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Is summarizing copyrighted content by an AI "fair use"?

Stack Exchange has announced that it will introduce as a preview a new form of a question asking assistance : Through an updated semantic search experience, after a user searches or asks a question in the Stack Overflow search bar, we can leverage AI to provide a results summary that draws from multiple high-quality answers on Stack Overflow, in addition to providing the traditional search results list of questions and answers. A screenshot added shows a heading saying "Search results", followed by a summarizing text that is, as I understand it, produced by an Artificial Intelligence agent. Below that follows a list of links, with a header "Sources", that list the answers used to produce the summary. It is is relatively clear the list is covered under fair use. But what about that summarizing text? To produce it, the whole content of all listed answers needs to be processed, making it adapted material . Would this form of processing considered to be "fair use"? Note this is different from using large databases (in this case, the whole of the SO content) to train the AI. The already-trained AI processes a relatively small number of answers (maybe up to 50) to give a summary of their content. The practical difference this would make lies in the fact that answers on the Stack Exchange network are licensed by its authors by a CC-BY-SA license. While the attribution requirement is obviously fulfilled by the listing of the sources, the question remains if the share-alike clause needs to be respected. Must the result summary text be licensed also under a CC-BY-SA license? This Q&A does give a general overview how to determine fair use, but does not give an answer how to apply the tests (especially no. 3, substantiality) to the above case.

The standard answer to a question about fair use is to recite the fair use defense, with a heavy does of "it depends on whether...". There are non-legal questions which are outside of the scope of Law SE (the exact technology for extracting text summaries from a small database and how one might tweak the numbers in a huge database given an analysis of a small set of texts). The sample extract-texts are highly-probable word sequences when writing about the particular topic, therefore not demonstrably derived from any particular source. The required processing that SE does is in order to create this database is within the scope of the license granted to the network, so SE creating the summary is allowed. The summary texts are sufficiently associated with protected source text. If the content in question is "created by SE", then it cannot be copied without permission. However, protection only applies to human-created content which is protected by copyright. The fruits of bot-labor are not protected by copyright, therefore SE cannot sue users for copying text that they created with an AI. In other words, the generated text is outside the scope of copyright law and licensing requirements.

Is summarizing copyrighted content by an AI "fair use"?

Stack Exchange has announced that it will introduce as a preview a new form of a question asking assistance : Through an updated semantic search experience, after a user searches or asks a question in the Stack Overflow search bar, we can leverage AI to provide a results summary that draws from multiple high-quality answers on Stack Overflow, in addition to providing the traditional search results list of questions and answers. A screenshot added shows a heading saying "Search results", followed by a summarizing text that is, as I understand it, produced by an Artificial Intelligence agent. Below that follows a list of links, with a header "Sources", that list the answers used to produce the summary. It is is relatively clear the list is covered under fair use. But what about that summarizing text? To produce it, the whole content of all listed answers needs to be processed, making it adapted material . Would this form of processing considered to be "fair use"? Note this is different from using large databases (in this case, the whole of the SO content) to train the AI. The already-trained AI processes a relatively small number of answers (maybe up to 50) to give a summary of their content. The practical difference this would make lies in the fact that answers on the Stack Exchange network are licensed by its authors by a CC-BY-SA license. While the attribution requirement is obviously fulfilled by the listing of the sources, the question remains if the share-alike clause needs to be respected. Must the result summary text be licensed also under a CC-BY-SA license? This Q&A does give a general overview how to determine fair use, but does not give an answer how to apply the tests (especially no. 3, substantiality) to the above case.

It’s unlikely the summary is an infringement First, it can’t be a derivative or an original work because it has no human author. If it did have a human author, it would most likely be an original work, not a derivative. A summary of a copyrighted work is an original work of creation, not a derivative of the summarised work. Unless it’s a copy. The test for whether it’s a copy is if a substantial portion of the subject matter has been copied - a qualitative test. This is why I say it’s unlikely rather than being certain - some summaries will cross the line into being copies, but most won’t. As you observe, the CC-BY-SA gives SE the right to make copies anyway, so long as they give attribution, which they have. Because these summaries are machine generated, there is no copyright in them, so there is no need for a licence for anyone to use them. If they are infringing copies, then they are copies of the original work(s) that have already been licensed by the original authors.

Can someone be arrested for bus fare evasion?

Recently a woman was filmed being arrested for alleged fare evasion in front of her son in Croydon. She is anonymous but the footage has been all over the news and social media. Was there any legal basis for her arrest? If not what would the closest arguable legal basis for it have been?

UPDATE On 24/07/2023, Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist, a senior officer in the Metropolitan Police Service (the "Met"), released a statement giving the police's account of the incident and the "legal basis for her arrest" as requested by the OP. It is quite lengthy but I have resisted editing or redacting it to ensure the whole statement is available to those users (like me) that would rather not follow anonymous links. I have also resisted emboldening any of the text to allow users to make up their own minds without any unconscious bias on my part. Finally, I have left my original answer as is for posterity. The statement in full reads as follows (with the description of what caused the arrest bolded): “It is clear from the video that has been shared online that this incident was distressing for the woman involved and particularly for her child. We understand why it has prompted significant public concern and we want to be transparent about our position and the role of our officers. “Officers from the Met’s Roads and Transport Policing Command were supporting TfL ticket inspectors on a pre-planned operation in Whitehorse Road, Croydon on Friday, 21 July. As buses pulled into the stop, TfL inspectors would check the tickets of those onboard and also those getting off. “Anyone without a valid ticket is required to provide their details to a TfL inspector so a penalty fare can be issued. This is not a policing matter. Officers only become involved where details are not provided or where someone tries to leave when challenged. “The woman involved in this incident was asked to provide her ticket as she got off the bus, but did not do so. She was spoken to by a TfL inspector, then by a PCSO and finally by a police officer. She continued to try to walk away and did not provide her ticket for inspection. “She was arrested on suspicion of fare evasion and was handcuffed. When officers were able to take her ticket from her so that the TfL inspectors could check it, they were able to confirm it was valid. She was immediately de-arrested and her handcuffs were removed. “Throughout the incident, the child was comforted by a PCSO who immediately recognised his distress. Anyone seeing how upset he was would be moved by this, and we regret any impact it may have on him. “We recognise that the use of handcuffs can be a cause of concern, particularly given the context of this incident and the type of offence involved, but when a person is trying to physically leave an incident it is an option officers can consider. All uses of force must be proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. “Ticket inspection operations of this nature are difficult. They place police officers in direct confrontation with frustrated members of the public and could escalate what would otherwise be civil matters to a different level. “This incident raises questions about the extent to which officers are having to intervene in this way when supporting TfL in their operations. We will now work with TfL to ensure that the balance is right between officers tackling the most serious crime on the transport network and supporting their own operations to ensure revenue protection. “An initial review of the officers’ actions did not identify any conduct matters but we will reflect on it carefully, in discussion with communities locally, to urgently identify any opportunities to do things differently. “Given the level of community concern generated we believe it is in the public interest to voluntarily refer the matter to the Independent Office for Police Conduct to review.” ORIGINAL ANSWER YES A breach of the Regulations is a summary offence. As such, a suspect may be arrested if all the relevant conditions at section 24 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 are met. See section 67 Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981: Penalty for breach of regulations. Subject to section 68(1) of this Act [ i.e. reasonable excuse ], if a person acts in contravention of, or fails to comply with, any regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act and contravention thereof, or failure to comply therewith, is not made an offence under any other provision of this Act, he shall for each offence be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale. And see Paragraph 7 Public Service Vehicles (Conduct of Drivers, Inspectors, Conductors and Passengers) Regulations 1990: (2) ... every passenger on a vehicle being used for the carriage of passengers at separate fares shall– (a)declare, if so requested by the driver, inspector or conductor, the journey which he intends to take, is taking or has taken in the vehicle; (b)where the vehicle is being operated by the driver without a conductor– (i)save as provided in (ii) below, immediately on boarding the vehicle, pay the fare for the journey he intends to take to the driver or, where appropriate, by inserting in any fare-collection equipment provided on the vehicle the money or token required to pay that fare; or (ii)if otherwise directed by the driver, an inspector or a notice displayed on the vehicle, shall pay the fare for his journey in accordance with the direction; (c) where the vehicle is being operated by the driver with a conductor, pay the fare for the journey which he intends to take , is taking, or has taken in the vehicle to the conductor immediately on being requested to do so by the conductor or an inspector; (d)accept and retain for the rest of his journey any ticket which is provided on payment of a fare in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) or (c); (e) produce during his journey any ticket which has been issued to him either under sub-paragraph (d) or before he started his journey for inspection by the driver, inspector or conductor on being requested to do so by the driver, inspector or conductor ; and (f)as soon as he has completed the journey for which he has a ticket, either– (i)leave the vehicle; or (ii)pay the fare for any further journey which he intends to take on the vehicle. Paragraph 7 covers numerous alternative scenarios and as I have not seen the video, nor know the surrounding circumstances, I have emboldened the more likely alleged breach(es). I will review this if/when more details become available.

Can someone be arrested for bus fare evasion?

Recently a woman was filmed being arrested for alleged fare evasion in front of her son in Croydon. She is anonymous but the footage has been all over the news and social media. Was there any legal basis for her arrest? If not what would the closest arguable legal basis for it have been?

Remember the topic here is how you get arrested for fare evasion. Don't presume the fare evader is cooperating or producing ID on demand . This is shocking in certain countries where people predominantly drive cars, and are not familiar with high-density transit (even though their city has a new light rail system lol**). But it actually makes sense. There has been a change in transit fare collection in the last 25 years. Historically, you paid the driver or conductor, who visited every passenger to collect fares. Non-payment meant you didn't board (or on trains with roving conductors, were put off the train at the very next stop, and the schadenfreude of disrupting your journey satisfied the railroad). However, to save labor costs, they have switched to a model called "Proof of Payment", which the rider must obtain before boarding*. There is a small chance that a Fare Inspector may come through the vehicle. That reduces labor costs because the inspector need only visit occasionally: their existence motivates people to self-pay. When caught, a fare evader is guilty of much worse than evading one fare. It is likely they are a repeat offender, having successfully evaded 10-20 fares prior to this, depending on how often the fare inspectors come around. As such, the consequences must be more severe . Generally, a costly citation is issued of 20-100 times the absent fare. However, some people simply do not pay these citations. They become familiar to fare inspectors... and yes, the next step on the consequence chain is arrest . That may also be an outcome if the person refuses to identify themselves so a ticket could be issued, or refuse to present proof of payment. So it's not like "OMG someone forgot to validate, call MI5" - that is a false representation of what happened there. Or it could be exactly that, except the forgetter had an arrest warrant from another agency . Transit police do a disproportionate amount of gathering up fugitives. * This is done by a variety of methods: a ticket machine at the station where you buy the ticket immediately before boarding is the simplest, but is a flow constraint and maintenance headache. Sale of no-time-limit paper tickets, which can be carried indefinitely but must be time-stamped at a validation machine before boarding; valid for 2 hours after stamping. (They tried putting ticket and validation machines on the vehicle, but people congregate around them and validate only when they see an inspector.) Monthly passes, transit "credit cards" like Oyster that can be loaded with monthly passes or validations, or all sorts of things with phones and apps. ** And that gets extra super fun when they get a bit enlightened, and decide to give the Light Rail system an honest try. PoP is anything but intuitive, and not well explained, so they botch it... so where a normal company who wants their business might give them a gift basket or some swag, they get a $300 citation. That's it. You will never pry them out of the automobile for the rest of their lives .

Can someone be arrested for bus fare evasion?

Recently a woman was filmed being arrested for alleged fare evasion in front of her son in Croydon. She is anonymous but the footage has been all over the news and social media. Was there any legal basis for her arrest? If not what would the closest arguable legal basis for it have been?

When you are caught in the UK without a ticket, someone will ask for your identification. Give them your id, you will be sent off and receive a small fine in the mail. You don’t have to carry id. And you can refuse to show them an id, and refuse to pay. That will get you arrested. If you don’t want to get arrested in front of your children then you should do nothing to get you arrested. Obviously the presence of your children won’t stop an arrest. Around London you most likely have an Oyster card or you have registered your debit card or just your phone. You tap in when you go through the gates at your train station and tap out when you leave, so your fare is calculated at the end of the day. Sometimes a tap is missed, so you are seen as entering but not leaving or the other way and your fare is estimated. Once a month you can fix such an estimate on the website. London busses you tap in once and then can stay on the bus forever or get on other buses for 60 minutes. The current record is someone getting on 26 different buses in that time.

Why does an LLC have to be filed with most or all states but not an LP?

For example, in New Mexico, California, and Montana, one must create an LLC by filing through the state government. But as far as I know, none of those states require the same for a Limited Partnership. (Though if doing a certain type of business in the states, one probably has to register the LLC/LP but that's a different matter than what I'm asking.)

A limited partnership is a entity with one or more unlimited liability partners and one or more limited liability partners. This form of organization was popular, especially in the 1970s and 1980s in the oil and gas industry and in the real estate development industry, before it was possible to have partnership taxation with a fully limited liability entity (which became possible in the 1990s). The limited partnership form of organization allowed limited liability investors to receive passthrough taxation, because there were other unlimited liability investors. Unlike limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), some partners in a limited partnership (LP) have unlimited liability. These days true limited partnerships that are not limited liability limited partnerships are used mostly in estate planning, and residually by not very up to date lawyers in the oil and gas industry and real estate development industries where they used to be the preferred form of organization. One of the main reasons that they are used now is that state law typically decrees that limited partners have no voting or management rights, which is attractive to many promoters and family business owners who want to bring in additional investment or transfer economic ownership rights without ceding control. Historically, limited partnership organizational documents had to be filed in the real property records of the counties where the limited partnership owned real estate, because they were used predominantly for real estate investments and because unlimited liability general partnerships usually don't have to file organizational documents with the state because they are the default form of organization. Most states have since changed their laws so that limited partnership have to file organizational documents with the state level Secretary of State (see, e.g., Colorado , California , New York , and Texas ) rather than in county real property records. But a few states, by virtue of inertia, have not changed their laws and retained the historical requirement. Both the historic registration requirement in real property records and the modern requirement of Secretary of State filings flowed from the language of widely adopted model statutes for limited partnerships.

For an LLC that is not a C-Corp but taxed as a C-Corp (form 8832), does the EIN change when becoming real C-Corp?

Suppose someone creates an LLC and will not be raising funds now, and won't have other company owners yet (like a sole-proprietorship), but elects for the LLC to be taxed as a C-Corp with form 8832. Now, my understanding (if correct) is that this LLC is not a C-Corp, but only being taxed as one, and it will receive an EIN. If that previous sentence is correct, does becoming an actual C-Corp later (f.e. the owner decides to raise funds) require getting a new EIN? EDIT: Someone replied to me from another place saying that the EIN will change if I go from an LLC taxed as a C corp to formal C corp: Are they correct, or incorrect?

Now, my understanding (if correct) is that this LLC is not a C-Corp, but only being taxed as one, and it will receive an EIN. If that previous sentence is correct, does becoming an actual C-Corp later (f.e. the owner decides to raise funds) require getting a new EIN? Not quite right. The LLC is a C-Corp for tax purposes now and remains one after the change of state law form of organization. The LLC is not a corporation for state law purposes, however. C-corporation is a purely tax law term. An LLC is also not a corporation for the federal tax purposes of issuance of 1099s to it by third-parties. A new EIN is not required or allowed. It is necessary for the EIN to remain the same for tax characteristics of the original entity like amortization of formation costs, earnings and profits, inside basis of assets, outside basis of ownership interests, loss carry forwards, and the like to continue to the reorganized entity as part of the IRS tracking of those tax characteristics associated with the entity. The conversion from being an LLC to a corporation under state law is considered a tax free reorganization of the existing corporation under 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F), otherwise known as an "F reorganization" which is "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation, however effected". This form of entity conversion is tax free pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 351. But, for tax purposes, there is continuity of entity in an F reorganization. This F reorganization would probably be noted on the corporation's annual IRS Form 1120 (which has to be filed every year even for shell corporations that aren't funded), with a supplemental disclosure if there is no box to check for it and no separate form for it (I haven't done an F reorganization in eons and let the CPAs handle the forms involved). There are a few reasons to convert an LLC already taxed as a C-corporation to an actual state law corporation. As a general rule with narrow exceptions (e.g. for lawyers), third-parties do not have to issue at IRS Form 1099 information return to state law corporations that they make payments to for goods or services. Ultimately, this is just a rule, but it flows logically from the fact that either an S-corporation or a C-corporation must file IRS Form 1120 every year even if it has no activity, while a partnership must file IRS Form 1065 only in years when it has taxable activity. This rule was created before LLCs taxable as C-corporations existed and the relevant statute has not been amended to reflect the possibility of an LLC taxed as a C-corporation since doing so would not increase revenues and it impacts few taxpayers and is easily circumvented with an F reorganization by any taxpayer that cares. State law corporations have more default rules of law regarding governance and usually more case law regarding governance as well. There are slightly more formalities to follow, but the burden involved is pretty trivial. The default rule for state law corporations is that the shares are transferrable property so long as a public offering of the shares is not made when they are transferred. In contrast, the default rule in an LLC is that voting rights are not transferrable without the other members admitting the transferee as a member of the company, often by a unanimous vote. This makes it much easier to handle shareholder level transactions without a lawyer's involvement. Members of an LLC will usually assume that it is taxed under Subchapter K and will therefore expect to receive an annual Schedule K-1 to IRS Form 1065 (a partnership tax return), until they learn that it is taxed as a C-corporation. Making the state law entity match the tax law rule prevents this confusion.d One downside of the conversion is that it is easier for creditors to seize shares of a state law corporation than to seize membership interests in an LLC which is difficult or impossible (a " charging order ") is the usual remedy for a creditor of an LLC membership interest. UPDATE: The quoted material in the question is saying that if you have an LLC taxes as a partnership or sole proprietorship and it elected to be taxed as a C-corporation (while remaining an LLC) that it needs a new EIN, which is correct.

Did cops break the law by entering a rental home when invited by one party and denied by another?

This story brought up a bit of a debate on the legality of MD cops entering a rental home when one renter originally stated that they could not enter but another later said they could. As I understand it according to Georgia v Randolph 2004 usually this would be unlawful, though the cops apparently did it and got away with it in this case. I've seen two arguments for why it may have been lawful. after being invited by the second roommate the cop glared at the first and said excuse me, and the first relented and let the guard in. So one could argue when he let the cops in he had removed his opposition to a search. I'm not sure if the polices actions count as compelling the tenants moving or not. The cops arguable were invited in the home, but not given permission to search. They were then lead somewhere where they had plain sight evidence of a crime which authorized a search, but their original entering of the premise did not constitute a search and as such couldn't be an unlawful search. I'm wondering if either argument would hold up in court. Would the evidence found be considered lawfully obtained if a lawyer tried to get it thrown out due to the tenants original refusal to allow a search without a warrant?

Pursuant to Georgia v. Randolph , Possibility 1 diverges significantly from the linked description in an important way, in that according to the report continued to deny permission and stood in the way of officers until they got menacing. If resident 1 accedes to the permission granted by resident 2, there is consent and the search is legal. The court held that a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have absent any consent. Disputed permission is no match for the Fourth Amendment central value of “respect for the privacy of the home” Until permission is explicitly (unequivocally) withdrawn, permission to enter entails permission to walk around and see. Since the contraband was in plain sight, there was no need for additional consent to see the drugs in resident 1's room. Note that the 4th Amendment frames the matter in terms of searches, not "entries or searches" suggesting that you could consent to one but not to the other.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

united-states Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts. You should hire an attorney for a few hundred dollars, so the job is done right. Even if you do nothing and your children do nothing, your children are not obligated to pay your debts out of anything other than your own assets at death, unless they have personally guaranteed those debts. And, if they have personally guaranteed those debts, you can't release them, only the creditor can do that. If your children owe debts to you, you can release them from those debts. But, you should hire an attorney to do so in order to avoid ambiguity. The biggest question would normally be whether or not the discharge of debts owed by your children to you should count in the process of dividing up the assets you have left after the debts you owe to third-parties at death, or not.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

Not possible in germany To not inherit a debt in Germany, the heir has to declare to the state that they don't want to inherit this inheritance. This also excludes them from inheriting anything else though.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

In the united-states this happens automatically. Heirs are not responsible for the "debts of the father", unless they willingly co-signed or something really weird is going on. They just aren't. You don't need to do anything special here. However -- when a person dies, it forms an estate which contains the assets and debts of the person who died. That estate is a legal entity, is treated by the law much like a person, and it still owes the debt . Get it? The estate still owes the debt. Someone would be assigned as an "executor" of the estate, and they would be responsible for continuing to manage the estate's assets - e.g. cancel cable TV at the deceased's home, make sure the electric and heating bill continues to be paid so the pipes don't freeze (to preserve value in that home), and part of that duty is to settle that debt. The executor should be making a searching inventory of the estate's assets, using probate or (if trust documents were prepared in advance) those trust documents to get control of assets, figuring out the value of those assets and liquidating (selling) them or making other arrangements. The executor does not need to use "their own money" to do any of those things, but I could see an executor lending the estate money short-term while the executor gets access to bank accounts etc. The debts must be paid by the estate and the executor must see to that. If the estate has cash lying around, they should simply contact the lender and offer to settle the debts using the estate's money. (not their own). Otherwise, the executor will need to liquidate (sell off) assets to raise money to pay off the debts. It would be wise to be sensible about this; if a descendant absolutely has their heart set on a Hummel vase, and the will grants them that vase, the executor make every effort to satisfy the debts by selling other stuff than that - and likewise for anything an heir very much wants or is of sentimental value. That's just "being a decent human being" (and is independent from the question of whether the heir is; don't sink to their level). Note that the executor is responsible for keeping the estate from being looted via self-service from heirs. If someone takes home the deceased's new $1000 iPhone that should be sold/returned to settled debts, that's on the executor to retrieve it. And this is where the weird can happen. Anyone who "self-help collects" assets like that phone or that vase before the estate is settled - they are stepping in front of another creditor "out of turn", and they become personally liable for the estate's debts, at least up to the value of what they improperly took (and the legal fees of going after them). The more they take, e.g. if they choose to move into and live in a house with a mortgage, the weirder it gets. They can easily find "their" car repo'd and stuck with a bunch of costs. Etc. With that warning given, it is certainly possible for the estate to sell any sentimental item to an heir at bona-fide market value as established in a manner likely to be acceptable to a judge (i.e. such that a creditor will give up and say "yeah, that's pretty close to market value". For instance, eBay "completed items" might be a valid way; a reasonably advertised auction would be; an "auction" that was advertised to no one but family would not.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

The heirs must use the proper way in spain . As in (almost?) everywhere else, debts are part of the estate and your heirs cannot accept your assets without accepting your debts. But they can accept the inheritance "a beneficio de inventario"(*). This means that if there are debts, they are liable only to the extent of the assets received. For example, you leave them a $100,000 bank account. If they accept "a beneficio de inventario" and then someone claims your $1,000,000 debt, they will be forced to pay your creditor $100,000. If they accept the inheritance without using that formula, they might be forced to pay the full debt. And of course, heirs may refuse the inheritance. Which, even with this formula, makes sense if they are sure that there will be no surplus (if you know that the $100,000 assets come with $1,000,000 debt, there is nothing for the heir by accepting the state other than the work of dealing with the debtors, paperwork...). (*) The literal translation of the expression does make not sense, I would translate it as "for what is worth".

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

There is an easy way to do this - get yourself life insurance for the amount you owe. When you die it is used to pay off your debt. This does not work if the OP is likely to die as the premiums would be excessive.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

In Japan, the heirs get the debts along with the assets, but they can opt out of getting both if they want. Once the choice is made, it cannot be changed later even if new assets or debts are discovered. Details may be found in the Japanese Civil Code, Chapter IV - Acceptance and Renunciation of Inheritance

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

You need to specify your country. I doubt there is any place in the world where you can get rid of the debt on your death other than by buying life insurance. Your potential heirs will either inherit everything, including the debt, or in most countries they can refuse to take your inheritance and get nothing. If you give a country, someone will likely tell you what your kids need to do to refuse your inheritance. And of course if you have more property than debt then they will take the inheritance and have to pay off your debt. Say you have a house worth a million and owe 100,000 to the bank, there is no way for me to get the house without having to pay back the 100,000.

Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.

I think you are getting confused with your estate. When you die, your estate inherits the debts, not your children. And you cant sign yourself out of that. The trustee then has the responsibility of paying off the debts if they are able to. In India, traditionally, the eldest son inherits the debt of their father. But this is not legal, its in the ethical, cultural and religious sense now.

Revenue share contract w merged company

Company A developed Product A and has a revenue sharing agreement with Partner A (who sold Product A) to Client A. The revenue sharing agreement is open ended, i.e. does not expire. Enters Company B with Product B. Product A and Product B are essentially the same with Product B being a newer version of Product A. Company B acquires Company A who agrees to merge with Company B, with Company B being the surviving company. Company B intends to kill Product A and offer Product B instead to Client A. Question - what happens to the revenue share agreement with Partner A - does Partner A have the right to continue to invoice Company B for its revenue share... given that Product A was discontinued?

It depends on the contracts The "merger" Partner A has no contract with Company B, only with Company A. Therefore, Company B has no rights or obligations towards Partner A unless they are part of the merger or acquisition of Company A. So, there are two contracts that need to be considered, the original one between Partner A and Company A and the merger contract between Company B and Company A. If the merger contract does not assign or novate the original contract from Company A to Company B, then Company B has no contract with Partner A. They can safely ignore Partner A. If the original contract is assignable (the default position) and the merger contract makes that assignment (either with reference to the particular contract or in general with all ongoing contracts), then Company B has assumed the rights and obligations of the contract with Person A as a successor-in-interest. At the same time, Company A remains liable for the obligations under the contract if Company B defaults. That is, if Person A is wronged under the contract, they can sue Company A or Company B, or both. If the contract is not assignable, it must be novated. this substitutes Company B for Company A as if they had always been a party to the contract. However, Person A has to agree to the novation. Such an agreement may already be in the original contract. There are some contracts, notably personal services contracts, that are neither assignable nor novatable. In this case, a new contract would need to be negotiated. Whatever happens, the merger will not end the contract - Person A will still have a contract with Company A or Company B. If it is an actual merger rather than an acquisition, there will be a new Company C that might hold the contract. Notwithstanding, there is still a contract between someone and Person A. The original contract Question - what happens to the revenue share agreement with Partner A - does Partner A have the right to continue to invoice Company B for its revenue share... given that Product A was discontinued? Depends on what the contract says about discontinuing Product A. While the contract, as described, is indefinite, I doubt very much if it is perpetual. Hopefully, the people who drafted the original contract dealt with the very realistic contingency that Company A (or whoever now holds the contract) might want to stop selling Product A. After all, no product keeps being sold forever. If so, then do what the contract says. If it doesn't, then Company A (or whoever) is probably under no obligation to a) continue to sell Product A and b) pay Person A if they aren't.

Is it illegal for an American to go to North Korea?

Is it illegal for US citizens to travel to North Korea? It may currently be impossible and probably a very bad idea, but is it actually illegal?

Short Answer Is it illegal for US citizens to travel to North Korea? Yes (but see the "fine print" below). Long Answer There is : a US travel ban to North Korea for American citizens, as of July 2017. Now, Americans wishing to travel to North Korea must obtain a Special Validation Passport from the US Department of State, only issued under very specific circumstances, such as for journalists covering the region or for humanitarian aid workers. The Biden administration extended the ban , initially established by the Trump administration, on traveling to North Korea on a U.S. passport absent special approval: The ban makes it illegal to use a U.S. passport for travel to, from or through North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the DPRK, unless the document has been specially validated. Such validations are granted by the State Department only in the case of compelling national interest. The U.S. State Department confirms that this ban is still in place . It states that : Travel to, in, or through North Korea on a U.S. passport without this special validation may justify revocation of your passport for misuse under 22 C.F.R. § 51.62(a)(3) and may subject you to felony prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1544 or other applicable laws. The maximum criminal penalty if you use a U.S. passport to go to North Korea and then return and a charged with a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1544 are quite serious. You could be sent to prison for up to ten years for a first or second offense, or up to fifteen years if you have two prior convictions under this statute, and/or fined, even if you weren't a terrorist or drug dealer, although the actual sentence would probably be milder, if you were charged with a crime at all. The criminal statute reads as follows (with the pertinent parts in bold): Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, any passport issued or designed for the use of another; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses or attempts to use any passport in violation of the conditions or restrictions therein contained, or of the rules prescribed pursuant to the laws regulating the issuance of passports; or Whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or delivers a passport to any person, for use by another than the person for whose use it was originally issued and designed— Shall be fined under this title , imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. There are also many other North Korean sanctions (and keep in mind that North Korea is legally an "enemy" of the United States with which the U.S. is officially still at war and does not have diplomatic relations). The most recent of those, from 2017 , prohibits ships and aircraft owned by a "foreign person" which have been in North Korean in the last 180 days from entering the United States. The ban does not prohibit a dual citizen from traveling to North Korea on a passport from the person's other country of citizenship, nor does it prohibit U.S. citizens from entering North Korea without using a passport (although entering North Korea without a passport or visa probably violates North Korean law). Of course, North Korea also regulates entry of people into North Korea under North Korean immigration laws. I do not know whether or not it is legal under North Korean law for people to enter it with a U.S. passport. But, given that the only U.S. citizen to enter North Korea without a special U.S. visa authorizing the trip in the last seven years was arrested immediately after crossing into North Korea this week , it would appear that this is illegal under North Korean law as well.

Is there any requirement to state the specific reason for a conviction?

I'm asking specifically about the validity of a conviction based on an allegation of "failure to appear" for a traffic camera violation. Let's say that "Lizzie" receives a citation via USPS First Class mail for a traffic camera infraction. She responds in a timely manner by signing and submitting the "certificate of innocence" that was included with the citation. The form is returned via USPS First Class mail, the same method used by the court, within the 30 days required by the statute. § ORS 810.436 (7)(a) states: A registered owner of a vehicle may respond by mail to a citation issued under subsection (1) of this section by submitting, within 30 days from the mailing of the citation, a certificate of innocence swearing or affirming that the owner was not the driver of the vehicle and by providing a photocopy of the owner’s driver license. A jurisdiction that receives a certificate of innocence under this paragraph shall dismiss the citation without requiring a court appearance by the registered owner or any other information from the registered owner other than the swearing or affirmation and the photocopy. The citation may be reissued only once, only to the registered owner and only if the jurisdiction verifies that the registered owner appears to have been the driver at the time of the violation. A registered owner may not submit a certificate of innocence in response to a reissued citation. Let's say that over a year later Lizzie receives, (again via USPS...) a notification of conviction and default judgement against her for failure to appear. There is no specific reason given for the allegation, only a list of possibilities: You did not file a response to your citation. You filed a response, but your response was missing information and could not be processed. You did not appear at the court hearing you requested. Each one of these is rebuttable. ( even if proof of delivery is absent, a sworn statement of fact ought to override an unspecified, unsubstantiated, and anonymous allegation from the boilerplate language of a form letter, right? ) Is there a requirement for the court to state the specific reason for a conviction in order for the conviction to be valid ? How can one appeal if the basis of the conviction is unknown, with only suggested or possible reasons presented in multiple choice format?

How can one appeal if the basis of the conviction is unknown, with only suggested or possible reasons presented in multiple choice format? You just appeal by rebutting all those possible reasons, and concluding that there was no reason for the conviction whatsoever.

Do labor laws in the US forbid firing striking union members and hiring strikebreakers?

I'm particularly interested in the context of current WGA/SAG-AFTRA strike in the US, but this is a general question. If some business amid a union strike would terminate its agreement with a union, can it lay off the striking union members and hire non-union workers in their place? Are there any legal reasons they can't do that?

It depends on the nature of the strike . If a strike is "protected" (allowed under the NLRA), you cannot be fired but if the strike is illegal, you can be. If the strike is legal and was at least in part over an unfair labor practice, you must be immediately reinstated after the strike ends. If the strike is over economic issues, you might have been replaced with a permanent employee so you are placed on a preferential hiring list. However this right to reinstatement can be lost if you engage in serious misconduct in connection with the strike or picketing.

Do labor laws in the US forbid firing striking union members and hiring strikebreakers?

I'm particularly interested in the context of current WGA/SAG-AFTRA strike in the US, but this is a general question. If some business amid a union strike would terminate its agreement with a union, can it lay off the striking union members and hire non-union workers in their place? Are there any legal reasons they can't do that?

A business cannot unilaterally terminate a collective bargaining agreement (the "Contract"), nor terminate a union's representation of its members. A business may hire non-union employees to work during a work stoppage ("strike"), or may have exempt (management) employees perform the duties of the striking employees. The union employees must be re-hired after a legal strike is over. Caterpillar famously employed these tactics during a 17 month strike in the 1990s that was disastrous to the striking workers, who were forced to agree to significant concessions to end the strike.

Is there a copyright issue for TikTok or YouTube users who upload a short film on the app?

Uploading an entire movie without permission from the copyright holder is definitely an issue. Since everyone is doing it and nobody gets sued, can we assume it is not a copyright violation? (Not necessarily, right?) There should be more detail and complex lines over here. Please help me understand better.

No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads " There should be more detail and complex lines over here " What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?

Took a picture of a bus stop showing a poster of a well known soccer player

Is it OK to post a picture I took of a bus stop I saw displaying a poster of a well known soccer player? Since then, I've seen it in many bus stops throughout the city. Want to post it on my website. Can I do it without having to ask for permission to show it? Do I then have the ownership rights to the picture?

Is your picture of the bus stop or the poster? australia It is not a breach of copyright to incidentally capture copyright material in a photograph. It is a breach to substantially reproduce that copyrighted material.

Took a picture of a bus stop showing a poster of a well known soccer player

Is it OK to post a picture I took of a bus stop I saw displaying a poster of a well known soccer player? Since then, I've seen it in many bus stops throughout the city. Want to post it on my website. Can I do it without having to ask for permission to show it? Do I then have the ownership rights to the picture?

Details of copyright law depend on the country. Imagine Alice goes to a museum and takes a photo of a work of art. In many countries, she could not use that photo without the permission of the artist and/or the museum. Alice now goes outside the museum and takes a photo of the building. Possibly the same here, the architecture is protected just like the artwork inside. Now Bob visits the same country. Bob takes a selfie in front of the skyline of the city, showing the museum and other parts of the scenery. In some countries, it would be recognized that Bob's main intent is to take a picture of himself, with the architecture in the background. So that is different from Alice's case. Charlie takes the picture at the bus stop you mention. There are now two or three things to consider: Who holds the copyright of the poster? Possibly a photographer or an advertising agency. Does the sports star have any rights regarding his likeness? Here the rules depend on the country. It might matter how much the star is a public figure, and if the image does constitute a 'legitimate' news event. Possibly the star has signed a 'model release' for a very specific scope and payment. This release could not be circumvented by taking a picture of the picture. Could Charlie's picture be called a reproduction of the original poster, or is the poster clearly in the background.

Took a picture of a bus stop showing a poster of a well known soccer player

Is it OK to post a picture I took of a bus stop I saw displaying a poster of a well known soccer player? Since then, I've seen it in many bus stops throughout the city. Want to post it on my website. Can I do it without having to ask for permission to show it? Do I then have the ownership rights to the picture?

An advertisement on the street is part of Panoramafreiheit in germany German courts had to decide, if the decor of a ship, which moves around, is an exception to copyright - and that even ads on a bus fall under this. As a result, ads on a bus stop also qualify for the exception. In the judgment of the 27. April 2017 "I ZR 247/15 - AIDA Kussmund" the highest german court decided: Der u.a. für das Urheberrecht zuständige I. Zivilsenat des Bundesgerichtshofs hat heute entschieden, dass sich die sogenannte Panoramafreiheit auf Kunstwerke erstreckt, die nicht ortsfest sind. Ein Werk befindet sich im Sinne dieser Vorschrift [ § 59 Abs. 1 Satz 1 UrhG ] an öffentlichen Wegen, Straßen oder Plätzen, wenn es von Orten aus, die unter freiem Himmel liegen und für jedermann frei zugänglich sind, wahrgenommen werden kann. Diese Voraussetzung ist auch dann erfüllt, wenn ein Werk nicht ortsfest ist und sich nacheinander an verschiedenen öffentlichen Orten befindet. Ein Werk befindet sich bleibend an solchen Orten, wenn es aus Sicht der Allgemeinheit dazu bestimmt ist, für längere Dauer dort zu sein. Die Panoramafreiheit erfasst daher beispielsweise Werke an Fahrzeugen, die bestimmungsgemäß im öffentlichen Straßenverkehr eingesetzt werden. Dabei kann es sich etwa um Werbung auf Omnibussen oder Straßenbahnen handeln, die den Anforderungen an Werke der angewandten Kunst genügt. Das Fotografieren und Filmen im öffentlichen Raum würde zu weitgehend eingeschränkt, wenn die Aufnahme solcher Fahrzeuge urheberrechtliche Ansprüche auslösen könnte. Künstler, die Werke für einen solchen Verwendungszweck schaffen, müssen es daher hinnehmen, dass ihre Werke an diesen öffentlichen Orten ohne ihre Einwilligung fotografiert oder gefilmt werden. The I. Civil Senate of the Federal Court of Justice, which is responsible for copyright law, has today ruled that the so-called freedom of panorama extends to works of art that are not fixed in place. [...] According to [the relevant] provision, a work is considered to be located in public paths, streets, or squares if it can be perceived from places that are outdoors and freely accessible to everyone. This condition is also fulfilled if a work is not fixed in place and is located successively in different public locations. A work is considered to be permanently located at such places if, from the perspective of the public, it is intended to be there for an extended period. Therefore, the freedom of panorama also applies to works, for example, on vehicles that are intended for use in public road traffic. This could include advertisements on buses or trams that meet the requirements of works of applied art. If the photographing and filming of such vehicles could trigger copyright claims, it would overly restrict photography and filming in public spaces. Artists who create works for such purposes must, therefore, accept that their works may be photographed or filmed at these public places without their consent. The ship's exterior was deemed to be under Panoramafreiheit, and thus an exception to copyright, just as much as any other building facade, the decor of vehicles and rolling as well as standing pieces of advertisement. under German law, you can have exploitation and copyrights in your picture, but you do not gain any in the underlying work that you depicted in your picture.

Is a US company obligated to lay off visa holders first over citizens?

With the current big tech firing frenzy I'd like to know if a US company must prefer the US citizens over working visa holders during mass lay offs? Let's say if there are 2 software developers but one is an immigrant, a working visa holder and the second is a citizen. They are both at the same level, professionally. Must the American companies prioritize citizens in keeping them hired and let the foreign nationals go? I know when a company sponsoring working visas they must prove the need and show they aren't able to source workers inside the US prior to getting the visas for the foreign candidates. So logically, it might follow that they should also priorities the citizens in case of mass lay offs. Can a company be sued by a citizen for keeping the foreign national if he can prove the wrong doing? Is there any reference in working visas(i.e.H1B) application saying something that in case of mass lay offs these conditions can happen?

There is no law in the US that mandates hiring preference for US citizens over others. Such a preference would be "national origin discrimination" , which involves treating people (applicants or employees) unfavorably because they are from a particular country or part of the world, because of ethnicity or accent, or because they appear to be of a certain ethnic background (even if they are not). Preferring US citizens entails dispreferring others, such as some of those who come from another country. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate with respect to hiring, firing, or recruitment based upon an individual's citizenship or immigration status. An employer is however allowed, indeed required, to obey any overriding federal law, for example they can refuse to hire a person who has no legal right be being employed because their visa does not allow employment.

Ex bank account

My boyfriend at the time wanted me to go to town and get some money from his account. We live an hour from town so he gave me his card like always before. I had this check from a ad company that was in my car, at the time I didn't have a account so I got his money out of the atm. Then I proceeded to deposit my check like I have down before, they said it takes 24 to 48 hrs like always. Monday morning comes around and the bank called him and said they were closing his account for fraudulent check. All the bank did was close his account no charges. But today because we are not together he thinks he can press charges on me can he?

It will depend a lot on how you endorsed the check. You should have signed the check over to your ex, and put "For Deposit Only" in ex's account. I bet you didn't do anything like that, because that's fairly obscure banking stuff they don't teach in school anymore. But yes, taking money out of an account not yours, without permission and without replacing that money, will put you in legal jeopardy because you did not promptly replace the money /cover it / make it good. The substance of the crime is in not replacing the money promptly. I mean it's technically a crime if you do replace the money, but there is no mens rea or "guilty mind", which is an essential element of a crime. For instance, I one pumped gas and drove off. I got a phone call from a police detective, and I immediately high-tailed it back to the gas station and paid my bill with a hearty apology. Nothing more was made of it . Since your boyfriend now seems to be hostile, I would advise re-paying your boyfriend using a payment method which is tracked and leaves a paper trail - like a cashier's check from a bank where you have a relationship. If you pay the boyfriend cash, nothing proves you paid it! You might even consider opening your own account at the bank involved in this crisis. Then you can say "look, that wasn't a fraudulent check at all, I just used bad judgment sharing an ATM, and I'd like to deposit that check into my own account here". The banker may be able to do that relatively efficiently, since they will have the check (or a Check21 compliant certified copy). Expect that money to have a long hold on it.

Suppose I incorporate in Delaware. If I sell online services to ppl anywhere in the US, do I need to register as foreign in every state?

Suppose I incorporate in Delaware, with an agent that has a physical address there to represent the company in Delaware, and I live in California building an online service from home. First do I need to register as a foreign company in California just because I live there? If people from anywhere in the US pay for the online service, do I need to register as foreign corporation in every state where my users are located?

An entity is usually required to have a foreign corporation registration in as state when it "does business" in the state, although ultimately, this is mostly a matter of state law. The place where the work is done by its officers, employees, and agents would be one place where the company "does business", in this case California. California is the state which is the single most likely to aggressively enforce that requirement because it ties into its Franchise Tax Board tax collection agency's functions. Usually, it would be optional to register in a state where one sends goods or data via third-party instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g. telephones, the Internet, U.S. mail, FedEx), without having an office or employee or agent for the conduct of business there (following the now overruled standard of International Shoe related to general jurisdiction over corporations or other non-residents of a state and the now overruled Quill case regarding sales taxing jurisdiction). This is probably still good law in most cases, although the inquiry would be fact specific and would also depend upon the requirements of state law. The nature of the services provided over the Internet would also matter. For example, if you provided advice on Iowa law as a lawyer, from an office in California, to Iowa clients with no connection to California, you would probably be "doing business" in Iowa. But, if you simply allowed people to access your non-Iowa specific data base from Iowa that was maintained in California, you are probably not doing business in Iowa, even if you charge a fee for doing so.

How far do terms and conditions go to prevent sale of 3D printed models

It has already been made well clear that a 3D print is a derivative work and thus subject to any license it is obtained under. However, many designers include rules, such as you not being able to give away any 3D prints of their models, even as gifts. However, were I to unexpectedly die and not have informed any of my kin, and one of them took these models, would the same terms apply to them? Would they be able to sell them at, for example, a rummage sale? Similarly, many designers offer a commercial tier giving you permission to sell their models, however, in that case, would the buyer then have the right to sell the model by right of first sale?

First Sale Doctrine One of the rights a copyright holder has is an exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending". 17 U.S.C. 106(3). This is distinct from the reproduction right they have to make copies or derivative works. So, absent a licence, you can neither make the model nor distribute the model. If you are operating under a licence, that is a legally binding contract between you and the copyright holder. If it says that you cannot give away models, then doing so is a breach of that contract and a breach of copyright for which you could be sued. However, if you did sell or give away the model to a third party, that would be a lawful transfer of title in the object itself, even though it is a breach of contract. An innocent third party (i.e. one who has no knowledge of the breach) would be a lawful owner and could do what they liked with the object and, under the first-sale doctrine, is not bound by the licence. If you were to die, the executor or administrator of your estate would be bound by the terms of the licence (whether they knew about them or not), and if they breached them, they would be liable for that breach. If done in good faith, they could seek indemnity from the estate, but if the estate has insufficient funds or has been finalised, they would be personally liable. This is largely theoretical as the copyright owner would have to pursue their claim so promptly that unless they were actively monitoring the death notices for anyone who ever downloaded their model, they would miss their chance. A third party who received the physical model from the estate, either by buying it or being given it as a beneficiary, would own it and have first-sale doctrine rights. Although originally a US concept ( Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 1908), it is my understanding that the first-sale doctrine has since spread to all common-law countries. The last was Australia in Calidad v Seiko Epson [2020] HCA 41. ... the public ... The above analysis presumes that the people you are gifting the models to are "the public". This may not be the case where the models are distributed to a small circle of people like family and friends. In that case, there is no general right of distribution, and the copyright owner would need to rely on their right of reproduction. That is, in making the copy in order to give the object away, you breached the licence. This becomes problematic when your decision to give away the object happens later, possibly years later, possibly after you're dead. So, it might not be a problem for the executor or administrator to distribute the object to a beneficiary, but it might be a problem to sell it at a deceased-estate auction. The former is not distribution to "the public"; the latter is.

What is the smallest audience for a communication that has been deemed capable of defamation?

Descriptions of the criteria for defamation seem widely to describe any statement that is communicated to a third party as being defamatory if they are (broadly speaking) false and harmful. This seems to allow for the possibility that relatively private communications can be deemed defamatory, even though most high-profile defamation cases involve public statements accessible to large if not unlimited audiences. Of course, the smaller the audience the more unusual it seems likely to be that such a communication could meet the serious harm test of the Defamation Act 2013 , yet it doesn't seem impossible that the right lie told to the right person could yet have serious enough consequences to be defamatory. Are there examples of very small-scale communications that have been tested for their ability to defame? Tagged england-and-wales since inspired by Nigel Farage's claim that internal correspondence shared internally between employees of a bank were defamatory, but other jurisdictions welcome too.

canada Damages for libel have been awarded based on publication to a single individual. The elements of defamation are ( Grant v. Torstar Corp. , 2009 SCC 61 , para. 28): (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff . For an example, see Faryna v. Chorny , [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A). A letter "imputing unchastity" of a housekeeper was sent to a single individual.

What is the smallest audience for a communication that has been deemed capable of defamation?

Descriptions of the criteria for defamation seem widely to describe any statement that is communicated to a third party as being defamatory if they are (broadly speaking) false and harmful. This seems to allow for the possibility that relatively private communications can be deemed defamatory, even though most high-profile defamation cases involve public statements accessible to large if not unlimited audiences. Of course, the smaller the audience the more unusual it seems likely to be that such a communication could meet the serious harm test of the Defamation Act 2013 , yet it doesn't seem impossible that the right lie told to the right person could yet have serious enough consequences to be defamatory. Are there examples of very small-scale communications that have been tested for their ability to defame? Tagged england-and-wales since inspired by Nigel Farage's claim that internal correspondence shared internally between employees of a bank were defamatory, but other jurisdictions welcome too.

1 australia To be defamatory, the material has to be published (communicated by any means, including written, orally, pictorially) to at least one person other than the person making the claim. Arts Law Information Sheet Whether disclosure to one person can cause real harm depends on what is told and to whom. A lie to a (prospective) employer, University admissions officer, or security service vetting agent could be very damaging.

What is the smallest audience for a communication that has been deemed capable of defamation?

Descriptions of the criteria for defamation seem widely to describe any statement that is communicated to a third party as being defamatory if they are (broadly speaking) false and harmful. This seems to allow for the possibility that relatively private communications can be deemed defamatory, even though most high-profile defamation cases involve public statements accessible to large if not unlimited audiences. Of course, the smaller the audience the more unusual it seems likely to be that such a communication could meet the serious harm test of the Defamation Act 2013 , yet it doesn't seem impossible that the right lie told to the right person could yet have serious enough consequences to be defamatory. Are there examples of very small-scale communications that have been tested for their ability to defame? Tagged england-and-wales since inspired by Nigel Farage's claim that internal correspondence shared internally between employees of a bank were defamatory, but other jurisdictions welcome too.

Consider the case of Oscar Wilde v the Marquess of Queensbury, which has become a text-book example. Queensbury handed to a porter at Wilde's club a calling card on which he'd written something like 'To Oscar Wilde posing as a somdomite [sic].(accounts vary, but not relevantly.) The people actually seeing the comment on the card might have included only the porter but a potentially much larger audience was undoubted. The law being more stringent back in 1895, Queensbury was apparently arrested and criminally charged with libel. As it happens, Wilde lost his case on the grounds that Queensbury's remark was not defamatory but rather, true but even that is not relevant. What matters is that the card was left lying around the club and might have been seen by anyone picking it up and turning it over - or simply by the porter to whom it was actually given. That is to say, the audience need be no larger than 'perhaps one or more'. Of course if it was established that the audience was in fact no more than one, damages would be correspondingly small and but the degree of defamation is not the point: libel did or dit not occur.

I have mechanic licence from Turkey.Is there any way to easly get or change mechanic technician licenses in Alberta or Ontario

I am auto mechanic. I came to Canada 5 years ago I wanna do my job here but almost all places saying you need 4 years and every year 1500 hours and 8 weeks school than you can get license. Is there any way to avoid that time or make it Less with my turkish mechanic license and experience? Thank you .

In Ontario, you can apply for a Trade Equivalency Assessment. Skilled Trades Ontario’s Trade Equivalency Assessment is the first step towards obtaining a Certificate of Qualification for experienced workers who have not completed an Ontario apprenticeship but who have equivalent skills and experience. The Trade Equivalency Assessment determines whether you can challenge the certifying exam for a trade. If successful in the exam, you would pay a fee to be issued a Certificate of Qualification in that trade. In other words, this is a certification that you've gained practical skills and have enough work experience (which I would expect to be about four years , since that's what's required for people starting from scratch via the Ontario apprenticeship system.) You then also have to take a certifying exam. In Alberta, you can apply for the Trades Qualifier - Work Experience program. For an Automotive Service Technician, this requires: A minimum of 72 months AND 9,360 hours of work experience. A successful theory exam. A Trades Competency Verification (TCV) [a practical exam — ed.]

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

It is an unquestioned pre-American axiom, expressed in Latin as actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea ("the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty") which has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since at least the 17th century. It is thus presupposed in all criminal proceedings. It's not that a person only commits a crime with free will, it's that it is not deemed to be a crime if there is no free will. A person can be held at gunpoint and required to commit a criminal act: the person does indeed have free will to choose to be killed rather than commit the act, but the act is legally excused since dying is never held to be the only acceptable alternative to committing an otherwise-criminal act.

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

canada Conduct that is involuntary (in the sense of having no conscious control or awareness of one's actions) "cannot be criminal" ( R. v. Brown , 2022 SCC 18 ): To deprive a person of their liberty for that involuntary conduct committed in a state akin to automatism — conduct that cannot be criminal — violates the principles of fundamental justice in a system of criminal justice based on personal responsibility for one’s actions.

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I don't see how any legal system, US,or otherwise, could work without the assumption of free will. Defendant: I don't have free will, so I can't be held responsible for my actions. Judge: I don't have free will either, so I'm going to have to sentence you.

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

wisconsin I found the following in State v. Vinson , 269 Wis. 305 - Wis: Supreme Court 1955: The instruction of which appellant complains does no more than inform the jury of the well-known rule that one is presumed to intend the natural and reasonable consequences of his acts but that the presumption may be rebutted. "... there are certain presumptions which react against accused, such as the presumption of sanity, considered below in sec. 584, of knowledge of the law, see infra sec. 586, and that a person intends the natural and reasonable consequences of his acts, ..." 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, p. 893, sec. 579. I don't know that it's possible to intend to do something without free will, so I think these presumptions also imply a presumption of free will. The citation to a law encyclopedia would seem to indicate that these presumptions come from common law, and not from any particular statute (if the presumptions came from statute, they'd cite the statute instead.)

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I may be wrong, but it sounds like the question is flawed in that it makes inaccurate assumptions... namely; our legal system specifically addresses free will. It does not. To operate effectively we assume a person cannot be found guilty of committing a crime unless they did so with the ability to make a choice. From a recent ruling: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus KAHLER v. KANSAS CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS No. 18–6135. Argued October 7, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020 from page 3, paragraph 1 Defining the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness requires balancing complex considerations, among them the workings of the brain, the purposes of criminal law, and the ideas of free will and responsibility. This balance should remain open to revision as new medical knowledge emerges and societal norms evolve. Seems pretty clear they address the question you ask here?

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

Even if we were like machines or primitive animals, just reacting to the input we get in a deterministic fashion, the justice system still makes sense. It is clear that punishment has effect, and that people like to avoid punishment, no matter whether this a free choice or just wired into our brain. So I see no reason why Free Will is a necessary assumption.

Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A "universal and persistent" foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. " Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System " However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?

After some reflection, I have theorized that where it is "officially" stated that the American criminal justice system presumes that defendants commit crimes with free will is found in the U.S. Constitution: To clarify, a necessary component of something being a crime (in the U.S.) is that the alleged crime was done with free will. More specifically, the official stating of such is found in the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. My reasoning for this is derived from the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." As such, if there is something to be learned about how the American legal system works, it should be able to be derived from the U.S. Constitution. Although the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not explicitly detail how free will is presumed to exist within those who have committed a crime in the land of the U.S., case law [such as United States v. Grayson 438 U.S. 41 (1978)] explicates this matter. Furthermore, common law tradition of free will being a component of a crime having been committed is codified in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than explicitly argued. So, two things: As part of guaranteeing due process, it's required that for something to qualify as a crime, it must have been committed via free will. (It's not fair to consider otherwise) As part of due process, it is presumed that all persons have free will. Answer: The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

In California, simply spectating a "sideshow" is illegal (jailtime/fine). Is this constitutional?

In the Bay Area, there is a problem called "sideshows", where youths do dangerous stunts with cars (like donuts) on public streets, usually at an intersection (example video) . California, wanting to crackdown on this, has put out increasingly harsh laws. But some of these laws seem to have gone over the line to me. For example, I heard on ABC news that it is now illegal to spectate or record a sideshow. It is punishable by up to 6 months in prison or a $1000 fine. But doesn't this violate the Constitution, or some personal freedom? If a random passerby happens to see cars doing donuts, and stops to rubberneck (just watch), or even record, can that really be made illegal? I'm no expert in law or the constitution, but it just seems like an overreach to me... Perhaps it violates the First Amendment, which includes the right to gather and disseminate information about matters of public interest, if I recall correctly. Edit: link to an article about the law being passed on April 30, 2019

The San Jose version of the ordinance is presumably this . The term "spectator" is defined as: any person who is present at a Street Race or Reckless Driving Exhibition, or the site of the Preparations for either of these activities, for the purpose of viewing, observing, watching, or witnessing the event as it progresses. A "Spectator" includes any person at the location of the event without regard to the means by which the person arrived which rules out a person why "just happens to be there", and it does include a person who was driving by and decided to watch. It is specifically limited to "a Street Race conducted on a public street or highway" or "a Reckless Driving Exhibition conducted on a public street or highway or in an Offstreet Parking Facility". These terms are also defined – it does for example not include watching a street mime. The events being watch are violations of the state vehicle code (speeding, reckless driving). All of this would pass muster if constitutionally challenged – it is a narrowly-tailored restriction on the right to assembly that is necessary for a compelling government interest. §10.50.025 also makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly encourage, promote, instigate, assist, facilitate, aid, or abet said activities. The internet claims that this means you can't Tweet about one of these events, and this may be the ordinance you have in mind. This ordinance could easily be found to be unconstitutionally vague, because it may well be interpreted to mean "comment on it on Twitter", which is a protected expression.

In California, simply spectating a "sideshow" is illegal (jailtime/fine). Is this constitutional?

In the Bay Area, there is a problem called "sideshows", where youths do dangerous stunts with cars (like donuts) on public streets, usually at an intersection (example video) . California, wanting to crackdown on this, has put out increasingly harsh laws. But some of these laws seem to have gone over the line to me. For example, I heard on ABC news that it is now illegal to spectate or record a sideshow. It is punishable by up to 6 months in prison or a $1000 fine. But doesn't this violate the Constitution, or some personal freedom? If a random passerby happens to see cars doing donuts, and stops to rubberneck (just watch), or even record, can that really be made illegal? I'm no expert in law or the constitution, but it just seems like an overreach to me... Perhaps it violates the First Amendment, which includes the right to gather and disseminate information about matters of public interest, if I recall correctly. Edit: link to an article about the law being passed on April 30, 2019

No right is absolute, and all are held in balance with each other as well as the interests of the government (public order, public health and safety, etc.). To make it short: rights to assembly and speech can usually be abridged in the interests of resolving an immediate public safety issue or other illegal act. Which the events you describe certainly are on both counts—they endanger participants, spectators, bystanders, and public and private property alike, as well as creating a public nuisance (such as via noise ordinances) etc.—and spectating and recording them only contributes to and encourages the issue. The exact legal standards for when a right can be abridged depends on the right. For free speech issues it's usually "narrowly tailored to suit a compelling government interest" (but note "narrowly tailored" is more permissive than you might think), and there are time, place, and manner restrictions the government can avail itself of. The behavior you indicate seems to fall well within these exceptions, and it's arguable in what sense there's meaningful "speech" going on here in the first place. For right to assembly, in addition to time, place, and manner exceptions there's another, usually less restrictive (on the government), set of standards , which includes threats to public health and safety. And street races and stunts are clear examples thereof, as the drivers can easily lose control or the cars otherwise veer into spectators and/or property (plus the damage they are likely inflicting to the public roadways themselves, above and beyond normal permitted use). Furthermore, cities in California (and presumably elsewhere) have been dealing with this issue for years, and simply focusing on just the stunt performers and drivers has proven inadequate to address a compelling public safety issue. I had some initial difficulties finding explicit references to fines of spectators other than your own brief article. But here's a whole case synopsis from LA , specifically as an infraction of LA MC 47.15 . Notably, at no point is there any mention of trying to contest the validity of the law; only if the particular requirements (intent to spectate and proximity) were met and the difficulty in the ticketing officer to remember those things without it being easy for the defense to undercut this. They negotiated a plea deal, ultimately, to avoid jail time. Now not everyone is willing and able to contest things all the way up the appellate chain; even those that contest and appeal sometimes stop before reaching SCOTUS, for any number of reasons. But this seems suggestive nevertheless: a law office is putting forth a "we negotiated this down" rather than a "we contested it's validity wholesale" as an example of the kind of service and results you can get through them on this sort of issue. Combined, I would conclude that there is little reason to think a court would find the law unconstitutional.

FOIA request takes too long

I submitted a FOIA request to State Dept. of the United States. The FOIA request was immediately acknowledged, assigned a number and I was notified that it is being processed. This was some 180 days ago. I queried several times on the status of FOIA and was replied that it is still in process and that it was in "complex category". I fully appreciate that pandemic context makes the work harder, but what I asked is a specific document some 30 years ago and, while probably not digitized, I did not expect FOIA to take half a year. My questions are - is this normal to take FOIA this much time, even if it's in complex category. Secondly, what options do I have to press SD to produce the document or deny my request.

The State Department has what I believe are deliberately awful FOIA processing guidelines, which categorize virtually every request as complex, unless all the requested documents are " readily available for release ." Exactly what that means, I don't know, but I think it's safe to assume that they would not consider a 30-year-old document readily available. Nonetheless, that designation does not, as I understand it, have any effect on the statutory deadline to respond to the request, which is 20 days, regardless of whether it's been designated standard or complex. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) . Of course, all of this could vary somewhat depending on exactly what you've requested. If you've requested a press release from 1992, they should adhere to the 20-day deadline. But if you've requested a compendium of classified diplomatic cables, and they've decided to actually consider declassifying them, that might constitute the kind of "unusual circumstances" where the statute permits more than 20 days. Even then, though, the statute requires them to give you written notice of the circumstances, and the extension usually should not be more than another 10 days. At this point, you have the option of continuing to wait, calling the FOIA office for some polite sabre-rattling, going through the OGIS dispute-resolution program , or treating the delay as a denial and filing an appeal. You cannot go into court until you have gone through the full administrative appeal process.

What happens to one’s tenancy if one is evicted for a breach of it under section 8, Housing Act 1988?

Suppose Bob enters a 12 month tenancy contract and would then like to move early, suppose after 5 months. Bob would remain liable for the remaining 7 months of rental payments, which liability his tenancy deposit would expectably be withheld toward the partial payment of. Suppose Alice also enters a 12 month tenancy contract but would like to be released from it early, which her landlord denies her permission for. So she finds a replacement for herself to take over the remaining 7 months of her tenancy liability, called Charlotte. Charlotte moves in as a subletter, but Alice’s landlord is upset when she discovers that Charlotte has been sublet to without permission. What can Alice’s landlord do about this situation, other than move to terminate Alice’s tenancy by evicting her under section 8 Housing Act 1988? Once Alice gets evicted under section 8, then hasn’t Alice gotten her way anyway, in being released from the remainder of her tenancy term rental payment liabilities? And Alice’s landlord is now again on the hook for finding a new tenant to replace Alice some months earlier than planned. Perhaps one undesirable effect of this for Alice would be liability for her landlord’s section 8 proceeding legal costs, but suppose that these come to 35% of her tenancy deposit and her rental payments have otherwise all been punctually kept up to date. Would Alice not still get to keep more of her tenancy deposit than Bob got to keep of his, not to mention the further 5-6 months of rental liability that Bob was hypothetically left with?

Although Alice will mostly have achieved her aim in ending the tenancy early, there is one significant consequence of being evicted under section 8: a county court judgement (CCJ) against her. A CCJ check is a standard part of the referencing check done by landlords when someone applies to be a tenant. Having a CCJ on record means that Alice may find it much harder to find somewhere to rent in the future. So even if she's not out of pocket due to ending her tenancy early, she may end up with nowhere to live...or perhaps renting from a landlord who doesn't bother with CCJ checks, which may not be a good thing... EDIT: as pointed out in a comment, it looks like a CCJ would only apply if the tenant leaves while owing rent or other costs. If no money is due, then there will be no CCJ, even if the tenant is evicted under one of the other grounds of Section 8 (e.g. breach of contract). Realistically, there are up to three flaws with this scenario: Achieving a section 8 eviction can take many, many months, so it's entirely possible that Alice's fixed term will have ended anyway by the time the case comes to court, making much of this moot. My understanding is that eviction proceedings aren't cheap, so I'd be amazed if the costs only came to 35% of the deposit. Having a subtenant creates further complications, as the subtenant has certain rights even if their tenancy is invalid. But that's out of scope for this question.

Gaslighting ; criminal or civil

Gaslighting can be extremely damaging. Like Gang-Stalking, it is near impossible to prove it executed correctly. How can gaslighting be prosecuted as a crime?

england-and-wales There isn't a law that defines ' gaslighting ' as an offence. Generally it isn't unlawful to mislead, deceive or lie - of course, there are exceptions such as fraud , misleading advertising , perjury and so on. So the answer to your question must depend on what is meant by 'gaslighting' and the circumstances in which it has been said to have occurred. It seems to me that people understand and use the word differently - for me it pertains to intimate or family relationships (as in its alleged origin, the film Gaslight ), some people seem to use it for different serious behaviour and other people use it for relatively trivial behaviour. In the intimate or family relationship context, gaslighting might be part or all of the behaviour alleged to be the controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to s76 Serious Crime Act 2015 : 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. Here is the Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecuting s76 Serious Crime Act 2015 . Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence. Behaviour that causes psychological injury that amounts to recognisable psychiatric illness could be assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 ( see CPS Guidance for ABH ).

Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768 Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier? Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing & detained by the DPRK?

Any duty that exists is not legally enforceable in the courts in the U.S. (there are one or two cases in Canada imposing a similar duty in extraordinary rendition cases). Also, the arguably legal duty to provide diplomatic assistance to one's citizens doesn't apply in countries like North Korea where the U.S. has no diplomats. In practice, the U.S. government will do everything reasonably within its power to secure the release of a U.S. citizen held by a hostile foreign power (even a U.S. citizen who has behaved badly), because that's in the DNA of how the U.S. State Department always acts. But, at this point, short of an extreme Special Operations mission to abduct a prisoner that voluntarily defected from the U.S. while stationed in South Korea, there really isn't anything that the U.S. could do even if ordered to do so.

Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768 Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier? Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing & detained by the DPRK?

There is no duty rescue, except if a party negligently places another in harm (this is a general principle of law, probably not imposed on a government). A duty to negotiate is even less likely. POTUS can decide to negotiate, but Congress has not mandated any duty to negotiate so the courts will not order POTUS to negotiate if he decides not to. POTUS has the exclusive power to negotiate treaties, and the Senate has the exclusive power to approve them, so there is no constitutional basis for a law forcing a president to negotiate especially with a nation that we have no diplomatic relations with.

Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768 Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier? Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing & detained by the DPRK?

The Vienna Convention Consular Relations (1963-04-24) Article 5 (e) give a country the right to help and assist their nationals, either directly through their consulate (or through another consulate that represents their interests 1 ). This is more of a moral obligation to assist their citizens even if a crime has been committed by them (by assisting them the country does not admit/claim that the action of their citizen was right). 1 Article 27 (1)(c) the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State . Embassy of Sweden, Pyongyang - Wikipedia : The Swedish embassy serves as the protecting power for the United States and as consular representation for Australia, Canada, Italy, Finland, and Iceland. U.S. Department of State - Swedish Embassy (U.S. Protecting Power)

Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768 Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier? Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing & detained by the DPRK?

There is a statutory duty imposed on the president by 22 USC 1732 : Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress. This obviously does not apply to people who are detained for good reason, so it arguably does not apply to someone detained for entering a country contrary to law until the detention becomes excessive. Furthermore, because the duty is to "demand the release" of the detainee and to "use such means ... as he may think necessary and proper," it doesn't necessarily require negotiation. There is a similar statutory duty imposed on the secretary of state by 22 USC chapter 23, subchapter II (sections 1741 and following) : (a) Review The Secretary of State shall review, as expeditiously as possible, the cases of United States nationals detained abroad to determine if there is credible information that they are being detained unlawfully or wrongfully, based on criteria which may include whether— ... (b) Referrals to Special Envoy; notification to Congress (1) In general Upon a determination by the Secretary of State, based on the totality of the circumstances, that there is credible information that the detention of a United States national abroad is unlawful or wrongful, and regardless of whether the detention is by a foreign government or a nongovernmental actor, the Secretary shall— (A)expeditiously transfer responsibility for such case from the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State to the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; and ... This subchapter is a bit more vague, though, with requirements such as The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell shall (1) coordinate efforts by participating agencies to ensure that all relevant information, expertise, and resources are brought to bear to secure the safe recovery of United States nationals held hostage abroad; ... It is not clear from a brief reading whether any of this imposes a duty to negotiate anyone's release under any circumstances.

Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768 Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier? Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing & detained by the DPRK?

No. It doesn't. While the US does generally try, it has no obligation to do so. Here's a State Department web page discussing... https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html

Legality of Housing Reparations

Evanston, IL is offering $25,000 grants for housing costs to black residents who owned homes before 1969, but denies assistance to Asian, Hispanic, or white residents. My impression is that the Civil Rights Act and the 14th amendment prohibit discrimination based on race, and yet this law explicitly only applies to black residents. Some laws target races by saying "we will compensate for X past action", but then the law is for people who suffered from the action, like discriminatory housing policies, which Hispanic and other residents suffered from too. Is it legal for Evanston to give grants to black residents and not, say, Asian residents?

As a starting point, and because it is a common occurrence, we can conclude that the government can give a benefit to someone without having to give the same benefit to everyone. It is a political matter that a divorced spouse is entitled to Social Security benefits based on a marriage that lasted at least 10 years, and not 9 years. More such restrictions on benefits are listed here . Equal protection does not "everybody gets the benefit". Second, the government can give benefits to people whom it has harmed, again a point that hopefully does not require extensive justification. Third, and this leads to a concrete example, under the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, $37 million was paid by the federal government to 26,000 who were sent to the Japanese-American concentration camps during WWII, so there is an "effects-based" racial discrimination that this benefit was only given to a specific racial group, because the underlying wrong was also racially-based, and likewise Aleut residents of the Aleutian Islands and the Pribilof islands were likewise compensated for harm done to them by the government. A person is not barred from compensation by wrongful government action just because the persons and others who are compensated for governmental wrong were the victims of a racially discriminatory wrong (therefore there is a racal correlate to the class of victims). Victims of government harm can be conceptually divided into two groups: direct victims, and indirect victims. There is no controversy over the legality of the government compensating individuals for its wrongful actions. The only plausible point of legal objection would be over compensating people who descended from victims of government harm. There is a legal difference between lineage-based discrimination and race-based discrimination, simply because lineage-based discrimination is not racial discrimination, which is forbidden. There is a greater chance that lineage-based reparations could pass strict scrutiny, in that it more narrowly tailors the benefit to exactly reach the compelling government interest, as opposed to a policy that broadly gives a compensatory benefit to anyone who self-identifies as being of a particular race. Finally, the question might be asked whether a program of government compensation for wrongful acts can be selective, in which victims it identifies for compensation. Yes, it can, for example the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act for specific classes of persons harmed by government in connection with atmospheric A-bomb tests and uranium mining – it does not compensate all individuals who were harmed by government action. The question of which victims are compensated (by act of Congress) is not justiciable, it is a political question.

Legality of Housing Reparations

Evanston, IL is offering $25,000 grants for housing costs to black residents who owned homes before 1969, but denies assistance to Asian, Hispanic, or white residents. My impression is that the Civil Rights Act and the 14th amendment prohibit discrimination based on race, and yet this law explicitly only applies to black residents. Some laws target races by saying "we will compensate for X past action", but then the law is for people who suffered from the action, like discriminatory housing policies, which Hispanic and other residents suffered from too. Is it legal for Evanston to give grants to black residents and not, say, Asian residents?

Regardless of anything else, it is certainly possible for a city who feels a particular party might have the basis for a lawsuit against them, to reach out to that party prior to lawsuit and "settle" the matter. While this might seem like a giveaway, it's not quite. It is a fair exchange of a known, fixed, small amount of money, plus certainty , in exchange for uncertainty and a costly litigation involving a much larger amount of money. The plaintiff is now barred from suing on that matter , so the city enjoys the certainty that no million dollar judgment is hanging over their head. That reduces their insurance premiums. I cannot speculate about which developments in facts or law would lead Evanston to think they might have such legal exposure.

My lease agreement has a typo that changes the intended meaning

I'm in New York. I share this lease with a roommate who is also on the lease but is leaving a month after I am. Our lease that states "After the initial term of this Agreement, or in case of a month-to-month tenancy, the TENANT may terminate the Lease with a minimum of calendar days written notice." I assume here that the lease is just missing an exact number? But does this mean I don't have to give 30 days notice? It also states "The TENANT shall vacate the premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless the LANDLORD accepts further rent from the TENANT (other than past due rent), in which case a month-to-month tenancy shall be created which either party may terminate by a thirty (30) day written notice." Does the mention of 30 days here negate the other sentence?

The TENANT is both of you The TENANT (i.e. both of you) have to give 30 days notice. And the TENANT (again, both of you) must “ vacate the premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless …”.

My lease agreement has a typo that changes the intended meaning

I'm in New York. I share this lease with a roommate who is also on the lease but is leaving a month after I am. Our lease that states "After the initial term of this Agreement, or in case of a month-to-month tenancy, the TENANT may terminate the Lease with a minimum of calendar days written notice." I assume here that the lease is just missing an exact number? But does this mean I don't have to give 30 days notice? It also states "The TENANT shall vacate the premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless the LANDLORD accepts further rent from the TENANT (other than past due rent), in which case a month-to-month tenancy shall be created which either party may terminate by a thirty (30) day written notice." Does the mention of 30 days here negate the other sentence?

does this mean I don't have to give 30 days notice? You and your roommate are renting the premises jointly. You cannot terminate the agreement unilaterally. You need the agreement of the other parties to modify the lease. As far as the landlord is concerned, the two of you are jointly and severally liable for the rent through the end of the month in which he regains possession of the apartment, or the first month end that falls 30 days or more after he learns of your intention to relinquish possession, whichever is later. So no, you don't have to give 30 days notice. The 30 days notice of your roommate's departure is sufficient. Does the mention of 30 days here negate the other sentence? The other sentence doesn't specify a number of days, so this sentence isn't in conflict with it. If the other sentence specified a different number of days, there would be a conflict. If the lease didn't specify a number of days anywhere then the statutory notice period applying to month to month tenancies would apply, which is, if I recall correctly, 30 days.

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

germany Article 5 [Freedom of expression, arts and sciences] (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Sources : Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 2 [Personal freedoms] Article 5 [Freedom of expression, arts and sciences]

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

england-and-wales and northern-ireland It's called the Article 10 Right to Freedom of Expression and can be found at Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998: 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Note that paragraph 2 makes this a qualified right . These are rights: ...that permit interferences subject to various conditions. For example, the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8 of the ECHR) and the right to freedom of expression (Art. 10 of the ECHR) allow interference, but such interferences must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic state for the requirements of public order, public health or morals, national security or public safety. Source

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

For example, the eritrea Eritrean constitution, Art. 19 guarantees Every person shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Every person shall have the freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press and other media. Every citizen shall have the right of access to information. and 6 other rights. As long as you have a license to publish and get prior approval from the government for your publication, you are alright. Article 67 of the dprk Democratic People's Republic of Korea says that Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations sweden has a "Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression" , which is quite lengthy and specific. It is, however, a crime to publicly express disrespect for an group regarding race, color, national / ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation. In Norway, Art. 100 of the constitution says that No person may be held liable in law for having imparted or received information, ideas or messages unless this can be justified in relation to the grounds for freedom of expression, which are the seeking of truth, the promotion of democracy and the individual's freedom to form opinions. Such legal liability shall be prescribed by law. (etc.), and likewise criminalizes hate speech. Libel, fraud and death threats are communicative acts that are universally banned, and child pornography is almost universally illegal, so no country is anarchic in terms of expression. Every nation has limits on expression, which are generally taken to be implicitly justified exceptions to existing guarantees of freedom of expression. In some countries, the exceptions are named in detail in the constitution, in some (North Korea, Eritrea) the constitution is simply ignored.

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

australia Yes and No Comprehensive rights protections Australia is unique among liberal western democracies in that it does not have an enumerated Bill of Rights; neither in its Constitution nor as an enacted piece of legislation. With the exception of the ACT and Victoria, the states and territories don't have one either. Before Federation, the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected (19 votes to 23) including protections similar to those in the US Constitution. It failed largely because it was feared that due process protections would interfere with the racially discriminatory policies against aboriginal Australians and people of Chinese descent which all the colonies enthusiastically pursued. Australia in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries was breathtakingly and unashamedly racist. Today, racism is largely personal rather than institutionalised. Proposals for a Constitutional Bill of Rights were considered in 1929 and 1959 but neither progressed to a referendum. In 1942, a referendum was held on expanding Federal powers over post-war construction counterbalanced by Constitutional limitation on Parliament regulating freedom of expression and extending freedom of religion to the states: it was rejected at the referendum. A charter of human rights went to referendum in 1988: it was overwhelmingly rejected with no state reaching 30% approval. Several attempts to legislate a comprehensive Bill of Rights have also failed to go anywhere. However, individual pieces of legislation have created rights in specific areas. Reference Constitutional rights That said, the Constitution gives the following express rights: freedom of religion freedom against discrimination between the states the right ofAustralian Citizens to trial by jury. That said, all judicial systems treat non-citizens the same as citizens but Parliament could legislate to change this. the right of free trade among the states The right to acquire and hold property The courts have also found implied rights that are necessary to give effect to the democracy spelled out in the constitution: the right to vote, and the right of freedom of political communication. The High Court has also indicated that the classes of implied rights are not necessarily closed. Reference Non-constitutional rights Australia inherited the common law rights of England and, subject to subsequent statutory and judicial amendments, these are still in force. This means that freedom of expression is the default assumption baring any specific laws proscribing it. Australia is also a party to seven core international human rights treaties. The right to freedom of opinion and expression is contained in articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Also relevant are articles 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), articles 12 and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In addition, specific legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act and the Racial Discrimination Act provide both rights and restrictions on free speech within their particular sphere. Most such legislation is replicated at a state and territory level. Reference Permissable restrictions Derogation Under article 4 of the ICCPR, countries may take measures derogating from certain of their obligations under the Covenant, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression 'in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed'. Limitation [U]nder article 19(3) freedom of expression may be limited as provided for by law and when necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals. Limitations must be prescribed by legislation necessary to achieve the desired purpose and proportionate to the need on which the limitation is predicated. Reference

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

france Yes, but The Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 doesn't enumerate such rights, it describes how the Fifth Republic functions, powers, or checks and balances, and although it has been amended 24 times, there is no mention of freedom of speech in the text. The preamble of the Constitution outlines something important for this question however: The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946. ( The preamble was amended to include the Charter for the Environment of 2004, the original 1958 preamble obviously doesn't mention it, thus it has been left out here. ) A 1971 decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel struck down a law as anticonstitutional arguing the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen had full constitutional force because it is mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution. The Déclaration is thus part of the bloc de constitutionnalité . The Déclaration has one article relevant to freedom of speech, and two about limits to freedoms: Article 11 - The free communication of ideas and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law. Article 4 - Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These bounds may be determined only by Law. Article 5 - The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are injurious to society. Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be compelled to do what the Law does not ordain. Freedom of speech is a constitutional one , however it also can be limited by law , if the law aims to protect society from harm or protect other people's rights. The Constitutional Council has the power and responsibility to strike down laws that overreach and needlessly restrict freedom of speech, or any other freedom (as outlined in articles 61, 61-1, 62 of the Constitution). As for forms of speech restricted by law, they include defamation and copyright infringement (or perhaps more accurately authors' rights infringement), this much is common to the United States. A difference however is that hate speech, Holocaust-denial, or the use of Nazi symbols for their political value is considered harmful to society or infringes on other citizens' freedoms, as the law does explicitly forbid such forms of expression. Similarly to defamation, what constitutes hate speech is ultimately to be adjudicated by the courts.

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

canada In Canada, the right to freedom of expression is an explicit right, as described in Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms : Fundamental Freedoms Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association. However, Section 1 of the Charter also notes that The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In other wise, limits on free speech may be imposed if they can be "demonstrably justified." Whether the government can justify a law that infringes upon a Charter right is currently determined by the Oakes test , which requires that when a law is challenged on Charter grounds, the government must establish: that the law in question has a "pressing and substantial" purpose; that the provision in question is "rationally connected" to the law's purpose; that the provision "minimally impairs" the Charter right in question (i.e., it's not broader than it needs to be); and that the law's restriction of Charter rights is not disproportionate large compared to the positive effects of the law. Under this test, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that Section 1 allows for limits on various types of speech: speech that promotes hatred ( R v Keegstra and R v Andrews ) speech that is libelous ( Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto and R v Lucas ) speech that is obscene ( R v Butler but also R v Glad Day Bookshops ) solicitation of prostitution ( R v Skinner ) publication of election results before polls close ( R v Bryan ) publication of news about ongoing criminal trials, in certain cases ( Dagenais v CBC and R v Mentuck but also Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG) ) advertising directed at children ( Irwin Toy v Quebec (AG) ) noise pollution ( Montréal v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc. ) Finally, in the context of comparing Canada's speech laws with those of other countries, it is also important to note R v Zündel , a 1992 decision concerning a Holocaust denier. Zündel was prosecuted under a broad law against knowingly publishing false statements; but the Supreme Court found that the particular law did not have a pressing purpose, nor were its impairments of charter rights minimal, and so it struck down the law. More recently, in June 2022 Canada enacted an antisemitism law prohibiting Holocaust denial. The constitutionality of this law has, to the best of my knowledge, not yet been tested.

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (in force until 1991) states: Article 50: В соответствии с интересами народа и в целях укрепления и развития социалистического строя гражданам СССР гарантируются свободы: слова, печати, собраний, митингов, уличных шествий и демонстраций. Осуществление этих политических свобод обеспечивается предоставлением трудящимся и их организациям общественных зданий, улиц и площадей, широким распространением информации, возможностью использования печати, телевидения и радио. ( DeepL translation: In accordance with the interests of the people and with a view to strengthening and developing the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the freedoms of: speech, the press, meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. The exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by the provision of public buildings, streets and squares for workers and their organisations, by the wide dissemination of information, and by the possibility of using the press, television and radio. ) Article 57: Уважение личности, охрана прав и свобод граждан — обязанность всех государственных органов, общественных организаций и должностных лиц. (DeepL translation: Respect for the individual and the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens are the responsibility of all state bodies, public organisations and officials. ) This is pretty much explicit. However , Article 59 also says: Осуществление прав и свобод неотделимо от исполнения гражданином своих обязанностей. Гражданин СССР обязан соблюдать Конституцию СССР и советские законы, уважать правила социалистического общежития, с достоинством нести высокое звание гражданина СССР. (DeepL translation: The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the fulfilment of a citizen's duties. A citizen of the USSR must observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, respect the rules of socialist society, and carry with dignity the high title of a citizen of the USSR. ) So the freedom of speech was conditional, the state was supposed to guarantee the constitutional rights, but the citizens were supposed to abide by the Constitution. I guess this makes it a bit less "free" than the USA variant (and note that "suppose" is the key word here).

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

netherlands Freedom of speech in the Netherlands is guaranteed by article 7 of the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands : Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden or grondwet (ground/base law) for short. The article is comprised of the following four clauses: Niemand heeft voorafgaand verlof nodig om door de drukpers gedachten of gevoelens te openbaren, behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet. De wet stelt regels omtrent radio en televisie. Er is geen voorafgaand toezicht op de inhoud van een radio- of televisieuitzending. Voor het openbaren van gedachten of gevoelens door andere dan in de voorgaande leden genoemde middelen heeft niemand voorafgaand verlof nodig wegens de inhoud daarvan, behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet. De wet kan het geven van vertoningen toegankelijk voor personen jonger dan zestien jaar regelen ter bescherming van de goede zeden. De voorgaande leden zijn niet van toepassing op het maken van handelsreclame. This can be translated as Nobody needs prior permission to publish in print thoughts or feelings, under condition of everyone's responsibility by law. The law sets rules for radio and television. No prior supervision is performed on the contents of a radio or television broadcast. To publish thoughts or feelings through means other than those mentioned in the previous clauses, nobody needs prior permission for the contents thereof, under condition of everyone's responsibility by law. The law may regulate viewings accessible to persons younger than sixteen years to protect decency. The prior clauses are not applicable to trade advertisements. While this law is somewhat archaically formulated, in practice it appears largely applied in spirit, meaning that its application is not limited to the specific media mentioned in the law. Additionally there is the European Convention on Human Rights which also guarantees free speech, and which the European Union requires all members and candidate members to be signatories of. Another thing of interest may be to learn that the USA is built on common law (focus on precedent), whereas the Netherlands, and in fact the majority of Europe is built on civil law (focus on written law), which may impact through which (combination of) means a country protects certain rights.

Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it. I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable. Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?

The Danish constitution article 77 says Grundloven § 77 § 77 Enhver er berettiget til på tryk, i skrift og tale at offentliggøre sine tanker, dog under ansvar for domstolene. Censur og andre forebyggende forholdsregler kan ingensinde påny indføres. This can be translated as The constitution § 77 §77 Everyone is entitled to in print, in writing and speech, to publish their thoughts, under penalty of the courts. Censorhip and other preventative measures and rules cannot be reintroduced. This article is being violated by hate-speech laws (being a preventative measure) and was nearly totally abolished when a law nearly passed that would force "social media" companies to unrank dissenting views. Fortunately, the EU stopped it, because it wanted to introduce the same law itself.

Why don't victims often sue perpetrators / suspects?

Famously, although O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, he was later sued by their families and found to be liable for the deaths in a civil court. The difference being the standard of proof required in either situation, i.e. "...beyond reasonable doubt" vs "... on preponderance of evidence" or "... on the balance of probabilities". So it would seem that if a victim is worried that the suspect will get off, or even if they were already acquitted, the victim always has the option of suing the suspect and be more sure of a favourable result. (It also seems to add a "double jeopardy" element for the defendant, even if the second jeopardy is just reputational damage and having to pay money rather than jail time.) So my question is, why don't victims do this all the time? Obviously we can't look into the minds of every victim to understand the reasons, but are there other challenges that make this impractical despite it looking like a fairly obvious option available to them to get restitution / justice?

Most criminals aren't rich... Suing someone who has nothing, won't get you anything... Sure they can be held liable for millions of dollars. But that doesn't make the money magically appear. A million dollars from someone who has no money and a dollar will get you a soda. TLDR: Suing the perpetrator of a crime is a waste of time/money if they don't have any.

Why don't victims often sue perpetrators / suspects?

Famously, although O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, he was later sued by their families and found to be liable for the deaths in a civil court. The difference being the standard of proof required in either situation, i.e. "...beyond reasonable doubt" vs "... on preponderance of evidence" or "... on the balance of probabilities". So it would seem that if a victim is worried that the suspect will get off, or even if they were already acquitted, the victim always has the option of suing the suspect and be more sure of a favourable result. (It also seems to add a "double jeopardy" element for the defendant, even if the second jeopardy is just reputational damage and having to pay money rather than jail time.) So my question is, why don't victims do this all the time? Obviously we can't look into the minds of every victim to understand the reasons, but are there other challenges that make this impractical despite it looking like a fairly obvious option available to them to get restitution / justice?

It also seems to add a "double jeopardy" element for the defendant, even if the second jeopardy is just reputational damage and having to pay money rather than jail time. It doesn't. Double jeopardy only applies to two criminal prosecutions for the same conduct by the same sovereign. Civil lawsuits don't constitute double jeopardy. So my question is, why don't victims do this all the time? Obviously we can't look into the minds of every victim to understand the reasons, but are there other challenges that make this impractical despite it looking like a fairly obvious option available to them to get restitution / justice? First Restitution is routinely awarded as part of the sentence following a criminal conviction. Restitution doesn't compensate everything that a civil judgment does. For example, it doesn't cover non-economic damages for pain and suffering or some more remote economic losses. But often, it covers the core economic losses from a crime. Second The vast majority of convicted criminals are indigent and judgment proof or can only pay a little in excess of restitution. Even an ability to pay restitution is rare : Judges ordered 15 percent of federal offenders to pay restitution. Offenses for which courts ordered restitution most often were fraud, embezzlement, arson, auto theft, tax-related crimes, robbery, burglary and larceny. Thirty percent of offenders convicted of murder were ordered to compensate victims. The amount of restitution ordered between 2014 and 2016 totaled $33.9 billion. Between 2014 and 2016, U.S. Attorney’s Offices collected a total of $2.95 billion. Half of that came from debts imposed between fiscal years 1988 and 2014. As of the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in restitution debt was outstanding. The federal government has deemed $100 billion of that to be “uncollectible” based on the offender’s ability to pay. Almost all — 95 percent — of offenders ordered to pay restitution received a waiver allowing them to forgo payment because they had no ability to pay. State offenders have less of an ability to pay restitution, on average, than federal ones, who are often white collar criminals or immigration offenders. All criminal defendants with public defenders are by definition indigent. And according to the U.S. Department of Justice : approximately 66% of felony Federal defendants and 82% of felony defendants in large State courts were represented by public defenders. Going to jail or prison deprives criminal defendants of a meaningful income while incarcerated and dramatically reduces their ability to earn income when they are released, again reducing their ability to pay a civil judgment. Even when a defendant does have assets and some actual ability to pay, those assets may be protected from civil lawsuit judgments, for example, by a homestead exemption for an owned personal residence, or an exemption from creditors for pensions and IRAs. Also assets of a criminal defendant that aren't exempt from creditors are often seized by creditors of the criminal defendant due to inability to pay monthly payments during a criminal prosecution due to loss of income and employment, or collapse of a self-employed business, or use of available funds to pay a private criminal defense lawyer. Third Lawyers won't file a civil suit against a criminal defendant, even knowing that liability is basically automatic and effortless in the case of a criminal conviction where all appeals have been exhausted, unless there is a realistic possibility of recovering enough from the defendant in the civil suit beyond any restitution award to justify the legal work involved within a reasonable time. Fourth If a criminal defendant is acquitted at trial or the prosecutor declines to press charges, while this doesn't legally prevent a victim from bringing a civil lawsuit, as the O.J. Simpson case illustrated, it make it much less attractive for a lawyer in a civil case to take on and the risk that there will be no judgment or favorable settlement reached is great. It will probably be expensive to prove the case and the case will be hard fought. Fifth The statute of limitations for a civil lawsuit in tort for damages associated with a crime often runs before the criminal proceeding is concluded if there is not a plea bargain, this makes the legal work in the civil lawsuit more expensive and often crime victims don't think about the possibility of a civil suit until the dust has settled in the criminal case and they realize that the restitution award received does not fully compensate them for their losses. Keep in mind that crime victims usually don't hire lawyers because the prosecution is handled by state and local government paid lawyers, but victims aren't the clients of prosecutors and prosecutors usually don't advise victims on the possibility of bringing a civil lawsuit.

Does a registered trademark end if the owner throws it away?

If somebody registers a trademark for their company name and the name of its flagship product, and uses this names for a while, but then one day decides to stop using it and publicly announce they will never use the old name again, is the trademark still theirs, or is it automatically terminated? If not immediately, is it terminated after some period of time where the owner does not use it? Does it matter that the owner publicly proclaimed they'd never use it again?

A trademark must be used australia Use is inherent in the definition of a trademark: “the owner intends, and does, use the trade mark to distinguish its goods or services from goods or services dealt with or provided by others.” Anyone can apply to have a disused trademark deregistered. The application can be opposed by the owner who bears the onus of proving it is still in use. An owner who made a public announcement that they would no longer use it would have a hard time proving they still were. Also, they might be estopped from opposing the application at all.

Does a registered trademark end if the owner throws it away?

If somebody registers a trademark for their company name and the name of its flagship product, and uses this names for a while, but then one day decides to stop using it and publicly announce they will never use the old name again, is the trademark still theirs, or is it automatically terminated? If not immediately, is it terminated after some period of time where the owner does not use it? Does it matter that the owner publicly proclaimed they'd never use it again?

Well, a registered trademark is a registered trademark because it's registered . So to make it available again, that registration would need to be deleted. A simple announcement that it will no longer be used is not sufficient. Of course, the company could refrain from suing anybody for using the trademark, but that's a bit a risky path for anyone to rely on. switzerland (and probably many European countries) There's a rule that a trademark is only valid as long as it's in use. If, for more than 5 years, the registered owner appears to be no longer using it, anyone can request its deletion for a small fee and some evidence that the trademark is not being used. If the trademark belongs to a company that no longer exists, that is a strong indication that it is no longer used. Source

Does a registered trademark end if the owner throws it away?

If somebody registers a trademark for their company name and the name of its flagship product, and uses this names for a while, but then one day decides to stop using it and publicly announce they will never use the old name again, is the trademark still theirs, or is it automatically terminated? If not immediately, is it terminated after some period of time where the owner does not use it? Does it matter that the owner publicly proclaimed they'd never use it again?

united-states In the U.S., a registered trademark has to be periodically renewed with a statement stating that it continues to be used in interstate or international commerce, and if this ceases to happen, it lapses by operation of law. In the fact pattern of the question, announcing it will no longer be used would probably be a good defense to a trademark infringement suit from the registered trademark owner, at a minimum, as a common law estoppel or waiver, and as a defense to the affirmative case on the ground that there are no damages and that there is no possibility of confusion. On the other hand, it someone tried to mislead the public into thinking the the no longer used trademark that they were now using was still being used by a successor to the original owner, that could be grounds for a suit to enjoin the use to defraud the public if it harmed the registered owner of the trademark that had not yet lapsed by operation of law. It is possible to file a form with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) prospectively cancelling a registered trademark. Often this would be done as part of a settlement of a litigation dispute involving the trademark.

Do any USA states require accepting US cash for payment of goods or services?

According to the United States Federal Reserve: There is no federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether to accept cash unless there is a state law that says otherwise. Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm Are there any states, districts, regions, or territories within the USA that mandate that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept US currency or coins as payment for goods or services?

Not at the level of the state, but businesses subject to King County (WA) jurisdiction will, effective Jan. 1 2025, have to accept cash (within limits: not larger than $20 bill, not more that $200) for in-person transactions. Ad hoc exemptions are allowed in case of significant theft history, business operated at home, or with only one on-site employee.

Do any USA states require accepting US cash for payment of goods or services?

According to the United States Federal Reserve: There is no federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether to accept cash unless there is a state law that says otherwise. Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm Are there any states, districts, regions, or territories within the USA that mandate that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept US currency or coins as payment for goods or services?

Yes. In massachusetts , the General Law, chapter 255D, section 10A outlaws discrimination against cash buyers by retail (as opposed to wholesale) businesses. The section reads, in full: Section 10A. No retail establishment offering goods and services for sale shall discriminate against a cash buyer by requiring the use of credit by a buyer in order to purchase such goods and services. All such retail establishments must accept legal tender when offered as payment by the buyer.

To what extent does financial interest in vicarious liability in copyright law extend?

I've just learned about vicarious liability . It appears that it means that if you have a right to stop a copyright infringement and you're directly profiting from the fact that the infringement is occurring, you can be held liable for some of the damages. I was wondering how far the implication of direct financial interest can be stretched. The most concerning example would be ISPs or VPN providers potentially being held liable. After all, ISP or VPN company can block IP addresses which means they could easily make many forms of infringement much more difficult and they do make money off people using their services. You could say that ISP makes the money anyway, whether you're downloading movies legally or legitimately. However say all but one ISP blocked IP addresses of most torrent trackers, making it impossible for peers to connect with one another. The one remaining ISP that does not block them, despite their right to do so stands to gain by continuing to not block any content as that would bring them more clients. This could be extended to other things - for example software that can be used to extract content from a computer game. The company that makes it could place measures in it to prevent infringing use, but if they not people might buy the software specifically to steal content of games for example. So I was wondering how far can this liability be stretched regarding the direct financial gain condition.

ISPs and VPNs have “safe harbour” protections Just like the Post Office, FedEx and other “common carriers” who might be transporting illegal material. Basically the way it works is that if they don’t know, and stop when they are told about it, they can’t be held liable.

To what extent does financial interest in vicarious liability in copyright law extend?

I've just learned about vicarious liability . It appears that it means that if you have a right to stop a copyright infringement and you're directly profiting from the fact that the infringement is occurring, you can be held liable for some of the damages. I was wondering how far the implication of direct financial interest can be stretched. The most concerning example would be ISPs or VPN providers potentially being held liable. After all, ISP or VPN company can block IP addresses which means they could easily make many forms of infringement much more difficult and they do make money off people using their services. You could say that ISP makes the money anyway, whether you're downloading movies legally or legitimately. However say all but one ISP blocked IP addresses of most torrent trackers, making it impossible for peers to connect with one another. The one remaining ISP that does not block them, despite their right to do so stands to gain by continuing to not block any content as that would bring them more clients. This could be extended to other things - for example software that can be used to extract content from a computer game. The company that makes it could place measures in it to prevent infringing use, but if they not people might buy the software specifically to steal content of games for example. So I was wondering how far can this liability be stretched regarding the direct financial gain condition.

The concept of a “financial interest” affecting vicarious liability for copyright infringement is derived from United States case law. In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the Supreme Court described it in these terms: One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it .⁹ Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law. ⁹ We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that “the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn” … The words used in the question, “direct financial interest,” come from Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co. , 316 F.2d 304 (CA2 1963). That case was about whether a department store was liable for the sales of a concessionaire who sold infringing records in the department store, under a profit sharing agreement with the department store. The court held that this relationship resulted in secondary liability: Section 101(e) of the Copyright Act makes unlawful the “unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale” of phonograph records. Because of the open-ended terminology of the section, and the related section 1(e), courts have had to trace, case by case, a pattern of business relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another. It is quite clear, for example, that the normal agency rule of respondeat superior applies to copyright infringement by a servant within the scope of his employment. Realistically, the courts have not drawn a rigid line between the strict cases of agency, and those of independent contract, license, and lease. Many of the elements which have given rise to the doctrine of respondeat superior, may also be evident in factual settings other than that of a technical employer-employee relationship. When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials — even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired — the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation … The Supreme Court found that such liability did not exist in the Betamax case , 464 U.S. 417 (1984). While Sony had a financial interest in selling a product which was used to infringe copyright, it did not have enough control over its customers’ actions to be liable for their infringement: In [other] cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the “contributory” infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. This case, however, plainly does not fall in that category. The only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that “no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works off the air.” But in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the Supreme Court found Grokster liable for copyright infringement by the users of their peer-to-peer file sharing software. While the software had substantial non-infringing uses, the Supreme Court upheld MGM’s claim on an “inducement theory” because there was evidence that Grokster actively encouraged copyright infringement: Sony ’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law … The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission of infringement by another, or “entic[es] or persuad[es] another” to infringe, as by advertising . Thus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who “not only expected but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement” was liable for infringement “on principles recognized in every part of the law” … The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different today. Evidence of “active steps ... taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use. Whether an internet or VPN provider is liable for its users’ copyright infringement would depend on the specific evidence produced to the court. The court would need to interpret the above principles and consider other relevant case law. Proof of a “direct financial interest” in the infringement would be relevant, but not necessary or sufficient, to establish liability. The DMCA safe harbour provisions , 17 U.S.C. § 512 , may also apply, as compliance with these provisions could exclude any liability which the copyright holder was otherwise able to establish. However, “this is irrelevant unless [the defendant] is contributing to infringement; a noninfringer doesn’t need a safe harbor”: Flava Works Inc. v. Gunter , 689 F.3d 754 (CA7 2012).

Can I opt out of UK Working Time Regulations daily breaks?

The Working Time Regulations 1998, PART II, Regulation 10 says Daily rest 10.—(1) An adult worker is entitled to a rest period of not less than eleven consecutive hours in each 24-hour period during which he works for his employer. Entitled is the key word here. I know that I can opt out of the 48hrs per week limited as per this page You can opt out for a certain period or indefinitely. It must be voluntary and in writing. but I can't find anything whether it's fine to do it on daily rest.

Yes If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold): 4 .—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days. ... (3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) and any agreement under regulation 23(b) , the reference periods which apply in the case of a worker are ... So if we go to 23(b) : A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may— (a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and (7), 10(1) , 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and (b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and (4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation to particular workers or groups of workers.

Deceased spouse still on bank account

If one leaves deceased spouse on joint bank account, what happens? If one leaves deceased spouse on home deed, what happens? Note, Soc Sec has been provided with copy of death certificate. Accounts with beneficiaries have been dispersed.

There are multiple kinds of joint ownership, centered around the question of survivorship. One possible outcome is that the deceased willed their property to some other person Smith, therefore Smith will not have A's interest in the account. Let's assume that the accounts and house are both joint tenants with right of survivorship. Then the survivor simply is the only person who has the right to access the account. However, the account probably cannot be closed, because as far as the bank knows, the deceased spouse still has an interest in the account, and will require the spouse to sign the paperwork. Therefore the surviving spouse will have to bring in paperwork to establish that the deceased spouse is deceased. Similarly, a deceased spouse can remain on the deed, but when it comes time to sell the house, it will be necessary to legally "extinguish" the deceased spouse's interest in the house. It can also complicate mortgage-refinancing or using the house as security for a loan to leave the paperwork unresolved.

What is acceptable use of security deposits?

Context: Non-residential Florida Office Space Lease Akerman indicates : Landlords routinely require security deposits from their tenants before entering into a lease for commercial property. Security deposits are intended to provide the landlord with protection against damage to the leased premises and security for the tenant’s payment obligations under the lease. Question: What, if any, bright lines exist regarding whether a repair is reasonable after the tenant moves out? In particular: repairs to surfaces such as ceilings, floors, walls, bathroom fixtures. Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable?

What does the lease say? The deposit was collected for a reason, what was it? Whether it can be used to effect repairs and to what extent should be spelled out in the lease.

What is acceptable use of security deposits?

Context: Non-residential Florida Office Space Lease Akerman indicates : Landlords routinely require security deposits from their tenants before entering into a lease for commercial property. Security deposits are intended to provide the landlord with protection against damage to the leased premises and security for the tenant’s payment obligations under the lease. Question: What, if any, bright lines exist regarding whether a repair is reasonable after the tenant moves out? In particular: repairs to surfaces such as ceilings, floors, walls, bathroom fixtures. Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable?

Question: What, if any, bright lines exist regarding whether a repair is reasonable after the tenant moves out? In particular: repairs to surfaces such as ceilings, floors, walls, bathroom fixtures. Unless the lease specifically says so, no, there are no bright line rules. This said, usually non-residential leases spell out standards related to this issue at considerable length. It would be the rare exception for a lease to be silent on the subject unless the premises were extremely primitive and low in value (e.g. vacant land or a parking lot in a rural area). Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable? The general rule of thumb is that damage in excess of reasonable wear and tear, and substantial changes to the premises that were not authorized by the lease, are damages that the landlord can recover from the tenant and can use as a basis to make deduction from the security deposit. This is not a bright line rule and is instead, a general "standard".

Can I make an auto shop pay for oil damage from a defective oil filter?

About ten days ago I had a flat tired replaced at a local shop and added an oil change to the work order. A day later I notice a huge oil stain (about 3 ft x 10 ft) that flowed over the pavers on my driveway. I went back to the car shop for an evaluation and was informed that the oil filter was defective. They replaced it and went on my way. I can’t get the oil off the driveway after multiple attempts with multiple suggestions. In California do I have legal recourse for repair or replacing the affected pavers?

You can sue the shop for defective installation, or you can sue the manufacturer for a defective part. You will have to prove that it is the fault of the person that you are suing, so the shop will probably argue that it was a defective part that they couldn't have known about, and the manufacturer will probably argue that it was due to defective installation. If you have competent third-party testimony that proves that the part itself was defective, you may prevail, though if you can get them to write up a technical report that supports your contention, the manufacturer may simplify things by compensating you, if you waive your right to sue for damages. However, this may not be an option unless the shop retained the filter and can point to a specific manufacturing defect.

When is cursing illegal in the U.S.?

For example, I've heard before that it's actually illegal to swear at a police officer (I've also heard that's true in the U.K. as well, although that's not my question). However, what counts as "swearing" is a very subjective thing, and clearly there are plenty of contexts where no word is off-limits (because, thankfully, free speech is a thing here), so it seems like a difficult thing to enforce. I've also never heard of anyone actually being prosecuted for this. So, the three parts of my question are: When is it illegal to swear, if ever (I'm guessing this probably varies a lot by state, so I'd be okay with just a federal law answer)? What actually counts as swearing (under each law / circumstance)? What penalties would I be facing (under each law / circumstance)?

Denver lawyer David Lane has said , “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning . (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld : Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “ fucking queer ,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld : Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones ) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court . ( You get no jury for contempt cases. ) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017) . The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."

When is cursing illegal in the U.S.?

For example, I've heard before that it's actually illegal to swear at a police officer (I've also heard that's true in the U.K. as well, although that's not my question). However, what counts as "swearing" is a very subjective thing, and clearly there are plenty of contexts where no word is off-limits (because, thankfully, free speech is a thing here), so it seems like a difficult thing to enforce. I've also never heard of anyone actually being prosecuted for this. So, the three parts of my question are: When is it illegal to swear, if ever (I'm guessing this probably varies a lot by state, so I'd be okay with just a federal law answer)? What actually counts as swearing (under each law / circumstance)? What penalties would I be facing (under each law / circumstance)?

A recent state supreme court case spoke directly to this issue. Ruling date: June 25, 2015. The U.S. Constitution protects your right to curse at the police. The Seattle Times reports here that the Washington State Supreme Court has ruled in the case of State of Washington v. E.J.J. : " First Amendment protects profanity against police " A teenage boy convicted of obstruction after yelling and cursing at three Seattle police officers while they were investigating a disturbance at his house had a First Amendment right to behave the way he did, the Washington Supreme Court said in an opinion Thursday. Citizens who curse at police and call them abusive names while they’re investigating a crime are protected from arrest by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, the state Supreme Court ruled Thursday in a case out of Seattle.

When is cursing illegal in the U.S.?

For example, I've heard before that it's actually illegal to swear at a police officer (I've also heard that's true in the U.K. as well, although that's not my question). However, what counts as "swearing" is a very subjective thing, and clearly there are plenty of contexts where no word is off-limits (because, thankfully, free speech is a thing here), so it seems like a difficult thing to enforce. I've also never heard of anyone actually being prosecuted for this. So, the three parts of my question are: When is it illegal to swear, if ever (I'm guessing this probably varies a lot by state, so I'd be okay with just a federal law answer)? What actually counts as swearing (under each law / circumstance)? What penalties would I be facing (under each law / circumstance)?

Although swearing at a police officer in itself is not illegal , the police are very likely to try to find something else to charge you with – along the lines of " contempt of cop ." The law is very nuanced, one cannot say that anything is blanket legal or illegal.

When is cursing illegal in the U.S.?

For example, I've heard before that it's actually illegal to swear at a police officer (I've also heard that's true in the U.K. as well, although that's not my question). However, what counts as "swearing" is a very subjective thing, and clearly there are plenty of contexts where no word is off-limits (because, thankfully, free speech is a thing here), so it seems like a difficult thing to enforce. I've also never heard of anyone actually being prosecuted for this. So, the three parts of my question are: When is it illegal to swear, if ever (I'm guessing this probably varies a lot by state, so I'd be okay with just a federal law answer)? What actually counts as swearing (under each law / circumstance)? What penalties would I be facing (under each law / circumstance)?

You're asking about an exception to the right to free speech, and it turns out there's a good page on that question on Wikipedia . I was amused to discover that, among the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court, are "fighting words" and "offensive speech," which I believe would be the closest proscriptions on "cursing." ("Threats of violence" are also generally not protected.) I expect there is a good deal of variation in how U.S. jurisdictions have chosen to regulate and control unprotected speech. I would also be interested to see examples. One recent case that directly addresses your question is Washington v. E.J.J. , in which the Washington Supreme Court confirmed that the First Amendment protects the right to curse at police .

Does GDPR apply when PII is already publicly available?

Pretend there is a website, it might be free to access, or be a paid per search service, where the users get access to summarised information on the people that they search for. All of the information this website displays has been taken from public sources, such as news papers, personal profiles on company websites, LinkedIn, Facebook, other websites etc... Nothing has been copied from these sources, aside from the person's full name and position (such as secretary). The people have never consented to having their data published onto this website, it was mined manually by employees. Would the people be allowed to request their data be removed? I am interested in how GDPR or the Data Protection Act would apply when this information is already publicly available.

The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time.

is it illegal for a minor to contact a minor if the second minor's parents have instructed them not to do so?

I am 16 yrs old and my boyfriend's parents have told my boyfriend not to contact me (and have told me not to contact him) because they disapprove, and believe I am not a real person since they have never actually met me. My boyfriend however has met me before he moved. We mainly talk online now, and they say I may be predator or something malicious, which is not true. They told him not to contact me, but I reached out to him and his best friend online to let him know that I would be willing to have a phone call with them so they could talk to me and get to know me and realize I'm a real person. Thus: is it illegal for me to contact him if his parents told him not to, even though I initiated the contact and he was really just talking to me because he cares to try to fix it between us?

If, so far, you only had contact trough phone or internet, it is somewhat understandable that parents are afraid that their son/daughter falls for some internet-rip-off or some pervert with a fake profile. It may upset your or his parents, but continued contact is not in itself illegal (illegal as in "you could be sent to jail for it"), just because they say so. The parents could in theory get a restraining order or inform the youth safety agency (or however that is called in your place), but to do that, they would need to provide some rationale as to why they think that you (or your boyfriend) are an impostor. I think, this should really be solved on the social level, and your best option would really be to physically meet your boyfriend, maybe even when your or his parents are around. After all, Romeo and Julia didn't stop meeting just because they weren't allowed to...

Neighbor has a leak on their ceiling

I am having an issue with my downstairs neighbor. The neighbor has a damaged leaking ceiling with brownish color (which might be an issue for a long time) and is saying that the wet ceiling was observed just a few days ago. We have had heavy rain pouring over the past few days. The neighbor continues insisting that it is my fault even though I do not have a leak on my end. I contacted the property management right away and called a plumber. He came in and inspected my 2 bathrooms and found NO leak. He suggested it might be an issue with the roof or the ventilation but I still provided my insurance to the neighbor. I communicated this to the association but now he doesn’t believe my plumber’s inspection and he personally is making an accusation that this issue is from my unit. I find this unacceptable because the property manager is not a plumber but he has these demands and tells me that the plumber needs to remove my toilet and take a look. Why would they come in and mess with my toilet if it turns out it is not actually the toilet but the roof instead? Let me know what you think but I believe they should cut into my neighbor's ceiling and figure out the source of the leak and if it is my toilet okay go ahead and fix it. Especially when I already provided my insurance details.

From the legal perspective, nobody has to do anything until the court orders somebody to do something. The most likely order from a court would be "compensate X for your actions or inactions". Barring some peculiar circumstance, either you or the HOA would be liable to the downstairs person. You can look at the CCRs to see who is responsible for what, which mainly involves finding boundaries (where is the unit, and where are the common areas?). At some point, someone has to figure out what caused the damage. It is possible that via negligence, you caused damage (maybe the plumber was simply wrong); or maybe this is about rain, the ventilation system, and the common areas where the HOA is responsible. Whatever the case may be, the person below would sue to recover his cost of fixing the problem. Property owners often have insurance that insures against damage to their property – it sounds like you have such insurance, and the guy below has insurance. It's also possible that the HOA has insurance. Each insurer has a duty to their client, so the company of the guy below has a duty to him (they protect his interest), your insurer protects your interest, etc. The guy below is not required to figure out what the problem is and who to sue, he just has to notify his insurance company of the problem, and start the process of making a claim. That company naturally wants to limit their losses and collect from whoever is ultimately legally liable. You are under no legal obligation to respond to a neighbor's accusation, until the issue is formally escalated (the threat of a lawsuit, directly filed by him or by his insurance company). You don't have to accept or reject his beliefs. If there are no insurance companies involved, and if you are certain that this is the responsibility of the HOA, then you would probably not consider taking on unnecessary expenses to diagnose the problem. The guy below would have to shoulder the burden of proving that it is either you or the HOA that is liable.

Why does Double Jeopardy apply if you confess?

If you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person. Where is the justice in not being able to be tried again in those circumstances? There is now no doubt that you were in fact guilty - why tie the court/police's hands? For example, the case of Emmett Till, where the murderers freely admitted that they did it after the fact, and could not be tried again.

In the United States, prohibition against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection . As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has a less strict form , even though generally, special pleas of autrefois acquit would be available. It is also not the case that after an apparent "confession" in public that there is "no doubt" about a person's guilt. No evidence is "certain" in law without being tested in court. Also, you propose: you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was "wrong" about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable. You ask "where is the justice?" The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of "justice" across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the "correct" result in every particular case. The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the "correct" result in every case.

Why does Double Jeopardy apply if you confess?

If you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person. Where is the justice in not being able to be tried again in those circumstances? There is now no doubt that you were in fact guilty - why tie the court/police's hands? For example, the case of Emmett Till, where the murderers freely admitted that they did it after the fact, and could not be tried again.

Just because I believe I’m guilty doesn’t mean I am All crimes contain elements, each of which must be true for someone to be guilty. Yes, I shot the victim, yes, I intended to kill him, yes, he’s now dead, yes, I believe I’m guilty. But if he died in his sleep just before I pulled the trigger, I’m not. Confessions can be lies I know it might shock you, but people are not always telling the truth when they confess to a crime. There are various reasons why someone might do this: mistaken belief, protecting someone else, status etc. Grotesque as it is, in the Emmett Till case, the acquitted men would have received a great deal of status in their community if they had committed the crime - that could be enough incentive for them to falsely confess. Conflicting objects of the legal system Justice is only one of the purposes of our legal system. Others include efficiency and finality. Society can have only as much justice as it can afford - in both time and treasure. Yes, it would be more just if every case reached the correct result but it’s just too damn expensive. Similarly, the legal process must come to a final and definitive end. It is neither efficient nor just for the process to be never ending. Finally, in a criminal matter, compared to any given individual, the state has near limitless resources. It’s important not to allow the justice system to become a tool of persecution. You can’t allow the state to keep feeding coins into the slot machine until they hit the jackpot of a jury that agrees with them. Some jurisdictions do allow retrials in certain situations The rule against double jeopardy in the USA is a constitutional protection and, unless that changes, it is absolutely prohibited. Other common law jurisdictions such as the UK and some Australian states allow the rule to be broken for serious crimes (like murder) where there is “fresh and compelling evidence”. An unsworn confession by the accused isn’t very compelling.

Why does Double Jeopardy apply if you confess?

If you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person. Where is the justice in not being able to be tried again in those circumstances? There is now no doubt that you were in fact guilty - why tie the court/police's hands? For example, the case of Emmett Till, where the murderers freely admitted that they did it after the fact, and could not be tried again.

In the U.S., the bar against double jeopardy exists because court cases cost money both to the defendant and the tax payer. Since it is the state that can bring criminal cases and the state that has superior resources in evidence gathering, the law was implemented to prevent the state from ruining an innocent person by repeatedly trying them in court at the tax payer's expense. Additionally, it is to prevent the state, having once failed to convince the jury, to retry with another jury and continue to do so until they get a verdict they like. While there are occasions where Double Jeopardy does not attach, these are exceedingly rare (one of the few times it was done without declaring a mistrial was in a case where the judge in a bench trial was bribed to return a not guilty verdict. Because the defendant was never in a legal jeopardy situation, it was ruled he could be tried again for the same criminal event). Additionally, the State and Federal Government are separate sovereigns for the purposes of Double Jeopardy, and while the Federal Government does not normally try someone who is tried by the state regardless of outcome, it is certainly possible for them to do so as the rules preventing them are policy, not law.

Why does Double Jeopardy apply if you confess?

If you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person. Where is the justice in not being able to be tried again in those circumstances? There is now no doubt that you were in fact guilty - why tie the court/police's hands? For example, the case of Emmett Till, where the murderers freely admitted that they did it after the fact, and could not be tried again.

Another advantage of double jeopardy protection, beyond what has been mentioned already, is that it helps the truth to come out after the trial is over. For example, the murderers of Emmett Till would likely not have freely admitted to the crime had the possibility of criminal penalties still existed. There are several cases where this provides historians information that otherwise would have remained hidden.

Is operating a part-time beacon in the 10-metre band permitted?

Consider the text of 47 CFR § 97.203 - Beacon station , with the following scenario: Sally is a radio operator turning her station into a part-time beacon. She is class Extra and is allowed in all of the portions of each of the bands. Sally places her beacon in the middle of the ten meter band. Is Sally in violation of this regulation, subsection (d) in particular?

The key part of (e) is the National Radio Quiet Zone that covers parts of east-central West Virginia and west-central Virginia. Because of radio telescopes and military intelligence equipment in the area, there are restrictions (increasingly strict as you get closer) on potential radio interference. A radio source that would be no problem in most of the world can be a major problem when you are trying to pick up a radio signal from a few billion light-years away. So if Sally is in the National Radio Quiet Zone, she has to notify the National Radio Astronomy Observatory who will consider the power, location, etc. of the proposed beacon, and determine if it will potentially interfere with the radio telescopes before granting permission. If they grant permission, Sally is fine. Otherwise the FCC will decide what Sally can do. If Sally is outside the National Radio Quiet Zone, then (e) doesn't apply. So more information is needed before we can know if Sally is legal or not, but as a general rule: Outside the National Radio Quiet Zone, probably ok, inside it, will have to ask for permission.

Is operating a part-time beacon in the 10-metre band permitted?

Consider the text of 47 CFR § 97.203 - Beacon station , with the following scenario: Sally is a radio operator turning her station into a part-time beacon. She is class Extra and is allowed in all of the portions of each of the bands. Sally places her beacon in the middle of the ten meter band. Is Sally in violation of this regulation, subsection (d) in particular?

Looking at another paragraph in 47 CFR Part 97 we find § 97.101 which states (a) In all respects not specifically covered by FCC Rules each amateur station must be operated in accordance with good engineering and good amateur practice. The principal organization for US amateurs is the American Radio Relay League, and they publish a band plan which calls for beacons in the 10 meter band be in the range 28.200-28.300 MHz, which is not the "middle" of the 10 meter band. If Alice were to establish a beacon in a way not in accord with the band plan, it's possible that the FCC Regional Director might exercise the authority under 97.203 (f) and order Alice to cease operating the beacon.

Is operating a part-time beacon in the 10-metre band permitted?

Consider the text of 47 CFR § 97.203 - Beacon station , with the following scenario: Sally is a radio operator turning her station into a part-time beacon. She is class Extra and is allowed in all of the portions of each of the bands. Sally places her beacon in the middle of the ten meter band. Is Sally in violation of this regulation, subsection (d) in particular?

97.203(d) works together with 97.109(b) through (d): (b) When a station is being locally controlled, the control operator must be at the control point. Any station may be locally controlled. (c) When a station is being remotely controlled, the control operator must be at the control point. Any station may be remotely controlled. (d) When a station is being automatically controlled, the control operator need not be at the control point. Only stations specifically designated elsewhere in this part may be automatically controlled. If Sally is operating a beacon outside of the frequencies designated in 97.203(d), 97.203(d) doesn't authorize automatic control. Given that none of the other provisions for automatic control apply (97.201(d), 97.205(d), and 97.221 don't seem like they apply in your scenario), the station must be locally or remotely controlled. Sally (or another licensed operator designated by Sally) needs to be present and monitoring the station while it transmits. Walking out of the room and leaving the radio alone would be a violation. Given that a control operator is present then it would seem that this section is satisfied even while beaconing outside of the beacon subbands, however 97.101(a) and 97.101(b) could certainly be an issue as pointed out by Gerard Ashton .

Would it by libel if I told someone one of their friends is a thief?

Considering US law in general - An associate (call him Patrick) stole a fair bit of money over several years. I eventually severed all business relations and blocked Patrick on all platforms. I have no wish to spend my valuable life pursuing him in courts. I keep getting invitations on LinkedIn *as an example) from people whose first few contacts are Patrick. It may be that Patrick is using fake accounts to try and associate with me. But even if these are genuine profiles, would it be libel if I just told them that 'I dont want to associate with friends of a thief'. I won't be identifying who that person is. But if they know Patrick well enough they will know who I mean.

If your statement is true, it is not libel. But if it is false, it is libel. It does not matter if you directly name him, what matters is if he can be specifically identified by others. Not all others, but at least some others.

Legal status of animals in Germany

How has Germany has dealt with the legal status of animals? What, if any, transition has taken place from a thing to a creature in a legal context? This question is prompted by a sentence found in the BBC article Cat declawing: Should it be banned, and why does it happen in the US? For Americans, it's a matter of freedom and convenience – the right to the freedom to make decisions in terms of how you raise your cat, and convenience, because once you remove the claws, you don't ever have to worry about you or the furniture getting scratched.

Section 20a of the German Constitution added in 2002 states: Article 20a [Protection of the natural foundations of life and animals] Mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order. This adopts what American environmentalists would call a "conservationist" stance (i.e. that the environment including animals should be preserved for the benefit of people in the future) as opposed to an "environmentalist" stance (i.e. that the environment is intrinsically something entitled to protection in its own right and not just because of its future value to human beings). The German Civil Code (BGB) § 90a, adopted in 1990 (or 1998, it isn't entirely clear from my sources), states (in the definitional introductory part of the Code (in English translation) ). This appears in a larger context as follows: Division 2 Things and animals Section 90 Concept of the thing Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law. Section 90a Animals Animals are not things. They are protected by special statutes. They are governed by the provisions that apply to things, with the necessary modifications, except insofar as otherwise provided. Section 91 Fungible things Fungible things as defined by law are movable things that in business dealings are customarily specified by number, measure or weight. Section 92 Consumable things (1)Consumable things as defined by law are movable things whose intended use consists in consumption or in disposal. (2)Movable things are also regarded as consumable if they are part of a warehouse store or another aggregate of things whose intended use is the disposal of the individual things. Section 93 Essential parts of a thing Parts of a thing that cannot be separated without one or the other being destroyed or undergoing a change of nature (essential parts) cannot be the subject of separate rights. Section 94 Essential parts of a plot of land or a building (1)The essential parts of a plot of land include the things firmly attached to the land, in particular buildings, and the produce of the plot of land, as long as it is connected with the land. Seed becomes an essential part of the plot of land when it is sown, and a plant when it is planted. (2)The essential parts of a building include the things inserted in order to construct the building. Section 95 Merely temporary purpose (1)The parts of a plot of land do not include things that are connected with the land only for a temporary purpose. The same applies to a building or other structure that is connected with a plot of land belonging to another by a person exercising a right over that land. (2)Things that are inserted into a building for a temporary purpose are not parts of the building. Section 96 Rights as parts of a plot of land Rights that are connected with the ownership of a plot of land are regarded as parts of the plot of land. Section 97 Accessories (1)Accessories are movable things that, without being parts of the main thing, are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main thing and are in a spatial relationship to it that corresponds to this intention. A thing is not an accessory if it is not regarded as an accessory in business dealings. (2)The temporary use of a thing for the economic purpose of another thing does not give it the quality of an accessory. The temporary separation of an accessory from the main thing does not deprive it of the quality of an accessory. Section 98 Commercial and agricultural inventory The following are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main thing: in the case of a building that is permanently equipped for commercial operations, in particular a mill, a smithy, a brewery or a factory, the machinery and other equipment intended for the business, in the case of a farm, the equipment and livestock intended for the commercial operations, the agricultural produce, to the extent that it is necessary to continue the farming until the time when it is expected that the same or similar produce will be obtained, and manure produced on the farm. Section 99 Fruits (1)Fruits of a thing are the products of the thing and the other yield obtained from the thing in accordance with its intended use. (2)Fruits of a right are the proceeds that the right produces in accordance with its intended use, in particular, in the case of a right to extract component parts of the soil, the parts extracted. (3)Fruits are also the proceeds supplied by a thing or a right by virtue of a legal relationship. Section 100 Emoluments Emoluments are the fruits of a thing or of a right and the benefits that the use of the thing or the right affords. Section 101 Division of fruits If a person is entitled to receive the fruits of a thing or of a right until a particular time or from a particular time on, he is entitled to the following, unless otherwise provided: the products and parts stated in section 99 (1), even if he is to receive them as the fruits of a right, to the extent that they are separated from the thing during the period of entitlement, other fruits to the extent that they are due during the period of entitlement; however, if the fruits consist in remuneration for permission of use or of enjoyment of fruits and benefits, in interest, in profit shares or other periodically paid income, the person entitled has a right to a share corresponding to the duration of his entitlement. Section 102 Reimbursement of costs of production A person who has a duty to hand over fruits may claim reimbursement of the costs of producing the fruits to the extent that they reflect proper business practices and do not exceed the value of the fruits. Section 103 Allocation of charges A person who has a duty to bear the charges on a thing or a right until a specified time or from a specified time on must, unless otherwise provided, bear the periodically recurring charges in the proportion of the period of time of his duty, and bear other charges to the extent that they are payable during the period of time in which he has the duty. Some of the word choices are not the most idiomatic ways to translate into American legal English. A better translation for "things" would be "tangible property". A more natural translation of Section 90a in American Legal English would be: Animals are not property. They are protected by special statutes. They are governed by the provisions that apply to tangible personal property, with the necessary modifications, except insofar as otherwise provided. Similarly, the word "fruits" while understandable, would more often be translated into American Legal English as "proceeds", and American law wouldn't really make the distinction between "Fruits" in Section 99, and "Enoluments" in Section 100, at all. Also, most American jurisdictions would, unlike Article 90a, usually focus on the distinction between "pets" or "companion animals" and property, while not doing so for livestock in most circumstances, as the German civil code does. One of the classic trick questions on the American bar exam is to set up a criminal law question involving what would an an assault or a murder, but to substitute a dog or a cat for a person, which transforms the crime into theft or vandalism, since in the criminal law, animals are generally treated as property subject to some specific exceptions for animal cruelty and blackmail. German law addresses to some extent that sense that trips up American law students each year, that this absolute treatment of animals as having merely property status, derived from English common law, is unduly harsh. Two recent law review articles explain what these recent changes in the legal status of animals in Germany mean. A law review article from 2004 explores the important changes in the legal status of animals in Germany that occurred in 2002. The abstract of the article explains: In the summer of 2002, Germany welcomed animals into the folds of constitutional protection. With the addition of the words “and the animals,” Germany became the first country in the European Union (“E.U.”), and the second on the European continent,1 to guarantee the highest level of federal legal protection to its nonhuman animals. Though a welcomed development in the eyes of most Germans, this groundbreaking event received very little attention on the world stage. Common misconceptions about the ramifications of the constitutional amendment resulted in limited to no accurate representation in worldwide media. Likewise, international policymakers and animal protectionists have shown little awareness of this development and its potential implications. In addition to possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence in a major western country are vast. International leaders will certainly take note as the effects of this change begin to take place in Germany’s laws and, increasingly, in its international policies. More importantly, the global animal protection community should take note of what is possible, and what can be learned from the achievements of Germany’s animal protection community. This study traces the legal and social developments leading to Germany’s constitutional amendment which provides protection to animals, showing how this legal highpoint was achieved. Multiple sources are used, including congressional, judicial, and party documents, press releases, international media reports, personal communication with leaders in four major German animal protection organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published materials. This study will also critically assess the claims of the animal protection and opposition communities in order to predict where German animal law is going and what effects this change will have on the treatment of animals both within Germany and internationally. Concluding thoughts will address how the international animal protection community can understand this legal victory in a constructive context. Footnote 1 in the abstract states: BV 1992 § 24 (in 1992, Switzerland recognized the inherent worth of animals (die W¨urde der Lebewesen) in its constitution). Federal laws of a similar manner exist in Germany (Animal Protection Law implemented Sept. 1, 1990, art. 90a Tierschutzgesetz in der Fassung der Bekantuachung (Tierschutzgesetz), v. March 25, 1998 (BGB 1 I 1094) [hereinafter Tierschutzgesetz], and Austria (Art. 285 ABGB implemented July 1, 1988), but Switzerland was the first country to acknowledge the interests of animals within its national constitution. This development had virtually no international impact, however, and receives little attention outside of Switzerland. The abstract of a 2010 law review article on the topic further explains: In 2002, an animal protection clause was added to Article 20a of the German Constitution. Designed as a state objective, the nature of the animal protection clause decidedly influences its application. As a state objective, it is directed at all three branches of government, and each branch must ensure within its sphere of competence the realization of the stated goal. The Federal Constitutional Court has yet to address the precise scope of the provision. This Article examines the likely future effects of the animal protection clause. With respect to the legislative branch, this Article addresses the question of whether the state objective demands that a standing provision be created for animal protection groups. With respect to the judicial and executive branches, this Article focuses on three fundamental rights that are most likely to come into conflict with animal protection: freedom of religion; freedom of teaching, science, and research; and freedom of artistic expression. Seismic shifts in constitutional adjudication are not likely to be expected. The provision does not give rights to animals. However, at a minimum, it prohibits circumventing the Animal Protection Act by construing that statute in light of the Constitution. The animal protection clause removed the disproportionality between certain fundamental rights and the interest in animal protection. It mandates a balancing of constitutional interests and eliminates doubts regarding the constitutionality of the Animal Protection Act, especially with respect to the fundamental rights discussed.

What is the legal case for someone getting arrested publicizing information about nuclear weapons deduced from public knowledge

I have a vague memory of a court case involving a man being prosecuted for publicizing information about nuclear weapons. He obtained that information by logic deduction and probably calculations from all the public knowledge (newspapers, tv, etc). I have not been able to find that case. Does anyone know which is?

You are likely thinking of United States v. The Progressive, Inc. , 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) and the related injunction against a letter by Charles R. Hansen. However, these were not prosecutions; they were applications by the United States for injunctions to prevent the publication of the material. The allegation relating to The Progressive was that an article due to be published would be in violation of the "born secret" clause of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following). The author was journalist Howard Morland. That act declares as restricted (see 42 U.S.C. 2014 ): all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title. The U.S. argued: that its national security interest also permits it to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States. It is not universally accepted that the information was actually gleaned wholly from public knowledge, but that would not have made a difference to the government's position on the injunction. There was a related letter by Charles R. Hansen, containing instructions for a hydrogen bomb, that was also enjoined by the United States against being published in the Daily Californian . This was eventually the one actually first published, and is known colloquially as "the Hansen Letter." Ultimately, after the Hansen letter was published in The Press Connection and the Chicago Tribune (two publications not enjoined by court order), the government withdrew its request to prevent the publication, and the other publications went forward.

What is the legal case for someone getting arrested publicizing information about nuclear weapons deduced from public knowledge

I have a vague memory of a court case involving a man being prosecuted for publicizing information about nuclear weapons. He obtained that information by logic deduction and probably calculations from all the public knowledge (newspapers, tv, etc). I have not been able to find that case. Does anyone know which is?

As Jen said, there were no prosecutions but during the Manhattan Project, there were several investigations of possible leaks that discussed things remotely close to the actual work being conducted. One notable incident a cartoonist named Alvin Schwartz came under investigation of having received nuclear secrets from the Manhattan project employees after he penned and published a Superman story for the daily newspaper strip that use of the term "cyclotron." At the time, cyclotrons were real devices that were used (and still used) to separate fissile material from non-fissile material. The investigation was halted after Shwartz explained that he first read the term in a "Popular Mechanics" article that was published over a decade prior to his own use of the term. It's important to note that any time classified tech is described accurately in fiction or public articles, the authors are typically investigated to identify the leaker who gave them the secrets. Tom Clancy was once investigated for describing near perfectly the working mechanics of some tech that allowed U.S. Submarines to run quietly. Turns out no one told Clancy, he had just read publicly available info and made an educated guess about what was going on and turned out to be incredibly accurate. In training to handle classified material, this is something that those holding a clearance of any type are trained to be aware of. Two documents that are not classified may, in combination, reveal classified info. For example, one document that reveals Mr. James Bond is an employee at MI6, another document might reveal that Mr. Bond filed for travel expenses to Moscow on February 14th, and a third document that confirms that Agent 007 arrived in Moscow alive and well on the 15th of February. Separately, they might not reveal much, but combined, it can be deduce that Agent 007 and James Bond are one and the same, which could prove bad for Mr. Bond, now that it's open knowledge it's assumed that Russia knows who he is. If he's still in Russia, this could get him arrested or killed. Let's hope Q doesn't leave his schematics lying around. It should also be noted that, in the U.S. at least, a journalist or other civilian with no access to classified documents is rarely prosecuted for publishing classified info but may be put under intense scrutiny as the assumption is that they are working with an insider to expose secrets. The investigation is usually looking for the source of the leak. In the case of someone who deduced it from publicly available info, this might be useful in determining how to write stuff for the public consumption to prevent it. In the case of an actual source feeding them something they should not know, it could be met with disciplinary action (At the very least, it's a good way to get yourself fired. At the worst, it's a jail sentence.). While Prior Restraint (Government action that prohibits speech or expression prior to it being made) is allowed in the U.S., it is under very limited circumstances that the publication of such information would "would cause inevitable, direct, and immediate danger to the United States." ( Source ) As such, it's very rarely granted or enforced in modern U.S. Law.

Who if anyone owns copyright of algorithmically produced works?

The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page). The process is described in their paper which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce many forms of work that would be copyrightable if produced by a human. Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way? Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim? I am aware of the different decisions that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different. This question is somewhat prompted by this answer , but the question is different. Any jurisdiction would be interesting. Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art

germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right ) can only be held by a natural person , which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them , there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.

Who if anyone owns copyright of algorithmically produced works?

The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page). The process is described in their paper which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce many forms of work that would be copyrightable if produced by a human. Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way? Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim? I am aware of the different decisions that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different. This question is somewhat prompted by this answer , but the question is different. Any jurisdiction would be interesting. Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art

The work is public domain australia To have original copyright a work must have a qualified person as author: “qualified person means an Australian citizen or a person resident in Australia.” The Regulations extend coverage to works published in international jurisdictions “as if the foreign work or subject‑matter were made or first published in Australia.” So, the still require a “qualified person” but the definition would be changed to substitute the foreign nationality/residence. Australian courts have held that AI can be listed as inventors (but not owners) of patents, the Patents Act does not require an inventor to be a person the way the Copyright Act does for an author. Current case law , Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 149, found that a predominantly computer created telephone directory was not subject to copyright due to the absence of an author.

Who if anyone owns copyright of algorithmically produced works?

The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page). The process is described in their paper which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce many forms of work that would be copyrightable if produced by a human. Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way? Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim? I am aware of the different decisions that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different. This question is somewhat prompted by this answer , but the question is different. Any jurisdiction would be interesting. Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art

Nobody has a copyright united-states A few years ago, there was a discussion if a monkey can have copyright , but the case settled. Now, USPTO enacted a rule together with the library of congress on 16th march 2023, that only a human can create a copyright interest. See their rule (emphasis mine): II. The Human Authorship Requirement In the [Copyright] Office's view, it is well-established that copyright can protect only material that is the product of human creativity. Most fundamentally, the term “author,” which is used in both the Constitution and the Copyright Act, excludes non-humans . The Office's registration policies and regulations reflect statutory and judicial guidance on this issue. [...] III. The Office's Application of the Human Authorship Requirement [...] When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship.[31] As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.[32]

Who if anyone owns copyright of algorithmically produced works?

The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page). The process is described in their paper which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce many forms of work that would be copyrightable if produced by a human. Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way? Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim? I am aware of the different decisions that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different. This question is somewhat prompted by this answer , but the question is different. Any jurisdiction would be interesting. Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art

Since the "contemporary artists" have not been dead for 70 years, their works are copyrighted and may be used as training data only with an appropriate license, which should specify terms under which derived works can be produced and whether royalties must be paid in return. For practical purposes, that means it makes no real difference if the trainer, operator or prompt gives acquire partial copyright, their contribution is dwarfed by that of the artists that produced the original works.

Who if anyone owns copyright of algorithmically produced works?

The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page). The process is described in their paper which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce many forms of work that would be copyrightable if produced by a human. Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way? Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim? I am aware of the different decisions that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different. This question is somewhat prompted by this answer , but the question is different. Any jurisdiction would be interesting. Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art

united-kingdom U.K. legislation allows for computer-generated work to be the subject of copyright. A work is computer generated when the work is "generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work." Further, In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken. However, it is widely recognized that this leaves ambiguity about who this would be in any given instance .