another, this</b> one has <b>not acquired</b> any <b>ground,</b> but only the trees. <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> He has <b>acquired</b> the <b>ground</b> under them. The mishna states a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>: If the trees <b>grew,</b> the owner of the field <b>may not cut down</b> their branches, despite the fact that their shade damages his field. <b>And that which grows out of the trunk</b> is <b>his,</b> i.e., it belongs to the owner of the tree, <b>but</b> that which grows <b>out of the roots</b> belongs <b>to the owner of the ground. And if</b> the trees <b>died,</b> their owner <b>has no</b> rights to the <b>ground</b> where the trees had stood. If one <b>bought three</b> trees, he has <b>acquired</b> the <b>ground</b> along with them. If <b>they grew,</b> the owner of the field <b>may cut down</b> their branches, as he sold a specific piece of land along with the trees, not his entire field. <b>And that which grows out of the trunk and out of the roots</b> is <b>his,</b> i.e., it belongs to the owner of the trees. <b>And if</b> the trees <b>died,</b> the owner of the trees still <b>has</b> possession of the <b>ground,</b> as it was sold along with the trees. | |
| <b>One who sells the head</b> of <b>a large domesticated animal has not sold</b> along with it <b>the forelegs,</b> as each part is considered important in its own right. All the more so, if one <b>sold the forelegs he has not sold the head.</b> Similarly, if one <b>sold the windpipe</b> and the lungs <b>he has not sold the liver,</b> despite the fact that they are sometimes attached, and if he <b>sold the liver he has not sold the windpipe</b> and lungs. <b>But in</b> the case of <b>small</b> domesticated animals, if one <b>sold the head he has sold the forelegs,</b> although if one <b>sold the legs he has not sold the head.</b> Likewise, if one <b>sold the windpipe</b> and lungs <b>he has sold the liver,</b> but if he <b>sold the liver he has not sold the windpipe</b> and lungs. | |
| There are <b>four</b> basic <b>cases with regard to sellers</b> and buyers. If the seller <b>sold him wheat</b> and said that the wheat was <b>good, and it is found</b> to be <b>bad, the buyer,</b> but not the seller, <b>can renege on</b> the sale. If the seller sold him what he thought was <b>bad</b> wheat <b>and it is found</b> to be <b>good, the seller can renege on</b> the sale but the buyer cannot. If he sold <b>bad</b> wheat <b>and it is found</b> to be <b>bad,</b> or <b>good</b> wheat <b>and it is found</b> to be <b>good, neither one of them can renege on</b> the sale, as the condition of the sale was met. If the seller sold <b>reddish-brown</b> wheat <b>and it is found</b> to be <b>white,</b> or <b>white</b> wheat <b>and it is found</b> to be <b>reddish-brown,</b> and similarly, if he sold <b>olive wood and it is found</b> to be wood <b>of a sycamore,</b> or he sold wood <b>of a sycamore and it is found</b> to be wood <b>of an olive</b> tree, or if the seller sold him <b>wine and it is found</b> to be <b>vinegar,</b> or <b>vinegar and it is found</b> to be <b>wine,</b> in all of these cases <b>both</b> the seller and the buyer <b>can renege on</b> the sale. Since the sale was for a different item than that which was delivered, the transaction can be nullified even if there was no mistake with regard to the price. | |
| This mishna discusses several methods of acquiring movable property. With regard to <b>one who sells produce to another,</b> if the buyer <b>pulled</b> the produce <b>but did not measure</b> it, <b>he has acquired</b> the produce through the act of acquisition of pulling. If <b>he measured</b> the produce <b>but did not pull</b> it, <b>he has not acquired</b> it, and either the seller or the buyer can decide to rescind the sale. <b>If</b> the buyer <b>is perspicacious</b> and wants to acquire the produce without having to pull it, and he wishes to do so before the seller could change his mind and decide not to sell, <b>he rents its place,</b> where the produce is located, and his property immediately effects acquisition of the produce on his behalf. With regard to <b>one who buys flax from another,</b> because flax is usually carried around <b>this</b> purchaser <b>has not acquired</b> it <b>until he carries it from place to place</b> and acquires it by means of the act of acquisition of lifting. Pulling the flax is ineffective. <b>And if it was attached to the ground, and he detached any amount,</b> he has <b>acquired</b> it, as the Gemara will explain. | |
| With regard to <b>one who sells</b> food or drink that has an established price, such as <b>wine and oil, to another, and</b> the price <b>rises or falls</b> and the buyer or the seller wishes to renege on the sale, <b>if</b> the price changed <b>before the measuring</b> vessel <b>is filled,</b> the merchandise still belongs <b>to the seller</b> and he can cancel the sale. <b>Once the measuring</b> vessel <b>is filled</b> the merchandise belongs <b>to the buyer,</b> and the seller can no longer cancel the sale. <b>And if there was a middleman [<i>sarsur</i>] between them</b> and <b>the barrel</b> belonging to the middleman, being used to measure the merchandise, <b>broke</b> during the transaction and the merchandise is ruined, <b>it broke for the middleman,</b> i.e., he is responsible for the ruined merchandise. The mishna teaches an additional <i>halakha</i> with regard to sales: <b>And</b> anyone who sells wine, oil, or similar liquids is <b>obligated,</b> after he transfers the liquid into the buyer’s vessel, <b>to drip for him three</b> extra <b>drops</b> from the measure. After he drips those three drops, if <b>he turned</b> the barrel on its side <b>and drained</b> out the last bits of liquid that it contained, this <b>belongs to the seller</b> and he is not required to give these last drops to the buyer. <b>And a storekeeper is not obligated to drip three drops,</b> because he is too busy to do this constantly. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If the sale occurs on <b>Shabbat eve as nightfall</b> arrives, one is <b>exempt</b> from dripping these three drops, as there is a need to complete the transaction before Shabbat begins. | |
| With regard to <b>one who sends his son to a storekeeper with a <i>pundeyon</i>,</b> a coin worth two <i>issar</i>, <b>in his hand, and</b> the storekeeper <b>measured oil for him for</b> one <b><i>issar</i> and gave him the</b> second <b><i>issar</i></b> as change, and the son <b>broke the jug and lost the <i>issar</i>, the storekeeper</b> must compensate the father, as he gave the jug and coin to one who is not halakhically competent. <b>Rabbi Yehuda exempts</b> him from liability, <b>as</b> he holds that the father <b>sent</b> his son <b>in order to</b> do <b>this,</b> i.e., to bring back the jug and coin. <b>And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda</b> with regard to a case <b>when the jug is in the hand of the child and</b> the <b>storekeeper measured</b> the oil <b>into it that</b> the <b>storekeeper</b> is <b>exempt</b> if the child breaks the jug. | |
| <b>A wholesaler [<i>hassiton</i>] must clean his measuring</b> vessels, which are used for measuring liquids such as oil and wine, <b>once every thirty days,</b> because the residue of the liquids sticks to the measure and reduces its capacity. <b>And a homeowner</b> who sells his goods must clean his measuring vessels only <b>once every twelve months. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matters are reversed.</b> In the case of one who is constantly using his vessels for selling merchandise the residue does not adhere to the measuring vessel, and therefore a wholesaler must clean his measures only once a year. But in the case of a homeowner, who does not sell as often, the residue adheres to the measuring vessel; therefore, he must clean them every thirty days. <b>A storekeeper,</b> who constantly sells merchandise in small quantities, <b>cleans his measuring</b> vessels <b>twice a week and cleans his weights once a week; and he cleans</b> the pans of <b>his scales after each and every weighing,</b> to ensure that no merchandise has adhered to the pans, thereby increasing their weight. | |
| <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that it is necessary to clean a measuring vessel, <b>said? With regard to moist</b> items, which are likely to adhere to the measuring vessels. <b>But with regard to dry</b> goods, which do not adhere to the measuring vessels, one <b>does not need</b> to clean his measuring vessels. <b>And</b> before adding the weights and merchandise the seller is <b>obligated to let</b> the pans of the scale that will hold the merchandise <b>tilt</b> an extra <b>handbreadth for</b> the buyer by adding a weight to that side. If the seller <b>weighed for him exactly,</b> i.e., with the scales equally balanced initially, instead of allowing the scales to tilt an extra handbreadth, <b>he must give</b> the buyer <b>additional amounts [<i>geirumin</i>],</b> an additional <b>one-tenth in</b> the case of <b>liquids</b> sold by weight, <b>and</b> an additional <b>one-twentieth in</b> the case of <b>dry</b> goods. The mishna continues to discuss the correct method of weighing: In <b>a place where they were accustomed to measure</b> merchandise in several stages <b>with a small</b> measuring vessel, <b>one may not measure</b> all the items at once <b>with</b> a single <b>large</b> measuring vessel. In a place where they measure <b>with</b> one <b>large</b> measuring vessel, <b>one may not measure with</b> several <b>small</b> measuring vessels. In a place where the custom is <b>to level</b> the top of the measuring vessel to remove substances heaped above its edges, <b>one may not heap</b> it, and where the custom is <b>to heap</b> it, <b>one may not level</b> it. | |
| Chapter 6 | |
| With regard to <b>one who sells produce to another</b> that is sometimes purchased for consumption and sometimes for planting, <b>and</b> the buyer <b>planted it and it did not sprout, and even</b> if he had sold <b>flaxseeds,</b> which are only occasionally eaten, the seller <b>does not bear</b> financial <b>responsibility for them,</b> i.e., he is not required to compensate the buyer. Since the buyer did not specify that he purchased the produce in order to plant it, the seller can claim that he assumed the buyer intended to eat it. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> If he had sold <b>seeds</b> for <b>garden</b> plants, <b>which are not eaten</b> at all, then the seller <b>bears</b> financial <b>responsibility for them,</b> as they were certainly purchased for planting. | |
| When selling a significant quantity of produce or a number of items, there is a possibility that there will be a certain proportion of impurities in it or that some of the product will be of substandard quality. The mishna delineates what proportion is considered acceptable, for which a buyer may not demand compensation. With regard to <b>one who sells produce,</b> i.e., grain, <b>to another, this</b> buyer <b>accepts upon himself</b> that up to <b>a quarter-</b><i>kav</i> of <b>impurities</b> may be present <b>in</b> each <b><i>se’a</i></b> of produce purchased. When purchasing <b>figs, he accepts upon himself</b> that up to <b>ten infested</b> figs may be present <b>in</b> each <b>hundred</b> figs purchased. When purchasing <b>a cellar</b> containing barrels <b>of wine, he accepts upon himself</b> that up to <b>ten</b> barrels of <b>souring</b> wine may be present <b>in</b> each <b>hundred</b> barrels purchased. When purchasing <b>jugs</b> of wine <b>in the Sharon</b> region, <b>he accepts upon himself</b> that up to <b>ten inferior-quality jugs [<i>pitasot</i>]</b> of wine may be present <b>in</b> each <b>hundred</b> jugs purchased. | |
| If one <b>sells wine to another and</b> then <b>it sours,</b> the seller <b>does not bear</b> financial <b>responsibility for its</b> loss. <b>But if it is known</b> of this seller <b>that his wine</b> always <b>sours, then this</b> sale <b>is a mistaken transaction,</b> i.e., one based upon false assumptions, as the buyer intended to purchase wine that would maintain its quality; therefore, the seller must reimburse the buyer. <b>And if</b> the seller <b>said to</b> the buyer: It is <b>wine</b> that is <b>spiced,</b> which is preserved and of lasting quality, that <b>I am selling to you,</b> then <b>he bears</b> financial <b>responsibility to provide him</b> with wine that will keep <b>until</b> the festival of <b><i>Shavuot</i>. And</b> if the seller said: I am selling you <b>old</b> wine, he is responsible to provide wine <b>from the previous year. And</b> if he said: I am selling you <b>aged</b> wine, he is responsible to provide wine that is <b>from three years</b> earlier. | |
| With regard to <b>one who sells a plot</b> of land <b>to another,</b> with the buyer intending to build a bridal house for his son or a widowhood home for his daughter on that plot, <b>and similarly,</b> with regard to a contractor <b>who receives a plot</b> of land <b>from another</b> under a commission <b>to build for</b> the owner on that land <b>a bridal house for his son, or a widowhood home for his daughter,</b> the terms of the transaction are a matter of dispute. The mishna presents the dispute: In the latter case, the contractor must <b>build</b> a building that is at least <b>four cubits by six</b> cubits in size, and similarly, in the case of the sale, the seller must provide a plot of land that can accommodate a building of that size; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> A structure of <b>this</b> size <b>is a cowshed,</b> and a bridal house or a widowhood home is larger than that. <b>One who wants to construct a cowshed builds</b> a structure at least <b>four cubits by six</b> cubits in size. The mishna delineates the standard dimensions for various other structures. <b>A small house</b> is <b>six by eight</b> cubits. <b>A large</b> house is <b>eight by ten</b> cubits. <b>A banquet hall [<i>teraklin</i>]</b> is <b>ten by ten</b> cubits. The standard <b>height</b> for each of these structures is <b>equal to</b> the sum of <b>half its length and half its width.</b> There is <b>a proof of the matter; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> The proportions are <b>like the building of the Sanctuary;</b> it was forty cubits wide and twenty cubits long and its height was thirty cubits, which is the sum of half the width and half the length. | |
| <b>One who has</b> ownership of <b>a cistern</b> located <b>beyond the house of another,</b> i.e., the cistern can be accessed only by entering the property of the other, and also has access rights to that cistern, <b>may enter</b> the house to access his cistern only <b>at a time when it is usual for people to enter, and may leave</b> only <b>at a time when it is usual for people to leave. And</b> in addition, <b>he may not bring his animal</b> into the house <b>and water</b> it <b>from his cistern; rather, he</b> must <b>fill</b> a pail with water from the cistern <b>and water</b> his animal <b>outside. And this</b> one, the owner of the cistern, <b>constructs for himself a lock</b> on the entrance to the cistern to prevent the homeowner from drawing water from it, <b>and that</b> one, the homeowner, <b>constructs for himself a lock.</b> | |
| <b>One who has</b> ownership of <b>a garden</b> located <b>beyond the garden of another,</b> and also has access rights to it, <b>may enter</b> his garden only <b>at a time when it is usual for people to enter, and may leave</b> only <b>at a time when it is usual for people to leave.</b> Furthermore, he <b>may not bring merchants into</b> his garden, <b>and he may not</b> enter the garden solely in order to use it as a passageway, to <b>enter from it into another field. And the</b> owner of the <b>outer</b> garden <b>may sow the path</b> leading to the inner garden. If the court <b>gave him</b> an access <b>path from the side</b> of the outer garden, <b>with the agreement of both of them,</b> he <b>may enter at</b> any <b>time he wants, and leave at</b> any <b>time he wants, and may bring merchants into</b> the inner garden. <b>But</b> he <b>may</b> still <b>not</b> enter the garden solely in order to <b>enter from it into another field.</b> In such a case, <b>neither this</b> one, the owner of the inner garden, <b>nor that</b> one, the owner of the outer garden, <b>is permitted to plant</b> that side path. | |
| In the case of <b>one who had a public thoroughfare passing through his field,</b> and he <b>appropriated it and</b> instead <b>gave</b> the public an alternative thoroughfare <b>on the side</b> of his property, the <i>halakha</i> is that the thoroughfare <b>that he gave</b> them, <b>he gave</b> them, and they may use it. <b>But</b> the original thoroughfare that he took <b>for himself has not reached him,</b> i.e., he cannot appropriate it for his personal use. The standard width of <b>a private path</b> is <b>four cubits.</b> If a field owner sells the right to pass through his field to an individual, without specifying the width of the path, he must provide him with a path four cubits wide. The standard width of <b>a public thoroughfare</b> is <b>sixteen cubits.</b> The width of <b>a king’s thoroughfare has no</b> maximum <b>measure,</b> as the king may appropriate whatever width thoroughfare he wishes. The width of the <b>path for</b> the burial procession to <b>a grave has no</b> maximum <b>measure.</b> With regard to <b>the</b> practice of <b>standing</b> and comforting the mourners following a funeral, <b>the judges of Tzippori said</b> that the standard requisite size is the <b>area required for sowing four <i>kav</i> of seed.</b> | |
| There is the case of <b>one who sells a plot</b> of land <b>to another</b> in order for him <b>to construct for himself</b> an underground <b>catacomb, and similarly</b> the case of a contractor <b>who receives a plot</b> of land <b>from another</b> under a commission <b>to construct for him a catacomb.</b> If the size of the catacomb was not specified, then <b>he should make the inside of</b> each burial <b>chamber four cubits</b> wide <b>by six</b> cubits long <b>and open up into</b> the chamber, by digging into its walls, <b>eight</b> burial <b>niches [<i>kukhin</i>]</b> in which the coffins will rest. <b>Three</b> niches should be opened up <b>from</b> the wall <b>here,</b> along the length of the chamber, <b>and three from there,</b> along the other side, <b>and two</b> niches <b>from</b> the wall <b>facing</b> the entrance. <b>And</b> these <b>niches</b> should be formed so that <b>their length</b> is <b>four cubits and their height</b> is <b>seven</b> handbreadths, <b>and their width</b> is <b>six</b> handbreadths. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: He should construct the inside of</b> each burial <b>chamber six cubits</b> wide <b>by eight</b> cubits long <b>and open up into</b> the chamber, by digging into its walls, <b>thirteen</b> burial <b>niches. Four</b> niches should be opened up <b>from</b> the wall <b>here,</b> along the length of the chamber, <b>and four from there,</b> along the other side, <b>and three</b> niches <b>from</b> the wall <b>facing</b> the entrance, <b>and one from the right of the entrance and</b> another <b>one from the left.</b> The mishna describes the general structure of the catacomb: <b>And he</b> must <b>fashion a courtyard at the entrance of the</b> burial <b>chamber</b> that should be <b>six</b> cubits <b>by six</b> cubits, which is <b>equal to the</b> combined <b>length</b> of <b>the bier</b> of the deceased <b>and those who bury him,</b> to ensure adequate room for the burial to take place. <b>And he</b> should <b>open up two</b> burial <b>chambers into</b> the courtyard, <b>one from here and one from there,</b> i.e., on opposite sides of the courtyard. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> He should open up <b>four</b> burial chambers, one <b>on</b> each of the courtyard’s <b>four sides.</b> <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything</b> is <b>dependent on</b> the nature of <b>the bedrock.</b> If the bedrock is hard and strong it will be able to accommodate more niches, which will be more closely packed together, with less bedrock between them. If the bedrock is softer, fewer and more sparsely spaced niches should be formed. | |
| Chapter 7 | |
| <b>If one says to another: I am selling you</b> a plot of <b>earth</b> of the size <b>required for sowing one <i>kor</i> of seed [<i>beit kor</i>],</b> and <b>there</b> on that plot <b>there were crevices</b> [<b><i>neka’im</i></b>] <b>ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not measured</b> together <b>with</b> the rest of the field. Rather, the buyer must be provided with land measuring a <i>beit kor</i> exclusive of those crevices or rocks. If the crevices or rocks measured <b>less than</b> ten handbreadths, <b>they are measured</b> together <b>with</b> the rest of the field. <b>But if</b> the seller <b>said to</b> the buyer: I am selling you a plot of <b>earth</b> that is <b>about</b> the size of <b>a <i>beit kor</i>,</b> then <b>even if there</b> on that plot <b>there were crevices deeper than ten handbreadths or rocks higher than ten handbreadths, they are measured</b> together <b>with</b> the rest of the field. | |
| If one says to another: <b>I am selling you</b> a plot of <b>earth</b> the size of <b>a <i>beit kor</i>, measured</b> precisely <b>with a rope,</b> and <b>he gave</b> him even <b>the slightest amount less</b> than what was stipulated, the seller <b>must deduct</b> the difference from the purchase price of the field and return money to the buyer. If <b>he gave</b> him even <b>the slightest amount more</b> than what was stipulated, the buyer <b>must return</b> the difference to the seller. <b>And if</b> the seller <b>said</b> to the buyer that he is selling him a <i>beit kor</i> of land <b>more or less,</b> then <b>even if he gave</b> him <b>a quarter</b><i>-kav</i> <b>per <i>se’a</i> less</b> than what was stipulated, <b>or he gave him a quarter</b><i>-kav</i> <b>per <i>se’a</i> more</b> that what was stipulated, i.e., he gave him one twenty-fourth more or less than what was required, <b>it is his.</b> The sale is valid, since the seller told the buyer in advance that he was not committing himself to precise measurements. If the difference is <b>greater than that</b> amount, <b>he must make a calculation,</b> and the party that suffered a loss must be compensated. If the buyer received too much land, so that he must now compensate the seller, <b>what does he return to him?</b> He returns <b>money,</b> i.e., he pays the seller for the surplus land. <b>And if</b> the seller so <b>wishes,</b> the buyer <b>returns</b> the surplus <b>land to him. Why</b> then <b>did</b> the Sages <b>say</b> that <b>he returns money to him?</b> They said this <b>in order to enhance the power of the seller,</b> and enable him to demand payment for the surplus land, rather than accept its return. <b>As, if the surplus in the field was an area required for sowing nine <i>kav</i></b> of seed, <b>and in a garden an area required for sowing a half-<i>kav</i></b> of seed, <b>or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, an area required for sowing a quarter</b>-<i>kav</i> of seed (see 11a), the buyer must <b>return the land</b> itself <b>to</b> the seller, and the seller cannot demand payment in money. <b>And</b> if the surplus is greater than a quarter-<i>kav</i> per <i>se’a</i>, <b>it is not only the quarter</b>-<i>kav</i> <b>that he returns; rather,</b> he returns <b>all of the surplus.</b> Since he is already required to make a refund, the refund must be made in the precise amount. | |
| If the seller says to the buyer: <b>I am selling you</b> a plot of land of a certain size <b>measured</b> precisely <b>with a rope more or less,</b> thereby attaching to the sale two contradictory stipulations; in this case, the words: <b>More or less, nullify</b> the words: <b>Measured</b> precisely <b>with a rope.</b> Accordingly, if the surplus did not exceed a quarter-<i>kav</i> per <i>se’a</i>, the sale is valid as is. Similarly, if the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you a plot of land of a certain size <b>more or less measured</b> precisely <b>with a rope,</b> the words: <b>Measured</b> precisely <b>with a rope, nullify</b> the words: <b>More or less,</b> since the principle is that in all cases, one should attend to the final expression; this is <b>the statement of ben Nanas.</b> If one sells a field to another, telling him that he is selling him a field measuring a <i>beit kor</i>, <b>with its</b> particular <b>demarcations and borders</b> that the seller specifies for the buyer, the field’s measurement is not treated in as exacting a manner as in a standard sale. Therefore, if it later turns out that the field was not precisely a <i>beit kor</i>, but the difference is still <b>less than one-sixth,</b> the field <b>is</b> the buyer’s, and the sale is valid as is. But if the difference is greater, e.g., one-quarter or one-fifth, then, <b>until</b> it is calculated at <b>one-sixth,</b> the seller <b>must deduct</b> the difference from the purchase price and return money to the buyer. | |
| <b>If one says to another: I am selling you half a field,</b> without specifying which half he is selling, <b>an assessment is made</b> of the field, which is then divided <b>between them, and</b> the buyer <b>takes half of</b> the seller’s <b>field.</b> If the seller says: <b>I am selling you the half that is on the southern side</b> of the field, <b>an assessment is made</b> of the northern and the southern sides of the field, which is then divided <b>between them, and he takes the half on the southern side. And he accepts upon himself</b> to provide <b>the space for the fence</b> between the two halves of the field out of his own property. He also accepts to provide out of his own property the space for the larger <b>ditch and the smaller ditch,</b> which are meant to keep animals out of the field. <b>And how</b> wide <b>is</b> the larger <b>ditch? Six handbreadths. And</b> how wide is <b>the smaller ditch? Three</b> handbreadths. | |
| Chapter 8 | |
| <b>There are</b> family members who both <b>inherit</b> from <b>and bequeath</b> to each other upon their respective deaths; <b>and there are</b> those who <b>inherit</b> from certain relatives <b>but do not bequeath</b> to them; and there are those who <b>bequeath</b> to certain relatives <b>but do not inherit</b> from them; and there are those who, despite being relatives, <b>do not inherit</b> from <b>nor bequeath</b> to one another. The mishna lists those referred to above. <b>And these</b> both <b>inherit and bequeath: A father</b> with regard to his <b>sons, and sons</b> with regard to their <b>father, and paternal brothers;</b> all <b>inherit</b> from one another <b>and bequeath</b> to each other. <b>A man</b> with regard to <b>his mother, and a man</b> with regard to <b>his wife, and sons of sisters,</b> i.e., nephews born to the sisters of the deceased, all <b>inherit</b> from their respective relatives <b>but do not bequeath</b> to them. <b>A woman</b> with regard to <b>her sons, and a woman</b> with regard to <b>her husband, and maternal uncles,</b> all <b>bequeath</b> to their respective relatives <b>but do not inherit</b> from them. <b>And maternal brothers,</b> despite being blood relatives, <b>do not inherit</b> from each other <b>nor</b> do they <b>bequeath</b> to one another, as they are not considered relatives for the purpose of inheritance. | |
| The <b>order</b> of precedence with regard to <b>inheritances is this:</b> The verse states: <b>“If a man dies, and has no son, then you shall pass his inheritance to his daughter”</b> (Numbers 27:8). This teaches that <b>a son precedes a daughter.</b> Additionally, <b>all descendants of a son precede a daughter. A daughter precedes the brothers</b> of the deceased. Additionally, the <b>descendants of a daughter precede the brothers</b> of the deceased. <b>Brothers</b> of the deceased <b>precede the uncles</b> of the deceased. Additionally, the <b>descendants of the brothers precede the uncles.</b> <b>This is the principle:</b> Concerning <b>anyone who precedes</b> another <b>with regard to inheritance, his descendants precede</b> the other as well, <b>and a father</b> who inherits <b>precedes all of his descendants.</b> | |
| <b>Zelophehad’s daughters took three portions</b> of land <b>in</b> the <b>inheritance</b> of Eretz Yisrael: <b>Their father’s portion</b> that he received <b>because he was among those who left Egypt; and his portion</b> that he received <b>with his brothers in</b> the <b>property of Hepher,</b> their father; <b>and</b> an additional portion that he received from Hepher <b>because he was a firstborn,</b> and a firstborn <b>takes two portions</b> of inheritance from his father. | |
| <b>Both the son and the daughter</b> of the deceased are included <b>in</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>inheritance. But</b> the difference is <b>that the</b> firstborn <b>son takes a double</b> portion <b>of the property of the father, and he does not take a double</b> portion <b>of the property of the mother. And</b> another difference is that <b>the daughters are sustained from the property of the father</b> after he dies, as it is a mandatory condition of their mother’s marriage contract that they are to be sustained even before the estate is disbursed to the children, <b>but the</b> daughters <b>are not sustained from the property of the mother,</b> which is all inherited by the sons. | |
| In a case of <b>one who says: So-and-so, my firstborn son, will not take a double</b> portion of my estate; or one who says: <b>So-and-so, my son, will not inherit</b> my estate <b>among his brothers, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah.</b> With regard to <b>one</b> on his deathbed <b>who apportions his property orally,</b> granting it to his sons as a gift, and he <b>increased</b> the portion given <b>to one</b> of his sons <b>and reduced</b> the portion given <b>to one</b> son, <b>or equated</b> the portion of <b>the firstborn to</b> the portions of the other sons, <b>his statement stands. But if he said</b> that they will receive the property not as a gift but <b>as inheritance, he has said nothing.</b> If he <b>wrote</b> in his will, <b>whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end,</b> that he is granting them the property <b>as a gift, his statement stands.</b> In a case of <b>one who says: So-and-so will inherit</b> from <b>me, in a case where there is a daughter,</b> or: <b>My daughter will inherit</b> from <b>me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah</b> concerning the order of inheritance. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said</b> this <b>about one fit to inherit</b> from <b>him, his statement stands, but</b> if it was <b>about one for whom</b> it was <b>not fit to inherit</b> from <b>him, his statement does not stand.</b> With regard to <b>one who wrote</b> a document granting <b>his property to others</b> as a gift <b>and left his sons</b> with nothing, <b>what he did is done,</b> i.e., it takes effect; <b>but the Sages are displeased with him. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If</b> he did so because <b>his sons were not acting properly, he is remembered positively.</b> | |
| <b>One who says: This is my son,</b> is <b>deemed credible.</b> One who says: <b>This is my brother,</b> is <b>not deemed credible</b> with regard to his other brothers’ obligation to share the inheritance with the subject of his statement. When one claims that this man is his brother, this claim is accepted with regard to the speaker’s own portion, <b>and</b> the man in question <b>takes</b> a share of their father’s inheritance <b>with him,</b> i.e., <b>from his portion.</b> If the man in question <b>dies,</b> the <b>property</b> he received from the father’s inheritance <b>shall return to its place,</b> i.e., to the possession of the brother who testified on his behalf, from whose portion he received a share. If <b>property came into</b> the man in question’s possession <b>from somewhere else,</b> other than from the father, and the man in question died, all of <b>the brothers of</b> the one who testified <b>shall inherit with</b> the one who testified, as according to his claim they too are the heirs of the deceased. With regard to <b>one who died, and a will written by a person on his deathbed [<i>dayetikei</i>] is found bound to his thigh,</b> which clearly indicates that it was written by him and was not forged, <b>this is nothing.</b> The will is not valid, as he did not give it to anyone, and he may have reconsidered. If <b>he transferred ownership of</b> the will to the designated recipient <b>through another</b> person, <b>whether one of the heirs</b> or <b>whether not one of the heirs, his statement stands.</b> | |
| A healthy person <b>who writes</b> a document granting <b>his property to his sons</b> in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, <b>must write:</b> I give the property <b>from today and after</b> my <b>death.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not</b> write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies. If <b>one writes</b> a document granting <b>his property to his son</b> from today and <b>after his death, the father cannot sell</b> the property <b>because it is written</b> as granted <b>to the son, and the son cannot sell</b> it <b>because it is</b> still <b>in the possession of the father</b> with regard to using the property and consuming its produce. If <b>the father sold</b> the property, <b>it is sold</b> to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce <b>until</b> the father <b>dies,</b> at which point it belongs to the son. If <b>the son sold</b> it during his father’s lifetime, <b>the purchaser has no</b> right to use it <b>until the father dies.</b> In continuation of the case discussed in the previous mishna of a father who wrote a document granting his property to his son but reserved the rights to the produce during his lifetime, the mishna states that <b>the father may detach</b> produce from the land <b>and feed</b> the produce <b>to whomever he wishes, and what he left detached</b> at the time of his death <b>belongs to</b> all the father’s <b>heirs,</b> not only to this son. If a person died and <b>left adult and minor sons, the adults are not provided for by</b> using funds of <b>the minors, and the minors are not sustained,</b> i.e., they do not receive food, <b>by</b> using funds <b>of the adults. Rather, they receive a share</b> of the inheritance <b>equally,</b> and each son sees to his needs from his own share. If <b>the adults married, the minors marry,</b> as the Gemara will explain. <b>But if the minors say: We are marrying in the same manner that you</b> adults <b>married</b> during our father’s lifetime, the court <b>does not listen to them. Rather, whatever their father gave</b> the adults in his lifetime <b>he gave</b> them, and the minors do not have the right to receive more than their share of the inheritance. | |
| Similarly, if the father <b>left adult and minor daughters</b> but no sons, in which case his daughters inherit the estate, <b>the adults are not provided for by</b> using funds <b>of the minors, and the minors are not sustained by</b> using funds <b>of the adults. Rather, they receive a share</b> of the inheritance <b>equally,</b> and each daughter sees to her needs from her share. If <b>the adult</b> daughters <b>married, the minor</b> daughters <b>marry,</b> as the Gemara will explain. <b>But if the minors say: We are marrying in the same manner that you</b> adults <b>married</b> during our father’s lifetime, the court <b>does not listen to them.</b> <b>This</b> following <i>halakha</i> <b>is a stringency with regard to daughters’</b> inheritance <b>vis-à-vis sons’</b> inheritance: The <i>halakha</i> is <b>that the daughters are sustained by</b> using funds <b>of the sons,</b> as stipulated in their mother’s marriage contract, <b>but they are not sustained by</b> using funds <b>of the</b> other <b>daughters.</b> | |
| Chapter 9 | |
| In the case of <b>one who died and left</b> behind both <b>sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit</b> the estate <b>and the daughters are provided with sustenance</b> from it according to the stipulations of the deceased’s marriage contract with their mother. With regard to <b>a small estate,</b> which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, <b>the daughters are provided with sustenance. And</b> if <b>the sons,</b> who receive in this case neither inheritance nor sustenance, have no other means with which to support themselves, <b>they</b> go and <b>request</b> charity <b>at the doors. Admon says,</b> rhetorically: <b>I lost out</b> just <b>because I am male?</b> Rather, he holds that the sons also receive sustenance. <b>Rabban Gamliel said: I see</b> as correct <b>the statement of Admon.</b> | |
| With regard to one who <b>left</b> behind <b>sons and daughters and a <i>tumtum</i>,</b> whose halakhic status as male or female is indeterminate, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: <b>When the estate is large the males direct</b> the <i>tumtum</i> <b>to the females</b> and exclude him from the inheritance, claiming that perhaps the <i>tumtum</i> is female. When the <b>estate is small, the females direct</b> the <i>tumtum</i> <b>to the males</b> and exclude him from receiving sustenance, claiming that perhaps the <i>tumtum</i> is male. With regard to <b>one who says: If my wife gives birth to a male</b> the offspring <b>shall receive</b> a gift of <b>one hundred dinars,</b> if <b>she</b> in fact <b>gave birth to a male,</b> the offspring <b>receives one hundred dinars.</b> If he says: If my wife gives birth to <b>a female</b> the offspring shall receive a gift of <b>two hundred</b> dinars, if <b>she</b> in fact <b>gave birth to a female,</b> the offspring <b>receives two hundred</b> dinars. If he says: <b>If</b> my wife gives birth to <b>a male</b> the offspring shall receive a gift of <b>one hundred dinars</b> and <b>if</b> she gives birth to <b>a female</b> the offspring shall receive a gift of <b>two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and</b> in fact <b>she gave birth to</b> both <b>a male and a female,</b> the <b>male</b> offspring <b>receives one hundred dinars</b> and the <b>female</b> offspring <b>receives two hundred</b> dinars. If <b>she gave birth to a <i>tumtum</i>,</b> the <i>tumtum</i> <b>does not receive</b> anything. <b>If he said: Whatever</b> offspring <b>my wife gives birth to shall receive</b> a gift of a certain sum, and she gave birth to a <i>tumtum</i>, the <i>tumtum</i> <b>receives</b> it. <b>And if there is no heir other than</b> the <i>tumtum</i>, the <i>tumtum</i> <b>inherits all</b> of the estate. | |
| In the case of <b>one who</b> died and <b>left</b> behind <b>adult and minor sons,</b> if <b>the adult</b> sons <b>enhanced the property, they enhanced</b> it so that the profit goes <b>to the middle,</b> i.e., it is distributed among all the heirs. <b>If</b> the adult sons <b>said</b> from the outset: <b>See that which</b> our <b>father left</b> behind; <b>we are</b> going to <b>engage</b> in business with our share of the property <b>and profit</b> from it, then <b>they enhanced</b> the property <b>for themselves. And similarly,</b> with regard to <b>a wife who enhanced the property</b> of her deceased husband, <b>she enhanced</b> it so that the profit goes <b>to the middle,</b> i.e., it is divided between her and the heirs. <b>If she said: See that which my husband left me; I am</b> going to <b>engage</b> in business with my share <b>and profit</b> from it, then <b>she enhanced</b> the property <b>for herself.</b> | |
| With regard to <b>brothers who were</b> also <b>partners,</b> and it occurred <b>that one of them was summoned to</b> public <b>service,</b> which is assessed per family, <b>he was summoned from the middle,</b> i.e., the profits or expenses of his service are divided among them. If one of the brothers <b>became sick and sought treatment, the</b> cost of the <b>treatment is</b> paid <b>from his own</b> resources. It was common practice for friends of a groom to give him gifts in order to help cover the expenses of the wedding feast. These gifts are known as gifts of groomsmen, and would be reciprocated in turn. While the groom and the groomsman were at times the recipient and the giver of the gifts, respectively, the gifts were at times provided by the father of the groomsman and received by the father of the groom. In the case of <b>brothers, some of whom brought gifts of groomsmen in their father’s lifetime,</b> which were provided by their father, when <b>the gifts of groomsmen are reciprocated</b> after the father’s death, when one of the brothers gets married, <b>they are reciprocated to the middle,</b> i.e., the gift is divided among the brothers. This is <b>because gifts of groomsmen are</b> a legal debt owed to the father, <b>collectible in court. But</b> with regard to <b>one who sends his friend jugs of wine or jugs of oil,</b> a reciprocal gift <b>is not collectible in court, because they are</b> considered <b>acts of kindness.</b> | |
| With regard to <b>one who sends presents [<i>sivlonot</i>] to his father-in-law’s house</b> following his betrothal, even if <b>he sent there</b> the sum of <b>ten thousand dinars and</b> subsequently <b>ate there a groom’s feast even</b> worth the value <b>of</b> a single <b>dinar,</b> if for any reason the marriage is not effected, the presents <b>are not collected</b> in return by the formerly betrothed man. If he <b>did not eat a groom’s feast there,</b> the presents <b>are collected,</b> as they were not an unconditional gift. If he <b>sent many presents</b> with the stipulation <b>that they return with her to her husband’s house,</b> i.e., to his own house, after the wedding, <b>these are collected</b> if the marriage is not effected. If he sent <b>a few presents for her to use while in her father’s house, they are not collected.</b> | |
| With regard to <b>a person on his death-bed who wrote</b> a deed granting <b>all of his property to others, and he reserved</b> for himself <b>any amount of land, his gift stands</b> even if he subsequently recovers. If <b>he did not reserve</b> for himself <b>any amount of land,</b> and he recovered, <b>his gift does not stand,</b> as the gift was conditional upon his death, since is it evident that he did not intend to leave himself without means of support. If one <b>did not write in</b> the deed that he was <b>on his deathbed,</b> and he then recovered and wished to retract the gift, and <b>he says: I was on my deathbed,</b> and since I recovered, I can retract the gift, <b>but</b> the recipients <b>say: You were healthy,</b> and the gift cannot be retracted, the giver <b>must bring proof that he was on his deathbed</b> in order to retract the gift. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant,</b> and since the property is in the possession of the giver, the recipients must bring proof that they have the right to receive it. | |
| With regard to <b>one who divides his property</b> between various recipients <b>by</b> means of <b>verbal</b> instruction, <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> Both in the case of <b>one</b> who is <b>healthy and</b> in the case of <b>one</b> who is <b>dangerously ill,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: <b>Property that serves as a guarantee,</b> i.e., land, <b>is acquired by</b> means of <b>money, by a deed</b> of transfer, <b>or by taking possession</b> of it. <b>And that</b> which <b>does not serve as a guarantee,</b> i.e., movable property, <b>can be acquired only by pulling.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Elazar: There was <b>an incident involving the mother of the sons of Rokhel, who was sick, and</b> who <b>said: My brooch shall be given to my daughter, and it is</b> valued <b>at twelve hundred dinars. And</b> this woman subsequently <b>died, and</b> the Sages <b>upheld her statement.</b> This indicates that a person on his deathbed can gift property without an act of acquisition. Rabbi Elazar <b>said to them:</b> That case was different; <b>the sons of Rokhel should be buried by their mother,</b> i.e., he cursed them. It is not possible to bring a proof from this incident, as these sons were wicked people. Consequently, when ruling in this matter the Sages did not act in accordance with the <i>halakha</i>, but allowed the mother of the sons of Rokhel to give this valuable piece of jewelry to their sister without an act of acquisition having been performed. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: On Shabbat, the</b> verbal <b>statement</b> of a person on his deathbed <b>stands, as</b> he <b>cannot write,</b> and the Sages instituted that he can effect the transaction verbally lest the inability to do so exacerbate his condition. <b>But</b> a verbal instruction does <b>not</b> stand if stated <b>on a weekday. Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to Shabbat,</b> the Sages <b>stated</b> that his verbal instruction is sufficient, even though writing is prohibited. One can infer <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> that the same applies <b>with regard to a weekday,</b> when writing is permitted. <b>Similarly, one can acquire</b> property <b>on behalf of a minor, but one cannot acquire</b> property <b>on behalf of an adult,</b> since he can perform the act of acquisition himself; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> The Sages <b>stated</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a minor,</b> and one may infer <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> that this also applies <b>with regard to an adult,</b> who is able to perform the act of acquisition himself. | |
| <b>A house collapsed on</b> a son <b>and upon his father, or upon</b> a certain person <b>and upon those</b> from <b>whom he stands to inherit,</b> and it is unknown who died first. If the son <b>bore</b> the responsibility to pay the <b>marriage contract of</b> his <b>wife and</b> to pay <b>a creditor,</b> and the son had no money with which to pay them except that which he might inherit from his father, and <b>the father’s heirs say: The son died first and afterward the father died,</b> and therefore the son did not inherit property from his father, <b>and the creditors say: The father died first and afterward the son died,</b> resulting in the son’s inheriting his father’s property, enabling the creditors to collect payment from the property even after the son’s death, there is a dispute with regard to how to rule. Since it cannot be determined who died first, <b>Beit Shammai say: They divide</b> the property between them so that the father’s heirs receive half of his property and the son’s creditors receive the other half. <b>And Beit Hillel say:</b> The <b>property</b> retains <b>its</b> previous ownership <b>status.</b> Since the last known owner of the property was the father, the property is given to the father’s heirs. | |
| If <b>the house collapsed upon</b> a husband <b>and upon his wife,</b> and it is unknown who died first, if the wife did not have any children from her husband, then the following claims arise: <b>The husband’s heirs say:</b> The <b>wife died first</b> and was inherited by her husband, <b>and afterward the husband died,</b> and therefore the husband’s heirs inherit both his and her property. The <b>wife’s heirs say:</b> The <b>husband died first and afterward</b> the <b>wife died,</b> and her heirs inherit the property that she brought with her to the marriage and the payment of her marriage contract. <b>Beit Shammai say: They divide</b> the property under dispute between them. <b>And Beit Hillel say:</b> The guaranteed <b>property</b> that the wife brought with her to the marriage retains <b>its</b> previous ownership <b>status.</b> The sum of the <b>marriage contract</b> remains <b>in the possession of the husband’s heirs,</b> since the marriage contract is collected from the husband’s property. <b>Property that is brought into and taken out</b> of the marriage <b>with her,</b> i.e., usufruct property that remains in the wife’s possession during her marriage, remains <b>in the possession of the heirs of the</b> woman’s <b>father.</b> | |
| If <b>the house collapsed on</b> a son <b>and upon his mother,</b> and it is unknown who died first, the following claims arise: The mother’s paternal family claims that the son died first, and therefore they inherit from the mother, and the son’s heirs claim that the mother died first and her son inherited from her, and therefore they inherit from the son. In this case, both <b>these</b> Sages <b>and those</b> Sages, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, <b>concede that they divide</b> the property between them. <b>Rabbi Akiva said: In this</b> case <b>I concede that the property</b> retains <b>its</b> previous ownership <b>status. Ben Azzai said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>We are</b> already <b>troubled by</b> those cases where Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel <b>are in disagreement. But</b> do <b>you come to bring upon us a disagreement</b> with regard to <b>the</b> case where they <b>agree?</b> | |
| Chapter 10 | |
| In <b>an ordinary document, its witnesses</b> are to sign <b>inside it,</b> i.e., on the written side of the paper. In a folded and <b>tied</b> document, <b>its witnesses</b> are to sign <b>on the back of it.</b> With regard to <b>an ordinary</b> document <b>whose witnesses wrote</b> their signatures <b>on the back of it,</b> and <b>a tied</b> document <b>whose witnesses wrote</b> their signatures <b>inside of it, both of these</b> are <b>not valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A tied</b> document <b>whose witnesses wrote</b> their signatures <b>inside of it</b> is <b>valid, because one can transform it into an ordinary</b> document by untying it. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything</b> is <b>in accordance with regional custom.</b> | |
| <b>An ordinary document</b> is rendered valid <b>by</b> its having at least <b>two witnesses, and a tied</b> document is rendered valid <b>by</b> its having at least <b>three</b> witnesses. With regard to <b>an ordinary</b> document <b>in which a single witness wrote</b> his signature, <b>and a tied</b> document <b>in which</b> only <b>two witnesses wrote</b> their signatures, <b>they are both not valid.</b> If <b>it is written in</b> a document that someone owes: <b>One hundred dinars, which are twenty <i>sela</i>,</b> which is internally inconsistent since there are twenty-five <i>sela</i> in a hundred dinars, the holder of the document <b>has</b> the right to claim <b>only twenty</b> <i>sela</i>, the lower of the two amounts. If it is written that he owes: <b>One hundred dinars, which are thirty <i>sela</i>,</b> the holder of the document <b>has</b> the right to claim <b>only one hundred dinars,</b> again the lower of the two amounts. If it is written that someone owes: <b>Silver dinars that are, and</b> the remainder of the text, where the number of dinars should be specified, <b>was erased,</b> the amount must be <b>no less than two</b> dinars, the lowest amount to which the plural word dinars can be referring. That is what the creditor can claim. Similarly, if it is written: <b>Silver <i>sela</i> that are, and</b> the remainder of the text <b>was erased,</b> the amount must be <b>no less than two</b> <i>sela</i>. And if it is written: <b>Darics that are, and</b> the remainder of the text <b>was erased,</b> the amount must be <b>no less than two</b> darics. If it is <b>written in</b> the document <b>above,</b> in an earlier place in the document, that someone owes <b>one hundred dinars, and below,</b> toward the end of the document, it is written that the amount owed is <b>two hundred</b> dinars, or if <b>above</b> it is written <b>two hundred</b> dinars <b>and below one hundred dinars, everything follows the bottom</b> amount. <b>If so, why</b> does one <b>write</b> the information in <b>the upper</b> part of the document at all? It is a safety measure, <b>so</b> that <b>if one letter is erased from the lower</b> part of the document, thereby rendering it illegible, the information <b>can be learned from the upper</b> part of the document. | |
| A scribe may <b>write a bill of divorce for a man</b> who requests one, <b>even if his wife is not with him</b> to give her consent when he presents his request, as there is no possibility that he will misuse the document. <b>And</b> a scribe may write <b>a receipt for a woman</b> upon her request, attesting to the payment of her marriage contract, <b>even if her husband is not with her</b> to give his consent. This is true <b>provided that</b> the scribe <b>recognizes</b> the parties requesting the document, to prevent misrepresentation. <b>And</b> for both documents, <b>the husband gives</b> the scribe his <b>wages.</b> A scribe may <b>write</b> a promissory <b>note for a debtor</b> who requests one, <b>even if</b> the <b>creditor is not with him</b> when he requests the document, <b>but</b> a scribe may <b>not write</b> a promissory note <b>for a creditor</b> who requests it <b>unless</b> the <b>debtor is with him</b> and consents. <b>And</b> it is <b>the debtor</b> who <b>gives</b> the scribe his <b>wages.</b> A scribe may <b>write a bill</b> of sale <b>for a seller</b> of a field who requests one <b>even if the purchaser is not with him</b> when he presents his request, <b>but</b> a scribe may <b>not write</b> a bill of sale <b>for a purchaser</b> who requests it <b>unless the seller is with him</b> and consents. <b>And</b> it is <b>the purchaser</b> who <b>gives</b> the scribe his <b>wages.</b> | |
| A scribe may <b>not write documents of betrothal and</b> documents of <b>marriage except with the consent of both</b> parties, the groom and the bride. <b>And</b> it is <b>the groom</b> who <b>gives</b> the scribe his <b>wages.</b> A scribe may <b>not write contracts for sharecroppers and contractors except with the consent of both</b> parties, i.e., the sharecropper or contractor and the one who hires him. <b>And</b> it is <b>the</b> sharecropper or <b>contractor</b> who <b>gives</b> the scribe his <b>wages.</b> A scribe may <b>not write documents</b> testifying to <b>arbitration</b> agreements <b>or any</b> other <b>court enactment except with the consent of both</b> parties to the litigation. <b>And both</b> parties <b>give</b> the scribe his <b>wages. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> The scribe <b>writes two</b> documents <b>for the two</b> parties, one <b>for this</b> one <b>by himself, and</b> one <b>for that</b> one <b>by himself.</b> | |
| In the case of a debtor <b>who repaid part of his debt and</b> with the agreement of the creditor <b>deposited</b> the promissory <b>note with a third party</b> serving as a trustee to ensure that the creditor would not collect the full amount, <b>and</b> the debtor <b>said to</b> the trustee: <b>If I have not given you</b> the balance <b>from now until such and such a day, give</b> the creditor <b>his</b> promissory <b>note,</b> thereby enabling him to collect the full amount stated on the note, if the stipulated <b>time arrived and</b> the debtor <b>did not give</b> the balance to the trustee, <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> The trustee <b>should give</b> the promissory note to the creditor, in accordance with the debtor’s stipulation. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The trustee <b>should not give</b> it, as the stipulation is void. | |
| In the case of a creditor <b>whose promissory note has become erased,</b> he should <b>produce witnesses</b> who remember the details of the document to testify <b>about it. And</b> they <b>come before the court, and they ratify</b> his promissory note <b>for him,</b> stating: The promissory <b>note of so-and-so was erased,</b> and it stated that a loan for such and such an amount took place <b>on such and such a date,</b> <b>and so-and-so and so-and-so were its witnesses.</b> The ratification document is signed, and it may be used as a replacement for the erased document. In the case of a debtor <b>who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The creditor <b>should exchange</b> the promissory note for a new one stating the current balance and tear up the first promissory note. <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> The creditor may keep the original promissory note, and he <b>should write a receipt</b> for the payment he has received and give it to the debtor as proof of his partial payment of the sum recorded in the old note. <b>Rabbi Yehuda said</b> with regard to this arrangement: It is <b>found</b> that <b>this</b> debtor <b>must</b> now <b>guard his receipt against</b> being destroyed by <b>mice,</b> as if he no longer has the receipt, he will have to pay the entire sum recorded in the promissory note. <b>Rabbi Yosei said to him: This</b> situation is <b>fitting for him;</b> it is better that this procedure be followed, <b>and the strength of</b> the claim of <b>this</b> creditor <b>not be weakened.</b> | |
| In a case where there are <b>two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bathhouse or an olive press</b> as an inheritance, if the father had <b>built</b> these facilities <b>for profit,</b> i.e., to charge others for using them, <b>the profit</b> that accrues after the father’s death is <b>shared equally</b> by the two brothers. If the father had <b>built them for himself</b> and for the members of his household to use, the poor brother, who has little use for these amenities, cannot force the rich brother to convert the facilities to commercial use; rather, <b>the rich</b> brother can <b>say to the poor</b> brother: Go <b>take servants for yourself, and they will bathe in the bathhouse.</b> Or he can say: Go <b>take olives for yourself, and come and make</b> them into oil <b>in the olive press.</b> If there are <b>two</b> people <b>who were</b> living <b>in one city, one named Yosef ben Shimon and the other</b> also <b>named Yosef ben Shimon, one cannot present a promissory note against the other,</b> as the purported debtor can claim: On the contrary, it is you who owed me money; you repaid me and I returned this note to you upon payment. <b>Nor can another,</b> third person, <b>present a promissory note against</b> either of <b>them,</b> as each one can claim: It is not I but the other Yosef ben Shimon who owes you money. If a document <b>is found among one’s documents</b> stating: <b>The promissory note against Yosef ben Shimon is repaid,</b> and both men named Yosef ben Shimon owed this man money, <b>the promissory notes of both of them</b> are considered <b>repaid,</b> as it cannot be determined which debt was repaid and which is outstanding. <b>What should</b> two people with the same name in a single city <b>do</b> in order to conduct their business? <b>They should triple</b> their names by writing three generations: Yosef ben Shimon ben so-and-so. <b>And if they have</b> identical <b>triple</b> names, i.e., not only their fathers but their grandfathers had identical names, <b>they should write an indication</b> as to which one is referred to, such as: The short Yosef ben Shimon or the dark Yosef ben Shimon. <b>And if they have</b> identical <b>indications, they should write:</b> Yosef ben Shimon <b>the priest,</b> if one of them is a priest. In the case of <b>one who says to his son</b> before dying: One promissory <b>note among</b> the promissory <b>notes</b> in <b>my</b> possession <b>is repaid, but I do not know which one, the</b> promissory <b>notes of all of</b> those who owe him money <b>are</b> considered <b>repaid,</b> i.e., they are not valid for collection, as it cannot be determined which debt was repaid and which are outstanding. If there were <b>found</b> among his papers <b>two</b> promissory notes owed <b>by one</b> person, the one for <b>the greater</b> amount <b>is</b> considered <b>repaid, and</b> the one for <b>the smaller</b> amount <b>is not</b> considered <b>repaid</b> and can be collected; the debtor is favored in the case of an uncertainty. <b>One who lends</b> money <b>to another with</b> the assurance of <b>a guarantor cannot collect</b> the debt <b>from the guarantor.</b> <b>But if</b> the creditor <b>said to</b> the debtor: I am lending the money <b>on the condition that I will collect</b> the debt <b>from whomever I wish,</b> i.e., either the debtor or the guarantor, he <b>can collect</b> the debt <b>from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the debtor has property</b> of his own, then <b>whether</b> in <b>this</b> case, where the creditor stipulated this condition, <b>or that</b> case, where he did not, he <b>cannot collect</b> the debt <b>from the guarantor.</b> <b>And so Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say:</b> If there is <b>a guarantor for a woman for her marriage contract,</b> from whom the woman can collect payment of her marriage contract instead of collecting it from the husband, <b>and her husband was divorcing her,</b> the husband <b>must take a vow</b> prohibiting himself from deriving any <b>benefit from her,</b> so that he can never remarry her. This precaution is taken <b>lest</b> the couple <b>collude [<i>kenunya</i>]</b> to divorce in order to collect payment of the marriage contract <b>from this</b> guarantor’s <b>property, and</b> then the husband <b>will remarry</b> his wife. | |
| <b>One who lends</b> money <b>to another by means of</b> a promissory <b>note can collect</b> the debt <b>from liened property</b> that had been sold to others by the debtor after the loan was granted. One who lends money <b>by means of witnesses,</b> without recording the loan in a promissory note, <b>can collect</b> the debt only <b>from unsold property.</b> If one <b>presents to</b> a debtor a document in the <b>handwriting of</b> the debtor stating <b>that he owes</b> money <b>to him,</b> but without witnesses signed on the document, the creditor <b>can collect</b> only <b>from unsold property.</b> In the case of <b>a guarantor whose</b> commitment <b>emerged after the signing of</b> the promissory <b>note,</b> the creditor <b>can collect</b> the sum only <b>from unsold property</b> of the guarantor. The mishna relates: <b>An incident</b> occurred where such a case <b>came before Rabbi Yishmael, and he said:</b> The creditor can <b>collect</b> the sum <b>from unsold property</b> of the guarantor, but not from liened property that he has sold to others. <b>Ben Nannas said to</b> Rabbi Yishmael: The creditor <b>cannot collect</b> the sum from the guarantor at all, <b>not from liened property</b> that has been sold, <b>nor from unsold property.</b> Rabbi Yishmael <b>said to him: Why</b> not? Ben Nannas <b>said to him:</b> If <b>one was strangling someone in the marketplace,</b> demanding repayment of a loan, <b>and another</b> person <b>found him</b> doing so and <b>said to</b> the attacker: <b>Leave him</b> alone <b>and I will give you</b> the money he owes, the person who intervened is <b>exempt</b> from paying, <b>as</b> the creditor <b>did not loan</b> the money in the first place <b>based on his trust</b> of the one who intervened. <b>Rather, who is a guarantor who is obligated</b> to repay the loan he has guaranteed? One who tells the creditor before the loan takes place: <b>Lend</b> money to <b>him, and I will give you</b> the repayment, <b>as</b> in that case the creditor <b>did loan</b> the money <b>based on his trust</b> of the guarantor. <b>And Rabbi Yishmael</b> thereupon <b>said: One who wants to become wise should engage in</b> the study of <b>monetary law, as there is no greater discipline in the Torah, and it is like a flowing spring. And,</b> he added, <b>one who wants to engage in</b> the study of <b>monetary law should attend to,</b> i.e., become a disciple of, <b>Shimon ben Nannas.</b> |