Datasets:

vblagoje

/

Law-StackExchange-Deduplicated

like 0

Can shop staff search your bag when you are selected for a random rescan?

(UK based). My question refers to the situation where you are using the "scan as you go" system in which you scan items and pack them into your bag as you go around the shop, and pay at the till before you leave. When using this system you agree in the terms to random rescans, in which your items are occasionally completely rescanned by store staff to see if there is anything you didn't scan. However, this seems to imply that the shop staff have the ability to go through your personal bag, which may have your own belongings as well as your shopping. As far as I am aware here the store has no recourse to use citizens arrest powers, as there has been nothing to suggest you have broken the law, so they have no power to search your bag or detain you for a police member to search your bag. But if they have no power to search you, surely the rescan system will never catch potential shoplifters, as any unscanned items can be kept concealed in your bag.

You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.

Does res judicata prevent you from filing separate claims for different causes of action with overlapping facts?

(UK law, small claims.) This is a follow-on question to one I asked earlier. Splitting a claim into several small claims A reply to my question stated: You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. I would like clarification of the "same facts" part. What if the facts overlap, but have some different elements. Hypothetical case: Adam wants to sell a valuable painting. Bill promises to sell it for £120,000, and charge a fee of £10,000. But in fact he sells it for £95,000 and charges £20,000 for his work. So, Adam wants to sue Bill to recover some of his loss. Deciding that a claim in the high court is too expensive, he wants to make two claims in the small claims court. First case - a claim under tort law for negligence. Relies on the fact that the item was sold for less than its proper value. Cites facts A, B, C, D, E. Second case - a claim under contract law. Relies on the fact that Bill overcharged for his services. Cites facts A,B, C, F, G. Does the different causes of action, and the different but overlapping set of facts allow the splitting of the case?

Res judicata in the broad sense The relevant rule is stated in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313: where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case , and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. A more recent statement of the law appears in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2014] AC 160; [2013] UKSC 46 : Res judicata is a portmanteau term which is used to describe a number of different legal principles with different juridical origins. As with other such expressions, the label tends to distract attention from the contents of the bottle … Fifth, there is the principle first formulated by Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson , which precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but could and should have been raised in the earlier ones. These principles apply when one claim is decided, and in subsequent proceedings, the plaintiff raises issues which "could and should have been" addressed in the first claim. Consolidating pending cases Your question raises a slightly different situation, where two overlapping claims are brought at the same time. Doing this to avoid paying court fees is likely an abuse of process . It would also breach the plaintiff’s duty to help the court advance the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost. If both cases are pending, the overriding objective can be achieved by consolidating the cases or transferring them to a more appropriate jurisdiction. If the court does this, on its own motion or at the request of the defendant, the overlapping causes of action can be determined in one judgment.

Do 501(c)(7) organizations have to charge dues or fees to members?

(US/MA) I plan on registering a 501(c)(7) organization out of an existing gaming community. This community is one that requires membership applications, and meets only online. It is highly irregular, and frowned upon, for communities based in this specific game to charge fees or dues to its members or members of staff, and as such, I am wondering if 501(c)(7) organizations have to charge dues or fees to members, or if we can still request donations instead.

This answer is limited to U.S. federal taxation and does not address state income taxation in Massachusetts which is also within the scope of the question. The relevant statute with respect to a 501(c)(7) organization has the following language: The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a): (7)Clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder. Dues or fees are not required to qualify for 501(c)(7) status. But donations are not tax deductible for income tax purposes by the donor. Instead, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) is an exception from entity level income taxation. Its "profits" are not taxable income to the entity. The scope of organizations to which contributions are eligible for an income tax charitable deduction are set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (set forth below), which excludes 501(c)(7) organizations: For purposes of this section, the term “charitable contribution” means a contribution or gift to or for the use of— (1)A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is made for exclusively public purposes. (2)A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation— (A)created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States; (B)organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; (C)no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and (D)which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States or any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B). Rules similar to the rules of section 501(j) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph. (3)A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or society of, or trust or foundation for, any such post or organization— (A)organized in the United States or any of its possessions, and (B)no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. (4) In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic fraternal society, order, or association, operating under the lodge system, but only if such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. (5) A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of its members, or any corporation chartered solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily incident to that purpose, if such company or corporation is not operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of such company or corporation inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. For purposes of this section, the term “charitable contribution” also means an amount treated under subsection (g) as paid for the use of an organization described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4). A separate analysis applies to the question of whether a donation to a 501(c)(7) organization is eligible for the gift and estate tax charitable deductions (26 U.S.C. §§ 2522 and 2055 respectively), or to the charitable deduction for trusts (26 U.S.C. §§ 642 and 664). Donations to a 501(c)(7) organization are not eligible for the annual exclusion from gift taxation (currently $15,000 per donor per individual donee per year), nor are they eligible for the gift and estate tax charitable deductions (so, in theory, a donation to the 501(c)(7) should be reported on IRS Form 709), but dues and fees are not considered gifts so they don't need to fall within this exemption to avoid gift tax. Form 709 reporting requirements, however, are almost never enforced in practice in this context. Thus, in a 501(c)(7) organization, a payment of dues, a payment of fees, and a donation, are all identical from a federal income tax perspective. But due and fees are gift tax exempt, while donations are taxable gifts for gift tax purposes (and are not entitled to the estate tax charitable deduction).

I am a citizen by state X, but I bought a house in state Y and then changed my citizenship from X to Z

(all the instances of state here means a state in the general sense of a "country", not in the federal state of say a " U.S.A. state "). Let's assume that I am a citizen by state X , but I bought a house in state Y (with the passport type for identification being that of state X) and then at some point I have changed my citizenship from that of state X to that of state Z . How does the change of citizenship and the use of a new passport type may be used against me, in state Y? Someone tries to use the fact that I no longer use a passport issued by state X to say that I no longer owe the property (due to racism) Someone real estate official demanding ransom for changing all records from about passport type X to about passport type Z etc.

As a general principle: you don't have to do anything. While I can't rule out that some country might have a law that removes title to property from citizens of a certain other country (perhaps as part of some economic sanctions), this isn't generally the case. Generally, your property belongs to you, not "you, a person who is only a citizen of X." As for your examples... Someone tries to use the fact that I no longer use a passport issued by state X to say that I no longer due owe the property (due to racism) This isn't relevant. Your passport has nothing to do with your property ownership. My passport expired recently, but no one gets to come take my stuff. Some real estate official demanding ransom for making changing all records from that of passport type X to those of passport type Z Well...corrupt officials don't really need a legitimate excuse to extort bribes, but this seems like a particularly flimsy one for the same reasons as above. They could probably also extort a ransom to process your property tax payment before the deadline, or some other completely made-up reason.

The Kampala Amendments, Germany, and the White Helmets

(as a legal question, I understand that some follow only one of the two main narratives currently running on world events!) Annex I 2.2(g) states that: (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. counts as aggression. (not that this was necessary since Nicaragua vs USA (1986) said the same thing). Now I understand that if the armed action is extraterritorial to the funding state, as is the case with Germany's (et al's - but they never ratified the amendments) financing, only a state can bring a claim. However, if members of this group get resettled within Germany, can a private German citizen bring the same claim against their government? Or would it be necessary for any member of a group that violated the above quote to first carry out acts equivalent to state force within Germany itself?

UN Resolution 3314 is not binding, and Art 3(g) is "just a recommendation". Whether or not A can bring a claim against B has to be determined by the laws of a country with jurisdiction or, possibly, an international law. The summary is that an individual has no standing to pursue the matter in ICC; I don't know whether individual A could bring a claim against B in Germany under German law. The crime of aggression is defined by an amendment in 2010 (the Kampala Amendment) to the Rome Statute of the ICC . As it happens, the amendment was accepted (not ratified) by Germany. The crime of aggression is defined in the amendment as the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations Then there is a long list of conditions defining "act of aggression". The Rome Statute has numerous amendments , with the definition of aggression being the only relevant one that is in force. Now we can look at the statute itself (the originally passed statute). As a preliminary, "The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute" (Art.11) Under Art. 12, if a state becomes a party to the statute then they are subject to the court's jurisdiction w.r.t. the claim. Germany could then request an investigation by the prosecutor (and could be investigated), under Art. 14: A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes. There is no limitation to the effect that the state party has to have been in any way an aggrieved party. Art 13 gives the court jurisdiction if A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14...A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations or...The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15 So the bottom line is that Germany can request prosecution, or the Security Council can, or the Prosecutor can sua sponte prosecute an alleged crime. But Mr. Jones has no standing in ICC for alleged aggression. An alternative is that maybe Mr. Jones can bring a claim against an aggressor (let us say, the Elbonian Empire) under German law, but that would be orthogonal to questions about the Rome Statute.

Question on intent in Texas forgery case

(f) A person is presumed to intend to defraud or harm another if the person acts with respect to two or more writings of the same type and if each writing is a government record listed in Section 37.01(2)(C). Does this mean if a person had only one counterfeit bill then they would not be presumed to have intent to defraud? I apologize if there's something here I'm missing.....

No. it does not. Having an "intent to defraud or harm another" is an element of several of the offenses defined in that chapter. If a person has counterfeited 2 or more bills or government records, or possesses two or more such items, such intent is presumed. It is also presumed under another provision if a person has ID information on three or more persons. It is also presumed if a person fails to release an improper lien. If the conditions for presuming intent to defraud are not present, then the prosecution would need to prove this with evidence. That could include statements by the defendant or by witnesses, or circumstances which make it probable that there was such an intent. But the jury or judge (if a bench trial) would need to be satisfied that there was such an intent to convict on any of the offenses for which intent to defraud is an element.

Can medical information (such as expected time until a terminal condition occurs) be witheld from minors?

(not including mental issues) Do medical professionals have an obligation to tell the patient their findings, or can they just tell the parents and leave it up to their judgement whether or not the minor will be informed?

Do medical professionals have an obligation to tell the patient their findings, or can they just tell the parents and leave it up to their judgement whether or not the minor will be informed? Generally speaking, parents are "natural guardians" of their children to whom medical communications can be made by medical professionals without directly informing the child. But medical ethics also don't necessarily treat all minors the same. A distinction is made between more mature and less mature minors on a sliding scale. Physicians who treat minors have an ethical duty to promote the autonomy of minor patients by involving them in the medical decision-making process to a degree commensurate with their abilities. When minors request confidential services, physicians should encourage them to involve their parents. This includes making efforts to obtain the minor’s reasons for not involving his or her parents and correcting misconceptions that may be motivating their objections. Where the law does not require otherwise, physicians should permit a competent minor to consent to medical care and should not notify parents without the patient’s consent. Depending on the seriousness of the decision, competence may be evaluated by physicians for most minors. When necessary, experts in adolescent medicine or child psychological development should be consulted. Use of the courts for competence determinations should be made only as a last resort. When an immature minor requests contraceptive services, pregnancy-related care (including pregnancy testing, prenatal and postnatal care, and delivery services), or treatment for sexually transmitted disease, measures to prevent sexually transmitted disease, drug and alcohol abuse, or mental illness, physicians must recognize that requiring parental involvement may be counterproductive to the health of the patient. Physicians should encourage parental involvement in these situations. However, if the minor continues to object, his or her wishes ordinarily should be respected. If the physician is uncomfortable with providing services without parental involvement, and alternative confidential services are available, the minor may be referred to those services. In cases when the physician believes that, without parental involvement and guidance, the minor will face a serious health threat, and there is reason to believe that the parents will be helpful and understanding, disclosing the problem to the parents is ethically justified. When the physician does breach confidentiality to the parents, he or she must discuss the reasons for the breach with the minor prior to the disclosure. For minors who are mature enough to be unaccompanied by their parents for their examination , confidentiality of information disclosed during an exam, interview, or in counseling should be maintained. Such information may be disclosed to parents when the patient consents to disclosure. Confidentiality may be justifiably breached in situations for which confidentiality for adults may be breached, according to Opinion 5.05, “Confidentiality.” In addition, confidentiality for immature minors may be ethically breached when necessary to enable the parent to make an informed decision about treatment for the minor or when such a breach is necessary to avert serious harm to the minor. Source quoted: AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinion on Adolescent Care , Opinion 5.055 - Confidential Care for Minors, AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (November 2014). Also, it isn't entirely settled that physicians have a duty to make full disclosure to their adult patients regarding matters such as life expectancy when diagnosed with a terminal condition) if they determine that it is not in the best interests of the patient to receive the full and accurate information. The modern trend is to disfavor this practice unless a patient has given advance consent to it. But the American Medical Association ethics opinions cited below are only advisory guidance to state medical profession regulators who are not obligated by law to adopt it. Some states follow the modern trend expressed in these opinions, but others have not chosen to adopt this view. Even the modern view, however, affords physicians some discretion in the timing of when disclosures are made based upon the best interests of the patient that they perceive. There are at least two important ethics opinions on point: Opinion 8.08 - Informed Consent The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an informed choice. The patient should make his or her own determination about treatment. The physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible for the patient’s care and to make recommendations for management in accordance with good medical practice. The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice. Informed consent is a basic policy in both ethics and law that physicians must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is imminent. In special circumstances, it may be appropriate to postpone disclosure of information (see Opinion 8.122, “Withholding Information from Patients”). Physicians should sensitively and respectfully disclose all relevant medical information to patients. The quantity and specificity of this information should be tailored to meet the preferences and needs of individual patients. Physicians need not communicate all information at one time, but should assess the amount of information that patients are capable of receiving at a given time and present the remainder when appropriate. Opinion 8.082 - Withholding Information from Patients The practice of withholding pertinent medical information from patients in the belief that disclosure is medically contraindicated is known as “therapeutic privilege.” It creates a conflict between the physician’s obligations to promote patients’ welfare and respect for their autonomy by communicating truthfully. Therapeutic privilege does not refer to withholding medical information in emergency situations, or reporting medical errors (see 8.08, “Informed Consent,” and 8.121, “Ethical Responsibility to Study and Prevent Error and Harm”). Withholding medical information from patients without their knowledge or consent is ethically unacceptable. Physicians should encourage patients to specify their preferences regarding communication of their medical information, preferably before the information becomes available. Moreover, physicians should honor patient requests not to be informed of certain medical information or to convey the information to a designated proxy, provided these requests appear to genuinely represent the patient’s own wishes. All information need not be communicated to the patient immediately or all at once; physicians should assess the amount of information a patient is capable of receiving at a given time, delaying the remainder to a later, more suitable time, and should tailor disclosure to meet patients’ needs and expectations in light of their preferences. Physicians may consider delaying disclosure only if early communication is clearly contraindicated. Physicians should continue to monitor the patient carefully and offer complete disclosure when the patient is able to decide whether or not to receive this information. This should be done according to a definite plan, so that disclosure is not permanently delayed. Consultation with patients’ families, colleagues, or an ethics committee may help in assessing the balance of benefits and harms associated with delayed disclosure. In all circumstances, physicians should communicate with patients sensitively and respectfully. Sources quoted: AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on Informing Patients , Opinion 8.08 - Informed Consent and Opinion 8.082 - Withholding Information from Patients, AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (July 2012).

Have there been any known lawsuits where a party has intentionally lost because they wanted the opposite precedent of what wouldBenefitThemInThatCase?

(sorry about the camelCaseTitle, I ran out of characters) Have there been any lawsuits where the losing party is known to have intentionally lost, because they wanted the opposite precedent of what would benefit them in that particular case? For example, suppose XYZ Entertainment Inc. publishes a movie, then ABC Studios LLC uses part of it in their own movie in a way that is possibly fair use. XYZ then sues ABC. If ABC won, however, the precedent would do them more harm than good long-term; they don't want other companies to be able to copy their work in that way, and they are willing to pay damages to XYZ to avoid that. In the scenario described in my question, ABC would try to lose the lawsuit, because the damages they will pay by losing are less than the long-term loss they would suffer due to the precedent set by them winning. Has something like this ever happened? (This isn't limited to copyright; that was just an example.) Would it be ethical for a lawyer to "represent" ABC and try to lose the lawsuit for them if they specifically wanted this? I'm interested in answers for any jurisdiction, but especially the US.

There are some cases in which it is ethical to lose a suit on purpose, called Friendly Suits . They're not real controversies, as both parties already agree on the outcome desired, but judicial recognition of that outcome is still desired. Your example doesn't sound like that to me. It seems like it would be easier for ABC to just settle with XYZ before it made it to trial and risked setting precedent.

Is it legal to intentionally cause a probably non-fatal accident to prevent a likely fatal accident?

(sorry about the really bad drawing) Two cars, A and B, are at an intersection. A is stopped at a stop sign; B is moving and does not have a stop sign. Across the intersection from B, there is a pedestrian in a crosswalk. The pedestrian cannot feasibly escape, and B does not appear to be stopping. B is far enough back that A could prevent them from hitting the pedestrian by pulling into the road. B is driving at a speed at which hitting a pedestrian would probably kill the pedestrian, but crashing into another car would probably not result in any fatalities. Is it legal for A to pull out in front of B, intentionally causing a relatively minor accident to avoid a fatal one? Is A at fault?

Deliberately causing an accident is illegal. However, in some (probably many) jurisdictions there is a "necessity" defense against criminal charges. In Washington it goes like this: Necessity is a defense to a charge of (fill in crime) if (1) the defendant reasonably believed the commission of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize a harm; (2) harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law; (3) the threatened harm was not brought about by the defendant; and (4) no reasonable legal alternative existed. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge]. It is possible, if B is attempting to kill the pedestrian, that you have defense of others available as well.

At first UK, then EU, then GERMANY, then GDRP, now LGPD ... How far we will be enforced to comply with other countries extraterritorial laws?

(these are somehow related questions: 1 , 2 , 3 ; but not duplicate ). Also, if you downvote, please comment the reason of downvoting, and don't see the rant where it is not. Original question: We (website owners) are endlessly required to comply with any new law whatever is invented by any country. Once in every new period, each country takes a new law which enforce world users to comply with their laws. (UK asks this, GDRP asks that, Germany asks to reveal website holder information, now LGPD asks something [i dont know]). And there are 250+ countries: And we have to comply all of each country's law (whenever why invent something). Strange, crazy and unlegit (why I should comply with i.e. Burgundia's law? Website (generally - internet) is not a material property like factory, retail store or mine, as they have to have chosen physical location & audience), but internet/website is absolutely opposite thing by concept (a place without a physical presense), and world-wide-web (call it DNS systems, IANA or ICANN) distributes it to all over the world (so, we don't intentionally register websites in Burgundia, thus we are not responsible if our website is accessed from Burgundia. If they don't like our website's privacy & terms, then don't use that website), and people enters our websites all over the world and we have no idea from where users enter. So, why or how we are forced to created algorithms to detect from which country user comes, then learn all those countries legislation and for each country have appropriate terms? Per an average mortal website-owner, this seems just insane and dream. Is not there any treaty or organisation that gives us (website owners) some freedom & protects us from other countries' illegit requirements? btw. I used "Burgundia" as a phseudo country name not to offence anyone.

You don’t need to comply with these laws Just stop operating in their country. If you choose to operate in a country, by operating a mine, a retail store, a factory or, say, a web site, then that country has a right, recognised by all other countries, to require you to abide by their laws while doing so. Once you start interacting with users through your website (cookies, login, eCommerce) you are “operating” where your users are and are subject to the applicable law. If you were to require your users to declare that they were citizens of and presently in, say, Azerbaijan, then only Azerbaijani law would apply. There is also a basic rule of law that you are responsible for informing yourself of the law relevant to your activities and to comply with it. Ignorantia juris non excusat .

Can I forbid the government from using my patented invention?

(this is a purely hypothetical situation, for literary research) I've filed a patent on a certain technology for facial recognition/analysis, and as the patent holder I want to use my exclusivity to ensure it's not used to harm anyone. Unfortunately, the nature of the invented technique can be easily misused for what I believe are evil purposes. Military, then law enforcement agencies, have begun connecting me with manufacturers who want to incorporate my technique into their software suites, to which I am firmly opposed. Mind, the patent is still in review, so getting inquiries this soon strikes me as odd. My question is, can I deny the military use of my invention should the patent be approved, and if not, are there any ways in which I can sabotage or otherwise render it difficult for them? Perhaps by requesting an impractically large royalty or purposely presenting a subtly faulty implementation to their manufacturing firm?

Can you prevent the government from using your patent? The opposite is actually true. If you patent something, and it is felt to be potentially of national security interest, then they can take your invention for the nation, produce it, and prevent you producing it or sharing the design indefinitely (though it will be reviewed annually). This has happened to about 5000 patents so far. https://www.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents/ Even where it is not of national security interest, and the government (or its contractors!) is not using it directly as covered in user6726' answer, they can still take your patent under the equivalent of eminent domain... well, I'll quote from http://patentplaques-blog.com/eminent-domain-excercised-on-patents/ During World War I, the military took all patents relevant to wireless technology and put them in a mandatory licensing pool. Anyone was then able to use the patents and the patent holders received royalties. The pooling of the patents led to innovations including the mass production of vacuum tubes and a national FM radio network. So, in short, the government can use your invention for its own purposes; it can prevent you from using it; and it can force you to give it to others. They don't do this too often, but if you're working in an area that you think will be of especial interest to them, it's something to be aware of. In general, they will compensate you somewhat for your trouble, but not as much as the open market could have.

GDPR (and data protection laws in general) in regard to non-commercial, personal database

(this is the closest StackExchange site I could find, even so, I'm sorry if the Q is still a bit out of place). So, I've just finished building an application for better handling some of my needs and responsibilities. Eg. I have a billing module for issuing invoices, keeping records of my finances, etc. This software is solely for my own personal use, there is no way I will ever give anyone access or source codes to run their own instances. Now, the backbone of this software is obviously a comprehensive database with such records as people and companies. And I wonder, how legal this technically is? This database obviously contains a lot of personal information/data, information entered exclusively by me. This information is accessible only by me, it's not and will not ever be used for any commercial purposes (I won't ever sell the information itself, nor the information metadata). So, am I technically breaking any laws/regulations just by having such software? For instance, intuitively it seems to me that having a directory with people, their phone numbers, emails, addresses, etc. clearly breaks GDPR rules. However, on second thought, this is precisely what the contacts app on my phone is - a directory of people with their personal information. So is this the same thing, or does the exact same concept break different rules when it's implemented in the phone vs. custom software?

It is not illegal to have such software. The question is how you use it. Some uses of your phone's contact app can be a GDPR violation as well. The GDPR has an exemption for “purely personal or household purposes”. When an ordinary user uses some software for managing their personal or family life, that is not subject to GDPR. E.g. I have a contact list with friends and acquaintances and that is not subject to GDPR at all. You are mentioning invoices. Issuing invoices is not a purely personal activity. It affects people outside your friends and family. Your understanding of the term “personal” (the software is custom-tailored for your needs) is different from the GDPR's concept of “purely personal”. With respect to processing activities that you perform e.g. as a freelancer, you must consider the GDPR. For all such processing activities, you need a legal basis. For invoices this is simple because you're legally required to issue correct invoices. But if your software has aspects of a customer relationship management system, things would be a bit more tricky. The GDPR offers a choice of legal basis, but here there might be a “legitimate interest” to keep track of people with whom you have a business relationship. But it is not the features of the software that are relevant here, but which processing activities you're going to carry out with that data via the software. Mere storage of information is already a processing activity in the sense of the GDPR, though. If you're using the same systems for purely personal activities and business activities, it might be difficult to understand your obligations with respect to your data. If possible, it is best to keep your private life separate from business activities so that no confusion arises. For example with a contacts app, it could make sense to use different user accounts for personal and business use. Typical GDPR issues with a contact information database could be: not having a clear purpose for which this data is being stored and used storing the information for longer than necessary storing information about people with whom you do not have an appropriate relationship sharing the data with others, without a proper legal basis unsolicited marketing to people, though some kinds of direct marketing are allowed by the laws in your country

Hospital billed me for services that I explicitly refused. Are there any legal ramifications for hospital?

(well, my wife). Background - we lost a pregnancy early this year. Got pregnant again. Wife had some spotting during first trimester, became panicky, and rushed off to a hospital. The main thing they wanted to do was perform STD screening. We've been exclusive partners for over 7 years now and neither of us have ever had any STDs, so my wife outright refused. Doctor was flustered and asked what she did want done, and she said an ultrasound to check on the baby. They needed to do a urine test first (checking for HCG levels and what-not) and then after the HCG levels were deemed high enough, did an ultrasound (baby was fine). I wasn't there for the visit (I was out of town) but she called me while waiting for the ultrasound and gave me the full run down, reiterating to me her refusal to have STD testing done. A couple months later and lo-and-behold I get a bill from the hospital, including over $500 for the STD screening she refused. There were some other items on the bill that without question did not happen, so it is possible that this is a billing mistake and not simply them outright ignoring my wive's clear desires. As a result they either billed me for a test that didn't happen, or performed a test that my wife refused. Either way I obviously have no intention of paying for this. The hospital itself has been very obstinate about my attempts to get any information out of them. My goal here isn't some poorly-thought-out plan to sue the hospital for damages. Rather, they made a number of serious billing mistakes, to the tune of about $2000 that I absolutely should not have to pay (the total bill is about $3600). So far they have not been receptive to my attempts to fix this, and I'm trying to find any leverage I can to get them to take me seriously. I'm not above threatening to (or actually) taking them to small claims court over this. I would like to figure out what legislation or regulations might be applicable before I start throwing the word "lawyers" around. So, to recap: My wife refused some specific procedures. The hospital may have performed them anyway and definitely charged us for them (>$500). Are there any specific laws/regulations that this would violate that I can use to get them to take my requests seriously? Update After some more heated phone calls with customer service reps (I got out my grumpy voice, which is not my norm), they eventually assigned a manager/dedicated customer rep to discuss my case with me (took a couple weeks to finally get a call from them). They said they would look into it in more detail, and also suggested I file written requests for all hospital notes from my visit (which I was already doing anyway). After getting the results we determined that (not surprisingly) the procedures which we knew never happened really didn't happen. As a result of the manager's own digging they finally realized that some of the billed services never happened and finally removed them from the bill. However, I was told that the STD screening did happen, that the notes showed the results were discussed with my wife (they weren't), and that there was no mention of a refusal for STD testing in the notes, so those charges would stand. I fully intended to argue more (there were many mistakes in their notes so the fact that there was no record of us refusing the STD screening was meaningless, in my opinion). However, I got distracted by the holiday season. Fortunately, at the beginning of the year (aka a couple months after our last exchange) we got a phone call from the hospital telling us they were taking the charge for the STD screening off the bill. I'm not sure what changed their minds. All-in-all they took about $1700 off the bill. It's still far more than is reasonable (there was an expensive item which I contested which they did not change), but it's a big difference and I'm out of items that can be easily argued so...

There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated , and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment.

in washington state can a divorce case last 32 months

, i purchased divorce packet and met with someone from legal aid 2 weekends in a row where she asked the questions and i answered..she filled my answers in the blanks..she filed paperwork after i saw judge to waive cost of filing fee..i asked if i had to attend any court peoceedings and she told me no and that in 90 days id be divorced..i went out to celebrate being divoced and she babysat my kid..turns out from my research many years later i wasnt divorced for 32 months after initial filing!!..this person whod helped me to fill out the paperwork made herself a joinder to the case and i received no notices to appear for court and she went instead..my husband attended court via telephone cuz he lived in another state..he also wrote the court a letter and paid a filing fee on the same case..not once was i ever told by the woman whod helped me with my paperwork or by my exhusband both of whod i seen during the 32 month period at least 2 times ever said anything regarding me havoing to go to court or that i was not legally divorced after 90 days..was this legal

in washington state can a divorce case last 32 months Yes. There is no limit to the possible duration of a divorce case, especially where at least one represented party has any money. This report showcases various instances of divorce proceedings that have lasted longer than the marriage itself because lawyers dragged the case for as long as they want. Being in Washington or New Jersey makes no difference. Your description, including the mention that your "helper" from the divorce packet babysat your kid, suggests that you have been scammed. If you want to get divorced, it is in your best interest to learn about divorce & procedural laws of your state and then take the helm of your proceedings. You did not specify the conditions of the divorce packet you purchased. It is therefore unclear whether the packet provider has any duty toward you in the direction of an attorney-client relation. That being said, your husband as the adversary in the proceedings has no obligation to inform you about proceedings if he already notified the person representing you in court.

If a couple pre-drafted a *non binding letter* stating opinions on custody do you believe it would be admissible?

-I will get an attorney don't need to make the recommendation again -I understand that prenups/postnups can't negotiate custody (best interests of child) -But lets say a couple drafts a letter that makes clear that its not a contract, not binding, but is intended to be admissible as evidence* on the issue of custody and what is in the child's best interests. It would talk about our views of custody when our relationship was peaceful (and not pitted against each other). Things like our views of both of us being capable parents, personal belief that joint custody is in the best interests of child or if we can't work together that even split legal custody would be our preference, etc. *****I'm curious whether you believe a family judge would allow such a letter to be admissible as evidence and whether that would play any baring on their decisions (lets assume that once the day came one of the parents were no longer in agreement with the letter). I realize that the best interests of the children is the standard, but would a judge be swayed by a prior written opinion on the best interests from the child's own parents?** Would resigning the letter every ~5 years (and having multiple copies as evidence) be a big help or a little help?

Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.

What legislation in the UK or EU requires online services and software companies to care about security of their products?

... And to what extent? E.g. what is the minimum an online service or software vendor are required to do to protect personal data? Let's not talk about PCI-DSS and payments here.

What is the minimum an online service or software vendor are required to do to protect personal data? In the UK that is covered by the Data Protection Act 1998 . The full Act can be downloaded here (pdf) The Data Protection Act controls how your personal information is used by organisations, businesses or the government. Everyone responsible for using data has to follow strict rules called ‘data protection principles’. They must make sure the information is: used fairly and lawfully used for limited, specifically stated purposes used in a way that is adequate, relevant and not excessive accurate kept for no longer than is absolutely necessary handled according to people’s data protection rights kept safe and secure not transferred outside the European Economic Area without adequate protection There is stronger legal protection for more sensitive information, such as: ethnic background political opinions religious beliefs health sexual health criminal records Source Data protection Guide to data protection - Information security (Principle 7) This part of the guide offers an overview of what the Data Protection Act requires in terms of security, and aims to help you decide how to manage the security of the personal data you hold. We cannot provide a complete guide to all aspects of security in all circumstances and for all organisations, but this part identifies the main points. We also provide details of other sources of advice and information about security. There is no “one size fits all” solution to information security. The security measures that are appropriate for an organisation will depend on its circumstances, so you should adopt a risk-based approach to deciding what level of security you need. In brief – what does the Data Protection Act say about information security? The Data Protection Act says that: "Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data." This is the seventh data protection principle. In practice, it means you must have appropriate security to prevent the personal data you hold being accidentally or deliberately compromised. In particular, you will need to: design and organise your security to fit the nature of the personal data you hold and the harm that may result from a security breach; be clear about who in your organisation is responsible for ensuring information security; make sure you have the right physical and technical security, backed up by robust policies and procedures and reliable, well-trained staff; and be ready to respond to any breach of security swiftly and effectively. ... What level of security is required? The Act says you should have security that is appropriate to: "the nature of the information in question; and the harm that might result from its improper use, or from its accidental loss or destruction." The Act does not define “appropriate”. But it does say that an assessment of the appropriate security measures in a particular case should consider technological developments and the costs involved. The Act does not require you to have state-of-the-art security technology to protect the personal data you hold, but you should regularly review your security arrangements as technology advances. As we have said, there is no “one size fits all” solution to information security, and the level of security you choose should depend on the risks to your organisation. ... What level of security is required? The Act says you should have security that is appropriate to: "the nature of the information in question; and the harm that might result from its improper use, or from its accidental loss or destruction." The Act does not define “appropriate”. But it does say that an assessment of the appropriate security measures in a particular case should consider technological developments and the costs involved. The Act does not require you to have state-of-the-art security technology to protect the personal data you hold, but you should regularly review your security arrangements as technology advances. As we have said, there is no “one size fits all” solution to information security, and the level of security you choose should depend on the risks to your organisation. The following link goes into a lot more detail on this topic. Source https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/principle-7-security/ Further Reading Guide to data protection

Order of precedence in cases where more than one nation has an interest?

... Disclaimer first: This is a hypothetical that came up during a discussion elsewhere. No real people were harmed during the creation of this question, and any resemblance to current or past events is purely an accident. Here's the scenario: Alice is a British citizen and foreign exchange student currently studying at MIT. Kurt is a German citizen visiting Boston on a tourist visa. Because he's planning on a bit of traveling, he rented a car. Because Kurt is also a bit of an idiot, one fine evening he gets behind the wheel after drinking a bit too much, and Alice is killed in a hit-and-run during his DUI, which ends nonfatally a bit later against a lamp post. There are three nations that would have an interest in this case: The USA, or at least the state of Boston where a DUI with a fatal accident took place; The United Kingdom, who have lost a citizen through no fault of her own and may want to have a word with the person responsible, or at least reparations of some kind for her family; Germany, who probably isn't happy with their citizen's behaviour right now, but is obligated to look out for the citizen's rights under their constitution. Presumably, the US has first right here because they're the nation in which the crime happened, but how does international law shake out the rest of the order of precedence? Would the order of precedence change any if it had been a deliberate murder (say, Kurt buys a weapon in Boston, goes to the pub Alice happens to be in as well, a drunken argument happens and Kurt uses his newly purchased weapon to settle it)?

DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law.

Although there are conflicting claims about what happened on June 4th, 1989 in Tiananmen Square

... the government of China doesn't claim that nothing happened. There is an official narrative, including the claim that soldiers working for the government of China were victims of protesters. Given that the government of China acknowledges that something happened on June 4th, 1989, and given that there are living eyewitnesses who were there, what is the legal basis for the government of China to stifle discussion of that topic? For example, suppose that some people decide that research and study and formulating questions is too risky on the topic of what happened on June 4th, 1989. Nevertheless, there is an official narrative, so people should be able to memorize the official narrative word-for-word and hold competitions reciting that narrative. Also, students in all grades in school in China could refrain from answering any questions on examinations in mathematics, unless they were already provided with an answer to exactly the same question, and they could compete to recite the official answer, word-for-word. Would such actions risk penalties under laws of China? Are people in China required by law to go beyond repeating the officially correct answer to questions that they have already seen in mathematics, but forbidden to go beyond the official narrative on the topic of events in Tiananmen Square on June 4th, 1989?

Chinese citizens have the privilege of free speech The Chinese legal system is from a completely different tradition to the Civil and Common law traditions that trace their roots to Roman and Germanic law. Over the past 1500 years, these systems have gradually been asserting that the sovereign is subject to rather than above the law. Chinese law on the other hand is subservient to the sovereign - the Chinese Communist Party. The law exists explicitly to advance and protect the interests of the CCP, not Chinese citizens. Discussion of the events of June 4 1989 is not in the interest of the CCP so its not legal. Examples of law relating to freedom of expression in Chinese and English can be found here . Of particular relevance are the Regulations on the Administration of Publishing: Article 5: All levels of the People's Government shall ensure that citizens are able to legally exercise their right to freedom of publication. When citizens exercise their right to freedom of publication they shall abide by the Constitution and laws, shall not oppose the basic principles confirmed in the Constitution, and shall not harm the interests of the country, the society or the collective or the legal freedoms and rights of other citizens. Basically, you are free to say whatever you like unless the CCP doesn't like it.

23&me used in criminal investigations?

...Ok not literally. But 23 & me analyses your DNA and can tell you roughly where your genetics are from and in particular, could point towards a particular race of person. We know that DNA testing is a common part of criminal investigations to match or rule out suspects, but if investigators were really at a loss, could they use the broad genetics of a suspect, say taken from the finger nails of a victim, to point towards a particluar race or someone of particular genetic origin? I really don't mean this as a racial thing at all, just out of interest. If I, Scottish to the bone, committed a crime while on holiday in France, against someone that was a complete stranger to me and I them, would the police be able to say, well we know it's someone with Scottish origins? I could see this being ethically questionable and possibly lead to a high frequency of false detentions. And on the basis of genetics / race makes it all the worse. Is this something that happens / could happen in the UK, US, Europe?

The legal situation is that these tests can give you a hint who the suspect might be, and in previous applications of the technique, existing voluntarily-provided genetic information from relatives sufficed to point to the actual suspect. You cannot arrest or convict based on a hint. A hint plus other facts can result in a warrant, which can result in a conviction. This is the case of the Golden State Killer. The details of the case are not generally known, but see this paper for a bit more information. Basically, they used public genetic databases to arrive at a tree of about 1,000 persons related to the suspect, and used other investigative techniques to narrow it down further. Here is the heavily redacted warrant affidavit that will give you some clue what else went into the search warrant leading to his arrest. Simply knowing "the suspect was of Northern European ancestory" is of insufficient specificity to support a search of all full-blooded and partial-blooded Scotsmen. This "can" happen in the US, but the real question is, how effective is the technique. This is 99% a non-legal question about sufficiently extensive genetic databases. GEDMatch attempted to limit how their database could be used to catch criminals, but had mixed success . There have been attempts to limit police access to genetic databases at the state level, and no laws have been passed. The Dept. of Justice has limited restrictions on the use of forensic genetic data in cases that it is involved with in certain ways, see here . Basically, what they say is A suspect shall not be arrested based solely on a genetic association generated by a GG service. If a suspect is identified after a genetic association has occurred, STR DNA typing must be performed, and the suspect’s STR DNA profile must be directly compared to the forensic profile previously uploaded to CODIS. This comparison is necessary to confirm that the forensic sample could have originated from the suspect That paper which I mentioned above has detected in SCOTUS some retreat the position that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information willingly given to a third party, starting with US v. Jones , 565 U.S. 400. Conceivably, such testing could fall within the scope of 4th Amendment privacy constraints, given a suitable ruling (or argument that results in such ruling). At present, there is no legal impediment to that kind of testing.

On what type of area, land or territory can you abandon your vehicle in California without providing a right to anyone to get your vehicle towed?

...Other than land, area or territory of your own or under your control or one you have contractual permission for. For 4 weeks? And for 3 months? More?

None. Putting something on a piece of land long term and prohibiting anyone to move it is effectively occupying that piece of land. You only can occupy land that you either have legal rights to, or that encounters no objection from those who has (adverse possession). In the latter case, it's not that you don't "provide them right to tow", rather they just don't mind not towing it. What you describe more resembles homesteading , but that is not possible in California .

How to adopt a class from .Net Core?

.Net Core is licensed under MIT (copy below). If I understood it correctly, it says I'm allowed to copy and modify the software, including for sale, but that I have to include the license text in "all copies or substantial portions of the Software". What does this exactly mean if I wanted to use (and modify) a source file from .Net Core in a closed-source project? Do I just copy the file into the project and compile it into the executable? Do I have to include the license text with the compiled end-product or just in the source code? Does it have to be a separate file? The MIT License (MIT) Copyright (c) .NET Foundation and Contributors All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. The source file has this written at the top: Licensed to the .NET Foundation under one or more agreements. The .NET Foundation licenses this file to you under the MIT license. See the LICENSE file in the project root for more information.

You should include the license statement or whatever you want to call it with the product in the same way that Firefox allows users to look at it's licenses, so users can identify what they are allowed to do with the software just like you want to. As for the separate file part, that is up to you. They aren't telling you specifically how to use it, they just want to giving you the right to use it.

Is it legal to host a directory of .onion urls?

.onion is a special-use top level domain suffix designating an anonymous hidden service reachable via the Tor network. .onion. (2016, March 11). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 12:46, March 23, 2016, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=.onion&oldid=709560870 I would like to host and maintain a directory of .onion urls on the normal Internet. I am not sure if this is 100% legal because these urls often refer to highly illegal services. There are already directories on the Internet but that does not mean that they are legal. I am living in Germany and the servers will be hosted in Germany too. Is it legal? Do I need a special disclaimer?

Generally speaking, you are only linking to other resources on the web, and generally that's not illegal. But that could be different depending on the country that hosts the site and the country of the user's access. This site seems to have no problem: http://thehiddenwiki.org/hidden-wiki/ Read their TOS, too: http://thehiddenwiki.org/2013/06/26/terms-of-service-and-privacy-policy/ That site is hosted in Romania (the domain is privately registered in Malaysia), but Germany and Romania are both EU. Now, what users may use those links for may be illegal. And that's still in legal flux in some jurisdictions, i.e. the hosting of a site of BitTorrent links that allow downloading of copyrighted material while the link itself does not contain the material themselves. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_issues_with_BitTorrent Besides, a list of .onion links on the regular web is useless unless you know how to use the links; you're linking to resources on the "dark" that are not even directly accessible from those links on the "bright" web. Someone who wants to go to an .onion link needs to install Tor https://www.torproject.org/ to enable the DNS changes to access the .onion TLD (Top Level Domain). .onion is not even in the Internet's Root Domain; it's a special case TLD. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion Installing and using TOR is one more step that someone has to take to make use of a link in the "bright" web to reach a link in the "dark" web. So your links are "isolated" in one more sense from usefullness, and that could be a legal defense, if it even comes down to it. Like anything, do your own research and draft a good TOS for your site. And, at the same time, using TOR is not illegal itself (but could be in some countries) , but can result in illegal activity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_(marketplace) Read TOR's own legal FAQ: https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en

What effect does a project's software license have on its cultural works?

0BSD and ISC are software licenses. They grant permissions for software. I guess these granted permissions legally only apply to what fits the legal definition of software. What if a project combines software with non-software works? What effect does applying a software license to a project have on non-software works within that project? An example scenario is a website implementing 0BSD via top-level LICENSE.txt like in this template .

The scope of the license is a bit murky, since it just refers to "this software". The intent of the license author is not exactly relevant, because the license author isn't the person with the right to permit copying, the author of the content is. When a content-creator make a vague reference to a canned license, it is not at all clear what they wanted to grant permission to do. Since software is legally treated as being a "literary work" at least in the US, it's not reasonable to hold that permission to use "this software" specifically excludes non source-code items (such as help files, blogs about the software, even associated graphics). Some programs simply will not run without associated graphic content. By a preponderance of evidence, the courts would conclude that the copyright holder intended the entire "package" (that directory) to be licensed. Of course, the copyright holder could also change the license terms if that is not his intent, and that would (theoretically) affect future downloads, except that others could redistribute the package under the terms of the original license. If the rights-holder intended to restrict certain components, they would have given a more specific license, excluding whatever bits are to be excluded.

What is the effect of the repeal of a law amending a former law?

1 U.S. Code § 108 provides "Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided." However, many state codes provide rules on construction on both this and in cases where the amendment to a former act is repealed without also amending or repealing the former act itself. This is, as far as I know, not covered by Federal law directly. In general, I would like to understand, on the Federal level, the rules of construction regarding the repeal of an amendment amending a prior act. Would the original, unamended, text be in effect, or would the amended text still be in effect? For example, say Law A provides "XYZ", Law B provides "Law A is amended to say 'ABC'", and Law C provides "Law B is repealed." In this instance, after the effect of all three laws, does Law A provide "XYZ" or "ABC"? To be more specific, I am only interested in this instance in regards to legislative amendments, not constitutional amendments.

Fundamentally, it is a question of discerning what the legislature intended. There are decisions going both ways, but I think the better view is that, consistent with the general policy of 1 U.S.C. § 108, repeal of an amending statute generally would not revive an old federal law. Crawford, The Construction Of Statutes (1940) at p 641 suggests otherwise: the repeal of an amendment to a prior statutory enactment restores the prior enactment to the same status which it had prior to the amendment, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The authority cited is In re Lippincott , 119 N.J. Eq. 343 (1936): Where a statute completely repealing a prior statute is itself repealed the original act is thereby revived … this was the rule of the common law … If such be the effect of the repeal of a repealing act, it seems a logically necessary result, — at least in the absence of some facts or circumstances creating an exception, — that a similar result must be adjudged in the case of the repeal of an amending act. The original act is thereby restored to its original, unamended state. In Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan , 365 F. Supp. 1312 (1973), a federal court dismissed an argument by analogy to this decision: That argument relies upon an analogy to certain old New Jersey cases holding that where a statute completely repealing a prior law is itself repealed, the original act is thereby revived … These cases have been overruled by N.J.S. 1:1-3.2 , enacted in 1960. Note that the court elided the concepts of repeal and amendment. An amending statute can be seen as repealing part of an earlier statute and replacing it with the amended text. It is likely that today’s federal courts would be similarly reluctant to apply the common law approach suggested by Crawford in view of 1 U.S.C. § 108, despite the fact that in terms it deals only with the repeal of a “repealing Act.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Kohlsaat v. Murphy , 96 U.S. 153 (1877) tends to confirm this. The provision which became 1 U.S.C. § 108 had by then been enacted, “but that provision was not in force when the cause of action in this case arose.” The decision concerned the import duty payable on “cotton canvas cut into strips of the size and shape for slippers,” which was affected by a series of legislative amendments: In 1861, cloth cut into patterns for slippers was duty free. In 1862, duty of 10% was imposed on these goods. In 1864, the specific duty of 10% was re-enacted, but a duty of 35% was imposed on “manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for.” In 1867, the paragraph creating the specific duty of 10% was repealed. The Court held that the 1861 and 1862 laws were not revived, and the general duty of 35% was applicable: Attempt at one time was made, as indicated in the second ground of the protest, to maintain the proposition that the repeal by the joint resolution referred to, of the enumerating paragraph in the Act of June 30, 1864, revived the same provision in the Act of July 14, 1862, which imposed the same duty as the repealed paragraph … Eminent counsel urged the proposition; but the court held otherwise, for reasons which are entirely satisfactory … the plaintiffs in this case abandon that theory, and rest their case entirely upon the first ground assumed in the protest — that the goods imported are exempt from duty, or, in other words, that the effect of the joint resolution under consideration was to repeal the paragraph in the two prior acts, to-wit, the act of 1864 and the act of 1862, and to revive the corresponding provision in the Act of the 2d of March, 1861, which included such goods in the free list. Cases arise undoubtedly where it is properly held that the repeal of a repealing statute revives the old law, but the Court is of the opinion that the rule in that regard is inapplicable to the case before the Court … Rules and maxims of interpretation are ordained as aids in discovering the true intent and meaning of any particular enactment; but the controlling rule of decision in applying the statute in any particular case is that whenever the intention of the legislature can be discovered from the words employed, in view of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances, it ought to prevail , unless it lead to absurd and irrational conclusions, which should never be imputed to the legislature, except when the language employed will admit of no other signification. The full decision illustrates the ambiguity in the concepts of repeal and amendment, at least in the context of 19th-century legislative drafting practice. It is to be hoped that modern legislatures would be more careful to make their intent clear. But if a similar question did arise today, the court would probably lean towards applying the substance of 1 U.S.C. § 108 even to a statute which does not fall strictly within its terms.

Employer Tuition Repayment

1 year ago, I accepted a new job with an education budget included. I turned down their initial job offer. When they asked if there was anything that could entice me to reconsider, I countered with the options of an increased salary or an education budget. The job became too much... I was given many duties well outside of the job description I signed when I took the job. Also, an employee that left was not replaced and I had to take on many of his duties as well. I have been stressed to the point of affecting my health and working endless hours of overtime that I don't get paid for because I'm on salary. Now that I have accepted another job (similar pay, less stress/hours), I am being asked to repay the education budget and realizing that the job offer did stipulate 2 years of employment. I am trying to negotiate with the employer based on the fact that I wouldn't have accepted the job without the education. However, if that fails, I still think I have a case because the clause is worded "I will to the best of my ability continue to work for (company) for 2 years". I have put every effort I have into the job, put in all the time required to keep up with the added duties, and in the end I am still being asked for more. Would the "best of my ability" argument hold up if I get taken to court? (Amount: $2500, Country: Canada)

There is a general common law doctrine of contract interpretation which tells us that ambiguities are construed against the drafter. In your case, had the employer intended to require two years of work (or else reimbursement back to them) they could have explicitly stated this . The fact is, the contract is written as it is for a reason, likely to entice you to accept the offer of employment. They softballed the requirements to get you to take the job and now they are trying to play hardball. I would hope that a court would find this and tell the employer to think about these clauses next time. The fact is, after a deal goes south is a bad time for an employer to start explaining what these terms mean. You have fulfilled your half of the bargain. If the facts are as you say they are then you satisfied the "best of my ability" condition. Another problem you might have is if the employer does not take you to court but instead continues to make threats, maybe sends a collections agency after you. In that case you will need to get an injunction to stop the employer. In other words, get a court to state that you do not owe them any money and enjoin them from continuing to as if you do. EDIT: as a commenter mentioned, a contract may explicitly provide that ambiguous terms will not be construed against either party.

Can a separation agreement finalized in a California court be overturned by a Canadian (BC) Court?

1) A separation agreement was made between M & F (both Canadian) but living in California. 2) The agreement states that F entirely owns n Properties in Canada. 3) M moves back to Canada, and over 10 years later wants to challenge the separation agreement. 4) The case is circulating the courts now, and M is claiming the separation agreement is one-sided and unfair. M wants some of the properties and has placed a CPL(lein) on F's properties in the meantime. 5) F is forced to constantly travel between Canada & California to deal with this. How is it possible that the Canadian courts are even considering this? Do they have jurisdiction to over-turn a separation agreement made in California? M believes that F gave the BC Supreme court jurisdiction by replying to M's motion with a counterclaim. Is this a true, does it really work that way? Thank you. Please let me know if you require any clarification.

How is it possible that the Canadian courts are even considering this? Because they were asked to. Do they have jurisdiction ... Maybe. One of the powers a court has is to decide if they have jurisdiction. The case involves Canadians and Canadian real estate - they need to at least consider if they have jurisdiction. They can decide wrongly but that’s what appeals are for. F should be providing them with evidence that they don’t have jurisdiction on the basis of Res Judicata but they will ultimately make up their own mind. to over-turn a separation agreement made in California? Of course not - Canadian courts cannot tell a Californian courts what to do. And vice-versa. Which means they certainly have the power to refuse to enforce its effects in Canada. If F wants to rely on the Californian judgement in Canada then the Canadian court has to allow this.

GDPR - is user social ID personal data

1) Is Google or Facebook user ID number considered personal data? The ID itself is just a number, but you can use it to construct a profile url and reveal his identity through Google or Facebook profile. 2) If I have a website which enables social login and therefore stores registered user Google and Facebook ID numbers in the database, with no other personal data, not even email or name, just these IDs, am I data controller? 3) If answer to 1) is "yes", then is the user ID number in salt-hashed form considered personal data? Having a hash you cannot convert it back to user ID. But having a user ID e.g. from his social profile, it's possible to convert it to a hash and compare against all hashes in the database to tell if this person has account on this website or not.

Yes, because the person is reasonably easy identifiable by the ID. Yes, because you process the ID which is personal data according to 1. No, because you cannot identify the person by their salt-hashed personal data in a straightforward way.

Legal basis for "discretionary spending" vs. "mandatory spending" in the USA

1. "Discretionary" and "mandatory" dollars My general understanding of the federal budget process in the USA is that: discretionary spending must be "appropriated" by the House of Representatives every year, following ideas from Article I Sections 7 or 9 or something. mandatory spending is not subject to this requirement. 2. This Congress can't bind a future Congress (?) However, my layman's understanding of Congress's power also includes the notion that "this Congress can't bind a future Congress". Googling around has provided many instances of politicians and even law professors invoking this notion, but no authoritative source. Some (perhaps only weak) form of this principle must be true; otherwise this Congress could say "no new laws can be passed after 2030 except by a 4/5s majority in Congress" or whatever, effectively stripping future Congresses of all of their power. 3. So, "mandatory" for whom? Thus I think my question is, for whom is the spending "mandatory"? Future Congresses? Could they just do a simple majority vote (assuming the President signs it) to alter "mandatory" spending? If so, is it really "mandatory"? And how would it then substantively differ from "discretionary" spending? Is "mandatory" really just an escape clause from requiring Appropriations by the House of Representatives?

"Mandatory" spending means spending that takes place without passage of a new appropriation bill, but it may still be modified by Congress. The only truly mandatory spending categories that cannot be modified by future Congresses are interest on the national debt and certain multiple year contractual obligations (e.g. for naval ship building contracts). "Discretionary" spending means spending that has to be appropriated each budget cycle. Without affirmative legislation, each budget cycle, it doesn't happen. The distinction is important because the U.S. federal legislative process is frequently gridlocked with divided control with the President's political party (which has veto power), or with a division of partisan control between the two houses of Congress, each of which have veto power over the legislative process. It takes the approval of both houses of Congress and the President to pass legislation except in the case of a rare veto override or a Senate and President approved treaty, which requires a two-thirds majority, and appropriations bills have to start in the U.S. House. If all three are not controlled by the same party, getting legislation passes as is necessary for discretionary spending, is challenging. So the status quo default of mandatory spending is hard to modify.

How does a layperson know whether to hire a Queen's Counsel?

1. A layperson may not know whether his/her case is complex enough to hire a Queen's Counsel. So how does a layperson decide, when deciding hiring a public access barrister? 2. Are barristers obligated to advise a client on such a question? To wit, will a Junior Counsel truly choose to lose business, by tell a prospective client to hire a QC instead? And vice versa? Barristers may not be the most scrupulous humans (insert chiding joke about lawyers here).

For question 2, there is a firm requirement on barristers to inform the client if different counsel would be called for. To quote the Bar Standards Board handbook: rC17 Your duty to act in the best interests of each client (CD2) includes a duty to consider whether the client’s best interests are served by different legal representation, and if so, to advise the client to that effect. The guidance specifically mentions that if something should be handled by more (or less) experienced counsel, there is an ethical duty to tell their client.

How can tourists compare Consumer Protection laws, across the glut of USA jurisdictions?

1. What up-to-date resources compare the profusion of consumer protection legislations in the USA? 2. How can tourists pick the American jurisdictions with the most consumer-friendly laws? Many travelers do not know, or are stunned to find out when something goes awry, the fact that "[i]n the United States, contracts are governed by state law: with rare exceptions (such as certain contracts to which the federal government is a party), there is no such thing as U.S. contract law. [emphasis mine] However, the laws of the 50 U.S. states — as well as those of the handful of U.S. territories — are generally consistent in applying a "freedom of contract" approach to commercial agreements between sophisticated (or presumed to be sophisticated) parties. Accordingly, choice of law and choice of forum provisions in commercial agreements are generally enforced in accordance with the contract language." Even lawyers probably cannot know about, keep abreast of, or compare, the consumer laws for each US jurisdiction that change constantly — California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act vs. New York's General Business Law vs. Washington state's "Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86)" vs. Consumer Protection Procedures Act DC Official Code §§ 28-3901 to 28-3913 .

What up-to-date resources compare the profusion of consumer protection legislations in the USA? Each state publishes their laws. Google search is usually the first stop. How can tourists pick the American jurisdictions with the most consumer-friendly laws? Tourists don’t usually pick their destination based on local consumer protection law; they base it on what they want to experience. If they want to see the Statue of Liberty their plans have to include New York although long distance views are available from New Jersey. Yosemite necessarily involves California, New Orleans - Louisiana, Memphis - Tennessee etc.

How can a defendant in a criminal prosecution move a court in a way that no oral statements of the defendant be considered in its adjudication?

1.a Can you "plead the Fifth" (“Silence”) at the end of the sole written brief of a motion and stipulate that no waiver, express or implied, to Silence can be deemed valid or legal unless made by the movant in writing and duly signed so as to prevent any oral hearing of the defendant to be misconstructed, and to compel the court to deny, approve or otherwise adjudicate the motion on the merits of its written brief without being able to consider any communication (or the lack thereof) other than the movant’s written brief? 1.b Is there any standard language for such an averment or declaration? Any examples? Alternatively, can the movant move the court in the brief that no motion hearing be held? To only receive a written response by the court? UPDATE As an example relating to the matter from the Wikipedia: "Customs vary widely as to whether oral argument is optional or mandatory once briefing in writing is complete." Primarily interested in the context of California criminal law, but other jurisdictions are welcome!

A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.

Does the Secretary of Defense's vaccine mandate constitute a legal general order under UCMJ?

10 U.S.C. includes the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (near as I can tell), specifically I'm curious how the decisions made by the Secretary of Defense play into the (Section 891) Article 92 regulations. Specifically, Article 92 acknowledges two types of orders that a soldier might end up in trouble for disobeying: general orders and other, specific orders. On the face of it it would seem to me that an order from the Secretary of Defense carries the full weight of the Office of the President, and therefore the Commander in Chief as an order-giving entity that soldiers are obliged to obey. This Wapo Article discusses the refusal of the OK Nat'l Guard to follow the order (on counter-orders from the Governor). I'll break out the separate, interesting question about DoD authority over Nat'l Guard units into another post. But it makes me wonder: Would a general officer refusing to relay the vaccine mandate to the units under their command constitute disobeying an order under Article 92? If so, would an order like this from the Secretary of Defense constitute a general order or the more specific "other" case?

A lawful order issued by the President or Secretary of Defense carries the full weight of an order under the UCMJ. Note that the OK National Guard will come under this jurisdiction during annual training orders, which is a federal call-up.

If one is tried+convicted of a crime at a certain time, can one be tried+convicted of another crime that happened at the same time? [Yakuza Series]

100% inspired by Yakuza Lost Judgement. Bob is accused of assaulting Alice at X o'clock, with video evidence. It goes to trial, and Bob is successfully convicted. Later on, strong evidence comes up of Bob committing the murder of Mark at X o'clock. (e.g. security camera footage + DNA evidence). How can this be handled? Will Bob's original sentence (for assaulting Alice) have to be overturned before he can be tried for the murdering of Mark? Can someone in jail even be tried for something else while they're already in jail? P.S.: For the original context: Alice was in cahoots with Bob. Alice said Bob did the crime, and Bob admitted to it. Furthermore, Bob was trying to make a mockery of the justice system by showing how, even though he obviously committed the murder of Mark, he would just stay in for short sentence over the fake assault of Alice.

Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe.

Business obligations under the OECD AEI/CRS

101 governments have meanwhile signed the OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (AEI, AEoI) and have thus agreed to send information on foreign account holders to the home tax authority of each account holder, beginning with information from the year 2016 or, for later adopters, 2017. The defining document, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf , describes in its Annex, Section VIII, that a Reporting Financial Institution is essentially every institution that keeps money in user accounts. Banks have picked this up and will fulfill their obligation. Some banks have warned their customers before beginning to collect user data. Some banks have kept quiet about it. Other financial institutions, for example, bitcoin exchanges that keep user accounts, are very quiet. Some may even be unaware of their obligations under the contract. Hence my question. If a government signs an international contract, how is that binding for companies in its jurisdiction? Does the government have to inform all effected institutions? Does it have to pass a law? What happens if an institution does not fulfill its obligation? What happens if an institution does not even know its obligation? Is everybody obliged to read every contract which their government signs? Would a financial institution be obliged to inform its customers before it begins reporting user data that had hitherto been kept secret to the tax authority in each user's home country? Background information

Details vary by jurisdiction but, in general, a treaty negotiated by the executive branch would usually require ratification by the legislature to give it effect under domestic law. Once this is done and the new law is promulgated in whatever way government does this (e.g. publishing it in a government gazette) it is binding on everyone. Such promulgation is advising everyone - it is the obligation of the people affected to know what the law is and to comply with it. Ignorance of the law is not a defense. If a person doesn't follow the law they are subject to whatever sanctions the law provides after relevant due process. If they didn't know about the law: tough ; they should have known. Otherwise people could escape punishment for say, murder, because they didn't know it was illegal. People do not have to read every contract the government signs (indeed most of them are commercial in confidence) but they do have to know every law that applies to them. That doesn't mean they have to read them: just comply with them. Given that the customers should be aware of the law too there would be no general obligation for the institution to inform them unless the law itself says they have to.

How can one reliably find out if there is an open UK arrest warrant or inquiry about them, without visiting a police station? Can police lie about it?

101 is the united-kingdom 's non-emergency police phone number. Would they ever lead you to believe when asking outright on the phone whether you have any warrants or circulations that all is well when that wasn't actually the case? More broadly, what is the legality of police lying to people while on duty in the UK? Update (on behalf of OP) Its been suggested in comments, that this may be a useful alternative phrasing of the question to add here: "I want to find out if there is a UK arrest warrant, wanted status, or open inquiry of any kind on police records, about me. Apart from physically visiting a police station with ID, is there a safe or easy way to get this information? (And also, can those I ask, deceive me about it?)" The original question title was : "If one calls 101 (police line) and asks if one is wanted or has an open arrest warrant in the UK, could the line operator conceivably deceive them?"

The role of the 101 call handlers is to assist with enquiries and to progress reports of non-emergency incidents - not deceive. They are not (usually) police officers do not (routinely) have access to PNC . Even if they did, they are under no obligation to divulge potentially operationally-sensitive and/or personal information over the phone; especially as the caller's identity cannot be verified. In response to comments and the OP edit on 09/03/2022... The police will not confirm if you are wanted on warrant over the phone. You must attend your local police station and bring some form of identification with you such as a passport, driving licence or birth certificate. Source 1 You can find your local police force here 1 A random example taken from one of the 43 territorial police forces in england-and-wales

How is 14th amendment applicable to tourists and illegal immigrants?

14th amendment states "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof , are citizens of the United States...". Given this wording how is it that foreign diplomats' children born in United States do not have birthright to US citizenship because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and children of tourists and illegal immigrants do have the birthright to US citizenship? In other words, how is it that these two categories are "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and therefore their children have the right to US citizenship by birth? Edit: As mentioned below, according to United States v. Wong Kim Ark , Ark was granted citizenship by birth although his parents were foreign nationals and this is cited by many as a precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants. However, according to the same article, Ark's parents "were legally domiciled and resident" in United States at the time of his birth and tourists and illegal immigrants are not so can this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants?

[C]an this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants? Yes. If the case did not depend on the fact that they were lawfully resident in the US, then it would apply to those who are not lawfully present in the US. For the case to apply to some people but not others, there must be a distinguishing difference that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The question then is whether lawful residence is a distinguishing difference here, and it seems that no court has ruled on the question. Referring to current events, it would be possible for the executive branch to assert that the 14th amendment does not grant citizenship to one born in the US of parents who were not lawfully present. This would end up in court. For example, such a person could sue to compel the government to issue a passport, or, if the government sought to deport such a person, the person could assert US citizenship in deportation proceedings. At that point, the court would have to rule on the question, whereupon it would almost certainly rule that the 14th amendment does grant such citizenship. See, for example, Plyler v. Doe , in which the court ruled that illegal immigrants in a state are within its jurisdiction for the purpose of the equal protection clause. It would be odd indeed for the court to rule that the same word means something different in the previous sentence. Furthermore, in a footnote, the court writes [W]e have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ." ... [N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. You ask: [H]ow is it that foreign diplomats' children born in United States do not have birthright to US citizenship because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and children of tourists and illegal immigrants do have the birthright to US citizenship? Consider what happens when an illegal immigrant commits a crime in the territory of a US state: the person is subject to trial and punishment in the state's criminal justice system. A foreign diplomat who commits a crime, on the other hand, or indeed the child or other family member of a foreign diplomat, is immune from prosecution. That is what distinguishes diplomats from illegal aliens such that the first sentence of the 14th amendment applies to the latter, but not the former.

False advertising against seller's interest

15 USC 52 makes it illegal to disseminate a false advertisement. There are similar laws in each state. In every case that I am aware of successful false advertising charges, the false statement works to the advantage of the seller, making the product falsely appear better than it is. By the letter of the law (at least the federal law), a false statement that makes your product appear worse than it actually is would also be actionable false advertising. Is there any case in the US (any jurisdiction) where an advertising statement was false but against the seller's interest, and the prosecution was successful? Alternatively, is there any precedent for the notion that a false advertising claim against seller's interest is not unlawful. (Note that my question is not limited to that specific piece of US code, it is about all such laws, including RCW 9.04.010 which makes false advertising a crime)

Violations of 15 USC 52 can generally only be enforced by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in civil lawsuits seeking injunctions or civil fines pursuant to 15 USC 45 ; it is not a crime to violate 15 USC 52 as your use of the term "prosecute" might imply. In particular, 15 USC 45(n) in the enforcement provisions applying to all types of violations of that act which are enforced by the FTC in civil lawsuits, prohibits the kind of enforcement actions that you contemplate in your question. It says (emphasis added): The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.

Is there any case law on whether unreleased "derivative work" falls under the research exemption to Copyright law?

17 USC 106(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; reserves the right to prepare "derivative works" to the authors of the original work. The original authors, of course, can authorize such work use of their work to other parties. 17 USC 106, however, is "subject to sections 107 through 122." Section 107 (fair use) allows for an exception to copyright restrictions for the purposes of "research." In a series of comments to a different question, we have stumbled on a question of whether derivative work, which is performed privately and not shown to anyone, constitutes a violation of copyright. It all seems moot, but I have thought of a scenario where it may become apropos. purely hypothetical scenario here Suppose someone dabbles in a study of a foreign language X. Suppose they come across an esoteric industry publication in that language. They invest some personal time to produce a translation of that publication and fix it on paper. This would fall within all the parameters necessary to make this translation a derivative work. However, they do not publish the translation. Nor do they even show it to anyone. They do, however, study the material in it after the translation is completed. Having educated themselves on the subject matter covered in the translation, they come up with an invention which becomes commercially viable. And they develop the invention with a moderate degree of commercial success. A number of years after, someone else uncovers the unpublished manuscript of the translation and reveals the existence of the translation to the original authors. Do the authors have a copyright violation claim against the translator? It seems like it should fall under the research exception, but the question is whether the research exception has been tested in court for unpublished derivative works. Rather than speculating what a court might say on the subject, I am curious whether the courts have already said anything on this subject.

Probably not It is not at all correct to say that: Section 107 (fair use) allows for an exception to copyright restrictions for the purposes of "research." 17 USC 107 reads, in relevant part: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include [and the section goes on to specify the four statutory factors] The exception is not for "research" but for fair use , for which purposes "such as" research is one aspect of the definition, but not the most important aspect. So let us consider the actual factors in this hypothetical case: (1) the purpose and character of the use, The purpose appears to be for study and research, not for direct commercial exploitation, so factor (1) favors fair use. (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; The hypothetical does not much describe the source work, but it appears to be an original and creative one, but one describing facts of science or technology, not an imaginative work. Factor (20) thus probably favors fair use slightly, but has not much weight in this case. (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole It would seem that the whole of the source article was translated, so factor three leans against fair use. (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Because the translation is not published nor widely circulated, it does not serve as a substitute for the original for the general public, nor is there any harm done to any actual or potential market for the original. No economic harm is done to the copyright holder, nor would there be any such harm if many people separately engaged in similar use. Thus factor (4) strongly favors fair use. While no one can ever be sure what a court will rule in a particular fair use determination, the analysis above suggests to me that this use would in fact be held to be a fair use, given the circumstances in the question. What gets eventually exploited in this hypothetical is not the expression of the original source work, but the ideas it contains, and as 17 USC 102(b) says: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Had the researcher translated and paraphrased at once, producing a description of the ideas contained in the original work, but not translating their expression, there would have been no question of copyright infringement. Also, in those cases where the ideas are so closely bound up with their expression that they cannot be expressed in any other way, or only in one of a very few possible ways, the expression loses protection. This can happen with scientific and technical documents. Thus it would appear that there is no infringement in the situation described in the question, but not because of a "research exception". There is a great deal of case law on fair use in general, but I do not know of any that really closely fits the hypothetical in the question. Fair use case law tends to be tightly tied to the specific facts of the case at hand. In countries other than the US the exceptions to copyright are quite different both from the US concept of fair use and from each other, but this hypothetical would I think fall under an exception in several of them at least.

How does the exclusive right to public display apply, e.g., to t-shirts?

17 USC §106(5) says that the copyright holder of work holds the exclusive right to display the work publicly: (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time, on clothing I legally purchased from the copyright holder. Is this a prima facie case of infringement defensible via fair use? Or is it allowed by some other legal mechanism? Or is it flatly illegal and merely a terrible business idea to litigate? I understand the first sale doctrine of §109 allows the owner of a copy to distribute their own copy, but it doesn't seem to allow display. To add a few other examples beyond a t-shirt, what about displaying sculptures or other works of art in my yard? If I wanted to publicly display the entire text of a short story in my yard, would that be different (perhaps due to the "nature of the work" fair use factor)?

Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.

Was the banning of Alex Jones a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 241?

18 U.S. Code § 241 - Conspiracy against rights If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ... They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ... Recently Alex Jones received bans from Youtube, Facebook, Spotify, and Apple. I heard that this occurred soon after an annual meeting of the heads of these companies, and it seems that the coincidence of these bans was likely the result of an agreement between the companies. It seems that 2 or more persons have conspired to oppress Alex Jones because he has exercised his right to freedom of speech. This law seems to prohibit oppressing someone because they exercised their right to free speech. 1) Does he have a right to free speech? 2) Was he exercising his right to free speech on their platforms? 3) Did they ban him because he was exercising his right to free speech on their platform? 4) Does their ban constitute "oppression"? If yes, which body has jurisdiction over this and what actions would Alex Jones need to take in order to achieve justice?

The right to free speech is a right that is guaranteed against the federal and state governments only. It is not a right that is secured against private individuals and corporations. It is also neither absolute nor unconditional, as there are a number of exceptions/limits . Alex Jones could not walk into your home and start "exercising free speech" and leave you with no recourse whatsoever to remove him from your home. If you don't consent to him being there, you may legally tell him to leave and have him removed by force if he fails to comply. Facebook etc. are the "homes" of the relevant corporations. They simply told Alex Jones to get out and go somewhere else. He retains his right to free speech; he simply never had a right to speak wherever he wanted. An always relevant XKCD .

What prevents the DOJ from charging Democrats in Congress under U.S. Code § 2383?

18 U.S. Code § 2383 states Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof , or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Members of Congress can be charged for crimes and even removed from office and jailed during their term. Washington Post has an article stating that more than two dozen members of Congress have been indicted since 1980 . So it would seem that Congressmen are not immune from prosecution under the Federal law. A number of legal scholars, including Alan Dershowitz , have made the claim that, given the current fact pattern, "impeaching Trump would be an abuse of power by Congress." While abuse of power is a separate crime criterion, the act of violating the Constitution in order to attempt to unseat a duly elected President seems to fit the definition of rebellion (because it's an act of insurrection against the law). Of course, whether or not it is such an act is not my decision to make. In our legal system such decision are made by juries at trials (because it's a decision on the facts of the case). Is there a legal (rather than political) impediment preventing DOJ from charging Congressmen who voted for the impeachment of President Trump? I understand that, because of the political considerations, this question is hypothetical in nature. But I am asking about the law and not about the politics of it. Politics will change. The legal jeopardy (if it really exists) may remain in place for many years to come.

The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI , Friedman v. FBI , 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman , 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence " is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place . So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.

Is it legal to "shoot down" a drone on your property in the US?

18 U.S.C 32 states ... to include destruction of any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used , operated or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce. According to the FAA, drones fall under the category of UA (unmanned aircraft): The US Federal Aviation Administration has adopted the name unmanned aircraft (UA) to describe aircraft systems without a flight crew on board. More common names include UAV, drone , remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and remotely operated aircraft (ROA). Under these circumstances, it is illegal. But do non-government / non-commercial drones fall under this category? (drones owned by the average civilian) According to FAR 119-91C Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure . It's common to see people flying drones at lower altitudes than this. So assuming that drones are considered aircrafts and fall under these laws... Question If someone flew their drone under 500 feet over your property, would it be legal to shoot it down under a circumstance such as self defense? Could the shooter be charged under 18 USC 32? To avoid potential gun laws from interfering with information gathering: What if an imitation firearm, such as a BB gun , was used? What if no firearm was used? (Take the drown down by hitting it with a towel or broom) Feel free to include info relating to real firearm use (handgun, rifle, etc..), just know it's not what I'm truly asking about.

18 USC 32(a) says Whoever willfully— (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both 18 USC 31(1) defines "aircraft": The term “aircraft” means a civil, military, or public contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air. A personal private drone is not public or military, but it is "civil". In the definitions (b), it also says: In this chapter, the terms “aircraft engine”, “air navigation facility”, “appliance”, “civil aircraft”, “foreign air commerce”, “interstate air commerce”, “landing area”, “overseas air commerce”, “propeller”, “spare part”, and “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States” have the meanings given those terms in sections > 40102(a) and 46501 of title 49. The Title 49 definition (16) say “civil aircraft” means an aircraft except a public aircraft. So on that count alone, it is illegal, a federal crime. On a second count, it is illegal: it would count as destruction of property. In Washington under RCW 9A.48.070 it is a Class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously... (c) Causes an impairment of the safety, efficiency, or operation of an aircraft by physically damaging or tampering with the aircraft or aircraft equipment, fuel, lubricant, or parts. The exact details depend on what state this happens in. FAA restrictions for drones is that they should be flown below 400 ft, specifically §107.51 says A remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small unmanned aircraft system must comply with all of the following operating limitations when operating a small unmanned aircraft system... (b) The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be higher than 400 feet above ground level, unless the small unmanned aircraft: (1) Is flown within a 400-foot radius of a structure; and (2) Does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit. If the drone is actually trying to hit you, you can avail yourself of the defense of self-defense, but that is not available if you simply dislike it that someone flies too high over your property. There is no specific minimum distance from the aircraft and the ground, but the operator must fly the thing safely, and not above people. And finally, apart from the criminal aspects of shooting a drone out of the sky, you can also be sued for property damage, and is thus illegal. That said, in light of Boggs v. Meredith , this does not mean you will get anywhere if you sue the gunner for blasting your plane, at least if your venue is the western district federal court in Kentucky. You can sue in state court for trespass to chattels, and the FCC could (but did not) seek an action against the offender for blasting a plane out of the sky, but there is a narrow path for suing in federal court. The district court found that the plane-owner stepped off the path (the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). A state court could decide whether the airspace in question is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the US.

Filed each actions at once, could you move the court to conclude one or more actions for relief before moving to other actions?

18 U.S.C. 1915 (f)(1) "Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action [...]" This strikes me as one action may be obtained summary of judgement or other forms of decisions, if any, before others do. Is this possible? Typical? What are some of the main case laws governing any similar situations?

An "action" is a term of art that basically means a lawsuit with a particular case number. Claims for relief within a single lawsuit with a single case number are not "actions" (even if none of the parties to the different claims overlap). It isn't unheard of for there to be multiple civil actions pending at the same time regarding overlapping subject matter. But this is risky, because the first one to "final judgment" (something that has quite a technical definition) has "res judicata" effect that could be grounds for dismissal or summary resolution of all of the other lawsuits. To prevent this from happening, the other side facing multiple lawsuits can move to consolidate all of them into one case (there are a couple of different way this happens depending on the procedural details). Stays of one action by a judge knowing that other actions are pending are possible, but usually reserved for situations when motions to consolidate are pending.

Why was it formerly illegal to use the Swiss coat of arms in the United States?

18 U.S.C. § 708 formerly made the unauthorised commercial usage of the Swiss coat of arms (the white cross on a red field) a criminal offense in the United States. It was repealed this year , but why was it ever law in the first place, making it the only country or entity in the US ever to have protection for its heraldic devices?

I don't know any specific on the US law, but a special protection of the Swiss coat of arms is very widespread. This comes from a provision in Art. 53 § 2 of the First Geneva Convention 1949 : By reason of the tribute paid to Switzerland by the adoption of the reversed Federal colours, and of the confusion which may arise between the arms of Switzerland and the distinctive emblem of the Convention, the use by private individuals, societies or firms, of the arms of the Swiss Confederation, or of marks constituting an imitation thereof, whether as trademarks or commercial marks, or as parts of such marks, or for a purpose contrary to commercial honesty, or in circumstances capable of wounding Swiss national sentiment, shall be prohibited at all times. Because of the connection of the Red Cross and the Swiss coat of arms the US is obliged by international public law to prohibit the commercial use of that arms. I'm surprised to hear that law was repealed. Maybe it was transferred to some other place in the code? Often it is regulated next to the prohibition of the misuse of the Red Cross.

Why is it ok to submit false statements to a judge, according to 18 USC 1001(b)?

18 USC 1001(a) makes false statements to the federal government a felony. However, 18 USC 1001(b) says: Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. I don't understand why that exception exists, or when it might be useful in practical application. What is an example of when 18 USC 1001(b) would be applicable, beneficial, or necessary?

An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading "not guilty". 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of "lying" is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.

Does 18 USC 1542 contain a materiality requirement?

18 USC 1542: Whoever willfully and knowingly makes any false statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any passport the issue of which was secured in any way by reason of any false statement— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. 18 USC 1425: (a) Whoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship; or (b) Whoever, whether for himself or another person not entitled thereto, knowingly issues, procures or obtains or applies for or otherwise attempts to procure or obtain naturalization, or citizenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, or a certificate of arrival or any certificate or evidence of nationalization or citizenship, documentary or otherwise, or duplicates or copies of any of the foregoing— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. Neither section addresses false statements explicitly, but courts have found that 1425 has a materiality requirement, namely that immaterial false statements do not violate the statute (see US v. Alferahin ). Is it safe to say that a similar analysis would apply to section 1542? Has any court ruled explicitly on this question?

See United States v. Hart , 291 F.3d 1084: This appeal presents the question whether materiality is an element of the crime of making a false statement in an application for a United States passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. We have implicitly indicated that it is not, see United States v. Suarez-Rosario , 237 F.3d 1164, 1167(9th Cir. 2001), and now explicitly hold that proof of materiality is not required for this "false statement" offense. There is, explicitly, no materiality requirement. See also US v. Ramos , 725 F.2d 1322: Properly applied § 1001 requires proof that the false statement be of a material fact, see United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980), an element not needed for § 1542 where "any false statement" is sufficient . See Neder v. US , 527 U.S. 1 for SCOTUS-level analysis of reading materiality requirements into statutes that don't explicitly impose them.

Definition of rebellion and insurrection in US federal law

18 USC 2383 : Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. The terms "rebellion" and "insurrection" are not defined. Is there federal judicial precedent that sheds light on the meaning of these words as used in this statute? More generally, what elements or circumstances are necessary for an act to qualify as an act of rebellion or insurrection? Edit: The supposed duplicate question ( What prevents the DOJ from charging Democrats in Congress under U.S. Code § 2383? ) is different, and its answer does not answer this question. It explains that a particular incident is not rebellion or insurrection, but it does not enumerate the elements that must be present for an act to constitute rebellion or insurrection. In other words, it describes in part what rebellion and insurrection are not, but it does not describe what they are.

A Congressional Research article provides insight into the meaning of insurrection in the context of US federal law. The U.S. Constitution does not define insurrection or rebellion . Article 1, Section 8, clause 15, of the U.S. Constitution does empower Congress to call forth the militia “to suppress Insurrection.” It seems to follow that Congress has the authority to define insurrection for that purpose, which it has arguably done through enactment of the Insurrection Act . Part of that Act authorizes the President to call up the militia and armed forces in the event of “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States [that] make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. . . .” [. . .] Another part of the Insurrection Act , enacted approximately three years after the Fourteenth Amendment [. . .], authorizes the use of armed forces in cases where insurrectionists “oppose[] or obstruct[] the execution of the laws of the United States or impede[] the course of justice under those laws.” It seems likely that courts would consider these expressions as intent of Congress when hearing cases. An addition reference is from a Lawfare blog , One grand jury instruction on criminal insurrection, for instance, approved by a federal circuit court in Illinois in 1894, easily encompasses the events of that day: Insurrection is a rising against civil or political authority,-- the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in a city or state. … It is not necessary that there should be bloodshed; it is not necessary that its dimensions should be so portentous as to insure probable success, to constitute an insurrection. It is necessary, however, that the rising should be in opposition to the execution of the laws of the United States, and should be so formidable as for the time being to defy the authority of the United States.

Does a politician’s promise to "overthrow" the current system and replace it with a “Socialist World” rise to treason?

18 USC §2381 Treason. Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States . 18 USC §2383 Rebellion or insurrection. Whoever incites , sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States . In light of Seattle City Councilmember Kshama Sawant's recent speech given on 7/7/20 (see 2:33:00 to 2:34:04 ) "For those watching from outside Seattle, don't let anyone tell you in your fight to tax big business in your city that you're being divisive, because class struggle is what gets the goods. The private, for profit housing market has utterly failed working people. Not just here and now, but everywhere and always. Because capitalism is completely incapable of meeting the most basic needs of working people. Internationally, the working class needs to take the top 500 corporations into democratic public ownership, run by workers, in the interest of human need and the environment, not billionaire greed. I have a message for Jeff Bezos and his class. If you attempt again to overturn the Amazon tax, working people will go all out in the thousands to defeat you. And we will not stop there. Because you see, we are fighting for far more than this tax. We are preparing the ground for a different kind of society. And if you, Jeff Bezos, want to drive that process forward, by lashing out against us, in our modest demands, then so be it. Because we are coming for you and your rotten system. We are coming to dismantle this deeply oppressive, racist, sexist, violent, utterly bankrupt system of capitalism. This police state. We can not, and will not, stop until we overthrow it and replace it with a world based instead on solidarity, genuine democracy, and equality. A socialist world. Thank you. (Transcribed from given link) Do her words, especially "we cannot or will not stop" until we "dismantle," "overthrow," and "replace" this "police state" with a "Socialist World" rise to the level of violating 18 USC §2381 and/or 18 USC §2383?

TL; DNR: No. Charging the Councilwoman under §2383 for making a speech would violate the First Amendment, and "levying war" in the §2381 means actually fighting, not conspiring to fight. 18 USC §2383 Since §2383 is a statute, it must conform to the Constitution. To charge Sawant for what she said in a speech would violate the 1st Amendment, which says, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..." Even without the First Amendment problems, §2383 would not apply. The words "rebellion and insurrection" in §2383 are usually read to mean real violence, not vague words that may or may not involve violence. Not even Cliven Bundy, the Nevada rancher who has had several armed standoffs with the government, was charged under §2383. 18 USC §2381 Since §2381 is based on Art. 3, §3, the Treason Clause of the Constitution, the First Amendment does not apply to it. Following the Treason Clause, §2381 has two prongs. To be guilty of treason, one must either: a) Levy war against the United States; or b) Adhere to its enemies. "Enemies" has been interpreted to mean enemies in a real war , so the second prong does not apply. Since Sawant is not actually levying war against the United States, §2381 can only apply to her if it covers a conspiracy to levy war against the United States. The Supreme Court decided it did not in 1807, in Ex Parte Bollman . Bollman was charged with conspiring with Aaron Burr to carve a new country out of the US. The Court ordered Bollman released. In his opinion, John Marshall explained why: However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offenses. Marshall’s narrow reading of the Treason Clause was consistent with the views of the Founders. In Federalist 43, James Madison explained that in the past, “violent factions” had often used “new-fangled and artificial" definitions of treason to “wreck their alternate malignity on each other…” To keep from repeating this sorry history, the Constitution “opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger,” by defining what constituted treason and specifying how it was to be proved.

Is it legal to make false advertising claims but give the correct info in small print?

2 Terabyte Solid State Drive - only $20! (product is actually a 100 gigabyte hard disk drive) Would that ad be legal?

Hypo A quick factual analysis: You don’t mistype 200 gigabytes to 2 terabytes. That needs a “mistyping” of 200 to 2 and the words “gigs” to “tera”. No typo, that’s obvious. A reasonable person wouldn’t put the incorrect data quantity there in an honest mistake either since every reasonable person has a within -50% to + 100% sense of the price of things. One intending to sell and cognizing a difference in excess of that would do a double take on the price in such a case. Even if the price increase is not linear with the storage capacity of a hard drive, we are still talking about 2 and a half 3 times the price difference at best. It cannot happen in negligence. It might happen in reckless disregard, but knowing and intentional action appears more likely than not putting the onus on the advertiser to prove that is not the case affirmatively. Law In any case, the scope of uniform false advertising and unfair business practices acts of U.S. states typically require good faith actions and reasonableness in that they punish those not only who knew their advertisement is false, but those who should have known by the exercise of reasonable care, one summary example from California: “It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of […] personal property […] or anything of any nature whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated […] from this state before the public in any state [including this state], […] in any … manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that […] personal property […] or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the proposed […] disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which […] by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue […] or for any[one] to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell that personal property […] so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so advertised. Any violation of the provisions of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by both that imprisonment and fine.” (Cal. Bus. & Prof., § 17500) EDIT 1 — Not 200 gigs to 2 terabytes, but 100 to 2 I just noticed we’re not even talking about 200 GB “mistaken” to 2 TB, but 100 GB to 2 TB. It’s not apples to oranges, but an apple to soccer balls. Good luck to whoever wants to get on to the lower end of § 17500 claiming no knowledge, but reckless disregard. EDIT 2 — Hypo of disclaimer elsewhere In case where the correct information somewhere else is included in the advertisement, that both give rise to the presumption that actual knowledge of the untrue or misleading nature of the advertisement existed in the advertisers mind. On another note, in case a buyer's exclusive decision metrics relate to the storage capacity and the price, the statement of the storage capacity also creates both an implied warranty of fitness and an express warranty. ( Lane v. C.A. Swanson Sons , 130 Cal.App.2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) [“the label on the can coupled with the representation in the newspaper ads that the contents contained no bones, constituted an express warranty”], (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1 , 1791.2 , et seq. ; U.C.C. (UCC § 2-313(1)(b)) ["[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description."]) In other words, the buyer is not imposed any statutory or common-law duty to read further in the advertisement unless a reasonably cognizable indication is made that the storage-capacity statement is, well, false. For example, an internationally well-understood indication of the incompleteness of the a statement is the inclusion of an asterisk (less often a footnote number) behind the specific information or statement that needs further relating. Other than common sense, Brady v. Bayer Corp. , 26 Cal.App.5th 1156, 1172 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) provides the same: “Nothing in law or logic suggests consumers will take such a belt and suspenders approach[]: You cannot take away in the back fine print what you gave on the front in large conspicuous print[; in fact,] Under Commercial Code section 2316[,] any disclaimer ha[s] to be conspicuous.” Accordingly, even asterisk may not be sufficient as a matter of law, and an action based on an asterisk notice of disclaimer may potentially proceed to trial for the factfinder to decide if they would be put on reasonable notice that, as a matter of their good-faith duty, would have to look further on an advertisement to find that the storage capacity information was simply false.

Insurer charging both parties an excess

2 cars collide in a minor collision. The drivers are both insured with the same insurance company and both have comprehensive insurance. The insurance company comes up with a determination that both parties are partly at fault and charge BOTH parties the full insurance excess. Is this legal ? (I postulate that the insurance company is acting in bad faith, because they are trying to reduce the payout). Does it matter if the parties are equally at fault or 1 party is 75% at fault and the other 25% (Please assume for the sake of this question that there is nothing in the insurance policies which specifically talks about partial fault). The jurisdiction here is New Zealand, but I would be interested in how this scenario is handled in other jurisdictions as well.

If the law is the same in NZ as Australia and car insurance policies are written the same way (which given that the insurance companies are mostly the same) then: The excess in domestic policies is usually a "faultless" excess. If you have any fault, you are required to pay the excess. In most commercial policies, the excess is an excess: you pay it even if you are not at fault. Insurance companies in Aus/NZ operate on a "knock-for-knock" basis: that is they agree to pay for the damage to their client's vehicles and not sue each other to establish fault. Overall this keeps the costs of insurance lower and results in lower premiums. You will find, that if you read your contract, you agree to that. The contract will also detail the way in which the insurer will determine if you have to pay the excess or not. If you disagree with the way they have done this you have two options: The commercial option - whinge a lot and express your displeasure often and loudly until the agree to waive the excess to make you go away. Threaten to take your business elsewhere and point out that they are putting at risk thousands of dollars of future payments for a few hundred dollars now. Actually take your business elsewhere. The legal option - the contract will spell out how you resolve disputes.

how to know if somebody sued you in germany?

2 years ago before I left Germany someone I knew said that he will file a lawsuit against me :( I am now not in Germany and I didn't give this guy my address in my current country but how can I know if he really did it? who should I contact?

You're supposed to deregister with the registration office before moving out of country. This process involves giving the registration office your new address abroad. If you get sued, I assume that the court will first try to look up your address with the registration office. If you've done your homework, they will see where you moved and then try to initiate international process service. International process service is a science unto itself, so I won't go into detail with that. Short version is, the exact procedure for arranging international process service depends on the destination country and if everything goes fine, you should receive written notice that there is a lawsuit against you. If the court is unable to find your new address at the registration office, they will try to serve you at the last known address they can get hold of. This means that a postal operator will be instructed to serve you at your last home in Germany. This will of course fail because you're no longer there. (At this point, I assume that you have removed the name plate on your letterbox. If your nameplate is still there, you have a problem because your lawsuit may now be served on a letterbox you no longer live in.) The mailman will then check if there is a mail forwarding order for your address and if the forwarding address is foreign, the paperwork goes back to the court with your new address and a remark that international forwarding of process service is not permitted. THe court will then try to initiate international process service at your new address. If the postal operator has no fowarding order, the item will go back to the court as undeliverable. In this case, the court will serve you by public notification. This means that a note will be put up at the notice board of the court telling you to pick up the papers at the court. If you don't do that, process will be deemed served on you 14 days after the note was posted on the notice board. Conclusion Make sure that you are properly deregistered with the registration office. This includes informing the registration office about your new address. (This is required by law.) To be on the safe side, I would also recommend the following steps: • Make sure that the nameplate on your door, on the intercom panel and on your letterbox have been removed. Anyone showing up at your house should be able to tell that you no longer live there. • Seal your letterbox with adhesive tape after collecting your mail for the last time. Mailmen have the habit to remember names instead of reading name plates every day. This way, your mail won't end up in a dead letterbox. • Set up a mail forwarding order with Deutsche POst AG. This should be done 3 weeks before vacating the home. • If there is a regional mail company in your area, also set up a mail forwarding order with them. If you're the paranoid guy, there's even more you can do: • Periodically renew your mail forwarding order(s) • Contact the court and ask if they have a lawsuit for you • Inform the plaintiff about your new address. Then they can't claim not to know where you live. • Inform the local bailiff about your new address or ask them if they were instructed to serve something on you.

How does the US legal system treat car accidents with pedestrian casualties?

2 years ago in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a guy was driving 105 km/h (max allowed 60) through red light and killed two teenage girls on crosswalk. He didn't even bother to stop. Instead, he called his sister and friend to get him to Serbia border where he fled to Serbia. Later he turned himself and was extradited to Bosnia where the trial began. Now the trial is over and he is accused of "causing general danger" and "not helping injured", but there is no mention of killing someone. The prosecutors want the maximum sentence for those two crimes which is, I believe, only 8 years. So, how would the crime be treated in the US? What would be the charges? What is the maximum sentence he could get?

Assuming that this wasn't a planned murder or assault, the most serious charge would be vehicular homicide. In the US, this is governed by state law, but states are not radically different in whether this is a crime. In Washington, under RCW 46.61.520 , vehicular homicide is a class A felony , punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine The crimes is defined as causing death while driving (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or (c) With disregard for the safety of others. and such speeding is highly likely to be found to constitute the element of recklessness. There are also hit-and-run charges , which is a class B felony (10 years and $20,000). A person can be found guilty of both charges, and the judge can apply the prison sentences consecutively, meaning you add them up, rather than serve the jail time at the same time (in this case, essentially dispensing with the hit-and-run term). The law is written so that a killing is a crime, and if you kill two people that could be two charges (the question is whether there is a single act or two – most likely there was a single act in this particular case). There is no state where recklessly killing a person while driving is legal. First degree murder could be considered under 9A.32.030 if a person "Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". That kind of charge was applied to the Charlottesville driver , but it is highly unlikely to be applied to even the most extreme speeding. The actual penalty imposed depends on the sentencing laws of the state. In Washington there is a complex calculation based on the severity of the crime (16 degrees – vehicular homicide is level 11), prior criminal history, whether there are multiple convictions (vehicular homicide and hit-and-run). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances can also be considered to compute the actual sentence; I don't see any way for a non-specialist to guess what the actual penalty would be in this case.

What to do about Corporate ownership and registration renewal documents if Delaware corporate state registry had expired?

20 years ago a corporation was formed to purchase a private aircraft. The Delaware corporation's state charter had expired years ago due to non-payment of renewal fee. What are the legal consequences for aircraft renewal documents filed with the FAA or other authorities if the underlying corporate entity legally no longer exists?

Revive the company Delaware (and most other) jurisdictions allow the revival of an administratively deregistered company on payment of back-taxes and fees.

Rationale behind 27 CFR 555.209 (ATF explosive storage)

27 CFR 555.209 regarding ATF regulations of the storage of explosives in type 3 magazines (temporary storage boxes), states: A type 3 magazine is to be constructed of not less than number 12-gauge (.1046 inches) steel, lined with at least either 1/2-inch plywood or 1/2-inch Masonite-type hardboard. Other magazine types have similar requirements regarding 1/2” thick material. What is the specific rationale behind this requirement? I’m not looking for answers based on pyrotechnic experience. I’m looking for official ATF records, explanations, legal notes and documents, etc.

You can read the rationale if you know the docket number. The trick is figuring out when the specific rule was added. An example is a similar proposed rule from OSHA . The regulations appears to have existed before the creation of Homeland Security in 2003, and was numbered §55.209. The rule proposed January 9 2003 , and the wording of the rule is changed at that point. You can read the surrounding document to extract rationale (searching for "type 3" and "inch"). The proposal is on p. 4414, and unfortunately it only says that they it's about "added security". There is previous more technical discussion of analogous changes in other rules.

What, if any, exemptions exist to 28 U.S. Code § 516?

28 U.S. Code § 516 states: Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General. This seems to imply some exemptions existed at the time it was written or may have been anticipated in the future. Do any such exceptions exist?

I don't know of any comprehensive list, but several exemptions do exist: 12 U.S. Code § 5514 authorizes the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau to enforce consumer financial law. 15 U.S. Code § 43 authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to prosecute violations of the FTC Act. 15 U.S. Code § 78d–5 authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce securities laws. 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–4 authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to litigate equal-employment violations. As far as I know, non-DOJ litigators are limited to independent agencies that aren't headed by a Cabinet-level officer. I assume the idea is that because these agencies are meant to be independent, they need to be able to decide which cases to pursue without DOJ interference.

The legal distinction between gambling and insurance [USA]

28 US Code §5362(1)(A) defines a bet or wager to be: the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome (1)(E) then explicitly states that this does not include, inter alia , "any contract for insurance". My question is this: Ignoring (1)(E) and relying solely on the literal text of (1)(A), would insurance contracts have to be considered bets or wagers?

Gambling creates a risk where none exists. Gambling provides the opportunity for gains or losses. Insurance mitigates an existing risk of loss. The buyer of insurance has no opportunity for gain. The opportunity is to be made whole. EDIT: I suppose that I have provided the practical difference. The legal difference is that the statute distinguishes between the two.

Can data from computer forensic investigation be denied as evidence?

3 computers were sealed and taken from a person's apartment. Investigators invited him to unseal the PCs; the seals were intact and confirmed by owner and they started the cloning process. However, the hashes were just photographed by an expert without putting them into a document and giving it to the person who's being investigated, saying that they will invite him the next day to finish the paperwork. He wasn't invited, not even after 4 days, meaning that all devices remained unsealed all these days. Considering the above facts: Can evidence found by computer forensic expert be used in a court? Could a lawyer challenge this evidence in court given the procedure of investigation? Is there any applicable case law? Note: All hard-drives were cloned using a write-blocking device. Click this link to see what it looks like . Software that was/is used in investigations is FTK if I am not mistaken.

Short Answer Chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence. Qualification This sounds like a real case. Not a hypothetical. The outcome can go either way. It sounds like it's heading for litigation. The result will depend on the facts and legal arguments. If this is meant to be a hypothetical there are too few facts described to be able to analyze it. I suggest you hire an attorney and forget about getting the question answered here. Generally speaking, it's impossible to prove a negative. So on that basis, proving they did not tamper with the data will be a challenge at best. Lawyers can always challenge evidence. And chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence .

What should happen if I break a housing contract?

3 months ago, I moved to the UK and I signed a rent contract for a house, along with another person. Recently, the person who shares the flat with me decided to come back to her country, and leave the house. When we signed the contract, we were said that we couldn’t finish it earlier, but if we found a replacement, we could then leave. With the help of the recruiter (both the girl leaving and me moved here at the same time, and were recruited by the same company) we have found a new girl to replace her in the contract, but the recruiter has advised us to not inform the landlord yet, because since the other girl is breaching the contract already, we could be forced to leave the house and still keep paying the rent for the rest of the contract. But I feel that this is wrong, since there is a clause at the contract that forces us to inform him in case this happens. Since I’m not familiar with the UK law, could someone explain to me in what position I am? Could I have problems with the landlord in case the other girl breaches the contract? Could I be forced to keep paying the rent for the whole year and still not allowed to live here? Should I concern about something else? Now I’m leaning towards informing the landlord that the other girl wants to leave, but I’m worried about the possibilities afterwards. The advice of the recruiter doesn't seem right to me, and I think by following his advice, I'm going to end breaching the contract myself, and I would like to avoid that,

Could I be forced to keep paying the rent for the whole year and still not allowed to live here? I am not knowledgeable of UK law, but I highly doubt that the recruiter's statement is accurate. Forcing a tenant to both move out and keep paying solely because the other tenant breached the contract seems too punitive [toward the remaining tenant] to be enforceable. The worst that could happen is that the landlord makes you cover the other's rent for as long as the new tenant replaces the one who left. Even that would depend on the terms of your contract (for instance, if the contract provides that the signing tenants are jointly and severally liable ). Should I concern about something else? It is hard to pinpoint any possible issues without knowing the language/terms used in the contract. But generally speaking, contracts (or parts thereof) that contravene the legislation are void.

If a tenant is moving out before the end of the lease, do they have final say over who is the new subtenant?

3 roommates, A (me), B, and C. C moving out 5 months before the end of the lease. (Which is not the issue.) The issue is that B and A are not in agreement about who should take C’s spot. B suggested that A look for another place to live because B wants to change vital aspects of the apartment’s atmosphere/status quo. A little background: B was living in the apartment first, and then brought on A and later on C. Which I’m pretty sure is irrelevant because all three are on the lease- ie B has no greater “right” to the apartment because she has been living there for four more months than A. Also, A and C happen to be in agreement about what type of person should move in to replace C. The question is: does C have final say in regards to who takes over her lease? Can C deny someone that (for example) B suggests? Since C is the one who is still on the lease until it ends. Is there anything that can help me legally? I don’t want to move out and I won’t allow B to choose the new roommate.

First, you need to understand that there are 2 agreements here: one is the contract between the landlord and A, B & C ( jointly and severally ) which is a legally binding contract [the lease] and the other is the agreement between A, B & C which might be (but probably isn't) a legally binding contract [the roommate agreement]. If C can sublease and to whom and in what circumstances depends first on the lease - it is quite common to have a no subletting clause or to be able to sublet only with the landlord's agreement. Only if the lease allows subletting do we turn to the roommate agreement. Unless you have actually written this up and agreed that it will be a contract between the three of you it probably isn't one and isn't binding on anyone. If you don't have a binding agreement and the lease allows C to sublet, neither A nor B has any ability to restrict who C sublets to. Further, barring a binding roommate agreement that allows it, no tenant can force any of the other tenants to move out.

Abstract Idea Definition

35 U. S. C. §101 highlights "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" as patent-ineligible. The Alice/Bank case discusses abstract ideas and explains that in applying the §101 exception, a court must distinguish patents that claim the “building blocks” of human ingenuity. Where are the rules written on applying the §101 exceptions? For a precise definition of what the exceptions are, do I need to review the relevant cases or are they defined somewhere?

Abstract ideas have been identified by the courts by way of example, including fundamental economic practices, certain methods of organizing human activities, an idea ‘of itself,’ and mathematical relationships/formulas. They are the building blocks of human ingenuity. Full guidance here . This should be read in conjunction with the relevant cases it references to understand the notion of abstract ideas in intellectual property law. Follow on question here

Can a manager kick you out for being trans in North Carolina

36 minutes ago They kicked me out for being trans and going to my preferred bathroom. I get not using the lady's restroom if I had a big beard but I don't have a beard I wasn't doing anything in there but fixing my hair and makeup

It is not presently illegal for a private property owner in North Carolina to impose such a requirement on restroom users.

Can I take a second job at a potential customer of my first job?

4 months ago I quit my job to found a small startup (A) aimed at solving a niche problem only a few companies (including my old one) experience. I reached out to one potential customer (B) to invite them to try our demo, and they responded saying that they were interested in hiring me. I can see many ways becoming an employee for B could be mutually beneficial: I can improve A through first-hand experience & insights gained B gets free access to A's product, and A gains free testing Social proof: A can advertise B as a customer $$$ (duh) - able to keep A running longer. And possibly open-source it (will damage potential sales but increase potential impact) The one thing I'm concerned of - will it cause legal trouble? If I've already founded the company 4 months prior, could they say that I took the idea from working with them? Are there any risks I need to be aware of? More info: A is a software product, subscription based. We have no customers as yet, only demo users. I have about a month of runway left. We have applied to a startup accelerator and find out in 10 days if we have got in. B is a successful financial service provider. Thanks - Anon

You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.

Criminal Liability for judges under 42 USC 290-dd2(f) and 42 CFR 2.63 [Confidentiality of Substance Abuse Patient Records]

42 USC 290-dd2 establishes heightened confidentiality requirements for certain (really most) substance abuse treatment records. The statute grants authority to HHS to interpret the law and create regulatory provisions related to how these records are disclosed. This is codified in 42 CFR Part II. The statute itself establishes a penalty for violations: 42 USC 290-dd2(f) Penalties: Any person who violates any provision of this section or any regulation issued pursuant to this section shall be fined in accordance with title 18. It is reiterated in the regulations, furthermore being labeled as "criminal" 42 CFR 2.63: Criminal Penalty for Violations Under 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2(f), any person who violates any provision of this section or any regulation issued pursuant to this section shall be fined in accordance with Title 18 of the U.S. Code. [See also 2.62(b)(3) -- because penalty is criminal the regulations should be strictly construed in favor of defendant] Here is my question. Much of the regulatory provisions place mandatory obligations on the judiciary. For instance, a judge is required to issue a protective order, even w/o request from the party in question. Is there any reason why the statute should be construed as to exclude the possibility that a judge could be fined for not following the regulatory procedures that are set in place? Here is a good example: 42 CFR 2.64(c) Any oral argument, review of evidence, or hearing on the application [for an order to disclose protected records] must be held in the judge's chambers or in some manner which ensures that patient identifying information is not disclosed to anyone other than a party to the proceeding, the patient, or the person holding the record, unless the patient requests an open hearing in a manner which meets the written consent requirements of the regulations in this part. The proceeding may include an examination by the judge of the patient records referred to in the application. If a judge held a hearing to discuss issuing an order for disclosure and did so in an extremely public fashion and in a manner that didn't conform to the above regulation would they be criminally liable under the above statute?

A judge cannot be held liable for acts conducted as a judge, barring fraud or malfeasance.

Do I have the right to terminate a lease without penalty because I was a victim of domestic assault, and the assaulter is also on the lease?

5 months ago my girlfriend (now ex-girlfriend) and I signed a 1 year lease to rent a house in Arizona with another couple that she has known for many years. The main purpose of this was to save money. All four of our names are on the lease . We split everything equally four ways and in theory it would make things a lot cheaper. 4 months into the lease I broke up with my girlfriend. Without going into too many breakup details, I was the victim of domestic violence shortly after the breakup (about 2 weeks ago) in which my ex-girlfriend assaulted me. She was taken to jail that night and released sometime the next day on certain terms. One probably being that she couldn't return to the residence. Now based on my understanding she doesn't technically have any legal binding to pay her part regardless of her name being on the lease. It was a personal agreement between all of us to split everything equally, so the landlord doesn't care who pays what, as long as he/she gets the full amount each month, right? So it comes down to us 3 to come up with the full rent payment now. The other two are refusing to pick up her part, and I don't really have the money to cover her part alone. No luck on finding an additional roommate yet, but that's not within the scope of this question. So I read online that I may be able to terminate a lease being the victim of domestic assault - Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § §â I have no idea how to look up this law, and even if did I probably would not know how to interpret it. So my question is: Do I have the right to terminate this lease without penalty because I was a victim of domestic assault, and the assaulter is also on the lease?

The short answer is yes, but only if you fit the many detailed requirements of the statute set forth below. The relevant statute is the following section of the Arizona Revised Statutes: 33-1318. Early termination by tenant for domestic violence; conditions; lock replacement; access refusal; treble damages; immunity A. A tenant may terminate a rental agreement pursuant to this section if the tenant provides to the landlord written notice pursuant to this section that the tenant is the victim of domestic violence as defined in section 13-3601. The tenant's rights and obligations under the rental agreement are terminated and the tenant shall vacate the dwelling and avoid liability for future rent and shall not incur early termination penalties or fees if the tenant provides to the landlord a written notice requesting release from the rental agreement with a mutually agreed on release date within the next thirty days, accompanied by any one of the following: A copy of any protective order issued pursuant to section 13-3602 to a tenant who is a victim of domestic violence. A landlord may also request a receipt or signed statement that the order of protection has been submitted to an authorized officer of a court for service. A copy of a written departmental report from a law enforcement agency that states that the tenant notified the law enforcement agency that the tenant was a victim of domestic violence. B. A landlord may request from the victim the name and address of the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section, in writing, if known by the victim. C. The tenant may terminate the rental agreement pursuant to this section only if the actions, events or circumstances that resulted in the tenant being a victim of domestic violence as defined in section 13-3601 occurred within the thirty day period immediately preceding the written notice of termination to the landlord, unless waived by the landlord. D. If the tenant terminates the rental agreement as prescribed by this section and if the tenant is solely or jointly liable on the rental agreement, the tenant is liable only for rent owed or paid through the date of the lease termination plus any previous obligations outstanding on that date. The amount due from the tenant shall be paid to the landlord on or before the date the tenant vacates the dwelling. If the tenant has prepaid rent that would apply for the month in which the lease is terminated, the landlord may retain the prepaid rent and no refund is due to the tenant. If the tenant has paid a security deposit pursuant to section 33-1321, the security deposit shall not be withheld for the early termination of the lease if the tenant meets the requirements prescribed by subsection A of this section, but may be withheld for payment of damages which the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant's noncompliance with section 33-1341. E. A tenant who is a victim of domestic violence may require the landlord to install a new lock to the tenant's dwelling if the tenant pays for the cost of installing the new lock. A landlord may comply with this requirement by doing either of the following: Rekeying the lock if the lock is in good working condition. Replacing the entire locking mechanism with a locking mechanism of equal or better quality than the lock being replaced. F. A landlord who installs a new lock at the tenant's request may retain a copy of the key that opens the new lock. Notwithstanding any provision in the rental agreement, the landlord may refuse to provide a key that opens the new lock to the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section. G. A landlord shall refuse to provide access to the dwelling to reclaim property to any tenant if the tenant is the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section who has been served with an order of protection naming that tenant as the defendant and the landlord has received a copy of the order of protection, unless a law enforcement officer escorts the tenant into and out of the dwelling. H. A tenant who terminates a lease pursuant to this section and who is convicted of falsely filing a departmental report or order or protection for domestic violence is liable to the landlord for treble damages for premature termination of the lease. I. A person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section who provokes an early lease termination under this section is deemed to have interfered with the residential rental agreement between the landlord and tenant regardless of whether the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section is a party to the rental agreement, and the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section may be civilly liable for all economic losses incurred by a landlord for the domestic violence early lease termination. This civil liability includes unpaid rent, early lease termination fees, costs to repair damage to the premises and any reductions or waivers of rent previously granted to the tenant who was the victim of domestic violence. J. If there are multiple tenants who are parties to a rental agreement that has been terminated under this section, the tenancy for those tenants also terminates. The tenants who are not the victims of domestic violence, excluding the person named in an order of protection or a departmental report pursuant to subsection A of this section that caused the termination of the lease pursuant to this section, may be released from any financial obligations due under the previously existing rental agreement and the remaining tenants may be permitted to enter into a new lease with the landlord if the tenants meet all current application requirements. K. An emergency order of protection or a protective order that is issued to a resident of a rental property automatically applies to the entire residential rental property in which the tenant has a rental agreement. L. This section shall not be construed to limit a landlord's right to terminate a lease pursuant to section 33-1368 against the victim for actions unrelated to the act of domestic violence. M. A landlord is not liable for any actions taken in good faith pursuant to this section.

Owning rights/intellectual property

5 years ago my wife and her friend set up a business with no other employees at all until this date. I created the website, backoffice application and database (the data in there is not mine so they put them there) for the business because I didn't want them to pay anyone for those - just a goodwill. I was never paid either. Also there has never been a contract or agreement between us so no legal docs. Now my wife is moving away and her partners wants to take owner the business. The question I have is, am I the legal owner of these three properties or does business own them? I don't want them to be taken away for free and being sold on then I get nothing. All my efforts and time will be lost if you get what I mean. What is my rights and do you suggest? In UK!

This will depend on the agreement between you and the business. Since you never had a written agreement, there would have to be an implied agreement. As the creator of the website, you would hold the initial copyright on that site, including its design. If yo wrote the text shown there, you would hold the initial copyright on that, also. (Under UK copyright law, the initial holder is always an individual.) The question is whether you agreed to transfer that copyright to the business, or license it on a long term basis, or neither. Any of those arrangements would be possible, although in providing the site for the use of the business, you clearly contemplated some sort of license if not a transfer of copyright. Does the site have any copyright notice or statement? If so that might help define whether you retained or transferred copyright. Pretty much the same thing applies to the backoffice application and the database design. You hold or held the copyright on each, so the question is whether you transferred the copyright or granted a license, and if a license, o what terms, permanent or renewable. If you take this to court the court will have to guess what unstated agreement you had with the business. That might be unsatisfactory, as it will depend on the detailed facts of the situation. It will be better if you an the remaining business owner can come to some agreement, and this time put it in writing. You could agree to transfer the copyright, or to ,grant a non-exclusive license on a permanent basis, in return for whatever fee or other consideration yu can both accept. You could also make an agreement that the business can continue to use them without charge (a license) but if the business is later sold you would be entitled to a fee or a part of the sale price. Or you could agree that they are licensed only as long as the business is run by the friend, but any such license is not transferable to anyone else. The basic situation is that the copyright cannot be used by anyone without a transfer or a license. But since you knowingly allowed the business to use them, indeed created them for that purpose, you must have granted either the whole copyright or some license. Proving what you really had in mind 5 years ago would not be easy if it was never written down. Further info The OP writes in a comment: There is a T&C page in the website stating that the business owns it although I copied the whole text from other examples in the Internet. Also there is a classic Copyright notice at the footer. In light of this I wrote: If you added a copyright notice in the name of the business to the web site, and a T&C page saying that the site is owned by the business, that goes a long way to showing that you, in effect, gave the copyright to the business, and it would somewhat suggest the same for the application and database. You may still be able to make an agreement, but this probably reduces the chance of a court holding in your favor.

Why is it difficult to import 5-HTP (a form of Tryptophan) into some countries?

5-Hydroxytryptophan (WP) is sold in various places around the world as a dietary supplement that may boost serotonin levels, with possible benefits as a sleep aid, antidepressant, appetite suppressant, and antidepressant. Everyone appears to respond to 5-HTP differently (and there are woefully few published standardized general trials on the amino acid's function), but I've found that my own body clock seems to respond quite positively to 5-HTP, with no noticeable side effects, and that taking 100mg a day for a week or two makes it much easier for my body to realign back to "wake up early in the morning" after my sleep cycle has been knocked around for an extended period. (Sample size of 1. YMMV.) Unfortunately, living in Australia, I've always noticed an extra bit of friction whenever I've ordered 5-HTP online (I've never seen it available for purchase anywhere locally in NSW). Some websites will notify me that "this product cannot be shipped to your country" at checkout time or list that they do not ship 5-HTP to Australia in their store policy. A few websites don't make much noise on the subject, accept my order, and ship it off Some sites will feature large Australian flags, draw attention to the fact that they're using AUD$, and drop similar hints, but won't actually say they ship to Australia. A few rare sites explicitly claim that they ship to AU, and don't make much fuss about it. Why the... weirdness? I understand the FDA banned L-Tryptophan after linking it to the 1989 Eosinophilia-Myalgia Syndrome (WP) outbreak, then relaxed the ban in 2001, allowing the use of L-Tryptophan (and 5-Hydroxytryptophan, aka oxytriptan). What happened over the last 19 years though? Every checkout experience feels like an event horizon , where I know something impactful happened but I can't find or trace the source of the impact. While I obviously have a bias towards understanding the friction I'm experiencing here in Australia, having a worldwide view would also be very interesting too. The only reference I've been able to turn up (mostly due to subject ignorance) is https://www.erowid.org/smarts/tryptophan/tryptophan_law.shtml - an old-looking page (apparently last modified 2015) that notes that 5-HTP is "somewhat controlled" in Australia, but doesn't cite why. Some online stores publish similar-sounding positive noises about 5-HTP's controlled status and availability. Wikipedia has no section on *tryptophan's worldwide availability. I remember reading at some point (I forget exactly where from unfortunately) that Australia generally accepts/allows small quantities of 5-HTP to be imported for personal use, and blocks/turns away larger quantities to prevent resale. I'm curious as to the historical narrative behind why this distinction is made. Fundamentally speaking, though, why is there friction? If possible, actual legal citations and references would be awesome. When I buy 5-HTP, it would be nice to not have to keep making exceptions to my rule about always hunting for whoever has the best going price at any given moment in time. It would be cool if I could online stores concrete references and assuage their fears and concerns.

From the legal perspective, the question is whether the substance is legal in Australia. The legal root of the matter is the Therapeutic Goods Administration . Dosages above 100 mg are on "Schedule 4" meaning they require a prescription. There are also apparently state regulations. In Queensland , there is an amendment to the Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 to ensure that the substance 5-Hydroxy tryptophan (5-HTP) is captured in Schedule 2 with the exception of preparations that contain 100mg or less of 5-HTP per dosage unit Schedule 2 is "Substances, the safe use of which may require advice from a pharmacist and which should be available from a pharmacy or, where a pharmacy service is not available, from a licensed person". The fact that it is very difficult to verify what the current regulations are may explain the "friction", which may make online purchases difficult. The underlying reason for government regulation is to keep people safe. Politics SE is an appropriate place to debate the balance between safety and usefulness.

Cheapest Way To Sue Over Breach of Loan Contract?

6 months ago, I loaned a business friend $15000 to be repaid as $18,000 in a week. I have a complete contract which also includes the following section regarding lawyer fees for defaulting “Borrower shall pay all costs incurred by Lender in collecting sums due under this Note after a default, including reasonable attorneys' fees. If Lender or Borrower sues to enforce this Note or obtain a declaration of its rights hereunder, the prevailing party in any such proceeding shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the proceeding (including those incurred in any bankruptcy proceeding or appeal) from the non-prevailing party.” The contract also states that the loan should incur the maximum amount of interest allowed. Additionally, myself and the borrower are located in different states. Is my best bet to get a lawyer and sue? If so, approximately how much should I expect it to cost? How would it work with the requirement for him to pay the legal fees? Do I have the option to take this up via civil complaints? Or is that only for people who are in the same state? Any advice is greatly appreciated. Thank you all in advance

Is my best bet to get a lawyer and sue? If so, approximately how much should I expect it to cost? How would it work with the requirement for him to pay the legal fees? You would ordinarily either hire a lawyer or bring suit yourself in a limited jurisdiction court (the kind that handles misdemeanor criminal offenses and smaller dollar amounts owed, the exact name of the court differs from state to state). You can always bring suit in the county where the debtor resides. If the loan was not for consumer purposes, you could sue in the place where the loan "was made" or in a forum provided by the loan documents (which does not appear to be present), that might be different from the place where the debtor resides. Usually, you would want to hire a lawyer with offices not too far from the place where you are bringing suit, as limited jurisdiction courts often require in person appearances. Normally, a lawyer would ask to be paid up front, with you posting a retainer equal to a significant share of the estimated legal fees, called a retainer against which the lawyer would bill until it was exhausted, and would normally bill on an hourly basis. Fees on the order of $1,500-$5,000 wouldn't be unusual. One factor that would increase the cost would be the fact that your loan is almost certainly at an illegally high rate of interest, and you and your lawyer would have to examine the relevant law to determine the effect of that on the enforceability of your loan, and the correct amount to claim. In some jurisdictions and circumstances, this might make your entitle loan or at least all interest on it and all fees incurred to collect the debt, uncollectible. In other jurisdictions it might just reduce the amount of interest you could recover. Without this complication, it might have been a matter you could handle on your own. With this complication, you really need a lawyer. You could probably not legitimately claim the full $18,000 plus attorney fees and costs. Some lawyers would take a case like this on a contingent fee basis with you only advancing court costs and out of pocket expenses like process serving charged, but they'd typically do so only if they were confident that they would prevail at trial and if they were also confident that the debtor had the ability to pay. On a one-off basis, a contingent fee percentage of 40%-50% would be more common in this situation that the "usual" one-third contingency rate. "Reasonable" legal fees would be added to the amount you are owed on the loan if the high rate of interest doesn't invalidate this provision. Amounts recovered for legal fees would be paid to you from which you could repay your lawyer whatever you owed your lawyer. In a contingent fee case, usually hourly based fees are awarded and included in the total amount recovered (once the debtor actually pays) and the lawyer would get a percentage of the total collected regardless of what the amount recovered is supposed to be for. Another option would be to sell your debt to a debt collection firm which would charge you a small sign up fee and then collect a percentage of the debt recovered. The usurious interest rate involved, however, might discourage them from accepting you as a customer or buying the debt. If the debtor is not collectible with a job and/or real estate with substantial equity, you probably won't be able to find someone to take the case on a contingent fee basis at all, and will probably have to pay an hourly rate. Do I have the option to take this up via civil complaints? Or is that only for people who are in the same state? It isn't clear what you mean in these questions. A lawsuit is commenced by filing a civil complaint, filed by you or your lawyer in a court, and this can be done even if you don't live in the same state as the debtor, although it may be necessary to file it in the state where the debtor lives. But, the government won't supply a lawyer to help you collect your debt in the way that it would appoint a prosecutor to bring criminal charges against someone who committed a crime in which you were a victim.

Ending joint-tenancy agreement by sending registered mail to the landlord - was it done properly?

6th September sent the Special Delivery to the landlord: (courtesy of me - sent an email informing letting agent about the situation) Snippets from tenancy agreement Commencing on: 7 September 2016 Term of Rental: Twelve Months 1.2 The obligations and liabilities of the Parties under this Agreement are Joint and Several. 1.3 The Parties listed above agree that the Landlord’s Agent may provide their name, address and other contact details to third parties including, but not limited to, the Landlord, contractors, referencing companies, utility providers, the local authority and the appropriate tenancy deposit protection scheme provider. The obligations and liabilities of the Parties under this Agreement are Joint and Several. Notices under Section 47 & 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987: For the purpose of Section 47 & 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 the address at which any Notices (including Notices in any proceedings) may be served on the Landlord by the Tenant, is as set out below, until the Tenant is notified in writing to the contrary. 13 Upon the expiry of this fixed term of Rental, if no instruction has been received by either the Landlord or the Tenant, then the Agreement shall become statutory periodic. This means that the agreement will continue on a monthly basis until notice is received, two months from the Landlord and one month from the Tenant. Research I did back then I did a lot of research how to remove myself from the tenancy. I did call Shelter - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelter_(charity) - I did follow their recommendation. The rationale was as follows: There is joint tenancy It automatically continues... ...unless it is cancelled Therefore I did cancel I genuinely thought that charity dealing with homelessness is the best source of information. Was cancellation to renew done properly? Now I'm being told that the landlord didn't agree. Does the landlord have to agree?

No, it was not done properly See here . You cannot , and the landlord cannot agree to remove your name from the joint tenancy. You can cancel the tenancy for both of you, as can your ex. If you do this, the landlord is not under any obligation to offer your ex a lease on the same terms or at all so they would risk becoming homeless. The court has the power under the Family Law Act to make such a substitution so you can apply to them for such an order.

"In a manner inconsistent with its labeling": What's the deal with all the exceptions?

7 USC 136 (ee) defines what it means when the government says "To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling". It is loaded with exceptions in a mighty wall of text and run-on sentence. What does it all mean in practical practice? (ee) To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling The term “to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling” means to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the labeling.... ..... except that the term shall not include (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment, (3) employing any method of application not prohibited by the labeling unless the labeling specifically states that the product may be applied only by the methods specified on the labeling, (4) mixing a pesticide or pesticides with a fertilizer when such mixture is not prohibited by the labeling, (5) any use of a pesticide in conformance with section 136c, 136p, or 136v of this title, or (6) any use of a pesticide in a manner that the Administrator determines to be consistent with the purposes of this subchapter. After March 31, 1979, the term shall not include the use of a pesticide for agricultural or forestry purposes at a dilution less than label dosage unless before or after that date the Administrator issues a regulation or advisory opinion consistent with the study provided for in section 27(b) of the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, which regulation or advisory opinion specifically requires the use of definite amounts of dilution. So what are all those exceptions about, in actual practice?

Certified applicator here. Needless to say, every exception has a reason, and was lobbied for by applicators, manufacturers, or common sense. Let's run through them. (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, This is mainly about rinsate . When you're done spraying, you have a bunch of flushing out to do. The empty jugs or barrels need to be triple rinsed with agitation (fill-shake-dump 3x). The dregs of the premix tank have to go, and the tank rinsed out with clean water. The spray equipment needs to be purged (not least so the acidic or basic pesticide doesn't corrode it). This yields a lot of "contaminated" water which is simply water + the pesticide at a lower-than-normal concentration. This is called rinsate. You also sometimes end up with "leftover mix" or "mistake mix"; like 200 gallons of pre-mixed {Roundup? 2,4-D?) that a non-certified predecessor left behind. I don't know what that is, so I'll dilute it enough that it's definitely below maximums. So you have all this chemical that is highly diluted, of ??? dilution but well below maxima. Can't dump it on the ground. Can't dump it down the drain. My friend says "How do you dispose of old paint? Paint something you don't want, then throw it away." And that's exactly what you do: identify locations that are legal to spray the stuff, and spray it there. It's much weaker, of course. This exception (1) is specifically to allow for this case. Of course you know you need to run a full antibiotic treatment, or you'll just breed antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Some cases are like that, and the product labeling will tell you "don't under-use". That's what the "unless" is for. Presumably in that case they'll tell you what to do with the rinsate. (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment, The first part of this is for accidental or collateral damage: think about how civilians figure into the rules of war. You can't go "12 civilians, shoot them", but you can go "11 soldiers, 1 civilian, shoot them". Suppose you're spraying 2,4-D on your yard, at a 1.5 lb/acre rate (max 3.0) to suppress broadleaf (dandelions). "Lawns" are a crop specified on the labeling. Controlling broadleaf there is a labeled use, and therefore legal. Your yard also has butterflies. This is where the exception (2) comes into play. Since "the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling" (2,4-D on lawns to control broadleaf), then, when the local butterfly admirer accuses you of applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling (2,4-D is definitely not labeled for butterflies), you have a defense. The butterfly is the civilian you can't aim at, but it is not a war crime if you shoot at a soldier and hit a civilian by mistake. If the collateral damage becomes serious, e.g. there are big issues with pollinators (e.g. honeybees) being injured by pesticide use in factory farming, then the "Unless" clause allows the EPA to intervene and cancel exception (2) on a case-by-case basis. A consumer product might be pulled, or a commercial product will mention this in the (lengthy, fold-out) labeling. (3) employing any method of application not prohibited by the labeling unless the labeling specifically states that the product may be applied only by the methods specified on the labeling, That is to give you the versatility to apply as needed. Imagine you are a farmer. Most farm pesticides are sprayed from a land vehicle, and you use the highest concentration that is workable because water is heavy. But suppose you're far enough west that your cornfield is a circle and you use a rotary irrigator. You might mix the pesticide in with the irrigation water (at a dramatically lower concentration). This exception relieves the manufacturer of the obligation to cover every possible application method. But the factory is able to override this. (4) mixing a pesticide or pesticides with a fertilizer when such mixture is not prohibited by the labeling, Simply a labor-saver: to allow you to apply pesticide and fertilizer in one pass, which most gardeners appreciate. It also empowers products like weed-and-feed . (5) any use of a pesticide in conformance with section 136c, 136p, or 136v of this title, or (6) any use of a pesticide in a manner that the Administrator determines to be consistent with the purposes of this subchapter. These are statutory phrasing to enable other legislation or rulemaking. After March 31, 1979, the term shall not include the use of a pesticide for agricultural or forestry purposes at a dilution less than label dosage unless before or after that date the Administrator issues a regulation or advisory opinion consistent with the study provided for in section 27(b) of the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, which regulation or advisory opinion specifically requires the use of definite amounts of dilution. This locks in the "right to over-dilute" (exception 1) for ag and forestry applications.

Can states and localities have stronger immigration status-based employment discrimination laws than the federal law?

8 USC §1324b prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or prospective employees on the basis of immigration status, if the individual in question is a citizen or national of the United States, a lawful permanent resident (with a proviso that I won't discuss here), or an asylee or refugee. I'm wondering whether the existence of 8 USC §1324b rules out the possibility of any stronger state law. For example, suppose a state had a law that says employers can't discriminate against people with Temporary Protected Status (TPS). This doesn't directly conflict with federal law, since TPS people have an immigration status that allows them to work for any employer. However, I am not sure whether the concept of field preemption would apply here.

It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression "protected individual" was inserted, by Public Law 101-649 , to replace earlier "citizen or intended citizen". Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections.

Are slander and defamation the same thing?

@Dave One of the elements of slander is publication of the falsehood. The fact that people believe the falsehood and take action based upon it is part of the damages element in a slander case. Forming opinions and taking actions based upon false statements that you believe to be true without republishing the false statements is not actionable. – ohwilleke May 24 '21 at 17:01 But what about defamation ? Is this a legal synonym for slander? Or is it something different?

Slander is one of two main categories of defamation, the other of which is libel. Historically, slander applied to oral statements, while libel applied to statements in writing. The modern trend is to eliminate all substantive legal distinctions between libel and slander.

Can a railroad bar a property owner from access to their property?

A 90+ acre tract of land has CSX railroad on it. The property owner in this rural area hunts on the property. In fact the back half of the tract of land is bounded on three sides by the rail main line and two secondary lines. There is literally no way other than helicopter for the man to access this portion of his land without crossing a rail right of way. (130 ft) Note the triangle shaped portion surrounded by tracks Recently while hunting he crossed the Rail road tracks and right of way to hunt on the back half of his land. The game warden observed him walking across the tracks and cited him for trespassing on railroad property. According to the South Carolina law he is charged with breaking no one can be on the rail right of way except those with authority like rail workers, fire and emergency personnel and law enforcement. CSX rail police came to the court proceeding to vouch that this was a case of trespassing. Can a law that effectively bars a property owner from access to their property be enforced or does the constitution protect the property owner’s rights and thus make them exempt from such a state law? Edit: on the interactive tax map touching within the orange lines marking rr right of way brings up “no information available” touching elsewhere brings up the owners name info and market value.

It would seem that the law involved is probably Section 58-17-4096 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 58 . This is part of the General Railroad Law of SC (GRL), and apparently was last revised in 1996. Section 58-17-4096 reads, in full: (A) It is unlawful, without proper authority, for a person to trespass upon railroad tracks. (B) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days. Note that the section does not specifically define "proper authority" nor "trespass" (nor do the definition sections at the start of the GRL), so those terms should have their ordinary meanings. It might be argued that the landowner has "proper authority". It is interstice to contrast this with the previous section, SC Code § 58-17-4095 (2012) which gives a rather detailed list of who is authorized to "park or operate a vehicle on a railroad right-of-way". Persons authorized are: an employee of the railroad ... in the performance of his duties [one who] has authority from the railroad [one who] is using a public or private roadway which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is acting in an official capacity with the military, police force, a fire fighting organization, or some similar public authority ... which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is an employee of a public utility or telecommunications carrier, or of the forestry industry ... The question asks: Can a law that effectively bars a property owner from access to their property be enforced or does the constitution protect the property owner’s rights and thus make them exempt from such a state law? There is no such absolute right of access by the owner specified in the US Federal Constitution. As the comments by Nate Eldredge suggest, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment might be relevant, but that would have (or should have) been applied when the railroad lines were put in, and if proper compensation was paid at that tiem to the then landowner, future ownership would include the restrictions then imposed. Any easement should be recorded on the actual deed to the property, but a tract map would not normally show it. Moreover, it is possible that the railroad was put in before the fourteenth amendment made the takings clause applicable to the states, or before this incorporation was recognized in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago , 166 U.S. 226 (1897) . Even so, an easement might have been obtained by private agreement between the railroad and the owner of the land at that time. In the "Interactive Constitution" article "The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause" by Richard A. Epstein and Eduardo M. Peñalver (both noted professors of law) it is said that: ... The Clause also applies, not only to the confiscation of all existing interests in any individual piece of property, but to the confiscation of certain lesser interests in property. Under Anglo-American law, these would include recognized interests like easements (such as rights of way) , leases, mortgages, life estates, and remainders. ... ... Any time some private party could seek a court order stopping another private party from engaging in harmful activities, the government can impose the same limitations through fines and court orders without a duty to compensate. A law or regulation authorized by law may bar access by a landowner to a part of a property in proper cases. For example if the land is environmentally sensitive, or if there is a dangerous condition, such as old ordnance on a former proving ground or battlefield. Such a law would probably be a partial taking, and require appropriate compensation, depending on the exact circumstances The answer by Greendrake which says: the only theoretically possible case of trespassing here is that of trespass to chattels, but that is a tort, not a crime. There can be no charges, only claims. is incorrect because of Section 58-17-4096, which specifically makes such trespass a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. However, in Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern (Opinion No. 25454, Opinion Filed April 29, 2002) the South Carolina Supreme Court found that a railroad claiming under an 1845 charter which authorized it to purchase land, and force such purchases, had acquired only an easement, not a title in fee simple. The opinion by Justice Waller refers to and quotes the SC 1845 Act No. 2953 which granted powers of acquisition to the railroad, and mentions other similar acts of the same era granting such powers to other railroads. The opinion also cites the SC 1868 Act No. 43, 7, which explicitly limits such railroad tenures. The Justice wrote: The circuit court, pursuant to numerous cases of this Court, held Railroad acquired only an easement to use the tracks, rather than a fee simple determinable, and that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity. ... In Ragsdale v. Southern Ry. Co. , 60 S.C. 381, 38 S.E. 609 (1901), the Court construed a Charter to the Spartanburg and Union Railroad which had provisions identical to those of sections 9, 10 and 11 above. The Court noted that, under sections 9 and 10, the Legislature had specifically provided that land taken by and paid for by the railroad would vest in fee simple. However, the Court noted that no such words were used in section 11, which provided only that the company shall have "good right and title. . . so long as the same may be used only for the purpose of said road." The Ragsdale Court, after citing Justice Wardlaw's dissent in Lewis, concluded: [t]he legislature wisely made a distinction in the tenure by which the railroad company held the land when it was under one or the other of said sections. Having reached the conclusion that the rights of the parties are different under the foregoing sections, . . . [o]ur interpretation of the foregoing sections is that the railroad company acquired only a right of way over the land described in the complaint. ... We adhere to the wealth of authority in this state and hold the 1845 Charter created only an easement in Railroad, such that Faulkenberry is entitled to use the disputed crossing. We note, however, that although Faulkenberry may cross the railroad tracks, he may not do anything which would unreasonably interfere with Railroad's use of its easement. Marion County Lumber Co. v. Tilghman Lumber Co. , 75 S.C. 220, 55 S.E. 337 (1906) (owner of the dominant estate cannot materially interfere with use and enjoyment of servient estate's easement; owners must be held during continuance of easement to have abandoned every use of the land except such as might be made consistent with the reasonable enjoyment of the easement). See also Brown v. Gaskins , 284 S.C. 30, 33, 324 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ct.App.1984). ( A footnote to the opinion mentions that: The circuit court ruled that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity to cross the railroad tracks. In light of our holding, we need not address this alternate ruling. Note that in the Faulkenberry case there was apparently a road crossing the tracks, although not an authorized crossing. The doctrine of an easement by necessity might apply in the case described in the question. Detailed legal advice would be needed to determine this, and quite probably a court case.

If a 12 year old child uses his mother's car without her consent

A 12 year old child uses his parent's car without her consent. He loses control over the steering wheel and hits his twin brother, which causes his brother's death. In this case, who is held responsible? Can the son be sued?

Depending on the country (not mentioned), the mother may be at fault for not keeping the car out of the hands of her son, but on the other hand, it seems quite impossible to 100% prevent a determined 12 year old from getting hold of your car keys. That would likely be up to a judge to decide whether and how much she is at fault. And also depending on the country, the 12 year old will be held more or less responsible for his actions, due to his age. Depends on the laws, and may depend on the judge deciding whether a normal 12 year old, or whether this particular 12 year old, should know that him driving a car is illegal and highly dangerous and possibility of someone dying was foreseeable.

International sexting between two minors - Text only

A 12-year-old living in the U.S. "sexted" with a 14-year-old in Sweden. Was any crime committed? Are there possible legal consequences for either child having engaged in that act?

In the US, the various "child pornography" laws apply only if there is an actual picture of an actual child. A computer-generated image does not count under those laws, unless it is recognizably of an actual identifiable person who is or was a minor at the time, nor does a description of sex with a child, no matter how graphic or realistic. However I need to point out that any accusation of child pornography is potentially very serious, and any person who has been or might plausibly have been accused of such would do well to consult a lawyer who can review the exact facts and has tools to check recent caselaw. This page from the US DOJ says: Images of child pornography are not protected under First Amendment rights, and are illegal contraband under federal law. Section 2256 of Title 18, United States Code, defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under 18 years of age). Visual depictions include photographs, videos, digital or computer generated images indistinguishable from an actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict an identifiable, actual minor. Undeveloped film, undeveloped videotape, and electronically stored data that can be converted into a visual image of child pornography are also deemed illegal visual depictions under federal law. That page cites: 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children (Production of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2251A- Selling and Buying of Children 18 U.S.C. § 2252- Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (Possession, distribution and receipt of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A- certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2256- Definitions 18 U.S.C. § 2260- Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States The Wikipedia article mentions that: Simulated child pornography was made illegal with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA). The CPPA was short-lived. In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition held that the relevant portions of the CPPA were unconstitutional because they prevented lawful speech. Referring to Ferber, the court stated that "the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of children". The opinion in Ashcroft included the statement that: Whether or not the films we mention violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. See Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass ., 383 U. S. 413, 419 (1966) Under Ginsberg v. New York , 390 U. S. 629 (1968) , it may be a crime for an adult to provide "inappropriate" sexual content to a child, even if the content is not legally obscene, but this does not apply when both parties to a communication are minors. Text, written words, may be unlawful to distribute if and only if it passes the Miller* test , making it legally obscene. The wording of the test is: The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth , supra, at 354 U. S. 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 413 U. S. 24-25. This test applies whether the subjects are children or adults. I do not know\ what rules would be applied by the authorities in Sweden. They are likely to be quite different.

Statutory Rape: Which State's Laws Apply?

A 17 year old male child has sexual intercourse with a significantly (at least two decades) older man. In New York, where the child's residence is, this is, I think , legal. At the time of the incident, however, the child was staying in California, where this is, I think (same source), illegal, for a period of two months. The state of residence of the adult is unknown. Which state's laws apply? Can the adult be prosecuted?

When a criminal act takes place, the state in which the act took place has jurisdiction. State of residence of perpetrator or victim is not at all relevant. It also would not matter where the minor was "staying", all that matters is where the act took place. If that was California, California Penal Code 261.5(c) says Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Additionally, (261.5(e)(1) states Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an adult who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of this section may be liable for civil penalties in the following amounts:... (C) An adult who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor at least three years younger than the adult is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000)

What would be the default speed limit for a highway in Texas in this case?

A 2 lane road is enhanced, widened and expanded to 6 lanes. it goes through a small town. The previous speed limit on that road was 55 mph. After the new road is finished the speed limit signs are taken down in preparation for the new speed study. The police in this small town contend that the old speed limit of 55 mph is still in force. The say that because of the ordinance of that town is still on the books, they can still enforce it even though no speed limit signs are posted on the road. The road is a named and numbered state highway. According to Texas law, I see that it states this: (b) Unless a special hazard exists that requires a slower speed for compliance with Section 545.351(b) , the following speeds are lawful: (1) 30 miles per hour in an urban district on a street other than an alley and 15 miles per hour in an alley; (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; That road is a farm-to-market road. This road is also one where there are not many driveways and would be considered to be outside of an urban district. So what would the speed limit be on that road when there are no posted speed limit signs anywhere in that city on that road? In Texas speeding is considered to be a class C misdemeanor criminal offense and is not a civil infraction. In Texas a trial by jury can be had for those offenses.

It would be the speed limit that a reasonable person would assume. Such a person would see speed limit signs on the highway before it approaches the town (say 70 mph). Not seeing any other speed limit signs when entering/driving through the town, such a person would still look for signs of urban area (pedestrian crossings, bus stops etc.) — just in case they have missed a lower speed limit sign or it has been missing by accident. Not seeing any signs of urban area, not seeing any lower speed limit signs and continuing to see the highway (even though with some driveways), a reasonable person would assume that the speed limit does not change i.e. stays at 70mph. No reasonable person could know of " the ordinance of that town still on the books " that the police refers to. Given this, and also that the 55 mph signs were deliberately taken down, any reasonable judge would laugh the police out of the court room should they attempt to defend their enforcement of 55 mph.

IOS App rejected due to an unknown "_file"

A 5 year old app which was submitted every month successfully. Recently got rejected saying. “Your app uses or references the following non-public APIs: ABLE.framework, _file ” “Continuing to use or conceal non-public APIs in future submissions of this app may result in the termination of your Apple Developer account, as well as removal of all associated apps from the App Store.” is _file is supposed to be rejected ? is _file is really a private API ? Appeal is also rejected.

It's very simple: conform to the Apple Developer Guidelines or you can't use the App store. We have no idea why _file was the cause of rejection, other than Apple makes the rules, and one of their rules is no use of "non-public APIs." Apple is a private business and they administer their App store any way they want, within state and federal laws. You are bound by Apple's user agreement, a binding legal contract, which outlines reasons for App rejections, denial of appeals and canceling of your account, and venues for litigation or binding arbitration. If you don't like the terms of the contract for the App store, you don't have to agree to it.

Can an arbitration award be vacated for manifest disregard of the evidence?

A AAA arbitration over a credit card billing dispute between a consumer and a bank concluded recently. The consumer "won", in the sense that he obtained equitable relief, but lost, in the sense that he failed to recover damages. A key question of fact was whether the bank made billing statements available online. In his award, the arbitrator stated "[consumer] presented no evidence that his Ink account statements were not available ... [bank] presented evidence that such statements were available on the [website]. So, there was no showing of failure on the part of [bank] to provide access to statements". However, the bank presented no such evidence at the hearing. They called a single witness, who had no personal knowledge relating to online statement access, and even testified quite plainly under questioning from the arbitrator himself that the bank had no evidence, e.g.: ARBITRATOR: [M]y question to [witness] is, does [bank] have any way to show whether or not the statements were actually posted to one of those username accounts that could be accessed online at the time? WITNESS: No. There wouldn't be anything in [the evidentiary record] that would reflect that. ARBITRATOR: Okay, all right. When you say that, are you suggesting that there could be evidence somewhere else? WITNESS: Not that I'm aware of, no. ARBITRATOR: Well, how do you deal with the allegation that [consumer] is making that he would go to the account ... and not see any statements? Can you prove or disprove that? WITNESS: I cannot prove or disprove that, no. Is this grounds to vacate the award?

No Chapter 1, Section 10 of the FAA states that a court may vacate an arbitral award only if it finds that one of the following limited grounds applies: (1) the award is a result of corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; (3) arbitrator misconduct, such as refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made. There is no “the arbitrator screwed up” basis. This is pretty much universal across jurisdictions for arbitration. One of the features (whether you think it’s a good or bad feature is up to you) is that arbitration is, for all practical purposes, final . That’s it, we’re done. The law is written that way because parties to an arbitration freely and voluntarily chose this method of dispute resolution over the courts. In theory, at least. Having made their choice, the courts will not unmake it.

How to remove an entry from Boston Herald database

A Boston Herald database posted information about government employees' salaries here . Can a person named in the database remove their entry?

That would require a change in the law. Names and salaries of public employees have been held to not be highly personal information exempt from the public records law. See Attorney General v. Collector of Lynn , 377 Mass. 151, Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn , 374 Mass. 812. This is part of the "diminished expectation of privacy in matters relating to their public employment" attaching to public employment.

Can a person make a subject access request for police body cam footage?

A British Transport Police officer accused a subject of wasting police time after the subject waited patiently for police attendance to resolve a situation with a counterpart who had called police. The subject responded by challenging the accusation of wasting police time by having the police called on them. The officer changed his story by denying the he had said it. The subject calls this out by proposing to consult the body cam footage by Subject Access Request (under the Data Protection Act). The officer objects that one cannot make a Subject Access Request directly but rather could only do it through "a solicitor". Is there any truth to this whatsoever, and if so, on what basis could one not be entitled to make a request that one's representative can apparently make on one's behalf?

There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page , under the heading " How we use personal data ": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras , CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP

Are customer dissatisfaction and loss of trust enough reasons to terminate a relationship without obligations?

A Buyer signed an instalment agreement. The Seller prematurely terminated the agreement due to their own negligence. The Seller offered the Buyer another instalment agreement however, the terms are different from the initial agreement. The new agreement has stricter conditions and the Buyer felt taken advantage of. The Buyer is very dissatisfied with the Seller. Based on the Buyer's past dealings with the Seller, the Buyer does not trust the Seller is capable of handling this new arrangement. Buyer foresees it would cause more problems in the future. The Buyer rejected the new agreement. The Seller finally decided to abide by the initial terms but was unable to reinstate the auto deductions scheme. The Buyer doesn’t want to give in and the Seller insists the auto deductions cannot be reinstated. In this scenario, does the Buyer have the right to not resume the relationship and not be liable for the balanced payment or at least not immediately?

does the Buyer have the right to not resume the relationship and not be liable for the balanced payment or at least not immediately? There are a few gaps and inconsistencies in your description, which appears to relate to the linked post in regard to the purchased item (the pay-as-you-go service mentioned there is a separate contract that will be ignored here). Subject to missing details, (1) the buyer is not entitled to unilaterally terminate the [purchase] contract, and (2) the seller cannot force the buyer to make a lump-sum payment of a balance the they agreed would be paid in installments. The statements that " [s]eller prematurely terminated the agreement " and thereafter " decided to abide by the initial terms " suggest that actually the agreement had not been terminated. The seller merely desisted from amending or replacing the original agreement. The seller might be --or might have been-- in breach of contract at some point, but that is different from terminating that agreement. Nor does a party's breach necessarily entitle the counterparty to terminate that agreement. Generally speaking, that entitlement would have to be provided in the agreement. In some situations, a contract is voidable by a party. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §153. However, the scenario you and the other OP describe would not warrant that remedy. The seller's alleged inability to reinstate its automated deductions does not release him from his duty to perform the deductions as scheduled in the agreement. Even if the seller's [questionable] allegation is truthful, nothing appears to prevent him from processing the deductions manually. It is possible that manual processing of deductions translates to additional costs to the seller. To reduce those costs, the seller could devise lawful (i.e., not coercive, not misleading, etc.) incentives that would persuade the buyer to agree to a different arrangement. The buyer cannot be expected to waive a contractual right merely because the seller is adamant about the aforementioned inability. The tables could turn if the customer terminates the relationship in a way that amounts to breach of contract. Based on the details provided so far, it is in the buyer's best interest to stick to the terms of the agreement unless [maybe] the seller comes up with a satisfactory proposal.

What happens if a Canadian is convicted (misdemeanour)in Europe? Is the Canadian government notified?

A Canadian person is convicted of a misdemeanour while in Germany. The person gets a criminal record in Germany. Will the information about the conviction be sent to Canada? Will it appear in the Canadian database?

There is no systemic process by which convictions of crime in Germany (at all, let alone for misdemeanors) are reported to authorities in Canada. This said, a Canadian charged with a crime in Germany has a right to consular assistance (i.e. to call upon the Canadian embassy for help). And, if the Canadian actually does obtain assistance from the Canadian government in defense of criminal charges and is convicted anyway, obviously, a Canadian government official will know about it. I don't know if Canadian diplomats who provide consular assistance who learn of criminal convictions of Canadians abroad report those convictions to criminal record database record keepers in Canada, although I suspect that they do not.

May an employer legally terminate a contract, should the planned funding supporting that contract cease to exist?

A Canadian university issues job offers for its post-doctoral fellows according to a template in which one reads: This appointment is a term appointment from [date] to [date], and is funded, at least in part, from funds external to the University’s general purpose operating budget. In the event that these funds cease to be available, your appointment will be terminated. What is the rationale behind the legality of this clause? (Assuming that the employee's performance is satisfactory) shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract?

Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation.

Are there laws against International student in UK doxxing others in other country

A Chinese international student in the UK doxxing a netizen on Twitter because the netizen have an opposite political standard (don't support PRC) against him. He is going to report this netizen to the Chinese government and may cause that netizens have judicial trouble. Is it illegal or Violate some rules in the UK?

Doxxing (targeted research and broadcasting of personal information) is not regulated as such. Regulated are separate elements that individual doxxing cases may include: hacking, harassment, extortion, defamation etc. He is going to report this netizen to the Chinese government and may cause that netizens have judicial trouble. So, whether the activity in question is illegal depends solely on whether it includes any illegal elements exampled above. Bringing a person to the attention of justice or law enforcement (whether locally or in any other country) is not illegal by itself.

School tricking/forcing students to create content for school's website

A Computer Engineer school (which shall remain anonymous) has issued an assignment to almost every student, which is to produce a short (3-5min) tutorial of a given student-specific subject. The school website coincidentally has a "Tutorial video" section, but no content yet. When asked about this, the teacher said the assignment will not be used for the school website, even though the assignment requires students to concatenate their videos with a "For more tutorials, check school.name .com" at the end. If the student videos end up on the website, is the school breaking any laws or infringing any rights? The country I'm interested in is France. Note: This is a private school, and while the contract asks the students to give up image rights, there is no mention of the status of work produced in the school. Additional information: I've read the contract again in search of intellectual property. I've specifically refused to give up intellectual rights in the contract, but did concede image rights.

I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it.

What if a DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) breaks the law?

A DAO is a decentralized organization, typically powered by cryptography. It works much like a business, but without borders. Although a DAO typically receives instructions from its stockholders, it is ultimately controlled by its code. One particular DAO, ominously known as The DAO . It's mission statement: The DAO’s Mission: To blaze a new path in business organization for the betterment of its members, existing simultaneously nowhere and everywhere and operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code (emphasis present in original source). It already controls at least $20 million worth of assets , and it hasn't even started doing stuff yet! My question is, what happens if The DAO or some other decentralized organization breaks the law? For example, what if it breaks contracts, breaks copyright law, doesn't pay taxes, hires assassins or jay walks ? Would its shareholders be punished? Would its contractors (people it pays in the real world to do its dirty work) be punished? Note that it could still theoretically do things like commit financial fraud (such as ponzi schemes) without requiring contractors. Would people involved in the crypto systems allowing it to exist be punished (in the case of The DAO, ethereum miners ). Would the original programmer be punished? Note: I'm not saying The DAO or any other decentralized organizations will break the law. The DAO is even thinking of donating money to charity, which quite a nice thing. I guess practically a problem that might arise is that these things often operate internationally, and so if the values of the stockholders are based on one jurisdiction, and they don't really care about complying with the laws of other jurisdictions, you would have a problem (especially if they knew that there was nothing that those other jurisdictions could do about it).

The private organizations, in difference to international organizations (the organizations, members thereof are the countries) or the countries are not subjects of international law. They are also not a subject of criminal laws, so they technically can't break the law. The people can. If the actions of such organizations will break some laws, the people staying behind that organization will be made responsible. Either it will be single individuals, or the whole organization might be declared criminal (such as mafia or a gang) and there everyone, including stakeholders or casual employees/contractors might be subjects to interrogation, arrest and sentence. As for the problem you describe, when the organization made something illegal under one jurisdiction, and the stakeholders are sitting in other country, where such actions are not illegal, they might only partially be safe. They might be arrested not only in the country where the legal actions are taken, but also in third countries, that have extradition agreements with that country.

Is self-defense mutually exclusive of murder?

A Dallas man is charged with murder . The narrative indicates that the man shot the intruder in his back yard as the intruder approached with a pickax. Assuming that the homeowner does not have a duty to retreat and that he does have lawful cause to defend himself (from intruder with a pickax), why \ how does the narrative fit a murder charge? UPDATE: That being said, I would expect that the intruder being shot in the back of the neck does NOT help the defendant's claim of a justifiable shooting.

The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card.

How does a cancelled Delaware Domestic LLC affect the company's California Foreign LLC?

A Delaware Domestic LLC is cancelled status. The LLC has a California Foreign LLC. Is the Californian Foreign LLC legally able to continue in business, if the Domestic LLC is in cancelled status?

The 'California foreign LLC' is not a separate entity. There is one entity, the Delaware LLC, which happens to be registered with the Californian authorities as a foreign (out-of-state) LLC doing business in California. If the Delaware LLC is dissolved then it doesn't exist. Therefore it can't do anything anywhere. Pretending to carry on business in the name of a non-existent company would be fraudulent.

Not guilty defense nomenclature

A Deputy fired after putting knee on Black man's neck. . The news article reports: A relative of the man was arrested when she tried to intervene, according to the news report. Let us assume that kneeling on the neck is criminal: In the unlikely event that state prosecutes said relative, what principle / defense would her counsel engage to support a plea of not guilty?

Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3 , formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.

Differences between Damages and Quantum

A Dictionary of Law (9 ed. 2018). Edited by Jonathan Law. Quantum quantum n. (of damages) The amount of money awarded by way of damages. Damages damages pl. n. A sum of money awarded by a court as compensation for a tort or a breach of contract. Damages are usually a lump-sum award (see also provisional damages ). The general principle is that the claimant is entitled to full compensation ( restitutio in integrum ) for his losses. Substantial damages are given when actual damage has been caused, but nominal damages may be given for breach of contract and for some torts (such as trespass) in which no damage has been caused, in order to vindicate the claimant’s rights. Damages may be aggravated by the circumstances of the wrong. In exceptional cases in tort (but never in contract) exemplary damages may be given to punish the defendant’s wrongdoing. Damages may be classified as unliquidated or liquidated. Liquidated damages are a sum fixed in advance by the parties to a contract as the amount to be paid in the event of a breach. They are recoverable provided that the sum fixed was a fair pre-estimate of the likely consequences of a breach, but not if they were imposed as a penalty . Unliquidated damages are damages the amount of which is fixed by the court. Damages may also be classified as general and special damages . I'll cite some uses of 'quantum'. Anson's Law of Contract (2016 30 ed) p 432. Where the covenantee has a legitimate interest which it is entitled to protect, the restriction must not be longer in point of time, or wider in area, or otherwise be more extensive in scope than is necessary to protect that interest. The answer to this question in any individual case, however, must necessarily depend upon the interest to be protected, the nature of the contract and the relative positions of the contracting parties.159 The quantum of the consideration which the covenantor has received in exchange for the restraint is relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the contract.160 Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2018 8 ed) . p 242. Gardner has put forward the following ((1999) 115 LQR 438, 452) as a possible hypothesis for the remedial regime for proprietary estoppel: The approach is – to vindicate the plaintiff’s expectations (care being taken to achieve the best match between the details of the plaintiff’s expectations and the possible legal responses); – to vindicate those expectations in specie if practicable, but otherwise in a monetary form; but – to resort to some other quantum , not more generous than the expectation measure, if it is impracticable to give relief in the expectation measure; and – to resort to some other quantum , with no ceiling at the expectation measure, in the presence of another factor from a limited range recognised as meriting a departure from expectation relief. p 608. Hoffmann LJ in W illiam Sindall plc v. Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 WLR 1016. Damages under section 2(2) are therefore damages for the misrepresentation as such. What would be the measure of such damages? This court is not directly concerned with quantum , which would be determined at an inquiry. pp 727-728. Robert Goff J. In other cases, however, the actual benefit to the defendant may be considerably more than the appropriate or just sum to be awarded to the plaintiff, in which event the value of the benefit will not in fact determine the quantum of the award. I should add, however, that, in a case of prospecting, it would usually be wrong to identify the discovered mineral as the benefit. p. 817. Lord Lloyd in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1996] AC 344. Mr Forsyth was, I think, lucky to have obtained so large an award for his disappointed expectations. But as there was no criticism from any quarter as to the quantum of the award as distinct from the underlying principle, it would not be right for your Lordships to interfere with the judge’s figure.

Quantum means “how much” It’s simply a synonym for amount or quantity. It can be applied to damages or anything else that gets measured. The quantum of my height is 180cm, the quantum of my weight I’ll keep to myself.

Can a social security card be used/required as identification?

A FINRA-regulated institution is restricting my account on suspicion of identity theft and requiring that I give them a copy of my social security card which I of course don't have because what use does it even have? It has no photo or even date of birth or other identifying details so why would anyone even keep it? Even the SSA itself suggests that it is useless and unimportant, that if you've lost it you probably don't even need to replace it. Furthermore you can even be prohibited from obtaining a replacement if you get too many in a year or your lifetime. What if you're past your quota? In short, is it legal to require one to present their SSC as a precondition to accessing one's own funds? And corollary, are there any SEC/FINRA regulations that require an institution to demand one's SSC as identification?

Many financial institutions have to withhold taxes on the customer's behalf or at least notify the federal government of transactions like interest payments. To do that they need the customer's SSN or tax payer id and they are authorized to require that information . It isn't so much for ID purposes as making sure the info gets to the right tax account. If they suspect you of identity theft they may need some sort of documentary evidence of your SSN or taxpayer id rather than just your say so As trivial as it seems, a social security card is legal proof of your SSN

(Canada, British Columbia) What Cause of Action(s) would be available in the Situation Below? Ways to Calculate Remedies In this Case?

A Father (RE Agent, Broker, Owns Biz as RE Developer) is approached by his Daughter wanting to purchase Property for her to live in. An Agreement is eventually reached between the Father and Daughter and an Agreement/Contract is Made. The Father purchases property in 2014 for $120,000.00 (7% Increased Value since being built in 05) Daughter Pays Father Directly An Initial Down payment in the amount of $10,000.00 Daughter is Required To Make Timely Lump Sum Payments totaling $10,000.00 every 3 months. Payable to the Father. Tax and Interest Free. The Father would keep his name in addition to his Daughters Name on the Title Until Such time as the Principle had been Repaid, at which time His name would be removed, Leaving her with Sole Ownership and Title to the Property. All Payments were made in accordance with the predetermined schedule. TOTAL MONEY PAID to Father $160,000.00 September 2019 Father Pays A Moving Crew to Act as a Court Approved Bailiff, including the use of a Fraudulent/Forged Document purporting to be a genuine Writ of Possession used this document to justify the Forcibly Gained Entry To Property and Completely Removed his Daughter And Her Fiancée Wrongfully from their Home along with their belongings. The Reason this is mentioned, or thought to be relevant is the issue surrounding the several written "threats" made by the Father that had announced his intentions to so weeks before. The Couple end uprooted, and with few options in the Market in their BC Town. The forced move cost dearly, as in addition to the costs associated with acquiring a new residence, re-establishing and restarting their business during the Lockdown- adding there had been costly mistakes on behalf of the movers damaging a considerable amount of their property for which was realted to their businessd. There has been a pattern in previous circumstances, that follow much the same patterns of intimidation, and other types of behavior such as described here, on behalf of the Father. In Decemeber 4th of 2020 The Father Sold the Home For $262,500.00 Todays Date: The Father has Not Paid or Provided any Such Monies To The Daughter. Est. Value $307,000 in 2022

The daughter needs local legal representation. Your presentation of facts says there was fraud, theft, breach of contract, and likely several torts. Any remedy will be through the courts.

Mediation: Agenda format

A Florida Condominium owner is initiated litigation against an HOA. The judge requires that both sides engage in mediation. Is there a cananical format (template) for mandatory mediation before trial? If yes, an example would ideal.

No such template exists. Different mediators have different approaches, and there are essentially no rules whatsoever for mediation procedures. If the court is handling the mediation itself, you may be able to look to the civil rules or local rules, but I would not expect you to find anything.

Mediation: process / objectives

A Florida Condominium owner is initiated litigation against an HOA. The judge requires that both sides engage in mediation. IANAL: What exactly does a judge expect both sides to do at the meeting? What must the plaintiff do in the meeting to ensure that they have met expectations?

A party's mediation obligations can vary wildly, from state to state, and even from mediator to mediator. Fortunately, the normal protocol will be for the mediator to reach out to all the parties to explain how the process will work and what is expected of them. It would not be unusual to see any combination of the following: Ex parte premediation conversations about the process; Premediation statements from the parties about their position and objectives, which may be shared with the other side or only with the mediator; One or more rounds of premediation offers and demands; An in-person or Zoom meeting of the parties, which could then include; An opening statement by the mediator, usually focused on mediation protocols; Opening statements by the parties; Discussion and negotiation between the parties (less common); Breakout sessions in which the mediator shuttles back and forth for ex parte discussions with each of the parties (much more common); Back-and-forth exchanges of offers and demands; A final "mediator's proposal," i.e., the mediator's final attempt to bring the parties to an agreement with a resolution she thinks both sides will accept.

Why use USPS to Deliver Demand Letter when email is available

A Florida HOA is in breach of contract: the next step is to send a 'demand' letter seeking actionable remedy. There is a history with HOA of using email: is there any compelling reason to send the demand letter via USPS registered mail?

Why use USPS to Deliver Demand Letter when email is available The answer essentially lies in NateEldredge's comment, and is consistent with Firefighter's Inst. for Racial Equal v. City fo St. Louis , 220 F.3d 898, 903 in that regular mail (and impliedly email) as a method of service is generally inadmissible " because the court cannot be assured that delivery has occurred ". Even if the HOA replied to your email, phoog is right in that the possibility of falsification of email records may prevent some courts from admitting service by email.

Attorney Client Privilege: email

A Florida defendant forwards an email (not an accident) to a plaintiff that contains discussion between defendant's attorney and said defendant. Is the forwarded forwarded client-attorney privileged?

No Voluntary disclosure , even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself.

Injunction, petition or other?

A Florida homeowner association is violating its bylaws and statutes by performing action X. Does one seek an emergency? preliminary? injunction from a judge to not perform X? or is it a petition? Assume the matter is time sensitive. Any support in the form of a form or instructions is appreciated. UPDATE: Assume the HOA action is a time & materials purchase that is nonrefundable: petitioners have filed for arbitration with the state authority to enjoin the HOA to follow statue & bylaw. The HOA has been notified of arbitration and is moving forward anyways: this is origin / driver of the question

An injunction However, injunctions are only granted if: Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; Plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and A temporary injunction will serve the public interest. Obviously, you have given no details but it seems hard to see what how a violation of by-laws and statute could not be remedied by damages after the event. A purchase of something for cash is certainly repairable with damages.

Tenant at Sufferance

A Florida residential tenant contract is written such that after the term the renter is on a month to month contract and either party may terminate with 15 days notice. Is this example coined by "Tenant at Sufferance"? If not what are the differences?

No. The difference is the tenancy at sufferance is a status that arises from a wrongdoing by the tenant. It is a tenancy at sufferance when a tenant wrongfully stays in possession of the property after the expiration of the tenancy.

How might this use of the Star Wars logo and universe be legal?

A French book about Star Wars recently came out , giving a psychological approach on the films and characters. The book doesn't contain images, but on the cover, the Star Wars logo is visible, and there's a drawing of Sigmund Freud holding Darth Vader's helmet. I believe the names of the characters are used throughout the book, as well as names of planets, spaceships, or other fictional elements from the films. I believe the author thinks they are in their own right to use these elements, and I assume the publishing company also did some research before putting out this book. But I also know that Lucasfilms and Disney love suing all sorts of people , from their own former employees to Ronald Reagan. To me, the line isn't clear between the two. So I am wondering if this use of the Star Wars universe respects copyright and trademarks regulations, and on what legal grounds. (I am asking because I would like to write and sell derivative works as well, and I don't know how I could be sure to never break a law). EDIT: I asked the author yesterday if they had to pay to use the trademarked logo, derivative visuals, etc, and he said "Copyrights for Star Wars only applies to images taken from the film. Not on the logo, font or drawing inspired from". JURIDICTION: France & USA

You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation.

Refund when resident dies in assisted living - with particular contract terms

A General Hypothetical Situation: An elderly individual is in an assisted living facility and passes away within the first week of a month. The individual's family seeks a pro-rated refund for the time of that month that the individual did not live there (because, of course, individual is deceased). The Contracts: [ If it matters, both of the following documents are separate from one another and from any other agreement ]. Say there are two form contracts. 1 and 2: Contract #1: The first was signed by the individual's family when it was presented at the beginning of the individual's stay. This one is titled "Refund Policy" and states that no refund will be given unless 30-day notice is given to the facility that the resident is "leaving." Contract #2: The second was neither presented to nor signed by the individual or the individual's family at any time. This one is titled "No Refund Policy In Case of Death." It explains that no matter what, there will be no refund in the instance the resident expires with time remaining in the month (meaning if the resident dies on November 1 and November has already been paid for, not even then would the family receive any refund). The Question: Given that the one form signed made no mention of death and specifically related to "leaving" and the fact that the second form exists (ostensibly for some reason as opposed to just for the joy of having yet more forms), but was not signed or presented (or discussed), can the individual's family get that remaining monthly fee back legally? My initial thoughts focus on the wording of the contract signed and the existence of the second, more specific, contract. Simultaneously, I am wondering whether the contract is enforceable under the theory of contract of adhesion. Thoughts?

There is only 1 contract - the one where the Home allows the resident to live there in return for money. What you have described in the forms are terms that may or may not form part of the contract, not seperate contracts. Form 2 is irrelevant - as it was not presented to the other party it doesn’t form part of the contract. Notwithstanding, under Form 1, there is no refund. The resident “left” without giving notice; even though the circumstances are such that the resident couldn’t give notice that is not the homes’s problem.