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Can I use code from a computergame that is owned by a company A in order to develop my own game at company B?

I want to develop a game with my own company, lets call it Indiantruckaimulator, that is very similiar to the already existing game, Eurotruck simulator. I would greatly benefit if I could use their Code/Software and simply add some changes. Is there a way for me to get access to that code, preferably through colaboration :), to be able to build upon that? Thank you for your time and answers!

Code is copyrighted The code is copyrighted. You need a license from the copyright owner to manipulate it, if you alter it to the extent that you create a derivative work and do not qualify for Fair Use or a similar exception (see below). Creating a game with a different map clearly is a derivative work. You can only get that license from the company that initially made or currently distributes the game which code you want to use. If they don't respond or don't want you to use their code, you can't use their code at all. But... fair use?! There are some exceptions to needing a license, like fair use. However, those are generally not available for making a competing game.

Liabilities with restoring a stuck-down video from archive?

In this [movies.meta.se] question: What if a question's embedded video clip is struck down for copyright violation? , I discuss a potential policy issue for that exchange. In the case I list, there is a question that was asked, which includes an embedded YouTube video from a Star Wars movie to better explain the author's question. Disney, as Disney does, struck down the video as a copyright violation. (In the case of that particular question, the video, in my opinion, isn't actually needed, as the question, to me, is still understandable.) We get, however, many questions that are related to things shown directly in the attached or linked videos and without them the question becomes problematic in understanding. My question here is not about (US) "fair use" or the legality or morality of the strike or use of the video, but specifically about one possible choice given by GalacticNinja: If I could not find a suitable replacement, I would check for an archived version of the video at the Internet Archive Wayback Machine. (The Internet Archive Wayback Machine can make backups of YouTube videos.) If the copyright holder has struck down a video as a violation, what is our potential liability involved, if we were to re-embed or re-link to an archive which still shows the struck down video? I would ask about potential liability as a user and to the SE corporation.

Under the DMCA safe harbor provisions, the platform is protected from liability if they follow specific procedures, but may be liable for contributory infringement if they do not. The crux of the procedural dance is their receipt of official notices and counter notices, and their responses. The trigger is a sworn statement by the copyright holder: in the scenario that you describe, there is no such take-down notice. A take-down notice is directed at a specific infringement (delivered to Youtube), and the required remedy is that the content host must remove the copied material. This was done in the particular case, so there is no further issue. The copyright owner would have to separately serve notice on MeTube or FreeTube for distributing the same work. SE or similar platform is not even close to the liability ballpark until it gets served with notice. YouTube, on the other hand, could be liable if they restored the content after taking it down (this is covered via the counter-claim and put-back provisions). The copyright owner's whack-a-mole department has to dilligently find all of those infringers. "Infringing" boils down to copying, not to "referring to", and in the cases you are asking about, there is no copying of the content – there is a reference (link) to allegedly infringing material. The case Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc. , 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 gives indications of what actions other than actual copying might be deemed "contributory infringement". The court points out that browsing anything requires copying – "in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who browsed infringes the copyright" – although if the person browsing "was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages". So yes, there is always potential for end-users to be sued for infringement, and usually an escape hatch for innocent infringers. The other question raised in this case, about the platform's liabilities, is somewhat mooted by the apparent age of the would-be infringement which sees to predate DMCA. But the case does include an element of infringement-by-link, and the court found in that instance that "defendants have actively encouraged the infringement of plaintiff's copyright", citing various facts where the host overtly directed users to infringing sites, for example "Please mirror these files . . . . It will be a LOT quicker for you to download the compressed version . . . Needless to say, we need a LOT of mirror sites, as absolutely soon as possible". This is markedly different from what happens on SE. Inline linking is generally considered safe (the burden of stopping copyright infringement is on the actual host). There is no encouragement of infringement, only the potential.

Worker was sent to a store he was fired from but wasn't allowed to complete his job. New employer fired him as result

This is a theoretical situation. A person had worked at a retail store. He was terminated without cause and with severance. A few years later the same person is working for a marketing company on a part time basis. On one shift the company sends him to the retail store he was terminated from. An hour after arriving, he is told by his manager (by phone) that he has to leave, and is told by the new store manager that he was trespassing and had been banned. There had been no prior discussion about being banned. The marketing company immediately terminated him and canceled his future shifts due to the single "complaint" from the store. There was no notice, explanation or severance pay. Have any laws been broken? Does the worker have recourse against the marketing company or store? Does it make a difference if he was a part time employee or contractor? Does the worker have a right to know what the store had said about him to see if it was slander?

For purposes of this answer I am assuming that Bob is an employee. If Bob was a contractor then Employer could simply stop assigning him shifts. I am also assuming he has worked there more than 3 months as under BC law employees with less than 3 months service can be dismissed without cause without notice/severance. I'm also assuming that no illegal discrimination took place here**. The short answer is this all looks legal and Bob would have difficulty fighting it. A private business can refuse admittance to anyone for any reason. Even if Bob personally considers it unjust, they are not obliged to serve him. As it is private property, being on the premises was indeed trespassing. This would likely be sufficient for Termination With Cause. Realistically, any action severe enough to get banned from a store would be more than enough to constitute gross misconduct. I work in retail and have only ever seen it happen for theft or aggressive behaviour. "Breaking Company Rules" is also considered Just Cause and in this case the company has a rule of "don't piss off the clients so much they complain, much less eject you". Bob does not have a legal right to know what happened in a private conversation. It's possible the store didn't even give details beyond "Bob was barred from the premises." *Hypothetical male characters are called Bob- that's just how it is. **Ammend "except illegal discrimation" whenever I say "for any reason"

Who owns a copyright of a work that is found to be infringing? For example Warhol case that SCOTUS heard

Warhol made screen prints from Lynn Goldsmith's photograph. Those prints have earned millions of dollars. If SCOTUS finds that Warhol infringed, who owns copyright to the Warhol prints? If they are not transformative enough to qualify as fair use, does Goldsmith own the copyright to the prints? Or does Warhol own them and he has to pay a licensing fee?

Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered . In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say . While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed , albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims . Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing 1 . Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives 2 , rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure.

Who gets to see the living revocable trust documents when a person dies?

Suppose that person X has setup a living revocable trust and his or her will leaves everything to the trust. The trust controls who gets the assets after person X dies. After some time, person X dies. Who has the right to see the living revocable trust? I am thinking the trustee of the trust does and all the beneficiaries of the trust do. Does a contingent beneficiary have the right to see the trust documents? Is there anybody else who has the right to see the trust documents? The jurisdiction that I am interested in is the United States and in particular the state of New Jersey.

Unlike the Last Will and Testament of a decedent, a revocable living trust that becomes irrevocable by virtue of the death of the settlor generally does not become a matter of public record at the death of the settlor. In both New Jersey, and under the Uniform Trust Code, a beneficiary of a trust needs to be informed that they are a beneficiary of a formerly revocable trust, when the settlor of the trust dies. At common law, the majority rule was that a beneficiary only needed to be informed of the existence of the trust when there was a need to know for some reason (e.g. for tax purposes). New Jersey law provides that: A trustee, upon request of a beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the beneficiary a copy of the trust instrument. N.J.S. § 3B:31-67(b). This has the virtue of being easy to administer. The New Jersey rule calls for slightly more disclosure that the potentially more difficult to administer majority common law rule, which is found in the unmodified provision of the Uniform Trust Code adopted unmodified in many states, which states that: A trustee . . . Upon request of a qualified beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the qualified beneficiary a copy of the portions of the trust instrument that describe or affect the beneficiary's interest[.] Uniform Trust Code Section § 813(2)(a). The Uniform Trust Code is a model statute, sponsored by American Bar Association affiliated entities, that states can adopt if they wish as state law with whatever modifications they deem fit. Of course, there are other reasons that disclosure of the trust could be required, at least, in the event that interactions with these parties rose to the level of litigation or were necessary to make a transaction go forward. For example, it might have to be disclosed to a financial institution in which the trust wishes to establish an account, to a title company in connection with a real estate transfer from the trust, to taxing authorities, to someone with standing to do so suing the drafter of the trust for legal malpractice, to a trust protector or legal representative of a beneficiary, to creditors of the trust or of the decedent-settlor of the trust, to a former beneficiary contesting the validity of a change to the trust, or to someone who would have inherited from the decedent if the trust had not been formed contesting the validity of the trust's formation.

Is Crypto the same as any foreign currency?

A foreign currency exchange is nothing new. On the other hand cryptographic currency ("crypto" i.e. Bitcoin) is relatively new, as are their exchanges. https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/sec-brings-charges-cryptocurrency-trading-platform-coinbase-99866462 If crypto is a currency, Why not regulate it as a currency and not a security?

Is Crypto the same as any foreign currency? No. Crypto is generally treated as a commodity and capital asset, like gold, and not like a currency, under U.S. tax law. Other jurisdictions vary in how they treat cryptocurrency legally and for tax purposes. Bitcoin (unlike other cryptocurrencies) is also regulated on a non-tax basis as a commodity by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Other cryptocurrencies are regulated in the U.S. as securities by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Why not regulate it as a currency and not a security? Cyptocurrencies are not very much like currencies which is why they are not regulated in that way. The basis for treating it more like a security and less like a foreign currency for securities fraud/disclosure purposes is that it is a better fit to securities law which is designed for more varied legal arrangements than foreign currency laws. Foreign currencies are backed by the full faith and credit of sovereign countries (which are non-profit entities). Also, foreign currencies are transparently based upon laws that are almost always a matter of public record and relatively straightforward. And, of course, banks and money changing firms trading in foreign currencies are subject to significant tax and financial regulation of their own, although not as securities. In contrast, like other securities, cryptocurrencies are private creatures of contract created by entities with shareholders which do not have uniform legal properties. New "coins" can be created in different ways in different crypto currencies, and the relationship between the cryptocurrency to the non-crypto financial markets varies. Securities-like disclosures are necessary for members of the public dealing with it to understand the risks, benefits, and mechanics of the cryptocurrency in question. The U.S. Securities And Exchange position and its basis is suggested by the ABC News story linked in the question , which states: Coinbase has been targeted by U.S. regulators in a new lawsuit Tuesday that alleges the cryptocurrency platform is operating as an unregistered securities platform and brokerage service. The lawsuit from the Securities and Exchange Commission comes only a day after it filed charges against Binance, the world's largest crypto exchange, and its founder Changpeng Zhao are accused of misusing investor funds, operating as an unregistered exchange and violating a slew of U.S. securities laws. Coinbase shares plunged nearly 15% early Tuesday. In its complaint, the SEC said Coinbase made billions acting as the middle man for cryptocurrency buyers and sellers but did not give investors lawful protections while acting as a broker. “Coinbase has for years defied the regulatory structures and evaded the disclosure requirements that Congress and the SEC have constructed for the protection of the national securities markets and investors,” the SEC said in its complaint, which was filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. It seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest, penalties, and other equitable relief.

Would a poker buyin share voucher be a "security"?

Hello I am trying to learn more about securities and really confused by the laws regarding unregistered securities in the US. NJ state if that helps too. I made a scenario and I am needing help to understand if this would be legal or not. In online poker you play poker and when you win the tournament against other players then are granted a entry ticket into the next event. As you may know you can win money in poker. I am having trouble understanding the Howey Test which is "investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others." Which is used to deem what is and isn't a security. Here's my thought experiment from my thinking into this concept: If you were to play a poker tournament, win it and be issued a ticket that gave you access to a percentage of all the money paid into the NEXT tournament by other players (let's call it a "money ticket") as a prize would this "money ticket" be a security? Why/why not? The "money ticket" would basically be a revenue share voucher. Edit: What if you only got the profits if you won the second tournament as well? Would the ticket still be a security? Thank you!

Almost certainly yes. As you say, the test is indeed the Howey Test , which, as you say, asks if it is an "investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others." Here, the "efforts of others" would be running the poker tournament. The "expectation of profits" is to be derived from the proceeds of their efforts running the tournament, advertising it, etc. It's basically pretty similar to receiving something like equity in the tournament, and equity is of course well-established to be a security. To avoid running afoul of laws against unregistered security offerings, they would likely need to either limit the people who could win such a ticket to accredited investors or go to the trouble of formally registering the securities. The latter isn't impossible: banks routinely register a wide variety of securities that they sell to their various customers. But it is a lot more process, and banks who do this are set up to be able to do it with as little process overhead as possible. Whether that would be practical for a company running poker tournaments would probably depend a lot on the details of the situation.

Do any jurisdictions besides Texas permit a couple to register a marriage years after the fact?

A couple in Texas, otherwise unmarried, can go to the county courthouse and register their marriage on any date they choose. The date can be years earlier. Is this allowed elsewhere? What legal system is this practice likely to be inherited from? I would like to offer more information about why I am curious about formalization of informal marriages. First, as in Texas, same sex couples could obtain certification of marriages that were initiated before such marriages were legal. People could obtain the benefits of a long standing marriage, even predating Obergefell versus Hodges. Moreover, Texas law does not seem to prohibit any couple from moving to Texas, becoming residents, and formalizing their long-standing relationship, though started elsewhere. This might take only a few days or possibly a month depending on the requirements for residency. Second, I met a couple who had recently married in Britain in a Hindu (I believe) ceremony, but did not marry in a church or registry office. Thus, their marriage was not registered. I met them on the airplane when they were flying to Las Vegas with the intention of marrying there to obtain legal recognition of their marriage. They seemed to believe that others had done the same. From news sources I understand that marriage without documentation in Britain is fairly common among both Hindus and Muslims. This presents a problem, particularly to women, if they later seek a divorce since they are not recognized as married by the British courts.

The question mischaracterizes Texas law. Texas allows a common law marriage to be formally acknowledged in a document signed by the parties, for bureaucratic convenience and to end uncertainty. As clarified in the comments: this procedure isn't for couples who are "otherwise unmarried", but for those who are already married under common law (by living together as spouses, etc). And the date presumably can't actually be any date they choose, but only within the time period of their common-law marriage. In Texas, there is a common law marriage (per the link above) when you and your partner: are not already married, informally or formally, to anyone else at the time the marriage was created, AND both you and your partner were at least 18 years of age when the marriage was created; and you agreed to be married, AND afterward, lived in Texas as a married couple, and represented to others that you are married (“holding out” to others). These requirements, or some close variant of them, are typical of almost all common law marriage states. Common law marriages may be formed in the following U.S. states : Colorado: Common law marriage contracted on or after Sept. 1, 2006, is valid if, at the time the marriage was entered into, both parties are 18 years or older, and the marriage is not prohibited by other law (Colo. Stat. §14-2-109.5) Iowa: Common law marriage for purposes of the Support of Dependents Chapter (Iowa Code §252A.3) Otherwise it is not explicitly prohibited (Iowa Code §595.1A) Kansas: Common law marriage will be recognized if the parties are 18 or older and for purposes of the Divorce and Maintenance Article, proof of common law marriage is allowed as evidence of marriage of the parties (Kan. Stat. §23-2502; Kan. Stat. §23-2714) Montana: Not strictly prohibited, they are not invalidated by the Marriage Chapter (Mont. Stat. §40-1-403) New Hampshire: Common Law Marriage: "persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married." (N.H. Stat. §457:39) South Carolina: allows for marriages without a valid license (S.C. Stat. §20-1-360) Texas: Common Law Marriage in specific circumstances (Tex. Family Law §1.101; Tex. Family Law §2.401-2.402) Utah: Utah Stat. §30-1-4.5 While Texas provides a standard form for doing so, affidavits from each spouse, possibly filed in public real property records where the parties reside, would have the same effect. The use of a standardized safe harbor state approved form for doing this is a Texas-specific innovation. Common law marriage derives from English law, although it has since been abolished in England. The practice of formally documenting events and relationships that arise by operation of law with a signed instrument is a long standing one in all sorts of legal contexts. The Texas standard form Declaration would be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it about the common law marriage of the parties, that would be hard to rebut. But, if someone had a legitimate reason to question whether they were actually married on the date stated (e.g. to overcome a claim of spousal confidential communications privilege) this could be overcome with evidence offered in an evidentiary hearing to the contrary (e.g. proof that the couple didn't meet until two years after the date recited).

Legal ramification of becomming incompetent with regards to financial accounts

A spouse becomes mentally incompetent as a result of an auto-accident. What happens to the individual brokerage and bank accounts of the incapacitated spouse? Would a power of attorney (POA) or durable POA come into/or go out of effect? How would the competent spouse gain control over these individual accounts? Are there any legal or financial tools to prepare for such events?

united-states If there is a durable POA in place naming the non-incapacitated spouse as agent, the non-incapacitated spouse could act on behalf of the incapacitated spouse with respect to accounts for which the non-incapacitated is not a signer already. If there is not a POA in place, the non-incapacitated spouse could apply to a court of probate jurisdiction to be appointed as the guardian (i.e. guardian of person) or conservator (i.e. guardian of property) of the incapacitated spouse. I am not aware of any U.S. jurisdiction in which a non-incapacitated spouse has the right to act on behalf of an incapacitated spouse without a court order or a durable POA. To prepare for this possibility, spouses can execute durable powers of attorney, which often also include a clause designating the agent as the person with priority to serve as the conservator of the principal spouse in the event of incapacity. A spouse could also be set up as co-signer without an ownership interest of a spouse's account. A durable power of attorney can be immediately effective and survive disability, or it can be a "springing power" which takes effect upon incapacity. The process for determining when the principal is incapacitated when a durable power of attorney with a springing power is involved depends upon the language of the power of attorney, the financial institution's policies, and the law (in the U.S. almost always state law) of the place where the power of attorney is to be used. Sometimes a statement from the power of attorney agent is sufficient to trigger a springing power of attorney. Sometimes a doctor's letter is necessary. Sometimes a financial institution officer is given discretion regarding how to show to their satisfaction that the power of attorney principal is incapacitated.

Can terms of a will be legally kept secret before filed in court?

Let's say a father has two sons and he creates a will. He leaves something to son A and something else to son B. He doesn't want either of the sons to know the amount the other gets. And let's assume neither of the sons are aware of the total amount in order to figure out the other's portion of the inheritance. We can introduce more than 2 sons to remove the assumption of the sons' unawareness of the total. Is it possible to create a will like that? I am in the United States. If it varies by state, could you share examples of states with different answers? CLARIFICATIONS: The father doesn't want his executor to disclose son A's inheritance to son B and vice versa. If the sons want to share this information between them, that's their choice. The will is a complete secret from his family until his death.

FIRST: A last will and testament does not have to be disclosed to anyone [1] prior to death. But at death, notice of the commencement of a probate proceeding which is necessary for the will to be given effect must generally be given to: (1) everyone who takes under the will, and (2) everyone who would take if either that particular version of the will were invalid and a prior will that it revokes is valid, and (3) everyone who would take if there were no valid will, and (4) creditors whose claims are accepted as valid, but are not paid due to the insolvency of the probate estate. Everyone entitled to notice of the probate of a will is entitled to see the last will and testament submitted to the court in its entirety. The case could be placed under seal to prevent people other than interested parties and their lawyers from seeing the will, but not sons of a decedent who are interested parties by definition even if they get nothing under the will, because they would take if there was no will. SECOND: This said, it is easy to make a secret transfer effective upon death via a variety of non-probate transfers such as a beneficiary designation on an account, or the provisions of a trust, that don't require a court proceedings to take effect the way that a will does (people who think that they can avoid probate by having a will are fundamentally mistaken, probate is a court proceeding necessary to give a will legal effect). Only some of these methods of making a secret gift work if the estate is subject to estate taxes which requires disclosures to be made on gift and estate tax returns of all transfers taking effect at death (something that can be circumvented by making a transfer during life that is not reportable during life because it is within some exception to gift taxation). NOTES: [1] Usually a will has to be shown to the two witnesses to a will, unless it is executed under the recently repealed Louisiana law allowing for a "mystic will" which has seven people witness the envelope but no one witness the will itself prior to death. Of course, holographic wills, substantially in the handwriting of the person writing them, don't have to be witnessed at all.

Can a need assessment for the purpose of the Care Act 2014 be done privately?

Generally they are required to be performed by a local authority. However, for NHS medical assessments, there is a statutory right to choose where the period of time that has passed since the referral has been made exceeds a certain length. Under the right-to-choose, the NHS must still finance the private assessment that would be undertaken under the right-to-choose. Regardless of whether the LA must compensate the cost of a privately procured need assessment, legally, should it recognise the outcome of a privately procured assessment undertaken for the purpose of establishing need for the care act 2014 if one is arranged?

Legally, a local authority is not required to recognize the outcome of a privately procured assessment undertaken for the purpose of establishing need for the Care Act 2014. The local authority has a duty to complete its own assessment under the Act and may not simply accept a privately procured assessment as valid. However, a privately procured assessment may provide useful information that can be taken into consideration by the local authority in carrying out its own assessment. Ultimately, it is up to the local authority to determine the weight and relevance of the information provided by privately procured assessments.

Do anti discrimination laws bind overseas service providers when the victims of their discrimination are in the jurisdiction of the law?

Bob lives in Birmingham or perhaps Madrid. He joins an online club operated by an overseas entity based in Peru, or perhaps Chicago. They incidentally find out that he is black and promptly cancel his membership in the group without notice, explaining that they don’t take kindly to his black likes. Legally speaking, if not practically, does Bob have recourse under the British or European anti discrimination laws as he would if the operator were European or British, or if the matter were one of data protection?

Based on the information provided, it is unlikely that Bob has recourse under British or European anti-discrimination laws in this scenario. Firstly, the overseas entity may not fall under the jurisdiction of the UK or EU anti-discrimination laws. The laws generally apply to entities operating within the UK or EU, and it is unclear from the information provided whether the overseas entity has any operations or presence within these regions. Moreover, even if the overseas entity was subject to UK or EU anti-discrimination laws, there may be limits on their extra-territorial application. For example, the UK Equality Act 2010 may only apply to acts of discrimination that have a "sufficiently close connection" with the UK. However, Bob may have some recourse under the overseas entity's internal policies or terms of service. If the entity's cancellation of Bob's membership was in violation of their own policies or terms, he may have a contractual claim against them. Additionally, depending on the circumstances, there may be data protection issues at play. If the overseas entity obtained and utilized Bob's personal information (including his race) unlawfully or in breach of data protection laws, he may have a claim against them.

Who gets to see the will when somebody dies

When somebody dies, who has the right to see the will? I am thinking the executor does and all the beneficiaries do. Does a contingent beneficiary have the right to see the will? Is there anybody else who has the right to see the will?

Normally a will lodged with the Surrogate's Court is a matter of public record. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to compel discovery as to the existence or whereabouts of any paper purporting to be a will of any decedent who died a resident of the county, which has not been offered for probate, and to require the paper to be lodged with the surrogate of the county for probate. N.J. Stat. § 3B:3-29. If a will has been registered in the New Jersey Will registry then a search of the registry in furtherance of the goal of locating a will is allowed for interested persons: Only interested persons and their representatives may conduct a search of the registry. As used in this act, "interested persons" means children, spouses, potential heirs, devisees, fiduciaries, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. N.J. Stat. § 3B:3-2.1 .

Who gets to see the will when somebody dies

When somebody dies, who has the right to see the will? I am thinking the executor does and all the beneficiaries do. Does a contingent beneficiary have the right to see the will? Is there anybody else who has the right to see the will?

This would depend on the country. In New Zealand, the executor is not legally obliged to allow beneficiaries to see the will. Once probate has been granted then it becomes public record and anyone can apply to the High Court to view it. From Citizens Advice Bureau

Tradesman billing unreasonable fees

What prevents a tradesman from billing a client an unreasonable fee after the work is done? For example, a plumber may quote provisionally £100 verbally (or not even give a cost estimate as is common here in the UK), do the work, then invoice £10,000 for a minor job that took maybe an hour. What consumer protections are in place for a case like this?

The law It’s a long-standing tenent of contract law that, where a price has not been agreed, a reasonable price is to be paid.

Is the use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate?

Is use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and/or legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate?

canada Guidance from the Government of Canada Yes. The Government of Canada's guide on legislative drafting has a section on gender-neutral language . It emphasizes that "gender-specific language should not be used in legislation." The first-listed alternative strategy (alongside others) is to "use the singular 'they' and its other grammatical forms... to refer to indefinite pronouns and singular nouns." It acknowledges that "[i]n the past, the masculine pronoun was commonly used in the English language to signify the non-specific 'he or she'" but that "[i]t is now generally well-accepted that gender-specific language should only be used for references to persons of one gender or the other." One example from the guide: Every taxpayer shall file their tax return no later than April 30 of the year following the year in which they earned the income on which they are paying taxes. Guidance from the British Columbia Law Institute In the guide, Gender Diversity in Legal Writing , the institute explains: Canadian lawyers no longer write law, or write about the law, as if it only applies to men of European descent who own real property. ... Language and the law continue to evolve, moving towards even more inclusive language in legal writing. ... The highest levels of our profession have recognized that gender inclusivity is a matter of justice and professionalism. The British Columbia courts require all counsel to identify themselves and their pronouns. ... We have adopted gender-inclusive ways of referring to people, in particular the use of “they” as a singular pronoun. The guide says: They/them is also used as a gender non-specific singular pronoun when a writer does not know a person’s pronouns. Just like the pronoun “you,” they/them can be used in singular or plural forms. One example it provides: Minister Williams said they misspoke when they said their budget was “balanced to the last penny.” French text It is slightly more complex to render French legal writing to be gender-inclusive, given that adjectives and third-person plural pronouns are gendered, but the Government of Canada's Translation Bureau shares several resources , including guidance from the Commission de la construction du Québec , and an article from the Canadian Bar Review .

Is the use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate?

Is use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and/or legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate?

In U.S. law this is more a matter of style than a formal requirement. I have seen the singular "they" in contracts, but some contract drafters prefer to use the plural entirely, or to use a "he or she" construction. The singular "he" to have the same meaning as the singular "they" used to be common place and is still often fond in statutes and contracts, but is gradually falling out of favor. Legislative use is up to the legislators involved, for the most part. Judges aren't confused by it when it is used in that fashion.

What law requires me to safeguard classified information?

Let's say I have a briefcase full of Top Secret papers, and I carelessly leave it on the table at Burger King and it falls into the wrong hands. 18 U.S. Code § 798 apparently only applies if I "knowingly and willfully" provide the information to an unauthorized person. My employer certainly expects me to safeguard the information I have been entrusted with, but does my negligence actually violate any law?

Assuming all the required elements are met, 18 U.S. Code § 793(f)(1) would presumably apply: Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information (f)Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information, relating to the national defense (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen , abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

What law requires me to safeguard classified information?

Let's say I have a briefcase full of Top Secret papers, and I carelessly leave it on the table at Burger King and it falls into the wrong hands. 18 U.S. Code § 798 apparently only applies if I "knowingly and willfully" provide the information to an unauthorized person. My employer certainly expects me to safeguard the information I have been entrusted with, but does my negligence actually violate any law?

My employer certainly expects me to safeguard the information I have been entrusted with, but does my negligence actually violate any law? Normally contract law, in which you promise not to disclose information (even if not negligent) in a non-disclosure agreement signed between you and the employer, and trade secret statutes. *See, e.g., Colorado Rev. Statutes § 7-74-101 , et seq.

Whats the point of a federal law that does not get enforced?

In the USA, the Constitution requires a Census every ten years. Anyone living here, legally or not, are required by law to respond to the Census, as well as be truthful. This has been the case from from the first Census taken in 1790, till that last one in 2020. The punishment has even been amended by Congress twice since its inception. However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. And of those, only two people have been convicted. Of those two, one had the conviction overturned. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? This might be more of a political question, but maybe there is a legal reason? Edit: I cant find exact numbers - and exact numbers might be impossible to get - but from some quick research, it sounds like not answering the census at all is fairly common. From one post on the Census Bureau's website, the answer rate is over 60%. And as far as I can tell, there is no numbers on people responding being complete or truthful.

However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.

Does the renaming of the German 'ebay Kleinanzeigen' to 'Kleinanzeigen' mean they loose any trademark to their name?

So ebay Kleinanzeigen is a company that owns a website for classified ads. People can post classified ads there and search the website to buy things from classified ads. I suppose ebay has the exact same business model in various other countries. This is the German branch. Now the German word 'Kleinanzeige' means exactly classified ad. Recently they renamed both their website and the company itself to just 'Kleinanzeigen'. To me this looks like a classic example of a trademark for common words as in this or this question and in their case this seems to be exactly a generic term. The name of the company is exactly what they sell. To me this means they shouldn't be able to get any trademark or copyright for that name. Anyone else offering Kleinanzeigen in Germany can just call them Kleinanzeigen because that is what they are. Is that what happened here or do they have some other way to protect their company name? It seems very strange to me to deliberately rename the company to lose any trademark associated with it.

There is already any number of other pages that are named kleinanzeigen, just with different top level domains (probably sprung into existence after the plan for the renaming became public). But if you are a Website operating in Germany that owns the kleinanzeigen.de domain, that probably does not worry you too much (you could probably fight others over the use of the word for a specific purpose such as a classifieds website, because sometimes specific uses might be protected; but that would be an uphill battle, since as pointed out the name is the literal description of the business model). What might worry you is that somebody is tricked into confusing kleinanzeigen.eu or kleinanzeigen.biz with your valuable property. The way to avoid that is to register a " Wort-Bild-Marke ", a combination of your name with one or more distinctive graphic elements. You will notice that the "kleinanzeigen" name on the website is rendered in a specific font and is preceded by what on closer inspection turns out to be a stylized letter "k". That is something that can be protected by law. Nobody else is allowed to be too close to that design, so that minimizes the danger that visitors confuse a competitor's page with the "original" kleinanzeigen page. Since the question alludes to eBay's business, kleinanzeigen is no longer a part of eBay - for some three years now they belong to Adevinta, a Norwegian conglomerate that runs classified portals in various countries. So keeping "ebay" in their name was not really an option (and all alternatives to "kleinanzeigen" were probably worse).

Is it common for software licenses to, as written, technically prohibit normal and expected use of the software?

In Is distributing software that makes modifications to video games legal? an example snippet of a video game license is given, which reads: You may not copy the Software (except as specifically permitted herein) and, except as expressly permitted by law, you may not modify, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble or create derivative works of the Software. Presumably "as specifically permitted herein" gives you the right to copy the software to your computer and into memory to run it. But no such exception seems to be given allowing you to "modify" or "translate" the software where technically necessary. I'm not aware of any common computing platform where loading an application does not usually involve "modifying" it (to link it together in memory with required system dynamic libraries). And similarly, "translating" running software (from instruction set architecture instructions to some internal representation of micro-operations inside the CPU) is technically necessary for execution on almost any real computer. And setting a global variable in an anonymously-mapped page in memory will create a derivative work; the software almost certainly creates ephemeral derivative works of itself in normal operation. Is it common for software license agreements to be so poorly drafted that, if taken literally, they fail to usefully license the software as would be needed for execution on real machines? Do courts tend to expand them to grant the necessary permissions after all, to fulfill the intent of the agreement? Or do they tend to read them restrictively, giving developers a free pass to extract damages from any ordinary users they don't like? Is there a statute about this that "expressly permits" people to actually use software they license?

There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.

Is the Howey test pertaining to the source of profits or the receiving of profits?

The Howey test states: "investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others" Is this "profits to be derived from the efforts of others" pertaining to the source of the money (imagine the money coming from people not including yourself thus from the efforts of others) or the receiving of profits (so it would mean the money source could be other people. As long as you yourself are NOT an active participant and are NOT showing some level of work to acquire the profits in some kind of work or competition of skill or luck regardless of the source of the money you're participating to acquire.) Thank you.

The Howey test is a test of what constitutes an "investment contract", which is a residual form of security subject to the federal Securities Act of 1933 and the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934. There are also many per se securities which automatically qualify without analysis under that test. An arrangement that merely constitutes active participation in self-employment is not a security, even if it flows from activities of others (like customers paying money) and even if you must invest some money (e.g. a buy-in price to become a partner in a law firm). For example, if you take over a one man sole proprietorship landscaping business from its previous owner, the business purchased is not a security, because the business you are purchasing does not have you profiting from work done by other people, you seeking to make money from your own work. But, if offered to pay the owner of the sole proprietorship landscaping business $100,000 in exchange for 50% of his future profits, without having to work in the business yourself, that would be an investment contract that constitutes a security, for purposes of federal securities laws, under Howey .

Can a judge force/require laywers to sign declarations/pledges?

I read this story where a US judge is forcing lawyers in his court to sign a pledge saying they did not use ChatGPT to generate filings without being checked by a human. While that's a very reasonable thing, I am wondering where that authority comes from, or what the limits are. Can a US judge require lawyers in their court to sign other types of pledges? What if they refuse? What if they don't agree with it or feel it violates a freedom? Is this similar to a judge's authority to charge people with contempt which also has no recourse?

canada In Canada, this would fall within a court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes. For example (in another context): Based on a reading of the authorities, I am able to conclude that the Courts have the inherent jurisdiction to require parties and their solicitors to enter into undertakings regarding the use of documents produced for discovery. ( Anderson v. Anderson et al. , 1979 CanLII 1673 (ON SC) ) The inherent jurisdiction of a court to control its own processes extends to controlling the conduct of lawyers, being officers of the court (see e.g. R. v. Faulkner , 2013 ONSC 1824, paragraphs 8-9 ). If the lawyer or their client believes a particular exercise of this inherent jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , they could challenge it on those grounds. The court's order as such is not subject to the Charter , but the common law governing its issuance is subject to Charter scrutiny. See generally Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. , [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.

Can a judge force/require laywers to sign declarations/pledges?

I read this story where a US judge is forcing lawyers in his court to sign a pledge saying they did not use ChatGPT to generate filings without being checked by a human. While that's a very reasonable thing, I am wondering where that authority comes from, or what the limits are. Can a US judge require lawyers in their court to sign other types of pledges? What if they refuse? What if they don't agree with it or feel it violates a freedom? Is this similar to a judge's authority to charge people with contempt which also has no recourse?

united-states An attorney is required to tell the truth in court even if not under oath, and can be disbarred for failing to do so. For most practical purposes, an attorney is always under oath anyway. If there are procedural matters in a particular case where there are factual issues, attorneys can be required to provide facts that substantiate a lack of wrong doing on pain of having wrongdoing assumed. This is part of the general authority of a judge (sometimes called the judge's "inherent authority") to supervise proceedings in that judge's courtroom. But, the judge does not have the authority require statements unrelated to cases pending before him. A judge can't, for example, require an attorney to pledge support for a political candidate or a sports team.

If I create a fictional brand name in a movie script and then copyright the script can the fictional brand name be considered my trademark?

Let's say I write a movie script. The movie gets made and it does well. In the script a fictional brand exists with a specific, un-trademarked name. Now let's say someone created a real brand that had the same name as my fictional brand and offered the same product; would I have grounds to sue?

If I create a fictional brand name in a movie script and then copyright the script can the fictional brand name be considered my trademark? No. The fictional brand name (which I often call a "fakemark" in this context) cannot become a trademark from the movie or its script alone. To register a trademark federally under the Lanham Act you need to describe a novel mark and you have to show that it has been used in interstate and/or international commerce. (You can file an intent to use application to hold that trademark for a bit, but it isn't final until the proof of use in commerce application is filed.) There are state common law trademarks, and evidence from state filings can help to prove a state common law trademark filing, but this just postpones the timing of showing proof of use in commerce sufficient to establish trademark protections prior to the time of infringement. In a state common law trademark you present proof in the court case alleging infringement and not to a government agency at the time you start claiming the trademark exists. Now, if you created a spin-off real life business based upon a fake business in a movie, like Bubba Gump's Shrimp Company, at that point, you could get trademark protection for it. But, merely having a brand in a movie that is never used in actual commerce does not established a trademark.

Why and when would an attorney be handcuffed to their client?

While reading about the trial of Hans Reiser I came across this peculiar sentence: On Monday, July 7, 2008, Reiser led police to Nina's shallow grave in the Oakland Hills. Reiser's attorney, William Du Bois, who was handcuffed to Reiser and accompanied by a heavy police guard to the site, said that the remains were found buried on the side of a hill […] (Originally reported by SFGate ) I find this very strange for multiple reasons: The attorney is not legally responsible for the defendant's safety or security. The attorney is free to leave at any time. The attorney is not required to be armed and can not be expected to defend himself from a violent defendant …nor can he be expected to physically restrain the defendant if necessary. If the heavy police guard has to intervene, having an innocent civilian chained to the target must make their job much more difficult in case the defendant has to be subdued by force. Why and when would this be standard practice, and who would order that? Is it something that the Judge would order, or would the attorney himself have to suggest it? † † Unfortunately we can not ask him personally since, while researching the question, I found that he recently passed away .

My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role.

Why and when would an attorney be handcuffed to their client?

While reading about the trial of Hans Reiser I came across this peculiar sentence: On Monday, July 7, 2008, Reiser led police to Nina's shallow grave in the Oakland Hills. Reiser's attorney, William Du Bois, who was handcuffed to Reiser and accompanied by a heavy police guard to the site, said that the remains were found buried on the side of a hill […] (Originally reported by SFGate ) I find this very strange for multiple reasons: The attorney is not legally responsible for the defendant's safety or security. The attorney is free to leave at any time. The attorney is not required to be armed and can not be expected to defend himself from a violent defendant …nor can he be expected to physically restrain the defendant if necessary. If the heavy police guard has to intervene, having an innocent civilian chained to the target must make their job much more difficult in case the defendant has to be subdued by force. Why and when would this be standard practice, and who would order that? Is it something that the Judge would order, or would the attorney himself have to suggest it? † † Unfortunately we can not ask him personally since, while researching the question, I found that he recently passed away .

Preliminary answer: According to the East Bay Times ... Despite the presence of officers, Du Bois said he was handcuffed to his client. “I guess they were afraid he would run,” he said.

Is there liablility if Alice startles Bob and Bob damages something?

The other day I saw a random clip on YouTube, where Alice sneaks up to Bob, who is vacuuming, and scares Bob. Bob gets startled and swings the vacuum into (Bob's own) expensive television, breaking the TV in the process. It got me thinking if Alice could be liable for damages here and what the respective law would be. Supplemental: Would anything change, if the TV was actually owned by Alice?

I will assume that whatever Alice did to startle Bob was a breach of a duty that she owed to Bob, in order to get to what I see as the more interesting aspect of the question: whether Bob's intervening act removes Alice's liability for the breaking of the television. There are certainly scenarios where Alice might have startled Bob without even breaching a duty, but in that case the analysis would end there. A startle reaction will almost never sever the chain of legal causation In negligence, Alice is held liable for harm that is reasonably foreseeable as a result of Alice's breach of a duty. One of the elements of a successful negligence claim is causation : Alice is not liable for harm that is too remote from her breach. On its own, proof by an injured plaintiff that a defendant was negligent does not make that defendant liable for the loss. The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant’s negligence (breach of the standard of care) caused the injury. That link is causation. 1 ( Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32, paragraph 6 ) Bob's startle response would almost certainly be considered a foreseeable reaction, and thus, not sufficient to separate Alice from the breaking of the television. An instinctive human reaction , or any non-negligent human action in the chain of causation will almost never break the chain of causation, because such reactions will be held foreseeable; and even if they are not, the precise chain of events leading to an accident need not be foreseeable. (Ken Cooper‑Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada (Carswell, 1996)) See also The Restatement of Torts (Second), § 447, which says that an intervening act does not remove the defendant's liability if: "(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent." "[I]t is the general nature of the intervening acts and the accompanying risk of harm that needs to be reasonably foreseeable. Legal causation does not require that the accused must objectively foresee the precise future consequences of their conduct." ( R. v. Maybin , 2012 SCC 24 ). Foreseeability does not require that the intervening action be probable ; it only requires that it would not be brushed aside as "far-fetched." The degree of probability that would satisfy the reasonable foreseeability requirement was described in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) as a "real risk", i.e. "one which would occur to the mind of a reasonable man in the position of the defendan[t] ... and which he would not brush aside as far-fetched " ( Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd. , 2008 SCC 27, paragraph 13 ). Examples of intervening acts held to be reasonably foreseeable: Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 146. A carriage owner had left a two-horse carriage unattended on a busy street. The judge accepted evidence from an independent observer that two boys had come along and one of them threw a stone at the horses and the horses bolted along the street (these boys were not before the court as co-defendants; nothing more is said of them). A constable managed to stop the horses, but was injured in the process. The carriage owner was liable in negligence: a reasonable person should have foreseen that the horses might get loose and someone be injured while trying to stop them. The court said, " it is not necessary to show that this particular accident and this particular damage were probable ; it is sufficient if the accident is of a class that might well be anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable results of the wrongful act." Foreseeability here does not have its colloquial meaning Greendrake's answer says that "whereas Bob's shock is foreseeable, I pretty much doubt that him breaking the TV is." In my view, this takes too colloquial a view of foreseeability. As Hart and Honoré say in Causation in the Law , 2nd Ed. (1985): ... in one sense everything is foreseeable, in another nothing. The consequences of negligence are almost invariably surprises. All depends on the detail with which the harm is described. ... there will always be some details of the recoverable harm which are not foreseeable. ... the fact that harm described by reference to certain details is not foreseeable does not render the harm, more broadly described , unforeseeable. ... If we have learned from experience to expect a 'rainstorm' on seeing dark clouds, then the rainstorm was foreseeable even if, when it occurs, it has other characteristics (e.g. lasted two hours, covered an area of 40 sq. miles) which we could not foresee but which might appear, ex post facto , in a more specific description of it. Of course, foreseeability is a question of fact, and I acknowledge that a finder of fact might very well conclude that swinging a vacuum is not within a class of actions that might be anticipated by a reasonable person. While I disagree with Greendrake's analysis and conclusion, the contrast with my answer helps highlight precisely where the issue would be if this were to be litigated. 1. Note the terminology. The breach of the standard of care is the negligence . But liability only follows when the negligence causes harm. This is contrary to the framing in Dale M's answer , which says, "Alice was negligent if her actions caused damage to Bob’s TV," and that "[i]f we are talking about Alice’s TV then there is no negligence because Bob has suffered no damage." That language conflates negligence (the breach) with liability (breach plus causation).

Is there liablility if Alice startles Bob and Bob damages something?

The other day I saw a random clip on YouTube, where Alice sneaks up to Bob, who is vacuuming, and scares Bob. Bob gets startled and swings the vacuum into (Bob's own) expensive television, breaking the TV in the process. It got me thinking if Alice could be liable for damages here and what the respective law would be. Supplemental: Would anything change, if the TV was actually owned by Alice?

I actually remember seeing a similar court case on TV. I'm pretty sure it was Judge Judy, as she went off on the friend, berating about being childish, irresponsible, and was lucky his friend didn't have worse injuries. I don't remember the case exactly, but it goes something like this: A mechanic was working in his home's garage. The mechanic was working on fixing something and very focused. His friend had arrived unannounced and saw this and decided to jump scare him. His friend snuck up behind the mechanic and and yelled. The friend confirmed this is what happened in his testimony. The scare caused the mechanic to flinch and cut his hand deeply on a sharp piece of metal he was working on. This wound required him to be taken to the emergency room, get stitches, and lose time working at his full time job, due to the injury. The mechanic sued his friend for damages. The judge said the visitor is liable, as his intent was to provoke the reaction which caused the injury. Had it been purely accidental, there would have been no intent and therefore, no liability.

Is there liablility if Alice startles Bob and Bob damages something?

The other day I saw a random clip on YouTube, where Alice sneaks up to Bob, who is vacuuming, and scares Bob. Bob gets startled and swings the vacuum into (Bob's own) expensive television, breaking the TV in the process. It got me thinking if Alice could be liable for damages here and what the respective law would be. Supplemental: Would anything change, if the TV was actually owned by Alice?

Possibly The relevant law is negligence . Most jurisdictions say that there are four elements to a negligence action: duty: the defendant has a duty to others, including the plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care, breach: the defendant breaches that duty through an act or culpable omission, damages: as a result of that act or omission, the plaintiff suffers an injury, and causation: the injury to the plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act or omission. Arguably, Alice was negligent if her actions caused damage to Bob’s TV. If we are talking about Alice’s TV then there is no negligence because Bob has suffered no damage.

Is not disclosing your address a reason alone to be remanded into prison?

What do you do if your duty solicitor recommended you to self represent but the judge / court basically ignores the testimony and continue to abuse, exploit and invert language and its meaning/origin backed up by "laws" to put pressure onto someone who is innocent. Why are so many laws designed to intentionally create "criminals"? Those who have the courage to speak out and expose abuse, corruption and crime seem to be more and more considered and labeled a danger or even a terrorist to public safety and health.

No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.

Use an image under GNU/GPL in a commercial application

We are currently developing a commercial application. We found some images(icons) which are under GNU/GPL license. I'm not an expert in this kind of things, but I was wondering if it is legal to use the image inside our commercial application(which is definitely not under GNU/GPL license). For what I read here , some obligation are induced when we modify the file. But in our case, we use it in a bigger application. So: Is it legal to use it? Is there something we should absolutely do?(Like indication in the license of our application that some parts are under GPL/GNU? Or indicate where this icon is coming from?)

Is it legal to use it? Well, of course it is. Is there something we should absolutely do?(Like indication in the license of our application that some parts are under GPL/GNU? Or indicate where this icon is coming from?) I kind of find it strange that the images aren't licensed under a more media friendly license, such as Creative Commons licenses, which are kind of intended for that stuff. The GPL is more intended for source code. By using the image, you'd have to force your entire application under the GPL. This is what the GPL's copyleft clause is known for. I'm not sure you would like to do that, as your entire application would have to be licensed under the GPL. Honestly, I would try to avoid the GPL anywhere you can. If you can find a similar icon under Creative Commons licenses, you'd be in a much better position.

Use an image under GNU/GPL in a commercial application

We are currently developing a commercial application. We found some images(icons) which are under GNU/GPL license. I'm not an expert in this kind of things, but I was wondering if it is legal to use the image inside our commercial application(which is definitely not under GNU/GPL license). For what I read here , some obligation are induced when we modify the file. But in our case, we use it in a bigger application. So: Is it legal to use it? Is there something we should absolutely do?(Like indication in the license of our application that some parts are under GPL/GNU? Or indicate where this icon is coming from?)

You must follow the terms of the GPL whenever you distribute the file, whether you modify it or not. The file is copyright and you infringe the copyright holder's rights if you distribute it other than under the terms of the GPL. I'm not going to attempt to summarize the terms of the GPL here, as I don't want to get it wrong and summaries are widely available elsewhere.

Use an image under GNU/GPL in a commercial application

We are currently developing a commercial application. We found some images(icons) which are under GNU/GPL license. I'm not an expert in this kind of things, but I was wondering if it is legal to use the image inside our commercial application(which is definitely not under GNU/GPL license). For what I read here , some obligation are induced when we modify the file. But in our case, we use it in a bigger application. So: Is it legal to use it? Is there something we should absolutely do?(Like indication in the license of our application that some parts are under GPL/GNU? Or indicate where this icon is coming from?)

Since nobody seems to have even touched on this detail but this is popping up in search results... I'm not a lawyer, but my understanding, based on what I've read in free game development resource communities, is that, as long as you don't combine the image and non-GPLed stuff in the same file, it counts as aggregating the image and code, not making one a derivative work of the other. (The most common context I've seen this in was people wondering whether it was legal to use GPLed code and CC-BY-SA art assets in the same project.) In other words, as long as your GPLed image is a separate file from your non-GPLed stuff, it's legal for the same reason that it's legal to distribute a magazine CD or DVD containing both GPLed programs and programs under GPL-incompatible EULAs, even if you have a pretty Autorun launcher menu that can start either one. Aside from that, you'll want to include proper attribution in your About dialog, manual, or wherever your standard place for that is. (A good rule of thumb is to include the work's name, creator's name, a link to wherever the version you are using was originally posted, and a mention of the license under which you're using it. (ie. "GNU GPL 2.0-only", "GNU GPL 2.0-or-later", "GNU GPL 3.0-only", "GNU GPL 3.0-or-later", etc.))

Use an image under GNU/GPL in a commercial application

We are currently developing a commercial application. We found some images(icons) which are under GNU/GPL license. I'm not an expert in this kind of things, but I was wondering if it is legal to use the image inside our commercial application(which is definitely not under GNU/GPL license). For what I read here , some obligation are induced when we modify the file. But in our case, we use it in a bigger application. So: Is it legal to use it? Is there something we should absolutely do?(Like indication in the license of our application that some parts are under GPL/GNU? Or indicate where this icon is coming from?)

Without any serious precautions, including these files means that you have to publish your complete application under the GPL license. With some serious precautions, including these files means that you can be taken to court for copyright infringement, and you may win or you may lose, but it will cost you. And if this becomes public, it will damage your reputation. The very simple method is to either contact the copyright holder and offer them some money for a license that allows you to include these images, if you want these images and no others, or to go to a site that specialises in providing icons or images for that kind of purposes. Either way is likely cheaper than talking to a lawyer about this for an hour.

Which of these two possible readings of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is the correct one?

The 27th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States stipulates that: No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. This was meant to restrict members of Congress from voting themselves free money, by forcing them to win reelection before they could take advantage of raises in pay, and is unambiguous in cases where a law simply changes, up front, the pay of members of Congress; once the law to change their pay has been passed, they have to wait until after the next general election before the change in pay can take effect. However, the text of the amendment does not specify whether the requirement for "an election of Representatives [to] have intervened" requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the passage of the law that alters Congressional pay , or whether it instead requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the event that triggers the law's alteration of Congressional pay . For laws that simply straight-up change the pay of members of Congress, there is no ambiguity, as the passage of the law is the event that causes it to alter Congressional pay, making the two readings equivalent. However, one could easily imagine a law where these two readings aren't equivalent. For example, a law might be passed saying that, if Congress can't agree on a budget in time to prevent a government shutdown, they forfeit their pay for the duration of the shutdown ; in such a case... The first reading would merely prevent the law from coming into effect until after the first election of Representatives following its passage . After this point, the law could, without violating amendment #27, immediately forfeit Congressional pay right from the start of a government shutdown, without needing to wait for further elections. In contrast... The second reading would, for each shutdown, prevent Congressional pay from being forfeited until after the first election of Representatives following the start of the shutdown (as, for this hypothetical law, the triggering event for the loss of Congressmembers' pay - the event that actually causes their pay to be cut off - is the occurrence of a government shutdown), which would, as government shutdowns very rarely drag on all the way until the next election, render such a law effectively toothless. Which of these readings of the 27th Amendment is the correct one? Has this even been decided?

The amendment restricts when a change in law takes effect. The amendment does not restrict all laws, just those "varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives". A law could be passed this session automatically increasing (or decreasing) congressional pay by 5% per annum, and could take effect after the 2022 elections have taken place in November. Like all constitutional amendments, we do not get an authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the words until someone sues someone else and SCOTUS says what it means. Shaffer v. Clinton , 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 is a case almost on point, precisely over whether COLAs violate the 27th Amendment. The Executive branch (defendants) sought dismissal and certain Congressmen and citizens (plaintiffs) sought summary judgment, "asserting there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining in dispute and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law". The case was dismissed with prejudice without much mention of the merits the annual COLAs provided by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 are not independent laws under the Twenty-seventh Amendment and that Adjustments to congressional salaries under the Ethics Reform Act are not discretionary acts of Congress. The adjustments are calculations performed by nonlegislative administrative staff, following a specific formula provided by Congress in the Act This provides a good basis for thinking that a future court would reach the same "failure to state a claim" dead end, but in lieu of something above the level of U.S. District Court, Colorado would be necessary to make the conclusion "a matter of settled law". What you propose does not require making more than one law, and then a bunch of administrative calculations that does not involve Congress.

Which of these two possible readings of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is the correct one?

The 27th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States stipulates that: No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. This was meant to restrict members of Congress from voting themselves free money, by forcing them to win reelection before they could take advantage of raises in pay, and is unambiguous in cases where a law simply changes, up front, the pay of members of Congress; once the law to change their pay has been passed, they have to wait until after the next general election before the change in pay can take effect. However, the text of the amendment does not specify whether the requirement for "an election of Representatives [to] have intervened" requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the passage of the law that alters Congressional pay , or whether it instead requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the event that triggers the law's alteration of Congressional pay . For laws that simply straight-up change the pay of members of Congress, there is no ambiguity, as the passage of the law is the event that causes it to alter Congressional pay, making the two readings equivalent. However, one could easily imagine a law where these two readings aren't equivalent. For example, a law might be passed saying that, if Congress can't agree on a budget in time to prevent a government shutdown, they forfeit their pay for the duration of the shutdown ; in such a case... The first reading would merely prevent the law from coming into effect until after the first election of Representatives following its passage . After this point, the law could, without violating amendment #27, immediately forfeit Congressional pay right from the start of a government shutdown, without needing to wait for further elections. In contrast... The second reading would, for each shutdown, prevent Congressional pay from being forfeited until after the first election of Representatives following the start of the shutdown (as, for this hypothetical law, the triggering event for the loss of Congressmembers' pay - the event that actually causes their pay to be cut off - is the occurrence of a government shutdown), which would, as government shutdowns very rarely drag on all the way until the next election, render such a law effectively toothless. Which of these readings of the 27th Amendment is the correct one? Has this even been decided?

It says law, not an event. Make it simple: they pass a law that says “whenever the speaker of the house says Abracadabra during a session, pay shall be increased by 5%”. That law would not take effect until the next Congress, and would allow them to bypass the constitutional requirement. It would also hopefully result in everyone that voted for it being removed from office, and the next congress revoking the law. Which is the intent of delaying the laws effective date.

Australian resident libels UK resident

Can a UK Resident sue an Australian Resident for Libel or Defamation, as in Australia, If the sender of emails had lived in the UK?

Sure If the Australian defames the UK citizen to a third party the UK citizen can take legal action wherever the defamation took place. However, be aware that defamation requires making untrue statements that damage the reputation to a third party. Calling someone a @#$& to their face is not defamation.

Why "client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle"? Rather than AND "the law clearly supported the firm's client"?

Why did Managing Partner tip Associate to "tell opposing counsel [MERELY] that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle" ? What's wrong with Associate's first reply ( "he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle" ) ? Why didn't Managing Partner tip Associate to proffer BOTH reasons, and improve the Associate's reply by name-dropping the Partner? To wit, why not " tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle " PLUS that BOTH Partner and Associate " had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle " ? Learning to work with opposing counsel takes practice. You need to be assertive, but not obnoxious, and respectful, but not fawning. It is also critical to think strategically: As an associate headed out to a meeting with opposing counsel with the goal of reaching a settlement, the managing partner asked, "So what are you going to tell opposing counsel?" The associate replied that he was going to tell opposing counsel that he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle. [Emphasis added] "No," the managing partner boomed, "You are going to tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle." [Gray highlight added] The case settled promptly thereafter—exactly the result the client wanted. Grover E. Cleveland, Swimming Lessons for Baby Sharks : The Essential Guide to Thriving as a New Lawyer (2016 2 edn), page 139.

Because when Lawyer A claims to have exhaustively researched the law and concluded that his client is right, Lawyer B will not credit that statement, even for a second.

Why "client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle"? Rather than AND "the law clearly supported the firm's client"?

Why did Managing Partner tip Associate to "tell opposing counsel [MERELY] that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle" ? What's wrong with Associate's first reply ( "he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle" ) ? Why didn't Managing Partner tip Associate to proffer BOTH reasons, and improve the Associate's reply by name-dropping the Partner? To wit, why not " tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle " PLUS that BOTH Partner and Associate " had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle " ? Learning to work with opposing counsel takes practice. You need to be assertive, but not obnoxious, and respectful, but not fawning. It is also critical to think strategically: As an associate headed out to a meeting with opposing counsel with the goal of reaching a settlement, the managing partner asked, "So what are you going to tell opposing counsel?" The associate replied that he was going to tell opposing counsel that he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle. [Emphasis added] "No," the managing partner boomed, "You are going to tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle." [Gray highlight added] The case settled promptly thereafter—exactly the result the client wanted. Grover E. Cleveland, Swimming Lessons for Baby Sharks : The Essential Guide to Thriving as a New Lawyer (2016 2 edn), page 139.

Bargaining bluff Telling them that you have "exhaustively researched the law" in the endeavor to make them settle will only invite them to question & debate your research and thus grant them some bargaining power . Instead of doing that, an experienced lawyer (A) gets what they want (settlement on their terms) by being pushy and pretending they're not going to settle and are heading to the court. The opposing counsel (B), perhaps having researched the law themselves, comes to the conclusion that it is better to offer a settlement. But now lawyer A has the bargaining power and gets what they want.

Why "client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle"? Rather than AND "the law clearly supported the firm's client"?

Why did Managing Partner tip Associate to "tell opposing counsel [MERELY] that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle" ? What's wrong with Associate's first reply ( "he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle" ) ? Why didn't Managing Partner tip Associate to proffer BOTH reasons, and improve the Associate's reply by name-dropping the Partner? To wit, why not " tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle " PLUS that BOTH Partner and Associate " had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle " ? Learning to work with opposing counsel takes practice. You need to be assertive, but not obnoxious, and respectful, but not fawning. It is also critical to think strategically: As an associate headed out to a meeting with opposing counsel with the goal of reaching a settlement, the managing partner asked, "So what are you going to tell opposing counsel?" The associate replied that he was going to tell opposing counsel that he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle. [Emphasis added] "No," the managing partner boomed, "You are going to tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle." [Gray highlight added] The case settled promptly thereafter—exactly the result the client wanted. Grover E. Cleveland, Swimming Lessons for Baby Sharks : The Essential Guide to Thriving as a New Lawyer (2016 2 edn), page 139.

Because this is a negotiation, not a legal argument What you say to your opponent before you get to court is not (necessarily) a statement of your legal rights. It’s a discussion on how to end the dispute as quickly and as painlessly as possible. This can include a statement (right or wrong) that the principle is more important than the money. Don’t say this unless you’re very rich and don’t mind spending a lot of money just for the satisfaction of breaking your opponent. For example : Packer’s legendary willingness to gamble led to some of the most incredible casino stories ever heard, and include an epic put down of a multi-millionaire Texan oil baron. Bored by the Texas man’s boorish behaviour at the blackjack tables, Packer called the braggart out over his claimed $100million worth. “I’ll flip you for it,” was Packer’s brutal offer, the Texan suddenly lost for words at the idea of his fortune resting on the toss of a coin. For Packer, a many-times self-made millionaire, it was just another day at his ‘other’ office. It’s not what you say to the judge If the case gets to court, then you have to make cognisant legal arguments. But if you do get to court, you’re effectively saying “I’ll flip you for it.”

Copyright for Speeding Photo

If I get a ticket for speeding in Germany with a photo taken by an automatic camera, is there any copyright attached to that photo, or can I use it without asking the state for permission?

A flash photo (Blitzfoto/Beweisfoto) is a technical aid (Technische Hilfsmittel) for the speed limit enforcement (Geschwindigkeitsüberwachung). They are created for the sole purpose to be used as evidence for a fine notice (Bußgeldbescheid) and must originate from a responsible authority (i.e. not privat persons or companies) that is determined by state laws. It is an integral portion of the file (Akte) of the notice. The file belongs to the responsible authority (generally called Bußgeldstelle ). Since it is a combination of technical data togeather with a photo, the copyright rules for a photo should not be assumed. flash photo of a culprit flying 15 km/h over the 30 km/h speed limit The responsible authority will not have any copyright, due to §5 UrhG , but it still belongs to them. Sources : Act on Copyright and Related Rights (Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG) §5 - Official works §10 - Presumption of authorship or ownership

Copyright for Speeding Photo

If I get a ticket for speeding in Germany with a photo taken by an automatic camera, is there any copyright attached to that photo, or can I use it without asking the state for permission?

It’s possible there is no copyright I’m not familiar with the specifics of German copyright law, but, in general, a photograph must have an author to be protected by copyright. As far as I know, it has not been litigated but it’s possible that a photo taken by an automated camera has no author and, therefore, no copyright. A counter argument is that the technician who set up the camera, choosing its field of view and the parameters by which it is triggered is sufficient to make them the author. Assuming that is the case, then the technician owns the copyright and the person who engaged the technician has full economic rights. Unlike English speaking countries, copyright in Germany does not recognise the “work for hire” doctrine and does not allow transfer of copyright except by inheritance. So, you would need the technician’s permission to use it and the states permission to profit from it. Subject to the normal exceptions.

How does GPL affect a Makefile-only modification?

As a continuation of this question , does a Makefile modification when building GPL source mean my own program becomes GPL also ? For example, if some third-party GPL'd source contains exit(), and I add to the Makefile -Derror_handling=exit and link an error_handling() function that performs error handling and returns without exiting, does that count as a GPL modification ? I could also change link order and supply my own exit() function to achieve the same result, would that count as a GPL modification ?

Your program doesn’t “become GPL” at all. That’s not how GPL works. The GPL license gives you two permissions without any obligation: You are allowed to use the software, and you are allowed to modify the software and use the modified software. If the software is a combination of GPL licensed and your own software, then your own software is not GPL licensed. The GPL license only comes into play when you distribute it (hand a copy to someone else), with or without your software added. You then have the choice: Either you ship the complete software under the GPL license and everything is legally fine, or you ship it without the GPL license which makes it copyright infringement. It’s your choice. Changing the make file does nothing to the license, you have to do that yourself. Of course when I say “choice” is like leaving a store with goods, you have the choice to pay or become a thief. It doesn’t mean it’s legal, it isn’t.

What is the meaning of the phrase "be and the same?"

I applied for and received a court order to change my name and it had an odd phrase that I'm struggling to understand: ...it is hereby ordered that the name of [previous legal name] be and the same is changed to [new legal name]; I've searched around for definitions of this phrase but only found a few other examples of usage, some of which have an extra comma to produce " be, and the same is hereby [granted/ordered/approved/etc]," suggesting one might parse the sentence as two overlapping clauses "the name of [X] be [Y]" and "the name of [X] is changed to [Y]." But in that case I'm still not sure why those two clauses have distinct enough effects to need to both be present.

It's not a single phrase. It's two different parts of a compound predicate in the passive voice. The past participle is the same in both elements, so it is elided from one of them. A more transparent but repetitive way of writing this is ...it is hereby ordered that the name of [previous legal name] be changed to [new legal name], and the same is hereby so changed. Or even ...it is hereby ordered that the name of [previous legal name] be changed to [new legal name], and [previous legal name] is hereby changed to [new legal name]. The purpose of this seemingly duplicate language is that saying "it is ordered that X be Y" in the subjunctive mood could be interpreted as saying that something should happen but not actually causing it to happen. But saying "it is ordered that X is Y" was grammatically incorrect in the 17th century or so.

How to access SCOTUS opinion announcements from the bench

I guess my query is in the title. I read that the Supreme Court of the United States would resume annunciation of its opinions , but I have not, for the life of me, been able to find announcements from previous terms. I believe they're on the website of the National Archives, but I still can't locate them. Could anyone here help me?

Oyez.org hosts these when they become available. E.g.: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402 However, the Court does not make these available until long after the opinion announcement (generally, at the beginning of the following term).

Can you be arrested for not paying a vendor like a taxi driver or gas station?

I have read conflicting information about police in the United States arresting people for not paying a bill from a retail vendor, like a taxi driver, auto mechanic or restaurant. On one hand my understanding is that in all states if you owe money to a vendor, then they have to sue you to collect it. It would seem unlikely to me that a vendor's complaint that you did not pay them would constitute the basis for a criminal arrest. For what? On the other hand I keep reading what are essentially rumors on the internet that the police can and will arrest you if a store keeper or other vendor complains that you have not paid them AFTER THE FACT. For example, I read one case where a guy left an auto mechanic's shop after the mechanic tried to add an unapproved "diagnostic" charge to a bill and later he got a phone call from the police who threatened to arrest him if he did not go back to the shop and pay the mechanic the disputed charge. Allegedly the cop told him, "You have to pay him or I will arrest you. You can sue him later if you want to." I have read similar things where it is claimed if you leave a cab and do not pay, the driver can chase after you and if he can somehow find you, then he can have you arrested. So, what is the reality here? Does this even happen and what are the laws involved here? I mean I guess if I could get somebody arrested by just saying to the police that they owed me money, there are a lot of people I could get arrested. UPDATE: I think Frederick's comment is very relevant in that the complex question seems to be whether there is "intent" to defraud, in other words, did the customer set out to obtain the services with no intention of paying in the beginning, or did they later refuse or fail to pay for some reason that had no relation to their original intent. So, there seems to be a psychological aspect to the problem.

Theft of service In Texas : [t]heft of service charges can also arise if you agree to make payment in exchange for a service, and then refuse to pay for the service once it’s rendered. Texas Penal Code Section 31.04 : A person commits theft of service if, with intent to avoid payment for service that the actor knows is provided only for compensation... the actor intentionally or knowingly secures the performance of the service by agreeing to provide compensation and, after the service is rendered, fails to make full payment after receiving notice demanding payment. For purposes of this section, intent to avoid payment is presumed if any of the following occurs...the actor absconded without paying for the service or expressly refused to pay for the service in circumstances where payment is ordinarily made immediately upon rendering of the service, as in hotels, campgrounds, recreational vehicle parks, restaurants, and comparable establishments;... Probable cause Whether you "could get somebody arrested by just saying to the police that they owed me money", read the various Q&As on this site about the probable cause standard for arrest .

Can you be arrested for not paying a vendor like a taxi driver or gas station?

I have read conflicting information about police in the United States arresting people for not paying a bill from a retail vendor, like a taxi driver, auto mechanic or restaurant. On one hand my understanding is that in all states if you owe money to a vendor, then they have to sue you to collect it. It would seem unlikely to me that a vendor's complaint that you did not pay them would constitute the basis for a criminal arrest. For what? On the other hand I keep reading what are essentially rumors on the internet that the police can and will arrest you if a store keeper or other vendor complains that you have not paid them AFTER THE FACT. For example, I read one case where a guy left an auto mechanic's shop after the mechanic tried to add an unapproved "diagnostic" charge to a bill and later he got a phone call from the police who threatened to arrest him if he did not go back to the shop and pay the mechanic the disputed charge. Allegedly the cop told him, "You have to pay him or I will arrest you. You can sue him later if you want to." I have read similar things where it is claimed if you leave a cab and do not pay, the driver can chase after you and if he can somehow find you, then he can have you arrested. So, what is the reality here? Does this even happen and what are the laws involved here? I mean I guess if I could get somebody arrested by just saying to the police that they owed me money, there are a lot of people I could get arrested. UPDATE: I think Frederick's comment is very relevant in that the complex question seems to be whether there is "intent" to defraud, in other words, did the customer set out to obtain the services with no intention of paying in the beginning, or did they later refuse or fail to pay for some reason that had no relation to their original intent. So, there seems to be a psychological aspect to the problem.

Yes, an arrest is possible Taking a taxi and telling the driver you will pay, and having already intended not to pay in the beginning but running of is, in germany , Fraud (Betrug) under §263 StGB . That is a Straftat that can be punished with up to five years of prison . The same is true for taking gas and not paying, which is treated as Tankbetrug . If the decision to not pay only came up the moment the taxi arrived or the tanking was complete, it is conversion (Unterschlagung) under § 246 StGB , punishable with three years of prison . As the punishment in both cases is possibly more than one year, this is a Verbrechen (~Felony). If the amount in dispute is below 50 €, then the damaged party has to request prosecution. In case of 50 € or more, merely alerting the police and filing an Anzeige puts the prosecution in motion. And because it is a felony, the police may not just demand the suspect to come to the station, they can also arrest the suspect if there is a risk of flight (and they get a warrant). Note that because the state of mind is not known to the police investigating, they will assume fraud or conversion based on the evidence and not consider accidentally forgetting to pay. This is because it was the duty of the party receiving the goods or service to ensure they had paid, and if it was an accident they should have discovered that very timely and remedied the situation by paying. Not doing that means they are at least committing conversion. While it is often very hard for a taxi driver to get the suspect arrested unless they know exactly who they drove and often only a price of below 50 €, gas stations have video evidence of the driver and car as well as the higher value lead to much easier prosecution. An arrest might also be done for the mere purpose of asserting your identity. Can arrest be mitigated? Yes. You can prevent the criminal offence by making clear to the damaged person that you either: promise to pay at a later date, e.g. leaving an item of value to cash out with the needed pay later. have a genuine dispute, and provide the required information to be sued.

My child's name is "Robert'); drop table *;--" Is he in trouble?

(Source: https://xkcd.com/327/ ) So with the upcoming birth of my first child, I suggested the name "Robert'); drop table *;--". While I was quickly told that wasn't going to happen, I have to wonder what could happen if he was actually named that. For the less technical, this name contains what is called a SQL injection attack. If the name is entered into a poorly designed SQL system, it could potentially execute a sql command and drop all tables (i.e. cause the organization's IT manager to have a somewhat bad day, depending on how good their backups are). So assuming I am able to get this name on his birth certificate and get his SSN assigned under that name (let us assume that the government has been able to build their system such that this name can be handled without issue), what would happen if his name fulfills its intended purpose when signing him up for day care? In that while signing little Bobby tables up for day care, his name wiped out all their data, and because of their lack of a good IT policy, they have no backups, causing no small amount of trouble for the day care. What would I be charged with or sued for in this case? I assume I am on the hook for some sort of malicious destruction of data or somehow liable for the loss of data. Would this being his name afford any sort of protection? Or would the fact that it was selected intentionally to cause damage be an issue? Jurisdiction: United States, pick any state you feel like.

Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent . See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College . Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.

My child's name is "Robert'); drop table *;--" Is he in trouble?

(Source: https://xkcd.com/327/ ) So with the upcoming birth of my first child, I suggested the name "Robert'); drop table *;--". While I was quickly told that wasn't going to happen, I have to wonder what could happen if he was actually named that. For the less technical, this name contains what is called a SQL injection attack. If the name is entered into a poorly designed SQL system, it could potentially execute a sql command and drop all tables (i.e. cause the organization's IT manager to have a somewhat bad day, depending on how good their backups are). So assuming I am able to get this name on his birth certificate and get his SSN assigned under that name (let us assume that the government has been able to build their system such that this name can be handled without issue), what would happen if his name fulfills its intended purpose when signing him up for day care? In that while signing little Bobby tables up for day care, his name wiped out all their data, and because of their lack of a good IT policy, they have no backups, causing no small amount of trouble for the day care. What would I be charged with or sued for in this case? I assume I am on the hook for some sort of malicious destruction of data or somehow liable for the loss of data. Would this being his name afford any sort of protection? Or would the fact that it was selected intentionally to cause damage be an issue? Jurisdiction: United States, pick any state you feel like.

No, your future first child would not get into trouble, since they cannot be held responsible for the initial name gave to them by another. You, as the 'responsible' parent may be held responsible in states such as Connecticut where not for fraudulent or nefarious purposes and does not infringe on the rights of another person, is a condition (if if legal in one state, but used in another where it is not). Robert'); drop table *;-- Would not be allowed in some US-States, since it contains symbols that are not allowed: ) ; * Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia In many U.S. states, hyphens and apostrophe are the only two symbols personal names can officially contain. In some computer systems and in the machine-readable zone of a passport, they are omitted (Mary-Kate O'Neill → Mary Kate ONeill) Sources : Naming in the United States Craziest Baby Naming Laws By State

My child's name is "Robert'); drop table *;--" Is he in trouble?

(Source: https://xkcd.com/327/ ) So with the upcoming birth of my first child, I suggested the name "Robert'); drop table *;--". While I was quickly told that wasn't going to happen, I have to wonder what could happen if he was actually named that. For the less technical, this name contains what is called a SQL injection attack. If the name is entered into a poorly designed SQL system, it could potentially execute a sql command and drop all tables (i.e. cause the organization's IT manager to have a somewhat bad day, depending on how good their backups are). So assuming I am able to get this name on his birth certificate and get his SSN assigned under that name (let us assume that the government has been able to build their system such that this name can be handled without issue), what would happen if his name fulfills its intended purpose when signing him up for day care? In that while signing little Bobby tables up for day care, his name wiped out all their data, and because of their lack of a good IT policy, they have no backups, causing no small amount of trouble for the day care. What would I be charged with or sued for in this case? I assume I am on the hook for some sort of malicious destruction of data or somehow liable for the loss of data. Would this being his name afford any sort of protection? Or would the fact that it was selected intentionally to cause damage be an issue? Jurisdiction: United States, pick any state you feel like.

My child's name is “Robert'); drop table *;--” Is he in trouble? When signing up , the name itself is unlikely to cause system --and hence legal-- issues. That is, in most cases that scenario of injection would be a non sequitur . Consider the following: Database implementations typically store first, middle, and last name in separate fields, whence the middle (or last) name starting with drop table would be surrounded by quotes (and thus, be disabled) when inserting into table(s). Tables are set up --via DDL-- so as to prevent important fields from being null (or have length equal to zero). Accordingly, code prior to the insert command ought to parse the entry so as to avoid abends from the database. Decent parsing code would catch entries for field middle_name (or last_name) which consist of a supposedly empty name '' followed by the drop command. I am not sure DDL commands accept wildcards as arguments. Of course, that could vary among RDBMSs, I haven't tried this, and I would have to start my test db (no plans to do that right now, haha). Thus, in the event that signing up does cause a mess, the parent should conduct discovery on the implementation of the system to examine its robustness. Depending on the results of discovery, the parent could support the argument that the database was so weak that proximate or but for causation shall be ruled out. Similarly, poor design & implementation of the database is a mitigating factor , which would reduce the liability --if any-- traceable to the father's choice of name. I started emphasizing the phrase " when signing up " because harm and liability might ensue if/when the kid's entire name is typed afterwards in other fields that are more "free format". As you surely know, there are fields of much greater length and intended for extended description, narrative, or elaboration of an event. Whereas one may expect reasonable robustness on crucial/key fields of a database table, that expectation does not necessarily hold for free-format fields. That being said, a short version of the kid's long name would most likely be used in free-format fields. What if the name was unintentionally selected? (Per initial version of your post ...) That argument would be unavailing. It is just not credible that (1) a person with no background in databases would choose a name of that sort; and (2) a person with background in databases "did not know" that such last name could harm the database/catalog.

My child's name is "Robert'); drop table *;--" Is he in trouble?

(Source: https://xkcd.com/327/ ) So with the upcoming birth of my first child, I suggested the name "Robert'); drop table *;--". While I was quickly told that wasn't going to happen, I have to wonder what could happen if he was actually named that. For the less technical, this name contains what is called a SQL injection attack. If the name is entered into a poorly designed SQL system, it could potentially execute a sql command and drop all tables (i.e. cause the organization's IT manager to have a somewhat bad day, depending on how good their backups are). So assuming I am able to get this name on his birth certificate and get his SSN assigned under that name (let us assume that the government has been able to build their system such that this name can be handled without issue), what would happen if his name fulfills its intended purpose when signing him up for day care? In that while signing little Bobby tables up for day care, his name wiped out all their data, and because of their lack of a good IT policy, they have no backups, causing no small amount of trouble for the day care. What would I be charged with or sued for in this case? I assume I am on the hook for some sort of malicious destruction of data or somehow liable for the loss of data. Would this being his name afford any sort of protection? Or would the fact that it was selected intentionally to cause damage be an issue? Jurisdiction: United States, pick any state you feel like.

That string of characters is not acceptable as a name in some jurisdictions in the first place. germany will block the name on the basis that the name is on one hand prone to damaging the child , and ]on the other hand is unprintable by the Bundesdruckerei. Insted, your child will only be registered as the closest equivalent, Robert Drop Table. japan will block the name, because it does not use Hiragana, Katakana or approved kanji. The closest would be the phonetic ロバート ドロップ テーブル (Robāto doroppu tēburu) or, using the proper words for drop and spreadhseet ロバート 落とす 表計算 (Robāto Otosu Omotekeisan)

Legal Considerations for Offering Rewards in Exchange for Tenant Selection in Germany

My company and I are located in Germany and we intend to distribute flyers on the street. In the flyers, we offer a reward to those who are willing to rent out their homes in exchange for us being able to select the tenants (for example, offering 1500 euros). Subsequently, we plan to create a separate advertisement where we are seeking tenants for the house and asking for a higher amount of money (for example, 3000 euros). From a legal perspective, could such a practice be considered illegal? What aspects should we be mindful of? Thank you! Guten Tag, Ich und mein Unternehmen sind in Deutschland ansässig und beabsichtigen, Flyer auf der Straße zu verteilen. In den Flyern bieten wir eine Belohnung (zum Beispiel 1500 Euro) für diejenigen an, die ihr Haus vermieten möchten, im Gegenzug dafür, dass wir die Mieter auswählen dürfen. Anschließend planen wir, eine separate Anzeige zu schalten, in der wir Mieter für das Haus suchen und einen höheren Geldbetrag verlangen (zum Beispiel 3000 Euro). Aus rechtlicher Sicht könnte eine solche Vorgehensweise illegal sein? Auf welche Aspekte sollten wir achten? Vielen Dank!

As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany , there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015 . Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder?

A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be "attempting to commit burglary", so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not "reasonably appears about to commit" sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado . Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. ( Source ) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer ). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the "heat of passion" defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder?

A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

Probably new-south-wales Self-defence is defined in s418 of the Crimes Act 1900. The defendant would probably rely on ss418(2)(a-b). You are allowed to use reasonable conduct to (a) defend yourself, and (b) terminate a depravation of liberty. Both would seem to apply to the facts. The only real question for the jury is if the conduct (stabbing the assaulted with a kitchen knife) was reasonable. That depends on the circumstances: if you stabbed and fled, almost certainly; if you stabbed and gloated for half an hour while the perpetrator bled out, maybe not.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder?

A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

canada Self-defence requires that the act commmitted in response to the threat be reasonable The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that "a threat of force is being made against them or another person." Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. And the act must be reasonable in the circumstances. This all comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code . It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. Your scenario establishes that condition (a) is satisfied: the accused would believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them. Condition (b) also appears to be satisfied: you say "she acted only to end the assault." The availability of the defence will turn on condition (c): whether "the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances." Whether the act is reasonable depends on many factors, including the nature and proportionality of the response Section 34(2) says: (2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances , the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: (a) the nature of the force or threat; (b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force ; (c) the person’s role in the incident; (d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; (e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident; (f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat; (f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident; (g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force ; and (h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful. Most likely, the only factors meaningfully at play will be (2)(b) (especially any "other means available") and (2)(g) (the "nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force"), but all the factors are to be considered. When proportionality of the response is an issue, a typical jury instruction is: Keep in mind that persons who reasonably believe they are under attack may not be able to weigh with precision the exact measure of defensive action needed to repel the attack Self-defence may be available as a defence in the circumstances you describe Depending on the totality of the circumstances, there could be a successful self-defence defence available. See a similar example from R. v. Ameralik , 2021 NUCJ 3 : Ms. A's spouse confronted her and threatened her in a small kitchen Ms. A tried to stab him in the arm, but the blade slipped and pierced his lung and heart Ms. A was charged with second degree murder She was found not guilty of murder because she did not intend to cause bodily harm that she knew was likely to cause death She would have been guilty of manslaughter if not for self-defence Mr. Aaluk advanced toward Ms. Ameralik shouting that she should stab him, after their verbal altercation had escalated into physical violence. Perceiving an imminent threat to herself and her unborn child by a much larger Mr. Aaluk who had previously punched her in the stomach during her pregnancy, Ms. Ameralik grabbed the only weapon available to her, the sharp kitchen knife she had been using to prepare dinner and stabbed him once. Ms. Ameralik did not have to weigh her response to a nicety. Given her vulnerability, recognizing how physically outmatched she was, I am satisfied Ms. Ameralik’s use of force was not out of proportion to the threat of violence she was experiencing at the time of the incident. No one factor in the test for self-defence is determinative and the whole relationship between a couple must be considered to determine whether the accused was acting in self-defence. I am left with no doubt that Ms. Ameralik suffered significantly for years as a victim of intimate partner abuse while in a relationship with Mr. Aaluk. Having carefully reviewed the criteria above within the context of the history of violence, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Ameralik’s actions were unreasonable in the circumstances.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder?

A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

germany The scenario you describe would be considered violence by the assailant. And also rape. There is §32(2) StgGB : Notwehr ist die Verteidigung, die erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwärtigen rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden. Self-defense is the defense which is necessary to stop a present, unlawful attack on oneself or others. (My translation.) Your fictional case describes a present attack. It also describes an unlawful attack (see above). Stabbing the assailant is suitable to stop the rape. Which leaves, as a last point, the question if lethal force is necessary to stop the attack. The last bullet point does not require the victim to make a strict test of proportionality, only to test if lesser means are readily at hand. Lethal force is allowed to stop a rape if the victim sees no non-lethal way. Precedent rules out self-defense if there is a gross disproportionality between the unlawful attack and the defense. A common example would be shooting somebody as the only feasible way to prevent the theft of an apple from an orchard. But that is not the case here. Of course things depend on the details. Say the first stab cripples the leg of the assailant, and the defender is in a position to realize this. Then the defender could simply back off and walk away. Likewise, if the assailant sees the knife and starts to run away, the present attack stops. It would also get complicated if the victim knew that the assailant was unable to take criminal responsibility for his acts. For instance, the permission of disproportionate defense from §32 does not apply if the assailant is a small child.

Is there a place where adultery is a crime?

Most countries I know of have regulations on marriage or partnership and there's a registration office for a change in marital status. But as far as I can tell, that's purely a civil matter. Getting married may change your tax quotes, or who inherits your stuff once you pass away, but it has no implications in criminal law. In former times, this was different, as e.g. the bible requests that a couple that is found during adultery shall be stoned. Now Bob finds his wife Alice in bed with Charles. Does he have any way of Alice getting a fine or a jail sentence? Or some other legal action against her (assuming he doesn't want to get divorced)? Or is it really true that the state doesn't care anything about a marriage except keeping a registry of it? Edit: The comments and the first answer suggest that there are US states that have such laws (which I didn't expect). However I'm particularly interested in European countries. And also in possible penalties. The linked question seems to indicate that even where such a law exists, it is not enforced.

united-states Criminal Consequences Of Adultery State Criminal Laws In a large majority of U.S. jurisdictions , adultery is no longer a crime (assuming the sexual act is consensual and not incestuous) including 35 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the several U.S. territories. "States which have decriminalised adultery in recent years include West Virginia (2010), Colorado (2013), New Hampshire (2014), Massachusetts (2018), Utah (2019), Idaho (2022), and Minnesota (2023)." Adultery is rarely enforced criminally in the 15 states and Puerto Rico, as of 2023, that still do have adultery laws on the books that have not been held unconstitutional by state courts. This is, in part, due to doubts about the constitutionality of these crimes under federal and state constitutions, in part, due to changing norms, and in part, due to the limited benefit of a misdemeanor or felony prosecution to all persons involved (and the state) in such cases. The birth of a child who is conceived with a father other than the mother's husband while the mother is married is not automatically conclusive proof of the crime of adultery under either state law or under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. For example, under South Carolina law adultery involves either "the living together and carnal intercourse with each other" or, if those involved do not live together "habitual carnal intercourse with each other" which is more difficult to prove. Similarly, in Florida, the crime is "Living in open adultery". Also, in the case of a prosecution of an unmarried man, knowledge that the woman is married would typically be an element of the crime of adultery, and it is similarly never a crime to be raped in the U.S., even if you are married. In 12 of the states where adultery is still a crime (Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Virginia), it is a petty offense (the maximum punishment in Maryland is a $10 fine), or is a misdemeanor. But it continues to be a felony in 3 states (Oklahoma, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and is punishable most severely among those states in Michigan who someone convicted of adultery faces up to four years in prison and in Oklahoma where the maximum sentence is five years in prison. Military Justice It is a crime that is actively enforced for active duty members of the U.S. military under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. In the U.S. military, adultery is a potential court-martial offense, falling under the General article (Art. 134). The Manual for Courts-Martial defines (para. 99) "Extramarital sexual conduct" as being: Elements.(1) That the accused wrongfully engaged in extramarital conduct as described in subparagraph c.(2) with a certain person; (2) That, at the time, the accused knew that the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. U.S. military law on adultery was revised in 2019 in order to include same-sex encounters in the offense. Neither the U.S. military, nor any U.S. state, has penalties for adultery that differ depending upon whether or not the adultery results in the birth of child. Federal Constitutionality The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of adultery crimes since its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003) which decriminalized any kind of sex between consenting unmarried adults that does not constitute prostitution, as a matter of constitutional law (including sex between married adults with each other). The highest court of the State of Massachusetts declared its adultery statute unconstitutional as a violation of the U.S. Constitution in the case of Commonwealth v. Stowell , 449 N.E.2d 357, 389 Mass. 171 (1983). But, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), holding that the U.S. Constitution did not invalidate a state sodomy statute in a case involving tow consenting men, largely discouraged constitutional challenges until Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick in 2003. See, e.g., Oliverson v. W. Valley City , 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1482 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that "The claim of the right to commit adultery cannot be considered “fundamental.", and denying a constitutional challenge to a police officer being disciplined for adultery while not on duty, in reliance on Bowers v. Hardwick ). In the two decades prior to Lawrence , however, no state or federal court has declared an adultery statute unconstitutional on U.S. Constitutional grounds, despite the fact that there have been a handful of adultery prosecutions in this time period in some of the states where adultery remains a crime. For example, there was one prosecution in Virginia in 2004 , and another one in New York State in 2010 . On the other hand, the last time someone was prosecuted for adultery in Wisconsin was in 1990 . I am not aware of any post- Lawrence adultery prosecution by a state government that has led to appeal that produced a published or binding precedents on the issue of the constitutionality of these state adultery statutes. This is, in part, because prosecutions for adultery in state courts are rare and are misdemeanor prosecutions in most cases. But, appeals of minor misdemeanor convictions are rare. Courts within the U.S. military justice system, at least, have expressly rejected constitutional challenges to the Uniform Code of Military Justice's adultery prohibition since Lawrence was decided. See, e.g. , C. Scott Maravilla, " Prosecuting Adultery Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence V. Texas " (July 29, 2007). Other Criminal Law Considerations Giving birth itself, regardless of the circumstances, is never a crime in the United States. Some sexual acts which can sometimes result in the conception of a child are crimes (most obviously incest and rape, including statutory rape and abuse of a position of trust rape). But these offenses are not related to marital status unlike a true adultery charge. A murder of the spouse or the non-spouse with whom that spouse is engaged in adultery in the heat of passion immediately following the discovery of them "in the act" is a mitigating factor. This can reduce a murder charge to a manslaughter charge in many states. This incomplete defense to a murder charge is known as the "heat of passion" defense. Paternity The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the "other man" in an affair with a married woman who gives birth as a result does not have a constitutional right to seek to have his paternity of the child legally established. See Michael H. v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Thus, the standing of the "other man" to bring suit to determine that he is the father of such a child is purely a matter of state law. The state laws addressing this question and some related questions are addressed in the article, " TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES: PART II: Questioning the Paternity of Marital Children " (2002) by Paula Roberts. Civil Liability In a handful of U.S. states a husband can bring a lawsuit for money damages (called alienation of affections or "criminal conversation" despite the fact that it is a civil lawsuit) against someone who has sex with his wife. The vast majority of U.S. states have abolished such lawsuits, however. In fiscal years 2000–2007, there were an average of 230 alienation of affections filings in North Carolina per year — a bit over 0.5% of the number of all divorces. The tort is also recognized in Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah, but it is frequently litigated only in North Carolina and in Mississippi. Many of the states where the tort is not commonly used impose restrictions on it that make it less attractive. In Illinois, Hawaii and New Mexico, these limitations make it exceedingly difficult to prevail in an alienation of affections case and recover substantial monetary damages. The standard of proof is lower in Utah and South Dakota, which continue to have actively litigated alienation of affections suits, although not used as often in these states as in North Carolina and Mississippi, for reasons that are presumably unrelated to the relevant legal standards that apply to these lawsuits. Also, in a rape case, a rape victim can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages against the rapist for assault and battery in most cases, and in those cases, many states allow a spouse of a rape victim to bring a parallel lawsuit against the person who committed the assault that is called a lawsuit for loss of consortium. The right to sue for loss of consortium is not specific to rape cases; it applies in all lawsuits for personal injury where it is available. Civil lawsuits involving rape cannot be subject to arbitration requirements by a pre-dispute contract between the parties to submit all disputes between them to arbitration (e.g. in a suit between an employee and an employer related to conduct that facilitated a co-worker's rape of the employee under sex discrimination laws) under a federal law enacted effective in the year 2022. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to grant petitions for certiorari seeking to have laws establishing civil liability in these cases declared unconstitutional. Divorce Implications In most U.S. state, divorce is granted without regard to marital fault and adultery is not considered in alimony awards or property divisions. While every U.S. state has some form of no fault divorce, and number of U.S. states also have fault based divorce, and a number of U.S. states, however, allow consideration of adultery as a form of marital fault in divorce proceedings, including how much, if any alimony is awarded and in property divisions. No state would consider being raped an act of marital fault, however, even if this caused a wife to give birth to a child whose biological father was not her husband, and even if the husband wanted her to have an abortion. Selected Non-U.S. Criminal Adultery Laws Adultery is no longer a crime in any European country, Turkey, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, or India. Adultery is no longer a crime in most or all of Latin America. Adultery is a crime in the Philippines (in a manner that punishes married women more severely than married men). It is notable that in this case, that the Philippines has a significant Muslim minority population. Adultery is also a crime in Indonesia and in Bangladesh. Adultery is also a crime according to Wikipedia at the first link in this answer, in "several sub-Saharan African Christian-majority countries." One of these countries is Rwanda. And, according to Wikipedia at the first link in this answer: In Muslim countries that follow Sharia law for criminal justice, the punishment for adultery may be stoning. There are fifteen countries in which stoning is authorized as lawful punishment, though in recent times it has been legally carried out only in Iran and Somalia. Countries which follow very strict versions of Sharia law in their criminal systems include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brunei, Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, 12 of Nigeria's 36 states (in Northern Nigeria) and Qatar; although these laws are not necessarily enforced. Al-Shabaab, a jihadist fundamentalist group based in East Africa (mainly Somalia) and Yemen also implements an extreme form of Sharia. Obviously, this answer is not absolutely complete. It leaves the status of a number of particular countries unresolved.

Is there a place where adultery is a crime?

Most countries I know of have regulations on marriage or partnership and there's a registration office for a change in marital status. But as far as I can tell, that's purely a civil matter. Getting married may change your tax quotes, or who inherits your stuff once you pass away, but it has no implications in criminal law. In former times, this was different, as e.g. the bible requests that a couple that is found during adultery shall be stoned. Now Bob finds his wife Alice in bed with Charles. Does he have any way of Alice getting a fine or a jail sentence? Or some other legal action against her (assuming he doesn't want to get divorced)? Or is it really true that the state doesn't care anything about a marriage except keeping a registry of it? Edit: The comments and the first answer suggest that there are US states that have such laws (which I didn't expect). However I'm particularly interested in European countries. And also in possible penalties. The linked question seems to indicate that even where such a law exists, it is not enforced.

Adultery is not a crime in any European country, the last being Romania which repealed its law against adultery in 2006. In a few states of the US it is a crime (New York, Oklahoma, Michigan, Wisconsin etc). It is a capital offense in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Brunei, Iran, and Somalia.

Is there a place where adultery is a crime?

Most countries I know of have regulations on marriage or partnership and there's a registration office for a change in marital status. But as far as I can tell, that's purely a civil matter. Getting married may change your tax quotes, or who inherits your stuff once you pass away, but it has no implications in criminal law. In former times, this was different, as e.g. the bible requests that a couple that is found during adultery shall be stoned. Now Bob finds his wife Alice in bed with Charles. Does he have any way of Alice getting a fine or a jail sentence? Or some other legal action against her (assuming he doesn't want to get divorced)? Or is it really true that the state doesn't care anything about a marriage except keeping a registry of it? Edit: The comments and the first answer suggest that there are US states that have such laws (which I didn't expect). However I'm particularly interested in European countries. And also in possible penalties. The linked question seems to indicate that even where such a law exists, it is not enforced.

Yes. In the United States military, for in instance, adultery can subject you to court-martial .

Is there a place where adultery is a crime?

Most countries I know of have regulations on marriage or partnership and there's a registration office for a change in marital status. But as far as I can tell, that's purely a civil matter. Getting married may change your tax quotes, or who inherits your stuff once you pass away, but it has no implications in criminal law. In former times, this was different, as e.g. the bible requests that a couple that is found during adultery shall be stoned. Now Bob finds his wife Alice in bed with Charles. Does he have any way of Alice getting a fine or a jail sentence? Or some other legal action against her (assuming he doesn't want to get divorced)? Or is it really true that the state doesn't care anything about a marriage except keeping a registry of it? Edit: The comments and the first answer suggest that there are US states that have such laws (which I didn't expect). However I'm particularly interested in European countries. And also in possible penalties. The linked question seems to indicate that even where such a law exists, it is not enforced.

Indonesia Saudi Arabia Somalia Iran Qatar Pakistan Afganistan Bangladesh Rwanda Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin (although rarely enforced). The Phillipines The list is not necessarily exhaustive. Penalties range from fines through imprisonment to death by stoning. In most countries “adultery” is any extra-marital sex even between single people. Be aware, that in many of these jurisdictions, woman who have been raped have been successfully prosecuted for adultery. In some Arabic states, unmarried couples sharing the same hotel room is sufficient evidence to lead to an adultery conviction - this includes people who have legal civil partnerships at home. It should go without saying that most of these countries have laws against public indecency (which can include kissing or texting) and homosexual sex.

Suspect's Right to Privacy in Court

If no charges have been filed , do courts have any responsibility to protect a suspect's privacy during an investigation? Example below. Let's say this is in New Jersey, United States. Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public, to protect X's privacy since no charges have been filed. (Perhaps this is her office's policy in these circumstances; her motivation is not clear at this point.) The judge rejects the prosecutor's request and refuses to seal the courtroom. Members of the public witness the court proceedings and learn that X is under investigation for embezzling from her employer. Not only has X not been convicted of any crime; she hasn't even been charged yet (and indeed might never be). Have any of X's rights been violated? Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? (And: if her rights have indeed been violated, does she have any legal recourse?)

Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public Search warrants Search warrants are generally issued ex parte (i.e. without an adversarial hearing) and are routinely kept secret until they have been carried out. Targets of search warrants are often, but hardly always, the subject of criminal investigations. Search warrants can only be issued upon a showing a probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence pertinent to a crime that has been committed. If a search warrant is issued wrongfully, the remedies are a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and/or a civil lawsuit for money damages, after the search has been completed. Conceivably, a search warrant target could argue that the affidavit providing a basis for the search should continue to be kept under seal, but, unless this was necessary for a grand jury investigation to continue in secrecy, this request would usually be denied. Subpoenas A subpoena does not require a showing of probable cause to issue and can be contested before documents are turned over pursuant to it by the person to whom it is directed (and sometimes other people as well), but a subpoena is rarely issued to an actual target of a criminal investigation. A prosecutor can usually maintain secrecy by conducting an investigation through a grand jury which has subpoena power. Protecting the privacy of a subpoena target would not be a valid reason for closing the courtroom. But a prosecutor's desire to not tip off other subjects of the grand jury investigation, which a public hearing on quashing a grand jury subpoena might do, would be a basis for a valid request from the prosecutor to close the hearing to the public. Have any of X's rights been violated? No. There is a constitutional right of the public and the press to attend court hearings in most circumstances. There is no constitutional right to not have your reputation tarnished by criminal prosecutors in the course of a criminal investigation. Also, generally speaking, prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for any conduct they commit in the course of a courtroom process. Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? No. Similar arguments were soundly rejected by an appellate court panel, for example, in the classified documents criminal investigation of former President Trump .

Meaning of 'Gift of Residue' section of a will

This section is in a family member's will: Gift of Residue I give my Residuary Estate to the said [Full Name] absolutely and if [Name] shall fail to obtain a vested interest leaving issue who survive me then such issue shall take by substitution and if there shall be more than one of such issue they shall take in equal shares per stirpes but so that no issue shall take whose parent is alive and so capable of taking. What does this mean?

What does this paragraph mean? Line by line. I give my Residuary Estate This is a gift, effective when the person writing the Will dies, of everything that is left over after all debts and taxes are paid and after any other gifts already in the Will (e.g. leaving a car or a house or a Monet to someone in particular) have been given. to the said [Full Name] absolutely I'm going give [Full Name] a name so that it is easier to follow this explanation. [Full Name]'s name for purposes of this answer is "Luna". This says to give all that stuff to Luna when the person who wrote the Will dies, if Luna is still alive for whatever the required amount of time is after the person who wrote the Will dies. The required survival time period is either in the boilerplate provisions of the Will, or in the relevant statute if the Will is silent on the question. The Will says "absolutely" because historically, someone who received gifts of property in deed or wills in England only got to keep it for their lifetime, unless it clearly specified otherwise, after which someone else would get it. But in this case, if Luna survives this long, Luna gets all of this stuff with no strings attached. and if [Name] shall fail to obtain a vested interest leaving issue who survive me then such issue shall take by substitution If Luna dies before the person who wrote the Will does, or doesn't stay alive for the required number of days afterwards, then Luna isn't entitled to this stuff. Luna's descendants get it instead (i.e. Luna's descendants "take by substitution" what Luna would have gotten if Luna had lived, instead of Luna's probate estate getting the stuff). and if there shall be more than one of such issue they shall take in equal shares per stirpes but so that no issue shall take whose parent is alive and so capable of taking. If Luna predeceases and has exactly one living descendant who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies, and that living descendant lives the required number of days after the person who wrote the Will dies, then the sole living descendant of Luna gets all of the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies. If Luna has more than one living descendant, the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies, then Luna's descendants gets broken up the way described below, which is called per stirpes : Create one share for each child of Luna who is alive and survives Luna by the required amount of time. If Luna has only one living child, that child gets everything even if Luna's child has children of their own. Create one share for each child of Luna who didn't live for long enough after the person who wrote the Will's death, if the predeceased child has descendants who are alive and remain alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time. This share is then broken up into one sub-share for each child of the predeceased child who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies and is still alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time, and one sub-share for each predeceased child of the predeceased child who has living descendants who remain alive for the requisite number of days. Continue this process until 100% of the the residuary estate has been assigned to someone and give them their share of it once the estate is settled. If someone lives past the minimum number of days to outlive the person who wrote the Will, and then dies, that person's share goes that person's probate estate. For visual learners, a per stirpes distributions of assets looks like this: A per stirpes distribution to descendants is the plain vanilla ordinary way to giving stuff to the descendants of a dead person when you don't know in advance who will outlive you. What if Luna predeceases with no living descendants? Usually, this paragraph of a Will will be followed by another paragraph called the "ultimate contingent beneficiary" which says who gets the stuff that's left over in the residuary estate if Luna predeceases the person who wrote the Will and has no living descendants. Often, the ultimate contingent beneficiary will be one or more distant relatives, a list of friends, or a charity. If there is no ultimately contingent beneficiary in the Will, but Luna and all of Luna's descendants predecease the person who wrote the Will, then it goes to the next of kin (a.k.a. "heirs at law") of the person who wrote the Will, if there are any relatives of the person who wrote the Will who are close enough to qualify to inherit under English inheritances law. If there is no one closely enough related to the person who wrote the Will to qualify under English inheritance law, then the stuff "escheats" (i.e. is inherited by default) by the King (or Queen) of England, as the case may be. There are some circumstances when the Will can be ignored. Everything above explains what this language in the Will means. This isn't always what happens, however. There are several exceptions to the general rule that property goes to the people that the Will says it goes to. I won't list them all here, but it is important when a Will is being written to understand that this is the case. For example, if the person who wrote the Will leaves nothing in the Will to their spouse of thirty years as of the death of the person who wrote the Will, who has no assets of their own, then the Court will partially ignore what the Will says and give some of the residuary estate to the surviving spouse. Also, the Will only controls assets that are in the "probate estate". Some assets pass at death in what are called "non-probate transfers" that are not controlled by what the Will says. And, finally, of course, if the Will was written when the person signing the Will was of unsound mind, the Will can be invalidated in a "Will contest" in the appropriate court if the person contesting the Will's validity can prove that the person signing it was of unsound mind at the time. This is mediocre legal writing This paragraph gets the job done, but it is not very well written by modern legal Will drafting standards. It is adequate and probably meets the standard of care for a lawyer who hasn't committed malpractice. Lawyers in England have been writing paragraphs like this one for three or four hundred years. But it is not "best practices" legal writing in a Will. Good modern legal drafting for a Will would be much easier for a non-lawyer to understand, in addition to being clear and unambiguous.

Liable of sexual abuse in civil case and no prison time?

It was reported a few minutes ago that Trump Is Found Liable for Sexual Abuse in Civil Case , but "Its findings are civil, not criminal, meaning Mr. Trump has not been convicted of any crime and faces no prison time." Why is this trial different to other trials where a person that's found guilty of sexual abuse is sentenced to prison? Is this different because he's an ex-president?

There are many different kinds of laws, and many different ways of violating them. The main two are (1) criminal law, which generally addresses violations that injure the government's interests; and (2) civil law, which largely addresses violations that injure private parties' interests. Some conduct can violate both sets of laws: If you steal something from a store, the government can put you in jail for theft, and the store can sue you for the value of the item you stole. If you punch someone in the face, the government can can put you in jail for assault, and the person you punched can sue you to pay for their hospital bills. If you grope a woman in a dressing room, the government can put you in jail for sexual assault, and the woman can sue you for battery. Donald Trump falls into that last category. Jean Carroll has sued him for battery, but the government cannot prosecute Trump for the crime because enough time has passed that the criminal statute of limitations has expired. Moreover, a civil trial cannot subject someone to jail time because such a deprivation of liberty requires greater procedural safeguards -- jury unanimity, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc. -- that do not always apply to civil trials like this. Trump's status as ex-president has no bearing on the penalties the court may legally impose on him.

Liable of sexual abuse in civil case and no prison time?

It was reported a few minutes ago that Trump Is Found Liable for Sexual Abuse in Civil Case , but "Its findings are civil, not criminal, meaning Mr. Trump has not been convicted of any crime and faces no prison time." Why is this trial different to other trials where a person that's found guilty of sexual abuse is sentenced to prison? Is this different because he's an ex-president?

Civil cases can not lead to prison time Prison time is only available in criminal cases. Civil cases lead to civil remedies, which are usually money or an order not to do something, very rarely an order to do something specific, but never prison time. A monetary award can be meant to make the claiming party whole ( damages ), to punish the sued party ( punitive award ), or both. The case in question was civil in nature and resulted in a hefty monetary award for the plaintiff. The award contained both damages and punitive amounts. Why not a criminal trial? The problem is the statute of limitations of the actual criminal act had run out years ago, so no criminal case could be filed. However, the statute of limitation for the civil act of defamation only started when Mr. Trump spoke about the plaintiff in a defaming manner sometime in 2019. The first case was brought timely in November 2019, while Trump was president. Since the civil lawsuit for defamation was brought timely, the case went forward. It is of note that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the statute of limitations for many things was halted and thus extended, and as a result, the case could have been brought even later. In this case Mr. Trump claimed was covered under presidential immunity. However, Mr. Trump did stop being president in 2020 and repeated the defaming statements in a statement of 2022, creating a new instance of defamation, which then was brought in a new case. As a private citizen... the case this time stuck with no defense. There also was a Battery claim in there, which used a very narrow window opened by the Adult Survivor Act in which New York did re-wind the statute of Limitations - or rather a lookback window. This means that within one year from November 24th 2022, victims of sexual abuse after they had turned 18 can file a case to seek civil remedies regardless of the year in which the abuse took place.

Liable of sexual abuse in civil case and no prison time?

It was reported a few minutes ago that Trump Is Found Liable for Sexual Abuse in Civil Case , but "Its findings are civil, not criminal, meaning Mr. Trump has not been convicted of any crime and faces no prison time." Why is this trial different to other trials where a person that's found guilty of sexual abuse is sentenced to prison? Is this different because he's an ex-president?

There is criminal law, and there is civil law. If you are convicted of breaking criminal law, you can go to jail for that. The rule is that your guilt must be proven "beyond reasonable doubt" In a civil court, you can be accused of causing damage, If you are convicted you may be convicted of paying those damages, plus possible extra damages. The rule is that to be convicted in a civil court, your guilt must be established on the basis of probabilities, say 51% chance that you are guilty. It is absolutely common that there is enough proof to order payment in a civil court (51% chance of guilt) but not enough for a criminal conviction (guilt beyond reasonable doubt). Consider a case where our cars crashed, but it's not obvious whether my car damaged yours, or yours damaged mine. It is quite clear that ONE of us should pay for the damage. The one paying is the one who is more likely guilty, even though none of us is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. PS. It seems the case was brought years after the event. At that time I’m told statute of limitations had run out for any criminal charges, but not for a civil case. So in this case Mr Trump couldn’t be criminally convicted even if evidence would have normally shown him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. A woman in the UK had the opposite happen to her: She was raped, the rapist convicted, and she didn’t sue for damages because there was no money. Six years later the convicted criminal won millions in the lottery, but the time had run out for her to sue for damages.

Medical POA and a Home Health Aid

Imagine a standard POA for medical has been given to an adult son for his parent to become effective when the parent cannot speak for him/her self. It has been determined by several doctors that the parent has dementia and cannot speak for herself. Would the POA for medical enable the adult son to bring in a home health aid into the parent's home against her wishes? My guess is no because the parent still control's her home.

Your guess is correct (although an aggressive person could argue that the parent would never have the wherewithal to sue to complain about it). The adult son really needs to have a guardianship established by a court, because a POA isn't sufficient to do what needs to be done. Usually, an agent in a POA has priority for appointment as a guardian, and if the facts are clear, it isn't necessary to hard to get a guardianship established. But it does take money and it isn't instantaneous.

Under which law is the police allowed to hold one's passport and phone after being in detention for 21 hrs?

Is the UK police allowed to hold one's passport and phone for further "investigation" after he had been in detention for 21 hours? Further the police told him that he is not allowed to leave his flat.

england-and-wales The length of time a suspect is held in police custody before being released is unrelated to the police's power (and duty) to sieze potential evidence for further examination or to require e.g. the surrender of a passport as a condition of pre-charge bail (along with the requirement not to apply for international travel documents or tickets etc). If the suspect is assessed to be a flight risk, under section 50A(2)(a) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) they can retain a passport if they see... the need to secure that the person surrenders to custody The retention of property, such as a phone, is allowed under section 22 PACE: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— (a) anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— (i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or (ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence ; and (b) anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. (3) [...] (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. [...]

What is the Constitutional justification for Federal gun possession laws?

The US Constitution reserves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal government. What is the Constitutional provision that allows for Federal laws such as the law that felons may not possess firearms? This appears to be 18 USC § 922(g) . So, the argument is that because a gun was at one time transported across a state line, the federal government can make laws about who can possess it? What about a gun that was not transported across a state line, but manufactured in the same state that the felon, or stalker or whatever lives in?

The Interstate Commerce Clause effectively means all economic activity in the US is under Federal jurisdiction because even something that's not directly involved in interstate commerce, even something not involved in commerce at all, can have an indirect effect on interstate commerce. In Wilkard v. Filburn the government successfully argued that Federal limits on wheat production were enforceable on a farmer that grew his own wheat to feed his own animals even though the farmer never sold his wheat to anyone and the wheat never left the state. A similar more recent case, Gonzales v. Raich , confirmed that this same principle applied to someone growing medical marijuana for personal consumption in a state where medical marijuana was legal. In your example, the felon is buying a gun manufactured in the same state. While this doesn't have a direct immediate effect on interstate commerce, its indirect effects are more obvious than in the two cases mentioned above. If it were legal for felons to buy guns made in state, but not out-of-state, then it would have a fairly dramatic effect on interstate commerce. Gun manufacturers would set up local manufacturing operations in many states to make guns for the felon market. (In theory at least, in practice I think most if not all states also ban felons from owning guns.) Also since guns are durable items, unlike wheat and marijuana, it's all but impossible to show that the gun will never leave the state and participate in interstate commerce directly.

What is the Constitutional justification for Federal gun possession laws?

The US Constitution reserves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal government. What is the Constitutional provision that allows for Federal laws such as the law that felons may not possess firearms? This appears to be 18 USC § 922(g) . So, the argument is that because a gun was at one time transported across a state line, the federal government can make laws about who can possess it? What about a gun that was not transported across a state line, but manufactured in the same state that the felon, or stalker or whatever lives in?

The justification for federal jurisdiction is the commerce clause. But it doesn't automatically apply to every firearm; the connection to interstate commerce must be real for the law to apply. In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court held the following when striking down the related 922(q) which at that time banned firearms in schools zones but did not have a clause about interstate commerce (emphasis mine): ... although this Court has upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly those terms are defined. Nor is it an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under the Court's cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. To uphold the Government's contention that § 922(q) is justified because firearms possession in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States. The constituionality of 922(g) was later also challenged in court, with a different result. In National Ass'n of Government Employees v. Barrett , (N.D. Ga. 1997), the court upheld the constitutionality of 922(g), stating (emphasis mine, some citations shortened): Plaintiffs first assert that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause with the enactment of § 922(g) (9) and that § 922(g) (9) is thus unconstitutional. In making this assertion, plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court's decision of United States v. Lopez, in which the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by regulating the mere possession of a gun. Plaintiffs' reliance on this decision is, however, misplaced. Section 922(g) (9), unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, contains a jurisdictional element, which requires the government to demonstrate that the firearm was possessed "in or affecting commerce" or received after having "been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." This element is fatal to plaintiffs' facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) (9). See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, (upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g) (1), which makes it unlawful for felons to possess a firearm, because it contained a jurisdictional element); United States v. Turner, (noting that every court of appeals "has held that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) provides the requisite nexus with interstate commerce that § 922(q), [the statute at issue in Lopez,] lacked"). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to dismissal of plaintiffs' claims to the extent that those claims are brought under the Commerce Clause. I think it's clear from these decisions that the interstate commerce nexus is required for this or any similar law to be constitutional. This isn't a case like Gonzales v. Raich; the firearm is legal to sell across state lines for most people, just not for felons, and so its mere existence can't affect interstate commerce. So, my conclusion is that a gun made totally in-state, with in-state parts, would not violate this law - and furthermore, Congress cannot constitutionally modify the law to change this. But as the court in State v. Wahl (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004) said: We also note that the market in firearms is heavily interstate in nature, even international in character, and it would be indeed rare that a firearm, or at least some of its component parts, would have never moved across state lines... Indeed, no more is required than a minimal nexus that the firearm had been, at some point, in interstate commerce. So it might be difficult to find a gun that doesn't violate this law. Given that it is probably also a violation of state law for a felon to possess a gun regardless of where it was manufactured, I don't see felons going around using in-state guns just to avoid a federal charge on top of the state one.

Can an independent contractor from Zimbabwe have a bank account in South Africa to receive income from a South African company?

In a case where a South African company has contracted independent contractors from for example Zimbabwe or other foreign countries, is it legal for the independent contractor to be paid into a South African bank account (whether the bank account is a foreign account or a local account)? If the foreigner was at some point in South Africa legally and at that time, they opened a bank account in South Africa but after some time, they returned to their own country but never closed the South African bank account and they started to work remotely for the South African company, is it legal for the independent contractor to be paid into a South African bank account? What about tax liabilities? Is it perhaps a way for the independent contractor to avoid paying tax in their own country and can the South African company be held responsible for that? Would a better option not be to pay the independent contractor into their local account in their own country?

is it legal for the independent contractor to be paid into a South African bank account? Yes. What about tax liabilities? Tax liabilities have nothing to do with the location of the bank into which you are paid. Is it perhaps a way for the independent contractor to avoid paying tax in their own country and can the South African company be held responsible for that? Only if the independent contractor is committed (1) to engaging in felony tax fraud and (2) to causing the person paying the independent contractor to incur civil tax liabilities and civil tax penalties that will cause the person hiring the independent contractor to fire the independent contractor and sue the independent contractor for money damages. The proposed course of conduct of trying to use a bank account in a particular place to avoid paying taxes could also implicate both the independent contractor and the person paying the independent contractor as a co-conspirator in felony money laundering, which is a extraditable offense.

How could a nonprofit obtain consent to message relevant individuals at a company on LinkedIn under the ePrivacy Directive?

Suppose a nonprofit wishes to contact some EU-based employees of an EU-based company in an effort to get that company to use a free service it is offering, and is considering doing so via LinkedIn. Per Article 13 of the ePrivacy Directive - i.e. Directive 2002/58/EC : The use of automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent. And, per Article 2(h), 'electronic mail' would include social media messages such as LinkedIn messages: "electronic mail" means any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient's terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient 'Direct marketing' is not defined in the ePrivacy Directive, but the UK Information Commissioner's Office gives the following guidance (my emphasis): Direct marketing is defined in section 122(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018 as: “the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”. This covers all advertising or promotional material, including that promoting the aims or ideals of not-for-profit organisations – for example, it covers a charity or political party campaigning for support or funds. The marketing must be directed to particular individuals. In practice, all relevant electronic messages (eg calls, faxes, texts and emails) are directed to someone, so they fall within this definition. Genuine market research does not count as direct marketing. However, if a survey includes any promotional material or collects details to use in future marketing campaigns, the survey is for direct marketing purposes and the rules apply . From this, it seems that: (a) Prior consent would be required to send messages to specific individuals to promote the nonprofit's offering, including via LinkedIn. (b) A simple message asking if a person would be interested in learning more, or otherwise trying to obtain their consent, would itself be considered direct marketing, so itself require prior consent... If this is correct, how could the nonprofit legally contact the relevant stakeholders? I am confused about what should be done in this case. It seems very strange that a person at a company who might be interested in using the nonprofit's services cannot even be sent a one-line opt-in request to receive more details on LinkedIn. Any thoughts gratefully appreciated. Some solutions I have considered: Take advantage of the difference between 'corporate subscribers' and 'individual subscribers' in the UK's implementation of the ePrivacy Directive (PECR), which allows direct marketing to employees' corporate email addresses . Only applies to the UK and probably does not apply to LinkedIn. Phone the individual concerned to obtain consent prior to sending a message. Requires knowing the phone number and is time-consuming. Contact the company's official email address (e.g. info@company.com) instead. Impractical as reply rate is very low from such addresses.

You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.

How could a nonprofit obtain consent to message relevant individuals at a company on LinkedIn under the ePrivacy Directive?

Suppose a nonprofit wishes to contact some EU-based employees of an EU-based company in an effort to get that company to use a free service it is offering, and is considering doing so via LinkedIn. Per Article 13 of the ePrivacy Directive - i.e. Directive 2002/58/EC : The use of automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent. And, per Article 2(h), 'electronic mail' would include social media messages such as LinkedIn messages: "electronic mail" means any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient's terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient 'Direct marketing' is not defined in the ePrivacy Directive, but the UK Information Commissioner's Office gives the following guidance (my emphasis): Direct marketing is defined in section 122(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018 as: “the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”. This covers all advertising or promotional material, including that promoting the aims or ideals of not-for-profit organisations – for example, it covers a charity or political party campaigning for support or funds. The marketing must be directed to particular individuals. In practice, all relevant electronic messages (eg calls, faxes, texts and emails) are directed to someone, so they fall within this definition. Genuine market research does not count as direct marketing. However, if a survey includes any promotional material or collects details to use in future marketing campaigns, the survey is for direct marketing purposes and the rules apply . From this, it seems that: (a) Prior consent would be required to send messages to specific individuals to promote the nonprofit's offering, including via LinkedIn. (b) A simple message asking if a person would be interested in learning more, or otherwise trying to obtain their consent, would itself be considered direct marketing, so itself require prior consent... If this is correct, how could the nonprofit legally contact the relevant stakeholders? I am confused about what should be done in this case. It seems very strange that a person at a company who might be interested in using the nonprofit's services cannot even be sent a one-line opt-in request to receive more details on LinkedIn. Any thoughts gratefully appreciated. Some solutions I have considered: Take advantage of the difference between 'corporate subscribers' and 'individual subscribers' in the UK's implementation of the ePrivacy Directive (PECR), which allows direct marketing to employees' corporate email addresses . Only applies to the UK and probably does not apply to LinkedIn. Phone the individual concerned to obtain consent prior to sending a message. Requires knowing the phone number and is time-consuming. Contact the company's official email address (e.g. info@company.com) instead. Impractical as reply rate is very low from such addresses.

Ad 1: E-mail Private E-mails are PII and need to be handled under GDPR. You need either consent or legitimate interest to work with those. Marketing without previous engagement is not a legitimate interest. Ad 2: calling Private phone numbers are PII and you need GDPR consent or a legitimate interest to work with those. Marketing without previous engagement is not a legitimate interest. Also, you can not use an automated calling machine, as that is explicitly called out. Also marketing calling in itself has strict rules. Ad 3: official e-mail Re low reply rates are because typically, marketing mails are filtered and deleted before anyone actually reads them. That is not a question of law though. Ad 4: Informational message Informing someone you have no relation to that a service is available is advertisement, no matter if it is a service for free or pay.

Is a provider's collecting your PHI and then cancelling your appointment a HIPAA violation?

Suppose someone arrives on time for an appointment, fills out all of the new patient paperwork, supplies a photo of their ID and insurance and is then told by the provider after handing in the material that their appointment has been cancelled. Is collecting all of this PHI without actually seeing the patient a HIPAA violation?

The HIPAA Privacy rule does not prohibit collection of information, it limits disclosure of collected information. §164.502 categorizes the standard permissions to use and disclose. An example of such information is your name. It is allowed for them to ask your name in order to make an appointment, it is not necessary to wait until they actually see you.

Can my will gift digital files to specific people?

A specific bequest is defined as such: the gift in a will of a certain article to a certain person or persons Here it says: A specific bequest is a gift (bequest) or a specific item or asset to a named person or entity. Does a computer file count as an item? Can I say that person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B? I imagine that I can, but it is not immediately clear to me that "item" or "article" includes digital files.

Wills are governed by state law, but yes you may. Almost anything that can be legally owned/possessed can be bequeathed. When a copyright holder dies their copyrights (intangible property) are transfer to the estate or heirs as proscribed in the will or state law if no will exists.

Can my will gift digital files to specific people?

A specific bequest is defined as such: the gift in a will of a certain article to a certain person or persons Here it says: A specific bequest is a gift (bequest) or a specific item or asset to a named person or entity. Does a computer file count as an item? Can I say that person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B? I imagine that I can, but it is not immediately clear to me that "item" or "article" includes digital files.

Technically, you would be bequesting the rights to the files. Rights are assets, and can be bequested. You have the right to access your laptop, and assuming you created the files, you have the right to copy them onto another device and do whatever else you want to do with them. Those rights can all be bequested, even though the files themselves are in some sense not "items".

Can my will gift digital files to specific people?

A specific bequest is defined as such: the gift in a will of a certain article to a certain person or persons Here it says: A specific bequest is a gift (bequest) or a specific item or asset to a named person or entity. Does a computer file count as an item? Can I say that person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B? I imagine that I can, but it is not immediately clear to me that "item" or "article" includes digital files.

The short answer is "sure, why not?" A will disposes of the deceased's property . In many cases a digital file can be treated in the same way as an analogous item of personal property such as a chattel (like a book or a key) or chose in action (like a bank account or share certificate). If the analogy holds up and the executor faithfully executes the deceased's instructions, then there is no problem. When the analogy breaks down because of the fundamental differences between digital files and the established categories of property, this highlights the amorphous nature of property itself. In the common law system, property is just a bundle of rights which can be enforced by starting litigation by analogy to previous cases. To answer your question properly, we need to analyse the problem in terms of hypothetical parties who could sue each other and persuade the court to make or not make particular orders. Assume that the deceased writes in their will that "person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B," but the executor just gives the laptop to A. B could sue the executor for breach of trust , and argue that file B was an item of personal property which the executor was bound to transfer to B. The executor could reply that the clause was a non-binding expression of wishes, to be treated in the same way as a direction about funeral arrangements. To resolve this dispute, the court would hear evidence about why file B is so important and perhaps, why the executor chose not to comply with the deceased's wish. These details could be important to the court's determination of the resulting questions of property law and equity . On the other hand, suppose the executor gives B a copy of file B, then gives the laptop to A with the original version of file B still on it. This might defeat the testator's goal of giving file B exclusively to B (which would go without saying, if the file were an item of personal property). Whether B could somehow enforce that exclusivity would again raise complicated questions of equity, and perhaps copyright . On the other hand, if the reason for exclusivity was that file B was a Bitcoin wallet (which A then appropriates), the analogy to tangible property might become workable again. This means that the longer answer to your question is "maybe, but anybody who wanted to enforce that part of your will would need to persuade the court that the file can be treated as personal property, or that your executor is otherwise obliged to follow your instructions about the file as a matter of trust law."

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

You cannot legally force police to wait to carry out the search. They can search even if you are not present. In fact, they are required to execute the warrant within a certain time frame, which precludes delaying the execution of the warrant. You can inspect the warrant to see if it is "proper" (has the judges name, correct address, is a search warrant and not a warrant of removal/deportation...). Calling a lawyer is always wise, but that does not stop the search.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

You can certainly call your lawyer when the warrant is served but the police are going to seize the evidence they want to since the warrant is at this stage considered valid. There are several avenues during various stages of the legal process where the warrant can be contested in courts, since any incriminating evidence will be communicated to the defendant and its admissibility in a trial will be determined prior to a jury ever being empaneled.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

Your protection from unauthorized searches is granted through inadmissibilty of evidence not through preventing the search. So if the police show up at your door and only present a supermarket receipt they can still search your apartment. But the 2 pound bag of cocaine found on your living room table will be excluded from evidence because the search was invalid. Hence from the police perspective showing you an invalid search warrant is a very bad idea because it would invalidate any possible evidence they find. They would be better off not searching your place and not knowing about it because then it still exists in principle and may possibly be found later with a valid search warrant. If they have seen it with an invalid search warrant the evidence is lost legally.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

Jurisdiction germany : The police does not have to wait, but common advise is to call a lawyer or at least a neighbour to act as a witness and ask the police to wait. The common principle of commensurability applies to search warrants as well. So unless there is immediate danger (e.g. of you or someone else making things disappear) they might wait, especially if it's just a few minutes. While no specific law forces them to do so, not waiting a few minutes when it would not hinder them to do so opens them up to legal challenges on those grounds. Calling a lawyer also gives an opportunity for the lawyer to talk to the police by phone, even if arriving at your place takes time. Sidenotes: In Germany, there are restrictions on time, the police can't serve a search warrant in the middle of the night, unless they convince a judge of immediate and urgent danger. German search warrants also have to state what is to be searched and seized and again the principle of commensurability prohibits police from searching or seizing other things. That's why lawyers generally advise you to just hand over or show them where to find what they're looking for, which minimizes the mess they'll cause. Fun fact: If they break your door, or otherwise damage your property, they have to pay for the damage, if it exceeds 25 Euros.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

Jurisdiction: united-states You can ask a police person anything. They are not legally obliged to wait, but yes you can ask them just about anything. As always, it is best just to do whatever the person with the gun tells you to do. Dead people cannot sue You have a well established constitutional right to film police while on duty. You are also not required to leave the premises while they do the search. It would be prudent to have them explain the exact details of what the warrant entitles them to do and film them while they do it. As always there are a slew of ways in which a warrant can be invalidated, but none of them can happen when they search your place. You can beat the wrap but not the charge. Whether what police do is legal or not there is basically nothing you can do to prevent a police person from doing whatever they like. They truly are a law upon themselves.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

My understanding is that the police do not have to wait; however, it seems likely that if the police searched your apartment under the auspices of a supermarket receipt, not only would the evidence be inadmissible but you'd have a cause of action for civil damages under Section 1983.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant?

Somewhat influenced by this question . This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

Jurisdiction: russia A lawyer can be present during a search, but does not have to , therefore the police are not obliged to wait for one ( Criminal Procedure Code Article 182). However, it may well be reasonable not to let the police in even if they are unfriendly and are insisting! Arranging contractors and equipment necessary for breaking into your house might take them much time. Use all of this time to find a lawyer, and open your door at the very moment you hear a hydraulic cutter start! You are unlikely to get any additional charges for that.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

california You intended to kill them, you killed them, that's murder California Penal Code Section 187(a): Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. California Penal Code Section 188(a)(1): Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature. If this weren't the case, one could nitpick the cause of death almost endlessly. For instance, what if you stabbed them nearly to death, they were almost saved by a surgeon, but then they died of an infection that they acquired in the hospital? The law's solution is simple: if you not only killed them, but you also intended to kill them before doing so, that's murder.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

That’s murder new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900 s18 : Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. The act of chasing the victim with intent to kill caused the death. QED.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

england-and-wales You're describing a murder In English Law, the act of running from an attacker would be entirely within the realms of 'causation' (e.g. the attack caused them to escape) and is explicitly called out in case law as one of the things that an attacker would expect their victim to do in self-defence, hence remaining part of the attacker's responsibility. Per the CPS (Crown Prosecution Service) guidance on Homicide ; To break the "chain of causation" an intervening act must be such that it becomes the sole cause of the victim's death so as to relieve the defendant of liability - see R v Wallace (Berlinah) [2018] EWCA Crim 690; R v Kennedy (Simon) [2008] Crim. L.R. 222. Examples of intervening acts are: ... An act of the victim if not within the range of response which might be anticipated from a victim in his situation: R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95 and R v Williams Davis 1992 CLR 198 . In both the cases cited above, the victim of a violent assault attempted to flee and were injured during their attempt to escape . The aggressor was deemed to be accountable as this was a predictable chain of causation .

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

This will depend upon the legality of your actions so far, and how closely they are related to the death. For instance, if you were chasing that person with the intent to kidnap them, torture and then kill them, it’s going to be murder because you are committing a crime and they die because of that. If instead, you called and invited them to your house with the intent to do the same thing, and they get hit by a bus on the way, you haven’t yet committed an illegal act and you are free and clear (albeit disappointed that you didn’t get to torture them first). So, the key question is going to be did they die as a result of a crime you committed, and how closely that crime was related to their death.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

What you describe could be construed as felony murder in it is a death that happened during the committing of a felony. You were in the process of assaulting the victim and then he slipped and hit his head against a rock and died from that. In some states felony murder carries the death penalty like Nevada for instance. Intentions are pretty clear, you don't chase a person with a knife if you intend to do no harm.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

Also in English Law, the rule is, if you intended serious harm to a person, and a person dies because of it, that's murder. This definition means that: You didnt need to intend their death. Its enough to prove you intended to do them serious harm, and they died as a result of what you did. That's murder. It doesnt have to be the same person. If you intended serious harm to person A, but because of your actions a different person B died, thats murder as well. So if you punch someone hard enough, and they fall and die, the question will be whether you knew or should have known it was likely to do "serious harm", or would do it, or whether you intended "serious harm". (Sometimes the courts emphasise the criterion by describing it as "really serious harm" when talking to a jury.) Also if you mean to kill, or even "seriously harm", one person, and a different person dies - a bystander, or wrong victim - dies, thats murder too. In both cases, the "chain of causation" in Richard's answer is used to decide if the death was, or was not, a result of your actions, or resulted legally from some other cause.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

Also applies to injuries and in tort law. See the eggshell skull rule . Which says that if you intend to do a harm, "the unexpected frailty of the injured person is not a valid defense to the seriousness of any injury caused to them." So even if you manage to escape the murder charge, O.J. Simpson style, the victim's family gets another bite at the apple, in civil court. And there, they get to use all the evidence from the criminal trial, but the standard of proof is only "more likely than not" i.e. 51% likely . Since all the evidence has already been vetted by the criminal court, it is "shooting fish in a barrel" for the civil plaintiffs. So you will end up bankrupt and a pauper for the rest of your life, and even worse, you will have to live in Florida if you want to accumulate wealth via home equity, it being the only state that protects unlimited equity in a homestead. That is why OJ lives there. "Rest of your life" because bankruptcy doesn't clear liabilities from intentional crimes. Think about that. You get in a quarrel with someone and push them against the wall and yell at them, and they have a record of being extremely prudent about COVID precautions so it 51% more likely than not their fatal case came from you... boom, wrongful death. You could not have imagined they were not vaccinated, nor that you even had COVID.

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions?

For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

In the USA, if you commit a felony, and someone dies as a result, that’s murder. It doesn’t matter whether you intended to kill them (although you said they did). But it must happen as a foreseeable result. Foreseeable is for example two armed bank robbers committing a felony by robbing a bank, and police shooting one of them, the other is guilty of murder. Foreseeable is if you stab someone with a knife, they are taken to hospital, and they die because of a stupid and negligent act in the hospital. Not foreseeable is if you stab someone, they are taken to hospital in an ambulance, and that ambulance gets hit by a truck and your victim killed. It would be foreseeable if the victim tries to run away, runs into the street without looking or falls over their own feet and gets killed. It would not be murder if the death was not an intended or unintended result of your felony of attempted murder. Still attempted murder, of course.

Bob dies because Eve chose not to be vaccinated, is this a crime?

Bob is a clinically vulnerable adult that has a weak immune system. Eve is one of Bob's friends. Eve has been offered a vaccine for a widely spread and contagious disease that has the potential to kill Bob if he caught it from Eve. Eve does not take this vaccine, as she does not think it will affect her and it goes against her beliefs/morals. Unfortunately, Eve catches this disease and then passes it on (transmits) it to Bob. As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for murder, manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him?

As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself.

Bob dies because Eve chose not to be vaccinated, is this a crime?

Bob is a clinically vulnerable adult that has a weak immune system. Eve is one of Bob's friends. Eve has been offered a vaccine for a widely spread and contagious disease that has the potential to kill Bob if he caught it from Eve. Eve does not take this vaccine, as she does not think it will affect her and it goes against her beliefs/morals. Unfortunately, Eve catches this disease and then passes it on (transmits) it to Bob. As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for murder, manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him?

For the sake of argumentation, let me use the law from germany here. Under the condition, that the illness is a tracked infection under §6 Infektionsschutzgesetz (law for the protection from infections), then they are legally obliged to isolate and enter quarantine. That means, the mere act of meeting Bob would be a violation of law. Among the illnesses on that list are Cholera, Yellow Fever, Variola vera and Yersinia pestis - smallpox and plague. But SARS-COV-2 is also on that list. By purposefully meeting anyone while being under the mandated quarantine or isolation , Eve not only is to be fined for that (violating the quarantine) but also can be liable for damage to Bob as, according to the law, transmission is foreseeable. However, we can't a priori assume the necessary murder criteria in Germany, so it is possibly better described as Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge (StGB §227 - infliction of bodily harm resulting in death) or negligent homicide (StGB §222). The latter is punishable with up to 5 years or fine, the former with at least 3 years normally and 1 to 10 in lesser cases. However, there might be grounds for trying to go for other unlawful killing statutes, based on the exact pattern.

Does the President really have the absolute right to declassify anything he wants to?

The claim has been made by Donald Trump and many others that the sitting President has the absolute right to declassify any documents he wishes. Leaving aside the issue of what procedure he would have to use or what evidence there would have to be to accept that a particular document was in fact declassified, I'm curious if it's really settled law that he has this power. I can think of at least two cases where it would seem that he wouldn't have that power: Congress has declared some information classified, for example information related to nuclear weapons. Is it settled law that Congress has no idependent power to declare something classified such that the President cannot revoke that status? As a co-equal branch that also has national security responsibilities of all kinds, it would seem quite odd to say that Congress needs the President to classify things for it or that the President can revoke a classification that originates with Congress. The Constitution declares treaties ratified by Congress to have the power of Federal law, second only to the Constitution. Many classified documents are classified by the United States because their foreign sources declared them classified and our information sharing treaties require us to respect those designations. Is there really any reason to think the President can unilaterally revoke a classification designation imposed by a foreign power and that United States is obligated to honor by the operation of a treaty that the Constitution makes part of Federal law?

Congress has passed some laws that enable POTUS (via is branch) to restrict access to certain information. For example 50 USC 3126 , defines classified information to be information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. Or, 50 USC 3164 defines it as means any information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated Under existing law, material is classified with a certain statutory authorization (in these instances under Ch. 44 of Title 50, "National Security"), and Congress has given POTUS the sole power to add and subtract documents from the list of "classified" materials. See especially Subchapter VI . Of course, Congress cannot implement these laws themselves, that is the prerogative of the Executive branch (perhaps that is the feature of separation of powers that causes problems for understanding "classification"). In theory, Congress could pass a new law that imposes a special "classification" on a certain kind of document and furthermore limits the president's discretion to impose or remove said classification, they just have not done so yet. The real limit on presidential declassification power is the Administrative Procedure Act. POTUS cannot, himself, actually do much except as commander-in-chief, besides order other people to do things. A previous president issued an order that describes what should be done by departments, w.r.t. classified material, but each department then has to devise "rules" which, depending on the rule, have to be put out for public comment. As long as there exists rules (in the Federal Register) that require something more than presidential say-so for classification or declassification, then POTUS cannot unilaterally (de)classify, he also has to follow the rules. Which he can order changed, but there is a procedure that has to be followed.

Belgian inheritance laws valuation date

Is the value of a property at the time of deceased used for splitting inheritence or is it the value of the property when sold a later date?

I only know the relevant law in germany but strongly suspect the law is the same or very similar in Belgium. The relevant date for the value of an inheritance is the day of the death. For all items in the inheritance the value on that day needs to be estimated and this value is used both for computing an inheritance tax and for computing the size of the inheritance for the different heirs. For real estate there should be some formula that uses a square meter price from some official source to compute the value (in German this is called 'Bodenrichtwert' and can be found for example here ). Whether you can realize more or less than this price in an actual sale later on is not relevant for the inheritance. If there is no testament the heirs need to agree amonst each other who gets what. Their respective shares in total value are computed based on the value at the time of death.

Belgian inheritance laws valuation date

Is the value of a property at the time of deceased used for splitting inheritence or is it the value of the property when sold a later date?

I am in New Zealand. My answer is based on my experience. My parents-in-law died not so long ago. To figure out the value of their house, the lawyer said that the house would have to be sold. So, the trustees wanted to sell the house. But I wanted to buy it for sentimental reasons for my wife. I asked the beneficiaries to select a valuer. I offered them the price from the valuation less 2% (agent fees). And it was accepted. Note that this was for the purpose of splitting the value of the house. Of course, the Tax department would probably take the value at the time of death. But there are no death duties in NZ.

The Consumer Regulations 2013: limits of applications and 'gambling' (UK law)

The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 provides consumers and traders with a number of protections and requirements. Regarding limitations of what this law is applicable to, section 6 states: Limits of application: general 6.—(1) These Regulations do not apply to a contract, to the extent that it is— (a)for— (i)gambling within the meaning of the Gambling Act 2005(1) (which includes gaming, betting and participating in a lottery) To me it seems that this law contains a number of provisions which may be relevant in dealings between gambling operators and their customers and that aren't in themselves strictly forms of 'gambling'. For example, section 10 (regarding what traders must do to inform customers before entering into a contract) could apply to customers singing up with the operator (?), or section 40 regarding additional charges made to a customer without to prior consent could apply to charging customers for services and charging for their telephone help line, etc. Does section 6(1)(i) mean in effect that none of this law's provisions are applicable to dealings between gambling operators and customers, or rather that the law is generally applicable in such contexts but is not applicable with regards to how its provisions might apply to gambling in the narrower sense of the act of placing bets, playing casino games, or playing one of their lotteries (for example, the information which must be made available to a customer before placing bets, playing such games, etc)?

They do not apply at all to gambling Gambling is instead regulated under the Gambling Act 2005 .

Contract Law: Sale by Auction; Undeclared Reserve Price

What is the correct position: during an auction, the Auctioneer accepted a bid but when the client returned to pick up the sold item, the Auctioneer declined to get the money saying the accepted price was fall below the reserve price. Can the bidder who won sue for breach of contract? NB: The Auctioneer did not mention that there was a reserve price on the item.

Generally, the bids are the offer which the auctioneer may, but is not bound to, accept. ( Chitty on Contracts , § 4-025). Many Sale of Goods Acts specify that the " sale is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of a hammer " (see Ontario's Sale of Goods Act ; see also Chitty on Contracts , § 4-025). If the auctioneer is not going to accept the bid, the auctioneer may withdraw the lot. If the property is put up for auction subject to a reserve price , no contract is formed if the auctioneer mistakingly purports to accept a bid lower than the reserve price ( Chitty on Contract , § 4-026). Any after-the-fact declaration of the existence of a reserve bid has no bearing on the formation of the contract. The only thing that matters is whether the property is put to auction subject to a reserve price . If it is not put up subject to a reserve price , then the contract for sale is formed with the highest bidder when the auctioneer announces the completion of the auction. If the property is put up subject to a reserve price , then no contract is formed, even where there is purported acceptance by the auctioneer.