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9b413a422ed638cef5f135365ec03ea4ea8a4f2757a0c4a22d97a24a20569634

3---The legal system can give AI duties without giving it rights.

Eva Bernet Kempers 22. “Transition rather than Revolution: The Gradual Road towards Animal Legal Personhood through the Legislature” Cambridge University Press. 04-13-22. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/transnational-environmental-law/article/transition-rather-than-revolution-the-gradual-road-towards-animal-legal-personhood-through-the-legislature/321523E062E9A3674804047908DC9A83

the legal sphere consisting of a range in differing degrees for a i status encompasses incidents while excluding fundamental protections humans need

image of the legal sphere – as consisting of a range of various legal entities that hold rights and incidents in differing degrees – . , for a rtificial i ntelligence or robots, a legal status might be envisioned that encompasses several incidents of legal personhood ( such as the capacity to be held accountable ) and simple rights, while excluding some of the fundamental protections that humans and animals might need

as consisting of a range in differing degrees a legal status might be envisioned several incidents such as the capacity to be held accountable that humans and animals might need

['The more pluralized image of the legal sphere – as consisting of a range of various legal entities that hold rights and incidents of personhood in differing degrees – might also be relevant for legal approaches to other non-humans. One could imagine that, for artificial intelligence or robots, a legal status might be envisioned that encompasses several incidents of legal personhood (such as the capacity to be held accountable) and simple rights, while excluding some of the fundamental protections that humans and animals might need (such as the protection of bodily integrity). ']

[(11, 21), (24, 57)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoRu-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Emory

CoRu

b761bef3da2536c4086e9e1840a8da6f0d73543bd0be4ca0567ba196ef35017f

1. Bombers are rendered unusable due to bases.

Kingston Reif et al. 11. Director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. Contributing Authors Include: Travis Sharp and Kirk Bansak. “Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Bombers, Missiles, and Submarines.” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 2011. https://armscontrolcenter.org/pruning-the-nuclear-triad-pros-and-cons-of-bombers-missiles-and-submarines/

bombers are located at only three bases be significantly damaged by a surprise attack Instead of deterring bombers exacerbate tension

bombers today are located at only three continental bases could therefore be significantly damaged by a surprise attack Instead of demonstrating resolve and deterring an adversary, scrambling bombers might actually exacerbate tension odds are vanishingly small that an adversary could ever deploy a missile defense system robust enough to stop 100 percent of incoming long-range missiles. The alternative penetration option offered by bombers may therefore be practically useless.

only three continental bases

['• U.S. bombers today are located at only three continental bases in Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota. The bomber force could therefore be significantly damaged by a surprise attack against only three targets.', '• Because bombers can carry both nuclear and conventional payloads, during a crisis an adversary might suspect that a conventionally-armed bomber was actually carrying nuclear weapons, thereby encouraging an attack against the bomber or a preemptive nuclear strike.', '• Instead of demonstrating resolve and deterring an adversary, scrambling bombers might actually exacerbate tension by rousing suspicion of an impending nuclear strike, thereby prompting further escalation.', '• Though assured strategic penetration is vital to deterrence, the odds are vanishingly small that an adversary could ever deploy a missile defense system robust enough to stop 100 percent of incoming long-range missiles. The alternative penetration option offered by bombers may therefore be practically useless.']

[(9, 23)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoYa-Neg-ada-Round-2.docx

Emory

LoYa

724087c6378ff9e28eae3a76d8cc412d10705b10b03cb76e163c155c8f3b3bdf

Adding “leadership” results in self-interested collaboration unable to solve social and ecological crisis---we must shift to view society as a collective whole.

Todd Khozein et al. 13, Founder and Co-CEO of SecondMuse. And Michael Karlberg, professor of Communication Studies at Western Washington University. And Carrie Freeman, Co-CEO for SecondMuse. Chapter 11 “From Competition to Collaboration: Toward a New Framework for Entrepreneurship.” in Creating Good Work: The World's Leading Social Entrepreneurs Show How to Build a Healthy Economy (edited by Ron Schultz, 2013, Palgrave Macmillan).

Collaboration refers to cooperation among to achieve a common goal Collaboration is still viewed as self-interested competition this self-interested view is deeply maladaptive under social and ecological interdependence Under these the well-being of every individual is dependent on the entire social body Rather than viewing society as an arena for self-interested competition , we need to begin viewing it as a complex living system to reframe by shifting from a social contest frame to a social body frame collaboration and reciprocity-not competition

Collaboration refers to cooperation among diverse individuals to achieve a common goal collaboration is encouraged merely to enable an organization to compete Collaboration is still widely viewed as a strategy of self-interested competition this self-interested view of collaboration is part of the same conceptual framework that is becoming deeply maladaptive under social and ecological interdependence . Under these conditions, the well-being of every individual is dependent on the well-being of the entire social body . These new conditions require us to adopt a more mature conception of social and economic relationships. Rather than viewing society as an arena for self-interested competition , we need to begin viewing it as a complex living system an organic whole we need to reframe our conception of society by shifting from a social contest frame to a social body frame Within any organic body, relations are collaboration and reciprocity-not competition within an organic body, the competitive hoarding of resources or the pursuit of mutually exclusive gains is a sure sign of disease these dysfunctional relations continue to dominant human societies-especially within market interactions .

Collaboration is still widely viewed as a strategy of self-interested competition this self-interested view of collaboration deeply maladaptive every individual entire social body self-interested competition an organic whole we need to reframe our conception of society by shifting from a social contest frame to a social body frame relations are collaboration and reciprocity-not competition sure sign of disease market interactions

['Collaboration, as we are using the term, refers to cooperation among diverse individuals, groups, or organizations working together systematically to achieve a common goal. In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the development of more effective collaboration among diverse individuals or entities within organizations. However, such intraorganizational collaboration is often encouraged merely to enable an organization to compete more effectively against other organizations for access to scarce resources, markets, profits, and so forth. Likewise, some attention has also been paid to interorganizational collaboration, but largely for the same reasons: to enable partner organizations to compete more effectively against rivals in zero-sum relationships. Collaboration, in other words, is still widely viewed as a strategy of self-interested competition.', "Unfortunately, this self-interested view of collaboration is part of the same conceptual framework, alluded to earlier, that is becoming deeply maladaptive under today's conditions of ever-increasing social and ecological interdependence. Under these conditions, the well-being of every individual and group is increasingly dependent on the well-being of the entire social body. These new conditions therefore require us to adopt a more mature conception of social and economic relationships. Rather than viewing society as an arena for self-interested competition, we need to begin viewing it as a complex living system-or an organic whole. In other worlds, we need to reframe our conception of society by shifting from a social contest frame to a social body frame. 4", 'Within any healthy organic body, relations among its component cells and organs are characterized by collaboration and reciprocity-not competition. Indeed, within an organic body, the competitive hoarding of resources or the pursuit of mutually exclusive gains is a sure sign of disease. Yet these dysfunctional relations continue to dominant human societies-especially within market interactions.', '']

[(5, 12), (13, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-UMW-Debate-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Emory

PiWa

f777dd47dd2d252df691c61d0506a10992f243913bcd95993883da4a8a31e5cd

dematerialization and decarbonization – makes consumption efficient and sustainable

Adler 22, is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and the founding Director of the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, where he teaches courses in environmental, administrative and constitutional law. (Jonathan, 01-12-2022, “Markets and Dematerialization,” Human Progress, https://www.humanprogress.org/markets-and-dematerialization/)

fundamental decoupling of consumption from growth as economies grow they use but also consume fewer resources U nited S tates is “ post ‐ ​peak in exploitation of earth despite continued increase in g d p We use less fertilizer and water growing more crops energy use decoupled dematerialization of soda cans 85 grams in 1950 By 2011 13 grams telecommunications A cable made from silica can carry the volume of 1 ‑ ton copper cables satellite enable us to bypass cables altogether saves copper paper doomsayers predicted colliding with earth’s finite resources capitalism and tech progress are allowing us to tread lightly on earth limits to growth have been transcended capitalism could unleash gains in the rest of the world capitalism facilitates incentives that drive efficiency gains This leads to health and prosperity capitalism drove dematerialization and could drive decarbonization Global challenges remain but solving will require more capitalism not less

Dematerialization may be the most important unsung example of environmental progress in the 21st century the relentless drive to do more with less has led to more efficient resource use a soda can today is made with a fraction of the metal required 50 years ago What is being observed represents a fundamental decoupling of resource consumption from economic growth as mature economies grow they use fewer resources per unit of output but also consume fewer resources overall economic growth in developed nations coincides with a net reduction in resource consumption The U nited S tates in particular is “ post ‐ ​peak in its exploitation of the earth according to McAfee McAfee a research scientist at MIT We’re using less of most resources year after year even as our economy and population grow The United States uses less gold, steel, aluminum, copper, stone, cement and even paper than it did at the start of this century despite continued increase in g ross d omestic p roduct Annual consumption of all but six of the 72 resources post peak We use less fertilizer and water while growing more crops Plastic consumption as is energy use have been decoupled from population and economic growth as well dematerialization of soda cans is easy to grasp c ans weighed 85 grams in the 1950 s By 2011 the average was under 13 grams Substitution can be a n powerful source of dematerialization telecommunications A single fiber optic cable made from less than 150 pounds of silica can carry the same volume of information as multiple 1 ‑ ton copper cables satellite and wireless technologies enable us to bypass physical cables altogether This saves copper but other resources too paper saved by e ‑ mail doomsayers have predicted the imminent depletion of one resource or another Huma n impact on the environment was to increase wit h the rise of wealth technology and population colliding with the earth’s carrying capacity It seemed “logical that finite resources would be exhausted this is not what happened capitalism and tech progress are allowing us to tread lightly on the earth instead of stripping it bare Malthusian “ limits to growth ” have been transcended This was neither planned anticipated nor product of the ecological agenda advocates have called for constraints on consumption limits on technology and greater recycling None of those impulses did much to encourage dematerialization We do more with less not because of government regulation or administrative direction but because of capitalism and technology dominant forces driving dematerialization in developed countries could unleash similar gains in the rest of the world one way to get more is to do more with less Market capitalism facilitates and enhances the underlying incentives that drive efficiency gains and technological advance This leads to dematerialization but also promotes health and prosperity Dematerialization has occurred in the wealthiest nations but has yet to reach much of the world ypes of pollution are declining but plastic waste and greenhouse gases — are not Not everything wrought by capitalism and technological advance has been positive even if the net result is a good one McAfee writes reducing carbon intensity is important for responsive governments Market ‐ ​driven capitalism and technological advances drove dematerialization and could drive decarbonization as well The proper suite of policies could facilitate a decarbonization in energy to rival the dematerialization in telecommunications Ill ‐ ​conceived policies could blunt market incentives that drive efficient resource use capitalism’s triumph over material scarcity explains how m odern society has achieved material ecological sustainability and market capitalism was the cause Global challenges remain but solving such challenges will require more capitalism , not less

Dematerialization unsung environmental progress efficient decoupling consumption growth fewer resources consume fewer resources net reduction U S post ‐ ​peak McAfee less continued increase g d p less fertilizer water more crops energy use decoupled soda cans 85 grams 13 grams Substitution telecommunications silica satellite saves copper paper doomsayers wealth technology population capitalism tech progress limits to growth transcended dematerialization capitalism technology similar gains rest of the world Market capitalism efficiency gains health prosperity net result dematerialization drive decarbonization triumph ecological sustainability market capitalism challenges remain more capitalism not less

['Dematerialization may be the most important, yet unsung, example of environmental progress in the 21st century. It is commonplace to observe that the relentless drive to do more with less has led to more efficient resource use, so that a soda can today is made with a fraction of the metal required 50 years ago. But dematerialization is not merely a story about increased efficiency or per‐\u200bcapita reductions. What is now being observed represents a fundamental decoupling of resource consumption from economic growth, such that as mature economies grow, they not only use fewer resources per unit of output, but they also consume fewer resources overall. In short, economic growth in the most developed nations increasingly coincides with a net reduction in resource consumption. The United States in particular is “post‐\u200bpeak in its exploitation of the earth,” according to Andrew McAfee in More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources — and What Happens Next. McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, explains, “We’re now generally using less of most resources year after year, even as our economy and population grow.” The United States uses less gold, steel, aluminum, copper, stone, cement, and even paper than it did at the start of this century, despite the continued increase in gross domestic product. Annual consumption of all but six of the 72 resources tracked by the U.S. Geological Service are “post peak.” We also use less fertilizer and water while growing more crops. Plastic consumption is up, as is energy use, but these two appear to have been decoupled from population and economic growth as well. How does this dematerialization occur? Some examples may be useful. The dematerialization of soda cans is relatively easy to grasp, particularly for those of us who can remember the heavier cans of the 20th century. Aluminum cans weighed 85 grams when introduced in the 1950s. By 2011, the average can was under 13 grams. Cans today are not only thinner and lighter, they are produced more efficiently, with fewer separate sheets of metal. Substitution can be an even more powerful source of dematerialization. Consider telecommunications. A single fiber optic cable made from less than 150 pounds of silica can carry the same volume of information as multiple 1‑ton copper cables. And were that not enough, satellite and wireless technologies enable us to bypass the use of physical cables altogether. We can communicate more and yet use vastly less material to do so. This not only saves copper, but other resources too. Think of all the paper saved by e‑mail, e‑banking, and e‑readers. Markets or Malthus? It was not expected to work out this way. Throughout the modern era, doomsayers have predicted the imminent depletion of one resource or another. Human impact on the natural environment was to increase inexorably with the rise of wealth, technology, and population, inevitably colliding with the earth’s natural carrying capacity. It seemed “logical and inevitable” that “the planet’s finite stock of these resources would someday be exhausted.” Yet, this is not what happened. Instead, “capitalism and tech progress are now allowing us to tread more lightly on the earth instead of stripping it bare.” The Malthusian “limits to growth” have not merely been delayed or forestalled; they have been transcended. This was neither planned, nor anticipated, nor is it the product of the ecological agenda advanced by the modern environmental movement. Since the first Earth Day in 1970, environmental advocates have called for constraints on consumption, limits on technology, and greater recycling. None of those impulses, in McAfee’s view, did much to encourage dematerialization. Indeed, he suggests, pushing for recycling may have cut the other way, insofar as recycling dulled the price signals that incentivized producers to do more with less. The environmental policies born of the 1970s may have “worked amazingly well” to reduce pollution and related environmental harms, but they played just a bit part in the story of dematerialization. We do more with less not because of government regulation or administrative direction, but because of capitalism and technology. These are the dominant forces driving dematerialization in the most developed countries and they could unleash similar gains in the rest of the world. We “want more all the time, but not more resources,” McAfee notes. We want more of what resources can provide, and one way to get more is to do more with less. Market capitalism both facilitates and enhances the underlying incentives that drive efficiency gains and technological advance. This not only leads to dematerialization but also promotes “critical aspects of well‐\u200bbeing,” including health and prosperity. What’s left to be done While celebrating dematerialization and dramatic improvements in many measures of human well‐\u200bbeing, McAfee acknowledges there is more to be done. He devotes the latter part of the book to considering the challenges that remain. Dematerialization has occurred in the wealthiest nations, but it has yet to reach much of the world. Some types of pollution are declining, but others — including plastic waste and greenhouse gases — are not. He also worries about the potential effects of economic concentration and “disconnection among people and declines in social capital.” Not everything wrought by capitalism and technological advance has been positive, even if the net result is a good one. McAfee is an optimist, but he sees serious storm clouds on the horizon. He is particularly concerned about the atmospheric increase in greenhouse gases and writes that reducing “the carbon intensity of our economic activities” is “the most important task for responsive governments.” He is right to be concerned about climate change, but his discussion of the policy options is somewhat thin and disconnected from the central thrust of his book. Market‐\u200bdriven capitalism and accompanying technological advances drove dematerialization and could drive decarbonization as well, particularly if carbon emissions are priced. The proper suite of policies could facilitate a decarbonization in energy to rival the dematerialization we observed in telecommunications. Yet, the nature of any government interventions matters. Ill‐\u200bconceived policies could blunt the market incentives that drive more efficient resource use. McAfee gives such questions relatively little attention, however. He also is too quick to credit regulatory interventions for prior environmental gains, such as the reductions in air and water pollution over the past half‐\u200bcentury. Those trends often began before the regulatory measures he celebrates, and some regulatory measures may well have caused more harm than good. McAfee did not set out to write a wonky treatise on environmental policy, and More from Less is not one. The book tells the story of capitalism’s triumph over material scarcity with clarity and insight. He ably explains how modern society has achieved material ecological sustainability, and market capitalism was the cause. At a time when capitalism is viewed with suspicion, More from Less rises to its defense. Global challenges remain, but More from Less suggests solving such challenges will require more capitalism, not less.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpBa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Kansas

SpBa

adcbe4be40b6378fe22ad965782fe3c8570a6fa8720b7f3aa1783c2c0d718c5d

Fetal personhood isn’t inevitable – but the barrier is willpower. Our link ev proves the Aff plan FOREGROUNDS new contradictions that would resonate with the Judiciary.

Craddock 22 (et al; Josh Craddock is an affiliated scholar with the James Wilson Institute on Natural Rights and the American Founding. He graduated magna cum laude from the Harvard Law School, where he served as editor-in-chief of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. He later clerked for the Honorable Chief Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Prior to law school, Josh managed advocacy teams for non-profit organizations at the United Nations and participated in negotiations for the Sustainable Development Goals. “The Next Pro-Life Goal Is Constitutional Personhood” - Newsweek – 7/19/22 - #E&F - )

Alito's opinion in Dobbs hints at 14th personhood Dobbs distinguishe[d]" cases which Roe and Casey based on 'potential life' It is not a far leap from Dobbs to personhood The hurdle is not moral, or constitutional rather one of willpower.

Alito's majority opinion in Dobbs hints at 14th Amendment personhood Dobbs distinguishe[d]" other cases on which Roe and Casey relied based on what those decisions call 'potential life' and what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an 'unborn human being. It is thus not a far leap from Dobbs to constitutional personhood The hurdle is not one of moral, or constitutional truth but rather one of willpower.

14th Amendment personhood 'potential life' thus of willpower.

['Justice Samuel Alito\'s majority opinion in Dobbs actually hints at this understanding of 14th Amendment personhood. Dobbs "sharply distinguishe[d]" other cases on which Roe and Casey relied based on the reality that "abortion destroys what those decisions call \'potential life\' and what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an \'unborn human being.\'" In other words, Dobbs rejected Planned Parenthood\'s noxious "clump of cells" disinformation and candidly acknowledged the moral salience of the unborn child.', 'It is thus not a far leap from Dobbs to constitutional personhood. The hurdle is not one of moral, biological, or constitutional truth, but rather one of fortitude and sheer willpower. All relevant constitutional actors must flex their muscles to help us reach the promised land of an abortion-free America.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-UK-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

fafa487e0beced8c1799a0970575762394661cb684f0b4e63c3d4a10a9607352

Uncontrolled third-world urbanization devolves to dystopia and global war—extinction.

Liotta 12—(*Professor of Humanities and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Salve Regina University; **PhD from the State University of New York, Adjunct Professor at the Naval War College, Norwich University, and Long Island University, Senior Fellow at Homeland Security Management Institute). *P.H. Liotta and **James F. Miskel. September 2012. “Megacities: The Past, Present and Predictions for the Future”. UTNE Reader. . Accessed 10/3/21.

megacities pose the most significant security threat to our existence . massive urban centers that matter most are in less-developed states unable or unwilling to manage challenges that concern the world . They will be havens for terrorists and criminal networks , as well as environmental depletion . natural laboratories where elements most harmful to international security are grown . If crowded masses are left to their devices collective rage and hunger will erupt . inhabitants will leave — violence will spill over international border s rapidly spreading

By 2025 27 cities will have populations greater than 10 million and more than 600 cities will have populations greater than one million. Specific megacities pose the most significant security and environmental threat to our existence . With the rise of massive urban centers in Africa and Asia, cities that will matter most in the twenty-first century are located in less-developed , struggling states . A number of these huge megalopolises reside in states often unable or simply unwilling to manage the challenges that their vast and growing urban populations pose. swarming, massive urban monsters will continue to grow and should concern the world . By 2025 there will be twenty-seven cities with populations greater than 10 million some will pose the most significant security threat in the coming decades. They will be havens for terrorists and criminal networks , as well as sources of major environmental depletion . They will serve as freakish natural laboratories where all the elements most harmful to international and human security are grown . If crowded masses are left to their own devices by inept or uncaring governments , their collective rage and hunger will inevitably erupt . And when inhabitants tire of the lawlessness, poverty, and instability of the megacities, they will leave — bringing violence with them . these petri dishes of danger will spill over international border s with rapidly spreading contagion

2025 greater than 10 million most significant security and environmental threat to our existence massive urban centers matter most less-developed , struggling states unable or simply unwilling urban monsters the world most significant security threat havens for terrorists and criminal networks major environmental depletion freakish natural laboratories most harmful to international and human security crowded masses inept or uncaring governments collective rage hunger inevitably erupt leave violence with them spill over international border s rapidly spreading contagion

['', 'By 2025, at least 27 cities will have populations greater than 10 million and more than 600 cities will have populations greater than one million. Specific megacities, intimately connected to globalization, pose the most significant security and environmental threat to our existence. Drawing on the authors’ three decades of international fieldwork and seasoned policy analysis, The Real Population Bomb (Potomac Books, 2012) by P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel discusses the effects these underserved megacities have on foreign, military, environmental and economic policies. Explore the historical dilemmas of megacities and how these problems are shaping the global, economic and environmental landscape of our world. This excerpt is taken from Chapter 1, “Introduction: Welcome to the Urban Century.” ', 'We live in the age of the city. The City is everything to us—it consumes us, and for that reason we glorify it. —Onookome Okome', 'There was a time when the city was the dominant political identity. Centuries and even millennia ago, the most advanced societies in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and South America revolved around cities that were either states in themselves or were the locus of power for larger empires and kingdoms. The time of the city is coming again, though now in a considerably less benign way.', '-Advertisement-', 'With the rise of massive urban centers in Africa and Asia, cities that will matter most in the twenty-first century are located in less-developed, struggling states. A number of these huge megalopolises—whether Lagos or Karachi, Dhaka or Kinshasa—reside in states often unable or simply unwilling to manage the challenges that their vast and growing urban populations pose. There are no signs that their governments will prove more capable in the future. These swarming, massive urban monsters will continue to grow and should concern the world.', 'By 2015 there will be six hundred cities on the planet with populations of 1 million or more, and fifty-eight with populations over 5 million. By 2025, according to the National Intelligence Council, there will be twenty-seven cities with populations greater than 10 million—the common measure by which an urban population constitutes a “megacity.” If measures are not taken soon, some of these megacities will pose the most significant security threat in the coming decades. They will become havens for terrorists and criminal networks, as well as sources of major environmental depletion. They will serve as freakish natural laboratories where all the elements most harmful to international and human security are grown. If crowded masses within these unaccommodating spaces are left to their own devices by inept or uncaring governments, their collective rage, despair, and hunger will inevitably erupt. And when inhabitants tire of the lawlessness, poverty, and instability of the megacities, they will leave—those that can—bringing violence with them. In the face of rising expectations that globalization inevitably entails, these petri dishes of despair and danger will spill over municipal boundaries and international borders with rapidly spreading contagion.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Round2.docx

a3090d4052f90c97f2d04bd5f9ce735a6000059bab3e451905a52b239357e261

The field is junk.

Ruth Leys 17, Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor Emeritain the Humanities Center at Johns Hopkins University, “Setting the Stage,” Introduction of The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique

there is no consensus regarding science of emotion’s assumptions articles contradict each other with regularity , as if criticisms raised have no bearing and do not deserve token acknowledgment a domain in stasis in which researchers cling to contested positions leaving questions unresolved The brain is a machine thought proceeds one step at a time unconscious thought running in the background is fanciful thought can attend to only one set of information at a time researchers have explanation no unconscious thought at all I carried out an experiment we chose retrieving familiar words from memory results were unequivocal : There is no sign that we can search for x’s when thinking about y’s As soon as we switch from one to another , all processes for that first category cease unconscious thought is a myth psychoanalysis has been displaced by psychology the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology a bogus science practitioners do not research claim remains untested psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab do not participate in congresses , do not submit papers to journals hypotheses are so vague they are hard to test and irrefutable psychoanalysts do not perform trials or studies Psychoanalysis is pseudoscience untestable yet regarded as axioms the brain is complex human nature is not one thing , but comprises multiple drives Some impel violence others inhibit violence The decision to wage war depends on many processes lining up and escaping restraining psychological processes , which are distributed in networks connecting individuals motives that lead to violence need not be homeostatic . There is no reason the urge to hurt builds up and needs to be discharged. Violence carries risks of death when the target defends himself or when attacking preemptively natural selection predicts not urge to violence but rather one that is sensitive to circumstances Populism in the Anthropocene mobilises against institutions and business interests separation of science from politics, is no longer tenable safeguarding life can become the basis of populism 'green populism' means re-imagining expertise preserving life political authority is rooted in care renouncing 'eternity' experts side with 'the people' saving the world provides content to the scientific project expertise grant rationale of relief emergency sanctioned on basis of 'non-violence' This is Rising Tide Extinction Rebellion mobilisation needn't organise around exclusion 'green populism' names the institutions that threaten life, positioning them against 'the people' populists' posit environment as popular concerns

there is no consensus regarding the science of emotion’s most basic assumptions articles directly contradict each other appear with regularity , as if criticisms that have just been raised have no bearing whatsoever on the present author’s claims and do not deserve even token acknowledgment . The impression left is of a scientific domain in stasis in which researchers cling to their contested positions and research strategies , leaving fundamental questions unresolved Gross reviews the “ many daunting conceptual and empirical challenges ” facing the field myth actual science The brain is a computing machine the cycle of thought proceeds one step at a time neurons are highly interconnected there seems little scope for assigning different problems to different brain networks . If interconnected neurons are working on different problems, then neither task will be completed successfully If the brain solves problems through the cooperation computation of vast networks of individually sluggish neurons, then any specific network of neurons can work on just one solution to one problem at a time the idea that profound unconscious thought can be “ running in the background ” as we go about our everyday lives is fanciful the cycle of thought can attend to only one set of information at a time psychologists search for evidence for unconscious mental work researchers have a simpler explanation no unconscious thought at all Can we find evidence for unconscious memory search? I carried out an experiment we chose the simplest possible task: retrieving familiar words from memory the results were unequivocal : There is absolutely no sign that we can search for x’s when we are currently thinking about y’s ; or search for y’s when we have been thinking about x’s. As soon as we switch from searching one category to searching another , all search processes for that first category appear to cease abruptly unconscious thought is a myth WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology Psychoanalysis is a bogus science its practitioners do not do scientific research their claim remains untested psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab . They do not participate in scientific congresses , do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience hypotheses are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are irrefutable As for therapeutic efficacy , little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience . Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms No root cause pacifying drives Human Nature Has Multiple Components People tend to reduce human nature to a single essence and debate what that essence consists of But the brain is mind-bogglingly complex with many anatomically and chemically distinguishable circuits . Most psychologists believe human nature is not just one thing , but comprises multiple intelligences drives , or other subsystems . Some may impel us toward violence , but others inhibit us from violence Self-control Empathy The moral sense Reason The decision to wage war depends on many psychological processes lining up in the right way and escaping the restraining influence of other psychological processes , which are distributed in social networks connecting many other individuals . There is no reason to expect these competing influences should remain constant over history The intuition that a respite from war could not be real rests on a mental model in which the drive toward violence is conceived of as a hydraulic force it is a big mistake to think that all human responses are homeostatic . Many are reactive they are elicited by combinations of triggers and cognitive and emotional states motives that lead to violence need not be homeostatic . There is no reason to believe the urge to hurt someone builds up and needs to be discharged. Violence carries significant risks of injury or death when the target defends himself or when he is tempted into attacking preemptively natural selection predicts adaptations evolve when their expected costs exceed their expected benefits . We should not expect a hydraulic urge to violence to evolve, but rather one that is sensitive to circumstances environmentally friendly extinction Populism in the Anthropocene we can and should envision an alternative populism The 'enemy' that populism mobilises against are political threats to life itself: elite institutions that refuse to accept existential danger at hand, and business interests that exploit the delay Arendt's work points to why focusing on and caring for the human remains fixed on the sphere of action where human beings appear before one another as unique and irreplaceable the Anthropocene highlights the separation of science from politics, is no longer tenable safeguarding and mourning of life can become the basis of populism in the Anthropocene care for life cannot stop at humanity, but must extend beyond that " Stop, you're killing everything! " should be the cry From an Arendtian perspective the Anthropocene brings science and politics into closer relation notions of 'universality' and 'eternity' lose their a priori epistemological and political status the 'terrestrial' is common to the human species 'green populism' does not mean pure technocratic administration. Rather, it means re-imagining techno-scientific expertise preserving human and non-human life Epistemic and political authority is rooted in care and rescue we don't have endless time In renouncing the turn towards 'eternity' , that Arendt saw as the anti-political quality of modern science , experts can side with 'the people' and their habitat saving the common terrestrial world provides ethical content to the scientific project The political and practical dimensions of expertise grant the rationale of humanitarian and ecological relief emergency intervention are sanctioned on the basis that they pursue a policy of 'non-violence' This is Rising Tide , Climate Mobilisation , Extinction Rebellion and School Strike for Climate Mass mobilisation creates a 'people' in a populist sense, but needn't organise around nationality or exclusion ary identities The scientist no longer perform the same distancing role between the expert and society As part of a 'green populism' , epistemic-political authority does not rest on a withdrawal from the flux of change and loss, but on a capacity to pacify, temper, slow and remember The cry of " Stop, you're killing us! " names the institutions and interests that threaten life, positioning them against 'the people' 'left populists' already posit environment al issues as popular concerns

no consensus science most basic assumptions directly contradict regularity no bearing even token acknowledgment scientific domain in stasis cling contested positions research strategies fundamental questions unresolved many daunting conceptual empirical challenges computing machine one step at a time little scope different problems different brain networks just one solution to one problem at a time unconscious thought fanciful the cycle of thought only one set a simpler explanation no unconscious thought at all unequivocal absolutely no sign from searching one category searching another all search processes cease abruptly unconscious thought a myth Human Nature Multiple Components reduce human nature to a single essence But mind-bogglingly complex many anatomically and chemically distinguishable circuits human nature not just one thing multiple intelligences drives other subsystems Some may impel but others inhibit Self-control Empathy The moral sense Reason to wage war many psychological processes the right way escaping restraining influence of other psychological processes distributed social networks many other individuals no reason competing influences constant a hydraulic force a big mistake all human responses homeostatic reactive motives violence not homeostatic no reason to believe significant risks death defends attacking preemptively natural selection expected costs expected benefits a hydraulic urge sensitive to circumstances Populism in the Anthropocene can should The 'enemy' elite institutions business interests Arendt's work no longer tenable the Anthropocene Stop, you're killing everything! Arendtian perspective closer relation 'universality' 'eternity' 'green populism' not human and non-human life Epistemic political authority care rescue 'eternity' Arendt anti-political quality of modern science the common terrestrial world ethical content political and practical dimensions of expertise humanitarian and ecological relief emergency intervention policy of 'non-violence' Rising Tide Climate Mobilisation Extinction Rebellion School Strike for Climate Mass mobilisation populist needn't nationality exclusion ary identities no longer distancing role Stop, you're killing us! institutions interests against 'the people' 'left populists' environment al issues

['But those same readers might be surprised or disconcerted to discover that there is no consensus regarding the science of emotion’s most basic assumptions. On the contrary, articles that directly contradict each other appear with regularity, as if criticisms that have just been raised have no bearing whatsoever on the present author’s claims and do not deserve even token acknowledgment. The impression left is of a scientific domain in stasis, one in which the majority of researchers cling to their contested positions and research strategies, leaving fundamental questions unresolved. This is all the more striking because the editors have repeatedly invited contributions and commentaries on pertinent selected themes, in which it might be expected that differences would be confronted and thrashed out. The situation is captured in James Gross’s paper “The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades” (2010), in which the author considers the future of emotion research. In a section that he describes as not for those readers who are “faint of heart,” he reviews the “many daunting conceptual and empirical challenges” facing the field before going on to recommend the “incredible conceptual and empirical opportunities” for research in a discussion that he warns readers to avoid “if you are prone to getting dizzy.”1', 'Unconscious thought is a myth---prefer actual science. ', 'Nick Chater 18, professor of behavioral science at Warwick Business School, “There is No Such Thing as Unconscious Thought,” The Mind Is Flat: The Remarkable Shallowness of the Improvising Brain, Yale University Press ', 'The brain is a cooperative computing machine—large networks of neurons collectively piece together the solution to a single problem. Importantly, the cycle of thought proceeds one step at a time. The brain’s networks of neurons are highly interconnected, so there seems little scope for assigning different problems to different brain networks. If interconnected neurons are working on entirely different problems, then the signals they pass between them will be hopelessly at cross-purposes—and neither task will be completed successfully: Each neuron has no idea which of the signals it receives are relevant to the problem it is working on, and which are just irrelevant junk. If the brain solves problems through the cooperation computation of vast networks of individually sluggish neurons, then any specific network of neurons can work on just one solution to one problem at a time.', 'Even the introspection of geniuses is not to be taken at face value.', 'Solving difficult problems, whether mathematical, musical, or of any other kind, is the very antithesis of a routine, specialized problem with a dedicated brain network: On the contrary, thinking about such problems will need to engage most of the brain. So the idea that profound unconscious thought can be “running in the background” as we go about our everyday lives is fanciful indeed. Routine and highly practiced activities aside, the cycle of thought can attend to, and make sense of, only one set of information at a time.', 'Poincaré and Hindemith cannot possibly be right. If they are spending their days actively thinking about other things, their brains are not unobtrusively solving deep mathematical problems or composing complex pieces of music, perhaps over days or weeks, only to reveal the results in a sudden flash. Yet, driven by the intuitive appeal of unconscious thought, psychologists have devoted a great deal of energy in searching for evidence for unconscious mental work. Other researchers have, though, a simpler explanation, which involves no unconscious thought at all.', 'Let’s consider why one gets stuck with a difficult problem in the first place. What is special about such problems is that you can’t solve them through a routine set of steps—you have to look at the problem in the “right way” before you can make progress (e.g., with an anagram, you might need to focus on a few key letters; in deep mathematics or musical composition, the space of options might be large and varied). So ideally, the right approach would be to fluidly explore the range of possible angles on the problem, until hitting on the right one. Yet this is not so easy: Once we have been looking at the same problem for a while, we feel ourselves stuck or going round in circles.', 'Mental cul-de-sacs occur when our brains fail to find a satisfactory analysis or interpretation. Conscious attempts to clear the cul-de-sac can, of course, often be successful: We jettison some information, and focus instead on slightly different information. We focus on different parts of a cryptic crossword clue (perhaps the word “jumble” means this is some kind of anagram). We actively dredge up different pieces of knowledge that we think might help us. (“Oh—this looks like a geometry problem with circles and angles; I learnt about circle theorems at school; what were they all about?”) All too often, though, such deliberate attacks on a problem fail. Indeed, we can find ourselves endlessly going down the same mental cul-de-sacs, such as when I search for the word artichoke, where my typical internal dialogue is something like: “No, not avocado! Not asparagus! Not aubergine! And certainly not aspidistra! Help!”', 'Breaking out of mental cul-de-sacs is precisely what a break will give us. A clear mind is more likely to succeed than a mind filled with partial solutions and suggestions which have clearly failed. And, by sheer chance, we might even bump into a clue that helps. But probably the most important aspect of setting a problem aside is that, when we return to it, we see it afresh unencumbered by our previous failed attempts. Often, our new perspective will be no more successful than the old, but, now and again, we will chance on the right perspective—the pieces of the mental puzzle will suddenly snap into place.', 'Now and again, of course, thoughts do spontaneously “pop into our minds”—names we had struggled to remember, things we have forgotten to do, and occasionally even insights into tricky problems with which we have been struggling. But this isn’t the product of unconscious, background thought. It arises when we momentarily flip back to thinking about an old problem for a moment and, now free of the unhelpful mental loops which got us stuck in the first place, we almost instantly see a solution that had evaded us before—or, in some cases, dimly suspect where such a solution might lie. The “almost instantly” is key: The answer hits us fast, before we are even aware we have returned to the problem. This sensation of sudden insight never occurs for problems that can’t, if looked at the right way, be solved—or partially solved—in a flash. Suppose I try and fail to calculate 17 x 17 in my head; there is no chance that, while idly waiting at a bus stop, I’ll suddenly think “I bet its 289!”', 'Poincaré’s description of his particular method of solving mathematical problems suggests why he was particularly susceptible to brilliant flashes of insight. His strategy was to work out the outlines of the solution, without pen and paper; and only then to, somewhat laboriously, translate his intuitions into the symbolic language of mathematics, to be checked and verified. Crucially, for Poincaré, mathematical problems were transformed into perceptual problems: and with the right perceptual intuition, the creating a proof would be relatively routine, if slow. A perceptual problem is just the kind of problem that can be solved in a single mental step—provided that we happen to lock onto just the right information and see the pattern in that information in just the right way like the Dalmatian and doleful cow.', 'Poincaré’s mathematical brainwaves, like the sudden resolutions of the initially baffling Dalmatian or cow images, are fundamentally perceptual. Crucially, in neither case is the sudden revelation the product of hours or days of unconscious thought. Instead, the solution is found in a single mental step when we contemplate the problem again. Having broken free of our previous and incorrect analysis, by happy chance our brains alight upon the correct solution.', 'This viewpoint is nicely illustrated by one of the most celebrated stories of scientific insight: the discovery of the structure of benzene by the great 19th-century chemist August Kekulé. The brainwave struck as he was having a daydream in which a snake began to swallow its own tail. It suddenly struck Kekulé that benzene might itself have a circular structure; and before long he had worked out his detailed analysis of the chemical structure of the benzene ring.', 'Yet his momentary insight was surely a suspicion that the structure of benzene might be circular; and surely he must have followed endless false trails before alighting on the correct answer. Indeed, Kekulé only knew he had the correct answer after carefully piecing together the detailed structure of the benzene ring, and checking that it worked. So the “flash of inspiration” is often perhaps better termed a “flash of suspicion.” On those rare occasions when the flash of suspicion turns out to be justified, it is so easy to have the illusion that one’s brain had somehow worked out the complete answer, and checked it in detail, before suggesting it to the conscious mind. And if that were true, this chain of events would, of course, require unconscious thought, and lots of it. But the checking and analysis comes after the momentary mental flash, not before.', 'We might wonder how it is that the right perceptual interpretation happens to come to mind. Could it be that, while we may be unable actively to pay attention to more than one thing at a time, our brains can unconsciously search our mental archives, pulling out, as it were, useful files for later use? If so, then Poincaré’s unconscious could perhaps have been running through potentially relevant bits of higher mathematics, stored over a lifetime of study. Then, on returning to a problem, some vital clues to the solution might have been ready to hand—and a flash of insight would result. Perhaps the brain can’t solve a problem unconsciously, but unconscious activation of relevant memories might prepare the ground for finding the solution.', 'Can we find evidence for unconscious memory search? With my colleagues Elizabeth Maylor and Greg Jones at the University of Warwick, I carried out an experiment some years ago that tested whether unconscious memory searches can help out the conscious mind.', 'Rather than choose deep mathematical reasoning, we chose the simplest possible task: retrieving familiar words from memory. Suppose, for example, that I ask you to name as many foods as you can. Despite the vastness of your food vocabulary, you will almost certainly find yourself slowing down surprisingly quickly, with flurries of fruits, bursts of baked goods, and surges of seasonings, punctuated by surprising, and ever longer, silences. Suppose, instead, I ask you to name as many countries as you can. Although there are 200 or so countries recognized by the United Nations, most of which will be familiar to you, you will, again, struggle sooner than you might expect.', 'But what if I asked you to name as many food items or countries as possible? The only way to do this is to focus on foods for a while, and then move over to countries when foods are getting tricky, and then back to foods again when you are running out of countries—and so on. This is interesting in itself—perhaps indicating that our memories are organized so that foods are linked to other foods, and countries are linked to other countries. But this switching strategy is also interesting for another reason: It provides a way of finding out how far we are able to continue to search for the category we are not currently generating.', 'If unconscious thought is impossible, any background racing around our mental archives is entirely ruled out. That is, if we are scouring our memories for foods, we cannot simultaneously search for countries, and vice versa. If so, we should generate foods or countries more rapidly than we can generate one or the other alone.', 'Suppose, instead, that while focusing our conscious minds on generating foods, unconscious mental search processes can work away, in the background, unearthing a string of countries. Then, when we switch to countries, we should be able rapidly to download these—they would not need to be found afresh, because unconscious search would have identified them already. If it is indeed possible to search for foods or countries simultaneously (even though we can consciously report the results of only one search at a time), then the rate at which we generate answers in both categories should be substantially greater than the rate at which we can generate answers from either category alone.', 'Across a wide range of test stimuli, the results were unequivocal: There is absolutely no sign that we can search for x’s when we are currently thinking about y’s; or search for y’s when we have been thinking about x’s. As soon as we switch from searching one category to searching another, all search processes for that first category appear to cease abruptly. While it would be highly advantageous for an unconscious process to keep running in the background, there is absolutely no evidence that this occurs.', 'An active unconscious, able to amplify the power of our limited conscious minds, would be a wonderful boon, working away on countless difficult problems, while we go about daily lives; and overcoming the slow step-by-step flow of conscious thought. But unconscious thought is, for all that, nothing more than a myth, however charming.', 'Psychoanalysis belongs in museums.', 'Dr. Mario Bunge 10, philosopher and physicist, physico-mathematical sciences PhD at the National University of La Plata, 10/6/2010, “Is Psychoanalysis Science or Pseudoscience?” https://www.realclearscience.com/2010/10/06/is_psychoanalysis_science_or_pseudoscience_237794.html', 'WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy.', 'Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body.', 'Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513).', 'More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups.', 'In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience.', "This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted.", 'For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on.', 'As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies.', 'Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.', 'No root cause of war---pacifying drives inhibit war. ', 'Dr. Steven Pinker 13, professor of psychology at Harvard, “The Decline of War and Conceptions of Human Nature,” International Studies Review, pp 369-419, , pacc ', '2. Human Nature Has Multiple Components', 'People tend to reduce human nature to a single essence and then debate what that essence consists of. Are we nasty or noble, Hobbesian or Rousseauan, ape or angel? In this way of thinking, if we regularly engage in violence, we must be a violent species; if we are capable of peace we must be pacifistic.', 'But the brain is a mind-bogglingly complex organ with many anatomically and chemically distinguishable circuits. Most psychologists believe that human nature is not just one thing, but comprises multiple intelligences, modules, faculties, organs, drives, or other subsystems. Some of these subsystems may impel us toward violence, but others inhibit us from violence.', 'Human violence springs from at least four kinds of motives, each involving different neurobiological systems:', 'Exploitation: Violence used as the means to an end; that is, damaging a human who happens to be an obstacle on the path to something the actor wants. Examples include plunder, rape, conquest, the displacement or genocide of native peoples, and the murder or imprisonment of political or economic rivals.', 'Dominance: The urge among individuals to ascend the pecking order and become the alpha male, and the corresponding urge among groups for tribal, ethnic, racial, national, or religious supremacy.', 'Revenge: The conviction that someone who has committed a moral infraction deserves to be punished.', 'Ideology: Shared belief systems, spread virally or by indoctrination or force, which hold out the prospect of a utopia. Examples include nationalism, Fascism, Nazism, communism, and militant religions. Since a utopia is a world that will be infinitely good forever, one is permitted to perpetrate unlimited amounts of force against those who stand in its way, as in the saying, “You can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.”', 'Pushing against these nasty impulses are some of our kinder, gentler faculties:', 'Self-control: Circuitry in the frontal lobes of the brain that can anticipate the long-term consequence of actions and inhibit them accordingly.', 'Empathy: The ability to feel someone else’s pain.', 'The moral sense: A system of norms and taboos centered on intuitions of fairness to individuals, loyalty to a community, deference to legitimate authority, and the safeguarding of purity and sanctity. The moral sense can motivate the imposition of standards of fairness and can render certain courses of harmful action unthinkable. (Unfortunately, it can also be a cause of violence, because it can rationalize militant ideologies based on tribalism, puritanism, and authoritarianism.)', 'Reason: Cognitive processes that allow us to engage in objective, detached analysis. Whether people actually commit acts of violence, then, depends on the interplay among these faculties; the mere existence of human nature does not doom our species to a constant rate of violence.', 'The decision to wage war, in particular, may be triggered by any combination of the violence-inducing motives. If the decision is not overturned by any of the motives that inhibit violence, the decision-maker must then mobilize an aggressive coalition by whipping up the aggressive motives in his compatriots, while disabling the peaceable motives. The actual outbreak of war thus depends on many psychological processes lining up in the right way and escaping the restraining influence of other psychological processes, which are distributed in social networks connecting many other individuals. There is no reason to expect that the relative strengths of these competing influences should remain constant over the course of human history.', '3. Facultative Components of Human Nature', 'Many components of human nature are facultative (environmentally sensitive), not hydraulic (homeostatic). The intuition that a respite from war could not possibly be real often rests on a mental model in which the drive toward violence is conceived of as a hydraulic force. At best, it can be diverted or channeled, but it cannot be bottled up indefinitely. The hydraulic model of human motivation is deeply embedded in the way we think about violence. It was given a scientific imprimatur by psychoanalysis, ethology, and behaviorism (in the guise of drive reduction), and it fits with the cybernetic notion of homeostasis, in which a feedback loop maintains a system in a steady state by counteracting any imbalance. It also fits with our subjective experience: no one can go indefinitely without food, water, or sleep, and it is a challenge to do without sex or to hold in a mounting urge to yawn, sneeze, scratch an itch, or expel various substances from the body.', 'But, it is a big mistake to think that all human responses are homeostatic. Many are opportunistic, reactive, or facultative: they are elicited by combinations of environmental triggers and cognitive and emotional states. Consider evolutionarily prepared fears such as those of heights, snakes, confinement, deep water, or spiders. Even if one were born with an innate phobia of snakes, as long as one never encountered a snake one could live one’s entire life without experiencing that fear. Other examples include the tendency to shiver, fall head over heels in love, or experience sexual jealousy.', 'The motives that lead to violence, too, need not be homeostatic. There is no reason to believe that the urge to hurt someone gradually builds up and periodically needs to be discharged. Violence carries significant risks of injury or death when the target defends himself, when he or his relatives wreak revenge, or when he is tempted into attacking preemptively. The theory of natural selection predicts that adaptations evolve when their expected costs exceed their expected benefits. We should not expect a hydraulic urge to violence to evolve, but rather one that is sensitive to circumstances. These may include predation and exploitation, when an opportunity to exploit a victim at low risk presents itself; dominance, when one’s masculinity is suddenly impugned in front of an important audience; vengeance, to punish (and thus ultimately deter) insults or injuries; rampage, when a longstanding menace is suddenly exposed in a window of vulnerability. If the circumstances never materialize—say, if one lives an orderly, bourgeois life, free from grave threats or insults—any tendency to react with violence could lie as dormant as a fear of poisonous snakes. The same sensitivity to environmental contingencies could, if circumstances line up, prevent political leaders from experiencing any urge to mobilize their countries for war.', 'Populism will be environmentally friendly in the Anthropocene---solves extinction.', 'Dr. William Davies 20, Political Economy Professor at Goldsmiths, University of London, with a Sociology PhD from Goldsmiths, December 2020, “Green Populism?: Action and mortality in the Anthropocene,” Environmental Values, 29(6), pp. 647-668, White Horse Press, pacc', 'Populism in the Anthropocene', 'Reflecting on the intersection of health policy and democracy in the time of Trump, the health policy scholar Ted Shrecker has argued that "we can and should envision an alternative populism, organised around a rubric like: \'Stop, you\'re killing us!\'" (Shrecker, 2017). Shrecker refers to the mounting evidence of how social and economic policies in the global north since 2008 have been leading to risks to public health and, in certain populations, reduced life expectancy and rising mortality rates (Whyte & Cooper, 2017). The \'enemy\' that such a populism mobilises against are political threats to life itself: elite institutions that refuse to accept the existential danger at hand, and business interests that exploit the delay.', 'One thing that stands out from the survey evidence on trust in professions and institutions across liberal democracies is that medical professions, and especially nurses, retain very high levels of public confidence, compared to other sources of expertise (Gallup, 2018). We might speculate that, following Arendt, the expertise and authority of medical practitioners do not suffer from the political problem of unworldliness, that besets scientific expertise and technocracy. Arendt\'s work points to why this might be: by focusing on and caring for the human body across the cycle of birth, life, loss and death, the medical gaze remains fixed on the sphere of action where human beings appear before one another as unique and irreplaceable. The dramatic progress of medicine from the seventeenth century onwards was clearly driven by scientific progress, treating the body as a specimen of physical matter which obeyed scientific principles. However, the culture of therapeutic care - and its inevitably psycho-somatic dimensions - points to an aspect of the medical vocation that is unlike the value-free scientific vocation defended by Weber, in which "death is meaningless". The quest for scientific certainty and truth is blended with an engagement with the world of human suffering, loss, memory and mourning.', 'The dawn of the Anthropocene highlights the ontological equivalence to the human and non-human worlds, albeit with a particular responsibility accorded to humans in effecting the natural disasters that now confront human and non-human history (Hamilton, 2017). \'Human\' and \'natural\' history converge into a single field, as the separation of nature from culture, science from politics, is no longer tenable. This nevertheless poses the question of how the non-human world is to be introduced to politics and represented as a matter of concern. My proposition is that, echoing Shrecker\'s claim, the very safeguarding and mourning of life itself can become the basis of a possible populism, in which expertise becomes modelled around the ideal type of the nurse rather than of the classically modern scientist. And yet, in the Anthropocene, the care for life cannot stop at the bounds of humanity, but must extend beyond that. As Hamilton argues, anthropocentrism is unavoidable given the unique role played by human beings in bringing us to this geo-human point in history, but at the same time the project of caring for the non-human and desisting our violence against it is now an ethical injunction that should supplant the scientific \'vocation\' towards infinite \'progress\' (Hamilton, 2017: 143). The modern conceit, that the value of \'progress\' can be oblivious to rare deeds or losses, is no longer tenable. On the contrary, recognising and publicising the meaning of specific losses, through rare deeds and mourning, is integral to the politics of conservation. "Stop, you\'re killing everything!" should be the cry.', "From an Arendtian perspective, the crucial quality of the Anthropocene, which brings science and politics back into closer relation to each other, is that notions of 'universality' and 'eternity' lose their a priori epistemological and political status. As Latour has emphasised, the concept of the 'global' (which always implies its opposite of the local or national) needs now to be supplanted by that of the 'terrestrial', a specificity that is common to the human species, amongst all others (Latour, 2018). Meanwhile, the human imprint on the earth system will now last until the end of the planet's existence (longer even than the planet has existed for to date), meaning that any idea of what is 'permanent' or 'natural' about earthly existence is now coloured by contingent historical actions, including by scientists of the past four hundred years. As Hamilton argues:", 'The globe is no longer the "disenchanted" Earth given to us by the scientific revolution. But nor is it "re-enchanted"; it is no magic that pervades it but willed activity. (Hamilton, 2017: 37)', 'Not only is the practice of science politically invested in the construction and transformation of nature (as science studies has argued), but the erstwhile objectivity of science has acquired a mortality of its own. Human and non-human worlds acquire a common existential condition of finitude, and each are shaped by the often violent collisions between the two.', "A challenge of a 'green populism' is of how to construct a common political world, in which the lives, actions and deaths of humans and non-humans are granted recognition and meaning. This does not mean subsuming them under general laws of statistics and mathematics, by way of pure technocratic administration. Rather, it means re-imagining centres of techno-scientific expertise in ways that are attuned to preserving the constantly shifting conditions of human and non-human life, that recognises the passage of time and the loss that accompanies it, as ontologically and politically decisive. Epistemic and political authority is therefore rooted in ideas of care and rescue, in such a way that is mindful of the fact that we don't have endless time. In renouncing the turn towards 'eternity', that Arendt saw as the anti-political quality of modern science, experts can side with 'the people' and their habitat, recognising the shifting relation between the two, and the irreversibility of the (sometimes traumatic) loss that is felt in this unfolding dynamic. The physical demise and death of the objects of knowledge can no longer be external to the vocation of modern science, and the over-arching, unifying telos of saving the common terrestrial world provides ethical content to the scientific project, of the sort Weber refused (Hamilton, 2017: 48).", "The political and practical dimensions of expertise are therefore confronted head-on, and granted the rationale of humanitarian and ecological relief. Forms of emergency intervention are sanctioned on the basis that they pursue a policy of 'non-violence' within the common world of humans and non-humans, that otherwise threatens to tip into a constant war between the two (albeit one that was initiated by humanity). On this basis, the practices, political authority and privileges of experts connects with some idea of the popular 'general will', not via liberal forms of representation but through a recognition of the material conditions of life itself. This is apparent in contemporary forms of climate action, such as Rising Tide, Climate Mobilisation, Extinction Rebellion and School Strike for Climate, which specifically breach or circumvent legal and institutional norms of democratic representation (Jacobsen, 2018). These forms of social mobilisation have elements in common with non-violent protest and wartime mobilisation, in that they seek specifically to move a mass of human bodies, in solidarity with one another and with the non-humans that need rescuing. Mass mobilisation, which historically has arisen in the context of nations at war, creates a 'people' in a populist sense, but needn't only be organised around nationality or exclusionary identities. What it does require, however, is the sense of urgency that action is needed now, and a recognition of the unique status of the present opportunity. This is what the modern scientific vocation is definitively unable to achieve.", 'Embedded in such movements, expertise does not purport to be neutral on the question of its own political and cultural preconditions, nor on the lived consequences of its interventions. The scientist no longer absents themselves - ethically, bodily, culturally and politically - from the process of knowledge production, and methods and credentials of knowledge no longer perform the same distancing role between the expert and society, metropole and rural life. As part of a \'green populism\', epistemic-political authority does not rest on a withdrawal from the flux of change and loss, but on a capacity to pacify, temper, slow and remember. Social and natural science have equal weighting in this regard, as they trace the passage of time through the movements and changes in the human and non-human world (Elliott, 2018). The cry of "Stop, you\'re killing us!" applies to the fast and \'slow\' violence that afflicts social ecology. At the same time, it names the institutions and interests (such as fossil capital) that threaten life, positioning them against \'the people\', as populist rhetoric invariably does.', 'In practice, what this involves is a joining up of medical and ecological vocations and policy domains. A number of \'left populists\' are already positioning environmental issues as popular concerns, where they overlap with health and wellbeing. In March 2019, in response to a conservative charge that environmentalism is an \'elitist\' movement, US Senator Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez replied "this is not an elitist issue. This is a quality of life issue", before going on to list the lung diseases, lost businesses and threats to life of poor Americans resulting from a failure to take environmental matters seriously. "People are dying", she argued. In 2019, Britain\'s Labour party proposed a \'Wellbeing law\' that considered health and climate goals side by side. The same year, Labour announced a policy to create an \'NHS forrest\', planting a million trees around hospitals.']

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Northwestern-PaCh-Aff-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

PaCh

4d74272d14501def74b6668dd7a57b7f664c1a179b4032a9a02b9efd12674fec

The basis for liability under the plan will be defectiveness.

Boghetti ‘19 [Jean-Sebastien, Professor of Private Law, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), June 1 2019, “Civil Liability for Artificial Intelligence: What Should its Basis Be?” https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541597]

two types of regimes product liability and liability for fault product liability applies to robots the Directive and the liability it establishes should apply to algorithms liability for fault in case of damage caused by AI is not self-evident assessment of fault is based on a comparison between the defendant and the behaviour which a model person would have adopted It is doubtful if the reasonable robot could be anything else than a restatement that the robot should not be defective the basis for liability will be defectiveness .

two types of regimes product liability and liability for fault Most Western legal systems have special product liability regimes. there are many common features between the special product liability regimes applicable all over the world. There is actually no doubt that it applies to robots or any device in which a software program or algorithm is embedded he question is whether it should also apply to ‘standalone algorithms’. . If one considers the implicit rationale of the Directive, the Directive and the liability it establishes should apply to stand-alone algorithms when they are made available to the general public, like physical products The application of liability for fault in case of damage caused by , or in connection with, AI is not self-evident if it is proven that a person was negligent when designing an algorithm, he can be made liable The real question is whether a software program or algorithm can itself be at fault. The assessment of fault is normally based on a comparison between the defendant ’s behaviour and the behaviour which a model person would have adopted It is doubtful if the test of the reasonable robot could be anything else than a restatement of the requirement that the robot should not be defective . A negligent robot is just a defective one. whether product liability or liability for fault applies the basis for liability will be defectiveness . Defect thus appears as a central and unavoidable concept

implicit rationale algorithms not self-evident can itself fault comparison doubtful restatement defective . A negligent robot is just a defective one. defectiveness Defect thus appears as a central and unavoidable concept

['Non-sector-specific regimes are quite different in that respect. Each country has of course its own rules, but there are two types of regimes that can be found in most (Western) legal systems and whose application can at least be contemplated in case of damage caused by or in connection with the use of, AI: product liability and liability for fault10. ', 'Most Western legal systems have special product liability regimes. The developments which took place in the USA as of the 1930s, and especially in the 1960s and 1970s, were a source of inspiration for the 1985 European Directive on product liability11. This text, in turn, served as a model for legislation in many countries outside the EU. The result is that there are many common features between the special product liability regimes applicable all over the world. For the sake of simplicity, however, the focus here will be on the common European regime based on the 1985 Directive.', 'Whether this regime is applicable to AI has been the subject of some debate. There is actually no doubt that it applies to robots or any device in which a software program or algorithm is embedded12. The question is whether it should also apply to ‘standalone algorithms’. It seems quite clear that the Directive’s drafters did not contemplate this issue, and the few official declarations there have been on the subject are contradictory13. If one considers the implicit rationale of the Directive, however, and the need to meet the challenges raised by the mass distribution of standardised products, then it can be accepted that the Directive and the liability it establishes should apply to stand-alone algorithms, at least when they have not been designed to meet the specific needs of a particular customer, but are made available to the general public, like physical products can be14.', 'The application of liability for fault in case of damage caused by, or in connection with, AI is not self-evident. Of course, if it is proven that a person was negligent or at fault when designing an algorithm, he can be made liable for any damage caused by his fault or negligence. The real question is whether a software program or algorithm can itself be at fault. That a non-human could be negligent or commit a fault seems at first sight preposterous15, and yet the suggestion cannot be discarded outright. After all, if there really is such a thing as AI, it is conceivable that this intelligence could err and be at fault16. Besides, should robots be granted some sort of legal personality or be considered as agents, as some suggest17, then this might create an incentive to recognise a concept of ‘robot’s fault’. This fault could then become the basis for the robot’s personal liability, or for the liability of the robot’s principal, if the robot is considered as an agent18.', 'Assuming, be it only for the sake of discussion, that there could be such a thing as a robot’s fault, how should this fault be characterised? The assessment of fault is normally based on a comparison between the defendant’s behaviour and the behaviour which a model person, such as the bonus paterfamilias, the reasonable (wo)man or the (wo)man on the Clapham omnibus19, would have adopted in similar circumstances, and one could think of recognising the figure of the reasonable robot, or of the autonomous Clapham omnibus. It is doubtful, however, if the test of the reasonable robot could be anything else than a restatement of the requirement that the robot should not be defective. A negligent robot is just a defective one. The conclusion therefore seems to be that, whether product liability or liability for fault applies, and leaving aside the issue of who should answer for damage attributable to AI, the basis for liability will be defectiveness.', 'Defect thus appears as a central and unavoidable concept when one contemplates the application of traditional non-sector-specific liability regimes to damage caused by, or in connection with, AI. It is also a complex and protean one, as all those who have even a slight interest for product liability know. A preliminary distinction should be made between defects in a software program or algorithm, on the one hand, and ‘physical’ defects in the objects that are governed or animated by the algorithm, one the other hand (for example a non-functioning brake or sensor in an autonomous vehicle). The latter are just ordinary defects, even if they were caused by the operation of AI, and the ordinary rules of product liability should therefore apply to them.']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShSi-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-1.docx

Michigan

ShSi

861d16101714f0e7cafedfd0b3a0f9199b359fcac3533006e46b0b4ed7e17ad9

2. PATCHWORK

Colleen Honigsberg et al. 22, Colleen Honigsberg is an Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Edwin Hu is a Research Fellow, New York University School of Law Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance; Robert J. Jackson, Jr., is the Pierrepont Family Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, and Co-director of the New York University School of Law Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance, “Regulatory Arbitrage and the Persistence of Financial Misconduct,” Stanford Law Review, April 2022, 74 Stan. L. Rev. 737

Despite known costs of financial-advisor misconduct regulatory oversight tragic consequences can follow state regulators have been subject to significant industry capture SEC not immune state oversight is susceptible to capture oversight invites jurisdictional competition toward laxer regulatory approach local insurance regulatory decisions lack salience to command consumers’ state regulators are vulnerable to extensive industry influence

Despite well- known costs of financial-advisor misconduct the law gives advisors lax regulatory oversight across fragmented regulatory regimes tragic consequences can follow state regulators have long been thought to be subject to significant industry capture While the SEC are not immune literature has argued state oversight is especially susceptible to capture state governments’ primacy in oversight invites jurisdictional competition toward a laxer regulatory approach local insurance regulatory decisions lack the salience necessary to command consumers’ attention state insurance commissioners’ cozy relationship with industry 50% go directly to industry positions after leaving government state regulators are vulnerable to extensive industry influence

well- known costs lax regulatory oversight fragmented regulatory regimes tragic consequences follow state significant industry capture SEC immune literature state especially susceptible primacy jurisdictional competition laxer regulatory approach salience consumers’ attention cozy relationship industry 50% directly to industry positions vulnerable extensive industry influence

['D. Financial Advisors and Regulatory Capture', 'Despite the well-known costs of—and the imperfect disciplinary mechanisms associated with—financial-advisor misconduct, no prior work has examined the incentives that the law gives advisors to seek lax regulatory oversight. There is, however, a growing literature documenting the movement of professionals across fragmented regulatory regimes—including teachers,48 clergy,49 and police officers50—and the tragic consequences that can follow.', 'Drawing on that literature, the next Part explains how advisors have considerable freedom in selecting the regulatory regime that will govern their work. In particular, we show that there is good reason to expect advisors with an extensive history of misconduct to prefer oversight by state insurance regulators rather than by the federal government.51', 'One reason is that state insurance regulators have long been thought to be subject to significant industry capture.52 While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and self-regulatory organizations operating subject to SEC oversight are certainly not immune to the economics of industry influence,53 prior literature has argued that state-level insurance oversight is especially susceptible to capture by industry. For example, some have contended that state governments’ primacy in insurance oversight invites jurisdictional competition toward a laxer regulatory approach.54 Others contend that local insurance regulatory decisions lack the salience necessary to command consumers’ attention.55 Others cite state insurance commissioners’ cozy relationship with industry: One study found that 45-50% of commissioners go directly to insurance industry positions after leaving government.56', 'Whatever the reason, it has long been argued that state insurance regulators are vulnerable to extensive industry influence. And it has also long been understood that financial advisors frequently engage in costly misconduct. No prior work, however, has examined the degree to which the relatively lax regulatory environment provided by the states allows advisors who have engaged in misconduct to continue advising investors. In the next Part, we describe how current laws governing financial advice permit that result.']

[(8, 28)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Aff-9---NDT-Round-4.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

2fcb70fea3c99452d59857343467fbf0146e101ee937e816b41dc550d737364a

2. Congressional suits---plank one and two sue if they do which bolsters solvency.

Neumeister 18, J.D. Yale Law School. (McKaye, June 2018, “Reviving the Power of the Purse: Appropriations Clause Litigation and National Security Law,” Yale Law Journal, Volume 127, )

Congress would bring lawsuit for violating Clause use or threatened use of lawsuits revive biggest check on Executive war making and bargaining power judicial review reinvigorate ex post check create accountability majority clarified Executive is not free from controls because foreign affairs possibility of lawsuit is valuable if trend of executive accretion continues adjudication allow Congress exercise appropriations power

legislative reform have not succeeded in correcting national security imbalance . An Appropriations Clause case could more effectively vindicate the Framers intended and prevent the accretion of disproportionate power to the Executive First, Congress would appropriate funding for national security attaching an explicit restriction stating that no funds are being appropriated for purpose x, or appropriating in narrow categories such as to make clear through its omission that purpose x has not been funded when the Executive pursues x by withdrawing and spending funds that have been appropriated for another act ivity, Congress would pass a resolution to bring a lawsuit against the Executive for violating the Appropriations Clause the lawsuit would allege that the President violated the Constitution by "draw [ing]" money "from the Treasury" not "in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."" Congressional Appropriations Clause litigation has the opportunity to serve as a beneficial tool for reinforcing the appropriations power in national security. The use or merely the threatened use of these lawsuits revive Congress's biggest check on Executive war making and increase Congress's political bargaining power in national security policy making Appropriations litigation can reassert Congress's constitutional role in national security disputes judicial review can reinvigorate appropriations as an ex post check on executive overreach such a check would create political and legal accountability that is currently lacking in national security policy making the majority clarified that " [t] he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue Justices went even further in their defense of Congress's role in the separation of powers the President's power reaches 'its lowest ebb "' under the Youngstown framework Appropriations litigation redistribute the burdens of making war and funding national security actions A congressional Appropriations Clause lawsuit-requiring only a majority of one house to authorize suit - vindicates the original constitutional distribution of burdens and power The possibility of an Appropriations Clause lawsuit is valuable if the trend of executive accretion of national security power at the expense of Congress continues . This kind of lawsuit will become increasingly valuable if the constitutional imbalance in power increases it is not impossible to imagine an imperial unitary executive with a robust belief in an inherent executive spending authority winning the presidency and blatantly disregard ing Congress's appropriations limits only adjudication will allow Congress to exercise its appropriations power to check executive war making and unilateral national security policy making A robust Appropriations Clause could strengthen Congress's constitutional hand in dealing with the Executive generally these lawsuits could help Congress reassert its constitutional role in national security

not succeeded imbalance effectively vindicate Framers intended disproportionate power explicit restriction pass a resolution bring a lawsuit violating allege violated opportunity serve beneficial tool reinforcing use merely the threatened use revive biggest check political bargaining power reassert reinvigorate ex post check political legal accountability currently lacking not free ordinary controls checks merely because foreign affairs went even further lowest ebb Youngstown redistribute only a majority one house vindicates possibility valuable trend expense continues increasingly valuable increases not impossible imagine imperial unitary executive robust belief blatantly disregard ing only adjudication will allow robust strengthen hand dealing with reassert

['Thus far, legislative reform and attempts to appeal to the judiciary have not succeeded in correcting the constitutional national security imbalance. An Appropriations Clause case could more effectively vindicate the vision that the Framers intended and prevent the accretion of disproportionate power to the Executive. Such a suit would proceed in two steps. First, Congress would appropriate funding for national security, either attaching an explicit restriction stating that no funds are being appropriated for purpose x, or appropriating in narrow categories such as to make clear through its omission that purpose x has not been funded. Then, when the Executive pursues x by withdrawing and spending funds that have been appropriated for another activity, Congress - or one chamber thereof- would pass a resolution to bring a lawsuit against the Executive for violating the Appropriations Clause. Specifically, the lawsuit would allege that the President violated the Constitution by "draw [ing]" money "from the Treasury" not "in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."" Congressional Appropriations Clause litigation has the opportunity to serve as a beneficial tool for reinforcing the appropriations power in national security. The use - or merely the threatened use - of these lawsuits could revive Congress\'s biggest check on Executive war making and increase Congress\'s political bargaining power in national security policy making.', 'Appropriations litigation, first and foremost, can help reassert Congress\'s constitutional role in national security disputes. "The multiple constitutional prerequisites for government activity" - such as the necessity of congressional appropriation before undertaking an action -"are checks upon the exercise of government power, reflecting the foundational decision that the exercise of such power should be deliberate and limited."8 2 Though modern presidential spending discretion in national security means that appropriations are no longer prerequisites for a specific activity, judicial review can reinvigorate appropriations as an ex post check on executive overreach. As both Founding-era thinking and early practice indicate, such a check would create political and legal accountability that is currently lacking in national security policy making."', 'The Supreme Court recently reiterated in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry that "many decisions affecting foreign relations" -including the appropriations required to carry out those decisions - "require congressional action."84 Repudiating the broad delegation of power to the Executive articulated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,` the majority clarified that " [t] he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue."" The dissenting Justices went even further in their defense of Congress\'s role in the separation of powers.87 For these sentiments to have any effect, the President must be made to abide by Congress\'s appropriations decisions. After all, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Zivotofsky dissent, "the President\'s power reaches \'its lowest ebb"\' under the traditional Youngstown framework "when he contravenes the express will of Congress." " By enabling Congress to enforce its appropriations power, the courts can help "restore the balance of power"" in the national security context.o', "Appropriations litigation can also help redistribute the burdens of making war and funding national security actions, so as to be more faithful to the Constitution. The constitutional text and history suggest that a majority of either house of Congress is sufficient to reject the decision to declare war,91 or reject an appropriation to fund a war. However, with the President's spending discretion and ability to begin a conflict without congressional authorization, Congress essentially requires a veto-proof two-thirds majority in each house to defund an unauthorized war.92 A congressional Appropriations Clause lawsuit-requiring only a majority of one house to authorize suit -vindicates the original constitutional distribution of burdens and power. The great gulf between the interbranch cooperation prescribed by the Constitution and the current reality of unilateral executive action in this area means that Appropriations Clause lawsuits would be particularly valuable in national security and foreign-relations cases.", 'Furthermore, these lawsuits could also improve the balance of power among the branches as a general matter. As discussed in Part IV, because Appropriations Clause litigation is based on a provision that is unusually clear by constitutional standards," it could spur targeted judicial involvement in interbranch disputes. It could thereby help defuse conflicts between Congress and the President that might otherwise escalate. The breadth and clarity of the appropriations power makes it perhaps the most potent of a larger suite of tools with which Congress can exert its authority against the other branches." The clause both vests Congress with the power to appropriate and "ensur[es] that the money [is] actually spent for the purposes for which it was appropriated."" Congress can use this power generally- depriving the executive branch of the means to do its workor specifically- affecting particular policies through riders.9 6 Indeed, the Appropriations Clause allows Congress to invade what would otherwise be the President\'s exclusive power to execute the law." Instead of asking, in the abstract, whether the Executive has the authority under the Constitution to engage in a particular activity, a court can focus on the simpler question of whether Congress has appropriated funds for that activity.', 'To think of this in more familiar terms: if Congress is right in arguing that it has not appropriated funds for the Executive\'s actions, or that an appropriations rider prohibits funds from being spent on those actions, then any Appropriations Clause case will be funneled into category three of the tripartite Youngstown framework. 98 Because the President\'s activity is "incompatible with the expressed ... will of Congress," the President\'s "power is at its lowest ebb." 9 A congressional decision to sue would throw Congress\'s disapproval into starker relief, sharpening the conflict and ensuring that appropriations litigation would take place in category three. Under the Youngstown framework, the President would only be able to win such a suit if she acts under a power that is "both \'exclusive\' and \'conclusive\' on the issue" in dispute - a claim that "must be \'scrutinized with caution."\' 00 And as the Court noted in Zivotofsky, even when a President successfully proves that she has exclusive authority over a particular power, Congress can still use the Appropriations Clause to shape many of the President\'s policy decisions under that power. \' Most cases, therefore, will be rather clear cut: the courts will not need to sift out the two branches\' substantive powers, and will be able to rule for Congress on the constitutional question. Appropriations Clause lawsuits, therefore, could simplify and help resolve otherwise intractable separation-of-powers disputes. In the context of this more limited and concrete legal question, the judiciary may be more willing to intervene on Congress\'s side in constitutional disputes between the political branches.', "The possibility of an Appropriations Clause lawsuit is also valuable if the trend of executive accretion of national security power at the expense of Congress continues. This kind of lawsuit will become increasingly valuable if the constitutional imbalance in power increases. Under the current state of our politics, it is not impossible to imagine an imperial unitary executive with a robust belief in an inherent executive spending authority winning the presidency and blatantly disregarding Congress's appropriations limits. 102", 'Such a President may spend without appropriation in violation of the Constitution if he lacks political hope of persuading Congress to vote in his favor,"o3 or is willing to act in the face of potential political retribution. Or he may act when he mistakenly believes -or wants to believelo - that he has the authority to make national security expenditures without congressional approval. In these circumstances, only adjudication will allow Congress to exercise its appropriations power to check executive war making and unilateral national security policy making.', "A robust Appropriations Clause could thus strengthen Congress's constitutional hand in dealing with the Executive generally. But leaving aside potential benefits for the separation-of-powers jurisprudence, at the very least these lawsuits could help Congress reassert its constitutional role in national security.", '', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-6---Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-3.docx

Kansas

MaPa

5db28b9e9105bd1c02eec04554cb0bae2b1ecf7694089ea389af03779cab7401

The 1AC has fallen prey to magical voluntarism—the hollow gesture of the ballot ignores material recalcitrance which promotes complacency and wish-fulfillment

Gunn and Cloud 10 (Joshua Gunn, PhD from the University of Minnesota, professor @ the Department of Communication Studies @ the University of Texas @ Austin, Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication and Rhetorical Studies Professor @ Syracuse University, exact date unknown but year is 2010, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism," Communication Theory – Vol 20, https://www.academia.edu/6726468/Agentic_Orientation_as_Magical_Voluntarism_Gunn_Cloud?auto=download, accessed 3-17-2022)

magic thought is assimilated to bourgeois consciousness ideology explodes in occultism academic magical thinking fantasies of omnipotence magical voluntarism agency is understood as ability to transform the world fosters misrecognition of material recalcitrance there is limit to efficacy of symbolic action idea one can choose agentic orientation regardless of context and material limitation is regressive promotes wish-fulfillment complacency

By its regression to magic under late capitalism, thought is assimilated to late capitalist forms globalization led to a dramatic intensification of enchantment get rich quick pyramid schemes a magical capitalism promote the doctrine of the existence of spirit central to bourgeois consciousness ideology explodes in occultism Idealism come full circle’’ intensification and proliferation gullibility academic s are susceptible to magical thinking and fantasies of omnipotence magical voluntarism notion that human agency is understood as the ability to control phenomenon through proper manipulation Going beyond the idea that thoughts influence actions transform ing the world magical voluntarism fosters deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance inability to recognize structural political economic cultural and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in their interest refuses to acknowledge there is a limit to efficacy of symbolic action The Secret teach that ‘‘[y]our life is a reflection of your thoughts According to Foss, Waters, and Armada agency is a matter of consciously choosing differing interpretations of reality the understanding of agency is informed by voluntarist ideology Agentic Orientation represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of reason discredited among scholars We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that in situations such as genocide agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions The idea that one can choose agentic orientation regardless of context and material limitation is regressive but tacitly promotes wish-fulfillment As a consequence magical voluntarism leads to complacency

bourgeois consciousness occultism magical thinking magical voluntarism regardless of context

['**edited for language', '', 'By its regression to magic under late capitalism, thought is assimilated to late capitalist forms.', '—Theodor Adorno (1994, p. 129).', 'Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced∂ the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic∂ intensification ... of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid∂ schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an∂ effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its∂ core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed∂ against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the∂ ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central∂ to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno,∂ ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes∂ in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133). What the Comaroffs point to is∂ not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and∂ proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is∂ presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987).', 'As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and∂ narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some∂ level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the∂ idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a∂ philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human∂ agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through∂ the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well∂ beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions∂ in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters∂ a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the∂ structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability∂ to act in her [their] own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge∂ that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and∂ thought alone fail to shift existing social relations.', 'In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and∂ DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that∂ ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things,∂ and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think∂ about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject∂ of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical,∂ neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee,∂ 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a∂ crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world.', 'Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal∂ by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates,∂ magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also∂ Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human∂ agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of∂ reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and∂ Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s∂ millions of readers.', 'Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat∂ magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach∂ the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the∂ perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed∂ to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication∂ and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique∂ of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic∂ brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number∂ rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in∂ ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide ... agents have choices about how∂ to perceive their conditions and their agency ... [which] opens up opportunities for∂ innovating ... in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’∂ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context∂ and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the∂ field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’∂ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through∂ visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism∂ and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic∂ complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.', '']

[(0, 17), (45, 68)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-Gonzaga-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

3cea91406051d14bb732c148342cd415ac183b54ec6135330a9a39c4c9140d53

[2] Their abstract theorizing allows material harm to continue against indigenous people – we should instead focus on concrete particulars as a starting point as the only ethical strategy

Matsuda 88 (Mari, Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, “When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method”, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7 1989)

The multiple consciousness I urge is a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is ac- cessible to all of us in its con- crete particulars These details are accessible Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression. Abstraction allows theorists to discuss with no connection to what those concepts mean in real people's lives mainstream intellectual training values abstraction and denigrates nitty-gritty detail. High talk about lan- guage, meaning, sign, can mask racist and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, re- sist! The reality and detail of op- pression are a starting point

The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is ac- cessible to all of us in its con- crete particulars . We should know of our sister carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 a.m. in a shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on the West Bank, and in Nicaragua. These details are accessible to all of us, of all genders and colors. We can choose to know the lives of others by reading, studying, listening, and ventur- ing Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression. Abstraction , criticized by both feminists and scholars of color, is the, method that allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the aspirational mode of liberalism with no connection to what those concepts mean in real people's lives . Much in our mainstream intellectual training values abstraction and denigrates nitty-gritty detail. Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to op- erate both within the abstractions of standard ju- risprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge High talk about lan- guage, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask racist and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sis- ter who is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, re- sist! The reality and detail of op- pression are a starting point

["The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is ac- cessible to all of us. We should know it in its con- crete particulars. We should know of our sister carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 a.m. in a shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on the West Bank, and in Nicaragua. The jurispru- dence of outsiders teaches that these details and the emotions they evoke are relevant and impor- tant as we set out on the road to justice. These details are accessible to all of us, of all genders and colors. We can choose to know the lives of others by reading, studying, listening, and ventur- ing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono work may be the most effective means of ac- quiring a broader consciousness of oppression. Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression. Abstraction, criticized by both feminists and scholars of color, is the, method that allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the aspirational mode of liberalism with no connection to what those concepts mean in real people's lives. Much in our mainstream intellectual training values abstraction and denigrates nitty-gritty detail. ", '', 'Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to op- erate both within the abstractions of standard ju- risprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge. Whisperings at Yale and elsewhere about how deconstructionist heroes were closet fascists remind me of how important it is to stay close to oppressed communities. High talk about lan- guage, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask racist and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sis- ter who is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel, as I have, that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, re- sist! Read what Professor Williams, Professor Scales-Trent, and other feminists and people of color are writing.\' The reality and detail of op- pression are a starting point for these writers as they enter into mainstream debates about law and theory.']

[(0, 10), (10, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaVa-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-1.docx

Dartmouth

CaVa

a5e68a41327006b1a3d3c2a0faed6b32059ea66e0895d617666ebc66a9da3adf

Reading Grove is pedagogically inconsistent — he helped publish a military white paper and concedes that we should develop a new national security strategy

Sotiriadis & Grove 20, *Lt Col, USAF **Ph.D. (Jake Sotiriadis; Jairus Grove, June 2020, " GLOBAL FUTURES REPORT ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD," Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1108029.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3_qVNz4t1Vjb739BmHf1ODX3h_JGFvtIjqA8Tzg5D6cuQGwlLykrExCy8)

the national security establishment must develop skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected COVID revealed vulnerabilities for supply chains society economy , and national security Rather than “definitive” conclusions or policy recommendations, this document challenges us to consider the future defy accepted probabilities to affect the D o D

COVID sheds an important light on the criticality of futures-based thinking to move us beyond conventional assumptions and positions the national security establishment must develop the skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected COVID revealed overlooked vulnerabilities for our supply chains society economy , and national security The primary aim of this report is to disrupt how we conceptualize national security futures . Rather than arrive at “definitive” conclusions or prescribe budgetary, policy , or force structure recommendations, this document instead challenges us to consider how the future can defy accepted probabilities to affect the D o D and the Air Force Jairus Victor Grove

COVID sheds an important light on the criticality of futures-based thinking to move us beyond conventional assumptions and positions the national security establishment must develop the skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected COVID revealed overlooked vulnerabilities for our supply chains society economy , and national security The primary aim of this report is to disrupt how we conceptualize national security futures . Rather than arrive at “definitive” conclusions or prescribe budgetary, policy , or force structure recommendations, this document instead challenges us to consider how the future can defy accepted probabilities to affect the D o D and the Air Force Jairus Victor Grove

['The COVID-19 pandemic sheds an important light on the criticality of futures-based thinking to move us beyond conventional assumptions and positions. In today’s chaotic cycle of rapid change, growing complexity, and radical uncertainty, the national security establishment must develop the skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected. To be sure, the fallout from COVID-19 has revealed overlooked vulnerabilities for our supply chains, our society, our economy, and—most pertinent for this report— our national security strategy, which relies on all three. The primary aim of this report is to disrupt how we conceptualize national security futures. Rather than arrive at “definitive” conclusions or prescribe budgetary, policy, or force structure recommendations, this document instead challenges us to consider how the future can defy accepted probabilities to affect the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force. We are living far from “equilibrium system,” when novel and even catastrophic change are most likely. However, in every alternative future—no matter how severe or unexpected—there are always winners and losers. The organizations best positioned to seize and incorporate the exploits of the new order will be those with the capability to perceive, learn, and adapt even when the signals from tomorrow may seem utterly ridiculous today.', 'Lt Col Jacob S. Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D.', 'Chief, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, AFWIC', 'Jairus Victor Grove, Ph.D.', 'Director, the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies', 'The University of Hawaii at Manoa', 'Washington, D.C., June 2020']

[(0, 10), (11, 21)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Texas-Round-6.docx

Michigan

ShGa

1c63b4a9d9c1c66eae4971924768d87953ca65203e1b41115a39de1dc04af7b0

Finishing McMichael

McMichael 09 (Philip McMichael, professor of development sociology at Cornell University, “The World Food Crisis in Historical Perspective”, July 1, 2009, https://monthlyreview.org/2009/07/01/the-world-food-crisis-in-historical-perspective/)

the debt crisis encouraged the dismantling of strategic grain reserves exposing farmers and consumers to extreme price volatility The consolidation of agribusiness set the stage for the world food crisis. This enables corporate price fixing US agricultural production is responsible for the crisis of “peak soil,” intensified the “metabolic rift,” interrupting the natural carbon and nutrient cycles and degrading soils soils exhibit forms of erosion that suggest the world faces declining yields

the crisis revealed the inherent vulnerabilities of the neoliberal food regime where the large-scale commodification of food renders it a speculative target and control by financial markets or agribusiness enables price inflation Liberalized trade relations have restructured food circuits deepening a food dependency that started when prices were low food import bill of developing countries rose by 25 percent as food prices rose the debt crisis encouraged the dismantling of strategic grain reserves in the global South International agencies such as the IMF proposed conditions that governments had to reduce strategic grain reserves to defray debt National food reserves have been privatised and are now run like transnational companies exposing farmers and consumers to extreme price volatility transmission of rising commodity prices is not simply a matter of integration of markets it is a result of consolidation of power in the agri-food sector The consolidation of agribusiness set the stage for the world food crisis. Liberalization and privatization combine to accelerate food circulation globally and restructure food production and retailing along corporate lines This enables corporate profits from price fixing The monopoly structure of the heavily subsidized agribusiness food system means traders, processors, and retailers are in a position to raise food prices the trade rules that govern today’s food system companies are in perfect position to turn food scarcity into immense profits food price increases are encouraged and rapidly transmitted around the world its roots lie in the industrial agricultural model US agricultural production The latter is responsible for the crisis of “peak soil,” as inorganic fertilizers and monocropping have intensified the “metabolic rift,” interrupting the natural carbon and nutrient cycles and degrading soils while there is still arable land soils exhibit forms of erosion that suggest the world faces declining yields

inherent vulnerabilities of the neoliberal food regime price inflation extreme price volatility set the stage for the world food crisis. responsible for the crisis of “peak soil,” declining yields

['', '32 According to one report:', 'Countries like Bangladesh can’t buy the rice they need now because the prices are so high. For years the World Bank and the IMF have told countries that a liberalized market would provide the most efficient system for producing and distributing food, yet today the world’s poorest countries are forced into an intense bidding war against speculators and traders, who are having a field day. Hedge funds and other sources of hot money are pouring billions of dollars into commodities to escape sliding stock markets and the credit crunch, putting food stocks further out of poor people’s reach. According to some estimates, investment funds now control 50-60% of the wheat traded on the world’s biggest commodity markets.33', 'In effect, the crisis revealed the inherent vulnerabilities of the neoliberal food regime, where the large-scale commodification of food renders it a speculative target, and control by either financial markets or agribusiness enables price inflation (even with record harvests of staple crops).34 Food stocks are highly centralized—five corporations control 90 percent of the international grain trade, three countries produce 70 percent of exported corn, and the thirty largest food retailers control one-third of world grocery sales.35 Arguably, such concentration of corporate power was enabled by the vision articulated by the chairman of Cargill: “There is a mistaken belief that the greatest agricultural need in the developing world is to develop the capacity to grow food for local consumption. This is misguided. Countries should produce what they produce best—and trade.”36', 'Liberalized trade relations, under WTO rules, have restructured food circuits, deepening a food dependency that started when prices were low. Wheat imports in Africa increased “by 35 percent between 1996 and 2000, while the total value of these ever-cheaper imports actually fell by 13 percent, on average”37; about 70 percent of countries in the global South are net food importers38; and in 2007, the “food import bill of developing countries rose by 25 percent as food prices rose.”39 Such food dependency often results from import surges of low-price products that harm local producers. Thus, the FAO noted 669 cases of poultry import surges between 1983 and 2003, 50 percent of which occurred in Africa, responsible for only 5 percent of global poultry trade. During this time 70 percent of Senegal’s poultry industry and 90 percent of Ghana’s local poultry production were wiped out by poultry imports from the United States, the European Union, and Brazil.40 Meanwhile, the debt crisis encouraged the dismantling of strategic grain reserves in the global South. International agencies such as the IMF proposed conditions that governments (for example, Malawi)41 had to reduce strategic grain reserves to defray debt,42 and governments like that of India sold grain reserves on the world market.43 The transnational peasant movement, Vía Campesina, noted:', 'National food reserves have been privatised and are now run like transnational companies. They act as speculators instead of protecting farmers and consumers. Likewise, guaranteed price mechanisms are being dismantled all over the world as part of the neo-liberal policies package, exposing farmers and consumers to extreme price volatility.4', 'Paul Krugman invoked this problem in a New York Times column, “Grains Gone Wild,”', 'Governments and private grain dealers used to hold large inventories in normal times, just in case a bad harvest created a sudden shortage. Over the years, however, these precautionary inventories were allowed to shrink, mainly because everyone came to believe that countries suffering crop failures could always import the food they needed.45', 'Not unlike the dismantling, or deterioration, of customary grain reserves in colonial hinterlands, the corporate food regime substitutes the price mechanism for public methods of meeting social needs for food provisioning. The consequence has been the removal of obstacles to the rapid passing along of price increases for staple foods. But transmission of rising commodity prices is not simply a matter of integration of markets, rather it is a result of consolidation of power in the agri-food sector. A case in point is the Mexican corn market. While corn prices fell continuously following NAFTA’s liberalization of corn imports from the United States, tortilla prices in Mexico tripled during the 1990s. And during 2006, when world corn prices did rise rapidly, tortilla prices doubled again, so that “low-income people found themselves priced out of the tortilla market, and forced into less-nutritious alternatives like white bread and ramen noodles.”46 With only two food processors controlling 97 percent of the industrial corn flour market, and the state reducing food subsidies, tortilla riots have become part of the political landscape—spurred by a 10 percent reduction in wages resulting from rural migrants displaced by corn imports.47', 'Emblematic of the food crisis, Mexican underconsumption is related to the construction of profitability. While real wages have declined as tortilla prices increased, the production cost of tortillas has been cut—as industrial methods have adulterated the food commodity for the working poor. That is, capital has managed with state support to reduce costs and raise prices—an accomplishment depending on conditions of neoliberal trade relations, complemented by cronyism and the privatization of the Mexican state.', 'The consolidation of agribusiness under the neoliberal food regime thus set the stage for the world food crisis. Liberalization and privatization combine to accelerate food circulation globally and restructure food production and retailing along corporate lines. This enables corporate profits from price fixing, in addition to the transmission of rising prices through processes of corporate integration of markets in agricultural and food products. The monopoly structure of the heavily subsidized agribusiness food system not only means producers receive low prices for their products, but also that traders, processors, and retailers are in a position to raise food prices. Rates of profit for agribusiness have soared; for example, in 2007, Cargill’s profits rose 36 percent, ADM’s 67 percent, and Bunge’s 49 percent, while in the first quarter of 2008, Cargill’s net earnings rose 86 percent, ADM’s gross profits were up 55 percent, and Bunge’s gross profits increased by 189 percent. Fertilizer companies profited also—for example, in 2007 Potash Corporation’s profits rose 72 percent, and Mosaic’s profits rose 141 percent, while, in the first quarter of 2008, Potash’s net income rose 186 percent and Mosaic’s net income rose more than 1,200 percent. Meanwhile, seed and agrochemical corporations reported unusual profits for 2007: Monsanto, 44 percent; DuPont, 19 percent; and Syngenta, 28 percent.48 Rising prices for inputs like fertilizer, seed, and chemical sprays explains why most small farmers have not benefited from rising food prices. GRAIN remarks:', 'Intimately involved with the shaping of the trade rules that govern today’s food system and tightly in control of markets and the ever more complex financial systems through which global trade operates, these companies are in perfect position to turn food scarcity into immense profits. People have to eat, whatever the cost.49', 'Conclusion', 'Corporate control through a food regime based in market liberalization is a proximate cause of the globalization of a system in which food price increases are encouraged and rapidly transmitted around the world. But its roots lie in the industrial agricultural model, and its heavy fossil-fuel dependence. As a recent Chatham House report claims, producing “one tonne of maize in the US requires 160 litres of oil, compared with just 4.8 litres in Mexico where farmers rely on more traditional methods. In 2005, expenditure on energy accounted for as much as 16% of total US agricultural production costs, one-third for fuel, including electricity, and two-thirds indirectly for the production of fertilizer and chemicals.”50 The latter is, of course, responsible for the crisis of “peak soil,” as inorganic fertilizers and monocropping (originating in the colonial plantation system) have intensified the “metabolic rift,” interrupting the natural carbon and nutrient cycles and degrading soils. This means that while there is still arable land available globally, soils in use exhibit forms of exhaustion and erosion that suggest the world faces steadily declining yields under the present regime of dependency on petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides.', '', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrHa-Neg-CEDA-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PrHa

068a7fc222c2cfd7407d93245faeed3a4c91460e26000c4eb71878662a03f925

Cyber-attacks are good---key to enhanced precision in crisis bargaining.

Rabkin, 17 — *Jeremy A. Rabkin; PhD, Harvard University; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. Professor Rabkin serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace (originally appointed by President George W. Bush in 2007, then appointed for a second term by President Barack Obama and reconfirmed by the Senate in 2011). He also serves on the Board of Academic Advisers of the American Enterprise Institute and on the Board of Directors of the Center for Individual Rights, a public interest law firm based in Washington, D.C. **John Yoo; Emanuel Heller Professor of Law and director of the Korea Law Center, the California Constitution Center, and the Law School’s Program in Public Law and Policy. (2017; “Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules for War;” Ch. 1—We Must Think Anew; //GrRv)

Efforts to limit cyber attacks cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances Cyber weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages these improve the precision of force and thereby reduce death

we question the idea that nations should look to rules to produce lasting limits on war nation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons Nations have observed other norms Efforts to impose more specific and demanding rules , such as limit ing cyber attacks will similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances , new weapons and military situations , and the immediate exigencies of war Nations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic Cyber weapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded Cyber weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war. Nor these new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal Today's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber technology prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations .

rules lasting limits on war refrained chemical weapons norms specific demanding rules limit ing cyber attacks unforeseen circumstances weapons military situations exigencies adhere benefit outweighs the cost similar logic Cyber weapons succeeded Cyber weapons of proportion precision of force reduce human death destruction Nor useless arms race marginal gains much greater gains military capability cyber technology prohibition regulation equal impacts on rival nations

['Instead, we question the idea that nations should look to formal treaties and rules to produce lasting limits on war. Despite the recent deterioration in the Syrian civil war, nation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons against each other since the end of World War I. They have followed the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, though not consistently. Nations have observed other norms in the breach, chief among them the immunity of the civilian population and resources from attack. World War Il not only saw the aerial bombing of cities and the nuclear attacks on Japan, but the years since have seen precision targeting of terrorists off the battlefield, attacks on urban infrastructure, and the acceptance of high levels of collateral damage among civilians. International lawyers and diplomats may proclaim that nations follow universal rules, either because of morality or a sense of legal obligation, but the record of practice tells a far different story. Efforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting targeted drone attacks, banning cyber attacks, or requiring human control of robotic weapons, will similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war. Just as new technology led to increases in economic productivity, so too has it allowed nations to make war more effectively. ', "Nations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost, as when protecting enemy prisoners of war secures reciprocal protection for a nation's own soldiers taken captive by the enemy. Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic. Nations will be most inclined to respect legal restraints on new weapons when their use by both sides would leave no one better off or would provide little advantage. Cyber and robotic weapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded, as with use of poison gas on the battlefield. Cyber and robotic weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages, as do poisoned bullets or blinding lasers. Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war. ", "Nor have these new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race. Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal. Mutual reductions could leave both sides in the same position as they were before the agreement. Today, the marginal cost of nuclear weapons for the U.S. and Russia so outweighs their marginal benefit that it is not even clear that a binding international agreement is needed to reduce their arsenals. Russia, for example, reduced its arsenal below New START's ceilings of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 strategic launchers even before the U.S. approved the deal. 45 The United States likely would have reduced its forces to those levels even if the Senate had refused to consent to the treaty, a position the executive branch also took in 2002 with the Treaty of Moscow's deep reduction in nuclear weapons. Today's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Indeed, we do not even now have enough information to understand which nations will benefit and which will not, which makes any form of international ban even less likely. "]

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-1%20-%20Northwestern-Round6.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-1%2520-%2520Northwestern-Round6.docx

8b2b04e04c8223ceae8b1c8802ccf4a1bbd98fc2937f9de551a0e292ed3e2407

5. It's not offense---if sole purpose doesn’t spur operational changes, neither does NFU.

William A. Chambers et al. 21, Major General (retired) William A. Chambers, Dr. Caroline Milne, Dr. Rhiannon Hutton, and Dr. Heather Williams (IDA consultant), “Impact on the Force,” Institute for Defense Analyses, 2021, pp. 15–20 JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29560.7

ability of the U S to strike quickly is conflated with ability to strike first a premise that NFU should drive reduction ignores the objective to provide a variety of flexible options This is distinct from declaratory policy NFU has no effect on force needs The overwhelming conclusion of research , including consultations with those involved in implementation of nuclear policy and employment guidance , is that NFU would not require any modification prompt-strike capability has value regardless of first use

In the public NFU debate, the ability of the U S to execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first . The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU should drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon . This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture to provide the capability for a variety of flexible options This posture is distinct from declaratory policy . In short, NFU has no effect on force needs or posture The existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative In other words, a capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy The overwhelming conclusion of research , including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance , is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements Any discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture . Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on the ICBM force Voices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg For this group, an NFU policy ought to guide divestiture Any debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first there is no reason to assume ICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike there is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity maintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first prompt-strike capability has value regardless of when For example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and days could cause significant political risk the ability to respond when under confirmed attack because of first use is not precluded by NFU Current strategic conditions still require this ability Because adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons declaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters , thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required

ability U S quickly conflated first NFU reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon ignores fundamental objective variety flexible options posture distinct from declaratory policy NFU no effect on force needs or posture choice, not an imperative capability not equivalent “first-use” policy overwhelming conclusion of research consultations involved implementation nuclear policy employment guidance any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements Any discussion begin not necessitate changes in force posture raised ICBM joined critics of the ICBM leg guide divestiture other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first no reason to assume ICBMs vehicle of choice for a first strike second-strike capacity regardless of when reestablish deterrence after minutes days significant political risk confirmed attack first use not precluded NFU strategic conditions still require this ability require speculative decided other reasons separate matters no changes force requirements force posture required

['In the public NFU debate, the ability of the United States to execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first. The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU policy should drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon. This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture43—to provide the capability for a variety of flexible options to deter adversaries and assure allies, in accordance with presidential guidance, for a variety of circumstances. This posture is distinct from declaratory policy. In short, NFU, or ambiguity regarding NFU, has no effect on force needs or posture. Maintaining flexible options allows a president to decide whether an action is necessary, and if so, how prompt an action is necessary. The flexibility manifests in the following available choices:', '• Nuclear and non-nuclear options;', '• Immediate or delayed response options;', '• An array of nuclear strike options, in terms of scale, yield and delivery mechanisms; and', '• The option to use nuclear weapons first, or after a nuclear weapon is confirmed to be inbound, or has already been employed and detonated on U.S. or allied soil.', 'The existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative.44 In other words, as described earlier, maintaining a capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy. U.S. forces are postured such that abstaining from nuclear use is always an option.', 'The overwhelming conclusion of IDA’s research, including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance, is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements. It stands to reason, however, that the credibility of an NFU policy could potentially be enhanced if it was accompanied by a significant change in force requirements or posture. That credibility, though, is a perception formed in the mind of the adversary. IDA’s research revealed that for the main nucleararmed competitors of the United States, a shift to NFU, even if accompanied by a significant change in nuclear force posture, is unlikely to be viewed as credible and would not cause Russia and China to favorably alter their behavior. Beyond the question of whether NFU requires changes to the force is the question of what adoption of NFU would allow. That question must fundamentally be answered based on adversary capability and intent and on the strategic setting the United States faces.', 'Any discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture. Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on one leg of U.S. nuclear forces: the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Voices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg of the triad, citing perceived risks inherent in the ICBM’s ability to conduct nuclear strikes on very short notice. For this group, an NFU policy ought to guide the divestiture of the United States’ most responsive deterrent force. In contrast, proponents of an ambiguous declaratory policy argue that the most responsive force, the ICBM, is the bedrock of strategic deterrence and that perceived risks are mitigated by the numerous safeguards in place that govern its employment.', 'Any debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first. Narrowing the NFU debate to the ICBM force is thus problematic for several reasons. First, there is no reason to assume that ICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike. ICBMs provide rapid attribution and almost certainly rapid response, but the United States has other options at its disposal.45 Second, there is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity. They could be used to support a limited response to adversary first use. 46 Third, maintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first. The United States has two prompt response options—ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched from SSBNs47—that possess complementary attributes and provide a technological hedge.48 This prompt-strike capability has value regardless of when nuclear weapons are employed. For example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and hours or days could cause significant political and military risk.49 Lastly, the ability to respond when under confirmed nuclear attack because of first use by an adversary—a deterrent capability required by every president since the early 1960s—is not precluded by an NFU policy. Current strategic conditions, current adversary capability, and, as a result, current national policy guidance still require this ability.', 'However, because the NFU policy debate so often tends to span questions of force structure and to be in support of the NDAA stipulation to explore implications for force posture and force requirements, IDA researched several ways in which changes to nuclear or conventional forces could accompany an NFU policy, despite the evidence indicating the lack of a link.50 [FOOTNOTE 50 BEGINS] Historically, whether a country professed an NFU policy or not has been tied—at times superficially— to its conventional standing. U.S. adoption of NFU today could therefore be seen as an assertion of conventional superiority. Such an assertion may be false. At a minimum, it could result in increased pressure to regain and maintain that superiority in key areas of competition, which is problematic given the challenges to the U.S. military advantage in every warfighting domain stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and affirmed by the bipartisan NDS Commission. [FOOTNOTE 50 ENDS] In every case, IDA’s research reinforced the fact that force posture changes are likely more costly and more complicated than one might expect, especially in terms of impact to deterrent capability. In sum, IDA’s exploration of changes to force requirements and force posture, thought by some to be plausibly linked to NFU, yielded no feasible changes that would provide the necessary deterrent capability for today’s strategic setting. Moreover, in light of Russian and Chinese perceptions about the threat posed by some U.S. weapon systems and technologies, IDA assessed that the second-order implications of any potential NFU-driven changes to the force posture could be significant.51 [FOOTNOTE 51 BEGINS] For example, Russia and China have expressed deep concern about U.S missile defense systems threatening their survivable second-strike capability and cite the need to overcome U.S. missile defenses as motivations for their own hypersonic development and nuclear modernization programs, although some of this rhetoric is likely posturing. Brad Roberts, ed. “Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction. Perspectives from Russia, China, and the United States, LLNL-TR-809702 (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, May 2020), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1635770; Kelly Snyder, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, R46458 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), November 10, 2020), https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/natsec/R46458.pdf. [FOOTNOTE 51 ENDS] ', 'Allies are also a factor in force posture considerations, and many experts cited that conventional force posture may also need to change to bolster allied/partner confidence in U.S. commitments to extended deterrence as the result of a change to an NFU policy. A change in posture could manifest as increased cooperation with allies and partners (e.g., more technology sharing, foreign military sales, joint exercises/capability demonstrations) or increased investments in emerging technologies to supplement capability gaps.52 Supplementing nuclear forces with more robust conventional capabilities is nontrivial. One must consider the development, procurement, and sustainment costs and timelines, the technical challenges, the concepts of operations (e.g., whether these would be “niche” capabilities or available for widespread use), and the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional deterrence in national security strategy.', 'Because adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons (e.g., to bolster credibility of NFU pledge, assure allies and partners, and so forth), and on the specific form of those force posture/force requirement changes (e.g., nuclear only, nuclear and conventional, at home or abroad). Such cost calculations must account for a multitude of factors that go well beyond the monetary cost of the force structure itself.', 'In sum, the lessons from considering the impacts of an NFU policy on the force are clear: (1) declaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters, thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required; (2) adversary capabilities and perceptions are key; and (3) any assessment of force posture implications must account for multiple factors that extend beyond nuclear force structure.', '']

[(11, 29)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Texas-Doubles.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

8c133f2bb2c3326e2343e77fa5329dfe39ed99159349673976e9e0b516184128

That solves existential threats.

Carrie A. Lee and Max Manguiles 23. Lee is a MWI research fellow and the chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. Manguiles is the Research Director of MWI. “RETHINKING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FOR MODERN STRATEGY.” Modern War Institute. 8-14-2023. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/rethinking-civil-military-relations-for-modern-strategy/

New tech emerging domains changing the range rapidly changing info environment domestic groups undermine democratic processes challenges demand c m r range of actors potential threats vulnerabilities continues to grow Cyber threaten military targets also civilian infrastructure intellectual property Space assets a sat enable GPS used by both military and civilians the global banking and investment threats to democratic processes require coordination

New tech nologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars emerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against and the rapidly changing info rmation environment domestic extremist groups seek to undermine democratic processes These emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about c ivil- m ilitary r elations the range of actors , potential threats , and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era Cyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success Space assets , which can be held hostage by foreign a nti- sat ellite capabilities, enable GPS ( used by both military and civilians ) and, in turn, the global banking and investment system Domestic threats to democratic political processes require intense coordination between civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders

New tech emerging domains info environment democratic processes c ivil- m ilitary r elations potential threats continues to grow Cyber capabilities infrastructure intellectual property Space assets global banking investment

['New technologies are changing the way that militaries\xa0prepare to fight\xa0wars, emerging domains are changing the\xa0range of actions\xa0that states have to deter and defend against, and the rapidly changing information environment is challenging states’\xa0ability to signal\xa0intentions and respond to accurate information. What’s more, domestic security concerns have sprung to the forefront in the United States, challenging traditional conceptions of threat as\xa0domestic extremist groups\xa0seek to undermine democratic processes and encourage political violence.', 'What do these changes have in common? They all blur the lines between American civilians and the military. These emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations—an area of study best thought of as the relationship between the military, government, and society. We solicited ideas from a wide range of civil-military relations scholars and curated them into a series of articles to tackle this challenge head on. Each author offers a new idea to help guide American strategy making in the complex environment of modern civil-military relations.', 'Security\xa0in the United States has never been about simply defending borders. However, the range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era. Whereas\xa0traditionally\xa0we think about war as a primarily military phenomenon, novel technologies, domains, and threats now clearly involve\xa0commercial\xa0and private interests as well. Cyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success. Space assets, which can be held hostage by foreign\xa0anti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the\xa0global banking\xa0and investment system. Domestic threats to democratic political processes require\xa0intense coordination\xa0between civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders who may be called upon to enforce peace. And military leaders today\xa0must attract\xa0a different kind of recruit who can meet these new demands.', '', '', 'Impeachment CP']

[(10, 17), (22, 34)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Neg-NDT-Round-6.docx

Emory

GaHe

03da30a013c808c5a0ca5226bdd6d79d8ec418fae30f277258eba57e24753067

Debt ceiling is not urgent---Congress has months to raise it---and inevitably will.

Ali 23 (Shirin, Associate Writer, “The U.S. Hits the Debt Ceiling Today. Wait, What?!,” 18 Jan 2023, , DOA: 1-20-2023)

The economy isn’t going to explode this week The Treasury has “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running these buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash “before early June.”

The economy isn’t going to explode this week The Treasury Department has mechanisms in p lace—known as “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running while limiting some spending, like suspending new investments in retirement and disability funds All these maneuvers buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling . Yellen estimated that “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash to pay its bills “before early June.”

isn’t going to explode this week a few more months inevitably “before early June.”

['The economy isn’t going to explode this week. Secretary Yellen has told Congress that the U.S. will hit its debt ceiling on Jan. 19, but that’s just the beginning. The Treasury Department has mechanisms in place—known as “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running while limiting some spending, like suspending new investments in retirement and disability funds. These moves are temporary, and retirees aren’t affected, as the Treasury Department will make those funds whole again after the debt-limit impasse ends. All these maneuvers buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling. Yellen estimated that “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash to pay its bills “before early June.”']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaSo-Aff-Texas-Round-2.docx

Kansas

HaSo

a52257ce2f6a809d49fc976a1048db0616e78df649a2cabbfb4a10865e17b143

Blurred lines—drones overwhelm other capabilities—makes them irrelevant.

Rabkin 17—(Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, PhD in government from Harvard University). Jeremy Rabkin & John Yoo. September 12, 2017. “Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules for War”. Encounter Books.

i law continued to attack drones Although admitting drones “are here to stay,” growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition States use drones to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape detection or evade responsibility The line between war and peace will blur

U.N. i nternational law officials have continued to attack drones . Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,” robots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.” Their growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations States can use drones to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility . The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other

i law attack drones drones “are here to stay,” low-intensity drawn-out applications of force necessary addition far from conventional battlefields escape immediate detection evade responsibility war peace

['', 'Nevertheless, U.N. international law officials have continued to attack drones. Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,” Christof Heyns worried that robots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.”34 Their growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations, including the U.S., the UK, France, Russia, China, India, and Israel, among others. States can use drones and other technology, such as cyber weapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility. The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Aff-Gonzaga-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

30f449a083cf7821ce6d9d7efc3e48c035cba87147ffe236afcaf910fcadee7f

8. and robust study on Chinese emissions.

Kun Wang 20 – Professor at Guangdong Ocean University Cunjin College, Department of Economics and Finance, China (Yu Kun Wang* and Li Zhang, Reconsidering the relationship between CO2 emissions and economic growth: New evidence from China during 1990–2016 IJRES 7 (2020) 1-16 doi.org/10.33500/ ijres.2020.07.001)//gcd

Unlike previous studies this used subjective mutation and randomized examination China's approaching statistically significant U-shaped relationship between growth and emissions GFC of 08 did not change in relationship emissions have decreased even though GDP increased China’s emissions decreased 40% no study indicated coal decreased during Asian crisis

To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook . By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise ). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies , this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and ln GDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. , the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999 , the GFC of 20 08 –2009 did not lead to structural change s in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009 ich indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.

we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. Unlike subjective mutation randomized field examination a U-shaped relationship GDP China's statistically significant U-shaped relationship growth and carbon emissions the GFC change s in between lnGDP and lnCO2 CO2 emissions and linked CO2 emissions Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. China's coal consumption decreased during Asian financial crisis

["Although EKC theory has been widely used to describe the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions, limited knowledge exists regarding its empirical validity. To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach, we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. We performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise (Wang et al., 2019). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance. Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship. The breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance. To confirm the robustness of our results. We assumed that this mutation point pattern was selected at random, and that the mutation point of the time series was completely unknown in advance. This study is the first to combine EKC theory and the RD approach to perform empirical analysis for observing the structural change in the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered. This result indicated that a Kuznets inflection point did not exist between China's lnGDP growth and lnCO2 emissions during 1990–2016. However, the Chow test and RD test results indicated that regardless of the effect of other policies, China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve. Numerous regressions reported in this study indicated that a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. Another important finding of our analysis is that although the overall structural model was stable when using Equation 10, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999. The substantial reduction in the coal demand in 1999 played an important role in the structural change in the nonlinear correlation between lnGDP and lnCO2. However, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009, which indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked. China has the highest population in the world, and its TPES increased every year from 1990 to 2016, in which the TPES was 2958 Mtoe. However, during the past 4 years, CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased. As per the UNFCCC 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions by 40 to 45% in 2020 compared with its carbon emissions in 2005. Data from the IEA indicated that the ratio of CO2 to GDP was 1.5 in 2005 and 0.9 in 2016. Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. Consequently, China achieved the goal of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 4 years in advance. We extend our results to examine the effect of emission fee levy on the cost of environmental degradation. A positive relationship was obtained between emission fee levy and CO2 emissions, which confirmed our hypothesis. This finding may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has implemented environment protection taxes instead of penalties in the environmental regulations since 2018. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have imposed carbon taxes since 1990 (Piciu and Tricǎ, 2012). The effectiveness of the environmental protection tax implemented in China since 2018, is an important topic that can be examined in future research. Many studies have indicated that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China maintained stable economic growth, the RMB did not depreciate, and Chinese exports continued to increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, China's CO2 emissions decreased from 3.021 billion tons in 1998 to 2.92 billion tons in 1999. However, its GDP increased from USD1776 billion in 1997 to USD1915 billion in 1998 and USD2062 billion in 1999. Thus, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s GDP exhibited sustainable growth. Finally, our empirical results indicated that the Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study."]

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-5%20-%20Texas-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-5%2520-%2520Texas-Round3.docx

4aba520cc3c7822871d6ec7fbfba36cb1714f1c39191bd7c9ec45371d93ed3aa

Psychology proves the CP doesn’t solve---being able to sue the robot is key to patient satisfaction and overcomes aversion.

Christina Mulligan 18. "Revenge against Robots," South Carolina Law Review 69, no. 3 (Spring 2018): 579-596. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/sclr69&div=22&g_sent=1&casa_token=N6WFgqb1rUAAAAAA:TQkDAtRmF77okdwWfPNxxMpiaVE11bkmfv3Le2H5faJ5HbETAhYkkWXEi05sP5CvjhlA8YM&collection=journals

legal actors might target the robot itself there are ways to hold robots accountable and reasons law would vengeful responses may provide psychological benefits to victims revenge against robots may be necessary consider an alternate appeals to a government body to cover the cost you feel a nagging frustration the psychological benefit that revenge might create satisfaction' is an outcome the law should support revenge is re-establishment of power balance vengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are recognize parties could be granted immunity what legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims one can imagine human users' blaming the offending object current events suggest this is accurate violence against misbehaving robots is psychologically beneficial to humans punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans

legal actors might target the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself . The notion of holding a robot accountable evokes absurd and amusing mental images But there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so. vengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims taking revenge against wrongdoing robots specifically may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm consider an alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body to cover the cost In this society, governments or charities are very generous Plus, the procedure is fast and efficient Your instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable But you might feel a nagging frustration —the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all. consideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals— satisfaction' –which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support reven ge is the means and not the end The end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance vengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering. consider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian we could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car. various parties could be granted immunity Alternatively some parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault. what legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents one can imagine human users' blaming the offending object current events suggest this insight is accurate enacting revenge on a robot vengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable our actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots "deserve." punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans we should punish robots

the robot itself reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so. psychological benefits to victims robots specifically may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction government body to cover the cost nagging frustration law and society should support recognize various parties could be granted immunity blaming the offending object accurate violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable psychologically beneficial to humans we should punish robots

['When a robot hurts a human, how should the legal system respond? Our first instinct might be to ask who should pay for the harm caused, perhaps deciding to rest legal liability with the robot\'s hardware manufacturer or its programmers. But besides considering tort or criminal actions against corporate and human persons, legal actors might also target the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself. The notion of holding a robot accountable for its actions initially evokes absurd and amusing mental images-a prosecutor pointing to a smart toaster shouting, "And what do you have to say in your defense? Jury, note that the toaster says nothing. It says nothing because it is guilty." And it is easy to laugh at this scenario and brush the idea aside. But there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so. This Essay proceeds by first exploring how vengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims (Part II). It goes on to argue that taking revenge against wrongdoing robots, specifically, may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm and addresses the concern that punishing robots would psychologically injure humans (Part III). The Essay then shifts focus to robots themselves, arguing that it is justifiable for humans to blame robots for their actions because, like animals, autonomous robots are best understood as the causes of their own actions (as "agents") (Part IV). Finally, the Essay evaluates whether a robot\'s moral culpability is relevant to the issue of robot punishment (Part V) and considers how revenge against robots could be implemented (Part VI). II. SEEKING SATISFACTION THROUGH REVENGE When asked what the goal of tort law is, many say that its goal is "to make victims whole."\' "Making a victim whole" is usually understood to mean returning a victim to the position they were in before a harm occurred or placing a victim in the position they would have been in had they not been injured. 2 In practice, this means awarding tort victims financially.3 When a pedestrian gets hit by a car and physically injured, they can sue the car\'s driver and may receive as compensation the cost of their medical bills, lost wages from the injury, and even an approximation of the value of their physical pain and suffering.4 But consider for a moment an alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body or a private charity to cover the cost of the accident. In this society, governments or charities are very generous, and injured individuals receive in compensation the same as or more than they would have received in our more litigious society. Plus, the procedure is fast and efficient and does not require long, contentious legal battles. Your instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable because injured parties are made whole quicker. But you might also imagine yourself in that situation and feel a nagging frustration—the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all. The driver hit you with a car and then just walked away from the situation. Their car insurance payments did not even increase. Maybe they never thought about you again, knowing that existing institutions would make sure you were taken care of. One might suppose that this frustration comes from a desire for revenge—the desire to see the car driver suffer in some way because of the suffering they inflicted.5 Here, it is useful to distinguish between retribution and revenge. Retributivists might support the law taking punitive actions because the driver deserves to suffer for their wrongdoing. But while retribution focuses on what a wrongdoer deserves, the notion of revenge additionally involves a personal desire in the wrongdoer\'s victim. 6 To the extent that we focus on the effect of revenge on the victim rather than the wrongdoer, one might be concerned that indulging a desire for revenge would cultivate socially undesirable behaviors and attitudes in the victim. One might additionally resist the idea of vengeance, as distinct from retributive punishment, under a theory that revenge merely harms a wrongdoer while doing little to benefit society. And depending on the form it takes, revenge does not necessarily contribute to making the original victim whole in any concrete sense; rather, as Mahatma Gandhi purportedly said, "An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind." 7 Yet this understanding of revenge omits a consideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals—satisfaction\'–which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support. The purpose of revenge may initially seem to be to inflict harm on a wrongdoer, but reven', '', 'ge (as contrasted with retribution) is more precisely conceived of as the means and not the end. The end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance between the wrongdoer and victim so that, in the eyes of any of the wrongdoer, the victim, or third parties, the noneconomic injury committed against the victim has been set aright.9 Psychology research indicates that satisfaction is a complicated state-it is not simply created by inflicting harm on a wrongdoer.\' 0 However, while harming wrongdoers alone may not be satisfying to parties seeking revenge, one psychological study has demonstrated that vengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering. Psychological satisfaction need not only be achieved by a combination of acknowledgement and harm. A third party\'s judgment could generate the effect as well, such as when courts, the press, or one\'s social circle state and agree that an alleged wrongdoer is at fault. Scholars have argued that one role of the court process is to create a shared narrative of what "the truth" of a situation is.1 2 Psychological studies show that victims who act as agents and tell their stories in court are more likely to feel positively about the outcome of their cases, even though they are less likely to be as highly economically compensated as someone who takes less of an active role in telling their story or moving their case forward.1 3 Other work indicates that court judgments affirm a plaintiff s worth to their community or society.1 4 Even the availability of "nominal damages" exemplifies how the public nature of the court system can provide satisfaction in cases where what a victim really wants is an acknowledgement by an authority figure or society that they were wronged.\' 5 Indeed, some litigants claim that what they really want from the objects of their lawsuits is a sincere apology. 16 In private life, we are also likely familiar with situations where two individuals have a personal conflict and appear to try to convince their mutual acquaintances of "who was right" in the absence of one party\'s conceding that they were wrong. These sorts of actionsapology, making a public statement, and authoritative or public judgment all serve to provide satisfaction to a victim or party to a conflict by indicating that the victim or party was in the right. Satisfaction is ultimately about restoring perceived and real power and social standing, and a variety of behaviors besides those described above can reset the power dynamics between two parties. As a historic example, duelists often evaded physical harm, 7 and no one was necessarily established as the wrongdoer following a duel." The ritualization of the duel served as a mechanism by which social standing between two feuding parties could be restored.19 Although duels served to restore one\'s standing in the eyes of one\'s community, they also served to change the psychological disposition of the parties with respect to each other. Duelists found themselves in a position of both deadly power over and vulnerability to their opponent, and in circumstances where no deadly shots were attempted, a duelist found himself in both a superior and grateful position: superior because he spared his opponent when he did not have to, and grateful because his opponent spared him. The gravity of the moment could be understood as not simply satisfying arguably-barbaric social expectations, but as genuinely changing the psychological disposition that the duelists had towards each other.20 III. DIRECTING EMOTIONS AT THE ROBOT So instead of our original example of the driver and pedestrian, let us instead consider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian. When considering how to approach the injured party, we now may be inclined to ask at least two questions: who should make the pedestrian economically whole, and how can the pedestrian achieve satisfaction from the aftereffects of the accident. Depending on the circumstances, we can imagine being attracted to several options for holding human persons and corporations accountable for the accident. Of the parties, we could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car. In choosing to privilege valuing safety or encouraging innovation, we could imagine courts holding these parties to different standards of liability.2 \' To encourage innovation, various parties could be granted immunity for various kinds of accidents, or damages could be capped. Alternatively, to encourage exacting safety precautions, some parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault. While our inclinations first may be to ask what legal standards will encourage innovation and safety, we can also ask what legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents. Depending on what kind of robot we are dealing with and the kind of harm that occurred, the target of one\'s need for satisfaction might be quite different. In the case of a hardware or physical failure, one might direct one\'s ire to the manufacturers. In the case of a non-autonomous smart device, where the cause of a problem within the computer\'s code is clear, one might reasonably be inclined to criticize the software developer or the party who chose to run the software in the device. In the case of any computer, if many similar devices are making the same error, even if we cannot understand why, one might again focus on the software developer or manufacturer, with an instinct towards the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-even if we cannot tell exactly what happened, we might be inclined to think there was negligent design. But one can also imagine human users\' blaming and experiencing anger with the offending object itself instead of the programmer or manufacturer. Both current events and fiction suggest this insight is accurate. News reports about the "drone slayer," who shot down an aerial drone over his house, illustrate the instinct to target offending objects instead of or in addition to the human actors responsible for them. 22 Similarly, one of the most famous scenes in the movie Office Space consists of several characters carrying a frustrating office printer into an empty field and destroying it with a baseball bat.23 This phenomenon is likely even more pronounced in the case of social and autonomous robots. "Social robots" are defined by robot ethics researcher Kate Darling as "a physically embodied, autonomous agent that communicates and interacts with humans on a social level." 24 Some social robots only act in predetermined ways, but others are autonomous. "Autonomous" robots have the ability to "make (limited) decisions about what behaviors to execute based on perceptions and internal states, rather than following a pre-determined action sequence based on pre-programmed commands." 25 Many studies and anecdotes indicate that humans feel more empathy towards robots the more life-like they seem as they appear more social and autonomous. 26 This empathy can manifest as a powerful emotional aversion to causing robots pain and suffering even though humans consciously know that the robots are not alive and cannot feel anything.2 7 One could analogously imagine humans being equally inclined to feel negative or vengeful emotions towards autonomous, social robots, even if they "know" that robots are merely objects that run code. Kate Darling has made a Kantian-style argument28 that even though robots do not experience suffering, governments should pass laws that protect robots from cruelty for some of the same reasons that laws against animal cruelty exist to guide the psychological state of humans who might act against them and to reflect moral judgments about how humans should behave rather than to protect the animals (or robots) themselves.2 9 But, even if torturing innocent robots is psychologically harmful to humans, enacting revenge on a robot that has caused harm, as part of a formal process, may not be. Indeed, it may be that vengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy. Although counterintuitive, we can argue that violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable using reasoning similar to Darling\'s: our actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots "deserve." If it turns out that punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans following an injury, we should punish robots. ']

[(10, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-3.docx

Emory

GiKe

f7da768b089a50055e6fb4da537aecfae1efe4d427b46bcaa5b56b82dfa40ad4

U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.

Lavin 17 [Frank Lavin is the Chairman of Export Now. He served in the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department during the Reagan, Bush (41) and Bush (43) Administrations. Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. October 20, 2017. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2017/10/20/things-fall-apart-populism-and-foreign-policy]

populism makes it difficult to govern Trump’s grievance-based foreign questions were absent What is America’s role the value of an alliance should we promote democracy policy choices are cost-free unintended consequences are incidental populists berate NATO ignoring the downside to hectoring leaders imagine leadership as a decision between be a minute early or late Obama’s instinct is better responding after to S C S not confronting Russia and in Aleppo or ISIS deterioration in foreign policy will continue It makes sense to skimp cut defense reduce international good-will and connectivity The approach might work in a static environment but stasis incentivizes a destabilizer At some point history presents the bill as a matter of national policy we need to be early

What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign populism is grievance-based It focuses on problems rather than solutions This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a govern ing coalition constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives Trump avoided articulating a positive vision Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based : terrorism , trade and immigration they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent What is America’s role in the world ? What is the value of an alliance ? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights , or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations? populism is exculpatory policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs Cost-benefit analysis , transition costs , the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late responding after -the-fact to S C S not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections and in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should b e a minute late. It makes sense to skimp , to cut defense expenditures to reduce international good-will and connectivity The minimalist approach might work in a static environment , but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer At some point , history presents the bill then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself

grievance-based problems rather than solutions govern ing coalition foreign policy pronouncements grievance-based terrorism trade immigration essentially domestic absent America’s role in the world alliance promote democracy human rights exculpatory cost-free without trade-offs Cost-benefit analysis transition costs unintended consequences incidental NATO ignoring downside publicly hectoring leaders wall minute early minute late Obama’s S C S Russia Aleppo ISIS deterioration foreign policy continue skimp cut defense expenditures reduce international good-will connectivity static environment stasis incentivizes destabilizer history presents the bill national policy need to be a minute early pay the price for the boom

['Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief.', 'What is Populism?', 'This populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?', 'Second, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension.', 'Third, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances.', 'Fourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free.', 'To be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy?', 'To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late.', 'Finally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities.', 'The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument.', 'The main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

Michigan

MiFl

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MiFl/Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

f99a0dc99d1b42d838ac3f890ea60597141bd299daaee32d4f3a322ed71f28f7

No NoKo war. Recent reports are wrong.

Motin 1—26 (*Dylan Motin: Ph.D. candidate in political science, Kangwon National University; Researcher, Center for International and Strategic Studies; Non-resident fellow, European Centre for North Korean Studies, 1-26-2024, "Is North Korea Preparing to Start A War?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/north-korea-preparing-start-war-208875?page=0%2C1)

even if overestimating strength, it is doubtful No Ko assessed their small arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 warheads . it is quite certain to lose So Ko is far more formidable No Ko has no air force . U.S. presence would commit to the war sources confirm forces are too weak DPRK providing Russia with ammunition hard to imagine if it was expecting war that the situation “is more dangerous is untrue , 1968 raid 2010 bombardment 2017 “fire and fury” tweets we have seen worse episodes . recent signaling is reassuring . Kim recognizes statehood . deemphasizing reunification and shared identity took down propaganda may be too early to affirm Kim has chosen war.

Showing a victory is plausible and benefits outweigh the costs would reinforce case that war is coming. even if overestimating their strength, it is doubtful No rth Ko reans assessed their small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed warheads . How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of forces , that he could win a war and then live to conquer the ROK ? The authors preempt this criticism by stating surprise attacks happen, and historical record should make us doubt deterrence. the most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory . formidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States and invade Southeast Asia Syria and Egypt started Yom Kippur with a large numerical superiority Argentina attacked the Falklands and knew geographic distance would hinder a strong response. Ukraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority China ’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it probable it would resort to force North Korea faces no such opportunity , it is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in 1950 . Pyongyang had an overwhelming superiority while the ROK had no armor and air force . the United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul the DPRK had full backing from Soviet Union and China . So uth Ko rea is far more formidable today it is now No rth Ko rea that has no air force . U.S. presence on the ground would commit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm forces are still too weak to wage a general war. the 38 North article leaves some facts out The DPRK has been providing Russia with ammunition and ballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang selling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the future . that the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since 1950 ” is untrue , as the Peninsula came close to war several times . In 1968 , North Korean commandos raid ed the Blue House in Seoul, 2010 was also dangerous seeing bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and sinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017 ’s “fire and fury” tweets Relations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes . North Korea’s recent promise to enshrine the South as its main enemy signals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation . If it has “ no reason to opt for war , there is no intention of unilaterally going to war .” recent signaling is reassuring . Kim calls the South the “ Republic of Korea ” instead of the traditional “ South Joseon ” and recognizes its separate statehood . Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests diminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and desire to respect sovereignty . After announcing its new approach the DPRK closed a radio station used to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It took down propaganda websites targeting the public. television airs maps showing the country’s current borders , whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory. North Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising . Inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are poor . North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo Pyongyang hopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The American disinterest in diplomacy does not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm Kim Jong-un has chosen war.

even if overestimating strength, it is doubtful No rth Ko reans assessed their small arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 warheads sheer balance of forces live to conquer the ROK credible theories of victory Japan Syria and Egypt Argentina Russia China no such opportunity quite certain 1950 overwhelming superiority no armor and air force no formal commitment full backing Soviet Union China far more formidable today no air force commit Washington to the war still too weak selling its arsenal total war more dangerous than any time since 1950 untrue several times 1968 raid 2010 bombardment 2017 “fire and fury” tweets we have seen worse episodes little change threats of annihilation no reason to opt for war there is no intention of unilaterally going to war reassuring Republic of Korea South Joseon separate statehood deemphasizing reunification shared identity diminishing interest in conquering the ROK sovereignty radio station encrypted messages to spies propaganda websites current borders extremely surprising poor too early

['', 'Showing that a victory is plausible and the benefits outweigh the costs would reinforce the case that war is coming. Yet, even if overestimating their country’s strength, it is doubtful that the North Koreans assessed that their small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed nuclear warheads. How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of nuclear forces, that he could win a nuclear war and then live to conquer the ROK?', 'The authors preempt this criticism by stating that surprise attacks happen, and the historical record should make us doubt the enduring strength of deterrence. Although true, the most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory.', 'Its formidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States in 1941 and invade Southeast Asia, even if Tokyo gravely underestimated America’s resolve to fight a long war. Syria and Egypt started the Yom Kippur War in 1973 with a large numerical superiority, modern weaponry, and realistic, limited objectives. Argentina attacked the defenseless Falklands in 1982 and knew that geographic distance from Britain would hinder a strong response. In addition, this attack on remote South Atlantic islands was unlikely to elicit nuclear retaliations.', 'More recently, invading Ukraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority in most indicators. One easily understands how Vladimir Putin assessed he could quickly conquer the country without taking much risk. Similarly, China’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it increasingly probable it would resort to force to annex Taiwan.', 'North Korea faces no such opportunity, as it is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in June 1950. Back then, Pyongyang had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and quality, while the ROK had almost no armor and air force. In addition, the United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul, while the DPRK had full backing from the Soviet Union and China.', 'Obviously, South Korea is far more formidable today, and it is now North Korea that has almost no air force. Also, U.S. presence on the ground would automatically commit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm that their forces are still too weak to wage a general war.', 'Moreover, the 38 North article is problematic because it leaves some facts out of the picture.', 'The DPRK has recently been providing Russia with large quantities of ammunition and even valuable ballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang liberally selling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the near future. On the contrary, it should prefer to start a war if Russia could supply it with weapons and materials, which is unlikely as long as the Ukraine War continues.', 'The two experts’ assertion that the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950” is simply untrue, as the Peninsula came close to war several times. In January 1968, North Korean commandos raided the Blue House in Seoul, leaving many dead, a few days before the seizure of the USS Pueblo. Many others died in border clashes during the following years. 2010 was also a dangerous time, seeing the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017’s “fire and fury” tweets, either. Relations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes.', 'Although North Korea’s recent promise to enshrine in its constitution the South as its main enemy is worrying, it signals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation. If we take Pyongyang to its word, it has “no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”', 'It contrasts with Russia’s behavior up to the Ukraine War. First, Moscow readied its military for war. Then, it promised to employ “military-technical measures” if its demands regarding Ukraine were not met before effectively invading the country. In addition, one could argue that Pyongyang is merely reacting to Seoul’s Defense White Paper released in 2023, reclassifying the North and its regime as enemies. Indeed, South Korean law still considers the North not as a sovereign, equal state but as an “anti-government organization.”', 'If anything, some of the recent signaling is rather reassuring. Kim now calls the South the “Republic of Korea” instead of the traditional derogatory “South Joseon” and recognizes its separate statehood. Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests a diminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and a desire to respect each other’s sovereignty.', 'After announcing its new approach to inter-Korean relations, the DPRK closed a radio station traditionally used to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It also took down propaganda websites targeting the South Korean public. North Korean television now airs maps showing the country’s current borders, whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory.', 'When a state contemplates conquering and annexing another, it usually emphasizes its shared destiny and the need to reunify with the lost homeland. The Kremlin justified its invasion of Ukraine by underlining Russian-Ukrainian “historical unity.” China continues denying Taiwan’s political legitimacy and preaches about “one country.” Although not impossible, North Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising.', 'Inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are worryingly poor. North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo in the West Sea, and further tensions are probable. Pyongyang seemingly hopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The current American administration’s disinterest in diplomacy and lack of initiative does not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm that Kim Jong-un has chosen war. ', '', '', '']

[(0, 5), (6, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-9---D4-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

6d9d9c286d4e6ace553e7d2572899b9d77c496648def99e90b00db97e38a65a1

Law includes administrative rules.

Wests Federal Practice Digest 4th Edition ’99 vol 110 p. 26

Regulation was “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act authorized by Congress, and had effect of “law

Regulation was “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act , authorized by Congress, and , therefore, had force and effect of “law

['E.D.Ark. 1989. Regulation on availability and character of Federal Home Loan Bank Board was “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act, was authorized by Congress, and, therefore, had force and effect of “law” within meaning of trade secrets statute criminalizing agency employee’s disclosure of information not authorized by law; ability to release certain documents was appropriate power for Board in carrying out duty to eliminate fraud in operation and conversion of savings and loan associations. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905; Federal Home Loan Bank Act. §§ 11, 17, 17(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1431, 1437, 1437(a); Home Owner’s Loan Act of 1933, §§ 5, 5(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464, 1464 (a), National Housing Act, § 402, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1725 – Jackson v. First Federal Sav. of Arkansas, F.A., 709 F.Supp.887.—Banks451']

[(0, 29), (42, 45)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Aff-nu-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Aff-nu-Round3.docx

1017a19344b8d78ed7c3bd632c9b7524bb4e93d77f6411e34f97eb8f50cbbc27

The 1AC's performance of spoken word lyric reifies the exceptionalism of humanist discourse – the mobilization of narratives as a collective means of resistance is complicit with the use of lyric to inscribe the demand for species level identification – that's the apex of humanism

Moore 16 (Chapter 6 The Ends of Lyric's Animal Life; or, Why Did the Hedgehog Cross the Road? Isabel A. Moore Professor — Ph.D., 1991, Cornell University Professor of English and Women's and Gender Studies. Biopoetic Bestiaries and Lyric Animals )

draw the line at the needlessly extravagant idea that poetry may save our souls animal acts as a human( ist ) projection reveals the humanist tensions in arg s for poetry an idealized object of fantasy as the animal biopoetic fears while positing survival Poetry is alive but in its own world biopoetic discourse collapses into humanism ontological commitment to personhood poetics looks like the survival of persons elevating the "romance" of the human body sense and voice so that seeming exceptionalism reinforce our own

Stevens argues that poetry may "help us to live our lives," I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it's felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls no lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre generalization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life Book of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question: Newfoundland dog Boatswain—is "'beauty without vanity heroic animal acts as natural mirror a human( ist ) projection to get to the person go by way of the dog all poems lead to man I question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre "when it's felt to be at particular risk," as if to save it along with our souls poems undo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry " biopoetics " to describe life-and-death figures into defenses of lyric biopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language Given these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault's description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could "take life or let live." Foucault's "modern man" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls "his existence as a living being into question," biopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer biopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre's continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life animal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog permitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul animals arguably most encode the innocent place of 'life itself fetishized idealization of "affect as animal idealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe moving animals become the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page neoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse I propose [we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others new mode of relation cannot address the "literary pedigree" of waxing lyrical avoiding metaphors altogether can't avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth if we can't take lyric's animals neoliterally , can we instead take seriously the animal's unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many? taking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human locates its challenge "'in here' animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called "the human." position of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres reveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arg ument s for poetry 's originary primacy, animated by or as animal an idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal generic life remains all too human( ist ) "Why Lyric?'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival : " Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world : never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites we need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival However isolated or threatened poetry has been saved again hand-wringing over the genre's death renders it all the more available for resurrection that object has come to stand in for "something" like—in fact for nothing less than—"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature What remains at stake in poetry's continued survival is precisely our own biopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism ontological commitment to the universal value of personhood possibility of community or collective life set against annihilation poetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject's voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons , a people, or the species as a whole humanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between "the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life" by elevating the "romance" of the hand and the eye along with "the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice ," so that lyric's seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own .34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human( ist ) life "organic whole" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism's single and singular generic model. hedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism an idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection

needlessly extravagant no lyric hero animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait arg s for poetry rather than asking why we desire its survival commitment seeming exceptionalism

['', 'Biopoetic Bestiaries and Lyric Animals', 'In his essay "Getting Round," Paul Muldoon takes up the theme of poetic utility in light of the genre\'s potential demise and its attempted resurrection:', 'While I understand why Wallace Stevens argues that poetry may "help us to live our lives," I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it\'s felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls.1', 'If poetry might still act as an Arnoldian criticism of life or lend us a Stevens-like hand in living it, no lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre. But perhaps Muldoon protests too much against such extravagances; in The Faber Book of Beasts, edited in the same year as "Getting Round," he effectively asserts that lyric as much as living animals can save the day and our souls, or that they might at least save the genre along with our species\' sense of self. His introduction to the anthology opens thus: "It seems that in poetry, as in life, animals bring out the best in us. We are most human in the presence of animals, most humble, and it is only out of humility, out of uncertainty, out of ignorance, that the greatest art may be made" (Faber Book of Beasts, xv).2', "As reviewer William Scammell points out, this generalization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life, but Muldoon subsequently recites and redirects Stevens's claim in order to strengthen his slide from humble (human) animals to the hyperbolic heights of aesthetic hubris.3 His alphabetized Book of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question:", 'This ongoing question of "What am I?" is, indeed, central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry. For if, as Wallace Stevens argues . . . the function of the poet "is to help people live their lives," it might also be argued that nowhere is that responsibility thrown into sharper relief than in our accounts of the parallel lives of "our little kinsmen." For there, almost uniquely, do we see ourselves not only for who and what we are, but glimpse the possibility of what we might become.4', 'What we might become, Muldoon concludes—quoting Byron on his Newfoundland dog Boatswain—is "\'beauty without vanity, strength without insolence, courage without ferocity, and all the virtues of man without his vices.\' "5 Here the heroic animal acts as morally instructive ideal, a natural mirror that reflects the best in "man" rather than refracting or breaking down to reveal a human(ist) projection. Taking a crack at this less than sound lesson, Scammell cites another critic\'s comment on an anthology about man\'s best friend: "Whether these poems are really about dogs or about people is a hard question, but that is, in a way, their point: to get to the person go by way of the dog."6 That is, the hard question is one of ontology as much as hermeneutics, by which all poems lead to man—and by which animal poems in particular might indeed save our souls and ensure the good life.', 'In this chapter, I am not interested in asking or answering an ontological question about human and other animals ("What am I?"),7 or a hermeneutic one about what animal poems mean or are about. Nor is mine the familiar question of lyric\'s ontology, its utility, or its decline and fall, whether John Stuart Mill\'s "What Is Poetry?" (1833), Joseph Epstein\'s "Who Killed Poetry?" (1988), Dana Gioia\'s "Can Poetry Matter?" (1991), or Jonathan Culler\'s "Why Lyric?" (2008). To paraphrase through a parallel debate, rather than asking with W. J. T. Mitchell what pictures—or lyrics—want, my aim is closer to Georges Didi-Huberman\'s in Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art. I question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre "when it\'s felt to be at particular risk," as if to save it along with our souls.8 However needlessly extravagant this quasi-religious desire seems to the Muldoon of "Getting Round," his animal hyperboles in the Faber Book of Beasts answer to its utility and its persistence. So too does his backtracking on Stevens\'s life line, which he draws only to cross it again in the name of lyric animals, by virtue of a "but" that doubles back in order to sustain both the genre\'s survival and our own. By this logic, lyric\'s origi-nary and ontological question becomes "central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry," and the genre can, after all, save "not only the day but our souls."9', 'Against Muldoon\'s assertion that animal poems can exemplify lyric\'s life lessons for us, I argue that they might instead throw into "sharper relief"—and ultimately serve to undo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry. I use the term "biopoetics" to describe the entry of these animist or life-and-death figures into critical accounts and poetic defenses of lyric, which repeatedly collapse the genre\'s survival with our own.10 While poetic language has traditionally been granted the power to animate (and therefore to deface), biopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language: more the impossible animation of lyric than the hyperbole of lyric animation.11 Biopoetic discourse reads its genre as if living its own parallel life, and so as the continuation of human species life by other means—most intensely at those times when that species is felt to be at particular risk, whether in Muldoon\'s meditations on "Getting Round" the violence of The Troubles, or in Stevens\'s reflections on the imaginative force of nobility as "self-preservation" against the modern "pressure of reality" that was the Second World War.12 Given these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault\'s description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could "take life or let live."13 If, by the mid-twentieth century, Foucault\'s "modern man" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls "his existence as a living being into question,"14 twentieth- and twenty-first century biopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer. Doubly fearful of lyric\'s and our demise, biopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre\'s continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life. In Rei Terada\'s description, believing that a certain use of language might "preserve value and ultimately life" is at once "knowingly figurative and nonetheless thinks magically":15 as if "the spirit of the letter" might "in itself" come to life, save life, or even end it.16', 'The animal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog (to which I will return below). The slide between animal and animation is permitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul or animating principle. As Nicole Shukin observes of today\'s "biopolitical times," "animals arguably most encode the innocent place of \'life itself,\'" both through the fetishized idealization of "affect as animal," and in the naturalization of animal movement translated into a kind of perpetual motion, taken to be the first sign of life.17 As a literalized figure of "life itself" (already a problematic concept) the animal is idealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe. In both senses of the word, moving animals in Muldoon\'s Book of Beasts—and in a certain hedgehog genealogy—become the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page and grant them legs, breath, or spirit. This knowingly faith reads from within language as if its objects could literally be mobilized, or as if language and its letters were themselves alive through or as animal motion.', "Despite recent calls for a serious or neoliteral animal studies, then, taking animals literally is not my approach to lyric's animals, because a kind of neoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse.19 Rosi Braidotti champions a neoliteral approach against", 'the metaphoric habit of composing a sort of moral and cognitive bestiary in which animals refer to values, norms, and morals. I propose that, instead of waxing lyrical about the nobleness of eagles, the deceit of foxes, or the humility of lambs . . . [we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others.20', 'Though it can offer a trenchant critique of any subtle animal glossary or moralizing Book of Beasts, Braidotti\'s "new mode of relation" for animal studies cannot and does not wish to address the "literary pedigree" of waxing lyrical.21 Her neoliteral approach dreams of avoiding metaphors altogether by moving beyond the empire of signs, of mobilizing its object of study by taking its figurative animal life literally. But Braidotti can\'t avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth. Her desired "as such" or "as is" cannot help but ring with an as if a hyperbolic waxing lyrical that\'s hard to take literally (however knowing): "As such, I am a she- wolf ... I am Mother Earth, the generator of the future."22', 'But if we can\'t take lyric\'s animals neoliterally, can we instead take seriously the animal\'s unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many? For Cary Wolfe, taking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human. Rather than positioning "the animal of animal studies . . . out there among the birds and beasts," Wolfe locates its challenge "\'in here\' as well"23 As he has it in Animal Rites,', 'the figure of the "animal" in the West ... is part of a cultural and literary history stretching back at least to Plato and the Old Testament, reminding us that the animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called "the human."24', "Here the seemingly unique, even ancient position of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres (at least as far back as Horace and Sappho), but Wolfe's invocation also reveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arguments for poetry's originary primacy, animated by or as animal. The lyric is as much", "an idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal, and both ideals can be made strange or endangered from within. By taking lyric animals seriously without taking them neoliterally, I unsettle the biopoetics that holds out for lyric's life as if to save our own.", 'That generic life remains all too human(ist) in critical defenses of lyric\'s singularity, its continued relevance, and its ancient history. The perhaps bristling question posed by Jonathan Culler\'s "Why Lyric?\'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival: "Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world: never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites "25 The article\'s titular question and its opening sentences rest on the assumption that lyric is (alive and well), so that we need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival. However isolated or threatened by the "but" of narrative norms and professional neglect, poetry—already equated with the title\'s lyric—has been saved again: prolifically, hyperbolically, even virtually alive.26 As Virginia Jackson observes in "Who Reads Poetry?" recent hand-wringing over the genre\'s death by lack of readership renders it at once "all-important" and "nearing extinction," but therefore all the more available for resurrection.27 Didi-Huberman makes a parallel point about the discourse of art history on the "death of art": if art (poetry) can die, it can also be conceptualized as "nascent," complete with an "auto-teleology" or meaningful history that can resurrect and so preserve its critical object.28 Yet in the current returns of the repressed, Jackson hears more than professional or public concern over the loss of a critical or generic object. Instead, that object has come to stand in for "something" like—in fact for nothing less than—"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature."29 What remains at stake in poetry\'s continued survival and its presumed singularity is precisely our own (however knowingly or hyperbolically).', 'The surface vitalism of biopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism akin to what Oren Izenberg endorses as the "new humanism." Izenberg argues that this tradition emerged in the twentieth century to define the genre as an ontological commitment to the universal value of personhood: a concept aligned with the correlate possibility of community or collective life, and set against the modern "specter of total annihilation."30 In the midst or in the wake of the century\'s biopolitical disasters, and after the death of the romantic lyric subject—mourned by Harold Bloom31 and celebrated by Marjorie PerlofP2—the humanism of twentieth-century biopoetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject\'s voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons, a people, or the species as a whole. In other words, and without resorting to personification or animation via the speaking voice, the vitalist defense of poetic singularity offers a means of saving lyric as the guarantor of the human species (and of humanism): the subject is dead; long live poetry!33 To put it by way of Wolfe\'s useful reading of Cavell (who is describing Wittgenstein\'s "forms of life"), species humanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between "the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life" by elevating the "romance" of the hand and the eye along with "the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice," so that lyric\'s seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own.34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human(ist) life, internalizing lyric as our somatic and moral heart, and positing its millennial persistence as evidence of a shared and transhistorical culture- For instance, while Susan Stewart\'s theory of lyric possession undermines and historicizes the privileged place of the speaking and emoting subject, her Poetry and the Fate of the Senses sustains lyric as the universal foundation of human art, and so of the species: as if the lyric made us human as much as all human cultures share the lyric.35 Comparable arguments in the name of poetic singularity retain the echo of a species humanism to varying degrees in their various claims for (universal human) freedom, (essential human) culture or making, and (somatic human) rhythm and senses.36 Each of these claims marks a subscription to what Stewart calls poetry\'s force as an "anthropomorphic project"—its making and sustaining of persons against "effacement"37—and all of them are understood to be indexed (vertically) by lyric\'s continued life. Only by a biopoetic logic that seeks to save our species and to uphold human consciousness can "poetic forms" be literalized, even immortalized, as if "the continuance of human life by physical and social means."38', 'Below, I turn to the literalization or mobilization of lyric form via the animal in particular, extending Mary Poovey\'s inquiry into the model system that literary criticism adopted from the biological sciences: "what particular model system—what frog, baboon, or laboratory mouse—governs the practices of critics as apparently diverse as New Critics, deconstructionists, and New Historicists?"39 Poovey answers that the "organic whole" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism\'s single and singular generic model.40 I add that the hedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism (hardly the usual avian suspect, nor man\'s more familiar best friend).41 For critics, the hedgehog acts as an idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection, indexing the genre\'s bristling hermeticism, its perfect self-enclosure, and therefore its survival. First, I lay out a brief genealogy of the lyric hedgehog\'s near-death experiences from Schlegel through Derrida, and then I explore the animal\'s appearance in two of Muldoon\'s poems: "Hedgehog" and "When the Pie Was Opened." Even as the hedgehog is mobilized as a figure of lyric life or as the literalized life of language, this extravagant desire comes undone when the hedgehog becomes instead a figure of murder-suicide, recalling the fatal biopolitics that the neo- literal biopoetics of the lyric animal—or the animal lyric—would forget.', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Harvard-Round1.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Harvard-Round1.docx

5146dca55a332edbcc9b3c8dc8883ccafdb42218dc2239e08a761a8edaa15e27

Every administration has allowed first use for this exact reason.

Kaplan ’23 [Fred; April 27; Author on nuclear policy, Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Slate, “What Biden Is Doing to Keep South Korea from Going Nuclear,” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2023/04/biden-south-korea-meeting-nuclear-weapons-foreign-policy.html]

every president has reserved the option to respond with nuc s they stopped short of declaring for fear of alarming the allies , who would question reliability of guarantees and build their own nuc s —which set off rounds of arms races This happen this year . Yoon mulled Seoul might build bombs allies made clear they trust Biden but start pondering their own deterrent

every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuc lear weapon s But they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies , who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and , in response, consider build ing their own nuc lear arsenal s —which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races This is what seemed about to happen earlier this year . Yoon mulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs . North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles South Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they start at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent

every explicitly reserved nuc s stopped short declaring alarming the allies question the reliability build ing their own nuc s set off new rounds arms races this year Seoul atom bombs made clear trust Biden own deterrent

['But over the decades, every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuclear weapons, if the stakes are very high and if a conventional defense alone can’t hold the line. Several presidents, including Barack Obama and Joe Biden, have considered adopting a “no first-use” policy. They have privately expressed doubts that any American president would be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. But they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies, who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and, in response, consider building their own nuclear arsenals—which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races.', 'This is what seemed about to happen earlier this year. Yoon and a few South Korean security analysts mulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs. North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles and enriching more uranium. When Donald Trump was president, he had talked about folding up the “nuclear umbrella” that had long protected South Korea and Japan, even pulling U.S. troops out of Asia (and, for good measure, withdrawing from the NATO alliance in Europe). They saw Trump preparing to run again in 2024. They heard many Republicans parroting his America-first rhetoric after regaining control of the House. South Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they have reasonable doubts about the next president. It makes sense for them to start at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Kentucky-Round-3.docx

Michigan

ShGa

5270633a912516ed5992b7da6e86cdda083c33e34f7ce1307273dd58deb21895

2. Public domain counterplans don’t incentivize the creation of AI

Ben Kovach 21, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., December 2021, OSTRICH WITH ITS HEAD IN THE SAND: THE LAW, INVENTORSHIP, & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 19(1), 137-153

perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship This is unsatisfying it is abandoning patent law as an incentive tool AI will play in integral part in the way we innovate To not leverage patent law to incentivize the development would be a abandoned, opportunity. This would to claim AI conceived ideas as their own not allowing any person to be an inventor is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool the AI would be allowed as inventor would incentivize machine development User confidence would increase the economic value giving creators another means of monetizing and a incentive to continue development

If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor when it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three candidates nobody these candidates have disqualifying flaws if neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable This is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool AI will play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward. To not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own The USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor when it is conceiving of the patented claim, There does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve not allowing any person to be an inventor rendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable , is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development A solution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person The pre-contracting of patent ownership is the status quo for the vast majority of patents When a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time the AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be transferred This solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users Users could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract User confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development .

AI is not allowed nobody disqualifying flaws inventorship awarded inventorship not be patentable abandoning the use of patent law incentive tool AI integral part leverage patent law incentivize the development act dishonestly claim AI conceived ideas as their own There does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship not allowing any person unpatentable undesirable abandonment of patent law incentive tool for AI development acknowledge that AI allow AI as a named inventor vast majority of patents decided ahead of time allowed as inventor patent ownership would be transferred incentivize machine development pernicious scope AI creator easily license their machines AI patents to themselves confidence increase the economic value AI creators monetizing their work compelling incentive to continue development

['B. If Not AI, Then Who?', 'If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor even when it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three viable candidates: the user or operator of the AI system, the creator of the AI system, or nobody. All of these candidates, when considered against the primary theories of patent law justification, have arguably disqualifying flaws.', 'First, the user or operator of the AI system is considered as a candidate for inventor of an AI-conceived idea. For the purposes of this paper, the user is referring to the person exposing a creativity machine to an area of knowledge and receiving the resultant idea.93 It is oftentimes the case that the creator and user of a creativity machine is the same person. As creativity machines inevitably become more widespread, it is a surety that more and more people outside of the creators will be the users of the machines. For that reason, this analysis considers each candidate on its own. For example, when analyzing the AI user as a candidate for inventor, it will be assumed that the person is a user only and not also the creator.', 'Ideally, patent law’s incentive power would be harnessed to incentivize the development of better creativity machines. In other words, the people creating and developing creativity machines should be the ones targeted by the incentive power of patent law. The user, having had no role in the creation of the AI, is therefore a poor fit with incentive theory. The user seems closer to a free rider, swooping in to extract the benefit from an innovation he did not necessarily contribute to.94 The user is the person contributing the most proximate labor to the generated idea.95 However, the amount of labor that the user provides, simply exposing the creativity machine to knowledge and possibly inputting basic solution requirements, does not seem very significant. The proximate, but small, amount of work contributed means that the user is also a poor fit with labor theory. In summation, the user is the human most closely involved with the creativity machine when it conceives of an idea. However, the user’s justification for being an inventor under both incentive and labor theories is so weak, it does not seem useful or proper to allow the user to be considered the inventor of an AI-created work.', 'Next, the creator of the AI system is considered. In many ways, the creator represents the opposite side of the coin from the user in the justification analysis. If patent law seeks to incentivize the creation and improvement of creativity machines, the AI creators are the people to incentivize. If AI creators were considered the inventors of all works conceived by their AI systems, a very strong incentive would exist for AI creators to continue to improve existing systems and build new systems. After all, the creators would be able to reap the reward of all inventions generated by their machines. It could also be argued that the AI creator is the most deserving of the patent reward according to labor theory. The creator is, after all, expending considerable time and effort in creating the creativity machine in the first place. This labor, however, is quite removed from the creativity machine’s idea conception. The creator’s labor is not nearly as proximate to the creativity machine’s ideation as the user’s labor is.', 'If the AI creator were assigned as inventor, a disastrous fairness and practicality issue would likely arise. Awarding inventorship of any and all ideas to the creator of the AI system would have massively far-reaching consequences. If a patented AI system, like Thaler’s original creativity machine, were broadly used, it would mean a single person (or party, depending on how generously Thaler construes the definition of creator) would be the inventor of all AI created ideas. That would be a nearly limitless, wide ranging, and powerful grant of IP protection. This would also introduce complex line drawing disputes for creators of AI systems. The question of who is legally considered a creator would become incredibly important and lead to increased cost and litigation upon the legal system. For these reasons of fairness and practicality, the creator of the AI does not seem to be the proper candidate to award inventorship to.', 'Finally, if neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship, perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable. This is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool.96 It is clear that AI generally and creativity machines specifically will play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.97 To not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a missed, or more accurately abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own, as Thaler himself has already admitted to doing.98 ', 'The USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor even when it is conceiving of the patented claim, does not seem to have a compelling solution. There does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve creativity machines, and thus the incentive power of patent law is lost on him. Additionally, the user’s labor, while proximate to the creativity machine’s idea creation, is minimal. The AI creator is the ideal party for patent law to incentivize further AI development and also puts considerable labor into the creativity machine. The practical effect of assigning inventorship to the creator, however, is too wide-ranging to be allowed.', 'Finally, not allowing any person to be an inventor, thus rendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development.', 'C. AI Should Be Allowed as an Inventor', 'i. A Proposed Solution', 'The legal fiction concerning AI and inventorship seems untenable. A possible solution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person. The pre-contracting of patent ownership is already the status quo for the vast majority of patents; as of 2013, “about ninety-three percent of patents were assigned to organizations rather than individuals.”99 When a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time by a contract, the AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be immediately transferred to the contractually identified person.', 'This solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users. Users could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract. User confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development. It is true that under the current regime, patents could be assigned to users, but the entire system is reliant upon users claiming they are inventors when they really are not. A user could not be confident in licensing a creativity machine under this climate, relying on the law to continue to look the other way as users take matters into their own hands.']

[(4, 13)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

36e598436c2efa8633f7b5a4eaba72c8099ab638f86052ec06d512fe07003458

AI regulation overshoots, destroying productive applications necessary to prevent existential catastrophes

Gönenç Gürkaynak 18, Founding Partner of ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, LL.M. from Harvard Law School, İlay Yılmaz, Partner at ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, and Güneş Haksever, LLM from Istanbul Bilgi University, Attorney at IBM Turkey, “Stifling Artificial Intelligence: Human Perils”, Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 32, Issue 5, 12/12/2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3285264

Although scientists calculated significant positive effects of (AI) If reg s stifle we risk wasting true potential the ‘dark age’ of advancement Often predictions are highly inaccurate . Based on ‘The World in 2010’ in 76 , we be above and below three planets five years ago regarding AI equally off base regulators could jump the gun which lead to irreparable harm of societies potential should be entirely free allowing active and a ggressivel research any issues from AI will result from failure to direct to needs at some point natural , human or external threaten the fate of the Earth , and we need AI to save us hope society has not pulled the brakes too early

Although scientists calculated the significant positive welfare effects of (AI) , fear mongering continues to hinder AI development . If reg ulation s in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies the ‘dark age’ of human advancement Often predictions of the future are highly inaccurate . Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’ , published in 19 76 , we should have be en living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago . Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base To avoid premature regulation over AI, we should search for the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern In the absence of an objective benchmark regulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies Regulation at this stage would be perverse . The economic efficiency potential s of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time , allowing us to active ly and a ggressivel y research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind If you think future robot overlords will thank us for ignoring and under regulating , think again any issues we may face from AI s will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs , not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early at some point of time natural , human -related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth , and we may need AI to save the planet and us . One hope s that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early

significant positive welfare effects fear mongering hinder development reg ulation s stifle wasting true potential ‘dark age’ predictions highly inaccurate 76 be above below three planets five years ago AI equally likely off base premature search meaningful point in time objective benchmark jump the gun irreparable harm total welfare perverse potential entirely free this point active a ggressivel not extinction robot overlords under regulating think again any issues AI failure effectively direct needs not too early some point natural human -related external threaten fate of the Earth need AI to save the planet and us hope pulled the hand brakes too early

['Although scientists have calculated the significant positive welfare effects of Artificial Intelligence (AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies. Not only would Schumpeter dislike us for spoiling creative destruction, but the AI thinkers of the future would also rightfully see our efforts as the ‘dark age’ of human advancement. This article provides a brief philosophical introduction to artificial intelligence; categorizes artificial intelligence to shed light on what we have and know now and what we might expect from the prospective developments; reflects thoughts of worldwide famous thinkers to broaden our horizons; provides information on the attempts to regulate artificial intelligence from a legal perspective; and discusses how the legal approach needs to be to ensure the balance between artificial intelligence development and human control over them, and to ensure friendly artificial intelligence.', 'Our technology, our machines, is part of our humanity. We created them to extend ourselves, and that is what is unique about human beings. – Ray Kurzweil1', '1. Introduction', 'The Chinese cardboard game “Go” is one of the most complex strategy games humankind invented. Go was considered so important, there are myths indicating that ancient kings played Go between their armies in the battlefield to resolve the conflict in peace. Computers prevailed against humanities best in many zero-sum, perfect-information, partisan, deterministic strategy games2 before, with the exception of Go, which was something to be proud of.', 'The strategy aspect of Go is very complex and emphasizes the importance of balance on multiple levels and has internal tensions. A game of Go cannot be won by using brute force: calculating every possible move, similar to what IBM®’s then state of the art AI, Deep Blue® used to win over Gary Kasparov. To manoeuvre through the countless possible moves on the Go board and chose the most efficient path, one requires capabilities beyond the conventional computing powers; capabilities only our minds have (or so we thought), such as extremely accurate image and pattern recognition and insight, all of which we thought granted us superiority over the artificial minds we created.', 'In October 2015, a software called “AlphaGo®” became the first computer to beat a professional human Go player in an un-handicapped game of Go (Silver and Hassabis, 2016). AlphaGo’s victory is probably one of the most significant demonstrations of the capabilities of an AI. Firstly, it shows that AIs are beginning to surpass us at things where success is dependent on strategy as well as calculation. Things we classify as a “game”, from stock exchange to conflicts, from contract negotiations to hostage situations. Second, AlphaGo developed strategies on its own, through playing millions of games against itself. These feats sent the chills down the spines of those who fear that AIs will overpower us in the future.', 'We humans accelerate the future with our minds. This is a strength and a weakness. Often, our predictions of the future are highly inaccurate. Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’, published in 1976, we should have been living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago. Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base.', 'To avoid premature regulation over AI, we should be studying and searching for the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern. The study of a point of ripeness, a ‘threshold ability test,’ asks when AI could really bring about concrete disadvantages that might counter-balance the demonstrated contribution to economic efficiency and welfare.', 'In the absence of such an objective benchmark marking the point in time when AI becomes a competitor with the human mind, regulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies.', 'Most of what we consider AI today is really our own intelligence re-formatted and re-cycled, with the help of computers lacking any skill of learning or consciousness of being. Regulation at this stage would be perverse. The economic efficiency potentials of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time, allowing us to actively and aggressively research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind.', 'If you think our future robot overlords will one day thank us for ignoring the risks and under regulating, think again. On the one hand, any issues we may face from AIs will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs, not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early. On the other hand, at some point of time in the not too distant future, natural, human-related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth, and we may need AI to save the planet and us. One hopes that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early, fearing our own active imagination.']

[(7, 16), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%20National%20Debate%20Tournament-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%2520National%2520Debate%2520Tournament-Doubles.docx

63dd32d7b43ae50657847de8ee13d6f486000e07e405b0acfb8f41f1b3a7dae6

Dialogue solves inadvertent nuclear escalation---assumes emerging tech {cyber, hypersonics, cpgs, missile defense, space}

Lynn Rusten 21, vice president for NTI's Global Nuclear Policy Program "Next Steps on Strategic Stability and Arms Control With Russia," https://media.nti.org/documents/Next_Steps_on_Strategic_Stability_and_Arms_Control_With_Russia_-_Rusten_Excerpt.pdf

deep discussions address nuclear accident dialogue address hypersonic prompt-strike missile defense cyber space These topics included in reinvigorated dialogue on strategic stability lead to new agreements and practices to tamp down dangerous competition comprehensive dialogue addres many key factors

Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deep en discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue address hypersonic conventional prompt-strike missile defense cyber capabilities and military activities in outer space These topics included in reinvigorated dialogue on strategic stability lead to new agreements understandings and practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security comprehensive dialogue addres sing many of these key factors .

Renewed dialogue hypersonic conventional prompt-strike missile defense cyber capabilities military activities in outer space lead to new agreements understandings comprehensive dialogue

['Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deepen discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue should address nuclear capabilities as well as dual-capable delivery vehicles and hypersonic technologies, conventional prompt-strike systems, missile defense and the offense-defense relationship, cyber capabilities, and military activities in outer space. These topics must be included in a reinvigorated U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability that ideally should lead to new agreements, understandings, and practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security. Such disparate challenges cannot all be addressed in a single treaty or agreement, but because they are interrelated—and likely to become more so over time—a comprehensive dialogue on strategic stability must begin to identify and chart a course toward addressing many of these key factors.', '']

[(5, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Neg-1---Harvard-College-Tournament-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

AvLe

ad93f883c80a7ce4abdb1250ebfe61502064d1918139128b5e6f8ff63c53e9fe

Thesis of this arg is that conventional wars still happen –nuclear deterrence allows the state to pretend it doesn’t by acting as if nukes stopped them

David P Barash 18, Ph.D. Peace and War, professor of psychology emeritus at the University of Washington. He has written, edited or co-authored 40 books, 1-14-2018, "Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash

Nuclear deterrence remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited deterrence is not remotely as compelling as its reputation suggests public has been bamboozled touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age peace prevailed because they had no quarrel justified fighting a war There is no evidence Soviet leadership contemplated trying to conquer Europe duration of ‘ nuclear peace’ lasted less than five decades 20 years separated the First and Second Wars before that there had been more than 40 years of relative peace the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes nuc s have not deterred other forms of war Vietnam Iraq Afghanistan The pattern is deep deterrence via nuc s lacks credibility weapons that are more usable more credible as deterrents deterrence requires arsenal remains invulnerable resulting situation which each side perceives advantage in striking first deterrence assumes optimal rationality everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd -Marked--- there are substantial risks associated with conventional war accidental unauthorised use false alarms broken arrow’ accidents launching firing theft or loss of a nuclear weapon when it comes to nuclear deterrence we’re all in over our heads

Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited . deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves Even a brief examination reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence with its promise of strength , security and safety what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War peace prevailed because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war even a conventional one There is no evidence the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe Post facto arguments might be the currency of pundits but are impossible to prove and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim history is no more reassuring The duration of ‘ nuclear peace’ lasted less than five decades . More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars ; before that , there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat war involved weapons available at the time which for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes nuc lear weapon s have not deterred other forms of war . The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments the US lost the Vietnam War Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war Nuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands countries were less successful in getting their way Deterrence does not deter The pattern is deep The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others deterrence via nuc lear weapon s lacks credibility deployed weapons that are more usable and thus more credible as deterrents , are more liable to be used. deterrence requires each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘ counterforce’ strike The resulting situation which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable . deterrence assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that they will always retain control over their emotions as well Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd . -Marked--- in certain situations when either side is convinced that war is inevitable when the pressures to avoid losing face are intense an irrational act can appear appropriate, even unavoidable National leaders aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise there is no rational way to establish the minimum size of one’s arsenal ethical deterrence is an oxymoron Nuclear deterrence a cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’ Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure least likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’ attack there are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war accidental or unauthorised use irrational use or false alarms There have also been numerous ‘ broken arrow’ accidents accidental launching firing theft or loss of a nuclear weapon circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch Undoing the ideology of deterrence won’t be easy but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation. when it comes to nuclear deterrence , we’re all in over our heads .

potentially lethal ideology been increasingly discredited not remotely as compelling reputation suggests bamboozled shiny surface strength security safety crumbles critical scrutiny prior engine sped off the lot turned the key terribly destructive war conventional one no evidence currency of pundits impossible to prove counterfactual claim more reassuring nuclear peace’ 20 years separated 40 years of relative 55 years Emperor Deterrence has no clothes lost the Vietnam War Iraq Afghanistan legitimate any sort of war escalate demands does not deter deep invasion Iran North Korea lacks credibility usable invulnerable counterforce’ dangerously unstable optimal rationality absurd inevitable unavoidable presumes otherwise oxymoron paths to failure escalated conventional war accidental unauthorised use irrational use false alarms broken arrow’ accidental launching firing theft flock of geese hostile missile launch we’re all in over our heads

['In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.', 'After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’', 'Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough).', 'Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’', 'Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation.', 'Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny.', 'Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked.', 'Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high.', 'Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.', 'There are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now.', 'Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one.', 'There is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened.', 'In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: ‘But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’', 'The only way to make sure nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure there are no such weapons', 'We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace.', 'What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815).', 'Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable.', 'It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy.', 'The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it.', 'Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic.', 'Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them.', 'In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases.', 'Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs.', 'In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not.', 'Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries.', 'Nuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands; if anything, such countries were less successful in getting their way', 'Deterrence, in short, does not deter.', 'The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands.', 'US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.', 'In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t.', 'Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US.', 'All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.', 'It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting.', 'First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.', 'Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.', 'Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.', '', '', ' -Marked---', 'In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are especially intense – an irrational act, including a lethal one, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable.', 'When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’', 'While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him.', 'Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.', 'If something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten', 'Finally, there is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons makes money for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space.', 'Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the technological accomplishments of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise insecure leaders and countries, then, once again, there is no rational way to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the law of diminishing returns, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’.', 'In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’', 'The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car.', 'Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the least likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’ (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity, and could lead to ‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened. There have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch.', 'The above describes only some of the inadequacies and outright dangers posed by deterrence, the doctrinal fulcrum that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Aff-NDT-Round-7.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

8770dbd527f7a4eec15e9f65a340f5275c9d502ff16061b5627cc9d6bb160db5

Plan focus is good --- theorizing subversion of settler technologies is historically successful and necessary for decolonization --- and turns their place arguments *their author

La Paperson 17, Pseudonym of K. Wayne Yang, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego, PhD Social and Cultural Studies, Berkeley, “A Third University Is Possible,” June 2017,

Indigenous people subvert legal technologies as part of resistance Indigenous communities are fighting biopiracy by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own knowledges Treaties are technologies of Indigenous survivance there is slippage, indeterminacy unintended results; it could result in something good Oneida restoration via treaty law result in 13,004 acres taken into trust colonizing technology has been hotwired Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of technologies , think about how we might turn these gears into decolonizing operations make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise Even when dangerous.

Everywhere land resists Indigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance . And technologies and technological beings resist too. Patent law is patently designed to favor corporations , Monsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world. Indigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges Treaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance the treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion there is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy , unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible that an x-mark could result in something good the Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty via treaty law courts, casinos, and excise taxes, result ing in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust settlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands colonizing technology has been hotwired The return of land is a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark Figure out how technologies operate Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies , think about how we might operate on technologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations . Attach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise ; let it tick its own countdown. Even when they are dangerous.

subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges also of Indigenous survivance always the possibility 13,004 acres of land taken into trust colonizing technology has been hotwired Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies turn these gears into decolonizing operations make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise Even when they are dangerous.

['', 'Even When They Are Dangerous', 'Everywhere land resists and refuses—whales that destroy ships, bees that refuse to work, bombed islands that reconstitute themselves. The land also resists in the form of people; Indigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too.', 'Patent law is patently designed to favor corporations, a legal technology whose colonizing functions are particularly evident when considering how Monsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world. Yet Indigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life and that document knowledge for expropriation in the first place, by creating digital libraries of traditional knowledges, and sometimes by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges.[35]', 'Treaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance. As Scott Lyon says, an x-mark that signs the treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion. . . . And yet there is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible, that is, that an x-mark could result in something good. Why else, we must ask, would someone bother to make it?”[36] Since 1948, the Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty over historical reservation lands via a complex set of avenues involving treaty law, U.S. courts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust by the Department of the Interior in 2014.[37]', 'Sometimes settlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations. Hopefully, they/we might do so without conditions. As I write, the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands in California.[38] I am not saying wealthy settlers who return land are decolonizing. I am saying that some colonizing technology has been hotwired; something scyborg is happening.', 'The truth is that any return of land is not just due to the good graces and benevolence of wealthy settlers; it is a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark. About Hollywood star Johnny Depp’s purported promise to buy land for Comanche, Sonny Skyhawk, a Sicangu Lakota actor and founder of American Indians in Film and Television, said, “If it’s from the heart, we accept it. If it’s not from the heart, we’ll accept it anyways.”[39]', 'Developed as weapons of surveillance and assassination, drones are hard to imagine as decolonizing instruments; yet these machines we hate may serve a function before we discard them. Originally a wind-powered device similar to the childhood wind toys of its Afghani creator Massoud Hassani, the Mine Kafon drone “can autonomously map, detect, and detonate land mines” and could contribute to demilitarizing mine-filled lands within a generation.[40] Dynamite, which left Alfred Nobel rich and many dead, and which abetted in U.S. westward imperial expansion, blew up the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams and restored the Elwha River.[41] A giant, autonomous artificial coastline could assist the ocean to clean herself of the great Pacific Garbage Patch.[42] Oysters made “plantable” by farming technologies detoxify the Hudson and so become too poisonous to eat, but because of them, the frogs will return.[43] Wind-powered strandbeests—originally devised to restore Dutch beaches—now roam almost autonomous, almost free.[44] Toxic and explosive and wind-willed machine animals, you, scyborg, might read about and feel some odd sense of recognition.', 'Figure out how technologies operate. Use a wrench. Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized—at least for a machine cycle. Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how we are the drones, the explosives, the toxified, the operative parts of those technologies—and ideally, how we might operate on ourselves and other technologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations.', 'If this sounds easy and obvious, then my writing has failed you. Listen: you will need to remember this when you are accused of destruction. Attach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown. Ask how, and how otherwise, of the colonizing machines. Even when they are dangerous.']

[(3, 14)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Aff-Navy-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

9360dc63806df7a7824b880ea1a9ba7fba00ba7badc09b22ffceb922fdd25a5d

3---Tech leadership stalling due to concentration---most recent consensus of experts is AFF.

Christopher Cole 12/15/21, partner at Crowell Moring, “Lawmakers Worry Rampant Mergers Crushing US Innovation,” Law360, lexis.

Innovation across the economy suffered as antitrust laws fall short experts said In the latest congressional hearing figures testified the economy faces a growing threat from large companies' strategies that knock out startups and take advantage of market power to stifle innovation Monopoly power stifles ability of new companies to gain funding and enter the market innovation is all about competition there had been an " alarming increase in consolidation

Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation unabated experts said Wednesday In the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals , real estate and agriculture , Antitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' m and a strategies that aim to knock out startups and rivals then take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies . The trend stifle s U.S. innovation and harms consumers , Monopoly power stifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively innovation is all about competition there had been an " alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy." Alford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy hard-hit by a lack of innovation

Innovation antitrust laws fall short stopping merger deals massive industry consolidation unabated experts said Wednesday latest congressional hearing possible overhauls American competition laws industry concentration technology pharmaceuticals real estate agriculture advocates business figures testified growing threat large companies' m a knock out startups rivals take advantage market power profiting off old technologies stifle s U.S. innovation harms consumers stifles new companies better products services gain funding enter the market competitively innovation is all about competition alarming increase consolidation multiple competitive problems hard-hit lack of innovation

['Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation to continue unabated, experts said Wednesday on Capitol Hill.', 'In the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals, real estate and agriculture, a Senate panel zeroed in on the impact of monopolies on the development of cutting-edge products and services.', "Antitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' merger and acquisition strategies that aim to knock out startups and growing rivals, then take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies. The trend stifles U.S. innovation and harms consumers, they said.", "Senators looked to the experts to inform the lawmakers' biggest push in years to revamp antitrust laws, including a major bipartisan bill introduced in October, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act. The bill would make it harder for online sales platforms to self-preference their own products. Sens. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., and Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, are lead sponsors of the bill, one of numerous antitrust proposals circulating on Capitol Hill.", '"It\'s always been innovation that has fueled the American economy," said Klobuchar, who chairs the Senate Judiciary antitrust panel, but that "cannot thrive without open and competitive markets."', 'Monopoly power is on the increase in industries "from cat food to caskets," Klobuchar said, and that stifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively. "We also have to remember that innovation is all about competition," she said.', 'Utah Sen. Mike Lee, the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, also voiced concern about consolidation suffocating the economy. Lee said that "I\'m a huge advocate of the consumer welfare standard" that federal courts use to assess whether market behavior is unlawfully anticompetitive but "when competition suffers, so does innovation."', '"One might say that competition is itself the mother of innovation," said Lee, who has been working closely with Klobuchar and Grassley, the full committee\'s ranking Republican, on antitrust legislation this year.', 'Still, Lee said lawmakers and enforcers must take care not to carry out "regulatory overreach" that ends up protecting no one except market incumbents when they make it harder for startups to succeed. Lee touted Utah\'s "pro-free market" approach that he said has been a magnet for new businesses and driven the quality of life higher in the Beehive State. "I do worry, however, that D.C. bureaucrats may spoil the party for everyone," he said.', 'Conservatives also voiced concern that consolidation of power in Big Tech has allowed the top companies to rein in free speech, and Lee pointed to the controversy over the startup social media platform Parler, which almost sunk amid the turmoil over the 2020 election.', "The vast technology sector was only one aspect of Wednesday's hearing, however, as several witnesses talked about growing monopolies in pharma, real estate and other parts of the economy where they said behemoths' market power was holding back innovation.", 'Diana Moss, president of American Antitrust Institute, told senators there are many reasons that innovation is currently struggling in the U.S. economy. She said the financial markets\' "laser focus on shareholder returns" based on the bottom line and short-term profits was making it more difficult for companies to invest in much-needed research and development.', '"Another reason is weaker antitrust enforcement over the last 40 years," Moss said.', 'Alex Harman, competition policy advocate at Public Citizen, the liberal-leaning advocacy group, called unfettered merger and acquisition activity and the massive buildup of a small number of companies "one of the most critical issues of our time." Harman said there had been an "alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy."', 'Another witness, Roger Alford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy. One of the sectors hard-hit by a resulting lack of innovation is real estate sales, said Alford, a former deputy assistant attorney general with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division.']

[(12, 22)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-Texas-Round2.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-Texas-Round2.docx

bad8b00b26f5abfead867abf493d50f9e1e17724c83560ceb9670dfad62af1d8

Magnitude

Farquhar, 17 -- Research Scientist at DeepMind

in nuclear war between the U S and Russia smoke would cause global cooling making it impossible to grow food this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc s regional nuclear war are unlikely to lead to extinction the risk of extinction is greater from a conflict between the U S and Russia

Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuc s. in nuclear war between the U S and Russia smoke would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling , severe ozone loss, and ag disruption - a nuclear winter. making it impossible to grow food exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc s a regional nuclear war are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction the risk of human extinction is greater from a conflict between the U S and Russia . Tensions between these countries increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

impossible to grow food this scale only possible between the US and Russia more than 90% of the world's nuc s extinction U S and Russia

['[Sebastian, John Halstead, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Stefan Schubert, Haydn Belfield, and Andrew Synder-Beattie, "Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance," Global Priorities Project, 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf, accessed 8-25-23]', '', "The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country's population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption - a nuclear winter.", "According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.", 'It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Neg-Harvard-Round-5.docx

Kansas

ReSo

5c19e91b1dbe254b167469d790a0196662aec7df1ef9917c7e25ea1d7bf7b715

3---CYBER---automation failures from rapidly increasing AI increases vulnerability.

Christiano 19, Computer scientist who works on AI safety at OpenAI (Paul, March 17th, “What failure looks like,” Alignment Forum, , Accessed 11-04-2022)

we could not recover from automation failure catastrophe would occur conflict between states disaster serious cyberattack create local shocks rapidly cascading automation failures local shock is compounded by widespread failures in fear and breakdown

Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure Under these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed they are now more interested in controlling influence after the catastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions An unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability a conflict between states a natural disaster a serious cyberattack since that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe The catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures A few automated systems go off the rails As those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance more and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing Realistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown

could not recover correlated automation failure controlling influence catastrophe unrecoverable catastrophe heightened vulnerability conflict natural disaster cyberattack recovery is impossible precipitate catastrophe rapidly cascading series of automation failures larger disturbance failing widespread human failures

['Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure. Under these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed---they are now more interested in controlling influence after the resulting catastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions and incentives.', 'An unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability---a conflict between states, a natural disaster, a serious cyberattack, etc.---since that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe. The catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures: A few automated systems go off the rails in response to some local shock. As those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance; more and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing. Realistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown of existing incentive systems---many things start breaking as you move off distribution, not just ML.', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Texas-Open-Doubles.docx

Kansas

PaMa

426c496078b6b33579fa69e1e453fe5c6c5f7e0d301ab2953481f6811a352f4c

‘Antitrust laws’ are specific and enumerated and do not include Section 5

Justin P. Raphael 16, Litigation Partner in the San Francisco Office of Munger, Tolles & Olson, “Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support Filed by Defendant”, Thompson, et al. v. 1-800 Contracts, Inc., et al., US District Court for the District of Utah, November 2016, Lexis

action was not brought “to punish violations of antitrust laws .” Rather under Section 5 “antitrust laws” encompass specific statutes which is exclusive That does not include Section 5 multiple courts acknowledged FTC A is not “antitrust law.” defined by Clayton Section 5 is not antitrust law

The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws .” Rather , it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act The term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes which the Supreme Court has held is exclusive T he definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive . Therefore it is of no moment that a statute not listed therein may be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC A ct is not an “antitrust law.” prima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “ does not include violations of the FTC Act Section 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘ antitrust law s’ within the meaning of the Clayton Act

was not brought any of the antitrust laws Section 5 of the FTC Act “antitrust laws” defined in the Clayton Act encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes which the Supreme Court has held is exclusive exclusive it is of no moment colloquially described not multiple courts FTC A “antitrust law.” prima facie weight ‘antitrust laws’ does not include violations of the FTC Act antitrust law

['The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws.” Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. The term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a), which the Supreme Court has held is exclusive. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958) (“[T]he definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment that [a statute not listed therein] may be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC Act is not an “antitrust law.” See Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1031 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing “prima facie” weight provision of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), and noting that “prima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “does not include violations of the FTC Act”); Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 982 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that Section 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘antitrust laws’ within the meaning of Sections [16(a) and 16(i)] of the Clayton Act”).']

[(10, 20)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%20National%20Debate%20Tournament-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%2520National%2520Debate%2520Tournament-Doubles.docx

532d58ab0f4a2e3d4bc12033cfa45104277a759ebb92d0fcfdbc2b96e7f85755

South Asian arms-racing causes nuclear war between India and China.

USIP 22. United States Institute of Peace Senior Study Group on Strategic Stability in Southern Asia. “Enhancing Strategic Stability in Southern Asia: USIP Senior Study Group Final Report.” https://www.usip.org/southern-asia-strategic-stability-report.

China India Pakistan capabilities expanding nuclear arsenal investing in delivery systems aspire to field triads very different stages investments threatens rivals cascading dilemma arms racing disrupts stability heightens risk crises cross nuclear threshold arms race dynamics exacerbate instability in Southern Asia India’s relations with China deteriorated their border saw violent clashes India China away actively investing in military capabilities infrastructure along Himalayan frontier future disputes escalate Nuclear use cannot be ruled out Afghanistan Taliban rule unpredictable evolution dangerous dynamics raise concern inevitable flare-ups spiral Southern Asia regional arms race instability escalation

China , India , and Pakistan developed nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries Each of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal investing in related delivery systems . All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities China India Pakistan very different stages in this process making these investments in national security each state threatens its rivals cascading security dilemma arms racing disrupts regional strategic stability heightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold arms race dynamics exacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia missile defense systems MIRV tactical, sea-based (surface and submarine) dual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management raise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states. India’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly their long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades India and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo Both are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier future disputes could escalate Nuclear use cannot be ruled out India-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship Other regional developments Afghanistan Taliban rule unpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination should raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral Southern Asia policymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities avoid actions contribute to a regional arms race instability escalation

expanding its nuclear arsenal China India Pakistan cascading security dilemma cross the nuclear threshold arms race dynamics exacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia India’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly actively investing military capabilities infrastructure could escalate cannot be ruled out Afghanistan Taliban rule flare-ups could spiral contribute to a regional arms race instability escalation

['China, India, and Pakistan have developed nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries: the United States, China, and India, respectively. Each of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and investing in related delivery systems. All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities, but China, India, and Pakistan are at very different stages in this process. In making these investments in national security, each state also threatens its less powerful rivals. The result, a “cascading security dilemma,” encourages arms racing, disrupts regional strategic stability, and heightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold. In addition to general arms race dynamics, the introduction of new munitions, more capable delivery systems, and potentially more risk-acceptant doctrinal shifts tend, on balance, to exacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia. Sophisticated missile defense systems; hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles; and tactical, sea-based (surface and submarine), and dual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management and raise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states. The potential for conflict between India and Pakistan remains high following the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. Subsequent diplomacy led to the resumption of a ceasefire along the Line of Control in 2021, but the underlying causes of hostility, including although not limited to the disputed territory of Kashmir, remain. Moreover, India and Pakistan appear to have drawn lessons from 2019 that increase the likelihood that future crises could escalate in dangerous ways, possibly even to the nuclear threshold. All told, 2019 showed important shifts in long-standing positions (by India and Pakistan, as well as China and the United States) and a new willingness by all parties to accept greater risk. Over the past several years, India’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly. In the summer of 2020, their long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades. India and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo. Both are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier, raising the prospect that future disputes could escalate into even more significant conventional military exchanges. Nuclear use remains unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out, if only as the unintended consequence of conventional military escalation. India-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship as well as military investments, both conventional and nuclear. In addition to worrisome trends in bilateral India-Pakistan and India-China relations, India faces the thorny challenge of managing relations with two hostile neighbors (China and Pakistan) that are increasingly close partners. Other regional developments, including in Afghanistan, where Taliban rule is likely to create new opportunities for terrorist groups, further threaten strategic stability in Southern Asia. Ultimately, it is the unpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination—India-Pakistan crises, China-India border violence, and resurgent terrorist threats—that should raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral. The United States has only a limited capacity to influence the behavior of other nuclear-armed states. The overlapping and interconnected rivalries and territorial disputes in Southern Asia further complicate the policy challenge facing Washington. In particular, US policymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities as they deepen the strategic partnership with India and deter aggression while taking care to avoid actions that could contribute to a regional arms race, greater instability, or crisis escalation.', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Aff-Kentucky-RR-Round-4.docx

Emory

KeRa

a166b13d682a41774949a197b740f36ff5ede40678b508c06ee2c9b68c29e95f

The CP doesn’t chill innovation – its appropriately not overly broad

Diamantis ’21 [Mihailis; 7/24/21; Associate Professor, The University of Iowa College of Law; George Washington Law Review; “Algorithms Acting Badly: A Solution from Corporate Law,” vol. 89]

beneficial-control carries no inherent risk of overbreadth beneficial-control cannot be overbroad since it only purports to answer whether a corporation has acted allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts show which corporations are potentially liable prosecutors and plaintiffs would need to establish the corporation acted culpably

the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth even if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive it does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that what they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283 corporate liability generally requires acts and mental states the best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability , using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states. The beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry whether a corporation has acted Acts alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm As a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts This would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably , i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well

no inherent risk overbreadth acts mental states bifurcated approach corporate liability corporate acts corporate mental states. cannot be overbroad identify algorithmic harms corporate acts potentially liable acted culpably

['To show that the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth, it will help first to add some nuance to the claim that respondeat superior goes too far concerning employee misconduct. First, even if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive. For example, it does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that, though each employee is fully innocent, what they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283 Respondeat superior only attributes misconduct from single employees to corporations. If no employee individually did anything wrong, there is nothing to attribute to the corporation.', 'More important for present purposes, corporate liability generally requires acts and mental states.284 Although respondeat superior applies to both under current law,285 we can, and should, analyze its performance concerning acts and mental states separately. It may turn out that respondeat superior, or something modeled after it, works better for one or the other. In that case, the best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability, using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states.', 'The beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry—whether a corporation has acted. Acts alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm.286 As a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts. This would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably, i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well. The beneficialcontrol account offered here does not purport to say anything about corporate mental states or culpability.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-Indiana-Round-1.docx

Michigan

McSk

e5ee296420611dca7542dabf53de4844c9684852180b3d3971833ac3cc878aaa

AI avatar personhood based on a corporate law analogy strikes a perfect balance between incentivizing innovation and enabling legal accountability.

Cheong ’22 [Ben; Lecturer of Law @ Singapore University of Social Sciences, Master of Law @ Cambridge, Bachelor of Laws @ Exeter, Counsel, @ RHTLaw Asia LLP; International Cybersecurity Law Review. “Avatars in the Metaverse: Potential Legal Issues and Remedies,” vol. 3]

users expect avatars’ rights to be protected could be resolved by making an avatar responsible for actions this would need a legal persona to the avatar and to sue or be sued If an avatar steals these are problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court As jurisdictional issues relating to location of the avatar become unclear avatars could be incorporated by borrowing from company law a i learning from its host should be granted legal personality conferred through registration the benefit would be a corpus of rules not regulating can have serious ramifications Avatars allow users to separate from who they are to communicate and act in ways not possible offline This anonymity could give rise to exercise of power in an arbitrary manner This lead to societal instability Stability can only be achieved if law is applied laws could stipulate the separate personality would be disregarded if crimes had been committed liability on the ultimate human determined by a sliding scale of harm in a metaverse decentralised , it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ registration would mandate minimum capital requirements causation and foreseeability would be expanded to cover avatars the deep learning avatar is a separate person Hence could be clothed with legal personality

When users interact through avatars , there may be situations where some altercation would equate to breach of tort law or criminal law users expect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse one way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse But this would mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar , accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued The difficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person or entity who operates that avatar The law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human behind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar , it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality The main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts . If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’ this would involve issues relating to property theft and i p If loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court As the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum become s unclear , it may be the case that an i law of metaverse could be developed some concepts from company law could be incorporated avatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law Where an avatar possesses a i capabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions , execute contracts and supervise others on its own avatars should be granted legal personality This legal personality could be conferred through registration , with each natural person entitled to only one avatar Arguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted so the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars the benefit of conferring legal personality to an a i system would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings Similar concepts could apply to avatars Incorporating avatars would allow specific rules to be imposed not regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one while cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real harms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not real Avatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are and they can behave in ways their users never would making it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible offline This supposed anonymity and its empowerment of the real person could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community This could lead to societal instability This is the reason society has rules In return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights Stability can only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally and not just to advance the interests of a select few Hence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights to be similarly protected it would be absurd to allow one player to sue another in the virtual world if one player engaged in PvP killed their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items If we were to argue that avatars should be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant the question becomes at which stage of the development this conferral should be permitted At present , it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit an independent ‘conscience’ Where an avatar is concerned exhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the criterion in determining legal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist with in the metaverse itself , such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse Such laws could stipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed . Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm to the community and the real-world Should the metaverse be developed it becomes important from a regulatory perspective that corresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse if someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system However, in a metaverse which is decentralised , it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ This can be visualised through Bitcoin Satoshi Nakamoto , the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin, cannot be identified In such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world If we accept that activities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on company law principles would offer a solution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse all avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration , similar to how a company is incorporated legislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures such as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation to meet potential liability claims The concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded to cover harm by avatars or infrastructures If the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human through deep learning the avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether If the avatar is able to perform transactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse , then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations , i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover copyright , harassment and ratified by an ‘international’ community without country-specific boundaries If we are to combine a i with the metaverse, the situation becomes overly complex If avatars become capable of m l and can perform mundane tasks without human intervention it may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations Companies serve as a model Just like companies, avatars are non-human , and both exist to increase economic investments in the marketplace whatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity Even though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against taking of property without due process and are entitled to freedom of speech Companies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings ownership of property and contractual obligations corporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified the “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans ” and humans still make the final decisions Similarly, in Roblox ’s metaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions. However, for more advanced avatars possessing a i with a neural link between the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be grant ed legal personhood Companies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts However, there are limitations to punishing a company given that it is not a natural person Hence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions subject directors of a company to criminal offences Breaches of these may result in a fine , disqualification or imprisonment While a company is a separate legal entity , it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence There is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence , it is not far-fetched that an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host

avatars altercation breach of tort law criminal law users rights protected avatar responsible actions metaverse legal persona rights duties legal system sue or be sued difficult distinguish ‘legal’ avatar real-life person entity operates against an avatar human behind address by avatar causality rights liability existing legal concepts steals digital ‘Gucci bag’ property theft i p money reputation real-world sufficiently substantive real claim real court fully developed jurisdictional location of the avatar forum become unclear i law company law incorporated incorporated legal person borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law a i capabilities learning from its human host make decisions contracts supervise others own should be granted legal personality conferred registration natural only one avatar stretched avatars conferring legal personality a i system presence of a corpus of rules rights and liabilities avatars avatars specific rules imposed not serious ramifications very structure of cyberspace separation real virtual more real real harms dismissed not separate themselves who they really are users never would communicate act not be possible offline anonymity empowerment real person exercise of power in an arbitrary manner personal expense community societal instability society rules other Stability only be achieved law is applied equally avatar’s similarly protected absurd engaged in PvP killed their opponent claimed the opponent’s items rights similar human consciousness permitted present difficult to imagine unconscionability independent ‘conscience’ avatar ‘conscience’ not be the criterion legal personality in the metaverse itself within agrees subject their avatars to legal personality governed laws of the metaverse separate legal personality avatar disregarded crimes torts liability ultimate human being behind the avatar sliding scale harm community real-world regulatory perspective corresponding law avatar very limited recourse manufacturer distributor gaming system metaverse decentralised difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ Bitcoin Satoshi Nakamoto cannot be identified virtual community parallel real-world which type of law company law solution factual situations subject to registration company incorporated legislation minimum capital requirements ecosystem infrastructures higher causation foreseeability expanded avatars infrastructures independently human deep learning separate person altogether transactions in the metaverse person should be granted rights and obligations new law metaverse copyright harassment ratified ‘international’ community country-specific boundaries combine a i overly complex m l mundane tasks human intervention expedient rights obligations Companies model non-human both increase economic investments marketplace also avatars increasing productivity ‘persons’ entitled protection taking property due process freedom of speech as persons legal proceedings property contractual obligations company legally personified through humans humans final decisions Roblox avatars act through humans person behind advanced a i neural link even stronger case should be grant legal personhood liable same manner natural person punishing directors criminal offences Breaches fine disqualification imprisonment separate legal entity incorporeal through human agents physical presence not far-fetched avatar clothed with legal personality similarly through its human host

['When users interact through their avatars, there may be situations where some form of altercation occurs that would equate to breaking the law, if it took place between people in the real world. Such incidents could be in breach of tort law (which covers civil claims such as negligence or nuisance) or criminal law (involving illegal acts and crime such as assault, murder, burglary or rape).21 If an avatar assaults another, would the criminal laws of assault and battery apply to this situation? Such issues in the metaverse would arise as users would expect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse. Hence, one way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse. But this is complicated, because it would mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar, accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued.22 The more difficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person (or an entity) who operates that avatar.', 'The law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human being behind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar, it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality, i.e. that one is deemed to have caused harm to a human being if one knows a human being was behind the avatar.', 'Another way to visualise the future of metaverse would be to understand it through the online game platform and game creation system that has been developed by Roblox.23 In Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, users can update their avatars with new clothing, hair and accessories on a regular basis using digital items, and developers and creators will be able to generate revenue by selling user-generated content.24 Virtual worlds are serious revenue generators. Gucci, for instance, ran its own ‘Gucci Garden Experience’ event in the Roblox online platform in May 2021. Players were able to try and purchase fashion accessories for their avatars. The digital ‘Queen Bee Dionysus’ bag was listed for 475 Robux, which was equivalent to $5. But it was eventually sold for $4115. This was real money as players would need to purchase Robux, the virtual currency of Roblox using real money.25', '2.2 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse', 'The main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts. If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’ in the ‘metaverse’, this would involve issues relating to property rights, theft and intellectual property law. If loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court of law.26', 'As the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum to resolve potential dispute becomes unclear, it may be the case that an international law of metaverse could be developed to deal with these issues.27 This paper suggests that some concepts from company law could be incorporated into this metaverse law. In a decentralised metaverse of the type envisaged by Bell, avatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law.', 'Where an avatar possesses artificial intelligence capabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions, execute contracts and supervise others on its own in the metaverse, there is a case to be made that avatars should be granted legal personality in the metaverse. This legal personality could be conferred through the process of registration, with each natural person entitled to only one avatar in this decentralised and limitless metaverse. Arguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted,28 so the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars in the metaverse.', 'Lucchetti has previously argued that the benefit of conferring legal personality to an artificial intelligence system would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings.29 Similar concepts could apply to avatars in the metaverse. Incorporating avatars in the metaverse would allow specific rules to be imposed on it in order to govern its rights and obligations in the metaverse.', '2.3 The impetus to protect avatars’ rights in the metaverse', 'The concept of the avatar is generally used to refer to users’ virtual selfrepresentation.30 It is argued that not regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one. Franks has observed that while cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real life, harms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not really real, as they are by their nature not physical, bodily harms.31', 'Avatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are, and they can behave in ways their users never would in real life, making it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible in the offline world.32 This supposed anonymity that the avatar has in the metaverse and its empowerment of the real-life person could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community at large. This could lead to societal instability as individuals could have their possessions taken away from them without any form of recourse.33 This is the reason why society has rules in place to deal with deviations from acceptable conduct. In return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights, individuals would have to give up the right to punish someone on their own. Stability in society can only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally to everyone and not just to advance the interests of a select few.34 Hence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights in the metaverse to be similarly protected.', '2.4 Granting rights to avatars if they possess consciousness', 'The current metaverses, at least those existing, are very much on the internet and can be depicted through multiplayer games. One manifestation of this at present would be Robolox.35', 'In determining whether an avatar should be granted rights that a human being possesses, one must first understand the requirements to be recognised as a natural person. If what separates a natural person from everything else (be it a robot, animal, computer simulation, or virtual game, etc.), is ‘consciousness’, then it becomes necessary to explore what the requirements of consciousness are.36 It appears that the two requirements for consciousness are the feeling of arousal and awareness.37 If this view is adopted, the difference between a human being and an avatar is this concept of consciousness.', 'Indeed, equity was developed to deal with the harshness of the common law through one’s understanding of ‘conscience’. Drakopoulou has argued that “equity, as we are reminded, was originally employed to remedy defects of the common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice, with an ecclesiastic chancellor acting as keeper of the king’s conscience”.38 In BOM v BOK, 39 a Singapore court decision which involved a wife who sought to deprive her husband of almost all his assets in the aftermath of an extremely traumatic event in the husband’s life by getting him to sign a deed of trust giving away essentially all his assets and rendering him a pauper. Vitiating factors that affect one’s conscience such as unconscionability and undue influence were considered.40', 'For many years, characters in a game [e.g. Runescape, a fantasy massively multiplayer online role-playing game (‘MMORPG’)], were not capable of exhibiting a conscience.41 Hence, it would be absurd to allow one player to sue another player in the virtual world if one player engaged in player versus player combat (PvP), killed their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items as a reward. If we were to argue that avatars in the metaverse should be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant to decide whether avatars should be granted rights, the question then becomes at which stage of the technological development this conferral of rights should be permitted.42', 'If an avatar in the metaverse unconscionably forces another avatar in the metaverse to give up all his possessions similar to the situation in BOM v BOK, 43 the issue is who experiences this unconscionability. If science and technology have progressed to such a state that when a human being enters the metaverse, a neural link would be formed between one’s brain and one’s avatar, then it may be possible to argue that the avatar itself is able to experience consciousness (e.g. the ‘2045 initiative’ by Dimtry Itskov).44 In that situation, if the avatar has been accorded legal personality, then it would be possible for the aggrieved avatar to sue another avatar for inducing the avatar who might be suffering from an ‘infirmity’ to enter into a contract. At present, it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit such an independent ‘conscience’ in the first place, but even this concept of conscience as we understand it is under threat by the doctrine of solipsism, i.e. the problem of other minds.45', 'It is arguable that avatars, at least in MMORPG at present, clearly fall short of the avatars possessing this degree of ‘consciousness’.46 Even artificial intelligence interfaces at present, including DeepMind,47 are not at the stage where one can say that it has developed full consciousness (i.e. the ability to feel arousal and awareness) or perhaps to function without any human intervention.48 Nonetheless, technology is advancing rapidly and it is difficult to predict when the metaverse will become mainstream. Indeed, the pace of technological developments has led a former ‘Go’ champion beaten by DeepMind to retire from professional play after declaring that artificial intelligence is an entity that cannot be defeated.49', '2.5 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse through incorporation', 'Where an avatar in the metaverse is concerned, perhaps exhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the only criterion in determining whether an avatar should be granted legal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist within the metaverse itself, such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse.50 Such laws could also stipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed. Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm inflicted to both the metaverse community and the real-world community.51', 'B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd, 52 was a dispute which involved the algorithmic trading of cryptocurrency and exposed significant monetary losses that an end-user of the software could suffer when the software malfunctioned, especially since actual money was involved in these trades.53 The Singapore court held that it could look at the mindset of a human actor, namely the programmer and his knowledge of the software.54 This meant that the trading software programme was not deemed as capable of exhibiting its own mind. The algorithmic trading software carried out trades only as it had been programmed. Had the software involved deep machine learning, the trading software programme could then ‘learn’ how to trade. Over time, it could develop its own trading algorithm not within the contemplation of the original programmer. In that situation, it would be both unforeseeable and unfair to ascribe liability on the original programmer, as there would be no relevant human actor’s mind-set to consider.55', 'Should the metaverse be developed according to that envisioned by Ball,56 then it becomes important from a regulatory perspective that the corresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse. It seems that if someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system.57 However, in a metaverse which is decentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ to ascribe liability to. This can be visualised through Bitcoin, i.e. if someone loses his or her Bitcoin, it makes no sense to sue Satoshi Nakamoto, the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin, because he cannot be identified.58 In such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world community.', 'If we accept that, similar to the real-world community, activities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on.59 In this article, the argument is for the regulation to be based on company law principles, which would offer a potential solution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse. Having said that, company law principles alone would not be able to solve every conceivable issues that could arise in the metaverse, and it is outside the scope of this paper to deal with the various laws that would need to be developed to deal with these issues.60', 'The paper argues that all avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration, similar to how a company is incorporated. In order for this to work, legislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures that the avatars interact with, such as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation mandated in order to meet potential liability claims in the metaverse.61 The concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded under negligence law,62 for instance, to cover harm caused by avatars or infrastructures in the metaverse.', '2.6 Granting avatars separate legal personality', 'In the metaverse of the future, it is perhaps desirous to grant avatars a separate legal personality.63 If the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human person (e.g. through deep learning), then the avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether. In his paper, Chesterman dealt with the various categories of automation where robots are concerned.64 Perhaps similar concepts can be transposed to the metaverse. If the avatar is able to perform various transactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse, then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations, i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover various subject matters, such as copyright, harassment, etc. and possibly ratified by an ‘international’ metaverse community without country-specific boundaries.65', 'Comparing avatars in the metaverse to artificial intelligence systems, there have been numerous papers written on whether artificial intelligence objects should be granted separate legal personality.66 If we are to combine developments in artificial intelligence with the metaverse, then the situation becomes overly complex. If avatars eventually become capable of ‘machine learning’67 and can perform mundane tasks without human intervention, then it may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations that a human being would have.', 'The problem becomes even more complicated if there is an artificial intelligence robot in the real world that ‘operates’ an avatar in a metaverse, instead of a human being. In other words, the person behind the avatar in the metaverse is an artificial intelligence virtual self.68 One can perhaps draw reference from a 1999 sci-fi move, Bicentennial Man, directed by Chris Columbus, to visualise how this would become possible.69 There is a strong case to be made that if the development of artificial intelligence virtual self reaches this stage sometime in the future, then it may become persuasive to grant such ‘virtual selves’ legal personality, which would include property rights.70', '2.7 Granting avatars rights similar to those of a company', 'Companies may serve as a model for extending rights to avatars in a metaverse. Just like companies, avatars are non-human, and both can exist to increase economic investments in the marketplace. There is a case to be made that whatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity.71', 'For example, it had been established by the US Supreme Court that corporations were persons under the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, and thus entitled to protection of the due process clause in Minneapolis & S.L.R. Co. v Beckwith. 72 Even though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against the taking of their property without due process and are entitled (at least to some extent) to freedom of speech.73 Companies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings, ownership of property and contractual obligations.74', 'However, the scope of rights that avatars in a metaverse should possess are not currently settled. Indeed, Day has argued that “there is an ongoing debate over which rights are guaranteed, and until that debate is settled, avatar rights will also be an open question under this analytical framework”.75', '2.8 Incorporating avatars in the metaverse', 'While a natural person is subject to rights and obligations within society, corporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified, even though it is not a natural person.76 Eidenmuller has argued that the “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans” and that humans still make the final decisions.77 Similarly, in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions. It is identical to companies in that it has to act through someone. However, for more advanced avatars in the metaverse of the future possessing artificial intelligence capabilities and with a neural link in place between the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be granted legal personhood.78', 'Companies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts.79 However, there are limitations to punishing a company, given that it is not a natural person. For example, unlike a natural person, companies cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, caning or be subjected to the death penalty.80 Hence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions in the UK Companies Act 2006 subject directors of a company to criminal offences for the company’s failure to comply with statutory obligations.81 Breaches of these obligations may result in a fine, disqualification or imprisonment. In many common law countries, the legislation clearly recognises the incorporated company as a ‘body corporate’.82 While a company is a separate legal entity, it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence.83 There is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence, it is not an entirely far-fetched notion that an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse.84']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Aff-4---Wake-Semis.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

3bb25dba16c545bc6b5d1300a273f24eaf179ecbf493804f1eddbf39cfd3e7a0

Simultaneous action means Biden and Congress share credit for the perm—voters attribute credit by perceived contribution.

Arceneaux 6—(Professor of Political Science at Temple University). Kevin Arceneaux. “The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office?”. Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 5 (Oct., 2006). . Accessed 8/3/21.

Respondents vote for their senator when they attribute responsibility to the national government the state showed a similar relationship responsibility attributions match the actual responsibilities Citizens appear capable of distinctions in where they attribute credit within the federal system

An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor this pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues. Perceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities Citizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do and these distinctions structure where they attribute credit for policy outcomes these distinctions affect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system the issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible

attribute responsibility to the national government responsibility state government similar significant and positive relationship between responsibility attribution for their vote choice match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do these distinctions structure where they attribute credit within the federal system

['', ' An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor. This pattern did not extend to mayoral voting behavior.', 'Accessible causal responsibility attributions regarding education and traffic congestion linked to mayoral vote choice when functional responsibility for these issues coincided with the city. In contrast, accessible causal responsibility attributions for these issues did not affect senate or gubernatorial vote choice when functional responsibility matched those levels of government. Moreover, if accessibility for these attitudes is lowered, at a certain point all of these coefficients shrink and become statistically insignificant. To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the combined effect coefficients for unemployment (and their 95% confidence intervals) calculated at different levels of attitude accessibility in the gubernatorial vote choice model. Note that as causal responsibility attributions regarding unemployment become less accessible (i.e., the latency score increases), the combined effect shrinks and the confidence interval crosses zero. Consequently, the federalist voting hypothesis may only apply, if at all, to a subset of voters for whom a particular issue is salient and readily accessible. ', 'The pattern of statistical significance for the coefficients in Table 4 is also intriguing. Unemployment only has an effect on national and state-level voting behavior, while education and traffic congestion only have an effect on city-level voting behavior (as long as functional responsibility is also attributed to those levels). In some sense, this pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues. The national government has more to do with developing policies that affect unemployment, while local governments are more involved with setting education policy and handling traffic congestion. While only suggestive, these data lead to a hypothesis worthy of further study: Perceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities. ', 'The cause of this match between perceived and actual functional responsibilities is far from clear. It may reflect knowledge on the part of the respondent. After all, these results only work for respondents with highly accessible attitudes on the subject. Perhaps these individuals care a great deal about these issues and are motivated to pin credit or blame on the appropriate office. On the other hand, it may reflect the set of issues discussed in the campaign. There are at least two reasons why campaigns may be the main culprit for explaining this pattern. First, campaigns at different levels of government tend to emphasize the issues over which officials are functionally responsible (Atkeson & Partin, 2001; Tidmarch, Hyman, & Sorkin, 1984). Second, when campaigns focus on an issue, considerations about that issue, such as causal responsibility attributions, are more likely to be accessible (Zaller, 1992). ', 'The findings with regard to unemployment may provide some evidence for the campaign-effects claim. In 2002, unemployment was an issue in both senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns. The relationship at the state level is likely further enhanced by the fact that all three of the incumbent governors in the state analyzed here were Republican, the same party as the sitting president. President Bush and his policies became an issue in each of these gubernatorial campaigns, which may be responsible for some degree of spillover from the national to the state level. ', 'Conclusion ', 'Citizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do, and these distinctions structure where they attribute credit or blame for policy outcomes. However, these distinctions only affect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system under specific conditions. The data analyzed here suggest that the issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible. As already discussed, future study should hone in on the explanation for this nuanced finding. Does it reflect campaign- specific cues, knowledge on the part of the voter, or both?', '', '', '', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%20Washington-Round4.docx

Minnesota

FrPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/FrPa/Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%2520Washington-Round4.docx

e7519f6c87c21eb35e8925828556d7a5db7faf08df8610e6086c5a8fb32e84d0

3- The civil service impact- the Advantage is about courts- the card isn’t No Unique solvency internal link because they don’t make more people care about civil service- and says squo solves

Everest-Phillips, 18 -- UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence director

dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver Civil services ensure the world faces a range of existential challenges . From terror to climate change the future of this planet will put a premium on ‘bureau-craft’ measurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, t also qualitative inequality I o t energy the list goes on complexity are creating new realities the accelerating pace will create high-impact crises that suddenly appear out of nowhere . A massive amount of unpredicted change is inevitable These uncertainties require public administrations effective public service Governments cannot otherwise get things done nature of the state varies The role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. This will require civil servants to be much more creative without public bureaucrats, states would not function

public service is critical A trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver Civil services ensure governments can be catalysts for progress the world faces a range of existential challenges . From terror to climate change problems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential. the future of this planet will put a premium on ‘bureau-craft’ measurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, bu t also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era. We live at a time of unprecedented pace of change These include sharply growing inequality , the 4th industrial revolution I o t shifts in energy supplies and the list goes on complexity are creating new realities What is new in the 21st century is the accelerating pace of these phenomena , their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create complexity is responsible for the increase of shocks and high-impact crises that suddenly appear out of nowhere . A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable . This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’ Chaos is the ‘new normal’. known unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty These uncertainties require public administrations As the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash Old assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current The W E F highlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare administration is essential an effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done , and done well . nature of the state varies The role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative The world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make without committed public bureaucrats, states would not function

underpins the ability of a state to deliver range of existential challenges terror climate change the future of this planet inequality I o t energy complexity high-impact crises that suddenly appear out of nowhere A massive amount of unpredicted change is inevitable cannot otherwise get things done states would not function

['[Max, The Passionate Bureaucrat: Lessons For The 21st Century From 4,500 Years Of Public Service Reform, 2018, https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789813234833_0001, p3-12, accessed 2-4-22]', '', 'When things go well in government, public officials rarely get any credit. Attention-seeking politicians, focused on the next election, are only too happy to hog the limelight. When government fails, political leaders are usually more than eager to blame their officials. Yet, whether ignored or derided, public service is critical to sustaining and improving the quality of life for nations around the world. A trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver on the needs and aspirations of its citizens. Civil services ensure that governments now and in the future can be catalysts for progress.', 'As the second decade of the 21st century draws to an end, it is clear that the world faces an unparalleled range of existential challenges. From tackling terrorism to halting climate change, the problems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential.', 'Every state in the coming years will require a high-performing public service dedicated to promoting shared, collective interests. Whatever the merits of the private sector and civil society, the future of this planet cannot be left to social movements or profit-maximising ambitions driven by personal enrichment and selfish individualism. A new generation of dynamic public servants is urgently needed. Their key attribute for success must be the ability to find solutions that build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. This will require prioritising the capacity of officials to win the trust of the population. That core objective demands enhanced skills and attributes in the public service. It will need to articulate eternal objectives — building a good society, defending human dignity, preserving the national interests, including being the stewards of the long-term future. This will put a premium on not only professionalism of the ‘bureau-craft’, measurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, but also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era.', 'Our Age of Anxiety', 'We live at a time of deep concern over the unprecedented pace of change. The new phenomenon we are confronting is a complex mix of factors. These include sharply growing inequality, the 4th industrial revolution, advances in life sciences, the Internet of things, the digital economy,1 rapid advances in communications, the rise of social media, shifts in energy supplies and 3D printing — and still the list goes on. In addition, jobless growth, the rise of China, unprecedented levels of migration, the demographics of ageing in the developed world and a youth bulge in many developing countries, with the world’s population adding one billion over the last 12 years and set to grow by 2.9 billion — equal to another China and India — by 2050, are the backdrop.2 Millions die of hunger whilst a third of all global food production is wasted. The first person to live up to 150 years has already been born.', 'This ‘Age of Anxiety’ may create both exaggerated expectations and excessive disillusionment over the ‘4th Industrial Revolution’. Sharply growing inequality around the world is increasing social tensions. Faced by the magnitude and complexity of change that is rapidly redefining human potential, reshaping industries and changing societies, political leaders seem unable to articulate a convincing vision for getting through the current upheavals to reach a brighter future.', 'Instead, politics in many parts of the world is mired in rising populism and resurgent nationalism, post-fact politics, post-truth journalism and false and deliberately faked news. Social media are seen to act as society’s conscience, but also create political ‘echo chambers’ in which the Internet plays a polarising post-fact role, including spreading fake news. The problem is exacerbated by a decline in the quality of journalism and concern over the distorting influence of lobbyists in some countries like the United States. Not unsurprisingly, the result is a new era, the ‘Age of Anxiety’.', 'Change, complexity and global interdependence are creating new realities, unique opportunities and serious challenges for development that are profoundly different from those of the past. Emerging economies are rapidly industrialising; new technologies are coming quickly into use; and a growing web of interconnectedness is transforming geopolitics, international competitiveness and sustainability.', 'This ‘4th Industrial Revolution’ is just the beginning, but the evidence for its future impact is already clear. For example, in South Africa, as a result of new technologies, 39% of core occupational skills will have altered by 2020; 47% of jobs in the United States will be automated by 2040.3 By the end of 2016, around two-thirds of the world’s population had access to a mobile phone. Mobile phone users include nearly everyone in the developed world and already 62% of the population in low and middle-income countries.4 Potential new uses for artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive computing are emerging. Already the annual R&D budget of the dominant Internet search engine Google is more than twice the combined R&D expenditure of the five biggest defence companies in the United States, an extraordinary change from the Cold War era that ended barely a generation ago.5', "The ‘great disruptive forces’ of the 21st century are not of themselves new: climate change, industrial revolution, urbanisation (with more people living in cities today than were alive on the whole planet in 1970) and globalisation (in the global flow and networks of trade, finance and people) are familiar themes. For the first time in human history, more people live in cities and towns than in rural areas. By 2050, 67% of the world's population is projected to be urban. The contribution of cities to the global economy and human development will therefore increase. Cities are already engines of economic growth, accounting for 70% of global GDP and, while the world’s largest 150 metropolitan areas represent only 13.5% of the global population, they account for over 40% of global GDP.6", 'Wicked Ostriches, Perfect Swans and Black Elephants', 'What is new in the 21st century, however, is the accelerating pace of these phenomena, their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create. Their interdependence and complexity is also responsible for the increase of low-probability shocks and high-impact crises that suddenly seem to appear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable. This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’.9 Chaos is becoming the ‘new normal’. We may act like ostriches by sticking our heads in the sand when we see a black swan10 heading in our direction, while ‘black elephants’ in the room may trample all under foot if ignored.', 'Such ‘known unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty created by the VUCA world.11 We are already aware of our bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Hyperbolic discounting,12 the gambler’s fallacy13 and the information bias14 are all only too familiar, but the list of humanity’s known cognitive blind-spots and shortcomings seems to go on and on.', 'The wisdom of crowds quickly turns into mass hysteria and ‘Extraordinary Popular Delusions’. Group-think, risk aversion and cognitive dissonance shade off into bubbles of false hope and collective denial in which no-one is guilty but everyone is to blame. We have no time to worry about all the other unexpectedly strange and scary ‘unknown unknowns’, doubtless too many for Wikipedia to list, but probably just waiting to happen.', 'A new disruptive age of digital public empowerment, big data and metadata challenges the human capacity to cope with the unprecedented scale of ‘wicked problems’. Existing comfort zones are crumbling under the speed and nature of fundamental change. Disruption and discontinuity will become the new normal. ', 'The New Era: Complexity in a Complex World', 'In the deep complexity of such complex systems that we cannot hope to control but only influence, there are no easy answers. Taking action to prevent or pre-empt seems ever more problematic and unlikely. These uncertainties will require public administrations to be prepared to ‘Think the Unthinkable’ or at least, ‘Ponder the Unpalatable’. Yet Political leaders and their officials are still struggling to learn and build on lessons from the continuing fall-out after the 2(X)8 Global Financial Crisis, the ever-accelerating pace of technological change and digital transformation, and delivering effectively in an unexpected climate of escalating geo-political instability.', 'As the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash over our heads, the unelectable political maverick morphs into a popular ideological visionary. The silent majority is no longer silent. Old assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current of the new public information age. Reaction time for those in authority has shrunk from 24 hours to something closer to 24 minutes, as policymaking by tweet takes hold in the White House.', 'The World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Risks Report highlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare. The opportunities and challenges for achieving economic growth, quality education, healthy and fulfilling lives for the coming years will be fundamentally different from those of the past. The past provides limited insight and guidance to shape the ‘World We Want’. The sheer ambition of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the volatile new reality of the 21st century call for innovative approaches to turn good policies into results for citizens. Simplistic nationalist, isolationist, protectionist, xenophobic and populist narratives are challenging governments, as stewards for the future of their nation, to sharpen their ability to look towards the future to realise the grand vision inherent in 2030 Agenda.', 'In this new environment, the quarter of a century from the end of the Cold War with the Fall of the Berlin Wall now seems, in retrospect, to have been an era of relative certainty and abnormal stability. Who could declare the ‘End of History’ with Donald Trump in the White House? The new era is more like war than peace in the number and numbing pace of events that are being unleashed; or perhaps more like the lead up to war in the late 1930s, when democratic values crumbled at the Munich Conference of September 1938. Then economic uncertainty and political instability fed off each other.', 'The same is true today. The dynamic of recent years — exceptionally high rewards for those at the top, a hollowing out of the middle class, and the expansion of low-paid insecure jobs at the bottom — seems set not just to continue but to become more pronounced. In the longer term, it is estimated that two-thirds of children that are today in primary school will enter the world of work by taking jobs that have not yet been invented.', 'The result, globally, is a pervading mood of fear for managing in choppy seas surrounded by new, uncharted and turbulent waters. Public expectations of government are rising faster than public institutions can deliver.', 'Yet it is only too easy to forget that huge strides have been made. Real progress is happening, sometimes at an incredible pace: Rwandans today can expect to live 32 years longer than they did in 1990 and spend twice as long at school.15 Furthermore, in almost every country, a more educated population with stronger professional organisations has fostered a vibrant civil society (and, some fear, a culture of narcissism).16 New technology creates forums for openness and citizen feedback that challenge governments’ ability to respond. As of December 2016, heads of states and governments in 173 countries are using Twitter for engaging with citizens. Facebook comes in close second with 169 governments having set up official pages on the social media platform.', 'The result, in many instances, is growing pressure to govern better. This means better regulation, less corruption and higher ethical standards in the conduct of public affairs. More and more, governments are responding to these pressures, demands and changes. Leaders realise that they cannot afford to lag behind in a world of increasingly dynamic and competitive markets, as well as pluralistic, diversified societies where higher expectations give birth to new, progressively more complex challenges.', 'All this uncertainty explains why it is important to strengthen public service. The challenges facing political and administrative leadership everywhere are already daunting and still growing.', 'Seven Attacks', 'In recent decades, efforts to undermine the motivation and morale of effective and efficient public officials working for the common good have advanced on seven fronts.', 'The first is ideological. This is encapsulated in the assertion, regardless of evidence and repeated often enough to have become regarded by many as a truism, that any public service is, by its very nature, inherently incompetent, indolent and unresponsive. Of course, if this were true, it would reflect the decisions of political leaders to allow it.', 'Consider post-independence Singapore, where political determination for building a highly disciplined and motivated public service has transformed the city-state.', 'The second is intellectual — and a ‘Catch 22’ conundrum. Public Choice Theory posits that Public Service is inherently self-serving and needs to be constrained, and New Public Management (NPM) propagates that it is inherently apathetic and needs to be incentivised into being effective.', 'The third is commercial — big profits are generated for consultants and the private sector by fostering the ideas of NPM: running government like a business, outsourcing services and promoting public-private partnerships.', 'The fourth is political — blaming the public service for failure offers a tempting scapegoat for politicians to deflect criticism of their own inadequate leadership and direction.', 'The fifth is financial — pay levels for professional posts in public service have lagged behind those of the private sector that either many high-skilled vacancies could not be filled or special pay arrangements were required.', 'The sixth is institutional — there has been selective truth in portraying obstructive public service unions and unhelpful ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to obscure much more positive images of devotion to public good, as famously demonstrated by the unstinting self-sacrifice of the New York Fire officers on and after 9/11.', 'And the seventh is organisational — both elected leaders and senior administrators benefit from creating a ‘permanent revolution’ of ceaseless reforms and reorganisation of public service. Despite mounting evidence over the years that many reforms achieve almost no lasting improvements, but greatly demoralise staff, the temptation to appear to be shaking up supposedly lazy and incompetent bureaucrats is all too great. This is aggravated by the fact that in some cases senior managers themselves lack the knowledge and skills, and sometimes the willingness, to use resources efficiently.', 'Tackling all seven of these causes is essential if an impartial and merit-based public service is to evolve in many countries. Such public administration is essential both in itself and for the legitimacy of the state.', 'But development is hampered by the lack of a credible theory of change to explain how or why an ‘impartial, ethical, fair and meritocratic public service’ emerges, and how it can be promoted and fostered. Is public service excellence the result of efforts to make government more accountable and responsive, closer to citizens, or more efficient?', 'Unfortunately, civil service reform has often failed. Three key reasons for this are: (i) excessive focus on cost-cutting irrespective of the consequences; (ii) inadequate attention to the politics; and (iii) applying ‘best practice’ rather than ‘best fit’.', 'Getting to Helsinki?', 'Given the central role governments play in facilitating development, including providing public goods, addressing externalities, and laying the foundation for private property and private enterprise, improvement in public administration is essential for progress. Of course, ‘good’ governance is desirable everywhere: poverty reduction, growth, development, peace and security, free markets, transparency, property rights, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, a IVee media, free and fair elections, independent judiciaries, vibrant civil society and effective public services. If, in this vision, where all good things come together, why is every country not like Finland, where I served for three happy years as a young diplomat in the 1980s — well-run, honest and peaceful?', 'What are the priorities? If it is necessary — even a prerequisite — for all good things to be achieved together, the task becomes overwhelming. But fortunately, history shows that that is not the case. Rather, as countries get wealthy they can in the process develop ‘good’ government. The 21st century rich world (broadly speaking, OECD countries) did not first establish liberal democracy, free markets and merit-based public services and then achieve prosperity.', 'But in all instances of successful development, an effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done, and done well. The nature of the state varies (from democratic to autocratic, from liberal to authoritarian), the role of public administration remains the same: an effective civil service promotes the public good efficiently and fairly. Improving the competence of the state can and should better the lives of its people. If, then, the challenges of reform and enhancing civil service performance are universal, every reform addresses its own context. Yet, even if the specifics to a particular environment of time and place are unique, many principles (including strengthening accountability and responsiveness), issues (such as consolidating the intrinsic motivation of civil servants) and problems (e.g. politicisation, corruption, performance measuring) are shared.', 'So public sector reform seems to be the answer, offering a temptingly simple ‘quick win’: whatever the problem might be, cuts and reorganisation seem self-evidently to be the solution. Politicians, voters, citizens and taxpayers ‘know’ with passionate certainty, regardless of the evidence that ‘bureaucrats’ waste money, are slow and incompetent. Political leaders, in echoing that, often also feel the administrative leadership is thwarting their ambitions and chances of re-election.', 'The role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative in handling political ambiguity, advising government ministers on policy tensions and contradictions, and delivering services to the public.', 'For the state to thrive in the coming era, it will need to work simultaneously on achieving five outcomes: (i) unlocking the creativity and collaborative spirit needed to solve complex problems; (ii) overcoming the fallacy that the private sector is inherently more innovative and efficient than the public service; (iii) creating societies that are perceived by their citizens as fair; (iv) fostering the trust of citizens in their governments; and (v) bolstering the legitimacy of the state.', 'These daunting and interconnected aims will result in a new phenomenon: the public recognition by political leaders and citizens that future prosperity, environmental sustainability and social cohesion are dependent on committed and creative civil servants passionate about promoting the long-term national interest. This is a vision of public service that is a manifesto for state-building in our era for developed and developing countries alike.', "Trusted by politicians and the people to tackle the great challenges that humanity faces in the 21st century, public service will be rejuvenated by this vision — to ‘make a difference’. The world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make. Yet there are, at present, probably few more unpopular tasks than praising government bureaucracy. As we will see in the following chapters, literally ever since recorded history began, with the 1st Bureaucratic Revolution, the public official has been a derided figure. This phenomenon grew in the 2nd and 3rd Bureaucratic Revolutions, as the range and reach of the state expanded. In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the government’s own posters depicted crude caricatures of inefficient bureaucrats sleeping at their desks surrounded by piles of paper. Any failings of the state could conveniently be blamed on public officials. The nation was exhorted with slogans such as: Fight the Bureaucrats who Hinder the Workers' Efforts! Many officials ended up in Stalin’s gulags.", 'Yet, without committed public bureaucrats, states and markets would not function, freedoms would not be upheld, and the poor, vulnerable and oppressed would suffer more. Their role in holding the state together is rarely noted. But in 2017, although it was never written down or given a codename, France’s top officials had a detailed plan to ‘protect the Republic’ if far right leader Marine Le Pen was elected president. An unnamed senior official told the media: ‘The philosophy, and the absolute imperative, was to keep the peace, while also respecting our constitutional rules’.17 In the after-life, bureaucrats also play an important role. The Hindu God Chitragupta keeps a file on every person, recording their good and bad actions, in order to assign them to heaven or hell.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-SpBa-Neg-3---Gonzaga-Round-6.docx

Kansas

SpBa

b6bbafb0d7c92e90732f355926aaa80372f4c205c5a126f9734eeb9d21431cfa

No extinction from ecological disaster—effects are slow and localized.

Brook et al. 18 — Barry W. Brook, ARC Australian Laureate Professor and Chair of Environmental Sustainability at the University of Tasmania in the Faculty of Science, Engineering & Technology, Erle C. Ellis, Ph.D., Cornell University, 1990 Professor, Geography & Environmental Systems University of Maryland, and Jessie C. Buettel, “What Is the Evidence for Planetary Tipping Points?” In Effective Conservation Science: Data Not Dogma, Chapter 8, Oxford University Press (2018). http://ecotope.org/people/ellis/papers/brook_2018.pdf

natural limits begs the question of a global tipping point the nine processes lack evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global crossing” because of complex systems and wild fluctuations irreversible global collapse is speculative and arbitrary This raises questions on the biological relevance of such thresholds ignores inherent complexity and promotes “one size fits all” . The global enterprise is driving changes But it does make it implausible that systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a state that is inhospitable .

As living standards and human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic growth . This begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people . There is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past taking the form of mass extinction events it would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration The boundaries concept , coined less than a decade ago represents the idea that societies have transgressed the historical “natural” conditions — the “safe operating space” —under which human societies have thrived . However, to mark the boundaries “reference state,” defined baselines are required . is there evidence of global tipping-point with safe space and global risk demarcated? The search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine boundaries Since its original publication including the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts , have become prevalent in scientific discussions concerned with global change This work has been heavily cited , Most of the nine processes and systems listed in lack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing” it is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent system that is prone to tipping anthropogenic pressures vary geographically , and the responses to stressors can be heterogeneous While global tipping points have been hypothesized , their exact “position” has not been determined . If the boundaries did exist at a global level This is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in stat e variables that have occurred without any evidence of an irreversible global collapse The problem with going from local process to a global tipping point the operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional the proposed boundaries represent global aggregations The value assigned is speculative and an arbitrary point as opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics . supported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological relevance of such thresholds for the Earth acceptance of these boundaries will inhibit our understanding of human impacts . Even if one can measure a global environmental attribute , it does not follow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that , when crossed, leads to irreversible change . Asserting “safe” global limits on or decline in the local species abundance ignores inherent complexity and promotes “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions. Their frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation will occur. If it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor) boundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk. One of the appeals of planetary boundaries is that it resonates as a narrative for environmental action the biosphere , and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in varied ways . The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes but in a haphazard fashion , with responses weakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale But it does make it implausible that the planet , or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable .

living standards human welfare possible natural limits growth begs the question of whether be approaching a global tipping point ten billion people rapid global shifts distant past mass extinction events logical and indeed intuitive Earth system is susceptible planetary regime shifts human alteration boundaries concept societies historical “natural” conditions “safe operating space” human societies thrived mark the boundaries baselines are required evidence of global tipping-point safe space and global risk demarcated? mechanisms and evidence nine boundaries original publication related “safe operating space” global regime shifts scientific discussions has been heavily cited nine processes listed theoretical mechanisms evidence causal connection local perturbations global “boundary crossing” local-to-regional measures representative prone to tipping anthropogenic pressures vary geographically responses to stressors heterogeneous been hypothesized exact “position” exist at a global level lack of our understanding complex systems wild fluctuations in stat e variables evidence of an irreversible global collapse going from local process global tipping point “Earth system processes” local or regional proposed global aggregations assigned is speculative an arbitrary point phase shift global non-linear dynamics statement to the baseline is deemed excessive.” scientific underpinning boundaries significant questions relevance of such thresholds these boundaries human impacts measure a global environmental attribute real-world threshold that irreversible change “safe” global limits local species abundance inherent complexity “one size fits all” if we pass threshold “X,” ecological degradation down to a choice human development potential risk uncertain (and data poor) society is willing to accept planetary boundaries a narrative for environmental action external pressures varied ways driving large-scale changes haphazard fashion weakly connected transmitted slowly cross-continental scale make it implausible that the planet to tip irreversibly radically different state inhospitable

['*The Nine Planetary Boundaries Brook Et Al. Refer Too Are, “Land-Use Change, Rate of Biodiversity Loss, Phosphorus Cycle, Global Freshwater Use, Ocean Acidification, Climate Change, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading, Chemical Pollution, Terrestrial Net Primary Production, and Biodiversity Intactness”', '', 'As living standards, technological capacities, and human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic and population growth. Climate change, habitat loss, and recent extinctions are examples of impacts on natural systems that have been used as markers of global environmental degradation associated with the expanding influence of humans (Barnosky et al., 2012; McGill et al., 2015). Past civilizations have faced rapid declines and even collapsed in the face of regional environmental degradation, drought, and other environmental challenges (Scheffer, 2016; Butzer and Endfield, 2012). This begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people. If this is indeed the case, the future of both biodiversity and humanity hangs in the balance. The hypothesis is that without urgent action to prevent reaching a global tipping point, the natural life support systems that sustain humanity may fail abruptly, with drastic consequences. 8.1 Regional tipping points yes— but what about global tipping points? There is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past, sometimes taking the form of mass extinction events, which have been linked to biophysical tipping points (Hughes et al., 2013). Tipping points occur when components of a system respond gradually to an external forcing to a point at which the response becomes nonlinear and abrupt. This response is often amplified through positive feedback interactions that induce an eventual state (or regime) shift (Lenton, 2013). Tipping points are well documented in studies of local ecosystems, such as lakes, that undergo regime shifts driven by alterations of energy or nutrient flows when thresholds are crossed and hysteresis prevails (Scheffer et al., 2015). Various tipping elements, some definite and others speculative, have also been noted in the Earth’s climate system (Lenton et al., 2008). Given this context, it would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration of Earth’s ecology. James Lovelock’s original Earth-system conception of “Gaia,” for instance, focused on interconnections and positive feedbacks between the geosphere and the biosphere, which act to promote stability and resilience (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974). But within this same framework, a temporary global forcing event, invoking disconnections and positive feedbacks, could lead to a rapid transition to an alternative stable state, as has been observed in many local systems (Kefi et al., 2016). This conceptual model invites the question of whether identifiable “boundaries” exist within the interacting components of the Earth system. If they do—and they are transgressed—then the planetary biosphere might be dramatically and permanently altered (Brook et al., 2013). 8.2 Planetary boundaries as a seductive policy framework The planetary boundaries concept, coined less than a decade ago (Rockström et al., 2009), represents the idea that contemporary societies have potentially transgressed the historical “natural” conditions— the “safe operating space”—under which human societies have historically thrived. However, to mark the boundaries of a planetary safe “reference state,” defined baselines are required. One possibility that has been suggested is the climatic conditions that marked the last 10 000 years of our current warm interglacial period, the Holocene, in which agricultural and urban societies first arose, should be used as a safe space (Steffen et al., 2015). Other safe spaces (or conversely boundaries) might be similarly recognized. In total, nine planetary boundaries have been hypothesized in association with Earth-system processes that, if sufficiently distorted, might potentially cause harmful changes in Earth’s functioning as a wholistic system (Table 8.1). This perspective has led some to postulate the potential breaching of critical thresholds, pushing the Earth out of the Holocene and consequently inducing a shift in the stability of the system (Barnosky et al., 2012). To quote: “Crossing these boundaries could generate abrupt or irreversible environmental changes.” (stockholmresilience.org/ research/planetary-boundaries.html). A hope often expressed is that flagging the crossing of these boundaries as a significant risk will provoke decision makers and the public into taking actions to mitigate harmful global changes (McAlpine et al., 2015). Such a framework, of global tipping points counterbalanced by secure safe spaces within planetary boundaries, is conceptually elegant and politically seductive. Notably, this implies two possible conditions—a state in which environmental change is without risk, and another in which risk is clear and action necessary. Such a framework is both constraining and liberating, and clearly defines a safe zone in which human societies may go about their activities without risk. As a consequence, if such clear knowledge on the risks of altering global environmental processes existed, a defined set of boundaries could be extremely useful to decision makers. But is there evidence of global tipping-point dynamics with safe space and global risk clearly demarcated? 8.3 The search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine planetary boundaries Since its original publication, the planetary boundaries framework, including the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts, have become increasingly prevalent in scientific and policy discussions concerned with global change (Corlett, 2015). This work has been heavily cited, updated, and actively promoted as a policy tool. But there has also been a counter-vailing critique that challenges the universality, utility, and even the underlying validity of the planetary boundaries framework (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016; Lenton and Williams, 2013). The underlying bases for this debate stem from disagreements over technical and scientific issues, including questions of scale, scientific underpinning, deterministic “boundary setting,” and the generality of mechanisms proposed. Most of the nine processes and systems listed in Table 8.1 lack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing” (Brook et al., 2013). The exceptions are the atmospheric and oceanic systems, which seem to most closely fit the characteristics required for a globally “scaled-up” version of the coupled, non-linear dynamics that have been shown to undergo phase shifts. But for others, like global land use or worldwide biodiversity, it is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent planetary system that is prone to tipping (Mace et al., 2014). Moreover, anthropogenic pressures vary geographically, and the system responses to stressors can be highly heterogeneous (Reyer et al., 2015). While global tipping points have been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined. If the boundaries did exist at a global level, there is a good chance they could not be known until well after the regime shift or boundary crossing had occurred. This is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred historically and continue to occur, without any evidence of an irreversible global collapse. Finally, implementing policies that avoid crossing planetary boundaries is a “global commons” problem, and everything we know from climate action indicates that it is difficult to generate agreements that address such risk when there is uncertainty about thresholds (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). 8.4 The problem with going from local process to a global tipping point For at least six of the nine proposed boundaries, the operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional (Table 8.1), yet the proposed boundaries represent global aggregations (the sum of many component sub-systems). The value assigned to any particular boundary is, in virtually all cases, speculative and represents an arbitrary point along a continuum of possible values, as opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics. The most plausible threshold is for ocean acidification, because it is directly related to the calcite and aragonite compensation depth (i.e., something that is inherently quantifiable). The others are purely supported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological and physical relevance of such thresholds for the Earth system. What is currently needed are explicit efforts to link long-term monitoring to the choice of these boundary values (Robert et al., 2013). Unquestioning acceptance of these boundaries that in turn guide subsequent global assessment (as in Newbold et al., 2016) will only inhibit our understanding of human impacts. In addition to masking finer-grained detail, globally averaged or aggregated metrics are also often difficult to link to directed action. For instance, the recent Paris Agreement to limit average global temperature rise to less than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels was ultimately re-framed as a plethora of national goals or aspirations based on carbon-emissions intensity (Rogelj et al., 2016). This is partly because a “global temperature,” averaged across all the Earth system, is not a real physical phenomenon or quantity observed in any place. As such, it cannot be used to guide or monitor local system states. What can be monitored and altered are the trajectories of the underlying drivers of system changes (e.g., carbon emissions intensity, in the climate case), and these therefore ought to be the domain of targets. Even if one can identify and measure a global environmental attribute, it does not automatically follow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change. Asserting “safe” global limits on indicators like land-use change (the boundary of a maximum of 15% of land given over to cultivation, see Table 8.1) or decline in the local species abundance of originally present species (e.g., “10% loss relative to undisturbed habitat” as is the case in Newbold et al., 2016) is totally arbitrary. Such thinking ignores inherent complexity and promotes a “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions. Trying to avoid crossing a global land-use or biodiversity boundary might also lead to perverse outcomes locally, such as if restoring a “safe level” of biodiversity intactness in the world’s most fertile and productive regions (where most food originates) triggers undesirable trade-offs such as the displacement of farming to marginal regions that require more land, greater inputs, and hardship. In the context of food production, Running (2012) recently argued that at most an additional 10% of harvestable annual net global primary production (NPP) of terrestrial plants could be co-opted for future human use without crossing out of the planetary safe space. The implications of this assertion are draconian. Global NPP has been essentially steady, even with the massive agricultural expansion that has occurred over the last century. Thus, because the allocation of NPP is essentially a zerosum activity, asserting that humans can only get at most an additional 10% of that NPP implies future shortages of food, fiber, fodder, and fuel for people (Erb et al., 2012; Lewis, 2012). Policy based on this boundary would be fraught with human suffering, while the boundary itself has little mechanistic support or clear evidence of existence. In a similar vein, seeking to achieve uniform limits on practices such as nitrogen or phosphorus fertilizer use would inevitably lead to winners and losers at local scales (de Vries et al., 2013), because of differences in soil fertility and the legacies of historical farming practices (Erb et al., 2012; Carpenter and Bennett, 2011). For instance, while nitrogen fertilizer has been over-used in many developed countries, increases are urgently needed in sub-Saharan Africa to close the yield gap (Mueller et al., 2014). Given the consistent need for regionally appropriate limits, what practical use is a globally defined boundary? 8.5 Finding the research questions in an arena that is rife with competing visions of desirable futures Planetary boundaries are typically based on biogeochemical and ecological principles. Their frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation or regime shift will occur. What this framing neglects is that there are inevitable trade-offs between human development goals and environmental protection/risk. Policy based on any assumed boundary will substantially impact development options. For the most part, truly natural areas are not the main “life support systems” for humanity; instead, people rely on those ecosystems that have been modified or engineered (Ellis et al., 2013). If it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor) planetary boundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk. Science has a vital role in guiding environmental management. Ultimately, however, science must intersect with human decisions: physical laws are not negotiable, but our response to them is (Larsen et al., 2015). Global change is not a societal construct, so we must avoid the temptation to couch scientific models as policy directives. Value judgements do (and must) play a key role in determining how people respond to global environmental challenges and the possibility of inflexible planetary boundaries. What has become starkly apparent from the debate on planetary tipping points and possible global regime changes is the need for a concerted research agenda aimed at the potential links between biophysical and social systems to determine possible boundary “positions.” This research could come in the form of: (1) empirical examinations of regime shifts (or not) under gradual degradation; (2) models that explicitly link ecosystem changes and hypothesized boundaries to specific upheavals; and (3) explorations of how the framing of a boundary influences decision makers. For instance, our approach to Earth-system simulations is sophisticated for climatic components but lacks the resolution and mechanisms needed to test ideas on the planetary interconnectedness of nutrient and energy flows, or feedbacks across global biomes (Harfoot et al., 2014). The Madingley model of ecosystem dynamics (https://madingley.github. io/about) offers one promising example of an innovative attempt in this direction, because its design goals are to explicitly capture the scaling of processes that affect biodiversity from local to global scales (Purves et al., 2013). We can also seek a better understanding of the mechanistic underpinnings of the drivers of changes in global systems, such as land-use change and agricultural intensification. This could generate empirically based “bottomup” forecasts of trajectories, which, when linked to multi-ecosystem models, should improve our forecasts of the risks of planetary state shifts (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016). One of the appeals of planetary boundaries is the hypothesis that it resonates as a narrative for environmental action. The question is: how do decision-makers respond to these boundary arguments? Some research suggests that thresholds inhibit collective actions against tragedies of the commons (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). This is a field ripe for theoretical and empirical study. We also need to ask the hard questions about whether conceptual models like planetary boundaries the most effective strategy and engagement tool for conservation and mitigation are. The difficulty in getting international agreement on climate targets (e.g., the 2 °C “guardrail”) is an obvious case in point (Symons and Karlsson, 2015). Perhaps focusing on planetary opportunities: leverage points for guiding global change in better directions (e.g., carbon-neutral energy systems) is potentially a more effective focus of scientific attention (DeFries et al., 2012). By focusing on something to be averted as opposed to an outcome to be achieved, we risk breeding complacency on one side of a boundary, and hopelessness on the other. To summarize the above: the biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in many and varied ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes in most components of the Earth system, but in a haphazard fashion, with responses often being weakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale. What we observe, for the global processes compiled in Table 8.1, is largely just the sum of all those changes. Acknowledging this reality should not be taken as diminishing the seriousness of these impacts or denying that major changes are occurring to the biosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere due to human activity. But it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable. Although the goal of sustainable stewardship of our planet is a laudable and an achievable one, the mechanisms and opportunities to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems lie mostly in targeted, localized actions (Jonas et al., 2014).', '']

[(0, 15), (58, 139), (240, 307)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Rutgers-Round5.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Rutgers-Round5.docx

af8e507b52267ad56f6eeac9f201092974b158dfb6d79c692e1f7a404ab85af8

Soko prolif now.

Kim 24, Associated Press. (*Hyung-jin and **Foster Klug, 1-13-2024, "South Koreans want their own nuclear weapons as deterrent to North Korea's burgeoning arsenal," Milwaukee Independent, https://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/newswire/south-koreans-want-nuclear-weapons-deterrent-north-koreas-burgeoning-arsenal/)

With dozens of nukes in No Ko ’s arsenal repeated threats to launch and a stream of tests South Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow a U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc s to defend the South knowing Pyongyang could kill millions with atomic retaliation 80% support their nation acquiring atomic weapons Seoul prefer nuc s of their own Trump suggested the alliance was transactional he sought closer ties with Kim demanded So Ko pay billions more to keep troops No matter how strong a commitment Biden makes now, if America-first becomes the next president Biden’s commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight support can be linked to No Ko ’s advancements and Ukraine showing So Ko even friendly nations may hesitate to help a country battling a nuclear enemy

The alliance with the U S has allowed So Ko to build a powerful democracy Until now With dozens of nukes in No Ko ’s burgeoning arsenal repeated threats to launch and a stream of tests South Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow a U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc s to defend the South attack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions with atomic retaliation . a strong majority of South Koreans 80% support their nation acquiring atomic weapons It reflects a surprising erosion of trust Nonprolif say a global nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing Seoul would prefer nuc s of their own Part of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of Trump Trump repeatedly suggested that the alliance , far from “ironclad,” was transactional Even as he sought closer ties with Kim Trump demanded So uth Ko rea pay billions more to keep American troops No matter how strong of a security commitment Biden makes now, if America-first becomes the next U.S. president , Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight South Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to No Ko ’s advancements and Ukraine Ukraine may be showing So uth Ko reans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear enemy We absolutely need nuc s

So Ko Until now dozens of nukes No Ko ’s burgeoning arsenal losing faith hesitate use nuc s kill millions atomic strong majority 80% acquiring atomic weapons nuc s Trump transactional closer ties Kim billions more how strong Biden America-first become a mere scrap of paper overnight No Ko ’s Ukraine Ukraine nuclear enemy absolutely need nuc s

['The alliance with the United States has allowed South Korea to build a powerful democracy, its citizens confident that Washington would protect them if Pyongyang ever acted on its dream of unifying the Korean Peninsula under its own rule. Until now. With dozens of nukes in North Korea’s burgeoning arsenal, repeated threats to launch them at its enemies, and a stream of tests of powerful missiles designed to pinpoint target a U.S. city with a nuclear strike, a growing number of South Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow to back its longtime ally. The fear is this: That a U.S. president would hesitate to use nuclear weapons to defend the South from a North Korean attack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions of Americans with atomic retaliation. Frequent polls show a strong majority of South Koreans — between 70% and 80% in some surveys — support their nation acquiring atomic weapons or urging Washington to bring back the tactical nuclear weapons it removed from the South in the early 1990s. It reflects a surprising erosion of trust between nations that like to call their alliance an unshakable cornerstone of America’s military presence in the region. “I think one day they can abandon us and go their own way if that better serves their national interests,” Kim Bang-rak, a 76-year-old security guard in Seoul, said of the United States. “If North Korea bombs us, we should bomb them equally in retaliation, so it would be better for us to have nukes.” Underscoring those fears: Just hours before the U.S.-South Korean tank drills began in Cheorwon, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw two ballistic missile test launches meant to simulate “scorched earth” nuclear strikes on South Korean command centers and airfields. At the heart of South Korean unease is a broader debate over who gets to have nuclear weapons, a question that has anguished nations since two U.S. nuclear bombs flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The sharp rise in support for South Korean nuclear weapons is not occurring in a vacuum. Nonproliferation experts say a vibrant global nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing. Nine countries — the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — spent nearly $83 billion in 2022 on nuclear weapons, according to a recent report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. That was an increase of $2.5 billion from 2021, with the United States alone spending $43.7 billion. How South Korea deals with the nuclear question could have major implications for Asia’s future, potentially jeopardizing the U.S.-South Korean alliance and threatening a delicate nuclear balance that has so far kept an uneasy peace in a dangerous region. * * * Ironclad. That was how the United States has long described its commitment to South Korea should a war begin. U.S. officials are adamant that any attack on Seoul by North Korea’s 1.2 million-member military would be met with an overwhelming response. The United States, bound by treaty to defend Seoul and Tokyo, stations 28,500 troops in South Korea and another 56,000 in Japan. Tens of thousands of Americans live in greater Seoul, a sprawling area of 24 million people about an hour’s drive from the inter-Korean border. “The ironclad commitment is not just words; it’s a reality. We’ve got thousands of troops right there,” Gen. Mark Milley, who was then the top U.S. military officer, recently told reporters in Tokyo. An attack, said the now-retired Milley, “would spell the end of North Korea.” Asked about the South Korean public’s support for creating its own nuclear force, Milley said, “The United States would prefer nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We think they’re inherently dangerous, obviously. And we have extended our nuclear umbrella to both Japan and South Korea.” South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik said recently that he and his U.S. counterpart signed a document in which Washington agreed to mobilize its full range of military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend the South from a North Korean nuclear attack. Many in Seoul, however, would prefer nuclear weapons of their own. North Korea’s only advantage over the South’s high-tech military is nuclear bombs, Kim Taeil, a recent university graduate, said in an interview. “So if South Korea gets nuclear weapons, we’ll secure an advantageous position where North Korea can’t rival us.” * * * While the idea of South Korea pursuing its own nukes has been around for decades, it was rarely mentioned in public by senior government officials. That changed in January when conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol said that his nation could “acquire our own nukes if the situation gets worse.” “It would not take long,” he said, while also raising the possibility of requesting that the United States reintroduce nuclear weapons into South Korea. At an April summit in Washington, Yoon and President Joe Biden took steps to address such South Korean worries. The result was the Washington Declaration, in which Seoul pledged to remain in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear weapons state, and the United States said it would strengthen consultations on nuclear planning with its ally. It also said it would send more nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula as a show of force. Not long after the meeting, the USS Kentucky became the first nuclear-armed U.S. submarine to visit South Korea since the 1980s. Opponents of South Korea obtaining nuclear weapons said they hope the declaration will reassure a nervous public. “No one can tell 100% for sure” whether a U.S. president would order nuclear strikes to defend Seoul if it meant the destruction of an American city, Wi Sung-lac, a former South Korean nuclear envoy, said in an interview at his Seoul office. That was why the greater consultations called for between the allies in the Washington Declaration are needed to “manage the situation (so) we can tone down public anger and frustration,” he said. Part of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of Donald Trump — and to his possible reelection in 2024. Trump, as president, repeatedly suggested that the alliance, far from “ironclad,” was transactional. Even as he sought closer ties with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump demanded South Korea pay billions more to keep American troops on its soil and questioned the need for U.S. military exercises with South Korea, calling them “very provocative” and “tremendously expensive.” “No matter how strong of a security commitment President Biden makes now, if someone who espouses isolationism and an America-first policy becomes the next U.S. president, Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight,” Cheong Seong-Chang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea, said in an interview. * * * South Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to North Korea’s extraordinary weapons advancements and to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. North Korea first tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland in 2017. While the North is still working to overcome technological hurdles with its ICBMs, the weapons have fundamentally changed the region’s security calculus. One of the poorest countries on Earth, North Korea may now have an arsenal of 60 nuclear weapons and has declared that it is deploying “tactical” missiles along the Korean border, implying its intent to arm them with lower-yield nuclear weapons. While the Koreas have avoided major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953, deadly skirmishes and attacks in recent years have killed dozens. If future violence escalates, some observers believe that North Korea, outmatched by U.S. and South Korean firepower and fearing for the safety of its leadership, could resort to using a tactical nuclear bomb. “There is probably no conventional-only scenario in Korea anymore,” according to Robert Kelly, a political science professor at Pusan National University in the South. “North Korea would rapidly lose a conventional conflict. Pyongyang knows this, dramatically raising the likelihood it will use nuclear weapons first, at least tactically.” Russia’s war against Ukraine may also be showing South Koreans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear-armed enemy. Kim’s visit earlier in 2023 to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and toured weapons facilities, has raised fears that North Korea could receive technology that would boost its nuclear program. “We absolutely need nuclear weapons. Basically, peace can be maintained only when we have equal power to (our enemy’s),” Kim Joung-hyun, a 46-year-old office worker in Seoul, said. “If you look at the Russian-Ukraine war, Ukraine can’t handle the Russian invasion on its own, other than begging for weapons from other countries.”']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Aff-ADA-Quarters.docx

Kansas

ReSo

63898440e844840bdf5d19240efc4c2518a6d687086454b96a7034759f5fef41

Expanding AI duties will be co-opted to expand embryonic personhood

Laitos 12, * Laitos, Professor of Law and John A. Carver, Jr. Chair in Natural Resources and Environmental Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; (2012, “”, Sturm College of Law, Faculty Scholarship, )

expanding standing to natural objects lead to slippery slope expansion to other nonhuman entities expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on fetus rights expanded standing grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right coupled with elimination of injury-in-fact could conceivably give zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum

expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion to other nonhuman entities expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication Although attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses is not a novel idea expanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right coupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement could conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum

natural objects slippery slope expansion non-human standing huge effect abortion question fetus rights expanded standing newly legal right elimination injury-in-fact conceivably zygote-embryo-fetus momentum

['2. EXPANDING STANDING TO OTHER NONHUMAN, NONNATURAL RESOURCES', 'Even in 1972, Stone recognized that expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion of standing to other nonhuman entities, such as computers.74 Can we envision a future where our laptops or smart phones or other wonders of modern technological advances could bring claims against humans, or one another, in courts? Could a virus-infected operating system bring a lawsuit against the programmer who created the virus? And, most certainly, expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication. Although attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses in order to represent rights of the unborn is not a novel idea, expanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right, coupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement, could conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum. The right of nonuse proposed here should be limited to natural and environmental resources whose nonuse component is endangered by human use.75 Neither computers nor embryos have Jan a similar nonuse dimension, and therefore the arguments advanced here do not logically extend to nonnatural resources.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Neg-4---Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Kansas

PaSe

e8ef052b8cb9678ec35650f452a4a89bbaa6f513f00cb5e6fa2bb41cd137cef8

Their deterrent effect signals willingness and cements credibility.

Geller 22 (Patty-Jane Geller, former senior policy analyst for nuclear deterrence and missile defense @ Heritage Foundation, MS in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College, 5-16-2022, "The Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile: Worth the Investment for Deterrence," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile-worth-the-investment-deterrence, accessed 9-29-2023)

Allies may question assurance should the U S ignore the disparity with Russia and China capability deployed in allies’ own regions reinforce that the U S is committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella because it is sea-based , the SLCM-N provide this without provoking protests against basing allies such as Japan and So Ko have the capabilities to produce their own nuc s

Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuc s in Europe or the Indo-Pac using its high-yield , strategic nuc s They may question U.S. assurance commitments in general should the U S ignore the growing disparity with Russia and China capability deployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the U S is committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella because it is sea-based , the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements NATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing allies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well Especially as allies such as Japan and So Ko have the tech capabilities to produce their own nuc s

question credibility limited employment nuc s Europe Indo-Pac high-yield nuc s assurance commitments general U S Russia China allies’ own regions reinforce U S nuclear umbrella sea-based additional requirements support SLCM-N improve deterrence without protests nuclear weapons basing question commitment nuclear force deterring Japan So Ko tech own nuc s

['', 'SLCM-N AND ALLIED ASSURANCE', 'Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuclear weapons in Europe or the Indo-Pacific using its high-yield, strategic nuclear forces. They may also question U.S. assurance commitments in general should the United States ignore the growing disparity with Russia and China. A nuclear capability that can be deployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the United States is committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella. Additionally, because it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements. For this reason, NATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing.', 'Maintaining allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella is critical as allies in Europe, and even more so the Indo-Pacific, become increasingly threatened by Russian and Chinese aggression. For instance, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson predicts that China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. At the same time, allies have reason to doubt U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, as the United States has sought to minimize its role in the world over the course of recent administrations. If the United States cannot modernize and maintain force levels of its own nuclear forces, allies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well. Especially as allies such as Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities to produce their own nuclear weapons, the United States must ensure its extended deterrence commitment remains credible. Developing the SLCM-N would aid in this effort.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-6---USNA-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

67f64da69347f64a910501661561bfa85152dae97b4c905ebf72b4fd99bf4f03

a---The Philippines---entrapment fears outweigh.

Jeffrey Hornung 22. Senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Former fellow for the Security and Foreign Affairs Program at Sasakawa USA and associate professor for the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Ph.D. in political science from George Washington University. M.A. in international relations with a concentration in Japan Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “Cases: The Philippines.” Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Indo-Pacific, Chapter 2, Pages 3-19.

it is extremely unlikely Manila host U.S. GBIRMs When U S withdrew Lorenzana lamented making Philippines target of China not reassurance that worries me being involved in war GBIRMs can never happen I will not allow it

it is extremely unlikely Manila host U.S. GBIRMs When the U nited S tates withdrew from the INF Treaty Lorenzana lamented U.S. move as potentially trigger ing nuclear arms race around the world signaled reluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines target of China fear of U.S. actions dragging Philippines into war with China It is not lack of reassurance that worries me It is being involved in war we do not seek and want any agreement by Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs provoke strong response from China GBIRMs can never happen will never happen because I will not allow it it’s a violation of the Constitution You cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines introduction of U.S. GBIRMs into Philippines is highly unlikely

extremely unlikely U S nuclear arms race lack of reassurance any agreement strong response never happen cannot highly unlikely

['Despite the pro-U.S. sentiment and the recent trend of improving U.S.-Philippine ties, as long as Manila views regional dynamics like the Duterte administration has, it is extremely unlikely that Manila would host U.S. GBIRMs. When the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty — despite stating that it was interested in developing only conventionally armed GBIRMs — Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana lamented the U.S. move as potentially “. . . trigger[ing] a nuclear arms race around the world.”44 He also signaled the reluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines a target of China, saying, “Should there be a shooting war and nuclear weapons would be used, I think the Philippines would be a fair target for anybody who’s against the United States.”45 Although not directly referring to GBIRMs, Lorenzana has also expressed his fear of U.S. actions dragging the Philippines into war with China. In speaking about U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea, Lorenzana said, “It is not the lack of reassurance that worries me. . . . It is being involved in a war that we do not seek and do not want.”46 Given that any agreement by the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs would provoke a strong response from China, Lorenzana’s sentiment is also applicable to hosting such capabilities, since their usage could potentially involve the Philippines in a conflict of which it is not a direct participant.', 'Duterte has also expressed reluctance. He has stated not only his refusal to host a permanent U.S. presence but also his refusal to host U.S. GBIRMs. Referencing troops, Duterte said, “. . . you have my solemn promise that I will never allow any foreign troops. . . . I will never allow them in my land.”47 Then, shifting to GBIRMs, he said, “That can never happen. That will never happen because I will not allow it. . . . it’s also a violation of the Constitution.”48 The exact violation he is citing is unclear, as the presence of foreign bases and troops is prohibited as are nuclear weapons. But given that Duterte said, “You cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines,” he may have been referring to nuclear-armed GBIRMs, even though — as mentioned earlier — the U.S. Department of Defense has emphasized that it is considering only conventionally armed GBIRMs.49 Should Duterte’s successors express similar concerns of becoming an unwanted participant in a war with China or a reluctance to host a permanent U.S. presence out of concerns of potentially violating the constitution, the introduction of U.S. GBIRMs into the Philippines is highly unlikely. ']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-HaWi-Neg-Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Emory

HaWi

3b2d695ce7d04b772b9c472de662ec3e88ca1e8fa8108e2339b690c666270198

4---Nuclear force reductions shift the focus to outcompeting in emerging technologies.

Heather Williams et al. 23, senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former senior lecturer (associate professor) in defense studies at King’s College London, PhD in war studies from King’s College London; Kelsey Hartigan is former senior adviser to the director of the U.S. Special Operations Command Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, MA from Georgetown University; Joseph Rodgers holds MA in nonproliferation and terrorism from the Middlebury Institute for International Studies; Reja Younis holds MA in international relations from the University of Chicago; “Alternative Nuclear Futures: Capability and Credibility Challenges for U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” May 2023, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/230508_Williams_AlternativeNuclearFutures.pdf?VersionId=hBDOOH8QVKZndCAssb9Hmyno36Hi6KHx

debates about the size and purpose of the nuclear arsenal will argue the U S should focus on conventional and advanced tech while pursuing nuc arms control the U S will need to compete in emerging disruptive tech risk of escalation will shift to the nonnuclear level to disi nfo gray zone , and cyber activities

future shifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal . Some will argue that the U S should focus on outco mpeting in conventional and advanced tech nologies while pursuing nuc lear arms control efforts the U S will need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive tech nologies as extended deterrence In this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear , but shift to the nonnuclear level in a new version of the stability-instability paradox the security landscape will look drastically different. The U S will need to develop responses to disi nfo rmation, gray zone , and cyber activities where competition with adversaries is less visible and harder to communicate to allies and publics

future shifting competition debates about the size purpose U.S. nuclear arsenal focus on outco mpeting conventional advanced tech nologies nuc lear arms control emerging and disruptive tech nologies not disappear gray zone cyber activities less visible

['A future defined by shifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the United States should use the stall in Russian and Chinese investment to outcompete them in nuclear capabilities, while continuing to compete in conventional and advanced technologies—though this will face significant domestic challenges. Others will argue that the United States should focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts, which may face domestic opposition but would strengthen the international nuclear regime if successful. In both cases, the United States will need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as a component of an extended deterrence strategy. In this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but rather shift to the nonnuclear level of conflict in a new version of the stability-instability paradox.', 'In a scenario of shifting competition, the security landscape will look drastically different. The United States and its allies will need to develop coherent and meaningful responses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities. In this future, the United States will have to rebuild alliance structures and convey the need for defense partnerships in a world where competition with adversaries is less visible and thus harder to communicate to allies and publics.']

[(8, 26), (279, 287), (458, 465), (571, 577)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Texas-Open-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

db4bc5beffc096b3f34ef5147e74b6ed8d86035ef6822fc4dee2fc2ce9b71e63

Slow growth undermines the rules-based order.

Haas 17 [Richard; January 10; President of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan; Penguin Press, “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order,” Print]

the burden of maintaining order will fall on the U S no group of countries has the capacity or mind-set Iran ISIS China and Russia climate trading terror or disease the domestic is national security Foreign policy begins at home the world cannot work absent the U S the U S cannot act if it does not have a foundation The better the U S is economically , the more available in resources to devote abroad without divisive debate The basic test will be growth

the burden of maintaining order at the global level will fall on the U S This is inevitable the U S is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order There is more than self-interest at stake certain actors are incompatible with U.S. interests . Examples include Iran ISIS China and Russia are actors and forces to contend with no country can contend with global climate a world trading system or successfully combat terror ism or disease the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia foreign policy is not enough what the U S does at home the domestic realm , is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the U S needs to put its house in order Foreign policy begins at home the world cannot come up with the elements of a work ing order absent the U S The U S is not sufficient , but it is necessary the U S cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation . National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the U S is doing economically , the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities respect for the U S will increase only if it is seen as successful The most basic test will be economic growth

maintaining order global level inevitable the most powerful country decades to come no other country group of countries the capacity the mind-set a global order certain actors incompatible U.S. interests actors and forces contend with global climate a world trading system foreign policy not enough home the domestic realm every bit as much a part of national security foreign policy begins a work ing order not sufficient necessary lead or act effectively a strong domestic foundation inevitably requires human, physical, and financial resources doing economically available the way of resources a divisive and distracting domestic debate respect only if The most basic test economic growth

['A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe.', 'It will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems.', 'Another reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges.', 'Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter.', 'When it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3', 'Earlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful.', 'The most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-texas-Round6.docx

Michigan

AgHs

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgHs/Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-texas-Round6.docx

d0d3b524544d2c08a2aca46ba12f9c317b39f9268366343c8a224f4fe008dbc5

4. New low yield options have removed ‘any doubt’ that it succeeds.

Miller ’19 [Franklin C.; March 6; foreign policy and nuclear defense policy expert, served 31 years in the U.S. government, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense and a Special Assistant to President George W. Bush; United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Outside Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Posture, “Outside Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Posture Update,” H.A.S.C. no. 116-9]

weakness in deterrent relates to escalate to de-escalate To remove any doubt D o D moved to deploy low-yield option and dispel misperceptions about will and capability warhead attacked on suggestion weapon is designed to mak war-fighting possibility . This flies in the face of policy Expanding flexible options is important for deterrence raise nuclear threshold ensure adversaries perceive no advantage in limited escal ation, making nuc less likely If you think world is dangerous envision it without a reliable deterrent effective force deters conventional aggression against NATO and Pacific . Would Putin attack Ukraine if Kyiv had nucl ? Would he be striking NATO if umbrella was not in place ? Would we resupply Ukraine without nuc deterrent ? questions answer themselves Now we should be clear deterring non-nuclear attack is vital

weakness in our deterrent relates to Russia's development of a military doctrine which envisages escalate to de-escalate To remove any such destabilizing doubt in the minds of Russia's leaders, the D epartment o f D efense has moved to deploy Trident II W-76 warheads to provide a low-yield option to counter the Russian strategy and to dispel miscalculation and misperceptions about US will and capability warhead has been attacked on a number of grounds. One particularly pernicious suggestion is that the weapon is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby mak ing nuclear war-fighting a real possibility . This criticism flies in the face of official policy which is stated unambiguously this is not intended to, nor does it enable , "nuclear war-fighting ." Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options is important for the preservation of credible deterrence It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escal ation, making nuc lear employment less likely some deterrence worst-case If you think the world is dangerous now , try envision ing it without a reliable nuclear deterrent an effective nuclear force deters not only nuclear attack but also conventional aggression against NATO and the Pacific . Would Putin have attack ed Ukraine if Kyiv had retained a nucl ear arsenal ? Would he be striking NATO if our nuclear umbrella was not in place ? Would we be able to resupply Ukraine without a strong nuc lear deterrent ? These questions answer themselves Now more than ever we should be clear that our nuclear deterrent plays many roles deterring a major non-nuclear strategic attack is vital

weakness envisages escalate to de-escalate any doubt D o D deploy warheads low-yield option dispel misperceptions will capability attacked pernicious lower mak war-fighting possibility flies in the face official policy unambiguously nor enable war-fighting flexible credible deterrence threshold no possible advantage escal nuc less likely

['The second weakness in our deterrent capabilities relates to Russia\'s development of a military doctrine which envisages the threat or even the actual use of low-yield nuclear weapons to "win" a conventional war. (This is commonly called the "escalate to win" or "escalate to de-escalate" strategy.) This Russian doctrine, which began to emerge in the late 1990\'s, explains why Moscow has modernized its shorter range nuclear forces- in order to provide the means to implement this doctrine and why Russia has carried out field exercises which feature the use of these weapons in this type of scenario. The intended effect is to increase the readiness of Russia\'s armed forces to carry out such attacks while simultaneously to coerce and intimidate NATO member states. That the Russian government embarked upon this effort, in the full face of existing U.S. nuclear forces, suggests strongly that the Russian military believes the U.S. and NATO lack an appropriate counter. To quote the NPR:', '"Russia\'s belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow\'s perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow\'s first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercises and statements. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative." (NPR p 53-54)', "To remove any such destabilizing doubt in the minds of Russia's leaders, the Department of Defense has moved to build and deploy a limited number of modified Trident II W-76 warheads to provide a low-yield option to counter the Russian strategy and to dispel miscalculation and misperceptions about US will and capability. This modest step deliberately eschewing any notion of mirroring the Russian investment in a wide series of low-yield tactical nuclear systems is designed to enter service in the near future.", 'The low-yield Trident warhead has been attacked on a number of different grounds. One particularly pernicious suggestion is that the weapon is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby making nuclear war-fighting a real possibility. This criticism flies in the face of official policy which is stated clearly and unambiguously in the NPR:', '"To be clear, this is not intended to, nor does it enable, "nuclear war-fighting." Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression. It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely." (NPR, p 54)', '5. Even if there’s some instability, deterrence is holding for worst-case scenarios. ', 'Edelman ’22 [Eric and Franklin Miller; May 19; counselor, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former defense undersecretary for policy from 2005 to 2009; foreign policy and nuclear defense policy expert, served 31 years in the U.S. government, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense and a Special Assistant to President George W. Bush; Defense One, “Nuclear vs. Conventional Spending? We Don’t Have that Luxury,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/nuclear-vs-conventional-spending-we-dont-have-luxury/367182/]', 'If you think the world is dangerous now, try envisioning it without a credible, safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.', 'Third, general arm-waving about cutting nuclear modernization costs begs the following questions: what is it specifically that opponents propose cutting? Should we abandon the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile in favor of keeping the 70-year-old Minuteman III? Do we buy fewer B-21 stealth bombers, which also have a conventional mission, just as they begin to enter full-scale production? Should we halt the assembly line that is building replacement SSBNs even as the existing Ohio-class boats will be forced to retire in the years ahead on safety grounds? Any of these would delay critical replacements for aging platforms in the field today as well as drive up overall program costs as procurement is stretched out and delayed.', 'Fourth, the notion that the White House’s Office of Management and Budget will provide separate line-items to fund triad modernization outside the defense budget is risible. Whether such special funds should exist, as they do in the UK to support Britain’s continuous at sea deterrent is an interesting philosophical question but not one that will help us negotiate the immediate challenges facing the United States’ defense establishment today.', 'Fifth, a clear-eyed look at the true cost of nuclear modernization will reveal that it constitutes between 2.5 and 3.0 percent of the defense budget. The operation and sustainment of the existing force accounts for another 3.5 to 4.0 percent. Simple arithmetic makes clear, therefore, that the percentage of the Defense Department budget not devoted to nuclear systems is about 93 percent. Looking to save money on the nation’s nuclear forces remains the “hunt for small potatoes” as David Mosher, the former director of the national security division of the Congressional Budget Office, described it some 20 years ago. It is no doubt for that reason that former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said that the cost of nuclear modernization is a small price to pay to deter an existential threat.', 'Finally, Ferrari’s thesis ignores the fundamental truth that an effective nuclear force deters not only nuclear attack but also conventional aggression against our treaty allies in NATO and the Pacific. Would Putin have attacked Ukraine if Kyiv had retained a nuclear arsenal? Would he be striking NATO if our nuclear umbrella, aged as it is, was not in place? Would we and other NATO members be able to resupply Ukraine without a strong nuclear deterrent? These questions answer themselves.', 'Now more than ever we should be clear that our nuclear deterrent plays many roles, and in the first instance deterring a major non-nuclear strategic attack is vital.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Dartmouth-RR-Round-1.docx

Emory

KeRa

66223b4fd19bb1f45261e44e1ddaccdabdd4ba55f5d8c46864145e988522d75c

2. Advantages 2 & 3---Partisan backlash destroys U.S. credibility AND modeling

William E. Kovacic 14, George Mason University Foundation Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, “Politics and Partisanship in U.S. Federal Antitrust Enforcement”, Antitrust Law Journal, Volume 79, Number 2, p. 710

Partisanship diminish stature with foreign agencies legitimacy of U.S. antitrust depends upon perceived motives Foreign observers may not respect a system which yield abrupt adjustments antitrust risks seeming capricious , unpredictable , and menacing ability of DOJ and FTC to encourage other jurisdictions to adopt practices may suffer if its own system is believed infirm

Partisanship can diminish the stature of the agency in interactions with foreign competition agencies . One reason involves the reputation of the U S abroad. In the eyes of foreign competition agencies , the legitimacy of the U.S. antitrust system depends partly upon the perceived motives that guide implementation Foreign observers may not respect a regulatory system in which regime changes yield abrupt adjustments in enforcement policy. An antitrust system that lacks a widely-accepted foundation of enduring principles risks seeming capricious , unpredictable , and menacing . Stark policy variations are only a presidential election away Foreign perceptions assume ever greater importance in a world of multiple competition authorities The ability of the DOJ and the FTC to encourage other jurisdictions to adopt sound practices and to resist destructive political influence may suffer if its own system is believed to be manifestly infirm

diminish the stature foreign competition agencies reputation U S eyes of foreign competition agencies legitimacy perceived motives not respect abrupt adjustments capricious unpredictable menacing only a presidential election away encourage other jurisdictions to adopt sound practices suffer own system believed manifestly infirm

['3. Reduced Influence Abroad ', 'Partisanship can diminish the stature of the agency in interactions with foreign competition agencies. One reason involves the reputation of the United States abroad. In the eyes of foreign competition agencies, the legitimacy of the U.S. antitrust system depends partly upon the perceived motives that guide implementation.90 Foreign observers may not respect a regulatory system in which regime changes yield abrupt adjustments in enforcement policy. An antitrust system that lacks a widely-accepted foundation of enduring principles risks seeming capricious, unpredictable, and menacing. Stark policy variations are only a presidential election away.', 'Foreign perceptions assume ever greater importance in a world of multiple competition authorities. Only a relatively short time ago, antitrust law was chiefly a concern of U.S. economic policy alone. Today over 120 jurisdictions have antitrust laws, and more are on the way.91 The United States participates in numerous endeavors to encourage acceptance of sound enforcement norms.92 The ability of the DOJ and the FTC to encourage other jurisdictions to adopt sound practices and to resist destructive political influence may suffer if its own system is believed to be manifestly infirm.']

[(11, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Round3.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Round3.docx

e5c11bddf35ca6ed1020e567a878f06f5e2f3a2a8e570015f3495e55b839c84f

The US economy is overwhelmingly resilient—shocks are priced in, thumped by a million things

Ip 17 - (Greg Ip, Chief Economics Commentator, The Wall Street Journal; 9-6-2017, WSJ, "Comfortably Numb: Why the U.S. Economy Shrugs Off Politics," 9-14-2021) url: https://www.wsj.com/articles/comfortably-numb-why-the-economy-shrugs-off-risks-from-nuclear-war-to-protectionism-1504717902

how much risk can the econ tolerate ? Quite a bit The government could shut down default treaties torn up Yet growth accelerated ahead of two major hurricanes political risk happened before and are quantifiable to businesses Big policy actions take their toll slowly What would overwhelm these ? nuclear war Political risk is a new normal It takes its toll slowly and at the margin

Just how much political risk can the U.S. econ omy tolerate ? Quite a bit , it seems The federal government could shut down It could default on its obligations if the debt ceiling isn’t raised. Trade treaties with Mexico, Canada and Korea may be torn up . North Korea has tested an apparent H-bomb Yet economic growth has remained largely unperturbed and may have even accelerated ahead of two major hurricanes . Stock prices remain near record highs . The reason for the dichotomy is that the impact of political risk depends on the risk . Government shutdowns , protectionism , presidential scandals , even conventional wars have happened before and are thus knowable and sometimes quantifiable to businesses , consumers and investors Faced with such risks, the usual reaction is to assume they won’t happen . Because political risk has been a constant , it has lost some of its shock value . Big policy actions such as rising trade barriers or reduced immigration do take their toll slowly , not in a spasm of panic selling and recession . What would overwhelm these coping mechanisms ? nuclear war . Political risk is part of a new normal . It takes its toll slowly and at the margin

political risk econ tolerate Quite a bit shut down default on its obligations debt ceiling torn up H-bomb largely unperturbed accelerated two major hurricanes record highs impact of political risk risk Government shutdowns protectionism scandals conventional wars happened before quantifiable to businesses assume they won’t happen political risk has been a constant shock value Big policy actions slowly panic selling recession coping mechanisms nuclear war new normal slowly at the margin

['', 'Just how much political risk can the U.S. economy tolerate? Quite a bit, it seems.', 'The federal government could shut down in a few weeks for lack of a budget. It could default on its obligations if the debt ceiling isn’t raised. Trade treaties with Mexico, Canada and Korea may be torn up.', 'North Korea has tested an apparent H-bomb and threatened to use it. And overseeing these challenges is an unpredictable and often-divisive president with associates embroiled in an investigation over ties to Russia.', 'Yet economic growth has remained largely unperturbed and, judging by the latest gross domestic product numbers, may have even accelerated ahead of two major hurricanes. Stock prices remain near record highs.', 'The reason for the dichotomy is that the impact of political risk depends on the risk. Government shutdowns, protectionism, presidential scandals, even conventional wars have happened before and are thus knowable and sometimes quantifiable to businesses, consumers and investors.', 'Federal default or nuclear war fall in the category of unprecedented and unthinkable. Faced with such risks, the usual reaction is to assume they won’t happen. Yet that assumption becomes a risk in itself: It alleviates the pressure to prepare for either and multiplies the damage if they do occur.', 'The outbreak of the global financial crisis a decade ago ushered in an era of elevated political risk, as illustrated by an index compiled by the academic economists Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom and Steven Davis that tracks mentions of economic policy uncertainty in newspapers. The U.S. mortgage meltdown was soon followed by the European sovereign debt crisis, a showdown over the U.S. debt ceiling in 2011, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union last year and the election of Donald Trump last fall.', 'Because political risk has been a constant, it has lost some of its shock value. Investors have in effect built that risk into their assumptions; their demand for safety is one reason government bond yields around the world are so low.', 'Since 2009, hedge funds as a group have positioned themselves for another meltdown like the subprime bust, says Jason Thomas, head of economic research at Carlyle Group, a private-equity manager. But “the same psychological factors that make ‘next subprime’ investment strategies seem more appealing,” he says, have also led businesses to favor cash retention or share buybacks over capital expenditure, and policy makers to regulate more. That depresses growth but also makes the economy less vulnerable to sudden shifts in sentiment.', 'As a result, hedge fund performance has suffered from strategies designed to profit from a meltdown that has yet to happen. With bearish psychology already so prevalent, actual selloffs have been brief and the VIX, the market’s so-called “fear gauge,” which is based on derivatives prices, has been subdued.', 'Those who watch politics and policy for a living—a sizable contingent on Wall Street and in Washington—tend to overestimate how many ordinary people do the same, and thus how much their behavior will change because of politics. In market economies, the natural rhythm of the business cycle easily drowns out politics. Big policy actions such as rising trade barriers or reduced immigration do take their toll, as the latest British data suggest, but slowly, not in a spasm of panic selling and recession.', 'What would overwhelm these coping mechanisms? Something previously unfathomable, like nuclear war.', 'No atomic weapons have been used since the U.S. dropped them on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The public assumes global leaders won’t let it happen again. As Capital Economics notes in a recent report, the market barely sold off during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the closest the world has come to nuclear war since 1945.', 'A nuclear attack on a U.S. ally, city or electrical grid via electromagnetic pulse is so alien to a business’s frame of reference that it can’t be planned for. On earnings calls with investors in the past three quarters, big companies have mentioned tax policy 1,024 times, immigration issues 40 times, and North Korea just 14 times, according to Hamilton Place Strategies.', 'But North Korea may be a less rational actor than the Soviet Union was in 1962. Mr. Trump’s willingness to go to war is also being underestimated, says Marc Sumerlin, a former economic aide to President George W. Bush who runs Evenflow Macro.', 'To say there’s no military solution is to say Americans must accept living within missile range of a country whose leader may be unstable, he says: “That’s not as easy a decision for someone who’s taken an oath to defend the country as it is for someone sitting in a think tank.”', 'As with nuclear war, the assumption the U.S. won’t default is based on the fact that it hasn’t done so since 1814, at least deliberately. It delayed payment on some Treasury bills in 1979 because of a technical glitch. Its refusal to repay some bonds in gold in 1933 also is considered by some a type of default.', 'The Fed and Treasury in 2011 drew up contingency plans if the debt ceiling wasn’t raised to prioritize debt payments over other obligations such as Social Security benefits. Yet the deepening dysfunction of U.S. lawmaking means default by accident is a recurrent threat.', 'Political risk is part of a new normal. It takes its toll slowly and at the margin as decisions to hire or invest are deferred, rethought or resized. But until the unthinkable happens, don’t expect it to tank the economy.', '', '']

[(0, 5)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Munson-Aff-Navy-Round2.docx

Minnesota

AmMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmMu/Minnesota-Amundsen-Munson-Aff-Navy-Round2.docx

30917db72dbfdc5d67f93b723c856ab3d442ff2685e86da7d86ea54b32bbb688

North won’t. It’s legally enshrined.

Josh Smith 22. “Kim Jong Un's 'decapitation' fears shine through in new North Korea nuclear law.” Reuters. 9/9/22. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kim-jong-uns-decapitation-fears-shine-through-new-nkorea-nuclear-law-2022-09-09/.

North enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes with Kim saying legislation makes nuclear status irreversible and bars denuclearisation talks

A new North Korean law calls for "automatic" nuclear launches if the country's leadership or command and control systems are threatened North Korea enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself with Kim saying the legislation makes the country's nuclear status " irreversible " and bars denuclearisation talks

enshrined the right irreversible bars denuclearisation talks

['SEOUL, Sept 9 (Reuters) - A new North Korean law calls for "automatic" nuclear launches if the country\'s leadership or command and control systems are threatened, underscoring leader Kim Jong Un\'s fears of a so-called "decapitation" strike, experts said. In an updated nuclear policy law passed on Thursday, North Korea enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself, with Kim saying the legislation makes the country\'s nuclear status "irreversible" and bars denuclearisation talks. ', '']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Neg-3---Navy-Round-2.docx

Emory

RuSh

0ea0242a2dcbab0fab3271bed80223f15615e54f9098ce334a4ad4d11553de11

Tort law alone is an enormous body of literature and fact-intensive law.

Lannetti 2K [David; Summer 2000; Associate at the law firm of Vandeventer Black LLP; Tort and Insurance Law Journal, “Toward a Revised Definition of ‘Product’ Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,” vol. 35]

Torts develop through the vast amount of law and lit In addition to summarizing attempts to persuade through recommended approaches demands unique flexibility based on the fact-intensive nature "[t]he task is to parse th [e] huge body of law

Torts develop through the vast amount of case law and legal lit In addition to summarizing the law a Restatement often attempts to persuade its readers through its recommended approaches to highly contentious issues A Torts Restatement further demands a unique degree of flexibility based on the fact-intensive nature of tort law "[t]he task of restaters is to parse th [e] huge body of case law

develop vast amount case law legal lit summarizing persuade recommended highly contentious Torts unique degree fact-intensive task parse huge body

['', 'II. The Evolution of the Torts Restatement of the Law', 'A Restatement of the Law holds a unique place within our legal system. Although a Restatement is developed entirely by the ALI,14 a private organization comprised of a group of judges, law professors, and attorneys,15 it generally is highly regarded in the legal field because it rests on the premise that the law can be improved through a distillation of the vast amount of case law and legal literature into "clear statements of the rules of the common law."16 In addition to summarizing the law within a given field, a Restatement often attempts to persuade its readers through its recommended approaches to highly contentious issues.17 This attempt at per suasion has been both criticized and praised by scholars; some contend that a Restatement should consist of merely a compilation of existing law, while others support a Restatements ostensible role in improving the law through recommended legal interpretations.18 A Torts Restatement further demands a unique degree of flexibility based on the fact-intensive nature of tort law.19', '<<FOOTNOTE 17 BEGINS>>', 'See Shapo, supra note 13, at 682 (claiming that a Restatement may be able to "distill wisdom on hotly disputed matters"). Professor Shapo identifies three basic approaches to Restatements of the Law: a "reductionist" approach, in which reporters of the Restatements merely "count[] the decisions and select[] the majority rule"; an approach that is "case centered, incremental, and focused on reasoned development," whereby reporters "seek wisdom and excellence in their choice of legal rules"; and a "frank legislative approach," in which reporters are "candidly responsive to competing political interests." Id. at 634-35. As the co reporters of the Products Liability Restatement opine, "[t]he task of restaters is to parse th[e] huge body of case law, to discern the major themes, and to articulate those themes in rules of law." James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 667, 682 (1998)', '<<FOOTNOTE 17 ENDS>>', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-NDT-Round-8.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

9044bb96f8001c10e4c693d1c3bf68c3be37ec6f12585c8f0d31d78c8476496e

No bioterror impact

Lentzos 14 (Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, )

bioterror concern is a myth experts believe risk to be small backed by historical evidence attempts were small-scale knowledge and resources necessary for scaling storage, and dissemination. present significant barriers medical countermeasures blunt the impact

Those who have overemphasized bioterror portray it as an imminent concern , with emphasis on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks This is a myth assumption is that terrorists would seek mass-casualty weapons leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe the risk of large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small . This is backed by historical evidence attempts in the past were small-scale assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These present significant barriers Even if a weapon were disseminated successfully medical countermeasures , such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack .

overemphasized imminent concern high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks mass-casualty weapons leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small . historical evidence small-scale It does not. scaling up, storage, and dissemination. significant barriers Even if medical countermeasures , significantly blunt the impact of an attack

['', 'The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.¶ The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ¶ The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.¶ Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Round5.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Round5.docx

7f4dfb846528164cacb5e18e5404c9aad204c7755ade97c16bb5d64f4b958961

Plank 1 solves populism terminal.

Richard N. Haass & Charles A. Kupchan 21. *President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Former Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. *Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and was Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council. “The New Concert of Powers”. Foreign Affairs. 3-23-2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-03-23/new-concert-powers

global concert of major powers Fashioning major-power consensus on international norms advancing shared approaches to crises to preserve peace in a multipolar world China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States relying on dialogue to build consensus

The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions Fashioning major-power consensus on international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises to preserve peace in a multipolar world A global concert would have six members China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty include sponsoring terrorists

global concert of major powers Fashioning major-power consensus on international norms advancing shared approaches to crises to preserve peace in a multipolar world China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States dialogue to build consensus sponsoring terrorists

['The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.', 'Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences.', 'A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope.', 'Fashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible. ', 'A GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY', 'A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop.', 'Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey.', 'A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests.']

[(11, 18), (30, 40)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-2%20-%20Kentucky-Round3.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-2%2520-%2520Kentucky-Round3.docx

dc3f9bae14feceaa82f1c8c9cdef268e6cc676f03e7be700b330f06e13e375a1

Only patents disseminate the process of AI learning and enable reproducible innovation.

Quach ’22 [Katyanna; July 9; covers artificial intelligence, scientific research, accelerator chips for machine-learning, and other topics; “AI inventors may find it difficult to patent their tech under today's laws,” ]

Fast evolving tech pushing limits of IP rules bad decisions result in a stranglehold on competition Publishing patents disseminates knowledge , Inventors have to describe their work in a way that someone can understand and reproduce Neural networks aren't easily explainable reproducibility difficult in m l acceptance rate for AI patents dropped following the Court decision in Alice vs CLS ruling had chilling effect on applications lack of consistency and clarity in patent laws has discouraged investment also led foreclose protection entirely for important inventions

Fast evolving tech nologies are pushing the limits of today's IP policies and rules bad decisions could result in a stranglehold on competition among public and private AI creators AI is already impacting most industries and many aspects of our society Publishing patents disseminates valuable knowledge , giving engineers and scientists ideas on how to advance technologies or invent new ones. Inventors Not only do they have to demonstrate their invention is novel , non-obvious, and useful, they have to describe their work in a way that someone skilled in the same field can understand and reproduce it . And here's the rub. Neural networks aren't easily explainable . The number-crunching process that seemingly magically transforms input data into an output is often opaque and not interpretable. Experts often don't know why a model behaves the way it does, making it difficult for patent examiners to assess the nitty-gritty details of an application Furthermore, reproducibility is notoriously difficult in m achine l earning Medical data taken from real patients to train an algorithm that can detect tumors Full disclosure of the system may also reveal proprietary information The USPTO previously hit a stumbling block when it came to applying patent law to AI inventions. Mary Critharis, USPTO's chief policy officer and director for international affairs, noted the acceptance rate for AI patents dropped in comparison to non-AI inventions in 2014 following the US Supreme's Court decision in the Alice Corp vs CLS Bank International case The Supreme Court ruling may therefore have had a chilling effect on AI patent applications and acceptance a group of US senators said there is " a lack of consistency and clarity in patent eligibility laws ," The lack of clarity has not only discouraged investment in critical emerging technologies, but also led the courts to foreclose protection entirely for certain important inventions in the diagnostics, biopharmaceutical, and life sciences industries , Clear guidance from the USPTO is helpful in encouraging inventors But advice only goes so far. US courts, ultimately, have the final say in these matters And it's not clear if and how AI-generated technologies can be patented Current US laws, at least, only recognize IP produced by "natural persons" much to the chagrin of one man Stephen Thaler sued Andrei Iancu, the former director of the patent office, when his application listing a neural network system named DABUS as an inventor was rejected It could get interesting if people start filing patents for inventions devised and optimized by automated machine-learning algorithms The USPTO cannot definitively answer all these questions; some of these issues will have to be tried and tested in court

stranglehold on competition disseminates valuable knowledge understand and reproduce it reproducibility

['Future AI could be a challenge for US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) officials, who need to wrap their heads around complex technology that\'s perhaps not quite compatible with today\'s laws. Under the Department of Commerce, the USPTO\'s core mission is to protect intellectual property, or IP. Creators file patent applications in hope of keeping competitors from copying their inventions without permission, and patents are supposed to allow businesses to thrive with their own novel designs while not stifling wider innovation. Fast evolving technologies, such as deep learning, are pushing the limits of today\'s IP policies and rules. Clerks are trying to apply traditional patent approval rules to non-trivial machine-learning inventions, and bad decisions could result in a stranglehold on competition among public and private AI creators. We all know how overly broad patents on software and other technology can make it past USPTO, causing headaches for years to come. "AI is already impacting most industries and many aspects of our society," Kathi Vidal, the agency\'s director and a former engineer, said during the inaugural meeting of the AI and Emerging Technologies (ET) Partnership Series held virtually last month. "AI and emerging technologies have the potential to dramatically improve our day-to-day lives. They will provide countless and unpredictable benefits to our social well-being not just here in the United States, but around the world. But the bottom line is, we need to get this right. "We need to make sure we\'re setting laws, policies and practices that benefit the US and the world." Publishing patents disseminates valuable knowledge, giving engineers and scientists ideas on how to advance technologies or invent new ones. Inventors have to meet a list of criteria in order for their applications to be considered. Not only do they have to demonstrate their invention is novel, non-obvious, and useful, they have to describe their work in a way that someone skilled in the same field can understand and reproduce it. And here\'s the rub. Neural networks aren\'t easily explainable. The number-crunching process that seemingly magically transforms input data into an output is often opaque and not interpretable. Experts often don\'t know why a model behaves the way it does, making it difficult for patent examiners to assess the nitty-gritty details of an application. Furthermore, reproducibility is notoriously difficult in machine learning. Developers need access to a model\'s training data, parameters, and/or weights to recreate it. Providing this information in a patent application may satisfy examiners, but it may not be in the interests of the inventors or the wider public. Medical data taken from real patients to train an algorithm that can detect tumors, for example, is sensitive and opens up all sorts of risks if it is handed over for government agency workers to process, publish, and store. Full disclosure of the system may also reveal proprietary information. It may be easier in some cases to not patent the technology at all. The USPTO previously hit a stumbling block when it came to applying patent law to AI inventions. Mary Critharis, USPTO\'s chief policy officer and director for international affairs, noted the acceptance rate for AI patents dropped in comparison to non-AI inventions in 2014 following the US Supreme\'s Court decision [PDF] in the Alice Corp vs CLS Bank International case. Justices ruled CLS could not have infringed Alice\'s financial computer software patent, because it was too abstract. Like laws of nature and natural phenomena, abstract ideas can\'t ordinarily be patented. The Supreme Court ruling may therefore have had a chilling effect on AI patent applications and acceptance, as they too may have been assumed to be too abstract, at least until further guidance was issued to patent examiners on how to deal with abstract designs. "[The data] provides some suggestive evidence that the Alice decision impacted AI technologies," said Critharis. "The allowance rate stayed below the non-AI application rate until about 2019. The reason for this was that in 2019, the USPTO had issued revised subject matter eligibility guidance," she continued, referring to the advice discussed here [PDF]. "I think this is the reason why we\'re seeing an increase in allowance rates, but there was definitely an impact of the Alice decision on AI related applications." As machine learning evolves, and more patents are applied for and picked apart in court, we could see another dip in allowance rates. Last year, a group of US senators said there is "a lack of consistency and clarity in patent eligibility laws," and asked the USPTO to clarify what inventions are patentable and why. "The lack of clarity has not only discouraged investment in critical emerging technologies, but also led the courts to foreclose protection entirely for certain important inventions in the diagnostics, biopharmaceutical, and life sciences industries," they wrote in a letter. Clear guidance from the USPTO is helpful in encouraging inventors to file patents more successfully. But advice only goes so far. US courts, ultimately, have the final say in these matters. And, separately, it\'s not clear if and how AI-generated technologies can be patented. Who owns the IP rights of art, music, or writing created using generative models? These creations riff off existing content and can mimic certain styles. Do they violate copyright? Can these models be listed as inventors if they create content? Current US laws, at least, only recognize IP produced by "natural persons" much to the chagrin of one man. Stephen Thaler sued Andrei Iancu, the former director of the patent office, when his application listing a neural network system named DABUS as an inventor was rejected. It could get interesting if, as some legal experts believe, people start filing patents for inventions devised and optimized by automated machine-learning algorithms. These inventions may not be entirely novel but the way in which they were produced was; will these be accepted, or is it an obvious rejection? The USPTO cannot definitively answer all these questions; some of these issues will have to be tried and tested in court.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Ziggy-ONLINE-Wayne-State-Round-6.docx

Michigan

McSk

7f7aa199d9c2293d8440cf768fa686d59822b8f9bab1b41766f20181a21bbd68

Nuclear war massively ratchets up all forms of oppression and crushes necessary space for critical response

Martin 12 – Brian Martin, Professor Emeritus in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, at the University of Wollongong (Australia), PhD and MSc in Theoretical Physics from the University of Sydney, BA in Physics from Rice University, Vice President of Whistleblowers Australia, “Reform - When Is It Worthwhile?”, Anarchist Studies, Volume 20, Number 2, Autumn, p. 61-68 [language modified]

nuclear war, as well as causing devastation could usher in a much more repressive world order 9/11 provided the pretext for a massive expansion of the security state; a nuclear attack, even if limited, would offer a far stronger rationale

Ever since the development of nuclear weapons, peace campaigners have opposed them. There have been two major mobilisations against nuclear weapons, the first in the late 50s and early 60s and the second in the early 80s Wittner, in his comprehensive study of anti-nuclear-weapons campaigning argues that movements have had a crucial impact on governments: when there is little opposition, states proceed with greater nuclear deployment, whereas public protest has restrained government leaders. To the extent that anti-bomb campaigning has prevented nuclear war , or reduced the risk , it has made a vital contribution to struggles for a better world , because nuclear war, as well as causing massive devastation to humans and the environment, could also usher in a much more repressive world order 9/11 provided the pretext for a massive expansion of the security state; a nuclear attack, even if relatively limited, would offer a far stronger rationale

50s 60s 80s comprehensive study crucial impact restrained prevented nuclear war reduced the risk vital contribution to struggles for a better world usher in a much more repressive world order pretext massive expansion far stronger rationale

['Opposition to nuclear weapons', 'If war is the health of the state, nuclear weapons are the health of state terror: the very threat of nuclear attack is a type of state terrorism.[23] Nuclear weapons were at the core of the cold war. Leaders of dominant nuclear states still use the alleged nuclear threat from some enemy state - Iraq, Iran, and others - as justification for their own arsenals and for repressive policies including surveillance of the population and criminalisation of internal dissent on national security.', 'Ever since the development of nuclear weapons, peace campaigners have opposed them. There have been two major mobilisations against nuclear weapons, the first in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the second in the early 1980s. At other times the issue has not had the same prominence, yet many campaigners have continued efforts against the nuclear threat.', 'Lawrence Wittner, in his comprehensive study of anti-nuclear-weapons campaigning,[24] argues that movements have had a crucial impact on governments: when there is little opposition, states proceed with greater nuclear deployment, whereas public protest has restrained government leaders. To the extent that anti-bomb campaigning has prevented nuclear war, or reduced the risk, it has made a vital contribution to struggles for a better world, because nuclear war, as well as causing massive devastation to humans and the environment, could also usher in a much more repressive world order.[25] The terrorist attacks on 9/11 provided the pretext for a massive expansion of the security state; a nuclear attack, even if relatively limited, would offer a far stronger rationale.', '']

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ndtceda

MichiganState-JaSc-Neg-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

JaSc

2c94df76329a5ea4b48e271a3f7a865074728cc858464548f820ce1d31e3143c

High threshold for pre-emption—states are permitted to expand antitrust beyond federal law.

Samp 14—(chief counsel at the Washington Legal Foundation, JD from University of Michigan). Richard A. Samp. 2014. “The Role of State Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis”. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. Volume 15, Issue 1, Article 14. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=mjlst.

The Supreme Court rejected that state antitrust is preempted whenever it diverges from federal law . For example Under federal law , only direct purchasers are permitted to sue . In contrast, laws from states permitted recovery by indirect purchasers . The Supreme Court rejected the assertion that federal antitrust law was a ceiling on anticompetitive conduct . “Congress intended federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace , state antitrust . the Supremacy Clause arises when “ compliance with federal regulations is a physical impossibility

Congress has passed laws over the past 125 years designed to prevent businesses from engaging in anticompetitive conduct . the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very trust in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States .” Many states have also adopted antitrust statutes . state courts routinely interpret state antitrust laws in ways that diverge sharply from federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected claims that state antitrust law is preempted whenever it diverges from federal antitrust law . For example , the Court permitted Attorneys General of Alabama , Arizona , California , and Minnesota to file antitrust claims under their respective state laws against cement producers even though those state government s , because they did not purchase cement directly but rather purchased only through intermediaries , would not have been proper plaintiffs under federal antitrust law. Under federal law , when producers conspire to fix prices, only direct purchasers , and not subsequent indirect purchasers , are permitted to sue to recover losses as a result of the conspiracy . In contrast, antitrust laws from the four states permitted recovery by indirect purchasers . The Supreme Court rejected the defendant cement producers’ assertion that federal antitrust law was intended to serve as a ceiling on businesses’ liability for engaging in anticompetitive conduct . It stated, “Congress intended federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace , state antitrust remedies . on several prior occasions , the Court has recognized that the federal antitrust laws do not preempt state law.” On the other hand state antitrust laws—like all state laws—are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Supremacy Clause and are impliedly preempt ed to the extent that they conflict with federal law. Such a conflict arises when “ compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility ,”

Congress anticompetitive conduct trade or commerce among the several States states antitrust statutes diverge U.S. Supreme Court rejected state antitrust preempted diverges federal antitrust law Alabama Arizona California Minnesota file antitrust claims cement producers state s directly through intermediaries federal law direct purchasers indirect purchasers recover losses antitrust laws from the four states indirect purchasers rejected the defendant cement producers’ assertion that federal antitrust law was intended to serve as a ceiling on businesses’ liability for engaging in anticompetitive conduct supplement, not displace several prior occasions do not preempt On the other hand Supremacy Clause preempt compliance federal and state physical impossibility

['', 'Congress has passed a series of laws over the past 125 years designed to prevent businesses from engaging in anticompetitive conduct that results in higher prices for consumers. Most prominently, it adopted the Sherman Act in 1890.4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form or trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”5 Among the types of agreements deemed to constitute per se violations of section 1 are agreements among competitors to limit output.6', 'Many states have also adopted antitrust statutes. While those laws tend to be similar to federal law, their language is not identical, and state courts routinely interpret state antitrust laws in ways that diverge sharply from federal law.7 For example, California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act,8 diverges in a number of respects from federal antitrust law. The California Supreme Court recently cautioned, “[i]nterpretations of federal antitrust law are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing the Cartwright Act . . . .”9', 'The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected claims that state antitrust law is preempted whenever it diverges from federal antitrust law. For example, the Court permitted the Attorneys General of Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota to file antitrust claims under their respective state laws against a group of cement producers even though those state governments, because they did not purchase cement directly from the producers but rather purchased only through intermediaries, would not have been proper plaintiffs under federal antitrust law.10 Under federal law, when producers conspire to fix prices, only direct purchasers, and not subsequent indirect purchasers, are permitted to sue to recover losses incurred as a result of the conspiracy.11 In contrast, antitrust laws from the four states permitted recovery by indirect purchasers.12 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant cement producers’ assertion that federal antitrust law was intended to serve as a ceiling on businesses’ liability for engaging in anticompetitive conduct.13 It stated, “Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies. And on several prior occasions, the Court has recognized that the federal antitrust laws do not preempt state law.”14', 'On the other hand, state antitrust laws—like all state laws—are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,15 and are impliedly preempted to the extent that they conflict with federal law.16 Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”17 or when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”18 On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has concluded that state antitrust law is preempted because it conflicts with a federal statute other than federal antitrust law.19', '', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Northwestern%20Season%20Opener-Round4.docx

Minnesota

FrPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/FrPa/Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Northwestern%2520Season%2520Opener-Round4.docx

4f2ab4601f224ea8094885c0a2caf58c63e0a49b47bceb2480a207e0b257f03b

It’s impossible

Babones 15 Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology & social policy at the University of Sydney, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12, 2015, “Is China a threat? The Devil’s in the details”, http://salvatorebabones.com/is-china-a-threat/

no country has staged a large amphibious assault since 50 The Chinese military will never have the capacity It can’t be done a single missile can sink a ship carrying thousands It is not possible

China’s growing military sounds like a regional menace. But to whom? Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large -scale amphibious assault since 19 50 For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale or launched from land bases The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible . China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China have historically been interested in pushing.

But to whom? Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large -scale amphibious assault since 19 50 The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops not technically possible .

['What about regional conflict? China’s growing military certainly sounds like a regional menace. But a menace to whom? Here again the details get in the way of the China threat story. To the east, Japan’s government is responding to Chinese expansion by boosting its own defense spending to record levels, proposing to change its pacifist constitution to allow greater military flexibility, and making a renewed push to resolve the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute with Russia. If Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally succeeds in making peace with Russia, that would leave China and its ally North Korea as the sole focus for Japan’s entire military capacity. Japan is a rich, technologically advanced country of 127 million people. It can look after itself. For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan. Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950. For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq). The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible. The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto. China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They’re all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw.', '']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-wake-Round4.docx

Michigan

AgHs

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgHs/Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-wake-Round4.docx

7786874feaf47e9d2e6f84d3655be729bda1e8bc726c0bea29edbcc11afcf40b

3 – Mismatch between knowledge and activity – malfunctions are likely and trigger a global domino effect.

Curran ’20 [Dean; Assistant Professor in Sociology @ University of Calgary, PhD in Sociology; “Connecting risk: Systemic risk from finance to the digital,” Economy and Society 49(2), p. 239-264; AS]

world is littered with silos complex systems, alongside lead to crisis programs exhibit complexity beyond comprehension monopolistic model creates interdependencies as companies insert as universal breakdown in websites traced back to malfunctioning of AWS due to a typo error started a domino effect outage damaged 54 of the top 100 retailers AWS has become responsible for the internet running’ underpin our life complexity is intensified b monopolistic

pre-crisis finance also mismatch between knowledge and activity The modern world is littered with silos pockets of specialist knowledge where technical experts work in mental and structural silos these silos are proliferating our world is becoming more technologically complex by the day’ we are witnessing an even more dangerous process in which we have a dual process of the production of increasingly complex and interconnected systems, alongside increasingly narrow, cordoned bases of knowledge and responsibility for those who are cumulatively producing this externalized complexity This process is clearly on display in the lead -up to the financial crisis digital economy manifests extreme mismatches between the scope of knowledge of those developing computing programs and the interdependencies that emerge on top of them computer programs exhibit a level of complexity well beyond the comprehension of a single person or group of people Alongside then is a massive mismatch between the extremely small part of an overall program that any one set of programmers develop and understand which even then can contain flaws in itself and the intersections of these units into larger systemic fragilities across the network As interactive complexities build on top of interconnected and low redundancy systems and intensify the problems emerging from these features, this mismatch intensifies problems of interactive complexity problems of interactive complexity are amplified by how tightly-coupled computing systems can be massive automated systems can be [ harmed ] by even a single mistake the emerging monopolistic business model of the digital economy creates greater interdependencies as large digital companies seek to insert themselves as a universal ly necessary part of the ‘stack’ of digital computing services cascading failure of websites exemplifies how interconnectedness and complexity interacts with mismatches and the massive ramifications actions can have In February 2017, several websites stopped functioning this breakdown in availability of these websites and services was traced back to the malfunctioning of AWS The malfunctioning occurred due to a single typo by an Amazon employee employee was debugging a billing system and ended up taking offline more servers than were intended This ‘ error started a domino effect that took down two other server subsystems and so on AWS also suffered a significant outage due to human error in 2011 upgrading its primary servers traffic that the server manages was sent to a back-up server rather than the rest of the network. This back-up server was not intended to handle this much higher level of traffic , thus causing traffic to get ‘ stuck’ massive outage is estimated to have damaged business of 54 of the top 100 internet retailers , with an estimated total economic impact of $150 million Reflecting on the systemic importance of a single cloud computing company, it was noted that AWS has become responsible for keeping much of the internet running’ and that ‘AWS has come to underpin so much of our daily life at we hardly even notice how important it’s become — until it stops working’ the cascading impacts of AWS outages continue to be felt. As with interconnectedness and low redundancy growing complexity and mismatch between knowledge and impacts in the digital economy, though shaped by the technology is not an inevitable dimension of the technology , but massively intensified b y monopolistic characteristics of the digital economy and the goal of digital giants to grow as large as quickly as possible (

mismatch silos specialist knowledge proliferating technologically complex production externalized complexity financial crisis digital economy extreme mismatches interdependencies well beyond single person group of people larger systemic fragilities interactive complexities interconnected low redundancy systems interactive complexity automated systems harmed single mistake monopolistic business model digital economy universal ly necessary digital computing services cascading failure mismatches massive ramifications functioning breakdown malfunctioning AWS single typo Amazon employee billing system domino effect AWS outage primary servers back-up server traffic stuck’ massive outage 54 of the top 100 $150 million systemic importance become responsible for keeping much of the internet running’ so much of our daily life cascading impacts growing complexity technology not an inevitable dimension massively intensified monopolistic characteristics digital economy as large quickly as possible

['Mismatches between scope of knowledge and activity', 'In addition to high interconnectedness, low redundancy and high interactive complexity, pre-crisis finance also exhibited a significant mismatch between the scope of knowledge and activity. As Tett (2009, p. xiv) argues ‘The modern world is littered with these silos – pockets of specialist knowledge, where technical experts work in mental and structural silos. Indeed, these silos are proliferating, for as the pace of innovation speeds up, and spreads further and further around the globe, our world is becoming more technologically complex by the day’. As such, while Tett (2009, 2015) primarily focuses her critique on increasing silos of knowledge, as her quote suggests we are witnessing an even more dangerous process in which we have a dual process of the production of increasingly complex and interconnected systems, alongside the increasingly narrow, cordoned bases of knowledge and responsibility for those who are cumulatively producing this externalized complexity. This process is clearly on display in the lead-up to the financial crisis.', 'While, as discussed above, the complexity of interconnections between Mortgage Backed Securities grew the scope of knowledge of its producers did not correspondingly grow – in fact, in many ways it constricted. Rather than carefully investigating the different potential risks, ‘Mortgage lending had become an assembly-line affair in which loans were made and then quickly reassembled into bonds immediately sold to investors’ (Tett, 2009, p. 112). Even when key additional layers of complexity were added through the development of ABS CDOs, there was little additional knowledge or orientation to the additional connections that were being generated. Ultimately, the primary knowledge base and orientation of the producers and sellers of ABS CDOs was how to attain the desired credit rating on these investments – all other portions of complexity were externalized by the vast majority of those formulating these investments. Consequently, once the model of the Gaussian copula was identified as a way to solve the problem of estimating correlations, the complexities were neglected, with the Gaussian copula functioning as the ‘combustion engine of the CDO world’ (Tett 2009, p. 119–122). As MacKenzie’s (2011) discussion of different clusters of evaluation practices likewise shows, those who made and rated the ABS CDOs lacked a sufficient basis of knowledge to fully understand their actual activity – both in terms of the vulnerabilities of the investments they packaged and the vulnerability of the financial system to these extremely complex investment vehicles. As emphasized above, these mismatches between knowledge and activity not only left open the potential for creating extremely risky financial transactions, but also tended to shield those who created and benefitted from the risk from responsibility for the consequences of these risks.', 'The digital economy likewise manifests extreme mismatches between the scope of knowledge of those developing computing programs and the interdependencies that emerge on top of them. As emphasized above, contemporary computer programs exhibit a level of complexity well beyond the comprehension of a single person or group of people. Alongside this complexity then is a massive mismatch between the extremely small part of an overall program that any one set of programmers develop and understand – which even then can contain flaws in itself (Schneier, 2018) – and the emergent intersections of these units into larger systemic fragilities across the network. As interactive complexities build on top of interconnected and low redundancy systems and intensify the problems emerging from these features, this mismatch between scope of knowledge and activity intensifies these problems of interactive complexity. Moreover, problems of interactive complexity are amplified by how tightly-coupled computing systems can be – massive automated systems can be disabled [harmed] by even a single mistake as computers do not possess the type of hermeneutic interpretability that living agents do (see Kernighan, 2017). Yet, it is not only the physical nature of computing that leads to the potential for a single mistake to cascade through a computing device; the emerging monopolistic business model of the digital economy creates greater interdependencies as large digital companies seek to insert themselves as a universally necessary part of the ‘stack’ of digital computing services (Nunan & Di Domenico, 2017). An illustrative example, the cascading failure of websites in February 2017, exemplifies well how the interconnectedness and complexity of the web interacts with mismatches between the knowledge of specific individuals and the massive ramifications that their actions can have.', 'In February 2017, several websites on the East Coast of the United States stopped functioning properly, including the websites of Slack, GitHub, GitLab, Quora, Medium, Expedia, Adobe Cloud, with reports of Xero, SiriusXM, and Nest internet-connected devices also ceasing to function properly (Nichols, 2017). In fact, outage monitoring sites DownDetector and isitdownrightnow.com were also not functioning properly due to the overloading of the sites because of a massive spike in internet users checking on the functionality of these other websites (Nichols, 2017). Ultimately, this five-hour breakdown in availability of these websites and services was traced back to the malfunctioning of Amazon Web Services (AWS), a core cloud computing provider. The malfunctioning had occurred due to a single typo by an Amazon employee. The employee was debugging a billing system and ended up taking offline more servers than were intended. This ‘error started a domino effect that took down two other server subsystems and so on … ’ (Del Rey, 2017). AWS had also suffered a significant outage due to human error years earlier in 2011. In upgrading its primary servers, the traffic that the server usually manages was sent to a back-up server rather than being sent to the rest of the network. This back-up server was not intended to handle this much higher level of traffic, thus causing a significant amount of the traffic to get ‘stuck’. Despite this single mistake of redirection to the back-up server, if the system had functioned properly, the problem would not have cascaded in this way, but this mistake interacted with other as of yet previously unidentified bugs, thus amplifying the breakdown in service (Goldman, 2011).', 'The massive outage in February 2017 is estimated to have damaged the business of 54 of the top 100 internet retailers, with an estimated total economic impact of $150 million (Bort, 2017). This has led to the incident being described as ‘Amazon and the $150 million typo’ (Hersher, 2017). Reflecting on the systemic importance of a single cloud computing company, it was noted that AWS has ‘quietly become responsible for keeping much of the internet running’ and that ‘AWS has come to underpin so much of our daily life that we hardly even notice how important it’s become — until it stops working’ (Swearingen, 2018). Yet, different parts of AWS malfunctioned again in September 2017 and then in March 2018, hitting Alexa, Slack and Capital One. While Amazon apologized and promised changes, the cascading impacts of AWS outages continue to be felt. As with interconnectedness and low redundancy, the growing complexity and mismatch between knowledge and impacts in the digital economy, though shaped by the technology, is not an inevitable dimension of the technology, but rather massively intensified by the monopolistic characteristics of the digital economy and the goal of digital giants to grow as large as quickly as possible (see Hindman, 2018).']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-ChangDeutsch-Aff-Kentucky-Round6.docx

Dartmouth

ShCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShCh/Dartmouth-Shankar-ChangDeutsch-Aff-Kentucky-Round6.docx

3fdfb2aa9f36b7a0d88ad778f85cf30ea562d5ee2cc672604c9f9e2516e01302

NFWZs fail---laundry list.

TC 6, analysis and research institution in international relations. (Thucydides Center, 4-28-2006, “Nuclear-weapon-free zones: advantages shortcomings and prospects,” Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, https://www.afri-ct.org/2006/nuclear-weapon-free-zones/)

Since great powers refuse to disclose whereabouts of nuc s They would enter the zone without permission The right to deny is hypothetical potential targets include communication, surveillance and intelligence facilities The treaties do not ban such facilities Each party may withdraw if events jeopardize the supreme interests The pledge is conditional . It will cease to be valid in case of an attack

Visits and transits through zonal states of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may take place It is not clear to what extent they differ from the stationing , which is prohibited . Since the great powers refuse to disclose the whereabouts of their nuc lear weapon s , they are unlikely to request permission for a visit or transit by a nuclear-weapon-carrying ship or aircraft. They would enter the zone without asking for permission . This has already happened. The right of the zonal states to deny permission is purely hypothetical introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone, even for a short time , whether in time of peace or in time of war, would defeat the sought goal of total regional denuclearization To make a nuclear attack against the parties to a zonal treaty militarily unjustifiable and less likely, all potential targets of a nuclear strike would have to be removed from the denuclerized areas such targets include nuclear-weapon-related support facilities such as communication, surveillance and intelligence -gathering facilities . They include navigation installations serving the nuclear strategic systems of the great powers. The n w f z treaties do not ban such facilities compliance with the non-proliferation obligations is monitored by the I A E A there is no provision for checking whether the nuclear-weapon states respect the status of the denuclearized zones Each party to a n w f z treaty may withdraw from it, if some extraordinary events jeopardize the supreme interests of its country. The party itself decides whether such events have occurred abrogation of a denuclearization treaty by one party affect the security of other, especially neighbouring , parties The pledge made by France , Russia , the U K and the U S not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the denuclearized zones is conditional . It will cease to be valid in case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon powers or their allies, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. This convoluted exception weakens the n s a of the nuclear powers the demands repeatedly made in different disarmament fora make these assurances unconditional

not clear stationing prohibited without permission purely hypothetical short time defeat sought goal total regional denuclearization militarily unjustifiable all potential targets targets do not ban non-proliferation obligations I A E A no provision extraordinary events jeopardize supreme interests abrogation affect the security neighbouring France Russia U K U S conditional cease to be valid convoluted exception weakens unconditional

['Transit. Visits and transits through zonal states of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may take place if allowed, but their frequency and duration are not limited. It is, therefore, not clear to what extent they differ from the stationing, which is prohibited. Since the great powers refuse, as a matter of policy, to disclose the whereabouts of their nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to request permission for a visit or transit by a nuclear-weapon-carrying ship or aircraft. They would rather enter the zone without asking for permission. This has already happened. The right of the zonal states to deny permission is thus purely hypothetical. In any event, introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone, even for a short time, whether in time of peace or in time of war, would defeat the sought goal of total regional denuclearization.\xa0Scope of the obligations. To make a nuclear attack against the parties to a zonal treaty militarily unjustifiable and, consequently, less likely, all potential targets of a nuclear strike would have to be removed from the denuclerized areas. In addition to nuclear weapons themselves, such targets include nuclear-weapon-related support facilities; such as communication, surveillance and intelligence-gathering facilities. They also include navigation installations serving the nuclear strategic systems of the great powers. The nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties do not, however, ban such facilities.\xa0Verification. Whereas compliance with the non-proliferation obligations is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is no provision for checking whether the nuclear-weapon states respect the status of the denuclearized zones.\xa0Withdrawal. Each party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty may withdraw from it, if some extraordinary events have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. The party itself decides whether such events have occurred. However, abrogation of a denuclearization treaty by one party may affect the security of other, especially neighbouring, parties. Consequently, states should either give up the right to resort to the withdrawal clause (as they have given up the right to make reservations), and thereby render their obligations irreversible, or have recourse to a withdrawal clause exclusively under some very restrictive conditions.\xa0Negative security assurances. The pledge made by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the denuclearized zones is conditional. It will cease to be valid in case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon powers or their allies, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. This convoluted exception weakens the negative security assurances of the nuclear powers. Hence the demands repeatedly made in different disarmament fora to make these assurances unconditional.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-WiMc-Neg-4---MAC-Semis.docx

Kansas

WiMc

190bae70d1dd60d160fdaa5e99e70f183295ef5efde9f9e39e8ce95410beb763

CCP-PLA fights now---military purges.

Gan 24, CNN Reporter and China Specialist for the network (Nectar Gan, January 5, 2024, “Xi’s latest purge targets the military. Why did powerful generals fall out of favor?” CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/05/china/china-xi-military-purge-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html)

Behind the compounds of the Chinese powerful generals disappeared one after another were removed without explanation sign of a purge came when nine officers were ousted Xi made rooting out disloyalty a hallmark since 2012, and latest shake-ups suggest that is far from over At the center is the Rocket Force built to oversee nuclear missiles it’s obvious to Xi the Rocket Force has been compromised

Behind the military compounds of the Chinese capital, powerful generals have disappeared from public view one after another . Some were subsequently removed from their positions without explanation the clearest sign of a sweeping purge inside China’s military came last Friday, when nine high-ranking PLA officers were ousted from the country’s top legislature. the latest purges recalls the graft probes which led to the downfall of multiple senior generals and their underlings Xi has made rooting out disloyalty a hallmark of his rule since coming to power in 2012, and the latest shake-ups suggest that campaign is far from over within the military At the center of the latest purge is the PLA’s Rocket Force , an elite branch Xi has built up to oversee China’s nuclear missiles Right now, it’s obvious to Xi Jinping and the Chinese high command that the Rocket Force leadership has been compromised

compounds generals have disappeared removed positions without explanation sign purge military nine officers were ousted purges graft probes downfall generals underlings rooting out hallmark of his rule shake-ups far from over military center purge Rocket Force oversee nuclear missiles it’s obvious Chinese Rocket Force has been compromised

['Behind the walled government and military compounds of the Chinese capital, powerful generals have disappeared from public view one after another. Some were subsequently removed from their positions without explanation, even for roles as high-profile as\xa0.', 'After months of\xa0\xa0and evasive non-answers from government spokespersons, the clearest sign of a sweeping purge inside China’s military came last Friday, when nine high-ranking PLA officers were\xa0ousted from the country’s top legislature.', 'While the National People’s Congress (NPC) itself is just a rubber-stamp parliament, its members enjoy a degree of immunity from arrest and criminal prosecution granted by the constitution. Previously, such sudden expulsions often served as a prelude to further disciplinary or legal action.', 'In keeping with the opacity that shrouds Chinese elite politics, no reason was given for the generals’ sudden ouster from the legislature.', 'But experts who have long studied China’s military point to a corruption purge as the likely cause – possibly over the procurement and development of advanced equipment that has been a key element in leader Xi Jinping’s efforts to “modernize” the PLA and transform it into a “world class” fighting force.', 'To some, the scale and depth of the latest purges recalls the graft probes in the early years of Xi’s tenure, which led to the downfall of multiple senior generals and their underlings.', 'Xi has made rooting out corruption and disloyalty a hallmark of his rule since coming to power in 2012, and the latest shake-ups suggest that campaign is far from over within the military.', 'At the center of the latest purge is the PLA’s Rocket Force, an elite branch Xi has built up to oversee China’s fast-expanding arsenal of nuclear and ballistic missiles.', 'The Chinese leader has\xa0\xa0the force as a “core of strategic deterrence, a strategic buttress to the country’s position as a major power, and a cornerstone on which to build national security.”', '“Right now, it’s obvious to Xi Jinping and the Chinese high command that the Rocket Force leadership has been compromised,” said James Char, a longtime PLA-watcher and research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-5---Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Kansas

MaPa

2fdd28cc66ac734a9ce2f16092d4ea9d23877d4d83a1370a03f001a92ff567ab

That means meeting “expand the scope” does not necessarily “prohibit anticompetitive business practices”

Dul 15 (Jan, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA): Logic and Methodology of “Necessary but Not Sufficient” Causality, 15 July 2015, ) //Snowball

scholars confuse necessity and sufficiency Necessary causes are not automatically sufficient because other requirements play a role

scholars often confuse necessity and sufficiency A necessary cause allows an outcome to exist A sufficient cause ensures that the outcome exists Necessary causes are not automatically sufficient because other requirements play a role

['', 'Although scholars often confuse necessity and sufficiency (Chung, 1969; Goertz & Starr, 2003), the two are totally different.1 A necessary cause allows an outcome to exist; without the necessary cause, the outcome will not exist. A sufficient cause ensures that the outcome exists; it produces the outcome. A student who wants to be admitted to a U.S. graduate school (the outcome) needs to have a high score on the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) test: An adequate GRE score is necessary for the outcome. Necessary causes are not automatically sufficient. An adequate GRE score is not sufficient for admission because also other admission requirements play a role (e.g., the student’s motivation letter, a good TOEFL score, reputation of the student’s bachelor program, recommendation letter). However, if the student’s GRE score is too low, there is guaranteed failure, independently of the student’s performance on the other requirements. Therefore, a necessary cause is a constraint, a barrier, an obstacle, a bottleneck that must be managed to allow a desired outcome to exist. Each single necessary cause must be in place, as there is no additive causality that can compensate for the absence of the necessary cause. Prevention of guaranteed failure and increased probability of success are core constituents of the “necessary but not sufficient” logic of “X causes Y.”2']

[(0, 3), (4, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Soper-Maverick-Neg-Rutgers-Semis.docx

Kansas

SoMa1

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SoMa1/Kansas-Soper-Maverick-Neg-Rutgers-Semis.docx

3b868977078aeffc21bba6f9dbe8500d9bbbcf65bf6f00846ff58bc0b22f1278

The alternative is a refusal of the Rights of Nature in favor of indigenous self-recognition and epistemic justice.

Temper 18, Ecological economist, scholar activist and filmmaker based at McGill University, Montreal and the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Leah, Blocking pipelines, unsettling environmental justice: from rights of nature to responsibility to territory, Local Environment, DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2018.1536698)

disturb Western epistemologies justice must include self-governing breaking down dualism question the state the framework is rooted in Western thought the state framework unable to provide for self-determination interrogating the mapping of political space implies need to decolonise law looking beyond liberal frames of justice difficult to integrate into Western legal institutions charged with environmental justice integration of Indigenous philosophies lead to erasure questioning knowledge includes refusal antagonistic politics that disrupt production of settler-colonial power reject rights-based discourse premised on self- actualisation and resurgence of cultural practices

This paper aims to contribute to a disturb ance of Western epistemologies of Environmental Justice such frameworks in their attempt to be inclusive and universal can lead to foreclosing other understandings of what justice is A decolonial analysis suggest limits and adaptations to the trivalent framework based on recognition I argue that rather than simply participation, justice must include self-governing authority that rather than distribution environmental justice calls for breaking down the dualism between humans and nature and beyond recognition what is needed is epistemic justice and self-affirmation I question the capacity of the state and legal framework for accommodating such a decolonial and transformative environmental justice and instead propose that direct action may serve as more effective tools of resistance These can inform struggles, help hone tools of resistance and transformatively rethink human–nature relationships the framework is still rooted in Western thought and experience and is designed to deal primarily with claims of exclusion It is a less appropriate fit for the settler-colonial context Indigenous peoples have to address their claims within a sovereignty they do not recognise Rather than participation, what they are seeking is political exemption granting rights is not only insufficient, but simply wrong the state framework was unable to provide a mechanism for resolving the demand for Indigenous self-determination the settler state does not constitute a legitimate framework within which Indigenous peoples may be more justly included participation within the legal system leaves intact two primary features of colonial domination the legitimacy of the settler state’s claim to sovereignty over their territories and the normative status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of governance on the other Instead of participation and inclusion, justice for occupied and Indigenous peoples calls for interrogating the mapping of political space and inclusion within the frame of the territorial state itself This implies the need to decolonise law and to deconstruct the state’s grounds to inaugurate law on lands acquired through colonial settlement decolonising participatory parity, which entails reframing the authority of the state itself and looking beyond standard liberal frames of justice Because the state is often the key actor pushing extractive projects, decentring is an important contribution from Indigenous thought that can productively unsettle EJ Such an understanding of nature is extremely difficult to integrate into Western legal institutions charged with delivering environmental justice The testimony of Delga Uukw and Nisgay Wa Uukw in the Delgamuukw case aimed to unsettle the Western idea of ownership and jurisdiction over land and resources and demanded a destabilising of the nature/culture binary that Western law is built on. It contributed to transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure by destabilising our own understanding of what it means to be human it may call into question western notions of property and distribution altogether Epistemic justice entails overcoming barriers for alternative forms of being and seeing the world to be recognised as valid and valuable knowledge relational ontologies and a destabilisation and reconceptualisation of the natureculture binary are increasingly finding a place in initiatives to imbue Nature with rights Yet there remain considerable challenges in theory, policy and law to dissolving this “ontological divide” 5 and numerous tensions emerge in the translation of Indigenous ethics of care into legal and policy frameworks The integration of Indigenous philosophies into hegemonic institutions can often lead to distortion erasure and co-optation a new form of epistemic extractivism and violence the mobilisation of diverse actors of the concept of Buen Vivi the political act of translation Through this, “the inherently relational character of Andean cosmovision was lost whereas modern rationality was reaffirmed The Unist’ot’en enactment of epistemic justice rests on questioning the knowledge structures This includes both politics of refusal as well as healing and sharing to transform the capacity of others to hear it involves action and lived practice The Unist’ot’en checkpoint demonstrates a very different approach to the politics of recognition Instead of appealing outwards its aim is to create a space for selfrecognition and Indigenous re-affirmation In this newly reclaimed space, the Unist’ot’en camp members have been able to assert their own understandings and to live their concept of justice through practice through enactment and through antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic and production of settler-colonial power The Unist’ot’en camp members reject a rights-based discourse that can only be accorded to them by what they perceive as an occupying power and actively assert their responsibilities to the territory and their ancestral and natural law This is based on the concept of stewardship, whereby the warriors are managing the land because of their dependency on it Rather than speak about “rights” to fish they refuse to let their responsibility to the river to be diminished is premised on self- actualisation direct action and the resurgence of cultural practices through antagonistic politics Environmental justice has always been about resistance of redefining the concept of nature, and about reconnecting to place and territory. The space created by resistance camps becomes a fervent space for transforming the collective imaginary and the hermeneutical capacity of the many visitors.

disturb ance of Western epistemologies universal recognition self-governing authority beyond recognition self-affirmation question the capacity of the state and legal framework direct action rooted in Western thought less appropriate fit settler-colonial context sovereignty they do not recognise simply wrong legitimate framework legitimacy of the settler state’s claim to sovereignty interrogating the mapping of political space decolonise law looking beyond standard liberal frames of justice extremely difficult to integrate into Western legal institutions charged with delivering environmental justice Western idea of ownership destabilising what it means to be human Epistemic justice valuable knowledge numerous tensions emerge integration of Indigenous philosophies into hegemonic institutions distortion erasure co-optation epistemic extractivism violence relational character lost modern rationality was reaffirmed questioning the knowledge structures politics of refusal Instead of appealing outwards selfrecognition Indigenous re-affirmation assert their own understandings practice enactment antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic and production of settler-colonial power reject a rights-based discourse occupying power their responsibilities responsibility to the river self- actualisation direct action antagonistic politics

['5. Discussion – unsettling environmental justice', 'This paper aims to contribute to a disturbance of Western ontologies and epistemologies of Environmental Justice. While the theories of EJ proposed by Schlosberg and Fraser have made tremendous contributions towards a more pluralist understanding of justice; such frameworks in their attempt to be inclusive and universal can also lead to foreclosing other understandings of what justice is, who the subjects of justice should be and how it should be delivered.', 'A decolonial analysis informed by the two moments of Wet’sewet’ten history explored here suggest limits and adaptations to the trivalent framework based on recognition, participation and distribution. I propose three pillars of a de-colonial environmental justice. I argue that rather than simply participation, justice must include self-governing authority; that rather than distribution (of nature), environmental justice calls for breaking down the dualism between humans and nature, and beyond recognition, what is needed is epistemic justice and self-affirmation. I question the capacity of the state and legal framework for accommodating such a decolonial and transformative environmental justice and instead propose that direct action, and assertion of responsibility and care may serve as more effective tools of resistance.', 'These insights are not only relevant for an environmental justice that takes decolonisation and the claims of Indigenous peoples seriously but can also contribute towards a more radical and potentially emancipatory environmental justice that can inform struggles, help hone tools of resistance and transformatively rethink human–nature relationships (Temper 2017).', '5.1. Beyond participation – self-governing authority', 'The standard narrative in EJ is that justice requires fair and meaningful participation by those affected. For Fraser (2008) this entails the need for “participatory parity” – which entails inclusion of all “subjects of justice” understood as those jointly subjected to a structure of governance, which sets the ground rules that govern their interaction (Fraser 2008, 65). Participatory parity therefore primarily concerns itself with how to build inclusion within existing governance structures. Fraser’s theory contains important elements of reflexive openness which allows discussion around who the subjects of justice are in each context. However the framework is still rooted in Western thought and experience and is designed to deal primarily with claims of exclusion – those where the denial of participation is the main complaint. It is a less appropriate fit for the settler-colonial context, whereby the problem is precisely that Indigenous peoples have to address their claims within a sovereignty they do not recognise. Rather than participation, what they are seeking is political and social exemption. They are not seeking participation but recognition of their sovereignty and their self-governing authority. Westra (1999) illustrates this by pointing to the distinction between black communities in the U.S. who demanded an end to segregation as a result of being forcibly excluded from society – to be treated as equals – and aboriginal peoples in Canada who have been forcibly included and assimilated into society through discriminatory laws. In this case, she argues, granting rights is not only insufficient, but simply wrong.', 'The limits to participatory parity are well demonstrated by the Delgamuukw case where the state framework was unable to provide a mechanism for resolving the demand for Indigenous self-determination. As Coulthard (2014, 36) argues, the settler state does not constitute a legitimate framework within which Indigenous peoples may be more justly included. Instead, the Delgamuukw case brought into question the court’s very authority. Borrows (1999) refers to this as “Sovereignty’s Alchemy”, asking “What alchemy transmutes the basis of Aboriginal possession into the golden bedrock of Crown title?” (558), referring to the fact that the underlying injustice is the assumption of the sovereign power as the foundation of the legal order itself (Muldoon 2008). As Coulthard (2014, 36) argues; participation within the Canadian legal system leaves intact two primary features of colonial domination that Indigenous assertions of nationhood call into question: the legitimacy of the settler state’s claim to sovereignty over their territories and the normative status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of governance on the other.', 'Instead of participation and inclusion, justice for occupied and Indigenous peoples calls for interrogating the mapping of political space and inclusion within the frame of the territorial state itself. The terms of participation, and the subjects of justice are mis-framed. This implies the need to decolonise law and to deconstruct the state’s grounds to inaugurate law on lands acquired through colonial settlement (Pasternak 2014). It also calls for decolonising participatory parity, which entails reframing and questioning the authority of the state itself as the governance framework and looking beyond standard liberal frames of justice to acknowledge that the existing international system of nation-states cannot meet Indigenous demands for self-determination, and that a commitment to justice for Indigenous peoples may entail calling those state-systems into question (Young 2000). Because the state is often the key actor pushing extractive projects, decentring the state and envisioning governance beyond its confines is an important contribution from Indigenous thought that can productively unsettle EJ.', '5.2. Beyond distribution – destabilisation of the human/nature dualism', 'Environmental justice from the outset was concerned with the distribution of environmental resources and burdens. This perspective relies on a conception of nature as a passive object that can be more justly and equitatively distributed among human populations through different property rights, allocations, etc. Such a perspective on distribution is incompatible with Indigenous conceptions of nature and on human-ecological relationships that call into question the view of the environment as a commodity that can be owned or traded.', 'The Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan cosmology views humans as being fundamentally interconnected with their ecology. The plaintiffs, Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw, describe in their opening address a view that understands the world to be a differentiated unity, of which humans are only one part. There is no strict human/nature dualism in this view (Wa and Uukw 1992). They wrote:', 'The Western world-view sees the essential and primary interactions as being those between human beings. To the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, human beings are part of an interacting continuum, which includes animals and spirits. Animals and fish are viewed as members of societies, which have intelligence and power, and can influence the course of events in terms of their interrelationship with human beings.', 'This relational perspective on nature sees human and non-human living beings as well as inanimate objects, within a matrix of relations, “backward and forward in time, laterally in the present” (Kneen 2015, 33). A relational ontology, summed up by the Indigenous prayer phrase “All my relations”restores agency and subjectivity to nature. In Indigenous legal tradition it is often expressed as “natural law”: laws that are in keeping with the laws of the natural world (Westra 2012). According to natural law, relationships with nature are what define one’s responsibilities to them. Thus instead of distribution of nature, the emphasis is on mutual relations based on reciprocity and care.', 'Such an understanding of nature is extremely difficult to integrate into Western legal institutions charged with delivering environmental justice. The natural law of Indigenous legal tradition, as well as Western law, are both based on a worldview and an understanding of how humans are (e.g. individual, competitive, communal, etc.) and how they relate to the larger world, as well as to non-human life forms (Napoleon 2013). The testimony of Delga Uukw and Nisgay Wa Uukw in the Delgamuukw case aimed to unsettle the Western idea of ownership and jurisdiction over land and resources (Bryan 2000) and demanded a destabilising of the nature/culture binary that Western law is built on. This destabilisation fits closely to the deconstructive cultural politics as described by Fraser (1995). It contributed to transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure by destabilising identities and our own understanding of what it means to be human.', 'However, the court was not able to “recognize nature and the Other” in the relational perspective that the plaintiffs asked underscoring how the legal liberal tradition is unable to recognise Indigenous relationship to land and nature other than through its own conceptions. This point is underlined by Indigenous legal scholar Val Napoleon (2005) who explains that', 'The Court was not able to hear or accept the adaawk as presented – a legal and political institution rather than a simple cultural artefact or chronological history record. The forms of expression, symbolism, and inter-connections between the worlds of spirits, humans, and animals proved to be beyond the grasp of the trial judge.', 'Yet, beyond this, it may call into question western notions of property and distribution altogether. As Smith (2011, 61–62) argues, “Indigenous peoples are forced to argue in courts that it is ’their’ land. What they cannot question within this system is the presumed relationship between peoples and land. That is, should land be a commodity to be controlled and owned by peoples?”', '5.3. Epistemic justice', 'Epistemic justice entails overcoming barriers for alternative forms of being and seeing the world to be recognised as valid and valuable knowledge and includes the even greater challenge of translating this into real policy and practice and social justice. ', 'For example, relational ontologies and a destabilisation and reconceptualisation of the natureculture binary (Plumwood 2004) are increasingly finding a place in initiatives to imbue Mother Nature with rights such as in the Bolivian and Ecuadorean constitutions. Yet there remain considerable challenges in theory, policy and law to dissolving this “ontological divide” 5 and numerous tensions emerge in the translation of Indigenous ethics of care into legal and policy frameworks, as several authors have documented in the case of rights of nature (Arsel 2012; Fish 2013).', 'The integration of Indigenous philosophies into hegemonic institutions can often lead to distortion, erasure and co-optation, a new form of epistemic extractivism and violence. For example, Widenhorn (2013) examined the mobilisation of diverse actors of the concept of Buen Vivir, finding that the political act of translation served to transform “buen vivir into an object of knowledge detached from the knowledge holder”. Through this, “the inherently relational character of Andean cosmovision was lost … whereas modern rationality was reaffirmed”. She points to the gap between concept and reality and the tension between the need to make marginalised knowledges politically relevant, and the danger of erasing, co-opting and distorting these knowledge systems through the very act of doing so.', 'On the other hand, Valladares and Boelens (2017) explore the rights of nature discourse as an “epistemic pact” that can serve as a tool for re-politicizing the environmental debate by challenging the dominant mono-cultural, functionalist and extractivist notion of nature, defined by capitalism and science”. They suggest that the political radicalism implied by this act of intercultural translation can lead to the creation of new alliances for territorial defense.', 'This leads to the question of how the recognition and participation of nature that some scholars (Nussbaum 1997; Schlosberg 2007) have been claiming for can be done in an epistemically just way? Can public policy “translate” concepts such as rights of nature, Indigenous self-determination, responsibility, into real justice? What are the limitations for these claims as tools of resistance and how can epistemic justice be enacted by those claiming it?', 'These questions would require more space to treat in depth, yet the case study suggests that moving towards epistemic justice requires on one hand, the opening up of concepts of nature and meaningful intercultural communication. The challenge for transformative epistemic justice here is not in translating Indigenous concepts into terms comprehensible to liberal legal traditions but rather further developing through education, intercultural communication and listening, the interpretative “hermeneutical” resources to make sense of Indigenous experience and perspectives. From here may emerge the possibility to transcend colonial and liberal constructs and open other worlds and other relationships with land, territory and nature.', 'The Unist’ot’en enactment of epistemic justice rests on questioning the knowledge structures through which decisions are made themselves; and creating and asserting their own processes and practices relying on their own knowledge, language and ways of seeing and being the world. This includes both politics of refusal (Simpson 2014) as well as healing and sharing to transform the capacity of others to hear. Most importantly beyond discourse it involves action and lived practice.', '5.4. Beyond recognition: rights v. geographies of responsibility', 'These are not resources – these are life-forms that we have access to. Our laws are our responsibilities. The way we harvest salmon is our living law. (Unist’ot’en Camp)', 'The Unist’ot’en checkpoint demonstrates a very different approach to the politics of recognition. Instead of appealing outwards, its aim is to create a space for what Coulthard (2014) refers to as “selfrecognition” and Indigenous re-affirmation. In this newly reclaimed space, the Unist’ot’en camp members have been able to assert their own legal understandings, and to live their concept of justice through practice, through enactment and through antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic and production of settler-colonial power.', 'The Unist’ot’en camp members reject a rights-based discourse that can only be accorded to them by what they perceive as an occupying power, and actively assert their responsibilities to the territory and their ancestral and natural law. According to the camp members, as warriors, they hold a sacred responsibility for all life in their territories. This is based on the concept of stewardship, whereby the warriors are managing the land because of their dependency on it, because of its intrinsic value as well as on behalf of the unborn future generations. Rather than speak about “rights” to fish they refuse to let their responsibility to the river to be diminished.', 'This assertion of responsibility through active presence is premised on self-actualisation, direct action and the resurgence of cultural practices through antagonistic politics. Environmental justice has always been about resistance, about continual repolitisation of the environment, of redefining and expanding the concept of nature, and about reconnecting to place and territory. The space created by resistance camps such as the Unist’ot’en camp becomes a fervent space for transforming the collective imaginary and the hermeneutical capacity of the many visitors.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HiWi-Neg-65th-Annual-George-R-R-Pflaum-Debates-at-Emporia-State-Round-6.docx

Kansas

HiWi

b2ebb2a42db5b677a75f89f82e55185cc5bb6cba0d8cc1dbd3274bcaff279f08

First use isn’t credible with Russia and is counterproductive to victory.

Wolfsthal ’19 [John; July 2; Senior Advisor to Global Zero and the Director of the Nuclear Crisis Group. He is the former Senior Director at the National Security Council for Nonproliferation and Arms Control. He is a member of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board; Texas National Security Review, “Nuclear First-Use Is Dangerous and Unnecessary,” https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-nuclear-first-use-and-presidential-authority/#essay4]

In Russian aggression not clear first-use is needed or credible in a conventional scenario NATO would defeat any attack Russia has avoided NATO put forward a strategy that would counter losses with a first strike unclear what scenario it would make sense even given concerns NATO would make it harder to prevail if Russia were the aggressor use would eliminate the ability punish Russia

In the scenario of Russian aggression it is not clear that first-use is needed or would be credible In the case of a conflict in a Baltic state nuclear weapons would play no credible role in a purely conventional scenario , NATO forces over time would be able to defeat any Russian attack on NATO territory. Russia appears to believe this as well it has avoided a direct conventional attack against NATO It is also why Russia has put forward a strategy that would counter conventional losses with a first nuclear strike It remains unclear under what scenario it would make sense to the nuclear level This remains true even given concerns about Russian cyber and unconventional attacks By using nuclear weapons NATO would make it harder to prevail conventionally should Russia initiate a nuclear attack all options would be legitimately on the table if Russia were the aggressor against NATO, U.S. nuclear use would eliminate the ability of Washington to rally the global community to punish Russia The world would instead focus on the U S crossing the nuclear threshold

Russian aggression needed credible Baltic no credible role conventional scenario any Russian attack believe this as well avoided counter first nuclear strike unclear make sense cyber unconventional harder to prevail initiate on the table aggressor nuclear use eliminate global community focus nuclear threshold

['Russia', 'In the oft-cited scenario of Russian aggression against a NATO ally, it is not clear that American nuclear first-use is needed or would be credible. In the case of a conflict in a Baltic state stoked by Russian agents and actions, nuclear weapons would play no credible role. If a conflict escalates to a full conventional conflict between Russia and NATO, the consequences are unpredictable to a point. There is, of course, real concern about how long it would take NATO to stop and repel a Russian conventional attack. But in a purely conventional scenario, NATO forces over time would be able to defeat any Russian attack on NATO territory. Russia appears to believe this as well, which is why until now it has avoided a direct conventional attack against NATO (this rationale is at least as credible, if not more, as the idea that Russia is deterred from such attacks by the threat of a NATO nuclear first-strike). It is also why Russia has put forward a nuclear escalation strategy that would counter conventional losses with a first nuclear strike to protect the existence of the Russian state.', 'It remains unclear under what scenario it would make sense for NATO to escalate to the nuclear level when such a move would lead to a Russian nuclear response either in Europe, against the United States, or both. This remains true even given concerns about Russian cyber and unconventional attacks on U.S. command-and-control and early warning assets. By using nuclear weapons first, NATO would make it harder to prevail conventionally and, thus, such action should be avoided. Of course, should Russia initiate a nuclear attack to avoid conventional defeat, all options would be legitimately on the table and no-first-use constraints would be lifted.', 'Furthermore, if Russia were the aggressor against NATO, U.S. nuclear use would limit if not eliminate the ability of Washington to rally the global community to condemn and punish Russia for its actions. The world would not be concerned with Russia’s aggression and would instead focus on the United States crossing the nuclear threshold for the first time in more than 70 years. Moreover, some would see Russia’s inevitable retaliation as legitimate.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-GiSa-Aff-Kentucky-Round-6.docx

Michigan

GiSa

ee6d7735ddc7950f04a127b8f4dfa8f5687bd74a9f623f2fe07839665e1fca83

Nuclear sabotage is possible, especially with increasing cyber integration.

Futter 16, professor of international politics and researcher in international relations at University of Leicester. (Andrew, 07-2016, “Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons”, Royal United Services Institute, https://static.rusi.org/cyber_threats_and_nuclear_combined.1.pdf)

cyber transformed scope for sabotage and direct attacks against nuclear weapons such as procurement, supply chain, early warning or destruction of facilities the threat is real and manifest Trojans, or faults, can be inserted into software or components in manufacturing and maintenance stages it could involve physical alteration introduction of malware to change a process, or malware to allow access Sabotage has always been a principal nuclear risk 2007 Aurora Generator demonstrated possibilities of sabotage through cyber means Stuxnet caused direct damage to a nuclear facility by attacking valves that manage flow of uranium and attacking converters which regulate speed of the device demonstrating it is possible to damage physical systems not connected to the internet

The cyber age and the computerisation of society has transformed the scope for sabotage of key systems, both in terms of critical national infrastructure and direct attacks against nuclear weapons and associated systems. On the one hand, there are narrow and discrete attacks that are directed against nuclear forces and systems , such as in procurement, supply chain, early warning or the destruction of facilities . While nuclear weapons systems are certainly likely to be far better protected against sabotage and attack than commercial infrastructure, the threat is real and is manifest right across the nuclear weapons enterprise. The main threat here is that vulnerabilities, problems, logic bombs, software and hardware Trojans, or faults, can be inserted into software , systems or components in the manufacturing , supply and maintenance stages . Sabotage can come in many guises: it could involve the physical alteration of components so that they do not work or at least do not work as expected; it could involve the introduction of malware or ‘doctored’ coding to change a process, or even the implanting of malware to allow access to the component in order to control, disrupt or destroy it in the future. Sabotage has always been a principal nuclear risk , but the first known example of ‘cyber-sabotage’ can actually be traced back to the 1980s, when the CIA began an extensive operation to feed modified technical and computer-related equipment to the Soviet Union.30 While the 2007 Aurora Generator test demonstrated the possibilities of sabotage through cyber means ,48 there have only been a handful of cyber-attacks that have caused physical destruction and are publicly known,49 and only one – Stuxnet – that has caused direct damage to a nuclear facility (although there are rumours that there have been US-led attacks on the North Korean nuclear programme too).50 The Stuxnet worms were designed to attack the supervisory control and data acquisition control systems operating the centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, first by attacking the valves that manage the flow of uranium hexafluoride into the centrifuge, and later more directly by attacking the frequency converters themselves which regulate the speed of the device .51 Stuxnet has been credited with causing damage to centrifuges and delaying any Iranian bomb (albeit perhaps only temporarily),54 and demonstrating that it is possible to infect and damage physical systems – often not connected to the internet – by hacking into the computers and networks that control them.

['The cyber age and the computerisation of society has transformed the scope for sabotage of key systems, both in terms of critical national infrastructure and direct attacks against nuclear weapons and associated systems. In this way the challenge is divided into two different kinds of attacks. On the one hand, there are narrow and discrete attacks that are directed against nuclear forces and systems, such as in procurement, supply chain, early warning or the destruction of facilities. On the other, there are attacks that are not directed against nuclear weapons but that could affect nuclear thinking, such as a strategic attack against critical national infrastructure (the implications of this are considered in more detail in Chapter III). While nuclear weapons systems are certainly likely to be far better protected against sabotage and attack than commercial infrastructure, the threat is real and is manifest right across the nuclear weapons enterprise. As a US Defense Science Board report warned in 2013: ‘US nuclear weapons may be vulnerable to highly sophisticated cyberattacks’.26 Ultimately, this is also likely to be true for other nuclear-armed actors.27', 'The procurement of nuclear-related software and components and the need to update and replace key systems presents a serious challenge for the nuclear weapons complex. The main threat here is that vulnerabilities, problems, logic bombs, software and hardware Trojans, or faults, can be inserted into software, systems or components in the manufacturing, supply and maintenance stages. Sabotage can come in many guises: it could involve the physical alteration of components so that they do not work or at least do not work as expected; it could involve the introduction of malware or ‘doctored’ coding to change a process, or even the implanting of malware to allow access to the component in order to control, disrupt or destroy it in the future. As Ross Anderson suggests, ‘the moral is that vulnerabilities can be inserted at any point in the tool chain, so you can’t trust a system you didn’t build yourself’.28 That said, even protecting systems built ‘in house’ – as nuclear C2 systems almost certainly will have been29 – is not straightforward, and some vulnerabilities may simply be the result of accidents, bugs or unanticipated circumstances (as discussed in Chapter I).', 'Sabotage has always been a principal nuclear risk, but the first known example of ‘cyber-sabotage’ can actually be traced back to the 1980s, when the CIA began an extensive operation to feed modified technical and computer-related equipment to the Soviet Union.30 Under what became known as the ‘Farewell Dossier’, ‘defective computer chips, flawed aerospace drawings, and rewritten software were all injected into an unsuspecting Soviet military-industrial complex’,31 ‘contrived computer chips found their way into Soviet military equipment’ and the ‘Pentagon introduced misleading information pertinent to stealth aircraft, space defense and tactical aircraft’.32 While the extent of the operation remains much disputed,33 former Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed would later claim that the huge explosion of a Russian gas pipeline in 1982 was a direct result of the Farewell Dossier.34', 'More recently, and while the majority of attention has focused on Stuxnet, it is clear that a widespread sabotage campaign (including cyber) directed against the Iranian nuclear programme has been underway for well over a decade. According to Michael Adler:', 'It seems to be clear that there is an active and imaginative sabotage program from several Western nations as well as Israel involving booby-trapping equipment which the Iranians are procuring, tricking black-market smugglers, cyber operations, and recruiting scientists.35', 'In fact, during the 1990s the US and Israel ‘modified’ vacuum pumps purchased by Iran to make them break down;36 in 2012, Iranian lawmaker Alaeddin Boroujerdi accused the German company Siemens of planting tiny explosives inside equipment that the Islamic Republic had purchased for its disputed nuclear programme;37 in 2014, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif blamed ‘the West’ for ‘trying to sabotage the heavy water nuclear reactor at Arak by altering components of its cooling system’;38 and a huge explosion at the Parchin military base in October 2014 again raised the question of sabotage.39 Similar techniques have also been used by various governments to bolster counter-proliferation efforts against certain states and terrorist groups seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities. As Eli Lake points out ‘the specific benefit of [cyber] sabotage is that it makes countries [and terrorists] wary of purchasing crucial [nuclear-related] materials on the black market’.40', 'In addition to the direct threat of sabotage, the cyber challenge also involves attempts to attack, compromise or ‘spoof’ early-warning and communications systems, and therefore to undermine the information that nuclear decision-makers and nuclear systems rely upon. Attempts to ‘jam’ electronic communications or to deceive an adversary by providing false or misleading information have long been key components of warfare,41 but the nature of this challenge is also changing in the cyber age. There is perhaps no better example of this than the alleged use of the Suter computer programme by Israel against Syrian air-defence radar in 2007 to allow Israeli jets to bomb a suspected nuclear site at al-Kibar. Instead of simply jamming radar signals, the Suter programme reportedly hacked into the Syrian air-defence system, allowing it to ‘see what enemy sensors see and then to take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen’.42 As a result, the non-stealthy F-15 and F-16 Israeli airplanes used in the attack remained undetected and were able to bypass the Syrian air defence system and bomb the suspected complex unhindered. It remains unclear exactly how the Suter system worked, but it is possible that code could have been beamed into the radar from above or the system could have been hacked or compromised electronically in another way prior to the attack.43 The Syrian radar system was likely purchased from Russia and is currently being used by a number of other states – among them, reportedly, Iran.44 While this attack was fairly limited, it nevertheless provides a stark warning of new types of vulnerability, particularly for key nuclear communications and early-warning systems.45 While there are ways to protect and ensure against such attacks, nuclear communications and early-warning systems represent an obvious target in any future crisis, both for states and terrorist groups.46 Likewise, the risk of ‘spoofing’ remains ever-present – for example, in July 2014 an Israeli military twitter account was hacked and an erroneous report published that the top-secret nuclear facility at Dimona had been attacked by rockets and had caused a ‘radiation catastrophe’.47', 'The final set of cyber-sabotage challenges involves attacks intended to cause physical destruction and harm or that are designed to cause a nuclear explosion. While the 2007 Aurora Generator test demonstrated the possibilities of sabotage through cyber means,48 there have only been a handful of cyber-attacks that have caused physical destruction and are publicly known,49 and only one – Stuxnet – that has caused direct damage to a nuclear facility (although there are rumours that there have been US-led attacks on the North Korean nuclear programme too).50 The Stuxnet worms were designed to attack the supervisory control and data acquisition control systems operating the centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, first by attacking the valves that manage the flow of uranium hexafluoride into the centrifuge, and later more directly by attacking the frequency converters themselves which regulate the speed of the device.51 The thinking, according to one of the architects of the attack, speaking to David Sanger, ‘was that the Iranians would blame bad parts, or bad engineering, or just incompetence’.52 The success of Stuxnet was dependent upon a considerable amount of prior monitoring and mapping of the system before any attack could take place, and this information was integral to its ability to work as planned. Moreover, it is believed that Stuxnet entered the air-gapped Natanz system through an infected USB drive, or another similar medium, and probably via an unwitting employee who had access to infection points.53 Stuxnet has been credited with causing damage to centrifuges and delaying any Iranian bomb (albeit perhaps only temporarily),54 and demonstrating that it is possible to infect and damage physical systems – often not connected to the internet – by hacking into the computers and networks that control them.', 'However, while Stuxnet represented a quantum leap in cyber capabilities and Operation Orchard demonstrated the vulnerabilities of early warning and communications, the direct threat of cybersabotage to the nuclear enterprise remains limited – at least for now. That said, recent events have shown that even systems thought not to be connected to the internet, as well as those vital for nuclear operations, could be compromised in a worst-case scenario, and the risk of indirect interference or interference from third parties, notably a terrorist group, remains a key challenge (as discussed in Chapter III). Therefore, it may be that older and less sophisticated systems and infrastructure used in nuclear C2 are safer and more secure against (cyber) sabotage and interference.55 As General C Robert Kehler, former head of US Strategic Command, testified to Congress in March 2013:', 'Much of the nuclear command and control system today is the legacy system that we’ve had. In some ways that helps us in terms of the cyber threat. In some cases it’s point to point, hard-wired, which makes it very difficult for an external cyber threat to emerge.’56', 'Modernisation and added complexity of nuclear systems is therefore very much a double-edged sword: greater functionality, speed and processing power must be balanced against a higher possibility of vulnerabilities and the creation of new vectors for attack.57']

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ndtceda

Kansas-LoPh-Neg-02---Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Kansas

LoPh

8e752132ebd25d1142901a91c5e88fc9a13f17fe6e7c8feaef060dd0d040b379

3---Trump---damage is done.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

Trump will have enduring consequences for U.S. influence a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy was untrustworthy and illiberal the world cannot unsee Trump there is nothing Biden can do to stop that all countries must hedge Whatever promises are made a resurgence of America firstism will loom menacingly 2020 was not a renunciation of Trump the trampling of norms barely registered the next election could turn out differently

the Trump presidency will have enduring consequences for U.S. power and influence in the world it is easy, especially for most insular Americans, to implicitly normalize what was in fact a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy Trump’s foreign policy was different : shortsighted , transactional , mercurial , untrustworthy , boorish, personalist , and profoundly illiberal such palpable relief must be tempered by a dispiriting truth, rooted in that notion of anarchy : the world cannot unsee the Trump presidency Nor can it unsee the way members of the U.S. Congress behaved in the final weeks of the Trump administration, voting opportunistically to overturn an election and helping incite violence at the Capitol countries around the globe will have to calculate their interests and expectations with the understanding that Trump is the sort of thing that the U.S. political system can plausibly produce For U.S. partners in Asia , Europe , and the Middle East , however, Washington’s priorities on the world stage must now be interrogated , and any conclusions reached must be held with qualifications rather than confidence there is nothing Biden can do to stop that From now on, all countries , everywhere , must hedge their bets about the U S something that will unnerve allies Whatever promises are made and best behaviors followed over the next few years, a resurgence of knuckle-dragging America firstism will loom menacingly in the shadows. That possibility will inevitably shape other states’ conclusions about their relations with the U S even with the election of Biden a traditional, centrist liberal internationalist countries will now have to hedge against the prospect of an indifferent , disengaged , and clumsily myopic U.S. foreign policy anarchy also demands that states see the world as it is , not as they wish it might be. the warning signs that the U S is not the country it once was could not be flashing more brightly . the 2020 U.S. presidential election was not by any stretch of the imagination a renunciation of Trump 2020 put to rest the comforting fable that Trump’s election was a fluke Trump is the United States or at least a very large part of countries don’t have the luxury of clinging to some idealized version of the U S ’ national character Trump presided over dozens of ethical scandals most of which would have ended the political career of any other national political figure the trampling of norms barely registered with most of the American public. Nor did the sheer, horrifying incompetence of the administration’s handling of the gravest public health crisis in a century chase Trump from the political scene 74 million voted for him One cannot paint a picture of the American polity and the country’s future foreign policy without including the significant possibility of a large role for Trumpism the next U.S. presidential election could turn out quite differently

Trump presidency enduring consequences for U.S. power influence implicitly normalize norm-shattering approach to foreign policy different shortsighted transactional mercurial untrustworthy personalist profoundly illiberal rooted anarchy cannot unsee the Trump presidency Nor unsee Congress opportunistically overturn an election incite violence at the Capitol around the globe calculate their interests expectations Trump U.S. political system plausibly produce Asia Europe Middle East interrogated any conclusions qualifications rather than confidence there is nothing Biden can do to stop that all countries , everywhere hedge their bets unnerve allies Whatever promises best behaviors followed resurgence knuckle-dragging America firstism loom menacingly inevitably shape relations even with Biden hedge prospect indifferent disengaged clumsily myopic is wish it might be. not could not be flashing more brightly was not any stretch renunciation of Trump put to rest fluke Trump is the United States national character dozens of ethical scandals ended the political career any other trampling of norms barely registered sheer, horrifying incompetence gravest public health crisis chase Trump from the political scene 74 million cannot paint a picture American polity future foreign policy significant possibility large role for Trumpism next U.S. presidential election quite differently

['This is why even though Donald Trump has become a member of a rather exclusive club—one-term U.S. presidents—the Trump presidency will have enduring consequences for U.S. power and influence in the world. Leo Tolstoy warned that “there are no conditions to which a man may not become accustomed, particularly if he sees that they are accepted by those around him,” and it is easy, especially for most insular Americans, to implicitly normalize what was in fact a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy. Level whatever criticisms you may about the often bloodstained hands of the American colossus on the world stage, but Trump’s foreign policy was different: shortsighted, transactional, mercurial, untrustworthy, boorish, personalist, and profoundly illiberal in rhetoric, disposition, and creed. ', 'Some applauded this transformation, but most foreign policy experts, practitioners, and professionals are breathing a sigh of relief that a deeply regrettable, and in many ways embarrassing, interlude has passed. (It is exceedingly unlikely that any future president will exchange “beautiful letters” with and express their “love” for the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.) But such palpable relief must be tempered by a dispiriting truth, rooted in that notion of anarchy: the world cannot unsee the Trump presidency. (Nor, for that matter, can it unsee the way members of the U.S. Congress behaved in the final weeks of the Trump administration, voting opportunistically to overturn an election and helping incite violence at the Capitol.) From this point forward, countries around the globe will have to calculate their interests and expectations with the understanding that the Trump administration is the sort of thing that the U.S. political system can plausibly produce. ', 'Such reassessments will not be to the United States’ advantage. For 75 years, the general presumption that the United States was committed to the relationships and institutions it forged and the norms it articulated shaped the world in ways that privileged U.S. interests. If it is increasingly perceived to be feckless and self-serving, the United States will find the world a more hazardous and less welcoming place. ', 'POWER AND PURPOSE', 'One country tries to anticipate the foreign policy behavior of another by making assessments about two factors: power and purpose. Measuring the former seems straightforward, although it is often not. (France seemed to boast a formidable military in 1939, and the Soviet Union was considered a superpower a half century later, yet both countries suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed under pressure.) Measuring the latter—purpose—requires more guesswork in practice but is even more important. Is a country a friend or a foe, and in either case, for how long? Is a country’s word its bond, or are its commitments ephemeral and its pronouncements little more than shallow, opportunistic posturing? Ultimately, these are questions of trust and confidence that require judgment calls. And for better or worse, it is easier to partner with a country whose underlying foreign policy orientation is rooted in purposes that are reasonably consistent over time. ', 'For U.S. partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, however, Washington’s priorities on the world stage must now be interrogated, and any conclusions reached must be held with qualifications rather than confidence. And there is nothing that President Joe Biden and his team of immaculate professionals can do to stop that. From now on, all countries, everywhere, must hedge their bets about the United States—something that will unnerve allies more than adversaries. Whatever promises are made and best behaviors followed over the next few years, a resurgence of knuckle-dragging America firstism will loom menacingly in the shadows. That possibility will inevitably shape other states’ conclusions about their relations with the United States, even as nearly every world leader rushes to shake the hand of the new U.S. president. ', 'Thus, even with the election of Biden—a traditional, centrist liberal internationalist, cut from the same basic foreign policy cloth of every U.S. president (save one) across nine decades—countries will now have to hedge against the prospect of an indifferent, disengaged, and clumsily myopic U.S. foreign policy. After all, anarchy also demands that states see the world as it is, not as they wish it might be. And the warning signs that the United States is perhaps not the country it once was could not be flashing more brightly.', 'Although the margin of victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election was wide (the two candidates were separated by seven million votes, a 4.5 percent edge in the popular vote, and 74 electoral votes), it was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a renunciation of Trump. In 2016, some argued that Trump’s election was a fluke. This was always whistling past the graveyard, but the case could be made. After all, the election hinged on only about 80,000 votes, spread across three swing states. Even with that, but for the historically contingent geographic quirks of Michigan (the Upper Peninsula) and Florida (the Panhandle), those states would have gone blue. And the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton (who did walk away with the popular vote by a large margin), was, for some key constituencies, a suspect candidate. ', 'The 2020 election put to rest the comforting fable that Trump’s election was a fluke. Trump is the United States—or at least a very large part of it. Many Americans will choke on that sentiment, but other countries don’t have the luxury of clinging to some idealized version of the United States’ national character. Trump presided over dozens of ethical scandals, egregious procedural lapses, and startling indiscretions, most of which would have ended the political career of any other national political figure of the past half century. But the trampling of norms barely registered with most of the American public. Nor did the sheer, horrifying incompetence of the administration’s handling of the gravest public health crisis in a century chase Trump from the political scene in disgrace. (Imagine what would have happened to Jimmy Carter, a decent man dealt a difficult hand by an oil shock and the Iranian hostage crisis. Those events were enough to have his approval rating plummet into the 20s and soon send him packing after his landslide defeat in 1980.) Rather, Trump characteristically treated a pandemic that killed well more than a quarter of a million of the people under his charge as a personal inconvenience, to be managed exclusively for perceived political advantage. Even so, 74 million people voted for him—nine million more than did in 2016 and the most votes ever cast for a U.S. candidate for president, with the exception of Biden, who garnered 81 million. ', 'One cannot paint a picture of the American polity and the country’s future foreign policy without including the significant possibility of a large role for Trumpism, with or without Trump himself in the Oval Office. Looking ahead four years, America watchers must anticipate that the next U.S. presidential election could turn out quite differently. This does not bode well for U.S. interests and influence in world politics. As Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, observed, “If you know that whatever you’re doing will at most last until the next election, you look at everything in a more contingent way.” ', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-SpBa-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-4.docx

Kansas

SpBa

faa2d8cf6d0a15c7443df153afa87efbefd7e69c939e8308602aeb3fca1ae114

4. Process Education---It’s good

Abbe Gluck et al. 15. Anne O’Connell, and Rosa Po. *Professor of Law at Yale University. **Professor of Law at UC Berkeley. ***J.D. Candidate at Yale University. “Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking” Columbia Law Review. 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789. l/n.

process is dead Congress organized itself into committees passed filibuster fast-track budget process rules that govern the omnibus bills fail to appreciate deviations from the textbook process under unorthodox policymaking Given so much scholarship rely on understanding how Congress and the executive function accurate account of the modern policymaking process seems vital not all unorthodox policymaking is the same .

the Schoolhouse Rock cartoon version of the conventional legislative process is dead . It may never have accurately described the lawmaking process in the first place. This is not news to anyone in the halls of Congress or the executive branch. the textbook understandings that form the basic assumptions underlying the doctrines and theories of both fields are woefully outdated. Just as the now-textbook 1970s model was once itself revolutionary, ours is again a world of both "unorthodox lawmaking" n15 and "unorthodox rulemaking." These unorthodoxies are everywhere and they are not exceptions. n16 They are the new textbook process Another question is who are we--the lawyers--to judge? The Constitution gives to Congress the power over its own procedures. Congress organized itself into committees and passed rules such as the filibuster , the fast-track budget process , and the rules that govern the omnibus bills that give rise to many of the unorthodoxies we see today "Unorthodox lawmaking empirically documented the increase in legislative-process deviations a phenomenon elaborated on in a coauthored empirical study of congressional drafters by one of us has begun the legislative and rulemaking processes are inextricably linked, and that each set of unorthodoxies feeds into and illuminates the other. We also argue that it would be a return to the Schoolhouse Rock! fiction to fail to appreciate the sheer variety of deviations from the textbook process that fall under the general umbrella of unorthodox policymaking One goal of the Essay is simply to set the record straight Given that so much scholarship and legal doctrine at least purports to rely on an understanding of how Congress and the executive branch actually function , an accurate account of the modern policymaking process seems vital process variation When it comes to legislation, the Court has never been consistent in its articulation of what the role of interpretive doctrine is supposed to be in the first place Unorthodox policymaking is now often the norm rather than the exception. But not all unorthodox policymaking is the same . This Part focuses on these two themes, documenting the modern prevalence of unorthodox policymaking and resisting the way in which the limited accounts that do exist tend to lump together all deviations from conventional process as a single phenomenon Outsourcing difficult legislative and regulatory questions to special processes, commissions, and unconventional delegates raises its own set of questions for law, as do the simultaneously regulatory and legislative roles of the modern President, and the increasing use of nonformal means, such as guidance, for regulation. Direct democracy is yet another type of lawmaking whose differences from the norm courts seem to prefer to ignore

woefully outdated. Just as the now-textbook 1970s model was once itself revolutionary, ours is again a world of both "unorthodox lawmaking" and "unorthodox rulemaking." These unorthodoxies are everywhere and they are not exceptions. They are the new textbook process fast-track budget process it would be a return to the Schoolhouse Rock! fiction to fail to appreciate the sheer variety of deviations from the textbook process that fall under the general umbrella of unorthodox policymaking One goal of the Essay is simply to set the record straight accurate account of the modern policymaking process seems vital But not all unorthodox policymaking is the same Outsourcing difficult legislative and regulatory questions to special processes, commissions, and unconventional delegates raises its own set of questions for law, as do the simultaneously regulatory and legislative roles of the modern President, and the increasing use of nonformal means, such as guidance, for regulation. Direct democracy is yet another type of lawmaking whose differences from the norm courts seem to prefer to ignore

['And so it seems that the Schoolhouse Rock! n13 cartoon version of the conventional legislative process is dead. It may never have accurately described the lawmaking process in the first place. This is not news to anyone in the halls of Congress or the executive branch. But it may be news for law. The Court\'s first opinion directly confronting these modern developments--King v. Burwell, n14 the recent challenge to the ACA--was issued just before this Essay went to press. Until then, most of the doctrines, theories, and casebooks had overlooked--or perhaps intentionally ignored--the fact that the textbook understandings that form the basic assumptions underlying the doctrines and theories of both fields are woefully outdated. Just as the now-textbook 1970s model was once itself revolutionary, ours is again a world of both "unorthodox lawmaking" n15 and "unorthodox rulemaking." These unorthodoxies are everywhere and they are not exceptions. n16 They are the new textbook process. The "law crowd"--a group in whom the value of process is deeply instilled--tends to view these changes as disconcerting, as the Court did in King. But evaluating them is quite complex. Arguably, some of these modern unorthodoxies are beneficial to democracy, particularly insofar as they enable the enactment of policy that otherwise could not occur in an age of gridlock or under considerable fiscal constraints. n17 What is more, what is [*1795] orthodox today may have been unorthodox yesterday. The Administrative Procedure Act n18 (APA) and Chevron deference n19--two core modern institutions of administrative lawmaking--were considered unorthodox when first proposed. n20 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review, one of the unorthodoxies we discuss, may now be close to orthodox status, despite its lack of statutory and judicial recognition. n21 Another question is who are we--the lawyers--to judge? The Constitution gives to Congress the power over its own procedures. n22 Congress organized itself into committees and passed rules such as the filibuster, the fast-track budget process, and the rules that govern the omnibus bills that give rise to many of the unorthodoxies we see today. n23 Congress also passed the APA, which explicitly permits agencies to regulate without notice and comment--a practice today viewed as unorthodox because of its increased use and de facto binding effect on regulated entities. n24 This Essay develops a modern account of unorthodox lawmaking and unorthodox rulemaking and, in the Strauss tradition, substantiates [*1796] the link between them. For example, both lawmaking and rulemaking often now bypass the hurdles of transparency that have become familiar. Both use outside delegates for many controversial issues. Both also have generated significant jurisdictional overlap: The "deal making" required to surmount political division leads to bundling unrelated bills, drafted by multiple congressional committees, which in turn creates overlap across administrators and gives a more prominent role to the White House because it takes on the role as coordinator-in-chief. n25 Who wins and who loses from these deviations? Power inures to party leaders and the President--who wears two different, but equally powerful, hats as legislator and chief administrator. On the other hand, policy experts in committees and agencies, as well as those who favor decentralized power, may get the short end of the stick. From a democracy perspective, the process loses transparency and public input and sometimes obfuscates accountability. But it may also gain in efficiency and productivity. "Unorthodox lawmaking" was first brought to the attention of the academy by political scientist Barbara Sinclair, in her eponymous book. n26 Subsequent editions empirically documented the increase in legislative-process deviations, n27 a phenomenon elaborated on in a coauthored empirical study of congressional drafters by one of us. n28 On the administrative law side, separate work by two of us has begun to develop the modern unorthodox rulemaking account. n29 Until now, these two accounts mostly have been discussed in isolation and have themselves relied on fairly simplified description. n30 In contrast, [*1797] we argue here that the legislative and rulemaking processes are inextricably linked, and that each set of unorthodoxies feeds into and illuminates the other. We also argue that it would be a return to the Schoolhouse Rock! fiction to fail to appreciate the sheer variety of deviations from the textbook process that fall under the general umbrella of unorthodox policymaking. Omnibus bills and rules are different from emergency bills and rules; both are different from unorthodox delegations; and so on. Part I expands the preexisting descriptive account by developing a new typology of these deviations and roughly surveying their scope empirically. Part II explores these connections as well as other ways in which common motivations, such as gridlock, institutional complexity, and fiscal constraints, give rise to the deviations in both branches. The final two Parts investigate the normative and legal implications of our descriptive account. As Part III explains, these unconventional practices allow certain institutional actors to gain and lose power and offer benefits and drawbacks for social welfare and democratic legitimacy. Part IV looks to doctrine and details how, in the contexts of both statutory interpretation and administrative law, these unorthodoxies have been largely invisible, even as the courts seem obsessed with ensuring that judicial decisions in statutory cases reflect how Congress legislates or that agencies otherwise faithfully execute Congress\'s commands. Two brief examples will illustrate our direction. On the legislation side, take the simple example of one of the Court\'s favorite interpretive rules--that a term used in one part of a statute means the same thing when used in another part. n31 While this "presumption of consistent usage" may make sense for very short statutes, or statutes involving a single subject matter drafted by a single congressional committee, it makes little sense for omnibus deals that put together diverse statutes, drafted at different times, by different institutional actors. On the administrative law side, to take another basic example, the Supreme Court has yet to decide how its central deference doctrine--Chevron--applies when multiple agencies share authority. n32 [*1798] One goal of the Essay is simply to set the record straight. Given that so much scholarship and legal doctrine at least purports to rely on an understanding of how Congress and the executive branch actually function, an accurate account of the modern policymaking process seems vital. At a broader level, the Essay\'s goal is to question the capacity of and role for courts in taking this amount of process variation into account. Part of this inquiry is motivated by an interest in the jurisprudential foundations of statutory law. When it comes to legislation, the Court has never been consistent in its articulation of what the role of interpretive doctrine is supposed to be in the first place. Sometimes the Court tells us that its doctrines aim to reflect how Congress drafts--for instance, the rule that Congress does not write with redundancies. Other times, the Court tells us that legislation doctrine helps Congress draft "better" or encourages legislative deliberation. Still other applications of interpretive doctrine aim to impose on legislation external values, like federalism, that Congress might not have considered. n33 These potential normative frameworks are often in tension in any given case. On the administrative law side, the Court has been less interested in engaging in a shared interpretive con-versation with agencies and more interested in questions of accountability. n34 But even there, the theoretical basis has been fuzzy, since the Court seems to measure accountability against the APA, and not against actual agency and White House practices. n35 Obviously, all of these different norms have different implications for a theory that would take unorthodox processes into account. One caveat at the outset is that we do not engage judicial unorthodoxies, or unorthodoxies related to agency enforcement and agency adjudications. A comprehensive study of unorthodox mechanisms in law might well include these, for instance, examining court innovations such as the increasing use of unpublished and thus nonprecedential opinions n36 and the rise of specialty courts. n37 These developments, while fascinating, are outside the scope of this Essay, which trains its focus on the public law-making processes. Even with respect to Congress and the executive branch, [*1799] one Essay cannot possibly tackle all unorthodox practices and we recognize omissions: For instance, we do not discuss foreign affairs. In addition, we focus mostly on action by policymakers. One could also develop an account of unorthodox inaction in lawmaking and rulemaking. n38 Our efforts, as noted, build on Strauss\'s contributions. Strauss has always written with both modern legislation and administration--and their connections--front and center. n39 He was an early identifier of the varied unorthodox roles played by the President and the potential doctrinal implications of those different roles. n40 He was one of the first scholars to consider the question of Chevron deference for presidential interpretations, and also the link between agency statutory interpretation and the legislative history debate raging on the statutory side. n41 And his pathbreaking work on Chevron as a judicial management tool is a rare realist analysis of doctrinal development in response to the sprawl of regulation. n42 He has been a consistent voice in pushing back against those who turn a blind eye toward the political and legislative context of statutes, and we aim to follow his example here. n43 I. THEMANY FORMS OF UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING AND RULEMAKING Unorthodox policymaking is now often the norm rather than the exception. But not all unorthodox policymaking is the same. This Part focuses on these two themes, documenting the modern prevalence of unorthodox policymaking and resisting the way in which the limited accounts that do exist tend to lump together all deviations from conventional process as a single phenomenon. n44 Omnibus actions are different from emergency actions, not only in motivation and in how the final product looks, but also in the distinct challenges each poses for courts. Outsourcing difficult legislative and regulatory questions to special processes, commissions, and unconventional delegates raises its own set of [*1800] questions for law, as do the simultaneously regulatory and legislative roles of the modern President, and the increasing use of nonformal means, such as guidance, for regulation. Direct democracy is yet another type of lawmaking whose differences from the norm courts seem to prefer to ignore.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

51ac8982d8f7264675d51e221f8dcb96160519a8ae97004c174c8e23ef6378c6

Turn: small firms are better innovators.

Hemphill & Wu ’20 [C. Scott; Moses H. Grossman Professor of Law @ New York University School of Law; and Tim; Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science and Technology @ Columbia Law School; “Nascent Competitors,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 168(7), p. 1879-1910; AS]

nascent competitor is Innovation take the form of technical progress business models competition is valuable because entrant's product represent advance an increases pressure on the incumbent innovate in response also opens door to further entry competition can lower the price disruptive innovations come out of small firms Bell Apple smaller firms transform the industry Bell's telephone did not improve the telegraph, but replaced it displace an incumbent through paradigm shift for example software Nascent competition important in technological change

a nascent competitor is an innovator Innovation can take the form of technical progress or new business models that better serve consumer needs Protecting innovation is important because new products and services drive growth competition is valuable because the entrant's product may represent a real advance an d because the entrant increases pressure on the incumbent to innovate in anticipation or response Competition also opens the door to further entry in this and other businesses. Finally competition can benefit consumers by lower ing the price paid for these innovations small innovative firms have played important role in innovation a significant number of disruptive innovations have come out of very small firms with new technologies unproven at the time: examples include Bell Telephone RCA, MCI, Genentech, Apple , Netscape, and dozens of others There is competitive significance of the big innovations at the smaller firms , for they also represent competitive entry, and completely transform the industry , unproven innovators are a key source of disruptive innovation Bell's telephone did not improve the telegraph, but replaced it , or the impact of Apple on the computing industry nascent competitors offer fresh competition for the market They displace an incumbent through paradigm shift for example software or decoding a genome Nascent competition tends to be important in industries marked by rapid innovation and technological change Software, pharmaceuticals mobile e-commerce search, and social network s

innovator technical progress business models important growth valuable real advance anticipation response further entry lower ing the price paid small innovative firms disruptive innovations very small firms competitive significance smaller firms completely transform disruptive innovation replaced paradigm shift software genome be important technological change

["Innovation. First, a nascent competitor is an innovator. Innovation can take the form of technical progress or new business models that better serve consumer needs. Protecting the fruits of innovation is important because new products and services drive economic growth. Such competition is valuable both because the entrant's product may represent a real advance and because the entrant increases the pressure on the incumbent to innovate in anticipation or response. 29 Competition also opens the door to further entry in this and other businesses. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, competition can benefit consumers by lowering the price paid for these innovations.", 'Over the last century and a half, small, innovative firms have played a particularly important role in the process of innovation and competition. This is not to discount the important history of innovation at big firms with large research laboratories, such as Bell Labs, Xerox PARC, and research labs at General Electric and Merck.30 However, over the same period, a significant number of disruptive innovations-those that transform industry-have come out of very small firms with new technologies unproven at the time: examples include the Bell Telephone Company, RCA, MCI, Genentech, Apple, Netscape, and dozens of others.31', "There is a particular competitive significance of the big innovations at the smaller firms, for they also represent competitive entry, and sometimes completely transform the industry.32 New, unproven innovators are a key source of disruptive innovation.33 Consider that Bell's telephone did not improve the telegraph, but replaced it, or the impact of Apple's personal computer on the computing industry. As this suggests, nascent competitors can hold the promise of offering fresh competition for the market, not just in the market. They have the capacity to displace an incumbent through a paradigm shift-for example, a new platform for developing software or decoding a genome. Nascent competition tends to be important in industries marked by rapid innovation and technological change. Software, pharmaceuticals, mobile telephony, e-commerce, search, and social network services are leading examples.", '']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-Cai-Sullivan-Aff-Northwestern-Round2.docx

Dartmouth

CaSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/CaSu/Dartmouth-Cai-Sullivan-Aff-Northwestern-Round2.docx

34ff249c0f12ae64e05601a345107660dec87d1a2213795289fe16b0da2deb86

Do both. Court enjoins the President, who follows on. That is the only way to ensure compliance. Else, Biden says no.

Perkovich 13 – V.P. for Studies & Chair, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, overseeing the Nuclear Policy Program and Tech & Int’l Affairs Program

domestic dynamics of the U.S. pose a obstacle to proposed policy Adopting is a career one for a president Proponents of new nuclear systems will mobilize resistance contractors lab s Proposing a change portrayed as weakening power invites ostracism

The domestic dynamics of the U.S. nuclear establishment pose a major obstacle to proposed policy Adopting is not a security risk but a career one for a president Proponents of new nuclear -weapon systems that would be ideal for preemptive first strikes will mobilize resistance from contractors and lab s that fear any move to reduce the role of nuclear weapons Proposing a policy change that would be portrayed as weakening the power and resolve projected by the United States invites ostracism instability escalation legality and morality are not as important as perceived resoluteness

domestic dynamics major obstacle proposed policy not a security risk career one mobilize resistance contractors lab s fear any move portrayed weakening power resolve projected invites ostracism

['George Perkovich, also Director of the Secure World Program, Alton Jones Foundation, and serves as the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair at CEIP, “Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine,” 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/01/do-unto-others-toward-defensible-nuclear-doctrine-pub-51303', 'The domestic dynamics of the U.S. nuclear establishment pose another major obstacle to the proposed policy. Adopting this policy is not a security risk but a career one for a president and others who want to rise in the national security establishment. Proponents of potential new nuclear-weapon systems that putatively would be ideal for preemptive first strikes will mobilize resistance, including from contractors and laboratories that generally fear any move to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Proposing a policy change that would be portrayed as weakening the power and resolve projected by the United States invites ostracism. The problems of instability, escalation, legality, and morality that would derive from initiating nuclear use are not as important as the perceived resoluteness of threatening first use. However, again, the policy recommended here is not no-first-use or sole purpose. It is consonant with what the American public assumes U.S. policy is: to retaliate as a last resort against an aggressor that threatens the survival of the United States or its allies.']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCa-Aff-7---Dartmouth-Round-2.docx

Dartmouth

BaCa

2b9bd33b9b4fa14f8886ebabf38c5edb3b86f683af95c21d0c31139b562e2aac

It's hotly debated, core of the topic, and predictable.

Hildabrand ’15 [Clark; January 16; J.D. candidate at Yale Law School, B.A. from Washington and Lee University, writing under review by Professor George Priest; Tennessee Journal of Business Law, “Interactive Antitrust Federalism: Antitrust Enforcement in Tennessee Then and Now,” vol. 16]

state antitrust has risen and supplement federal in notable litigation Some commentators view state enforcement as a deviation from the “ passive ” role but the trend is a revitalization of historic antitrust debates surrounding the relationship between federal and state enforcement explore how the Sherman Act impacted acceptance of stronger antitrust state enforcement surpassed limited federal capacity antitrust law demonstrates usefulness of federalism

state antitrust enforcement has risen to some degree, and attorneys have begun supplement ing federal enforcement, such as in the notable antitrust litigation involving Microsoft Federal prohibitions opened an area of antitrust regulation for state enforcement dominance Some commentators view heightened state enforcement as a novel deviation from the traditionally “ passive ” state antitrust role but the current trend of active state enforcement is a revitalization of historic state antitrust enforcement activity State antitrust overlapped and occasionally exceeded federal enforcement before World War I In light of the recent debates surrounding the proper relationship between federal and state antitrust enforcement , this Article explore s how the Sherman Act impacted state antitrust enforcement the implementation of the Sherman Act and the national acceptance of stronger antitrust regulation contributed to state antitrust enforcement that surpassed and supplemented the limited federal antitrust capacity in the first few decades antitrust law demonstrates the usefulness of federalism in providing avenues for consistent enforcement of antitrust law

antitrust enforcement risen supplement ing notable litigation opened an area state enforcement commentators novel deviation passive current trend revitalization historic overlapped exceeded recent debates proper relationship federal state antitrust Sherman Act national acceptance stronger antitrust regulation state surpassed supplemented federal antitrust capacity usefulness of federalism

['In recent years, state antitrust enforcement has risen to some degree, and state attorneys general have begun supplementing federal enforcement, such as in the notable antitrust litigation involving Microsoft.14 Federal prohibitions against indirect purchaser antitrust actions15 have opened an area of antitrust regulation for state enforcement dominance.16 Some commentators view the heightened state enforcement as a completely novel deviation from the traditionally “passive” state antitrust role,17 but the current trend of more active state enforcement is, in fact, a revitalization of historic state antitrust enforcement activity.18 State antitrust enforcement overlapped and occasionally exceeded federal enforcement in the years before World War I, and, in the absence of negative economic effects from over-regulation, the resurgence of state antitrust enforcement is not inherently troubling.19', 'In light of the recent debates surrounding the proper relationship between federal and state antitrust enforcement, this Article explores the early years of state antitrust enforcement to see how the Sherman Act impacted state antitrust enforcement. Since Tennessee was the location of the first federal case brought under the Sherman Act20 and has been involved in a recent indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation,21 this Article specifically focuses on the development of antitrust law within Tennessee. Before the Sherman Act, Tennessee antitrust enforcement was limited to the narrow confines of common law restraint of trade,22 but the implementation of the Sherman Act and the national acceptance of stronger antitrust regulation contributed to state antitrust enforcement that surpassed and supplemented the limited federal antitrust capacity in the first few decades following the enactment of the Sherman Act. For these reasons, the author contends that the development and implementation of Tennessee’s antitrust law demonstrates the usefulness of federalism in providing two avenues for consistent enforcement of antitrust law when political and legal limitations preclude one of the methods of enforcement from adequately punishing behavior that harms consumer welfare within states, while simultaneously discouraging the inefficient over-enforcement of antitrust laws.', '', '']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Hormozdiari-Dombcik-Neg-Northwestern-Round2.docx

Michigan

HoDo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/HoDo/Michigan-Hormozdiari-Dombcik-Neg-Northwestern-Round2.docx

ec4f2d46efac2898fa1d751a2a130d66bce9e4fe44d59c3208a501f87dfd45f8

Comity sends cases abroad—US courts don’t hear anything.

Anderson 18 - (*Robert D. Anderson, **William E. Kovacic, ***Anna Caroline Müller and ****Nadezhda Sporysheva *Senior Counsellor and Team Leader for Government Procurement and Competition Policy, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; Honorary Professor, School of Law @ University of Nottingham, UK **Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy and Director @ Competition Law Center @ George Washington University Law School; Visiting Professor @ Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London; and Non-Executive Director, UK Competition and Markets Authority ***Legal Affairs Officer, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat ****Legal/Economic Analyst, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; 10-21-2018, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, "Competition Policy, Trade And The Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments In Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges And Issues For Reflection," doa: 6-4-2021) url: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.pdf

jurisdictional conflicts may arise 'positive comity' can be helpful allows one party to request another party take enforcement actions thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources

the extraterritorial reach of competition law is a sensitive issue and jurisdictional conflicts may arise , two different countries may assert their own jurisdiction in the same case, leading to potential divergent assessments the possibility of 'positive comity' can be , where available, helpful . Positive comity allows one party to request another party to take appropriate enforcement actions with respect to anti-competitive activities occurring in the territory of the requested party that adversely affect important interests of the requesting party, thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources by allowing the better-placed party to deal with the issue

extraterritorial reach sensitive issue jurisdictional conflicts may arise 'positive comity' allocating effectively enforcement resources better-placed party

['', "In part to tackle these issues, an increasing number of jurisdictions have embraced versions of the 'effects doctrine'. 276 Under this principle, domestic competition laws are applicable to firms and arrangements based outside of the domestic market when they have effects that are felt within the domestic territory. Such applications of competition law have, beyond a doubt, yielded important benefits for consumers in many instances. Nonetheless, the extraterritorial reach of competition law is a sensitive issue and jurisdictional conflicts may arise. For example, two different countries may assert their own jurisdiction in the same case, leading to potential divergent assessments. In such circumstances, the possibility of 'positive comity' can be, where available, helpful. Positive comity allows one party (requesting) to request another party (requested) to take appropriate enforcement actions with respect to anti-competitive activities occurring in the territory of the requested party that adversely affect important interests of the requesting party, thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources by allowing the better-placed party to deal with the issue.277"]

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-MAC-Round4.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-MAC-Round4.docx

c201bb778d7b496aee5cc1fab8a1143d7e0af01dd48f4657774720ab09720931

4—Smart cities fail—won’t be broadly adopted

Jim Robbins 21, contributor to Yale Environment 360, 12/1/21, “Why the Luster on Once-Vaunted ‘Smart Cities’ Is Fading,” https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-the-luster-is-fading-on-once-vaunted-smart-cities

smart cities are being constructed proponents say these represent a healthier planet prominent cities faced serious obstacles Abu Dhabi abandoned its plan cost was far more than forecast completed city in South Korea has not been able to fill buildings a ghost town When you take dimensions of human nature and algorithmicize them, there is always failure History, culture are missing from smart cities Despite trillions spent to create these developers say people will come,’ and they don’t . People want culture

a burgeoning number of “ smart cities are being constructed . NEOM is a $500 billion city under construction in Saudi Arabia. Egypt is building a new smart capital a smart city is a city filled with sensors that monitor myriad aspects of life All the monitors in these cities are connected to the IoT While proponents say these communities represent the future of a healthier planet prominent smart cities have faced serious obstacles to realizing their utopian visions Abu Dhabi abandoned its smart city master plan because of financial problems because the cost of some aspects of the city was far more than forecast a completed smart city in South Korea has not been able to fill its buildings . It’s a ghost town When you take messy ambiguous dimensions of human nature and try to find ways to algorithmicize them, there is always a failure there History, culture spiritual aspects of life are missing from smart cities Despite trillions being spent to create these cities of the future leading analysts believe in a very different concept A smart city without people is a dumb city. You are building a smart city in the absence of people, in the absence of history culture developers say , ‘We are going to build this great, amazing city and people will come,’ and they don’t . People want to live in communities and have culture around them

proponents serious obstacles has not been able to fill its buildings ghost town always a failure there missing from smart cities they don’t

['Woven City is one of a burgeoning number of “smart cities” that have been recently built or are now being planned or constructed. NEOM is a $500 billion sprawling futuristic city for a million people under construction in Saudi Arabia. Egypt is building a new smart capital near Cairo that planners say could eventually be home to 6.5 million people. Telosa, proposed by a former Walmart executive, would be a city of 50,000 in the western United States “in a place yet to be determined.” Numerous smart cities have been or are being built in China.', 'There’s no single concept of a smart city. But the basic definition is a city filled with sensors that monitor myriad aspects of life, from traffic to pollution to energy and water use. In the case of the Woven City, “smart homes” will feature sensors that will monitor the occupants’ health. All the monitors in these cities are connected to the backbone of these prototype communities, the Internet of Things (IoT), meaning the interconnection of tiny computers placed in everyday objects. The massive trove of collected data will be interpreted with artificial intelligence to make cities greener and more livable.', 'While proponents say these communities represent the future of a healthier planet, some prominent smart cities have faced serious obstacles to realizing their utopian visions. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi abandoned its smart city master plan because of financial problems that began in 2008 and continued because the cost of some aspects of the city was far more than forecast. Songdo is a completed smart city with a population of 170,000 in South Korea that has not been able to fill its buildings. It’s sometimes described as a ghost town, or, variously, as cold, impersonal, homogenous, and dully predictable.', 'One recent paper on smart cites grappled with ways these cities can introduce serendipity into daily life to combat their monotonous nature.', '“There are a lot of good things that can come of” smart city concepts, “especially for the environmental applications,” said Shannon Mattern, a professor of anthropology at The New School for Social Research and the author of A City is Not a Computer. “But it really limits your [ways] of intervention to the types of things that lend themselves to quantitative measurement,” she said. “When you take messy ambiguous dimensions of human nature and try to find ways to algorithmicize them, there is always a failure there, something that slips through the cracks.” History, culture, and the spiritual aspects of life are among those aspects that critics cite as missing from — or are diminished — in smart cities.', 'There has been criticism, as well, of smart cities being alien to the landscape on which they are built. In her book Spaceship in the Desert, about Masdar City, Göckcę Günel, an anthropologist at Rice University, said both Masdar City and Neom “share the vision that the desert is an empty zone on which any kind of ideal can be projected,” she said. “That’s why I compared Masdar City to a spaceship insulated from the rest of the world.”', 'Despite the fact that trillions of dollars are being spent to create these spectacular, Oz-like, all-encompassing cities of the future, some leading analysts believe in a very different concept of smarter cities.', '“I hate almost every effort at building a greenfield smart city,” said Boyd Cohen, a professor at EADA, a business school in Barcelona, who is one of the pioneers of the smart city concept and a longtime climate strategist. “A smart city without people is a dumb city. You are building a smart city in the absence of people, in the absence of history, in the absence of culture. The developers say, ‘We are going to build this great, amazing city and people will come,’ and they don’t. People want to live in communities and have culture around them.”', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

dc46c9ce8d35e953161e9cc99b984832ebbe725f214d249c0b1e90c1d702f8ec

2. TURN. Abstracting nuclear violence is inaccurate & reinscribes racist violence.

John Streamas 23. Director, American Studies and Culture Ph.D. Program at Washington State University, Ph.D., American Culture Studies: Bowling Green State University. “Nuclear Threat as Race Hatred.” https://jhs.press.gonzaga.edu/articles/10.33972/jhs.226

Nuclear weapons pervade our thinking the ultimate colonizer very heart of whiteness The fact that they exist very presence will wreak havoc than we can fathom The Bomb is a tool of the racial contract The nuclear mundane is slow violence distributes damage unevenly Poor people people of color Indigenous people queer people women receive the least benefit most exposed to its harm Black cities are nuclear bait to protect White suburbs 88 percent o African American wiped out in conflict suffering directly caused by the Bomb histories of suffering are blunted and obscured military nuclear culture has abstracted and systematized racial hate label manifestations such as necropolitics bare life death-in-life social death precarity already-dead Bomb creates nuclear necropolitics The Bomb is a weapon of national hate short-term planning failed to consider consequences of nuclear war deterrence is no substitute for long-term planning Aforementioned concepts have failed to confront institutions with convincing accusations of their complicity They have failed to grasp long-term effects on terrorized people of color existence has imposed spatiotemporality of the apocalypse logic of their analyses of racism accommodates no vision of a future empower people so we may dismantle the Bomb

Nuclear weapons pervade our thinking . Control our behavior. Administer our societies. Inform our dreams They bury themselves like meat hooks deep in the base of our brains. They are purveyors of madness. They are the ultimate colonizer . Whiter than any white man that ever lived. The very heart of whiteness It is such supreme folly to believe that nuclear weapons are deadly only if they’re used The fact that they exist at all their very presence in our lives, will wreak more havoc than we can begin to fathom The Bomb is a tool of the racial contract The nuclear mundane is the slow violence of the atomic age it distributes its damage unevenly Poor people , people of color , Indigenous people , queer people , and women receive the least benefit from the nuclear complex and are most exposed to its harm : the most toxic nuclear sites are located on Indigenous land, and in proximity to poor communities and communities of color; predominantly Black cities are established as nuclear bait to protect the White suburbs 88 percent o f the African American population wiped out in the first minutes of a full-scale atomic conflict the vicious nature of a society’s racism lies in its construction of racialized others as the first and worst victims of nuclear weapons as technologies of annihilation develop, it becomes increasingly important radiation-borne illnesses and diseases suffer from serious health issues This may not be the instant death of victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but still it is suffering directly caused by the building of the Bomb histories of the suffering are blunted and obscured When strategists know that a nuclear strike against the United States may kill many Whites, still they arrange for it to kill Blacks quicker and disproportionately military nuclear culture has abstracted and systematized racial hate label manifestations of this kind of hate with terms such as necropolitics , bare life , death-in-life , social death , precarity , the already-dead the Bomb creates a nuclear necropolitics Purporting to represent the interests of a significant portion of a nation, even if not its majority, it acts as if all the people who make up that portion vented their rage and hatred of a targeted group. Whether the crew of the Enola Gay hated Japanese matters less than that their institutional function was to perform an act of hate The Bomb is also a weapon of national hate The winner with the Bomb says effectively Even if we all die, it will be our people who will stand last and longest neoliberal world governed by short-term planning failed to consider the particular consequences of nuclear war Nuclear deterrence is no substitute for long-term planning false reassurances of deterrence cannot possibly understand the ambient and perpetual terrors felt by the Bomb’s prospective targets Aforementioned concepts have so far failed to confront institutions with convincing accusations of their complicity They have also largely failed to grasp the long-term effects on terrorized people of color the existence of nuclear weapons has already imposed on the world spatiotemporality of the apocalypse Nuclear racism underwrites the condition of infinite ending The logic of their analyses of racism , like the logic of the Bomb, accommodates no vision of a future empower people of color so that we may dismantle the Bomb

the ultimate colonizer The very heart of whiteness The fact that they exist at all wreak more havoc The Bomb is a tool of the racial contract slow violence unevenly Poor people people of color Indigenous people queer people women nuclear bait 88 percent wiped out directly caused blunted obscured quicker disproportionately abstracted systematized necropolitics bare life death-in-life social death precarity already-dead nuclear necropolitics institutional function national hate particular consequences nuclear war long-term planning ambient perpetual terrors confront institutions complicity long-term effects terrorized people of color spatiotemporality of the apocalypse infinite ending no vision of a future dismantle the Bomb

['In her essay “The End of Imagination” Arundhati Roy argues for the racial component of the Bomb: ', 'Nuclear weapons pervade our thinking. Control our behavior. Administer our societies. Inform our dreams. They bury themselves like meat hooks deep in the base of our brains. They are purveyors of madness. They are the ultimate colonizer. Whiter than any white man that ever lived. The very heart of whiteness. (p. 101) ', 'She opens her essay by recalling that India has acquired the Bomb, but she blames the United States for inventing and developing it. She adds, “It is such supreme folly to believe that nuclear weapons are deadly only if they’re used. The fact that they exist at all, their very presence in our lives, will wreak more havoc than we can begin to fathom” (p. 101). This idea, set beside Mills’s, suggests that the real target of the Bomb is not a rival White nation but the nations of subpersons. The Bomb is a tool of the racial contract. ', 'The world today reads Japan as a nation on the cutting edge of a nuclear energy industry that, even in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, perseveres and prospers. And that industry was largely launched by the 1950s Eisenhower-era “Atoms for Peace” program that aimed to replace Japanese memories of the Bomb with ambitions for atomic power as a peaceful energy source (Hurley, 2020). Japan’s political and corporate elites want their nation to be known as a leader in nuclear energy, not as a victim of nuclear weapons. According to Mills’s idea, the racial contract requires the complicity of at least a few of its victims: “there should be no essentialist illusions,” he says, “about anyone’s intrinsic ‘racial’ virtue. All peoples can fall into Whiteness under the appropriate circumstances” (2022, pp. 128–29). ', 'Yet the history of Japanese victimhood refuses to be erased or replaced. Few survivors remain, but the testimony of many survivors is preserved in print and film, and the bombed cities appear both in histories of the U.S. facilities that processed uranium and plutonium for those bombs and in reports of failing efforts to clean those facilities and make them safe.1 The Hanford site in southeastern Washington, which is little more than one hundred miles from my home and workplace, processed plutonium for the Nagasaki bomb, and its radioactive waste has been leaking for decades and threatens to continue leaking for decades to come.2 Moreover, the bombed Japanese cities play small but crucial roles in contemporary fiction by Japanese American writers such as Ruth Ozeki (in A Tale for the Time Being) and Asako Serizawa (in Inheritors).3 The governments of Japan and the United States have failed to banish nuclear terrors from the memory of survivors and the imagination of cultural activists. ', 'Those terrors, even before U.S. leaders justified the Bomb and even as Americans celebrated it for ending the war, were evident to writers of color. Langston Hughes’s character Simple insists that the Bomb was a race weapon that would never have been used on Germans, the White enemy (1990). To be sure, technologies of war were developing less for strategic purposes than for annihilation. As Sven Lindqvist writes in A History of Bombing, “The laws of war protect enemies of the same race, class, and culture. The laws of war leave the foreign and the alien without protection” (2001, p. 2). Against enemies deemed “savages and barbarians,” then, anything is permissible (Lindqvist, 2001, p. 2). A weapon with the lethal reach of the Bomb might kill different peoples, but still it could target a particular—in Japan’s case, a racialized—population. In Infrastructures of Apocalypse Jessica Hurley (2020) identifies such targeting: ', 'The nuclear mundane is the slow violence of the atomic age; like all slow violence, it distributes its damage unevenly. Poor people, people of color, Indigenous people, queer people, and women receive the least benefit from the nuclear complex and are most exposed to its harm: the most toxic nuclear sites are located on Indigenous land, and in proximity to poor communities and communities of color; predominantly Black cities are established as nuclear bait to protect the White suburbs, with the result that by 1984, an estimated 88 percent of the African American population would have been wiped out in the first minutes of a full-scale atomic conflict. (p. 14) ', 'This does not mean that White lives would not be lost, only that the vicious nature of a society’s racism lies in its construction of racialized others as the first and worst victims of nuclear weapons. Even left-leaning popular culture—Dr Strangelove comes to mind—makes the Bomb terrible by making its annihilation seem total and indiscriminate; but people of color such as Hughes have known better. How racist must Whites be to know and not care that, though they will still die, they will at least outlive Blacks by a few minutes? This is race hatred at its worst. ', 'This may seem like a crude and insignificant distinction of White racism, but I argue that, as technologies of annihilation develop, it becomes increasingly important. My field, Ethnic Studies, teaches that in the United States the farthest-reaching and the deepest racisms inhere in ambient cultures of institutions and policies that need no hateful and viciously prejudiced people, that racism exists, as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2021) argues, “without racists.” Surely the growing literature of Americans living near nuclear facilities and suffering apparently radiation-borne illnesses and diseases suggests that Whites are targets, if not exactly of institutional racism, then of similar or related protocols of suffering. In her gathering of Hanford-area testimonies, almost all by Whites, Trisha T. Pritikin mentions that farmer Tom Bailie “remembers deformed animals born on the family farm and how the ‘people from Hanford’ would collect ‘weird stuff’ such as dead chickens, vegetables from the family garden, and water samples” (2020, p. 170). Bailie and his sister “suffer from serious health issues that they believe were caused by their childhood exposures to Hanford’s radiation releases” (Pritikin, 2020, p. 170). This may not be the instant death of victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but still it is suffering directly caused by the building of the Bomb. If people of color can be complicit in nuclear warfare, then working Whites can suffer its devastations too. ', 'Still, even eight decades after development and first use of the Bomb, histories of the suffering are blunted and obscured. Competing interests often displace those histories. An example is a recent book for young adults, Roseanne Montillo’s (2021) Atomic Women: The Untold Stories of the Scientists Who Helped Create the Nuclear Bomb, which celebrates women whose work, often uncredited, contributed to the Manhattan Project that built the Bomb. Montillo’s understandable concern with gender discrimination in science and engineering fields says nothing about the racism of the Pacific War and little about her subjects’ being implicated in the Bomb’s carnage. Near the end of her closing chapter, Montillo acknowledges that the Bomb “killed more than two hundred thousand people in the immediate aftermath,” but she returns quickly to her complaint that women who contributed to its construction were denied credit (2021, p. 216). Feelings about the Bomb among these women depended, Montillo says, “on their personal views of science and on their beliefs about how such discoveries could help or hurt humanity,” but the book ends on its overarching triumphalism: “Whatever their feelings, no one can deny, least of all themselves, that these female scientists were leaders in their fields” (2021, p. 219). ', 'Other recent books on the Bomb trade narratives of victims’ suffering for celebrations of scientific genius or the intensity and focused teamwork of the Manhattan Project. Curiously, too, in recent years a number of White women writers have published novels set in the Bomb project.4 The protagonists of these novels are themselves young White women, hired into low-paying jobs at nuclear facilities in Oak Ridge, Hanford, or Los Alamos. They know only that their jobs are part of a mission that will help the war cause, but they are warned against asking for details. Because these are contemporary novels, the protagonists may take note of the presence and treatment of women and people of color working at the facilities, but their main concerns involve romantic entanglements with young male co-workers. To say that these are historical novels is only to say that they are set during wartime in worksites that are part of the war mission. Their authors do not otherwise implicate them in the terrors of the Bomb. And yet one of these novels, Sharma Shields’s (2019) The Cassandra, set in Hanford, features a young White woman named Mildred, who suffers terrifying visions of the Bomb that she cannot possibly know she is helping to develop. She warns, “We’re making a bomb that will kill thousands. Tens of thousands. It will maim even more. People will drop dead from the sickness it brings. Eyeballs will melt from their sockets. It will affect the land here, too. The very soil around us will give birth to demons” (Shields, 2019, p. 186). When Mildred tries to discuss her visions, she is regarded as crazy and is hospitalized—institutionalized. The value of Shields’s novel is that, though her protagonist cannot know the Hanford mission, still, even if only through visions, she senses that she is implicated in the war and its terrors. Like protagonists in the other recent Bomb novels, she feels no ostensible race hatred. Unlike them, however, she does feel herself implicated in the kind of national race hatred that drives the Pacific War and builds the Bomb. ', 'Institutional racism, rather than casting aside White hate as a motivating cause, merely transforms and redefines that hate. It may mask itself as nationalism or patriotism, as military strategy or even as national defense, but it is at its core race hatred. In a James Bond movie, the hero kills coolly, dispassionately, as a function of his job. He needs only to assume that his enemy must be killed, not even that the enemy is hateful. This is the martial code by which soldiers are urged to retain their sanity and their moral bearing: Do your job, and do not overthink it. Michael Walzer (2015) implies that “unjust wars” happen when soldiers and leaders do overthink and still kill indiscriminately, though he also seems to sense that no killing, not even the killing by the Bomb, can ever be entirely indiscriminate. Postwar nuclear deterrence, says Walzer, depends on an assumption that preparing, even threatening to kill is still not killing, though it is “frighteningly close—else deterrence wouldn’t ‘work’—and it is in the nature of that closeness that the moral problem lies” (2015, p. 269). That very closeness seems to be at the heart of debates within the United States over gun control laws, though people obtain guns in an assumption that they will someday use them, and as more people have guns, more will die of guns. Believing otherwise may seem naïve, yet it is a belief held by political and military leaders defending nuclear arsenals. Asked in 1985 about deterrence, the secretary general of NATO said, “I don’t believe it’s worked; I know it’s worked. There hasn’t been a war for 40 years. … there is no other way at the present time of keeping the peace for the world” (Siracusa, 2008, p. 62). Yet the “moral problem” that Walzer identifies inheres in the “closeness” of deterrence to mass killing, and a fear that the existence of nuclear arsenals sustains a terrifying sense that they will eventually be used. The secretary general’s scant “40 years” were marked not by peace but by fear and terror, by the closeness of annihilation. ', 'This fear needs to be discussed in racial contexts. At my state university in southeastern Washington, the spike in publicity given in the summer of 2020 to police killings of young Black people, including the videotaped murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, prompted the president’s office (2020) to issue a public declaration of support for people of color, even to agree that “Black Lives Matter.” Yet when I and several students of color called their attention to the fact that local police vehicles bore a decal saying “All Lives Matter,” a racialized repudiation of the racial-justice movement, they were silent. The logic of “All Lives Matter” prizes the purported equality of the level playing field, assuming that Black lives deserve no “special treatment.” It is a logic that opposes Affirmative Action and other programs that aim at overcoming institutional inequalities, a logic that can work only in an absence of preexisting inequalities, assuming that institutional racism does not exist. It acknowledges individual race hatred, but insists that institutions are neutral and thus equal and fair. It refuses the belief that racism is itself an institution, that it needs no personal animus to perpetuate and profit from its practice. It needs only the racial contract that Mills notices. That police officers, themselves agents of much institutional racism, would embrace an “All Lives Matter” logic should be expected. But that the very university administrators who declare that “Black Lives Matter” simultaneously give their tacit support to “All Lives Matter” betrays an indifference made inexcusable because it ignores institutional racism. Even in their “Black Lives Matter” declaration, administrators dared to assure people of color that local police would be involved in resolving problems of racialized law enforcement—completely oblivious to the fact that people of color distrust and fear police. It is a fear that permeates our communities and will end only after racialized policing ends. We can never be assured by Whites in power who assume that racism exists only in personal animus, and that equal treatment equals justice. In the same way, people can never be assured that the military and political leaders who build and maintain nuclear weapons will keep peace. And because these leaders define warmaking policy, people of color have extra reason to fear warmaking institutions. ', 'When strategists know that a nuclear strike against the United States may kill many Whites, still they arrange for it to kill Blacks quicker and disproportionately. For more than anywhere else, military nuclear culture has abstracted and systematized racial hate. Theorists and scholars label manifestations of this kind of hate with terms such as necropolitics, bare life, death-in-life, social death, precarity, the already-dead. Gabriele Schwab says the Bomb creates a “nuclear necropolitics” (2020, p. 18). But largely unconcerned with hate, these theories name conditions of marginalization and suffering. These conditions are, as the theorists recognize, creations of institutional power that may or may not express hate. If a Black teenager is charged with a serious crime and tried as an adult, does it matter whether the court and the prosecutor are motivated by hate? Are they not merely following established protocols? While no one would deny that the Pacific War between the U.S. and Japan was largely a race war—even Paul Fussell (1988), who applauded the Bomb, believing that it saved his life by foreclosing his assignment to an invasion of Japan, acknowledges that the viciousness of the Pacific War was driven by racism on both sides—does it matter whether the crew of the bombers that dropped nuclear weapons hated the Japanese? ', 'These are, however, the wrong questions. What does matter is that the institution acts as if it hates. Individual hatred targets individual victims, but when institutional policy targets many victims, each suffering as if from individual hatred, then the institution is merely organizing and systematizing the work of many haters. Purporting to represent the interests of a significant portion of a nation, even if not its majority, it acts as if all the people who make up that portion vented their rage and hatred of a targeted group. Whether the crew of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the Bomb on Hiroshima, hated Japanese matters less than that their institutional function was to perform an act of hate. People merely “doing their job” for an institution or a nation may therefore hurt and kill more than people who hate—but this is still, I argue, a kind of hate. The Bomb, as a weapon of national strategy and dominance, is also a weapon of national hate. ', 'And this is why—notwithstanding laments over heartless euphemisms such as “collateral damage”—strategists build and use and defend the Bomb. Sven Lindqvist is not entirely correct to argue that “laws of war protect enemies of the same race, class, and culture” (2001, p. 2). For it is institutional hate that creates a certainty of “collateral damage”—a certainty that not only some “enemies of the same race, class, and culture” will die too, but that even some members of victorious dominant groups will die, indifferent sacrifices for the cause of annihilation. The winner with the Bomb says effectively, “Even if we all die, it will be our people who will stand last and longest.” ', 'This is the logic of racism today, as evolved in the racial contract, and it is the logic of the Bomb. Mathias Nilges offers a hopeful alternative in cultural politics, arguing that the “contemporary novel allows us to see that we have not in fact reached the categorical end of time,” that it tries to provide “a historical reading of time”—an apparently alternative temporality, not unlike CPT (Colored People’s Time) or Indian Time or Island Time (2021, p. 13). Racialized alternative temporalities such as CPT offer people of color a way of bearing racism, but they also envision better worlds. They give hope for the racially suffering (Streamas 2010). Indian Time in Jennifer Givhan’s 2019 novel Trinity Sight saves the lives of a few characters. Major characters survive nuclear disaster by entering not exactly an alternative world but an indigenous world in which no such disaster can exist. If in the “real,” surface world of quotidian mainstream existence, a person of color, already a target of racism, is also a target of a first nuclear strike, among the first and worst to suffer and die, that person is already a proleptic victim of nuclear war. ', 'Of course this poses a peculiar nuclear-age problem for people of color. In Ethnic Studies we examine the history of institutional racism, a history of enslavement, dispossession, incarceration, exclusion, inequality. My department offers a 400-level course called Racism and Anti-Racism in a Global Context, in which, when I teach it, we focus as much on resistance as on injustice. Because injustice persists and evolves, resistance must adapt to its changing forms. Sometimes the work of anti-racism seems futile. Decades of lessons in racialized healthcare have not prevented enormous inequalities during the coronavirus pandemic.5 Yet we struggle on, not only because we want to share visions of long arcs of justice with Martin Luther King, Jr, but also—and mostly—because the struggle is our only source of hope. Campaigns for reparations, police defunding, and sovereignty may seem unreachable, but at least they remain imaginable at the ends of those arcs of justice. Much less imaginable—even unimaginable—is release from the terrors of the threat of nuclear war. Knowing that wars are often waged over race, and that as people of color we are first and worst to be targeted, and that we have no access to technologies of peace equal to the scale of technologies of nuclear war, we feel particularly vulnerable and particularly terrorized. What form of resistance is possible or even imaginable? Even more soberly, why have technologies of annihilation become so powerful that nations are willing to sacrifice many of their racially privileged along with their racialized others? ', 'A terrifying answer is that yes, nations have embraced technologies of annihilation in a mad passion to prove their superiority over their others, including racialized others. It is the logic of the racial contract. This reduces soldiers in nuclear war to disposable tools, and comports with Western simplifications of Japanese kamikaze fliers as mere suicidal tools, as if to say that leaders are indifferent to the deaths of their racial kin as long as they survive. A likelier answer is that such nations believe that they can survive—or at least the worthiest among them can survive—nuclear war under conditions good enough to build a world even more to their liking and gain. In Ethnic Studies we teach, however, that racism persists because it is profitable, meaning that an exploitable racialized laboring class is necessary to the privileges and luxuries of ruling classes. So at least some racialized others must survive. ', 'A still likelier answer is that a neoliberal world governed by short-term planning has failed to consider the particular consequences of nuclear war. That strategizing the disproportionate deaths of people of color risks a loss of both an exploitable laboring class and a community of inferiorized others to blame for economic shortfalls seems not to have entered the minds of military and political leaders. Nuclear deterrence is no substitute for long-term planning; it is a contingency of terror. Just as university administrators oblivious to the insult of “All Lives Matter” decals on police vehicles cannot possibly understand the ambient and perpetual terrors felt by students and faculty of color, national leaders oblivious to the false reassurances of deterrence cannot possibly understand the ambient and perpetual terrors felt by the Bomb’s prospective targets. The Bomb is thus not only a race weapon but also a species weapon, though I have sought here to highlight its largely ignored racial function, mostly because the already ambient terrors of racism are compounded by its existence. Aforementioned concepts such as precarity, bare life, and necropolitics name the ambience of such terrors, but have so far failed to confront institutions with convincing accusations of their complicity. They have also largely failed to grasp the long-term effects on terrorized people of color. ', 'Perhaps the best understanding of these terrors and their effects may be found in Radiation and Revolution, Sabu Kohso’s excoriation of nuclear culture: ', 'The spatiotemporality of the apocalypse has been unleashed. This is not in the sense of eschatology or the end of the world as a singular event. Nor is it dystopia as opposed to utopia. It is a radical shift in the arrangement of material and immaterial powers. That is, the physical and corporeal contents of the battlefield between power and popular struggle have begun to be affected by the material limit of the expansive World and the tendency of its shrinking…. The present and future battleground is oriented by the shift from the process of the World’s infinite development to the process of its infinite ending—entropy. In the infinite process of ending, the multitude of nation-states will have to reconstruct governance and development through a material programming of stages (as in the Apocalypse of John) while calculating the material limit of the natural resources of the earth. (2020, p. 126) ', 'Whereas Robert Jay Lifton’s 1965 book Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima studied the terrors visited upon people who had experienced nuclear war, aiming to caution against inflicting such terrors on the future, Kohso argues such caution is too late. Even without the actual use of atomic bombs, the existence of nuclear weapons has already imposed on the world what he calls the “spatiotemporality of the apocalypse.” Ours is a world of “infinite ending.” For people of color, already occupying the spatiotemporality of racial terror, this nuclear terror is no more bearable for being shared, albeit disproportionately, with many of the racially privileged. Nuclear racism merely underwrites the condition of “infinite ending.” ', 'How then do we end an ending? Kohso offers a not altogether satisfactory “apocalyptic communism,” in which revolutionary spaces “are characterized by their weakness, humbleness, and invisibility, … for neither could we nor would we want to make a strong unified force to beat and take over the nation-states and American and Chinese empires, but rather we would only want to decompose them from within in synchronicity” (2020, p. 159). In other words, fight war with peace. To the suspicion that such a strategy has never worked, Kohso might claim that its opposite, most ominously represented by the very idea of deterrence, has never worked, either. ', 'People of color might therefore expand “Whitey hates us” to “Whitey hates almost everyone,” for an end of racism cannot guarantee an end of nuclear threat. Under the racial contract, institutional policy normalizes and masks institutional race hatred. Yet much of my argument here rests on a suggestion that racism and nuclear threat are components of the same apocalyptic system, and that eradicating one promises greatly to diminish the terror of the other. Kohso’s vision of decomposing empires may just put life back into life. It may hint at the future that both Mills particularly and Ethnic Studies generally refuse to discuss. The logic of their analyses of racism, like the logic of the Bomb, accommodates no vision of a future. But an end of empire may well be an end of the Bomb. ', 'So far Ethnic Studies has devoted little attention to racial implications of the Bomb, suggesting that even its scholarship gives up on the future. But contracts can be broken, and a violation of the racial contract may well empower people of color so that we may dismantle the Bomb.']

[(5, 13), (14, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Neg-Kentucky-Round-2.docx

Emory

MoSa

dcd55d38a52841caa46b8ecfaf66b9a9b42e61b428227a72ea111fa317fa1917

It won’t escalate—despite redline blurring, escalation thresholds are sufficiently clear.

Sari 19—(Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Director, Exeter Centre for International Law; Fellow, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Fellow, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps). Aurel Sari. 6/6/19, "The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The Challenge of Hybrid Threats", Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 2,

the threat should not be overrated . blurring the line must be put in perspective . in the absence of a realistic connection with actual war , warfare is a misnomer . . The line between war and peace may look blurred but this is because use of the concept in a loose manner creates a link between acts below the threshold of war and the prospect of war . hostile interference not entailing force are unlikely to subvert Article 5 . As interventions in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate, there is little ev nonmilitary instruments rendered armed force redundant. Tweets do not seize ground . Since states are not capable of achieving military objectives without armed force , they are not able to circumvent defense guarantees . allies refrain from describing it as an armed attack . not every security challenge gives rise to self-defense . There are actions to which it would be unreasonable to use force because doing so would be disproportionate or risk escalation

the threat of subversion should not be overrated . widespread unease over the blurring of the line between war and peace must be put in to perspective . Armed conflict is integral to the concept. Hard power and the threat of military confrontation remain essential components of the concept, but actual or imminent hostilities do not . Describing non-forcible measures carried out by hostile powers as hybrid warfare may be justified in circumstances where these activities constitute shaping operations in anticipation of armed conflict However, in the absence of a realistic connection with actual ding war , labeling such measures as acts of warfare , whether hybrid or not, is a misnomer . It may convey the hostile nature of geopolitical confrontation, but it is still hyperbole . The dividing line between war and peace may look blurred when it is viewed from the perspective of a wide understanding of hybrid warfare, but this is because use of the concept in a loose manner creates a link between non-forcible acts falling below the threshold of war and the mere prospect of war . Since hybrid war fare in a broad sense does not necessarily involve armed violence , the question arises whether mutual defense clauses should be considered as implicated in such circumstances at all . There are compelling reasons to answer in the negative . acts of hostile interference not entailing the use of force are unlikely to subvert Article 5 NAT . As Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate, there is little ev idence that nonmilitary instruments have rendered the use of armed force redundant. Tweets do not seize ground —infantry battalions do . Since states are not capable of achieving traditional military objectives , such as seizing and holding ground, without employing armed force , they are not able to circumvent mutual defense guarantees by limiting themselves solely to non-forcible measures . At the sa me time , the fact that specific incidents are not caught by Article 5 does not point to a flaw in their design . Take Skripal allies studiously refrain ed from describing it as an armed attack escaped the reach of Article 5 . this is not the result of some drafting deficiency, but reflects the fact that not every security challenge gives rise to the right of self-defense under i nternational law . There are plenty of hostile actions in response to which it would be unreasonable to use force — either because doing so would be disproportionate to the threat, and thus morally and politically unpalatable, or because it would carry a real risk of escalation with limited prospects of compelling the adversary to submit to our will, or both

threat not be overrated blurring of the line put in perspective actual hostilities do not absence a realistic connection actual war warfare misnomer hostile nature hyperbole dividing line look blurred loose manner link below the threshold of war prospect of war hybrid war mutual defense implicated at all negative hostile interference not entailing the use of force are unlikely to subvert Article 5 Georgia and Ukraine little ev nonmilitary instruments armed force Tweets do not seize ground —infantry battalions do without employing armed force not able to circumvent mutual defense guarantees specific incidents are not caught does not point flaw in their design refrain armed attack not every security challenge gives rise to the right of self-defense under i law unreasonable to use force disproportionate real risk of escalation

['', 'Nevertheless, the threat of subversion should not be overrated, either. In particular, the widespread unease over the blurring of the line between war and peace must be put into perspective. Hybrid warfare in its original, narrow sense describes a style of operational art: the integrated use of conventional and unconventional methods of warfighting in the same battlespace. Armed conflict, whether actual or impending, is integral to the concept. By contrast, hybrid warfare in its broader sense describes the use of the full range of instruments by hostile actors in pursuit of their strategic goals. Here, hybrid warfare no longer refers to a method of waging war, but to the combination of diverse levers of influence for the purposes of geopolitical competition. Hard power and the threat of military confrontation remain essential components of the concept, but actual or imminent hostilities do not. Describing non-forcible measures carried out by hostile powers as hybrid warfare may be justified in circumstances where these activities constitute shaping operations in anticipation of armed conflict or where they form part of ongoing hostilities.283 However, in the absence of any realistic connection with actual or impeding war, labeling such measures as acts of warfare, whether hybrid or not, is a misnomer.284 It may convey the hostile nature of geopolitical confrontation,285 but it is still hyperbole. The dividing line between war and peace may look blurred when it is viewed from the perspective of a wide understanding of hybrid warfare, but this is so largely because the very use of the concept in such a loose manner creates a link between non-forcible acts falling below the threshold of war and the mere prospect of war.286 Russian theorists of contemporary conflict have avoided such conceptual freefall by insisting that violence is an integral element of warfare.287 Since hybrid warfare in a broad sense does not necessarily involve armed violence, the question arises whether mutual defense clauses should be considered as implicated in such circumstances at all. There are compelling reasons to answer in the negative. On their own, acts of hostile interference not entailing the use of force are unlikely to subvert Article 5 NAT or Article 42(7) TEU. As Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate, there is little evidence that nonmilitary instruments have rendered the use of armed force redundant. Tweets do not seize ground—infantry battalions do. Since states are not capable of achieving traditional military objectives, such as seizing and holding ground, without employing armed force, they are not able to circumvent mutual defense guarantees by limiting themselves solely to non-forcible measures. At the same time, the fact that specific incidents are not caught by Article 5 or Article 42(7) does not necessarily point to a flaw in their design. Take, for example, the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal with a chemical nerve agent in Salisbury on March 4, 2018, an act which the British Government declared to be an unlawful use of force.288 While commentators are divided as to whether the incident did in fact amount to the use of force,289 they concur that it certainly did not reach the level of an armed attack.290 Indeed, the UK and its allies studiously refrained from describing it as an armed attack.291 The Salisbury incident thus escaped the reach of Article 5. Yet this is not the result of some drafting deficiency, but reflects the fact that not every security challenge gives rise to the right of self-defense under international law.292 Similarly, the fact that Chinese warships support the frontline operations of Chinese civilian and coast guard vessels in the South China Seas by providing a deterrent effect does not mean that their mere presence constitutes an armed attack. Nor should we assume that military force is an appropriate and effective response to every type of threat.293 There are plenty of hostile actions in response to which it would be unreasonable to use force—either because doing so would be disproportionate to the threat, and thus morally and politically unpalatable, or because it would carry a real risk of escalation with limited prospects of compelling the adversary to submit to our will, or both.', '', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-6---USNA-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

35eb9dab633b1add3aa37ca1b34b4cc560d6b1525466352db7a5d11513875b10

Other countries solve—UMN reads BLUE

Raidt 14 [John; 2014; Vice President and Jones Group International Scholar, Senior Fellow at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, M.A. in Public Administration from the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, “Patents and Biotechnology,” p. 1-69]

Breakthroughs treat diseases meet major challenges involving food energy and environment achievements hinge on innovation biotech Competitiveness mounting global competition for bioscience industry development as both developed and developing nations seek to grow and advance in this high-wage, China is investing annual growth at 20% The next leap forward is medicine geneti c s could stop health costs in tracks The industry factor in achieving energy , water , and food securit y tec h may be the only way to meet demand In energy employed to biofuel “advances in sciences contribute innovative solutions to global challenges the “ biggest challenge is to address backlog while maintaining quality .” insufficient notice is a burden improper decisions foster resource-sapping litigation at the expense of r and d another problem costly lawsuit abuse The targets are startups lawsuits take years and time and money otherwise devoted to innovation

Breakthroughs yielded new methods of treat ing human diseases and disorders Gene-based innovation help meet major global challenges involving food production, energy development, and environment al protection achievements in life science hinge on America’s ability to maintain innovation The marvels are but a small sampling of the transformational capabilities emerging from biotech a greater variety of ways to meet essential human needs will be revealed Benefits: Competitiveness mounting global competition for bioscience industry development as both developed and developing nations seek to grow and advance in this high-wage, China is investing heavily in biotech and “hopes to keep the average annual rate of growth of the industry at 20% Maintaining our excellence in this field of the future is a strategic and economic necessity Benefits: Revolutionizing Health Care The next great leap forward is the era of personalized medicine By some estimates, geneti c ally based diagnostic s could help stop health care costs in their tracks —an economic imperative for a country that is reeling from the highest health care costs in the world The industry will factor heavily in achieving global energy , water , and food securit y . Genetic tec h nology is helping render crops more disease resistant , water efficient and may be the only way to meet global food demand while protecting natural resources In the energy sector , genetic know-how is being employed to environmentally friendly forms of biofuel “advances in the life sciences have the potential to contribute innovative and mutually reinforcing solutions to global -reaching , societal challenges Backlogs and Delay the office’s “ biggest challenge is to address the growth of pendency and the backlog while maintaining high quality .” Moreover, insufficient patent notice is a significant burden on the system improper patent decisions more generally, foster resource-sapping litigation that enriches lawyers at the expense of r esearch and product d evelopment another major problem awaits— costly lawsuit abuse . The problem has reached epic proportions with the emergence of sophisticated “ patent trolls .” The targets of their lawsuits are often the startups that are trying to drive real innovation in our economy “Patent lawsuits take about five years to process, and ultimately inhibit future scientific developments.” This is time and money that could otherwise be devoted to inquiry and innovation

Breakthroughs treat diseases global challenges food energy environment hinge innovation small sampling biotech human needs Competitiveness China biotech annual rate 20% excellence strategic economic necessity Health Care great leap forward medicine geneti c s stop health care costs economic imperative factor heavily global energy water food securit y tec h disease resistant water efficient only way global food demand energy sector biofuel life sciences innovative mutually reinforcing solutions global -reaching societal Backlogs Delay biggest challenge backlog high quality insufficient significant burden improper resource-sapping litigation expense r d major problem lawsuit abuse epic proportions patent trolls lawsuits startups real innovation five years inhibit time money innovation

['Breakthroughs in genetic understanding have yielded new methods of anticipating, preventing, diagnosing, and treating human diseases and disorders. But the benefits continue to extend well beyond human health. Gene-based innovation involving plant, animal, microbial, and other nonhuman life-forms has the potential to help meet major global challenges involving food production, energy development, and environmental protection. By all accounts, the most spectacular life science marvels are yet to come; and the most disruptive breakthrough will likely be one we can barely imagine today. What’s certain, however, is that achievements in life science hinge on America’s ability to maintain a superb ecosystem of innovation—an asset produced by the synergy of four key elements: World-class brains. Ample resources to finance solutions, research, development, and deployment. Excellent cross-disciplinary collaboration to drive transformational insight. Strong incentive to invest time, money, and energy in the innovation process. Each of these ingredients is vital. The focus of this report, however, is on “incentive.” It’s the aspect that encourages creators to employ their minds, resources, and collaborative energies to bring to life know-how, products, services, and solutions that meet human needs. Incentivizing and enabling individuals and enterprises with vision, talent, and ambition to turn creative ideas into useful goods is the mission of the U.S. patent. From its inception 225 years ago, the patent system has been the central catalyst of U.S. innovation that drives the most productive economy on Earth. A patent grants the holder exclusive intellectual property rights to his or her invention or discovery for a limited period of time in exchange for making the innovation public. This enables the inventor to recoup his or her investments, before being undercut by imitators who neither risked capital nor toiled to invent, and reap the fruits of a job well done. Patents, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, “added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.” The quality and scope of U.S. patent laws, policies, and procedures will heavily influence our ability to fuel the fire of genius in the cutting-edge disciplines of bioscience and bring its life-improving potential to fruition in the years to come. Purpose It is not the purpose of this paper to mire the reader in the arcana of bioscience patent law or the complexities of genetic science. The aim is to provide useful and timely input to policymakers, business leaders, and the public through the following: 1. Exploring why bioscience (i.e., genetics) is so essential to the nation’s economic future. 2. Examining the important role that patent policy will play in shaping the future. 3. Identifying the major issues and controversial questions at the intersection of genetics and patent policy. 4. Suggesting strategic objectives, principles, and approaches that may be helpful in coping with the legal, economic, and social challenges materializing on the biotech patent policy front. Broad Benefits The marvels listed in this paper are but a small sampling of the transformational capabilities emerging from our biotechnology innovation system. As the state of genetic science matures, a greater variety of ways to meet essential human needs will be revealed. The industry’s crucial role in the country’s economy will expand. Reaping its full benefits, however, requires wise and prudent public policy—informed by a clear understanding of the stakes. Benefits: Job Creation. As reported in Science magazine, “The North American biotech business has grown to a behemoth that consists of more than 1,280 companies, with market capitalization exceeding $200 billion. Last year’s sales of $13.4 billion and revenues of $18.6 billion more than doubled the industry’s figures for 1993, according to consulting firm Ernst & Young.”3 Moreover, in 2012, “American biotechnology companies spent $9.9 billion on research and development (R&D)” to keep the pipeline of solutions and job creation flowing.4 According to the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the industry is responsible for “directly employing 1.42 million Americans in high-quality jobs and indirectly supporting an additional 6.6 million workers; [and] the average biotechnology employee makes $77,595 annually, far above the national average salary.”5 Wages in the field remain “79% greater than the average paid in the overall national private sector.”6 By some estimates, “biomedical engineering jobs are expected to grow a staggering 72% by 2018, the highest percentage growth of any field by far.”7 “The message is clear,” says the Battelle and Biotechnology Industry Organization and Biothreport, “a strong bioscience industry base offers the United States of America … a high value economic driver. It stands out in its creation of high quality jobs, the breadth of markets it serves, and its research and development.”8 Benefits: Competitiveness. The United States, however, is not alone in recognizing the enormous potential of biotech. The Battelle and Biotechnology Industry Organization report cites the “mounting global competition for bioscience industry development as both developed and developing nations seek to grow and advance in this high-wage, high-growth industry.”9 As the National Technical Information Service reports, “A number of nations have targeted biotechnology as being critical for future economic growth.”10 China is investing heavily in biotech and “hopes to keep the average annual rate of growth of the industry at 20% between 2013 and 2015.”11 Across the globe, biotech hubs and clusters are proliferating, taking center stage in the competitiveness strategies of countries both big and small.12 Not just in China, but in Canada (particularly the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia), Asia (including Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Australia), and Europe (especially Munich, Germany; Cambridge, United Kingdom; Basel, Switzerland; Oslo, Norway; as well as France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium).13 Our comparative advantage, though, is huge. We have the world’s greatest public and private research institutions, unique biomedical infrastructure, and strong federal support. The American system synchronizes the collaboration of academia, government, and the private sector, making us the global leader in delivering biotechnological developments. Our leadership, however, will be tested mightily in the years to come as demand grows and competition stiffens. Maintaining our excellence in this field of the future is a strategic and economic necessity. Benefits: Revolutionizing Health Care. The field where biotechnology is expected to have its keenest impact is health care. The breakthroughs in diagnosing, preventing, and treating disease have not come as swiftly as predicted a decade ago. It turns out that diseases and disorders have more complicated origins than predisposition correlated to a single gene or set of genes. The genetic factors are themselves more complex than previously understood and many “nurture” issues also play a hand. Deciphering the multiform causes of human health problems has been complicated and time-consuming work, as has been deriving therapies from genomics and proteomics. Nevertheless, “more than 350 biotechnology-based drugs—designed to treat AIDS, Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, heart disease, multiple sclerosis, and obesity, among other conditions—have started human clinical trials.”14 Increasingly, we will look to pharmacologists, makers of advanced medical devices and equipment, and providers of research, testing, and medical services to deliver better health care at far lower cost. A report produced by the Human Genome Project (HGP) notes, “as our understanding at the molecular level of how things like diabetes or heart disease or schizophrenia come about, we should see a whole new generation of interventions, many of which will be drugs that are much more effective and precise than those available today. The HGP reports that “most new drugs based on the completed genome are still perhaps 10 to 15 years in the future.”15 The next great leap forward is the era of personalized medicine. It will soon be possible to have one’s personal genome sequenced for $1,000, providing individualized data on hereditary susceptibility to disease and enabling prevention and customized therapies that could “transform the practice of medicine.”16 By some estimates, genetically based diagnostics and preventative care could help stop health care costs in their tracks—an economic imperative for a country that is reeling from the highest health care costs in the world. In 2010, the United States spent $2.6 trillion on health care— by far more in gross terms and as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than any other country. U.S. health care spending leapt from 7.2% of GDP in 1970 to 17.9% of GDP in 2010. No other country even comes close, and our costs continue to expand at a faster clip than our productivity.17, 18 Enormous health care costs are placing a debilitating strain on our households, enterprises, and public finances—an average of $8,402 per person per year and growing. In many instances, these expenses are borne by businesses struggling to compete in a price-sensitive global economy.19, 20 In a 2010 survey of more than 500 U.S. chief financial officers and senior comptrollers about their cost concerns, the No. 1 by far was the rising expense of employee benefits, including health care and pensions.21 Moreover, rising health care costs play a significant role in massive federal and state budget imbalances that degrade our business environment and endanger the country’s prosperity. By expanding productivity, spurring job growth, and reining in health care costs, biotech innovation is an economic necessity. A troubling aside is the little bang we get for our health care buck. In its January 2013 report titled U.S. Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies says that while the United States is “among the wealthiest nations in the world … it is far from the healthiest. Although Americans’ life expectancy and health have improved over the past century, these gains have lagged behind those in other high income countries.” Ranking 17 high-income countries by life expectancy at birth (in 2007), U.S. males and females placed 17th and 16th, respectively. The “health disadvantage prevails even though the United States spends far more per person on health care than any other nation.” The Institute went on to say that “[t]he tragedy is not that the United States is losing a competition with other countries, but that Americans are dying and suffering from illness and injury at rates that are demonstrably unnecessary.”22 Benefits: Modern Agriculture, Energy, and Justice Administration The benefits of biotech extend well beyond the ability to revolutionize man’s ability to cost efficiently predict, prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases and disorders. The industry will factor heavily in achieving global energy, water, and food security. Genetic technology is helping render crops more disease resistant, water efficient, and nutritious, and may be the only way to meet global food demand—expected to double by 2050—while protecting natural resources. More than 13.3 million farmers around the world use agricultural biotechnology to increase yields, prevent damage from insects and pests, and reduce farming’s impact on the environment. In the energy sector, genetic know-how is being employed to alter how plants turn sunlight into chemical energy, making possible new, cheaper, and more environmentally friendly forms of biofuel. Craig Venter, widely credited as the first person to sequence the human genome, is working to genetically modify algae to produce energy. No fewer than 50 biorefineries are being built across North America to test and refine technologies to produce biofuels and chemicals from renewable biomass, which can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.23 Even in the administration of justice, biotechnology is transforming the state of the art, helping genetically identify the guilty and exonerate the innocent. Benefits: Transforming the Future. Despite the array of impressive benefits that genetic science has already yielded, Science magazine predicts that “biotech’s best years are yet to come, particularly in the pharmaceutical trade.”24 The National Research Council’s study titled A New Biology for the 21st Century notes that “advances in the life sciences have the potential to contribute innovative and mutually reinforcing solutions to global-reaching, societal challenges … and at the same time, serve as the basis for new industries that will anchor the economies of the future.”25 <<TEXT CONDENSED, NONE OMITTED EXCEPT TEXT BOXES>> Perhaps most exciting is that we find ourselves in the infancy of what MIT calls the “Third Revolution”—in which the “convergence of life sciences, physical sciences and engineering” will spawn revolutionary “new products and processes with new market opportunities.”26 The potential was captured by authors John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene in their book Megatrends 2000: “As we move through the next millennium, biotechnology will be as important as the computer.”27 Looking ahead to 2050, The Economist says, “Medical miracles are likely to come from genetically targeted drugs, vaccines that do not need refrigeration during transport and stem cells that grow new tissues.”28 MEETING A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE. Such a future will not come to fruition, however, unless we are able to sustain a fertile environment in which the promise of biotech can blossom to its full potential—a strategic objective that can’t be achieved without a modern, efficient patent system. The patent system is an integral component of America’s overall innovation system—one that doesn’t run on autopilot, oblivious to the legal and economic environment. It is a complex architecture that is responsive to public policy choices and incentives that will either nurture or stymie it. Moreover, the view that intellectual property is bad for society is on the rise at home and abroad. An informed public discussion is essential to ensure that policymaking is positively influenced by educated public sentiment. Why Patent Policy Matters The intellectual property rights (IPR) protection system has been the lifeblood of American economic prowess since the birth of the nation. Its foundations were established in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which empowered Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” In 1790, Congress exercised this authority to establish a national patent system for granting intellectual property protection to “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof.” Now, as then, the award of a U.S. patent confers on the recipient the exclusive right to make, use, and sell an invention for a limited period of time (usually 20 years) in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. The system is administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and enforced by the federal courts. More than two centuries later, patent-driven innovation remains America’s fountainhead for job creation, productivity, and a rising quality of life. Nearly half of U.S. GDP since World War II has been derived from patent-reliant technology. IP-intensive industries employ more than 40 million workers and generate $7.7 trillion in gross output (nearly 33% of the total).29 The IP system will continue to pace our country’s development, particularly in the trade-based global economy where the sustaining a high rate of innovation is crucial. Importance to Biotech. While we rely on the IP system to stimulate innovation across the economy, the modern biotech sector is perhaps the most patent dependent by virtue of the enormous costs of discovery in such a long-lead and labor-intensive industry.30 It takes nearly 10 years and on average costs $1.8 billion to bring a new pharmaceutical to market. Even longer periods of time and higher costs are required to produce genetically derived therapies—in which failure is an integral part of the discovery process. “Typically, less than 1% of the compounds examined in the pre-clinical period make it into human testing. Only 20% of the compounds entering clinical trials survive the development process and gain Food and Drug Administration approval.”31 Without having to incur these monumental development costs, imitators can readily reproduce winning therapies and offer them at far lower prices than those who bore the sacrifice of discovery.32 Lower costs sound appealing to a cash-strapped health care system. But without the ability to recoup their investments, the willingness of biotech innovators to spend enormous sums necessary on investigation will wither, starving the pipeline of new therapies. This dynamic is especially relevant to “recombinant protein therapeutics” (RPT), the most promising biomedical frontier. The process of mixing and matching genetic material to derive therapies is exceptionally expensive, and the products are harder to bring to market than conventional drugs.33 This is why RPT development depends so heavily on patent protection. “Patents,” reports the National Institutes of Health (NIH), “have largely played their traditional role of inducing investment in engineering and product development, including expensive post-discovery clinical research to prove safety and efficacy.”34 What would our innovation system look like without patents? It’s hard to imagine that it would be much to look at given that the primary alternative would be trade secrecy. But the high cost of seeking patent protection overseas, among other reasons, is elevating the status of trade secrecy as an IP tool of choice, despite its chief shortcoming. As the NIH points out, “trade secret protection lasts for as long as the secret is kept confidential. If the secret is never publicly disclosed, it will never lose its protection. If the secret is uncovered by means of industrial espionage, disloyal employees, theft, or the like, the owner of the secret has legal recourse against those who misappropriated the secret, or anyone who procured it through such impropriety.”35 Protection is not afforded, however, “in the event that someone managed to successfully duplicate the recipe by legitimate means.”36 A trend toward greater trade secrecy to avoid the pitfall of an insufficient patent regime poses two significant problems. For companies, it’s unsustainable because today’s technology makes inimitability exceedingly difficult to maintain. For society, it’s undesirable because secrecy deeply undermines the scientific process that feeds on the kind of transparency and collaboration that the patent system was conceived to deliver. Opting for trade secrecy over patent protection will have a chilling effect on innovation and threatens to undermine broad-ranging scientific advancement. The quality of innovation touches our lives and enterprises in so many ways. Thus, we are all stakeholders in the patent debate and, in particular, the life science patent debate. U.S. Patent System: The Challenges Biotech, though a highly unique sector and particularly reliant on IP, must meet the same patent criteria for its innovations as apply to those of all other industries and faces the same challenges posed by the administration of the system. Regardless of industry, winning a patent for a “discovery” or “invention” requires the claimant to meet a four-part test. The discovery or invention must be novel. It must have usefulness. It must be unobvious. And it must be adequately described. As simple as these requirements may appear, devising and applying fair, rational, and up-tod-ate criteria for each standard is extremely difficult, particularly when the system is dealing with complex, technical material in a high-stakes environment. Biotech, like other industries, lives at the mercy of the USPTO and suffers greatly when the IPR process is deficient, as does our economy from jobs and opportunity lost. Three problems continue to loom large with our patent system in general—a significant and persistent backlog of patent applications, poor patent quality, and an increasing level of IPR litigation and violation. A poorly performing patent system is a major liability when speed to market, first-mover positioning, and cost control in a global economy are necessities, particularly in the frontier biotechnology field where the United States must remain a world leader. <<PARAGRAPH BREAKS RESUME>> Backlogs and Delay. As of September 2012, the USPTOs reported a logjam of unexamined patent applications exceeding 608,000 submissions.37 First Office Action Pendency (the average number of months from the patent application filing date to the date a “First Office Action” [i.e., the first documentary action made by the examiner regarding the substance of the patent is dispatched by the USPTO]) is currently 21.9 months.38 Traditional Total Pendency (the time that a patent application is originally filed to when the USPTO issues or abandons the patent) is currently 32.4 months.39 In 2008, the USPTO director, noting the trend of increasing applications and longer pendency periods, stated that the office’s “biggest challenge is to address the growth of pendency and the backlog of patent applications waiting to be examined while maintaining high quality.”40 In 2012, the USPTO received more than 576,000 applications, three times the number submitted in 1992.41 Each year the applications are more technical and challenging. Meanwhile, the USPTO continues to experience difficulty maintaining a qualified cadre of examiners able to make good decisions in a timely fashion.42 Poor Patent Notice and Quality. The USPTO’s deficit in human capital not creates only a sclerotic patent system but also one that issues too many poor-quality patents. Poor patents (those that are overly broad or don’t truly meet the novelty, utility, unobviousness, and describe-ability criteria) impede innovation as does the rejection or delay of legitimate applications. As former Senator John Sununu pointed out in a recent Boston Globe editorial, “When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues a patent that is overly vague, broad, or trivial, it invites uncertainty and litigation.”43 Moreover, insufficient patent notice and titling is a significant burden on the system. Ill-defined and poorly publicized patents in particular, and improper patent decisions more generally, foster resource-sapping litigation that enriches lawyers at the expense of research and product development. According to one study of gene patents, more than one-third of a sampling examined was deficient. Not only do these insufficiencies stem from patent examiners who aren’t up to speed on technology, but the lack of technological expertise by the judges who hear patent cases contributes to the problem. Lawsuit Abuse. For those who successfully navigate the USPTO’s wickets and obtain a patent, another major problem awaits—costly lawsuit abuse. The problem has reached epic proportions with the emergence of sophisticated “patent trolls.” These are entities that exist for the purpose of filing patent lawsuits. The White House has described them as “firms who do not practice the patents they own and instead engage in aggressive litigation to collect license and other fees from alleged infringer.s” A 2007 study by the University of Houston Law Center found that patent litigation increased 120% between 1990 and 2005.44, 45 The American Enterprise Institute observes: “Patent law has turned into a legal game … [and] there is an increasing trend of parties buying up patents and then suing companies that touch those patents.”46 These “parties,” otherwise known as patent trolls, have “perfected the art of turning patents into a lottery.”47 As described in a 2011 Harvard Business Review article, “[M]any of these patent trolls don’t produce anything, but rather scoop up patents, wait for a successful product or service to come to market, and then threaten to sue the ‘infringers.’ The targets of their lawsuits are often the startups that are trying to drive real innovation in our economy, companies that rarely have the resources to fight back.”48 “Patent lawsuits, on average, cost about $10 million, take about five years to process, and ultimately inhibit future scientific developments.”49 This is time and money that could otherwise be devoted to inquiry and innovation. PricewaterhouseCoopers reports that the biotechnology and information technology sectors are seeing the fastest rise in patent dispute cases.50 ']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-MAC-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

53eb8b180254b30154a68238e4483c2fa9029bb2b8f45ad75848f44b6669b2e7

Only the plan can send a signal that effectively shapes antitrust norms.

Raviv ’14 [Adam; 2014; Counsel, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP; Penn State Arbitration Law Review, “Too Darn Bad: How the Supreme Court’s Class Arbitration Jurisprudence Has Undermined Arbitration,” 6 Y.B, Arb. & Mediation 220, 246-247]

the Court's view of class arbitration sends an important message to other countries about limitations When the U S highest court says that class proceedings are incompatible sends a signal to the rest of the world that arbitration need not provide for class Italian Colors are striking in an international context they run counter to the trend in countries moving toward class arbitration--even though for many class is new To the extent U.S. courts begin to move away from class actions other countries may follow. the Court's aversion to arbitration sets back multiparty arbitration institutions are less likely to facilitate class arbitrations where courts suggest that they ar e not arbitrations

the U.S. Supreme Court's view of class arbitration also sends an important message to other countries about the limitations of arbitration When the U nited S tates' highest court says that class proceedings are incompatible with the fundamental nature of arbitration it sends a signal to the rest of the world that arbitration need not provide for class proceedings Italian Colors are striking in an international context they run counter to the trend in other countries , which have been moving toward class arbitration--even though for many class is new Canada refused to enforce a class-waiver provision in an arbitration [* To the extent U.S. courts now begin to move away from appreciating the benefits of class actions , other countries may follow. the Court's aversion to arbitration sets back multiparty arbitration International institutions are less likely to facilitate class arbitrations where national courts suggest that they ar e not really arbitrations in the first place.

important message When the U S sends a signal Italian Colors are other countries may follow. multiparty arbitration institutions where courts suggest

['F. The Decisions Sent an Anti-Arbitration Message to Other Countries and Arbitral Institutions', "Apart from highlighting possible conflicts between the FAA and the New York Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court's view of class arbitration also sends an important message to other countries about the limitations of arbitration. When the United States' highest court says that class proceedings are incompatible with the fundamental nature of arbitration, it sends a signal to the rest of the world that arbitration need not provide for class proceedings.", 'The Concepcion and Italian Colors decisions are particularly striking in an international context, because they run counter to the trend in other countries, which have been moving toward class arbitration--even though, for many countries, the idea of class proceedings in arbitration or litigation is a relatively new one. 151 For example, in 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to enforce a class-waiver provision in an arbitration [*247] agreement similar to the one in Concepcion. 152 To the extent U.S. courts now begin to move away from appreciating the benefits of class actions, other countries may follow.', "Likewise, the Supreme Court's aversion to multiparty arbitration sets back the cause of multiparty arbitration in international proceedings. In the investor-state context, one of the most noted arbitral decisions of recent years was the jurisdictional award in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, where for the first time an ICSID tribunal allowed a group of 60,000 individual claimants to join together to bring a claim against Argentina. 153 But unlike the AAA and JAMS rules, no major international arbitral institution has procedural rules for class arbitration. Even the ICDR, the international counterpart to AAA, does not provide for class proceedings in its rules. 154 International institutions are less likely to facilitate class arbitrations where national courts suggest that they are not really arbitrations in the first place. 155"]

[(0, 5), (6, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Kentucky-Semis.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Kentucky-Semis.docx

b7d04c8d064020bc262aaf86b02aef3da93bc5b0010a03f97de4d9a9933afc2c

That requires nuclear abolition.

David Cliff 11. Researcher with the Arms Control and Disarmament Programme at the Verification Research Training and Information Centre, et al., September 2011, “Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament: Practical steps against nuclear rearmament,”

disarmament mean absence of any usable nuclear weapons disarmament requires, at minimum dismantlement of all nuclear explosive devices for a state to have been ‘ disarmed ’ of nuclear weapons it would need to have dismantled its entire arsenal

This report has understood ‘ disarmament ’ to mean the absence of any usable nuclear weapons in a state’s possession nuclear disarmament requires, at a minimum , the dismantlement of all nuclear explosive devices under the national control of a state for a state to have been ‘ disarmed ’ of its nuclear weapons capability, it would need to have dismantled its entire existing arsenal of nuclear warheads there are two dimensions to a country’s nuclear arsenal disarmament can take into account most fundamental is, obviously, the nuclear arsenal itself second is the supporting infrastructure Addressing the second without addressing the first would not constitute disarmament (for obvious reasons: the state would still possess a nuclear arsenal

absence of any usable nuclear weapons requires, at a minimum dismantlement of all disarmed dismantled its entire existing arsenal two dimensions second supporting infrastructure would not constitute disarmament

['', 'This report has understood ‘disarmament’ to mean the absence of any usable nuclear weapons in a state’s possession. In this, it has been informed by Steve Fetter’s understanding that nuclear disarmament requires, at a minimum, the dismantlement of all nuclear explosive devices under the national control of a state. In other words, for a state to have been ‘disarmed’ of its nuclear weapons capability, it would need to have dismantled its entire existing arsenal of nuclear warheads (or have had them dismantled by others). It has not addressed the political, societal, legal and military-technical aspects of the issue, which are the subject of a companion study by SIPRI.', 'The use of the word ‘existing’ is important. As this report has shown, there are two different dimensions to a country’s nuclear arsenal that disarmament actions can take into account. The most fundamental dimension is, obviously, the state’s nuclear arsenal itself. The second dimension is the supporting infrastructure that could potentially be drawn on to produce new nuclear weapons in the future. Addressing the second without addressing the first would not constitute disarmament (for obvious reasons: the state would still possess a nuclear arsenal). Addressing the first without the second would constitute disarmament—but the ability to produce more weapons in the future would significantly affect the irreversibility of that disarmament.', '', '']

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrHa-Neg-CEDA-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

PrHa

5e47ebf32d456d453e5d6506c7975d8768f0e2773c7917e288cad5585c3e7973

The Supreme Court is angling to rule on fetal personhood now.

Papenfuss 22, Trends Reporter @ Huffington Post. Quoting Rachel Maddow, American television news program host and liberal political commentator. Maddow hosts The Rachel Maddow Show, a weekly television show on MSNBC, and serves as the cable network's special event co-anchor alongside Brian Williams (Mary, June 25th, “Rachel Maddow Predicts 'Fetal Personhood' SCOTUS Case Will End Abortion Nationwide,” The Huffington Post, , Accessed 08-23-2022)

Republicans will bring a “fetal personhood” case before the Court Such a case aim to define a fetus as a human the extremist fight is a long game There’s nothing in today’s opinion that stop them from accepting fetal personhood It’s hardly far-fetched

Republicans will now angle to bring a “fetal personhood” case before the Supreme Court Such a case would aim to define a fetus as a human the extremist fight is a long game , decades in the making Republicans aren’t about to ease off now that the court has overturned Roe v. Wade There’s nothing in today’s opinion from these six justices that would stop them from accepting a fetal personhood case A fetal personhood case ... would give this court a path could be their vehicle to impose a nationwide ban on abortion It’s hardly far-fetched they’ve kind of broken the seal here, haven’t they? Roe was a 50-year-old precedent

Republicans “fetal personhood” case Supreme Court six justices stop them accepting a fetal personhood case hardly far-fetched

['An alarmed Rachel Maddow is convinced Republicans will now angle to bring a “fetal personhood” case before the Supreme Court in a bid to totally shut down abortion nationwide.', 'Such a case would aim to define a fetus as a human being, and an abortion as murder. Maddow warned the extremist fight is a long game, decades in the making, often enforced with violence, and that Republicans aren’t about to ease off now that the court has overturned Roe v. Wade.', '“The anti-abortion political project of the Republican Party and the political right has been the central organizing principle for the right’s entire effort around the judiciary, one for which there is still no match or mirror on the left. It’s a big deal,” she said on MSNBC’s “Rachel Maddow Show” Friday.', 'This movement, 40 years in the making, “is just now hitting its stride, that is just coming into maturity,” she noted.', 'And they’re not stopping, she warned.', '“There’s nothing in the reasoning of today’s opinion from these six justices that would stop them from accepting something like a fetal personhood case,” Maddow explained.', '“A fetal personhood case ... would give this court a path to not just let individual states ban abortion, which is what they did today. ... A fetal personhood case could be their vehicle to impose a nationwide ban on abortion, on the order of the United States Supreme Court,” she said.', 'It’s hardly far-fetched, Maddow argued.', '“Would it be that much more radical than what they’ve done today?” she asked. “I mean, they’ve kind of broken the seal here, haven’t they? Roe was a 50-year-old precedent that had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court itself multiple times,” she noted.']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaWi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Kansas

HaWi

1075678d32018119a629fb898739fcad8dede9334aba7b7621bcbd184c2f77b5

The plan deters and remedies exclusionary conduct.

John B. Kirkwood 21, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. American Law Institute. Executive Committee, AALS Antitrust and Economic Regulation Section. Advisory Board, American Antitrust Institute. Advisory Board, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, "Tech Giant Exclusion," Florida Law Review, Forthcoming, pg. 42-43, 01/15/2021, SSRN.

tech giants excluded third parties selling on their platforms enhances market power no successful challenge reason is conduct did not violate Sherman Act should be amended to reach unilateral exclusion by tech giants D o J and FTC authorized to obtain civil penaltie s couple civil enforcement with private damage actions, magnifying the deterrent effect of antitrust law sanctions alter giants’ calculus stiff sanctions reduce exclusionary conduct Even if it could capture this market it is unlikely to attain significant advantages risk expanding Sherman deter procompetitive conduct minimized by confining amendment to tech giants and including proof requirements

tech giants have excluded third parties selling on their platforms by demoting them in search results, using nonpublic seller-specific data to boost their own products, or refusing to deal with them because they are competitors It enhances tech giants’ market power and injures customers no one has successful ly challenge d this conduct most likely reason is conduct did not violate the Sherman Act This gap should be closed Sherman Act should be amended to reach unilateral exclusion by tech giants that reduces competition significantly, even if it is unlikely generate or maintain monopoly power the D o J and the FTC should be authorized to obtain civil penaltie s if they establish a violation of this new section couple public civil penalty enforcement with private treble damage actions, magnifying the deterrent effect of antitrust law twin sanctions would alter the tech giants’ financial calculus They would not deploy exclusionary tactics unless likely gains outweighed prospect of substantial financial penalties the issue is not easy to resolve stiff financial sanctions are likely to reduce exclusionary conduct Even if it could capture this complementary market it is unlikely to attain significant advantages over third party competitors risk that expanding the Sherman Act would deter procompetitive conduct can be minimized by confining the amendment to tech giants and including proof requirements that would defeat most challenges to desirable conduct

excluded demoting them nonpublic seller-specific data deal enhances injures successful ly challenge d not violate the Sherman Act gap amended unilateral exclusion unlikely D o J FTC public civil penalty enforcement deterrent effect alter not deploy exclusionary tactics not easy to resolve reduce could significant advantages deter minimized confining the amendment proof requirements

['The tech giants, as we have seen, have excluded third parties selling on their platforms by demoting them in search results, using nonpublic seller-specific data to boost their own products, or refusing to deal with them simply because they are competitors. While this behavior is not widespread, it appears to be unjustified and anticompetitive. It enhances the tech giants’ market power and injures their customers. Yet no one in the United States has successfully challenged any of this conduct.', 'The most likely reason is that the conduct did not violate the Sherman Act. It is unilateral, not collusive, and it did not result in actual or imminent monopoly power. 224 This gap should be closed. The Sherman Act should be amended to reach unilateral exclusion by the tech giants that reduces competition significantly, even if it is unlikely to generate or maintain monopoly power. Further, the Department of Justice and the FTC should be authorized to obtain civil penalties if they establish a violation of this new section. This would couple public civil penalty enforcement with private treble damage actions, magnifying the deterrent effect of antitrust law.', 'These twin sanctions would alter the tech giants’ financial calculus. They would not deploy exclusionary tactics unless the likely gains outweighed the prospect of substantial financial penalties. Of course, that might not stop them in every case. They may figure that if they can disable rivals for a time they can achieve sufficient scale economies or network effects to ward off future entry, thereby earning long-run profits that would exceed the cost of any sanctions they have to pay.225 But they cannot count on that and the issue is not easy to resolve.226 In the face of such uncertainty, stiff financial sanctions are likely to reduce the incidence of exclusionary conduct. This is particularly so in complementary product markets, where the tech giants cannot generally hope to gain the scale and network advantages they possess in their core businesses.227 ***FOOTNOTE BEGINS*** 227 For example, Amazon sells private label batteries on amazon.com. Even if it could capture more of this complementary market for itself, it is unlikely to attain significant advantages over third party competitors like Eveready and Duracell. ***FOOTNOTE ENDS***', 'The existence of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is no reason not to expand the Sherman Act. In theory, Section 5 covers anticompetitive conduct that falls short of monopolization, but as Section A explains, its remedies are limited and its track record has been disappointing. Section B addresses the risk that expanding the Sherman Act would unduly deter procompetitive conduct. This risk can be minimized, however, by confining the amendment to the tech giants and including proof requirements that would defeat most challenges to desirable conduct. Section C describes the recent Congressional support for this change. Section D uses a detailed example to demonstrate that it would be workable in practice.', '']

[(8, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-Kentucky%20RR-Round2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-Kentucky%2520RR-Round2.docx

f8900c9592c00faf2bef5211c58241c382890d35ce607243409217e0f99320ab

2---Empowering extremist militancy causes civil war---goes global and nuclear.

Laitman ’17 [Michael; August 25; Professor of Ontology and Theory of Knowledge, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Russian Academy of Science; News Max, “There Will Be No Winners in the Second Civil War,” ]

America is rife with extremists see war as inevitable A civil war will not end in America China , Russia Korea , Iran will destroy whatever war doesn’t America will be history , and a third war , with nuc powers , will follow President needs to build cohesion the infrastructure of the country is people ideology cannot legitimize itself people need plurality the other option is war When we think of “ one or the other This will inevitably create extremists that lead to war

America is already so rife with extremists that many people see war not only as imminent, but as virtually inevitable A civil war in America will not end in America China , Russia , North Korea , Iran , and others will destroy whatever the war doesn’t America will be history , and a third world war , with multiple nuc lear powers , will follow . There will be no winners President Trump needs to start build ing national cohesion But the real infrastructure of the country is its people , not its asphalt roads or railroads an ideology that undermines freedom cannot use the First Amendment to legitimize itself Even more importantly, people need to learn that plurality of views is not a recipe for war the other option is war When we think in terms of “ one side or the other wins,” This will inevitably create unions of extremists that will feed on hatred of the other side, which in turn will lead to war . The only way to avoid this route is to make unity mainstream Therefore, unity is not unrealistic; it is the only realistic option for society

extremists war inevitable civil war not end America China Russia North Korea Iran destroy be history third world war nuc powers no winners build cohesion real infrastructure people ideology cannot not other option war one side other inevitably create extremists war mainstream only

["Referencing Dennis Prager’s\xa0, “America's Second Civil War,” Gingrich added, “What you’re seeing with Antifa, what you’re seeing on college campuses, what you’re seeing, to some extent, in the bureaucracy, is a real division of the country. …I wish we could all sing Kumbaya and come together but I don’t think that’s what’s gonna happen. …As a historian, my view is pretty straightforward: one side or the other wins.”", 'America is already so rife with extremists on both sides of the political aisle that many people see war not only as imminent, but as virtually inevitable. If that’s the case, we’d better get busy digging ourselves bunkers… and graves.', 'And not just in the U.S. A civil war in America will not end in America. If the country plunges into battle, many will be vying for the loot. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and others will destroy whatever the war doesn’t, the American empire will become history, and a third world war, with multiple nuclear powers, will follow. There will be no winners because, to quote Machiavelli, “Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please.”', 'Is there really no alternative?', 'I think there is, or I wouldn’t be writing here. In my\xa0, I noted that President Trump needs to take a more appeasing tone in order to start building national cohesion. It’s great to state, “No matter our color, creed, religion or political party, we are ALL AMERICANS FIRST,” but doing so right after the Charlottesville murderous car ramming is the epitome of poor timing. Such statements should be part of the president’s routine, not rare occasions.', 'Trump excels in using social media. If he uses it to broadcast a constant stream of unifying messages, notwithstanding the cynicism of the press, he will win over the American people’s hearts regardless of their political affiliation.', 'I wholly agree that America requires massive infrastructure projects. But the real infrastructure of the country is its people, not its asphalt roads or railroads. The administration needs to implement ASAP solidarity programs that will create a uniform American identity. People need to learn that an ideology that undermines freedom of speech, freedom of religious practice, and freedom of the press, cannot use the First Amendment to legitimize itself.', 'Even more importantly, people need to learn that plurality of views is not a recipe for war; it is precisely what has made America great in the first place. When people of different approaches and views strive for\xa0the same\xa0goal, they are far more likely to achieve it. If the goal is the well-being of all Americans, the entire country will benefit from it, and this goal should top the priority list of every American.', 'It might not seem possible to patch up the divided United States, but 1) no one has ever sincerely tried, and 2) the other option is war.', 'With my students, I have developed simple and easily applicable techniques that create a sense of unity and connection even among the most\xa0, such as Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, ultra-Orthodox and devout agnostics, and affluent and needy. These techniques work wonders wherever we have tried them: North America, Western and Eastern Europe, and in Israel.', 'Today’s world is pushing toward connection. The interconnectedness of reality requires that we learn how to work in a world where everyone is dependent on everyone else. When we think in terms of “one side or the other wins,” we cannot succeed because we are perpetuating a mindset of separation. This will inevitably create unions of extremists that will feed on hatred of the other side, which in turn will lead to war. The only way to avoid this route is to make unity mainstream.', 'If this seems unrealistic, think of your own body. Without the unity of radically different organs all working in unison for the\xa0common cause\xa0of sustaining you and keeping you healthy, you would not exist. Therefore, unity is not unrealistic; it is the\xa0only\xa0realistic option for society.']

[(0, 7), (8, 11)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoRu-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Emory

CoRu

358ba77905d371c87f85fa1bb64ba90606458208d6c371bbdb64ee4a9c22366a

‘Nuclear forces’ means the whole arsenal---warheads and bombs mated to delivery systems across all platforms

Brad Roberts 23, Study Group Chair and Director, Center for Global Security Research, et al., Spring 2023, “China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf

nuclear forces” refers to delivery platforms (bombers and sub s ), weapons mated to delivery systems SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems c and c assets, and infrastructure to conduct nuclear combat op s

The term “ nuclear forces” refers to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile sub marine s ), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems c ommand and c ontrol assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat op eration s

delivery platforms sub s c c op s

['The term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations. The platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components: those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed. The operationally-deployed component is readily available (immediately or within a few days), while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

4494da414da1d26cfd12a11ee4b3182e2144fd888ff2a6936016e508f5b3e13f

Independently, they violate the word ‘in.’ It requires empowering a named actor.

Calabresi ’94 [et al; Two authors - Steven Calabresi is an Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law who also holds a J.D. from Yale University. Co-author is Saikrishna Prakash – who, at the time of this writing, held a J.D.. from Yale University, 1993 and a B.A., Stanford University. 1990. Saikrishna Prakash is currently a James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Miller Center Senior Fellow at the University of Virginia. “The President's Power to Execute the Laws,” - The Yale Law Journal - Vol. 104 – #E&F - available via https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/8863/29_104YaleLJ541_December1994_.pdf?sequence=2]

"Vest" t]o place in possession of' an entity. This meaning is confirmed by use of "vest" in constitutional provisions to connote placing a power in a named actor. "vest" clearly refers to empowerment

Plain Meaning of the Verbs "Vest" and " Extend " In its verb form, vest means t]o place in possession of' an entity. The verb "to extend," however, has no such meaning It derives from to stretch an already existing power."' etymology and plain meaning make clear that the verb "vest" empowers whereas the verb "extend" can carry no empowering connotation. This plain dictionary meaning is confirmed by use of the verb "vest" in constitutional provisions to connote placing a power in a named actor. The word "vest" clearly refers to empowerment

Plain Meaning of the Verbs "Vest" and " Extend " in to stretch an already existing power."' constitutional provisions in a named actor.

['2. The Plain Meanings of the Verbs "Vest" and "Extend"', 'Let us closely examine, then, the plain meanings of these two verbs. In its verb form, vest means "[t]o place in possession of\' an individual or entity.116 It derives from the Latin word "vestis" for outer garment and is related to the word "vestments" (as in ecclesiastical vestments, the robes of church office). The word signifies the "clothing" of an official or of an institution with the general trappings and realities of power. It survives today in this sense in the word "investiture," the ceremony whereby a judge (or a bishop) assumes both the robes and the powers of his office. The verb "to extend," however, has no such meaning. It derives from the Latin "extendere." meaning "to stretch [tendere] out [ex]" an already existing thing or, in this case. a power."\' The etymology and plain dictionary meaning of these words make clear that it is the verb "vest" in the Article III Vesting Clause that empowers the federal judiciary to act whereas the verb "extend" can carry no empowering meaning or connotation.', 'This plain dictionary meaning is confirmed by the use of the verb "vest" in other constitutional provisions to connote placing a power in the hands of a named actor. Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides: The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. 118', 'The word "vest" as it is used here clearly refers to the empowerment of an institution. This use confirms our intuition that the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses must be in some sense grants of "the executive" and "the judicial" power and not "inkblots" or mere designations of a title.', '']

[(0, 9), (10, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Kansas

PaMa

2090550176e659f5935848d608c9365bdba85429806c67a124ba83b140dc6e09

Growth is sustainable, physical limits aren’t absolute, AND resource use is declining now---the alt unleashes global disaster

Ronald Bailey 18, B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor

"degrowth." gussies up Malthusianism Americans transgress all boundaries "Countries with higher life transgress boundaries ingenuity in markets is making boundaries irrelevant energy costs will be lower reactors supply all carbon-free energy Peak phosphorus is not at hand reserves last years . There are no shortages crops use less while maintaining yields biotech create efficient staples drought and saline-tolerant crops Humanity reached peak farmland, and 400 million hectares will be restored farming replaced by developments growth lighten footprint Rather than degrowth, the planet need more

Unless rich countries drastically reduce material living standards and distribute to poor countries, the world will come to an end The researchers think the way to prevent apocalypse is "degrowth." The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising biophysical indicators of environmental pressure researchers calculate that annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion consist of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass plus 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons per person how does the U.S. do with regard to biophysical boundaries and social outcomes Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries those transgressions provided a good life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability —Haiti But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction at 4. life expectancy is 52.3 years Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi , Nepal , Myanmar , and Nicaragua . All of them score dismally on social indicators, and GDPs The country that comes closest to researchers' ideal biophysical boundaries while social indicators is… Vietnam "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and expectancy tend to transgress biophysical boundaries ," A better way to put this is that wealth and technology make people happier, healthier, and freer human ingenuity unleashed in markets is well on the way toward making supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant . Take carbon dioxide emissions : Supporters of renewable energy technologies say costs are already or will be lower than fossil fuels . Boosters of nuclear reactors argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need battery-powered vehicles replace mass transit Peak phosphorus is not at hand at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years . The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years . " There are no imminent shortages of rock," With respect to deleterious effects researchers are working to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields nitrogen fertilizer is a problem, but plant breeders are working to solve researchers used biotech nology to create nitrogen- efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while reducing fertilizer use other projects engineer fixation the crops would make their own fertilizer from air Most water is devoted to irrigation the ongoing development of drought -resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help Humanity already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the U S east of the Mississippi most animal farming will be replaced by lab-grown steaks and milk. developments in food production undermine worries about overconsumption humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller as trends toward dematerializatio n take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to wring more value out less stuff absolute dematerialization has taken off many commodities "If all people are to lead life within planetary boundaries the level of resource use associated with basic needs must be reduced." They are entirely backward with how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides technologies to lift people from poverty while lighten ing humanity's footprint on the world. Rather than degrowth, the planet —and poor people— need more and faster growth

old-fashioned Malthusianism biophysical indicators per capita boundaries transgress all seven life expectancy democratic quality paragon of sustainability abysmally Malawi Nepal Myanmar Nicaragua closest Vietnam life satisfaction expectancy technology ingenuity irrelevant emissions renewable energy lower than fossil fuels all of the carbon-free energy not at hand 266 years total resources over 1,140 years imminent shortages endow crops maintaining yields biotech nology efficient varieties make their own fertilizer drought -resistant saline-tolerant already reached 400 million hectares double the size replaced food production get smaller dematerializatio superb mechanism entirely backward Economic growth poverty lighten ing humanity's footprint more faster

['Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that\'s the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O\'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth."', 'Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity.', "Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person.", "On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent.", 'So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita.', 'On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent).', "On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita.", 'Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively.', "The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306.", '"Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer.', "O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century.", 'Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world\'s known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields.', "O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air.", "Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass.", "And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities.", 'After cranking their way through their models of doom, O\'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity\'s footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%20Aff-Harvard-Round2.docx

Kentucky

BaDa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/BaDa/Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%2520Aff-Harvard-Round2.docx

735bbbf2bd769b1109e8c89ddf65f34505eb5fc68950b25b9f6050e47aae2a83

Perm do the CP—overturning Actavis is a pre-req—alows some pay for delay snowballs into allow it all

Silver 21 (Khadijah M. Silver is a healthcare and life sciences journalist, attorney, and policy analyst with bylines at Law360, Institutional Investor, Popular Science and others. Silver holds a JD in health law from Boston University School of Law and is a member of the New York State Bar., 7-22-2021, accessed on 10-22-2021, MedCity News, "Fight over “pay for delay” heats up in Washington - MedCity News", https://medcitynews.com/2021/07/fight-over-pay-for-delay-heats-up-in-washington/)

Supreme Court telling future courts to apply an antitrust “rule of reason” test

Abbott told senators to leave reverse settlements to antitrust enforcement agencies unfortunate result of any attempted fixes would be “significant competitive distortions that hamper competition Supreme Court took up the issue in 2013, ruling weakly in favor of the Federal Trade Commission in FTC v. Actavis highest court refused to uphold the FTC’s assertion that reverse payment deals are by nature anticompetitive, instead telling future courts to apply an antitrust “rule of reason” test

['', 'By contrast, George Mason University’s Mercatus Center Senior Research Fellow Alden Abbott told senators to leave reverse settlements to antitrust enforcement agencies. Without wholesale healthcare regulatory reform, the unfortunate result of any attempted legislative fixes would be “significant competitive distortions that hamper competition,” he argued.', 'PhRMA counsel Geoffrey Levitt agreed that existing statutory structures were balancing competition and innovation, and should be left alone.', '“It would be inappropriate to put FTC in the role of substituting its business judgment for that of companies and second–guessing companies on a retrospective basis, which could have a substantial chilling effect on innovation or even punish pro-competitive behavior,” he testified.', 'The Supreme Court took up the issue in 2013, ruling weakly in favor of the Federal Trade Commission in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. The highest court refused to uphold the FTC’s assertion that reverse payment deals are by nature anticompetitive, instead telling future courts to apply an antitrust “rule of reason” test to determine their market impact.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-WYO-Round2.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-WYO-Round2.docx

ab4a659c031b6240c6c60e7d94e4c6e317b735c01b6f0e9d363102beac7d70b5

3. Outweighs on magnitude---populism undermines response to every existential risk.

Dr. Andrew Leigh 21, PhD from Harvard, Member of the Australian House of Representatives, former Professor in the Economics Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, “What's the Worst That Could Happen: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics”, MIT University Press, ebook

humanity could become extinct with superintelligence, bioterror totalitarianism nuclear war , asteroids a pandemic Extinction risk outstrips other dangers populists critiq institutions, and internationalism sideline work on climate change and nuclear war the biggest risks such as next virus combine infectiousness with deadliness extremists developing versions of plague climate change rendering the planet uninhabitable nuclear catastrophe superintelligence could spell disaster unknown unknowns could be lurking tackling ex risks is a political problem rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s survival populists tend to be uninterested in long-term threats Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers a risk factor in itself

humanity could become extinct with out-of-control superintelligence, bioterror ism, and totalitarianism among the largest risks we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future imagine our species becoming extinct due to a catastrophe such as nuclear war , asteroids , or a pandemic the danger surpasses plenty of perils we already worry about Extinction risk outstrips other dangers we have another one billion years before the increasing heat of our sun brings most plant life to an end That’s plenty of time to figure out how to become an interstellar species and move to a more suitable solar system humans aren’t good at understanding extinction risk Our thinking about dangers is skewed by an “availability bias”: a tendency to focus on familiar risks we are lousy at judging the probability of rare but catastrophic events our instincts fail us as the magnitudes grow larger In this environment, a special style of politics has thrived: populism Populists see politics as a conflict between crooked elites and the pure mass of people populists make a stronger attack on elites, claiming that they are dishonest or corrupt. Populists then claim that they—and only they—represent the “real people The political strategy of populists involves critiq uing intellectuals, institutions, and internationalism . The political style of populists tends to be fierce They have little respect for experts and the systems of government electoral success of populists has served to sideline work on long-term dangers such as climate change and nuclear war Trump lost but transformed the Republican Party while the strength of populism threatened to sideline issues of catastrophic risk, coronavirus did the opposite COVID-19 never threatened to extinguish humanity, but it highlighted our vulnerability to infectious diseases But it’s still an open question as to how COVID-19 will affect humanity’s ability to think about the long term accentuating the long term requires taking risk more seriously and placing greater emphasis on saving our species the biggest risks facing humanity such as the next virus might combine the infectiousness of COVID-19 with the deadliness of Ebola bioterrorism , and danger of extremists developing their own versions of smallpox or the bubonic plague climate change could be catastrophic rendering large sections of the planet uninhabitable threat from new nuclear powers has made the problem less predictable what we used to call an arms race now looks more like a bar fight, with hazards coming from unexpected directions , including terrorist groups sensible strategies can reduce the odds of nuclear catastrophe superintelligence has been dubbed the “last invention” we’ll ever make a i whose abilities exceed our own could spell disaster Once a superintelligence can improve itself, it is unstoppable we need to build the guardrails before the highway also consider unknown unknowns other doomsday scenarios could be lurking around the corner tackling ex istential risks is a political problem preventing nuclear war, averting bioterrorism, and curbing greenhouse emissions are problems of government the values of those who run the country will determine how much of a priority the nation places on averting catastrophe That’s why the rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s long- term survival populists tend to be uninterested in dealing with long-term threats . Populists’ focus on the short term means we’re in danger of missing the threats that could kill us Most critics of populism have concentrated on the present day. They’re missing the bigger picture. Populists are primarily endangering the unborn Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers ; it represents a risk factor in itself through the possibility of a totalitarian turn in which democracy is replaced by an enduring autocracy For each of the existential risks we face, there are sensible approaches that could curtail the dangers Because of its focus on the urgent over the important, populist politics should bear the label, “Warning: populism can harm your children what is the alternative? A stoic approach to politics isn’t about favoring one side of the ideological fence over another. Instead, it’s about the temperament of good political leadership Decisions are based on empirical evidence , not emotion. Anger has no place in effective leadership

become extinct bioterror totalitarianism catastrophe nuclear war asteroids pandemic Extinction risk other dangers familiar risks special style of politics has thrived: populism crooked elites and the pure mass of people critiq uing intellectuals, institutions, and internationalism sideline work on long-term dangers such as climate change and nuclear war lost but transformed the Republican Party saving our species biggest risks facing humanity next virus bioterrorism climate change catastrophic new nuclear powers unexpected directions terrorist groups reduce the odds of nuclear catastrophe superintelligence a i spell disaster unstoppable unknown unknowns other doomsday scenarios lurking around the corner ex political problem values rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s long- term survival uninterested in dealing with long-term threats missing the threats that could kill us endangering the unborn doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers risk factor in itself Decisions are based on empirical evidence

['How likely is it that humanity could end? Experts working on catastrophic risk have estimated the chances of disaster for a wide range of the hazards that our species faces. Adding up the threats, philosopher Toby Ord estimates the odds that humanity could become extinct over the next century at one in six, with an out-of-control superintelligence, bioterrorism, and totalitarianism among the largest risks. He argues that most of the risks have arisen because technology has advanced more rapidly than safeguards to keep it in check. To encapsulate the situation facing humanity, Ord titled his book The Precipice.', 'A one in six chance of going the way of dodos and dinosaurs effectively means we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future. Six chambers. One bullet. Even the most foolhardy soldier usually finds an excuse not to play Russian roulette. And that’s when just their own life is at stake. In considering extinction risk, we’re contemplating not one fatality but the death of billions or possibly trillions of people—not to mention countless animals.', 'It can seem impossible to imagine our species becoming extinct due to a catastrophe such as nuclear war, asteroids, or a pandemic. But in reality, the danger surpasses plenty of perils we already worry about. One way to put catastrophic risk into perspective is to compare it with more familiar risks. If extinction risk poses a one in six risk to our species over the next century, then it means that it is far more hazardous than many everyday risks. Specifically, it suggests that the typical US resident is fifteen times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk—such as nuclear war or bioterrorism—than in car crash.2', 'Extinction risk outstrips other dangers too. Ask people about their greatest fears, and you’ll get answers like “street violence,” “snakes,” “heights,” and “terrorism."4 But in reality, these are much less hazardous than catastrophic risks. People in the United States are 31 times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk than from homicide. Catastrophic risk is 3,519 times likelier to kill than falls from a height, and 6,194 times more likely to kill than venomous plants and animals. If you have ever worried about any of these threats, you should be more fearful about cata- strophic risk. Extinction risks aren’t just more dangerous than any of them; they are more hazardous than all of them put together. Catastrophic risk poses a greater danger to the life of the typical US resident than car accidents, murder, drowning, high falls, electrocution, and rattlesnakes put together.', 'A one in six risk is just the danger in a single century. Suppose that the risk of extinction remains at one in six for each century. That means there’s a five in six chance humanity makes it to the end of the twenty-first century, but less than an even chance we survive to the end of the twenty-fourth century. The odds that we survive all the way to the year 3000 are just one in six. In other words, if we continue playing Russian roulette once a century, it’s probable that we blow our brains out before the millennium is halfway through, and there’s only a small chance that we make it to the end of the millennium.', 'Part of the reason humans undervalue the future is that it’s hard to get our heads around the idea that our genetic code could live on for millions of years. At present, the best estimates are that our species, Homo sapiens, evolved around three hundred thousand years ago.1 That means we have existed for about ten thousand generations. But we have another one billion years before the increasing heat of our sun brings most plant life to an end.1 That’s plenty of time to figure out how to become an interstellar species and move to a more suitable solar system. Humans could live to enjoy another thirty million generations on earth.', 'Thinking about the mind-boggling scale of these numbers, I’m reminded of the Total Perspective Vortex machine, created by Douglas Adams in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe. Anyone brave enough to enter sees a scale model of the entire universe, with an arrow indicating their current position. As a result, their brain explodes. As Adams reflects, the machine proves that “if life is going to exist in a universe of this size, then the one thing it cannot afford to have is a sense of proportion.”', 'Still, let’s try. Imagine your ancestors a hundred generations ago. They are your great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-grandparents. These people lived around 1000 BCE, at the start of the Iron Age. They might have been part of Homeric Greece, ancient Egypt, Vedic age India, the preclassic Maya, or Zhou Dynasty China.', 'Contemplate for a moment about what the hundred genera- tions between our Iron Age ancestors and today have achieved. They built the Taj Mahal and Sistine Chapel, the Angkor Wat and Empire State Building. Thanks to them, we can relish the poetry of Maya Angelou, novels of Leo Tolstoy, and music of Ludwig van Beethoven. An abundance of inventions has delivered us deli- cious food, homes that are comfortable year-round, and technol- ogy that provides online access to a bottomless well of entertain- ment. If time machines existed, we might pop in to visit our great100 grandparents, but few would volunteer to stay in the Iron Age.', 'Yet humanity is really just getting started. If things go well, it’s ten thousand generations down, thirty million to go. Imagine what those future generations could do, and how much time they have to enjoy. Here’s one way to think about what it means to have thirty million generations ahead. Suppose humanity’s potential time on the planet was shrunk down to a single eighty- year life span. In that event, we would now be a newborn baby— just nine days old. Homo sapiens is a mere 0.03 percent through all we could experience on earth.', 'We won’t meet most of those who follow us on the planet, but we should cherish future generations all the same. If you value humanity’s past achievements—the Aztec and Roman civiliza- tions, art of the Renaissance, and breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution—then the generations to come are just as worthy. This is what political philosopher Edmund Burke meant when he described society as “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.’- To appreciate the past is akin to admiring the achievements of distant places. Like geography, his- tory helps us better understand the way of the world.', 'Politicians like me like to speak fondly about looking after "our children and our grandchildren.” But it usually stops after a generation or two. Policy pays little heed to the many generations that will follow. For my own part, it took a coronavirus-induced shutdown to have the time to spend reflecting deeply about the long term. This book had been rattling around in my head for years, but it was only when all my meetings, events, and travel were canceled that I had the time to write it. Pandemics are one of the threats to humanity that I’ll discuss in this book, but in this instance, it provided a chance to reflect on the long term. It’s tempting to ignore the distant future. It’s easier to love the grandchildren whom we hug than the great-great-great-grand- children whom we’ll never get to smile on. But that doesn’t make those far-flung generations any less important. Via my wife, our children can trace their lineage to Benjamin Franklin, but I’m more excited about the potential achievements of the generations yet to be born.', 'For companies and governments, a major impediment to long- term thinking is the idea of discounting the future. When investing money, this is a reasonable approach. A dollar in a decade’s time is less valuable than a dollar today for the simple reason that a dollar today could be invested and earn a real return. Share markets have good and bad years, but based on returns from the past 120 years, someone who put $1,000 into the US stock market for an average year could expect it to be worth $1,065 after twelve months (accounting for dividends and inflation).2 Approximating these returns, when governments contemplate making investments, they often apply a discount rate of around 5 percent, while companies use rates that are higher still.2', 'When it comes to growing your greenbacks, this makes perfect sense. If Kanesha offered you $ 1,000 today, and Jane offered you $ 1,000 in a year’s time, most of us would think that Kanesha was making the more generous offer. Kanesha’s cash can be put to productive use and would be worth more than Jane’s when the year is out.', 'But what if we’re talking about Kanesha and Jane themselves? Suppose Kanesha is alive today, and Jane is yet to be born. When discounting is applied to lives, it suggests that Kanesha’s life to- day is worth twice as much as Jane’s life in fifteen years’ time. It implies that Kanesha today is worth 132 times as much as Jane in a century’s time. So if we’re spending money to keep them safe, a 5 percent discount rate indicates that we should spend more than a hundred times as much to protect Kanesha today than to pro- tect Jane in a century’s time.', 'The further we stretch the time period, the more ridiculous the results become. Discounting at a rate of 5 percent implies that Christopher Columbus is worth more than all eight billion people on the planet today.— Naturally, it also implies that your life is worth more than eight billion lives in five hundred years’ time. Even if you value the hug of a loved one over the unseen successes of next century’s generations, is it fair to ruthlessly dis- miss the distant future? Discounting is the enemy of the long term.', 'As philosopher Will MacAskill points out, there is something morally repugnant about concluding that the happiness of those who will be alive in the 2100s is inconsequential simply because they live in the future. MacAskill coined the term “presentism” to refer to prejudice against people who are yet unborn.” Just like racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, he argues that mis- treating those who live a long way in the future is unfair. To dis- criminate in favor of Kanesha against unborn Jane is a form of presentism. If you traveled back in time to the 1500s and met someone who claimed that they were worth more than everyone alive in the 2000s, you’d rightly regard them as an egomaniac. Isn’t it equally narcissistic to ignore the happiness of people in the 2500s?', 'Some have contended that we should favor the living over the unborn for the same reason that philanthropy favors the down- trodden over the wealthy. If incomes rise over time, the argument goes, then asking today’s citizens to help those in the future is like taking from the poor to give to the rich.— But this reasoning ignores the fact that we are talking about the survival of future generations. Theoretical riches won’t do them any good if they are practically dead—or if planetary apocalypse snuffs out their chance to be born. Similarly, it misses the possibility that future pandemics, wars, or climate disasters could make coming genera- tions significantly poorer.—', 'Insights from behavioral science help explain why humans aren’t good at understanding extinction risk.— Our thinking about dangers is skewed by an “availability bias”: a tendency to focus on familiar risks. Like the traders who failed to forecast the collapse of the securitized housing debt market, we are lousy at judging the probability of rare but catastrophic events. Most important, our instincts fail us as the magnitudes grow larger. In research titled "The More Who Die, the Less We Care,” psychologists Paul Slovic and Daniel Vastfjall argue that we become numb to suffering as the body count grows.— Humans’ compassionate instincts are aroused by stories, not statistics. Indeed, one study found that people were more likely to donate to help a single victim than they were to assist eight victims. This may help explain why the international community has been so slow to respond to genocide, including recent incidents in Rwanda, Darfur, and Myanmar. As artificial intelligence researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky notes, human neurotransmitters are unable to feel sorrow that is thousands of times stronger than a single funeral.— The problem is starker still when it comes to extinction risk. Our emotional brains cannot multiply by billions.', 'Add to this a media cycle that has become a media cyclone, in which stories explode in a matter of minutes, and “outrage porn” seems to drive the news choices of many outlets. In the 2016 US election, researchers found that for every piece of professional news shared on Twitter, there was one piece of “junk news.’’— Conflict fueled by social media keeps us in a primal state of rage and retaliation. And this isn’t the only force that makes politics myopic. Campaign contributions tend to come from donors who have an immediate interest in a “today” issue rather than from people aiming to solve long-term problems. This kind of “instant noodle” politics prioritizes quick results and sidelines fundamental challenges.', 'In this environment, a special style of politics has thrived: populism. The term “populist" gets thrown around a lot—typically as an insult—so it’s worth taking a moment to define it precisely.— Populists see politics as a conflict between crooked elites and the pure mass of people. Many candidates trying to defeat an incumbent will criticize “insiders,” but populists make a stronger attack on elites, claiming that they are dishonest or corrupt. Populists then claim that they—and only they—represent the “real people.” Populists combine a fierce critique of elites and personal appeal to the “silent majority.”', 'The political strategy of populists involves critiquing intellectuals, institutions, and internationalism. The political style of populists tends to be fierce. They do not strive for unity and calm consensus. Populists share with revolutionaries a desire for sudden and dramatic change. They have little respect for experts and the systems of government. Populists’ priorities tend to be immediate issues such as crime, migration, jobs, and taxes. Consequently, the electoral success of populists has served to sideline work on long-term dangers such as climate change and nuclear war.', 'Donald Trump may have lost his presidential reelection bid, but he has transformed the Republican Party, which has jettisoned its longstanding commitment to free trade, immigration, and global alliances. Many moderate Republicans, who might have served comfortably under Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, have quit the party or been defeated by Trump-supporting populists. The Republican Party, which holds nearly half the seats in Congress and controls a majority of state legislatures, has embraced populism to a degree that was unimaginable when it was led by George W. Bush, John McCain, or Mitt Romney. After four years under President Trump, the Republican Party is now more cynical and isolationist, focused on immediate grievances rather than long-term challenges.', 'Yet while the strength of populism threatened to sideline issues of catastrophic risk, coronavirus did the opposite. The worst pandemic in a century led to the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression. Churches and concert halls fell silent. International travel collapsed. The Summer Olympics were postponed. Stocks plunged, and for a brief moment, the price of a barrel of oil went negative. Globally, millions lost their jobs, and millions more faced famine.', 'COVID-19 never threatened to extinguish humanity, but it highlighted our vulnerability to infectious diseases. More than at any time in living memory, people focused on the dangers of pandemics. The popularity of Geraldine Brooks’s Year of Wonders, Stephen King’s The Stand, Emily St. John Mandel’s Station Eleven, and Albert Camus’s The Plague vividly illustrates the way in which fear of pandemics has become more acute.', 'We know that disasters can remake society. The black death helped usher in the Renaissance.— The Great Depression made a generation of investors more risk averse.— World War II spawned the United Nations and formed the modern welfare state. In autocracies, droughts and floods can topple dictators.—', 'Coronavirus is reshaping the world in numerous ways.— Handwashing is in. Cheek kissing is out. The rise of big cities is slowing as people consider the downsides of density. Firms that automated their production systems to deal with physical dis- tancing requirements and stay-at-home orders are discovering that they can get by permanently with fewer staff. More tele- working and less business travel is leading to a drop in demand for receptionists, bus drivers, office cleaners, and security guards. When it comes to our use of technology, coronavirus suddenly accelerated the world to 2030. When it comes to globalization, the pandemic took us back to 2010.', 'But it’s still an open question as to how COVID-19 will affect humanity’s ability to think about the long term. Most of the examples I’ve listed are instances in which crises affected societies organically: the shock came, and it changed our behavior. But accentuating the long term requires taking risk more seriously and placing greater emphasis on saving our species. Linebackers are swift to respond when an offensive player suddenly takes a step to the right. But it takes longer to recognize that a team’s offensive plays are skewed to the right and modify the defensive formation accordingly.', 'Like a football team that adapts its tactics, this book argues that we should lengthen our thinking. At minimal cost, society can massively reduce the odds of catastrophe. By ensuring that the big threats get the attention and resources they need, we can safeguard the future of our species. As insurance policies go, this one is a bargain.', 'In the chapters that follow, I’ll outline the biggest risks facing humanity. I’ll begin in chapter 2 with pandemics, such as the possibility that the next virus might combine the infectiousness of COVID-19 with the deadliness of Ebola. What can we do to shut down exotic animal markets, speed up vaccine develop- ment, and create surge capacity in hospitals? I’ll then delve into bioterrorism, and the danger of extremists developing their own versions of smallpox or the bubonic plague. How difficult is it for them to create these devilish diseases, and what can we do to prevent it?', 'In chapter 3, I’ll then explore climate change—perhaps the in- tergenerational issue that has received the most public attention in recent years. While much of the modeling looks at how global warming could be bad, my focus is on the chances that it’s catastrophic. This isn’t about climate change shortening the ski season; it’s about the possibility of temperatures rising by 18°F (10°C), rendering large sections of the planet uninhabitable. What does the risk of cataclysmic climate change mean for energy policy?', 'Next, I’ll turn to nukes. As a child in the 1980s, I vividly re- member watching The Day After. My classmates and I agreed that a nuclear war was inevitable. When the Cold War ended, the world seemed safer, but in the three decades since, the threat from new nuclear powers has made the problem less predictable. As I discuss in chapter 4, what we used to call an arms race now looks more like a bar fight, with hazards coming from unexpected directions, including terrorist groups. Yet just as there are practical ways to avoid pub brawls (don’t drink past midnight, avoid the stairs, look out for the glass), so too are there sensible strategies that can reduce the odds of nuclear catastrophe (adopt a “no first use" policy, reduce the stockpiles, control loose nukes).', 'A superintelligence has been dubbed the “last invention” we’ll ever make. An artificial intelligence machine whose abilities exceed our own could turbocharge productivity and living stan- dards. But it could also spell disaster. If we program our artificial intelligence to maximize human happiness, it could fulfill our wishes literally by immobilizing everyone and attaching electrodes to the pleasure centers of our brains. As chapter 5 notes, what makes artificial intelligence different from every other risky technology is its runaway potential. Once a superintelligence can improve itself, it is unstoppable. So we need to build the guardrails before the highway.', 'What are the odds? In chapter 6,1 complete the discussion of catastrophic danger by examining less risky risks, including asteroids and supervolcanoes. I also consider the prospect of “unknown unknowns.” For example, prior to the first atomic bomb test, some scientists thought there was a chance it could set the atmosphere on fire, destroying the planet. When the Large Hadron Collider was being built, critics warned that the particle collisions inside it could create micro black holes. Although neither situation eventuated, they raise the question of what other doomsday scenarios could be lurking around the corner. How should the prospect of these unexpected risks change our approach to cutting-edge science? Drawing together these dangers with the major hazards, I report the likely probability of each, benchmarking existential risks such as nuclear war and pandemics against individual risks such as being struck by lightning or dying on the battlefield.', 'Ultimately, tackling existential risks is a political problem. Private citizens can achieve many things, but preventing nuclear war, averting bioterrorism, and curbing greenhouse emissions are fundamentally problems of government. Governments control the military, levy taxes, and provide public goods. So the values of those who run the country will determine how much of a priority the nation places on averting catastrophe.', 'That’s why the rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s long- term survival. In chapter 7,1 discuss the factors that have led to the electoral success of populists during recent decades, and why populists tend to be uninterested in dealing with long-term threats. Populists’ focus on the short term means that—like a driver distracted by a back seat squabble—we’re in danger of missing the threats that could kill us. I’ll explore why populists around the world struggled to respond to COVID-19, and what this says about the dangers that populism poses to our species. Most critics of populism have concentrated on the present day. They’re missing the bigger picture. Populists are primarily endangering the unborn.', 'Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers; it represents a risk factor in itself through the possibility of a totalitarian turn —in which democracy is replaced by an enduring autocracy. The road to democracy is not a one-way street. Over the centuries, dozens of countries have backslid from democracy into autocracy —abandoning the institutions of fair elections, protection for minorities, and free expression. Such an outcome could be deadly for dissenters and miserable for the multitudes. Chapter 8 explores why democracy dies and identifies the signs that institutions are being undermined. Chapter 9 suggests how we might strengthen democracies to allow citizens to have a greater say, and lower the chances of the few taking over from the many. Chapter 10 concludes the book.', 'When COVID-19 hit, many rushed out to buy life insurance.— In our personal lives, we know that spending a small amount on insurance can guard against financial ruin. Societies can take a similar approach: implementing modest measures today to safe- guard the immense future of our species. For each of the existential risks we face, there are sensible approaches that could curtail the dangers. For all the risks we face, a better politics will lead to a safer world.', 'Because of its focus on the urgent over the important, populist politics should perhaps bear the label, “Warning: populism can harm your children." But what is the alternative? In the conclusion, I argue that the answer lies in the ancient philosophy of stoicism. A stoic approach to politics isn’t about favoring one side of the ideological fence over another. Instead, it’s about the temperament of good political leadership. Stoicism emphasizes that character matters and holds that virtue is the only good. Decisions are based on empirical evidence, not emotion. Anger has no place in effective leadership. Strength comes from civility, courage, and endurance. Stoics make a sharp distinction between the things they can change and those they cannot.']

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ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-georgetown-Round-5.docx

Emory

GiKe

c5f18359c4d8b54f3da0e6ed0cdfcd243c1d76b2e97883c29e0f05c109da79f1

The plan solves by enabling strategic dialogue. That creates a necessary off-ramp for Korean crisis escalation which culminates in nuclear war.

John Carl Baker 23. Nuclear Field Coordinator and Senior Program Officer at Ploughshares Fund. PhD in Cultural Studies from George Mason University and an MA in American Studies from the University of South Florida. “North Korean Arms Control Doesn’t Have to Conflict with Disarmament.” https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/01/north-korean-arms-control-doesnt-have-conflict-disarmament.

The U S can pursue realistic policy toward Korea to secure pragmatic constraints put the peninsula on the path to disarmament Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been able to leapfrog ahead so advanced the priority is preventing use chance of Korea relinquishing arsenal was zero Are proliferation risks of changing policy greater than those of the status quo they are not the current policy is creating prolif risks in South Korea public support dipped by 2018’s détente if diplomacy advanced support for nuclear weapons continued to trend downward easing pressure for South Korean proliferation diplomatic window closed because Trump clung to disarmament Handed an opportunity to restrain the North decrease regional prolif the U S stuck with the status quo U.S. policy prioritize lowering risks achieving practical limitations structuring diplomacy fosters modest arms control perception of equal status is important allows Korea to inhabit its role as a responsible nuclear state process open up discussions on arms control risk reduction acknowledging them to pursue diplomacy will lower the risk of nuclear war produce safer world risk reduction lower the risk of nuclear war improve odds of denuclearization prioritizing constraints on tactical weapons given North Korea’s posture renewed risk of preemptive war would lower prolif risks

it is a false choice to see arms control and denuclearization as a zero-sum game. The U nited S tates can pursue a realistic policy toward North Korea without rejecting commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament North Korea’s nuclear program must acknowledge it in order to secure pragmatic constraints that will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament North Korea has a highly advanced nuclear weapons program to talk about denuclearization in anything but the very long term makes no sense North Korea also debuted a new nuclear posture last year that allows for preemptive strikes in some scenarios North Korea is not a nuclear upstart North Korea is in an even better position for advancement because it benefits from decades of knowledge acquisition by the other nuclear-armed states North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been able to leapfrog ahead U.S. military approaches North Korea not as an emergent challenge to be solved, but as a sophisticated threat in need of deterrence Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program “is now so far advanced that the priority is preventing its use the chance of North Korea relinquishing its arsenal was “ zero percent.” Biden administration continues to resist an adjustment Are the proliferation risks of changing U.S. policy greater than those of continuing with the status quo ? they are not the current policy is itself creating prolif eration risks in South Korea In 2018, public support for nuclear weapons development dipped by nearly 10 points What explains this sudden drop 2018’s détente diplomatic opening The United States and North Korea were talking too the threat level was clearly lower than the nuclear war scare of 2017. if diplomacy advanced support for nuclear weapons might have continued to trend downward easing public pressure for South Korean proliferation diplomatic window closed in part because the Trump administration clung to disarmament as the goal for talks Handed an opportunity to restrain the North and decrease regional prolif eration risks the U nited S tates instead stuck with the status quo a strategic failure whose results we are living with today The U.S. military already recognizes the extent of the North Korean challenge U.S. policy can prioritize lowering risks and achieving practical limitations while remaining committed — in the long run — to disarmament. structuring diplomacy around the fact that North Korea’s arsenal is here for the foreseeable future deemphasizing disarmament gets the North Koreans to the table fosters even a modest arms control agreement that would be more than “maximum pressure” ever achieved U.S. policy should acknowledge North Korea’s arsenal. This perception of equal status is important : it allows North Korea to inhabit its desired role as a “ responsible nuclear state ” the process will open up discussions on arms control or risk reduction acknowledging them in order to pursue diplomacy that will lower the risk of nuclear war and produce a safer world risk reduction would lower the risk of nuclear war improve the odds of denuclearization over the longer term Mount and Kim recently made a strong case for prioritizing constraints on tactical nuclear weapons given their role in North Korea’s posture the renewed risk of preemptive war warhead miniaturization is still incomplete would lower prolif eration risks

must acknowledge it will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament highly advanced North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been able to leapfrog ahead the priority is preventing its use they are not current policy 2018’s détente diplomatic opening advanced easing public pressure for South Korean proliferation the U nited S tates instead stuck with the status quo fosters even a modest arms control agreement the process will open up discussions on arms control or risk reduction that will lower the risk of nuclear war and produce a safer world nuclear war given their role in North Korea’s posture the renewed risk of preemptive war lower prolif eration risks

['However, it is a false choice to see arms control and denuclearization as a zero-sum game. The United States can pursue a realistic policy toward North Korea without rejecting commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. A revised policy should not accept North Korea’s nuclear program but must acknowledge it in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament. The Reality of the Threat The unfortunate reality is that North Korea has a highly advanced nuclear weapons program — so advanced, in fact, that to talk about denuclearization in anything but the very long term makes no sense. Last year, the Kim regime conducted around 90 missile tests, making 2022 its most active year on record. The tests displayed North Korea’s wide variety of weapons, from cruise and short-range missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States. North Korea also debuted a new nuclear posture last year that allows for preemptive strikes in some scenarios, a particularly concerning development given the South Korean government’s own emphasis on striking first in a conflict. North Korea is not a nuclear upstart — it has had nuclear weapons for more than 15 years. While not a perfect parallel, it is worth considering the growth of the U.S. program between the primitivism of 1945 and the relative complexity of 1960, by which point the arsenal included everything from small tactical nuclear weapons to ICBMs. In some ways, North Korea is in an even better position for advancement because it benefits from decades of knowledge acquisition by the other nuclear-armed states. What Trotsky once called “the privilege of historical backwardness” allows for the rapid development of destructive as well as productive prowess. In other words, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been able to leapfrog ahead, a process that continues apace due to the lack of formal constraints on its arsenal. Experts have argued for years that the North Korean program is well past the point where politically safe notions like CVID — complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement — are a real possibility. But perhaps the most convincing evidence comes from the U.S. military, which now approaches North Korea not as an emergent challenge to be solved, but as a sophisticated threat in need of deterrence. In July, the Wall Street Journal reported on a meeting in which military and intelligence officials gathered with outside experts to examine the state of the North Korean threat. Individual views varied, but the general takeaway from the meeting was that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program “is now so far advanced that the priority is preventing its use.” One senior military official said that the chance of North Korea relinquishing its arsenal was “zero percent.” Official U.S. policy does not align with this assessment and the Biden administration continues to resist an adjustment. In October, when Under Secretary of State Bonnie Jenkins seemed to endorse talking with North Korea about arms control, the administration quickly walked back her comments. And in December, White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator Kurt Campbell declared that that the United States was still on the “right track” when it comes to North Korea. Proliferation Risks Opponents of revising U.S. policy often argue that it will reward a flagrant proliferator and raise the risk of further proliferation. By focusing on arms control or risk reduction, they contend, the United States will be tacitly accepting the North Korean program. And that, in turn, could cause other states — South Korea first among them — to consider nuclear arms themselves. After all, didn’t North Korea get away with it? The precedent would be troubling. Anyone who supports disarmament or international law will find it distasteful to concede that, for now at least, North Korea is going to keep its weapons. And there certainly is a risk that states could learn from the North Korean example, although one wonders how many would be willing to pay the heavy price of sanctions in exchange for nuclear armament. But the question is: Are the proliferation risks of changing U.S. policy greater than those of continuing with the status quo? I would argue they are not. In fact, there is evidence that the current policy is itself creating proliferation risks in South Korea. Support for nuclear weapons acquisition in South Korea is very high. Politicians and pundits regularly discuss it, and a recent survey shows that 71% of the public supports the development of nuclear arms. Precise levels have fluctuated and there have been occasional declines, but in general, support has trended upward over the past 12 years — with one big exception. In 2018, public support for nuclear weapons development dipped by nearly 10 points. What explains this sudden drop? The decline in security conditions has obscured the promise of 2018’s détente, but the diplomatic opening was very real. It saw no less than three inter-Korean summits, working-level talks between the South and North Korean militaries, the signing of an inter-Korean military agreement, collective mine removal in the Joint Security Area and the demolition of guard posts at the Demilitarized Zone. The United States and North Korea were talking too — and while the Singapore summit fizzled, the threat level was clearly lower than the nuclear war scare of 2017. These events impacted the South Korean public. Some South Koreans likely questioned the need for nuclear weapons if there were going to be limitations on North Korea’s arsenal and better relations on the peninsula. It is unfortunate that 2019 went so poorly because if diplomacy had advanced, support for nuclear weapons might have continued to trend downward, easing public pressure for South Korean proliferation. Skeptics argue that 2018 was a North Korean “charm offensive,” a false opening destined to fail because of the Kim regime’s duplicity. But it is important to remember that the diplomatic window closed in part because the Trump administration clung to disarmament as the goal for talks. When the Hanoi summit fell apart in February 2019, it spurred a quick regression in relations and a then-record year for North Korean missile tests. Is it any wonder support for a South Korean nuclear weapons program quickly recovered? Handed an opportunity to restrain the North (and decrease regional proliferation risks), the United States instead stuck with the status quo — a strategic failure whose results we are living with today. A New Policy Changing tack from past failures will involve discomfort, but the benefit will be a policy grounded in the reality of the threat and the urgent need to lower nuclear risks. The U.S. military already recognizes the extent of the North Korean challenge; the civilian government should too. U.S. policy can prioritize lowering risks and achieving practical limitations while remaining committed — in the long run — to disarmament. Here’s how: First, the United States should deemphasize denuclearization. That does not mean jettisoning it entirely, but it does mean talking about it less and structuring diplomacy around the fact that North Korea’s arsenal is here for the foreseeable future. Engagement should emphasize smaller-scale objectives that could realistically form part of a diplomatic agreement with North Korea. Skeptics will argue that this approach plays into the hands of the Kim government, which has declared that it will never give up its weapons. But if deemphasizing disarmament gets the North Koreans to the table and fosters even a modest arms control agreement, that would be more than “maximum pressure” and CVID ever achieved. Secondly, U.S. policy should acknowledge — but not accept — North Korea’s arsenal. For sure, deemphasizing denuclearization means engaging with North Korea as a relative peer. This perception of equal status is important: it allows North Korea to inhabit its desired role as a “responsible nuclear state” and in the process will open up discussions on arms control or risk reduction. By design, disarmament will not be on the menu. Instead of ignoring or downplaying this absence, though, Washington should explain that it is not accepting North Korea’s weapons but acknowledging them in order to pursue diplomacy that will lower the risk of nuclear war and produce a safer world. It should then reiterate its opposition to proliferation as well as its own commitment to disarm under Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, making the point that it still seeks a world without nuclear weapons – regardless of who has them – and that realistic engagement with North Korea is a step in producing that world. As Toby Dalton and Ankit Panda put it recently, “risk reduction would lower the risk of nuclear war in the near term and improve the odds of denuclearization over the longer term.” Lastly, the United States should explore risk reduction and achievable constraints in its discussions with North Korea. These objectives are limited, but their positive impact would be real and, unlike a laser-focus on disarmament, they stand a chance of success. Given the Pentagon’s emphasis on deterrence, the United States should suggest military-to-military talks with North Korea. Potential topics could include North Korea’s new declaratory policy and practical mechanisms to reduce the risk of nuclear war, such as a deconfliction hotline. Diplomacy through the usual channels is dead, but offering peer-to-peer military meetings might be a way to entice North Korea back to negotiations. Policymakers will dislike the implication of equal status, but since the United States is not willing to provide up-front sanctions relief, it needs to consider other ways to get North Korea to the table. Providing Kim Jong Un with a minor propaganda win would be a small price to pay for jumpstarting negotiations. The United States should approach all talks with flexibility and lowered expectations. Indeed, the first step in pursuing achievable gains is identifying the possibilities that are off-the-table. Red lines likely include (from the American side) the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula and (from the North Korean side) unilateral steps toward disarmament. If North Korea insists on relitigating its own maximalist demands, the United States should stress that it is willing to discuss proportionate sanctions relief, which Kim wants, but only for smaller-scale measures. Neither side will benefit from wasting time on the near-impossible. Instead, talks should address the most urgent risks and seek to make substantive improvements in mutual security. Adam Mount and Jungsup Kim recently made a strong case for prioritizing constraints on tactical nuclear weapons, given their role in North Korea’s posture, the renewed risk of preemptive war and the fact that warhead miniaturization is still incomplete. An agreement limiting tactical weapons would also align with the security interests of South Korea and could lower proliferation risks.']

[(10, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Debates-Octas.docx

Emory

GaHe

d290013dd95fa585222038116908df9023dfbe54ba3a3551a8fd8da2432e9d34

AI-led DAOs replace humans, creating mass inequality and job insecurity.

Matthew Newman 18. Founder of Shared Intelligence and an accredited Change Manager and Transformation Consultant, specialising in delivering strategic outcomes in multi-sourced IT service environments, who advises and interfaces to CIO level on harnessing disruptive ICT and realising global transformations, has 20 years’ experience leading business engagement for major change programmes; delivering outstanding results in financial services, health-tech, insurance, oil & gas, public sector, media and FMCG, “DAOs — End of the org chart or the end of job security?” https://bit.ly/3Tmxk3k

AI/ DAO scenario sees increase in AI usage through smart contracts This would mean humans would directly compete with AI counterparts for employment humans would need to become “skills nomads”. there is a higher likelihood of a wealth divide occurring as those with resources to outpace humans would also heavily invest in steering DAOs it corrupts many of the goals of the DAO by outsourcing decisions to autonomous agents seems likely it would require severe downsides for the majority of the population scenarios point to an increase in instability Although DAO offers tantalising vision of future where workers have a stake the capabilities offer opportunity for wholesale arbitrage , job insecurity and concentration of wealth

AI/ Human DAO scenario sees a continued increase in AI capabilities, and a continued uptake in AI usage within companies increase in both it is likely that AIaaS (Artifical Intelligence as a Service) becomes a workable business model such a model trained/fit AI agents become available “for hire” to use as a service it is entirely likely that they would increasingly do so through smart contracts , perhaps in a DAO set-up This would mean that humans would directly compete with AI counterparts for employment on an ongoing basis. As AI developers could quickly go to market, they would be incentivised to focus on activities currently filled by humans for best return, meaning humans would need to become “skills nomads”. there is a higher likelihood of a wealth divide occurring in society, as those with the resources to outpace humans would also be able to more heavily invest in steering the DAOs , leaving an underclass attempting to carve-out a living before AI learned their earning skills. it corrupts many of the goals of the DAO as “members” will have essential traded power for return by outsourcing their decisions to autonomous agents also means that those who command the most effective AI will have the most effective DAOs, concentrating power in a radical way it seems likely that it would require outside governance to prevent severe downsides for the majority of the population . all the above scenarios point to is an increase in instability for those who are unable to gain a foothold in controlling the organisation’s strategy Although the DAO offers a tantalising vision of a cooperative future where workers have a stake in their own destiny, the same capabilities also offer an opportunity for wholesale arbitrage , job insecurity and concentration of wealth

through smart contracts in a DAO set-up directly compete with AI counterparts for employment “skills nomads”. higher likelihood of a wealth divide outsourcing their decisions to autonomous agents severe downsides for the majority of the population increase in instability wholesale arbitrage job insecurity concentration of wealth

['Scenario 3: AI/Human DAO The third scenario sees a continued increase in AI capabilities, and a continued uptake in AI usage within companies. With an increase in both it is likely that AIaaS (Artifical Intelligence as a Service) becomes a workable business model. In such a model trained/fit AI agents become available “for hire” to use as a service. Were we in a future with companies already using such services, it is entirely likely that they would increasingly do so through smart contracts, perhaps in a DAO set-up. This would mean that humans would directly compete with AI counterparts for employment on an ongoing basis. The priority for humans would be to diversify and adapt at a quicker pace than the AI counterparts, or take activities that AI couldn’t perform. As AI developers could quickly go to market, they would be incentivised to focus on activities currently filled by humans for best return, meaning humans would need to become “skills nomads”. In this environment particularly there is a higher likelihood of a wealth divide occurring in society, as those with the resources to outpace humans would also be able to more heavily invest in steering the DAOs, leaving an underclass attempting to carve-out a living before AI learned their earning skills. There is also a further step for the last scenario. An increase in Natural Language Processing capabilities, alongside a thorough ontology for tasks and an increase in reliable curation/ratings systems could lead to the use of AI in the selection of strategic path and selection of human/AI agents to perform those tasks. Although such a scenario is probably the ultimate in the efficient production of value, it has some clear downsides. Firstly it corrupts many of the goals of the DAO as “members” will have essential traded power for return by outsourcing their decisions to autonomous agents. It also means that those who command the most effective AI will have the most effective DAOs, concentrating power in a radical way. Although there are many variables to consider in predicting the effect of such an outcome, it seems likely that it would require outside governance to prevent severe downsides for the majority of the population. What all the above scenarios point to is an increase in instability for those who are unable to gain a foothold in controlling the organisation’s strategy. Although the DAO offers a tantalising vision of a cooperative future where workers have a stake in their own destiny, the same capabilities also offer an opportunity for wholesale arbitrage, job insecurity and concentration of wealth. As with most AI and future tech, it depends on the decisions we make as a society as to the outcome we would realise.', '']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoRu-Neg-Georgetown-Round-6.docx

Emory

CoRu

29d68102b02306d3b0b2bc92e6b91eedfe89cc5024ab6a6e9987d40faf42ed24

Political engagement is possible and preferable to the alt—their theory is totalizing, tautological, obscures power politics, and favors neoliberal goals over proximate solutions.

Reed 18 - (Adolph Reed Jr, Professor, Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; 5-22-2018, Dialectical Anthropology, "Antiracism: a neoliberal alternative to a left," doa: 4-24-2021) doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-017-9476-3

Antiracist scholarship view disparities in which blacks appear worse off amount to evidence that race remains determinative of black lives however categories like race mask micro-level dynamics that present nuanced causality. if looking for racial effects in data sets organized by race you will find them, but that will not lead to sound interpretations antiracist politics is rhetorical not political the formulation advanced to validate white supremacy’s overarching power presumes what it needs to demonstrate . The point of analogizing slavery is to subordinate complex mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced black politics not reducible to a unitary struggle antiracist politics is a component of neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness ; Sanders did not embrace naturalized categories but revealed them as social relationships established by human beings thus, open to change through policies gains black Americans have won have been the product of alliances Emancipation Reconstruction civil rights the repudiation of scientific racism . the limitations of these movements reflected constraints by capital generations of black activists understood oppression was linked to more general dynamics and the only way to secure benefits is to win them for everyone. the reductionist premise that racial subordination remains the dominant framework underlies ontological views of racism . findings of disparity do not tell us anything about proximate sources and do not point to remedial responses That ontological view underlies preference for invoking historical analogies in lieu of argument . People think about black politics as a unitary freedom movement because that is how discussion has been framed The interest in carving out a field of study converges with class interest in maintaining interpretive authority of race relations racereductionist politics is the left wing of neoliberalism and nothing more

Antiracist activism and scholarship proceed from the view that statistical disparities in the distribution by race of goods and bads in which blacks appear worse off categorically (e.g., less wealth, higher rates of unemployment, greater incidence of disease) amount to evidence that race remains fundamentally determinative of black Americans’ lives . however , disparity is an outcome, not an explanation, and deducing cause from outcome seems sufficient only if one has already stacked the interpretive deck in favor of a particular causal account gross categories like race may mask significant micro-level dynamics that could present more complex and nuanced understandings of causality. if you go out looking for racial effects in data sets organized by race you will be likely to find them, but that will not necessarily lead to sound interpretations of the factors that produce the inequalities. This issue is not a concern for antiracist politics because its goal is propagation of the view that inequalities should be understood as resulting from generic white racism. Its objective is rhetorical not political and programmatic . Antiracist discourse posits racism as a totalizing phenomenon impervious to changing institutional circumstances adducing a causal dynamic that underlay a political conjuncture in the past to support a claim about causality in the present presumes that the same dynamics operated in the past and present. the race-reductionist formulation advanced to validate the claim of white supremacy’s overarching power presumes what it needs to demonstrate . that interpretive pathology is pernicious politically because the claim of continuity demands ignoring historical specificities of both past and present that are crucially important for making adequate sense of either. The point of analogizing current conditions to slavery is to subordinate consideration of the discrete, complex mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced in quotidian life to the meta-historical contention that generic white supremacy, or racism, most significantly explains disadvantages and injustices that black Americans suffer today. But even in the nineteenth century, at the nadir of the defeat of Reconstruction and imposition of Jim Crow black politics was not adequately reducible to a unitary struggle against white supremacy In the antiracist political project racism is an amorphous, ideological abstraction whose specific content exists largely in the eyes of the beholder. antiracism’s targets can be porous and entirely arbitrary; this like antiterrorism, the struggle can never be won. The politics that follows from this view centers on pursuit of recognition on groupist terms as symbolic depiction in the public realm and as claims to articulate the interests, perspectives, or voices of a generic black constituency It is not interested in broadly egalitarian redistribution this antiracist politics is like bourgeois feminism and other groupist tendencies, an oppositional epicycle within hegemonic neolib eralism, one might say a component of neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness ; During the campaign, antiracist activists and commentators routinely attacked Sanders for being inattentive to black concerns The Sanders campaign was so disorienting because it did not embrace these naturalized categories [racism and sexism] but , instead, revealed them as social relationships established by real human beings and, thus, open to change through the application of political and economic policies . it laid out a working class politics of hope that was both visionary and practical. it helped lay bare the actual mechanisms of capitalism that drive inequality. And it exposed decades of neoliberalism that are impeding real change in the labor, racial justice and other social movements antiracist politics is a professional-managerial class politics. Its adherents are not concerned with trying to generate the large, broad political base needed to pursue a transformative agenda because they are committed fundamentally to pursuit of racial parity within neoliberalism antiracist activists’ and pundits’ insistence during the 2016 election campaign that Bernie Sanders did not address black concerns made that point very clearly because every nearly item on the Sanders campaign’s policy agenda would disproportionately benefit black and Hispanic populations that are disproportionately working class the gains that black Americans have won have been the product of alliances condensed around broad egalitarian agendas Emancipation and even Reconstruction were produced by a convergence of interests among disparate constituencies The civil rights movement was the product of a consensus created by the New Deal that presumed the appropriateness of government intervention in private affairs for the public good, the broad repudiation of scientific racism following World War II, . To be sure , Reconstruction, the New Deal, the War on Poverty, and even the civil rights movement failed to redress all of the challenges confronting blacks. But the limitations of each of these movements reflected political constraints imposed on them, in large part, by capital generations of labor-oriented black activists understood the exploitation and oppression of black Americans was linked to more general dynamics of exploitation and oppression and the only way to secure benefits for black Americans is to win them for everyone. Antiracist politics is a class politics; it is rooted in the social position and worldview, and material interests of the stratum of race relations engineers who operate in Democratic party politics and as government functionaries , the punditry and commentariat , education administration and the professoriate , corporate , social service and nonprofit sectors , and the multibillion-dollar diversity industry . as black and white elites increasingly go through the same schools, live in the same neighborhoods, operate as peers in integrated workplaces, share and interact in the same social spaces and consumption practices and preferences, they increasingly share another common sense not only about frameworks of public policy but also about the proper order of things in general the reductionist premise that racial subordination remains the dominant ideological or material framework generating and sustaining systemically reproduced inequalities and class power This tension underlies a source the appeal of ontological views of racism as an animate force that transcends time and context . findings of disparity : (1) are not surprising considering how entrenched inequalities work; (2) do not tell us much, if anything , about the proximate sources of the disparities; and (3) do not point to remedial responses Disparitarian discourse’s commitment to a fundamentally essentialist and ahistorical race-first view is betrayed in the constantly expanding panoply of neologisms institutional racism systemic racism structural racism colourblind racism post-racial racism etc intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic antiracism political ontology That ontological view of racism underlies the preference for invoking historical analogies in lieu of argument . The point of analogies is not to explain mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced. It is to preserve the interpretive framework that identifies racism as the source of those inequalities Antiracism’s class character helps to understand why its adherents are so intensely committed to it People think about black politics as a unitary , transhistorical freedom movement because that is how scholarly and popular discussion of black Americans’ political activity has been framed during the 1950s and 1960s, and especially after the institutionalization of black studies as a field of study . The guild interest in carving out and protecting the boundaries of a field of study and interpretive authority converges with the broader class interest in maintaining managerial and interpretive authority in the political economy of race relations Black professional-managerial class embeddedness has become increasingly solidified with the Clinton/Obama/Emanuel wing of the Democratic party’s aggressive commitment to a leftneoliberalism centered on advancement of Wall Street economic interests But that notion of social justice and equality that is disconnected from political economy that generate the most profound inequalities in the society. that alliance against class politics has become even more aggressive via a new sort of race-baiting attacking advocates of social-democratic politics, as racist reducing working class to a white racial category and synonym for backwardness and bigotry. The practical upshot of that moral stance is that there can be no political alternative outside neoliberalism. That is why it is important to center the interests and concerns of working people who are the vast majority of the country, that we recognize that racereductionist politics is the left wing of neoliberalism and nothing more .

Antiracist activism scholarship statistical disparities rhetorical not political and programmatic institutional circumstances presumes what it needs to demonstrate contemporary inequalities not adequately reducible unitary struggle It is not interested in broadly egalitarian redistribution bourgeois feminism neolib component of neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness naturalized categories social relationships real human beings open to change political economic policies product of alliances broad egalitarian agendas Emancipation Reconstruction convergence of interests disparate constituencies civil rights movement the broad repudiation of scientific racism But the limitations of each of these movements reflected political constraints imposed on them, in large part, by capital more general dynamics race relations engineers government functionaries punditry commentariat education administration professoriate corporate social service nonprofit sectors multibillion-dollar diversity industry reductionist premise ontological views of racism anything proximate sources remedial responses institutional racism systemic racism structural racism colourblind racism post-racial racism etc ontological view historical analogies in lieu of argument unitary transhistorical maintaining managerial and interpretive authority race relations racereductionist politics is the left wing of neoliberalism

['', 'This is a feature of contemporary antiracist discourse generally. Antiracist activism and scholarship proceed from the view that statistical disparities in the distribution by race of goods and bads in the society in which blacks appear worse off categorically (e.g., less wealth, higher rates of unemployment, greater incidence of hypertensive and cardiovascular disease) amount to evidence that race remains fundamentally determinative of black Americans’ lives. As Merlin Chowkwanyun and I argsue, however, disparity is an outcome, not an explanation, and deducing cause simplistically from outcome (e.g., treating racially disparate outcomes as ipso facto evidence of racially invidious causation) seems sufficient only if one has already stacked the interpretive deck in favor of a particular causal account (Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012, 167–168). We also discuss a garbage in, garbage out effect in studies that rely on large-scale aggregate data analysis; gross categories like race may mask significant micro-level dynamics that could present more complex and nuanced understandings of causality. Put another way, if you go out looking for racial effects in data sets that are organized by race as gross categories, you will be likely to find them, but that will not necessarily lead to sound interpretations of the factors that actually produce the inequalities. As likely as not that purblind approach can lead to missing the extent to which particular inequalities that appear statistically as ‘racial’ disparities are in fact embedded in multiple social relations (Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012, 150–151, 158–159). This issue is not a concern for antiracist politics because its fundamental goal is propagation of the view that inequalities or injustices suffered by black Americans should be understood as resulting from generic white racism. Its objective, that is, is rhetorical and ideological, not political and programmatic.', 'Antiracist discourse posits White Supremacy/racism as a totalizing phenomenon, a force impervious to changing institutional circumstances—a primordial foundation of being, just as the White League contended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The thrust of the Take ‘Em Down NOLA argument, for example, is that: (1) the monuments were erected to celebrate white supremacist power, which was the foundation of slavery, lynching and brutalization of black New Orleanians, disfranchisement, imposition of Jim Crow, and denial of blacks’ basic civil rights. (2) The fact that they remain on display in the present underscores the continuity of White Supremacy’s power. (3) That continuity indicates that, as in the past, contemporary racial inequalities most meaningfully result from white supremacy, which therefore must be the primary target of struggles for social and racial justice.', 'But adducing a causal dynamic that underlay a political conjuncture in the past to support a claim about causality in the present presumes that the same dynamics operated in the past and present. That is, the race-reductionist formulation advanced to validate the claim of white supremacy’s overarching power presumes what it needs to demonstrate. Sociologist Mara Loveman follows Rogers Brubaker, Pierre Bourdieu, and others in arguing that this interpretive problem and the confusions that generate it can be addressed by abandoning ‘race’ as a category of analysis to gain analytical leverage to study ‘race’ as a category of practice (Loveman 1999, 895–896; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Bourdieu 1991). She embraces historian Barbara J. Fields’s assessment that Battempts to explain ‘racial phenomena’ in terms of ‘race’ are no more than definitional statements and argues that Rejection of ‘race’ as an analytical concept facilitates analysis of the historical construction of ‘race’ as a practical category without reification, and thus provides a degree of analytical leverage that tends to be foreclosed when race is used analytically (Loveman 1999, 895–896; Fields 1990, 100).', 'In the current political context that interpretive pathology is pernicious politically because the claim of continuity demands ignoring historical specificities of both past and present that are crucially important for making adequate sense of either. The point of analogizing current conditions to slavery or earlier regimes of openly white supremacist hierarchy is to subordinate consideration of the discrete, complex mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced in quotidian life to the meta-historical contention that generic white supremacy, or racism, most significantly explains disadvantages and injustices that black Americans suffer today. But even in the nineteenth century, at the nadir of the defeat of Reconstruction and imposition of disfranchisement and the Jim Crow order, black politics was not adequately reducible to a unitary struggle against white supremacy; differences of perspective, agendas, and programs pertained among blacks and determined strategic directions, including pursuit of allies (Stein 1974).', 'In addressing another racially charged issue—how we should regard Rachel Dolezal’s embrace of a transracial identity in relation to Caitlyn Jenner’s embrace of a transgender one— historian Susan Stryker neatly describes the appeal and limitations of argument by analogy: Analogy is a weak form of analysis, in which a better-known case is compared to one that is lesser known, and thereby offered as a model for understanding something that is not yet well understood…Analogy’s rhetorical strength is to be found precisely in its ability to condense complicated forms of similarity into singularly powerful linguistic gestures and acts of speech, while its analytical weakness lies precisely in the nonidentity of the things being compared (Stryker 2015). Even if we were to accept racism as a label summarizing the various factors involved, noting those apparent similarities does not tell us how inequalities are reproduced today and has nothing to say practically about how to combat them. And it is important to interrogate why it is paramount within the antiracist framework that we understand the present through analogy to the past.', 'In the antiracist political project white supremacy/racism is—like terrorism—an amorphous, ideological abstraction whose specific content exists largely in the eyes of the beholder. Therefore, like antiterrorism, antiracism’s targets can be porous and entirely arbitrary; this means that, also like antiterrorism, the struggle can never be won. Clint Smith’s romantic assessment of Take ‘Em Down NOLA’s contribution indicates as much and makes clear, as does everything that Ta-Nehisi Coates has ever written (e.g., Coates 2014, 2016a, b, 2017), that winning anything concrete is not the point. The politics that follows from this view centers on pursuit of recognition and representation on groupist terms—both as symbolic depiction in the public realm and as claims to articulate the interests, perspectives, or voices of a generic black constituency or some subset thereof, e.g., youth or grassroots. It is not interested in broadly egalitarian redistribution.', 'Notwithstanding its performative evocations of the 1960s Black Power populist militancy, this antiracist politics is neither leftist in itself nor particularly compatible with a left politics as conventionally understood. At this political juncture, it is, like bourgeois feminism and other groupist tendencies, an oppositional epicycle within hegemonic neoliberalism, one might say a component of neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness; it is thus in fact fundamentally anti-leftist. Black political elites’ attacks on the Bernie Sanders 2016 presidential nomination campaign’s call for decommodified public higher education as frivolous, irresponsible, or even un-American underscores how deeply embedded this politics is within neoliberalism (Richardson 2016; Sheinin 2016; Johnson 2016).', 'During the campaign, antiracist activists and commentators routinely attacked Sanders for being inattentive to black concerns, which they insisted are separate from political economy and capitalist class dynamics and reduced to pro forma rehearsal of slogans like Bblack lives matter^ and denunciation of an abstract Bsystemic racism.^ After the 2016 election, antiracist hostility toward efforts to generate broadly working class-based, social-democratic alternatives to Democratic neoliberalism, if anything, intensified. Coates (2017), for example, denounces as white supremacist any suggestions that working-class whites’ votes for Trump stem from anything other than commitment to white supremacy. Social scientists and other public opinion experts have provided steady grist for antiracist and other identitiarian ideologues’ incessant rehearsal of the trope of a hopelessly backward, racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic white working class as the main danger to progress in the society. In this insistence, they join Clintonoid neoliberal Democrats of all races, genders, and sexual orientations who reject downwardly redistributive politics for more openly class-based reasons. Thus, as Mark Dudzic points out in a superb essay originally written before the election:', 'Joan Walsh, among many others, opined that Sanders’ substantial support among white workers (who overwhelmingly supported Clinton in 2008) is because Bshe has been damaged by her association with the first black president.^ And Paul Krugman, that eternal guardian of the left gate of the ruling class, pontificated that the Sanders campaign failed to understand the importance of Bhorizontal inequality^ between groups (Dudzic 2017).', 'Dudzic’s assessment of liberals’ reaction to the social-democratic enthusiasm Sanders sparked applies equally to antiracist activists and commentators:', 'The Sanders campaign was so disorienting to both conservatives and liberals because it did not embrace these naturalized categories [racism and sexism] but, instead, revealed them as social relationships established by real human beings and, thus, open to change through the application of political and economic policies. After stumbling a bit in the early months around how to give voice to the outrages of police violence and mass incarceration, it laid out a working class politics of hope that was both visionary and practical. In the process, it helped lay bare the actual mechanisms of capitalism that drive inequality. And it exposed the fault lines created by decades of neoliberalism that are impeding real change in the labor, racial justice and other social movements (Dudzic 2017).', 'Although its attraction to Black Power Bmilitancy^ suggests insurgent racial populism, the current race-reductionist politics centers on exposé and demands for recognition, not egalitarian redistribution. Its project is elimination of disparities within a regime of intensifying economic inequality, which antiracism takes as given. As Warren et al. put it:', 'antiracists…remain attuned to a vision of justice defined by ensuring equal access to hierarchically distributed social goods such as family wealth (and redressing historical impediments to the accumulation of wealth rooted in discrimination). Indeed in making frequent recourse to the adjective Bnarrow^ in chastising a politics that roots inequality in economic exploitation, antiracists and identitarians have positioned the idea of racial justice as a critique of, rather than an expected consequence of, socialism. It is largely for this reason that, as Walter Benn Michaels has noted…‘the commitment to identity politics has been more an expression of…enthusiasm for the free market than a form of resistance to it (Warren et al. 2016.).', 'Even when its proponents believe themselves to be radicals, this antiracist politics is a professional-managerial class politics. Its adherents are not concerned with trying to generate the large, broad political base needed to pursue a transformative agenda because they are committed fundamentally to pursuit of racial parity within neoliberalism, not social transformation. In fact, antiracist activists’ and pundits’ insistence during the 2016 election campaign that Bernie Sanders did not address black concerns made that point very clearly because every nearly item on the Sanders campaign’s policy agenda—from the Robin Hood tax on billionaires to free public higher education to the $15/h minimum wage, a single-payer health care system, etc. (Sanders for President)—would disproportionately benefit black and Hispanic populations that are disproportionately working class. Most of all, the gains that black Americans have won have been the product of alliances condensed around broad egalitarian agendas. Historian Touré F. Reed notes:', 'Emancipation and even Reconstruction were produced by a convergence of interests among disparate constituencies—African Americans, abolitionists, business, small freeholders, and northern laborers— united under the banner of free labor. The civil rights movement was the product of a consensus created by the New Deal that presumed the appropriateness of government intervention in private affairs for the public good, the broad repudiation of scientific racism following World War II, and the political vulnerabilities Jim Crow created for the United States during the Cold War. To be sure, Reconstruction, the New Deal, the War on Poverty, and even the civil rights movement failed to redress all of the challenges confronting blacks. But the limitations of each of these movements reflected political constraints imposed on them, in large part, by capital (Reed 2018).', 'As A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King, Jr., and two generations of labor-oriented black activists—including the entire spectrum of radical to conservative black civic elites and trade union leaders collected in historian Rayford Logan’s 1944 volume, What the Negro Wants—understood, first, the exploitation and oppression of black Americans was linked to more general dynamics of exploitation and oppression and, second, the only way to attain and especially to secure benefits for black Americans is to win them for everyone. That lesson has been lost for many antiracist activists and commentators enamored with contemporary race reductionism; instead, they channel the performative militance associated with Black Power politics as the insurgent, racially authentic tendency in the late 1960s and 1970s.', 'Yet Black Power politics consolidated as a less potentially transformative, class-skewed alternative to the black-labor-left, social-democratic approach advocated by Rustin, Randolph, and others (A. Philip Randolph Institute 1966; Randolph 2014a, b; Rustin 1965, 1966; Reed 2015, 2016a, 2017a; Le Blanc and Yates 2013; Logan 1944). Black Power politics was fundamentally a petition politics, albeit a loud and flamboyant one. For all their overheated rhetoric about self-determination, including even in some cases what now might be called cosplay fantasies of armed struggle, Black Powerites generally depended on ruling class largess for realization of their programmatic objectives. That was their alternative to trying to form broad, popular coalitions and to navigate the compromises and constraints that sort of politics requires. As a practical politics, Black Power was fundamentally directed toward government institutions, private or philanthropic funding sources, and other agencies capable of conferring or ratifying claims to represent a generic black community (some referred to the style at the time as militant begging; I suppose today it could be considered an institutional species of aggressive panhandling.) Contemporaneous critics like Harold Cruse (1968, 193–260) and Robert L. Allen (1969) pointed out the Black Power program’s class character, and Rustin presciently suggested that its most likely outcome would be creation of a new black establishment^ (1966, 36) (emphasis in original).', 'Black Power, at least in the ethnic pluralist form in which it congealed as black politics, was at bottom a Bookerite politics of elite-brokerage, as is the essence of ethnic pluralism. The core Bookerite project, under the rubric of racial uplift or advancement, has always been— since Washington and the stratum of black racial advocates that emerged from the context of disfranchisement at the turn of the twentieth century—substitution of black professionals, managers, and intellectuals for their white counterparts within those institutions charged with administering to the needs of black populations. The political goal, that is, was establishment of managerial authority of the nation’s Negro problem within whatever larger political and economic order prevailed (Warren 2003, 27). Warren’s critique, which he elaborated further in What Was African American Literature (2012), sheds light on contemporary antiracists’ singular commitment to the reductionist view that race/racism is the foundation and source of all injustice and inequality affecting black Americans. It also thus helps to make sense of the affective power that explaining current inequalities through analogy to slavery or Jim Crow has in antiracist discourse.', 'Antiracist politics is a class politics; it is rooted in the social position and worldview, and material interests of the stratum of race relations engineers and administrators who operate in Democratic party politics and as government functionaries, the punditry and commentariat, education administration and the professoriate, corporate, social service and nonprofit sectors, and the multibillion-dollar diversity industry. That stratum comes together around a commonsense commitment to the centrality of race—and other categories of ascriptive identity—as the appropriate discursive framework through which to articulate norms of justice and injustice and through which to formulate remedial responses. It has grown and become deeply embedded institutionally throughout the society as an entailment of the victories of the 1960s. As the society moves farther away from the regime of subordination and exclusion on explicitly racial terms to which race-reductionist explanations were an immediately plausible response, race has become less potent as the dominant metaphor, or blanket shorthand, through which class hierarchy is lived. And as black and white elites increasingly go through the same schools, live in the same neighborhoods, operate as peers in integrated workplaces, share and interact in the same social spaces and consumption practices and preferences, they increasingly share another common sense not only about frameworks of public policy but also about the proper order of things in general.', 'Those quotidian realities put pressure on the reductionist premise that racial subordination remains the dominant ideological or material framework generating and sustaining systemically reproduced inequalities and class power. This tension underlies a source the appeal of ontological views of racism as an animate force that transcends time and context. Because it is an evanescent Evil that is disconnected from specific human purposes and patterns of social relations, racism, again like terrorism, can exist anywhere at any time under any manifest conditions and is a cause that needs no causes or explanation. That is why statistical demonstration of apparent racial disparities seems within antiracist discourse to be selfsufficient evidence of the persistence of racism’s paramount impact on black Americans, despite the fact that findings of disparity: (1) are not surprising considering how entrenched inequalities work; (2) do not tell us much, if anything, about the proximate sources of the disparities; and (3) do not point to remedial responses, although those retailing the findings often present them as though they do. As Chowkwanyun and I indicate, moreover, relentless commitment to finding disparities and insistence that manifest inequalities be understood in those terms despite those interpretive failings suggests the presence of other ideological factors:', '[Disparitarian discourse’s] commitment to a fundamentally essentialist and ahistorical race-first view is betrayed in the constantly expanding panoply of neologisms –institutional racism, systemic racism, structural racism, colourblind racism, post-racial racism, etc. – intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologistic racism/antiracism political ontology. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind [Thomas] Kuhn’s account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to salvage an interpretive paradigm in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority. And in this circumstance as well the salvage effort is driven by powerful material and ideological imperatives (Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012, 167).', 'That ontological view of racism is what enabled Bell’s insistence that nothing has changed for black Americans since 1865 without having to confront apparently disconfirming evidence of his own biography and the context of his declaration. It also underlies the preference for invoking historical analogies in lieu of argument. The point of those analogies is not to explain the mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced. It is to preserve the interpretive framework that identifies racism as the definitive source of those inequalities.', 'Antiracism’s class character helps to understand why its adherents are so intensely committed to it even though it is so deeply flawed analytically and has generated so little popular traction politically. One layer of its appeal derives simply from habit buttressed with a simulacrum of familiarity engendered by the naïve conceptions of black political history that prompted Willie Legette’s deathless observation that The only thing that hasn’t changed about black politics since 1965 is how we think about it (Warren et al. 2016). People think about black politics as a unitary, transhistorical freedom movement or liberation struggle because that is how scholarly and popular discussion of black Americans’ political activity has been framed almost universally since the academic study of black politics and political thought took shape during the 1950s and 1960s, and especially after the institutionalization of black studies as a field of study in the academic mainstream through the 1970s to 1990s. The guild interest in carving out and protecting the boundaries of a field of study and interpretive authority over its subject matter converges with the broader class interest in maintaining managerial and interpretive authority in the political economy of race relations (Reed 2004).', 'Crucial to making sense of the current political moment and how to navigate the real perils that face us after November 2016 is recognition that, no matter how it may have been aligned in the past, antiracist politics now is fundamentally antagonistic to a left politics of broadly egalitarian social transformation. Key elements of the black professional-managerial strata have been embedded in and are agents and minions of what we now call neoliberalism—as public functionaries, contractors, and aspirants—since its emergence in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, underclass ideology rationalized claims to a special tutelary role for the black professional-managerial class in relation to a rank-and-file black population that that politics rendered invisible as postal workers, teachers, truck drivers, carpenters, clerks, warehouse workers, electricians or line workers, nurses, cable technicians, etc. or members of a constantly expanding industrial reserve army and represented as an undifferentiated mass to be ventriloquized and Buplifted.^ Underclass ideology came with a remedy of inculcating Bpersonal responsibility,^ which conveniently permits public officials to deflect concerns with retreat from social service provision and other social wage policies in an era increasingly defined by regressive transfer. Neoliberal privatization also has produced greatly expanded commercial and career opportunities for black (and Latino, female, etc.) entrepreneurs under the rubric of community Bempowerment,^ Brole modeling,^ or Bsocial entrepreneurialism^ in a vast third sector economy driven by a nonprofit sector likely as not committed to privatizing public goods in the name of localist authenticity and doing well by doing good, as well as the steadily growing diversity industry. These developments legitimize an ideal of social justice shriveled to little more than enhancement of opportunity for individual upward mobility— within the strictures of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession.', 'Black professional-managerial class embeddedness has become increasingly solidified with the Clinton/Obama/Emanuel wing of the Democratic party’s aggressive commitment to a leftneoliberalism centered on advancement of Wall Street and Silicon Valley economic interests and strong support for social justice defined in identity group terms. But that is necessarily a notion of social justice and equality that is disconnected from political economy and the capitalist class dynamics that generate the most profound inequalities in the society. And militant opposition to conventional left norms of justice that center on economic equality unites the Clintonite neoliberal Democrats and race-reductionist antiracists. In this regard, the most telling moments of the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination campaign included when the random, self-selected Black Lives Matter activists attacked Sanders for supposedly not declaring his opposition to racism in a way that suited their tastes and when former civil rights movement icon Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) and other prominent black functionaries denounced Sanders’s calls for greatly expanding social wage policy and shifting national priorities toward addressing the needs of working people as irresponsible. Perhaps most telling of all, though, was when and most of all how Hillary Clinton blithely and disingenuously blew off Sanders’s concerns with economic injustice. On the eve of the Nevada primary, she declared to a rally of her supporters BNot everything is about an economic theory, right? If we broke up the big banks tomorrow – and I will, if they deserve it, if they pose a systemic risk, I will – would that end racism? Would that end sexism? Would that end discrimination against the LGBT community? Would that make people feel more welcoming to immigrants overnight? Would that solve our problem with voting rights, and Republicans who are trying to strip them away from people of color, the elderly, the young?^ (Weigel 2016).', 'Since the election, that alliance against class politics has become even more aggressive in red-baiting Sanders and the left via a new sort of race-baiting—attacking socialism, and advocates of socialism or social-democratic politics, as racist or white supremacist. It has closed ranks around condemnation of working-class whites who voted for Trump as loathsome and irredeemable racists with whom political solidarity is indefensible and in the process reducing working class to a white racial category and synonym for backwardness and bigotry. Antiracists and neoliberal Democrats unite in high moral dudgeon to denounce suggestions that more than racism operated to generate the Trump vote and that some working people, particularly those whom Les Leopold describes as Obama/Sanders/Trump voters—and not necessarily only white ones—felt betrayed by both parties (Leopold 2017; Lopez 2016; Parenti 2016; Edwards-Levy 2017; Shepard 2017; Skelley 2017; Cohn 2017). The practical upshot of that moral stance is that there can be no political alternative outside neoliberalism. That is why it is important, as we look toward the daunting prospect of building a movement capable of changing the terms of debate in American politics to center the interests and concerns of working people—of all races, genders, sexual orientations, and whatever immigration status—who are the vast majority of the country, that we recognize that racereductionist politics is the left wing of neoliberalism and nothing more. It is openly antagonistic to the idea of a solidaristic left. It is more important than ever to acknowledge that reality and act accordingly.', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-4-Wake-Round4.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-4-Wake-Round4.docx

5c3843aaef154bcb83d3845d5294a68f06e78e1ee4922944c14615538dbbdad5

3—Legal Gaps—unlike traditional protectionism, antitrust is a unique threat because it lacks a multilateral governance framework—no alt-causes.

Murray 19—(Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Juris Doctor, May 2019). Allison Murray. 2019. "Given Today's New Wave of Protectionism, Is Antitrust Law the Last Hope for Preserving a Free Global Economy or Another Nail in Free Trade's Coffin?". Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 42, no. 1. HeinOnline. Accessed 9/4/21.

Protectionist rhetoric has consumed the internationa stage past leaders eliminated protectionist mechanisms by trade agreements Notwithstanding recent tariff threats it is unlikely leaders will terminate agreements leaders will be forced to rely on antitrust law , the more subtle mechanism of restricting trade to form tariff-like measures perception of enforcement of antitrust as protectionist may cause death of free trade competition law might through selective , discriminatory enforcement be a trade barrier .” countries have abandoned hope for international antitrust U.S. lack of support has proven persuasive regional treaties are a best bet for solidifying binding coop on antitrust given an international authoritative body does not exist Absent change in perceptions antitrust is likely to be manipulated to be a nail in free trade’s coffin , instead of key to its preservation cartels

Trump . Le Pen . Brexit . Protectionist rhetoric has consumed the internationa l political stage . Western countries and their leaders were once the drivers of economic globalization and removing trade barriers to appeal to their constituents. Western national leaders are championing the very protectionism that they once criticized . past world leaders have eliminated most of the protectionist trade mechanisms that once ran rampant in the international economy. by implementing multilateral and bilateral trade agreements . By and large tariff policies and other forms of protectionism were either eliminated or dramatically reduced. Now when a government imposes a tariff, it becomes a rather extreme political statement which sends global consequences Protectionism did not end when the age of overbearing tariff policies did , despite then-leaders’ best efforts to vilify it. the end of the tariff era forced nations to achieve protectionist goals through more subtle trade vehicles, like antitrust law . It is a fear of many that antitrust law may become overused and inequitably applied to achieve and combat protectionist aims . Notwithstanding the recent uptick in tariff threats it is unlikely that all Western leaders will revamp or terminate the trade agreements set forth by their predecessors and bring back the kinds of tariff policies that once existed in their place. Although in the United States Trump recently imposed tariffs on steel imports, it appears that his intent is to limit this behavior to a specific industry rather than institute a widespread policy favoring the use of tariffs generally . Western leaders in the E.U. appear to be growing more comfortable than their predecessors with considering similar policies. Given the anticipated continuation of cooperative trade agreements and the proliferation of protectionist rhetoric leaders will be forced to rely on existing avenues to meet protectionist aims. Again, we find ourselves rely squarely on antitrust law , the more subtle and widely accepted mechanism of restricting trade to address perceived inequities. Antitrust and competition laws can form a subtle trade barrier resulting in the imposition of tariff-like measures . the perception of enforcement of antitrust laws as an abusive and solely protectionist mechanism may cause the death of even the smallest semblance of international free trade that remains in the international marketplace today. near-term enforcement of antitrust and competition laws may be either the last hope for preserving aims toward a free global economy or the final nail in free trade’s coffin . the subject most at the center of the recent rise of protectionist rhetoric: the perception of unfair enforcement of antitrust laws among the U nited S tates, the E uropean U nion, and China. antitrust laws serve to promote and preserve fair competition in an otherwise free market. The formation and enforcement of national antitrust laws has become a quite prominent trend internationally . Nearly all countries have adopted some form of domestic competition law Protectionist trade measures characteristically include tariffs , subsidies , quotas , and currency valuation activities that the Great Depression of the 1930s was deepened by the highly protectionist policies. Counterintuitive as it was, the very policies implemented to battle the poor national economy and to retain domestic jobs appeared to worsen the problem. Critics of antitrust law contend that protectionism was the main reason behind the creation of antitrust laws. These critics appear to greatly oversimplify the issues . It is true that antitrust laws do superficially disrupt the market A further criticism of competition law’s protectionist roots is that “ competition law might through selective , discriminatory enforcement — be abused as a trade barrier .” it may become more likely given the recent political climate. The fact that a law can be abused does not eliminate the need for that law altogether . Antitrust law is but a tool that can be wielded to support either free trade or protectionist aims . D. Anti-Dumping: The Premier Protectionist Tool of Antitrust Anti-dumping policies allow governments to “impose duties whenever goods are sold in export markets at less than their fair value to “prevent firms from price discriminating between markets,” especially national ones. unlike standard trade tariff systems, anti-dumping measures are still an acceptable application of a country’s power because they are not precluded by trade agreements . In light of the recent economic struggles of the Western world and resulting protectionist views , there seems to be no incentive for countries to subvert the trend toward increased anti-dumping enforcement . countries appear to have generally abandoned all hope for an international body of antitrust enforcement . The U.S. continues to withhold support for internationalization, and its lack of support has proven to be quite persuasive to members of international cooperative efforts. regional and bilateral treaties have been put in place to encourage cooperation on antitrust enforcement are not harmonized , vary widely , and contain different levels of required coop Yet, they are a country’s best bet for solidifying any kind of binding coop eration with another country on antitrust laws. Our current political climate reveals a return to protectionist rhetoric and policies. Antitrust will be a pivotal force on the world stage there is a widespread perception that domestic countries unfairly apply antitrust laws to foreign firms through " unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market conditions " for their domestic industries and firms.` systematic bias against foreign companies would thwart the goal of antitrust and undermine countries' cooperative efforts ." the E.U. , U.S. and China have been accused of claims of unfair antitrust enforcement the cry for protectionist policies is louder than it has been for decades There has been a staunch rise of populist and protectionist rhetoric from many nations. Rightly or wrongly this protectionist rhetoric has changed the political backdrop against which antitrust laws are and will be bred and enforced in the near term. VI. CONCLUSION Some amount of protectionism is inevitable . protectionism preserves the sovereign powers enjoyed by certain countries. While attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims given that an international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust does not exist . Antitrust law, like medicine , must be used appropriately to be effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade as promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at risk of being used to thwart free trade . That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders. antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade . Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric fueling the current political landscape antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to be come a nail in free trade’s coffin , instead of the key to its preservation . Only time will tell, but anti-trust law will impact the international economic community significantly for years to come cartels

Trump Le Pen Brexit Protectionist rhetoric drivers of economic globalization removing trade barriers championing the very protectionism that they once criticized most of the protectionist trade mechanisms multilateral and bilateral trade agreements By and large tariff policies other forms Now rather extreme political statement did not end overbearing tariff policies did antitrust law fear of many become overused inequitably applied protectionist aims recent uptick in tariff threats terminate the trade agreements policies that once existed specific industry widespread policy favoring the use of tariffs generally Western leaders in the E.U. anticipated continuation of cooperative trade agreements proliferation of protectionist rhetoric existing avenues squarely on antitrust law more subtle widely accepted tariff-like measures perception protectionist death of even the smallest semblance of international free trade near-term enforcement of antitrust and competition laws last hope for preserving aims toward a free global economy final nail in free trade’s coffin most at the center perception U S E U quite prominent trend internationally domestic competition law characteristically tariffs subsidies quotas currency valuation the Great Depression very policies greatly oversimplify the issues criticism protectionist roots selective discriminatory enforcement trade barrier does not eliminate the need for that law altogether support either free trade or protectionist aims D. Anti-Dumping: The Premier Protectionist Tool of Antitrust anti-dumping measures not precluded by trade agreements protectionist views no incentive increased anti-dumping enforcement abandoned all hope international body of antitrust enforcement U.S. withhold support lack of support regional and bilateral treaties not harmonized vary widely different levels coop best bet binding coop return to protectionist rhetoric pivotal force domestic countries unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market conditions systematic bias cooperative efforts E.U. U.S. China unfair antitrust enforcement louder than it has been for decades staunch rise populist and protectionist rhetoric changed the political backdrop VI. CONCLUSION Some amount of protectionism inevitable preserves the sovereign powers act on this protectionism trade agreements use domestic antitrust law international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust like medicine used appropriately should encourage free trade being used to thwart free trade exacerbated perceptions of unfair enforcement weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade change in perceptions protectionist rhetoric manipulated nail in free trade’s coffin key to its preservation impact the international economic community significantly for years to come cartels

['', 'INTRODUCTION', 'Trump. Le Pen. Brexit. Protectionist rhetoric has consumed the international political stage. Western countries and their leaders were once the drivers of economic globalization, relying on free-market speeches and the prospect of removing trade barriers to appeal to their constituents.1 They pointed fingers at other countries engaging in or encouraging protectionist behavior and challenged them in the court of public opinion and elsewhere to stop their antics. The “our country first, world trade after” mentality was widely politicized and vilified. Now, it seems that Western national leaders are championing the very protectionism that they once criticized.2', 'Although a system of truly free world trade has never been perfected, past world leaders have eliminated most of the protectionist trade mechanisms that once ran rampant in the international economy. They did so by implementing multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. These webs of agreements have bolstered decades of support for free trade, or at least some version of it. By and large, tariff policies and other forms of protectionism were either eliminated or dramatically reduced. Now, as we have seen in the media, when a government imposes a tariff, it becomes a rather extreme political statement which sends a shockwave of significant global consequences.', 'Protectionism did not end when the age of overbearing tariff policies did, despite then-leaders’ best efforts to vilify it. Rather, the end of the tariff era forced nations to achieve protectionist goals through more subtle trade vehicles, like antitrust law.3 So, the recent resurgence of protectionist rhetoric should mean that these subtle trade vehicles, including antitrust law, will be relied on more heavily. It is a fear of many that antitrust law may become overused and inequitably applied to achieve and combat protectionist aims.', 'Notwithstanding the recent uptick in tariff threats, it is unlikely that all Western leaders will revamp or terminate the trade agreements set forth by their predecessors and bring back the kinds of tariff policies that once existed in their place. Although in the United States (“U.S.”), President Trump recently imposed tariffs on steel imports, it appears that his intent is to limit this behavior to a specific industry rather than institute a widespread policy favoring the use of tariffs generally.4 To remedy bad behavior in a specialized set of industries is not to instigate a global paradigm shift. This purpose is underscored by his use of the national security exemption, which is largely interpreted as being used for individual situations rather than general policy schemes.5 Many still hope that his course of action will be retracted and is merely a strong negotiation tactic. However, there is no doubt that Trump is far more comfortable than past leaders with subverting the status quo on trade relations.', 'Trump is not the only high-profile leader flirting with staunch protectionism. Western leaders in the E.U. appear to be growing more comfortable than their predecessors with considering similar policies. However, Western lawmakers themselves do not seem as persuaded by the statements of their leadership. The general sentiment among international policymakers is that there has been too much political wherewithal spent on loosening international trade barriers to take actions that could counteract that progress.6 Presidential actions taken because of dissatisfaction with current global trade relations aside, a complete overhaul of trade agreements may be too daunting and difficult a task, especially absent ample political support in legislative bodies.', 'Given the anticipated continuation of cooperative trade agreements and the proliferation of protectionist rhetoric as the new norm of public opinion, leaders will be forced to rely on existing avenues to meet protectionist aims. Again, we find ourselves relying squarely on antitrust law, the more subtle and widely accepted mechanism of restricting trade, to address perceived inequities. In the words of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), “once formal trade barriers come down, other issues become more important.”7 Among the important issues lies antitrust law. Antitrust and competition laws can form a subtle trade barrier resulting in the imposition of tariff-like measures.', 'Antitrust law can be enforced to reach protectionist aims and to combat them. It is a tool that allows nations to achieve individual protectionist aims without undermining the future of trade between countries and the cooperative framework underpinning the relatively delicate global free trade enjoyed today. However, the perception of enforcement of antitrust laws as an abusive and solely protectionist mechanism may cause the death of even the smallest semblance of international free trade that remains in the international marketplace today.', 'This paper explores how the near-term enforcement of antitrust and competition laws may be either the last hope for preserving aims toward a free global economy or the final nail in free trade’s coffin. We will begin by examining the background of antitrust and competition laws, explaining the goals and economic theories at the heart of the laws, including the myriad of criticisms. Next, we will take a general view of the prevalence of competition laws in the world market, revealing the differences in underlying theory and enforcement by the top three players on the international trade stage. This paper will finish with the subject most at the center of the recent rise of protectionist rhetoric: the perception of unfair enforcement of antitrust laws among the United States, the European Union, and China.', 'I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW', 'It is no great revelation that trade has become increasingly global. However, it is nowhere near the true, theoretical conception of free trade contemplated by economic theorists. In that world of perfect free trade, businesses would “enter and exit markets instantly and without cost,” no single firm would be “large enough to influence prices by altering output,” and any business that “tried to charge more than its costs would be undercut by another [competitor].”8 The efficiency of this perfectly competitive environment would know no borders and require no government enforcement.', 'Of course, such a perfect world does not exist. Firms can become large enough to influence output and prices, businesses can collude amongst themselves to edge out a new market entrant, and the firms engaging in these business practices could suffer no or minimal repercussions from the market.9 “A market is not politically neutral; its existence creates economic power which one actor can use against another.”10', 'The economic inefficiencies that plague the real world have caused national lawmakers, especially those in less developed economies, to pursue nationalist policies to protect their national industries.11 These “economic nationalists . . . frequently regard trade negatively, believing it to be destructive of traditional values.”12 They recognize that under reasonably certain circumstances, namely where large economies and monopolists can exploit their market positions, free and unregulated trade may actually be more harmful than beneficial.13', 'To protect their national markets from such realities, lawmakers adopt antitrust laws. These laws serve to promote and preserve fair competition in an otherwise free market.14 They “ensure that the market is free to allocate resources in response to demand . . . free from restraints imposed by private parties.”15 Without such private “restraints,” resources are certain to be allocated more efficiently by maximizing aggregate national wealth,16 while still providing nations with some control and protection from firms engaging in foul play. This adoption of antitrust law was long regarded as a solution that enabled the best of both worlds; it was thought to be a win-win for nations wanting to compete on the international economic stage without giving up their sovereign ability to penalize those that attempt to take advantage of such an open economic market.17', 'The formation and enforcement of national antitrust laws has become a quite prominent trend internationally.18 Nearly all countries that are, purport to be, or aim to be major players in the global economy have adopted some form of domestic competition law. Since the 1890s, the amount of “gross domestic product (“GDP”) in countries with antitrust enforcement rose from less than 20 percent to over 95 percent.”19 Over 120 nations have adopted antitrust laws into their domestic legal systems, and nearly 20% of these nations have adopted these laws in the last fifteen years.20', 'II. CRITICISM OF ANTITRUST LAW', 'Although antitrust laws have been widely adopted, the laws are not without criticism.', 'A. Ambiguity in the Laws', 'Many critics of antitrust law claim that the laws themselves are “couched in vague, indefinable terms, permitting the Administration and the courts to avoid defining in advance what a ‘monopolistic’ crime is and what it is not.”21 These critics claim that antitrust laws rely on “deliberate vagueness and ex-post facto rulings” rather than “clear definitions . . . known in advance and discoverable by a jury after due legal process,” which clearly calls into question their efficacy.22 The vagueness and lack of clear definitions for the concepts at issue in antitrust law have caused significant discussion in academic circles:', 'Today, courts appear to be confused about whether market power and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts . . . Supreme Court opinions demonstrate a marked inconsistency as to whether market power and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts. We can find no Supreme Court opinion that contrasts the terms “market power” and “monopoly power” deliberately and explicitly, i.e., that finds the existence of one but not the other. . . . Other Supreme Court opinions also appear to treat market power and monopoly power as identical concepts.', 'Despite these references, however, the Supreme Court, in other cases, seems to have articulated standards for “monopoly power” and “market power” that, at least linguistically, are incompatible. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court defined “market power” as “the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently defined “monopoly power,” at least for section two cases, in accordance with the definition articulated in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.—i.e., as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” Strictly construed, the Court’s language appears to require a higher burden of proof to establish “market power” than to demonstrate “monopoly power,” because proof of a defendant’s ability to exclude competition would not suffice to demonstrate the existence of “market power.”23', 'The varied and unpredictable scope of what constitutes a “market” is perhaps the clearest example that critics use to highlight antitrust law as muddied and inconsistent. Market definitions are suggested by the parties to the proceedings and are presumably skewed toward whatever position the suggesting party takes in the dispute. The court either adopts one of these definitions or, if entirely unpersuaded, creates a new one that is more fitting to the situation at hand. Often, the court receives criticism for using too narrow or too broad of a definition.24 Most importantly, while the court requires some rationale behind the definitions proposed by the parties, there is no preset or standard for the scope of market definitions.', 'This largely affects the landscape of antitrust law because whatever market definition is adopted by the court can substantially affect the court’s findings. For example, the European Union (“E.U.”), in a recent investigation of Google, claimed that Google had dominated the market and abused fair competition laws.25 The E.U. authorities defined the relevant product market as the Android operating system.26 Naturally, because the operating system was considered “its own market” and Google obtained control over 100% of the operating system, the court found that Google maintained a monopoly.27 Had that relevant product market been characterized by the court more broadly, perhaps as cell phone operating systems or as online shopping forums, Google probably would not have been found to have the requisite market control required to be a monopolist.28 That ruling, as with many cases, hinged entirely on the scope of the market definition being applied, leaving behind the uncertainty that had the market definition been broader, the court perhaps would have ruled the opposite way.', 'B. Antitrust’s Competing Goals', 'Especially in the U.S., a criticism of antitrust is that the goal of preserving competition in economic markets, the most intuitive and obvious goal of enacting competition laws, has taken a backseat to a different goal set by the legislature: consumer protection.29 It is argued that the introduction of a consumer welfare standard has led to inconsistent enforcement, as it is a contradictory goal to preserving competition.30', 'At some level, consumer protection and preservation of competition through antitrust laws appear to have consistent effects. Economists and laypersons alike seem to understand the concept that “monopolies lead to high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many sellers drives prices down.”31 It is a matter of basic supply and demand. As low prices are beneficial to consumers, why wouldn’t consumers be inherently protected by laws preserving a larger supply and more competitors? As with many economic concepts that rely on unattainably perfect rational behaviors, there are real-world exceptions.', 'There are many sets of circumstances in which the application of antitrust laws to preserve competition in the market may actually hurt consumers.32 Among these circumstances are the following: (1) the maintenance of “low prices for ‘bads,’”33 a term for products that are deemed to have negative consequences on society, like tobacco; (2) “low prices for status goods”;34 and (3) “the pursuit for innovation in durables and fashion goods.”35 After all, a consumer could benefit from a large company lowering its prices, regardless of whether the company’s purpose in doing so is to undercut the competition and force its competing businesses out of the market.36 That company is clearly utilizing an anticompetitive and monopolistic tactic, but the lowered price would benefit the consumer. Advocates of antitrust laws assume that the next course of action for a monopolist would be to increase its prices to the detriment of its consumers once the company is the only provider of its product, but it is possible that a company would not elect that course of action. It is possible, although improbable, that the consumer in this scenario would never be harmed by the company’s anticompetitive conduct, therefore making consumers better off without the intervention of antitrust laws.', 'U.S. antitrust laws at least purport to concern themselves with longterm competition in the market rather than short-term consumer benefit. However, recent case law suggests that even calling “preservation of long-term competition” the goal of the law is debatable. The U.S. Supreme Court in Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ruled that “predatory price cutting is not unlawful unless the predator has a reasonable prospect of recouping his investment from supracompetitive profits.”37 This ruling insulated certain kinds of anticompetitive behavior so long as the behavior does not result in a reasonable possibility of harm to consumers. While the ruling attempted to address the above example, to many, the Court appeared to be struggling to maintain a balance between preserving competition and protecting consumers, which solidifies the criticism that consumer protection, a concept that can be at direct odds with perfect competition, is treated as one of the dual aims of the law itself. ', 'C. Antitrust: Isn’t It Just Protectionism on its Face?', 'Closer to the critical point of this paper, another popular criticism of antitrust law is that the laws themselves are inherently protectionist.38 Trade protectionism is a “theory, practice, or system of fostering or developing domestic industries by protecting them from foreign competition.”39 Protectionism is “a politically motivated defensive measure.”40 Economics experts agree that “in the short run, it works. But, it is very destructive in the long term.”41 While preserving the country’s competitive abilities for a short period, protectionism eventually makes the country engaged in protectionist policies and its industries “less competitive in international trade.”42 The more inward a country focuses, the more coddled and inefficient its markets and domestic companies become. In addition, surrounding countries will retaliate with protectionist policies, further thwarting the efficiencies gained from a free trade economy and its attendant benefits like downward price pressure and availability of goods for consumers.', 'Protectionist trade measures characteristically include tariffs, subsidies, quotas, and currency valuation activities.43 In the U.S., economists have argued that the Great Depression of the 1930s was deepened by the highly protectionist policies. During that time, the U.S. maintained the largest tariff rates of that century.44 They were intended to prop up the national industries that were struggling in light of the country’s poor economic health.45 Counterintuitive as it was, the very policies implemented to battle the poor national economy and to retain domestic jobs appeared to worsen the problem.46', 'Critics of antitrust law contend that protectionism was the main reason behind the creation of antitrust laws. In the U.S., small farmers were being underpriced by larger, more efficient farms.47 Antitrust laws were enacted to protect those underperforming farmers from the lowerpriced competitors.48 Critics claim that the antitrust laws artificially stunted the market efficiency of the larger firms and, presumably, the technological advances that such efficiency would have driven in the markets, and thereby stunted the true value of competition rather than promoting it.49', 'These critics appear to greatly oversimplify the issues. It is true that antitrust laws do superficially disrupt the market, like any form of regulation would, despite their avowed purpose to avoid market disruptions. Antitrust enforcement can and does thwart the market efficiency the laws intend to promote. However, by protecting competition, sometimes in the form of propping up inefficient competitors, it ensures that market power is not concentrated in any one actor. In doing so, it ensures that market power cannot be abused by any one actor. The societal goals of avoiding this kind of market abuse can be viewed as protectionist. But, are not all laws inherently protectionist in some manner? Perhaps not in the sense that they favor domestic firms over foreign ones, but surely in the sense that they intend to serve as protection for whatever the scope of regulation pertains to—here, the markets. ', 'A further criticism of competition law’s protectionist roots is that “competition law might—especially through selective, discriminatory enforcement—be abused as a trade barrier.”50 That is true, and further to the point of this paper, it may become more likely given the recent political climate. However, shouldn’t we be wary of a world without such protections? The fact that a law can be abused does not eliminate the need for that law altogether. Antitrust law is but a tool that can be wielded to support either free trade or protectionist aims.51 It depends entirely on those with the power to enforce and evaluate antitrust claims.', 'Despite the protectionist roots of antitrust laws, their preservation has provided the opportunity for at least some version of free trade. The protections afforded to countries through antitrust laws may be the only safeguards that provide these countries with the requisite peace of mind to c onsider engaging in a global free trade market. One would think that the pro-free trade, anti-protectionism critics of antitrust laws would value some market distortion over the outright elimination of all free trade.52 Of course, this assumes that the critics of protectionism would value any course of action that results in some free trade over none.', 'D. Anti-Dumping: The Premier Protectionist Tool of Antitrust', 'Anti-dumping policies are the antitrust topic that receives the most frequent and stark criticism. Anti-dumping policies allow governments to “impose duties [(e.g., fines on a company)] whenever goods are sold in export markets at less than their fair [(e.g., market)] value.”53 The policies are intended to “prevent firms from price discriminating between markets,” especially national ones.54 Similar to the above protectionist arguments about antitrust laws on the whole, critics often argue that antidumping laws “induce more distortions in the market than they resolve.”55', 'What sets antidumping apart from the rest of antitrust policy? Why is antidumping a riper target for criticism? Although all competition laws address market distortions, anti-dumping is the only measure among them that does not merely act to eliminate anti-competitive behavior of a firm; rather, anti-dumping is punitive in nature.56 A successful antidumping claim results in relief that is more severe than a mere injunction or making the injured party whole.57 Anti-dumping cases result in the imposition of fines and high tariffs on the anticompetitive party, even to the extent that the fines or tariffs dramatically affect the party’s ability to continue its current and future business dealings.58 For this reason, certain countries, like Japan, share the view that anti-dumping measures are the most easily abused antitrust tool and a great threat to the preservation of free market competition.59', 'Anti-dumping legislation gained popularity after the Second World War, perhaps unsurprisingly coinciding with the declining popularity and use of tariffs.60 Today, over ninety countries have adopted anti-dumping laws; nearly every country that has antitrust laws has anti-dumping laws as well.61 Some experts argue that trade liberalization and anti-dumping laws have spurred the rise of anti-dumping measures. These experts point to agreements that have eliminated trade tariffs as the cause of these adoptive anti-dumping measures.62 See Figure 1 below.', 'Even against the “we want free trade” public backdrop of the 1980s and 1990s, countries attempted to protect themselves from overt anticompetitive behavior, like price dumping.64 Any alternative risked losing public support for trade liberalization at the first sign of abuse in the market.65 One can imagine the public outcry that would ensue if a country was unable to respond to anticompetitive behavior. Even the U.S., which had traditionally been a staunch advocate for free trade, “imposed more than 600 antidumping measures and nearly 300 anti-subsidy duties since 1980,” each of which were “aimed at correcting what the U.S. government deemed to be unfair trade.”66', 'A key criticism of anti-dumping policy is that it is used inconsistently to serve special political interests.67 In the U.S., steel is an “emblem of [the] country’s descent from greatness.”68 American steelmakers have lobbied for decades to preserve and protect the domestic industry.69 Today, the U.S. makes “half as much as 50 years ago and employs just a third of the workers.”70 Past U.S. Presidents made it part of their political platforms to initiate trade policies that would limit the importation of competing steel products, especially from Europe and Japan.71 The Trump Administration appears to be no exception. Although Trump recently resorted to imposing tariffs, he first used anti-dumping measures to protect the American steel industry.72', 'The first trade case brought by the U.S. government during the Trump Administration was an anti-dumping case alleging that producers from other countries (Brazil, Norway, and Australia) deliberately sold silicon metal (a raw material required to produce steel) “at artificially low prices in the U.S.”73 The alleged dumping margins were 134.9%, 45.7%, and 52.8% respectively.74 After an affirmative ruling in favor of the U.S. in October of 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) made final affirmative determinations in February of 2018.75', 'Additionally, on November 28, 2017, the DOC self-initiated an antidumping case against China alleging that China exported common alloy aluminum sheets at a low price in order to materially injure the domestic industry for that product in the U.S.76 This self-initiation is highly unusual and has not been done in more than twenty-five years.77 In its initial evaluation, the U.S. estimated that the illegal prices being set were between 48 to 100 percent less than the fair market value.78', 'These are only a few examples of antidumping cases that have affected the darlings of American industry. According to the DOC, “enforcement of U.S. trade law is a prime focus of the Trump administration. From January 20, 2017, through February 26, 2018, the Department of Commerce initiated 102 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations—a 96% increase from 52 in the previous period. The Commerce Department currently maintains 424 antidumping and countervailing duty orders which provide relief to American companies and industries impacted by unfair trade.”79', 'Of course, the hope remains that the U.S. process continues to be impartial and unmoved by political interests. Fairness is an integral part of our justice system and serves as the cornerstone justification for the imposition of otherwise unacceptable tariffs on foreign parties. However, such need for impartiality (in perception or otherwise) has not dissuaded special interest groups and political figures from publicly lobbying the U.S. Government to make certain rulings. As to the self-initiated case against China referenced above, Congressmen, CEOs, labor union leaders, and other politically powerful individuals created a spectacle of their public lobbying efforts, citing the importance of “protecting” the U.S. constituents from “trade practices . . . threatening U.S. jobs.”80', 'The perception that the law is susceptible to manipulation based on special political interests is partly what made Boeing’s 2017 filings against Bombardier for anti-dumping violations, and the preliminary findings of the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in favor of Boeing, so controversial.81 Essentially, Boeing brought an action against Bombardier, a smaller competitor, alleging that Bombardier had been offering passenger jet products at well below its own costs.82 Boeing, a U.S. company, was ridiculed in the press and accused of filing the suit merely to obliterate a smaller foreign competitor’s growing foothold in a product market where Boeing already had strong market power.83 Boeing was perceived as a bully and a whiner, while Bombardier, the party alleged to have engaged in the improper and anticompetitive conduct, was portrayed as a victim.', 'The U.S. Government made its preliminary ruling that Bombardier had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and recommended the application of hefty duties (~300%) against Bombardier as punishment.84 The preliminary ruling suggested that Boeing was well within its rights to bring the claim, despite being the larger and more powerful market player. Even still, the international and domestic press toward Boeing and the U.S. was pointedly negative. High profile national leaders, including British Prime Minister Theresa May, threatened trade wars against the U.S. and warned Boeing that continued action could jeopardize its contracts.85 Ultimately, the U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) reversed its position and issued a decision against Boeing.86 The surprise ruling, which was contrary to their initial recommendation, calls into question whether the USITC succumbed to the immense political pressure surrounding the issue.87', 'Critiques aside, the benefit of anti-dumping policies is that they can be effective even without a supranational system of power. Much like a country’s standard trade tariff systems, the duties are imposed by that country without requiring any coordination or cooperation from other countries.88 However, unlike standard trade tariff systems, anti-dumping measures are still an acceptable application of a country’s power because they are not precluded by trade agreements.89 In light of the recent economic struggles of the Western world and resulting protectionist views, there seems to be no incentive for countries to subvert the trend toward increased anti-dumping enforcement.', 'III. PREVALENCE OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE WORLD MARKET', 'Antitrust, and its proverbial little brother, antidumping, are the subject of academic dart throwing, but no realistic alternative solution appears to have taken their place. Legislatures seem to have accepted that antitrust is the only option to ensure any free trade, as this paper has suggested on numerous occasions. Each of the three major players in the world economy—the United States, the European Union, and China— have antitrust laws and enforce them. None show any sign of stopping. So, the fact remains that these laws are the reality with which we must continue to contend. ', 'A. The United States', 'The U.S. has a long history of antitrust enforcement. The U.S. was one of the first nations to adopt antitrust laws through the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in 1890 and 1914, respectively. At that time, it was the response to a public outcry for protection from domestic monopolistic firms. So, at least initially, antitrust laws in the U.S. were highly political, sitting at the forefront of public debate and playing a large role in deciding elections.90 As time went on, the public outcry for protection from domestic monopolistic firms turned into an outcry against international firms.91 The U.S. antitrust system of laws gained popularity and clout with its constituents more quickly and gained more public awareness than similar laws in other countries.92', 'The U.S. system of antitrust laws then began to serve as an example of antitrust laws abroad. Setting aside the wide reach of U.S. influence in international matters generally, the sheer size of the U.S. market itself made U.S. antitrust law something to learn from.', 'Although the U.S. spurred on the trend, its antitrust law is significantly different from that of other countries in several ways. At a high level, some distinctive features of the U.S. laws are the possibility of criminal sanctions on bad actors, the automatic trebling of damages, and the encouragement of private actors to bring suits.93 Today, over 75% of antitrust cases in the U.S. are brought through private enforcement.94 These features are not common to other jurisdictions.', 'B. European Union', 'After the U.S. adopted its antitrust laws, Europeans recognized the need for their own version of competition laws. The E.U. enacted the first collective prohibition on competition-distorting agreements in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.95 The E.U. has since set out its antitrust policy in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). ', 'Despite the fact that the E.U. and the U.S. subscribe to similar legal constructs and economic policies, major differences between the U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws and their enforcement exist. One such difference is that private enforcement claims are nearly nonexistent in Europe.96 Although the number of private enforcement claims are starting to increase, they are being brought at a rate far lower than private enforcement claims in the U.S. Virtually all antitrust litigation in the E.U. is brought by the European Commission.97 Unlike the U.S., the E.U. did not experience the same politicization of these issues that led to public support and awareness at the constituent level of its general population.98 To some, the European Commission bringing most antitrust cases may give the impression that the E.U. is more regimented and strategic about which cases to pursue than its U.S. counterparts.', 'Another difference is that European competition laws do not provide for criminal sanctions,99 or automatic treble damages for antitrust violations.100 Again, unlike the U.S., public support for antitrust law was weaker and less politicized in Europe. This weaker support may have made E.U. constituents less accepting of severe consequences for bad actors. Of course, some scholars might say that U.S. constituents are just generally more comfortable with extreme punitive measures than their E.U. counterparts, and antitrust law is no exception.', 'On a global scale, the E.U. model has displaced the U.S. model as the international example to follow.101 Perhaps the E.U. competition laws are perceived as more moderate, or perhaps the E.U. is just perceived as a better example of international cooperation. As the E.U. is a trade regime made up of many countries that have had to cooperate and negotiate amongst themselves, the E.U. laws were already the product of many great minds from many countries. To succeed at all, the sovereign nations of the E.U. have had to concede on national positions in order to form a centralized community position. The U.S. model was not subject to multinational negotiations. On the contrary, the U.S. generally does not make concessions during trade-related negotiations, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the Trump Administration is especially unwilling to make trade concessions.102 This may be a contributing factor to the perception that the U.S. model is necessarily more extreme than its E.U. counterparts.', 'Another reason for the trend toward the E.U. model may be the perception that the U.S. seems to look more favorably on dominant firms, especially given the reality that a large concentration of large firms were founded in the U.S.103 The E.U. and most non-U.S. countries are thought to be more suspicious of large and dominant firms, and therefore are perceived to be more objective in their antitrust analysis.104 In comparison to the U.S. model, the E.U. system has been said to have a more active government presence, wider policy goals, and less stringent theoretical guidelines.105', 'C. China', 'China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) went into effect in 2008.106 A newcomer to the area of antitrust, China’s “core provisions of the AML were modeled largely on E.U. competition law and, to a lesser extent, on the laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries.”107 On its face, the law appears neutral; “[i]t subjects foreign and domestic corporations to anti-trust scrutiny” and “promote[s] economic efficiency” as its policy motive.108 However, the Chinese law is different from the U.S. and the E.U. laws in that it widely reserves the government’s right to reject foreign acquisitions because of national security concerns; these concerns are both national and “economic” ones.109', 'To be fair, other countries, including the U.S. and E.U., reserve this right as well.110 However, scholars say that the scope of China’s “national security” concerns is much broader than the interpretations of other countries.111 China’s antitrust laws, unlike the E.U. and U.S., are not primarily enacted to promote market efficiency. Instead, there is a focus on national economic security, which serves to protect “‘strategic and sensitive’ industries and Chinese national champions.”112 China’s leadership has long feared “that Western critics ‘aim to change [China’s] economic infrastructure and weaken the government’s control of the national economy.’”113 So, the leadership has gone to great lengths to avoid these changes.', 'China’s political system does not share the same Western democracy and rules of law as the U.S. and the E.U.114 Further, China does not share the same economic ideology of the U.S. and E.U. protectionism. “Market manipulation” is not a dirty phrase with negative connotations in China. By virtue of China’s communist system, its government bodies are expected to intervene and insulate the country in ways that Western capitalists would not. Unlike the U.S., China’s people have not been trained to trust a “market” but a government.', 'It is likely that Chinese antitrust laws will never mimic any Western economic view of free markets.115 Setting political systems aside, the Eastern world’s concept of free trade is more concerned with notions of fairness between nations.116 This may explain why China places significantly high strategic value on not becoming overly dependent on imports. Conversely, the Western view of free trade, at least in theory, does not concern itself with national fairness or import dependency as much as it does with global market efficiency.', 'IV. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ISSUES', 'Despite the strong propensity towards the adoption of antitrust laws at the national level, countries appear to have generally abandoned all hope for an international body of antitrust enforcement.117 The U.S. continues to withhold support for internationalization, and its lack of support has proven to be quite persuasive to members of international cooperative efforts.', 'A. Failed Attempts at Establishing an International Body of Antitrust Governance or Harmonization', 'Formal international competition law attempts have failed, in large part, due to lack of support from the U.S.118 The first attempt was commissioned by the League of Nations, which explored whether an international system against cartel arrangements was within the realm of possibility.119 At the time, “Europeans looked at cartel arrangements as an attempt to preserve economic stability,” and the reports praised some cartels as “instruments of peace, international cooperation, and prosperity.”120 As a result, the League did not adopt any measures against cartel activity, citing the greater good.', 'After World War II, it was again argued that there was a need for international governing authority over antitrust enforcement.121 World leaders and lawmakers sought a new, more cooperative world and discussed competition laws during the proposed International Trade Organization (“ITO”) Havana Charter in 1947.122 The notes from those discussions contained “detailed rules regarding the substance and enforcement of competition law,”123 indicating that it was heavily debated and discussed, but ultimately no competition rules were decided upon.124 The U.S. was among those countries which refused to ratify the contemplated competition rules.125', 'Shortly after the Havana Charter, nations enacted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).126 The GATT, like the agreements that came before it, remained silent on international competition rules.127 This repeated failure to address international competition rules in international trade agreements suggests that centralized international competition laws may be a non-starter for years to come.', 'The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in 1995 and is the closest entity to a central authority on international trade laws, despite the fact that no centralized law exists.128 Again, the Doha Ministerial attempted to negotiate international competition rules and introduce them into the established authority of the WTO.129 By 2004, during the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the plans to adopt competition laws were foiled.130 Developing countries and the U.S. did not provide their support for the introduction of competition laws.131', 'As a result, although the WTO was established to be a primary venue to litigate antitrust matters between countries, the WTO can argue only that a country unfairly applied their own country’s domestic laws.132 There is still no international set of laws promulgated by the WTO. Given that discrepancies exist even between the three major trade countries, the lack of internationally set authority is quite limiting.', 'Given these historically failed and haphazard attempts, it is not likely that a uniform antitrust law can be adopted globally. China, the U.S., and the E.U. all subscribe to varying versions of free trade and what constitutes an appropriate method of enforcement. Further still, the national values significantly differ between these countries. In China, national security terms and the promotion of national industry is paramount.133 Similarly, the U.S., while not allowing for the same breadth of application as China in its national security terms, seems determined to preserve its domestic laws despite the clear preference of other nations for E.U. competition laws.134', 'B. Informal Harmonization and Cooperation', 'Efforts to informally harmonize international competition laws have continued despite the failure of formal international laws. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) each adopted codes that outlined negotiations and agreed to competition law principles.135 The codes were completely informal and non-binding.136 Although the OECD’s latest recommendations for antitrust cooperation were revised relatively recently in 1995, the agreement is still a “law . . . of the softest variety.”137 This is in part because Western industrialized nations seek to address anticompetitive behavior, while the burgeoning countries are more concerned with promoting economic development and regulating multinational corporations.138', 'The International Competition Network (“ICN”) is another institution that encourages cooperative action on antitrust principles.139 However, the ICN, much like other informal networks, does nothing to limit or minimize the protectionist behaviors of countries, which is common in the face of uncertainty and lack of consensus on topics such as antitrust.140', 'Lack of enforceability aside, these negotiations and cooperative efforts “established a framework that has been reasonably successful and has set the stage for more binding commitments on a bilateral basis.”141 The fact of the matter is that there is no economic model that is globally or unanimously accepted by all nation-states, so there can be no truly successful global harmonization.142 To internationalize the law, even in an informal capacity, would require the policy behind the laws to be agreed upon.143 How can one agree to perfect and protect an economic policy that is not itself uniform amongst all nations?144', 'C. Regional and Bi-lateral Treaties', 'In addition to informal harmonization efforts, certain regional and bilateral treaties have been put in place to encourage cooperation on antitrust enforcement.145 In 1991, the U.S. and E.U. entered into a cooperative antitrust agreement.146 Other nations have also entered into antitrust cooperation agreements.147 These agreements are not harmonized, vary widely, and contain different levels of required cooperation.148 Yet, they are a country’s best bet for solidifying any kind of binding cooperation with another country on antitrust laws.', 'V. CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE AND RISING PROTECTIONISM RHETORIC', "Our current political climate reveals a return to protectionist rhetoric and policies. Today, the bulk of protectionism is accomplished through non-tariff barriers, such as domestic content legislation and other restrictive measures.' 49 Antitrust is another one of these measures that will, at least for the foreseeable future, be a growing and pivotal force on the world stage.", 'A. Perception of Unfair Enforcement', 'As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a widespread perception that domestic countries unfairly apply antitrust laws to foreign firms through "unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market conditions" for their domestic industries and firms.`0 A systematic bias against foreign companies would thwart the goal of antitrust and undermine countries\' cooperative efforts."\' In nearly equal measure, the E.U., U.S., and China have been the accused and the accuser of claims of unfair antitrust enforcement. 152', 'In the Western markets, China is said to have been discriminatory in its application of antitrust law to foreign businesses. 153 Even after the enactment of its antitrust laws, the consensus by scholars has been that China is focused on protecting its own domestic companies and industries, and the law is used to create a barrier to entry for foreign firms.154 Through the AML national security language, China has expressed and codified its perceived interest in avoiding adverse impacts to its domestic small and medium-sized enterprises and has rejected the "survival of the fittest, markets will self-correct inefficiencies" economic theories shared by most Western countries.155', 'Not surprisingly, some of the strongest criticism of China has come from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce."\' It claims that China is using AML to "advance policy and boost national champions . . . [through] systemic, officially sanctioned curtailment" of rights afforded under the laws.\' Further, the Chamber adds that "all transactions blocked or conditionally approved to date have involved foreign companies."158 Generally, "foreign companies have well-founded concerns about how ... China\'s legal framework for antitrust enforcement provides opportunities for protectionism and industrial policy to sway decisions." 59 Companies and countries alike considered China\'s AML to be a "newer, subtler form of protectionism, one cloaked in regulatory impartiality but intended primarily to promote Chinese companies, especially the big, powerful, state-owned companies." 60', 'Although the U.S. appears to be quick to make these allegations, it is not immune from being on the receiving end of similar charges."\' The U.S. has also attempted to preserve its own "economically important industries which are threatened by import competition" through protectionism on many occasions, though perhaps with more subtlety than China.162 Some academics observe that the U.S. appears to be "less keen to go after its own monopolies, although [the U.S.] appears to have no problem going after foreign ones."i"3', 'Even the E.U., who is often considered to be the most moderate of the three, is not immune. High ranking U.S. officials "accused the E.U. of bias against U.S. companies."l6 4 Even then-President Barack Obama suggested that the E.U. was engaging in protectionism.1 65', "The oddity here is that these perceptions of misapplication of the law have been proven to be unfounded, at least in the E.U. An empirical study of over 5,000 cases from 1990 to 2014 evaluated the E.U.'s enforcement of antitrust laws on foreign and domestic merger activity.166 They concluded that the E.U. is less likely to challenge a U.S. or foreign acquirer, a fact in direct opposition to what the U.S. has claimed.1 67 Rather, the E.U. appears to apply more stringent guidelines to its domestic E.U. members.'6 8 The study concluded that while the E.U. has engaged in extraterritorial enforcement of its own laws, it has been more cautious to do so than the U.S.' 69 Whether that will change considering the recent political climate has yet to be tested. Further, only time will tell whether similar studies will be conducted and reveal similar conclusions as to the U.S. and China's enforcement of antitrust laws.", "The fact remains that all countries have nationalist policies. Where antitrust laws support the welfare enhancing goals of a country or its constituents, it makes sense that national leaders will gladly enforce those antitrust laws.' The question becomes, what happens when the enforcement of the law results in less favorable conditions for a nation's constituents? At least in perception, any sensitivity to its national constituents will seem like a misapplication of the law. ' As long as nations have priorities that are inherently at odds with some other nations' adopted economic policies, there is a risk of a perception of unfair enforcement.'72", 'B. Outcry for Protectionism, Generally', 'Given the lingering effects of the recent global recession, “the cry for protectionist policies is louder than it has been for decades.”173 No longer are political leaders “willing to subordinate [their] short-term economic interests to long-term interests and to the larger good of the international economy.”174 Articles far and wide seem to suggest the same thing: the E.U. and U.S. populations are hearing about protectionism as a far more familiar and welcomed concept as of late.175', 'The above-referenced articles, like many published before and since, demonstrate a sentiment felt by many observing the international political scene. There has been a staunch rise of populist and protectionist rhetoric from many nations. In addition, we know from the history of the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws that strong political support from the masses can create strong effects in republic-based political environments.176 Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, this protectionist rhetoric has changed the political backdrop against which antitrust laws are and will be bred and enforced in the near term.', 'C. The United States, Donald Trump, and Making America Great Again', 'Trump has been long perceived to carry a protectionist agenda. Although not an “isolationist,” an extreme version of protectionism that very few would expect an international business mogul to have, Trump has openly and proudly stated that his focus is on “America First.”177 He made countless speeches during his election and since obtaining office that have repeated “the idea that America is being taken advantage of by other countries and the assertion that trade deals and immigration have destroyed jobs and fueled crime.”178 His message has reached the masses of the American and international populations.179 His own campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” cements a message, even to individuals unschooled in antitrust doctrine or other generally accepted economic theories, that Trump, a celebrated businessman, finds there is an imbalance in the way America had been participating in world trade. ', 'Trump’s actions so far are nearly as strong as his rhetoric. In attempts to further free trade, he has worked toward “getting rid of the foreign market access borders that often shut out American goods and services, and having stronger enforcement of our trade agreements.”180 Despite those actions however, he has also continued to criticize former leaders for the current trade agreements in place or those potential agreements negotiated between the U.S. and various countries around the world, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership.181 Further, he has made it clear that tariffs are not something he is afraid to implement.182', 'Trump is clearly supporting protectionism through his actions and rhetoric, a choice that reverberates as a war cry through the heart of proworld trade economists. His statements have fueled several articles warning that Trump’s protectionism is perhaps the greatest threat to “the system of rules and regulations that has governed world trade for decades.”183 Will that come to fruition? Considering his recent tariff decisions, it may.184', 'D. Brexit and Le Pen in the (former) E.U', 'Trump is not alone in his protectionist sentiments. In March of 2017, the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) served notice terminating its participation in the E.U.185 While trade relations are only a small part of that which the E.U. negotiated on behalf of its members, Brexit still broadly represents the U.K.’s rejection of steps toward economic integration in favor of making its own decisions on trade.186 Clearly, this decision was the result of the U.K.’s protectionist aims. Leading up to the U.K.’s vote to leave the E.U. and since, articles conveying protectionist viewpoints have been on the rise. For example, it was suggested that coordination within the E.U. unnecessarily limited the U.K.’s freedom to run their country: ', 'By withdrawing from the EU, we can organize economic and social affairs in this country not by deliberate design from the top down, but more organically and spontaneously . . . It’s because we know in our bones that it is a daft way to run a whole continent. I suspect it is not only the Brits who will soon be demanding the freedom to opt out.187', 'By some, coordination with the E.U.’s efforts were perceived as eliminating the power of the U.K. altogether:', 'And this is the thing with the EU. Once consent is established for the basic foundation, the ossification process begins to the point where you no longer have the power, reform is impossible and like trade and agriculture, it simply drops out of public discourse. Why debate that which cannot be influenced? This is how we drift from democracy to technocracy—and subsequently stagnation and disaffection. That is why I would vote to leave every single time.188', 'Supporters even grew concerned that all of the E.U. nations had lost their ability to function separate from the E.U.:', 'The EU has become too economically and politically integrated for its member states to function as truly independent nations.189', 'Whether this type of rhetoric will result in further political actions toward protectionism within the U.K.’s borders, or was just intended to encourage British citizens to vote for Brexit, enough of the population seemed to agree by way of a popular vote for Brexit that its parliamentary body could manage its own economic affairs just fine without the E.U. playing a role.', 'On the mainland, other E.U. nations seem affected by a rise in protectionist rhetoric. Marine Le Pen, a French politician, led an—albeit unsuccessful—campaign for the presidency of France, in which she called for “smart protectionism,” introducing the term into the living rooms of the population.190 Whether an effective strategy or not, she garnered support from “ordinary middle-class French people” in part because “protectionism sounds like common-sense economics” as well as a job creation plan.191 The accepted and long-term effects of such a potential economic plan were not discussed as much as the rhetoric, which proudly touted: “we need protectionism.”192 Although Le Pen was not ultimately elected, she brought to the limelight a sentiment of protectionism and garnered political support for it, which set the stage for the far-right protectionism that seems to be sweeping the politics of other E.U. countries.', 'E. General Protectionist Sentiment on the Rise', 'Although the above represent a few admittedly cherry-picked examples of growing protectionism, the WTO has reported that there has been a “surge in antitrade rhetoric around the world . . . being accompanied by a rise in the introduction of protectionist measures by the world’s leading economies.” 193 Between October of 2015 and May of 2016, the major world economies “introduced new protectionist trade measures at the fastest pace seen since the 2008 financial crisis, rolling out the equivalent of five each week.”194', 'The WTO’s warning was intended to raise awareness that the creeping protectionism of the 1930s may be rearing its ugly head yet again, with the intention of preparing world leaders to avoid the pitfalls of such an approach.195 With so many agreements in place that are designed to prevent countries from raising tariff levels and engaging in the policies which plagued the world economy during the Great Depression, it makes sense that individual countries may fall back to antitrust law as a lever to promote protectionist policies. ', 'VI. CONCLUSION', 'There is a clear “conflict between the evolving economic and technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing compartmentalization of the world political system composed of sovereign states . . . .”196 This conflict can breed protectionist political views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the “rational” assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency.', 'Some amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although “inefficient” in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term.', 'While attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether.', 'Antitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade’s coffin, instead of the key to its preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear: anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic community significantly for years to come.', '', 'cartels.']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-National%20Debate%20Tournament-Round7.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-National%2520Debate%2520Tournament-Round7.docx

4657aa73ddd88c6aae6a6776602bd9a9a6b4ab31e5ed464fb7bf1cdcacc3f363

It lacks a private right AND treble damages---that fails

John B. Kirkwood 21, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. American Law Institute. Executive Committee, AALS Antitrust and Economic Regulation Section. Advisory Board, American Antitrust Institute. Advisory Board, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, "Tech Giant Exclusion," Florida Law Review, Forthcoming, p. 7, 01/15/2021, SSRN.

Section 5 is unlikely to fill this no private right of action and no treble damages FTC bring restitution but power is in doubt and has never tried to exercise it outside Section 2 unlikely to supply needed deterrence

problem is when they have disadvantaged third parties they have not violated the Sherman Act Section 5 of the FTC Act is unlikely to fill this gap there is no private right of action under Section 5 and no treble damages . The FTC might bring a restitution action but the Commission’s power is in doubt and the Commission has never tried to exercise it in a case involving exclusionary conduct outside bounds of Section 2 Section 5 is unlikely to supply the needed deterrence

disadvantaged not violated the Sherman Act Section 5 of the FTC Act no private right of action treble damages doubt never exclusionary conduct unlikely

['Antitrust policy, then, should to continue to focus on protecting consumers from market power and workers and other vulnerable suppliers from monopsony power. This orientation would not immunize the tech giants – they have engaged in exclusionary tactics that appear to have harmed consumers and possibly workers. The problem is that when they have disadvantaged third parties that use their platforms, they have not violated the Sherman Act. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that their conduct has created monopoly power or a dangerous probability of monopoly power in any relevant market. As a result, the tech giants could continue to exclude third parties with little fear of substantial financial penalties.13', '[FOOTNOTE] Section 5 of the FTC Act is unlikely to fill this gap. While Section 5 does prohibit anticompetitive conduct that falls short of monopolization, there is no private right of action under Section 5 and no treble damages. The FTC might bring a restitution action in district court, but the Commission’s power to do so is in doubt and the Commission has never tried to exercise it in a case involving exclusionary conduct outside the bounds of Section 2. See infra Section V.A. Section 5, in short, is unlikely to supply the needed deterrence. [END FOOTNOTE]']

[(8, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Aff-Harvard-Round6.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Aff-Harvard-Round6.docx

fcf4c828478b3a829d4f124cc632d2bd3f4c9face7eda82ae55f02c8713ce090

Private sector AI innovation. solves existential environmental destruction.

Isabelle and Westerlund 2022 [Diane A. Isabelle - Technology & Innovation management; International business, Entrepreneurship). PhD in Management, an MBA and an Engineering degree. Sprott School of Business, Carleton University, Ottawa. Department of Business Management, School of Management, College of Business and Economics, University of Johannesburg. Mika Westerlund - MSc Econ, Marketing (Helsinki School of Economics), DSc Econ, Marketing (Helsinki School of Economics). Sprott School of Business, Carleton University, Ottawa. “A Review and Categorization of Artificial Intelligence-Based Opportunities in Wildlife, Ocean and Land Conservation,” Sustainability 2022, https://doi.org/ 10.3390/su14041979, , ///k-ng]

the links between Artificial Intelligence and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals is burgeoning as climate change and the biotic crisis leading to mass extinction of species are raising concerns across the globe Our findings provide governments and entrepreneurs with Artificial Intelligence opportunities for tackling decreasing biological diversity, which has severe implications for global food security, nature, and humanity Advances in AI have opened the door to tackle global challenges these goals are relevant humanity AI is believed to contribute solutions to the UN’s SDGs with less than ten years concerted efforts from governments, private and public organizations are needed sustainability of oceans is under threat CO2 emissions, acidification deoxygenation overfishing, and land-based pollutants Coral reefs are at risk of collapse dead zones are rising Terrestrial ecosystems are critical to all aspects of life The planet is losing biodiversity at “mass extinction” rates species’ have declined by 60 percent deforestation Desertification and land degradation affect agriculture globally For AI systems to accelerate SDGs they must be trusted estimates suggest AI could increase global GDP by 16 trillion by 2030 comprehensive literature review found 869 articles discuss the application of AI to SDGs They highlight the imperative to develop necessary regulatory insight to enable sustainable development AI approaches for SDG is contributing to better monitoring of pollution biodiversity microplastic debris fishing, aquaculture, shipping, and mineral extraction one million species are facing extinction 22 percent of known animal species AI technologies can help address the main threats affecting biodiversity loss of habitat, deforestation, desertification, climate change, overharvesting, and IAS AI alone will not resolve threats to life Without the role of business progress will be slow, which humanity cannot afford time is running out. This is essential to adequately embed into decision-making and support innovation With only a decade left business as usual is not an option for government and the private sector All stakeholders must accelerate development of AI technologies to reach goals adapted to proposed AI policies and governance mechanisms to mitigate potential harmful impacts

The scholarly literature on the links between Artificial Intelligence and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals is burgeoning as climate change and the biotic crisis leading to mass extinction of species are raising concerns across the globe . With a focus on Sustainable Development Goals 14 (Life below Water) and 15 (Life on Land), this paper explores the opportunities of Artificial Intelligence applications in various domains of wildlife, ocean and land conservation. For this purpose, we develop a conceptual framework on the basis of a comprehensive review of the literature and examples of Artificial Intelligence-based approaches to protect endangered species, monitor and predict animal behavior patterns, and track illegal or unsustainable wildlife trade. Our findings provide scholars, governments , environmental organizations, and entrepreneurs with a much-needed taxonomy and real-life examples of Artificial Intelligence opportunities for tackling the grand challenge of rapidly decreasing biological diversity, which has severe implications for global food security, nature, and humanity . Advances in Artificial Intelligence ( AI ) and supporting digital technologies have opened the door to the application of AI-enabled systems to tackle global challenges . As such, AI holds great promise to accelerate many of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals [1,2]. In 2015, all United Nations Member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet. The agenda encompasses 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 targets to end poverty and hunger, and strategies to improve health, education, spur economic growth, while tackling climate change and preserving oceans and forests [3] in all countries, regardless of their actual development status [4]. Great progress has been achieved in some of the goals, in particular goals related to primary health and education [5]. Of significant concern though are goals where progress is more challenging due to complex systemic global issues such as climate change, ocean health, and biodiversity loss, and for which time to address them is running out [5]. Yet, these goals are very relevant for many sectors, not to mention humanity —hence, the impetus for our research. The scholarly literature on the links between AI and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is burgeoning. On the one hand, AI is believed to contribute technological solutions and breakthroughs to advance the UN’s SDGs [1,4,7,8]. Other studies have investigated specific aspects of AI related to SDGs such as global governance, policy perspectives, the role of business, ethics, knowledge spillovers, Green AI, AI in Industry 4.0, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related impacts of AI, among others [8,9,11–18]. Despite this wealth of AI knowledge, our review of the literature since the adoption of the UN SDGs did not reveal previous work related to the categorization of AI approaches and opportunities specifically related to SDGs 14 and 15. This is deeply concerning and a critical research gap. Without a strong understanding and an organization of AI avenues of solution to SDGs related to the environment such as SDGs 14 and 15, the research risks being disjointed. Furthermore, with less than ten years to deliver the SDGs by 2030— dubbed the “decade of action” [5,6]— concerted and cooperative efforts from governments, private and public sector organizations are urgently needed . . More than three billion people rely on the ocean for their livelihoods, and over 80 percent of world trade is transported by sea [ 19]. However, the sustainability of oceans is under severe threat due to human activities. Rising CO2 emissions, acidification and deoxygenation , overfishing, and land-based pollutants lead to long-term repercussions requiring urgent actions to protect marine environments, invest in ocean science, and support small-scale fishing communities as well as sustainably manage the oceans [19]. The chemistry of the oceans is changing faster than at any point in 300 million years, resulting in acidification and rising temperatures of oceans [20]. Every year, some 8 million tons of plastic—and their toxins—enter the oceans [21]. Coastal areas are home to nearly 40 percent of the world’s population. These areas face growing risks from eutrophication—that is, excess nutrient loading into coastal environments resulting from human activities Fertilizer run-off, livestock waste, sewage discharge, aquaculture and atmospheric nitrogen emissions are the main drivers of eutrophication [19]. Coral reefs are increasingly at a risk of collapse due to global heating and overfishing, resulting in a loss of coastal protection from sea-level rise, and impacts on tourism and fisheries [22]. Living coral has declined by half globally since the 1950s, resulting in some 60 percent of coral-reef-associated biodiversity [22]. Over half of marine key biodiversity areas are not protected. Further, “ dead zones ”—areas of water that lack sufficient oxygen to support marine life— are rising at an alarming rate [19,20]. The Second World Ocean Assessment report from the United Nations notes that the understanding of the ocean is continuing to improve. However, human activities continue to degrade the ocean. SDG 15, Life on Land, aims to “protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss” [27]. Terrestrial ecosystems are critical to all aspects of human life , considering that over 80 percent of the human diet is provided by plants [28]. However, human-influenced drivers are causing unprecedented shifts and degradation of terrestrial ecosystems [29]. Forests are biodiverse ecosystems, providing habitats to over four-fifths of all terrestrial species, as well as sources of clean air and water [29]. The UN reports that progress to safeguard key biodiversity areas has stalled over the last five years [27]. The planet is losing its biodiversity at “mass extinction” rates : species’ populations have declined by around 60 percent since 1970 [20]. The risk of species extinction has worsened by almost 10 percent in the past 25 years alone [5]. Further, an estimated 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their livelihood [29], and forests are home to more than 80 percent of all terrestrial species of animals, plants and insects [28]. Forests act as carbon sinks by absorbing about two billion tons of carbon dioxide per year [2]. Yet, current deforestation rates could lead to a drop in rainfall, triggering wider consequences for the Earth’s atmospheric circulatory systems [20]. Although progress has been made towards sustainable forest management, the world has lost 100 million hectares of forest over the last 20 years [27]. Desertification and land degradation affect over half of the land used for agriculture globally . For AI systems in general, and to accelerate the realization of SDGs , they must be trusted by people; in other words, these systems must be robust, lawful, and ethical, referred to as “trustworthy AI systems” [4,34]. Emerging technologies such as blockchains can help improve trust in applications such as fisheries [24]. The World Economic Forum and the multinational consulting firm PwC estimate that advanced and emerging technologies under the umbrella of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies, or Industry 4.0, which includes AI, blockchain, Internet of Things, 5G and drones, could accelerate progress towards over two-third of SDGs [5]. As evidence of the unprecedented speed and scale of AI technologies in the economy, estimates suggest that AI could increase global GDP by nearly USD 16 trillion by 2030 [31]. Palomares et al. [4] conducted a comprehensive literature review and found 869 articles that discuss the application of AI and digital technologies to the SDGs . These articles were then classified by SDG targets. Of these 869 articles, only 45 and 43 articles were related to SDG 14 and 15, respectively. The authors offer a comprehensive panoramic view of AI technologies for achieving the SDGs, along with a SWOT analysis of AI-driven technologies as facilitators or barriers for each of the SDGs [4]. They note the important contribution of AI-based technologies in achieving the SDGs. Nonetheless, they stress the need for a symbiotic relationship between AI and various digital technologies, the importance of the undergoing digital transformation in the development of the SDGs, and the need for high -quality, open and large-scale data infrastructures, since AI systems are fueled by big data. Vinuesa et al. [7] categorized the 17 SDGs into Society, Economy and Environment Groups, and demonstrated the positive impacts of AI on 134 targets across all the goals but a negative impact for 59 targets across all the goals, based on published evidence of AI serving either as an enabler or an inhibitor of the SDGs [7]. The authors looked at the role of AI in achieving the SDGs and found many examples of AI applications to the environment goals (SDGs 13, 14, and 15). They highlight the imperative to develop the necessary regulatory insight and oversight for AI-based technologies to enable sustainable development and to determine the ethical standards that AI-based technology should be subjected to The application of AI and machine learning approaches for SDG 14 is contributing to better monitoring of illegal, unregulated and unreported catches, improving traceability of products, reducing wastage in supply chains and improving the monitoring of movements of fishing fleets, among others [23]. Marine litter and plastic pollution are another threat to marine ecosystems and biodiversity [42–44]. Several AI-based applications have been developed to automatically detect, classify, and quantify floating marine litter in aerial images to help monitor and assess the environmental threat [43,44], including remote sensing technologies combined with machine learning algorithms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and satellite imagery [44]. Example 1: MARLIT is a floating marine waste detection web app that operates on an algorithm with deep learning capabilities. The system uses AI to learn from some 4000 aerial images of the coast around Catalonia to identify the presence, density, and distribution of waste, rather than by direct observations owing to the sheer scale of the data. The deep learning techniques of the system’s open access algorithm, boosted by artificial neuronal networks, automate the quantification and categorization of marine litter. Upcoming improvements to MARLIT include adapting it for use with remote sensors, which could then enable it to be used with drones as part of a fully automated process [45]. Plastic and microplastic debris do not all float but are instead collecting at the bottom of the ocean. The largest patch of such debris is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, covering 1.6 million square kilometers with its 80,000 tons of plastic waste [25,33]. Autonomous and real-time AI systems are used to map marine debris, with results disseminated through open-source maps [33]. Other AI-based systems tackle the removal of marine debris either from the ocean or by collecting it at the source, i.e., from the rivers [33]. Example 2: Ocean Cleanup, a Dutch company, has developed an AI-based ocean cleaning system that uses algorithms to identify the optimal deployment location to collect the garbage. Real-time telemetry monitors the health and functioning of the system [46]. Example 3: Researchers in the Czech Republic have developed self-propelled microrobots that can swim, attach to plastics, and break them down. This proof-of-concept study could pave the way toward systems that can capture and degrade microplastics [47]. A crucial role of the ocean is that of climate regulation, which requires a better understanding of the ocean and the seafloor. However, less than 10 percent of the seafloor has been mapped and at depths of less than 4000 m [33]. A stronger understanding of the impact of human activities and effects of climate change on climate regulation from the ocean is needed. AI can provide faster and better data collection and analysis [33]. This target aims to sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts by strengthening their resilience and taking action for their restoration [23]. The main threats to marine ecosystems, again, come from hu- man activities: fishing, aquaculture, shipping, sand and mineral extraction , oil and gas exploitation, and pollution, among others [23]. Example 4: IBM has pioneered autonomous AI-powered microscopes that assess the health of plankton and share the information in the cloud. The goal is to create 3D models of plankton and monitor them in their natural environment. Microscopic plankton species are key indicators of ocean pollution levels, not to mention the base of the ocean food chain, and hence, they are quite crucial to fisheries [40,48]. This technology is being explored to provide early detection of oil spills and other signs of toxicity in the water [40]. The global footprint of fishing is much larger than those of other forms of food production, even though fisheries provide only a small fraction of global caloric production for human food consumption [41]. It is estimated that fish provide 20 percent of animal protein to about 3 billion people [27]. Yet, that footprint is poorly understood and quantified. The sustainability of fisheries is essential to the livelihoods of billions of people and particularly in developing countries where the vast majority of fishermen live [49]. SDG 15 aims to tackle issues of deforestation, land degradation and desertification, which cause loss of biodiversity, and to eliminate poaching and trafficking of protected species, as well as prevent invasive alien species [2]. The loss of forests and biodiversity is staggering. It is estimated that one million animal and plant species are facing extinction , equaling to 22 percent of known animal species . Forests are the habitat of most terrestrial animals, plants, and insects. Forests also combat climate owing to their carbon sink capacity, that is, absorbing more carbon than it releases. Managing forests sustainably could increase their capacity to remove human-produced carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, hence reducing greenhouse gas emissions [2]. AI technologies can help address SDG 15 targets, and we are looking at solutions for the related targets 15.2, 15.3, 15.5, 15.7 and 15.8. Considerations for studying deforestation include identifying the factors that affect it, predicting where deforestation will occur, and predicting how much forest will be lost. These considerations involve a large number of interrelated variables that are well suited to using more advanced machine learning models and deep learning, using a variety of available datasets [59]. Deforestation has increased in speed and intensity in the important Amazon rainforest due to numerous factors, including migrant occupation of rural lands, mineral exploration, and timber extraction. The deforestation creates negative impacts on Brazil’s biodiversity [60]. AI approaches can help. For example, AI can analyze satellite data and ground-based sensors to monitor forest conditions and detect activities such as illegal deforestation [20]. Example 11: Leal et al. [60] show that AI and, more specifically, artificial neural networks (ANN) can successfully estimate the deforestation rates by rural property, hence showing the high potential of ANN as a tool to estimate deforestation rates. In the Amazon rainforest, machine learning is used to demonstrate the significant influence on the deforestation process of regular roadway network and clandestine roadway network in the last 30 years [61]. Example 12: ForestNet is a deep learning model developed to automatically identify and classify the drivers of primary forest loss in Indonesia, using satellite imagery [62]. Indonesia suffers one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, hence the role of deforestation in its emissions profile is significantly larger than the rest of the world [63]. Example 13: NASA is using machine learning algorithms and supercomputers to map non-forest trees across a wide area to calculate how much carbon they store. The aim of the project is to enhance understanding of Earth’s carbon cycle and how it is changing over time [64]. A number of trends are resulting in land degradation, defined as the reduction or loss of the biological or economic productivity of land [65]. These trends include unsustainable land use management strategies, population growth, and urbanization, and are affecting the well-being of billions of people [66]. Taken together, land degradation and desertification affect over half of the land used for agriculture globally [29]. Deforestation and climate change contribute to soil SDG 15 targets are all connected: the main key threats affecting biodiversity are human activities, loss of habitat, deforestation, desertification, climate change, overharvesting, and introduction of invasive alien species ( IAS ). Here, again, AI technologies can support the achievements of SDG 15. AI and complementary technologies alone will not resolve the threats to life below ocean and life on land. An exhaustive analysis of other enabling factors, barriers and challenges to overcome so that AI advances can be adequately embedded into decision-making processes is outside the scope of this study. However, suffice it to mention institutional barriers, safety, ethics of AI, misuse of AI-related information, digital surveillance and privacy, legislation related to transparency and accountability of AI, Green AI, regulatory insight and oversight, and insufficient integration of science with regulatory authorities [5–7,66,76,77]. Through our literature searches and exploration of AI-based approaches to contribute toward SDGs 14 and 15, we observe that emerging AI systems are primarily at the research, proof-of concept stage, within universities, often in conjunction with research centers. Without the role of business to help accelerate the achievements of SDGs 14 and 15, progress will be slow, which humanity cannot afford as time is running out. Fortunately, business, and even startups can get involved. This is enabled by the fact that academic researchers, alone or in partnership with others, make their datasets, models and findings readily available to support current and future research. This is important since more open and reproducible science is essential to adequately embed science into the decision-making process and to support the development and commercialization of innovation and technologies [66]. With only a decade left to meet the global goals, business as usual is clearly not an option for government , universities, research centers, and the private sector . All stakeholders must take an interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral approach to work collaboratively to accelerate progress towards the SDGs. The rapid development of AI technologies can and should be harnessed to reach these goals , in a sustainable fashion. Our framework could be adapted to map current and proposed AI policies and governance mechanisms against SDGs with a view to identify policy areas most urgently needed for beneficial AI technologies to emerge yet proactively anticipate and mitigate potential harmful impacts . This work should be coordinated at the global level for optimum impacts and speed. Our framework could lead to a deeper understanding of potential AI-enabled business opportunities to overcome the severe implications of the SDGs 14 and 15 for global food security, nature, and humanity. Businesses can use our M3 framework to help determine where their efforts should lie to competitively bring novel products and services aligned with the “end goal” of our framework, seeking collaborators and developing sustainable business models.

['The scholarly literature on the links between Artificial Intelligence and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals is burgeoning as climate change and the biotic crisis leading to mass extinction of species are raising concerns across the globe. With a focus on Sustainable Development Goals 14 (Life below Water) and 15 (Life on Land), this paper explores the opportunities of Artificial Intelligence applications in various domains of wildlife, ocean and land conservation. For this purpose, we develop a conceptual framework on the basis of a comprehensive review of the literature and examples of Artificial Intelligence-based approaches to protect endangered species, monitor and predict animal behavior patterns, and track illegal or unsustainable wildlife trade. Our findings provide scholars, governments, environmental organizations, and entrepreneurs with a much-needed taxonomy and real-life examples of Artificial Intelligence opportunities for tackling the grand challenge of rapidly decreasing biological diversity, which has severe implications for global food security, nature, and humanity. Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and supporting digital technologies have opened the door to the application of AI-enabled systems to tackle global challenges. As such, AI holds great promise to accelerate many of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals [1,2]. In 2015, all United Nations Member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet. The agenda encompasses 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 targets to end poverty and hunger, and strategies to improve health, education, spur economic growth, while tackling climate change and preserving oceans and forests [3] in all countries, regardless of their actual development status [4]. Great progress has been achieved in some of the goals, in particular goals related to primary health and education [5]. Of significant concern though are goals where progress is more challenging due to complex systemic global issues such as climate change, ocean health, and biodiversity loss, and for which time to address them is running out [5]. Considering this situation, the focus of our research is on two specific environmentrelated SDGs: SDG 14, Life below Water, and SDG 15, Life on Land. The goal of SDG 14 is to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”, while the goal of SDG 15 is to “protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss” [3]. At this time, these two SDGs are languishing at the bottom of priorities by industry and countries alike and are not receiving the attention they require [6]. Yet, these goals are very relevant for many sectors, not to mention humanity—hence, the impetus for our research. The scholarly literature on the links between AI and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is burgeoning. On the one hand, AI is believed to contribute technological solutions and breakthroughs to advance the UN’s SDGs [1,4,7,8]. On the other hand, studies have shown the unintended consequences of AI [1,7], particularly related to societal impacts, reduced inequalities (SDG 10) [9] and ethical considerations [10]. Despite these unintended consequences being worthy of further research, our work concentrates on AI’s positive current and potential contributions to SDGs 14 and 15. Previous scholarly work has investigated AI-enabled technologies to all SDGs. Among them, Palomares et al. [4] conducted a SWOT analysis of AI technologies to determine whether they act as facilitators or barriers to each of the SDGs. Vinuesa et al. [7] investigated the positive and negative impacts of AI on the SDGs and identified important aspects that are currently overlooked in research. Sætra [1] broadened the investigation of AI and SDGs by factoring in a larger context, interlinkages, and AI’s ethical implications and sustainability to avoid AI hype. Other studies have investigated specific aspects of AI related to SDGs such as global governance, policy perspectives, the role of business, ethics, knowledge spillovers, Green AI, AI in Industry 4.0, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related impacts of AI, among others [8,9,11–18]. Despite this wealth of AI knowledge, our review of the literature since the adoption of the UN SDGs did not reveal previous work related to the categorization of AI approaches and opportunities specifically related to SDGs 14 and 15. This is deeply concerning and a critical research gap. Without a strong understanding and an organization of AI avenues of solution to SDGs related to the environment such as SDGs 14 and 15, the research risks being disjointed. Furthermore, with less than ten years to deliver the SDGs by 2030— dubbed the “decade of action” [5,6]—concerted and cooperative efforts from governments, private and public sector organizations are urgently needed. The purpose of our study is not to provide an exhaustive and all-encompassing literature review of this extensive field, but rather to investigate the extant academic and practitioner literature and propose a conceptual framework to categorize AI opportunities for various domains of wildlife, ocean and land conservation. Of note, the study does not focus on any specific type of AI, but rather explores the variety of options in the conservation context. This study is one of the pioneers that discusses the role of AI technologies in SDGs 14 and 15 specifically and provides a conceptual framework to guide future research. The framework can be built upon for further exploration as its application is largely transferable to other SDGs. Moreover, we support Sætra’s conclusion [17] that there is a need to go beyond simplistic analyses of AI applications per specific SDG. Hence, the framework can be used to further investigate the deterioration of natural habitat and decrease in biological diversity—that is, the biotic crisis leading to mass extinction of species. Our findings provide scholars, governments, environmental organizations, and entrepreneurs with a much-needed taxonomy and examples of AI opportunities for tackling these grand challenges that have severe implications for global food security, nature, and humanity. The 17 SDGs can be organized into three main dimensions: economic, social, and environmental [4]. Under the environmental dimension, the natural environment comprises three SDGs: SDG 13, Climate Action; SDG 14, Life below Water; and SDG 15, Life on Land [4]. In this study, our focus is on SDGs 14 and 15, addressing marine and land life. This section summarizes the two SDGs of interest and provides a brief overview of AI along with the status of AI in the achievement of those SDGs. SDG 14, Life below Water, aims to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development” [19]. More than three billion people rely on the ocean for their livelihoods, and over 80 percent of world trade is transported by sea [19]. Ocean activity has increased by 26 percent since pre-industrial levels and is expected to increase by a further 125 percent during the current century [5]. However, the sustainability of oceans is under severe threat due to human activities. Rising CO2 emissions, acidification and deoxygenation, overfishing, and land-based pollutants lead to long-term repercussions requiring urgent actions to protect marine environments, invest in ocean science, and support small-scale fishing communities as well as sustainably manage the oceans [19]. The chemistry of the oceans is changing faster than at any point in 300 million years, resulting in acidification and rising temperatures of oceans [20]. Every year, some 8 million tons of plastic—and their toxins—enter the oceans [21]. Coastal areas are home to nearly 40 percent of the world’s population. These areas face growing risks from eutrophication—that is, excess nutrient loading into coastal environments resulting from human activities Fertilizer run-off, livestock waste, sewage discharge, aquaculture and atmospheric nitrogen emissions are the main drivers of eutrophication [19]. Coral reefs are increasingly at a risk of collapse due to global heating and overfishing, resulting in a loss of coastal protection from sea-level rise, and impacts on tourism and fisheries [22]. Living coral has declined by half globally since the 1950s, resulting in some 60 percent of coral-reef-associated biodiversity [22]. Over half of marine key biodiversity areas are not protected. Further, “dead zones”—areas of water that lack sufficient oxygen to support marine life—are rising at an alarming rate [19,20]. The Second World Ocean Assessment report from the United Nations notes that the understanding of the ocean is continuing to improve. However, human activities continue to degrade the ocean. Furthermore, a lack of quantification of the impacts of pressures and their cumulative effects on ocean remains [23,24]. Of particular concern is the low level of funding for marine research, particularly compared to the oceans’ enormous economic contribution. Marine research requires expensive research vessels and specially designed advanced technologies and equipment. It is also logistically challenging. Still, the proportion of gross domestic expenditure on ocean science is smaller than that of other major fields of research [19]. Adding to these constraints, COVID-19 has led to dramatic reductions in ocean observations and the full impact of the pandemic on ocean science is still unknown [19]. That said, target 14.a, i.e., “increase scientific knowledge, research, and technology for ocean health”, aims to address these challenges. The UN has defined seven key targets for SDG 14 (14.1 through 14.7) and three additional targets (14.a, 14.b and 14.c) for resource mobilization and policy to be achieved by 2030 [25]. These targets are described in Table 1. Aiming to reach the targets includes setting and measuring key indicators, along with the drafting and implementation of international legal and institutional frameworks. The achievement of “Life below Water” goal and targets are measured by a set of key indicators [25]. SDG 15, Life on Land, aims to “protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss” [27]. Terrestrial ecosystems are critical to all aspects of human life, considering that over 80 percent of the human diet is provided by plants [28]. However, human-influenced drivers are causing unprecedented shifts and degradation of terrestrial ecosystems [29]. Forests are biodiverse ecosystems, providing habitats to over four-fifths of all terrestrial species, as well as sources of clean air and water [29]. The UN reports that progress to safeguard key biodiversity areas has stalled over the last five years [27]. The planet is losing its biodiversity at “mass extinction” rates: species’ populations have declined by around 60 percent since 1970 [20]. The risk of species extinction has worsened by almost 10 percent in the past 25 years alone [5]. Further, an estimated 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their livelihood [29], and forests are home to more than 80 percent of all terrestrial species of animals, plants and insects [28]. Forests act as carbon sinks by absorbing about two billion tons of carbon dioxide per year [2]. Yet, current deforestation rates could lead to a drop in rainfall, triggering wider consequences for the Earth’s atmospheric circulatory systems [20]. Although progress has been made towards sustainable forest management, the world has lost 100 million hectares of forest over the last 20 years [27]. Desertification and land degradation affect over half of the land used for agriculture globally. Land degradation disproportionately affects the global poor [28,29]. On a more positive note, almost all countries have adopted legislation for preventing or controlling invasive alien species. These alien species negatively affect native biodiversity [27]. The UN has defined nine key targets for SDG 15 (SDG 15.1 through 15.9) and three additional targets (15.a, 15.b and 15.c) for resource mobilization and policy to be achieved by 2030, described in Table 2 below [30]. As for all of the SDGs, the achievements of the Life on Land goal and targets are measured by a set of key indicators [30]. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is generally defined as the intellect expressed by computer systems—as opposed to human intelligence—that can sense their environment, think, learn, and act [31]. Its definition has evolved over time and is further divided into two types: artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), which includes all current AI—that is, AI applications developed for a particular task, such as Google search; and artificial general intelligence (AGI), which remains theoretical but is rapidly becoming feasible with the proliferation of applications [9]. AGI encompasses machines with abilities to reach and pass human intelligence, for instance autonomous cars [32] that are increasingly capable of performing complex intellectual tasks similarly to humans. In the context of the SDGs, the United Nations defines AI as an ensemble of advanced technologies that enable “machines capable of imitating certain functionalities of human intelligence, including such features as perception, learning, reasoning, problem solving, language interaction, and even producing creative work” [10]. AI is not a new phenomenon, given that the term “artificial intelligence” was first coined in 1955 [4]. However, technical advances have allowed a more rapid progress in recent years [10]. Despite this progress, AI is still in its infancy, and its evolution is therefore challenging to predict [8]. That said, AI has reached a stage of development and widespread application that provides hope for its contribution to achieving the SDGs [4,15]. Essentially, AI accomplishes complex goals by collecting data from its environment and processing that data to learn the way to achieve the goal it was designed for. Hence, the main elements of an AI system are: (1) computational system, i.e., software or hardware that can process data through algorithms, (2) data, and (3) end goal [4]. An AI system requires the following skills [4,31,33]. Knowledge representation: input data represented in a specific format that can be stored and processed. Natural language processing: algorithms that process human language input and convert it into understandable representations. Computer vision/image analytics: pull of relevant information from images for advanced classification and analysis. Machine learning: learning algorithms to work with extremely large datasets, capacity to extrapolate patterns, adapt to new scenarios, and to learn from examples, and deep learning, a subset of machine learning, that constructs artificial neural networks to mimic the structure and function of the human brain. Automated reasoning: capacity to perform specific actions based on input data and information/knowledge stored. Major AI disciplines focus on endowing AI systems with the capacity for reasoning and decision making, and for learning, based on input data. AI systems learn by processing known examples and observations [4]. As such, machine learning is a family of techniques for AI systems to learn and adapt without following explicit instructions, by using algorithms and statistical models to analyze and draw inferences from patterns in data [24]. Basic types of machine learning include (i) supervised learning (learning based training data), (ii) unsupervised learning (learning relies on the machine to seek patterns by finding similarities on non-annotated data), and (iii) reinforcement learning (based on an iterative process of rewarding and punishing the algorithm to learn a specific task) [4]. According to a recent report by PwC, there are various forms of AI intelligence today, namely automated, assisted, augmented, and autonomous intelligence [31]. While assisted and augmented intelligence differ in terms of representing hardwired versus adaptive systems, both keep humans in the loop. Automated and autonomous intelligence also differ in terms of adaptivity, but do not necessitate human assistance and replace human routines and tasks with computing power. Indeed, AI often requires other digital technologies to complement data acquisition, processing, storage and communications, and interaction to perform required tasks. These so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies include blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT), 3D technologies, 5G communication infrastructure, Big Data, augmented/virtual reality (AR/VR), and emerging technologies, such as quantum computing and generic engineering, that have not yet reached their maturity but will be transformative [4,5]. Recently, Mabkhot et al. [14] investigated the extent to which 4IR technologies contribute to each of the SDGs. Among 4IR technologies, Big Data and analytics are strong contributors to all of the SDGs, but the influence of 4IR on SDGs 14 and 15 is generally weaker than for other SDGs [5,14]. AI-driven robotics are also part of the AI landscape, addressing smart machines with the capacity to act and move in the physical world. For example, more drones are now enabled by robotics, able to fly without a pilot and operate autonomously [5]. Most innovations related to AI are a combination of existing and new technology. For example, AI + sensors + big data + drones = precision monitoring [5]. Self-driving cars or autonomous vehicles are other examples of AI-driven robotics: they must learn from their input data, and deal with the uncertainty and complexity to determine the most optimal ways to complete a journey [4]. Autonomous vehicles are the results of combining sensors + robotics + AI + 5G [5]. For AI systems in general, and to accelerate the realization of SDGs, they must be trusted by people; in other words, these systems must be robust, lawful, and ethical, referred to as “trustworthy AI systems” [4,34]. Emerging technologies such as blockchains can help improve trust in applications such as fisheries [24]. The World Economic Forum and the multinational consulting firm PwC estimate that advanced and emerging technologies under the umbrella of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies, or Industry 4.0, which includes AI, blockchain, Internet of Things, 5G and drones, could accelerate progress towards over two-third of SDGs [5]. As evidence of the unprecedented speed and scale of AI technologies in the economy, estimates suggest that AI could increase global GDP by nearly USD 16 trillion by 2030 [31]. That said, inequalities abound. Economic and environmental gains of tackling environmental challenges with AI technologies would predominantly be captured by Europe, East Asia and North America due to these regions’ current digital readiness and levels of technology adoption, while Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa would stand to gain the least [20]. Hence, there is an opportunity and an urgent need to strengthen innovation capacity globally to accelerate SDG progress, taking into consideration the concept of inclusive innovation to reduce the inequality-increasing effects of innovation [35]. A recent PwC report has mapped some 345 technology applications across the SDGs, as a representation of the most prominent innovations. The report summarizes these technologies and their level of maturity (low, medium, high) for SDGs 14 and 15. For example, high-maturity AI technologies include aquatic or land habitat monitoring, detection, and analytics, while low-maturity technologies include genome modification and advanced nanorobotics [36]. However, the report notes that emerging solutions (low maturity) could still outperform mature solutions over the coming decade to 2030, if the enabling environment is supportive, and/or the solution has a large market and high disruptive capability [36]. Currently though, the World Economic Forum [5] notes that many emerging solutions are nascent, with a focus on commercial market gains rather than achieving global goals. These promising solutions will likely be unable to move past the concept or demonstration stages without an enabling and supportive environment that values broader environmental and social goals. We conducted a comprehensive and interdisciplinary literature review to identify the connections between AI and SDGs, with a focus on SDGs 14 and 15. Specifically, we examined both the academic and practitioner literatures to ascertain the state of knowledge of AI practices and opportunities to positively contribute to the achievement of these two SDGs. The aim of this literature search is to develop a categorization framework of academic and emerging practices in AI-based approaches in wildlife and land conservation. From that framework, we identify research gaps and propose avenues for future investigations. Similarly to Sætra [1], this study contains a theoretically based development of a framework to describe AI as a general scientific field and as more specific AI applications for SDGs 14 and 15. This means that we are using the existing scholarly research on AI and the SDGs, with a direct focus on SDGs 14 and 15. We supplemented this analysis by examining recent related AI and SDGs reports from reputable international organizations such as the United Nations, World Economic Forum, and OECD, among others, along with reports from world leader multinational professional service providers such as PwC and Deloitte. As the United Nations member states adopted the SDGs in 2015, our literature review has primarily concentrated on the most recent developments since 2019. We note that our aim is not to conduct a formal systematic literature review but rather to approach our work from a narrative literature review perspective. Whereas systematic reviews are best suited to addressing highly structured and specific research questions, the goal of a narrative literature review is to examine important topics, describe the current state in focused areas of inquiry, advance theory development, propose directions for research, and focus and shape research questions. Baumeister and Leary [37] note that narrative literature reviews can tackle broader and more abstract questions and are particularly useful for linking together many studies to note their connections. Thus, this type of review can serve to inform the field and propose ways forward. However, narrative reviews have been criticized as having potential problems, arising mainly from the fact that narrative reviews need not be exhaustive in literature selection. The main limitations arise from the possibility of selection biases that can lead to erroneous conclusions [38]. To mitigate these potential issues, our review of the research literature drew processes for literature selection from previously published systematic reviews and supplemented the process by identifying a research area, identifying inclusion criteria, and selecting studies that meet the criteria. Of note, our study does not focus solely on a specific industry or literature stream, instead aiming at investigating the broader role of AI to our selected targets under SDGs 14 and 15. We organized our review of the literature in four phases as shown in Figure 1. Phase 1 focused on reviewing scholarly work for systematic literature reviews of AI related to SDGs. The scholarly literature on the links between AI technologies and the SDGs is burgeoning. In this first phase, we identified recent literature reviews related to AI and SDGs to ascertain the state of the academic literature in this field. To do so, we conducted a search of recent literature reviews using Google Scholar. The search yielded only a few academic literature reviews specifically addressing aspects of AI and SDGs [4,7,8]. We summarize the reviews as below. Palomares et al. [4] conducted a comprehensive literature review and found 869 articles that discuss the application of AI and digital technologies to the SDGs. These articles were then classified by SDG targets. Of these 869 articles, only 45 and 43 articles were related to SDG 14 and 15, respectively. The authors offer a comprehensive panoramic view of AI technologies for achieving the SDGs, along with a SWOT analysis of AI-driven technologies as facilitators or barriers for each of the SDGs [4]. They note the important contribution of AI-based technologies in achieving the SDGs. Nonetheless, they stress the need for a symbiotic relationship between AI and various digital technologies, the importance of the undergoing digital transformation in the development of the SDGs, and the need for high-quality, open and large-scale data infrastructures, since AI systems are fueled by big data. Vinuesa et al. [7] categorized the 17 SDGs into Society, Economy and Environment Groups, and demonstrated the positive impacts of AI on 134 targets across all the goals but a negative impact for 59 targets across all the goals, based on published evidence of AI serving either as an enabler or an inhibitor of the SDGs [7]. The authors looked at the role of AI in achieving the SDGs and found many examples of AI applications to the environment goals (SDGs 13, 14, and 15). They highlight the imperative to develop the necessary regulatory insight and oversight for AI-based technologies to enable sustainable development and to determine the ethical standards that AI-based technology should be subjected to. Finally, Di Vaio et al. [8] conducted a systematic literature review of studies on AI and sustainable business models in light of SDGs, during the period 1990–2019, which yielded 73 articles. The authors found that the role of AI in the development of such sustainable business models from the perspective of the SDGs is not well explored in the literature [8]. Next, phase 2 comprised a review of scholarly and practitioner work for AI articles related to SDGs 14 and 15. In this second phase, we relied on Scopus database consultation, Google Scholar, and manual retrieval of articles from references of various scholarly and practitioner work to investigate the present state-of-the art literature on the role of AI in tackling SDGs 14 and 15 specifically. We chose a period of 2015 to 2021 inclusively, since the UN adopted the SDGs in 2015. Thereafter, phase 3 included a selection of illustrative examples of AI applied to SDGs 14 and 15. Illustrative examples of application of AI to selected targets of SDGs 14 and 15 were chosen for their direct relevance to a target, from a credible source, and generally no older than three years. Care was taken to identify illustrative examples for every selected target of SDGs 14 and 15. Finally, phase 4 consisted of the development of a framework and mapping of illustrative examples. In this last phase of the work, we developed a conceptual framework that best represents findings from the previous three phases and mapped the selected illustrative examples onto the framework. The illustrative examples are not intended to be exhaustive, but to be representative of recent applications of AI-enabled technologies in connection with SDGs 14 and 15. They are valuable for our intended purpose of proposing an organizing framework to help grasp the extent of current and emerging AI-enabled applications and identify opportunities. The ocean is the largest ecosystem on the planet, covering two-thirds of the earth’s surface and containing 97 percent of the planet’s water [19]. The ocean supports life, produces more than 50 percent of the oxygen we breathe, moderates the climate, facilitates global trade and energy production, provides food, energy, water, jobs and economic benefits, and supports tourism [19,39,40]. However, human activities have inflicted a massive decline in ocean health, yet our reliance on the ocean ecosystem is likely to increase. As indicated by interrelated goal and targets of SDG 14, significant challenges must be addressed, all of which require data. Fortunately, concerted efforts have led to the availability of large datasets to improve global-scale ocean governance and assess the effectiveness of policies [41]. That said, Palomares et al. [4] point out the dearth of intelligent monitoring and management systems in the least developing countries, which accentuates problems related to illegal fishing, dumping and ocean pollution. The application of AI and machine learning approaches for SDG 14 is contributing to better monitoring of illegal, unregulated and unreported catches, improving traceability of products, reducing wastage in supply chains and improving the monitoring of movements of fishing fleets, among others [23]. Marine litter and plastic pollution are another threat to marine ecosystems and biodiversity [42–44]. Several AI-based applications have been developed to automatically detect, classify, and quantify floating marine litter in aerial images to help monitor and assess the environmental threat [43,44], including remote sensing technologies combined with machine learning algorithms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and satellite imagery [44]. Example 1: MARLIT is a floating marine waste detection web app that operates on an algorithm with deep learning capabilities. The system uses AI to learn from some 4000 aerial images of the coast around Catalonia to identify the presence, density, and distribution of waste, rather than by direct observations owing to the sheer scale of the data. The deep learning techniques of the system’s open access algorithm, boosted by artificial neuronal networks, automate the quantification and categorization of marine litter. Upcoming improvements to MARLIT include adapting it for use with remote sensors, which could then enable it to be used with drones as part of a fully automated process [45]. Plastic and microplastic debris do not all float but are instead collecting at the bottom of the ocean. The largest patch of such debris is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, covering 1.6 million square kilometers with its 80,000 tons of plastic waste [25,33]. Autonomous and real-time AI systems are used to map marine debris, with results disseminated through open-source maps [33]. Other AI-based systems tackle the removal of marine debris either from the ocean or by collecting it at the source, i.e., from the rivers [33]. Example 2: Ocean Cleanup, a Dutch company, has developed an AI-based ocean cleaning system that uses algorithms to identify the optimal deployment location to collect the garbage. Real-time telemetry monitors the health and functioning of the system [46]. Example 3: Researchers in the Czech Republic have developed self-propelled microrobots that can swim, attach to plastics, and break them down. This proof-of-concept study could pave the way toward systems that can capture and degrade microplastics [47]. A crucial role of the ocean is that of climate regulation, which requires a better understanding of the ocean and the seafloor. However, less than 10 percent of the seafloor has been mapped and at depths of less than 4000 m [33]. A stronger understanding of the impact of human activities and effects of climate change on climate regulation from the ocean is needed. AI can provide faster and better data collection and analysis [33]. This target aims to sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts by strengthening their resilience and taking action for their restoration [23]. The main threats to marine ecosystems, again, come from hu- man activities: fishing, aquaculture, shipping, sand and mineral extraction, oil and gas exploitation, and pollution, among others [23]. Example 4: IBM has pioneered autonomous AI-powered microscopes that assess the health of plankton and share the information in the cloud. The goal is to create 3D models of plankton and monitor them in their natural environment. Microscopic plankton species are key indicators of ocean pollution levels, not to mention the base of the ocean food chain, and hence, they are quite crucial to fisheries [40,48]. This technology is being explored to provide early detection of oil spills and other signs of toxicity in the water [40]. The global footprint of fishing is much larger than those of other forms of food production, even though fisheries provide only a small fraction of global caloric production for human food consumption [41]. It is estimated that fish provide 20 percent of animal protein to about 3 billion people [27]. Yet, that footprint is poorly understood and quantified. The sustainability of fisheries is essential to the livelihoods of billions of people and particularly in developing countries where the vast majority of fishermen live [49]. Considering that 152 countries are coastal countries [50], AI technologies can supplant the high cost of direct observations of fishing activity on board vessels and improve the management of and efficiency in fisheries [23,51]. Drones are being explored to identify and video record boats that are illegally fishing [40]. Example 5: Refind Technologies in Sweden installed an AI software in a fishing boat to help identify fish subspecies from photographs taken by the system [52]. Such automized recognition of image recognition in fisheries allows the analysis of large data volumes on removals of commercial fishing fleets, and at lower costs [24]. Several other recent AIbased systems have become reality and are poised to enable the automation of biodiversity monitoring [53], helping also in the tracking of endangered species. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major threat to marine biodiversity [54], even in marine protected areas, which are set up to help fish stocks recover from prior over-exploitation [51]. IUU represents a major cost for society as a whole [51] and a huge global challenge. The achievement of target 14.4 is directly linked to target 14.6, i.e., end subsidies contributing to overfishing [50]. Example 6: Satlink, a Spanish startup, is using AI to collect data on catchments and releases to hold fishing boats accountable to their catches and quotas [40]. Blockchains can help combat IUU fishing and sustainability of marine ecosystems by improving traceability from “bait to plate”, to help address illegal fishing [54]. The nature of the technology is such that the data in the blockchain are, with some caveats, tamper proof, and blockchain is self-organizing across jurisdictional borders and institutional responsibilities [24]. This is important as the issues of oceans are transboundary in nature. They require global policies, commitments, and management from public and private actors to make progress [5]. Some believe that blockchain will become the industry standard for transparency and traceability in fisheries [54]. Fishcoin has even become a moniker to refer to blockchainbased seafood traceability [55]. Yet, maintaining blockchains in near real-time requires communication infrastructure, such as satellite communication, appropriate bandwidth and stable network connections, which might prove challenging, not to mention cost prohibitive for small-scale fisheries [24]. It would be naive to think that blockchain, data mining, and AI will eradicate IUU fishing. However, these examples demonstrate that technology can improve compliance to laws and regulations and help consumers make better informed purchasing decisions [5,24], which is SDG 12, Responsible consumption and Production. SDGs and targets are challenges that offer a multitude of entrepreneurial opportunities as evidenced by the following examples. Example 7: Provenance, a UK-based company, applies blockchain to create end-toend transparency in supply chains, including fishing products [56]. This contributes to sustainability and food safety related to fish. Example 8: OpenSC, a collaborative venture, has developed a supply chain transparency platform based on blockchain to verify and trace large amounts of Patagonian tooth fish and prawns [54]. Coral reefs form the life system of the ocean, yet they are some of the most threatened ecosystems on the planet. Currently, 75 percent of the world’s coral reefs are threatened [57]. Reefs play a key life nurturing role as an ecosystem, with 25 percent of all marine life depending on coral reefs [57] and half a billion people depending on reefs for their livelihood [57]. Example 9: CoralNet is a web-based AI resource that analyzes coral reefs, using deep neural networks that allow annotation of images. This open-source application serves as a data repository and a collaboration platform [58]. Example 10: Similarly, CORail is an international partnership including Intel, Accenture and the Sulubaaï Environmental Foundation (Philippines) to collect reef data using AI-driven video analytics, cameras fitted in the ocean, and continuous and non-invasive monitoring to assist researchers determine strategies to protect reefs [33]. SDG 15 aims to tackle issues of deforestation, land degradation and desertification, which cause loss of biodiversity, and to eliminate poaching and trafficking of protected species, as well as prevent invasive alien species [2]. The loss of forests and biodiversity is staggering. It is estimated that one million animal and plant species are facing extinction, equaling to 22 percent of known animal species. Forests are the habitat of most terrestrial animals, plants, and insects. Forests also combat climate owing to their carbon sink capacity, that is, absorbing more carbon than it releases. Managing forests sustainably could increase their capacity to remove human-produced carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, hence reducing greenhouse gas emissions [2]. AI technologies can help address SDG 15 targets, and we are looking at solutions for the related targets 15.2, 15.3, 15.5, 15.7 and 15.8. Considerations for studying deforestation include identifying the factors that affect it, predicting where deforestation will occur, and predicting how much forest will be lost. These considerations involve a large number of interrelated variables that are well suited to using more advanced machine learning models and deep learning, using a variety of available datasets [59]. Deforestation has increased in speed and intensity in the important Amazon rainforest due to numerous factors, including migrant occupation of rural lands, mineral exploration, and timber extraction. The deforestation creates negative impacts on Brazil’s biodiversity [60]. AI approaches can help. For example, AI can analyze satellite data and ground-based sensors to monitor forest conditions and detect activities such as illegal deforestation [20]. Example 11: Leal et al. [60] show that AI and, more specifically, artificial neural networks (ANN) can successfully estimate the deforestation rates by rural property, hence showing the high potential of ANN as a tool to estimate deforestation rates. In the Amazon rainforest, machine learning is used to demonstrate the significant influence on the deforestation process of regular roadway network and clandestine roadway network in the last 30 years [61]. Example 12: ForestNet is a deep learning model developed to automatically identify and classify the drivers of primary forest loss in Indonesia, using satellite imagery [62]. Indonesia suffers one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, hence the role of deforestation in its emissions profile is significantly larger than the rest of the world [63]. Example 13: NASA is using machine learning algorithms and supercomputers to map non-forest trees across a wide area to calculate how much carbon they store. The aim of the project is to enhance understanding of Earth’s carbon cycle and how it is changing over time [64]. A number of trends are resulting in land degradation, defined as the reduction or loss of the biological or economic productivity of land [65]. These trends include unsustainable land use management strategies, population growth, and urbanization, and are affecting the well-being of billions of people [66]. Taken together, land degradation and desertification affect over half of the land used for agriculture globally [29]. Deforestation and climate change contribute to soil degradation [29]. Example 14: Researchers from the University of Geneva in collaboration with researchers from the National Research Council of Italy, the European commission and the European Space Agency have developed a knowledge-generation system to address the challenge of inadequate mapping and monitoring of land degradation changes at the national scale. Building on Trends.Earth, an online platform that monitors land degradation using satellite imagery and global data, itself a relatively new tool [65], the proof-of-concept is a scalable and flexible framework to monitor land degradation at different geographical scales, to support evidence-based policymaking [66]. SDG 15 targets are all connected: the main key threats affecting biodiversity are human activities, loss of habitat, deforestation, desertification, climate change, overharvesting, and introduction of invasive alien species (IAS). Here, again, AI technologies can support the achievements of SDG 15. Example 15: Wildbook, a browser-based tool, is an example of automated identification that uses neural networks and computer-vision algorithms to detect and count animals in images, and to identify these animals within a species, allowing a more precise estimate of wildlife population sizes [52], especially regarding endangered species. Example 16: Conservation Metrics, a California firm that uses AI to assist wildlife monitoring, applied AI to audio files representing 25 days’ worth of recordings of birds colliding with powerlines to measure the number of bird deaths. The system found a much higher number of deaths than expected, motivating researchers to work with the power utility of the studied geographical area to come up with solutions to this issue [52]. Only 3200 tigers are left from more than 60,000 a century ago [67]. Elephants, rhinos and scores of other wild animal species are threatened by extinction due to poaching, which is a growing problem. Gloomily, the number of poached rhinos in South Africa increased from 13 in 2007 to 1215 in 2014 [68]. A substantial amount of poaching occurs within huge nature preserves of some million and more hectares [67,69]. Working on such extensive areas, rangers tasked with protecting endangered wildlife are constantly outnumbered by poachers, given that this lucrative illegal industry is estimated to be worth USD 7 billion [69]. Many countries depend heavily on tourism and visits to protected areas and national parks. Fewer animals also mean fewer tourists, hence less funding to protect these areas and pay park rangers [68], further compounding the problem. Example 17: Wildlife Protection Solutions (WPS), a nonprofit, is using machine learning and a network of motion detectors and cameras to identify more poachers and at a faster pace than ever before using only remote monitoring. The system is estimated to be twice as effective as previous non-machine learning approaches and is constantly improving with more data. Example 18: Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security (PAWS) is an AI-driven system developed by researchers at the University of Southern California that incorporates game theory applied to wildlife protection [67]. With data such as patrol activity and poaching signaling and topographical data, PAWS plans routes for rangers that maximize poacher apprehension while minimizing wildlife risk. As a learning system, more data provides better outcomes against poaching. PAWS has been successfully implemented in Uganda and Malaysia, and is also being enhanced to improve its accuracy for efficient patrols to combat poaching [67]. Example 19: Archangel Imaging, a UK-based start-up, is using AI and satellite communications to tackle wildlife poaching in protested areas and national parts using technology first developed by ESA Space Solutions. The system has cut response times to sightings of poachers from a couple of hours down to minutes. When a poacher is detected by the system, an alert is sent to the nearest park range or a drone. Space technology has allowed the deployment of off-grid AI monitoring [68]. Invasive alien species (IAS) are plants, animals, pathogens, and other organisms that are non-native to an ecosystem. Often, IAS have been introduced by humans into places where they do not belong. These species compete with native species and adversely impact biodiversity and disrupt ecosystem functions. IAS are considered one of the greatest threats to biodiversity and these invasions are accelerating worldwide. Since the 17th century, IAS have contributed to nearly 40 percent of all animal extinctions for which the cause of death is known [70]. In addition to the threat to biodiversity, IAS exacerbate poverty due to their impact on agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and natural systems [70,71]. Sadly, the damage is also aggravated by climate change, pollution, habitat loss and human activities [70]. Example 20: Jensen et al. [71] tested the performance of various machine learning algorithms, using remote sensing data on Kudzu vine, an invasive plant that originated from East Asia and quickly outcompeted native plants in parts of the US. The goal of the study is to enhance the automatic detection of invasive plant species in given geographic areas. Example 21: Carter et al. [72] have developed and tested a rapid machine-learning approach that can provide data-driven management information for early detection of potential invaders. Example 22: Robots can help reduce the threat of invasive species. For example, robot predators are being designed in controlled environments by researchers from UWA and New York University to combat mosquitofish, listed as one of the worst IAS owing to their ability to survive about anywhere, hence creating huge impacts on biodiversity as they outcompete native species [73]. The use of machine learning and deep learning and the development of maps of IAS have increased in recent years. However, the development and testing of machine learning models can be complex and time consuming. AI and machine learning require not only computing power but large amount of training data, which, for endangered species, might be challenging if not impossible to collect. Human input is still needed [52]. That said, open-source programs allow users to export training data and use libraries to create machine-learning models [52]. Another challenge is the nonuniversal access to very large datasets and computer power required to use them, which might negatively impact the use of AI for SDGs [1]. Hence, the use of AI to reduce deforestation, for instance, is considered a major challenge in the least developed countries [4]. Drawing from these recent examples of applications of AI and AI-driven robotics to various domains of wildlife and land conservations under SDGs 14 and 15, we now turn to the development of a conceptual framework to categorize these AI applications and opportunities with a view to portray the state of advancement of AI to contribute to SDGs 14 and 15 and observe the gaps and research opportunities. The framework is a 2-by-3 matrix that reflects the state of the technology’s development and the focus of the application. Specifically, the states are determined as: Current: the components of the overall AI-enabled system are based on existing technologies already in use in wildlife and land conservation. Emerging: one or several components of the overall AI-enabled system are based on new and promising science and technology such that the overall system is more experimental in nature for wildlife, ocean and land conservation, with applications generally falling in the range of proof-of-concepts and feasibility studies. The focus of the applications is the context of AI-enabled applications to SDGs, defined as: Measure: refers to capability of AI-enabled systems to count, estimate, detect, map, identify, or classify parameters of interest. Monitor: refers to the automated capability of AI-enabled systems to assess and follow the evolution of parameters of interest. Mitigate: refers to the capability of AI-enabled systems to contribute to harm reduction from threats to wildlife and land conservation. The Measure–Monitor–Mitigate framework or M3 framework represents a continuum from simpler to increasingly more sophisticated capabilities of AI-enabled systems to help address SDGs 14 and 15 targets. Table 3 summarizes the previously discussed examples using the framework axes in pursuance of placing the AI systems into various cells of our framework. Based on a summary of the examples shown in Table 3, we now map them onto our framework shown in Figure 2 Our framework comprises six cells based on the state of AI technology and the focus of AI-enabled systems for our recent AI application examples to help address selected targets of SDGs 14 and 15. The obvious first observation is the empty Current–Mitigate cell. This finding suggests that the current knowledge and applications of AI and complementary technologies do not extend to mitigating, that is, do not contribute to harm reduction from threats to wildlife and land conservation. This is an important contribution of this study. It shows that without a concerted push to accelerate the development of AI, its applications would essentially linger at measuring and monitoring threats without reaching its potential as a key component of a science-based approach to achieve SDG targets. Referring back to PwC’s study on forms of AI intelligence [31], the results from our literature searches and selected examples of emerging practices in AI-based approaches to SDGs 14 and 15 show that most current AI applications in the various domains of wildlife, ocean and land conservation would fall under “assisted” or “augmented” intelligence rather than “automation” or “autonomous” intelligence. Likewise, using PwC’s report on the mapping of some 345 technology applications across the SDGs [36], most of the AI technologies used in our examples are more likely to fall under “high” maturity with some under “medium” maturity than under “low” maturity. Our review of the literature revealed that SDGs 14 and 15 are currently languishing at the bottom of priorities by countries and industry alike and are not receiving the attention that is urgently required for nature and humanity. The arrow on our framework indicates that the path that is required to move from where most of AI applications tend to be now, that is, in the Current–Measure cell, to the end goal of Emerging–Mitigate cell. With over 60 years of development and rapid advances in recent years [10], undoubtedly, there will be a better and larger variety of solutions in the ever-evolving domain of AI to help achieve SDG targets. However, these solutions cannot be developed in isolation. In effect, various frontier technologies such as blockchain, IoT, and robotics work in tandem with AI to result in better performing systems that can also be adapted to a broader range of wildlife, ocean and land conservation challenges. Our examples in the “emerging” cells and particularly those in the “end goal” cell demonstrate this. Vinuesa et al. [7] raise the possibility that AI could analyze large-scale interconnected databases to support evidence-based decision making related to SDGs and the environment (SDGs 13, 14 and 15). On that note though, AI benefits for some SDGs might turn out to be disadvantages for others, or enablers/inhibitors also raised by Vinuesa et al. [7]. For instance, high energy data centers to run blockchains aimed at helping to achieve targets under SDGs 14 and 15 such as the Fishcoin blockchain application from our examples could have a detrimental effect on targets under SDG 13, Climate Action, particularly depending on the nature of the energy source used to run such data centers. In that vein, Microsoft is exploring the feasibility of subsea datacenters powered by renewable energy, on-shore wind and solar, off-shore tide and wave, with Project Natick, a deployment of a full-scale datacenter module in the North Sea [74,75]. AI and complementary technologies alone will not resolve the threats to life below ocean and life on land. An exhaustive analysis of other enabling factors, barriers and challenges to overcome so that AI advances can be adequately embedded into decision-making processes is outside the scope of this study. However, suffice it to mention institutional barriers, safety, ethics of AI, misuse of AI-related information, digital surveillance and privacy, legislation related to transparency and accountability of AI, Green AI, regulatory insight and oversight, and insufficient integration of science with regulatory authorities [5–7,66,76,77]. Through our literature searches and exploration of AI-based approaches to contribute toward SDGs 14 and 15, we observe that emerging AI systems are primarily at the research, proof-of concept stage, within universities, often in conjunction with research centers. Conversely, we observed that some of the new discoveries led to the formation of new ventures, such as OpenSC, a venture co-founded by WWF and BCG Digital Ventures [54]. International scientific collaboration to achieve scientific progress is a well-discussed mechanism in the literature [78,79]. On that note, it is uplifting to observe the numerous ISCs related to SDGs in our study and selected examples. This is in line with Payumo et al.’s [80] mapping of collaborations and partnerships in SDG research, which shows an increased collaboration rate, particularly at the institutional level and in the US, the UK, and Europe. Careful considerations of inclusive innovation [81] must be at the forefront to address the AI divide between developed and developing nations and resulting inequalities [7,13,15,82]. Commercialization of science and technology from universities and research centers, including knowledge and technology transfer to business, is a long and arduous process fraught with obstacles [83]. Scalability is often the next step in current AI-enabled systems for SDGs 14 and 15. Therefore, SDGs can become a catalyst for innovation for business, small and large [6] and cross-industry collaboration [5]. Enabled by strong leadership and embedded in business strategic goals, engagement with SDGs can lead to fruitful collaborative research partnerships and technology transfer opportunities for entrepreneurs to scale up and commercialize emerging AI-enabled technology solutions for planet, people and profits, using sustainable business models [84]. Recent applications and opportunities for further cross-sectoral and cross-industry collaboration include the use of machine learning to model an environmental system such as an aquatic ecosystem to forecast its behavior, analyze its capability to react to natural or human-induced disturbances and unforeseen events, and provide decision-making aid to implement suitable measures to protect it [85,86]. Likewise, the application of AI methods or models in a specific context, for instance the application of deep learning and meta-transfer model to make predictions in one aquatic habitat based on a model developed in another aquatic habitat [86]. Another area includes beneficial symbiotic human-robot collaboration, as it allows for robots to take care of both dangerous and harmful tasks and tasks that require accuracy and care [87–89]. It is indisputable that the private sector must and can play a key role in developing and commercializing innovative products and services that will contribute to achieving SDGs. That said, the academic literature mentions the need to better understand the role of business in addressing SDGs [16]. A case in point, Mio et al.’s [16] systematic literature review of SDGs and the strategic role of business found that among industries, mining, banking, fishing, and tourism industries were most investigated in academic studies about businesses and SDGs. As for specific SDGs, they compared academic research with evidence from corporate practice [6] and found that the most discussed SDG was Goal 9 (Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure). SDGs 14 and 15 were notably absent. Similarly, PwC’s analysis of 1141 companies in 31 countries [6] shows that SDG 13, Climate Action, appeared in the top three goals for business in essentially all of the countries in the sample. However, SDG 14 did not. These are alarming findings. Without the role of business to help accelerate the achievements of SDGs 14 and 15, progress will be slow, which humanity cannot afford as time is running out. Fortunately, business, and even startups can get involved. This is enabled by the fact that academic researchers, alone or in partnership with others, make their datasets, models and findings readily available to support current and future research. This is important since more open and reproducible science is essential to adequately embed science into the decision-making process and to support the development and commercialization of innovation and technologies [66]. Apparent knowledge spillovers from AI are not as widespread as expected though, as evidenced by a study in Australia [12]. Moreover, application of machine learning is now more accessible. Several organizations and companies are offering pretrained models, model development platforms and open-source models that can enable small firms and entrepreneurs to latch onto potential SDG-related opportunities. In a trust to motivate firms to become more involved in AI research for SDGs, care must be taken that the economic value does not introduce long-term threats to environmental sustainability [7]. This study addressed the need for a better understanding of the evolving field of AI-enabled systems to contribute to the achievements of SDGs, with a direct focus on selected targets of SDGs 14, Life below Water, and SDG 15, Life on Land. The resulting framework makes several important contributions to theory and practice. This study echoes the insights from prior work, and that is the strong and urgent need to harness the opportunities afforded by AI and complementary technologies to help achieve SDG goals related to the environment. This is particularly so for SDGs 14 and 15 that are currently under-researched. Our M3 framework that categorizes practices in AI-based approaches to biodiversity, ocean and land conservation is based on a solid foundation of recent scholarly work. Our findings provide scholars a much-needed taxonomy and an organizing framework to grasp the disjointed literature on AI and SDGs. The M3 framework can be built upon for further exploration. For instance, despite being focused on two SDGs goals and selected related targets, its application is largely transferable to other SDGs. We support Sætra’s conclusion [17] that there is a need to go beyond simplistic analyses of AI applications per specific SDG. Hence, our M3 framework can be applied to further investigate the grand challenge of increasing deterioration of natural habitat and decreasing biological diversity. With only a decade left to meet the global goals, business as usual is clearly not an option for government, universities, research centers, and the private sector. All stakeholders must take an interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral approach to work collaboratively to accelerate progress towards the SDGs. The rapid development of AI technologies can and should be harnessed to reach these goals, in a sustainable fashion. Our framework could be adapted to map current and proposed AI policies and governance mechanisms against SDGs with a view to identify policy areas most urgently needed for beneficial AI technologies to emerge yet proactively anticipate and mitigate potential harmful impacts. This work should be coordinated at the global level for optimum impacts and speed. Our framework could lead to a deeper understanding of potential AI-enabled business opportunities to overcome the severe implications of the SDGs 14 and 15 for global food security, nature, and humanity. Businesses can use our M3 framework to help determine where their efforts should lie to competitively bring novel products and services aligned with the “end goal” of our framework, seeking collaborators and developing sustainable business models. While we recognize that this study has its limitations and caveats, we identified relevant knowledge gaps that provide directions for future research. The analysis and interpretation of findings represent the perspective of the authors. Although we developed a rigorous methodology and conducted a comprehensive review of the literature, we might have missed articles and other material on how AI can positively contribute to the achievement of SDGs 14 and 15. Furthermore, relevant studies might not have been published yet. Our framework concerns SDGs 14 and 15. However, SDGs are interrelated and particularly so with SDG 13, Climate Action. This represents an opportunity to incorporate AI-enabled systems for SDG 13 into our M3 framework to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the state of AI applications toward the three environmental SDGs, that is, SDGs 13, 14 and 15. Overall, the recent and accelerating development of AI technologies generates positive benefits towards the achievements of the SDGs, with further benefits yet to come [10]. This has been our perspective in this study. Realistically, harmful impacts of AI related to SDGs must be further explored, building from prior work [1,4,7] and aiming at producing more responsible AI innovation. Future research directions could also extend to ESG factors to consider AI-related ESG impacts [17]. In closing, it is our hope that our M3 framework will become a helpful tool in the quest to benefit from AI advances to combat what are conceivably the greatest challenges of the current century to our natural world.']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-AdWe-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

AdWe

c768976c780f0f3da36e0dcf808839a89f471ba502e162240ed39a3752581815

3 – The likelihood is near-zero for the next fifty years AND still unlikely long term.

Gunkel ’18 [David; 2018; Ph.D. and Professor in the Department of Communication at Northern Illinois University, award-winning scholar, having authored over 80 scholarly journal articles and book chapters and 12 books; Robot Rights, “Thinking the Unthinkable,” Ch. 1]

get real . Do I think robots have rights within 50 years ? No the likelihood is so small as negligible the technical challenges of insect intelligence now , to human are so great though rights were 200 years ago, human s are by no means upheld . Why easier for robots? In the short term it appears impossible improbable . In the long run unlikely The point is not whether robots qualify as persons , but the framework

Ok, let’s get real . Do I think robots will have (human) rights within 20– 50 years ? No , I do not I think the likelihood is so small as to be negligible . Why? Because the technical challenges of moving from insect -level robot intelligence , which is where we are now , to human -level intelligence are so great After all, even though the rights were established over 200 years ago, human right s are still by no means universally respected or upheld . Why should it be any easier for robots? In the short term it appears to be, if not impossible , then at least highly improbable . In the long run projected into a distant hypothetical future The question concerning robot rights is unlikely and practically not worth the effort The point is not to decide whether robots will qualify someday as a kind of persons , but to reali[z]e that we are stuck within the wrong conceptual framework . The digital is forcing us to rethink new solutions

real robots 20– 50 years No likelihood so small negligible technical insect -level now human -level so great 200 years human s no means respected upheld any easier short term impossible highly improbable distant unlikely not worth not qualify persons wrong conceptual framework rethink

['By all accounts, the report was insufficient, perhaps necessarily so, since it was not a peer-reviewed scientific study but a short thought-piece designed to motivate public discussion. There is, however, a bit of oversteer in these critical responses. In addition to directing criticism at the document and its perceived deficiencies, the respondents also characterized the entire subject of robot rights as a fantastic distraction from the serious work that needs to be done and therefore something no serious researcher would think about, let alone say out loud. In all fairness, it is entirely possible that the remarks were motivated by a well-intended effort to try to direct public attention to the “real problems” and away from dramatic media-hype and futurist speculation. And this is undoubtedly one of the important and necessary objectives of science education. But even if we grant this, the comments demonstrate something of a dismissive response to the question of robot rights and its relative importance (or lack thereof) in current research programs. Even when taking a more measured and less polemic approach, as Winfield did in a blog post from February of 2007, the “rights question” is, if not dismissed, then indefinitely delayed by being put aside or pushed off into an indeterminate future.', 'Ok, let’s get real. Do I think robots will have (human) rights within 20–50 years? No, I do not. Or to put it another way, I think the likelihood is so small as to be negligible. Why? Because the technical challenges of moving from insect-level robot intelligence, which is more or less where we are now, to human-level intelligence are so great. Do I think robots will ever have rights? Well, perhaps. In principle I don’t see why not. Imagine sentient robots, able to fully engage in discourse with humans, on art, philosophy, mathematics; robots able to empathi[z]e or express opinions; robots with hopes, or dreams. Think of Data from Star Trek. It is possible to imagine robots smart, eloquent and persuasive enough to be able to argue their case but, even so, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that robot emancipation would be rapid, or straightforward. After all, even though the rights of man as now generally understood were established over 200 years ago, human rights are still by no means universally respected or upheld. Why should it be any easier for robots? (Winfield 2007).', 'In this post, Winfield does not dismiss the concept of robot rights per se, but comes at it directly. In the short term (20–50 years), it appears to be, if not impossible, then at least highly improbable. In the long run, it may be something that is, in principle at least, not impossible. This possibility, however, is projected into a distant hypothetical future on the basis of the more exclusive Will Theory of rights, i.e., that robots would be “smart, eloquent and persuasive enough to be able to argue their case.” The question concerning robot rights, therefore, is not “unthinkable”; it is just unlikely and practically not worth the effort at this particular point in time. As Holland had succinctly stated it during the press briefing, “it’s really premature I think to discuss robot rights” (Randerson 2007).', 'A similar decision is operationalized in the official response issued by the Foundation for Responsible Robotics to the European Parliament’s recently published recommendations to the European Commission concerning robots and AI (Committee on Legal Affairs 2016): “Some of the wording in the document is disappointingly based on Science Fiction. Notions of robot rights and robot citizenship are really a distraction from the main thrust of the document that only served to catch the wrong type of media attention” (Sharkey and Fosch-Villaronga 2017). Likewise, Luciano Floridi (2017, 4) suggests that thinking and talking about the “counterintuitive attribution of rights” to robots is a distraction from the serious work of philosophy. “It may be fun,” Floridi (2017, 4) writes, “to speculate about such questions, but it is also distracting and irresponsible, given the pressing issues we have at hand. The point is not to decide whether robots will qualify someday as a kind of persons, but to reali[z]e that we are stuck within the wrong conceptual framework. The digital is forcing us to rethink new solutions for new forms of agency. While doing so we must keep in mind that the debate is not about robots but about us, who will have to live with them, and about the kind of infosphere and societies we want to create. We need less science fiction and more philosophy.” According to Floridi, it might be fun to speculate about things like robot rights, but this kind of playful thinking is a distraction from the real work that needs to be done and quite possibly is an irresponsible waste of time and effort that should be spent on more serious philosophical endeavors.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-IpSh-Neg-Indiana-Doubles.docx

Michigan

IpSh

d6be48797e894e081a0389fd0b7b69ec50f2d046496983fe55286de8bfb3c054

It solves every impact.

Mark Helprin 15. Senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, 6/22/15,”Indefensible Defense”,

warf in the Mid East e m p s pathogens and terrorism w lead to world war military will determine security deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus tech ascendance presage superiority in mass industrial 20th-century warfare the d i b fail to deter wars

Continual warf are in the Mid dle East a nuclear Iran e m p weapon s emerging pathogens and terrorism involving w eapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States these are phenomena that we are equipped to face are the currents that lead to world war . how we approach the strength of the American military , the nuclear calculus China, and Russia will determine the security and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense , all else rests . even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus . In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s tech nological ascendance presage superiority in mass industrial 20th-century warfare Subtract the the d efense i ndustrial b ase we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose

warf are in the Mid dle East a nuclear Iran e m p s emerging pathogens and terrorism threaten the United States equipped to face lead to world war China, and Russia will determine the security THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR provide for defense all else rests the deterrence of war reliance on surplus ascendance presage superiority in mass industrial 20th-century warfare the d i b we will fail deter wars

['Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose. ', '']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoYa-Neg-ada-Round-6.docx

Emory

LoYa