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Minecraft EULA for mods

Word on the street is that it's against the EULA to sell Minecraft mods. I took a look at the actual EULA , which they use California/corporate/cutesy/condescending language to say that they don't want you making money off of Minecraft, but list a specific exclusion to that (ads on videos of Minecraft content), and then apparently have some other document that somehow says that you can accept donations but not do sales of mods, which a lot of people refer to, but I can't find a document explaining. There seems to be several details different in what I am reading vs what people are proselytizing about the EULA, so I have questions that are all interrelated. I came across the story of Physics mod , where a dev quit their job to work on the mod full time and it sounds like Microsoft pulled some strings to have their Patreon account banned. That's why I'm scratching my head about all this after doing some preliminary research. On what legal basis can Microsoft restrict the sale of mods that they even explain that they don't own in their EULA? This seems strange to begin with, and such a basis would have to be world-wide, which seems to make it even stranger. World-wise legal commonalities are very few and far between, since some people are slaves, some subjects, some citizens, and some a mix of all of those. Isn't their only course of remedy to ban your account? If your account is banned, then the EULA doesn't apply, so you can sell mods, right? How can you own a mod, but immediately, permanently, and irrevocably, give it away to the entirety of the internet? Logic would dedicate that whomever is telling you what to do with "your" mod actually owns it, in this case, Microsoft. Which would mean that you don't own it, Microsoft does. Given these points, a mod developer could have a public account that got banned, as a sort of honeypot, and then use 1 or more anonymous accounts, or borrow someone else's, if they want to play or test their code. That doesn't happen, or doesn't happen very often. Why not? Microsoft focuses heavily on "not sharing the game" when talking about mods, a distinction that I don't understand. Especially when mods by definition modify the game. The game binaries are available free of charge for anyone and everyone to download, and it's only after launching them that you can log in, so it seems there is 0 incentive to share a copy of the game. Yet they focus on this to the point it's occasionally part of the launcher screen. Why is this concept so intertwined with a completely different concept (making and distributing mods)?

Copyright is the reason Microsoft owns the copyright to the Minecraft code. That gives them exclusive rights to make copies and derivative works . A mod is a derivative work. Further, copyright is near universal because of the Berne Convention, the countries in blue all respect each other’s copyright: So, you can only make a derivative work if you are Microsoft, have Microsoft’s permission, or fall into one of the copyright exemptions which aren't relevant here. The EULA is the permission Microsoft gives and they set the terms on what you can and can’t do. If you make a mod without following the terms of the EULA then that is a copyright violation and gives Microsoft the ability to sue you and prevent you from distributions the mod. Copyright in an infringing derivative varies by jurisdiction but in the USA, there is no copyright in the work - so, yes, Microsoft do not own it (but they can prevent its distribution) but neither do you . Copyright laws allow Microsoft to not only prevent you from distributing the infringing mod, they can prevent anyone from distributing it - that’s how the get people like Patreon to shut down accounts.

When a lower court bases its outcome on an interpretation of the law, what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed?

When a lower court bases its outcome on a question of the law (e.g. the interpretation of a statute, or the requirements of the common-law or the constitution), what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed? Will a lower court's position on a question of law be permitted to stand as long as it is a position "open to a reasonable person"?

canada Courts must be correct on questions of law; it is not enough that the interpretation is reasonable When an appellate court reviews a lower court's position on a question of law, the lower court's position is reviewed on a standard of correctness . See Housen v. Nikolaisen , 2002 SCC 33 : On a pure question of law, the basic rule with respect to the review of a trial judge’s findings is that an appellate court is free to replace the opinion of the trial judge with its own. Thus the standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness ... There are at least two underlying reasons for employing a correctness standard to matters of law. First, the principle of universality requires appellate courts to ensure that the same legal rules are applied in similar situations. ... It is not open to the lower court to come to a conclusion that is different from that which the appellate court declares to be the correct one on a question of law. Even if lower court's interpretation would be one "open to a reasonable person," it will be overturned if it does not match that of the appellate court. Questions of law are reviewed on a lower standard ( reasonableness ) in judicial reviews of administrative decisions The alternative standard, reasonableness , is applicable in the judicial review many administrative tribunals and agencies, even on questions of law. That is unless the statutory scheme invites more strict review by courts or if it is a constitutional question or a general question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole or relate to jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies, in which case, the administrative decision-maker's interpretation of law will still be reviewed on a correctness standard. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 . But even in this regime of judicial review, a decision will not be upheld simply because it was open to a reasonable person to come to the decision. The review looks like this: A reviewing court must develop an understanding of the decision maker’s reasoning process in order to determine whether the decision as a whole is reasonable. To make this determination, the reviewing court asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision This is significantly more robust that merely inquiring whether the outcome was open to a reasonable person. a court conducting a reasonableness review properly considers both the outcome of the decision and the reasoning process that led to that outcome was recently reaffirmed in Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács , 2018 SCC 2, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 12. In that case, although the outcome of the decision at issue may not have been unreasonable in the circumstances, the decision was set aside because the outcome had been arrived at on the basis of an unreasonable chain of analysis.

When a lower court bases its outcome on an interpretation of the law, what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed?

When a lower court bases its outcome on a question of the law (e.g. the interpretation of a statute, or the requirements of the common-law or the constitution), what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed? Will a lower court's position on a question of law be permitted to stand as long as it is a position "open to a reasonable person"?

united-states Decisions of lower courts are reviewed on appeal de novo , with no deference to lower court interpretations, except in the case of habeas corpus review of state court determinations of law in criminal cases, which can only be set aside if the interpretations are unreasonable. This standard of review also applies to written contract interpretation, when the language of the contract is undisputed and unambiguous, and to any determination made by a lower court without resolving a dispute of facts in an evidentiary hearing.

When a lower court bases its outcome on an interpretation of the law, what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed?

When a lower court bases its outcome on a question of the law (e.g. the interpretation of a statute, or the requirements of the common-law or the constitution), what is the standard under which that interpretation is reviewed? Will a lower court's position on a question of law be permitted to stand as long as it is a position "open to a reasonable person"?

It depends australia “Standard of review” is not a term that is used in Australia, instead, the governing legislation would determine if an appeal were to be strict, a rehearing, or a rehearing ‘de novo’. Similarly, whether there is a right to appeal, what can be appealed, what the court may consider, and what powers they have are defined by the statute. Note that this is the situation for appeals: merits review of administrative decisions and common law judicial review are different and are addressed later. In casual usage, the word “appeal” might be used for any of the three but formally they are different. For this question, ‘de novo’ hearings are the easiest to deal with - the trial judge’s reasoning is immaterial as the appellate courts retries the case from the beginning. In a strict appeal the appellate court only considers the law at the time of the original trial and the evidence that was before it. It is also limited to only those matters that the parties raise in the appeal - there might be a glaring and obvious error in the decision but if its not raised in the appeal, its not for the court to go looking for it. The standard that is applied is whatever the statute says or, if it is silent, whether the decision is correct or not on the matters in dispute in the appeal. In a rehearing, the appellate court may consider subsequent changes in the law and may allow fresh evidence on the facts. This may mean that the decision was correct at the time but is incorrect now. Again, the statute dictates the standard to be applied with the default being correctness. Merits review of administrative decisions are not done by the courts but by internal or external administrative review bodies. For example, each state and territory has a civil and administrative tribunal which are known by their acronyms - NCAT for NSW, VCAT for Victoria, QCAT for Queensland etc. A merits review looks at the correctness of the decision as well as considering if the decision was the “best” in the circumstances - it may overturn a correct decision for a better correct decision. There were traditionally four grounds for applying for judicial review of a decision: the decision was ultra vires (it was beyond the legal power or authority of the decision-maker to make the decision) the decision was made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness (for example, if the decision-maker did not give the person concerned a fair hearing) in the case of a court or tribunal, there was a jurisdictional error (the court or tribunal mistakenly decided that it had (or did not have) jurisdiction over a particular matter) in the case of a court or tribunal, there was an error of law on the face of the record (there was a mistake of some kind in the record of the court’s decision, not in its reasons for decision). Again, legislation can limit the scope of these. For example, the arbitration acts severely restrict the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration, among other things, an error of law on the face of the record is not reviewable.

Original author of project that a company abandoned

I'm the original author of a project that was made on company time and resources. While waiting for this project to come to life it just died without any support on marketing it and not using it at all. Now I'm wondering if I can use this as my own releasing it for proprietary purposes or as an open source project. Are there legal outcomes when in the case of the company taking it back as their own proprietary product? I'm no longer an employee on said company.

Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine.

Original author of project that a company abandoned

I'm the original author of a project that was made on company time and resources. While waiting for this project to come to life it just died without any support on marketing it and not using it at all. Now I'm wondering if I can use this as my own releasing it for proprietary purposes or as an open source project. Are there legal outcomes when in the case of the company taking it back as their own proprietary product? I'm no longer an employee on said company.

Consider a company car If they aren’t using it; is it ok for you to take it without permission? Same principle applies to IP.

Hypothetically, in the U.S., is it legal for a parent to sell items inherited by their minor child?

Let’s say that a minor child, who is very close to the age of majority, inherits a house in which that minor child had lived with only one of their parents, until that parent’s death. Now let’s say that the surviving parent was estranged from the deceased parent and did not live in that house before the other parent’s death. Let’s also imagine that, according to public records, the surviving parent had signed a quit claim on the house, and is not on the new mortgage. To make this more interesting, now let’s imagine that, since the death of the parent, the minor child has not lived in the house they inherited; however, the surviving parent is now living in that house. As a final twist, let’s say that the surviving parent (who is now living in the house inherited by the minor child) is neither the guardian nor the conservator of the minor child. In a hypothetical scenario like this, would it be legal for the surviving parent to sell any of the contents of the house that the minor child inherited, without the minor child’s consent?

Parents do not have the right to their child's property. See this question . The parent cannot sell the house as they don't own it. The minor does- there is no law that says they cannot own real estate. There are limits on what minors can and can't do with it but this simply means that the legal guardian would be involved in selling it. Even if the parent was the legal guardian they would be selling it on behalf of the child. Depending on the age of the child this would involve either their consent or this being in their best interests. The contents are more complicated. In theory, if they were also inherited by the child, no. In practice it would be difficult to prove ownership. The most reliable way to prevent this would be taking physical possession of any important items by removing either the item or the parent from the house.

What proportion of parenting time makes someone a "primary parent"?

The terms "primary parent," "majority of parenting time," "shared parenting time," and "split parenting time" are used to describe the division of parenting. What do these mean?

canada Child support In Canada, under the Federal Child Support Guidelines (used when computing child support after a divorce, and in most or all provinces after a separation), the terms are defined as follows: majority of parenting time "means a period of time that is more than 60% of parenting time over the course of a year" (s. 2(1)); shared parenting time is when "each spouse exercises not less than 40% of parenting time with a child over the course of a year" (s. 9) split parenting time describes a situation where "there are two or more children, and each spouse has the majority of parenting time with one or more of those children" (s. 8). Which of these regimes a couple falls into is significant because it changes the approach to computing the amount owing for child support . "Primary parent" outside of child support Outside of the computation of child support, there is no concrete definition for what makes someone a "primary parent." Parenting arrangements or orders will just describe the division of parenting responsibilities, such as who has day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child; decisions about residence, friends, activities, education, medical treatment, etc. Typically though, when the phrase "primary parent" is used, it describes the person with day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child. But this isn't a descriptor that can be applied universally to the relationship. For example, a person might have "primary parenting of the children over the holiday" ( Wilson v Wilson , 2023 ONSC 3387, at para 163 ). Some courts are careful to place the term in quotes to emphasize that it isn't a precise term (e.g. "she puts great stock in being the 'primary parent'": Begum v Klippenstein , 2023 ONSC 2970 at para 86 ).

Hackintosh vs. fair use

Note: Cross-posted from SE SuperUser to get thoughts from legal experts here. Follow up question to Revisit the Hackintosh policy . Use case: I create a userscript (in a [licenced] Windows or a Linux) and release it under GNU GPLv3 http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html . I'd like to test the script with browsers available in macOS as well. To be able to achieve this with the x86-based systems mentioned above (I do not own or have access to any Mac) I get a macOS ISO image and install macOS in a local VM. Does this comply with fair use's " public interest in the wider distribution and use of creative works " ? If the answer is (more) "yes" are questions regarding such a use case tolerated here on SU? [not of interest here on Law] If the answer is (more) "yes" do questions regarding such a use case comply with SE's Acceptable Use Policy (or any other TOS)?

Breach of contract is within the wider definition of illegal When you install Apple OS, the installer prompts you to read and adhere to a clickwrap contract. This contract, the license agreement, only grants you a license to install and use the software if you adhere to a list of enumerated device types or cases. The enumerated cases, broadly speaking, are not allowing installation on non-Apple machines. Not following the terms of a license and creating a Hackintosh is a breach of contract. Breach of contract is something that Apple can sue the person breaching the contract over - that makes it fall within the wider sphere of illegal or rather legal wrong(doing) ). But it is not criminal . It's a civil wrong(doing) .

Hackintosh vs. fair use

Note: Cross-posted from SE SuperUser to get thoughts from legal experts here. Follow up question to Revisit the Hackintosh policy . Use case: I create a userscript (in a [licenced] Windows or a Linux) and release it under GNU GPLv3 http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html . I'd like to test the script with browsers available in macOS as well. To be able to achieve this with the x86-based systems mentioned above (I do not own or have access to any Mac) I get a macOS ISO image and install macOS in a local VM. Does this comply with fair use's " public interest in the wider distribution and use of creative works " ? If the answer is (more) "yes" are questions regarding such a use case tolerated here on SU? [not of interest here on Law] If the answer is (more) "yes" do questions regarding such a use case comply with SE's Acceptable Use Policy (or any other TOS)?

Let me try to find a legal question here. The SE main TOS page states that Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion , that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. The question of whether SE will get sued over this policy is therefore "No", they have complete discretion to kick you off. Still, maybe there is some question as to what the word "illegal" means. The popular meaning of illegal is "prohibited by criminal law", but the broader meaning assumed on Law SE is something like "may reasonably be negatively sanctioned if brought to court", and includes crimes, torts, breaches of contract, administrative fines, judicial injunctions and so on. Presumably the real intent is to prohibit uses which encourage actions that stand a reasonable chance of being found to be illegal, were the matter to be brought to court ( everything "may or may not be legal"). Without calling into question the logic of such a principle in the first place, and unless you refine the principle to narrowly mean "criminally prohibited", then this means "is it illegal to run Mac OS on non-apple hardware". It sort of looks like it is a violation of the EULA for the operating system, which makes it copyright infringement to do so (and illegal in virtually every nation, except Iran and Eritrea). It is entirely unclear what the prohibition against "illegal use" is supposed to refer to. It is not universally illegal to advocate certain (unnamed) political positions, but it is in some countries. Hate speech is legal in the US, and illegal in other countries. It may be illegal to describe how to violate a software EULA in some country, though it is not, in the US.

Is it legal to profit from explaining a book's content?

I was wondering if explaining a book's contents on a potentially monetized Youtube channel is similar to simply being a tutor or teacher if the book is freely available online via "pressbooks". The book is under the following terms: Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original. I definitely plan to provide a link to the book, but it's the 'noncommercial' part I was concerned about. Also, would it be ok to also include the definitions mentioned in the book, or would I have to write it in my own words? [1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/McBAb.png

That licence does not allow you to do what you want It’s a non-commercial licence and your usage is commercial (making money). You don’t need a licence to perform commentary or review of a book Providing that you use as little material as necessary from the original work, commentary and review is one of the exceptions to copyright carved out by fair dealing in most English speaking jurisdictions. In the USA, the fair use exemption is not so clear as it involves a four factor balancing test. Your planned use is in favour of being fair use, your commercialisation is against.

"Murder laws are governed by the states, [not the federal government]." Is Vivek Ramaswamy right?

United States presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy stated he doesn't support a federal ban on abortion, a practice which he understands to be murder, because the U.S. federal government doesn't regulate murder (emphasis added): For years, I was an opponent of Roe v. Wade . I think it was constitutionally wrongly decided. I think Dobbs was correct to overturn it because the federal government has no business here . Murder laws are governed by the states . So if abortion is a form of murder, which is the pro-life position, and I am pro-life, then it would make no sense for that to be the one law that was still governed at the federal level. However, isn't it true that murder is regulated by the federal government as well? Is Vivek Ramaswamy correct in claiming that murder is governed solely by the states?

It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111 . However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.

"Murder laws are governed by the states, [not the federal government]." Is Vivek Ramaswamy right?

United States presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy stated he doesn't support a federal ban on abortion, a practice which he understands to be murder, because the U.S. federal government doesn't regulate murder (emphasis added): For years, I was an opponent of Roe v. Wade . I think it was constitutionally wrongly decided. I think Dobbs was correct to overturn it because the federal government has no business here . Murder laws are governed by the states . So if abortion is a form of murder, which is the pro-life position, and I am pro-life, then it would make no sense for that to be the one law that was still governed at the federal level. However, isn't it true that murder is regulated by the federal government as well? Is Vivek Ramaswamy correct in claiming that murder is governed solely by the states?

This Is Not An Accurate Statement Of U.S. Constitutional Law State governments have "plenary" (i.e. unlimited) power to enact any legislation authorized by the state's constitution which is not contrary to the U.S. Constitution or federal law. Every U.S. state has statutes defining and punishing various grades of homicide. The federal government may only enact legislation specifically authorized by the U.S. Constitution which is not, in principle, at least, plenary, although it is very broad. In practice, while the federal government has enacted federal criminal homicide statutes, those statutes are piecemeal and generally involve some interstate, international, maritime, or federal government related nexus. For example, there are quite a few federal statutes that criminalize the murder of federal officials. The federal government has piracy statutes that criminalize conduct including murder committed on the high seas where no U.S. state has jurisdiction, parallel statutes that criminalize murders connected to air travel, and statutes that criminalize murder in places where no U.S. state or territorial government has jurisdiction like unincorporated federal territories in the Pacific Ocean. Murders of members of Indian Tribes by other members of Indian Tribes on an Indian Reservation are prosecuted in federal courts by federal prosecutors rather than in state or territorial courts. The federal government has statutes like the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that criminalize organizations and de facto organizations of people who commit multiple "predicate crimes" one of which is murder if it implicates interstate commerce. And so on. As Wikipedia explains : If murder is committed within the borders of a state, that state has jurisdiction, and in a similar way, if the crime is committed in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Superior Court (the equivalent of a state court in the District) retains jurisdiction, though in some cases involving U.S. government property or personnel, the federal courts may have exclusive jurisdiction. If, however, the victim is a federal official, an ambassador, consul, or other foreign official under the protection of the United States, or if the crime took place on federal property or involved crossing state borders, or in a manner that substantially affects interstate commerce or national security, then the federal government also has jurisdiction. If a crime is not committed within any state, then federal jurisdiction is exclusive, for example vessels of the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Merchant Marine in international waters and U.S. military bases worldwide. Recently, the Supreme Court, in the McGirt decision, reaffirmed that major crimes within the reservation boundaries of Native American tribes, for which a tribal member is suspected, must be investigated and prosecuted by the federal, not state, government. Federal penalties will apply if found guilty. In addition, murder by a member of the United States Armed Forces of a prisoner while under custody of the United States Armed Forces is in violation of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and can result in the perpetrator being tried by a general court-martial, subjecting to certain types of jurisdictions within its own borders or with foreign nations. So, yes, the federal government does have all sorts of laws prohibiting and punishing murder in a variety of specific circumstances with some federal hook. Some of those law are even generally applicable throughout the United States (e.g., the federal homicide offense of murdering a postal worker). As a matter of constitutional law, while the federal government doesn't have complete plenary power to adopt the equivalent of a state murder statute with no federal government jurisdictional hooks whatsoever ( see United States v. Lopez ,m 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which held that the federal government didn't have the power to prohibit gun possession in school zones under the authority granted to it by the Interstate Commerce Clause), it could clearly criminalize far more murders at the federal level than it does. It is unquestioned, as a matter of constitutional law, that Congress can criminalize all intrastate bank robberies and all intrastate thefts of controlled substances. Congress could regulate far more murders as well, if it wanted to do so. This Stance Appeals To A GOP Minority That Thinks The Courts Have Allowed Congress To Exceed Its Limited Constitutional Authority To Legislate A significant subset of conservative political activists are ideologically opposed to the breadth of federal legislative authority which the courts have permitted under the Interstate Commerce Clause and a few other less commonly used hooks (most notably power of Congress to spend federal money for the general welfare and to use that spending to bribe states to adopt substantive state policies). Mr. Ramaswamy's rhetoric is crafted to appeal to this minority within the conservative movement (the majority of both liberals and conservatives don't really care about federalism except as a tool to serve policy goals when it presents itself). But this isn't actually the law and if anyone tried to really enforce this narrow view of limited federal power across the board rather than to support selective political objectives, the conservative movement would swiftly disavow it. This Does Reflect A Long Standing Bipartisan Criminal Justice Federalism Consensus The federal government could also clearly devote more resources than it does to prosecuting homicides under existing federal homicide statutes, that it instead allows state governments to handle. But, while Mr. Ramaswamy isn't strictly correct that the federal government doesn't regulate murder as a matter of constitutional law authority, it is also true that the criminal justice enforcement related to homicides is predominantly a state level activity. This practice has been the living law in the United States for a very long time. For example, in 2021 there were 22,900 reported non-negligent murders in the United States. Of those murders, 54.4% (12,478) of them were solved, predominantly through state court criminal prosecutions, and secondarily through the death of a few hundred murders a year in the course of the offense, an attempted arrest, or by suicide shortly after committing the murder. But, there were only 311 federal non-negligent homicide prosecutions in that year. Thus, only about 3-4% of all homicide prosecutions are brought under federal criminal statutes, and the balance are brought under state criminal statutes. Territorial v. Subject-Matter Federal Homicide Prosecutions Moreover, a large share of the federal criminal homicide prosecutions (probably at least a majority of them) involve murders on Indian Reservations or in some other circumstance where the justification for federal involvement is territorial, rather than under federal laws that are generally applicable throughout the United States. It would be unreasonable to interpret the statement from Vivek Ramaswamy that the federal government "doesn't regulate murder" to mean that he was saying that murder should be legal in places where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of any state government (such as the on the high seas or Indian Reservations or in unincorporated federal territory). Only about 1-2% of homicide prosecutions in the U.S. (outside of places where the federal government's authority over murder charges is territorial) are prosecuted in federal court, under federal laws without territorial limitations. To that point, I wouldn't be surprised that Mr. Ramaswamy would favor strict regulation of abortion in circumstances where there is no state or territorial or Indian Reservation jurisdiction over the issue. So, while Mr. Ramaswamy isn't accurate as a question of constitutional law about the authority of the federal government to criminalize murder, his statement does reflect what has been a widely held bipartisan policy consensus for as long as the U.S. has existed. Side Point: Federal Death Penalty Prosecutions Are Rare Incidentally, the federal government has brought about 1% of death penalty homicide prosecutions. You can count on your fingers the number of federal death penalty prosecutions committed in states without a death penalty, since the death penalty was reinstated, post- Furman in about 1976. From 1976 to 8 December 2016, there were 1,533 executions. . . . The South had the great majority of these executions, with 1,249; there were 190 in the Midwest, 86 in the West, and only 4 in the Northeast. No state in the Northeast has conducted an execution since Connecticut, now abolitionist, in 2005. The state of Texas alone conducted 571 executions, over 1/3 of the total; the states of Texas, Virginia (now abolitionist), and Oklahoma combined make up over half the total, with 802 executions between them. ( Source ) 16 executions have been conducted by the federal government since 1963. Of the 16 federal executions took place since 1976, 13 took place during the last six months of the Trump Administration. Specifically : The last pre-Furman federal execution took place on March 15, 1963, when Victor Feguer was executed for kidnapping and murder, after President John F. Kennedy denied clemency. . . From 1988 to October 2019, federal juries gave death sentences to eight convicts in places without a state death penalty when the crime was committed and tried. . . . No federal executions occurred between 1972 and 2001. From 2001 to 2003, three people were executed by the federal government. No further federal executions occurred from March 18, 2003, up to July 14, 2020, when they resumed under President Donald Trump, during which 13 death row inmates were executed in the last 6 months of his presidency. Since January 16, 2021 no further executions have been performed. . . . There are 43 offenders remaining on federal death row. . . . The most recent person to be executed by the military is U.S. Army Private John A. Bennett, executed on April 13, 1961, for child rape and attempted murder. The only executions by the federal government committed in states where the death penalty was abolished in the last sixty years were Dustin Lee Honken (Iowa, executed in 2020), Corey Johnson (Virginia, executed in 2021), and Dustin John Higgs (Maryland, executed in 2021). Five other defendants were sentenced to death but died in prison or have not been executed yet, most notoriously the Boston Marathon bomber. Pro-death penalty conservatives could have used broader federal homicide legislation to expand the death penalty widely into states that have abolished the death penalty, but neither Republican nor Democratic Presidential administrations have chosen to do so, and legislators have not passed budgets or new federal criminal homicide statutes to facilitate this possibility. He Is Really Proposing A Novel Federalism Based Compromise On Abortion In this case, Ramaswamy is using this position to advance his political goal of trying to take a national abortion ban off the table of legitimate issues in a national Presidential election because he knows that politically, this proposal would do him more harm than good in a general election, while allowing him to continue to meet a GOP abortion litmus test by supporting abortion bans at the state level in states where there is the political will to pass them. Equally important, of course, is the fact that this stance provides him with vaguely plausible talking points that help him to strike a somewhat principled compromised between the most extreme anti-abortion advocates in the GOP base (and most of the leading GOP Presidential candidates) on one hand, and independent voters in general elections who are strongly turned off by national abortion ban proposals, on the other.

"Murder laws are governed by the states, [not the federal government]." Is Vivek Ramaswamy right?

United States presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy stated he doesn't support a federal ban on abortion, a practice which he understands to be murder, because the U.S. federal government doesn't regulate murder (emphasis added): For years, I was an opponent of Roe v. Wade . I think it was constitutionally wrongly decided. I think Dobbs was correct to overturn it because the federal government has no business here . Murder laws are governed by the states . So if abortion is a form of murder, which is the pro-life position, and I am pro-life, then it would make no sense for that to be the one law that was still governed at the federal level. However, isn't it true that murder is regulated by the federal government as well? Is Vivek Ramaswamy correct in claiming that murder is governed solely by the states?

I think this is inevitable in a federal system: it is difficult to imagine a country not having laws that outlaw homicides, including murder. If a group of countries decide to federate, they have two choices: try to negotiate all the homicide laws into one uniform federal code, or leave homicide as a state matter. Generally there are enough other problems for them not to want to run with the first option. The only other federal system that I know reasonably well is Australia, where each state has it's own laws for crimes against the person, crimes against property, driving, etc.

Is it illegal to alter your boarding pass?

So the problem is my legal gender on my id is non-binary ("X"), but the airline (Frontier) only allows you to choose male or female. I went around in circles with their customer support and their supervisor on this for hours and got nowhere with them. As a result my boarding pass gender and my ID gender are not going to match. I'm worried that TSA either A) won't let me through or B) will demand a free grope patdown because my gender information won't match. Would it be illegal for me to simply pre-print my boarding pass to PDF, edit the gender to match my ID, and then print it out to bring with me?

I recognize your difficulty, and I'm not sure about the formal legality of it (which would go to the materiality of the alteration, which if material would probably be a presentation of a false document to a TSA officer). But more practically, when you present your boarding pass and ID to the TSA officer before going through security, their system checks your boarding pass against the boarding pass in the computer system. If those don't match, you are sent back to the ticketing desk. My wife and I had to do this on a recent trip simply because folding up our boarding passes to put them in my wallet caused smudging that was enough to cause the TSA system to conclude that our boarding passes weren't in the system. This also triggered heightened bag searches and pat down searches for both of us going through security the second time around. In your shoes, I'd try my chances with a TSA officer accepting the ID v. boarding pass mismatch with your brief explanation instead. Due to the limitations of airline software, discrepancies between IDs and boarding passes are common enough for reasons like the inability of airline software to handle two word surnames, very short surnames, hyphens, and apostrophes.

Legal to become president if U.S. adds new state/territories?

If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president?

If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does "natural-born citizen" mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the "is a citizen of the United States at birth" language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h) , which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that "natural-born citizen" implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution.

Legal to become president if U.S. adds new state/territories?

If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president?

This issue has never been addressed, even in dicta, by any court case of which I am aware, and I've read many of the relevant case laws in articles about this issue. The language of the constitution is unclear on this point and its meaning in general is subject to a lot of debate by academics. There are legitimate reasons for both interpretations. Some of the analysis applying to foreign born children U.S. citizens (who are "natural born citizens), arguably points to a theory of the requirement that would hurt residents of the newly acquired territory because that case law looks to the status of the person on the day that they were born. The original constitution overcame the issue for the new colonies by grandfathering in people who were in the colonies at the time that they became independent. This could be taken either as an implied precedent for newly acquired territory, or as a precedent for the fact that an exception for newly acquired territory requires express constitutional language, depending upon your approach to interpreting the text.

Legal to become president if U.S. adds new state/territories?

If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president?

tl;dr It can be complicated, and it usually comes down to the language Congress uses in the legislation that treats the addition. Background Article II, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution lays out the eligibility requirements for a president. No person except a natural born citizen . . . shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. To see whether someone is a "natural born citizen" there are a couple of places one can look. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 deals with nationals and citizens of the United States at birth. It details a list of circumstances in which an individual may be considered a U.S. national by birth. Setting aside most of the situations that don't appear to pertain to your question: The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof; The definition for "United States" comes from 8 U.S.C. § 1101 , which deals with both nationality and immigration. Section 1101(a)(38) explains that: The term “United States”, except as otherwise specifically herein provided, when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Congress updates it frequently—for example to reflect the political union with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which took effect on November 3, 1986. But 8 U.S.C. § 1101 alone probably isn't outcome determinative. It's possible that one might still be considered a natural born citizen of the United States if other legislation ( e.g. , the covenant recognizing political union itself or a Congressional resolution) recognizes the status. For example, people still debate whether Senator John McCain is a natural born citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1401 or by virtue of other Congressional legislation. He was born at a military installation associated with the Panama Canal Zone in 1936, which was not widely considered a U.S. territory at the time. The next year (1937), Congress passed 8 U.S.C. § 1403 , which retroactively awarded citizenship to those born in the zone on or after February 26, 1904. So some people argue that he became a natural born citizen retroactively under § 1403, while others argue he was a natural born citizen at the moment of his birth under § 1401. For territorial additions (like the Marianas), presidential eligibility likely comes down to they way in which the legislation that recognizes the union treats citizenship. Births after the effective date of the union likely face a lower hurdle to natural born citizenship, while those born before the effective date may be more dependent on a retroactive grant.

Ousting an illegal sublet

My situation is the following: I sublet my apartment to a previously homeless person (I did not know this while subletting). We filled out the sublet form, but never submitted it. He has been living in my room for two months. He has not paid the rent for this month, and has completely stopped all communication. I am currently traveling abroad, and am unable to talk to him in person. When I talked to my landlord, my landlord said that I am their tenant, they can change the lock codes for me, and then ask the guy to talk to me. My questions are the following: a) Is this illegal? Changing the lock codes, and then asking him to vacate the house? He has clearly violated all terms of the contract by being a month late on rent. b) The sublet form was never submitted. Does this protect me, if the guy decides to take me to court? c) I am an international student in the US, and will be starting a job soon. If I am taken to court, and lose, will this affect my record and immigration status?

It is generally illegal in all US states for a landlord to change the locks on a tenant. Given your description of the facts, this person (henceforth "squatter") is a tenant, lack of forms and lease notwithstanding. When a person violates the terms of a lease, the landlord's recourse is to sue the person for damages and to petition for eviction (where the sheriff removes the person from the premise). Penalties for illegal lockouts tend to be very severe, however the tenant on the lease is not the one at risk on that point. The squatter can't win in a court case against the former tenant, but he can still file paperwork which the tenant must respond to. If the tenant of record doesn't show up in court, summary judgment will be entered against him. The landlord can sue you for the rent owed.

Can you aid and abet a crime against yourself?

Bob tells Bill, "I want to shoot someone, but I don't have a gun." Bill gives Bob a gun. Bob then shoots Bill. (Assume that Bill survives, both are legally allowed to possess the gun, the transfer of the gun would have been legal if Bob requested it for a legal reason, and Bob doesn't shoot anyone else.) Obviously, Bob has assaulted Bill, but has Bill committed a crime?

united-kingdom In the notorious Spanner Case in the UK in 1987, several gay men were prosecuted for aiding and abetting consensual sadomasochistic assaults upon themselves. So the answer to your question is yes, at least in the UK.

Can you aid and abet a crime against yourself?

Bob tells Bill, "I want to shoot someone, but I don't have a gun." Bill gives Bob a gun. Bob then shoots Bill. (Assume that Bill survives, both are legally allowed to possess the gun, the transfer of the gun would have been legal if Bob requested it for a legal reason, and Bob doesn't shoot anyone else.) Obviously, Bob has assaulted Bill, but has Bill committed a crime?

canada Aiders and abetters are liable for the primary offence Criminal Code , s. 21 makes parties to an offence liable of that offence on equal footing with the person who actually committed it: 21 (1) Every one is a party to an offence who (a) actually commits it; (b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or (c) abets any person in committing it. The purpose is to "make the difference between aiding and abetting and personally committing an offence legally irrelevant... whether a person personally commits or only aids and abets, he is guilty of that offence... and not some separate distinct offence." R. v. Thatcher , [1987] 1 S.C.R. 652. The actus reus The actus reus that makes one a party is to do or omit something that assists or encourages the principal to commit the offence. R. v. Briscoe , 2010 SCC 13 . The mens rea The mens rea requires that the aider or abetter "know that the perpetrator intends to commit the crime, although he or she need not know precisely how it will be committed." The aider or abetter also does not need to share the perpetrator's intention. "It is sufficient that he or she, armed with knowledge of the perpetrator’s intention to commit the crime, acts with the intention of assisting the perpetrator in its commission." Briscoe . "Criminal liability as a party to an offence... does not require that the harm in issue be foreseeable in relation to a specific identifiable individual." R. v. Natewayes , 2015 SKCA 120, affirmed in 2017 SCC 5. Application Bill very likely knew of Bob's intention to assault someone using a gun, and, with that knowledge, Bill did something to assist Bob in commiting that offence. This would make Bill a party to an assault.

Can you aid and abet a crime against yourself?

Bob tells Bill, "I want to shoot someone, but I don't have a gun." Bill gives Bob a gun. Bob then shoots Bill. (Assume that Bill survives, both are legally allowed to possess the gun, the transfer of the gun would have been legal if Bob requested it for a legal reason, and Bob doesn't shoot anyone else.) Obviously, Bob has assaulted Bill, but has Bill committed a crime?

germany If any given law actually applies is for judges to decide, but on the face of it this sounds like a case of "Beihilfe" as per § 27 Strafgesetzbuch (German penal code): (1) Als Gehilfe wird bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einem anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat Hilfe geleistet hat. (2) Die Strafe für den Gehilfen richtet sich nach der Strafdrohung für den Täter. Sie ist nach § 49 Abs. 1 zu mildern. With (1) saying that anybody aiding a crime (more literally a purposefully committed illegal act) will be punished, and (2) saying the possible punishment depends on the punishment for the crime that has been aided. (As a later addendum, the fact that Bill is the victim should not have much bearing onto the outcome, since he clearly was okay with a crime being committed; that he happened to be the victim is incidental. A German judge is also not elected and indeed completely independent, subject only to the law and his own conscience, so unlikely to respond to outside pressure. Instead this comes down to the question if Bill was aware that Bob was making a serious threat and a crime actually was planned.). Bill can also not escape this by not starting legal action against Bob since shooting somebody is "gefährliche Körperverletzung" (aggravated assault, I think) per StGb 224 , and this is an "Offizialdelikt", i.e. a crime that will be persecuted by a state attorney even if the assaulted party does not seek legal action (and this would certainly uncover Bills part in the shooting). Following a very interesting comment by JanusBahsJacquet I tried to find out if Bill would have already aided a crime if Bob had not actually shot anyone. It seems that is very hard to answer and depends on the difference if that was a "Vorbereitungshandlung", i.e. abstract preparation to commit a crime, or a "Versuch", an attempt to commit a crime. As this source says Der Wille desselben, ein Rechtsgut zu verletzen, muss sich zusätzlich in einem bestimmten nach außen sichtbaren Verhalten manifestieren meaning "the intent to violate the law must manifest in a distinct visible behaviour" to determine if this was a Vorbereitungshandlung or an actual attempt. Arguably, making threats to shoot somebody should count as "nach außen sichtbares Verhalten", so my layman's intuition would suggest that even if Bob does not shoot, Bill aided the attempt to commit a crime, which is already a criminal offence, so even if Bob does not actually shoot, Bill will still face legal consequences.

California non-compete laws: where do they come from?

I once read that California non-compete laws come from the gold rush era, and yet I was not able to find any more information about the subject. It would be interesting to understand what historical circumstances led California to have these non-compete laws which many of the other US states don't have. (and why those states don't have such laws) Thank you in advance for any answer whatsoever.

Overview California's prohibition on non-competition clauses was part of the Civil Code it adopted in 1872 which was written predominantly by David Dudley Field II, whose first major accomplishment was drafting a significant overhaul and codification of civil procedure rules for New York State a couple of decades earlier that was widely emulated and became the standard framework for civil procedure until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in the 1930s. He was heavily influenced by European civil codes and by criticism of the common law system. He was an anti-slavery Democrat who later became a Republican and represented (unsuccessfully) the leader of the Tammany Hall's leader Boss Tweed who was the epitome of corrupt machine politics in a trial of the century class criminal case. Another reference that can be reviewed is David S. Clark, "The Civil Law Influence on David Dudley Field's Code of Civil Procedure", in Mathias Reimann (ed), The Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World: 1820–1920 (1993) 63–87. Long Answer Only three states ban employee noncompetes: California (since 1872, see Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 94 5 (2008)); North Dakota (since 1865—before North Dakota was even a state, see Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26 (N.D. 1993)); and Oklahoma (since 1890—before Oklahoma was a state, see Brandon Kemp, “Noncompetes in Oklahoma Mergers and Acquisitions,” 88 Okla. B.J. 128, 128 (2017)). ( Source ) The cited California case at the page cited states: Under the common law, as is still true in many states today, contractual restraints on the practice of a profession, business, or trade, were considered valid, as long as they were reasonably imposed. (Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 284, 288.) This was true even in California. (Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 357 [relaxing original common law rule that all restraints on trade were invalid in recognition of increasing population and competition in trade].) However, in 1872 California settled public policy in favor of open competition, and rejected the common law “rule of reasonableness,” when the Legislature enacted the Civil Code. (Former Civ. Code, § 1673, repealed by Stats. 1941, ch. 526, § 2, p. 1847, and enacted as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600, Stats. 1941, ch. 526, § 1, p. 1834; Bosley, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288.)Footnote 3. Today in California, covenants not to compete are void, subject to several exceptions discussed briefly below. Footnote 3: "Prior to oral argument, we granted Andersen’s request that we take judicial notice of various documents providing information on the history of section 16600 and its predecessor statutes. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 453, 459.)" Wikipedia summarizes the 1872 adoption of the Civil Code in California as follows: The Civil Code of California is a collection of statutes for the State of California. The code is made up of statutes which govern the general obligations and rights of persons within the jurisdiction of California. It was based on a civil code originally prepared by David Dudley Field II for the state of New York (but which was never enacted in that state). It is one of the 29 California Codes and was among the first four enacted in 1872. Though the Code is organized in a manner similar to the inherited Colonial Spanish and Mexican Civil Law civil codes, many of its provisions are codifications of well-established American common law principles. For example, it contains a definition of consideration, a principle in the common law of contracts which has no direct equivalent in civil law systems. Similarly, it codifies the mailbox rule that communication of acceptance is effective when dropped in the mail, which is a feature unique to the common law. First adopted in 1872 and signed into law by then Governor Newton Booth, the Civil Code is divided – similarly to its civil law analogues – into four divisions: "the first relating to persons"; "the second to property"; "the third to obligations"; "the fourth contains general provisions relating to the three preceding divisions." Division One contains laws which govern personal rights while Division Two contains laws which govern property rights. Division Three codifies the substantive contract law of the State of California as well as various regulations relating to agency, mortgages, unsecured loans, extensions of credit, and other areas of California law. Division Four defines remedies available in lawsuits, what constitutes a nuisance, various maxims of jurisprudence, and other miscellaneous provisions which relate "to the three preceding divisions." Although revolutionary for its time, the California Civil Code was actually the third successfully enacted codification of the substance of the common law. The first was the Code of Georgia of 1861 (largely based on the work of Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb independent of Field), which is the ancestor of today's Official Code of Georgia Annotated. Then Dakota Territory beat California to the punch by becoming the first jurisdiction to enact Field's civil code in 1866. David Dudley Field II's audacity in trying to codify all of the general principles of the common law (including the law of property, domestic relations, contracts, and torts) into general statutory law in the form of a civil code was extremely controversial in the American legal community, both in his time and ever since. Most U.S. states (as well as most other common law jurisdictions) declined to pursue such an aggressive codification. The Restatements of the Law were developed in the 20th century as a compromise between those who felt the common law was a disorganized mess and those who valued the flexibility and richness of the common law. Only California, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana enacted virtually all of Field's civil code, while Idaho partially enacted the contract sections but omitted the tort sections. Later, Guam borrowed much of the California Civil Code for its own legal system. Justice Stephen Johnson Field (who was David Field's brother and was largely responsible for introducing his work to California), praised the California Codes (including the Civil Code) as "perfect in their analysis, admirable in their arrangement, and furnishing a complete code of laws," while English jurist Sir Frederick Pollock attacked the Civil Code as "about the worst piece of codification ever produced" and called it "the New York abortion" (since it was never enacted in that state). What was David Dudley Field II's agenda? According to this Wikipedia article : After having practiced law for several years, Field became convinced that the common law in America, and particularly in New York state, needed radical changes to unify and simplify its procedure. 1836 was particularly devastating for Field: his first wife, youngest child, and one of his brothers all died in the same year. To cope with his grief, he paused his law practice, traveled to Europe for over a year and focused on investigating the courts, procedure, and codes of England, France and other countries. He then returned to the United States and labored to bring about a codification of its common law procedure. Upon returning, he also established his own law firm, in which he was joined by his brothers Stephen and Jonathan. Much of Field's ideas on codification and the civil procedure rules were based on the 1825 Louisiana Code of Procedure. The Louisiana code was drafted by jurists including Edward Livingston, Louis Lislet (1762–1832), and Pierre Derbigny. In turn, the Louisiana code was inspired by French (including the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806), Spanish, and Roman law, the common law tradition, and Livingston's Louisiana Practice Act of 1805. European civil law thus influenced American civil procedure, partially through the intermediary of Louisiana. Livingston helped to prepare criminal and civil codes for Louisiana, and Field's personal papers at Duke University Libraries reveal that he had read Livingston's 1825 report on the Louisiana Civil Code. Field was also influenced by criticism of the common law by his law partner Henry Sedgwick, as well as lawyer William Sampson. Field devoted more than 40 years to this codification project. He began by outlining his proposed reforms in pamphlets, professional journal articles, and legislative testimony, but met with a discouraging lack of interest. In 1846, Field's ideas gained wider notice with publication of a pamphlet, "The Reorganization of the Judiciary", which influenced that year's New York State Constitutional Convention to report in favor of a codification of the laws. In 1847 he finally had a chance to put his ideas into official form when he was appointed head of a state commission to revise court procedure and practice. . . . In 1857, Field became chair of another state commission, this time for the systematic codification of all of New York state law except for those portions already reported upon by the Commissioner of Practice and Pleadings. In this work he personally prepared almost the whole of the political and civil codes. . . . The codification, which was completed in February 1865, was adopted only in small part by the state of New York, but it served as a model upon which many statutory codes throughout the United States were constructed. For example, although Field's civil code was repeatedly rejected by his home state of New York, it was later adopted in large part by California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, as well as the territory of Guam many years later. (Notably, Idaho largely enacted the contract sections of Field's civil code but declined to enact the tort sections) . . . Thanks to Field's brother, Stephen (who served in the California State Assembly and as California's fifth Chief Justice before being appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court), California bought into Field's codification project more than any other state. California first enacted a Practice Act in 1851 influenced by the Field Code, then in 1872 enacted Field's civil procedure, criminal procedure, civil, penal, and political codes as the first four California Codes (California merged Field's penal and criminal procedure codes into a single code). . . . Field was originally an anti-slavery Democrat, and he supported Martin Van Buren in the Free Soil campaign of 1848. He gave his support to the Republican Party in 1856 and to the Lincoln Administration throughout the American Civil War. Field was part of the team of defense counsel that William M. Tweed [a.k.a. "Boss Tweed"] assembled to defend himself during the first criminal prosecution of Tweed in 1873. Other members of the defense team included John Graham and Elihu Root. This first trial ended when the jury could not agree on a verdict. In a second trial in November 1873, Tweed received a sentence of twelve years in prison and a $12,750 fine from judge Noah Davis.

Where would I find information about Sales Tax in New Jersey about tutoring?

Is there a document or New Jersey official page where I could find information about sales tax pertaining to conducting tutoring services in New Jersey? I am using a Stripe Payment system and it doesn't take out Sales Tax and it concerns me because I can't seem to find anything or simply don't know where to search to find such information.

This document explains what is taxable vs. exempt, and also explains how to get more definitive answers (email, call, office visit).

Could a trial be held against a sitting President?

During the Mueller investigation, it came out that the Justice Department has a policy against indicting a sitting President, so nothing he found would result in bringing charges against Trump. However, Trump is now out of office, and this week they indicted him for offenses related to the classified documents that were found at Mar-A-Lago after he left office. I can easily imagine lots of delays in taking this to trial. Suppose he wins the election next year, and the trial doesn't get started until 2025. As I understand it, the reasons for not indicting POTUS are due to the way a trial would interfere with their ability to do their job (or vice versa: they can't participate in their defense adequately if they're busy running the country). Wouldn't these reasons also apply if the indictment were prior to their taking office? Would the trial have to be delayed until after they leave office again?

That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.

Does owning a house before the marriage exempt it from divorce asset division?

If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Jurisdiction: USA, but for example let's use California and New York for two types, if that's needed to narrow things down. Obviously, assume that there's no negotiated settlement between spouses, and divorce goes to family court judge.

united-states Overview If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). This seemingly simple question doesn't have a simple answer. This is in part because state law on the subject varies so much. Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Yes. The other reason that this is a difficult question to answer is that there are many other potentially relevant factors. This answer will provide some examples of some of the relevant facts that were not provided in the question. State Law Varies Greatly It is necessary to look to particular states, such as the New York and California, as suggested in the question, regarding this matter, as there is no uniformity or even guidance in federal law (there is even a common law exception to federal court jurisdiction that actually specifically prohibits federal courts from handling divorces and other domestic relations matters). There are two extreme starting points in terms of how this question is handled under state law, but many states are hybrid systems that borrow from each of these systems. Also, there are very practically important differences in detail with respect to how final outcomes are determined, even in states that have the same basic systems. Once critical details are considered, there are probably at least half a dozen basic sets of rules among the fifty U.S. states concerning the question of how a house acquired prior to marrying by one spouse before marriage is treated in a property division during a divorce, and each of those basic sets of rules has some state specific variations. This also sets aside the ubiquitous possibility in every U.S. state that these rules have been modified by a marital agreement between the spouses (such as a prenuptial agreement). There are also significant differences between states, beyond the scope of this question, regarding the inheritance rights of a spouse in a house acquired by the other spouse before the marriage began in that spouse's sole name, at death. Equitable Division One of the two extremes in U.S. law is the pure traditional equitable division rule, in which all property of each spouse (regardless of whose name it is titled in) may be distributed in a manner that the judge finds to be equitable, rather than equal, and the concepts of separate and marital or community property does not exist. In the traditional equitable division regime, and in some states, but not others, a divorce court may consider marital fault in some (but not all) divorces, in deciding what is equitable in divorces commenced on fault based grounds. Each of these states has both fault based and no-fault divorces, a marital fault in not considered in property divisions in no-fault divorces in these states. New York State, for example, has a mixed fault and no-fault based divorce system. In equitable division states, often a business or a pension will be allocated entirely to a spouse who is active in the business or occupation associated with that asset, and a house will be allocated to a spouse who is not involved with the business or the occupation that gave rise to the pension. Community Property Another of the extremes in U.S. law is the community property regime, in which property acquired before the marriage and by a gift or inheritance are separate property not subject to division in a divorce, and everything acquired during the marriage is owned 50-59 by the spouses. In a community property state, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage automatically becomes property that is owned 50-50 by the spouses immediate and often some kinds of property formally titled in only one spouse's name can't be transferred without the consent of both spouses. For example, in California, which is a community property state, a house purchased in the name of one spouse before the couple marries is initially, at least, on the day of the wedding, entirely the separate property of the spouse who owns it. But, considerations discussed below regarding appreciation and the source of payments to related to the house will sometimes muddy the waters of this analysis. New York State: A Hybrid System New York State is strictly speaking an equitable distribution state and a spouse does not have a present ownership interest in property titled in their spouse's name which is acquired during the marriage. But, New York State does make a distinction between separate property and marital property at the time of a divorce, so it is really a hybrid of a traditional equitable division regime and a community property regime, unlike some other states that are more pure examples of the traditional equitable division system. During the divorce both spouses have to tell the judge about their income and any debts they owe. When the court grants a divorce, property will be divided equitably (though not always equally) between the spouses. New York's Equitable Distribution Law recognizes marriage as an economic as well as a social partnership. The law requires that a judge divide property as fairly as possible. The Equitable Distribution Law talks about two types of property for purposes of divorce: marital property and separate property. Marital property will be divided between the two spouses. Marital Property: all property either spouse bought during the marriage, regardless of whose name is on the property. Pension plans and other retirement plans are considered marital property. The portion of marital property earned during the marriage will be divided by the court. Separate Property: property a spouse owned before the marriage, or any inheritance or personal injury payments or gifts from someone other than the spouse during the marriage. To see the factors a court should consider in making an equitable distribution award, see Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). ( Source ) In New York State, separate property and marital property is defined as follows: c. The term "marital property" shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined. d. The term separate property shall mean: (1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse; (2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property , except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part. ( Source ) The factors to be considered in the equitable property division in New York State, per the same source, are as follows: Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions. a. Except where the parties have provided in an agreement for the disposition of their property pursuant to subdivision three of this part, the court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, and in proceedings to obtain a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for the disposition thereof in the final judgment. b. Separate property shall remain such. c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider: (1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action; (2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects; (4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution; (5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage; (6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part; (7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. **However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse; (8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property; (9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party; (11) the tax consequences to each party; (12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; (13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration; (14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts; (15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and (16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper. e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property. f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property. g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel. h. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph d of this subdivision. Thus, in New York State, unlike Colorado (discussed below), appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage is separate property and not marital property. Section 234 of the New York Domestic Relations Law referenced in the bolded language above states: § 234. Title to or occupancy and possession of property. In any action for divorce, for a separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. Where the title to real property is affected, a copy of such judgment, order or decree, duly certified by the clerk of the court wherein said judgement was rendered, shall be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county in which such property is situated, as provided by section two hundred ninety-seven-b of the real property law. Usually, the authority granted by Section 234 is used to enter temporary orders granting a spouse possession and use of a residence titled in the name of the other spouse until the case is concluded, although it could be applied to a post-decree decision as well. Also, while New York State now finally has "no fault" divorces (it was the last state in the U.S. to make this option available), it also allows spouses to commence a fault based divorce. In a fault based divorce, marital fault (e.g. having an affair) can be considered as a factor by the court in equitably dividing the couple's property in the divorce if fault is successfully established. Fun Fact: In New York State, family court judges don't have jurisdiction over divorces , which are instead handled by the general jurisdiction trial court in the state known as the "Supreme Court". New York State's apex court is called the "Court of Appeals". Complicating Factors The reality, however, is more complicated than these extremes in most cases. Many states adopt parts of each regime, develop their own special rules, or implement the same basic system of marital property ownership and property division upon divorce in different ways. Appreciation And Payment Of Carrying Costs During The Marriage For example, Colorado is not technically a community property state, and community property rights of a spouse in marital property are not recognized during the marriage. But in Colorado, upon divorce, there is a distinction between separate property and marital property that is very similar to that found in community property states. And, in Colorado, while property owned before a marriage is not marital property, appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage, and income from separate property, is marital property. Another issue is what payment of mortgages and other costs of maintain real estate that is separate property from funds earned from wages or investments of either spouse during the marriage, will often muddy the waters. California's rule in this situation is non-obvious from general community property principles ands is quite tricky and technical. California allocates some appreciation of separate property which has had mortgage principal paid for in part from income earned during the marriage or marital property to community property and some of the appreciation to separate property, on a pro-rated basis determined at the time that the property is valued for divorce purposes. For example, in California, if the home was worth $100,000 net of a $100,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage, and then is then sold free and clear net of costs of sale for $400,000, then $100,000 of the proceeds are separate property, $100,000 of the proceeds are community property, and $200,000 of the proceeds are appreciation is is pro-rated between the two, in this case, evenly. so $200,000 of the proceeds is separate property and $200,000 of the proceeds is marital property. But, taxes, insurance payments, and interest payments as opposed to principal payments, do not add to the community property value of the house, as they are current expenses that don't change the value of the property under California law, even though money is fungible. In general, some states that distinguish between separate and marital property, or separate and community property, at the time of a divorce, treat appreciation in separate property and payment of carrying costs for separate property as giving rise to some marital or community property interest in that property that is traceable to appreciation during the marriage or income acquired during the marriage, while other states continue to treat property acquired before the marriage entirely as separate property even if it appreciates, and/or even if carrying costs for the property are paid for from income acquired during the marriage. In states where appreciation in the property and/or payment of carrying costs with income earned during a marriage, gives separate property a partial marital property status, these two factors often convert a house that was originally separate property almost entirely into marital property after a long marriage, while modifying its separate property status only slightly after a short marriage. In the same vein, different states that distinguish between separate property on one hand, and marital or community property on the other, treat income from separate property earned during a marriage such as rent, interest, and dividends, differently than other states do and sometimes differently than appreciation in the asset itself. Quasi-Community Property A third complicating issue is the question of "quasi-community property." If property is acquired as separate property or community property in a community property state, many states which are not community property states will treaty property acquired or owned by one or more members of the couple while they lived in that community property state as if it were governed by the community property laws of the place where the property is located, or the laws of the place where it was located before it was sold and reinvested in property in the state where the divorce case is being litigated. Other jurisdictions recognize property acquired while a couple lived in a community property state and its proceeds to retain its community property v. separate property status with a "quasi-community property" doctrine. But, these jurisdictions, rather than applying the community property laws of the state where particular property was acquired, applies a generic set of community property laws to property acquired in any community property state during the marriage. Sanctions For Economic Waste Also, in both traditional equitable division regimes that make a separate v. marital property distinction, and in community property regimes, sometimes if the owner of the house that would otherwise be classified as separate property commits "economic waste" that destroys the value of marital property out of spite, or without good cause. When that happens, a court may order that the harm to the marital or community property caused by the economic waste of a spouse be remedied with a contributions from the guilty spouse's separate property. Marital Agreements Finally, almost every state allows married couples to modify the property division rules of the state as applied to that couple, in a prenuptial agreement or a postnuptial agreement (collectively, "marital agreements") if it is prepared with the proper disclosures and formalities, and informed consent is given to the agreement. For example, one of the common terms of a marital agreement (especially for late in life remarriages of widows and widowers, but also in many other cases) states that upon a divorce, legal title to property will be followed strictly when making a property division, with the value of any jointly owned property split exactly equally. In other words, a marital agreement will often provide that property will be divided upon a divorce in the same way that it would be divided if the couple had never married. This is sometimes called a "your's is your's, and mine is mine" prenup. Marital agreements like this also often waive any right to alimony to the full extent permitted by law (which economically is almost equivalent to treating the members of the couple as if they had never married) and often waive any inheritance rights of a surviving spouse upon their spouse's death.

Does owning a house before the marriage exempt it from divorce asset division?

If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Jurisdiction: USA, but for example let's use California and New York for two types, if that's needed to narrow things down. Obviously, assume that there's no negotiated settlement between spouses, and divorce goes to family court judge.

canada When spouses separate, each has a right to property division that is governed by provincial legislation. I give three examples, only one of which (British Columbia) excludes a house brought into the marriage from property division. The other two (Saskatchewan and Ontario) give the family home / matrimonial home special treatment for property division and do include it for division, even if it was owned by a spouse prior to the marriage. british-columbia A previously owned home is excluded from property division. If a spouse acquired the house before the relationship between the spouses began, it is excluded from "family property" for the purpose of property division: Family Law Act , s. 85 . 1 saskatchewan The "family home" is not exempt from property division, even if it was owned by a spouse prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship. There is a presumption that its value will be divided equally, unless a court finds that to be unfair considering extraordinary circumstances or unfair to the spouse with custody of the children. Family Property Act , ss. 22-23 . ontario The value of the "matrimonial home" is never deducted from the value of family property even if it was owned by a spouse on the date of marriage. Family Law Act , s. 4(1) . quebec Québec has two regimes. Before July 1, 1970, the default regime was community of property . Since July 1, 1970, the default regime is partnership of acquests . Spouses could and can choose a non-default regime or otherwise alter the scheme to their specific desires by contract. But before property division under either regime, the value of family patrimony is to be divided equally between spouses ( art 416 CCQ ). The family residence is part of the family patrimony ( art 415 CCQ ). This right cannot be renounced by a marriage contract ( art 423 CCQ ). 1. For background about B.C.'s change from a "family purpose" model (where property was included for division if it was used for a family purpose) regime to an "excluded property" model (where all property is included unless on a fairly precise "excluded" list, such as pre- and post-relationship property), see the 2010 White Paper on the Family Relations Act Reform . It does not discuss why it was not recommended that the family residence not be always counted as family property.

How do you check the legality of a new business model?

How do you check the legality of a new business model to make sure it will be legal, and you won't be running afoul of some law you have no idea of?

Hire a lawyer, who is licensed and trained in law and who is obligated to be honest with you and advocate for your interests, and get him/her to review your business plan. He/she will point out real or potential problems with your ideas and plans, show you legal gray areas of the law and advise you on what you can and can't do. Some lawyers offer a free initial consultation. As an example, you can browse and read specialties and qualifications for legal help in New Jersey: https://www.justia.com/lawyers/business-law/new-jersey There's no substitute for real legal advice; not consulting with an attorney before signing contracts or starting a business can put in in real legal jeopardy. Don't ask legal advice from randos on the Internet, as they are not trained or licensed, and it is illegal to act or work as a lawyer without being licensed. As ohwilleke points out, you may want or need to consult several different lawyers.

How do you check the legality of a new business model?

How do you check the legality of a new business model to make sure it will be legal, and you won't be running afoul of some law you have no idea of?

When you have a problem with your car, you take it to a person who is trained to fix cars and knows about them. You pay money for their time and expertise. This is more or less the same situation- you consult a lawyer.

How (and how come) are US state/federal prosecutors allowed to seal indictments?

I have recently heard Tara Reade (who had accused US president Joseph Biden of sexual attack several decades ago) say, that there has been a sealed indictment against her, for the past 3 years (2020-2023), following some kind of grand jury procedure. Assuming that is possible (regardless of whether it's actually true or not) - what is the legal basis of doing this? That is, what legislation allows for prosecutors or juries to avoid publication indictments of individuals for significant periods of time? And has this power even been challenged constitutionally? More specifically, has such process been recognized as "due" in context of the Fifth amendment to the US constitution?: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

An indictment is not the deprivation of liberty. An indictment is actually part of the due process of law that is guaranteed in the Constitution. Deprivation of liberty means incarceration. The processes that are generally part of incarceration are the initial court hearings after arrest and the trials to gain conviction for offenses.

How (and how come) are US state/federal prosecutors allowed to seal indictments?

I have recently heard Tara Reade (who had accused US president Joseph Biden of sexual attack several decades ago) say, that there has been a sealed indictment against her, for the past 3 years (2020-2023), following some kind of grand jury procedure. Assuming that is possible (regardless of whether it's actually true or not) - what is the legal basis of doing this? That is, what legislation allows for prosecutors or juries to avoid publication indictments of individuals for significant periods of time? And has this power even been challenged constitutionally? More specifically, has such process been recognized as "due" in context of the Fifth amendment to the US constitution?: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

The purpose of the grand jury system is to ensure that innocent people don't have their names dragged through the mud by the mere fact of being accused of a crime. The US founding fathers were concerned that the government could announce that, say, they were indicting ein for murder, let that accusation ruin your reputation by being reported in papers, and later withdraw the charges when it turned out there was no evidence. The accusation would still sully your reputation. The grand jury system avoids that by forcing the prosecutor to lay out their evidence to the grand jury in secret. These proceedings are sealed so that your reputation isn't damaged if the grand jury declines to indict. If the grand jury does choose to indict, that indictment stays sealed until the prosecutor makes it public. Prosecutors may keep indictments sealed for many reasons. But in the case of large, long-running investigations, the most common reason is so that they can unseal indictments against a number of people at once. If you're investigating an organized crime family, for example, you might develop evidence against Little Fish first, go to the grand jury, and indict him. With that sealed indictment, you might convince Little Fish to turn state's evidence and implicate Medium Fish. You go to the grand jury and secure an indictment against Medium Fish and leverage that, eventually, to indict the Big Fish you're after. At the end, you unseal all the indictments at once and arrest everyone. If the indictments were made public immediately, it would be a major tip-off to the organized crime family that investigators were closing in on Big Fish.

How (and how come) are US state/federal prosecutors allowed to seal indictments?

I have recently heard Tara Reade (who had accused US president Joseph Biden of sexual attack several decades ago) say, that there has been a sealed indictment against her, for the past 3 years (2020-2023), following some kind of grand jury procedure. Assuming that is possible (regardless of whether it's actually true or not) - what is the legal basis of doing this? That is, what legislation allows for prosecutors or juries to avoid publication indictments of individuals for significant periods of time? And has this power even been challenged constitutionally? More specifically, has such process been recognized as "due" in context of the Fifth amendment to the US constitution?: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

Grand jury proceedings and statements are sealed in their initial state, for example you can't go listen in on the hearing. At some point a legal document may be produced, and filed with the court: they are sealed, unless they are unsealed. Here is a motion to unseal an indictment, and here is a motion to seal an indictment. You will notice that in both cases the US attorney simply says "we request that the indictment be (un)sealed". FRCP 6 requires secrecy, see (e)(3) for the "exceptions". Essentially, secrecy is in the nature of the grand jury process, which does not determine guilt, it only determines if there is enough evidence to formally charge. It is a filtering tool that decides if there is probable cause for an arrest. Public records laws all have exceptions built in for various purposes, one of them being that secret court records are not subject to otherwise mandatory release. There are no clauses to the effect that a secret record must be released after a particular period of time (this is distinct from declassification).

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

No, you would be guilty of perjury. In order to go through the legal formality, you have to obtain a license, Washington example (King County) seen here . You must swear that you are single, divorced, or widowed. If you leave the box unchecked, you won't get a license. If you are married and check any box, you have committed perjury.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

New York's Domestic Relations Law explicitly contemplates the licensing and solemnization of second marriages for already-married couples. However I haven't read it closely enough to determine whether a clerk is required to consider granting a license to such a couple or it within the clerk's discretion to refuse; the law explicitly authorizes clerks to require proof of the existing marriage, so this provision would not meet your goal if the clerk does demand that proof (it leaves room for the clerk's discretion but I wonder whether that is to cover situations where the parties are well known to the clerk, e.g. in small towns); and failing to declare the existing marriage probably constitutes perjury as noted in another answer. Section 15(1)(a) in full, with emphasis added: 1. (a) It shall be the duty of the town or city clerk when an application for a marriage license is made to him or her to require each of the contracting parties to sign and verify a statement or affidavit before such clerk or one of his or her deputies, containing the following information.  From party one:  Full name, place of residence, social security number, age, occupation, place of birth, name of father, country of birth, maiden name of mother, country of birth, number of marriage.  From party two:  Full name, place of residence, social security number, age, occupation, place of birth, name of father, country of birth, maiden name of mother, country of birth, number of marriage.  Both parties shall also be required to present to the clerk documentary proof of age in the form of an original or certified copy of a birth record, a certification of birth issued by the state department of health, a local registrar of vital statistics or other public officer charged with similar duties by the laws of any other state, territory or country, a baptismal record, a passport, an automobile driver's license, any government or school issued identification card that contains a photograph of the applicant, a life insurance policy, an employment certificate, a school record, an immigration record, a naturalization record, a court record or any other document or record issued by a governmental entity, showing the date of birth of such parties.  The said clerk shall also embody in the statement if either or both of the applicants have been previously married, a statement as to whether the former spouse or spouses of the respective applicants are living or dead and as to whether either or both of said applicants are divorced persons, if so, when and where and against whom the divorce or divorces were granted and shall also embody therein a statement that no legal impediment exists as to the right of each of the applicants to enter into the marriage state.  The town or city clerk is hereby given full power and authority to administer oaths and may require the applicants to produce witnesses to identify them or either of them and may examine under oath or otherwise other witnesses as to any material inquiry pertaining to the issuing of the license, and if the applicant is a divorced person the clerk may also require the production of a certified copy of the decree of the divorce, or proof of an existing marriage of parties who apply for a license to be used for a second or subsequent ceremony ; provided, however, that in cities or towns the verified statements and affidavits may be made before any regular clerk or designee of the clerk's office. The drafting is a bit sloppy, but the intent seems clear. In light of this it is difficult to imagine an interpretation of the bigamy statute that would criminalize a "second or subsequent" marriage of a married couple. Nonetheless, as noted above, this may not solve the problem presented in the question.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

england-and-wales This is legal though uncommon in England - I did it nine days after my marriage abroad precisely because it was the easiest and cheapest way to get a marriage certificate in English. We arranged it with my local senior registrar in advance; unfortunately he did not inform his colleague performing the ceremony about this, causing a slight delay when we said "no" to her final check as to whether we were single, divorced or widowed. We now have two wedding anniversaries each year. The relevant current position is set out in Section 13(2)(h)(iii) of the Registration of Marriages Regulations 2015 , though this repeats provisions in earlier regulations. (2) In column 4 the registrar must enter the condition of the parties to the marriage in the following manner— (h) ... if the marriage is between two parties who have previously been through a form of marriage with each other ... and neither of them has since married a third party, then ... (iii) if the ceremony was performed for the avoidance of doubt as to the validity of a previous ceremony, enter the words “Previously went through a form of marriage at … on …”, inserting the particulars of the place and date of the previous ceremony; and part of our marriage certificate looks like

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

I know two people who have married the same person twice for cultural reasons. In each case the husband was a Westerner; one bride was Indonesian, the other Bengali. Each bride had married in a Western country first; her parents didn't mind her marrying someone from outside their religion, provided she married within the norms of her culture. The parents wanted their friends and relatives to see that their daughter had indeed married properly, to someone who at least dressed as a Muslim or Hindu groom, and that she wasn't just shacking up with a Westerner. IMHO bigamy is about an intention to deceive, and that was missing from these two sets of marriages.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

united-states The Edmunds Act, of 1882 , was passed into law by the 47th Congress. Despite its age, it was not repealed. On page 3, it reads, Every person who has a husband or wife living who, in a Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, hereafter marries another, whether married or single [...] It is not an infringement on this statute to marry the "same" person again. Only "another". The Department of State states [sic]: If you get married abroad and need to know if your marriage will be recognized in the United States and what documentation may be needed, contact the office of the Attorney General of your state of residence in the United States.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

england-and-wales This explicitly is not bigamy, which is defined in English law as a second marriage to another person . Whosoever, being married, shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable Offences Against the Person Act (1861) Since no other person is involved, whatever this is, it's not bigamy.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married?

The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

The bigamy law of Indonesia reads: Artikel 279. (1) Met gevangenisstraf van ten hoogste vijf jaren wordt gestraft: 1°. hij die een huwelijk aangaat, wetende dat zijn bestaand huwelijk of zijne bestaande huwelijken daartegen een wettig beletsel opleveren. 2°. hij die een huwelijk aangaat, wetende dat het bestaande huwelijk of de bestaande huwelijken van de wederpartij voor deze daartegen een wettig beletsel opleveren. This is different from the current Dutch criminal code Artikel 237 1 Met gevangenisstraf van ten hoogste vier jaren of geldboete van de vierde categorie wordt gestraft: 1°.hij die opzettelijk een dubbel huwelijk aangaat; 2°.hij die een huwelijk aangaat, wetende dat de wederpartij daardoor een dubbel huwelijk aangaat The Indonesian code refers to an existing marriage being a legal impediment to a second marriage. The Dutch code refers to a 'double marriage'. Under Indonesian law marriage is a religious act recorded by the state, never ever a civil act of union, and Article 1 of the Marriage Act of 1974 and related court decisions makes it extremely clear that a marriage is conducted by a religious leader, and the state is only recording the act that has already taken place. However, for Muslims, the state is involved in the religious proceedings, while for non-Muslims this takes place only after the fact. Of course historically marriage in many countries didn't even involve a religious leader, let alone the state, and the Indonesian words for 'marriage', are both Arabic words meaning sexual intercourse and/or marriage, i.e. 'kawin' and 'nikah'. The decision of the Constitutional Court in 46/PUU-VIII/2010 makes it clear that a purely Islamic marriage that does not involve the state's hand is still valid, providing it complied with Syariah law. An unrecorded marriage in Indonesia is referred to as 'nikah siri'. This term is often used to describe any form of cohabitating couple who have not undergone any kind of religious ceremony whatsoever. The term nikah siri is similar to that of نكاح العرفي or nikah 'urfi. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikah_%27urfi However siri/sirri are used only in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The practice of unrecorded marriages/nikah siri is very common in Indonesia, and gives rise to bigamy in that a man requires his wive(s) permission to marry further women. According to all the sources I can find, if you perform (Muslim) nikah with the same person twice then that is meaningless, and while it's quite common to do so, the second 'marriage' cannot possibly be a marriage. https://islamqa.info/en/answers/149267/he-did-the-marriage-contract-with-a-girl-but-did-not-tell-his-parents-and-he-wants-to-do-the-marriage-contract-again-in-their-presence https://www.zawaj.com/askbilqis/doing-nikah-twice/ https://questionsonislam.com/question/nikah Since the second 'marriage' seems to be acceptable and indeed possibly desirable for familial harmony, while the second marriage does not create a new marriage, it does not seem that it is illegal to do so. According to Catholic law, married people cannot remarry. They must have their existing marriage pronounced void. Article 1127 of Canon law provides 'It is forbidden to have another religious celebration of the same marriage'. 'Celebration' here refers to 'performing a marriage'. It would appear that it might violate Indonesia's bigamy law for two Catholics to marry again. Since it can be difficult to register a marriage many years later, it's likely common for Indonesians of all religions to 'marry again', ignoring the fact of the earlier religious wedding. It is not likely anyone would ever be prosecuted for this, since the state has the goal of regularizing everyone's paperwork, i.e. making sure people have marriage certificates and so on, and getting this done is more important than the specific precise details....

Terminating an independent contractor

If an independent contractor works for a company who assigns him shifts, can the company cancel the assigned shifts without warning or reason and effectively terminate the relationship? Assume there is no specific clause in any contract that handles termination. Is any sort of severance or notice required?

If a contract calls for work on a shift by shift basis and doesn't contain any termination clause, the default assumption would be that the contractor can be terminated at any time without notice or severance. But, this said, not everyone classified by the person hiring them as an independent contractor is really an independent contractor for the purposes of the law. It isn't at all uncommon for a business to classify someone as an independent contractor improperly when that person is legally an employee with all of the rights of an employee under the relevant legal definitions of an employee. The determination of whether someone is an independent contractor or an employee is based upon the facts and circumstances of the relationship and not simply by the agreement of the parties. Few people who work on a shift by shift basis for a single firm are actually independent contractors. Most are actually employees.

Terminating an independent contractor

If an independent contractor works for a company who assigns him shifts, can the company cancel the assigned shifts without warning or reason and effectively terminate the relationship? Assume there is no specific clause in any contract that handles termination. Is any sort of severance or notice required?

Assuming the contractor is actually a contractor, cancelling the contract would be governed by the contract itself. Many contractors use non-refundable deposits and include notice periods for this reason. If there is nothing about cancelling the contract, the company can cancel it. They would potentially be liable for damages incurred to the client because of this such as missing other paid work or non-refundable expenses. Claiming these damages would involve going through small claims court. Note that if no work was done, the contractor is not entitled to payment for the work- just other damages suffered.

Is it true that the Chief Justice granted royal assent to the Online Streaming Act?

Within the first minute of this video it is asserted that, although the royal assent to Canadian legislation is normally granted by the governor general, in this case of the Online Streaming Act it was somehow done by the chief justice, Richard Wagner. In a quick search with search engines, I find no corroboration of this assertion. I know that normally the governor general does this, and obviously the king can do it if he wants to (and on a few occasions that's been done), but I'd never heard of the chief justice doing such a thing. What's the story here? Have there been previous cases of the chief justice rather than the governor general granting royal assent to legislation? Under what circumstances is such a thing done? How is this authorized by the constitution?

Royal Assent can be signified by one of two modes : (1) "in Parliament assembled"; or (2) "by written declaration." It was the latter mode by which Assent was signified on April 27, 2023 : On Thursday, April 27, 2023, the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, acting in his capacity as Deputy of the Governor General, signified assent in His Majesty’s name to the bills listed below. Assent was signified by written declaration, pursuant to the Royal Assent Act, S.C. 2002, c. 15.... Several justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Governor General are deputies of the Governor General: see their commissions in The Journals of the Senate, 44th Parl, 1st Sess., November 25, 2021 . (Note that their commissions currently exclude from them the power of "signifying Royal Assent in Parliament assembled," the first of the two listed modes of Royal Assent above.) The power to appoint deputies comes from the Constitution Act, 1867 , s. 14 and the Letters Patent constituting the office of the Governor General . Section 14: It shall be lawful for the Queen, if Her Majesty thinks fit, to authorize the Governor General from Time to Time to appoint any Person or any Persons jointly or severally to be his Deputy or Deputies within any Part or Parts of Canada, and in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the Governor General such of the Powers, Authorities, and Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any Limitations or Directions expressed or given by the Queen; but the Appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the Exercise by the Governor General himself of any Power, Authority, or Function. Letters Patent, s. VII: And Whereas by The British North America Acts 1867 [ Constitution Act, 1867 ] to 1946, it is amongst other things enacted that it shall be lawful for Us, if We think fit, to authorize Our Governor General to appoint any person or persons, jointly or severally, to be his Deputy or Deputies... Now We do hearby authorize and empower Our Governor General... to appoint any person or persons... to be his Deputy or Deputies... This is also mirrored in the provinces, where the Deputy Lieutenant Governor is typically the Chief Justice of the province. Royal Assent is reported in the Canada Gazette, the official newspaper of the Government of Canada. There are many other examples of Royal Assent being signified by the Chief Justice , acting in his or her capacity as Deputy of the Governor General.

Is it true that the Chief Justice granted royal assent to the Online Streaming Act?

Within the first minute of this video it is asserted that, although the royal assent to Canadian legislation is normally granted by the governor general, in this case of the Online Streaming Act it was somehow done by the chief justice, Richard Wagner. In a quick search with search engines, I find no corroboration of this assertion. I know that normally the governor general does this, and obviously the king can do it if he wants to (and on a few occasions that's been done), but I'd never heard of the chief justice doing such a thing. What's the story here? Have there been previous cases of the chief justice rather than the governor general granting royal assent to legislation? Under what circumstances is such a thing done? How is this authorized by the constitution?

Wikipedia : Under the Royal Assent Act, 2002, the alternative practice of granting assent in writing, with each house being notified separately, was brought into force. The speaker of the Senate or a representative reads to the senators the letters from the governor general regarding the written declaration of royal assent. As the act provides, royal assent is to be signified—by the governor general or by a deputy, usually a Justice of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis added) No mention of the identity of the person granting royal assent is to be found in the (rather short) Royal Assent Act 2002 . The constitution provides that the monarch may authorize the governor general to appoint deputies: 14 It shall be lawful for the Queen, if Her Majesty thinks fit, to authorize the Governor General from Time to Time to appoint any Person or any Persons jointly or severally to be his Deputy or Deputies within any Part or Parts of Canada, and in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the Governor General such of the Powers, Authorities, and Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any Limitations or Directions expressed or given by the Queen; but the Appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the Exercise by the Governor General himself of any Power, Authority, or Function. Wikipedia on Deputy of the Governor General of Canada : Currently, the secretary to the governor general, the deputy secretary to the governor general, and the justices of the supreme court are called upon to act as deputies of the governor general; when the latter are acting in this capacity, they are addressed as The Honourable the Deputy of Her Excellency the Governor General. The deputy's commission will read as follows: [...] I couldn't find much more on this in official sources, neither on the site of the Governor General's office nor in that of the Supreme Court. But I did find a couple of news articles reporting the resignation of Governor General Julie Payette and noting that the Chief Justice would assume the role while the office was vacant.

Is it true that the Chief Justice granted royal assent to the Online Streaming Act?

Within the first minute of this video it is asserted that, although the royal assent to Canadian legislation is normally granted by the governor general, in this case of the Online Streaming Act it was somehow done by the chief justice, Richard Wagner. In a quick search with search engines, I find no corroboration of this assertion. I know that normally the governor general does this, and obviously the king can do it if he wants to (and on a few occasions that's been done), but I'd never heard of the chief justice doing such a thing. What's the story here? Have there been previous cases of the chief justice rather than the governor general granting royal assent to legislation? Under what circumstances is such a thing done? How is this authorized by the constitution?

Jen's answer above is either insufficient or requires clarification (I don't have privileges to post comments at this time) Jen points out that The Governor General has appointed Richard Wagner as her Deputy, as published in https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/sen/Y4-441-4.pdf . However, The text of the commission clearly and explicitly states " ... all the powers , authorities and functions vested in and of right exercisable by me as Governor General, saving and excepting the powers of dissolving, recalling or proroguing the Parliament of Canada, of appointing members of the Ministry and of signifying Royal Assent in Parliament assembled " It seems to me that Richard Wagner has the power to signify Royal Assent by written declaration. This limits him to giving assent to non-spending bills. (thank you @alexg for the clarification). Given that royal assent is done for the sake of tradition, and the GG does not have the discretion to decline giving assent, the practical function of assent is to stamp a "valid date" on new legislation, but nothing more. Ie, the only thing gained by delegating this power to Deputies is that the inevitable royal assent can be given with less delay than if only the GG had the power. The commission also indicates the powers are available to Wagner " ...whether I be absent form Canada or not ", rather than only at times the Governor General is "unavailable". The two terms, "unavailable" and "absent from Canada" are clearly not interchangeable, but this point is moot in the case of the Wagner commission; I merely point it out because @Jen uses the wrong terminology. Legislating is important business. Let's get the language right. A more correct description would be "the Governor General has unconditionally delegated most powers...". The effect is that when a Governor General power is required, either Wagner or the General Governor can be contacted, with equal effect, at the discretion of the power seeker. It makes no practical difference for royal assent, but in other cases like making regulations, it could mean that a Deputy can make a regulation that is different than the GG would have made. I think there is reason for concern regarding the unconditional delegation of powers, but not because of royal assent powers.

Can the victim drop charges?

In this example, pretend Alex stabs Bob using cutlery (a knife) at a restaurant, who subsequently presses charges as it was an unprovoked attack. Bob later decides to drop the charge, he has survived but it left with reduced hand movement to the extent he can no longer write, or hold a mobile phone. In this narrow scenario, that assumes there were no other factors at play (for example the knife style was not banned), since Bob has dropped the charge are the police still allowed to pursue the attacker Alex? This question is for the United Kingdom, England and Wales only.

england-and-wales In England and Wales, with the exception of private prosecutions , complainants don't 'press' (or drop) charges. There are several public authorities that can prosecute criminal offences but generally we talk about circumstances that involve the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). When a crime is reported to the police the police investigate. When the police complete their investigation they refer the case and send the evidence to the CPS. (A minor offence such as low value shoplifting can be handled by the police, although if the case goes to court it must be reviewed by the CPS before the first hearing.) Generally the CPS decides whether to prosecute based on 'the Full Code Test'. In short: "Is there enough evidence against the suspect to provide a realistic prospect of conviction?" "Is it in the public interest to prosecute?" (In urgent situations the CPS might decide it's necessary to decide based on 'the Threshold Test'.) The CPS prosecutes on behalf of the Crown, not the complainant. A criminal case is named along the lines of Rex/Regina or R. v Alex, not Bob v Alex. Sometimes it may be difficult to proceed with prosecution if a complainant (or witness) decides not to cooperate or sometimes the CPS might decide not to prosecute because of the complainant's circumstances. But the CPS is allowed to prosecute without the complainant's approval or cooperation. Under the Victims' Right to Review Scheme , in some circumstances a complainant can seek a review of a CPS decision not to prosecute or decision to stop a prosecution.

Can the victim drop charges?

In this example, pretend Alex stabs Bob using cutlery (a knife) at a restaurant, who subsequently presses charges as it was an unprovoked attack. Bob later decides to drop the charge, he has survived but it left with reduced hand movement to the extent he can no longer write, or hold a mobile phone. In this narrow scenario, that assumes there were no other factors at play (for example the knife style was not banned), since Bob has dropped the charge are the police still allowed to pursue the attacker Alex? This question is for the United Kingdom, England and Wales only.

The idea of a victim pressing or dropping charges is largely a myth. It is true that the law may take the victim's wishes into account for minor offenses but neither the police nor the prosecution service need their permission. It'd be a terrible thing if this was the case- you'd give every criminal the incentive to intimidate or silence their victim. In this case the police would continue to investigate and would charge Alex with some kind of assault (depending on the exact nature of the attack). Given the nature of the crime, the prosecution service could likely secure a conviction without Bob.

Can the victim drop charges?

In this example, pretend Alex stabs Bob using cutlery (a knife) at a restaurant, who subsequently presses charges as it was an unprovoked attack. Bob later decides to drop the charge, he has survived but it left with reduced hand movement to the extent he can no longer write, or hold a mobile phone. In this narrow scenario, that assumes there were no other factors at play (for example the knife style was not banned), since Bob has dropped the charge are the police still allowed to pursue the attacker Alex? This question is for the United Kingdom, England and Wales only.

Bob cannot drop charges, that's up to the police and the prosecutor. What can happen though is that if Bob was the only witness, and without Bob's witness statement it is unlikely that Alex would be convicted, and Bob refuses to be a witness, then police and prosecutor may give up on trying to solve the case and convict Alex. On the other hand, if by chance there were two police officers in the restaurant who saw everything that happened and who are reliable witnesses for Alex's crime, then the prosecution will continue. A real case will be somewhere in between, so the prosecutor will decide what the chances of a conviction are.

Does being a student in the EU allow one to do internships anywhere in the EU?

Can a student, studying in the EU with a student visa take on a summer internship? Could they take an internship anywhere in the EU? I tried asking my student office but they haven't replied.

No, as a non-EU/EEA/CH citizen, you don't benefit from the freedom of movement and work given to EU citizens by Union law. Depending on the national law of the country you're doing your masters in, you may be able to do an internship in that country If you wish to do an internship in other EU countries, you must follow the appropriate rules as a non-EU citizen in the country you wish to do one

Legal consequences of not tipping in the US

In the US, there is an expectation of almost always tipping certain service providers like waiters and bartenders. Generally, it is expected that customers tip 15% for ordinary service, 20% or more for great service (or when in a large group), and even poor service is supposed to merit 10%. Tipping nothing is considered appropriate only for extremely bad behavior from the service provider. Whenever the topic comes up, many people are enraged at the suggestion of not tipping. It's not unheard of for service providers to harass the customer or even throw them out for refusing to tip, and it is easy to find people claiming that they go further and sabotage the customer by spitting in their food, deliberately serving them very poorly, trashing their car, etc. My question is 2 part: Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? Even if the customer tipped nothing, they still paid the price of the service, part of which covers the employee's paycheck as well. What minimum level of service is a customer reasonably entitled to expect, legally speaking, even if they do not tip?

You are perfectly within your rights not to tip. Unless you start your dining experience with "I'm not going to be tipping you tonight, just to let you know." you will get the same service as anyone else. Most businesses are within their rights to ask you to leave for any reason except those explicitly prohibited by law. So conceivably if you started off with the preceding sentence, the manager could ask you to leave. Not tipping wait staff at most restaurants is still an awful thing to do. No customers like tipping. Unfortunately, tipped staff can and usually are paid well below the conventional minimum wage. That they can be, is codified into law and would take a substantial amount of effort to change. Business owners are able to push the cost of paying their employees a livable wage onto their customers, and we are forced to accept it. It's a hideously flawed system that is ever so slowly changing, but it doesn't change the fact that if everyone decided not to tip, the wait staff in 95% of restaurants wouldn't be able to survive on their 'wages'. So you are within your rights not to tip, you probably won't suffer anything negative unless you are aggressively up front about the fact that you aren't going to tip, and you will be punishing the person with the least power in the equation for the fact that you don't like how the system works over here. Tipping a bartender is different and usually less necessary, and more likely to be drink is four bucks and a bit, here's a fiver keep the change. Tipping less or more than that may change the speed at which you get refills or attention.

Legal consequences of not tipping in the US

In the US, there is an expectation of almost always tipping certain service providers like waiters and bartenders. Generally, it is expected that customers tip 15% for ordinary service, 20% or more for great service (or when in a large group), and even poor service is supposed to merit 10%. Tipping nothing is considered appropriate only for extremely bad behavior from the service provider. Whenever the topic comes up, many people are enraged at the suggestion of not tipping. It's not unheard of for service providers to harass the customer or even throw them out for refusing to tip, and it is easy to find people claiming that they go further and sabotage the customer by spitting in their food, deliberately serving them very poorly, trashing their car, etc. My question is 2 part: Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? Even if the customer tipped nothing, they still paid the price of the service, part of which covers the employee's paycheck as well. What minimum level of service is a customer reasonably entitled to expect, legally speaking, even if they do not tip?

Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. No. There is no such legal obligation. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? It depends on the method for retaliation. For instance, some conduct might be disorderly or violent enough to be sanctioned by the penal code, or it might subject the customer to a risk of communicable diseases/infections, or reasonably cause the customer to feel frightened/harassed, etc.

Legal consequences of not tipping in the US

In the US, there is an expectation of almost always tipping certain service providers like waiters and bartenders. Generally, it is expected that customers tip 15% for ordinary service, 20% or more for great service (or when in a large group), and even poor service is supposed to merit 10%. Tipping nothing is considered appropriate only for extremely bad behavior from the service provider. Whenever the topic comes up, many people are enraged at the suggestion of not tipping. It's not unheard of for service providers to harass the customer or even throw them out for refusing to tip, and it is easy to find people claiming that they go further and sabotage the customer by spitting in their food, deliberately serving them very poorly, trashing their car, etc. My question is 2 part: Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? Even if the customer tipped nothing, they still paid the price of the service, part of which covers the employee's paycheck as well. What minimum level of service is a customer reasonably entitled to expect, legally speaking, even if they do not tip?

Part One: Tipping is not required by law but there is a social stigma about not tipping, to the point that tipping anything below 20% will make most Americans blush, even if the service is exceptionally crummy. Tipping in the U.S. is a reward system that allows the customer to reward exceptional service and punish abysmal service. It is not unheard of for customers who will tip 0% to leave a note detailing reasons why they found the service so bad that they left no reward. On the flip side, it's not unheard of for over 20% tips to come in. Famously Far Right Talking Head Rush Limbaugh is rumored to leave tips of at least 100% for his meals and several other nice celebrities are known to have a larger tip than necessary. Most minimum wage laws do allow employers who have employees receiving tips to pay well under minimum wage, but these can same employees can make in excess of minimum wage depending on the night, the type of restaurant, and even the section of tables they are working. Part 2: Depends on the retaliation. Staff may sit bad tippers with consistently poor staff, but this is anecdotal. Teenagers are typically the worst across the board tippers so they tend to receive slower service as are some foreigners where tipping is not practiced as regularly (in Japan, for example, tipping is considered extremely rude, as it implies that the individual receiving the tip will soon be out of a job for their poor work, and will need the cash to help out during this time). As mentioned else where, endangering the health of a customer such as spitting in the food of a consistently poor tipper is illegal. Either way, retaliation is not the best course of action because the key to a better tip is better service. As a final rule, since it is not discussed, counter service that put out a tip jar has a lower expectation to receive a tip for service and there is little stigma against not tipping at these places than there is for not tipping at a dining service.

Legal consequences of not tipping in the US

In the US, there is an expectation of almost always tipping certain service providers like waiters and bartenders. Generally, it is expected that customers tip 15% for ordinary service, 20% or more for great service (or when in a large group), and even poor service is supposed to merit 10%. Tipping nothing is considered appropriate only for extremely bad behavior from the service provider. Whenever the topic comes up, many people are enraged at the suggestion of not tipping. It's not unheard of for service providers to harass the customer or even throw them out for refusing to tip, and it is easy to find people claiming that they go further and sabotage the customer by spitting in their food, deliberately serving them very poorly, trashing their car, etc. My question is 2 part: Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? Even if the customer tipped nothing, they still paid the price of the service, part of which covers the employee's paycheck as well. What minimum level of service is a customer reasonably entitled to expect, legally speaking, even if they do not tip?

Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? A tip is a gratuity, not an obligation. A mandatory tip a surcharge. Given that, certainly tip is not an obligation. Is it against a bad tipper? IMHO restaurants, although receive public and generate revenues from sales, restaurants are not public places but private. Therefore a restaurant can ban you for any reason, including non tipping people. Any side effect against waitresses when customers don't tip? certainly yes. Waitresses are expected to get tips and share these tips among co-workers aliviating the burden to pay salaries from the restaurant owner. The owner therefore may retaliate against that employee that does not generate tips or even let go (or make go) the employee.

What award can an unpaid independent contractor expect? What are the legal incentives to pay contractors?

I (Washington State, USA) worked, under contract, for an LLC (Los Angeles, California, USA) and never received payment. I was considered an independent contractor; contract specifies Californian jurisdiction. I have limited legal counsel and anticipate legal action in small claims court. I anticipate that no representative of that LLC will come to court, and expect a default judgment. For purposes of this question, let's say that the contract specified US$500 for my services, and I have received none of this. What awards can I expect? In what ways would a judge's decisions about awards be legally limited? $500? Interest? Time spent pursuing collections? Filing fee? Anything else? My research so far suggests $500 plus reasonable (less than credit card) interest. I am primarily interested in this because it doesn't seem that there are any legal incentives for LLCs to actually pay their contractors; if only a fraction of contractors seek justice, and the award never exceeds the originally agreed upon amount, then the rational decision would seem to be, don't pay the contractor. Are there any other legal disincentives for this behavior? I'm aware that Los Angeles has recently passed a Freelancer Protection Act, but to my knowledge, I am not covered by this act-- I am located outside of LA and the contract was entered into prior to the passage of this act.

What awards can I expect? In what ways would a judge's decisions about awards be legally limited? $500? Interest? Time spent pursuing collections? Filing fee? Anything else? My research so far suggests $500 plus reasonable (less than credit card) interest. Your lawsuit would be for breach of contract, probably filed in California small claims court for this small dollar amount. An award for breach of contract includes: the amount not paid pursuant to the contract, pre-judgment interest from the date that payment was due at the statutory rate in California (the legal rate specified in the contract applies until the contract is superseded by the verdict, but if the prejudgment interest rate is not specified in the contract, the rate is ten percent per annum from the date of the breach, California Civil Code § 3289), post-judgment interest at the statutory rate in California ( 10% per annum in a contract if not otherwise specified ), and out of pocket costs incurred in filing the lawsuit (typically, the filing fee, the service of process fee, postage, copying costs incurred for trial exhibits, and any court fees incurred to collect the judgment if it is entered). Attorney fees are not available unless the contract says so. You are not entitled to any recovery for time spent pursuing collections. Often you have have a collections agency collect it for a percentage of the amount recovered (probably 50% in a claim of this size) plus a small fee, although they might not accept such a small dollar amount debt to collect. The main virtue of this is that it hurts the credit of the person who owes the money, a harm to the non-paying customer that is often far worse than not paying the amount owed on time. Are there any other legal disincentives for this behavior? A well drafted contract can provide for an award of attorney fees incurred in collecting the debt, can set a non-usurious interest rate and late fees for non-payment, and can take steps like requiring a deposit up front, or consenting to service of process by mail, to make collection more likely and to create stronger incentives to pay. Also, if the non-payment rate is low enough and the value of your time doing what you normally get paid to do is high, it may not make economic sense to pursue bad debt which takes some time and some money to get a small potential recovery, as opposed to letting it slide and doing more work that does pay. A small claims lawsuit is probably ten to thirty hours of work for which you will not be compensated even if you win. Depending upon your average hourly rate for your labor, and the percentage of your billings that go uncollected, it may not make economic sense to collect the unpaid bill, or you may want to delegate the job to someone else whose effective hourly rate of labor value is lower. Courts are cost effective places to collect large debts, and can be cost effective if many people owe you money and you can mass produce your collections process (as, for example, credit card companies do). But courts are often not cost effective for collecting one off small dollar amount debts, despite the streamlined process and reduced filing fees that are available in small claims court. if only a fraction of contractors seek justice, and the award never exceeds the originally agreed upon amount, then the rational decision would seem to be, don't pay the contractor. Consumers are not purely rational actors on a transaction by transaction basis in these matters. The vast majority of the time, people pay as agreed even though they could get away with paying less by forcing the person who did business with them to sue them to get paid. On a case by case basis, this is often not rational, but as a long term strategy for all transactions that a consumer enters into, it often does make rational sense. In small dollar transactions, blacklisting people from future business and harming their credit records is usually enough of an incentive to make uncollectible invoices an acceptable cost of doing business. But a good business person does evaluate every customer to whom trade credit is extended for creditworthiness if the customer does not pay in advance. On the other hand, as a business person, you may have a strategic interest in pursuing every unpaid invoice even if it isn't cost effective to do so when considering that unpaid invoice in isolation, in order to instill in your customers the knowledge that when you say you will sue them if you aren't paid, that you are making a credible threat. This may discourage people from not paying you in the first place.

Does an MLAT request have an age limit?

Having recently found out about Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) requests, I had some questions that I could not find on the government (gov.uk) website. I am interested in both between UK and EU and between UK and non-EU MLAT requests. Would the alleged perpetrator's age be a factor, for example if they were at the time of the crime (or still are) under the age of criminal responsibility in either the UK or the other country. Could that prevent an MLAT being used? Would it be based on the age of criminal responsibility (nine years of age in England & Wales), or the age that the country considers citizens to be adults (I believe is 16 in England & Wales)? Would the answers to the above also apply to the alleged victim, for example they were too young at the time of the crime for an MLAT to be used to investigate whatever crime they were a victim of?

Short answer Does an MLAT request have an age limit? Not really. But there is little or no legal authority resolving this question definitively. Long answer Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLATs) enable law enforcement authorities and prosecutors to obtain evidence, information, and testimony abroad in a form admissible in the courts of the Requesting State....MLATs require the Requested State to provide the Requesting State with certain kinds of assistance or evidence such as documents, records, and testimony, provided the requirements of the treaty are satisfied. The process is streamlined through the establishment of a “Central Authority” within each country ( Source ) Ultimately, what is covered by an MLAT depends upon the exact language of the treaty in question. An MLAT is typically a bilateral treaty between two countries only, so most countries have dozens of separate MLATs that apply to different countries. In order to write this answer, I reviewed a representative sample of MLATs, all of which tend to follow a similar model. This was possible because these treaties tend to be quite short. Typically, a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) is limited to " criminal matters ", but expressly excludes military justice cases, national security cases, and political offenses. Newer MLATs often also sometimes exclude petty offenses such as less serious misdemeanors and traffic offenses from their definition of "criminal matters". On the other hand, MLATs often including prosecutions of violations of government regulations, and civil forfeiture cases, in their definition of "criminal matters". They do this either by including them in the express language of the treaty itself, or through statements in an official commentary to the treaty prepared during negotiations over the treaty between the countries that are parties to it. The context of what is allowed in an MLAT in the treaty itself also makes clear that the term "criminal matters" includes suspected criminal matters where it has not yet been established definitively that a crime has been committed at all. Half of the reason for an MLAT is to assist law enforcement in one country in the process of investigating suspected crimes, just as they would domestically. An MLAT doesn't only pertain to prosecutions of already identified suspects whose crimes are already well established. Apart from this very thin level of guidance, however, an MLAT typically does not tightly define what constitutes a "criminal matter". Extradition treaties usually require that a person be extradited to a requesting country for a crime only if the producing country has an offense similar in character and severity of punishment to that of the requesting country. But MLATs typically do not require "dual criminality" to compel the producing country to assist the requesting country in obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution by the requesting country. Would the answers to the above also apply to the alleged victim, for example they were too young at the time of the crime for an MLAT to be used to investigate whatever crime they were a victim of? The age of the alleged victim would be irrelevant to whether something was a criminal matter which an MLAT can be used to investigate or gather evidence regarding. Nothing in the concept of an MLAT or the typical terms of an MLAT would suggest that this is the case. Nothing suggests that offense against juveniles, from child abuse to child molestation to theft from children, cannot be investigated using the MLAT process. Would the alleged perpetrator's age be a factor, for example if they were at the time of the crime (or still are) under the age of criminal responsibility in either the UK or the other country. Could that prevent an MLAT being used? Would it be based on the age of criminal responsibility (nine years of age in England & Wales), or the age that the country considers citizens to be adults (I believe is 16 in England & Wales)? There is little or no academic commentary, and little or no case law, addressing the question of whether juvenile delinquency offense that would be crimes if committed by adults count as "criminal matters" for purposes of an MLAT. Ultimately this question would usually be resolved by the "Central Authority" in the state receiving a request for assistance under the MLAT interprets it. The term "criminal matters" in an MLAT, however, is typically given a fairly broad definition to the extent that it is defined at all, as noted above. Also, an MLAT is frequently used in criminal investigations before the identity or age of the offender or suspect is known. For example, an MLAT could certainly be used to investigate a suspected bike theft gang that appeared to be operating across the border between the Netherlands and Belgium, even if there was a reasonable chance that some or all of the members of the gang were minors, but law enforcement wasn't yet sure who was involved in the gang. So, the more plausible reading of the term "criminal matters" in an MLAT, in most cases, is that for purposes of the MLAT, an offense that would be a criminal matter if committed by an adult, does not cease to be a criminal matter merely because it was committed by a minor. This would be a fair reading of these treaties, even if an offense may be official classified for domestic purposes as "juvenile delinquency" or something similar when it is committed by a minor, rather than being usually handled by the criminal justice system for adult offenders. This being said, there certainly is a legitimate argument that could be made that juvenile offenses should not count as "criminal matters" for purposes of an MLAT, at least when domestic criminal laws make that distinction. MLATs are rarely clear on this point, and it is fair, to argue at least, that something which isn't defined formally as a "criminal matter" in the requesting country's domestic law shouldn't count as a "criminal matter" for purposes of the MLAT. People suspected of engaging in conduct that would be a crime if committed by an adult, however, will not generally have standing to participate in the treaty implementation process. An MLAT is generally implemented through government to government interaction through each country's "Central Authority", in which a suspected criminal or investigation target has no involvement. And, as previously noted, decisions regarding what is covered by the treaty are usually going to be made by the Central Authority of the country receiving a request for legal cooperation from the Central Authority of another country. So, juvenile's charged with offenses that would be crimes if committed by adults are in a poor position procedurally to argue that an MLAT should be interpreted in a narrow manner to exclude their case, and would have only a weak argument to support that position, even if they could.

Legality of using book covers from Google Books API on a website

Under US copyright law, is it legal to download images of book covers from the Google Books API and display them on my website? The purpose pertains to obtaining product images for an online store that specializes in second-hand book sales.

Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.

How can I tell if a court case exists?

As someone without access to pricy legal search engines, how can I tell if a given case exists? For context, a lawyer was recently found to have cited a number of cases hallucinated by ChatGPT. The transcript of his ChatGPT session is now online. ChatGPT cited 39 cases in response to queries by the lawyer; I'd like to see how many of them are real. Some, such as Bell Atlantic v. Twombly are easy "yes"s: they've got Wikipedia articles. Six of them, such as Varghese v. China Southern Airlines , are easy "no"s: they were called out as fake in the court filings. But what about the remaining cases?

A properly cited case will include a reference to a case reporter, online database, or neutral citation . To confirm that the case exists, you would have to track down the purported reporter/journal/database and query whether the case exists at that location. There is a meta post that presents online legal research tools. Many universities and courts have public law libraries that have access to printed reporters and/or online databases.

How can I tell if a court case exists?

As someone without access to pricy legal search engines, how can I tell if a given case exists? For context, a lawyer was recently found to have cited a number of cases hallucinated by ChatGPT. The transcript of his ChatGPT session is now online. ChatGPT cited 39 cases in response to queries by the lawyer; I'd like to see how many of them are real. Some, such as Bell Atlantic v. Twombly are easy "yes"s: they've got Wikipedia articles. Six of them, such as Varghese v. China Southern Airlines , are easy "no"s: they were called out as fake in the court filings. But what about the remaining cases?

united-states For absolute certainty, you could do what the court in the linked Chat-GPT case did: contact the clerk of the court that issued the alleged opinion and ask if that opinion really exists. In the case of cases reported in the various leading case reporters, however, free Google searchable services will generally have full text copies that can be found online. These resources have close to 99% of published appellate court opinions that are reported in recognized case reporters in the U.S. Secondary materials are often hard to get online for free, but primary legal authorities are usually easy to find. Westlaw, Lexis, and some specialized subject matter services like tax publishers, often also have unpublished or unreported decisions that would not be revealed by such a search. But, while the vast majority of cases decided are unpublished, the vast majority of cases cited in legal briefs are published decisions that are reported in recognized case reporters. And, in some courts, citations to unpublished opinions, must be accompanied by the full text of those decisions or are entirely forbidden. So, you could restrict inquiries to court clerks to cases whose existence is not verified from free sources on the Internet.

When flatmates get an AVO against each other, who has to move out?

If one flatmate trespasses in another’s room after an extended period of hostile verbal and nonverbal communication, can the flatmate who was trespassed against get an AVO? If so, who has to move out?

Usually, an order would specify what happens. There is no hard and fast rule in this situation.

Prevent family overriding organ donation wishes

In the UK, the NHS generally allows families of the deceased to override their expressed wishes to donate their organs. Is there any legal mechanism whereby a person could prevent this from happening such that their organs were donated regardless of their family's consent?

No Your information is slightly wrong . Families do not have the legal right to override the wishes of the prospective donor, however, the ultimate legal decision maker (where donor consent has been given) is the medical practitioner. The donor or the family can influence that decision but they can’t dictate it. Most doctors will not harvest in opposition to the family’s wishes but that is a matter that is legally within the doctor’s discretion.

Can this statement be considered a threat?

If you write in an email, "Enter at your own risk. Anyone trying to enter a home without permission or consent will be treated as a trespasser or intruder.". Is that considered at threat? For country specific or local laws, United States / Florida.

In the U.S. it does not. U.S. has strong Castle Law doctrines and self-defense laws that allow the use of firearms for self-defense within the home. The sign is that the homeowner is armed and will defend himself if there is an intruder. Florida is also a stand your ground state which means that in public, self-defense is valid use of force for civilians even if they have the ability to flee the would be criminal. As anecdotal evidence, when I was living in the state, my boss was telling me the story of how he got a gun and went to do some paperwork at the sheriff's office. When the deputy received the paperwork, he saw that the gun was going to be used for home defense and told my boss, "In the case of home defense, if, God forbid someone enters your home looking to do harm to you and yours, remember: Shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us."

Can you be fired for refusing to lie?

If your employer asks you to lie about something, and telling the lie is legal, but you refuse on moral grounds, can they fire you? Does it matter if religious beliefs are involved? (For example, if a Christian saying "I believe the Bible says lying is wrong" is protected, is an atheist saying "I believe the world would be a better place if people didn't lie" also protected?)

united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.

Can you be fired for refusing to lie?

If your employer asks you to lie about something, and telling the lie is legal, but you refuse on moral grounds, can they fire you? Does it matter if religious beliefs are involved? (For example, if a Christian saying "I believe the Bible says lying is wrong" is protected, is an atheist saying "I believe the world would be a better place if people didn't lie" also protected?)

Not usually australia You may only be dismissed in Australia for fair reason. These are: poor performance misconduct dangerous behaviour refusing to follow instructions no further need for the position (redundancy or retrenchment) Refusing to do as you are told would fall under “refusing to follow instructions”. However, an “instruction” must be both lawful and reasonable. Depending on the lie, it might not be lawful or reasonable. If so, you can’t be fired at all. If it is a lawful and reasonable instruction then there are not grounds to instantly fire someone. Even when you have a reason, except for gross misconduct, you can’t dismiss an employee unless and until they have been given a fair hearing to explain themselves and have been given the opportunity to “mend their ways”. Even for gross misconduct, they still must be given an opportunity to justify their conduct.

Can you be fired for refusing to lie?

If your employer asks you to lie about something, and telling the lie is legal, but you refuse on moral grounds, can they fire you? Does it matter if religious beliefs are involved? (For example, if a Christian saying "I believe the Bible says lying is wrong" is protected, is an atheist saying "I believe the world would be a better place if people didn't lie" also protected?)

You can be fired for anything, or nothing at all. Whether the reasons stated would hold up in court when challenged is another matter entirely. And a company wanting to force their employees to lie as part of their job isn't going to have any problems with having their HR department lie about the reason you were being fired. They'll just make something up that sounds believable enough to a judge that the judge will go along with it. And even if not, going back to a job after such an experience isn't a good idea so you'd still be out of a job (though the court might order them to pay you a decent sum as a severance). I've experienced something similar (though this wasn't about being told to tell lies) myself. Company wanted to fire me for medical reasons, which is illegal. So they made up an excuse that I "had not met my contractual targets" (while I was on sick leave), despite no such targets ever having been defined, and despite me being unable to reach any targets because I was on medical leave, WITH their own medical evaluation team agreeing I was unable to work. They decided to not risk a court proceeding when I threatened to sue and instead consented with paying me a good severance package.

Can you be fired for refusing to lie?

If your employer asks you to lie about something, and telling the lie is legal, but you refuse on moral grounds, can they fire you? Does it matter if religious beliefs are involved? (For example, if a Christian saying "I believe the Bible says lying is wrong" is protected, is an atheist saying "I believe the world would be a better place if people didn't lie" also protected?)

united-states In some circumstances, a whistleblower, fired for revealing illegal practices or unsafe working conditions, could have grounds for a wrongful-termination suit. One such law is section 11(c) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA). A lawyer could actually face discipline under their bar association for making material, false statements in the scope of their representation of a client, or knowingly allowing their advice to be used to commit a crime or fraud, although they are then supposed to withdraw from representing that client.. However, you are most likely thinking of a case in the news recently (February 2023), in which a teacher claims that she considers the school district policy, requiring her to say something to students that she doesn’t agree with, which she calls a “lie” (even though there is no statement of fact involved, and even though she’s already allowed not to say anything on that subject) and says is against her religion. In other contexts, teachers clearly can get fired for teaching their own personal religious beliefs instead of the approved curriculum, or for refusing to teach a required topic at all. Teachers’ religious liberty does not, under current precedent, give them a right to teach Creationism in biology class, the Book of Mormon in history class, or that the world’s social problems are all caused by the internal contradictions of late Capitalism. In practice, though, teachers who didn’t agree with one part of the curriculum they were given more often get out of it passive-aggressively: they skip over it, or put it last on the syllabus and run out of time for it. Almost no one would actually want a broad legal doctrine that no one can be fired for refusing to say what they consider “a lie,” and what narrower one a sympathetic judge might create is a matter of speculation.

How can a lawyer represent a guilty client?

This is specifically referring to the circumstance where a lawyer knows for a fact that their client is guilty through whatever means, and the client is pleading not guilty. So I have often heard that a lawyers justification for representing a client that they know is guilty by ensuring the trial is fair, but the only way a trial can be fair for a known guilty party is if that person is convicted of a crime, no? I fully understand the right of everyone to have a fair trial and adequate representation. I also understand that even if found guilty the person should be protected from unfair convictions/punishments. However in the event that the lawyer knows the client is guilty, and by some set of circumstances through the trial the client is found not guilty, wouldn't that be just as immoral as an unfair trial? Is this sort of circumstance justified in some written/legal way? Lawyers obviously have an obligation to ensure a fair process, but do they have no obligation for justice? Also if allowed I would be interested to hear if the laws on this vary from country to country.

canada A person is deemed to not be guilty unless convicted In Canada, by s. 6 of the Criminal Code , "a person shall be deemed to not be guilty of the offence until he is convicted." This is also bolstered by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." There is always a chance that the tier of fact is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt The accused (and therefore their lawyer) cannot be sure that the evidence will leave the trier of fact (judge or jury) with no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Thus, the accused and their lawyer can only "know" the accused is guilty in the colloquial sense (in that they did the things that could be found to be a crime). However, they cannot know that they will be guilty in law. There is always a chance that the trier of fact is not convinced. Ways that the Crown's case can fall apart at trial: what appeared to be convincing to the parties just isn't convincing to the trier of fact a key witness or evidence becomes unavailable it turns out critical evidence was obtained contrary to constitutional principles a key witness's credibility or reliability crumbles on cross examination the prosecution is complacent in diligently moving the trial forward and the trial drags on to the point that a stay of proceedings is warranted (e.g. in jurisdictions with strict rights to timely trials) The interest in truth-seeking is not the only component of a fair trial Fair trials should seek the truth, but they should also be timely ( Jordan ), and they should also not rely on evidence obtained contrary to the Charter ( Grant ). Fair trials are not only about securing convictions when a person did the things that could constitute an offence if proven. At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be confused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused's point of view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. R. v. Harrer , [1995] 3 SCR 562, at para 45 The lawyer's duty Tuckiar v. R [1934] HCA 49 : He had a plain duty, both to his client and to the Court, to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise to in favour of complete acquittal or conviction of manslaughter only. No doubt he was satisfied that through [an interpreter] he obtained the uncoloured product of his client's mind, although misgiving on this point would have been pardonable; but, even if the result was that the correctness of [another witness]'s version was conceded, it was by no means a hopeless contention of fact that the homicide should be found to amount only to manslaughter. Whether he be in fact guilty or not, a prisoner is, in point of law, entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he committed, and it is not incumbent on his counsel by abandoning his defence to deprive him of the benefit of such rational arguments as fairly arise on the proofs submitted. The subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosure. No doubt he was actuated by a desire to remove any imputation on Constable McColl. But he was not entitled to divulge what he had learnt from the prisoner as his counsel. Our system of administering justice necessarily imposes upon those who practice advocacy duties which have no analogies, and the system cannot dispense with their strict observance. A laywer's obligation is to put forward on behalf of their client their best efforts. Whether they "know" their client is guilty of the offence charged or not, to do otherwise amounts to a dereliction of duty and weakens the protections afforded all of us who believe in the rule of law: Arthur Maloney, Q.C., "The Role of the Lawyer in Society" (1979) 9 Manitoba Law Journal 351 .

What powers do the police have to stop a car in Oklahoma?

Can a police officer in Oklahoma pull you over because they think your ID is suspended, despite not committing any traffic violations? Also is it lawful for the officer to write a police report before arresting a suspect in this situation?

Stop: possibly The standard for initiating a traffic stop is named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Terry stop . The standard is rather simple: Initiating the stop only requires reasonable suspicion . If their computer claims that the driver's license of the car owner is expired or suspended, that is reasonable suspicion to at least stop the car to check if the owner is driving it and if the license really is expired. Arrest: possibly To facilitate an arrest, the next level of scrutiny is needed: probable cause . Generally, there is little requirement on when a police report is to be written, but contemporary reports (at the same time or close to) are typical. Example of rising through the ranks Alice, 16 years old, dent in the fender from a fenderbender. That is not even a warning's worth and does not rise reasonable suspicion. Bob cop's computer still reads the license plate and Bob gets a flashing light: the car owner's license is expired. That is reasonable suspicion that there is an offense if the owner and Alice are the same person. But Bob needs to verify that. The reasonable suspicion can go away if for example the car was owned by Charles, a 60-year-old gentleman, then the suspicion that Alice's license is expired goes away. But the stop in itself was reasonable! Bob starts the ticket after stopping Alice, then passes the car to get to Alice. Looking in he sees that behind Alice lies a box stamped "Top Secret - US President's Eyes Only" all over. Bob arrests Alice for the probable cause of possibly possessing those documents illegally. The documents were in plain sight, so no search was needed btw.

How may expectation damages be calculated?

Bob wins an auction for an uncommon item for £100. The seller fails to take payment or deliver the goods. There weren't that many other equivalent items available online at the moment. Bob's purchase was used, but very lightly and in nearly new condition. All of the other items currently available online are either of a different model/size, or come without certain components included in the price, or are in significantly more dilapidated condition, or all of the above, and are in any event selling for at least £250 and up. New units of this product retail for £450. Expectation damages are supposed to put a claimant in the same position they would be in as if the contract had been performed. But if this is not possible in the current market climate, then is it fair to claim for a new unit at the price sold at by the manufacturer? This puts Bob in a better position then he would have had if the contract had been completed. Suppose the defendant defends the claim and instead of paying Bob the price of a new one proposes to the court to simply fulfill the original contract by selling Bob their used one at the original price and pay Bob's legal costs. Is this still open to the seller? Finally, is the original contract price of £100 that Bob would have paid for the used unit to be subtracted from the calculation of expectation damages?

canada As a starting point, courts are likely to view the market value of the contract (e.g. £100) as the floor for expectation damages, but it is open to Bob to prove higher expectation damages by demonstrating the cost of obtaining a sufficiently similar alternative, while reasonably attempting to mitigate damages. See Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 K.B. 786, quoted with approval in 2002 BCCA 2017: In the case of a breach of a contract for the delivery of goods the damages are usually supplied by the fact of there being a market in which similar goods can be immediately bought, and the difference between the contract price and the price given for the substituted goods in the open market is the measure of damages; that rule has been always recognized. Expectation damages in such a circumstance is a question of fact, left to the trier of fact (judge or jury) and is assessed based on what they view a reasonable person to have done. If obtaining a device with slightly different properties allowed Bob to get a substitute for £250 that might be considered reasonable mitigation when considered alongside the alternative of buying a completely new identical item for £450. Bob doesn't actually have to take the mitigating steps in buying an alternative. This can all be argued in the hypothetical (i.e. what would put Bob in the position expected by performance of the contract). But damages will be limited to the costs Bob would have incurred, while reasonably mitigating the costs, in placing himself in the same position had the contract been performed.

gdpr: classification of a psychiatric report

I'm following a job-related course regarding data protection and the GDPR (European Union, I'm located in Italy). My background is not in law. I was puzzled whether a psychiatric report ("perizia psichiatrica", a document with legal purposes) falls in the sensitive data category. The course says it does not [edit: I double-checked, and the question was intentionally unclear, so probably that was the reason of the confusion], but I also read that "Health data" is indeed sensitive ( https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/key-concepts/special-categories-personal-data/ ). What is the reason behind this apparent paradox?

Its special personal information The GDPR uses “special” not “sensitive”. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

How is 'National Amusements' allowed to own Paramount Global? As well as CBS, etc.? In light of U.S. v. Paramount?

I know that 1948 was a long time ago, and that antitrust decisions/regulations/etc. seem to weaken over time, but.... The Paramount Global CBS Viacom Whatever conglomerate, majority-owned by National Amusements, Inc., is a company that integrates production of TV shows and movies with distribution of those shows and movies..... In light of the ongoing writers' strike, should these conglomerates be broken up again?

Markets change over time Most anti-trust/monopoly laws are framed in terms of market dominance. In 1948, the only market for video was the cinema. That was an inherently local market; outside the big cities, customers literally had one and only one realistic option. In 2023, the market for video is on multiple platforms, geographically unrestricted, largely independent of time, and probably includes non-video media. The market is bigger so what it takes to dominate the market is also bigger.

How to get official confirmation if anyone has filled a police complaint against me or not

My wife has alleged that she made a police complaint against me in Germany for a false domestic violence case. Is there a way to find out if any complaint has truly been filed against me or not if I don't live in Germany anymore?

You can query the Zentrales Staatsanwaltliches Verfahrensregister regarding your own cases once they reach that level. I'm not sure how this works out if you are no longer in Germany, since you would have to prove that you are yourself. As I understand this site , they expect you to send a postal letter rather than a mail. There is no guarantee of getting a complete answer. Investigations may be tagged as 'secret' to avoid warning the criminals. That would usually not be the case in a domestic violence investigation, but it is more common in organized crime cases and the like.

How to get official confirmation if anyone has filled a police complaint against me or not

My wife has alleged that she made a police complaint against me in Germany for a false domestic violence case. Is there a way to find out if any complaint has truly been filed against me or not if I don't live in Germany anymore?

You can ask for a “Selbstauskunft”. I have no idea how you would get one, and what it costs, but the police would know. That would contain everything the police has on file about you (only you yourself would be able to get that information, everyone else would get something redacted). If your wife’s complaint was serious enough to be written down it would be there. If she went to a police station, made a complaint, but let it slip to the officer that the complaint is false and only made to get you into trouble, then it might not ever have been recorded. That means legally the complaint doesn’t exist.

Removal of branding constituting trademark infringement

A common brand of commercial refrigerators used in stores in my country all have the following sticker on them (emphasis mine): Trademark Infringement The [Brand Name] trademark on this product is infringed if the owner, for the time being, does any of the following: Applies the trade mark to the product after its state, condition, get-up or packaging has been altered in any manner Alters, removes (including part removal) or obliterates (including part obliteration) the trade mark on the product Applies any other trade mark to the product Adds to the product any written material that is likely to damage the reputation of the trade mark Notice of the above contractual obligations passes to: Successors or assignees of the buyer Future owners of the product So they're claiming that removing their branding form one of their products would constitute trademark infringement. Is there any legal basis for this claim (or any of the others)? How could buying one of their units and removing all of their branding from it infringe their trademark?

It’s mostly crap Trademarks in new-zealand do what they do everywhere else: prevent other people from using your trademark to identify their goods or services. Applies the trade mark to the product after its state, condition, get-up or packaging has been altered in any manner It’s still their product so using their trademark to identify it is legal. Even if the change is substantial - consider the Intel Inside trademark for chips inside computers. Alters, removes (including part removal) or obliterates (including part obliteration) the trade mark on the product Nope - your fridge, do what you like with it. Applies any other trade mark to the product This one depends. If you do it in such a way that it could confuse a reasonable person that the fridge is the product of the other trademark, that’s a violation. But if you stick AC/DC stickers to your fridge, it isn’t. Adds to the product any written material that is likely to damage the reputation of the trade mark. Like writing “sux” or “produces crap fridges” after their brand name? Nope, that’s just freedom of speech - or criminal damage if you don’t own the fridge. Now, any or all of these obligations could be made terms of the contract when you buy the product but breaching them would be a contract law matter, not a trademark law matter. In any event, terms on a sticker inside a box are not part of the contract unless it can be proved that you were made aware of and agreed to them. Even if you agreed, it would only apply to successors, assignees, or future owners if they agreed. As written, you have no obligation to ask them to agree when the fridge moves on.

Claiming against eBay sellers: mechanics and practicality

It seems clear that in principle eBay sellers are subject to either the consumer rights or sale of goods act respectively, depending on whether the seller is a company or individual. But how does one claim against just the user name? I doubt that eBay would willingly be so cooperative, so is it purely a matter of filing a legal claim, perhaps performing pre action protocol or even serving claim form by eBay messages and then probably seeking an ex parts or default judgment if they don't engage and then ultimately asking the court to compel eBay to disclose the user's name and address?

You subpoena eBay You file your claim against username. You then subpoena eBay to provide all relevant information about username (name, address etc.). You then update your filing. Of course, you have to complete any dispute resolution clauses that may exist first.

Breach of contract between eBay users

Breach of contract between eBay users Bob bids on an item on eBay. He wins the auction. The seller, perhaps disappointed at the price the item had fetched, promptly"cancels the order" on spurious grounds of "issues with the buyer's delivery address", when the auction was for collection from the seller's address by the buyer. The seller immediately relists the item with identical description and a rare enough item as it is with a higher starting price, thus breaking the contract. Bob hadn't yet had a chance to pay for the item before the seller cancelled it so there is no question of seeking a refund but does the contract of winning the auction not bind the seller as well as the buyer? Bob hadn't paid so have lost any money but he stole wants the item he won. How can he compel the seller to cancel the new auction and sell him the item as they contracted to do? Related: Lost merchandise: Replacement or refund

How can he compel the seller to cancel the new auction and sell him the item as they contracted to do? Expectation damages are the typical remedy for breach of contract The general measure of damages for breach of contract is expectation damages : "the plaintiff will be entitled to the value of the promised performance" ( Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co. , 2002 SCC 43 at paragraph 26 ); "the purpose of expectation damages is to put the plaintiff in the same position it would have been if the contract had been performed ( Grandeur Homes Inc. v. Zeng , 2021 ONSC 4005 at paragraph 19 ). This is a general principle of common-law contract law rooted in English jurisprudence. See Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, p. 855: The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. This was recently confirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in Morris-Garner v. One Step (Support) Ltd. , [2018] UKSC 20: Damage for breach of contract are ... a substitute for performance. That is why they are generally regarded as an adequate remedy. The courts will not prevent self-interested breaches of contract where the interests of the innocent party can be adequately protected by an award of damages. Specific performance is not usual Specific performance (cancelling the new auction and forcing the first sale) is an exceptional remedy for breach of contract. Specific performance is an equitable remedy . As an equitable remedy, it is always discretionary; the wronged party does not have a right to specific performance. Specific performance may be ordered when: expectation damages are inadequate as a remedy where the contract was for a sale of a particular piece of land (but even this has been limited in some jurisdictions to circumstances where the property is particularly unique) difficulty in quantifying damages Specific performance is typically not ordered when a substitute is available by which expectation damages would be demonstrated. See generally Chitty on Contracts , §30-015–30-025.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

Several countries have laws against Holocaust denial . Such laws typically punish people who seriously minimise the scale of Nazi crimes, or entirely deny that generally accepted Nazi atrocities took place. The Wikipedia page lists several examples. In Austria, National Socialism Prohibition Law (1947, amendments of 1992) section 3h criminalizes "whoever denies, grossly plays down, approves or tries to excuse the National Socialist genocide or other National Socialist crimes against humanity in a print publication, in broadcast or other media." Belgium also has a 1995 law against those who "grossly minimise, attempts to justify, or approves the genocide committed by the German National Socialist Regime during the Second World War", punishable by "a prison sentence of eight days to one year, and by a fine of twenty six francs to five thousand francs". In Czechia it is forbidden not only to deny Nazi genocide and crimes against humanity, but also similar crimes by Communist regimes (presumably primarily aimed at the Communist rulers in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe). The Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms (2001) § 405 says "Anyone who publicly denies, disputes, approves or attempts to justify a Nazi, Communist or other genocide or Nazi, Communist or other crimes against humanity or war crimes or crimes against peace will be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years".

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

To clarify the answer regarding the U.S.: There is no Federal level statute for criminal defamation in the U.S. However, there are statutory laws in the U.S. that criminalize defamation in 23 states, a case law in Iowa, and a constitutional grant for criminal defamation in South Dakota (25 states with a law in some form). That said, most states restrict criminal defimation very narrowly. In addition, it's a very rare crime to see prosecuted, let alone successfully. Between 1992 and 2004, only 41 charges were made, of which only 6 resulted in a conviction. Between 1965 and 2004 (39 years), there were only 16 successful convictions. Almost all sentences for convictions seem to indicate that the crime is a misdemeanor, with jail time averaging 173 days for those that serve jail time at all (misdemeanors in most states are 12 months for a single offence at the maximum) with fines, probation, and community service among the sentences for the charge.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

united-kingdom In the UK, the Communications Act 2003 makes it illegal to lie over the internet in order to annoy someone. (2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he— (a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be false, But in this case the intent to annoy is a necessary element along with the known falsehood. It's not generally illegal to lie simply to mislead people.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

Many jurisdictions in the United States make it a crime to defame someone.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

new-zealand contempt-of-court A few years ago New Zealand lawmakers overhauled the law of contempt of court . On the one hand, they abolished a whole lot of common law contempt offences ( s 3(3)(a) ): (i) contempt in the face of the court; and (ii) publishing information that interferes with a fair trial; and (iii) jurors researching information relevant to the trial; and (iv) disclosing juror deliberations; and (v) disobeying court orders; and (vi) scandalising the court On the other hand, they introduced a new criminal offence of publishing false statements about judges ( s 22 ): (1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person publishes a false statement about a Judge or court; and (b) the person knew or ought reasonably to have known that the statement could undermine public confidence in the independence, integrity, impartiality, or authority of the judiciary or a court; and (c) there is a real risk that the statement could undermine public confidence in the independence, integrity, impartiality, or authority of the judiciary or a court.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

canada Until 2021, Canada's Criminal Code contained s. 181, which made it an offence to spread false news. Every one who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. It was ruled unconstitutional in 1992 ( R. v. Zundel , [1992] 2 SCR 731 ), but that did not remove it from the statute books. It was removed in 2021 in a clean-up bill along with many other "zombie" laws. See this explainer about the Bill.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime?

Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

In Finland, the crime of defamation is covered by the Criminal law. Rikoslaki, chapter 24, §9 and §10 (Translation mine) §9 Defamation Whoever Presents or insinuates false information of another, in a manner likely to cause damage or suffering to the injured party, or disdain towards them, or In a manner other than part 1 defames another Is to be sentenced to a fine for defamation. [...] §10 Aggravated Defamation If defamation as per part 1 of §9 causes great suffering or injury, and the crime is also otherwise aggravated, the criminal must be sentenced to a fine or no more than two years of imprisonment for aggravated defamation. In fact, §8 criminalizes publishing true statements regarding a person's private life. I have read news stories that mention that the police has an ongoing investigation for defamation or violation of privacy.

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"?

In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation" . This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview , says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

united-states But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? Legal Ethics Considerations There are circumstances when commenting publicly on litigation violates the ethical rules for lawyers related to trial publicity See Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (the numbering system for professional conduct rules for lawyers is uniform nationally in the U.S. although the substance of the rules can differ in detail from state to state - Colorado's rule is fairly typical). Mostly this rule calls for avoiding statements that could prejudice a jury unless the other side has already done so and those statements need to be rebutted. This rule states (in its Colorado version): (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). Statements such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court" are allowed and are not terribly uncommon. But, making a comment about something that can be easily inferred from the publicly available documents filed in court provides little or no positive advantage for a litigant. Also, one doesn't have to say much to create at least a colorable Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 issue that a mediator can raise in settlement talks, or that a judge can be forced to analyze. Even if the claim of unethical trial publicity ultimately doesn't hold water, it still muddies the waters and distracts lawyers and litigants from dealing with the substance of the dispute. The Risk That A Statement Will Be Used Against You Usually, the main concern is similar to the concern about talking to police: Anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. For example, this week former President Trump's public statement about his knowledge of classified documents , which are the subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation of him, seriously harmed his position legally. (His statement was made quite a while ago in a semi-private forum, but at a time when the possibility of a criminal investigation still should have been on his radar screen.) In the civil rape-defamation case against him (as noted, for example, in this Law.SE answer ), Trump's decision to continue to speak publicly about matters that were the subject of active litigation against him in an earlier case resulted in an extended statute of limitations and an opportunity to refile the case without having to worry about Presidential immunity from liability for statements he made while in office. It isn't just former President Trump that does things like this, but his conduct provides good textbook examples of what lawyers worry about when their clients talk about cases that are being litigated. Social media statements about pending cases by litigants routinely provide powerful evidence against them in trials. Some clients (particularly politicians and many senior executives of big and medium sized businesses, but also more ordinary people with big egos) are "forces of nature" who can't resist running their mouths, usually to their detriment, when given the least leave to do so. It is easier to teach them to say "no comment" across the board about pending litigation, than to transmit the depth of understanding necessary to comment without saying something potentially harmful. Lawyers spend many hours and sometimes days preparing their clients for depositions for a reason. Avoiding Annoyance To Opposing Counsel, Parties, And Judges Making a comment about pending litigation has the potential to aggravate opposing counsel and can emotionally influence non-lawyer opposing parties with whom a negotiated settlement will be reached 90%+ of the time (only about 1-2% of civil cases go to trial, but some are resolved by default judgments or on motion practice as opposed to by settlement). It can also irritate a judge who frequently prefers to be out of the public spotlight when necessary, even when the statements made aren't prohibited, and judges in the U.S. have lots of discretionary authority.

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"?

In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation" . This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview , says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

common-law Yes, the legal reason is called sub judice . The US seems to be less bothered about it due to the First Amendment, but in the rest of the common law world (UK/CA/AU/NZ etc.) publicly commenting about specifics of an ongoing litigation may be contempt of court . The general idea is that the jury may be influenced by what the media says, and that will interfere with a fair hearing/trial. The jury is supposed to make decisions only on what they hear/see in the courtroom. Where the case is decided by judges only (i.e. bench /judge-alone trials), in theory it should not be a problem to herald the hell of it in the media because judges are paid for their ability to withstand side influences and make decisions only on what is adduced before them. But people/organizations prefer to err on the side of caution and so see it wise to refuse to comment anyway.

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"?

In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation" . This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview , says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

It can be a bad idea in germany While it is not illegal to speak about the own ongoing litigation, talking about it can be very ill-advised: News articles are usually not admissible as evidence in court (unless to prove a statement was made ) There are no jurors that could be swayed, and Schöffen discuss the whole case with the professional judge(s) when they join them on the bench. By claiming a position to the press, which the court deems wrong, an injured party by those statements can sue for various forms of defamation (Beleidigung §185 StGB , Üble Nachrede §186 StGB , Verleumdung §187 StGB , Verleumdung gegen Personen des öffentlichen Lebens §188 StGB , Verunglimpfichung Verstorbener §189 StGB ) and is nigh guaranteed to win due to the law on Truth by Judgment under §190 StGB . Example: Alice claims to the press that Bob murdered Charleene. The court finds Bob not guilty. Alice will now be found guilty under §187 & §190 StGB - A court's judgment automatically becomes the truth , and if revised or appealed the truth changes accordingly. Germans are very litigious in this field: the various forms of defamation fill as4% of all German lawsuits filed by private citizens. In the united-states , Judges are prohibited from talking about ongoing cases on their desk As discussed here pertaining the successful appeal in United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) we have a specific point when, a judge talking about a case that is not yet decided and on their desk can lead to a successful appeal of the judgment. The point here is, that judges need to follow the code of judicial conduct , which demands that a judge may not talk about an ongoing case in any way or fashion : (6) A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. A judge should require similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control. The prohibition on public comment on the merits does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge’s official duties, to explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal education. Similarly, lawyers in the united-states shouldn't The lawers are similarly bound to their state bar's code of conduct, which often mirror the Model Rules of Professional Conduct . More on that in Ohwilleke's excellent answer

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"?

In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation" . This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview , says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

Can't help, might hurt You're just giving ammo to the opposition. First, they can cite what you said directly, right in court. If you have anyone public-facing with "foot in mouth disease", that can set you back badly. It can also hurt your credibility if the jury perceives those statements as unbelievable or insensitive. Nobody likes a liar. Best way to avoid that problem is for those statements to not exist . Second, in a social media age, it can backfire. If you say "There has never been any methyl amine in the building" inevitably, that will get spread around social media , and it WILL reach the ears of some random guy who did, in fact, special-order methyl amine from you 18 years ago and has the receipts to prove it. And now the opposition has something they didn't have before . It also makes it harder to stop (quash) an opponent from exploring an area of interest, if you yourself raised that area of interest in the media. You're not going to win any hearts and minds with denials. There's no extreme level of urgency or firmness that makes a denial more believable; if anything, the opposite. So you're better off not bothering. If you're the kind of company that has fans, let the fans fight the good fight in the media for you.

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"?

In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation" . This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview , says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

Even if you are right, court proceedings are still expensive, strenuous, and time-consuming. So, it is common in court cases involving organizations or corporations that they end without a judgement, for example through a settlement agreement between the parties. Such a settlement agreement often stipulates that neither party was at fault, but it is somewhat hard to reach such an agreement if you have already made public statements claiming the opposite. As an example why corporations would want to settle, consider the Oracle v. Google case where there wasn't a settlement. It took 12 years, and in the end, Google won, but it won in a manner which didn't actually answer the most important question. So, this was all a giant waste of money and time for all involved parties, including Google, Oracle, and the Supreme Court. Oracle wanted to prevent Google from distributing Android, but they lost. Google wanted the courts to decide, once and for all, whether interface descriptions are copyrightable, but the courts side-stepped that question. So, in the end, nobody got what they wanted. And the Supreme Court wasted time trying to wiggle themselves out of the question.

Is Scamming Extortion in New York?

Welcome to the Internet, where people are the worst and want money for nothing: Alice is a normal citizen of New York with an e-mail address. She receives an E-mail from Bob, a New York State Citizen, in which he claims to have sexually incriminating material collected by tapping into Alice's webcam. Bob demands money via Bitcoin to not share the material with the public. Alice does not own a Webcam so knows that such material doesn't exist, but feels annoyed and informs the police, and does also not pay. Now, in real life, we know that it is nigh impossible to trace the e-mail back to Bob, but for the exercise, assume that somehow the police manage to identify Bob based on his Bitcoin wallet into which some person they can not identify has paid. Still, they bring it to the prosecution. Bob is found to never had the material they claimed to own for any of the people he sent such mail to. New York State Prosecutor Charles wants to bring suit but then pauses: The behavior of Bob appears to be extortion, but does this fit the letter of the law? It is clearly not NYPC § 135.60 , as no physical force is there, but maybe NYPC § 155.05(2)(e) could work. So Charles brings the suit under NYPC $ 155.05(2)(e)(v), because he believes that the unidentified person has been acting out of fear to be publically humiliated... Now, the question is: Is that actually the right section or might the whole case be in the wrong venue (e.g. belonging to federal court as wire fraud)?

Bob appears to have committed "attempted larceny" by extortion, contrary to § 155.05(2)(e)(v) : (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; See § 110.00 : Attempt to commit a crime. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. And see § 110.10 which covers the "impossibility" that Bob actually had compromising images from Alice's non-existent webcam: Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. (NB Bob's sentence, if found guilty, would depend the value of his attempted extortion)

Is Scamming Extortion in New York?

Welcome to the Internet, where people are the worst and want money for nothing: Alice is a normal citizen of New York with an e-mail address. She receives an E-mail from Bob, a New York State Citizen, in which he claims to have sexually incriminating material collected by tapping into Alice's webcam. Bob demands money via Bitcoin to not share the material with the public. Alice does not own a Webcam so knows that such material doesn't exist, but feels annoyed and informs the police, and does also not pay. Now, in real life, we know that it is nigh impossible to trace the e-mail back to Bob, but for the exercise, assume that somehow the police manage to identify Bob based on his Bitcoin wallet into which some person they can not identify has paid. Still, they bring it to the prosecution. Bob is found to never had the material they claimed to own for any of the people he sent such mail to. New York State Prosecutor Charles wants to bring suit but then pauses: The behavior of Bob appears to be extortion, but does this fit the letter of the law? It is clearly not NYPC § 135.60 , as no physical force is there, but maybe NYPC § 155.05(2)(e) could work. So Charles brings the suit under NYPC $ 155.05(2)(e)(v), because he believes that the unidentified person has been acting out of fear to be publically humiliated... Now, the question is: Is that actually the right section or might the whole case be in the wrong venue (e.g. belonging to federal court as wire fraud)?

It is clearly not NYPC § 135.60, as no physical force is there, Not so. The facts presented clearly state an offense of attempting to commit the crime of coercion in the third degree which is colloquially called "extortion." An attempt crime is committed when "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime." NYPC § 110.00 . § 110.10 Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. An attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a Class B misdemeanor. See NYPC § 110.05. The underlying crime attempted which Bob attempted to commit is as follows: § 135.60 Coercion in the third degree. A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, . . . by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will: . . . 5 Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or . . . 9 Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his or her health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships. Coercion in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. Coercion in the second degree does not require proof of the use of physical force. That is only one of nine possible forms of coercion which can give rise to this offense. Bob attempted to get Alice to transfer Bitcoin by instilling fear in hear that a secret would be revealed or that Bob would take action that would damage Alice's reputation and/or personal relationships. He thought he could successfully instill fear in Alice and get the Bitcoin even though he was bluffing about his ability to carry out his threat. If Alice had paid the Bitcoin he would have been guilty of coercion in the third degree. But, since he failed to cause Alice to act, he is only guilty of attempted coercion in the third degree. Bob is also be guilty of attempted larceny by extortion as explained by Rick . Is that actually the right section or might the whole case be in the wrong venue (e.g. belonging to federal court as wire fraud)? In most cases involving fraud both state courts and federal courts have jurisdiction over some crimes that apply to the criminal conduct involved. The FBI has, for decades, had a policy of not investigating property crimes involving a loss of less than $75,000, not as a matter of law, but as a means of rationing scarce investigatory resources. So, the likelihood that federal prosecutors would pursue this case would depend upon the amount demanded and any other factors that make it particularly attractive (e.g. because it is part of a pattern of offenses by the same person affecting victims in many different states).

A witness (former gov't agent) knows top secret USA information. Can a court compel them to reveal the informaton?

A former US federal government employee knows information that was classified as top secret by the federal government. This information is relevant to a case. They were called to testify before the court. This person is not a defendant. I believe the 5th amendment would be a valid defense since the witness would be violating the Espionage Act, but claiming the 5th on the witness bench would probably ruin the witness' credibility before the jury. Therefore, we may safely exclude "pleading the 5th" on the answers. Can a court compel the witness to disclose the information? Is there any lawful recourse for the witness (to keep confidentiality) other than the 5th amendment ?

The court should not compel the witness to disclose the information because there is a state secrets privilege which bars disclosure of governmental secrets in litigation. An interlocutory appeal of some sort would generally be permitted in cases where the privilege is not honored, and typically, the federal government would become an intervenor in the litigation with respect to that issue. Not infrequently, the state secrets privilege will prevent a matter from being litigated at all, rather than merely preventing the admission of evidence, or requiring that the matter be resolved in a sealed secret bench trial. For example, spies cannot sue the government for not being paid for spying as a result of the state secrets privilege. Similarly, someone who suffers a personal injury arising from a covert operation can not sue the government for that injury.

A witness (former gov't agent) knows top secret USA information. Can a court compel them to reveal the informaton?

A former US federal government employee knows information that was classified as top secret by the federal government. This information is relevant to a case. They were called to testify before the court. This person is not a defendant. I believe the 5th amendment would be a valid defense since the witness would be violating the Espionage Act, but claiming the 5th on the witness bench would probably ruin the witness' credibility before the jury. Therefore, we may safely exclude "pleading the 5th" on the answers. Can a court compel the witness to disclose the information? Is there any lawful recourse for the witness (to keep confidentiality) other than the 5th amendment ?

The US Court Public Guide to Classified Information suggests that if you are a plaintiff you should file a notice when you file the (Federal) case to get the right people assigned. 18a U.S. Code § 6 appears to suggest that motions can be filed (by anyone related?) which will activate the necessary machinery where the government will stop any public disclosure of classified information. Some organizations have more specific guidance to follow pre-appearance, even for seemingly innocuous court appearances. TL;DR: Don't blurt out classified information in court (or anywhere else) without giving the powers that be a chance to squash that concept like a bug (or they will squash you like a bug instead).

A witness (former gov't agent) knows top secret USA information. Can a court compel them to reveal the informaton?

A former US federal government employee knows information that was classified as top secret by the federal government. This information is relevant to a case. They were called to testify before the court. This person is not a defendant. I believe the 5th amendment would be a valid defense since the witness would be violating the Espionage Act, but claiming the 5th on the witness bench would probably ruin the witness' credibility before the jury. Therefore, we may safely exclude "pleading the 5th" on the answers. Can a court compel the witness to disclose the information? Is there any lawful recourse for the witness (to keep confidentiality) other than the 5th amendment ?

In theory... Because [18 U.S. Code § 798][1] requires a "willful" disclosure of classified information, the answer lies in the definition of the legal term 'willful'. This is not the same as being willing or compelled. The term "willfully" means no more than that the forbidden act was done deliberately and with knowledge, and does not require proof of evil intent. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956). An act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. There is no requirement that the government show evil intent on the part of a defendant in order to prove that the act was done "willfully." See generally United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1979); American Surety Company v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925)(Hand, J.); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (involving 15 U.S.C. § 32(a). See also 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff & K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 17.05 (1992). Taken from - https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-910-knowingly-and-willfully#:~:text=An%20act%20is%20done%20%22willfully,See%20generally%20United%20States%20v . So it stands to reason that if the witness knew the information was 'classified' and they answered the question, I think they would be in some trouble. I believe the witness can simply say something to the effect of "I am unable to legally answer that under 18 U.S. Code § 798". I would love to see a court attempt to compel the witness to answer after that statement, as it could qualify as "solicitation to commit a crime" by the court. The legal debate there would be interesting. But don't quote me. [1]: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/798

A witness (former gov't agent) knows top secret USA information. Can a court compel them to reveal the informaton?

A former US federal government employee knows information that was classified as top secret by the federal government. This information is relevant to a case. They were called to testify before the court. This person is not a defendant. I believe the 5th amendment would be a valid defense since the witness would be violating the Espionage Act, but claiming the 5th on the witness bench would probably ruin the witness' credibility before the jury. Therefore, we may safely exclude "pleading the 5th" on the answers. Can a court compel the witness to disclose the information? Is there any lawful recourse for the witness (to keep confidentiality) other than the 5th amendment ?

The Espionage Act requires a "willful" disclosure of classified information, so a witness testifying under threat of contempt wouldn't be subject to legal liability for that testimony. For that reason, the Fifth Amendment wouldn't really be a valid objection. And even if the disclosure would be criminal, answering those questions wouldn't be testimony about a criminal act, but the criminal act itself, so again, the Fifth Amendment would not apply. (But perhaps cross-examination would, if questions are framed as "You told the court that x , right?" But there are other options instead. Ideally, the witness would notify the U.S. Attorney's Office that the other party is seeking this testimony, and the USAO would then assert one of two objections: If the testimony is sought in civil litigation, the government would likely object that the testimony would be governed by the state-secrets privilege. Doing so would require testimony from the head of the relevant military or intelligence agency that disclosing the information would be likely to injure national-security interests. If the evidence is excluded, the case would continue forward on whatever other evidence remains. If the testimony is sought in a criminal case, the witness would object that it is governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act , in which case, the court should hold a hearing at which it would determine whether the information relevant and otherwise admissible. If the evidence is excluded, the court may be required to dismiss the charges against the defendant, or it may simply order a jury to make adverse inferences against the government regarding whatever information is at issue.

Why don't people who are untruthful during jury selection get held in contempt of court?

This question is U.S. based. I ask this because recently I was summoned for jury duty. When we were in the courtroom, the judge asked each of the jurors in the box a list of questions. One of them was their command/understanding of the English language. One person said he didn't understand English and ignored the judge's questions. If I recall, some of the follow up questions asked were: Do you understand English? (The guy answered "no") If you don't know English, how did you know to come here today? (ignored the judge) How old are you? (ignored the judge) What do you do? Do you work or go to school? (ignored the judge) It was clear he understood English because once the judge dismissed him, he immediately jumped out of his chair to leave. Everyone laughed because they knew the guy was lying. Even the judge remarked that even though he claimed he didn't understand English, he understood enough English to know "you're dismissed" meant he could leave and couldn't get out of his chair fast enough. My question is why don't the courts charge people with contempt of court when it's clear they are untruthful? This is total disrespect of the judge and the court and is insulting everyone, especially the honorable judge's intelligence. We can't charge him with perjury because he didn't take an oath but if people were charged with arrest or contempt of court for this, there would hopefully be less of this. EDIT: Sorry, I didn't mean to make this question into a debate about knowledge of English. I just wanted to ask about holding people in contempt or some other punishment to prevent people from being untruthful when questioned during the jury selection process. I understand and sympathize with those who don't have a strong understanding of English to be on the jury and don't mind them being excused. Yes, maybe if this guy was a better actor and wasn't so blatant about him "not knowing English", I wouldn't be as outraged and he may have still gotten dismissed. He might not fool the judge since the judge probably sees this (acting) from others every day though.

Why don't people who are untruthful during jury selection get held in contempt of court? The premise of the title question is incorrect. Jurors are regularly held in contempt of court for being untruthful during jury selection. I suspect that the number of prospective jurors held in contempt by courts on any given day that courts are open in the United States would be in the hundreds nationwide every day (about 1-3 per day on a typical day in the entire State of Colorado), and in the tens of thousands nationwide every year, although usually the punishments would be at the mild end of what is allowed by law. But, this isn't applied blindly in a zero tolerance fashion because the court's primary goal is to get cases tried not to punish dishonest prospective jurors and it doesn't have unlimited resources. Also, the court handling jury selection doesn't want to scare off jurors and have them try to formulate truthful excuses that the jurors wouldn't insist upon because they are afraid of being punished for slight missteps in the jury selection process. Also, in the example mentioned, the question about an ability to speak English is really about an ability to be fluent enough to understand what is going on and be a fruitful deliberator in hearing a court case and deciding with other jurors who won. This is different from the ability to have the rudimentary understanding of some English language basics which is implicated in the conduct described. The judge would not be abusing his or her discretion to assume that the prospective juror was truthfully indicating that he was not sufficiently fluent to serve appropriately as a juror despite having some limited ability to speak and understand English.

Is an exact match necessary to prove trademark infringement?

For the sake of example, let's use Robert E. Howard's character "Conan, the Barbarian". The author died in June 11, 1936, Cross Plains, Texas, United States. As seen above, it's been almost 97 years of his passing at the time this question was posted. His works, including the mentioned character, are well into public domain. Though that might be true, the expression "Conan, the Barbarian" is trademarked. Assume I want to write a novel about the rebirth of the character in the modern times. The title would be "Conan, the reborn Barbarian". Assume the copyright holder sues me for infringement of the eponymous copyright. Do they have cause to file this lawsuit? Does the use in the hypothetical above constitute a "sufficiently related" use as stated in https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement The key factors considered in most cases are the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and whether the parties' goods and/or services are sufficiently related that consumers are likely to assume (mistakenly) that they come from a common source. Other factors that courts typically consider include how and where the parties' goods or services are advertised, marketed, and sold; the purchasing conditions; the range of prospective purchasers of the goods or services; whether there is any evidence of actual confusion caused by the allegedly infringing mark; the defendant's intent in adopting its mark; and the strength of the plaintiff's mark. Issues of copyright are to be ignored. There's no copyrighted material or fair use. The character used in the hypothetical is in public-domain .

An exact match to a trademark is not necessary for trademark infringement to occur, as demonstrated in Toys "R" Us v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Toys R Us successfully sued the adult website Adults R Us despite the lack of an exact match to any trademark, as the use of the name "Adults R Us" diluted the trademark of Toys R Us. However, your specific hypothetical would probably need an actual lawyer to properly guess whether it would likely be considered infringing, as it's hard to know for certain.

What 'specific legal meaning' does the word "strike" have?

Over on main meta, on the post containing a statement from Stack Overflow about the current moderator action , there was a brief edit war over the inclusion (or not) of the word "strike" in the title. An SO staff member said : While we recognize that the community is referring to this event as a "strike", that term has a specific legal meaning and we have been advised not to refer to it as such. For that reason, we ask that future editors of this post do not edit it to use that language. What 'specific legal meaning' might be being referred to here? Why might a corporation want the act of refusing to perform duties to not be referred to as a strike? Is it relevant that those withholding effort are unpaid volunteers? I'm guessing at the jurisdiction and hence the appropriate tag.

united-states Under US law, unions and employees enjoy a set of protections codified under the National Labor Relations Act. Some of those rights specifically pertain to strikes , and in particular, employees engaged in "lawful" strikes cannot be fired merely for striking (but they can be replaced). Stack Exchange, Inc. takes the position that moderators are not employees and are not subject to the NLRA. Their reluctance to use the word "strike" likely stems from this position. If the moderation strike were a "strike" within the meaning of the NLRA, that would imply a large and complex set of restrictions on how Stack Exchange may respond to the strike. It would also suggest that moderators, as employees, have a right to discuss their "workplace conditions" with each other or the public - which might be construed to include some or all of the moderation policies that Stack Exchange has distributed in private (but I'm somewhat doubtful of that). Of course, it would also raise serious problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act (moderators are unpaid and the FLSA sets a minimum wage), but that is a different law, and it is theoretically possible that a court would rule that moderators are employees for NLRA purposes but not for FLSA purposes. I have never heard of such a ruling actually happening, and it is far more likely that moderators are not employees for either purpose . Still, it might be unwise to refer to the strike as a "strike," just in case the issue gets litigated.

What 'specific legal meaning' does the word "strike" have?

Over on main meta, on the post containing a statement from Stack Overflow about the current moderator action , there was a brief edit war over the inclusion (or not) of the word "strike" in the title. An SO staff member said : While we recognize that the community is referring to this event as a "strike", that term has a specific legal meaning and we have been advised not to refer to it as such. For that reason, we ask that future editors of this post do not edit it to use that language. What 'specific legal meaning' might be being referred to here? Why might a corporation want the act of refusing to perform duties to not be referred to as a strike? Is it relevant that those withholding effort are unpaid volunteers? I'm guessing at the jurisdiction and hence the appropriate tag.

The term has potentially as many specific legal meanings as there are statutes that use the word. One example is title 29 of the United States Code, chapter 7 (Labor-Management Relations), which defines "strike" thus: The term “strike” includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees. Which is not terribly helpful. Also unhelpful is the definition of "employee": The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. In fact, it is not usually necessary to observe statutory definitions of terms when discussing something that is outside the scope of the statute in question. Lawyers will nonetheless counsel their clients to avoid doing so because they do not want the use of the word to be taken as an implied admission of some circumstance that might weaken the client's case. I don't suppose the striking moderators are actually employees of Stack Exchange, Inc., so I cannot imagine how using the word "strike" could cause trouble. But that doesn't matter a whole lot. If they don't want to use the word strike, they can refrain from using it. If they're trying to spin the situation by hiding behind purported legal advice, the only way you're going to prove that is with direct evidence. Even if the legal reasoning is bogus, it could just be that they have a bad lawyer, or just an overcautious one. Maybe they are worried that SE using "strike" would trigger a requirement to pay moderators minimum wage. Or about something else. Or maybe it's just spin.

How is internet archiving legal, when it appears to violate many websites terms of use?

Internet archiving services like the internet wayback machine work by rehosting content from other website. However, many websites in their term explicitly disallow people to frame their website or rehost their content. So my question is, how are internet archive websites allowed to work? As a cursory search, I've found that a lot of websites have the phrase (or variants): Under no circumstances may you “frame” the websites or any of their content or copy portions of the websites to a server, except as part of an Internet service provider’s incidental caching of pages. Yet, many of the sites that have this phrase are archived on archive.org My initial thoughts are that these websites don't have a problem with what archive.org is doing, so they don't pursue any legal action. However, it seems that archive.org is blatantly violating a huge number of websites terms. Although I have not legal experience, it seems that this could easily open themselves up to a class action lawsuit. Does anybody have any thoughts on this? Relevant Questions Rehosting website - This question mentions that rehosting websites violates copyright unless explicitly allowed.

Most of the major archiving platforms are nonprofit ventures with purposes that could fall within the fair-use exception to the Copyright Act. Archive.org, for instance, is for educational and archival purposes. Perma.cc, meanwhile, is for preserving legal history. I don't know about Perma.cc, but Archive.org will take down pages just because you asked, so that also cuts in its favor.

How is internet archiving legal, when it appears to violate many websites terms of use?

Internet archiving services like the internet wayback machine work by rehosting content from other website. However, many websites in their term explicitly disallow people to frame their website or rehost their content. So my question is, how are internet archive websites allowed to work? As a cursory search, I've found that a lot of websites have the phrase (or variants): Under no circumstances may you “frame” the websites or any of their content or copy portions of the websites to a server, except as part of an Internet service provider’s incidental caching of pages. Yet, many of the sites that have this phrase are archived on archive.org My initial thoughts are that these websites don't have a problem with what archive.org is doing, so they don't pursue any legal action. However, it seems that archive.org is blatantly violating a huge number of websites terms. Although I have not legal experience, it seems that this could easily open themselves up to a class action lawsuit. Does anybody have any thoughts on this? Relevant Questions Rehosting website - This question mentions that rehosting websites violates copyright unless explicitly allowed.

Terms and conditions aren't necessarily binding It's worth noting that while activities such as the Wayback Machine have had many legal issues, they're mostly centered on copyright, not regarding terms and conditions. A key part of this is that terms and conditions are not law, and they're not binding contract to which you've somehow agreed. Quoting another relevant answer , "In the case of a web site, the owner of the web site is granting you a license, subject to certain terms, to access the web site and use it." You're free to not accept that license offer in which case you don't have their explicit permission to access that site. However, you don't necessarily need their permission to do so - the permission is useful because it protects you from the following two main legal claims: Copyright - it may be that this implied license in combination with T&C is the only thing that gives you the copyright owners' permission to copy that data. However, that's not a factor in fair use scenarios where copyright owner's permission isn't required, which is the main legal claim of internet archives (which sometimes gets contested ). It doesn't matter whether the copyright holder clearly tells you "I don't allow this!!!" in person, in email, in a legal cease&desist letter or on the T&C section of their website, if the copyright law permits you to make and/or distribute these copies without their permission. "Hacking" laws like CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) - it may be that violations of T&C get prosecuted by various laws designed to target hacking. However, that generally requires something worse than what internet archives are doing. Internet archives generally respect both 'robots.txt' standard to limit access to what websites don't want to be scraped, they generally accept takedown notices, and their mission makes it less likely for courts to consider that the activity is in bad faith. If someone like myself would "just" scrape the same sites for some commercial gain, and continue to do so after receiving explicit cease and desist notice, then a lawsuit would have a larger chance of succeeding - but even then likely not, see a HIQ Labs vs Linkedin court ruling and an article about it as an example where a company explicitly and intentionally scraped Linkedin data against their T&C for years but the court didn't consider that as a violation of CFAA.

To what is the judge in the Lina E. trial referring to by "deplorable deficiencies in recent trials of far-right extremists"?

It is in the news that there have been protests after the sentencing of Lina E for attacks on neo-Nazis. Wikipedia quoting this German language news article says: Hans Schlüter-Staats, the Higher Regional Court of Dresden judge overseeing the trial, stated that "opposing right-wing extremists is a respectable motive" and that there had been "deplorable" deficiencies in recent trials of far-right extremists To what cases is the judge referring to here?

To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article ( 2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration ) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version ( Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats , presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written , to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.

Can I use code from a computergame that is owned by a company A in order to develop my own game at company B?

I want to develop a game with my own company, lets call it Indiantruckaimulator, that is very similiar to the already existing game, Eurotruck simulator. I would greatly benefit if I could use their Code/Software and simply add some changes. Is there a way for me to get access to that code, preferably through colaboration :), to be able to build upon that? Thank you for your time and answers!

You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you.