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Does copyright law prevent the destruction of works?

Does copyright law, in any jurisdiction, prevent the owner of a physical instance of a copyrighted work from destroying it? Are there other laws that allow the creator to prevent destruction of artworks by their owners?

united-states Under the UCC, uniform commercial code, you can find the "first sale doctrine". It is an exception to the copyright law, granting the buyer of a work the right to sell, display, or dispose of the copy. It also grants the right to use parts of the copy (e.g. I can shred a painting and weave a basket with the canvas strips) to create other works. Though it says "first buyer" the right attaches on a transfer of the copyright (i.e. a second sale). This is implied in the "dispose" section. ref This does not allow the buyer to create derivative works from the copyrighted material. One still cannot take photographs of a work and publish them as the original copyright sticks. The first sale doctrine attaches only to the material copy bought. The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. ref Note that the original IS a "copy" for the purposes of this statute, even if no other copies, as commonly understood in language, were made. The waters are muddy on digital copies or artwork that only exists in digital medium. EULAs and works sold under a license might change these rights. Such interactions are beyond the scope of this answer. Specific statutes might protect some historical or heritage artwork from destruction or further modification, though.

Does copyright law prevent the destruction of works?

Does copyright law, in any jurisdiction, prevent the owner of a physical instance of a copyrighted work from destroying it? Are there other laws that allow the creator to prevent destruction of artworks by their owners?

brazil Under Brazilian law, there are two distinct copyright laws. The material rights, that can be transferred, and the moral rights, that are inalienable. An artist can sell the artwork and transfer the former, but the latter remains with the artist for as long as the copyright remains (death of author +70 years). The patrimonial rights are the same as in other parts of the world. But the moral rights give the author the ability to: Claim authorship of the work . This can lead even to defamation or libel lawsuits if claims to the contrary arise. Be mentioned or to sign the artwork The author may demand that their name is displayed next to the artwork, or to actually sign or place a watermark on the work. Artwork integrity - The author may deny modifications or changes to the artwork that may be considered harmful to the image or honor of the author. Keep works unpublished and private - artworks cannot be published without the author permission. This permission is implicit with the sale or licensing but an author cannot be forced to publish a new work. right to withdrawal the author may request works to be removed from public view, unpublished or deleted if they harm their image or honor. Exercising this right may incur a penalty or other monetary sanctions to the author, however (i.e. to repay the losses incurred to a third party). Some of these rights might exist or be implied in other jurisdictions but they are explicitly stated in the Brazilian copyright law. ref_1 ref_2

Playing a game I didn't purchase (until now)

For about 6 months I've been playing my brother's copy of the original DOOM and DOOM 2. He purchased it on Steam, however there is no DRM lock-in on the actual IWAD gamefiles (all that's required to play the games). I became curious, at what point is it considered piracy. Lets begin with, I am playing it on his computer whenever he authorizes me to do so. Surely that can't be illegal. Later, I make a separate user account on Windows to play the same game (Steam has a feature of "Library sharing" on the same computer). Lets then say that I install Linux on his computer and play the same game, just from a different OS and user account. Is that still legal? Its still on his physical computer, and we cannot both play it at the same time due to there only being one computer. The instance of Linux is entirely there for me, not something he cares to use. Later I clone the Linux partition with all my files onto my own laptop, and play DOOM from there. At this point, we have 2 separate computers with the same exact original copy of one game. I'm guessing that isn't permitted by the EULA (not that anyone cares). My question is, where does the law draw the line? At what point does it become against the license policy? PS: I did actually end up buying the entire series, because I decided to record the MIDI music turning them into MP3's (and FLACs). I am located in Canada, and forgot to metion I am playing this via source port "GZDoom" licensed under GNU GPL3+ and MIT. Only the gamefiles (IWAD's) are subject to standard copyright.

At the point where you copy the game files, including the WADs, onto a new machine the original licensee (your brother) does not have access to, you are infringing copyright. Merely copying the files onto a Linux partition won't constitute infringement as it's the same commercial software on the same system, just with a different OS (IIRC correctly the Steam version of Doom uses DOSBOX, a DOS emulator, to run the original code on both Windows and Linux. The only difference between the Linux and Windows versions are the DOSBOX builds, and DOSBOX is open source software that permits this). To get it to actually run on Linux, you'd need to either get a source port or a copy of DOSBOX (both are free to download), but neither actions would change the legality of it.

What is the origin of the term “court” as a reference to the judicial institution?

Does the legal usage of the word court as in a court of law derive from the idea of a royal court, as an expression of the idea that the original courts of law were ultimately simple vehicles for the exercise or discharge of royal authority on behalf of the royal sovereign? If not, then what is the origin of the use of the word court to denote the judicial institutions that we call courts of law?

Does the legal usage of the word court as in a court of law derive from the idea of a royal court, as an expression of the idea that the original courts of law were ultimately simple vehicles for the exercise or discharge of royal authority on behalf of the royal sovereign? Yes : The meaning of a judicial assembly is first attested in the 12th century, and derives from the earlier usage to designate a sovereign and his entourage, which met to adjudicate disputes....

What's the default copyright transfer for a magazine article, in absence of a written contract?

Suppose an author sells an article to a magazine in the United States, but without a written contract and without any oral discussion of what rights were being sold. The magazine comes out containing the article, and everyone is happy. Now, many years later, the magazine wants to include the article in a new bound volume of the magazine's contents, without further permission from or payment to the author. Can the author object? In light of 17 USC sec. 204(a), I assume the burden of proof would be on the publisher to show a written agreement to transfer more than the right to publish the article once. And since there is no written agreement, the publisher would lose if the author took it to court. So, it seems like a simple answer. But in the law I'm always amazed to discover different angles and factors I hadn't thought of. Hence this post.

None Transfer of copyrights or exploitation rights always requires a written contract. Licensing does not require a written contract. HOWEVER.... "An author sells an article to a magazine" is a special situation: that is acceptance of the written terms of sale that were in place when the article was sold. That is a written contract, and typically they buy the article with very specific rights. And... things really can get murky for really old publications like Weird Tales

What's the default copyright transfer for a magazine article, in absence of a written contract?

Suppose an author sells an article to a magazine in the United States, but without a written contract and without any oral discussion of what rights were being sold. The magazine comes out containing the article, and everyone is happy. Now, many years later, the magazine wants to include the article in a new bound volume of the magazine's contents, without further permission from or payment to the author. Can the author object? In light of 17 USC sec. 204(a), I assume the burden of proof would be on the publisher to show a written agreement to transfer more than the right to publish the article once. And since there is no written agreement, the publisher would lose if the author took it to court. So, it seems like a simple answer. But in the law I'm always amazed to discover different angles and factors I hadn't thought of. Hence this post.

There is no default The terms of each contract define what rights are transferred and what are retained. Subject to the law in specific jurisdictions … In some jurisdictions, a copyright transfer requires a written agreement, in others, it doesn’t. However, I can grant an exclusive, perpetual, all-rights licence which is practically a copyright transfer without it having to be in writing. Some jurisdictions allow a licence or copyright transfer to be cancelled after a given time period. In some this may be automatic, in others, the author must take specific steps. Some do not allow the transfer of some rights - like moral rights, and others do not allow any transfer, while still others will let you give away the farm. Notwithstanding, assuming the contract is lawful in the relevant jurisdiction, then what it says goes. If there is dispute about the terms of the agreement, including disputes about if there was a written agreement now lost, well, courts resolve those types of disputes all the time. The consider the evidence and who bears the burden of proof on each assertion and make a ruling about what the agreement was. There may be testimony of people who witnessed the events, there may be testimony of standard-form contracts that were typically used at the time, there may be written correspondence, there may be payment slips, etc. The trier of fact has to weigh all that and decide who’s case is proved.

What's the default copyright transfer for a magazine article, in absence of a written contract?

Suppose an author sells an article to a magazine in the United States, but without a written contract and without any oral discussion of what rights were being sold. The magazine comes out containing the article, and everyone is happy. Now, many years later, the magazine wants to include the article in a new bound volume of the magazine's contents, without further permission from or payment to the author. Can the author object? In light of 17 USC sec. 204(a), I assume the burden of proof would be on the publisher to show a written agreement to transfer more than the right to publish the article once. And since there is no written agreement, the publisher would lose if the author took it to court. So, it seems like a simple answer. But in the law I'm always amazed to discover different angles and factors I hadn't thought of. Hence this post.

Your conclusion is correct under US law. 17 USC 204(a) says A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. Therefore, the magazine only has two legal options for publishing. First, if the author is an employee, the magazine is the author and this is a work for hire, which is contrary to your presumption. Second, the work may be licensed, which can include an implicit license. A transfer has to be sufficiently explicit that it is a complete transfer of rights, and not merely suggestive. Implied licenses are valid but their conditions are not crystal clear, see for example Latimer v Roaring Toyz, 601 F.3d 1224, Pelaez v McGraw Hill, 399 F. Supp. 3d 120. This instruction on implied licenses say how the defendant can establish that there is such a license. the defendant has the burden of proving that: the defendant requested that the plaintiff create a work; 2. the plaintiff made that particular work and delivered it to the defendant; and 3. the plaintiff intended that the defendant [copy] [distribute] [use] [retain] the plaintiff's work. If the court cares about the first test (which is a bit ritualistic), there was never an implied license, that is, the magazine erred in not securing a written license. An implied license cannot be perpetual or exclusive.

Why are some sections of the US Code formatted so weirdly?

There are actually two questions here. First , why are sections not in order? You have 28 USC §1 through §6, which talk about the Supreme Court, then you have §41 to §49 (appeals courts), then §81 to §144 (district courts) immediately afterwards. Why is this? Does Congress do this sort of thing to emphasize the "separation" between the types of definitions, or is it just the case that they're "reserving" numbers in case they need to add something (like §40 before §41)? Other examples of this: 17 USC §101 through §122, followed immediately by §201 to §205; 22 USC § 1 through §136, followed immediately by §141 to §183; 18 USC § 2381 through § 2391, followed immediately by § 2421 to § 2429. 51 USC § 10101 followed by § 20101, "implying" they skipped 10,100 sections (except they didn't). Second , why do certain portions of the US Code look like, well, these oddly listed names? Did Congress just run out of numbers or were they trying to "squeeze an entirely new section" in but couldn't quite make it? 16 USC §470x-6, § 470aaa, § 590z-11, §668ss 15 USC §77bbbb, 79z-6, 80b-21 22 USC §2799aa-2 42 USC §300mm-62, 1397mm, 2000aa-5, 2000bb-4, 2000gg-6 To me the US Code looks like, well, spaghetti code. And I know lawyers are the ones who look at it and I think they probably couldn't care less about how it looks as long as the law is there, but I'm just curious as to why they opted for the approach of sticking random letters on some of the numbers.

Many of the titles in the U.S. Code are not positive codifications . Instead they are consolidations, classifications, and editorial codifications made by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel. Title 42 (noted in phoog's answer) is not a positive codification. This means Congress did not choose its numbering scheme. Only the titles with an asterisk on this page have been enacted as positive law. Instead, the law codified into Title 42 are the various public statutes passed by Congress over the years that the Law Revision Counsel has included in Title 42. It is the public statutes that have the force of law. See e.g. Pub. L. 98-183 , whose elements the Law Revision Counsel put in Chapter 20A of Title 42. The Law Revision Counsel says: Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, is a non-positive law title. Title 42 is comprised of many individually enacted Federal statutes––such as the Public Health Service Act and the Social Security Act––that have been editorially compiled and organized into the title, but the title itself has not been enacted. Whether a provision of a public statute is included in the U.S. Code and where it will be included is determined by the Law Revision Counsel , although placement may be obvious when a statute amends an already codified statute. As for the cramped numbering ( contrary to the comment of Weather Vane , which says that insertions would require renumbering of subsequent clauses), the Law Revision Counsel says: Chapters based on statutes that have been amended many times may have cumbersome numbering schemes with section numbers such as 16 U.S.C. 460zzz-7 and 42 U.S.C. 300ff-111. Where the U.S. Code skips over large portions of section numbers this could be an intentional decision to leave room for growth, especially in a title that has undergone positive codification process through Congress, or it could be the result of previous sections that have been removed after repeal. For more background, see the detailed guide from the Law Revision Counsel.

Why are some sections of the US Code formatted so weirdly?

There are actually two questions here. First , why are sections not in order? You have 28 USC §1 through §6, which talk about the Supreme Court, then you have §41 to §49 (appeals courts), then §81 to §144 (district courts) immediately afterwards. Why is this? Does Congress do this sort of thing to emphasize the "separation" between the types of definitions, or is it just the case that they're "reserving" numbers in case they need to add something (like §40 before §41)? Other examples of this: 17 USC §101 through §122, followed immediately by §201 to §205; 22 USC § 1 through §136, followed immediately by §141 to §183; 18 USC § 2381 through § 2391, followed immediately by § 2421 to § 2429. 51 USC § 10101 followed by § 20101, "implying" they skipped 10,100 sections (except they didn't). Second , why do certain portions of the US Code look like, well, these oddly listed names? Did Congress just run out of numbers or were they trying to "squeeze an entirely new section" in but couldn't quite make it? 16 USC §470x-6, § 470aaa, § 590z-11, §668ss 15 USC §77bbbb, 79z-6, 80b-21 22 USC §2799aa-2 42 USC §300mm-62, 1397mm, 2000aa-5, 2000bb-4, 2000gg-6 To me the US Code looks like, well, spaghetti code. And I know lawyers are the ones who look at it and I think they probably couldn't care less about how it looks as long as the law is there, but I'm just curious as to why they opted for the approach of sticking random letters on some of the numbers.

Does Congress do this sort of thing to emphasize the "separation" between the types of definitions, or is it just the case that they're "reserving" numbers in case they need to add something (like §40 before §41)? You could look at it both ways. The first section in a chapter or subchapter is often one more than a multiple of 100, so 1, 101, 201, etc. This emphasizes the topical grouping but it also leaves space for new sections at the end of each subchapter. Did Congress just run out of numbers or were they trying to "squeeze an entirely new section" in but couldn't quite make it? Yes. There are instances of both. It does create a good deal of confusion, as you've noticed. For example, chapter 20A of title 42 comprises sections 1975, 1975a, 1975b, etc. But section 1975 also has a subsection 1975(a). Similarly, 1975a has a subsection 1975a(a). Confusing! For some reason, congress decided to squeeze almost the entirety of civil rights legislation between section 2000 and section 2001 (part of chapter 21 and all of chapters 21A through 21G). Why, I do not know.

How could someone whose trades are being copied be liable to the person who is doing the copying?

It is reported that someone was copying the trades of a noted NFT trader. This noted NFT trader profited from this by making an inflated bids on one of his own NFTs, and when the copycat replicated the trades on other NFTs they were purchased for ~10 times the usual rate. The copycat (ThinkingETH) has since described the loss as "stolen funds", and someone said : I unironically think @ThinkingETH might have good legal claims to get their ETH back from the bot 'trick' if they hire a skilled litigator. Legally the issues are a bit more nuanced than they might be normatively from the standpoint of cryptotwitter. Is there a case here? Is there some nuanced issues that could mean that the seller is responsible for the seller to have "stolen" from the buyer? Is there a civil case to be made that the funds should be returned? Any jurisdiction would be interesting, as it seems to matter little where these events occur.

This type of fraud is called shill bidding Unless the rules of the auction allow it, a vendor is not permitted to bid on their own item. Even when they are, such vendor bids may be disclosed. The relevant laws date from well before the rise of online auctions but they are just as applicable. There have been successful prosecutions to my knowledge, including jail time, in the USA and the UK . A quick Google search shows these are not unique. A victim of such a fraud can seek restitution through a civil claim.

Is avoiding captcha illegal?

This question came to mind reviewing this SO answer. There is this similar question here , but it's 8 years old, and covers only the UK and north America. So, I would like to know if, in the European Union, or at least in France, whether bypassing/avoiding captcha is illegal or not.

It’s not “bypassing the captcha” that is the problem, but accessing a server in a way that you are not allowed to. Say you are a human being, you visit a website, there’s a captcha, and your eyesight is quite bad. The website is ok with humans using the site. So asking your nephew to enter the captcha is fine. Now you are running a bot network. The site doesn’t want your bots. The captcha is there to stop them. The problem is not these bots getting around the captcha, it’s them accessing the server. The captcha might make sure that the site counts as “protected” though, which might make accessing it without authorisation more serious.

When does s3(1) of the Defamation Act *not* apply in malicious falesehood cases?

To successfully bring a claim for maliicous falsehood in the UK, one has to show that one has suffered "special damages", which are actual damages suffered as a direct consequence of a malicious, false statement. However, one does not have to do this if s3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 applies. This is below: In an action for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damage— (a) if the words upon which the action is founded are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form; or (b) if the said words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication. But surely this section of the Act would always apply. The loss suffered as a result of a statement is always going to be economic (e.g., lost investment, sales, etc.) and the statement being malicious means that it was intended to cause damage when it was made. Thus, whis this section of the Act considered to be an exception to the general rule, when in fact it would seem to apply in all cases?

The section exempts the plaintiff from having to prove or even plead special damages when they instead plead and prove that the words were intended to cause pecuniary (even if not yet realized) damages This statutory exception has also been adopted in Canadian jurisdictions and they have turned to U.K. jurisprudence to understand its meaning ( Almas et al. v. Spenceley , [1972] 2 O.R. 429 (C.A.)): The Court was referred to a number of cases under the law as it then stood whereby it was strictly required that special damages be set forth in the pleading and whereby no plea of general damages would be entertained. This was changed in England by the Defamation Act, 1952 (U.K.), c. 66, s. 3 (1), and here by a similar section, s. 19(a) of the Libel and Slander Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 51 ... The Ontario Court of Appeal quoted from Clavet v. Tomkies et al. , [1963] 3 All E.R. 610 (Lord Denning) (emphasis mine): All I would say is that, as I read s. 3 of the Defamation Act, 1952, it gives a benefit to a plaintiff in that it is not necessary to plead or prove special damage if the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage . This means that special damages (actual and provable pecuniary losses up to the date of trial) need not be proven nor even pleaded if the words are calculated (meaning intended to) cause pecuniary damage (which might have not yet occurred, but might be proven as likely future damages at trial). Brown on Defamation confirms that generally: there must be an express allegation that the plaintiff has suffered some particular special damage as a result of the slander, unless there is some special statutory provision foregoing an allegation of special damages where the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage with respect to an office, profession or trade. This is not redundant with the maliciousness element Malice need not be the intent to cause pecuniary loss. Malice can be made out by any improper motive, including spite, or an intention to cause pure reputational harm with no regard for pecuniary damages. In my view, this section has the greatest effect at the pleading stage. I agree that in many (although not all) malicious falsehood cases, proof of malice will double for proof of an intention to cause pecuniary damages.

When does s3(1) of the Defamation Act *not* apply in malicious falesehood cases?

To successfully bring a claim for maliicous falsehood in the UK, one has to show that one has suffered "special damages", which are actual damages suffered as a direct consequence of a malicious, false statement. However, one does not have to do this if s3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 applies. This is below: In an action for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damage— (a) if the words upon which the action is founded are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form; or (b) if the said words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication. But surely this section of the Act would always apply. The loss suffered as a result of a statement is always going to be economic (e.g., lost investment, sales, etc.) and the statement being malicious means that it was intended to cause damage when it was made. Thus, whis this section of the Act considered to be an exception to the general rule, when in fact it would seem to apply in all cases?

Pecuniary and special damages are different types of damages Under UK law, a court can award: Special damages: "quantifiable financial losses up to the date of trial ". These have to be proved. General damages: "This term covers all losses which are not capable of exact quantification, and are further divided into pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages." Pecuniary damages: "The major head of pecuniary damages is future loss of earnings" - this is what s3(1) is primarily aimed at. In personal injury cases, it also covers future care costs - this could be relevant if the defamation caused mental harm. Non-pecuniary losses: Pain and suffering, Loss of amenity, and damages for the injury itself. Unlikely to be relevant in a defamation case. Provisional damages: "The general rule is that only one award of damages can be made. If damage turns out to be more serious than was anticipated at the time of the award, there is no further action available to the claimant. This can cause obvious hardship in personal injury cases. Under the terms of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (s.32a) the court has power to make a provisional award that allows the claimant to return to court should further anticipated serious deterioration occur."

Can teachers search our dorms without our explicit consent if they have "suspicion"?

I am a girl attending a boarding high school in the US. In June, some students who returned to the dorm early saw some male teachers exiting their rooms. They reportedly ran back to the school building without answering any questions when they saw the students. That night, multiple students shared that their drawers were seemingly searched and in some cases underwear and other things were missing. In the monthly school meeting the search became the main topic. Eventually a high-ranking teacher attempted to clarify what happened. He claimed that they "had suspicion" that someone was hiding illegal firearms in their room, but they could not narrow it down so they had to search all the rooms, both the boys' and the girls'. They declined to explain any further on the reasoning behind the suspicion and merely added they reported it to the police and received permission. The session was then dismissed much earlier than usual. The speaker was visibly shaking so I doubted that was the real reason. The distrust only grew when we contacted the local police and an officer told us that they never received such report from our school. The rhetoric has changed ever since. Here is a non-exhaustive list of excuses they came up to cover up the situation. Local police authorized search due to firearm suspicions - debunked, never alerted the police A majority of all students agreed to the search - debunked, no school-wide poll The student council unanimously agreed to the search - debunked, no such topic was discussed A majority of all parents agreed to the search - debunked, no such notice to parents A majority of parents in the school board agreed to the search - debunked, never happened The teachers were substituting dorm workers on vacation to fix dorm equipment - debunked, workers were present The list goes on and on and I find it pathetic that they are still not apologizing even though two months have passed and we are in vacation. I wonder, had at least one of the excuses listed above been true, would that have validated male teachers from intruding our private space? If our parents or our student representatives agree, can they really enter our rooms even though we were never asked nor notified about it?

A private school in the US is not bound by the 4th Amendment requirement for searches to be "reasonable", just as parents do not need a search warrant to search your room. Instead, limitations would arise from contract law. This typically means that per the contract whereby you can go to that school, you agree to certain things (as do they). This may or may not include the power for a teacher to conduct a surprise inspection. It just depends on what is said in the contract regarding dorm room searches. Typically, adjudication of this type of matter is left to parental outrage rather than courts, unless there is a clear violation of the contract terms.

Can teachers search our dorms without our explicit consent if they have "suspicion"?

I am a girl attending a boarding high school in the US. In June, some students who returned to the dorm early saw some male teachers exiting their rooms. They reportedly ran back to the school building without answering any questions when they saw the students. That night, multiple students shared that their drawers were seemingly searched and in some cases underwear and other things were missing. In the monthly school meeting the search became the main topic. Eventually a high-ranking teacher attempted to clarify what happened. He claimed that they "had suspicion" that someone was hiding illegal firearms in their room, but they could not narrow it down so they had to search all the rooms, both the boys' and the girls'. They declined to explain any further on the reasoning behind the suspicion and merely added they reported it to the police and received permission. The session was then dismissed much earlier than usual. The speaker was visibly shaking so I doubted that was the real reason. The distrust only grew when we contacted the local police and an officer told us that they never received such report from our school. The rhetoric has changed ever since. Here is a non-exhaustive list of excuses they came up to cover up the situation. Local police authorized search due to firearm suspicions - debunked, never alerted the police A majority of all students agreed to the search - debunked, no school-wide poll The student council unanimously agreed to the search - debunked, no such topic was discussed A majority of all parents agreed to the search - debunked, no such notice to parents A majority of parents in the school board agreed to the search - debunked, never happened The teachers were substituting dorm workers on vacation to fix dorm equipment - debunked, workers were present The list goes on and on and I find it pathetic that they are still not apologizing even though two months have passed and we are in vacation. I wonder, had at least one of the excuses listed above been true, would that have validated male teachers from intruding our private space? If our parents or our student representatives agree, can they really enter our rooms even though we were never asked nor notified about it?

in some cases underwear and other things were missing. This is a bigger problem than merely entering dorms. Theft is unambiguously a crime. Additionally, theft of underwear, especially from underage girls, is likely to be a sexual offence (depending on where you are, of course). Proving it may be difficult though. If your parents agreed to the search, of course, you have no authority to complain. However I would be frankly shocked if there was not near-unanimous protest by parents at this. This is more likely the route you need to go down. A mass protest by parents at a fee-paying school tends to get the attention of the board!

Can teachers search our dorms without our explicit consent if they have "suspicion"?

I am a girl attending a boarding high school in the US. In June, some students who returned to the dorm early saw some male teachers exiting their rooms. They reportedly ran back to the school building without answering any questions when they saw the students. That night, multiple students shared that their drawers were seemingly searched and in some cases underwear and other things were missing. In the monthly school meeting the search became the main topic. Eventually a high-ranking teacher attempted to clarify what happened. He claimed that they "had suspicion" that someone was hiding illegal firearms in their room, but they could not narrow it down so they had to search all the rooms, both the boys' and the girls'. They declined to explain any further on the reasoning behind the suspicion and merely added they reported it to the police and received permission. The session was then dismissed much earlier than usual. The speaker was visibly shaking so I doubted that was the real reason. The distrust only grew when we contacted the local police and an officer told us that they never received such report from our school. The rhetoric has changed ever since. Here is a non-exhaustive list of excuses they came up to cover up the situation. Local police authorized search due to firearm suspicions - debunked, never alerted the police A majority of all students agreed to the search - debunked, no school-wide poll The student council unanimously agreed to the search - debunked, no such topic was discussed A majority of all parents agreed to the search - debunked, no such notice to parents A majority of parents in the school board agreed to the search - debunked, never happened The teachers were substituting dorm workers on vacation to fix dorm equipment - debunked, workers were present The list goes on and on and I find it pathetic that they are still not apologizing even though two months have passed and we are in vacation. I wonder, had at least one of the excuses listed above been true, would that have validated male teachers from intruding our private space? If our parents or our student representatives agree, can they really enter our rooms even though we were never asked nor notified about it?

Privacy Between people, there exists a common law right to privacy , independent of the quasi-constitutional right of people against the government. In this case, the specific tort the school has committed is intrusion on seclusion : The elements of an intrusion on seclusion claim are: The defendant intentionally intruded upon the plaintiff's seclusion or private concerns. The intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The intrusion caused the plaintiff anguish and suffering. There is no requirement that the defendant disclosed any facts about the plaintiff, as in a public disclosure claim. Liability attaches to the intrusion itself. You will note that having a good reason for the intrusion is not a defence. Defences Permission There is no tort if the person (or their legal guardian) consents to the search. Such a consent might be in the contract between the student (or their parents as guardians) and the school. The consent may be in general terms such as allowing the school to “take reasonable steps” to enforce school rules or protect the health and safety of students, staff, and visitors. Whether what the did was in line with the contract would depend on the circumstances - it could go either way. In loco parentis Notwithstanding the contract, a school stands in loco parentis (in the place of the parent) for any minor children in its care are control. So for anyone under the age of 18, the school can consent to the search on behalf of the student, just like a parent could. Health and Safety legislation There is almost surely a state law that imposes a duty on the school to provide a safe environment. Such a law may make it legal for the school to conduct a search for a firearm without needing permission.

Can teachers search our dorms without our explicit consent if they have "suspicion"?

I am a girl attending a boarding high school in the US. In June, some students who returned to the dorm early saw some male teachers exiting their rooms. They reportedly ran back to the school building without answering any questions when they saw the students. That night, multiple students shared that their drawers were seemingly searched and in some cases underwear and other things were missing. In the monthly school meeting the search became the main topic. Eventually a high-ranking teacher attempted to clarify what happened. He claimed that they "had suspicion" that someone was hiding illegal firearms in their room, but they could not narrow it down so they had to search all the rooms, both the boys' and the girls'. They declined to explain any further on the reasoning behind the suspicion and merely added they reported it to the police and received permission. The session was then dismissed much earlier than usual. The speaker was visibly shaking so I doubted that was the real reason. The distrust only grew when we contacted the local police and an officer told us that they never received such report from our school. The rhetoric has changed ever since. Here is a non-exhaustive list of excuses they came up to cover up the situation. Local police authorized search due to firearm suspicions - debunked, never alerted the police A majority of all students agreed to the search - debunked, no school-wide poll The student council unanimously agreed to the search - debunked, no such topic was discussed A majority of all parents agreed to the search - debunked, no such notice to parents A majority of parents in the school board agreed to the search - debunked, never happened The teachers were substituting dorm workers on vacation to fix dorm equipment - debunked, workers were present The list goes on and on and I find it pathetic that they are still not apologizing even though two months have passed and we are in vacation. I wonder, had at least one of the excuses listed above been true, would that have validated male teachers from intruding our private space? If our parents or our student representatives agree, can they really enter our rooms even though we were never asked nor notified about it?

united-kingdom In the UK at least, boarding house parents generally operate in loco parentis of the biological parents. This is usually contractually established as part of the attendance contract. This gives the boarding house parents most of the rights the biological parents would have within the context of the boarding house. This can even extend outside of this context in-extremis if the parents can't be contacted (for example if consent for emergency surgery is needed). This, without a doubt, extends to conducting searches of students' dorms with, or without, their consent. That being said, if we take the events as you describe them, this sounds extremely suspect. I'd be looking to raise this with school governance as this sort of "search" sounds like it would clearly be against school policy. It is also unclear whether the staff-members in question would be the ones in-loco parentis. Unless they were the house parents, I sincerely doubt it. The missing underwear would also be seemingly theft. While the house-parents would have the right to confiscate property, this should usually be logged, placed in a safe, and returned to the student/parents of the student at the first opportunity (likely the next time they are going home or after a punishment period had expired). I also can't see any justifiable reason for confiscating underwear...

Can a company demand employees use part of their paycheck to buy their services?

A retail chain my friend worked for wanted to boost sales of a membership that included benefits like free shipping and preferred pricing. They gave each employee a small bonus on 1 paycheck equal to the price of the membership and employees were told the bonus was to be used to buy a membership for themselves. Apparently, they believed it would help employees sell the membership if they experienced the benefits themselves. From the company's perspective, sales of the membership at POS were an important metric for the company; there were long-term company goals for membership sales. Presumably they gave employees money for the membership instead of the membership itself so they could transact more sales and claim to be closer to hitting their total sales goal. Was it legal for the company to make this additional payment while requiring it be used to buy their own service?

If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.

Can a company demand employees use part of their paycheck to buy their services?

A retail chain my friend worked for wanted to boost sales of a membership that included benefits like free shipping and preferred pricing. They gave each employee a small bonus on 1 paycheck equal to the price of the membership and employees were told the bonus was to be used to buy a membership for themselves. Apparently, they believed it would help employees sell the membership if they experienced the benefits themselves. From the company's perspective, sales of the membership at POS were an important metric for the company; there were long-term company goals for membership sales. Presumably they gave employees money for the membership instead of the membership itself so they could transact more sales and claim to be closer to hitting their total sales goal. Was it legal for the company to make this additional payment while requiring it be used to buy their own service?

It is unlikely that the company can compel existing employees to enter into an additional personal membership contract with them, or use their facilities in a personal capacity. However, I wouldn't necessarily presume ulterior motives. It is extremely useful for anyone involved in customer service, to understand what exactly the customer sees and experiences as part of the interaction. Arranging to make a small payment to the workers through the payroll so that they can follow the exact sign-up process, is not just the most thorough approach, but (I imagine more importantly to the bosses...) probably perceived to be the cheapest and simplest approach. In terms of salesmanship, it probably would have been a better approach for the bosses to invite willing employees to sign up for personal membership, and to have made available the facility for an employee to request a small subsidy for the purpose.

How can I ensure I am contacted when a specific relative dies or is hospitalised?

I have an Uncle in declining years that lives a state or two away. Is there any protocol for having local emergency services call my cell should my Uncle be taken to hospital, becomes unconscious, passes away? I have spoken with him, know his wishes, and call weekly, but circumstances may arise. How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal?

How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal? There is no ironclad method. The law does not specify how authorities should determine contact information for next of kin. As a practical matter some of the better methods (few people use all of them) are: Create an "emergency contact" business card and put it that person's wallet and/or purse. Put another such card in a prominent place in their home like taped to the wall next to their phone charger or under a magnet on the refrigerator or on a cork board in the house. Make sure that the person has their own ID and medical insurance card and a card containing any medical alert information (e.g. drug allergies and blood type and religious objections to any particular sort of treatment) there as well. A "wallet biopsy" is standard operating procedure for first responders when the identity of a person suffering an emergency is unknown. Enter your name as an "in case of emergency" (ICE) number on that person's cell phone. You can also set up their cell phone to authorize you to locate it with an app. More crudely, you can put a sticker that says "emergency contact" with your name and phone number physically on the outside of the person's phone. The mechanics of putting emergency information in a phone can be found at this insurance company website . If they have a medical alert or home security system or medic alter bracelet, have them put you as an emergency contact for that. Put a medical power of attorney naming you as an agent (if the person is willing to execute one) together with your contact information in the patient file of all of the person's medical providers such as a treating primary care physician, home health care person, etc. Keep the number for these providers on hand so that you can call them to ask if there is any news or appointments have been missed. Have the person list you as an emergency contact in places that keep records of one such as an employer, membership based gym, a college or educational institution where the person is taking some classes, and their nursing home or assisted living center (if any). Provide your contact information to (and get contact information from) neighbors, landlords, financial advisors, accountants, lawyers, and family members of the person who are likely to be contacted and ask that they let you know if something happens. Spend at least a little time with as many of them as possible in person, when you are in town, to the fullest extent possible. Become friends with them on social media and interact with them every once and a while in that context. Put them on your Christmas letter list. Share your excess tomatoes and strawberries with them. Send them little thank you notes and gifts when you learn that they did something nice for the person like helping them shovel snow or trimming the shrubs on their shared property line. Little courtesies create a moral impetus on their part to take the trivial effort of calling you to let you know that something is up when it happens. Have a local contact you can have look into the situation if you are unable to reach the person at the usual times, ideally someone with a spare key and security codes to the house and/or apartment building or gated community. If there is no one who can do that, local law enforcement can be asked to do a "welfare check" on the person. Have a copy of a will, power of attorney, or HIPPA release that allows a third party to corroborate your connection to the person and be in a position to tell someone local where the original will is located. It is also good to keep a log or journal of your contacts with the person so that you can demonstrate that when they go missing that it really is an unusual and concerning event and to demonstrate that you are in regular contact with the person. For example, I have a client who died this week while his emergency contact person was visiting family in another country. When she was unable to reach him, she checked with his doctor, learned that he had failed to show up for a medical appointment scheduled for earlier that day, and then had her son who was still in town use a spare key she had given him to check in on my client, where her son had the misfortune of discovering the deceased client.

How can I ensure I am contacted when a specific relative dies or is hospitalised?

I have an Uncle in declining years that lives a state or two away. Is there any protocol for having local emergency services call my cell should my Uncle be taken to hospital, becomes unconscious, passes away? I have spoken with him, know his wishes, and call weekly, but circumstances may arise. How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal?

New Jersey has a very specific registry for next-of-kin The Next-of-Kin Registry is a New Jersey statewide web-based system that allows individuals at least 14 years of age to voluntarily submit and maintain emergency contact information through the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. This non-public information will only be used by law enforcement officers to locate designated emergency contacts in an event that a person is involved in a vehicle crash that renders him or her unable to communicate. The Next-of-Kin Registry was established in response to "Sara's Law," which was created in memory of Sara Elizabeth Dubinin from Sayreville. Miss Dubinin became unresponsive following a motor vehicle crash in September 2007 and lapsed into a coma before her parents could be notified. She eventually passed away. The law sought to ensure that an emergency contact could be notified immediately in the event of a vehicle crash. OP tagged the question for New Jersey so if the uncle lives in NJ, OP can use this registry.

How can I ensure I am contacted when a specific relative dies or is hospitalised?

I have an Uncle in declining years that lives a state or two away. Is there any protocol for having local emergency services call my cell should my Uncle be taken to hospital, becomes unconscious, passes away? I have spoken with him, know his wishes, and call weekly, but circumstances may arise. How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal?

The Next Of Kin Registry ( NOKR ) was established as a FREE tool for daily emergencies and national disasters... You may be able to register your emergency contacts with your state DMV or Motor vehicle office check with your State agency for more information as many states have adopted this process. Currently we are aware of SC, DE, CO, NJ, FL , NV and OH. Appears a few states have this option directly.

Can I use my browser to change the prices of things I buy online?

I can use Chrome's inspector tools to modify my local copy of the html on websites I visit. After changing the prices on a page in this way, for some websites I believe I can actually proceed through a checkout process, and buy items at whatever new altered price I want. What kind of trouble can I get into for this - if any?

You can get arrested for theft and/or fraud. This is not some new way to steal items; changing price tags started approximately the day after price tags were invented. Some state laws handle it explicitly, some implicitly; for instance, Maryland defines "deception" in its theft statute to include "(vi) remove or alter a label or price tag;" theft is committed if, among other possibilities, (b) Unauthorized control over property - By deception.- A person may not obtain control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; In other states, caselaw says that switching price tags is deception, and doing it for gain is fraud. See this California case in which switching price tags and buying the item is completed generic "theft by false pretenses" if the cashier didn't know you had switched the tags and relied on the new ones (in that case, the cashier knew so it was just attempted theft); see also this Nebraska case. Notably, the deception there is not tied to a statute saying "switching physical price tags is deception;" rather, it's deception because it involves knowingly making a false representation of a material fact (i.e. the true price of the goods) with intent to fool the store into thinking the real price is the lower one. As a general rule, many criminal laws handle new technology by looking at how you're using it. If what you're doing would be flagrantly illegal if not done on a computer, it will likely be illegal if you use a computer. Because you used the Internet, you might theoretically face further charges. If this is considered to be deception, you could in theory be on the hook for wire fraud . This is a federal felony offense. While small-scale offenses would more likely be prosecuted at the state level (and if you are federally prosecuted for one small fraud you'll probably face 0-6 months in jail instead of the 20-year maximum sentence for wire fraud), it is in fact a federal crime to commit wire fraud.

Can I use my browser to change the prices of things I buy online?

I can use Chrome's inspector tools to modify my local copy of the html on websites I visit. After changing the prices on a page in this way, for some websites I believe I can actually proceed through a checkout process, and buy items at whatever new altered price I want. What kind of trouble can I get into for this - if any?

Under the common law, you'd be committing a felony: theft by false pretenses. Each state has probably replaced the common law definition with a statute, and additionally there'd be a federal felony law for fraud via the internet. Even if the retailer noticed it and cancelled the transaction, they could still report you for attempted theft. It is true that you'd be unlikely to face prosecution with higher priorities in law enforcement. Nevertheless it is a terrible idea to commit multiple felonies just because you are playing the odds that no one will care enough to charge you.

Can I use my browser to change the prices of things I buy online?

I can use Chrome's inspector tools to modify my local copy of the html on websites I visit. After changing the prices on a page in this way, for some websites I believe I can actually proceed through a checkout process, and buy items at whatever new altered price I want. What kind of trouble can I get into for this - if any?

If you do this successfully, then you used your computer's browser to hack into the company's server that handles sales. Computer Fraud Act, "Knowingly accessing a protected computer and causing damage and loss to that computer". Now if you are successful, then some software developer should obviously be fired for gross incompetence. If your browser sends a request to buy 100 items at $20 each instead of the correct price at $100 each, that request should very obviously not be allowed. But that's no excuse for you.

Vietnamese branch of international company with too few sick leave days

Suppose that a person A recently got a job in Vietnam from an international company based in Europe. FIt ism my understanding that the minimal sick leave days required in Vietnam is 30 days, but this company has it in the single digits. Is this company violating Vietnamese labor laws? If yes, what can A do about it?

Such a person is not necessarily covered by Vietnamese employment law. It is common for employees from one country to work in another - that does not automatically make them subject to the second country’s employment law. Temporary overseas assignments (which can be days, weeks, months, or even years) generally do not change the jurisdiction of the employment contract providing the intention is that the employee will return at the employer’s cost at the end. The particulars depend on the details of each nation’s laws and any treaties between them as well as the terms of the employment contract and the actual situation.

Does any state legislature explicitly prohibit the use of playing cards in school?

I am a Math teacher in a private school in the US. A majority of students consider probability and statistics a very boring topic and tend to focus significantly less compared to other topics. So last semester I reworked the curriculum and started playing games with decks of playing cards. I encouraged students to calculate probabilities, expected values, etc then come up with strategies to improve their odds of winning. I saw a meaningful boost in both engagement and grades. I shared this teaching method in a message group. Some public school teachers liked the idea but had reservations about the legality of the content. They were worried about playing cards' connection to gambling, which could "raise the eyebrows of school boards and other authorities". As far as I know minors playing card games is fine as long as there is no money or other things that have monetary value on the line. Of course school districts could decide to ban such content if they considered it undesirable, but is there any education-related legislation in any state that explicitly states that "material that incites or resembles real-life gambling" cannot be used in schools, blocking them from being introduced to the classroom in the first place?

england Quite the opposite; although playing cards are not specifically mentioned, gambling education is actively encouraged in schools: but through the support of charities and the voluntary sector - not by statute. The key players are: PSHE Association (standing forPersonal, Social, Health and Economic) who, in partnership with BeGambleAware have a host of educational material , including the: Gambling prevention education handbook GamCare alongside YGAM and Fast Forward (from Scotland) and in line with PSHE Association guidance launched the Gambling Education Framework, that: provides a set of evidence-based principles to deliver effective gambling education for anyone who works with young people (aged 7 to 24) in a paid or voluntary capacity across a variety of formal and informal settings, including schools in England. Although tagged united-states , I have answered according to the LawSE Help Centre : " we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag] "

Theoretical vs. Actual Speed Limit

One of the peculiarities of Texas is that it's normal for people to drive 5-10 MPH over the speed limit while on the interstate. Provided they're not doing a speed trap, the police generally don't care. Another of Texas's peculiarities is that most drivers don't respect reduced speed limits for construction zones unless there's a speed trap or it's dangerous to go normal speeds. As a result, if you drive the speed limit, you can conceivably end up driving 15 mph slower than everybody else in construction zones. This is unsafe for you and everybody else on the surrounding road. Say that you're going the speed limit, and someone hits you because you're going 15 mph slower than the prevailing traffic conditions. Are you liable? You're following the speed limit, but by doing so you made yourself a danger to those around you.

The situation in Texas is complicated. Driving faster than the posted maximum speed limit is not in and of itself a crime; rather, per Texas Transportation Code 545.352(a) , it is prima facie evidence that the speed is a violation of 545.351(a) : "An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing". It is theoretically possible to defeat a speeding ticket by demonstrating that the speed was, in fact, reasonable and prudent. Texas also has a law regarding minimum speed, 545.363(a) : "An operator may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law". Since the speed limit is not a hard limit, the "compliance with law" clause does not protect you. If you get rear-ended while driving slower than the flow of traffic, your best defense is probably 545.351(b)(2) : "An operator...shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle that is on or entering the highway in compliance with law and the duty of each person to use due care". The question in court becomes your claim that driving slowly constituted "due care" versus the other driver's claim that their speed was "reasonable and prudent". It's likely that you'll win, but it's not the slam-dunk case that it would be in a state where posted speed limits were hard restrictions.

Theoretical vs. Actual Speed Limit

One of the peculiarities of Texas is that it's normal for people to drive 5-10 MPH over the speed limit while on the interstate. Provided they're not doing a speed trap, the police generally don't care. Another of Texas's peculiarities is that most drivers don't respect reduced speed limits for construction zones unless there's a speed trap or it's dangerous to go normal speeds. As a result, if you drive the speed limit, you can conceivably end up driving 15 mph slower than everybody else in construction zones. This is unsafe for you and everybody else on the surrounding road. Say that you're going the speed limit, and someone hits you because you're going 15 mph slower than the prevailing traffic conditions. Are you liable? You're following the speed limit, but by doing so you made yourself a danger to those around you.

If you are following the speed limit and somebody rear-ends you it is because they were speeding and following too closely. They are making themselves a danger to those around them, and they are liable for the damage.

Is it illegal to take pictures of the police in public in Germany?

I visited Cologne last year. I was taking a selfie with my phone's inner camera in front of a monument. I was unaware that my phone's outer camera was facing police officers conducting checks. One of them noticed it and approached me. He saw the picture of me with the monument instead of them, apologized for his misunderstanding then went back to work. Is it an offense to photograph the police in Germany? I searched multiple websites but people gave very different answers and opinions, even on the same forum. I've never been charged for such offense anywhere in the EU but Germany is well known for its strict privacy laws and I do not wish to break any laws. If it is indeed illegal and I get fined for it, will my past record add extra burden every time I visit Germany such as extra checks or questioning? Or is it something I can brush off since I live in Schengen anyway?

No, but... It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. However you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem but you have no right to publish the photo. To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. Publication without a release (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons is a punishable offense , which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from Art. 2 GG , §22 , §23 and §33 Kunsturhebergesetz . Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned in this question . Do note that such photography can also be a crime under §201a StGB , especially if your photography shows someone as vulnerable. Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons.

Is it illegal to take pictures of the police in public in Germany?

I visited Cologne last year. I was taking a selfie with my phone's inner camera in front of a monument. I was unaware that my phone's outer camera was facing police officers conducting checks. One of them noticed it and approached me. He saw the picture of me with the monument instead of them, apologized for his misunderstanding then went back to work. Is it an offense to photograph the police in Germany? I searched multiple websites but people gave very different answers and opinions, even on the same forum. I've never been charged for such offense anywhere in the EU but Germany is well known for its strict privacy laws and I do not wish to break any laws. If it is indeed illegal and I get fined for it, will my past record add extra burden every time I visit Germany such as extra checks or questioning? Or is it something I can brush off since I live in Schengen anyway?

england-and-wales NO The Metropolitan Police offer the following clarity (which is reproduced in similar terms by the other 42 police forces and various law enforcement agencies): Freedom to photograph and film Members of the public and the media do not need a permit to film or photograph in public places and police have no power to stop them filming or photographing incidents or police personnel. By way of some background: there has been some misunderstanding and misuse of the stop and search powers under section 43 Terrorism Act 2000. The issue being the officer's reasonable suspicion the person stopped may be a terrorist which, on occasion, was not subjectively reasonable. Although tagged germany , I have answered according to the LawSE Help Centre : " we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag] "

Is it illegal to take pictures of the police in public in Germany?

I visited Cologne last year. I was taking a selfie with my phone's inner camera in front of a monument. I was unaware that my phone's outer camera was facing police officers conducting checks. One of them noticed it and approached me. He saw the picture of me with the monument instead of them, apologized for his misunderstanding then went back to work. Is it an offense to photograph the police in Germany? I searched multiple websites but people gave very different answers and opinions, even on the same forum. I've never been charged for such offense anywhere in the EU but Germany is well known for its strict privacy laws and I do not wish to break any laws. If it is indeed illegal and I get fined for it, will my past record add extra burden every time I visit Germany such as extra checks or questioning? Or is it something I can brush off since I live in Schengen anyway?

Yes, usually it is. The more specific answer is: it depends. There is no specific law that makes it illegal to photograph police per se. However Germany has fairly strict regulations towards privacy and right to your own image and it is usually illegal to photograph a person without their consent if their face is visible in details. This also includes policemen on duty.

What, if any, is the tolerance built into speed limits in India?

Jurisdiction: India Legislation: Central Motor Vehicles Act Sub-jurisdiction: Maharashtra Legislation: Mumbai Motor Vehicles Act Speed limits in India are according to the referenced article below. In many nations, there is actually a grace of +5km/hr, or similar value so that any inadvertent gain (e.g. slope of carriageway, downwind) does not result in a fine. Is there any similar grace/speed tolerance in India? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_limits_in_India

What, if any, is the tolerance built into speed limits in India? None in statute (that I can find), but the police may have an informal policy 1 to allow for other factors like inaccuracies in one's speedometer and misreading the needle due to parallax . 1 The one I am aware of is " 10% +2 " where, say, anyone going over 35mph on a 30mph road gets a ticket etc

In France, can the insurance not apply if my motorcycle has racing parts?

I have a motorcycle in France that is insured. For clarification, I do ride on road and not on a circuit. Doing some maintenance, I changed the air filter to a racing one that says to increase air flow (and therefore performances). In the description of the filter is written "Competition use on closed circuit only." and the filter has a different color to clearly indicate it's a racing one. For precision, there is a similar air filter said to be for "performance" that does not contain the "Competition use on closed circuit only." line in the description nor the special color and with smaller indicated air flow. In case of an accident (responsible or not), can my "all-risks" insurance not apply because of this ?

Racing parts generally lack EWG certification and thus roadworthiness certificates A part needs to have an EWG registration number matching to the type of vehicle to be allowed to be used on a street-legal motorcycle. If a part has non street-legal parts, its whole registration usually is void. Driving a vehicle without a valid registration is illegal and generally not insured. Please check the regulator or the general information of insurance companies about what replacement parts have to comply with. Your insurance agency usually can help you too.

In France, can the insurance not apply if my motorcycle has racing parts?

I have a motorcycle in France that is insured. For clarification, I do ride on road and not on a circuit. Doing some maintenance, I changed the air filter to a racing one that says to increase air flow (and therefore performances). In the description of the filter is written "Competition use on closed circuit only." and the filter has a different color to clearly indicate it's a racing one. For precision, there is a similar air filter said to be for "performance" that does not contain the "Competition use on closed circuit only." line in the description nor the special color and with smaller indicated air flow. In case of an accident (responsible or not), can my "all-risks" insurance not apply because of this ?

The best thing to do is read your policy and ask your insurer. Some insurance policies do not include modifications from the factory state. If you have such a policy and do not declare the modification to your insurer, your insurer might be able to void the policy if you make a claim.

Is there a bright line for witness, prosecutor & judge intimidation?

ABC News reports: Trump on Friday afternoon had posted a message to his social media platform, Truth Social, saying, "IF YOU GO AFTER ME, I'M COMING AFTER YOU!" I am curious as to how the legal community will process the tweet. I'd like to understand if there is a "bright line" so as to determine if it has been crossed.

The only bright line regards the First Amendment. 18 USC 1512 articulates a line that is not to be crossed, but it is not clear where the line is as regards speech (subsection (a)(1) sets forth a bright line, viz "kills or attempts to kill", irrelevant to the present question). Otherwise, the remaining categories fall into three subtypes: (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to.. (c) Whoever corruptly— (d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from— These laws address communications addressed to witnesses, w.r.t. testimony. Case law e.g. US v. DiSalvo , US v. Murray all indicates that the forbidden threat must be addressed to an individual who might be a witness, whereas the above statement is not addressed, it is merely uttered (there is no clearly-intended recipient of the utterance). Similarly, 18 USC 1503 forbids "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ing] to influence, intimidate, or impede" a judicial officer, but this requires there to be a threat made to a specific judicial officer.

Is there a bright line for witness, prosecutor & judge intimidation?

ABC News reports: Trump on Friday afternoon had posted a message to his social media platform, Truth Social, saying, "IF YOU GO AFTER ME, I'M COMING AFTER YOU!" I am curious as to how the legal community will process the tweet. I'd like to understand if there is a "bright line" so as to determine if it has been crossed.

Witness intimidation is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1512, which imposes penalties on anyone who: (a)(2) uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to ... influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding or (b) knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding Courts explicitly disclaim the use of bright-line tests in for violations of Section 1512 in cases like this, which do not involve the actual use of physical force. Instead, the courts look to the context of the speech or conduct in question to determine whether the defendant used a "threat of physical force" or "corruptly persuaded" the witness not to testify. The guidance that the courts give on those questions is fairly squishy. Under subsection (a)(2), for instance, threats of physical force would have to be "true threats" to satisfy First Amendment analysis, meaning that they were “serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence.” Counterman v. Colorado , No. 22-138, 9 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2023) . And there is no bright-line test to determine whether a threat is such a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence; instead, courts must look at “all of the contextual factors” that could inform that answer. Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343, 345 (2003) . Subsection (b) appears to require the same totality-of-the-circumstances analysis rather than using any bright-line test: There is general agreement that it does not require "acts, threats, emotional appeals, or persistent pleading," but does require the Government to prove "a defendant's action was done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about false or misleading testimony with the hope or expectation of some benefit to the defendant." ... However, the persuasion "need not be explicit" to be corrupt. ... Indeed, corrupt persuasion includes situations where a defendant coaches or reminds witnesses by [**18] planting misleading facts. United States v. Edlind , 887 F.3d 166, 173-174 (2018) . Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction in Edlind even where the defendant explicitly told the victim to tell the truth: Edlind's statements can be seen as attempts to confuse Kwiatkowski as to what was real and what was Chujoy's odd sense of humor. By confusing Kwiatkowski, Edlind sought to undermine his ability to testify persuasively against Chujoy in the Inca's Secret case. Coupled with the circumstantial evidence implicating Edlind -- the timing of events following Chujoy's June 3 letter and Edlind's constant attempts at avoiding governmental surveillance -- there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction for witness tampering. The jury was free to reject Edlind's statement to "tell the truth" as a shallow attempt to immunize herself from prosecution.

Is it generally legally allowed for UK police to lie to people in the regular course of discharging their policing duties?

Generally speaking can one count on the words coming out of a British police officer in uniforms mouth as truthful? Under what circumstances is it permitted not to be? Is there any special circumstances or authorizations that are required for them to be permitted to lie? If so, what are these?

It seems to not be allowed for a UK police to lie. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes it illegal for the police to mislead a suspect in order to make them believe that the police have evidence which they do not or that the evidence they have is stronger than it is, or that there is a possibility of leniency (for example in return for ‘cooperation’) where none exists. Realistically, there is no reason that a police officer might lie to a suspect during interview. Also see from innocenceproject.org : The law does not allow lying to suspects, under any circumstances.

Is it generally legally allowed for UK police to lie to people in the regular course of discharging their policing duties?

Generally speaking can one count on the words coming out of a British police officer in uniforms mouth as truthful? Under what circumstances is it permitted not to be? Is there any special circumstances or authorizations that are required for them to be permitted to lie? If so, what are these?

Further to @Daxelarne's accurate answer An undercover officer (UCO), authorised under section 29 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), by the very nature of the role can lie - but only insofar as to create what's called a " personal or other relationship " (i.e. a covert relationship). Although a UCO may have additional authority for " criminal conduct " under section 29B they cannot, for example, lie to entrap a suspect in to committing a crime they would not otherwise do. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, covert surveillance officers carrying out " Directed Surveillance " under section 28 RIPA may occasionally lie to maintain their cover but not to the extent that creates a covert relationship. For example, Q: " Are you following me? " A: " Don't be daft, I'm looking for my lost dog. Goodbye "

Is it generally legally allowed for UK police to lie to people in the regular course of discharging their policing duties?

Generally speaking can one count on the words coming out of a British police officer in uniforms mouth as truthful? Under what circumstances is it permitted not to be? Is there any special circumstances or authorizations that are required for them to be permitted to lie? If so, what are these?

See Irina Khasin, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices in the United States , 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 1029 (2021) . Pages 1031-3 In Europe, police officers pursue confessions with equal zeal but employ different means to achieve the desired end. 6 The modern framework for police interrogations in England, established by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE), focuses on the search for truth by seeking reliable confessions through the use of fair police practices. 7 Rather than leaving the courts to delve into the emotional state of every defendant who challenges a confession, English law establishes a uniform standard for the police to follow when conducting interrogations. 8 To determine the admissibility of confession evidence, the English courts consider whether police officers have complied with PACE guidelines. 9 While some trickery by the police may be permissible under the provisions of PACE, English courts have held that the intentional misrepresentation of evidence is unfair and violates the law.' 10 Because this type of police deception compromises the veracity of a suspect's statements, English judges routinely exclude any confessions gained through deception as unreliable.11 Although research suggests that the use of fabricated evidence is rare in English interrogations, 12 PACE enforces the prohibition by requiring the police to record every interview. 13 Even a violation of the recording requirement itself can result in the exclusion of a confession from trial. 14 Although commentators have criticized deceptive police practices for decades, 15 American jurisprudence continues to overlook what English courts have long recognized: deceptive police practices yield false confessions and, thus, wrongful convictions. 16 Confessions gained through police deception are often factually inaccurate and untrustworthy.17 English law limits the use of these deceptive practices by establishing clear rules for the police to follow and empowering courts to enforce those rules.'8 PACE artfully balances police and prosecutorial interests with the fair and reliable administration of justice. 19 In evaluating the need for reform in American police interrogation policy, English law provides a valuable model for comparison. Pages 1051-3 Courts considering the admissibility of confessions evidence evaluate police conduct for compliance with PACE section 76 and 78.189 The cornerstones of the law governing police interrogation are reliability and fairness. PACE section 76 provides: If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained (a) by oppression of the person who made it; or (b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid. Applying PACE section 76, courts consider the words or actions that induced such confession to determine whether the confession made by the particular suspect is likely to be unreliable. 190 Questioning that might be acceptable in the interrogation of an average suspect may still cast doubt as to the reliability of admissions made by a particularly vulnerable or inexperienced suspect, such as a child. 191 Section 76 permits judges to exercise considerable discretion in excluding confessions on the basis of reliability. 192 Section 78 further develops the courts' power to bar confessions by allowing judges to exercise discretion in excluding evidence that would otherwise be admissible on the basis that it would be unfair to offer the evidence as proof in a criminal trial.193 In English courts, the function of the judge is to protect the fairness of the proceedings. 194 Because each case will turn on its relevant facts, the government has been reluctant to fetter individual judges' discretion by drawing bright line restrictions.195 Courts in England routinely exclude confession evidence obtained unfairly by some deceit or trick played on the suspect. 196 Even before the enactment of PACE, English common law granted courts the discretion to exclude confession evidence if the police made misrepresentations to persuade a suspect to make the incriminating statements. 197 Since PACE was enacted, defendants usually challenge evidence obtained as a result of a trick as "unfair" under PACE section 78.198 If the defendant can show that the police acted in bad faith by making a deliberately deceitful representation, the court likely will exclude the confession from evidence. 199 In R v. Mason, the Court of Appeal excluded a confession for such a bad faith misrepresentation by a police officer.200 With no direct evidence to connect the suspect to the crime, the police officer falsely told the defendant and his solicitor that they had found the suspect's fingerprints at the scene of the crime. 201 After being presented with this false evidence during his interrogation, the defendant confessed to the crime. 202 The Court of Appeal held that the deceit perpetrated on the defendant and his solicitor was reprehensible and impacted the fairness of the trial. 203 As the confession was the only definitive evidence linking the defendant to the crime, the conviction was overturned.204 Although express deception by the police during the interrogation of a suspect is generally prohibited in England, the courts have found that some types of police deception do not warrant the exclusion of confession evidence.205 For example, the English "courts have exhibited a considerable degree of tolerance of surreptitious tape-recording by ... the police."206 In Bailey, the police had failed to obtain confessions from two suspects through ordinary questioning; as a result, the police placed the two suspects in a bugged cell in an effort to record incriminating statements.207 Before doing so, the officers acted out a deceptive charade to lull the suspects into a false sense of security.208 The police officers suggested to the suspects that they should have been placed in separate cells, but an uncooperative custody officer had placed them in the cell together.209 Assuming that their conversation would be private, the suspects made incriminating remarks.210 The court found that the use of deception was "merely a detail," refusing to exclude the admissions from evidence at trial.211 Aldert Vrij, "We Will Protect Your Wife and Child, But Only If You Confess" Police Interrogations in England and the Netherlands , in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 5, at 55, 56. See JOHN SPRACK, EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4-5 (9th ed. 2002). Id. Id. at 7. See Vrij, supra note 6, at 56 (stating that it is implied that evidence obtained by deceit and trickery cannot be admitted into evidence in courts in England). See generally id. at 55-79 (discussing interrogation procedures in England). PETER MIRFIELD, SILENCE, CONFESSIONS AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 11 (1997) (explaining that evidence indicates that the use of manipulative techniques has declined since the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act); Slobogin, supra note 5, at 43. Code of Practice on Audio Recording Interviews with Suspects (Code E), 3.1 (promulgated under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 67, pt. VI (Eng.)) [hereinafter Code E]. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 43. See, e.g., Magid, supra note 3, at 1169-70 (describing the criticism of commentators and the popular press of the false confessions that arise from the use of deceptive interrogation techniques); Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation , 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 9 (1996) (advocating the prohibition of any lies during questioning); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions , 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111, 148 (1997) (advocating substantial limits on deception by proposing that police be prohibited from presenting false forensic evidence). White, supra note 15, at 111. Id. See SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4-7 (describing how PACE develops a framework for the exercise of police powers and how it is enforced). See id. (noting that PACE sets out the framework for the exercise of police powers, accounts for the public interest and provides enforcement methods for courts). See id. at 29 (describing the framework set out by Sections 76 and 78). Id. Id.; cf. MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 283 ("[T]he mental handicap of the accused may properly be considered . . . for the purposes of section 76(2)(b)."). The leading case is R v. Everett . See Case Comment, Reliability of Confession-Mental Condition of Suspect: R v. Everett , 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 826 (Eng.). Confession and Breaches of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) (U.K.), http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/confession_and_breaches_of_police_and_criminal_evidence_act/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). Id. Id. Id. See Richard Stone, Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act: Practice and Principles , 3 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, § 11. 1 (1995), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles3/stone3.html; cf. R v. Houghton, (1978) 68 Crim. App. 197, 206 (Eng.) ("Evidence would operate unfairly against an accused if it had been obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person or by a trick or by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage.") (citations omitted); MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 12 (recognizing the "emerging consensus in official circles" that the kind of tactics "advocated by Inbau, Reid, and Buckley, as well as being arguably unethical, is also inimical to the gathering of reliable confession evidence"). MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 199. Id. at 205-09. Id. at 206. R v. Mason , (1988) 1 W.L.R. 139, 144 (Eng.). Id. at 142. Id. Id. at 144. Id. MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 207. Id. at 208. R v. Bailey , (1993) 3 All E.R. 513, 514 (Eng.). Id. Id. Id. Id.

"In person" in UK practice

If the record of a UK civil hearing identifies a party as being "in person", does that mean that the defendant was physically present or that the court had not been informed that the defendant had professional representation? There are actually three hearings involved. In (1), a court ruled in favour of the plaintiff "in default", I believe the defendant did not attend. In (2), the ruling was vacated due to an administrative irregularity without either party's direct involvement. In (3), the plaintiff's application for the vacation to be vacated (I'm sure there's a better way of putting that...) was rejected, but despite this being primarily between the plaintiff and the court the defendant was identified as "in person". I've had a fairly detailed explanation of what happened from the plaintiff, but I'm trying to work out what the defendant's position regarding the third hearing was.

I don't think the record keeping of the lower courts that grant the majority of default judgments is consistent enough to confidently say what "in person" means, especially without a copy of the document to read in its full context. However, it probably means that the defendant physically attended the courtroom and was not represented by a lawyer. Arguably a defendant who does not attend could still be considered an "in person" (unrepresented) litigant, but I would expect the court to describe this situation with a more explicit term like "no appearance." Your question also appears to indicate that the defendant was not described as "in person" when default judgment was entered. This typically occurs in the defendant's absence, so the addition of the words "in person" to the record of the later hearing suggests that they did attend the later hearing.

What is a "strata lot"?

In relation to real property, what is a "strata lot"?

A strata lot is a unit of real property resulting from the division of property into lots as per a "strata plan" under the Strata Property Act . This division may be stratified in that it can describe horizontal divisions of the property by reference to floors and/or ceilings of a building. This is a niche terminology only used in a few jurisdictions, like Australia, British Columbia, and Alberta. The owners of the strata lots make up a "strata corporation" with responsibility for the care and management of the common property, common facilities, and corporation assets. Many strata structures are like what are known as condominiums elsewhere (and even informally within B.C.), but stratas encompass more than just typical condominiums. A strata plan can be " duplexes, townhouses, fractional vacation properties—even single family homes in bare land strata corporations. "

What is a "strata lot"?

In relation to real property, what is a "strata lot"?

new-south-wales A strata lot is a unit in a strata title - one way of multiple people owning land. In the USA, the closest equivalent would be a condominium. Australia uses the Torrens Title system for registering land ownership where the title is held and guaranteed by the government- if the government register says you own it, then absent fraud on your part, you own it and anyone damaged by errors or fraud on the title gets compensation from the government, not you. Forgive the diversion but I’m about to use the term “Torrens Title” to refer to a pice of land which is owned freehold which is a common usage even though “Torrens Title” also refers to the entire system of land ownership, including Strata, Company, and Community Titles. Historically, when multiple people own land as tenants-in-common or joint tenants, they own the entire land collectively. This works fine for small family and similar groups but it doesn’t really work if you want to give different people different rights - like these people can use apartment 1 and those people can use apartment 2. One workaround is a contract among the owners but it still leaves the property tied together - if one wants to sell then all have to sell (or not). Another was to form a company that owned the land with different classes of shares that gave people rights to use different parts of the building - there are still a few company title buildings (so called) around. Then if one wants to sell, they only have to sell their shares. However, this was always a bit of a kludge because company law is targeted at companies that run businesses rather than a device for real estate ownership. It also meant that anyone that managed to get more than 50% of the shares would control the building - a patient property developer could buy units as and when they became available and then launch a takeover to force people out of their homes. So, in the post-war era, Australian governments enacted Strata Title laws custom designed to manage apartment building ownership. The term strata comes from the fact that ownership is divided by floor (and by units within floors) forming a strata. When a strata title is registered, the surveyor assigns each unit a proportion of the whole in line with the amenity of the particular lot which determines their contributions to the strata title company that is formed and “owned” by the unit holders and that, in turn owns the land and the building. Each lot is registered along with the overall plan providing a permanent and government-backed record of who owns what. Units can change hands and that automatically gives the holder a say in the running of the strata. Typically, the strata company owns the building and the unit holder owns everything inside the walls, up to and including the paint. The strata is run by the unit holders through a management committee who usually engage a professional strata manager. Operational and capital budgets are determined annually (with some statutory minimums) and each unit holder must contribute their proportion in quarterly instalments. In theory, the capital sinking fund should have enough money in it to replace the building at the end of its life. It’s possible for units within a strata to themselves be a strata. I own a unit in a residential strata that is itself part of a strata that has a commercial part and a council-owned carpark. Strata title has been very successful, however, at the end of last century, they were being used to try and cope with private subdivisions where the streets, utilities etc. were not owned by local government/public utilities but supplied by the developer. Because strata is customised for apartment buildings it sort-of didn’t work very well. So, the Community Title was developed which allows for the residents to own and operate the infrastructure and have titles within the community which can themselves be Torrens title, strata title, or community title like Matryoshka Dolls .

When does a cogeneration plant feed power to the net, according to the german KWK-G 2015?

§7 (1) of the current german KWK-G (Law concerning co-generation plants) makes a huge difference for power fed into the grid, or not. Say an installation consumes 150-200 kW contiually, and operates a 100kW el CHP - so there's never any net backfeed into the net. This describes a typical sewage gas CHP at a wastewater plant. Is this cogeneration plant feeding into the net according to §7 (1)? The relevant wording is "Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird, beträgt: ..."

(1) Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird und auf den die §§ 61e bis 61g und 104 Absatz 4 des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes in der am 31. Dezember 2022 geltenden Fassung nicht anzuwenden sind, beträgt... The german is - unlike Ohwilleke complains with the english translation - quite clear: Electric energy to qualify under this paragraph needs to: [be produced] by implication get put into a network for public consumption [in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist] needs to not be regulated under §§ 61e to 61g or 104 (4) EEG (law partaining renewable energy) §61 was repealed and removed in the 2023 version, a §104 does no longer exist either. Old versions of §61 EEG and §104 EEG are archived. The various §61a to g regulated which type of producer got which percentage and §104 regulated who gets money for produced energy. Among those regulations, which make the meaning of §7(1) KWKG very clear is §61e EEG (2022) (1) Der Anspruch nach § 61 Absatz 1 verringert sich auf null Prozent der EEG-Umlage für Strom aus Bestandsanlagen, wenn der Letztverbraucher die Stromerzeugungsanlage als Eigenerzeuger betreibt, (1) The entitlement pursuant to Section 61 subsection 1 is reduced to zero percent of the EEG surcharge for electricity from existing systems, if the end consumer operates the power generation system as a self-producer, Under the old law, you need to actually produce more than your own requirement to be entitled to a payout, as producing less was meaning you are only an Eigenerzeuger. Even under the new requirement, Einspeisung is a standing term in Germany: It is only Einspeisung if the electrical energy is actually put into the public energy network ("Zufuhr von Strom in das öffentliche Versorgungsnetz").

When does a cogeneration plant feed power to the net, according to the german KWK-G 2015?

§7 (1) of the current german KWK-G (Law concerning co-generation plants) makes a huge difference for power fed into the grid, or not. Say an installation consumes 150-200 kW contiually, and operates a 100kW el CHP - so there's never any net backfeed into the net. This describes a typical sewage gas CHP at a wastewater plant. Is this cogeneration plant feeding into the net according to §7 (1)? The relevant wording is "Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird, beträgt: ..."

I doubt that it is possible to answer this question accurately based upon the text alone (having read the statute in translation), and I doubt that there are even many lawyers or accountants in Germany who would know the answer if they don't work in this industry. The statutory language is ambiguous in these circumstances, and each of the possible readings could be reasonable in the fact pattern that you identify. In practice, it would come down to what interpretation makes sense in light of the larger context of how the relevant utility operates its electrical grid. If the grid were operated by the utility with meters that only disclose net power generation, then it is quite likely that this would not be treated as contributing to the grid. But, if the grid were operated by the utility with meters that measured draws from the grid and contributions to the grid separately, it might be appropriate to treat the times when it did make contributions to the grid as contributions for purposes of Section 7. A utility administrator or engineer would probably be more likely to know the answer even though, technically, it is a legal question. I strongly suspect that German courts would be likely to defer to the utility company's interpretation of Section 7 so long as it had a clear, consistent and rational interpretation of what that term means. On the other hand, if the utility treated one co-generation plant one way, and another one down the road differently, in the face of substantially similar facts, the court would probably decide which interpretation made the most sense under the circumstances itself, and would impose that interpretation on the utility.

Is the District of Columbia a "territory"?

Within the boundaries of the United States there were at various times "organized incorporated territories", that were not a part of any of the states and whose governments were organized by acts of Congress rather than by a state constitution drafted by statesmen within the state and enacted by the voters of the state, and that, unlike the states, had no voting representatives or senators in Congress. (Somewhat like the three territories of northern Canada today, I think?) Is the District of Columbia simply an instance of that phenomenon, or is there some essential difference?

Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 states that "The Congress shall have Power" To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings which then happened in 1 Stat. 130 (1790). It is there referred to as "a district of territory" but more often simply as a "district". Unlike territories, its existence for its actual purpose as seat of government is specifically enabled by the Constitution. Then via 2 Stat 103 (1801), DC was politically brought within the control of Congress, so that residents were no longer residents of Maryland or Virginia. In this act it is consistently termed a "district".

Strata bylaw about secondary suite in Lower mainland area

The townhome is in Port Coquitlam, BC, Canada and the strata by-law states Secondary suites within Strata Lots are prohibited. Should any Owner of a Strata Lot be found to have constructed a secondary suite within his or her or any other Strata Lot located in the Strata Plan, the Strata Council shall be entitled to take any one or more of the following actions: (a) take all necessary steps to remove the secondary suite; (b) notwithstanding section 25 (1) of these Bylaws, levy a fine not to exceed $50.00 per day for each day the Owner is in contravention, such fine to be added to and form part of the month’s assessment or levy to be collected by the Strata Council from the Owner of the Strata Lot and the Strata Council are hereby authorized to take all necessary steps to collect such amounts from any Owner; (c) evict the tenant in accordance with section 138 of the Strata Property Act; (d) seek a declaration from any Court of competent jurisdiction with regard to the enforcement with limitation and/or an injunction to prevent the continuation of the secondary suite within a Strata Lot; and upon receiving such declaration or injunction, costs shall be the responsibility of the Strata Lot Owner contravening the provisions of the Bylaw and shall be recoverable on a solicitor and own client basis by the Strata Corporation; and (e) should any portion of Bylaw 2 (2) be deemed unenforceable by any competent jurisdiction, then for purposes of interpretation and enforcement of the Bylaw, each sub-paragraph hereof shall be deemed a separate provision and severable, and the balance of the provisions contained herein shall remain in full force and effect. The unit already has a living room, bedroom, bathroom and Laundry which are legal and approved by the strata. If we were to rent it out, we are considering adding a kitchenette ie a Refrigerator, Small Induction top stove/Rice cooker/Electric Hot pot/Coffee maker and microwave i.e. Regular kitchen appliances other than a full size gas. Will this be flouting the by-law? Would adding the above setup for a small kitchenette make it a secondary suite? Could that be problematic in any way? **Strata does not define any rental restrictions in BC by the law. They have just the secondary suite restriction.

You will need look up the definition of a "secondary suite" and include that in your question for a better answer. Where I live this is called an ADU, for Auxiliary Dwelling Unit. The definition of an ADU specifies permanent facilities for sleeping, sanitation, and food preparation. Since you can add bedrooms and bathrooms to any house without creating an ADU, it really hinges on "permanant facilities for food preparation". In other words, a kitchen. Since you could have a coffee pot or microwave in your master bedroom and it wouldn't be a kitchen, it is generally considered that small countertop appliances don't count. Since many people have an extra full sized refrigerator or freezer in their garage without it being a kitchen, it is reasonable that doesn't count either. Same thing with a sink in the utility room... So where does the line lay with a "kitchenette"? That will depend on the exact wording of the bylaws for your locality, as well as how whoever enforces these things interprets it. Could it be a problem? Perhaps... if you advertise it for rent with a kitchen and the local authority takes notice. FMI, what is a "Strata lot"?

California being more powerful than the federal government

The federal government has the power of administrative wage garnishment. This allows it to complete a levy by filling a form rather than filing a collection lawsuit and using courts. It is still an administrative procedure, there is still a form to issue. The California Franchise Tax Board bypasses this entirely. It is mechanistically able to levy my chase bank account for $3000 just by calling chase and never even mailing a physical judgement. Under procedural behavior, California has more power to levy bank accounts than the federal government does, it doesn't even need an administrative process to do it. This is probably unconstitutional as California can "get levies out" faster than the federal government and "win" the race to get funds first. Does this violate the Supremacy Clause?

Your premise that California's tax collection powers are greater than federal tax collection powers is basically wrong. Both California and the federal government carry out most of their due process functions within their respective tax collection agencies in an administrative process rather than in the courts. In the federal system, the courts are usually resorted to only when that taxpayer pays the taxes due and then seeks a refund, or when their is an appeal from the final layer of the IRS administrative law system which is the Article I court known as Tax Court (in which I have litigated more than once). The Supremacy Clause is only violated when a state law violates or contradicts a federal law, which is not what happens in this case. The federal government can and has set up a system for determining whether the federal or state tax collection rights have priority in the same asset, which mostly flows from the timing of the recording of a tax lien by the relevant bodies.

Are Technological Standards bodies required to be approved by the government?

In the interest of cross vendor compatibility, the method by which different technologies interoperate is often standardized. This means that a non binding agreement is made between multiple parties to abide by rules set forth in a documented standard. Examples of this include The USB Device Working Group, Jedec, The C++ Standards Committee, and PCI-SIG. While presumably in the public's interest, these groups appear to be a fragrant violation of antitrust laws. Do they require a special license to operate? If so, what would such a license look like and what agency would issue it?

Standards-setting by industry groups is not inherently anti-competitive and these groups do not require a licence from the government to operate. They are a prototypical example of "private ordering" (see David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, "Standards Setting and Antitrust" (2003) 87 Minn. L.R. 1913 , p. 1987). What can be anti-competitive is when a corporation advocates for an element to be included in a standard for reasons other than technical considerations. See e.g. the International Standards Organization's " Competition Law Guidelines ." An example violation is the behaviour of Rambus, Inc. : According to the FTC complaint, Rambus nonetheless participated in JEDEC’s DRAM standard-setting activities for more than four years without disclosing to JEDEC or its members that it was actively working to develop, and possessed, a patent and several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies ultimately adopted in the standards. ... In its liability opinion dated July 31, 2006, the Commission found that, “Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets.” In another example , Dell Computer Corporation was alleged to have voted to approve the VL-bus standard and certified that the standard did not infringe its intellectual property. After the standard became very successful, Dell asserted an earlier-issued patent against several computer manufacturers using the standard. The FTC entered a consent agreement with Dell: prohibiting Dell from enforcing its patent against those who wanted to use the VL-bus standard. The FTC's order also prohibited Dell from enforcing patent rights in the future when it intentionally failed to disclose those rights upon request of a standards-setting organization.

Can privacy regulations prevent my alma mater from sharing the fact that I graduated there?

I graduated from some private high school a long time ago. During my years there, I have experienced and witnessed a variety of dubious practices that violate students' rights. I always wanted to leave but never had the necessary resources nor support to execute my plan. Due to this I never associate myself with my school, not even in my resumés. Recently I received an honorable mention in an invention competition. I was so proud of myself until I searched the name of the competition on Google. On page 1 a familiar name popped up. It was my school's name. When I clicked on it, I saw my name in a school blog post. John Doe's remarkable feat in Blah Blah Invention Competition John Doe, Class of 2000 has won an honorable mention in ... I was so surprised that they heard the news in the first place, considering the fact that I cut off all contact with the school admin and peers after I became an adult. I didn't want my name on that page, especially given the fact that some alumni have started to come out about what they suffered in school in recent years. Can I prevent them from using the fact that I graduated their school on their website by citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act(FERPA) or others? Or is this fair game per first amendment grounds and am I out of luck?

The privacy rule is spelled out here . Subpart D addresses disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records, saying when consent is required vs. not required (there being 16 conditions under which consent is not required). Mostly this refers to "required by law" exceptions, or "for school-internal use", but also includes "directory information". Information may be disclosed if the student (as an adult) or a parent (of a minor) has consented to disclosure. Under the legal definition of "record", that simply means "tangible information" (not "conversations"). An education record is one that is "directly related to a student; and maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution", possibly including the information that you cite – providing that the information is maintained and disclosed by the school. In addition, though, certain information can be freely disclosed, namely "directory information" which is: Directory information includes, but is not limited to, the student's name; address; telephone listing; electronic mail address; photograph; date and place of birth; major field of study; grade level; enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time); dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees, honors, and awards received; and the most recent educational agency or institution attended. The regulation explains that this is information that "would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed". Privacy standards have changed since the law was passed – but it is allowed by the existing law.

What legal designation status does the Ukrainian flag possess, and what recent changes has it had to its status?

Under the town and country planning act, flags have three possible designations. What is the designation of the Ukrainian flag, and what has been its most recent changes of status?

The flag of Ukraine is a "Class H" advertisement under Schedule 1 of the The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 , secondary to the Town and Country Planning Act. Schedule 1 of the regulation lists under Class H Any country’s national flag and it has included this since its inception in 2007 .

Which law rules polygraphs inadmissible in UK?

Where does it say that polygraph tests (lie detector tests) are inadmissible under law in England and Wales? I am mostly interested in their usage being disallowed for criminal (both Magistrates' Court and Crown Court) and civil matters. However, if they were allowed elsewhere, such as for employment tribunals, that would be useful knowledge.

canada See R. v. Béland , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 : It is therefore my opinion that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination would clearly offend the rule against the admission of past or out‑of‑court statements by a witness. All of the considerations upon which the rule is based are as applicable to polygraph evidence as to other statements. The repetition of statements by another witness adds nothing to their weight and reliability. The ultimate decision as to the truth or falsity of the evidence of a witness must rest upon the exercise of the judgment of the trier of fact. This is as true of evidence of polygraph tests as of any other evidence. In the last analysis, the trier of fact must reach its conclusion on the basis of the evidence given by a human being in court. The evidence of the polygraph operator if heard by the trier of fact adds nothing to the earlier statement of the witness which is sought to be supported. ... It was also argued that the polygraph evidence was receivable as expert evidence. The polygraph operator, as an expert, was trained and qualified to give his opinion as to the veracity of the witness, based solely on his interpretation of the significance of the responses made by the witness to the questions put on the examination. ... Here, the sole issue upon which the polygraph evidence is adduced is the credibility of the accused, an issue well within the experience of judges and juries and one in which no expert evidence is required. It is a basic tenet of our legal system that judges and juries are capable of assessing credibility and reliability of evidence. Another answer says: The real problem with polygrapher's opinions however (like policeman's opinions), is that they simply aren't reliable enough. But lack of reliability was not part of the Supreme Court's legal reasoning for rejecting the use of polygraph evidence in court.

Which law rules polygraphs inadmissible in UK?

Where does it say that polygraph tests (lie detector tests) are inadmissible under law in England and Wales? I am mostly interested in their usage being disallowed for criminal (both Magistrates' Court and Crown Court) and civil matters. However, if they were allowed elsewhere, such as for employment tribunals, that would be useful knowledge.

What I say during a lie detector test might be considered a valid testimony. But the point of a lie detector test is to identify lies and state that my testimony is not true. "I didn't kill my wife" is valid testimony. That might be considered in court unless it is considered hearsay. The lie detector test saying "he lied, therefore he killed his wife" is not valid testimony. I never said "I killed my wife", so it's not valid testimony. You would at least have to have an expert witness who is willing to testify that this machine can beyond a reasonable doubt detect that I am lying, and you won't find that expert witness.

whether entitled to reward or not

Tam lost his wireless airpods in the campus. He advertised online and near the campus, a reward of $50 to who returns the lost earphones. Sania found them and went to return it. But next day she saw the advertisement and claim the reward. Advise Tam.

Sania is entitled to a reward of 7,50€. germany In Germany, to reward honest finders, the finder of an item is entitled to 5% of a lost item's value of up to 500€ under § 971 BGB . Airpods cost about 150 €, so Sania is entitled to a Fider's reward of 7,50 €. Anything more would be at the discretion of Tam, accepting less is at Sania's discretion. Do note, that denial of the finder's reward at the moment that Sania hands over the item means, that they also deny their entitlement to the reward. In fact, it is upon Sania to demand the reward, and unless they do so, it is presumed that they do not want a finder's reward. However in making her entitlement to the reward known, Sania may not cross the line into coercion or blackmail (§§ 240, 253 StGB). Should Sania say, without explanation "I demand a payment of 100 € for the airpods", that could be coercion, as she is not entitled to that. If she however says "I am entitled to finder's reward of 7,50 €, and had expenses of 2.50 € to get the phone to you, therefore you owe me 10 €" the picture is different - that is exactly the amount that the law says she would be owed. This is because atop the actual reward Sania can reclaim reasonable fees, such as the bus fare to get the phone to Tam under § 970 BGB . Under § 972 BGB, Sania does not have to relinquish the item till the reward and expenses have been paid but also does not become the owner of the item. The Fundbüro To evade a possible claim for "Unterschlagung von Fundsachen" (~conversion by not reporting a found item), the Fundbüro (Found item's office) exists when the owner can't be made out rapidly. Not only does it calculate the required finder's reward, but also handing it over to the office fulfills the requirement to report a found item that is worth more than 10 € under § 965 BGB . It is customary to store the lost items at the Fundbüro, but that is not required. To gain the item from the Fundbüro, Tam will have to pay any required handling fees to the office but also gets notice of how much he should pay to Sania as well as her contact details. Sania will get contact details of Tam in return, together with a notice that she has a claim to a reward of such value. Should Sania not have given her details, it is presumed that she did not want the finder's reward. If Sania retained the item, the Fundbüro will inform Tam of the estimated finder's reward and contact details for Sania, so Tam can reclaim the item.

whether entitled to reward or not

Tam lost his wireless airpods in the campus. He advertised online and near the campus, a reward of $50 to who returns the lost earphones. Sania found them and went to return it. But next day she saw the advertisement and claim the reward. Advise Tam.

Sania is not entitled to the reward This is very much contract law 101. Tam made an offer to the world that was acceptable by performance: return my airpods and we have a contract. However, Sania did not see the ad and was therefore not returning the AirPods in response to the offer. Acceptance of an offer requires knowledge of the offer. Therefore, there is no contact and Tam is under no obligation to provide Sania with anything, not even a thank you.

whether entitled to reward or not

Tam lost his wireless airpods in the campus. He advertised online and near the campus, a reward of $50 to who returns the lost earphones. Sania found them and went to return it. But next day she saw the advertisement and claim the reward. Advise Tam.

england-and-wales canada See Williams v Carwardine (1833), 5 Car & P 566, 172 ER 1101 , aff'd 4 B & Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB). Police were investigating a suspected murder and the brother of the deceased publicly distributed a notice offering £20 for "such information as may lead to a discovery of the murder of the said Walter Carwardine." Mary Williams gave a statement to police that led to the eventual conviction of William Williams for the murder. However, the reason Mary gave the statement was because William severely beat her and "being apprehensive of death, she made a disclosure." The common assumption is that William suspected that Mary knew something of the murder, because she had been deposed for an unsuccessful first prosecution against some other suspects. The defendant in the contract suit did not want to pay the £20. He argued that Mary did not make the disclosure because of the reward. The trial judge put it to the jury whether Mary was induced by the handbill. They found that "she did not give that information for the sake of the £20 reward, nor in consequence of the handbill, but from stings of conscience." The judge still ordered the £20 to be paid. On application for a new trial ((1833) 4 B & Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)) the judges noted the finding from the lower court that the plaintiff "was not induced by the offer of the reward, but by other motives." Denman C.J. asked "Was any doubt suggested as to whether the plaintiff knew of the handbill at the time of her making the disclosure?" The answer: "She must have known of it, as it was placarded all over Hereford, the place at which she lived": (1833) 5 C & P. The judges agreed with the trial judge ((1833) 4 B & Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)): Denman C.J.: "The plaintiff, by having given information which led to the conviction of the murderer ... has brought herself within the terms of the advertisement, and therefore is entitled to recover." Littledale J.: "The advertisement amounts to a general promise, to give a sum of money to any person who shall give information which might lead to the discovery of the offender. The plaintiff gave that information." Parke J.: "There was a contract with any person who performed the condition mentioned in the advertisement." Patteson J.: "I am of the same opinion. We cannot go into the plaintiff's motives." Acceptance does not require subjective knowledge of the offer . "Meeting of the minds" is an objective standard .

If for some reason the Canadian Parliament had the idea to impeach and convict someone, what would be the legal implications of that?

I am 100% aware of what a no confidence motion is. This is emphatically not what I am referring to. Impeachment is an unambiguous right of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to have, having been used for centuries even though nobody has been convicted in the last 200, starting in the Good Parliament of 1376 with the impeachment of Baron Latimer. The Commons can impeach and the Lords can convict anyone except the King of anything which is illegal under the laws. The King can pardon fines and imprisonment but cannot pardon the bar from office if the Lords applies such a thing as per the 1701 Act of Settlement. Nobody has ever been impeached before in Canada. Canada clearly has words in the Constitution to make its own similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and impeachment was attempted only 19 years before confederation in 1848. The accused survived a Commons vote, but nobody doubted the legal authority of the Commons was still valid. Assume that the speaker either goes along with it, or else is sacked by the Commons and a pro impeachment speaker put in their place, or the Commons resolves to amend the rules letting them bypass a speaker who is an opponent of impeachment. Then what?

Section 18 of the Constitution Act 1867 states: The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers shall not confer any privileges, immunities, or powers exceeding those at the passing of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof. Note that the Parliament of Canada is responsible for defining the privileges of its houses, and there is no default fallback. The Parliament of Canada Act 1985 define the privileges in section 4 as The Senate and the House of Commons, respectively, and the members thereof hold, enjoy and exercise: (a) such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof, in so far as is consistent with that Act; and (b) such privileges, immunities and powers as are defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, not exceeding those, at the time of the passing of the Act, held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof. So in theory, the Canadian House of Commons could impeach someone right now, as an inherited power from the UK HoC, but if this was tried the Commons could fall foul of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Senate would be under pressure not to try the individual impreached.

If for some reason the Canadian Parliament had the idea to impeach and convict someone, what would be the legal implications of that?

I am 100% aware of what a no confidence motion is. This is emphatically not what I am referring to. Impeachment is an unambiguous right of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to have, having been used for centuries even though nobody has been convicted in the last 200, starting in the Good Parliament of 1376 with the impeachment of Baron Latimer. The Commons can impeach and the Lords can convict anyone except the King of anything which is illegal under the laws. The King can pardon fines and imprisonment but cannot pardon the bar from office if the Lords applies such a thing as per the 1701 Act of Settlement. Nobody has ever been impeached before in Canada. Canada clearly has words in the Constitution to make its own similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and impeachment was attempted only 19 years before confederation in 1848. The accused survived a Commons vote, but nobody doubted the legal authority of the Commons was still valid. Assume that the speaker either goes along with it, or else is sacked by the Commons and a pro impeachment speaker put in their place, or the Commons resolves to amend the rules letting them bypass a speaker who is an opponent of impeachment. Then what?

The Canadian Parliament cannot “impeach” someone They can, however, punish them for breach of privilege or contempt Any disregard of or attack on the rights, powers and immunities of the House and its Members, either by an outside person or body, or by a Member of the House, is referred to as a “breach of privilege” and is punishable by the House.[116] There are, however, other affronts against the dignity and authority of Parliament which may not fall within one of the specifically defined privileges. Thus, the House also claims the right to punish, as a contempt, any action which, though not a breach of a specific privilege, tends to obstruct or impede the House in the performance of its functions; obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the House in the discharge of their duties; or is an offence against the authority or dignity of the House, such as disobedience of its legitimate commands or libels upon itself, its Members, or its officers. The last time this occurred was against a RCMP officer in 2008. The punishment imposed was simply the fact that they had been found in contempt.

Can students transfer to a new high school purely on their will?

My high school life was subpar at the very least. I was constantly bullied and never received the necessary protection from school staff. This coupled with dwindling grades created a negative feedback loop. My health was degrading both mentally and physically so I consulted the school counselor. She was unwilling to provide any help let alone documents needed for a transfer. My custodial parent wasn't any more supportive either, so I gave up on the idea and kept going to school, barely meeting the requirements for graduation. It's been almost two decades since I graduated and left NYC, but bad memories still haunt me to this day. From time to time I wonder whether I might have been able to switch schools without the school's nor my custodial parent's consent, had I known better. Can students struggling like me submit transfer applications on their own to move to another school unsponsored? Does the availability of such choices vary by state?

The primary question is whether the target school can/must accept you. A private school is not compelled to accept you, a public school might be. Because of the law compelling you (as a minor) to go to school, some public school will have to accept you as a student. However, as a minor, your preference is low on the list of legal priorities. The primary controlling factor is the school district where you live, and their policy. They may demand that you attend the school "in the area where you live", or it can be an urging of various strengths. It is conceivable that you can attend school in an entirely different district (we have some cross-district migration possibilities, but that is rare). If district policy allows for a student to go to a school outside their home zone, then the question of discretion comes up: it is highly unlikely that a district would allow a problem student to "impose" himself on a foreign school, so the school intended to receive the student probably has some say in the matter. Parental consent will be essential, so if the parent(s) oppose moving the student, the district is unlikely to allow the transfer. The student might also be consulted. In other words, no, student desire alone will not enable the student to transfer schools. The school that you are assigned to by default has even less direct say in the matter, but indirectly it could influence the recipient school's willingness to allow the transfer. For NYC, here is a preliminary page regarding transfers. Safety and accessibility concerns are easy, also moving within the city etc. but academic and social concerns are "a possibility", one to be determined on a case by case basis.

Are surveillance laws in EU member states necessary and proportionate?

On the 10th of July the EU Commission adopted a new adequacy decision, as a successor to the failed Safe Harbour and Privacy Shield agreements, to allow data transfers from the EU to the USA. The two areas this covers are legal redress if data is wrongly handled, and the question if the surveillance laws that allow the US government to collect data are "necessary and proportionate". As a citizen of a EU member state I am happy that these questions are addressed. What I do wonder is if we (as in "we, the EU") ask more from others than we are prepared to deliver ourselves, because of course every EU member state has their own surveillance laws and agencies, and constitutional protections only apply to their own nationals, and the GDPR applies only to EU residents. It does not seem like we offer any protection e.g. to the data of US nationals that is processed in the EU (I might be wrong here, but such laws are certainly not broadly discussed if they exist). I am also not sure if national laws are always particularly proportional - e.g. in my native Germany, the Bundesnachrichtendienst has a right by law to listen in to telecommunication world wide; while it says that complete surveillance is unlawful, the constraint is that they have to restrict themselves to not tap into more than 30% of global telecommunication networks at the same time. If your constraint exceeds your actual capabilities, then for practical purposes you do not have a constraint at all. So, would surveillance in the EU pass muster under the GDPR, or does the EU ask for protections for its citizens that it is not willing to grant to foreigners? I am not asking for a line-by-line discussion of specific laws, that would be impractical, but I am curious if if this has been discussed as a part of the process that resulted in the GDPR or the adequacy decisions, and if so, if the discussion had any influence on the proceedings.

These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

germany German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits. You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc. Some places in Germany differentiate their services between "locals" and "others", for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be "tourists" 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a "the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free" approach. Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

US states establish residency , used for access to services (like public libraries), things like in-state public university tuition, and paying taxes. Generally this is less of a service to the residents than a revenue source by the state (new car registration, for example). Residency is established solely by where you physically live (there are weird exceptions for people living RV-life type existences, but many will find this fringe existence difficult). There is no application for change of residency, no restrictions exist on what state you can live in. If you move there, you will be a resident there. US states don't do anything for a resident who is in another state. They have no effect whatsoever on federal courts inside their borders except for passing state laws that federal courts may use. Quasi-citizenship does exist for states. The 14th Amendment states that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." It specifies US citizenship and thus invalidated previous theories that US citizenship required some type of state citizenship. I can find exactly zero methods to acquire citizenship in a state, certainly not in the last two I've lived in, other than residing in one.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

Under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of the state in which the citizen resides, a term usually interpreted to match the common law concept of domicile. There are two privileges and immunities clauses in the U.S. Constitution. One protects the privileges and immunities that U.S. citizens hold in every state which generally speaking has been narrowly interpreted to protect only rights that flow from the federal government. The other entitles a citizen of one U.S. state to the privileges and immunities of citizens of another state where the person may be present, facially seeming to prohibit discrimination based upon state citizenship. A state may insist that you are a citizen of a U.S. state to vote in that state's elections. It may also prefer state citizens in matters of hunting and fishing licenses and tuition at public educational institutions. But, a state may not limit occupational licenses in the state to state citizens.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

Switzerland is another example of different countries doing things differently. You become a citizen of Switzerland by becoming a citizen of a municipality. Different cantons have different laws regulating the granting of citizenship by municipalities.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

germany historical For 2023, the answer by @nvoigt is correct. However, prior to the german re-unification, West Berlin did have special status. While being a Bundesland (county) of West Germany, it was in parts governed by allied laws back from post-WW2 occupation times. The most famous effect being that residents of West Germany were exempt from compulsory military service. This made Berlin universities popular among parts of the young male population who saw studying in Berlin a way to get out of that. Also, the people of West Berlin did not have the same passport as other western Germans, but were issued a "provisional passport". Here is a rare picture of one in item #5: https://www.t-online.de/region/berlin/news/id_90751288/berlin-vor-der-wende-10-dinge-die-nur-west-berliner-miterlebt-haben.html

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

Citizenship is a national concept australia Australian states, territories, and local governments can and do have the concept of residency which may or may not be tied with citizenship. For example, if you are a citizen, your place of residence as recorded on the Australian Electoral Roll determines which state/territory and local government elections you vote in. Where you employ people determines in which state/territory you are liable for payroll tax and worker’s compensation insurance. Where you live determines which state/territory you must get your driver’s license etc.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

canada "Naturalization and Aliens" fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government in Canada, as outlined in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (originally enacted as the British North America Act 1867 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom). Although Canadian citizenship as a separate legal status was not established until 1947, the Parliament of Canada previously regulated the process of naturalizing aliens into British subjects in Canada, subject to the limits imposed by the British Empire. However, the law does not prevent provinces from granting certain benefits to certain classes of citizens or residents in general. Notably, it is a constitutional right to move to and take up residece in any province and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province, but other areas are not regulated. For example, everyone who was born in Quebec, or who was selected by Quebec as immigrants, may benefit from resident tuition rates, even if they move away from Quebec immediately after their birth or landing. Resident tuition rates also exist in some other provinces (Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador), although the place of birth has no effect on the qualification there. Quebec is in many aspects a special case, as there is a strong sovereigntist movement and it runs its own immigration system (all provinces have the shared power over immigration, but Quebec is the only one exercising that power). So there was a reason to make some nationality-like thing. Nonetheless, the resident tuitition rates qualification is a really limited application and the status could not really be called as nationality or citizenship.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

Indigenous nations have their own citizenship/membership requirements (the terminology and conception can vary from people to people). For an example within canada , see the The Constitution of the Nisga’a Nation , s. 8: Citizenship (1) Every Nisga’a participant who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada is entitled to be a Nisga’a citizen (2) A person who is not a Nisga’a participant and who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada may become a Nisga’a citizen if permitted by, and in accordance with, Nisga’a law. The consequences of Nisga'a citizenship are outlined in the constitution. The membership in Indian Act "bands" is recorded on a "Band List" that may be controlled by the band: A band may assume control of its own membership if it establishes membership rules for itself in writing in accordance with this section and if, after the band has given appropriate notice of its intention to assume control of its own membership, a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to the band’s control of its own membership. The consequences of band membership are presented in this Q&A: What are the consequences of "band" membership under Canada's Indian Act?

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship Hunting. There are many such rules around hunting. In Ontario, canada , for example, All non-residents wishing to hunt black bear must contract the services of an operator licensed to provide bear hunting services. Only Ontario residents are allowed to go hunting black bear on their own in Ontario. There is a similar rule for moose, with the exception that an Ontario resident who holds a valid moose tag can bring along a non-resident on the hunt if they are an immediate relative.

Does the right to a speedy trial extend to the prosecution?

The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to a speedy trial. In comments related to Donald Trump's latest arraignment, his lawyer suggested that Donald Trump doesn't want a speedy trial. Has a ruling ever held that the right to a speedy trial extends to the prosecution, or that the defendant cannot waive this right? The unlimited ability to delay the trial by the defendant would open the door to all sorts of abuses.

The Sixth Amendment is very specific: "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy[...] trial." There is no such constitutional right given to the prosecution, and such a right would not serve the public interest. Defendants very often waive their right to a speedy trial in order to have more time to prepare a defense. Conversely, however, the defendant does not have the right to draw out the proceedings indefinitely. When the right to a speedy trial is waived, it falls to the court (that is, the judge) to schedule the proceedings at its discretion. It may choose to take into account the wishes of the prosecution or the defense or both, but is not required to do so.

Does the First Amendment shield the previous president from the August 2023 D.C. Indictments?

The former president is charged with: Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) Count 2: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Conspiracy to Obstruct an Official Proceeding) Count 3: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding) Count 4: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) As I understand it, the charges are based on what was said by Donald Trump. Is there a standard / caselaw that provides a speech litmus test to determine whether any of said counts are violated?

The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them. There is literally a U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) This statute states that: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally. At noted here : Fraud and Perjury While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for false or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements fall outside its protection. The government generally can impose liability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make factual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material benefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly giving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional. This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant. Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is United States v. Rafoi , 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023). This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States. The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional. Also pertinent is a much older U.S. Supreme Court decision , Hammerschmidt v. United States , 265 U.S. 182 (1924): [F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario: “It also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez , 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the "Stolen Valor Act" in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A law review article from 2015 attempts to clarify the scope of Alvarez , distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and "lies that must be protected for their own sake". The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, "High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment," 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015). It is notable that in Alvarez every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the "Stolen Valor Act", over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012. It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form DD214 , which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well. Another issue which influenced swing votes in the Alvarez case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful. One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of Rickert v Washington , is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, "the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech." This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign. An August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service , the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above. This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same) Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that: Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. United States v. Fischer , 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The foundation for this ruling is longstanding : Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949), the Supreme Court held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money is not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of lawbreaking remains protected speech. There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same. In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws. Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. U.S. v. Saylor , 322 U.S. 385 (1944). This also comes within the "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above. FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be "death qualified" in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump. As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes.

Restriction of freedom of expression in the case of sympathy for terrorist organisations

There is a number of organisations which are listed by the US government as terrorist organisations - Wikipedia What are the legal implications of this in relation to the 1st Amendment? If, for example, there is somebody who is non-violently expressing sympathy for the goals of an organisation declared as terrorist by the US government, is that illegal in the US?

The U.S. Department of State maintains the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and along with other government departments are charged with the process of making said designations. Under U.S. Law, it is illegal to provide material support to any FTO with Material support being defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as: currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets except medicine or religious materials. Note that the list exempts religious materials, such as holy books or documents speaking of ideology that may motivate the group. This would serve to make clear that the law is not against expression of sympathy for the ideology, but is targeting the means by which the FTO can use violence in support of their belief. It should also be noted that the law bars entry to the United States by aliens who are known members or representatives of an FTO, but this is a higher level of Material Support as it implies that such people are actively engaged in an FTO's activities. Finally, the law states that financial institutions that operate in the U.S. that become aware of accounts belonging to FTOs should take control of the accounts and value within it and immediately report to the treasury. An FTO is by definition any organization that participates in activities that meet the legal definition of terrorism, which is neutral towards the beliefs motivating such activities and instead focuses on illegal actions.

What is the judicial rationale for introducing the grainger test to qualify beliefs?

Section 10 Equality Act 2010 seems very clear that “belief means any religious or philosophical belief”. (Emphasis added) Yet, the employment tribunal in Grainger set down a five limb test which functions to exclude certain philosophical beliefs from protection of the act. But how can that be read to exclude “any” beliefs from protection, however frivolous, or however unsavourily transphobic or fascist they may be? More to the point, how did the tribunal account in this for the word “any”? (Note: I am referring mainly to the judicially set down “grainger test”.)

As revised, I think this question is really asking why the judge in Grainger plc v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311 laid down the test that he did, when the statutory provision at hand used more general words. In summary, the reason why the Grainger test does not protect every belief is that the European Convention on Human Rights doesn't either. The judge's conclusions on the ECHR's notion of "belief" are mainly taken from the analysis in a House of Lords case ( Williamson , cited below), which is binding precedent on the tribunal on that point. The new thing was drawing the line between "belief" in ECHR jurisprudence, and "belief" in the employment equality regulations, which was justified for two reasons: one, that Parliament demonstrably was trying to make the alignment; and two, that it would be incoherent with the Convention obligations to do otherwise. Note that the definitions in the Equality Act 2010 are carried forward from the 2003 regulations which were at issue in Grainger , the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 , so we have to look at this text instead. In 2(1) it said, following amendments in 2006 not shown in the online text: In these Regulations – i. "religion" means any religion, ii. "belief" means any religious or philosophical belief, iii. a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and iv. a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief. This regulation was introduced in order to bring EU Directive 2000/78/EC into UK law. Although the text in the 2010 Act is not identical, it does carry forward the same effect of the Directive, and so the decision still makes sense to apply. Also, Brexit has happened, but that does not displace the reasoning. In interpreting the provision: Because it derives from EU law, which is meant to mean the same thing in other member states, the domestic regulation should be read consistently with the directive. The court can look to EU authorities to find out what the directive ought to mean, although there was not much to look at in this instance. The respondent said that "belief" should be read consistently with the language in the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning religion, belief and discrimination - principally Articles 9(1) and 14. The court was still bound to read the domestic legislation in a way that is at least compatible with the Convention rights, even if the scope of "belief" is not absolutely identical (see paragraph 19 of the judgement), but the most obvious way to make the ideas compatible is if they are the same. The parliamentary history of the amending statute shows indications that it was made in awareness of ECHR case law about "belief". Courts can sometimes use this kind of information to resolve genuine textual ambiguities. The judge looked to domestic precedent, in particular a decision of the House of Lords ( R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15 ) which looked at the same provisions of the ECHR in the context of a claimed philosophical belief in favour of corporal punishment in schools. This in turn drew on extensive case law, including even an English ecclesiastical case from 1866, as well as many more recent sources from around the world. The thrust of all of this is that not every single possible propositional belief is protected by the ECHR; when it talks about belief it does not mean "a statement which somebody somewhere believes to be true", but rather refers to certain kinds of philosophical conviction. The application of this idea to employment discrimination is new in Grainger , hence "the Grainger test", but wrangling over the scope of "belief" is not new. The test itself, set out in paragraph 24, is really a collation of quotations from the various relevant past judgements. I won't try to figure out the exact provenance of all of the words since that is actually already set out in the judgement. But for example, (iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. comes from paragraph 36 of Campbell and Cosans v UK [1982] 4 EHRR 293, ... the applicants' views relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour ... Similarly, (v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others is there because of Article 17 of the ECHR, as interpreted in Campbell (citations omitted in this quotation), the expression "philosophical convictions" in the present context denotes, in the Court's opinion, such convictions as are worthy of respect in a "democratic society" and are not incompatible with human dignity ; in addition, they must not conflict with the fundamental right of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 (P1-2) being dominated by its first sentence This of course raises the question of why the ECHR's scope is what it is. That is somewhat more of a policy question than a legal one, in that the treaty reflects what its parties felt comfortable with agreeing. What matters in legal terms is that the Convention is binding on the UK, and the words that it uses must be interpreted according to what Convention authority (the Strasbourg court) says that they mean.

What is the judicial rationale for introducing the grainger test to qualify beliefs?

Section 10 Equality Act 2010 seems very clear that “belief means any religious or philosophical belief”. (Emphasis added) Yet, the employment tribunal in Grainger set down a five limb test which functions to exclude certain philosophical beliefs from protection of the act. But how can that be read to exclude “any” beliefs from protection, however frivolous, or however unsavourily transphobic or fascist they may be? More to the point, how did the tribunal account in this for the word “any”? (Note: I am referring mainly to the judicially set down “grainger test”.)

It does mean any religious or philosophical belief The Grainger test is a test to determine what qualifies as a religious or philosophical belief as opposed to any sophistry a plaintiff might espouse. The basis for this is that, under the UK constitution, the judiciary is responsible for interpreting what Acts of Parliament mean. Specifically, in this instance, what “any religious or philosophical belief” means.

What are the consequences of "band" membership under Canada's Indian Act?

Canada's Indian Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 recognizes "bands," "members of a band," and "Band Lists." A band may control its own membership according to membership rules it creates for itself, and with the consent of the majority of the electors of the band. What are the consequences of membership in an Indian Act band?

The consequences of membership in a band include the following: this is one path to entitlement to be registered as an Indian in the Indian Register (see s. 6(1)(b)) and all the consequences of that registration; eligibility for certificates of possession on the reserve lands of the band (see ss. 20, 24, 81(1)(i)), and when residing on the reserve, being subject to the by-laws created by the band (s. 81(1)); entitlement to a share of distribution of band money (s. 64); eligibility to distribution of up to $3000 of band money for infant children (s. 52.1); and entitlement to vote or run for councillor or chief (ss. 74-77). Note though that the Indian Act band structure is only one of several modes of Indigenous governance in Canada. See e.g. the Nisga'a Nation and the many First Nations with self-government agreements in Yukon .

FOIA website - 90% of requests are "Under Agency Review"? What am I missing?

https://foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/search/advancedSearch The vast majority of entries on "Under Agency Review" with no details, requester names or requester organizations. Even requests submitted back in 2020. What am I missing? Does the FOIA just never get round to 90% of requests or is there something else? ETA: My question is different than the one answered here: FOIA request takes too long

Government compliance with FOIA is notoriously bad. I found the following article in the Duke Law Journal illuminating: FOIA, INC. . There are some eye-opening statistics in there, like p.1375: At the end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal government dated back to 1993. More details on the response times from several large federal agencies begins on p.1423. (The article goes into detail to show how, in those agencies, commercial requesters have overwhelmed even well-funded FOIA offices.) It seems that the largest issue in compliance is a lack of resources. Apparently, "We don't have funding to comply with the law" is an acceptable response for the executive branch.

Is termination of (employment) contract binding, without regarding estoppel/waiver

I am speaking in the sense of employment contract, but I believe the same scenario is applicable to all kinds of contracts. The employer exercises their power to terminate Alice, and pay in lieu of notice as required by law (and also contract). Employer and Employee signed a document stating the above. However a few days later, the employer changed his mind and decided that it is a summary dismissal, and he will not pay in lieu of notice (as it is not required by law and employment contract). Let's assume for academic purpose we can not argue from the point of waiver by election/waiver by estoppel, and the legality of summary dismissal itself. What I want to ask is Can the employer switch from termination to summary dismissal? (which I believe is yes, as most judgement I see only argues employer cannot go back in his word because of waiver) Is the termination document a binding contract, especially considering a. Does it have a consideration, i.e. can the termination itself be a consideration? b. Does it constitute an agreement, as employee cannot actually refuse it? My ultimate goal is actually only to get the payment in lieu of notice, are there any other way to do that, other than argue on the legality of summary dismissal / waiver? In general, is there any way to protect termination of contract, if termination itself is not binding? I am sure I miss something as I cannot believe the world works like that.

The signed document is almost certainly a contract See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? It contains all the required elements: Intention to create legal relations. There is no doubt that the parties intended that this agreement would end their previous employment contract. Agreement. Obviously. Consideration. By making this particular agreement both parties are giving up rights that they had under the employment contract and at law, that is sufficuient consideration. Legal Capacity. Assuming they had capacity to enter the original employment contract they probably have it now. Unless one of them was drunk. Or insane. Genuine Consent. There is no information given that suggests this wasn’t a genuine agreement. Legality of Objects. It’s not illegal to terminate employment.

What is jury nullification?

What is jury nullification and what are its origins and history? What actions by a juror would be considered nullification?

Quoting from here , Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding. In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted. One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws. Zenger was the first case in America; in 1670 , it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of "illegal assembly" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released. Interestingly enough, according to The New York Times In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial. The Times also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.

What is jury nullification?

What is jury nullification and what are its origins and history? What actions by a juror would be considered nullification?

A jury is charged with finding fact , and is supposed to take the law as given to them by a judge. "Jury nullification" occurs when a jury bends the law to produce a desired result. This was made possible by English common law, which gave juries great latitude in determining what they would rule on. The underlying power may go all the way back to the Magna Carta of 1215. One example occurred in "Dickensian" England where theft of an item value at one shilling (twelve pence) or greater carried the death penalty. In order to spare a young defendant this fate, the jury valued a diamond necklace at only 11 pence.

What is jury nullification?

What is jury nullification and what are its origins and history? What actions by a juror would be considered nullification?

It has been accepted under English Common Law for centuries, (jury trial began around 1215), that jurors have an absolute right to bring in any verdict, and are not answerable for their decision to any court of law. I believe this is also the case in other English-speaking jurisdictions such as the United States, which adopted trial-by-jury. In the United Kingdom there has been a fairly recent case involving members of the campaign group Extinction Rebellion, where the jurors did acquit the defendants out of sympathy for their motives. There are other similar cases pending I understand. This report in The Guardian newspaper 23 April 2021 tells you all about it.

Property and Intestacy when married

What happens to property without a will while it is in probate? An IRA with a named beneficiary is exempt from probate. A house in joint tenancy does not pass through probate. However, say a car is titled in only one spouse's name. What would actually happen with the registration, title, etc? The car can not be used by the living spouse? The auto itself goes into probate?

Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form . But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).

Conditions of a signed lease

I've been renting a house for about 7 years now. For the first year we had a signed lease. After that, its never been renewed. I just pay rent every month. No problems. My question ... do the condition of that signed lease apply now? For example, the lease contained a late fee of $50 if the rent was more than 4 days late. Would that still apply?

You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.

Can one use a personal injury lawyer when the police won't act?

Based on a true story: Bob's car is parked in the street. Ted is driving down the street recklessly with Alan as a passenger. Ted sideswipes Bob's car doing quite a lot of damage, but takes off. Next day, Alan shows up at Bob's doorstep saying, "You wanna get the guy who sideswiped your car last night? I was the passenger in that car and I was scared witless and I banged my head hard when he hit your car." Bob says, "Heck yes" and Alan takes him to Ted's house where Ted's vehicle is parked. Bob gets pictures of Ted's vehicle showing the damage and paint scrapings from Bob's car. He's got this evidence plus Alan as a witness. Bob calls the Austin Police Department and after a couple minutes the cop says, "You know, we're not going to do anything about this." "Why not?" "Because we're losing 40 cops per month, and we can't hire more. We have only 3 cops for all of downtown Austin just not. Our response time for an active shooter is 18 minutes. We don't have the manpower for this." Bob is lamenting about this to one of his friends. The friend says, "Why don't you engage The Hammer?" (The Hammer is a personal injury lawyer who has billboards all over Austin and commercials that run every 2 minutes on daytime TV.) He goes on: "Give the The Hammer all your evidence and let him treat it as a civil case. He can get to the court system, sue the pants off of Ted and you don't have to go through the police." So my question is: Is Bob's friend on to something? If cops won't act in a criminal case, is possible and sensible to hire The Hammer to get restitution? Additional information: Bob's car was a project car, and wasn't registered, licensed, or insured at the time.

Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.

Can one use a personal injury lawyer when the police won't act?

Based on a true story: Bob's car is parked in the street. Ted is driving down the street recklessly with Alan as a passenger. Ted sideswipes Bob's car doing quite a lot of damage, but takes off. Next day, Alan shows up at Bob's doorstep saying, "You wanna get the guy who sideswiped your car last night? I was the passenger in that car and I was scared witless and I banged my head hard when he hit your car." Bob says, "Heck yes" and Alan takes him to Ted's house where Ted's vehicle is parked. Bob gets pictures of Ted's vehicle showing the damage and paint scrapings from Bob's car. He's got this evidence plus Alan as a witness. Bob calls the Austin Police Department and after a couple minutes the cop says, "You know, we're not going to do anything about this." "Why not?" "Because we're losing 40 cops per month, and we can't hire more. We have only 3 cops for all of downtown Austin just not. Our response time for an active shooter is 18 minutes. We don't have the manpower for this." Bob is lamenting about this to one of his friends. The friend says, "Why don't you engage The Hammer?" (The Hammer is a personal injury lawyer who has billboards all over Austin and commercials that run every 2 minutes on daytime TV.) He goes on: "Give the The Hammer all your evidence and let him treat it as a civil case. He can get to the court system, sue the pants off of Ted and you don't have to go through the police." So my question is: Is Bob's friend on to something? If cops won't act in a criminal case, is possible and sensible to hire The Hammer to get restitution? Additional information: Bob's car was a project car, and wasn't registered, licensed, or insured at the time.

Yes. This happens every day, possibly hundreds of times around the United States.

Can one use a personal injury lawyer when the police won't act?

Based on a true story: Bob's car is parked in the street. Ted is driving down the street recklessly with Alan as a passenger. Ted sideswipes Bob's car doing quite a lot of damage, but takes off. Next day, Alan shows up at Bob's doorstep saying, "You wanna get the guy who sideswiped your car last night? I was the passenger in that car and I was scared witless and I banged my head hard when he hit your car." Bob says, "Heck yes" and Alan takes him to Ted's house where Ted's vehicle is parked. Bob gets pictures of Ted's vehicle showing the damage and paint scrapings from Bob's car. He's got this evidence plus Alan as a witness. Bob calls the Austin Police Department and after a couple minutes the cop says, "You know, we're not going to do anything about this." "Why not?" "Because we're losing 40 cops per month, and we can't hire more. We have only 3 cops for all of downtown Austin just not. Our response time for an active shooter is 18 minutes. We don't have the manpower for this." Bob is lamenting about this to one of his friends. The friend says, "Why don't you engage The Hammer?" (The Hammer is a personal injury lawyer who has billboards all over Austin and commercials that run every 2 minutes on daytime TV.) He goes on: "Give the The Hammer all your evidence and let him treat it as a civil case. He can get to the court system, sue the pants off of Ted and you don't have to go through the police." So my question is: Is Bob's friend on to something? If cops won't act in a criminal case, is possible and sensible to hire The Hammer to get restitution? Additional information: Bob's car was a project car, and wasn't registered, licensed, or insured at the time.

You don't ask about this, but there is a third option in some jurisdictions: to bring a private criminal prosecution against Ted. In my home jurisdiction of England and Wales, private prosecutions are allowed , though not common. The Crown Prosecution Service may at its discretion take over a private prosecution at any stage, either to continue it to its conclusion, or to discontinue it; but anyone can start one. In England and Wales if you are involved in a collision which causes damage to property you must stop and give your details to anyone reasonably requiring them, and if nobody does, you must report it to the police "as soon as is reasonably practicable", and in any case within 24 hours (s170, Road Traffic Act 1988). Ted's failure to do so constitutes an offence, so a private prosecution could be brought if the police wouldn't investigate, or the CPS declined to proceed. I note you don't specify the jurisdiction you're asking about, though I infer it's Texas, USA; but I thought it worth noting the option exists in some places, and may exist for Bob.

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

Copyright law doesn't say the art isn't copyrighted if it was made unlawfully. It seems the art can be copyrighted and the act of making it can be a criminal offence. I'm not aware of any such copyright cases that have gone to trial. A fairly well known case that settled out of court is that of Jason “Revok” Williams and H&M. Williams noticed his art in a photograph used in an H&M marketing campaign. His lawyer sent a cease-and-desist letter to H&M. In response, H&M applied for a court order stating that the product of an unlawful act could not be copyrighted. Following some bad publicity H&M relented and settled with Williams. H&M stopped using the photograph and withdrew the application for the court order. ( News source ) ... The debate over street artists’ copyright privileges has entered courtrooms quite a bit over the past few years, according to Philippa Loengard, deputy director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts. ... The [H&M] claim wasn’t surprising, Loengard said, but it also doesn’t hold up. At its core, a copyright requires only two things: that the work is original and that it is a tangible medium of expression. [Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.” Another case settled out of court is that of Joseph "Rime" Tierney and Moschino. Tierney sued Moschino for using his art on its designs. One day before the court was notified of the intention to settle, Moschino sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that unlawfully made art could not be copyrighted. ( News source ) "As a matter of public policy and basic logic, it would make no sense to grant legal protection to work that is created entirely illegally."

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

No You are conflating two different ownership concepts: the art in which the copyright exists, and the artwork that is the expression of the art (my terminology). The artist owns the art, the train company owns the artwork. Copyright exists in an artistic or literary work as soon as it is fixed in a tangible form and the author is the owner of that copyright. The owner of the artwork is the person who owns the substrate that the expression is made on. So if I write a novel on your paper or computer, then I own the copyright in the novel, you own the physical paper or Word document. It doesn’t matter if I have your permission to use those things or not. If I don’t have your permission then what I did might be illegal and lead to my arrest or you seeing me for damages but I still own the copyright. It would be an interesting question to consider if the State could seize my copyright under proceeds of crime legislation but that’s beyond the scope of this question. So, no, the train company cannot take photographs of the art and publicly display it. They can take photographs of their trains, which would incidentally contain the art, and display those. There’s a line there that a court would have to find should it ever come up. They can display the trains as an art display because they own the artwork. They could even cut the vandalised parts off the train and display those. What they can’t do is copy the art.

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. Correct. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti[.] Not correct. If you buy a copyright-protected painting, you own the painting, but you do not own the copyright in the painting. Similarly, if an artist creates a work on an object you own, you own the work, but the artist owns the copyright. Because the train company owns the work, it can do certain things with the work including destroying it or selling it to someone else, but they cannot sell copies of the work without permission.

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

Maybe kind of (Speculative), but probably not, but it probably makes no difference. If the fact that it is on the train forms part of the artwork, rather than being merely a canvas, the whole piece (graffiti plus train) might be argued to be a derivative work of the train livery, which if it has distinct visual elements such as logos or other artwork, will certainly be protected under its own copyright. If that's the case, the graffiti may not be protected by copyright as an unauthorized derivative work. While this doesn't mean the proprietor of the train livery owns the copyright to the graffiti, it might mean the graffiti artist cannot claim copyright, or if he can, is subject to a counter-claim for copyright violation themselves. This would protect the train company from a copyright claim, but wouldn't mean they owned the copyright themselves. This is very speculative, it is probably more likely that a court would not find a derivative work, but this would depend on the facts of the particular graffiti, and whether and how it incorporated elements of the train livery into the overall piece. Consequences for the train company The train company is basically safe here. Copyright violation is a civil offence, and remedies would likely be limited to financial loss and an order to stop making copies. However in order to assert his rights, the graffiti artist would have to reveal himself, which would subject him to criminal penalties for vandalism, and a civil claim for the costs of cleaning or repainting the train. If the train company are also able to claim for "unjust enrichment" (depending on local law) then they might be able to take the whole value of the copyright, or even the copyright itself. The "artist" is unlikely to come out ahead. Disclaimer: I am not a copyright lawyer, or a lawyer.

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

It's an occasion where the train company could claim "fair use" in the USA. Or say that it is criticism etc. Now if there was graffiti on some part of a train, and the train company removed that part, replaced it with a clean part, and put the part with the graffiti into an exhibition, then they wouldn't have copied anything, so copyright is irrelevant.

In an opposite-sex sexual assault case, is "I'm homosexual" a valid defense?

Let's say Alice is sexually assaulted by a man, and circumstantial evidence pinpoints Bob as the attacker. Can Bob claim that, because he is homosexual/asexual, he does not find Alice sexually desirable and so cannot be the attacker? I'm unable to find anything on this via Google. The closest is the gay panic defense which is still not what this question is about.

This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.

In an opposite-sex sexual assault case, is "I'm homosexual" a valid defense?

Let's say Alice is sexually assaulted by a man, and circumstantial evidence pinpoints Bob as the attacker. Can Bob claim that, because he is homosexual/asexual, he does not find Alice sexually desirable and so cannot be the attacker? I'm unable to find anything on this via Google. The closest is the gay panic defense which is still not what this question is about.

Bob's argument that you describe is simply an evidentiary argument about identity. If identity and the elements of sexual assault are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Bob's argument is no defence. canada In Canada, one of the elements of sexual assault is that the touching be of a sexual nature. This is an objective test (see R. v. Chase , [1987] 2 SCR 293, at para 11 : The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: "Viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer." Touching with the motivation of punishment or humiliation can meet this test, regardless of the lack of sexual motivation of the accused. See e.g. R. v. S. (V. C. A.) , 2001 MBCA 85 . Depending on the circumstances, this could even render Bob's argument wholly irrelevant.

Full text of Act of Settlement, 1781 - during the early company rule in India

Can someone please tell me where I can find the full text of the Act of Settlement, 1781 passed by the British Raj in India? I tried finding it on the internet but couldn't find it. Thank you!

I believe you will find it on page 210 of this volume of the Statutes at Large in Google books : An Act to explain and amend so much of an Act, made in the thirteenth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, An Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe, as relates to the Administration of Justice in Bengal; and for the Relief of certain Persons imprisoned at Calcutta in Bengal, under a Judgement of the Supreme Court of Judicature; and also for indemnifying the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and all Officers who have acted under their Orders or Authority, in the undue Resistance made to the Process of the Supreme Court

Can Musk threaten X11?

Twitter, recently changed hands and became owned by Elon Musk, who decided to change its name to "X". There's the FOSS X11 desktop environment being developed for various Unix and Unix-like systems, and is hosted at x.org . Many operating systems provide X11 GUI packages under the "umbrella" name of xorg (which means installing this package will automatically install other dependencies on those systems) Q : Is it possible, that some kind of trademark dispute can lead to X11 losing its x.org domain name, and/or other formed/formless assets?

This is unlikely to be a problem. There are many companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an X or the name Xcom . That Twitter has changed to X branding does not substantially change this general situation. With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as X or x.com . Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that x.com could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour. It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp. The x.org domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the x.org domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both x.com and x.org were among the six single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while x.com has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, x.org has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004.

Can Musk threaten X11?

Twitter, recently changed hands and became owned by Elon Musk, who decided to change its name to "X". There's the FOSS X11 desktop environment being developed for various Unix and Unix-like systems, and is hosted at x.org . Many operating systems provide X11 GUI packages under the "umbrella" name of xorg (which means installing this package will automatically install other dependencies on those systems) Q : Is it possible, that some kind of trademark dispute can lead to X11 losing its x.org domain name, and/or other formed/formless assets?

Trademark rights go to the first one who uses them in commerce, or who registered them with the intention to use them in commerce. So if anything, the X.Org Foundation could be a legal threat to Twitter X , claiming that the rebranding of Twitter infringes their trademark which they have already been using in commerce for decades. Not the other way around. However, a possible response of a large company discovering that they inadvertently infringed on the trademark rights of a much smaller company and now facing a legal dispute with them, is to look for a small third company that used a similar trademark even before that to obtain those even earlier trademark rights. I remember that mobile game developer Zynga once pulled that maneuver in a trademark dispute with another developer. But unfortunately I can't find details about that case, because thanks to the countless trademark lawsuits Zynga was involved in, this became ungoogleable. But a comment by user71659 on this question mentions a legal dispute between two email providers where this maneuver was used successfully. So what Twitter X could now do is try to find some tech company that used the X brand for a software product even before X.Org and then buy them. But considering that the X Window System was already published in the 80s, that might be quite challenging.

Under what legislation has former U.S. President Trump been indicted for "conspiracy to defraud the US"?

It's reported by BBC News that Mr Trump is charged with four counts, including: conspiracy to defraud the US tampering with a witness conspiracy against the rights of citizens Focusing on the first bullet point to avoid asking multiple questions 1 : What legislation introduces and/or covers the offence of defrauding the US? 1 Although I would be interested in knowing more on the underlying legislation for a charge of conspiracy against the rights of citizens which I might post as a follow-up question

Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud United States) Here the indictment's introduction alleges that Trump perpetrated: A conspiracy to to defraud the United States by using dishonesty, fraud, and deceit to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful federal government function by which the results of the presidential election are collected, counted, and certified by the federal government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. temporary link to indictment pdf pending finding a better version: https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute) : If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

If my product (open source or proprietary) requires Oracle GraalVM to work and bundles Oracle GraalVM, can I charge money for my product?

If my product (no matter open source or proprietary) requires Oracle GraalVM to work and bundles Oracle GraalVM, can I charge money for my product? According to the link of GraalVM Free Terms and Conditions (GFTC) including License for Early Adopter Versions: https://www.oracle.com/downloads/licenses/graal-free-license.html (b) redistribute the unmodified Program and Program Documentation, under the terms of this License, provided that You do not charge Your licensees any fees associated with such distribution or use of the Program, including, without limitation, fees for products that include or are bundled with a copy of the Program or for services that involve the use of the distributed Program. If I charge users a fee, how do I define whether the fee is associated with my product or Oracle GraalVM?

If I charge users a fee, how do I define whether the fee is associated with my product or Oracle GraalVM? provided that You do not charge [...] including, without limitation, fees for products that include or are bundled with a copy of the Program or for services that involve the use of the distributed Program. Your program does envision to bundle the program and the service does involve the use of the distributed Program, so you can't charge anything full stop.

Is the recording of an audience singing in public copyrighted?

A church records their service on audio . The service, open to the public but behind the closed doors of their building, is performed before a live audience who voluntarily attend. The church then sends out a copy of the recording to paying subscribers around the world. The recording includes announcements, speeches, prayers, musical and theatrical entertainment, and a sermon all of which I would assume are copyrighted by the church entity since it is their employees and volunteers who made and produced it. Likely everyone who contributed gave consent to record their work, except perhaps members of the audience who were distinctly asked to pray out loud for the group's benefit. Also included is the singing of gospel songs by the audience . The audience is prompted and led by a song leader who is possibly accompanied by a piano player on some or all of the songs. Assume the piano player is a paid employee. My question is: Is the singing by the audience copyrighted as part of the larger or complete work? Probably in the same category: Are the prayers solicited from the audience also copyrighted? The question seems unclear in this regard: It is highly unlikely that the church asked any member of the audience for their permission to record their singing much less to distribute it. Assume they did not. No audience member signed a waiver granting the church copyright permission over their vocals, foot-stomping, or hand-clapping. To further muddy the waters, some of the songs sung by the audience may be copyrighted while others are in the public domain. I assume the audience's singing is about common for a diverse group - so not necessarily "original" or "creative".

There is copyright in the recording (probably) The person who first fixed the material in a tangible form owns the copyright. Presumably, whatever legal entity the church is, as it was made by a volunteer as a work-for-hire. That is because they were the ones who fixed it in tangible form. This is why journalists own the copyright in interviews they make with subjects. The copyright in the performance is a separate copyright from any that might exist in the composition. If the recording violates the composer’s copyright (e.g. the church did not pay the required statutory royalties to perform the songs), then there is no copyright in the recording, and the composer can sue the church for making it. There is no copyright in works that violate another's copyright. Making an audio recording without permission is a crime This is totally unrelated to copyright, but in most jurisdictions, you need the speaker’s permission before recording their voice. If the recording is obvious (e.g. a microphone in your face or a big sign saying services will be recorded), then permission can be implied - by knowingly speaking while you are aware you are being recorded, you have consented to the recording.

Is the recording of an audience singing in public copyrighted?

A church records their service on audio . The service, open to the public but behind the closed doors of their building, is performed before a live audience who voluntarily attend. The church then sends out a copy of the recording to paying subscribers around the world. The recording includes announcements, speeches, prayers, musical and theatrical entertainment, and a sermon all of which I would assume are copyrighted by the church entity since it is their employees and volunteers who made and produced it. Likely everyone who contributed gave consent to record their work, except perhaps members of the audience who were distinctly asked to pray out loud for the group's benefit. Also included is the singing of gospel songs by the audience . The audience is prompted and led by a song leader who is possibly accompanied by a piano player on some or all of the songs. Assume the piano player is a paid employee. My question is: Is the singing by the audience copyrighted as part of the larger or complete work? Probably in the same category: Are the prayers solicited from the audience also copyrighted? The question seems unclear in this regard: It is highly unlikely that the church asked any member of the audience for their permission to record their singing much less to distribute it. Assume they did not. No audience member signed a waiver granting the church copyright permission over their vocals, foot-stomping, or hand-clapping. To further muddy the waters, some of the songs sung by the audience may be copyrighted while others are in the public domain. I assume the audience's singing is about common for a diverse group - so not necessarily "original" or "creative".

Assume first that the composition is still protected by copyright. Only the author can authorize public performance of the work. Everybody is an infringer if they don't have a license to perform the work. Now assume that the music director secured a performance license. Then you look at the terms of the license to see whether it is allowed to record the performance; and if it is allowed, it is allowed without restriction, or only for non-commercial purposes. If the composition is not protected by copyright anymore, then it can be recorded. The person who creates the recording (putting it in fixed form) hold the copyright to that particular work (the recording). Copyright law relies on the undefined concept of "author", which as the courts say is a "question of fact". An author originates or "masterminds" the original work, controlling the whole work’s creation and causing it to come into being, which is not the case with a member of the choir. More likely, the music director and sound engineer create and hold copyright in a joint work. We might assume that some of the sermon was written down in advance, which is to say that it has a fixed form, but that's far from assured; at any rate, the preacher can also conspire with the engineer and music director to create a joint work, where the engineer's contribution is putting the work into fixed form. So the transitory singing of the choir is not protected by copyright (it literally can't be copied), but the recording of a choir and sermon is protected by copyright, and the copyright is owned by the people who originated or masterminded the recording. Probably not the choir.

Would making a non-profit TV show about Ronald Mcdonald be legal?

Ok, this is going to sound weird, but I didn't have any better forum to ask this on. Me and a friend are working on a sort of Horror/Comedy. A basic plot rundown: Ronald Mcdonald is a crazy lunatic who acts as the guardian of McDonalds, and will protect it at all costs. Yes, he tries to kill the Main Character. We plan for this to be posted on YouTube, with credit to Mcdonalds in the credits, and in the video description. It will be free to watch, and we won't make any profit from it at all. Is it legal to do this, or is it an infringement on copyright?

Not the show you describe Ronald McDonald is a trademark, and his appearance is copyright owned by the McDonalds corporation. That means that subject to an exemption, only McDonalds can decide what happens with Ronald McDonald. As described, you are going to use Ronald McDonald , not a generic clown that evokes Ronald McDonald in a comedy/horror. The most relevant exception that springs to mind is the trademark Parody exemption (and a similar exemption that exists for copyright fair use). Your movie doesn't appear to be a parody - the idea of a murderous clown protecting a burger chain is not, on its face, a parody of McDonalds. That is, it might be funny (or not) on its own terms, but it is not obviously poking fun at McDonalds which is the essence of parody. Obviously, your plot outline is brief and perhaps the full script is an incisive commentary on the way McDonalds is doing ... something. Further, famous marks have extra protection - works that tarnish the mark are more likely to be considered infringing. Tarnishment happens when a distinctive mark is depicted in a context of sexual activity, obscenity or illegal activity. You know, like a crazy lunatic murderer. Compare and contrast with this parody: This evokes McDonalds but it doesn't use any of their trademarks or copyrighted material and it also evokes other fast-food restaurants. The parody elements are clear: it clearly isn't McDonalds; it only uses as much material as necessary to get the audience to make the link; the joke is about fast-food restaurants: their sameness, teen-worker-exploitation, promotions, crap food etc. When they do explicitly compare Krusty Burger with McDonalds the joke is about McDonalds : Lou: Y'know, I went to the McDonald's in, uh, Shelbyville on Friday night. Chief Wiggum: The McWhat? Lou: Uh, the McDonald's restaurant. I never heard of it either, but they have over 2,000 locations in this state alone. Eddie: Hmm. Must have sprung up overnight. Lou: You know the funniest thing though? It's the little differences. Chief Wiggum: Example. Lou: Well, at McDonald's you can buy a Krusty Burger with cheese, right? But they don't call it a Krusty Burger with cheese. Chief Wiggum: Get out… well what do they call it? Lou: A Quarter Pounder with cheese. Chief Wiggum: A Quarter Pounder with cheese? Well I can picture the cheese, but… uh. Do they have Krusty Partially Gelatinated Non-Dairy Gum Based Beverages? Lou: Mmm hmm, they call 'em Shakes. Eddie: Huh, shakes. You don't know what you're gettin'.